

An experienced student of foreign affairs summarizes world problems and conditions as he sees and foresees them.

Wanted: The Long View

SAMUEL P. HAYES

“**I**N NO country is public opinion so powerful as in the United States,” English historian James Bryce wrote in 1888. “The simple fact is,” Secretary of State Dean Rusk recently said, “that the long-range foreign policy of the United States is determined by the American people.”

If these statements are true, then our schools face a formidable challenge in world affairs education. Nothing is more important than for teachers to impart and for students to develop the most enlightened and far-seeing views possible in international relations. The broad perspective is essential. Without an understanding of the main forces shaping our world, the bits and pieces of current international events make little sense. It is no exaggeration to say that the competence of our future leadership and the wisdom of public opinion in the years ahead rest on what is being taught and learned in the schools today.

Basic to an understanding of global politics is an appreciation of the unprecedented changes which have altered our planet since the end of World War II. It is not only that more nations and more powerful weapons exist. It is not only that science has revolutionized our way of life or that the industrialized regions of the world are enjoying a golden age of prosperity. It is rather that the very framework in which we need to think about world affairs is totally new.

Samuel Hayes is president of the Foreign Policy Association. Before joining FPA in 1962, Mr. Hayes was director of the Center for Research in Economic Development and a professor of economics at the University of Michigan.

For Americans, the most basic change of all has been the swift emergence of this country as a world leader. Thomas Jefferson, our first Secretary of State, managed the foreign affairs of the nation with a handful of clerks and consular officials. Prior to World War II, the State Department employed some 6,000 people. Now, more than 24,000 people work for the State Department and thousands of others work in closely affiliated agencies.

Once able to live in splendid isolation, the United States has been thrust into total international involvement. As a result, our foreign affairs have become intricate almost beyond analysis. With troops in more than 30 countries, with commitments to defend more than 40 countries, with foreign aid having gone to more than 100 countries, little happens anywhere that does not affect our interests. Though we may not have power enough to influence all events, we have too much at stake to ignore any event. In coming years, the extent of our involvement is likely to deepen.

No Country an Island

Rarely can a foreign policy problem be treated in isolation. For instance, our Ambassador in country X may telegraph Washington that, unless the United States votes a certain way on a colonial issue in the UN, our relations with country X will deteriorate. The State Department personnel directly concerned with our relations to country X evaluate the information. But the Department's Bureau of African Affairs also receives a copy of the telegram because the colony in question is in Africa. The Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, which deals with other regions sensitive to colonial questions, may be called in. A copy of the telegram may go to the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, because the UN is concerned. The opinion of the Bureau of Public Affairs is solicited, because the subject is a sensitive one for an important sector of American public opinion. The Defense Department must have its say, because the United States has military bases in country X.

Before taking any step, government officials must consider how various possible actions might affect different U.S. interests. Because we have many interests and they often con-

flict, decisions are never easy. How much of one interest, for example, can be sacrificed for the sake of another? Should the United States risk alienating country X by voting against it—or risk alienating newly independent nations by voting with country X?

If the student is to grasp the nature of international affairs, he must be attuned to their subtlety and complexity. The recent development of East-West relations shows how complex global diplomacy can be. For most of us the worldwide political, economic, and ideological struggle against communism has been an extraordinarily wearing battle. We are used to fighting men, not ideas. We are prone to see issues in black and white, not in the often muted tones of cold-war gray. We are accustomed to reasonably quick solutions, not to protracted conflict. As one author put it, “wars which are not wars in the classical sense bedevil our minds and our times.”

Communists take a different view of the cold war struggle. As they see it, the fight to bury the Western world, whether by peaceful or violent means, is a battle which may last for generations. They are presumably prepared for the long struggle, confident that victory will ultimately be theirs because they are on history’s side. It has been debated whether men in the Western world are equally capable of adopting the long-range view and can muster the patience and endurance necessary to sustain their ideals over the long haul.

“A Balance of Terror”

These qualities are particularly pertinent now, when East-West relations depend upon a continuing “balance of terror.” With both superpowers having more than enough nuclear weapons to annihilate the other, each must tread gingerly to avoid triggering an escalation process that might get out of control.

