VOICES OF THE FAITHFUL:
RELIGION AND POLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY INDONESIA

by

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DEDICATION

For the women in my family, especially my grandmother Pauline.
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PREFACE

Voices of the Faithful grew out of a deep interest in the intersections of religion and politics. We regularly see connections between religious faith and human behavior, but we do not usually study these relationships in detail. Though religion and politics are perhaps the biggest public parts of many people’s lives, it is not always clear how or why the two spheres converge and diverge. This project is an attempt to provide some of this needed detail, specifically regarding when, how, and why religion influences public opinion and political behavior. This detail is not only important for the faithful in understanding themselves, but also atheists, agnostics, or “casual believers” for whom there can be real consequences when religion and politics mix.

I am a political scientist, but my approach to the study of religion and politics is multidisciplinary. Bringing together the field of political science and the various disciplines that often fall under the umbrella term “area studies” is a difficult albeit necessary task in my opinion. While political science usually looks to explain patterns of social and political phenomena, other disciplines do not see historical events as individual data points to be aggregated. They are instead complete, unique, and subjective cases. Finding a middle ground between these two approaches is hard to do and opens my work up to criticisms. Depending on the audience, I am too much of a political scientist and too little of an area studies specialist or too area-studies focused and not political science enough. Added to this issue is the fact that I research religion and employ mixed methods. Religion can be “fuzzy,” and mixed methods can mean I am either too quantitative or too “soft” with ethnographic approaches. The criteria for determining too much or too little of something tend to be vague and can be contentious matters in themselves. It will ultimately be up to readers to decide if I have struck the right balance, but I hope they know that I have done my best with this dissertation.
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ABSTRACT

Voices of the Faithful: Religion and Politics in Contemporary Indonesia

by

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My dissertation asks how influential is Islam for political participation in Indonesia. I examine the varied ways in which Islam presents itself in contemporary Indonesian politics, particularly at the level of the masses, and the conditions under which Muslim Indonesians engage in political participation. I use a mixed-methods research design involving focus group interviews, personal in-depth interviews, historical-archival work, participant observation, and national public opinion surveys to trace the presence and absence of “religious stimuli” for political behavior.

My work reveals a difference between “religious political participation” and political participation by religious actors. While religion is important for Muslims, it usually does not directly or regularly influence the majority of Indonesians to take political action. Much depends on different components of religion and individual and social contexts. There is an active minority for whom Islam is relevant, and for this group of occasional or habitual participants, the presence and salience of “religiously-relevant political issues” and “religious resources” (often meaning associations and social networks) significantly affect different types and frequencies of political participation.
CHAPTER I

Introduction

Research Topic

Certain scholars and laypersons once thought that modernization would lead to increased secularization throughout the world, but this anticipated phenomenon has not come to pass in all countries and cultures. Instead of waning, religion has maintained or increased its importance in the private and public lives of many people, particularly in the Muslim world. Yet, G. A. Almond, R. Scott Appleby, and Emmanuel Sivan observe “a general tendency to underplay religion as an autonomous force in politics, to oversimplify and minimize the complexity of ‘church-state’ relations as they form and reform around the globe.” The authors argue, “The dominant explanatory view of religion is reductive, treating it as epiphenomenal to economic, political, or psychological realities.” They add, “Since the Enlightenment, the principle of separation of church and state has been an essential criterion of modernization and the measure of liberty. It leads scholars, journalists, and statesmen to assume that religion is an unequivocally private matter.”¹ One exception to this assumption, however, is the role of Islam in politics, especially since the terrorist attacks in New York on September 11, 2001. American media coverage and scholarship often link Muslims to terrorism, which leads audiences to believe that Islam and political extremism are not only causally-related, but also quite common. My research diverges from these two tendencies by providing a nuanced picture of religion and politics whereby the relationship between Islam and political behavior is neither underestimated nor overemphasized.

My research project asks how influential is Islam for political participation? While I have a theory for how Islam matters for political behavior, this question leaves open the possibility that the religion may not always be influential. I also work from

the premise that before we try to understand what is “extraordinary” (e.g.,
fundamentalism and radicalism), we should first try to understand that which is
“ordinary.” In this dissertation, I examine the varied ways in which Islam presents itself
in contemporary Indonesian politics, particularly at the level of the masses, and the
conditions under which Muslim Indonesians engage in political participation.
Establishing the micro-foundations of political behavior by “average” Muslims helps us
comprehend the full range and quality of political engagement and its consequences in
Indonesia and potentially elsewhere.

Theory and Research Design
Indonesia is a highly religious society where Islam infuses the daily lives of
millions. Religious expressions pepper everyday speech. Schools and businesses
demonstrate reverence for Islam. Mass media incorporates religious programming and
content. Indonesia is also home to two of the largest religious organizations in the world.
Muhammadiah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) are said to have almost 60 million members,
and each supports a multitude of mosques, charities, schools, social services, and some
political endeavors. In the government sector, certain political parties have religious
foundations and individual politicians may mix religion and politics in their rhetoric and
policies. Though many Indonesians integrate Islam into their everyday routines at the
micro-level and observe a fusion of religion and politics at the macro-level, their religion
does not automatically nor uniformly translate into active political participation oriented
towards the state. Religion is still influential for political life, but its scope and
magnitude depends on the context.

Determining Islam’s influence on political behavior is contingent upon
disaggregating the religion into personal and associational components along with an
understanding of environmental factors. Because Islam is diverse and individual and
sociopolitical conditions vary, the religion’s relationship to political participation
fluctuates. In analyzing voter turnout and strikes, demonstrations, protests, etc., I find a
difference between political participation by religious actors and “religious political
participation.” The latter is distinguished by an aim for religious ends or being motivated
by religious beliefs. In this way, there are times when Islam matters and other times
when it does not. For many, this might be a puzzle: How is it that religion does not drive the majority of citizens’ political behavior in a country with a dominant religion?

Diversity within Islam essentially limits the formation of a single political project or identity around which the majority of Muslim Indonesians can unite. Religious beliefs, values, and practices vary with regards to orthodoxy and political orientation. While there is general consensus on what Islam is *not*, there is less agreement on what it *is*, especially in the political sphere. The individual identities of Muslim Indonesians are also multi-dimensional where their religion can overlap, confront, or be placed in a hierarchy with other factors such as socio-economic status, education, gender, ethnicity, and age. There are also psychological, social, and political factors that might be influential. The great diversity of religious opinions and behaviors along with the changing salience of religion at the individual-level restricts the ability of elites to mobilize the masses, the development of a bottom-up mass movement, and the creation of fixed boundaries between Islam and politics.

The heterogeneity of Islam in Indonesia does not prohibit identifying patterns, however. My research first finds that only select personal and associational components of religious identity influence voter turnout and protest behavior. Second, while religion is important for Muslims, it usually does not directly or regularly influence the majority of Indonesians to take political action, especially beyond voting. There is an active minority for whom Islam is relevant, and for this group of occasional or habitual participants, the presence and salience of “religiously-relevant political issues” with the use of “religious resources” (typically in the form of associations and social networks) significantly affect different types and frequencies of political participation.

With regards to research methodology, I turned to a variety of disciplines and research approaches for ideas and data. I agree with a comment by Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi that “…such a complex phenomenon as religion cannot be explained by a single research discipline.”

I would add that this applies to politics as well. Fortunately, the field of political science includes different methodologies, some borrowed from other social and behavioral science disciplines such as anthropology, economics, history, and

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psychology. My project uses a mixed-methods research design involving focus group interviews, personal in-depth interviews, historical-archival work, participant observation, and national public opinion surveys to trace the presence and absence of “religious stimuli” for political behavior. The “quantitative” method of surveys are useful to gauge general patterns of attitudes and behaviors, while the “qualitative” methods of focus groups, interviews, archival research, and participant observation provide details for whether or not my theory is correct either wholly or partially.

**Topic Relevance**

The first reason why this present study on religion and politics is important is that researchers and lay observers often presume that religion directly affects public opinion and political behavior, but comprehensive evidence showing when, how, and why tends to be lacking, incomplete, or limited, especially in the context of developing democracies such as Indonesia. This is related to the field of religion and Islam in particular being understudied by political scientists.

The second reason, which is peculiarly the opposite of the first, is that religion is often presumed not to be a catalyst for certain thoughts or actions, even though some evidence suggests this conjecture to be inaccurate. Many resources from the field of political science point to other variables such as socioeconomic status, race and ethnicity, gender, political ideology, party identification, and institutions as the key influences for political opinions and behaviors. While these studies may be accurate, they may be incomplete without the incorporation of religion into the “story.”

The third reason is mentioned in the introductory paragraph. Research concerning the intersection of religion and politics is significant because despite what past advocates of modernization theory once believed about all of the world’s countries eventually going down the path of secularization, religion has not gone away. It is still influential in politics and ignoring religion makes for an incomplete or erroneous understanding of political landscapes in various countries including Indonesia. Studies such as this dissertation are thus useful theoretically and empirically to identify the processes behind the staying power and strength of religion and details about the ideological and behavioral convergence and conflict of religion and politics.
The fourth reason why my study on religion and political participation is important is its potential implications for future research on democratization. Democratization does not necessarily equal secularization, and this era has shown that new and developing democracies do not all follow the same path in terms of institutions, economics, and social development. Unlike other places that utilize a “separation between church and state” approach, developing democracies such as Indonesia combine religion and politics on a daily basis. This can have its ideological, institutional, and policy advantages and disadvantages for individuals, the general public, the state as a whole, and foreign relations. Research on this topic can therefore shed some scholarly light on the present state of affairs, as well as possibly offer policy guidance for future “do’s” and “don’ts” regarding religion and politics in democratic or democratizing settings.

Country Selection: Why Indonesia?

“Indonesia is the largest natural lab,” noted the head of the Indonesian Institute of Sciences, Lukman Hakim, at a 2006 workshop. His colleague, Rochadi Abdulhadi, added that Indonesa is “heaven for researchers.” Indeed, Indonesia is a fascinating and appropriate country to study for content and methods purposes. Indonesia is the fourth most populated country in the world. In basic numbers, this means that the country has a big impact in the Southeast Asia region and beyond. Indonesia is also the largest Muslim country and third largest democracy in the world. As mentioned earlier, the process of ongoing modernization and industrialization has not secularized all countries, at least in the case of Indonesia and some of her neighbors like Malaysia and the Philippines. Additionally, Indonesia is a relatively “new” or “young” developing democracy and it appears in some ways to be “compatible” with religion, namely Islam. Though other countries and their citizens profess a “separation between church and state,” Indonesians in general openly acknowledge and at times encourage an active relationship between religion and politics.

3 Prof. Dr. Lukman Hakim (Wakil Kepala LIPI) and Prof. Dr. Rochadi Abdulhadi (Sekretaris Utama LIPI), Workshop – Kajian Kegiatan Dan Hasil-Hasil Penelitian Peneliti Asing Di Indonesia: Sebuah Pemetaan Awal (Knowledge/Teaching, Activities, and Results of Foreign Researchers’ Research in Indonesia: Early Mapping), Jakarta, Indonesia (29 November 2006). Indonesian quotes: “Indonesia adalah lab alam yang terbesar” and “…surga untuk peneliti.”
Why research contemporary Indonesia in particular? Though this project is grounded in Indonesia’s long social, political, and economic histories, it exclusively focuses on the post-1998 period. Former president Suharto went to great lengths and successfully limited political engagement by the mass public during his almost 32-year reign. His departure from office and the transition to democracy opened up political opportunities unlike anyone had seen or experienced in several decades. Institutional change blossomed, and formal and informal political engagement by elites and masses boomed. In many respects, the post-1998 period is distinct from the preceding colonial, independence, and dictator phases, and therefore deserving of its own attention. People are also interested in knowing about and understanding the relationship between religion and politics in the here and now, in part because the relationship is either new or somewhat different from previous times, but also because of its policy relevance and concerns about how to properly negotiate the terrain of this current transition period. In specific, there are concerns and questions regarding the conceptions and practices of “democracy” such as political participation and the “fit” of religion.

For more selective readers, Indonesia has a little something for everyone. Methodologists may be interested in Indonesia and this dissertation to learn how well traditional research methods utilized in the United States (e.g., focus groups, surveys, and newspaper archives) travel to Indonesia where such methods are not yet common. Also, those new to using certain fieldwork methods overseas and those interested in mixed methods may benefit from a closer look at work in and on Indonesia. Political behavioralists might want to examine Indonesia because of increased and varied political participation after the Suharto regime fell in 1998. This is connected to institutional changes after Suharto as well such as direct elections and redrawn political boundaries, which may be of interest to institutionalists. Area studies scholars will most likely be intrigued by Indonesia because it is a culturally diverse country in terms of ethnic groups, languages, and local and regional histories. Religious Studies students will probably concentrate on Indonesia as a religiously diverse country with its majority religion, minority religions, and large variety within each religion. Those interested in organizations and social movements or those scholars with more of an emphasis in sociology will perhaps be interested in Indonesia for its active civil society. Teachers of
and researchers in World Politics and International Relations might note that Indonesia has significant regional and international ties via trade, military, tourism, and charity. It is also a country with its share of domestic and international challenges such as economic development, ethnic conflict, terrorism, environmental degradation, poverty, health problems, gender issues, educational barriers, secessionist movements, corruption, police, military, and foreign relations. Political scientists with a love of history or any researchers who center on history may pay attention to Indonesia for its interesting, at times tragic, colonial history and its “hidden” history such as the conflicts during the 1960s and current corruption. No one dissertation can cover all of these topics, but this dissertation touches, even if very briefly, on many of them.

Besides choosing to research Indonesia for my own academic and professional purposes, I met many Indonesians who are interested in their country’s past, present, and future experiences, but do not necessarily have complete, accurate, or timely information about such experiences. There is high demand among Indonesians for data, especially data on religion and politics, as Indonesians are not only curious, they are practical. Though it is a cliché saying, it is often true that information is power. For example, ordinary citizens armed with knowledge about themselves and elites in the realm of politics can be powerful actors. Without information, it is much more challenging to hold individuals and entities accountable, responsible, and welfare-oriented in a society. Indonesians are also interested in issues of inclusion and exclusion. Knowing about religiopolitical dynamics can inform what changes need to be made, if any, regarding representation and decision-making processes. I hope this project can aid this process in some productive manner.

There is also general demand for information related to Indonesia from non-Indonesians who are not in academia. Whether it is from average citizens in other countries interested in a country new to them or a country they sometimes hear about in the mass media – usually matters concerning natural or manmade disasters, religion, and social instability – or government bodies focused on political and economic interests or non-profit groups aspiring to increase the standards and quality of living around the world, people outside Indonesia want to know what is going on, what is going well, and what is in need of improvement in the country. In an increasingly globalizing society,
too, more and more people realize that what happens with their neighbors can impact their own lives. The nature of that impact and interconnectedness depends in part on the kinds of information available to academics and non-academics alike about important matters such as religion and politics. In that respect, my hope for the dissertation is that its contents are descriptively and analytically valuable to others.
Chapter I Bibliography


CHAPTER II

Religion and Politics

Muslims typically believe and experience Islam as a holistic religion, one that contains a complete belief, value, and action system. We therefore see the intertwining of their religion with various aspects of life including politics. Before proceeding to an analysis of how influential Islam is for political participation in contemporary Indonesia, this chapter provides a working definition of “religion,” information about Islam in Indonesia, and details about the relationship between Islam and politics during and after the Suharto period for definitional clarification and background purposes. Readers already familiar with these topics may turn directly to Chapter III for an account of political participation in the country.

Definitional Issues

“Religion” often means different things to different people. Scholars and laypersons struggle with all-encompassing definitions since religion involves multiple concepts, beliefs, practices, and actors within the spiritual and earthly worlds. Religion also encompasses an entire way of thinking and being. As it pertains to all aspects of a person’s life, it is both personal and public. For example, religion typically has a rule or statement about food, marriage, family, sex and sexuality, work, customs, art, education, the environment, and government or politics. With so many spheres of influence and an array of ideas, behaviors, and players, the borders of “religion” are often blurred.

Besides the multi-dimensional nature of religion, there are four additional complications in the process of defining religion. First, there are multiple approaches to the study of religion, which can color one’s definition. Examples include historical, theological, philosophical, psychological, sociological, phenomenological, and feminist
Second, definitions of religion can vary depending on the macro-, meso-, or micro-level of analysis:

Religion may be explained as an ultimate context for meaning and value. It may be explained as a social entity, for example, the authoritative symbol set, adherence to which creates a society out of a group of individuals. At a slightly lower level, it may be understood as an instrument for social control. It may be understood as the way in which individuals organize to cope with social change and other threats in their environment. It may be understood as a factor in the development of individual identity, or as the individual reaching for timeless and undifferentiated experience.

Each of these levels of analysis also runs the risk of being too broad or too narrow. Being too broad can lead to over-generalizations or superficiality, while being too narrow can mean limited generalizations or inflexibility. A third complication is that definitions can be functional or substantive. This refers to what religion does versus what religion is. The former focuses less on content and more on “the task the phenomenon serves with respect to psychological, social or political operations.” An example of this is Emile Durkheim’s classic distinction between the “sacred” and “profane” where he defines religion by its social function rather than some particular religious content. The fourth concern is the difference between religious experience and describing or talking about such experience. Moojan Momen states, “…the religious experience cannot be adequately defined or communicated. It can only be experienced and grasped in a direct way. All attempts to describe and analyse it are, to a large extent, missing the mark, because they are relying on the descriptions of those who have had the experience, data

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6 Crawford, 4.
8 Ibid., 24-25.
which are themselves faulty.”\textsuperscript{9} The data contains errors because, as Clifford Geertz notes, “…even with the best will in the world an informant will have some difficulty in recapturing and formulating what religion amounts to for him, and indeed he is almost certain to render it in terms of commonsense stereotypes and rationalizations…”\textsuperscript{10} The Muslim mystic and philosopher al-Ghazali also spoke of the mystical and religious experience as  

…something that cannot be apprehended by study, but only by immediate experience (\textit{dhawq} – literally ‘tasting’), by ecstasy and by a moral change. What a difference there is between knowing the definition of health and satiety, together with their causes and presuppositions, and being healthy and satisfied! What a difference between being acquainted with the definition of drunkenness…and being drunk!\textsuperscript{11}

These four factors affect the process of defining “religion,” and in turn, influence the content, quality, and interpretations of research about religion.

**Dissertation Definition**

While any definition of “religion” will remain imperfect because of the aforementioned definitional issues, continued attempts at defining the concept and practice of religion are necessary if we are to analyze the relationship between religion and politics. Definitions provided by some of the most important theorists of religion (e.g., Karl Marx, Sigmund Freud, F. Max Müller, E.B. Tylor, David Hume, etc.) understand the term “religion” to refer to a system of thought and practice, one with prescriptions and proscriptions for behavior, which centers on a higher being, the supernatural, or a spirit world. There are elements of something beyond human understanding and abilities. Religion often, though not always, incorporates a god or


gods, an origins narrative or explanation of the beginning and end of days, a worldview about proper or right belief and conduct, and a spiritual dimension to the world that is inaccessible or has limited accessibility by humans. “Religious followers” or the “faithful” are those who believe and practice a particular religion. They may ascribe their religious status themselves or have others assign labels to them. Their identities may be contested internally or externally depending on who and what is being asked. In this dissertation, the faithful are mainly those who personally mark themselves as such, that is, they self-identify as members of a religion. However, the level and type of commitment differs from person to person and may change in an individual over time.

This project assumes that religion as a whole is a cultural phenomenon, but does not make judgments about whether or not it is an invention of humankind in general or from a certain time period such as the Enlightenment. Like Melford E. Spiro, I assume that “religion is a cultural institution, and on the further assumption that all institutions – though not all of their features – are instrumental means for the satisfaction of needs, I shall define ‘religion’ as ‘an institution consisting of culturally patterned interaction with culturally postulated superhuman beings.’”¹² These institutions consist of belief, action, and value systems.¹³ I use Spiro’s definition because it incorporates both an individual and associational approach to religion in that individuals may hold particular beliefs and values, as well as engage in certain actions, but these are all within the framework of an institution where “religion is an attribute of social groups, comprising a component part


¹³ Ibid., 98.
of their cultural heritage; and that its component features are acquired by means of the same enculturation processes as the other variables of a cultural heritage are acquired.”

Like other social and political institutions, religion can change over time. Many beliefs, values, and actions have had continual compliance over the years, while others have been added, dropped, or modified in some manner. These changes may depend on unique geographic, socio-political, economic, or historical circumstances.

My definition is generic enough to apply to most religions and animistic or magical traditions. It is a useful framework for thinking about Islam in Indonesia in particular, which is the focus of this dissertation, because it recognizes personal and group dimensions of the religion, as well as permits flexibility for a diverse population. Specific measures of Islam are further elaborated in later data chapters.

Islam in Indonesia

Indonesia has an estimated population of 237,512,352. Assuming that percentages from the 2000 census for population demographics have remained relatively stable, this would mean over 200 million Indonesians are Muslim. Most Indonesian Muslims are Sunni, although there are those who follow the Shia and Sufi branches.

The census indicates the following statistics for the “official,” meaning government-recognized, religions: 86.1% Muslim, 5.7% Protestant, 3% Roman Catholic, and 1.8% Hindu. 3.4% were classified as “Other” or left unspecified. These persons may have been followers of Buddhism (the fifth official religion), Confucianism (the sixth official religion), Aliran Kepercayaan (unofficial), or some other religion or

14 Ibid., 97.
15 United States Central Intelligence Agency, “Indonesia,” The World Factbook (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/id.html, 2008), 23 May 2008. While it is acknowledged that the CIA may have its own political or national biases, its World Factbook is widely used and accepted by foreigners and Indonesians alike. This may be partially due to the lack of alternative sources for centralized data in English.
16 State recognition of Confucianism has varied throughout the years. One of the main debates is whether or not Confucianism is a religion. Because of confusion and inconsistency in applying the law, many Confucians self-identify as Buddhists. In addition, data on Buddhists is more readily available than Confucians, which is reflected in census data and reports by the Indonesian government. For example, the 2000 national census did not permit respondents to choose Confucianism as their religion.
17 Aliran Kepercayaan refers to various religious streams, which may or may not be linked to official religions. They often incorporate indigenous beliefs and practices. This can include animism and kebatinan, which refers to spiritualism, mysticism, and other types of beliefs and practices related to one’s inner self. Some practitioners and observers also use the terms “agama Jawa,” “Javanism,” or “kejawen”
tradition (unofficial). The state does not formally recognize any religions other than the aforementioned ones, nor does it acknowledge atheism. Religious data are also unavailable for immigrants and foreign nationals.

Table 2.1 contains frequencies and percentages for religious affiliation by province from 2005 for the officially sanctioned religions. Some observers consider the figures to be somewhat conservative as they put the population of Muslims below the 200 million member mark. Debates also persist regarding the undercounting of minority faiths and unofficial religions in state censuses and surveys.

Table 2.1 Frequency and Percentage Table for Religious Affiliation by Provinces in Indonesia.\(^{18}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Christian</th>
<th>Catholic</th>
<th>Hindu</th>
<th>Buddhist</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Bali</td>
<td>204,436 (5.72%)</td>
<td>25,290 (0.71%)</td>
<td>25,258 (0.71%)</td>
<td>3,296,155 (92.25%)</td>
<td>21,826 (0.61%)</td>
<td>3,572,965 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Bangka Belitung</td>
<td>794,307 (83.19%)</td>
<td>69,643 (7.29%)</td>
<td>21,116 (2.21%)</td>
<td>994 (0.10%)</td>
<td>68,750 (7.20%)</td>
<td>954,810 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Banten</td>
<td>7,746,781 (95.76%)</td>
<td>129,494 (1.60%)</td>
<td>83,641 (1.03%)</td>
<td>35,601 (0.44%)</td>
<td>93,859 (1.16%)</td>
<td>8,089,376 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Bengkulu</td>
<td>1,523,187 (97.53%)</td>
<td>129,494 (1.60%)</td>
<td>10,414 (0.67%)</td>
<td>4,241 (0.27%)</td>
<td>2,260 (0.14%)</td>
<td>1,561,831 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>DI Yogyakarta</td>
<td>3,114,444 (91.75%)</td>
<td>168,914 (5.08%)</td>
<td>100,025 (3.19%)</td>
<td>6,141 (0.19%)</td>
<td>4,858 (0.15%)</td>
<td>3,394,382 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>DKI Jakarta</td>
<td>7,157,182 (85.85%)</td>
<td>501,168 (6.01%)</td>
<td>336,514 (4.04%)</td>
<td>28,508 (0.34%)</td>
<td>313,217 (3.76%)</td>
<td>8,336,589 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Gorontalo</td>
<td>894,771 (97.28%)</td>
<td>16,796 (1.83%)</td>
<td>2,903 (0.32%)</td>
<td>3,145 (0.34%)</td>
<td>2,187 (0.24%)</td>
<td>919,802 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Irian Jaya Barat</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Jambi</td>
<td>2,439,894 (94.99%)</td>
<td>54,613 (2.13%)</td>
<td>26,200 (1.02%)</td>
<td>1,768 (0.07%)</td>
<td>46,123 (1.80%)</td>
<td>2,568,598 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Jawa Barat</td>
<td>34,864,322 (95.97%)</td>
<td>656,534 (1.81%)</td>
<td>282,969 (0.78%)</td>
<td>184,987 (0.51%)</td>
<td>341,128 (0.94%)</td>
<td>36,329,940 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Jawa Tengah</td>
<td>29,942,066 (96.86%)</td>
<td>500,644 (1.62%)</td>
<td>373,601 (1.21%)</td>
<td>27,297 (0.09%)</td>
<td>67,867 (0.22%)</td>
<td>30,911,475 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


-- Asterisks (*) refer to information from the original URL: “Papua includes Irian Jaya Barat, Riau includes Kepulauan Riau, and Sulawesi Selatan includes Sulawesi Barat.”

-- I calculated the percentages for this table using Microsoft Excel since the website provided only raw figures.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Muslim Majority</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Jawa Timur</td>
<td>33,672,798</td>
<td>(96.18%)</td>
<td>575,182</td>
<td>(1.64%)</td>
<td>399,869 (1.14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Kalimantan Barat</td>
<td>2,212,526</td>
<td>(58.26%)</td>
<td>468,958</td>
<td>(12.35%)</td>
<td>888,619 (23.40%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Kalimantan Selatan</td>
<td>2,888,001</td>
<td>(97.51%)</td>
<td>28,511</td>
<td>(0.96%)</td>
<td>18,122 (0.61%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Kalimantan Tengah</td>
<td>3,069,335</td>
<td>(69.67%)</td>
<td>306,841</td>
<td>(16.41%)</td>
<td>58,193 (3.11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Kalimantan Timur</td>
<td>2,426,112</td>
<td>(81.78%)</td>
<td>307,641</td>
<td>(10.37%)</td>
<td>166,018 (5.60%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Kepulauan Riau</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Lampung</td>
<td>6,357,604</td>
<td>(95.66%)</td>
<td>80,266</td>
<td>(1.21%)</td>
<td>83,656 (1.26%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Maluku</td>
<td>564,035</td>
<td>(49.24%)</td>
<td>488,631</td>
<td>(42.66%)</td>
<td>88,577 (7.73%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Maluku Utara</td>
<td>670,383</td>
<td>(76.12%)</td>
<td>203,244</td>
<td>(23.08%)</td>
<td>6,862 (0.78%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam</td>
<td>4,023,431</td>
<td>(97.51%)</td>
<td>39,123</td>
<td>(0.96%)</td>
<td>5,705 (0.14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Nusa Tenggara Barat</td>
<td>3,818,344</td>
<td>(95.71%)</td>
<td>9,613</td>
<td>(0.24%)</td>
<td>7,941 (0.20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Nusa Tenggara Timur</td>
<td>384,945</td>
<td>(97.94%)</td>
<td>1,369,302</td>
<td>(34.66%)</td>
<td>2,185,195 (55.31%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Papua</td>
<td>491,811</td>
<td>(97.94%)</td>
<td>1,338,064</td>
<td>(34.66%)</td>
<td>2,185,195 (55.31%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Riau</td>
<td>4,647,864</td>
<td>(97.51%)</td>
<td>71,848</td>
<td>(1.35%)</td>
<td>282,000 (5.31%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Sulawesi Barat</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Sulawesi Selatan</td>
<td>6,959,472</td>
<td>(89.50%)</td>
<td>606,238</td>
<td>(7.80%)</td>
<td>127,502 (1.64%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Sulawesi Tengah</td>
<td>1,577,511</td>
<td>(78.67%)</td>
<td>322,314</td>
<td>(16.07%)</td>
<td>23,829 (1.19%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Sulawesi Tenggara</td>
<td>1,692,644</td>
<td>(95.29%)</td>
<td>30,458</td>
<td>(1.71%)</td>
<td>12,957 (0.73%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Sulawesi Utara</td>
<td>610,860</td>
<td>(28.40%)</td>
<td>1,371,214</td>
<td>(63.75%)</td>
<td>128,962 (6.00%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Sumatera Barat</td>
<td>4,147,436</td>
<td>(97.80%)</td>
<td>49,371</td>
<td>(1.16%)</td>
<td>38,767 (0.91%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Sumatera Selatan</td>
<td>7,423,144</td>
<td>(95.16%)</td>
<td>90,186</td>
<td>(1.16%)</td>
<td>100,359 (1.29%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Sumatera Utara</td>
<td>7,530,839</td>
<td>(65.54%)</td>
<td>3,062,965</td>
<td>(26.66%)</td>
<td>550,456 (4.79%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total** | 182,083,594 | (87.20%) | 12,964,795 | (6.21%) | 6,941,884 | (3.32%) | 4,586,754 | (2.20%) | 2,242,833 | (1.07%) | 208,819,860 | (100%) |

With the exception of the provinces of Bali, Maluku, Nusa Tenggara Timur, Papua, and Sulawesi Utara, most locations across the archipelago have a Muslim-majority population.
Muslims in Indonesia share similarities with their Muslim brothers and sisters in other parts of the world. Their religion consists of a shared set of beliefs, values, and actions that center on Allah (God). The term “Islam” is derived from Arabic and means “submission.” A “Muslim” is one who submits or surrenders his or her will to God. The community of Muslims is called “ummah.” Persons from any nationality, race, ethnicity, gender, class, etc. are welcome provided they follow the precepts outlined in the religion.

Muslims believe in God, angels, and prophets. Their specific visions of life on earth and life after death are found in Islam’s primary sacred text, the Qur’an (“the recitation”). The Prophet Muhammad’s life example of following God and the Qur’an is known as Sunnah (“the way,” “habit,” or “usual practice”). It is the second most important source of information for Muslims. The hadiths, which are the oral traditions and sayings of the prophet, serve as models of proper living and are based on what the prophet said and did during his life. There is also a system of Islamic law called Shariah. Debates persist regarding the contents and implementation of the Qur’an, Sunnah, hadiths, and Shariah, which contributes to variation in the Muslim world.

Islam does not have a centralized organizational structure or bureaucracy similar to that of other religions such as Christianity and its clergy system. Imams (religious leaders or preachers) come from the laity. Their level of formal religious education and experience varies, though the most respected and popular leaders typically have spent many years studying Islam and are knowledgeable in Arabic. Imams lead groups during prayers, give sermons, and read from the Qur’an. They assist with special ceremonies, as well as advise the community on personal and public matters. There are also ulamā (“those who are learned”) who are usually legal scholars who help guide the faithful.

Rather than rely on a savior, Muslims believe that salvation is attained by performing certain actions in this life. The Arkan al Islami (“Pillars of Islam”) is an

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19 See Appendix B for additional information about Islam concerning beliefs and demographics.
20 “Qur’an” may also be spelled “Kor’an” or “Koran.”
21 “Sunnah” may also be spelled “sunna.”
22 “Hadith” is spelled “hadis” in Indonesian.
23 “Shariah” may also be spelled “Sharī‘a” and is spelled “syariah” in Indonesian.
action system designed to implement Islamic beliefs and values in daily life. The five pillars are summarized below:²⁴

(1) Shahadah²⁵ is the confession of faith: “[T]here is no God but Allah and Muhammad is his messenger.”

(2) Salat refers to five daily prayers which take place before sunrise, between mid-day and mid-afternoon, between mid-afternoon and sunset, after sunset, and between twilight and dawn. When Muslims pray, they face towards a shrine called “Ka’ba” in Mecca. Congregational prayers are held on Fridays.

(3) Zakat is the payment of 2.5% of one’s total income to the state for distribution to the poor and less fortunate.²⁶ The term means “purification,” which suggests that wealth is defiling unless it is shared.

(4) Sawm²⁷ is the practice of fasting. During the month of Ramadan, Muslims are required to abstain from food, drinks, and sex every day from dawn to sunset. Children, the sick, and travelers do not have to fast.²⁸ The purpose of fasting is to cultivate spiritual, moral, and physical self-discipline.


²⁵ “Shahadah” may also be spelled “syahadah.” Brackets are my own.

²⁶ Zakat is a form of legal almsgiving, but not automatically grounded in formal law since it is voluntary. In Indonesia, it can be administered by the government, non-profit organizations, or handled individually. Besides zakat, Muslims also provide other forms of voluntary donations of money, goods, and services (often known as “sederoh”) to those in need more generally for charity or longer term philanthropy. Wakaf in particular is a form of religious endowment such as donating property for mosques and schools. For more information about philanthropy in contemporary Indonesia, especially with attention to the roles and patterns that women play, see Amelia Fauzia, “Women, Islam and philanthropy in contemporary Indonesia,” Indonesian Islam in a New Era: How Women Negotiate Their Muslim Identities, ed. Susan Blackburn, Bianca J. Smith, and Siti Syamsiyatun (Clayton, Victoria, Australia: Monash University Press, 2008), 167-190.

²⁷ “Sawm” may also be spelled “saum.”

²⁸ Where possible, Muslims are asked to later make up the fasting days that they missed.
(5) *Hadj*²⁹ is a pilgrimage to the Ka’ba in Mecca. It is an obligation at least once in the life of all Muslims whose health and financial resources permit them to make the journey.

Sometimes there is discussion of a sixth pillar, that of *jihad*, which refers to “exertion in the way of God.” *Jihad* is performed when a Muslim preserves and protects the faith in some manner. God blesses those who die while performing *jihad* with a place in heaven. Overcoming nonbelievers as a soldier of Islam is one example of *jihad*, but there are many other forms of *jihad*. Therefore the common stereotype of *jihad* meaning “holy war” is inaccurate.

There are two main branches or sects of Islam: Sunni and Shia. Sunni make up over 75% of the world’s Muslim population and between 10-20% are Shia. Specific numbers are difficult to obtain, but one estimate of the Shia population in Indonesia is between one and three million.³⁰ After the passing of the Prophet Muhammad, followers had a conflict over who should succeed him to lead the community. The crux of the dispute lay in the Sunni belief that Abu Bakr was the first caliph after the Prophet Muhammad and that the next two caliphs were legitimate leaders. The Shia instead believed that Ali, a cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad, was the rightful leader.

Debates between the two sects are ongoing and affect Islamic jurisprudence and understandings of Islamic religious authority.³¹ The Sunni believe that religious authority stems from *sunna* (tradition) and *ijma* (scholarly agreement or consensus among Islamic jurisprudents). The Sunni also have four schools of Islamic doctrine and law: *Hanafi*, *Maliki*, *Shafi’i*, and *Hanbali*. Each uniquely interprets the *Hadith*, but all are considered to be equally valid so a Sunni Muslim can choose any of the four schools to follow. The Shia differ in that they prefer to focus on *imams* and their interpretation of doctrines and rituals as sources of religious authority.

²⁹ “*Hadj*” may also be spelled “*Haj*” or “*Hajji*.”
A third branch of Islam is Sufism. It is a form of mysticism that is accepted to varying degrees in Indonesia and elsewhere in the Muslim world. According to David Levinson,

The common threads of Sufism are the belief that the truth can only be found through personal experience culminating in union with god, that Sufi masters known as *shaikhs* are to be honored and achieve the status of saints after death, and that celibacy is preferable to marriage. The group got its name from a coarse woolen mantle, known as a *suf*, that its early practitioners wore and has since become a distinguishing feature.\(^{32}\)

Levinson adds that Sufism “was the main group responsible for spreading Islam beyond its political boundaries in Africa and Asia as they were able to easily absorb local customs and beliefs.”\(^{33}\) Sufism itself also changed after interactions with different cultures resulting in about seventy Sufi orders.\(^{34}\)

In practice, Islam infuses daily life at the individual-level in Indonesia. It is often present in speech, texts, images, objects, ideas, and actions. Examples include traditional personal greetings to one another where Indonesian Muslims say “assalamu alaikum” (“peace be upon you”) and “alaikum salam”\(^{35}\) (“And upon you is the peace”) in return. This greeting is also stated at the beginning of formal and informal gatherings, no matter the size and sometimes no matter the function of the meeting or the background of the members involved. Frequently peppering everyday talk is the phrase “In Sha’Allah,” which means “If Allah wills” or “God willing.” It is said when a person wants to do something and makes a future plan or promise. The phrase invokes God’s permission and blessing. One could hear a taxi driver say “In Sha’Allah” in response to a question about arriving at a destination on time or hear it spoken by a co-worker about a possible promotion. Other Arabic and Islamic expressions are added in personal interactions as well such as when requests are made, when a person sneezes, or accidents are avoided.

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\(^{33}\) Ibid.

\(^{34}\) Ibid.

\(^{35}\) Alternate spelling and pronunciation: “wa ‘alaikum as-salam.”
In the latter case, someone might say “Alhamdulillah” (“Praise be to God”) in thanksgiving.

Further examples of Islam in daily life include architectural design influences on the interiors and exteriors of buildings, and most notably mosques of different shapes, sizes, and age are located in all kinds of urban and rural settings. These mosques serve both religious and social purposes. The familiar azan (call to prayer) several times a day reminds Muslims and non-Muslims alike of the presence and practice of religion. Religious schools from primary to university are also visible. In addition, one might see Muslim banks around town.

Restaurants and grocery stores also demonstrate respect for religion with signs, certificates, and stickers indicating halal (permissible) products. The absence of haram (forbidden) products such as pork and alcohol is quite evident. Department stores have special Muslim clothing sections as well. Walking around, one can see women and girls in jilbab (headscarves) and most people wearing modest attire. On Fridays especially, one will see men and boys on their way to Jumaatan (Friday prayers and sermons) wearing baju kokoh (traditional shirts), sarung kotak-kotak (plaid sarong wraps), and peci (rimless caps usually made of black felt or velvet) or kufi (typically a white skull cap).

