

AN EXCHANGE THEORY OF INCENTIVES OF URBAN POLITICAL PARTY ORGANIZATION

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Introduction

All organizations, be they social, economic, political, or whatever, face basically the same problem in order to survive as viable, on-going entities: they need to attract and retain a core of activists who will engage in the activities necessary for achieving the organization's collective goal. Furthermore, the way in which an organization or its leadership goes about resolving the problem of recruiting and retaining organizational activists has considerable impact upon its internal dynamics (i.e., its structures and procedures, distribution of power, hierarchical relationships, etc.) In the case of the political party, the way in which party leaders recruit and retain activists and voters also has profound consequences on the political process, for the party occupies a strategic place in the vertical relationship between citizen and government. In fact, it probably would be accurate to say that the way party leaders go about attracting and retaining organizational activists will be similar to the way they go about appealing for electoral support (Sorauf, 1964 and 1966; Eldersveld, 1964).

While many students of organization theory and political parties have recognized the significance of organizational survival, few have made an explicit attempt to develop and test a theoretical framework on the problem (Gluck, 1970; Wilson, 1962; Eldersveld, 1964). Representative of the importance of attracting and retaining grass-roots activists is the statement made by Banfield and Wilson (1963, p. 27) in reference to the groups which participate in big-city politics:

*My thanks to Professor Robert H. Salisbury for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the 1974 meetings of the American Political Science Association, Jung Hotel, New Orleans, September 4-8, 1974.

Any organization must offer a continuous stream of incentives to elicit the activities that it requires from its members or other 'contributors'...If it is to grow, or even to survive, every organization must offer a suitable mixture of such incentives--material, non-material, or both--and it must offer them in sufficient quantity and without interruption. In a more general statement, Sorauf (1964, p.81) has recognized the importance of examining the incentive system of political parties. In one of the most concise statements of the problem, he notes:

The political party has another, less obvious aspect behind the facade of its external image and its political functions. Internally it is a vast network of personalities, authority relationships, and incentives to activity. Basic to these relationships are the rewards and sanctions, the political incentive system, which the political party commands and manages. If the party is to continue functioning as an organization it must make 'payments' in an acceptable 'political currency' adequate to motivate and allocate the labors of its workers.

The Elements of an Exchange Theory

The theory of organizations which is developed and applied to the urban political party is called an "exchange theory." (Blau, 1964; Curry and Wade, 1968; Olson, 1965; Salisbury, 1969). The theory is based upon the following basic assumptions: (1) individuals have a variety of needs, drives, and goals which they seek to attain; (2) some of these can best be achieved within the context of organizational participation; (3) organizations need some mechanism to influence the behavior of its activists (i.e., to insure adherence to

the collective goal and encourage sustained participation). The purpose of conceptualizing the organization as a network of exchanges is to identify and emphasize the kinds of transactions (or exchanges) which take place between the party organization (or its leadership) and its grass-roots activists (and voters).

Three sets of exchanges are involved in the process of organizational survival: recruitment exchanges, contribution exchanges, and retention exchanges.

Recruitment exchanges focus upon the organization's need to attract members who will participate in it. To accomplish this the organization offers a variety of inducements to potential members. These inducements must be sufficiently valuable or desirable to the potential activist to motivate his/her participation. In most instances they must offer something that cannot be attained through other organizations.

Contribution exchanges focus on the activities the individuals perform in behalf of the organization, (i.e., in pursuit of its collective goal). They constitute the contributions he makes to the organization. At the same time, contributions represent the way in which the individual strives to realize the inducements which initially motivated organizational participation.

The possibility of conflict between the contributions the individual wants to make and those the organization leaders expect requires a mechanism of internal discipline. This mechanism exists in the form of retention exchanges. Though the ultimate purpose of this exchange is to encourage the activist to continue organizational participation, their immediate effect is to emphasize the rewards activists realize from the contributions they have made to the organization's collective goal. At the same time, the rewards of participation serve to sustain the activist in the organization. Access to the control over rewards permits an organization's leadership to discipline activists and influence the direction and intensity of their participation.

The relationship between contributions and rewards is so continual as to be almost cyclical in nature. This is one of the reasons for referring to the interaction between inducements, contributions, and rewards as an incentive system. The interaction that characterizes the system is terminated under two circumstances. First, participation will be terminated when no rewards are realized from the contributions an activist makes to the organization. Second, participation will be terminated when the rewards realized from contributions diminish in value or desirability (Gluck, 1970, Chap. VIII).

