

In this reviewer's judgment, a special difficulty with this scholarly book is that it is not clearly pitched to any particular audience. The level of treatment assumes something more than the background of undergraduates. On the other hand, the analysis is not sufficiently developed in depth as a reference work for international relations specialists or even for most graduate students. At the same time, the book's contents are so circumscribed substantively that they are not likely to generate a wide interest for the lay public. For example, Bailey repeatedly stresses the necessity of constructing effective institutions of peace, but how to go about this frustrating task is ignored. The most crucial problem is thus left hanging in the air.

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CYRIL E. BLACK and RICHARD A. FALK, eds. *The Future of the International Legal Order*, vol. 4, *The Structure of the International Environment*. Pp. xvi, 637. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972. \$17.50. Paperbound, \$9.50.

According to the editors, the purpose of this volume, the fourth to result from a large-scale collaborative project, is twofold. First, its aim is to discuss "the international legal aspects of the most important problems of the development of the human environment." Second, its goal is to analyze "the institutions, agencies, and movements that must be further adapted to the rapidly changing needs of humankind." The hope is to explore "the adjustments in the present international system that are minimally necessary and practicable" (p. ix).

The book is comprised of fifteen essays by leading specialists in international law, institutions, and politics. All of the authors write about subjects that they have dealt with at greater length elsewhere and with which they are prominently identified. Not surprisingly, the result falls far short of a program for action for the near future.

Nor will the reader find a coherent and comprehensive treatment of the implications of foreseeable technological developments for international law and institutions. Instead, the volume is more a sampler of the available literature from which the reader can pick and choose, and the range of choice is wide and the overall quality high. Those interested in the future of the international legal order will find much in the volume that will interest and stimulate them.

The list of topics covered is by now familiar: population, food, eco-systems and their modification, ocean resources, and other similar issues that have been salient in recent popular and academic discourse. The treatment, of course, varies with individual authors, but all blend description, prediction, and prescription. In general, the specialists in international law among the authors are less inhibited about making normative assertions than the political scientists. But for all, the hoped for, as well as the expected, future involves a global system with increased authority for political units that are more inclusive than the nation-state. Some of the authors show clearly how technological developments pose problems that almost inescapably will have to be resolved by assignments of authority to larger units. The plan of the book, however, provided for a division of labor; some authors were to raise certain questions that others were to answer. As is inevitable in enterprises of this genre, the execution of the scheme has left lacunae, questions raised but not answered—concerning, for example, population—and seemingly gratuitous answers—involving, for example, individual responsibility in international law.

Questions of value are largely unexplored, except of course through the general bias in favor of more inclusive systems of authority. However, in a fascinating introductory essay Harold Lasswell points toward one possibility of the principal elites throughout the world identifying with one another and consolidating a global system of public order that would buttress their positions vis à vis mass discontent. This issue of the value consequences of

international authority system clearly deserves greater attention.

The basic weakness of this book is that of the field generally. Our capacity for prediction is extremely limited. The methodology used here is that of the sensitive observer, analyzing the recent past and speculating about the future. Whether a different approach would have produced more, must at this stage remain a matter of debate. Whatever ones position in this debate, however, there is much in this volume that will be of interest.

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WILLIAM DIEBOLD, JR. *The United States and the Industrial World: American Foreign Economic Policy in the 1970's*. Pp. xv, 463. Published for the Council on Foreign Relations. New York: Praeger, 1972. \$13.50.

This is an outstanding book, though not because of the novelty of the analysis or the boldness of the recommendations. It contains no call to the barricades, discloses no secret information, sets up no heroes, impales no villains, and reveals no short-cuts to peace and prosperity. But it is a gold mine of relevant information. It is gracefully written, well organized, and intelligently indexed. It is suffused with the mature wisdom of a Cicerone who knows his way around, not only in international economics, but in other fields as well.

The result is mercifully undogmatic: indeed, the book may suffer slightly because a decent author operating under Council on Foreign Relations or Brookings' ground-rules tends to give more than a fair shake to "on-the-other-hand" arguments put forward by impetuous members of his sizable supporting cast of study groups, advisory panels, and manuscript readers.

The theme of Diebold's book is the evolution since World War II of United States economic relations with other major industrialized areas—Western Europe, Japan, and Canada (the special relationship with Canada is particularly well analyzed)—

and the problems posed for the future by the efficiencies and deficiencies of what the author calls "the Bretton Woods approach." By that term, he means the effort to build a global economy based on intergovernmental cooperation, the equal treatment of sovereign nations, and the gradual removal of barriers to the movement of goods and funds (but not people) across national boundaries—in short, the major objectives of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Diebold's shorthand may be mildly disconcerting to those who associate the GATT with Geneva or Havana and regard the World Bank and the IMF as the true Bretton Woods twins. Nevertheless, there is plausible logic in his terminology and little likelihood that Cuba will complain.

The aim of the Bretton Woods or GATT-IMF approach was to unleash a process to get the world moving in a direction. Despite zigzags and setbacks, the result was more prosperity by the beginning of the 1970s than the world had ever before known. It was also, however, a United States lacking in either program or goals for the years ahead. Present requirements extend well beyond anything that can be described as "the removal of barriers," an essentially negative function, and involve greater harmonization of domestic economic policies and more positive "management" of the international economy. Diebold is specific about the kinds of actions that need to be taken but deliberately refrains from saying when they should be taken. Space limitations prevent this discursive reviewer from summarizing the recommendations on policy and machinery. Suffice it to say that they build constructively on existing foundations and will whet readers' appetites for the two follow-up books on United States foreign economic policy projected by Diebold.

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OLE R. HOLSTI. *Crisis Escalation War*. Pp. 290. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1972. \$11.00.