Navigating the Boundaries of Blackness: Congressional Caucuses, U.S. Foreign Policy, and African Affairs

by

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DEDICATION

To my beloved Mother Zufan Lemma Demessie, my amazing Father Aklilu Demessie, and my inspiring Brother Nebyat Aklilu Demessie. The three of you are my air, my heart, the wind beneath my wings and I love you more than you’ll ever know. And in the name of the Demessie Family, I dedicate this dissertation to my wonderful American grandfather, Harvey Gittler, for his heart of gold in using his life to promote the lives of others.
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It wasn’t until Jesse Jackson launched a presidential campaign and assembled a group of black leaders together on December 21, 1988, that the use of the term “African American” was officially designated as a descriptor for black people in the United States: “To be called African American has cultural integrity,” Jackson said. “It puts us in our proper historical context” (JBHE 1997, 12). His efforts continued when he successfully demanded that the New York Times refer to black people as “African American” and they subsequently followed suit. Jackson was attempting to ascribe displaced black people in America with an identity beyond the whims of white folk, who assigned them interchangeable terms such as “Negro,” “Colored,” and “Black”, in hopes of instilling a sense of national identity to a group of people who had not only been stripped of their culture and ethnic distinctiveness or a land mass to which they could call “home,” but also their citizenship rights in the United States (Walton and Smith 2006). Essentially, slavery rendered black people in America invisible, while also truncating any viable sense of ethnic or national attachment to their ancestral homeland in Africa. Equally important, as the numbers of African immigrants to America have increased sizably since
the mid 20th century, the failure of political science discourse and scholarship to recognize black ethnic diversity has also rendered them invisible. This has been particularly troubling for mainstream American politics discourse because without accounting for black ethnic diversity, we cannot capture nuances in voting patterns, policy preferences, congressional representation, participation, social and political movements, citizenship rights, etc., that would help both scholars and policymakers better assess issues of equality and representation within black America.

Scholarship in American political science, and discursive texts in the social sciences more broadly, have been tainted by the same misconceptions. As African American political scientists entered the realm of American politics discourse, most notably in 1969, with the inception of the National Conference of Black Political Scientists (NCOBPS), substantial progress has been made in contributing to a better understanding of race, ethnicity, culture, and nationality as it pertains to black people in America, Africa, and the Caribbean. Furthermore, pioneering scholars like Hanes Walton Jr., Cheryl Miller, Joseph P. McCormick, Mack H. Jones, and others have made groundbreaking contributions in the study of black politics, setting the framework for what is now known as the subfield of African American politics. For example, Walton’s critique of research methods, traditions, and theory building in *African American Power and Politics*, emphasizes how the research paradigm of political science scholarship must change in order to capture the changes taking place in the American political context:

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1. African immigrants in America estimated at 1.4 million according to the 2007 American Community.
2. Black America refers to all black peoples in the United States whether they are African American, African, or Caribbean.
Political science scholarship also changes during such a transformation, because intellectual and academic support must be provided for the new political rhetoric, visions, and promises. The best way to create new political alternatives and objectives is to change political science scholarship at one of its most fundamental levels – the methodology. The techniques and procedures for data analysis must be revised so that they will present the factual data of the changed political context in the bold new light of that very context (Walton 1997, 52).

Still, African American political scientists have carried most of the burden in attempting to collect new and more accurate data in order to expand on questions of black ethnicity, black nationality and black immigration; however, there is much more work to be done for such work to be recognized within mainstream American politics scholarship.

This dissertation project, which is the first and only study of African Congressional Caucuses in the U.S. House of Representatives, is an attempt to create a discourse which takes seriously black ethnicity in the United States and lays the foundation for future analyses in legislative behavior and representation in Congress that offer insight into how legislators think about, work for, and represent African immigrants in the U.S. Furthermore, as black immigrants from Africa and the Caribbean enter the United States, such future analysis will offer black ethnic groups in America offers a more accurate reflection of the changing landscape of American politics.

**From Africa to America: The Intersection of Race, Ethnicity, and National Identity for Black People in the United States**

The concept of ethnicity has been characterized by noted, contemporary scholar, Anthony Smith, as having the following six attributes: “a collective proper name, a myth of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more differentiating elements of common culture, an association with a specific ‘homeland,’ and a sense of solidarity for
significant sectors of the population,” (A. Smith 1991, 21). Nationalism, on the other hand, is defined as an “ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential ‘nation’” (A. Smith 2006, 51). With respect to Africa, Smith articulates the formation of nationalism as it infringed upon the previously constructed ethnic groups dispersed throughout Africa:

The dilemma is even sharper in sub-Saharan Africa, whose states were created, if not deliberately across ethnies [French term for ‘ethnic community’], at least with little reference to them. Here the colonial states had to foster a purely territorial patriotism, a sense of political loyalty to the newly created states and their embryonic political communities. In the independent states born of these territorial communities several ethnies, ethnic fragments and ethnic categories were drawn together by political regulation and social boundaries that had come to include previously unrelated groups in the post-colonial political system, and had brought them, even against their will, into a new struggle for scarce resources and political power. In these circumstances the ruling elites, who may often have been recruited from a dominant ethnies or coalition of ethnic groupings, were tempted to fashion a new political mythology and symbolic order not only to legitimate their often authoritarian regimes, but also to head off threats of endemic ethnic conflict and even movements of secession. In these cases the state is utilized to fashion the ‘civil religion’ whose myths, memories, symbols and the like will provide the functional equivalent of a missing or defective dominant ethnies. So the project of nation formation in sub-Saharan Africa suggests the creation of the components of a new ethnic identity and consciousness that will subsume, by drawing together, some of the loyalties and cultures of the existing ethnies (Smith 2006, 41).

Therefore, whereas black people in the United States declared themselves “African Americans” or “Continental Africans in America”, Africans in Africa faced the aftermath of renegotiating their ethnic identity to one of nationality based on the concept of nation-state borders that were forced upon them by Western imperialism and colonization (Jaynes 2000). Both colonization in Africa and slavery in America have been the fundamental basis for the continued struggle of black people across the globe to assert
their identity beyond race. As a result, black people across the globe have been homogenized, mischaracterized and misunderstood.

Africa is a continent made up of 54 countries, several thousand ethnic groups, and a population estimated over one billion (BBC News). No other continent with as many countries or as great a human population have suffered from “continental homogenization” in the same way as Africans. By continental homogenization, I mean the perpetuation of the primordial classification of race as the signal identifier of black people across the continent of Africa, irrespective of their ethnic and national identities. Continental homogenization is the result of old racist ideologies of the West that purported a scientific justification for black people as an inferior race, and thus reduced black people to simply their phenotype with no regard for their ethnic, or cultural distinctiveness. Albeit unintentional, some scholars in the social sciences have perpetuated continental homogenization in their work by utilizing the typological and epistemological framework that itself is limited in its ability to deconstruct the black/white paradigm. Still, the contribution of American politics scholarship to the discussion of race relations in the United States thus far has been valuable and necessary in bringing us to this critical moment in time where we can begin to not only ask that scholars push the boundaries of their research on black America beyond race, but demand it.

However, as African American political scientists have advocated for years, it is critical that empirical and qualitative studies build on existing scholarship by expanding old paradigms and creating new ones that accurately reflect the intersectionality of race, ethnicity, and national identity for black people in America and beyond. In this regard,
political scientists in American politics must collect new data and catch up with the times in order to assess how the intersectionality of multiple identities influences and shapes the political behavior of black people in America, as well as the elected officials who represent them. In the case of American politics, we must not only use the master’s tools to dismantle the master’s house, but also use new tools to lay the foundation for a new home. Mainstream political scientists who study race and politics must also seriously consider the contribution of African American political scientists to the discipline because their work has already pushed the boundaries in taking a more complex approach to the study of race and black ethnicity in America.

One of Ernest Gellner’s major contributions to the study of nationalism was that “nationalism engenders nations and not the other way around,” (Gellner 1983, 55). Other renowned philosophers like Benedict Anderson defined the nation as an “imagined community both inherently limited and sovereign” (Anderson 1983, 6). However, the basis for analyses of national identity and ethnicity has been Eurocentric and does not address the intersection of race, ethnicity, and national identity as it applies to Africans in Africa and African Americans in America. One of the key differences between African and European immigrants in America is the degree to which blackness as a racial category refuses to acknowledge how ethnicity and nationalism have impacted and shaped the identity of black immigrants.

Before identifying the second major difference between African and European immigrants, it is necessary to understand how Africans have negotiated their identity in contemporary America. As a continent, Africa is comprised of countries or nation states. As opposed to African Americans who can only trace their roots to a continent at best,
African immigrants from these nation states, although categorized by limited census options that merely classify them as black, have distinguished themselves as hyphenated Americans, an ethno-national identity that enables them to trace their roots to a specific nation-state at the very least. Therefore, African immigrants tend to identify themselves as Kenyan-Americans, Nigerian-American, or Somali-American, while descendants of slaves, with no knowledge of where in Africa they came, are left with a continental identity that is understood as African American. In fact, there are ethnicities within the nation-states and Africans in America subscribe to those identities as well; however, they are more pronounced between the ethnic groups within the nation state, while their common identity on a national level (their ethnonational identity) is more pronounced in the United States. For example, Ethiopian-Americans may also be Tigre, Amhara, or Oromo; however, when it comes to political representation or foreign policy matters, they come together as Ethiopian Americans (Zalan).

Finally, another critical difference between African and European immigrants is not so much the resistance to assimilation on the part of Africans in America, but rather the maintenance of a strong ethno-national identity solidified by neighborhood communities, language, culture, economic globalization, the refusal to adopt American names similar to Asian immigrants, transnational migration patterns, and a staunch refusal to be classified in the same category as African Americans. For example, “Little Ethiopia” in Los Angeles, is the first officially recognized business and restaurant district from Africa in the United States and the city is home to approximately 60,000 Ethiopians (ESFNA), second to Washington D.C. and estimated at 200,000 (Fernandez-Pereda). Another instance of maintaining a strong ethnic identity is the DC local government’s
“Language Access Act in 2004\(^3\),” which makes available Amharic-English translators at any government-run institution in the District of Columbia due to the large presence of Ethiopian Americans in the area. The Ethiopian community even has its own *Yellow Pages* for the DC metro area, one example of the ways in which ethnic identity has been preserved and strengthened despite the tendency to homogenize Africans and African Americans under the label of “black.”

To further highlight the problem with treating black people in the United States as if they solely identify themselves by race, there is no better example than the tension between Ethiopian Americans and African Americans in the DC area that emerged when the Ethiopian community approached the city council with a proposal to designate the 9\(^{th}\) and U street area as “Little Ethiopia.” Their proposal was met with staunch refusal on part of many African Americans who already valued the history of they place they knew as the “Black Broadway” (Coomarasamy). However, even the following statements by African Americans in the DC area reveal varying concepts of blackness as an indicator of membership within the African American community:

"Everything that is historic by Europe is preserved, is honored, cherished. Everything that's American should be done the same way - still call it a Black Broadway, [said Tony Prassard, DC jazz club director].

"The Ethiopian community is a great community, but they must understand that they are our guests. This is an American community. African-American contributions should be acknowledged and preserved just like anybody else's contribution."

But one of those who serves the food takes a different view. African-

\(^3\) “On April 21, 2004, the District of Columbia enacted a fundamental piece of civil rights legislation—the DC Language Access Act of 2004. The Act holds covered agencies accountable for providing the District’s limited and non-English proficient (LEP/NEP) residents with greater access to and participation in their programs, services and activities. The Act identifies the Office of Human Rights (OHR) as the agency designated to oversee and enforce the implementation of the law.”
American student Jennifer Blake is a waitress at the nearby Salome restaurant. "Ethiopia is African-American history," she says.

"There are many different cultures within the whole African-American community and I think that it's important that we grab hold of each culture, each country. We need to love one another" (Coomarasamy).

Even within black communities, Africans membership to the African American community is not agreed upon. Similar examples between African Americans and Caribbeans are also prevalent across the United States. Questions of who is African, who is American, and who qualifies as African American are debatable and have been going on in black America for the past three decades; yet within mainstream American politics scholarship, such discussions are absent in the analyses.

This dissertation project is an attempt to make visible black ethnicity within mainstream American politics as it relates to the legislative representation of Africans in America vis-à-vis congressional caucuses. It is also an attempt to encourage scholars in mainstream American politics to consider seriously how race, ethnicity, and national identity shape and influence the political behavior, policy preferences, participation, and representation of black people in the United States.

Despite census data and other survey data in political science that continue to collapse Africans, Caribbeans, and African Americans into one category and designate them all either “African American” or “black”, it is necessary to not only clarify the meaning of terms like “black” and “African American”, but to clarify who exactly qualifies as having membership to which group and why.

In other words, scholars in mainstream American politics must begin to incorporate and conceptualize “blackness” and “blacks in America” within a broader
typological and epistemological framework that more accurately reflects the significance of black ethnicity in the scholarship on black political behavior and representation.
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ABSTRACT

This dissertation develops a new perspective on descriptive and substantive representation based on race by exploring legislative behavior in congressional caucuses that serve black ethnic communities. Furthermore, it attempts to understand how and why congressional caucuses invite more complex analyses of such ethnic cleavages, while also providing insight into how legislators think about, work for, and represent racial and ethnic minority groups across the U.S.

Using a mixed-methods approach, I analyze members’ behavior on African congressional caucuses at both the group and individual level using a primary data set involving 120 House members. My quantitative analysis employs an ordered logistic regression model analyzing caucus activity on a set of U.S.-Africa foreign policy issues outlined in the Council of Foreign Relations U.S.-Africa Policy Recommendation Report in 2005; while my qualitative analysis is based on interviews with Africa caucus representatives and African embassy officials.

I argue that descriptive representation and substantive representation are virtually inseparable when it comes to race and ethnic-based caucuses. For black ethnic caucuses, even when ethnicity becomes the predominant characteristic by which legislators join
caucuses, race still matters when it comes to the legislative efforts of caucus members; the more black members present on a black ethnic caucus, the more active or engaged the caucus tends to be in representing its policy goals and interests. However, while race remains significant at the individual level, I also find that cross-racial representation on black ethnic caucuses is significant; the ability of Whites, Latinos, Asians, and African American members of Congress to work together as a caucus contributes more to caucus activity compared to the Congressional Black Caucus. Additionally, being a member from a state with a large African foreign-born population is also significant, suggesting that members are generally responsive to black ethnic constituencies.
CHAPTER 1

Understanding Race and Ethnic-based Congressional Caucuses in the U.S. House of Representatives

When Rep. Keith Ellison became the first African American Muslim elected to serve in the U.S. House of Representatives, the enthusiastic support on part of the Somali community in Minneapolis resulted not simply because Ellison was black, but because he was a Black Muslim who could relate to the interests of the Somali community whose religious background he shared. When Rep. Mike Honda, a Japanese American congressman from Silicon Valley, CA, chaired and founded the Congressional Ethiopia and Ethiopian American Caucus in 2000, it was because he recognized a particular segment of the black population in his district with whom he shared an immigrant identity. Such nuances in black legislative representation often go unnoticed because ethnic diversity within the U.S. black population has not been adequately accounted for when considering theories of congressional representation within racial politics discourse.

This dissertation expands the discourse on black legislative behavior by examining members of Congress who operate collectively on race and ethnic-based caucuses in the U.S. House of Representatives. The recent emergence of black ethnic caucuses comprised of legislators who need not identify racially or ethnically with the
minority group they represent have challenged the argument of whether or not a black face is the only face that can collectively serve black interests. I examine caucus activity and legislative participation on black ethnic caucuses in order to determine the extent to which descriptive representation contributes to substantive representation in regard to the following research question: “Does racial representation on African congressional caucuses matter for the substantive representation of U.S. foreign policy interests towards Africa?” To answer this question, I test whether or not the race of caucus members is a significant predictor of caucus activity by conducting an ordered logistic regression analyses of African congressional caucuses and the Congressional Black Caucus in the U.S. House of Representatives. My quantitative analysis measures caucus activity for a sample of 120 Africa caucus members while controlling for a host of pertinent variables: race, district percent black, committee power, foreign policy ideology, African foreign-born constituent population, the length of time an individual has served in Congress, and the number of black members per Africa caucus. My qualitative analysis consists of in-depth interviews with caucus senior staff and embassy officials from each country for which an African caucus exists.

If constituents feel their ethnicity influences their policy preferences more than race and legislators respond by representing black ethnic communities separate from African Americans, then scholarship capturing shifts in black legislative representation must take into account both race and ethnicity. Furthermore, given the steady increase in caucus formation and legislators’ efforts to collectively work with other legislators to achieve their policy goals, my research locates the Congressional Black Caucus at the center of the debate about descriptive and substantive representation for particular racial
and ethnic minorities. I argue that descriptive and substantive representation is virtually inseparable when it comes to race and ethnic-based caucuses. For black ethnic caucuses, even when ethnicity becomes the predominant characteristic by which legislators join caucuses, race still matters when it comes to the legislative efforts of caucus members; the more black members present on a black ethnic caucus, the more active or engaged the caucus tends to be in representing its policy goals and interests.

The racial group consciousness on the part of African American legislators in believing their fate is linked to other African Americans not only explains the motivation behind the creation of the Congressional Black Caucus, but also explains their motivations for working for African political causes in the United States and across the globe. Also, because racial group consciousness for African Americans tends to link its fate with immigrants from Africa, African American legislators tend to work harder and be more engaged in the interests of Africans as well as the black ethnic caucuses that represent them.

In an effort to expand our understanding of racial group consciousness for black people beyond African Americans, this project proceeds as follows: Chapter one begins with a theoretical examination of descriptive and substantive representation and provides background for the polemical debate surrounding the differences in legislative representation based on race. I also emphasize the symbolic significance of race and ethnic-based caucuses for black and nonblack legislators. Second, the discussion moves to legislative behavior on congressional caucuses and how the institutional nature of caucuses impedes or expedites legislative activity. Using the Congressional Black Caucus as a model for understanding racial group representation in Congress, I discuss the
similarities and differences of race and ethnic-based ethnic caucuses, particularly focusing on the 108th to 111th sessions of Congress for which the Committee on House Administration provides the most accurate records on caucuses.

Chapter two begins with an overview of the 2005 Council on Foreign Relations (COFR) Report and provides a historical context for understanding current U.S.-Africa foreign policy. Specifically, this chapter outlines fifteen major foreign policy issues the United States has been working on with respect to all sub-Saharan African countries for which a black ethnic caucus exists in the House. For my sample of African countries, I also present summary results on U.S.-Africa foreign policy based on the perspectives of the corresponding African embassies. My surveys and interviews of African embassies include their perceptions of black ethnic caucus efficacy, engagement with American legislators on U.S. foreign policy issues affecting their particular country and the African continent as a whole.

In chapters three and four, I explain my research design, methods of primary data collection, and hypothesis. For the caucuses, I present results from my quantitative analyses as well as report survey results of U.S. Africa foreign policy issues laid out by the COFR. I also compare the caucus survey results with the survey results from their corresponding embassies. I then analyze caucus activity on the top COFR issues (Energy Sector, China’s Economic Expansion, and HIV/AIDS) for each individual member on an African caucus and present my quantitative results from my regression analysis. Regarding the four COFR issues, I also present descriptive results based on six measures of legislative representation for all African congressional caucuses in the U.S. House of Representatives, rating the degree to which each caucus is engaged in a particular activity.
and the potential impact such activity bears on relevant policy. I address the methodological limitations of my study, which include six country-specific African congressional caucuses; however, that is the total number of country-specific African congressional caucuses that exist. While the scope of my study involves a small sample, this chapter explains the importance of my study and similar studies that explore ethnic differences in black politics and black legislative behavior. Furthermore, I discuss the methodological challenges facing scholars who study ethnic politics when looking at intra-black diversity in the U.S. population that accounts for differences in political representation and policy preferences.

At the individual level, I show that race is a significant predictor of caucus activity, however, at the group level it is not. I also present qualitative interview results with the caucuses’ corresponding African embassy officials and their beliefs on the success or failure of U.S.-African foreign policy and African congressional caucuses in particular. My qualitative analysis of legislative staff on black ethnic caucuses and embassy officials from the corresponding countries also demonstrates the relative closeness between the CBC and African embassy officials in agenda setting on U.S.-Africa foreign policy compared to all other black ethnic caucuses. Chapter Four reports the overall results of my analysis and explains the implications for the significance of descriptive representation based on race vis-à-vis caucuses or informal groups in Congress and emphasizes avenues for future research targeted at expanding the discourse on ethnicity within racial politics discourse.
In 2007, the American Community Survey estimated that approximately 1.4 million Africans immigrated to the United States. Voluntary immigrants from Africa do not refer to themselves as “African Americans”, “Negro”, or “Black American” nor do they share a similar historical frame of reference with African Americans. Africans identify themselves by their nationality from which they came and identify with a history of colonization. African Americans identify themselves as “Continental Africans,” because they do not know from which nationality they came and identify with a history of slavery in America that identifies them solely by their race (i.e. “African Americans,” “Negro,” “Colored,” “Black,” “Afro-American,” or “Black American.”).

American politics scholarship has operated within a racial construct that does not account for black ethnicity, thereby grouping Africans, African Americans and Caribbean into the same category. Unfortunately, the 2010 Census did not make any improvement on addressing this dilemma for black people in the United States; they only considered ethnic background for non-blacks as seen in the figure below (Census 2010).

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4 The emergence of “Black Nationalism,” defined by black unity, self-determination, and independence from mainstream American life, was in an effort to reclaim a connection to Africa, but also to create a place called a “home” from which they could be treated as equal citizens. Ernest Gellner is often quoted for his argument that “nationalism engenders nations and not the other way around” and this is one of the major impetuses behind Black Nationalism – to identify with a nation, a place, or a land mass that would fully recognize African Americans as its citizens (Gellner 1983, 55).

5 See Prologue for detailed analysis of the emergence of term “African American.” Also, for people with Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin, a separate question is asked altogether with multiple option is asked altogether.
Scholarship in American political science, and discursive texts in the social sciences more broadly, have been tainted by the same misconceptions of black identity society continues to grapple with in the United States today. When Africans immigrate to the United States, they become hyphenated Americans (i.e. Ethiopian-American, Nigerian-American, etc.) and identify themselves by their ethno-nationality. Ethno-nationality refers to the country or nation-state from which an immigrant comes from, which then is understood as their ethnic background. In fact, while mainstream political science continues to operate within a black/white paradigm, Africans continue to not only resist their racial classification in order make visible their ethnic background, but are also renegotiating their identity in order to grapple with such a dilemma. In fact, a new film just released in 2010 by a Ghanaian filmmaker, Kobina Aidoo, entitled, “The Neo-African Americans,” has been spreading rapidly throughout the United States and
“examines the dramatic rise of voluntary immigration from Africa and the Caribbean to the United States in recent decades, and the ways this development has altered the African American landscape (Buysee 2010)” Some Africans in America are now adopting the term “Neo African American” and other terms in order to assert their identity:

The central question, ‘Are you African American?’ was posed to about a dozen of these immigrants throughout the film, and their answers revealed the complexity of black identity in America today.

‘I’m more Haitian American than African American, but more American than Haitian,” said one.

“No,” said another. “I am Afro-Latino American” (Buysee 2010).

It is clear that “as America’s black population grows increasingly diverse, [such terms as “African American,” “Black American,” “Negro,” etc.] may no longer suffice (Buysee 2010). While there remains great debate on the definition of terms among Africans themselves, one observation is abundantly clear: ethnicity matters for Africans and thus distinguishes them from African Americans beyond race. And mainstream American political science can ignore it no longer. Furthermore, legislators have already recognized the importance of black ethnicity and are representing African constituent interests not by race, but by their ethnic background or ethnonational identity, thus political science scholarship must accurately capture the changing political context of legislative behavior and representation for black people in the United States.

Cross-racial representation refers to the ability of a racially heterogeneous make-up of legislators to represent a black ethnic minority group vis-à-vis a congressional caucus, unlike the Congressional Black Caucus, the Hispanic Caucus, or the Asian
Pacific American Caucus. While there are African American representatives in Congress, there are no members of Congress of 1\textsuperscript{st} or 2\textsuperscript{nd} generation African descent nor has there ever been. Instead, African Americans and the CBC have made it their prerogative to represent the specific needs and interests of Africans and other foreign policy related matters. However, the paradigm shift from a “for-us-by-us,” strategy to cross-racial legislative representation of black ethnic minorities has not only highlighted the importance of ethnicity for black people, but has also made significant how immigration over the past few decades has changed the political landscape of American politics and racial politics discourse.

