

# Trends and nontrends in the Western alliance: a review

Karl W. Deutsch, *Arms Control and the Atlantic Alliance*  
New York: Wiley, 1967. Pp. 167.

Karl W. Deutsch, Lewis J. Edinger, Roy C. Macridis, and Richard L. Merritt, *France, Germany, and the Western Alliance*  
New York: Scribner's, 1967. Pp. 324.

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Forecasting the political future is a hazardous art. In these two books (which draw on a common body of data), Karl Deutsch and a group of colleagues undertake to chart the "outlook for a decade" in regard to European integration, the Western alliance, and arms control. This is not a safe, small study but one which brings together a wide variety of material to support an imaginative analysis. The results are decidedly stimulating, and contribute significantly to our knowledge of important aspects of European politics.

Three questions are central to the two volumes:

(1) Are nation-states being superseded by supranational loyalties, interests, and institutions?

(2) What are the implications of the above trends for arms control and disarmament?

(3) What are the important current trends in French and German domestic politics, especially in relation to foreign policy and continued political stability?

With considerable duplication of material between the two books, *France, Germany*

*and the Western Alliance* provides the more complete discussion of these topics.<sup>1</sup> The first two sections, by Macridis and Edinger, contain a wealth of information about the attitudes of French and German elites—reputedly influential figures in political, military, business, and academic life, leaders in the mass media, and high civil servants. It brings one into the atmosphere of informed political opinion in France and Germany as of 1964. If the sampling and interviewing techniques might be criticized, one must concede that much of the material is available nowhere else. We find new information about such fascinating topics as the future of nationalism in Germany, and the consuming French question, "After de Gaulle . . . ?" In the latter instance, the evidence presented strengthens our conviction that the basic constitutional forms of the Fifth Republic are here to stay: 70 percent of the French elite accepts the presi-

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<sup>1</sup> Only *Arms Control and the Atlantic Alliance*, however, presents a translation of the elite interview questionnaire and a complete set of percentaged responses.

dential system itself, as well as direct election of the president. A majority, however, rejects the Gaullist interpretation of this form, and there is evidence of relatively great frustration and alienation among French—as contrasted with German—elites.

The third section of *France, Germany and the Western Alliance* and all of *Arms Control and the Atlantic Alliance* are by Deutsch. With an impressive breadth of vision and intellectual energy, five different types of evidence are brought together—elite interviews, mass opinion polls, content analysis of the elite press, a survey of arms control proposals, and aggregate statistics—and used to probe into the background and the future of Western politics. As usual, Deutsch does not fail to provide stimulation—but we are stimulated mainly to disagree. For much of the material points to interpretations opposite to those at which Deutsch arrives. Let us cite his conclusions. His first main point in *Arms Control* (p. 14) projects the future of European integration over the coming decade:

For this period, the view of President de Gaulle, that only nation states will be obeyed and supported by the population, and the view of M. Raymond Aron, that there will be no European federation—even for the next twenty years—seem to be borne out by the great preponderance of data examined.<sup>2</sup>

He goes on to say (p. 17):

Since the mid-50's, European integration has slowed, and it has stopped or reached a plateau since 1957–58. An analysis of trade data, going back as far as 1890, suggests that . . . Europe is now much more highly integrated than it was

<sup>2</sup> An identically worded statement is used to sum up *France, Germany and the Western Alliance*. In these conclusions, Deutsch voices a widely-held view: see, for example, Hoffmann (1966).

between the wars or before the First World War, but since 1957–58 there have been no further gains.

### *The Evidence of Transaction Flows*

In the decade since the Common Market came into being, trade among the Six has approximately doubled; other exchanges, such as tourist flows, have also increased sharply. In itself, of course, this does not constitute integration. These increases are to be expected, Deutsch argues, as a result of increases in productivity and in the worldwide level of these activities. To determine whether integration has taken place, he employs a statistical tool called the Index of Relative Acceptance. As measured by this RA Index, Deutsch finds that European integration in trade, travel, and exchanges of mail and students has passed its peak and leveled off or declined in the last decade. The RA Index of international trade within the Six, for example, has dropped from a high of 1.07 in 1948 to .77 in 1963.

