The Dialogics of Southern Quechua Narrative

STANDARD WRITTEN REPRESENTATIONS of oral narratives lead inevitably to their being interpreted for their referential content alone, that is, for the extent to which the events that they describe reflect a culture’s truths, preoccupations, and fantasies. Such treatment of oral narratives as “text artifacts” (in the sense of Silverstein and Urban 1996:3) privileges a representational reading at the expense of understanding their social coordinates and uses. For instance, on the printed page, Southern Quechua narrative, edited and arranged, looks like the written genre that we call “prose”: crafted by the hand of the editor and translator to appear to be neatly bounded; shoehorned into a structure of event, elaboration, and denouement so that it can exist in printed form, severed from settings, from other texts, and from speakers.1 In its skin, Southern Quechua narrative is dialogical at several interpenetrating levels: first, a formal level in which the narrative is produced between interlocutors (Mannheim and Tedlock 1995; also see Allen 1986; Howard-Malverde 1989, 1990); second, by embedding discourse within discourse by means of quotations or indirect discourse (Tedlock 1983; Urban 1984, 1991); third, intertextually, in which implicit or hidden dialogue between texts is brought out through the intertextual reference to other coexisting narratives (Kristeva 1969, 1970; cf. Briggs and Bauman 1992), at times through what Mikhail Bakhtin (e.g., 1981) calls “double register”; and fourth, in a complex pattern of participation through which dialogue takes place not only between actual speaking individuals (as in the first sense of dialogue) but between distinct, intersecting participant roles that are produced as pragmatic shadows of the face-to-face event of speaking, evoking multiple interactional frameworks.2

These different dialogical levels inform each other even in the dynamic process of the narrative event. A focus upon the multiple and mutually embedded dialogues within Quechua conversational narrative requires us to interrogate not only our understandings of narrative texts but also the relationship between ethnographer and text. An ethnographer is incorporated at multiple levels of the production of that text, not only through transcription and translation but also in the contingencies of the telling of the story.

Southern Quechua oral narratives, then, are complex events, whose formal structure connects them to each other, to their subtexts, and to the people who tell and listen to them. To put our claims negatively, there are no “ur-texts” behind specific narrative performances or events, no neatly identifiable formulas that open and close a narrative performance with the aural equivalent of white margins, and no contexts apart from the contexts of situation and contexts of culture that are locatable in specific performances. Understanding the interrelationship between the fine structure of narrative and its performance is not a matter of personal choice in varying the analytical optic nor a matter of blind “fidélité au texte” (Lévi-Strauss 1987). Rather, it is a matter of good sociology, of understanding that the horizons of interpretation of any given performance are resolutely particular but resolved only through the structured knowledge and experience of a larger discursive field. When we say that “oral stories have no existence outside specific contexts of performance,” we are not arguing that they are radically aleatory; rather, the principles by which they are produced, understood, transmitted, and reshaped must be located analytically elsewhere than in the “text” as narrowly understood on

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analogy to academic expository prose. Although we make this argument specifically about Southern Quechua, we suggest that it applies more generally to other languages, as well as to different configurations of texts.

Drawing upon examples from rural communities of Chayanta, Bolivia, and Quispichanchis and Urubamba, Peru, we examine these four levels of dialogue in order to make the claim that Quechua narratives are neither fixed nor formulaic in spite of the continuities, historical and regional, in the content of stories. The conversational narratives that we describe are drawn from audio-taped conversations between ethnographers and Quechua speakers who are in general monolingual.

**Levels of Dialogism**

**Formal**

Southern Peruvian and Bolivian Quechua conversational narrative is constructed jointly between participants and is thus formally dialogical. Quechua narrative usually arises in the course of a conversation, with the topics closely keyed to the previous topic of conversation. Quechua narrative requires the active participation of the listener, including signals of assent such as grunts, "right" or riki or chiqaq, repetition of the storyteller's last phrase, and intrusive participation such as questions and interruptions with new details. Similar traditions of constructing narrative jointly have been observed elsewhere, ranging from true joint construction of narrative to stylized audience response. There are situations in which a storyteller creates a monologue, such as when an ethnographer has a tape recorder in front of the storyteller and does not know the appropriate responses or is shy about interrupting the narrative. But as Ellen Basso has pointed out, "Published myths are fictitious objects—what we call texts—that are the products of a complex process of recording, transcribing, translating, and ultimately presenting them on the printed page according to a selected plan of arrangement" (1985:11).

The conversational quality of Southern Quechua narratives misled each of us during fieldwork. During the late 1970s, while Mannheim was working on a dialect survey in the department of Cuzco, Peru, he recorded examples of local varieties of Quechua by asking speakers for narratives (kwenta or istorijas, "stories," both words borrowed from Spanish). Invariably he would hear in response, "I don't know any stories." In spite of this, he noticed late in fieldwork that among the conversations he listened to and recorded were whole stretches of discourse that looked exactly like what Andean ethnographers and folklorists have been calling "myths," "legends," and "stories." The topics, themes, and roles were the same; the order of narrated events was often the same. But they were conversations. Similarly, Van Vleet noticed that in the conversations and interviews that she recorded in the department of Chayanta, Bolivia, in 1995–96, fragments of stories (some long stretches of conversation, others quick references to characters or details of stories) were interwoven throughout conversation. She also asked to hear cuentos (stories) during visits to elderly community members. Although at times she was told, "I don't remember any stories," or given the name of a different "grandparent" who really told stories well, Van Vleet did develop relationships with a few grandmothers and grandfathers who related cuentos to her. Some of these stories were quite similar to those compiled by ethnographers and folklorists and published in Quechua, Spanish, and sometimes English. Gathering these more "complete texts" was a double distraction. On the one hand, their "completeness" allowed her to discard her own responsibility in creating the kind of situation in which such a monological telling became possible in the first place; on the other, it distracted her from exploring the more normal situation in which bits and pieces of stories would arise in natural conversation. Because we first learned about Quechua narrative by reading collections of folktales that had been carefully edited to fit the requirements of a written medium, and because our models of "narrative" were monologues, rather than conversational narratives (such as the North American stories discussed in Polanyi 1989 or Johnstone 1990), we mistakenly expected to collect fixed texts, perhaps formulaically constructed. The epistemological assumptions that are bound up in our own conceptions of storytelling and narrative form often have more influence than we realize upon our ethnographic research and analytical framework (see Certeau 1988:63–64; H. White 1987).

**Embedded Discourse**

A second level of dialogism in Quechua conversational narrative is dialogue cited within the narrative through the use of citations or indirect discourse. Reporting what people have said in the recent past or the distant past is a crucial aspect of all Quechua storytelling, but the kinds of discourse that are appropriate to embed in narrative depend on genre conventions. For example, narrative descriptions of festivals include snippets of the songs that are typically sung in the festival, as in Guaman Poma's descriptions of Inka festivals (Mannheim 1986) or Andrés Alencastre Gutiérrez and Georges Dumézil's (1953) account of Carnaval in the provincias altas of Cuzco. All Quechua narrative includes reported speech, sometimes set off from the rest of the narrative through the quotation formulae nispa
nin or nispa nisqa (see Hornberger 1992) or by changes in pitch, tone of voice, speed, and pauses.

Bakhtin (1981) developed his notion of citation in terms of the written work of an author and emphasized the difficulties of appropriating words as one's own, the unavoidable possibilities of multiple meanings and interpretations of words that are always "half someone else's." His ideas are likewise important to citation within conversational narrative, for the work of oral narrative also rests between oneself and the other. The reported speech of characters, like stories themselves, are embedded in previous narrations, in prior contexts, in memories, and in the possible permutations of future narrations. The citation of a grandmother's words in a story are laminated on the words of the grandmother telling the story. Moreover, as Greg Urban (1984, 1991) has pointed out, reported speech within a narrative is more than mere citation of words; an entire context-of-situation is embedded, meaning that quoted speech always carries with it a culturally specific pragmatics of speech and action.

