

The New Urban Revival in the United States

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Dimensions of the New Urban Revival

Urbanisation patterns in the United States have taken some unlikely turns over the past quarter of a century. After following fairly predictable trends in the 1950s and 1960s towards increased urban growth and westward movement, the nation experienced a 1970s 'counter-urbanisation' similar to that which occurred in many other developed countries (Champion, 1989; 1992). In the US, counter-urbanisation was associated with several redistribution reversals that were linked to both metropolitan size and region of the country. In assessing these reversals at great length, Frey and Speare (1988) concluded that the 1970s was a "transition decade" for population redistribution in the US. However, the term 'transition' did not refer as much to the specific geographical patterns of redistribution that had emerged, as it did to the changing social and economic contexts for urban and regional growth. The changing national industrial structure, the rise of the global economy and improvements in communications and production technologies, have changed the geography of opportunities across space and the ability of populations to respond to these changes. At the same time, the diffusion of 'urban' amenities to all parts of the country—including areas previously considered to be remote or rural—has expanded the location options for both employers and residents. More so than in the past, the population and economic

growth of regions, metropolitan areas and small places are dependent on how successfully these areas can adapt to rapidly changing circumstances.

Despite the realisation that the contexts for urban and regional redistribution had been altered, there was little consensus among scholars as to the form of urbanisation that would emerge in the 1980s and 1990s. With findings from the 1990 US census now in hand, the broad dimensions of the new urbanisation in the US can now be detected. Three of these dimensions appear to be significant and are likely to continue to characterise US urban growth for the next decade.

First, there is a return to urbanisation—but not the urbanisation of the 1950s and 1960s. New patterns of urban growth and decline are faster paced. They reflect continuing shifts in industrial structure and favour areas with diversified economies, particularly those engaged in advanced services and knowledge-based industries. Over the 1980s, recreation and retirement centres also did well. However, many small and non-metropolitan areas, particularly in the interior part of the country, fared poorly under the adverse period influences of the 1980s, and as a result of their dependence on less than competitive industries. Growth prospects for these areas are unstable, at best, unless they can diversify their economic bases. Hence,

the urban revival of the 1980s created sharper growth and decline disparities across regions and places than the urban growth of earlier decades.

A second dimension of the new urban revival involves the expanded growth of the nation's minority populations—primarily Blacks, Hispanics and Asians. More immigration from Latin America and Asia along with population gains among native-born minorities has led to a strong nationwide growth advantage for minorities relative to 'majority whites'. Yet these alterations in ethnic balance play out quite differently across the geographical landscape. While it is true that minorities have dispersed more widely than in earlier decades, most of their growth is still heavily concentrated in specific regions and metropolitan areas. For example, the greater Los Angeles metropolitan area garnered more than one-fifth of all minority growth in the US during the 1980s, and just nine metropolitan areas accounted for over half of that growth. Although each of the large minority groups exhibits somewhat different geographical distribution patterns, there exists a wide majority-minority distinction in population composition across broad regions and metropolitan areas. This is bound to influence the social and political character of these areas and affect neighbourhood and community redistribution within those areas that house large minority populations.

The third major dimension of the 1980s urban revival is the continued spread of population and jobs outward from historic central cities of metropolitan areas. Although the suburban office boom was already apparent in the 1970s, it was clear that suburban territory outside central cities had become the primary locus of activity for most metropolitan residents (Cervero, 1989). This suburban growth has resulted from both the continued relocation of activities away from northern central cities and from recent, sometimes sprawling, growth within the suburban areas of South and West metropolitan areas. Garreau's (1991) book, *Edge City* has popularised the notion that new suburban office

and commercial complexes might serve as new central places in the modern metropolitan area. Indeed, empirical evidence supports the view that suburban areas have captured most urban employment and residential growth in the 1980s. Studies show that the typical commuter now lives and works within the suburbs, and that several suburban cities now rival their central cities in the production of export goods and services (Pisarski, 1987; Stanback, 1991). Central cities still play an important part in metropolitan-area demographic dynamics. As a group, they are becoming even more differentiated from the remainder of the metropolitan area in their demographic compositions, as they still house a plurality of the nation's minority populations. Yet, American suburbs are also becoming more differentiated by race, class and economic function, and represent the arena of future growth in most metropolitan areas.

The sections that follow will evaluate these three broad dimensions of new urban revival in the US, based on results from the 1990 census. Although the terms 'urbanisation' and 'counter-urbanisation' have been used, these evaluations will focus on metropolitan and non-metropolitan distinctions, along with individual metropolitan areas. (See the Appendix for a discussion of the metropolitan-area definitions that are used.) In order to provide some background for our evaluation of the new urban revival, the next section reviews major explanations for the 1970s 'counter-urbanisation' phenomena in the US and their respective forecasts for the future.

Evaluating Old Explanations

Since the new urban revival can be seen as part of a general transition in redistribution processes, it is useful to view it in the light of explanations that were proposed to account for the counter-urbanisation patterns of the 1970s. First noticed as the non-metropolitan turnaround—where the non-metropolitan population grew faster than the metropolitan population (Brown and Wardwell, 1980;

Fuguitt, 1985)—, US counter-urbanisation also involved two related redistribution reversals: a redistribution down the metropolitan-size hierarchy wherein the nation's largest metropolitan areas grew more slowly than smaller-sized ones; and an accelerated regional redistribution out of the North (Northeast and Midwest census regions) towards the South and West. Together, these reversals led toward increased population flows to smaller-sized, less dense, less developed portions of the nation's spatial system (Frey and Speare, 1988). A variety of theories was offered to account for these departures from previously dominant redistribution patterns. They can be generalised into three broad explanations, such that each has different implications for the future. The discussion below draws from more extensive treatments of these explanations in Frey (1987, 1989).

Period Explanations

Period explanations attributed the 1970s reversals to the unique economic and demographic circumstances of the decade (Wardwell and Brown, 1980; Richter, 1985; Garnick, 1988). The oil shortage associated with the decade's energy crises prompted extensive extractive industry development in the non-metropolitan south-west, mountain West and Appalachia. Agricultural surpluses, worldwide, stemmed migration flows away from rural areas. At the same time, the decade's recessions severely reduced employment growth in northern industrial metropolitan areas—filtering low-paying manufacturing jobs to smaller communities. Some period demographic influences were also relevant. The rise of the large 'baby boom' cohorts to college age increased their populations in small college towns. Likewise, large elderly birth cohorts (born between 1910 and 1930) raised demands for small retirement communities. In sum, period explanations attributed the 1970s counter-urbanisation patterns to that period's unique economic and demographic dislocations.

Regional Restructuring Explanations

Regional restructuring explanations took a more global and transformative perspective toward the 1970s counter-urbanisation.¹ While acknowledging that some period influences did take place, restructuring theorists tend to see the deindustrialisation-related decline of the 1970s as a short-term episode—leading toward a new spatial organisation of production. This new spatial organisation involves expanding worldwide markets, improved communications and production technologies and, most significant, the rise of the multinational corporation. They forecasted new agglomeration tendencies for metropolitan areas that function as advanced service centres, with corporate headquarter centres, banks and similar institutions. Growth was forecast, as well, in areas with 'knowledge-based' industries. On the other hand, areas that could not make the production-to-services transformation successfully would decline.

Noyelle and Stanback (1984) linked these tendencies to the rise of advanced services and the reduced role of labour-intensive manufacturing production in the national economy. Within this transformation, services are becoming 'inputs' in the production process—in knowledge-based activities like engineering, R&D and planning—and will benefit from economies agglomeration. The multi-location corporation becomes an agent in this transformation, as it both promotes division of labour across a network of places and centralises service activities in particular metropolitan areas. At the other extreme, communities that engage in routine production and consumer service activities would have unstable growth prospects since the economies of these 'off-centre' areas will be constrained by vagaries of external decision-making.

Deconcentration Explanations

Deconcentration explanations of counter-urbanisation draw from the human ecology tradition in American sociology (Hawley,

1978; Wilson, 1984; Wardwell, 1980). As with the regional restructuring explanation, deconcentration writers acknowledge the effects of changing industrial structures and technological innovations. However, they place stronger emphasis on the role of residential consumer preferences in location decisions. These scholars held that, in the 1970s, long-standing residential preferences toward low-density locations became less constrained by institutional and technological barriers. They saw a convergence—across size-of-place categories—in the availability of ‘urban’ amenities that were previously accessible only in large places. As a result, they believed that the 1970s counter-urbanisation heralded a gradual, but long-term, shift away from urban agglomeration.

The key to this explanation is the changing role of distance in determining the social organisation of space. Both producer and consumer space will be much less constrained by the geographical limitations and transport costs of producer activities—resulting in greater locational flexibility for both firms and households (Wardwell, 1980). Smaller communities are not seen as ‘off-centre’ sites for routine production activities. Rather, those with requisite amenities should attract a broad mix of residents seeking white-collar employment in firms that are deconcentrating in response to a greater competition for well-trained workers. Hence, the deconcentration perspective predicted a long-term continued dispersal of the population toward smaller communities.

Alternative Scenarios for the 1980s and 1990s

Alternative scenarios for the 1980s and 1990s are offered by each of the three explanations despite the fact that all three accounted for some of the 1970s redistribution reversals (Beale and Fuguitt, 1978; Long, 1988; Long and DeAre, 1988; Fuguitt *et al.*, 1989; Frey, 1990).

Period explanations treated the 1970s as a distortion of long-term urbanisation patterns—implying that more traditional

urbanisation tendencies should re-emerge after the decade’s demographic and economic shocks subsided. South and West growth would continue but, within each region, large areas would grow at the expense of smaller ones and traditional centres of industry would again attract population. This ‘return to the past’ scenario assumed that no new shocks would occur in the 1980s—an assumption that turned out to be false.

The regional restructuring perspective forecasted a return to urbanisation but in new locations. It viewed the metropolitan losses of the 1970s as part of long-term change in the nation’s industrial structure. Population growth should occur in areas that serve as corporate headquarters and those that specialise in information and ‘knowledge-based’ activities. Consequently, renewed growth was predicted for northern metropolises that already held strong profiles as corporate and finance centres and for those that specialise in new industries. Weaker growth prospects were predicted for single-industry areas, especially those tied to natural resources and manufacturing. Unstable growth prospects were predicted for smaller ‘off-centre’ cities and non-metropolitan communities engaged in peripheral production activities.