Each of the exchanges between the individual and the organization emphasizes a different concept of organizational participation. Recruitment exchanges focus on the inducements which attract members to the organization; contribution exchanges emphasize the activities

which the individual performs in pursuit of the organization's collective goal; retention exchanges focus upon the rewards which activists receive from the organization. These concepts constitute what Sorauf (1964, Chap. 5; 1968, Chap. 4) has called the political incentive system.

The utility of an exchange theory of organizational participation depends upon the extent in which the concepts and constructs are formulated in terms that apply to a variety of organizations. Hence, a simple catalogue or list of specific inducements, contributions, and rewards would be of little value, since the items on the list would depend to a large extent upon the kind of organization (economic, social, political, etc.) being examined. A number of students of organizational participation have developed their own schemes for classifying incentives (Barnard, 1938; Simon, 1961; Wilson and Clark, 1961). Generally speaking, many of the classifications of incentives are inadequate or unsatisfactory for the purpose of developing and applying a theory of organizational participation. First, some are limited in applicability to specific kinds of organizations. Salisbury (1969), for example, argues that the Wilson-Clark schema of incentives does not lend itself to the analysis of interest group exchanges. Second, in many instances the criteria of classification are not stated clearly. Simon (1961), for example, fails to distinguish clearly the meaning of the "personal reward" and "personal inducement" categories of incentives.

The classification of incentives presented in this analysis is based upon a distinction between the object and value of organizational incentives. The object of an incentive refers to the distinction between those which are sought for the benefit of the individual personally and those which are sought for the benefit of some person or group other than the activist. The emphasis on the object of incentives recognizes the need to provide an answer to the question of "who benefits?" from organizational participation. It is important to note that our concern is with the primary object of an incentive as perceived by the individual. It is possible for an incentive to benefit more than one object (eg., both self and "significant others"). It is also possible for an incentive to benefit an object in recruitment exchange but not in retention exchange, or vice versa. This problem will be dealt with empirically by identifying and comparing the recruitment exchanges with the retention exchanges. Analysis of this sort will provide some indication of the extent to which the inducements which initiate organizational participation are similar to or different from rewards which sustain it.

The second dimension of organizational incentives emphasizes their value. This

distinction rests on the fact that some incentives are either monetary or material in value, or can be easily translated into something which has such a value, while other incentives have no monetary or material value and cannot be easily translated into anything which has such a value. Jobs, patronage, business contacts, and clients, for example, are regarded as monetary/material or near monetary/material in value, while status and prestige, friendships, policy influence, and community service are neither monetary/material nor near monetary/material in value. Incentives of this kind are sought for their inherent value, either for the individual as such or for the community in general. Whichever is the case, however, they cannot be easily or readily translated into monetary or material advantages. In fact, incentives such as policy influence, prestige, and community service may not even be pursued for monetary or material purposes. Instead, they tend to be important for ideological or psychological reasons.

These two dimensions of organizational incentives can be combined to produce a fourfold classification of incentives which appears in Figure 1 below.

FIGURE 1. CLASSIFICATION OF INCENTIVES OF ORGANIZATIONAL PARTICIPATION

		OBJECT OF THE INCENTIVE	
		SELF	OTHER
VALUE OF THE INCENTIVE	TANGIBLE	A	B
	INTANGIBLE	C	D

Incentives falling into box "A" are tangible/self-oriented and include such things as wages, salaries, business contacts, patronage, contracts, and preferential treatment. Of particular importance is the fact that the incentives in this category are sought for the personal benefit of the organizational participant. This serves to distinguish them from the tangible/other-oriented incentives in box "B". This category also consists of jobs, salaries, patronage, etc. However, in this instance the incentives are sought for the benefit of some person or group other than the organizational participant. The incentives in box "C" are intangible/self-oriented and consist of such things as social status and prestige, opportunities for new friendships, and the feeling of importance which derives from association with important and influential people. The intangible/other-oriented incentives in box "D" include the desire to work for the enactment of specific laws,

policies, or programs, philosophical impulses to "serve the community" or fulfill a civic obligation, and general ideological impulses to "serve democracy."