**A Theoretical Assessment of Descriptive and Substantive Representation**

Descriptive representation (DR), or “standing for”, is understood in the literature to exist when legislators and the constituents they represent “share some distinctive and defining characteristics. In the case of black voters and their elected black officials, the common characteristic is race. Substantive representation (SR), or ‘acting for’, exists when legislators and voters share fundamental policy interests and policy preferences. The idea is that voters will feel represented when the elected official acts in ways that promote their shared policies” (Fenno, 2003, 4).

Representation is arguably the most important responsibility of legislators, the most important concern of constituents, and the most thoroughly investigated topic in political science, and yet no standard definition exists. At the end of the day, most scholars subscribe to Heinze Eulau’s characterization of representation in *The Politics of Representation*: “But, in spite of many centuries of theoretical effort, we cannot say what
representation is” (Tate 2003, 3). Although scholars have traditionally understood representation to entail members acting like delegates and voting for constituent interests (Miller and Stokes 1963), other scholars have expanded the notion of representation to include the process or spectrum of activities members involve themselves in during their term: drafting or cosponsoring bills, making public appearances and speeches, coalition-building with colleagues, joining caucuses and committees, agenda setting, issue uptake, and visiting their districts (Smith 1981; Jones 1987; Hall 1996; Hammond 1998; Singh 1998; Canon 1999; Fenno 2000; Fenno 2003; Cox and McCubbins 2005; Sulkin 2005).

As Pitkin suggests, “Perhaps representation must be redefined to fit our politics…political representation is primarily a public, institutionalized arrangement involving many people and groups…what makes it representation is not any single action by any one participant, but the over-all [process] of the system” (Pitkin 1967, 221). Therefore, representation should be understood as a process of multiple acts and behaviors not restricted to policy initiatives or policy achievements. By expanding the definition of representation to include the aforementioned work of legislators, we can engage in a more nuanced examination of representation that complicates the distinction between self-interest and group-interest. From this perspective, even self-interested actions such as advertising, credit claiming, and position-taking (Mayhew 1974) may ultimately serve the interests of the constituency, and thus can be considered a form of representation. In the same way that the invisible hand encourages an individual to pursue self-interest to promote the public good, a legislator’s self-interested endeavors can also translate into better representation for her constituents. Therefore, while it is true that members may behave in ways that may do a disservice to her constituents, it is not
always the case that member behavior that aids in reelection does not also aid in representing the interests of the constituency.

When assessing political representation, Pitkin’s seminal 1967 work on descriptive and substantive representation helped set the stage for years of empirical research that would investigate and attempt to measure just what representation is; however, Pitkin’s analysis emerged on the heels of the Civil Rights Movement when “political representation was being contested in the United States… over redistricting and voting rights” (Disch 2005). Therefore, while Pitkin’s work is groundbreaking in its theoretical inquiry of DR and SR, her critique of descriptive representation based on race comes at the cusp of the Civil Rights Movement when black legislators, or what Taeku Lee would call *marginalized counterelites* (Lee 2002), were organizing around race and making themselves *accountable* for addressing and helping secure voting rights for African Americans along with a host of other civil rights issues. Furthermore, only two years after Pitkin’s book was published, the establishment of the Congressional Black Caucus would officially declare itself the “conscience of Congress,” and organize itself collectively based on race: all members of the CBC were black and addressed issues affecting black people not only in their district, but across the country and world. Therefore, Pitkin’s notion that descriptive representation based on race was not a significant factor in political representation was premature if not altogether false; at the very same time Pitkin was publishing her analysis on representation in the late 1960s, African Americans, who suffered from disenfranchisement and unequal treatment under the law because of their race, were collectively mobilizing and working with African American legislators in Congress to ensure their interests would be represented.
Dovi refutes Pitkin’s claim that DR has “no room for representation as accountability” by deferring to more recent work that suggests DR & SR are not as distinct from one another as the research indicates (Sapiro 1981):

[Pitkin’s] line of reasoning – that a politics of presence is somehow incompatible with accountability – has defined the theoretical problem facing proponents of descriptive representation. Sapiro showed that trusting some groups to protect another group’s interests, e.g. letting husbands take care of their wives’ interests, was and continues to be foolhardy. The recurring betrayals of historically disadvantaged groups by relatively privileged groups partially explain why traditional mechanisms of accountability are insufficient. By emphasizing the conflicts between advantaged and disadvantaged citizens, Sapiro laid the theoretical groundwork for a politics of presence. She did so by standing Pitkin’s point on its head: Democratic accountability sometimes requires descriptive representation (Dovi 2002, 730).

While Pitkin’s work is valuable in outlining the determinants of democratic accountability and safeguards necessary for constituents to be duly represented, her disbelief in the value of descriptive representation fails to consider its substantive currency when constituents prefer legislators to look like themselves because often what legislators look like is indicative of what they look like they are going to do - a subtle, yet crucial distinction. Therefore, it is critical to keep in mind that descriptive representation is not entirely separate from substantive representation; in fact, the former is often indicative of the latter.

Racial Redistricting, Minority Interests, and Substantive Representation

Securing the right to vote and electing black candidates to advocate for the interests of black constituents has been a priority for African American empowerment and representation in the American polity (Walton 1997). In fact, black political behavior on the ground and in Congress is, in large part, defined by a “sense of community” that
reaches beyond district lines to also serve a national constituency of African Americans (Walton 1994).

Redistricting, or the allocation of House seats within a state based on the population within a congressional district, has been critical in empowering or disempowering racial minorities. Following the 2000 census, only four out of the forty-two districts represented by blacks in the House were majority white, while the rest were majority black or majority minority (blacks and Latinos) (Walton 2006). Not only is it unlikely that white constituents will vote for a black candidate, but white candidates may also be “reluctant to reach out to black voters, since doing so often results in a larger loss of white voters from their existing coalition,” leaving black constituents in majority white districts with little hope in getting their policy interests and concerns addressed (Frymer 1999, 10). This dilemma has ultimately left the onus of representing black interests on black candidates who already made it their mission to address policy issues affecting the black community as a whole (Hill 1994), thereby strengthening the association of descriptive representation based on race with substantive representation.

For African Americans, racial group consciousness has been the driving force shaping black legislative behavior (Whitby 1997). Hall and Heflin expand on DR and SR for African Americans by highlighting how racial group identification and shared experiences of racism and discrimination lead representatives to vote the same as black constituents (Hall and Heflin 1994). Dawson’s theory of linked fate has also been a classic text referred to for its analysis of the psychology of group solidarity among African Americans that explains political preferences and actions are motivated by racial group interests, which serve as a proxy for individual interests (Dawson 1994; Whitby
Some scholars show that the race of the legislator is a reliable indicator of whether a legislator will support minority interests, (Hutchings et al 2004; Whitby 1997; Mansbridge 1999; Cameron, Epstein & O’Halloran 1996; Minta 2009), and other scholars have shown that the race of the legislator makes no difference in the representation of minority groups (Thernstrom 1987; Hero and Tolbert 1995; Swain 1993). While most of these studies involve dyadic relationships between legislator and constituent, scholarship on DR and SR for African Americans has vastly contributed to our understanding of the discourse on racial politics and black legislative behavior. However, with the inception of the Congressional Black Caucus and subsequent racial and ethnic caucuses organizing around shared racial identity, the important question remains, in what ways might theories of descriptive representation based on race change when moving beyond the individual legislator to that of a group of legislators”?

**The Congressional Black Caucus and the Emergence of Race and Ethnic-Based Caucuses**

Race and ethnic-based caucuses (REBCS) have their origins in the establishment of the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) in 1971. Referred to as the “Conscience of Congress,” the CBC began as a group of newly elected African American representatives of the 77th Congress whose goal it was to “promote the public welfare through legislation designed to meet the needs of millions of neglected citizens”. The Hispanic and Asian Pacific American congressional caucuses followed the CBC’s model in 1978 and 1994 respectively, with caucus membership exclusively limited to legislators who racially or ethnically identified with the group represented by the caucus.
Operating as a collective interest group in Congress, the CBC brought attention to issues that affected African Americans on a national scale and gave black members the opportunity to capitalize on civil rights legislation and continue to influence policy that affected their community. The CBC has since been the model of collective minority group representation; other legislators of color have followed suit with their respective communities.

Hammond refers to the CBC as a “national constituency caucus [which, unlike other caucuses] works to place issues on the public agenda and engage in a wide range of agenda-setting activities” (Hammond, 1998, 97). CBC’s efforts to shape the presidential agenda were no more evident than in February of 1970, when the CBC proposed sixty-one recommendations for governmental action on domestic and foreign issues to President Richard Nixon:

> Our concerns and obligations as members of Congress do not stop at the boundaries of our districts, our concerns are national and international in scope. We are petitioned daily by citizens living hundreds of miles from our districts who look on us as Congressmen-at-large for black people and poor people in the United States (Barnett 1975, 35).

These recommendations called for the following:

- Eradication of racism within the United States and in its dealings with other nations.
- Earning of a decent living or the means to survive in dignity when work is not available.
- Decent housing for black families and equal access to the total housing market.
- Fair and impartial justice and adequate protection against drug abuse and crime.
- Enforcement of civil rights and other constitutional guarantees through vigorous affirmative action by the government.
- A fair share of the public funds used to support business and community development and full participation in determining how tax dollars are spent in black communities.
- The federal government’s guarantee of ample health care for all citizens.
- Protection of federal standards and guarantees in programs financed by federal funds.
• Full participation by members of black communities in the executive, judicial, and legislative branches of the government at every level (Barnett, 1975, 36).

The sixty-one point plan became known as the “black agenda” and black members saw the CBC as an opportunity to affect change within Congress much in the same way blacks had mobilized on a grassroots level during the Civil Right Movement. Acting as a cohesive legislative unit, the CBC saw its role as the “Congress at large for 20 million Black people” pertinent to the full inclusion of African Americans into the American polity (Barnett, 1975, 36). Therefore, to some degree, black legislative behavior has always been about more than just one’s district, but how black members operate collectively on behalf of black people across the nation. Thus, scholarship must continue to understand black legislative behavior beyond the dyadic relationship between legislator and constituent.

As Fenno points out in Going Home, the CBC is the typical site of analysis on black politics in political science literature:

Because of its longevity and its prominence, the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) has attracted the bulk of this research on minority influence in Congress. Studies of the CBC's makeup, its representativeness, its internal cohesion, its legislative strategies, its bargaining leverage, its external relationships, and its overall accomplishments have dominated assessments of black member influence in the House – and assessments of their changing influence as well (Fenno, 2003, 2).

Beyond highlighting the significance of the CBC as a cohesive legislative body within Congress, Fenno also offers a multifaceted approach to determining political representation that suggests a good deal of substantive representation among CBC members is going on at home – personal, electoral, and organizational ties. If this is the case, then descriptive representation may very well have more expected substantive
utility for black members and their constituents because race is associated with a particular kind of experience that transcends district and state lines: “a national constituency of black citizens [who] share a set of race-related concerns” (Fenno, 2003, 7).

With currently 10% of House representatives being black, studies have also shown that group cohesiveness with regard to CBC (Canon 1995) has worked in favor of promoting the policy interests of African Americans. Nonblack members working with members of the CBC also stand to gain in reaching their policy goals from the symbolic value of working with members of a different race; shared constituency interests or policy objectives between racial or ethnic groups create incentives for black and nonblack legislators to work together. Nonblack legislators may have a particular motivation to coalition-build with black legislators because they will appear more sympathetic to the concerns of black people and this could aid them or their party in the next election. Therefore, the symbolic and substantive worth of the CBC has often been one and the same; given the small number of black members in Congress, operating collectively as a group has the empowering effect of increasing the likelihood of meeting goals members have in common (Pinney & Serra 1999), while at the same time creating incentives for other black and nonblack members alike to help promote and reach such goals because of the symbolic merit of cooperating with such a representative body as the CBC.

REBCS have organized in similar fashion to the CBC; however, members of ethnic caucuses need not racially or ethnically identify with the group they represent. The post-2000 spike in REBCS like the Singapore Caucus, Caribbean Caucus, Albanian Caucus, and Ethiopian and Ethiopian American Caucus suggest that social scientists
reconsider, extend, or at least modify, the present paradigm of descriptive and substantive representation that limits the discussion of race and representation to that of simply “blacks” and “whites”.

Given the racial paradigm that empowers the CBC, APA, and Hispanic Caucus to implement a “for-us-by-us” strategy of minority representation, African caucuses, along with other ethnic caucuses, stand as a fascinating development in stark opposition to conventional theories of race, representation, and identity politics. Ethnic caucuses challenge a host of basic assumptions in DR and SR literature and racial politics that do not hold, or at the very least not in the same way, for Africans in particular: 1) ethnic identification, as opposed to racial identification, as the impetus for representing black people as a group, and 2) the ability of members of ethnic-based caucuses to descriptively and substantively represent an ethnic group for whom few of its members, if none at all, ethnically identify as African. Exploring the question of whether cross-racial representation of black ethnic minorities matters ultimately helps determine if there is added value in DR when it comes to the SR for minorities as a collective group.

In the 108th Congress6, approximately 300 caucuses existed and close to 10% were race and ethnic-based. Forty-four percent of the REBCS were established in or after the year 2000. The past four congressional sessions have shown somewhat of a steady increase in the number of REBCS, which at the very least, implies that legislators find caucuses beneficial for their policy or electoral goals. The decrease in CMOs between the 110th and 111th Congress can most likely be attributed to the change in administration,

6 190 of the 300 caucuses “were registered with the Committee on House Administration as congressional member organizations” (Richardson 2004, summary).
which resulted in a change in party leadership, perhaps leaving caucuses led by the Bush administration dormant or extinct.

Table 1.1 Congressional Member Organizations, 108th-111th Congress

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Congressional Member Organizations (CMO)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Congressional Session</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Year</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No. of REBCS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No. of CMOS Total</strong></td>
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Source: (Dilger and computation based on Committee on House Administration records)

The emergence of REBCS reflects the increased presence of ethnic minorities and their particular collective interests. However we must ask whether, to legislators, ethnic minorities are nothing more than a growing segment of the voter population for legislators to capitalize on without substantively representing them. Additionally, whether caucuses emerge after members sit on relevant committees may perhaps explain the impetus for congressional caucus activity.

**Legislative Behavior and the Institutional Nature of Congressional Caucuses**

Caucuses can be thought of “as an identifiable, self-conscious, relatively stable unit of interacting members whose relationships are not officially prescribed by statutes and rules” (Fielli, 1962, 76). They exist to impact the policy process (Steven et. al 1962; Hammond 1998). Caucuses that formally register with the Committee on House Administration (CHA) are known as congressional member organizations (CMOs), and they tend to have more longevity and influence than informal member groups (Dilger 2009). CMOs also have better records, so only caucuses deemed CMOs are considered in
this project. The *Congressional Yellow Book* has 645 informal member organizations and 40% of them are CMOs (Dilger 2009). The CHA requires CMOs to electronically register on their web site with a name, statement of purpose, CMO Officers, and the contact information of staff assigned to work on CMO issues (Dilger 2009).

Caucuses differ in terms of their establishment, membership and area of focus, ranging from the 1996 Congressional Diabetes Caucus with 289 members to the 2002 Kashmir Forum with only three members. One of the oldest caucuses to exist in the U.S. House of Representatives was the Democratic Study Group (DSG), established in 1959 to curtail conservative democratic agendas by pulling resources together to advance more moderate-to-liberal policies (Hammond, 1998, 1). By the 1970s, fewer than a dozen informal congressional groups existed; by 1999, the number had skyrocketed to 185. By 2004, the number reached approximately 300 (Richardson 2001; Richardson 2004).

In *Congressional Caucus in National Policymaking*, Susan Hammond categorizes caucuses into six groups: party caucuses, personal-interest caucuses, national constituency caucuses, regional caucuses, state/district caucuses, and industry caucuses. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) illustrates the proportion of caucuses that fall into each category.
While the substantial increase in caucus formation may cause one at first to conclude that caucuses must be effective, Salisbury’s proliferation hypothesis calls for closer scrutiny of the motivations of caucus formation, before making such a claim: “as a ‘natural’ social response among conflicting specialized groups, formal associations are created, or emerge, to represent the conflicting claims of each differentiated set of interested parties…it is the processes by which values are altered that one must look for an explanation of group formation” (Salisbury, 1992, 5). Drawing on this point, Hammond cites deficiencies in the organization of Congress, combined with “increased issue complexity, new systems of political participation, increased constituent demands,
[and] technological change” (Hammond, 1998, 19). Caucuses have no distinctive
legislative power, although their members do. Following Gingrich's successfully led
effort to cut funding for legislative service organizations in 1995, caucuses have been
restricted in their activities. The CHA established firm guidelines for caucuses that make
it more difficult for legislators to use their caucus membership to affect policy:

- CMOs have no separate corporate or legal identity;
- CMOs are not employing authorities
- Members’ representational allowance may not directly support a
  CMO as an independent entity;
- CMOs may not be assigned separate office space;
- neither CMOs, nor individual members, may accept goods, funds, or
  services from private organizations or individuals to support the
  CMO;
- Members may use personal funds to support the CMO; and
- Members of a CMO, in support of the objectives of that CMO, may
  utilize employees (including shared employees) and official
  resources under the control of the member to assist the CMO
  carrying out its legislative objectives, but not employees may be
  appointed in the name of a CMO.

In terms of communications:
- CMOs may not use the congressional frank, nor may a member lend his or her
  frank to a CMO [Frank, or the Franking Commission, refers to congressional
  mailing standard approval for members to send correspondence to constituents in
  their district]
- Members may use official resources for communications related to the purpose
  of a CMO. Any such communications must comply with the franking regulations;
- Members may devote a section of their official website to CMO issues, but
  CMOs may not have independent web pages;
- Members may use inside mail to communicate information related to a CMO;
- Members may prepare material related to CMO issues for dissemination;
- official funds may not be used to print or pay for stationary for the CMO
- Members may refer to their membership in a CMO on their official stationary
  (Dilger 2009).

Hammond’s discussion of REBCs provides insight into how the structure and
institutional framework of caucuses affect the ways in which the interests of racial and
ethnic minorities get represented:
Unlike other types of caucuses, national constituency caucuses work to place issues on the public agenda and thus to influence governmental and congressional agendas. Also unlike other types of caucuses, a high proportion of national constituency caucuses engage in a wide range of agenda-setting activities. Within Congress they testify at hearings, draft bills and amendments, and work with party leaders on committee issues. There is no clear pattern to the activity of these caucuses in setting administrative agendas; they choose their strategies according to the issue and their estimate of success (Hammond, 1998, 96).

Framing the discussion of descriptive and substantive representation of racial and ethnic minorities by emphasizing the institutional foundation of congressional caucus activity is essential in developing a more informed theoretical assessment of how and why race and ethnic-based (REB) interests matter. I argue that political scientists have not adequately investigated the impact of informal groups in Congress, bypassing a major feature of congressional activity affecting legislative decision-making. Members of Congress voluntarily create, join, or align themselves with caucuses to further their goals of cooperation, specialization, and representation. Ultimately, as Hammond suggests, “[caucuses] work because they serve members’ interests” (Hammond, 1998, 19).

Furthermore, this study reveals the motivations behind nonblack participation on African caucuses. Additionally, congressional caucuses in the United States serve as the primary informal means by which racial minority legislators work collectively to represent specific interests from their racial or ethnic group (Hammond 1998). Congressional caucuses are analogous to interest groups; they function like internal lobbyists, doing the work of interest groups inside Congress. Therefore, analysis that captures the influence of caucuses can provide further insight into why legislators do what they do and to what extent their actions are motivated by informal networks and alliances in Congress (Hammond 1998).
Focusing on African caucuses is particularly insightful because they operate much like the CBC, though unlike the CBC, their members do not have to racially or ethnically belong to the group they represent. U.S. census data estimates that 25% of the growth in the black population was due to the influx of immigrant groups from Africa and the Caribbean between 1990 and 2000 (Logan 2003). Therefore, instead of approaching black people as a singular, monolithic group, it is necessary to deconstruct the existing black/white paradigm and investigate whether political representation based on race changes when ethnic background is taken into account.

African immigrants and their descendants have been virtually nonexistent in American politics literature even though members of congressional caucuses have voluntarily chosen to make such groups visible in the political process. The COFR and African embassy perspectives provide a strong counterbalance for measuring congressional caucus efficacy on foreign policy issues. The former provides a set of specific U.S.-Africa foreign policy recommendations from a nonpartisan think tank regarded highly by U.S. policymakers and throughout the world, while the latter provides perspectives from African officials on the receiving end of U.S. foreign policy

Conclusion

My research is the first and only study of African congressional caucuses in the U.S. House of Representatives, involving primary data collection. While several studies have analyzed the Congressional Black Caucus, no one has analyzed black ethnic caucuses altogether within the context of racial politics discourse. Analyzing whether descriptive representation based on race or cross-racial representation affects substantive
representation on race and ethnic-based congressional caucuses will further enhance the ability of scholars to adopt a more multi-dimensional approach towards legislative representation and allow scholars to broaden their theories about racial representation.

Congressional caucuses are like spider webs, linking members of Congress to one another in a complex set of informal networks and alliances. Their institutional nature renders them almost invisible in their efforts to infiltrate the legislative process; thus, a significant amount of legislative activity on behalf of racial minorities is going on behind the scenes. My dissertation investigates the inner-workings of legislative activity for black ethnic caucuses in the House of Representatives in an effort to reveal the ways in which group racial representation in Congress impacts the interests of minority groups for which an REBC exists. This is important for analyzing what factors account for effective legislative representation of racial and ethnic minorities, as well as the extent to which the race of the legislator continues to matter in this regard. Furthermore, extending the literature on DR and SR for black ethnic communities captures the ethnic diversity within the U.S. black population as well as the nuances in black legislative behavior. The next chapter entitled “U.S.-Africa Foreign Policy, Affairs, and Relations in the 21st Century,” provides the lens from which to analyze current U.S.-Africa foreign policy through quantitative and qualitative analysis of African embassy perceptions of black ethnic caucuses.
CHAPTER 2

Racial Group Consciousness and U.S. Africa Foreign Policy

“Americans and Africans are linked by a common heritage, a common history, and common values. The blood of Africa flows in the veins of America. Indeed, it is impossible to imagine the dynamic, multifaceted America of today without the contributions of Africans and their descendants to every aspect of our national life. It is not a coincidence that as African Americans have entered into the mainstream of American life, Africa itself has entered into the mainstream of foreign policy.”

Johnnie Carson, Assistant Secretary of African Affairs
Remarks before the Council on Foreign Relations
June 25, 2009

In chapter one, a theoretical approach for understanding descriptive and substantive representation vis-à-vis congressional caucuses is provided as a framework for understanding how and why legislators have sought to address U.S.–Africa foreign policy interests and incorporate African immigrants into the American polity. I posit that the emergence of race and ethnic-based caucuses provides the ability to analyze the significance of black ethnicity in the United States and also the extent to which the race of the caucus member matters in the substantive representation of caucus activity. Most important, I argue that the more black caucus members present on an African caucus, the more active and engaged the caucus will be in meeting its policy goals and I attribute this
phenomenon to the racial group consciousness of African American members of Congress as a driving force extending to immigrants from Africa.

In this chapter, I explain the significance of racial group consciousness and theories of common fate and how these concepts can trump ethnic differences within the U.S. black population. Second, I provide the historical background of U.S.-Africa foreign relations in order to understand the degree to which the racial group consciousness of members on the Congressional Black Caucus has positively contributed to the advancement of U.S.-Africa foreign policy. Finally, I offer a current critique of U.S.-Africa foreign policy in the 21st century that acknowledges the extent to which racial group consciousness continues to inform the CBC and African American legislative behavior when it comes to U.S.-African foreign policy, thereby emphasizing the extant importance of racial representation on congressional caucuses.

