SEEING CONQUEST: COLLIDING HISTORIES AND THE CULTURAL POLITICS
OF HAWAI‘I STATEHOOD

by

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A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(American Culture)
in The University of Michigan
2009

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50th Anniversary of Statehood Protest on March 18, 2009 at the Hawai‘i State Capitol; U.S. Airforce flyover juxtaposed with banners that read “Hawaiian Independence.” Photo by Jon Shishido
My constant source of strength and laughter
partner in life and crime Heijin
parents Eloise and Dick
sisters and brother Candace, Shelley, and Drew
I love and admire each of you
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Six years in the making, this dissertation has been supported and shaped by many. I would like to first thank Vicente M. Diaz, who generously read and re-read and then re-read each chapter. Part professor, part coach, he helped me navigate this process and come out sane (hopefully) on the other end. Thank you for all the six-hour lunches at Old Country Buffet, where we talked, laughed, and challenged one another over plate after plate of Midwestern fried foods.

Candace Fujikane, words cannot express my admiration for her courage and political insight to challenge our communities to recognize the roles we play in systems of oppression. I am blessed to have her in both my intellectual and familial genealogy. If it hadn’t been for that breakfast where she told me that a Ph.D. was possible, I would never have applied to graduate school.

Haunani-Kay Trask, whose book From a Native Daughter and course in my senior year at the University of Hawai‘i changed my life. Every visit home she always took me to dinner, pushing my scholarship to remain politically relevant to issues facing Hawai‘i.

The dissertation committee: Andrea Smith, who taught me so much about theory and politics in ways that were clear, accessible, and funny. Damon Salesa, for always saying those witty one-liners that put life and career into perspective. Penny Von Eschen for teaching me about the relationship between culture and the Cold War, two topics I continue to learn more about from her. Amy Stillman for her generosity and guidance,
playing Hawaiian music at her home always helped with being homesick. And Phil Deloria, for encouraging me to follow this line of research and to write theory accessibly and thoughtfully. Something I continue to work towards and aspire to do.

To Anne Keala Kelly, a source of inspiration whose work helps everyone to realize how crucial it is to speak out, thank you for all that you do! The One Love Writing Collective, Afia Ofori-Mensa, Lorgia Garcia, Sam Erman, Kelly Sisson, and Tyler Cornelius, the non-competitive atmosphere they created helped my work to grow in an environment that was truly about learning and sharing. To the Dudu Crew (Brian Chung, LeeAnn Wang, Hugo Shi, Lani Teves, Lloyd Grieger, Isa Quintana, and everyone else), thank you for sharing those long, long nights at the 24 hour Duderstadt Library, you guys made studying bearable but especially fun. Tracy Lachica Buenavista, for her commitment to bettering our communities and of course, for making me laugh and always keeping me in check. Roderick Labrador who gave me invaluable advice about graduate school and how to get through it. Your support and friendship has meant a lot to me.

Thank you also to the numerous professors, friends, and family for their comments and support at different stages of this project: Jonathan Okamura, Noenoe K. Silva, Henry Yu, Duane Champagne, Erin Wright, Kekuni Blaisdell, Don Nakanishi, Cristina Bacchilega, Noel Kent, Davianna Pomaika‘i McGregor, Cindy Franklin, Eiko Kosasa, Karen Kosasa, David Stannard, Dylan Rodriguez, Sarita See, Kristy Ringor, Iokepa Salazar, Tina Delisle, Margaret Fajardo, Johanna Almiron, Umi Perkins, Faye Caronan, Matt Wittman, Kealani Cook, Kiri Saliata, Cynthia Marasigan, Harold Symonds, Brandon Matsumoto, Randall Sagisi, Jason Gavilan, Manu Vimalassery, and

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Diana Yoon. Thank you to the Hawaiian Independence Action Alliance, especially to Lynette Cruz who tirelessly organizes, educates, and inspires.

Mom for all the daytime and late night rides around Maui with Kuku’s (the family dog) talking about life, history, and community. She works long hours teaching and always sacrifices for our family instilling in me values that I aspire to replicate in my own life. Dad always made the road smoother for me and worked hard to provide everything that he was never given. I’m always looking forward to future games of chess and rich man, poor man. Thank you to Oma and Ahpa for all your love and never-ending generosity, but especially for raising Heijin. Shelley Takasato and Drew Saranillio, two of the best older siblings anyone could hope for and two of the most strongest and thoughtful people I know. Thank you for always looking out for me. To Ai Saranillio, Glen, Tai and Kota Tomita as well as Dean and Devan Takasato, thank you for helping me get through the last two years. It was nice to write while being so close to family.

Last but not least, a big thank you to Sharon Heijin Lee. You are my best friend whose grace, intelligence, and compassion help me strike a balance between work and play. Since our first year at UCLA together, nearly 8 years ago, you have read my papers and edited them, always patiently helping me with my writing and thinking. We did all of this together and I absolutely could not have gotten here without you.
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INTRODUCTION
SILENCING THE OPPOSITION

[S]aid monies...being illegally expended [by the Hawaii Statehood Commission] are used to aid private purposes and individuals and are an illegal gift of public moneys to the proponents of statehood for Hawaii...[Such monies are] to the exclusion and detriment of citizens and taxpayers of the territory of Hawaii opposed to statehood...


Which utterances are destined to disappear without any trace? Which are destined, on the other hand, to enter into human memory through ritual recitation, pedagogy, amusement, festival, publicity?

- Michel Foucault

On the morning of August 19, 2006, state Representative Barbara Marumoto, dressed as the Statue of Liberty, and state Senator Sam Slom, waving a large American flag, led a group of around fifty people to celebrate Admissions Day—a state holiday that commemorates Hawai‘i statehood. This group’s state-sponsored commemoration, however, was blocked by Hawaiian grassroots activists, also estimated at around fifty, who had previously asked Marumoto and Slom to hold their celebration next door at the state capitol. Carrying Hawaiian nationalist flags and signs that read “Kanaka Maoli Independence,” protestors argued that ‘Iolani Palace “is a sacred spot, which is the seat of our government” and also the site where the U.S. military-backed overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom had taken place 113 years earlier. The two groups clashed when the group celebrating statehood continued with their program and began to sing the “Star Spangled Banner”—without the accompaniment of the Kalani high school band, which
decided to leave the event and not get involved. The Hawaiian group countered by using a public address system to interrupt the U.S. national anthem. Verbal arguments and near-physical confrontations continued for over an hour until the group celebrating statehood—tired and frustrated—decided to leave. The Hawaiian group formed a circle and prayed.

Far from the romantic images commonly associated with Hawai‘i, political battles and protests between groups—each armed with opposing versions of history—occur more frequently in Hawai‘i. These disputes are often shaped by U.S. national narratives that underpin American civil liberties, which have contributed to numerous assaults on indigenous Native Hawaiian communities. Such narratives translate into local, state, and federal court cases, policies, and actions, such as the numerous legal challenges to so-called Hawaiian “entitlements,” the U.S. military’s post-9/11 “land-grab” in Hawai‘i, major real estate and hotel developments on sacred sites and Native burials, and the legitimacy (or dismissal) of an over thirty year contemporary Hawaiian movement for self-determination, to name just a few. These actions and policies are all intimately tied to U.S. national narratives that speak of equality and progress while obscuring the very colonial violence these stories enact. Such contemporary conflicts are not only animated by different memories of the past, but whether past injustices—such as the 1893 overthrow—remain locked in the past; or if this past wrong sustains the political conditions for new assaults to emerge, thus persisting and shaping, even haunting, our present moment. Indeed, the past and present are mutually constitutive of each other, where notions of history help to shape our views of present realities. Our willingness to identify with certain histories over others is a complex choice, one with a multitude of
explanations, but this choice is generally influenced by one’s own sense of a natural order of things.

Most critics of Native Hawaiian protests of Admissions Day view such opposition as politically contrived and ahistorical. They argue that Hawaiians alive during the 1940s and 1950s, like other communities, wholly embraced statehood and played crucial roles in its achievement. For most in Hawai‘i, the history of statehood is a liberal movement preserved in popular memory, a simultaneous tale about a long struggle to oppose haole (white) racism and an expression of self-determination that was democratically and definitively settled. Indeed, one of the primary reasons Hawai‘i statehood took nearly 60 years to accomplish, was its largely “Asiatic” population, or more specifically, an inflated fear that imperial Japan would “take-over” Hawai‘i. Southern congressmen were even said to have passed photographs of people from Hawai‘i (Asian and Hawaiian) in order to sway other congressmen to oppose Hawai‘i statehood. Many in Hawai‘i, indeed, supported a state-led movement to gain their civil rights as “first-class American citizens,” countering various inequalities created by white racism (both locally and nationally) and advancing a liberal and anti-racist ideal that U.S. citizenship and democracy should not be limited to haole only. Often cited is the June 1959 congressionally mandated plebiscite, which revealed that of the 155,000 registered voters, 17 to 1 were in favor of statehood (132,773 to 7,971).

Yet, as Native Hawaiian demonstrations on Admissions Day illustrate, Hawai‘i statehood was only possible as a result of U.S. imperial force and power. Statehood is argued to be the manifestation of a U.S. military-backed overthrow of an independent Hawaiian government in 1893 and its illegal annexation and occupation in 1898. Many
further argue that the 1959 statehood plebiscite was itself fraudulent, as the ballot was
drafted to limit the vote to statehood, and did not include the United Nations mandated
options for “independence” or other “separate systems of self-government.”\(^8\) Indeed,
United Nations Rapporteur Miguel Martinez in 1998 found Hawai‘i’s incorporation into
the United States to be in violation of international law and recommended to the United
Nations that Hawai‘i be placed back on the list of Non-Self-Governing-Territories.\(^9\)
Given the fact that 2009 marks the 50\(^{th}\) anniversary of Hawai‘i statehood, the idea that the
civil liberties achieved through statehood came at the expense of Native Hawaiians’
human rights to self-determination is cause for major contemporary conflict and anxiety.
Histories between these groups have become so intensely opposed that on Admissions
Day in 2008, near the time when the Hawai‘i 50\(^{th}\) Anniversary Statehood Commission
announced its yearlong plans to commemorate its “golden anniversary,” more than
twenty members of a Hawaiian group from Maui were arrested for taking control of
‘Iolani Palace seeking to reinstate an independent Hawaiian nation.\(^10\) These historically
provoked political divisions beg the questions: was there, as Hawaiian activists claim, a
longstanding history of opposition to statehood? Or is such a history a “mere thing” built in and on a present politics?

Situated in comparative ethnic studies, American studies, and cultural history, this
dissertation examines the complex interplay between different Asian American groups,
Native Hawaiians, and haole, within historical moments of interaction shaped by
opposing versions of history. Here, I defamiliarize the familiar narration of Hawai‘i
statehood by tracing the production of this narrative, providing a genealogy of different
state apparatuses and series of knowledges of history and race (primitivism and
orientalism) that worked together to narrate and materialize the historical domination that produced Hawai‘i statehood. By examining the cultural politics of Hawai‘i statehood at the intersections of “race” and “indigeneity,” this project theorizes the productive tensions created by placing Asian American and Native Hawaiian histories in conversation. I argue that these groups’ oppressions are “overlapping without equivalence,” where these communities are each historically oppressed but their specific forms of oppression cannot be equated. In this study, I show how statehood proponents challenged, and even modified, an orientalist notion that Asian Americans were foreign threats who were to be excluded permanently from the national polity as “ineligible for citizenship.” Yet, at the same time that this movement made racism against Asian Americans visible, statehood proponents made invisible (by naturalizing) another form of oppression, a primitivist (and American modernist) notion that viewed Native Hawaiians, like other indigenous peoples, as permanently “unfit for self-government.”

Such an analysis signals a political need to become “multilingual” in these different histories and the temporal dissonance that allows these groups to relate differently to settler national narratives and projects for empire.

While Hawai‘i statehood is memorialized, as a civil rights victory that united Hawai‘i in order to achieve statehood, nearly all but forgotten is the existence of other Native Hawaiians and supporters who, citing the 1893 overthrow, voiced opposition to statehood. Such lapses in present memory are systemic and deliberate, as the state commissions responsible for normalizing support for statehood, actually repressed and intimidated Hawaiian opposition. These state apparatuses monopolized taxpayer monies to finance a massive opinion campaign targeting a local and national population to
support statehood. This campaign’s control of public resources, its volume, visibility, and centrality, consequently blocked any opposing movement or narrative from forming. As quoted in the epigraph above, former Territorial senator Alice Kamokila Campbell sued the Hawaii Statehood Commission on January 17th, 1948—the anniversary of the 1893 overthrow—seeking to stop this state apparatus from accessing taxpayer monies to campaign for statehood (chapter three).

To be sure, statehood and the formation of these state apparatuses were created out of economic concerns, rather than altruistic ones. The United States was in severe economic depression in the 1890s and 1930s, which led Congress to alter Hawai‘i sugar industry’s lucrative tariff relations in both moments. Further “integrating” Hawai‘i into the United States—in other words, extending U.S. colonial control—was seen by settler planters as ways to regain profitable tariffs. In order to regain tariffs through incorporation, however, the battle over public opinion would need to be won. As such, the Hawaiian Bureau of Information (1892-1893), would not only work to attract tourists and haole settlers to Hawai‘i, but would also work to shape national public opinion around the 1893 overthrow and movement for annexation (chapter one). This commission would serve as the blueprint for other commissions charged with further placing Hawai‘i under colonial control of the United States. By the mid-1930s, the Hawaii Equal Rights Commission (1935-1947) led a similar movement to regain profitable tariffs by capturing consent for statehood (chapter two).

By the end of the Second World War, however, statehood was desired, not to alleviate economic depression but rather, to capitalize on a growing tourism industry and post-world war boom. As long as Hawai‘i remained a territory and not a state, large U.S.
banks and insurance companies were prohibited by their corporate indentures from issuing large loans or insurance policies. This lack of investment capital inhibited businesses from managing and profiting from record numbers of tourists visiting the islands. In this context, the Hawaii Statehood Commission (1947-1959) was formed to lead a more aggressive campaign for statehood (chapter three). The links between these commissions are not only institutional, but also familial. For example, Lorrin P. Thurston, the son of Lorrin A. Thurston who helped lead the overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom and created the Hawaiian Bureau of Information, would eventually come to chair the Hawaii Statehood Commission.

By the 1950s, statehood proponents realized that they needed to show how statehood served the needs and interests of Washington D.C. Thus, the geopolitical scope of Hawai‘i statehood has global implications, given Hawai‘i’s ideological value to U.S. Cold War projects for global hegemony. As a consequence of these politics, the movement for statehood led by both federal and territorial leaders would create a general fear of publicly opposing the interests of these elites. This consequently disposed well-intentioned citizens—the good citizen-subject—to see their interests in the hegemonic ideology of the state and thus enact the colonial oppression of an influential and domineering class.

I wish to be clear, that I am not arguing that Native Hawaiians who supported statehood were “duped.” Hawaiians did not all either embrace or reject statehood uniformly but rather, adopted a range of responses based on astute political assessments of changing conditions and possibilities occurring in Hawai‘i at the time. Instead, this dissertation examines the racial and historical discourse on statehood that censored
Hawaiian opposition to reaffirm colonial power in the past and present. This project asks, to what different historical forces did Asian Americans and Native Hawaiians respond, and what did the acquisition of statehood seem to promise? How can U.S. civil rights discourse facilitate projects of settler colonialism and empire? How do settler states narrate and represent the colonial violence necessary for its existence, and how is it made to seem normal and natural? What role does settler colonialism play in normalizing the U.S. occupation of Hawai‘i?

If nations are themselves narrations, as cultural critics have argued, then the dominant historical narrative defining the state of Hawai‘i is in the statehood movement.\textsuperscript{17} Hawai‘i’s quest for statehood tells a particularly American story, a narrative of western settlement and the linear evolution of the primitive into the modern, what Ralph Kuykendall, foremost Hawai‘i historian in the 1960s, articulated in the subtitle to his text as \textit{A History From Polynesian Kingdom to American State}.\textsuperscript{18} Yet, Hawai‘i’s statehood movement also narrates an American tale that is closely related but also distinct from the settlement stories told on the U.S. continent. Hawai‘i’s narrative tells a story not just of white settlement but of Asian settlement; it describes Hawai‘i as a place where Asians, who were largely seen as “perpetual foreigners” by the American public, helped to settle an exotic territory in the middle of the Pacific Ocean—a place where the seemingly oppositional cultures of the East and West were reconciled to create an “American melting pot” of the Pacific.\textsuperscript{19} The narrative of establishing U.S. capitalism and democracy in a non-western place was familiar, but Hawai‘i was both non-contiguous and more importantly settled, as far as many Americans were concerned, by the wrong kinds of settlers. By the end of the Second World War, Congress was forced
to contend with the question of whether or not to admit a qualified but largely non-white territory into the Union. This dilemma was further complicated by the particular historical moment in which the question of statehood was debated in Congress, as Hawai‘i statehood intersected with both African American civil rights movements, Indian termination policy, as well as U.S. Cold War politics—since a militant labor movement in Hawai‘i had created suspicion that the islands were inundated with communists.

In his intricate study of Hawai‘i statehood, Last Among Equals, Roger Bell shows how Southern senators blocked Hawai‘i’s bid for statehood as they wished to keep congressional control for the Democrats and also felt nervous that new liberal Asian senators might facilitate the passing of civil rights legislation. In Completing the Union John S. Whitehead compares the movement for statehood in Hawai‘i and Alaska and their particular utility as military posts during the Cold War.20 It is at the intersection of civil rights and the Cold War that we can gain a more expansive view of Hawai‘i statehood. In order to make Hawai‘i less foreign in the eyes of Congress and the American public, local proponents of statehood used Hawai‘i’s alterity to their favor.21 A diverse range of communities formed an historical bloc, including many Native Hawaiians that consented to a presumably higher calling of U.S. nationality in order to demonstrate their merit through alternative versions of American modernity. Many argued that Hawai‘i’s citizenry— theorized as racially diverse but culturally American—should be showcased above all other American achievements for the world to see what only American democracy could accomplish. This was especially key since the Soviet Union and China began criticizing the United States in the 1940s as a white supremacist nation, even arguing that Hawai‘i statehood was an effect of capitalism’s failure and
continued need for colonies. This argument, statehood proponents asserted, could be challenged only if statehood were achieved. Scholars such as Derrick A. Bell Jr., Thomas Borstelmann, Penny M. Von Eschen, Nikhil Singh, Christina Klein, and Mary Dudziak have each shown differently how the idea of the United States as a racially diverse nation based on harmonious race relations was mobilized during the Cold War for the purposes of U.S. global hegemony. For instance, Derrick Bell argues that the celebrated Brown v. Board of Education case, which desegregated public schools, cannot be understood without considering its value to whites. Bell argues that we should expand our consideration of civil rights projects and not simply concern ourselves with, “those concerned about the immorality of racial inequality, but also those whites in policy making positions able to see the economic and political advances at home and abroad that would follow abandonment of segregation.” Bell thus shows that the Brown decision helped to provide “immediate credibility” in the Cold War to “win the hearts and minds of emerging third world people.”

By the 1940s and 50s, when decolonization throughout Asia, the Pacific, Africa and Latin America was transforming an international order, and criticism of Western colonialism was the dominant international sentiment, Cold War warriors were aware that Hawai’i statehood had ideological value for gaining the allegiance of newly decolonized nations. Hawai’i’s majority Asian and Pacific Islander population could thus serve as the new face of a militarily powerful and economically dominant United States—one that would assist the maintenance of U.S. military bases and secure access to resources and markets throughout Asia and the Pacific. As Christina Klein argues in Cold War Orientalism Hawai’i statehood had the ability to rearticulate U.S. imperialism as the
spreading of democracy, which created a misleading distinction between European
colonial powers and the United States. Klein contends that Hawai‘i statehood made the
United States “a little less white and Western in its national identity” and cites a 1959
Newsweek article that declared “Hawaii will be the first state with roots not in Europe but
in Asia” stating that no longer would America be known as the “land of the white man”
and “tarred with the brush of ‘colonialism.’”

While Hawai‘i statehood helped to give American race relations a multicultural
face before an international community, the local discourse of statehood in Hawai‘i
furnished the Hawai‘i elite with a form of insulating, if not reconsolidating, their
economic power and hegemony that had been under threat. In chapter three, I show that
by 1934, haole settler hegemony was in crisis. In this year, as a part of New Deal
agricultural policies created to respond to the Great Depression, Congress ignored
Hawai‘i’s status as an “incorporated territory” and limited the quota of sugar that could
be exported, tariff-free, to the U.S continent. Hawai‘i’s Republican Party, who
represented the interests of the Big Five—five interlocking corporations which dominated
the Territorial politics and economy of the territory and who were intimately involved in
the overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom—began pushing for statehood in an attempt to
maintain and reestablish hegemony. For many of Hawai‘i’s non-white working class,
however, statehood symbolized a rejection of haole hegemony, seeking access to
opportunities limited by haole privilege and racism. Hawai‘i’s political structure had
been based on an amended Northwest Ordinance that declared that the U.S. president
would appoint Hawai‘i’s Territorial governor while its citizenry would vote for a non-
voting delegate to Congress and its legislature. Many of Hawai‘i’s appointed governors,
judges, and politicians were a part of the exclusive Big Five power structure and condoned an arrangement of power that was exploitative and often violent towards the numerous labor movements in the 1930s and 40s that called for better living and work conditions. Hawai‘i’s sugar planters purposefully kept their labor forces racially divided by using the discourse of scientific racism, to determine and justify segregated and hierarchical plantation housing and pay-positions. Labor historians Ronald Takaki, Gary Okihiro, Edward D. Beechert, Sanford Zalburg, and Moon-Kie Jung, write that paternalism and “divide and conquer” were systematic strategies used to “offset” any one nationality from accumulating power as well as to keep racial groups from effectively uniting to challenge the Big Five.

Moon-Kie Jung’s recent book *Reworking Race*, explains how the International Longshoreman and Warehouseman’s Union (ILWU), while credited with the successful organizing of Hawai‘i’s labor force solely around class interests, actually did so by “reworking race,” a project facilitated by the 1935 Wagner Act and earlier labor activists who established relations with the west coast after participating in the 1934 San Francisco dockworkers strike. Under the slogan “An injury to one, is an injury to all” the ILWU coordinated a massive strike in 1946 during which 21,000 workers shut down thirty-three of the thirty-four sugar plantations in Hawai‘i. When pineapple workers went on strike the following year and dockworkers went on strike two years later, consequently crippling Hawai‘i’s entire island community for 157 days, the Big Five accused the ILWU leadership of being communist infiltrators with connections to the Soviet Union.

While ILWU support of statehood started in the 1930s, the hysteria created by McCarthyism and its criminalization of labor, provided a political opportunity for the Big
Five to marginalize both labor and the general public through a newly written state constitution. By April of 1950, at the same time that Hawai‘i’s State Constitutional Convention took place, the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC) was called to investigate communism in Hawai‘i. Hawai‘i’s ILWU labor leaders were eventually found in violation of the Smith Act (the Act which allowed HUAC to criminalize communists), and the general sentiment garnered from the sensationalism of the HUAC hearings helped to pass a conservative state constitution that limited the influence of the both the voting public and labor unions. This state constitution would, in fact, maintain many of the Territorial structures of governance (specifically governor appointments), which had allowed the Big Five to monopolize political power. Although the labor leaders of the ILWU and other radicals, collectively referred to as the “Hawaii 7,” were fined and sentenced to prison, the verdict was met by a general strike of twenty thousand ILWU members who refused to load military cargo headed for the Korean War. Further appeals kept the convicted seven out of jail until they were exonerated in 1958.

Despite attempts to maintain white settler hegemony, a new political force emerged that gave birth to a new arrangement of power in Hawai‘i. The emergence of various labor movements of plantation and dockworkers, changing demographics and their impact on voting, and the disenfranchisement of rights through martial law during World War II would alter Hawai‘i’s political landscape. Asians in Hawai‘i, indeed, had historical reason to agitate. As a result of the 1900 Organic Act, Hawai‘i adopted the naturalization laws of the United States that prohibited Asian immigrants already in Hawai‘i to naturalize or vote. Labeled “ineligible for citizenship,” this generation would have to wait for their children to come of voting age to gain political representation. In
1936, University of Hawai‘i sociologist and proponent of the “immigration assimilation model,” Romanzo Adams, predicted that, by 1944, two-thirds of Hawai‘i’s Asian population would be able to vote, consequently increasing the strength of the “non-caucasian majority” and leading to a redistribution of power.\(^3\) Realizing that a previously closed window of political opportunity was poised to open, many Asian Americans helped form the Democratic Party to challenge the Republican Party’s control over the legislature. Roger Bell explains that, “new forces, which ultimately achieved statehood, were identified with the burgeoning Democratic Party. Supported largely by the descendents of Asian immigrants, who had long been denied equality in island life, the Democrats fervently believed that equality as a state in the Union would pave the way for genuine democracy and equality of opportunity at home.”\(^3\) By 1952, Congress passed the Walter-McCarren Act, making it possible for the first generation Japanese to naturalize and vote; by 1954 Japanese Americans were the largest voting bloc in the territory, and the Democratic Party, with the support of the ILWU, dislodged the Republican plantation oligarchy from the legislature in what has been termed in Hawai‘i as the “Democratic Revolution.”

Indeed, during the Territorial period, there emerged a complex transition between a white racial dictatorship and a hegemonic “multicultural” state.\(^3\) Ronald Takaki notes that Asian American struggles against the haole oligarchy reflected a new consciousness, “a transformation from sojourners to settlers, from Japanese to Japanese Americans.”\(^3\) Takaki’s seminal *Strangers From a Different Shore* uses the term “settler” to challenge common notions that Asians in the United States are “sojourners,” perpetual foreigners who never historically settled in the United States. Takaki goes on to argue that Asians
In Hawai‘i, “[b]y their numerical preponderance… had greater opportunities [than on the U.S. continent] to weave themselves and their cultures into the very fabric of Hawaii and to seek to transform their adopted land into a society of rich diversity where they and their children would no longer be ‘strangers from a different shore.’” In fact, the opportunities afforded to Asian groups as a result of their “numerical preponderance” were key to shifting power away from a single racial dictatorship, dominated through coercion by haole racism, to a hegemonic “multicultural” democracy still organized by hierarchical notions of race. Such a shift, however, is not without other social and political consequences. For instance, while Ronald Takaki celebrates a history within which the children of Asian immigrants were no longer made to feel like “strangers from a different shore,” Roger Bell notes that Native Hawaiians, after statehood, “had become…strangers, in their own land, submerged beneath the powerful white minority and a newly assertive Asian majority.” In spite of a movement for genuine equality, the counter-hegemonic strategies of Asian Americans against haole supremacy challenged, modified, and yet renewed a hegemonic U.S. colonial system.

Although 20th century history of Hawai‘i statehood has been largely narrated and thus understood as a struggle against white racism, contextualizing these dynamics within a history of U.S. occupation and settler colonialism further complicates our understanding of Hawai‘i statehood. Hawaiian histories by scholars such as Haunani-Kay Trask, Noenoe K. Silva, Jonathan Kay Kamakawiwo‘ole Osorio, J. Kehaulani Kauanui, Sally Engle Merry, Keanu Sai, Lilikala Kameʻeleiwa, Amy Ku‘uleialoha Stillman and many others, have displaced a previous historiography that obscured Native Hawaiian resistance to U.S. occupation. As Noenoe K. Silva writes: “[o]ne of the most
pernicious myths of Hawaiian history is that the Kanaka Maoli [Hawaiians] passively accepted the erosion of their culture and the loss of their nation.\textsuperscript{40}

As the research and legal actions of scholar Keanu Sai have shown, the Hawaiian Kingdom may have been overthrown, but subjects of the nation had in fact never officially relinquished their national sovereignty.\textsuperscript{41} The political consequence of this reality is that it places past and present Hawai‘i under the formal category of “occupation,” rather than a “colonized” territory, a status with equally different legal implications. This settler community’s interests converged with that of the United States, and in collusion with it, and amid Hawaiian national protests, overthrew and then illegally annexed Hawai‘i in 1898. I contend that “occupation” and “settler colonialism” are not two irreconcilable polarizing frameworks but are actually both pertinent to an understanding of the uniqueness of Hawai‘i’s situation and the multiple tactics that the United States has utilized to dominate Hawai‘i. Thus, Keanu Sai’s framework, which examines international law, sovereignty and occupation at the legal level, provides a clear understanding of the illegitimacy of the occupying United States, while a discussion of settler colonialism, at the level of power relations, can help to describe the form of power that was used to normalize such occupation. Moreover, these forms of power were also used to establish a violent rationale through which Hawaiians are relegated to being permanently “unfit for self-government,” while settlers (Asian and haole), although contentious with one another, are afforded the masculine and intellectual capacity to turn “primitive” Hawaiian lands into “modern” and “democratic” societies. In other words, Hawai‘i’s patterns of settlement and legal and sovereign legacies, and the colonial
discourses of dominance that enabled them, share characteristics of both settler colony
and nation under occupation.

As critical projects that examine the particular historical formations of settler
colonialism and occupation in Hawai‘i develop, scholarship examining Asian Americans
in Hawai‘i also have the potential to be transformed by engaging with the history of
Native Hawaiians. While Asian American history usually begins with western
colonialism/imperialism’s displacement of peoples from Asia, or at the point of entry to
the Americas or the Pacific, Asian American historiography seldom if ever considers the
roles of Asian Americans in histories of settler colonialism and indigenous dispossession.
Though the effects of land dispossession and genocide against Native Americans and
Native Hawaiians are acknowledged, indigenous histories are often articulated in past
tense, as memorialized moments that are rarely used to interpret relations of force in the
present.

One of the first works in Asian American studies to situate Asian Americans and
Native Hawaiians within a context of U.S. settler colonialism is the 2000 Hawai‘i issue of
Amerasia Journal published by UCLA’s Asian American Studies Center. Asian
American studies scholars Candace Fujikane and Jonathan Okamura guest edited this
special volume and its subsequent reprint as an anthology titled Asian Settler Colonialism
in Hawai‘i: From Local Governance to the Habits of Everyday Life in Hawai‘i.42
Positioning Hawai‘i within its historical and contemporary colonial realities, Fujikane
argues: “As in every settler state, there are differences and power relations that cut across
settler populations, between white settlers and nonwhite settlers, among Asian settler
groups, between working-class settlers and the settlers who make up the more privileged
classes… Nevertheless, an analysis of settler colonialism positions indigenous peoples at the center, foregrounding not settler groups’ relationships with each other or with the U.S. settler state, but with the indigenous peoples whose ancestral lands settlers occupy.” Fujikane further argues that such intellectual work has political stakes, where only by supporting Hawaiians to achieve self-determination can “Asian settlers liberate themselves from their roles as agents in a colonial system of violence.” Indeed, other emerging and established scholars such as David Stannard, Eiko Kosasa, Karen Kosasa, Ida Yoshinaga, Julia Kaomea, Ku‘ualoha Ho‘omanawanui, Momiala Kamahele, Cristina Bacchilega, Lani Teves, Sora Han, Kristy Hisako Ringor, Bianca Isaki, Roderick Labrador, Jackie Lasky, Manu Vimalaserry, Diana Leong, among others, have begun probing such difficult and challenging issues and histories.

In the anthology’s key article, “Settlers of Color and ‘Immigrant’ Hegemony: ‘Locals’ in Hawai‘i,” Haunani-Kay Trask argues that Asians in Hawai‘i are “settlers of color” who have benefited from and contribute to the continued dispossession of Native Hawaiians. Trask argues that American narratives of immigration and democracy are complicitous with colonialism’s justification and obfuscation of the ongoing story of Hawaiian dispossession.

Hawai‘i, like the continent, is naturalized as but another telling illustration of the uniqueness of America’s “nation of immigrants.” The ideology weaves a story of success: poor Japanese, Chinese, and Filipino settlers supplied the labor for wealthy, white sugar planters during the long period of the Territory (1900-1959). Exploitative plantation conditions thus underpin a master narrative of hard work and the endlessly celebrated triumph over anti-Asian racism. Settler children, ever industrious and deserving obtain technical and liberal educations, thereby learning the political system through which they agitate for full voting rights as American citizens. Politically, the vehicle for Asian ascendancy is statehood… For our Native people, Asian success proves to be but the latest elaboration of foreign hegemony.
Accordingly, some Asian ethnic groups in Hawai‘i have gained political and economic power through land deals after statehood. In their influential book *Land and Power in Hawai‘i: The Democratic Years* George Cooper and Gavan Daws write that Asians in the Democratic Party, predominantly Japanese and Chinese, gain political power but have no land, while the Big Five corporations have large tracts of land but have lost a considerable amount of political power. These groups created numerous partnerships, many with individuals publicly imagined on opposite ends of the political spectrum, collaborating and profiting on the same land deals. Davianna Pomaika‘i McGregor, however, describes rural Hawaiian communities known as cultural kīpuka, who were “bypassed by major historical forces of economic, political, and social change,” thus allowing these communities to maintain traditional practices of land tenure and culture. Trask explains that the Hawaiian sovereignty movement emerged from these rural communities, as development increasingly encroached on Hawaiian ways of life and in the post-statehood period, forced many to begin organizing for a national land base distinct from the organizing of “local” communities against similar encroachments and trends.

Yet, scholarship that examines tensions between Asian Americans and Native Hawaiians within a framework of settler colonialism has been labeled “ahistorical.” Scholars such as Davianna Pomaika‘i McGregor and Gary Okihiro contend that settler colonialism is a binary concept inadequate to interrogate Hawai‘i’s complex history of labor exploitation and colonization. McGregor argued at the 2009 national Association for Asian American Studies conference in Honolulu that contemporary uses of settler colonialism are an extension of anti-Japanese racism during World War II. She has
variously argued that the concept does not take into account Native Hawaiian racism against Asian Americans or the persistence of class differences in Hawai‘i. In what is perhaps the most extensive critique of settler colonialism in print thus far, Dana Takagi has argued that tensions between Asian Americans and Native Hawaiians are products of an indigenous Hawaiian nationalism that emerged in the 1990s.59

This dissertation challenges these arguments by showing that similar tensions between Asian Americans and Native Hawaiians were very much existent in the Territorial period leading to statehood in 1959. Moreover, the term “settler” has long been in use to describe Asian Americans and I use it to also identify myself. As mentioned earlier, Ronald Takaki has used the term “settler” as an analytical and historical term describing Asian American communities. I also use the term this way, but with different political aims. I do not use the term “settler” to make a claim on the United States against white exclusion, but instead to place Asian American history in direct conversation with a history of colonial dispossession enacted against Native peoples—a history that is deliberately buried and subjugated in settler nations. In this way, the term “settler” contains a pedagogical capacity to challenge perceptions of reality, to widen one’s visual world in order to see the colonial oppression of settler nations with real political, economic, and legal consequences. The term “settler,” can thus be used as both a political identity and as an interpretive analytic, one that can defamiliarize itself with, and divest itself of, predominant U.S. narratives and identities in Hawai‘i. In Hawai‘i, such identities and narratives lead most non-Hawaiians to think of themselves as immigrants, citizens or locals—identities that assume Hawai‘i as a legitimate multicultural state under the United States. Indeed, many are opposed to the
term “settler” because of its derogatory undertones, yet other political identities have been appropriated to enact a transformational politics. For instance, the term “Black” was imagined as having negative connotations, but after the term became politicized and transformed, it became a source of pride and empowerment. Settler colonialism is also criticized for reinscribing a Native and settler binary. Yet such analytical categories help to better understand power relations, not as good Native versus bad settler, but as historical categories that help us examine the nature of different forms of power and oppression. For instance, feminist politics make use of historically loaded, but complex analytical categories of “man” and “woman” in order to better expose heterosexist patriarchal domination. As Cristina Bacchilega has argued on her own identification as a settler: “From my position, somewhat analogously to men supporting feminism, I seek to be a student and ally. This need not entail taking Hawaiian cultural and scholarly production wholesale as ‘truth,’ but it does involve realizing how much is lost by either ignoring it or rescripting it before we malihini even take it seriously.”

