CONDITIONAL EXTREMISM – WHEN DO EXCLUSIONARY NATIONAL IDENTITIES SPUR HOSTILITY TO IMMIGRANTS & RADICAL RIGHT SUPPORT?

by

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Abstract

Exclusionary national identity is a defining feature of radical right party ideology. Radical right politicians campaign by fomenting hostility toward immigrants and promoting a restrictive view of national identity. Yet, in my cross-national analysis of public opinion data, I find that restrictive views of national identity are not associated with support for radical right parties. Nor does hostility toward immigrants always go hand in hand with a restrictive view of national identity according to past scholarship. Why do radical right parties appear to be so successful in some cases by campaigning on these issues? I explain why by showing that the manifestation of latent exclusionary national identity into popular radical right support depends on the “perfect storm” of cultural and economic threats – such as increased levels of migration and unemployment – as well as the permissiveness of electoral laws – such as those in high district magnitude proportional representation systems. Analyses use data from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) 1995 and 2003 modules on National Identity.
Chapter 1
Introduction: The Puzzle of Conditional Extremism

1.1 Introduction

Anti-immigration rhetoric is increasingly contentious in recent decades, particularly in Western Europe, as evidenced by anti-foreigner campaign slogans and anti-Muslim policies, such as the 2009 Swiss popular vote to ban the building of mosque minarets. Radical right parties – the only successful new party family in Europe other than the Greens – mobilize voters using anti-immigrant platforms seen as the most “extreme” form of identity politics in contemporary liberal democracies.

A review of several recent campaign slogans of radical right parties reveals their appeals for homogeneity and disdain for outsiders and Muslims in particular. “Vienna must not become Istanbul,”1 asserted a 2007 Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) campaign slogan in Austria, while their 2009 European parliament slogan was “The West in Christian Hands.” The Flemish Block (VB) in Belgium began under a nationalist slogan that the party still uses today, “Our own people first.” The Dutch Freedom Party (PVV) was founded in 2006 based on the call to, “Stop the Islamization of the Netherlands.” In Switzerland, one recent slogan for the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) in 2007 was “My Home, Our Switzerland, Keep It Secure.” The Danish People’s Party (DPP) used an

1 Several years prior, the FPÖ also used a similar slogan, “Vienna must not become Chicago,” typical of European radical right party Anti-American rhetoric that sees the United states as “on the verge of destroying the authenticity of other peoples, their institutions, and their autonomy” (Markovits 2007, p. 30) and lacking any proper history or tradition.
election advertisement in 2007 showing a hand-drawn picture of the Islamic prophet Muhammad under the slogan, “Freedom of speech is Danish, censorship is not. We defend Danish values.” Examples of anti-immigrant – or what some call “extreme” – slogans among the radical right are abundant.

These extremist parties would be of little importance to political scientists if they were simply fringe parties, or if they had little power in parliaments or cabinets. While historically in the post-WWII period these parties had little influence, as Figures 1-1 through 1-8 show, electoral support for radical right parties has, for the most part, been steadily growing in much of Europe over the last decade. This sustained increased electoral success of radical right parties began its upward trend in the 1980s (Rensmann 2003, Mudde 2007, Wilcox et al. 2003).

Scholars have many explanations for the recent rise in popularity of these parties, which I discuss in detail below. Large demographic shifts in developed democracies have been cited as one major contributing factor. In contemporary developed democracies, the percentage of populations that are non-native, or “foreign-born”, has been steadily increasing for several decades. As Figures 1-1 through 1-8 show, the last decade shows a steady and persistent rise in the percent of the population that is foreign-born in developed democracies. This gradual change in the balance between so-called “natives” and non-natives in Europe has been accompanied by the trends shown in Figures 1-1 through 1-8 of increased popularity of radical right parties in democratic countries. In the same decade that we have seen the persistence of an increase in foreign-born populations, we also see an increase in radical right party vote share in democracies. However, while
both the percentage of foreigners and radical right support have been growing over the last decade, the variance in radical right party support is more volatile than the gradual increase in foreign-born populations. Moreover, while there does seem to be a correlation between the increasing encroachment of foreign-born populations and radical right party support by natives, we cannot be confident that this is a causal relationship, and much is left to be explained. As I discuss in this chapter, there remains a lack of clarity about the causes of this shift in radical right support.

1.2 Radical Right Ideology – What’s the Radical Right Vision?

The scholarship on radical right parties states that the minimal defining feature of such parties is their appeal to a restrictive and exclusionary view of national identity (e.g. Mudde 2007, Rydgren 2007, Eatwell 2000). For radical right parties, the core concept is the nation in an ethnic, blood-tied and völkisch manner, and the essential political doctrine is founded upon a nationalist ideology (Mudde 2007). Radical right ideology “holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (‘the nation’) and that nonnative elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state” (Mudde 2007, p. 19). Radical right parties have a core doctrine of demonizing foreigners and defining the nation as sacred (Eatwell 2000), and emphasize an ethnically homogenous view of the nation (Rydgren 2007). In other words, according to minimal definitions of radical right ideology, exclusionary national identity is assumed to go hand in hand with contempt for non-natives.

This is not surprising, given a cursory look at campaign slogans, advertisements, and images of these parties in the media. In addition to the slogans cited earlier, consider two visual examples from the French case. Figure 1-9 shows a political cartoon depicting
Jean-Maria Le Pen, leader of the Front National (FN) as the excrement of the French Gallic Rooster, implying that such radical right leaders are an inevitable byproduct of national symbols.

**INSERT FIGURE 1-9 HERE**

Similarly, Figure 1-10 shows one of the FN recent campaign rally slogans, “France, love it or leave it!” This rallying cry seems to tie neatly together French identity and loyalty to France with hostility towards outsiders within the French borders.²

**INSERT FIGURE 1-10 HERE**

This assumption that national identity is inherently associated with disdain for and mobilization against foreigners is not unique to scholarship on the radical right. Much of contemporary research on intergroup relations assumes that in-group favoritism in general is related to out-group denigration (Brewer 1999).

Despite these assumptions, however, there is not a clear relationship between national identity – even exclusionary or “ethnic” national identity – and anti-immigrant attitudes. First, let me define three national attachments that are theoretically important to distinguish at the start in discussions of national identity. There are many forms of national attachments, and I will address here the three most prominent in the scholarship. First, patriotism is defined as *pride in the nation state*. This is the strength of feeling of pride in and affinity for the nation state. Second, national identity is *identification with a constellation of beliefs about national symbols and ideals*. To illustrate, for French identity, this concept would define what beliefs citizens hold about it means to be a Frenchman, such as speaking French, being born in France, or having French parents. I

² Other images will be discussed in some brief case analyses in Chapter 2 (Figures 2-1 through 2-3).
primarily focus on exclusionary beliefs about national identity, which are based on ethnic requirements for membership in a nation state, since the radical right ideology is founded on restrictive beliefs about national identity. However, civic beliefs about national identity also exist, such as a belief that it is important for a true American to believe in liberalism. Third is nationalism, defined as a belief in and feeling of *international superiority of one’s own nation* (also more traditionally known as chauvinism).³ In other words, German nationalism would be the belief of Germans that Germany is better than other countries, and a feeling of superiority over other countries. Unlike national identity beliefs, nationalistic beliefs are inherently comparative; the focus is not on the traits that make one a citizen of the nation state, but rather whether the nation is believed to be better (or worse) than others.

Several studies of American national identity find that only nationalism is consistently associated with anti-immigrant attitudes (deFiegueriedo and Elkins 2003, Huddy and Khatib 2007), while patriotism has no relationship with anti-immigrant attitudes, but predicts other political behaviors (e.g. civic engagement). In survey analyses of anti-immigrant opinions, national identity has a less clear relationship with anti-immigrant attitudes. National identity seems to predict anti-immigrant attitudes in some contexts, but not others. Maddens et al. (2000) find that in Belgium, the relationship between national identity and anti-immigrant attitudes varies widely by region. Citizens

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³ This concept more traditionally could be termed chauvinism (Arendt 1945), based on the French *chauvinisme*, coined to describe excessive nationalism. Arendt (1945, p. 457) describes chauvinism as a sense of nationalistic superiority that is “an almost natural product of the national concept insofar as it springs directly from the old idea of the ‘national mission.’ It has a logical affinity with expansion because a nation’s mission might be interpreted precisely as bringing its light to other, less fortunate peoples that, for whatever reasons, have miraculously been left by history without a national mission.” In the current scholarship on national attachments, the terminology used to describe this concept of belief in national superiority is nationalism, so I use that terminology here, but one could substitute this more traditional concept of chauvinism, which describes the same concept.
residing in Flanders with a strong Belgian identification feel positive toward outsiders, while citizens in the region of Wallonia with a strong Belgian identification have negative attitudes toward foreigners; the relationship between national attachment and anti-immigrant attitudes is different depending upon the region in which Belgians dwell. Maddens et al. propose that what might explain this is that what citizens believe it means to be Belgian is exclusionary in Wallonia, but not in Flanders. While some find exclusionary identity to be associated with negative attitudes toward immigrants in the United States (Citrin et al. 1990, Schildkraut 2007), Carter and Perez (2008) find that exclusionary beliefs about American national identity (what they call nativism) has different effects for black and white Americans when it comes to predicting hostility to immigrants. Blacks with exclusionary beliefs about what constitutes American identity do not hold anti-immigrant attitudes, while white Americans with such beliefs are likely to disparage immigrants (Carter and Perez 2008). While most scholarship on the relationship between national identity and anti-immigrant attitudes up until now has been done in the United States, the relationship between exclusionary identity and anti-immigrant prejudice has been recently tested by Pehrson et al. (2009) in the European context, where they find that exclusionary national identity has a moderate positive relationship with prejudice toward immigrants.

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4 Unfortunately, the survey used for their study did not measure what beliefs respondents held about what it means to be Belgian. Other surveys, including the ones I make use of, do ask respondents what characteristics they have in mind when they think about national identity.

5 Note that this study only explores the different relationship between exclusionary identity and anti-immigrant attitudes for black and white Americans. This is not to say that hostility between the black community and immigrant communities is non-existent, as evidenced by such incidents as anti-Korean violence during the race riots in Los Angeles in 1992. This research does suggest, however, that exclusionary American identity seems to work differently for different racial groups.

6 However, Pehrson et al. (2009) also argue that contextual differences – specifically whether the nation on average ascribes to an ethnic or civic conception of national identity – are more important than individual-level beliefs. They also find that national identification predicts prejudice more strongly in wealthy
Scholars often focus predominantly on the differences between nationalism and patriotism (e.g. de Figueiredo and Elkins 2003, Huddy and Khatib 2007, Davidov 2009) since beliefs about national identity have an unclear relationship with anti-immigrant sentiments. Yet, these are precisely the latent beliefs assumed to be the driving force of manifested radical right support. One might say that this is just a quibble over terminology, and question whether the complex empirical relationships between these closely related concepts about the nation and anti-immigrant attitudes really matters for understanding radical right politics. However, since appeals to exclusionary views of national identity are at the very core of radical right party platforms and ideologies, these concepts are not merely semantics (Mudde 2007, Rydgren 2007 p. 242). Distinguishing carefully between beliefs about national identity and nationalism on the one hand and anti-immigrant attitudes on the other is important for understanding both the ideology of the radical right and the psychology of radical right supporters.