**Extensions of Racial Group Consciousness and Common Fate**

Race and politics literature has paid close attention to ideas of racial group identification, membership, and consciousness. Although scholars continue to ascribe different meanings to the terms and use them interchangeably, it is critical to understand they are separate and distinct concepts (McClain et al 2009). Identification is defined as how one describes oneself, while membership “refers to the assignment of an individual into a particular group based on characteristics that are specific to that group, in accordance with widely held inter-subjective definitions” (McClain et al 2009, 473). Racial group consciousness, “on the other hand involves identification with a group and a political awareness or ideology regarding the group’s relative position in society along
with a commitment to collective action aimed at realizing the group’s interests” (Miller et al 1981, 495). While racial group consciousness has been discussed in the literature with respect to African Americans and their levels of political participation, some scholars have analyzed whether or not these concepts extend to the Asian, Latino, and Caribbean population (DeSipio 2002; Lien 2001; Rogers 2006; Schildkraut 2005; Sears and Savalei 2006) and others have warned against the direct mapping of theories of racial group consciousness to other nonblack minorities without considering factors such as “ethnicity, culture, immigration status, citizenship, country of origin, and national history” (McClain et al 2009, 480).

Common fate for African Americans has been articulated most notably by Dawson’s measure known as the “black utility heuristic,” which measures to what degree an individual feels what happens to other black people will have something to do with what happens in their life (Dawson 1994). According to his analysis, a rise in the socioeconomic status of African Americans does not diminish their sense of linked fate, but on the contrary, makes it more likely to be present and operating. Thus, black legislators are likely to exhibit strong feelings of common fate as measured by the black utility heuristic, which “leads an individual to use the social standing of the group as a proxy for the wellbeing of the individual” (McClain et al 2009, 477). Perceptions of linked fate among African American legislators is the reason for the creation of the Congressional Black Caucus and its efforts to collectively “advance the global black community by developing leaders, informing policy and educating the public,” as articulated by the mission statement of the Congressional Black Caucus Foundation in 1971.
Scholars of race and representation agree that although their interpretations regarding racial group consciousness may differ across groups, there is no question that the increase in non-white immigration to the United States has not only drastically changed our perception of race and racism in America, but has called for a reexamination of the specific ways in which ethnicity complicates our ideas about political mobilization, participation, and representation for racial and ethnic minorities. For example, it may appear logical to conclude that because ethnicity matters for African immigrants, race does not; however this study postulates that even when Africans do not consider their race important to their identity or share perceptions of common fate with African Americans, Africans continue to benefit from the fact that African Americans do consider race an integral part of their identity. How so? Because African American legislators extend their feelings of racial group consciousness and perceptions of common fate to Africans and are thus motivated to act on their behalf in the same ways they work for and on behalf of African Americans. This is a subtle, yet crucial distinction of how race and ethnicity can matter for groups who may not hold either category important to their identity, but at the same time can be positively or negatively affected by groups who do consider race and/or ethnicity an important part of their identity.

With respect to black immigrants who entered the U.S. voluntarily, a racial stratification system that does not give black immigrants the option to identify beyond being “black,” assumes black immigrants “share a common racial identity with other black people, namely African Americans (Benson 2006, 222). However, immigrant background plays a critical role in shaping the identity for black immigrants who come to America:
Research on racial group identification, including studies of West Indians, Haitians, Dominicans, Africans, and Puerto Ricans, consistently shows that migrants resist, at least initially, identifying as part of the black racial minority (Apraku 1996; Arthur 2000; Duany 1998; Itzigsohn and Dore-Cabral 2000; McDemott 2003; Rodriguez 2000). For example, migrants actively set themselves apart from African Americans by asserting their ethnic origin through the use of language and culturally distinctive dress (Apraku 1996; Arthur 2000; Duany 1998; Waters 1999) (Benson 2006, 224).

While it is the case that over time black migrant groups are more likely to share a sense of common racial identity with African Americans (Rogers 2006; Waters 1999), it is likely Africans have not yet reached a point where they share a sense of common racial identity considering their recent arrival and settlement in metropolitan cities across the country with dense African populations that reinforce and help maintain a strong ethnic identity.

Racial group consciousness and common fate on part of African Americans has always been extended to black communities across the globe in the quest for freedom and equality, and the CBC has been at the forefront of setting the agenda in this respect among African American members of Congress. It is no coincidence that the CBC has been referred to as the “conscience of Congress,” and as the next section will elaborate, it was and continues to be racial group consciousness on part of black members that played a critical role in advancing U.S. foreign policy towards Africa.

**U.S.-Africa Foreign Policy and the CBC: 1960s-1990s**

The 1960s marked a period of liberation for many countries in Africa that suffered from colonization, but also for many African Americans who were in the midst of the Civil Rights Movement during that time. When I interviewed the CBC senior staff
On May 14th, 2009, he explained how black members of Congress were a critical factor in getting Africa on the U.S. foreign policy agenda:

Charlie Diggs [cofounder of the Congressional Black Caucus] at this point had become a subcommittee chairman of the Africa subcommittee and he expressed a strong interest in Africa policy because Africa had never really been an area of particular interest to the United States. What we [the U.S.] did with regards to Africa was generally through colonial powers. If we had a problem with an English colony like Nigeria or Ghana, we’d go to London and talk with them about it. Africans started after World War II to become, and specifically in the sixties, become advocates for their own freedom.

It was recognized among scholars and among policymakers that the United States needed to create a policy for the continent to directly relate to the newly independent states and not to depend on colonial states for our policy….

But Africa was a natural because the movement for self-determination had really struck a chord in the black community. People saw that as very much parallel to our own civil rights movement that was coming to a head in the sixties, that was the same struggle for freedom, and there was a welcome – there was a desire to relate to the struggle for freedom in Africa and find a vehicle for the freedom fighters in Africa to relate to our civil rights struggle.

The sixties was a major turning point not only for African liberation, but also for the United States to start building bilateral relations with African countries and establishing direct communication with African leaders. African American representatives used their political power to put African issues on their agenda along with their own issues of political incorporation and equal opportunity.

Whereas Europe and the United States had long dealt with one another when it came to Africa, decolonization in Africa confronted the West with the challenge of recognizing and dealing with African leaders in newly independent states. Furthermore, the critical nature of racial politics and grassroots movements on the U.S. home front such as the “Free South Africa Movement” in which black elected officials participated in protests to raise awareness about the need to take an active policy stance against
Apartheid, challenged U.S. policymakers to take issues that affected the African continent more seriously in international affairs.

Since the inception of the CBC, black members in Congress have always played a critical role in encouraging the U.S. government to take the Africa continent more seriously when it comes to international affairs. The CBC’s first chairman, Rep. Charles Diggs (D-MI), was appointed chair of the subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee in 1969 and the first black congressman to travel to Africa, where he served as one of the U.S. delegates present for Ghana’s independence in 1957. With regard to Africa, Diggs is remembered most famously for mobilizing CBC members to put pressure on the Nixon administration to take an active stance against apartheid in South Africa and also his resigning as a U.S. delegate to the United Nations due to Nixon’s signing of the Azores agreement with Portugal. The Azores agreement provided Portugal with a $436 million dollar loan to boost its economic operations without any consideration for its continued subjugation of the African countries it colonized: “‘This enormous, unprecedented and anomalous commitment which was made to a country which has refused to recognize its obligation under the UN charter of self-determination for the people of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, and Cape Verde is staggering, especially when I consider our alleged inability to put money into crucial areas for the 23 million Blacks in the United States,’ Diggs said” (Jet Magazine 1972, 20). Along with his Africa counselor staffer, Goler Teal Butcher, who provided legal expertise and strong staff leadership on Africa issues, Diggs set the tone for the kind of engagement the CBC was likely to be involved in when it came to foreign relations between the United States and Africa.
Diggs and Butcher were key players in the advancement of U.S. foreign policy not just for their individual actions, but also for taking the lead in setting the CBC’s agenda to include foreign policy towards Africa. They were among a much larger cohort of African American politicians and professionals who gained entry, if only marginally, into the corridors of Washington power in the wake of the 1960s civil rights movement. Diggs and Butcher paved the way, in the words of Sylvia Hill (2004), for "young black activist types, . . . internationalists in some sense, whether they defined it as Pan Africanist or anti-imperialist, . . . [people who were not] careerist in the traditional sense of the word (Minter 2010). Diggs and the CBC’s legacy of speaking out and working on issues that affected Africans never dwindled, but in fact very much coincided with the efforts of other influential African American leaders and organizations who worked with the CBC to continue their efforts to improve U.S.-African foreign relations and policy.

When the Foreign Assistance Act was passed in 1961, with its roots in the Marshall Plan’s efforts to aid in the reconstruction of Europe after World War II, Congress established the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). For the next fifty years, Africa would be on the receiving end of U.S. foreign assistance targeted at food aid, poverty and disease reduction, and peacekeeping.

Entities like the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Catholic Relief Services (CRS), along with several other agencies and NGOs, began to emerge during the 1960s and directed their efforts towards humanitarian aid on the continent. Additionally, with Africans taking power in a neo-colonial era, ethnic/religious conflict, coups, and civil war became a major concern for decades following African liberation and remain a major issue today. As the COFR report makes clear, “U.S. policy
toward Africa should change to reflect Africa’s growing strategic importance.

Washington should maintain its historic and principled humanitarian concerns, while broadening the basis for U.S. engagement on the continent” (COFR 2005, xiv). Given the significant transformation of African nations to reclaim power in the latter half of the 20th century, democratize their government regimes, and attempt to adequately address issues of poverty and economic and political stability, U.S. foreign policy towards the continent was also challenged with the need to adequately and comprehensively establish and promote foreign relations that not only recognized African leadership, but sought to negotiate and work directly with African leaders to empower and assist them in addressing humanitarian and political issues facing the continent.

Since World War II, African American lobby groups which included “the Council on African Affairs (1937-1955). The American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa (1962-1967), the CBC (1969-present), and TransAfrica (1977-present)” (Leanne 1998, 17) were unified in their efforts to point out Congress’s disregard to take Africa seriously. Prior to the Clinton Administration, African American leaders and CBC members “remained strikingly consistent” in their criticism of U.S. African policy, which centered on the view that 1) Africa was important insofar as it was a proxy battleground for Cold War politics, 2) U.S. interest was “primarily based on a desire to exploit the natural resources and cheap labor of Africa,” and 3) the same racist beliefs about black people that marginalized African Americans and took away their freedom and civil rights was the same sentiment that informed U.S. foreign policymakers’ attitudes and interest with regard to Africa (Leanne 1998, 17).
By the time the Cold War and apartheid in South Africa had ended, foreign policy towards the continent had become more decentralized as black legislators and organizations shifted their focus from apartheid and advocacy to U.S. engagement in social, political, and economic issues in Africa. By the time Clinton took office in 1992, Congress had gradually redirected its focus to that of increasing foreign aid. However, the most significant contribution under his administration was the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), legislation geared at improving economic and trade relations with Africa, which eventually passed in 2000. While foreign policy towards Africa had gained more attention in the 1990s compared to the 1960s, CBC members still maintained a strong belief that racism played a significant role in U.S. policy towards the continent, and nothing heightened these sentiments more than Clinton’s policies or lack thereof, during the Rwandan genocide in 1994:

CBC members and TransAfrica continued to declare their concerns about persisting forms of U.S. racism… African American leaders expressed much anger over the administration’s slow movement in condemning the Rwandan killings as acts of “genocide” (calling the killings genocide earlier would have mandated international intervention). Black leaders voiced equal disappointment over the refusal of the United States to become in any way involved militarily in preventing the genocide. Even beyond this, they were dismayed over the lack of U.S. support in helping African states to organize in order to intervene in Rwanda (Leanne 1998, 20).

Racial group consciousness and perceptions of common fate among African American legislators are not simply feelings about past racism and/or discriminatory policies carried over to the present day, but are feelings that can be heightened or diminished according to current day policies perceived as racist; it is this perception that also plays a strong role in influencing black legislators to take action when it comes to foreign policy towards Africa. For example, the U.S.’s lenient policies towards the South African
government during apartheid was vociferously met with anger and a call to action by
CBC members operating out of the same imperative they did for African Americans
during the Civil Rights Movement. As one CBC senior staff member put it when
interviewed May 14th, 2009:

You had a generation that is very familiar with the protest and they continued the
protest politics. The whole Free South Africa Movement was, well, not the whole
of it, but certainly when it became most visible in the mid-60s, it involved daily
marches in front of the South African Embassy and arrests on a daily basis in
order to empathize with Nelson Mandela and the ANC leaders who had been
arrested and were in jail in South Africa, so the traditional civil rights
demonstrations and arrests is what we recalled over the last couple of weeks and
very symbolic, but also very much an indication of the generational change is that
John Lewis was the man who was most prominently arrested. There’s nobody in
the caucus who was closer to the CRM, and himself a legitimate leader of that
movement that John Lewis, so he was acting out of that historical imperative.

The CBC’s track record of involvement in foreign policy towards Africa goes beyond
advocacy and legislation proposals to engagement. A Congressional African Affairs
Specialist reported that:

Beginning in the nineties, we began to see a more assertive CBC…But you had
key leaders within the CBC who took the lead [when it came to Rwanda]…Congressman Payne was one of the senior members at that time in the committee.
He traveled during the genocide. After the genocide he took the lead at committee
hearings and the declaration. He was one of several [CBC] members who actually
wrote a letter to Clinton at the height of the genocide. And many CBC members
also took the lead during that period. The same thing on Somalia. Payne and I
believe L.C. Hastings. That was important in many ways. Not only to talk about
these issues, but to actually go there really didn’t get you much votes or didn’t get
you much support in terms of your constituency.

The same thing for Sudan. That was the first, you know, high-level delegation that
actually went into a liberation area without the visa and without the permission of
the central government. And they {CBC members} spent several days in the
liberation area and southern Sudan. So that was important and as we moved
forward, whether it’s Congo, whether it’s Nigeria, or South Africa, you see more
and more CBC member active.
CBC members have made a clear connection between the failure of foreign policy towards Africa and the perceived existing racist ideologies that continue to guide them; this assessment has only heightened the feelings of racial group consciousness among African American legislators whose feelings of common fate transcend national boundaries.

**U.S. Africa Foreign Policy in the 21st Century: Present Day Perceptions of Racial Group Consciousness and Common Fate**

U.S. Africa foreign policy made a major shift for the better and then for the worse during the Bush administration for two major reasons: the G8 Summit declaring that Africa topped its agenda and the terrorist attacks of September 11th. These two events set the stage for more engagement of African American legislators in foreign policy matters and reinforced their efforts to speak and act out feelings of common fate on behalf of Africans.

Following the 2005 G8 Summit in Gleneagles, Scotland, where world leaders declared poverty in Africa as their top agenda, the Bush administration pledged along with several industrialized democracies across the globe to double aid to Africa. By 2006, Bush more than doubled aid to Africa from $10 billion in 2000 to $23 billion (America.gov 2010). In addition, the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), approved during Bush’s term, offered the first serious U.S. attempt to shape its foreign policy towards Africa with an eye towards development.
and not simply dependency. Bob Geldof, head organizer of the “Live 8” concerts that were held worldwide to raise awareness of Africa’s development needs, told Time Magazine that “[Bush] has actually done more than any American president for Africa” (U.S. Department of State 2010).

However, while such major shifts in U.S.-Africa relations were taking shape on the dawn of the 21st century, the 9/11 attacks in 2001 and the war in Iraq also dramatically transformed U.S.-Africa foreign policy into a militaristic response effort on the war against terrorism. With the creation of AFRICOM by the United States Department of Defense, many development proponents vociferously argued that AFRICOM was nothing more than a way for the U.S. to use Africa as a proxy battleground to fight terrorism and simply promoted alliances with corrupt regimes in Africa, which ultimately would reverse any benefits that might come as a result of Bush’s efforts to double aid and development initiatives on the continent (U.S. Department of State 2010). On the other hand, some African scholars like Zambian economist, Dambisa Moyo, encourage redirecting foreign aid and humanitarian assistance to finding “more innovative ways for Africa to finance development including trade with China, accessing the capital markets, and microfinance” (AFRICOM 2010). Economic stability requires self-sufficient access to global markets, lack of dependency on foreign aid, and partnerships with countries interested in trade and investment in Africa. Furthermore, China’s increased economic presence in Africa, has piqued the U.S. interest in Africa in ways that may be reminiscent of the Cold War conflict that led to a power struggle on the

7 Live 8 concerts to raise awareness about Africa were in reference to G8 Summit on Africa in 2005.
continent by two of the world’s largest superpowers, potentially leaving African governments more politically and economically unstable than they had been before.

However, the CBC continues to maintain a different approach towards Africa when it comes to economic development, and the CBC interview respondent was clear in delineating that race was a primary source responsible for differing views between black and nonblack legislators:

CBC Senior Staff Caucus Representative: We believe that our view of Africa, which comes from caring deeply about its people, is a more engaging one. As we move towards this world of free trading environment, we want Africa to be included.

When we started talking about AGOA, and still the truth, the United States has very little experience in Africa, unlike the colonial powers from Belgium and France and England. And it’s still a selling job to convince U.S. companies that they can do well in Africa.

Now, some people…there is one exception that has caused a little bit of tension, human rights activists, the white human rights community, which I’d call Amnesty International, people of that sort, have been down on Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe for a good decade because they believe he has turned Zimbabwe into a dictatorship. We don’t argue with that, but we feel very nostalgic about his freedom fighter role and the history of Zimbabwe, where the white controls awfully hard, the need for land distribution. There are complexities in Zimbabwe that we feel have not been fully appreciated if you look at it through only the human rights prism. And therefore, the Black Caucus, I would say, differs from the Amnesty Internationals or the white human rights community, because we give credit to the circumstances that might lead a Mugabe to act the way he does, as opposed to just giving a simplistic response that because he doesn’t have free elections he’s a dictator.

The CBC interview response asserts an extant difference in the CBC’s current foreign policy approach, compared to that of nonblack legislators, in that it recognizes the negative repercussions of colonialism in Africa and slavery in the United States as two sides of the same coin. This is important to the discussion of racial group consciousness because there is a consistent effort by the CBC to attribute the backwardness of U.S.-
Africa foreign policy as very much related to the current struggles faced by African Americans to be treated equally as a result of U.S. policy, or lack thereof.

While it is too early to determine whether the U.S.’s first black president, Barack Obama, will continue Bush’s legacy or redirect foreign policy towards Africa in the same engaging manner the CBC believes to be beneficial, the fact that Obama and his administration have made explicit remarks about the significance of a connection between Africans and African Americans, reiterates the importance of race with respect to U.S.-Africa policy. Under the Obama administration, the president has pledged to focus on “democracy, opportunity, [economic] health, and peaceful resolution of conflict” in Africa (Gachara 2010). On July 11, 2009, Obama traveled to Ghana and delivered a historic speech about Africa’s significance to the world and to the United States:

We must start from the simple premise that Africa’s future is up to Africans.

I say this knowing full well the tragic past that has sometimes haunted this part of the world. I have the blood of Africa within me, and my family’s own story encompasses both the tragedies and triumphs of the larger African story…

As for America and the West, our commitment must be measured by more than just the dollars we spend. I have pledged substantial increases in our foreign assistance, which is in Africa’s interest and America’s. But the true sign of success is not whether we are a source of aid that helps people scrape by – it is whether we are partners in building the capacity for transformational change.

In the 21st century, capable, reliable and transparent institutions are the key to success – strong parliaments and honest police forces; independent judges and journalists; a vibrant private sector and civil society. Those are the things that give life to democracy, because that is what matters in people’s lives (Gachara 2010).

Obama’s speech symbolically represented an intimate understanding of Africa’s challenges combined with a foreign policy agenda that plans to build on existing
institutions and relationships to promote policy that sees Africa as a partner in the effort to promote economic and political stability in the region. Establishing such a personal connection with the continent emphasizes the overall notion that race still matters and also suggests that descriptive representation matters not only in representing issues constituents care about, but also the way leaders and people of foreign nations perceive U.S. foreign policy.

During Obama’s first year in office, his Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Johnnie Carson, addressed the Council of Foreign Relations and stated that the COFR, along with members of Congress and other stakeholders, would be part of the dialogue that would shape U.S.-Africa foreign policy. Interestingly enough, Carson used rhetoric similar to that of Obama in his speech in Ghana and Egypt, in regard to the salience of racial identity as a marker of a deep-rooted connectedness to the continent. In fact, Carson makes a much more explicit statement about the common link between Africans and African Americans as a way to suggest to Africans and the world a deeper level of understanding and confidence in engaging in U.S.-Africa relations that promote a mutually beneficial partnership.

Americans and Africans are linked by a common heritage, a common history, and common values. The blood of Africa flows in the veins of America. Indeed, it is impossible to imagine the dynamic, multifaceted America of today without the contributions of Africans and their descendants to every aspect of our national life. It is not a coincidence that as African Americans have entered into the mainstream of American life, Africa itself has entered into the mainstream of foreign policy.

In fact, it is not just foreign policy that has driven our relationship with Africa. It has been a much broader mutual engagement of Americans and Africans in education, academic and cultural exchanges, religion, media, literature, tourism, business, and all the way to the level of communities across this country reaching out to African communities at their own initiative. In this exciting context I am pleased and honored to address the outlines of U.S. Africa policy under the
administration of a president whose Kenyan father came to America on a scholarship.

For the America of the 1960s, at least for the U.S. Government, Africa was an open question, a new factor in the world. But it remained on the margins in terms of U.S. foreign policy, which focused on the Cold War, Europe, and East Asia. We were most uncertain about the very leaders of African liberation who knew America best, men such as Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah and Mozambique’s Eduardo Mondlane. These were men who had been educated in and lived extensively in the U.S., who had imbibed at the sometimes contradictory well of American values and had experienced personally as black men the humiliations of America’s own Jim Crow-style racism (U.S. Department of State 2010).

Carson’s comments emphasize the significance of descriptive racial representation in hopes of bolstering confidence on the African side that United States policy is guided by a deep-seated understanding of the historical ties that link Africans and African Americans. This is important because it suggests that shared identity or background matters at the level of leadership even when it comes to foreign policy with African nations and their people.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I have argued that racial group consciousness on the part of African Americans is a primary motivation for the CBC’s involvement in U.S.-African foreign policy and black legislative activity overall. African American legislators extend their feelings of racial group consciousness and common fate perceptions to Africans, and that has been an integral factor in the progression of U.S.-African foreign policy, albeit gradual. An historical overview of U.S. foreign policy towards the continent from the 1960s until the 21st century demonstrates a consistent trend of engagement on the part of CBC members. Furthermore, the interviews offer a more detailed account of the legislative activism of CBC members who are very much aware of how colonialism has
negatively impacted the continent, similar to the ways in which slavery has left African Americans fighting for resources in the quest for full participation and equality in the American polity.

The next chapter lays out the research design of my study, and the hypothesis builds on the notion of racial group consciousness explained in this chapter as a primary explanatory factor for current black legislative behavior towards U.S.-Africa foreign policy, not only within the CBC, but also with respect to the African congressional caucuses that have since emerged in the U.S. House of Representatives.
CHAPTER 3
Measuring the “Currency” of Racial Representation on African Congressional Caucuses

Descriptive representation is a reliable indicator for the substantive representation of African interests in African congressional caucuses. While the emerging trend of race and ethnic-based caucuses to include members that do not racially or ethnically identify with the caucus may still positively impact policy and the groups they represent, race still matters when it comes to the legislative efforts of caucus members. Specifically, my hypothesis argues that the more black members present on a black ethnic caucus, the more active or engaged the caucus tends to be in representing its policy goals and interests. Even when black ethnicity is the predominant characteristic by which caucuses are created, racial group consciousness on the part of black members encourages them to work harder and be more engaged in issues concerning Africa and its Diaspora.

In this chapter, I describe my research design involving quantitative and qualitative methods to examine the effects of race on congressional caucus activity. These methods consist of a quantitative regression analysis of African congressional caucus activity controlling for ten predictor variables (six individual-level predictors and
four group-level predictors). I also present overall caucus activity scores on a zero to five scale across 15 policy issues from the COFR Report, which discusses the issues of greatest importance to U.S.-Africa relations; my dissertation analyzes these issues listed in the table below. The top four policy issues of increasing importance to the U.S. are energy, competition from China, terrorism, and HIV/AIDS (COFR 2005, 4).