Intertextual Dialogue

Julia Kristeva writes that "any text is constructed as a mosaic of quotations; any text is the absorption and transformation of another" (1980:66). Texts are less autonomous objects than nodal points in semiotic networks built up through citation, through intertextual relations in absentia and through the replication of semiotic patterns across media (Mannheim 1998b). Kristeva takes this further, proposing that there is an inherent tension in the play between the speaker's intertextual network and the addressees, as these interface dialogically, engaging, contradicting, or reinforcing each other (in nonexclusive ways). A third level of dialogism in Quechua conversational narrative, then, is a dialogue implicit among texts, brought out through the intertextual reference to other narratives. Not only are the words of another appropriated and refracted in writing and speaking, but so too do texts engage other texts. Intertextual references may be implicit or unspoken, building a network of interlocking units of meaning, keyed to everyday activities and habitual understandings (Mannheim 1998a).

Participation Format

Finally, Quechua conversational narrative is dialogical in the sense that a dialogue is created in the very event of speaking, in the mutually constitutive dynamic between the organization of participant roles in the speech event and the social field within which it occurs. Narrative meaning is an emergent property of the performance, conceived of as a fully engaged social event, constructed jointly through the actions of all partici-
of a woman who lives below our comadre,” he says, “was killed by a lik’ichiri. Her brother,” he adds, nodding toward Maria, “was going to Argentina, and, well, he came back with that sickness.”

Kristina acknowledges him, and he says, “Yes.”

“But how did it kill him?” she asks.

And Lorenzo answers, “He was extinguished [suffocated] maybe. Maybe he came down with the sickness really fast. All his fat was sucked out with a machine!”

She makes a scared sound, and Lorenzo begins to repeat that the fat was sucked out, as she says, “Oh, they extr—they took all of his fat out?”

He agrees, “Yes. . . . yes.”

“And he emphasizes again, “Yes, with a machine.”

“What is that machine like, anyway?”

“I don’t know,” he says in Spanish. Then switching back to Quechua, he says, “What could it be like? I haven’t ever seen it either. But with a machine, they say.”

After a pause of about a second, Kristina asks whether the lik’ichiri are like almas, the souls of the dead who walk at night. And both Maria and Lorenzo answer at once: “¡Runallataq a! (They’re just people!)

They all agree again. Lorenzo begins to say something else (“Not on that side,” fading into inaudibility) when María interrupts saying, “When no one sits at our side, we don’t arrive with lik’ichiri sickness.”

Lorenzo supports this and says to Kristina, “Now on a bus like that we would sit.”

“Yes,” Kristina says.

“Now when you would sit with someone you don’t know, now don’t you fall asleep?” he asks.

Maria speaks for Kristina. “I will go,’ she says. Say [to him]: ‘Going makes me fall asleep.’ ”

Instead Kristina says “Ayyyy,” groaning because she habitually sleeps on buses.

And Lorenzo answers, “Fall asleep then already with that machine. He puts it to you until . . . and you, you will sleep.”

“That’s what I don’t like; from La Paz to Llallagua the bus goes only at night,” Kristina tells them.

Lorenzo reiterates, “Don’t sleep. . . . Don’t sleep.”

“A Black Sheep Could Have Cured Him (Maria’s Story)”

Soon after, Lorenzo states that long ago they did not know how to cure the wasting that follows a lik’ichiri’s attack, and because of that, a person who had his fat sucked out just died, and the others just watched. Kristina repeats what he has told her, and he agrees again. Then he says, “Now they know to slaughter a black sheep for someone who has lik’ichiri sickness. They drink the blood of the black sheep and eat the meat, and with that they get better.”

Kristina acknowledges this, and Maria picks up the narrative, saying, “A long time, my brother walked in pain, slowly. He had gone to Argentina to work in the phosphate mines. (Most travel then was by foot.)

Lorenzo adds, “A long time he had a fever.”

Maria tells Kristina, “I said, ‘Just cure him, just cure him, just cure him!’ ”

Lorenzo makes a short laughing sound, saying “With llatitas you tried to cure him.”

And Kristina breaks in, asking if he just died, little by little, with his fat sucked out.

Maria says “Yes. For that we would have fed him a black sheep, ours who was sick. And how then he might have gotten better, gotten better—until we had cured him, yes . . . With ones who know. But no. Until. He ate dirt and died.”

Maria continues her story, “[He said,] ‘Guuuuuu.’ People so many arrived. Um, ‘Guuuuuun,’ he just said.

People just arrived, about him.

Like that.

He died, that brother of mine. Ayyyy.

He was so young!”

“Oh no, then. . . . There aren’t lik’ichiri here? Only out there by Chayrapata?”

“No, in Argentina he ran into a lik’ichiri.” (Kristina checks this, and she affirms it again, saying, “Yes, that was where he went.”)

After another pause Kristina asks if lik’ichiri are like people, if they are peasants.

Maria answers ambiguously, “No, they are just like that, like that.”

Without clarifying this, Kristina reiterates that a long time ago they did not know to drink the blood of a black sheep in order to cure the sickness.

Maria agrees. She tells Kristina that her brother had a wife who returned to her own community after Maria’s brother died. Maria then talks about the relationships of her siblings, which Kristina thought was a tangent at the time. As Maria lists the birth order of her siblings, Kristina repeats every name. At this point Lorenzo intervenes saying, “Now you won’t ever sleep going to that side.” He laughs. And laughing Kristina tells him, “I won’t sleep anymore.”

“Priests Buy the Fat”

After we note that most people on the bus sleep as they are traveling and that lik’ichiri definitely travel on buses, Lorenzo informs Kristina that lik’ichiri definitely travel on buses.

“Who do they sell it to?” Kristina wants to know.

“Right, they sell it to priests, they say.

With that they baptize those little children.

With that human fat.”

Kristina is surprised. “Ahhiiii”

“They are selling everything in order to earn a lot.

To priests they sell, they say.

Priests, they buy it, and with that they baptize the children.”

“Really?”

“Over on that side there are so many; here there aren’t any.

No there aren’t any.

They hate it here.

That side they have them.

Here they wouldn’t want to let a person from that side sleep in the house.”
Formal Dialogue

At a formal level this narrative was produced conversationally in the interaction of three people. Lorenzo and Maria at different times provided details, filled in pieces of the story, and agreed with each other. In this conversation, Maria participated a great deal, adding details and taking over a strand of the narrative that Lorenzo began; she told of the death of her brother at the hand of the lik'ichiri and of his relationships in the community while Lorenzo took on the role of adding details about lik'ichiri and the secret to traveling without being attacked by one. Van Vleet moved between giving limited but essential responses and asking questions. The narrative came up in a conversation, triggered by a discussion of her plans to travel.

Like other Southern Quechua conversational narratives, the lik'ichiri story was not organized around a single overall plotline leading to a resolution. Instead, the point of the story was to convey specific details, such as the places where lik'ichiri are encountered, the way in which lik'ichiri extract fat from unsuspecting fellow human beings, and the ways the sickness might be cured, in addition to details that seemed extraneous, such as the names of Maria's seven siblings.

For an ethnographer and particularly for a nonnative speaker of Quechua, conversational narratives often appear fragmentary. A story may begin "in the middle" or fail to follow Aristotelian conventions of plot development. The storytellers are easily distracted from the topic and often go off on tangents. We are not alone in noting this about Quechua narrative. In one of the earliest sources on Inka dynastic mythology, compiled less than 20 years after the Europeans arrived in Peru, the writer complained that Native Andeans would not give him a complete narrative (Betanzos 1987:7). Similarly, Catherine Allen observed that Quechua historical accounts have a fragmentary quality, "cropping up in conversation every now and then" (1988:96). Fragments and tangents become increasingly important, however, in tracing out the multiple dialogues that are intertwined in a conversation. A tangent in the "surface" dialogue may be more significant at another level.

