IN THEIR PROVOCATIVE BOOK Higher Superstition: The Academic Left and Its Quarrels with Science, Paul Gross and Norman Levitt use the example of natural science to illuminate the stance of contemporary theory in the humanities and related social sciences toward broad issues of the construction, verification, and status of what we used to call "knowledge." The particular poststructuralist pattern of strong cultural construction whose manifestations they map across a broad spectrum includes aspects of cultural studies, feminism, environmentalism, and scientific critique. Those areas display a common aversion toward the twin checks of internal consistency and external falsifiability familiar to empirical standards of verification. But that is just the point, since empiricism itself is under attack as merely a cultural construct. As the French cultural theoretician Pierre Machery noted in his A Theory of Literary Production in a remark that might have made more grist for the mill of Gross and Levitt, "A rigorous knowledge must beware all forms of empiricism, for the objects of any rational investigation have no prior existence but are thought into being." Such attitudes lead quickly to the position of leftist literary scholars like Catherine Belsey, whose "claim is not that such a history ... is more accurate, but only that it is more radical." Higher Superstition traces the genealogy of those attitudes in literary romanticism, as does Susan Haack in a recent article. I dissent not so much from their analysis of the current scene as from their genealogy of it. The notion of romanticism as irrational, emotional, idealist, or antiscientific has a long history in the twentieth century, touching such diverse figures as T. S. Eliot or the original New Critics who saw romanticism as lacking rigor, irony, or "wit," or historians like Peter Viereck who saw it as leading directly to Fascism. Gross and Levitt adopt a more nuanced and accurate view when they write of romantic opposition to "the narrowly empirical and the strictly rational" (italics mine). But the caution of those qualifiers drops away as they go on to write of Wordsworth as a "self-satisfied old Tory," of Blake's Newton as a "figment, not the preeminent mathematician and physicist of his time" (p. 105), of trendy studies of gender and science as "Goethe's—and
Wordsworth's and Whitman's—Romantic idealism in this year's Paris original" (p. 142), or of the "monumental figures" of Romantic individualism as "notable for their rejection of the worldview suggested by the orthodox science of their day" (p. 223). The common thread of these characterizations concerns an alleged Romantic hostility towards reason and empiricism as arbiters of experience.

I would like to argue not so much for calling such constructions of Romanticism "wrong" but rather for recognizing that a different construction of Romanticism is possible and even defensible, one in which the Romantics object not to reason and empiricism but to their undue dominance, and seek instead a reintegrated human psyche with reason as a major but not sole part. Such a view might begin with Blake's mythological figure of "Urizen," the pun in whose very name indicates which of the prime human faculties he represents. Blake memorably depicted him in chains in The Book of Urizen to indicate his fallen state, but also described in The Four Zoas (Night the Ninth) Urizen's joyous recovery of his original glory as soon as he renounces his desire to dominate all other powers. Correspondingly, in the last book of his epic The Prelude, Wordsworth called Imagination "but another name for absolute power / And clearest insight, amplitude of mind, / And Reason in her most exalted mood" and wanted future generations to think of himself and his friend Coleridge as "sanctified / By reason and by truth."5 And Coleridge himself had announced in the very first chapter of his great Biographia Literaria that "no authority could avail in opposition to Truth, Nature, Logic, and the Laws of Universal Grammar." He found poetry attractive because it seemed more, not less, logical than science: "Poetry . . . ha[s] a logic of its own, as severe as that of science; and more difficult, because more subtle, more complex, and dependent on more, and more fugitive causes."6 Shelley of course studied the science of his day carefully and went through a phase of considering himself a materialist. And even though a Romantic like Keats could write in moments of doubt that "I have never yet been able to perceive how any thing can be known for truth by consequitive [sic] reasoning" he would then immediately add "and yet it must be"? Those instances, which could easily be multiplied manyfold, would yield a different portrait of Romanticism and of the roots of current attitudes. The Romantic critique of "narrowly empirical" and "strictly rational" would then be no more anti-scientific than that of Gross and Levitt themselves when they criticize contemporary strong constructionism in these terms: "Cultural constructivism, at least in the full-blooded version of ideologues like Aronowitz, is a relentlessly mechanistic and reductionistic way of thinking about things. It flattens human differences, denies the substantive reality of human idiosyncracy, and dismisses the ability of the intellect to make transcendent imaginative leaps" (p. 56).

