

Personal hostility and international aggression

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Reasoning by analogy is man's most favored and least trusted logical tool. Without it he would be seriously hampered in his search for explanations of human behavior, yet with it he has committed some of his most noteworthy scientific blunders. The perils of reasoning by analogy have been catalogued with such devastating care in the education of most thinkers that they have had to choose from among three alternatives if they are loath to abandon this fascinating form of logic. First, they can continue the practice of this arcane art in the privacy of their own minds and display the outcome of such thought to the public while maintaining strict secrecy regarding the process by which it was achieved. Second, they can boldly display their predilection and admit their addiction to all forms of analogy but render their activity harmless by erecting a series of "warning" or "caution" signs for the reader. As an excuse for their psychological quirk, they may lean on rationalizations similar to those once popular as an explanation for the heavy consumption of whiskey, i.e., for medicinal purposes, snake bite, etc. Finally, the scientist may, rather than call a spade a spade, call an analogy a model. Such a maneuver is a testament to scientific ingenuity for it simultaneously gives prestige to the process while leaving its essence unchanged.

This account of personal hostility and international aggression is not intended as

an exercise in analysis by analogy or model building. Rather, it will describe the vicissitudes of threat, aggression, and deterrence among children who hate. The extrapolation from personal hostility to the paradoxes of international aggression can be stimulating and provocative if we are the masters rather than the victims of reasoning by analogy. An analogy is, like any instrument, not dangerous in itself; its hazard lies in the way it is used. Analogy has a long and noble history of fomenting new vistas of thought and new combinations of ideas. Its successful application requires only restraint and avoidance of excess.

Living with a group of 70 aggressive, anti-social, anti-adult boys provides, in miniature, an unparalleled opportunity to experiment with the natural history of aggression and its deterrence. The setting for these observations was The University of Michigan Fresh Air Camp. The camp is a clinical training center for graduate students drawn from the fields of clinical psychology, psychiatric nursing, psychiatric social work, and special education; the campers are boys recruited from detention homes, training schools, mental hospitals, and clinics throughout the State of Michigan. The camp specializes in children who hate. Since it is a diagnostic and therapeutic training center (3) there is an "unnatural" element to the interaction of these aggressive children; their most violent and gross expressions of hostility are ob-

structed by the adults for reasons of common humanity. In almost all other respects (except for physical punishment) the camp duplicates the normal life-setting of the child who is in violent protest against the form society has taken, the demands it makes on him, and the forces who represent the present world order. The camp, then, is an arena in which each child acts out his destructive pathology in relating to himself, his peers, and the rules of peaceful living.

The Communication of Threat

At the beginning of the camp season, our angry young men are usually strangers to one another. While each has a long record of war-like proclivities, he has only a dim awareness of the details of the hostile encounters of the other boys. Each boy has organized his perception of the world and his position in it along the dimension of toughness, fierceness, fearlessness, and resistance to the influence of others. It is these ingredients that come to flavor the social mixture which shortly emerges. At once, the boys begin a pattern of militant probing of one another in their individual and group relations seeking to establish a basis for dominance and submission.

The camp aggressive pecking order is established by the boys through a number of interpersonal devices which resemble those used by nations to establish their position in the world. A description of some of the most prominent devices and brief case illustrations of their use will be presented here but no reliable objective data are available. The generalizations which make up the substance of the analogy are derived from observations of patterns of delinquent aggression at the camp for the last six years. In this respect, the conclusions reached should be treated as theoretical speculations based on clinical experience. The regularity of the appearance of these aggressive se-

quences makes the nature of our summer experience highly predictable but statistical estimates of the frequency of appearance of each of the devices or of the frequency of various responses to our attempts to deter aggression must await the execution of a systematic experiment now in the planning stage.