Unlike the above explanations, deconcentration proponents predicted the continued dispersal of population away from densely-settled agglomerations. Facilitated by changes in the nation’s industrial structure, and technological improvements in communication and production, these tendencies would make both employment opportunities and urban amenities accessible to residents of small communities. This continuation of the 1970s counter-urbanisation would imply further growth for smaller-sized places particularly in the South and West.

Post-counter-urbanisation: Metro Areas and Regions

The metropolitan and regional growth patterns, that can now be observed over the 1980–90 decade, provide much stronger empirical support for the ‘period’ and ‘regional

Table 1. Percentage population change for region and metropolitan categories, 1960–90.

Region and metropolitan category ^a	1990 size (millions)	Percentage 10-yr change			Percentage 5-yr change	
		1960–70	1970–80	1980–90	1980–85	1985–90
<i>North</i>						
Large MAs	62.9	+12.0	-0.9	+2.8	+1.3	+1.5
Other MAs	25.6	+11.1	+5.2	+3.3	+0.9	+2.4
Non-MAs	22.6	+2.6	+8.0	0.1	+0.7	-0.6
<i>South</i>						
Large MAs	28.2	+30.9	+23.4	+22.3	+12.3	+8.9
Other MAs	31.9	+15.5	+20.9	+13.4	+8.8	+4.2
Non-MAs	24.9	+1.1	+16.3	+4.6	+4.4	-0.3
<i>West</i>						
Large MAs	33.8	+29.1	+20.0	+24.2	+10.9	+11.9
Other MAs	10.8	+24.8	+32.2	+22.8	+11.4	+10.2
Non-MAs	8.1	+9.0	+30.6	+14.1	+9.1	+4.6
<i>US totals</i>						
Large MAs	124.8	+18.5	+8.1	+12.1	+6.0	+5.8
Other MAs	67.9	+14.6	+15.5	+10.8	+6.1	+4.4
Non MAs	56.0	+2.2	+14.3	+3.9	+3.6	+0.3
<i>Region totals^b</i>						
North	111.0	+9.8	+2.2	+2.4	+1.1	+1.2
South	84.9	+14.2	+20.1	+13.3	+8.6	+4.3
West	52.8	+24.6	+24.0	+22.2	+10.7	+10.3
<i>Total</i>	248.7	+13.4	+11.4	+9.8	+5.4	+4.1

^a Metropolitan areas (MAs) are defined according to constant boundaries determined by OMB as of 30 June 1990. Large MAs include 39 CMSAs and MSAs with 1990 populations exceeding 1 million.

^b These regions are consistent with standard census definitions where the North region represents the combined Northeast and Midwest census regions. When an individual MA overlaps regions, its statistics are assigned to the region where its principal central city is located.

Source: Compiled at University of Michigan Population Studies Center from decennial Census data and estimates prepared by the Census Bureau Population Division.

restructuring' explanations than for the 'deconcentration' explanation presented above. The period explanation's prediction of a 'return to the past' urbanisation pattern had to be altered to take into account new 1980s forces that had strong effects in limiting small metropolitan area and non-metropolitan area growth (Beale, 1988; Beale and Fuguitt, 1990). The regional restructuring explanation's predictions were most successful in characterising the growth patterns for large metropolitan areas in the 1980s. (Frey, 1990; Frey and Speare, 1992). However, the most recent data for the decade do not bear out the deconcentration explanation's prediction of a broad-based, continued population dispersal (see Table 1).

Period influences were largely responsible for the poor population growth of non-metropolitan areas during the 1980s (Beale, 1988). These included two severe recessions, an overvalued dollar, and a worldwide decline in food prices early in the decade—followed by a decline in oil prices at mid decade. Essentially the same global and cyclical forces which contributed to the 1970s population gains in manufacturing and resource-based non-metropolitan counties, shifted to turn this growth on its head during the 1980s. Manufacturing counties sustained greatest losses in the early 1980s, while agricultural-based counties did most poorly at mid-decade. The greatest shifts occurred among non-metropolitan mining counties

where boom turned to bust between the mid and latter part of the 1980s.

Large Metropolitan Areas

While period economic influences dominated non-metropolitan declines during the 1980s, the regional restructuring explanations were more salient in explaining large metropolitan-area growth patterns. As the theory predicted, those areas with more diversified, advanced service-based economies were most able to overcome their deindustrialisation-related losses of the 1970s. Such areas as New York and Boston were in a good position to build on their existing advanced services and high-tech development bases. Areas that were still wedded to old-line manufacturing, such as Detroit, Cleveland and Pittsburgh, again displayed decade-wide declines in the 1980s (see Table 2). Finally, areas such as Houston and Denver, whose economies are tied heavily to the boom then bust extractive industries of the period showed fluctuating growth patterns over the decade. The different experiences of metropolitan areas with distinct economic functions are portrayed in Figure 1.

Here, New York and Los Angeles, areas with strong international corporate and trading linkages, rebounded steadily from their 1970s growth slowdowns. (New York's population gains became reduced in the latter part of the decade due to sharp turndowns in the financial services and real estate.) For Detroit, an automotive centre, the early 1980s constituted the nadir of the industrial 'shakeout'—coincident with the rising dollar and reductions in exports. Denver's pattern is consistent with many areas linked to oil and extractive industry bases where substantial early decade population gains turned to sharp slowdowns as those industries encountered mid-decade shocks.

While individual large metropolitan areas exhibited growth and decline patterns—consistent with the regional restructuring explanation—large metropolitan areas, on the whole, rebounded from their 1970s declines and fared better than non-metropolitan

areas. Nevertheless, there are strong regional variations which are consistent with the regional restructuring and period explanations discussed above.

Regional Variations

The national trend toward 1980s reurbanisation was accompanied by a small deceleration of redistribution to the South and West. Although 1980s South and West regional growth continued to outpace that of the North by a considerable degree, the differential has diminished—particularly for the South and particularly for the last half of the 1980s (see Table 1). The largest 1970s-to-1980s reductions in Sunbelt growth levels occurred in the smaller and non-metropolitan areas of the South and West regions. These are the areas that contributed the most to Sunbelt gains in the 1970s. Non-metropolitan areas also showed declines in the North but this region's largest metropolitan areas rebounded slightly from their 1970s declines—producing a small increase in that region's decade-wide growth. Clearly, the strong 1970s draws of small Sunbelt places diminished over the 1980s and large northern metropolises benefited from regional restructuring influences.

These region and metropolitan size growth disparities are sharpened even further when a coastal-interior dichotomy is drawn within each region.² In both the South and West, the 1980s small and non-metropolitan declines were concentrated in the interior—where many single-industry and resource-based communities are located. Similar declines are shown for non-metropolitan areas of the interior (midwest) portions of the North for communities specialising in agriculture and manufacturing. In contrast, the greatest regional restructuring-generated gains occurred within large metropolitan areas located in the coastal portions of these regions. These areas have historic strengths as trade, finance and recreation centres (Frey and Speare, 1992). The coastal-interior patterns are evident in Figures 2–4 which contrast growth patterns of large metropolitan areas with those of

Table 2. Percentage change in the 25 largest metropolitan areas in North, South and West regions, 1960-90

Region and metropolitan area ^a	Area function ^b	1990 size (millions)	Percentage 10-yr change					Percentage 5-yr change	
			1960-70	1970-80	1980-90	1980-85	1985-90		
<i>North</i>									
New York CMSA	D	18.1	11.8	-3.6	3.1	2.9	0.2		
Chicago CMSA	D	8.1	12.2	2.0	1.6	1.9	-0.2		
Philadelphia CMSA	D	5.9	12.1	-1.2	3.9	1.7	2.1		
Detroit CMSA	S	4.7	13.4	-0.7	-1.8	-3.6	1.8		
Boston CMSA	D	4.2	12.7	0.8	5.0	2.0	3.0		
Cleveland CMSA	D	2.8	9.8	-5.5	-2.6	-2.0	-0.6		
Minneapolis-St Paul CMSA	D	2.5	23.0	7.8	15.3	5.9	8.9		
St Louis MSA	D	2.4	12.4	-2.2	2.8	1.5	1.3		
Pittsburgh CMSA	S	2.2	-0.7	-5.2	-7.5	-3.6	-4.1		
Cincinnati CMSA	D	1.7	9.9	2.9	5.1	1.2	3.8		
Milwaukee CMSA	S	1.6	10.9	-0.3	2.4	-1.3	3.7		
Kansas City MSA	D	1.6	14.2	4.4	9.3	4.2	4.8		
<i>South</i>									
Washington MSA	S	3.9	37.3	6.9	20.7	7.3	12.5		
Dallas-Fort Worth CMSA	D	3.9	37.1	14.6	32.6	19.8	10.7		
Houston CMSA	D	3.7	38.1	43.0	19.7	16.8	2.4		
Miami CMSA	D	3.2	48.8	40.1	20.8	8.9	10.9		
Atlanta MSA	D	2.8	35.0	27.0	32.5	15.6	14.6		
Baltimore MSA	D	2.4	14.8	5.3	8.3	2.4	5.7		
Tampa-St Petersburg MSA	O	2.1	34.8	46.0	28.2	15.8	10.7		
<i>West</i>									
Los Angeles CMSA	D	14.5	28.8	15.2	26.4	10.8	14.1		
San Francisco-Oakland CMSA	D	6.3	27.7	12.9	16.5	8.2	7.6		
Seattle CMSA	D	2.6	28.6	14.0	22.3	7.4	13.9		
San Diego MSA	O	2.5	31.5	37.1	34.2	14.6	17.1		
Phoenix MSA	D	2.1	46.4	55.4	40.6	22.4	14.9		
Denver CMSA	D	1.8	32.6	30.7	14.2	12.9	1.2		

^a CMSAs and MSAs defined by OMB as 30 June 1990, with 1990 populations exceeding 1.5 million. Abbreviated CMSA or MSA name is according to primary central city(s).

^b Classed as: Diversified service centres (D), Specialised service centres (S), and Other (O), drawing from the typology of Noyelle and Starback (1984).