The increases in absolute levels of trade and other exchanges are unarguable; it is only when we control for size and prosperity according to the RA Index that we find evidence that European integration halted by 1957. If, however, we make use of *another* statistical tool—the Critical Ratio—then our trade indicators tell us that the degree of European integration more than *doubled* between 1957 and 1963.<sup>3</sup> Use of the CR as a measure of integration has been endorsed by reputable authorities (Savage and Deutsch, 1960).

It is vital to note that the RA Index—and Deutsch's entire line of reasoning on this subject—are based on zero-sum assump-

<sup>3</sup> Calculations by John F. Early, cited in Leon Lindberg, *Europe as a Political System: Measuring Integration* (forthcoming).

tions. As measured by Deutsch, more integration of "Europe" requires relatively *less* transaction with the rest of the world; relative isolation, autarky, and even relative hostility are requisites to his concept of integration.

In these two books Deutsch takes this concept of transactional integration and projects it directly onto the political scene, without specifying how given levels of given transactions may relate to the development of an integrated political system. He has undertaken to chart the political outlook for a decade, but his model is not a predictive one: for this purpose, the transaction statistics are of little value except insofar as they can be considered measures of independent variables pressing toward political integration. The RA Index provides a null model, suitable for pointing out deviations to be accounted for by some substantive theory; it does *not* indicate whether given political effects are likely to occur. For this purpose, a simple measure of the relative size of the transaction may be more appropriate (see Russett, 1967, pp. 122-27).

In terms of simple percentage figures, France, Germany, and the other Common Market countries are coming to trade more and more with each other. In 1956 France, for example, sent 26.5 percent of her exports to the other members of the EEC; by 1967 the figure had risen to 42 percent; according to a French estimate, this should reach 50 percent by 1970. Conversely, France's EEC imports were 24 percent of her total in 1955, 37 percent by 1967, and estimated to reach 42 percent by 1970 (estimates are from *L'Express*, September 11-17, 1967). It is not clear that these levels of trade flow must continue to increase in order to constitute a pressure for political integration; and it is by no means clear that economic pressures or precon-

ditions for political integration have ceased to exist or to develop.

What we do perceive quite clearly is that there has been a halt in major political integrative activities at the elite level—and with it, a growing sense of frustration and demoralization among "Europeans." This lack of progress has not been due to a lack of effort: major innovations have been launched, such as the negotiations for British entry into the Communities (vetoed by de Gaulle in January 1963) and a set of proposals which would have greatly strengthened the role of the European Commission (blocked by a French boycott lasting until January 1966). But is this observed stagnation in elite-level political integration really what we would have expected on the basis of underlying socioeconomic trends? I tend to think not.

The social system does not necessarily determine the behavior of the political system. Knowledge of trends in a nation's economy, communication flows, and the demands of military strategy give valuable information about some of the forces acting as inputs to the political system; they often may play a decisive role in shaping policy. But it is probably pointless to attempt to demonstrate that any one of these factors is determinating; human will remains an autonomous factor. A strongly held political will, entrenched in the control of a tightly centralized decision structure, can act in defiance of any number of "inexorable" socioeconomic trends, and may continue to do so for long periods of time. This can place the proponent of "deeper" explanations in a difficult position: to maintain the argument that his particular independent variables are the governing ones, he must interpret them in such a way that they "predict" the political behavior which is actually forthcoming. When this is done,

the interpretation may contain glaring inconsistencies.