Depending on the time of year, one might see row upon row of goats or cows sold along the sides of the street or being transported in large trucks for the purposes of religious sacrifice during Idul Adha (Feast of the Sacrifice). There are also green, gold, and black decorations for particular holy days, as well as bunches of ketupat (woven coconut leaf packets which are decorative or filled with cooked rice for consumption) hanging in homes, stores, and offices. The days can be very quiet and the evenings boisterous (e.g., takbiran – recitations) during Ramadan (fasting month). Offices close early or completely during Muslim holidays. Official business, whether political, economic, or educational, slows down dramatically during Ramadan. Cities can be noticeably empty when families mudik (leave to visit home villages) during Lebaran (celebration at the end of the fasting month), too.

Additionally, hotel rooms include a copy of the Koran and a kiblat (directional symbol) so Muslims know which direction to pray towards Mecca. Television programs include the call to prayer, sermons, recitations, discussions, and holiday-themed variety
shows. Radio programs, websites, books, periodicals, and mobile phone messaging add further evidence of Islam in everyday life. *Spanduk* (banners) hung around town may contain indirect or direct religious messages. Any transactions or behavior (e.g., food, money, and gifts) purposely involve the right hand or both hands, not the left hand on its own. Art, particularly calligraphy and images of Mecca, is present in homes, schools, and businesses. There are private and government agencies and advertisements that focus on the *haj* (“greater” pilgrimage to Mecca) and *umroh* (“lesser” pilgrimage to Mecca). Travelers in general are exposed to religion as well. For instance, a Lion Air pamphlet lists the following prayer in Arabic, Indonesian, and English:

We seek the help of Allah, the most Gracious, the Most Merciful…Who has bestowed upon us the will and ability to use this aircraft, without Whom we are helpless. Verily, God alone we worship and to God alone we shall return. Oh Allah, shower us with Your blessings and protect us on this journey from any hardship or danger and protect also our family and our wealth.  

Other short prayers for Protestants, Catholics, Hindus, and Buddhists are included in the pamphlet, too. Furthermore, Muslim organizations exist at the local and national levels, ranging in membership from a handful of members to millions across the archipelago. They are involved in religious, social, educational, and political services. In the government sector, too, certain political parties have religious foundations, and individual politicians freely mix religion and politics in their rhetoric, practice, and sometimes policies.

Though Islam is ubiquitous in Indonesia, it is not homogenous. While there are overarching precepts and traditions that unify and guide the Muslim faithful in Indonesia and around the world, Indonesia’s large size (over 17,000 islands spanning over 700,000 square miles), multifaceted history, and diverse ethnic populations contribute to significant variations within Islam and amongst Muslims. For example, prior to encounters with Muslim traders and holy men from the Middle East, other faiths

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dominated in Indonesia. The earliest peoples were animists who later were exposed to Hinduism, Buddhism, and Christianity by way of Indian traders and teachers. Large Hindu and Buddhist kingdoms (e.g., Mataram and Majapahit) flourished for some time. Islam eventually spread through conversions mainly among elites and then trickled down to the masses through the efforts of Islamic teachers and intermarriage between locals and foreigners. The religion did not enter all parts of the country peacefully or quickly, though, particularly in the interior areas of the islands and places where other religions like Hinduism had a stronghold. Clifford Geertz notes that Islam did not “move into an essentially virgin area” in Indonesia and as such, “Islam did not construct a civilization, it appropriated one.”  

Geertz continues,

Compared to North Africa, the Middle East, and even to Muslim India, whose brand of faith it perhaps most closely resembles, Indonesian Islam has been, at least until recently, remarkably malleable, tentative, syncretistic, and, most significantly of all, multivoiced. What for so many parts of the world, and certainly for Morocco, has been a powerful, if not always triumphant, force for cultural homogenization and moral consensus, for the social standardization of fundamental beliefs and values, has been for Indonesia a no less powerful one for cultural diversification, for the crystallization of sharply variant, even incompatible, notions of what the world is really like and how one ought therefore to set about living in it. In Indonesia Islam has taken many forms, not all of them Koranic, and whatever it brought to the sprawling archipelago, it was not uniformity.

The aforementioned diversity is reflected in the different voices of the faithful, which are often collected into and represented by specific, sometimes competing, movements and organizations. There are four main distinctions when describing the general Muslim population in Indonesia. The first distinction or tension is between

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38 Ibid., 12. Bold emphasis added.
“orthodox” Muslims and “syncretistic” Muslims. Based on the earlier works of Geertz, researchers have categorized orthodox and syncretistic Muslims (mainly from Java) into three categories. Frederick Mathewson Denny writes,

First are the Santris, who are quite orthodox and to some extent arabicized and conscious of their relationship with Muslims everywhere. Then there is the Abangan category, the majority, who are Muslim but syncretized with traditional regional beliefs and customs. Finally there is the Priyayi class, Muslims, but deeply influenced by their aristocratic past as Javanese, with older Indian-influenced attitudes and behavior patterns.

Denny qualifies the aforementioned statement, however: “This three-fold classification should be used cautiously, because the social reality is complex and subtle, with overlapping and blending of components.” The complexity and subtlety are largely due to the influence of kebatinan, which incorporates local traditions and customs.

The second distinction for Indonesian religious orthodoxy is between two major movements: santri moderen (modernists) and santri kolot (traditionalists). The modernists distinguish between religious and secular spheres, while the traditionalists tend to fuse religion into all aspects of life. The modernists typically adhere to orthodox theology based on scripture, while the traditionalists tend to focus on senior religious scholars and leaders (kyai and ulama) as well as their religious schools. Levels of openness to and adoption of “modern” or “Western” concepts and practices vary between and within the two movements. The modernists often assert a “purified Islam,” however, whereby they avoid certain non-Islamic beliefs and practices, unlike traditionalists who sometimes permit them.

Two Muslim organizations – Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) – represent the modernist and traditionalist schools of thought and practice. The status of

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39 Instead of “syncretistic,” some authors use the term “nominal.” I prefer the use of “syncretistic,” however, as “nominal” has negative connotations.
40 “Santri” is also a term for students who attend Islamic schools known as pesantren.
42 Ibid.
43 “Kyai” may also be spelled “kiai.”
these Muslim organizations has fluctuated over the years, but they are the oldest, largest, and arguably most influential religious organizations in Indonesia. Muhammadiyah claims to have 28 to 30 million followers and NU is thought to have almost 30 million members in its fold. Each supports many mosques, charities, schools, social service groups and issues, and some political endeavors.

Besides Muhammadiyah and NU, there are numerous other Muslim organizations in Indonesia whose interests run the gamut from charity to educational to political. The more active and well-known politically-oriented groups include Front Pembela Islam (FPI, Islamic Defenders Front),\(^\text{44}\) a group working towards full implementation of Islamic law, but not an Islamic state; Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, HTI, an organization and political party that aims to restore the pan-Islamic Khilafah (Islamic caliphate); Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL, Liberal Islam Network), which as it name indicates is liberal and interested in pluralism as well as more individual interpretations of religious doctrine; Majelis Mujahedeen Indonesia (MMI, Indonesian Mujahedeen Council), a group that supports Shariah and eventually would like to see an Islamic state in place; and Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS, Prosperous Justice Party), a conservative Muslim political party (or “movement” according to its members) that wants the Indonesian state to be based on the principles of Islam, but not necessarily for the country to become a formal Islamic state with Shariah.

Further along or perhaps set outside of the spectrum of the abovementioned organizations is Ahmadiyah, which is arguably not a politically-oriented group but by virtue of their controversial minority status has become involved in politics. For many years and specifically since July 2005, many Muslims consider Ahmadiyah members to be outsiders after a fatwa (legal decree/religious edict) from the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI, Indonesian Council of Ulemas). They are believed to practice an illegitimate form of Islam and thus deemed to be a heretical sect.\(^\text{45}\)

Organizations such as Muhammadiyah, NU, JIL, PKS, and FPI represent a third dimension or tension for Indonesian religious orthodoxy and organization, which may be

\(^{44}\) Critics of FPI label the organization “radical” for their particular interpretation and implementation of Islam.

\(^{45}\) Controversial issues include Ahmadiyah’s views about jihad, Jesus, and the “revival” of Islam, as well as their particular interpretations of the Qur’an.
characterized as a political spectrum or ideological differences in the form of “liberal,” “moderate,” “conservative,” and “radical” or “fundamentalist.” Such political categories are utilized by the groups themselves and in reference to others, though their position on an ideological scale would depend on whom you were talking to at the time and what issue or debate was being discussed.

Fourth, Indonesian religious orthodoxy can be divided between those considered to be scripturalists versus substantialists, where the former focus on literal interpretations of Islam and the latter emphasizes the essence of Islam. Scripturalists criticize substantialists for believing in content over form. Another debate concerns when and how to interpret the Qur’an and hadiths for different social contexts and time periods. The scripturalists argue for traditional understandings, and the substantialists are more open to re-interpretations. There is also divergence with regard to perspectives about government. Substantialists tend to accept the “secular” Indonesian state, while scripturalists are more interested in Shariah or a caliphate.

Additional dimensions to Muslim identity in Indonesia include gender and ethnicity. Examples of the gender aspect include Aisyiyah (Muhammadiyah’s women’s organization), Nasyiatul Aisyiyah (Muhammadiyah’s younger women’s wing), Fatayat NU (NU’s women’s group), Muslimat NU (another women’s group of NU), various non-profit local women’s organizations, and women’s issues in general such as marriage, family, clothing and covering, education, and gender mainstreaming in economic, social, and political entities. Ethnicity is present through local and regional affiliations that have familial, cultural, and geographic roots. Self-identification and comparisons to other groups differ since ethnicity is often linked to education, socio-economic status, political orientation, religious interpretation, local history and tradition (also known as adat or custom), and linguistics. This variation within and between Muslim groups, alongside particular gender and ethnic groupings, has public features. For example, some groups believe their own “in-groups” are “conventional” and perceive certain “out-groups” as “unconventional” or even “radical” with regards to religion and other aspects of personal and social identity. Also, stereotypes and comparisons about “insiders” and “outsiders” can include perceived levels of devoutness, education, and “sophistication” or “civility.”
An “Us versus Them” mentality sometimes develops over time because of such supposed differences, and internal or external conflicts can ensue.

**Islam and Politics in Indonesia**

“Politics” is commonly understood as a sphere in which people engage in a series of power plays to determine who gets what. This sphere is usually public in nature and involves a range of actors, values, interests, and interactions. Religion and politics may be understood as distinct concepts, but they overlap since “both are concerned with the pursuit of values—personal, social, or transcendent,” and they “are dimensions of human experience engaged in the meaningful exercise of power.”

Potential relationships between religion and politics include theocracy or hierocracy, state religion, predominant religion, a multi-religious society, an a-religious society, and an anti-religious state.

When the spheres of religion and politics overlap, the relationship can be supportive, neutral, or opposing. One’s perspective about the “proper” role of religion in politics or politics in religion and the extent to which religion is part of the private sphere, public realm, or a mixture of both can influence the type and scope of benefit or conflict. Of concern to many is the particular debate about the “compatibility” of religion and politics in democratic or democratizing settings, especially as it pertains to representation, equality, freedom, and sociopolitical stability.

Islam is an oft-discussed subject in the “compatibility debate” since it is a holistic religion that encompasses all spheres of life including politics. Deliar Noer writes:

Islam, from its inception, has comprised both a religious and a civil and political society. It does not separate the spiritual and the worldly affairs of man, but includes teachings on secular as well as religious activities.

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Islamic law, *sjarī’at*, governs both aspects of life – man’s relations with God and his relations with his fellows.⁴⁹

This holistic approach distinguishes Islam from some other religions. L. Carl Brown explains that one reason for this difference, specifically when compared to Christianity, is that “Islam knows no ‘church’ in the sense of a corporate body whose leadership is clearly defined, hierarchical, and distinct from the state.”⁵⁰ Brown further states, “The organizational arrangement of Muslim religious specialists, or ulama, makes an *institutional* confrontation between Muslim church and Muslim state virtually impossible.”⁵¹ There are of course exceptions to this generalization such as certain Shia experiences, and this is also not to say that Muslims have not challenged state entities before; on the contrary, they have protested and changed political leadership, apparatuses, and policies when deemed necessary throughout history.

Believing that religion and politics ought to be linked is one thing, while implementation is another. Close ties and cooperation between religious and political leaders, along with connections to the laity and masses, may be common in Muslim-majority settings, but this does not mean that Muslims have not struggled in their attempts to negotiate the boundaries of religion and politics. Key issues in these struggles have been concerns over authority or legitimacy (discussed earlier) and what may be characterized as pragmatism. “Pragmatism” here refers to the actual application of religious values, principles, and precepts in daily social and political life. Muslim leaders, for instance, do not all agree on how or when to implement Islam in local, provincial, or national politics in Indonesia.

Much of what we see today with regard to Islam and politics in Indonesia is rooted in the country’s dynamic past. While an exhaustive historical account of Indonesia and her peoples is beyond the scope of this project, it is still useful to have a general sense of religion and politics in the country since independence.

⁵¹ -- Note: This difference to Christianity is instead a close similarity to Judaism.
⁵² Ibid.
The nationalist leader and first president Sukarno and his supporters declared Indonesian independence on August 17, 1945. A struggle ensued with the Netherlands during the next four years until the Dutch colonialists finally acknowledged the country’s independence. The transition was not easy given the deep conflicts with foreigners and Indonesia’s sheer geographic and cultural diversity.

The nationalist movement leading up to independence and guiding the country in its early stages after independence incorporated religion intentionally and unintentionally, and voluntarily or reluctantly, depending on one’s perspective. “Secular nationalists” tended to believe that “the struggle for independence began with the establishment of the Budi Utomo (Noble Endeavor) on May 20, 1908…”52 From this root other secular nationalist movements developed such as Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI, Indonesian Nationalist Party) in 1927, Partai Indonesia (Partindo, Indonesian Party) in 1931, Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia (new PNI, Indonesian Nationalist Education Party) in 1933, Partai Indonesia Raya (Parindra, Great Indonesian Party) in 1935, and Gerakan Rakyat Indonesia (Gerindo, Indonesian People’s Movement) in 1937.53 However, others view the establishment of Sarekat Islam (SI, Islamic Association) on October 16, 1905 as the start of the nationalist movement.54 “In Indonesia Islam was a force that promoted the rise and growth of Indonesian nationalism,” says Harun Nasution.55 With a highly multi-ethnic population, “It was mainly Islam…that created in them consciousness of belonging to the same group. Islam was their rallying point of identity. It was through Islam that different ethnic groups were united into a large comprehensive community. Islam was able to break the power of local nationalism.”56

Despite the early involvement of Muslims in the nationalist movement, Indonesia did not become an Islamic state. The country has the world’s largest Muslim population, but Muslims make up a majority, not the totality, of religious persons there. The Indonesian state is also not based on syariat law (Shariah or Islamic law). Currently,

53 Ibid., 1-2.
54 Ibid., 2.
56 Ibid.
only the special province of Aceh follows *syariat* law. Though several *Peraturan Daerah* or *Perda* for short (local regulations), which are considered to be *Shariah*-like bylaws, have been passed in select areas around the country recently, Indonesia is still mainly based on *Pancasila*. President Sukarno announced *Pancasila* at the Republic of Indonesia’s Independence Proclamation.\(^{57}\) It is a type of state ideology or philosophical foundation. In Sanskrit, “panca” means “five” and “sila” refers to “principles.” The five interconnected principles are (1) The Belief in One God, (2) Humanity which is Civil and Just, (3) A United Indonesia, (4) Wise Representation of Democracy,\(^ {58} \) and (5) Social Justice for Every Indonesian Citizen.\(^ {59} \)

The first principle of *Pancasila* was subject to debate before ratification, however. A small committee within the *Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia* (PPKI, Committee for the Preparation of Indonesia’s Independence) suggested the *Piagam Djakarta* (Jakarta Charter) on June 22, 1945. The amendment would have changed the first principle to include “the obligation to carry out the Islamic *syariat* for its adherents.”\(^ {60} \) This wording was eventually dropped because of opposition from non-Muslims in general and many secular nationalists who believed in separating religion from the state, though they themselves were usually religiously-affiliated. Had the amendment passed, “the state would have had a special obligation toward one of the religious communities. Moreover, this would have obliged the state to interfere with the internal affairs of one religion and give it special attention, undermining the neutrality of the state and religious matters.”\(^ {61} \) Denny writes, “The strict Muslim groups were disappointed at independence with their leaders’ decision not to make the Sharī‘a the law


\(^{58}\) This phrase may also be translated from Indonesian into English as “Democracy/Rule by the People Guided by Wisdom in Deliberation and Representation.”


\(^{60}\) Leo Suryadinata, *Elections and Politics in Indonesia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002), 10-12.

of the land. This was done, it was said, in the interests of national unity.\(^\text{62}\) Sven Cederroth further explains the compromise on the first principle of *Pancasila*:

Actually this phrasing of the principle represents a skilful compromise between those forces who, at the time of independence, argued for the advent of an Islamic republic and those, Christians, Hindus and others, for whom this was unacceptable. By consciously substituting the word Allah for *Tuhan* (Lord), the groundwork was laid for a religious pluralism in the newborn republic. Proclaiming just belief in God, without further specification, made it possible to transcend the religious plurality and create a sense of unity among the diverse ethnic groups of the archipelago.\(^\text{63}\)

While many believe that the Indonesian state is secular because of its *Pancasila* foundation, such secularism is a matter of interpretation. For instance, *Pancasila* may be understood in a religious sense. “The Belief in One God” principle involves religion most directly, while the other principles arguably reflect religious beliefs or values. With an emphasis on monotheism, there is also an implied tie between religion and the state.

Additionally, the state’s secularism may be dependent upon which time period one examines. The state, specifically under the leadership of Suharto, took great strides to separate religion and politics, but on occasion mixed messages and overlap occurred. Writing during and about the 1980s, Donald E. Weatherbee states,

In February 1985, the political parties bill was passed requiring that all political parties espouse only the state ideology as their principle.

Resisted most strongly by Muslim politicians grouped under the umbrella United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP), the new

\(^{62}\) Denny, 339.


-- This plurality does not automatically include indigenous or minority religions that do not follow monotheism, however.
law effectively secularizes party competition through stipulating that parties can differ only in their programs, not in their principles.\textsuperscript{64}

The Suharto regime further institutionalized \textit{Pancasila} later that same year through \textit{asas tunggal} (one/whole foundation):

> It was not until June that the controversial Bill on Mass Organizations was passed… The Bill on Mass Organizations extended the Pancasila system to all associational aspects of Indonesian society. All private voluntary social groupings must adopt the Pancasila as their sole guiding principle. If any group is deemed to have deviated from the Pancasila, the government has broad powers of intervention and dissolution.\textsuperscript{65}

Some Muslim groups opposed this edict because the law essentially “subordinate[d] Islam to a secular state ideology” (a civil religion if you will) and “restricted the practices of Islam to family, mosque, and prayer, rather than allowing Islam to enfold the fullness of human activity, including politics.”\textsuperscript{66} Tensions mounted and resulted in opposition events and political violence leading up to and following the passage of the law. One example of the religiously-related conflict was the Tanjung Priok riot on September 12, 1984.\textsuperscript{67} The Suharto government quickly cracked down with arrests, trials, and jail sentences for “subversive” dissidents.

The relationship between religion and politics under the New Order government shifted, however, in later years.\textsuperscript{68} Muhammad Sirozi mentions two different periods:

\textsuperscript{65} Ibid., 143. Organizations are now free to have a different foundation or basis than Pancasila (e.g., Islam), but many have not changed. According to Leo Suryadinata, \textit{Elections and Politics in Indonesia} (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002), 61, the formal requirement that Pancasila function as the sole ideology for mass and political organizations came to an end in November 1998 at the Special Session of the MPR under the then president, Habibie.
\textsuperscript{68} Portions of this section on the varied relationship the Suharto regime had with certain Muslim groups were previously published in Jennifer Epley, “Development Issues and the Role of Religious Organizations
During the first 20 years of the New Order era, 1965-85, the relationship is generally said [to] have been uneasy or tense, but since the mid-1980s until the crisis of early 1998, the relationships were said to have been getting better.\(^6^9\) Unexpectedly, during the latter part of his rule, Suharto began to show a more positive attitude towards religious leaders and started to embrace some of their religious and political interests and issues. The Minister of Religious Affairs (1983-1993), Sjadzali, wrote: “The New Order government has taken many steps/policies to involve religion in national life and development, and in enhancing service to the religious ummah (Muslim community) for the perfection of their ibadah or ritual duties.”\(^7^0\) Empirical evidence includes state permission in 1991 for Muslim school girls to wear jilbab (head scarves), the national lottery PORKAS was banned, Suharto and his family went on a pilgrimage to Mecca in May 1991, an Islamic banking system was allowed, Suharto pledged three billion Rupiah to Bank Muamalat Indonesia in August 1991,\(^7^1\) and Suharto himself supported the Ikaten Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI, Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals).\(^7^2\) At the founding meeting of ICMI in December 1990, Suharto inaugurated the association with high-ranking government officials in attendance and one of his closest advisers, B.J. Habibie, was named the head of the group.\(^7^3\) Denny even goes as far to say that Islam flourished in some ways during this later period:

Nevertheless, under President Suharto, Indonesian Islam has thrived, judging from the projects that have been sustained, like mosque building, the development of Islamic schools everywhere, the establishment of a national system of Islamic universities that train religious teachers and


\(^7^0\) Ibid. Sirozi writes that the source is from 1991, page 136.

\(^7^1\) Bank Muamalat Indonesia is the leading Shariah bank in Indonesia. Example supporters include the Indonesian Council of Ulemas (MUI) and the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI).

\(^7^2\) Ibid., and Frederick and Worden, http://countrystudies.us/indonesia/86.htm.


leaders for small towns and villages, and government policy that favors Islam on the old bitter issue of whether religious bodies should have the right to proselytize.\textsuperscript{74}

Though Islam was not a state religion, the close ties between the state and the Muslim community that Suharto later permitted and Muslim groups sometimes pushed for meant that religion-state boundaries continued to be blurred.

Readers might ask why there was a shift in government perception and treatment of Muslim leaders and groups. Prior to these changes, the government appeared to fear the demands for and possible creation of an Islamic state and strongly opposed attempts by Muslims to be politically organized and actively engaged. Now the New Order government was willing to hear and support Muslim interests. Accounts of why this happened vary. Some Muslim leaders saw these changes as a sign of good intentions of the state towards Islam: “Many Muslim leaders spoke warmly of a new era in Islam-state relations.”\textsuperscript{75} Others believed that Suharto’s efforts more specifically indicated an intentional move from secularization to Islamization. There were critics of the changes, however, and they remained skeptical. They wanted more substantial changes and not “small candy.”\textsuperscript{76} R. William Liddle’s possible explanations include: 1) The changes were consistent with Suharto’s realistic appraisal of the growing number of influential (and pious) Indonesian Muslims, 2) the President was attempting to coopt another constituency, 3) Suharto had become more devout in his old age, and 4) he needed to balance declining loyalty from the military.\textsuperscript{77}

Another potential explanation for the shift may be the change from political to cultural approaches in Muslim efforts to promote Islamic values. Syafi’i Anwar suggests that Nurcholis Madjid’s idea of “Islam, yes; Partai Islam, no!” provided rationale to eliminate the “conceptual tension” between Islamic thinking and the social and political

\textsuperscript{74} Denny, 339.
\textsuperscript{75} Hefner, 229.
\textsuperscript{76} Sirozi, 10-11.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., 12. Originally three points were listed in Sirozi’s paper, but I split them into four points. Also, Sirozi takes quotes from Liddle, 1997, page 308. The original Liddle citation is missing from Sirozi’s paper, but readers can refer to Liddle’s list of publications available at http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/rwliddle/Liddle.pdf for examples of these explanations.
Changing from an orientation of politics to one of cultural issues and *Masyarakat Islam* (Islamic society) more generally may have allowed for Muslim organizations and leaders to be closer to the government and military. It also may have helped Indonesian Muslims to better balance the state ideology of *Pancasila* with their religious beliefs and practices. In this way, Suharto may not have felt threatened by “Islamic fundamentalism” as both he and the public established a compromise of sorts – particularly on the matter of *Pancasila* – where mutual suspicion was no longer necessary.

During the post-Suharto period, connections between religion and politics continue, some in similar forms as during previous years and others in new ways. *The International Religious Freedom Report 2007 – Indonesia* reports from a legal standpoint that the Indonesian Constitution provides for freedom of religion, which the government generally respects. The report notes that the country’s laws are said not to discriminate against any religious group (e.g., employment, housing, and health care), but there are legal restrictions on certain types of religious activity and on unrecognized religions. In some cases, the government fails to actively protect specific religious and social groups such as minority faiths from discrimination and abuse. One such controversial case is that of *Ahmadiyah* whose members have experienced discrimination, harassment, and violence and in some local areas are banned.

Other examples of institutional links between religion and politics at the national level include close ties in its offices and political parties. While government institutions uphold *Pancasila*, there are offices such as the Ministry of Religious Affairs, also known as the Department of Religion, which administers assistance for religious education (mainly Islamic schools: *pesantren* and *madrasah*), building places of worship, the *haji* (pilgrimage to Mecca), *zakat* (tithing/almmsgiving), and *wakaf* (property donated for religious or community purposes). Some political parties have Islam or Christianity as

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78 Ibid., 13.
80 Ibid.
their basis as well. Because these parties are a minority, however, they often build coalitions with the *Pancasila*-based political parties.

There is also overlap between secular and religious identities among individual leaders. Former President Abdurrahman Wahid (October 20, 1999 to July 24, 2001) was the head of the largest Muslim organization in Indonesia, *Nahdlatul Ulama*, from 1984 to 1999 before becoming President.\(^{82}\) Former Chairman of the *Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat* (People’s Consultative Assembly), Amien Rais (1999 to 2004), was the leader of the second largest Muslim Organization, *Muhammadiyah*, from 1995 to 2000.\(^{83}\) Akbar Tandjung was once chairman of *Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam* (Muslim Student Association) from 1972 to 1974 and head of the *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat* (House of Representatives) from 1999 to 2004.\(^{84}\)

*The International Religious Freedom Report 2007 – Indonesia* specifies additional cases of government involvement in religious matters.\(^{85}\)

- While Aceh remained the only province authorized to implement Islamic law (Shari’a), several local governments outside of Aceh promulgated laws implementing elements of Shari’a that abrogated the rights of women and religious minorities. The Government did not use its constitutional authority over religious matters to review or overturn these local laws.
- The Government requires all adult citizens to carry a National Identity Card (KTP) which, among other things, identifies the holder’s religion. Members of religions not recognized by the Government are generally unable to obtain KTPs unless they incorrectly identify themselves as belonging to a recognized religion.

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• The 2006 Revised Joint Ministerial Decree on the Construction of Houses of Worship requires religious groups that want to build a house of worship to obtain the signatures of at least 90 members and 60 persons of other religious groups in the community stating that they support the establishment, as well as approval from the local religious affairs office.

• The Guidelines for Overseas Aid to Religious Institutions requires domestic religious organizations to obtain approval from the Ministry of Religion to receive funding from overseas donors.

• The Child Protection Act of 2002 makes attempting to convert minors to a religion other than their own through “tricks” and/or “lies” a crime punishable by up to 5 years in prison.

• Article 156 of the criminal code makes spreading hatred, heresy, and blasphemy punishable by up to 5 years in prison.\(^86\) Although the law applies to all officially recognized religions, it is usually applicable in cases involving blasphemy and heresy against Islam.

• As in previous years, during the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan, many local governments ordered either the closure or a reduction in operating hours of various entertainment establishments.

• Based on Law 17/1999, the Government has a monopoly on the organization of the Hajj to Mecca. The law states that the Ministry of Religious Affairs is responsible for providing guidance, service, and protection to citizen Hajj pilgrims during their pilgrimage.

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\(^86\) According to the USCIRF Annual Report 2008 – Indonesia, “Since 2005, over 150 individuals have been arrested or briefly detained under Article 156 and 156a of the criminal code, according to which ‘expressing feelings of hostility, hatred or contempt against religions’ and ‘disgracing a religion’ are punishable by up to five years in jail. Arrests, detentions, and re-education programs for ‘deviancy’ continued in the past year.” United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, \textit{USCIRF Annual Report 2008 - Indonesia}, 1 May 2008 (http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4855699ec.html), 17 March 2010.

-- Note: The USCIRF Report and similar documents do not specify how “blasphemy” in particular is defined.
• The Government bans proselytizing, arguing that such activity, especially in areas heavily dominated by members of another religion, could prove disruptive.

• The 1974 Marriage Law makes polygamy illegal for civil servants, except in limited circumstances.\(^{87}\) Marriage law for Muslims draws from Shari’a and allows a man to have up to four wives, provided that he is able to provide equally for each. For a man to take a second, third, or fourth wife, he must obtain court permission and the consent of the first wife; however, conditions are not always met in practice.

• The Government formed the Indonesian Council of Ulemas (MUI) in 1975 and continues to fund and appoint its members. The MUI is not formally a government body. Nevertheless, its edicts or fatwas (religious decrees) are designed to be moral guiding principles for Muslims. Although MUI opinions are not legally binding, society and the Government seriously consider them when making decisions or drafting legislation.

Furthermore, government life can be similar to individual daily life with Muslim greetings, opening prayers, referring to God or religion in speeches, breaks or allotted time for prayers, halal (permitted) food and drink, traditional clothing and attire, and time off for religious holidays. The following is a list of special Muslim days that are recognized as national holidays: the Birth of the Prophet Muhammad, the Ascension of the Prophet Muhammad, Eid al-Fitr, Eid al-Adha, and the Muslim New Year. The government also recognizes non-Muslim religious holidays such as Good Friday, the Ascension of Christ, and Christmas for Christians, Chinese New Year and Waisak (Buddha Day) for Buddhists and Confucians, and Nyepi for Hindus. In addition, the armed forces provide resources for religious persons at their housing complexes, though not all areas have facilities and programs for all six religions.

\(^{87}\) For more information about the debate over the earlier 1973 version of the marriage law bill, see Johns, 217-219. The final version of the bill separated civil courts from Muslim ones for dealing with the key matters of marriage, divorce, and polygamy.
Conclusion

Islam is present at all levels of society in Indonesia. Given the many aforementioned examples of the connections between religion and the state in particular, the following quote from Robert Hefner is fitting: “Religion in Indonesia is thus not only a matter of personal conviction or choice. It is also a public, even a governmental, affair.” Though many Indonesians integrate religion into their everyday lives and observe a blend of religion and politics in government, questions remain concerning when and how exactly religion is influential in politics versus merely being a part of the surrounding environment. Chapter III starts answering these questions by presenting information about how Muslim Indonesians define political participation and what they do. After setting the stage for participation patterns, the remaining chapters move to an analysis of the extent to which Islam plays a role in Indonesians’ political attitudes and actions.

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88 Hefner, 206.
Chapter II Bibliography


http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4855699ec.html

http://philtar.ucsm.ac.uk/encyclopedia/islam/islam.html


CHAPTER III

Political Participation

Like religion, “political participation” can mean different things to different people. This chapter provides a working definition of “political participation,” one that reflects conventional ideas from the political science literature and common conceptions from Indonesians. The chapter then presents an overview of political participation in practice using concrete examples from contemporary Indonesia so readers can have a picture of some of the participation norms, especially amongst Muslims.

Definitional Issues

“Political participation” can have many meanings. Descriptions and classifications of political participation are complicated by the ambiguity of the first half of the term: “political.” Conceptual stretching can make for a wide definition whereby almost any action could be construed to be political participation, while not enough stretching can make for limited views or analysis. The definition of political participation can also vary depending on type, level, frequency, duration, level of commitment or effort, form, and context. “Type” refers to political participation that is conventional or unconventional, legal or illegal, proactive or reactive, instrumental or symbolic/expressive, and involves individuals or groups. “Level” can mean local, regional, national, or international points of reference. “Frequency” is the number of occurrences and regularity. “Duration” concerns the length or time period of a political activity. “Level of commitment or effort” is the amount of dedication, obligation, work, and responsibility involved with political behavior. “Form” is the precise shape or style of activity. “Context” refers to orientation such as internal (within a group) or external

89 Some authors use the terms “legitimate” or “illegitimate” to refer to conventional and unconventional forms of political participation. I prefer not to use these terms because of potentially biased or negative connotations.

90 Legality here refers to laws set forth by higher governmental institutions and the rights citizens are afforded to engage with and in government. Religious laws are of a different sort.
(towards others). Defining and measuring political participation is further compounded by the fact that these seven categories can overlap in a myriad of ways.

**Dissertation Definition**

Since the range of political activities is vast, it is important for me to establish some boundaries in order to present a meaningful study of political participation. Thus, for the purposes of my research project, the term “political participation” is understood to mean *active political participation oriented towards the state and government policies*:

The term *political participation* is being used here to mean those activities of citizens that attempt to influence the structure of government, the selection of government authorities, or the policies of government. These activities may be supportive of the existing policies, authorities, or structure, or they may seek to change any or all of these. This definition emphasizes active involvement that is instrumental or goal-oriented.91

M. Margaret Conway’s definition is similar to Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie, and Jae-on Kim’s definition in *Participation and Political Equality*. Verba, Nie, and Kim “focus on acts that aim at *influencing* the government – either by affecting the choice of government personnel or by affecting the choices made by government personnel.”92 Examples of such active political participation include voting, campaigning, participation in organizations, and contacting public officials. My dissertation expands their definition to include activities that may be perceived as “outside” of the system such as “irregular” or illegal ways of influencing politics, examples of which include demonstrations, protests, strikes, and violence. My use of Conway’s definition also echoes the definitional approach taken in Nancy Burns, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Sidney Verba’s book *The Private Roots of Public Action*, which differentiates the state as “an institution with special characteristics in modern societies” from other social institutions

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and “private relationships—for example, bosses and employees or parents and children—in which power is exercised.” In addition, rather than “include all collective involvements that influence the life of the community, even those charitable and organizational activities that do not touch upon what is traditionally called the ‘public sector’,” the authors and I “use the term ‘political’ in its conventional and more limited sense” when defining political participation.

Specific measures of active political participation include joining elections; running for office; volunteering for politicians or parties; wearing political party clothing or putting up party signs on vehicles or houses; contributing money or items to candidates and parties; joining parades, public meetings, or campaign meetings; joining strikes, demonstrations, protests, or boycotts; occupying public buildings; blocking traffic; being involved in disturbances or riots; making or signing petitions; visiting, contacting, or writing a letter to officials; and writing a letter to a newspaper about matters related to politics.

Active electoral and non-electoral behavior vis-à-vis the government can be distinguished from passive forms of political participation such as general interest in politics or government affairs, partisanship (e.g., feeling close to one particular political party), sense of political efficacy, civic norms or education, paying attention to political news in the mass media, political discussions with family or friends, supporting political ceremonies, and artistic expressions with political content. These feelings and actions are not treated as measures of political participation in my dissertation because they can be too far removed from influencing the state, or there are times when they influence political participation.

**Indonesian Conceptions**

The aforementioned definition closely corresponds to how Indonesians, and specifically Muslim Indonesians, conceptualize and practice political participation. During August 2004, I traveled to Indonesia where I distributed a short two-page

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94 Ibid.
95 Passive forms of political participation are also known as “political engagement” or even “public opinion.”
questionnaire to nearly 100 people to get a sense of how Indonesians think about
religion and politics. I received 84 completed questionnaires from 56 women and 28
men affiliated with one of three universities: Sanata Dharma University in Yogyakarta,
Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta, and an Islamic university in Purwokerto. The
average age of respondents was about 25 years old with the range being between 18 to 60
years old. The pool of respondents consisted of 56 Muslims, 22 Catholics, 5 Christians,
and 1 Hindu. Respondents provided demographic information as well as their opinions
for three open-ended questions, one of which was “In Indonesia, what is the meaning of
“political participation?”'. Though I used a convenience sample (i.e., “snowballing”
started with personal contacts) of mainly university-educated participants and
generalizations are therefore limited, the resulting data is similar to observations found
using other research methods employed in this dissertation.

Despite varied demographic backgrounds, individual responses for the open-
ended questions about religion and politics were quite similar. Most of the respondents
understood the term “political participation” generally to mean some type of involvement
in politics. Several respondents simply restated the term in some fashion such as
“Someone’s participation in the political arena” and “Joining in the field of politics.” Others
had particular political activities in mind, which spoke to the categories of form,
type, level, and context. Example responses included joining elections, taking part in
social or political organizations, political party activities, and demonstrations. For
instance, a 35 year-old Muslim man in Purwokerto stated, “Political participation means
participation in political activities such as elections, involvement in social/political
organizations, becoming a legislative assembly member, and involvement in social
organizations.” A 26 year-old Muslim woman in Yogyakarta added, “Political

96 See Appendix A for questionnaire details.
participation is not only joining in political parties but also can be implemented in other forms. For example, students often make demonstrations.”

Besides identifying certain forms of political participation, respondents also recognized other features. Some referred to participation at the individual- or group-level: “It’s a form of individual or organizational involvement in political activities. It can be in the form of political parties or non-governmental organizations,” said a 25 year-old Muslim woman affiliated with Sanata Dharma University. Others noted that political participation can be direct or indirect, active or passive, and state- or policy-oriented. A 21 year-old Muslim woman in Yogyakarta wrote, “Political participation means being involved (usually directly) in making state policies and determining the distribution/division of power in the state.” Similarly, another 22 year-old Muslim woman in the same city said, “Political participation is the role of society as individuals or collectively through organizations/political parties to influence policies taken by the government.”

Some respondents indicated the purpose of political participation. One 24 year-old Muslim woman in Purwokerto wrote, “Political participation is a type of our participation as citizens for the prosperity and safety of our country. Participation in various areas.” A 31 year-old male Muslim in the same city stated, “Political participation is participation in matters related to citizens’ rights in politics. For example, choosing legislative members, presidential candidates/vice presidential candidates.”

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One 21 year-old Muslim woman in Yogyakarta said, “Political participation means joining in the channeling of citizens’ aspirations in order to develop a nation which is just, prosperous, ordered, peaceful, and flourishing through its political doctrines, in order to reach a purpose such as these.”

In July 2005, I returned to Indonesia for more fieldwork. I conducted three focus groups, which were held at the Indonesian Institute for Civil Society (INCIS) in Ciputat, South Jakarta. I was interested to hear opinions from Indonesian Muslims in specific and in person to see if what I had learned in the previous year from the mini-survey was accurate and reasonably representative. One particular advantage of the focus group discussion method is obtaining unique data from a “social context.” For a more detailed comparison of the methodological advantages, as well as limitations, of my focus group discussions and mini-survey, readers can turn to Appendix A.

