

to men born of two Athenian parents. If women are not "Athenians," who could the second parent be? The law may actually have meant to identify men whose natural father and maternal grandfather were both Athenians.

Loraux is a preeminent French structuralist historian whose several books explore the contours of what she calls the Athenian "civic imaginary." By civic imaginary Loraux means the idealized self-image that the city produces in a variety of public discourses and through which the city forges a collective identity. Loraux's work should interest political theorists for the way it implies that the Athenians practiced forms of political theorizing on various civic occasions through an assortment of cultural performances. *The Children of Athena* suggests in particular that Athenians conducted sophisticated thinking about citizenship by telling and retelling in many civic contexts a story that they claim, in mythic terms, describes the origin of their *polis*. While this book was published in France more than a decade ago (1984), this graceful translation includes a 1990 Epilogue written for the second French edition in which Loraux states that she stands by her original analysis. Today the book is a testament to the importance of recognizing the "civic imaginary" as a valuable object of study not only in history (as Loraux argues) but also, I would add, in political theory.

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THE CORRESPONDENCE OF THOMAS HOBBS, 2 volumes, edited by Noel Malcolm. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994. Volume 1, \$78.00; Volume 2, \$78.00.

As Thomas Hobbes reaches the crescendo in his description of the natural condition of mankind in *Leviathan*, just before he notes that which is "worst

of all . . . continual fear and danger of violent death," he describes a way of life where there is "no knowledge of the face of the earth . . . no arts, no letters, no society" (chap. 13 [1994, 60]). In *Leviathan* Hobbes tries to demonstrate how a sovereign power frees us from the need to seek power after power and allows us to gain knowledge of the face of the earth, to enjoy the arts, the letters, and the society of like-minded men. Reading the correspondence collected by Noel Malcolm in this magnificent two-volume edition of letters to and from Hobbes, we see Hobbes, for the most part, living the life for whose sake, he argues, we must create leviathans. These letters do reveal political conflicts that affected Hobbes's life: Hobbes fled to Paris in the early 1640s when he saw that "words that tended to aduance the prerogative of kings began to be examined in Parliament" [35];¹ he worried that language in a new edition of *De Cive* identifying him as a tutor to King Charles would be used by his enemies [52]; he at times writes that travel is dangerous and that because of wars in Italy [5] or the plague [34], he must delay and cancel trips. Nevertheless, this is the correspondence of a man who does *not* focus on the momentous events occurring in the political world of seventeenth century Europe, a man who insists on enjoying the arts, the letters, and the society of the scientists and philosophers of his time.

In 1636 Hobbes writes to the third Earl of Devonshire that he has decided not to serve as a "domestique" because "the extreame pleasure I take in study ouercomes in me all other appetites. . . . I must not deny my selfe the content to study in the way I haue begun" [21]. The letters confirm Hobbes's "content" in studying and enjoying the "extreame pleasure" of the mind, while he finds tedious the "newes" of the day. Hobbes would rather speculate on the movement of objects in space than remark on the conflicts that give fire to so many seventeenth century political crises. His political thought aims to ensure that we enjoy the life he, at least according to these letters, appears for the most part to have enjoyed himself.

I

Malcolm's two volumes are a tour de force. They provide a splendid resource and view into the intellectual and social life of learned men of seventeenth century England, France, and to some degree Holland.² Malcolm has collected, transcribed, and translated into English all the known published and unpublished letters to and from Hobbes. He has scoured the sources to identify almost every character mentioned in the letters—from various letter

carriers (p. 595) to William Faithorne the engraver (p. 558) to assorted booksellers and authors of scientific works mentioned throughout the letters. He provides a Biographical Register, a sort of mini-DNB (Dictionary of National Biography), about the individuals with whom Hobbes corresponds and the many others who frequent the texts of the letters. Malcolm identifies original sources of quotes and references so that we can, for example, understand Stubbe's reference to Sidney's character Demaetas (p. 427), be familiar with the content of Wallis's works so often attacked by Hobbes, and grasp the meaning of a reference to Typhon in Bacon's *De sapientia veterum* (p. 196). Malcolm reproduces the emendations by each letter writer, gives cross references, and provides clear reproductions of the geometrical figures that fill Hobbes's and his correspondents' letters. The accomplishment is magisterial.