Ethnography and Intertextuality

The form of this Quechua narrative contributes to the content of the narrative. Far from a bounded "text" that is prefabricated and reiterated with little alteration from telling to telling, this conversational narrative depends for its meaning not only upon the existential fact of its emergence in conversation but also upon the many ways in which previous tellings and potential tellings create an intertextual web within which the narrative is embedded. William Hanks has noted that a text "can be taken (heuristically) to designate any configuration of signs that is coherently interpretable by some community of users" (1989:95), implicating not only verbal texts but even nonlinguistic practices or sign systems. The conversational narratives that we have reproduced in writing are made up of significant units that repeat themselves in other narratives and that derive meaning from a larger discursive field. To a certain extent we call this a text, rather than a spontaneous conversation, not because of its potential isolability as a formal unit but because of its boundary conditions: its relationship to other texts (see Derrida 1967:227, 1979:84).

Networks of texts, implicitly related in prior tellings, in the histories of interaction among participants, and in imagined future tellings, play out as the conversation unfolds in time and play back into the ways in which everyday relationships are understood by interlocutors. The ethnographer is partially within and partially outside of this nexus of relationships. Although an oral narrative constructed between ethnographer and Quechua speakers is subject to the same contingencies as other conversational narratives, the participants may have access to different arrays of texts. For Kristeva, texts brought into the time frame of the discourse at hand create an arena of intertextuality, a "space of indeterminacy" that is resolved through the interaction of author, text, and reader. Her point is complicated by the example of conversational narrative. Multiple participants interpret the speech event in the process of its unfolding long before the recorded text has been half-forgotten, transcribed, translated, remembered, and reinterpreted through various other texts.

Ethnographers and historians of the Andes in writing about lik'ichiris or ñak'aqs have drawn upon a wide range of written accounts based upon oral narratives from the 16th through the 20th centuries, from Peru and Bolivia, and even Mexico. Most of these written accounts do not have bearing on the normal transmission of these stories, inaccessible as they have been to most Native Andeans. Nevertheless, significant details of the narratives remain consistent between texts from different regions and historical periods, as an explanation for the motives of outsiders being around Native Andeans. The earliest and most famous is from an account written in 1574 by the Peruvian priest Cristóbal de Molina "el Cuzqueno," who reported that many Native Andeans believed that the Spanish invaders were "sent from Spain for Indian body fat, to cure a certain disease, for which no medicine could be found except for body fat. Because of that, in those days the Indians went around very circumspectly, and they avoided the Spaniards to such an extent that they did not want to carry firewood, herbs, and other things to the house of a
Spaniard, so that they would not be killed for their fat once they were inside" (Molina 1980:79).13 Marcin Mróz (1992:10) recorded a similar account from the region of Ayacucho, Peru, more than 400 years later.

Similarly, during the late 1970s a high-school-educated woman from a rural village noticed that Mannheim had a can of Nivea Cream (here Mannheim is the "I"): "Sir. Do you know what they make that from?"

I saw it coming and could barely suppress a giggle. "No, seriously. This is true!!!"

(How could I be so stupid as to buy Nivea Cream?) It was then that I realized that Nivea Cream, which was almost universally used at the time by the Spanish-speaking elites and middle classes, was understood by peasants to have been made from the bodies of other peasants. (And here we have a distillation of class and race in highland Peru; urban elites take the very fat of Native Andean peasants to keep their skin moist.) Well, I had to come up with an excuse, no matter how lame, and said, "Well, I bought it in Bolivia."

"Oh, in that case, it's not important."

And in fall 1994 a reporter for the Agence France Presse reported from Pampa Cangallo, the original epicenter of the Peruvian violence of the 1980s and 1990s, that fear of the "ñaq'aq" was once again taking precedence over fear of the army and of guerrillas (Chappaz 1994).

According to the sociologist Henri Favre (1987), in the mining areas of Huancavelica, the harvest of human body fat is even described as an organized extractive industry, in which the Peruvian government gives out concessions to harvest human fat, always within a well-regulated harvest season. In the Southern Peruvian zones that border on coca-producing and -processing areas, the slaughterers are said to take the fat to clandestine processing points, sending them off in airplanes in the middle of the night. The fear of ñaq'aq tends to be strongest today in those places where there is strongly organized production for export: for example, in the Pampa of Anta in Cuzco (where white maize is produced for export), in the mining areas of Ayacucho and Huancavelica, and adjacent to coca-producing regions. Most stories characterize the ñaq'aq as gringos or mestizos and, as Mróz (1992:14) notes, an unknown mestizo or white who arrives in a rural community will be assumed to be one.

Details in the lik'ichiri narrative from Chayanta, such as the selling of the fat to priests, the danger of traveling alone at night and of sleeping on buses, the distinction between those who live there and we who live here resonate with these and other, published renditions from Peru. Other aspects of the narrative, such as the extraction of fat with a machine, are details that create a locally layered account of lik'ichiri. Each was catalyzed by a specific, local context-of-situation, many of which included the detail of the machine. Early in her fieldwork, a Quechua professor with whom Van Vleet studied suggested that people in the Andean countryside would suspect that she was a lik'ichiri, especially if she had them listen to tape recordings through her Walkman headphones. Not long after, on a trip out to visit a number of communities in the province of Chayanta, an assistant told Van Vleet and her husband about lik'ichiri, who are often gringos who travel. Another story was catalyzed by a visit to her assistant's ritual kinsman, who had the sickness. This man told her also that lik'ichiri extract fat and blood with a machine, showing her a round red mark on his side where his fat had been extracted. His family had just killed a black chicken for him to eat as a cure. During Mannheim's field research, his assistant visited a village with a friend from the countryside. Both were from a village just out of range socially from their natal village and thus were unknown. After they recorded someone, the tape recorder clicked off and their interviewee asked what the sound was. "Grabadora" (Tape recorder), responded his assistant. The interviewee heard "Yawadora" (Blood machine). By the time they decided to leave, the rumor had circulated far and wide that they were going around extracting blood with a machine.

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Within the context of the narrative emerging in conversation, Lorenzo alluded to previous tellings of the narrative, tellings that we should assume are not exact replicas of the one that we have reproduced on the page. Although Van Vleet had not heard Lorenzo or María telling lik'ichiri stories previously, Lorenzo initiated his narrative with an allusion to two other narratives, noting that María's brother as well as the husband of another woman in the community had died from lik'ichiri during travel. Toward the end, Lorenzo reiterated the importance of not sleeping on the bus. "This is the secret," he said, of not having your fat extracted. "Someone told me, and I told my children. Now I am telling you." These previous tellings, along with hypothetical and future narrations, are implicit in the narrative that Van Vleet (Kristina) jointly constructed with Lorenzo and María, even had they chosen not to mention them.

The lik'ichiri stories have, in turn, been read by scholars in terms of political and economic and social commentary on relationships between Native Andeans and others. Most recent commentators have treated lik'ichiri as an implicit, corporealized theory of social subordination in which the life force of the poor, their fat, is taken by the rich.14 Ñak'aq or lik'ichiri are intermediaries, Mróz suggests, between Quechua-speaking peasants (runa) and nonruna and between distinct but imbricated sets of social norms. As Luise White (1993)
observed, though working with analogous African materials, the specific formulations of such stories do not map easily onto specific modes of political-economic appropriations of value. Moreover, an account that would ground such representations in specific forms of neocolonial dependency would need to account for a similar cluster of stories in Europe and the United States, both historically (see Hufford 1982) and currently, with the North American counterpart to the anak’aq an extraterrestrial. The celebrity that such stories have obtained among scholars of the Andes (anthropologists, in particular) is probably a mixture of a nervous self-doubt that our monographs are the church bells that resonate beautifully with the life force of our Native Andean interlocutors and misplaced self-importance of the role of scholars in mediating the relationships between Native Andeans and others.

