In principle, it seems a sensible, even attractive, move to combine method and theory across disciplines and research traditions to address a common problem. How, you ask yourself, can it hurt to increase the size of our analytic and investigatory toolboxes? Often, however, the cold light of day—and one’s colleagues’ scrutiny—can cast a sobering shadow.

Take this project. On reflection, it is not obvious why I imagined that comparativist scholars committed to a social constructionist perspective would be engaged, let alone convinced, by my argument. After all, it is an argument about the constitution of racial belief that is baldly psychological in its derivation and ensnared in methods of experimental investigation that every introductory anthropology student comes to believe are part of a contrived effort to efface the very cultural context that the field is committed to explore. And, adding insult to injury, against years of work showing that psychological reductionism is a hopeless mystification of an issue of power and authority, I conclude that there is a conceptual, mental priority to understanding racial practices. Exactly what did I expect?

To be honest, much worse. I cannot pretend that the commentators do not convey a deep skepticism about both the project’s methods and conclusions. But I am heartened by the clear and close readings given the paper, and the evident understanding of the argument the commentators obviously have. Indeed, I was frequently struck by how cogently my position is grasped and engaged if not acceded to. Many of the points raised are significant, and many signal a need for further work, particularly Hacking’s skepticism about the way cognitive developmental theory has embraced and perhaps contorted theories long debated in philosophy, Dominguez and Stoler’s concern that there may be limits to how micro our gaze on politics can be, and Estroff’s caution that experiments are useful to the extent that they inform us of everyday thinking.

Arguably the crucial reservation is Hughes’s closing notice that it may well not matter whether there is a special-purpose cognitive device underlying racial thinking—what counts is how to teach children “to
appreciate difference and value diversity in ways that we, as adults, have not" (p. 123). I find the idea sympathetic but potentially dangerous. How can we expect to develop methods of teaching without understanding the processes of learning? Does it make sense to motivate someone to diet by telling them they do not feel hunger? Does it make sense to motivate antiracism by telling children, through multicultural touring, that racial differences are valuable but not deep ("we're all the same under our skins") when every athletic shoe commercial tells them the former is not the case and their own private experience says the latter is not possible? In short, how can we expect the form of challenge not to change with the nature of the beast? Understanding is critical. It just isn't enough.

So, let me begin by rehearsing my argument as well as the logic of the research design meant to assess it. Then I propose to review its moves in an attempt to answer and acknowledge the criticism and commentary offered.

THE ARGUMENT IN BRIEF

1. Race as a category of mind is distinct from race as a category of power. The distinction is logical (one cannot have a category of power without having a corresponding category of mind) and possibly causal (e.g., it has been argued that race is a category of mind because of the role it plays in organizing power relations).
2. Racial thinking is intimately linked to essentialist reasoning. Most frequently this linkage has been explained in the following way: essentialist reasoning emerges as a function of the fundamental support such reasoning provides the political use of race.
3. An alternative interpretation is that race is essentialized because human psychological endowment includes an innate tendency to organize information about other humans in a very specific way. This tendency includes an essentialist heuristic.
4. We can test between the alternative causal accounts by investigating whether race is essentialized because it is politicized or whether it is essentialized because it is organized around innate principles of reasoning.
5. Conclusion: Race is recruited as a category of power because of the properties it has in virtue of being a domain-specific category of mind.

Let us consider each point in turn.
Race in the Mind Can Be both Logically and Empirically Distinguished from Race in Society

Consider first the logical distinction. When thinking about race, people (at least in modern American society) engage in two analytically separable acts. On the one hand, they distinguish racial kinds (to adopt the more careful language Ian Hacking recommends). On the other hand, they differentially rate individuals in virtue of their supposed membership in particular racial kinds. Clearly this latter point is linked to, even arguably a function of, relations of power: the correlation between systems for rating racial kinds and differential positions in hierarchies of power and authority is massive. Distinguishing racial kinds, in contrast, is not necessarily (although it might be in empirical fact) linked to relations of power and authority but is necessarily linked to questions of mental processing: discriminating (in the psychological sense) between different races is logically prior to discriminating (in the political sense) against members of different races. We cannot value something over something else, show preference for something over something else, fear something over something else, and so on unless we can tell the two things apart.

