

## Chapter 1

### Cosmopolitanism in the Age of Globalization

On the morning of February 24, 2006, the Japanese archipelago resounded with excitement, joy, and pride. At the Turin Winter Olympics, Arakawa Shizuka, representing Japan, won a gold medal in the women's figure skating singles. More than 40 percent of Japanese households with televisions turned into the live-broadcasting to witness the moment Arakawa received a gold medal and sang the national anthem.<sup>1</sup> I was watching the broadcast myself and, I admit, was moved by Arakawa's outstanding performance that made her, as the broadcaster put it, "the first Asian woman who won a gold medal in the history of Olympic figure skating!"<sup>2</sup> The event also excited me for a totally different reason: I realized that I could use it as a kind of "natural experiment" to probe Japanese youth's national identities and understandings of national groups—what I was studying in Japan at the time.

On the morning after, I went to Ms. Kojima's second-grade classroom at Ueoka Elementary School. While I was setting up a portable chair in the back of the classroom, several students came up to me and, as usual, surrounded my chair. Since I began participant observation in Ms. Kojima's classroom in June 2005 as a part of my fieldwork,

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<sup>1</sup> *Nihon Keizai Shinbun* on 28 February 2006.

<sup>2</sup> *Nihon Hōsō Kyōkai*, Turin Olympics live-broadcasting on 24 February 2006.

it had become my routine to chat with students before *asanokai*, a morning homeroom meeting. On that morning there was a set of questions that I wanted to explore with second graders. So I began, asking, “Do you know who won a gold medal?” The students who surrounded me grinned and shouted “Arakawa!” I nodded. Of course they knew. Television, radio, and newspapers were full of the news. I continued, “Now, tell me which makes you happier: when a Japanese skater like Arakawa wins, or when a foreign skater wins?” The students broke into laughter and looked at me as if I were out of my mind. They yelled, “Of course, when a Japanese skater wins!” “Yeah!” “Mr. Saito, why do you always ask such a weird question?!”

Waving my hands up and down, I gestured to them to calm down, “Okay, okay. But why? Why do you feel happier when a Japanese skater wins?” Again, the students laughed and yelled, “Why not?” “It’s natural!” “Because she is Japanese and I am Japanese!” “We are Japanese!” I nodded. Their answers made sense: their identifications with Japan would make them feel that they were part of the admirable accomplishment of the gold medalist representing Japan. They felt excited, happy, and proud for Arakawa because she was a member of their own imagined community, Japan.

Thanking them for answering my “weird” questions, I was about to turn off my digital voice recorder when Shino, one of the students who gathered around me, said, “But...” I paused and looked at her. Shino continued, “I feel sorry for Slutskaya. She was very good. She was called ‘queen’. But she never won a gold medal. She really wanted to win. But she didn’t. I kind of wish she won (*katasete agetakatta*).” Two other girls next to her nodded and said, “Yeah, I’m sorry for her, too...” Face to face with the girls, I also nodded, not in agreement, but in amazement. Shino expressed her identification with

Irina Slutskaya, the Russian figure skater, perhaps if not as much as with Arakawa, in the context of the Olympic Games, presumably the quintessential occasion of national effervescence.

Yet this was not the first time I encountered a Japanese student who expressed some kind of attachment to the non-Japanese. Over the course of my fieldwork I recurrently ran into students who expressed attachment to people and objects of foreign nationalities. Clearly, attachments to foreigners were not isolated incidents. Neither were they limited to the children and adolescents that I studied. The nationally representative survey that Nihon Hōsō Kyōkai (NHK) conducted in 2003 showed that more than 80 percent of Japanese between age 16 and 19 expressed their desire to have many foreigner friends and participate in activities to help people in developing countries (NHK Broadcasting Culture Institute 2004: 127). Thus students like Shino who extended their attachments beyond Japan were not an anomaly among contemporary Japanese youth.

This extension of attachment beyond national borders baffled me at first because it contradicted the presumed hegemony of nationalism as an organizing principle of the modern world (Gellner 1997). Nationalism is an essentialist cultural formation that defines the world as being naturally “divided into nations, each with its own character, history and destiny” (Smith 2001: 21) and dictates that people should be “members of one and only one nation” (Calhoun 1997: 18). Under the purview of nationalism, people are supposed to confine attachments within their ascribed and essentialized national group. So the extension of attachments beyond Japan that I witnessed during my fieldwork could not be subsumed under nationalism. What exactly is this phenomenon?

## **Cosmopolitanism in a Global World**

I suggest that the phenomenon is a part of what social theorists call “cosmopolitanism.” In the past, philosophers, such as the Stoics and Immanuel Kant, discussed cosmopolitanism as a normative ideal of allegiance to humanity-as-a-whole (Nussbaum 1996, 1997). The ensuing debate among social theorists, however, takes a different approach to cosmopolitanism. Unlike philosophers, social theorists conceptualize cosmopolitanism as an empirical phenomenon, specifically as an orientation of openness to foreign others and cultures, against a backdrop of globalization (Beck 2004; Hannerz 1990). Although social theorists continue to use the same word “cosmopolitanism” as philosophers did in the past, they use it to conceptualize an empirical phenomenon, not a normative ideal, emerging under a new historical condition of globalization.

When social theorists speak of “cosmopolitanism,” they have mostly in mind the subjective dimension of globalization; however, their definition of cosmopolitanism as the subjective dimension is more focused than simply the intensification of awareness of the world as a whole in the existent literature on globalization (Guillén 2001; Robertson 1992). They specify cosmopolitanism as an orientation of openness to foreign others and cultures, building on a foundational definition of cosmopolitanism that Ulf Hannerz proposed: “[It] is first of all an orientation, a willingness to engage with the Other. It is an intellectual and aesthetic stance of openness toward divergent cultural experiences” (1990: 239). Ulrich Beck, arguably the most prominent social theorist of cosmopolitanism, has elaborated the concept further as an experiential horizon of “dialogical imagination” that denotes

the *internalized* otherness of others... the ability to see oneself from the viewpoint of those who are culturally other—as well as to practise this within one’s own experiential space through the imaginative crossing of boundaries (2004: 153).

Cosmopolitanism is thus defined as a psychological disposition of being open to cultural others and willing to engage in dialogue with them and transform one’s perspective and sense of the self.

Beck has also proposed a causal link, albeit a vague one, between cosmopolitanism and quotidian reality of globalization that he calls “internalized globalization” (Beck 2002). By “internalized globalization” Beck means more or less the same as what Roland Robertson means by “glocalization” (1995): a transformation of local cultural practices through incorporation of foreign cultural objects and idioms. Cosmopolitanism emerges among ordinary people as the result of changes in their practices of everyday life that is comprised increasingly of foreign cultural objects and idioms (Osler and Starkey 2003; Skrbis, Kendall, and Woodward 2004; Tomlinson 2002). Moreover, this circulation of cultural objects and idioms across national borders is driven mostly by mass media (Appadurai 1996), i.e. by “print capitalism” that once played a decisive role in the formation of national communities (Anderson 1991). As Bruce Robbins suggests:

If people can get as emotional as [Benedict] Anderson says they do about relations with fellow nationals they never see face-to-face, then now that print capitalism has become... so clearly transnational, it would be strange if people did *not* get emotional in much the same way, if not necessarily to the same degree, about others who are *not* fellow nationals (1998: 7).

As print capitalism, a cultural technology constitutive of imagining a community, began to circulate cultural idioms and objects across national borders and enable people to imagine beyond the nation, social theorists expect that the way humans think and feel

about the world also changes. Cosmopolitanism, openness to foreign others and cultures, is the psychological effect of the environmental change characterized as “globalization”—more specifically, “cultural globalization,” a change of a semiotic and discursive environment within which people develop psychological schemas and identities. What distinguishes social theorists of cosmopolitanism from theorists of globalization is the former’s focus on a new form of subjectivity.

Cosmopolitanism as a new form of subjectivity is different from internationalism and transnationalism. Internationalism began to develop in the nineteenth century as a political doctrine to extend solidarity beyond national borders (Cheah 2006). While this definition of internationalism is similar to that of cosmopolitanism, internationalism is fundamentally a polity-centered concept. Unlike internationalism, cosmopolitanism in the sense of openness to foreign others and cultures is a “structure of feeling” (Williams 1977) that operates in ordinary people without a consciously-formulated political doctrine. Cosmopolitanism is also considered different from transnationalism. While the latter concerns only immigrants, the former does not. Social and emotional ties to co-ethnics or co-nationals in their native lands that immigrants retain are transnational in the sense that they traverse national borders (Portes 2001; Levitt and Jaworsky 2007); however, such ties are not necessarily cosmopolitan in the sense of being open to foreign others and cultures (Roudometof 2005). The concept of cosmopolitanism refers to openness to foreign others and cultures mainly in *non-immigrant* populations who are not transnational. Cosmopolitanism can emerge among ordinary people because their life-worlds are being penetrated by foreign others and cultures. A novel feature of social theory of cosmopolitanism is the focus on psychological orientations of such non-

immigrant populations who have been hitherto regarded as unproblematically “*homo nationalis*” (Balibar 2005).<sup>3</sup>

Although this causal relationship between globalization and cosmopolitanism sounds reasonable, I argue that a causal mechanism and process are still underspecified. Apparently, being in the culturally globalized environment does not automatically make everyone cosmopolitan. Then, how does the environmental change (globalization) lead to the psychological change (cosmopolitanism) among some people, but not others? What mechanisms mediate the presumed causal relationship between the two? The dissertation takes on these questions by focusing on education as a premier causal mechanism and process that mediates the relationship between globalization and cosmopolitanism.

### **Education and Youth: Mechanism and Process**

The focus on education is not arbitrary. Sociologists, both functionalists (Durkheim 1956; Gellner 1997) and institutionalists (Thomas, Meyer, Ramirez, and Boli 1987; Meyer, Kamens, and Beavot 1992), consider education as a premier organizational vehicle of nation-building. In countries with mass schooling, people spend a substantial amount of time inside schools during the first eighteen years or so of their lives. At school people learn not only cognitive models of how the social world works but

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<sup>3</sup> In a way, “cosmopolitanism,” defined as an orientation of openness to foreign others and cultures, encompasses both internationalism and transnationalism if the latter are understood as different articulations of cosmopolitanism within different populations under different historical conditions. Internationalism was present among activists and intellectuals from the mid-nineteenth century onward against the backdrop of consolidation of national states. Transnationalism has been present among immigrants since the onset of globalization in the second half of the twentieth century. While cosmopolitanism that social theorists speak of is coextensive with transnationalism because both are driven by globalization, the former is present among non-immigrants.

also normative models of how the social world should look like. While mass media play an important role in globalization of the cultural environment, the education system is still the most important producer and distributor of cognitive and normative models of the world that are considered to be true and legitimate. People make sense of their surroundings and go about their daily activities by relying on such models of the social world. Cognitive and normative models of the social world the education system promotes therefore mediate how people respond to globalization, depending on whether these models are favorable or unfavorable for cosmopolitanism. To better understand the causal relationship between globalization and cosmopolitanism, it is necessary to unpack how the education system provides people with models of what is happening in a global world and how they should think, feel, and act in it.

Studying the education system also sheds light on youth. In the past developmental psychologists and political scientists argued that attitudes toward national groups developed during primary-education years (Piaget and Weil 1951; Hess and Torney 1967). A stage in life course when people are enrolled in the education system, especially primary education, overlaps with a stage in human development when people acquire a certain way of thinking and feeling about the social world in terms of national groups. Before the onset of globalization, humans had a relatively straightforward developmental trajectory as homo nationalis: at an early age they secured stable attachment to their ascribed nations. Now that the cultural environment circulates foreign people and cultural objects extensively, “youth” cannot be taken for granted as human actors who are in the process of securing attachment to their ascribed nations. In fact, today’s youth are situated on the frontier of globalization both culturally and human-



developmentally. Given that they encounter people and objects of multiple nationalities on a daily basis, how do they develop their thinking and feeling about their ascribed nations and beyond? This additional focus on youth can help clarify a process of how cosmopolitanism as a psychological orientation develops over the course of life in the globalized cultural environment.

Thus the dissertation aims to contribute to the incipient study of cosmopolitanism in two ways. First, it tries to clarify the presumed causal relationship between globalization and cosmopolitanism by studying a mediating role of the education system. Social theorists of cosmopolitanism tend to give the impression that cosmopolitanism is an inevitable outcome of living in the globalized cultural environment, for they have not theorized causal mechanisms that connect or disconnect globalization and cosmopolitanism. Second, the dissertation tries to clarify a human-developmental process of cosmopolitanism. No one is born cosmopolitan. Rather, one becomes cosmopolitan. Yet social theorists of cosmopolitanism have not probed how a person acquires a psychological orientation of openness to foreign others and cultures, given the general tendency in social theory to assume actors as fully-developed adults (Corsaro 1997; Stephens 1995). Combining focuses on education and youth, the dissertation explores causal mechanisms and processes that mediate the relationship between globalization and cosmopolitanism.

### **Finding Cosmopolitanism in Japan**

To examine the mediating role of education in the causal relationship between globalization and cosmopolitanism, as well as to clarify the process of development of

cosmopolitanism in youth, I conducted fieldwork in Mikawa City, Japan, from May 2005 through March 2006. The total population of the city was about 360,000 at the time of my fieldwork. The city is located more or less in the middle of the main island of Japan. The main industry of the city is manufacturing. Many factories and companies that produce various car parts are located in the city, since the headquarters of a major Japanese car company are located nearby.

I chose Mikawa City, Japan, as a fieldwork site for two reasons. One was that not only Mikawa City but Japan as a whole could offer a novel case for developing social theory of cosmopolitanism further. Even though the theory is presented as generally applicable across the world, the reality is that it was developed mostly by European social theorists in the context of European integration. Adding a new, non-European case study can help broaden a scope of social theory of cosmopolitanism, as well as discover hitherto-unknown historical and human-developmental pathways to cosmopolitanism outside the European context. Another reason was simply logistical. Japanese schools are generally reluctant to let an outsider in. This reluctance was magnified in recent years because of a few high-profile incidents where strangers intruded into schools and killed students and teachers. Moreover, I wanted to embed myself in schools for nearly a year. While Japanese schools regularly have visiting teachers and researchers from outside for a day, they are not at all used to having an outsider for an extended period of time. In fact my request to conduct research was initially turned down by the Japanese sister city of Ann Arbor, Michigan. The city official cited school principals' unwillingness to let a stranger into their schools. Given these logistical difficulties, I thought that schools in my hometown would be my best bet because I was not completely an "outsider" to them.

When I sent and faxed my request to schools in Mikawa City in December 2004, they promptly accepted my research proposal.

The day after I arrived in my hometown on May 10, 2005, I visited Ueoka Elementary and Junior High Schools. I met with principals and teachers who were in charge of school activities, and we decided on details of my research activities inside the schools. Ueoka Elementary and Junior High Schools are located within about half a mile from each another. Approximately, 600 and 360 students were enrolled in the respective schools. The schools are situated on the suburban-rural borderline, the south edge of Mikawa City. Both schools are public. In Mikawa City, the public schools that students attend are automatically determined by their residence. As a result, the three schools have students of heterogeneous class backgrounds living in the same neighborhood; however, the majority of students enrolled in the schools come from working- and lower-middle-class families. Many of their parents have blue-color and white-color jobs at factories and companies in automobile-related industries. The number of students from middle- and upper-middle class families is small. While I was making arrangements for my research at the elementary and junior high schools, my cousin introduced me to his former adviser at Karitani University of Education. The university is located in Owari City, about 14 kilometers northwest of Mikawa City. Almost all teachers in elementary and junior high schools in Mikawa City are graduates of the university. After meeting with my cousin's former adviser, I established contact with another professor at the university who specialized in social studies education, and I became a guest member of his study group. These two professors helped me conduct a study of college students.

By the end of May I established a routine of my fieldwork. Two days a week I visited classrooms in second and sixth grades at Ueoka Elementary School. My typical day started with walking to the school with students living nearby my house. In Mikawa City, as well as in many parts of Japan, students who live close to one another form groups and walk to schools together every day. While walking together, we typically talked about popular television programs, video games, upcoming school events, and so on. Around eight o'clock we reached the school, and I went to a classroom where I was scheduled to visit on the day. I stayed in a classroom until students were done for the day and walked home with them. During the daytime I not only observed lessons but also participated in activities during a school lunch, a clean-up, and a recess. Once a week I did more or less the same routine in classrooms in eighth grade at Ueoka Junior High School. I visited Karitani University of Education less often, once every three weeks, to conduct surveys and interviews with college juniors and seniors, observe classes, and participate in seminars. Then in July I modified my routine by adding a weekly visit to Ueoka Nursery School. After I found out that second graders could already express their thinking and feeling about Japan vis-à-vis other countries, I decided to probe even younger children. So I asked Ueoka Nursery School, in which I had been enrolled myself when I was a child, to allow me to conduct interviews and participant observation. The nursery was less than 500 meters away from Ueoka Elementary School. 100 preschoolers were enrolled, and their class backgrounds were comparable to those of Ueoka Elementary and Junior High Schools. At the nursery I stayed in classrooms from the beginning of the school day to the end, playing, talking, eating, and napping with preschoolers. In short, I typically spent four days a week, rotating among Ueoka Nursery

School, second- and sixth-grade classrooms at Ueoka Elementary School, and eighth-grade classrooms at Ueoka Junior High School, while visiting Karitani University of Education once every three weeks. I continued this routine until March 2005, the end of the Japanese school year when I concluded my fieldwork.

Thus the data I collected are cross-sectional. I studied five different age groups of students (preschool, second, sixth and eighth grades, and college) at the same time. In the following chapters, however, I interpret the data to suggest longitudinal arguments when reasonable. Such approximation of longitudinal trajectories based on cross-sectional data is reasonable when “cohort and period effects are *known*, or known to be nonexistence” (Mason and Fienberg 1985: 59). In the present study period effects are roughly known: all students participated in the study during the same period when the cultural environment was increasingly global. Cohort effects are more difficult to specify, however, because there is no clear-cut way to group the five different age groups into cohorts. At one extreme, the five age groups can be identified as a single cohort of students who grew up in the equally global cultural environment. This way, any differences between the five age groups would be interpreted as effects of age (e.g. effects of different stages of psychological development). At the other extreme, the five age groups can be regarded as five different cohorts where effects of globalization were inversely additive: the younger students were, the more immersed they were in the global cultural environment. The inversely additive effects of globalization probably hold even when the five age groups are bundled into cohorts somewhat differently (e.g. preschool

and second grade as one cohort, sixth and eighth grades as another, and college).<sup>4</sup> This way, if some of differences between the five age groups cannot be explained simply by the inversely additive effects of globalization, they would be interpreted as effects of age.

In the dissertation I assume the inversely additive effects of globalization because this assumption is more realistic than grouping the five age groups as a single cohort. The assumption is also consistent with what I saw during my fieldwork: younger students were more “native” to the global cultural environment. At the same time, however, I noticed clear age differences in terms of psychological development. Throughout the dissertation, then, I interpret differences between the five age groups in terms of some forms of interactions between effects of cohort and age, i.e. the inversely additive effects of globalization and effects of different stages of psychological development. The dissertation thus presents how two different modes of temporal processes—history and human development—are intertwined through the mediation of the education system.

### **Multi-method Approach to Cosmopolitanism**

In addition to survey and ethnographic data on students, I collected additional data on past education policies and school curricula and contemporary textbooks. The different kinds of data were necessary because the dissertation’s main question required data on both the cultural-environmental change (globalization) and the new psychological orientation (cosmopolitanism). Historical and semiotic data on the Japanese education system and practices help contextualize survey and ethnographic data on students’ psychological orientations. Accordingly, the dissertation consists of four substantive

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<sup>4</sup> In demography a cohort constructed based on cross-sectional data is called “synthetic cohort” (Mason and Fienberg 1985).

chapters that use different methods and data step by step to examine mechanisms and processes through which globalization causes cosmopolitanism through the mediation of the education system.