The focus group discussions consisted of Group 1: Eight Muslim women students (early 20s), of whom seven were leaders of various religiopolitical student organizations and one did not participate in a formal student group; Group 2: Eight Muslim men (30s and over) from different socioeconomic backgrounds; and Group 3: Five Muslims (2 women, 3 men) from different age and status backgrounds. Background research into gender dynamics and group communication suggested I might find differences in speech content and behavior if I divided my focus groups along gender lines so I had a women’s group, a men’s group, and a mixed group. All participants shared the same religion – Islam – though displayed intrafaith differences, and other aspects of their personal backgrounds such as education and socioeconomic status also varied to some extent.

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Each group discussed the same four base questions. One question was “In your opinion, what is the meaning of “political participation?””. All three groups echoed observations from my 2004 fieldwork. For example, participants from all three groups mentioned elections and political parties. A member from Group 1 noted lobbying and someone from Group 3 made a remark about demonstrations and boycotts. Participants in general discussed different aspects of power, individual and group actors, and variations of processes and outcomes. Sample quotes follow below:

**Power and Rights**
- “If we hear the word ‘politics,’ power is visible/imagined.”¹¹⁰
- “Political participation is a right of everyone.”¹¹¹

**Forms**
- “Political participation, [is] for example [when] we join in elections, choosing the president, city/provincial/regional leaders, and neighborhood leaders.”¹¹²
- “I will add to the opinion that political participation in fact is not just joining parties or general elections, joining local elections, but [it is also] at the lowest level, at the level of neighborhoods, village/neighborhood youth associations, other organizations like non-profits are forms of political participation.”¹¹³

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¹¹⁰ Participant D.N., *Focus Group Discussion #1*, research by Jennifer L. Epley, Ciputat, Jakarta, Indonesia (July 9, 2005). Indonesian quote: “Kalau mendengar kata politik, yang terbayang adalah kekuasaan.”
Range or Scope
- “Political participation, it’s not just the output, but we also must see the process. Political participation is how we join in the political processes, the scope of which is small as well as large[,] in parliament or out of parliament.”\(^{114}\)
- “But political participation can start from the bottom, from small groups.”\(^{115}\)

Purpose
- “Participating in politics directly towards the state like becoming a part of authority[,] there is also becoming a part of civil society, for example criticizing authorities’ laws and decisions.”\(^{116}\)
- “It means we can directly participate to ask for the direction/purpose of change which is better.”\(^{117}\)

Observations from my mini-survey and focus group discussions correspond with my dissertation’s definition of “political participation” as attempts to influence the structure of government, its authorities, or its policies. Political participation in this sense is active and oriented towards the state. The specific measures discussed in the next section and used throughout this research project are based on examples from the mini-survey, focus group discussions, personal conversations, and popular forms of participation analyzed in the political science literature.


\(^{115}\) Participant I.Y., *Focus Group Discussion #1*, research by Jennifer L. Epley, Ciputat, Jakarta, Indonesia (July 9, 2005). Indonesian quote: “Tetapi berpartisipasi politik bisa dimulai dari bawah, dari kelompok kecil.”


\(^{117}\) Participant, *Focus Group Discussion #2*, research by Jennifer L. Epley, Ciputat, Jakarta, Indonesia (July 17, 2005). Indonesian quote: “Artinya, kita bisa berpartisipasi langsung mengajak ke arah perubahan yang lebih baik lah.”
Political Participation in Practice

Moving beyond political participation as a concept, in practice citizens attempt to influence the structure, policies, and members of government in several different ways. Voting has been and continues to be the most popular form of active political participation in Indonesia. Table 3.1 shows voter turnout rates for select Indonesian parliamentary and presidential elections over time according to the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA):

Table 3.1 Voter Turnout Rates for Indonesian Parliamentary and Presidential Elections (1971-2009).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Total Vote</th>
<th>Registration</th>
<th>Voter Turnout</th>
<th>Invalid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>121,504,481</td>
<td>176,411,434</td>
<td>68.9%*</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>104,099,785</td>
<td>171,265,442</td>
<td>60.8%**</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>124,456,342</td>
<td>148,000,369</td>
<td>84.09%***</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>106,228,247</td>
<td>155,048,803</td>
<td>68.51%****</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>110,298,176</td>
<td>118,217,393</td>
<td>93.3%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>110,938,069</td>
<td>124,740,987</td>
<td>88.93%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>97,789,534</td>
<td>107,565,697</td>
<td>90.91%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>85,822,000</td>
<td>94,000,000</td>
<td>91.3%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


** Adam Carr notes the number of enrolled/registered voters to be 171,558,775, which would make voter turnout 60.7%. His source was the Indonesia Election Commission website. Psephos Adam Carr’s Election Archive, “Indonesia: 2009 Legislative Election.” (http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/i/indonesia/indonesia2009leg.txt), 01 March 2010.


**** The first round of the presidential elections took place on July 5, 2004 with a total vote of 106,228,247 or voter turnout was 68.51%. The second round of the presidential elections took place on September 20, 2004 with a total vote of 110,394,163 or voter turnout was 71.2%. Data is from Kompas online. Psephos Adam Carr’s Election Archive, “Indonesia: 2004 Presidential Election.” (http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/i/indonesia/indonesia2004pres.txt), 01 March 2010.

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These voter turnout rates are comparable to or higher than those found in other democracies such as the United States, France, Germany, Italy, South Africa, India, and other Asian countries. The high pre-1998 percentages may be attributed to obligatory voting under the Suharto regime. The high post-1998 percentages may be due to a sense of “political euphoria” in the context of a “new democracy.” Though Indonesia has relatively high voter turnout rates, the country has experienced declining voter turnout since the 1999 elections. This is not surprising since “political euphoria” often fades over time, democratic consolidation occurs, and increasingly individual-level factors affect participation. Similar patterns are found in countries such as Japan, Korea, and the Philippines, though voter turnout rates sometimes rise in certain years.

Though other forms of electoral participation in Indonesia are not as popular as voting, the percentages are arguably substantial. The Asia Foundation reports that 27% of respondents in a 1999 public opinion survey, which represents nearly 36 million people out of the total Indonesian electorate, claim to have attended meetings or street rallies. The Asia Foundation notes, “Even allowing for some overclaims, this is a large figure.” Furthermore, 6% of respondents (representing 8 million) say they worked as volunteers for political parties or candidates, and 5% say they contributed money to political parties or candidates.  

As for non-electoral participation, The Asia Foundation recorded the following data when they asked respondents “In the past five years, have you…”:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form of Participation</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Got together with people in the community or worked informally with others to deal with community issue/problem</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Been a member of political party or organization that took stands on political or community issue</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Ibid., 308.
Served on local government body or council that deals with community problems/issue | 7%
Contacted government official about problem/issue | 3%

The Asia Foundation concludes, “Indonesians work informally together on local problems, but rarely get involved with official political structures.”¹²¹ Because the aforementioned survey question wording roughly covers the years 1994 to 1999, it is impossible to determine whether responses are indicative of pre-1998 non-electoral participation or merely the relatively brief post-Suharto period.

The pattern of relatively high voter turnout and lower frequencies of non-voting behavior, specifically amongst Muslim Indonesians, continued through 2006. Working with Lembaga Survei Indonesia (LSI, Indonesian Survey Institute), I conducted a national public opinion survey in December 2006 based on multi-stage random sampling to obtain more detailed data about political participation.¹²² The survey included 1,227 respondents of which 1,046 were self-identified Muslims. Table 3.3 shows percentages for self-reported active political participation by Muslim Indonesians. The survey question for respondents was “Since three years ago, have you very often, somewhat often, rarely, or never done the following activities…?” Since the variables were asked as separate questions, respondents may have had experience with multiple forms of political participation.¹²³

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form of Participation</th>
<th>Very often (%)</th>
<th>Somewhat often (%)</th>
<th>Rarely (%)</th>
<th>Never (%)</th>
<th>Don’t know/No answer (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Join elections to choose members of the DPR, DPRD, Bupati, etc.</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Run for office for village head, Bupati, DPRD member, etc.</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>95.9</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹²¹ Ibid.
¹²³ Missing cases were also omitted from analysis.
Based on these particular measures of political participation, the majority of the Muslim Indonesians surveyed do not actively participate in politics besides voting. Of those respondents who do participate in non-voting activities, many do so only rarely. Amongst respondents who are relatively active, there is also a distinction concerning preferred types of political participation. When combining the categories of “Very often” and “Somewhat often,” the top three forms of political participation amongst Muslim respondents are joining elections to choose members of the DPR, DPRD, Bupati, etc. (75.9%); wearing political party clothing or putting up political party signs on vehicles or houses (18.6%); and joining parades, public meetings, or campaign meetings (9.8%).

With regards to certain non-voting activities, Muslim Indonesians are less active than citizens in neighboring countries. Tables 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 display cross-national data from a 2004 AsiaBarometer Survey for three measures of political participation. The figures listed for Indonesia include non-Muslims, but for interpretative comparisons, it should be noted that 90.9% of the respondents are self-identified Muslims (Sunnah).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Very Often</th>
<th>Somewhat Often</th>
<th>Occasionally</th>
<th>Rarely</th>
<th>Never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer for a politician or political party</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wear political party clothing or put up political party signs on vehicles or houses</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribute money or items to candidates or political parties</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>95.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Join parades, public meetings, or campaign meetings</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>74.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make or sign a petition</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>95.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visit, contact, or write a letter to a government official or member of the DPR/DPRD</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>96.5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Write a letter to a newspaper about matters related to politics</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>95.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

125 The remaining respondents self-identified as Catholic (1.3%), Christian religion other than Catholic (5.2%), Hindu (2.3%), Buddhist (Mahayana) (0.1%), or Confucian (0.1%).
Table 3.4 Self-Reported Political Participation – Signing a Petition – in Seven Asian Countries (2004).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Have done (%)</th>
<th>Might do (%)</th>
<th>Would never do (%)</th>
<th>Don’t know (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>74.8</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Respondents in Cambodia, Japan, and Korea appear to have the most experience with or are most open to the idea of signing a petition. Indonesia has the highest percentage of respondents (74.8%) who said they would never sign a petition. This may be because many Indonesians do not have exposure to or practice with petitions as a form of political participation, which might be a legacy from the Suharto period. Other countries with low percentages of citizens who have signed a petition include Malaysia and Singapore. These low percentages may be due to institutional constraints or different “political cultures.”

Table 3.5 Self-Reported Political Participation – Joining in Boycotts – in Seven Asian Countries (2004).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Have done (%)</th>
<th>Might do (%)</th>
<th>Would never do (%)</th>
<th>Don’t know (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>81.2</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>71.8</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Those surveyed in Korea and Cambodia are more likely to have joined or might join in a boycott than their peers in other Asian countries, especially those in Indonesia and Singapore. Indonesia again scores the highest percentage with 81.2% stating that they would never join in a boycott.
Table 3.6 Self-Reported Political Participation – Attending Lawful Demonstrations – in Seven Asian Countries (2004).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Have done (%)</th>
<th>Might do (%)</th>
<th>Would never do (%)</th>
<th>Don’t know (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>75.6</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>73.6</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The actual or possible act of attending a lawful demonstration also appears to be more common in Cambodia, Japan, Korea, and the Philippines than in Indonesia. Here, too, Indonesia has the highest percentage answering “Would never do” (75.6%).

Given the high level of non-participation (excluding voting), one might think that Indonesians in general and Muslim Indonesians in specific do not frequently engage in active political participation oriented towards the state as isolated individuals because they would rather do so in groups through organizational involvement. This would correspond with the popular notion by Indonesians and foreign observers that Indonesia is a “collectivist society” and thus has a group orientation. Alternatively, one might think that individuals reserve more of their time, energy, and resources – which may or may not be political in nature – at the level of a group, i.e., “internal” participation within an organization. However, the following table reveals that very active involvement and membership in political and non-political organizations or associations is rare and is not as widespread as we might imagine or assume from the literature on civil society in Indonesia. This suggests that individuals are not necessarily more politically active through groups or spending a lot of time within organizations. My 2006 survey asked respondents the following question regarding a variety of social, political, economic, and religious groups: “Are you a very active member, somewhat active member, less active member, or not a member of the following organizations?”:

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126 Epley 2006 Survey. Missing cases omitted from analysis. If respondents were confused or had questions of the interviewer, the following notes were read out loud: “Very Active” means a formal position, leadership position, routine volunteer, or routinely joining activities. “Somewhat Active” means
Table 3.7 Self-Reported Involvement and Membership in Organizations/Associations by Frequency Level Among Muslim Indonesians.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization/Association</th>
<th>Very active (%)</th>
<th>Somewhat active (%)</th>
<th>Less active (%)</th>
<th>Not a member (%)</th>
<th>Don’t know/No answer (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Workers union (e.g., laborers union, farmers union)</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>90.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional association (e.g., teacher, doctor, business, etc.)</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>93.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social association such as art, culture, sports, animal lovers, etc.</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>90.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious organization or group like NU, Muhammadiyah, church, etc.</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social organization such as social welfare, family, education, women, environment, health, etc.</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>87.8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social organization in the village such as village council/board</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>88.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Pemuda” organization127</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>88.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student organization on or off campus</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>96.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political organization (e.g., political party)</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>94.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Combining the categories of “Very active,” “Somewhat active,” and “Less active,” the top three types of organizations and associations for membership and involvement were religious organizations or groups like Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, churches, etc. (21.3%); social organizations such as social welfare, family, education, women, environment, and health groups (10.9%); and “Pemuda” organizations (10.5%). Though these percentages potentially translate into millions of members, membership seems to be more about affiliation than consistent or committed behavior in these cases.

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127 The term “Pemuda organization” can refer to general youth groups, neighborhood youth associations, youth wings of religious or political groups, paramilitary wings of political parties, or certain kinds of “criminal” organizations.
Conclusion

Active political participation beyond voting is not prevalent in contemporary Indonesia, specifically amongst Muslim Indonesians. “Deep” membership and involvement in formal social or political organizations also appear to be rare. Since the democratic transition began in 1998 after the fall of Suharto, there are many more institutional, organizational, and individual opportunities and resources available to support citizens’ active engagement in politics. Why is it then that the participation norm is actually non-participation or low levels of participation among the majority of citizens? What are the main obstacles or hindrances to political participation? Chapter IV answers these two questions through an examination of social and individual factors that have both historical and personal dimensions.
Chapter III Bibliography


Mujani, Saiful. 2003. “Religious Democrats: Democratic Political Culture and Muslim
Political Participation in Post-Suharto Indonesia.” Ph.D. diss., The Ohio State University.


CHAPTER IV

Explaining Non-Participation and Low Levels of Participation in Indonesia

This chapter presents several reasons for non-participation and low levels of participation in contemporary Indonesia. At the macro-level, the Suharto regime had a negative impact on mass politics. The legacy of de-politicization of the masses continues to be a barrier to political action by ordinary citizens today. At the meso-level, a lack of political party mobilization limits political participation. Parties have particular functions with regards to the citizenry, and when they do not execute their functions very well, one result is non-participation or low-levels of engagement. At the micro-level, individual circumstances can restrict participation. Pressing personal concerns can mean prioritizing other activities above political participation for example. We might expect that one possible resource to minimize these three obstacles is religion. Religion could potentially provide information, networks, incentives, and other sources of support for political participation. Yet, for the majority of Indonesians, religion is not a means to overcome the aforementioned challenges. Religious diffusion or diversity instead prevents mass religiopolitical mobilization.

Macro-Level: The Suharto Regime and Its Impact on Mass Politics

Prior to Indonesia’s independence in 1945 and later during the 1950s and early 1960s, Indonesians had experience with political participation. Much of the earlier research about their activities centers on party politics. One concept commonly found in past literature is “aliran,” which means “stream” in Indonesian. Clifford Geertz pioneered the usage of the term in his anthropology research, which mainly took place on the island of Java. Joel S. Kahn writes,

While Geertz’s definitions of the aliran are not entirely consistent, he suggests that they represent a form of social organization which arose to
fulfill certain social needs in the years after Indonesian independence. The aliran were formed around the “four major all-Indonesia political parties” and consist of both local party organizations “plus a whole set of organizational appendages” such as women’s clubs, youth and student groups, labor and peasant unions, religious and charitable associations and the like.\textsuperscript{128}

The political parties referred to above include two Muslim parties – Masjumi and \textit{Nahdatul Ulama} – and the two relatively secular parties of \textit{Partai Nasional Indonesia} (PNI, Indonesian Nationalist Party) and \textit{Partai Kommunis Indonesia} (PKI, Indonesian Communist Party). In other works, Geertz incorporates religious cleavages into the concept of \textit{aliran} whereby the major groups consisted of Muslims (santri), which corresponded to support for Muslim parties; Hindu-Buddhist elites (priyayi), who pledged allegiance to the Nationalists; and the peasant syncretists (abangan), who associated with the Communists.\textsuperscript{129} Sometimes the different \textit{aliran} also corresponded with members’ occupations with the santri as traders and entrepreneurs, priyayi as feudal landlords or civil servants, and abangan as mainly peasants.\textsuperscript{130}

The \textit{aliran} groups are thought to have continued into the Suharto period, but changed in shape and influence. General Suharto rose to power in 1965 after a coup attempt purportedly organized by Communists. After eliminating most of the Communist Party’s members and sympathizers, Suharto set out to modernize the country economically and politically via a “New Order” government. Suharto also aimed to establish political order after serious conflicts during the post-independence period of the late 1950s to the early 1960s.

Several authors characterize the Suharto government as one of total personal rule, but R. William Liddle distinguishes between different features of the “New Order pyramid”: “a dominant presidency, a politically active armed forces, a decision-making process cent[e]red in the bureaucracy, and a pattern of state-society relations that

\textsuperscript{129} Ibid., 95.
\textsuperscript{130} Ibid.
combines cooptation and responsiveness with repression.”

Put another way, “The political structure of the New Order can be described as a steeply-ascending pyramid in which the heights are thoroughly dominated by a single office, the presidency. The President commands the military which is *primus inter pares* within the bureaucracy, which in turn holds sway over the society.” This pyramid scheme protected and benefited Suharto and his supporters by heavily restricting mass political participation and repressing actual and potential opposition whenever and wherever possible.

Suharto explicitly introduced the concept of the “floating mass” in 1971 and formalized it into law in 1975. The floating mass policy banned political activities below the district and city levels. It served to “depoliticize the Indonesian population,” says Leo Suryadinata. Michael R. J. Vatikiotis explains that the concept “rested on the assumption that the vast majority of Indonesia’s population was unsophisticated and prone to the ill-effects of politicking at the village level. Political parties were therefore banned from operating in the villages, and political activity was severely restricted except for brief periods close to elections.” Hans Antlöv explains the policy’s impact: “The crippling uniformity the New Order imposed on ordinary people undermined critical thinking and extracted a heavy price in the form of standardization, co-optation of community leaders, abuse of power and corruption.” As for those who happened to have political skills and resources, Suharto either brought them into the fold or suppressed them to neutralize potential threats.

In an effort to regulate state-society relations, but also have the appearance of legitimacy and representation, the New Order government permitted certain types of political participation rather than abolish all forms of it. While the Suharto regime profoundly limited mass politics, ordinary citizens were socially and politically engaged...
via the aforementioned aliran, but the channels were limited as the political party landscape changed with the presence of new parties, the absorption of some parties into others, and banned parties. The primary government party was Partai Golongan Karya (Golkar, Party of the Functional Groups). Citizens mainly participated in social groups with the occasional political mobilization, particularly during elections. Levels of willingness, frequencies, and commitment on the part of participants varied. Since much of the political culture was a top-down affair during the New Order period, the majority of Indonesians did not have a lot of opportunities, motivation, resources, or incentives for active political participation. In many ways, the general public perceived and experienced politics as something distant, “dirty,” or for and by elites.

The legacy of repression under the Suharto regime negatively affected several generations by suppressing political socialization, education, and practice, which are often considered to be critical for democratic understanding and participation. It was not until 1998 that a period of democratization began and more political opportunities were available for the general public to actively and voluntarily engage in politics. Of note, however, is the glaring absence of any mention of Suharto’s legacy in my focus group discussions between 2005 and 2006. While this omission could be due to a desire to avoid talking about sensitive political topics, my general impression is that it has more to do with a lack of awareness of how the political culture of de-politicization maintained during the Suharto period continues to affect today’s generations and has yet to fully disappear. Another way to think about this is that if de-politicization was a norm for so long, it is not surprising to find that many people do not actively or consciously think of how they were de-politicized.

The distance from politics cultivated during the Suharto period manifests itself in contemporary Indonesia in at least four ways: a distinct lack of interest in political matters, feelings of lacking political efficacy, uncertainty about democracy as a concept and practice, and lingering fears. First, a 2003 survey by The Asia Foundation asked respondents, “How interested are you in politics? Very interested, somewhat interested, not very interested, or not interested at all?”136 The Asia Foundation reports, “In 2003,

Indonesians indicated less interest in politics than even the low level found at the time of the first democratic elections in 1999. Two-thirds of voters (65%) now say they are not interested in politics, while fewer than three in ten (28%) express interest in it. This represents a growth in disinterest compared to four years ago, when 56% said they were not interested in politics. At present, only 5% say they are very interested in politics, while one-third are not at all interested.137 The survey inquired about the reasons for Indonesians not being interested in politics and found the following responses:138

- Don’t like politics (37%)
- I’m not educated/too poor (30%)
- Politics is dirty (13%)
- Waste of time/I’m too busy (8%)
- Other (5%)
- Don’t know (16%)

According to The Asia Foundation, “The majority of the voters who say they lack interest in politics provide reasons that suggest alienation from the political process rather than an inability to participate in politics.”139

Indonesians also demonstrate disinterest by how frequently they do not discuss politics with others. In response to the question “How often do you discuss politics with friends?”, the majority of those polled by The Asia Foundation in 2003 chose “not very often” (30%) or “almost never” (59%).140 These are similar figures to those found specifically amongst Muslim Indonesian respondents in my 2006 survey, which asked how often a person discusses politics with family, friends, or work colleagues: 19.3% of respondents answered “rarely” and 67.2% said “never.”141

A second legacy from past suppression of mass political socialization, education, and practice is the feeling among citizens that their voices do not matter. This perceived lack of political efficacy has not wholly disappeared during Indonesia’s democratic transition. When asked, “How much influence do you think someone like you can have over government decisions – a lot, some, very little or none at all?”, many Indonesians

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137 Ibid., 61.
138 Ibid., 62. The survey question was “If not interested in politics, why not?”
139 Ibid.
140 Ibid., 63.
141 Epley 2006 Survey. The survey question for respondents was “Since three years ago, have you very often, somewhat often, rarely, or never done the following activities…?”
responded negatively. In 1999, 61% said very little or none at all. The percentages did not improve when The Asia Foundation asked another cohort of respondents the same question in 2003: 71% said very little or none at all.\textsuperscript{142} The percentages from 2004 are not as bleak depending on question phrasing, according to AsiaBarometer data, which found the following sentiments among its Muslim Indonesian survey respondents:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Efficacy Measures</th>
<th>Strongly agree (%</th>
<th>Agree (%)</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree (%)</th>
<th>Disagree (%)</th>
<th>Strongly disagree (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Generally speaking, people like me don’t have the power to influence government policy or actions.</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Since so many people vote in elections, it really doesn’t matter whether I vote or not.</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The feeling of lacking political influence is also reflected in comments from one of my 2006 focus group discussions. A 21-year old Muslim woman bank employee, N.A., stated, “[We] just submit to one’s fate, [we] cannot really do anything, the problem, you know…”\textsuperscript{144} when asked about problem-solving for public policy issues. She was also not optimistic regarding certain forms of political action: “Demonstrations also do not solve problems.”\textsuperscript{145} When asked about family experiences related to political participation and whether or not people were involved in activities such as joining elections, N.A. said that a lot of her friends and family did not join. According to her, “Some were lazy to vote and some just didn’t vote; it was the same thing.”\textsuperscript{146} She continued, “In my family, my

\textsuperscript{142} Ibid., 93.
\textsuperscript{143} AsiaBarometer 2004 Survey. Missing cases and “Don’t know” omitted from analysis.
\textsuperscript{144} “Focus Group Discussion 6 – Non-Active.” Jennifer Epley, researcher, Freedom Institute, Central Jakarta, Indonesia (30 Jul. 2006). Indonesian: “Pasrah saja, tidak bisa berbuat apa-apa, soalnya kan paling apa yaa…”
\textsuperscript{145} Ibid. Indonesian: “Demonstrasi juga tidak menyelesaikan masalah.”
\textsuperscript{146} Ibid. Indonesian: “Banyak sih. Teman-teman, keluarga juga ada beberapa yang tidak ikut, alasannya…ah, sama aja, males nyoblos, tidak nyoblos sama aja.”
father submitted a blank ballot, didn’t perforate the paper. His reason was the same. Does not change anything.”  

A third legacy of the Suharto period is uncertainty about “democracy” in general. Despite experience with elections and aliran activities during the New Order regime, Indonesians did not have sufficient practice with democracy and have either not yet learned its meaning or had enough time to implement it. To gauge how much Indonesians know about democracy as a concept and practice, The Asia Foundation’s 2003 survey asked, “If a country is called a democracy, what does that mean to you? Anything else?” The respondents answered:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know / No response</td>
<td>(53%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political rights</td>
<td>(49%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Freedom: of speech, of association, of demonstration, of religion, of criticism, all aspects (24%);</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Elections: choice in elections, freely choosing leaders, government of/by/for people, elections (15%);</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Equal rights: equal justice for all, protect citizens rights, human rights (5%); and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Responsive government: discussion, listening to others, to people, mistakes corrected (5%).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace, safe</td>
<td>(5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic gains – jobs, free rice</td>
<td>(2%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Many Indonesians do not know the meaning of democracy in part because they have been socialized to think of government in a certain way through political experience and the national education system. The 1999 poll by The Asia Foundation found respondents to be divided regarding views about the role of government:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government is father; people are children</td>
<td>(49%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government and people are equals</td>
<td>(40%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government is boss, people are workers</td>
<td>(4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know, not sure</td>
<td>(7%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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147 Ibid. Indonesian: “Kalau di keluarga saya, Bapak saya golput, tidak nyoblos. Alasannya ya mungkin sama. Tidak bisa merubah.”


149 The Asia Foundation, Charney Research, and AC Nielsen, *Indonesia in Transition: The Indonesian Electorate in 1999*, 306. The survey question was “Which of these is closest to your view of what the government should be?”
The Asia Foundation writes, “In most social groups the view that government is like a father held a majority or plurality over the view that government and people are equals. The exceptions were some high-end groups – students, urban women under 35, and large-scale farmers (over 10 hectares) – and, surprisingly, those with no or incomplete primary education.” These responses reflect the varying relationships that different groups had with the Suharto government.

There is also uncertainty about “politics” in general, due in part to previous alienation or co-optation in the political process, which influences non-participation or low levels of participation. Hans Antlöv remarks,

…depoliticization has had the effect of depriving ordinary citizens and prospective leaders alike of critical knowledge about how to engage in politics. For decades, people learnt that the only way to solve conflicts was through violence; that the only way to reach decisions was by monopolizing power; that the only way to gain promotion was by manipulating connections; and that the only way to conduct politics was through patronage. Many people today simply do not know how to construct programs around important principles, build and educate constituencies around political issues, lobby for their interests, engage the public in debate, produce alternative public policies, or solve conflicts peacefully.

This lack of knowledge is apparent in a comment from the same 2006 focus group discussion mentioned earlier in which J.W., a 38-year old Muslim male businessman mentioned, “I don’t really understand if it’s politics, that’s all.” AsiaBarometer found similar sentiments among its Muslim survey respondents: 13.0% strongly agree and

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150 Ibid.
151 Hans Antlöv, 75. [American spelling change]
152 “Focus Group Discussion 6 – Non-Active.” 2006. Indonesian: “Saya kurang mengertilah kalau politik, itu aja.”
49.3% agree with the statement “Politics and government are so complicated that sometimes I don’t understand what’s happening.”

The fourth Suharto legacy is that Indonesians still do not feel totally comfortable or free enough to express their political opinions. Though there have been large improvements since 1998, there are still concerns and lingering fears for some, thereby potentially impacting participation in a negative manner. In July 1999, The Asia Foundation asked respondents “Do people feel free to express their opinions in the area where you live? Did they feel free to express their political opinions before the events of last May?” In that survey, 83% said that people in their areas could express their opinions freely, while only 9% felt they could not do so. This was an increase from an earlier poll in January when 55% felt they could express their opinions freely, 20% said they could not, and 25% were unsure. Before May 1998, 28% of respondents believed that people could speak freely and 42% said they could not do so. My 2006 survey also solicited responses concerning the contemporary political climate, especially for particular fears. The survey question was “What is your opinion towards the following statements: In our country right now, how often…?” The next table presents answers by Muslim Indonesians in specific:

**Table 4.2 Self-Reported Fears during 2003-2006 for Muslim Indonesians.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fears</th>
<th>Always (%)</th>
<th>Often (%)</th>
<th>Rarely (%)</th>
<th>Never (%)</th>
<th>Don’t know/No answer (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People are afraid if they talk about political problems/questions.</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People are afraid of arbitrary arrest by a legal apparatus.</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People are afraid to join organizations.</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People are afraid to perform their religious studies/training.</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People are afraid to criticize the</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

153 AsiaBarometer 2004 Survey – Measure Q30d. Missing cases and “Don’t know” omitted from analysis. Neither agree nor disagree: 19.3%; Disagree: 16.3%; and Strongly disagree: 2.1%.
155 Epley 2006 Survey. Missing cases omitted from analysis.
A little over half of the Muslim Indonesian respondents said they are never afraid to criticize or demonstrate against the government. While this bodes well for present and future democratic endeavors, these fears have not completely disappeared and can still contribute to non-participation or low levels of participation even when individuals are interested and want to be politically involved.

Though Indonesia has made great strides in changing its political culture since the Suharto period, there are still problems concerning a lack of interest in political matters, feelings of lacking political efficacy, uncertainty about democracy and politics, and lingering fears. As new generations gain more awareness of and experience with democracy, the norm of de-politicization may eventually give way to a norm of engagement, but only if the other participation obstacles explained in the next sections are adequately addressed.

**Meso-Level: Lack of Political Party Mobilization**

Though Indonesia’s democratic setting now allows and encourages various forms of active participation by citizens, many individuals still do not engage in political behavior due a lack of effective and efficient political party mobilization. Political parties traditionally have the functions of mass representation, interest articulation and aggregation, socialization, and mobilization. They can provide political motivation, resources, and opportunities for the purposes of collective action and individual advancement. Political parties in Indonesia do not always fulfill these functions or implement these processes very well, however, which in turn contributes to non-participation or low levels of participation by the masses.

First, political parties are not deeply rooted or connected to their constituencies. This is evident by the presence of limited political party bases and low levels of political party identification (Party ID). The Asia Foundation asked respondents, “Do you normally think of yourself as a supporter of any political party?” and discovered that 66% answered “Don’t know” or refused to answer. Parties with 1% or more included Golkar
10%, PDI-P 6%, PKB 5%, PPP 3%, PAN 2%, Partai Keadilan 1%, PBB 1%, and Parkindo 1%.\textsuperscript{156} Comments about feeling distant from the political process were also reflected in the high percentage of Muslim Indonesians whom I surveyed in 2006 who did not feel close to any political parties: 81\%.\textsuperscript{157} According to the 2004 AsiaBarometer Survey, only 2.3\% of Muslim Indonesian respondents answered “political party” when asked about which social circles or groups are important to them.\textsuperscript{158} Syamsuddin Haris, a researcher from the Political Research Center of the Indonesian Institute of Sciences, describes the relationship between political parties and the people as a “gap between elites and the masses.” According to Haris, most political parties have yet to become institutionalized and are “floating” like the “floating masses” during the Suharto period. He adds that political parties are not very close to the people and thus less accountable.\textsuperscript{159} This lack of close party affiliation contributes to non-participation since the lack of connection can mean limited political information, opportunities, resources, and incentives. Additionally, not feeling close to a party can contribute to political apathy because there is no or inadequate interest and motivation generated by others to be politically involved.

Limited Party ID may be partially attributed to a lack of knowledge about the differences between political parties such as programmatic platforms and ideologies. When The Asia Foundation asked respondents “What difference do you see, if any, between the different parties in the DPR today?”, the majority of those surveyed did not know:\textsuperscript{160}

<p>| | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>(10%)</td>
<td>Religious commitment</td>
<td>(2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaders</td>
<td>(5%)</td>
<td>Numbers/power</td>
<td>(2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor division</td>
<td>(4%)</td>
<td>Can’t specify/Other</td>
<td>(9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issues they stress</td>
<td>(2%)</td>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>(66%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{156} The Asia Foundation, Democracy in Indonesia: A Survey of the Indonesian Electorate in 2003, 97.
\textsuperscript{157} Epley 2006 Survey. Missing cases omitted from analysis. The survey question was “Is there a political party that you feel more close to?”
\textsuperscript{158} AsiaBarometer 2004 Survey. Not mentioned: 97.7\%.
\textsuperscript{159} Jennifer L. Epley, Personal interview with Syamsuddin Haris (Jakarta: Indonesian Institute of Sciences, 05 July 2006).
\textsuperscript{160} The Asia Foundation, Democracy in Indonesia: A Survey of the Indonesian Electorate in 2003, 100.
Without clear value differentiation, citizens can feel disconnected from the political process and channels of representation and accountability.

Another reason for lack of political party affiliation is negative perceptions of parties. Several of my informants conclude that parties do not deliver social change and are even “dirty.” Medelina K. Hendytio, a researcher at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta, observes *ragu-ragu* (“hesitation”) on the part of the masses towards state politics and interventions since they do not really see the government as being effective. According to Hendytio, people ask “Manfaat untuk saya apa? Untung untuk saya apa?” This can be translated as “What benefits are there for me? What advantages/profits are there for me?”

N.S.P., a 24-year old Muslim woman working as a media advertising staff member, states, “I haven’t yet found one [group] that can make social change, like not yet.”

W.F., a 26-year old Muslim male information-communications officer, says, “Political parties in Indonesia have not yet tied themselves to public issues. Yeah, if one is connected to a political party to look for work, this is not society’s aspirations for example. I believe that more pushing for social change is from LSM than political parties.”

W.F. continues, “In my opinion, elections are like beauty contests.”

A more negative view of politicians comes from I.H.A., a Muslim woman member of *Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam* (HMI, Muslim Students Association) from Bandung, who says she does not personally *main politik* (“play politics”) because politics can be “dirty.” She thinks politicians are rather self-oriented and not necessarily involved in politics on behalf of the public. I.H.A. believes they lie, cheat, and engage in corruption.

Hans Antlöv writes, “In post-reformasi Indonesia, political parties are still widely viewed as tainted. *Politik* is something of a dirty word, used to describe the

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161 Jennifer L. Epley, Personal interview with Medelina K. Hendytio (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 13 December 2006).
163 Ibid. “LSM is an acronym for “Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat,” which refers to non-profit or non-governmental organizations. Indonesian: “Partai politik di Indonesia belum bersandarkan ke isu-isu publik. Ya sekali kalau gabung ke partai politik bagian dari mencari pekerjaan, bukan sebagai aspirasi masyarakat, misalnya seperti itu. Saya lebih percaya bahwa yang lebih banyak mendorong perubahan sosial adalah di LSM daripada di partai politik.”
164 Ibid. Indonesian: “Menurut saya, pemilu itu kan beauty contest.”
motivations behind unwanted and unpopular decisions (as in dasar politikus, ‘typical of a politician!’).”\textsuperscript{166} AsiaBarometer also found its Muslim survey respondents to view elected officials in a negative light (Table 4.3). Respondents not only felt that government officials ignore them, but that officials are also involved in corruption, which has negative consequences for the public:

Table 4.3 Opinions About Government Responses to Citizen Concerns Among Muslim Indonesians.\textsuperscript{167}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government Response Measures</th>
<th>Strongly agree (%)</th>
<th>Agree (%)</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree (%)</th>
<th>Disagree (%)</th>
<th>Strongly disagree (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Generally speaking, the people who are elected to the [NATIONAL PARLIAMENT] stop thinking about the public.</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government officials pay little attention to what citizens like me think.</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is widespread corruption among those who govern the country.</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A clear majority of those surveyed shared the opinion that government officials stop thinking about the public (57.3%), pay little attention to citizens (64.2%), and engage in corruption (55.1%).

Without a sense of closeness or trust between the masses and political parties or officials, there is little chance for a mutually-beneficial relationship. Weak parties elicit weak responses from the public. Non-participation or low levels of participation are common in Indonesia partially because the traditional agents or enablers of participation are not fulfilling their roles. This challenge of top-down mobilization is not helped by bottom-up individual forces that also work to limit political involvement by the masses.

\textsuperscript{166} Hans Antlöv, 75.

\textsuperscript{167} AsiaBarometer 2004 Survey. Missing cases and “Don’t know” omitted from analysis.
Micro-Level: Individual Circumstances

In addition to the considerations presented in the previous sections, individuals also do not engage in political behavior due to personal reasons. In many cases, pressing current individual-level concerns mean political participation is less of a priority. In numerous personal conversations with a wide variety of people in different parts of Indonesia, I found a typical comment was that there is not enough time. When balancing the main areas of life such as work, family, and education, many people cannot find the time to get politically informed or involved. In some cases, a distinction is made between short-term and long-term engagement. That is, if the political activity is relatively quick (e.g., voting), then it is more likely that a person will take part, whereas volunteering over an extended period of time (e.g., helping a political party or NGO) can be too much of a commitment. These kinds of individual considerations are very similar to those found in other parts of the world. Another comment I heard was that participation can be costly. Whether using public transportation or one’s own transport, it costs money to get from Point A to Point B. Taking time off of work or school for political participation and giving political donations are also forms of financial losses. On other occasions I heard comments that indicated prior bad experiences, which include some of the reasons mentioned before such as fears or intimidation of the political process, lack of political efficacy, and politics not being interesting.

Even if explicitly provided an opportunity to be politically active, many Indonesians would not choose to do so because of their individual circumstances. The Asia Foundation asked respondents, “If a political party was willing to nominate you to become a member of [the] People’s Consultative Assembly at [the] central or regional level, would you be willing to run? If not, why?” Their general answers along with their reasons are listed below.\footnote{The Asia Foundation, \textit{Democracy in Indonesia: A Survey of the Indonesian Electorate in 2003}, 64. Brackets added.}

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{lc}
\textbf{I. Responses} & \\
Yes & (16\%) \\
No & (77\%) \\
Don’t know & (6\%)
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
II. Reasons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I’m not educated/too poor</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not interested in politics</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waste of time/too busy</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I’m a woman</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics is dirty</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too old</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other/Don’t know</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Though holding political office is a high bar for political participation, it is telling that The Asia Foundation finds, “Overwhelmingly, the issue in running for office is a feeling of political competency. The primary reason voters give for not wanting to run for political office – far more important than any other factor – is their lack of education or money (67%).”\(^{169}\) Rather than point to personal commitments such as family or preferred career paths, respondents noted a lack of educational and financial resources.