Within the Chayanta narrative, the discourse surrounding these relationships is ambiguous, in spite of the incorporation of these previous tellings. Rosaleen Howard-Malverde notes that "as the transmission process occurs, so storytellers take possession of others' previous words, with all the ideological baggage they may bring in tow. They re-articulate these words within the here-and-now, which necessarily opens the way for new meanings, as well as allowing for the preservation of the old" (1990:5; Becker 1995:28). The opposition between runa and nonruna is not the only interpretation available through the lik’ichiri texts, a proposition that is supported by Lorenzo and Maria’s insistence that lik’ichiri were “runallataq” (“Just people” or “Just runa”) and Maria’s statement that lik’ichiri were not like peasants but “just like that.” Van Vleet’s participation in the narrative reconfigures the possibilities of what may be said or left unsaid. Lorenzo and Maria went through more than a little linguistic and cultural work to explain to Van Vleet what they would have been able to assume as general knowledge among others. Moreover, their emphasis that she was potentially vulnerable to harm by lik’ichiri may be juxtaposed with her being a gringa, who, with more than one machine in her possession, was also potentially suspect of being a lik’ichiri.

If the texts that we ethnographers use to create an intertextual network for our own analyses may be somewhat differently configured than the array of texts alluded to in the course of a conversational narrative, then we may not assume that various other participants draw upon a bounded collection of texts or interpret a narrative in the same way. We will return to the meanings of lik’ichiri texts below, through the analysis of multiply layered dialogues within conversational narrative.

### Reported Speech

Although no single person has authority over the narrative that emerges in this conversation, both of these elderly people make weak claims to authority and emphasize the importance of hearing or of being attentive to their words. Their words, however, are saturated with history, or, in a Bakhtinian formulation, permeated with the intentions of others. Dialogue, then, also occurs at the level of citation, and citation should be understood not only as reported speech “but in many covert forms as well—forms that imitate, stylize, or parody the stylistic features associated with other persons, genres, times, and places” (Bakhtin 1981:134–135; cf. Irvine 1996). While Lévi-Strauss once claimed that the “mythical value of the myth remains preserved, even through the worst translation. . . . Its substance does not lie in its style, its original music, or its syntax, but in the story which it tells” (1955:430; see Tedlock 1983:40). Dell Hymes (1981b), Dennis Tedlock (1983), Urban (1984), and others have emphasized that reported speech and other types of citation may have particular importance to the interpretation of narratives. Pauses, onomatopoeia, archaic words, and phrases: these poetic subtleties, as citations within narrative, are significant to style but also “have a potential for radically altering surface meanings” (Tedlock 1983:54).

From this perspective, myths may be interpreted not only in terms of social, political, or intellectual issues but also in terms of language use. Urban (1991) argues that an important consequence of any narrative having reported speech within it is that it contains an embedded metapragmatics, an implicit theory about the relationship between speech and action. In Urban’s analysis of the Shokleng myth “The Giant Falcon,” the referential theme of replacement and the irreversibility of death is intertwined with the pragmatic theme of the importance of following instructions. For Shokleng, “Instructions issued by elders are the blueprints for successful adaptation to an uncertain world. . . . The myth actually contains an implicit threat: if instructions are not followed, dark consequences will ensue” (Urban 1984:325).

The authority structure among Quechua speakers is more flexible, and indeed, the personal authority of a speaker is not taken for granted but, instead, must be established conjuncturally both socially and through such grammatical devices as the use of evidential markers. Quechua’s conversation-like coparticipation structure guarantees that no one has final authority over a set of narrated events. This is so even if the narrator personally experienced the events!

Although direct quotation in narrative is a near-universal (Mannheim and Tedlock 1985:7; see Lucy 1993), different cultures of language use, of epistemology, and
of authority may be more or less encoded in reported speech.\textsuperscript{16} Storytellers themselves may be more or less effective in manipulating claims to social or political authority; but as Judith Irvine argues, citation, though manipulable, may also be unavoidable, so unavoidable “that it puts in doubt the very possibility that a sentence might represent but a single subjectivity. Words, forms, and styles bear the traces of those who have used them in the past” (1996:151).

We include, then, another example drawn from a conversational narrative, through which we can begin to explore the pragmatics of speech and action. This example is a short extract from a conversation that began and ended with a discussion about Van Vleet’s plans for traveling to La Paz. She had come to visit another elderly couple, Juana and Bartolomé, with their teenage granddaughter, Reina.\textsuperscript{17} The afternoon had been filled with radio announcements of a strike and roadblocks throughout Chayanta Province, to begin the next day in reaction to increases in gasoline prices and the privatization of the Bolivian petroleum company. Van Vleet was anxious about leaving the community the next day because of the roadblocks but was still determined to see her husband off for the United States. As Bartolomé listened to the radio, Juana and Van Vleet talked about the possibilities for travel. They too had plans to travel but had postponed them until after the strike. Juana encouraged Van Vleet to postpone her trip as well. (Here, the story is told from Van Vleet’s perspective.)

The narrative began abruptly to my ears, with Juana announcing that someone’s lover had died. Confused, I asked, “He died? Who?”

She replied that the lover died. Then she went on with the story about a girl who follows a condenado (condemned soul), thinking that she is following her lover.

Then the girl, the girl was crying really hard as she traveled, they say. Then the soul, they say, saw her.

After that, “Le—Let’s go, let’s return now,” he said.

He didn’t show himself to the girl.

“Show yourself to me,” she said. He didn’t show himself.

And from that they probably just went along, just went along

There was a lake (lago).

A lake (qhuta).

Throughout this narrative I had been answering with “right,” “and then,” and “uh-huh.” Juana yawned and continued.

“Then another, perhaps on the shore of that lake there were houses.”

And I asked,

“There was a house there [next to] a lake?” indicating with my hands as well as my question. She agreed and resumed her story:

“I will slaughter.

“We will cook,” saying she said.

The girl went, they say, to slaughter.

Saying, “We will cook at that house.”

And then, a dog

Awuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuu
the unsavory character of the young man she is following. She says, "I will slaughter (ňak'asaq). We will cook." The verb ńak'ay means "to slaughter an animal," usually by cutting its throat, but no animal was mentioned by the girl. At the end of this narrative, Juana says that the young man's throat was cut (ńak'asqa, the past participle of slaughter). Almost in afterthought, she adds, "They say his father killed him." Other versions of this story begin with far more detailed descriptions of the young man's death. The young man is said to return in the night to his parents' house and steal food. His father, they say, stayed up one night to catch the thief. Not realizing that the thief was his own son (for he could not see in the dark), he swung and cut the young man's neck through with a machete. The young man's immoral actions of stealing food from the household (and in another version stealing his own sister) put him in the position of being killed like an animal.18 This parallel between the killing of animals and the killing of this young man who returns to walk among the living after he has been buried by his parents may be extended to our discussion of lik'ichiri, as well.

ńak'aq, the nominalized form of the verb "to butcher," is the more common Quechua expression in Bolivia and Peru for lik'ichiri (which is an Aymara retention). A ńak'aq, then, is someone who kills a human being as if it were an animal. Often the names of animals are applied to human beings in a derogatory sense, indicating a transitional or not properly socialized state, such as calling brothers who fight "dogs," calling sons-in-law "bulls" or "condors" (Allen 1997; Harris 1994), or naming someone who acts stupidly a "burro." Here we should note that in the last narrative a young man was killed like an animal for his immoral actions. In contrast, the lik'ichiri kill innocent people as if they were animals. In both cases, though, the boundary between humans and nonhuman animals (a key cultural distinction for Quechua speakers, as for other Andeans) is thrown into relief by its transgression.19

**Intertextuality: Reprise**

The story of the dead lover details the flooding of a lake as the result of a girl throwing a brush and a mirror. The flood prevents the soul from crossing the lake and following the girl back to the house of the grandmother who alerted the girl to the fact that her lover was, in actuality, dead. This module of the story of the dead lover is related to another story about a city that was flooded by a male supernatural being as revenge for refusing hospitality. The flooded city story, which is known throughout the Andes, was recorded as early as the beginning of the 17th century.20 It tells of a supernatural being who arrives dressed in rags at a wedding party in a politically important village. Ejected from the party, he takes revenge by turning the village into a lake. A woman from the village follows him and is turned into stone. This and related stories, or at least their constituent modules, are part of a larger discursive field that establishes a moral alignment among irrigation, gender relations, and sociability (Hopkins n.d.).