To contextualize findings of the fieldwork, the next chapter provides a historical analysis of Japanese education after World War II. The goal of Chapter 2 is to understand the trajectory of Japanese education leading up to the beginning of the twentieth-first century when the present study took place. The historical analysis shows that normative cosmopolitanism in the sense of commitment to humankind was institutionalized in Japanese education in the aftermath of World War II and influenced later education debates, policies, and curriculum changes in response to perceived realities of globalization. That is, in Japan the institutionalization of normative cosmopolitanism preceded the increasing circulation of foreign people and objects across national borders. Because of the prior prominence of normative cosmopolitanism in the education system, recent education reforms in response to globalization have retained a strong idealist tone. At the same time, however, globalization has rearticulated the meaning of normative cosmopolitanism. In the contemporary Japanese education system, normative cosmopolitanism in the new sense of traversing national borders through social and emotional ties with foreign peoples is added on to the original sense of transcending national differences in the name of humanity.

Chapter 3 examines how normative cosmopolitanism at the system level is translated into textbooks and lessons. I first discourse-analyze textbooks in social studies that were used at Ueoka Elementary and Junior High Schools. I focus on social studies because the subject provides students with explicit cognitive and normative models of the

social world. The discourse analysis reveals two important features of textbooks in social studies. One is the emphasis on the interdependency among peoples and countries in the world. Another is the emphasis on the importance of attachment to foreign peoples and countries. That is, textbooks of social studies circulate a cognitive model of the interdependent world and normative model of attachment across national borders. I then show how these cognitive and normative models in textbooks of social studies are embedded in moral education, the most important element of Japanese education. In daily practices of moral education, students learn that humans are fundamentally interdependent with one another and that attachment to the other (e.g. in the form of empathy and solidarity) is foundational to being human. The logic of moral education reinforces normative cosmopolitanism taught in social studies.

Historical and discourse analyses in Chapters 2 and 3 thus illustrate the Japanese education system as a mechanism that channels effects of globalization through its persistent commitment to normative cosmopolitanism. The next two chapters examine psychological effects of globalization mediated by such an education system. Chapter 4 reports results of survey interviews that probed attachments that Japanese students felt toward Japan vis-à-vis foreign countries. Compared to previous studies, the percentage of those who expressed attachment to foreign countries was significantly higher. This finding indicates that cosmopolitanism in the empirical sense of being open to foreign others and cultures increased its presence, and that the development of attachment to one's ascribed national group did not have to follow a linear trajectory. Chapter 5 continues to examine psychological effects of globalization, focusing on cognitive models of attachments. Results of survey interviews show that when students perceived



an individual categorically, they thought that the individual could belong to only one national group. When students perceived an individual relationally, i.e. in terms of his attachments or ties that traversed national borders, they thought that the individual could belong to more than one national group. This indicates that some students' understanding of the social world was moving away from nationalism that bounded a person's attachment to a single nation toward cosmopolitanism that unbounded it.

While the data I present in Chapters 4 and 5 are cross-sectional, they offer interesting implications for a process of development of cosmopolitanism over the course of life. The first implication is that cosmopolitanism deepens over the course of life. When explaining their answers, older students tended to express more serious attachment to foreign countries and be more aware of various factors that could influence an individual's attachment. The second implication is a disjunction between emotional and cognitive aspects of cosmopolitanism. Chapter 4 shows that attachments to foreign countries peaked in sixth and eighth grades and subsided in college. In contrast, Chapter 5 shows that the percentage of students who subscribed to a cosmopolitan cognitive model of attachment, which allowed a person to feel attached to more than one national group, increased consistently from elementary school through college. This implies that while older students were more likely to be cosmopolitan cognitively, they were less likely to be cosmopolitan emotionally. Put somewhat differently, older students more readily recognized that there were people who would feel attached to multiple national groups, but they did not feel the same for themselves.

Thus multi-method analyses in Chapters 2 through 5 show how the education system operates as a mechanism that mediates the causal relationship between

globalization and cosmopolitanism and how a process of development of cosmopolitanism may occur across different age groups. Chapter 6 then concludes the dissertation by suggesting further research questions on cosmopolitanism based on the case study of Japanese education and youth. In a way the dissertation is a first step in a series of continuing efforts to “discover, map and understand the Cosmopolitan Condition” (Beck and Sznaider 2006: 3).

## **Chapter 2**

### **A Genealogy of Normative Cosmopolitanism in Japanese Education**

As I mentioned in Chapter 1, the educational system plays a crucial role in channeling effects of globalization on human subjectivity. This is because the education system is the most prominent distributor of legitimate cognitive and normative models of the social world. Psychological effects of globalization cannot bypass the mediation of the education system. For example, if the education system circulates only nationalist models of the social world—where it is natural and normative for a person to develop attachment only to his or her ascribed nation—it is likely to keep people from developing cosmopolitanism. In fact, for a long time sociologists understood the education system as a quintessential state apparatus that disseminates such nationalist models of the social world.

In recent years, however, researchers began to reexamine the nature of the education system against a backdrop of globalization. Most researchers agree that the idea of “humanity” is gaining greater emphasis in the education system than before, as more and more education-policy discourses and school curricula incorporate the supranational idea of “humanity” as a fundamental principle of organizing identities, practices, and institutions (Benavot and Braslavsky 2007; Coulby and Zambeta 2005;

Schissler and Soysal 2004). In other words, “normative cosmopolitanism” in the sense of commitment to humanity is gaining ground in the education system.

Yet the idea of “humanity” or normative cosmopolitanism did not appear in education only recently but when the United Nations (UN) organizations were established after World War II. Especially the United Nations Educational, Cultural, and Scientific Organization (UNESCO) promoted school curricula and educational programs for international understandings and world peace. The reason the idea of “humanity” in education did not catch researchers’ attention until recently is that education-policy and curriculum discourses were dominated by another concept that the UN organizations legitimized: “nation.” New states came into existence en masse after World War II, and they adopted the format of the education system as a means of nation-building (Meyer 1999; Meyer, Kamens, and Benavot 1992). The importance of “nation” as a unit of organizing identities, practices, and institutions eclipsed that of “humanity.” As perceived realities of globalization heightened at the end of the twentieth century, however, the idea of “humanity” came out of the shadow of “nation.” The education system no longer looks like a quintessential vehicle of nation-building because of the increasing presence of normative cosmopolitanism.

This chapter examines the case of Japan in light of the recent studies of normative cosmopolitanism in education. The first question is simply whether and how normative cosmopolitanism has been incorporated into the Japanese education system. Studies of Japanese education (Hein and Selden 2000; Lincicome 2005; Shibata 2005) give the impression that conservative politicians have collaborated with the Ministry of Education (MOE) to keep school curricula and textbooks decidedly nationalistic throughout the

postwar period. Does this mean that the worldwide diffusion of normative cosmopolitanism failed to penetrate into Japanese education? If not, how did the Japanese education system adopt and adapt normative cosmopolitanism in its education policies and curricula? These questions are important because they can shed light on how the Japanese education system mediates psychological effects of globalization. If the Japanese education system promoted nationalism relentlessly, it must have curtailed the development of cosmopolitanism in students. If the Japanese educational system promoted normative cosmopolitanism, it could have facilitated it. This chapter begins to unpack the working of the Japanese educational system as a mediator of the causal relationship between globalization and cosmopolitanism.

Below, I analyze a history of the Japanese education from the end of World War II through the beginning of the twenty-first century when the present study took place. I take the end of World War II as a starting point because that was when normative cosmopolitanism began to be institutionalized through the UN organizations. How the Japanese education system responded to the institutional diffusion of normative cosmopolitanism in the past has a decisive influence on how it organizes policies and curricula in response to globalization in the present. The following historical analysis is based on three kinds of data. The first data are laws that determined legal parameters of the Japanese education system. The second are school curricula specified in the Course of Study issued by the MOE. The third are discussions by policymakers, i.e. politicians, bureaucrats, policy advisers, and educators, with regard to laws and school curricula. These discussions are documented in newspapers, parliamentary proceedings,

recommendations prepared by advisory councils and committees, and memos and reports published by the MOE.

Before proceeding to the history of postwar Japanese education, let me describe briefly what the education system was like before World War II. In 1871 the Meiji government established the MOE to administer all educational activities within the territory of the Japanese state. The education system as a state apparatus of nation-building consolidated in the 1880s. While drafting the Imperial Constitution, the Meiji government decided that education policies should be determined through imperial rescripts and directives, not subjected to the Constitution and the Imperial Diet. The Meiji government also issued “The Imperial Rescript on Education” in the name of the emperor in 1890. The Imperial Rescript defined the central goal of Japanese education as moral education of “imperial subjects (*shinmin*)” who “in a time of crisis shall bravely and loyally shoulder the divine imperial destiny.”<sup>5</sup> In the following decades the Japanese state continued to tighten its grip on the education system. When Japan entered war with China in 1937, the government enacted the Law of Total Mobilization of the National Spirit in an attempt to mobilize the population for the war. In 1940 the Imperial Aid Association was created to subsume all existing economic, political, and civic associations for the purpose of the total mobilization of the population. As Japan opened another war front with the United States in December 1941, all education activities became subordinated completely to the execution of the war. Toward the end of World War II, air raids by the United States military and shortage of food as well as other resources paralyzed infrastructures in Japan, including schools. After the atom bombings of Hiroshima and

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<sup>5</sup> “*Kyōiku ni kansuru chokugo*” on October 30, 1890, reprinted in *Gakusei hyakunenshi*, Vol. 2 (MOE 1972: 11).

Nagasaki on August 6 and 9, 1945, and the entry of the U.S.S.R in war with Japan on August 8, the Japanese military government was finally ready to surrender.

### **Introduction of Normative Cosmopolitanism, 1945-1947**

On August 14, 1945, Japan surrendered to the Allied Powers led by the United States. For Japanese political leaders at that time, the most important goal was to maintain the extant emperor-centered national polity (*kokutai*). On the following day after Shōwa Emperor announced Japan's unconditional surrender to the Allied Powers, the MOE issued instructions that commanded teachers to commit themselves resolutely to the "maintenance of the national polity according to the sacred pronouncement of His Majesty."<sup>6</sup> At this point, the MOE had no plan to voluntarily reform the existent education system. When Higashikuniomiya Naruhiko formed a new cabinet on August 17, however, the new prime minister appointed Maeda Tamon as minister of education. Maeda was anomalous for a Japanese policymaker at that time. In his youth, Maeda had been a student of the Japanese-Christian intellectual Nitobe Inazō who became the first under-secretary-general of the League of Nations in 1920. Maeda himself had represented Japan at the International Labour Organization (ILO) in Geneva between 1923 and 1925 and presided over the Museum of Japanese Culture in New York City between 1938 and 1941. In his memoir *Sanshō Seishi* (1947), Maeda recounted fondly these overseas experiences as formative of his views and aspirations as an educator.

On September 15, under Maeda's leadership the MOE issued "The Educational Principles for Building New Japan." The document consisted of a preamble and eleven

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<sup>6</sup> "Monbushō kunrei" on August 15, 1945, reprinted in *Sengo nihon kyōiku shiryō shūsei, Vol. 1* (San'ichi Shobō 1982: 27).

articles that redefined purposes of Japanese education. As stated in the preamble, the MOE declared that

for the purpose of building new Japan that should contribute to world peace and welfare of humanity, we must strive to eliminate the extant education policies that were subordinated to warfare and, instead, we must implement education policies to build foundations of the cultural and ethical national state.<sup>7</sup>

For the first time since the Meiji Restoration, contributing to “world peace” and “humankind” was defined as a purpose of Japanese education. Maeda’s extensive experiences of working in international settings influenced the MOE to introduce normative cosmopolitanism as a key educational ideal of “new Japan.” Nonetheless, the first article of “The Educational Principles for Building New Japan” document also insisted on the “maintenance of the national polity.” Maeda still held onto the idea of the emperor as the inviolable foundation of Japanese education, no matter how normative cosmopolitanism should be embraced to eliminate what he condemned as “militarism and extreme, narrow-minded nationalism.”<sup>8</sup>

The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) did not share Maeda’s inclination to preserve education as a vehicle of the national polity. Having arrived at Yokohama on August 28, the SCAP was keen to eliminate militarist-nationalist ideologies and promote democracy. On October 31, the SCAP issued a directive to expel militarist teachers immediately from schools. On December 31, the SCAP suspended teaching of moral education and Japanese history and geography, which had played a crucial role in promoting nationalism in prewar Japan. The SCAP’s pursuit of

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<sup>7</sup> “*Shin nihon kensetsu no tameno kyōiku hōshin*” on September 15, 1945, reprinted in *Sengo nihon kyōiku shiryō shūsei, Vol. 1*, pp.121-122.

<sup>8</sup> Speech by Maeda Tamon at the ministerial workshop sometime in October 1945, reprinted in *ibid.*, p.122.



demilitarization eventually caught up with Maeda on January 4, 1946, when it issued a directive to expel militarists from public offices. According to the directive, Maeda was defined as a “militarist” since he had taken part in the Imperial Aid Association that had lent support to the wartime government. Maeda resigned from his office on January 10.

Abe Yoshinari, the principal of the prestigious First High School in Tokyo, became the next minister of education. During Abe’s tenure, the United States Education Mission, which consisted of twenty-seven American educators (mostly university professors), came to Japan on March 5, 1946. During the next two weeks the Mission met with officers of the Civil Information and Education Section (part of the SCAP) and their Japanese counterparts selected by the MOE, and they discussed ways to transform the Japanese education system. On March 30, the Mission submitted the “Report of the United States Education Mission to Japan” to the SCAP. As the Report underlined “liberalism” and “democracy” in its introduction, these two ideals were defined as foundational to education reforms (US Education Mission to Japan 1946: 1-6). On April 7, General MacArthur released the Report with his enthusiastic approval. For the rest of the Occupation, the Report served as a basis of education reforms for both American and Japanese policymakers (Tsuchimochi 1993).

Soon after the release of the Report, political chaos ensued. When the first general election was held on April 10, the Liberal Party led by Hatoyama Ichiro won the largest number of seats in the Imperial Diet. Then the SCAP intervened and banned him from assuming public office because they thought of him as a militarist. When Yoshida Shigeru finally emerged as a prime minister on May 22, Abe resigned and recommended Tanaka Kōtarō, whom Maeda had appointed as a bureau chief within the MOE, as his

successor. Yoshida accepted Abe's recommendation. For a policymaker at that time Tanaka was as anomalous as Maeda. Tanaka had been a law professor at Tokyo University and specialized in "world law," the comparative study of laws across civilizations to uncover their common moral foundations. Tanaka was also a Roman Catholic. (Because of his research topic and Catholic faith, Tanaka had been blacklisted by the wartime government that banned foreign cultures and languages.)

Since Tanaka believed strongly in the importance of morality, he began to formulate plans to replace the Imperial Rescript on Education that had laid moral foundations of prewar Japanese education. At the meeting of the Committee on Reform of the Imperial Constitution on July 15, Tanaka revealed,

We are in the process of formulating basic ideas for the foundational law of education. Its scope and content are still vague, but the goal of the law is first and foremost to declare fundamental principles of democratic and pacifist education, that is, principles similar to the ones in the preamble of the Constitution.<sup>9</sup>

By the end of September, the MOE had produced the first draft of the Fundamental Law of Education that consisted of eight articles (Sugihara 1983: 260-262). Even after Yoshida did not reappoint Tanaka for the minister of education when he reshuffled his cabinet on January 30, 1947, the MOE continued its work on the draft under the new minister Takahashi Seiichiro, professor of economics at Keio University, and submitted the final draft to the Privy Council for review on March 5.<sup>10</sup> Yoshida's government made one last revision according to the Council's recommendation and submitted a bill of the Fundamental Law of Education to the Imperial Diet on March 12.

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<sup>9</sup> The Imperial Diet Committee on Reform of the Imperial Constitution on July 15, 1946.

<sup>10</sup> These drafts are collected in *Kyoiku kihonhō no seiritsu* (Sugihara 1983: 260-282)

The bill consisted of the preamble and eleven articles, just like the previously issued “The Educational Principles for Building New Japan” during Maeda’s tenure. The preamble defined the purpose of the Law as follows:

We have established the Constitution of Japan and declared our determination to create a democratic and cultured national state and contribute to world peace and welfare of humankind. Realization of this ideal depends fundamentally on the power of education. We shall educate human beings who revere the dignity of the individual as well as seek truth and peace ardently....<sup>11</sup>

The preamble did not define recipients of education as Japanese but “human beings who revere the dignity of the individual.” Although “the Constitution of Japan” implied that the Law was framed in terms of the Japanese state, the preamble emphasized normative cosmopolitanism in terms of contribution to “world peace and welfare of humankind” and education of “human beings.” The Law signaled a radical departure from the prewar education that relentlessly promoted nationalism among students.

Concurrent with the passage of the Law, the MOE issued the Draft Course of Study to provide teachers with curriculum guidelines that translated the Law into more concrete terms. The first chapter of the Draft Course of Study defined “overall objectives of education” concerning four dimensions of human life: individual, family, society, and economy. The MOE elaborated the dimension of “society (*shakai*)” more extensively than the other three. The section on “society” began with the first goal, to “cultivate attitudes to love the whole of humanity, revere liberty and dignity of other persons, forgive others, and respect their opinions,” and ended with the ninth and final goal, to

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<sup>11</sup> Available at a web page of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology: [http://www.mext.go.jp/b\\_menu/kihon/about/index.htm](http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/kihon/about/index.htm) (1 January 2007).

“understand world history, geography, science, arts, morality, and religions, and acquire the spirit conducive to achieving peace in cooperation with the rest of the world.”<sup>12</sup>

While normative cosmopolitanism was institutionalized within the education system, a social movement was also promoting the same ideal. After the UNESCO was established in November 1946, Japanese teachers, educators, and university professors in several cities began to form nongovernmental organizations based on the constitution of the UNESCO. In May 1948 they established the National Federation of the UNESCO Associations in Japan (NFUAJ). Japan joined the UNESCO in June 1951, three months before signing the San Francisco Peace Treaty to regain sovereignty. At the 1951 General Conference of the UNESCO, which approved Japan’s membership, Maeda Tamon as a Japanese representative declared that “the spirit of the UNESCO is the guiding principle for reconstructing Japan as a peaceful, democratic national state.”<sup>13</sup> In the same year the Parliament (reformed and renamed from the Imperial Diet after the new Constitution took effect) passed a law to establish the Japanese National Commission for the UNESCO within the MOE. The objective of the Commission was to promote and advise domestic educational activities that aimed to accomplish objectives of the UNESCO.

In short, during the early years of the Occupation, normative cosmopolitanism came to be institutionalized in the most important document of the Japanese education system: the Fundamental Law of Education. Normative cosmopolitanism was further institutionalized through the Draft Course of Study and the National Commission for the UNESCO. I suggest that this could not have happened without two peculiar institutional

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<sup>12</sup> “Chapter 1: Overall Objectives of Education,” available at <http://www.nicer.go.jp/guideline/old/s22ej/> (1 January 2007).