### *The Evidence of Public Attitudes*

In the last decade there has been a considerable penetration of the European idea among mass publics in France, Germany, and their partners; a heavy majority in all of these countries has come to support the general principle of European unification, and a majority (if a somewhat weaker one) favors moving toward a "United States of Europe" with its federalist implications. Deutsch himself cites some of this evidence (in *Arms Control*, p. 20): "Between 1954 and 1962 there was a marked increase in the importance of an image of a United Europe in both French and German opinion. Most of this increase occurred between 1957 and 1962." He more or less discounts this evidence by pointing out that domestic concerns still weigh much more heavily on the public mind than do European affairs.

This may well be true, but it does not change the fact that developments in public opinion since 1957 seem to have moved in a "European" direction. There is some reason to believe, moreover, that this will continue as a long-term trend. It has been hypothesized that the generation which received its primary socialization after World War II has been formed with a basically less nationalistic and more "European" orientation than older age groups. This hypothesis gains support from a recent analysis of German survey data. The study shows that in various surveys made in the mid-1950s, the 16 or 18 to 29-year-old group was slightly less favorable to proposals for a United States of Europe than were adults as a whole; this pattern is consistent with findings that younger adults are generally somewhat less politicized than older adults (Milbrath, 1965, p. 134).

From 1955 to 1967, while the overall level of support for a United States of Europe increased from 68 to 78 percent, the level of support from the youngest German group rose from 66 to 82 percent. By the latter year, this youngest group was 14 percentage points more favorable to the proposal than was the oldest German group.<sup>4</sup> The shift in its relative position may have taken place because the postwar generation now constituted most of its membership.

If the hypothesis is correct that relatively stable differences exist in the sense of political community identification among various European age groups, one can make a reasonably clear deduction that this fact will have an eventual impact on the political system: as given age groups are recruited into the electorate and, eventually, into the political elite, then (other things being equal) they should influence political decision-making in a specifiable direction.<sup>5</sup>

On the other hand, the impact of transaction flows on European policy-making is not clarified by Deutsch in either of these books. It is not even made clear whether they are thought to *have* any impact: if they are merely indicators of changes in public attitudes, as is suggested at one point in *France, Germany . . .* (p. 217), then it makes little sense to disregard direct measures of mass and elite attitudes because they are not confirmed by (one interpretation of) these indirect indicators.

Deutsch's imaginative development of quantitative techniques has been one of his great contributions to political science. In

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<sup>4</sup> See Institut für Demoskopie (1967). For additional evidence of an intergenerational shift toward more "European" orientations, see Inglehart (1967).

<sup>5</sup> By the end of the 1970s, the group which entered primary school after World War II will constitute a majority of the population 20 to 59 years of age in the six EEC countries.

his treatment of the data concerning mass feelings of trust and friendliness between France and Germany, Deutsch is imaginative to a fault. Opinion surveys indicate that French "good feelings" and feelings of trust toward Germany *both* increased very markedly during the period 1954 to 1962. German trust and "good feelings" toward France also increased sharply during this period. The superficial observer might be misled into thinking that this was a good sign. Deutsch, however, notes that "good feelings" tended to increase more rapidly than trust; he subtracts the latter percentages from the former, converts plus signs into minuses, and dwells somewhat ominously on what he calls the "trust gap." One wonders whether, if the findings had been that trust had increased more rapidly than "good feelings," Deutsch would have spent two or three pages expressing concern over the growing "friendship gap."

### *The Evidence of Elite Attitudes*

If it is true that public interest in European affairs is relatively weak, then it becomes all the more vital to look at elite attitudes: the elites will have a relatively free hand to act in preventing or bringing about political integration. Here again, the evidence available in the two books scarcely supports Deutsch's conclusions. We learn that among the French elites interviewed, 83 percent were at least conditionally in favor of further limitations on national sovereignty, as compared with 13 percent who were against. Among the German elites, the respective figures are 91 percent for, and four percent against (*Arms Control*, p. 119; *France, Germany*, p. 280). The elite data, moreover, suggest that the zero-sum assumptions on which Deutsch bases much of his reasoning do not hold true.