**Religious Diffusion and Its Consequences**

One possible resource to minimize the three aforementioned obstacles is religion. Religion could potentially be a catalyst for participation because of its beliefs, values, structures, institutions, resources, and actors. Yet for the majority of Muslim Indonesians, religion does not seem to directly or regularly influence them to engage in political behavior. How is it that Islam has not mobilized Indonesians en masse for concrete religious or political ends? There are two interrelated answers. First, diversity within Islam limits the formation of a single political project or identity around which the majority of Muslim Indonesians can unite. Religious beliefs, values, and practices vary with regards to orthodoxy (e.g., orthodox versus syncretistic; modernists and traditionalists; scripturalists versus substantialists; and other group affiliation such as gender and ethnicity) and political or ideological orientation, as described in Chapter II. While there is general consensus on what Islam is not, there is less agreement on what it is, especially in the political sphere. Second, the individual identities of Muslim Indonesians are multi-dimensional where their religion can overlap, confront, or be placed in a hierarchy with other factors such as socio-economic status, education, gender,

\(^{169}\) Ibid., 65.
ethnicity, and age. There are also psychological, social, and political factors that might be influential, some of which were discussed earlier.

The variety found within Islam in Indonesia overall means that there is no monolithic uniform version to be implemented in politics. Indonesia is not formally an Islamic state. Islamic law exists in some parts of the country, but varies in type and implementation. Islamic political parties do not dominate politics in terms of public popularity or actual government seats. For example, recent elections showed a decrease in votes for Islamic parties from about 38% in 2004 to around 24% in 2009. Many Muslim Indonesians are not closely affiliated with or active in formal religious associations. Religious organizations themselves also experience internal debates and tensions. Members within Muhammadiyah and NU, the two largest Muslim organizations in the country, have recurring disagreements about the proper meanings of “Islam” as well as the relationship between religion and politics for instance. Without a unified sense of religious orthodoxy and political orientation, political parties, religious organizations, and other groups encounter problems in developing and capitalizing on one cohesive, accepted agenda. This in turn limits mass recruitment, retention, and advancement in different political climates. Such challenges are not unique to Indonesia; they are very typical for religious parties and movements elsewhere.

Chapter II explains diversity within Islam in Indonesia overall. The kinds of diversity discussed in that chapter point to variation amongst groups and individuals. Individual religious identities are further delineated in the next section to expand on the notion of religious diffusion.

**Individual Religious Identities**

Muslim Indonesians typically agree on the belief in God and the *Arkan al Islami* (Pillars of Islam), which include the *Shahadah* (confession of faith), *Salat* (five daily prayers), *Zakat* (form of tithing), *Sawm* (fasting during Ramadan), and the *Hadj* (pilgrimage to the Ka’ba in Mecca). However, there are differences in everyday religious beliefs and practices. For example, 72.8% (not 100%) of Muslim Indonesian respondents in the 2004 AsiaBarometer Survey answered “religion” when asked about which social
circles or groups are important to them. There is also variation regarding personal opinions about how religious identity compares to other aspects of one’s identity. AsiaBarometer found that Muslim Indonesian respondents did not all answer alike when interviewers asked, “There are a number of major components whereby you form your identity. They include religion, ethnicity, region, language, class and nationality. How do you rate religion with other components?”

Table 4.4 Opinions Comparing Religious Identity to Other Components of Identity Among Muslim Indonesians.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity Comparisons</th>
<th>Apply (%)</th>
<th>Not mentioned (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religion is more important than ethnicity.</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>45.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion is more important than region.</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>58.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion is more important than language.</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>69.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion is more important than class.</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>61.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion is more important than nationality.</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>70.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“Apply” in this context most likely refers to a “yes” answer to valuing religion over other aspects of one’s personal identity.

Another example of intrafaith variation among individuals comes from my 2006 survey which shows that not all Muslims agree on which areas of life should be regulated by religion:

Table 4.5 Self-Reported Opinions Among Muslim Indonesians Regarding Different Fields That Should Be Regulated By Religion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field Subject to Religious Regulation</th>
<th>Yes (%)</th>
<th>No (%)</th>
<th>Don’t know/No Answer (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economics or work</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>82.2</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government or law</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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170 AsiaBarometer 2004 Survey. Not mentioned: 27.2%.
171 Ibid.
172 Epley 2006 Survey. Missing cases omitted from analysis. The survey question was “In your opinion, which of the following areas should be regulated by religion?” Note: The verb “diatur” was used in the question, which can be translated as “regulated,” “arranged,” “organized,” or “ordered.”
The following table contains further evidence of diversity with varying levels of religious practice or ritual for twelve measures of religiosity from my 2006 survey:

Table 4.6 Self-Reported Religious Behavior Among Muslim Indonesians.173

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious Behavior</th>
<th>Usually/Very often (%)</th>
<th>Often (%)</th>
<th>Rarely (%)</th>
<th>Never (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pray five times a day</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fast during Ramadhan</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perform optional prayers</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perform optional fasting</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recite or read the al-Qur'an outside of prayers</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do congregational/community/group prayers besides Friday prayers</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Join religious recitations/teachings (e.g., join “majelis taklim,” religious lectures/speeches, “tahlilan”)</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Request a prayer or advice from a religious leader</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watch, listen, or read religious programs via television, radio, newspaper, or website</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discuss beliefs or religion with family</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discuss beliefs or religion with friend or work colleague</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discuss beliefs or religion with religious leader</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Religious organizations appear to have some difficulty in accommodating the aforementioned individual-level variation in beliefs and practices, which can add to the challenge of maintaining long-term committed membership or activity. As described earlier in Table 3.7, 78% of the Muslim Indonesians surveyed in 2006 are not members

173 Epley 2006 Survey. Missing cases and “Don’t know/No answer” omitted from analysis. The survey question was “Do you usually/very/often/always, sometimes, rarely, or never do the following religious/worship activities?”
of religious organizations like NU, Muhammadiyah, church, etc. This result shifted when respondents were asked about specific membership activity levels in explicitly Muslim organizations. Though there was an increase in the total percentage of affiliated individuals from 21.3% to 30.2%, the respondents did not report high levels of active membership within the organizations:

Table 4.7 Self-Reported Membership Activity Levels Among Muslim Indonesians Affiliated with Certain Muslim Organizations.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Muslim Organization</th>
<th>Very active (%)</th>
<th>Somewhat active (%)</th>
<th>Less active (%)</th>
<th>Not active (%)</th>
<th>Not a member (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>75.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhammadiyah</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>92.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Distance from Muslim organizations was also evident when respondents were asked about how close they felt to religious leaders:

Table 4.8 Self-Reported Levels of Closeness to Muslim Organization Leadership Among Muslim Indonesians.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Muslim Organization</th>
<th>Very close (%)</th>
<th>Close (%)</th>
<th>Less close (%)</th>
<th>Not close (%)</th>
<th>Don’t know/No answer (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhammadiyah</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>87.1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Without a single, unified voice regarding religious beliefs and practices or a strong sense of closeness to religious leaders, along with low membership activity levels in organizations, it is difficult to imagine how religious or political elites could successfully execute widespread top-down mobilization or movements for religious or religiopolitical ends in government and public policy. In this way, religious

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174 Epley 2006 Survey. Missing cases and “Don’t know/No answer” omitted from analysis. The survey question was “Are you a very active, somewhat active, less active, not active, or not a member of these organizations?” Respondents may have also been a member of more than one organization; it is difficult to determine the precise overlap, however.

175 Epley 2006 Survey. Missing cases omitted from analysis. The survey question was “How close are you with the leader/head or local figure from the following organizations?”
organizations are similar to political parties; weak connections make for weak political responses.

**Conclusion**

Suharto’s legacy of de-politicization, a lack of party mobilization, individual circumstances, and religious diffusion and diversity are some of the major factors influencing non-participation or low levels of participation in contemporary Indonesia. While the political opportunity structure has opened since 1998 and resources that positively support political behavior are increasingly available, the majority of Indonesians and, specifically, the majority of Muslim Indonesians, do not regularly, actively engage in politics.\(^{176}\) One exception is voting and related electoral behavior. The next chapter examines the modest and subtle role religion plays for these forms of participation, while Chapter VI focuses on the minority of citizens who are active consistently or intermittently beyond voting and how religion plays a different and larger role for them.

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\(^{176}\) For a brief comparison between Muslims and other religious groups in Indonesia for ten measures of political participation, see Appendix F.
Chapter IV Bibliography


—. Personal interview with Syamsuddin Haris (Jakarta: Indonesian Institute of Sciences, 05 July 2006).

—. Personal interview with Medelina K. Hendytio (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 13 December 2006).

—. Personal interview with I.H.A. (Asrama Haji Sudiang near Makassar, Muslim Students Association 25th National Committee Congress, 23 February 2006).


Chapter V

Electoral Behavior: Voter Turnout in Indonesia

As presented in Chapter III, the top three forms of self-reported political participation amongst Muslim Indonesian survey respondents in 2006 were joining elections to choose members of the DPR, DPRD, Bupati, etc. (75.9%); wearing political party clothing or putting up political party signs on vehicles or houses (18.6%); and joining parades, public meetings, or campaign meetings (9.8%). Similar to other countries, voting in specific is the most widely recognized and practiced form of political participation in Indonesia. Despite the challenges noted in Chapter IV, voting is relatively easy when compared to other forms of political participation. Institutionally, Indonesia has universal suffrage. Socially, there is general acceptance that voting is a “good” form of participation. Indonesians are also familiar with voting practices since they have had prior experience, although vote choices were severely limited while Suharto was in office. For individuals, voting does not require high economic resources in most places, nor does it demand extensive commitment or effort since elections are only periodically held. During election periods, the other aforementioned forms of electoral behavior that show support for political parties and candidates are common, but not as popular as voting itself.

There are numerous reasons why individuals participate as they do, but few studies have pinpointed how influential Islam is for electoral behavior, especially at the individual-level. This chapter first provides some background about what political scientists generally think affects political participation and then examines the extent to which their ideas apply in the context of contemporary Indonesia through an analysis of

177 Jennifer L. Epley, “National Survey,” collaboration with Lembaga Survei Indonesia: Evaluasi Akhir Tahun, Desember 2006. I combined the categories of “Very often” and “Somewhat often” to obtain the percentages listed above.
religious and non-religious influences for voter turnout. The data show an array of expected and unexpected relationships, especially regarding the subtle role of Islam via associational or organizational life.

**Background**

In attempts to identify correlates of electoral behavior, particularly voter turnout, scholars have examined different characteristics of individuals and groups. The traditional argument for why people (usually Americans) engage in electoral behavior is related to socioeconomic status (SES). Higher education, income, and job status are said to provide resources (e.g., time, money, and civic skills), interest, and access, which shape a person’s political worldview and can make her more likely to engage in activities such as voting and organizing than those individuals with lower SES levels (Milbrath 1965; Milbrath and Goel 1977; Verba and Nie 1972; and Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). However, researchers have found that SES is not always the sole explanatory factor for political interest and participation. For example, I find that the impact of SES for individual voter turnout is unclear in Indonesia because of the country’s consistently high voter turnout rates, which include voters from a range of income brackets.

Besides SES, scholars have found individual psychology to be pertinent to electoral behavior. Political ideology is a popular variable for instance.\(^{178}\) Political ideology here typically refers to self-identification on a political spectrum such as “left,” “center,” and “right.” Researchers might use party identification as a proxy for political ideology since political parties tend to have platforms that define their goals and methods for how government and society should be run. Voting for a certain party could therefore indicate an individual’s underlying ideological preferences.

While political ideology and party identification are useful constructs and correlates for voter turnout in some countries, they are not always helpful in settings where parties lack clear or distinct ideologies and where citizens have low adherence to a political ideology or party. Supplementing observations from the section about lack of political party mobilization in Chapter IV, Dr. J. Kristiadi of the Indonesian think tank

\(^{178}\) Political ideology could also fit in the category of group factors since ideology is usually tied to an organization, association, or movement.
Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)\textsuperscript{179} states, “We do not have strong political parties because all existing parties are relatively new and somewhat pragmatic and are only generally active a few months before and after general elections.”\textsuperscript{180} Civil society groups could be alternative measures of ideology, but like political parties, non-profit organizations are like “jamur di hujan” (“mushrooms after it rains”). There are high numbers and activities during elections, but “turun nanti” (“later decrease”), according to Dr. Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, a researcher from the Political Research Center at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences and a lecturer at the University of Indonesia.\textsuperscript{181} One consequence of pragmatic versus ideologically-oriented parties and non-profit groups is a feeling of distance between leaders and citizens. Dr. Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Deputy Chair for Social Sciences and Humanities at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences in 2006,\textsuperscript{182} notes that the emotional connectedness between representatives and citizens is low, especially when there are no local political party offices. Political party switching by voters is thus a regular occurrence in which people might choose three different parties at three different levels (i.e., local, regional, and national).\textsuperscript{183} These challenging experiences suggest that there must be additional or alternative correlates to voter turnout beyond political ideology and party identification in Indonesia.

Political scientists have explored other aspects of individual psychology besides ideology or party identification such as an individual’s interest in politics, trust in government or the state, and sense of efficacy (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). The latter generally refers to the extent to which a person believes in his or her ability to bring about sociopolitical change and that his or her actions will have a desired impact or

\textsuperscript{179} Dr. J. Kristiadi is a Senior Fellow at CSIS in Jakarta. He is currently the Secretary of the Board of Directors of CSIS Foundation. Dr. Kristiadi is also a lecturer at Atma Jaya University. According to the CSIS website, “He is currently involved in [the] Papua Working Group in resolving conflicts in Papua and one of the leading political scientists in the country.” (http://www.csis.or.id/scholars_view.asp?tab=0&id=29, 30 March 2010).


\textsuperscript{181} Jennifer L. Epley, Personal interview with Ikrar Nusa Bhakti (Jakarta: LIPI – Pusat Penelitian Politik, 26 July 2006).

\textsuperscript{182} In 2006, Dr. Dewi Fortuna Anwar was also the Director for Research and Program at the Habibie Center in Jakarta, as well as a member of the Board of Directors of the Center for Information and Development Studies. In earlier years during the Habibie administration, Dr. Anwar was Assistant to the Vice President for Global Affairs and Assistant Minister/State Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

\textsuperscript{183} Jennifer L. Epley, Personal interview with Dewi Fortuna Anwar (Jakarta: LIPI, 23 June 2006).
outcome. Survey-based research has shown that individuals who feel a high sense of efficacy tend to get involved in politics more than those individuals who feel a lower sense of efficacy (Abramson and Aldrich 1982; and Blais 2000). According to data from the American National Election Studies, declining feelings of political efficacy partly explain lower voter turnouts in the United States over the years. An irony or paradox in Indonesia is that despite very low levels of interest in politics, trust in government or the state, and personal sense of efficacy (see Chapter IV), voter turnout rates for contemporary parliamentary and presidential elections are still relatively high, averaging between 60-75% (excluding the 93.3% figure from the 1999 elections). This incongruity begs the question of what else might be influencing voter turnout.

Researchers have also investigated group factors because affiliation with a group can affect the type and level of political opportunities and resources an individual possesses. Group identity and social networks can have a variety of functions such as providing a shared sense of history, common cause, and similar experience; supplying information about how to view one’s self and relationships with others (e.g., in-groups/out-groups and social roles); presenting a mindset of and chance to implement “power in numbers”; furnishing material resources such as educational or financial tools; and applying social/peer pressure within and between groups. Race and ethnicity, gender, and religion are examples of social groupings which could potentially influence individual political thought and action and mobilize people across SES lines or differently within SES categories.

Authors who mention religion in particular have found that it can be a powerful predictor of individual voting behavior (Rose and Urwin 1969; Converse 1974; and Brooks and Manza 1997), but the general causal theory linking the two variables tends to be unclear. It is difficult to determine exactly what is distinctive about religious beliefs, practices, or parties that motivate or mobilizes the faithful because of the multi-dimensional nature of religion and measurement issues (see Chapter II). This problem also presents itself in the literature from the field of sociology of religion, which can

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184 See for example Steven J. Rosenstone and John Mark Hansen, Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America (New York: Macmillan, 1993).
185 There are authors who discuss correlations between religious beliefs, attitudes, or practices and political attitudes (Tessler 2003), but this project focuses on political behavior such as electoral participation and demonstrations.
overlap with political science research. Previous authors offer some detail about how religious attitudes, beliefs, and communality (e.g., individual and family share same religion) correlate with political behavior, namely voting for particular American political parties (Lenski 1963; and Beit-Hallahmi, ed. 1973), but again the causal theory goes unspecified or appears incomplete. Other general models tend to prioritize doctrinal differences between religious groups or “conflicts” with other traditions (e.g., social stratification and inequality) as motivation for voting in the first place and then voting for certain parties (Dillon, ed. 2003). Perhaps even more broadly, some argue that religion can provide a “movement culture” that serves to encourage and support certain political behavior (Dillon, ed. 2003).

Like these previous researchers, my study has similar constraints regarding causality. My work has some advantages, though. I provide a more complete picture of correlates for political behavior by analyzing the potential influence of multiple religious and non-religious factors, individual and group attributes, and variation within Islam as a variable. Furthermore, my research adds to the literature from area studies specialists who move beyond the realm of religion and politics in the United States and other advanced industrialized democracies.

If we turn to area studies research and what has been written previously about Indonesia, my project diverges from the traditional elite-oriented or small-scale approaches by emphasizing “ordinary citizens” across the country. “Elite-oriented” refers to a focus on the state, prominent leaders, political parties, and the military as actors in the political sphere. One example from Indonesian Studies is R. William Liddle’s 1970 book Ethnicity, Party, and National Integration: An Indonesian Case Study. A more recent example is Benedict Anderson’s Violence and the State in Suharto’s Indonesia (2001). Such work is immensely useful for understanding elite beliefs and behaviors, especially since they tend to be major political forces, but the masses are either directly or indirectly treated as merely people being acted upon by those at the top of the political hierarchy. The encounter between religious identity at the micro-level and politics is in reality much more dynamic than this portrayal.

“Small-scale” refers to anthropological case studies or small-N work by sociologists, economists, and political scientists. Rita Smith Kipp’s work on the Karo
people (1993) is one example. Clifford Geertz’s research on the Javanese and Balinese is probably the most famous small-scale research on identity issues in Indonesia. Other work tends to focus on one person. For instance, C.W. Watson collected various Indonesian autobiographical accounts in *Of Self and Nation* (2000). Though these kinds of work contain rich, in-depth information, it is difficult to make generalizations beyond those few individuals or groups.

Most of the large-scale or macro-level research on Indonesian elections and political behavior comes from before the democratic transition in 1998. The first elections held in newly-independent Indonesia were in 1955. In 1957, Herbert Feith produced the first major study of this election. The next elections were not until 1971, the first election under the New Order regime, and the topic of two main studies, one by Masashi Nishihara (1972) and the other by B.B. Hering and G.A. Willis (1973). R. William Liddle wrote about the later elections under Suharto (1990s). Leo Suryadinata (1983) and others also focused on selected elections during this time. These studies offer some guidance in terms of understanding contemporary elections, but are constrained by the unique time period in which they were conducted and are about. In addition, such work heavily stresses the role of competition amongst elites and between political parties rather than closely examine the perspectives or characteristics of individual voters.

More recent research includes work by Leo Suryadinata (2002), Dwight King (2003), Hans Antlöv and Sven Cederroth, ed. (2004), whose book includes writings by Syamsuddin Haris, and Aris Ananta, Evi Nurvidya Arifin, and Leo Suryadinata (2004). These scholars mainly analyzed the 1999 elections in comparison to earlier years with varying use of political and cultural variables and assorted results concerning the significance of religion. Saiful Mujani’s 2003 dissertation titled *Religious Democrats: Democratic Political Culture and Muslim Political Participation in Post-Suharto Indonesia*, which was later revised and published in Indonesia in the Indonesian language, is another useful source of information. Mujani finds that the correlation between Islam and political participation is mixed: “It depends on what component of Islam and on what dimension of political participation.”

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186 Saiful Mujani, “Religious Democrats: Democratic Political Culture and Muslim Political Participation in Post-Suharto Indonesia” (Ph.D. diss., The Ohio State University, 2003), 289.
William Liddle on various electoral research projects to expand our knowledge of voters and democracy in post-1998 Indonesia. Another large-scale, but cross-national project is Ronald Inglehart’s *World Values Survey* and his book with Pippa Norris (2004), which develops a theory of existential security and secularization. All of these works are useful starting points from which to understand general public opinion, political behavior, religious and spiritual values, and overall welfare in Indonesia. My work complements (and differs from) this subset of previous literature by viewing religion and politics through a bottom-up lens, one that carefully considers citizens at the individual-level. I also combine large- and small-scale research so as to be in a position where I can make generalizations, but not miss important substantive details in the process such as intrafaith differences and a combination of religious and non-religious influences.

**Indonesian Voters: It Depends**

Indonesians by and large turn out to vote despite institutional and individual challenges. Because Islam is the majority religion in Indonesia and often mixed with politics to varying degrees (see Chapter II), we might be quick to assume that religion drives voter turnout. On the other hand, political science researchers point to the importance of non-religious influences for voter turnout. With a multitude of possible factors at work, which are significant and which are not for individual Indonesians?

In my preliminary studies of political behavior, I anticipated that religion matters for voting since day-to-day blending of religion and politics is a norm, religion has deep roots in society, and religion can “cut across” different fields. However, I suspected that religion does not function as a blunt instrument or simple entity and rather that there might be different conditions under which religion was related to political participation. In other words, I believed that that there would be a high degree of contingency. In the case of Indonesia, I thought that the scope and magnitude of Islam as an influence for voter turnout would depend on the context, namely who was involved and what things they cared about or do, religious or otherwise. I imagined that the individual identities of Muslim Indonesians are multi-dimensional where their religion can overlap, confront, or be placed in a hierarchy with other factors such as socio-economic status, education, gender, ethnicity, and age. Other psychological, social, and political factors might also
be influential. Finally, I thought that there might be a difference between “religious political participation,” which may aim for religious ends or be motivated by religious beliefs, and political participation by religious actors. These points were initially confirmed by the popular use of the word “Tergantung,” meaning “It depends,” by Indonesians during my discussions with them about religion and politics. There is the sense that identity is like “gado-gado” (a mixed vegetable dish with peanut sauce) or “soto” (noodle soup with meat and vegetables), which implies multiple parts make up the whole of an individual.

To unpack the myriad of possible correlates for voter turnout, I turned to my 2006 national public opinion survey.\(^{187}\) I selected traditional variables from political science literature such as those mentioned earlier and incorporated my own set of variables that I thought were culturally and historically relevant to Indonesians. I then tested different models using cross-tabulations\(^{188}\) and multinomial logistic regression\(^{189}\) to locate significant factors. I supplemented and cross-checked this statistical data with data from secondary writings, focus group discussions, personal interviews, and other sources.

**Findings**

**Non-Religious Influences**

Socioeconomic status (SES) as measured by monthly household income and last level of education is a traditional non-religious influence that matters for frequent voting in U.S. politics, but does not seem to significantly correlate with voter turnout in Indonesia:

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\(^{187}\) See Appendix A for further research design information. Note that “Don’t know/No answer” were omitted from analysis along with system missing cases.

\(^{188}\) Though I initially used bivariate correlation tests to locate potential relationships, I found such tests to be limited. Bivariate correlations lack control variables, do not take into account antecedent variables, assumes the ordinal measurement between categories is similar (i.e., similar distance or magnitude between category choices), and cannot handle nominal variables (i.e., categories of reference can be switched, which creates interpretation problems).

\(^{189}\) I chose multinominal logistic regression because my dependent variable of voter frequency is nominal and has more than two categories. Though the categories appear ordinal (i.e., in rank order), I cannot be sure about the spacing between them, meaning I cannot classify with certainty the metric degree or type of separation between each grouping. In SPSS, I ran a Test of Parallel Lines for an ordinal logistic regression model to confirm my choice of method. The significance level was not greater than .05, so I cannot assume that the parameters across the categories of the dependent variable (voting) are the same.

-- Note: For interpretive purposes, a positive coefficient in a model means that odds increase as a unit increases, while a negative coefficient means that odds decrease as a unit increases.
Table 5.1 Cross-tabulation for Average Monthly Household Income by Voting.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average Monthly Household Income</th>
<th>Voting</th>
<th>Very often</th>
<th>Somewhat often</th>
<th>Rarely</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 1 million Rupiah</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Income</td>
<td>42.1%</td>
<td>34.4%</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Voting</td>
<td>75.1%</td>
<td>78.1%</td>
<td>76.1%</td>
<td>73.0%</td>
<td>76.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - 2 million Rupiah</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Income</td>
<td>43.1%</td>
<td>28.4%</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Voting</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - 4 million Rupiah</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Income</td>
<td>49.2%</td>
<td>32.8%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Voting</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 4 million Rupiah</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Income</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>45.0%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Voting</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>1217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Income</td>
<td>42.6%</td>
<td>33.4%</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Voting</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Across and within all income groups, the majority of survey respondents said they vote “Very often” or “Somewhat often.” I found similar results in a cross-tabulation of last level of education and voting.

Gender is another traditional variable of interest for voter turnout. For gender and voting, the following cross-tabulation table shows that there is not much difference between or among men and women regarding the frequency of voter turnout:

Table 5.2 Cross-tabulation for Gender by Voting.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Voting</th>
<th>Very often</th>
<th>Somewhat often</th>
<th>Rarely</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Gender</td>
<td>44.5%</td>
<td>32.2%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

190 The exchange rate in 2006 was $1 (USD) to between Rp. 9,000-11,000 (IDR).
Within gender groupings, most people answered “Very often” or “Somewhat often” for voting. Between men and women, there is a 4.2% difference in favor of men for those answering “Very often” and a 4.2% difference in favor of women for those answering “Somewhat often.”

Though SES and gender do not appear significant for voter turnout in Indonesia, other traditional non-religious variables seem to be related to voting. For example, party identification is somewhat correlated with voter turnout in Indonesia. Though the majority of survey respondents (80.8%) answered “No” when asked if “Is there a political party that you feel more close to?”, those who did feel close to a party seemed to be mostly found in the “Very often” group for voting as seen highlighted in this next table:

Table 5.3 Cross-tabulation for Feeling Close to a Political Party and Voting.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feel close to a political party</th>
<th>Voting</th>
<th>% within Feel close to party</th>
<th>% within Voting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very often</td>
<td>Somewhat often</td>
<td>Rarely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Feel close to party</td>
<td>40.2%</td>
<td>34.4%</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Voting</td>
<td>76.1%</td>
<td>82.8%</td>
<td>85.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Feel close to party</td>
<td>53.2%</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Voting</td>
<td>23.9%</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Feel close to party</td>
<td>42.7%</td>
<td>33.5%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Voting</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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One’s location, be it in a rural setting or an urban area, also correlated with voter turnout. Table 5.4 shows frequencies and percentages for rural/urban location and voting:

**Table 5.4 Cross-tabulation for Rural/Urban Location by Voting.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Voting</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very often</td>
<td>Somewhat often</td>
<td>Rarely</td>
<td>Never</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>745</td>
<td>40.5%</td>
<td>38.8%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Rural/Urban</td>
<td>40.5%</td>
<td>38.8%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Voting</td>
<td>58.1%</td>
<td>70.7%</td>
<td>56.1%</td>
<td>48.9%</td>
<td>61.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>45.8%</td>
<td>25.2%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Rural/Urban</td>
<td>45.8%</td>
<td>25.2%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Voting</td>
<td>41.9%</td>
<td>29.3%</td>
<td>43.9%</td>
<td>51.1%</td>
<td>39.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>1221</td>
<td>42.6%</td>
<td>33.5%</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Rural/Urban</td>
<td>42.6%</td>
<td>33.5%</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Voting</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Within rural areas, 79.3% of survey respondents answered “Very often” or “Somewhat often.” This is a higher percentage than the 71% of respondents said “Very often” or “Somewhat often” within urban areas.

For age, there appear to be variations for different age groups concerning voter turnout. Table 5.5 shows that 33.2% of respondents within the 15-29 age group chose “Rarely” or “Never” when asked about voting frequency, which is similar to the 33% of respondents within the 60-69 age group, but much higher than those in other age brackets. Generally-speaking, it seems that those who are 30 years or older tend to vote more often than those younger than 30.

**Table 5.5 Cross-tabulation for Age by Voting.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Very often</th>
<th>Somewhat often</th>
<th>Rarely</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15-29 years old</td>
<td></td>
<td>96</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age Group</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>% within Age</td>
<td>% within Voting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39 years old</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>47.1%</td>
<td>33.9%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49 years old</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>49.2%</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59 years old</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>42.9%</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-69 years old</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>37.6%</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70-79 years old</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>44.1%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80-91 years old</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>42.7%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This data on age corresponds with data from other countries where being older is positively related to voter turnout. The observation or argument is that with age comes more interest and need to be actively involved in politics. Experience in turn then encourages continued political involvement.

An additional test using multinomial logistic regression further confirms the insignificance of socio-economic status and gender for voter turnout, and the significance of age, feeling close to a political party (a proxy for party identification), and rural/urban location. Table 5.6 highlights the significant non-religious variables for voter turnout:
Table 5.6 Model 1: Odds of Being Among Frequent Voter Group with Multiple Non-Religious Factors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable: Voting (a)</th>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>Wald</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
<th>95% Confidence Interval for Exp(B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lower Bound</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very often</td>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>.222</td>
<td>.530</td>
<td>.175</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.675</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.030</td>
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<td>.000</td>
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<td>.041</td>
<td>1.502</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.220</td>
<td>1.052</td>
<td>.970</td>
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<td>.0</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>1.030</td>
<td>.970</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>-.078</td>
<td>.199</td>
<td>.155</td>
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<td>.694</td>
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<td>.626</td>
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<td>.0</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>1.030</td>
<td>.970</td>
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<td>.209</td>
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<td>.970</td>
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<td>.373</td>
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<td>.009</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>1.028</td>
<td>.981</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Monthly household income</td>
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<td>.043</td>
<td>2.266</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.132</td>
<td>1.066</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.053</td>
<td>.170</td>
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<td>.680</td>
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<td>.921</td>
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<td>.142</td>
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<td>.</td>
<td>.0</td>
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<td>.</td>
<td>1.030</td>
<td>.970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
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<td>.205</td>
<td>1.278</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.258</td>
<td>.793</td>
<td>.530</td>
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<td>3.007</td>
<td>1.955</td>
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<td>0(b)</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.0</td>
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<td>1.030</td>
<td>.970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rarely</td>
<td>Intercept</td>
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<td>.645</td>
<td>3.356</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.067</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.028</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>7.824</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>1.028</td>
<td>1.008</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Monthly household income</td>
<td>.042</td>
<td>.049</td>
<td>.715</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.398</td>
<td>1.043</td>
<td>.946</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.032</td>
<td>.062</td>
<td>.271</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.603</td>
<td>1.033</td>
<td>.915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not close to a party</td>
<td>-.194</td>
<td>.350</td>
<td>.307</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.580</td>
<td>.824</td>
<td>.415</td>
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<td>.</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>1.030</td>
<td>.970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>-.235</td>
<td>.242</td>
<td>.941</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.332</td>
<td>.791</td>
<td>.492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>0(b)</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>1.030</td>
<td>.970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>.412</td>
<td>.254</td>
<td>2.630</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.105</td>
<td>1.510</td>
<td>.918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>0(b)</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>1.030</td>
<td>.970</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) The reference category is: Never.
(b) This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.
Average monthly household income, education, and gender lacked statistical significance in this model. The age variable may be interpreted as follows: If age increases by one unit, meaning as a person gets older, the odds are 1.030 higher for a respondent to be found in the “Very often” group of voters than in the “Never” group. For party identification, being amongst those who said that they do not feel close to a political party decreased the odds of being found in the “Very often” group of voters by .452. Put another way, feeling close to a political party increases the odds of being in the frequent group of voters. Finally, living in a rural location increased a person’s odds of being in the “Very often” group by 1.722.

After speaking with scholars who specialize in Indonesian politics and discussions with Indonesian elites (e.g., academics and politicians), I learned about additional non-religious factors for voter turnout that are arguably unique to a developing democracy or Indonesia in particular. I tested another model that incorporated items such as transportation and consumption costs, personal safety concerns, being invited by other people, and incentives like money or gifts (e.g., t-shirts and hats). I included the previously discussed variables of age, feeling close to a party, and rural/urban location as a set of controls. As the next table demonstrates, I only found transportation costs and personal safety concerns to be significant among the additional non-religious factors:

### Table 5.7 Model 2: Odds of Being Among Frequent Voter Group with Multiple Non-Religious Factors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable: Voting (a)</th>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>Wald</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
<th>95% Confidence Interval for Exp(B)</th>
<th>Lower Bound</th>
<th>Upper Bound</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very often</td>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-1.110</td>
<td>.744</td>
<td>2.225</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.136</td>
<td>1.029</td>
<td>1.011 - 1.047</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.029</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>9.865</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>1.030</td>
<td>.830 - 1.288</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Invitation from other people (e.g., friends, family, etc.)</td>
<td>-.186</td>
<td>.224</td>
<td>.691</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.406</td>
<td>.830</td>
<td>.535 - 1.288</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Invitation from religious leader/prominent</td>
<td>.147</td>
<td>.178</td>
<td>.681</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.409</td>
<td>1.158</td>
<td>.818 - 1.640</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Questions 163-169: How important are the following things for your participation in the aforementioned activities? (Reference to political participation measures asked earlier in the survey.)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Intercept</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Somewhat often</th>
<th>Interception</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Rarely</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Transportation and</td>
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<td>.248</td>
<td>6.695</td>
<td>1.010</td>
<td>.658</td>
<td>2.254</td>
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<tr>
<td>consumption costs</td>
<td>.248</td>
<td>.245</td>
<td>27.547</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>2.241</td>
<td>.892</td>
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<tr>
<td>“Uang lelah” or gifts</td>
<td>-2.254</td>
<td>.945</td>
<td>5.687</td>
<td>1.017</td>
<td>.880</td>
<td>1.914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>like t-shirts, hats, etc.</td>
<td>.240</td>
<td>.276</td>
<td>10.404</td>
<td>1.001</td>
<td>.705</td>
<td>1.360</td>
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<td>Personal safety</td>
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<td>.130</td>
<td>1.323</td>
<td>1.250</td>
<td>.752</td>
<td>.410</td>
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<td>.345</td>
<td>.680</td>
<td>1.410</td>
<td>.382</td>
<td>.239</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.226</td>
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<td>1.023</td>
<td>.860</td>
<td>.401</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.234</td>
<td>7.047</td>
<td>1.008</td>
<td>1.177</td>
<td>.167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-1.638</td>
<td>.763</td>
<td>4.610</td>
<td>1.032</td>
<td>.868</td>
<td>.567</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>.009</td>
<td>8.737</td>
<td>1.003</td>
<td>1.009</td>
<td>1.047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.233</td>
<td>.508</td>
<td>1.476</td>
<td>.536</td>
<td>1.337</td>
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<td>people (e.g., friends, family,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>etc.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invitation from religious</td>
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<td>.185</td>
<td>.961</td>
<td>1.327</td>
<td>.834</td>
<td>1.722</td>
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<tr>
<td>leader/prominent figure</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invitation from workplace</td>
<td>.029</td>
<td>.228</td>
<td>.016</td>
<td>1.899</td>
<td>.658</td>
<td>1.610</td>
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<tr>
<td>leader/prominent figure</td>
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<tr>
<td>Invitation from a political</td>
<td>-.142</td>
<td>.244</td>
<td>.337</td>
<td>1.561</td>
<td>.538</td>
<td>1.400</td>
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<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-2.254</td>
<td>.945</td>
<td>5.687</td>
<td>1.017</td>
<td>.880</td>
<td>1.914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.023</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td>4.448</td>
<td>1.035</td>
<td>1.002</td>
<td>1.046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invitation from other</td>
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<td>.276</td>
<td>10.404</td>
<td>1.001</td>
<td>.239</td>
<td>.705</td>
</tr>
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<td>people (e.g., friends, family,</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>etc.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Invitation from religious</td>
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<td>.222</td>
<td>1.914</td>
<td>1.167</td>
<td>.880</td>
<td>2.104</td>
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<td>leader/prominent figure</td>
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</table>
Because Indonesia is often considered to be a “collective society” with a group rather than individual orientation, scholars and laypersons tend to think that social pressure of some kind can significantly impact political behavior either positively or negatively. Though social pressures exist, my survey respondents generally do not think that invitations from other people are important influences for political behavior. The percentages of those answering “Not important” when asked about invitations from family and friends was 61.4%, invitations from religious leaders/prominent figures was 51.6%, invitations from workplace leaders/prominent figures was 62.6%, and invitations from political party persons was 71.1%. However, within this set of possible invitations, religious leaders/prominent figures garnered the highest percentage if one combines the categories of “Very important” and “Important” (32.3%). Family and friends along with workplace leaders each had 17.3%, while political party persons only had 8.9%. When controlling for multiple factors, though, my model shows that these social invitations overall are statistically insignificant for voter turnout for the “Very often” group, but not the “Rarely” category.

There is also conventional wisdom that incentives like money or small gifts can significantly influence voter turnout. Slow economic growth or high unemployment rates contribute to the notion that vote-buying is easy and common. On the contrary, 55.4% of survey respondents stated that “uang lelah” or gifts like t-shirts, hats, etc. were not

<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
<th>.258</th>
<th>.270</th>
<th>.911</th>
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<th>.340</th>
<th>1.294</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Invitation from a political party person</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Uang lelah” or gifts like t-shirts, hats, etc.</td>
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<td><strong>Personal safety</strong></td>
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<td>.019</td>
<td>.707</td>
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<td>.587</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>Rural</td>
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<td>.979</td>
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<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) The reference category is: Never.
(b) This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.
important to them. It is not that vote-buying or giving other material incentives do not happen, but rather it does not seem that recipients seriously factor such goods into their decisions to vote or not. My model supplements this opinion by showing that this variable is indeed insignificant for voter turnout.

The additional non-religious variables that do seem to matter are transportation and consumption costs and concerns about personal safety. For the variable of transportation and consumption costs, a one unit increase such as from “Very important” to “Important” or “Less important” to “Not important” implies an increase in odds of 1.756 for being found in the frequent group of voters. In other words, as the importance of transportation and consumption costs goes down, the more likely one will find that respondent in the “Very often” group. Presumably, if someone has the means to participate and does not worry too much about costs, he or she will go to the polls. As for personal safety, a one unit increase in the importance scale in the direction of “Less important” or “Not important” would mean a decrease in odds of .763 for being found in the frequent group of voters. This also means that a respondent who felt that personal safety was very important to him or her is more likely to be in the “Very often” group. One possible interpretation of this link is that people will turn out to vote if they believe that the activity is safe and will not bring them harm.