There are a few regrets about what is missing, regrets that can perhaps be judged as greediness on the part of this reviewer. For those of us without access to the manuscripts and their transcriptions, I longed for a page or two reproduced from one of Hobbes's letters so that we might get a feeling for his handwriting, how he drew his geometrical figures, how he amended his texts. For the longer letters, page headings identifying the author of the letter would have helped. More often, though, the regrets arise about what was not under Malcolm's or the publisher's control, letters that we know existed but can no longer be located. The footnote that sadly records this fact, through no fault of Malcolm's energies, appears too frequently. One regrets that the letters are mostly from Hobbes's correspondents rather than from Hobbes himself. One laments long gaps that often separate the letters; we have a letter from September 1649, but nothing again until June 1651, the period immediately preceding publication of *Leviathan*. Occasionally we have the actual back and forth that constitutes a correspondence [40-48, 50-56], but this is the exception.

These regrets should not diminish the enormous admiration for Malcolm's achievement—and for his withholding what must have been the strong urge to editorialize. He uses the notes to tell us “what Hobbes's letter is referring to, not what it reminds me of” (p. lxiv), thus allowing the letters to speak for themselves. Since Malcolm has maintained this editorial distance, let me in what follows try to give a texture to how these letters help us know Hobbes and the world within which he was writing, but also indicate some of the questions they raise as well as some methodological issues the letters suggest about the reading of Hobbes's political texts. Space limitations preclude doing justice to the richness of the collection and allow me only to raise, not to answer, the questions that must arise from a reading of these letters about

why reactions to Hobbes differed so greatly on the continent and in England and why Hobbes in his letters showed so little interest in the political events of his time.

II

Hobbes's English peers described him as the " 'Monster of Malmesbury,' the arch-atheist, the apostle of infidelity, the 'bug-bear of the nation' " (Mintz 1962, vii). Yet the continental philosopher Samuel Sorbière writes: "I admire even more your goodness, your courtesy, and all those fine qualities which make you the perfect gentleman as well as a great philosopher. You fulfill all the duties of civil life, you are a good friend . . . and of the best temperament in world" [166]. The letters repeatedly show Hobbes's correspondents praising his character and waxing rhapsodic about his friendship and his intellect. For sure, there is the occasional letter that is not so generous,³ but for the most part Sorbière's judgment rings throughout the volumes.

Hobbes's own letters illustrate the self-deprecation and sardonic wit evident in his other writings. In his autobiography he writes of his cowardice, how he and fear were born twins (*Opera Latina*, 1.lxxxvi). This is not mere affectation. Travels in Europe are delayed by worries about nearby political conflicts and by disease: "[I]t were not discretion to passe through the plague on no greater errand then . . . curiosity of the traueellers" [4]. At the end of his life he delays publication of *Behemoth* "lest it should offend him [the King]" [206]. Elsewhere we learn of his laziness [42 and 112] and mediocre horsemanship [24]. Malcolm draws attention to a passage in which Hobbes writes to the Earl of Newcastle about a cold that makes "me keepe my chamber, and a chamber . . . that makes me keepe my Cold" [24]. Although Hobbes was seriously ill with a lasting fever while in Paris in 1647, a tendency to hypochondria surfaces. In 1649 he informs Gassendi that he is in "fairly good health [*satis bene valeo*] for my age" [62]. Hobbes is, of course, to live another 30 years. While expressing concern for his health [164], there is also evidence of impressive stamina; at 89 Hobbes writes on the circumference of the circle and continues his intense controversies with his enemy Wallis [200].⁴ Hobbes's delight in debate is long-standing: "My odde opinions are bayted. but I am content wth it, as beleeuing I still have the better, when a new man is sett vpon me; that knowes not my paradoxes, but is full of his owne doctrine, there is something in the disputation not vnpleasant" [39].