SABER RATTLING

Most often, sabers are rattled on a to-whom-it-may-concern basis. Tall tales of aggressive prowess, violation of the law, defiance of adults, and resistance to requests all communicate threat to the eager listeners. They constitute a declaration of readiness to act violently as well as a demonstration of fearlessness. As soon as some recognizable order begins to emerge in the group, the saber-rattling becomes increasingly target-oriented and these subtle communications of threat focus on that person perceived as most powerful. The art of saber-rattling is practiced with great finesse by these boys, and they are careful to make their threats ambiguous and not easily challenged. At this stage in their relations with others they cannot afford, nor do they intend, to have a showdown. They rather are seeking to detect saber-rattling-induced-fear in others. This device is the least expensive and least dangerous form of establishing dominance over others. It is also, by its very ambiguity, the least effective. Its most usual consequence is heightened saber-rattling by the intended victims. If at this point the threat is reinforced by sudden, violent action, the dominance pattern quickly crystallizes with the advantage going to the aggressor. The cost of an ill-timed or poorly prepared assault is immense. The aggressor who fails is pounced upon by the others and forced to suffer further humiliation and loss in status. Being aware that this fate awaits the loser, saber-rattling is intense and pro-

longed but the point of no return is carefully avoided.

The most usual form of saber-rattling is the threat of massive retaliation if any other boy tampers with one's personal possessions. This is done before any tampering occurs. Tommy, for example, walked into his cabin the first day, distributed his possessions on his bed, coolly surveyed his new cabin mates, turned to the counselor and announced, "If anyone touches this stuff he's going to be minus some teeth." The fact that these were the first words he uttered made his aggressiveness have greater impact and the generalized nature of the threat was such that no other boy felt personally challenged. In this instance the counselor was taken aback and erred by stating that he didn't think anyone would touch his property. When the counselor failed to deal with the fact that threatening others was improper behavior and responded, rather, by assuring the threatener he would not have to carry out the threat, the other boys could only conclude that the threatener was indeed powerful. In the first few moments of his diplomatic contact with the other boys, the threatener had gained an enormous advantage; an advantage that could have been limited by a proper and well-timed response.

RECOUNTING PAST GLORIES

A refined version of the communication of threat is to be found in the recital of glory attained in great historical conflicts. This device has a quality of the "Terrible Turk" about it and is not subject to critical or objective appraisal by the listeners. To be sure, the audience regularly discounts these tales of heroism and power, but a lingering doubt is planted in the mind of the consumer and this doubt can grow vigorously when nurtured by the intended victim's fears. The potential combatants match story-for-story while they eye one another warily to judge the degree of current prowess that remains from this colorful history. I have seen boys literally come to believe their own propaganda and act hastily and ill-advisedly while swept up in their delusion of capability. As their fictions wax

more incredible, the level of threat perceived by others increases apace and the probability of open conflict becomes assured. Once these tribal tales have become excessive and when the dominance-seeker is confident of his ground, he can force the issue simply by announcing publicly that the other is a liar. This grievous insult can only be revenged by battle or backing down. Either alternative fixes another portion of the ranking of dominance and submission. Again, the challenger has the advantage and usually eliminates the other as a competitive threat. A bold course of action, particularly when it is excessively violent, acts to inhibit similar behavior among the observers and to force them to soft pedal their accounts of ancient heroism.

Harold had been sent to the detention home (for two days) when he was caught extorting money from younger school children. One evening he was regaling his cabin mates with stories of a series of fierce fights he had with bigger boys at the detention home and of how he had used judo to best them. As the other boys listened with fascination and asked detailed questions, he began to elaborate in an unbelievable fashion. One other boy vied for attention by telling similarly exaggerated tales, each one topping the other. As the audience became split between the two, the boys began to accuse one another of lying and fell to fighting in an attempt publicly to demonstrate their prowess. They remained enemies for the duration of camp since each had unforgivably wounded the other psychologically.