The contributions to the collective goal of the organization are a second element in the exchange between an organization and its activists. As used here, contributions refer to a variety of activities and functions--physical, intellectual, monetary, etc.--performed by organizational activists. In the case of political parties it is possible to identify different kinds of contributions to the organization's collective goal. Our classification includes voter-mobilization contributions, personal-campaigning contributions, party organizational contributions, and party decision-making contributions.

The Urban Political Party Organization: An Application of Exchange Theory

The task of an exchange theory of organizations is twofold. First, it identifies the pattern of incentives and contributions which enable an organization to achieve its collective goal and survive. Second, it explores the relationship between these exchanges and other variables of organizational participation to determine the effects of a particular pattern on the organization's internal and external characteristics.

We have chosen to apply exchange theory to the urban political party organization for two reasons. First, the urban party represents an instance in which the exchanges of organizational participation emphasize a particular pattern of incentives and contributions. The literature on urban parties provides ample evidence of the extent to which grass-roots activists in the urban party organization were recruited and retained by the effective use of material, personally-beneficial inducements and rewards. In terms of the classificatory scheme presented above, the recruitment and retention of grass-roots urban party activists emphasized tangible/self-oriented and intangible/self-oriented incentives. The contributions of urban party activists also reflected a rather specific pattern, involving the performance of voter-mobilization and personal-campaigning contributions while minimizing the involvement of grass-roots activists in party decision-making contributions. The traditional machine organization was one in which activists were recruited and retained by tangible/self-oriented and intangible/self-oriented incentives. In return, activists performed contributions that enhanced the election of the party's candidates. They did not participate in the selection of those candidates, the formulation of party policies, etc. These contributions were usually made by the

party leaders who used their control of governmental machinery to continue the flow of self-oriented incentives to grass-roots activists.

A second reason for our interest in urban party organization is the consequences of the exchanges which were (and perhaps still are) characteristic of the traditional machine organization. Though American political parties are frequently characterized as loosely organized and highly decentralized, with little or no internal discipline, the classic machine organization achieved a high degree of discipline, centralization, and specialization of function (Eldersveld, 1964; Sorauf, 1968; Wolfinger, 1972). The classic machine presents a situation of centralized power and internal discipline in which decisions made by the leaders were regarded as absolutely binding on a cadre of rank-and-file activists and voters. In return for contributions directed toward the election of the organization's candidates, the party leaders provided grass-roots activists with a continual flow of material, personally-beneficial rewards. In return for votes on primary and election day, party leaders provided their voting constituency with a flow of material and psychic rewards. The party leaders, for their part, enjoyed almost uninterrupted and unchallenged control of the party hierarchy and governmental machinery.

The Study

Data on the incentives and contributions of organizational participation were collected by the investigator in personal interviews conducted with a randomly selected sample of fifty Republican and fifty Democratic committeemen in the party organizations in Buffalo, New York. These committeemen represent the lowest level of activists in the organizations of their party. An initial response rate of 90% was obtained. The size of the sample required substitution of those who refused to participate in the study or were unavailable at the time field work was being conducted.

The interview schedule was developed and pre-tested by the investigator. The major items were those dealing with the inducements, contributions, and rewards of party participation. In each instance respondents were asked open-ended and fixed-alternative questions concerning the reasons for their initial entry into the party organization, the kinds of activities or functions they performed, and their reasons for continuing or terminating party participation. Responses to the open-ended questions were coded by the investigator and, as a check on reliability, by a colleague who was not involved in the study. Discrepancies between the two codings were resolved by asking a second colleague to code the open-ended responses. Fortunately, however, this was not necessary very often.

a) Recruitment Exchanges

The analysis of the recruitment exchanges of the urban party organization will focus upon two dimensions of this relationship: the kinds of incentives urban parties offer to attract activists to the organization and the relevant variables of participation which influence the appeal of these incentives to the persons they are offered to.¹

The demographic character of the city is a factor that has had considerable impact on the urban party organization. The "typical" machine activist was older, less educated, and more ethnic-group oriented than the general population (Forthal, 1946; Gosnell, 1937; Salisbury, 1965). The data in Table 1 presents the demographic attributes of contemporary urban party activists according to the recruitment incentives they identified.

The data indicate that the tangible/self-oriented and intangible/self-oriented recruitment incentives are more likely to appeal to older than to younger party activists. The only group of activists which expressed any substantial commitment to other-oriented incentives, either tangible or intangible, were those below thirty-five years of age. Of the activists in this age group, two identified tangible/other-oriented recruitment incentives and five identified intangible/other-oriented recruitment incentives as important.