I tested the relationship between exclusionary national identity and radical right support to explore whether – as theories on the core ideology of the radical right would suggest – there is a strong relationship between these variables at the individual level. The International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) conducted two modules on national identity with excellent measures of beliefs about national identity and nationalism, which I describe in greater detail later in Chapter 3. I tested a probit model with clustered standard errors on the pooled ISSP modules\(^7\) with radical right vote intention as the dependent variable and exclusionary national identity and nationalism as my independent variables of interest. I also controlled for the other traditional individual-level explanatory countries. They do not look at radical right support. As I will suggest, economic and institutional context modifies how identity is expressed in anti-immigrant attitudes and radical right support.

\(^7\) Methodology and measures for my analyses will be discussed in great length in Chapter 3.
variables for radical right voting, including sex, age, ideology, education and skill level. This analysis (see Table 1-1) of the relationship between exclusionary views of national identity and nationalism on the one hand and radical right vote intention on the other shows that there is no substantive or statistically significant relationship between exclusionary beliefs about national identity or nationalism and radical right vote intention.

**INSERT TABLE 1-1 HERE**

These results suggest that national attachments do not matter at all in predicting radical right voting. This is puzzling, since scholarship asserts exclusionary beliefs about national identity are the defining feature of radical right parties and lay the foundation upon which such parties appeal to voters. When do these latent exclusionary views manifest themselves in support for parties that run on anti-immigrant platforms?

In sum, in many contemporary democracies, radical right politicians campaign by railing against immigrants and promising their countrymen to preserve native culture. Citizens with exclusionary views about who is a “true blooded” countryman do not necessarily dislike immigrants, nor are they more likely to support the radical right parties. Why, then, are radical right politicians getting increased voter support by running on anti-immigrant platforms and appeals to restrictive views of the nation? I explain why this is the case by exploring how the “perfect storm” of cultural and economic threats – such as significant increases in migration and unemployment – to the country and permissive electoral laws influence citizens with exclusionary beliefs about national identity.
In this chapter, I lay out how the scholarship has tackled the question of explaining radical right party support. I build upon this past scholarship to resolve the puzzle outlined in the paragraph above. The radical right scholarship is divided into two camps – the “micro” camp that focuses on individual-level predictors of radical right support and the “macro” camp that focuses on national-level environmental factors as the best predictors of shifts in radical right support (Mudde 2007, Rydgren 2007). Below, I review the dominant explanations given by each camp for the recent surges in and support for radical right support. I suggest that we must integrate individual-level and environmental-level explanations. I offer an explanation that considers how environmental threats and electoral institutions modify individual level predictors of radical right support. To understand radical right support, we must explore how the relationship between exclusionary beliefs about national identity and radical right support is modified by national threats – such as increased levels of migration and unemployment – and institutional factors – such as permissiveness of electoral systems.

1.3 Individual-level (Micro) factors

Here, I discuss two key individual-level explanations for radical right support – insecurity and anti-immigrant attitudes. The insecurity hypothesis sees supporters of the radical right as losers of modernization, such as the unemployed or unskilled workers who are unable to keep up with the economic and social changes that accompany post-modernization (Betz 1994). This hypothesis features an economic self-interest argument, which contends that those individuals in society who are harmed by immigration – e.g. unskilled workers – will be the largest supporters of the radical right. Consistent with these explanations, unskilled workers and the lower education strata are over-represented
in radical right electorates (Norris 2005, Lubbers et al. 2002). However, the bulk of the
support for the radical right comes from the middle class and the mid-education stratum
(Mudde 2007, p. 224; Norris 2005; Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Rydgren 2007, p. 149).
In other words, while economic self-interest clearly matters, the majority of the support
for the radical right comes from those who are not objectively “insecure.”

Supplementing the insecurity hypothesis, explanations for radical right party
support point to exclusionary national identity and anti-immigrant attitudes as the key
micro-level explanatory variables for radical right support (Norris 2005, Mayer 2002,
Minkenberg 2000, Van der Brug et al. 2000). This explanation contends that supporters
of radical right parties have exclusionary beliefs about national identity, and therefore
support radical right platforms, such as national homogeneity and opposition to
multiculturalism and immigration. Exclusive beliefs about national identity are purported
to explain radical right support controlling for the traditional socioeconomic predictors of
insecurity. However, this seems empirically incorrect according to Table 1-1. When
testing this explanation, scholars treat the concepts of exclusionary national identity and
hostility towards immigrants as the same, and measures of attitudes towards immigrants
are used as a proxy for beliefs about national identity. Using anti-immigrant attitudes as a
proxy for national identity may not seem like a problem at first glance, but the
scholarship on identity and prejudice against out-groups, which I discussed briefly above
and will review in more detail below, provides theoretical justification for treating group
identity and prejudice as separate concepts.

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8 Note that these measures are indicators of objective socioeconomic status. However, it may be the case
that those who are skilled and educated nevertheless perceive themselves as threatened. The explanations
discussed here do not incorporate feelings of insecurity, but rather objective insecurity. Perceptions of
insecurity may be as important as (or more) objective insecurity.
What are possible causal mechanisms at work in the scholarship on anti-immigrant attitudes and radical right support? In other words, what explains anti-immigrant attitudes, and why would these attitudes matter in predicting radical right support? The radical right scholarship assumes it is national identity that is doing the causal work, and uses anti-immigrant attitudes as a proxy for national identity. Why would we expect national identity to be associated with anti-immigrant attitudes? The scholarship on anti-immigrant attitudes uses the framework of social identity theory to explain such attitudes. Early social identity theorists explored group dynamics at the individual level, and found that even when removing the socio-historical context of long-standing group conflicts, we still find group competition in “minimal group experiments” (Tajfel 1981, Tajfel and Turner 1986). Social identity theory contends that in order to maintain positive self-esteem, people strive to achieve or maintain a positive social identity and that this positive identity derives largely from favorable comparisons that can be made between the in-group and relevant out-groups. The key mechanisms at play are categorization and positive distinctiveness. Minimal group experiments conducted by Tajfel and Turner showed that when individuals are randomly categorized in arbitrary groups (categorization), they favor their in-groups in allocation games (positive distinctiveness). Social identity theory argues that individuals strive to have a positive view of the self, and that therefore they attach themselves to identities that are viewed favorably compared to out-groups. One proposed implication of this theory is that if people favor their own group (positive distinctiveness), and attribute different characteristics to the in-group than out-groups, then people should see their own group as superior. Accordingly, we should expect those expressing group identification (such as to
their nation) to denigrate out-groups (such as immigrants).

Yet, despite these expectations of social identity theory, empirical research has shown that the story is not necessarily one in which in-groups denigrate out-groups, nor are (specifically for this project) those with exclusionary beliefs about the nation also anti-immigrant. As discussed earlier, scholars find that while nationalism – belief in national superiority – is associated with increased prejudice towards immigrants, exclusionary national identity is not always associated with anti-immigrant attitudes (Maddens et al. 2000, Carter and Perez 2008). Robert Merton (1957) has suggested a necessary distinction between concepts of “manifest” and “latent” sociological processes. Manifest social processes are conscious and deliberate, while latent social processes are the unconscious and unintended ones (Merton 1957, Berger 1963). What makes latent exclusionary beliefs about national identity become manifested in anti-immigrant attitudes and support for the radical right? Beliefs about national identity underlie radical right ideology, yet scholarship on the radical right has not yet explored the influence of national identity (as opposed to anti-immigration attitudes) at the individual-level. These findings underscore the need for more theorizing about the relationship between exclusionary national identity, immigrant denigration, and radical right support. This requires a more detailed exploration of the nature of national identity.

National identity is what psychologists refer to as a symbolic predisposition, which I defined above as identification with a constellation of beliefs about national symbols and ideals. Sears et al. define symbolic predispositions as: “stable affective preferences through conditioning in their preadult years, with little calculation of the future costs and benefits of these attitudes” (Sears et al. 1980 p. 671). National identity is
considered one of the most enduring predispositions because education early in life socializes young children to categorize the world into abstract categories, such as nations, and beliefs about the nation and each individual’s place in it is one of the most basic abstract categories that children acquire in school (Darden and Grzymala-Busse 2006). National identities are particularly salient in modern nation-states (Schatz and Lavine 2007), where implicit and explicit symbols (e.g. flags, memorials) and ideals (e.g. individual freedom, republicanism) are a part of the daily lives of citizens. National identities are “reinforced throughout one’s life, enable psychic economy, constrain and facilitate political discussion, dictate behavioral norms, and, by definition, delineate identities” (Schildkraut 2005, p. 24). While national identities are acquired early on, the content of these symbolic predispositions do vary to some degree across time, space, and individuals (Schildkraut 2005, Schildkraut 2007).

As noted above, national identity is not always associated with anti-immigrant attitudes (Carter and Perez 2008, Huddy and Khatib 2007, de Figueiredo and Elkins 2003, Maddens et al. 2000, Brewer 1999, Hjerm 1998). Because in-group favoritism does not seem to translate automatically into out-group derogation, social identity theorists have looked beyond categorization and positive distinctiveness alone to predict when out-group hostility will be associated with in-group identity (Brewer 1999). It is logically possible for two groups to both have positive distinctiveness, but on different dimensions. Brewer (1999) suggests that one potential mechanism that triggers positive distinctiveness to be associated negative views of the out-group is threat to the in-group. According to the implications of Brewer’s (1999) hypothesis, a threat to the national in-

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9 Most work that looks at the effects of nationalism does not control for beliefs about national identity, which although conceptually related are distinct concepts. Carter and Perez (2008) find that measures of these concepts in the United States are correlated, but only weakly. My research supports this finding.
group might explain when hostility against immigrants arises among those with exclusionary national identity. However, the mechanism of threat cannot be understood by looking only at the individual level. If threat matters, we must look beyond the individual level. In light of assumptions that national identity is the fundamental ideology of the radical right, which seems clear from a look at campaign slogans and platforms of the radical right, why would national identity have a negligible relationship with radical right support (see Table 1-1)? It appears group context matters, as the group threat hypothesis (Brewer 1999) suggests. This brings me to macro-level explanations.

### 1.4 Environmental-Level (Macro) Factors

I will discuss two macro-level explanations that dominate the literature on support for the radical right – modernization theory and realistic group conflict theory. Contemporary modernization arguments focus on the macro-level socioeconomic changes, such as post-industrialization, transition from state socialism to capitalist democracy, and globalization. According to these arguments, losers of the economic changes that have come with modernization – such as the working class and small business owners – will hold immigrants in contempt and support radical right movements (Betz 1994, Givens 2002, Swank & Betz 2003). While there is some support for this at the micro-level (see discussion of the insecurity hypothesis above), there are several problems with modernization theory at the macro-level. While modernization theory is helpful in understanding the initial emergence of modern radical right parties (Lipset 1955), it is unclear how changing degrees of globalization lead to the variations in radical right support. The empirical evidence is very weak both for the globalization and post-industrialization hypotheses (Mudde 2007; Veugelers, John and Andre Magnan 2005;
Swank and Betz 2003; Keohane and Nye Jr. 2000), and authors find that wide variation within much of Western Europe is unexplained by these hypotheses.

