APPENDIX S1: Scoring system for monitoring dilemma variables

A more user-friendly version of this appendix (as an interactive MS Access form) is available upon request from the author

		p (probability of	catching rule-breaker)		p=
p_raw =min(1,p4)*p5	5				o_raw=
p = .01 if p_raw<=.01	p = .1 if .01 <p_raw<=.1< th=""><th>p = .25 if .1<p_raw<=.25< th=""><th>p = .5 if .25<p_raw<=.5< th=""><th>p = .75 if .5<p_raw<=.75< th=""><th>- <u>-</u></th></p_raw<=.75<></th></p_raw<=.5<></th></p_raw<=.25<></th></p_raw<=.1<>	p = .25 if .1 <p_raw<=.25< th=""><th>p = .5 if .25<p_raw<=.5< th=""><th>p = .75 if .5<p_raw<=.75< th=""><th>- <u>-</u></th></p_raw<=.75<></th></p_raw<=.5<></th></p_raw<=.25<>	p = .5 if .25 <p_raw<=.5< th=""><th>p = .75 if .5<p_raw<=.75< th=""><th>- <u>-</u></th></p_raw<=.75<></th></p_raw<=.5<>	p = .75 if .5 <p_raw<=.75< th=""><th>- <u>-</u></th></p_raw<=.75<>	- <u>-</u>
p1: area to be covered by	y individual monitor = p	1a/p1b/p1c			p1=
p1a: area of PA (km2)					p1a=
p1b: area of exploitable res					p1b=
Protected resource scatt exploitation anywhere	tered evenly over entire PA; f	airly equal likelihood of	(e.g. nomadic pastoralists of hur	ulations living within limits, or with nomadic / semi-nomad nters with camps); deep sea fishing	1
Protected resource patch	hy, but distributed througho	ut PA	activities that generally occur w	restrial PA; forest-based resources in fragmented landscar ithin walking distance of a road (many roads within PA)	, 2
Protected resource heav	vily clustered but distributed	throughout PA	e.g. fishing ponds, activities that within PA)	t generally occur within walking distance of a road (few roa	ads 3
Exploitation generally oc	ccurs within close distance of	border	e.g. most firewood, fodder colle	ection, timber, grazing (by people living in outside settleme	ents) 4
,	ocalized clusters and close dis		e.g. shallow reefs, beach-seining	5,	5
p1c: number monitors: nun	mber of employed monitors (for top-town) or user grou	p size (for community-based)		p1c=
p2: % area monitor can c	cover per hour (rough es	timate [¥] based on tran	sportation mode) = p2a/p1	L	p2=
p2a: monitor's most comm	on mode of transportation				p2a =
Car/boat/motorbike					5
Boat/bike/horse					2
Foot, easy to average ter	rrain				1
Foot, difficult terrain			e.g. dense forest, mountains, sw	vamp	0.5
p4: probability of detecti	ing offender during a 4h	nr shift = p2*4*p4a			p4=
p4a: temporal predictabilit	ty of illegal event:				p4a=
•	hr, can occur at any time, las			e hunting is legal; Rare or opportunistic take of illegal spec	
	ppen at any time, including ni	ght	e.g. hunting or fishing		0.33
predictable schedule or				orest products, fishing with nets	0.5
•	ns of regular visitation, or last		e.g. smaii-scale swidden agricuit	ture, mining, long term fishing nets	1
Permanent presence (ca	nn comfiscate assets even if o	ffenser not there)	e.g. large-scale or permanent ag	griculture, residence	10
p5: probability of recogn	izing illegal activity If of	ffender is observed =	(p5a+p5b)/2		p5=
p5a: activity conspicuousne	ess				p5a=
Resembles legal activity	imperceptible			pecies if activity is otherwise legal, surpassing quota, illega In area where people are otherwise allowed	l activity 0.1
Can be detected, but car	n pretend to be doing someth	ning else	e.g. Setting traps where people common	are otherwise allowed, hunting w/o permit where permits	s are 0.5
Conspicuous			presence where people are not illegal and conspicuous equipme	allowed, presence of livestock where livestock not allowed ent	d, using 1
p5b: product conspicuousn	ness:				p5b=
product immediately ind	distinguishable from legal pro	ducts	e.g. species caught illegally but i	indistinguishable from legally caught version, pearls, preci	ous 0
small enough to fit in po	ocket		e.g. small NFTPs, orchids, anima	ıl parts,	0.1
Can fit in backpack			e.g. firewood, fodder, agricultur	ral products, small to med animals	0.5
bulky and impossible to	hide		e.g. med to large animals, timbe	er	1

¥ based on rough estimation that a monitor can cover 1km2 per hour on foot (walking 4km/hr, with a detection range of a little over 100m in each direction)