THE ROLE CALL OF ALLIES

Early in the process of social maneuver the child can increase his potential threat by making unsparing reference to his "gang" at home or other allies who would join him in an aggressive adventure. This role call of allies tends to be highly unrealistic since their capacity to deliver military support and their willingness to become embroiled in a purely local contest are highly speculative. In itself, the reference to allies is an admis-

sion of weakness that does not go unnoticed by those exposed to such claims. Unless some convincing demonstration of allied solidarity is forthcoming, our aggressive children demote the users of such a threat to a submissive status. The usual response of the threatener is then to redouble his effort to frighten others with the strength of his allies and this action serves only to confirm the group's original low estimate of his capacity.

Allies prove to communicate the greatest threat when they are obviously present, certain to act immediately in retaliation, capable of inflicting substantial damage, and are not paraded out of fear. To accomplish these ends, groups of boys consolidate their relations with others into a gang structure and a group code which binds them together. By institutionalizing (1) their aggressive behavior and becoming interdependent on one another, they increase the risk of becoming involved in a personally meaningless conflict but the price is always judged well worth the benefit they receive through the strength of unity. The formation of gangs in the camp makes the role call of allies a more meaningful threat and one that serves as a focus for the endless tug-of-war of dominance-submission relationships. As the gangs come to resemble nation-states, the quality of aggressive interplay shifts to a different dimension with altered characteristics. To judge the individual's readiness to respond with hostility you must now account for his relationship to his social group and the complexity of the prediction increases immeasurably (1).

Few leaders are lone wolves. There is a reassurance in the existence of a gang and we never encountered a child for whom the notion of submerging individual desires to the group good was not already a familiar idea. Tony (one of our most accomplished delinquent leaders) began, with the aid of a single lieutenant, to form a loyal group by what now

seem to us to be a classic series of steps. Once the broad outline of dominance and submission had been established he forced the weakest boys to join him or suffer punishment. At the same time, he bribed those of middle power by sharing stolen candy and cigarettes with them. Having assembled a hard core of five boys, he consolidated them into a loyal group by leading forays (night raids, attacking lone younger children, forcing adult decisions in their favor, etc.) which made the group both disciplined and visible to others. The remaining three boys, who had been strong enough to resist Tony's leadership, soon joined the ranks with the others since they found the array of Tony's allies too powerful to withstand. Tony's visible display of allies forced the cabin holdouts to line up with him but it also acted to threaten neighboring cabins whose borders he regularly trespassed. Other gangs formed (using the argument of mutual defense against Tony) and open warfare soon resulted. As an interesting sidelight, those groups formed only with the common motive of defense suffered more internal bickering and never developed a coherent policy of meeting Tony's threats and invasions.

OUR GROWING MIGHT

For both groups and individuals, threat is apparent in communication to others about growing prowess and might. In camp this most frequently takes the form of description of exotic weaponry secretly available. Thus, a real or imagined switch-blade knife that a boy implies he has available to him is a source of considerable anxiety to others. If he is known to be weaponless, he can resort to claiming that, out of common cause, others are planning to supply him with the means of destruction. The core of this threat is mystery and the wise propagandist lets the threat spawn its twisted offspring in the fantasy of his victim. A knife or other weapon is a meaningful threat since it tends to equalize the more obvious and observable dimensions of size, age, and strength. In much the same fashion, psychological warfare about strength is conducted via the enhancement of observable

properties. The boys spend hours practicing boxing or muscle-building in highly public places and they work to achieve and accomplish feats of ability in fields related to aggressive capacity (i.e., athletics). The threat of growing might usually spurs the intended victims to engage in an armaments race with the threatener. If this course is taken and not restrained by some outside force, the inevitable consequence is open warfare. As each hostile child successively increases his threat to the other, the process reaches a point where it is intolerable to both and the tension becomes mutually unbearable. At this juncture, the need for relief from the tension of threat is greater than the deterrence provided by fear of the consequences of warfare and combat soon is joined.