Source: Compiled at University of Michigan Population Studies Centre from decennial Census data and estimates prepared by the Census Bureau Population Division.




Figure 1. Annual percentage population change, 1970-90: New York, Detroit, Los Angeles and Denver CMSAs.




Figure 2. North region: annual percentage population change, 1970–90.

non-metropolitan areas in both parts of each region.

The Rural Renaissance

The continued 'rural renaissance' predicted by deconcentration proponents did not come into fruition. Underlying this explanation was the view that residents could now actualise well-documented preferences for non-metropolitan locations. However, the hard economic realities of the 1980s, discussed above, did not permit this to occur for most of the population and for most non-metropolitan counties. There were, however, two notable exceptions.

One of these involves the continued growth of non-metropolitan retirement counties (Beale, 1988; Beale and Fuguitt, 1990; Frey, 1992a). These counties grew faster than non-metropolitan counties with other economic functions, and faster than the overall national population for most of the 1970s and 1980s. While concentrated in Florida, they are located in amenity-laden areas in all parts of the US. Their growth provides evidence that 'footloose' populations—like the

retired elderly—are apt to select non-metropolitan residential locations when their preferences are not constrained by workplace considerations. Moreover, by attracting large numbers of elderly movers, with substantial discretionary incomes, these non-metropolitan counties will generate increased employment for younger, labour-force-aged persons in service, construction and other complementary industries.

A second type of non-metropolitan county that should sustain continued growth over the 1980s is the so-called exurban county that lies adjacent to the metropolitan area. Residents selecting these counties tend to hold a preference for living close to, but not inside, a major urban centre (Zuiches, 1981; Fuguitt and Brown, 1990). Many of the faster-growing exurban counties may, later, be subsumed by an expanding metropolitan area (Fuguitt *et al.*, 1989) but still retain a largely rural or non-metropolitan character. The continued gains of retirement and exurban counties, alone, will not revive the 'rural renaissance' predicted during the 1970s. That prediction failed to disentangle a mix of period, regional restructuring and




Figure 3. South region: annual percentage population change, 1970–90. Key to lines: see Figure 2.

deconcentration influences that served to provide an illusion that a new era of settlement dispersion had begun. Yet, the 1980s return to urbanisation is clearly not a return to the urban patterns observed during the 1950s and the 1960s. The interplay of regional restructuring and period influences on employment and residential movement patterns continues to rearrange the spatial patterns of growth and decline across regions and individual metropolitan areas.

Minority–Majority Growth Disparities

A second signature of US urbanisation during the 1980s is the disparate shifts of the White ‘majority population’ and those of race and ethnic minorities. The nation’s racial and ethnic minority groups are becoming a continually stronger influence on population redistribution patterns. Largely the result of changing immigration levels and origins (Jensen, 1989; Bean *et al.*, 1990; Jasso and Rosenzweig, 1990), the combined minority population (including Hispanics and races other than White) grew more than seven times as fast as the non-Hispanic White ‘majority’ population over the 1980s.³ The number of Asians more than doubled

during that time from 3.5 million to over 7 million. Hispanics increased by more than half—from 14.6 to 22.3 million. Blacks, numerically the largest minority, added 3.5 million to their population over the 1980s, reaching a total count of almost 30 million.

As a result of these increases, the minority population is now composed of 60.5 million people—almost a quarter (24.4 per cent) of the total population. Yet, these minorities are hardly distributed evenly across the national landscape. Historically, immigrants have tended to settle in either traditional ‘port-of-entry’ areas or where large concentrations of their ethnic group were already located (Farley and Allen 1987; Bean and Tienda, 1987; Long, 1988; Cromartie and Stack, 1989; McHugh, 1989; Johnson and Roseman, 1990). Native-born minorities have mainly travelled well-worn migration paths, where the chance to be near friends and family often took precedence over economic opportunities. Although these stereotypes have shifted slightly during the 1980s, minority redistribution patterns are still quite different from those of the white majority. Such distinctive minority–majority patterns are likely to continue throughout the 1990s and lead to widening disparities between the racial and




Figure 4. West region: annual percentage population change, 1970–90. Key to lines: see Figure 2.

ethnic compositions of regions, metropolitan areas and communities.

Disparities by Region and Metropolitan Size

Distinctions between the majority–minority compositions of broad regions and metropolitan categories can be seen in the results of the 1990 census. Whites constitute about three-quarters of the nation's population and represent almost that share (72 per cent) in the South. The proportion of Whites, however, increases to 83 per cent in the North and drops to 67 per cent in the West. In large metropolitan areas (having populations greater than 1 million) in the West, the White share sinks to only 63 per cent. This contrasts sharply with the non-metropolitan North, where Whites make up 96 per cent of the population. Even greater disparities among individual metropolitan areas and non-metropolitan communities are camouflaged by these patterns. What stands out about the 1980s is the way in which minority–majority growth patterns served to accentuate these differences. The largest minority gains took place in the

rapidly-growing West region and in large metropolitan areas, where minority populations grew by 59 per cent—almost twice the national minority rate (see Table 3).

Each of the nation's three largest minority groups is contributing to this pattern. Blacks and Hispanics made the largest gains in the West, and all three minorities registered their greatest gains in large metropolitan areas. The three differ in some respects, however. Hispanic gains are concentrated most heavily in the largest Sunbelt metropolitan areas, which serve as most frequent destinations of Mexican immigrants. The greatest Asian gains occurred in large metropolitan areas in all three regions where better-educated, skilled Asian immigrants are responding to mainstream employment opportunities. Blacks, breaking past migration patterns are leaving large northern metropolises for large metropolitan areas in the South and communities of all sizes in the West. These changes point to the rise of more Blacks into the middle class where they are following migration patterns more consistent with those of the White majority. However, there is also a strong element of return migration among less well-off Blacks relocating nearer the

Table 3. 1990 population and 1980-90 percentage change of total population, non-Hispanic Whites, all minorities, Blacks, Hispanics and Asians by region and metropolitan categories

Region and metropolitan category	Total population		Non-Hispanic whites		All minorities		Blacks		Hispanics		Asians	
	1990 Population ^b	1980-90 Percentage change	1990 Population	1980-90 Percentage change	1990 Population	1980-90 Percentage change	1990 Population	1980-90 Percentage change	1990 Population	1980-90 Percentage change	1990 Population	1980-90 Percentage change
<i>North</i>												
Large MAs	62 897	+2.8	47 184	-2.1	15 712	+21.2	9 590	+10.3	4 634	+40.1	1 721	+123.5
Other MAs	25 524	+3.5	23 107	+1.5	2 416	+28.2	1 473	+15.6	586	+56.3	281	+127.1
Non-MAs	22 581	-0.2	21 679	-1.0	901	+26.4	339	+21.8	272	+33.5	108	+85.2
<i>South</i>												
Large MAs	28 168	+22.3	18 210	+13.8	9 957	+41.5	5 673	+24.0	3 617	+70.4	697	+159.3
Other MAs	31 895	+13.4	23 553	+10.9	8 342	+21.3	5 646	+12.3	2 217	+41.1	325	+120.9
Non-MAs	24 857	+4.6	19 165	+4.1	5 692	+6.3	4 434	+1.2	919	+19.1	91	+81.5
<i>West</i>												
Large MAs	33 843	+24.2	21 350	+10.1	12 493	+59.0	2 376	+21.9	7 191	+67.8	2 899	+123.0
Other MAs	10 828	+22.9	7 491	+14.9	3 336	+45.9	368	+42.3	1 970	+53.6	904	+49.0
Non-MAs	8 114	+13.9	6 384	+10.1	1 729	+32.4	83	+56.8	944	+37.7	243	+40.4
Total	248 709	+9.8	188 128	+4.4	60 581	+30.9	29 986	+13.2	22 354	+53.0	7 273	+107.8
<i>Met classes</i>												
Large MAs	124 908	+12.1	86 745	+3.8	38 163	+37.0	17 640	+15.9	15 443	+58.9	5 318	+127.3
Other MAs	68 247	+10.8	54 152	+7.1	14 095	+27.6	7 487	+14.1	4 774	+47.8	1 511	+72.1
Non-MAs	55 553	+3.8	47 230	+2.4	8 322	+12.8	4 857	+3.1	2 136	+28.5	443	+57.0
Total	248 709	+9.8	188 128	+4.4	60 581	+30.9	29 986	+13.2	22 354	+53.0	7 273	+107.8
<i>Regions</i>												
North	111 002	+2.4	91 971	-1.0	19 030	+22.2	11 403	+11.3	5 493	+41.3	2 111	+121.6
South	84 921	+13.3	60 929	+9.5	23 991	+24.5	15 754	+12.6	6 754	+51.2	1 114	+138.8
West	52 786	+22.2	35 228	+11.0	17 559	+53.4	2 828	+25.0	10 106	+61.6	4 047	+94.5
Total	248 709	+9.8	188 128	+4.4	60 581	+30.9	29 986	+13.2	22 354	+53.0	7 273	+107.8

^a Metropolitan areas are CMSAs, MSAs and (in New England) NECMAs, defined according to constant boundaries determined by OMB as of 30 June 1990. Large metropolitan areas have 1990 populations exceeding 1 million.

^b in 1000s.

Source: Compiled at University of Michigan Population Studies Center, from 1980 and 1990 US Censuses.

Table 4. Metropolitan areas with greatest 1980–90 increases: total population, non-Hispanic Whites, minorities

Metropolitan area	Increase (1000s)
<i>I. Areas with greatest total increase</i>	
Los Angeles CMSA	+ 3034
Dallas–Fort Worth CMSA	+ 955
San Francisco CMSA	+ 885
Atlanta MSA	+ 695
Washington DC MSA	+ 673
<i>II. Areas with greatest White increase</i>	
Dallas–Fort Worth CMSA	+ 487
Atlanta MSA	+ 414
Phoenix MSA	+ 412
Tampa–St Petersburg MSA	+ 345
Seattle CMSA	+ 324
<i>III. Areas with greatest minority increase</i>	
Los Angeles CMSA	+ 2795
New York CMSA	+ 1398 ^a
San Francisco CMSA	+ 787
Miami CMSA	+ 635 ^a
Houston CMSA	+ 484

^a Area experienced gain in minority population and loss in White population

South (Cromartie and Stack, 1989; Johnson and Roseman, 1990).