My point is not to argue that Gross and Levitt are themselves Romantic, but rather that different constructions of romanticism are possible and would lead to different conclusions. How, then, do we judge between them? One way of judging, which I favor recuperating in a new form, would apply traditional empirical standards and ask how well each view fits the evidence, how much
evidence contradicts each view, and how internally consistent is each theory. Another view, often more in favor in the humanities today, would choose according to which view is more likely to promote a desired political agenda. As the well-known theorist Frank Lentricchia bluntly states, "This sort of theory seeks not to find the foundation and the conditions of truth but to exercise power for the purpose of social change. It says there is no such thing as eternally 'true' theory. I conceive of theory as a type of rhetoric." That view, of course, grows largely out of French poststructuralist thought, particularly that associated with Foucault and various French materialist critics. It was able to succeed so well in literary circles partly because the traditional anti-empiricism and antirationality associated with one view of Romanticism had already cleared the way for it by diminishing humanistic reliance on reason and empiricism as checks. That was particularly so because even those enemies of Romanticism, the New Critics, had still construed literary study as an alternate form of knowledge to science. Those willing to challenge the new French theories on grounds of empiricism and reason were few on the ground by the late sixties, and in any case reason and empiricism were the very faculties now under attack as oppressive and constraining of attempts to establish a more just social order.

A typical position paper of a Continentally influenced theorist of the postmodern critique of objectivity runs like this one, in which I have changed only the names of the countries to make a rhetorical point:

In France relativism is an exceedingly daring and subversive theoretical construction. In America, relativism is simply a fact. Everything I have said and done in these last years is relativism by intuition. If relativism signifies contempt for fixed categories and men who claim to be the bearers of an objective, immortal truth . . . then there is nothing more relativistic than [our] attitudes and activity. From the fact that all ideologies are of equal value, that all ideologies are mere fictions, the modern relativist infers that everybody has the right to create for himself his own ideology and to attempt to enforce it with all the energy of which he is capable.

Today such critiques carry heavy claims of progressive attitudes, and seek to intimidate scrutiny and challenge by painting opposition as reactionary and oppressive. The problem is, the critique that I have just read is taken verbatim from Mussolini, and forms part of his 1921 positioning of Fascism as an advanced philosophical position in the article "Relativismo e Fascismo." This should not surprise us in view of the actual politics of many poststructuralist luminaries, from the key philosopher Martin Heidegger's support of the Nazis when university rector to the influential popularizer of deconstruction Paul De Man's wartime newspaper propaganda in support of Nazi designs. Their gravitation toward authoritarian governments consorts oddly with the rhetoric of indeterminism, to say the least. Indeed, the French poststructuralists themselves regularly supported murderous regimes such as Mao's China, which they glorified just after the only years in recorded history during which the population of China actually dropped because of governmental policies underlying the Great Leap Forward. Indeed, although the academic left regularly conflates elitism with capitalism and with modernism,
every Marxist revolution of our century has been led by an educated elite claiming to speak in the name of a less advanced "people." The problem may be not that literature is not political, but that simply claiming that it is political tells us nothing of the humanity or viciousness of the politics of the claimant.

