

Attitudes toward westbound refugees in the East German press

ERNST F. MUELLER

Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan

Churchill is supposed to have characterized Russia as an enigma inside a riddle wrapped in a mystery. This description seems to apply—*mutatis mutandis*—to all totalitarian systems; we know too little about them. What is relatively accessible, however, are their newspapers. Admittedly, the press is not the most reliable source of information in any social system but, with other avenues of research often closed, it is especially intriguing to study newspapers, trying to make them yield information and even predictions.

This study is an attempt to do just that by considering the reaction of the East German Communist party press to the refugee problem in the months before the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961.¹ It is a post-factum analysis, and the predictive power of the conclusions drawn from the results is, of course, limited to a narrow range of similar situations.

The hypotheses of this study rest on the assumption that the German Democratic Republic is a modern industrialized state and that the foremost aim of every state is its own survival as a functioning social system (Marschak, 1959). Janowitz (1957) characterizes the state as a "territorially based social system which monopolizes the use of the instruments of violence for both internal and external objectives" (p. 9). We assume

further that the modern industrialized state takes the organizational form of a large-scale bureaucratic organization and that principles of organizational theory are applicable not only to capitalist business enterprises but Communist states as well.²

A model for survival is specified by Caplow (1953). According to his views, survival of an organization is assured only if the organization maintains a minimal level of efficiency in its objective functions, and if conflicts can be reduced to a tolerable level, i.e., to a level which induces the members of the organization to continue their participation in it. According to Etzioni (1961), social participation is defined as the integration of the members into the social structure, as well as their willingness to fulfill objective functions within that social structure. Likert (1959) states that willingness to continue participation is assured if interaction between member and organization with its prospective costs and rewards supports the individual's sense of personal worth. Simon, Smithburg, and Thompson (1950) list conditions under which an organization can induce its members to continue participation, thus assuring the survival of the organization: (a) A member will continue his participation in an organization if the offered inducements are at least

¹For a description of the event see Mueller and Greiner (1969).

²For a more detailed exposition of the theoretical considerations, see Mueller and Greiner (1967).

as large as the contributions demanded of him. In order to determine this ratio, knowledge of the values and attitudes of the members is necessary, as well as knowledge of the alternatives to participation. (b) The contributions demanded from the members form the pool from which the organization draws inducements to further participation. Consequently, an organization will be able to exist only as long as sufficient contributions are pooled. Only in this manner can inducements be offered appealing enough to assure further contributions. As Janowitz (1960) and others emphasize, a complex social system cannot assure such social participation by the use of coercion alone. Because of size and complexity and the prohibitive costs of coercion, the modern industrialized state cannot assure social participation without using "manipulation" as a means of social control. "Manipulation" will be defined here as the use of techniques of social control that leave the individual with a feeling of voluntary adjustment to the social system. Manipulation will the better achieve this goal the more it takes into account and considers the wishes and problems of those from whom contributions are expected. Only if such wishes and problems are taken into account can manipulation operate effectively by itself. The less it is possible to consider them, the more necessary it is to augment manipulative techniques by coercive measures. The purpose of manipulation is a reduction in the cost of social control, with outright coercion assumed to be the most expensive form in a modern industrialized state. Several effective manipulative techniques exist. The use of social bribes, such as increasing one's prestige, can be labelled manipulation. In the same way it is manipulation if—unknown to the members—the state or any other organization structures the social and physical environment in such a way that a certain kind of behavior is the only one possible. A third

technique of social manipulation is the use of propaganda, the use of controlled selection and presentation of information as a means of social control. The last-named technique concerns us in this study.

On the basis of these assumptions and their implications it seems justified to draw the following conclusions: (1) Since the modern industrialized state must try to control conflict through the use of manipulation in preference to coercion, and since propaganda is an instrument of manipulation, the state will attempt to control an increase in conflict endangering participation through increased propaganda efforts. (2) Since the modern industrialized state may be forced to use coercion to assure its own survival, but since coercion alone is assumed to be the most expensive form of social control, the state will try to combine coercion and manipulation in such situations. The state will not take coercive action without having readied its citizens for such a measure by propagandistic preparation. (3) Since the modern industrialized state, even in a situation of unavoidable coercion, cannot dispense with manipulation (at least not with manipulation in the sense of propagandistic preparation), and since an increase in conflict will be accompanied by increased efforts at control through propaganda, intensity of propaganda becomes a guide to the magnitude of social problems even in situations of imminent coercion.

In order to investigate the validity of the above conclusions in the context of this study, several additional assumptions are needed: (1) The building of the Berlin Wall was a matter of survival for the GDR. (2) The building of the Berlin Wall was an act of coercion, not manipulation. (3) The stream of refugees was an indicator of social conflict in the GDR. (4) The party newspaper *Neues Deutschland* can be considered a propaganda instrument of the state, i.e., it is directly available for the representation and

furtherance of state interests.

Critics in the GDR who have questioned the validity of these operationalizations have labelled all but the fourth one as biased. Nevertheless, we maintain their validity, based on an extrapolation of the refugee statistics and on statements in the Communist party press itself. If one accepts these operational assumptions, then the following testable hypotheses seem justified:

(1) The decision of the government of the GDR to build the Berlin Wall will be preceded by a period in which the party newspaper *Neues Deutschland* deals significantly more frequently with the refugee problem than in an earlier control period.

(2) The building of the Berlin Wall will take place only after a period of increasingly intense propagandistic preparation. Three aspects of press activity will change as indicators of propagandistic preparation: (a) the attitude of the press toward the refugees becomes significantly more negative; (b) the number of arguments that imply coercive action increases significantly; (c) the number of letters to the editor addressing themselves to the refugee problem increases significantly.

(3) There will be a significant positive correlation between the weekly number of refugees and the weekly number of lines dealing with refugee problems in the party newspaper *Neues Deutschland*.

Treatment of the Refugee Problem before the Wall Decision

MOVEMENT OF REFUGEES IN THE YEARS 1950-1961

In our consideration of press activity we will study the two years 1960 and 1961. It may, however, help to establish a frame of reference to review the movement of refugees since 1950. Many thousands had left the Soviet zone of occupation before 1950. As

a matter of fact, German migration began even before the Russians arrived. In the beginning there were occasional West German or Allied efforts to curb this influx of then unwanted manpower. Systematic record-keeping started in the fall of 1949; 1950 is the first complete year tabulated. During this entire period there was some movement into the Soviet zone of occupation and later into the GDR, but these movements never even approached the magnitude of westbound migrations.

