

Time for reorientation: a review of recent research on the Arab-Israeli conflict

Ania Francos, *Les Palestiniens*

Paris: Julliard, 1968. Pp. 318. Fr. 20.70.

Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Fedayeen Action and Arab Strategy*

London: Institute for Strategic Studies (Adelphi Paper No. 53), 1969. Pp. 43. 5s (75¢).

To Make War or Make Peace (New Outlook Symposium)

Proceedings of the International Symposium on Inevitable War or Initiatives for Peace.
Tel-Aviv: New Outlook, 1969. Pp. 288. I.L. 8.00 (\$2.50).

Hisham Sharabi, *Palestine and Israel: The Lethal Dilemma*

New York: Pegasus, 1969. Pp. 224. \$6.95.

Nadav Safran, *From War to War: The Arab-Israeli Confrontation, 1948-1967*

New York: Pegasus, 1969. Pp. 464. \$10.00.

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Voltaire's somewhat facetious criticism of certain Biblical texts, "*dans un livre saint un peu d'exactitude ne nuirait pas,*" can be applied to current writings on the Arab-Israeli conflict.¹ A good amount of the work is an

¹The author wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to Ziva Reuveni and Rosalind Daly, without whose help this review would have been impossible. Daniel Heradstveit and Johan Galtung (Oslo) have been instrumental in suggesting the type of approach argued for in this review.

extension of traditional work on the Middle East. Orientalists, staunch adherents of the historical-philological approach, wrote dictionaries and grammars alike, "through a very considerable amount of additions and translations of texts, to histories of wider or narrower scope" (van Nieuwenhuijze, 1965, p. 1). The taste of a wider public was served by travelogues which gradually expanded into general descriptions of regions or countries: descriptions in which a preoccupation with

politics in the Western sense of the term has tended to increase and in which palatability to the Western lay public has often but not always been matched by accuracy or verification on the spot (*ibid.*).

1. *Current Work on the Conflict: Some Lugubrious Thoughts*

The most typical and predictable trend in work on the present conflict has been the growth of a polemical literature which over-emphasizes background dimensions, substantive matters, and the value of social justice while buttressing the case for one party or another. This has been particularly and painfully true for efforts entitled with supposedly "scientific" labels and originating from "research" centers (e.g. Kadi, 1966; al-Khalidi, 1958; Sayegh, 1961, 1965). The three wars (1948, 1956, and especially 1967) accelerated the rate of publications of "quickies" in Western countries and the Middle East. Many of the books which have been published since the 1967 war in the US, while not easily lending themselves to the categories of research articulated above, have been more sophisticatedly biased, the case being made more often than not for Israel (e.g., Love, 1969; Prittie, 1968; Kimche and Bawly, 1969).

Such streams of publications are not likely to dry up in the foreseeable future. Yet some gradual change has already been coming about in the broad picture of Middle Eastern studies through the introduction of such disciplinary approaches as modern sociology as well as some honest attempts to cope with questions of cultural relativity—typified by the works of Berger and van Neiuwenhuijze (1962 and 1965). Thus one kind of difficulty in our job is relating the five works in review to certain needs of inquiry in the field of conflict management, reduction, or resolution. It should be obvious that we are referring essentially to even more advanced *interdisciplinary* approaches, *comparative* in nature

(in the sense of possible generalization beyond language or culture area, etc.), and *quantitative* in orientation.

The main problem with this criterion, however, is that in the service of peace one must also try to find value in *any* contributions that deal with the Israeli-Arab conflict, inasmuch as the works can offer innovative redefinition of the issues involved, strategies for "defreezing" the situation, and perhaps more balanced understanding of the factors involved. The works under review make little progress in any of these directions, though: all of them are redundant to an extent and only the last one has some qualities of the kind of work we envisage on the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, each one of them carries with it certain advantages over earlier work, and I will attempt to extract a few of these points and interrelate them to a suggested frame of reference for further research. Before doing this, I will briefly review each of the works within what we consider to be their sociopolitical context.