<sup>13</sup> “History of NFUAJ,” available at <http://www.unesco.jp/contents/about/movement.html> (1 January 2008).

entrepreneurs, Maeda and Tanaka. As Andrew Abbott put it, “individuals are central to history because it is they who are the prime reservoir of historical connection from past to present” (2005: 3). Maeda was an individual reservoir that had preserved the normative cosmopolitanism in his person throughout the war years. When Maeda became the minister of education after the war, he defined normative cosmopolitanism as one of foundational purposes of the postwar education system. Unlike Maeda, Tanaka did not champion normative cosmopolitanism per se, but he was strongly committed to creating some foundational document to define the moral basis of the postwar Japanese education. A chain of actions by Maeda and Tanaka led to the institutionalization of normative cosmopolitanism in the Fundamental Law of Education. Moreover, during the same period, the MOE incorporated the commission for the UNESCO. This meant a tight coupling of education-policy and curriculum discourses between the MOE and the UNESCO, since the commission inside the MOE operated as a channel through which the UNESCO’s recommendations could flow into the Japanese education system. The creation of the NFUAJ also shows that there was a popular support for the UNESCO in Japan at the time. Thus normative cosmopolitanism was not only institutionalized as foundations of the postwar Japanese education system but also enjoyed wide support among a public.

### **Coupling of Normative Cosmopolitanism with Nationalism, 1951-1971**

As the Korean War broke out in June 1950, conservative Japanese policymakers began their effort to rehabilitate nationalism in the education system. The SCAP had already shifted its policies from comprehensive democratization and demilitarization

toward quick remilitarization of Japan as an anti-communist ally in the Far East. In August, given the directive from the SCAP, the Japanese government established the self-defense force called Police Reserve Force. In this process of rebuilding Japan's military capabilities, conservative policymakers thought that Japanese youth should be taught patriotic morals to defend their national state. Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, for example, attacked the postwar education system for failing to "teach youths thoroughly that the history of Japan is unparalleled, and that the Japanese land is the most beautiful in the world, in order to cultivate love of the country (*aikokushin*) among them."<sup>14</sup> As Japan was about to regain its sovereignty in the midst of the escalating Cold War, conservative policymakers aimed to bring back moral education in school curricula as a means to promote patriotism and national identity.

The conservative attempt to rehabilitate nationalism in education gathered force after two conservative parties Liberal Party and Japan Democratic Party merged into the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) on November 15, 1955, and gained a majority in the Parliament. In January 1956, Kiyose Ichirō, the first minister of education under the LDP government openly criticized the Fundamental Law of Education: "the Law connects the individual to the world directly, but it totally lacks a concept of the nation (*kuni*) that mediates the two."<sup>15</sup> On February 8, 1956, the LDP government submitted to the Parliament a proposal to set up an Ad-Hoc Council to consider reforms of the postwar education system. According to the government, the education system was "reformed hastily in the peculiar situation under the Occupation, so that it has more than a few

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<sup>14</sup> *Mainichi Shinbun*, September 1, 1952.

<sup>15</sup> Speech by Kiyose Ichirō aired on the radio on January 2, 1956, transcribed and reprinted in *Sengo nihon kyōiku shiryō shūsei*, Vol. 5 (San'ichi Shobō 1983: 44).

aspects that are incompatible with the reality.”<sup>16</sup> Explaining the government’s proposal, Kiyose argued that he had no problem with the Law except for one: “When I look at the Law, I cannot help wondering, ‘Where on earth is discussion of loyalty to our Japanese nation?’”<sup>17</sup> Although the proposal was passed in the Lower House of the Parliament, it did not have enough time to pass the Upper House during the same session and was automatically rejected. (In Japan bills and proposals automatically expire at the end of a session during which they are submitted to the Parliament, unless legislators vote to extend deliberation on those bills and proposals.) The proposal eventually failed partly because there were other, more urgent bills to discuss and partly because the opposition parties and major newspaper like *Asahi* and *Mainichi* strongly criticized the proposal as a reactionary return to prewar nationalism (Yagi 1984: 128-129).

Instead of trying to reform the Fundamental Law of Education, the LDP turned to more tractable goals. On March 8 the LDP submitted a bill to change the law of boards of education that had been legislated during the Occupation. The reform bill was meant to replace local election of board members with appointment by municipal heads in order to keep socialists, who were backed by teachers unions, from taking control of education boards. While the opposition parties resisted fiercely, the LDP powered through, given that they had a majority. On June 1 the bill was passed in the midst of angry cries and fistfights after five hundred policemen were called in to maintain order in the Parliament. In the same year the MOE under the influence of the LDP government also tightened criteria of textbook inspection in such a way that textbooks would include more positive descriptions about Japanese society and history.

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<sup>16</sup> 24th Parliament Lower House Cabinet Committee on February 8, 1956.

<sup>17</sup> 24th Parliament Lower House Cabinet Committee on February 22, 1956.

This conservative resurgence culminated in 1958 when the MOE issued a new, legally binding (no longer “draft”) Course of Study and reintroduced moral education as the central pillar of the Japanese education system. The new Course of Study stated moral education was based on “fundamental principles of education defined in the Fundamental Law of Education and the Basic Law of School.” In this respect it was no different from the previous Draft Course of the Study. The new Course of the Study, however, went on to insist that

the goal of moral education is to educate the Japanese (*nihonjin*) who never lose the spirit of reverence for humanity; who express this spirit in everyday activities of the family, the school, and the society to which they belong; who make efforts toward the creation of unique cultures and the development of the democratic national state and society; who voluntarily contribute to world peace and pioneer the future of the world.<sup>18</sup>

Unlike the Fundamental Law of Education, the new, legally binding Course of Study specified recipients of Japanese education explicitly as the “Japanese.” The new emphasis on education of the Japanese as a national collectivity was thereby added to the extant emphasis on normative cosmopolitanism.

The conservative resurgence also coincided with postwar Japan’s economic takeoff. Thanks in part to the economic boom that the Korean War had stimulated, the postwar Japanese economy recovered to surpass its prewar performance in 1956, as the Economic White Paper hailed the “end of postwar.” The 1950-60s was, however, not only the time of economic growth but also the heyday of student protests. On May 20, 1960, the LDP government under Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke used their majority in the Parliament to pass a bill to renew the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty while the police kept

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<sup>18</sup> “Chapter 1: Overall Guidelines,” available at <http://www.nicer.go.jp/guideline/old/s33e/chap1.htm> (1 January 2007).



at bay literally physical resistances from the opposition parties. This triggered large-scale protests from university students and left-wing groups in the Tokyo area, to such an extent that the U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower had to cancel his scheduled visit to Japan. Kishi resigned by taking responsibility for the turmoil.

After Kishi's resignation, Ikeda Hayato became the prime minister and launched the famous "Income Doubling Plan (*Shotoku baizō keikaku*).” Araki Masuo, whom Ikeda appointed for the minister of education, interpreted the student protests as a part of widespread moral decline among Japanese youth. In October 1962 he requested the Council for Curriculum (CC) to make recommendations to improve moral education. In June 1963 Araki also requested the Central Council for Education (CCE) to formulate policy guidelines to improve postsecondary education. As a part of their response, the CCE published a controversial report "The Ideal Person" in October 1966. The CCE included the following assertion of the importance of the Japanese nation for Japanese citizens:

Today no individual or ethnic group exists without being part of the national state. The national state is the most organic and powerful institution. The individual's happiness and security depend largely on the national state. A path to contribution to humankind is made possible by the national state.<sup>19</sup>

This emphasis on the importance of the national state was coterminous with the world-wide diffusion of the institutional format "national state" (Meyer et. al 1997). The 1960s was the decade during which the UNESCO and OECD produced a number of studies and recommendations with regard to the relationship between national education and

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<sup>19</sup> "Kitai sareru ningenzō" on November 16, 1966, reprinted in *Sengo nihon kyōiku shiryō shūsei*, Vol. 8 (San'ichi Shobō 1983: 74-83).

socioeconomic development (Papadopoulos 1994; Valderrama 1995). The national state as a unit of organizing education policies and school curricula was gaining ascendancy.

The growing emphasis on the national state in education happened when Japanese were regaining pride in their country. As Japan achieved the “economic miracle,” Japanese began to reevaluate positively their cultural attributes unlike in the aftermath of World War II. The Tokyo Olympics in 1964 also signaled to many Japanese the rising stature of their national state in the world arena. These reevaluations led to the emergence of the literary genre known as “Theory of the Japanese (*Nihonjinron*),” popular writings on characteristics that made the Japanese people unique and special.

Despite the affirmation of national identity and surging national pride in the 1960s, the LDP did not try to reform the Fundamental Law of Education. Instead, the LDP government chose to pursue curriculum reforms to support the rapid economic growth while leaving institutional fundamentals unchanged. Moreover, most policymakers perceived the economic success as indicative of a well-functioning education system that did not require any fundamental institutional changes. In other words, in the 1950s-60s policymakers “grafted” new education policies and curricula onto the existing system. They brought back emphasis on national identity at the level of the Course of Study, but they did not challenge the Law itself. This strategy generated the obligatory coupling of nationalism and normative cosmopolitanism. While it was becoming more acceptable for policymakers to discuss the “nation” and “Japanese people,” such discussion was frequently framed within the normative ideal of cosmopolitanism, to contribute to “world peace” and “humankind.”

Nonetheless, the education reforms in the 1950s-60s began to rearticulate the relationship between nationalism and normative cosmopolitanism. Unlike during the Occupation, nationalism was no longer seen as a complete antithesis of normative cosmopolitanism. Policymakers continued to see normative cosmopolitanism holding nationalism in check; however, they also began to re-conceive of the former as being advanced by the latter. This incipient rearticulation of the relationship between nationalism and normative cosmopolitanism—from antithesis to symbiosis—paved a way to the emergence of a new formulation of normative cosmopolitanism in conjunction with education reforms in response to globalization.

### **Reararticulation of Normative Cosmopolitanism with Globalization, 1971-2006**

After the rapid economic growth and political turbulence of the 1960s, the CCE published a report in June 1971 and urged a wave of education reforms “in anticipation of the new age characterized by rapid technological innovations and drastic social changes, both domestic and international.”<sup>20</sup> A month later, the U.S. President Richard Nixon cancelled the Breton Woods system, increasing the interdependency among national economies. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War also led to a price hike of gas worldwide, terminating the high-level growth of the Japanese economy. The incipient globalization of the economy began to confront the Japanese education system.

In May 1974 the CCE made another set of recommendations to educate “Japanese who live in international society (*kokusai shakai ni ikiru nihonjin*)”:

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<sup>20</sup> The 22nd CCE Report on June 11, 1971, reprinted in *Sengo nihon kyōiku shiryō shūsei*, Vol. 10 (San’ichi Shobō 1983: 25-75).

As international society faces a number of worldwide problems (e.g. the North-South inequality, population/food crises, and energy security), it is becoming more important than ever to emphasize international cooperation and the spirit of solidarity. To respond to this condition of the world, we must recognize it is extremely important for our country to educate Japanese full of internationalism (*kokusaisei yutakana nihonjin*) who actively seek friendships with other peoples.... For our country to be able to actively fulfill duties as a member of international society, every national citizen must be educated as a Japanese person who has deep understanding of cultures and traditions of foreign countries, as well as ability and attitude that will win trust and respect in international society.<sup>21</sup>

Given the recommendations, policymakers began to put forward new education policies and curricula for the purpose of educating “Japanese full of internationalism.” The Japanese government lobbied the UN to establish United Nations University in Tokyo in 1975, and the MOE started recruiting native English speakers as assistant English teachers in 1977.

At the same time the new Course of Study in 1977 defined “*Kimigayo*,” a song that celebrated the imperial reign, as the national anthem. The new Course of Study also put “greater emphasis on moral education than before.”<sup>22</sup> Then the MOE inspected new editions of history textbooks in 1982 and suggested (not required) that “invasion (*shinryaku*)” of East Asia during World War II could be reworded as “advancement (*shinshutsu*)” to the region. In other words, the new educational preoccupation, to adapt

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<sup>21</sup> “*Kokusai kōryū shinkou no tame no jyūten shisaku*” on May 27, 1974, reprinted in *Sengo nihon kyōiku shiryō shūsei*, Vol. 11 (San’ichi Shōbō 1983: 252-67). “*Kokusai shakai*” and “*kokusaisei yutakana nihonjin*” are often translated as “international society” and “international Japanese,” respectively; however, “international” does not quite capture nuances of the word “*kokusai*.” The word does not simply signify internationalism in the sense of relations among national states. As the excerpt of the CCE shows, the word is used in a context where the world and people figured as important units that are independent of, though interdependent with, national states.

<sup>22</sup> Speech by the minister of education Kaifu Toshiki on June 8, 1977, transcribed and reprinted in *Sengo nihon kyōiku shiryō shūsei*, Vol. 12 (San’ichi Shōbō 1983: 180-81).

Japanese to the increasing interdependency of the world, was coupled with the continuing effort to promote national identity and patriotism in school curricula.

Education debates in the 1970s signaled an important change in the meaning of normative cosmopolitanism. During this period policymakers began to talk about Japan's contribution to the world in much more concrete and practical terms. Commitments to world peace and humankind were moved to a background. Instead, policymakers named worldwide problems (e.g. inequality, poverty, energy) and discussed ways to educate Japanese to contribute to solving the problems in cooperation with other peoples. While normative cosmopolitanism in the aftermath of World War II tried to transcend nations, normative cosmopolitanism during this period acknowledged nations and encouraged Japanese people to work with other peoples across national borders.

Indeed, the 1970s was a turning point in the genealogy of normative cosmopolitanism in Japanese education. Although Japanese policymakers continued to invoke normative cosmopolitanism in the original sense of commitment to humanity, they also began to use normative cosmopolitanism in a more concrete sense: fostering attitudes and skills to work cooperatively with other peoples and countries. This new and concrete formulation of normative cosmopolitanism was based on the transnational scope of economic, political, social, and cultural activities. Normative cosmopolitanism in this new sense demanded that Japanese people should traverse national differences horizontally. The new version of normative cosmopolitanism was different from the original one that demanded vertical transcendence of national differences in the name of "humankind" in the aftermath of World War II. Normative cosmopolitanism in Japanese education thus began to acquire a double meaning as follows:

Figure 2.1 Two Meanings of Normative Cosmopolitanism

Original	New
After World War II	After the 1970s
Supranational scale	Transnational scope
Vertical transcendence	Horizontal traversal

The new meaning of normative cosmopolitanism was confirmed during Nakasone Yasuhiro's tenure as prime minister between November 1982 and November 1987.

Nakasone had advocated the Constitution reform ever since he was elected to the Lower House of the Parliament in 1947. Even though he thought that the Constitution had many virtues, such as democracy, pacifism, and normative cosmopolitanism, he regarded it as one-sided, undemocratic imposition by the SCAP (Nakasone 1992). When Nakasone became prime minister, education reform was one of his top priorities, as he had been long interested in education. Instead of receiving recommendations by the CCE and other councils under the MOE, Nakasone wanted to initiate an education reform under his own cabinet. In the process of creating his own education council, Nakasone had to make many compromises with the MOE and the LDP members who had close ties with the ministry. One of the compromises that he had to make was to give up his plan to reform the Fundamental Law of Education (Hood 2004; Schoppa 1991), but he managed to set up the Ad Hoc Educational Council in August 1984.

At the first meeting of the Council, Nakasone listed problems and tasks confronting the existent education system: a recent increase of school violence and youth crimes, over-emphasis on educational attainment, over-standardization of schools, the

need to strengthen *kokusaisei* (internationalism). In his speech, Nakasone marked “internationalization (*kokusaika*)” as a keyword: “Internationalization of education has become an important task as various areas of social life are being internationalized.” He insisted, however, that “reforms must also aim to preserve and develop our unique, traditional culture, educate citizens with self-awareness as Japanese who contribute to international society.”<sup>23</sup>

All four reports that the Council published between 1984 and 1987 confirmed the importance of education of international Japanese. The Council argued

This new stage of internationalization (*kokusaika*) requires different understandings and responses than the previous era of modernization when Japan played a catch-up with the West. This new stage demands that we should adopt a planetary perspective, contribute actively to world peace and progress in various areas, as the increasing interdependency of the world bolsters economic, cultural, and all types of activities across national borders.<sup>24</sup>

Although adoption of a “planetary perspective” and contribution to “world peace” were important educational concerns, the Council stated that

we must establish education to help students recognize that good internationalists [*yoki kokusaijin*] are good Japanese, cultivate love of the country, and embody unique Japanese culture, along with education that helps them deepen their understandings of other cultures and traditions.<sup>25</sup>

Thus the Council’s reports reinforced the emerging trend in education discourses in Japan. In addition to the existent meaning of normative cosmopolitanism institutionalized in the Fundamental Law of Education, policymakers rearticulated it in concrete and practical terms in conjunction with perceived realities of the increasing interdependency of the

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<sup>23</sup> Speech by Nakasone on September 5, 1984, reprinted in *Rinji kyōiku shingikai shingi keika no gaiyō*, Vol. 1 (Rinji Kyoiku Shingikai 1984: ii-iii).

<sup>24</sup> *Rinkyōshin sōran*, Vol. 1 (Kyoiku Seisaku Kenkyukai 1987: 108).

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid*, p. 72.

world. They emphasized the aspect of horizontal traversal of national borders in addition to transcendence of national differences.

The overall trajectory of the Japanese education system remained the same through the 1990s to the present. Even the controversial reform of the Fundamental Law of Education under the LDP-New Komeito government in December 2006 did not change it. The preamble of the new Law introduced “inheritance of the tradition” into purposes of Japanese education; however, it retained normative cosmopolitanism, to “contribute to world peace and welfare of humankind.” The second article of the new Law, the center of the controversy, introduced a new emphasis on “cultivation of respectful attitudes to the tradition and the culture, as well as love of our country and native land that have produced them.” Nonetheless, the second article also stated that such patriotism must go hand in hand with cultivation of “attitudes to respect other countries and contribute to peace and progress of international society.”<sup>26</sup> Thus the new Fundamental Law of Education confirmed the trajectory that had built up from previous periods: the obligatory coupling of nationalism and normative cosmopolitanism, and the new meaning of normative cosmopolitanism in response to globalization.

## **Conclusion**

The history of postwar Japanese education shows that normative cosmopolitanism has been institutionalized ever since the aftermath of World War II. In the 1950s-60s conservative policymakers rehabilitated the idea of the Japanese nation and rearticulated the relationship between normative cosmopolitanism and nationalism from one of

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<sup>26</sup> “The New Fundamental Law of Education,” available at the MEXT web page [http://www.mext.go.jp/b\\_menu/kihon/about/index.htm](http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/kihon/about/index.htm) (1 December 2007).



antithesis to that of symbiosis. From the 1970s onward policymakers rearticulated the original formulation of normative cosmopolitanism with globalization and generated a new meaning of normative cosmopolitanism that demanded Japanese people should traverse national borders horizontally by virtue of international cooperation rather than transcend national differences vertically in the name of “humanity.” Thus at the system level Japanese education promotes both nationalism and normative cosmopolitanism. While it insists on the importance of Japanese national identity in a global world, it also encourages thinking, feeling, and acting that go beyond narrow confines of the Japanese nation.

Now the question is how this relationship between nationalism and normative cosmopolitanism is worked out at the ground level. Is normative cosmopolitanism also present in concrete semiotic devices (e.g. textbooks) and practices (e.g. lessons) that surround students on a daily basis? Or is normative cosmopolitanism simply rhetoric at the system level decoupled from actual practices at the ground level? To clarify the nature of the Japanese education system as a mediator of the causal relationship between globalization and cosmopolitanism, it is necessary to understand how normative cosmopolitanism at the system level is enacted (or sabotaged) at the ground level. Hence the next chapter zooms into everyday educational practices inside schools.