Data covering migrations, found in the following tables and figures, have been provided by the Bundesministerium für Vertriebene in Bonn. The figures represent only the number of persons asking for asylum in refugee camps in Berlin, Giessen, and Uelzen, or those who were referred to them. Although these figures do represent the majority of refugees, there is in addition an unknown number of persons who successfully entered West Germany via other than the official channels. Table 1 shows the yearly number

TABLE 1
YEARLY NUMBER OF REFUGEES DURING
THE PERIOD 1950 TO 1961

Year	Number of Refugees	
1950	197	788
1951	165	648
1952	182	393
1953	331	390
1954	184	198
1955	252	870
1956	279	189
1957	279	622
1958	204	092
1959	143	917
1960	199	188
1961	207	026

of refugees since 1950; Figure 1 is a rough graphic representation of the data in Table 1.

The migratory movement fluctuates greatly but without showing a clear trend either up or




FIG. 1. Graphic representation of the yearly movement of refugees from the GDR during the years 1950-1961.

down.³ Absence of a unidirectional trend is explained by the fluctuations in political and social pressure. Thus the year 1953, with its speed-up of collectivization in all branches of the economy and its increase of the work norms, produced the largest number of refugees. In contrast the proclamation of the "new course," easing of pressure after the revolt of June 17, 1953, and the comparatively hopeful tenor of the meeting of the foreign ministers in Berlin in February 1954 are accompanied by marked decreases in numbers of refugees. The year 1955, in turn, brought pressure against the church, recruiting drives for service in the *Volkspolizei* (people's police), and a series of economic bottlenecks including shortages of consumer goods. Not until 1958 are rationing cards abolished in the GDR; that plus perhaps the "spirit of

³This by itself poses an interesting problem. Why was there—despite the improvement of conditions in the GDR—a relatively constant number of persons willing to leave?

Camp David" created by Khrushchev's visit to the United States may have given the population in the GDR hope for an easing of the pressure. In any case, the numbers of refugees in this and the following year are low. But the final collectivization of all farmers and heightened tension over the fate of Berlin bring renewed increase in the movement of refugees until August 13, 1961, the date for the closing of the border to West Berlin.

Table 2 and the corresponding graphic representation in Figure 2 show the monthly numbers of refugees during 1960 and 1961. Tables and figures illustrate seasonal fluctuations within each year; the apex of the refugee curve lies practically always in the summer months, which may be due to better weather conditions, but also to the fact that summertime is vacation time when it is easier to camouflage a flight as a vacation trip.

Figure 2, the graphic representation of Table 2, shows the slow increase in the number of refugees during 1960 and the early

TABLE 2
MONTHLY NUMBER OF REFUGEES
IN THE TWO YEARS 1960 AND 1961

Month	1960	1961
January	9,905	16,697
February	9,803	13,576
March	13,442	16,094
April	17,183	19,803
May	20,285	17,791
June	17,888	19,198
July	16,543	30,415
August	21,465	47,433
September	20,698	14,821
October	21,150	5,366
November	16,427	3,412
December	14,399	2,420
Total	199,188	207,026

TEST OF THE FIRST HYPOTHESIS:
METHOD OF INVESTIGATION

The first hypothesis states that the government decision to close the border will be preceded by a period of increased press activity. The hypothesis rests on the assumption that a complex industrialized social system will choose the coercive solution to a problem only after it has exhausted all possibilities for manipulation. The attempt to stop the stream of refugees through increased propaganda in the press would be such a possibility for manipulation.

1. *Fixing the date of the government decision.* In order to test the hypothesis it is first necessary to fix a date for the decision to solve the conflict by using coercive means. Such a

months of 1961 followed by a sudden and decisive upswing in July of 1961.




FIG. 2. Graphic representation of the monthly movement of refugees from the GDR during 1960 and 1961.

date cannot be fixed with absolute precision. There is not enough information available. Furthermore, a decision of such risk, whose consequences were hard to predict, is not a point on a time scale but a developing process of which we can at best fix the last step. If one must choose a specific date, however, it seems best to select March 16, 1961, when, as far as the leadership of the GDR was concerned, the decision to use coercion was made during a meeting of the central committee of the SED.⁴

2. *Measuring the activity of the party press.* According to the hypothesis, then, the period before March 16 should be characterized by a noticeable preoccupation of the press with the refugee problem. We chose as index of this activity the number of lines of all articles—or parts of articles—concerned with the refugee problem in the leading party newspaper *Neues Deutschland*.

Four groups of articles were considered relevant: (1) Those addressing themselves directly to the problem of westbound migrations. (2) Articles about "*Grenzgänger*," commuters who lived in East Berlin but worked in the western sectors, thereby depriving the GDR of much needed manpower. *Grenzgänger* also introduced ideas which were a general source of irritation to the system. Moreover, the differences in living standards were constant propaganda for the West. (3) Articles describing the sad fate of persons having fled to the West. In this group belong also articles reporting the return of refugees who were disappointed with life in the Federal Republic. (4) Articles concerned with the reverse movement, migration from west to east. These articles were included as indirect arguments against westbound flights; life there cannot be that much better if people living it chose to come to the GDR.

Not included were articles dealing exclusively with bad conditions of one sort or an-

other in West Germany without in any way mentioning the refugee problem in any of the four aspects listed. Also left out were articles critical of the system—for example, criticisms of the arrogant actions of bureaucrats, unless these were tied directly to the refugee problem (as happened in rare instances).

This description of the categories of articles considered refugee-related does not comprehend all possible or especially subtle approaches. Articles which on the surface speak solely of the vices of the capitalist system in West Germany might very well be intended as arguments against a flight to the West. On the other hand, articles describing the flight of young men to the GDR who would escape being drafted into the West German army, which seem to warn against westbound migration, might have been intended as illustrations of the decay of the West German system for which no one wants to fight.

There is no perfect solution to this problem. Defining categories is often a somewhat arbitrary process. Thus it is the more essential that the categories be reliably coded. This seems to be the case. Correlation of the line counts of two independent raters working without knowledge of the hypothesis in a check period (January/February and May/June 1961) is $r = 0.80$. Correcting this correlation coefficient by the use of the Spearman-Brown formula results in an estimated reliability of 0.89.

In addition to the number of lines, we considered the simple number of refugee-related articles, variability of weekly line counts, and the kind of argumentation used—i.e., whether the articles were addressing themselves to the refugee problem directly (categories 1 and 2) or only indirectly (categories 3 and 4). Thus we hoped to assess not only the increased level but also the concentration of approach, both of which gave the press activity the character of a planned newspaper campaign.