A favorite (and regular) method of accruing additional might for a gang is to steal table knives from the dining room. These are sharpened, surreptitiously, for a later "rumble" of unspecified dimensions. In one such incident, a single table knife was stolen at lunch and the word spread so rapidly through the grapevine that forty knives were missing after supper. We forced a general disarmament by offering amnesty to all who would surrender their weapons and we recovered all but a few. The most determined of our aggressive leaders insisted they were "clean" and kept their knives hidden. Throughout that particular summer we were plagued by the continual theft of knives and as each culprit was apprehended he would insist that he needed it for self defense since the staff had been unable to disarm the others. While the weapons were *never* used in combat, the threat posed by their possession caused a succession of fights and provoked extreme distrust among individuals and gangs.

DETERRENCE BY ATTACK

The single most effective device for spreading threat throughout the group is to be found in deterrence by attack or what might be described as the vicious example. The usual sequence of events involves the conscious selection, by a determinedly ag-

gressive boy, of an innocent victim who possesses exactly the proper characteristics and potentialities. Once selected, the victim is provoked into a hostile act (usually over possessions) and then is soundly beaten by the attacker. The original hostility on the part of the victim is used by the attacker as a guarantee of immunity from authority and the victim's savage defeat spreads like wild fire through the community and acts at once as a threat to everyone. The aggressor need not repeat this demonstration again since he has dramatically and violently established his dominance and conveyed a widespread threat. He then proceeds to prey on any and all unprotected boys using saber-rattling as his chief and highly effective weapon. The only limit on his capacity to aggrandize against others is the aggressive strength he had to begin with. If he is not very powerful he will be deterred by bigger and more powerful boys unless he converts his victims into satellites who will fight as he commands them. It is interesting that satellites achieved by conquest become, before long, willing allies who share a common sense of purpose with the aggressor. They soon "forget" the basis of their association with the aggressor and as they share the benefits of association with him, become convinced they are partners rather than prisoners. Attempts to explain the true nature of their relationship to the aggressor fail to dissuade unless the benefits of dissociation are made as attractive as those available as a satellite. The satellizing person, whatever his original motivation, tends to be actively well informed about the advantages of his status and only vaguely able to comprehend the abstract possibilities of other arrangements. This is no accident; it is a routine aspect of dominance-submission relationships.

Aggressively delinquent boys rarely attack their victims without first provoking them to

some hostile act. Deterrence by attack is judged in terms of the transparency of the rationalization that is used to justify the assault. Among boys who hunger for power, the flimsiest of excuses is deemed sufficient and they are constantly on the alert for the proper opportunity. The most vicious illustration was the case of a boy who hit a "friend" in the mouth while the "friend" was taking a mid-afternoon nap. The inhumanity of this act was so threatening to the other boys that the aggressor became the undisputed leader of the group. It became a major task to demonstrate to the boys that they followed out of fear rather than respect.

The Response to Threat

The most usual response to threat is the experience of fear. Fear in turn stimulates counter measures designed to remove the threat and it is these counter measures that produce warfare between boys or gangs. The classic obverse case is that of the small boy who rattles his saber, recounts his past glories, calls the role of his allies, and defines his growing might only to be greeted by raucous laughter and amusement on the part of the "victim" who is twice his size. The hollow threat provokes no fear and no retaliation. When faced squarely with a meaningful threat the victim usually responds in kind. He threatens through a series of "if" propositions. He threatens to deprive (if you attack, I will withhold things you want). He threatens to retaliate in kind or he threatens a horrible but unspecified fate for the attacker. This exchange of ultimatums is always halted by combat if one of the two boys is certain of his capacity to win. It is halted short of combat if the ultimatums are face-saving and clearly recognized as such by both the stronger and the weaker parties. In any event, the weaker party must be the first to cease issuing ultimatums (thus tacitly admitting defeat) if he wishes to avoid open hostility of a physical sort.