The second macro-level theory in the literature on the radical right fall within what I will refer to as realistic group conflict theory, which subsumes several explanations in the literature, such as the “ethnic backlash” (Mudde 2007) explanations and the economic crisis/material threat explanations (Mudde 2007, Golder 2003). Realistic group conflict theory (Bobo and Hutchings 1996, Sniderman et al. 2004) draws from Blumer’s group position theory (1958) and Sherif’s (1956) theory of group conflict that contend inter-group hostility results from historically developed views that group members form about the proper social order, where members of dominant groups in societies see those from out-groups as potential threats to the domination of their own in-group. Realistic group conflict theory takes the key explanatory mechanism to be competition for dominance and resources, and the driving motive for all groups is to be better off than other groups.

From this theory follows two key implications for work on anti-immigrant attitudes and radical right support. Dominant populations should perceive immigrants as a potential threat to their in-group, and thus we might expect mass immigration of ethnically different groups – particularly at levels that threaten the native group’s status as dominant numerically in a given society – to be associated with anti-immigrant attitudes and radical right support. This is often referred to as the ethnic backlash explanation in the scholarship on the radical right. Second, when immigrants are flowing into a country, during times of economic crisis, immigrants who are competing with natives for scarce resources will particularly threaten the native majority. This is similar
to the economic crisis/material threat hypothesis in the radical right scholarship, but it is important to note that according to realistic group conflict theory, significant immigration is a necessary condition for economic crisis to instigate competition between native and non-native groups, since without immigration there would be no need for natives to scapegoat non-natives as competitors. In immigrant-sender countries or in countries with few immigrants, dominant group members will instead scapegoat native minorities who are perceived as the lower social order groups (Bobo and Hutchings 1996).

The literature on both of these implications of realistic group conflict theory – ethnic backlash and economic crisis – come to mixed conclusions about whether there is empirical support for the theory. Some find a positive correlation between aggregate levels of radical right support and migration (Swank and Betz 2003, Golder 2003), while others find a negative or no correlation (e.g. Dulmer and Klein 2005). Similarly, very contradictory findings exist in the literature on poor economic conditions as related to electoral support for the radical right (Mudde 2007, pp. 205-206) – some scholars find a strong relationship between economic crisis and radical right success while others do not. However, only Golder (2003) takes into account the theoretically important role of immigration as a necessary condition for economic crisis to trigger radical right support, and he finds support for the expected implication that unemployment combined with high immigration is associated with aggregate levels of radical right electoral support, which is consistent with the expectations of realistic group conflict theory.

Little scholarship brings the “macro” and “micro” explanations for radical right support together. Debate continues on what matters most with regard to radical right support, individual or environmental level factors. How environmental-level factors
influence individual-level attitudes and behaviors remains largely unexplored. My explanation, described in the next chapter, attempts to reconcile this gap in the scholarship by proposing how individual level factors interact with the environment. Before proceeding to this explanation, I turn to a brief literature review of the supply-side explanations for radical right party support, with a focus on electoral systems.

### 1.5 Modifiers of Radical Right Demand: Electoral Laws

Nation-states have electoral institutions that structure the environment in which political parties compete. Radical right “parties do not exist in a vacuum; they are instead conditioned to a greater or lesser extent by the ‘rules of the game’ of the political system in which they operate. Any attempt to explain why certain West European right-wing extremist parties have performed better at the polls than others would therefore be incomplete without an in-depth examination of the institutional environment in which these parties exist” (Carter 2005, p. 146). Since Duverger’s (1954) study of electoral and party systems, political scientists have grappled with how electoral laws affect the way in which social divisions are translated into the number of political parties in democratic countries. As Clark and Golder (2006, p. 681) state, “electoral institutions modify the effect of social forces on the creation of political parties. Social forces create more or less pressure for the multiplication of political parties and electoral laws either permit these pressures to be realized or they constrain them by discouraging the formation of new parties.” The effects of electoral laws are of particular interest for scholars of new parties, such as the radical right parties.

According to the implications of Duverger’s hypothesis, we should expect few parties in non-permissive electoral systems, such as single member district plurality
(SMDP) systems, regardless of whether demand exists for new parties to emerge.\textsuperscript{10} In permissive systems, such as different variants of proportional representation (PR) with high district magnitudes, we would expect the number of parties to be a function of the permissiveness of the system and social pressures (Clark and Golder 2006, Duverger 1954). Thus, in discussing when we would expect radical right parties to emerge, we must take into account the permissiveness of electoral systems in countries where the social pressures exist for such parties. My discussion above addresses different perspectives on when we should expect the social pressures (i.e. demand) for radical right parties, so I will not elaborate further on the role of social pressures. Assuming we can account for demand for radical right parties, I will briefly describe how electoral laws are expected to affect these demands according to Duverger’s hypothesis.

In view of the mechanical and psychological effects of electoral laws,\textsuperscript{11} low district magnitude systems (e.g., SMDP) are expected to punish small, nationalized parties, such as radical right parties. In such systems, we should expect lower votes for radical right parties due to psychological effects of electoral laws, which lead to strategic voting. In addition to fewer votes for such parties, fewer seats should be won by radical right parties due to the disproportional translation of votes into seats in such systems. On the other hand, as electoral laws increase in the proportionality of how they translate votes into seats, the “punishing” mechanical and psychological effects of electoral laws on small parties will decrease.

Some find that, as we would expect according to the implications of Duverger’s

\textsuperscript{10} This is not strictly the case according to the logic of Duverger’s hypothesis. If new demands for parties are heavily concentrated in regions that overlap with electoral districts, new parties can emerge in non-permissive SMDP systems.

\textsuperscript{11} These effects are described in more detail in both Chapter 2 – my theory chapter – and Chapter 4, which explores the modifying effects of electoral laws.
hypothesis, radical right parties do benefit electorally from proportional electoral systems and low electoral thresholds (Norris 2005, Carter 2005, Golder 2003). Yet, other studies have concluded precisely the opposite (Arzheimer and Carter 2006, Swank and Betz 2003) based on empirical findings that proportionality of electoral systems has a negative effect on the electoral success of the radical right. However, note that Duverger does not predict that proportionality of electoral systems should automatically translate to success of new parties. Rather, his hypothesis is that given demand for new parties, such systems should permit the translation of these demands into electoral success. These contradictory findings have led many (e.g. Mudde 2007) to dismiss the importance of electoral systems and look to other political opportunity structures to explain radical right success. While other political opportunity structures are undoubtedly important, it is hasty to conclude electoral systems are not of importance in accounting for the electoral success of radical right parties. In Chapter 2, I lay out how we would test the hypothesis that electoral institutions modify demand for the radical right, and in Chapter 4, I test my hypotheses for how electoral institutions modify demands for the radical right.

1.6 Conclusion and Plan for the Dissertation

The growing radical right party support in recent decades is alarming to many scholars of political science and to citizens with multicultural ideals in the countries where the radical right is growing. As this chapter illustrates, political scientists still have yet to account for fluctuations in support for these extremist, anti-immigrant political parties. The studies of the demand for radical right parties are divided into two camps, the so-called micro and macro camps. According to micro-level explanations, those who are economically insecure are disproportionately represented among the radical right
supporters, so clearly individual economic interest matters. Anti-immigrant attitudes also are associated with support for the radical right, but the proposed causal mechanism of exclusionary national identity is not associated with radical right support. Social identity theorists (Brewer 1999) suggest that in-group attachments (such as national identity) become associated with out-group denigration in contexts of in-group threat. This suggests the need to bring together environmental-level factors with individual-level explanations. The “macro-level” camp has many contradictory findings about the effects of different environmental variables (migration change, economic crisis, electoral laws) on radical right voting, leading some scholars to dismiss the usefulness of these explanations.

I assert in Chapter 2 that individual-level identities are modified by environmental conditions, including cultural and economic threats and electoral laws, and contend that understanding these interactive relationships is essential to explaining when exclusionary national identity is associated with hostility to immigrants and radical right support. I go deeper into the theoretical mechanisms of my explanation, and lay out several hypotheses for testing. In chapter 3, I test my hypotheses that exclusionary national identity interacts with national cultural and economic threats to activate the relationship between exclusionary national identity and radical right demand. In Chapter 4, I discuss and test the role that electoral laws play in translating radical right demand into radical right votes, i.e., how political institutions shape popular demand for the radical right. In chapter 5, I lay out my conclusions and the implications of my research for our understanding of the conditions under which we should be concerned about extremist politics.
## Chapter 1 Tables

Table 1-1: Probit Model of Probability of Voting Radical Right (ISSP 1995 & 2003)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>(RSE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exclusionary National Identity</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.47**</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Occupation</td>
<td>-0.21**</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.26**</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>0.16*</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.01**</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>1.03**</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-4.87**</td>
<td>(0.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>21933</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R-squared</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** p ≤ .05  
* p ≤ .10  

Model is a probit model with clustered standard errors.
Chapter 1 Figures

Figure 1-1: Austria % Foreign Born & Vote Share 1995-2008

Figure 1-2: Belgium % Foreign Born & Vote Share 1995-2007
Figure 1-3: Britain % Foreign Born & Vote Share 1995-2005

Figure 1-4: Denmark % Foreign Born & Vote Share 1995-2007

Figure 1-5: Netherlands % Foreign Born & Vote Share 1995-2006
Figure 1-6: Sweden % Foreign Born & Vote Share 1995-2006

Figure 1-7: Switzerland % Foreign Born & Vote Share 1995-2007

Figure 1-8: United States % Foreign Born & Vote Share 1995-2004
Figure 1-9: Political Cartoon of Jean-Marie Le Pen\textsuperscript{12}

![Political Cartoon of Jean-Marie Le Pen](image1)

Figure 1-10: May 1, 2009 Front National (FN) Rally ("France, Love it or Leave it")\textsuperscript{13}

![May 1, 2009 Front National (FN) Rally](image2)

\textsuperscript{12} Bell, Steve. April 23, 2002. \textit{The Guardian Observer}.

Chapter 2
Environmental Triggers of National Identity

2.1 Introduction

“When an alien lives with you in your land, do not mistreat him.
The alien living with you must be treated as one of your native-born.
Love him as yourself, for you were aliens in Egypt.”
The Bible (New International Version), Leviticus 19: 33-34

“From the Garden of Eden to 1984, no age or society seems
wholly free from unfavorable opinions on outsiders.”
John Higham, Strangers in the Land, p. 3

The scholarship on radical right populist parties states that the defining feature of
such parties is their nativist ideology (e.g. Mudde 2007, Rydgren 2007, Eatwell 2000).
Despite these assumptions, however, research comes to mixed conclusions about the
relationship between beliefs about national identity and radical right support. Contrary to
assumptions throughout the radical right literature, the story is not simply one in which
those who have exclusionary views of national identity predispositions more likely to
vote radical right. In Chapter 1, I posed the question: under what conditions can we
expect exclusionary beliefs about national identity to be associated with prejudice and
support for political mobilization against “foreigners”?