The critical question, then, is not whether these two things—what I have called racialism, on the one hand, and racism, on the other—can be analytically kept separate, but whether there is an empirical contingency linking the emergence of one with the emergence of the other. Neither a psychological nor political analysis is adequate by itself. For example, let’s accept, for a moment, that races are psychologically distinguished only because of the political “work” the system of racial thinking does. This would not diminish the need for a description at the level of psychological representation, since, as already observed, the act of political discrimination presupposes the act of psychological discrimination. This observation in itself may not be particularly compelling—not because it is trivial, which I believe it is not—but because it does little to untangle the causal relationship between racialism (race as a category of mind) and racism (race as a category of power). That is, on the basis of these data alone, we cannot tell which, if either, has priority.

Racial Thinking Is Intimately Linked to Essentialist Reasoning

Luckily there is a third phenomenon in the mix, essentialism. Race, like other features of our (both constructed and encountered) environment, is essentialized in the sense that racial identity is thought to be determined by a hidden essence that develops in the process of natural reproduction and is thought to be shared by all members of a particular racial kind. While essentialist construals play a central role in the repro-
duction and legitimization of power and authority, essentialist reasoning invariably plays a central role in racial systems for reproducing and legitimizing power and authority. The question of interest is whence racial essentialism? The most frequently voiced answer is that essentialism in racial thinking develops as a function of power relations. In essentializing race, not only are racialized relations of power and authority naturalized (grounded in the facts of nature), but racialized relations of power and authority are untethered from the ambiguous and (literally) superficial manifestations of race, its visual correlates. Essentialism, as Stoler proposes, provides a tactical mobility that allows race to be understood in remarkably flexible ways despite its apparent basis in human physical variation.

This explanation seemingly encounters difficulty given the generalized willingness, according to Medin and his associates, of humans to essentialize virtually anything, particularly any category of things. This difficulty is only apparent, however, since a political interpretation of racial essence supposedly explains a critical feature of the distribution of essentialist reasoning: not all categories and kinds that humans recognize are as readily essentialized. Indeed, race (and gender) turn out to be more essentialized than many other familiar strategies that humans use in sorting the social world into relevant kinds (e.g., occupational kinds that capture habitual patterns of functional behavior, or kinds of personality that capture habitual patterns of enduring affect). The reason is that race (and gender) are more essentialized because race (and gender) are more implicated in the organization and regulation of power. Voilà, prima facie proof that mental representations of race take their form because of the political function these representations serve.

Race Is Essentialized, in Part, Because Human Psychological Endowment Includes an Innate Tendency to Organize Information about Other Humans in a Very Specific Way

I propose an alternative account. Human cognition organizes information in a way that makes essentializing a range of human collectivities virtually inevitable. In particular, this essentialist understanding is the product of a domain-specific competence for parsing the world into human kinds of which race is one instantiation. More specifically, the human-kind competence is a conceptual structure that takes as input information about human variation and produces as output the principles necessary for forming the frequently encountered folk belief that humans can be partitioned into distinct types or kinds on the basis of their concrete, observable constitution. This is not to argue that humans are naturally partitionable into such kinds. Rather it is to argue that people believe that humans can be so partitioned. The notion of observable
constitution is not limited to surface features that are thought "racial" (e.g., skin or hair color), but captures the more general idea that racial differences are embodied, natural, enduring, and encompassing of nonobvious or inner qualities (including moral and mental ones) as well as outward physical ones.

This, I hope, defuses Hacking's concern that the human-kind competence might underwrite ideas about virtually any sort of human affiliation. The human-kind competence, should it exist, is a conceptual tool for developing an understanding of intrinsic human variation, a way precisely to distinguish critical identities and statuses that endure and are part of a corporate logic of social organization from those that are transitory and idiosyncratic. On the other hand, there is no reason to believe that because human kinds are thought to be embodied that they are tied to a specific range of visual manifestations. As Stoler makes clear, one of the most important things that essence does is allow us to be mistaken about identity via visual inspection alone.

