

Brazilian and U.S. student samples responded to measures of behavioral intention, perceived norms, and affect regarding prosocial behaviors. Subjects were randomly assigned to either an anonymous or public condition in answering the questionnaire, and subjects were categorized as either allocentric, i.e., tending to subordinate their personal goals to the goals of others, or idiocentric, i.e., tending to subordinate the goals of others to their personal goals. The Brazilian sample indicated they would do what was expected of them and would enjoy doing so, whereas the U.S. sample reported not only less intention to do what was expected of them, but also less enjoyment regarding adherence to norms. As predicted, U.S. subjects in the anonymous condition showed less willingness to perform prosocial behaviors with high personal cost than U.S. subjects in the public condition, whereas the Brazilians did not respond differently in the two conditions. These results imply that the Brazilians have *internalized* ingroup norms; the U.S. subjects demonstrated *compliance* because of social desirability pressures. In collectivist cultures, habits and other such mechanisms of social control may predict pro-social behavior, whereas both habits and attitudes may be necessary to predict pro-social behavior in individualist cultures.

COMPLIANCE AND VALUE INTERNALIZATION IN BRAZIL AND THE U.S. Effects of Allocentrism and Anonymity

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Cultures vary in the degree to which they encourage individualist or collectivist behavior and values in their members. Individualist cultures place high value on individual regulation of behavior, self-sufficiency, and separation of personal from ingroup goals (Hui &

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Triandis, 1986). In contrast, collectivist cultures stress ingroup regulation of behavior, interdependence, and the subordination of personal goals to the goals of the ingroup. In individualist cultures, the person is the center of the psychological field and the self is experienced as distinct from the group. In collectivist cultures, the ingroup is the center of the psychological field and the self is viewed as an extension of the ingroup.

Many theorists, such as Parsons (1961), Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961), and Hofstede (1980), have described individualism-collectivism as a major dimension of cultural variation. A substantial literature, reviewed by Triandis, Leung, Villareal, and Clack (1985) suggests that the relative emphasis on individual versus collective goals has important implication for a wide range of variables, including gross national product (Adelman & Morris, 1967), crime, suicide, child abuse, divorce rates (Naroll, 1983), and cognitive differentiation (Witkin & Berry, 1975). Cross-cultural studies have indicated that Northern and Western Europeans and North Americans tend to be individualistic (Inkeles, 1983; Stewart, 1966). Southern Italians (Banfield, 1958), traditional Greeks (Triandis & Vassiliou, 1972), Chinese (Hsu, 1981), Hispanics, and Far Eastern minorities in the United States (Triandis, 1983; Triandis, Marin, Lisansky, & Betancourt, 1984) tend to be collectivists. Hofstede (1980) has shown that Latin Americans (e.g., Venezuelans and Colombians) tend to be collectivists. A study comparing Brazilians to 21 other non-Latin countries suggested that they too are collectivists (The Cultural Connection, 1985).

In collectivist cultures, the number of salient ingroups is small and may include the nuclear or extended family, friends, co-workers, or fellow citizens. In Latin American culture, the group orientation is evidenced by strong feelings of loyalty, reciprocity, and solidarity among members of the same family, avoidance of interpersonal competition, and the high value placed upon *simpatia* – enhancing positive feelings in positive situations and diffusing negative feelings in negative situations (Triandis, Marin, Lisansky, & Betancourt, 1984).

Within cultures there are parallel variations. *Allocentric* individuals pay attention to ingroups more than to their personal goals, whereas *idiocentrics* emphasize personal goals over loyalty to ingroups. Idiocentric persons have been shown to have a higher need for achievement, and they also report that they are more lonely, compared to allocentric individuals (Triandis et al., 1985). There are suggestions in the literature that allocentric individuals tend to have happier marriages (Antill, 1983), and that the social supports that are readily available to them may help them deal more effectively with life change stress (Cohen & Hoberman, 1983), may safeguard their health (Gottlieb, 1983), and may enable persistence at a task under unfavorable conditions (Sarason, Levine, Basham, & Sarason, 1983). Allocentrics were found to place less importance on the values of competition and self-reliance and more importance on the values of cooperation, equality, honesty, and self-sacrifice of personal interests for the attainment of collective interests (Triandis et al., 1985).

Hui (1984), guided by suggestions from social scientists from six continents (Hui & Triandis, 1986), developed a scale designed to measure individualism-collectivism. Triandis et al. (1985) have reported on the scale's convergent and discriminant validity. This scale (known as INDCOL) has been modified for use at both the cultural (individualist-collectivist) and individual (idiocentric-allocentric) levels, based on research in more than a dozen countries (Triandis et al., 1986).