In this chapter, I propose an answer to this question that brings together theorizing
about individual and environmental determinants of radical right voting. I briefly discuss
three cases – Switzerland, Belgium and Austria – that illustrate the interplay between
individual and environmental level dynamics in the recent rise in support of radical right parties in electoral politics in many developed democracies. Next, I suggest an explanation to account for these changes that explores how exclusionary beliefs about national identity become triggered in climates of threat, such as times of economic crisis and times when immigrants stream into a country in comparatively large numbers. Latent predisposing factors – even the presumably fundamental ones, such as exclusionary conceptions of national identity – should not be explored in a vacuum. Rather, I generate an explanation for how environmental level factors, such as economic and/or cultural threats, trigger the relationship between individual level predispositions, such as national identity, that then become manifested in anti-immigrant attitudes and radical right support. Let me turn to three brief descriptions of the recent rise of the radical right that suggest how these factors interact in contemporary politics.

2.2 Brief Case Studies of the Rise of the Radical Right – Switzerland, Belgium and Austria

The 2007 campaign poster from the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) pictured in Figure 2-1 brought a firestorm of criticism from international media sources against the radical right wing populist party in Switzerland.

INSERT FIGURE 2-1 HERE

The poster shows foreigners as black sheep who must be kicked out “for security” by the pure white sheep, which are shrouded in the backdrop of Switzerland’s flag. This poster is clearly meant to appeal to Swiss national identity and those with anti-immigrant attitudes. An astute student of comparative politics may recall that Lijphart’s (1999) Patterns of Democracy put forth Switzerland as the prototype of a consensus democracy,
and therefore, one might assume that the SVP’s extreme rhetoric fell on deaf ears in Switzerland. After all, Lijphart argued that consensus democracy is the “kinder, gentler form of democracy” (Lijphart 1999, p. 275). However, this is not what happened. To the contrary, running on this extremist anti-foreigner platform, the SVP gained 62 seats in 2007 (29% of the vote), making it the largest vote-getter in the National Council of Switzerland election. Since Lijphart published *Patterns of Democracy*, SVP’s electoral support has been steadily growing.

Between 1993 and 2007, the SVP more than doubled its popular vote in parliamentary elections. Its largest gain came in the 2003 election, when it won fifty-five seats (an eleven seat gain from previous the 1999 election). According to media reports on the 2003 election, “the party ran an anti-foreigner campaign, in which asylum seekers were portrayed as criminals and drug dealers, but the campaign seems to have found favour with more voters than it offended” (“Swiss Right,” 2003). The United Nations refugee agency also said the party’s propaganda contained some of the most anti-asylum campaign advertisements ever seen in Europe. What happened to this kinder, gentler consensus democracy that Lijphart put forth as a model of compromise and representation? The economic tides had changed in Switzerland, and as BBC News reported during the 2003 election, “Switzerland's once strong economy is heading for a slump, unemployment is rising, and social benefits are being cut back. The election campaign was dominated by the SVP's anti-foreigner propaganda, overshadowing concerns about the economy” (“Swiss Right,” 2003).

SVP’s anti-foreigner propaganda is not without policy implications; in late 2009, the SVP campaigned to amend the Swiss constitution, which guarantees freedom of
religion, to ban construction of minarets (the spires that adjoin many mosques and serve as a location for the Muslim call to prayer). In a televised debate over the referendum, “Ulrich Schlüer, a member of Parliament from the S.V.P., said minarets were a symbol of ‘the political will to take power’ and establish Shariah, or religious law” by Muslim residents in Switzerland (Cumming-Bruce and Erlanger 2009). The SVP’s campaign posters urging voters to vote yes on the ban depicted a Swiss flag sprouting black, missile-shaped minarets alongside a woman darkly shrouded in a niqab – a face veil worn by observant Muslim women – with menacing eyes (see Figure 2-2).

On November 29, 2009, the anti-minaret referendum passed with 57.5% of the popular vote, and since the ban gained both a majority of votes and passed in a majority of the cantons, it will be added as an amendment to the Swiss constitution.

Lijphart’s second example of a consensus democracy, Belgium, provides another puzzling case. In the last several decades in Belgium, two radical right populist parties have competed in each region of Belgium: the Vlaams Blok (VB) in Flanders and the Front National (FN) in Wallonia. In the 1980s, these radical right populist parties received little electoral support, particularly in Wallonia. For example, in the European parliament elections in 1989, the FN party in the French-speaking Wallonia received less than one percent of the vote, and the VB radical right party in Dutch-speaking Flanders received a modest 7% of the vote. Yet, only five years later in the next European parliament elections of 1994, the FN received over eight times more votes (8%) than in the previous election among the French-speaking electorate, and the VB received almost twice as many votes (13%) among the Dutch-speaking electorate. In fact, the VB has
grown in every general election since 1981.

A study of VB’s party manifestos shows no change in the main issues of the party, which during this period consistently appealed to voters on issues of national identity, immigration, and crime (Walgrave and de Swert 2004). For example, in his speech at the VB’s “Family Festival” in 1991, the leader of the party Philip Dewinter was quoted as saying, “only prostitutes leave their doors open. We don’t want to transform Flanders into a public brothel open to any foreigners from Africa or Asia” (van den Brink 1996, p. 103). The radical right parties in Belgium appealed to issues of national identity and anti-immigrant sentiment throughout this period, and yet had extremely different electoral success in 1989 and 1994.

Although party rhetoric remained unchanged, the national socioeconomic context changed considerably in Belgium. Annual unemployment in Belgium in 1994 was 9.8%, compared to 8.2% only one year prior to the election (LABORSTA). Not only was unemployment up in 1994 compared to the previous year, but was also higher than the rate in the 1989 election year, when unemployment was 8.3%. This rise in unemployment was accompanied by increased media coverage of immigrant and crime issues. Walgrave and de Swert (2004) studied the content of media coverage in the 1990s, and found that “the media content analysis suggests that especially immigrant and crime coverage may have played a role in the electoral growth of the VB in the 1990s. Immigration and crime are the exclusive property of the VB. They had considerable media attention, and their coverage increased through the 1990s” (Walgrave and de Swert 2004, p. 490). In other words, the success of anti-immigrant, nationalist discourse surged in Belgium in an environment of economic and security uncertainty where immigrants were publicized as
scapegoats for these social ills.

Similarly, in another one of Lijphart’s consensus democracies, Austria, the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) has consistently run on anti-immigrant rhetoric under the leadership of Jörg Haider, who came into party power in 1986. In his 1986 campaign, Haider’s stump speeches associated immigration with unemployment when he asked voters if it was necessary to have 140,000 unemployed and 180,000 immigrant workers in Austria. Under Haider’s new leadership, characterized by nationalist and anti-immigrant discourse, the FPÖ party was modestly successful, and won 9.7% of seats in the 1986 election. Yet, with just around 10% of the seats, the FPÖ was still a fringe party in the late 1980s. In the summer of 1989, the borders of Austria were opened to Eastern European countries. The FPÖ immediately responded with their “Resolution on the Foreigner Question” in late 1989, which suggested that both European and non-European foreigners were associated with drug abuse and crime (Gärtner 2002, p. 21). Media reports at that time reflected rising fears among the population of new immigration. In spring of 1990, a series of articles called “Threats by Foreigners!” was published in Austria’s most widely read tabloid, the _Neue Korne Zeitung_ (Gärtner 2002, p. 19). In the same year, FPÖ’s electoral support almost doubled compared to the previous parliamentary election only four years earlier. In fact, FPÖ gained 16.6% of the seats in parliament. According to the Austrian employment office records, unemployment steadily rose from 5% in 1989, to 5.4% in 1990, to 5.8% in 1991, to 5.9% in 1992 and to 6.8% in 1993 (LABORSTA).

As unemployment gradually continued to rise in the early 1990s, the FPÖ released its “Austria First” referendum in 1993, which was widely covered in the
Austrian media. The “Austria First” referendum included a suggestion for a constitutional amendment stating Austria is not a country of immigration – essentially redefining what it means to be Austrian – and putting a freeze on immigration until the national unemployment rate fell to under five percent. National unemployment by the time of the 1994 parliamentary elections was twenty percent higher than at the time of the 1990 elections. Amidst this context of “economic crisis, social fragmentation and increasing flow of Eastern immigration, Haider’s authoritarian and anti-immigrant discourses seduced a large potion of the Austrian electorate” (Dézé 2004, p. 31). In the 1994 elections, FPÖ’s seat share increased again by one-third (to 22.5% of the seats) compared to the 1990 election. FPÖ had shifted from a fringe extremist party to a major party in the Austrian system. This shift in power in the 1990s culminated when FPÖ took power in a governing coalition with the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) in early 2000. The FPÖ continues to appeal to public fears of “foreign” invaders, as illustrated by their most recent 2009 campaign slogan “The West in Christian Hands – Day of Reckoning” (see Figure 2-3).

In all three of these cases – Switzerland, Belgium, and Austria – the radical right populist parties consistently ran on platforms appealing to exclusionary views of national identity and anti-immigrant sentiments. This should not be surprising given individual-level explanations suggesting that anti-immigrant voters support radical right parties. Given that all three examples are prototypes of the supposedly kinder, gentler form of consensus democracy, one would expect – as was the case for many decades – that these parties would appeal only to fringe elements in these societies. Yet, in very short time
periods, large surges took place in the electoral success of these parties, which were accompanied by changes in the socioeconomic climate of these countries: threats of new immigration, rising unemployment, and media attention given to these national threats. However, these environmental variables have been unable to explain radical right success in past empirical studies. Some scholars find these factors matter, while others find that they do not (see Chapter 1). I argue that the reason individual and environmental explanations come to mixed conclusions about the causes of radical right support is because these factors are not independent causes of radical right success. National socioeconomic threats activate exclusionary beliefs that in turn trigger anti-immigrant attitudes and radical right support.

2.3 Environmental Level Triggers of Individual Level Predispositions

The economic insecurity hypothesis provides clear expectations about what the demographic predictors of radical right support should be (e.g., unemployment, low-skill occupation, generation). However, as scholarship on this subject has shown, this only tells part of the story. Explanations about the roles of national identities and macro-level changes in migration levels and the economy are theoretically appealing, but the empirical results are contradictory. Although they are often studied in isolation due to different levels of analysis, realistic group conflict theory and social identity theory are not mutually exclusive. One might ask, as Sniderman et al. (2004, p. 36) did, “how do predisposing factors and situational triggers in combination shape reactions to ethnic minorities?” Exclusionary national identity alone does not account for anti-immigrant attitudes, as the mixed empirical findings on the subject of anti-immigrant attitudes show. Similarly, group competition over resources during times of ethnic and/or economic
threat alone is not enough to explain who supports the radical right, as the mixed empirical results for such macro-level explanations shows. In fact, Blumer’s original group position theory (1958) treated perceptions of in-group superiority and out-group hostility as necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for intergroup conflict.

