

classifications. It appears that these properties must be universals: they will have to be identical in different particulars. The connection between emergent properties and emergent laws or ways of working also requires to be elucidated. It is natural to make such a connection, but its exact nature is difficult to spell out. All these matters require thorough consideration, but do not get it from Margolis.

With the move up to persons, even more controversial issues arise, but are hardly discussed in critical fashion. It is a pretty radical move to explain the special features of language-use and the rest of social life by postulating 'a peculiar and distinctive ontology' for these things. Why not try to explain the phenomena more simply, yet still within Margolis' general framework, by postulating further emergent attributes and laws? Or, if a special relation of embodiment really is required, why not apply it to persons only, instead of to persons *and* their social products, such as words and works of art? We can all agree that what makes a particular spoken word-token, produced on a particular occasion, a *word*, is something more than its acoustic properties. But what makes such a token a word might be nothing more than very complex relational properties of the acoustic object (emergent properties, Margolis could claim) including, centrally, relations to people. Margolis never articulates these more conservative versions of Emergentist materialism, nor says why his own theory is to be preferred.

Thomas Kuhn has pointed out the psychological or sociological fact that insisting upon the inadequacies and difficulties of current scientific paradigms is never by itself sufficient to cause their abandonment. For the latter to occur, it is also necessary that an alternative paradigm have been clearly articulated. There must be a new raft on which to jump. Philosophy is not in the happy position of having established paradigms within which work can be carried forward and agreed results obtained. But we do have some roughly constructed rafts. We have positions and programmes which are at least relatively well worked out and articulated. Margolis has provided us with no more than a sketch-plan, together with hints, for the building of a new raft.

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Explorations in Language and Meaning: Towards a Semantic Anthropology.

BY MALCOLM CRICK. New York: Halsted Press (John Wiley & Sons), 1976. Pp. vii + 212. \$15.75.

Anthropology is in disarray. Functionalism has run its course, and we are now confronted with a bewildering proliferation of schools and methodologies concentrating attention on different aspects of the study of man. Yet according to Malcolm Crick, there is a single fundamental theme emerging from this unsettled condition: a concern with *man as a maker of meaning*. What Crick proposes in this stimulating book is to describe the current philosophic climate of social anthropology, especially as it exists in Great Britain, and to show how anthropology, if it is to progress at all, must move forward with a new image of man as a being whose social institutions and life forms, indeed whose whole social self, is his own creation.

'Semantic anthropology' is Crick's expression for the new turn, and one must be thankful that with this phrase he does not intend to christen yet another theoretical school. His inclinations, in fact, are clearly against grand theoretical pretensions. Semantic anthropology, by treating human beings as

'convention-making, theory-constructing, rule-following creatures' (p. 88) has as its purpose the understanding of human meaning, a task for which the methods of the natural sciences are intrinsically ill-suited. So much, perhaps, is not particularly new, but Crick's book has a freshness which comes from the application of the techniques and style of ordinary language philosophy to methodological problems in anthropology. From the philosophic side, there is an obvious debt to Wittgenstein and Austin, and to Peter Winch's *The Idea of a Social Science*. Yet Crick cannot be accused, as can so many other social scientists who have borrowed from the work of philosophers, of having taken over philosophic positions as though they represented 'findings' on which further research could be based (or worse, of taking over the jargon of a philosophic school without seriously considering the problems which occasion the jargon). Crick is an anthropologist who knows philosophy well and uses it with sophistication.

The book begins by considering topics chosen because they stand in interesting relations to the semantic turn in anthropology. Attention is given to the unjustly neglected Victorian philologist Max Müller, whose work is seen by Crick as adumbrating many of the best modern attitudes toward the study of other cultures. It was Müller who cautioned against taking terms like 'animism', 'fetishism', or 'taboo', and imagining that they are concepts under which activities in different cultures may be easily subsumed, an issue to which Crick later devotes considerable attention. In Müller's declaration that 'the true philosophy of the human mind . . . is the philosophy of language', Crick finds a laudable concern with meaning, which stands in stark contrast with the bent of recent American linguistic anthropology. Much of the contemporary work which brings together linguistics and ethnology is viewed by Crick as exhibiting 'an apparently detailed, but actually superficial comprehension' of cultural facts. 'Over the last decade the number of studies has grown enormously, jargon has proliferated, questionnaires and quantification have already appeared giving those precise answers to probably insignificant questions so typical of social science' (p. 66).