Given the perception of threat by others,

aggressive boys indulge in all the familiar national patterns of response (5). They threaten massive retaliation, they engage in brinkmanship, they openly discuss first and second strike capabilities, they engage in armament races, they recruit allies, and they assume a succession of defensive postures in their search for security and freedom from fear. They tend regularly to underestimate the capacity of the enemy as they concentrate on what *they* will do in retaliation for attack. They tend to stereotype the enemy and simplify his thought processes in order to be able to plan easily for defense. When the threat is directed toward a group or gang, there are long arguments about policy and defense with the actual behavior at the time of open conflict being quite spontaneous, unthinking, and not according to plan.

The most common first reaction to threat is an unfortunate one—communication with the enemy ceases. The immediate effect of this withdrawal from direct contact with the opponent is to render the determinants of action as much a consequence of fantasy and fear as of an appraisal of reality. Corrective information about motives, tools, or plans are left to speculation and the machinations of fear and anxiety. Preparations for defense are always misinterpreted by the antagonist as preparation for attack and a vicious circle is closed. The catalogue of reactions to threat is a familiar one and need not be detailed. It is at this point in the interpersonal relations of children who hate that mechanisms for the deterrence of aggression become mandatory.

The Deterrence of Aggression

The attempt to head off disorder or to restore peace is an unending process with these children. Ideally, all our efforts should be directed toward prevention and the construction of a world in which there would be

no need for assault as a part of interpersonal diplomacy. This, unfortunately, is not possible in a situation in which individuals have been allowed to develop an aggressive style of life and have had experiences which assure the development of hatred toward the world as it is. We must start, then, with the fact of aggression as a way of life; aggression that has proved a profitable device in the past or aggression that has been the single alternative offered to the child in his early life. A power-hungry potential leader finds in aggression the path to his aims.

The devices we use to control aggression are mostly stop-gap in nature. They are attempts to limit the expression of hostility so that the long process of reorganizing the individual and of providing him with alternatives for achievement other than war (4) can be begun. The catalogue of deterrents to be described is not rank-ordered in terms of effectiveness since the usefulness of each technique varies immensely with the specifics of each situation.

DISENGAGEMENT

This deterrent to aggression has the advantage of controlling the intensity of hostile interchange and the flaw of severing communication between the warring parties. We make an attempt to prevent complete communication loss by restricting contact only when it is absolutely necessary. In many instances we can find neutral zones of activity in which the activity itself acts as a cushion to the mutual aggression. Group activities that do not require one-to-one contact can, if properly supervised, absorb much mutual antagonism. The purpose of disengagement is to eliminate the possibility of head-on encounter while encouraging interaction that can have a positive outcome. Transient aggressive outbursts that are a consequence of passing frustrations

frequently dissolve in the midst of the substitute activity and then need no further attention. If no better than neutrality is achieved, each of the boys tends to store up hostility for a later encounter. Disengagement without constructive re-establishment of communication between the warring parties becomes nothing more than a temporary stand-off and increases the tension and perceived threat between them.

In order to disengage two combatants and yet maintain communication between them, we appoint a neutral third party (a counselor) to act as intermediary between them. In this fashion, each boy is prevented from directly provoking the other or responding directly to provocation since direct contact of any sort is a violation of the rules to which we have agreed. In order to break the hostile deadlock, the counselor arranges a series of highly gratifying situations in which they both can participate (ice-cream making, special trips, etc.) without competing for the gratification. Activities that work best are those in which their independent contributions produce an otherwise unobtainable end product which they can then mutually enjoy. Preparing and cooking food for a cook-out is effective if their individual hungers are not allowed to become too intense.

a) *Demilitarized Zones.* When the level of mutual hostility is extremely high, disengagement must take a more drastic form than the simple and general admonition to stay away from one another. The stated specification of situations and areas to be avoided becomes necessary. The purpose of the demilitarized zones goes beyond reducing the possibility of open conflict. It serves as an indication to the fighters of the seriousness with which an aggressive solution to their problems is viewed. Frequently, the complexity of the arrangements for disengagement and demilitarization of certain zones impresses each child with his own power (why else all the adult attention?) and, in a sense, both get carried away with admiration for their own "wanted"

posters. It is an excellent face-saving device for all concerned and it is greeted with a sigh of relief by the combatants.