Table 3.1 COFR U.S.-Africa Foreign Policy Priorities

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<th>U.S.-AFRICA POLICY ISSUES</th>
<th>Council of Foreign Relations, 2005 Africa report</th>
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<td>1</td>
<td>Energy Sector</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>China’s Economic Expansion</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Terrorism (Counterterrorism)</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>HIV/AIDS</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Conflict Resolution/Peacekeeping/UN</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Democracy &amp; Human Rights</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Economic Growth</td>
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<td>Millennium Challenge Account (MCA)</td>
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Former National Security Advisor for President Bill Clinton, Anthony Lake, and former New Jersey Governor, Christine Todd Whitman, served as taskforce chairs of the 2005 Africa report produced by the Council on Foreign Relations (COFR) entitled “More Than Humanitarianism: A Strategic Approach Toward Africa.” The COFR, established in 1921, is the longest standing, nonpartisan foreign policy membership organization and think tank responsible for producing much needed analyses on U.S. foreign policy across the globe. In my interview with COFR Chairman Anthony Lake, he summarized the motivation behind the COFR report and noted the challenge the U.S. faces to look beyond the stereotypical view of Africa in order to adequately improve U.S. foreign relations in a way that can address the social, political, and economic issues it faces:
Former National Security Advisor Anthony Lake: Our report is not the first time people have advocated for a strategic approach to Africa; people who care about Africa have been arguing about this for at least two generations, including myself. I think a lot of the problem is that more and more the public perception of Africa is one of “Africans are people who kill each other” or “Africans are people who starve.” The result can be, dangerously, either donor fatigue or peacekeeping fatigue. And, of course, the stereotypes are unfair and overwhelmingly wrong. The most crucial question is not what we, the United States, come up with, but what are the solutions that Africa comes up with and how can the United States help them reach their own solutions.

COFR contributors and participants also include senior government officials and prominent world leaders. COFR policy recommendations are taken into serious consideration by state department officials, members on the relevant committees in Congress such as the Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs, House Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health, and Appropriations; therefore the COFR report is an ideal barometer to test the efficacy of U.S.-Africa foreign policy.

Congressional activity is measured based on self-reported scores from senior staff caucus representatives. The survey also includes questions regarding legislative activity on the top COFR issues. Furthermore, I asked the caucuses to rate the extent to which their activity may potentially impact the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) requirements for the distribution of U.S. foreign aid to African countries. In addition to the quantitative review, I analyze transcribed interviews with caucus staff in order to have them explain caucus activity ratings and create a more accurate picture of general caucus objectives and performance which was missing due to the lack of record keeping.

Hypothesis and Data

I examine the effect of racial composition of African congressional caucuses in the House of Representatives in order to determine if an increase in black members on a black ethnic caucus correlates with a more active or engaged caucus. Specifically, I focus
on the Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Sudan caucus – the only country-specific African caucuses that exist in Congress. While I originally included the Nigeria and Uganda caucuses in my sample, they are no longer in existence and no contacts or past information were kept. I chose therefore not to include them, although their corresponding embassies did participate in my analysis and commented on their perceptions of the Nigeria and Uganda caucus during the time they were active.

Two sets of surveys and interview protocol were constructed for this analysis: first, for the African congressional caucuses and second, for the embassies that corresponded with each caucus. The Congressional Black Caucus was also included in the sample for comparative purposes, although there is no single African country that corresponds to the Congressional Black Caucus. All interviews took place in Washington D.C. in the spring of 2009, during the House recess period of the 111th Congress. In addition to the quantitative portion of the survey discussed in detail later in this chapter, the qualitative portion of the caucus interview dealt with why and how the caucus was created, major successes and challenges the caucus faced or continues to face in achieving its goals, whether President Obama will benefit the caucus’s agenda, and the extent of the cooperation with other congressional caucuses and the CBC. Embassies were asked about their particular country’s foreign relations and major policy concerns with the United States, levels of cooperation with caucus members, the CBC, and other members in the House, the potential benefit of President Obama, and interactions with members on the Africa and Global Health Subcommittee.

I also constructed an individual level-data set for all 120 House members in the 110th and 111th Congress who sit on an African congressional caucus and/or the
Congressional Black Caucus. This was primary data, which accounted for a host of variables: race, district percent African American, committee power, foreign policy ideology, African foreign-born population, length of time in office, as well as how many African Americans served on each African Caucus.

Although close to fifty\(^8\) race and ethnic-based caucuses exist in the 110\(^{th}\) and 111\(^{th}\) Congress, my data analysis is restricted to the black ethnic caucuses for purposes of analyzing the significance of race and ethnicity with respect to Africans and African Americans. While this project is mostly restricted to descriptive results, it is a critical step towards understanding the role black ethnic diversity plays not only in shaping the policy preferences of black ethnic communities, but also the behavior of the elected officials who represent them.

The present study, then, includes six African congressional caucuses spanning from the 106\(^{th}\) to the 111\(^{th}\) Congress, six African embassies, and the CBC. Each caucus is evaluated on its activity regarding fifteen U.S.-Africa policy issues from the Council of Foreign Relations U.S.-Africa Report drafted in 2005. Caucus activity is measured based on six levels of legislative participation most commonly associated with national constituency caucuses. This study also focuses on the top four issues of greatest importance to the United States when it comes to the continent as a whole: the Energy sector, China’s economic expansion, HIV/AIDS, and Terrorism (Counterterrorism). Thus, by examining the same set of policy issues for all African congressional caucuses and the Congressional Black Caucus in the U.S. House of Representatives, we can collect and report data that captures the nature of caucus activity and the extent to which each is

\(^8\) Congressional Member Organization web site, 111\(^{th}\) Congress.
in alignment with the U.S. government’s approach to the continent as a whole. Most important, we can begin to assess the importance of both race and ethnicity within the context of racial politics discourse. With qualitative caucus interviews to help explain the caucus’s motivations and activity, we can assess to what extent racial group consciousness of black members extends to immigrants from Africa and helps explains their membership and activity on African caucuses.

To the question, “Does racial representation on African congressional caucuses matter for the substantive representation of U.S. foreign policy interests toward Africa?” I hypothesize that the more black members on an African congressional caucus, the higher the caucus activity score. I measure my hypothesis by first computing the caucus activity score (CAS), which is a summary variable made up of activity ratings on Energy, China’s economic expansion, Terrorism, and HIV/AIDS, for every caucus member who sits on an African Caucus and the CBC and classify them into three levels of caucus activity: 0 for “no activity,” 1 for “moderate activity,” and 2 for “high activity.” Second, I present qualitative and descriptive results on caucus activity for all fifteen U.S.-Africa foreign policy issues outlined in the Council of Foreign Relations Report: Energy, China’s economic expansion, Terrorism, HIV/AIDS, Conflict Resolution/Peacekeeping/UN, Democracy & Human Rights, Economic Growth, Millennium Challenge Account, Africa Growth & opportunity Act, Global Cooperation, Genocide, Trade Reform, U.S. Assistance (Reform & Prioritize), Prevent Future Atrocities, and Poverty. The CAS is computed for each caucus in my sample. I also take into account whether or not caucuses have engaged in any of the following six types of legislative activity: 1) Cosponsoring a bill, 2) Drafting bills or amendments, 3) Meeting to set the caucus position/agenda, 4)
Meeting/working with party leaders in Congress, 5) Meeting with African leaders, embassy officials, churches, synagogues, or mosques or community organizations, and 6) Using committee power of caucus member to advance caucus agenda. Lastly, I survey the caucuses on whether or not they are active in addressing the Millennium Challenge Account requirements necessary for African countries to receive foreign aid from the United States; the sixteen requirements fall into the categories of governing justly, investing in people, and promoting economic freedom.

**Research Design: Explanation of Sample and Variable Construction**

The research design involves primary data collection involving quantitative, qualitative, and descriptive statistics in an effort to collect data about general African caucus activity. I have also attempted to gauge “the impact of the [congressional caucus] activity results from the work of the caucus, or in some instances group leaders, or group staff working with group leaders, not from caucus members’ other positions” (Hammond 1985, 603).

Senior legislative staffers charged with running the caucuses were interviewed for this study. Since the purpose of this study is to move beyond dyadic representation to group-representation, I interviewed five senior staff caucus officials representing the caucus as a group. The senior staff representative for the caucus works directly for the caucus group chair and is responsible for setting and coordinating the caucus agenda and activities; therefore he or she is most qualified to accurately serve as a representative respondent for the actions of all caucus members. Furthermore, resolutions, dear colleague letters, requests for co-sponsorships, information updates, caucus meetings/briefings are all activities coordinated by the caucus staff appointed to the
caucus, and so they are therefore likely to be the candidates most qualified to participate in my survey and interview.

I conducted six interviews with high-ranking senior officials from the following embassies: Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Sudan, and Uganda. In order to avoid disclosing the identity of the embassy officials interviewed, I do not reveal their official title; however, it should be noted that they are qualified to speak to all issues raised in my interview because their positions designate that they be familiar with all aspects of business and foreign relations their embassy is involved with.

**Potential Sample Bias**

The specific focus on African congressional caucuses severely limits my sample size to six, and with missing data for two of the caucuses, there is a sizable concern regarding significance and generalizability of my results across all African caucuses. However, because my sample frame includes all African congressional caucuses in the House and there was no way to achieve a greater value for the $n$ in my sample, the small sample size has no relationship to the significance of my results. Similar to studies that have been conducted on decision making of the Supreme Court Justices, with a total sample of nine justices for example, no one would suggest that such studies are not useful in providing informative analyses simply because significance could not be gained due to the sample size. Furthermore, my large $n$, individual level data set, from which my quantitative analysis derives, provides valuable insight for the small and non-generalizable group level data.

While it is true that country caucuses vary with respect to issue priority, there is still much to be learned about the potential similarities or patterns that may exist with
regard to the treatment of U.S. involvement in African Affairs. Also, while another potential bias of this study may be the fact that several members serve on more than one caucus and contribute to multicollinearity, determining whether or not similar patterns in agenda and function exist across caucuses may also be revealing in terms of how effective caucuses can actually be when legislators are serving on multiple caucuses. This potential bias is also worthy of dissection because it may speak to the dedicated interest of certain legislators to get involved in issues which would otherwise be forgotten. Additionally, the issue of caucus members’ relevant committee positions raises concerns about the factors that actually account for variance in caucus activity. The Foreign Affairs Committee is arguably the most relevant committee impacting policy toward Africa and Africa caucus activity, and the present study does take this influence into account. Furthermore, transcribed interviews help explain the motivations of caucus founders and chairs, and therefore will reveal the extent to which individual members and members who hold relevant committee positions are responsible for caucus activity.

Also, while self-reported activity scores are likely to be inflated by caucus staff members, embassy survey results help mitigate such bias because my analysis includes embassy perceptions of caucus activity on the same set of COFR issues. Moreover, the caucus and embassy survey both include a question about interactions or meetings between caucus members and embassy officials, so in many ways each set of surveys and interviews serve as counterchecks to the other.

Finally, the length of time a caucus has been in existence, as well as the election of a new majority, can explain how active a caucus can be at one time or another. However, caucuses tend to be overwhelmingly democratic, spearheaded by the caucus
chairperson’s office, and so are unlikely to be susceptible to party changes since caucuses are voluntary and unrestricted in how active they choose to be at any specific moment in time. While several factors may confound the ability to explain variance in caucus activity due to its unrestricted, voluntary nature, this study considers the importance of qualitative research in isolating the factors accountable for caucus creation, motivation, and activity. Little quantitative data exists on race and ethnic-based caucuses altogether, and no data or literature in American politics exists on African caucuses; my mixed-methods focus on a small sample of caucuses therefore provides us with a methodologically balanced approach to studying a new phenomenon of race and ethnic-based representation, which provides the analytical framework for future studies interested in how black ethnicity affects black legislative behavior.

**Why African Congressional Caucuses in the U.S. House of Representatives Are Important**

In order to make the argument for the importance of African congressional caucuses, it is necessary to understand why and how congressional caucuses shape and impact policy. As chapter one explains, while roll call voting analysis remains a critical measure of substantive representation, it does not account for the work and effort legislators engage in when supporting or fighting for an issue desired by one’s constituency (Hall 1996). Caucuses do not hold any legislative power per se; however, because they have the potential to influence policy or frame a policy agenda, they are likely to demonstrate the intensity with which a group of legislators cares about an issue (Hall 1996). This is important for distinguishing ideological differences among like-minded legislators who may vote the same way but for different reasons (i.e. party
loyalty, party pressure, logrolling, ideological preference, or constituency interest). Therefore, caucuses are important not only because they expand theories of representation beyond voting, but also because they reveal legislators’ motivations for voting a particular way. Knowing why legislators vote the way they do helps constituents, colleagues, and other parties involved better strategize and maximize their “lobbying” efforts by pursuing members most likely to be persuaded with the least effort.

African congressional caucuses become an important aspect by which both embassy officials and foreign-born populations address their foreign policy preferences. Petitioning caucus members in this manner is beneficial to constituents because caucus members are already likely to be involved in matters of interest to the black foreign-born population and are therefore more likely to respond to both domestic and international interests concerning Africa.

On the other hand, we can also understand how caucuses can be perceived as another type of legislative activity that is “subsidized” by interest groups (Hall and Wayman 1990; Hall and Deardorff 2006) and that such a “subsidy” complements the goals of legislators” (McCormick and Mitchell 2007, 580). This same argument is provided with respect to an article published in the Political Research Quarterly about the Human Rights Congressional Caucus entitled, “Commitments, Transnational Interests, and Congress.” Established in 1983, The Human Rights Caucus has a 150 plus active membership and has been very influential in advocating and influencing policy. Caucuses are informal groups engaged in setting an agenda and gathering likeminded legislators to join together in the advancement of a particular cause, issue, or policy. Therefore, approaching caucuses as interest groups, “even those interest groups that have
a transnational rather than national focus and that are not conventionally considered rich in the resources that politicians seek [according to Keck and Sikkink]” (McCormick and Mitchell 2007, 580). lends itself to understanding why legislators voluntarily join caucuses; costs of participation are low, accountability is shared by the group and not a single legislator, and legislators can push for their policy interests as a group and reap the symbolic and substantive benefits (McCormick and Mitchell 2007, 580). Therefore, caucuses are important because they afford members the ability to push forward specific policy interests, increase the likelihood that they will influence policy by teaming up with likeminded legislators who symbolically claim expertise and special commitment to the issue(s) at hand, and yet members are not accountable in any institutional sense because caucuses are voluntary and members are not bound to any specific responsibility when joining them.

From this perspective, we can extend the literature on Congress and interest groups to that of caucuses, even those with transnational or foreign policy agendas, and approach caucus members as:

Professional lobbyists [who] know their territory [and] make very efficient use of their [colleagues’] time. [Caucus members] can tell you what information you need to have, and what questions you will have to answer. You will find out who you have to convince and why. Essentially, they guide you through the jungle of government and public opinion (Honorable John Reid) (Lobbying Legislators 2010).

Although the lobbying analogy may appear counterintuitive because caucus members are not likely to spend time, energy, and resources persuading members who do not agree with their cause to join their caucus, Hall and Deardorff (HD) offer an economic model of consumer theory that suggests if counteractive lobbying exists, it is not between groups with opposite policy objectives as much as it is between groups fighting for more
attention} among likeminded legislators, and such a theory explains exactly what legislators are doing when lobbying other legislators to join their caucus. Attention can be defined as resource allocation of legislators’ time, co-sponsorship efforts, issue interpretation, public opinion, or agenda-settings. When legislators consider joining a race or ethnic-based caucus, they undergo a similar same decision-making process with respect to being associated with a lobby group; the only difference is the costs are inconsequential and unlikely to play a crucial role in reelection. Although caucuses such as the Democratic Caucus, Hunger Caucus, or the Congressional Black Caucus are recognized by constituents and often reported about in the media, many of the ethnic-based caucuses are neither known to the general public nor to the foreign-born population represented by the caucus.

If legislators are more inclined to unite with likeminded legislators to represent the interests of a racial or ethnic minority group, then REBCs can be considered the collective voice of racial and ethnic minority interests. REBCs can be particularly advantageous for foreign-born constituents to address their foreign policy concerns addressed vis-à-vis caucuses as opposed to their individual legislator who is constrained by multiple demands to address district-related matters, which are domestic as opposed to international.

The aforementioned outcomes imply that if constituents are aware that they are represented by a caucus, they are likely to gather as a group and petition caucus members to address their concerns in the same manner that legislators themselves petition other legislators to join their cause. For example, the Ethiopian and Ethiopian American Caucus was created when Ethiopian American constituents in Rep. Mike Honda’s San
Jose district approached Honda with their specific business and foreign relations interests. Rep. Honda, responding to his specific group of Ethiopian American constituents, then created a similar group in Congress to speak directly to the issues of this specific ethnic group in his district. There are winners and losers in every democracy (some succeed in gaining legislator’s attention while others do not), and while legitimating private power and influence in Congress appears highly problematic because those with more resources are more likely to have more influence, McConnell reminds us that it is unlikely we can realistically expect otherwise given the nature of American democracy: “Scandals over the exercise of ‘influence’ are frequent, but are seemingly dependent more upon chance discovery and the popular mood than upon the actual occurrence of the phenomenon of influence itself. That phenomenon is probably one of the constants of political life in a democracy” (2007, 28). I am not suggesting that groups should be granted unregulated discretion in shaping or advancing legislators’ agendas, but that the perception of lobbying groups as operating outside of mainstream means of influence (via money, power, prestige, etc.) or in opposition to constituency interests is flawed and misplaced.

The reason some race and ethnic-based caucuses are active and others are not can also be explained in the same way we think about interest groups: resource allocation, legislative staff expertise, and constituent influence.

While a fundamental difference between interest groups and caucuses is that all caucus members are elected officials and cannot use money to aid their policy pursuits, the goals of both groups are virtually identical – to impact and shape policy on issue(s) of interest. In fact, Kollman’s study of outside lobbying on issue saliency (Kollman 1998) can be reinterpreted as follows: One of the goals of interest groups outside of Congress is
to create interest groups inside of Congress. And therefore, the existence of caucuses may in large part be explained by outside lobbying efforts. “For example, the Ad Hoc Congressional Committee for Irish Affairs was created (September 28, 1977) following the request of several major Irish-American organizations, including the Ancient Order of Hibernians and the Irish National Caucus, [and] the Senate Beef Caucus was formed after some coordinating initiative by the National Cattlemen’s Association” (Richardson 2001, 16).

Caucuses provide information, legislative staff, cues on voting preferences, and opportunities for coalition-building and developing legislation (Fielli 1962; Stevens et. al 1981; Hammond 1998). They enhance cooperation among like-minded legislators (whether across party lines or otherwise), serve as alternative routes of influence for legislators unable to gain membership on relevant committees while also assisting members who do serve on the relevant committees, and increase the chances for reelection. All members of Congress serve on at least one caucus and their voluntary nature suggests that legislators believe caucuses are more likely to facilitate cooperation than to inhibit it.

Specialization is also an important aspect of caucuses. African caucuses are country specific and often issue specific, affording legislators and constituents a platform to engage in matters of particular interest to foreign-born constituents and second generation Americans such as foreign policy, globalization, democratization, as well as domestic interests where they reside. Specialization enhances legislative organization and affords groups the opportunity to gain expertise on a single or set of issues. It is the reason why Congress, parties, committees, bureaucratic agencies, and interest groups
exist. Ever since Olsen and Wilson’s discussion of selective incentives and interest group formation, scholars have devoted much attention to additional factors that account for group viability and goal attainment. For example, reelection, money, membership, and communication networks help advance group objectives.

Hall’s Participation in Congress is groundbreaking in its articulation and examination of legislative participation, which offers a new and improved (but most importantly accurate) theory of participation that gauges revealed intensities in order to draw more informed analyses of legislative behavior. He pays homage to Dahl’s theoretical emphasis of intense minorities in explaining congressional participation and concludes with what can easily be translated into strong support for future research and analyses of congressional caucuses:

Nonparticipation does not inherently imply abdication; rather, it can reflect a process of delegation by the chamber (or party) to some subset of members who act as its agents (see Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Krehbiel 1991). Public bodies, like private organizations, can achieve substantial gains in efficiency by implementing a division of labor that brings expertise to bear on complex matters in a timely fashion (Krehbiel 1991). Indeed, I suspect that informational processes of this kind are no small part of the collective-choice process most of the time. No one would assert that panels of members or subsets of players can do whatever they want in the name of the chamber. But neither would one make such a claim about a dictator in the name of the state (Hall 1996, 253).

Ultimately, caucuses are specialized informal groups that help with the division of labor in Congress, while also providing constituent-specific representation. While specialization aids legislative organization, it also breeds more specialization, and caucuses certainly provide support for that claim. Dahl’s earlier work tracing the scholarly debate on who governs in a democracy provides support for viewing legislators as group-conscious actors, in which, “Neither people nor parties but interest groups, [it
was said,] are the true units of the political system” (Alexander 2006, 58). If it is the case that all members of Congress serve on at least one caucus, then analysis of dyadic relationships between interest groups and legislators, without attention to informal networks and alliances, may prove problematic.

In essence, caucuses are important because they help legislators achieve their policy goals by creating opportunities for legislators to act on behalf of or with a group of like-minded legislators. Moreover, McCormick and Mitchell cite Fenno in their argument and go further to suggest that caucus membership serves as proof that legislators are not always motivated solely by reelection, but by their ideological preferences of “good” public policy:

By extending the original theory to incorporate Fenno’s (1973) notion that some politicians may also be motivated by conceptions of “good public policy” and their own ideological and policy convictions, we can begin to see how actions of public interest groups and members of Congress may come together for legislative action of a noneconomic nature. What is required, then, is that we assume politicians have policy preferences that they wish to translate into legislation or other action, once elected and reelected. Importantly, members of Congress are not solely focused on electoral advantage: they will pursue an ideological cause or commitment, at least where it brings no obvious electoral disadvantage (McCormick and Mitchell 2007, 582)

However, gaining an electoral advantage should not always be perceived as a personal interest at the cost of tending to one’s constituency, but in fact in service to one’s constituency. When members engage in legislative activities such as caucus participation, which offers little benefit to members’ chances of reelection, caucus membership can also be a symbolically advantageous act for members with the potential to advance legislators’ goals directly and indirectly. For example, when the Congressional Black Caucus protested genocide in Darfur outside of the Sudanese Embassy and were arrested for it in April 2009, they sent a clear message not only to Sudanese government officials
and interested constituents, but also to their own colleagues in Congress that CBC members have taken leadership on this issue and if other legislators or constituents care to join the cause, they know where to go.

While U.S.-Africa foreign policy has just begun to take on a more strategic economic and political consideration with regard to its approach to the African continent, African caucuses remain an integral part, separate from the Africa subcommittee, of prioritizing and pushing relevant foreign policy issues with respect to Africa. Additionally, while foreign policy matters appear to lie outside the scope of tending to one’s district, representatives with foreign-born populations or second generation Americans often care about both domestic and international policy issues and are likely to think about foreign policy matters when deciding which representative to elect from their district. In other cases, members were approached by someone in their district, prompting them to create the caucus.

Similar to the Congressional Black Caucus, the African caucuses are the only form of collective ethnic minority representation in Congress. Given the racial disparities that continue to exist when discussing policy issues such as affirmative action, racial profiling, criminal punishment, housing, poverty, and healthcare, citizens of African background and the issues they care about are often overlooked. However, caucuses provide a distinct point of entry into the American political process for Africans and other ethnic groups that live in the United States because they focus specifically on issues affecting a particular ethnic group. Therefore, having a set of U.S. legislators collectively acting on African caucuses has benefits for district constituents as well as for Africans across the country and in the Diaspora. It should also be noted that African caucuses,
along with ethnic caucuses in general, serve as mechanisms for incorporating the particular interests of ethnic minorities and are important for understanding how immigration to the U.S. since the 1960s has shaped and shifted the policy concerns and priorities of the U.S. population.

**Significance of Primary Data Collection of Congressional Caucuses: Assessing and Extending the Boundaries of Blackness Beyond African Americans**

The significance of the present project is that it makes visible black ethnic groups in America that would otherwise be categorized as African American, analyzes the potential for foreign-born blacks to mobilize and engage in the American polity, explores the extensions of racial group consciousness among African Americans to Africans and the Diaspora, and illustrates the agency with which legislators operate outside of the black/white paradigm. Furthermore, it provides a commentary on how the salience of ethnicity affects legislative behavior similar to the ways in which race continues to shape and motivate legislators’ actions.