In summary, the variables that significantly correlated with voter turnout were party identification, rural/urban location, age, transportation and consumption costs, and personal safety concerns. The insignificant variables were SES, gender, invitations from other people, and incentives like money or gifts. Certain traditional variables travel well enough from different country contexts like the U.S., while others do not. It would be a mistake to insist that one factor drives voter turnout since multiple influences may be at work; it depends on the individual Indonesian. It might also be a mistake to solely focus on non-religious variables to the exclusion of religious factors. The next section therefore provides an assessment of potential religious variables for voter turnout in case they, too, have a significant role to play.
Religious Influences

It must first be noted that there are challenges to measuring Islam’s influence for voter turnout. As discussed in Chapter II, Islam does not lend itself easily to categorization because of religious diffusion or diversity. In addition, there is not an expressly linear relationship between religion or religiosity and voting. Simply being Muslim does not automatically translate into voting. Though my research may not perfectly capture “Islam” or what it means to be “Muslim,” my attempts to identify or specify relationships between religious identity and voter turnout produced some interesting results. Like the aforementioned non-religious variables, not all religious variables are significant for voter turnout. Only selected aspects of personal piety and religious association seem to matter.

In an effort to be sensitive to religious diversity in general and at the individual-level, I consulted with Muslim Indonesian informants to get a sense of different religious practices. My 2004 mini-survey and focus group discussions from 2005 and 2006 provided examples such as praying five times a day, reading or reciting the Qur'an, involvement in religious organizations, discussions about religion, studying religion, and celebrating holy days. I then incorporated multiple religiosity measures into my 2006 survey to see which personal and associational attributes of the religion correlated with voter turnout. I kept the different components separate, rather than collapsed into an index variable, because each measure was not usually highly correlated with the others, though they were all significant at the .01 level (two-tailed). In bivariate correlation tests, for instance, the highest correlation figures were between discussions about beliefs or religion with family and discussions about beliefs or religion with a friend or work colleague (.691) and discussions with a religious leader (.602). Praying five times a day correlated with fasting during Ramadhan (.655), and performing optional fasting correlated with performing optional prayers (.588). Most of the remaining correlations ranged between .097 to around .450. The various measures are picking up certain aspects of religiosity common to the faithful, but are also capturing something different.

I also focused on measuring religious practices more so than beliefs because it is very difficult to concretely measure beliefs. For example, there are measurement concerns for articulated belief and implicit belief. Articulated beliefs are those that
individuals acknowledge and have some awareness. People may be willing to share, but the sharing could also be limited. Implicit beliefs are those that people may “really” have with perhaps less awareness. It is hard to talk about implicit beliefs if people do not know how to communicate their beliefs or even know if they have them in the first place. In addition, sometimes there is inconsistency within each of these two types of belief. For instance, a person might believe one thing, says he or she believes it, or thinks he or she believes it, but then act in a contradictory fashion. Because belief and talking about belief involve special forms of cognition, they may not reflect actual practices and habits well. Alternatively, measuring religious practices is easier in that people usually know and can recall if they physically did or did not perform an action. In this way, there is less ambiguity for measuring practice compared to beliefs or opinions. Unlike religious practice, religious beliefs are also much more subjective and can potentially span a limitless number of topics, which makes choosing precise measures a challenge. This subjectivity lends itself to much variation for interpretation as well.

The first type of religious variable of interest is personal piety. “Personal piety” can be used as an umbrella term for those religious activities that are internally-focused. In the case of Islam in Indonesia, personal piety can be measured by praying five times a day, fasting during Ramadhan, performing optional prayers, performing optional fasting, and reading or reciting the Qur’an outside of prayers. These activities indicate levels of religiosity, but are notably personal in nature. These religious practices do not necessitate interactions with others formally or informally. Table 5.8 shows a probability relationship between the five measures of personal piety and the likelihood or odds of being in the “Very often” group of voters compared to the “Never” group of voters:

Table 5.8 Odds of Being Among Frequent Voter Group with Personal Piety Measures.192

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable: Voting (a)</th>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>Wald</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
<th>95% Confidence Interval for Exp(B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

192 The entire sample of survey respondents is included (i.e., Muslims and non-Muslims) in this set of models in an effort to avoid statistical bias, but for interpretative purposes, the majority of respondents are self-reported Muslims and presumably most non-Muslims did not answer questions that were specifically representative of Islam.
Not all five measures of personal piety appear to be significantly related to voter turnout. Only fasting during Ramadhan and reading or reciting the Qur’an outside of regular prayers are statistically significant. The coefficients are negative, which means that for
each unit increase in the direction of less frequency (e.g., moving from “Very often” to “Often” or “Often” to “Rarely” or “Rarely” to “Never”), there is a decrease in odds for finding that respondent in the frequent group of voters. Substantively, this is a “positive” finding for the relationship between personal piety and voter turnout.

The second type of religious variable of interest is “associational components of Islam.” Associational here refers to religious activities that are externally-oriented. The next table presents the odds of an Indonesian being found in the frequent group of voters compared to the “Never” group with regards to discussing one beliefs or religion with others. The only religious variable that is statistically significant is discussing beliefs or religion with a religious leader:

### Table 5.9 Odds of Being Among Frequent Voter Group with Discussions with Other People about Beliefs or Religion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable: Voting</th>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>Wald</th>
<th>Df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
<th>95% Confidence Interval for Exp(B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very often</td>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>1.737</td>
<td>.559</td>
<td>9.665</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td></td>
<td>.639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>9.829</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>1.025</td>
<td>1.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Family discussion</td>
<td>-.019</td>
<td>.161</td>
<td>.014</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.907</td>
<td>.981</td>
<td>.716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Friend discussion</td>
<td>.248</td>
<td>.165</td>
<td>2.240</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.134</td>
<td>1.281</td>
<td>.926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Religious leader discussion</td>
<td>-.529</td>
<td>.148</td>
<td>12.724</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.589</td>
<td>.440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not feel close to a party</td>
<td>-.753</td>
<td>.283</td>
<td>7.072</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.471</td>
<td>.270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Feel close to a party</td>
<td>0(b)</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>.339</td>
<td>.200</td>
<td>2.875</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.090</td>
<td>1.403</td>
<td>.949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>0(b)</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat often</td>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>.145</td>
<td>.578</td>
<td>.063</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.802</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.023</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>7.849</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>1.023</td>
<td>1.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Family discussion</td>
<td>.173</td>
<td>.166</td>
<td>1.093</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.296</td>
<td>1.189</td>
<td>.859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Friend discussion</td>
<td>.149</td>
<td>.171</td>
<td>.759</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.384</td>
<td>1.161</td>
<td>.830</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Religious leader discussion</td>
<td>-.317</td>
<td>.153</td>
<td>4.280</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.039</td>
<td>.729</td>
<td>.540</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

103
These findings suggest that the odds of being in the frequent group of voters are decreased by .589 for each incremental move in the direction of fewer or no discussions with a religious leader. That is, moving from “Very often” to “Often” to “Rarely” to “Never” has a dampening effect on voter turnout. While an expressed invitation from religious leaders/prominent figures did not show up as statistically significant in an earlier model, this model indicates that there is something about discussions with them that is relevant for voter turnout.

Discussions are not the only way to measure association or an external-orientation within Islam, however. The next model includes additional measures: congregational/community/group prayers besides Friday prayers, joining religious recitations/teachings (e.g., “majelis taklim,” religious lectures/speeches, and “tahlilan”), requesting a prayer or advice from a religious leader, and watching, listening, or reading religious programs via television, radio, newspaper, or websites. These activities typically involve group settings and social interactions often at a mosque.
Table 5.10 Odds of Being Among Frequent Voter Group with Associational Measures of Islam.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable: Voting (a)</th>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>Wald</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
<th>95% Confidence Interval for Exp(B)</th>
<th>Lower Bound</th>
<th>Upper Bound</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Very often</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intercept</td>
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<td>.678</td>
<td>19.953</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.007</td>
<td>1.040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.023</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>7.569</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>1.023</td>
<td></td>
<td>.821</td>
<td>1.475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Group Prayer</td>
<td>.096</td>
<td>.149</td>
<td>.411</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.522</td>
<td>1.101</td>
<td></td>
<td>.592</td>
<td>1.098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recitations/Teachings</td>
<td>-.215</td>
<td>.158</td>
<td>1.864</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.172</td>
<td>.806</td>
<td></td>
<td>.522</td>
<td>1.098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Religious Leader Advice</td>
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<td>.149</td>
<td>.772</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.380</td>
<td>.877</td>
<td></td>
<td>.654</td>
<td>1.175</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Religious Programs</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.532</td>
<td></td>
<td>.400</td>
<td>.707</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not close to a party</td>
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<td>.314</td>
<td>5.621</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.018</td>
<td>.475</td>
<td></td>
<td>.257</td>
<td>.879</td>
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<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td></td>
<td>.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rural</td>
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<td>.213</td>
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<td>.019</td>
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<td>2.504</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
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<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td></td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Somewhat often</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Intercept</td>
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<td>.694</td>
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<td>.114</td>
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<td>.009</td>
<td>1.023</td>
<td></td>
<td>.907</td>
<td>1.646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Group Prayer</td>
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<td>.152</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>.187</td>
<td>1.222</td>
<td></td>
<td>.907</td>
<td>1.646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recitations/Teachings</td>
<td>-.079</td>
<td>.161</td>
<td>.243</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.622</td>
<td>.924</td>
<td></td>
<td>.674</td>
<td>1.266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Religious Leader Advice</td>
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<td>.154</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.935</td>
<td>1.013</td>
<td></td>
<td>.749</td>
<td>1.368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Religious Programs</td>
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<td>.149</td>
<td>13.550</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.579</td>
<td></td>
<td>.433</td>
<td>.774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not close to a party</td>
<td>-.521</td>
<td>.324</td>
<td>2.586</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.108</td>
<td>.594</td>
<td></td>
<td>.315</td>
<td>1.121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Close to a party</td>
<td>0(b)</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td></td>
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<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>1.145</td>
<td>.221</td>
<td>26.869</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>3.142</td>
<td></td>
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<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td></td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Rarely</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-.068</td>
<td>.831</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.935</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.019</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>3.698</td>
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<td>.054</td>
<td>1.020</td>
<td></td>
<td>.867</td>
<td>1.782</td>
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<td>.218</td>
<td>.184</td>
<td>1.406</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.236</td>
<td>1.243</td>
<td></td>
<td>.616</td>
<td>1.314</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Recitations/Teachings</td>
<td>-.106</td>
<td>.193</td>
<td>.299</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.585</td>
<td>.900</td>
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<td>.486</td>
<td>.979</td>
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<td>.184</td>
<td>.016</td>
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<td>.899</td>
<td>1.024</td>
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<td>.713</td>
<td>1.469</td>
</tr>
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<td>Religious Programs</td>
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<td>.178</td>
<td>4.329</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.037</td>
<td>.690</td>
<td></td>
<td>.486</td>
<td>.979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not close to a party</td>
<td>-.309</td>
<td>.387</td>
<td>.636</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.425</td>
<td>.734</td>
<td></td>
<td>.344</td>
<td>1.569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Close to a party</td>
<td>0(b)</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td></td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>.427</td>
<td>.262</td>
<td>2.651</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.103</td>
<td>1.532</td>
<td></td>
<td>.917</td>
<td>2.561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>0(b)</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td></td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) The reference category is: Never.
(b) This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.

Here we see that watching, listening, or reading religious programs via television, radio, newspaper, or websites is statistically significant. The negative coefficient means that
moving in the direction of “Rarely” or “Never” decreases the odds by .532 of finding a respondent in the category of frequent voters.

A final measure of Islam with a view towards an associational or external orientation is membership and activity level in religious organizations. The next model includes a combination of religious and non-religious organizations for comparative purposes:

Table 5.11 Odds of Being Among Frequent Voter Group with Social, Religious, and Political Organizations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable: Voting (a)</th>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>Wald</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
<th>95% Confidence Interval for Exp(B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very often</td>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>12.786</td>
<td>3.849</td>
<td>11.035</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>1.023</td>
<td>1.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.023</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>8.044</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>.570</td>
<td>.278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Workers union (e.g., laborers union, farmers union)</td>
<td>-.563</td>
<td>.366</td>
<td>2.370</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.124</td>
<td>.570</td>
<td>.278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Professional association (e.g., teacher, doctor, business, etc.)</td>
<td>-.368</td>
<td>.329</td>
<td>1.249</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.264</td>
<td>.692</td>
<td>.363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social association such as art, culture, sports, animal lovers, etc.</td>
<td>.387</td>
<td>.209</td>
<td>3.426</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.064</td>
<td>1.473</td>
<td>.977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Religious organization or group like NU, Muhammadiyah, church, etc.</td>
<td>-.465</td>
<td>.170</td>
<td>7.462</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.628</td>
<td>.450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social organization such as social welfare, family, education, women, environment, health, etc.</td>
<td>-1.038</td>
<td>.426</td>
<td>5.930</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.015</td>
<td>.354</td>
<td>.153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social organization in the village such as village council/board “Pemuda”</td>
<td>-.878</td>
<td>.427</td>
<td>4.223</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.040</td>
<td>.416</td>
<td>.180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Pemuda”</td>
<td>.381</td>
<td>.219</td>
<td>3.020</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.082</td>
<td>1.463</td>
<td>.952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization Type</td>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Workers Union (e.g., laborers union, farmers union)</td>
<td>Professional Association (e.g., teacher, doctor, business, etc.)</td>
<td>Social Association such as art, culture, sports, animal lovers, etc.</td>
<td>Religious Organization or group like NU, Muhammadiyah, church, etc.</td>
<td>Social Organization such as social welfare, family, education, women, environment, health, etc.</td>
<td>Social Organization in the village such as village council/board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student organization on or off campus</td>
<td>-0.661</td>
<td>0.595</td>
<td>1.232</td>
<td>1.267</td>
<td>0.516</td>
<td>0.161</td>
<td>1.659</td>
<td>0.112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political organization (e.g., political party)</td>
<td>0.112</td>
<td>0.350</td>
<td>0.103</td>
<td>0.748</td>
<td>1.119</td>
<td>0.563</td>
<td>2.222</td>
<td>0.516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not close to a party</td>
<td>0.498</td>
<td>0.205</td>
<td>5.891</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>1.646</td>
<td>1.101</td>
<td>2.461</td>
<td>0.112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close to a party</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat often</td>
<td>1.783</td>
<td>4.864</td>
<td>0.134</td>
<td>1.714</td>
<td>1.022</td>
<td>1.006</td>
<td>1.039</td>
<td>-0.445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Pemuda&quot; Organization</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization (e.g., political party)</th>
<th>Intercept</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Workers union (e.g., laborers union, farmers union)</th>
<th>Professional association (e.g., teacher, doctor, business, etc.)</th>
<th>Social association such as art, culture, sports, animal lovers, etc.</th>
<th>Religious organization or group like NU, Muhammadiyah, church, etc.</th>
<th>Social organization such as social welfare, family, education, women, environment, health, etc.</th>
<th>Social organization in the village such as village council/board</th>
<th>“Pemuda” organization</th>
<th>Student organization on or off campus</th>
<th>Political organization (e.g., political party)</th>
<th>Not close to a party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>-42.343</td>
<td></td>
<td>.019</td>
<td>-.208</td>
<td>.449</td>
<td>-.193</td>
<td>-.886</td>
<td>-.936</td>
<td>.149</td>
<td>-.500</td>
<td>12.723</td>
<td>-.178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>0(b)</td>
<td>.4056</td>
<td>.10897</td>
<td>.047</td>
<td>.108</td>
<td>.347</td>
<td>.052</td>
<td>.039</td>
<td>.261</td>
<td>.559</td>
<td>.35536.457</td>
<td>.381</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The survey question asked about membership and activity levels in various organizations. The answer choices were “Very active,” “Somewhat active,” “Less active,” and “Not a member.” The model shows that active involvement in a religious organization or group like NU, Muhammadiyah, church, etc. is statistically significantly for voter turnout.

Other types of organizations that were found to be significant include social organizations such as social welfare, family, education, women, environment, health, etc. and social organizations in the village such as village council/board. The negative coefficients for these three types of groups mean that a unit increase on the scale of organizational involvement in the direction of less or not activity implies a decrease in odds of being found in the “Very often” group of voters. For religious organizations in particular, the odds are decreased by .628 of being in the frequent voters group for each unit increase towards less participation in organizations like NU, Muhammadiyah, church, etc.

**Behind the Numbers**

The data showing a mixture of significant relationships between different components of a person’s identity and voter turnout are not surprising since the faithful are not always primarily, totally, or uniformly guided by their religion to the exclusion of other influences. While the models give us a snapshot of potential influences, it is impossible to locate exactly when, how, and why some non-religious variables matter more or less than religious variables at any given point in time for an individual. Despite this limitation, what the models do tell us is that religion can and does matter for individual Indonesians regarding voter turnout, but it depends.

If we take a close look at the influence of Islam for voter turnout, we find that it is perhaps less the content or substance of the religion and more the communication and interactions with other followers that influence electoral behavior. This appears to be a pattern of political participation by religious actors making use of religion somewhat modestly or subtly through a kind of “joining” rather than an order of what to think.
The significance of discussions with religious leaders, paying attention to religious programs, and involvement in religious organizations shows that social networks with a religious dimension are closely connected to politics in Indonesia. For those on the ground, this finding is probably not shocking because religious organizations in particular contribute to citizens’ exposure to the process and content of electoral politics. For example, Medelina K. Hendytio, a researcher with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), says that she sees her peers learning about specific visions of political education and voter education in groups such as Nahdlatul Ulama and its women’s wings. She thinks that members learn in the group and then are “siap untuk masuk politik” (“ready to enter politics”). Even if Muslim Indonesians are not regularly or actively involved in religious organizations, they get a lot of information and cues for electoral behavior from them. A case in point is Muhammadiyah, which has millions of members and whose behavior in the electoral arena therefore does not go without notice. In 2006, Abdul Mu’ti was the Chairman of Muhammadiyah Youth and Education. He explained that Muhammadiyah’s involvement in politics varies at the organizational level and individual member level. As an organization, it provides aspiration, advice, and opportunities. For example, Muhammadiyah communicates information to its members (and the general public) via media statements and publications, sometimes gives official endorsements for political parties and candidates before elections, holds meetings or hearings, and engages in lobbying efforts. Muhammadiyah also partners with non-profit organizations and international agencies on political education projects. On occasion, Muhammadiyah participates in demonstrations. Of note is that individual members are free to interpret Muhammadiyah’s teachings and instruction, which means that not all members follow what leadership suggests. For instance, Muhammadiyah officially endorsed Amien Rais for president in the 2004 elections, but he lost in the first round. Muhammadiyah did not know what was in the “hati nurani” (“inner heart”) of their members who chose another candidate – and for many, this was okay. Mu’ti adds that Muhammadiyah is like a house with different entrances or gates. Muslim Indonesians join the organization because of different

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193 Jennifer L. Epley, Personal interview with Medelina K. Hendytio (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 13 December 2006).
purposes and interests, only one of which might be politics. As such, the organization emphasizes broader issues and programs rather than dictating each step for individual members at the polls.\textsuperscript{194}

Like Muhammadiyah, Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI, Muslim Students Association) members join elections and the organization as a whole supports democracy. According to Sidratahta Mukhtar,\textsuperscript{195} HMI provides political socialization through pemikiran (thinking) and diskusi (discussion); voter education (e.g., education for women to participate); and verbal support and education for “free and fair elections” and “good candidates.” Individuals are free to join political activities on their own, but are encouraged to incorporate HMI’s vision of Islam. Many individual members do not support explicitly Islamic parties, though, since they are deemed not to be sufficiently inclusive.\textsuperscript{196}

Early on, The Asia Foundation recognized the importance of citizens’ exposure to religious organizations with regards to electoral politics. Since 1999, the foundation has supported Jaringan Pendidikan Pemilih untuk Rakyat (JPPR, People’s Voter Education Network). JPPR’s aim is to ensure free and fair elections in Indonesia. It is a national network and many members are affiliated with Muhammadiyah and NU. JPPR is itself non-sectarian and includes Christian and interfaith organizations, but primarily draw on the resources of Muslim organizations to practically and effectively reach as many Indonesians as possible. The sheer size and reach of religious organizations mean a better ability to mobilize members and network volunteers to spread voter education. Douglas Ramage (Representative to Indonesia/Director of The Asia Foundation in 2006) explains that religion is a vehicle for multiple objectives. Often development agencies see Muslim groups as only charitable groups when in fact they are also important for good governance and economic development.\textsuperscript{197} From a policy perspective, Robin Bush (current Director of The Asia Foundation in Jakarta) adds that since religion infuses life

\textsuperscript{194} Jennifer L. Epley, Personal interview with Abdul Mu’ti (Jakarta: Muhammadiyah Offices: Youth Division and Education Division, 27 June 2006).
\textsuperscript{195} In February 2006, Sidratahta Mukhtar was a Ph.D. student at Universitas Indonesia and a candidate for HMI Chairman from the Malang branch.
\textsuperscript{196} Jennifer L. Epley, Personal interview with Sidratahta Mukhtar (Makassar: Muslim Students Association 25\textsuperscript{th} National Committee Congress, 23 February 2006).
\textsuperscript{197} Jennifer L. Epley, Personal interview with Douglas Ramage (Jakarta: The Asia Foundation, 16 March 2006).
in Indonesia, it is more effective to have political education programs put their messages in religious terms. Muhammadiyah and NU are able to help with public awareness and promote participation at the community level because they are already present at that smaller community level and share a sense of identity with members.\(^{198}\) This is especially important for issues of gender. Sandra Hamid states that working with and through religious organizations permits the foundation to support women’s involvement in elections since women are often more receptive to listening to religious organizations and things are in a language they understand.\(^{199}\)

While I do not have survey data that causally links the work of NU, Muhammadiyah, HMI, and The Asia Foundation to voter turnout, it seems that their efforts may have some impact if they are indeed reaching individuals through religious leaders, media programs, and formal organizations. My understanding is that there is an element of socialization or encouragement of “democratic culture” via religious social networks that indirectly or even directly influences frequent voting. This is a subject deserving of further in-depth research.

**Conclusion**

Overall, though religion is an important part of an individual’s identity, it is not always significant for voter turnout. When it is significant, associational components of Islam seem to have more (or at least a different kind of) impact than personal piety and certain non-religious variables. Voting also appears to be more a form of political participation by religious actors rather than “religious political participation” since the act of voting in and of itself is not explicitly guided by religious goals or agendas. However, further research is necessary to determine correlates of vote choice because the substance of decisions may actually be related to religious political participation. Such research is slowly emerging as political scientists with interests in Indonesia who usually research political parties are beginning to think and write more about individual voters, especially regarding support for religious versus non-religious parties. For example, Saiful Mujani of the Indonesian Survey Institute and R. William Liddle of The Ohio State University

\(^{198}\) Jennifer L. Epley, Personal interview with Robin Bush (Jakarta: The Asia Foundation, 13 April 2006).

\(^{199}\) Jennifer L. Epley, Personal interview with Sandra Hamid (Jakarta: The Asia Foundation, 19 April 2006).
find that “secular” political parties and politicians currently dominate Indonesian politics. They also observe a decrease in voter support for Islamist parties in the 2009 elections. However, Mujani and Liddle note that individual Muslims hold a combination of Islamist and “secular” values, which can varyingly impact vote choice and support for Islamist organizations (though they find that support for such groups is very low). Like their initial research, my data offers more questions than answers for the significance of religion for electoral behavior under different circumstances, but together our observations lay some critical groundwork for future projects.

One possible way to locate more answers or additional clarification about how influential Islam is for political participation is to examine non-electoral behavior. Demonstrations and protests are the subject of the next chapter. Such activities are similar to voting in that they are conventional, legal, and usually peaceful forms of participation, but differ in terms of popularity/frequency and motivation. Like voter turnout, there is a mixture of religious and non-religious influences for demonstrations and protests, but unlike voter turnout, there are times when religion takes on a much clearer and stronger role.

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Equinox Publishing.


Chapter VI

Non-Electoral Behavior: Demonstrations and Protests in Indonesia

Chapter V examined the role of religious and non-religious influences for voter turnout and found a mixture of variables to be significant. For religion especially, it appears that certain personal and associational components of Islam significantly and positively correlate with voter turnout. However, a key finding is that despite this religious influence, the act of voting itself is a form of political participation by religious actors rather than religious political participation. This chapter takes a closer look at the similarities and differences between political participation by religious actors and religious political participation in the context of non-electoral behavior, specifically demonstrations and protests.

As noted in the previous chapter, “religious political participation” can be defined as political participation that has religious ends or is motivated by religious beliefs and values. We can identify religious political participation via the presence of “religiously-relevant political issues” and “religious resources” (e.g., religious organizations, leaders, rhetoric/language, and symbols). While demonstrations and protests are by no means the norm in contemporary Indonesia, they are useful case studies for identifying and understanding religious political participation because “politicized religion” is more frequently related to public policy debates, which garner protest reactions, than electoral politics or voter turnout.

This chapter provides background on why people are generally thought to engage in demonstration and protest activities, information about Muslim Indonesians regarding such behavior, and an analysis of related religious and non-religious factors.
Background

Scholars and laypersons typically view non-electoral behavior in the form of protest to be unconventional because the participation is outside of traditional institutions or channels of influencing the state such as elections or contacting officials (Barnes and Kaase 1979; Dalton and van Sickle 2005). Depending on how broadly “protest” is defined, it can include silent non-compliance, gossip, character murder, and sabotage (Scott 1985) or violent acts like rebellions and assassinations (Gurr 1968). Protests are usually perceived to be a form of collective action that is disruptive and challenging. Protests can vary in planning or strategies, number and type of actors, time period (short-versus long-term), level or locale, form (e.g., demonstrations, boycotts, and riots), and outcomes.

There are three classic arguments for what influences political protest. First, deprivation and dissatisfaction are believed to be motivating influences for protest. People are thought to protest out of a relative sense of deprivation or inequality in relation to others and in relation to their expectations. Existing poor economic situations or serious changes to economic situations are especially thought to stimulate negative psychological reactions, which are followed by protest behavior (Gurr 1968, 1970; and Bratton and van de Walle 1992). Citizens may be frustrated with institutional incompetence, low state capacity, or, at the extreme end, repression. However, beyond a set of shared grievances, there is also a need for organizational resources and actors to mobilize people. This is the topic of resource mobilization theory.

Second, studies show that the type of institutional setting in which citizens live can contribute to protests. For example, some scholars believe that a closed political system increases the likelihood that people will choose unconventional political activities because they do not have access to traditional means (Kitschelt 1986). Protesters are thought to choose activities that are outside of the system because they are not “insiders.” On the other hand, there is research indicating that open political systems that permit protests witness them more often because people are freer and therefore more likely to engage in this activity. In open systems, the potential and actual costs to protest are lower when compared to living under repressive regimes where protesting can elicit serious negative consequences (Dalton and van Sickle 2005). A system that is both
closed and open is said to have a curvilinear relationship where different levels or combinations of openness correspond with varying degrees of protest (Meyer 2004). Related to this institutional setting argument is political opportunity theory, which examines how receptive or vulnerable a political system is to challenge. Changes in political pluralism, elite unity, or institutions can open up spaces for protest (Eisinger 1973; Tarrow 1998; and Meyer 2004).

Third, “political culture” is thought to influence protest. There are three interpretations of this notion. Some think that protest is organically tied to certain geographic, racial, ethnic, class, or other group identifications. Others find that modernization can lead to a political culture where people emphasize self-expression and participation, which can encourage behavior that challenges elites and the state (Inglehart 1990, 1997; and Inglehart and Welzel 2005). The latter authors note that protest may eventually be added to conventional repertoires of political participation as challenges become more common in advanced industrialized democracies. Still others argue that ideological extremism is connected to protest (Powell 1998). This idea is based on the observation that political extremism such as left-right divides or fundamentalism within radical religious groups incites conflict.

As for who specifically gets involved in protest, literature from political science and research from scholars of social movements point to the importance of individual resources and socialization processes, particularly the role of social networks in inviting and organizing citizens. It is widely believed that individuals who get involved in protests are those who have strong beliefs or convictions, information, time, money, and expertise plus a feeling of dissatisfaction and support for collective action from like-minded people. Although there are debates concerning how much and how often each of these factors is necessary for protest behavior, there is general agreement that it takes a lot for a person to take to the streets. Social networks and organizations are thought to ease the amount of work and risk for individuals to participate, as well as effectively combine individual efforts into a group whole. In this way, they are often deemed to be a more critical determinant of protest activities than individual characteristics or personalities since activists can come from all walks of life.
Demonstrations and Protests

As noted in Table 3.3, few Muslim Indonesian survey respondents in 2006 said that they frequently join in strikes, demonstrations, protests, or boycotts; occupy public buildings; block traffic; or get involved in disturbances/riots. Only 0.1% answered “Very often,” 0.8% said “Somewhat often,” and 2.9% stated “Rarely.” These low percentages are not surprising given that the Suharto regime suppressed dissent for over thirty years, and demonstrations and protests are therefore a fairly uncommon and arguably new phenomenon. However, such small percentages do not convey the powerful impact of these activities. For instance, they contributed to Suharto’s fall from office and continue to be relevant for public policy debates. The small percentages also do not convey the “normalcy” of these activities. What was once understood to be unconventional participation during the Suharto period is now considered “normal” during the democratization period. The Indonesian analyst Munafrizal Manan notes,

Since the beginning of mid-1998, the daring of society increased in a very impressive manner. Voices of protest and demands that would have seemed absurd to imagine occurring openly before became a part of the reality of contemporary Indonesian political life. Protests, demonstrations, rallies, and mass actions of different kinds, became normal political activities. Even before the year [1998] had ended there had been almost 3,000 demonstrations carried out by almost every social layer.

“Normalcy” here refers to acceptance and tolerance of protest as a method of political participation oriented towards the state, but not necessarily agreement with the content or outcomes of such an approach.

While there is a common perception that fewer demonstrations have occurred since 1998, they happen on a regular enough basis to make headlines in the daily local and national news. Endy Bayuni, who was the Chief Editor of The Jakarta Post in 2006, says that everyday there is more than one story to choose from to report about

201 95.7% answered “Never,” and 0.6% are listed as “Don’t know/No answer.”
demonstrations from Jakarta and elsewhere. Sometimes there are three or four
demonstrations planned for one location in Central Jakarta alone, so the police have to
regulate the hours when granting permissions.\textsuperscript{203}

While an accurate numerical count of strikes, demonstrations, protests, riots, etc.
(hereafter SDPR) is not possible because the data are not available from government or
private sources and because newspapers are subjective in their decisions to publish stories,
one can still get a good impression of how popular non-electoral behavior is by looking at
newspaper article frequency from two daily newspapers: \textit{Kompas} and \textit{Republika}.
\textit{Kompas} has a reputation for being a “people’s paper” (but perhaps of the United States’
\textit{New York Times} variety), and \textit{Republika} has a general reputation for being a “Muslim
paper.” The most widespread form of political activity reported in both papers is
demonstrations. In 2005, \textit{Kompas} had 386 articles about SDPR and \textit{Republika} had 340.
In 2006, \textit{Kompas} had 342 articles and \textit{Republika} had 280.\textsuperscript{204} The following two figures
list their monthly article frequencies:

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure6_1.png}
\caption{National News Coverage of SDPR in Indonesia During 2005.}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{203} Jennifer L. Epley, Personal interview with Endy Bayuni (Jakarta, 23 March 2006).
\textsuperscript{204} It is unclear what explains the decline of SDPR reports in 2006 for \textit{Kompas} and \textit{Republika}. 

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The articles from *Kompas* and *Republika* provide information about location, subject matter, and actors for cases of SDPR, but lack content standardization, thus making conclusive comparative statements difficult. Some general patterns did emerge, though. I first observed that SDPR activities took place throughout the year, with fewer reports listed in only a handful of months during the two years. Second, reports of SDPR came from all across the Indonesian archipelago, but the vast majority of them are about activities in the capital city of Jakarta. This is likely due to the perspective that one’s protest activity will be most effective if directly targeted at officials and policies in the political capital where all of the main politicians and offices are physically located. Third, many SDPR activities centered on a key single public policy issue. Fourth, economic issues such as unemployment, price hikes, oil subsidies, corruption, etc. were the most popular subjects of reported SDPR cases. The second most popular subject was the general category of “political,” which includes issues related to political parties, elections, representation, “secular” public policies, institutional reform, and the like. Fifth, few cases of SDPR are explicitly religious in nature such as public policies with religious dimensions or involving religious actors and organizations. My sixth observation was
that the articles about SDPR included a range in unit size from groups of less than 50 to those in the thousands. Finally, the articles mention an assortment of participants from individuals to formal social or political organizations to “spontaneous” gatherings, all representing different socio-economic, gender, ethnic, religious, and political backgrounds.

Other researchers make similar observations about reported cases of SDPR by the mass media. Max Lane, an author, translator, and researcher with over 35 years of experience in and with Indonesia,\(^\text{205}\) writes,

> These kinds of protest actions, and many others, have continued at a sustained pace since 1998. There has been no let up. *Pembebasan* monthly magazine, published by the People’s Democratic Party, regularly reports a smattering of these protests in each issue. Each issue has reported at least twenty and up to 200 cases of various forms of protest involving almost every social sector: students, workers, farmers, neighborhood residents, teachers, doctors, nurses, electricity company employees, bank employees, the state airplane factory employees, victims of Suharto period injustice, squatters, public transport drivers, taxi drivers, journalists, street traders, fishermen, women demonstrating against sexism of various kinds; and so the list could go on.\(^\text{206}\)

My newspaper data and Max Lane’s work suggest that demonstrations and protests are a method of political participation open to use by almost any Indonesian citizen. Contrary to a commonly-held stereotype, SDPR are not exclusively the domain of the lower-class.

The diversity of issues, actors, and locations reported in *Kompas, Republika*, and *Pembebasan* also indicate a lack of formal organized social movements on a national scale. Though economic concerns are generally the focus of SDPR, there is a tendency for activists and associates to focus on single issues rather than develop a larger movement culture. For example, there does not seem to be a consistent or coherent self-


conscious environmental movement, feminist or women’s movement, or class movement in Indonesia. There do not appear to be systematic coordinated efforts (top-down or bottom-up) to engage in massive collective action over extended periods of time. Instead, it seems that the trend is for specific groups to take action on a case-by-case basis if there are particular public policies at the local or national level that threaten their livelihood, sensibilities, or value system. Today even the student movement, which helped bring down Suharto on May 21, 1998, is less united and coordinated, as well as experiencing low membership. One article from *The Jakarta Post* finds that the May 1998 rallies are only a part of history, not a current part of the majority of students’ lives and interests. Lamgiat Siringoringo, former chief of Atmajaya University’s campus bulletin *Viaduct*, says “Trying to reach students who were not familiar with the 1998 movement was also a bit pointless. They have been disconnected from history.”207 University of Indonesia student executive body chief Azman Muammar notes, “Less and less people want to be involved in student organizations and activities. School fees are getting higher and most students are just interested in getting through university fast. The rectorate has also slashed [the maximum] study period to only six years.” Other student leaders claim that university authorities do not support student movements or “subtly represses activists.”208 Another article points to additional factors: the student movement no longer has a common enemy to unite their struggle, public support for the movement has waned, and some student groups have joined formal electoral or party politics.209

The lack of formal social movements might mean fewer coordinated SDPR activities on a national scale, but it does not prevent a minority of people from still voicing their grievances and taking action. What helps move this special group from the passivity or inertia that characterizes the majority of the population? The next sections answer this question by outlining a two-step process for SDPR.

208 Ibid.
First Step: Dissatisfaction

Of the three classic arguments for what influences political protest, the first concerning deprivation or dissatisfaction seems to be what primarily motivates individual Indonesians to protest, but as I will discuss later, it depends on the issue. Sources of dissatisfaction and the processes for dealing with that dissatisfaction have a mixture of religious and non-religious dimensions. Additionally, it takes more than simply feeling discontent to motivate an individual to join a demonstration or protest. People generally complain much more than they take action to resolve their complaints. As will be explained in the next section, certain public policy issues garner dissatisfaction, and then a set of influences can bring people together in different ways as a response.

The second classic argument about institutional setting is important for understanding the overall political context in which Indonesians act since the changes in the political opportunity structure after 1998 allowed for more varied and frequent forms of political participation by ordinary citizens. While Indonesians express their preferences more freely now at the ballot box, there is a minority for whom voting is not enough. *The Jakarta Post* Chief Editor Endy Bayuni says, “My own feeling is that these demonstrations reflect the breakdown in the communication, that the elected politicians are not doing their job properly or effectively, and therefore people feel that they have to resort to street demonstrations to make their voices heard, which is allowed in a democratic Indonesia, which was not tolerated under Suharto.” Suryopratomo, Chief Editor of *Kompas* in 2006, adds that there is not yet a culture for bringing the public voice to government, so people do not know if there is a way other than demonstrations. The “purpose” is not yet the same between the government, the people, the economy, and so forth. The government’s response is always “akan, akan, akan” (“will, will, will”), but they do not follow through.

Generalizing from the numerous reports that have crossed his editorial desk, Suryopratomo characterizes two types of demonstrations in Indonesia: (1) Pre-1998 in which demonstrations were a strong expression of dissatisfaction with the government, and (2) Post-1998 in which demonstrations are a way to “memaksakan” (“force” or

\[\text{210} \text{ Jennifer L. Epley, Personal interview.}\]

\[\text{211} \text{ Jennifer L. Epley, Personal interview with Suryopratomo (Jakarta: Kantor Redaksi Kompas, 04 April 2006).}\]
“impose”) an agenda. In some cases, it is the model for representing the interests of certain groups. I find the classifications of anti-state and agenda too broad, though. I believe SDPR activities are instead a combination of these two types, including the aforementioned two classic arguments for what influences political protest. My understanding is that dissatisfaction with government necessitates pushing a particular agenda, one that is informed by values and ideology. Citizens can then choose to exercise their right to dissent via protest behavior because the political system is open and recognizes protest as a legitimate form of political participation. Individual citizens also require support from others to be efficient and effective with regard to their demands.