While the advance in military technology has given the superpowers enormous strength, the balance of terror has imposed a large degree of restraint upon their actions. The United States dared not intervene during the 1956 anti-Soviet Hungarian revolution because Washington feared

such a move might spark a global war. During the desperate days of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, President Kennedy pursued a policy of graduated pressures to show the Kremlin that we meant business. He was also careful, however, to act with enough flexibility to permit the Soviet Union to remove its missiles without being backed into a corner from which there might be no possible response except a nuclear strike. Similarly, the Soviet Union has been careful not to risk a direct confrontation with the United States in Vietnam. As additional nations acquire nuclear capability, both risks and the need for restraint in the conduct of foreign affairs will grow.

Need for Accommodation

The restraint with which policy makers must operate has an important bearing on our future relations with the Communist countries. Total victory—meaning complete subjugation of the enemy—is not a realistic possibility in the present world context. Barring all-out nuclear war, which would produce only losers, we—as well as the Communists—must accept the fact that ours will continue to be a diverse world. If history proves anything, it is that no one political or economic philosophy can be universally applied. The nuclear facts of life demand that there be some form of accommodation between the contending forces, though there may be wide disagreement on the terms of that accommodation.

The general aim of U.S. policy has been to search for means of lessening tensions with the Soviet Union. In recent years, the Kremlin has also shown signs of wanting to promote a détente. The pursuit of accommodation will, in all probability, continue to be a major diplomatic activity—although localized conflicts, such as the one in Vietnam, will certainly make it more difficult to achieve further relaxation.

The need for caution and the search for a tolerable coexistence formula is not likely to find favor with those who demand definitive answers to world problems, or who think it treasonable to deal with Communists, or who believe that communism would wither away if only the West took the right actions. Nor does the search for coexistence meet with

favor in some of the more die-hard Communist circles. But is any course possible other than one which aims at an acceptable accommodation?

No Place for Dogmatism

World affairs are simply too tangled for a dogmatic approach. For instance, while it was once possible to regard the Communist bloc as a monolith, such a view plainly has no place today. The Sino-Soviet rift has torn the Communist world asunder. Yugoslavia has been an independent Communist state since 1948. Rumania, in resisting Moscow's plans for the economic integration of Eastern Europe, and in criticizing the presence of Russian troops in satellite nations, has asserted its right to act independently. Throughout Eastern Europe, the Communist nations are following their national interests, which do not always coincide with those of Moscow.

If present trends are any indication, the Communist nations are likely to go their own political and economic ways to an even greater degree in the future. Eastern Europe may find itself increasingly drawn to the economic opportunities offered by the West and could turn its back on Moscow. The Sino-Soviet split would widen, thus making a U.S.-Soviet détente all the more attractive to the Kremlin. At the same time, the United States may be drawn more deeply into conflict with Communist forces in Asia.

The members of the Western alliance have also been taking off in different directions. When the alliance was formed in the late 1940's, the possibility of Soviet military aggression against Western Europe was a distinct threat. Now that the Soviet threat has receded, the need for alliance has lost its urgency. In a sense, the alliance has been a victim of its own success in carrying out its original aims. Today the allies are able to agree on few important policy matters. The vision of an Atlantic partnership between the United States and a united Western Europe is fading. Economic talks aimed at reducing tariffs and spurring trade between the United States and Western Europe are going badly. NATO, the very symbol of alliance, is in disarray. French President de Gaulle seems determined to divorce his country from NATO and he

wants U.S. troops out of France. He would also like to see U.S. influence in European affairs curbed.

End of Bipolarity

The breakup of the bipolar world has been one of the most dramatic manifestations of change in the 1960's. The period ahead may see the emergence of new alliance systems. De Gaulle speaks of a Europe extending to the Urals—something he believes may be achieved when the Soviet Union abandons its imperial designs and modifies its totalitarian system. He sees advantages in a close French-Soviet link which would provide a loose safety belt around Germany and perhaps make German reunification possible on terms that would satisfy all sides. If a satisfactory unification formula cannot be achieved, however, West Germany may emerge even more clearly as the principal U.S. ally in Europe.

Another possibility is that the drive toward European economic and political unity will be reinvigorated and the Common Market countries (France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) will assume major-power status in world affairs and perhaps even possess their own nuclear force. Although Gaullist actions seem to preclude such a development in the near future, the postwar trend has been toward establishing regional institutions geared to deal with supranational problems. The post-de Gaulle period, therefore, may mark a new push toward continental unity.