Traditionally, national constituency caucuses followed the model of the CBC, with members sharing the same racial identity as the group the caucus claimed to represent, (e.g. Hispanic Caucus or Asian Pacific American Caucus). Thus, with respect to African congressional caucuses whose members do not racially or ethnically identify with the group they represent, assessing whether or not the number of African American members on an African caucus correlates with caucus activity and performance provides an appropriate test case for analyzing the importance, or what I refer to as “currency,” of
racial representation or the substantive value derived from similar racial background between legislator and constituent.

While race and politics literature have begun to consider the differences in political incorporation for nonwhite immigrants into the United States (Rogers 2006; Jones-Correa 2002; Waters 1999; Vickerman 1999; Kasinitz 1992), they have focused largely on Caribbeans, Latinos, and Asians (Jones-Correa 1998; Lien 2001; Lien 2004, Wong 2000; DeSipio 1996; Ong and Nakanishi 1996; Espiritu 1992). Even literature on wage earnings, educational attainment, and social mobility patterns of immigrant communities in the U.S. (Borjas 2006) falls short of considering African populations. Additionally, African immigrants in the United States stand in stark contrast to African Americans when it comes to socioeconomic status and educational attainment, and therefore are critical to our understanding of how race, ethnicity, and immigration intersect to produce different political, social, and economic outcomes for various black ethnic communities in the United States. And this is important for locating opportunities for coalition-building between African Americans and black ethnic communities, addressing differences in policy preferences for foreign-born black populations so that they may better assimilate into and be represented by their elected officials, and the identifying legislator(s) and caucuses that cater to the needs and interests of ethnic specific constituencies.

Conclusion

The purpose of this dissertation is to break new ground by discussing the significance of ethnicity in black legislative representation and begin collecting data that
enables us to determine whether the race of the legislator matters in the substantive group representation of African caucuses. Furthermore, a research design that focuses on a new congressional phenomenon of representing black ethnic groups in Congress requires both preliminary data gathering and baseline descriptive knowledge about how these caucuses operate in order to create a space within American politics literature and advance further studies in black legislative behavior and political representation for black ethnic minorities in the United States.

Additionally, dissecting the institutional nature of caucus activity for race and ethnic-based caucuses allows us to ascertain whether legislative representation vis-à-vis caucuses remain the most effective avenue for impacting policy and representing the interests of racial and ethnic minority groups. Furthermore, expanding our ideas of legislative representation beyond roll call voting suggests that scholars also revisit the question of which aspects of legislators’ work qualifies as substantive. Analyzing the currency of racial representation vis-à-vis congressional caucuses is not to suggest that nonblack members are not beneficial for representing black ethnic communities, but that black members tend to work harder and push for policies that better represent black ethnic communities because their ideas about racial group consciousness supersede ethnic and cultural cleavages that may divide them. The next chapter discusses the results of my study and also includes a subsection of results from the perspectives of African embassies.
CHAPTER 4

Does Race Matter when it comes to U.S. Foreign Affairs with Africa?

In chapter three, I hypothesized that the more black members on an African caucus, the higher the caucus activity score. In this chapter, I test this hypothesis empirically and qualitatively using self-reported activity scores from the congressional caucuses and interviews from senior staff representing the caucuses. This chapter proceeds as follows: first, I report general information about caucus membership, racial and gender composition of the caucus, party makeup, caucus founders, and year established. Second, I explain my variable calculations for caucus activity and empirical results from my individual level analysis of caucus activity. Finally, I present my qualitative analysis to expand on the quantitative results and present descriptive results for all African caucuses in comparison to the Congressional Black Caucus.

The following tables provide a general descriptive overview of the African caucuses:
Democrats heavily dominate African congressional caucuses, with only 16.4% Republican caucus members across all African caucuses. The racial composition of the

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African caucuses reveal that a majority of the members on the Ethiopian and Kenyan caucus are black, but all members on the Côte d’Ivoire Caucus are black and only 23% of the Sudanese caucus members are black. There are very few Asian, Latino, and Pacific Islanders who hold membership on an African caucus; however, Rep. Mike Honda (D-CA), a Japanese-American who has been chair of the Asian Pacific American Caucus since 2003, is the founder of the Ethiopian Caucus and most active in pushing forth the caucus’s agenda because he serves as its founder and chair.

The Sudan Caucus has the largest membership with 91 members and the highest proportion of female members (18%). The Sudan caucus also has the highest number of Republican members, with fifteen members spanning the states of Alabama, Louisiana, Texas, Washington, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Arizona, South Carolina, and Virginia. The Nigeria and Uganda Caucus, for which little information exists because they are no longer in existence and did not keep good records, are the only African caucuses in my sample that were founded by Republican congressmen. Royce cofounded the Nigeria caucus with Democratic representative William Jefferson, who was later indicted on sixteen counts of corruption for bribery scandals with high-ranking officials in Nigeria, Ghana, and Cameroon. Although the Nigeria caucus expired in 2003 and Jefferson was charged in 2006, it is very likely that Jefferson took advantage of caucus power for his own personal gain. The Uganda caucus was founded by Christopher Smith (R-NJ), Africa Subcommittee Chairman at the time, and co-chaired the caucus with Rep. Edolphus Towns (D-NY). Both caucuses have no records available beyond their founders, year established, and co-chairs. The Nigeria caucus was established from 1999-2003 and the Uganda caucus was established from 2004 to 2006 and never renewed as a CMO
thereafter. Interestingly enough, the Uganda caucus sent a letter to President Museveni of Uganda, notifying him of the establishment of the caucus; however, no records exist documenting what the caucus did within its two-year existence.  

Variable Computation and Model Construction

In order to measure the significance of the race of a caucus member on caucus activity at the group level and individual level, I use an ordered logistic regression model with caucus activity as the dependent variable. Caucus activity is coded zero for “no activity,” with nine subsequent categories of activity. This model controls for the following predictor variables: 1) whether or not a member is Black, White, or Asian, 2) whether or not a member sits on a relevant congressional committee, 3) whether a member’s foreign policy ideology affects a member’s caucus activity, 4) whether the African foreign-born population in the state is significant, 5) whether the African American district population is significant, 6) whether the length of time a member has served in office affects his caucus behavior, and 7) whether or not the number of black members at the caucus group level matter for the Côte d’Ivoire, 8) Ethiopia, 9) Kenya, and 10) Sudan caucuses.

Before explaining the rationale for the predictor variables, the construction of the dependent variable, the Caucus Activity Score (CAS) is as follows: the CAS variable was constructed using primary data collected for every House member who sits on an African caucus or the Congressional Black Caucus. Therefore, the sample in this model includes 120 House members, all of whom serve or have served on an African Congressional

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10 See Appendix C
11 See Appendix E
Caucus or the Congressional Black Caucus in the 110th and 111th Congress. The Council of Foreign Relations reports that the top four policy priorities for the U.S. government to focus on with respect to foreign relations with Africa are energy, China’s economic expansion, HIV/AIDS, and terrorism. Each caucus reported specific caucus members were who highly and moderately active on the top four aforementioned policy issues in their caucus based on the following three survey questions:

1) Looking at the list of (fill in country name) caucus members, who were the real leaders on the caucus on X issue? (X refers to COFR top four policy issues)

2) Were there any other members who did not take the lead, but were active on X issue?

3) Any other members who were involved in the issue, even if not as active as the members you already mentioned?

Caucus members listed in response to question one were designated leaders on the issue and therefore were considered “highly active”. For survey question two, although caucus members listed in response to question two were not leaders on the issue, they were still involved and thus considered “moderately active.” None of the respondents had answers for survey question three, so my analysis only considers questions one and two. Highly active caucus members were assigned two points per issue, and moderately active members were assigned one point per issue. Each member’s scores across four issues, whether moderately (1 pt.) or highly active (2pts.), were aggregated, assigning a single caucus activity score per member. Thus, the dependent variable was constructed with nine levels of caucus activity, reflecting the distribution of activity scores ranging from zero to nine.
The first predictor variable is race, which is central to testing the null hypothesis (Ho) at the individual level:

\[ Ho: \text{The more black members present on a black ethnic caucus (African), the higher the level of caucus activity.} \]

There are only two Asian Americans, one Pacific Islander, and one Latina caucus member who sit on an African caucus. Since Rep. Mike Honda (D-CA), chair of the Ethiopia Caucus, has a significant impact on caucus activity, Asians were included in the model, while Pacific Islander Rep. Eni Faleomavaega (D-AS) and Latina Rep. Linda Sanchez (D-CA), with no caucus activity, were coded zero for race, identical to the majority of white representatives. Therefore, race accounts for White, Black, and Asian members (0=White, 1=Black, 2=Asian).

The second predictor accounts for members with committee power. Committee power is defined as any caucus member who sits on a congressional committee with jurisdiction over issues that are taken up by the African caucuses. One potential argument is that caucus members who spearhead caucus activity are likely to be more driven by strengthening their committee power (Shepsle and Weingast 1987) than by race because legislators are interested in securing a seat in the subsequent election. In other words, members who chair a caucus or take up an issue (Sulking 2005) are likely to be interested in their individual reelection efforts as opposed to being motivated by conceptions of “good public policy” (Fenno 1973). Moreover, one could argue that even if caucus members are motivated by good public policy by virtue of voluntarily joining a caucus, they do not do anything substantial for the group and succumb to the collective action problem, riding the coattails of highly active caucus members who are interested in their
own individual policy pursuits. Therefore, contrary to the significance of race as an explanatory factor of caucus activity, it is plausible that the variance in caucus activity reflects members’ committee activity, thus supporting the theory that caucuses are merely extensions of individual committee power and committee agendas. For example, the fact that all the policy issues observed in this analysis deal with U.S. foreign relations matters and are derived from the Council of Foreign Relations Report, it is likely that members who serve on the Foreign Affairs Committee are likely to sit on the caucuses. In fact, of the 144 members\textsuperscript{12} who sit on a relevant committee, 40% sit on the Foreign Affairs Committee.

With respect to the four COFR issues (energy, China’s economic expansion, terrorism, and HIV/AIDS), various committees were accounted for in this analysis. The Energy and Commerce Committee deals with energy related issues, including foreign policy, and the Appropriations Committee deals with federal funding to support the implementation of bills and joint resolutions (U.S. House of Representatives 2010). The Armed Services committee has jurisdiction with respect to “defense policy generally, ongoing military operations, [and] the organization and reform of the Department of Defense (U.S. House of Representatives 2010)”. And the Homeland Security committee’s counterterrorism agenda states, “Protecting the American people from terrorist threats is the founding purpose of the Department and our highest priority” (Homeland Security). Therefore, committee power (0=Not on relevant committee, 1=Member on Foreign Affairs Committee, 2= Member on Energy & Commerce Committee, 3=Member of Appropriations Committee, 4=Member of Homeland Security Committee).

\textsuperscript{12}144 members are from a pooled data set ample of 480, so in actuality there are 36 members who sit on a relevant committee.
Committee, 5=Member of Armed Services Committee, 6=Member on at least two relevant committees already included in committee power variable) is differentiated with regard to the four issues in the figure below.

Table 4.2 Congressional Committees with Jurisdiction over U.S.-Africa Foreign Relations Major Policy Priorities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S.- ARICA FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES (COFR 2005 report)</th>
<th>CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Energy Sector</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Energy and Commerce Appropriations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China’s Economic Expansion</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Appropriations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterterrorism</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Appropriations Homeland Security Armed Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Appropriations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The third predictor variable is foreign policy ideology (FPIIdeology) as scored in the National Journal’s (NJ) rating in the Almanac of American Politics. Ever since the phenomenon of race and ethnic-based caucuses emerged with the Congressional Black Caucus in 1971, addressing the specific needs and concerns of racial minority groups has been an overwhelmingly Democratic agenda; therefore, party would also be likely to predict caucus activity. Furthermore, party identification is an indicator of political preference and likely to explain caucus membership, since 82% of members in the sample are Democrats. However, an even stronger measure than party would be foreign policy ideology and the degree to which foreign policy ideology explains members’ legislative behavior in general and on caucuses specifically. Since party identification and foreign policy ideology are highly correlated (r=.648, n=120, p=.000), party is
dropped from the model, and foreign policy ideology is used as the third predictor. The foreign policy ideology (FPIdeology) score analyzes roll call data on every House member on a host of foreign policy issues and the degree to which members tended to vote together. Votes were then identified as conservative or liberal, and every House member was assigned a “foreign policy ideology” score on a scale from 100 to 0 or liberal to conservative. Therefore, FPI is a better predictor of caucus activity than party because it captures within-party differences in foreign policy preferences among the 82% of Democrats who dominate membership on the African congressional caucuses in my sample, while also accounting for foreign policy ideology among the few republicans in this sample who may have more liberal policy preferences on foreign policy issues; this may also explain why they have voluntarily joined a race or ethnic-based caucus dominated by Democrats.

The fourth predictor takes into account the African foreign-born population to account for the degree to which constituent demand plays a role in whether or not a member decides not only to join a caucus, but also to play an active role on the caucus. Constituent interest is likely to be a significant predictor of legislative behavior and representation (Miller & Stokes 1963). Due to the paucity of data on African foreign-born population combined with the gross underestimation of African populations by the U.S. Census, the Migration Policy Institute (MPI), a nonpartisan think tank provides the best source of data on immigrants, refugees, and migration patterns at the state level; therefore the African foreign-born population variable is coded 1 if a member is from NY, CA, TX, MD, VA, NJ, MA, and 0 if a member is not from a state mentioned in category one.
Table 4.3 African Foreign-Born Population in the United States, Migration Policy Institute

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>African Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The seven states above accounted for 53% of all African-born immigrants, and the data from the Migration Policy Institute above also reports that over one-third of the 1.4 million African immigrants live in four metropolitan areas: “New York, Northern New Jersey, Long Island, NY-NJ-PA, with the largest number of African born (13.8%), followed by Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV (11.3%) Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA (4.5%), and Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI (4.3%)” (Terrezas 2010). While this variable does not differentiate between African foreign-born citizens and noncitizens or African foreign-born population at the district level, 40% of the caucus members come from one of the seven states that are home to over half of the African foreign-born population, suggesting constituent influence should nonetheless be controlled for.

The fifth predictor is the percentage of African-Americans in the caucus member’s district. The premise and hypothesis of this study assumes African American members of Congress feel kinship to their African counterparts and an obligation to represent their needs and concerns, thus significantly contributing to caucus activity. Based on the argument that African American members of Congress extend their feelings of racial group consciousness to African immigrants, African American constituents
should also support African American legislators in this regard. On the other hand, numerous articles point to the tension, perpetuation of stereotypes, and cultural misunderstandings between African Americans and Africans in the United States (Jackson and Cothran 2003, Rogers 2006, Waters, 1999). Therefore, there could be a negative relationship between African caucus activity and the presence of a significant African American population in the district; African Americans may potentially view foreign-born Africans as their competition with respect to employment, housing, and education. For example, a case in point is affirmative action policy, which according to the Civil Rights Project at Harvard University, suggests that affirmative action beneficiaries are not African Americans, but rather students of African or Caribbean descent:

Immigrants make up 13% of the nation’s college-age black population, but their representation in Ivy League and elite universities exceeds 25% of the total enrollment of black students, twice their proportion in the general population! Elite schools are admitting black students, in part to accommodate both legal and sociological goals. Those goals were driven by the Civil Rights Movement of the Vietnam generation. Africans do not necessarily require affirmative action to attend college, but surely many benefit from it. Consequently, many black youngsters that have absolutely no connection to American slavery are benefiting from the Martin Luther King phenomena. Curiously, both the President of the United States, Barack Obama of Kenyan heritage, and arguably the most respected public figure in the nation, Jamaican descendant, Colin Powell, have the same amount of civil rights credentials as Dick Cheney and Pat Buchanan. None (Hayes 2009).

Accounting for the perceptions of African American constituents from districts whose members serve on African congressional caucuses is another way to address potential points of tension, indifference, or support between Africans and African Americans. Therefore, the district percent African American is used from the 2007 and 2008 Census Bureau and American Community Survey statistics.
The sixth predictor variable is the number of terms a House member has served in Congress. Mayhew’s fundamental argument places the electoral connection at the center of a legislator’s overall goals (Mayhew 1974), so legislative activities such as joining caucuses, whether a race or ethnic-based caucus or not, are arguably taken up by legislators concerned with reelection. Therefore, according to Mayhew’s argument, House members would be unlikely to voluntarily join a caucus if it posed a risk to their chances of getting reelected, conversely, it may encourage junior members to join a caucus if doing so is perceived to gain them political points in the subsequent election. Senior members of Congress are unlikely to be affected by caucus membership. Seldom, if ever, do members resign or terminate their caucus membership, however the incumbent advantage remains a strong predictor for reelection, so the term in office is coded as a linear variable indicating the number of terms a member has served up until the 111th Congress and information was gathered using the Almanac of American Politics.

Predictor variables seven through ten account for the number of black members in the Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Sudan caucuses, and are coded “1” if the member of the caucus is black and “0” if the member is white. The CBC is the reference category and is therefore left out of the sample. Controlling for the racial composition of the caucus will test the significance of descriptive representation based on race at the group level, while the first predictor in the model analyzes the significance of race at the individual level. According to my hypothesis, the CBC, with 100% black members, should be the most active across the four COFR issues compared to the African caucuses.

Each member in the sample of 120 African and CBC caucus members has four observations with respect to the foreign policy issues on energy, China’s economic
expansion, counterterrorism, and HIV/AIDS. Therefore, stacking the data across four issues gives us a total sample of 480 observations. Also, this model incorporates cluster analysis to account for members in each of the five caucuses, some of whom are members in more than one African caucus and/or the CBC. The ordered logistic regression equation is outlined below.

\[
\text{Logit (p Caucus Activity)} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{race} + \beta_2 X_{Commpower} + \beta_3 X_{AfricanFB} + \\
\beta_4 X_{DistrictPcntBlk} + \beta_5 X_{FPIdeology} + \beta_6 X_{termsinoffice} + \beta_7 X_{cote01} + \\
\beta_8 X_{Ethiopia01} + \beta_9 X_{Kenya01} + \beta_{10} X_{Sudan01}, \text{cluster (Houserep)}
\]

**Quantitative Results**

The results of the ordered logistic regression are displayed in the table below and disprove my hypothesis that the caucus activity level increases as the number of black members on the caucus increases, as indicated by the statistical significance of the multiracial African caucuses at the 1 and 5 percent levels. However, it should be noted that the Sudan caucus, with the smallest number of black members (only 23%), is not significant.
### Table 4.4 Quantitative Results from Ordered Logistic Regression Model

**Ordered Logit Model**

Reference Category:
- CBC
- Pseudo R² = .3288

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caucus Activity on U.S.-Africa Foreign Policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(COFR Top four Policy Issues: Energy, China’s Economic Expansion, HIV/AIDS, Terrorism)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Robust S.E.</th>
<th>P Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual Level Significance</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Member</td>
<td>2.478***</td>
<td>.450</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>2.109***</td>
<td>.590</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Percent Black</td>
<td>-.003</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>.656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Policy Ideology</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>.638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Foreign Born Pop.</td>
<td>.909***</td>
<td>.305</td>
<td>.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terms in Office</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>.033</td>
<td>.613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power of Committee</td>
<td>.070</td>
<td>.108</td>
<td>.516</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Caucus Group Significance</strong></th>
<th>B</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire Caucus</td>
<td>1.455**</td>
<td>.685</td>
<td>.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia Caucus</td>
<td>2.729***</td>
<td>.516</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya Caucus</td>
<td>.977**</td>
<td>.431</td>
<td>.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan Caucus</td>
<td>.144</td>
<td>.350</td>
<td>.682</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: ***, **, * refer to statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, S.E. in brackets

The percent of African Americans in the district, the foreign policy ideology of caucus members, the length of service in office, and sitting on a relevant congressional committee, are insignificant and do not explain caucus activity behavior. However, two powerful explanatory measures that explain caucus activity with statistical significance at the 1% level are race at the individual level for black and asian members and being a caucus member from a state with a significant African foreign-born population. If a member is Black or Asian, the chance of being active on a caucus are 2.478 and 2.109 (respectively) more likely, indicating a positive relationship between race and caucus activity. In terms of linear predicted values, the table below illustrates the degree caucus
activity would increase in each African congressional caucus with the addition of one Black or Asian legislator.

Figure 4.5: Increase in Caucus Activity Per Addition of Black or Asian Member

Odds Ratio Conversion to Linear Predicted Values

While having a Black or Asian member on an African caucus significantly increases caucus activity in each of the four caucuses above, the Ethiopia caucus stands out from the other caucuses in terms of the degree to which the race of the member contributes to caucus activity. Beyond the fact that the key policy priorities may affect each country differently, it is worth investigating the particular committee membership characteristics and issue involvement of the members on the Ethiopia caucus for a more detailed perspective on caucus operations and behavior, since this may help explain the significance of race on caucus activity. For example, much of the explanation for race having the greatest effect in the Ethiopian case is that Rep. Mike Honda, Japanese-

13 See Appendix F for table of numerical values.
American from the 15th district in California. The two scatter plots\textsuperscript{14} below make apparent the degree to which the black members on the Ethiopia caucus were active. The first scatter plot outlines the magnitude of activity by committee membership for every Africa caucus member and CBC member in the sample (n=120), while the second scatter plot outlines caucus activity by race. Only 13% of the sample serve on the foreign affairs committee, and among those, five black house members have activity scores higher than five; Rep. Donald Payne (D-NJ), the House Chariman of Africa Subcommittee, had the highest score of twenty-four, Rep. Barbara Lee (D-CA) followed with a score of sixteen, Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee (D-TX) was third with a score of thirteen, Rep. Greg Meeks (D-NY) had a score of ten, and Rep. Diane Watson (D-CA) followed with a score of eight. All five of the aforementioned black members make up 50% of all black members serving on the Ethiopian Caucus. Therefore, the plots reveal that Ethiopian caucus activity is steered, in large part, by a few black members most closely involved and active on African affairs as a result of their membership on the Africa House Subcommittee\textsuperscript{15}. Additionally, with the exception of Payne, whose score is highly correlated with his powerful committee chairmanship, the other black foreign affairs members across all caucuses come from the three top states with the highest African foreign-born population: New York (10.7%), California (10.2%), and Texas (8.4%).

\textsuperscript{14} The numbers on the y-axis are just identification numbers for each house member and do not hold any value.

\textsuperscript{15} It should also be noted that Rep. Mike Honda, Asian American founder of the Ethiopian caucus, received a score of eight as well and he is not a member of the foreign affairs committee; however, as mentioned earlier, there were only two Asian Americans in the data set so they were dropped from analysis.
Figure 4.6: Caucus Activity Differentiated by Foreign Affairs Committee Membership
The qualitative and descriptive results section expands on other aspects of the Ethiopia Caucus, while also elaborating on the other African caucuses as well.

**Interpretation of Results**

The overall findings from the regression analysis suggest three major developments in the political representation and participation of race and ethnic-based minorities: 1) African American and non-African American legislators are increasingly...
aware of the African foreign-born population as a distinct group beyond simply “black,” and discern and act on the potential to represent their specific needs and concerns as a racially heterogeneous legislative group; 2) the African foreign-born population are mobilizing themselves in ways that make them visible to legislators, and/or legislators are cognizant of the potential to capitalize on specific, untapped African constituencies within the U.S. black population; and 3) the significance of congressional caucuses suggest members will continue to utilize the group caucus structure to represent race and ethnic-based minorities, and will engage in various forms of legislative representation beyond roll voting to do so. Furthermore, even though caucuses are voluntary, suggesting that legislators are motivated by their good will and ideological predispositions of what they consider to be good public policy, the results suggest that, in their voluntary legislative endeavors also, legislators remain concerned with reelection.