3. *Determining length and position of the*

⁴See *Der Spiegel*, 1966, No. 34, p. 26.

test-period. The time period to be investigated before the decision date is referred to as the test-period. A sequence of ten weeks was determined for its length, since a span of time two and a half months long seemed sufficient to detect the workings of a press campaign if one existed.

Some difficulty was caused by the question where to locate this test-period. How much before is "before?" Should one count back ten weeks from the week of decision? Or should one assume that the campaign started still earlier and had already run its course by March 16? Or could it be that the press campaign would run beyond any decision date through sheer inertia of planning?

To reduce uncertainty the following question was raised: Does the test-period differ from periods of equal length before and after it with respect to the intensity of newspaper activity? Table 3 gives the relevant information about the three time spans in question.

TABLE 3
COMPARISON OF THE INDICES OF PRESS
ACTIVITY BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER
THE TEST-PERIOD

	a) Pre- period (10/24/60- 1/1/61)	b) Test- period (1/2/61- 3/12/61)	c) Post- period (3/13/61- 5/21/61)
Sum of lines for the period	1341	1239	952
Variability of weekly sums	20-359	28-185	0-247
Number of articles per period	58	43	31

A comparison of the line counts in the three periods, using the Kruskal-Wallis test (Lienert, 1962), does not show any significant differences ($H = 2.53$, $p > 0.05$).⁵ Variability of the weekly sums of newspaper lines is also not significantly different in the three periods

⁵The use, where possible, of nonparametric statistics seems advisable since it cannot be assumed that refugee-related articles are normally distributed.

when using the Kamat test ($K_{ab} = 13$, $K_{ac} = 9$, $K_{bc} = 14$, all $p > 0.05$; Lienert, 1962). The number of articles, however, is not equally distributed over the three periods ($\chi^2 = 8.31$, $p < 0.05$). The number of articles in the time span labelled "post-period" is significantly smaller than the number of articles in the pre-period ($\chi^2 = 8.20$, $p < 0.01$). Pre-period and test-period do not differ significantly from each other ($\chi^2 = 2.22$, $p > 0.05$). Test-period and post-period also show no significant difference ($\chi^2 = 1.94$, $p > 0.05$).

Tendencies toward a greater number of articles as well as a greater number of lines might speak for the choice of this earlier period as test-period. On the other hand, the tendency toward reduced variability suggests the period January 2 to March 12, 1961 as test-period. There is no indication that a press campaign gained momentum only after the decision had been made. On the contrary, there is a tendency toward a decrease in press activity in the post-period. Since it seemed less arbitrary to interpret "before" as "directly before" and since originally, before perusal of the data, the period January 2 to March 12, 1961 was chosen as the test-period, and since finally no significant arguments seem to speak against it, it was decided to retain the test-period as originally proposed. Any other interpretation harbors the danger of working in favor of the hypothesis by moving the test-period to where it seems most convincing.

4. *Choosing the control period.* There remains the question, with what time span should the test-period be compared? It does not seem advisable to choose any time after the decision date, since the objective of the propaganda might change. We assumed that the main objective of propaganda released before the decision would be to influence the behavior of the population, to contain migration. After it had been made, the main objective might shift to preparing the people for some future action and to anticipate negative

reaction by an attempt to justify the intended and decided-upon action. We chose a ten-week span of time in 1960, so that the weekly numbers of refugees would be roughly comparable to those of the test-period. This, then, is the period from March 7 to May 15, 1960. The average weekly number of refugees during this period is 3,735—not significantly different from the test-period weekly average of 3,660 ($t = 0.15, p > 0.05$). The t -test for uncorrelated means served as statistical test (Guilford, 1956). Variances of the weekly numbers of refugees do not differ significantly from each other according to the F -test of differences between variances ($F_{9,9} = 2.15, p > 0.05$; Guilford, 1956). In all other respects nothing seems to speak against choosing this span as a control period. The volume of newspaper in both periods is comparable, and average number of pages per newspaper—*circa* six pages—does not seem to differ between the two periods in any way worth mentioning. Furthermore, there does not seem to be any difference between the two periods with respect to the attention that is absorbed by other campaigns or special daily events.

5. *Procedure.* Necessary volumes of the leading party newspaper of the SED, the daily *Neues Deutschland*, were available from the Department of Journalism at the Universität Münster. Several missing issues were found and checked at the Institut für Zeitungswis-

senschaft in Dortmund.⁶ The first step of analysis consisted of identifying all the refugee-related articles or parts of articles and listing them in a prepared form. An excerpt of this form is shown in Table 4 to illustrate the layout.

TABLE 4
ILLUSTRATIVE EXCERPT OF
IDENTIFYING FORM

Date	Page	Number of lines	Title
March 60			
15.	2	27	Übersiedler bestätigen Blitzkriegspläne
...	SPD-Genosse fand keinen Unterdrückten
31.	1	6	

One line in the *Neues Deutschland* contains, on the average, 5.5 words. Headlines were added to the line count on this basis. Pictures were not transformed into line equivalents; only their captions were used.⁷

TEST OF THE FIRST HYPOTHESIS:
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The results of the statistical test are given in Table 5, which compares not only control-

⁶A characterization of *Neues Deutschland* is to be found in Herrmann (1963).

⁷A complete listing of all articles used in this study is given in Mueller and Greiner (1969).

TABLE 5
COMPARISON OF LINE COUNT, NUMBER OF ARTICLES, AND VARIABILITY OF LINE COUNT IN TEST-PERIOD, PRE-PERIOD, AND CONTROL-PERIOD

Comparison of:	Number of articles	Significance of difference (chi-square)	Number of lines	Significance of difference (U-test)	Variability of line counts	Significance of difference (Kamat-test)
Test-period and contr.-period	43	1.94 ($p > .05$)	1239	$z = 0.89$ ($p > 0.05$)	28-185	$K = 10$ ($p > .05$)
Pre-period and contr.-period	58	8.20 ($p < .01$)	1341	$z = 0.08$ ($p > 0.05$)	20-359	$K = 14$ ($p > .05$)

period and test-period but also control-period and pre-period to indicate how the results would be altered by a different positioning of the test-period. The tests of significance used were the chi-square test, the Mann-Whitney U-test, and the Kamat test (Lienert, 1962).

Statistical tests do not show any significant differences between the periods with respect to the number of lines and the variability of the weekly line counts. Nor does the number of articles in the test-period differ from that in the control-period. Only the number of articles in the pre-period is significantly greater than in the control-period.