The activists in the classic machine organization had little formal education. The lack of educational achievement generally had two consequences for the urban party organization. First, it meant that poorly educated activists often depended upon the party leaders for material well-being and social/psychic gratification. Second, it reinforced the monopoly which party leaders had over decision-making activities in the organization, since less educated activists had neither the capability nor the desire to engage in the involved and sometimes complex discussions bearing on the formulation of party policies and programs or the selection and endorsement of party candidates (Mosher, 1935).

The data in Table 1 indicate that tangible/self-oriented and intangible/self-oriented recruitment incentives appeal to less educated party activists. This is certainly the case among the activists whose formal education terminated with grammar school; it is also the case for those who went up to, but no further than, high school. It is only among the college and graduate/professional school attenders that we find much preference for tangible/other-oriented and intangible/other-oriented recruitment incentives.

The recruitment exchanges of the classic machine organization also emphasized the ethnic composition of the city. We have attempted to explore the relationship between ethnicity and the recruitment exchanges of

Table 1 - Recruitment Exchanges and Selected Demographic Characteristics

I. AGE:

Recruitment Incentives:	Age of Party Activists			
	below 35	35-54	55-64	65+
tangible/self-oriented	3 (30%)	18 (45%)	16 (44.4%)	8 (57.1%)
intangible/self-oriented	0 -	15 (37.5%)	13 (36.1%)	4 (28.6%)
tangible/other-oriented	2 (20%)	2 (5%)	5 (13.9%)	2 (14.3%)
intangible/other-oriented	5 (50%)	5 (12.5%)	2 (5.6%)	0 -
N =	10 (100%)	40 (100%)	36 (100%)	14 (100%)

$\lambda = 0.043$

II. EDUCATION:

Recruitment Incentives:	Educational Background				
	grade school	high school	college	grad./prof. school	tech. school
tangible/self-oriented	7 (53.8%)	18 (34.6%)	2 (16.7%)	8 (53.3%)	5 (62.5%)
intangible/self-oriented	6 (46.2%)	17 (32.7%)	2 (16.7%)	0 -	3 (37.5%)
tangible/other-oriented	0 -	10 (19.2%)	3 (25%)	3 (20%)	0 -
intangible/other-oriented	0 -	7 (13.5%)	5 (41.7%)	4 (26.7%)	0 -
N =	13 (100%)	52 (100%)	12 (100.1%)	15 (100%)	8 (100%)

$\lambda = 0.028$

III. ETHNICITY:

Recruitment Incentives:	Ethnic Identification	
	ethnic identifier	native Am. identifier
tangible/self-oriented	31 (43.7%)	7 (24.1%)
intangible/self-oriented	28 (39.4%)	8 (27.6%)
tangible/other-oriented	7 (9.9%)	3 (10.3%)
intangible/other-oriented	5 (7%)	11 (37.9%)
N =	71 (100%)	29 (99.9%)

$\lambda = 0.118$

urban party organizations by asking our respondents to identify their nationality background, and by dividing the responses to distinguish "ethnic-identifiers" from "non-ethnic-identifiers" or "native Americans."²

The data in Table 1 indicate that ethnic-identifiers have a distinct preference for the self-oriented recruitment incentives of organizational participation, while those who identified themselves as native Americans divide almost equally between the self-oriented and other-oriented incentives. The preference of ethnic-identifiers for self-oriented incentives is reflected in the fact that fifty-nine (or 80%) of the respondents in this group identified either tangible/self-oriented or intangible/self-oriented recruitment incentives. Among the native Americans, on the other hand, fifteen (51.7%) identified either of the two categories of self-oriented incentives, while fourteen (48.3%) identified either of the two categories of other-oriented recruitment incentives.

The recruitment of activists to the urban party organization was based only partially upon the appeal of certain incentives to persons with particular demographic attributes. This exchange was also related to a number of variables of party politics. Among the more important of these are the initial source of interest in party politics and the majority-minority status of the party organizations.