Use of settler colonialism as an interpretive analytic does not dismiss scholarship interrogating other historically formed systems of power and oppression. Largely informed by the scholarship on intersectionality and coalitional politics by scholar Andrea Smith, this dissertation makes use of her conceptual frame that white supremacy is comprised of distinct but interrelated logics: labor exploitation, genocide (settler colonialism), and war (orientalism). Smith’s intervention provides a much-needed framework for relational thinking in comparativist scholarship. Smith argues that current understandings of white supremacy are limited as they assume that different communities are impacted by white supremacy uniformly. Part of this error, she argues, stems from
conventional failure to understand how white supremacy “is constituted by separate and distinct, but interrelated, logics.” The first logic she identifies is labor exploitation—where certain racial groups become equated with being “slaveable.” This pillar is useful in thinking about Hawai‘i’s long history of labor exploitation and militant unionism. The second pillar is settler colonization or genocide, through which the indigenous must disappear so that others can lay a claim over their land. This pillar is easily recognizable in Hawaiian history and will be elaborated on throughout this dissertation. The last pillar is Orientalism or war, where there needs to be a permanent foreign threat that allows the United States to be in a permanent state of war. This last pillar has numerous historical examples in Hawai‘i’s history, whether it is the Japanese prior to and during World War II, the threat of communists, or currently, in reference to so-called “terrorists.”

Taking into account different logics of oppression allows us to understand that we can be simultaneously oppressed while also being oppressive when we do not take into account the kinds of oppression faced by other communities. More significantly, it also places emphasis on strategies for resistance, particularly those that do not unintentionally keep systems of oppression in place for others. There are numerous ways of thinking about how we can each participate in maintaining exploitative conditions vis-à-vis our own personal empowerment or collective ascendancy. For instance, non-Native peoples are promised the ability to join in the colonial project of settling indigenous lands. All marginalized communities are promised that they will economically and politically advance if they join U.S. wars to spread “democracy.” As such, Smith’s model of relational thinking is productive not only in an analysis of Hawai‘i statehood but also in countering assertions that Asian settler colonialism is ahistorical. Her conceptual frame
allows me to analyze historically created systems of power and also think reflectively about how one’s own community participates in nationally mediated structures of power and oppression. “This way,” according to Smith, “our alliances would not be solely based on shared victimization, but where we are complicit in the victimization of others.”

Qualifying these different forms of systemic oppressions is crucial to understanding the colonial inequalities produced through Hawai‘i statehood. The 1893 overthrow and 1935 movement for statehood, for instance, are examples of “accumulation by dispossession,” a form of capitalist exploitation used to further dispossess the Native population of their national lands and self-government, in order to seize their national property as a means to acquire access to capital. In Capital, Marx takes Adam Smith to task for explaining the gap between the rich and the poor through a “nursery tale,” a kind of origin story, about two sorts of people, “one, the diligent, intelligent and above all frugal elite; the other, lazy rascals, spending their substance, and more, in riotous living.” Marx goes on to criticize Smith’s idea of “primitive accumulation,” arguing that “[i]n actual history, it is a notorious fact that conquest, enslavement, robbery, murder, in short, force, play the greatest part.” As David Harvey and Hannah Arendt have argued, however, the “original sin” of robbery that is described in “primitive accumulation” is not simply located in the past, but is more accurately to be understood as an incomplete and recurring process that is essential to the continuation of capitalism. Harvey renames this process, “accumulation by dispossession,” to describe a wide range of processes that are used during moments of economic crisis, caused by overaccumulation, to move the economy out of depression.
In a similar examination of periods of state crisis, Michel Foucault’s *Security, Territory and Population* further examines the ways in which the state justifies acts of violent expropriation through what he terms the “theatricality of the state.”

Foucault’s ideas on necessity, violence, and theatricality are used throughout the dissertation. First, a crisis is identified, one that threatens the status-quo, followed by what government leaders consider the *necessity* of the state (raison d’etat), a necessity that justifies breaking the law. Some sort of *violence* (coup d’etat) is used to maintain or reacquire the fundamental dynamics of force to keep the elites in positions of power.

Theatricality, or the “theatrical practice in politics,” is then used to represent the act of violence, to shape public opinion in order to legitimize and reinforce state power. Its purpose and consequence is to justify the *violence* used by political and economic leaders to maintain the relations of power of the elite. In Hawai‘i’s case, we can easily see how the historical and political process of further incorporating Hawai‘i into the United States through the 1893 overthrow and 1959 statehood relied extensively on state agencies—the Hawaiian Bureau of Information (1892-1893), the Hawaii Equal Rights Commission (1935-1946), and the Hawaii Statehood Commission (1947-1959)—to narrate state violence and to strengthen the economy.

As the foregoing discussion illustrates, this dissertation is an interdisciplinary project that examines a range of cultural productions read through the theories and practices of cultural studies, and supported by archival research. Instead of approaching a study of Hawai‘i statehood using methods that focus on powerful individuals and repressive institutions, as Roger Bell and John S. Whitehead have, I take a discursive approach to statehood. I question the ways in which knowledge and power define and
limit, not only what is considered “sayable” in a given historical moment but also why certain narratives achieve wide circulation and publicity, while other narratives are contained and censored.\textsuperscript{58} I seek to illuminate how state agencies, in different historical moments, attempted to frame the rules of discourse for civil society through a range of state sanctioned opinion campaigns that reveal practices of governance and the theatricality of the state. Here I examine cultural texts that normalize and narrate the United States in Hawai‘i, such as Hawai‘i exhibits at World’s Fairs, state seals, historical and scientific discourse on race relations, political cartoons, films, newspapers, and the papers and literature of the different territorial and federal agencies involved in the movement for statehood. Taken together, these texts and cultural productions use gendered representations of “primitives,” “orientals,” and “whites” that help to create a space in which citizen-subjects imagine participating equally in a nation without understanding that nation to be an emerging empire and without knowledge as to how they are active participants in that ongoing formation.

At the same time, I juxtapose these narrations with an assortment of political actions and cultural productions, many from Native Hawaiians that denaturalize the United States in Hawai‘i. Much of these activities involved direct and indirect criticism of occupation—commemorations of the 1893 overthrow, statehood testimony, a lawsuit against the Statehood Commission, stories of hauntings, nationally acclaimed but currently obscure history books, and visual art, among others. These moments of pedagogy and resistance are “local” Hawai‘i examples of the kind of “unexpected” historical “anomalies” that, as Philip J. Deloria asserts, may not be anomalous but instead, representative. By recovering and examining the frequency of these “secret
histories” (rare, occasional, frequent) we might be better equipped to challenge dominant characterizations and assumptions of Hawaiians as passive during the drive for statehood and write complex and transformative histories informed by or in relation to Native Hawaiian cultural politics. As Deloria writes: “[t]hose secret histories of unexpectedness are, I believe, worth further pursuit, for they can change our sense of the past and lead us quietly, but directly, to the present moment.”

Indeed, as settler studies scholars Anna Johnston and Alan Lawson have argued, “the occupation of land formerly owned by others always translates into the cultural politics of representation.” In fact, the cultural politics of U.S. settler colonialism are particularly complex because they intersect with the different histories of U.S. racial and imperial subjugation and their accompanying cultural representations. The contemporary relevance of settler colonialism is also a difficult narrative to imagine and understand, much less contend with, as it is often obscured in the mind’s eye behind American national narratives that mythologize and naturalize the act of occupation. For this reason, I also turn to critiques of visuality to assist my work. Accordingly, ways of seeing are often guided intimately by ways of knowing, which are themselves shaped by a pedagogy of history, culture, and one’s position within the cultural politics of the everyday.

Mieke Bal has argued that the theoretical theme of visuality thus “lends itself particularly well to the kind of questioning that cultural analysis and history address to each other, not only because history has been so predominantly text-based, but more importantly, because ‘looking’ as an act has been central to a philosophy of science that put observation at the core of its procedures of evaluation.” The privileging of sight within western science was once held as one of the “noblest” of senses for objectively knowing
racial difference. As Martin Jay writes, however, this difference was produced not in a given “objective reality open to an innocent eye” but rather, in an “epistemic field, constructed as much linguistically as visually” and often used in the service of surveillance and empire building.  

Fig. 1, “School Begins,” *Puck*, 1899

In the political cartoon above, drawn in 1899 by Louis Dalrymple in the nationally popular magazine *Puck*, we are given a kind of representational map of different cultural representations and discursive logics that link settler colonialism to an emerging U.S. empire at the turn of the twentieth century. The piece offers a rich and deliberate visual arrangement of differently infantilized, gendered, and racialized groups whose cultural representations mutually constitute a pyramidal view of the world, one that seeks to justify and naturalize both colonial expansion and white supremacy. The tools of oppression, in this case a “manifest domestic” education (represented in the mostly white and feminized studious U.S. states, California, Texas, New Mexico,
although Alaska is interestingly racialized) and the ever-looming masculine military (represented through Uncle Sam’s “big stick”) are ever present to help nurture, in the citizenry’s imagination, the continuity of settler colonial expansion across the continental United States with the overseas colonies acquired in 1898 and 1899. As Raymond Williams argues, works of art can be particularly useful in “complex societies” as evidence for grasping the “hegemonic in its active and formative but also its transformational processes.”

Cultural and Visual critic John Berger has argued that the medium of drawing impacts its viewer in ways that differ from paintings and sculptures. He asserts that before a drawing, the spectator “identifies himself with the artist, using the images to gain the conscious experience of seeing as though through the artists own eyes.” Scott Long adds that political cartoons give political cartoonists a certain representational power, in ways that photographers or other artists are often limited. He writes: “The cartoonist deals with abstractions, ideas and emotions that are beyond the comprehension of a lens… Ask a photographer to take a picture of the Dollar Gap or the New Deal … or the Monroe Doctrine and he will be baffled.” Political cartoons at the turn of the 20th century were immensely popular, particular those that ran in the weekly magazines like Puck and its competitor Judge, both of which rivaled the influential dailies by the end of the 19th century. “Their weekly cartoons were awaited eagerly,” writes Scott, and “were passed from hand to hand, and were the subject of animated comment in all political circles.” Sometimes referred to as the “ungentlemanly art,” political cartoons were viewed by some politicians as threats; on four separate occasions, American legislators even tried to restrict or ban all political cartoons. Even the notorious William Marcy
Tweed, a corrupt politician and businessman in the 19th century, weighed in: “Stop them damn pictures, I don’t care so much what the papers write about me. My constituents can’t read. But, damn it, they can see pictures.”

When cultural productions (such as the one above) are closely read, properly historicized, and their cultural forms are paid careful attention to, different works of art can be useful historical sources for examining the intricate power arrangements of a particular moment in U.S. history.

Homi Bhabha describes the nation itself as a cultural narration where “the nation, as a form of cultural elaboration…, is an agency of ambivalent narration that holds culture at its most productive position, as a form for ‘subordination, fracturing, diffusing, reproducing, as much as producing, creating, forcing, guiding.’”

I wish to pay careful attention to the cultural representations of indigenous peoples in order to examine their utility in narrating the act of colonization as “fair” and “natural” to most U.S. citizens. Andrea Smith shows how the discursively linked constructs of indigeneity and gender are integral components to justifying the conquest of both Native bodies and land: “[t]he project of colonial sexual violence establishes the ideology that Native bodies are inherently violable—and by extension, that Native lands are also inherently violable.”

By examining these narrative logics and contextualizing U.S. national narratives within a history of colonization, I investigate the production of a narration of the United States in Hawai‘i that normalizes Hawai‘i’s incorporation into the United States.

I begin this dissertation by looking at the discursive erasure of the internationally recognized Hawaiian Kingdom by an American discourse on primitivism, a particular discourse through which the takeover of Native American and Native Hawaiian land was made to seem natural and inevitable. Chapter One thus examines the narrations featured
at the 1893 Chicago World’s Columbian Exposition that rationalized and celebrated settler colonialism establishing future expectations of U.S. empire. After helping to lead the overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom in 1893, Lorrin A. Thurston attended the Chicago Exposition. Thurston helped found the Hawaiian Bureau of Information and Annexation Club, and was now helping to organize the “Cyclorama of Kilauea,” a fifty-foot high and 400 foot wide landscape painting of Kilauea volcano that was used by the bureau as an “imperial advertisement” for both annexation and tourism. In this first chapter, I also look at the spatial and temporal layout of the exposition that ethnologists used as visual evidence to divide the world’s people into three temporal categories: primitives, orientals, and whites. Here I delineate the different narrations of “primitivism” and “orientalism,” by examining the politics of the Japanese exhibit, which was displayed in a favored position in the White City. I place these cultural narrations within what Walter LaFeber calls “depression diplomacy,” the introduction of a new overseas economic frontier as a means to alleviate labor discontent and industrial economic depression within the United States.72

I extend this examination in Chapter Two in a close look at the different power relations existent in settler colonialism. Caroline Elkins and Susan Pedersen identify four dimensions of settler colonialism—namely, the metropole, white settler population, military, and indigenous population. Hawai‘i’s history, however, requires the addition of an important fifth: a settler population that is neither white nor Native. Thus, with an eye to further illuminating the specific form of settler colonialism in Hawai‘i, I examine more closely three historical and cultural registers that evidence the differential but interlocking forms of oppression in the machinations of settler colonialism. To this end, I
examine more closely three examples or cases. First, I turn to political cartoons from the turn of the twentieth century questioning how the different gendered personifications of the Philippines as “little brown brothers,” and Hawai`i as “hula maiden,” were used to justify the different political trajectories of each territory towards independence and statehood, respectively. In the second section, I turn to how settler colonialism and American frontier discourse in Hawai`i were bolstered through academic discourse on race, culture, and ethnicity of whites, orientals, and primitives. More specifically I examine the work of the Australian psychologist Stanley Porteus, and the University of Hawai`i School of sociology (which has links to the 1893 Chicago World’s Columbian Exposition). I end this chapter by looking at the 1937 congressional investigation of statehood. By this time, the hegemony of the Big Five is weakened and the opinion campaign of the Hawaii Equal Rights Commission is unable to control testimony and as a result laborers and Hawaiians speak out openly against both the Big Five and Hawai`i Statehood.

In Chapter Three I trace two mutually constitutive but competing projects that occur during a moment of post-World War II economic expansion—the Japanese American project to defeat a notion that they were perpetual foreigners “ineligible for citizenship” and a particularly Native Hawaiian project to combat the idea that Hawaiians were “unfit for self-government.” In this section, I analyze the central narrative and key sequences in terms of Cold War motivations that created support for a U.S. nationalist, anti-racist discourse that defended Japanese Americans. In the same chapter, I juxtapose the terms by which Hawai`i Territorial Senator Kamokila Campbell opposed statehood. Campbell was a public spokesperson for the suppressed voices of Hawaiian opposition to
Hawai‘i statehood and perhaps for this she has become an obscure figure in Hawai‘i’s history. Taken together, the contrasting narratives in this chapter indicate that the anti-racist politics of Japanese Americans had a kind of redemptive quality as well as an economic utility in conservative Cold War politics, while the anti-colonial politics of Hawaiians obviously struck deeply at the interests of the United States.

Chapter Four offers a close read of the artwork of a Hawaiian artist who goes by the pseudonym Kēwaikaliko. In his artwork titled Benocide, after former Governor Benjamin Cayetano, he critiques the neoconservative legal challenges emerging out of the 2000 Rice v. Cayetano decision—which declared Hawaiian-only voting in the Office of Hawaiian Affairs race-based and thus unconstitutional. Thus, this image also comments critically on the relations among Hawaiians, different Asian American groups, and whites, in a moment when a history of the overthrow in 1893 is forced into the public by a Hawaiian movement for self-determination that emerges in the 1970s. Through selective narrative framing and the use of historically legible images, Kēwaikaliko creates a loaded illustration of a Hawaiian man being lynched by then governor Cayetano (Hawai‘i’s first governor of Filipino descent), a neoconservative white settler, and a pig or pua‘a. Through highlighting a notion of sight, this chapter will trace how Benocide appropriates the gaze and reverses it upon a settler colonial system through his visual art and the use of the historical and spatial configurations of a lynching.

Taken together, these chapters illustrate the complex ways that Hawai‘i statehood, narrated as a liberal anti-racist civil rights project, have facilitated and normalized projects of colonialism and empire. Through a discursive approach to statehood, and a critical reconsideration of the ways that state agencies framed the rules of discourse using
representations of primitives, orientals, and whites to normalize the presence of the United States in Hawai‘i, we are better able to understand how Hawai‘i statehood became expected, how it came to be considered an inevitable outcome of history, and how ideas about history and race were arranged so as to invalidate and silence opposition to statehood. These stories of American egalitarianism, besides silencing Hawaiian opposition, obscure how economic depression and desires for capital expansion largely underpinned elite desires for statehood—a kind of settler accumulation through Native dispossession. Thus, contemporary Hawaiian demonstrations on Admissions Day challenge the state’s narration of itself, and in doing so, also illuminate the “counterhistories” of Hawai‘i. Like critical contemporary Hawaiian art, the unearthing and retelling of systemically and deliberately buried histories also visualize, how the state’s present power was taken historically by illegal force, and at the expense Native Hawaiian birth-rights to self-determination. Collectively, they expose an ongoing history of dispossession where, “the triumph of some means the submission of others.”


6 Interview with Robert McElrath in Perspectives on Hawai‘i’s Statehood, (Oral History Project, Social Science Research Institute University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa, June 1986) 117.

7 Secretary of Hawaii, “Results of Votes Cast (Three Propositions) Held June 27, 1959,” Hawaii State Archives.


9 Miguel Alfonso Martinez, Study on Treaties, Agreements and Other Constructive Arrangements between Indigenous Peoples and Nation States.


For an analysis of how Homi Bhabha’s phrase “overlapping without equivalence” can be given a “settler” inflection, see Anna Johnston and Alan Lawson, “Settler Colonies,” in A Companion to Postcolonial Studies, 374.


16 Interview with Malcolm McNaughton in Perspectives on Hawai‘i’s Statehood, (Oral History Project, Social Science Research Institute University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa, June 1986), 52-53.


26 In 1924 the Hanapepe massacre left sixteen dead, 101 arrested, sixty of whom were sentenced to up to four years in prison. In 1938 the Hilo Massacre left fifty wounded after police fired on picketers.


38 Roger Bell, *Last Among Equals*, 293.


42 *Asian Settler Colonialism in Hawai‘i: From Local Governance to the Habits of Everyday Life in Hawai‘i*, ed. Candace Fujikane and Jonathan Okamura, (Honolulu, University of Hawai‘i Press, 2008).


44 *Ibid.*, 8


73 Kēwaikaliko is the artist’s pseudonym.

74 Michel Foucault, “*Society Must Be Defended,*” (New York: Picador, 2003), 72.

CHAPTER ONE

A FUTURE WISH: THE HAWAIIAN BUREAU OF INFORMATION AND ITS ADVERTISEMENTS FOR ANNEXATION AT THE 1893 COLUMBIAN EXPOSITION

The decline of the native Hawaiian element in the presence of newer sturdier growths must be accepted as an inevitable fact, in view of the teachings of ethnological history. And as retrogression in the development of the Islands can not [sic] be admitted without serious detriment to American interests in the North Pacific, the problem of a replenishment of the vital forces of Hawaii presents itself for intelligent solution in an American sense—not an Asiatic or a British sense.

- James G. Blaine, U.S. Secretary of State, 1881

Only four months after helping to lead the overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom, Lorrin A. Thurston was in Chicago at the 1893 World’s Columbian Exposition. Thurston, a third generation settler descending from some of the first American missionaries to Hawai‘i, was at the Columbian Exposition helping to manage his “Cyclorama of Kilauea”—a five story high and 400 foot wide landscape painting of Kilauea crater designed to encircle the viewer and give the impression of standing in the actual volcano. Using the cyclorama as an imperial advertisement for both tourism and annexation—and doing so nearly five years before de jure U.S. control of Hawai‘i—Thurston placed large American flags at the top of his cyclorama. Thurston hoped that the cyclorama might help to present another vision of the American frontier, one that would extend the imagined borders of the United States into the Pacific to Hawai‘i. For annexationists, Hawai‘i needed to be seen not as the internationally recognized nation that it had been since 1843, but rather as an exotic island frontier zone, a primitive space
to be made anew with the joint help of white settlers in Hawai‘i and the newly industrialized United States.³

Lorrin A. Thurston’s activities in Chicago were part of a predetermined opinion campaign to shape public perception of the overthrow of Queen Lili‘uokalani and generate national and international support for the annexation of Hawai‘i to the United States. Described by an historian as “the most ardent and proficient propagandist on behalf of the provisional government,” Thurston, in 1892, formed two groups: the Annexation Club and the Hawaiian Bureau of Information. Whereas the Annexation Club conspired with U.S. Foreign Minister John L. Stevens to secretly plot and carry out the overthrow, the Hawaiian Bureau of Information would act as a kind of media arm of the campaign. Officially responsible for promoting tourist travel and attracting a “desirable population” to colonize the islands, its more secretive function was to produce literature that justified white settler control over Hawai‘i and help to annex it to the United States.⁴ If hegemony is hard work, as is often said, then Thurston worked tirelessly, traveling across the country to provide facts and figures to journalists.⁵ He also maintained conversations with former U.S. Minister John L. Stevens who, from his residence in Maine, was also editorializing on the need for annexation. In Chicago, Thurston’s “Cyclorama of Kilauea” displayed at the Chicago World’s Columbian Exposition, played a key role in their opinion campaign as it helped to cast Native Hawaiians as primitive while narrating the overthrow of an internationally recognized nation in their favor.

The cultural work required to normalize white settler control over a people imagined to be “primitive” resonated at the Columbian Exposition. It is here that
Frederick Jackson Turner pronounced his famous frontier thesis, arguing that American exceptionalism and freedom originate from masculine white settlers’ experience with taming the wild frontier and its “primitive” inhabitants. These experiences were deemed responsible for creating rugged American individuals who were wary of authority and more capable than Europeans of maintaining a society built on democracy and freedom. Evidence of Turner’s rugged American masculinity was found in the 1890 Census, which declared that white settlers had completely settled the continental United States. The significance of the settlement of the frontier was bolstered by the 1890 Massacre at Wounded Knee, a mass murder of around 300 Lakota by the U.S. 7th Cavalry, imagined by most Americans to be the final military defeat of Native American resistance. As Philip Deloria argues, these events informed much of the displays at the 1893 Columbian Exposition, wherein U.S. history was narrated “not as a frontiersman’s struggle with wild lands, but as one long Indian war, a violent contest in which Americans were shaped by constant struggle with a dangerous and challenging adversary.”

In the last decade of the 19th century, the presumed final pacification of Native Americans—with stakes in the crafting of American ideas of white manhood and nationhood—was also imagined to signal America’s readiness to transition from a continental colonial power to a hemispheric imperial power. Future president Theodore Roosevelt, a political ally and friend of Hawai‘i propagandist, Lorrin A. Thurston, would declare in various volumes of *The Winning of the West* that the closing of the continental frontier only meant the opening of a new frontier overseas. While the narration of the Columbian Exposition constituted white American nationhood through the settlement of the frontier and conquest of Native Americans, the “Cyclorama of Kilauea” portrayed
Hawai‘i as a new American frontier zone to be settled and annexed by the United States. Native Hawaiians, particularly Hawaiian women, substituted in place of Indians, were constructed as a new worthy “adversary” considered both “dangerous and challenging” to the presumed natural development of white settler control over Hawai‘i.

This chapter examines the links between the narrations of the overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom and the conquest of Native Americans at the 1893 Columbian Exposition. Here, I illustrate how the Hawaiian Bureau of Information targeted exposition visitors with an opinion campaign to achieve Hawai‘i’s expected annexation by the United States. First, I examine how the discourses of orientalism and primitivism that were employed by ethnologists at the Columbian Exposition, worked hand-in-hand to subject individuals to view the world, in particular, non-white (or other non-white) peoples, as potential threats to their well-being in ways that scientifically and morally rationalized colonial violence and future expectations of American empire. Secondly, through a close read of the Hawaiian Bureau of Information’s “Cyclorama of Kilauea,” I show how the gendered and racialized logics used in the cyclorama worked to collapse an internationally recognized Hawaiian Kingdom into a U.S. domestic discourse on Native Americans, specifically by categorizing Native Hawaiians as primitives deserving of U.S. colonization.

“Depression Diplomacy”

With more than 27 million people attending the Columbian Exposition, U.S. economic and political leaders hailed the exposition as a “celebration of America’s coming-of-age,” a “grand rite of passage” that pronounced the readiness of the United States—as a full-fledged modern industrialized nation—to take its place amongst the
leading nations of the world. The entire exposition was referred to popularly as the “White City,” and it commemorated the 400th anniversary of Christopher Columbus’s so-called “discovery” of America and the fulfillment of this “divine” event through the imagined defeat of Native Americans and the successful settlement of their lands. Such culminating achievements were issued as evidence of white American superiority.

U.S. claims of white racial superiority, however, occurred at a time when its economic and social dominance appeared most threatened. By 1893 the United States was in a major economic depression, with 500 banks closed and 15,000 companies out of business. By the middle of 1894 unemployment had reached a record 4 million. During this time, greedy management practices, coupled with poor economic and work conditions, were causing class conflict such as the 1887 Haymarket Riot and the 1893 Pullman strikes in Chicago, as well as some thirty lesser known (but still major) strikes that occurred throughout the country at the time of the Columbian Exposition. No longer exclusively reliant on agriculture, U.S. foreign policy sought larger foreign markets in which to sell the surplus of products created as a result of rapid industrialization. Many white working-class Americans began to link industrial maturity with degenerating labor conditions and began to call for revolution. In 1894 Secretary of State Walter Gresham wrote: “I am not a pessimist, but I think I see danger in existing conditions in this country. What is transpiring in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and in regions west of there, may fairly be viewed as symptoms of revolution.” Thus, many business and government leaders believed that foreign markets, through aggressive imperialist policies, were necessary in guarding against revolt. Walter LaFeber explains that the U.S. military support of the overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom, which took
place in the same year of the Columbian Exposition, was a product of what he calls “depression diplomacy”—the desire to acquire or secure control of overseas markets as a means of alleviating industrial economic depression and domestic labor unrest in the United States. In other words, by 1893, the U.S. economic system was not sustainable without enacting a more aggressive policy of imperialism, one that would gain America access to markets in Asia.

This same economic depression in the United States also impacted Hawai‘i and motivated white settlers to overthrow the Hawaiian Kingdom. By 1893, Hawai‘i’s sugar industry was largely dependent on access to U.S. markets. The Reciprocity Treaty between the United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom, initially signed in 1876, gave Hawai‘i’s sugar industry a two-cent per pound bounty and thus a favored position over other foreign sugars that were competing in the U.S. market. In return, the Hawaiian government was forbidden from leasing or disposing “any port, harbor, or other territory” to any other nation. Joseph Nāwahī, an ardent Hawaiian nationalist and representative from Hilo and Puna, strongly voiced the opposition of many Native Hawaiians to the Reciprocity Treaty, calling it a “nation-snatching treaty” and the “first step of annexation.”

Because of the lagging U.S. economy in the 1890s, however, sugar growers in the United States successfully lobbied Congress to pass the 1890 McKinley Tariff. This act would abolish the tariff relations established through the Reciprocity Treaty and diminish Hawai‘i’s sugar planters’ ability to compete in U.S. markets. Hawai‘i’s sugar planters viewed the Reciprocity Treaty as completely necessary for the sugar industry in Hawai‘i to remain competitive. Z.S. Spalding, a prominent sugar planter reminisced that, “before
the reciprocity treaty had passed… I do not think that there was a single plantation that had not gone into bankruptcy.”21 In fact, four years after the Reciprocity Treaty was established, sugar production doubled and by 1890, plantations produced ten times more sugar than they had in 1876.22 This dramatic rise in sugar production led to the accumulation of more capital, the establishment of banks, new technologies in irrigation and processing and especially, a demand for more land, resources, labor, and political influence.

Having amassed economic power through the Reciprocity Treaty, white settler planters were willing to use whatever force necessary to maintain profitable tariff relations with the United States. For instance, when the Reciprocity treaty was up for renewal in 1885, the United States offered to do so only in exchange for the use of Pearl Harbor as a Naval base. When King Kalākaua (1874-1891) refused, white settlers organized rifle clubs and forced the infamous “Bayonet Constitution” upon him. Written by Lorrin A. Thurston, the Bayonet Constitution would dramatically limit the influence of the monarch while disenfranchising a majority of Hawaiians from vote for the House of Nobles through income, property and literacy requirements. It also restricted all Asians from both naturalization and voting.23

Although the 1887 Bayonet Constitution was imagined as giving white settlers electoral advantages, it also sparked a highly organized and articulate movement whose target was the governmental structure established by the Thurston-created faction. As Noenoe K. Silva has shown in Aloha Betrayed, Hawaiians began organizing into political parties: the Hui Kālāi‘āina and Hui Aloha ʻĀina Party.24 By 1890, one year after an unsuccessful coup attempt to remove the Bayonet Constitution, Hawaiians, through the
Hui Kālāʻina joined forces with the Mechanics’ and Workingmen’s Political Protective Union to run candidates who were both friendly to labor and a new constitution.25 Many wealthy Chinese who were Hawaiian nationals but unable to vote, also began to employ hundreds of Hawaiians to enable them to meet the income requirements for voting.26 This new historical bloc won the 1890 elections by a landslide. Two years later, in an election held in October of 1892, this new political group would also win two vacant seats in the House of Nobles.27 Indeed, those marginalized from vote became effective at politically defeating the plantation elite even when the Bayonet Constitution was designed to marginalize them from political influence.

With white settler economic and political power was on the wane, sugar planters discussed annexation to the United States as a possible answer to regaining advantageous tariff relations lost with the passing of the 1890 McKinley Tariff. Still, by the early 1890s, some sugar planters needed convincing, as they were concerned that annexation might bring American laws that would extinguish the contract system that had also made the sugar industry lucrative. Debates were framed between the benefits of maintaining an exploitable Asian labor force versus reestablishing profitable American trade relations through annexation. Paul Isenberg, a prominent leader of the sugar industry, explained that he was strongly opposed to annexation because he felt safer having a surplus of labor. Isenberg believed that having easy access to Asian laborers would make it easier to control their workforce, specifically stating that such conditions would make it so that the “Chinese and Japanese had to work or be hungry.”28

The large number of “Oriental” laborers required by the sugar plantations also led to anxieties about the possibility of an imperialist plot by the Japanese to take control of
the islands. By 1897, there were 25,000 Japanese out of a total population of 109,020 in Hawai‘i. Anxiety over the possibility of such a large Japanese population gaining control of Hawai‘i had some merit. In *Between Two Empires* Eiichiro Azuma asserts that the exodus of laborers from Japan to Hawai‘i coincided with a “branch of Japanese imperialist thought” that viewed the western hemisphere as Japan’s own frontier to be settled. Meiji leaders, he explains, viewed Japanese emigration as a part of a Japanese style of manifest destiny, forged out of overseas settlements that were economically and politically tied to Japan. Azuma argues that government leaders assigned, “a nationalist meaning to the act of emigration on the premise that the masses shared the same dedication to the state’s collective purpose.” As such, white sugar planters needed to contend not only with a burgeoning Hawaiian movement to protect their national sovereignty, but also a large Japanese population whose government had an interest in the Hawaiian Islands.

Aware of Japan’s imperialist views, white settler elites used the Bayonet Constitution to cast Asian plantation laborers in Hawai‘i as foreign threats, outlawing their naturalization and prohibiting them from voting. But in fact, the relationship between Japanese plantation laborers in Hawai‘i and the Japanese government was often tenuous. According to Azuma, “most emigrants of rural origin viewed their endeavors from the standpoint of personal interest without much regard to the purported duties of the imperial subject.”

At the same time, it was also “personal interest” that motivated Japanese plantation laborers to initiate a petition, on April 9th of 1893, less than three months after the overthrow, that did not oppose the overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom but rather
demanded their electoral participation in the new settler government. The petition argued that the Japanese were the “physical and intellectual” equals of any of the other foreigners.\textsuperscript{34} Likewise in 1894, the Chinese in Hawai‘i sent a petition, signed by hundreds of people, to the Provisional Government also seeking their right to vote.\textsuperscript{35} Thus, if white settlers were going to maintain political and economic power for themselves—which was the principle reason for overthrowing the Hawaiian Kingdom—then they would need some kind of assurance that annexation was even a possibility.

Using the Columbian Exposition as a front to travel to the United States in 1892, Thurston traveled beyond Chicago to Washington D.C. to meet secretly with the Harrison administration, which expressed interest in annexing Hawai‘i.\textsuperscript{36} Through his Secretary of the Navy, B.F. Tracy, President Harrison stated, “if conditions in Hawaii compel you people to act as you have indicated, and you come to Washington with an annexation proposition, you will find an exceedingly sympathetic administration here.”\textsuperscript{37} The U.S. minister in Hawai‘i, John L. Stevens, was a protégé of Secretary of State James Blaine. Blaine believed that the president should not wait to annex Hawai‘i because he thought that Britain or Japan would annex the islands if the United States did not.\textsuperscript{38}

In January of 1893, Queen Lili‘uokalani, who had taken over as constitutional monarch after the death of her brother King Kalākaua, responded to the numerous calls for a new constitution that would restore the voting rights of Hawaiians. Thurston and the Annexation Club used her attempt to promulgate a new constitution as an opportunity to seize the Hawaiian Kingdom. Stating that the actions of the Queen were “dangerous to American lives and property,” the planter elite read a pronouncement at the courthouse establishing the Provisional Government while eighty marines landed to help occupy the
Hawaiian Kingdom. Thurston and four others then traveled to Washington DC. Only two weeks after the overthrow, President Harrison tried, without success, to rush a treaty of annexation through Congress.