The third classic argument of political culture, which suggests that certain group identifications, modernization, or ideological extremism influences protest, is open to interpretation. I do not have clear evidence that some ethnic or class groups are more likely to protest than others for instance. It could be the case that modernization is leading more Indonesians to emphasize self-expression and participation, but the low percentages of survey respondents who engage in SDPR suggest that such activities are not as popular as we would expect given Indonesia’s growing level of economic development. Finally, I have anecdotal evidence that ideological extremism might be connected to protest behavior (e.g., Hizbut Tahrir demonstrations on religious topics), but the diversity of issues and actors mentioned earlier imply a range of ideological preferences, not just those based in fundamentalism or radicalism.

Second Step: Associations and Issue Saliency

Who participates in SDPR and when is the subject of this section. The first step is having feelings of dissatisfaction, but dissatisfaction about what? My 2005 and 2006 focus group discussions and 2006 interviews highlight general discontent with “secular” issues such as economic problems and corruption, as well as issues with religious components such as the treatment of women and minority faiths along with various matters related to Islamic law. Despite unhappiness, stress, and worry, though, most Indonesians with whom I personally spoke and the majority of those I surveyed did not

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212 Jennifer L. Epley, Personal interview. The interviewee did not elaborate on which exact groups make use of demonstrations for which agendas.
take formal action beyond discussions with others because of the macro- and micro-level challenges for political participation that are described in Chapter IV.

Since dissatisfaction is insufficient on its own to motivate individuals to engage in protest behavior, a second step is required. Like voter turnout, I find that there is a mixture of religious and non-religious influences for Muslims to join SDPR activities. Though there is a mixture of influences for SDPR, the critical underlying factors for translating dissatisfaction into political action are social ties or associations and the presence of a public policy issue that has issue saliency:

**Figure 6.3 Association and Issue Saliency.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue Saliency</th>
<th>Association</th>
<th>No Association</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDPR likely</td>
<td>SDPR not likely</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDPR possible</td>
<td>SDPR not likely</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In most cases, SDPR is political participation by religious actors because the issue of interest and resources involved are “secular,” but in a minority of cases, SDPR can be religious political participation where the role of religion and religious groups as vehicles for participation are more prominent. The rest of this chapter explores this distinction with an examination of economic-oriented SDPR and religiously-oriented SDPR.

**Economic-Oriented SDPR**

Like non-Muslims, Muslims care about their financial status and security. Employment, a reasonable cost of living, access to affordable quality education, and minimizing corruption at all levels of government and society top the list of priorities for Muslim Indonesians. For some, economic concerns are very serious and the burden becomes too difficult to bear. For others, economic matters may not be as stressful or burdensome, but they have an awareness of and sympathy for the negative consequences that trouble their fellow community members. We can expect to see these groups engage
in SDPR if they are connected to or embedded in an association of like-minded persons, the group has the resources to take action, and there is a specific target, that is a public policy issue that is perceived to directly impact their economic lives. The public policy issue in question does not only have to come from the government in the form of a directive or law, though, because there can be overlap between private business entities and state interests. Munafrizal Manan’s book *Gerakan Rakyat Melawan Elit* lists the following examples of economic-oriented SDPR between May 1998 and November 2001 as reported in *Kompas* and other research:

- People occupied and fenced off 2,165 hectares of rubber plantation land in Bogor, West Java. Bambang Trihatmojo, who is Suharto’s son and owned the land, was planning to make a self-contained town development.
- Villagers from Suci and Pati in Jember, East Java occupied coffee plantation land managed by a local provincial government company. Ten people were injured when the police attempted to disperse the group.
- In May 2000, villagers from Kayu Batu village near Jayapura, Papua blockaded Telkom\(^{213}\) offices over land compensation issues.
- Also in May 2000, people from four villages in Muara Batang Gadis in North Sumatra blockaded the offices of the Kerang Neam forest company. They protested over the twenty-five years of forest clearing of “people’s lands.”\(^{214}\)

While it does not appear that formal organizations mobilized these protesters, informal associations and networks were still crucial for the locals and local community leaders to organize themselves. They shared the same grievances and perceived threat, as well as provided each other with group support (e.g., a sense of safety or power in numbers and resources such as transportation). Their dissatisfaction, the subject of their unhappiness, and the resources they utilized did not seem to have any religious dimensions, hence this

\(^{213}\) Telkom is a telecommunications company in Indonesia. It is semi-privatized and majority-government owned.

was political participation by religious actors (assuming that the majority of those involved were Muslim or of another faith in the case of Papua).

The economic-oriented SDPR that take place outside of Jakarta differ in some respects to those that occur in the political capital. SDPR in Jakarta often include many more participants who are actively organized by formal associations. Their focus tends to be directed at existing or proposed official government policies. Sometimes there is coordination across groups in different cities. Two examples of this kind of highly organized mass collective action in the form of SDPR in Jakarta (and sometimes elsewhere) are described below:

**2005 Oil Prices**

In 2005, many Indonesians were concerned about increasing oil prices and decreased government subsidies. *Kompas* reported that the price of world oil had reached 50 U.S. dollars per barrel. This would have made the Indonesian government responsible for a subsidy of Rp. 73 quintillion or Rp. 200 billion per day. This obligation would have burdened the government budget, so officials decided to raise the price of *Bahan Bakar Minyak* (*BBM*, refined fuel oil) almost 29% on February 28, 2005. Almost immediately, the decision provoked outrage and protest among citizens who depended on BBM in a variety of ways.

Most citizens recognize that Indonesia’s economy is still developing and subject to change. They are well aware of the country’s high unemployment rate, fluctuation in costs for goods and services, and widespread corruption. For the most part, the general public adapts and waits for progress to the best of their ability. However, there are times when the threat to their livelihoods is so dramatic, as in the case of *BBM*, that they feel a need to more directly involve themselves in politics. It is not that the issue itself mobilizes people because it does not have agency as an actor (i.e., people mobilize people), but rather the issue functions as a signal that a political response of some kind is needed or warranted. In this way, the presence of a serious policy issue that elicits strong negative reactions is a sort of pre-condition to SDPR, and then it is associations that organize mass reactions in attempts to resolve grievances.

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In the context of rising BBM prices and decreased subsidies, the following are just some of the formal and informal organizations that mobilized people for demonstrations, protests, and strikes throughout Jakarta and other major cities in Indonesia as reported by Kompas and Republika:

- Jaringan Rakyat Miskin Kota
- STIE
- KAMMI
- Gerakan Rakyat Banten Bersatu
- Hizbut Tahrir
- Front Penyelamatan Rakyat Surakarta
- Linkar Studi Aksi untuk Demokrasi Indonesia
- Gerakan Mahasiswa Cirebon
- Mahasiswa se-Kota Makassar
- Mahasiswa Unismuh
- STIMIK
- UIM
- Universitas Satria
- FPRM-Semarang
- PRD (political party)
- LMND
- Universitas Islam Indonesia
- Mahasiswa UIN Jakarta
- IAIN Makassar
- UNM
- Front Pemerintahan Rakyat Miskin
- HMI Cabang Ambon
- HMI Cabang Kudus
- Gerakan Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia
- Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Katolik Republik Indonesia
- Liga Mahasiswa Nasional Untuk Demokrasi
- Somasi
- Fobmi
- Koalisi Perempuan
- Kontras
- Front Nasional Perjuangan Buruh Indonesia
- Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia
- Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia
- Lingkar Mahasiswa Jakarta Raya dan Banten
- Koalisi Masyarakat Pesisir Indramayu
- Gabungan Serikat Buruh Independen
- Aliansi Tolak Kenaikan Harga BBM
- Forkot
- Relawan Perjuangan Demokrasi
- Barisan Oposisi Rakyat
- Serikat Rakyat Miskin Kota
- Aliansi Perempuan
- PMII
- Humanika
- Student executive boards at universities in Jakarta-Bogor-Depok-Bekasi
- Forum Solidaritas Mahasiswa dan Pemuda
- Aliansi Mahasiswa Bekasi
- Solidaritas Anak-Anak Korban Sutet
- PDIP (political party)
- PBR (political party)
- Front Pembela Islam

This list includes a combination of “secular” associations and ones that are based in religion. However, most of the dialogue, rhetoric, symbols, and resources used were not religious in nature. For example, arguments about economic justice and helping the poor were not couched in Islamic language nor reasoning. While many Muslims were active regarding BBM, their SDPR activities were not religious political participation.
2006 Labor Law

In 2006, the Indonesian government proposed revisions to Law No. 13/2003 on Manpower.216 The law addresses labor issues such as work agreements, employment relations, inspection, employment termination, workers’ institute, and wages. Part (d) of the first page reads as follows:

That protection of workers is intended to safeguard the fundamental rights of workers and to secure the implementation of equal opportunity and equal treatment without discrimination on whatever basis in order to realize the welfare of workers/laborers and their family by continuing to observe the development of progress made by the world of business…217

Workers wanted to safeguard their fundamental rights and worried that any revisions to the law would encourage exploitation by employers. Items in the revision draft included allowing businesses to outsource their labor, a free flow of expatriates for jobs in Indonesia, so-called “recruitment firms” as third parties between employees and employers, and permission to restrict/reduce severance payments for fired workers.218 The government reasoned that revisions were necessary to improve the country’s investment and business climate. They were acutely aware of hesitancy or reluctance on the part of domestic and foreign businesses to invest their money in Indonesia.

Anticipating a strong public outcry, security forces in Jakarta were on high alert status from April 28 to May 21, 2006. Using the International Workers Day on May 1st as momentum for their cause, hundreds of thousands of workers united against the government’s proposed revisions to the labor law and requested May 1st to be a national holiday.219 They marched from the Hotel Indonesia traffic circle in downtown Jakarta to the State Palace and House of Representatives. Others marched from the Tanjung Priok

217 Ibid.
219 Ibid.
Seaport to the mayor’s office in North Jakarta. Similar rallies were held in major cities and towns in other parts of the country including Medan in North Sumatra and Makassar in South Sulawesi. The rallies on May 1st and 2nd were generally peaceful, but problems erupted on May 3rd in front of the House of Representatives. Workers broke through barricades as police used tear gas to disperse the crowds. Without justifying the destructive behavior, most workers supported the protesters’ demands. Bambang Aria Wibawa, a 28 year-old man who works in a manufacturing company and lives in Bekasi, said:

For the workers themselves, the rally was an expression of real worries and concerns. The government has taken the easy way out in trying to create a better investment climate by revising the Labor Law in favor of businesses. The main problem, and the most difficult one to solve, is the high-cost economy. Systemic reform is needed here, instead of putting the nation’s most vulnerable people under pressure.\(^{220}\)

The reference to “high-cost economy” is also mentioned in research by Transparency International Indonesia and Jabotabek Labor Union. Their research found that “invisible expenses” can reach 35-45%, while social security costs are only 8-10% of total production cost. Furthermore, the World Economic Forum ranks government inefficiency, lack of infrastructure, poor tax rules, corruption, low quality of human resources, and policy instability above labor concerns as factors that hamper investment.\(^{221}\) Many workers like Bambang Aria Wibawa therefore believe that the government must work to resolve these pressing infrastructure problems \emph{before} turning to changes in the labor force.

The government eventually bowed to pressure from organized labor, but decided to appoint several universities – University of Indonesia, Padjajaran University, Gadjah Mada University, University of North Sumatra, and Hasanuddin University – to further

assess the law and inform possible policy changes in the future. It remains to be seen what formal changes, if any, are recommended or have been made to date.

The mass demonstrations and protests that occurred in May 2006 were not a new phenomenon. There were similar grievances and actions taken in 2000. That year, the government proposed a regulation that would make it more difficult for employers to dismiss workers. After the government made changes based on employers’ objections, trade union and worker organizations complained that their rights were no longer protected or advanced. Thousands took to the streets and participated in strikes. In some locations like Bandung, the demonstrations involved property destruction and arrests. In the end, the government postponed implementation of the regulation as one by one the governors of Jakarta, East Java, Central Java, Lampung, Kota Batam, and so on realized the effects of mass mobilization and resistance.222

Similar to mobilization around the case of BBM, SDPR activities that centered on the 2006 labor law and the proposed labor regulation in 2000 would not have been possible without formal associations taking the lead and mobilizing citizens. Individuals on their own would have had grievances and known the government was the source of their concerns, but without further resources from organizations such as information, representation, and material support, they probably would not have been motivated to take to the streets nor had as strong an impact as they did. Serikat Pekerja Nasional (National Workers Union), the Konfederasi Serikat Buruh Sejahtera Indonesia (Confederation of Indonesian Prosperous Workers Unions), the Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia (Confederation of Indonesian Workers Unions), and the Aliansi Buruh Yogyakarta (Alliance of Yogyakarta Laborers) were just some of the key actors mentioned in articles by Kompas and Republika.

Also similar to mobilization on BBM, the SDPR activities related to the 2006 labor law should not be classified as religious political participation. While the participants were largely Muslim, their religious identity did not seem to motivate their behavior. For instance, religious organizations did not have a high profile in the mobilization efforts. I did not hear of any religious leaders instructing their congregations to take to the streets. In Republika, I only read general descriptions of the

222 Max Lane, Unfinished Nation: Indonesia Before and After Suharto (New York: Verso, 2008), 209-211.
May demonstrations. I also did not see any writings about how Islam might play a role for attitudes or behaviors on this issue.

**Religiously-Oriented SDPR**

Besides economic issues, Muslim Indonesians mobilize on religious issues. I use the term “religiously-relevant political issues,” which refers to the presence of political issues that are seen through the lens of religion. These are issues that religious individuals feel are salient to themselves and other followers in some way. General issue areas may include, but are not limited to education, family (e.g., marriage, children, and the elderly), modernization, religious doctrine, clothing, food, rituals, law, and health.

Although religion can permeate all aspects of life for the faithful, some issues – not all – may help motivate people to participate in politics more directly or frequently. Religiously-relevant political issues may be salient and public at individual, local, provincial, and national levels, but are not always present in the same ways over time. These issues are possibly connected to “latent” parts of one’s religious identity, and they may get “activated” by serious exposure and conflict with the “Other.” In this way, issue-based political participation tends to be more reactive than proactive where individuals act politically when some public policy issue is perceived as so detrimental to themselves or whom they care about that they must make a difference. While *Kompas* and *Republika* reported multiple cases of religiously-relevant political issues, the most popular and controversial of them in 2006 was the anti-pornography bill. The next section analyzes the bill and the SDPR activities it elicited.

**2006 Anti-Pornography Bill**

In 2006, the House of Representatives in Indonesia deliberated over a controversial and polarizing bill about pornography. Showing the diversity of Islam throughout the country, different groups of Muslims supported the bill, while other Muslims criticized it. Non-Muslims joined the debate as well, typically coming out on the side of opposition. Unlike the *BBM* or labor law issues, the pornography bill drew individuals to engage in religious political participation, that is, their SDPR activities had
obvious religious dimensions. Debates about gender, the status of minority faiths and
cultures, and cultural/artistic freedom also entered into the picture.

The 2006 bill focused on regulating pornography in an effort to stop or minimize
exploitation. Its origins were from 2003 when a delegation from the Indonesian Ulemas
Council called on Akbar Tandjung, then the leader of the Golkar Party and Parliament
Speaker, to deal with the growing spread of pornography. Akbar Tandjung suggested
they draw up the legislation.223 The draft addressed erotic, sexual, and obscene
pornography on radio, television, film, books, magazines, internet, and other media.
Many Indonesians did not strongly object to such regulation, though they were also aware
of the presence of a “black market,” which the government with or without a formal law
in place would have difficulties controlling. What was contentious was the bill’s
inclusion of “pornoaksi” (“pornographic action”) under the umbrella term of
“pornography.” For example, the bill added articles that prohibited showing “bagian
tubuh tertentu yang sensual” (“sensual body parts”), being naked in public places, public
kissing, and erotic dancing.224 Though many Indonesians did not have a problem with
regulating commercial publications, they expressed confusion or dissent over controlling
personal behavior.

Supporters of the anti-pornography bill included religious groups such as Majelis
Ulema Indonesia, Prosperous Justice Party, Muslimat Alwasliyah, Salam Universitas
Indonesia, Islamic Defenders Front, and Hizbut Tahir, along with Muslim women’s
groups like Wanita Islam, Wanita Persis, Wanita Tarbiyah, and Wanita Peduli Umat. On
March 16, 2006, a talkshow sponsored by Gadjah Mada University, RRI Nasional, and
TVRI Yogykarta discussed the topic of “Pornography, Law, and Culture.” Their terms of
reference included the following arguments for why the aforementioned religious groups
were in favor of the bill:

- Pornography and pornographic action ruin Indonesia’s youth
generation.

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224 Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia, “Pasal 25-28,” *Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia
Tentang Anti-Pornografi dan Pornoaksi*, 2006.
• Pornography and pornographic action result in sexual deviation, sexual insult, and household break-ups because they are dishonest/corrupt.
• Pornography and pornographic action are inappropriate with Eastern (Asian) customs/traditions, especially in Indonesia.
• The anti-pornography bill will not disturb/interfere with artistic creativity.\textsuperscript{225}

In personal interviews, I heard that Islamists like the Islamic Defenders Front in particular supported the bill because they worried about the negative influences of “Western decadence” and perceived a loss of morality in the country. I also heard members of the Prosperous Justice Party express support for the bill because they thought it would increase respect.

On the other side of the debate were religious and non-religious groups such as Kohati, Serikat Perempuan Mandiri, Seroja, KPI, Rahima, Perempuan Mahardika, LBH APIK, Komite Paralegal Indonesia, LBH Jakarta, Fatayat NU, ICRP, various groups in Bali, and other women’s groups in different cities. Their arguments are summarized below:

• The draft of the bill can be interpreted in many ways and will create problems for implementation on the ground.
• Women will be the object and victim; triggering violence against women.
• The bill impedes artistic creativity.
• There is confusion over the terminology and understanding.
• The bill does not appreciate local traditions which are complex.
• The bill is counter-productive for the development of the tourist sector.\textsuperscript{226}

\textsuperscript{225} “Pornografi, Hukum, dan Kebudayaan,” \textit{Talkshow Agama dan Budaya - Terms of Reference}. Center for Religious and Cross-Cultural Studies - Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta, RRI Nasional, and TVRI Indonesia, 16 March 2006.
\textsuperscript{226} Ibid.
The first point concerning interpretation were particularly relevant for critics after hearing about how Tangerang police were starting to arrest women suspected of prostitution. One married pregnant housewife with two children was arrested at 8pm while waiting at a bus stop, calling into question the enforcement of so-called “moral order.”

The fifth and sixth points regarding local traditions and tourism were especially important for the province of Bali. Bali was the first province to formally reject the bill on the grounds that it would constrain their local cultural traditions and hinder their tourist industry. Its majority-Hindu population has a different style of dress from their Muslim counterparts in Java, one that is arguably less conservative, for instance. This was a similar argument put forth by those in Papua where there are native tribes that do not wear clothing or wear very little. Some Balinese dances, while sacred to locals, might also be construed as provocative or “sexy” to outsiders and therefore banned under the proposed bill. Critics of the bill also worried that traditions such as *omed-omed* or *med-medan* in which large groups of youths hug and kiss each other on Ngembak Geni Day, the day after *Nyepi* (Hindu Day of Silence), would be prohibited. Furthermore, many Balinese expressed concern that the bill would restrict the behavior of foreigners from other cultures, which would likely result in reduced tourism, an important mainstay of the province’s economy.

Like the *BBM* and labor law issues, the pornography bill elicited strong reactions in the form of SDPR activities all across Indonesia during early 2006:

- March 18th: Thousands of Muslims demonstrated in Mataram, Lombok demanding the bill’s speedy passage. The Alliance for Islam organized the event with participants from various social groups, political parties, and student organizations. Earlier in the week prior to that protest, though, around 300 activists, mostly women, demonstrated against the bill outside of the local Legislative Council.227

March 26th: The Muslim Brotherhood, Hizbut Tahrir, and Persatuan Ummat Islam held a rally at the Hotel Indonesia traffic circle in Jakarta. A conservative estimate of the number in attendance is around 200. I heard one unidentified speaker, a Muslim woman wearing a headscarf. She raised her voice loud into the microphone and argued that the anti-pornography/pornographic action law was not against women. She said that the law protects women and children. There will be less discrimination and problems after the government implements this law, she added. Every few words or sentences, she would say “Allah Akbar” (“Great God” or “God is Great”).

May 6th: Hundreds of activists, artists, and members of cultural communities, many dressed in colorful outfits, marched in downtown Jakarta against the bill. Diverse But One Alliance organized the protest and picked the theme “No! To Zero Culture.” Their message: “The country is rich in cultural diversity and therefore a law in the name of morality will only be a conduit to destroy the harmony of that diversity.”

May 21st: Demonstrations in Central Jakarta brought together Muslim organizations such as Hizbut Tahrir, Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama, the Prosperous Justice Party, and others from Jakarta, Banten and West Java. Observers estimated attendance to be in the tens of thousands for those who came to show support for the bill in front of the House of Representatives complex.

Protesters on both sides of the pornography bill debate were essentially arguing over which aspects of religion, in this case Islam, should be implemented in the public sphere, and to what extent. In other words, what should the boundaries be between religion and the state? While most Indonesians accept a general mix of religion and

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politics in the country (see Chapter II), the pornography bill seriously called into question the meaning, justification, and implementation of such a mixture at the individual-level. Even groups that we might expect to take a uniform position such as Nahdlatul Ulama experienced dissent from within their ranks. Moderate young activists in the NU Youth Forum urged the organization to carefully consider its support for the bill. The NU Youth Forum coordinator, Zuhairi Misrawi, stated, “Morality does not only include religious values but also the development of society.” He added that a person’s moral values were personal and therefore should not be enforced by law. 231

Those who engaged in SDPR activities clearly cared about their ideological positions, felt that they were correct, and believed that their values or way of life would be gravely threatened somehow. Groups did not turn to electoral politics for this issue because it was not an election year. They instead contacted public officials and took to the streets. People who did not usually take such actions were encouraged to do so by community leaders, formal organizations, and informal associations that developed in response to the bill. The faithful were found on both sides of the debate. Whether they were on one side or the other depending on their personal interpretations and whether they were active or not depended in part on which social networks they were tapped into at the time. Because most of the participants were focused on a religiously-relevant political issue and they made use of religious resources (e.g., religious organizations, symbols, language, etc.), I understood their SDPR activities to be religious political participation rather than political participation by religious actors.

Conclusion

Muslim Indonesians rarely participate in SDPR activities. When they do, it is because of the presence of a public policy issue that they deem significantly salient in some manner and they can draw on resources to support their preferences. For the minority of those people who do take political action, it is usually on economic matters and they mainly make use of “secular” organizations or networks. On the rare occasion there is a substantial religiously-relevant issue (and also with a perceived threat in mind),

231 “NU youths, leaders at odds over bill,” The Jakarta Post (http://www.thejakartapost.com, 04 April 2006), 06 April 2006.
people engage in religious political participation, whereby their religion informs their interests and who they work with to reach their goals. As shown in the previous chapter on voter turnout, Muslims have complex identities where there are a myriad of religious and non-religious influences that can affect when, how, and why they participate in contemporary politics. SDPR happen to be a type of participation where the role of religion can be more prominent under a certain set of conditions, though.
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CHAPTER VII

Conclusion

My dissertation asked how influential is Islam for political participation? To answer this question I studied contemporary Indonesian politics, specifically looking at the role of religion for voter turnout and protest behavior. I found that Muslim identity is diverse and fluid. The religion itself is not monolithic or uniform. Different personal and associational components of the religion can have a lot, some, or no impact on political behavior; it depends and is largely context-driven.

For voter turnout, the non-religious variables that significantly correlated were party identification, rural/urban location, age, transportation and consumption costs, and personal safety concerns. The insignificant variables were SES, gender, invitations from other people, and incentives like money or gifts. The significant religious variables included fasting during Ramadhan, reading or reciting the Qur’an outside of regular prayers, and discussing beliefs or religion with a religious leader. Watching, listening, or reading religious programs via television, radio, newspaper, or websites was also statistically significant. Furthermore, active involvement in a religious organization or group like NU, Muhammadiyah, church, etc. was statistically significantly for voter turnout. Other types of organizations that were found to be significant included social organizations such as social welfare, family, education, women, environment, health, etc. and social organizations in the village such as village council/board. These groups may or may not have religious dimensions. The religious variables found to be insignificantly correlated were praying five times a day, performing optional prayers, performing optional fasting, and discussing one beliefs or religion with family or friends. Congregational/community/group prayers besides Friday prayers, joining religious recitations/teachings (e.g., “majelis taklim,” religious lectures/speeches, and “tahlilan”), and requesting a prayer or advice from a religious leader were also statistically
insignificant. Overall, it appears that voter turnout is most often a form of political participation by religious actors.

Protest behavior, too, is a mostly a form of political participation by religious actors, but under special circumstances, it can be religious political participation. As stated in Chapter VI, Muslim Indonesians rarely participate in SDPR activities. When they do, it is because of the presence of a public policy issue that they deem significantly salient in some manner and they can draw on resources such as associations to support their preferences. For the minority of Indonesians who take political action, it is usually because of economic issues and mobilization by “secular” organizations or networks. In the rare event there is a religiously-relevant issue that is strongly salient, people engage in religious political participation. In this case, religion guides their interests, strategies, and activist partnerships.

**Implications**

There are ideological, institutional, and policy consequences related to my research findings. Academics, policymakers, and laypersons can take from the work what they will, but I will summarize three important (albeit normative) implications. First, my work shows that diversity really does characterize Indonesia overall, democracy in Indonesia, and individual (Muslim) Indonesians. In terms of ideology, there is a wide assortment of goals, expectations, and actions. If we understand political ideology to be a set of objectives and methods for how society and government should operate, it remains to be seen how and to what extent the majority of Muslim Indonesians agree. This diversity at the macro- and micro-levels can prove advantageous or problematic depending on who you talk to and the subject matter at hand. Given this context, perhaps on some level the Pancasila ideology is a sufficient compromise or pragmatic approach to organizing the state and its policies.

Second, democratic institutions need to be further consolidated and improved should we want to (1) maximize the benefits of diversity and minimize its challenges, (2) mediate conflict, whether that conflict is secular or religious in nature, and (3) better incorporate the masses into decision-making processes. At this point in time, there is a great disconnect between citizens’ expectations and the state’s capacity to fulfill those
expectations. This is mainly due to weak or corrupt institutions and government actors, but also because of an unwillingness, hesitancy, or inability on the part of citizens to actively engage. Opening up the political opportunity structure to allow citizen participation is one thing, while providing efficient and effective channels to participate regularly and meaningfully is another.

Third, the Indonesian government needs to be aware that certain public policy issues will garner high levels of protest activities, while others do not. The state can anticipate different kinds of reactions based on the subject of the policies: People will turn out for economic and religious concerns. The state should then explore ways it can direct such energy into productive dialogue and joint decision-making. One potential method would be to encourage and facilitate political parties in shifting from candidate-centered or patron-client politics to specific policy platforms and agendas. A result of such a shift might be a reduction in the policy rollercoaster ride in which the government proposes something and runs the risk of the public reacting strongly and negatively via protests. There are arguably more benefits to moving the field of contestation from the streets to polling stations and lobby meetings.

For all three of these points, I would argue that a critical point of reference and resource is associations or organizations. Indonesians are both individualistic and collective in their orientation. If the country wants to promote ideological, institutional, and policy changes, it will need to recognize that its citizenry have their own individual attitudes and values, but are also embedded in social relations. These relations are usually informal – families, workplaces, neighborhoods, schools, and places of worship – but there are also formal networks through established, organized, and resource-rich associations. Individuals may not always join or participate in such formal groups, but when it comes to issues that they find salient or threatening, they make use of them for information, guidance, and collective action. Rather than wait for a reactive cycle to occur, it might be more useful for the state to be proactive and work with these organizations in advance on programs of mutual interest. Of course, this last suggestion would require state actors to practice more democratic principles (e.g., representation and equality), moving from a notion of self-centered politics to one of popular sovereignty.
Future Research

Though my dissertation contains useful information, it raises a lot more questions than it provides answers. There are several directions that future research projects can take using my existing work as a starting point. First and foremost, I would like to conduct a cross-national study in which the relationships between religion and political participation in Indonesia are compared and contrasted with relationships in other countries. I agree with colleagues’ suggestions that it would be fruitful to determine if patterns found in Indonesia are typical or atypical compared to other countries with Muslim-majority populations, countries with dominant religions besides Islam, and other developing democracies in Asia and elsewhere. My preliminary analyses point to areas in which Indonesia deviates from certain norms (e.g., the role of SES for political behavior), but also shows striking similarities in other respects (e.g., relationships between public policies and protests), which are deserving of further exploration.

A second line of future inquiry will be a deeper examination of individual preferences and choices. For example, I would like to change gears from voter turnout to vote choice and investigate organizational membership and activities in more detail. I will locate additional data on beliefs and attitudes and use research methods to link such data to behavior. I essentially want to identify clearer causal mechanisms in an effort to better explain why religion drives some kinds of political participation and not others and only under select conditions. This will also require building and testing theories that more adequately address alternative influences besides religion.

A third project of interest centers on the topic of the politicization of religion. While conducting fieldwork research in Indonesia, a common refrain I heard was that religion can be an *alat* (“tool”) for politics and vice-versa. Though religion does not uniformly or regularly influence political behavior by the majority of Muslim Indonesians, there is widespread recognition that political leaders need to use certain religiopolitical symbols, rhetoric, and practices to garner mass support. I plan to research the ways in which political elites talk about and use religion for political ends and to what extent the general public is responsive to their claims and actions. I also plan to research the circumstances under which religious leaders talk about and use politics for religious
ends and to what extent the general public responds positively or negatively. Possible case study comparisons include Malaysia, the Philippines, and the United States.

Finally, I would like to delve more into specific forms of political behavior, particularly when, how, and why demonstrations matter for policy. Chapter VI touched on the popularity and normalcy of mass demonstrations in Indonesia. I want to research the emergence of demonstrations and the kinds of policy responses they elicit in a comparative study of more than one country. Who are most likely to choose demonstrations as a form of political expression, and why? Are there analytical and practical differences for the size of demonstrations, participant backgrounds, type of public policies, and location (e.g., local versus national)? What kinds of intended or unintended consequences result from demonstrations? Answers to these questions will hopefully contribute to our understandings of citizen participation more broadly and the role of religion in politics more specifically.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A

Research Design

Methodology

Research design involves many theoretical, conceptual, and methodological challenges, especially when working in a developing country such as Indonesia. Robert Elson illustrates this observation when he writes that “Indonesian politics has been poorly served by historians.” Some of his reasons are below:

The practice of the discipline of history is generally very weak in Indonesia, which means that there has been – apart from odd sensationalist newspaper and magazine exchanges about such things as who really found the generals’ bodies at Lubang Buaya or the whereabouts of the missing Supersemar letter – little sign of intellectual excitement or historical debate about the country’s politics. More importantly, perhaps, Indonesia has never been a place that made historical research on modern themes easy, especially for foreigners. With a few exceptions, government archives on the post-1945 period remain closed to domestic and foreign researchers; continuous runs of Indonesian newspapers are difficult to find; and obtaining interviews requires stamina, patience and even courage, as well as well-placed local go-betweens – and that before the interview has even begun. There is, finally the supreme difficulty of the subject matter itself; the political history of modern Indonesia is a cascade of related and unrelated themes and plots, a whirling kaleidoscope of people,

emotion, interests, skullduggery, nobility and violence not lending itself readily to interpretation.\textsuperscript{233}

These challenges are not necessarily confined to a particular academic discipline, and though Elson speaks from an historian’s perspective, his comments resonated with my own experience as a political scientist who conducted research in Indonesia, the United States, and Australia. In Indonesia, I came across most of the technical difficulties that past researchers have met with before, but I also encountered special challenges in terms of access to persons and data because of my gender, age, and nationality. While my overall fieldwork experience was positive, there were times when I was faced with a choice – make a sacrifice to get information or do nothing – and I often chose the latter after considering ethical, legal, and personal concerns. It is not impossible for a researcher such as me to find data, however. Information is available, but availability often depends on the topic of interest, one’s resources, and how far one is willing to go to get data. Quality and quantity may be of concern as well given that information can be incomplete, dated, or open to interpretation. On the latter point, I found comments from Douglas E. Ramage to be applicable to my own research: “A caveat regarding the ‘accuracy’ of various Indonesian views is also necessary. Political behavior and decisions flow from people’s perceptions and statements, regardless of their accuracy. While what someone said in an interview may not be entirely ‘true,’ it is still the case that such perceptions form the reality of politics and lead to tangible political outcomes.”\textsuperscript{234} Ramage also mentions how written records are not always available either because of the contemporary nature of certain topics or because Indonesia is still an “oral culture” in many ways.\textsuperscript{235}

Given the challenges of data collection and later data analysis, one has to think carefully and early about choosing the most appropriate methods for the research question and theory at hand and the actual context in which the research will take place. This dissertation project utilized a “mixed methods” approach, meaning a combination of

\textsuperscript{233} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{235} Ibid.
qualitative and quantitative methods.\textsuperscript{236} I decided on mixed methods for three reasons: (1) Reliance on one research method could make for potential bias, inaccuracies, or incompleteness, especially given the complexities of religion and politics, (2) certain social science research methods, particularly from the field of American political science, are not yet widespread in Indonesia so their use may be considered novel and constructive, and (3) each method from a multi-pronged approach can serve to supplement, confirm, or qualify evidence obtained from other methods. This latter point speaks explicitly to my theoretical and empirical preferences for conducting research, but also to the anticipated weaknesses in data quality and quantity in Indonesia.

A mixed-method approach yields answers to different parts of my research question and works to provide a more complete picture of the political beliefs and behaviors of religious individuals, as well as \textit{why} such individuals do what they do. The different methods have their strengths and weaknesses and in mixing one hopes to maximize the strengths and minimize the weaknesses. The mixed method approach is also useful because together there can be more information about the cultural and historical complexities that are particular to certain groups and areas. In this way, integrating methods can supply more background about “meaning” and “place.”

The selected mixed methods were meant to pre-test methods, improve theory-building, gather much needed “factual” data, and then find descriptive and/or causal inferences. The main methods used for this research were focus group discussions, interviews, opinion surveys, newspaper archives, participant observation, and secondary writings:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Focus Group Discussions</td>
<td>Multiple groups, each sharing certain personal, social, or political characteristics</td>
<td>Small-n descriptive data to uncover specific information about general public opinion and forms, frequencies, and justifications for political participation; aimed to uncover causal mechanisms; and opportunity for unique data from a “social context”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td>Purposeful sample of</td>
<td>Small-n descriptive data to uncover</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{236} There are ongoing debates about the definition of “qualitative” and “quantitative” methods as there can be overlap in concepts and practices in and out of the field and between and within the two terms.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method Type</th>
<th>Population/Method</th>
<th>Data Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Survey</td>
<td>General population</td>
<td>Large-n descriptive data to discover general patterns and correlates of opinion and behavior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mini-Survey</td>
<td>Convenience sample/snowball sampling</td>
<td>Preliminary data collection regarding key concepts and definitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper Archives</td>
<td>Two national media daily papers: <em>Kompas</em> and <em>Republika</em></td>
<td>Identify possible religiously-relevant political issues at the national, provincial, and local levels and the rhetoric used to discuss/debate such issues, as well as who is involved and how</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participant Observation</td>
<td>Selected demonstrations and meetings</td>
<td>First-hand experience, describe general settings, and triangulate or validate data collected from other research methods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Writings</td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>Obtain descriptions, analyses, statistics, etc. from previous authors for background data, theory-building, and theory-testing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All of methods I employed are in English, Indonesian, or a mixture of both. Where some original texts (e.g., *Qur’an*) were in Arabic, I relied on English or Indonesian translations. Because Indonesia is diverse, some information may be missing or limited because of the use of English and Indonesian to the exclusion of other ethnic languages such as Javanese, Chinese, Balinese, and numerous others from different islands. However, national and local politics usually involve the national language, and therefore reliance on Indonesian may not be that problematic when looking for patterns between and within groups across the archipelago. As Anthony H. Johns writes, “This is the language of public life, education, and modern national culture.”

Evidence-gathering took place from 2002 to 2009, but the bulk of the data comes from dissertation fieldwork conducted during 2006 in Indonesia while I was a Fulbright Student Grantee and guest of *Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia* (LIPI, Indonesian Institute of Sciences) and the Indonesian government. I also used library resources from the University of Michigan, Gadjah Mada University, collections from organizations such as the Freedom Institute and Centre for Strategic and International Studies, and Monash

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University. In addition, I made use of books and documents from Jakarta contacts at The Asia Foundation, Komisi Pemilihan Umum (KPU, General Elections Commission), and the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Further sources of information were obtained from personal colleagues and acquaintances from various universities, non-profit organizations, social and political groups, and the mass media.

Taking the aforementioned matters into consideration leads to three main assumptions about the data collected from my particular research design. The first assumption is that “religion” and “politics” are processes or systems with certain observable traits. As a researcher, I am typically restricted to information that is “open” versus “hidden.” The types and amount of “open” information may depend on who is involved in data-gathering and for what purposes, though. The second assumption relates to an element of rational choice theory, that is that individuals often try to maximize benefits and minimize costs when making decisions. Relevant caveats include: (1) “rational choice” is not solely confined to economic concerns, but can also involve things like religion, (2) individual preferences can change over time, (3) individuals may be working with incomplete or imperfect information, and (4) individuals may not always have the abilities or resources to make thorough, “fair,” or utilitarian choices (i.e., “bounded rationality”). The third assumption is that despite perceived weaknesses in the data, the findings can still be valued as being accurate and meaningful in its own way.

The remainder of this section describes the research methods in more detail. Procedures are listed as well as justifications and challenges:

**Focus Group Discussions (FGD)**

**Definition**

George Kamberelis and Greg Dimitriadis write, “Interest in focus groups in the social sciences has ebbed and flowed over the course of the past 60 years or so. In many respects, the first really visible use of focus groups for conducting social science research may be traced back to the work of Paul Lazarsfeld and Robert Merton. Their focus group approach emerged in 1941 as the pair embarked on a government-sponsored project to assess media effects on attitudes toward America’s involvement in World War II.”

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<sup>238</sup> “Focus Group Discussions” are also known as “Focus Groups” or “Focus Group Interviews.”
Kamberelis and Dimitriadis continue, “Two dimensions of Lazarsfeld and Merton’s research efforts constitute part of the legacy of using focus groups within qualitative research: (a) capturing people’s responses in real space and time in the context of face-to-face interactions and (b) strategically “focusing” interview prompts based on themes that are generated in these face-to-face interactions and that are considered particularly important to the researchers.”