The initial source of interest in party politics is important because it provides the activist with a frame of reference for orienting himself to the party and his role in it. There is what might be called a "group view" of party politics which filters down from the party leaders and sustains their conception of the organization's collective goal. Students of party politics have distinguished external sources of interest--family, friends, and politicians--from internal sources of interest--issues, candidates, and party. The data in the top portion of Table 2 indicate that externally- and internally-influenced

Table 2 - Recruitment Exchanges and Two Variables of Party Politics

I. SOURCE OF INITIAL INTEREST IN PARTY POLITICS:

Recruitment Incentives:	Source of Initial Interest in Party Politics		
	External Influences	Internal Influences	Other or None
tangible/self-oriented	15 (37.5%)	9 (20.9%)	8 (47.1%)
intangible/self-oriented	19 (47.5%)	19 (44.2%)	7 (41.2%)
tangible/other-oriented	4 (10%)	5 (11.6%)	2 (11.8%)
intangible/other-oriented	2 (5%)	10 (23.3%)	0
N =	40 (100%)	43 (100%)	17 (100.1%)

$$\lambda = 0.063$$

II. MAJORITY-MINORITY PARTY STATUS:

Recruitment Incentives:	Majority-Minority Party Status	
	Majority Party	Minority Party
tangible/self-oriented	23 (46%)	17 (34%)
intangible/self-oriented	16 (32%)	21 (42%)
tangible/other-oriented	3 (6%)	5 (10%)
intangible/other-oriented	8 (16%)	7 (14%)
N =	50 (100%)	50 (100%)

activists were both recruited to the party organization by the appeal of self-oriented incentives.

The recruitment exchange between the party organization and its activists is also affected by the distinction between the majority-minority status of the parties. It is not wholly coincidental that machines flourished in the party that dominated urban government and politics. This is so largely because access to (or control over) governmental machinery is necessary to provide the self-oriented incentives which recruit and retain activists. As a result, we would expect to find the recruitment of activists to the majority party to emphasize tangible/self-oriented and/or intangible/self-oriented incentives.

Examination of the data in Table 2 reveals that activists in both the majority and minority urban parties are inclined to favor the two categories of self-oriented recruitment incentives. However, activists in the minority party place somewhat greater emphasis on intangible/self-oriented incentives, while activists in the majority party emphasize tangible/self-oriented incentives. In neither case, however, are tangible/other-oriented or intangible/other-oriented recruitment incentives important to the basic recruitment exchanges of the two urban party organizations.

b) Contribution Exchanges

Once recruited to the organization, the activist contributes to its collective goal. The literature on political parties provides ample evidence of the extent to which American parties are electoral organizations, judged largely in terms of their ability to win elections (Sorauf, 1968).

The contributions which activists make to the party organization can be viewed from two perspectives: from the perspective of the activist and from the perspective of the organization and its leadership. From the perspective of the activist, contributions are the way in which recruitment incentives are realized. From the perspective of the organization and its leadership, contributions are the way in which the goal (or goals) of the group is achieved.

Our purpose here is to identify the kinds of variables of party politics which affect the contributions that activists make to the party organization and its collective goal.³ One of these variables is majority-minority party status. It has been argued that the contributions of activists in the majority party reflect the election orientation of that party, while the contributions of activists in the minority party reflect the needs of the organization per se and are more concerned with establishing the party at the grass-roots.

Table 3 - Contribution Exchanges and Majority-Minority Party Status

Contributions:	Majority-Minority Party Status	
	Majority	Minority
	Party	Party
Voter-mobilization activities	26 (52%)	11 (22%)
Personal-campaigning activities	16 (32%)	11 (22%)
Party organizational activities	7 (14%)	24 (48%)
Party decision-making activities	1 (2%)	1 (2%)
None	0 -	3 (6%)
N =	50 (100%)	50 (100%)

The data in Table 3 confirm the view that activists in the majority party emphasize election-related contributions. Better than 80% of them identified the two categories of contributions most directly relevant to the electoral orientation of political parties. At the same time, the data also indicate that the emphasis of minority party activists on contributions directed toward the organization is only slightly greater than their emphasis on election-related contributions. It is more probable that minority party activists see their contributions in terms of both election victory and establishing the party at the grass-roots.

Students of party organization have argued that the length of time a person has been in

the party organization affects the way he orients himself to it, particularly in terms of his role conception. There is good reason to believe that the longer an individual has participated in the party organization, the more likely he is to hold the "group view" of his role in it. This would mean that activists who have served for a longer period of time are more likely to emphasize the election orientation of the party and identify election-related activities in their contribution exchanges. The data in the top portion of Table 4 are concerned with the relationship between the contribution exchanges of activists and the length of their participation in the party organization.