2. *A European Work in Search of Social Justice*

Francos' book is typical of the anti-Israel left in France. Behind her entire argument runs a thread of personal history. Quite often in the case of Jews it is related to the Holocaust, and nearly always a resemblance is found between US-dominated Vietnam and Israel. Francos is a Jew whose parents had emigrated to Palestine in the 1920s only to return to Europe, disillusioned, several years later. They were both killed at Auschwitz. Her immediate experiences before spending three years with the Fedayeen² (in Syria and Jor-

²I shall use *Fedayeen* interchangeably with Palestinians. The name *Fedayeen* (i.e., in Arabic, "those who sacrifice themselves") was introduced to the Israeli-Arab conflict by Egyptian authorities in 1955 as the official label for irregulars dispatched into Israel on subversive missions. In this

dan) were in Algeria and Cuba. Hence her psychological need to articulate the oppression of the Palestinians is understandable. Her position reminds one of Rodinson's interpretation of the Arab-Israeli conflict as "the struggle of an indigenous population against the occupation of part of its national territory by foreigners" (Rodinson, 1969). The book is a personal account with considerable frankness. It is valuable in that it captures the way that Palestinians think, and especially *their* reality. She does not attempt to analyze the situation beyond suggesting that the Palestinians have a case. It is precisely because of her bias that some of Francos' criticisms are valuable. For instance, she attacks some Palestinian leaders for the luxuries they enjoy and evaluates Shukeiry's tactics—notably through an examination of his Palestinian Liberation Organization and its manipulation by Arab governments to control the Palestinian problem. Her revealing analysis of the friction between Arab bourgeoisie and Palestinian refugees, as well as tensions she describes in Arab establishments *vis-à-vis* the growing strength and salience of the Fedayeen—all of these discussions may help to clarify certain moods and strategies chosen by the Fedayeen.

There are nuclear points in Francos' analysis that deserve more articulation and lend themselves to more systematic study. An illustration is her conclusion that Palestinians have been developing ideological predispositions and social organizations different from those of the populations and countries in which they reside. Beyond the simple proposition that there are Nasserites in Egypt, Baathists in Syria, etc., it appears that, concomitant with the process of communicative "unification" among Palestinians, one also needs to

obtain a deeper insight into a much less studied dimension, namely, the Palestinian interaction with the various *host societies*. A second important focus in Francos' research is on events shaping the history of the Fedayeen, particularly the Karameh affair (in March 1968), suggesting implicitly that the steady increase of the Fedayeen depends at least partially on opportunities to stand out, brave and able, against the Israelis.

Galle (1968) dismisses Francos' study as a "propaganda tract." In my opinion he does so because of his preference for balanced presentations (see Galle, 1968 and 1969). Obviously, one cannot compare Francos' work to Rouleu *et al.* (1967), a dialogue between two much more informed journalists guided by an experienced moderator (see Kapeliuk, 1969). Francos' book is more in the style and the mood of Givet (1968), where questions of anti-Israeli attitude are further expressed only to demonstrate the confusion as well as the difficulty in relating the complex Israeli-Arab relationship to Jewish consciousness in the European left.

3. *An Israeli Strategical Perspective*

If one takes Francos to be total emotionality, Harkabi (1969) is nothing but rationality. Harkabi was the Israeli chief of military intelligence from 1955 to 1959. Since then he has been *academically* concerned with the Arab-Israeli conflict. His doctoral dissertation (1968) is the most lucid, systematic study of Arab ideology in the conflict. Western readers, however, had already been presented with fragments of his analysis of the Arab collapse in the Six Day War (Harkabi, 1967) and a general brief summary of the confrontation (Harkabi, 1965). More than anyone else, Alter (1968) succeeded in putting both the background and the motivation of Harkabi's work in a nutshell.

There is an enormous lack of symmetry in the positions of the two antagonists. The Israeli posi-

discussion we do not deal with Palestinian refugees (actually the majority) who are not associated with the organizations *currently* active against Israel and Zionism.

tion on the Arabs over the years has on occasion been stupid, blundering, unfeeling, but it has also showed aspects of common sense, even humanity, especially since June, 1967, and, by and large, one can say that its guiding principle has been enlightened self-interest. The Arab position on Israel, by contrast, has been blind, fanatic, self-deceptive, self-destructive, harshly inflexible, and in many respects morally obscene.