The notion of contemporary "theory" as progressive carries over into the essays in the influential current book Critical Terms for Literary Study, published by University of Chicago Press. Less a handbook or dictionary than a set of brief essays on twenty-eight key terms or topics, the widely circulated volume functions as a window on state-of-the-art literary practice. The list of which topics have been privileged by inclusion repays attention. Terms like representation, discourse, determinacy/indeterminacy, culture, canon, gender, race, and ethnicity dominated the first edition (1990). To them the just-published new edition (1995) adds six more—popular culture, diversity, imperialism/nationalism, desire, class, and (improbably) ethics. Those are meant to clarify what the back cover describes as "the growing understanding of literary works as cultural practices." Both editions are as notable for what they omit as for what they include. This construction of the turn toward cultural practices does not feature such terms as evidence, consistency, or empiricism, which some might think important for analyzing the social embedding of literary activity. Nor is the currently fashionable label "desire" matched with any of the faculties such as reason or imagination that would have attended its Blakean balance in the human form divine. The book's canon also excludes "esthetics" or any related term, in accord with the current recoil from esthetic approaches to literature and (following Walter Benjamin's influential formulations) association of them with Fascism. Yet the volume is strangely silent on the other pole as well, the text as material object, and offers its quotations from previous authors as though the physical texts themselves were unproblematic, transparent lenses rather than themselves constructions. Instead of all those, Critical Terms for Literary Study repeatedly offers a partial selection featuring one set of terms while marginalizing or suppressing other sets that might contribute toward a fuller view. To the extent that the book accurately reflects "advanced" humanistic study, it also reflects the presuppositions that call forth responses like Higher Superstition. In remaining silent on material aspects of the text in particular, it misses an important opportunity to bring advanced criticism together with recent advances in editorial theory and textual construction in ways that might rejoin what Blake would regard as the fallen body of current theory.

A surprising number of terms that contemporary theory uses metaphorically have literal senses in contemporary textual construction. Among them are text, margin, gap, erasure, production, instability, and inscription. Those literal usages offer both an empirical check on some of the more extreme aspects of current theory and an opportunity for a fuller critical enterprise. That is especially true of the newer paradigms of editorial activity introduced over the past dozen years. In place of an older editorial enterprise aiming to recover an alleged ideal, pure, unitary form of a text corrupted in transmission, the newer paradigm accepts the validity of multiple authorized versions of texts that resemble processes as much as they do products. On the
one hand it sees the "eclectic" construction of texts as creating ahistorical hybrids never before seen on land or sea, and on the other it tends to regard "texts" as comprising more than merely the words of an individual work on the page. Shakespeare and Yeats offer ready examples of what I mean.

Any reader, layman or scholar, wishing to sit down and read "Shakespeare" cannot do that with a text that is unproblematic or transparent at the level of its own construction. That is, we read Shakespeare's plays not in editions that simply transcribe faithful authorial manuscripts, for there are no such manuscripts to transcribe, but rather in editions that scholars construct out of various imperfect textual "witnesses" or surviving textual versions known to be corrupt in major ways. The general procedure is for the editor to select one or another version as "copy-text," a technical term denoting the version that the editor follows when unable otherwise to decide what decision to make from the conflicting evidence, and in Anglo-American editing particularly associated with so-called accidentals like punctuation (for this reason, editors sometimes suggest a "divided authority" in copy-text). The editor then usually emends the copy-text according to evidence from other textual witnesses deemed to carry authority in a particular case. Such editions are called "eclectic" not necessarily in that the editors freely mix and match, but rather in that the resultant texts are comprised of parts chosen or inferred from various distinct documents as emendations of the copy-texts. As D. C. Greetham summarizes in his recent and now standard *Textual Scholarship: An Introduction*, "By the third quarter of the twentieth century, it would be fair to say that the dominant mode of Anglo-American textual criticism, institutionally and academically, was the copy-text school of eclectic editing designed to produce a reading clear-text whose features were [allegedly] a fulfillment of authorial intentions by the selection of authorially sanctioned substantive variants from different states of the text." As Greetham points out, this type of edition has become known as the "text that never was" but which "by implication, ought to have been, in the best of all possible worlds, since it constructed authorial intention in despite of the testimony of individual documents." Such substantive emendations are usually made according to criteria that Peter Shillingsburg has neatly schematized as either esthetic, historical, authorial, or sociological.