Table 4 - Contribution Exchanges and Three Variables of Party Politics

I. LENGTH OF PARTY ACTIVITY:

Contributions:	Length of Party Activity				
	less than	5-9	10-14	15-19	20 years
	4 years	years	years	years	or more
Voter-mobilization activities	3 (30%)	7 (35%)	13 (43.3%)	9 (39.1%)	6 (35.3%)
Personal-campaigning activities	2 (20%)	5 (25%)	15 (50%)	7 (30.4%)	6 (35.3%)
Party organizational activities	4 (40%)	5 (25%)	2 (6.7%)	5 (21.7%)	3 (17.7%)
Party decision-making activities	0 -	0 -	0 -	2 (8.7%)	2 (11.8%)
None	1 (10%)	3 (15%)	0 -	0 -	0 -
N =	10 (100%)	20 (100%)	30 (100%)	23 (99.9%)	17 (100.1%)

$\lambda = 0.083$

II. PARTY LEADERSHIP:

Contributions:	Party Leadership	
	Yes	No
	Voter-mobilization activities	2 (9.1%)
Personal-campaigning activities	2 (9.1%)	22 (28.2%)
Party organizational activities	5 (22.7%)	23 (29.5%)
Party decision-making activities	13 (59.1%)	4 (5.1%)
None	0 -	5 (6.4%)
N =	22 (100%)	78 (100%)

$\lambda = 0.277$

(Table 4 continued on next page)

Table 4 - Contribution Exchanges and Three Variables of Party Politics (continued)

III. GOVERNMENT LEADERSHIP:

	Government Leadership	
	Yes	No
<u>Contributions:</u>		
Voter-mobilization activities	1 (6.3%)	30 (35.7%)
Personal-campaigning activities	2 (12.5%)	22 (26.2%)
Party organizational activities	4 (25%)	25 (29.8%)
Party decision-making activities	9 (56.3%)	2 (2.4%)
None	0 -	5 (5.9%)
N =	16 (100.1%)	84 (100%)

$$\lambda = 0.176$$

Examination of the data reveals that activists who have been in the party organization longer are more likely to engage in election-related contribution exchanges. The two categories of election-related contributions, voter-mobilization activities and personal-campaigning activities, are identified by an overwhelming number of activists who have been in the party ten years or more. Election-related contributions are also salient for more recent party activists; at least 50% of the activists who have participated in the party organization for less than ten years identified either voter mobilization or personal campaigning contributions. Equally interesting is the fact that organizational contributions were identified more frequently than party decision-making ones.

Leadership in the party organization also affects the contribution exchanges of party activists. While all of the respondents in the sample were grass-roots committeemen, some also held additional positions in the party organization such as ward or district leader, ward or district executive, etc. In spite of the general salience of election-related and organizational contributions, it should not be surprising to find party decision-making contributions identified more frequently by those holding positions of leadership in the party hierarchy. The data in the middle portion of Table 4 indicate that party leaders are more likely than nonleaders to identify decision-making contributions. In fact, leaders are also considerably less likely to engage in the more routine and mundane contributions relating to electoral victory. It seems that the performance of both party organizational and party decision-making contributions is concentrated in the hands of the party leadership.

A related variable of party politics is that of government leadership. In addition to occupying positions of leadership within the party hierarchy, some activists hold elective or appointive positions in the governmental structure. On the basis of our findings regarding the contributions of party leaders, we would expect government leaders to perform decision-

making contributions considerably more often than do non-leaders. At the same time, the data indicate that government leaders are less likely to perform voter-mobilizational and personal-campaigning contributions. The pattern of contribution exchanges for activists holding positions in both party and government suggests that the composition of these groups is similar.

c) Retention Exchanges

One variable in particular has been employed throughout our analysis thus far: majority-minority party status. A basic argument in support of this is that access to various incentives of party participation will be affected by whether the party enjoys control of governmental machinery.

The relative electoral status of urban parties is no less important in affecting retention exchanges. The ability of the urban party organization to provide various kinds of rewards will be affected by its control over or access to urban governmental structure. This would seem to be particularly true for the provision of tangible/self-oriented and intangible/self-oriented rewards. The upper portion of Table 5 arrays the data on retention incentives according to the majority-minority status of the two urban party organizations.