Allocentric individuals experience greater ingroup regulation of behavior and a heightened sense of duty to the ingroup, as compared with idiocentrics. Therefore, we expected that, for allocentrics, the correspondence between reports of what they were likely to do in a given situation (behavioral intention) and what was expected of them (norms) would be greater than the correspondence between behavioral intention and subjects' feelings (affect) with respect to the behavior (Hypothesis 1). In contrast, we predicted that idiocentric subjects would say they intended to behave more in accord with their feelings than in accord with perceived norms (Hypothesis 2).

To examine the impact of social desirability on individualism-collectivism, subjects were randomly assigned to either an anonymous or public data-collection condition. We predicted that subjects in the anonymous condition would be less motivated to present themselves in a socially desirable manner, and as a result would report lower rates of intention to engage in prosocial behaviors involving high personal cost. In contrast, we expected that subjects in the public condition would report higher levels of intention to engage in pro-social behaviors because of the pressure to respond in a socially desirable manner (Hypothesis 3).

METHOD

SUBJECTS

Subjects in the U.S. sample were 147 male and female University of Illinois undergraduates who participated in return for course credit. The Brazilian sample was composed of 232 male and female undergraduate volunteers from two private universities in Rio de Janeiro.

PROCEDURE

Subjects' degree of idiocentrism-allocentrism was measured using a 15-item adaptation of the INDCOL scale described in Triandis et al. (1986). The second part of the questionnaire presented the subject with five scenarios (see Appendix A) in which either (a) the subject disagreed with another person, (b) the subject had an embarrassing family problem such as alcoholism or sexual disturbances, (c) another person was doing something that had adverse health consequences, (d) another person fell ill and required a full-time caretaker, or (e) another person asked for a loan. For each scenario, the subject was asked (a) what he or she would do (behavioral intention), (b) what he or she was expected to do

(perceived norm), and (c) how he or she felt about the situation (affect) when the other person involved in the scenario was either a member of the subject's family, a friend, a co-worker, a neighbor, or a fellow national. The presentation of the items measuring behavioral intention, norms, and affect was counterbalanced within the questionnaire.

All items were originally written in English. In developing a Portuguese version of the questionnaire, back-translation (Brislin, 1980) was used. The scale was translated into Portuguese by a native Brazilian, fluent in English. This version was then translated into English by a native American, fluent in Portuguese. The new English translation was compared with the original, and differences suggested modifications. The process continued until the two English versions converged.

The subjects were randomly assigned to either an anonymous or a public condition. In the public condition, subjects were asked to provide detailed personal identifying information on the first page including name, address, and telephone number. To emphasize the experimenter's ability to identify individual subject's responses, subjects were told that some of them might be contacted for a follow-up study in which their questionnaire responses would be examined and discussed by a group of friends in the laboratory. Subjects in the anonymous condition were asked to report only their gender on the questionnaire; they were explicitly told that their responses would be private and that the experimenter would not be able to associate individual participants with their responses. The questionnaire was presented in three different counterbalanced formats to avoid fatigue effects, and required approximately one hour to complete.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Within both the U.S. and Brazilian samples, idiocentrics were defined as those subjects who scored more than one standard deviation below the within-culture mean on the modified INDCOL

TABLE 1
Correlations Between Norms and Intentions
and Affect and Intentions Among Brazilian and
U.S. Subjects who are Allocentrics and Idiocentrics

	<i>n</i>	<i>rNI</i>	<i>rAI</i>	<i>t</i>
Allocentrics				
Brazil	39	.42	.80	-3.65***
U.S.	24	.72	.22	2.74**
Idiocentrics				
Brazil	37	.69	.72	.32
U.S.	23	.47	.05	-2.30*

NOTE: Correlations were computed between scores on Norm, Intention, and Affect scales.
 * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .005$.

scale; subjects who scored more than one standard deviation above the mean composed the allocentric subsample. Separate scales of behavioral intention, norm, and affect were created by summing all intention, norm, and affect items respectively, across each of the scenarios.

Because the measurement equivalence of the INDCOL scale has not been demonstrated *across* cultures, comparisons of mean scores are only valid *within* cultures (Malpass, 1977).

