SHOULD PHILOSOPHERS AND EDUCATORS BE SPEAKING TO EACH OTHER?
Gary D Fenstermacher
School of Education
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

In a previous issue of *Educational Theory*, René Arcilla sets out to explain why philosophers and educators are not speaking to one another. He begins with the contention that “the philosophical community expresses no interest in thinking about education,” and “the educational community does not seem to care about philosophy.” In an effort to effect a rapprochement between the two, Arcilla turns to Dewey’s analysis of the relationships between philosophy and education as these are developed in *Democracy and Education*. Arcilla contends that Dewey’s conception of the connections remain powerful and evocative, but falls short in an important way. Educators have not turned to philosophy for the social theory they need to sustain their educative endeavors, as Dewey would have them do. Rather they turned to social science, with the result that “the conversation between philosophers and educators [is] today dead” (PE, 8).

Arcilla offers two ways to recover the conversation. The first is for philosophers of education to join the social science theorizers, becoming such things as “feminist anthropological theorists, or liberal political-science theorists, or postmodernist sociological theorists” (PE, 10). Arcilla asserts that many philosophers of education have selected this first path, perhaps unaware that its ultimate consequence is the abandonment of philosophy. The second option is for philosophers of education “to discover how to make those parts of philosophy which are precisely not featured in the social sciences pertinent to educators” (PE, 11). Arcilla concludes with only a hint of how this second option works, directing us to consider skepticism and skeptical questioning as something unique to the work of the philosopher that is not also contributed by the social scientist.

This fretful analysis of the current state of affairs between philosophy and education is provocative and clearly well-intentioned. It is also illuminating in its critique of Dewey’s exposition of the connections between philosophy and education. But alas it is also too imprecise, at too gross a level, and with too many questionable presuppositions to serve as a compelling warning to philosophers of education to alter their conduct. In turning over the definitions and logic of Arcilla’s argument, I try to show how the absence of nuance and complexity impairs the case he makes. I also raise doubts about the central theme of Arcilla’s argument, that the marriage between philosophers and educators “is currently on the rocks,” that the conversation between the two is dead. I conclude with some ways of thinking about

---

1. René Vincente Arcilla, “Why Aren’t Philosophers and Educators Speaking to Each Other?” *Educational Theory* 52, no. 1 (Winter 2002), 1. This article will be cited as PE in the text for all subsequent references.
philosophy of education that may sustain the hoped-for relationships between philosophy and education that are clearly desiderata for Arcilla, and for which he and I are in agreement.

Are Philosophers and Educators Not Speaking?

There are two major claims contained in Arcilla's argument that deserve close consideration. The first is the empirical claim that philosophers and educators are not currently speaking. The second is the normative presupposition that they should be. The empirical claim is taken up in this section; the normative claim, in a later section.

Is it indeed the case that philosophers and educators are not speaking to one another? To find out, it is first necessary to ascertain the members of each of the sets to which Arcilla refers: Who are the educators of whom he writes, and who are the philosophers? Following a determination of the membership of each set, we can then inquire whether it is indeed the case that some or all members of these sets are not communicating across the two sets. Unfortunately Arcilla does not specify the membership of either set, so I do so here. Among those belonging to the set of educators one might count K-12 classroom teachers, school building and district administrators, college teachers, teacher educators, educational researchers and evaluators, educational policy analysts, staffs of professional education organizations, and authors of educational texts. If all of these are members of the set of educators, then the claim that educators and philosophers are not speaking to one another is likely to fail. One need only examine the citation lists in education journals and magazines or look up citation references on the ISI Web of Science Internet site to establish a prima facie case that educators and philosophers are conversing with one another. Educational researchers, policy analysts, teacher educators, and staffs of professional education organizations are frequently found citing the work of philosophers, and philosophers are often found consulting with educator organizations, serving on their committees, and writing for their publications.

Who are the members of the set of philosophers? At times, the reader has the sense that Arcilla is referring to philosophers who are members of university departments of philosophy. In this sense of membership, Arcilla appears to be lamenting the inattention of contemporary academic philosophers to matters educational. This claim will likely bear up under scrutiny, as there does not appear to be much discussion of educational matters in the disciplinary literature of professors housed in university departments of philosophy, nor much communica-

---

2. ISI Web of Science is an Internet web site available by subscription. It includes the Science Citation Index, the Social Science Citation Index, and the Arts and Humanities Citation Index. Information on subscribing to this website can be found at <http://www.isinet.com/isi>.