C (cost of monitoring)							
Ccatch: if C3 = 5, Ccatch = 5 otherwise, Ccatch = (C1 + C2 + C3 + C4) / 4	C=						
C1: Energy costs / discomfort:							
Can monitor from stationary location p1<1 and habitat open		1					
monitoring occurs in day, requires little physical activity e.g. monitoring via car or boat		2					
monitoring occurs in day with some physical activity, conditions normal default for monitoring on foot		3					
monitoring occurs at night or in day with bad conditions mention of heat, cold, demanding terrain e.g. ice, steep mountain,		4					
monitoring occurs under excruciating conditions e.g. ice, steep mountain, C2: Opportunity cost / ability of monitor to multi-task	c2=	3					
Monitors participate in same activity in same area as potential rule-breakers	C2-	1					
Monitors do own activity, but in same area as potential rule-breakers		2					
Monitoring takes some extra time, but can be done periodically e.g. occasional raids, inspection of homes, watching a radar etc.		3					
Monitors must devote most time to monitoring		4					
Monitoring is full time job		5					
C3: Safety costs: danger of monitoring / confronting a rule-breaker	c3=						
No more risk than everyday life		0 1					
minimal risk (wildlife, hostile but unarmed people with no history of violence) some risk (harsh environment, dangerous wildlife, armed people but no history		2					
considerable risk (armed people with some history of violence)							
guerrillas out to kill		5					
C4: Social costs: Potential social retaliation for punishing a rule-breaker	c4=						
typical rule-breakers live in different community than monitor and have little political power; general community supports rule/role of monitor or neutral		0					
typical rule breakers live in same community as monitor, but not related & have little political power; general community supports rule/role of monitor or neutral		1					
typical rule-breakers are from different community than monitor and have little political power; general community views rule/role of monitor negatively		2					
typical rule breakers live in same community as monitor, but not related & have little political power; general community views rule/role of monitor negatively		3					
typical rule breakers are in monitor's family, village authorities, or people monitor relies upon; general community supports rule/role of monitor or neutral typical rule breakers are in monitor's family, village authorities, or people monitor relies upon; general community views rule/role of monitor negatively		4 5					
B(Benefit of resource) Bu = for individual user, Bm# = for monitor		3					
if Bu1=0 or Bu2=0, Bu=0; otherwise, Bu = (Bu1+((Bu3+Bu2)/2 -2)) max=5	Bu=						
Bm = (Bm1 + (Bm2/2)) max = 5	Bm=						
	1/Bm1=						
Worth nothing (no one wants to use resource regardless of rules)	_	0					
A single take has little to no monetary value e.g. Firewood, fodder, grazing livestock, many NTFPs		1					
A single take has some monetary value e.g. Fishing, hunting small-med animals, swidden agriculture, small-scale timber/mining		2					
A single take has significant monetary value e.g. Permanent agriculture/ranching/settlement, med-scale timber/mining, large animals e.g. trawling, ivory, oil, Large-scale forestry/mining,		3 4					
Bu2: Alternative Sources	Bu2=						
lots of alternative sources, no extra costs associated with using alternative							
sources e.g. Can get same product legally - quality, distance, etc. all equal or worse for illegal sources	!	0					
lots of alternative sources, extra costs are minimal (slight inconvenience) e.g. Can get same or similar product legally, but slightly farther/slightly lower quality/ slight	y higher	1					
some alternative sources, although some extra costs. (small life-change e.g. Can get same or similar product legally, but farther/lower quality/higher		2					
required or small decrease in income involved) competition/lower return (e.g. with legal fishing method)/have to pay minimal access fees							
alternative sources are much more costly (significant life-change required or decrease in income involved) e.g. Can get same or similar product legally, but much farther/much lower quality/much lower return/have to purchase or pay large access fees		3					
no alternative source e.g. Fish/bushmeat/firewood/grazing where no legal sources exist & location is far from		4					
market. Land for settlement/agriculture where there are no legal options							
Bu3: Role in subsistence	Bu3=						
for recreation only		0					
luxury item or minimally useful useful, but not essential. May help with income/diet but not main contribution		1 2					
userus, but not essential. May high with income, duet out than contribution important, but not only source of protein, calories, income, etc.		3					
essential for subsistence, few to no other options		4					
Bm2: Collective benefits beyond value of resource itself	Bm2=						
value of resource taken = value lost e.g. sustainable extraction or extraction of resources that have little to no indirect impact or	1	0					
national/local economies or of species considered pests		Ü					
loss of resource causes other minimal per-capita losses e.g. hunting/fishing in tourist areas visited for general ecosystem (rather than species itself)		1					
habitat destruction (grazing/firewood/clearing land) in slightly degraded lands resource is keystone / it's loss causes loss of other resources e.g. selective logging, mining, hunting keystone species (not critical for tourism)		2					
e g clear-cutting primary forest trawling severe mining cutting mangroves dynamiting							
extraction of resource causes severe damage beyond value of resource itself reefs		3					
very limited resource, Critical for economy e.g. killing animals that carry substantial tourism industry (e.g. mt. gorillas); dynamiting reef	š	4					
M (Direct benefit to monitor for catching a rule-breaker)#							
nothing or negative e.g. there is no fine / users rarely have money or assets with which to pay fine / prison is the		0					
very small e.g. token fine/bribe		1					
small to medium e.g. small to medium fine or bribe, confiscation of assets of value (cattle, guns, crops)		2					
high e.g. companies with assets to pay large fines; confiscation of very valuable assets (boats,							
cars, permanent houses)		3					