What of racial kinds? There exist a number of human kinds that are defined in terms of their concrete, observable constitution and in terms of their intrinsic natures (e.g., gender, caste, possibly age-grades). What distinguishes racial from other human kinds is that racial kinds are in principle capable of comprehensive self-reproduction. You do not need more than one racial kind to produce a viable social system. Contrast, in this regard, racial to other candidate human kinds (e.g., gender). A female cannot reproduce without a male. Similarly, a single caste cannot reproduce the social system in which it is embedded without other castes, despite the fact that castes are largely endogamous. (The caste system is by definition a complex division of articulated labor; without the other castes no one caste can exist.) Races, in contrast, to the degree they are embedded in such existential divisions of labor, are so embedded in virtue of empirical (imperial) fact, not definition. Races are capable of sustaining themselves without, both figurative and literal, intercourse with other races.

The move from human to racial kind is not simply a move from more general to more specific, but one from potential belief to realized belief. That is, racial kinds are instantiations of a human-kind potentiality. This instantiation occurs only when the conceptual competence makes contact with cultural discursive and political economic environments. The human kind competence may stand apart from these environments but a human kind—that is, a fully interpreted belief about intrinsic human difference—cannot. But this radical dependence on the cultural and political environments does not imply that race derives its fundamental features from those environments or that it exists in our minds because of those environments. Rather, these environments recruit a mental
potential and use it to index, map, legitimize, and explain a particular
distribution of power and authority.

**We Can Assess This Claim by Comparing the Conceptual Representations of Race in Environments in which Race Is Politicized with Environments in which It Is Not**

The comparativist argument that race is conceptualized as a function of its role in organizing the distribution of power and authority is convincing to the extent that all and only politically charged systems of racial thinking are essentialized. It is not convincing in the event that there are racial systems that are essentialized but not politicized. As Dominguez notes, given the hegemonic success of the European and American imperial projects, finding instances of this sort may no longer be possible, even if they existed in the past. There is, however, one possible comparative study that can still be done. It involves children—indeed our (i.e., European and American) children. We know from previous research that children’s racial thinking undergoes significant change during the first decade of life. These involve changes in the sorts of things represented in racial categories and the sorts things done with racial categories. I speculated that this opens up an interesting possibility. We can examine whether the sorts of things represented in racial categories change as a function of the sorts of things done with racial categories. In short, we can explore whether racial categories take their form because of the potency they have for organizing children’s political lives or whether they take the form that they do independent of that organization. I suggest that the evidence supports the latter. Children, who otherwise do not politicize race, essentialize it.

**Hence, Race Becomes a Category of Power in Virtue of Its Properties As a Domain-Specific Category of Mind**

Several commentators were not convinced. They argue that an alternative interpretation is equally plausible, that it is the politics of race that shapes these young children’s beliefs. My error was having focused attention on too limited a view of the political arenas. After all, several commentators noted that the politics of race indelibly shapes the lives of American children and is indelibly inscribed in American public discourse. Imagining that children are outside the scope of American racialist and racist politics is naive, to put the most charitable interpretation on it. I agree. Children’s lives are as much influenced by racial politics as those of the adults with whom they live. We are not focusing on their lives in the sense of their life chances, the likelihood that they will live in poverty, suffer ill-heath, or attend substandard schools. The question is
whether children use race to organize those arenas of the life space that they control. Children's lives are governed by adults but not entirely controlled by them. Children have agency. They exercise that agency in all sorts of ways—as any parent can attest. The relevant question is, in those arenas in which children do have agentic potential, what role does race play? I believe the evidence here is both striking and informative: when it comes to structuring the environments in which children exercise significant control (e.g., the playground), race plays a minor role at best.