To further clarify whether government decision was preceded by a press campaign, a qualitative index is used: the percentage of arguments dealing directly with the refugee problem. Arguments are called direct if they are concerned with migration from east to west and its causes and consequences (categories 1 and 2). All other arguments are indirect (categories 3 and 4). Table 6 presents these data and sets them in relation to the argumentation used in the last ten weeks before the closing of the border. This period is labelled "end-period."

Table 6 shows two things: (1) lack of direct approach to the problem is practically the same in the first three periods, and (2)

there is a marked difference in approach between the first three periods and the end-period. Only during the end-period is there a direct attack on the problem.

Finally, it might help to present the weekly line counts of all five periods in graphic form; this is done in Figure 3, showing that what differences might seem to exist in the early periods are small as compared with the differences between earlier periods and the end-period.

Taking all these results together, it seems justified to say the following: Although there is a tendency toward increased press activity before the date of government decision and for a decrease directly thereafter, it is not possible to secure this tendency statistically using as indices of press activity the number of lines and the variability of weekly line counts. If one adds to this a qualitative impression about the similarity of argumentation, it does not seem justified to speak of a press campaign preceding the decision to use violence. Accordingly, in the later interpretation of all the data, we will proceed on the assumption that this hypothesis cannot be confirmed.

Propagandistic Preparation of the Wall-Building

The second hypothesis assumed that the building of the Wall could take place only after a period of propagandistic preparation and justification, since a complex industrialized system would have to try to combine the use of coercive means with manipulation in order to reduce costs of social control. To test this hypothesis it was stated that three aspects of press activity should change in the period before the date of action: (1) the attitude toward the refugees and the *Grenzgänger*, (2) the frequency of arguments that imply and "justify" the use of coercive means, and (3) the number of letters to the editor addressing themselves to the refugee problem.

TABLE 6
COMPARISON OF THE PERCENTAGE
OF ARTICLES WITH DIRECT
ARGUMENTATION IN THE
VARIOUS TIME PERIODS

Period	Articles with direct argumentation	Total number of articles	Percentage
Control-period	7	31	23
Pre-period	13	58	22
Test-period	11	43	26
End-period	134	173	77




FIG. 3. Graphic representation of the weekly line counts of refugee-related articles in five ten-week periods.

CHANGE IN ATTITUDE TOWARD THE REFUGEES: METHOD OF INVESTIGATION

1. *What span of time should be studied?* The question of when to begin an analysis of the government's attitude toward the refugees was linked to their numbers. It seems reasonable to expect a change in attitude as the social situation changes. Thus it was decided to begin the investigation of press arguments two months before the generally increasing trend in number of refugees took a decisive upswing. To choose two months is arbitrary but such a time span seemed long enough to establish a base line against which changes could be assessed. Figure 2 shows a decisive increase in number of refugees from June to July of 1961. Given the magnitude of the increase it seemed unnecessary to apply a statistical test. Thus the beginning date of the qualitative analysis of the press is May 1, 1961.

The period from May 1 to August 13 was divided into three sections: (1) from May 1 to June 30, (2) from July 1 to July 31, and (3) from August 1 to August 13.

2. *What method of content analysis should be used?* Osgood's method of "evaluative assertion analysis" (Osgood, 1959) was chosen. This procedure allows the drawing of inferences about the attitude of a source toward various social objects, e.g., countries, people, political decisions. It helps to code valuations contained in value-laden concepts in newspaper statements according to specified rules which increase the objectivity of the analysis. The method tries to immunize the rater against the positive or negative influences that the content of a statement may exert. The analysis begins with the selection of raw statements from a given source and ends with the positioning of the attitude objects on a value scale ranging from +3 to -3. It proceeds in several steps:

(1) Identification of all concepts that might elicit attitudinal reactions in the reader in connection with a given topic. For example, in the sentence: "To become a refugee from the GDR means working for war," the words "refugee" and "GDR" and "war" would elicit attitudinal reactions.

(2) In a second step the complex sentences in the source are reformulated as a series of short statements consisting of subject, predicate, and object. For example, the sentence: "Although Pfeifer [a refugee] supported the SED's fight against crime in West Germany, he did not vote for the SED in 1948," would be broken into the following statements: (a) West Germany/has/crime; (b) SED/fights against/crime; (c) SED/is/a fighter; (d) Pfeifer/supported/SED's fight; and (e) Pfeifer/did not vote for/SED.

(3) In a third step these statements are evaluated with respect to the direction and intensity of the valuation expressed in them. The decision whether a valuation is positive or negative is in most cases easy to make. For the attribution of intensity, Osgood offers rules such as that verbs like "to be" or "to have" express high intensity, while the conditional "might" or "should" express low intensity. For example, the sentence: "The West German capitalists have exploited the deepest human emotions," would become: West German capitalists/have exploited/-2/deepest emotions/+3.

(4) In a final step the numerical expressions for the evaluative statements are summed and weighted by the intensity of the assertion to yield an index for the position on the value scale.⁸

3. *What kind of newspaper material should be used?* Not all newspaper articles are suited for this kind of analysis. Only programmatic articles, essays, satires, and strongly opinionated news items can be used. Straight news, and the simple reporting of facts, are not suited for the application of this method although they too, of course, often contain an implicit valuation.

In the first evaluation period of May 1 to June 30 all suitable articles were used. The

total sum of lines in these articles was 764. The other two periods offered more material than could be mastered. Of the usable material from these periods, articles were selected at random until a comparable number of lines was reached. In the second evaluation period, eight out of 22 usable articles were randomly selected with a total number of 766 lines. In the third evaluation period, nine out of 67 usable articles were selected with 762 as the total number of lines. Table 7 has these data and shows the percentage of articles with value judgments increases significantly in the course of the three periods ($\chi^2 = 11.94, p < 0.01$). In other words, the press takes an increasingly more engaged position.

TABLE 7
PRESENTATION OF THE NUMBER OF ARTICLES USED IN THE EVALUATIVE ASSERTION ANALYSIS IN THE THREE EVALUATION PERIODS

Evaluation period	Number of articles			Number of lines
	Total	Usable	Used	
5/1-6/30	33	6	6	764
7/1-7/31	54	22	8	766
8/1-8/13	104	67	9	762

4. *Categories used in the evaluative assertion analysis.* With respect to which categories was the newspaper material evaluated? On the basis of our impressions from the reading of *Neues Deutschland*, we chose six categories which (1) seemed relevant to the refugee problem and (2) could be expected to elicit specific attitudinal reactions in other readers, too. Our list of categories does not claim to be exhaustive:

(a) Socialism. In this category belong all mentionings of the word "socialism" itself as well as all combinations like "socialist order" or "socialistic idea" that seem to pertain to socialism as a political ideology or as the idea of a certain kind of social organization. Not counted were statements referring to the GDR as a state.