Also the subject of a probing critique is the structuralism of Lévi-Strauss. In the clearest short summary and criticism of Lévi-Strauss I have seen in print, Crick makes it clear that the whole structuralist project, despite appearances to the contrary, is bound to ignore questions of meaning. The ultimate goal of the Lévi-Straussian variety of structuralism is to make an inventory of those mental constraints which underlie, and give latent order to, the chaotic welter of human expression and design. Emphasis is placed entirely on the syntax of, for example, myth, and not its meaning in any ordinarily recognizable sense. In fact, though Lévi-Strauss depends heavily on close ethnography, the native view is seen as designed more to perpetuate social forms than to explain social reality. Thus the human sciences must regard consciousness as their enemy, must probe beneath its surface in order to reveal the underlying structures which determine it. This is not so much the search for a deep structure in any Chomskyan sense as it is an attempt to formulate logical laws which are construed to have the coercive efficacy of physical laws. In the end, the structuralism of Lévi-Strauss becomes a sort of ethnological Kantianism which has been transformed into an *ersatz* empirical science.

Along with this view of meaning as a secondary and always reducible phenomenon goes Lévi-Strauss' tendency to exhibit the window dressing of empirical science without adopting its standards of criticism. We are presented with the absurd spectacle of the algebraic notation of *Mythologiques*, and as Crick points out, a technical terminology ('homology', 'transformation', 'oppo-

sition', and so forth) which is used in an excessively careless fashion. The same can be said of Lévi-Strauss' use of the very term 'logic', which, Crick tells us, can be placed 'along with those other virtually meaningless metaphorical renderings of scientific concepts which he scatters through his writings' (p. 54). Moreover, although we are provided with masses of data purporting to verify the interpretations Lévi-Strauss proffers, we are given little idea of what might disconfirm them: 'When evidence of an association of honey and sperm is not taken as upsetting a general relationship between honey and menstrual blood, but as adding a new dimension to it [in *L'Origine des Manières de Table*], one wonders what type of ethnographic discovery would upset an ongoing structural analysis' (p. 55). Crick's lucid and succinct examination of these difficulties has surely increased our understanding of the muddles which lie at the heart of Lévi-Strauss' work.

Structuralism may depend on close attention to ethnographic detail, but in the final analysis, the native's point of view is seen as having little intrinsic interest; it is simply more grist for the structuralist mill. In this sense, it assumes that there is a discontinuity between the native's knowledge of his life and world, and the social scientist's knowledge. It is in contrast with this perspective that Crick thinks the alternative provided by ordinary language philosophy is so important. Our knowledge of society, whether provided by a sociologist or philosopher, is essentially continuous with our ordinary knowledge of ourselves and others. Our own understanding of ourselves 'constitutes a great part of what we are' (p. 90). Though this does not entail that ordinary language ought to have the last word in, J. L. Austin's phrase, it 'should at least have the first word' (p. 90). By taking the meaning of thought and behaviour as essentially embedded in how agents themselves view their own condition, linguistic philosophy offers an illuminating model for anthropology. Ordinary language philosophy characteristically takes with the utmost seriousness the largely constitutive relation between what a person does and that person's own description of what he is doing. Implicit in ordinary discourse there are, moreover, criteria for intelligibility and criticism upon which any anthropological interpretation must be based, as well as a set of basic presuppositions about the nature of man and human understanding in general.