Harkabi is a true representative of the Israeli establishment inasmuch as he stresses the articulation of problems and flaws in Israel's enemies, while advancing the general thesis that there is no chance for Israel to be accepted by the Arabs or, conversely, any justification for coming to terms with Arab grievances so long as Arabs are not able to perform as a responsible party to the conflict. Typical of his line of thought is a comparison of the 1964 Covenant of the PLO (Jerusalem), that is, of its "shaping," and the fourth meeting in 1968 when the Covenant was changed. Harkabi's analysis emphasizes the use of the word covenant (and not charter) in order to convey the sacredness of their nationalism and the accompanying vows. An obvious deduction from this type of analysis is that the Palestinians' stand does not allow any possibility of reconciliation; one could further infer from this that their position is more rigid than Israel's and must be considered a primary hurdle to peace.

Harkabi is gearing a large amount of his effort towards educating Israelis about the necessity of living with the conflict for a long time. An important corollary of this orientation is that there is little likelihood of Arab society progressing in the desired direction. In the work under review his emphasis is on ideology and strategy. His analysis is the opposite of Francos', not only in that he shows the immorality and extreme refractory strategies of the Fedayeen but that he also documents his argument quite skillfully, using such primary sources as Fatah pamphlets and Arab strategists' work. An example of his effort is a presentation of early Arab treatises

that criticize the chosen path of guerrilla warfare, and spell out the differences between Palestine and Algeria (or other revolutionary wars)—an exercise not prevalent at all in present Arab writing (see, for an exception, 'Alush in Harkabi, 1969, pp. 18–19).

Compared with Francos, Harkabi evidences more of an analysis, albeit impressionistic, of political, psychological, and social dimensions of the conflict. He is particularly convincing in his detailed study of discrepancies between the Fedayeen's stated goals and their implementation. Often, however, the study takes a polemical approach to the issues, as when its author declares that "Fatah knows that it cannot establish a defended base either in the occupied territories or in Israel proper" (Harkabi, 1969, p. 34). While this "reality" was certainly the case when Harkabi wrote the statement in London in 1968, he knew only too well that his assertion would be irrelevant to Fatah's strategy then, as well as in subsequent months when Fedayeen activity intensified.

In effect, Harkabi's hard thinking does not transcend the imperative of Israel-Arab peace, *per se*. Considerable correspondence with many of his assessments can be found in Arab literature, all the way from semi-official statements in an Egyptian daily to scholarly works like Sharabi (1969). However, quite typical of all these statements, but particularly intriguing, is the fact that even an Israeli Arab such as M. Wated reacts vehemently to such an analysis.³ Wated is closer to understanding both Israel's position and some of the Arab inadequacies (see, for example, Wated on the role of the intermediary in the Arab world). "He did some research and came to the conclusion that the Arabs are first class liars and

³Excellent statements and elaboration on this discussion can be found in the Israeli Daily, *Ma'ariv*. See the articles, "Reflections of an Arab Scholar after the Six Day War," Nov. 11, 1969; "The Palestinian Covenant and its Meaning," Dec. 12, 1969; and "Reflections of an Israeli Arab," Dec. 5, 1969.

that their national consciousness is superficial" (*New Outlook* Symposium, 1969, p. 120). Hard thinking on this conflict, then, cannot be accepted by Arabs, inasmuch as they read humiliating elements into the literature.

4. *Symposia in Search of Peace*

Different from Francos, though also politically left, and different from Harkabi, though also mainly Israeli, is the *New Outlook* Symposium. In the case of the Middle East it has been said that "A complicating and inhibiting factor in the quest for peace is that the search is almost an exclusive monopoly of the leftist groups" (Merlin, 1968, p. 237). This statement seems particularly appropriate here in that it underscores the need for unorthodox ways of achieving peace as well as the willingness of some participants to take risks for the very reason that they are objectively as well as subjectively less committed to defending establishment positions and goals.

The *New Outlook* Symposium is a most interesting collection of statements from Israel. It indicates not only the desire for peace but the general awareness that peace requires concessions, that the Palestinians have often been mistreated by Israelis, and that the expectancy has not been matched by comparable initiatives on the Arab side. In view of our comments on Francos, it should be noted that foreign contributors to the symposium appear much less informed and much less innovative, when compared with their Israeli counterparts, about the real goals and the real constraints. For instance, Horovitz, who notes that "understanding begins with children," completely ignores the many difficulties already encountered in Jewish-Arab coeducation in Israel (*New Outlook* Symposium, 1969, pp. 151-152).