In *Leviathan* Hobbes describes the joy "arising from imagination of a man's own power and ability"; if it is "grounded upon the experience of his

own former actions, [it] is the same with *confidence*" (chap. 6 [1994, 31]). Hobbes never lacks "confidence." Near the end of his life, he writes to Anthony Wood that even were he not included in Wood's book on the Antiquities of Oxford, "I shall still be praised by most of the scholars of the present time, and by even more (I believe) of those of the future" [197]. Explaining the delay in sending his works to his friends, he writes: "The reason . . . is partly laziness, but mostly the fact that I find it difficult to explain my meaning to my own satisfaction. I am seeking to achieve in metaphysics and physics what I hope I have achieved in moral theory, so that there may be no room left for any critic to write against me" [42]. Or to Sorbière he writes in 1649:

I give as much time to the task of writing as is permitted by my health. . . . I say the task of writing for it is not the effort of finding out the truth but that of explaining and demonstrating it which is holding up publication. I should be ashamed of such tardiness, were I not certain that it is sufficiently justified by the book itself. [61]

This confidence spills over into arrogance. Hobbes is dismissive of those who do not accept his arguments. "It is correct; and if people burdened with prejudice fail to read it carefully enough, that is their fault, not mine. They are a boastful, backbiting sort of people" [164]. His opponents responded in kind. C. Huygens writes in 1662 of Hobbes:

[H]e is incapable of being led thereby to admit his error. Nor do I think there is any danger that he might get anyone to accept his falsehoods for truths; for, through his frequent mistakes, he has so diminished his credit with everyone, that almost so soon as they see a new problem propounded by Hobbes, they declare that a new incorrectly drawn figure has appeared. . . . I suggested that his eyesight was failing not in order to ridicule him but because I thought this was the reason why his attention had wandered so. [149]

Malcolm realizes that few users of this collection will read the correspondence from cover to cover. This is a pity; by reading the two volumes one becomes engaged in the men whose lives intertwine with Hobbes's. We grimace a bit when du Verdus appears, knowing that the letter will be filled with complaints about what may have been a real conspiracy and real poisonings, but the outrage eventually becomes tedious.⁵ We watch the maturing of Peleau from sycophantic adoration to real engagement with Hobbes's ideas [103]. We grieve with Hobbes over the death of Gassendi and sense the loss after Sorbière's last letter: "I have no doubt I shall pass away before reaching your age, since although I am not yet 60 years old, I am already shaky on my feet, and suffer some pain in my sides" [185]. Sorbière dies the following year at age 54.

The letters reveal as well the different attachments that marked Hobbes's life. There is a marked distance in Hobbes's relationship with Sir Gervase Clifton whom he served briefly and whose son he accompanied to Europe. In one letter Hobbes even suggests that Sir Gervase not bother to write back.⁶ This contrasts with the personal warmth and intellectual depth that fill the letters between Hobbes and members of the Cavendish family. To the Cavendishes he writes about natural philosophy, optics, and the nature of light. He advises Charles Cavendish about proper deportment:

To encourage inferiours, to be cheerefull with ones equals & superiors, to pardon the follies of them one converseth withall, & to help men of, that are fallen into ye danger of being laught at, these are signes of nobleness & of the master spirit. Whereas to fall in loue with ones selfe vpon the sight of other mens infirmities . . . is the property of one that stands in competition with such a ridiculous man for honor. [28]⁷

To another Cavendish he writes: "The hope of not being long from yor Lop [Lordship], makes me let Philosophy alone till then; and then if I haue any thinge you shall fetch it out, by discourse for by that meanes I shall take in as much more, and so be no looser" [22]. Hobbes's letters to Sir Gervase simply repeat: "There is no newes" [4, 13, 11]. Malcolm describes Sir Gervase's interests as letters, poetry, and plays (pp. 821-3). Hobbes's were physics, geometry, and epistemology.