b) *Secession*. Failing all else, we sometimes allow small groups to secede from the larger society for brief periods of time. This is an extreme form of disengagement which permits a gross reorganization of the individual or group relationships free of the stimulation to aggress provided by others. Such a move must be a voluntary one and communication about the meaning of the secession and plans for eventual unity with the larger society must be continuous. The most usual outcome of such secession is that of a growing awareness on the part of those involved of their own contribution to their difficulties. Secession is most effective when blame for interpersonal difficulties is being attributed solely to the actions of others. Secession amounts to a process of eliminating the supposed causes of the difficulty in order to examine the individual's behavior free of stimulation and provocation. The effectiveness of this device depends in great part on the willingness of adults to allow aggressive children to prey on one another rather than the larger society. Humanity dictates that such experiments be done with caution since they regularly prove to be painful to all concerned.

TREATIES AND TRUCES

Cease fire arrangements can be made with some success either on an implicit or explicit basis. As with most instances of aggressive conflict, we can depend on the existence of considerable fear in both boys. The explosive and uncontrolled character of open hostility is such that no one can really be comfortable with it and it is this fear-inspiring quality which brings our antagonists to the diplomatic table. The willingness to negotiate is stimulated further by the awareness of disapproval for aggressive be-

havior by the outside world. In any event, the meanest and toughest of our clients has always welcomed the opportunity to protest his innocence and to accuse his opposite number. We have discovered that any form of treaty or truce has a limited future. They tend to last only as long as it is to the mutual interest of the parties to maintain them. The moment of rupture is never fully predictable since it is a function of any of a number of situations which can act to light the fuse. Continued communication, positive experiences, and therapy focused on the reasons for the mutual hostility are needed. Without these reasoned attempts at a solution of the relationship, treaties and truces do no more than provide time for the emotions to fester and for both sides to prepare anew.

OCCUPATION TROOPS

In the most severe instances, disengagement, demilitarization, or truce and treaty are not sufficient deterrents. A stronger third party is required to police the terms of the agreement. These watch dogs need to be vigilant in the early stages of their task and be sensitive to the developing situation in order to pass control on to those being policed. If vigilance continues beyond the demands of the situation, the watch dogs become the recipients of hostility issuing from both sides. Efforts to anticipate difficulties and to head off trouble are resented since they take place at a point in time where the consequences of a failure to interfere are far from apparent. Such peace-making is trying to the most expert of men.

Our use of occupation troops is usually on a territorial basis; members of warring gangs are not allowed to be in the cabin area without adult supervision. This third party is always resented as an inhibitor of the right to self-determination and receives not only aggression displaced from the true target but is hated for what it represents as a symbol of parent-like interference. In part, the resentment arises be-

cause the occupation troops are a constant reminder that the child is not considered capable of managing his own affairs. This visible insult to one's maturity is a frustration that evokes aggression which gets heightened every time a dispute is settled in favor of the enemy.

INSPECTION

Occupation troops also act as inspectors to assure that the terms of agreement are being kept. Inspection is resented in the extreme by innocent and guilty alike. In instances when contraband is being sought (cigarettes, knives, stolen property, etc.) the victims of the act of inspection use the act in an attempt to establish a basis for emotional blackmail against the inspectors. Cooperation tends to be sullen or coupled with resentment and inspectors soon are torn between their need to enforce the law and an equally compelling need to establish friendly and unsuspecting relations with those being inspected. We have discovered no way to make threat of inspection appear to be other than what it is—an expression of distrust of others. The more thorough the inspector, the more hostility his acts engender. In an effort to circumvent this situation, we do not ask those who have a good relationship with the child or who must deal with him in other circumstances to act as inspectors. We try to leave negotiation and diplomacy for those who are neutral or whose relationship is uncontaminated.