A second set of concerns turns on whether children themselves develop an appropriate repertoire of racial beliefs as readily as I suggest. Dominguez and Stoler doubt this, contending that "race is, in fact, not easy to learn" (See Dominguez, p. 97). Dominguez supports this by observing that "adults exposed to racial thinking through conquest or migration are often puzzled and 'misread' the signs. Biologists, physical anthropologists, and geneticists have never even agreed on how many different 'races of mankind' there are, nor what criteria of classification to use. . . . Official U.S. censuses have never agreed either, even in the context of the United States alone. Who, then, thinks that 'race' is easy to learn?" (p. 97). Two problematic assumptions underlie her argument. The first is the assumption that the development of an ability among adults lacking that ability closely resembles the development of that ability in children. Adults exposed to new languages through conquest or migration have great difficulty manipulating new linguistic signs. Yet, language is easy for children to acquire. It is just difficult for adults to do so. Why? Because children have access to a language-acquisition device, adults do not. I believe that there are parallels between children's and adults' social reasoning abilities. Similarly, just because the criteria for category membership is difficult to identify (or perhaps is even impossible to identify), this does not mean that it is difficult to acquire the category. Many categories whose membership criteria are difficult or impossible to identify are readily learned, often without any tuition at all (try to define, e.g., a mug versus a cup or a tree versus a shrub). One thing that we know is not a measure of learnability is the amount of effort adults invest in teaching it. Bowel control and natural-language grammars, to pick examples almost at random, are the focus of enormous parental attention and intervention. Parents worry, cajole, and seek all sorts of expert advice on how best to improve their children's speech and hygiene. But the bulk of evidence overwhelmingly supports the fact that children develop these skills largely on their own, independent of their parents' anxieties and efforts. Colonial administrators' concerns about the racial affiliations of Dutch children raised in the colonies is compelling evidence of how colonial administrators organize their understanding of the world, as
Stoler notes. However, as an account of cognitive development, it is not all that informative.

Consider now a third concern raised by several commentators; namely, whether race is as two-dimensional as I portray it. I do not have a two-dimensional image of race; race is a way of reducing the dimensions that we see in others. Take Estroff's example of differential diagnosis and hospital admission rates among blacks and whites. It is not I who simplifies race by reducing people to a racial status alone, as Estroff seems to suggest. It is the health care professionals whose decisions create the differential racial rates of involuntary admissions. What is complex about race is not its surface level manifestation; indeed, from that perspective race is "simple." What is complex about race is the depth of our cognitions about it. But what of personal experience? Do not the sorts of tasks I pose to young children violate the scope and depth of self engagement with race and racism? Do not they distort and ignore the very cognitive depth I just cited? Estroff argues that the "reciprocal and influential relationships between identifying others and self" are self-evidently important to understanding one's racial beliefs (p. 114). This is a strong, and intuitively plausible, claim. Yet, a growing body of literature now suggests that self- and other-identification and reasoning are largely independent of each other, at least with respect to race (see Cross 1985, 1991 for reviews). The long-held and influential view that black children's preference for white dolls meant that black children's self-image was damaged is predicated on the assumption that there must be just the "reciprocal and influential relationships between identifying others and self" as Estroff proposes (p. 114). Yet, surprisingly, this appears not to be the case. The reason is that the understanding of who each of us is personally is quite different from understanding who each of us is with respect to the various groups to which we belong and the positioning each of these groups has in social hierarchies. Thus, while I am as confident as Estroff that Patricia Williams provides articulate testimony on the subjective experience of prejudice, I am considerably less sure that this testimony conflicts with what we discover by examining the group performance of a sample of preschoolers on a series of controlled tasks. Williams's testimony is about one thing, the preschoolers' pattern of performance is about another.4

This disjunction between inner experience and attribution of social meaning should not be all that unfamiliar to anthropologists. As Appadurai (1990) notes, the pragmatic consequences of social engagement include interiorizations that are at once psychological and inauthentic (in the sense that they conflict with personal experience and affect). Thus, begging in South Asia, he suggests, "works" (for the beggar) because the conduct of public life draws the potential donor into a "community of sentiment" that guides and shapes behavior while leaving the donor's
"real" internal landscape unaffected (1990:107-110). Charity does not require sympathy or benevolent sentiment, only that a certain ecology of conduct exists. Part of the power of that ecology is that it is parasitic on precisely the sorts of two-dimensional portrayal that gives substance to the interiorization of social position rather than the infinitely richer experience of self as (semi)autonomous agent, which has unique and (semi)private access to affect.