III

Malcolm notes the contrast between the hostile reception given Hobbes's ideas in England and the enthusiastic reception on the continent, even among highly religious men like Father Mersenne (p. xxxiv).⁸ In 1674 Hobbes complains to Anthony Wood about the corrections that Dr. John Fell had made to Wood's draft of his book on the antiquities of University of Oxford: "[W]here you wrote about my book *Leviathan*, first, that it was very well known to the people of neighboring countries, he inserted the word 'for the public harm it caused' . . . Then, where you wrote 'he wrote a book', he inserted 'most monstrous'" [197]. In contrast, from the continent, Francois Peleau writes that he thinks Hobbes "the greatest, or rather the only philosopher of all ages, to whom our age is indebted for its knowledge of truth, and the explanation of it." He concludes that he should rather "have one Hobbes than three thousand Socrates" [85]. (No wonder this letter remains among the papers at Chatsworth; it is hard to imagine allowing such a letter to fall into the rubbish heap.) Peleau adds: "As for your *Leviathan*, I have decided

to learn your language in order to understand it; I am sure that I would learn Arabic and Turkish if you had written in those languages" [85]. From Sorbière (who described Hobbes in 1647 already as "the new hope of true philosophy" [55]), he hears: "You are indeed the father of politics and its leading expert, the person who, like Galileo in physics, put an end to empty quibbling on that subject" [141]. Sometimes the letters from the continent verge on sycophancy, but there is no mistaking the admiration Hobbes earned among his continental correspondents.⁹

From Hobbes's English correspondents we hear little praise for and infrequent reference to *Leviathan*. Edmund Waller ridicules the "censures" by William Pike by playing on the fishy name of the author of those censures [88]. Henry Stubbe writes of the difficulties of translating *Leviathan* into Latin [80, 87, 91], but in general, attention to content of *Leviathan* from his English correspondents appears infrequently at best.¹⁰ Hobbes's continental friends show far more interest. Peleau was ready to learn English so as to read *Leviathan* in the original. Du Verdus produces the most interesting letter in the entire collection with regard to *Leviathan*, an extended series of specific questions. Most are linguistic, asking about phrases such as "manning ships," but some raise substantive issues, such as the possible different meanings of the phrase "know thyself," and whether animals can feel admiration or exhibit the "signes . . . of Religion"—and how we could possibly answer such questions [100]. Du Verdus also asks whether Hobbes's argument that the sovereign must be the head of the church opens the door for women priests, since women can be sovereigns [108].¹¹

The letters that survive, however, show a Hobbes primarily engaged in controversies about the inadequacy of "numbers for confirming or refuting geometrical demonstration" [161], the duplication of the cube, the proportion of the circumference of the circle to its semidiameter, theories about motion and cyclometry, about air and matter. If one were to rely on the testimony of these letters alone, it might seem that far more of Hobbes's life, intellectual endeavors, and fame rested on the niceties of geometrical proofs than on the grand questions of psychology and political order that fill his volumes on politics. The discussions about physics should not, however, be written off as minor disputations in the life of the man who wrote *Leviathan*. As Hobbes writes about the dialogues of Galileo in 1634: "I heare say it is called in, in Italy, as a booke that will do more hurt to their Religion then all the bookes haue done of Luther and Caluin, such opposition they thinke is betweene their Religion, and naturall reason" [10]. To Sorbière he writes that his disagreements with Wallis were disagreements "with all the ecclesiastics of England, on whose behalf Wallis wrote against me" [112].¹²

The easy separation between disciplines that marks contemporary academic work dissolves in the interconnections between the debates found in these letters about squaring the circle, the sources of perception, the basis for experiments, the nature of (and whether there can be) a vacuum, and the implications of all these issues for the existence of God. Throughout his life, Hobbes stubbornly affirms his original views on materialism, refusing to admit "spirit" or "non-material" substance into our vocabulary. Hobbes's commitment to materialism, to the impossibility of the vacuum, to the mechanisms of optics, to deduction are essential premises for his political thought, though these connections are not developed in the letters.