Besides deliberate emendation, one other major factor enters into the texts of Shakespeare that most of us read—the modernization of spelling. This might at first seem a harmless procedure, simply for the convenience of the reader translating antiquated Elizabethan spelling into standard modern form. But our notions of standardized spelling (and punctuation, for that matter) are only a little over a century old. The Elizabethans did not share them. Turning the protean varieties of Elizabethan orthography into orthodox modern renderings regularly loses ambiguities and richesses made possible by the earlier text. A brief and simple example occurs in the famous mock-judgment scene (usually Act III, Scene vi in modern editions) from *King Lear*, when the mad King addresses the disguised Edgar as judge, calling him a "robbed man of justice." But in the sole surviving witness text to this particular scene, Lear refers to a "robbed" man of justice, and the pun on robbed/robed carries rich
overtones lost in the silent modernization. Indeed, the modern texts that have Lear addressing Edgar at this point are themselves eclectic interpolations, since the original quarto does not indicate to whom Lear is speaking. This sort of thing happens with great frequency in the text. The result is that contemporary editions are multiple constructions both as eclectic copy-text editions and as modernized spelling (in contrast to “old spelling”) ones. The implications of that situation are only beginning to make themselves known.

Nearly all current theorizing and critique of Shakespeare's *King Lear*, whether older or newer in orientation, utilizes widely used eclectic current editions like the Riverside or Penguin, which employ modernized spelling as well. The fact that such editions have little documentary validity but rather are based on conflations made nearly a century after composition affects adherents of both the “older” and “newer” *King Lear*s. On the one hand, resisters of the “version” theory cannot simply advocate returning to the “old” or “true” text of *Lear*, because whatever text they mean by that is itself a constructed artifact, and usually a conflated one as well. On the other hand, the recuperation of versions is particularly damaging to newer readings emphasizing cultural practice and historical embedding. Surely the “text” that we would want to relate to Elizabethan cultural practices would be some variant of an Elizabethan text, rather than of a modernized construction that would better serve relation to our culture. The main witness documents to *King Lear* are two, the so-called Pied-Bull Quarto of 1608 and the famous “First Folio” of 1623 (there is also a “bad Quarto” of 1605). Seventeenth-century productions and texts of the play regularly followed the folio version. Not until 1709 did one Nicholas Rowe prepare the first edition of Shakespeare that we would call “critical,” in that it conflated texts of both the quarto and the folio tradition into a new hybrid purporting to be closer to the Shakespearean original, which was conceived as unitary and stable. That tradition continued all the way until 1986, when the controversial Oxford Shakespeare text prepared by Stanley Wells and Gary Taylor appeared. Their edition followed the arguments of scholars in *The Division of the Kingdoms* collection that the two sources—quarto and folio—represented two different *versions* of the play, which Shakespeare as practicing playwright had revised. The Oxford Shakespeare, accordingly, produced edited separate texts of the folio and quarto versions, rather than conflating them. In so doing they provide the “entire” play by printing edited texts of both the quarto and folio version, in contrast to the older eclectic or conflated texts which necessarily leave some material out.

What difference does it make? All the difference in the world. For example, Cordelia is stronger in one version than in the other, even to the point of apparently leading an army in act four. Lear's death speech differs, implying acceptance of defeat in the quarto text but continued illusion in the folio; and the quarto’s famous mock-judgment scene on the heath does not appear in the folio at all. Our modern texts are *constructions* in the literal sense, and the recoil from reason and empiricism helps explain why so many critics and theorists remain ignorant of the extent to which choices made by editors affect critical possibilities. Yet the choices—quarto, folio, or hybrid—are not
infinite, but circumscribed. Few would go so far as to advocate following the text of Nahum Tate, who rewrote the play in 1681 to give it, among other things, a happy ending! Incredibly, that version held the stage for a century and a half, all the way through the Romantic period. Not even the most anti-empirical theorist today advocates its return. Yet most contemporary critics still adhere to modernized conflated texts when discussing the political or social meanings of the play.

W. B. Yeats offers a more modern instance from our own century. I pass over quickly here the tendency of contemporary theorists to denounce Yeats’s politics by, say, unwittingly using the 1924 revisions of texts written thirty years earlier when discussing Yeats’s own early social views. They do so because the widely available collected editions of the poetry follow his own practice in keeping earlier quasi-chronological arrangements of volumes and sequences even while incorporating drastically revised texts under the earlier dates. The versions of “Dedication to a Book of Stories Selected from the Irish Novelists” or “Lamentation of the Old Pensioner” printed in the collected Poems in fact reproduce the drastic revisions of the early 1920s even while keeping the 1893 heading for the “Rose” section in which they appear. And even noting the change in title of a later poem like “September 1913” from the earlier “Romance in Ireland (On reading much of the correspondence against the Art Gallery)” might enable critics better to place the poem in its original context as part of the original campaign for a municipal art gallery in Dublin during the great labor battles of 1913. In those controversies, Yeats sided with the workers during the strike, just as they and their leaders sided with him on the gallery; he even published an article on their behalf, for which he received public thanks from fiery leaders like the socialist James Connolly and militant James Larkin. Knowledge of how and why the text was constructed might cause critics to reconsider the charge of elitism sometimes leveled against that poem and those surrounding it.