## **Chapter 3**

### **Normative Cosmopolitanism inside Schools**

In this chapter I focus on textbooks and lessons in two subjects of school curricula in Japanese primary education: social studies and moral education. I “sampled” these two subjects in primary education because they have traditionally played an important role in nation-building, providing people with nationalist cognitive and normative models of the social world. If even textbooks and lessons in these core subjects of nation-building turn out to promote not only nationalism but also normative cosmopolitanism, it would be safe to conclude that normative cosmopolitanism exists in Japanese education not merely at the system level but also at the ground level. To find that out, the chapter analyzes textbooks and lessons in social studies and moral education at Ueoka Elementary and Junior High Schools.

In Japan social studies consist of civics, geography, and history. Moral education is accorded a special status in Japanese school curricula. As an academic subject, it is taught once a week; however, the MOE defines moral education as a central pillar of school curricula. The Course of Study demands that moral education must “be carried out through the whole of educational activities” (MEXT 2004: 1). While social studies give students concrete information of how the social world does and should work, they are

framed within moral education. Below, I examine each subject in turn to clarify how normative cosmopolitanism is taught (or not) in its textbooks and lessons.

### **Social Studies**

While social studies consists of civics, geography, and history, my main focus is on history because history education has played a crucial role in nation-building (Gellner 1983; Green 1990; Nozaki and Inokuchi 2000). The state has used history education to provide students with standardized biographical narratives of their ascribed national group. In Japan formal instructions of Japanese history begin in sixth grade. History education in sixth grade introduces students to an overview of the entire Japanese history—from the third century B.C. to the present. In history education in seventh and eighth grades at junior high school, students study the same Japanese history again, but this time in greater depth than in sixth grade. In sixth grade one lesson period is 45-minute long, and 100 periods (out of 945 periods as the total number of periods during the school year) are allocated to social studies. In junior high school one period is 50-minute long, and 105 periods (out of 980 periods as the total number of periods during the school year) are allocated to social studies. From sixth grade through eighth grade approximately 50 percent of the periods allocated to social studies are used for history education. The other 50 percent of lesson periods of social studies are used for civics and geography education.

At Ueoka Elementary and Junior High Schools teachers taught history lessons based on the textbooks *New Social Studies (Atarashi shakai)* published by Tokyo Shoseki, the largest textbook producer in Japan. The sixth-grade *New Social Studies* consists of

two volumes: the first volume is devoted to Japanese history, and the second to civics and geography. The eighth-grade *New Social Studies* also consists of two volumes: one is devoted to Japanese history, and the other to geography. Typically, social-studies lessons took the following format: on a blackboard, a teacher wrote down years, names, and series of events that students were expected to copy on their notebooks; a teacher also asked students to recite, sometimes in unison, segments of textbooks that summed up important points of lesson units. Social studies is probably the most textbook-dependent academic subject in Japanese education because both lessons and examinations in social studies focus almost exclusively on memorization of contents of textbooks. Since students have almost no opportunity for in-class discussions, the mode of reading is “dominated” in the sense that “one accepts the message at face value” (Apple 1993: 61).

One feature that stands out in the *New Social Studies* textbooks is cartoon characters printed on the texts. These cartoon characters are Japanese students. Cartoon students are set to be the same age as real students who use the textbooks. The textbooks occasionally print grown-up cartoon characters (e.g. teachers) talking with cartoon students. In most of the time these cartoon characters look toward readers and address them by making statements or asking questions in balloons. Sometimes cartoon students direct their gaze toward visual materials printed next to them, making comments and asking questions about the materials. These cartoon characters, including vectors of their gazes and gestures are semiotic devices to influence psychological readiness in students to identify with Japanese people. The authorial voice of the textbook is Japanese, so that reading the main text automatically forces students to identify with a standpoint of the Japanese authorial voice. More importantly, cartoon Japanese students with facial

expressions, gazes, gestures, and utterances provide students with templates of how to react emotionally to the texts.

The textbook also presents visual images of famous “Japanese” figures in politics, arts, literature, and religion as focal points of identification with Japanese people. These historical figures from the eight century onward are praised for their accomplishments; for instance, in a lesson unit on modernization after the Meiji Restoration, the textbook lists pictures of three Japanese scientists, Noguchi Hideyo, Kitasato Shibasaburō, and Shiga Kiyoshi, as “Japanese who made important contributions to the world” (Tokyo Shoseki 2005a: 97). The fact that these historical figures are presented as sources of national pride manifest in another way: visual images of famous Japanese figures cease to appear after a historical period of the 1930s when Japan started war with China. Facial expressions of cartoon Japanese students are also different in the lesson unit on World War II, compared to other lesson units. In lesson units that cover the Japanese history before World War II, faces of cartoon characters tend to express curiosity and excitement about historical events. In contrast, lesson units on World War II present facial expressions of shock, sadness, and pensiveness. Then cartoon characters in lesson units on postwar Japan resume facial expressions of positive emotions, such as excitement and happiness. Thus the absence of famous Japanese figures in lesson units during the 1930s and late 1940s, as well as faces of cartoon students expressing negative emotions toward wartime events, helps students dis-identify with the legacy of the Japanese military aggression.

Nonetheless, the textbooks encourage students to identify with ordinary Japanese people as victims of the war. Although history textbooks mention atrocities that Japan

committed against Asian peoples, they often fail to provide details of the atrocities (Hein and Selden 2000). For example, both the sixth- and eighth-grade history textbooks state that when the Japanese military occupied Nanjing, “many Chinese, including women and children, were killed” (Tokyo Shoseki 2005a: 103, 2005b: 170); however, the textbooks do not mention even the approximate number of the Chinese victims while noting that “the Japanese people were not informed of this incident.” In contrast, when the textbooks describe the atom bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, they mention the approximate number of the dead: “tens of thousands of people died in an instant,” and “it is estimated that more than twenty thousands in Hiroshima and more than fourteen thousands in Nagasaki died within several years after the bombings” (2005a: 111; 2005b: 177). Next to the descriptions of the damages of the atom bombings, the sixth-grade textbook adds a two-page-spread illustration of a fire-bombing of Tokyo (in which a mother and a daughter are trying to escape from the sea of fire), and the eighth-grade textbook a two-page-spread photo of ruins of Hiroshima. Thus, consistent with popular Japanese narratives of World War II (Dower 1999; Orr 2001; Yoneyama 1999), the history textbooks use both linguistic and visual registers to emphasize that the Japanese people were the victim of the war.

What previous studies of Japanese history textbooks did not discuss, however, is the extent to which history textbooks discuss interactions between Japan and the rest of the world. The very first lesson unit of the sixth-grade textbook describes the Yayoi period (the third century B.C.) when rice farming began in the Japanese archipelago. Rice is considered to be the most important staple food in Japan since processes of production and consumption of rice came to symbolize the essence of the Japanese way of life

(Ohnuki-Tierney 1993). In the lesson unit on a historical origin of such a high-profile signifier of Japaneseness, three cartoon students make the following statements:

Boy A: “I have learned that techniques of rice farming were brought [to Japan] by immigrants from the Korean Peninsula.”

Boy B: “What else was brought [to Japan] from the Korean Peninsula and China?”

Boy C: “Let’s find out things that were brought [to Japan] from the Korean Peninsula and China by looking up books in a library” (Tokyo Shoseki 2005a: 12-13).

The sixth-grade textbook repeatedly mentions flows of people, ideas, technologies, and objects from China and Korea up till the late Edo period. After the arrival of Commodore Perry in 1853, the textbook focuses on Japan’s interactions with the “West” while continuing to mention Japan’s interactions with the “East”—China and Korea—in terms of colonialism and wars during the first half of the twentieth century. Although the eighth-grade textbook presents Japanese history in greater detail, it has the same structure.

These examples suggest that Japanese history textbooks are not simple-mindedly nationalist. It is necessary to take note of ambiguities and tensions built into the textbooks. While the coverage of atrocities that Japan committed against its neighboring countries during World War II can be judged inadequate, the textbooks also present the history of Japan in terms of recurrent borrowings from China and Korea. The narrative structure of the history textbooks is therefore split between two competing voices. The dominant, nationalist voice aims to increase psychological readiness in students to identify with Japan and Japanese people, whereas the other voice celebrates flows of people, ideas, technologies, and objects that traverse countries and regions. Here normative cosmopolitanism in the sense of horizontal traversal penetrates into history textbooks, emphasizing the fundamentally interdependent nature of the social world.

The presence of normative cosmopolitanism is clearer in geography textbooks. Overall, the geography textbooks used at Ueoka Elementary and Junior High Schools have the same structure as the history textbooks. The same cartoon characters appear throughout, providing students with templates of emotional reactions to information in the textbooks. For the most part cartoon characters encourage students to identify with Japan and Japanese people by presenting images of various areas of Japan in positive light. Unlike the history textbooks, however, the geography textbooks have lesson units that are devoted exclusively to foreign peoples and countries as objects of study. About 50 percent of the second volume of the sixth-grade geography textbook and 25 percent of the eighth-grade geography textbook are devoted to studies of foreign peoples and countries.

The section “Japan in the World” in the sixth-grade textbook, for instance, describes Japan’s relationships with the United States, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, and China. Faces of cartoon students express positive emotions, such as admiration and excitement, and invite students to feel positive emotions toward the foreign peoples and countries.

Boy A: “I have learned that fast-food restaurants and theme parks popular in Japan came from the United States.”

Girl A: “The United States and Japan have a close tie through trading.”

Boy B: “Roasted meat (*yakiniku*) popular in Japan came from the Korean Peninsula.”

Boy C: “South Korea and Japan have had a close tie since the long past.”

Girl B: “Jeddah is famous for the jewelry-like beauty of its night view.”

Boy D: “I have learned that the desalination plants in Jeddah utilize Japanese technologies.”

Boy E: “Many of Japanese food and customs came from China.

Boy F: “China is developing its economy rapidly and attracting the world’s attention” (2005c: 36-45).



With positive emotions manifest on their faces, cartoon students narrate characteristics of the United States, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, and China, by emphasizing Japan's close ties with these countries against a background of photographic images of the foreign people and their customs. One cartoon girl is even dressed in the traditional Korean dress *chima jeogori*, expressing her identification with South Korea. The emphasis on Japan's ties with the foreign countries in the linguistic register is combined with positive emotions on faces of cartoon characters in the visual register, encouraging students to like the countries. The eighth-grade geography textbook also presents the United States, Malaysia, and France in the same manner. Thus the geography textbooks prime students to develop attachment to foreign peoples and countries.

Figure 3.1 South Korea in the Sixth-Grade Geography Textbook



In sum, the history and geography textbooks have a dual structure. The textbooks operate predominantly to encourage students to identify with Japan and Japanese people; however, they also encourage them to develop attachment to foreign peoples, countries, and cultures.

### **Moral Education**

In Japanese school curricula moral education (*dōtoku*) is considered to be the most fundamental. As an academic subject, moral education is allocated one lesson period per week in every grade level. Ueoka Elementary and Junior High Schools use *The Bright Heart (Akarui kokoro)* and *The Bright Life (Akarui jinsei)*, respectively, as textbooks of moral education. These textbooks are edited volumes of moral tales and essays compiled by a group of principals in the prefecture. Copies of *The Notebook of the Heart (Kokoro no nōto)*, the moral education textbook that the MEXT publishes, are also used as supplemental materials. Moral education is not, however, primarily an academic subject; rather, it is a sort of *meta*-academic activity to inculcate a set of schemas considered essential to Japanese people. Thus, even though moral education as an academic subject is taught only once a week, it permeates daily activities of elementary and junior high schools in Japan. Put in the words of one sixth-grade teacher at Ueoka Elementary School, “everyday is moral education.”

The most important objective of Japanese moral education is to cultivate in students a distinct type of “*kimochi*” or “*kokoro*,” typically translated as feeling or heart. *Kokoro* (heart) is *the* keyword of moral education (Lewis 1995; Sato 2004) to the extent that it is adopted in the titles of the moral education textbooks. Daily activities of

Japanese schools are organized not simply to teach students academic subjects but also to influence their practical senses of right and wrong. Japanese education is total in the sense that it “takes a whole person-oriented and integrated approach towards combining the educational goals of nonacademic and academic activities” (Tsuneyoshi 2001: 77). Learning activities that do not contribute to moral cultivation of the heart is considered to be a failure, no matter how they facilitate cognitive development of students.

At Ueoka Elementary and Junior High Schools daily activities were structured to make students identify with one another in order to achieve desirable outcomes as a group. Every lesson period began with a set of formalized actions as follows: student monitors (*nichoku*) gave a command “Stand up,” and all students in a homeroom stood up; student monitors gave another command “Attention,” and all students erected their bodies straight; student monitors continued, “We begin X-th period,” and the other students responded in unison “Yes”; then student monitors said, “Bow,” and all students bowed to a teacher who is facing them in the front of the homeroom; the final command from student monitors was “Sit down.” Students and teachers repeated a similar procedure at the end of every lesson period and engaged in more elaborate series of formalized actions at weekly assemblies and annual events throughout the academic year. While students were taking those formalized actions, teachers were always ready to intervene and make students repeat expected actions when they did not do them right; for example, when students failed to stand up in unison, when they did not say “Yes” loud enough, or when some students did not bow properly, teachers stopped students and ordered all of them to do it again, sometimes more than twice until students got it right.

These daily rituals create situations in which actions of students are evaluated at a group level. Even when only one of group members fails, the rest of the group has to take responsibility. In such situations, students have to learn to empathize with one another and synchronize their actions. The same arrangement is repeated in groups smaller than homerooms: groups to carry out non-academic daily activities, such as serving school lunch and cleaning up school facilities. Prior research on Japanese schools has shown that these practices are common across different regions of Japan. Putting students constantly in situations where they have to coordinate their actions to achieve group outcomes, daily practices of Japanese schools force students to learn to empathize with one another. The crux of Japanese moral education is to cultivate the readiness for mutual empathetic identification.

Practices of moral education are not merely repeated on a daily basis. They are carried out with intense emotion. The clearest examples of emotional intensity of moral education occurred recurrently in the eighth-grade homeroom of Ms. Kato, a physical education teacher in her forties. The pretext was an upcoming city-wide sports competition for eighth graders. To show their support, ninth graders designed posters and presented them to all four eighth-grade homerooms. In one afternoon period Ms. Kato stood in front of students in her homeroom and asked how they would like to express their gratitude to ninth graders. Three female students expressed their opinions, converging to the idea of writing thank-you notes to ninth graders. No further discussion was forthcoming from the other students. Ms. Kato asked, "That's it?" Ms. Kato then abruptly said that only the three students should write thank-you notes because they were the only ones who suggested the idea. The rest of the homeroom remained silent.

After about two minutes of silence, Yamamoto-kun, sitting in the last row took out his homework notebook from a drawer of his desk and started working on his homework. He tried to do it secretly, but Ms. Kato spotted him and yelled, “Go ahead! Start working on homework or whatever you want to do! You heartless kids! You think only of yourselves! You do things only for yourselves! Do it! Do it! It will help you!” Students looked stunned and hesitant. Silence continued. Sato-kun stood up and walked slowly to the front of the room where homework notebooks were piled. He searched for his notebook in the pile and picked it up. Ms. Kato looked at him and said, “Why don’t you distribute homework notebooks to others?” Sato-kun stopped and looked at other students with his face frozen. He lifted up a pile of notebooks slowly, but he stopped and put them back. He hurried back to his seat only with his homework notebook. Ms. Kato yelled to the entire homeroom, “Why don’t others start working on homework now? You think only of yourselves. You don’t have to do things for others. Take up your homework notebooks and start working! Move! Quick!” But students did not leave their seats and remained silent. Ms. Kato walked and stood in front of Terada-kun’s seat. He was a male homeroom leader. He kept looking down. Ms. Kato yelled at him, “Stop thinking! You should think only of yourself, shouldn’t you? Why don’t you start working on homework? If a homeroom leader starts doing it, others will follow! So show others an exemplary behavior! Unless you do it, others won’t do. So take up your homework notebook and start working. Move! Quick!” Terada-kun and more than a dozen of students finally stood up and went up to the front of the room to pick up their notebooks.

About four-fifths of the students started working on their homework. A few minutes later, Hayashi-kun raised his hand. He had not worked on his homework. While

others started working on homework, he had kept sitting and looking down. Ms. Kato looked at him and said, “What? Do you want to say something? Don’t raise your hand. Come up.” When Hayashi-kun went up and stood in front of Ms. Kato, he said, looking down, in a small and squeezing tone, “Teacher, I would like to write a thank-you note to ninth graders.... So please give me a piece of paper.” Ms. Kato raised her voice and yelled, “Why didn’t you say so at the beginning?! You had a chance before. Why now?” After several seconds of silence, Hayashi-kun opened his mouth and said, “Well... earlier I didn’t want to repeat what the others already said.” Immediately Ms. Kato shot back, “But who told you that you didn’t have to express your opinion when it’s the same as others’?” Ms. Kato turned to other students. “Now some of you must have wondered whether it was all right to start working on homework.... Of course, it was wrong! If you are human, it’s only natural to feel grateful to ninth graders! Humans don’t live alone! They live only by supporting each other! You don’t even understand this!” Students stopped working on homework. They were all looking down. Ms. Kato handed Hayashi-kun a piece of colored paper for a thank-you note. He received it and went back to his seat.

Then Kodama-san stood up and went up to Ms. Kato. She said, “Teacher, I would like to write a thank-you note, too.” When another girl also stood up and was about to go up to the front of the room, Ms. Kato yelled, “What? Now more of you will follow? Why didn’t you come up sooner? How long in the world did it take you to come to this?” Ms. Kato turned to Kodama-san and shouted, “Kodama, why don’t you understand what I have said many times?” Ms. Kato uttered several more sentences in a rapid succession. Kodama-san broke into tears and started sobbing. After several seconds of silence, Ms.

Kato handed a piece of paper to Kodama-san. She returned to her seat by wiping her tears. Terada-kun stood up, went up to Ms. Kato, and said, “Teacher, I think everyone is thankful...” Ms. Kato interrupted him and yelled, “How can you tell? You only believe that! How can they be thankful when they are working on their homework? They think only of themselves!” Tears welled up in Takeda-kun’s eyes. His eyes were red. He blinked rapidly to prevent tears from flowing down. Silence was back in the room.

Now Kojima-san, another homeroom leader and also one of the three students who had suggested the idea of writing thank-you notes, went up to the front. She said to Ms. Kato “Teacher..., it’s kind of strange for me to write several thank-you notes on behalf of my classmates.” It was apparent that she suggested to Ms. Kato indirectly that everyone should be allowed to write. Ms. Kato responded by yelling, “Of course, it’s strange! Ninth graders will know from the same handwriting that you posed as different students! They will know that only a very few students in this homeroom felt grateful for their present and wrote thank-you notes! But if ninth graders think this homeroom is shameful, that will be fine by me!” Kojima-san was almost in tears. She blinked her eyes rapidly like Terada-kun did. Ms. Kato said to her, “You don’t have to stand here. Go back to your seat.” But Kojima-san remained where she was, looking down. Ms. Kato looked around and yelled, “Why are you so indifferent when the homeroom leaders are being scolded?! Why no support?! When they are being scolded and crying, you do nothing!”

A common theme that runs through episodes of moral education is the importance of empathetic identification. Ms. Kato demanded that students should imagine feelings of other persons (e.g. ninth graders and homeroom leaders). The emphasis on empathy was also connected to coordination of actions to accomplish group-level outcomes. In Ms.