GARY D FENSTERMACHER is Professor in the Program in Educational Studies at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan. His primary areas of scholarship are character education, the moral dimensions of teaching, and accountability and accreditation in teacher education.
tion between these philosophers and educators, whether the latter are situated in tertiary, secondary or elementary schools. I am less sure that the claim will bear up when the set is expanded to include philosophers employed in departments or colleges of education.

Might philosophers employed in departments or colleges of education be characterized as in a dialogical relationship with educators? That depends, as we have seen, on who the educators are. Some ways of identifying educators (such as teacher educators or educational researchers) indicate some fairly close relationships to philosophers. Other ways may suggest distant or nonexistent relationships, as when the set of educators is restricted to K-12 classroom teachers. On the other hand, I am not aware of any evidence that compels the claim that classroom teachers do not read Maxine Greene, Thomas Green, Nel Noddings, or Denis Phillips. Would reading the work of these philosophers count as being in a dialogical relationship with philosophy? I would like to think so, although I know there are those who would argue that reading and reflecting on someone's work is not the same as being dialogically related to them.

Having raised the possibility that more educators than we know attend to the work of philosophers of education, consider the possibility that philosophy also appears in educational contexts via the work of scholars who are not typically identified as professional philosophers. Among names that come to mind are Robert Coles, Howard Gardner, bell hooks, John Goodlad, Lawrence Kohlberg, and Lee Shulman. These scholars do a good deal of philosophical work themselves, and are also attentive to the work of professional philosophers. Quite a few of the them are also social scientists, an observation that lends a somewhat different perspective to Arcilla's notion that educators have turned from philosophers to social scientists for guidance with their problems. Arcilla makes this point as if it represents a turning away from philosophy, but it may also be understood as an acknowledgment of philosophy by a different audience. That is, it is not so much that in favoring social science over philosophy, educators have rejected philosophy, as Arcilla suggests. Rather it is that social scientists have become philosophy's "translators" to education. Social scientists are the "intermediary inventive mind" of which William James spoke in his *Talks to Teachers.* Social scientists establish the empirical referents and conditions for philosophical ideas, and as such are not only more accessible to educators, but are also more useful to them. Whether or not one finds this contention warranted, it does make apparent that philosophy makes its appearance in education in several different ways, sometimes directly in the work of

3. It seems somewhat bizarre to even ask such a question, as if philosophers of education were not educators, nor educators, philosophers.

4. Arcilla might reject my claim that discourse between educational researchers and philosophers of education is evidence that educators and philosophers are speaking to one another. This rejection would be based on his contention that philosophers of education who are deeply engaged with social scientists are not doing philosophy so much as they are doing social science, and thus the discourse between the two has more the form of educator-to-educator talk rather than philosopher-to-educator talk. I take up this point later in this article.

educational philosophers, sometimes in the use of philosophical concepts and theories by educational scholars who are not philosophers.

One need only introduce more robust and inclusive conceptions of the philosophical and educational role to see that there may be more communication between philosophy and education than Arcilla believes to be the case. That the relationship may not be as estranged as Arcilla suggests is not, however, the only empirical point in need of scrutiny. There is another, subtler, element in Arcilla's argument that bears inspection.

WHO BEARS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONVERSATION?

As Arcilla makes his case for an improved relationship between philosophy and education, he places the burden for the rapprochement on the philosopher. He writes of the two things the philosopher can do to resuscitate the relationship, but is silent on what the educator might do. One wonders whether the educator should share a portion of the burden, and if so, what form that burden might take. Readers of this journal may have encountered, as I have, incoming doctoral students who describe the sense of incredulousness, disappointment, or mockery displayed by their fellow school teachers when they announce that they are leaving teaching to earn a doctorate. Some of their fellow teachers ask why they believe that "higher" education has anything of value to offer "lower" education, why they think that there is anything worthwhile "there" that would benefit "here." Professors often listen to these tales with a sense of failure and guilt, yet it is a rudimentary principle of relationships that very seldom is one of the parties solely at fault for the break-up. Philosophers may indeed do more than they are doing to forge dialogical relationships with educators, but the obligations are reciprocal.