To become more European, it does not seem necessary to become less Atlantic:

When asked to choose between policies of strengthening mainly European institutions, such as the EEC, and strengthening NATO, 40 percent of the 124 articulate French respondents prefer EEC whereas only 4 percent favor NATO. . . . [Among the German respondents] A 72 percent majority refuses to choose and insists on supporting both—a middle way favored also by a French plurality of 49 percent.<sup>6</sup>

Even when presented with a question which suggests that a choice must be made between European and Atlantic institutions, a majority or plurality of respondents rejects the assumption. It seems to be a strong expression of sentiment that European and Atlantic commitments are not incompatible. The Gaullist design for Europe does not seem to represent the thinking of French and German elites.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup> *Arms Control*, p. 27; cf. *France, Germany*, p. 281. Only seven percent of the French and three percent of the German elites indicated that they did not wish to strengthen *either* European or NATO institutions (*Arms Control*, p. 122).

<sup>7</sup> It also fails to represent the attitudes of the French general public. An IFOP survey in the fall of 1967 asked a national sample of adults how they thought they would vote in a referendum on withdrawal from the Atlantic alliance. The question was neutrally worded and was preceded by mention of the fact that France had already withdrawn from some aspects of the alliance. Responses were:

For withdrawal	12%
For staying within	54%
NA, DK	34%
Total	<u>100%</u>

Among those expressing themselves, there was a ratio of 4½ : 1 in favor of France staying within the Atlantic alliance. Adherents of the Democratic Center, not surprisingly, were 75 percent "for" the alliance. But a heavy majority of Gaullists—61 percent—were *also* favorable

### *Technological and Strategic Considerations*

The decisions by the Soviet Union and the US to employ anti-ballistic missile defense systems make it clearer than ever how illusory was the "independence" provided by the French *force de frappe*: whatever major power deterrent value it might once have promised will probably be nullified by the ABM. Although there are various counter-measures France can undertake, competing at this new level of technology would probably require resources beyond anything she could muster. By the time she has produced a response, it will very likely be a generation behind the technology of the superpowers.

The French and German elites interviewed for the studies at hand seem to have recognized the futility of the *force de frappe* in 1964. "The idea of a national deterrent is unpopular among the elites of France, where it is official government policy" (*Arms Control*, p. 58). It gained even less support in Germany. A majority of the French elites agreed that the national deterrent was not credible to France's enemies; and a majority of those responding to the question, "What would happen to the *force de frappe* if de Gaulle left the political scene?" expected that it would be supranationalized (*France, Germany*, pp. 96-97; *Arms Control*, p. 60).

But to base a nation's defense on a collective deterrent requires a joint political will: the logic of technological development points toward establishment of suprana-

tional European political institutions. This is true in a variety of areas quite apart from military considerations. Within the limits of the present institutional framework, the West European nation-states are likely to fall progressively farther behind the frontiers of technology, especially in those areas which require major governmental investments. France's yearly total expenditures on research and development now fall considerably short of the monthly outlay for that purpose in the US. And the record of Anglo-French cooperation in the development of jet aircraft illustrates the hazards of attempting to coordinate research and development on an intergovernmental basis. Long-term planning is undermined by the continual threat that one partner may withdraw unilaterally (as has happened in some instances); similar problems have plagued attempts at intergovernmental collaboration for the development of nuclear and missile technology. Space-age technology is a league in which only continental-scale powers can compete, and from the French point of view the price for admission is European integration.