Unfortunately for the Thurston-faction, the shared interests between them and the U.S. government would be broken, as Grover Cleveland would defeat Harrison in the presidential elections. As a friend of Liliʻuokalani, and under counsel from Secretary of State Walter Gresham, Cleveland opposed the annexation of Hawaiʻi. Geopolitical pressures elsewhere, indeed, contributed to Cleveland’s decision. By 1893, American economic interests in Asia may have been nascent and the Cleveland administration focused on South America. And although he opposed Hawaiʻi’s annexation per se, President Cleveland favored maintaining de facto imperial control of Hawaiʻi. Cleveland desired to maintain possession over Pearl Harbor and Assistant Secretary of State Alvey Adee added that Hawaiʻi was just too multiracial and not capable of maintaining “a voting population sufficient to confer a rightful claim to state-hood.”

Upon receiving the annexation treaty and questioning its rush, Cleveland sent a special investigator, Congressmen James Blount to “uncover the facts” about the “Hawaiian Revolution,” so-called by white settlers in Hawaiʻi, who had likened the overthrow to the American Revolution. Yet, Blount reported that Hawaiians were overwhelmingly opposed to annexation: “They are convinced they have been the victims of a great wrong committed by American officials. They look to Washington for redress…. I am satisfied that if the votes of persons claiming allegiance to foreign countries were excluded [annexation] would be defeated by more than five to one.” Hawaiian testimony influenced Commissioner Blount and staved off annexation such that
the United States Congress had to resort to an unconstitutional joint resolution, in 1898, to annex the Hawaiian Islands.

Although the 1893 annexation attempt was defeated by the combined efforts of Hawaiian nationalists and the Cleveland administration, the settler-planter class was still able to maintain possession of the government of Hawai‘i. President Cleveland did attempt to restore Lili‘uokalani but refused to use necessary force. Consequently, the final decision to restore the Hawaiian Kingdom was left to Congress, which in 1894 proceeded to recognize the Provisional Government as the Republic of Hawai‘i. In the same year, Congress passed the Wilson-Gorman Tariff, which returned white settler planters to the position of strategic importance they enjoyed during the Reciprocity Treaty era.

The planners of the World’s Columbian Exposition in Chicago found synergy between the story expressed in their fair and the events taking place in Hawai‘i. In preparation for the opening day of the Exposition, the Chicago Tribune supported the idea of hoisting the same American flag above the exposition’s “Grand Entrance” that had been raised over the Hawaiian Government Building during the overthrow, opining that such a gesture would “advertise the cause of annexation and once more bring it home to the minds and hearts of all Americans.”

The similarities between white settler claims over Native American and Native Hawaiian lands were also not lost on Hawaiians or Native Americans. For instance, in a public argument between W.R. Castle and a Hawaiian man named Kaho‘okono from Hilo, Kaho‘okono argued that “…with annexation, the natives would be driven to the woods like the Indians.” Castle replied: “… that was what I was waiting for. The good
Indians… were living on their own lands, with their own schools and churches.” But the “bad Indians,” Castle argued, “would have scalped that man, and the Hawaiians would not be treated as they were unless they were like them.” These same connections were also made in Indian country about the situation in Hawai‘i. In a letter to Queen Lili‘uokalani, the “Citizens of the Cherokee Nation” inquired: “How many volunteer Americans would it require to re-establish Your Majesty’s Government and displace the oligarchy that usurps your country?”

Whites, Orientals, and Primitives at the Chicago World’s Columbian Exposition

With its domestic and global reach, and celebration of linear national narrations of discovery, settlement, and progress, the 1893 Chicago World’s Columbian Exposition is instructive of the kinds of temporal and spatial logics that organized U.S. state formation and settler colonial power. Like other nations that hosted previous World’s Fairs, the United States attempted to project its imperial prowess through displays of its colonial
feats and possessions. There was a difference, however. By 1893 the United States had not yet practiced a classical form of colonialism, one that involved governing overseas lands and peoples through administrative functions emanating from a metropole. Instead, the form of colonialism associated with the United States involved practices of settler colonialism, through which the U.S. national land base was itself wholly dependent on settlers colonizing what they viewed as savage frontiers filled with savage peoples and seemingly primitive subsistence economies. Such colonial practices aimed to remake the “wilderness” into their own so-called modern “civilizations.”

The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 can be said to be the legal manifestation of the kind of settler colonial expropriation that led to the formation of the United States. This ordinance helped to organize and make legal the violent expropriation of Native American lands by deeming Native peoples “unfit for self-government,” and thus renaming and claiming these lands as U.S. territories and states. After achieving a large enough settler population (5,000 “free male inhabitants of age”) and replacing or containing the indigenous population (frequently, with assistance from the U.S. military), white settlers could make this land their own and proceed to organize and incorporate themselves into new territories. After reaching a population of 60,000 and drafting a state constitution, these territories could petition Congress to recognize them as newly formed states on equal footing with the rest of the U.S. states. The Northwest Ordinance declared in Act Three, however, that “The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians; their land and property shall never be taken without their consent; and, in their property, rights, and liberty, they shall never be invaded or disturbed.” Yet, statehood for Ohio, the very first territory to be admitted through the Northwest
Ordinance, was the result of a ten-year war (from 1785 to 1795) between the United States and different Indians nations of the Midwest. This ten-year war ended with the signing of the Treaty of Greenville, which forced tribal nations to cede most of the territory of the current state of Ohio and parts of Indiana. Indeed, as a legal doctrine, the Northwest Ordinance was the manifestation of an ideological narrative through which white settler violence against Indians and the expropriation of their lands and resources were deemed natural, inevitable, and perhaps most shockingly, legal.

Robert Rydell writes in *All the World’s a Fair* that organizers of the Chicago World’s Columbian Exposition sought to illustrate through visual display the benefits of white civilization’s conquest of peoples deemed “primitive” to an international audience. The Midway Plaisance and the White City were the two foundational and largest sections. Peoples from around the world were displayed as living ethnological exhibits at the Midway Plaisance—a two-mile strip that led to the White City. The temporal and spatial arrangement of the Midway Plaisance leading to the White City was deliberately organized by the exposition’s Department of Ethnology to classify the people of the world along a smooth linear progression from dark anachronistic primitivism to enlightened white modernity, with the inscrutable oriental somewhere in the middle.
Denton J. Snider argues that generally, groups were racially arranged at the Midway along a “sliding scale of humanity.” Snider states that “savage races” such as Africans from Dahomey and Native Americans, were sequestered on one end of the Midway while ethnic whites, represented by two German and two Irish villages, were situated nearest to the White City. Between them were Orientalist representations of the Mohammedan world, West Asia, and East Asia. These exhibits were organized by the Smithsonian anthropologist, Frederic Putnam, in a way that illustrated America’s ability to transform or modernize non-white cultures. By hailing whiteness as the apogee of all civilizations and cultures, this pyramidal view of the world helped to create a space to imagine the formation of an American empire and, especially, to normalize a seemingly natural order of the world where primitives, orientals, and whites were seen along a linear march from barbarism to civilization in ascending order.
Many ethnologists at the exposition pushed strongly the idea of social evolution—
that the way to world peace is for the non-western world to adopt U.S. fashioned
capitalism and democracy. Social evolution, expressed through competitive capitalism,
justified western rule over non-western peoples on the basis of “natural” superiority.

According to Susan Buck-Morss, one powerful cultural consequence of social evolution,
is that, “Within this pseudo scientific discourse, the claim of social injustice became a
logical impossibility.”

Injustices committed against groups deemed primitive and savage were especially
seen as logically impossible. The anthropologist Otis T. Mason argued that there were
three “modern types of savagery” in the world: the American (Native Americans), the
Negroid, and the Malayo-Polynesian. Among these, the latter category (an ethnological
and linguistic collapsing of Malaysians and Polynesians) saw inhabitants of Southeast
Asia and Oceania as savage, and would undergird and justify U.S. colonial projects in
Hawai’i, Samoa, Guam, and a genocidal war in the Philippines. As Michael Adas
cogently writes about frontier regions throughout the world, “terms like primitive and savage…came to signify sorry pasts and tragic futures that would ultimately end with their cultural, and perhaps biological extinction.” People cast as “primitive” were typically regarded as having made no progress towards civilization; their cultures portrayed as having contributed nothing to the overall goal of world peace, and even considered as being impediments to real progress.

If the Midway Plaisance occupied anachronistic space, the White City was viewed as a “future wish,” one that articulated both U.S. national identity and a future destiny possible only if the status quo could be maintained and expanded. The White City, an ensemble of enormous Olympian structures (albeit made of temporary material), was the manifestation of an ostensibly superior form of governance. Amid populist protests, the future destiny of the United States was said to be attainable only if the American population were obedient and practiced “good citizenship.” Arsonists who were most likely involved in the Pullman strikes, however, burned down the White City, blatantly rejecting the role of “good citizen” that the ruling classes were hoping they would play.
While expositions were often used to discipline the white working class, this “future wish” also mobilized a sinister expectation that Native peoples would disappear. In *The Question of Palestine* Edward Said writes that the colonial project of settlers seeks to “cancel and transcend an actual reality” by means of a “future wish—that the land be empty for development by a more deserving power.” As long as “primitives” could be proven as forever in the past, as a people whose history or futures were already written as obituaries, settlers could legitimate their occupation by asserting themselves as the modern inheritors of Native peoples’ lands. But settler nations simultaneously rely, at a symbolic level, on the existence of a “primitive” people to assert its national difference from other nations and the perception of itself as a “modern” nation. Anthropology’s patronizing claims to guard against Native elimination thus simultaneously facilitated this expectation of Native disappearance.

![Fig. 1.6, Japanese Exhibit at Columbian Exposition](image)

In order to place the blame of Native disappearance solely on the inability of primitives to live in civilized modernity, evidence had to exist that other non-white
groups had been made anew through the teachings of the west. The Japanese at the Wooded Isle were held up as an example of such success, a kind of early version of a model minority discourse. Orientals,” as opposed to “primitives,” were not peoples at the beginning of progress; rather, they were seen as symbols of the measure of progress along the spectrum between the spheres of the “traditional” and “modern” (with the modern referencing the West).

The Japanese government, described as having made greater strides toward “the Western spirit of enterprise and civilization,” was given a space for display in the White City at the Wooded Isle, a part from the Midway. Japanese officials stated that they were excited to participate at the exposition in order to further commercial ties with the United States and prove “that Japan is a country worthy of full fellowship in the family of nations.”

The Japanese were imagined as having the ability to open Asia to capitalism, and thus much needed markets that would help get the United States out of economic depression. Americans consequently referred to the Japanese affectionately as the “Yankees of the East.” Azuma explains that the Meiji government understood that in order to be considered a “civilized” nation, Japan would have to “partake in the practice of colonization.” Indeed, the Meiji state’s colonization of the Ainu in Hokkaido in 1869 was modeled after the conquest of Native Americans by the United States. Accordingly, Japan would establish its own form of manifest destiny by colonizing Okinawa, Taiwan, south Sakhalin, Kwantung Province in northern China, and then annexing Korea in 1910. But while the United States hailed Japan as having a civilizing influence on a seemingly backward Asian continent, it insisted that Japan’s “supremacy” always be subordinate to that of the United States. Robert Rydell writes, “as long as the Japanese showed
deference to the desires of the United States, there was every reason to believe that the Japanese people could be accommodated after a fashion in the future utopia.\textsuperscript{63} By the time of Theodore Roosevelt’s presidency, however, American military and political leaders predicted that the emerging industrial and militarized nation of Japan was destined for future war with the United States.\textsuperscript{64}

The temporal and spatial arrangement of “primitives” and “orientals” along the Midway Plaisance and White City allowed the United States to create a body of knowledge about these groups that would help to enact specific policies. The knowledge being produced about “primitive” peoples helped to reify U.S. colonial policies that declared Native peoples “unfit for self-government,” helping to justify federal oversight of Native governance through the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Such policies and cultural representations would help to normalize acts of conquest, to shift the threat of Indian violence in the nineteenth century to twentieth century nostalgia and metaphor.\textsuperscript{65} On the other hand, orientalism created both a formidable ally and enemy. Japan would be used as an example of a people who had followed the Americans’ lead and established itself as a nation worthy of respect. This respect, however, would simultaneously be perceived as a threat to notions of white superiority. To be sure, fear of the Japanese was often based on an idea that they might, in fact, be a superior people capable of displacing whites. Such cultural representations were used to justify the passing of the 1907 Gentlemen’s Agreement. This informal arrangement led to the United States agreeing that they would not block Japanese immigration, so long as Japan did not allow further emigration to the United States. By deeming the Japanese “ineligible for citizenship,” further laws would be passed that would block naturalization, land ownership, and voting. Such cultural
representations also provided justification for the United States to fortify Hawai‘i as a military outpost to defend against Japanese attack in the early twentieth century.

The Cyclorama of Kilauea

![Cyclorama of Kilauea at the Chicago World’s Columbian Exposition, 1893](image)

The Hawaiian Bureau of Information’s “Cyclorama of Kilauea” functioned as an advertisement for tourism, settlement and annexation, all of which sought to reaffirm white settler economic and political rule in Hawai‘i. Due to the small number of white settlers in Hawai‘i, especially when compared to the number of Hawaiians and Asians, white economic and political leaders saw tourism as an attractive economic alternative to sugar, one that would allow them to increase the white settler population through capital expansion and still be unaffected by American tariffs. In 1891, the *Daily Pacific Commercial Advertiser*, the mouthpiece of the white settler elite that Lorrin A. Thurston would eventually buy and own, responded to the effects of the McKinley Tariff:

> In spite of the blow which the sugar industry has received, there are those who think that we are about to enter upon a period of great expansion and consequent prosperity… The tourist travel to these Islands is capable of an almost indefinite expansion. It might yield an income of several millions a year. If it comes the
country will be opened up by a network of roads which will give to thousands of acres of arable land a ready access to market. With the realization of these conditions the prosperity of the country will be assured and we can laugh at sugar tariffs.66

Many believed that tourism would stabilize Hawai‘i’s economy and increase the immigration of white settlers in the hopes of eventually outnumbering the Native population and giving whites political power at the voting booths. Numerous articles in the settler newspapers reported the desires of “hundreds and thousands” of whites who would consider moving to Hawai‘i only if it were a part of the United States.67 One such sentiment was expressed thus: “I would not expatriate myself, but if I could own a little land and have a home in such a climate and stay under the flag it would be a great temptation.”68 Outnumbering the Native population was also seen as fundamental to economic stability and expansion. Thurston wrote in a letter to Secretary of State James Blaine in 1892 that there was an “overwhelming electoral majority in one class [the natives], and the ownership of practically all the property in another class [white settlers],” consequently creating conflict where settlers, “are constantly, more or less openly, threatening revolution and disturbance.” Thurston explained that while it might not actually lead to revolution or bloodshed, the “constant possibility” of revolution prevented capital from coming into the country, halting further economic development.69

Indeed, after facing defeat at the voting polls in 1890, Lorrin A. Thurston became heavily involved in promoting white settlement and tourism to Hawai‘i.

Teaming up with Benjamin Dillingham, a well-known owner of the Oahu Railway & Land, Co., and William F. Sesser, a railroad-advertising agent from Michigan, Thurston used the Hawaiian Bureau of Information to distribute literature throughout the United States that portrayed Hawai‘i as a place where Hawaiian savagery and American
civilization met. Over one thousand large photographs of the Kilauea volcano, ten thousand copies of a pamphlet titled *Paradise of the Pacific and Inferno of the World*, and 50,000 smaller pamphlets titled *Vistas of Hawaii* were distributed nationally. The development of printing technology near the end of the nineteenth century aided the Bureau’s campaign tremendously. Lynn A. Davis explains that the opinion campaigns seeking to capture national consent for annexation utilized numerous photographs due to the new low costs of reproducing images of Hawai‘i. Davis also points out that Thurston himself provided a “specific model” to promote Hawai‘i as a tourist destination.

Every person who entered the Cyclorama was given the pamphlet entitled *Vistas of Hawai‘i*. In *Legendary Hawai‘i and the Politics of Place*, Cristina Bacchilega analyzes the larger pamphlet, “Its photos juxtapose images of powerful steamers to Native canoes, and beautifully landscaped ‘private’ yards to ‘glimpses of the great volcano, Kilauea.’ Thurston illustrates the binaries of his subtitle, *Paradise of the Pacific and Inferno of the World*, by displaying Native Hawaiians as part of the ‘infernal’ scenes—these representing the desolate volcano and that dark world before civilization brought trains and hotels to the islands.” In line with portraying Hawai‘i as a frontier zone, white settlement was considered necessary to bringing Hawai‘i out of its primal and anachronistic space. Through proper white American settlement, the symbols of savagery and modernity on the farthest margins of the American frontier helped tourists feel a combination of threat from wild dark savagery yet safety in knowing that the land had been settled and modernized by American settlers. But there was a threshold: if modernity went too far, and extinguished the exoticism associated with the “primitive,” Hawai‘i’s selling power would be lost.
The Cyclorama of Kilauea deployed many of the tropes that were used in the different sections of the Columbian Exposition. For starters, as mentioned, it represented Hawai‘i as a new U.S. frontier zone. Frederick Jackson Turner writes, “…the frontier is the outer edge of the wave—the meeting point between savagery and civilization.” The Cyclorama advanced this same idea by representing Hawai‘i, through a volcano, as a primordial origin of sorts: Kilauea volcano would be served up as a geological signifier of the absolute beginning stages of development, a place on earth at its most primitive state. At the same time, this primitive stage of development was represented in what was considered to be one of the most modern forms of western technological entertainment in existence, the cyclorama. Considered to be “all the rage in America,” cycloramas or panoramas, were linked to the mobile gaze and new styles of modern visual consumption. With their large panoramic screens, cycloramas were also the predecessor to motion
picture films. Thurston was certainly very keen to the selling power of visually combining the primitive and the modern.

While the volcano itself helped to create a sense of primitive danger, the evocation of Pele, described as the “Goddess of Fire,” was crucial to providing an explicitly racialized, gendered, and superstitious Native threat. Pele’s statue stood above the entrance to Thurston’s Cyclorama and, at twenty-five feet, it was said to be the second largest statue at the Columbian Exposition. An 1893 booklet on the Midway described the statue of Pele this way: “Her hair is blown wildly back and there is a terrible frown upon her beautiful face, as she prepared to annihilate her enemies.” Pele’s “enemies,” as narrated in the superficial Hawaiian stories told in the cyclorama and its advertisements, were always men.

This sense of Native threat was also inscribed upon the spectator in highly visceral and theatrical ways. Frightened initially by the crater’s sheer mass and the sinister image of Pele, viewers were then enveloped in an exotic chant to Pele. The chant was then followed by a short lecture on the science of the volcano. In this way, Native “superstition” and the female threat of Goddess Pele were pacified by an objective
masculine science in the form of enlightened geologists who could measure, categorize, and rationally explain away superstitious Native mythology. A write up of the exhibit speaks to this dynamic: “Language utterly fails to adequately describe the awful grandeur of the vast crater and the terrible fascination of the mighty forces constantly in action within its frowning walls, but a few volcanic facts will give some conception of what the volcano is and its method of action.”

In the landscape painting of Kilauea crater inside the cyclorama, Chicago painter Walter W. Burridge depicts the figure of a geologist walking and studying within the crater. Here, two competing sets of knowledge about one location were juxtaposed. As a people who were seen as having a more advanced knowledge over the crater, settlers could position themselves as more deserving (than Native inhabitants) of that space. The representation of Pele, combined with the science of geology, sought to cancel or trivialize Hawaiian cultural associations with place.

Thurston and his geologists were entrenched in the discourse of the frontier and spoke of geology as a war between civilization and the destructive female power of Pele. Thomas Jaggar, an early geologist would eventually title his book, *Volcanoes Declare War*, telling of his and Thurston’s involvement in the 1935 U.S. Army’s dropping of six tons of bombs on a lava flow from Mauna Loa. Interestingly, the lines between a superstitious Native past and rational enlightened present would be blurred, however, when two of the bombers touched wings in mid-air and burst into flames, an incident that Hawaiians in the area had warned the Army about, stating that such bombings were desecrations against Pele. In fact, the ashes of one of the pilots killed in the bombing went missing on its return flight back to the U.S. continent. The pilot’s ashes were never found. Pacific Islander Studies scholar Vicente M. Diaz points out that such moments
where “men of reason” are thrown for a loop, have the gendered and epistemic effect of calling “into question that particular form of manliness built on reason.”

In stark contrast to the one-dimensional portrayals of Pele in the Cyclorama, Native Hawaiian stories describe Pele, and the women associated with her, as offering a profoundly powerful and feminist narrative. As Noenoe Silva writes of Pele, and the epic in which she appears:

Pele is demanding, jealous, angry, unpredictable, and vengeful. Further, the other women in the epic engage in meaningful and pleasurable activities: they fight of evils, outsmart rapists, chant and dance hula, surf, practice medicine and religion (one and the same at times), and have loves and profound relationships, especially with each other. They are not cooking, cleaning house, or worrying about husbands. They are not domesticated; rather, they are adventurous.

In contrast, Pele’s representation in the cyclorama entails the pacification and domestication of an irrational and belligerent Native woman. This resonates fully with the narration of the overthrow of Queen Lili‘uokalani, one of the world’s most publicly visible and known women, who was also publicly vilified as a direct threat to white settler control over Hawai‘i. Not surprisingly, Thurston described Lili‘uokalani as a “dangerous woman.” As indicated earlier, it was Lili‘uokalani who sought to promulgate a new constitution to restore a system of checks and balances and full political vote to Native Hawaiians. This attempt to open political office to vote was characterized as dangerous to “American lives and property,” which was taken to justify the landing of U.S. marines to occupy Hawai‘i. The American press also ran numerous stories about Lili‘uokalani’s supposed savagery and hot temper. One in particular told of Lili‘uokalani’s plan to have Thurston and others beheaded for committing treason. Lili‘uokalani responded by stating that beheading was a form of punishment never used
in the Hawaiian Islands and that she would rather have Thurston and company banished and their properties confiscated.82

Yet, the portrayals of Pele and Lili’uokalani also show how the aims of colonialism and tourism relied on different representations of Hawaiian women. Pele’s statue was designed by Ellen Rankin of Chicago whose goal was to portray Pele as a “Venus of the Pacific,” the most “beautiful woman that ever lived.”83 In order to lure tourists and settlers to Hawai‘i, Pele was sculpted with European features, a beauty aesthetic palatable to a white American audience. Lili’uokalani, on the other hand, was often represented in political cartoons as having “primitive” features, repeatedly described, by the missionary elite, as both savage and sexually deviant.84 Andrea Smith explains that because Native women are often seen as filled with sexual sin and dirty, “the rape of bodies that are considered inherently impure or dirty simply does not count.”85 Consequently, Smith argues, such an ideology makes it so that their colonization is also made to not count.86
In fact, there is also much overlap between the gendered advertising for tourism and annexation. Thurston writes in *Vistas of Hawaii* that it was the wresting of political control from Hawaiians that transformed Hawai‘i into a place that could be safely visited by tourists and correctly developed by whites. Like most advertisements, the pamphlets and cyclorama produced by the Hawaiian Bureau of Information distracted the viewer from seeing a highly politicized situation offering, in its place, a space of fantasy defined by settler desire and colonial imagination. As an imperial advertisement for annexation, the cyclorama sold Hawai‘i and Hawaiians as existing in an exotic and primitive past, which thus allowed a future wish for annexation and settlement by a people discursively constructed as more deserving of Hawai‘i and more capable of bringing it into the modern world. The “Cyclorama of Kilauea” enjoyed a fairly long run in the World’s Fair circuits and eventually made its way to the San Francisco Midwinter Fair of 1894-95, a Boston Cyclorama theater, and eventually, the 1901 Buffalo Exposition.\(^7\) Long capturing the imagination of its viewers, the cyclorama was able to cast the Hawaiian Kingdom, and anything associated with Hawaiians, as existing in a vanishing past, while presenting a Hawai‘i under both American and white settler control as foretelling of a bright future filled with new economic and political possibilities.
Lorrin A. Thurston often obsessively talked about the death of the Hawaiian Kingdom and the birth of a new settler government. He argued that once Hawaiians understood that the monarchy was dead and “this idea penetrates the skulls of the great unwashed electorate,” Hawaiians themselves would become Annexationists. The State of Hawai‘i seal used today, adopted in 1895, visually offers us an understanding of this logic and a “future wish” as it relates to Hawai‘i. Viggo Jacobsen designed the Hawai‘i seal in an art competition sponsored by the legislature of the Republic of Hawai‘i. In a 1979 issue of *Aloha Magazine* the author writes:

The seal is a modified version of the royal coat of arms of the Hawaiian Kingdom… The rising sun replaces the royal crown and Maltese cross of the original coat of arms, and signifies the birth of a new state. King Kamehameha the Great and Goddess of Liberty holding the Hawaiian flag replace two warriors on the royal coat of arms. Puloulou, or tabu ball and stick, in the second and third quarters was carried before the king and placed before the door of his home, signifying his authority and power. Here, it is a symbol of the authority and power of government. The phoenix, symbol of death and resurrection, symbolizes the change from the monarchy to a freer democratic form of government.
In 1895, three years before Hawai‘i was fraudulently annexed through joint resolution by the United States, the star at the center of the shield represented the “the Star of Hawaii,” a “future wish” for statehood of which Viggo Jacobsen wrote, “we hope to see ultimately placed in the banner of the United States.” At the same time, however, most Hawaiian nationals had not given up their claims to Hawaiian independence. As Noenoe K. Silva’s research has uncovered, a failed war was attempted in 1895 but in 1897, when talks of annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States resumed, the Hui Kalai‘aina and Hui Aloha ‘Aina Parties circulated petitions signed by over ninety percent of the Hawaiian population opposing American citizenship throughout the islands. The Hawaiian nation remained very much alive. White settlers, however, sought to dismiss Hawaiian claims to nationhood by playing to a much more recognizable international threat to white order than that posed by Native Hawaiians.

This threat—the Yellow Peril—is also one that Thurston would no doubt learn more about from his experiences at the Columbian Exposition. In 1897, Thurston wrote that white settlers in Hawai‘i understood their political dilemma as a contest not between Native Hawaiians and white settlers, but rather between the white and the yellow race, stating: “It is no longer a question whether Hawaii should be controlled by the native Hawaiian, or by some foreign people; but the question is, ‘What foreign people shall control Hawaii?’” By 1897, tensions between Japan and the Republic of Hawai‘i were near breaking point. The Republic had begun to force ships, filled with Japanese laborers to return to Japan in the belief that Japan was participating in a “peaceful invasion” of the islands. This led to talks of war between Japan and the United States. Both the Republic of Hawai‘i and U.S. military leaders hoped to exploit these tensions, believing
this might force the United States to immediately annex the islands. By the latter part of the 1890s, military leaders wanted to keep Hawai‘i away from Japan so that it could never use Hawai‘i as a staging point to attack the west coast.  

In 1898, imperialists would again seek annexation. The national press, however, reminded the public of the 1893 crime upon which annexation stood. The *New York Times* ran an editorial titled, “Story of a Crime,” stating that before the “Hawaiian crime is actually consummated,” the American public should remember the whole story of the January 1893 overthrow.  

The *San Francisco Call* dubbed the annexation “shameful,” because “It made the United States a receiver of goods stolen while we held the owner to be robbed.”  

Unable to get the constitutionally required two-thirds vote from the Senate, Senator Morgan of Nevada, citing the annexation of Texas as a precedent, pushed the annexation through joint resolution, which only required half the vote of Congress. The comparison was, and still is, flawed: Texas was not annexed as a territory but rather, admitted into the union as a “state.” Moreover, unlike Texas, neither the white settler elite of Hawai‘i or Washington D.C. sought statehood for Hawai‘i. The problem wasn’t simply that Hawai‘i’s majority population was non-white. It was that the large numbers of Native peoples could still threaten the political control of the numerically small white settler elites should they gain full voting rights afforded by statehood.  

In 1927, Lorrin A. Thurston expressed the same general view of many of his peers relegating Hawai‘i statehood to an indeterminate “future wish” stating: “Do I object to statehood? Most assuredly not, so long as it remains an ideal, not a reality.”  

A serious movement for statehood did not emerge until 1934, when another major economic depression abolished favorable tariff relations and again motivated Hawai‘i’s white
business and governing elite to further colonial control of Hawai‘i, this time through statehood. The Hawaiian Bureau of Information, charged with leading an opinion campaign to achieve annexation and regain favorable tariff relations in the 1890s, would be nearly reproduced in 1935 in the form of the so-called Hawaii Equal Rights Commission. This commission would lead to another opinion campaign to get Hawai‘i statehood for economic reasons.

The links between 1893 and the 1930s, however, are not only limited to these commissions and economic depression. Relations between Chicago and Hawai‘i, specifically the Columbian Exposition and the University of Hawai‘i, would also be furthered through the University of Chicago School of Sociology. This department was built on the site where the Midway Plaisance once stood and in its early formulations, it used much of the logics of the Columbian Exposition for its intellectual foundations. This department would be responsible for training sociologists who would then travel to Hawai‘i and produce knowledge about race relations in the islands that would reaffirm notions of both primitivism and orientalism, thereby constituting Hawai‘i as a veritable “racial frontier.”

Indeed, a critical retelling of the 1893 Chicago World’s Columbian Exposition helps contextualize Hawai‘i statehood within the history of the formation of other U.S. states. This political and cultural process was not inevitable; rather, it was a long and violent process underpinned by a white supremacist ideology that saw the expropriation of Native American lands and resources as a natural occurrence. This ideology would also be used to collapse the international sovereign rights of the Hawaiian Kingdom into a racist colonial discourse on Native Americans. The Columbian Exposition, with its
various displays of peoples deemed primitive, oriental, and white, helped to naturalize white supremacist violence making it seem like nothing more than the spreading of democracy and progress.
1 James G. Blaine to James M. Comly, Department of State, 1 December 1881, in Thurston, Lorrin A. Miscellaneous Papers, M-144, Hawaii State Archives.

2 For more on “imperial advertisements” see Anne McClintock, Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest, (New York: Routledge, 1995), 207-231.

3 Long before Hawai‘i was imagined as a U.S. frontier after the 1893 overthrow, the larger Pacific, particularly Samoa, had been a site for the intersection of various empires, what Damon Salesa refers to as an “international frontier.” See Damon Salesa, “Samoa’s Half-Castes and Some Frontiers of Comparison,” in Haunted by Empire: Geographies of Intimacy in North American History, ed. Ann Laura Stoler, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006).


6 Frederick Jackson Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History,” delivered at the American Historical Association, 1893.


10 Here I am using Philip J. Deloria’s theorization on the “unexpected” where he explains that “broad cultural expectations are both the products and the tools of domination and that they are an inheritance that haunts each and every one of us… It is critical, then, that we question expectations and explore their origins, for they created—and they continue to reproduce—social, political, legal, and economic relations that are asymmetrical,


21 As cited in William A. Russ, *The Hawaiian Revolution (1893-1894)*, 12


27 Seats in the House of Nobles had a property requirement of $3,000 or annual income of $600 to either run for these offices or vote for them.


32 William Adam Russ, Jr., 130-177.

33 Eiichiro Azuma, 20.

34 Kathleen Dickenson Mellen, Bishop Museum Archives, MS 19, Box 3.4.

35 “A Petition signed by several hundred Chinese will be presented to the Councils today, asking that the Chinese in Hawai‘i be given the voting franchise,” *Pacific Commercial Advertiser*, May 17, 1894.

36 Ralph Kuykendall, 534.

37 *Ibid.*, 536

38 James G. Blaine to James M. Comly, Department of State, 1 December 1881, in Lorrin A. Thurston Miscellaneous Papers, M-144, Hawaii State Archives, Honolulu.

39 Walter LaFeber, 203


41 Kathleen Dickenson Mellen, 288

42 The response of the Provisional Government is not recorded at the Hawai‘i State Archive, but the Executive advisory council might not have trusted the *Chicago Tribune* because of some editorials that criticized the Provisional Governments control of Hawai‘i. Letter, March 30, 1893 from Claude H. Wetmore to the “Executive and Advisory Councils of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands,” and April 6, 1893 at Hawai‘i State Archives, “1893 Executive Advisory councils: Petitions,” Folder 6.


48 Ibid.

49 Ibid., 45.

50 Ibid., 43-46.


52 Robert Rydell, 59-60.


54 Robert Rydell, 44.


59 Robert Rydell, All the World’s a Fair, 51.

60 Ibid, 48-49.
61 Ibid., 51.
62 Eiichiro Azuma, 18.
63 Robert Rydell, 50-51.
64 Tom Coffman, The Island Edge of America: A Political History of Hawai‘i, (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2003), 22
65 Philip J. Deloria, Indians in Unexpected Places, 71-83.
66 Ralph Kuykendall, Hawaiian Kingdom, 110.
68 Ibid.
69 Years later, the Hawai‘i territorial legislature would act on this same sentiment when it passed a bill urging Congress to pay the fares of “caucasian farmers and farm laborers” to “diversify agriculture,” but also provide a “stronger local militia” for the “military defense of the United States. Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 9, Offered on April 17, 1911 by A.F. Judd, adopted in the Senate, April 19, 1911 and House April 22, 1911; Also see Ralph Kuykendall, Hawaiian Kingdom, 536-537.
71 Cristina Bacchilega, Legendary Hawai‘i and the Politics of Place: Tradition, Translation, and Tourism, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 93
72 Ibid.
73 For a more in depth look at the relationship between dialectic of modernity and sacredness see Gelder and Jane M. Jacobs, Uncanny Australia: Sacredness and Identity in a Postcolonial Nation, (Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 1998), 1-22.
74 Frederick Jackson Turner, 200.


Kathleen Dickenson Mellen, “Hawaiian Scrapbook,” *Paradise of the Pacific*, (December, 1945), 32.

Vicente M. Diaz, *Repositioning the Missionary: Rewriting the Histories of Colonialism, Native Catholicism, and Indigeneity in Guam*, (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Pacific Islands Monograph Series, forthcoming), 127.


Lili‘uokalani, *Hawaii’s Story by Hawaii’s Queen*, 246-49


Lorrin A. Thurston, *Writings of Lorrin A. Thurson*, 83.

William Adam Russ, 220.