⁸The evaluative assertion analysis of this material is presented in detail and consecutively in Mueller and Greiner (1967).

For the test of Hypothesis 2a the category "refugee" is the essential one. For methodological reasons, but also in order to put this category into perspective, it was necessary to determine several categories.

The evaluative assertion analysis was done by two independent raters, one of whom did not know the date of the articles to be rated. The correlation between these two ratings is $r = 0.95$. Correcting this correlation coefficient by the use of the Spearman-Brown formula gives an estimated reliability of 0.97, which seems very high indeed. It should be pointed out that the articles to be rated were selected beforehand. Thus it was clear from the beginning that they would contain evaluative material related to the categories. This seems, however, entirely appropriate, since what was to be checked was not the reliability of selecting refugee-related articles but the use of a certain method of content analysis. Furthermore, the independent ratings were preceded by an intensive training period. All data relevant to the assessment of reliability are presented in Table 8.

TABLE 8
PRESENTATION OF DATA RELEVANT TO THE ASSESSMENT OF RELIABILITY OF THE EVALUATIVE ASSERTION ANALYSIS

	Rater G	Rater T	Significance of the difference
Mean	-1.3	-1.0	$t = 1.12,$ $p > 0.05$
Standard deviation	2.40	1.51	$F = 2.53,$ $p < 0.05$
Correlation between G and T	N = 16	0.95	est. rel. = 0.97

(b) GDR. This category was coded when a statement referred to the real state as compared to the intended social order. In 1961 this distinction was still explicitly made. At that point the GDR was not yet supposed to have achieved full socialism. It was "on the way toward socialism." In this category,

then, are articles about politicians, institutions as parts of the state, East Berlin as a capital, and citizens of the GDR.

(c) Federal Republic of Germany. The distinction between actual state and intended social order does not apply to this category or to USA and "West Berlin," which follow. This distinction, clearly acknowledged in relation to the GDR, is not made when the press speaks about West Germany. The statements "capitalist system of exploitation" and "Federal Republic" are one as far as evaluation is concerned. Thus two kinds of statements make up this category—statements about the social system in West Germany and statements about the political organization of this area.

(d) USA. What was said above about the Federal Republic of Germany applies here.

(e) West Berlin. The same as (d).

(f) Refugee. Under this category fall not only statements referring to persons who have left the GDR forever, but also statements referring to the *Grenzgänger*, persons who live in East Berlin but work in Western sectors. The reason for this equal treatment was already given; it will be discussed in more detail.

CHANGE IN ATTITUDE:
RESULTS AND DESCRIPTION

1. *Attitude change during the three evaluation periods.* The position of the attitude objects on the value scale in the three periods and changes in these positions are presented in Table 9. As could be expected, the attitude objects "socialism" and "GDR" have a highly valued position on the scale while "GFR" and "USA" and "West Berlin" are negatively valued. It should be noted that the position of these five attitude objects hardly changes. Only the category "Refugee" shows a more noticeable trend. From a position of -1.4 during the period May-June, the valu-

TABLE 9
VALUATION OF THE SIX ATTITUDE OBJECTS
DURING THE THREE EVALUATION PERIODS

Category	Evaluation Period		
	May-June	July	August
Socialism	+3.0	+3.0	+3.0
DDR	+2.6	+3.0	+2.8
DFR	-2.8	-2.9	-2.9
USA	-2.5	-3.0	-2.9
West Berlin	-2.8	-2.9	-2.9
Refugee	-1.4	-2.5	-2.8

ation sinks on the seven-point scale to -2.5 in July, and to -2.8 in August.

Figure 4 illustrates the same data graphically. Is this change in attitude statistically significant? Difficulty in testing lies in the fact that the individual statements are not independent of each other. On the other hand, if one wants to assume that the articles are independent of each other, the difficulty then is that some articles contain more state-

ments about refugees than others, thus resulting in an unequal stability of data. To correct this to some degree, articles whose attitude rating depended upon fewer than three statements were left out. Thus, three articles had to be eliminated—two in the second evaluation period, one in the third. The significance of the differences in central tendency between the periods was assessed by the Kruskal-Wallis test (Lienert, 1962). The result of the test was significant ($H_{corr} = 5.89$, $p < 0.05$). It should, however, be interpreted conservatively because of the manipulation of data.

2. Description of the attitude of the press toward the refugee problem in the three evaluation periods. For the first period (May-June), the attitude toward the refugees in this period is best expressed in the article "Offener Brief an einen Republikflüchtigen." The emotional tone is only moderately negative, the argu-




FIG. 4. Graphic representation of attitude changes in *Neues Deutschland* toward the six attitude objects in the three evaluation periods.

mentation relatively detached and by no means one-sided. The act is condemned but not the actor. The two adjectives "foolish" and "short-sighted" characterize best the attitude of *Neues Deutschland* toward the refugees in this period. The refugees are described as men and women who run blindly to their doom and often return, their illusions about the "golden West" shattered.

To "prove" this point, most of the articles speak about the sad fate of refugees in the West or about the people who moved from West Germany to the GDR. Two articles of substantial length "inform" the reader of the dirty methods of seduction (*Abwerbung*) used by the CIA and the West German political police (*Verfassungsschutz*) to entice people to come to their side. Both articles seem to argue indirectly against flight by pointing out the dangers awaiting westbound refugees. To summarize the tenor of the articles in this period: The horrors of the West will be chosen only by those who are not able to think properly. This is, unchanged, the same propaganda line that characterized the earlier periods investigated in connection with testing the first hypothesis.

For the second period (July), the attitude score for the category "refugee" is -2.5 in this period, a marked decrease as compared with the -1.4 position in May and June. The numerical score reflects the increased hostility against the *Grenzgänger*. The press begins to make this group the scapegoat for many of the regime's internal difficulties. No longer are they characterized solely as acting foolishly and unthinkingly; now they are traitors to the working class, pursuing egotistical goals and exploiting the achievements of the GDR by harvesting where they haven't sown. They are accused of introducing social unrest through slanderous propaganda and of creating shortages by buying up durable consumer goods. (The purchasing power of the *Grenzgänger* was indeed unreasonably high

because the exchange rate between the Deutschmark-West and the Deutschmark-East [*Schwindelkurs*] was always in their favor.)