The data indicate a slight preference among majority party activists, and a considerable preference among minority party activists, for intangible/self-oriented rewards. Among the majority party activists, seventeen identified intangible/self-oriented retention incentives and fifteen identified tangible/self-oriented incentives. Among the minority party activists, eighteen identified intangible/self-oriented incentives while twelve identified tangible/self-oriented ones. One conclusion which emerges from an examination of these data is the continued dependence of urban party activists upon the rewards of machine politics: tangible/self-oriented and intangible/self-oriented incentives continue

Table 5 - Retention Exchanges and Three Variables of Party Politics

I. MAJORITY-MINORITY PARTY STATUS:

Retention Incentives:	Majority-Minority Party Status	
	Majority Party	Minority Party
tangible/self-oriented	15 (30%)	12 (24%)
intangible/self-oriented	17 (34%)	18 (36%)
tangible/other-oriented	9 (18%)	7 (14%)
intangible/other-oriented	7 (14%)	3 (6%)
None	2 (4%)	10 (20%)
N =	50 (100%)	50 (100%)

$$\lambda = 0.078$$

II. INTENTION TO CONTINUE AS PARTY ACTIVIST:

Retention Incentives:	Intention to Continue in Party	
	Yes	No
tangible/self-oriented	38 (52.8%)	3 (10.7%)
intangible/self-oriented	20 (27.8%)	6 (21.4%)
tangible/other-oriented	9 (12.5%)	10 (35.7%)
intangible/other-oriented	5 (6.9%)	9 (32.1%)
None	72 (100%)	28 (99.9%)

$$\lambda = 0.138$$

III. ASPIRATION FOR A CAREER IN POLITICS:

Retention Incentives:	Aspire to a Career in Politics	
	Yes	No
tangible/self-oriented	14 (35.9%)	31 (50.8%)
intangible/self-oriented	8 (20.5%)	20 (32.8%)
tangible/other-oriented	5 (12.8%)	6 (9.8%)
intangible/other-oriented	12 (30.8%)	4 (6.6%)
None	0 -	0 -
N =	39 (100%)	61 (100%)

$$\lambda = 0.085$$

to reward grass-roots activists in urban parties for the contributions they make to the organization's collective goal.

The orientation the activists assumes toward the party organization is likely to affect the distribution of retention incentives, just as it affected the distribution of recruitment incentives and contributions. One aspect of this orientation toward the party consists of the intention to remain as a party activist. The data in the middle portion of Table 5 indicate that activists who intent to continue in the party are more likely to identify tangible/self-oriented and intangible/self-oriented retention incentives. In fact, these two categories of incentives are identified by 58 of the 72 activists who intend to continue in

party politics. Equally interesting is the fact that nineteen of the twenty-eight activists who do not intend to remain in the party organization identified tangible/other-oriented and intangible/other-oriented retention incentives. These data provide reason to believe that tangible/other-oriented and intangible/other-oriented are not the most satisfying rewards of party participation, for they appear to be unable to sustain the participation of those activists who identified them.

The data in the lower portion of Table 5 deal with the use of party politics as a vehicle of upward mobility in politics. The data indicate that tangible/self-oriented and intangible/self-oriented incentives are

Table 6 - Incentive Reorientation: Stability and Change in Recruitment and Retention Incentives

Retention Incentives:	Recruitment Incentives			
	tangible/ self- oriented	intangible/ self- oriented	tangible/ other- oriented	intangible/ other- oriented
tangible/self-oriented	20 (50%)	8 (21.6%)	2 (20%)	2 (15.4%)
intangible/self-oriented	18 (45%)	22 (59.5%)	4 (40%)	5 (38.5%)
tangible/other-oriented	1 (2.5%)	5 (13.5%)	4 (40%)	1 (7.7%)
intangible/other-oriented	1 (2.5%)	2 (5.4%)	0 -	2 (15.4%)
None	0 -	0 -	0 -	3 (23.1%)
N =	40 (100%)	37 (100%)	10 (100%)	13 (100.1%)

$$\lambda = 0.157$$

identified most frequently by activists who do not aspire to a career in either the party organization or governmental structure, while tangible/self-oriented and intangible/other-oriented incentives are identified most often by those who do aspire to such a career.

Perhaps the most important factor affecting the ability of the party organization to retain its grass-roots activists is the extent of stability or change in incentives from recruitment to retention (Eldersveld, 1964, p. 286 ff; Ippolito, 1969; Bowman, *et al.*, 1969). The ability of the party to provide the recruitment incentives which motivated party participation in the first place, or to provide a satisfactory substitute, is a significant factor in determining whether the organization will have a cadre of grass-roots activists and maintain a viable structure at the grass-roots. The classic machine organization was uniquely able to retain a core of loyal activists by using its access to governmental structure as a source of tangible/self-oriented and intangible/self-oriented retention incentives.