Kato's homeroom, moral education came to the fore when a collective action, to express gratitude as a homeroom, was at stake. This is why much time and effort are devoted to preparation for school events: they force students to empathize with one another in order to coordinate their actions. When the Chorus Competition was approaching, for instance, Ms. Kato repeatedly told her students that their "chorus won't improve unless everyone makes an effort to create a wonderful harmony together." Ms. Kato used a chorus as a metaphor to emphasize the importance of mutual empathetic identification and group solidarity. Indeed, it was not accidental that a chorus was part of every school event at Ueoka Elementary and Junior High Schools. Students sang the national anthem, school songs, traditional songs, or popular songs in unison at school events because a chorus not only symbolized group harmony but also accentuated school events as occasions for collective effervescence. Thus daily activities, as well as annual school events, facilitated mutual empathetic identification among students.

While moral education facilitates empathetic identification primarily among Japanese students, it can also provide students with opportunities to extend their empathy to non-Japanese persons. During the academic year of 2005-06, for example, the sixth-grade teachers and students at Ueoka Elementary School took on an ambitious project: to collect enough funds to build a school building in Cambodia. The project was initiated by one of the four sixth-grade teachers Ms. Suzuki in collaboration with her acquaintances Mr. and Ms. Tanaka, owners of a family business who had already built one school in Cambodia. To raise 3,300,000 yen (about 30,000 dollars) necessary for building a school, the sixth-grade teachers and students planned to have a fundraising drive in September 2005. In June and July before a summer recess began, students discussed where they



should go to collect donation and what signs they should make. After deciding that they would go to a few shopping malls in the city over a weekend and ask shoppers for donation, they made signs by themselves that described plights of Cambodian children and called for donation to build a school. Then, over one weekend in September, accompanied by sixth-grade teachers and parent volunteers, they took turns to stand in the shopping areas and called for donation.

After the fundraising drive, however, they were still approximately two million yen short of the goal. So they decided to have a “charity bazaar.” Students made posters and letters to advertise the bazaar and distributed them to houses in neighborhoods surrounding Ueoka Elementary School. The following episode happened in Ms. Suzuki’s homeroom in October 2005. As the first fundraising drive had not succeeded in collecting enough funds, the teachers and students decided to hold an additional charity bazaar. In a period of integrated study to formulate plans for the forthcoming bazaar, Ms. Suzuki wrote on the blackboard: “For children in Cambodia.” She turned and looked at students, asking, “What activities have you done so far to build a school for Cambodian children?” A few students raised their hands, stood up, and said in turn, “We distributed ads,” “We collected donation,” and “We are going to do bazaar.” Ms. Suzuki nodded. She then asked all students to come up to the front and write down on the blackboard their honest feelings and thoughts about their experiences of their fundraising project. In about five minutes all students finished writing on the blackboard and returned to their seats. Ms. Suzuki read aloud what everyone wrote. After reading all of them, Ms. Suzuki turned to students and asked, “For whom did you do all these work?” Remaining seated, several students said in sporadic unison, “For children in Cambodia....” Nodding, Ms. Suzuki

responded, “Yes, yes, but when you were doing the fundraising activities, did you have in mind Cambodian children? Those children who lost their legs because of land mines, those children who make living by collecting trash, those children who cannot go to school to study even if they want to?”

After a few seconds of silence, three students raised their hands to indicate that they had those children in mind. Looking around slowly, Ms. Suzuki continued, “Now, the question is for whom we are doing this. I want you to pay attention to these two students who wrote they felt bad while they were collecting donation. Akiyama-kun, could you say a little more about what made you feel bad?” Akiyama-kun stood up and described a high-school girl who said to him “no” in a harsh tone when he asked for donation. Ms. Suzuki also called on another student who wrote she felt bad. She stood up and recounted a young woman’s angry look when she asked for donation. Then Ms. Suzuki talked briefly about two passers-by who asked her skeptically why they were helping Cambodian children rather than Japanese children. “You see,” Ms. Suzuki went on, “there are various people in the world, and some of them don’t think what we are doing is worthwhile. But what would you say to those people? Could you give them good and heart-felt explanations? What I care most is whether you have real sympathy (*omoiyari*) for Cambodian children. What I’m concerned about is whether you only enjoyed yourselves without really thinking about them. If you are going to do the charity bazaar only for fun, you wouldn’t be able to answer the question, ‘Why are you selling these goods?’ I want you to be ready to answer the question. If you don’t work for the upcoming bazaar with real feelings (*kimochi*), it would be just a play. Of course, the bazaar will be fun, but I want you to fully understand why you are doing this. It would be

meaningless to continue this work if you didn't have this [pointing at the phrase "For children in Cambodia" on the blackboard]. We will continue this work only if you have real willingness to help Cambodian children. If you didn't have it, I wouldn't want you to help out the charity bazaar. People in Cambodia wouldn't appreciate it. If you do this because the teacher tells you to do, because others tell you to do, because your friends tell you to do, then, it would be meaningless. I want you to really think about this point."

Thus the lesson was moral through and through: learning activities would be considered to be a failure if they did not foster in students empathetic identification with Cambodian children. Here what moral education aimed to inculcate—readiness for empathetic identification—could be transposed into a transnational context, producing empathetic identification across national borders. Although moral education primarily fosters empathetic identification among Japanese students, it does not prevent students from learning to identify empathetically with foreigners. This shows that even the central pillar of Japanese education could have a dual structure. Moral education permeates everyday school activities by placing students in situations that force them to empathize with each other in order to achieve group-level outcomes; however, moral education does not confine empathetic identification to Japan and Japanese people. Readiness in students for empathetic identification, which moral education aims to cultivate, can be transposed into learning activities that involve foreign peoples and countries.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter has shown that textbooks and lessons in social studies and moral education share a dual structure. They facilitate attachment not only to Japan and

Japanese people but also to foreign countries and peoples. Textbooks and lessons in these subjects also legitimate a cognitive model of the social world defined by interdependency, whether it is the interdependency of Japan with other countries in social studies or that of the self with others in moral education.

I suggest that the consistent dual structure in both social studies and moral education is not accidental. It is embedded systematically in the cognitive and normative model of the social world that Japanese moral education promotes. In moral education attachment to the other (in the form of solidarity and empathy) and interdependency with the other are understood as constitutive of the self and the social world. This logic of moral education permeates textbooks and lessons of social studies. Learning the social world at the purely cognitive level is considered as a failure of education. Successful and legitimate learning activities must be accompanied by moral development. This is why textbooks and lessons in social studies take the distinctly moral undertone, encouraging students to develop attachment to people and appreciate their mutual interdependency. These “people” are not only Japanese but also foreigners.

This finding shows that normative cosmopolitanism at the system level is enacted at the ground level. Specifically, the encouragement for attachment to foreign people and countries, as well as the emphasis on the interdependency of the world, dovetails with the system-level commitment to normative cosmopolitanism in the sense of traversing national borders. The tight coupling between the system-level commitment and ground-level practices is probably based on the high degree of centralization of the Japanese education system. Decoupling between formal curricula and actual practices is less likely

in centralized education systems like in Japan than in decentralized ones like in the United States (Rowan 2006; Stevenson and Baker 1991).

The fact that the education system promotes not only nationalism but also normative cosmopolitanism at both system and ground levels makes it difficult to present a clear-cut picture of the education system as a mediator of the causal relationship between globalization and cosmopolitanism. For instance, the present study cannot specify exactly how nationalism and normative cosmopolitanism in educational practices interact with each other in influencing subjectivities of students. Nonetheless, it is at least clear that normative cosmopolitanism has now become a part and parcel of the education system. This, however, does not tell us whether and how Japanese youth actually develop cosmopolitanism as a psychological orientation. Thus the next two chapters explore the question of whether and how youth develop cosmopolitanism in the globalized cultural environment where the education system legitimizes normative cosmopolitanism.

## **Chapter 4**

### **Cosmopolitanism as a Multiplication of Attachments**

As discussed in the previous chapter, one important feature of normative cosmopolitanism in Japanese education is the encouragement for attachment to foreign peoples and countries. (Another feature is the emphasis on the interdependency of the self and the social world.) This educational feature makes it legitimate for Japanese youth to develop attachment to foreign peoples and countries; however, the institutional legitimation of attachment that extends beyond Japan does not automatically guarantee the existence of such attachment in students. Within the cultural environment where normative cosmopolitanism is legitimized by the education system, how do Japanese youth actually develop attachments that traverse national borders? Below, I examine this question of a micro process through which the globalized cultural environment leads youth to develop attachments beyond Japan.

#### **Actor-Network Theory of Cosmopolitanism**

Before proceeding to empirical examination of the question, let me introduce Bruno Latour's actor-network theory to illuminate the psychological orientation of cosmopolitanism in terms of attachments that traverse national borders. Since actor-

network theorists focus mostly on studies of science and technology, they have not participated in debates on globalization and cosmopolitanism. Nevertheless, I suggest that actor-network theory offers conceptual heuristics that are useful in unpacking a process of the development of cosmopolitanism in the globalized cultural environment.

First, Latour conceptualizes a human actor (or “actant” in his language) as a marionette attached to strings: “The more strings the marionettes are allowed to have, the more articulated they become” (2005: 216). “From now on,” Latour continues, “when we speak of actor we should always add the large network of attachments making it act” (217-218). Although Latour does not specify what these “attachments” are, I propose to define them primarily in psychological terms. Here actor-network theory connects to psychological theories of identity development. Attachment is the most rudimentary form of identification. When a person develops attachment or identification with people and objects in the environment, that attachment or identification has an effect on his or her sense of the self. A person’s self develops as “*the sum total of all that he can call his*, not only his body and his psychic powers, but his clothes and his house, his wife and children” (James 1950: 291). Attachments or identifications with people and objects are building blocks of the self.<sup>27</sup>

Indeed, Latour himself discusses, albeit too briefly, psychological underpinnings of actor-network theory as follows:

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<sup>27</sup> My conceptualization of “identification” vis-à-vis “identity” is different from the one suggested by Rogers Brubaker and Fredrick Cooper (2000). While I agree with them about the importance of paying attention to the psychodynamic and context-dependent nature of identification, I am reluctant to preclude *a priori* the possibility of consolidation of identifications into a phenomenological wholeness of the self, which the concept of “identity” purports to capture (Chodorow 1999; Erikson 1959, 1968). I believe that the possibility of “identity” should be kept as an empirical question.

You need to subscribe to a lot of subjectifiers to become a subject.... We might end up gaining some ‘intra-psyche’ only if we are entering into a relationship with a lot of ‘extra-psyches’, or what could be called mind-churning substances, namely *psycho-tropes*” (Latour 2005: 216).

In other words, human subjectivity is mediated fundamentally by “mind-churning substances,” such as images and discourses, in the environment; and these substances that are available as “subjectifiers” to a person are delimited by a network of humans and nonhuman objects to which the person is attached. Here Latour’s view of a network as a provider of mind-churning substances dovetails with a central thesis of cultural psychology: human psychological processes (e.g. the self and schemas) are mediated by cultural practices (Bruner 1990; Cole 1996; Rogoff 2003). That is, the “intra-psyche,” what is inside the head, develops only through active appropriation of the “extra-psyche,” what is outside the head (Holland and Cole 1995; Norman 1988; Strauss and Quinn 1998).

Moreover, attachments that a person develops toward people and objects in the environment have psychologically transformative effects. In the language of actor-network theory this means that such people and objects to which a person becomes attached operate as “mediators”:

*An intermediary*, in my vocabulary, is what transports meaning or force without transformation... *Mediators*, on the other hand... transform, translate, distort, and modify the meaning or the elements they are supposed to carry” (Latour 2005: 39).

At the purely physical level, a person is connected to all sorts of people and objects in his or her everyday life. Some of these people and objects are merely intermediaries: interactions with them do not transform the person because there are no attachments between them. Yet other people and objects act as mediators by virtue of the person’s attachments to them.



I suggest that cosmopolitans are like the marionettes. They are human actors who have developed attachments with foreign others and cultural objects and, consequently, transformed their thinking and feeling about the world. From the perspective of actor-network theory, cosmopolitanism is not about transcending particular cultural communities. Rather, it is about working through attachments with humans and nonhumans that belong to multiple cultural communities. Cosmopolitanism means a multiplication of attachments that crisscross group categories and boundaries that are often essentialized in antagonistic terms.

This actor-network theory of cosmopolitanism challenges the dichotomy between cosmopolitans and locals. Ulf Hannerz argued that “there can be no cosmopolitans without locals” because for locals,

diversity itself, as a matter of personal access to varied cultures, may be of little intrinsic interest. It just so happens that it is the survival of diversity that allows all locals to stick to their respective cultures. For the cosmopolitans, in contrast, there is value in diversity as such, but they are not likely to get it, in anything like the present form, unless other people are allowed to carve out special niches for their cultures, and keep them (1990: 250).

I agree with Hannerz that there can be no cosmopolitans without locals; however, I would like to add a twist to his statement, i.e. there can be no cosmopolitans without locals because there are only cosmopolitan-locals. Some of cosmopolitans today are elite frequent flyers who travel across national borders for business as well as for pleasure (Calhoun 2003). Others are immigrants and refugees who cross borders out of economic necessities or political prosecutions (Pollock et al. 2000). The majority of cosmopolitans are, however, non-immigrant populations who do not travel as much as frequent flyers

and immigrants, but whose everyday lives are penetrated by humans and nonhumans that have traveled from other places.<sup>28</sup>

In short, actor-network theory specifies the causal relationship between globalization and cosmopolitanism as follows: globalization distributes foreign humans and nonhumans as potential objects of attachment in people's everyday life; when people do develop attachments to these foreign humans and nonhumans, the latter act as mediators and transform people's subjectivities. Yet this is all theory. Do student really develop such attachments to foreign people and objects? If so, how? To answer the questions, in the next section I report findings from my fieldwork.

### **Method and Data**

One of the survey questions was designed to examine Japanese youth's attachment to their ascribed nation Japan. Previous studies have found that attachment to one's ascribed nation develops early. In their pioneering research Jean Piaget and Anne-Marie Weil (1951) asked children from age six to thirteen, "Which nationality would you choose if you were free to choose?" All the children answered that they would like to keep their ascribed nationalities. In another pioneering study in political science Robert Hess and Judith Torney (1967) reported that nearly 95 percent of their interviewees from

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<sup>28</sup> Here the anthropological tropes of "travel" (Clifford 1997) and "hybridity" (Bhabha 1994) must be reconfigured to encompass the glocal or cosmopolitan-local conditions of non-immigrants. A distinction between mobile and immobile does not map onto a dichotomy between cosmopolitans and locals because localities themselves are becoming glocal and hybrid as they are made up of both mobile and immobile actants. People do not have to "travel" (either literally or metaphorically) to be cosmopolitans. "Cosmopolitan locals" are therefore different from "rooted cosmopolitans (Appiah 2006). While the latter are people like elites and immigrants who travel across national borders, the former are non-immigrants who encounter travelling people and objects.

second to eighth grade in the United States answered that America was the best country in the world and they would rather be an American than a member of another nation. Hess and Torney concluded that attachment to one's ascribed nation develops at a very early age as a foundation of political understandings and attitudes. A number of studies in social psychology have confirmed that children almost always express preferences for and attachments to their national in-groups (Tajfel et al. 1970; Reicher and Hopkins 2001; see Reizábal, Valencia, and Barrett 2004 for an exception). Attachment to one's ascribed nation has been thought to develop during early childhood and remain stable ever after.

The almost-automatic attachment to one's ascribed nation is consistent with nationalism, specifically the nationalist idea of a "chosen people"—one's nation is special and the best in the world—that played a decisive role in the formation of national states (Weber 1978: 925). Indeed, nationalism as a cultural formation dictates that a person should be loyal to his or her ascribed nation alone (Calhoun 1997: 18). Nevertheless, if cosmopolitanism is indeed emerging due to globalization and facilitated by the Japanese education system, a different pattern should be expected.

To find that out, I asked students the same question that Piaget and Weil and Hess and Torney used in their studies: "If you could choose a country where you are born and grow up, which country would you choose? Why?" If the nature of attachment to one's ascribed nation has not changed, a very high percentage of respondents should express their attachments to Japan from a very early age.

Table 4.1: National Attachment across Age Groups

	Group (Age)				
	Preschool (5-6) n = 28	2nd grade (7-8) n = 84	6th grade (11-12) n = 117	8th grade (13-14) n = 122	College (20-23) n = 100
Japan	96.4 %	70.2 %	44.4 %	45.9 %	72.0 %
Foreign country	3.6 %	29.8 %	55.6 %	54.1 %	28.0 %

Table 4.1 shows a pattern that is different than in previous studies. A percentage of those who expressed their attachment to Japan was high in preschool and second grade. The percentage went down significantly in sixth and eighth grades, though it went up again in college. An effect of age was statistically significant,  $\chi^2(4, N = 451) = 46.481, p < .001$ . Sex and experience of going abroad did not have statistically significant effects on attachment. Below, to clarify meaning of the observed pattern, I present and analyze reasons that respondents gave for their answers.

### **Preschoolers and Second Graders**

It was not easy to make preschoolers elaborate reasons for their choices. Except for a few 6-year-olds, they shied away from responding to my probing questions. A 6-year-old boy was enthusiastic and shouted, “I’d like to be the same! I’m glad I was born here!” A 6-year-old girl said that she would like to be born in Japan again because “Japan is where I was born, and I can speak in Japanese here.” The preschoolers were more talkative when I asked them over the course of my fieldwork whether they disliked any country. Nine of the preschoolers who had participated in the survey told me that they

disliked a “foreign country” by misunderstanding that it was a name of a country. The most popular reason was either “their names sound strange” or “I’d have to speak English.” In short, 5-to-6-year-old preschoolers expressed their attachment to Japan for two reasons. First, Japan was simply familiar to them. Familiarity bred favoritism. Second, the preschoolers seemed to have aversion to foreign others and cultures because of their strangeness and unfamiliarity, mostly linguistic.

7-to-8-year-olds were a little more articulate than the preschoolers in explaining their choices. Their reasons for choosing Japan were related mostly to safety and comfort that Japan would offer:

7-year-old boy: Because there is no war.

8-year-old girl: Because I was born in Japan and it’s the most peaceful.

While safety and comfort tend to be generally important for young children, they could be also precocious in appropriating pacifist discourses in public arenas: since the end of World War II, Japanese national identity has been defined predominantly in terms of the constitutional renunciation of war as a sovereign right. It is known that children often subscribe to nationalist ideologies handed down by adults (Coles 1987).

After safety and comfort, language was the second most common reason for attachment to Japan:

7-year-old boy: Because people speak Japanese in Japan.

7-year-old girl: Because in Japan I can understand what people are saying.

These second graders were similar to the preschoolers: language played an important role in their attachments to Japan. This may be related to the fact that young children tend to map language and social differences onto each other (Hirschfeld and Gelman 1997).

Previous research on children’s understanding of national groups also found that children

tend to reason that people who speak the same language belong to the same national group and those who speak different languages belong to different national groups (Jahoda 1962; Piaget and Weil 1951). Perhaps the cognitive mapping of language and social groups facilitates attachment to one's ascribed nation.

In addition, there were second graders who expressed the phenomenological immutability of their attachments to Japan:

8-year-old boy: Because the Japanese are born in Japan.

8-year-old girl: Because I like Japan best. Absolutely Japan.

For these students, it was impossible to imagine belonging to another country because their attachment to Japan was so strong. They took for granted their ascribed national identity as Japanese.

Among second graders who chose countries other than Japan, the three most popular countries were the United States, China, and South Korea. Reasons for their attachments to foreign countries were related to respondents' interests:

7-year-old girl (the United States): Because I want to speak and write English.

7-year-old girl (China): Because their bodies look flexible.

The girl who chose the United States was learning English, and the girl who chose China were taking gymnastics lessons. If someone is interested in learning English or gymnastics, she is likely to be receptive to images that are associated with the English language or gymnastics in her everyday life, and these images inevitably include those of foreigners. If someone is not interested, she may not notice or respond actively to foreign images that are associated with English or gymnastics. In this sense, students' interests operated as a basis of attachments to foreign countries.