Sniderman et al. (2004, p.36) propose that both economic interest and national identity underlie reactions to immigrants in Western Europe. Brewer (1999, pp. 435-436) argues that perceptions of threat to an in-group’s interests or survival triggers the relationship between in-group identity and fear and hostility toward the threatening out-group. Similarly, in their survey experiment study of the impact of national identity predispositions combined with primes of situational threats, Sniderman et al. (2004, p. 36) hypothesize that the environment makes individual predisposing characteristics salient.

A great many, care about their country’s national identity and culture, again not on a continuous basis, but when a risk to the national way of life becomes salient. A large portion of the public accordingly should be ready to respond to circumstances triggering a concern about their economic well-being and their country’s way of life above and beyond those immediately concerned about either.

I propose that the way in which identity is translated into support for the radical right is a dynamic process in which national identity is made salient under certain environmental conditions that threaten the dominant native population. This would help to explain why environmental-level explanations and individual-level explanations taken in isolation do a poor job of explaining opposition to immigration and support of the radical right.

What threats should prime this relationship? In his historical analysis of anti-immigrant movements in the United States, Higham (1955) found that anti-immigrant sentiment has ebbed and flowed depending on the national cultural and economic
contexts. Higham outlines how amidst a period of “savage depression” in the 1890s, “fear of the stranger accumulated on all sides, mounting into hatred, bursting into violence, and intruding into politics” (Higham 1955, p. 68). There are many ways in which the national social environment could be under threat from so-called “outsiders,” particularly sudden changes in the national ethnic makeup of the population and poor national economic conditions. Both of these are collective threats to the nation-state. Blumer (1958) similarly predicted that cultural and economic threats will trigger group competition between dominant and non-dominant groups (see Chapter 1.4). According to realistic group conflict theory, cultural and economic environmental threats should trigger a positive relationship between national identity and anti-immigrant attitudes and behaviors.

Another potential threat is a threat to national security. However, unlike with population shifts and economic downturns, the implications of security threats are less clear. Higham’s (1955) historical research suggests that security threats can actually have the effect of solidifying national native and immigrant resident communities against a common enemy or enemies. During World War I, Higham (1955, p. 243) cites several American campaigns for unity, including “a great public reception for thousands of newly naturalized citizens on May 10, 1915” with President Woodrow Wilson giving the address, and over one hundred cities celebrating the Fourth of July as a united Americanization day under the slogan, “Many Peoples, But One Nation.” Rather than national security threats being a trigger of generalized anti-immigrant sentiment, it is more likely that specific groups of the ethnic background of the wartime opponent would be targets of negative attitudes and behaviors. History has seen many such examples,
including internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II or more recent increase in detaining of Muslim immigrants following the September 11, 2001 terror attacks (Bernstein 2007).

This insight that the environment is important in shaping attitudes is not a new one. Work in comparative politics suggests that the context of inter-group relations has a significant effect on whether political group competition or anti-immigrant attitudes emerge in countries (e.g. Quillian 1995, Golder 2003, Posner 2004, Sniderman et al. 2004, Weldon 2006). Quillian (1995, p. 591) argues “threat and the effect of individual characteristics on expressions of prejudice, then, are not completely separate.” Yet, scholars have not yet explored the modifying effects of threat on the relationship between exclusionary national identities (the supposed driver of radical right ideology) and attitudes about immigrants and the radical right. Sniderman et al. (2000, p. 9), in their study of anti-immigrant attitudes and radical right wing parties in Italy, acknowledge that prejudice is embedded in the context of changes in the economy and society, but that the design of their study does not permit them to get a direct grip on it. Their later experimental survey work in the Netherlands (Sniderman et al. 2004, p. 46) suggests that immigrant attitudes are a product of both predisposing factors and situational threats, but the experimental design does not explore whether actual (as opposed to perceived) threats in the environment interact with predispositions to shape anti-immigrant attitudes and vote choices for radical right parties. Similarly, in Schildkraut’s work on the relationship between the American national identity predispositions and public policy clashes over immigrants, she suggests “it is certain that conflicts such as these are becoming more and more common in the United States. The ethnic composition of the population has
undergone dramatic changes over the past thirty years” (Schildkraut 2005, p. 1). Yet, despite her suggestion that environmental change has been a catalyst in activating national identity predispositions, scholars have not yet tested this interactive relationship across time or space.

In other words, cross-national or time-series research on anti-immigrant attitudes and radical right support has not yet explored how situational triggers – such as economic or cultural threats – interact with citizens’ national identity predispositions. I hope to build upon past scholarship by describing and testing how such threats trigger a relationship between exclusionary national identity on the one hand and anti-immigrant attitudes and radical right support on the other. Specifying the interactive relationship between environmental threats and national identity will help explain why the empirical record for these different explanations for radical right support is mixed.

2.4 Priming Mechanism: The Role of Elite Frames

How does this priming process take place, i.e. how is it that citizens come to view changes in the national climate as threats? What sets in motion this interaction between individual predisposition and environmental threats? As the brief case studies above hinted, elites spread their messages to the electorate through party propaganda disseminated through the mass media. In each of the cases described above, the media and party elites played major roles in framing social changes – shifts in immigration, drastic increasing unemployment – as threats to national security and national cultural purity. The campaign slogans, posters, and political cartoons depicted in both Chapters 1 and 2 illustrate just a few of the frames elites use to activate feelings of threat among citizens with exclusionary beliefs about national identity.
Kinder and Sanders (1996) in their study of the racial politics in the United States explain how elites frame citizens’ understandings of such issues.

Here we suggest that such debate among elites – what we will call momentarily a war of frames – is a central component of public opinion. For public opinion depends not only on the circumstances and sentiments of individual citizens – their interests, feelings toward social groups, and their political principles – but also on the ongoing debate among elites. This debate becomes available to citizens in a multitude of ways: through the reporting of daily events in television news programs, newspapers, and radio; through editorials, syndicated columns, political talk shows, cartoons, newsletters, and the like; and most directly through press conferences, debates, advertisements, speeches and so forth.” (Kinder and Sanders 1996, pp. 164-165)

This process of elite framing is, of course, not unique to the United States. In the modern developed democracies where radical right parties have emerged as new political players in the last several decades, the norm is for citizens to receive information about politics through media and party organizations in the ways discussed by Kinder and Sanders (1996).

Widespread coverage of issues relevant to the radical right agenda – such as immigration and unemployment – raises awareness among national publics, and coverage consistent with radical right perspectives on these salient issues can reinforce the positive impact that media can have on boosting radical right support. As Walgrave and de Swert (2004) have shown in their case study of Belgium, media coverage of radical right issues, such as immigration, surged during the period of electoral success of the VB in Belgium throughout the 1990s. Based on their time series analysis of the relationship between VB electoral success and media coverage of immigration and crime issues, Walgrave and de Swert (2004, p. 496) conclude that a “large part of VB’s success can be ‘explained’ by these two topics and their coverage in two (or three) media during three periods
preceding the poll. The time series analysis suggests that the media’s attention to those issues could have had an impact on the party’s results during the 1990s.”

Mudde (2007, pp. 259, 277) also asserts that propaganda and elite agenda setting are extremely important in the success of radical right parties throughout Europe. He points to the success of the French FN and the Belgian VB as having highly effective propaganda campaigns, as well as the example of the German radical right German People’s Union (DVU), which gained impressive regional success on the basis of mass mailing campaigns. As noted above, a popular tabloid publication was attributed as playing a large role in the success of the FPÖ in Austria. Mudde (2007) discusses how the mainstream media outlets in Austria, Poland, Italy, France, Germany, Belgium, and other European countries have played an important role in “setting a public agenda highly favorable to populist radical right parties, which raise similar issues and present solutions in line with those offered or suggested in the media” (Mudde 2007, p. 249).

In sum, the elite frames disseminated through the media and party propaganda are the mechanisms that work in concert to prime attention to national environmental threats among those with exclusionary national identities in the electorate. Voters’ predispositions become salient when they perceive deleterious national changes – such as increased immigration or increased unemployment – as threatening based on elite cues about these issues. This causal process is illustrated by Figure 2-4.

14 There are major media voices that are explicitly pro-immigrant in these countries, as well. Thus, as with most political debates, the immigrant issue is contested and citizens are exposed to competing frames. However, I would argue that the anti-immigrant threat frames will be more effective in priming citizens with latent exclusionary beliefs about national identity, since the anti-immigrant frames threaten those beliefs. Though I do not explore other conceptions of national identity here, future research might explore what frames are effective for priming civic conceptions of national identity. I discuss this possibility for future research in Chapter 5.
2.5 Implications of the Explanation – Hypotheses

As noted in Chapter 1, despite theoretical expectations of social identity theory, it is not always the case, holding all else equal, that national identity is associated with anti-immigrant attitudes. Bringing the causal mechanisms of social identity theory together with realistic group conflict theory, I expect certain national threats disseminated by elites to prime the relationship between these predispositions and anti-immigrant attitudes and behaviors. According to realistic group conflict theory, dominant groups will denigrate groups that threaten their dominance. Under conditions of threat – a perceived deleterious change in the balance of resources or power between the native dominant group and immigrant out-groups – I expect individuals’ national identity predispositions to be related to denigration of immigrants and support for radical right parties. What constitutes a perceived deleterious change in the balance between the native dominant group and immigrant out-groups? I propose several hypotheses to test potential perceived deleterious changes.

Realistic group conflict theory helps us to make predictions about what threats should prime competition between groups and make group identities salient. According to realistic group conflict theory, the dominant group in society will be threatened by minority groups that compete with them for majority status, power and cultural dominance. Therefore, the first hypothesis I propose is that immigrants will be seen as a threat if they flow into the country in historically large numbers, becoming a numerical threat to the dominant group and its way of life. Note that according to realistic group conflict theory, for a group to be perceived as a threat (in this case immigrants) by the dominant in-group, they must be seen as alien or different. Thus, immigrants from a very similar ethnic background would not be seen as threatening, even by those in the
dominant group with exclusionary conceptions of national identity. Sherif’s (1956) group conflict experiments and Blumer’s group conflict theory asserts that intra-group relations and perceptions are shaped over time. Given that the dominant in-group sees itself as entitled to rights and resources, in order for group threat to be ignited, there must be some shift in the balance (or perceived balance) of power between the groups. Thus, a cultural threat would emerge if the relative size of the groups shifted significantly in favor of the out-group (the immigrants); this would be perceived as a deleterious change in the cultural environment of the dominant, native group. According to this hypothesis, one should expect comparatively high migration levels by “foreigners” (i.e. immigrants who are ethnically different from the in-group) to be associated with anti-immigrant attitudes and radical right support. I call this the cultural threat hypothesis. A cultural threat should trigger exclusionary national identity predispositions to be salient in forming a variety of attitudes about “foreigners” and the radical right. As noted above, elite framing of these cultural threats sets the activation process in motion.

*Cultural Threat hypothesis:*
A cultural threat will be communicated by elites to trigger a positive relationship between exclusionary national identity predispositions and 1) anti-immigrant attitudes, and 2) radical right support. In conditions of low cultural threat, there will be a negligible relationship between national identity and anti-immigrant attitudes and radical right support. In conditions of high cultural threat, there will be a positive relationship between national identity and anti-immigrant attitudes and radical right support.