95 William Adam Russ, 332.


CHAPTER TWO
DRAWING THE LINES OF HAWAI‘I STATEHOOD:
CRISES OF HAOLE HEGEMONY AND THE HAWAII EQUAL RIGHTS
COMMISSION

The early decades of Hawai‘i’s Territorial period saw a rapid growth in both the sugar industry and U.S. military. With sugar planters’ access to U.S. markets secure for the time being, those who helped in the overthrow and presumed annexation of Hawai‘i to the United States further amassed large amounts of capital. For instance, thirteen new plantations were created with $40 million available in new capital investment.¹ Between 1910 and 1913 land for sugar increased by 130,000 acres.² Widely and collectively referred to as the Big Five—Castle & Cooke, Charles Brewer & Company, Alexander & Baldwin, Theophilus H. Davis & Company, and Heinrich Hackfeld & Company (renamed the American Factors during World War I)—these interlocking agencies would come to control 41 of the 47 sugar plantations and over 95 percent of the total sugar production in Hawai‘i by 1930.³ The Big Five, through a system of interlocking directorates, also controlled the industries that surrounded the plantations, namely banking, insurance, shipping, utilities and retailing. Three of these five agencies came under the control of four families (Alexander, Baldwin, Castle, and Cooke) whose patriarchs first traveled to Hawai‘i as missionaries. As the common saying about the missionaries in Hawai‘i goes: “They came to do good, and did well.”
Big Five desires to maintain access to profitable U.S. sugar markets converged with U.S. military leaders’ interests in maintaining the Hawaiian Islands as a military outpost. These mutual interests would keep their relations amicable. Hawai‘i’s strategic location in the middle of the Pacific Ocean would also help to bolster U.S. economic and military power in Asia and the Pacific. By the early part of the twentieth century, the United States had become cautious of Japan, particularly due to its military victory over the Russians in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). Success in this war led the U.S. military to shore-up both the U.S. Army and Navy in Hawai‘i out of fear that Japan could invade the islands as a staging point to invade the U.S. West coast. Hawai‘i’s strategic location would also provide the U.S. military easy access to conduct operations in “Oriental waters.” With military installations in Hawai‘i, Samoa, Guam, and the Philippines, the United States was in a key position by the early part of the twentieth century to establish itself both economically and militarily as a hemispheric power throughout Asia and the Pacific.

By the 1930s, however, the arrangement between the U.S. military and the Big Five would come under extraordinary strain. In 1931, Hawai‘i political leaders, and especially a rapidly growing tourism industry, received unwanted national and even international attention after Thalia Massie, a well-connected aristocrat and wife of a Naval officer, was brutally beaten and allegedly raped by whom she described as four or five “Hawaiian” men. Evidence would later confirm that her accusations were fabricated. In Honor Killing, David Stannard describes the atmosphere in Honolulu during the “Massie Affair” as an “ethnically divided powder keg.” In 1932 the five accused men, a mix of Hawaiian, Japanese, and Chinese, were free on a mistrial as the
jury could not come to a decision, particularly due to questionable police investigations. Many Congressmen took notice of the ability for men of color in the colonies to be free after “harming” a white woman and attempted to place Hawai‘i under a Naval form of government.® Equally disturbed by what he considered to be the Territorial Government’s incompetence at securing a guilty verdict for those “cutthroats,” Admiral Yates Stirling concluded to the press a racist expectation that lynching be used to restore order: “since the five accused men were as free as air, I half expected, in spite of discipline, to hear any day that one or more had been found swinging from trees by the neck up Nuuanu Valley or at the Pali.”9 Only a few days after Admiral Stirling’s comment, one of the accused, Horace Ida, was severely beaten and left for dead at the Pali—a stretch of road that cuts through a generally secluded Ko‘olau mountain. Another of the accused, Joseph Kahahawai, unfortunately did not survive his attack. Kahahawai would be kidnapped by Massie’s husband, her mother, and a family friend and then shot. The Massie gang would attempt to get rid of Kahahawai’s body by dumping it into a blowhole, a lava tube that would have dismembered his body, but the group was caught en route and apprehended. The already tense relations among the military, Big Five, and now, especially the non-white majority, reached unprecedented levels after Kahahawai’s convicted murderers received a commuted sentence—from ten years hard labor to one hour spent in Governor Lawrence Judd’s office. Walter Dillingham, the son of Benjamin Dillingham (who we met in Chapter One), commented on the dangerous precedent that Governor Judd’s decision posed in a majority non-white community: “While this may be condoned under conditions which prevail where whites are in the majority, it would be a hazardous thing to give any such recognition of lynch law in our community where it is
vital to stress the necessity of abiding by the laws of the country.”

Amid several rounds of federal investigations that cited Hawai‘i political leaders as neglectful and inefficient, Congressmen sought to establish a commission form of government over Hawai‘i. Representative John E. Rankin of Mississippi, for example, assumed that the white settler leadership of the Territory was inept at maintaining racial order and control. In 1933, Rankin introduced legislation that would have removed the white settler elite from control of the government and allowed the President to appoint nonresidents to key positions in the Territory. Southern Congressman believed that a change in Territorial government would create the proper conditions, where a white person would never be sentenced to ten years hard labor for killing someone “black,” especially one who had harmed a white woman.

As the circumstances of the Massie case reveal, racial hostilities by the 1930s were highly gendered and often involved a fear that white society was losing order and control in the islands. Much of these anxieties were indeed catalyzed by the Great Depression. Beginning with the U.S. stock market crash in 1929, over five thousand banks were forced to close and industrial production would fall by 50 percent, a situation that caused an estimated 15 million people to be unemployed. By December of 1936, nearly one-quarter of Hawai‘i’s labor force was out of work and the power and prestige held by the Big Five was under extraordinary stress. With a U.S. capitalist system in disarray, Congress would pass legislation that would again, much like it did the 1890s, impact the Big Five’s access to U.S. sugar markets. As a part of New Deal Agricultural policies, the 1934 Jones-Costigan Sugar Act abolished the tariff relations providing the Big Five access to highly lucrative U.S. sugar markets. Unlike the 1890s, however,
federal policies to combat the Great Depression brought more worries for the Big Five. Congress would also pass the 1935 Wagner Act, which empowered Hawai‘i’s dockworkers to organize themselves into unions without employer intrusion or interference. In an island society that depended primarily on importing and exporting goods through ports and harbors, dockworkers could now oppose the Big Five in unprecedented ways. In turn, the Big Five searched for new political means to give it a larger voice in Congress, particularly to counter what it called “federal discrimination.” Statehood was imagined as providing them with this means.

Hawai‘i’s occupation by the United States was thus comprised of a complex constellation of processes and interests. These processes consisted of a delicate arrangement of variously mediated struggles, which were orchestrated by U.S. designs for empire and global imperial politics, labor immigration and protest, economic depression and planter access to U.S. markets, racial tensions and alliances, and struggles for equality. All of these forces contributed to an often obscured or ideologically justified arrangement of power: the (re)consolidation of settler accumulation through Native dispossession.

In this chapter, I highlight settler colonialism as a major dimension of economic and social force in Hawai‘i, one instructive of the kind of organizing racial logics that made the Americanization of Hawai‘i and aims for statehood seem natural and inevitable. Thus I place settler colonialism in relation to other historical processes that generate profit through dispossession, namely labor exploitation and empire building. To illustrate the relations between these historical processes, I provide three different examples that call attention to particular formations of settler colonial power. In section
one, I compare the representation of Hawai‘i and the Philippines in late 19th and early 20th century political cartoons, questioning how their gendered representations helped to naturalize different political trajectories—indeed for the Philippines, and statehood for Hawai‘i. In section two, I apply the concept of settler colonialism, paying careful attention to the differential positionalities of non-white settlers, including their complex relations to systemic structures of white racism through labor exploitation on the one hand, and participation in settler discourses complicit in the dispossession of Native Hawaiians on the other. In this section, I also offer close readings of academic and scholarly texts produced in the early half of the 20th century that use “primitives” and “orientals” as objects of knowledge for political aims. Examples include the work of Australian psychologist, Stanley D. Porteus, and that of the University of Chicago-trained sociologists who founded the Department of Sociology at the University of Hawai‘i, whose works justified “oriental” assimilation to the United States often through “frontier” narratives defined in opposition to “primitives.” Such organizing logics would be key to the Hawai‘i statehood movement. In the third and final section, I examine local editorials, political cartoons, and testimony pertaining to the 1937 congressional statehood hearings in Hawai‘i, which provided an opportunity for those regularly surveilled by the settler state to reverse the imperial gaze and instead testify before a more powerful U.S. congressional authority on the abuses and corruption of the Big Five. Where the first two sections provide examples of the production of differential colonial knowledge about different Asian groups and Hawaiians, the last section explores a moment where this dynamic is reversed, and the “objects of knowledge” are the Big Five themselves. I begin first with a comparison of the different representations of colonial
power representing Native Hawaiians and Filipinos as American primitives destined for different political statuses—statehood and independence.

“Little Brown Brothers” and “Hula Maidens”

Numerous political cartoons at the turn of the twentieth century narrated Hawai‘i’s annexation to the United States as permanent, naturalizing this political arrangement by representing it as a marriage between Uncle Sam and a “hula maiden.” The annexation of the Philippines, on the other hand, was most often represented as a situation in which “little brown brothers” were being reared and educated by a benevolent Uncle Sam for eventual self-government. The forms of imperial power over these two sites have very distinct dynamics and objectives, requiring different forms of gendered narratives and cultural representation. For example, and as we shall see in greater detail later, the U.S. backed overthrow of Queen Lili‘uokalani in 1893 and the pacification of Philippine nationalists led by a controversial Emilio Aguinaldo made for very different forms of belittling these leaders. The imagined racial and gendered inferiority of the political leaders of Hawai‘i and the Philippines—as primitive woman and boy respectively—helped to justify the need for a more “manly American race.”

When the United States ventured to occupy various island nations at the end of the nineteenth century, much of its experience of colonial governance involved settler colonialism and campaigns of genocide enacted against Native Americans. On the other side of the Pacific Ocean, by the end of the 19th century, Filipinos were on the cusp of ousting the remnants of a failed Spanish empire. Seeing an opportunity to gain further access to Asian markets, U.S. leaders made secret arrangements with Spain to assume colonial control over the archipelago. The result of this arrangement was the
Philippine-American war (1899-1905), in which upwards of 2 million Filipinos in the first four years were killed—mostly civilian non-combatants—so that the United States could purportedly teach Filipinos about democracy and self-government. Historian Patricio Abinales describes much of the genocidal campaigns that took place in Mindanao, the largest and southernmost most island consisting primarily of Muslim communities, as modeled after the American genocidal campaigns against Native Americans. When the Americans first arrived to the northern islands, General Elwell Otis erroneously declared that the war against the Tagalog “tribe” would last only a few weeks. When the so-called “insurgency” continued to fight and in fact grew stronger, the United States deployed hundreds of thousands more American soldiers. Their mission was to carry out what one American Governor would later describe as a “depopulation campaign.” Indeed, General “Howlin’ Jake” Smith is said to have ordered his soldiers to, “Kill and burn, kill and burn, the more you kill and the more you burn the more you please me.” He also commanded them to shoot “Everything over ten,” and turn the land into a “howling wilderness” where “even the birds could not live there.” Though the U.S. Army persisted, and reenacted what Patrick Wolfe calls a “homicidal frontier” in the Philippines, they could not reduce the Filipino population to levels that white settlers in other American territories might find tolerable. The difference in the Philippines too was that there was not a sizable white American settler population invested in settling these islands.
In many political cartoons at the turn of the 20th century, Native Americans, Native Hawaiians, and Filipinos were drawn side by side, with menacing, but “moralizing” lessons attached to them. In an 1899 cartoon in Judge an Indian chief uses “Professor Marconi’s wireless telegraphy” to warn a bandaged Filipino holding a spear, “Be good, or you will be dead.” Caricatured, and made light of through the cultural form of a cartoon, are a pile of Filipino bodies racialized as African, and a burnt village in the immediate background. Further on the distant horizon, Hawai‘i, also depicted as a Black native, holds a spear and looks on. The brand of American conquest, underpinned by a discourse of American primitivism, makes genocide seem like the fault of the Native for resisting. While the cartoon certainly contains some serious commentary, the juxtaposition of western technology used by American primitives is “unexpected,” creating humor that is produced as a result of normative “expectations” for Native peoples. Philip J. Deloria writes, “Primitivism, technological incompetence, physical
distance, and cultural difference…such images have remained familiar currency in contemporary dealings with Native people.” Such kinds of humor, he elaborates, draw from situations considered out of the ordinary that actually help to reinforce our expectations of other unmarked or absent categories. These expectations of primitive incompetence ideologically underpin gross inequalities. In other words, this cartoon has no white American soldier, yet the image of inept primitives helps to normalize white American conquest, conveying an insidious idea that the genocide of primitives was a natural and inevitable fact of modernity. Such expectations of Native disappearance simultaneously elide responsibility for genocidal conquest.

Fig. 2.2, “Civilization,” *Judge*

In the 1899 political cartoon on the front cover of *Judge*, titled “The Filipino’s First Bath,” U.S. President William McKinley scrubs the darkness and savagery off the
unwieldy Filipino child with the brush of “education” and the whitening waters of “civilization,” all the while exhorting (in the caption), “Oh, you dirty boy!” Puerto Rico and Cuba are portrayed as model colonial citizens, more mature than the Philippines, presumably because they have willingly washed and whitened themselves and are now happily donning the stars and stripes. The racist association of brown skin with dirt links Filipino racial types and national territories to uncleanliness and primitive disorder. In this way they seem to beckon their “benevolent assimilation” from dirty “little brown brothers” into white adulthood except that this presumed ultimate status of masculinity could never be attained. Indeed, the cartoon provides an example of the kind of ambivalence that surrounds colonial mimicry, where the image articulates the need to discipline and reform Filipinos to mimic whiteness, while the achievement of such aims still does not confer equality, since obvious physical differences between Filipinos and white Americans help to reinforce the so-called civilized power of the United States.

Filipino independence would thus be based on a simultaneous recognition of their potential for attaining sovereignty, albeit one that is predicated on an assumption of their racial inferiority. Put another way, Philippine independence was structured around a notion of Filipinos being worthy for self-government as fully matured men, while remaining racially inferior in a status that renders them forever “white but not quite.”

U.S. President William McKinley termed the practice of colonial governance used to occupy the Philippines “benevolent assimilation,” a complex project intended to be both temporary and permanent. As historian Vicente Rafael explains:

The allegory of benevolent assimilation thus foresaw the possibility if not the inevitability, of colonialism’s end. But equally important, it also insisted on defining and delimiting the means to that end. While colonial rule may be a transitional state of self-rule, the self that rules itself can only emerge by way of
an intimate relationship with a colonial master who sets the standards and practices of discipline to mold the conduct of the colonial subject. In other words, the culmination of colonial rule, self-government, can be achieved only when the subject has learned to colonize itself.²⁷

U.S. colonial governmentality in the Philippines was intended ultimately to create a neocolonial system in which colonialism reproduced itself to the benefit of the United States. Thus, U.S. occupation was able to continue itself under a supposedly independent political status. Once the Americans were successful at “making native inhabitants desire what colonial authority desired for them” and once they established an economic, political, and military structure that forced Filipino leaders to abide by this ideology, only then did the U.S. plan to grant the Philippines their “independence.”²⁸

In 1934, the same year that Congress abolished Hawai‘i’s profitable tariff relations, which set the Big Five on a mission for statehood, Congress also passed legislation that would track the Philippines toward independence. The motivating rationale for this, however, was less benevolent than it was economic. Burdened by governmental responsibilities to Filipino nationals during the depression, Congress passed the Tydings-McDuffie Act to limit Filipino immigration to the United States to fifty persons a year while turning the Philippines into a Commonwealth destined for independence (with major stipulations) in ten years time.²⁹ Progress towards independence was halted during the violent invasion and occupation of the Philippines by Japan from 1941 to 1944. After “liberation,” however, the United States threatened to leave the Philippines without rebuilding the war-torn nation. It also conditioned the release of (badly needed) financial assistance on the Philippine government’s agreement to include the so-called “Parity Amendment” in its constitution. This amendment granted
extraterritorial rights to U.S. citizens and corporations, in effect giving them the same rights as, perhaps even more than, most Filipinos. These rights led to the continued exploitation of the country’s natural resources and labor. During the U.S. Cold War, when the United States began to escalate its military campaign in Vietnam, the Philippines signed the Mutual Defense Treaty (in 1951), the Manila Pact, and the Laurel-Langley Agreement (both in 1954), all of which provided additional U.S. economic and military influence in the “independent” Philippines. Indeed, Americans created a situation in which they could claim responsibility for all that had gone well for the Philippines, and force Filipinos to take responsibility for all that had not.

Fig. 2.3, Hawaii and Uncle Sam Gun Shot Wedding, *Puck*

As for Hawai‘i, U.S. occupation of the archipelago was facilitated and normalized by a process of settler colonialism, whereby Hawai‘i’s settler and military leaders
imagined their control over Hawai‘i as something permanent. In the political cartoon above, Hawai‘i is depicted as a “hula maiden” in the process of being wedded, albeit reluctantly, to Uncle Sam. Symbolically and politically, this “marriage” aided a settler colonial project whose purpose was not to teach the numerically outnumbered Native Hawaiian population to run their own government, but to dispossess Native Hawaiians of land, resources, and sovereignty, and insert in their place white settlers figured as more deserving and capable of leading a feminized Hawai‘i. Kathy E. Ferguson and Phyllis Turnbull argue that engendering Hawai‘i as dark, inept, but fertile and female was key to creating a sense of what Native Hawaiians lack, but relatedly, also key to creating not merely the necessity for white masculine settlers, but the occasion to galvanize that self-identity of white settlers as fathers, husbands, and progenitors, of Hawai‘i’s future:

Maps of Hawai‘i from Captain James Cook’s expeditions represent Hawai‘i with soft, curved, breast-like mountains and mysterious coves and bays. Missionary accounts of “the natives” emphasize their darkness; naked, unashamed, promiscuous; lacking in writing, lacking in modesty, lacking in the knowledge of God. Planters found a different lack—lack of industriousness, frugality, punctuality, property, devotion to accumulation. Military planners found a lack of awareness of foreign enemies, an absence of appropriate defense technology, a properly masculine political hierarchy wanting. The successful establishment of a white settler-led government after the 1893 overthrow was seen as evidence of a modern masculine state that worked in partnership with the United States in establishing a smooth continuum for U.S. control over Hawai‘i. In fact, statehood was never promised to settler leaders at the time of alleged annexation, but the U.S. occupation of Hawai‘i was considered permanent, marking Hawai‘i as an “integral part
of the United States,” consequently making independence seem like a logical impossibility.

Thus, unlike the Spanish catholicized Philippines, Hawai‘i was imagined to be thoroughly American by the time of annexation, where American Calvinist missionaries were imagined to have brought American modernity to the islands in 1820. For instance, missionary descendant and Big Five executive W.R. Castle, wrote to Congress in 1899 about these differences: “Those countries [referring to former Spanish colonies] are Spanish and absolutely un-American. Hawaii has never been Spanish, and for seventy-five years has been growing American, til [sic] it is as ready for the territorial government proposed as any of the territories of this country ever were!”32 The Calvinists in Hawai‘i—spiritual and cultural descendants of the same group that had violently displaced the Pequot Indians of the Massachusetts area in the 17th century—disseminated well into the 19th century a white supremacist worldview, which included the logic of settler colonialism.33 And while settler colonial practices throughout the nineteenth century did not negate the legal existence of Hawaiian Kingdom sovereignty and government, they did initiate a process that would eventually lead to conditions that by 1893 made the overthrow possible. Indeed, the arrival of the missionaries and their views of white supremacy launched a historical process that aimed to expropriate land and replace Natives with supposedly more racially superior, and thus more deserving settlers. Though Native Hawaiians initiated two wars to regain Hawaiian control of the government from those white settlers, they could not wage a protracted war as in the Philippines because of their relatively small population base. According to David Stannard, Hawai‘i’s population at the point of contact in 1778 was around 800,000; other
estimates are upwards of one million. By the 1890 Census the population had collapsed to around 39,000 on account of foreign diseases from both the West and East.\textsuperscript{34} By 1900 Hawaiians comprised only one fourth of the total population.\textsuperscript{35} Some Hawaiians were aware of the commonality of their struggle to oppose an imperialist oppressor with Filipinos. In 1899 for instance, Robert W. Wilcox, the Hawaiian nationalist who led armed revolts to restore the Hawaiian nation, wrote two letters to Emilio Aguinaldo, the leader of the Philippine war against the United States, to express solidarity with the Filipino fight for independence and to offer his services.\textsuperscript{36}

Unable to regain their national government through the bullet, Hawaiians, once again, gained political ground through the ballot. Wilcox represented the \textit{Hui Kalai‘aina} and traveled to Washington D.C. to challenge the fraudulent Newlands Resolution, which sought to annex Hawai‘i to the United States.\textsuperscript{37} With funding from a group of wealthy Chinese (and a Hawai‘i legislator named Lincoln Loy McCandless), Wilcox took up residence in Washington D.C.\textsuperscript{38} Wilcox spoke to the Committee on Territories and convinced its members to unanimously strike the property qualification for voting, and attempted to secure the vote for Asians, but was unsuccessful.\textsuperscript{39} In the first years of the Territorial period, and with encouragement from Queen Lili‘uokalani, Hawaiian men worked within the new American political system electing Robert W. Wilcox (of the Home Rule Party) as Hawai‘i’s first delegate to Congress.\textsuperscript{40} Though they had been forced under U.S. occupation, Hawaiians parlayed their voting numbers, around 60 percent of the voting population, to turn a colonial system against itself and politically challenge white settler control. With Hawaiians dominating the Territorial vote in the early part of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, many Hawaiians attempted to push for statehood in an
effort to achieve full voting rights and dislodge white settler influence.

The continuation of white settler hegemony, as hegemony goes, required negotiated consent from Native Hawaiians, a consent that was essentially backed by federal appointments, (presumably) under threat of U.S. force. While the Hawaiian Kingdom was long criticized for having an undemocratic constitutional monarchy by annexationists, the American Territorial system took the selection of political positions away from democratic vote and allowed Territorial governor Sanford B. Dole to appoint these positions, Dole was himself appointed by U.S. President William McKinley. Indeed, white settler hegemony in the beginning years of U.S. occupation was wholly reliant on keeping key political positions away from vote and establishing a Territorial structure based on appointments by the White House. A key political position that was determined by vote was the congressional delegate to Washington D.C. The Big Five, however, was successful at getting Prince Jonah Kuhio, nephew of Queen Lili‘uokalani, to run as a Republican for this elected position. He subsequently defeated Robert W. Wilcox in 1903. Kuhio had agreed to this plan, as long as government jobs went to Hawaiians. Ty Kawika Tengan points out that by 1927, Hawaiians held 46 percent of executive-appointed government positions, 55 percent of clerical and other government jobs, and over half of the judgeships and elective offices. 41

While Native Hawaiians were successful at negotiating a U.S. colonial system that was forced upon them, the territorial period was still dominated by the Big Five and governed by a discourse of paternalism and white supremacy. Tengan further argues that Hawaiians were constituted largely by the discourse of the “lazy kanaka,” an old and persisting racial thread of colonial discourse that had the effect of emasculating Hawaiian
men, especially in contrast to either the haole elite, or “hard-working” Chinese and Japanese men, many of whom, left the plantations to establish businesses in Honolulu. Thus Hawaiian men, by the 1930s, were seen as lacking the “manly qualities” required for political and economic success, and certainly, for self-government. Inasmuch as politics, and especially the goal of “self-governance” were considered fraternal masculine spaces, the engendering of Hawai‘i as a primitive “hula maiden,” combined with the emasculation of Hawaiian men through a discourse of “lazy kanakas,” had the effect of establishing the archipelago as a feminized space. Marking Hawai‘i as feminine could facilitate a policy that established Hawai‘i as an “integral part of the United States,” a Territory that lacked the masculine traits needed for proper self-government, something white American men were imagined as furnishing.

Asian American Settler Colonialism

Settler colonialism is a historical process often contained to the past or selectively used to describe only white settlement. Yet, Patrick Wolfe argues against such frames stating succinctly that, “invasion is a structure not an event.” Like other white supremacist formed structures, settler colonialism is a historically created system of power that aims to expropriate Native territories and eliminate Native modes of production in order to replace Native people with settlers who are discursively constituted as superior, and thus more deserving over these contested lands and resources. Initially created through a notion that enlightened white settlers are superior to dark primitive Natives, in time, white settler colonialism as a structure would become modified through distinctly non-white and non-indigenous struggles for political and economic inclusion. These political projects for equality in the settler state would not consider or address
fundamental issues of occupation, especially of the specific situation of Native Hawaiians. Such racial projects for inclusion and equality in the settler state thus modify, and even renew a hegemonic settler colonial system. Here, I wish to highlight settler colonialism as a changing and evolving discursive practice, one that plays a key role in the initial stages of the statehood movement.

Historians Caroline Elkins and Susan Pedersen explain that settler colonialism in the twentieth century often consists of a four-sided structure in constant struggle and negotiation. These four-sides consist of an “imperial metropole where sovereignty formally resides, a local administration charged with maintaining order and authority, an indigenous population significant in size and tenacity to make its presence felt, and an often demanding and well-connected settler community.” Indeed, these four dimensions of settler colonialism help to name some of the different constituents and institutions involved in the power play to achieve or defeat statehood—imperial metropole (Washington D.C.), local administration (which I argue for Hawai‘i translates into a large military presence), indigenous population (Native Hawaiians), and settler community (the Big Five). While Elkins and Pederson’s framing helps to identify an arrangement of settler colonialism in other geopolitical locations, in Hawai‘i there also exists a fifth dimension—what Hawaiian scholar Haunani-Kay Trask names “Asian settlers,” non-indigenous and non-white groups, exploited for their labor and possessing their own histories of subjugation by imperialism, yet still maintaining a sense of racial difference from Hawaiians and often benefiting from their dispossession.

While on the sugar plantations, Asian settlers were considered an exploitable labor source, viewed largely as commodities, whose value was shaped by scientific
racism and U.S. imperial discourse. These laborers had long contended with western, and/or eastern, imperialism or occupation before setting foot in Hawai‘i. Large-scale Asian settlement began in the 1840s, when laborers from China first traveled to Hawai‘i to begin working on the first sugar plantations. Individual settlers from Portugal would travel to Hawai‘i in the 18th century, but began immigrating in larger numbers by 1878. Laborers from Japan also began immigrating in large numbers by 1885, although there was in fact an earlier group that experienced such bad working conditions that the Japanese government decided against subjecting any more of its citizens to such oppression. After annexation laborers from Okinawa (1900) and Korea (1903), and those sites colonized by the United States—Puerto Rico (1900) and the Philippines (1906)—immigrated in large numbers. To be sure, many would also leave Hawai‘i, either to return to their country of origin, or move on to the U.S. continent. In either case, George H. Fairfield, manager of the Makee Sugar Company, stated the rationale for such recruitment policies: “Keep a variety of laborers, that is different nationalities, and thus prevent any concerted action in case of strikes, for there are few, if any, cases of Japs, Chinese, and Portuguese entering into a strike as a unit.”

The use of these groups as objects of knowledge that would inform hierarchical ideas involving Asian settlers and Hawaiians is best illustrated in the work of the University of Hawai‘i psychologist Stanley D. Porteus. Hailing from Australia, a place where settler colonial practices were often informed by ideas that the aboriginal population were to be treated like wildlife, Porteus interviewed plantation managers and conducted different tests in elementary schools to help white political leaders better control Hawai‘i’s non-white population. Indeed, much of the information in his and
Marjorie E. Babcock’s now infamous 1926 book, *Temperament and Race*, concerned the issue of controlling labor dissent by studying the racial “temperament” as well as the “educational capabilities” of each community (the book was made widely known in 1997 through successful Hawaiian student protests at the University of Hawai‘i, who demanded the renaming of the social sciences building, which had been named after Porteus). According to Porteus and Babcock, the key difference in intelligence and socioeconomic status of different non-white groups lay in the presumed categorical difference between “primitive” and “oriental” races. Reaching back to the work of the German craniologist, Emil Villiger, Porteus and Babcock linked intelligence to the different weight and size of these groups’ brains. For example, they cited a 1912 study by Villiger that provided the following ranking, in ascending order, of racial types based on the average measurements:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Racial Type</th>
<th>Average Measurement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australian aboriginal</td>
<td>1185 grammes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negro</td>
<td>1244 grammes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malay</td>
<td>1266 grammes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaiian</td>
<td>1303 grammes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>1332 grammes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caucasian</td>
<td>1335 grammes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Porteus and Babcock argued that the weight of their brains would also determine their performance in education. For wider comparative purposes, perhaps for good measure, Porteus and Babcock added, “the comparative retardation of the Australian aboriginal seems to be true of other more or less primitive races.”

Though Porteus and Babcock’s racist ideas were commonplace amongst the Big Five elite, as social scientific arguments they represented an out-of-favor position in a debate-taking place throughout much of the social sciences. In anthropology, for
example, Franz Boas had by the 1920s convinced many that “culture” accounted for the
difference between so-called “civilized” and “primitive” people, and that culture was
determined by “historical events,” rather than biology. Porteus and Babcock responded
to Boas by arguing that history has proven that education would in fact be wasted on the
“idiot or imbecile,” since “primitive races” like Australian aborigines and Filipinos who
had long contact with whites had progressed very little. A long history of “white”
conquest and campaigns of genocide enacted against Australian aboriginal peoples and
Filipinos were, predictably, not taken into consideration.

In contrast to those labeled as “primitive races,” Porteus and Babcock argued that
the “Oriental” groups in Hawai‘i were actually gaining in social status and had the
potential to surpass whites. This advancement in social status proved to them that
“Orientals,” though “poorly endowed” when compared to whites, could nonetheless
overcome the “handicaps” of color, custom and language and possibly thrive. In
comparing Japanese with Native Hawaiians, for instance, Porteus found that Hawaiians
were not driven to succeed because of their “temperamental adaptability,” which was
owed to the education they received from the American missionaries. The Japanese, on
the other hand, lacked Hawaiians’ alleged ability to “harmonize” with whites. Indeed,
Porteus observed that the Japanese were quick to “turn the white man’s own weapons
against him” by going out on strike describing them as “self-assertive and anxious for a
larger place in the sun.” Such observations became the principal subject and claim of
their book, that these “barefooted, horny-handed, ignorant labourers were not poorly
endowed, but were rich in an inheritance of temperamental or psychosynergic traits that
only needed the opportunity to make their weight felt in inter-racial and social
competition.”57 If inherited “temperament” and “psychosynergy” gave “Orientals” the potential to succeed, imperial history furnished the “opportunity,” but at an epic risk to white racial power. Porteus and Babcock predicted that Japanese desires for ascendancy amounted to a threat to white society and could result in an “inevitable clash of temperaments” if the proper conditions were not prevented.58

Indeed, while whites were considered intellectually superior to all other racial groups, nature and history did not automatically guarantee their primacy or exalted social position. White economic and political superiority might have been inherited, but it was not an inevitable outcome in the face of competition. Porteus and Babcock explain: “it is undoubtedly true that though the word is over-worked, the older civilizations do tend to become ‘effete.’”59 And so, while Porteus and Babcock argue that the historical settlement of Australia, Canada, and other “new lands” were different from—actually superior to—Hawai‘i by virtue of maintaining white control (which they dubbed a “vanguard of settlement”), the more salient issue lay in a threat posed by “Oriental” laborers who were now themselves clamoring for equality with whites.60 Unsurprisingly (from our vantage point today), Porteus and Babcock end their study with a warning to the white race: “If we hope for race survival, then we must proceed to develop to the full our human resources, the children that are already born.”61

Porteus and Babcock furnished a body of knowledge that would highlight the vulnerability of white privilege and power in an effort to regulate the social and political development of non-whites (Asians and Hawaiians). Accordingly, Hawai‘i’s sugar planters purposefully kept their labor force racially divided in terms of pay, housing, and jobs in order to maintain a paternalistic system of that fostered competition and division
amongst their work force. Such “divide and conquer” tactics was hoped to stall any collective organizing that might lead to the dissolution of a white supremacist order. In *Reworking Race*, Moon-Kie Jung elaborates that the racial hierarchy among three of the largest groups—the Portuguese, Japanese, and Filipinos—consisted of work and pay positions that descended in order of status and power. Filipinos were often relegated to unskilled labor positions, while a sizable number of Japanese and Portuguese were found in supervisory, skilled, and semi-skilled jobs. The perceptions of cultural differences among these three groups, I would argue, were constituted by discursive formations of whiteness, orientalism, and primitivism. These discourses furnished the stereotypes and the now commonplace perceptions of differences among various groups in Hawai‘i.

Here the Portuguese were, in fact, often grouped somewhat tenuously as “white,” while the Japanese were racialized as “oriental” (a term that continues to be used locally in contemporary Hawai‘i), and Filipinos were viewed as “primitive.” This pyramidal arrangement of power determined the capabilities, potentials, and value of the differently commodified labor groups on Hawai‘i’s sugar plantations, consequently fostering division and animosity. Such discursive categories continue to shape how these groups are perceived today.

In Hawai‘i’s labor strikes, these divisions played out in relation to white supremacy and global imperial politics. Moon-Kie Jung argues that the colonial rule of imperial Japan often made the Japanese in Hawai‘i understand themselves to be superior to “stateless” races. In fact, the first large and organized strike of 1909 by the Japanese did not seek universal racial equality, but rather recognition that the Japanese should not be treated as an inferior race. Thus strike leader Motoyuki Negoro argued, “We are first-
rate nationals [itto kokumin]. Therefore we have the right to demand equal pay with stateless Puerto Ricans and the so-called white laborers of the Portuguese.”

In the 1920 strike, in which Japanese and Filipino laborers went out on strike simultaneously, but not in solidarity, the general depictions of the Japanese as an invasive “yellow peril” underpinned by deep suspicions of their loyalty to America, had the effect of further fracturing potential class solidarity between Japanese and Filipino workers. Such accusations of Japanese disloyalty helped to shape, even discipline, the Japanese to prove their “Americanism,” often in opposition to other groups who might be seen as more foreign than the Japanese. By the time of the Great Depression, Jung asserts, the need to prove Japanese loyalty to America, “drove a deeper wedge between Japanese and Filipino workers, as the Nisei’s reactive insistence on their Americanness led them to define themselves in contradistinction to the Filipino ‘alien race.’”

For their part, Filipinos also felt compelled to show their own brand of loyalty. Filipino labor leader Pablo Manlapit attempted to call off the 1920 strike after he was convinced that Japanese labor dissent was actually an imperialist ploy to take over Hawai‘i. Manlapit explained that since the Philippines and Hawai‘i were both U.S. territories, he was indebted to American interests and therefore “opposed this shocking scheme of the Japanese who are attempting to occupy the Territory.”

In a similar vein to the work of Porteus and Babcock, sociologists and anthropologists at the University of Hawai‘i by the 1930s began to produce scholarship that would also advance the categories of “oriental” and “primitive” in ways that naturalized white supremacy. The form of knowledge produced by the University of Hawai‘i School of Sociology, however, would have different expectations and political
stakes for East Asian groups deemed “Oriental.” As opposed to Porteus and Babcock’s predictions that “Orientals” were destined for an “inevitable clash” with whites, University of Hawaiʻi sociologists instead determined that “Orientals” were destined to assimilate into white society. Thus, as part of its disciplinary value, sociology was viewed as having the ability to reconcile cultural difference, helping “Oriental” peoples to assimilate properly and gain membership in American modernity. Anthropology, on the other hand, was then used to study and preserve “primitive” cultures, fixing these groups in the past, at the very beginning of an “imagined spectrum of progress” that would produced in opposition to a modern white America. The binary logics inherent in these categories would help to legitimate white settlers’ claims over Hawaiʻi. For instance, if “Orientals” were “foreigners” from afar, then white Americans could presume to be “natives” of here. Similarly, “primitives” defined as cultures preserved permanently in the past, could allow white settlers to imagine themselves to be bearers of modernity and progress to Hawaiians. For instance, future Congressional Delegate Elizabeth Farrington declared that Hawaiians had progressed only because of the “education they’ve gotten from us,” and that otherwise they would still be in the Stone Age.