Educators, particularly those working at the K-12 level, have an obligation to grasp the anti-intellectualism that often undergirds their ridicule of the academy. Educators owe a duty to consider the ways that their practice can be furthered, and their students benefited, by pedagogical reflection that is conceptual, theoretical, abstract, and subject to strictures of logic and argument. Educators may find that attending to the philosophical aspects of teaching and learning enlarges their sense of efficacy and the personal satisfaction they gain from their work, in a manner not dissimilar from the benefits gained when the science teacher acts as scientist, the history teacher as historian, or the literature teacher as writer. Unfortunately this conception of the educator (particularly the K-12 educator) as one who is attentive to the philosophical dimensions of practice is becoming increasingly problematic in these times of standards, high stakes tests, alignment of curriculum with tests, and scripted approaches to instruction.

The policymaking and regulatory onslaught by state and federal agencies may further diminish the K-12 educator's interest in philosophical inquiry, by imposing such strict conditions of accountability that the educator's professional autonomy and personal agency are severely diminished. Absent sufficient sense of agency and autonomy, the educator may perceive little advantage in becoming more engaged with the philosopher in the conceptual, logical, and theoretical aspects of practice.
If this surmise should turn out to be the case, there is an additional burden placed upon educators: The burden of reclaiming control of their own practice, of their freedom to pursue practices they believe (with warrant) to be in the best interests of their students. This burden must be borne by the educator, although the philosopher who grasps the issues and understands the political dynamic can be of considerable assistance.

Arcilla would, I believe, support this involvement of the philosopher in the circumstances of the educator. Indeed, an engagement between the philosopher and the educator on matters of public policy and classroom practice appears to be ideally suited to the Deweyan analysis of the philosopher-educator relationship that Arcilla endorses. The difference between us is that Arcilla does not discuss the educator’s obligations for effecting a dialogical relationship with the philosopher, instead he limits himself to what the philosopher might do to establish such a relationship. If the educator is unwilling, unready, or unable to accept a measure of responsibility for this relationship, I am far less sure than Arcilla seems to be that it will amount to a fruitful one.

These ruminations on the impact of the contemporary policy apparatus on the potential for relations between philosophers and educators suggest that there is more to establishing such relations than willingness and good will on the part of the primary dialogical partners. There is also the larger “surround” of social policy, civic engagement, and practical politics that bear on both the likelihood of good relations and the fruit that they may yield. This surround requires the attention of philosophers and educators, wherein they work to promote one that is productive of the very relations that Arcilla argues ought to obtain between philosophers and educators. However, the character of this surround also depends on other participants’ commitment to it, such as policymakers, jurists, and business and commercial interests. This broadly shared responsibility for the quality of the surround means that there is more to good communication between philosophers and educators than the good intentions of these two parties. In so stating, I appear to be presuming a point that should be placed in doubt: Philosophers and educators are always advantaged by being in a dialogical relation with one another. It is time to take up this normative consideration.

**SHOULD PHILOSOPHERS AND EDUCATORS BE SPEAKING?**

When Arcilla says that the marriage between philosophy and education is on the rocks, the range of application of the term “philosophy” seems inclusive and encompassing. Are all forms of philosophizing included, all schools of philosophy? Or is the restriction to, say, Anglo-American philosophy departments in colleges and universities along with philosopher counterparts in schools of education? One could read Arcilla quite broadly, as asserting a claim such as this one: There ought to be some common ground upon which philosophers of whatever school or persuasion might be beneficially engaged in dialogue with educators of whatever school or persuasion. Putting the matter in this fashion leads one to wonder whether there might not be some activities of philosophers, or schools of philosophical thought, in which educators might quite legitimately be uninterested. In addition to this lack of
interest, might not an educator also properly be entitled to the view that some philosophy, while interesting in some general way, is of little value or utility in the context of educational practice?