Equation 2-1 shows my model for testing this hypothesis, and Figure 2-5 represents what I expect the marginal effect of national identity ($\beta_1 + \beta_3 \times \text{Cultural Threat}$) to be on anti-immigrant attitudes and radical right support.
Equation 2-1: Anti-Immigrant Attitudes and Radical Right Support = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Exclusionary National Identity} + \beta_2 \text{Cultural Threat} + \beta_3 \text{Exclusionary National Identity} \times \text{Cultural Threat} + \beta_4 \text{Controls} + \varepsilon

Second, some have argued (e.g. Golder 2003) that cultural threat in the form of increasing number of immigrants is a necessary, but not a sufficient, trigger for a context of threat. Realistic group conflict theory does assert that out-group members must be competing (or perceived to be competing) for a greater share of rights or resources that “belong” to the in-group. According to this view, immigrants only would be seen as a threat to natives when jobs and resources are scarce. This occurs during times of economic crisis. Therefore, the second macro-level factor that I hypothesize to prime the relationship between exclusionary national identity and anti-immigrant attitudes and radical right is an economic threat. An economic threat should trigger national identity to be salient in forming negative of attitudes about “foreigners” and support for the radical right in countries where immigrants are a substantial and visible minority.

There are two hypotheses that I derive from this explanation, and both treat the first cultural threat hypothesis as a necessarily (but not sufficient) condition. Some argue that according to the implications of factor endowment models, trade attitudes and protectionist behaviors should be different in importing and exporting countries. Mayda and Rodrik (2005, pp. 1394-1395) find that country characteristics – such as level of wealth – robustly determine whether skilled workers are pro-trade; in rich countries, high skill and education are correlated with pro-trade attitudes, while this relationship is weak or negative in poor countries. Similarly, we might expect immigration attitudes are different in immigrant sender and receiver countries. If this hypothesis is true, in
immigrant receiver countries, economic threats should make exclusionary national identity salient in forming attitudes towards immigrants. Under conditions of economic crisis – reflected in high national unemployment – I expect individuals’ national identity predispositions to be related to negative attitudes towards immigrants.

Economic Threat Hypothesis
A poor economic environment in immigrant receiver countries will be communicated by elites to trigger a positive relationship between citizens’ exclusionary national identity predispositions and 1) opposition to immigration, and 2) radical right support. At low economic threat in immigrant receivers, exclusionary national identity will have a negligible effect on anti-immigrant attitudes or radical right ideology. At high levels of economic threat in immigrant receivers, exclusionary national identity will be primed and will have a positive relationship with anti-immigrant attitudes and radical right support.

Equation 2-2 represents the model I will use to test this hypothesis, and Figure 2-6 illustrates the predicted marginal effect of national attachments in immigrant receiver countries ($\alpha_1 + \alpha_3 \times \text{Economic Threat}$).

\[
\text{Equation 2-2: Anti-Immigrant Attitudes and Radical Right Support} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \text{Exclusionary National Identity} + \alpha_2 \text{Economic Threat} + \alpha_3 \text{Exclusionary National Identity} \times \text{Economic Threat} + \alpha_4 \text{Controls} + \varepsilon
\]

If this hypothesis is correct, in immigrant sender countries, I expect that this economic threat hypothesis will be falsified. In other words, economic threat should not trigger a positive relationship between national identity predispositions and my dependent variables of interest in immigrant sender countries. This is because in immigrant sender countries, “immigrant” is not a salient frame, and thus should not be salient in making anti-immigrant judgments. Rather, native minority groups would most likely be targeted in downturns in such countries.
However, some scholars argue that protectionist attitudes are only partly explained by conventional economic models, and that symbolic attachments – including patriotism and nationalism – are equally important predictors of whether individuals favor trade regardless of whether they are in an importer or an exporter country (Mayda and Rodrik 2005). If this is true, then we should not necessarily see a distinct difference between immigrant receiver countries and immigrant sender countries; economic threats should activate the relationship between exclusionary national identity and anti-immigrant attitudes and radical right support regardless of sender/receiver status. I will explore the predictive power of these alternative explanations. If the economic threat hypothesis is correct, Figure 2-7 shows what I expect to find in immigrant sender countries.

INSERT FIGURE 2-7 HERE

However, if this implication of realistic group conflict theory is not correct, and group attachments predict anti-immigrant sentiment regardless of whether a country is historically an immigrant receiver, I will find no difference between sender and receiver countries.

An alternative hypothesis that I derive from the theory that cultural threat is a necessary but not sufficient condition to trigger the relationship between national identity and radical right support is what I label the economic-cultural threat interaction hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, it is not necessarily the case that a relationship between national identity and anti-immigrant attitudes/radical right support is triggered during times of economic crisis in all immigrant receiver countries, but rather it is the coincidence of a cultural threat (e.g. a large shift in the population balance between the native group and immigrant groups) and an economic threat (e.g. a large increase in
unemployment). This coincidence of threats could occur in countries that historically have been immigrant sender or receiver countries; what matters is not historical immigrant receiver status, but the occurrence of a perceived deleterious change in the balance between natives and non-natives. In other words, the causal mechanism that primes exclusionary national identity is the occurrence at the same time of perceived deleterious changes in both the economy and the cultural balance between dominant and immigrant groups.

_Economic-Cultural Threat Interaction Hypothesis_
A cultural threat combined with an economic threat will be communicated by elites to trigger a positive relationship between citizens’ national identity and 1) anti-immigrant attitudes and 2) radical right support. At low levels of both economic and cultural threat, national identity will have a negligible effect on anti-immigrant attitudes or radical right support. At high levels of both cultural and economic threat, the relationship between national identity and radical right support will be primed by this context of threat.

The implications of the economic-cultural threat hypothesis, shown in figure 2-8, can be tested using the model proposed by Equation 2-3.

Equation 2-3: Radical Right Support = \(\mu_0 + \mu_1\text{Exclusionary National Identity} + \mu_2\text{Economic Threat} + \mu_3\text{Cultural Threat} + \mu_4\text{Exclusionary National Identity x Economic Threat} + \mu_5\text{Exclusionary National Identity x Cultural Threat} + \mu_6\text{Economic Threat x Cultural Threat} + \mu_7\text{Exclusionary National Identity x Economic Threat x Cultural Threat} + \mu_8\text{Controls} + \epsilon\)

Finally, my hypotheses above focus on anti-immigrant attitudes and support for radical right ideals, but not necessarily radical right voting. Given the important role of the supply-side described in Chapter 1, particularly electoral permissiveness (Givens 2005, Norris 2005, Golder 2003), I expect that the relationship between radical right
voting and the attitudinal predictors discussed here (exclusionary national identity, anti-immigrant attitudes, radical right ideals) would be weaker in systems with non-permissive electoral rules. For example, in some countries with low district magnitudes, such as single member district plurality (SMDP) systems, there may be no viable radical right party for structural reasons, which would dampen the effect of the demand-side mechanisms proposed here. Note that all three of the cases discussed in the brief case analyses at the start of this chapter are countries with relatively permissive electoral systems. Voters in such systems can cast sincere votes for smaller parties, and be assured that their votes will likely be translated into representation of their preferences. However, voters may not vote their sincere preferences in electoral systems that are not permissive due to the psychological and mechanical effects of such electoral laws, since a vote for the radical right in such countries may simply be a “wasted” vote. Since it is the case that voters have a strong incentive to vote strategically rather than sincerely due to lack of permissiveness in low district magnitude electoral systems, my final hypothesis is the electoral systems hypothesis:

_Electoral Systems Hypothesis_
The effect of anti-immigrant attitudes, radical right ideals, and exclusionary national identity on radical right voting will be modified by the electoral system. The relationship between exclusionary national identity, radical right ideals, and anti-immigrant attitudes and radical right vote will be negligible in non-permissive electoral systems. The relationship between exclusionary national identity, radical right ideals, and anti-immigrant attitudes and radical right vote will be positive in permissive electoral systems.

This hypothesis is also illustrated by Figure 2-9 and to test the modifying effect of electoral laws on anti-immigrant preferences, I will test the following model shown in Equation 2-4:
Equation 2-4: Radical Right Vote/Partisanship = \( \delta_0 + \delta_1 \text{National Identity (N)} + \delta_2 \text{District Magnitude (D)} + \delta_3 \text{ND} + \delta_4 \text{Controls} + \epsilon \)

2.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, I propose an explanation that brings together individual level and environmental level explanations for anti-immigrant attitudes and radical right support. First, by combining the insights from social identity theory and realistic group conflict theory, I suggest radical right demand is a function of the dynamic relationship between individual-level predispositions (exclusionary national identity) and environmental threats. According to my explanation, an interactive relationship exists between individual national identity predispositions and environmental threats, such that cultural and economic threats prime the relationship between such dispositions and anti-immigrant attitudes and radical right support. I outlined several possible implications that follow from this explanation – the cultural threat hypothesis, the economic threat hypothesis, and the economic-cultural threat interaction hypothesis – and will test these hypotheses about the modifying effects of threat in Chapter 3. This is the first part of the causal story, which helps us better understand demand for the radical right.

Second, the supply side must be considered; according to Duverger’s hypothesis, electoral laws should further modify the relationship between these attitudes and radical right votes. Attitudes – such as anti-immigrant attitudes and far right ideology – and identities – such as exclusionary conceptions of national identity – associated with demand for the radical right will only be translated into votes in permissive electoral
systems. I test the electoral systems hypothesis in Chapter 4. Figure 2-10 illustrates the multi-level causal process proposed here.

INSERT FIGURE 2-10 HERE

This explanation builds on past scholarship by considering how both individual and environmental factors interact to create conditions under which those with restrictive views about national identity are likely to be anti-immigrant and vote radical right.
Chapter 2 Figures

Figure 2-1: “For More Security”: Swiss People’s Party Campaign Slogan 2007 (© Pascal Lauener/Reuters 2007)

Figure 2-2: “Stop – Yes to ban of minarets”: SVP Anti-minaret Campaign Poster (© The Washington Post 2009)

Figure 2-3: “The West in Christian Hands – Day of Reckoning”: Austrian Freedom Party Campaign Slogan 2009 (© Reuters Pictures 2009)

15 Retrieved from http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1673669,00.html
17 Retrieved from www.daylife.com/photo/0cu6eK8dRdgKO
Figure 2-4: Threat Activation Mechanism

- National Threat
- Elite Frames
- Exclusionary National Identity
- Radical Right Demand (e.g. Anti-Immigrant Attitudes)
Figure 2-5: Cultural Threat Hypothesis

Marginal Effect of National Identity Predispositions on Radical Right Support conditioned on Cultural Threat

Figure 2-6: Economic Threat Hypothesis in Immigrant Receiver Countries

Marginal Effect of National Identity Predispositions on Radical Right Support conditioned on Economic Threat in Receiver Countries
Figure 2-7: Economic Threat Hypothesis in Immigrant Sender Countries

Marginal Effect of National Identity Predispositions on Radical Right Support conditioned on Economic Threat in Sender Countries

Figure 2-8: Economic-Cultural (E-C) Threat Interaction Hypothesis

Marginal Effect of National Identity on Radical Right Support Conditioned on E-C Threat Interaction
Figure 2-9: Modifying Effects of Electoral Laws
Figure 2-10: Conditional Extremism: When Exclusionary National Identity is Associated with Radical Right Support
Chapter 3

Demand Side of Radical Right Support:
Exclusionary National Identity, National Threat &
Radical Right Attitudes

3.1 Introduction

My central question is: under what conditions can we expect exclusionary national identity to be associated with anti-immigrant attitudes and support for radical right parties mobilizing against “foreigners”? In Chapter 2, I suggested that the relationship between radical right support and exclusionary national identity is modified by threats to the nation-state, such as economic threats and cultural threats. In other words, the success of radical right party appeals to exclusive views national identity will depend on the interaction between individual level predispositions and environmental threats.