In addition to the psychological damage which inspection seems to do, it happens also to be fairly ineffective as a means of controlling behavior or discovering contraband. Among boys with records of delinquency, the normal channels of intelligence are as effective as, and if done properly, free of the stigma and indignity of, inspection. If the participants agree to the inspection and cooperate with it, we can deduce either that the inspected have decided to match wits with us or that inspection is

unnecessary. The hostility generated by inspection hardly makes it worth the effort.

SOCIAL ISOLATION

In the tradition of all blockades, social isolation acts to deprive the aggressive child of his victim. This is a last resort used only for totally unmanageable children since it is essentially a punitive act. Being deprived of the society of his peers is an especially painful event since the average child is without the requisite skills for tolerating aloneness. Isolation is usually entered into with bravado by the child but this soon passes into intense longing for companions. We isolate the child from those with whom he cannot relate peacefully but we do not remove him completely from human contact. There are advantages to positive contact with other non-combatants and all the child's contacts are supervised by an understanding adult. The role of adult supervision is not that of police and prisoner, it is rather that of a friend to a child in trouble. All of the adult's efforts are directed to understanding the source of the child's conflict and to providing insight about it to the child. In this manner, we again pursue our policy of expanded rather than restricted communication about the problem to be solved. In our search for the sources of irritation we need always to probe beneath the surface of the distasteful behavior. To the degree that we stereotype and oversimplify, we fail at our task and hostility breaks out anew.

Social isolation is used only for violent and dangerous children. When a child is isolated socially, he is removed from his cabin and while he has access to all of the facilities of camp he is never allowed to contact (or be in the vicinity of) those toward whom he has hostile feelings. Two conditions are imposed: (1) he must work actively to solve his problem of relating to the group, (2) he must make enough progress to be able to return to his group within a three-day

period. If we fail to succeed in this effort we send the boy back to the detention home. In essence, sending him home is the equivalent of establishing a complete blockade so that we no longer render him any service. With all the resources at our command we find we are forced, at times, to take such extreme steps.

An Appraisal of the Deterrence of Aggression

With all the skill and experience we have accumulated in the management and deterrence of aggression, we must still report cases that resist the best of our efforts. Aggression with an admixture of psychosis or aggression with deep roots may require lengthy treatment without much hope for success. When such children reach the age when they are more able to instrument the hostility they feel or when they rise to positions of power in a society, the problem of curbing them is intensified incredibly. Their hostility evokes an echo in the unexpressed anger of those who follow them and the cloak of rationality and righteousness soon descends over their behavior.

The behavior of an aggressive individual can be controlled, as we have demonstrated, but only under special circumstances. In our case, the aggressive child is relatively powerless against adults experienced with hostility in all of its forms and almost all of our control issues from this relationship. The older and more experienced the child, the less effective are our controls and the more we must rely on repressive measures.

Our observations of this microcosm of aggression have taught us several things. We have come to know of the intimate connection between fear and aggression and have learned never to deal with one without the other. We have discovered that the most usual error is that of underestimating the fear component in aggressive acts. It is most often for this reason that solutions to aggression tend to fail. We have been

forced to face squarely the powder-keg-and-lighted-match character of hostile persons. Their emotions and their capacity to aggress are ever-present dangers to peaceful existence and form the basis for seemingly trivial incidents that trigger great explosions.

The role of fear has its greatest impact when communications are severed between the hostile units. A rise in tension regularly accompanies the failure to communicate since the anchoring points in reality are eliminated. Ignorance gives fear free reign and elevates tension and the perception of threat to the point that the reality of capacity to attack becomes less vital than the promise of freedom from tension.

Deterrence of aggression we have found always to be a part solution and an unstable one at best. Unless the basic causes of aggression are remedied, deterrence can bring only a false sense of security. Positive deterrence in the form of need satisfaction and acceptable alternative forms of behavior must be a necessary second step.