For readers of this journal, the question is whether these letters give insight into the origins, problems, meaning of his political theory. And here the answer is mixed. Apart from the long letters from du Verdus [100, 108], there is little discussion of the content of the political works; when the political writings appear, the letter writers usually ask only about unfamiliar English terms. Most correspondence about *De Cive* and *Leviathan* reduces to issues about publication, translation, typeface, misprints—and even the concern with getting praise from well-known men so that publishers might see profit in publishing Hobbes's works [44-47, 52, 56, 144, 155]. Hobbes the speculative geometrician and physicist emerges in these letters; Hobbes the political theorist is less visible.

IV

The earliest letter in the collection from Hobbes's friend Robert Mason is written in 1622. It discusses political issues and offers considerable detail about the conflicts between Catholics and Protestants. A few other letters discuss political events and religious schisms, but we learn little from these letters of Hobbes's interest in the specifics of political life. His letters to Sir Gervase from Europe and England repeatedly remark that there is little "newes" [5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13]. We find similar comments in his letters to the Cavendishes: "There is no newes at Court but of Maskes, which is a stay to my Lords going to Oxford" [10]. Hobbes is pleased by the delay since it allows time for "business" which seems to mean the purchase of books. Attending his Lordship at Court does not lead to reflection on the political events that are about to cause a major reassessment of the relation between the English Parliament and the King. The wars in Italy interfere with Hobbes's travel plans; they do not tell us about a natural condition of war among states. The King's tenuous position means that Hobbes does not want

the biographical sketch of himself included in his books to take notice of his service to the King [52]; it does not turn him to thoughts of the nature of monarchical sovereignty. Hobbes longs to be in quiet places, distant from the political bustle of cities. From Geneva he writes: "The towne is free from noyse, company, and ill example, free from contagion, and warre, and fitte for study and retirednesse, having allso good ayre and walkes wch in other great townes are wantinge" [4].

Although half of his most famous work discusses religion and the relationship between priests and political powers, Letter 37 from 1641 in which he comments that he is "of the opinion, that Ministers ought to minister rather than gouerne" and that "the dispute for [precedence] between *spirituall* and *ciuill power*, has of late more then any other thing in the world, bene the cause of *ciuill warre*, in all *places of Christendome*" is the singular example of any actual interest in the defining events of the time.¹³ Instead, throughout the letters the interest in political life is from a theoretical perspective. The books he searches for among the booksellers of London are theoretical works, not tracts. In 1634, he searches for copies of Galileo's dialogues in London [10]. In a letter written some two years later from Paris, he reports that there is "nothing to write from hence but that we are here"; he can only study nights and reads works such as Seldon's *Mare Clausum* and *Concerning Truth* [18].

After translating Thucydides, Hobbes eschewed the study of history as a foundation of political knowledge. As in his scientific writings, he insisted in his political writings on deduction as the right method for analyzing political life. "Though in all places of the world men should lay the foundation of their houses on the sand, it could not thence be inferred, that so it ought to be. The skill of making and maintaining commonwealths consisteth in certain rules, as doth arithmetic and geometry" (*Leviathan*, chap. 20 [1994, 135]). The response to historical events is subjective and cannot be the basis for a science of politics with principles that are true across time and space. Insofar as these letters reveal anything about his thought and his interactions with his friends and colleagues, he did not communicate with others through reflections on the specifics of the momentous historical events occurring around him. The letters, debating the proofs of theorems and the motion of objects through space, do not rely on the observation of actual cubes transforming themselves into squares or of falling weights, but on the deductive reasoning that he applied to his political works as well.

In one of the letters to Mersenne through whom Hobbes carries on his debates with Descartes, Hobbes comments:

I do not at all defend my errors; still less do I defend them obstinately. Unless M. Descartes behaves in the same way, I shall certainly be his superior in moral conduct.