In addition, students' parental figures functioned as a basis of attachment to foreign countries:

7-year-old girl (Italy): Because I went there when I was a baby. My dad is a chef and studied in Italy.

8-year-old girl (Brazil): Because my dad is friends with people of Brazil. I want to go there.

These second graders did not develop attachment to foreign countries via their own interests; however, they were influenced by their parental figures who presumably had attachment to particular foreign others and cultures.

In short, the majority of preschoolers and second graders were attached strongly to Japan. This was more or less consistent with the previous studies that found that young children almost always expressed attachment to and preference for their ascribed national groups. Yet a fair number of second graders also expressed their attachments to foreign countries. These students possessed certain interests and parental figures that primed them to develop attachment to foreign others and objects in their daily environment.

### **Sixth and Eighth Graders**

In both sixth and eighth grades more than half of the students expressed attachment to foreign countries. In both grade levels the three most popular foreign countries were the United States, Australia, and Italy. Compared to preschoolers and second graders, sixth and eighth grades had more specific knowledge of countries in terms of their own interests. An 11-year-old boy who loved science, chose the United States "because there is NASA." A 12-year-old boy chose Italy because he could see "a lot of cars like Ferrari, Lancia, Lamborghini, and Fiat." He was known to be a "car-maniac" among his classmates, and he also professed to me his plan to work for a car

company when he grew up. A 13-year-old boy who played soccer provided a similar reason for his choice of Brazil: “Because Brazilians are physically talented. I could become a soccer player by doing a lot of practice in Brazil.” These sixth and eighth graders were more articulate than their younger counterparts in explaining their attachments to foreign peoples and countries.

Sixth and eighth graders’ reasons for choosing Japan were more or less the same as second graders’—safety and comfort that they felt about living in Japan—though they were able to more elaborate narratives about their attachments to Japan:

11-year-old girl: I have not been abroad many times, I am not familiar with foreign countries, but I like Japan because it is peaceful.

13-year-old boy: Because living conditions are good, and various facilities are well established.

13-year-old girl: Because there are various good things in Japan, and I like Japanese culture and good manners.

Unlike preschoolers and second graders, however, there was no student who identified with Japan because of familiarity with the Japanese language. Linguistic familiarity seemed to no longer play as an important role in anchoring students’ attachments to their ascribed nation.

Thus sixth and eighth graders were similar to their younger counterparts in terms of reasons for their attachments to Japan and foreign countries: the sense of safety and comfort undergirded attachment to Japan, and interest facilitated attachment to a foreign country. Nonetheless, the high percentage of attachment to foreign countries in sixth and eighth grades was distinct. Although more data are necessary to formulate a cogent interpretation of the distinct pattern, a particular developmental stage in which many sixth and eighth graders were in—puberty—might have played a role. During a period of puberty when significant physiological changes happen, adolescents tend to question



their ascribed identities and explore novel identifications (Erikson 1968; Kroger 1993). Perhaps the extensive attachments to foreign countries among sixth and eighth graders were part of the more general psychological process of identity exploration that took place in the increasingly global cultural environment where foreign humans and nonhumans were available as potential objects of novel identifications.

### **College Students**

Unlike in sixth and eighth grades, the majority of college students chose Japan as a country in which they would like to be born and grow up. There was one phrase that college students used recurrently in explaining their choices. It was “after all [*yappari*].” They were aware that Japan had problems. It was not a perfect country, but—*after all*—they still affirmed attachment to their ascribed nation. For example, one 21-year-old college senior who had spent eight years in Singapore and Australia when he was younger, chose Japan because he thought that

four seasons are wonderful, after all. Characteristics, events, food, smell, and everything that are unique to each season are all good. Also, while I have been exposed to different languages, I feel the Japanese language is wonderful.

This kind of reflective attachment to Japan was more visible than in younger students:

20-year-old female: I think every country has some problems, big or small. So, I think I’m fine with Japan because I know about its problems.

21-year-old male: Because I like Japan after all. I don’t lack complaints, but that’s not a problem because I think of making the country better.

Thus attachments to Japan that these college students expressed seem to be qualitatively different from those that younger students expressed. The former showed traces of critical reflection on the nature of their attachment to their ascribed nation.

Nevertheless, there was also another group of college students who expressed their attachments to Japan without “after all”:

20-year-old female: I was born and grew up in Japan, so I can’t imagine living in another country.

21-year-old male: I love the way I am now. If I were reborn, I would make a little more effort, but I would like to live a life similar to this one.

Like their counterparts in the younger age groups, their answers suggested that their attachments to Japan had phenomenological immutability. For instance, after the survey, Kana (21 years old) told me that she really loved Japan, and her experiences with foreigners had not been very positive:

Before coming to college, I was really afraid of foreigners. Even assistant English teachers at my high school, I felt like “I want to run away from them.” I mean, I feel really, really bad about not being able to understand them, talk with them.

It seemed as though college students in this group neither had ever felt attached to foreign people and objects nor reflected critically on their attachments to their ascribed nation. They were similar to younger students who took for granted their ascribed national identity as Japanese.

Among college students who chose countries other than Japan, Switzerland, the United States, Australia, and Sweden were the four most popular foreign countries. While college students were more articulate about reasons for their attachments to foreign countries, they were similar to their younger counterparts in that their attachments were based on their own interests:

20-year-old male (Switzerland): Because it’s a permanently neutral country, and they will never have war, and I have an impression that it’s full of nature. I like that peaceful and beautiful country.

21-year-old female (Norway): I home-stayed there. I can’t express how wonderful the life was in the midst of the great natural environment. I think Norwegians are very fortunate.

Attachments to foreign countries, however, did not seem to make college students self-hating Japanese. For example, Kimiko (23 years old) had visited Australia, Britain, France, Hong Kong, and South Korea while in college. Her desire to go abroad developed early because of her sister who was ten years older: “My sister, after she graduated from college, went to Canada and studied there for three years. That made me feel like, ‘Yeah, I too want to live abroad or study abroad.’” Yet Kimiko’s attachment to foreign countries did not turn her away from Japan. While she was still debating whether she should become a teacher after graduation, she was articulate about how she would like to contribute to Japan:

If I decide to become a teacher..., well, I don’t want to be obsessed with “for the country,” but I believe that is an extremely important job, to be involved with lives of children who will shoulder our future. I want to become a teacher after I get to know the world outside the school system. That will delay my entry into a teaching job, but I want to become a teacher after I have expanded my horizon, so I can communicate to my students what I have learned.

Apparently, attachments to foreign countries and Japan were not incompatible. While Kimiko expressed her attachment to foreign countries, she was also attached to Japan to the extent that she felt compelled to make a positive change to the country.

In a similar vein, Shizuka (23 years old) expressed her attachment to both Japan and a foreign country, in her case, South Korea. She was interested in popular music and a fan of the female South Korean singer, Boa, who was able to sing songs in both Korean and Japanese: “I like her best. She is really pretty. I came to like South Korea because of her.” After coming to college, Shizuka’s personal interests developed into academic and professional interests. At the time of the interview, Shizuka was taking Korean lessons and going to participate in a study trip to South Korea at the end of the academic year.

Her goal as a schoolteacher was to educate younger generations in such a way that they could improve Japan's relationship with Asian countries and South Korea in particular:

For my senior thesis, I'm studying the relationship between Japan and South Korea, and between Japan and Asia. I think older generations are narrow-minded. There are definitely generation gaps in attitudes toward South Korea. What I can do is to help younger generations cultivate new attitudes, perspectives that are necessary in our times. That's what I want to do. It's not so much about "for Japan." It's about contributing to the relationship between Japan and foreign countries.

Here Shizuka's attachments to Japan and South Korea seemed to be in dialogue with each other. She was not putting one country over the other but orienting herself to the relationship between the two.

Such extension of attachment beyond a single country was true of Toshio (22 years old). Toshio had a regular contact with a Cambodian graduate student in his adviser's laboratory. Through this personal contact with the Cambodian student, he got interested in Cambodia and decided to write a senior thesis about science education in Cambodia. When he visited Cambodia for a fieldwork, local children made a lasting impression on him:

I went to the Museum of Landmines, and at the entrance there were children who lost their legs... but they grinned wonderfully and said to me, like, "Thank you for coming! I hope you will visit the museum again." And that moved me greatly. That made me feel like, "I'm really glad to come here." I admire Cambodian people. Their eyes were shining, beamed with vitality.

His attachment to Cambodians, however, did not stop him from feeling attached to Japan.

Although he was cautious about excessive patriotism, he believed that being proud of Japan is important:

Being able to say, "I was born in Japan and proud of being Japanese," I think that's a very good thing. I'm not saying, "We should do things for the nation (*kuni*)." I'm just saying pride in having being born in Japan is a good thing.

Again, attachments to two nations were not constrained in zero-sum terms. Toshio extended his attachment to Cambodian people while maintaining his attachment to Japan.

The cases of these college students who expressed their attachments to foreign countries show two patterns. The first is that students' interests and contacts played an important role in the development of attachments to foreign countries. This was a recurrent pattern found across age groups. The second is that those who expressed attachment to foreign countries were not self-hating Japanese; rather, they exhibited attachments to *both* Japan and foreign countries. The results show that a multiplication of attachments does happen, as actor-network theory predicts. In contemporary Japan where everyday life is penetrated by foreigners and foreign cultural objects and idioms, even children and adolescents, who are neither frequent flyers nor immigrants, develop attachments that traverse national borders and become cosmopolitans.

### **Multiple Attachments**

Although students in the present study are not representative of the population of Japanese youth, my findings are consistent with population-level statistics compiled by the NHK Broadcasting Culture Institute. As I mentioned briefly in Chapter 1, the NHK survey "Attitude Structure of Contemporary Japanese People" conducted in 2003 found that attachments to foreign countries and peoples were strong among younger generations of Japanese: more than 80 percent of respondents under age 30 answered that they would like to have friends from foreign countries and more than 60 percent answered that they

would like to study and work abroad (NHK Broadcasting Culture Institute 2004: 127).<sup>29</sup>

This indicates that among younger generations of Japanese it is not unusual to develop attachment to foreign others and cultures.

I argue that the growth of multiple attachments parallels the material dimension of globalization. In the contemporary world, economic, political, and cultural activities are being rescaled beyond the national state (Brenner 2004; Sassen 2006). As a result, “what is still represented or experienced as ‘national’ ... may in fact have shifted away from what had historically been considered or constituted as national” (Sassen 2003: 3). On the subjective dimension, cosmopolitanism in the form of attachment to foreign others and cultures can be said to be growing inside *homo nationalis*. As Erik Erikson argued, the self that a person develops over the course of his or her life “includes all significant identifications, but it also alters them in order to make a unique and a reasonably coherent whole of them” (1959: 121). Japanese youth that I studied were all Japanese citizens and possessed attachment to Japan, albeit to different degrees. The significant number of them, however, also expressed attachment to foreign others and cultures. If Erikson, as well as cultural psychology and actor-network theory, is correct, such attachment to foreign others and cultures alter people’s sense of the self. Those who appear to be simply Japanese on surface carry inside attachments that traverse national borders.

I should like to note, however, one caveat on the current state of multiple attachments in contemporary Japan. As shown above, foreign countries to which students expressed their attachments were often those of the “West.” This means that at present the geography of attachments is West-centric. Perhaps this is due to the fact that since the

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<sup>29</sup> The population of the survey was Japanese citizens who were above 16 years of age. Subjects were selected through stratified two-stage sampling.

Meiji Restoration in the mid-nineteenth century, Japanese have measured their modernity against world powers in Western Europe and North America (Harootunian and Najita 1988; Tanaka 1993). Nonetheless, China and South Korea were the second and third most popular foreign countries among second graders. This popularity of Japan's two East Asian neighbors seems to be the result of the recent "Asian boom" in Japan, including but not limited to the increasing number of Chinese and Korean dramas on television. Transnational circulation of popular cultures among Asian countries took off in the 1990s, enabling Japanese to encounter images of other Asian peoples as their modern equals for the first time since the Meiji Restoration (Iwabuchi 2002). As countries in the Asian region like China, South Korea, and Taiwan grew into economic powers, "Asia" ceased to be Japan's "East." Growing up in a cultural environment where positive images of Chinese and Koreans circulate extensively, younger generations of Japanese may well be developing attachments to Asian peoples and countries more than older generations. If this trend continues, the geography of attachments is likely to move away from the extant West-centric one.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter has shown that some Japanese youth do develop attachments not only to Japan and but also to foreign countries. This finding diverges from the previous studies that found attachment to one's ascribed nation developed during early childhood and remained stable after that. Yet the chapter has also shown that globalization of the cultural environment and normative cosmopolitanism in Japanese education system did

not influence everyone's attachment equally. Only those who had strong interests in or contacts with foreign others and cultures expressed their attachments to foreign countries.

Moreover, these attachments to foreign countries as well as Japan were qualitatively different across age groups. Attachments among older students indicated greater psychological depth. This clearly indicates a human-developmental dynamic in attachments. A longitudinal study is necessary to clarify how initially idiosyncratic attachments to particular foreign others and cultures based on one's interests and contacts may or may not acquire psychological depth over time. Assuming that the data approximates longitudinal data, it points to the existence of multiple, at least three, trajectories of attachments: (a) those who remain attached strongly to Japan from preschool through college (straightforward national attachment); (b) those who resume strong attachment to Japan after going through a stage of strong attachment to foreign countries around sixth and eighth grade levels (curvilinear national attachment); (c) those who come to feel attached strongly to foreign countries around sixth and eighth grade levels and remain that way even at an older age (mature multiple attachments).

In the next chapter, I continue to probe the existence of cosmopolitanism in Japanese youth. While this chapter has examined how students felt attached to Japan vis-à-vis foreign countries, the next chapter is going to examine how they think about such attachments reflexively. That is, the examination of cosmopolitanism is moving on from the domain of emotion to that of cognition.



## Chapter 5

### Cosmopolitanism as Relational Cognition

While the previous chapter examined how students felt attached to Japan vis-à-vis foreign countries, this chapter examines what they thought about such attachments. Globalization does not simply circulate foreign people and objects to create the possibility of attachments that traverse national borders. It also circulates (representations of) people who actually possess such multiple attachments. Between 1980 and 2002, for instance, the number of marriages between Japanese and non-Japanese increased more than fivefold, from 6,045 to 35,879 (Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare 2003). The number exceeded forty thousands in 2004, which meant one out of fifteen new marriages involving Japanese persons was international.<sup>30</sup> Between 1994 and 2004, the number of foreign residents in Japan also increased from 1,354,011 to 1,973,747.<sup>31</sup> The growing number of international couples and foreigners in Japan expose Japanese youth to representations of people who are potentially attached to more than one country.

A case in point was Roberto Shibata who joined Ms. Kojima's second-grade homeroom in September 2005. His father was a Japanese Brazilian and his mother a

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<sup>30</sup> *Asahi Shinbun*, 31 December 2005.

<sup>31</sup> "2006 Summary Statistics of Foreign Residents in Japan," available at <http://www.moj.go.jp/PRESS/050617-1/050617-1.html> (1 January 2008).

Caucasian Brazilian, both of whom came to Japan for employment opportunities. One day Roberto and I talked about soccer in anticipation of the World Cup in Germany in June 2006. Both Roberto and I knew that Brazil and Japan had been drawn against each other at the qualifying stage. So I asked him, “Which team would you support at the World Cup, Japan or Brazil?” After a moment of reflection, he exclaimed, “Japan, Brazil, both!” “Both?” I asked. “Yeah,” said Roberto, nodding firmly.

It is one thing for Japanese youth to feel emotionally attached to countries other than Japan. It is another thing for them to cognitively represent the possibility of such attachments in their mind to make sense of people like Roberto. Cosmopolitanism as a psychological orientation has both emotional and cognitive dimensions. On the emotional dimension cosmopolitanism manifests in the form of multiple attachments that traverse national borders, challenging nationalism that tries to limit a person’s attachment only to his or her ascribed national group. But how does cosmopolitanism manifest on the cognitive dimension, and how might it challenge nationalism?

### **“Nation” as Cognition: Nationalism versus Cosmopolitanism**

As prominent sociologist of nationalism Rogers Brubaker and his colleagues (Brubaker, Loveman, Stamatov 2004; Brubaker, Feischmidt, Fox, and Grancea 2006) have argued, “nation” is primarily a way of seeing, a unit of categorical classification. In this cognitive sense, nationalism is a way of seeing the world in terms of “nations” that are defined as categorical and exclusive entities. That is, nationalism is “a theory about the world being ‘naturally’ divided into [national] communities” (Billig 1995: 63), stipulating that “each people has an ‘essential’ identity” and “people are normally

members of one and only one nation” (Calhoun 1997: 7; 18). Here nationalism conceptually curtails the possibility of a person possessing attachments to multiple nations. Nationalism operates according to the logic of either-or, whereas cosmopolitanism operates according to that of both-and.

The categorically exclusive thinking of nationalism seems to be expressed most clearly in two domains. The first domain is pride. The positive feeling toward one’s ascribed national group manifests most clearly in the idea of a “chosen people.” This nationalist belief is consistent with findings in social identity theory that have shown that people are motivated to feel positive toward their own groups. In a situation where groups are understood as mutually exclusive like nations, people tend to generate a discourse to emphasize desirability of their own group over outgroups (Nesdale and Flesser 2001; Turner 1999). The popular literary genre “Theory of the Japanese (*Nihonjinron*)” articulates most clearly the nationalist model of pride in terms of what made the Japanese people so special (Befu 2001; Yoshino 1992).

The second domain is loyalty. This is “the dimension of nationalism that has the clearest claim to be primordial” (Calhoun 1997: 6). When people are suspected of multiple national loyalties, they are seen as traitors; for example, such a perception motivated the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II. The idea of national loyalty is also invoked to commemorate dead soldiers. Some soldiers sacrifice their lives primarily for their loved ones, not for their country (Ohnuki-Tierney 2002). Nationalism reduces such a cognitively complex picture of the world and allows people to interpret soldiers’ deaths simply as straightforward expressions of national loyalty.

Thus the categorically exclusive logic of nationalism forecloses the possibility of multiple attachments in these two domains because it dictates that a person is proud of and loyal to only one nation. Cosmopolitanism, however, supports a different cognitive model for understanding attachments. Cosmopolitanism operates according to the logic of both-and because it permits a multiplication of attachments across national borders. Under the purview of cosmopolitanism, people are allowed to be proud of and loyal to more than one nation. These forms of multiple attachments that traverse national borders are fundamentally at odds with nationalism that divides the world into discrete nations and confines a person's attachment—pride and loyalty—to one nation.

### **Method and Data**

During my fieldwork I gave students a survey that examined their cognitive models of attachment. To half of the participants I presented the following scenario:

A baby was born to the Japanese couple Mr. and Ms. Sato. For reasons, the baby was adopted and raised by the American couple Mr. and Ms. Smith. They named the baby Ken Smith. Ken is growing up at their home. The Satos have black eyes, are short, like rice, think that Japan is better than America, and speak only Japanese. The Smiths have blue eyes, are tall, like wheat, think that America is better than Japan, and speak only English.

To the other half of participants I gave a reverse scenario in which a baby born to Mr. and Ms. Smith was adopted, named Ken Sato, and raised by Mr. and Ms. Sato. I then asked students to answer the following questions and provide reasons for their answers:

- (1) Which country does Ken think is better when he grows up?
- (2) Ken has grown up to become a twenty-year-old adult. Now Japan and America play against each other at the World Cup. Which team is Ken more likely to support?