Amongst the Israeli participants several issues seem to be paramount: one is in their explicit awareness of the internal and external

hazards the movement for Greater Israel represents, and therefore statements about borders, expansion, and other aspects of territoriality emphasize a minimalistic approach. Another concern shared by most participants is how to deal with the Arabs, coexistence being the first goal—the second "stage" hopefully leading to more cooperation. Manipulation of the situation so as to meet the Arabs at some acceptable point is precisely where most people in the symposium feel that very little can be achieved in the immediate future. Clearly most of them agree that escalation is not going to bring the participants together, and in this respect the symposium is extremely responsive to the kind of criticism generally advanced against Israel in Arab circles. It might prove difficult to elaborate on the various opinions for solving the conflict beyond these general descriptions, simply because the symposium reflects the entire political spectrum in Israel with the exception of the extreme right and the Movement for Greater Israel, which is, at most, a minute group.

In two areas the symposium appears to be very distant from the Israeli majority. The first area consists of the hazardous effects of the conflict on Israeli society. For instance, Arieli, a history professor in Jerusalem, compares Israel in seclusion to Sparta (*New Outlook* Symposium, 1969, pp. 83-84). Quite a few participants make it clear that they view the Israeli situation *vis-à-vis* the occupied territories negatively, not only because it blocks the chances for peace, but because they believe that the values and realities of Israeli society have been pushed far away from any moral or historical goal that Zionism ever sought (for example, Yalin-Mor, *New Outlook* Symposium, 1969, p. 192).

A fascinating final session of the symposium deals with the Palestinian refugee problem (March 30, 1969). Nearly all of the participants offered a diagnosis of the situation based on acceptance of the Palestinian movement—which is probably the most

sound general agreement coming from the symposium. Most participants also support absorption of a certain number of Arab refugees in Israel. Apropos of this approach, Shamir's statement concerning the immediate need for the *establishment's* formulation of a policy with a Palestinian orientation, to be proclaimed in a formal, serious, and sincere manner, is probably the most convincing one (*New Outlook* Symposium, 1969, pp. 193–99). It is encouraging to know that such a view is held by a person associated with the semi-official and very respected Shiloah Research Institute of Tel-Aviv University.

It is too early to measure, let alone evaluate, the impact that the symposium will have on Arab circles. There have not been any known symposia in Arab countries that responded to the Israeli quest or, for that matter, to any international organization asking for similar efforts. In fact, in over 1,000 treatises on the conflict appearing in Arab countries, there is not even the slightest acknowledgment of the symposium or efforts like it. It appears that *The Arab World*, in a special issue, has provided somewhat of a deviant collection of statements by scholars, most of whom are of Palestinian descent. This is probably an embryonic extension to match the progressive call from Israel. Though not emphasizing peace as the goal, and with a far from balanced approach to the conflict, Abu-Lughod's collection is a welcome contribution to the dialogue. Appearing in the United States, this collection is no less consciously directed to the public than the *New Outlook* Symposium. The focus is on Israeli abuse of Palestinians as well as on legal issues deriving from the recent confrontation, the lack of responsible attitudes, religious life, etc.—clearly issues in which full agreement on initiatives can be found with the *New Outlook* participants. While some of the studies in the collection (for example, Suleiman, pp. 59–65) do not warrant a thorough reading due to their methodological and statistical inade-

quacies, others such as Abu-Lughod's article on Israel–Arab policy (pp. 31–39) and Cherif Bassiouni's contribution on the international legal aspects of the conflict (pp. 41–51) convey important points.

5. *A Search for Grounds for US Policy?*

One of the participants in Abu-Lughod's collection is Hisham Sharabi, the author of the next work under review (Sharabi, 1969). Sharabi, a graduate of the American University of Beirut and the University of Chicago, is of Palestinian origin, and hence his sympathies. His work on the Middle East has been in the field of contemporary comparative politics, which he teaches at Georgetown University and the John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

The analytical tool which he uses in examining the May–June prelude to the 1967 war consists of a comparison of the negotiable and the nonnegotiable categories in the antagonists' positions. He is not convincing in his argument, which is that the crisis of 1967 has been received by Arabs primarily "in terms of fundamental human rights," that is, the Palestinian Arabs' right to their land and home (Sharabi, 1969, p. 124; also in Abu-Lughod, 1968, p. 29). His contention is one of many squarely refuted by all the other works on review (notably Francos). The assertion that Nasser wanted to achieve maximum "easy" gains in the prelude, with the explicit assumption that the Israelis would not fight, escapes a fair analysis. Sharabi's analysis of the basic assumptions and goals of Israeli strategy and credibility and the gaps in its credibility are better formulated, though he pushes his case too far with his suggestion of a "compulsion" in Israel (in terms of its hard strategies) to engage in all-out defensive war.