In practice, Michael Quinn Patton explains, “A focus group interview is an interview with a small group of people on a specific topic. Groups are typically 6 to 10 people with similar backgrounds who participate in the interview for one to two hours. In a given study, a series of different focus groups will be conducted to get a variety of perspectives and increase confidence in whatever patterns emerge.” Patton adds:

The focus group interview is, first and foremost, an interview. It is not a problem-solving session. It is not a decision-making group. It is not primarily a discussion, though direct interactions among participants often occur. It is an interview. The twist is that, unlike a series of one-on-one interviews, in a focus group participants get to hear each other’s responses and to make additional comments beyond their own original responses as they hear what other people have to say. However, participants need not agree with each other or reach any kind of consensus. Nor is it necessary for people to disagree. The object is to get high-quality data in a social context where people can consider their own views in the context of the views of others.

Methodologically-speaking, this dissertation project made use of focus group interviews, but the term “focus group discussion” (“FGD” for short) is used instead as it is more

241 Ibid., 385-386.
popularly or colloquially understood in Indonesia and was the term used throughout the duration of my fieldwork research.

**Purpose and Justifications**

This dissertation project utilized focus group discussions because of the following advantages, which are taken from Patton’s book:242

- “Data collection is cost-effective.”
  - *Note:* Given my limited budget and schedule as a graduate student, the focus groups saved time, energy, and money. As Kamberelis and Dimitriadis put it, “On a practical level, focus groups are efficient in the sense that they generate large quantities of material from relatively large numbers of people in a relatively short time.”243

- “Interactions among participants enhance data quality. Participants tend to provide checks and balances on each other, which weeds out false or extreme views (Krueger and Casey 2000).”244
  - *Note:* The participants did indeed help clarify or correct each other as needed.
  - *Note:* Kamberelis and Dimitriadis state, “In addition, because of their synergistic potentials, focus groups often produce data that are seldom produced through individual interviewing and observation and that result in especially powerful interpretive insights. In particular, the synergy and dynamism generated within homogeneous collectives often reveal unarticulated norms and normative assumptions. They also take the interpretive process beyond the bounds of individual memory and expression to mine the historically sedimented collective memories and desires.”245

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242 Ibid., 386.
243 Kamberelis and Dimitriadis, 903.
245 Kamberelis and Dimitriadis, 903.
Note: Kamberelis and Dimitriadis add, “Focus groups, while functioning as sites for consolidating collective identities and enacting political work, also allow for the proliferation of multiple meanings and perspectives as well as for interactions between and among them. Because focus groups put multiple perspectives “on the table,” they help researchers and research participants alike to realize that both the interpretations of individuals and the norms and rules of groups are inherently situated, provisional, contingent, unstable, and changeable.”

• “The extent to which there is a relatively consistent, shared view or great diversity of views can be quickly assessed.”
  - Note: One could quickly see similarities within the groups themselves and then differences between the different groups. Also, the group discussions did not present ideas or opinions that were greatly different from the expected results.

• “Focus groups tend to be enjoyable to participants, drawing on human tendencies as social animals.”
  - Note: In Indonesia, group interactions are quite common, so the FGD method lends itself to a more comfortable, familiar context (especially with an Indonesian moderator) than a one-on-one interview with a foreign researcher.
  - Note: Several participants indicated directly after the FGD or later via email or SMS/textmessaging that they enjoyed the discussion, learned something, and/or met new people that shared their backgrounds or interests.

Though focus groups have their own set of limitations or cons (the points below are also from Patton’s book) the following list includes responses or qualifications to such potential problems:

246 Kamberelis and Dimitriadis, 904.
247 Patton, 386-388.
• “The number of questions that can be asked is greatly restricted in the group setting.”
  o *Note:* The number of actual focus group questions ranged between four to fifteen questions (including sub-questions). This is quite comparable to the number of questions that I was able to ask in a one-on-one interview setting. Therefore, an individual interview may not necessarily be considered more informative than a focus group simply based on the number of questions asked.

• “The available response time for any particular individual is restrained in order to hear from everyone.”
  o *Note:* This may be true on some level, but most participants were given ample time to answer questions and add commentary whenever they wanted to speak. Participants were rarely interrupted to request that time be given to another participant to speak. Participants were also polite to one another and waited their turn to speak for the most part.

• “Facilitating and conducting a focus group interview require considerable group process skill beyond simply asking questions. The moderator must manage the interview so that it’s not dominated by one or two people and so that those participants who tend not to be highly verbal are able to share their views.”
  o *Note:* The moderator and I conducted several meetings and multiple email correspondences concerning procedures and format.
  o *Note:* After each FGD, the moderator and I held a review session to discuss “what went right” and what needed improvement or change for the next discussions.
  o *Note:* At the time, the moderator was a journalist for *The Jakarta Post* and had extensive experience with interviewing people from diverse backgrounds. Though he was new to the FGD method, his journalistic skills proved valuable.

• “Those who realize that their viewpoint is a minority perspective may not be inclined to speak up and risk negative reactions.”
Note: Every effort was made to make for a safe, comfortable environment in which to share a range of beliefs and opinions. Before the start of the FGD, the moderator clearly explained the focus group procedures (e.g., confidentiality) and encouraged participants to speak freely regardless of the particular opinion. Additionally, FGD participants did not have to speak if they did not want to and were also given the option of leaving the group without repercussions if they felt it necessary.

Note: If a participant appeared unusually quiet compared to other participants (perhaps because of a minority opinion or some other reason), the moderator attempted to draw him/her out to participate more by using supportive language.

Note: Because the participants shared similar backgrounds and opinions, it did not appear that there were strong minority perspectives within each group, though this is still of course a possibility.

• “Focus groups appear to work best when people in the group, though sharing similar backgrounds, are strangers to each other. The dynamics are quite different and more complex when participants have prior established relationships.”

Note: Most of the participants did not know each other well in each group prior to the discussion. If they were not complete strangers, then some may have seen others at certain events (e.g., meetings or rallies), but it did not appear that they were closely connected.

• “Controversial and highly personal issues are poor topics for focus groups. (Kaplowitz 2000).”

Note: Religion and politics are admittedly sensitive topics in Indonesia, but the participants commented at length, thus leading me to believe that despite sensitivity, the desire to share their opinions weighed more. This may be wholly or partially due to the limited social opportunities to discuss such topics with others in a safe, comfortable environment and with such focus.

\[248\] M.D. Kaplowitz, “Statistical Analysis of Sensitive Topics in Group and Individual Interviews,” *Quality 
“Confidentiality cannot be assured in focus groups.”
  
  o *Note:* The informed consent form explains that confidentiality cannot be guaranteed 100%. The moderator and I requested that participants not share the comments of others from the group, but if they did happen to mention certain opinions to not use personal names. The participants seemed to understand the limited level of confidentiality and the request not to refer to their peers’ names.

“’The focus group is beneficial for identification of major themes but not so much for the micro-analysis of subtle differences’ (Krueger 1994: x).”
  
  o *Note:* The focus group discussions did present major themes, but they arguably presented “subtle differences” as well. Many of the participants used specific examples to explain their positions, thus providing for nuanced details.

“Compared with most qualitative fieldwork approaches, focus groups typically have the disadvantage of taking place outside of the natural settings where social interactions normally occur (Madriz 2000: 836).”
  
  o *Note:* While it is true that the topic and procedures for the focus group discussions were not as “natural” or “common” as everyday conversations that people may have at home, work, school, or elsewhere, the advantages of the “unnatural setting” were apparent. First, the FGDs were closed sessions, so no family, friends, coworkers, etc. were present to make comments or pass judgment on the participants. Second, going to a different location, particularly if it was far from one’s neighborhood or workplace and/or unfamiliar to others, provided a sense of anonymity if the participant wanted or needed such anonymity. Third, the different, quiet setting may have allowed for participants to concentrate and thus answer questions better. They did not have the usual distractions of family, household duties, or work tasks to interrupt their flow of thought.

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and discussion. Though some participants did take time to answer text messages on their handphones, this is considered “normal” practice in Indonesia. As a final note, there was “natural” small talk and interaction before and after each FGD, which positively contributed to the more formal, focused discussion. In other words, the FGDs were not so formal or strict as to alienate or isolate individuals. All of these points suggest that the FGDs were perhaps more “natural” than everyday conversations because there was a freedom and context for their personal opinions. In this way, the “unnatural” opportunity provided for “natural” thoughts, opinions, and interactions.

**Background**

On informed consent forms and during introductions, FGD participants were informed that the aim of the focus group discussions was to provide details about the relationship between religion and politics in Indonesia with a special emphasis on “ordinary citizens.” Participants were told that they would be asked questions about their involvement (or lack of involvement) in political activities and their views about religious thought and practice. They were also advised that data from the group discussions would be used in my dissertation and potential future articles and books. Additionally, participants were told that they could receive reports upon completion of the research if they were interested and provided their contact details. Copies of the informed consent forms were provided at the end of the discussions.

The actual focus group discussion proceedings adhered as closely as possible to the plans in the original research design, but some parts were altered in terms of participants and procedures depending on different circumstances. For example, some discussion had smaller turnouts than expected because of absentees even though there were prior confirmations. Discussions may also have started later in the day than planned because of transportation difficulties, prayer times, or whether the group decided to have lunch before, during, or after the discussion.

I conducted seven focus group discussions in Central Jakarta in 2006. The focus groups involved very active, somewhat active, and less active members from the
following groups of interest: *Jaringan Islam Liberal* (*JIL*, Liberal Islam Network), *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (*PKS*, Prosperous Justice Party), women, a mixed group, *Muhammadiyah*, and *Nahdlatul Ulama* (*NU*). There was an additional group of non-active and unaffiliated individuals as well. All of the focus group discussions took place at the Freedom Institute, which was located at Jalan Irian No. 8, Menteng, Jakarta 10350. The meeting times listed below do not include additional time for waiting for participants to arrive, filling out informed consent forms, introductions, general chatting, etc.:

**Focus Group Discussion (FGD) #1: Jaringan Islam Liberal (*JIL*, Liberal Islam Network)**
- Date: Saturday, 17 June 2006
- Time: 1:40pm – 3:45pm
- Number of Participants: 4 (2 men and 2 women)

**Focus Group Discussion (FGD) #2: Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (*PKS*, Prosperous Justice Party)**
- Date: Sunday, 25 June 2006
- Time: 12:40pm – 2:15pm
- Number of Participants: 6 (3 men and 3 women)

**Focus Group Discussion (FGD) #3: Women**
- Date: Saturday, 08 July 2006
- Time: 12:55pm – 3:05pm
- Number of Participants: 13 women

**Focus Group Discussion (FGD) #4: Mixed**
- Date: Saturday, 15 July 2006
- Time: 12:40pm – 2:45pm
- Number of Participants: 6 (4 men and 2 women)

**Focus Group Discussion (FGD) #5: Muhammadiyah**
- Date: Saturday, 29 July 2006
- Time: 12:30pm – 2:41pm
- Number of Participants: 7 (5 men and 2 women)

**Focus Group Discussion (FGD) #6: Non-Active**
- Date: Sunday, 30 July 2006
- Time: 12:35pm – 1:35pm
- Number of Participants: 5 (3 men and 2 women)

**Focus Group Discussion (FGD) #7: Nahdlatul Ulama (*NU*)**
Date: Saturday, 12 August 2006
Time: 12:32pm – 2:35pm
Number of Participants: 7 (5 men and 2 women)

I acted as the lead researcher and also worked with an assistant who served as an organizer and moderator for the focus group discussions. The assistant was M. Taufiqurrahman (Taufik) who was a journalist for *The Jakarta Post*, a national English-language newspaper in Indonesia, at the time. The moderator was chosen for his language abilities and interviewing experiences. I believed that the focus group discussions would run more efficiently and effectively with a native speaker of Indonesian. I also thought that the focus group discussion method would take into account the fact that some participants may feel more comfortable discussing religion and politics with peers in a “safe” group setting than alone with a foreign interviewer.

Taufik worked on his own and with staff at the Freedom Institute to identify potential participants for each of the focus group discussions. He contacted and confirmed participation of potential participants as well as served as moderator during the discussions, which were based on a preset list of topics and questions. Taufik also assisted with extra tasks such as “sensemaking” after the discussions were completed and locating transcribers.

Further notes detailing the overall process of the focus group discussion method follow:

- **Recruitment:** Recruitment did not involve random sampling. The lack of accurate statistical and geographic data for sampling purposes meant that only “snowball” techniques would be feasible. Though the recruitment relied on “word-of-mouth” (e.g., colleagues, friends, and past research participants made referrals), the groups themselves were purposefully created to represent variation in religious backgrounds, as well as variation in political participation, while attempting at the same time to represent the main types of religious identity and political action or inaction in Indonesia (particularly Java).
“Controls”: “Controls” were instituted insofar as possible to minimize respondent bias between and within the different groups.

- All groups were mixed with regards to age, socioeconomic status, education, and gender (except the all-women FGD).
- All groups included Muslim participants (except for JIL where one member self-identified as Catholic).
- All FGDs were held in the same location (Freedom Institute meeting room) in the afternoon during the weekend (Saturday or Sunday) and were between 1 and 2 hours long.
- All FGD participants were exposed to similar procedures (e.g., informed consent, background surveys, the same moderator, similar discussion questions, compensation, etc.).
- Each group contained individuals with similar backgrounds (i.e., organizational affiliation or behavioral similarities) to provide for an easier, more comfortable discussion environment.

Location: Certain groups such as PKS, Muhammadiyah, or NU may have felt new to or uncomfortable in the setting of the Freedom Institute meeting room given the history and ideology of the institute, as well as stereotypes about its purpose, activities, and directors or affiliates. Though there may have been some negative perceptions in the beginning or throughout the FGD, this was not openly or directly observed in general by the lead researcher or moderator.

- One exception was a couple of comments from PKS members after I mentioned the free library at the Freedom Institute. I assured them that there was a range of materials (i.e., not just “liberal” resources) available for use. Some of the PKS participants were also interested in applying to the Fulbright-AMINEF Program to which I had an affiliation, but were concerned about a “liberal bias” for Indonesian applicants (e.g., several former Fulbright Student Grantees were associated with JIL). I explained that the Fulbright Program evaluates candidates based on different criteria and weighs grades, essays,
recommendations, and TOEFL scores the most, rather than simply focusing on political affiliation.

- **Compensation:** All focus group discussion participants received envelopes with Rp. 80.000 as a thank you for their involvement in the research project. Everyone referred to the money as “uang transpor” (“transportation money”) or “honor” (“honorarium”), though the participants were free to spend the money as they pleased and not necessarily on transportation. Compensation was provided to individuals at the end of the focus group discussion, but some received their envelopes earlier in cases where they left the group before the discussion was completed. Participants were also treated to coffee, tea, snacks, and a boxed lunch, with some choosing to eat before the discussion and others eating during it or waiting until the end of the discussion.

- **Recordings:** I used a small digital recorder as well as a cassette recorder during the focus group discussions. The recorders were placed in the middle of the table and adjustments were made when needed. Copies of the recordings were later created as back-ups.

- **Delays and Interruptions:** Depending on the time or other circumstances, there were delays or interruptions to the start of the FGDs or during the discussions. Examples include a family emergency and time for afternoon prayers (PKS members).

- **Questions:** The main questions for each FGD were the same, but there were some variations depending on the group of participants and their particular backgrounds. Changes included:
  - After FGD #1, a couple of questions were simplified for clarity.
  - Additional questions were asked for the purposes of clarification and obtaining more specific examples.

- **Problems with Particular FGD:** FGD #4 was supposed to be the non-active group, but the assistant misunderstood who was to be invited to the discussion. Rather than invite individuals who do not participate in politics, he invited people that he thought were unaffiliated to formal organizations. It turned out that two participants were members of Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI,
Muslim Students Association), while the others were unaffiliated. In addition, four participants were journalists, but two were from other jobs (lawyer and NGO director), so the group could not be said to represent media professionals either. All participants had been active in politics at some point in their lives, too, so they were definitely not representative of non-active people. The Non-Active FGD therefore had to be redone.

The aforementioned procedures were based on recommendations from Indonesian colleagues and acquaintances as well as prior experience with the focus group discussion method in July 2005. I collected data from three focus group discussions during a pre-dissertation fieldwork trip for conceptual, theoretical, and methodological purposes:

Focus Group Discussion (FGD) #1: Women Students
- Date: Saturday, 9 July 2005
- Number of Participants: 8

Focus Group Discussion (FGD) #2: Men
- Date: Sunday, 17 July 2005
- Number of Participants: 7

Focus Group Discussion (FGD) #3: Men and Women
- Date: Saturday, 23 July 2005
- Number of Participants: 5 (3 men and 2 women)

All three discussions took place at the Indonesian Institute for Civil Society (INCIS) in Ciputat, Jakarta. Zenal Mutaqin, a member of INCIS and an employee at Lembaga Survei Indonesia (LSI, Indonesian Survey Institute) at the time, acted as an assistant and moderator. Much like the 2006 focus group discussions, recruitment was based on personal invitations and word-of-mouth, i.e., snowballing. Participants received compensation, lunch, and copies of their informed consent forms, too. The sessions informally started around 10:30am as people arrived. The discussions usually went from 11:00am to about 1:00pm or so. Lunch and informal chatting took place afterwards. The sessions were tape-recorded (one digital and one cassette recorder). All participants were Muslim. Christians were invited to the third group in particular in the hopes that a mixed faith discussion group would occur, but the Christian participants did not join the group.
They did not provide any reasons for not participating though they had previously agreed to come. Zenal and I cannot speak for those who did not show up, but possible reasons could have included prior or unexpected personal commitments, transportation problems, second thoughts about being involved in a research project, or concerns about interacting with Muslims in a Muslim-dominated part of the city.

The discussion procedures were as follows:

1. Zenal will thank everyone for coming today, introduce himself, and explain the focus group in general.

2. Jennifer will briefly introduce herself and the research project. Jennifer will then explain that she will sit in the room, listen, and take notes, but not participate in the discussion.

3. Zenal should then explain the focus group procedures.
   
   • First, there will be the “informed consent” forms (surat ijin). The participants are to read the form and sign their names. If they have any questions or concerns, they can ask Zenal or Jennifer. If they do not feel comfortable signing their real names, they can sign imaginary names. Zenal should sign the forms, collect them, and then give them to Jennifer to check. Jennifer will also sign them.

   • Second, Zenal should explain that the focus group is confidential, so they should feel free to be open with their opinions. If at any time the participants do not feel comfortable, they can say something to Zenal or Jennifer, or they may leave the focus group.

   • Zenal will then ask the group to quickly introduce themselves. The participants should give their name, occupation (example: student), and if they want, their hometown or background.

   • Then Zenal will start with the first question. There are a total of four questions to be asked:

      (1) Menurut Anda, apa artinya “beragama?” (In your opinion, what is the meaning of “being religious/having a religion?”)
(2) *Menurut Anda, apa artinya “berpartisipasi dalam politik?”*  
(In your opinion, what is the meaning of “political participation?”)

(3) *Menurut Anda, apakah agama dan politik bisa menjadi satu atau seharusnya terpisah?* (In your opinion, should religion and politics become one/be united or should they be separated?)

(4) *Menurut Anda, apakah agama mempengaruhi partisipasi politik?* (In your opinion, does religion influence political participation?)

The moderator was given special instructions to probe with additional questions if answers were unclear or needed more explanation as well as how to keep the group discussion focused on the main questions. The moderator was also instructed to ensure that participants had equal chances to speak. Also, the moderator was told not to include his own opinions in the discussion as it might bias answers.

The three 2005 focus groups were exploratory in that the content of the discussions were to be used to guide decisions about future focus group discussions, who would be interviewed in later months, what would be included in the semi-structured questionnaires (i.e., interview questions), and inform the kind of language and concepts used in the national survey. The focus group discussions were actual sources of data in that they provided useful definitions/terms and major themes related to the interaction between religious identity and political participation.

**Interviews**

**Background**

Semi-structured and unstructured interviews\textsuperscript{251} with both closed and open-ended questions were conducted with a purposeful sample of scholars, government officials, religious persons, and individuals who are “less connected” to religion in an associational

\textsuperscript{251} Much of the research was also informed by informal discussions and conversations as formal interviews were not always possible or culturally-appropriate.
sense. Interviews ranged between 20 minutes to 1 hour or more depending on the availability and interest of the interview subject. Interviews were conducted in Indonesian and English. There were opinion, knowledge, and background questions. Interview locations were usually offices, cafes and restaurants, and universities. Interview times varied with some taking place in the morning and others in the afternoons or evenings. Generally-speaking, interviews were professional and cordial, but there were occasions in which I experienced subtle and sometimes not-so-subtle problems regarding my gender, age, and nationality. No formal compensation was provided to interview participants, though I offered to assist individuals with informational needs where appropriate. Informed consent forms were used for some, but not all people as the forms themselves are not necessarily “culturally-appropriate” in certain Indonesian contexts. This does not mean that participants were coerced or manipulated in any manner, however. There was full disclosure of my personal background and my research intent and purpose to everyone who provided information. Informants were also told that they could receive reports about my research if they were interested and provided their contact details. Insofar as possible, I tried to build rapport, maintain neutrality, and be culturally-sensitive with all informants.

**Purpose**

The main objectives of the interviews were to gather background information for individuals, organizations, and the general public, as well as personal opinions on different topics. I aimed to get a sense of the terminology used when discussing religion and politics, specifically religiously-relevant public policy issues and political participation, how people construct meaning or make sense of particular phenomena, and the extent to which individual ideas matched or not with data collected via other research methods.

**National Survey**

**Background**
Lembaga Survei Indonesia (LSI, Indonesian Survey Institute) conducts regular national surveys related to public opinion and political behavior in Indonesia. The Yayasan Pengembangan Demokrasi Indonesia (YPDI, Foundation for Democracy Development in Indonesia) founded LSI in August 2003. LSI is a non-profit, independent, and non-partisan research institute. Their clients are various. Examples include the Asian Barometer (Taiwan), the Japan International Cooperation Agency (Japan), The Heritage Foundation (United States), Comparative National Election Project, CNEP (United States), Indonesian government agencies such as the Department of Communication and Information and The Department of Culture and Tourism, Indonesian political parties (e.g., GOLKAR, PDI-Perjuangan, and PAN), and individual politicians (e.g., governors, regents/mayors) and political candidates running for office. LSI is unique in Indonesia because it adheres to the code of ethics on public opinion survey research established by the International Association of Public Opinion Research (IAPOR). LSI is also a member of CNEP and the consortium of Asia Barometer.

LSI is managed professionally and has a strict set of academic principles which guide its research designs, implementation procedures, and analysis. As of February 2006, LSI’s head office had 8 permanent staff members, 3 social science researchers, 3 statistics and data analysis experts, and 2 administrative staff members. Their 182 Area Coordinators were located in different cities and regions across the archipelago. The Area Coordinators are responsible for fieldwork activities and each coordinates the work of between 20-50 surveyors. Both the Area Coordinators and surveyors are not permanent staff and work based on project and individual availability. All employees receive formal survey training and have experience with data collection and face-to-face interviews. Steps are also taken to ensure quality control and correct data entry.

Dr. Saiful Mujani founded and heads LSI. Dr. Mujani served as an advisor and mentor during my overseas stay, as well as provided the opportunity to me to add my own questions on one of LSI’s ongoing omnibus surveys. The original plan was to have my survey questions go out in May 2006, but this was postponed to fine tune my survey questions and because of schedule changes in LSI’s own work. A survey was scheduled

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252 Former contact details: Wisma Tugu Wahid Hasyim, Jalan KH. Wahid Hasyim, No. 100, Jakarta Pusat, 10340, Indonesia; Telephone: (021) 3156373 or 3156686; Fax: (021) 3156473; Current Website: http://www.lsi.or.id
for the field in September or October 2006, but then again for logistical reasons, we waited until after Ramadan and Lebaran to carry out the survey in December 2006.

The survey itself was called “Evaluasi Akhir Tahun” (“End of the Year Evaluation”). The survey included 1,227 respondents. The sampling technique was multistage random sampling. The first stage consisted of stratifying the Indonesian population based on the population in each province so that the percentage of respondents in each province is equivalent to the percentage of the population in that province. All provinces in Indonesia were included in the sample. The next stratification level was based on location: urban (42%) and rural (58%). The last stratification level was based on gender: 50% men and 50% women.

The next stage involved selecting the village level as the primary sampling unit (PSU). Systematic randomization was used to select villages in each province based on the population size in that province. In each selected village, LSI listed the name of the Rukun Tetangga (RT, neighborhood) and randomly selected 5 neighborhoods. In each selected neighborhood, LSI then listed families based on Kartu Keluarga (KK, family cards) and then randomly selected 2 families. From these 2 selected families, LSI listed male and female family members who were aged 17 years old and above or were married and then randomly selected a family member. If in the first family, the selected respondent was a man, then in the second selected family/household, the random selection is only performed among the women in order to select a female respondent.

LSI designed the overall questionnaire, but I created my own questions for my dissertation project (not including the general demographic variables which are already included in the survey). In discussing scale development in survey instruments, Robert DeVellis suggests consulting with experts to “rate how relevant they think each item is to what you intend to measure,” “evaluate the items’ clarity and conciseness,” and for “pointing out ways of tapping the phenomenon that you have failed to include.”

I applied this advice in general, writing and revising over ten drafts of all of my survey

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253 There were 610 male respondents and 617 female respondents. There are missing cases for certain variables, however.
254 The sampling technique information in this section comes directly from correspondence with LSI in 2006. The information above may be characterized as standard protocol and can be found in other LSI documents such as proposals and contracts.
questions in consultation with staff from LSI. In specific, we had extensive discussions about how to cater the questions to the Indonesian population to take into account certain cultural and educational factors. The final questions were often a compromise in that my preferred measures had to be changed somewhat or a lot depending on the potential respondents’ backgrounds and the limited space for questions on the survey instrument.

LSI collected the field data via in-person interviews and entered the data into the statistical program SPSS. I was responsible for editing the final file and cells for my own research purposes. Finally, the work agreement included formal assistance from me on some of LSI’s other research projects and a one-time payment of US$5,000.00 (inclusive of 10% VAT) to add my research questions on the omnibus survey.

**Purpose**

The survey functioned as a vehicle to identify general patterns or correlates of public opinion and political behavior. The aim was breadth versus depth. Because of limitations with the final dataset, many of the findings may be considered “descriptive data” or “simple cross-tabulations.” Where possible, I conducted correlation tests and regression analysis.

**Mini-Survey**

**Background**

In August 2004, I conducted preliminary research into the concepts, definitions, and relationships between “religion,” “religious organizations,” and “political participation.” I made a small two-page questionnaire that included demographic questions and three open-ended opinion questions to be distributed at and around three universities: Sanata Dharma University and Gadjah Mada University in the city of Yogyakarta and an Islamic university in Purwokerto. I did not use formal statistical sampling. The convenience sample consisted of me asking local students, faculty, and administrators to distribute the mini-survey amongst themselves and return the forms to me after completion.

The first side of the questionnaire sheet asked background questions. Respondents noted their gender, age, religion (e.g., Islam, Christian, Catholic, Hindu,
Buddhist, Other, or None), experience with religious schooling (e.g., during elementary school/junior high school/high school/university; type: boarding school, afternoon studies, and studies during school holiday breaks; frequency in years, and names of schools), and membership in religious organizations (e.g., during elementary school/junior high school/high school/university; type: non-profit, political, student, pemuda, or other; frequency in years; and names of groups).

The three qualitative questions on the second side of the questionnaire sheet were as follows: (1) In Indonesia, what is the meaning of “religious organization,” (2) In Indonesia, what is the meaning of “political participation,” and (3) Do you think that there is a relationship between religious organizations and political participation? Please write yes or no and explain your opinion with specific examples. If you don’t mind, please write about your experience with school or a religious organization.

56 women and 28 men responded. 56 respondents were self-identified Muslims. 39 were from Sanata Dharma University or contacts associated with it; 29 were from Gadjah Mada University or the surrounding area, and 16 were from Purwokerto, specifically Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri (STAIN, State Islamic College). The average age of respondents was about 25 years old with the age range being between 18 to 60 years old. Sanata Dharma is a Catholic university with 8,000-10,000 students from different religious and socioeconomic backgrounds. Gadjah Mada is the largest university in Indonesia in terms of student body (about 55,000), as well as one of the oldest in the country. It is typically ranked third behind University of Indonesia and the Bandung Institute of Technology. The university attracts people from all across Indonesia. The Islamic college in Purwokerto is a small educational institution servicing Muslim students and interests.

Purpose

Due to limited resources and time, I needed a method that could reach a relatively large number of people, but also obtain meaningful responses to questions of interest similar to in-person interviews. While the mini-survey results may not be generalizable to the larger population, they provide a useful snapshot of opinions about religion and politics in 2004 among people associated with diverse academic institutions.
**Newspaper Archives and Coding**

**Definition**

“Newspaper coding” in this dissertation project refers to finding articles of interest related to religion and political participation and then listing relevant information in different categories in Microsoft Excel.

**Background**

I mainly utilized two libraries, one at the Freedom Institute and the other at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, as well as one clipping service located at Kompas headquarters, in Jakarta to obtain information regarding contemporary public policy issues and political participation as they relate to religion. I collected newspaper articles from 2005 to 2006 from two daily newspapers: Kompas and Republika. Kompas has a reputation for being a “people’s paper” (but arguably of the United States’ New York Times variety) and Republika has a general reputation for being a “Muslim paper.” My original purpose for selecting the two papers was to locate similarities and differences regarding coverage of national and domestic public policy issues and political participation activities. The newspapers provided varying levels and types of details about religiopolitical activities, actors, and issues.

As for assistants, there were three for this research method, one doing the bulk of the work as a coder and the other two assisting later as editors and data checkers. Tasks included locating relevant newspaper articles and photocopying them, coding relevant newspaper articles in Microsoft Excel, and communicating regularly with the lead researcher. “Maybe” articles were photocopied and listed in a Microsoft Word document. Saidiman\(^{256}\) acted as the main data collector and coder, while Afni, and Sofi helped later in the project. They were all undergraduate students from local universities in Jakarta at the time of the research.

Using Microsoft Excel and the following template as a guide, my assistants and I coded articles related to religion and politics:

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\(^{256}\) Saidiman was an undergraduate student at Universitas Islam Negeri – Ciputat and an active member of JIL.
More specifically, we attempted to locate as many of the following activities as possible:

- Salute flag
- Hang flag outside of one’s home
- Sing national anthem
- Picture of President and/or Vice-President in workplace and/or home
- Vote for a particular candidate or party
- Cast a blank ballot
- Vote
- Cast a blank ballot

\*257 Some activities (particularly those listed with quotation marks) were based on measures in Saiful Mujani, “Religious Democrats: Democratic Political Culture and Muslim Political Participation in Post-Suharto Indonesia” (Ph.D. diss., The Ohio State University, 2003).
- Not vote
- No participation of any kind (active avoidance of politics)
- Run for political office
- Try to persuade others to vote
- Try to persuade others to vote for a particular candidate or party
- Use any social pressure to influence certain electoral outcomes
- Attend political meetings
- Attend political parades
- Attend political rallies
- Formal member of a political party
- Work for a particular candidate or party
- Volunteer for a particular candidate or party
- Give money to a particular candidate or party
- Give other contributions to a particular candidate or party (e.g., gifts)
- Wear party-affiliated colors or clothing (e.g., t-shirts with candidate pictures)
- Use party-affiliated stickers, buttons, or some other item on self, motorcycle, motorcycle helmet, car, truck, etc.
- Hang party-affiliated colors or flyers/posters on home, in neighborhood, or around town
- Distribute party leaflets
- Participate in a demonstration/protest
- Participate in a boycott
- Participate in a riot
- Participate in a strike
- Use violence to influence certain electoral outcomes
- Use violence to disrupt the election
- Use violence against the government
- Use violence against another civilian group
- Occupy public buildings
- Block traffic
- Damage public facilities
- Holds a political leadership/representative position (e.g., party leader, governor)
- Visit local representative/politician’s office
- Call local representative/politician
- Write to local representative/politician (paper or email)
- Organize a petition
- Sign a petition
- Editorials, research, or other writings with political content
- Public statements by individuals or groups
- Participation in an interest, lobby, or advocacy group
- Participation in a leadership role regarding civic education or political debates
- Interest in politics or government affairs
- Partisanship (e.g., feel close to one particular party)
- Watches television programs with political content
- Reads political news in newspapers, magazines, journals, etc. or online
- Listens to political news or programs on the radio
- Discusses politics with family, friends, and/or co-workers
- Attend community meetings (neighborhood or village/town groups)
- Organize community meetings (neighborhood or village/town groups)
- Attend community meetings that specifically meet to discuss and/or resolve “community issues such as security, bad condition of local roads, tensions or conflict between groups in the community”
- Organize a “community meeting to resolve any community problem”
- Active, occasional, or non-membership in civil society organizations and associations (e.g., member, leader, occasional volunteer, no affiliation):
  - Arts or cultural club (e.g., dance, theater, music, wayang kulit [shadow puppet plays])
  - Union
  - Professional association (e.g., teachers, doctors)
  - Sports association/club
  - Religious organization that is politically-oriented
  - Religious organization that is not politically-oriented
  - Social welfare organization
  - Family-oriented organization
  - Education-oriented organization
  - Security council
  - Youth organization
  - Student organization
  - “Social organization at local community level such as village council (dewan desa)”
  - “Rotating credit association (arisan)”
  - Environment-oriented organization
  - Business-oriented organization
  - “Associations of animal lovers such as bird watchers (pencinta burung), fighting cock aficionados (pencinta ayam piaraan)”
  - “Cooperative”
  - New movement organization/non-profit organization (Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat)
  - International organization (e.g., Red Crescent/Cross, Amnesty International)

In addition, opinion pieces, editorials, and other similar commentary that dealt with religion and religious organizations were included in the data file as well.
Additional background notes follow below:

- **“Controls”:** Only one coder was used to maintain consistency in data collection and processing over time. Additional assistants and I checked the dataset for errors and made additions or corrections as needed, however.

- **Locations:** The coder located newspapers at the newspaper business offices (e.g., Kompas headquarters and library), as well as the libraries at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Freedom Institute in Central Jakarta. The coder made the relevant photocopies or downloaded material from digital archives, and then personally coded the articles at home, libraries, and internet cafes. The extra assistants and I double-checked the copied materials.

- **Delays and Interruptions:** Adhering to the original research design plan which called for a decade’s worth of data – January 1997 to January 2007 – was not possible. I had to change the timeline to January 2005 to December 2006 because of limitations related to accessibility and cost. For example, problems included locating missing newspapers and locating complete articles or pictures with captions in the digital archives. Also, a lack of permission to make photocopies from bounded copies prevented coding of more than two years. All articles before January 2005 are in bounded hardback book form.

**Purpose**

The newspaper coding is not meant to provide a numerical count of public policy issues and political participation activities over time. An accurate numerical count is not possible because newspaper businesses are subjective in their decisions to publish and how they cover stories that involve public policies and political participation (e.g., marketability, reader interest, space constraints, political pressures, etc.). Rather, the coding aims to provide information about public policy debates and the general or popular types of political participation in Indonesia. Articles also offer details about who is involved and why. In addition, the newspaper coding points to certain aspects of social
and political discourses such as the importance, intensity, or meaning of certain policies and political behavior.

In describing the process of systematically coding different kinds of data on nations, R.J. Rummel distinguishes four types of data:258

- Events: discrete political happenings (e.g., a coup threat, military clash);
- Flows: state behavior with continuity in time (e.g., trade);
- Structures: formal behavioral relationships (e.g., membership in international organizations); and
- Attributes: a characteristic of a state (e.g., area).

These categories may be applied to the topic of religion and politics and the method of newspaper coding. Newspapers can and do include information about specific events (e.g., demonstrations), flows (e.g., interactions between the government and demonstrators during a particular time period), structures (e.g., nature of the relationship between officials and “the people” or special interest groups; membership in civil society organizations), and attributes (e.g., various characteristics of religious identity and political participation).

Justifications

Advantages included the following:

- **Accuracy**: Individual interviews and discussions can involve problems of memory and inaccurate recall, whereas newspapers are produced daily and then archived. The articles themselves do not change over time nor are they susceptible to poor memory recall.
- **Availability**: News stories contain public information that is generally readily accessible.
- **Breadth**: The national newspapers contain articles about people and events from across Indonesia.

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• Specificity: The newspaper articles include names of individuals and groups involved in the areas of religion and politics. The articles can provide contextual details of who, what, where, when, how, and why.

Newspaper coding also has potential limitations or cons, however:

• Bias: Bias can come from the newspaper business, the reporters, the sources of information for the article, and readers’ interpretations. Any of these actors may have certain prejudices that can negatively influence the collection, processing, and understanding or analysis of information. For example, what is in the “public eye” may not in fact be the whole “truth” or the only “truth.”

• Low Information Quality: The newspaper articles do not always include pertinent, accurate, detailed, or complete information.

And why choose Kompas and Republika? These two newspapers were chosen for their availability, popularity, and reputations. Both are national newspapers read by many Indonesians. Kompas has a reputation for being “neutral” or “objective,” while Republika has an Islamic or Muslim reputation. The two papers may be compared and contrasted in terms of content, quality, and religious or political preferences.

**Participant Observation**

Participant observation, though not extensive, proved useful for general background purposes. I attended various public demonstrations and meetings to get a sense of “who,” “when,” “where,” and “how” with regards to everyday sociopolitical life. Though these firsthand experiences were typically short, single observations, they helped me to better understand the contexts in which religion and politics intersect as well as afforded me the opportunity to obtain information that was not always available or sometimes incomplete during the focus group discussions, interviews, newspapers, etc.

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259 “Participant observation” may also be called “direct observation,” “fieldwork,” “field-based observation,” “naturalistic observation,” and so on.
My personal involvement in the various demonstrations and meeting was mostly limited to “onlooker” or “spectator” status, though I did interact with others on occasion in the form of asking a few descriptive questions or answering their questions about my background. As Patton writes, “Social, cultural, political, and interpersonal factors can limit the nature and degree of participation in participant observation.”260 In specific, I was quite conscious of two particular barriers: my gender as a woman and my nationality as an American. I therefore had to be sensitive and flexible about which demonstrations and meetings I could attend, who I could speak with, and how long I would be permitted to observe activities. Where possible, I also tried to be aware of and adapt to “insider” and “outsider” points of view.

Secondary Writings

I found secondary texts through general and specific searches online and at the libraries of the University of Michigan, Freedom Institute, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Gadjah Mada University, and Monash University. I attempted to use the National Library of Indonesia and other private library resources, but it was difficult to locate relevant government records (e.g., census, policies), non-government organization publications, religious organization documents (e.g., constitution, publicity), surveys, and academic articles and books at those places. I also relied on contacts at The Asia Foundation, Komisi Pemilihan Umum (KPU, General Elections Commission), and the Ministry of Religious Affairs to obtain books and documents. One assistant – Tantowi – also helped in locating data. As stated earlier, further sources of information were obtained from personal colleagues and acquaintances from various universities, non-profit organizations, social and political groups, and the mass media.