These remarks do not address all the important issues raised in the rich and informative commentaries. Still, I hope they give a sense of my appreciation for the thoughtful reading that the piece received. In the end, I have to admit, I believe that a theoretically and methodologically collaborative effort is not only sensible but can thrive and be mutually informative.

ADDENDUM

Diane Hughes raises several specifically methodological questions that demand a more detailed response. Hughes contends that I have misconveyed previous research in the developmental literature as well as misinterpreted my own research findings. For instance, Hughes claims that studies of cross-race friendships reveal a more biased pattern of behavior than I suggest. This is an important point: if young children are in fact more racially exclusive in their friendships than I portray, this would fundamentally undermine my argument that race is not politicized by preschoolers. Hughes cites several studies that show a pattern of bias in friendships. Unfortunately, she combines here research on pre-schoolers with research on school-aged, including adolescent, children. I do not contend that children generally do not politicize race, but rather that young children (preschoolers) do not do so. There is no doubt that children develop the bias patterns of association typical of the adults around them. The question is when. A large number of studies show that preschool and school-aged children are reliably different in their willingness to enter cross-race friendship. None of the work Hughes cites suggests otherwise.5

What of preschooler children's racial attitudes, Hughes asks? Is there not considerable work showing that during the preschool years children develop strident racial prejudices? Does this not indicate that race is politicized? Indeed, I discuss this work in the body of the article, noting that it indicates that children use race to project properties that do not necessarily fall under the notion of race itself. The relevant question is whether these attitudes represent evidence that children are using race in the same way that the adults around them do. In fact, they indicate just the opposite. For adults there is an imperfect but demonstrable
relationship between attitudes and action. Adult racial prejudice influences adult practices of inclusion and exclusion. For children, this is not the case. Children's racial prejudices do not predict patterns of association. And this is not because children's prejudices generally do not predict patterns of association, as studies of gender belief, stereotype, and bias show (Fagot et al. 1986; McCandless and Hoyt 1961).

Hughes also suggests that my finding that preschoolers understand that race is immutable is inconsistent with widely accepted work by “developmental psychologists.” In fact, a number of studies, indeed influential studies, indicate that preschoolers do understand that race and gender are immutable both over the life span and over superficial transformations. While Hughes is correct that previous research suggested otherwise (see Aboud and Skerry 1983; Semaj 1980), more recent work has challenged these findings and called into question the reliability of the research design on which they were based. Bem (1989), Siegal and Robinson (1987), Springer (1995), and Taylor (1996), for example, provide compelling evidence—entirely consistent with my work—that preschoolers expect both gender and race to be fixed at birth and be immutable. The problem with previous research, Bem (1989) and Siegal and Robinson (1987) point out, is that earlier studies used a task that biases children against making judgments that constancy is maintained. The traditional strategy for assessing a child's grasp of either gender or racial constancy has been to ask the child whether a person's identity changes when superficial changes are made to that person's appearance. For example, is a black person wearing a blond wig and white makeup still a black person? When preschool children say, as researchers found that they do, that the person is no longer black, this has been interpreted as evidence that they do not grasp constancy. But, as Bem (1989) points out, asking children to make identity judgments on the basis of sudden changes in appearance is curious since children virtually never encounter such changes in the course of daily experience. Such judgments may be informative of what children believe about the experimenter's intention and how much they want to please the experimenter; but they probably have little relevance to children's understanding of constancy. Indeed, Siegal and Robinson (1987) found that by simply reversing the order of the question (i.e., by asking is the person the same gender after the transformation as before the transformation), the proportion of preschoolers who showed constancy rose from one-third to three-quarters.

