

II. MARK CHESLER.

JAMES E. CROWFOOT. *Partisans at Work*

These two case studies have much to recommend them. Each separately represents a well-documented, carefully interpreted report of what their authors claim is a successful change effort. Moreover, each reports change in a public agency actively involved in political controversy. Taken together these two studies are even more important because of the many ways in which they differ from and highlight each other. Each stems from a different tradition of planned social change. One tradition sees change as a primarily technical process engaged in by relatively neutral and objective professionals. The second sees change as a primarily political process engaged in by partisan citizens who have a specific position or cause to advocate. One stresses gathering complete information, neutrality and objectivity, collaboration and consensus; the other, the use of selective information, constituent accountability, power and conflict.

Goodstein and Boyer see themselves primarily as third parties in what started out as a managerial consultation. They put their money on a rational (from the scientific/managerial/professional perspective) process of change based upon a problem-solving scheme that begins with information retrieval and diagnosis. Their credibility is based upon acceptance of their personal good will and professional objectivity as evidence of their "political neutrality" with regard to all parties. Torczyner, on the other hand, clearly identifies himself as an advocate of certain issues and proceeds to try to manipulate the social system without much concern for either good will or openness. He already has a clear-cut diagnosis and is not interested in a complex inquiry, but rather in highlighting issues and mobilizing support for his position. He also assumes that the process of change is rational,

but not necessarily in adherence to the logic of system objectives. He assumes everyone's rational commitment to act out his self-interests until greater power resolves conflict of self-interests among members and groups. As a result, he mobilizes power as a strategy. His credibility stems from his long-term involvement with clients and colleagues and the payoff he has been able to deliver to them in the past.

Torczyner is quite clear about who his clients are; they are the poor, the youngsters who are to benefit from the program he advocates. Goodstein and Boyer state their unclarity about the identity of their client and their resolution of their client as the general public welfare. Professional claims of accountability to general public welfare are sometimes really accountability to the profession—a partisan group in the social structure—and at other times accountability only to oneself. Accountability to oneself clearly means one is acting on his or her own values and is once again a partisan. In either case the mythology of change-agent neutrality is apparent.

These differences are related to the institutional base, services, and ideology of the two change agents. Goodstein and Boyer are university-based, technical/political resources starting from an implicit coalition with administrator-professionals. As outsiders to the organization to be changed, they are requested to enter by administrator-professionals of their own social strata to temporarily apply their technical resources. Torczyner is a public agency-based political/technical resource to poor young people. He is a part of the organization to be changed and is in an ongoing, explicit coalition with this oppressed interest group in order to meet at least his definition of their needs.

Goodstein-Boyer, as purveyors of the ideology of professionally engineered planned change in the public interest, are not self-conscious in the use and labeling of their own power. For instance, they do not explain adequately the relation between themselves and the Workers Council. Was the Council really convinced that Goodstein-Boyer could objectively represent their interests and did not need to fight? Or did they feel that consultant power could not be fought effectively above ground and decided to take the real issues underground? Torczyner,

with the ideology of politically advocated planned change in partisan interests, fails to address the potential disparity of rational interests between himself and his clients. Is he, as he appears, "doing for" his clients by defining their needs and deciding what services to provide for them? Or is he actually operating out of his clients' own statements of their needs and control of his services?

THE RHETORIC OF CRISIS

The history of rebellion and disruption makes it clear that whoever has control of the public rhetoric can define much of the action. Varied uses of the concept of crisis seep into both of these papers and cloud our understanding of just who was experiencing what. Goodstein-Boyer make reference to a crisis in the municipal agency, but in their report there is no substantial evidence of an organizational crisis. There is evidence of disturbance, disaffection, annoyance, petitions, and perhaps not very efficient functioning. The Commissioner alone appears to be in a crisis situation: he is under severe threat, is close to a breakdown and cannot operate, but that still is not the same as the organization's having a crisis. A similar dynamic is evident in Torczyner's report. A crisis exists for the poor clients because they are simply not getting the services they need and they face incarceration. Torczyner uses conflict as a way of creating a potential crisis for Rabbi Porush and Mayor Kollek. Their crises force them to act in new and different ways, although the agency itself is not in crisis. As far as we can tell, neither agency was ever in a state of crisis; neither agency suffered a breakdown in the provision of services and normal operative functions. But the leadership of both agencies did experience crises at certain points in time.

Outcome and Method

We may examine the outcomes of these two change efforts from several different perspectives. In both cases the offending department heads were removed. In Torczyner's case the Rabbi was removed, but one has no promise of much more sympathetic leadership since he is to be replaced by his son, who is of the same social group. In the Goodstein-Boyer case the Commissioner was removed; but since we can expect the new Commissioner will come from the same class and medical/technical background and owe loyalty to the same interests, we may

expect a similar "son of the old Commissioner" effect to take place. In the Goodstein-Boyer case, a Department reorganization has been suggested and new criteria and members for a Board of Health approved. In a variety of ways one can see the beginnings of organizational restructuring, and some new structures may promise a different life for that agency. Torczyner has not altered the structures of the organization. He has primarily manipulated the resource allocation process so that with the same structure, and with close to the same norms, a new pattern of resource allocation has taken place and a new social welfare program is underway. It may also be the case that a new informal political structure will operate because of the way power was exercised in the process. However, it is clear that Torczyner is not moving toward organizational restructuring because the political coalition he put together is to remain informal, to be called on when necessary, and is not to be institutionalized in the ongoing bureaucracy in any way, shape, or form.

We feel we have been enlightened by each of these case studies and by the potential for comparing them. But it would be foolish to treat these issues as a set of mere academic distinctions. These two approaches to change carry tremendous implications for the future of political change, professional roles, societal resource distribution, and community control of government-organized services. We may highlight this by asking: What would Torczyner have done if the Rabbi had called in Goodstein-Boyer to try and bring about organizational understanding through an inquiry process? Further: What would Goodstein-Boyer have done if Torczyner was the department head who opposed their entry, tried to organize against them, and never was reached by them for later collaboration? What would each of these persons do in the other's case study? Clearly each of these practitioners carries situational values so different that they are "enemies." Clearly they may collaborate with each other at certain times and places; yet they clearly have very different values, experiences, and assumptions. Clearly they would get in each other's way.

It is interesting that both articles appear in *JABS*, which is, after all, not common turf. We can understand readily why

Goodstein-Boyer published their article in *JABS*. Much of the readership is professional change agents who are based in or oriented to the university, professional social welfare systems, and the administration and development of large organizations. Moreover, the professional reference group for Goodstein-Boyer is the readership and leadership of *JABS* and the professional movement with which it is associated. But why did Torczyner publish in *JABS*? His reference group of partisan advocates for social change is not the primary readership or leadership of *JABS* and its associated organizations. Does he seek to inform or share secrets, to confront, to convert? How much of the readership of *JABS* would utilize Torczyner's procedures, even as exogenous consultants in organizational change? Upon whom would a major school system be likely to call? Whom would the State Department or the U.S. Office of Education tend to call upon? Whom would Ford or General Motors call upon? Whom would a black or brown community group be likely to call upon? Whom would a student group be likely to call upon? Whom would a community antiracist group tend to call on?

Are our distinctions overblown? Overstated? Would Goodstein-Boyer reply that we are overstating the differences? Would Torczyner?