Hand in hand with this attitude change goes an increase in the valuation of the category "GDR" and a decreased evaluation of the categories "GFR" and "USA" and "West Berlin." Here appears what is often found in times of turmoil: polarization of attitudes, reevaluation of one's own system, and devaluation of the groups with which there is conflict.

Summarized, the themes of this period are (a) increased attacks against the West, (b) condemnation of the *Grenzgänger* as traitor, and (c) first letters to the editor demanding drastic measures.

For the third period (August), the analysis brings a further worsening of attitude toward the refugees (-2.8). Condemnation of the *Grenzgänger* and the refugees takes even more extreme forms. Current articles describe the refugee as a common criminal who abandons his children. The *Grenzgänger* becomes an enemy of the state who produces weapons for the West German warmongers. The valuation of the categories "GFR" and "USA" and "West Berlin" remains extremely negative. Descriptions of methods used by Western "espionage" and "seduction" agencies is supplemented by adding kidnapping to the list of methods they supposedly employ.

The treatment of the refugee problem remains the same during this period as in July, but tone and intensity of engagement become hysterical.

3. *Conclusion.* If one takes these qualitative impressions and adds them to the results of the more structured evaluative assertion analysis, it seems justified to conclude that, during the investigated period, an attitude change toward the refugees did indeed take place. The press valuation becomes more and more hostile. As the date for the closing of the

border approaches, the attitude of *Neues Deutschland* toward the refugees becomes more and more hysterically aggressive. It is in this sense that we will interpret the results in the later overview of all the data.

ACTION INDICATORS; METHOD OF INVESTIGATION

Hypothesis 2b states that the date of violent action approaches when the arguments which demand or imply action increase. To test this hypothesis, all relevant articles in our period of investigation (May 1 to August 13) were examined for action indicators.

1. *Definition of "action indicator."* The following categories of press statements were considered "action indicators": (a) announcements of government actions; (b) announcements of actions by factory committees, communities, and other organizations; (c) programmatic statements by politicians, journalists, professors, etc.; (d) demands made by the population in letters to the editor; and (e) demands coming from factories, collectivized farms, and other organizations in the form of resolutions.

2. *Procedure.* Within our period of investigation the first action indicator appears on June 17, 1961 in a statement by Walter Ulbricht during a press conference. From this week on, closeness to the date of action, measured in weeks, was placed in relation to the number of action indicators in a given week. The statistical method used was Spearman's rank-order correlation (Guilford, 1956).

ACTION INDICATORS: RESULTS AND CONCLUSION

Table 10 presents the relevant data. Column 2 gives the weekly number of articles containing action indicators. In the next column the total number of refugee-related articles for that week is given. The last column states the percentage of all weekly articles containing action indicators.

TABLE 10
RELATION BETWEEN THE CLOSENESS OF THE DATE OF ACTION AND THE NUMBER OF WEEKLY ARTICLES CONTAINING ACTION INDICATORS

Week	Articles containing action indicators	Total number of articles per week	% of all articles containing action indicators
6/12-6/18	1	5	20
6/19-6/25	0	7	0
6/26-7/2	0	3	0
7/3 -7/9	0	3	0
7/10-7/16	1	7	14
7/17-7/23	2	18	11
7/24-7/30	4	33	12
7/31-8/6	18	53	34
8/7 -8/13	38	51	75

Correlating closeness to date of action and number of weekly action indicators yields a coefficient of $\rho = 0.86$ ($p < 0.01$). If one compares closeness and percentage, the coefficient of correlation is $\rho = 0.58$ ($0.10 > p > 0.05$). Since it is not assumed that articles containing action indicators are distributed randomly, it does not seem plausible to say that just because more is written, the likelihood of encountering a certain argument is also increased. Thus we do not argue that the increase in action indicators is just a byproduct of the general upswing in press activity, but conclude that as the date of action approaches the argumentation points more and more toward action, although this trend is partly hidden by the increase in total press activity.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR: METHOD AND RESULTS

According to Hypothesis 2c a third criterion for the closeness of the date of action is the fact that the press begins to print letters to the editor. Not all of these letters are at the same time action indicators, since not all demand explicitly government measures. But as voices of the people, be they spontaneous or ordered, they seem singularly

sued to illustrate the necessity for action and to document the legitimacy of any step that might follow. Such letters should be most effective shortly before the date of action—otherwise they might be forgotten. Consequently, the printing of the letters should become a clue to the closeness of the date of action.

Within the period relevant for the testing of this hypothesis (May 1–August 13), no letters relating to the refugee problem are printed before July 12. In contrast, during the period from July 12 to August 13 relevant letters are found in thirteen editions of *Neues Deutschland*. The letters suggest solutions to the problem; they greet and applaud government measures against the *Grenzgänger*, and they demand further action. The most extreme examples are to be found in the editions of July 30, August 5, and August 12.

In order to test whether these thirteen editions containing letters to the editor were equally distributed over the total period of 33 days or whether they appeared with greater frequency in the early days of August, a chi-square test with Yates correction was made. Table 11 shows the distribution of the data.

TABLE 11
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CLOSENESS TO THE
DATE OF ACTION AND PRINTING OF
REFUGEE-RELATED LETTERS
TO THE EDITOR

		July	August	
Letters to the editor contained in the paper?	Yes	3	10	13
	No	17	3	20
		20	13	33

$\text{Chi}^2 = 10.19, p < .01$

There is indeed a relationship between the printing of refugee-related letters to the editor in *Neues Deutschland* and the closeness of the date of action; we therefore consider Hypothesis 2c supported by the data.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR: DESCRIPTION

Beginning with July 1, the most sought-after consumer goods—TV sets, refrigerators, cars, etc.—were sold only to persons who could prove that they were employed in the GDR. This new regulation was directed against the *Grenzgänger* and threatened their standard of living. The measure was not published until July 12. When it did, finally, appear in the newspaper, it was placed on the same page with letters to the editor applauding the new restriction. The fact that a measure in effect since July 1 is first published two weeks later and then together with approving comments made by the people can hardly be understood as other than an attempt to justify a government action.

The first demand for further “effective measures of the government” appears in the edition of July 30, two weeks before the building of the Wall. A community committee demands, “Stop the commuting once and for all!” In the first days of August, *Neues Deutschland* prints new suggestions by the people practically daily. On August 5, seemingly in response, the government puts a new measure into effect: retroactively from August 1, *Grenzgänger* have to pay rent and utilities in Deutschmark-West (applauding letters follow three days later under the headline “The time was more than ripe”). A news item of the same day, “Two hundred and twenty-eight *Grenzgänger* have returned,” supposedly demonstrates the effectiveness of the measure.