Here is a summary of a version told to Mannheim by a woman who grew up near another southern Andean lake, Lake Piwiray, in Chinchero. Since it was formally elicited, it is less detailed, uses less reported speech, and is less closely connected to the specific circumstances in which it was told.21

Lake Piwiray wasn't a lake in the old days. It was the City of Cuzco [the exact double of Cuzco, the former Inka capital].

One day, there was a wedding in Cuzco, with a fiesta. They really partied:
- they drank,
- they stuffed themselves,
- and they danced up a storm.

Then, with no shame at all, an old man entered the house where the party was going on.
- He was disguised in rags,
- with a dirty face all crusted with snot and with gummy eyes.

The revelers insulted the old man:
- "Throw the old man out. He's disgusting dressed like that, so throw him out disgustingly."

He went away crying bitterly.

As he went away a woman took pity on him. (She must have been a visitor.) She was outraged at the behavior of the partygoers. She went after him, carrying food and maize beer.

He had already made it to the mountains outside the city.

The woman followed him but couldn't catch up.

- The man simply told her that no matter what happened she shouldn't look back.
- She turned around and saw that the whole town had been turned into a lake.

Her relatives were there
- her children
- her husband
- and everyone who was anyone to her.
While she watched despairingly
it became water
it turned into a lake.
So then the woman turned
in that instant
into whatchamacallit . . . into rock.
She was bewitched.

[At this point, the storyteller suspected that Mannheim
hadn't understood that the old man was God, who had come
in disguise to test the partygoers.]

Today that City of Cuzco is a lake, Lake Piwiray.

At midnight you can hear a rooster crowing from the lake,
and the sound of a bell tolling.

And if you climb that mountain over there and you look
down at the lake,
at midnight you can see two large golden cattle glistening
in the water.

The association between a violation of appropriate
relationships of reciprocity and destruction by flood or
by metamorphosis into stone is familiar throughout the
Andes. In the story of the dead lover, a young man who
has committed the moral offense of stealing from his
parents is destroyed by a flood. And in the flooded city
story the revelers commit one of the worst possible
moral offenses in the Andean world, that of turning
someone away from a festival. An entire city suffers di-
vine judgment. The relationships among social/moral
offense, the image of the lake, and destruction by water
are coded directly in the structure of the narrative, giv-
ing the association a durable quality that has allowed it
to persist (at least since the early 17th century) and to
spread across the region.

For native Andeans these relationships have an ob-
jective quality that goes beyond a set of abstract intel-
llectual associations. The story always names a local
lake, one that is familiar to both the storyteller and the
audience. To inscribe the landscape with the narrative
and its implicit moral alignment gives them an objective
quality that transcends the here-and-now of the individ-
ual performance. Stories that are inscribed on the land-
scape are, according to Native Andeans, “true” (Allen
1986) or “history” (Howard-Malverde 1990). At the same
time, naturally occurring (as opposed to elicited) con-
versational narratives are anchored deeply into local
social particulars—specific individuals, personal expe-
riences, and the like—and bound closely to topics that
have already been introduced into the conversation.
These create an unbroken set of layers from the mytic
to the here-and-now. At the same time, by referencing
local places, specific individuals and individual experi-
ences and mundane topics, conversational narratives
acquire an aura of verisimilitude.

### Participant Roles

The final kind of dialogue in Quechua conversa-
tional narrative which we wish to discuss is the dialogue
produced between intersecting participant roles, which
evoke multiple interactional frameworks. Dialogue is
produced in the very event of speaking, in the interstic-
es of participant roles, as well as through the interaction
of participants as socially positioned actors with spe-
cific histories of interaction. One individual may play
a number of different roles over the course of a speech
event or even within a single utterance.

Under the traditional “communication” model of
language a speaker tosses words to an addressee like a
football, the words themselves serving as vehicles of
meaning. This model has been prevalent both in scholar-
ly (e.g., Bühler 1934; Saussure 1971) and folk tradi-
tions (see Reddy 1979), so prevalent in fact that it has
been adopted uncritically to model other forms of “ex-
change” (see Shell 1982). Students of linguistic prag-
matics have argued that it be rejected in favor of a
model in which speaker and hearer are disaggregated
into multiple roles affecting the interpretation of the ut-
terance, with a focus on meaning as an inferential pro-
cess rather than a process of transmission. Erving
Goffman (1974:517 ff., as modified by Irvine 1996), for
example, advocated dividing the traditional notion of
“speaker” into four:

- **author**, the person who scripts the words;
- **principal**, the party “committed to the position at-
tested to by the content of the utterance” (Irvine
1996:132);
- **animate**, the party who physically speaks the utter-
ance;
- **figure**, “the character, persona, or entity projected
into the audience’s imagination” by the utterance

These roles are frequently inhabited by different indi-
viduals, though they may also be inhabited by the same
individual, with different interpretations assigned to
the utterance by hearers depending on the set of roles
that they identify with the animator. A politician’s self-
confession, for example, can be interpreted as revealing
the politician’s true persona or as a cynical ploy depend-
ing on whether hearers have projected the politician
into the combined roles of author, animator, and prin-
cipal or into the single role of animator.

Similarly, Goffman divided the traditional position
of the **hearer** into several distinct sociologically framed
roles:

- **addressee**, the person specifically inscribed in the
discourse as a recipient;
bystander, a person who is not inscribed but whose participation is ratified by other participants in the interaction;

overhearer, a person who is neither inscribed nor ratified but is acknowledged by the other participants in the interaction;

eavesdropper, a person who is not inscribed, ratified, or acknowledged in any way.

The entire configuration of social roles in any given instant is called the production format of the utterance. Things get extraordinarily complex when one utterance is embedded in another, for example, by using quotation marks. In such situations an entire production format is also being embedded into another, the same physical participants potentially filling distinct roles at each level. The meaning of an utterance is an emergent property of the entire cluster of production formats and their respective configurations of roles (see Hanks 1996). That is, the meaning of an utterance is produced jointly (or dialogically) between roles within each production format and among roles that are distinctly assigned to the same social incumbent among production formats.

A relatively simple utterance from the lik'ichiri narrative will clarify the notion of dialogism in participant roles. During the course of the conversation, after Lorenzo had cautioned Van Vleet not to fall asleep on the bus, Maria said to him, "She says, 'I will go.' " The utterance contains two embedded production formats or frames: the quotation "I will go" and its bracketing statement "She says, 'I will go.' " In the quotation Maria was the animator of the utterance, having physically spoken it, but Kristina the anthropologist would have been the principal, the party held committed to the position of going. In the bracketing statement, however, Maria was both the animator and the principal, the person responsible for reporting what "She said."

Deictic elements, such as personal pronouns, link the roles within each frame to other simultaneously unfolding frames and to the context of situation. Deictics map social incumbents onto role configurations within distinct, simultaneous frames. They locate the participants of the conversational narrative, as well as the characters of the story, within a particularly conceived world, making the events within the narrative differentially relevant to the participants in the conversation (for example, when the specific assignment of participants to roles through deictics turned the lik'ichiri story into a practical lesson for Van Vleet). Attention to the specific context of performance requires not only a way of tracing the shifts in participant roles over the course of a speech event but also of tracing the ways in which a speech event may provide a context to another speech event, either embedded in the first or attached later in the interaction (see Hanks 1990).

Although participants in a conversation usually have little problem following shifts in interactional frames over the course of a narrative event, the analysis of the multiple layers of dialogical relationships between roles and frames may be complex even within an utterance as simple as the one that we just quoted. Irvine (1996) points out that the problem of tracing participant roles and frames (and more broadly, of mapping participant frames) occurs not only when there are too many individuals to fit them neatly into the traditional roles of "speaker," "addressee," and "other," but also when there are too few individuals, as when someone is talking to herself. This is not simply a matter of determining all the various possibilities and combinations of roles (as in Levinson 1988) but rather of understanding the process of fragmentation of participant roles, the variously layered contexts of utterances, and the ways in which they are connected (Irvine 1996:135).