University of Hawaiʻi sociologists defined Hawaiʻi as a veritable “racial frontier,” a lens through which the assimilation, or obliteration, of non-white cultures were seen as inevitable. Indeed, the overwhelming majority of Hawaiʻi’s sociologists were trained at the University of Chicago, which had intimate links to the propagation and dissemination of U.S. frontier discourses. As mentioned at the end of the previous chapter, the University of Chicago was itself built on and around the fairgrounds of the 1893 Chicago
World’s Columbian Exposition and its anthropology and sociology departments were initially informed by and were actually built on the Midway Plaisance. The linear arrangement of the non-white world along the Midway has similar links to the “race relations cycle,” a theoretical model on the inevitable assimilation of immigrant communities in the United States developed by Robert E. Park at the University of Chicago. As we saw in the previous chapter, the two-mile strip of the Midway categorized, exhibited, and arranged peoples of the world according to stages of development in very specific relationships to a utopic White City, which in turn represented an American civilizing project over a descending world order of whites, ethnic whites, orientals and primitives. In this imperial demarcation the assimilation or obliteration of peoples deemed to be weaker than the west was taken to be an inevitable outcome of civilization.

Noted for having trained many of the Hawai’i sociologists, Professor Robert E. Park, saw assimilation as a linear process, a march of civilization which began in Europe through which non-white groups were either neutralized or incorporated into the always forward moving project of U.S. civilization. Park offered his famous “race relations cycle” to explain the inevitable forward march of American (white) cultural supremacy based on the social facts of “conflict and competition,” “accommodation,” “assimilation,” “amalgamation,” and even “miscegenation.” Park, thus distinguished between worldly “civilizations” and provincial “cultures.” For Park, “cultures” possessed narrow and singular perspectives of the world. “Civilizations,” on the other hand, contained perspectives that were global in scope and self-aware of the existence of other cultures’ worldviews. The end result was that “cultures” died as they learned that their worldviews
were only one of many, while “civilizations” moved on, incorporating and encompassing weaker races. The notion that weaker races would simply assimilate into American society would be used in attempts to convince Congress that Hawai‘i should not be denied statehood on account of its large non-white population. As we shall see later in this chapter, statehood proponents would rely heavily on the scholarship of sociologists at the University of Hawai‘i to argue for the admission of Hawai‘i as a state.

U.S. frontier logics projected that groups would either assimilate or be obliterated, and such notions played themselves out in the power relations between different Asian settler groups and Native Hawaiians. In a pamphlet from the 1920 Sugar strike, for instance, Japanese laborers expressed a viewpoint that was not the least at odds with the U.S. imperial forms of racism which viewed pre-contact Hawai‘i as a giant wasteland devoid of civilization: “When we first came to Hawaii these islands were covered with ohia forests, guava fields and areas of wild grass. Day and night did we work, cutting trees, burning grass, clearing lands and cultivating fields until we made the plantations what they are today.” In Hawai‘i, as on the American continent, pre-western contact is seen a “vacant land” only awaiting productive labor to transform it into civilization. The presence or existence of its Native inhabitants and their own highly productive and complex agricultural systems, does not even merit mention.

Thus, Asian settlers may be considered inferior to the colonial metropole and white settler elite, but they nonetheless still maintained a sense of difference from and over the Native population. Indeed, Asian settlers are “simultaneously both colonized and colonizer,” classified as “Oriental,” they are constituted as inferior to whites but superior to “primitives.” The erasure of Hawaiians is partly seen in the aforementioned
emasculati
don of Native Hawaiian men even in the eyes of Asian laborers. Such troubled
relations, however, should not lose sight of the guiding hand of white hegemonic power
and racism. If Hawaiians were imagined as fixed in the past, then social mobility was
determined by moving in the opposite direction of “primitives.” Thus assimilating and
performing one’s Americanism, by aspiring to mimic white America, amounts to an anti-
Native discourse. For instance, Chinese workers were first brought into Hawa‘i in the
19th century to replace Hawaiian workers (who refused to work under such exploitative
conditions), were encouraged by plantation managers to call Hawaiian men “wahine!
wahine!” [Hawaiian for women].74 In a study conducted in the 1950s, Joseph C. Finney
interviewed non-Hawaiians about their impressions of Native Hawaiians. Finney found
that “Caucasians and Orientals” alike frequently described Hawaiians as “primitive” or
“lazy,” but also expressed remorse for the “inevitable” dying out of their culture. One
woman, identified as Japanese, explained: “You see the Hawaiians are known to be, are
popularly known to be lazy, and they don’t have a tradition for literacy and they’re not
the conscientious type, industrious type.”75 Even settlers who were not deemed
“Oriental,” but rather straddled the liminal space between “primitive” and “oriental,”
actively engaged in a politics of masculine identification with the United States in
opposition to Native Hawaiians.76 For instance, Filipino laborers often used the term
“Kanaka” (which refers to Native Hawaiians) as a slur to mean “‘boy’ or servant.”77
Given a desire to not be treated like others deemed “primitive,” Asian laborers actively
engaged in a politics of identification with the United States. In relation to Native
Hawaiian struggles for restoring nationhood, this politics of identification can also be
understood as a politics of colonial disavowal, or a politics dependent on disavowing
one’s complicity with U.S. occupation.\textsuperscript{78}

In such ways, civil rights projects challenge inequalities created by white exclusion and notions of white superiority, yet lose sight of another major form of white supremacist power, one that targets Native culture and their subsistence economies for erasure. Arguing against the idea that Asians are “perpetual foreigners” constructed historically as “sojourners,” Ronald Takaki asserts in his seminal book, \textit{Strangers From a Different Shore}, that many Asian Americans are in fact settlers who decided to remain in the United States permanently.\textsuperscript{79} Haunani-Kay Trask builds critically on this transformation of sojourners to settlers by pointing out its consequences for Hawaiians. Trask argues that “intrasettler competition” between \textit{haole} and Asians obscures a system that is dependent on the dispossession of Native Hawaiians. She writes: “In settler societies, the issue of civil rights is primarily an issue about how to protect settlers against each other and against the state. Injustices done against Native people, such as genocide, land dispossession, language banning, family disintegration, and cultural exploitation, are not part of this intrasettler discussion and are therefore not within the parameters of civil rights.”\textsuperscript{80} The critical point is not that Asian settlers did not challenge forms of white supremacy themselves, but rather that any racial project, even by exploited laborers, that does not also contend with issues of occupation can become agents of such oppression. Indeed, desires to be vindicated as “first-class citizens” through statehood were often driven by aspirations to prove one’s humanity, which was often denied by racist perceptions of different Asians and Hawaiians. Statehood proponents thus needed to prove to Washington D.C. that Hawai‘i’s largely non-white population was capable of assimilating to American culture and ideals.
In 1937, the popular editorialist, George Wright, conveyed in the *Hawaii Hochi* (a Japanese American daily) that he expected the 1937 congressional statehood hearings to be what he called an “engineered affair.” He believed that the public hearings would be filled with “hand-picked” individuals who “take their orders from the dominant industrial groups.” Wright wrote:

There will be a few hardy souls who are willing to come out in the open and oppose the idea of statehood on various grounds, some good and some pretty rotten. But the majority will follow the example of Willie Vocalite at the recent products show and perform their part with robot-like precision just as they have been previously fixed to do it, saying the things that have been transcribed upon the wax records of their mechanical minds.

Willie Vocalite was the Hawaiian Electric Company’s featured exhibit for the 8th annual...
Hawaiian Products Show. A large silver robot hailed for its numerous human-like abilities, Willie “Stands-up—Sits down—Waves flag—Shoots gun—Smokes and Talks.”

By calling those who voiced the interests of the sugar industry Willie Vocalites, Wright marked just how economically subjugated the general populace had become by the Big Five and commented on the kind of submission that was required of them. Indeed, by 1937, there was a general belief that the public had become either so entrenched in the statehood campaign of the Hawaii Equal Rights Commission, or had been effectively rendered mute or compliant under the threat of losing jobs that there seemed to be little to no opposing or independent viewpoints.

Indeed, the Hawaii Equal Rights Commission initiated the dissemination of statehood literature in the daily newspapers in order to shape public opinion in favor of statehood. Beginning in 1934, the Honolulu Star-Bulletin had begun to publish numerous articles that supported statehood. By 1935 the Hawaii Equal Rights Commission was formed and targeted editors of newspapers and magazines on the U.S. continent, commending certain articles, and “correcting” any article that did not support statehood. In this way, the Hawaii Equal Rights Commission and the Republican Party, under the leadership of Native Hawaiian congressional delegate, Samuel Wilder King, made it difficult for anyone to oppose statehood. As mentioned earlier, statehood was seen as necessary to regain rewarding tariffs for the sugar industry. The Hawaii Equal Rights Commission was quite explicit about the economic motivations for statehood and, since the sugar industry, government, and the media declared publicly the virtues and necessity of statehood, any person who opposed statehood was marked as a detractor, one at odds with Hawai‘i’s powerful elites.
In this climate of fear, and because testimony was heard openly, many people believed that the 1937 Joint Congressional Statehood Hearings would be a replay of the 1935 hearings, at which virtually no one spoke out against the repressive tactics of the Big Five. As a matter of fact, in 1937, the Big Five and the Republican Party paid the expenses of the congressional visitors. After the sixteen-day hearing was over, however, many would feel differently about the engineered set-up of the 1937 Congressional hearings. George Wright, for instance, retracted his earlier statements in the *Hawaii Hochi* and wrote that instead of a, “triumphant symposium on the incontrovertible right of Hawaii to become the 49th state there was a veritable dog-fight of snarling objectors who came prepared to show the gentlemen from the mainland exactly why Hawaii was unfit for statehood.” George Wright himself, and other writers in the alternative papers, played a significant role in facilitating such dissent.

In the years and months leading up to the 1937 hearings, an emerging labor movement had shaken the Big Five’s hegemony. Dockworkers were successful at getting the federal government to investigate Big Five violations of the Wagner Act of 1935. The Wagner Act, which had also created the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to ensure that employers abided by the Act, now provided longshoremen in the islands with the ability to force the Big Five to recognize their unions. Moon-Kie Jung identifies two factors—metropolitan state intervention and de-isolation—that took place in the 1930s that helped to plant the seeds for radical labor movements in the latter part of the 1940s to come into fruition. Metropolitan state intervention, Jung argues, was created with the passing of the Wagner Act and the establishment of the NLRB. De-isolation, in the meantime, had been established when Hawaiian men, like Harry Lehua Kamoku and Levi
Kealoha, kept ties with the West Coast maritime workers they met while helping in the 1934 San Francisco Strike and returned to the islands to help organize Hawai‘i’s longshoremen. Such ties between Hawai‘i’s longshoremen and those in the west coast would also bring the celebrated labor organizer, Jack Hall, to the islands.

Whereas previously the Big Five had simply fired and blacklisted active union members, in 1935, it formed the Industrial Association of Hawaii (IAH) to formally oppose the creation of unions. In March of 1937, with the urging of labor leaders in Hilo, the NLRB agreed to investigate the work conditions of longshoremen. For eighteen days the NLRB heard testimony in Hawai‘i, and eventually charged members of the Big Five for unfair labor practices. The NLRB trial examiner also found that Castle & Cooke had specifically violated the Wagner Act and ordered the company to reinstate eleven union members who were unfairly released in a 1936 strike. Thus, by the October 1937 statehood hearings, many believed that the Big Five’s power structure was weakened and vulnerable to attack.

In the weeks leading up to the statehood hearings, the Honolulu Star-Bulletin and Honolulu Advertiser ran articles that posed statehood as a natural and necessary step in the inevitable march towards progress, demanding that Congress treat Hawai‘i as an integral part of the United States and not as a foreign country. Alternative papers such as the Hawaii Hochi and Voice of Labor, however, were critical of the overlap between big business and government, and asked sharp and probing questions about what the Hawaii Equal Rights Commission’s organized visit would allow the congressmen to see and hear. For his part, George Wright highlighted Wyoming Senator Joseph C. O’Mahoney’s declaration of his intent, while in Hawai‘i, to investigate statehood in
relation to “the sugar industry, interlocking control, economic hegemony, political domination by privileged interests, the company store racket, espionage and the blacklist, labor intimidation and the peonage of workers under a medieval system of feudalistic exploitation.”

Wright capitalized on Senator O’Mahoney’s article in an editorial titled, “He Doesn’t Know Half of It!,” insisting that because of Senator O’Mahoney’s “fortunate advertisement,” and his general knowledge of the political scene in Hawai‘i, there was every possibility that the workers of Hawai‘i might be able to “give him the lowdown on the ‘system’ and introduce him to many new angles that he has never suspected before.”

In stark contrast to prevailing discourse, the alternative newspapers described those in opposition to the Big Five as not “bad citizens” but heroes who were capable of independent thinking and speaking truth to power in the face of exorbitant odds.

Fig. 2.5, “Getting Ready for Company, Hawaii Hochi

Fig. 2.6, “Too Many Entangling Alliances,” Hawaii Hochi
In addition to running editorials, the *Hawaii Hochi* also ran numerous political cartoons that further drew the lines, quite literally, of class conflict. Many of the political cartoons that led up to the congressional hearings paid careful attention to the issues of repression and silence, often comparing the Big Five and the Territorial government to the repressive fascism of Nazi Germany. The National Labor Relations Board was also making such comparisons as it continued to learn more from workers’ testimonies. Indeed, the NLRB went so far as to describe Hawai‘i as a “picture of fascism,” inasmuch as big business dominated the Territorial government and created a general climate of fear that stifled public speech against the interests of the Big Five and government.\(^\text{93}\)

Often times, the political cartoons caricatured the themes of secrecy and transparency, thus exposing Big Five efforts to conceal dirty practices from the view of the visiting Congressmen. To be sure, the political cartoons portray the settler elite as in a position of visual weakness. In these political cartoons, there is a reversal of the power of the Big Five, particularly as it is subject to the authoritative gaze of Washington D.C. While the non-white working class were often used as objects of knowledge, observed and studied by academics such as Porteus or the University of Hawai‘i sociologists who sought to produce knowledge about them that would maintain white hegemony, with the congressional committee in Hawai‘i, the ability to testify to a higher white authority furnished Hawai‘i’s non-white population a powerful opportunity to reverse the gaze and create knowledge about the Big Five and their repression. The result of this momentary reversal—and what might happen if O’Mahoney and the other Congressmen could see the corruption, the cover ups, and the political repression—was that it gave the general
public an understanding of Hawai‘i’s new political possibilities, like what had been taking place in the labor movement, beyond Big Five hegemony. Indeed, U.S. Congressional oversight on the question of statehood helped cast critical light on the Big Five and settler state power such as to offer the general public, and the working class in particular, a large voice to expose that exploitative power. In other words, the settler elite were now under visual surveillance by Congress, and the testimony and observations by the working class could have long lasting implications for the Big Five.

As was expected, on the first day of public hearings, Senator O’Mahoney began by stating that, “in the last two days while in Hawaii it has become apparent to me, and to some of the other members of the committee, that there is a sentiment in the islands which may not find free expression.”94 The question of “free expression” was an issue that came up in much of the testimony and was a major concern of the congressmen. Senator Tom Connally of Texas, for example, was informed that someone in the audience was intimidating witnesses by showing either “approval or disapproval” of their testimony.95 Indeed, there was a justifiable fear and risk in speaking openly against the interests of the Big Five. Garnett M. Burum, a house manager of the Seamen’s Institute and secretary-treasurer for the Hawaiian Island Federation of Labor, testified that while he could not provide examples of Big Five repression at the 1937 statehood hearings, he was himself recently fired from his job for providing testimony before the National Labor Relations Board and also falsely arrested for “conspiring to have a union man beaten up.”96 Such testimony would influence Representative Jack Nichols of Oklahoma, who interrupted the hearings, to read into the record this excerpt from an editorial in the October 7th issue of the Voice of Labor:
The Senators and Congressmen…will be entertained at the Royal Hawaiian, at the Waialae Club, at the homes of the “big shots.” They will go on carefully conducted tours to sugar plantations and to pineapple canneries and to model villages. They will hear speeches and they will see the military and naval establishments.

But they will be carefully shepherded away from fields where women or children are working, they will never see the slums of Palama or River Street, they will not see the darkened rooms where aged Chinese live and raise bean sprouts in pans of water in order that they may live. They will hear of the wonderful work Palama Settlement is doing, but they will not hear how many children are infected with syphilis, how many are illiterate, how many can not speak English, how many have to work to contribute to the support of their families while still of school age… We don’t believe they will know of these things when they leave. But we hope they do.97

Representative Nichols reported taking this as a challenge, for the committee, to be wary of what the Hawaii Equal Rights Commission organized visit would and would not allow them to see, and to be ready, “to hear about any condition that is existent in the Territory of Hawaii.”98 Accusations that the Big Five were going to “pull one over” on the visiting congressmen, in fact, made them anxious. The constant repetition, if not obsession, of this challenge seems to have struck at the congressmen’s egos, thus maneuvering two competing white masculinities (Big Five versus Congressmen) against each other. Chairman of the hearings, William King of Utah, however, thought that his fellow congressmen were “making too much of [it].”99

As was expected, Hawai‘i’s largely “Oriental” population, specifically the Japanese, was a major concern for the visiting Congressmen and for those testifying against statehood. While many opposed Hawai‘i statehood based on arguments that the Big Five were using it as a means to maintain control over politics and the economy, the question of Japanese American loyalty and bloc-voting was brought-up, particularly in light of imperial Japan’s invasion of China only a few months earlier. In fact, the very
first testimony offered at the hearings was given by an engineer in the Navy, who opposed statehood based on a belief that, “Under statehood we would have a Japanese Governor in three or four sessions,” and that such an outcome would in turn arouse whites to organize “the Ku Klux Klan… for the white man to get justice.” Indeed, many opposed statehood in the belief that Japanese Americans would remain loyal to Japan because of their dual citizenship. In this way, an Orientalist discourse helped to constitute the Japanese in Hawai‘i as perpetual foreigners, as ever looming threats to the safety of the United States in Hawai‘i. This widespread fear legitimized and naturalized the subsequent military build-up in Hawai‘i. By 1937, anti-Japanese American racism was at an all-time high, leading Secretary of State Cordell Hull to increase U.S. military personnel in Hawai‘i. Thomas T. Sakakihara, a Territorial House Representative and one of four Japanese American legislators, testified that as an American citizen by birth, he and many Japanese Americans “bitterly resented” that they were “often pointed out as Japanese” with its inference that “we are alien Japanese.” Sakakihara, like many others, asserted that the real obstacle to Hawai‘i statehood was not Japanese Americans but white racism:

> We have the ability, capacity, resources, and power to assume the duty as a State. The greatest obstacles however which is blocking the efforts of the Territory in attaining statehood are those who possess a feeling of superiority complex over citizens of foreign extraction born in Hawaii. They are composed largely of those Caucasian races who have migrated to Hawaii from mainland or some foreign country of Caucasian extraction. They entertain deep, unfounded suspicion as to the loyalty of American citizens of Oriental extraction to the government of their birth which is absolutely ridiculous and unsupported by evidence.

The issue of Japanese loyalty remained a major issue both for and against statehood in the coming decades, particularly as a result of the 1941 Japanese government’s military
attack on Pearl Harbor. During the 1930s, however, many statehood proponents sought to downplay the number of Japanese Americans in Hawai‘i.

One such person was University of Hawai‘i sociologist, Romanzo Adams. Adams played a key role in downplaying the numbers of Japanese in Hawai‘i by forecasting that the population of whites and Native Hawaiians would increase, while the “Oriental” population (including Filipinos) was destined to decrease. Adams acknowledged that he had been asked the president of the University of Hawai‘i, D.L. Crawford, to gather specific statistics on the number of Japanese who were born in Hawai‘i. Indeed, historian of science Christine Manganaro, explains that the University of Hawai‘i School of Sociology was the academic arm of the statehood movement, offering statistics and data that would make the multiracial population of Hawai‘i more comprehensible for, and acceptable to the American public and Congress. Congressional delegate Samuel King, whose Hawaiian mother was a childhood friend of Queen Lili‘uokalani and whose white father was involved in the overthrow and annexation of Hawai‘i to the United States, testified that “looking into the future of Hawaii” non-American elements would inevitably be absorbed by feelings of “national loyalty” or die of “natural causes.” The driving rationale behind King’s statements was the projected demographics offered by Romanzo Adams, and the logics of Park’s “race relations cycle,” which argued that as time passed Hawai‘i’s population would inevitably assimilate to American culture and move farther away from their “respective original ancestries.” Adams was in fact a frequent source of authority for government officials and statehood proponents throughout the hearings.

Findings that the numbers of Native Hawaiians were increasing drew a series of
anxiety-ridden questions from the Congressmen about the theme of Hawaiian “racial mixture.” Representative John Rankin of Mississippi, who was widely known in Hawai‘i for sponsoring the bill that would have established a military form of government, continually asked questions about intermarriage and what he called “racial atavism.”\textsuperscript{107} Rankin specifically asked whether Hawaiians who had married whites would be more “toward the Caucasian or toward the Hawaiian?”\textsuperscript{108} Though Adams repeatedly answered that this was a question for a biologist, Rankin eventually forced him to concede that the mixed blood Hawaiian could go either way, but that “They don’t like to emphasize their mixed blood. Students in my classes have told me that they always classify themselves as Hawaiians, although they know they have had a little bit of European or Asiatic blood.”\textsuperscript{109} Delegate Samuel King picked up on this issue. King contended that while Adams extolled the increase of Native Hawaiians, everyone born in the islands, regardless of race, was considered Hawaiian. King declared that: “All of us of local birth consider ourselves as Hawaiians; and every man who has a drop of Hawaiian blood in his veins or who has lived here for any length of time subscribes to that… In fact, descendants of missionary stock consider themselves as thoroughly Hawaiian as those of Hawaiian blood.”\textsuperscript{110} King attempted to render “race” a non-issue by stating that birth in the islands automatically made someone Hawaiian.

King’s views notwithstanding, John Ho‘opale’s testimony would show how expressions of indigeneity and opposition to settler colonialism remained relevant to other Hawaiians: “Now, my people, the original Hawaiians—not these naturalized Hawaiians, or foster Hawaiians—I am speaking about the aboriginal Hawaiians, who want to live on this land without interference from outsiders.”\textsuperscript{111} While not critical of the
United States in Hawai‘i, Ho‘opale was concerned that statehood might lead to Native Hawaiians being outnumbered in their own homeland. Ho‘opale argued that more Hawaiians would testify in opposition to statehood, but many were impoverished and employed by the Big Five, making them “afraid” to lose their “bread and butter.” As mentioned earlier, Hawaiians held a large proportion of government jobs and were thus constrained from speaking publicly against statehood. As such, Ho‘opale was concerned, since he saw statehood as a question of “the death and life of our country.”

A former House Representative in the legislature, Ho‘opale knew intimately the repercussions involved in opposing statehood; indeed, Ho‘opale was never again reelected because of his public stance against statehood. John Ho‘opale would, again in 1950, oppose statehood asking that Congress “restore the independence of our beloved land.”

Being numerically outnumbered in one’s ancestral land was, of course, a primary concern for many Native Hawaiians. In 1922, Native Hawaiians comprised 50 percent of the voting population, but by 1936, this percentage decreased to 30 percent. Since the overthrow of their government in 1893, Hawaiians were unable to control immigration to Hawai‘i. In 1932, Abigail Kawananakoa, would-be heir to the Hawaiian monarchy, expressed the view, common among many Hawaiians, that they were being made strangers in their own homeland:

We [Hawaiians] must live here, we cannot go to China, we cannot go to the Philippines, we cannot go to Japan… I have nothing but admiration for the Chinese and the Japanese and the Filipinos, but this is our home, and everybody is crowding us out of our home…It is a desperate situation.

The forms of colonial power with which Native Hawaiians were contending in their ancestral homeland thus targeted them for replacement. Roger Bell has argued that
another more immediate reason for opposition was that Hawaiians on the neighbor islands viewed statehood as but a precursor to reapportionment, which would then give the island of O‘ahu a majority of seats in both the House and Senate. Bell writes, “Many Hawaiian and part-Hawaiian residents of the outer islands viewed reapportionment as but a further formal step toward the triumph of American values and interests, symbolized so acutely by the rapid growth of Honolulu City and the modernization of Oahu.”

Despite the best efforts of the Hawaii Equal Rights Commission and the Big Five to get the congressmen to support statehood, the final congressional report that was released in 1938 did not recommend immediate statehood for Hawai‘i. The congressional committee stated that, “there is not complete unity on the question of statehood among the people of Hawaii,” and recommended a Territory wide plebiscite to ascertain the views of Hawai‘i’s general public. Moreover, the committee recommended further study and consideration, especially of the growing Japanese population in Hawai‘i, which had quadrupled in the preceding eight years, and which the committee identified as a cause of “considerable local discussion” due to the “present disturbed condition of international affairs.” At this time, tension between China and Japan had escalated into war, and the same was happening in Europe. In 1935 Germany ceased to recognize the Treaty of Versailles, and by 1938, had annexed Austria and most of Czechoslovakia, with aims to invade Poland the following year. Such events would culminate in the Japanese military attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. The inevitable clash between Japan and the United States finally took place.
While only 17 of the 68 witnesses opposed statehood, such numbers need to be understood within the general climate of fear that existed in publicly opposing the interests of the Big Five. George Wright, in fact, called the 1937 hearings a historical moment within which the “submerged nine-tenths of the population became vocal.” Wright criticized the mainstream media for favoring the advocates of statehood as a way to also discredit the opposition. But he also explained that “the crowds that attended the hearings knew what was going on and the news spread like wildfire, bringing others to join in the spectacle.” Indeed, the political cartoons coming out of the *Hawaii Hochi* celebrated the vocal opposition against the Big Five. One in particular, titled, “Hey! We Got the Wrong Congressmen!” showed a defeated pumpkin head, perhaps King, crying at a desk before which statehood proponents, figured as circus animals—“trained seals” read statements titled, “Why I Favor Statehood;” the “monkey press” taking sugar cubes
out of the “Sugar Bowl” each performing as they have been trained.

While unsuccessful at pulling off the “Statehood Hocus Pocus” in 1937, the Hawaii Equal Rights Commission succeeded with a 1940 plebiscite, a measure that in hindsight was responsible for putting the statehood movement back on track. It accomplished this, however, with effective and purposeful imprecision. According to Roger Bell the 1940 plebiscite was “deliberately imprecise,” and had been purposely worded in such a way as to avoid the very real possibility that a majority of voters would reject immediate statehood.\textsuperscript{122} The plebiscite’s original wording, crafted by Joseph Farrington, read, “Are you in favor of immediate statehood for Hawaii?” In the penultimate draft of the ballot, the wording was changed slightly, to employ a two-step process to ensure numbers: step one would have asked the preliminary question, “Are you in favor of statehood for Hawaii?” Those answering affirmatively would then answer: “Are you in favor of statehood for Hawaii NOW?” The final draft of the plebiscite question, however, was changed to simply read: “Do you favor statehood for Hawaii?” The plebiscite yielded a 67 percent vote in the affirmative, although the question only received 60 percent support on the island of O‘ahu, where the statehood campaign had been most active. Roger Bell has concluded that, “Because of the ambiguity of the plebiscite question, members of the Equal Rights Commission were obliged to concede that it had settled very little.” Statehood remained, as John Snell (Executive Secretary for the Hawaii Equal Rights Commission) acknowledged, “a hotly debated issue in the territory.”\textsuperscript{123}

By the mid-1930s the movement for statehood was clearly seen as an attempt to reconsolidate white racial power and privilege. Big Five prestige and influence was
always emboldened by its relations with the federal government, which for its part desired control over Hawai‘i as a means to maintain a large military force in the middle of the Pacific. As a result of the Great Depression, however, Congress extinguished the profitable tariffs and empowered dockworkers to unionize in ways that would extinguish the mutual interests of the Big Five. Such acts by Congress signaled to the Big Five the need to gain full congressional representation in Washington D.C. through statehood, in order to counter what they called “federal discrimination.” But gaining admission into the United States would be a difficult project to attain given Hawai‘i’s largely non-white population. Indeed, prior to and leading up to the initial movement for statehood in 1934, perceptions of Hawai‘i’s Asian and Hawaiian population had been largely shaped by the discursive categories of orientalism and primitivism, respectively informed by frontier logics of assimilation and obliteration developed and advanced by academics such as Stanley Porteus and the sociologists at the University of Hawai‘i. Such gendered categories would position these communities differently in relation to white society. For instance, where orientalism constituted Asian groups as foreign threats, who would either assimilate or clash with the United States, Hawaiians were portrayed as perpetual primitives, as forever in the past whose control over Hawai‘i had come and gone. Such discursive constructions would facilitate different kinds of politics, where Asian groups sought to counter the idea that they were foreigners by proving their Americanism and struggling to achieve statehood. Many Hawaiians, on the other hand, saw statehood as another step in the decimation of their culture and values. Indeed, some Hawaiians would oppose statehood, fearing its ability to marginalize and displace them within their own homeland.
It would be martial law, enacted by the December 7, 1941 Japanese military attack on Pearl Harbor that galvanized popular resentment against territorial status. While the economic elite profited off of martial law and, in fact, even sought to prolong it, the treatment of Hawai‘i’s civilian government and population (primarily Japanese Americans) was so careless and abusive that the Supreme Court found it, in 1946, in violation of the U.S. constitution. While the existence of a large and potentially influential Japanese American population in Hawai‘i gave reason to the congressional committee in 1937 to recommend against statehood for Hawai‘i, by the end of World War II, Japanese American loyalty in the military would become beneficial if not vital to a movement for statehood. Such devastating casualties and injuries sustained by Japanese Americans in the war would soften white perceptions of the Japanese as perpetual foreigners. In fact, highlighting the achievements of Japanese Americans would play an ideological role in reconciling two formidable empires—the United States and Japan.

2 Ibid.


5 Ibid.


7 Ibid.


10 Ibid., 387.


12 Roger Bell, 59.


15 The Jones-Costigan Act reduced the quota of sugar Hawai‘i planters were allowed to send to the United States and limited Hawai‘i sugar planters to refining only 3 percent of their raw sugar locally. Unincorporated territories such as Cuba was allowed to refine 22 percent of their crop, and the Philippines and Puerto Rico were able to refine nearly 10 percent. See Roger Bell, *Last Among Equals*, 60;


28 Ibid., 22.

29 Also in 1934 is the Indian Reorganization Act, which allowed Native American nations to return to local self-government, essentially establishing a neo-imperial structure for Indians.


31 Ibid.
32 W.R. Castle to Honorable Hugh R. Belknap, House of Representatives, February 15, 1899, National Archives.


34 David Stannard, *Before the Horror: The Population of Hawai‘i on the Eve of Western Contact*.

35 Roger Bell, 36.


38 Kathleen Dickenson Mellen, 363.

39 Kathleen Dickenson Mellen, 365.


42 Ibid., 45.

43 Ibid., 45.


47 Ronald Takaki, *Pau Hana*, 24


Ibid., 146.

Ibid., 146.


Ibid., 307.

Ibid., 29; 49.

Ibid., 49.

Ibid., 308.

Ibid., 49.

Ibid., 308.

Ibid., 308.

Ibid., 351.


Ibid., 100

Ibid., 154.


Ibid., 87-88.
67 Roger Bell, 115.


71 Henry Yu, 87.


82 Ibid.

83 Ibid.
84 “8th Hawaiian Products Show,” Honolulu Advertiser, 28 September 1937.

85 Voice of Labor, 7 October 1937.


88 Ibid., 111.

89 “Hawaii Outgrows The ‘Political’ Suit Given Her by Uncle Sam” “Hawaii Asks to be Treated as Part of the United States and Not as a Foreign Country,” Pacific Collection, University of Hawai’i Library.

90 Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 7 August 1937.

91 “He Doesn’t Know Half of It!,” Hawaii Hochi, 10 October 1937.

92 George Wright, Hawaii Hochi, 19 October 1937


94 Ibid., 11.

95 Ibid., 79.

96 Ibid., 95-97.

97 United States Congress, Joint Committee on Hawaii, Statehood for Hawaii: hearings before the United States Joint Committee on Hawaii, Seventy Fifth Congress, second session, on Oct. 6, 8, 9, 12, 13, 15, 177-22, (1937) 59-60; Voice of Labor, Thursday, 7 October 1937.

98 Ibid.

99 United States Congress, Joint Committee on Hawaii, Statehood for Hawaii: hearings before the United States Joint Committee on Hawaii, 60.

100 Ibid., 12; 13.

101 Ibid., 242.

102 Ibid., p.242.

Ibid., p.579.

Ibid., p.579.

Statehood for Hawaii, 431.

Ibid., 431.

Ibid., 431.

Ibid., 579.

Ibid., 173.

Ibid., p.174

Ibid., p.174

p.284.


David Stannard, Honor Killing, p.78.

Roger Bell, 65.

By 1940 hostility against the Territorial government had remained high. In August of 1938 tensions between labor and the Big Five erupted into state violence, in the “Hilo Massacre,” in which fifty people, including many union members and even a child, had been gunned down by the police under orders from Sheriff Henry K. Martin. The Territorial government did not take responsibility for the violence, and even beat a lawsuit filed by Kai Urutani against the police officers. The Territorial government did not enjoy widespread popular support. Roger Bell, 73.

Roger Bell, 73-74.

CHAPTER THREE
JAPANESE FOREIGNERS AND HAWAIIAN PRIMITIVES:  
GO FOR BROKE!, KAMOKILA CAMPBELL, AND THE HAWAII STATEHOOD COMMISSION

So much has been said and published favoring Statehood for Hawaii that it is only fair that the opposition be heard. Unfortunately, equal treatment under law is denied the opponents of Statehood.

- Alice Kamokila Campbell, 1953

The American use of the atomic bomb on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki signaled the defeat of Japan and the end of World War II in 1945. Such displays of U.S. military and technological might, the kind capable of obliterating entire cities of people in a matter of seconds, would also alert the world to the new leadership position of the United States in the new global order of things. Emerging from the war with their industries untouched, especially in comparison to war-torn Europe and Japan, the United States was in a position to lead the world both militarily and economically. Following the lead of the United States, the victorious nations of World War II would together establish the United Nations to solve future international conflict through processes of “peace”—armed with rules, regulations, and international courts for arbitration.