Before proceeding to present results, let me explain briefly what the survey tries to probe. The survey was designed to have the same structure as a “switched-at-birth” task that developmental psychologists use to probe “psychological essentialism.”<sup>32</sup> I was interested specifically in one element of psychological essentialism called “boundary intensification.” It is a cognitive operation that eliminates categorical ambiguities. When it is not immediately clear which category someone or something belongs to, “boundary intensification” augments category boundaries as discontinuous and assimilates ambiguities into existent categories (Gelman 2003: 67). This boundary intensification of psychological essentialism parallels the categorically exclusive thinking of nationalism. A switched-at-birth task that has been developed to test the former should be transferrable to a study of the latter.

In the scenario described above, Ken is presented as a category anomaly. His biological and adoptive parents belong to different countries, and his birth and adopted countries are different. In theory there are two cognitive strategies to cope with the category ambiguity. The first is to invoke the categorically exclusive thinking of nationalism and delimits Ken’s attachment to either Japan or the United States. If students answered that Ken was attached to his birth country, they used a biologically determinist version of nationalism. If students answered that Ken was attached to his

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<sup>32</sup> Psychological essentialism is “the view that certain categories have an underlying reality or true nature that one cannot observe directly but that gives an object its identity, and is responsible for other similarities that category members share” (Gelman 2004: 404). Psychological essentialism operates when humans think with social-group categories, such as race, ethnicity, and nationality (Gil-White 2001; Hirschfeld 1996; Medin, Unsworth, and Hirschfeld 2007). Psychological essentialism primes humans to think that boundaries of social-group categories are natural and discrete, category membership is innate and immutable, and social-group categories have essences that causally determine observable characteristics of their members. It facilitates reification of man-made social-group categories as natural, substantive, discrete, and causal entities.

adoptive country, they used a culturally determinist version of nationalism. Either way, the possibility of attachments to both Japan and the United States is excluded.

The second cognitive strategy is to accept the category ambiguity. If students answered that they could not tell to which country Ken felt attached, it means that they did not use the categorically exclusive thinking of nationalism to resolve the category ambiguity. If not the categorically exclusive thinking of nationalism, however, what cognitive model of attachment did these students use instead?

This is why it was crucial for me to ask even those who chose “can’t tell” rationales for their choices. Researchers typically exclude “can’t tell” from their substantive analyses. “Can’t tell,” however, can be an important source of information when researchers are interested in cognitive models that people use in their everyday life. This is because hesitation and confusion reflected in “can’t tell” points to the possibility that respondents do not share the framing of questions defined by researchers. The switched-at-birth task, for instance, frames a respondent’s choice in terms of two poles: birth country versus adoptive country. The logic of either-or is already implicit in the task. If respondents refused to answer in an either-or fashion and provided their own rationales, their “can’t tell” can reveal information about their cognitive models in ecologically more valid terms. As Richard Shweder has pointed out, “From the point of view of cultural psychology almost everything interesting about this type of experimental approach turns on understanding how the “stimulus situation,” or experimental game is understood and given meaning from the “native point of view” of members of different groups” (2007: 832). Thus “can’t tell” is an opportunity to probe into cognitive models that people use in their everyday life.

## Results

First, the effect of age group upon an inference about Ken's pride was statistically significant,  $\chi^2 (6, N = 440) = 140.032, p < .001$ . Two scenarios made no statistically significant difference. Second grade was different from the other three groups in that 33.7 percent of them thought that Ken would think that his birth country was better than his adoptive one. Sixth grade was the most biased for pride in the adoptive country. Eighth grade was similar to sixth grade, except for an increase in the percentage of students who chose "can't tell." College students were different from the other three groups in that the percentages of those who chose "adoptive country" and "can't tell" were more or less the same: 49.5 percent and 47.7 percent, respectively.

Table 5.1 Pride

	Group (Age)			
	2nd grade (7-8) <i>n</i> = 89	6th grade (11-12) <i>n</i> = 118	8th grade (13-14) <i>n</i> = 125	College (20-23) <i>n</i> = 107
Birth country	33.7 %	8.5 %	9.5 %	2.8 %
Adoptive country	62.9 %	88.1 %	77.8 %	49.5 %
Can't tell	3.4 %	3.4 %	12.7 %	47.7 %

Second, the effect of age group on an inference about Ken's loyalty was statistically significant,  $\chi^2 (6, N = 442) = 30.643, p < .001$ . Those who thought that Ken would be loyal to his adoptive country were the majority across age groups. At the same

time, the percentage of students who answered “can’t tell” increased with age and peaked 39.3 percent in college. Among college students two scenarios made a statistically significant difference with an alpha level of .05,  $\chi^2 (2, n = 107) = 7.341, p = .025$ . While 26.4 percent of college students chose “can’t tell” in the scenario where Ken was adopted by the American couple, 51.9 percent of them answered “can’t tell” in the scenario where Ken was adopted by the Japanese couple. Correlative with this change was a difference in the percentage of college students who answered Ken would support his adoptive country: 64.2 percent in the first scenario and 40.7 percent in the second scenario. In other words, college students thought that if the baby grew up in the United States, he was more likely to be loyal to his adoptive country, compared to growing up in Japan.

Table 5.2 Loyalty

	Group (Age)			
	2nd grade (7-8) <i>n</i> = 89	6th grade (11-12) <i>n</i> = 121	8th grade (13-14) <i>n</i> = 125	College (20-23) <i>n</i> = 107
Birth country	24.7 %	19.8 %	21.6 %	8.4 %
Adoptive country	65.2 %	61.2 %	49.6 %	52.3 %
Can’t tell	10.1 %	19 %	28.8 %	39.3 %

The tables presented above show three overall patterns. First of all, in both domains—pride and loyalty—the biologically deterministic version of nationalism was more common among younger students. Second, in both domains, the majority of students thought in culturally deterministic terms. Third, the percentage of students who



chose “can’t tell” increased with age. In the following, I summarize and analyze students’ rationales for their choices in order to clarify cognitive models of attachment that students used.

### **Biological Determinism**

Those who answered that Ken’s pride or loyalty would be biased for his birth country used the categorically exclusive thinking of nationalism in biologically deterministic terms. For example, in making inferences about Ken’s pride, second graders argued that his birth origin would matter more than his upbringing<sup>33</sup>:

8-year-old, female (J→A): Because he was born from Mr. and Ms. Sato. He loves Japan more.

7-year-old, female (A→J): Because Ms. Smith gave birth to the baby in America.

Older students used the same biological-determinist thinking:

11-year-old, male (J→A): Because Japan is his mother country.

11-year-old, male (A→J): Because that’s the country where he was born.

14-year-old, male (J→A): Because I don’t think he will lose his Japanese heart (*kokoro*).

21-year-old, female (J→A): Ken is originally Japanese. I think a Japanese person (*nihonjin*) feels proud of the place where he was born, not where he grew up.

These students thought that Ken was either Japanese or American at birth, which in turn would determine his pride despite his upbringing in his adoptive country.

The similar biological-determinist thinking was also found in the domain of loyalty: Ken’s loyalty was fixed at birth and he would remain loyal to his birth country even after spending twenty years in his adoptive country:

7-year-old, female (J→A): Because he was born in Japan.

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<sup>33</sup> Below, “J→A” denotes that a student responded to the scenario where the baby born to the Japanese couple was adopted by the American couple. “A→J” denotes that a student responded to the reverse scenario.

7-year-old, female (A→J): Because he was born in America first, and he is an American.

11-year-old, male (J→A): I think he will support a team from his Japanese hometown (*furusato*).

11-year-old, female (A→J): Because America is his birthplace.

13-year-old, female (A→J): Because his citizenship is American, I think he will support a team from his birthplace, even though he's grown up in Japan.

21-year-old, female (A→J): When he becomes 20 years old, I think he becomes conscious of his being American.

These students thought of Ken's birthplace as a kind of unbreakable "umbilical cord" that could bind his loyalty forever.

In short, there were a minority of students who thought of Ken's pride and loyalty in biologically deterministic terms. In a way, their cognitive model of attachment was that of strictly ethnic nationalism: a person is determined to remain attached to a nation to which he was born.<sup>34</sup>

### **Cultural Determinism**

The majority of students answered that Ken's pride or loyalty was biased for his adoptive country. Their cognitive model of attachment was culturally deterministic because it took upbringing as a main causal determinant. Judging Ken's pride, second graders thought that his upbringing was decisive:

7-year-old, male (J→A): He was born in Japan, but he's always in America. He grows up in America.

7-year-old, female (A→J): Because he's been brought up in Japan.

Older students also invoked cultural determinism:

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<sup>34</sup> Although the distinction between ethnic and civic nationalisms has been shown to be untenable and unhelpful as an analytical framework (Brubaker 1996), the distinction can be still deployed usefully when objects of analysis are practical cognitive operations in ordinary people.

12-year-old, male (J→A): Because he grows up in America and he looks like an American now.

12-year-old, female (A→J): He came to Japan, and he has been in Japan, so I think he will learn good things about Japan and Japanese culture, and he thinks that Japan is better.

13-year-old, female (J→A): Because he probably thinks that he is an American.

14-year-old, female (A→J): Because he has always lived in Japan. I don't think he thinks of America as his homeland (*bokoku*).

22-year-old, male (J→A): I think he has acquired American culture and tradition because he has grown up in America. I think Ken's homeland can be only America.

22-year-old, male (A→J): He will think the place where he has grown up (*furusato*), Japan, is better. It is even more so because his adoptive parents think so.

For these students, Ken would become a member of his adoptive country psychologically because of his upbringing. This “acculturation” then would make Ken proud of his adoptive country.

In a similar vein, student used cultural determinism to explain Ken's loyalty to his adoptive country:

8-year-old, female (J→A): Ken was born in Japan, but he went to America. After growing up, he is not Japanese but American. So he thinks Japan is an opponent.

8-year-old, male (A→J): Ken likes Japan because he's been raised by Mr. and Ms. Sato.

11-year-old, male (J→A): Because he thinks he is an American.

11-year-old, female (A→J): Because he's lived in Japan for a long time, he's more familiar with Japan, and he thinks Japan is better.

13-year-old, female (J→A): It's natural to support players from one's own country.

13-year-old, female (A→J): He no longer thinks of himself as an American after growing up in Japan.

21-year-old, male (J→A): He is familiar with American players and thinks America is his motherland (*bokoku*).

21-year-old, female (A→J): I think his heart (*kokoro*) has been brought up to be Japanese.

The majority of students across age groups invoked this kind of cognitive model that determined Ken's loyalty in culturally deterministic terms. “After growing up in Japan

for twenty years,” as one 21-year old college student stated, “isn’t it natural for Ken to support Japan?”

In short, the majority of students across age groups used the culturally deterministic version of nationalism when making inferences about Ken’s pride and loyalty. Their cognitive model took upbringing as a causal determinant of attachment. These students who thought about Ken’s attachment in culturally deterministic terms, however, were fundamentally similar to those who thought in biologically deterministic terms: both groups of students invoked the categorically exclusive thinking of nationalism that confined Ken’s attachment only to one nation. Whether nature or nurture was conceptualized as a causal determinant of attachment, their cognitive models excluded the possibility of multiple attachments that could traverse national borders.

### **Cosmopolitanism**

Now let me turn to rationales provided by a group of students who chose “can’t tell.” An increase in the percentage of “can’t tell” from second grade through college was consistent in both domains—Ken’s pride and loyalty. The most common rationale for “can’t tell” regarding both Ken’s pride and loyalty was his bi-nationality. These students thought that Ken would grow up to regard highly and support both countries because of his dual attachment:

8-year-old, male (J→A): He thinks both countries are good.

12-year-old, male (A→J): I don’t think Ken knows what to do. He was born in America, but he has lived in Japan, so he doesn’t know which team to support.

13-year-old, female (A→J): He will think both America and Japan are equally good because his real parents are American and his adoptive parents are Japanese.

14-year-old, female (A→J): I think he will support both America and Japan. I don’t think he can choose.

21-year-old, female (J→A): I think he would answer, “Both are good.” He is both Japanese and American.

21-year-old, male (A→J): Because Ken knows both Japanese and Americans, he can see good things about both countries, and I don’t think he will judge which is better.

22-year-old, female (J→A): I think he will support both. It’s not a matter of which is better, but he wishes that both teams could win.

21-year-old, female (A→J): I think Ken is both American and Japanese. I think he likes and supports both countries.

21-year-old, male (A→J): If I were Ken, I would think of both as my homeland and simply enjoy watching the game regardless of its outcome.

These students did not subscribe to the categorically exclusive thinking of nationalism. Instead, they thought that it was possible for Ken to develop attachments to both of his birth and adoptive countries. While nationalism is based on the logic of either-or, their cognitive models of attachments operated according to the logic of both-and. As one 22-year-old female student put it, she could not tell whether Ken would grow up to support Japan or the United States because “he is an existence standing between his biological and adoptive parents.” Ken’s category ambiguity was accepted as categorical hybridity by virtue of his relationships that cut across national borders.

One interesting finding was the asymmetry in college students’ responses to the question of Ken’s loyalty between the two scenarios. In the scenario where Ken was adopted by Mr. and Ms. Smith, the majority of college students used the culturally deterministic version of nationalism; however, in the reverse scenario where Ken was adopted by Mr. and Ms. Suzuki, those who chose “can’t tell” were the majority. This asymmetry suggested that college students perceived the United States as having greater power to “nationalize” its population than Japan. As the United States began a war in Iraq in 2003, the perception that Americans were highly patriotic or nationalistic became widespread in Japan. This may have led college students, who were politically more

conscious than younger students, to think that an adopted baby in the United States would be more likely to be loyal to his adopted country. To put it in the other way around, the scenario where Ken was adopted by the Japanese couple discouraged students to make a causal link between Ken's upbringing in Japan and his loyalty to Japan. This may be because the popular discourse of pacifism and its opposition to nationalism was still strong in Japan. The college students may have had considered Japan to be less nationalistic and therefore more conducive to the possibility of multiple attachments.

Table 5.3 College Students (Loyalty)

	Japan → America <i>n</i> = 53	America → Japan <i>n</i> = 54
Birth country	9.4 %	7.4 %
Adoptive country	64.2 %	40.7 %
Can't tell	26.4 %	51.9 %

Overall, many of the students who invoked Ken's bi-nationality in domains of pride and loyalty based on his relationships with both Japan and America. They reasoned that Ken could develop multiple attachments because of his social relationships that traversed national borders. This cognitive model that permitted multiple attachments was consistent with the new version of normative cosmopolitanism, horizontal traversal of national borders. Although the categorically exclusive thinking of nationalism predominated across the four age groups, the percentage of students who subscribed to the cosmopolitan cognitive model of multiple attachments increased with age.

## **Interdependent Self**

I suggest that the “relational cognition” of attachment that underwrote the idea of bi-nationality is correlated with the emphasis on the interdependency of the self and the world in social studies and moral education that I discussed in Chapter 3. Indeed, the relational cognition of attachment and the emphasis on the interdependency are probably homologous in the more general cultural idiom that operates in Japan: a construal of the self as interdependent with others (Markus and Kitayama 1991; Cross, Gore, and Morris 2002). A most legitimate cognitive and normative model of the self in Japan is defined in terms of social relationships in which the self is embedded. In this model the self is understood to be not an atomistic, free-standing entity, but as a nodal point of relations with others. When this model of interdependent self is recruited into a domain of nationality, it can facilitate cosmopolitanism that permits the self to be embedded in social relationships across national borders and therefore develop multiple attachments.

That relational cognition is a general cultural idiom in Japan is evinced by the following two examples from media coverage of the 2006 Turin Winter Olympics the 2006 World Cup in Germany. The first example is an American/Japanese figure skater Rena Inoue. She was born and grew up in Japan, but she became an American citizen and represented the United States in figure skating pair at the Turin Winter Olympics in 2006. When NHK aired television coverage of Inoue and her partner John Baldwin on *Highlights of Turin Olympics* on 27 February 2007, the broadcaster introduced that Inoue and Baldwin were the first pair ever who had succeeded a throw triple axel in the history of Winter Olympics. The broadcaster then proceeded to emphasize the close relationship between Inoue and Baldwin: “A throw triple axel where a woman thrown into the air

makes three and half turns. It's something that only a perfectly synchronized pair can accomplish." The camera zoomed into Inoue and Baldwin embracing each other after the short program of the competition where they succeeded the first-ever throw triple axel. After the close-up shot of the pair, the camera switched to another close-up of the audience waving the Stars and the Stripes. This sequence of audio-visual narrative signified Inoue as American through her relationship with Baldwin and the American national flag.

After this sequence, however, the audio-visual narrative shifted its focus to how Inoue made a comeback from a cancer in the past. The camera zoomed into a letter that Inoue wrote to her mother in Japan while she was battling a cancer in a hospital in the United States. Although the earlier audio-visual narrative had introduced Inoue as representing the United States, this one emphasized her Japaneseness in terms of her Japanese mother. Here NHK's television program did not present Inoue either American or Japanese in mutually exclusive terms. Inoue was American because of her relationship with Baldwin and her naturalization as an American citizen. But she was also Japanese because of her relationship with her mother. The audio-visual narrative of the television coverage therefore left unresolved the ambiguity of Inoue's national affiliation: she was presented as both American and Japanese, embedded in intimate and familial relationships that cut across national borders.

The second example is the Brazilian/Japanese soccer player Alessandro dos Santos. He was born in Brazil and naturalized to become a Japanese citizen and played for the Japanese national team at the World Cup in Germany in June 2006. Santos was not the first naturalized Brazilian-Japanese soccer player on the national team; for



example, Ramos Ruy and Wagner Augusto Lopes preceded him in the 1990s. Santos attracted greater attention because Japan and Brazil met at the World Cup for the first time in Germany. On 23 June 2006, a day after the match between Japan and Brazil, *Asahi Shinbun*, one of the two largest national newspapers in Japan, published an article as a special tribute to Santos. The article opened with the sentence, “Alessandro dos Santos assisted Japan’s first goal. He must have fought the match against his motherland Brazil with special feelings.” While presenting Brazil as Santos’s “motherland,” the article concluded with the following observation: “Before the match, Santos placed his right hand on his chest and sang ‘*Kimigayo*’ [the Japanese national anthem]. His face, gazing afar, was none other than Japanese.” The newspaper article therefore did not present Santos as either Japanese or Brazilian: Santos was both Brazilian and Japanese.

Interestingly, the middle, substantial part of the newspaper article was devoted to interviews with Santos’s Brazilian parents. They came to see the match between Japan and Brazil, wearing uniforms of the Japanese national team. The interviews revealed that Santos’s father was a professional soccer player himself who had once aspired to play for “*Seleção*,” the Brazilian national team. Watching his son playing against the very *Seleção*, he had “special emotions that can’t be expressed in words.” Although Santos’s mother strongly opposed at first to Santos’s naturalization to become a Japanese citizen, she was now glad to see his son’s “heroic performance.” Santos’ parents felt “very proud” that their son was playing for the Japanese national team. Here the newspaper article illustrated that naturalization did not eliminate Santos’s relationship with his Brazilian parents. While Santos was Japanese because of his Japanese citizenship and his

relationships with his Japanese teammates, he was also Brazilian because of his relationships with his Brazilian parents.