Likewise, Sharabi's analysis is too heavily influenced by the logic and frame of reference of his Arab sources—in fact, to that extent his

work compares unfavorably with the analysis of CBS correspondent Winston Burdett (1969), who has no command of the antagonists' languages. For example, the dilemma of going to war in Israel, especially the weight of possible losses in civil and military populations, receives better treatment from a "non-professional." More central to Sharabi's brief is his analysis of American foreign policy in the Middle East—yet it is not nearly as intensive an examination as the one Burdett offers. Sharabi dwells on "grave shortcomings and failures of the policy decisions in different administrations" from Truman to Nixon. Following Richard P. Stevens and others (Sharabi, 1969, p. 30), he advocates less American military aid and diplomatic support for Israel. He explicitly favors a United States policy involving "a determination to resist internal pressure and to act solely in accordance with the requirements of regional and global peace" (Sharabi, 1969, p. 217). His analysis falls short of specifying what this means but, since it is viewed as a condition capable of effecting a "radical change and of inducing Israel to accept a settlement not dictated by itself as victor" (*ibid.*), the implication is clear. A closer look at the politics and specifics of his suggested strategy regarding US policy and regionally-defined peace in the Middle East is necessary before we can seriously consider Sharabi's ideas.

Sharabi's work is particularly interesting for his treatment of Arab society and its internal processes in confrontation with a technologically superior adversary. His in-depth study of decision-making in Arab countries and amongst the Palestinians parallels Harkabi's and Francos' analyses. It is, however, precisely the question of the Palestinians that eludes his understanding. When he seeks to elucidate the grounds on which the prospects for peace lie, he fails. He informs us, for example (1969, p. 220) that:

Ironically, Palestinian resistance, if it did indeed escape destruction and succeeded in growing into a

popular revolutionary force capable of sustaining protracted warfare, would in part have Israel's Zionist leadership and its policy of domination to thank.

6. *A Sophisticated Approach to Coercion*

Nadav Safran is the author of the most encompassing work under survey (Safran, 1969). Born in Cairo, he spent several years in Israel. Somewhat like Sharabi, he has been academically productive in the United States, in an area related to his earlier experience: comparative Middle East politics. Previous work on Egypt and Israel have made Safran particularly suitable for the task of using effectively the Ford International grant which he received for this research.

Safran's focus is on coercion in the context of inter-Arab and big power relations. The most obvious aspect of his work (in comparison with the existing literature on the Arab-Israeli conflict) is the systematic search for trends over countries and over time. Careful to define each of the facets of coercion in terms of *meaningfulness* (toward different facets of coercion and other components of the analysis), *operational definition*, and *sources*, the author offers us a replicable study, which can of course be extended to later periods (see Appendix A in Safran, 1969, pp. 421–34).

Safran's analysis should be diametrically viewed against the above-reviewed "interpretations" which fundamentally involve two sets of incompatible claims, attitudes, and points of view. In numerous places Safran demonstrates the necessity of a closer look at issues in order to answer such questions as (1969, p. 146):

1. Who has been "responsible" for initiating the race between Egypt and Israel which has remained at the center of the accumulation of arms in the area? and
2. Who has been "responsible" for escalating it at various points?

In essence, though, there is nothing new in his answer—which is that neither Israel nor Egypt has been responsible; rather, he concludes that the arms race derives from the different perspectives from which *they were bound* to view things (*ibid.*). In terms of our previous discussion, Safran's work demonstrates succinctly that efforts like Sharabi's need more homework. Furthermore, Safran's type of analysis offers the frame of reference necessary to pinpoint when antagonists engage in military buildup. For example, we can see the spillover effect of the Egyptian-Israeli race into the area as a whole (see Safran, Fig. 21, p. 192) and the feedback effect of the arms race on inter-Arab relations as well as internal ones. Safran explicates and interrelates aspects of the dynamics and strain of arms buildup, effects on the relation of forces, comparative sacrifices imposed by the arms race, anticipation of war and the resultant "preparatory" patterns, etc.