The data in Table 6 provide some indication of the relative stability and change in incentives from recruitment to retention. The stability of tangible/self-oriented and intangible/self-oriented incentives is readily apparent from an examination of the data. Half (20 of 40) of those activists who were recruited by the appeal of tangible/self-oriented incentives reported their realization as rewards; better than half (22 of 37) of the activists recruited by the appeal of intangible/self-oriented incentives reported their realization as rewards. These two groups of activists display considerable stability in the structure of incentives affecting their party participation.

Most of the change in the structure of incentives occurred among those recruited by either tangible/other-oriented or intangible/other-oriented incentives. Activists in both groups tended to realize either tangible/self-oriented or intangible/self-oriented incentives as rewards. For example, only two of those

recruited by the appeal of intangible/other-oriented incentives reported their realization as rewards. At the same time, six of those who were recruited by the appeal of tangible/other-oriented incentives reported the realization of either tangible/self-oriented or intangible/self-oriented incentives as rewards. It appears from our data that urban party politics is not the most likely vehicle for the realization of either tangible/other-oriented or intangible/other-oriented incentives.

Conclusions

Our purpose in this paper was to identify the basic concepts of exchange theory and apply them to an analysis of urban party organization. The basic emphasis of exchange theory is on the nature and consequences of the transactions which take place between the organization and its activists in their struggle for survival in politics.

Having identified the basic exchanges and the concepts and constructs each involves, we attempted to explore the relationship between each of the concepts of exchange theory and selected variables of party participation. On the basis of this analysis, limited as it is, we feel justified in concluding that the urban party organizations we studied have been able to persist as "machines" by appealing to and retaining grass-roots activists with tangible/self-oriented and intangible/self-oriented incentives. At the same time, party leaders are able to direct the contributions of these activists to the performance of the variety of activities involved in electoral victory. This is particularly the case for the majority (Democratic) party.

Our analysis is not without its limitations. First, it is quite clear that certain difficulties inhere in connection with employing exchange theory to explain the survival or persistence of an organization. The most

obvious of these is the inability to test the theory for those organizations which have failed to survive altogether, i.e., which no longer exist. About all we can do in such instances is to assume, as exchange theory would hypothesize, that the organization failed to survive because it ceased to offer incentives to grass-roots activists which were of sufficient value to elicit the contributions necessary for the achievement of the group's collective goal. However, it is possible to employ exchange theory to explore the case of organizations which have persisted through time, albeit in a form different from an earlier one. In this respect it would seem profitable to use exchange theory to account for: 1) the demise of some urban machine organizations; 2) the persistence of others in substantially unchanged form; and 3) the persistence of still others in modified or completely different form (Greenstein, 1964).

A second limitation of our analysis lies in the possibility that variables for which data were not available are significant in the exchanges which account for the survival and viability of an organization.

Footnotes:

1. The open-ended measure for recruitment incentives read as follows:

Many party committeemen like yourself have told me of a number of different reasons for their having become party committeemen. From your own point of view, what are some of the reasons that led you to become a party committeeman?

The open-ended measure for retention incentives read as follows:

Now let's look at some of the experiences you have had as a party committeeman. Many party committeemen like yourself have told me of a number of different satisfactions and rewards that they have gotten from their party work. From your own point of view, what are some of the satisfactions and rewards that you have gotten from your party participation, either for yourself or for others?

2. In the interview schedule, each respondent was asked the following question:

If people ask you about your nationality background, what do you say that it is? Responses were recorded and coded both for the specific ethnic group named and for the "ethnic" and "native American" distinctions used in this analysis.

3. A series of open-ended and fixed alternative questions were used to measure the contributions of party participation. The open-ended measure read as follows:

Now I'd like to ask you some questions about the job of being a party committeeman.

First, how would you describe the job of being a party committeeman? I mean, what are some of the important things you do?

The first three contributions mentioned were recorded and coded for analysis. After the discussion was over, each respondent was asked to designate which of the contributions identified was "most important" in attaining the goals of the party. The most important contribution was used as the basis for classifying contributions according to the schema used in this analysis.

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