A number of incentive-compliance classification systems have been developed to explain differences in the power and hold of organizations in relation to their members. Terms such as "coercive," "normative," "purposive," "solidary," and "material incentive" are used to describe the incentive-compliance base.

These classification systems partially overlap and use terms in different ways. A set of dimensions is introduced to substruct the property space of incentives. Related to the economic conception of utility, the dimensions are negative and positive utility, probability of delivery, transferability, and collective goods. The property space includes most of the prior classifications as specific types. Finally, we introduce power-dependence concepts as an explanatory mechanism.

COMPLIANCE/INCENTIVE CLASSIFICATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONS
Underlying Dimensions

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A number of crude classifications have been developed to describe basic differences in the incentives employed by organizations to induce behavior and attitudes. The range is quite extensive. For example, Gordon and Babchuk (1959) employ the terms "instrumental" versus "expressive" to characterize voluntary associations, while Etzioni (1961) uses "coercive," "utilitarian," and "normative" to identify

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organizational compliance systems. Clark and Wilson (1961), following Barnard (1938), employ yet another set of concepts when they discuss "material," "purposive," and "solidary incentives." Warriner (1965) adds "performance-pleasure," "sociability," "symbolic," and "productive assumed value functions" to this inventory. Moreover, these typologies overlap psychological classifications, such as Kelman's (1958) processes of influence: "compliance," "identification," and "internalization."

Organizations need not rely on just one kind of incentive. For instance, an organization may mix coercive and normative compliance systems. Nevertheless, for comparative purposes they are often categorized by the dominant incentive. In each case the classification is used to explain some gross differences in organizational structure, leadership behavior, leader-member relations, membership commitment, or the like.

Without these classifications, research and thinking about organizations in the last fifteen years would have been much impoverished. For instance, all of the following works are related to compliance-incentive notions: Wilson's work on political organizations (1962, 1973); Zald and Ash's discussion of social movement organizations (1966); Warriner's (1965) and Warriner and Prather's (1965) research on voluntary associations; Oberschall's (1973) discussion of the social control of social movements; Hofstetter's (1973) and Conway and Feigert's (1968) work on political party participation; Bailis (1974) on the welfare rights movement in Massachusetts. Etzioni's (1975) massive summary of research on his classification scheme alone indicates how influential his ideas have been. As heuristic classifications, this work has been invaluable.

Nevertheless, the fact that these classifications only partially overlap and that they sometimes use similar words for organizations that employ quite different incentives is confusing and uneconomical. It also suggests that the authors are leaving out salient dimensions or making implicit simplifying assumptions.

The purpose of this paper is to present a property space (Lazarsfeld, 1937) of underlying dimensions of organizational incentives that contain the classifications as type concepts (i.e., labels for specific combinations of dimensions). If fully successful, this substruction of the property space will show the relation of these classifications to each other, identify types not contained or discussed in the prior classifications, and lead to a more refined and precise language for discussing incentives. Even if only partially successful, the substruction exercise will expose problems in the use of incentive concepts and suggest issues that must be taken into account in further theorizing. The underlying dimensions of this property space are specifications of the factors that affect *utility*. Our basic property space uses economic language to describe the dimensions of incentives which various organizations deliver. Finally, after presenting the property space, we will show how power-dependence analysis drawn from social psychology provides explanatory mechanisms for incentive theory.

Before turning to the dimensions of the property space, let us elaborate on our claim that the various classification systems do in fact partially overlap and that their languages are sometimes contradictory and ambiguous.

OVERLAP AND AMBIGUITIES IN CLASSIFICATION

The most widely used of all of these classification systems are those of Clark and Wilson (1961) and Etzioni (1961). Etzioni's "utilitarian" and Clark and Wilson's "material" are the same, although Etzioni is interested in utilitarian remunerative organizations, whereas Clark and Wilson are interested in material voluntary associations. (The difference between the two is that salary and wages are believed to be constantly necessary, and therefore "involuntary," while voluntary associations offer marginal, though concrete, incentives.) There is no parallel to Etzioni's coercive category in Clark and Wilson's schema. Etzioni lumps under one category, "normative," what Clark and Wilson divide into two, "solidary" and "purposive." However, at points Etzioni divides this normative category into "pure normative" and "social power."[1] Other examples of overlap can be given. It would appear that Gordon and Babchuk's (1959) "instrumental" category overlaps Clark and Wilson's "material incentives" and Etzioni's "utilitarian." However, in terms of the actual assignment of specific organizations to the class, Gordon and Babchuk's "instrumental" is really the same as "purposive" or "normative-based" organizations, e.g., the NAACP. Gordon and Babchuk's "expressive" category overlaps Clark and Wilson's "solidary" category and also Warriner's (1965) "performance pleasure" and "symbolic" categories.