Because the discussion of King Lear has already illustrated the hazards of multiple versions, I focus here instead on the hostile reception accorded recently to Yeats’s famous lyric “A Prayer for My Daughter,” especially for what it can tell us about a different aspect of cultural construction—about the literary context that the writer may create for his work, and even about what constitutes the boundaries of a literary work in the first place. Especially in the case of short lyric poems, the tendency to take the poem itself as unit has led to badly flawed results. “A Prayer for My Daughter” has become a particular whipping boy for one brand of feminist critic, especially in its beautiful sixth stanza:

May she become a flourishing hidden tree
That all her thoughts may like the linnet be,
And have no business but dispensing round
Their magnanimities of sound,
Nor but in merriment begin a chase,
Nor but in merriment a quarrel.
O may she live like some green laurel
Rooted in one dear perpetual place.16
And here is Joyce Carol Oates's influential attack on that passage, taken from the lead essay of the journal in which it appeared: "This celebrated poet would have his daughter an object in nature for others'—which is to say male—delectation. She is not even an animal or a bird in his imagination, but a vegetable: immobile, unthinking, placid, "hidden". The activity of her brain is analogous to the linnet's song—no distracting evidence of mental powers . . . the poet's daughter is to be brainless and voiceless, rooted. So crushingly conventional is Yeats's imagination. . . ."17 To say the least, Oates's reading is highly improbable as well as bad botany (a laurel tree is not a vegetable). Not Yeats's poem but rather Oates's reading is "crushingly conventional." It contradicts most of what we know about Yeats's actual attitude toward his daughter, including the fact that he sent her not to a local Irish school but rather to the same Swiss boarding school to which he sent his son. He did that because he thought that the Irish schools taught girls conformity and prepared them for nothing but marriage (the daughter, Anne, went on to become one of the leading Irish artists of her generation and to praise her father's attitude toward her education).18 More importantly for our purposes, Oates's attack is based on an isolation of the individual lyric typical not only of her own school of criticism but also of the original New Critics against whom contemporary theorists like to define themselves. Yet as Hugh Kenner and others have pointed out, Yeats did not write individual lyrics, he wrote books of poems, and he spent considerable time arranging and ordering those individual volumes.19 "A Prayer for My Daughter," for example, comes from a book called Michael Robartes and the Dancer. That volume begins with the comic title poem suggesting ways in which women can enlighten men, and it ends with a short lyric about Yeats restoring a house for his beloved and strong-minded wife, Anne's mother. "A Prayer for my Daughter" occurs more precisely between the ominous poem "The Second Coming," with its vision of a "blood-dimmed tide" of World War One sweeping over the modern world, and "A Meditation in Time of War," which invokes the specific setting of the Irish "troubles" or period of rebellion and civil war. In that context, "A Prayer for My Daughter" looks quite different, as a father's loving expression of the desire to protect from growing civil violence his first-born child, a baby of four months at the time. Oates would be unlikely to condemn such a poem emanating from contemporary Bosnia or Rwanda, especially if the civil war there were inscribed in the volume itself. In the Irish context, too, the proscription of "opinion" means not that Anne is not supposed to have opinions, but that her thoughts should be the opposite of mere "opinion," Yeats's code word for the opinionated ideologies that he saw bringing bloody destruction to the Ireland around him and which he began attacking with the very first line ("Opinion is not worth a rush") of the volume. In contrast, Anne's "thoughts" are to display "magnanimities" surpassing and correcting the narrowly intolerant opinions he saw around him. She is not to be "unthinking," as Oates claims, but rather a superior thinker of wholeness, crowned with the laurel of poetry and victory. Oates's construction is a misconstruction, formed by dismantling Yeats's own broader vision and substituting her own more limited one instead, in an uncanny reenactment of the kind of "opinion" which the poem challenges.
“A Prayer for My Daughter” illustrates one final aspect of literary construction appropriate for a newly empirical blend of textual scholarship with contemporary theory. Current editorial theorists distinguish between the “linguistic code” of a work, its words, with the “bibliographic code” or physical features of the text, such as layout, spacing, or design. An important feature of the bibliographical code of “Prayer for My Daughter” is venue of publication. Like every new book of Yeats’s poetry to appear in the twentieth century, the original volume of Michael Robartes and the Dancer bore on its title page the imprint of Cuala (earlier Dun Emer) Press, as well as a revealing colophon usually at the back. Dun Emer was the small fine-arts press founded along the lines of William Morris’ Arts and Crafts principles by Yeats’s sisters and Evelyn Gleeson shortly after the turn of the century as part of Dun Emer Industries. The name Dun Emer means Emer’s Fort. It signified both the nationalist and the feminist impulses of the press, founded partly to promote artistic Irishness and partly to give employment outside the home to young Irish women. Dun Emer’s first book was Yeats’s collection In the Seven Woods (1903), and the ability to provide the first print run of his successive volumes (before the wider distribution offered by the later Macmillan editions) helped keep the press financially afloat. Publication under such auspices does not make Yeats a feminist, of course, and offered him some advantages in design and audience. But the decision to publish his volumes under such an imprint—nationalist, feminist, and with all the work done by women—ought at the very least to give pause to those who want to view his work from “Adam’s Curse” through “Prayer for My Daughter” and “Politics” as antithetical to modern feminisms. Neither the women of Dun Emer/Cuala nor the author of the poems was so simplistic. Attention to the bibliographical code and to the literal construction and distribution of the work opens our eyes to some of the complexities of mire and blood here, and of the original social embedding of the poetry as serving a largely feminist enterprise.