Notwithstanding these differences among Blacks, Hispanics and Asians, the three minorities, as a group, differ sharply in distribution from the majority White population across regions and metropolitan area categories (see Figures 5 and 6). Nearly half of the White population is located in the North, and over half is located outside the nation's largest metropolitan areas. Less than a third of the minority population is located in the North, and almost two-thirds are located in large metropolitan areas. These majority–minority differences widened during the 1980s.

The disparities increased because the White population grew more slowly than the minority population and showed fewer disparities across geographical categories. A modest shift of Whites took place from the North to the Sunbelt during the 1980s, in response to the employment dislocations associated with various boom and bust areas discussed earlier. There were also sharply-

directed flows of elderly Whites to selected retirement communities. Thus, growth gains for US Whites were more modest and more evenly distributed across the South and West than minority gains.

Disparities across Metropolitan Areas

Across individual metropolitan areas, the minority and majority growth patterns observed across regions and metropolitan categories are even more accentuated. This becomes apparent when one compares those areas with the greatest absolute increases in the White majority population over the 1980s with those showing the greatest increases in minorities (see Table 4). The former areas, representing strong economic magnets of the 1980s, are attracting Whites in search of employment opportunities. The latter areas are in the nation's largest 'port-of-entry' metropolitan areas for immigrants and areas with very strong concentrations of minorities. Two other items are worth noting: among the five metropolitan areas on each list there is no overlap; and all five of the top




Figure 5. Distribution of Whites, Blacks, Hispanics and Asians across metropolitan areas.

minority gainers show greater increases than the top White gainer. The distinctive minority and majority metropolitan-area growth patterns for the 1980s can be characterised as follows.

Whites' moderate gains and declines. As the White population was not infused by a large immigration from abroad, internal migration yielded gains for some metropolitan areas and losses for others. The White population in five metropolitan areas grew by more than 300 000 (shown in Table 4), and by 100 000 or more in an additional 21 areas. Among these, 26 large gainers are retirement and recreation centres (six Florida cities, Phoenix and Las Vegas), large regional centres (Dallas-Ft Worth, Seattle, Minneapolis-St Paul, Denver), Washington DC and other

South Atlantic cities (Charlotte, Norfolk, Raleigh-Durham, Baltimore). Some of the latter, as well as Austin (Texas) are 'high-tech' magnets.

It is worth noting that only three of the 26 large White gainers are California metropolitan areas (San Diego, Los Angeles, Sacramento) and only four gained more minorities than majorities (Washington DC, San Diego, Los Angeles, Houston). Many areas with high White gains have very small minority concentrations (Minneapolis-St Paul, Salt Lake City, Portland (Oregon)) and only one of the large White gainers (Minneapolis-St Paul) is in the North.

Out of the 89 metropolitan areas that lost majority Whites, five lost more than 100 000 and 31 lost more than 10 000. New York lost the most (- 856 000), followed by Chicago (- 190 000), Pittsburgh (- 182 000), Detroit




Figure 6. Distribution of Whites, Blacks, Hispanics and Asians across regions.

(-173 000) and Cleveland (-107 000). Other large metropolitan areas (Miami, Milwaukee and Boston) also lost White population. Of the smaller areas where the White population declined, the majority were located in the 'rustbelt' or 'oilpatch' regions, midwest farming areas, and western mining areas. Nevertheless, 32 of the 89 metropolitan areas that lost majority Whites gained in total population. The most striking example is New York, where a gain of 1.4 million minorities more than offset its White losses.

To a large extent, patterns of White metropolitan growth and decline are consistent with the snowbelt-sunbelt, interior-coastal patterns for the total population discussed earlier. The White population, more than the minority population does,

responds to economic pushes and pulls across labour markets.

Minorities' concentrated gains. Minority populations grew in all but eight of the nation's metropolitan areas over the 1980s, but the bulk of this growth took place in a handful of areas.

Twenty per cent of the nation's 1980s population growth—representing a 2.8 million minority gain—took place in the Los Angeles metropolitan area, the home of 12 per cent of the nation's total minority population. The five top gainers (shown in Table 4), in fact, accounted for 43 per cent of national minority growth. Four other metropolitan areas—Dallas-Ft Worth, Washington DC, San Diego and Chicago—each increased their




Figure 7. Percentage of minority population: 1990 metropolitan areas. (Includes Hispanics and non-Hispanic races other than White).

Table 5. Average annual percentage change, central cities and suburbs, for US and regions, 1960–90

<i>Region</i>			
Central city			
Suburb ^a	1960–70	1970–80	1980–90
<i>Total US</i>			
Central city	+ 0.78	+ 0.09	+ 0.64
Suburb	+ 2.33	+ 1.73	+ 1.42
<i>North</i>			
Central city	+ 0.03	– 0.98	– 0.10
Suburb	+ 2.07	+ 0.87	+ 0.54
<i>South</i>			
Central city	+ 1.57	+ 0.91	+ 0.77
Suburb	+ 2.39	+ 2.87	+ 2.21
<i>West</i>			
Central city	+ 1.84	+ 1.53	+ 1.95
Suburb	+ 3.00	+ 2.44	+ 2.27

^a Central cities and suburbs (remainder of metropolitan territory) as defined by OMB, 30 June 1990.

Source: US Decennial Censuses reported by Forstall (1991).

minority populations by more than 300 000 during the 1980s. Excepting San Diego, eight of these nine are among the areas that contain the highest minority total populations in 1990. These nine together accounted for 43 per cent of the nation's total population and for 54 per cent of the nation's 1980s population growth. All served as port-of-entry areas for new immigrants or were traditionally Black areas. In all but one (Dallas–Ft Worth), minorities constituted over half of the overall population gain in the 1980s; and in each, minorities accounted for well above the national average proportion of total 1990 populations.

Nevertheless, a second echelon of 11 areas gained between 100 000 and 300 000 minorities in the 1980s. Several of these (Atlanta, Phoenix, Sacramento, Seattle, Orlando and Tampa–St Petersburg) have smaller minority populations than the nine largest gainers, with the better part of their total gain coming from non-minority Whites.

In spite of the widening distribution of the minority population over the 1980s, minority growth is mainly still concentrated

in those areas inhabited by large numbers of minorities over a decade ago. The effect of minority growth being so concentrated is that minority composition varies widely across US areas. Ten metropolitan areas are occupied by 'minority-majorities' (the 'minority' population is greater than one-half). Among these are five small and moderate-sized metropolitan areas near the Mexican border, in addition to Honolulu, Las Cruces, San Antonio, Miami and Los Angeles. Another 69 metropolitan areas with minority shares of over one-quarter are largely in the Southeast, Southwest and Pacific Coast states, together with a few large metropolitan areas on the northern and eastern seaboard.

In the vast majority (201) of the nation's metropolitan areas, however, less than 25 per cent populations belong to minorities (see Figure 7). In 97 of these, the minority share is below 10 per cent. These majority-dominated metropolitan areas are located mainly in the Northeast—west of the eastern seaboard, in the midwest, and in the upper northern-most mountain and Pacific states.

Blacks, Hispanics and Asians. Each of the three largest minority groups has spread to practically all metropolitan areas, but all still tend to remain concentrated in only a few areas. Although recent migration patterns have directed Blacks away from traditional northern metropolitan destinations, New York, Chicago, Philadelphia and Detroit still have the six highest concentrations of Blacks among metropolitan areas. Almost a quarter of the nation's Black population still resides in these traditionally Black areas, and 43 per cent of the Black population still lives in the 12 metropolitan areas with more than half a million Blacks.

The Black growth rates in these 12 areas suggest a distinct shift towards the Sunbelt. Chicago's Black population actually declined over the 1980s, and Black growth in Philadelphia and Detroit was significantly less than the national growth average for Blacks (13.2 per cent). At the same time, Miami, Atlanta and Dallas proved to be exceptionally appealing to Blacks. Additional fast-growing areas include the Southern areas: Orlando, Raleigh-Durham, and Tampa-St Petersburg; Western areas: Sacramento, San Diego, Seattle; and Northern areas: Boston and Milwaukee. The latter areas represent 'second-tier' Northern destinations for Blacks relocating away from Chicago, Detroit or New York.

Both Hispanics and Asians, in contrast with Blacks, are much more heavily concentrated in large metropolitan areas. The nine most heavily Hispanic metropolitan areas house 58 per cent of the nation's Hispanic population (Los Angeles alone contains 21 per cent). The four areas with over half a million Asians house slightly over half of the US Asian population. Furthermore, the port-of-entry status of Los Angeles, Miami, Houston and Dallas (for Hispanics) and Los Angeles, San Francisco and New York (for Asians) ensures that minority growth and concentration in them will continue to be high.

However, the spread of these groups is shown by the fact that 29 metropolitan areas had more than 100 000 Hispanics in 1990

(up from 22 in 1980), with high levels of growth displayed in areas like Washington DC, Boston, Phoenix, Orlando and Tampa-St Petersburg. The number of areas with Asian populations of greater than 100 000 had risen to 12 by 1990 (up from five in 1980). High Asian growth rates are characterised in the majority of the nation's metropolitan areas (from small population bases). Thus, these populations have both spread and remained concentrated. Areas with the most Hispanics tend to be in the West and in Texas. Only two metropolitan areas have Asian populations higher than 10 per cent—Honolulu (62.9 per cent) and San Francisco (14.8 per cent).

The minority population explosion—both native and immigrant—is contributing to a much more diverse national population. However, the trends for regions and metropolitan areas show that sharp disparities have emerged. Some parts of the country such as smaller communities in the North and Midwest are becoming increasingly 'whiter' and older than the overall population. Growing multicultural port-of-entry metropolitan areas, on the other hand, are becoming demographically very different. If current trends go on, the majority-minority polarisation across regions, areas and communities will intensify. Moreover, intra-metropolitan concerns regarding residential segregation, multi-lingual education, and political representation will be heightened in those parts of the country that have served as magnets for minorities.