What makes Safran's work even more relevant is that the foregoing analyses are interwoven with an *historical* introduction to the conflict, focusing first on pan-Arabism, inter-Arab organizations, and problems of Arab unity—and then on the big power interest pressures and involvement in the conflict. Finally, he relates the specific events *leading to* and *constituting* the 1967 war. Politically, almost every important item of information is accurately presented and analyzed. However, precisely because of this layout, one may miss some of the interrelations between the various parts of the analysis. Safran leaves them "unhomogenized" in terms of types of quantification, propinquity, and definitiveness of conclusion. This seems to be partly because Safran measures GNP and defense expenditures that are readily available but does not "extract" quantifiable trends in his evaluation of inter-Arab politics or big power behavior—data which are harder to obtain or satisfactorily define. Thus some promising avenues in regression and

correlation analysis, as well as covariance, are still open. Such trend-seeking work is badly needed if only to enable us to decipher the *fuller* meaning of each point in the arms buildup and the aggressive evolution of the conflict.

7. Recommendations: Needed Types of Research

Very briefly, some suggestions for such groundwork are now in order.

A. QUANTITATIVE APPROACHES TO THE CONFRONTATION IN SPACE AND TIME

An inherent assumption in analyzing conflict escalation in the prelude to World War I, the United States' involvement in Vietnam, and the deescalation process in the Cuban missile crisis has been that conflict reduction is to a certain extent the *reverse of conflict escalation* (Holsti, North, and Brody, 1968 and 1969; Milstein and Mitchell, 1968).

This and other reasons justify a quantitative longitudinal analysis of the actions, reactions, and interactions of nation-states for the purpose of analyzing conflict reduction in the Middle East as a *subsystem* of the international system. An *example* based on Azar (1969):

In analyzing nonroutine, extraordinary, or newsworthy actions which international nation-actors have been taking, Azar specifically studied the interaction between Egypt, Israel, Britain, and France. The time period extended from January 1956 through December 1957, thus covering the period of the Suez crisis. The analysis explores the dynamics of conflict reduction when one party to a conflict is composed of a differentiated alliance (in which one actor is postulated to be the most dominant one).

This type of analysis can be extended to social and behavioral aspects of the conflict, that is, to communication systems, education and socialization for hostility or for coexistence, image-evolution, etc. A closer look at measurable trends can show the merit of cer-

tain hypotheses (for example, Francos' derivatives from the Karameh affair); it can explicate changing aspects of the conflict and suggest common denominators and differences between and among facets of the disciplinary research. Further, such analysis should free us, at least partially, from the many speculations existing in the current efforts, and enable us to relate the work on the Israel-Arab conflict to complementary work on other intersocietal conflicts.

B. SENSITIVE EXTRACTION AND DISSEMINATION OF KNOWLEDGE ON TRENDS

What is becoming critical is the lack of prerequisites for trend analysis in the area of social services, community development, literary production, and the like. What is needed is an effort that will succeed in making data available by means of translation, extraction of measurable dimensions, classification, etc. Information on political events is relatively available: the *Arab Relations Review* (London) and the *Middle East Record* (Tel-Aviv) report events in terms of *local significance*, and therefore can be used for analyses that do justice to Arab or Israeli event-perception.⁴ Good data appear also about the UN actions in the Middle East conflict (for example, Mezerik, 1969, and Higgins, 1969). In light of the obvious research problems encountered in the first four efforts under review here, one priority of research should be the ability to account for *other* events as well. *An example:*

An interesting, ongoing attempt is being made by the periodical *Hamizrah Hehadash* (*The Near East*, Jerusalem) to extract information on the social life of Arab countries (for example, newspaper dissemination, university graduating classes, etc.). Broadening of its frame of inclusion and incorporation of

these materials in the *Middle East Record* would be a recommended progression.

Our previous discussion suggested that accessibility of the local language, while being very important, would not necessarily free the analysis from bias. The more information available to researchers in different centers, the less the necessity to confine further work to existing authoritative and singular efforts. This constraint, however, has generally been the rule rather than the exception with research on the Israeli-Arab conflict.

C. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN FOR BEHAVIORAL FACETS OF THE CONFRONTATION

Many of the questions of language and culture encountered at the level of cognitive style, such as frustration, types of hostility and its encouragement in institutionalized manners, adulation of violence, etc., are too complex to be treated adequately in an impressionistic way. Controlled work in these areas is needed, preferably of experimental design. *Example:*

One area of study might be an isolation of the five special "impacts" that Arabic language has had on the patterns of thought, that is, vagueness; overemphasis on the psychological significance of the linguistic symbols at the expense of their meaning; stereotyped emotional responses; overassertion and exaggeration; two levels of life, real and ideal—all of which Shouby relates to special canalization and development of deeply-rooted habits, religion, Arab past, and Arab nationalism. His explanation does not fully account for the rich hatred and compassion articulated readily by Arabs in evaluating the conflict (Shouby, 1951; see also Chejne, 1960, 1965 and Harkabi, 1967). Such phenomena do not exclude scientific publications (for example, the *Egyptian Political Science Review*).

Some experimental work has focused on adherence to reality in the personal perception of students and military journals. Experiments involved Arabic-speaking students at the American University of Beirut and American universities. Relationship between Edwards' and McClelland's measures of Achievement Motivation with (relatively) culturally unbiased probing of imaginative stories indicated some special traits appearing in Arab

⁴This consideration has not been taken too seriously by most of the event-interaction researchers of the conflict (including Azar's work mentioned above).

language and personality which bear directly and indirectly on Arab behavior *vis-à-vis* the conflict situations (Melikian, 1958, and Ben-Dak, 1969).

It became apparent in my review that the personal history and current association of each author has influenced the selection of his subject matter, and, more important, dictates at least partially the direction of his conclusions. There is very little we can do to change this phenomenon. However, by elucidating exact and reproducible methodologies we can contribute to the validity and reliability of research, thus removing much of the emotionality in present discussions.

D. THE SEARCH FOR AN INNOVATIVE MANIPULABILITY

The kind of research we need should be typified by the opportunity to appraise the situation before it actually occurs instead of allowing the blind process of competition between collectivities (and between individuals) to take its toll (see Washburn, 1966). It has been argued that game-simulations can help the search for "new," "unidentified" patterns in intersocietal relations. Furthermore, these are excellent teaching devices when participants demonstrate a good grasp of roles, images, strategies, empathy for the situation, and (what is especially crucial for our purposes) a feeling of potency (see Abt, 1964; Boocock and Coleman, 1966; Guetzkow *et al.*, 1963; and Gamson, 1969).

One conclusion that we can draw from the reviewed literature is that none of the authors is able to conceptualize a scientific scenario in which Arabs and Israelis will share sentiments and norms and will exchange resources and services of yet unknown (or known) kinds. Some relevant ideas may come from this gaming technique. *Example:*

Game-simulations were created on the assumption that both parties lack any real sense of empathy and knowledge central to the *Weltanschauung*

of the antagonist, and that certain mutually agreed-upon considerations are necessary in order to reach agreement on a solution (Peres, 1970, and Ben-Dak, 1969). In a game Arabs and Israelis, or for that matter participants who have assumed their roles, have to find a solution mutually agreed upon; or at least certain assumptions toward "creating" one. The very fact that the investigator can manipulate the situation as well as duplicate it with different participants allows him to reach a deeper understanding of constraints and inducements. In short, a range of possible, well-defined alternatives to end hostilities are available to him.

Obviously such work is of a tentative, mainly theoretical nature, but once it is related to empirical testing or regarded as a sensitizing means for defining research problems, it can add considerable significance to work on the conflict. When one looks, even cursorily, at assessments offering a showdown of one kind or another (for example, Sharabi, 1969), or protracted and irreconcilable positions (as Harkabi, 1969), the potential value of gaming is clear.

E. GEARING THE WORK TO A PERCEIVED SOLUTION

The suggestions presented above may have particularly important effects on work on the conflict if more researchers begin to (1) *interrelate findings from various research strategies*, suggested here, in somewhat the same way that work in psychology could relate testing, human factors engineering, and leadership studies to cross-cultural studies of values; (2) to gear systematically their research *to a closer look at options for a solution* of the conflict. The very fact that a solution must have grounds in any of the social sciences, be backed in time and space by knowledge of trends, have specificity in terms of ecology and be administratively unambiguous renders the current efforts ineffective. It is the contention of this article that we must free

ourselves from the atmosphere of a Greek tragedy.

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