Not only do these classification systems overlap, but they sometimes have ambiguous meanings and unclear referents. Wilson's work is more carefully done and extensive than most efforts in this area. Nevertheless, even his work has ambiguities. Take the category of organizations employing material incentives. The archetype is the business firm, paying wages and salaries. But because Wilson is largely interested in political associations and voluntary associations that may have political impact, he excludes businesses from analysis. So he turns to political machines that depend on patronage, wages, and salaries from government jobs. But he does not face the issue of whether these machines can be considered voluntary associations. As a result, he must lump taxpayer associations in the same incentive category with political machines. However, it would appear that the former offer a promise of material incentives, but the latter are dependent upon immediate patronage!

There are other ambiguities and partial overlaps in these classification systems, but little scholarly benefit would come from continued exposition. Only an encompassing framework would parsimoniously clarify the similarities and differences in these classifications.

THE ORGANIZATIONAL DELIVERY OF UTILITY: COMPONENTS OF A PROPERTY SPACE[2]

An organizational sanction or incentive is a reward or deprivation given (or promised-threatened) for participation in organizations and for compliance with organizational norms and behavioral expectations. The reward or deprivation accompanies participation. However, organizational staff need not *intend* to reward. Thus, ideological activists are rewarded by the mere act of working toward the values they have internalized, not necessarily by conscious distribution of incentives by executives. Physical punishment, social status, social relations with like-minded people, and the potential perfection of the world are examples of other sanctions that can operate to induce behavior.

How can we compare these discrete incentives? They have in common a utility or disutility and they are delivered by organizations. We assert that there is a systematic set of dimensions related to utility delivery by which concrete incentives can be compared and contrasted. In other words, we believe that by using the idea of utility together with dimensions familiar to students of exchange, we can isolate salient dimensions for comparing and contrasting organizational incentives.

Stated somewhat differently, incentives are values delivered. For comparing and contrasting organizational incentives, we need a set of dimensions of value and of the conditions for transferring value. Just as money, as a medium of exchange, has characteristics that separate it from other media of exchange (e.g., gold, letters of credit, promissory notes, bushels of wheat), so do various incentives have differential characteristics.[3]

Four dimensions of utility and its delivery are included in our property space: (1) the direction of utility—negative or positive value of the sanction; (2) expected utility—the probability that an incentive will be forthcoming; (3) transferability—the extent to which the reward or punishment is fungible (that is, the extent to which incentives can be traded for other utilities or are intrinsic to the reward or punishment); (4) collective goods—the extent to which the incentive must be supplied to every member of a society, community, or group, or is supplied (internalized) to individuals. Let us discuss these dimensions, showing how each helps clarify one aspect or another of incentive classifications.

NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE UTILITIES

Organizational incentives or sanctions are the actual or promised (threatened) delivery of positive or negative utilities. A good, service, or situation can be said to have positive utility if people will assume costs to *attain* them. They have disutility if people will assume costs to *avoid* them.

Since incentives include promises and threats, we must ask if nonfulfillment of a promise is the same as a negative incentive. The answer to this question evidently depends on expectations. Baldwin (1971: 23-24) has taught us that in discussing negative and positive sanctions we must establish "B's baseline of expectations at the moment A's influence attempt begins. This baseline is defined by B's expected future value position, i.e., his expectation about his future position relative to the things he values. Positive sanctions, then, are actual or promised improvements in B's value position relative to his baseline of expectation. Negative sanctions are actual or threatened deprivations relative to this same baseline."[4] Thus, once a promise becomes part of the baseline of expectations, nonfulfillment becomes a deprivation.