But how does it affect the truth of the matter under dispute if I have failed to demonstrate it sufficiently clearly? What if knowing the truth of some proposition in Euclid's *Elements*, I tried to make a demonstration of it and failed; surely it would not be any less true on that account, if it were in fact demonstrated by others, or by me at some other time? [34]

The truth of the theorem transcends the observation of whatever evidence might support or undermine it. Although we do not have Hobbes's answer to the question posed by Sir Kenelm Digby in 1637, one can speculate on the conversation that led to the question. Sir Kenelm writes: "[H]erein I would gladly know whither you work vpon the generall notions and apprehensions that all men (the vulgar as well as the learned) frame of all things that occurre unto them; or whither you make your ground to be definitions collected out of deep insight into the things themselues. Methought you bent this way when we talked hereof" [25]. From the letters it appears that it is not empirical observation or casual reflection, but the reasoning; it is not the study of history or current events, but deductions from first principles, the deep "insight," that characterizes Hobbes's political thought. In the letter where Hobbes argues that ministers ought to minister, he follows these comments by noting: "[Y]our lop may perhaps thinke this opinion, but a *fancy of Philosophy*. but I am sure that Experience teaches, thus much" [37]. This appeal to experience is unique in this large collection of letters.

It is possible that comments on current affairs would be unwise for one writing in seventeenth century England and especially problematic for Hobbes who prides himself on his cowardice; this must be kept in mind for the question I pose, namely, whether the striking absence of discussions about the political events of his time raises problems for contextualist readings of Hobbes's writings. Richard Tuck, for instance, suggested recently that the Earl of Newcastle's involvement in national politics at the end of the 1630s occasioned Hobbes's interest in politics (1993, 298). Likewise, according to Tuck, Hobbes's attacks in the *Elements of Law* against the citizens holding absolute rights of property and retaining private judgments "acted as the theoretical underpinning for the policy of Charles I and Stafford, and . . . was . . . directed at precisely the point of issue in the Ship Money debates" (1993, 313). These debates may have offered such a theoretical underpinning, but the letters give no indication that Hobbes worked from political problems of the time to conclusions concerning the dangers of private judgment. Tuck "believes" that there was too strong an "association between the idea of representation and the authority of the House of Commons" for Hobbes to have developed the idea of sovereign representation in the *Elements* (1993, 312). Again, the letters do not show Hobbes engaged in debates about the

claims of the House of Commons as “representatives” of the people.¹⁴ In developing his arguments, Tuck suggests that the Ship Money case led Hobbes to explore the political implications of post-skeptical philosophy (1993, 298), but nowhere in the letters do we find evidence of political events serving as prods to Hobbes’s reflections on theoretical questions.

There is a certain irony here; Hobbes would claim that generalizations one might make about his character or the influences on his thought that rely on the letters published in Malcolm’s volumes are suspect, especially since our access to the letters is serendipitous. How accurate a portrait of Hobbes’s whole life can they give us and how much can they tell us about his political thought? We remain at the mercy of Hobbes’s published work for an understanding of his thought. These letters give us windows through which we can look at the man who wrote them, but, as Hobbes would warn us, we cannot draw conclusions from observation. Jacob Klein once wrote of the introductory remarks to a series of lectures on Aristotle: “The lecturer began his exposition as follows: ‘As regards Aristotle himself, as regards the circumstances and the course of his life, suffice it to say: Aristotle was born, spent his life philosophizing, and died’ ” (1985, 171). The letters in the Hobbes correspondence may lead us to say the same about Hobbes. The letters show us a man for whom philosophizing was the primary activity and a man whose philosophy warned us about drawing conclusions from particulars rather than from the deep insights into first principles. We may need to be wary of saying more.

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NOTES

1. All references to the letters are included in the text in square brackets according to the number that Malcolm assigns them. For letters that appear originally in English, I follow Malcolm’s transcriptions of the original spelling and punctuation. For letters that appear

originally in Latin or French, I use Malcolm's translations. Readers will notice that in the translations the spelling and punctuation are modernized; thus, readers will readily recognize which letters originally appeared in English and which in another language.