Returning to the major implications of this study in legislative behavior and racial politics discourse, these results support both the importance of expanding our measures of legislative representation beyond voting as well as supporting the increasing significance of black ethnic diversity in addition to race. Even if caucuses are constrained in their ability to influence legislation compared to a committee, the fact that legislators have realized the importance of black ethnic communities and have utilized the caucus structure to address their concerns and foreign policy interests demonstrates the growing impact Africans are likely to have in the political process as well as the ability for legislators to respond to their interests.

Also striking is the ability of legislators to recognize the importance of U.S.-Africa foreign relations and African ethnic constituencies given the extent to which the
number of Africans in the United States has been underestimated. According to the 2000 U.S. census, a total of 881,300 Africans live in the United States. The American Community Survey from 2007 lists the African foreign-born population at 1,419,317 in 2007\textsuperscript{16}, which is more accurate, but still underestimated. Actually, according to data from the Migration Policy Institute, Western Union remittances, and community mutual assistance associations, the number of African immigrants in the United States is likely to approximate three million:

The exact size of the African immigrant community in the U.S. is unknown, largely because African immigrants are not enumerated separately in official censuses, but rather subsumed under the “Other” “Foreign Born”, “Black” or “Afro-American” categories. The African immigrant population in the U.S. is steadily growing due to refugee resettlement and diversity visa programs. For example, the number of African immigrants in the United States grew 40-fold between 1960 and 2007, from 35,555 to 1.4 million. Most of this growth has taken place since 1990. In 2005 alone, 85,000 African immigrants were legally admitted, including about 11,000 from Nigeria, 11,000 from Ethiopia, 6,000 from Ghana, and 5,000 from Kenya. The top individual countries of origin of the sub-Saharan African born are Nigeria, and Ethiopia. Since there is no official count of African immigrants in the U.S., the size of the community is underestimated. However, community sources suggest that over three million African immigrants are estimated to live in the U.S., more than 60% of whom are between 30-55 years old. Most African immigrants in the United States come from urban areas and are concentrated in New York, California, Texas, Maryland, and Virginia (Beyene 2010).

With the population of African immigrants in the United States more likely estimated at over three million, and second generation progeny who - although born and raised in the United States - have gone on to pursue higher education and politically mobilize along ethnic lines, it could be the case that the Africans are more visible than the official numbers suggest. Even tin my interview with the Kenyan Embassy, they reported having 300,000 Kenyans living in the United States, and yet they remain one of the smallest

\textsuperscript{16} American Community Survey 2007.
African populations in the United States, entering mostly after 2000. Most important, so long as the census does not account for ethnic differences within the U.S. black population, not only will the political and potentially powerful African constituencies go unnoticed along with their needs and concerns, but so too will the critical need to address outstanding racial inequalities between African Americans and the rest of society.

While there is no causal link as to whether an African foreign-born population influenced the decision for other members to create an African caucus, it certainly does not hurt members’ ability to achieve their caucus agenda and get re-elected with the support and involvement of their constituents represented by the caucus. Moreover, limited census options and public opinion surveys do not account for ethnicity with respect to the U.S. black population; therefore, it is difficult to approximate the significance of African caucuses acting on constituents’ voting preferences and foreign policy concerns.

Furthermore, while members may utilize committee power to pursue their caucus agendas, it is not integral to caucus activity; therefore, the results from my model assert that REBC caucuses cannot simply be perceived as extensions of committee power but rather as a tangential factor in terms of caucus generation or perhaps recruitment of other like-minded or “likely-involved-on-the-issue” legislators. While the foreign-born population tells the most compelling story as far reelection is concerned, the fact that committee power and length of service in office do not play a role in caucus activity diminishes the electoral connection argument. The fact that the percent of African Americans in the district has no effect on caucus activity suggests: 1) either African Americans are indifferent to their district representative working on issues that pertain
primarily to Africans; or 2) African Americans are unaware that their representative is involved in African caucus matters, or 3) African Americans support their representative on African caucus matters and may even feel represented by them, but regardless, the effort and activity is minimal and perceived as not having a significant impact either way.

With regard to foreign policy ideology, while it is true that race and ethnic-based caucuses are heavily dominated by Democrats (90% Democrats across all African caucuses) and thus are likely to behave and think similarly, accounting for within-party variance on foreign policy beliefs could potentially differentiate the “high activity” caucus actors from the “no activity” actors. Foreign policy ideology was measured on a 100-point scale from liberal to conservative with an average of 61 for the 120 members in my sample, suggesting a moderately liberal approach to foreign policy towards Africa among all African caucus members.

**Qualitative and Descriptive Results**

In order to interpret the quantitative results more fully, it is necessary to analyze the particular characteristics operating within and across each African congressional caucus and the Congressional Black Caucus. Therefore, the following section includes descriptive characteristics that shed light on what kind of legislative activity, beyond roll data, this project caucuses are involved in as well as qualitative interview analyses that incorporate further explanations of caucus generation, activity, and durability. Returning to the overarching argument purported in this project, which is not only the value of descriptive representation based on race and its connection to substantive representation, but also the extent to which beliefs about racial group consciousness may be driving African American members to act with regard to U.S.-Africa foreign policy, it is
necessary in this section to analyze comparatively the CBC’s activity along with that of the other African caucuses.

**Descriptive Caucus Group Results**

**Table 4.8 Council of Foreign Relations U.S.-Africa Policy Issues**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Energy</th>
<th>Africa Growth &amp; Opportunity Act (AGOA)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China’s Economic Expansion</td>
<td>Global Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>Genocide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>Trade Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Resolution/Peacekeeping/UN</td>
<td>U.S. Assistance (Reform &amp; Prioritize)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy &amp; Human Rights</td>
<td>Prevent Future Atrocities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Growth</td>
<td>Poverty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millennium Challenge Account</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2 above is a comprehensive list of fifteen issues from the Council of Foreign Relations Report that were included in my group analysis. The CAS variable below aggregates the caucus activity scores across the fifteen issues in table 4.2 on a scale from “0=No activity” to “5=very active,” assigning a composite score of activity for each caucus listed below.

**Table 4.9 African CAS and Number of Black Members on African Caucus**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Congressional Caucuses</th>
<th>Caucus Activity Score (CAS)</th>
<th>Percent Black Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CBC n=42</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte’Ivoire n=4</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia n=18</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya n=15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan n=91</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The quantitative results from the ordered logistic regression indicate that despite the lack of statistical significance of race at the group level, the individual black members
that make up the CBC account for the CBC’s having the highest activity score as opposed
to their legislative power as an exclusive group of African American members. However,
the descriptive caucus group results in this section appear to suggest that race is
significant at the group level.

While it is true that the CBC has over 40 members and has been in existence
much longer than the African caucuses, the policy ratings specifically pertain to caucus
activity in the past four years. The Ethiopia caucus received the second highest CAS
score and also has the second highest number of black caucus members. Table 4.4 below
delineates the activity scores across all fifteen issues, aggregated to produce the CAS
variable for each caucus.

Caucuses are not bound by any specific rules in terms of how much time,
resources, and energy are devoted to certain issues; therefore, caucus activity is likely to
also reflect issue priority and not just issue activity. Therefore, while issue priority
appears to complicate the ability to compare across issues in Table 4.2, the fact that the
Congressional Black Caucus, of which no single African country is affiliated, has higher
activity scores compared to all other African caucuses supports the underlying argument
that the racial group conscious ideology that motivates African American members of
Congress to act on behalf of African Americans as a collective community is the same
ideology that guides them to act on behalf of their African kinfolk. For example,
throughout the CBC Senior Staff interview on May 14, 2009, when providing
justification for their high caucus activity ratings, the respondent made several references
to kinship with Africans and the ability for the CBC to understand and address foreign
policy towards Africa:
CBC Senior Staff Representative: We want there to be human rights. We want good governance. We want to end corruption. We want to avoid civil conflicts. We want to respond to humanitarian crisis. We see Africa in a way I think African Americans see Africa, as a place where we have kinship. May not recall it specifically, it may not be in our current generation, but we care about it because we have a knowledge or consciousness that Africa is in our history, in our DNA, so we care.

The statement above serves as one of the many examples given as to why the CBC is so involved in African Affairs. Furthermore, there was a distinct effort on the part of the respondent to offer a historical perspective on the efforts of CBC members to advance foreign policy in Africa that reversed the U.S.’s backwards approach to the continent:

CBC Senior Staff Representative: Charlie Diggs [CBC cofounder] at this point [1970] had become a subcommittee chairman of the Africa Subcommittee of the House of Foreign Affairs Committee and he expressed a strong interest in Africa policy because Africa had never really been an area of particular interest to the United States. What we did with regards to Africa was generally through the colonial powers. If we had a problem with an English colony like Nigeria or Ghana we’d go to London and talk with them about it. As the Africans started, after WW2 and specifically in the 1960s, to become advocates for their own freedom, it was recognized among scholars and policymakers that the United States needed to create a policy for the continent to directly relate to the newly independent states and not to depend on the colonial state for our policy. Charlie Diggs defied the new members of the caucus that they should be very interested in foreign policy because in order to be influential in Congress, one has to participate in a variety of issues and use your power to the extent that you can. Even if you weren’t that interested in a particular issue, he wanted members of Congress to take positions on it because they might trade the position – they might want a vote on an issue of concern to the black community from a member who wanted their vote on another issue like foreign subsidies or something. So, it became apparent to all the new members that in order to be players they had to become fully participant. But Africa was a natural because the movement for self-determination had really struck a chord in the black community.

The CBC interview comments indicate both an acknowledgement of the distinct approach black members took when it came to African relations, as well as an explicit recognition of Africans as part of their extended community. Words and phrases such as
“kinship,” “consciousness,” “in our history” “in our DNA, so we should care,” make a strong argument in favor of African American legislators extending their beliefs about racial group consciousness and linked fate to African immigrants.

The second set of primary descriptive data in my analysis involved whether or not the African caucuses participated in any of the following types of legislative participation: 1) cosponsoring a bill, 2) drafting bills/amendments, 3) meeting to set caucus position/agenda, 4) meeting/working with party leaders in Congress, 5) meeting with African leaders, embassy officials, religious institutions, community organizations, and 6) using committee power of caucus member to advance caucus agenda. These six measures were asked with regard to the top four foreign policy issues (the energy sector, China’s economic expansion, HIV/AIDS, and Terrorism).

Table 4.10 Legislative Participation on African Congressional Caucuses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legislative Participation</th>
<th>CBC</th>
<th>Côte d’Ivoire</th>
<th>Ethiopia</th>
<th>Kenya</th>
<th>Sudan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
The results illustrate that the CBC has the highest score of legislative participation on all top COFR issues in the past four years and has participated in all six types of legislation except for cosponsoring a bill against terrorism. HIV/AIDS is not only a major caucus priority for the CBC, Côte d’Ivoire, and Ethiopia Caucus, but these three caucuses have met with embassy officials and relevant African institutions on the top four policy issues recommended in the Council of Foreign Relations report. However, the CBC is the most heavily engaged, as their total legislative participation score indicates. In fact, the CBC interview was the only interview in which the respondent qualified every survey answer given with an explanation in order to distinguish their answers from other caucuses; this in itself is worthy of noting because it further suggests the degree to which the CBC feels accountable for ensuring that U.S. foreign policy toward Africa be taken seriously, similar to their own demands for equal rights and treatment as African Americans. For example, the survey results appear to suggest that any indicator of activity across caucuses is because caucuses believe and hold the same policy agenda and beliefs. However, the CBC respondent delivered a detailed response on the terrorism issue and made it a point throughout the interview to distinguish the foreign policy perspectives of black members of Congress from other members of Congress. For example, the CBC and
Ethiopia both drafted or amended bills on terrorism in regard to Africa, but for different reasons:

CBC Senior Staff Representative: The reason we’ve become interested in terrorism is that we believe. First, let me say a couple things for context. Black caucus was not for the Iraq invasion. The black caucus thought Bush used the 9/11 attacks as a way to do something he wanted to do anyway, and that is to attack Saddam Hussein, and take over Iraq, so we’ve never been into ‘we have to root out terrorism at all costs.’ Not that we don’t care about the safety of the country, but we didn’t think that the Iraq war was a legitimate way. We think that he should have been in Afghanistan from the beginning trying to find the caves where Osama was and even now you’re seeing that debate that Obama is shifting some resources, which were wrongly spent he felt in Iraq, and led to a terrible waste of money and nation building and so on, but what has been concerning us about terrorism is that it’s been the basis of US policy in Africa.

We’re concerned that the Defense department, increasingly seems to be leading our diplomacy towards Africa because they are seeking to convince African nations to become part of our anti-terrorism network and we believe that brings African nations into conflicts it doesn’t need to, it gives it internal difficulties because of the Muslim versus Christian, it’s sometimes seen as Anti-Islamic. It’s doing a disservice to African countries to rope them into anti-terrorist campaigns and therefore, the United States would like to depoliticize our approach to Africa and make it a policy that’s driven by economic development as opposed to military. Now, some of us [Congress overall] are tempted by military involvement because there’s a feeling, since we’ve seen more neglect that engagement, some people feel that the U.S. is interested at all is better than not being interested, and there’s some people who would say that the military comes in and does a quicker, more efficient job than our aid agency does and when the military decides to build a school or a facility in the name of counterterrorism it gets done, and a year later its functioning and its good for the country. But others of us, and that’s the majority view in the caucus, really decry, and that’s Donald Payne’s view, that this is not a basis for US policy because it ultimately has onerous implications, or could have.

Ethiopia Caucus Senior Staff Representative: Terrorism always came up because when we were dealing with the human rights bill, you know, the state department’s argument was well, the administration’s argument at the time was always, you know, we can’t really be critical of Ethiopia right now because they’re an ally on the fight against terrorism, and so we had to well, caucus members had to, you know, argue that a little bit. Even though they are our allies, you know, it’s more important for us to check our allies, so [Honda] was definitely involved in legislation that had to do with that.
The fact that the CBC believes its approach to foreign policy is different than that of other members of Congress and attributes it to the same sense of racial group consciousness responsible for creating the CBC in the first place at the very least determines that descriptive representation based on race plays a significant role in motivating the CBC’s agenda towards U.S.-African foreign policy. Furthermore, the Ethiopia caucus was involved in terrorism legislation because it felt the U.S. state department was overlooking alleged voting irregularities that took place during the Ethiopian democratic elections in 2005. Following the election, riots and protests were enacted by the Ethiopian government’s opposition, of whom several were killed and arrested by the ruling regime. The Ethiopian Diaspora and government opposition organizations based in the United States such as the Oromo Liberation Front, Kinijit International Council, and Coalition for HR 2003 mobilized instantaneously and contacted the Ethiopia Caucus to push forth legislation encouraging the U.S. to take a stronger stance against the Ethiopian government’s failure to protect the rights of its citizens. Therefore, the caucus got involved on the issue of terrorism, and Payne sponsored H.R. 2003, with the co-sponsorship of the Ethiopia caucus members. A key component of H.R. 2003, the “Ethiopia Democracy and Accountability Act of 2007”, was a bill making military assistance to Ethiopia contingent upon the government’s efforts to ensure “human rights, democracy, independence of the judiciary, freedom of the press, peacekeeping capacity building, and economic development in the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia” (Govtrack 2010). The issue priority and involvement of the Ethiopia caucus members on the issue of unfair elections and counterterrorism initiatives
provides a context for understanding not only the high level of caucus activity, but also the significance of the racial composition of the caucus in aiding caucus activity.

Finally, table 4.5 below lists what issues the caucus has addressed with respect to the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), a bilateral development fund created under the Bush administration to determine the countries that are eligible for development assistance. Since the MCA requirements for funding rely on the U.S.’s fundamental principles of American democracy and free market capitalism, such as governing justly, investing in people, and promoting economic freedom, measuring the extent to which caucuses are involved in addressing these issues is another reliable indicator of whether or not caucus agendas coincide with that of Congress’s overall foreign policy agenda for Africa. The survey question asked the following: “The Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) established under the Bush Administration has the following 16 measures\(^\text{17}\) of performance assessment from which it distributes its foreign aid to other countries. In each of the three categories below, circle the performance measure your caucus has impacted or is trying to impact the most.” The results indicate that good governance is an overwhelming focus of all of the caucuses, compared to investing in education, health, and economic development, and this is consistent with the embassy officials’ interviews, which pointed out the U.S.’s lack of concern with respect to economic development. In the case of Sudan, the caucus’s focus has been on political rights, government effectiveness, and the rule of law. Sudan currently has the most contentious relations with the United States because of genocide in Darfur, and as a result, the caucus has made good governance in addressing the ethnic/religious conflict its primary caucus agenda.

\(^\text{17}\) See Appendix D for list of sixteen performance measures
Compared to the other caucuses, the CBC has more of an even-handed perspective on the importance of governance, education, health, and economic development, as reflected by their ratings above. One could argue that the CBC has a high score because their caucus activity encompasses the work they’ve been doing for all of Africa, while the other caucuses are country specific. However, they credit their high level of activity to their mission to speak on behalf of a continent of people long ignored by the United States and Europe:

CBC Senior Staff Representative: Our greatest challenge is still the marginalization of Africa. Even though 40 plus members of the black caucus regard Africa as a place where the U.S. should have strong interest and should have very different policy, we haven’t been very successful in going much beyond our number. And with our responsibility, or the responsibility of the larger

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18 See Appendix H for specific stipulations that make the categories promoting economic freedom, investing in people, and governing justly.
community of activists, or scholars, or even Africans themselves, I think if one looks at the way foreign policy gets made it is still very Eurocentric and maybe has more to do with money and success.

Africa gets talked of during the meetings in London and other places as a place where – as a charity case – as a place where we need to do more because ultimately it is an unstable world if we don’t bring those things about. And I think as long as Africa doesn’t have geopolitical significance it is difficult to keep it front and center on the U.S. agenda because in reality, most of the Congress doesn’t really have that much foreign policy interest, so it’s hard to drive it just as a constituency interest.

The comments above demonstrate the extent to which CBC’s legislative caucus activism towards Africa is guided by their feelings of racial group consciousness and obligation to represent the needs of Africans who have been marginalized historically, in a way similar to that of African Americans.

Table 4.12 below lists the composite scores from my survey and illustrates the positive correlation between the number of black members and the caucus activity score, as well as the LPS and MCA score. The LPS and MCA scores are similar to the CAS score in that the CBC has the highest score, followed by Ethiopia. The Côte d’Ivoire group is focused primarily on trade reform and energy. The Kenya caucus results are constrained by the fact that they were only in existence for two years and had very poor record keeping. The Sudan caucus has the largest membership of any African caucus and is the caucus with only a quarter of black caucus members. However, as indicated by the quantitative results, the CBC scores are likely to be a reflection of individual black member behavior as opposed to their collective impact as a group of African American legislators.
Table 4.12 Caucus Activity Profile Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Congressional Caucuses</th>
<th>Number of Black Members</th>
<th>Caucus Activity Score</th>
<th>LPS</th>
<th>MCA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CBC</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CAS: \[r = .497, n=5, p=.394\]
CAS/LPS/MCA: \[r=.604, n=5, p.281\]

Other Potential Arguments

The fact that race and ethnic-based caucuses are being created exponentially further lends itself to the symbolic importance of members representing racial and ethnic minorities. For nonblack members, REBCs have the benefit of showing that caucus members are partial to the needs and concerns of minority groups and foreign policy interests. For black members, REBCs are a continuation of the activist, progressive agenda that embodies the CBC - a feeling of racial group consciousness that includes the struggles that black people face on the African continent.

Another theory promoting caucus activity is the ability of members to use their committee power to symbolically or substantively leverage policy influence on caucus agendas or vice versa. Although my quantitative model already disputes this argument, it is important for further confirmation to tell the qualitative story. For example, Rep. Donald Payne (D-NJ) and Rep. Greg Meeks (D-NY) have both established foreign affairs records and are members of every African caucus listed below\(^\text{19}\). Furthermore, Meeks was the founder of the Kenya Caucus and Payne is co-chairman of the Sudan caucus,

\(^\text{19}\) Information on the Nigeria and Uganda Caucus Membership are not available.
which suggests that caucuses serve in aiding the agendas of legislators serving on relevant committees. However, while affecting legislation on the committee level may indeed be the ultimate goal of caucuses, caucuses are established not only to serve as additional leverage for legislators to advance their agenda on committees. Instead, caucuses also serve as opportunities for legislators to address issues not related to their committee membership, serve as an information gathering or advocacy groups on behalf of constituents in an effort to affect legislation, or give like-minded legislators symbolic and/or substantive leverage to push forth certain policy goals.

Table 4.13 African Congressional Caucus Founders and Committee Membership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caucus Founders</th>
<th>Caucus</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>C. Session</th>
<th>Committee Membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Edward Royce (D-CA)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Michael Capuano (D-MA)</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>109th</td>
<td>Financial Services Transportation and Infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Christopher Smith (R-NJ)</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>109th</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.13 lists the committee membership of the founder of each caucus and in the case of Butterfield, Honda, and Capuano, committee membership was not an explanatory factor in founding an African caucus. In fact, the interviews with the aforementioned caucus founders revealed the arbitrary and unsystematic way in which
Côte d’Ivoire Caucus Senior Staff Representative: We were approached by Rosa Whitaker of the Whitaker Group. She’s former Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Africa during Clinton, and she formed a public policy firm called the Whitaker Group located right here in D.C. And they had a keen interest in the whole business interest dealing with issues in Africa, particularly West Africa trying to grow regional economies, trying to encourage free and fair elections, specifically in Côte d’Ivoire. So we noticed that [Rep. Butterfield’s office] they were skimping in business opportunities for the people in North Carolina. We have a big peanut farming community in our district and they [Côte d’Ivoire] have lots of cocoa and—and, you know, other goods that we thought might be beneficial to try to pair up the two folks.

Ethiopia Caucus Senior Staff Representative: He [Honda] has a large Ethiopian American constituency and they’re very very active. Like they volunteered on his campaign. They donate money. They’re visible in his district, and so you know, as someone who is part of, you know, say a minority ethnic group or immigrant group, he’s very sensitive to the needs of constituents who don’t have a voice in Congress. Like, he understands what that means. So when he realized that, the Ethiopians in his district really didn’t have a direct link to Congress, he decided that a caucus was the best way to do it just like there is an Asian Pacific American Caucus. So that’s why he founded it.

Sudan Caucus Senior Staff Representative: My boss [Capuano] had been following a lot of the events regarding the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, but also kind of what had been unfolding in Darfur. I think his original interest in Sudan came because there was a group in our district who had actually brought a former slave into the office to meet with my boss. And this man had been enslaved in Sudan and the idea that slavery kind of still existed and the slave, you know, business was booming in certain parts of the world really just kinda struck my boss as very strange and something that you just don’t frankly hear about all that much even though, you know, human trafficking is so huge around the world. It doesn’t get as much attention as he thought it should, and so that kind of originally sparked his interest. And then he got more involved in other issues in Sudan and I think it’s precisely he didn’t sit on a relevant committee that he really felt like, you know, members who weren’t part of those committees still needed a voice in the issue and still needed sort of a platform for their involvement.

The interviews reveal a wide spectrum of factors motivating members to found an African caucus: mutual international trade and business interests, demands from constituents, and personal interest. The Côte d’Ivoire Caucus interview reveals the ability
of Butterfield to link economic interests in his district with international business opportunities that also benefit economic development in Côte d’Ivoire. In the case of the Ethiopia caucus, between Honda and his Ethiopian constituency there is a more descriptive story about shared immigrant identity spurring the creation of the caucus, Honda as both a person of color, as well as a person with an immigrant background. Additionally, Honda is the only chair of an African caucus who has devoted a web site exclusively to the concerns of the Ethiopia Caucus and makes it a point to explicitly state that the caucus serves as a legislative voice and “supports the community’s interests both here and in Ethiopia” (Honda 2010). Honda’s web site discusses his commitment to working with the CBC and the Congressional Hispanic Caucus to “champion the causes of under-represented communities by promoting social justice, racial tolerance, and civil rights.” It is clear that Honda sees his leadership and responsibilities on the Ethiopia Caucus in the same way he does the CAPAC and the CBC, as an advocacy group for the concerns of the collective Ethiopian American community in his district and in Ethiopia. The Ethiopian American Caucus activity score is rated highest, second to the CBC, suggesting that descriptive representation is a reliable indicator of substantive representation.