Inspection of the data showed that in Brazil, allocentrics reported higher intentions of performing the pro-social behavior, perceived stronger norms, and thought it would be more enjoyable to perform the pro-social behavior than did idiocentrics. All differences between Brazilian allocentrics and idiocentrics were significant at $p < .005$. Among U.S. subjects, there was a similar, non-significant trend for the norm and affect scales.

Hypothesis 1 predicted that, for allocentrics, there would be a higher correlation between intention and norms than between intention and affect. The Pearson product moment correlations are shown in Table 1.

In the case of the Brazilian allocentrics, the correlation between norms and intention (*rNI*) was .42, whereas the correlation between

affect and intention (r AI) was .80, which was opposite from prediction. In the case of the U.S. allocentrics, the r NI of .72 was significantly ($t = 2.74, p < .01$) greater than the r AI of .22, as predicted.

Hypothesis 2 predicted that for idiocentrics, r AI would be greater than r NI. Reference to Table 1 shows that there was a non-significant trend in the predicted direction in only the Brazilian sample. The hypothesis was rejected. These seemingly contradictory results may be more easily explained if we shift the level of interpretation from the individual to the cultural level. The finding that r AI is greater than r NI for Brazilian allocentrics and tended in that direction for Brazilian idiocentrics may reflect an *internalization* of the norms evident in a collectivist culture. Subjects know what duties are expected of them in a given situation and they find pleasure in behaving as expected. There is little discord between the ingroup's directives and the ingroup member's willingness to comply, and this is further bolstered by the individual's pleasure in behaving dutifully. Following Kelman's (1958) analysis, subjects do not indicate their willingness to comply merely because they want to be like the group (identification), nor out of fear of reprisal (compliance), but because the prescribed behavior is consistent with their values (internalization).

The expectation that r NI would be greater than r AI for allocentric subjects and less than r AI for idiocentric subjects may reflect idiocentric biases in the formulation of the hypotheses. In fact, consonance among norms, affect, and behavior in a collectivist culture, such as Brazil, seems a plausible mechanism of perpetuating allocentric values within the social system.

This consonance is most evident in Table 1. One notes the large values of r AI ($p < .001$) for Brazilian idio- and allocentrics, which are much lower in the U.S. sample. In both cultures, people say they intend to do what is expected of them (all r 's significant at $p < .05$), so they follow norms. The really striking difference is that the Brazilians indicate that they enjoy doing what is expected, while the U.S. subjects do not. For the U.S. subjects, this pattern is consistent with Kelman's characterization of compliance. Subjects

recognize normative pressure to engage in prosocial behaviors involving ingroup members, and report intentions to do so, but, unlike their Brazilian counterparts who may derive a sense of satisfaction from acting dutifully, the more individualistic U.S. sample reports little satisfaction with this “forced” behavior, as indicated by the low correlations between affect and intention.

Behavior is, in part, a function of intentions (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Triandis, 1977, 1980). Intentions are a function of norms and affect. Therefore, we may describe the behavior of Brazilians as overdetermined, because both norms and affect determine it. In the case of the U.S. sample, norms pull in the pro-social direction but, as the low affect-intention correlation indicates, there is little enthusiasm for the pro-social behavior. Furthermore, behavior has been shown to be a function of behavioral intentions and habits (Triandis, 1980). As behavior is repeated, it tends to become automatic (i.e., prediction does not require consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of the behavior). In short, the relative importance of behavioral intentions is reduced with repetition of the behavior, while the relative importance of automatic processes, such as habits, increases. The data presented above suggest the hypothesis that, in collectivist cultures, prosocial behaviors that involve ingroup members occur according to habits, whereas in individualist cultures attitudes also play a role. Thus, the picture that emerges is that in individualistic cultures people weigh the advantages and disadvantages of prosocial behaviors involving ingroup members, whereas in collectivist cultures they respond more or less automatically, without utilitarian computations, to the demands of situations requiring pro-social behavior.

The third hypothesis in this study was that subjects in the public condition would report higher levels of intention to engage in prosocial behaviors than would subjects in the anonymous condition. Consistent with this hypothesis, the U.S. subjects in the public condition indicated that they intended to perform the pro-social behavior to a significantly greater extent ($M = 64.30$, $SD = 18.72$) than those in the anonymous condition ($M = 36.74$, $SD = 26.89$) $t = 7.26$, $p < .001$. The Brazilian subjects, however, did not have

significantly different mean intention scores in the public ($M = 71.00$, $SD = 25.20$) or anonymous ($M = 70.04$, $SD = 25.41$) conditions. One might test this hypothesis with ANOVA, but an ANOVA *assumes* that the scores are equivalent in the two cultures. The t-test does not require this assumption since it is done *within* culture; hence, we consider it the correct way to test this hypothesis.