On August 11, *Neues Deutschland* reports the beginning of the registration of all *Grenzgänger*. Also on this date, several factory committees demand “effective measures for the protection of the population.” Demands now go beyond the group of *Grenzgänger*. The next day, August 12, there appears under the headline “The people’s will on the agenda” a report on the meeting of the *Volkskammer* (parliament) urging the government to apply stern measures and assuring

the leaders of the full confidence of the people. This line is further emphasized by a resolution taken by construction workers in Dresden and published the same day: "Every action of the government has our confidence." On August 13th, the border is closed.

As a result of the qualitative analysis of the press arguments one can conclude: (1) The attitude of *Neues Deutschland* toward the refugees becomes increasingly hostile as the date of action approaches. (2) As the date of action approaches there is an increase in the number of arguments hinting at action. (3) The printing of letters to the editor increases as the date for the building of the Wall comes nearer. (4) The last weeks before the date of action are characterized by an extreme intensity of newspaper activity, an intensity of engagement that can hardly be called anything but hysterical.

Relationship between Intensity of Press Activity and Number of Refugees

The third hypothesis states that there will be a significant positive relationship between the number of refugees and the intensity of the press activity. This hypothesis rests on two considerations: (1) the thought that a complex industrialized social system cannot afford to solve social conflict without using manipulation, and (2) the assumption that the intensity of the manipulation will be influenced by the severity of the problem.

PRESS ACTIVITY AND REFUGEES: METHOD OF INVESTIGATION

1. *The period of study.* We assume that press activity and number of refugees are interdependent variables. But we also assume that the process of mutual influence is triggered by the increase in number of refugees. We hope to support this idea by starting our comparison two months before the decisive

upswing in the number of refugees. When during two months preceding the upswing the press treatment of the refugee problem remains uniformly low, then it seems correct to conclude that the upswing was not caused by an increase in press activity (since there was none). The time span of two months seemed sufficiently long to establish a trend against which later increases could be measured. Since the decisive upswing in the number of refugees occurs in July 1961, the starting point for the test of this hypothesis is again May 1, 1961.

2. *The procedure.* The index of press activity is the weekly sum of lines. In all there are fifteen weekly sums. These sums are correlated with the number of refugees in the same week. The method of correlation is Spearman's rank-order correlation. It is advisable to use this method since the relationship between press activity and number of refugees over the total period is not a linear one (Guilford, 1956; Lienert, 1962).

The procedure was similar to the one followed earlier. At first all refugee-related articles were identified and their lines counted. This information was entered into the prepared form. Finally, the weekly sums of lines and the weekly numbers of refugees were correlated.

There remains a complication that has to be considered. In principle there should exist a latency period. If one assumes that it is the number of refugees which determines the activity level of the press, then one should not expect the press to react without delay. After all, articles responding to the migrations have to be written and approved before being published. Even if one assumes that causation is reversed and that it is the activity of the press which influences people in their decision to flee, a latency period should be assumed. Certainly, it is not an easy decision, and a lot of logistic details have to be settled before a person or family can leave. However,

if the relationship between the variables is one of mutual influence, then the effect of these latency periods should cancel out. This conclusion was supported by a check. Pragmatically, we correlated assuming latency periods of varying length and varying direction. When all the resulting correlations were smaller than when we correlated without assuming any latency period, we concluded that the process was indeed one of mutual influence and that the latency periods which logically must exist cancel each other out in their effect. Table 12 presents the relevant information.

Furthermore, we should point out two sources of error in the data: (1) We do not know whether refugees who are tabulated on a given date accomplished their flight that same day or a day or more earlier. Refugee numbers were never tabulated on Sundays and holidays, for example. (2) It is unlikely that the East German authorities learned of each flight immediately; certainly there was some delay and lack of reporting. Indeed, there are indications that East German authorities depended for information at least to some extent upon West German figures. We decided to proceed on the assumption that the two sources of error were of comparable magnitude and would cancel each other out. The fact that the correlation of refugees and newspaper lines within the same week yields

the closest association seems to justify this decision.

PRESS ACTIVITY AND REFUGEES: RESULTS OF THE CORRELATION

Table 13 presents the data that were compared. The correlation between weekly line counts and number of refugees is $\rho = 0.89$ ($p < 0.01$). The correlation between the number of articles and the number of refugees is also significant ($\rho = 0.84$, $p < 0.01$).

Thus we conclude that there is indeed a strong positive relationship between the intensity of press activity and the number of refugees, demonstrating that the press—at least in this instance—mirrors the severity of the social problem.

DETERMINATION OF THE TRIGGERING FACTOR

The rank-order correlation has shown that a relationship between the variables exists. This, however, does not answer the question whether the upswing in number of refugees triggers the increase in press activity or whether the activity of the press is responsible for the increased flow of refugees. We assumed that the process of mutually influencing each other would be started by the upswing in number of refugees.

Figure 5 seems to support this assumption. The flow of refugees remains roughly at the

TABLE 12
CORRELATION OF LINE COUNT AND NUMBER OF REFUGEES ASSUMING
LATENCY PERIODS OF VARYING LENGTH

Correlation between	N	rho	Significance
Number of refugees in the 1st week and line count 2nd week	14	0.54	$p < 0.05$
Number of refugees in the 1st week and line count 3rd week	13	0.58	$p < 0.05$
Number of refugees in the 2nd week and line count 1st week	14	0.60	$p < 0.05$
Number of refugees in the 3rd week and line count 1st week	13	0.53	$p < 0.05$
Number of refugees in the 1st week and line count 1st week	15	0.89	$p < 0.01$

TABLE 13
WEEKLY LINE COUNT AND WEEKLY NUMBERS OF REFUGEES
IN THE PERIOD MAY 1-AUGUST 13

Week	Number of lines	Number of articles	Number of refugees
1. Week (5/1 -5/7)	25	2	4030
2. Week (5/8 -5/14)	0	0	2882
3. Week (5/15-5/21)	244	6	4362
4. Week (5/22-5/28)	196	4	3842
5. Week (5/29-6/4)	393	5	4696
6. Week (6/5 -6/11)	49	2	4283
7. Week (6/12-6/18)	226	5	4519
8. Week (6/19-6/25)	397	7	4423
9. Week (6/26-7/2)	142	3	4569
10. Week (7/3 -7/9)	51	3	4307
11. Week (7/10-7/16)	334	5	7652
12. Week (7/17-7/23)	969	16	8683
13. Week (7/24-7/30)	2687	29	7863
14. Week (7/31-8/6)	3514	52	10446
15. Week (8/7 -8/13)	5479	51	12675

same level until the tenth week but increases markedly from the tenth to the eleventh week. In contrast, press activity remains constant during the first *eleven* weeks. Only in the

twelfth week is there a noticeable increase in the number of lines. At this point, then, the data themselves suggest a latency period. It seems as if *Neues Deutschland* reacted to the




FIG. 5. Movement of weekly numbers of refugees and weekly number of lines in the period May 1 to August 13, 1961.

increase in number of refugees with a delay of one week.