Indeed, we might even consider the possibility that some philosophical ruminations may be toxic for some educators — not toxic in the Socratic sense of being disturbing of convention or annoying to those in power, but of actually deflecting educators from the proper course of their work or leading them to think about their work in ways that are unhelpful, perhaps harmful. I confess to holding such an opinion for some of the philosophy I read, but pursuit of my peeves would take us too far afield of Arcilla's thesis. The point to be made is that not all occasions of philosophizing are occasions for dialogue with educators, nor is all dialogue between philosophers and educators likely to be beneficial. This fairly simple point may succeed because I did not limit it to philosophizing about education. Would my position change if the claim were revised to read that not all occasions of philosophizing about education are occasions for dialogue with educators?

It would not. Philosophizing about education, even when quite good, might not engage educators, for quite defensible reasons. Such philosophizing may be at the cutting edge of conceptual inquiry, it may be in the form of highly abstract theorizing, or it might depend quite heavily on imaginative speculation. As such, it is not yet ready to be consumed or applied in contexts of educational practice. Under these conditions, dialogue between philosophers and educators would be premature, perhaps dispiriting for one or both parties to the exchange. This point bears special consideration in these times when educational policy and research funding place a premium on intellectual work that has clear and direct implications for altering practice. The emphasis on "what works," on producing measurable results, often has a chilling effect on basic, abstract scholarship. In such contexts, it may be unwise to suggest that the sine qua non of the philosopher-educator relationship is akin to a good marriage, as it may confirm the attitudes and perspectives of those who have little patience for scholarship that does not quickly pay off for practice.

These counter-considerations suggest that a foul does not necessarily occur when philosophers and educators are not in a dialogical relation. That said, the fascinating question becomes one of detecting the conditions under which the absence of relation is a foul. To put the matter in this way reframes the title of Arcilla's article from "Why Aren't Philosophers and Educators Speaking to One Another?" to "What Are the Conditions Under Which Philosophers and Educators Ought to be Speaking to One Another, But Are Not?" The problem may not be that philosophers and educators are not speaking to one another, but rather that they are not in dialogue when they ought to be. It might also be the case that they need not be in relation at all in order to benefit one another. Just how this result might occur is considered in the next section.

**DIFFERENT WAYS OF DOING PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION**

I have raised a number of what might be called "arched eyebrow" points with respect to Arcilla's conception of the philosopher-educator relation. I do so primarily
in the belief that his analysis is at too gross or macro a level to capture the critical
details of what makes the relation both possible and mutually beneficial. Arched
eyebrows are not quite so serious as furrowed brows, however. My brow is not
furrowed in this case, for I do not disagree with the spirit that permeates Arcilla's
thesis. Indeed I applaud the notion of philosophers and educators having multiple
occasions to exchange, understand, and profit from one another's work. This result
might more likely be achieved by thinking of philosophy of education in a way
different from that suggested by Arcilla. To explore this difference, consider the
following two approaches to doing philosophy of education.

In one approach, both the problems and the methods of the discipline of
philosophy are taken up by the philosopher of education. Here the philosopher of
education is not focused on effecting change in how the pertinent activities of the
educational domain are carried out (although it is certainly the case that a deeper
understanding of an activity may change the practice of that activity). Rather, the
object of this endeavor is to render intelligible a specific domain of human phenom-
ena relevant to education. A second approach is to take up the methods of philosophy,
but not its problems. This second type of philosopher searches within the domain of
education for problems, bringing philosophical methods to bear upon their resolu-
tion. The intended focus of this second approach is to effect change in the educational
domain. These two types are here referred to as PE-I and PE-II.6

Drawing this distinction does not imply that PE-II is uninformed about or
inattentive to the grand problems in philosophy, nor that PE-I is ignorant of or
unconcerned about the problems of educational practice. It is more a matter of what
is dominant and what is recessive in the endeavors of the two types. PE-I holds the
problems of philosophy dominant and the problems of education recessive; PE-II
does the opposite. Both types of philosophers are trained in the methods of philoso-
phy and both are conversant with the classical and critical problems of philosophy.
The first type, however, is committed to exploring philosophy's problems as these
might bear on the enterprise of education, while the second type is committed to
engaging and resolving education's problems using the conceptual, logical, and
theoretical tools of philosophy.