2. Although some of the letters included in Malcolm's volumes are newly published, most have already been published—in collections of the letters of Hobbes's correspondents, in a series of publications by Ferdinand Toennies, in individual articles (e.g., Zagorin [1978]), in the Molesworth edition. Malcolm notes before each letter where else that letter appears in manuscript or published form. Quentin Skinner (1965-66) took account of the unpublished letters to Hobbes that were kept in the Chatsworth Library, but the article did not reproduce the letters' contents. Malcolm commits himself to publishing only letters to or from Hobbes and not letters about Hobbes by others. A quite different picture of the Bear of Malmesbury might emerge if Malcolm had included all such letters as well. See below, Section IV, fn. 14.

3. The debates between Hobbes and Descartes were carried on through the intermediary efforts of Mersenne, with Descartes sending letters to Mersenne intended for Hobbes. Malcolm quotes from the note to Mersenne attached to one of these letters: "I think it best if I have nothing to do with him and therefore refrain from replying to him. For if his character is as I suspect, we could scarcely communicate without becoming enemies" (p. 100).

4. Malcolm quotes a passage from the diary of the Danish scholar Ole Borch who describes his visit to Sorbière. Sorbière had just received a letter from "Hobbes, who is already in his early eighties (but who, nevertheless, plays tennis every Tuesday)," p. 584. In Letter 202, though, he does admit in 1678, a year before his death, that he is "now so weake that it is a paine to me to dictate."

5. We owe to du Verdus the letter in which Hobbes receives effusive congratulations on his marriage [67]. Hobbes, of course, never married. Du Verdus reveals the rumor of Hobbes's death in 1657: "I am too obedient to refuse to believe you when you assure me that you are alive," he responds to Hobbes [108].

6. Rogow (1986, 94) reads this letter differently, suggesting that Hobbes is expressing his loyalty and devotion to Sir Gervase and asks nothing in return. Malcolm offers a dating of the correspondence between Gervase and Hobbes that raises questions about some of Rogow's descriptions of Hobbes's life in the 1630s. See Letter 15 and Rogow (1986, 94, and esp. fn. 22).

7. The language here foreshadows the sociability prescribed by the Laws of Nature in *Leviathan* 15. It also recalls Keith Thomas's article on the social origins of Hobbes's thought (1965).

8. Skinner (1965-66) developed this point relying on the unpublished letters at Chatsworth, which now appear in Malcolm's volumes.

9. Du Prat writes from Paris that he had spoken to a bookseller about printing *Leviathan*. The bookseller "did open his eares to yt proposition. & answer'd yt yr de Cive in French is sold publicly & yt you were an author so well knowne, as he made no doubt but ye booke would sell away" [155].

10. For an exception, see 441, n 10, one of the many places where we must depend on Malcolm's erudition. About De Cive we have nothing from Hobbes's English friends. From his continental correspondents it receives frequent praise [75, 77, 89, 124], with du Verdus describing it as his "vade-mecum" [68].

11. Malcolm writes that Hobbes took seriously this comment and notes the change between the English and Latin versions of *Leviathan* on precisely this issue. [108, fn. 14].

12. Shapin and Schaffer (1985), relying frequently on the letters that now appear in Malcolm's volumes, explain well how Hobbes's resistance to the experimental method was part of his attack against the power of the clergy.

13. This makes one especially long for the letter from Hobbes referred to by Stubbe in 1659; Stubbe's letter responds to Hobbes with a discussion of a broadside attacking the state's imposition of religion on its people [138].

14. Tuck sets the writing of *Leviathan* in "the period of crisis within royalism, with hopes high at the queen's court that there might soon be a restoration" (1993, 323). He bases these claims in part on letters from Robert Payne to Gilbert Sheldon in which he describes the content of letters he received from Hobbes. Had these letters been included in Malcolm's edition, perhaps they would have given a quite different flavor to the background for Hobbes's political writings. Malcolm made the editorial decision not to include all the letters that simply mention Hobbes. Tuck's arguments raise the issue of what interpretive purchase may have been lost by this editorial decision.

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