Use of the notion of disutility allows us to clarify the concept of coercive incentives and coercive organizations. In common usage coercion has at least two meanings, the inflictions of unacceptable physical punishment and the denial of freedom to cross the boundary of the organizations. Denial of freedom to cross the boundary of organization can be defined as the imposition of unacceptable disutility when attempts are made to cross the boundary. The prison (through electric fences or armed guards), the isolated prisoner island (through risk of death in the sea), or institutions of slavery (through fugitive slave laws) all impose high costs if attempts are made to leave the organization.[5]

Note, however, that unacceptable boundary costs do not necessarily relate to the imposition of physical sanctions or other extreme disutilities within the boundaries of the organization. An organization could be fully coercive at the boundary (certain imposition of unacceptable disutilities), and rely upon other incentives within. Prisoner-of-war camps, "con-joints" and Skinnerian rehabilitation centers may operate on such systems.

It should be noted that any organization that is a *monopoly* provider of high-utility goods or services is "coercive" at the boundary. That is, leaving has extreme disutility. Social movement organizations, religious sects, or even businesses may be coercive for their members if exclusion from them would impose unacceptable costs. In the case of social movement organizations and religious sects, one might speak of coercion when such organizations monopolize highly desired ends—when participation and conformity is perceived as the only way to achieve the transformation of the world or to attain grace.

PROBABILITIES OF DELIVERY

Incentives are *promised* for delivery over time. Organizations "contract" to reward or punish for participation. Because of past performance and future prospects, organizations develop expected delivery rates.[6] Some organizations deliver daily, or weekly, or they write contingency contracts. Other organizations make promises with very low probability of deliveries (e.g., "Join us to get to the kingdom of heaven," or "Work hard and you'll become a movie star"). One major difference between external instrumental voluntary associations and remunerative or utilitarian organizations is that remunerative organizations typically have a high probability of payoff, while external instrumental voluntary associations have a lower probability of payoff. They promise payoffs in the future.

Examples of voluntary associations that are externally instrumental are pressure groups and trade associations. Their incentive systems are called external here because the utilities they promise to deliver are controlled in the first instance by other groups or organizations.[7] It should be noted, however, that voluntary associations using internally instrumental incentive systems have higher probabilities of payoff than externally instrumental associations. Such voluntary associations as cooperatives and stock and commodity exchanges are a subclass of remunerative organizations in this regard. However, they differ in the relative control of resources by participants. Internally instrumental voluntary associations are confederations of participants with relatively equal control over resources, whereas remunerative organizations *corporatively* control the resources.

We suspect that there is also a difference in the probabilities of expected reward of members in different types of external voluntary associations. Members of a trade association are likely to have less ambiguous goals and a shorter time-horizon than members of social movement organizations. Both have lower probabilities of delivery than remunerative organizations, but the trade association is likely to offer greater prospects than the social movement organization.

Finally, note that although remunerative organizations *usually* promise incentives with a high probability of delivery (e.g., there is very high probability that one will receive a check on Friday), sometimes they do not. First, where the industry or economy is unstable, guarantees of payment decline. Workers may have to accept scrip. As the probability of positive payoff declines, withdrawal of participation increases. Second, some organizations may mix high-probability payoffs with low-probability ones. Thus, promises of career advancement, bonus plans, and profit sharing plans are usually lower-probability incentive systems.

TRANSFERABILITY

Incentives are transferable to the extent that they have potential to create other (dis)utilities. Incentives such as money with high transferability have extrinsic utility. Incentives with very low transferability are those which have only intrinsic value—the incentive is pleasant or unpleasant in itself and has no other currency. For instance, membership in social clubs or in avocational groups may be satisfying in itself and may not be transferable outside. But if, as in belonging to elite clubs, the membership also gives status or contacts that lead to the accrual of utilities outside of the organization, it also has some extrinsic value and can be viewed as both a positive and a transferable incentive. On the other hand, incentives which transfer disutilities are, in Goffman's word, "stigmas." The Scarlet Letter, ex-prison or mental hospital status, and membership in Hell's Angels all inflict disutilities outside of the organization in which the incentive is accrued.