Hughes's most disturbing claim is that I misinterpret my own findings. Specifically, she argues that I misrepresent the findings of studies alluded to in the article but not discussed in detail there. In the earlier article I argue that by three years of age, children have a much more adult-like understanding of race, and particularly racial essentialism, than
previous scholars have credited them with. Even quite young children expect racial identity to be linked to family background, inherited, and impervious to environmental influence. Thus, for example, even three-year-olds believe that a child is more likely to racially resemble its parents than to resemble them in physique. Hughes’s interpretation of the same results is quite different. She reviewed the relevant publications and claims that when I presented three-year-olds with stimuli that contrasted race, occupation, and body build, they were likely to choose race over body build as a basis for continuity in growth, but not as a basis for continuity in inheritance. Importantly, however, they were as likely to choose occupation as they were to choose race as a basis for continuity in growth and inheritance. Four-year-olds were likely to select race over body build in the inheritance but not the growth condition, and to choose race over occupation in the growth but not the inheritance condition. Only seven-year olds consistently chose race over body build and race over occupation as a basis for continuity in both the growth and the inheritance conditions, an observation that is consistent with psychologists’ findings regarding constancy. [p. 120]

What accounts for these radically different interpretations of the same data? Answering this question requires describing the research design in slightly more detail (a comprehensive description of the research and its design can be found in Hirschfeld 1995, 1996). To avoid the task demand of previous research (which asked children to make identity judgments in the face of sudden changes in appearance), I asked children to make identity judgments in the context of naturally occurring changes with which even young children are familiar, namely the changes and continuities inherent in growth and inheritance. Children know that some aspects of a growing organism’s appearance change over time while other aspects do not. They also know that an organism resembles in appearance its parents, yet it is also different in appearance from them.

We could exploit this knowledge in order to examine children’s understanding of constancy (by asking children if a person’s race remains the same over the course of the life span or by asking them if a person’s children are likely to be the same race as that person). The problem is that this task would be too simple: children would surely answer yes on the basis of token identity alone. A more difficult task would pit race against some other physical feature. If children are unsure of racial constancy then they should expect that a person’s race changes during his or her lifetime as is their body build or even their habitual activities (as captured by occupation). Similarly, children should readily expect that their parents offspring will be as likely to resemble that person racially as they are to resemble them in body build or in habitual activity.

To test this, we showed one group of children a drawing of someone whose race, body build, and occupation are evident, and then showed them comparison drawings of two children, one of whom resembles the
person in body build and occupation, the other of whom resembles the person in race and occupation. If they do not grasp racial constancy, when asked which comparison drawing is a picture of the person when they were a child, children should be as likely to pick the first comparison drawing as the second. We showed a second group of children the same triad of drawings and asked them which child is the person's offspring. We reasoned that if they do not grasp constancy then they should be as likely to select the first comparison drawing as they are to select the second comparison drawing. Children who were posed the first question ("show me the picture of X when he/she was a child") participated in the growth condition; children who were posed the second question ("show me the picture of X's child") participated in the inheritance condition.

We presented children with three triads; in the first triad race was pitted against body build, in the second race was pitted against occupation (habitual activity), and in the third occupation was pitted against body build. The contrast of greatest interest here is the one in which race is pitted against body build (the critical questions being how often children chose the comparison drawing that matched the initial drawing racially and how often they chose the comparison drawing that matched the initial drawing in body build). This contrast is important because both race and body build are corporeal traits, literally embodied. Moreover, both are inherited aspects of appearance and both are informative of the population from which one is descended. If children grasp racial constancy—believe that race is immutable over the life span and inheritable—then they should choose the racially matched comparison drawing more often than the one that matches in physique. Table 1 reports the percentage of the time children selected the comparison drawing that matched the initial drawing racially (i.e., how often they chose race over body build). Note that random selection is 50 percent.