Maria's story of her brother's death is itself bracketed within a larger narrative of the lik'ichiri which Lorenzo tells, detailing the characteristics of lik'ichiri, the contingencies of an encounter, and the admonition not to sleep. In addition to incorporating her personal experience into the details of the lik'ichiri narrative, Maria used various shifts in footing to align herself affectively with Lorenzo and Van Vleet. For example, when Maria told of her brother's death from a lik'ichiri, she had taken over the strand of the narrative from Lorenzo.

Maria: "'Guuuuuuu,' he said [groaning].
So many people arrived.
Um, 'Guuuuuu,' he just said."

In this statement she shifts the context from the room in the house where they were sitting to that room where the sick young man lay dying many years before. She embeds her brother's dying groans into a statement about the huge number of people who arrived for his wake.

Maria locates her brother in a network of relationships, noting that his wife returned to her own community after he died. She lists her siblings in order, and Van Vleet repeats every name, the brother listed with two other siblings who died as children. Rather than being tangential to the lik'ichiri narrative (as Van Vleet initially supposed), Maria's emphasis on her brother's social relationships highlights the overwhelming concern of Southern Quechua-speaking peasants with those relationships of reciprocity. The story then may be interpreted not so much as being about gringos stealing fat as about a local ideology of reciprocity, imbued with a differently configured but overlapping set of asymmetrical relationships.

Moreover, the narrative is embedded in a context of hypothetical happenings. At least two different imagined
possibilities are intertwined in the moment of telling: the hypothetical context of her brother getting better had they known about curing with the blood of a black sheep, and the (as yet) unfulfilled possibility of a gringa anthropologist traveling alone: there, where lik'ichiri also travel. Finally, the event of the narrative occurred in a specific context, in relationship to a "here" of telling the story versus the "then" and the "there" in which the action of the story, both hypothetical and remembered, took place. Both Lorenzo and María emphasize that lik'ichiri do not come here; lik'ichiri are there. Going from here to there is dangerous, traversing the space in between those places in which there are people whom you care about and who care about you.

Turning again to the example of María voicing Van Vleet's words, María says to her husband, "She says, 'I will go.'" Without pause, she continues, bidding Van Vleet, "Say: 'Going makes me fall asleep.'"

She first addresses her husband, embedding a statement indicating a future action attributed to Van Vleet ("I will go") within a statement of reported speech ("She says"). Second, she addresses Van Vleet, embedding a statement of hypothetical, unbounded action ("Going makes me fall asleep") within the immediacy of a command ("Say"). Not only are future, and past, hypothetical and immediate contexts of interaction layered on top of each other, but each layer consists of a different configuration of participant roles in spite of having the same three actual participants.

Later in the conversation, Lorenzo reemphasizes the potential dangers of sleeping on the bus.

Lorenzo: We (exclusive) go from Cochabamba to here. We don't sleep, at all. At times the two of us go together, in just one seat—

Kristina: —Uh-huh.

Lorenzo: —we sit. That's all, I don't know how to sleep.

María: I always sleep.

Lorenzo: She sleeps, but with me anyway.

Kristina: Right.

This excerpt provides additional information through which to analyze the ambiguities of shifts in participant roles described above. Here, María explicitly aligns herself with Van Vleet, both of whom fall asleep on buses. Lorenzo reiterates his cautionary advice, as he has throughout the conversation, distinguishing between the habits of their gringa anthropologist who travels alone on buses, and the habits of peasants who always travel at least two together.

The participation structure of a speech event, then, is built from relationships to other speech events: past, future, or even unspoken (Irvine 1996:135). Layers of contextualization are produced between and within speech events. These multiple layers (which might be social, textual, and grammatical) have been called "shadow conversations" by Irvine to highlight the layering of sets of dialogical relationships that are informed by other sets of dialogical relationships within any communicative act (1996:151–152). Shadow conversations provide contexts of interpretation to the actually ongoing speech event, in part mediated through formal grammatical devices such as quotation, repetition, and evidential status. In order to understand how it is that relationships among utterances are built up by participants in the speech event, in order to account for such relationships with more than the vague labels "context of situation" and "context of culture," it is necessary to pay attention to the formal linguistic mechanisms that mediate them and to the complexity of interaction among these mechanisms in specific speech events.

**Evidentiality**

Central among these mechanisms in Quechua are the evidentials and related grammatical systems, which establish the relationship between an ongoing, present speech event and shadow events by marking the epistemic stance of a speaker role (author, principal, animator, figure) with respect to the narrated events. In Southern Quechua, evidentiality is marked by one of three intersecting systems: tense, evidential suffixes, and emphatics. In this section, we sketch these three systems and show how they work together to establish the relationship between the participants in the narrative event, the interactional frames embedded in the narration, and the system of narrative voices. Two caveats: First, Quechua evidentials are a substantial topic in their own right but have been little studied. Although evidential systems are described morphologically for much of the Quechua linguistic family, there has been no substantive syntactic or discourse-oriented research in either of the varieties of Quechua discussed here. Second, from the limited evidence that is available to us, evidentiality works in different ways in the two Quechua varieties discussed in this article. In Southern Peruvian Quechua, evidentials are more tightly integrated into the grammatical system than in the Quechua spoken in Chayanta. This should mean that the internal layering of discourse within discourse is accomplished slightly differently in the two places. The discussion that follows is based on evidence from Southern Peruvian Quechua. Differences between the Quechua spoken in Southern Peru and that spoken in Chayanta are noted where relevant.
The Tense System

All Southern Quechua varieties distinguish two past tenses that are marked by verbal suffixes, the unmarked preterite -rqa (~-ra) and the so-called drunken (or narrative) past -sqa. The grammarian Antonio Cusi-huaman Gutiérrez described the narrative past as marking "any action ... that has taken place either without the direct participation of the speaker, or while the speaker was not fully conscious" (1976b: 170, our translation). For example, the story of Lake Piwiray begins as follows:

1.1 Manas quchachu kasqan ñawpaqqa, ñawpaq tiempupiqa, (response: riki)
Llaqtas kasqa, "llaqtan, karan" ninku.
1.5 Qusqu llaqtas kasqa chaypi (response: an)

1.1 It wasn't(-sqa) a lake in the old days, in the old times (response: riki)
It was(-sqa) a city, "It was(-ra) a city" they say
1.5 It was(-sqa) the city of Cuzco there (response: an)

Lines 1.1, 1.3, and 1.5 set the scene of the story and establish a link between the scene and a lake that is familiar to everyone present. In all three lines the narrator (who is here animator and perhaps principal but neither author nor figure) uses the narrative past -sqa together with the reportive -s, establishing that although the lake is familiar and concrete, she is unwilling to vouch personally for the lake having been a city in earlier times. In line 1.4 she quotes an unnamed "they," establishing a new discursive frame, within which both preterite -ra and witnessed evidential -n are used,

Llaqtas karan, city-n was-ra

instead of

Llaqtas kasqa, city-s was-sqa.

Notice that the use of both the narrative past and the evidential marker are interpreted in terms of the speaker within a particular discourse frame, not necessarily the actually existing speaker. The speaker (or more precisely, the principal) in the frame established by the quotation is both standing in relative proximity to the events (licensing the -ra preterite) and able to vouch personally for them.

The distinction between the narrative past -sqa and the preterite -ra is also used to move the participants in the storytelling event closer to the events that are being narrated, particularly to foreground significant events in the narrative (marked by -ra) against the background in which they occur (marked by -sqa). In the story of Lake Piwiray, when the woman follows the old man out of the city, she is told not to look back:

2.1 Chayqi warmiqa mancharikun chaypi familiankuna kasharan chaypi— wawanpas
2.5 qusanpas piñan kanapis.
Anchaykunamanta desesperasqa qhawiriramuqtin unu kapun quchaman tuparusga.
2.10 Chaysi warmitaq tukurapusqa kasqa ratulla naman ... qaqaman.
Encantara kapusqa.
Chaymi kunan,
2.15 chayqi kunan kashan warmi
2.17 chaypi qaqa.