Within the Metropolitan Area

Over the past 20 years, the demographic dynamics between central cities and their suburbs have been altered. In the same way that the 1970s represented a transition decade for the nation's regional and metropolitan population shifts, a transition in the central city-suburb redistribution dynamic also occurred within metropolitan areas (Frey and Spear, 1988). The slowdown in metropolitan-wide growth produced lower rates of suburbanisation than in the 1950s and 1960s

(see Table 5), and the central cities of these areas bore the brunt of the metropolitan-wide decline. During that decade, several central cities—St Louis, Buffalo, Cleveland and Detroit—lost more than one-fifth of their populations. These patterns have had mixed effects on central cities. As Black suburbanisation began in earnest and as pockets of white gentrification evolved in some of the more cosmopolitan cities, the strong racial and social-status selectivity, that had typified the massive immediate post-war suburbanisation, began to dissipate slightly. Consequently, the pattern of 'Black city—White suburb' showed some signs of weakening, though not sufficiently to prevent the emergence of pockets of ghetto poverty.

Although the last decade has brought a continuing slowdown in the rate of overall suburban growth, the majority of the nation's metropolitan population (63 per cent) already resides in the suburbs where some of the fastest-growing individual communities are located. This raises the question of the future role of historic central cities, especially those located in larger metropolitan areas. Recent patterns indicate that some will become specialised, gentrified 'nodes' within larger multi-centred metropolitan areas. Nevertheless, many central cities will become racially diversified as growing concentrations of the new immigrant and minority groups begin to inhabit them.

City-Suburb Distinctions

The declines and growth slow-downs many large cities sustained during the 1970s were attenuated by the 1980s rises in metropolitan growth. Table 6, which shows trends for the dominant central cities and suburbs of the nation's 25 largest metropolitan areas, makes this clear. Four of the 18 central cities that lost population during the 1970s (New York, Boston, San Francisco-Oakland and Seattle) made gains in the 1980s, and all but one (Denver) of the other 14 displayed reduced losses. At the same time, four of the growing 1970s central cities (Houston, Miami, Tampa-St Petersburg, Phoenix) showed di-

minished gains in the 1980s. All of these are located in Sunbelt areas that sustained reduced metropolitan-wide 1980s growth.

There are two main reasons why the larger central cities have recovered from their 1970s losses. One involves the economic functions some of these cities serve, which fit with secular patterns of corporate growth and associated advanced service industries during the 1980s. Cities that function as headquarters for corporations and related FIRE (finance, insurance and real estate) industries tended to gain in employment and population for much of the decade. An example of this is New York, where the many employment opportunities caused the metropolitan area's population growth to become strongly concentrated there (particularly within Manhattan). At the same time, cities located within metropolitan areas where such industries are less prominent, or less centralised, did not rebound as well. (Detroit is a good example of this.)

A second ongoing source of growth in large cities is the accelerated immigration to prominent ports-of-entry. US minorities immigrating to the US are more likely to locate in the central city than the rest of the population. Consequently, large immigrant streams to areas like Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco and Miami augmented the growth of central cities as well as their diversity.

The Urban Concentration of Minorities

During the 1950s and 1960s, the 'Black city—White Suburbs' image of many metropolitan areas resulted from substantial 'White flight' of the period, as well as the ongoing Black migration to largely city-only destinations. Current city-suburb racial patterns are far more diverse than during those decades for two reasons.

First, the rising inflow of new immigrant populations, especially Hispanic and Asians, has significantly increased racial and ethnic diversity in many of the largest central cities and their suburbs. As previously stated, these groups tend to congregate in certain metropolitan areas and are more likely to

reside in the central cities of those areas than are the majority Whites.

Second, a small but detectable Black suburbanisation movement began in the 1970s. This was facilitated by better economic circumstances for Blacks and a significant reduction in the levels of racial discrimination in the housing market prompted by the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. This slight suburbanisation has not been enough to erase decades of racial residential separation, and high levels of community and neighbourhood segregation still exist between Blacks and Whites. Nevertheless, the pattern of Black suburbanisation has taken root, to a greater degree in some areas than in others (Frey, 1992b).

Table 7 illustrates the city-suburb dynamic of majority-minority shifts within the nation's largest metropolitan areas. These data show clearly that 'White flight' was alive and well in the 1980s. All but three of these central cities lost majority Whites during the decade, though the losses were greatest in northern and selected southern cities. Detroit's 47 per cent loss of Whites led that of all other cities by a wide margin.

These data also reveal that minority populations were mainly responsible for the stronger central city showings in the 1980s. All but five central cities of these large metropolitan areas gained minorities during the 1980s. Substantial minority gains in Los Angeles, San Francisco, New York, Boston, Dallas-Ft Worth, Houston and Seattle significantly altered these cities' demographic growth patterns. However, it is also worth noting that the rates of minority growth in the suburbs are considerably higher than those in the cities. Although these higher suburban growth rates represent smaller aggregate numbers (due to the often tiny suburban minority population bases), they reveal a continued suburbanisation of minorities in large metropolitan areas.

These selective majority and minority population changes have had the overall effect of perpetuating the difference between the central cities' minority make-up and that of the

remainder of the metropolitan area (see panel 1 in Table 7). Minority populations are generally much larger in central cities than in their surrounding suburbs. This is less clear-cut in western metropolises containing more sprawling, over-bounded central cities, but it is quite distinct in most northern and southern metropolitan areas. Eleven of these metropolitan central cities are composed of 'majority-minorities'—led by Miami (88 per cent), Detroit (80 per cent) and Atlanta (73 per cent). None of the surrounding suburbs has a minority proportion that high, though the multi-ethnic suburban areas surrounding Miami and Los Angeles are approaching 'majority-minority' status.

Have the redistribution patterns of the 1980s distinguished central cities from their suburbs even more? The data in the last panel of Table 7 reveal mixed patterns across metropolitan areas. Racial disparities between their cities and suburbs increased in all large northern metropolitan areas, though these increases are mostly modest. The largest increases occurred in Detroit as a result of its continued substantial 'White flight', and in Milwaukee, where new minority gains are heavily concentrated in the city. In the West, the experience of large metropolitan areas is quite different with absolute disparity indices being much lower than those for the North, and the changes over the 1980s are relatively modest.

Most interesting are the decade shifts among large Southern metropolitan areas. Four of these areas show modest increases in disparity, the results of both White suburban flight and minority city gains. Washington DC, Atlanta and Miami, however, are three notable exceptions. These areas showed some of the highest disparities in 1980 and sharp declines since then. Washington DC's decline resulted from its continued attraction of middle-class Whites to already-gentrified sections. The city's minority population simultaneously decreased, largely through Black suburbanisation into neighbouring Prince George County, but also through dispersed relocation of all minorities to different parts of the metropolitan area. In losing minorities and gaining central city Whites,

Table 6. Percentage change in Primary central city(s) and surrounding areas of the 25 largest metropolitan areas in North, South and West regions, 1960-90

Region and Metropolitan area ^a	Age of area ^b	1990 size (1000s)		Primary central city percentage 10-yr change		Surrounding area percentage 10-yr change			
		Metropolitan area	Primary central city(s)	1960-70	1970-80	1980-90	1960-70	1970-80	1980-90
<i>North</i>									
New York CMSA	1800	18087	7323	1.5	-10.4	3.5	21.3	1.7	2.8
Chicago CMSA	1860	8066	2784	-5.1	-10.8	-7.4	30.3	11.8	7.1
Philadelphia CMSA	1810	5899	1586	-2.6	-13.4	-6.1	21.5	5.1	8.0
Detroit CMSA	1870	4665	1028	-9.3	-20.5	-14.6	28.2	8.4	2.5
Boston CMSA	1830	4172	574	-8.0	-12.2	2.0	17.8	3.4	5.5
Cleveland CMSA	1870	2760	506	-14.3	-23.6	-11.9	21.1	0.5	-0.3
Minneapolis-St Paul MSA	1890	2464	641	-6.5	-13.8	-0.1	51.8	20.8	21.9
St Louis MSA	1850	2444	397	-17.1	-27.2	-12.4	28.1	6.5	6.4
Pittsburgh CMSA	1870	2243	370	-13.9	-18.5	-12.8	3.3	-1.8	-6.3
Cincinnati CMSA	1850	1744	364	-9.7	-15.1	-5.5	20.2	10.0	8.3
Milwaukee CMSA	1870	1607	628	-3.2	-11.3	-1.3	26.2	8.9	4.8
Kansas City MSA	1880	1566	435	6.5	-11.6	-2.9	19.3	13.8	14.8
<i>South</i>									
Washington MSA	1860	3924	607	-0.9	-15.7	-4.9	57.5	14.4	27.0
Dallas-Fort Worth CMSA	1910	3885	1454	19.5	4.2	12.8	63.9	47.3	48.2
Houston CMSA	1910	3711	1631	31.6	29.3	2.2	47.8	61.1	38.1
Miami CMSA	1930	3193	359	14.7	3.5	3.4	58.9	47.9	23.4
Atlanta MSA	1890	2834	394	1.6	-14.1	-7.3	56.3	44.1	42.4
Baltimore MSA	1820	2382	736	-3.5	-13.2	-6.4	34.3	19.4	16.5
Tampa-St Petersburg MSA	1920	2086	519	8.3	3.3	1.7	67.8	80.4	40.4
<i>West</i>									
Los Angeles CMSA	1890	14532	3485	13.6	5.4	17.4	35.9	19.0	29.5
San Francisco-Oakland CMSA	1860	6253	1096	-2.8	-5.4	7.6	40.6	18.3	18.6
Seattle CMSA	1900	2559	516	-4.7	-7.0	4.5	49.8	22.4	27.7
San Diego MSA	1920	2498	1111	21.6	25.6	26.8	43.7	49.2	40.7
Phoenix MSA	1940	983	330	33.0	35.2	24.5	72.5	85.8	58.3
Denver CMSA	1890	1848	468	4.2	-4.3	-5.1	64.3	55.6	22.6

^a Metropolitan areas are CMSAs and MSAs, defined by OMB as of 30 June 1990, with 1990 populations exceeding 1.5 million. Primary central city(s) consist of the one or two historically-dominant cities of the area, and the surrounding area consists of the remainder of the metropolitan area. Abbreviated CMSA or MSA name (according to primary central city(s)).