Just as with money, the transferability of other incentives depends upon their currency, acceptability, and recognition by others. If their visibility can be removed, the disutility of transferable incentives can be lowered.[8] For incentives to be transferable they must also be storable so that utility can be preserved. Most of the time money is a superior incentive to, say, artwork because its value is more easily transferable (exchanged) and its value more permanent. But in times of inflation a given amount of money loses its value while the artwork of a master increases. Organizations using negative incentives may vary in the extent to which the incentive is permanent. For instance, relying on the use of physical punishment will differ in the permanence of the disutilities inflicted. Those that maim inflict permanent utilities; those that merely inflict pain pass an incentive that is limited to captivity (setting aside the possibility of psychological scars).

There are three major types of positive incentives with low transferability: (1) those in which the intrinsic satisfaction comes from associating with the particular people in the organization (solidary incentives); (2) those in which the intrinsic satisfaction comes from the tasks the groups perform (avocational groups); and (3) those in which the members receive satisfaction from the goals the organization strives to attain (purposive incentives). Differences among organizations are reflected in the social structure of the groups, the degree of status homogeneity, and the durability and flexibility of each organization (see Warriner, 1965, and Warriner and Prather, 1965). For instance, a bridge club offering solidary incentives will recruit members from a narrower range of social statuses than a bridge club designed for the task of playing itself. Similarly, the social-relations-oriented bridge club is likely to embellish the activity with more informal activities, while the task-oriented club permits fewer distractions.

COLLECTIVE AND "OTHER DIRECTED" GOODS

Organization incentives also vary in whether they are directly delivered to the individual who participates (works, bears the costs of membership) or whether they are supplied, regardless of their efforts. In the latter case the participant benefits/loses from others' efforts. To the extent that an organization pays off by accomplishing some change in the social structure (laws, statuses, and the like) that rewards all members of a class, industry, or community, its payoff is a collective good available to all. In a parallel situation a class does not benefit but other individuals do. Thus, one may join the Committee to Save Joan Little in order to help women, to help blacks, to change Southern justice, or just to help Joan Little. The utility to the actor is someone else's benefit or the advancement of a cause.[9]

Olson (1965) argues that organizations offering collective goods are beset with the problem of free riders—most individuals will have little incentive to participate or bear the costs to the organizations. The costs to the individual will be great relative to his individual benefit, which will come whether he participates or not. Olson argues that unless organizations are made up of a few resource-rich participants who can control each other and for whom costs will be small relative to benefits, collective goods will rarely be sought without many more immediate and selective incentives.[10]

To the extent, then, that organizations provide incentives largely in the nature of promises to deliver collective goods, they will usually have difficulty mobilizing support. And if these are purposive social movement organizations that promise collective goods with low probabilities of delivery, they should have even less ability to mobilize support.

These four dimensions—direction of utility, probability of delivery, collective goods, and transferability—comprise

		INDIVIDUAL GOODS: TRANSFERABILITY LOW	INDIVIDUAL GOODS: TRANSFERABILITY HIGH	COLLECTIVE GOODS: TRANSFERABILITY LOW	COLLECTIVE GOODS: TRANSFERABILITY HIGH
NEGATIVE UTILITY	PROBABILITIES LOW	RANDOM HARRASSMENT		APOCALYPTIC RELIGIOUS SECT—"THE WORLD WILL BLOW UP"	
	PROBABILITIES HIGH	INDENTURED SERVANTS PRISON - LONG TERM SENTENCE, RELEASED OUTSIDE OF STATE	STIGMA INFLICTING A. PHYSICAL MARKS B. STATUS ANNOUNCING		SLAVERY-RACIALLY BASED
POSITIVE UTILITY	PROBABILITIES LOW	RELIGIOUS SECTS: GRACE PREDESTINED AND SECRET	SPECULATIVE BUSINESS GAMBLING CASINO	SOCIAL MOVEMENT STATUS CHANGE APOCALYPTIC RELIGIOUS SECT—"THE GOOD WORLD COMING"	SOCIAL MOVEMENT, ECONOMIC GOALS
	PROBABILITIES HIGH	SOCIAL CLUB, SECRET AVOCATIONAL CLUB	REMUNERATIVE ORGANIZATION, STABLE HIGH STATUS CLUB	COOP MARKETING ASSOCIATION	PRESSURE GROUP TRADE ASSOCIATION

Figure 1: Cross-Classification of Four Dichotomized Dimensions of Incentive Systems: Types of Organizations

our underlying dimensions of a property space for incentives. Dichotomizing each dimension into a low and high category gives us a property space with 16 classifications.