What is instructive about this distinction is that PE-II philosophers must
become enmeshed in the work and activity of educational practitioners [or research-
ers, or policy analysts] in order to engage in philosophizing. Dialogue is vital to their
doing so. In the case of PE-II, Arcilla's implication that the burden for rapprochement

6. An anonymous reviewer of this article questioned the logic of this distinction on the grounds that content
and method are so intimately connected that any attempt to separate them as I have done here is likely to
fail. The point is well-taken as a conceptual consideration, but may not quite so compelling as a matter of
fact. Philosophy of education is practiced differently, particularly in terms of how much of it is rooted in
and informed by the practices of schools, teachers, and students. Some philosophers of education approach
their work in ways that would be welcomed in most departments of philosophy, and likely be indistinguishable
from much of the work that takes place in these departments. Other philosophers of education are so
attentive to matters of practice that they would not be nearly so welcome in philosophy departments. One
need only consider John Dewey's standing within many American departments of philosophy to grasp this
point. Another example is Montaigne's quixotic standing as a philosopher in his own time; see Stephen
falls on the philosopher is, by and large, correct. For a PE-II philosopher to work successfully, he or she is typically the one to take the initiative to establish good relations with practicing educators. The PE-I philosopher does not face the same obligations, although he or she may seek out practicing educators as a matter of principle or style, or on occasion, as a matter of necessity. With this distinction between PE-I and PE-II, no foul occurs when PE-I types do not speak to educators, although there would be for PE-II types. The work of the PE-I philosopher, impelled as it is more by the problems of philosophy than those of education, is not likely to be framed in the discourse of the practicing educator. As such, dialogue may be difficult because the discourse is so different between the two contexts, The fact that the dialogue may fail is not, however, an indication that PE-I is any less valuable to or important for the educational enterprise than PE-II.

Permit me to turn to "straight" philosophy for some examples of what I consider PE-I types, among whom I would mention Alasdair MacIntyre, Martha Nussbaum, and John Rawls. 7 The work of these philosophers has been enormously valuable to philosophers of education, educational researchers, and possibly more than a few K-12 educators, even though these philosophers are more profoundly engaged in problems of philosophy than in problems of education. There are also philosophers who seem to move back and forth between the two types. The British philosophers of education from the mid- to late-twentieth century, such as R.S. Peters and Paul Hirst come to mind, as does American philosopher Israel Scheffler. Although Peters, Hirst, and Scheffler were certainly motivated by the problems of education, their work is not readily characterized as arising from or impelled by conversations with practicing K-12 educators. In contrast, there are some philosophers who demonstrate facility with and commitment to the enduring problems of philosophy while also exhibiting work that could only arise from close relations to the work-a-day lives of K-12 educators. These philosophers may be thought of as "bi-cultural," in the sense that their work is motivated by an intimate threading of the problems of philosophy and those of education. Names that come to mind here include Maxine Greene, David Hansen, Nel Noddings, Mary Ann Raywid, and Hugh Sockett. These are colleagues who engage with some frequency in dialogical relationships with K-12 educators and whose philosophical work exhibits the imaginative blending of the discourse of educational practice with that of the more traditional discipline of philosophy.

My purpose in distinguishing between these two ways of doing philosophy of education, and offering examples of philosophers whose work matches these types, is to frame a more pluralist view of philosophy of education. On this view, some philosophers will be speaking to educators and others will not. Both may serve education well, and both may serve it poorly (for merely being in a conversation with

7. Particularly the Martha Nussbaum of The Fragility of Goodness (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986) and Love's Knowledge (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); less so the Nussbaum of Cultivating Humanity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), which is a more direct commentary on education. Nussbaum serves as a good example of how the same philosopher may, at different times, occupy the role of Type I or Type II.
another is no assurance that either party is doing the other any good). The distinction also permits me to query Arcilla, asking whether he considered any such differences when framing his own argument and whether that argument is a plea for fewer PE-I's and more PE-II's. That seems doubtful, given his preference for making "those parts of philosophy which are precisely not featured in the social sciences pertinent to educators" (PE, 11). I am inclined to believe that he sees PE-I types as preferable to PE-II types (inasmuch as the PE-II type may, for Arcilla, be more social scientist than philosopher). But, then again, perhaps he favors the field tilting more toward PE-II as a means of enlarging the dialogue. The resolution of this modest conundrum awaits a finer-grained, more nuanced conception of the philosopher-educator relationship.