Between 1945 and 1946, when the United Nations addressed the issue of self-determination, Hawai‘i along with Alaska, Guam, American Samoa, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, would be placed on the United Nations list of Non-Self-Governing Territories under Chapter XI. As such the United Nations declared that the occupying countries had a “sacred trust obligation” to foster self-determination and self-governance
over the interests of the administering power and required these nations to do an annual report on the progress being made towards these aims. Legal scholar Maivân Clech Lâm points out that Italy, Germany, and Japan, the losing nations of World War II, were made to give-up their colonial possessions. These possessions were listed under Chapter XII, and unlike those non-self-governing territories listed under Chapter XI, these occupied territories were tracked for independence and their occupying powers were forbidden from interfering with this process. If, “war is merely a continuation of politics by other means,” as the saying goes, the reverse has also been argued as true, where: “Politics is the continuation of war by other means.” American leaders after World War II deployed both formulations to maintain the spoils of war and continue their control of non-self-governing-territories under U.S. occupation.

In a letter written by Acting Secretary of the U.S. State Department James E. Webb to Hawai‘i congressional delegate Joseph R. Farrington on 24 May 1949, Webb responds to Farrington’s questions regarding the relationship between the movement for statehood and the responsibilities of the United States to the U.N. Charter. Farrington asked whether the congressional “Enabling Act,” legislation that would have allowed Hawai‘i to form a state constitution and achieve statehood, as in violation of the Charter. Webb wrote that Hawai‘i had “repeatedly demonstrated their desire for statehood” and from the standpoint of foreign policy and the international obligations of the United States under Chapter XI of the Charter, the Department of State believed that “such action by the Congress would be in conformity with the traditional policy of the United States toward those peoples who have not yet become fully self-governing...” Webb further explained that in the view of the State Department, Hawai‘i statehood would
actually “serve to support American foreign policy and strengthen the position of the United States in international affairs.”

The traditional practice through which the United States incorporated new territories, was written in the Northwest Ordinance. Underlying and informing this policy was a linear settler narrative of transforming primitive wild frontiers into Territories, whereby after a period of American tutelage, these Territories could eventually be deemed worthy by Congress to enter as a full-fledged modern State of the Union. This view that statehood was an inevitable endpoint for the Territory of Hawai‘i, as opposed to some other form of autonomy from the United States, was the guiding logic of the statehood movement. This movement used taxpayer money to produce and disseminate massive amounts of literature that framed and limited discussions of Hawai‘i’s future political possibilities to a simple choice between statehood and status-quo (territorial status). Statehood proponents actively shaped public opinion by only highlighting the benefits of statehood. Evidence of such deliberate containment can be seen in the federally mandated plebiscite that took place in June of 1959. Mililani Trask, former Pacific Expert to the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, argues that the June 1959 statehood plebiscite violated America’s international trust obligations to the people of Hawai‘i. She explains that in 1953, the United Nations General Assembly had passed Resolution 742, which identified offering the options of “independence,” “separate systems of self-government,” and “Free Association” as the criteria to determine whether or not a non-self-governing people had “attained a full measure of self-government.” Despite the fact that 132,773 voted for statehood while only 7,971 voted against it, the federal ballot used in 1959 did not afford the people of Hawai‘i the options of independence, separate systems of self-government, or Free Association. Therefore, the plebiscite in 1959 was not a genuine representation of the people of Hawai‘i’s political preferences. The statehood movement actively contained and prevented the people of Hawai‘i from making an informed choice about their political future.
Hawai‘i the United Nations-mandated options of “independence” or other “separate systems of self-government,” and thus violated U.N. Resolution 742. The fact that the United States had such international obligations to offer other forms of governance besides statehood was not general public knowledge.

Indeed, the international human rights violations that were committed in the process of achieving statehood are still little known, and widespread knowledge is a casualty of how the statehood narrative has become memorialized as a civil rights victory. What is typically commemorated in the statehood narrative is the successful unification of Hawai‘i’s people to counter the racism of Washington D.C. and prove that Hawai‘i was worthy of American statehood. What this civil rights narrative obscures, however, was the existence of Native Hawaiians and supporters who opposed statehood viewing it as an extension of the 1893 overthrow, arguing instead for some form of independence or commonwealth status. Such lapses in present memory, I argue, are in fact largely the products of the state agencies responsible for shaping and normalizing public support for statehood—the Hawaii Equal Rights Commission (1935-1946) and the Hawaii Statehood Commission (1947-1959). These agencies articulated and institutionalized the rules of discourse for civil society through processes of selective narrative framing in ways that censored and repressed Native Hawaiian opposition.

This chapter traces two mutually constitutive, but different and competing political projects: the Japanese American anti-racist project of combating their legal and cultural marginalization as perpetual foreign threats “ineligible for citizenship,” and a distinctly Native Hawaiian struggle to combat their colonial designation as permanently “unfit for self-government.” Indeed, these two groups’ oppressions cannot be equated so
it is critical to understand how complex national narratives and relations of power governing a settler state, and an emerging U.S. empire, targeted these dissimilar communities differently. In the postwar, narrations of Japanese American loyalty and masculine sacrifice in World War II were popularized as a means to win both statehood for Hawai‘i but also reconcile two formidable empires—the United States and Japan. As such, an important and powerful agent in the production of this civil rights narration was the heroic, yet tragic story of Japanese American military service during World War II. Where previously the Japanese in Hawai‘i were considered obstacles to attaining statehood, after the war, the Statehood Commission would highly publicize Japanese American veterans as model American citizens, the good citizen-subject, who had proven their loyalty to the United States in war and thus Hawai‘i’s worthiness for integration through statehood.

Consequently, the articulation of Hawaiian self-determination through anything other than statehood did not serve the ideological and economic interests of Hawai‘i’s elite or Washington D.C. Hawaiian historical memory of the overthrow and political claims to independence or commonwealth status, thus effectively became subjugated; in their systematic erasure, they became dismissed as irrational, naïve, and even criminal. Hence, instead of thinking about Asian American and Native Hawaiian groups’ rights and projects as either in solidarity or always in opposition, perhaps as Patricia Williams suggests, “[w]hat is needed, therefore, is not the abandonment of rights language for all purposes, but an attempt to become multilingual in the semantics of each other’s rights-valuation.” This chapter is an attempt to place these different histories and logics of oppressions into conversation.
With a very brief recession between 1946 and 1947, the United States economy would otherwise surge for the next twenty years. Large military spending during and after World War II helped to get the United States out of the economic depression of the 1930s. America’s Gross National Product (GDP) more than doubled in the 1950s and would double again by the 1960s. Such increased national prosperity, combined with government subsidization of the development of commercial airlines, would greatly increase tourist travel to the Hawaiian Islands.

Prior to World War II the settler elite worked to gain statehood as a means to alleviate economic depression and regain profitable tariffs for the sugar industry. After the war, however, there emerged a historical bloc that advanced statehood as a means to capitalize on the post-war boom and the growing tourism industry. Malcolm MacNaughton, former president of Castle & Cooke and the Chamber of Commerce of Honolulu, would point out that giant lending institutions and insurance companies were looking to invest in Hawai‘i but were precluded by their corporate indentures as long as Hawai‘i remained a U.S. territory. In an interview given in 1986, MacNaughton reflected: “We couldn’t get this money. And air travel was increasing. Tourism was coming… We needed this money. Statehood would get it for us.”

After the first congressional hearings on statehood since World War II were held in January of 1946, proponents seized on the wide publicity garnered by the hearings to launch a national publicity campaign for statehood. After consulting with Congressional leaders in Washington D.C., Governor Ingram Stainback established the Citizens’ Statehood Committee. The Committee’s official title, Citizens’ Statehood Committee,
was in fact a misnomer insofar as it was established and managed by top territorial government officials with oversight by the Pacific Branch of the Secretary of the Interior and Hawai‘i’s business elite, and not everyday citizens. Indeed, as Stuart Hall has pointed out, state projects seeking to shape ideology are most effective when the “lines of force and opinion” seem produced “freely and spontaneously as the popular consent of the governed.”

In other words, the Territory’s attempts to shape public opinion would be more successful if they created the impression that everyday people and community groups, rather than government agents or economic interests, initiated the movement for statehood. This tactic of making a state-led movement seem grassroots became the cornerstone of the statehood opinion campaign.

In keeping in line with the perception that statehood was initiated by everyday citizens, attempts at winning public opinion through the media needed to be seen not as government paid advertisements for statehood, but rather as seemingly natural topics of conversation that occurred spontaneously and frequently in major media outlets. In a discussion on “Public Relations,” Joseph Farrington, son of former Governor Wallace R. Farrington, and future U.S. Congressional Delegate who led the statehood movement throughout the 1940s and early 1950s, wrote:

It should be clearly understood that no advertising of any kind is even remotely suggested in behalf of the statehood movement. It needs none and might suffer more than it gains... Public opinion can be mobilized in behalf of statehood by an entirely non-commercial use of such media as newspapers, magazines, radio, public meetings, personal campaigning, the distribution of literature—all appropriate publicity outlets.

Farrington also owned the Honolulu Star-Bulletin, one of the island’s two major dailies, and in fact used his newspaper to front the statehood movement. The Citizens’ Statehood Committee’s own executive committee, in fact, called for an “Article a day in daily
newspapers” to reinforce and normalize public opinion in support of statehood. Under the leadership of the Farrington family, their newspaper played a considerable role in shaping public opinion in favor of statehood. In her book *Shaping History: The Role of Newspapers in Hawai‘i*, Helen Geracimos Chapin concludes that Farrington’s use of his newspaper to support statehood illustrates the “powerful impact of newspaper ownership united to a political agenda.”

Alfred Pratte, former Honolulu Star-Bulletin employee, acknowledged that in regards to statehood, the Farrington family was responsible for “decades of preparing and organizing public opinion in Hawai‘i and Washington, D.C.”

Skilled at using the media to shape public opinion, Farrington also headed the national publicity campaign for statehood and conceived of the movement as a “dual attack.” Farrington argued that Honolulu should serve as the “headquarters” to disseminate information on statehood targeting populations both locally and nationally, while an office in Washington D.C. be responsible for lobbying Congress. The Committee hired the public relations firm Holst, Cummings, Co. and consulted with the Chamber of Commerce of Honolulu, to shape the master document, “Some Essentials of a Program to Secure Statehood for Hawaii.” The group estimated the total cost of the campaign to be $50,000, an amount that was funded privately and reimbursed later by the legislature, with support from the Chamber of Commerce of Honolulu.

Such organizing and strategizing would lay the foundation for a more aggressive and better-funded campaign for statehood. Territorial Senator Eugene Capellas, a member of the Citizens’ Statehood Committee Executive Board, introduced Act 115 in July of 1947, which abolished the Hawaii Equal Rights Commission and created the Hawaii Statehood Commission in its place. Comprised of a nine-member commission
who by law, were required to be known supporters of statehood, the Commission was authorized in 1947 to take over the national campaign for statehood. All records and personnel of the Hawaii Equal Rights Commission were transferred to the Statehood Commission. The new Commission was also given a budget of $200,000, “to assemble, compile, and disseminate information, conduct national or sectional advertising and publicity campaigns, appear as the representative of the Territory before Congress or any federal department in regard to statehood; and cooperate with any citizens’ organization formed to accomplish the objects of the Act.”

Indeed, the Honolulu office would remain in contact with more than seventeen hundred daily newspaper editors, and as Roger Bell notes, in the first decade the number of editorials that favored statehood grew from five hundred to about three thousand annually. The Commission aggressively controlled how statehood was written about and portrayed in the media. It regularly coached witnesses who testified before the different Congressional hearings and distributed nationally large amounts of pamphlets, photographs, and letters to different newspapers, government offices, magazines, businesses, community organizations, libraries, schools and universities, in support of the benefits of statehood. In fact, the Statehood Commission had intimate ties to the 1892 Hawaiian Bureau of Information, which utilized similar tactics to justify the overthrow in 1893 and sway public opinion to support annexation. Lorrin A. Thurston’s son, Lorrin Potter Thurston, would come to chair the Statehood Commission. Lorrin P. Thurston, like his father, was initially opposed to statehood fearing that “haoles from the mainland” who had more capital than those in Hawai‘i would soon displace the white settler elite. As manager of the other major newspaper, the Honolulu Advertiser, Thurston would
come to support statehood and, like Farrington, also use his newspaper to campaign for statehood. From “Japs” to “Japanese Americans”

One of the biggest obstacles that faced proponents of statehood, as we had seen in previous chapters, was that Hawai‘i contained a large population of Japanese Americans who were construed by an orientalist discourse as inscrutable foreign threats. In the decades leading to World War II, and punctuated by the December 7th attack in 1941, American national identity was informed by what Moon-Kie Jung terms “anti-Japanese Americanism.” Indeed, Japanese Americans who were linked to a belligerent empire in Asia were racialized differently from other non-white groups in Hawai‘i. Jung explains: “anti-Japanese racism was not based on an assured belief that the Japanese were inferior but on a fear that they were not.” The Hawai‘i statehood effort thus needed to contend with the question of Japanese American loyalty, and prove that the Japanese could assimilate to American ideals.

After World War II, however, statehood proponents responded to questions of Japanese American loyalty by pointing to the military heroism and massive casualties and injuries sustained by the 442nd and 100th Battalion. Nicknamed the “Purple Heart Battalion,” the 100th Battalion suffered the highest casualty rate and became the most highly decorated unit in the entire history of the U.S. Army. Together, the 100th Battalion and 442nd Regimental Combat team received more than 18,143 decorations but also suffered an unusually high number of casualties and injuries at 9,486. The unusually high casualty and injury rates show how officers of the U.S. Army viewed Japanese American soldiers as expendable; even the soldiers themselves believed they were
ordered on what were largely considered “suicide missions.” Yet, their willingness to take on these missions proved to many that Japanese American soldiers were fiercely loyal to the United States. What made their loyalty so surprising was that it took place at a time when the U.S. government promulgated overtly racist policies against Japanese Americans, particularly their internment and investigations of Japanese American espionage. At the onset of the war, many Japanese American men were designated 4C “enemy aliens,” a classification that not only made them ineligible for the draft, but also cast further suspicion over their loyalty to the United States. Doubted in this way, Japanese American soldiers were specifically sent to fight in Europe, away from the Pacific Theatre, where Japanese forces fought. Almost immediately after the war the United States helped a war-torn Japan rebuild itself. In this self-interested process, General Douglas MacArthur helped write Japan’s constitution where he offered U.S. military protection in exchange for an agreement by the Japanese government to never re-militarize. With Japan pacified as a non-threat and perceived as a new economic ally of the United States, there soon opened key opportunities to transform prevailing perceptions of Japanese Americans as perpetual foreign threats.

The MGM film, *Go For Broke!* played one such role in combating the idea that Japanese Americans were foreign threats to be permanently excluded from the U.S. national polity. The film first screened at the national Capitol on May 24, 1951. The *New York Times* heralded the film as an expression and demonstration of Japanese American humanity: “without fuss or feathers or an over-expense of preachy words, is aptly revealed and demonstrated the loyalty and courage of a racial minority group, along with the normal human qualities of decency and humor inherent in these men.” A
classic in the genre of postwar “racial minority films,” *Go For Broke!* challenged sentiments from around the world that the United States remained a white supremacist nation that restrained the civil rights of Japanese Americans. The film was written and directed by Robert Pirosh, who earned an Oscar nomination for the screenplay. It starred Van Johnson as the protagonist, Lieutenant Michael Grayson. The cast also included actual veterans from the 442nd Regiment, notably Lane Nakano, George Miki, Akira Fukunaga, Ken Okamoto, Henry Oyasato, and Henry Hamada. *Go For Broke!* screened nationally and internationally, through much of Europe and Asia. Most prominently, however, the film screened in Japan on December 7th, 1952, on the 11th anniversary of Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor.

Historian Tom Coffman explains that while Japanese American soldiers faced discrimination in the military, they were key to winning the “hearts and minds” of Asia and Japan. Edwin O. Reischauer, the principal architect of postwar U.S. relations with Japan (and eventual ambassador to Japan under John F. Kennedy), had argued in 1942 that the internment of Japanese Americans had “unwittingly contributed” to Japanese propaganda. Such propaganda stated that Japan was fighting a war to stop the United States from spreading white supremacist domination throughout Asia. Reischauer wrote: “We should reverse this situation and make of these American citizens a major asset in our ideological war in Asia. Their sincere and enthusiastic support of the United States at this time would be the best possible proof that this is not a racial war to preserve white supremacy in Asia, but a war to establish a better world order for all, regardless of race.”24 As a result of President Truman’s decision to use atomic bombs against Japan, coupled with the later military occupation of Japan by the United States, Reischauer
would highlight the need to celebrate with vigor the wartime heroics of the Japanese American veterans.

In the film the heroism and valor of Japanese American soldiers, especially their unwavering loyalty and military sacrifice to the American nation, are themselves deployed to rid the newly-commissioned Second Lieutenant Grayson of his bigoted views of Japanese Americans. From the start of the film, anti-Japanese racism is addressed through a series of pedagogical lessons on liberal racial tolerance. One series superimposes the text of President Franklin Roosevelt over footage of the marching *Nisei* (second-generation) soldiers. It reads:

> The proposal of the War Department to organize a combat team consisting of loyal American citizens of Japanese descent has my approval. The principle on which this country was founded and by which it has always been governed is that Americanism is a matter of the mind and heart; Americanism is not, and never was, a matter of race or ancestry.

The idea that “Americanism” is not a question of race but one of “heart” provides, I would argue, a sentimental and overly generous view of U.S. race relations. Such a myopic view of U.S. race relations frames the rest of the film. Tellingly, while the film relies on the valor of the *Nisei*—for example, also superimposed in the same scene described above is a table of their battle record: “7 Major Campaigns in Europe; 9,486 Casualties; 18,143 Individual Decorations; 7 Presidential Unit Citations”—there are many instances, where even in the film’s noble narrative, the *Nisei* are still pushed to the background through supporting roles or symbolic imagery.

The issue of white racial tolerance and a project of subduing white anxiety around blurring racial lines becomes the focus of much of the film. As a consequence, Lieutenant Michael Grayson takes center stage. Upon arrival at Camp Shelby in
Mississippi, a Japanese American soldier drives a visibly disturbed Lieutenant Grayson through the camp. The script describes Grayson’s discomfort with what he sees, “The distasteful expression on his rugged, handsome features leaves no doubt as to what he thinks of American citizens of Japanese descent. Grayson throws a glance at the jeep driver, then shifts his angular, six-foot frame to get as much space between them as possible.”

Accordingly, the cameras shoot the perspective of what Grayson sees from the jeep, providing the audience a scene where a white racial order is flipped on its head. Grayson is disturbed and offended to see an American military camp overrun by Japanese, where Japanese American soldiers doing a roll call respond to their exotic names being called, “Kawaguchi!” “Tsukimura!” Grayson is even more bothered by what the script describes as a “Hawaiian war chant” where so-called “Kanakas” from Hawai’i perform what appears to be hula, which is actually a fake hula done to an equally contrived “primitive” sounding song. Such displays of white discomfort with “Oriental” foreignness sets the stage for Grayson to be reformed, even liberated.

In the next sequence, Grayson meets with the Sergeant Major, and immediately asks to be transferred back to the U.S. 36th Infantry, his previous Texas National Guard unit. When asked if his request isn’t due to the Japanese American troops Grayson responds: “Because they’re Japs? No, sir, it isn’t that at all.”

Grayson consequently receives his first of many disciplinary lectures on the use of the term “Japs”:

…they’re not “Japs.” They’re Japanese-Americans – Nisei – or, as they call themselves, boodaheads [sic]. All kinds of boodaheads, Lieutenant. From Hawaii, Alaska, California, New York, Colorado - yes, and some from Texas. They’re all American citizens and they’re all volunteers. Remember that. And another thing. We officers are referred to as “haoles,” - not white men. Any questions?
Grayson is uncomfortable because he is outnumbered by Japanese Americans and is racially marked as “haole.” He consequently is no longer the invisible majority left unmarked by hegemonic normalcy. Indeed, the older white officers at Camp Shelby, ranked higher in the white heteropatriarchal order, lecture Grayson on his racism, demonstrating America’s new inclusive position on Japanese Americans. While possessing the necessary qualities of a military officer—white, tall, blonde, and a Texan—Grayson is still a newly commissioned officer. As such, his racism becomes evidence of his lacking full masculine maturity, where his superior officers consider racial tolerance of Japanese Americans necessary for his leadership position. Such lessons of anti-racism, however, function to maintain the established hierarchy that includes senior white leadership, over junior white leadership, over subordinate non-white (Japanese American) soldiers. In this way, the inclusion of Japanese Americans in the fraternity of soldiers recalls how the 1893 Chicago World’s Columbian Exposition included “Orientals” in ways that actually displayed Anglo American supremacy. In other words, the inclusion of Japanese Americans would be tolerated, so long as they continued to strive for only subordinate supremacy.

In order to portray the United States as a nation founded on democratic ideals, not white supremacy, the film needed to provide sufficient reasons for why the United States interned 110,000 Japanese Americans. Grayson broaches the topic when he asks the Captain if they use live ammunition at the rifle range, stating that all he knew was that the Japanese were placed in “relocation centers” and maybe “the army just had some surplus barbed wire they wanted to use, was that it?” His Captain admonishes Lieutenant Grayson by offering another lesson in racial tolerance:
The army was facing an emergency at the start of the war – a possible invasion by Japanese troops. So all Japanese-Americans on the West Coast were evacuated as a precautionary measure. There was no loyalty check – no screening – nothing. If there were any spies among them, I can assure you they’re not in the four-four-two. Every man in the outfit has been investigated, reinvestigated and re-reinvestigated. (rising) I suggest you start getting acquainted.28

Upon learning that he would be in charge of an all Japanese American unit, Grayson takes his frustrations out on his platoon by maintaining strict regulations and orders. The film, and the intensity of the drama, proceeds in a series of juxtapositions of scenes featuring private conversations among the white officers and private conversations of the Japanese Americans soldiers. In one scene, a Japanese American soldier named Sam, played by Lane Nakano, an actual 442nd veteran who had been interned with his family at the Heart Mountain Internment camp, prepares a care package of canned goods. Sam explains to fellow soldier Tommy (Henry Nakamura), that the package wasn’t being sent to his brother who was serving in the 100th battalion, but rather to Arizona where his family was interned in conditions worse than Camp Shelby. Given the poor treatment of this family, he is asked why he would volunteer to fight. Sam explains that the purpose of fighting was to end discrimination against Japanese Americans. Tommy, whose family had been killed in Hawai‘i during the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, responds in pidgin: “We show ‘em! We show ‘em us boodaheads good soldiers, good Americans!” Sam responds: “All we need now is the casualty lists.”29

After fighting alongside the 442nd in Italy and France, Grayson comes to respect his fellow soldiers. In a pivotal scene, which sets up the climactic rescue of the Texas Battalion by the Nisei soldiers, Grayson stands up for his Japanese American regiment in the presence of his unreformed racist friend named Culley, who is also from the Texas Battalion. Drinking at a bar, Grayson explains that the 442nd would be the Texas
Battalion’s artillery, and the ensuing dialogue between Grayson and Culley provides yet another pedagogical moment for reforming prevailing social confluations of Japanese Americans as enemy “Japs”:

Culley: They’re sending us up without our own artillery? Just the Japs?
Grayson: They’re a good outfit, Culley. Plenty good.
Culley: Practically winning the war single-handed, what I hear. (contemptuously) Japs!

Embarrassed as some of the Japanese American soldiers overhear their conversation, Grayson asks Culley to step outside.

Grayson: They’re not Japs, Culley.
Culley: What?
Grayson: They’re Japanese-Americans – Nisei – or, if you prefer, boodaheads. But not Japs. They don’t like it and neither do I.
Culley: What are you, a Jap-lover or something?
Grayson: I said, they’re not Japs. I’m warning you, Culley –

Grayson proceeds to scuffle with Culley, who would eventually change his views, but only after the 442nd and the 100th Battalion rescue the Texas Battalion. Popularly referred to as the “Lost Battalion,” the 100th battalion and 442nd regiment suffered 800 casualties to save 211 of the Texan soldiers.30 Forty years later, Senator Daniel Inouye, a veteran of this battle who had gone on to become one of the most powerful Senators on capitol hill, would state, forcefully: “I am absolutely certain that all of us were well aware that we were being used for the rescue because we were expendable.”31

While Japanese Americans are shown to have the ability to be included into American culture, Japanese culture is shown to be of particular value to the United States. For example, a Japanese American soldier nicknamed Chick (played by George Miki) constantly complains about racism and the conditions of the camp. Chick explains that while most others enlisted from internment camps, prior to the war he was in Iowa
getting paid $500 dollars a month for determining the sex of chickens. He exhorts: “Chick-sexing is a science. It was developed in Japan and it’s one place a boodahead gets a break…”32 In another moment, this one on “dirty tactics” during hand-to-hand combat, Grayson has his Sergeant, a Japanese American, in a hold for which he says there is no escape. But the Sergeant suddenly flips Grayson with a judo maneuver. I suggest that the idea of combining “oriental” Japanese knowledge with “western” American know-how would provide the cultural groundwork for integrating the Japanese American soldiers into the army. Such a project for inclusion is also about integrating Asia into American political and economic hegemony at the outset of the Cold War. As T. Fujitani succinctly argues, “Go For Broke was part of a new pattern of representations and discourses in which values considered to be traditional in Asian societies were celebrated as conductive to Americanism.”33 The cultural fluidity with which Japanese Americans could be both Japanese and American would also justify the disproportionate number of casualties suffered by the Nisei. Japan’s soldiers were racialized in popular culture as “kamikaze” pilots, posing a luminous foreign threat, whereby the Japanese soldiers were obedient to the point of death. In the context of war, the motto “Go for Broke,” used in Hawai‘i in reference to gambling until one is broke, but popularized nationally by the film, continues to essentialize Japanese Americans but now in self-sacrificial obedience to the U.S. nation. This characterization of Japanese American soldiers (as willing to “Go for Broke”) helped to justify the disproportionately large casualty rates of Japanese American soldiers. In a scene where the soldiers are exhausted and sent on yet another suicide mission to rescue the Texas Regiment, Tommy and Sam speak of the need to change the attitudes of white Americans like Lieutenant Grayson.
towards Japanese Americans. Facing possible death, Tommy tries to encourage a disheartened Sam, “It’s rough—it’s plenty rough—but we know what’s it all about. You bet. More bettuh we ‘go for broke,’ eh, Sam?” Sam eventually responds with a smile saying, “That’s about it, Tommy. More bettuh we ‘go for broke!’” Soon after, a shell is heard and explodes near two other soldiers injuring one and killing the other.

Fig. 3.1 The cast of the film Go For Broke! Short stature of Japanese American soldiers highlighted throughout film.

Though white racism is often the brunt of many of the jokes in the film white masculinity is simultaneously and continually reinforced. Japanese Americans are “shot” in the film in ways that highlight their short physical statures against the larger white American soldiers, like Grayson. These shots render them unthreatening to white heteropatriarchal order. In one particular montage, the soldiers are shown training for combat by running through an obstacle course, but they are unable to leap over trenches or climb a wooden wall. Their inability to perform what “normal” soldiers are routinely
able to do is a symbolic form of emasculation. Still racially different but nationally the same, the racial order of the United States would symbolically become more inclusive as a multicultural nation, yet still preserve notions of white supremacy.

While Japanese American military sacrifice helped to mend U.S. relations with Japan, therefore facilitating the opening of Asian markets to American businesses, in Hawai‘i, it also assisted both a movement for statehood and Japanese American ascendancy. Matsuo Takabuki, 442nd veteran, major player in land development, and a once controversial Trustee of the Kamehameha School Bishop Estate, recalls that their celebrated record on the battlefield “pushed” them “to the forefront of the statehood effort.”\textsuperscript{34} In his memoirs, Takabuki writes that future Congressional Delegate and Governor of Hawai‘i, John A. Burns, would tell Japanese American veterans: “Do not be ashamed of who you are. Talk about your war record… You have proven that you are Americans. You earned this honor under fire. Flaunt it.”\textsuperscript{35} Indeed, the Hawaii Statehood Commission would highlight the military achievements of the \textit{Nisei} in its literature.\textsuperscript{36}

Armed with their GI Bills, many \textit{Nisei} veterans would again leave the Islands to attain professional and law degrees, which upon their return, bolstered the social, economic, and political power of the Japanese American community. John A. Burns would help to reorganize the Democratic Party by drawing heavily from the popularity of the Japanese American veterans. Many veterans would thus become hugely successful in political office. Some notable examples include the aforementioned Daniel Inouye, who would become a Senator in the U.S. Congress, and George Ariyoshi, who would become the first Japanese American governor of the state. With other elected officials like Daniel Aoki, Sakae Takahashi, and Matsuo Takabuki, they worked together with Burns to
revitalize the Democratic Party in a concerted effort to unseat the Republican Party and its Big Five supporters.

With the ideological support of returning veterans and the political support of the ILWU, the Democrats were able to accomplish what is often referred to as the “Democratic Revolution of 1954,” wherein political control of the legislature shifted from the Republicans to the new Democratic Party. Takabuki explains, however, that the liberal Burns Faction, from its inception, was not interested in disrupting the Big Five:

We saw the potential growth of tourism as an industry, with new and different players. We realized the Big Five were important players in Hawai‘i’s economy, and we did not want to destroy them. However, we did not want them to continue to dominate and be the only game in town. Tourism would open all kinds of economic avenues for the future, providing opportunities for the upcoming generation of those outside the existing economic oligarchy.

This new political force sought a passive revolution, displaying no ambitions of fundamentally reordering social relations so much as they sought to be accommodated within the economic system of the Big Five. Prior to the “Democratic revolution,” Takabuki writes that returning veterans participated in creating a “financial revolution.”

After the attack on Pearl Harbor, many white businessmen would leave Hawai‘i fearing further military attack and martial law. This consequently led to an economic vacuum in which many Japanese American and Chinese American entrepreneurs were able to capitalize on abandoned businesses and wide open markets. Takabuki writes:

The Fukunagas of Servco started a small garage in Haleiwa, which grew into a large conglomerate of auto and durable goods dealerships, discount stores, and financial institutions. The Fujieki family started a small family market that grew into the Star Supermarket chain. The Teruyas’ small restaurant and market in the 1950s and 1960s eventually became Times Supermarket. Chinn Ho started Capital Investment. K.J. Luke and Clarence Ching created Loyalty Enterprises, while Aloha Airlines began with Ruddy Tongg. As the number of local
professionals, lawyers, and doctors grew in postwar Hawai‘i, the economic, professional, and political landscape also changed rapidly.\textsuperscript{41}

Takabuki explains further that the major banks in Hawai‘i—the Bank of Hawai‘i and Bishop Bank (now First Hawaiian Bank)—would not regularly offer business loans to anyone outside of the white economic circle. This led veterans Daniel Inouye and Sakae Takahashi to open two banks: Central Pacific Bank (CPB) and later, the City Bank of Honolulu.\textsuperscript{42} With financial and administrative support from major banking institutions in Japan, many in the Democratic party would venture in major residential and tourist related real estate development projects, as tourism displaced agriculture as the dominant industry in the 1950s and 60s.

Major land development projects, particularly in hotels and shopping centers were slowed down, however, because of the aforementioned fear or lack of confidence by stateside lenders and insurers in Hawai‘i’s territorial economy. This motivated many Japanese to push for statehood, alongside those on the other end of the political spectrum who were a part of or associated with the Big Five. Such an emerging historical bloc would not go unnoticed or unchallenged by others. During the war and after it, Alice Kamokila Campbell emerged as a leading opponent of statehood, publicly opposing the statehood movement while fighting for other forms of self-governance for Hawaiians.

**Alice Kamokila Campbell: Unfit for Self-Government and Commemorating 1893**

More than any other public figure in the 1940s, Alice Kamokilaikawai Campbell was a public spokesperson for the suppressed voices of Hawaiian opposition to statehood. Kamokila, as she was commonly known, was the daughter of sugar planter James Campbell, which afforded her the economic means to speak against statehood in ways that most other Hawaiians who had been dependent on the government or the Big Five
for work could not. Kamokila’s mother, Abigail Ku‘aihelani, was a key leader in organizing the 1897 Kū‘ē petitions opposing U.S. annexation. Indeed, Kamokila was informed by a long matrilineal genealogy of Hawaiian resistance. Elected as the first woman Territorial Senator from Maui County, Kamokila publicized her campaign by running a radio advertisement that spoke of the overthrow of Queen Lili‘uokalani. Kamokila thus challenged the colonial assumptions that Hawaiians, particularly Hawaiian women, were incapable of self-government.

Kamokila maintained that with the attainment of statehood, “something indefinable would be lost,” and therefore throughout her political career she would strive to achieve some form of self-governance, besides statehood, for Native Hawaiians. Kamokila would also make statements about the U.S. citizenship that was forced upon Hawaiians, stating, “[i]t took us quite a while to get used to being Americans.” Indeed, Kamokila identified herself as both Hawaiian and an American. I wish to argue, however, that her expression of U.S. patriotism should be understood in terms of what Tina Delisle has defined as a “citizen-subject of a U.S. empire,” other subjects of U.S. colonialism, who in active and in often contradictory ways, tried to rework the terms of U.S. citizenship to their advantage. In fact, Kamokila would seek out other colonized peoples whose American citizenship was forced upon them by the United States, namely Native Americans and other Pacific Islanders, in order to better understand other forms of American governance that might be available to Hawaiians. For instance, after being elected to the Territorial Senate, Kamokila traveled to Washington D.C. to attain information on the potential of turning the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act into a kind of Native American reservation to be administered through the Bureau of Indian Affairs.
In 1921, the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act set aside 200,000 acres of the least desirable land for “Native Hawaiians” of fifty-percent or more blood quantum. The aim was to address the massive poverty of many Native Hawaiians and “rehabilitate” them back on the land in a kind of subsistence economy, where they would be able to lease an acre of land for a dollar a year. Kamokila was asked by her Hawaiian constituents to investigate the Native American reservation system as an “alternative proposal to the present set up,” arguing that the government had been negligent in placing Hawaiians on the land. While in Washington D.C. Kamokila was able to hold meetings with influential and powerful elected officials such as Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes, Hawai‘i delegate Joseph Farrington, and several senators, to discuss the possibility of federalizing the Hawaiian Homes Commission. She also spoke with President Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt, presenting them with a royal calabash on behalf of the “Mothers of Hawaii.” Kamokila explained, however, that it was her discussions with the Bureau of Indian Affairs that made her “more and more drawn away” from the proposal and would seek alternative means of “correcting faults” in the commission. Later in the year, with help from President Roosevelt and against the will of the Hawaiian Homes Commission, Kamokila opened a cooperative store for homesteaders that served as a community center for the island of Moloka‘i, including a kindergarten and other activities. In her two terms as Territorial senator, Kamokila continued to enter numerous bills designed to improve the condition of Moloka‘i homesteaders.

In October of 1944, still seeking to combat the political and economic oppression of Native Hawaiians, Kamokila committed what many considered to be political suicide. She sought Congressman Sterling Cole of New York to sponsor a bill that would transfer
Hawai‘i from the Secretary of the Interior to the Naval department. After traveling to the U.S. Territories of Guam and Samoa, Kamokila argued that Hawaiians would be better able to negotiate the U.S. Navy than Big Five capitalism. She wrote, “I sincerely believe the prestige of America would be greatly enhanced if Pacific island natives, incapable as the old Hawaiians of coping with ruthless business methods are folded under the care and guidance of our great naval leaders.”

