continuity of economic change from the sixteenth century forward. And the lavish use of metaphor and the easy assignment of cause and motive seem to defeat rather than assist any effort at historical explanation.

But the author did not embark on a subtle analysis of the relation of the historical record to what actually happened. Rather he undertook to demonstrate how the South Sea Bubble illustrates "the unity of economic with general political and social history," and in this he has certainly succeeded. Indeed the course of events was so turbulent, and the emotional impact so complex, that we can only conclude that the episode must have meant vastly different things to different people. As a kaleidoscopic presentation, Carswell's book is something of a tour de force.

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MANUEL GOTTLIEB. The German Peace Settlement and the Berlin Crisis. Pp. xx, 275. New York: Paine-Whitman, 1960. \$8.50.

Among the issues on which the Cold War seems to feed, the Berlin, and, beyond that, the German, issue appear to be the most durable, vexing, and, perhaps, insoluble. Because all great powers are in closest military contact in the German area, these issues also appear to be among the most explosive in the world today. Manuel Gottlieb has made a significant contribution to the literature on this critical subject.

He proceeds from the assumption that the conflict in the 1960's has its roots in the negotiations of the 1940's. He argues that an East-West settlement, at that time, was not as far out of reach as is commonly understood. A united, liberal, but neutralized, probably "semisocialized," Germany could have been agreed upon. Germany "could have played a buffer role separating and bonding together East and West." The main obstacles to such an agreement appear to have been Western distrust of Soviet partnership, Western underestimation of Germany's reparation potential, and a Western desire to utilize

West Germany as a springboard for mobilization of North Atlantic forces in defense of an antisocialist community of interests.

The author has determined that monetary questions, currency reform, reparations, and related matters, of which he evidently has intimate, expert knowledge, were among the most crucial sources of conflict. The key issue of currency reform, to the Soviets a casus belli leading to the Berlin blockade, arose as much from Western as from Soviet intransigence, from inability to sift fact from fiction on the part of both camps, and to a considerable extent from general confusion on an exceedingly complex matter. Very strongly emphasized, although not too clearly brought out, is the tendency in East-West negotiations to deal in sweeping assumptions concerning the other side's intentions, to resort to abstractions instead of hard, close, and objective analysis of the respective positions on specific issues.

On the subject of Communist ideological commitment, this book takes a position somewhat unlike that underlying most investigations of the nature of the Cold War. While ideology is not disregarded, its role in the determination of Soviet policies is assessed differently. It is argued that in the German case, Communist ideology may in fact have been more flexible than elsewhere and at other times in history. Although no one can say with certainty that the Soviets would have accepted "coexistence" in the German zone, on different terms of course than those advanced by the West, it is argued here that their willingness to do so was never really put to the test. The author certainly makes a good case for re-evaluation of history related to the German issue with more attention paid to simple failings, miscues, and missed opportunities. For instance, he argues that on the question of reparations, had Soviet diplomacy been less crude, blundering, and inept, many of the cardinal errors on the Western side might have been avoided. If the reader has enough patience to work his way through an uncultivated, doctoral-thesis style, he should find this study most helpful to an understanding of the German question. scholarship concentrated on this volume is

indeed of high quality, as well as of staggering impact.

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JOHN GIMBEL. A German Community Under American Occupation: Marburg, 1945-52. (Stanford Studies in History, Economics, and Political Science, XXI.) Pp. vi, 259. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1961. \$5.50.

The over-all organization, policies, and activities of the United States in occupied Germany have, perhaps, not received the attention from scholars that they deserve, but there is at least a considerable body of literature currently available here. However, little attention resulting in publications has been paid to studies in military government detachments, liaison and security offices, and resident offices in specific German communities. It is generally recognized that the proof of a pudding is to be found in its eating, and it would seem to follow that the record of the United States in Germany depends in large measure on its achievements and failures in the various local areas in which the primary operations were carried on. Professor John Gimbel has set himself the task of examining the provisions made by the American occupation authorities in one important German community, Marburg, and the impact which American activities have had on various aspects of community life. It seems to this reviewer that he has made a very substantial contribution to a better understanding of the whole tangled web of the American occupation of Germany. Marburg may not be entirely representative—indeed what single community could claim to be-but it does offer a good basis for a study such as Gimbel has made. If somewhat comparable studies could be produced of half a dozen or so other communities it would then be possible to establish conclusions which would be of great value to those interested in military administration.

Gimbel has searched the military government files in the Kansas City Army Records Center and the files of the Office of the United States Commissioner for Germany, discovering that despite efforts taken several years ago to declassify a proportion of such documents, a serious problem of access remains. But he has gone much further than analyzing official records, which he has frequently found to be inaccurate, by carrying on field work in Mar-There he has consulted Landkreis burg. and Stadkreis papers, political party files, and the personal records of various key Germans and has interviewed local citizens. Altogether, his sources seem more than ordinarily adequate, even if they do not always provide great detail in certain areas. He has brought to his analysis a critical, but relatively impartial, attitude, which has made it possible to arrive at perceptive and well-founded generalizations.

The conclusions reached may seem to some readers very gloomy-certainly the record of the United States in Marburg was not one of brilliant success. The inadequate understanding of the great majority of American representatives of German language, history, institutions, and psychology, the mistakes in picking the wrong sort of Germans for staff and social contacts, the almost shocking turnover in American personnel, the badly confused policies—all make it hardly surprising that the ambitious American programs to reconstruct education, reform the civil service, and introduce new patterns of economic, social, and political organization did not succeed. But the impression of American character left on the people of Marburg was more favorable than one might suppose.

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GERALD FREUND. Germany Between Two Worlds. Pp. xx, 296. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1961. \$5.75.

During recent years a considerable number of books dealing with German problems have been published in English—though it is interesting to note that the Fifth Republic of France has within the brief space of two years probably received more attention than the Federal Republic of Germany or the German Democratic Republic