Figure 1 presents this property space with examples of types of organizations that offer incentives of a given combination of measured positions on variables. Without reviewing all cells, some comments are in order. Note that several of the cells on the negative utility side are empty or have specific sanctions rather than organizational types assigned. Because organizations are included within societies, and societies rather than organizations have legitimate control of violence, many organizations cannot employ disutilities based on force to induce behavior. Moreover, especially in modern societies, laws guaranteeing individual freedom prohibit status relations like slavery, or indentured servitude that would permit high use of negative utilities without resulting in people leaving the organizations. We had to "stretch" to fill in as many of the negative utility cells as we have. (The reader is encouraged to try his own hand at filling in the cells.)

Now turn to the right-hand side of the matrix. First note that the probability of delivery dimension allows us to distinguish two types of remunerative organizations. Utility of incentives being equal, the high-risk venture is likely to have a much greater problem in mobilizing support.

Examine also the cells in the rows with collective goods. We are able to distinguish a number of different kinds of organizations promising collective goods which, because they differ on other dimensions, are likely to have different abilities to induce commitment.

Finally, examine cells in the lower right-hand quadrant. On the one hand, a distinction is made between status conferral and sociability. The former incentive can be used outside of the group, while sociability can only be provided within the group. On the other hand, the linking of sociability and avocational incentives together indicates that our property space could be made even more refined by distinguishing between utilities gained from the interaction with organizational members and utilities gained from the task over which members interact. Adding such a dimension, however, doubles the number of cells of the property space and introduces a conceptual distinction at a lower level of abstraction.

This last point deserves amplification, for it suggests that our property space is incomplete, that it does not include all theoretically relevant dimensions. Property space construction balances two incompatible objectives—parsimony and completeness. The property space presented here is more complete than previous classifications, since it includes them as classes of our cross-classification. But it is our judgment that adding even more dimensions to enlarge the property space would strain the reader's ability to use the system.

Addition of other dimensions can be done for specific purposes. Our own candidates for heuristic addition are two. First, as mentioned above, whether the utility is attached to the task or to the social relation is important for distinguishing among so-called solidary associations. Second, utilities are sometimes unknown. Many incentive theorists use the concept of tangible versus intangible. Part of the meaning of tangibility has been taken up by using the intrinsic-transferable dimension. But another aspect of intangibility is "undefinability." Paralleling the concept of expectation of utility, or probability of delivery, might be ambiguity.

Such an aspect may be especially useful in distinguishing the incentive systems of established denominations from religious sects, or reform from revolutionary purposive organizations. Although both dimensions are candidates for inclusion in our property space, at this stage their addition would help to make for a finer-grained analysis, without including any major new types.

STRENGTH OF INCENTIVES AND ORGANIZATIONAL POWER

The property space we have developed is an abstract statement of the major descriptive dimensions for comparing and classifying the direction and delivery of utility. As such, it does not explain why some organizations will have alienated members, why leaders may be dependent upon followers, or many of the other concerns of incentive analysis. However, analysts who use incentivelike concepts can only make predictions because they combine assumptions, often unstated or unexplicated, about the psychological and social-psychological processes involved in motivating participation. Attention to these social-psychological assumptions will provide explanations for variation in the strength of incentives and the conditions for organizational power over members. Attention to these assumptions will also help us to *reduce* our property space, to explain why some of the logical possibilities only rarely occur and why others often occur. Here, two issues will concern us: (1) What determines the amount of utility of different organizational incentives? (2) What are the determinants of organizational power?

THE AMOUNT OF UTILITY

Behind the economist's generalized concept of utility lies a variety of specific tastes. In turn, "tastes" or "preferences" are shaped by physiology, culture, and psychology. It is best to make explicit what is often left implicit. First, the amount of utility of any single incentive depends upon the extent to which it satisfies or can be used to satisfy these tastes. Further, all tastes are not equal. Some tastes are related to basic physiological needs: food, body temperature, sleep, and avoidance of extreme pain are primary needs. In general, though not for all people all of the time, avoidance of the disutility of deprivation of these tastes takes precedence over others. Secondary or higher-order needs—approval from others, rewarding social relations, pursuit of ideals—have lower utility when primary needs are not met or satiated (see Maslow, 1948a and 1948b).