This is not to say that the major impetus behind support for "Europe" is a desire for European defense systems. The purpose of European integration is seen as primarily nonmilitary by the overwhelming majority of both French and German elites (*France, Germany*, p. 285; *Arms Control*, p. 45). Nevertheless, in a long time-perspective, its implications for international security are one of the strongest arguments for the European idea. We refer, of course, to the Monnet conception, which envisions European integration as a step toward Atlantic community and, eventually, toward an East-West security community. There are formidable obstacles in the way of these developments; the Monnet approach has

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to it; de Gaulle is at odds with his own partisans on this, as on other foreign policy issues. Even among Communist respondent, 44 percent said that they would vote for maintenance of the alliance, compared with only 30 percent who would vote against it (*Nouvel Observateur*, 1967).

been to reduce a large, long-term effort to problems of relatively manageable size. In the construction of Europe, limited but real powers have been turned over to supranational authorities, stimulating the growth of a variety of expectations and socioeconomic conditions favorable to increased political integration.

Currently, there is a tendency on both sides of the Atlantic to discount the need for such "Grand Designs" and to justify Gaullist ethnocentrism as "realistic." It is a short-term realism, comparable to the realism which triumphantly points out that "we no longer need to fix the roof—it isn't raining." In the short term, there is no need to make arrangements for collective control of major weapons systems: we now have peaceful coexistence (at least in Europe). Five or six years ago, the superpowers were at the brink of war; if nothing is done to institutionalize control of major violence, at least among the major powers, they will be there again, eventually. As the time-perspective lengthens, the likelihood of superdisaster rises toward certainty.

Circumstances require, not a balance of power, but a cartel of nuclear power. The potential costs of continued laissez-faire competition among great powers have risen far above any conceivable gains.

### *Trends and Personalities*

I have argued that economic, strategic, and technological considerations, as well as the predominant thrust of mass and elite opinion in Western Europe, favor political integration. Why, then, has policy-making in recent years diverged from the path indicated by these underlying pressures?

There has been a disturbing factor which must be examined on another level of analysis—and the factor is named de Gaulle. It seems almost too simple to explain major

historical events in terms of the influence of one man: surely there are "deeper" causes—causes to be found, for example, in the socioeconomic structure of the society. As a general rule, this view is probably correct; only in rare cases do individual actors have a major shaping influence on events.<sup>8</sup> A recent article by Greenstein (1967) sums up the circumstances under which this can happen. According to him, it depends on:

(1) Location of the actor in a given environment. A limiting case would be that of the dictator in a totalitarian system; here there is a tendency for political machinery to become "a conduit of the dictatorial personality" (Tucker, cited in Greenstein, 1967). While somewhat more limited in his powers than a totalitarian dictator, de Gaulle has the advantages of a seven-year term, plenary emergency powers, and a reserved domain in foreign affairs—all reinforced by a fairly widespread myth that he is indispensable to France. In the realm of foreign policy, de Gaulle alone is in effective control of France.

(2) The degree to which action admits of restructuring—in this case, *can* an individual in effective control of France contrive to block European political integration? As long as the European system is open to unilateral vetoes, the answer is yes.

(3) Personal strengths (or weaknesses) of the actor. De Gaulle's strengths—his skill as a politician, and as an actor in the theatrical sense—are exceptional. "Strength of character" is another important aspect: his insensitivity to personal popularity constitutes a great strength, from this viewpoint. To an extraordinary degree de Gaulle is a man who acts on the basis of inter-

<sup>8</sup> For an account of how a very small number of outstanding individuals, by themselves, made a major impact on the construction of "Europe," see Yondorf (1965).

nalized values, rather than in response to external stimuli.

In 1940, this trait redounded to his great honor. Since 1963 it has, perhaps, had an opposite effect. Nonetheless, in both periods he has acted in a way which is faithful to his early formation—that of a member of the French petty bourgeoisie, trained as a military officer, who came to maturity in the intensely nationalistic period preceding World War I. It is not surprising, then, that de Gaulle is strongly committed to a balance-of-power view of the world, one which reacts almost exclusively according to concepts of domination/subordination.