^b Census year when metropolitan area's primary central city first achieved a population of 50 000.

Source: Compiled at University of Michigan Population Studies Center, from decennial Census data.

Washington DC is unique among all large central cities.

The majority-minority shifts just described camouflage slightly different patterns among different racial and ethnic groups. The patterns for the individual groups—Hispanics, Blacks and Asians—are summarised for metropolitan areas with populations over 1 million in Table 8. For the most part, they show Blacks to be much more concentrated in central cities than Hispanics and Asians, and Asians to be the least concentrated of the three groups. City-suburb separation by race and ethnicity is clearly much lower in the West than in the North and South. As Blacks dominate northern metropolitan minority populations, overall majority-minority disparities are highest in northern metropolitan areas and have widened the most since 1980. City-suburb majority-minority disparities are smallest in western metropolitan areas and have increased little over the 1980s. This is worth noting because western metropolitan areas have grown the most as a result of recent Latin American and Asian immigration.

While city-suburb racial disparities deserve attention, it is also significant that all three major minorities—Blacks, Hispanics and Asians—are suburbanising in all regions of the country. Different mixes of minorities and different historical growth patterns have caused minority residential changes across communities and neighbourhoods within the suburbs to take different forms in different regions. For example, some West and Southwest metropolitan areas, with multi-racial mixes, show lower levels of neighbourhood segregation as a result of new dynamic transition patterns and 'majority-minority' suburban cities. On the other hand, a few old northern areas continue to display 1950s style Black city concentration and White suburban flight (a good example is Detroit).

These different scenarios suggest that new contexts for significant racial change will develop within the suburbs of the nation's sprawling metropolises. How these patterns get played out will have a long-term effect on the economic, social and political devel-

opment of communities that are now just evolving.

City Poverty

Since the 1970s, there has been a widespread elimination of central-city manufacturing employment opportunities that used to serve 'social upgrading' functions for recent immigrant and minority city residents. This has led to increased 'mismatches' between the skill levels and employment opportunities available to inner-city minorities, and increases in the levels of joblessness and poverty. According to some, this separation of employment opportunities is compounded by a selective out-migration of city minorities—leading to a spatial separation of middle- and working-class minorities from more poverty-prone minorities, left behind in the city. (Kasarda, 1988). Others argue that racial discrimination in housing exacerbates inner city minority poverty (Massey and Denton, 1993).

Although these circumstances represent important concerns for a growing number of individuals that reside in 'pockets of poverty' within large metropolitan areas, there are two misconceptions that are often held pertaining to city poverty. One of these is that most of the poverty population in the US resides within the central cities of large metropolitan areas. The second is that a substantial proportion of central-city residents are minority populations that are living in poverty. Neither of these suppositions is valid.

A study of 1980 poverty distributions indicates that fewer than 30 per cent of the nation's poverty population resides in the largest central cities (Bane and Jargowsky, 1988). This is the case for less than 20 per cent of the nation's non-Hispanic white US poor, although almost half of the nation's Black and Hispanic poor live in large cities. The remainder of the poverty population resides either in the suburbs of these large metropolitan areas, in smaller metropolitan areas, and in rural or non-metropolitan America.

The composition of the largest central

Table 7. 1990 percentage minorities, and 1980-90 percentage change for non-Hispanic Whites and minorities in primary central city(s) and surrounding suburbs of the 25 largest metropolitan areas in North, South and West regions

Region and Metropolitan area ^a	1990 Percentage minorities						Percentage change non-Hispanic whites			Percentage change minorities			City-Suburb disparity index ^b	
	Central city	Suburbs	Difference	Central city	Suburbs	Difference	City	Suburbs	Difference	1990	1980	Difference		
							city							
<i>North</i>														
New York CMSA	56.8	23.4	-33.4	-13.8	-4.1	+9.7	+22.2	+34.7	+12.5	33	30	+3		
Chicago CMSA	62.1	18.2	-43.9	-18.7	+1.2	+19.9	+1.3	+44.8	+43.5	44	43	+1		
Philadelphia CMSA	47.9	15.8	-32.1	-14.3	+4.7	+19.0	+4.8	+30.2	+25.4	32	30	+2		
Detroit CMSA	79.4	9.2	-70.2	-47.2	+0.5	+47.7	+1.8	+27.2	+25.4	70	59	+11		
Boston CMSA*	41.0	8.8	-32.2	-11.4	+0.1	+11.5	+30.2	+114.1	+83.9	32	28	+4		
Cleveland CMSA	52.2	11.6	-40.6	-19.4	-2.4	+17.0	-3.6	+19.8	+23.4	41	38	+3		
Minneapolis-St. Paul MSA	21.3	4.3	-17.0	-10.1	+19.8	+29.9	+69.8	+101.9	+32.1	17	10	+7		
St Louis MSA	49.9	13.6	-36.3	-16.9	+4.6	+21.5	-7.5	+19.3	+26.8	36	35	+1		
Pittsburgh CMSA	28.4	5.6	-22.8	-15.9	-7.0	+8.9	-3.6	+5.8	+9.4	23	21	+2		
Cincinnati CMSA	39.9	6.2	-33.7	-12.3	+7.4	+19.7	+6.8	+23.2	+16.4	34	30	+4		
Milwaukee CMSA	39.2	5.5	-33.7	-15.8	+3.5	+19.4	+34.9	+33.1	-1.8	34	24	+10		
Kansas City MSA	35.0	10.3	-24.7	-7.4	+13.0	+20.4	+6.6	+33.8	+27.2	25	23	+2		
<i>South</i>														
Washington DC MSA	72.6	30.9	-41.7	+1.2	+13.6	+12.4	-7.0	+72.1	+79.8	42	52	-10		
Dallas-Fort Worth CMSA	49.6	18.7	-30.9	-3.5	+35.1	+38.6	+36.1	+154.5	+118.4	31	30	+1		
Houston CMSA	59.4	28.6	-30.8	-20.6	+25.1	+45.7	+27.2	+87.0	+59.8	31	27	+4		
Miami CMSA	87.8	47.7	-40.1	-34.9	-4.1	+30.8	+12.6	+79.9	+67.3	40	48	-8		
Atlanta MSA	69.7	23.4	-46.3	-11.9	+29.9	+41.8	-5.1	+107.9	+113.0	46	52	-6		
Baltimore MSA	61.4	14.5	-46.9	-16.8	+12.7	+29.5	+1.5	+45.8	+44.3	47	45	+2		
Tampa-St Petersburg MSA	33.1	11.4	-21.7	-4.1	+35.5	+39.6	+15.6	+95.0	+79.4	22	21	+1		
<i>West</i>														
Los Angeles CMSA	62.7	46.3	-16.4	-8.4	+6.5	+14.9	+41.3	+72.9	+31.6	16	17	-1		
San Francisco-Oakland CMSA	59.7	34.3	-25.4	-6.5	+4.0	+10.5	+20.0	+62.1	+42.1	25	28	-3		
Seattle CMSA	26.3	12.3	-14.0	-1.7	+22.7	+24.4	+27.2	+81.3	+54.1	14	13	+1		
San Diego MSA	41.3	29.3	-12.0	+8.3	+27.0	+18.7	+67.7	+90.0	+22.3	12	10	+2		
Phoenix MSA	28.2	18.2	-10.0	+14.5	+53.2	+38.7	+60.3	+86.3	+26.0	10	6	+4		
Denver CMSA	38.6	14.0	-24.6	-12.1	+18.3	+30.4	+8.8	+58.3	+49.5	25	23	+2		

^a Metropolitan areas are CMSAs and MSAs, defined by OMB as 30 June 1990, with 1990 populations exceeding 1.5 million (*NECMA counterparts are used for Boston CMSA). Primary central city(s) consist of the one or two historically-dominant cities of the area, and the surrounding area consists of the remainder of the metropolitan area. Abbreviated CMSA or MSA name (according to primary central city(s)).

^b Equals central city percentage minority minus suburb percent minority.

Source: Compiled at University of Michigan Population Studies Center from the 1980 and 1990 US Censuses.

Table 8. 1990 population and 1980-90 change statistics for racial and ethnic groups in primary central city(s) and surrounding suburbs of metropolitan areas with 1990 populations exceeding one million

Race/Ethnic Group and region	1990 Population		Group percentage of total population				1980-90 Percentage change			City-Suburb disparity index	
	Central city ^a	Suburb	Central city	Suburb	Difference	Central city	Suburb	Difference	1990	1980	Difference
<i>Total population</i>											
North	18 858	44 038	100.0	100.0	--	-2.0	+5.1	+7.1	--	--	--
South	7 954	20 214	100.0	100.0	--	+4.1	+31.3	+27.2	--	--	--
West	8 626	25 218	100.0	100.0	--	+15.9	+27.3	+11.4	--	--	--
Total	35 438	89 470	100.0	100.0	--	+3.2	+16.0	+12.8	--	--	--
<i>Non-Hispanic Whites</i>											
North	9 194	37 989	48.8	86.3	+37.5	-14.1	+1.3	+15.4	38	34	+4
South	3 365	14 846	42.3	73.4	+31.1	-7.6	+20.1	+27.7	31	32	-1
West	4 459	16 891	51.7	67.0	+15.3	+0.2	+13.0	+12.8	15	15	0
Total	17 018	69 726	48.0	77.9	+29.9	-9.4	+7.6	+17.0	30	29	+1
<i>All minorities</i>											
North	9 964	6 048	51.2	13.7	-37.5	+13.1	+36.9	+23.8	38	34	+4
South	4 589	5 368	57.7	26.6	-31.1	+15.6	+77.0	+62.4	31	32	-1
West	4 167	8 326	48.3	33.0	-15.3	+39.3	+71.2	+31.9	15	15	0
Total	18 420	19 742	52.0	22.1	-29.9	+18.5	+60.3	+41.8	30	29	+1
<i>Blacks</i>											
North	6 352	3 238	33.7	7.4	-26.3	+5.8	+20.5	+14.7	26	25	+1
South	2 814	2 859	35.4	14.2	-21.2	+2.5	+56.1	+53.6	21	24	-3
West	1 090	1 286	12.6	5.1	-7.5	+4.9	+41.3	+36.4	7	9	-2
Total	10 256	7 383	28.9	8.3	-20.6	+4.8	+36.0	+31.2	21	22	-1
<i>Hispanics</i>											
North	2 739	1 895	14.5	4.3	-10.2	+29.8	+58.1	+28.3	10	8	+2
South	1 633	1 984	20.5	9.8	-10.7	+40.5	+106.6	+66.1	11	9	+2
West	2 185	5 006	25.3	19.9	-5.4	+62.7	+70.2	+7.5	5	3	+2
Total	6 557	8 885	18.5	9.9	-8.6	+42.1	+74.2	+32.1	9	7	+2
<i>Asians</i>											
North	811	910	4.3	2.1	-2.2	+114.5	+132.1	+17.6	2	1	+1
South	167	529	2.1	2.6	+0.5	+98.5	+187.1	+88.6	1	1	0
West	913	1 987	10.6	7.9	-2.7	+77.0	+153.3	+76.3	3	3	0
Total	1 891	3 426	5.3	3.8	-1.5	+93.4	+151.7	+58.3	1	1	0

^a Primary central city(s) consist of the one or two historically-dominant cities of the area, and the suburbs consist of the remainder of the metropolitan area.