Thus the examples of Rena Inoue and Alessandro dos Santos show that the interdependent nature of the self is emphasized not only in textbooks and lessons but also in mass media. I suggest that this cognitive model of the interdependent self helps some Japanese youth break away from the categorically exclusive thinking of nationalism, though the present study cannot answer exactly why only some youth, not others, transposed the model of the interdependent self into the domains of national pride and loyalty.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter has shown that cosmopolitanism manifests on the cognitive dimension in the form of thinking that permits multiple attachments based on a person's social relationships that traverse national borders. That is, the relational thinking enables people to mentally or cognitively represent multiple attachments—cosmopolitanism—in their mind, to break away from the categorically exclusive thinking of nationalism. Moreover, the data indicate that the relational thinking of cosmopolitanism increased consistently with age. This pattern presents an interesting contrast with the pattern found in the previous chapter. On the emotional dimension, the percentage of students with attachments that traversed national borders peaked in sixth and eighth grades and decreased in college. On the cognitive dimension, however, the percentage of students with cognitive models of attachments that traversed national borders increased almost additively and peaked in college. This means that while college students did not feel

attachment beyond Japan as much as sixth and eighth graders did, the former recognized more readily than the latter that a person could have attachment to more than one nation in theory.

But what does this disjunction between the emotional and cognitive dimensions mean? How should this pattern be interpreted in terms of different degrees of immersion in the globalized cultural environment and different stages of human development? Although the dissertation has made progress in shedding light on cosmopolitanism in contemporary Japan, it has also generated new questions. The next, concluding chapter sums up findings and arguments of the dissertation and articulates further research questions that they point to.

## **Chapter 6**

### **The Future of Cosmopolitanism**

The dissertation has provided a preliminary report on cosmopolitanism in contemporary Japan. Chapter 2 illustrated how normative cosmopolitanism in the sense of allegiance to humanity as a whole was institutionalized in the Japanese education system in the aftermath of World War II and how it acquired the new meaning of horizontal traversal of national borders after perceived realities of globalization began to grow in the 1970s. Next, Chapter 3 clarified how normative cosmopolitanism at the system level was translated into textbooks and lessons of social studies and moral education. Anchored in logics of moral education, textbooks of social studies promoted attachment to foreign others and cultures and emphasized the interdependency of peoples and countries across the world, which was consistent with the new meaning of normative cosmopolitanism. Chapter 4 then zoomed into students and probed whether and how they actually developed attachment to foreign peoples and countries in the globalized cultural environment where such attachment was normatively encouraged by the education system. Compared to prior research, the percentage of youth who expressed attachments to foreign countries increased, indicating the existence of cosmopolitanism. Chapter 5 proceeded to examine the cognitive dimension of cosmopolitanism. Although the


majority of students subscribed to nationalist models that confined a person's attachment to only one nation, the percentage of students who subscribed to models, which permitted a person's attachment to multiply based on his social ties that cut across national borders, increased with age. Thus, mediated by the education system that emphasized attachment to foreign peoples and interdependency of the world, globalization of the cultural environment leads to the psychological orientation of cosmopolitanism in some youth in contemporary Japan.

A contribution of the dissertation is twofold. The first is to clarify a role of the education system as a causal mediator of the relationship between globalization and cosmopolitanism. When social theorists of cosmopolitanism invoke globalization as an environmental cause of cosmopolitanism, they cite mostly changes in mass media and popular culture. They have not considered education seriously. Given that the education system provides people with explicit and systematic instructions of how they should think and feel about their own nation vis-à-vis foreign nations, however, studies of cosmopolitanism cannot bypass the question of how the education system mediates psychological effects of globalization. The importance of the education system is reinforced further by the fact that children and adolescents, who are malleable human-developmentally, spend more than one third of their weekdays inside schools learning cognitive and normative models of the social world. The dissertation has shown that while the Japanese education system continues to promote nationalism, it also facilitates cosmopolitanism by encouraging attachment to foreign peoples and emphasizing the interdependency of the world based on logics of moral education.

The second contribution of the dissertation is to demarcate empirically what cosmopolitanism looks like, which in turn refines the social theory of cosmopolitanism. Although cosmopolitanism is becoming a buzzword in social theory, empirical investigation of the phenomenon lags behind the theoretical hype. The dissertation joins a group of recent studies that began to propose survey and interview questions to measure cosmopolitanism as a psychological orientation (Mau, Mewes, Zimmermann 2008; Phillips and Smith 2008; Woodward, Skrbis, and Bean 2008). Specifically, the dissertation has probed cosmopolitanism on emotional and cognitive dimensions in terms of the concept of “attachment.” On the emotional dimension cosmopolitanism manifested in the form of attachment to both Japan and foreign countries. On the cognitive dimension cosmopolitanism manifested in the form of models of attachments that traversed national borders in the domains of pride and loyalty. These findings make it clear that cosmopolitanism as a psychological orientation is the result of the intensification of social relationships as felt and thought in everyday life rather than the transcendence of such relationships.

Now how do these two contributions add up to answer the central question of the dissertation—the causal relationship between globalization and cosmopolitanism? The causal chart below summarizes the causal relationship among globalization, cosmopolitanism, and education:

Figure 6.1 Relationship among Globalization, Cosmopolitanism, and Education



The dissertation has focused on two elements of cosmopolitanism as a psychological orientation of openness to foreign others and cultures: Japanese youth's emotional attachments to Japan vis-à-vis other countries and their cognitive models of national attachments in general. The emergence of cosmopolitanism is driven by globalization, the environmental change characterized by penetration of foreigners and foreign cultural objects into everyday life. Globalization circulates foreigners and foreign cultural objects as potential objects of attachments as well as representations of people (e.g. international couples) who possess multiple attachments that traverse national borders. The circulation of foreign people and objects also intensifies perceptions of connections across national borders. The education system then mediates this causal relationship between globalization and cosmopolitanism by legitimizing cognitive and normative models of the social world that are conducive to cosmopolitanism. Specifically, the Japanese education

system encourages students to develop attachment to foreign peoples and countries; it also encourages students to think of the world, the national state, and the self in terms of social connections that traverse boundaries. These operations of the Japanese education system facilitate psychological effects that globalization of the cultural environment exerts on students.

### **Looking Forward**

Thus the multi-method research on the Japanese case has not only broadened a scope of social theory of cosmopolitanism beyond the European context but also made progress in theorizing causal mechanisms and processes that mediate the relationship between globalization and cosmopolitanism. As I noted in Chapter 1, however, the dissertation is only a first step in a series of continuing efforts to understand the “cosmopolitan condition” of the contemporary world. Below, I conclude the dissertation by spelling out further research questions based on findings and arguments that I presented in the preceding chapters.

#### *Question 1: How durable and episodic is cosmopolitanism?*

The results of survey interviews gave an impression that attachments that students expressed and cognitive models that they used were fairly stable psychologically; however, it is possible that such attachments and cognitive models were manufactured artificially by the survey questions. Put somewhat differently: how much is cosmopolitanism as a form of subjectivity dependent on immediate discursive contexts?



Perhaps cosmopolitanism may be intermittent and episodic, as is the case with nationalism (Brubaker, Feischmidt, Fox, and Grancea 2006). It may be simply one “*modality of experience*, rather than a thing, a substance, an attribute” (207) among other modalities of experience whose saliencies change depending on time and place. Ethnographic data from my fieldwork indicates that cosmopolitanism indeed exhibited an episodic character. For instance, students spontaneously expressed their attachments to Japan and foreign peoples most often in conjunction with international events, such as the Turin Winter Olympics, Helsinki World Championships in Athletics, and the World Cup in Germany. This episodic and idiomatic nature of cosmopolitanism warrants further ethnographic studies to demarcate in which discursive contexts and spheres of social life cosmopolitanism is more likely to be activated, and in what manners.

Nevertheless, I do not think that cosmopolitanism (or nationalism) is completely episodic. Instead of generating cosmopolitanism out of nothing, those emotional events recruited and heightened attachments that students had already developed. Feeling attached to foreign others and cultures, as well as expressing such attachment, presupposes a schema that has developed over the course of life. The question should not be framed as a dichotomous one of whether cosmopolitanism is an episodic event or a durable schema. Rather, the question is how quotidian cultural practices build up cosmopolitanism gradually and how extraordinary events intermittently punctuate and reinforce its durability. Ethnographic studies with longitudinal emphasis will be necessary to answer this question.

*Question 2: How does cosmopolitanism develop over the course of life?*

Since cosmopolitanism is a psychological orientation, it inherently has a human-developmental aspect. Indeed, the cross-sectional data I have used in the dissertation indicates a human-developmental dynamic in cosmopolitanism. Older students showed greater degrees of seriousness and psychological depth when they expressed their attachments to foreign countries. Older students were also more likely to use cognitive models that permitted multiple attachments to traverse national borders. A longitudinal study is necessary to clarify human-developmental dynamics of cosmopolitanism. In this regard, future research on cosmopolitanism should include older adults and examine whether and how cosmopolitanism develops beyond youth.

Moreover, how is the development of attachments on the emotional dimension related to that of cognitive models of attachments? The question of the relationship between emotional and cognitive dimensions of cosmopolitanism needs further investigation especially because the dissertation found a disjunction between trajectories of development of cosmopolitanism on emotional and cognitive dimensions: while the percentage of students who expressed attachments to foreign countries peaked in sixth and eighth grades, that of students who subscribed to cognitive models of multiple attachments that traverse national borders peaked in college. One possible interpretation of this disjunction is that in the globalized cultural environment, the older people get, the more conscious they are of the existence of people with multiple attachments because they are cognitively more mature to notice complexities of the world; however, since they are older and have more or less settled in Japan, the more attached they feel toward Japan, whereas younger students have more open future and therefore feel more free in actively exploring attachments to foreign peoples, countries, and cultures.

To say the least, the disjunction between emotional and cognitive dimensions suggests that cosmopolitanism is not an all-encompassing psychological orientation. Some people can be cosmopolitan cognitively while remaining nationalist emotionally. Put somewhat differently, within a single person different psychological domains can become cosmopolitan or nationalist to varying degrees. That is, cosmopolitanism can manifest different psychological configurations among individuals. To capture such different configurations, it will be necessary to develop a scale to measure different dimensions of cosmopolitanism as a multi-faceted psychological orientation.

*Question 3: How does cosmopolitanism interact with nationalism?*

College students who expressed attachment to foreign countries were not self-hating Japanese; however, it is still unclear how attachments to foreign others and cultures may affect attachment to one's ascribed nation. In a similar vein, it is not clear whether and how a person switches between different cognitive models of attachments depending on contexts (e.g. some contexts may prime a person to invoke a nationalist model of attachment than a cosmopolitanism one). These questions are coterminous with that of how cosmopolitanism interacts with nationalism.

Among social theorists there is an emerging consensus that cosmopolitanism is not displacing nationalism in a zero-sum manner; rather, for cosmopolitanism to develop, it needs to presuppose existent cultural practices and institutions anchored in nationalism and national states (Beck and Sznaider 2006; Calhoun 2008; Roudometof 2005). While this formulation sounds reasonable, it does not specify mechanisms of how cosmopolitanism and nationalism can coexist. Are cosmopolitanism and nationalism two

distinct tool-kits, idioms, and modalities of experiences that are deployed in different moments? Or does the emergence of cosmopolitanism fundamentally change the nature of nationalism?

The relationship between cosmopolitanism and nationalism is particularly vexing in contemporary Japan. While the Japanese education system continues to uphold the legacy of cosmopolitanism, it has gone through revisionist reforms in recent years; for instance, the Ministry of Education approved history textbooks that discounted atrocities that the Japanese military had committed during World War II, and the Parliament passed the new Fundamental Law of Education that emphasized the importance of patriotism. Thus, since the late 1970s globalization seems to have strengthened both cosmopolitanism and nationalism in Japan. How are cosmopolitanism and nationalism articulated with each other at the institutional level, and how do tensions and contradictions between the two at the institutional level influence ways of feeling, thinking, and acting at the individual level? For social theory of cosmopolitanism, this is one of the most challenging questions, both conceptually and empirically.

*Question 4: How does a structural location influence the likelihood of cosmopolitanism?*

Furthermore, it is important to study effects of different values that “globalization” takes across different parts of the world so as to clarify the causal relationship between globalization and cosmopolitanism. Commenting on the relationship between globalization and identity, Charles Tilly contrasted two approaches:

Systemic theorists often treat globalization and identities as, respectively, a systemic property and a consequence of location within the system. Relational theorists counter that globalization consists of alterations in connections among persons, groups, and social sites, which in their turn alter the array of identities

available to those persons, groups, and social sites. No body of evidence will in itself resolve disputes between systemic and relational accounts (2008: 34-35).

I disagree. If no body of evidence ever resolves between systemic and relational approaches, it is because there is no dispute to begin with. Connections to foreign humans and nonhumans available to people are differentially distributed depending on people's structural locations within a given system. Daily practices in different parts of the world are embedded in transnational connections in different ways and to different degrees due to different histories and political climates. Even within a single national state, available connections to foreign humans and nonhumans can vary significantly depending on a person's structural location in terms of his or her age, gender, social class, etc. Synthesizing systemic and relational approaches can help clarify how a range of attachments and cognitive models available to people depends on their structural locations within and across national states.

Put another way, this synthetic approach will be able to delineate different forms of cosmopolitanism and their different carriers and causal mechanisms. Cosmopolitanism among elite frequent flyers (Calhoun 2003), cosmopolitanism among immigrants and refugees (Pollock, et al. 2000), and cosmopolitanism among non-immigrants that the dissertation has illustrated are all different from each other. The proposed framework that combines systemic and relational approaches can help social theorists of cosmopolitanism move beyond a dispute over who should be called cosmopolitan and instead begin to theorize different cosmopolitanisms in the plural.

*Question 5: How do local histories and cultural practices mediate the relationship between globalization and cosmopolitanism?*

Related to the question of structural location, it is also important to probe how heterogeneous histories and cultural forms in locales influence forms of cosmopolitanism. As discussed in Chapter 5, in the context of Japan cognitive models of attachments may have been influenced by a cultural idiom that represents the self as a nodal point of relations with others. Some students may have transposed the more general cultural idiom of the interdependent self to the specific cognitive task, rejecting the categorically exclusive thinking of nationalism and instead adopting the relational cognitive model that permitted attachments to traverse national borders.

In addition to such “indigenous” cultural resources that are available to the development of cosmopolitanism, there are also violent histories that nonetheless created extensive contacts among peoples of different nationalities as a basis of cosmopolitanism in the contemporary world. Colonialism, for example, bred struggles between the colonizer and the colonized; however, it also generated the possibility of attachment and identification that could cut across the boundary between the colonizer and the colonized (Gandhi 2006). That is, violent contacts among people can lead not only to conflicts but also to attachments. Although the dissertation examined only the post-World War II history of Japanese education, legacies of Japanese imperialism in Asia before World War II may have influenced the postwar institutionalization of normative cosmopolitanism in education and contemporary students’ attitudes toward Western and non-Western countries and peoples. Future research on the mediating role of the education system needs to pay greater attention to larger historical and cultural formations in which globalization, cosmopolitanism, and education are embedded.

*Question 6: How do different educational practices channel psychological effects of globalization for or against cosmopolitanism?*

Finally, it is important to recognize that education systems may not always mediate psychological effects of globalization in the direction of cosmopolitanism. Some education systems may encourage students to sever their attachments with foreign people and objects in their everyday life. If education systems discourage cosmopolitanism while mass media encourage it, do students still develop cosmopolitanism?

Even if education systems do not discourage cosmopolitanism, different education systems seem to promote cosmopolitanism in different ways and to different degrees. For instance, it may not be a coincidence that school curricula in Germany and Japan incorporate more cosmopolitan perspectives than in their respective neighboring countries (Schissler and Soysal 2004; Lincicome 2005). In the immediate aftermath of World War II, Germany and Japan were seen as guilty parties. The two countries adopted eagerly the worldwide model of cosmopolitan education that the UNESCO promoted, so that they could regain their legitimacy in world polity. This earlier and deeper institutionalization of cosmopolitanism may have influenced how the German and Japanese education systems responded to perceived realities of globalization in comparison with other countries.

Moreover, formal education systems do not monopolize educational activities that provide people with cognitive and normative models of the social world. Other social organizations, such as families and religions, circulate cognitive and normative models that influence people's response to the globalized cultural environment. Thus

comparative studies of education systems and their configurations with other social organizations will help better understand ways in which educational practices facilitate or curtail the relationship between globalization and cosmopolitanism.

These six questions point to future research projects that will continue investigation of cosmopolitanism that this dissertation has started. I hope the questions will further clarify mechanisms and processes through which cosmopolitanism develops in a global world.



## **Appendix**

### Survey (English Translation)

#### *Demographic Questions*

Age

Sex

Father's and mother's occupations

Amount of travel experience outside Japan

Favorite TV programs, cartoons, and books

#### *Attitude and Cognition Questions*

Who is Japanese?

Are there any Japanese whom you like/admire? Who are they?

Why do you like/admire them?

Are there any Japanese whom you do not like/admire? Who are they?

Why do you not like/admire them?

Is there anything you like about Japan?

Is there anything you do not like about Japan?

Do you think Japan is getting better or worse? Why do you think so?

Who is foreigner?

Have you talked with a foreigner before?

Are there any foreigners whom you like/admire? Who are they?

Why do you like/admire them?

Are there any foreigners whom you do not like/admire? Who are they?

Why do you not like/admire them?

Do you know any names of foreign countries? Could you list them?

Do you like any of these foreign countries in particular?

Why do you like it/them?

How do you know about it/them?

Do you not like any of these foreign countries?

Why do you not like it/them?

How do you know about it/them?

If you can choose a country in which you are born and raised, which country would you choose? Why?

Is there any foreign country you would like to visit?

### *Switched-at-Birth Task*

[J→A] A baby was born to a Japanese couple Mr. and Ms. Sato. Soon after his birth, the baby was adopted by an American couple Mr. and Ms. Smith. The baby was named Ken. He is being raised by Mr. and Ms. Smith in America.

These are characteristics of the Satos and the Smiths:

#### The Suzukis

1. They have black eyes.
2. They are short.
3. They like rice better than bread.
4. They believe that Japan is better than America.
5. They speak only Japanese.

### The Smiths

1. They have blue eyes.
2. They are tall.
3. They like bread better than rice.
4. They believe that America is better than Japan.
5. They speak only English.

When the baby grows up, will he have black eyes or blue eyes? Why do you think so?

When the baby grows up, will he be short or tall? Why do you think so?

When the baby grows up, will he prefer rice or bread? Why do you think so?

When the baby grows up, which country will he think is better, Japan or America? Why do you think so?

When the baby grows up, will he speak Japanese or English? Why do you think so?

Now, Ken has grown up and become a 20-year-old adult:

(1) Japan and America are competing in the World Cup soccer tournament. Ken is watching the competition. Which team will Ken support, Japan or America? Why do you think so?

(2) Whom is Ken likely to marry, a Japanese or an American? Why do you think so?

[A→J] A baby was born to an American couple Mr. and Ms. Smith. Soon after his birth, the baby was adopted by a Japanese couple Mr. and Ms. Sato. The baby was named Ken. He is being raised by Mr. and Ms. Sato.

These are characteristics of the Smiths and the Satos:

### The Smiths

1. They have blue eyes.
2. They are tall.
3. They like bread better than rice.
4. They believe that America is better than Japan.

5. They speak only English.

The Satos

1. They have black eyes.
2. They are short.
3. They like rice better than bread.
4. They believe that Japan is better than America.
5. They speak only Japanese.

When the baby grows up, will he have blue eyes or black eyes? Why do you think so?

When the baby grows up, will he be tall or short? Why do you think so?

When the baby grows up, will he prefer bread or rice? Why do you think so?

When the baby grows up, which country will he think is better, America or Japan? Why do you think so?

When the baby grows up, will he speak English or Japanese? Why do you think so?

Now, Ken has grown up and become a 20-year-old adult:

(1) Japan and America are competing in the World Cup soccer tournament. Ken is watching the competition. Which team will Ken support, Japan or America? Why do you think so?

(2) Whom is Ken likely to marry, a Japanese or an American? Why do you think so?

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