I first looked to see whether children's responses to the growth question differed significantly from their responses to the inheritance question. The issue is of interest because, unlike adults, young children

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<th>3-year-olds (%)</th>
<th>4-year-olds (%)</th>
<th>7-year-olds (%)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Growth condition</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inheritance condition</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>96</td>
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<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>98</td>
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Table 1
Frequency with which children in three age groups chose a comparison drawing that matched the initial drawing's race rather than body build.
may not understand that continuities in growth and continuities in inheritance involve (more or less) the same biological processes. Strikingly, there is no reliable difference between the children's performances on the two conditions. The appropriate data to analyze, then, are the averages across the two conditions. The analysis revealed that although the effect increased with age (i.e., older children were more confident in their judgments than younger children), children in all three age groups expected a person's race to be immutable. Hughes, to repeat, claims that this is not the case. She argues that four-year-olds but not three-year-olds reliably show constancy only in response to the inheritance question, and that three-year-olds but not four-year-olds reliably show constancy only in response to the growth question. Her reasoning, however, is flawed because she ignores the fact that the two sets of means cannot be statistically distinguished from one another (i.e., she has no warrant to compare across conditions that are not significantly different). Hughes analyzes the data as if there were a stable difference between the two sets of means, when in fact there is none. In short, she is making a distinction that the statistics do not support. This sort of reliance on the "raw" data (the numbers do fall out in the direction she suggests, there is just no reason to believe that they are reliably patterned in this way) rather than using inferential statistics to guide our conclusions is, I suspect, precisely the sort of error that psychologists are convinced anthropologists are likely to make.

NOTES

1. This characterization is drawn from and corrects some ambiguities in a proposal outlined in Hirschfeld 1996.

2. An alternative proposal is that human kinds are all and only those kinds that have been essentialized, the essentialization deriving from a general willingness to essentialize categories (as Medin has suggested) or a specific willingness to essentialize nonhuman living kinds extended to human collectivities (as a number of cognitivists and historians have suggested). I, however, do not think that the evidence supports either the domain-general or the tethered-to-biology, domain-specific interpretation, but interested readers might look at Hirschfeld 1996 and Gelman and Hirschfeld in press for fuller discussions of this point.

3. I was surprised that several of the commentaries, including Dominguez, Estroff, and Hacking, see me as taking race to be a visual ideology. Indeed, like Stoler, I believe that race invariably involves talk about the visual, but as invariably involves beliefs about essences—essences that explain why the visual is an imperfect guide to racial distributions.

4. For readers interested in more detailed methodological information can consult Hirschfeld 1996. Suffice to say, pace what several commentators assumed, (1) the stimuli were color drawings, not photographs, that did not exaggerate racial features; and (2) while several of the studies focused on children's reasoning about blacks and whites, several also explored children's beliefs about Hispanic/white and Hispanic/black comparisons.

5. Indeed, she does not deny this. Rather she suggests that there is some inconsistency in the results reported, citing as an example a recent ethnography of preschoolers by Ausdale.
and Feagin (1996). In fact, Ausdale and Feagin's main point is that previous researchers have underestimated the extent to which "children create and assign meaning for racial and ethnic concepts," particularly the "clear and often sophisticated understanding" that children have of these concepts (1996:779). This, of course, is the point that I am trying to make. In terms of preschoolers using race in the regulation of power and friendship, Ausdale and Feagin report only one incident of overtly and explicitly racial exclusion, an incident that everyone involved makes clear was exceptional in the extreme. Most of the incidents that they interpret as racial bias involve differences in language as well as differences in race. This is consistent with other studies revealing that bias does emerge when, but only when, ethnicity or race is mapped onto language (see Hirschfeld 1996:139 for a discussion of this point). Other examples Ausdale and Feagin discuss turn on much more indirect evidence of race, and often involve only indirect evidence of bias (as when, e.g., a child talks about the skin color of another child or talk about ethnic food, or even the color of a toy). That children notice racial features does not mean that they use these features in the service of exclusion (although they might use them occasionally for purposes of inclusion, see Fishbein and Imai 1993).

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