Source: Compiled at University of Michigan Population Studies Center from the 1980 and 1990 Censuses.

cities is certainly not dominated by Black poverty populations, according to 1988 statistics. In the central-city populations of the largest metropolitan areas, the Black poverty component represents less than 8 per cent, and the total poverty component represents less than 20 per cent. Moreover, within these central cities, the number of non-Black poverty households exceeds the number of Black poverty households. Approximately two-thirds of the Black households residing in these central cities, are not classed as poverty households. What is true is that the vast majority of Black poverty households in metropolitan areas are residing in the central city, rather than in the suburbs; while non-Black poverty households are more evenly distributed across the metropolitan area.

Certainly, the plight of the growing 'underclass' minority populations is not to be dismissed. The social and economic isolation that has befallen the inhabitants of concentrated poverty neighbourhoods is leading to severe economic consequences for these households and their children. The problems are amplified in individual metropolitan areas which house large percentages of minority and immigrant groups. Yet the residents of these concentrated poverty neighbourhoods comprise a relatively small share of all city poverty households. Bane and Jargowsky (1988) estimate that about 9 per cent of poor Whites and 35 per cent of poor Blacks live in such concentrated poverty neighbourhoods. Moreover, the majority of the nation's concentrated poverty households reside in just 10 of the nation's largest central cities.

Baby-boom Suburbanisation

One hope for city revitalisation that was held by many urban analysts in the 1970s, was the presumption that the large baby-boom cohorts—then ascending into their household-formation ages—would show an increasing preference for cities as residential locations. This hope was based on two premises. First, that baby-boom cohorts, like most earlier cohorts, would tend to prefer a central-city residence, at least at the early

stage of the life-course. Central cities have traditionally been seen as 'staging areas' for young adults before marriage and the child-bearing ages. Secondly, it was anticipated that the baby-boom cohorts—more so than earlier cohorts—would be likely to stay in the city beyond the early adult years. This expectation rests on the observation that these cohorts delayed marriage and child-bearing to a greater extent than did older generations. It was also thought that the cultural amenities and professional and service employment opportunities, located in central cities, would appeal to more affluent baby-boomers as they aged into their 30s and 40s.

The evidence of the 1970s suggests that boomer-initiated 'gentrification' was less pervasive than first anticipated (Nelson, 1988). Yet the sheer volume of baby-boomers who grew up in, or were attracted to, central cities served to stave off even greater declines than were already observed in the larger industrial cities (Frey and Speare, 1988). As the 1980s came to an end, the majority of baby-boom cohort members had already reached their 30s and early 40s.

What can now be stated about the city-suburb locations of adult baby-boomers as they reach the more residentially-stable portions of their life-course? Data from the late 1980s show that the city-suburb location of adult baby-boomers does not differ from the city-suburb distribution of older adult households, within the nation's largest metropolitan areas (data compiled from the March 1988 Current Population Survey of the Bureau of the US Census). These data also show that it is the more affluent baby-boomer households (those in the upper 30 income percentile) that are primarily responsible for the greater suburban relocation of all baby-boomers. Non-affluent baby-boomers in these large metropolitan areas are fairly equally distributed between the central cities and the suburbs, while the well-off boomers are more than twice as likely to locate in the suburbs than the city. This tendency is particularly evident among the older of the baby-boom generations (Frey, 1992c).

So, the hope that large numbers of

'yuppie' baby-boomers might serve to reinvigorate the nation's largest central cities seems to have been misplaced. Certainly there are pockets of gentrification within most of the largest central cities. Such pockets are more plentiful within more cosmopolitan urban centres, such as San Francisco or Washington DC. But it appears that the large baby-boom cohorts have followed the patterns of earlier generations in relocating to the suburbs as they have reached their more mature adult ages, and as their incomes have risen.

The Suburban Metropolis

The better part of the nation's urban population now resides in the suburbs. While the city-suburb growth dynamic has diminished in recent decades, redistribution across communities within the suburbs has increased. Both spatial and demographic change contribute to the continued growth of suburbs. Spatial change accompanies the outward spread of population, ultimately resulting in a reclassification of territory from rural to urban. Along with this, many individual suburban communities have experienced extremely high rates of growth. During the 1980s, 17 of the 25 fastest-growing communities (with populations greater than 100 000) were suburban (see Table 9). Suburbs—currently classed as such by federal statistical definitions—are now much more than mere adjunct clusters of bedroom communities. Over the 1970s and 1980s, these areas have developed into the dominant activity space for metropolitan populations and are rapidly becoming primary locations for metropolitan economies.

It is clear that since 1970, employment suburbanisation, which followed residential suburbanisation, has accelerated both in scope and in character. During the 1970s, the balance of metropolitan jobs moved from the central city to the suburbs in many older areas. Also during this decade, the suburbanisation of non-manufacturing jobs in these older areas outpaced that of manufacturing jobs (Frey and Speare, 1988). Many white-

collar office and service-industry jobs heralded the beginning of the 'suburban office boom' (Cervero, 1989).

In the past two decades, suburban employment gains have been associated with a new era of metropolitan economic development in which competition has developed between suburban employment centres and historical central cities. Stanback (1991), in a recent study of selected large metropolitan areas, finds that many communities have undertaken service activities previously concentrated in the central city such as wholesaling and business-related services. Other suburbs, labelled 'suburban magnet' areas, contain high-tech and office complexes, sales centres, divisional offices and, sometimes, headquarters for large corporations. These 'suburban magnet areas' are surrounded by hotels, retail and entertainment complexes located with ready highway access to other parts of the metropolitan area.

Recent studies undertaken in a variety of metropolitan areas show a rise in 'suburb-only' activity spaces as a result of the suburban spread of employment and development since 1970 (Hartshorn and Muller, 1986; Cervero, 1989; Garreau, 1991). The majority of residents in many large metropolitan areas both live and work in the suburbs (Pisarski, 1987; Frey and Speare, 1988). Meanwhile, central-city employers are becoming more dependent than ever on commuters from suburbs to fill positions that require higher education and skills (Stanback, 1991).

The continued suburban expansion of population, the post-1970 spread of employment, and the more recent suburban relocation of many minorities points the way to an increasingly heterogeneous suburban territory becoming the more dominant portion of the metropolitan area. Within this territory, suburban communities show disparate patterns of growth and decline, racial and ethnic transition patterns, land-use mixes, and associated planning and governance issues which argue for a focus on intra-suburban demographic changes over the next 10 years. For expansive suburban communities encom-

Table 9. The 25 fastest-growing places with populations of 100 000 or more by central city–suburb location

Place	1980–90 percentage change	1990 size (1000s)	Central city–Suburb location ^a
1. Mesa, AZ	89	288	Suburb
2. Rancho Cucamonga, CA	84	101	Suburb
3. Plano, TX	78	129	Suburb
4. Irvine, CA	78	110	Suburb
5. Escondido, CA	69	109	Suburb
6. Oceanside, CA	67	128	Suburb
7. Bakersfield, CA	66	175	Central city
8. Arlington, TX	63	262	Suburb
9. Fresno, CA	62	354	Central city
10. Chula Vista, CA	61	135	Suburb
11. Las Vegas, NV	57	258	Central city
12. Modesto, CA	55	165	Central city
13. Tallahassee, FL	53	125	Central city
14. Glendale, AZ	52	148	Suburb
15. Mesquite, TX	51	101	Suburb
16. Ontario, CA	50	133	Suburb
17. Virginia Beach, VA	50	393	Suburb
18. Scottsdale, AZ	47	130	Suburb
19. Santa Ana, CA	44	294	Suburb
20. Pomona, CA	42	132	Suburb
21. Irving, TX	41	155	Suburb
22. Stockton, CA	41	211	Central city
23. Aurora, CO	40	222	Suburb
24. San Bernadino, CA	40	164	Central city
25. Raleigh, NC	38	208	Central city

^a Central cities are dominant central cities of CMSAs

Source: 1990 Decennial Censuses.

passed within the largest metropolitan areas, these changes are especially complex, as illustrated by recent demographic shifts in the suburban portions of greater New York metropolitan region (see Figures 8, 9 and 10).

The New York CMSA (Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area) can be viewed as 12 component PMSAs (Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area) combined, which represent the broader commuting field of the New York metropolitan region (see Appendix for a discussion of CMSA and PMSA definitions). Demographic patterns reveal that the most rapidly growing PMSAs are located on the edge of the metropolitan region. These include the Orange County, New York, NY PMSA, the Danbury, CT PMSA, and the New Jersey PMSAs: Middlesex–Somerset–Hunterdon and Mon-

mouth–Ocean. Figure 9 indicates that the very highest rates of growth took place in the outer counties of these PMSAs—showing an increasing gradient of outer population growth. This growth has been begun to extend into adjacent metropolitan areas.

The spreading of minorities across the more suburban PMSAs of the New York region is also shown here. Of the 19 counties that lie outside the city of New York, 11 showed a pattern of minority gain and non-minority White loss. These counties are located within the inner PMSAs including Jersey City (NJ), Newark (NJ), Bergen–Passaic (NJ), Stamford (CT) and also include two suburban counties (Weschester and Rockland) within the New York PMSA. Both minority and majority populations grew in the remaining suburban counties, where minority growth was always higher.