In tracing these various constructions—of romanticism, of theory, of King Lear, and of “Prayer for My Daughter”—I have not meant to challenge the notion of construction itself, at least in what Gross and Levitt call its “weak” form (p. 44). Rather, I have meant to suggest that the idea of construction is itself a construction, as are the objects of its activity. Yet to say that historical labels, or theories, or works of art are “constructed” is not to say that all constructions are equal. I hope to have made clear that some constructions are better than others, because some take fuller account of the evidence available, are more internally coherent, and are grounded in a marriage of empirical procedures and theoretical inquiry. The joining of textual construction and literary theory need not produce either readings or views that are old-fashioned on the one hand or merely trendy on the other. To the contrary, they can produce views suited to our modern climate, correcting the excesses of both past and present. Doing that depends, too, upon a recuperation of one of the great targets of poststructuralism and of cultural studies—personal agency. It is that deprecated but necessary agency that allows us to say with Wallace Stevens in his great poem “Esthetique du Mal”:
And out of what one sees and hears and out
Of what one feels, who could have thought to make
So many selves, so many sensuous worlds,
As if the air, the mid-day air, was swarming
With the metaphysical changes that occur,
Merely in living as and where we live.  

NOTES
1 Paul R. Gross & Norman Levitt. *Higher Superstition: The Academic Left and Its Quarrels with Science*. The page number of further references will be cited inside parentheses within the text itself.
3 Ibid., p. 23.
4 Susan Haack, "Puzzling Out Science," p. 28 (n. 6).
8 Frank Lentricchia, *Criticism and Social Change*, p. 12.
10 In *Diuturna*, pp. 374–377.
12 Edited by Frank Lentricchia & Thomas McLaughlin.
14 Peter Shillingsburg, *Scholarly Editing in the Computer Age*, p. 19 and passim.
15 Wells and Taylor also prepared an original-spelling edition for Oxford. See also *The Division of the Kingdoms*, edited by Gary Taylor & Michael Warren.
20 The most influential statement of this distinction is in Jerome J. McGann, *The Textual Condition*, ch. 2.

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