While it is apparent that man is unlikely to discover a cure-all for his aggressive nature, it is also true that the world is populated by persons for whom aggression is not a problem. For nations of men this enviable state of affairs is achieved when the standards of behavior they value are such as to exclude aggression as a proper means of solving problems. While we are able to accomplish this in individuals more often than we fail at it, the process by which it is achieved is not so clear that we can draw up a set of fool-proof specifications for the mass production of such persons. This is an instance in which we cannot afford to fail in the process of socialization as often as we do. The nature of societies is such that the exceptions often prove to be our undoing. The task of socialization is an unending one since each generation grows to confront us

with exactly the same dilemma we have faced since the beginning of time (2).

What is the relevance of this analogy of the behavior of aggressive delinquents to the war-like actions of nations? It suggests, first, that a clearer understanding of the nature of aggression among groups is very much needed. Social scientists have access to groups in which the evolution of aggression can be studied with an eye to generalizations that will have application to international affairs. The contribution of behavioral scientists has been minimal in this area and, as a consequence, the aggressive acts of nation-states have been responded to by policy-makers as if they were unique and unpredictable. I submit that the careful study of aggressive group interaction in microcosm will eventually provide guide lines for the prediction of such events and for the determination of the most profitable form of deterrent policy. Aggressive interaction has about it a regularity which suggests that an assessment of the kind, quality, and degree of tension between nations would allow a rank-ordering of possible counter-measures in terms of their impact and probable effect. It seems logical to suppose that if it can be done with delinquent gangs it can succeed with other institutionalized ways of expressing aggression.

This analogy has even greater application to our understanding of the role of the aggressive leader in determining conflict between groups. It is, of course, much too naïve to attempt to account for national conflict on the sole basis of the leader's personality. Even the unquestioned leader of a small delinquent gang is subject to influence by his followers and must think in group as well as individual terms in planning his actions. The size and complexity of his following acts do force him to weigh his decisions with increasing care but they do not change the fundamental nature of his

personality. Thus, in times of crisis he is liable to act seeking only the counsel of his own impulses and he is liable, in general, to surround himself with subordinates who share his fundamentally aggressive orientation to life. What society labels as delinquent leadership has about it certain characteristics that must be acknowledged if we are to predict the course of its actions and it is in this respect that personal hostility looms large in international relations.

In our democratic society we tend to see leadership as a process in which a reluctant citizen has power thrust upon him by an enthusiastic electorate and we tend to view with suspicion any avowed desire, on the part of the candidate, to seek power for its own sake. There is something of a charade involved in ascending to power in America, and other nations may find it difficult to understand the discrepancy between the fact of exercise of power and our perception of its proper use. Leaders of other countries emerge from social conditions so unlike our own that we err greatly in assessing them and predicting their reactions from the frame of reference of our own kind of leadership. In this respect, the delinquent leader and his unabashed quest for personal power might be a better model for judging the personality structure of leaders of other cultures. In such leaders, power may not corrupt in the classic sense of converting good to evil; the use of power for personal glory and aggrandizement is more likely to have been the original motivation in his rise to power and this may not seem as reprehensible to members of cultures other than our own. Delinquent followers accept the authority of the raw exercise of power and respond to traditional democracy as evidence of wavering leadership.

To press the analogy further, it would seem reasonable to suppose that to the degree that other societies resemble our own

in values, beliefs, and conception of leadership we might be justified in using our own version of the characteristics of leaders as a guide for prediction of behavior. To the degree that leadership is a function of a life-long self-image constructed on notions of personal destiny, the mysticism of being chosen to lead, and the identity of power and leadership, we might more profitably look to the model of the psychic life of the delinquent as an appropriate guide. The leader for whom the exercise of power is a way of life may be, like delinquent leaders, highly sensitive to the perception of threat from other persons and ready to act violently and to ignore counsel when his emotions are sufficiently aroused. Rational considerations of history, economics, military preparedness or the opinion of others may thus have little impact on the final decision-making process. This analogy suggests that the concept of

"rational man" may have led us astray by causing us to reject too glibly the role of personal hostility and international aggression.

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