Having traveled to Guam and Samoa, Kamokila reasoned that because Hawaiians were unable to control immigration into Hawai‘i, Naval control would actually limit the flow of immigration (as it had Guam), and prohibit non-natives from owning land (as it did in American Samoa). Criticism of Kamokila was swift: the Honolulu Advertiser editorialized that her opinions did not represent the people of Hawai‘i and cast her as being “befuddled with an idealistic illusion of a primitive past, whose rigors she herself has never known...”

Fig. 3.2, Kamokila Campbell was a vocal and public opponent of statehood. Front page of Honolulu-Star Bulletin
In January of 1946, when the first Congressional hearings on statehood since World War II were held at ‘Iolani Palace, Kamokila would bring the issues of Hawaiian self-government, Big Five economic greed, and the numerical dominance of Japanese Americans, to bear against statehood. Aware that her testimony would be one of the few in opposition to statehood, the Hawaii Equal Rights Commission attempted to squeeze her into an afternoon with other witnesses. Kamokila skillfully forced the committee to provide a full day of testimony for her alone, stating that she needed more time for her graphs and charts to be prepared. In fact, her testimony was much anticipated in Hawai‘i: earlier in the month, Kamokila had publicly withdrawn from the Democratic party as a result of its endorsement of statehood, seeking instead a vantage point to be “independent and free to speak the truth.” She managed to get schedule her testimony on January 17, the 53rd anniversary of the overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom. By skillful maneuver, Kamokila used this historic date to force a history of the national dispossession of Native Hawaiians in conversation with the economic gains many believed would occur through statehood. Kamokila also knew that such an explicitly stated connection could mark her as “un-American” and invalidate her testimony.

On the day of her testimony, Kamokila chose to wear a black holoku gown with red and yellow lei and spoke for over two hours to thunderous applause in front of a packed room of over 600. Kamokila charged the Big Five with organizing the statehood movement as a means to advance their economic interests by attracting, “outside capital and independent financial giants.” Striking at the heart of the business community’s desires for statehood, Kamokila declared:
I do not feel...that we should forfeit the traditional rights and privileges of the natives of our islands for a mere thimbleful of votes in Congress, that we, the lovers of Hawaii from long association with it, should sacrifice our birthright for the greed of alien desires to remain on our shores, that we should satisfy the thirst for power and control of some inflated industrialists and politicians who hide under the guise of friends of Hawaii, yet still keeping an eagle eye on the financial and political pressure button of subjugation over the people in general of these islands.  

In her testimony, Kamokila also called attention to the links between Big Five economic domination and the fear and silence that many felt in opposing statehood. She shared an example of one such sentiment, sent to her in private, that implored her to speak on behalf of those who could not: “‘We can’t, Kamokila. My husband would lose his job.’”

Those present at the testimony, however, were able express their sentiments collectively in the cheers and applause made after Kamokila’s comments. For instance, when Representative Angell asked Kamokila why statehood wouldn’t be able to address the problems she cited in the Territorial structure, Kamokila responded with a thinly veiled reference to the 1893 overthrow: “Who is it that has put us in the position we are today but the people who are asking you for statehood? We, the real people of Hawaii, are perfectly happy, just as we are.” The roar from the audience would force Joseph Farrington, who chaired the hearings, to tell the crowd to “refrain from demonstrations until after the conclusion of the interrogation.” When asked by the congressmen what kind of government she would want instead of statehood, Kamokila responded, “an independent form of government” and then explained that if others wanted to live in a U.S. state, they could simply move to any of the forty-eight states in the nation.

Kamokila also criticized the numerical dominance of the Japanese. She implied that Japanese Americans aided the attack on Pearl Harbor and that their move from the plantations to small businesses could cause the Japanese to “get a hold on the islands.”
While other scholars have written her off as a wealthy racist, there is evidence to suggest alternatively that her statements were part of a strategy to gain political leverage to oppose statehood by purposely playing to the racial fears of white Congressmen and aligning with the conservative right. A few years earlier, Kamokila had opposed anti-Japanese racism, arguing that those “whose heart and mind are set against statehood for reasons based on prejudice, rather than ideals, those are the people of Hawaii who should be pitied rather than condemned.” Whatever the case, Kamokila’s statements against the Japanese American community reinforced the racism that they had sought to counter. At the same time, her remarks against Japanese Americans should not be taken as an invalidation of her aims to seek justice, for Hawaiians, against the overthrow of their nation. Kamokila had been arguing all along that statehood, especially as it was backed by Japanese American ascendancy, was a continuation of Big Five domination, what Haunani-Kay Trask describes as a second elaboration of foreign hegemony. Trask writes, “The history of our colonization becomes a twice-told tale, first of discovery and settlement by European and American businessmen and missionaries, then of the plantation Japanese, Chinese, and eventually Filipino rise to dominance in our islands.” Indeed, Trask explains that the vehicle for Asian ascendancy was statehood, which came at the expense of Native Hawaiians.

Kamokila’s anti-Japanese statements must thus be read against the backdrop of widespread circulation of heroic narratives about Japanese American loyalty, which made an ongoing history of racism against Japanese Americans visible, that in turn strengthened the statehood movement. What has been less visible to many, if not, rendered natural and normal, are the specific forms of colonial oppression over Native
Hawaiians. It is here that Andrea Smith’s conceptual framing in her “Three Pillars of White Supremacy”—of labor exploitation, orientalism, and genocide—can help us understand how otherwise noble efforts to combat one’s own form of oppression can lead unwittingly to participating in the oppressive logic of another. Where Japanese settlers and their supporters challenged the view that they were perpetual foreign threats, the cultural narratives of civil rights that anchors the Hawaii statehood celebration, forged deeply by the histories of Japanese American ascendancy and desires to capitalize on land developments in the postwar period, renders invisible their role in the settler colonization of Hawaiians. Adversely, Smith’s framework helps us also understand Kamokila’s predicament: in combating the notion that Hawaiians are destined to disappear and thus be replaced, she resisted this oppression by heightening fear that Japanese Americans were foreign threats “ineligible for citizenship.” In hoping to prevent the latest round of settler colonization and U.S. occupation of Hawai‘i through the vehicle of statehood, Kamokila appealed to a long and well-established fear, among many white Americans, of Japanese American political ascendancy in the United States. Even as it was entirely plausible that Kamokila herself frowned on Japanese American ascendancy in Hawai‘i, this ascendancy played a role in the continued political marginalization of Native Hawaiians.

Kamokila’s testimony (without the question and answer portion) was printed in the HonoluluAdvertiser the next morning and criticism of her in both the Advertiser and Star-Bulletin would last for over a month. Lorrin P. Thurston, son of Lorrin A. Thurston, was among the first of many to criticize Kamokila, writing in his newspaper that while her testimony was “undoubtedly the high spot of the entire hearings” her logics
were confused. Thurston would portray her as lacking consistency in her loyalty to political party or stances on statehood and that what she lacked logically was “made up for by her utter sincerity.”\textsuperscript{60} Thurston’s criticisms were chauvinistic and sexist. They reduced Kamokila’s views to little more than emotion and sentiment, figuring her as someone who lacked the masculine rationale to be logical and discerning. Most responses, however, criticized her for challenging Japanese American loyalty. One editorial asked: “So she thinks the AJAs have received too much publicity? Well, I think they rate it. They paid for it with blood—how does she pay for her publicity? Sooner or later it should dawn on her that people are getting fed up with her line.”\textsuperscript{61} Another argued that her comments have set race relations back 50 years.\textsuperscript{62}

A few days after her testimony, Kamokila made a statement to the press that she had been asked to launch an island wide petition to oppose statehood. This was a similar action to what her mother, Abigail Ku‘aihelani Campbell, had helped accomplish when a coalition of Hawaiian organizations toured the islands in 1897 with the Kū‘ē petitions to oppose U.S. annexation. In response, The Maui News published an editorial titled, “Kamokila in Die Hard Fight Against Hawaii,” and a few days later warned readers to, “Beware of What You Sign.”\textsuperscript{63} This petition, however, would not circulate because of the risk of providing the Big Five with a list of names that could be immediately used to “blacklist.” On September of 1947, however, Kamokila continued her opposition to statehood opening an “Anti-Statehood Clearing House.”\textsuperscript{64} This clearinghouse was designed to be a counter to the Hawaii Statehood Commission, from which she collected testimony in opposition to statehood and used them to lobby congress against statehood. Using her contacts in Washington D.C. she would send “anti-statehood information,
reports and arguments to congress." One year later, however, Kamokila would strike a major blow to the Hawaii Statehood Commission revealing the campaign to be predetermined and deliberately used to silence any opposition to statehood.

On January 17th, 1948, on the 55th anniversary of the overthrow, Kamokila Campbell filed a lawsuit in *Campbell vs. Stainback, et. al*, that challenged the legality of the financing of the Hawaii Statehood Commission. This lawsuit was timed to coincide with Oregon Senator Guy Cordon’s impromptu visit to investigate statehood. In the suit, Kamokila charged that the $200,000 (provided for by Act 115, that established the Statehood Commission) used by the Territorial government to nationally and locally campaign for statehood were “to the exclusion and detriment of citizens and taxpayers opposed to statehood.” Her suit targeted especially the Commission’s publicity campaign on three main points:

1. A national or sectional advertising and publicity campaign is not a valid public purpose for which public funds may be expended; 
2. Lobbying in Washington, D.C., is not a valid public purpose for which public funds may be expended; 
3. The grant of unlimited discretion to an administrative agency in the expenditure of public funds constitutes an invalid delegation of power by the legislature.

Seeking to place a Temporary Restraining Order on the governor, members of the Statehood Commission, and territorial officials before the court hearing, Kamokila sought to stop them from spending any more taxpayer money to gain public opinion for statehood. Circuit Court Judge Wilson C. Moore denied her request choosing instead to withhold any action until he decided whether the financing of the Statehood Commission was unconstitutional. Attorney General Walter D. Ackerman Jr., would file a demurrer against Kamokila’s case. One month later, Kamokila’s lawsuit was thrown out of Circuit Court by Judge Moore who declared that “regardless of what we think as individuals, we
must bow to the will of the majority. The last plebiscite showed more than two to one in favor of statehood and the territory, as an integral part of the United States, is in its democratic realm. The basis on which we operate this government is on the will of the people. But as indicated in chapter two, the 1940 plebiscite was “deliberately imprecise,” and even the Hawaii Equal Rights Commission determined that statehood was still a debatable issue.

Kamokila appealed this ruling and the Hawai‘i Supreme Court returned a unanimous decision in her favor. In March of 1949, Justice E.C. Peters ordered an injunction against the Statehood Commission that prohibited the use of public monies for said purposes. Justice Peters wrote:

The appellees justify the expenditure of public moneys for publicity purposes… upon the ground that the purposes thereof subserve the public welfare, are for a ‘public purpose’ and hence a rightful subject of legislation. With this we cannot agree. To accord validity to expenditures for an indiscriminate publicity campaign upon the ground that it is for a public purpose would do violence to that term as juridically defined and dignify as “public” what obviously is purely “political.”

In essence, the High Court rejected the Statehood Commission’s arguments, ruling instead that using taxpayer money to sway public opinion did not serve the “public” good, but instead constituted actions “purely political” in nature.

Though it could no longer spend public monies on national and sectional advertising, the Statehood Commission stepped up its indirect, if not underhanded, practice of using media outlets, supposedly autonomous from the government, to continue to sway public opinion. It did this in spite of the High Courts explicit ruling against the government’s alleged “right to petition the public for its favorable opinion” on political matters such as statehood in particular:
To conduct a national or sectional advertising campaign on behalf of statehood for Hawaii, and for such other purposes as might be included in the right to petition, is calculated merely to influence the reading public generally. Favorable public opinion upon the subject of statehood undoubtedly may exert a profound psychological effect upon those in whom repose the legislative authority to grant or refuse statehood... the creation of favorable public opinion is foreign to the definition and concepts of the citizen’s right to petition.72

Though the court found that the territory could not “petition the public” to shape public opinion in favor of statehood, it did not, more fundamentally, go so far as to declare the Commission invalid, and in fact left room for “reasonable” expenditures for the Statehood Commission to promote statehood. In this regard, the court too was prejudiced against any status other than statehood (or the status quo). This prejudicial view is best captured in the court’s view that Hawai‘i’s territorial status was temporary and transitional, with the inevitable end goal being statehood. According to the Supreme Court, the Territorial government was created specifically to promote “welfare, peace, happiness and prosperity” and thus opined that to “accelerate the evolutionary process of the political transition from a Territory to a State abstractly accomplishes the same result. Reasonable men cannot differ upon the political advantages resulting from statehood over and above those inherent in a Territory of the United States.”73 Yet, even back then, Kamokila, and others, were pointing to other forms of self-governance, other forms of international rights, and other ways of understanding Hawai‘i’s political history. Indeed, Kamokila and others had an international right to other forms of self-governance that were being blocked by U.S. governmental and legal maneuverings.

In 1953, Kamokila wrote a letter to Congress, arguing that of the $475,000 that had been appropriated for a government led statehood campaign since 1947, no money had been apportioned to opponents of statehood. By 1953, Kamokila had begun to
campaign for Commonwealth and admitted that while the majority of people in Hawai‘i were in favor of statehood, this was the only option being discussed and the general public “never had the opportunity of studying its merits to demerits.” She argued confidently that if those in Hawai‘i were to allowed a choice between Commonwealth and Statehood, she was confident that the majority would choose the former, “provided a reasonable time were given for them to receive adequate information concerning Commonwealth Status which thus far has been suppressed.”

Her letter to Congress in 1953 also shows how her strategies to oppose statehood had changed. Now, she had begun to highlight two different threats: one, that statehood for Hawai‘i would set a precedent for other territories (namely, Guam, Puerto Rico, American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, and the Panama Canal zone) to gain statehood, and two, communism through the International Longshoreman and Warehouseman’s Union (ILWU)—which by the mid-1930s had supported statehood and was allied with the Democratic party—had “crippled industry” and would pose a serious threat to the U.S. continent. By the 1950s, Kamokila would play to McCarthyism and the red scare to defeat statehood.

Lorrin P. Thurston received copies of Kamokila Campbell’s letter, after she asked that it be published in the Honolulu Advertiser. Thurston refused to publish it, but sent it nonetheless to the Hawaii Statehood Commission, suggesting that it be “circulated where it will do the most good.” In 1954, Kamokila, Harold Hughes, and former governor Ingram Stainback, formed the organization, Commonwealth for Hawaii. The Democratic Party, having just taken majority control of the legislature and sensing that statehood was around the corner, roundly condemned the new organization and upstart movement for commonwealth. Using the same linear logic employed by the Hawai‘i
Supreme court in its *Campbell* decision, Arthur Trask, John A. Burns, and William S. Richardson—leaders of the Democratic Party—prepared a “Resolution Denouncing Commonwealth for Hawaii.” They declared:

> the history of the people of the Hawaiian Islands, ancient and modern, is a positive chronicle of the progressive advancement of man from tribal leadership, absolute kingship, constitutional monarchy, and republic, to the status of an organized territory of the United States of America...the devotion of the people of Hawaii is rooted in the high objective of receiving full political rights as a state in the union of states of America and that any other political status is an abomination to the loyal and patriotic citizens of Hawaii.

The resolution described proponents of commonwealth as “sinister” and labeled their movement “illegal.” It was through such tactics of demonization and criminalization that proponents of statehood can be said to have subjugated and obstructed any political alternative to statehood.

Telling is the case of the Statehood Commission’s intimidation of a group of Papakolea Homesteaders and local historian Kathleen Dickenson Mellen when they attempted to write a document opposing statehood. In 1948, Mellen and the Homesteaders had met with Senator Hugh Butler during his congressional visit to investigate statehood in Hawai‘i. At the meeting, the Papakolea Homesteaders agreed to set their opposing viewpoints on paper and send the document to Butler, then Chair of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Butler would later write to Mellen asking for the letter promised him by the Hawaiian homesteaders. Mellen reported that the Statehood Commission had discovered their plans, “roundly denounced” her, and threatened to send a member of the Statehood Commission to “talk” with the people of Papakolea. According to Mellen, this group became “afraid to make the written statement. And I agreed with them—knowing only too well what has happened in the
past to those who dared oppose statehood openly.”77 There are, in fact, other recorded instances of state repression, enacted by the Hawaii Statehood Commission, against Hawaiian opposition to statehood. The research of John S. Whitehead shows that in 1957 the Hawaii Statehood Commission determined ways to counter taxi drivers and tour guides who were telling tourists that statehood was not desirable amongst Hawaiians.78

In 1960, a year after statehood, Kamokila submitted to the Senate a vision and message she received from the Goddess Pele. Her statement was inserted into the public record by Senate President William H. Hill, and read to the Senate by the clerk. Kamokila wrote that she had never previously received a visit from Pele, but had always been surrounded by “queer and incredible incidents.” She explained that in the face of such supernatural occurrences, “with the assistance of the old sages and knowledge given me by my mother and grandmother, I have been able to work out miraculous results.” Indeed, Kamokila’s opposition to statehood often ran parallel to those of her mother’s against annexation. Kamokila explained that she first received a vision of Pele on the morning of November 9th, and recalled her mother’s instruction, at times like these, to call aloud the names of those she thought were appearing to her. “When you mention the correct name,” explained Kamokila, “the vision will suddenly disappear.” After calling a list of names, she called the name Pele, and the apparition disappeared. Taking this as a sign, Kamokila traveled to Kilauea crater, where she received another message from Pele, instructing her to transmit this message to Hawaiians: “My people, my beloved people of Hawaii nei, I am here with you in all the attributes of womanhood, to alert, guide and protect you, the present and future generation against the many pitfalls that could engulf you in hasty decisions and spectacular progress.” Pele further stated that the “affairs of
state are in such a tangled mess,” and warned of a hidden agency “being drawn toward us led by a strong desire for possession.” Pele closed with a challenge to Hawaiians: “Now that we are at the crisis of our destiny, are we to fall into oblivion?”

While many Native Hawaiians did in fact support Hawai‘i statehood, many others did not, and it was their voices that were purposefully silenced and contained. In fact, the suppression of Hawaiian voices opposed to statehood heads a litany of repressive and unjust actions undertaken by agents of the state in the campaign to gain statehood. These include, as we have seen so far, the monopolization of taxpayer money by statehood proponents, limiting political choices for decolonization to statehood or territorial government, and instances of state repression against Hawaiians opposed to statehood. With repeated efforts by leaders (like Kamokila) to oppose statehood, particularly on dates commemorating the 1893 overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom, and grassroots opposition against statehood (such as the Homesteaders of Papakolea, taxi drivers and tour guides), it becomes impossible to continue to view statehood as a legitimate or at least genuine expression of self-determination or decolonization in accordance with internationally-agreed upon United Nations standards.

While condemned by the majority of the residents in Hawai‘i, much of Kamokila’s views and actions were supported, even mandated, by international law. It seems highly probable that Kamokila and others were unaware of the U.S. obligations to Hawai‘i under the United Nations. Joseph Farrington, however, knew that the United States itself placed Hawai‘i on the U.N. list of non-self-governing territories, as he was also probably aware that the requirements for proper decolonization required that the “administering” power make a genuine effort to educate the non-self-governing peoples
about their political rights and options. Yet, Farrington and others did not make this information available to the general public even with all of the avenues of media available to them. If in fact a democracy relies on an educated populace, by 1959, Hawai‘i residents were deliberately only educated to the benefits of statehood. Such deliberate containment of Hawai‘i’s options for political status combined with a highly partial opinion campaign to secure support for statehood, speak volumes about the actual status of democracy in Hawai‘i.

Both Japanese Americans and Native Hawaiians were contending with very different histories and political possibilities shaped by both U.S. foreign policy and the needs of a rapidly growing tourism industry. The conflicting aims between Japanese Americans seeking to be further included into the U.S. national polity and of those Native Hawaiians who sought some form of autonomy from the United States would only intensify as a result of new challenges posed by a Hawaiian movement for self-determination that emerged in the 1970s. This movement was a response to post-statehood real estate developments that displaced economically-poor rural communities, and many of these land developments, indeed, involved those who were either in or close with the Democratic party.\textsuperscript{80} The economic greed, which Kamokila Campbell argued would drive Hawai‘i as a state, led to numerous evictions of Hawaiians and increased militarization.\textsuperscript{81} Instead of seeing statehood in 1959 as a culminating achievement for Hawai‘i, evidence of its modern and democratic character, in my final chapter, I wish to examine the effects of statehood and its civil rights narrations on Hawai‘i. To further examine the complex power relations between whites, different Asian groups, and
Hawaiians in contemporary Hawai`i, and the legacy of Hawai`i statehood, I turn now to the artwork of one Hawaiian artist who goes by the pseudonym, Kēwaikaliko.

2 http://statehoodhawaii.org/vid_maivan.html


4 James E. Webb to Joseph R. Farrington, Department of State, May 24, 1949, Hawaii State Archives.

5 See also Kekuni Blaisdell, in Autobiography of Protest in Hawai‘i, (Honolulu, University of Hawai‘i Press, 1996) 367-368.


9 Interview with Malcolm McNaughton in Perspectives on Hawai‘i’s Statehood, (Oral History Project, Social Science Research Institute University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa, June 1986) 52-53.


12 Ibid.

13 Helen Geracimos Chapin, Shaping History: The Role of Newspapers in Hawai‘i, (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1996), 230.

14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.


17 Roger Bell, *Last Among Equals*, p.124

18 Lorrin P. Thurston was often critical of Joseph Farrington’s support of labor unions. Thurston argued that it fomented a Soviet inspired communist plot to take over Hawai‘i.


20 Ibid., 82.


24 Tom Coffman, *The Island Edge of America: A Political History of Hawai‘i*, pp.84-87.

25 *Go For Broke!* script, p.2.

26 Ibid., p.6.

27 Ibid., 7.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid., 13


31 Roland Kotani, p.115.

32 Ibid., 11.


39 Ibid., 79.

40 Ibid., 65-65.

41 Ibid., 65.

42 Ibid., 81.


47 The calabash, which once belonged to King Kalakaua, was a valued heirloom of the Campbell family. It was adorned with the Hawaiian Kingdom’s royal coat of arms, and was lined with a silver rim engraved with mangoes and grapefruit *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*, May 21, 1943, p.9.

48 “Maui Woman Senator, At Washington, Sees Flaws in ‘Reservation System’” in *Honolulu Star Bulletin*, June 17, 1943, p.6, c.6)
By May of 1944, Kamokila had become so popular that she was elected as the Democratic National Committeewoman for Hawai‘i. She was further considered to head the Territorial Senate as president and with her strong ties with politicians in Washington D.C. was considered a possible candidate for Congressional Delegate to oppose Joseph Farrington “Homes Commission Frowns on New Store Opened by Kamokila for Homesteaders,” *Honolulu Advertiser*, June 27, 1944.

Dorothy Benyas, “Kamokila Favors Navy Control of Territory, Envisions Greater Safety from Future Attack,” *Honolulu Advertiser*, October 1, 1944.

*Honolulu Advertiser*, October 6, 1944.


Roger Bell, 116.


Ibid.


“Ibid.

Text of Kamokila’s Testimony: Senator Discusses Objections In Detail; Cites Racial Issues,” *Honolulu Advertiser*, January 18, 1946; the last editorial was “Hawaii Soldiers Resent Kamokila’s Statement,” *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*, February 19, 1946.

“Kamokila’s Statements Before the Subcommittee Statehood Committee,” January 19, 1946, *Honolulu Advertiser*;


64 *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (September 18, 1947.)

65 *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* (September 18, 1947.)


68 Supreme Court of Hawaii, “Opinion of the Court,” pp.311-312.

69 “Court Denies Campbell Plea on ‘State’ Fund,” January 24, 1948, *Honolulu Advertiser*.


71 Supreme Court of Hawaii, p.315.


73 Supreme Court of Hawaii, Campbell v. Stainback et al., p.321.


75 Lorrin P. Thurston to Nils Tavares, Hawaii State Archives.

76 Roger Bell, 158.

77 Letter from Kathleen Dickenson Mellen to Senator Hugh Buttler, February 27, 1949, Box 97 “Confidential Letters,” Nebraska National Historical Society.


79 Alice Kamokila Campbell to State Senate, January 31, 1960, Hawaii State Archives.


CHAPTER FOUR

KĒWAIKALIKO’S BENOCIDE: POST-STATEHOOD AND THE INTERSECTIONS OF RACE, INDIGENEITY, AND SETTLER COLONIALISM

This artwork was created in October 2000. It was completed in a week and has been getting both positive and negative feedback. Grandma hates it.

- Kēwaikaliko, caption to Benocide

Fig. 4.1 Kēwaikaliko, Benocide, 2000; Pastel and fluorescent marker on paper.
A Hawaiian artist who goes by the pseudonym Kēwaikaliko critiques the legal challenges emerging out of the 2000 *Rice v. Cayetano* Supreme Court decision in his artwork titled *Benocide*. Rooted in a history of imperial dispossession, Kēwaikaliko created a loaded illustration that illuminates from a Hawaiian epistemological vantage point, perspectives that are often made ideologically invisible or closed to settlers.¹

Central to the artwork is a Hawaiian man being lynched by then governor Benjamin Cayetano, Hawai‘i’s first governor of Filipino descent (1994-2002). At the feet of former governor Cayetano lies the bearded and bloodied skull of Sanford B. Dole, the first colonial governor of the Territory of Hawai‘i and President of the interim governments between the 1893 overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom and presumed 1898 U.S. annexation.² The lynching of the Hawaiian man takes place on a tree with leaves made of money and upon which Death, smoking crystal methamphetamine or “ice,” is figured as its trunk. A *haole* settler, and well-known political pundit, who has been seeking to dismantle all Hawaiian rights and entitlements, stands wearing a swastika covered aloha shirt patriotically waving the state of Hawai‘i—and what is also the Hawaiian Kingdom—flag. Next to him is what I perceive to be a Hawaiian figured as a *puʻaʻa* or pig in western style clothing. A *puʻaʻa* with trickster-like qualities, perhaps a colluding Native, appears to be fondling the rear of the *haole* settler. Depicted in black and gray, and comprising the ground beneath this mob are Hawaiian women who appear in all manner of suffering. The black and gray envelop the green mountain that overlooks the urban sprawl of Waikīkī. Centered along the horizon is a nuclear mushroom cloud rising into the sky, a direct reference to nuclear testing in the Pacific and more specifically to the U.S. military’s devastating impact in Hawai‘i.
Benocide was exhibited at the Honolulu Academy of Arts in an exhibition entitled “Nā Maka Hou: New Visions” from May 13th until June 17th 2001. Featured amongst one hundred works of art by fifty-eight contemporary Hawaiian artists, the exhibition was designed to “communicate a new vision of Hawaiians in today’s society.” Manulani Aluli Meyer, scholar of Hawaiian epistemology and education, explains the pedagogical and theoretical implications of Hawaiian art in her essay “Hawaiian Art: A Doorway to Knowing,” which accompanied the Nā Maka Hou exhibition:

Hawaiian art has always inspired me to enter doorways to deeper relationships, wider truths and vivid realities… We read in art the possibilities of our people, we dialog with history, we repent with shame, we wonder, we marvel, we wake up! We are educated through the poetry shared by these modern prophets of ancient knowing. We are changed. We are changed forever.

Meyer speaks to the use of art as a pedagogical tool, one that dialogues with history and possibilities, challenging the viewer and their versions of reality. Kēwaikaliko offers a vision of Hawai‘i that often goes unseen, even among Hawai‘i residents, and is a clarion call for Hawai‘i’s residents to re-envision and re-imagine Hawai‘i’s contemporary situation. The caption that accompanies this piece, however, warns against a reading that would represent Benocide as speaking on behalf of all Hawaiians. Whereas his grandmother “hates it” and the artwork has been getting “both positive and negative feedback,” I do not wish to argue that all Hawaiians view the court cases in the way that my reading of Benocide does. As mentioned throughout this dissertation, my purpose in reading Hawaiian historical moments or texts is not to claim expertise in Hawaiian epistemologies or cultural knowledge. Instead, my interest lies in its rich observations of the intricate power relations operating within a settler colony under U.S. occupation and
this artwork in particular narrates visually the complex interrelations between whites, different Asian Americans, and Native Hawaiians in contemporary Hawai‘i.

Kēwaikaliko’s artwork continues the thread of Hawaiian resistance to settler colonialism and American hegemony, which are the legacies of the overthrow, annexation, and in this historical moment, statehood. Indeed, many who opposed Hawai‘i statehood in the 1940s and 1950s, like Kamokila Campbell and John Ho‘opale, forewarned that “economic greed” was behind a movement for statehood. The famous Mary Kawena Puku‘i, a Hawaiian scholar, dancer, composer and educator who helped keep Hawaiian knowledge alive during a lengthy and aggressive Americanization movement in the Territorial period, expressed concern in 1959 that statehood might lead to the further elimination of what few Hawaiian rights remained. Puku‘i observed, almost prophetically: “The question that stands up is what is to be done for my mother’s people? … Hawaiian people. Will it mean the dissolving of Kamehameha School?” In June of 2003 such a lawsuit materialized in John Doe v. Kamehameha, which sought to eliminate Hawaiian-first admissions policies. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s in a post-statehood era, Hawai‘i’s race relations, politics, and economy changed dramatically. Liberal multiculturalism replaced the white racial dictatorship that controlled Hawai‘i during the Territorial period. Such liberal multicultural rhetoric, however, worked to flatten the historical and political differences between Native Hawaiians and settler groups, positioning Hawaiians as just another ethnic group fighting for their “fair share of the American pie.” Representing Hawai‘i as a racially harmonious and exotic locale would also facilitate Hawai‘i’s economic transition from agriculture to tourism, creating major hotel and real estate developments that brought in millions of tourists a year.
radically altering island life. 

Beginning in the 1970s, but primarily by the 1990s, a Hawaiian movement for self-determination would raise public awareness of a history of the 1893 overthrow. Growing more vocal and forceful, this movement for self-determination would reach critical mass. In response to such movement for self-determination, there arose a string of legal challenges that attacked the few remaining Hawaiian so-called entitlements, seeking to contain a Hawaiian movement for self-governance by tying them up in court. History would in fact repeat itself, as the plaintiff in the case, Harold “Freddy” Rice, is a direct descendant of William Hyde Rice, one of the men who helped in the 1893 overthrow.

On February 23, 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court in *Rice v. Cayetano* struck down the Native-only voting scheme of the nine Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA) trustees. OHA is a state agency responsible for managing and administering trust monies generated from the “ceded public lands trust” to Hawaiians. 

The Court found OHA to be in violation of the U.S. Constitution’s 15th Amendment and ruled 7-2 that “Hawaiians” and “Native Hawaiians” were “race based” categories as opposed to political categories held by indigenous Hawaiians. Thus, the Court found that OHA was a state of Hawai‘i race-based agency and therefore ruled in favor of the plaintiff deeming the Native-only voting qualifications to be in violation of the 15th amendment.

As a result of the Court’s declaration in the *Rice* decision all federal and state programs benefiting Hawaiians as an indigenous people became vulnerable and a series of legal challenges ensued. In October of 2000 the Republican candidate for U.S. Senate, John Carroll, and Hawai‘i resident Patrick Barrett filed two separate lawsuits claiming racial discrimination, arguing that Hawaiian “entitlements” created by the
Constitution of the state of Hawai‘i violated the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. These two lawsuits were consolidated and when combined they threatened to eliminate the Office of Hawaiian Affairs; all federal programs for Hawaiian health, education, and housing; Hawaiian gathering rights; and the Department of Hawaiian Home Lands. Both cases were eventually thrown out of court for lack of standing once it was found that neither plaintiff had ever applied for a single Native program. In March of 2002, however, a group of 16 self-proclaimed “multiethnic Hawaii Citizens” sued the state in the Arakaki et al. v. Lingle case. This case was reduced to a ruling on the constitutionality of OHA in U.S. District court and was appealed to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals. The Federal Court of Appeals issued a ruling on 31 August 2005 reaffirming that the plaintiffs could not challenge the constitutionality of federal spending but ruled that they were in standing as taxpayers to sue OHA. Completed in October of 2000 Kēwaikaliko’s Benocide challenges the earlier lawsuits of Carroll and Barrett, but remains a salient critique against the logic of the string of legal assaults and rulings seeking to eliminate Hawaiian rights.

By situating the lynching in Benocide high on top of an affluent scenic point on the island of O‘ahu known as Tantalus, the three in attendance obtain a sweeping and panoptic vision of both Honolulu and the lynched Hawaiian. Here a totalizing imperial gaze or “commanding view,” one that implies a viewer with an elevated vantage point and the imperial authority to subject, discipline, and simultaneously objectify the colonized subject has direct bearing on both a reading of this artwork and its connections to the imperial gaze of the Rice decision. As David Spurr notes in The Rhetoric of Empire, the ideology of the gaze is an “active instrument in construction, order and
arrangement,” and its authority, similar to Foucault’s Panopticon, relies on an “analytic arrangement of space from a position of visual advantage.” The gaze defines the identity of the subject by fixing its identity in relation to the observers, while also objectifying it within a “relation of power inherent in the larger system of order.” The logic underpinning the lawsuit and Supreme Court’s decision to identify the OHA voting scheme as “race-based,” perceives race but renders Hawaiian sovereignty rights and a history of occupation invisible, consequently flattening the important historical and political differences between Hawaiians and settlers. Here, the dominant U.S. frameworks of race and citizenship make Hawaiian articulations of indigeneity and genealogy through the state racially discriminatory, thus upholding an imperial order that reaffirms U.S. settler hegemony in Hawai‘i. As Hawaiian legal scholar Kehaulani Kauanui explains: “Blood quanta classifications have consistently been used to enact, substantiate, and then disguise the further appropriation of native lands while they obscure and erase a discourse of specifically Hawaiian sovereignty and identity as a relation of genealogy to place.”

Seeing how systems of settler colonial violence and occupation attempt to remain invisible by its presumed naturalness and normalcy, Kēwaikaliko conveys visually his knowledge and view of contemporary Hawai‘i by drawing attention, quite literally, to the hidden aspects of imperial power that underpin the legal assaults. The artist is able to make such a system visible by turning the “observer into the observed,” marking and calling attention to a color-blind visual optic and the violence it enacts. In other words, through selective narrative framing Kēwaikaliko uses the medium of visual art to draw connections between various historical references, thus theorizing on the intersections
and distinctions between race and indigeneity, while framing a U.S. legal institution within a history of U.S. occupation and settler colonial domination. Through highlighting a notion of sight, this final chapter will trace how *Benocide* appropriates a gaze blind to Hawaiian indigenous birthrights and reverses it upon settler colonials and collaborative Hawaiians through the artist’s use of historically-legible images and the spatial configurations of a lynching.