In these respects, it is not surprising that Crick finds Evans-Pritchard's work paradigmatic of the sort of anthropology he has in mind. It is Evans-Pritchard 'who so significantly led the shift from function to meaning' (pp. 125-26), and who set the stage for the development of semantic anthropology by contending that 'anthropology was not a natural science studying physical systems, but one of the humanities investigating moral systems' (p. 2). Considering the respectful treatment accorded Evans-Pritchard by later functionalist writers, Crick's claim may seem odd, but in fact Crick argues that functionalist readings of Evans-Pritchard's monographs on Zande and Nuer religion grossly misinterpret the essential nature of his project. In particular, *Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among the Azande* 'has been emasculated by being converted into a functionalist framework where it was interpreted as about "social control" and the like . . . exactly the sort of approach from which Evans-Pritchard continually distanced himself' (p. 110).

Looming large throughout Crick's discussion is Wittgenstein's notion of a form of life, and as valuable here as that elusive idea may be, some old problems remain. Surely Crick is pointing us toward something important by reminding us that 'Evans-Pritchard received no answer when he asked what the effect would be of giving unaddressed *benge* to a fowl, because the question failed to grasp the nature of *benge* and the place of the oracle in Zande life: the inquiry simply

had no sense or relevance for them' (p. 131). Ideas, we cannot be reminded often enough, have their lives in systems of thought, and in some contexts certain questions may have no sense. But this does not mean that it is possible to claim that, in general, criteria for reality are internal to modes of discourse. Even if the notion of a flat earth is internal to some form of life and way of speaking, in such a manner that it cannot be questioned, the earth still has a shape in independence of language. Appeals to D. Z. Phillips' views about religious language and 'kinds of reality' are of little help here (p. 134), and I think Crick might have been a bit more circumspect in claiming that science forms a conceptual system with its own conventional presuppositions, much like any other. Such a view tends too much to underrate the self-critical and self-correcting spirit of the scientific enterprise, a spirit lacking in, for instance, many modes of religious discourse.

Nevertheless, Crick's discussion of conceptual structures and problems of translation is full of insight, and I could not agree more with his remark that anthropologists will 'need to cultivate the sort of sensitivities possessed by literary scholars' (p. 135) in order to tackle problems inherent in trying to grasp the meaning of social life in other cultures. And not only the sensitivities of literary scholars, but, it might be added, those of philosophers as well, for Wittgenstein's observation that 'When we do philosophy we are like savages, primitive people, who hear the expressions of civilized men, put a false interpretation on them, and then draw the queerest conclusions from it' (*PI*, sec. 194) has, as Winch once pointed out, its obvious corollary: that when we try to understand primitive peoples we are like philosophers who misinterpret them and move to the strangest conclusions. By throwing light on the distinctively conceptual, and hence often philosophical, nature of anthropological inquiry, Crick has performed a service for anyone interested in the relationships between the two disciplines. His book is a significant one which deserves our careful study.

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From Mandeville to Marx. The Genesis and Triumph of Economic Ideology. BY LOUIS DUMONT. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977. Pp. 236. \$16.50.

Dumont proposes a study of modern ideology, in contrast to the ideology of a caste society examined in his celebrated book *Homo Hierarchicus*. Instead of hierarchy he will examine the prevailing value of equality. But underlying the distinction between hierarchy and equalitarianism is another which Dumont regards as more basic, that between holism and individualism: individualism sets a value on a man as such, while holism subordinates an individual to the needs and values of society. Historically the latter has been the norm, the former the exception, and this work carefully traces the emergence of the ideology of individualism in the writings of Quesnay, Locke, Mandeville, Smith and (especially) Marx.

The enterprise is bold and attractive in conception and scholarly in execution. The reader will not fail to learn from the book or be challenged by it. However, the argument, especially in the chapters on Marx, is rendered needlessly difficult by a certain vagueness in laying the foundations.

Dumont claims, for example, that individualism entails equality. The nearest we have to an argument for this claim is that '... for us, every man is, in principle, an embodiment of humanity at large, and as such he is equal to every other man, and free' (p. 4). But while different individuals equally embody humanity, it is obvious that not all individuals are equal in talent and power. The