2.1 So the woman got frightened.
Her relatives were there
There— her children
2.5 her husband and everyone who was anyone to her.
While she watched despairingly it became water it turned into a lake.
2.10 So then the woman turned in that instant into whatchamacallit ... into rock.
She was bewitched.
So now,
2.15 So now it is said a woman is there
2.17 in that rock.

At the pivotal moment at which the woman understands that something unusual is going on (line 2.1), her fright is described with a nonpast ("zero") tense. Subsequently, her realization that her family is there is set into relief by marking it with the preterite -ra (2.2) before returning to 2.9's narrative past quchaman tuparusqa, ("it turned into a lake") when the deed has been done. In 2.1 the role of the principal of the utterance (the party committed to the position attested to by the content of the utterance) has shifted from the animator (the party who physically speaks the utterance) to the figure: one of the characters in the story. The shift is marked by the shift in tense, from the narrative past to the sequence of nonpast and preterite. The dominant pattern in the narrative is to set scenes and describe already realized events using the narrative past. Shifts to the preterite or to a nonpast signal reconfigurations in the allocation of participant roles in the speech event.
Evidential Suffixes

The second grammatical system that is implicated in establishing the relationship between the participants in the narrative event, the interactional frames embedded in the narration, and the system of narrative voices is that of evidential suffixes (sometimes called "validators" in the linguistic literature on Quechua). In Southern Peruvian Quechua, there is a three-way distinction between the witness marker -mi (-n following a vowel), the reportive -si (-s following a vowel), and the absence of either when it is expected (a "zero" marker), which usually signifies that the speaker is hedging. Cusihuaman writes that -mi is used to denote "that the speaker has seen or participated personally in the realization of the event that he describes, or that he knows directly that the event in question is going on or will occur in the near future" (1976b:240, our translation). In contrast, the reportive -si "denotes that the speaker knows or was informed of the event only through the mediation of another person or by means of other sources of information" (Cusihuaman 1976b:241, our translation). In questions, -mi and -si signal the questioner's expectations as to the epistemic source of the answer.

Evidential suffixes mark the sentence constituent that is making the actual assertion, as in

3. [Llaqtas karan Piwiray Qucha.
   It is said that Lake Piwiray was [a city].

as opposed to

4. [Piwiray Qucha]s Llaqtas karan.
   It is said that [Lake Piwiray] was a city.

We have marked the constituents that are being asserted by italics and square brackets. In the first example it is being asserted that Lake Piwiray was once a city (as opposed to being a lake). In the second it is being asserted that it was Lake Piwiray (as opposed to another lake, say, Lake Izcuchaca) that was once a city. The sentence constituent that is being asserted typically occurs at the beginning of a sentence. When it does not, another suffix, -qa, is used to mark the end of the previous constituent, so that the beginning and end of the constituent being asserted are always transparent.

3. [Llaqtas karan Piwiray Qucha.
   It is said that Lake Piwiray was [a city].

3'. Piwiray quchaqa [lqaqtas karan.
   Lake Piwiray, it is said that it was [a city].

In the same way that shifts between the two past tenses index shifts in the discourse frame, so, too, do shifts between the evidentials:

1.3 Llaqtas kasqa,
1.4 "lqaqtas karan" ninku.
1.5 Qusqu llaqtas kasqa chaypi

The shift from the reportive -si in 1.3 to -mi in 1.4 indexes a reconfiguration of speaker roles in the quotation, which nests one discourse frame into another. In 1.3 the principal is identified with the animator; in the quoted portion she is not. While in the principal-animator configuration the principal does not vouch for the referential content of the utterance, in the principal-animator configuration she does.

The verisimilitude of the story of Lake Piwiray is established by anchoring it to specific places on the local landscape, the lake itself and the rock-in-the-shape-of-a-woman that overlooks the lake (see Allen 1986; Howard-Malverde 1990). The storyteller does so in 2.14–2.17, establishing a metalinguistic frame for the entire narrative. But even within the metalinguistic frame (which is most directly hers, most directly one in which she is the principal as well as the animator, most directly tied into the here-and-now of the storytelling event), the storyteller shifts frames from one in which she directly vouches for the physical anchor, using -mi (2.14), to one in which she does so only through the mediation of another, with the anchor established indirectly (2.15).

2.14 Chaymi kunan,
2.15 chaysi kunan
2.16 kashan warmi
2.17 chaypi qaqa.

2.14 So now, I vouch.
2.15 so now, it is said
2.16 a woman is there
2.17 in that rock.

While the Quechua spoken in Chayanta (like that spoken in much of Bolivia) has suffixes -min and -sina cognate to the -mi and -si of Southern Peruvian Quechua, they are relatively rare in narrative. The suffix -min is an emphatic, signaling the commitment of the speaker to the veracity of the assertion; -sina signals that the assertion is conjectured or in some other way doubtful. Both -min and -sina seem to be less constrained syntactically than their Southern Peruvian Quechua counterparts.

Emphatics

The emphatic suffixes make up the third system implicated in establishing the relationship between the speech event and shadow events by marking the epistemic stance of a speaker role with respect to the narrated events. The emphatics include such affixes as -pun (definitely), -má (must), -chá (might), -chus (perhaps), -yá (intensifier), and so forth. They occur most often at the ends of utterances and frequently carry stress. In contrast to the evidentials, the emphatics mark the entire utterance rather than the assertion.
constituent. The emphatics vary considerably from one Southern Quechua variety to another.

In the story of Lake Piwiray, the density of emphatics increases considerably at two poles of subjectivity: in the storyteller's evaluation of the story, as she comes back over key points to make sure that we understood them (for example, in 5.12), and in attributing words and thoughts to a figure in the narrative (for example, in 5.8). In both cases, the emphatic holds semantically over the entire discourse frame that is established.

5.1 Qaqamanta warmis kashan, rumimanta.
Kashansis, ciertus.
Chaysi machulachaqa kasqa Dios.

5.5 Risqa, prueba ruwaq.
Wak thanta risqa, a proposito.
Wak thanta risqa.
"Ima nillawanqachá khayna haykuqti chay fiestakuqkuna." a ñ... 
Manas qarqulassaqakuchu

5.10 chhaynallatachus thuqa-thuqayusqakuchushina 
chaymantapis waqtasqakuchushina.

Ahá. (Chaynata MILLAYta atisqancha.) 
Khaynaman tukurachipusqa chayqa 
Dios kasqa

5.15 chay machula.
5.1 There's a woman made of rock, of stone.
There is, they say, for certain they say.
That little old man was God, they say.

5.5 He went there to test them.
He went in rags in disguise, on purpose.
He went in rags in disguise.
"What would they say to me if I went to their party like this." a ñ... 
They might not have thrown him out,
5.10 they might not have spit at him like that
and they might not have beat him up like that.

Ahá. (His power must have been FEARSOME.)
He was able to transform them, like this, so
He was God,
5.15 that old man.

In sum, the dominant pattern in the narrative is one in which the reportive -sí co-occurs with the narrative past -sqa (extending even to such personal interpretations as 5.13–5.15), but it is a pattern that is broken frequently, with every quotation, with every shift to narrative foreground, and every time the narrator surfaces to reconnect the story to the circumstances in which it is being told, by means of evaluative or other metalinguistic comments. The evidentials and related grammatical systems establish the relationship between an ongoing speech event and shadow events by marking the epistemic stance of a speaker role with respect to the narrated events. At the same time they are sensitive to and index the layering of voices, discursive frames, and narrative lines.