This obvious discussion has two immediate consequences, also obvious, for incentive theorists. It is not the type of incentive that creates the hold of organization over members, but the relative amount of utility of the incentive vis-à-vis other incentives. The coercive organization may be powerful for two reasons: (1) by inflicting pain or by withholding primary physiological needs, it controls formidable utilities; and (2) by constraining at the boundary, it controls access to the satisfaction of all other tastes. Remunerative organizations also have strong holds and can demand a great deal of work-time commitment because the amount of money they give is a requisite for the satisfaction of a whole host of tastes, many of them high priority. Consider, for example, a remunerative organization that only paid a dollar a week and a friendship club that gave a person a good deal of sense of belonging. We would certainly not consider the remunerative organization as stronger in its hold.

Thus, in the first instance, the power of organizations in relationship to their members comes from the ability to control access to important utilities. But important caveats are necessary. First, as primary needs get satiated, higher-order needs take on greater importance. Second, some people have tastes for ideals that are greater than their taste for food. Avoidance of death is not a sine qua non for all.

POWER DEPENDENCE ANALYSIS

Implicit in the discussion of coercive organizations is a concept of power formulated in power-dependence terms (see Emerson, 1962, or Thibaut and Kelley, 1959). Briefly, A's power over B is a direct function of B's valuation of states or objects controlled by A and an inverse function of the number of alternative sources of supply of the valued state or object. B's power is reciprocally defined by his control of valued objects for A. Emerson's analysis leads us to look at organizations as monopolistic or competitive suppliers. His analysis is strengthened by Thibaut and Kelley's notion of comparison level alternatives. Their formulation emphasizes the fact that commitment to a group or an organization is dependent not only on the amount of incentives offered but upon the discrepancy in utility offered in the focal relationship *as compared to the nearest feasible alternative.* Thus, maintenance of commitment depends upon available alternatives.

An exchange perspective applies as well to organizations that use coercive stimuli to induce effort, as long as one remembers that coercive organizations are fully dependent upon their ability to impose unacceptable costs at the boundary. No other alternatives should be available so that the coerced become unable to avoid negative utilities. Similarly, organizations offering poor salaries are able to gain greater commitment and effort if there are no alternative jobs available.

This framework also accounts for the weakness of organizations like the Kiwanis or Elks. The important point to note is these organizations are *not* major purveyors of sociability, friendship, intimacy, and love. Families, kin networks, and informal groups provide these. The ability of families and love relationships to draw forth commitment and effort, while variable, is clearly of an order that rivals the strength of the most coercive of organizations. Such organizations as the Elks and senior citizens clubs are likely to have stronger holds over people who are without attachment to family, kin, and informal friendship groups than where these forms of sociation are available elsewhere. Analysis of incentives without analysis of alternatives of supply is likely to lead to a partial analysis of the strength of incentives.

This relationship between the strength of organizational incentives and a participant's motivational investment in goods supplied by the organization and/or his ability to attain these goods elsewhere can be summarized parsimoniously by the microeconomic notion of price elasticity. In general, demand for a good is said to be inelastic when an increase in the cost of that good is not matched by a proportionate decrease in the number of buyers; demand is defined as elastic when an increase in cost results in a disproportionate decrease in the number of buyers (Mansfield, 1970). In the inelastic case, when participants cannot substitute around or do without the inducement they receive from the organization and when alternative sources of supply are nonexistent, then an organization has a powerful incentive; as the demands made on participants are increased dramatically, few participants will leave the organization. On the other hand, where participants have access to the inducements from other sources or if they can substitute for or do without such goods, then an increase in the time effort demanded by the organization will result in massive defections by participants.[11]

For example, pure social movements that rely solely on purposive incentives or organizations such as the Kiwanis or Elks that rely on friendship to motivate effort generally operate under the latter, elastic, condition, while families or concentration camps find that they use an inelastic inductment with few, rather imperfect substitutes and limited or no alternative sources of supply. Thus, it can be seen that the ratio between an increase in costs and the proportional decrease in those who continue to work for the organization is a parsimonious way of assessing the strength of collective incentives.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

We have developed a property space for incentive analysis using concepts related to the notion of utility. Our dimensions have been negative and positive utilities, the relative likelihood of incentive delivery, transferability, and the collectiveness of goods. These were used to develop a typology for the classification of incentives. The property space allows one to see the similarity and difference between organizations offering closely related incentives. It also provides a consistent language for describing the dimensions of incentives.