**PHILOSOPHY, SOCIAL SCIENCE, AND DIALOGUE: CAN YOU HAVE THEM ALL?**

In the preceding section, I argued that both approaches to doing the philosophy of education may prove beneficial to practicing educators. How that benefit accrues will differ, depending on whether the philosopher is type I or II. Hence the absence of dialogue is not always a foul for philosophy of education. In this concluding section I take a position that is decidedly counter to a portion of Arcilla's thesis, arguing that if a dialogical relation with practicing educators is the *desideratum* for philosophy of education, then becoming a social scientist of sorts may be the only way to succeed at the relation.

Before plunging too deeply into this argument, a step back from the main argument may prove useful. Arcilla's clean, even elegant, casting of his case makes it easy for the reader to be drawn quickly into his claims. Yet it would be well to ask, What is the root notion of doing philosophy that underlies his analysis? That is a question all-too-briefly addressed in the previous section. Another question pertains to the root notion of social science held by Arcilla when he argues that for philosophers of education to tie themselves to social science makes "the link to much of philosophy's tradition more and more of a liability, and 'philosophy of education' a serious misnomer" (PE, 10). His claims here bring to mind an anecdote about the young child who told one of Piaget's researchers that you could not be a Protestant and an American at the same time. Arcilla appears to be telling his readers that you cannot be a social scientist and a genuine philosopher of education at the same time.

Although I disagree with his point, there are probably ways of conceiving of philosophy and social science that permit a fairly strong case for this claim. The problem arises when Arcilla implies that philosophers of education and practicing educators *ought* to be in a dialogical relation with one another. In the case of dialogical relations that are based on conversations of some duration, conversations grounded in mutual regard, I believe such a relation can obtain only when the philosopher takes seriously the empirical realties of the educator's work, seeking to understand them as well as co-investigate them with the educator. In so doing, the philosopher of education becomes what I would call a social-scientist-of-sorts. The phrase is coined with a small smile, but with considerable fidelity to standard meanings of "social science." The philosopher of education is not necessarily a
trained psychologist or anthropologist, deeply conversant with the theories and methods of these disciplines, but is certainly an advanced amateur, a semi-professional, if you will. He or she possesses an astute observer's eye, a sense of systematic inquiry, and a desire to ground both logically and evidentially those putative relationships that are derived by practicing educators and their co-inquiring philosophers.

Now the "modest conundrum" with which the previous section concluded becomes a more serious conundrum. Arcilla argues that if a philosopher of education engages in social science, he or she goes over to the dark side (to lift a line from Star Wars), ceasing to be seriously engaged in philosophy of education. I contend that a philosopher of education can only be in a substantial and worthwhile dialogical relation with a practicing educator if he or she engages in social science (of sorts).* The upshot of this line of reasoning is that if you want to have a dialogical relation with a practicing educator, you have to relinquish the doing of serious, proper philosophy (given Arcilla's contention that one abandons philosophy when doing social science). If you do serious, proper philosophy, you cannot be in a worthwhile dialogical relation with practicing educators (given my contention that unless the philosopher attends carefully to the empirical realities of practicing educators, he or she cannot effect a sustained dialogical relation with them).

This bind is relieved by opting for more generous, multifaceted conceptions of what is involved in doing philosophy, social science, and education. It is also relieved by a more expansive conception of the dialogical relation, one that permits such relations to range from the engaged reading of philosophical works by practicing educators to sustained, two-way conversations between philosophers and educators rooted in mutual regard and benefit. This latter form of relation, however, is far more likely if the philosopher is a social scientist of sorts. If Arcilla is to succeed in arguing otherwise, he will have to offer a more robust and explicitly detailed account toward this end.

8. In an essay about articles published in Educational Theory during the decade of the 1980s, Wendy Kohli referred to me as a "philosophically informed educational researcher"; Wendy Kohli, "The Eighties," Educational Theory 50, no. 3 (Summer 2000): 354. On first reading of that description, I was uncertain whether to feel praised or demeaned. I am still not sure. What seems apparent, however, is that if a philosopher of education engages the study of education empirically and conceptually, a version of what I refer to here as Type II philosophy of education, his colleagues no longer seem certain of his status as a philosopher. That mindset may reveal a great deal about why philosophers and educators are not speaking to one another nearly so much as Arcilla desires.

9. It works both ways, as the philosopher may effect a relationship by the attentive and thoughtful observation and analysis of the educator's practice.