Indeed, Tantalus, the specific location where the lynching takes place, is marked by a settler genealogy of colonial erasure and authority. In an act exemplifying an imperial gaze, the Hawaiian name for Tantalus, *Pu‘u ʻōhiʻa*, became effaced when the students from Punahou high school, an elite private school created in 1841 to educate white missionary children separate from Hawaiians, renamed this place after a figure in Greek mythology (this is the same elite private high school that U.S. President Barrack Obama attended). The marking of *Puʻu ʻōhiʻa*, which literally means the mound of the ʻōhiʻa tree is identified through the use of the twisted ʻōhiʻa tree on which the Hawaiian is hung. Kēwaikaliko’s choice to locate the lynching here, pinpoints the historical linkage between the power that underpins the imperial gaze in the *Rice* decision and the overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom. Spurr notes, “the superior and invulnerable position of the observer coincides with the role of affirming the political order that makes that position possible.” Many of the men who were influential and actively involved in the U.S. backed overthrow also graduated from Punahou high school—for instance, Sanford B. Dole who is figured at the feet of Cayetano and the infamous Lorrin A. Thurston (who we met in chapter one). The plaintiff himself fifth-generation Harold “Freddy” Rice also graduated from Punahou high school.
While Cayetano is physically hanging the Native, he does not look at the hanging Hawaiian, but rather looks to the haole settler for recognition of this act.\(^{23}\) This is a subtle but apt illustration of the performative role that Cayetano as a Filipino American had to play in order to maintain his political power and inclusion. Eiko Kosasa and Ida Yoshinaga, founders of the group Local Japanese Women for Justice (LJWJ), exposed the chain of command in the state where soon after the U.S. Supreme court ruled in favor of the plaintiff in the *Rice* case, Hawai‘i’s Congressional Senator Daniel Inouye issued a statement to the Office of Hawaiian Affairs and Governor Benjamin Cayetano requesting the removal of all trustees who were voted into office.\(^{24}\) Inouye instructed in his letter, “I believe that the Governor has authority under a separate State of Hawaii statute to appoint interim trustees so that the important work of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs need not be interrupted.”\(^{25}\) Cayetano, under Senator Inouye’s instructions, called for the nine trustees to step down voluntarily or risk OHA’s closure, and then appointed his own trustees to office. Kosasa and Yoshinaga explain that, “[t]he intended result of Inouye’s statement was to facilitate the control of OHA by the state and away from the electoral process.” In *Benocide*, both the *pua‘a* and Cayetano choose not to look at the lynching but instead look to the haole settler as they struggle for subordinate supremacy within the constraints of the system. As I have argued elsewhere in this dissertation, such participants within systems of subordinate supremacy actively police a colonial order so that they remain included in such relatively “authoritative” positions.

Kēwaikaliko’s usage of a lynch mob to visually represent settler colonialism in Hawai‘i helps us to see the current multicultural order in which individuals and their constituencies have an interest in maintaining a U.S. colonial system that comes at the
expense of Hawaiians. Providing historical depth to the scene, Kēwaikaliko places at Governor Cayetano’s feet the bloodied skull of Sanford B. Dole, the first colonial governor of the Territory of Hawai‘i (1900-1903). As mentioned above, Dole was involved in the overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom and became President of both the Provisional Government (1893-1894) and Republic of Hawai‘i (1895-1898), two white settler governments formed after the U.S. supported overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom in January of 1893. Cayetano is positioned over Dole’s remains and appears to have Dole’s blood on his hands. Dole’s position beneath the feet of Cayetano can be understood as a historical reference of the transferal of political power from the largely white Republican Party to the (East) Asian American dominated Democratic Party. Resulting from a general, and popular desire for social change in Hawai‘i, coupled with important support from labor unions and the cultural valorization of the all-Japanese 442nd and 100th Battalion regiments after World War II, the Democratic Party in 1954 captured from the Republicans a majority of the seats in the legislature in what would be termed the “Democratic Revolution.” As I have labored to show in this dissertation, Hawaiian and Asian American oppressions are “overlapping without equivalence” and thus it is important to understand how these dissimilar forms of oppression are structured differently within the complex relations of power governing the settler state.

The contest between representative figures Dole and Cayetano historically frame the art piece. In what Haunani-Kay Trask describes as an “intra-settler struggle for hegemony,” the victor holds the noose. Cayetano stands where Dole once stood, exercising political power, which is only made possible by maintaining Hawaiian subjugation. As Haunani-Kay Trask explains:
While Asians, particularly the Japanese, come to dominate post-Statehood, Democratic Party politics, new racial tensions arise. The attainment of full American citizenship actually heightens prejudice against Natives. Because the ideology of the United States as a mosaic of races is reproduced in Hawai‘i through the celebration of the fact that no single “immigrant group” constitutes a numerical majority, the post-statehood euphoria stigmatizes Hawaiians as a failed indigenous people whose conditions, including out-migration, actually worsen after statehood. Hawaiians are characterized as strangely unsuited, whether because of culture or genetics, to the game of assimilation.27

While Cayetano was not a popular governor amongst many Asian settler communities in Hawai‘i, he, and the Democratic Party, are often touted as symbols of Asian success at assimilation and especially an Asian American civil rights struggle against white exclusion and racism.28 The collective desires for equality or empowerment within an American political system by marginalized groups—represented here by the remains at Cayetano’s feet—constitute crucial components of a complex hegemonic structure that must be understood and interrogated. The collective desire to oppose white racism, unfortunately, fails to address adequately an ongoing and overarching structure of settler colonialism and occupation. Such anti-racist projects can also actively perpetuate it insofar as it obscures U.S. occupation beneath a domestic U.S. civil rights discourse. The very naming of the art piece Benocide plays on Ben Cayetano’s collaboration with the elimination, or genocide, of Hawaiian indigeneity. For instance, in response to the Rice decision Cayetano declared: “I’ve lived in Hawai‘i long enough to feel I’m Hawaiian.”29

In such contexts cultural critic Moustafa Bayoumi has called for the development of an analytic that can attend simultaneously to different forms of oppression: “Does our reliance on race as perhaps the dominant mode for analysis compel us to obscure how something like the struggle for aboriginal rights may differ from the struggle for racial
equality? Is there something peculiarly American about seeing race but being blind to sovereignty rights?”

By holding the noose and looking to the *haole* settler, former Governor Cayetano also represents the collusion of the state of Hawai‘i with the legal assaults. The state of Hawai‘i has always been in a peculiar position of having to defend Native “entitlements” from suit while being negligent in administering these same “entitlements.” In Benocide, Cayetano lynches the Hawaiian on a tree with leaves made of money. The 1959 Admissions Act, which admitted Hawai‘i as a state, transferred an estimated 1.2 million acres of lands from the Federal government to the state of Hawai‘i. In what was to be called the Ceded Public Lands trust, “the betterment of the conditions of Native Hawaiians” was listed as one of its five responsibilities and twenty percent of the revenue gained by these so-called ceded lands were to be transferred from the state of Hawai‘i to another state agency, the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA), which was established in 1978. In 1991 the Hawai‘i Advisory Committee to the United States Commission on Civil Rights stated that both the Territory and State of Hawai‘i had been negligent for seventy-three years in fulfilling their fiduciary duties as trustees of the Ceded Public Lands Trust.¹ In 1990 the Hawai‘i State Legislature passed Act 304 to provide a mechanism for determining the amount of ceded land revenues owed to OHA. This law specified that OHA was indeed entitled to 20 percent of revenue from the ceded lands. Three years later in 1993 the state paid OHA $19 million and agreed to make annual revenue payments. OHA filed a lawsuit in 1994 to resolve all remaining back-payment issues. On September 12, 2001, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court ruled that Act 304 conflicted with the 1998 “Forgiveness Act” passed by Congress, which prohibited further payment.
of airport revenues for claims related to ceded lands, and was therefore invalid. The high court, however, reaffirmed OHA’s right to benefit from the ceded lands trust. Based on this ruling, Governor Cayetano ordered State departments to stop payments to OHA. He then offered to settle the issue of repayment in 1999 with a global settlement of $251 million and 360,000 acres of ceded lands but OHA declined.\footnote{31}

Across from Cayetano, the caricature of a well-known haole settler stands wearing a swastika covered aloha shirt, waving the state of Hawai‘i flag and clutching a bundle of documents under his arm. Here, he is representative of a group that has been using the precedent set by the Rice decision to dismantle all Hawaiian “entitlements.” This group, Aloha for All, is partially supported by the Campaign for a Colorblind America, a national group that challenges affirmative action programs across the United States.\footnote{32}

We believe that individuals of Hawaiian ancestry are just like the rest of us. Hawaiians are not a “people” separate from the State’s other citizens. They are not a “tribe,” not a “sovereign nation.” They are one among many ethnic groups in the state, entitled to the same respect we give all those groups and their varied cultures—but not more.\footnote{33}

Of the three—Cayetano, the pua’a, and haole settler—the haole settler is the only one who looks at the lynched Hawaiian directly. His “colorblind” worldview, however, makes the materiality of Hawaiian history and indigeneity hidden in plain sight. By reading the representations of the institutions that structure his worldview, symbols representative of a U.S. nation-state—the State flag and U.S. legal documents—the system of value attached to each shows how these value systems render occupation and indigenous issues ideologically invisible. In placing the swastikas, a symbol of a genocidal and fascist nation-state, within the haole settler’s Aloha shirt, Benocide forces one to view the effects of a neoconservative “Aloha for All” ideology to enact a cultural
genocide on Hawaiians.

The *haole* settler holds in his left hand the state of Hawaiʻi flag, which prior to the 1893 overthrow was a national symbol of an internationally recognized independent Hawaiian nation. The flag has since been recoded as the state of Hawaiʻi flag that remains under the imposed legal and ideological framework of the United States and its Constitution. The possession of the Hawaiian nation’s flag in the settler’s hand symbolizes settlers’ colonial control over the State and the flag’s hidden double meaning—both the successful occupation and the simultaneous obfuscation of this act—is exposed. Under his right arm is a bundle of documents representative of his group’s control of the U.S. legal system. This group has been using the precedent set by the *Rice* decision in order to legally terminate, or lynch, an indigenous political category held by Hawaiians. In Justice Anthony Kennedy’s opening remarks to his opinion on the *Rice* case, Kennedy applies the 15th amendment of the U.S. Constitution to Hawaiians and finds their relationship to the state of Hawaiʻi to be race-based.

A citizen of Hawaii comes before us claiming that an explicit, race-based voting qualification has barred him from voting in a statewide election. The Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, binding on the National Government, the States, and their political subdivisions, controls the case. By focusing the gaze upon Rice’s race and citizenship the court is able to, as Whiteness studies scholar Judy Rohrer writes, “render indigenous claims inarticulable by racializing native peoples, while simultaneously normalizing white subjectivity by insisting on a color-blind ideology.” This makes race the normative and salient issue in regards to Native entitlements. Indigenous rights are thus subsumed under a category of race, providing other potential plaintiffs with the groundwork to seek the further erasure of indigenous rights from Hawaiʻi through legal challenges. Within this identifying system,
the Native subject’s claims to indigeneity are executed for the supposed cause of equal rights and citizenship. Haunani-Kay Trask challenges such a declaration noting that:

As indigenous peoples, we are all outside the Constitution, the settler document that declares ownership over indigenous lands and peoples. Since the Constitution is an imposed colonial structure, nothing therein prevents the taking of Native lands or the incorporation of unwilling Native peoples into the United States.36

This history of political dispossession and forced inclusion into the United States is key to understanding the problematic logic of the Rice decision and its legal progeny. In his dissenting opinion to the Court, Justice Stevens points out, “It is a painful irony indeed to conclude that native Hawaiians are not entitled to special benefits designed to restore a measure of native self-governance because they currently lack any vestigial native government—a possibility of which history and the actions of this Nation have deprived them.”37

Tying these images together is the haole settler and his group’s campaign “Aloha for All” represented as swastikas within an Aloha shirt. By juxtaposing these symbols and letting them play off of each other, these comparisons do two things. First, they show how violence and injustice can be legitimized through the legal system of a nation-state. In Martin Luther King Jr.’s “Letter from Birmingham Jail” he writes that, “[w]e should never forget that everything Adolf Hitler did in Germany was ‘legal’ and everything the Hungarian freedom fighters did in Hungary was ‘illegal.’”38 King’s referencing of Nazi Germany’s legal genocide revealed the laws upholding segregation as also legal but unjust. In doing this, King encouraged pastors criticizing his non-violent activism to look past the state as inherently just and question how the legal system can codify violence. Kēwaikaliko does a similar move here. By evoking Nazi Germany, he
shows the “Aloha for All” project of applying the 15th amendment to Native entitlements as legitimizing a violent termination of Hawaiian rights and a category of indigenous.

Secondly, Kēwaikaliko’s referencing of “genocide,” in the title Benocide for instance, compares the systematic genocide committed by Nazi Germany to the cultural genocide committed through the termination of an indigenous category. By comparing these acts, the often subtle but material forms of violence committed against Hawaiians are revealed. Hawaiian playwright Alani Apio uses the term “cultural genocide” to describe the legal challenges in his 2001 Honolulu Advertiser newspaper commentary, “A Thousand Little Cuts to Genocide.”

…the things many of you say and do amount to 1,000 little cuts against us. And these cuts represent a subversive, long-standing cultural genocide against the Hawaiian people. Cultural genocide against the Hawaiian people.

Nobody executes us. No one lynch es us. No government enslaves our children or rapes our women. No citizenry chains us up and drags us from the backs of pickup trucks. No homicidal maniac gassing us. Just 1,000 little cuts to our self-esteem, self-identity, cultural pride—to our souls.39

The genocide referenced is not physical but cultural and political. It is the lynching of a Hawaiian nation and indigenous category, which makes Hawaiians distinct from settlers. According to Apio, “[p]eople with Hawaiian blood may still be here, but my culture—distinct and unique from everyone else—will have bled to death.”

Where the plaintiffs in the legal challenges portray themselves as innocent victims, the use of the legible image of a lynching takes us to the very emergence of the 15th amendment in 1870 and challenges a narrative of settler victimhood. In the late nineteenth century African American intellectuals and activists such as Ida B. Wells, Pauline Hopkins and others revealed that the mass hysteria surrounding alleged sexual offenses by African American men against white women were imaginary, thereby
revealing the practice of lynching to be a form of terrorism used to uphold a white racial order and arrest any social mobility amongst African Americans. As W. Fitzhugh Brundage explains:

Rather than punish criminals, lynchers actually sought to crush black economic aspirations, squelch black activism, and perpetuate white hegemony ... Once the myths were discredited, they [Black activists] believed, lynching would be understood for what it was—a crude and brutal tool of white supremacy.

By describing the legal assaults as a lynching of Hawaiians the myths of “racial discrimination” and settler victimhood are reversed, visually representing the legal challenges as a means to terrorize a Hawaiian community that has been mobilizing effectively for self-determination. Historian Jonathan Kamakawiwoʻole Osorio called the legal challenges a reactionary backlash to a Hawaiian movement that had created “widespread discussion and acknowledgement” of the 1893 overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom. Though U.S. Hawaiian specific entitlements have existed in Hawai‘i since 1921, it was not until 1996, three years after the largest demonstration in Hawai‘i’s history protesting the illegitimate overthrow of the Hawaiian nation, that the Rice case was filed. The 2000 Carroll and Barrett case were both thrown out of court after it was revealed that neither had applied to any Native programs. Chris Iijima, Professor of Law at the University of Hawai‘i asserted,

[…] these findings confirm that the Barrett and Carroll lawsuits were not motivated by any particularized concern for Hawai‘i, or its people, or even to redress any real harm to any of its citizens. These lawsuits were simply the application of a generalized right-wing ideology about the nature of race relations to the circumstances of Hawai‘i.

The sovereignty movement threatened and continues to threaten a dominant political order and the legal assaults were a means of impeding the Native movement for self-determination while also quelling the fears of settler residents. And while the plaintiffs in
the lawsuits imagine themselves as continuing the work of civil rights leaders such as Martin Luther King Jr., the historically created systems of unequal economic, political and cultural power in Hawai‘i are maintained, not challenged, by their actions.

The metaphor of a lynching point to commonalities between Hawaiians and racial minorities within a colonial order. But there are also representations that point to the unique genealogy Hawaiians have with the Hawaiian Islands, which speaks to the specific responsibilities they have to Hawai‘i. Haunani-Kay Trask explains the familial relationship that Hawaiians hold with Hawai‘i:

As the indigenous people of Hawai‘i, Hawaiians are Native to the Hawaiian Islands. We do not descend from the Americas or from Asia but from the great Pacific Ocean where our ancestors navigated to, and from every archipelago. Genealogically, we say we are descendents of Papahānaumoku (Earth Mother) and Wākea (Sky Father) who created our beautiful islands. From this land came the taro, and from the taro, our Hawaiian people. The lesson of our origins is that we are genealogically related to Hawai‘i, our islands, as family.

Kēwaikaliko’s other artwork titled *Papa A Me Wākea* feature the progenitors Papa (Earth Mother) and Wākea (Sky Father) and show how both the sky and the land are gendered in *Benocide*. In *Benocide*, they are both represented as suffering. Wākea is striated and colored yellow and magenta with a nuclear mushroom cloud rising from it. Below, Papa, the green patches of land, is enveloped in black and gray with Native women shown suffering and fighting, some within the crimson red blood. The Native man is raised to the sky by the noose and separated from the land via the noose of the colonial state, which creates displacement and interruption. In his left hand he is holding dirt, clinging to Papa or Earth Mother, and what few Hawaiian entitlements that remain. Hence, his clenching of land shows his desire to be released from the noose and returned to the land, thus reuniting political sovereignty with land and resources. The clenched fist also
cautions us from viewing the lynching as complete. In this historical moment he is not yet dead but still struggling from being executed.\textsuperscript{45} In the tree there is an ‘iole, or rat, seeking to free the lynched Hawaiian by chewing at the noose.

The \textit{pua‘a} or pig’s thoughts and actions are never predictable and remain ambiguous in this piece. The \textit{pua‘a} can be seen as either fondling the settler’s rear or as Vicente M. Diaz suggested, picking his pocket. He is a \textit{pua‘a} with \textit{kino lau}, a shape shifter who could be read as a greedy, colluding pig to be loathed or a pig with the potential to turn itself into a giant boar and ruthlessly defeat his enemies, like the pig-god Kamapu‘a. Lilikalā Kame‘elehiwa writes about Kamapua‘a and the characteristics of a pig nature:

\begin{quote}
Defiant of all authority, bold and untamed, he recalls the pig nature that lies dormant in most people. He is the primeval reveler, lustful after life, he is the creature eagerly sucking at a mother’s breast. Treacherous and tender, he thirsts greedily after the good things in life—adventure, love, and sensual pleasure. Kamapua‘a is a hero to Hawaiians because he recognizes no societal restraint, and we love him for it.\textsuperscript{46}
\end{quote}

In the drawing, the \textit{pua‘a} is in a position to free the lynched Hawaiian but perhaps because he is not actively protecting an indigenous political and cultural category, the \textit{pua‘a} participates in its destruction. The \textit{pua‘a} also troubles a colonizer and colonized binary without dissolving the cultural, historical, and political differences between Native and settler. Like Cayetano and the \textit{haole} settler, the \textit{pua‘a} is drawn with short, round, and stubby features. The lynched Hawaiian man, however, is drawn to scale. In the face of Hawaiian suffering and occupation, the commonly propagated and highly romanticized representations shrouding Hawai‘i (over 7 million tourists yearly) have as much relevance as a cartoon, but one with very material effects on Hawai‘i’s ecology and people.\textsuperscript{47}
Kēwaikaliko’s work forces the viewer to see the often uncomfortable and harsh realities of imperial violence in Hawai‘i while asking one to bear witness to the contemporary situation of Hawaiians. This, I would assert, is the principal purpose of positioning the viewer as a spectator to the lynching. In much the same way that lynchings throughout the United States were viewed publicly and necessitated general public support or at least silent complicity, we view the lynching as it happens, from the same perspective of the other spectators, which implicates the viewer in the symbolic lynching of Hawaiians. Positioning the viewer in this way, the artwork poses a difficult question: What are you going to do about this? As Manulani Aluli Meyer asserts:

We speak to you in shapes, colors, and metaphors. We view angles distinctly; we prioritize contours differently; we have different politics based on our experience of rape, pillage and transformation. We are speaking in the language of imagery and you are learning more about the passion and priorities of a people. The time demands it of all of us. And I believe we are ready to listen.48

Benocide offers a vision of Hawai‘i that often goes unseen by non-Hawaiians and those outside of Hawai‘i, whose only understandings of this place is shaped by advertisements propagated by the tourism industry. Yet the reality expressed visually by Kēwaikaliko is one experienced daily by many Hawaiians who continue to be subordinated by U.S. occupation and thus struggle for their human rights to self-determination and self-governance. Indeed, such acts of imperial violence have been made invisible by the normalized idea that primitives are “unfit for self-government” and thus “better off” under the United States. Hawaiian artwork such as Kēwaikaliko’s Benocide demystifies the illusions of American benevolence, revealing the current violent material effects of the continued U.S. occupation of Hawai‘i through U.S. statehood.

2 Kēwaikaliko, phone interview, October 30, 2003.


5 “Interview with Gabriel Kalama Pea, Andrew Poepoe, E. Pea Nahale. At Birch Street.” Bishop Museum 1959.236 (Haw 40.3).


10 The Barrett and Carroll cases were consolidated on December 15, 2000. Carroll, at 1234 fn.1.


12 Ken Kobayashi, “Lawsuit filed to Open OHA Seats to All Races,” Honolulu Advertiser (July 26, 2000).


20 Spurr, 16.


An article in the *Fil-Am Courier* describes Cayetano as “[t]he son of immigrants from Kalihi to Washington Place...the American Dream come true.” Zachary Labez, “Mabuhay...and Salamat, Ben” *Fil Am Courier* (December 16-30, 2002).


Debra Barayuga, “OHA sues to resume land revenues The agency says that the state failed in its fiduciary duties as trustee of the lands,” *Star Bulletin* (July 22, 2003).


See the Aloha for All group’s website at http://www.aloha4all.org/


EPILOGUE

50 YEAR ANNIVERSARY OF HAWAI‘I STATEHOOD

What does profit mean? One takes more than one gives. That’s what profit is.
- Kekuni Blaisdell, 1991

The colliding histories of Hawai‘i statehood that I have examined in this dissertation may have occurred in the past, but they certainly continue to inform and persist into the present. Just the fact alone that 2009 marks the 50th anniversary of Hawai‘i statehood almost guarantees historical and political collisions will occur. To plan for its yearlong commemorative events the state legislature allocated $600,000 to be used by the 50th Anniversary of Statehood Commission. This new Statehood Commission is not unlike the other commissions examined in this dissertation, both in terms of its resources and its campaign to win public opinion. Already, the Statehood Commission has been using selective narrative framing to propagate a history of statehood that reaffirms and normalizes U.S. imperial power in Hawai‘i. Given the contentious events on Admissions Day in 2006 (as we saw in the introduction) and a vocal and forceful contemporary Hawaiian movement for self-determination, the Commission vowed to create “culturally sensitive” commemorations and activities leading to Admissions Day in 2009.

As a part of its yearlong plans, the current Statehood Commission has been running a series of television and radio vignettes, called 50 Voices of Statehood, designed
to educate the public about different perspectives of Hawai‘i statehood. One such public service announcement features Reverend Abraham Akaka’s 1959 sermon, which was delivered at Kawaiaha‘o church on March 13th, 1959, the day after the Statehood bill was passed. In this vignette, U.S. Senator Daniel Akaka describes his older brother’s sermon as a celebration of both statehood and the Aloha spirit, and gives the impression that the largely Hawaiian church was uniformly supportive of statehood. While the sermon did celebrate statehood as an achievement, the actual text of Reverend Akaka’s sermon also acknowledges the existence of Hawaiian opposition to statehood, an antagonism premised on America’s desecration of Native sacred sites and a government “motivated by economic greed”:

There are some of us to whom statehood brings great hopes, and there are those to whom statehood brings silent fears… There are fears that Hawai‘i as a state will be motivated by economic greed; that statehood will turn Hawai‘i (as someone has said) into a great big spiritual junkyard filled with smashed dreams, worn out illusions; that will make the Hawaiian people lonely, confused, insecure, empty, anxious, restless, disillusioned—a wistful people. [Italics my own]

Reverend Akaka’s description of Hawaiians’ “silent fears” regarding the possible negative effects of statehood resonates with the sentiments expressed by John Ho’opale, Alice Kamokila Campbell, and others, who had described Hawaiians who were opposed to statehood as operating within a climate of fear. This climate, as we have seen, was produced through large amounts of taxpayer monies (used by the Hawaii Equal Rights Commission and Hawaii Statehood Commission), and through deliberate aims to silence and invalidate such opposition. Through the nearly 25-year state-sanctioned opinion campaign, those who voiced opposition to statehood were characterized as impediments to Hawai‘i’s presumed natural and inevitable growth into a full-fledged American state. While unpopular at the time, such opposing views that explored forms of governance
other than statehood or the status-quo—the only two options presented to Hawai‘i’s voters in the official plebiscite—would have satisfied international law.

Indeed, the very idea that statehood was a natural and expected development for Hawai‘i was ideological, shaped by American national narratives, the opinion campaigns of these commissions, and by those who had economic interests in statehood.8 Reverend Akaka’s statement in 1959, that many Hawaiians feared that Hawai‘i as a state would be motivated by “economic greed,” seem prophetic fifty years later. Catalyzed by the most recent economic depression (beginning in 2008), one that economists have compared to the Great Depression of the 1930s, Governor Linda Lingle and Attorney General Mark Bennett appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court to gain clear title to sell or transfer 1.2 million acres of so-called “ceded lands.”9 These “ceded lands” are in fact Hawaiian crown and government lands seized by the United States at the time of the alleged annexation in 1898. As mentioned in chapter four, when Hawai‘i became a state in 1959, the federal government transferred these lands to the new state government. In 1994, however, Pia Aluli, Jonathan Osorio, Charles Ka‘ai‘ai, and Keoki Ki‘ili sued the state of Hawai‘i in an effort to prevent it from selling 500 acres of these lands on Maui and 1,000 acres on the island of Hawai‘i. The case would make it to the Hawai‘i Supreme Court, which in February of 2008, reversed the lower court ruling and granted the plaintiffs’ request for an injunction to stop the state from selling or transferring these lands.10 The Hawai‘i Supreme Court ruled that the state of Hawai‘i cannot sell or transfer these lands pending resolution of Hawaiians’ claims as recognized in the 1993 Apology Resolution—a congressional resolution that apologized for the U.S. involvement in the 1893 overthrow of the Hawaiian nation. In acknowledging the moral and legal
transgression, the apology also explicitly recognized that Hawaiians had never relinquished sovereignty over Hawai‘i. In an unprecedented move, Governor Lingle went over her own State Supreme Court decision and appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. On March 31, 2009, the High Court ruled that the 1993 Apology Resolution, as a congressional “resolution,” that is, a vote that required only a simple majority rather than a two-thirds majority vote in Congress, did not sufficiently constitute a legal stop to the state’s titles to the lands in question. The irony of such a decision is that the annexation of Hawai‘i was itself based on a resolution, the Newlands Resolution, which was passed by Congress in 1898.

As a measure to clarify title to the so-called Ceded Lands, but in more direct response to the 1993 Apology Resolution and string of lawsuits (examined in chapter four) that sought to eliminate “Native entitlements,” the aforementioned Senator Akaka has introduced into Congress the Native Hawaiian Government Reorganization Act, popularly known as the Akaka Bill. In a hotly contested political move, this bill would grant “federal recognition,” granting sovereignty on a U.S. national level and thereby lead to some measure of autonomy for Hawaiians. Similar to statehood, such a move would grant Hawaiian self-determination through a civil rights legal discourse and not recognize the international claims that Hawaiians still hold since the overthrow of their nation. President Barrack Obama, who calls himself a Native son, has expressed support for the Akaka Bill. An article in Hawaii Business makes explicit the financial motivations behind Obama’s support for this bill, stating that it would bring greater economic stability to the state of Hawai‘i, particularly in regards to the issue of “legally clouded ceded lands.”
In a moment when the state’s attempts to gain clear title to “ceded lands” coincides with the celebration of its 50th anniversary of statehood, Hawaiian groups have intensified their own organizing efforts with a range of actions to expose the “history of theft” behind these state-sponsored commemorations and policies. At the official statehood celebration held at the open-air rotunda at the State Capitol, the Hawaiian Independence Action Alliance (HIAA), a coalition comprised of more than 10 different Hawaiian groups, organized a peaceful demonstration to draw attention to statehood’s more obscured history. Unlike the Statehood Commission (and its $600,000 budget), the HIAA action was a strictly grassroots effort with no financial support. The creativity and message of the demonstration, however, allowed the activists to steal the show. With tall red and black banners fastened to bamboo that read “HAWAIIAN INDEPENDENCE,” and with each participant wearing a single bright green letter on black t-shirts, the group
spelled out the phrases, “FAKE STATE” and “HISTORY OF THEFT” to critically link the celebration of Hawai‘i statehood to a history of U.S. occupation and imperialism in the Islands. Group organizer Lynette Cruz stated: “There was no treaty of annexation. Show me the treaty. There’s been an incorrect interpretation of history all these years.”

The official celebration of statehood withdrew from the open-air rotunda of the State Capitol and retreated into the Chambers of the House of Representatives, consequently leaving the capitol open for the demonstrators to openly chant and spread their message. While the local newspapers and news channels limited their coverage of the demonstration to brief mention, coverage by the Associated Press, provided the group national and international attention. Through newspapers such as the *Times of India* and *China Daily*, the existence of a Hawaiian movement for self-government seeking autonomy from the United States was made known internationally.¹⁴ Long-time Hawaiian activist Richard Pomai Kinney, who was 19 years old at the time of statehood, was quoted as saying: “Statehood is a fraud. My parents said Hawaii would become only a place for the wealthy. Look at it today. There’s nothing to celebrate.”¹⁵ Indeed, fifty years after statehood a disproportionate amount of Hawaiians live in high rates of homelessness, incarceration, infant mortality, and drug and alcohol addiction. They continue to face and oppose land developments on Native sacred sites and burials, legal assaults threatening the selling of lands stolen by the United States at the time of annexation, including evictions from these lands. Celebrating fifty years of a government that has legitimized, and at times initiated, such imperial violence was the last thing many wished to do.
This dissertation has examined historical actors, narrators, and cultural productions across diverse historical moments to offer a “history of the present,” an attempt to historicize the demonstrations of Hawaiians and supporters in the contemporary moment. Through an examination of the articulation of dissimilar histories and politics I have mapped historically the different logics of oppression (Three Pillars of White Supremacy) that are themselves productive of diverse political identities that limit and guide individuals in their visual world with real political, economic, and legal consequences. In particular, I have examined cultural productions—world’s fairs, movies, state seals, political cartoons, labor pamphlets, and visual art, amongst others—through the propagation of state-led opinion campaigns and the opposition to them, paying careful attention to the discursive formations of orientalism and primitivism, which helped to organize U.S. capitalism and settler colonial power. By situating Hawai‘i statehood at the intersections of U.S. labor exploitation, settler colonialism, and war, I examined how ambivalent nation narration(s) mobilized around Hawai‘i statehood, have historically disposed well-intentioned citizens to enact the colonial oppression of a domineering class. I have thus argued that state historical discourse takes the United States’ occupation of Hawaiian lands as fixed, and thereby allows a civil rights discourse, one with major limitations in addressing international human rights injustices against Hawaiians, to take precedent. Consequently, I have found that such a firmly entrenched civil rights discourse normalizes the U.S. occupation of Hawai‘i, limiting and constraining our field of vision from understanding the complicated and intricate colonial dynamics at play in Hawai‘i. Informed by the work of Andrea Smith, this dissertation
thus calls for an attempt to become multilingual in these dissimilar histories and logics of oppressions.

Whereas additional time and resources for revising this dissertation into book form will allow me to cover a number of other significant historical and counter historical incidents that I had initially proposed in my prospectus, this study points to new vistas of future research. For example, I will expand the historical scope of my project by repositioning the 1959 admission of Hawai‘i as a U.S. state not as a moment of apogee but rather, as a moment of profound economic and cultural transition, where the institutional workings of the state were streamlined to respond more quickly to multinational neoliberal capital. My hope is that such an expansion will explain the simultaneous development of corporate tourism, global U.S. militarism, and the rise of the contemporary Hawaiian sovereignty movement in the postwar period. The thematic and methodological expansion of historical scope will also situate my evolving thoughts of settler colonialism in conversation with the recent work of scholars such as Scott Morgensen, Andrea Smith, Mark Rifkin, and Chris Finley, each of who have begun to explore sexualized dimensions of settler colonialism through ideas such as “settler homonationalism.”

Whatever the future holds for this project, I am certain that the present and dimming future of Hawai‘i statehood will continue to operate at the intersection of a settler state and an ever expanding and meddling U.S. empire, whose twin formations will continue to be premised on a colonial logic of white supremacy dependent on the denial of the sovereignty of peoples figured as “primitive.” The theatricality of the state and its continued misrepresentation of the violence enacted by this empire, allows it to
sustain its practices of global hegemony through an image and narration of itself as an inclusive and changing liberal multicultural state. Hawai‘i’s own Barrack Obama is but the latest and most powerful elaboration of this. Within an ever-growing American system reliant on economic growth through labor exploitation, settler colonialism, and war, since its very inception, American liberation and exploitation are two-sides of the same coin. Until, perhaps, we become multilingual in the logics of each other’s histories, and create a politics to address these numerous forms of historical oppressions simultaneously, we will continue to renew a system of imperial violence and capitalist exploitation.


3 For instance, in a display set-up at the Kahului Airport on the island of Maui, a timeline begins in 1900, conveniently eliding the 1893 overthrow and 1898 illegal annexation.


6 Reverend Abraham Akaka’s sermon Ke Akua was so popular that it was published by the University of Hawai‘i press and disseminated nationally. Abraham Akaka, Aloha Ke Akua, March 13, 1959 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1959).


10 In 2002, Circuit Judge Sabrina McKenna ruled in favor of the state declaring that the state was authorized to sell these lands under the 1959 Admissions Act.


14 Mark Niesse, “Hawaii Celebrates 50 Years of Statehood,” News from Indian Country, 19 March 2009; also printed in the China Daily and Times of India.
15 Ibid.


17 Chela Sandova, Methodology of the Oppressed, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2000), 107.8.


19 As a UC President’s Postdoctoral Fellow, my first undertaking will be to more closely examine Hawai‘i statehood and indigenous politics within Cold War politics of integration, labor, and U.S. empire building.

20 Scott Morgensen, Welcome Home: Settler Sexuality and the Politics of Indigeneity, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, expected publication 2010).


---. *Before the Horror: The Population of Hawai‘i on the Eve of Western Contact*. Honolulu, HI: Social Science Research Institute, University of Hawaii, 1989.