This seemingly complex U.S. and Brazilian pattern of results can again be interpreted in terms of Kelman's theory regarding compliance and internalization. The individualistic U.S. sample complied with perceived normative pressure in the public condition, reporting a mean intention to perform pro-social behaviors almost as high as that of the Brazilians. However, when the anonymous condition eliminated the possibility of public scrutiny or reprisal, reported intention dropped substantially. The more collectivist Brazilian sample, in which subjects have presumably internalized the norms of the ingroup, showed almost no shift between public and anonymous conditions, suggesting that these subjects were responding not out of fear of reprisal, but in consonance with their values. Figure 1 shows the pattern of mean intention scores for idiocentric-allocentric, culture, and public-anonymous conditions.

Analysis of reported mean intention scores indicates the strong effect of the public/anonymous manipulation in the U.S. sample. The absence of such a difference in the Brazilian sample requires further analysis of the Brazilian data. The *entire* Brazilian sample was analyzed, collapsing over idiocentric and allocentric subjects. A comparison of correlations for the public versus anonymous conditions showed a strong effect of the experimental manipulation: The responses of subjects in the public condition were such that behavioral intention in a given situation was highly correlated with situational norms (.68), significantly more so than with affect (.43), $t = 3.71$, $p < .01$. In contrast, correlations for norms and intention (.50) and affect and intention (.53) for subjects in the anonymous condition were not significantly different, $t = -.35$. When subjects believed that their responses would be shared and discussed with friends, they tended to indicate their intention to do what they believed was expected of them ($r = .68$), to a much greater




Figure 1

extent than did subjects in the anonymous condition ($r = .50$), $z = 2.10$, $p < .05$. The difference between the correlation of affect and behavioral intention in the anonymous condition ($r = .53$) and in the public condition ($r = .43$) was not significant, $z = .981$.

Overall, the results related to Hypothesis 3 suggest that subjects were sensitive to the prospect of their responses being shared with others. In the public condition, there was a very high correspon-

dence between what subjects thought would be expected of them in a given situation and what they indicated they intended to do. In the anonymous condition subjects reported lower mean levels of intention to engage in pro-social behavior (U.S. sample) or lower correlation between norms and intention (Brazilian sample).

In sum, affect and norms may be consonant in collectivist cultures to a much greater degree than in individualist cultures. As a result, the anonymity of the data-collection conditions has an increased impact in individualist cultures. Of course, this phenomenon should be replicated in other collectivist and individualist cultures.

APPENDIX

Below are the five scenarios used in the study, as well as the scales used to measure behavioral intention, perceived norm, and affect toward the act.

A) Suppose you disagreed with many members of one of the groups mentioned below about something very important. What are the chances that you would confront them and bring the disagreement out in the open?

B) Suppose you and your spouse or your children are having a problem that is quite embarrassing (e.g., sexual difficulties or heavy drinking). What are the chances you would inform members of the groups mentioned below?

C) Suppose you notice that many members of the groups mentioned below have a lifestyle that is unhealthy (they smoke, drink, and do other things in excess; they do not exercise enough). What are the chances that you would do something about it?

D) Suppose that a member of one of the groups mentioned below got seriously sick, requiring that somebody spend a lot of time (40 hours per week) with him or her. What are the chances that you would do it?

E) Suppose that a member of one of the groups mentioned below asked you for a loan (about a week's wages). Assume that you have that much in the bank. What are the chances you would lend the money?

For each scenario, the phrase "groups mentioned below" referred to the following: family, friends, co-workers, neighbors, and fellow countrymen. The scale measuring *behavioral intention* was as follows:

“In this part, we want you to estimate the probability that you would *do* something when considering each of the various groups. Use the answer sheet as follows:

If you think that the chances are very high, you are *certain you would do it*, mark 6.

If you think that the chances are *high*, i.e., it is very likely you would do it, mark 5.

If you think that the chances are *more* than 50-50 that you would do it, mark 4.

If you think that the chances are *less* than 50-50 that you would do it, mark 3.

If you think that the chances are *very low* that you would do it, mark 2.

If you think that you are *certain* you would *not do it*, mark 1.”

For each subject, a behavioral intention score was calculated by summing the responses from each of the five scenarios for each of the five target persons.

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