Figure 8. Component PMSAs of the New York CMSA.

However, more dramatic shifts in the inner-counties led to the outward gradient in minority composition indicated in Figure 10.

Other characteristics of households and housing for the New York region's PMSAs indicate that only the outermost portions of this region conform to earlier stereotypes of suburbia. These outer areas, as of 1990, have high rates of growth, low percentages of minorities and greater than average shares of children, married couples and owned homes. However, the much larger part of New York's regional population, which lies outside the central city, displays a wide range of demographic and housing characteristics.

All major metropolitan areas show similar patterns of suburban growth. In fact, the pace and nature of these changes is even more dramatic in areas where both immigration and internal migration (such as in Los

Angeles or San Francisco) are contributing to increases in minority and majority populations. While this is not the case in many central cities, it is still possible to influence the direction of suburban development in these fast-growing areas. Hence, close attention needs to be paid to the emerging dynamics of demographic change across the nation's suburban territory.

Conclusion

The new urban revival in the US represents a return to urbanisation after the counter-urbanisation phenomenon of the 1970s. However, it is not a return to the traditional urbanisation that characterised the immediate post-World War II decades. The new urbanisation is unique, less for the geographical patterns of growth it will generate than for




Figure 9. Percentage population change, 1980–90, for counties located in the New York CMSA and its component PMSAs.

the pace at which these patterns will change and the processes that underlie them. The geography of employment opportunities is now strongly connected to both national and international forces that are subject to unprecedented change. This is facilitated by continuing improvements in telecommunications and production technologies which permit employers and residents to respond quickly in their relocation patterns. Hence, the specific geographical patterns of urban growth, observed during the 1980s, may change markedly over the next decade or two. Yet, the underlying processes associated with post-1970s counter-urbanisation will remain intact.

While subject to change, there were several noteworthy aspects to the geographical patterns of 1980s urban and regional growth in the US. One of these is the decline in the growth levels for non-metropolitan areas, ex-

cepting retirement areas and those that lie adjacent to growing metropolitan regions. There were also noteworthy gains experienced by the nation's largest metropolitan areas, particularly those located in the coastal parts of the US. Yet the fluidity of the growth and decline patterns is well illustrated by the boom-and-bust experiences for several areas, of all sizes, between the early 1980s and the late 1980s. Growth in the nation's Sunbelt region became attenuated during the last part of the decade, especially in its interior portions.

Both the geographical and temporal patterns of 1980s urban growth give credence to the regional restructuring and period explanations that were put forth earlier in this article. The renewed growth in moderate and large-sized metropolitan areas is clearly related to industrial transformations in the nation's economy. The most consistent




Figure 10. Percentage of non-Hispanic Whites, 1990, for counties located in the New York CMSA and its component PMSAs.

growth occurred in areas that served as advanced service and corporate headquarter centres, those that specialised in knowledge-based industries, and those that engaged in certain high-tech activities. Slower growth and declines occurred in areas that were tied to old-line manufacturing or declining industries, or that had heavily invested in activities subject to cyclical influences.

Two other dimensions of the 1980s urban revival will be a part of the urban redistribution pattern for the foreseeable future. One of these involves the distinct growth of and change in the distribution patterns of the nation's minority populations. Minorities make up about one quarter of the total population, but they constitute significantly greater shares of the populations in specific metropolitan areas and in the South and West regions. This is because most Hispanic and

Asian growth is still heavily concentrated in well-known port-of-entry metropolitan areas that already house large numbers of them. In contrast, the redistribution of non-minority Whites is driven by internal migration in response to labour market 'pushes' and 'pulls', as well as directed flows of the elderly population to selected retirement communities. Blacks, still the nation's largest minority, lie somewhere in between. Largely driven by internal migration, their redistribution patterns are becoming more like those of Whites, but their populations are still heavily concentrated in traditional South region and northern metropolis locations.

The population distribution disparities between non-minority Whites, and the combined minority population have intensified over the 1980s decade. Current redistribution processes suggest that this will

continue, leading to wide differences across regions in demographic characteristics, ranging from age structure, income characteristics, and dominant racial or ethnic identification. At its extreme, one can envisage a contrast between ageing, White small communities in the nation's mid-section, and young, vibrant, multi-cultural populations in large metropolises on the east and west coasts.

The final dimension of the new urban revival that is likely to continue is the increasing dominance of the suburbs as the 'locus of activity' for both residents and workers of the metropolitan area. The majority of the US metropolitan population already resides in the suburbs and this is especially the case for non-minority Whites. Still, the suburban population is becoming increasingly more diverse in a wide range of racial, income and housing characteristics. This will continue to represent a challenge for planners and government agencies involved with the co-ordination of services and transport networks across this diverse set of places. The other side of the challenge concerns the question of what role the historic central city can play as its population size and economic influence become diminished. For a subset of these central cities, the challenge is compounded by the existence of a large and growing concentrated poverty population that increases as a result of selective immigration, internal migration and non-migration of less-well-off segments of the population.

Each of these aspects of the new urban revival is likely to continue, in some form, over the next several decades. The new contexts of redistribution, established during the 'transition decade' of the 1970s will ensure that the rates of growth and decline across communities, regions and metropolitan areas will be sharper than in the past, as a result of more immediate responses to national and global economic circumstances. Yet, population redistribution patterns will continue to be distinct for different racial and ethnic groups. The disparities that appear to be emerging across regions and metropolitan areas, as well as within the expanding

metropolis, raise concerns about equity in access to jobs, housing, schools and social services. Hence, the new urban revival in the United States poses both opportunities and challenges associated with an urban system that has become more interconnected and responsive to global economic change, while becoming more sharply differentiated internally.

Notes

1. I make the distinction between regional restructuring theorists (my term) that propose an evolutionary 'post-industrialisation' explanation (Noyelle and Stanback, 1984) and those who adopt what might be called a 'deindustrialisation' explanation (Tomaskovic-Devey and Miller, 1982; Smith, 1984; Castells, 1985; Scott and Storper, 1986). According to the former, regional restructuring changes have progressively evolved from technological innovations in production, widening transport networks, and some scientific breakthroughs in telecommunications. The deindustrialisation writers also allow for these technological innovations, but view the fundamental triggering mechanism for restructuring to be rooted in a 1970s world-wide economic crisis that forced capitalists to disinvest heavily in selected economic sectors and regions. They are critical of excessive capital mobility and its dislocations on workers and communities. However, their descriptions of metropolitan and regional redistribution tendencies coincide closely with the view of the post-industrialisation theorists.
2. Interior and coastal portions of regions are defined in terms of Census divisions:
 North Coastal: New England and Middle Atlantic Divisions;
 North Interior: East North Central and West North Central Divisions;
 South Coastal: South Atlantic Division;
 South Interior: East South Central and West South Central Divisions;
 West Coastal: Pacific Division;
 West Interior: Mountain Division.
3. According to the classification system adopted by the US Census, the category, Hispanic, is an ethnic designation that cuts across racial categories such as White, Black or Asian. Unless otherwise noted, my designation of majority Whites or Whites pertains to Whites who are not Hispanics (non-Hispanic Whites). 'Blacks' or 'Asians', as used here, pertain to all members of the races, including their relatively small Hispanic components.

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Appendix. Metropolitan Area Definitions

The metropolitan area definitions¹ are consistent with those determined by the Office of Management and budget (OMB) as of 30 June 1990. These evolved from metropolitan area definitions that were first developed for the 1950 census. The original concept of a metropolitan area involved a central-city nucleus with a population of at least 50 000, along with adjacent counties (or towns in the New England states) that were economically and socially integrated with that nucleus. While most of the nation's present metropolitan areas can be characterised by this concept, additional modifications to the definition were instituted, over time, to account for special cases and more complex urbanisation patterns.

The current metropolitan area definition recognises two different types of metropolitan area: (1) Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs), which rep-

resent individual metropolitan area units, as in the original metropolitan area concept; and (2) Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Areas (CMSAs), which represent combinations of metropolitan area units (Primary Metropolitan Statistical Areas) which qualify as metropolitan areas in their own right but show strong commuting relationships with other such units. The 284 metropolitan areas, based on these definitions, include 264 MSAs and 20 CMSAs.

MSA Definition

An area can qualify as an MSA in one of two ways: (a) if there exists a central city of at least 50 000 population; or (b) if the Census Bureau-defined Urbanised Area² surrounding the central city has a population of at least 50 000 with a total metropolitan population of at least 100 000 (75 000 in New England). In addition to the county containing the main city, an MSA also includes additional counties that have strong economic and social ties to the central county, determined chiefly by the extent of the Urbanised Area's territory and by census data on commuting to work. New England MSAs are defined in terms of a core area and related town (rather than county) components. An MSA may contain more than one central city of at least 50 000 population and may cross state lines.

CMSA Definition

A CMSA comprises a combination of two or more metropolitan area units (called Primary Metropolitan Statistical Areas) which are integrated with each other on commuting criteria. Each Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area (PMSA) satisfies the same criteria as MSA units (discussed above) and

the total population of the combined PMSA units must exceed 1 million.

Alternative Metropolitan Definition for New England

As indicated above, the official MSA and CMSA definitions in the six New England states are defined in terms of towns, rather than counties. To satisfy some purposes, the Census Bureau has designated an alternative set of metropolitan definitions that are based on counties in New England. These are called New England County Metropolitan Areas (NECMAs). For some parts of this discussion, MSAs and CMSAs in New England have been defined in terms of NECMA counterparts. Because there are fewer NECMAs than MSAs in New England, the total number of metropolitan area differs in these instances (resulting in 280 rather than 284 US metropolitan areas).

Notes

1. These definitions draw, in part from the discussion in D.E. STARSINIC and R. FORSTALL (1989) *Patterns of Metropolitan Area and County Population Growth: 1980 to 1987*. US Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-25, No. 1039. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. A more detailed account of the current metropolitan area criteria can be found in the 3 January 1980 *Federal Register*.
2. Urbanised Areas are defined to include both the central city and its closely settled surrounding (incorporated and unincorporated) territory, determined on the basis of population and population density criteria.