**Conclusion**

In this article we discarded the traditional representation of Southern Quechua conversational narratives as the closely bounded, monological "fictitious objects [that] we call texts" in favor of a dialogical view that does not as easily lend itself to publication in collections of folktales. We discussed four distinct forms of dialogism in Quechua conversational narrative: (1) formal dialogism, in which the narrative is produced between interlocutors, (2) the embedding of discourse within discourse by means of quotations or indirect discourse, (3) intertextual dialogism, in which implicit or hidden dialogue between texts is brought out through the intertextual reference to other coexisting narratives, and (4) the complex pattern of participation through which dialogue takes place not only between actual speaking individuals (as in the first sense of dialogue) but between distinct, intersecting participant roles that are produced as pragmatic shadows of the face-to-face event of speaking, evoking multiple interactional frameworks. As might be gleaned from this discussion, these four types of dialogism are not mutually exclusive but overlapping and inextricably intertwined.

These are shadows that we can only begin to explore in this article. The nature of Quechua oral tradition—the ways in which linguistic form is mapped onto social moves, the repertoire of verbal genres available to speakers in any given situation, the semiotic vehicles by which intertextual linkages are established, the kinds of intertextual relationships that are brought to bear on interpreting texts, the kinds of embedding of participant frame and utterance within participant frame and utterance, the allocation of participation, the nature of narrative authority (in short, all the stuff that shows us how social ends are achieved in face-to-face interaction)—all these are still a terra incognita. They have enormous implications for approaching key problems elsewhere in Andean society and history. For example, by understanding the nature of social positioning in Andean narrative today, we can approach a more rigorous understanding of such critical early colonial sources on the Inka as Juan de Betanzos's *Suma y narración*: Why are overlapping events narrated several times from distinct perspectives? What were we being told implicitly about narrative in society? In order to answer this and similar questions, we need to make a concerted effort to understand Andean forms of talk.
ethnographically, an effort of the same scale that Andean anthropologists made in the 1970s when their central challenge was to understand political economy. We need to train ethnographers to work with linguistic form as central to understanding social life and to train linguists to understand language ethnographically, in its own skin.

Notes

Acknowledgments. Van Vleet's research was supported by a fellowship under the Fulbright-Hays Program, which is gratefully acknowledged. An earlier version of this article was presented to the Congreso Internacional de Americanistas, in Quito, July 1997. We are grateful to William Hanks for comments on that version, to Gary Urton for correspondence on the evidential suffixes in the Quechua spoken around Sucre, and to Anthony Berkley, Susan A. Gelman, and Sabine MacCormack for comments on the penultimate draft. The order of the authors' names is alphabetical.

1. By "Southern Quechua" we mean the linguistic continuum that includes the Bolivian and Argentine varieties of Quechua and those varieties spoken in the six southeastern departments of Peru (i.e., Quechua sureño: Cerrón-Palomino 1987; Mannheim 1991). These varieties can be characterized by an overlapping lexicon and pragmatics, and a morphosyntax whose variability is as yet undetermined.


4. See Haviland 1996, Silverstein 1996, and Urban 1996 for three very different case studies of the process of "entextualizing" talk; see also Bauman and Briggs 1990 and Kuipers 1990. Because of the romantic roots of mythography, such factitious objects are often treated by scholars as sacrosanct, in sharp distinction to the collaborative processes by which they are produced (Tedlock 1990).

5. We agree with Urbano (1993:26) that the notion of an "Andean mythology" has been twice invented, the first time in the context of the Christianization of Native Andean peoples in the 16th and 17th centuries, and the second in modern ethnographic and folkloric studies. But we are more pessimistic than Urbano as to the possibility of ever distinguishing myth from popular legend in an ontological sense, in large part because both the missionary and the scholarly inventions of myth have done such violence to Andean practices of telling myths.


10. The term lik'ichiri, from Aymara, is probably a linguistic retention in the community, which has switched from Aymara to Quechua within several generations' memory. The stem lik'i is "fat" (grasa in Bertonio 1612:195). The more common Southern Quechua expression for this is ñak'aq, the agentive form of the Quechua verb "to butcher," which we discuss further below. Rather than using words such as extract, attack, or grab to describe the action of a lik'ichiri against a traveler, Lorenzo uses the Aymara verbal root with Quechua suffixes: lik'ichachikuy.


12. There are, of course, points of contact between written scholarly media and aural transmission of narratives, for example, newspapers, which report scholarly work at a level of detail that would be unusual in a North American context.

13. "de España habían enviado a este Reino por unto de los indios, para sanar cierta enfermedad, que no se hallaba para ella medicina sino el unto; a cuya causa, en aquellos tiempos, andaban los indios muy recatados, y se extranaban de los españoles en tanto grado, que la leña, yerba, y otras cosas no las querían llevar a casa de español; por decir no las matasen, allí dentro, para sacar el unto." Although Molina's text attests to the antiquity of beliefs about the ñak'aq, it must be read with considerable care. Stern writes in an editorial note to Szemiriski 1987 that the stories about lik'ichiri or ñak'aq may be based in experiences of the ancestors of contemporary Andeans, who like the indigenous people of Mexico watched as the Spaniards removed fat from the dead on the battle ground and rendered it over the fire in order to save their wounds. At another level, Molina was committed to attributing exotic false beliefs to Andean people in part to advance his own claims within local ecclesiastical circles, and his work must be read with a grain of salt (Ramos 1992; Urban 1988:40, 1991:147–149).


17. These names are also pseudonyms.

18. "Stealing a woman" is a phrase used habitually to describe the first steps toward marriage in this region of the Andes.

19. Szemirsiski (1987) treats ñak'aq and condenados as interfaceable, we think mistakenly. Lorenzo and Maria emphasized the difference between lik'ichiris as "just people" and condemned souls (condenado, or aya ["dead"], or alma ["soul"]).


21. The story of the origin of Lake Piwiray was told to Mannheim by Rosalia Puma Escalante twice in formal elicitation. The distinction between the properties of elicited narrative and those of naturally occurring ("performed") narrative is discussed by Hymes (1981a) and McDowell (1974).

23. B. Schieffelin (1990: ch. 4) observes that similar practice is used systematically by Kaluli parents to “show” language to young children.


25. In this section the two-part line numbers consist of the example number and the line number, separated by a period. (E.g., “1.4” means “example 1, line 4.”) The past tenses -sqa, -vqa, and -ra are italicized, and the evidentials -mi and -si are underlined.

26. There was another member of the set, a dubitive -chi, until the late 17th century, when it was reassigned from this morphological paradigm to another, as -chá (Mannheim 1991:212).

27. There is also an emphatic particle si that signals absolute certainty (Herrero and Sánchez de Lozada 1984:398), but it is unrelated formally to any in Southern Peruvian Quechua.

28. Although -min and -sina do not seem to mark the scope of assertion in any straightforward way, a similar syntactic analysis of assertion is needed in the Quechua of Sucre in order to account for the use of the suffix -qa. It is especially striking is that min and -sina are used far less than their cognates in other varieties of Quechua (see Plaza Martínez and Howard-Malverde n.d.:87). We suspect that some Bolivian varieties of Quechua have reanalyzed them semantically from grammatical categories (obligatory, well-installed) to lexical, more like the emphatics. By grammatical category we mean those categories that must be expressed in a well-formed utterance of a language, as opposed to lexical categories that are not obligatory (but that nonetheless are internally structured, might have syntactic consequences, and might be expressed through bound grammatical morphemes); see Jakobson 1959 for a discussion of the distinction between lexical and grammatical meaning. In Southern Quechua, for example, person in the verb is a grammatical category, whereas number is a lexical category. A major problem in identifying such shifts is that there are no grammatical descriptions of Bolivian varieties of Quechua to get a fix on either the specifics or the dialectal distribution of this change. In general, the little descriptive work that there is in Bolivian Quechua has concentrated on morphology and on taxonomies of grammatical constructions. Basic linguistic research (descriptive, discourse-oriented, and dialectological) is long overdue in Bolivian Quechua.

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