There are several possible hypotheses that follow from the explanation that I suggested in Chapter 2, including the cultural threat hypothesis, which suggests that national identity of dominant group members is made salient in forming judgments about immigrants and radical right parties when there is a threat to the native group’s culture and way of life due to the increasing encroachment of “foreign” immigrants. Second, the economic threat hypothesis suggests that the relationship between national identity and radical right support is primed by poor economic conditions – high unemployment and job scarcity – that lead natives to scapegoat foreigners for economic problems. Lastly, the cultural-economic threat interaction hypothesis suggests that it is the coincidence of both
economic and cultural threats that trigger a positive relationship between exclusionary national identity and radical right support.

Scholarship on the radical right electorate finds that those with anti-immigrant attitudes (Norris 2005, Van der Brug et al. 2000, Mayer 2002, Betz 1994) and “extreme” conservatives who place themselves at the far right of the ideological scale (Van der Brug et al. 2005, 2000; Van der Brug and Fennema 2003) are more likely than others to vote for the radical right. These measures are good indicators of demand for the radical right.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine how the relationships between national identity and both anti-immigrant attitudes and far right ideology are modified by threats – cultural threat, economic threat, and the interaction between both economic and cultural threats. I begin with a discussion of my research design, including my data sources, measures of my concepts, and my statistical models. I then test 1) the cultural threat hypothesis, 2) the economic threat hypothesis and 3) the cultural-economic threat interaction hypothesis with respect to both anti-immigrant attitudes and far right ideology. I also perform several within country tests of the cultural-economic threat hypothesis. Lastly, my conclusion discusses the implications of the results of my empirical tests.

3.2 Research Design

3.2.1 Data Sources

I test my hypotheses using the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 1995 and 2003 Modules on National Identity, which contain cross-national data on national identity conceptions, nationalism, ideology, anti-immigrant attitudes, and vote intention. These datasets provide sufficiently large samples of countries at two points in

\[18\] I also tested these hypotheses with respect to ideology more broadly defined. See the Appendix for these results.
time to permit significant variation on environmental variables: economic threat, cultural threat, and (in Chapter 4) electoral systems. The 1995 dataset covers 23 countries and the 2003 dataset covers 34 countries (See Table 3-1).

INSERT TABLE 3-1 HERE

For data on number of immigrants, which I used to create a measure of cultural threat, I used the US Census Bureau's International Data Base to gather the net level of migration expressed in terms of number of migrants in each country’s population, and selected the migrant level for the year closest to when the survey was in the field as the annual migration rate for each country in the ISSP. For data on national unemployment, which I used to create a measure of economic threat, I used unemployment data from the International Labor Organization statistics. I gathered the annual mean unemployment rate for each country during the year closest to the period that the surveys were in the field in each country. For the 1995 ISSP module, field dates ranged from 1994-1996, and I used data for the year closest to when the survey went in the field.19

I also created a restricted sample of immigrant receiver countries to test the economic threat hypothesis, which suggests that we should see a relationship between anti-immigrant attitudes and national identity during a time of economic threat in countries that have historically been immigrant receiver countries. According to this hypothesis, for immigrant minority groups to be targeted as the scapegoats during times of economic threat, having a significant “foreign” population is a necessary (but not a

19 Data from 1994 was used for Spain, Poland, Austria, Germany, and Sweden. Similarly, 1996 data was used for countries that were in the field in 1996, which included Russia, Slovakia, and New Zealand. Japan 1995 and 2003, Chile 2003, Ireland 1995, South Africa 2003, and Philippines were coded missing on my measure of cultural threat due to missing migration data. In order to avoid losing data due to gaps in migration data, the migration data for Bulgaria 1995 is based on a 3-year average due to missing data in 1991-2. The data for Italy 1995 is based on a 4-year average due to missing data in 1991. These missing data reduced the sample size in 2003 from 34 to 32 and in 1995 from 24 to 21.
sufficient) condition. Absent a “foreign” population, the majority group will target native minorities during times of economic threat. To test this hypothesis, I treat immigrant receivership as a categorical variable and split the ISSP samples into immigrant receiver and immigrant sender countries. To categorize countries as immigrant receiver or immigrant sender countries, I again used the US Census Bureau's International Data Base to calculate the average number of net migrants in each country’s population for two decades beginning in 1980. I categorized countries as “immigrant sender” or “immigrant receiver” countries based on whether the average net number of migrants was greater than or equal to one over this period of two decades. The immigrant receiver countries in each year of the survey are indicated in Table 3-1.\textsuperscript{20}

3.2.2 Measures – Independent Variables

First, I will discuss my independent variable of interest – exclusionary national identity. As defined in earlier chapters, national identity is a symbolic predisposition, which is a relatively stable attachment to beliefs about political symbols and ideals formed early in life (Sears and Huddy 1987, Citrin et al. 1990, Schildkraut 2005). Several questions measuring beliefs about national symbols and ideals were asked in the ISSP modules, and I used these questions to create a national identity measure (following the approaches of de Figueiredo and Elkins 2003 and Citrin et al. 1990).\textsuperscript{21} Below, I describe

\textsuperscript{20} New Zealand was the one country that had a relatively drastic change from being a net immigrant sender to a net immigrant receiver over this two-decade period, so I made the decision to include it in the immigrant receiver category in the 2003 dataset. With the exception of New Zealand, when a country is listed in only one year, it is because it was only included in that wave of the ISSP and not the other. For example, France was not surveyed in the ISSP 1995, but was surveyed in the ISSP 2003.

\textsuperscript{21} Some might question whether we can compare national identity as a metric across the countries included in the ISSP modules. Davidov (2009) ran a series of metric invariance tests on the national attachment variables in the ISSP 1995 and 2003 models and concluded that researchers may use the ISSP data to study the relationships among nationalism, patriotism and other theoretical constructs across the countries included in the modules. Davidov (2009, p. 79) concludes that, “if differences are found in the relationship
how I created the metrics used for these concepts in this chapter.

The questions in the ISSP 1995 and 2003 modules ask how important respondents think it is for one to fit various criteria in order to be “truly (country nationality).” This includes: being born in the country, having citizenship, having lived in the country most of one’s life, being able to speak the country’s language, to be the same religion as the country, to respect the country’s political institutions and laws, to feel like a member of the country, to have the country’s ancestry (only asked in 2003 module), and sharing the country’s customs and traditions. In order to generate the best measure of national identity, I conducted a principal factors analysis\(^\text{22}\) (see Table 3-2) of these questions to explore whether all variables loaded onto one factor.

\text{INSERT TABLE 3-2 HERE}

Some scholars assume unidimensionality of national identity (e.g. de Figueiredo and Elkins 2003), while others argue that there are exclusionary (also termed ethnic by some scholars) conceptions and civic conceptions of national identity (Schildkraut 2003, 2005, 2007; Huddy and Khatib 2007; Pehrson et al. 2009). In the ISSP modules, only one factor was retained with an eigenvalue of greater than or equal to one. All but one of the national identity conception variables had factor loadings of greater than or equal to 0.50, including importance for citizens to be born in the country, to have citizenship, to speak the country’s language, to have spent most of one’s life in the country, to be the religion of the country, and to feel a member of the country.

I also conducted a principal factor analysis within each country to see if there

\(^{22}\) Again, this is consistent with the work of other scholars of national attachments (Citrin et al. 1990, de Figueiredo and Elkins 2003, Carter and Perez 2008).
were significant differences in which factors were retained between countries, as well as investigate whether using an index for exclusionary national identity that reflected between country differences influenced my results. With regards to which factors were retained, in all cases but one (Czech Republic in the 2003 module), one factor was retained with an eigenvalue of greater than or equal to one. In the 1995 module, it was always the case that the variables for importance for citizens to be born in the country, to have citizenship, and to have residency were retained at a value that was greater than or equal to 0.50. In 2003, importance of having citizenship, residing the in country, and having ancestry of the country were retained in every country. With regards to importance of being born in the country, all but one country retained this variable in the 2003 sample. Thus, these variables seem to be core elements of exclusionary national identity across countries.

With regards to which variables did not load onto the exclusionary identity factor at a level of greater than or equal to 0.50 in all countries, first, respect for political institutions did not load onto the retained factor for exclusionary identity in 74% of the countries in the 1995 sample and 72% of the countries in the 2003 sample. This is consistent with the pooled sample results, and is arguably due to the fact that this is a civic – not exclusionary – conception of national identity. Regarding importance of sharing religion, 43% of the countries in the 1995 sample and 23% of the countries in the

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23 The only country where the importance of being born in the country did not load onto the factor for exclusionary national identity was Israel, where the importance of having ancestry did load onto the factor. This likely reflects the unique nature of the Jewish nation-state, where those with Jewish ancestry are welcomed regardless of birthplace.

24 In many cases, these variables loaded at just the level under the threshold I designated.

25 It is interesting to note that several of the countries that did retain the importance for respect for political institutions included newly democratized countries in Eastern Europe (e.g. Bulgaria, Latvia, and Poland), as well as South Africa, where less than 10 years prior to the survey, apartheid had been abolished. In these newly democratized countries, respect for political institutions may be considered more important than in “older” democracies.
2003 sample did not retain this variable. Most of these countries were in Eastern Europe and East Asia. Regarding importance of feeling a sense of belonging in the country, 35% of the countries in the 1995 sample and 22% of the countries in the 2003 sample did not retain this variable. Lastly, with regards to language, 8% of the countries in the 1995 sample and 19% of the countries in the 2003 sample did not retain this variable. Based on these within country factor analyses, I created an index variable for exclusionary national identity to explore whether the results discussed below changed if I used this variable that accounted for slight differences in exclusionary beliefs between countries. Use of this variable did not change the results discussed in this chapter. Therefore, I used the variable based on the pooled sample factor analyses, as this variable maximizes comparability.

The national identity variable is an index that averages the retained variables ranging from 1 to 4. The mean score on national identity in both 1995 and 2003 is 3.0 with a standard deviation of 0.6, which indicates that the average respondent agrees for the most part with these exclusionary beliefs about national symbols and ideals. In the 2003 module, the importance of having national ancestry was also retained (this question was not asked in the 1995 module). It is worth noting that the one variable measuring beliefs about national identity that did not load onto the retained factor in the pooled samples – respecting political institutions of the country – is considered by many scholars who assert the multidimensionality of national identity to be a civic notion of national identity. This seems to support scholars who take the view that there are different types of national identity. My measure of national identity is a measure of exclusionary views of

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26 Several multi-lingual societies did not retain this variable, such as the Netherlands and Switzerland.
national identity. This view of national identity is assumed to underlie support for the radical right, so this measure is appropriate given my research question.