The end of bipolarity marks the beginning of a time of major change in the international lineup. This will impose new strains on U.S. policy and demand sustained thinking on a number of basic issues. How necessary is the Atlantic alliance? If the alliance is an asset to the United States and the West in general, what can Washington do to arrest NATO's decay? What policies should the United States pursue toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe? If détente is a proper goal, how can it best be realized? What policies should the United States develop toward Southeast Asia and China? Such questions will challenge the skills of our policy makers for decades to come.

The Underdeveloped World

Moreover, the problems we face during the balance of this century will have to be considered in the context of continuing global upheaval. In the postwar period, dozens of independent new nations have emerged from the ruins of the former colonial empires. These new nations along with certain of the older established countries, mainly in Latin America, are underdeveloped, predominantly agricultural, and plagued by political and social instability. In Africa, governments have been toppling like tenpins. In Asia, as elsewhere in the underdeveloped world, the depth of poverty is almost beyond imagination. In Latin America, explosive tensions threaten to rip apart the fabric of order.

The underdeveloped nations face staggering difficulties in their efforts to proceed along the development path. Despite more than \$50 billion in U.S. economic aid, despite billions of aid dollars from other countries, despite enormous internal efforts in some of the underdeveloped nations, the pace of progress has been agonizingly slow. India, after 15 years of labor, still has a per capita average annual income of less than \$100.

In our early enthusiasm for the foreign aid concept, many of us may have underestimated the difficulties of economic development. It is now more apparent that the struggle to reach a self-sustaining level will last for generations and that, if we are to help in that struggle, our aid will have to extend for a similar period. Yet, as a percentage of gross national product, the amount of aid we and the rest of the developed world are extending is steadily diminishing.

Food and Famine

Never, however, has the need been greater. Only now are we beginning to recognize the critical food and population problems the underdeveloped countries face. Every day, some 10,000 people in the underdeveloped world die from malnutrition. Half the world's people experience chronic hunger and dietary deficiency. Of every 20 children born in the underdeveloped countries, 10 perish in infancy from illnesses caused by improper diet. The nearly 500 million people

of India subsist on an average caloric intake some 10 percent less than minimum standards; and India was able to avert famine in 1966 only because of large emergency grain shipments from the United States and other countries.

If the underdeveloped countries cannot feed themselves adequately now, what will they do at the end of this century, when world population will have doubled its present 3.3 billion? Most of the increase will occur in the countries least able to feed their present populations. "Either we take the fullest measures both to raise productivity and to stabilize population growth, or we face disaster of an unprecedented magnitude," the director general of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization has said. President Johnson has proposed that the U.S. "lead the world in a war against hunger." The U.S. aid program in general is now being geared more closely to spurring agricultural development in low-income nations as well as to supplying more food on easy credit terms.

Many of the underdeveloped countries are making new efforts to increase their own agricultural yields and are tackling the other side of the equation—population control—as well. The development of an intrauterine device has made available a means of cheap, effective, and widely accepted birth control. A number of countries have established a network of birth control clinics and are making other birth control services available to the people. The United States, which until a few years ago refused to get involved in assisting the birth control programs of foreign governments, has made an about-face and is now offering technical aid to countries which request help. The United Nations is doing likewise. The crucial years in the struggle to control population growth and increase agricultural yield lie immediately ahead. It is certain, therefore, that population and food problems will occupy a large share of our attention in the next decades.

Cooperative Action

In all the sound and fury of the postwar years, public officials and private citizens from almost all countries have sought order and progress through cooperative action in such

institutions as the United Nations. While the UN has more nearly mirrored the world's ills than solved the world's problems, and while it has not been able to resolve great-power disputes or been the cure-all which many had sought, it has nevertheless performed a variety of valuable services. It has served as a forum for debate and quiet diplomacy; it has been a peacemaker in disputes involving small powers; its peace forces have helped preserve order on several occasions; its specialized agencies have promoted social and economic progress throughout the world. As the trend towards cooperative action continues to develop, the UN's role in world affairs may grow larger.

The ideas and forces shaping the world of tomorrow cry out for study and understanding. U.S. involvement in global affairs, the breakup of the old alliances and the formation of new ones, the risks added and the restraints imposed by nuclear weapons, the attempt by low-income countries to modernize and to solve their food and population problems, and the quest for global order are realities which will be with us for a long time to come. That these realities be thoroughly understood by our teachers and clearly transmitted to our students is one of the compelling needs of our day.