I would argue that the impact of trans-action flows depends on the setting in which they occur. Given the mentality of a de Gaulle, for example, increased American exchanges with France—increasing penetration by American business, a large influx of American tourists, scholars, military men—are likely to be perceived as invasion by an enemy empire. This is something to be resisted uncompromisingly. Given the mentality of a Servan-Schreiber, it may be perceived as a challenge—but accompanied by a willingness to learn from and cooperate with the competitor.<sup>9</sup>

The general has done major service for France and for the West; his accomplishments in decolonizing France and revamp-

ing her political structure are widely respected and will have enduring effects. However, it is clear that in his xenophobic nationalism de Gaulle is unrepresentative of France in general, and in particular of the elites who will succeed him.

Short-term anti-European effects may be expected to predominate as long as de Gaulle remains in his office. There is little reason to expect that they will continue beyond that point. Even assuming a continuation of Gaullists in power after the departure of the general, we can look for certain important changes in French policy toward "Europe." Within the Gaullist "Union of Democrats for the Fifth Republic," there is no one comparable to de Gaulle. He has filled the upper echelons of government largely with technocrats—men unlikely to exert a political will contrary to his, but, at the same time, men whose minds work very differently from his. They tend to be pragmatists rather than romantic nationalists. The elite interview data presented by Deutsch *et al.* seem to confirm the expectation that they (as well as the Gaullist mass constituency) would favor policy changes in a number of key respects.<sup>10</sup>

We noted earlier that the French elites seem to accept the constitutional form of

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<sup>9</sup> See Servan-Schreiber (1967). His response to the American challenge calls for a European Federation including Britain. The record-breaking sales and the immense amount of discussion which this book has provoked suggests that it strikes a resonating chord among wide circles of the French elite. Servan-Schreiber's reaction seems to be influenced by criteria of economic and technological rationality to a far greater degree than that of de Gaulle; similarly, he seems far more representative of the type of elite which is likely to direct French policy in the coming decades.

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<sup>10</sup> Roy Macridis seems to follow a somewhat similar line of reasoning. Dealing with the possibility of de Gaulle's death, he draws a conclusion which seems to be at variance with Deutsch's summary of the evidence: "French elites overwhelmingly identify de Gaulle's death as virtually the most important domestic event likely to bring about a change in the nation's foreign policy. . . . Only seven percent of the respondents affirm that the present policies toward European integration are likely to continue. Thus, by inference, we may expect significant changes in the direction of European integration" (Macridis in *France, Germany*, pp. 71-72).



the Fifth Republic, but tend to reject the excessive presidential domination which flows from de Gaulle's interpretation of his office (an interpretation which has included flagrant disregard for the constitution itself). Together with the fact that no imaginable successor will hold the political assets of de Gaulle, it seems likely that in future French governments substantially more day-to-day decision-making may gravitate into the hands of the premier. It seems likely, moreover, that the Gaullists will be at least somewhat weakened without de Gaulle. A glance at the present distribution of seats in the Chamber of Deputies makes it evident that even a very slight loss from the Gaullist bloc would throw the balance of power, in selecting a premier, to the politicians of the Center. It is precisely this group which is most pro-European and most Atlantic in orientation.

A somewhat similar situation applies to the presidency. Post-Gaullist presidential candidates will probably have to try to conciliate the Center. A Gaullist ultimatum—"Choose between me and chaos!"—delivered by Pompidou would be ridiculous.

De Gaulle is likely to remain in power through 1972 at the latest.<sup>11</sup> From that point on, we would argue, the various underlying pressures which have been discussed here should again begin to be reflected in elite-

<sup>11</sup> By that time, his current presidential term will expire. He would then be 82. While nothing is impossible, the likelihood of his running for another seven-year term seems remote; he himself expressed doubt at his November 1967 press conference.

level political activity. Other things being equal, we would expect that:

- (1) The United Kingdom will be admitted to the European Community.
- (2) The movement toward supranational organization of Europe will be resumed.
- (3) French anti-American and anti-Canadian policies will diminish.

Rumors of the death of European integration have been greatly exaggerated.

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