Furthermore, the active political participation on part of the Ethiopian community suggests that the caucus’s activity or lack thereof may play a critical role in Honda’s chance for reelection; hence, the Ethiopia Caucus, at least with respect to its founder, has the potential to be the primary decision-making factor for Ethiopian Americans when it comes time to vote for their district representative. It is no coincidence that Honda believes in the currency of race or ethnic-based group representation; Honda has also
chaired the Congressional Asian Pacific American Caucus (CAPAC) since 2003. In fact, Honda’s CAPAC message as chairman reiterates the importance of CAPAC for Asian Americans and models the CBC’s approach towards addressing the needs and concerns of African Americans:

CAPAC Chairman Rep Mike Honda (D-CA): The AAPI [Asian American Pacific Islander] community is exceedingly diverse and, with over 16 million [AAPIs] in the United States today, it is increasingly vital to support and foster within the various sectors the critical need for community awareness, involvement, and leadership. CAPAC will join together in solidarity to take its place at the policymaking table, and speak with one voice. We must advance an agenda that reflects the essence of the [AAPI] community’s needs. CAPAC has served as a leader in tackling critical issues within the [AAPI] community. After all these years, we can clearly see how far we have come as a community. However, let us not be satisfied with our progress thus far; instead, let us drive with increasing determination to where we ought to be (Honda 2010).

CBC Chairwoman Rep. Carolyn Kilpatrick (D-MI) Message: Since the formation of the CBC in 1971, our core mission has been to change course for African Americans and others by working to close, and ultimately eliminate, disparities that exist for all Americans. These disparities continue to exist from generation to generation. We feel it is time to confront crises in order to strengthen and maximize the potential and security of our communities. Finally, we would be remiss if we did not strive to continue the legacy of the CBC, whose position has always been ‘the CBC has no permanent friends, no permanent enemies; just permanent interests (Kilpatrick 2007).’

Both messages from CAPAC and the CBC approach Asian American Pacific Islanders and African Americans each as one unified national community linked by their shared racial background and history.

The Sudan caucus also emerged from constituents raising the issue to Rep. Capuano; however, it appears Capuano was motivated more by personal interest as opposed to constituent demand. The Sudan caucus representative makes a strong case for members being motivated to create or join a caucus because of their ideological
predispositions, and caucuses certainly provide legislators with the opportunity to symbolically reveal their policy preferences without necessarily having to suffer for them come election time. This does not mean that caucuses have no policy influence, but rather, unlike more formalized groups such as committees and political parties, caucuses can be activated at the will of the legislator and not bound by rules, regulations, or time-sensitive demands.

Caucuses can also symbolically bolster the image of members’ efforts on an issue by conveying a collective sense of legislative activism above and beyond traditional measures of legislative responsibility such as drafting bills, proposing amendments, and voting. For example, in the Sudan Caucus interview, Capuano envisioned the Sudanese Caucus as a “clearinghouse for information for members for anything going on in Sudan and also sort of a vehicle for advocacy,” but having reached out to influential foreign affairs committee members to co-chair the caucus, such as Frank Wolf (R-VA), Donald Payne (D-NJ), and Tom Tancredo (R-CO), not only has the caucus been credited with their legislative achievements in regards to genocide in Darfur, but Capuano, Wolf, Payne, and Tancredo have been declared congressional champions of the issue by esteemed organizations like the Genocide Intervention Network (GIN). GIN is a nonprofit organization based in Washington D.C. that “works to mobilize an anti-genocide constituency in the United States and Canada to raise the costs for inaction by politicians in the face of genocide” (GIN 2010). Started by college students in 2004, GIN’s advisory board now has influential leaders like former National Security Advisor to Clinton, Anthony Lake, and human rights activist and former director of African Affairs at the National Security Council, John Prendergast. GIN keeps a congressional
scorecard for their members to recognize their supporters and hold their legislators accountable. The organization’s web site proudly displays the Sudan Congressional Caucus co-chairs as their congressional champions of Darfur along with a link to information about the Sudan Caucus. The web site is very advanced in terms of specifying exactly why such congressmen are being honored, and the first bullet point listed is the fact that they co-chair the Sudan Caucus. GIN provides weekly news briefs on Darfur from the mainstream and independent press, providing a wealth of up-to-date information on the Darfur Crisis, making supporters and others aware of which members of Congress are involved, as well as ways to get involved in the issue politically.

**Figure 4.14 Genocide Intervention Network Web Site**

**Champions of Darfur**

Since the genocide in Darfur began more than three years ago, several members of Congress have emerged as champions for the cause. These members have done all they can to raise awareness of Darfur, both in Congress and in their communities, and have taken concrete action to stop the genocide. They have introduced legislation, chaired caucuses, held hearings, traveled to Darfur, written opinion articles, and engaged the Administration on the matter.

This bipartisan group of “Darfur champions” should be thanked for all they have done to save lives in Darfur. They have made a genuine difference and will go down in history as “upstanders”, individuals who instead of averting their attention, spoke up against genocide.

**Congressional Champions**

**REP. MICHAEL CAPUANO (D-MA)**

- Co-chair of the Sudan Caucus
- Sponsored amendment to H.R. 4939, increasing funding for the African Union troops
- Article about his efforts featured in the Associated Press

**REP. DONALD PAYNE (D-NJ)**
Figure 4.14 illustrates the potential for caucuses to serve as a measure of legislative activism which is regarded highly by constituents and activists. Caucuses have the additional benefit of signaling “ownership” over an issue, thereby providing more leverage for legislators to influence policy. The Sudan caucus illustrates how symbolic representation can translate into substantive representation.

The Kenya Caucus interview reveals a more spontaneous decision to establish the caucus as opposed having originated from a well-thought out plan. Even though Meeks serves on the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Financial Committee, it appears the caucus was not created like the Sudan Caucus out of a sense of urgency, but rather in an effort to promote and continue the economic strides that had already been taken in Kenya and other parts of Eastern Africa:

Kenya Caucus Senior Staff Representative: At the time he [Rep. Meeks (D-NY)] had some meetings with some officials from Kenya and was greatly interested in Kenya and had wanted to actually travel there…I think they had a travel van and some other things were happening and so I think he was just really compelled …And since his focus tended to be more on kind of like trade, investment, and those types of issues, I think there was a natural linkage there as well…a lot of things that happen in Congress are really around humanitarian issues when it comes to Africa and not so much on the trade and investment piece… There were some questions about government transparency. There were also a number of things that Kenya was doing right. And, I think, in contrast to some other
countries, it wasn’t recognized, you know, as much, so there were some places where they were actually making some strides… I can’t remember if it was one or a series of meetings and he pretty much said, “Hey. You know, I really want to do this. I feel like this is a good country. There should be more attention paid to Kenya as well as Eastern Africa. And, you know, I want to make it happen.” So that was pretty much how it started.

The staff interview with the Kenya caucus revealed that even though there was an interest in development and trade, there was no clearly defined agenda about the role the caucus would play in that respect, and the caucus died before it began. However, just as quickly as caucuses disappear, they can reemerge in a different and improved form. While my analysis surveys all country-specific African congressional caucuses, there are two other African-related congressional caucuses that have emerged around the same time: the West Africa Caucus in 2005 and the Africa Partnership for Economic Growth (APEG) in 2009. These two regional caucuses have made economic development and trade in Africa their number one foreign policy agenda, and both caucuses have members who serve on other African caucuses. However, unlike the West Africa Caucus, founded by John Boozman (R-AK), APEG has been much more public with African leaders and news outlets regarding its mission and future plans. APEG founders, Bobby Rush (D-IL) and Donald Payne (D-NJ) have consolidated the policy agendas of all the African congressional caucuses and have been vocal in addressing the African community about their intentions:

AGEP Co-founder and Chairman Bobby Rush (D-IL): I represent one of the poorest districts in the United States so I understand what African leaders are dealing with as they try to create jobs for their constituents. What makes the caucus different is the fact that we will focus not on fighting poverty like many organizations are doing but on creating prosperity. To do so, our policy has four pillars: mutual respect, engagement of the African Diaspora, economic empowerment and technology and innovation.
I strongly believe that Africa holds the key to its own development. We will therefore listen to Africans because U.S. policy should be based upon mutual respect. The U.S. needs Africa as well. I recently introduced a bill H. Con. Res. 128 to recognize the importance of Africa to the U.S. This will put an end to the paternalistic approach the U.S. has used in the past toward the continent and create a mutually beneficial policy framework for our nations.

We will engage the African Diaspora. The Diaspora represents a driving force that has not been tapped yet. Africans in America are sending billions of dollars back to their home countries every year through remittances. We can see a great example of the importance of the Diaspora in India and Taiwan. By acting as experts and ambassadors, they contribute to the burgeoning technology industry by linking businesses with markets in their home countries (Motaroki 2010).

The statements above further demonstrate that improving U.S. foreign relations with Africa has become a major priority among members who serve on African caucuses. While my hypothesis that race at the group level was significant was disproved, the quantitative and qualitative results of this study do strongly support the significance of race at the individual level, as well as supporting the overall positive relationship between black caucus members and African caucus activity. Furthermore, when specific measures of legislative activity and MCA efforts are considered, the variance explained in activity due to the number of black caucus members increase from 25 to 36 percent. Finally, when comparing CBC activity and African caucus activity on COFR issues, the CBC not only has the highest rating on every level of legislative activity and engagement measured, they attribute their efforts impacting foreign relations with Africa to their feelings of racial group consciousness and a sense of common fate with Africans.

African Embassy Results

African embassies in my sample reported their eagerness for the United States government to turn a serious eye towards economic investment and development in their country. The six embassies for which a congressional caucus exists in the U.S House of
Representatives include Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Sudan, and Uganda. With the exception of the Sudan, Nigeria, and Uganda caucuses, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, and Kenya reported “fairly good” foreign relations with the U.S., while the Nigerian and Ugandan Embassy reported their U.S. relations were “very good.” Sudan reported “not so good” relations with the U.S. given the tension between the U.S. and Sudanese government over religious and ethnic conflict that has left thousands dead in the Darfur region.

With the exception of Sudan, all embassies believe U.S. foreign relations with their country are “fairly good,” and the Nigerian and Ugandan embassies, whose caucuses no longer exist, believe foreign relations are “very good.” Sudan reports that their foreign relations with the U.S. are “not so good,” and their embassy representative further noted that although they are open and eager to talk with U.S. officials regarding genocide in Darfur and the housing of Islamic terrorists, the Sudanese Embassy currently shares no communication or diplomatic negotiations with any U.S. officials in Congress. This is not surprising considering the reason behind Rep. Capuano’s (D-MA) creation of the Sudan Caucus, which was precisely to address the failures of the Sudanese government to adhere to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan, targeted at ending political, religious, and ethnic conflict between northern and southern Sudan.

When asked about the top four COFR issues, the variables for political activities or participation, the results illustrated that energy and China’s economic expansion were not relevant issues for the embassies. In my sample, however, terrorism and HIV/AIDS were issues that embassy officials had discussed with U.S. officials whether or not they were on the relevant caucus. Kenya and Nigeria who had data missing, Sudan reported “no”,
and Côte d’Ivoire and Ethiopia said they had met with only caucus members about HIV/AIDS. The Uganda Embassy met with caucus and non-caucus members of Congress regarding HIV/AIDS.

**Table 4.15 Embassy Results on Interaction with U.S. Officials**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Embassy</th>
<th>Political Activities/Participation</th>
<th>Energy Sector</th>
<th>China’s Economic Expansion</th>
<th>Terrorism Counter Terrorism</th>
<th>HIV/AIDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>Meeting with caucus Member</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Meeting with non-caucus member</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Meeting with key committee or party leaders in Congress</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Meeting with other African ambassadors, religious institutions, immigrants from your country in local community</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Meeting with caucus Member</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Meeting with non-caucus member</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Meeting with key committee or party leaders in Congress</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Meeting with other African ambassadors, religious institutions, immigrants from your country in local community</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Meeting with caucus Member</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Meeting with non-caucus member</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Meeting with key committee or party leaders in Congress</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Meeting with other African ambassadors, religious institutions, immigrants from your country in local community</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>108</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The results in the table above indicate that whenever embassy officials have interacted with caucus members on the issues listed, they have also met with non-caucus members in Congress and vice versa. Similarly, when embassy officials have not met with caucus members on the issues listed, they have also not met with non-caucus members in Congress and vice versa. The logical assumption would be that caucus members would and should be more interactive in meeting with embassy officials compared to non-caucus members of Congress, but in fact what we find is that with regard to energy, the Uganda caucus actually met with key committee or party leaders in Congress and not with the caucus members.

Since congressional caucuses operate like interest groups for interested members of Congress to work together and push for the passage and implementation of certain policies, African embassies also perceive caucuses as allies when it comes to improving U.S. relations and other policy matters with their country. In fact, the motivation behind many of the caucuses, as will be described in country-specific analyses later in this chapter, can be attributed to a member’s meeting with an Ambassador or African constituent from the district. Only the Sudan caucus stands as a unique case, following
grave concern from Rep. Capuano (D-MA) that the United States was not active enough in putting pressure on the Sudanese government to restore peace and stability in the region. However, for the most part, all race and ethnic-based congressional caucuses are perceived as steps forward not only for caucus members but for the countries being tended to as well. In fact, the creation of the African caucuses is itself seen as an indicator of good foreign relations, and members take it upon themselves to notify the president and ambassador of the country in an effort to reach out and send the message that members want to work together with country officials to address relevant policy. Therefore, it is interesting to see how well both caucus members and embassy representatives take advantage of relevant caucus creation.

When the question, “How cooperative has _______ Congressional Caucus been in working to help achieve better U.S. foreign relations and policy with your country [with regard to energy, China’s economic expansion, Terrorism, and HIV/AIDS],” the Côte d’Ivoire and Kenyan Embassies reported “not applicable,” since countries vary in terms of issue priority. However, it is important to note that while the COFR advocates the United States take a serious look at the four issues deemed critical on the continent, the COFR does not believe nor advocate that such issues must be equally significant to each African country. In fact, the COFR report stands as a U.S. policy recommendation report targeted at U.S. officials and policymakers to help them advance a more comprehensive foreign policy and approach towards the continent as a whole. The Task Force report focuses on energy, China’s economic expansion, terrorism, and HIV/AIDS because their analysis suggested they are of new and increasing importance to United States interests and concerns in Africa. The report then examines more traditional components of U.S.
policy such as conflict resolution and peacekeeping, democracy and human rights, and
economic growth (COFR 2005, 27).

Table 4.16 indicates the four top issues that are of increasing importance to the
United States with respect to the entire continent vary in their degree of importance on a
country-specific basis, hence the choice “not applicable” across the board for Côte
d’Ivoire and Kenya. However, Ethiopia and Nigeria report that on the issues of terrorism
and HIV/AIDS, the caucuses have been very cooperative, and that is consistent with the
Ethiopia Caucus and Nigeria Embassy interviews:

Ethiopia Caucus Senior Staff Representative: AIDS was a huge issue because we
requested funding and got language passed through appropriations on HIV/AIDS. And
just raising the issue. Any opportunity he had, [Rep. Mike Honda] would raise AIDS as an issue. Like, even if he was dealing with something else, it was
like, you know, well don’t forget that there’s this issue. And terrorism always
came up because when we were dealing with the human rights bill, you know, the
state department’s argument, the administration’s argument at the time was
always, we can’t really be critical of Ethiopia right now because they’re an ally on
the fight against terrorism, and so we had to, well the caucus members had to,
argue that a little bit. Even though they are our allies, you know, it’s more
important for us to check our allies.

The Ethiopia staffer’s comments suggest they have been outspoken on the AIDS
and terrorism issues. In the Nigerian Embassy interview, an official commented that
while the Nigeria Caucus is no longer active, terrorism and HIV/AIDS were always
issues on the rise, and currently members of Congress have raised concerns about the
“internal tension with respect to the religious coloration of our country.” He went on
further to note that the Nigeria Caucus and other members of Congress were always
“very cooperative” in terms of U.S. aid for HIV/AIDS as they were with terrorism,

20 See Appendix G
although the U.S. has been more preventative than curative in its approach to combating terrorism.

Similar to the caucus activity scale that caucus senior staff reported on the 15 COFR Africa policy issues, embassies were also asked to report how active they perceive caucus members to be on policies relevant to their country. While it is true that the survey captures “perception of caucus activity” on a zero to five scale, incorporating a discussion on the perception of those countries on the receiving end of U.S. foreign policy not only provides an informative counterbalance of perspective, but also suggests that measuring the effectiveness or quality of U.S. foreign policy, like all international policy, should require input from the receiving country.

The table below illustrates the differences between embassy and caucus results on the top COFR issues. The difference was measured by subtracting the embassy score from the caucus self-report score; therefore, bar graphs approximating zero indicate that the embassy and caucus share equal perceptions about caucus performance on relevant policy. In the cases where the bar graph is positive, the embassy overestimated caucus activity relative to the caucus, and in the cases where the bar graph is negative the caucus overestimated its activity relative to the embassy. In order to distinguish values of zero from missing data, all values of zero have been coded .05. Therefore, values of .05 indicate that both the embassy and the caucus have equal perception of caucus activity. Nigeria and Uganda are excluded in this graph because their caucuses no longer exist and there were no records or contact persons who could speak to their caucus performance when they were viable.
Figure 4.17 Embassy Caucus Difference in Activity Scores: Energy, China’s Economic Expansion, Terrorism, HIV/AIDS
The difference in embassy and caucus results are best interpreted in combination with the embassy results on how cooperative they believe the caucuses have been on the issues of energy, China’s economic expansion, terrorism, and HIV/AIDS. Overall, the comparative ratings between embassy and caucus show that embassies overestimated caucus activity more than half of the time. More important, however, is the degree of overestimation. On the issue of terrorism (with the exception of Côte d’Ivoire, which is a small country, relatively politically and economically stable compared to other countries in my sample) the embassies perceive their particular caucus to be “very active” on the issue of terrorism. In the case of Sudan, the embassy believes the Sudan caucus has been equally “very active” on the issue of genocide; however the embassy interview revealed that the Sudan caucus members were identical in their efforts and ideology to non-caucus members. One of the key aspects reiterated by the Sudanese Embassy representative was
the fact that no member of Congress was willing to speak with them, including caucus members.

The Ethiopian Embassy and Ethiopia Caucus rated caucus activity on HIV/AIDS equally, both assigning “5”, the highest activity score option available. The Ethiopia Caucus representative mentioned the caucus’s push for foreign aid for HIV/AIDS through appropriations, and the Ethiopia Caucus chair also sat on the appropriations committee and was successful in getting language passed in this regard. Furthermore, the Ethiopia Caucus reported their vigilance in making HIV/AIDS in Ethiopia a top priority for their caucus; the embassy was aware of this fact as well and this most likely explains their rating. In the case of Kenya’s gross overestimation of caucus activity with a score of “5” compared to the caucus’s self-reporting of “0” activity on HIV/AIDS, the Kenyan embassy also indicated that with regard to all four COFR issues, the Kenya Caucus’s cooperation with them was not applicable, even though they overestimated caucus activity in three of the four issue cases.

While the embassy results on caucus activity and caucus cooperation do not appear to coincide, when the embassies were asked the same question regarding cooperation with the Congressional Black Caucus on the COFR top priority issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Energy</th>
<th>China’s Economic Expansion</th>
<th>Terrorism</th>
<th>HIV/AIDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Very Cooperative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Fairly Cooperative</td>
<td>Very Cooperative</td>
<td>Very Cooperative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Not at all Cooperative</td>
<td>Not at all Cooperative</td>
<td>Not at all Cooperative</td>
<td>Fairly Cooperative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Not so Cooperative</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Fairly Cooperative</td>
<td>Very Cooperative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Ethiopian embassy believed the Ethiopia Caucus was “very cooperative” on terrorism, whereas the CBC was given “not applicable” status. However, on the issues of HIV/AIDS, both the Ethiopian Caucus and the CBC were “very cooperative”. The Nigerian Embassy believed the CBC was “fairly cooperative” on China’s economic expansion, whereas the Nigeria Caucus felt the issue was “not applicable.” With respect to terrorism and HIV/AIDS, the Nigerian embassy believed both the CBC and Nigeria caucus were “very cooperative.” However, on the issue of energy, the Nigerian embassy had missing data for the CBC but said the caucus was “very cooperative”. Interestingly enough, where the Sudanese embassy reiterated its lack of communication with any U.S. elected officials due to the Darfur Conflict, the caucus and CBC were rated “not at all cooperative” across all COFR issues, though the CBC was rated “fairly cooperative” by the Sudanese embassy on the issues of HIV/AIDS.

While the ability to make any causal arguments as to the embassy caucus difference ratings and results on caucus cooperation is severely constrained, this data serves more as an exploratory inquiry of African embassies who serve as representatives on the receiving end of U.S. foreign policy towards Africa. Furthermore, embassy officials serve as liaisons of their government in the United States and tend to keep U.S. foreign policy honest and balanced by providing their own perspectives of U.S.-Africa foreign relations and the congressional caucuses working on related issues.
Conclusion

In this chapter, I have described my variable computations and reported my quantitative results, supplemented with qualitative explanations. I have shown that the CBC holds the highest caucus activity rating according to my measures. However, my hypothesis that caucus activity is a function of descriptive representation of race at the caucus group level is disproven. In fact, it is race at the individual level that explains caucus activity with statistical significance, along with caucus members from a state with a significant African foreign-born population. Cross-racial representation is also statistically significant, contrary to the argument that the Congressional Black Caucus would be the most active on African issues.

Furthermore, I have also shown that descriptive representation matters and that racial group consciousness is a driving force behind black members’ engagement with foreign policy towards the continent. African American members who racially or ethnically identify with the minority group they represent are likely to act and engage in influencing policy out of a sense of obligation motivated by feelings of racial group consciousness. The presence of African congressional caucuses also reveals the significance of ethnicity within the U.S. black population and the increasing importance of both African constituents political participation and U.S.-Africa foreign policy. Furthermore, including the perspectives of African embassies in the analysis of U.S. foreign relations with Africa not only serves as an additional measure of African caucus activity, but is a necessary measure of whether the countries on the receiving end of U.S. foreign policy feel the same way about their relations with the United States. Foreign relations is not a one way street but a bilateral relationship between two countries and
their interests with one another; therefore, future analysis of U.S. foreign relations should consider parties on the receiving end of foreign relations to better measure whether foreign policy and foreign relations meet their goals in a way that is mutually beneficial.

While studies of congressional caucuses based on race and ethnicity are challenged by poor record keeping and a lack of institutional responsibility (they merely require a one-page letter be submitted every congressional session for registration renewal\(^\text{21}\)), my study has taken into account this new phenomenon of “legislative activism” vis-à-vis race and ethnic-based caucuses. This study attempts to create the foundation for future analysis of both the impact of race and ethnicity on the U.S. black population when it comes to their policy concerns and preferences. Additionally, the study purports a reevaluation of caucuses as the most viable and strategic way for representing racial and ethnic minorities. Top-down legislative representation vis-à-vis congressional caucuses are not as well known as the CBC, CAPAC, or Hispanic caucus, even though they have the potential to be very influential in coordinating legislative agendas among likeminded legislators. However, as these caucuses continue to flourish and grow over time, it will be interesting to discern their impact on bill passage, amendments, and voting. Nonetheless, REBCs do create opportunities to make visible ethnic minorities who may otherwise be ignored, such as the African population. Future studies, however, should analyze whether congressional caucuses are the most ideal or only way to achieve the same purpose.

\(^{21}\) See Appendix B
CHAPTER 5

Conclusion

This dissertation develops a new perspective on descriptive and substantive representation based on race by exploring legislative behavior in African congressional caucuses that serve black ethnic communities. Furthermore, it attempts to understand how and why congressional caucuses invite more complex analyses of such ethnic cleavages, while also providing insight into how legislators think about, work for, and represent racial and ethnic minority groups across the U.S.

While I argue that the more black members present on a black ethnic caucus, the more active or engaged the caucus tends to be in representing its policy goals and interests, I find that cross-racial representation, or a racially heterogeneous group of members, contributes to a more active and engaged caucus. Specifically, when analyzing members in African congressional caucuses and their activity on U.S. foreign policy interests toward Africa, cross-racial representation is a significant factor in promoting caucus activity, which in turn, also pushes forward the concerns of black ethnic constituencies and their policy interests.
Although the notion of group-based descriptive representation based on race does not hold for race and ethnic-based caucuses, it does hold for caucus members at the individual level. African American and Asian members contribute significantly to African congressional caucuses. Furthermore, being a member from a state with a significant African foreign-born population plays an important role in not only explaining caucus activity, but also the potential of black ethnic constituents to effectively mobilize themselves in a way that gets their concerns addressed and their interests represented.