This language is useful when one seeks to combine the findings of various disciplines. In general, it is peculiar that analysts of organizational and political incentives and compliance write with little attention to the social-psychological and psychological underpinnings of their concepts. Moreover, they ignore price theory. Heuristically this is justifiable, but it leads to a needless one-sidedness in their work. For generations psychologists have worked upon dimensions of incentives and economists have discussed the conditions of elasticity. Organizational and political theorists ought not cut themselves off from such traditions. Our analysis provides a bridge.

At the beginning of this essay we noted that many scholars have found it useful to use compliance/incentive notions to account for differences among major classes of organizations. We believe they do so because incentives and incentive systems are among the fundamental constitutional elements of organizations (Zald, 1970). They are part of the bargain, the social contract involved in joining, participating, and leaving organizations. They shape other fundamental aspects of organization, the internal stratification and authority system, the range of usable technology and task differentiation, and the effectiveness of organizational goal attainment. We believe, then, that our effort here contributes to understanding a fundamental aspect of organizations.

NOTES

1. It is worth noting that 15 years have gone by since their original publications in this area, and that both Etzioni (1975) and Wilson (1973) continue to use their classifications. Yet neither takes into account the other's classifications or modifies his own toward the other's. Wilson (1973: 52) notes the overlap with Etzioni but writes that his focus is upon voluntary associations, leading him to focus upon incentives and inducements rather than on compliance. Etzioni (1975: 91) only notes that Wilson notes the overlap!

2. A property space can be either theoretically or empirically derived. Factor analysis and cluster analysis are archetypical statistical methods for empirically deriving underlying dimensions. Theoretical derivation proceeds by utilizing conceptual distinctions and related dimensions as units of analysis related to some theoretically defined object of analysis. Theoretical development of a property space leads to type concepts that represent combinations of unitary dimensions. A theoretically derived property space is successful if it reveals types that previous classificatory schemas had ignored. Empirically, these types may rarely be matched. Theoretically derived property spaces are also successful if by their introduction of salient dimensions they separate and make distinctions within classes previously considered homogeneous. See the writings of Bailey (1972, 1973) for the most recent work on typology construction and their relationship to empirical analysis.

3. Analogies to money have been used by other scholars to analyze noneconomic exchange. See Parsons (1963) on influence processes and Coleman (1970) on political money.

4. Anyone interested in the difference between positive and negative sanctions will find it worthwhile to read Baldwin's incisive analysis.

5. Etzioni (1975: 27) notes that the forms of coercion in which he is interested are dependent upon such boundary control.

6. This is the organizational delivery side of the concept of expected utility, which decision theorists use in incorporating probability of payoff into individual choice functions, See Siegel et al. (1964).

7. Paid staff in these associations receive high-probability incentives, while other members, lower probability incentives.

8. We should note that transferability relates to other dimensions of incentives that a finer-grained analysis might include. Pursuing the analogy to money, we would separate from transferability (1) the alienability of incentives (the extent to which they adhere to the recipient or are detachable); (2) their generalizability (the extent to which the amount of utility is abstracted from the incentive); and (3) the divisibility of incentives (the extent to which utility is infinitely divisible or must be delivered in "lumpy" units). These dimensions overly complicate the present property space and are therefore excluded.

9. Wilson's purposive organization and most of Etzioni's "pure normative organizations" are of these kinds (see Wilson, 1973: 35, 46; Etzioni, 1975: 10-11, 40-41). Utility is gained through either identification with direct beneficiaries or through the sense of moral or altruistic self worth that comes through the assuagement of internalized values (see Kelman, 1958).

10. Olson's analysis focuses only upon collective goods, those that must be jointly supplied. The concept of collective goods should not be confused with ego's desires for alter's benefit (altruism). Ego may value alter's benefit as much as he values his own. If the good will not be jointly supplied (in economic terms, has no externalities), there is no free-rider problem and either ego or alter must bear the cost of obtaining it.

11. For an application of elasticity concepts to political commitment and choice, see Strickland and Johnson (1970).

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