Can the impression suggested by Figure 5 be secured statistically? Yes, by testing the following three specific statements:

(1) The number of refugees in the eleventh week differs significantly from that in the first through tenth week.

(2) The line count in the eleventh week does not differ significantly from that in the first through tenth week.

(3) The line count in the twelfth week does differ significantly from that in the first through tenth week.

These statements can be tested with the help of a method of trend change analysis suggested by Augsberger (1956), a parametric method based on the assumption of linear trends. The first value that seems to deviate from the original trend is compared with a *t*-test to the value that would be expected had the trend continued unchanged. It is true that we don't consider the refugee-related articles to be distributed normally. We have used, therefore, nonparametric methods wherever possible. But since we do not know of any nonparametric method of trend change analysis that would suit our question, and since the *t*-test has been shown to be relatively invariant against deviations from normal distribution (Boneau, 1960), we decided to use Augsberger's method anyhow. Table 14 presents the relevant information.

On the basis of this trend analysis we can reject the hypothesis that an increase in press activity has triggered an upswing in number of refugees. Increase in press activity does not precede but rather follows the upswing. Moreover, the data do not contradict the hypothesis that increase of the flow of refugees activates the press. A stronger statement, however, is not possible on the basis of these data. Other interpretations can be suggested. For example, it could have been that in the week of July 17 the order went out to con-

TABLE 14
COMPARISON OF THE OBSERVED AND EXPECTED NUMBERS OF REFUGEES AND LINES IN THE FIRST THROUGH TWELFTH WEEKS

	Exp. value	Obs. value	<i>t</i> df = 11	p
Refugee numbers 11th week compared with trend in weeks 1-10	4734	7652	3.42	0.01
Line count in the 11th week compared with trend in weeks 1-10	230	334	N.S.	N.S.
Line count in the 12th week compared with trend in weeks 1-11	280	969	2.81	0.05

centrate on the refugee problem in preparation for the upcoming date of action. Without access to archives in the GDR it will be difficult to test such alternative hypotheses.

Summary and Interpretation

(1) On the basis of the data it seems improbable that the press undertook its attempt to stop the stream of refugees with the help of a propaganda campaign before the decision to close the border was made. The Marxist-Leninist theory of journalism clearly demands that the press be used as an instrument for influencing behavior. It seems plausible to think that the press had despaired. Migration was an old problem and it had become very clear over the years what was necessary to stop the drainage: Every time the regime had slackened in its pursuit of unpopular goals the number of refugees had decreased, for example, in 1953 after the introduction of the "new course." Therefore all that was necessary to reduce the flow was to keep the political development in harmony with the wishes, and even prejudices, of the people.

But exactly this happened less often in the GDR than in other countries of the Eastern bloc, for example, in Poland. In the GDR ideological postulates practically always had priority. The authorities presumed to know what was right, and were quite ready to force their "happiness" on the people. However, manipulation is a matter of small steps and the success of any attempt to manipulate behavior depends on the degree to which the wishes and problems of the people are taken into account. It was such consideration for the people that was too often lacking in the GDR, presumably for ideological reasons. Rigidity of an ideological position prevented a pragmatic and detached discussion of the problem, and, consequently, the use of exactly those arguments which might have been suited to swing the mood of the population.

This seems important, for one can generalize and say that the press in totalitarian systems in general may not be able to manipulate behavior in any decisive way; it is restricted in its choice of arguments, because the realm of principal state interests and ideological taboos seems far greater in these systems than in the parliamentary forms of government in the West, and the leeway for pragmatic arguments and bargains is correspondingly smaller.

A further consideration might support this conclusion: In a situation of basic conflict, where the state is not believed to act in a given person's interest, it is psychologically improbable to expect him to follow the influence attempts of an agent clearly allied with the state. Only a mediator could gain enough authority to persuade the people to alter their behavior. The press can function as such a mediator but only if it is recognized by the people as an independent source of power capable of advocating a course of action that does justice to both parties of the conflict. Under such conditions the press would have at least "expert power" (French and Raven,

1959). Its influence over the people would increase if it also had "referent power"—i.e., a record of defending the people against the long arm of the state. In totalitarian systems where the course of action is so greatly influenced by ideological postulates, always with the readiness to enforce them even against the will of the people, and in which the press is defined as an instrument of the leadership, the mass media cannot play a mediator role and are consequently limited in their ability to manipulate behavior in the case of conflict.

Other reasons can be added. For example, totalitarian systems seem less interested in leading people toward desired decisions than to keep them from making undesired reactions to decisions made without their participation. Inkeles (1950) and Janowitz (1961) point further to the people's satiation with propaganda and its lack of credibility as reasons for the fact that the press has comparatively little influence on the manipulation of behavior in totalitarian systems.

(2) It is the conclusion of this study and the opinion of all other sources used that it was the function of the press to justify a planned action and to prepare the population as well as the outside world for its coming. The change in argumentation, the increase of action indicators, and the manipulation of letters to the editor all speak for the fact that the preparation was planned and directed. It is interesting to note in this connection that the press had already begun preparing for the action at a time when the member states of the Warsaw Pact had not yet given their permission to build the Wall. Whether this was the anticipation of a decision expected to come, or whether it was a push forward to force the Kremlin to consent, cannot be decided.

(3) Determining the success of press preparation is largely a matter for speculation. To be sure, there was no revolt. Foreign politicians, for example Senator Fulbright,

began to consider a closing of the border as negotiable. The world did expect something to happen. In this sense, there was indeed a preparation. But to what extent it was due to the working of the press, and especially to the press treatment of the refugee problem, cannot be decided on the basis of these data.

The GDR as a state appears to have had neither achievement, nor promise, nor *Nestwärme* (warmth of the hearth) enough to bind its people in any way other than force. Force was applied to give a new ideology a chance to live. Whether such a last resort was justified is not a scientific question, and there one will have to take sides.

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