Methodological Challenges

Research has its challenges and this project was not immune to common and Indonesia-specific problems in design and implementation. The following is a list of methodological challenges, some of which are previously mentioned, that occurred in the field:

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260 Patton, 266.
Conceptual Issues

- Potential cross-cultural misunderstanding concerning concepts and measures.
- Accuracy and clarity of self-reporting.
- How to differentiate in the measurements between thinking and acting as an individual, an individual within a group, or as a group.

Logistical Issues

- Obtaining enough funding to implement research methods effectively, efficiently, and thoroughly.
- Access to certain individuals and organizations without prior established relationships.
- Access to persons and data given my gender, age, and nationality.
- Suspicion or concern from others depending on their affiliations and my own.
- Language and translation issues (English-Indonesian, Indonesian-English, and other languages such as Javanese).
- Working around individual and social schedules (e.g., Ramadan).
- Focus Group Discussions: Limited number of groups, only single sessions available, and complicated content (e.g., tangents, unfocused discussions, or not enough details).
- Interviews: Limited or no access to specific people (e.g., religious leaders, politicians), only single sessions, and limited details.
- National Survey: Limited number and type of questions, no open-ended questions and answers, and one shot so may not capture actors and variables over time (e.g., generational differences).  

- Mini-Survey: Convenience sample limits generalizability.

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261 See Jean M. Converse, and Stanley Presser, *Survey Questions: Handcrafting the Standardized Questionnaire*, Series: Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, Number 07-063 (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1986) for information regarding common concerns in designing surveys that I encountered in my own research design, along with strategies for dealing with such matters. However, some recommendations did not or could not apply in the context of Indonesia, my research topics, limited funding, etc.
• *Newspaper Archives and Coding*: Limited years, only two national newspapers available to compare, and missing articles.

• *Participant Observation*: Infrequent and limited access.

• *Secondary Texts*: Sometimes unavailable or incomplete information.

**Measurement Issues**

• Exact definitions of “religion,” “public policy,” “public opinion,” “political participation,” etc.

• Frequency of political participation.

• Possible reporting biases (e.g., purposeful/intentional misreporting or unintentional misreporting because of different perceptions or forgetfulness).

• Language and translation issues (e.g., affects types of interview, focus group, and survey questions).

**Human Subjects**

The Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the University of Michigan exists to “assure that the rights and welfare of human subjects participating in research are adequately protected.” IRB “reviews all planned research involving human subjects prior to initiation of the research, approves research that meets established criteria for protection of human subjects, and monitors approved research to ascertain that human subjects are indeed protected.”\(^262\) This research project received approval from the IRB – Behavioral Sciences committee in Ann Arbor for the period of 2006 to 2010.\(^263\)

Indonesia also has its own version of IRB. *Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia* (*LIPI*, Indonesian Institute of Sciences) oversees research in Indonesia and has special requirements for foreign researchers. It is similar to IRB in that it seeks to protect human subjects, but it is also aims to protect the country. LIPI granted approval for this project in July 2005 and October 2005, as well as provided renewal documents throughout 2006.

Prior to and during fieldwork, I did not anticipate any direct harm to those who participated in this project. Anonymous names and places were used if needed and steps


\(^{263}\) Pre-dissertation fieldwork completed in 2005 was supported by my dissertation advisors and LIPI.
were taken to ensure the confidentiality of interview subjects. I was unaware of the precise likelihood or form of indirect harm that may have been a consequence of participating in this project, but one example might be negative repercussions from a state apparatus once the work is published. Certain religious groups and leaders, as well as anti-system activists or radicals, have already taken steps (e.g., speeches, rallies, protests, etc.) to show disagreement with or hostility towards past and present government institutions and officials, however, and so I may argue that there is only minimal risk to the research participants for sharing their opinions about “everyday political life.” In this context, minimal risk refers to “the probability and magnitude of harm or discomfort anticipated in the research are not greater in and of themselves than those ordinarily encountered in daily life or during the performance of routine physical or psychological examinations or tests.”\textsuperscript{264}

\textsuperscript{264} http://www.irb.research.umich.edu/IRB_Behavioral/New/background.html#goals, accessed 1 April 2005.
Research Design Bibliography


APPENDIX B

Background: Islam

Additional Beliefs:

• Muslims believe that God revealed the Qur’an through the angel Jibrīl (Gabriel) to the Prophet Muhammad over a period of time—thirteen years in Mecca and about ten years in Medina—starting in 610 CE and ending in 632 CE when the Prophet passed away. Muslims also believe that the Qur’an is the literal word of God. The book has 114 surat (chapters) in the form of verses. There have been many commentaries and tafsir (interpretations) concerning what is actually said and meant in the verses.

• The Prophet Muhammad was the last in a line of prophets, all mortal men who taught people about God’s will. Since the prophets were mortal, they are not worshipped as gods.

• Islam assumes that all people are born innocent and capable of discerning “good” and “evil” through their reason and conscience. This is different from Christianity and its concept of “original sin” and the need to be saved from sin.

• The five religious duties of shahadah, salat, zakat, sawm, and hadj are required of all Muslims. Other religious activities are deemed required, optional, or forbidden depending on categories outlined in Islamic law. The “Five Principles” are as follows:265

(1) fard or wājib—duties and acts that are required of all Muslims and whose performance is rewarded and whose omission is punished (for example, prayer, almsgiving, and fasting).

(2) *sunna, masnūn, mandūb,* or *mustahabb*—duties and acts that are recommended but not required. Performance of them is rewarded, but omission is not punished (for example, certain supererogatory prayers during the salat or visiting Medina after the pilgrimage).

(3) *jā’iz* or *mubāh*—indifferent actions, whose performance or omission is neither rewarded nor punished.

(4) *makrūh*—actions that are disapproved but not punished or forbidden (there is a wide divergence of opinion about this category).

(5) *harām*—actions that are both forbidden and punished (for example, fornication, drinking wine, and stealing).

A more generic division is that of “harām” meaning “forbidden” and “halāl” meaning “permitted.” There are further distinctions between and within each of the five aforementioned categories and the two general groupings, as well as differences of opinion and practice according to specific schools of thought.

- Muslims carry out their religious practices at home, work, school, *masjid* (mosque), while traveling, and elsewhere. All of their deeds are recorded by angels to determine what happens on the Last Day when the world will come to an end. Based on a Muslim’s beliefs, the recorded deeds, and God’s mercy, God will determine who will be saved and permitted into paradise and who will be condemned and sent to hell. Muslims do not “earn” their way into heaven via good deeds, however, as the surrendering of one’s will to God is thought to be sufficient. The deeds are rather viewed as proof of this surrendering and one’s faith.

**Demographic Information:**

Though Islam has had a long history in many countries around the world, accurate and complete demographic information for Muslims is difficult to locate. As the Ministry of Hajj of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia explains, “It is not easy to determine
with any degree of accuracy the total number of Muslims. For some countries, up-to-date information is not available. In other cases, official figures are highly suspect.”

The Ministry, like many other organizations and individuals, tends to use data from The World Factbook, which is produced by the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Additional sources from the United Nations, census data from individual governments, and various internet resources are used to check and adjust numbers where deemed appropriate.

The Ministry of Hajj in Saudi Arabia estimates the number of Muslims worldwide to be around 1.5 billion or 22.5% of the world’s population. This is similar to the percentage provided by The World Factbook, where from a global population of 6,677,563,921, 33.32% are Christians, 21.01% are Muslims, 13.26% are Hindus, Buddhists are 5.84%, 0.35% are Sikhs, Jews are 0.23%, and 0.12% are Baha’is. Other religions make up 11.78%, the non-religious are at 11.77%, and 2.32% are atheists.

The World Factbook does not indicate how they differentiate between the categories of “non-religious” and “atheists.”

Contrary to popular belief, most Muslims live outside the Arab world and the Middle East in Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. The following table lists population and legal information for countries with high Muslim populations. With regards to legal systems in particular, many Muslim-majority societies employ a mix of civil law and Shariah (Islamic law). Also, not all United Nations member countries accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Examples include Brazil, China, France, Italy, and the United States. In their company are countries marked with an asterisk (*) below:

Table B.1 Population and Legal System Information for Select Muslim-Majority Countries.

---

267 Ibid.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country and Year of Independence</th>
<th>National Population</th>
<th>Religion Percentages for National Population</th>
<th>Legal System</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan (1919)</td>
<td>32,738,376</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim 80%, Shi’a Muslim 19%, and Other 1%</td>
<td>Based on civil and Shari’a law; *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh (1971)</td>
<td>153,546,901</td>
<td>Muslim 83%, Hindu 16%, and Other 1%</td>
<td>Based on English common law; *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt (1922)</td>
<td>81,713,517</td>
<td>Muslim (mostly Sunni) 90%, Coptic 9%, and Other Christian 1%</td>
<td>Based on Islamic and civil law; accepts ICJ jurisdiction with reservations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea (1958)</td>
<td>10,211,437</td>
<td>Muslim 85%, Christian 8%, and Indigenous Beliefs 7%</td>
<td>Based on French civil law, customary law, and decree; accepts ICJ jurisdiction with reservations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia (1945)</td>
<td>237,512,352</td>
<td>Muslim 86.1%, Protestant 5.7%, Roman Catholic 3%, Hindu 1.8%, and Other or Unspecified 3.4%</td>
<td>Based on Roman-Dutch law, modified by indigenous concepts and new criminal procedures and election codes; *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran (1979)</td>
<td>65,875,223</td>
<td>Muslim 98% (Shi’a 89%, Sunni 9%), and Other 2%</td>
<td>Based on Sharia law system; *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq (1932)</td>
<td>28,221,181</td>
<td>Muslim 97% (Shi’a 60%-65%, Sunni 32%-37%), and Christian or Other 3%</td>
<td>Based on European civil and Islamic law under the framework outlined in Iraq’s Constitution; *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan (1946)</td>
<td>6,198,677</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim 92%, Christian 6%, and Other 2%</td>
<td>Based on Islamic law and French codes; *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait (1961)</td>
<td>2,596,799</td>
<td>Muslim 85% (Sunni 70%, Shi’a 30%), and Other 15%</td>
<td>Civil law system with Islamic law significant in personal matters; *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya (1951)</td>
<td>6,173,579</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim 97%, and Other 3%</td>
<td>Based on Italian and French civil law and Islamic law; separate religious courts; *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia (1957)</td>
<td>25,274,133</td>
<td>Muslim 60.4%, Buddhist 19.2%, Christian 9.1%, Hindu 6.3%, Confucianism, Taoism, and other traditional Chinese religions 2.6%, Other or Unknown 1.5%, and None 0.8%</td>
<td>Based on English common law; Islamic law is applied to Muslims in matters of family law and religion; *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali (1960)</td>
<td>12,324,029</td>
<td>Muslim 90%, Christian 1%, and Indigenous Beliefs 9%</td>
<td>Based on French civil law and customary law; *</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---


274 Note: This includes 1,291,354 non-nationals.

275 Note: This includes 166,510 non-nationals.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Legal System</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>34,343,219</td>
<td>Muslim 98.7%, Christian 1.1%, and Jewish 0.2%</td>
<td>Based on Islamic law and French and Spanish civil law systems; *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>13,272,679</td>
<td>Muslim 80%, and Other 20%</td>
<td>Based on French civil law and customary law; *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>167,762,040</td>
<td>Muslim 97% (Sunni 77%, Shi’a 20%), and Other 3%</td>
<td>Based on English common law with provisions to accommodate Pakistan’s status as an Islamic state; accepts ICJ jurisdiction with reservations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>1932</td>
<td>28,161,417²⁷⁶</td>
<td>Muslim 100%</td>
<td>Based on Shari’a law; secular codes have been introduced; *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>12,853,259</td>
<td>Muslim 94%, Christian 5%, and Indigenous Beliefs 1%</td>
<td>Based on French civil law; accepts ICJ jurisdiction with reservations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>9,558,666²⁷⁷</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>No national system; a mixture of English common law, Italian law, Islamic Shari’a, and Somali customary law; accepts ICJ jurisdiction with reservations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>19,747,586²⁷⁸</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim 74%, Other Muslim 16%, Christian 10%, and Jewish (tiny)</td>
<td>Based on a combination of French and Ottoman civil law; Islamic law is used in family courts; *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>10,383,577</td>
<td>Muslim 98%, Christian 1%, and Jewish and Other 1%</td>
<td>Based on French civil law and Islamic law; *</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additional Muslim-majority states have emerged since the break up of the former Soviet Union: Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kazakstan, Turkmenia, Tadjikistan, and Kirzhgia. China, too, has a Muslim population in the western province of Xinjiang/Sinkiang,²⁷⁹ though precise figures are presently unavailable.

²⁷⁶ Note: This includes 5,576,076 non-nationals.
²⁷⁷ Note: This estimate was derived from an official 1975 census conducted by the Somali Government. Population counting is difficult because of the large number of nomads and refugee movements from famine and clan warfare.
²⁷⁸ Note: Additionally, about 40,000 people live in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. This breaks down to about 20,000 Arabs (18,000 are Druze and 2,000 are Alawites) and around 20,000 Israelis.
²⁷⁹ University of Cumbria, http://philtar.ucsm.ac.uk/encyclopedia/islam/islam.html
APPENDIX C

Background: 2004 AsiaBarometer Survey


http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/20420/detail?archive=ICPSR&q=asia+barometer+2004

F9 Do you regard yourself as belonging to any particular religion? If yes, which? (SA) [Note: F9 was omitted in China.]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Catholic</th>
<th>Confucian</th>
<th>8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Christian religion other than Catholic</td>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Muslim (Sunnah)</td>
<td>Sikh</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Muslim (Shiah)</td>
<td>Taoism</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Buddhist (Mahayana)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Buddhist (Hinayana)</td>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q43 Now I’d like you to look at this card. I’m going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I’d like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do or would never, under any circumstances, do it. (SA) [Note: Q43 was omitted in Brunei, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, and China.]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Have done</th>
<th>Might do</th>
<th>Would never do</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q43a  a. Signing a petition</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q43b  b. Joining in boycotts</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q43c  c. Attending lawful demonstrations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q18_1_11 Which of the following social circles or groups are important to you? - 11 Political party

Q18_1_12 Which of the following social circles or groups are important to you? - 12 Religion
Q20_1 There are a number of major components whereby you form your identity. They include religion, ethnicity, region, language, class and nationality. How do you rate religion with other components? - 1 Religion is more important than ethnicity.

Q20_2 There are a number of major components whereby you form your identity. They include religion, ethnicity, region, language, class and nationality. How do you rate religion with other components? - 2 Religion is more important than region.

Q20_3 There are a number of major components whereby you form your identity. They include religion, ethnicity, region, language, class and nationality. How do you rate religion with other components? - 3 Religion is more important than language.

Q20_4 There are a number of major components whereby you form your identity. They include religion, ethnicity, region, language, class and nationality. How do you rate religion with other components? - 4 Religion is more important than class.

Q20_5 There are a number of major components whereby you form your identity. They include religion, ethnicity, region, language, class and nationality. How do you rate religion with other components? - 5 Religion is more important than nationality.

Q30b Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each statement. - There is widespread corruption among those who govern the country.

Q30c Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each statement. - Generally speaking, people like me don’t have the power to influence government policy or actions.

Q30d Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each statement. - Politics and government are so complicated that sometimes I don’t understand what's happening.

Q30e Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each statement. - Since so many people vote in elections, it really doesn’t matter whether I vote or not.

Q30f Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each statement. - Generally speaking, the people who are elected to the [NATIONAL PARLIAMENT] stop thinking about the public.

Q30g Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each statement. - Government officials pay little attention to what citizens like me think.

**Indonesia**

1. **Sample size:** 825
2. **Respondents:** Male and female aged 20–59
3. **Company:** TNS Indonesia
4. **Time Frame:** Field work October 28–November 17, 2004; Data Processing November 18–December 1, 2004; Delivery December 2, 2004

5. **Language/s:** Bahasa Indonesia

6. **Sampling methodology in detail**

   **First stage:** The Primary Sampling Unit (PSU) was ‘Kecamatan’ (districts) of which there are approximately 4000 across the nation. In each PSU (cluster) 20 interviews were conducted and a total of 40 Kecamatan were selected systematically using an interval equal to the sampling fraction. Within each Kecamatan, a desa (village or suburb) was selected on the basis of a random number procedure.

   **Second stage:** The number of interviews per PSU was approximately 20. For the rural communities the maximum number of interviewer did not exceed 5 per village. Typically, a Kecamatan is represented by 4 villages, each having 5 interviews completed. In the cities, but also in the rural areas, interviewers were allocated to randomly selected RTs. The number of interviews per RT is maximum 5.

   **Third stage:** Within the selected RT the interviewer follows a random walk procedure. After each contact, skipping four dwellings before a new interview attempt is made. In a selected household, the Kish Grid method is used to randomly select a household member aged 20 to 59 years-old.

7. **Methodology of survey:** Face to face interview

8. **Completed Samples**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Designed samples</th>
<th>Completed samples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sex</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20–24</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25–34</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35–44</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45–54</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55–59</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sampling Areas</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumatra</td>
<td></td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Java</td>
<td>559</td>
<td>559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX D

Background: 1999 The Asia Foundation Survey


Sample size: 1,008 randomly selected in-person interviews of Indonesians qualified to vote in 22 of 27 provinces. Security problems meant East Timor, Aceh, and Maluku were excluded from the sample. The Asia Foundation, Charney Research of New York, and AC Nielsen collaborated on the survey methodology and reports. Pages 251-252 provide more information on the research methodology. The margin of error for the national sample is +/-3.5%. The survey was supported by the U.S. Agency for International Development.
APPENDIX E

Background: 2003 The Asia Foundation Survey


Sample size: 1,056 randomly selected in-person interviews of Indonesians eligible to vote in 32 of 33 provinces. The military situation in Aceh did not permit interviews. The Asia Foundation, Charney Research of New York, and AC Nielsen Indonesia collaborated on the survey methodology and reports. Pages 29-33 provide more information on the research methodology. The margin of error for the national sample is +/-3%. The survey was supported by the U.S. Agency for International Development.
The majority of Indonesians do not regularly, actively engage in politics with the one exception of voting. The following tables compare self-reported data from Muslim and non-Muslim respondents in my 2006 survey for ten measures of political participation. “Don’t know” and “No answer” were coded as missing values and thus are omitted from analysis.

Table F.1 Cross tabulation: Religion and Measure 1 – Join elections to choose members of the DPR, DPRD, Bupati, etc.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What is your religion?</th>
<th>Islam</th>
<th>Protestantism</th>
<th>Catholicism</th>
<th>Hinduism</th>
<th>Buddhism</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Count % within</td>
<td>Count % within</td>
<td>Count % within</td>
<td>Count % within</td>
<td>Count % within</td>
<td>Count % within</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very often</td>
<td>Somewhat often</td>
<td>Rarely</td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Very often</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>41.1%</td>
<td>35.1%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestantism</td>
<td>57.3%</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholicism</td>
<td>52.2%</td>
<td>30.4%</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hinduism</td>
<td>31.0%</td>
<td>37.9%</td>
<td>20.7%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhism</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>54.5%</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42.6%</td>
<td>33.6%</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>519</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table F.2 Cross tabulation: Religion and Measure 2 – Run for office for village head, Bupati, DPRD member, etc.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What is your religion?</th>
<th>Run for office for village head, Bupati, DPRD member, etc.</th>
<th>Very often</th>
<th>Somewhat often</th>
<th>Rarely</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Count % within</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>96.3%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestantism</td>
<td>Count % within</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>98.9%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholicism</td>
<td>Count % within</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>97.7%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hinduism</td>
<td>Count % within</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhism</td>
<td>Count % within</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Count % within</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count % within</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.2%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>96.6%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table F.3 Cross tabulation: Religion and Measure 3 – Volunteer for a politician or political party.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What is your religion?</th>
<th>Volunteer for a politician or political party</th>
<th>Very often</th>
<th>Somewhat often</th>
<th>Rarely</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Count % within</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>87.6%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestantism</td>
<td>Count % within</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>86.2%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholicism</td>
<td>Count % within</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>86.4%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hinduism</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

196
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What is your religion?</th>
<th>% within</th>
<th>Very often</th>
<th>Somewhat often</th>
<th>Rarely</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>589</td>
<td>1044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
<td>24.9%</td>
<td>56.4%</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestantism</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>19.1%</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
<td>57.3%</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholicism</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
<td>63.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hinduism</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>27.6%</td>
<td>65.5%</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhism</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>75.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>60.0%</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>29</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>692</td>
<td>1222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
<td>56.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table F.4 Cross tabulation: Religion and Measure 4 – Wear political party clothing or put up political party signs on vehicles or houses.
Table F.5 Cross tabulation: Religion and Measure 5 – Contribute money or items to candidates or political parties.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What is your religion?</th>
<th>Contribute money or items to candidates or political parties</th>
<th>Very often</th>
<th>Somewhat often</th>
<th>Rarely</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Count % within</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>996</td>
<td>1040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within</td>
<td>.1%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>95.8%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestantism</td>
<td>Count % within</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>96.6%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholicism</td>
<td>Count % within</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>93.5%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hinduism</td>
<td>Count % within</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>96.6%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhism</td>
<td>Count % within</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Count % within</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>90.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count % within</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1166</td>
<td>1218</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table F.6 Cross tabulation: Religion and Measure 6 – Join parades, public meetings, or campaign meetings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What is your religion?</th>
<th>Join parades, public meetings, or campaign meetings</th>
<th>Very often</th>
<th>Somewhat often</th>
<th>Rarely</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>Count % within</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>777</td>
<td>1042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
<td>74.6%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestantism</td>
<td>Count % within</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
<td>64.4%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholicism</td>
<td>Count % within</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
<td>76.1%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hinduism</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is your religion?</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>% within</td>
<td>Very often</td>
<td>Somewhat often</td>
<td>Rarely</td>
<td>Never</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.1%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestantism</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholicism</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hinduism</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhism</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.2%</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>1162</td>
<td>1211</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table F.7 Cross tabulation: Religion and Measure 7 – Join strikes, demonstrations, protests, or boycotts; occupy public buildings; block traffic; or be involved in disturbances/riots.
### Table F.8 Cross tabulation: Religion and Measure 8 – Make or sign a petition.

| What is your religion? | Islam | | Protestantism | | Catholicism | | Hinduism | | Buddhism | | Other | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Count | 0 | 4 | 23 | 997 | 1024 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 78 | 85 | 1 | 43 | 45 | 100.0% |
| % within | .0% | .4% | 2.2% | 97.4% | 100.0% | .0% | 3.5% | 4.7% | 91.8% | 100.0% | 2.2% | 2.2% | .0% | 95.6% | 100.0% |
| Count | 1 | 1 | 0 | 43 | 45 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 27 | 29 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 100.0% |
| % within | 2.2% | 2.2% | .0% | 95.6% | 100.0% | .0% | 3.4% | 3.4% | 93.1% | 100.0% | .0% | .0% | .0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| Count | 0 | 0 | 2 | 7 | 9 | 1 | 9 | 30 | 1156 | 1196 | | | | |
| % within | .0% | .0% | 22.2% | 77.8% | 100.0% | .1% | .8% | 2.5% | 96.7% | 100.0% |

### Table F.9 Cross tabulation: Religion and Measure 9 – Visit, contact, or write a letter to a government official or member of the DPR/DPRD.

<p>| What is your religion? | Islam | | Protestantism | | Catholicism | | Hinduism | | Buddhism | | Other | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Count | 1 | 6 | 21 | 1007 | 1035 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 81 | 86 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 100.0% |
| % within | .1% | .6% | 2.0% | 97.3% | 100.0% | .0% | 4.7% | 1.2% | 94.2% | 100.0% | 2.2% | .0% | 2.2% | 95.7% | 100.0% |
| Count | 1 | 0 | 1 | 44 | 46 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 27 | 29 | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What is your religion?</th>
<th>Islam</th>
<th>Protestantism</th>
<th>Catholicism</th>
<th>Hinduism</th>
<th>Buddhism</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Count % within</td>
<td>.1%</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very often</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat often</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rarely</td>
<td>991</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>1035</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1035</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1209</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table F.10 Cross tabulation: Religion and Measure 10 – Write a letter to a newspaper (“surat pembaca”) about matters related to politics.
Appendix G


In 1999, the government lifted restrictions on political party formation. Out of 148 registered political parties, forty-eight qualified\textsuperscript{280} to contest in the June 7, 1999 legislative election, which was the first major election after the fall of Suharto in 1998. Six parties passed the 2\% electoral threshold: Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDI-P, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle), Golkar (government party reformed after Suharto), Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB, National Awakening Party), Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP, United Development Party), Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN, National Mandate Party), and Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB, Crescent Star Party). The following table presents a breakdown of votes and seats for the 1999 legislative election:

\textsuperscript{280} The General Elections Commission conducts a screening or verification process through which parties must pass in order to participate in elections. For example, political parties must meet certain legal criteria and not be deemed “corporate bodies.” [I was unable to locate the Commission’s specific criteria.]
Table G.1 Share of Votes and Seats for Political Parties from the 1999 Legislative Election in Indonesia.\(^{281}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Parties</th>
<th>Total Votes</th>
<th>Total Votes (%)</th>
<th>Total Seats by Quota</th>
<th>Total Seats by Remainder</th>
<th>Total Seats</th>
<th>Total Seats (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (PDI-P)</td>
<td>35,706,618</td>
<td>33.73</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>33.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Golongan Karya (Golkar)</td>
<td>23,742,112</td>
<td>22.43</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>25.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP)</td>
<td>11,330,387</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>12.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB)</td>
<td>13,336,963</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>11.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN)</td>
<td>7,528,936</td>
<td>7.11</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>7.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB)</td>
<td>2,050,039</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Keadilan (PK)</td>
<td>1,436,670</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Nahdlatul Ulama (PNU)</td>
<td>679,174</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa (PDKB)</td>
<td>550,856</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan (PKP)</td>
<td>1,065,810</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI)</td>
<td>655,048</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Persatuan (PP)</td>
<td>590,995</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Politik Islam Indonesia Masyumi (PPIIM)</td>
<td>456,750</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Daulat Rakyat (PDR)</td>
<td>427,875</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia (PSII)</td>
<td>376,411</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Nasional Indonesia Front Marhaenis (PNI FM)</td>
<td>365,173</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI)</td>
<td>364,257</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Nasional</td>
<td>345,665</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Abdurrahman Wahid, nicknamed “Gus Dur,” from PKB became president and Megawati Sukarnoputri, daughter of Indonesia’s first president, became vice-president. Since the Indonesian constitution had a provision that the new president needed to be jointly elected by both houses of Parliament, Megawati did not win the presidency since she was not their nominee at the time despite her party, the PDI-P, having won the largest percentage of the popular vote. Megawati eventually became President, however, after the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR, People’s Consultative Assembly) unanimously voted to remove Gus Dur from office on July 23, 2001 and appointed her to the position. While popular in the beginning of his term, Gus Dur later started losing support after a series of conflicts over cabinet dismissals, cabinet reshuffling, military reform, personal corruption scandals, and political unrest in Maluku and West Papua. Terrorist attacks against churches in Jakarta and eight other cities in December 2000 added to uncertainty and disillusionment during Gus Dur’s presidency. Megawati became Indonesia’s first woman president after Gus Dur’s impeachment. She ran for re-election in 2004, but lost.

The 2004 legislative and executive elections were different from previous elections in that the people directly elected the political officials. On April 5, 2004, Indonesia held a legislative election in which twenty-four political parties competed. Seventeen parties won seats. Table G.2 lists voter turnout and party results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Vote %</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Vote %</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Vote %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partai IPKI (IPKI)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>328,440</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>328,440</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>328,440</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Kebangkitan Ummat (PKU)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>300,049</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>300,049</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>300,049</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Katolik Demokrat (PKD)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>216,663</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>216,663</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>216,663</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal (excluding parties without seats)</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>101,854,891</td>
<td>96.23</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Parties without seats (27 parties)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,991,046</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>105,845,937</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An exception was when candidates did not reach the designated threshold and the party then had to use their candidate list in sequential order.
Table G.2 Share of Votes and Seats for Political Parties from the 2004 Legislative Election in Indonesia.\textsuperscript{283}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Parties</th>
<th>Total Votes</th>
<th>Votes (%)</th>
<th>Total Seats</th>
<th>Total Seats (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partai Golongan Karya (Golkar)</td>
<td>24,480,757</td>
<td>21.58</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>23.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (PDI-P)</td>
<td>21,026,629</td>
<td>18.53</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>19.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP)</td>
<td>9,248,764</td>
<td>8.15</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>10.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Demokrat (PD)</td>
<td>8,455,225</td>
<td>7.45</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>10.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN)</td>
<td>7,303,324</td>
<td>6.43</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>9.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB)</td>
<td>11,989,564</td>
<td>10.57</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>9.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS)</td>
<td>8,325,020</td>
<td>7.34</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>8.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Bintang Reformasi (PBR)</td>
<td>2,764,998</td>
<td>2.44</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Damai Sejahtera (PDS)</td>
<td>2,414,254</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB)</td>
<td>2,970,487</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Persatuan Demokrasi Kebangsaan (PPDK)</td>
<td>1,313,654</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa (PKPB)</td>
<td>2,399,290</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Nahdlatul Ulama Indonesia (PNUI)</td>
<td>895,610</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia (PKPI)</td>
<td>1,424,240</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Nasional Indonesia-Marhaenisme (PNI-M)</td>
<td>929,159</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Pelopor (PP)</td>
<td>878,932</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Penegak Demokrasi Indonesia (PBDI)</td>
<td>855,811</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Nasional Banteng Kemerdekaan (PNBK)</td>
<td>1,230,450</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Patriot Pancasila</td>
<td>1,073,139</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Merdeka (PM)</td>
<td>842,541</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Syarikat Indonesia (PSI)</td>
<td>679,296</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Perhimpunan Indonesia Baru (P-PIB)</td>
<td>672,957</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Persatuan Daerah (PPD)</td>
<td>657,916</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Buruh Sosial Demokrat (PBSB)</td>
<td>636,397</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>113,448,398</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>550</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{283} Data from the Indonesian Election Commission (KPU); final result after Constitutional Court rulings. Cited in SEAsite Indonesia – Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Northern Illinois University. “Indonesian Elections” (http://www.seasite.niu.edu/Indonesian/Indonesian_Elections/elections.htm), 01 March 2010.
On July 5, 2004, Indonesia held its first round of presidential elections. The second round (runoff) was on September 20, 2004. Sources vary regarding final voter turnout numbers for both rounds (mentioned in Chapter III):

Table G.3 Vote Share for the 2004 Indonesian Presidential Elections – First Round.\(^{284}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presidential and Vice-Presidential Candidates</th>
<th>Total Votes</th>
<th>Votes (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono - Jusuf Kalla</td>
<td>39,838,184</td>
<td>33.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Megawati Soekarnoputri - Hasyim Muzadi</td>
<td>31,567,104</td>
<td>26.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wiranto – Shalahudin Wahid</td>
<td>26,286,788</td>
<td>22.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amien Rais - Siswono Yudohusodo</td>
<td>17,392,931</td>
<td>14.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamzah Haz - Agum Gumelar</td>
<td>3,569,861</td>
<td>3.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Valid votes: 118,656,868
Registered voters: 151,010,784

Invalid votes: 2,635,976
Voter turnout: 80.32%

Table G.4 Vote Share for the 2004 Indonesian Presidential Elections – Second Round (Runoff).\(^{285}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presidential and Vice-Presidential Candidates</th>
<th>Total Votes</th>
<th>Votes (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono - Jusuf Kalla</td>
<td>69,266,350</td>
<td>60.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Megawati Soekarnoputri - Hasyim Muzadi</td>
<td>44,990,704</td>
<td>39.38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Valid votes: 114,257,054
Registered voters: 150,644,184

Invalid votes: 2,405,651
Voter turnout: 77.44%

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono became president and Jusuf Kalla took the vice-president position after winning the runoff with 60.20% of the vote.

On April 9, 2009, Indonesia held general elections to elect members of the national legislature and regional House of Representatives. Thirty-eight political parties were eligible to compete in the national elections. Six additional parties were permitted to compete at the local level in Aceh. Table G.5 lists the final vote share according to the Indonesian General Election Commission:

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\(^{284}\) SEAsite Indonesia – Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Northern Illinois University, “Indonesian Elections” (http://www.seasite.niu.edu/Indonesian/Indonesian_Elections/elections.htm), 01 March 2010.

\(^{285}\) Ibid.
### Table G.5 Vote Share for Political Parties from the 2009 Legislative Elections in Indonesia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Parties</th>
<th>Total Votes</th>
<th>Vote (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partai Demokrat (PD)</td>
<td>21,703,137</td>
<td>20.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Golongan Karya (Golkar)</td>
<td>15,037,757</td>
<td>14.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDI-P)</td>
<td>14,600,091</td>
<td>14.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS)</td>
<td>8,206,955</td>
<td>7.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN)</td>
<td>6,254,580</td>
<td>6.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP)</td>
<td>5,533,214</td>
<td>5.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB)</td>
<td>5,146,122</td>
<td>4.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya</td>
<td>4,646,406</td>
<td>4.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat (Hanura)</td>
<td>3,922,870</td>
<td>3.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB)</td>
<td>1,864,752</td>
<td>1.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Damai Sejahtera (PDS)</td>
<td>1,541,592</td>
<td>1.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Kebangkitan Nasional Ulama (PKNU)</td>
<td>1,527,593</td>
<td>1.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa (PKPB)</td>
<td>1,461,182</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Bintang Reformasi (PBR)</td>
<td>1,264,333</td>
<td>1.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Peduli Rakyat Nasional (PPRN)</td>
<td>1,260,794</td>
<td>1.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia</td>
<td>934,892</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Demokrasi Pembaruan (PDP)</td>
<td>896,660</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Barisan Nasional (PBN)</td>
<td>761,086</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Pengusaha dan Pekerja Indonesia</td>
<td>745,625</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Demokrasi Kebangsaan (PDK)</td>
<td>669,417</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Republika Nusantara (PRN)</td>
<td>630,780</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Persatuan Daerah (PPD)</td>
<td>550,581</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Patriot</td>
<td>547,351</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Nasional Benteng Kerakyatan Indonesia</td>
<td>468,696</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Kedaulatan (PK)</td>
<td>437,121</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Matahari Bangsa (PMB)</td>
<td>414,750</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Pemuda Indonesia (PPI)</td>
<td>414,043</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Karya Perjuangan (PKP)</td>
<td>351,440</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Pelopor</td>
<td>342,914</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Kasih Demokrasi Indonesia</td>
<td>324,553</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Indonesia Sejahtera</td>
<td>320,665</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Nasional Indonesia Marhaenisme</td>
<td>316,752</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Buruh</td>
<td>265,203</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

On July 8, 2009, Indonesia held its second direct presidential election with the main candidate pairings of Megawati Sukarnoputri - Prabowo Subianto, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono - Boediono, and Jusuf Kalla - Wiranto. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) won a second term as president and the vice-president position changed hands from Jusuf Kalla to Boediono. There was no need for a runoff election since President SBY received more than 60% of the vote in the first round. The final results are listed in the table below:

Table G.6 Vote and Seat Share for the 2009 Indonesian Presidential Elections.\(^{287}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Parties, Coalitions, and Candidates(^{288})</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>Total Votes</th>
<th>Vote (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party Coalition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Candidate: Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice-President Candidate: Boediono</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breakdown of Coalition Members:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Demokrat (PD), 145 seats</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>73,874,562</td>
<td>60.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS), 57 seats</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN), 45 seats</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), 37 seats</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB), 27 seats</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 unseated parties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^{288}\) To nominate presidential candidates, a political party or multi-party coalition had to win 112 parliamentary seats or 25% of the popular vote in the April legislative election.
In each of the elections from 1999, 2004, and 2009, Indonesians could choose between Pancasila, secular nationalist, and Islamist political parties.\textsuperscript{289} Overwhelmingly, Indonesians chose Pancasila or secular nationalist parties to represent them in the legislature. Support for Islamist parties such as Partai Persatuan Pembangunan and Partai Bulan Bintang have steadily declined in succeeding elections. Partai Keadilan Sejahtera enjoyed a jump in 2004 only to experience a fall in 2009. Table G.7 shows the decrease in popularity of parties with explicitly Islamic platforms over time:

\textbf{Table G.7 Percentage Table for Legislative Seat Share Among Islamist Political Parties.}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Islamist Political Parties</th>
<th>1999 (%)</th>
<th>2004 (%)</th>
<th>2009 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB, Crescent Star Party)</td>
<td>2.81</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS, Prosperous Justice Party) – formerly Partai Keadilin</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>8.18</td>
<td>7.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Nahdatul Ummah Indonesia (PNU, Indonesian Nahdatul Community Party) – formerly Partai Nahdatul Ulama</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{289} Pancasila and secular nationalist parties have the state’s “Five Principles” (see discussion of the Indonesian Constitution in Chapter II) as their foundation, which Islamist parties have a religious foundation. The former typically have “secular” missions, visions, platforms, and policy recommendations, but this does not mean that they are anti-religion or that their members do not practice their faith privately or publicly. The latter have more explicitly Islamic preferences and agendas, which may or may not include support for Islamic law.
There are different possible explanations for the small percentages and pattern of decline. Many people prioritize non-religious values in electoral politics. Others do not want Islam to be formally a part of the state through political parties. Voters are also unhappy with the platforms of Islamic parties or how they have performed. As Chapter IV described, religious diffusion and diversity plays a role for limited mobilization as well. Azyumardi Azra, a leading scholar on Islam in Indonesia, says that there is not necessarily a “linear relationship” between religion and political parties. For example, wearing the *jilbab* (female headscarf) does not automatically correspond with supporting a religious political party. In the case of PKS, Azyumardi Azra believes that they won because of a platform about good governance and anti-corruption.  

The small and declining vote and seat shares amongst Islamic parties suggests that religion does not always play a direct role in voting behavior. However, there are indications that religion is still influential (though not necessarily in a linear or uniform fashion), especially since political ideology and party identification do not seem to largely account for voter turnout in the first place and then specific vote choice in the second place.

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290 Jennifer L. Epley, Personal interview with Azyumardi Azra (Ciputat: Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University (UIN), 09 October 2006).
**Indonesian Elections Bibliography**

Epley, Jennifer L. Personal interview with Azyumardi Azra (Ciputat: Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University (UIN), 09 October 2006).


SEAsite Indonesia – Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Northern Illinois University, “Indonesian Elections,” http://www.seasite.niu.edu/Indonesian/Indonesian_Elections/elections.htm