Studies in legislative representation have revealed the significance of racial and ethnic differences with respect to Latino, Asian, and more recently Caribbean populations in the U.S. (Jones-Correa 1998; Lien 2001; Lien 2004, Wong 2000; DeSipio 1996; Ong and Nakanishi 1996; Espiritu 1992); however, ethnic diversity has remained absent with respect to the African population in the United States. The challenge of scholars to examine the effects of black ethnic diversity on political representation and participation has been further exacerbated by census and data options that continue to categorize all black persons as either “African American,” “Negro,” or just “black.” With an African population in the U.S. more likely to approximate three million (and even more if one includes their progeny) (Beyene 2010), this study has made visible both the importance of group legislative representation and the representation of ethnic diversity with respect to the U.S. black population.

Scholarship on descriptive representation in American politics has expanded our understanding of the extent to which race matters in the substantive representation of minority interests (Canon 1999; Cameron et al 1996; Dovi 2002; Fenno 2003; Mansbridge 1999; Pitkin 1967; Swain 1993; Tate 2003; Whitby 1997). Much of this
research has focused largely on majority-minority districts enabling minorities to successfully elect members who share their racial or ethnic background. The importance of racial representation in Congress has been substantiated, in large part, by the extent to which members’ voting records reflect the interests of the minority group. However, while roll call voting has been critical to the analysis of whether constituents are being represented, it has not adequately captured other forms of legislative activity targeted at substantively representing the interests of racial and ethnic minorities: race and ethnic-based congressional caucuses.

Congressional caucuses facilitate cooperation among legislators and allow for members to prioritize issues and policies. As mentioned earlier, congressional caucuses are analogous to interest groups: they function like internal lobbyists, doing the work of interest groups inside Congress. Dahl’s earlier work tracing the scholarly debate on who governs in a democracy provides support for viewing legislators as group-conscientious actors: “Neither people nor parties but interest groups, it was said, are the true units of the political system” (Alexander 2006, 58). Although congressional caucuses are not given any legislative power as a group, they provide members with the ability to symbolically or substantively function as an interest group working to influence policy; caucuses are voluntary expressions of legislative activism on the part of legislators concerned with particular issues, policies, or people.

Additionally important to this study is the broadening of our concept of representation beyond roll call voting to that of legislative activity, effort, or intensity (Hall 1996) that includes activities like agenda setting, legislative advocacy, information-
gathering, bill co-sponsorship, and meetings with constituents, community organizations, and other elected officials.

**Summary Overview**

First, I show a positive relationship between race at the individual level for African American and Asian caucus members and African caucus activity. I argue that the racially heterogeneous composition of members serving on race and ethnic-based caucuses reveal the importance of ethnic differences.

Additionally, I theorize that racial group consciousness is a motivating factor driving African Americans’ legislative activity towards Africans and U.S. foreign policy towards Africa. The qualitative analysis of my study illustrated the extent to which perceptions of common fate extend beyond African Americans to that of Africans. The interview with the CBC revealed that members engage in African affairs and U.S. foreign policy towards the continent because “they have a knowledge or consciousness that Africa is in our history, in our DNA, so [they] care.” The qualitative interviews revealed that racial group consciousness was indeed a factor in African American legislative activity on African congressional caucuses, and the high participation rate of African American members on the other African caucuses is also likely to steer their activity, thereby contributing to the positive correlation in caucus activity.

When caucus activity is categorized into specific types of legislative activity, such as bill co-sponsorship, meeting with the African leaders and embassy officials, or using the committee power of a caucus member to advance the caucus agenda, the caucuses with majority African American members have higher activity scores, the CBC rating the highest once again. In addition, the African congressional caucuses reported their efforts
to advance the U.S. goals for foreign aid distribution as articulated in the Millennium Challenge Account in the areas of governance, education, health, and the promotion of economic freedom. The results revealed that the African caucuses with a majority of African American members had activity scores higher than the African caucuses with a minority of African American members. Furthermore, among the majority African American caucuses, the Millennium Challenge Account scores revealed a substantial difference between the CBC and the other caucuses. Finally, the quantitative results reveal the significance of the African foreign-born population and multiracial caucus coalitions in the efficacy of African congressional caucus activity.

While caucuses vary in their objective, structure, and goals, my analysis was able to provide a theoretical and institutional framework of race and ethnic-based caucuses that extracted consistent legislative agendas and activities for all African caucuses on the same set of issues in order to measure the importance of racial and ethnic representation, expand our ideas about congressional representation, and provide a more systematic way of evaluating the efficacy of race and ethnic-based congressional caucuses. Additionally, Chapter two explained racial group consciousness as an explanatory factor for black legislative behavior on African caucuses and provided an historical context for understanding the progression of U.S.-Africa foreign policy over the last forty years, which helps explain why, for example, African American members of Congress are motivated by feelings of racial group consciousness when it comes to caucus participation in foreign affairs with Africa: because they see their struggles for freedom and equality as one and the same and consider their ideas of common fate extending beyond national boundaries to that of their African kin. This chapter also gauged the
policy preferences and perceptions of U.S.-Africa foreign affairs from the receiving end, the African embassies for which an African caucus exists. The African embassies in my sample emphasized the importance of their own cooperation with the congressional caucuses and perceive the caucuses as allies in helping improve U.S.-Africa foreign policy. Although the embassies overestimated congressional caucus activity on the policy issues drafted in the Council of Foreign Relations report, the embassies are eager to work and cooperate with caucus members to advance their own foreign policy goals, particularly economic development.

**Implications and Future Research**

The implications of my study are twofold. First, this study implies an incorporation of the salience of ethnicity with respect to the U.S. black population within race and representation literature, not only to make visible African populations who are mobilizing and participating in the American political process, but also to account for variance within the U.S. black population in terms of political preferences and policies that shape “black America”22.” Secondly, the need to expand our ideas of congressional representation beyond roll call voting, especially in regards to the collective group representation of racial and ethnic minorities in Congress, is apparent given the increase of race and ethnic-based congressional caucuses. The fact that members are voluntarily uniting and engaging as a group to represent the interests of Africans and other ethnic groups at an increasing rate further suggests that representation literature look beyond the

22 Black America pertains to anyone living in the United States who phenotypically classifies black and this includes Africans and Carribeans.
fact that caucuses have no legislative power, and pay close attention to how legislators nonetheless utilize caucuses to influence and shape policy.

The political preferences, socioeconomic status, and political ideology vary when comparing different segments of the black community (African, African American, Caribbean); therefore, future analysis must account for ethnic differences in order to adequately address policy concerns and issues that affect groups differently within the same race. Moreover, the socioeconomic make-up and political ideology of Africans is significantly different from that of African Americans, so it is critical that analyses do not attribute the political attitudes and preferences of one group to that of the other. Future research must continue to account for both race and ethnicity to make visible African populations and other ethnic constituencies that legislators have already begun accessing for their personal interest, political gain, and/or because of constituent influence. With an African population in the United States approximating three million\(^{23}\) and located in concentrated areas throughout the country, their political power has revealed itself through the existence of race and ethnic-based caucuses.

Finally, the need to capture the motivations and political preferences of these untapped constituencies, is not only necessary for explaining diversity within the U.S. black population, but suggests a re-evaluation of the relationship between immigrants and Americans, and not so much one of race but rather of ethnicities within the races, particularly when ethnicity may explain fundamental differences in political preferences between Africans and African Americans.

\(^{23}\) Additionally, intergenerational differences between naturalized citizens and their kin, and/or intermarriage with African Americans, are overlooked (Zuberi 2000; Beyene 2004).
# APPENDICES

## Appendix A: African Congressional Caucus Membership List

### COTE D’IVOIRE CONGRESSIONAL CAUCUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Race of Member</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total= 4 members (4 Black)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. G.K. Butterfield (D-NC)</td>
<td>Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. John Conyers (D-NY)</td>
<td>Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Greg Meeks (D-NY),</td>
<td>Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Donald Payne (D-NJ)</td>
<td>Black</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### CONGRESSIONAL ETHIOPIAN AND ETHIOPIAN AMERICAN CAUCUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Race of Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total=18 (1 Asian, 7 White, 10 Black)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Mike Honda (D-CA)</td>
<td>Asian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Michael Capuano (D-MA)</td>
<td>White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Jim Clyburn (D-SC)</td>
<td>Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Elijah Cummings (D-MD)</td>
<td>Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Eddie Bernice Johnson (D-TX)</td>
<td>Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. William Lacy Clay (D-MO)</td>
<td>Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Barbara Lee (D-CA)</td>
<td>Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee (D-CA)</td>
<td>Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-CA)</td>
<td>White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Carolyn Maloney (D-NY)</td>
<td>White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Greg Meeks (D-NY)</td>
<td>Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Jim Moran (D-VA)</td>
<td>White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Donald Payne (D-NJ)</td>
<td>Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Robert C. Scott (D-VA)</td>
<td>Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Vic Snyder (D-AK)</td>
<td>White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Chris Van Hollen (D-MD)</td>
<td>White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Diane Watson (D-CA)</td>
<td>Black</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### KENYA CONGRESSIONAL CAUCUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Race of Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total=15( 8 Black, 7 White)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Greg Meeks (D-NY)</td>
<td>Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. John Boozman (R-AR)</td>
<td>White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Jim Clyburn (D-SC)</td>
<td>Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Paul Gillmore (R-OH)</td>
<td>White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Mark Green (R-WI)</td>
<td>White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee (D-CA)</td>
<td>Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members</td>
<td>Race of Members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Dennis Kucinich (D-OH)</td>
<td>White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Barbara Lee (D-CA)</td>
<td>Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Donald Payne (D-NJ)</td>
<td>Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Charles Rangel (D-NY)</td>
<td>Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. E. Clay Shaw Jr. (R-FL)</td>
<td>Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Tom Tancredo (R-CO)</td>
<td>White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Mike Thompson (D-CA)</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NIGERIA CONGRESSIONAL CAUCUS**

Year: 1999-2003

Founder (s) – Rep. William Jefferson (D-LA)  
Rep. Edward Royce (R-CA)

**Members**  
Total=17 (at least 2 white)  
*No other information recorded or could be obtained by Congress*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Race of Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**UGANDA CONGRESSIONAL CAUCUS**

Year: 2004-2006

Founder (s) – Rep. Christopher Smith (R-NJ)  
Chaired: Edolphus Towns (D-NY)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Race of Members</th>
</tr>
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# SUDAN CONGRESSIONAL CAUCUS

**Year:** 2005 - Current  
**Founder(s):** Rep. Michael Capuano (D-MA)  
Rep. Donald Payne (D-NJ)  
Rep. Tom Tancredo (R-CO)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Race of Member</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Michael Capuano (D-MA)</td>
<td>White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Donald Payne (D-NJ)</td>
<td>Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Tom Tancredo (R-CO)</td>
<td>White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachus, Spencer (R-AL)</td>
<td>White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berkley, Shelley (D-NV)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bishop, Sanford (D-GA)</td>
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<td>Blumenauer, Earl (D-OR)</td>
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<td>Capps, Lois (D-CA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Carson, Andre (D-IN)</td>
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<td>Cao, Anh &quot;Joseph&quot; (R-LA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Clay, Wm. Lacy (D-MO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cleaver, Emanuel (D-MO)</td>
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<td>Clyburn, James (D-SC)</td>
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<td>Cohen, Steve (D-TN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conyers, John (D-MI)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cooper, Jim (D-TN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Costello, Jerry (D-IL)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Courtney, Joe (D-CT)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Crowley, Joseph (D-NY)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dahlkemper, Kathy (D-PA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dent, Charlie (R-PA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Doggett, Lloyd (D-TX)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Doyle, Michael (D-PA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Engel, Eliot (D-NY)</td>
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<td>Faleomavaega, Eni (D-AS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Franks, Trent (R-AZ)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Garrett, Scott (R-NJ) RW</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goodlatte, Bob (R-VA)</td>
<td>White</td>
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<tr>
<td>Green, Al (D-TX)</td>
<td>Black</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hastings, Alcee (D-FL)</td>
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<td>Herger, Wally (R-CA)</td>
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<td>Himes, Jim (D-CT)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hinchey, Maurice (D-NY)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Holt, Rush (D-NJ)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Honda, Mike (D-CA)</td>
<td>Asian</td>
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<td>Inglis, Bob (R-SC)</td>
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<td>Jackson-Lee, Sheila (D-TX)</td>
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<td>Johnson, Eddie Bernice (D-TX)</td>
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<td>Johnson, Hank (D-GA)</td>
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<td>Kilpatrick, Carolyn (D-MI)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Langevin, Jim (D-RI)</td>
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<td>Larsen, Rick (D-WA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lee, Barbara (D-CA)</td>
<td>Black</td>
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<tr>
<td>Levin, Sander (D-MI)</td>
<td>White</td>
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<td>Members</td>
<td>Race of Member</td>
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<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
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<td>Loebsack, Dave (D-IA)</td>
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<td>Lowey, Nita (D-NY)</td>
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<td>Maloney, Carolyn (D-NY)</td>
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<td>Markey, Betsey (D-CO)</td>
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<td>Matheson, Jim (D-UT)</td>
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<tr>
<td>McCaul, Michael (R-TX)</td>
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<tr>
<td>McCollum, Betty (D-MN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>McCotter, Thaddeus (R-MI)</td>
<td>White</td>
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<tr>
<td>McDermott, Jim (R-WA)</td>
<td>White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McGovern, Jim (D-MA)</td>
<td>White</td>
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<tr>
<td>Meeks, Gregory (D-NY)</td>
<td>Black</td>
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<tr>
<td>Michaud, Michael (D-ME)</td>
<td>White</td>
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<tr>
<td>Miller, Brad (D-NC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mitchell, Harry (D-AZ)</td>
<td>White</td>
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<tr>
<td>Moran, Jim (D-VA)</td>
<td>White</td>
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<tr>
<td>Murphy, Chris (D-CT)</td>
<td>White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oliver, John (D-MA)</td>
<td>White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pallone, Frank (D-NJ)</td>
<td>White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pascrell, Bill (D-NJ)</td>
<td>White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paulsen, Erik (R-MN)</td>
<td>White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pitts, Joe (R-PA)</td>
<td>White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price, David (D-NC)</td>
<td>White</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rangel, Charles (D-NY)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reichert, Dave (R-WA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rothman, Steve (D-NJ)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rush, Bobby (D-IL)</td>
<td>Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanchez, Linda (D-CA)</td>
<td>Latina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schakowsky, Jan (D-IL)</td>
<td>White</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SUDAN CAUCUS CONTINUED…

Total = 91 (66 White, 21 Black, 1 Pacific Islander, 2 Asian, 1 Latina)
Appendix B: Sample letter application to register a caucus

January 3, 2009

The Honorable Robert A. Brady
Chairman
Committee on House Administration
1309 Longworth House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on House Administration
1313 Longworth House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Chairman Brady:

We would like to register the Congressional Caucus on XXXXX as a Congressional Member Organization for the 111th Congress. The Congressional Caucus on XXXXX will serve as an informal, bipartisan group of Members dedicated to maintaining and strengthening the United States-XXXXX relationship, and to educating other Members on the issues affecting the political, economic and security climates in this region of the world.

Representatives John Doe and Jane Smith will serve as Co-Chairs of the Congressional Caucus on XXXXX. Our staff assigned to handle caucus related issues are listed below:

Rep. John Doe
Kim Smith (Staff)
202.225.XXXX
kim.smith@mail.house.gov

Rep. Jane Smith
Bobby Jones (Staff)
202.225.XXXX
bobby.jones@mail.house.gov

We trust that the information provided meets the requirements for registering a Congressional Member Organization in the 111th Congress. Thank you for your attention to this matter and please feel free to contact us with any questions.

Sincerely,

/s/ John Doe
Member of Congress

/s/ Jane Smith
Member of Congress
Appendix C: Uganda Caucus letter to Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

November 17, 2004

His Excellency Yoweri Museveni
President
Republic of Uganda
Kampala
UGANDA

Your Excellency:

We are pleased to inform you that, along with several of our colleagues, we have established a Congressional Caucus on Uganda.

The purposes of the Caucus include improving relations and communications between the United States and Uganda; providing up-to-date information about common interest items to Members of Congress and their staffs; working to identify good policy ideas in each others’ country and see how these might be applied elsewhere; and recognizing the common concerns of our two countries, including (but not limited to) our mutual efforts to combat terrorism in Africa and around the globe, to ensure or bring about peace and stability in Northern Uganda as well as in other regions of Africa, and the fight against the spread of HIV/AIDS.

We hope, at some point in the future, that members of the new Congressional Caucus on Uganda will be able to visit your country so that we can meet with you and members of your government, and so we can deepen the friendships that already exist among us.

Of course, if you or other high-level Ugandan officials come to Washington, we will be happy to help arrange visits to Capitol Hill to meet with us.

We look forward to hearing from you soon, and to continuing to work with your Ambassador, Edith Ssempele, here in Washington, D.C.

Sincerely,

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH
Co-Chair

EDOLPHUS TOWNS
Co-Chair
Appendix D: MCA Sixteen Performance Measures

MCA Sixteen Performance Measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GOVERNING JUSTLY</th>
<th>INVESTING IN PEOPLE</th>
<th>PERFORMANCE ECONOMIC FREEDOM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil Liberties (Freedom House)</td>
<td>Public Primary Education Spending as Percent of GDP (World Bank/national sources)</td>
<td>Country Credit Rating (Institutional Investor Magazine)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Rights (Freedom House)</td>
<td>Primary Education Completion Rate (World Bank/national sources)</td>
<td>Inflation (IMF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voice and Accountability (World Bank Institute)</td>
<td>Public Expenditures on Health as Percent of GDP (World Bank/national sources)</td>
<td>3-Year Budget Deficit (IMF/national sources)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Effectiveness (World Bank Institute)</td>
<td>Immunization Rates: DPT and Measles (World Bank/UN/national sources)</td>
<td>Trade Policy (Heritage Foundation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law (World Bank Institute)</td>
<td>Control of Corruption (World Bank Institute)</td>
<td>Regulatory Quality (World Bank Institute)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control of Corruption (World Bank Institute)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Days to Start a Business (World Bank)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix E: Additional Analyses and Interpretation (Model 2 and Model 3)

MODEL 2
Simple Regression Model Measuring Caucus Group Activity

African CAS and Number of Black Members on African Caucus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Congressional Caucuses</th>
<th>Caucus Activity Score (CAS)</th>
<th>Percent Black Members</th>
<th>Activity Per Member</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CBC n=42</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1.418605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire n=4</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia n=18</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>3.166667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya n=15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan n=91</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>.3736264</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The results indicate that there is a positive relationship between the number of black caucus members and caucus activity [$\beta = 7.662, n=5, p=.256$]. 15% of the variance in caucus activity can be explained by the proportional increase in black membership. Although the p value is not significant, the results confirm a positive association with percent black caucus membership and caucus activity level. Furthermore, the lack of a larger sample has no relationship with the importance of this study, since my study includes all African country-specific caucuses in the House.

The graph below is useful in understanding the degree to which a percentage increase in black membership in a caucus corresponds to caucus activity per member.
MODEL 3
Multiple Regression Model Measuring Caucus Activity at Individual Level

Multiple Regression Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference Category: CBC</th>
<th>Pseudo R² = .3288</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Caucus Activity on U.S.-Africa Foreign Policy

| COFR Top four Policy Issues: Energy, China’s Economic Expansion, HIV/AIDS, Terrorism |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|
| \( B \)                         | Robust S.E.     | P Value |

**Individual Level Significance**

- Black Member: \( .589*** \)  \( .133 \)  \( .000 \)
- Asian: \( .428** \)  \( .210 \)  \( .044 \)
- District Percent Black: \( -.002 \)  \( .002 \)  \( .306 \)
- Foreign Policy: \( .000 \)  \( .001 \)  \( .863 \)

**Ideology**

- African Foreign Born: \( .250*** \)  \( .086 \)  \( .005 \)

**Pop.**

- Terms in Office: \( -.010 \)  \( .011 \)  \( .385 \)
- Power of Committee: \( .048 \)  \( .038 \)  \( .215 \)

**Caucus Group Significance**

- Côte d’Ivoire Caucus: \( 1.252* \)  \( .686 \)  \( .071 \)
- Ethiopia Caucus: \( 1.052*** \)  \( .162 \)  \( .000 \)
- Kenya Caucus: \( .878*** \)  \( .257 \)  \( .001 \)
- Sudan Caucus: \( .367*** \)  \( .127 \)  \( .005 \)
- Constant: \( -.456*** \)  \( .159 \)  \( .005 \)

Note: ***, **, * refer to statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, S.E. in brackets

The results from model one indicate that the caucuses with a majority of black caucus members had higher activity ratings compared to those with majority white caucus members, which is consistent with my argument that racial representation matters. Given the lack of an institutional structure required of committees and subcommittees in Congress, the variance is likely to be underestimated considering party identification and number of members. My interviews, explained later, also provide qualitative explanations for the quantitative results for understanding these results.
MODEL 4

Binary Logistic Regression Model Results

**Binary Logit Model:**
Reference Category: CBC
Pseudo R2=.5994

DV= No Activity, Moderate Activity, High Activity
Var: Ordered_activity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>P Value</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td><strong>Individual Level Significance</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Black Member</td>
<td>5.316***</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>1.381</td>
<td>.266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Percent Black</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.830</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign Policy Ideology</td>
<td>-.010</td>
<td>.277</td>
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<td>African Foreign Born Pop.</td>
<td>1.643***</td>
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<td>Terms in Office</td>
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<td>.926</td>
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<tr>
<td>Power of Committee</td>
<td>.217*</td>
<td>.057</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Caucus Group Significance</strong></th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Robust S.E.</th>
<th>P Value</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire Caucus</td>
<td>2.439***</td>
<td>.809</td>
<td>.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia Caucus</td>
<td>6.499***</td>
<td>.612</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya Caucus</td>
<td>1.297*</td>
<td>.730</td>
<td>.076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan Caucus</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.358</td>
<td>.990</td>
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</table>

(COFR Top four Policy Issues: Energy, China’s Economic Expansion, HIV/AIDS, Terrorism)

Note: ***, **, * refer to statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, S.E. in brackets
Appendix: F: Increase in Caucus Activity Per Addition of Black or Asian member

**Increase in Caucus Activity Per Addition of Black or Asian Member**

*Odds Ratio Conversion to Linear Predicted Values*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>Asian</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>4.76609</td>
<td>4.39694</td>
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<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>6.03991</td>
<td>5.67076</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>4.28744</td>
<td>3.91829</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>3.45459</td>
<td>4.06198</td>
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</table>

Appendix G: Embassy Results on Interaction with U.S. Officials

Based on top four policy issues listed in the Council of Foreign Relations Africa Report, 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Embassy</th>
<th>Political Activities Participation</th>
<th>Energy Sector</th>
<th>China’s Economic Expansion</th>
<th>Counter Terrorism</th>
<th>HIV/AIDS</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COTE D’IVOIRE</td>
<td>Meeting with caucus Member</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Meeting with non-caucus member</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Meeting with key committee or party leaders in Congress</td>
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<td>NO</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>YES</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Meeting with other African ambassadors, religious institutions, immigrants from your country in local community</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Embassy</th>
<th>Political Activities Participation</th>
<th>Energy Sector</th>
<th>China’s Economic Expansion</th>
<th>Counter Terrorism</th>
<th>HIV/AIDS</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ETHIOPIA</td>
<td>Meeting with caucus Member</td>
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<td>NO</td>
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<td>YES</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Meeting with non-caucus member</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embassy</td>
<td>Political Activities Participation</td>
<td>Energy Sector</td>
<td>China’s Economic Expansion</td>
<td>Counter Terrorism</td>
<td>HIV/AIDS</td>
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<td>---------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KENYA</td>
<td>Meeting with caucus Member</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Meeting with non-caucus member</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
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committee or party leaders in Congress
Meeting with other African ambassadors, religious institutions, immigrants from your country in local community

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