It is important to control for nationalism, which has been shown to be related to but distinct both theoretically and empirically from national identity. As opposed to national identity, which is concerned with beliefs about what it means to be a member of the domestic national community, nationalism is a chauvinistic belief in the international superiority of one’s national group, and is associated with increased prejudice towards out-groups (Davidov 2009, de Figueiredo and Elkins 2003, Li and Brewer 2004, Carter and Perez 2008). Since these concepts are related but distinct, it is important to control for nationalism as an alternative explanation for both anti-immigrant attitudes and radical right ideology in my analyses.27 The nationalism measures in the ISSP modules include a variety of questions about attitudes of national superiority: whether it is better to be a citizen of the respondent’s country than elsewhere, whether there are things about the country that make respondent ashamed, whether the world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the respondent’s country, if the country is generally better than most others, and if people should support their country even if it’s wrong. I conducted a principal factor analysis of these potential nationalism variables (see Table 3-3), and three variables measuring the beliefs about the superiority of the nation were retained in both years at factor loadings of greater than or equal to 0.50, including the belief that it is better to be a citizen of the respondent’s country than

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27 As with past scholarship, I found that my measures of these two concepts were modestly correlated. Bivariate correlations are 0.46 in the 2003 sample and 0.41 in the 1995 sample. This level of correlation is significantly lower than levels where one might be concerned about multicollinearity. However, to be sure multicollinearity is not a problem, I also checked the variance inflation factors (VIF) for the variables in my models, and the VIFs for national identity and nationalism were never at levels that would indicate a multicollinearity problem.
elsewhere, that the world would be better if more countries were like the respondent’s country, and that the respondent’s country is better than others.

**INSERT TABLE 3-3 HERE**

This factor analysis result and measure of nationalism is consistent with the results of past scholarship (Davidov 2009, de Figueiredo and Elkins 2003, Huddy and Khatib 2007) on measures of nationalism and public opinion toward immigrants in the ISSP modules. As with my national identity measure, I created an index of nationalism averaging these retained variables. See Table 3-4 for descriptive statistics for this and other variables in my analyses.

**INSERT TABLE 3-4 HERE**

The factor analysis results for national identity and nationalism were robust across the different modules for both years (see Table 3-2), which is consistent with past scholarship (Davidov 2009, di Figueiredo and Elkins 2003). Moreover, the factor analysis results in both years were also robust when I limited the samples to immigrant receiver countries only (as I do to test the economic threat hypothesis). In sum, the respondents’ scores on national identity throughout this paper indicate the degree to which the respondent adheres to these beliefs about the importance of national symbols and ideals. The respondents’ scores on nationalism indicate the degree to which the respondents agree with beliefs in the international superiority of their nation-states.

For my measure of cultural threat, absolute levels of migrants or immigrants were not theoretically attractive, since as I described in Chapter 2, the concept of a threat implies some perceived deleterious change in the relative population balance of power between natives and immigrants. An ideal indicator would measure a perceived
deleterious change in the numerical balance between the in-group and the out-group. Levels of immigration and migration are indicators of the size of the out-group, but immigration does not account for changes in the size of the in-group. Thus, to account for relative changes in the size of both native and foreign populations, I elected to use migration as my indicator of the population balance between the in-group and the out-group. Using migration data, to calculate whether cultural threat in any given period was relatively high or low, I created a measure of what I refer to as migration change ratio in my analyses. This measure compares the current migration level to the average migration level over the previous five years, which I calculated as follows:

\[
\text{Migration Change Ratio} = \frac{M_i}{(M_i + M_{i-1} + M_{i-2} + M_{i-3} + M_{i-4})/5}
\]

Since population change is typically relatively slow, I picked five years as a window of time to analyze recent change in the population balance of power between natives and immigrant. If this ratio is less than or equal to one, the number of net migrants in the current period is less than or equal to recent (over 5 years) levels, and therefore a cultural threat – a perceived deleterious change for the dominant group in the immigrant population – does not exist. However, if this measure is greater than one, the number of immigrants\textsuperscript{28} in the current period is high compared to average levels over the

\textsuperscript{28} This measure captures a perceived deleterious change in the quantity of immigrants. Yet, the quality – ethnicity, socioeconomic status, race, etc. – of the immigrants also matters in whether they are perceived by natives as a “foreigners”, and therefore, a cultural threat. For example, in my working paper on the subject of attitudes towards immigration in Europe (Potter 2007), I found the relationship between exclusionary national identity and prejudice toward “poor non-European” immigrants to be almost twice the magnitude of the relationship between exclusionary national identity and prejudice toward “rich European” immigrants. Unfortunately, measures of migration in each country by countries of origin of immigrants are
past five years, and therefore a cultural threat exists. Note that this indicator captures a perceived deleterious change in the relatively recent migration rate, which more closely aligns with the concept of threat than a static measure. In 1995, the mean for migration change was 0.92 with a standard deviation of 0.36. The range included in my analysis for migration change is between 0.18 and 1.55. In 2003, the mean for migration change was 0.93 with a standard deviation of 0.29. The range included in my analysis for migration change is 0.2 to 1.89. With the addition of migration change ratio data to the ISSP unavailable for a large comparative study such as this. Thus, this measure is not the best possible test of my cultural threat hypothesis. As I discuss in my conclusion, it would be interesting for future research to explore how the qualities of the immigrants influence the degree of anti-immigrant sentiment and radical right party success.

29 Slovenia was a significant outlier/influential point with a migration change ratio of -4 due to big fluctuations between positive and negative levels of migrants during the period of interest. Since it tripled the range of migration change ratio, the inclusion of Slovenia slightly diminishes the modifying effect of migration change. I examined the effect of Slovenia by estimating the models for cultural threat including a dummy for Slovenia, which did influence the effect of the interaction between cultural threat and national identity. The coefficient on Slovenia as a dummy variable was positive and statistically significant. In addition, AV Plots performed after the regression show that Slovenia is an influential cluster for both the coefficients on migration ratio and the interaction term of national identity and migration ratio. Therefore, this outlier was not included in the analysis.

30 The migration change ratio in Taiwan 2003 (7.5) constituted an outlier. Its inclusion increased the range of migration change by almost 400%. In this case, the high levels of migration rate were due to rare fluctuations between positive and negative rates of migration during the periods of interest in Taiwan. As with Slovenia in 1995, AV Plots show the Taiwan cluster to be highly influential on the coefficients of migration ratio, national identity, and the interaction term between these two. In addition, I did a test of the effect of Taiwan as a dummy in the models for cultural threat. The effect of the dummy variable for Taiwan was extremely high in magnitude and statistically significant. 95% of the observations are in countries that had migration change rates that fell between 0.18-1.89 due to standard fluctuations migration rates, so the outliers represent a minority of the data. I also had one country (Korea) that was extremely high on migration ratio (1.55, which is two standard deviations above the mean) due to the fact that out-migration (negative levels of migrants) were much less in 2003 than the average negative migrant level in the previous 5 years. In other words, this high ratio in the Korean case, unlike all other cases, was an indicator of reduced emigration rather than increased immigration. I made the decision that this situation of comparatively less out-migration was categorically different than my theoretical mechanism of a cultural threat. Including Korea in the analyses as a migration threat country does change the results of cultural threat models to be less substantively significant, so its elimination did provide more support for the hypotheses I was testing. However, I am comfortable that its deletion is consistent with my theory about what constitutes a “cultural threat,” so the models here test the mechanism I’m interested in.
dataset, the number of countries in 2003 is 30, and in 1995 is 20, or a total of 50 countries (see Table 3-1).³¹

To measure economic threat, I used unemployment change rates calculated using my data from the International Labor Organization statistics. A percent annual change in unemployment measure is consistent with the conventional wisdom in political science on economic voting – supported by both cross-sectional and panel studies (a recent review by Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2007 estimated about 400 such studies) – that how the economy is doing this year compared to the previous year significantly affects vote choice in modern democracies (Lewis-Beck et al. 2008). I took the difference between the annual unemployment rate and the previous year’s unemployment rate to measure the annual rate of change in unemployment (Uₜ – Uₜ₋₁), and then calculated the percent change in unemployment as follows:

\[
\text{Percent Change in Unemployment} = \left( \frac{U_t - U_{t-1}}{U_{t-1}} \right) \times 100
\]

I chose to use percent change since the same absolute change may be viewed differently

³¹ While this does reduce generalizability, with the exception of Slovenia 1995, the missing countries are where the radical right has absolutely no historical presence and are therefore substantively not the cases that inform the puzzle being examined here. Regarding the economic-cultural threat hypothesis using the pooled sample, when I ran my models using the full sample that included the outliers, it did not change the substantive results of the analyses. The directions on the coefficients were the same, although the magnitude of the three-way interaction term coefficient was lessened (which is not surprising given the range of migration change was increased six fold). Since the restricted samples used do exclude the one case from Africa (due to missing data) and the cases from East Asia (due to missing data and outliers), please note that the results discussed in this chapter are primarily based on Western Europe, Eastern Europe, the Americas, and Australasia. I will leave it to others or future work to determine whether such results are generalizable in regions where the radical right and immigrants more generally are not present (all the eliminated cases due to missing or outlier data were net immigrant sender/emigration countries).
depending on what the original rate was.\(^\text{32}\) For example, a one-point increase in unemployment would be viewed as a greater threat in a country with low unemployment, whereas a one-point change would be relatively smaller in a country with high unemployment. I used annual unemployment rates rather than quarterly or monthly rates so that the rates are adjusted for seasonal unemployment changes and patterns. Given my interest in economic threat, an annual decrease in percent unemployment or no change in unemployment would be a low threat context, whereas an increase in unemployment compared to the previous year would constitute a high threat scenario.\(^\text{33}\)

I included several demographic variables that are theoretically important for explaining both anti-immigrant attitudes and radical right ideology as controls in my analyses. Economic interest and insecurity arguments are well supported in the scholarships on anti-immigrant attitudes (Scheve and Slaughter 2001) and radical right voting (Chistofferson 2003, Mayer 2002). I expect skilled, educated workers to be less likely to hold either anti-immigrant attitudes or far right ideology. Education is considered a measure of human capital by economic interest explanations, and education is also a measure of a “liberalizing” effect rather than human capital alone. Education has a “liberalizing” effect because higher education is a process of socializing students to conform to elite norms, which in modern democracies largely embrace ideals of tolerance and freedom. Both hypotheses about the effect of education on anti-immigrant attitudes and far right ideology – the economic interest and the liberalizing hypotheses – expect

\(^{32}\) When I did all my analyses with absolute change rather than percentage change, the substantive results were the same for all of my models.

\(^{33}\) Among immigrant receiver countries, missing unemployment data only affected Slovenia in the 1995 module. Among the full sample, Venezuela was dropped due to missing data from the 2003 analyses. Venezuela is not an immigrant receiver country, so it is not part of the restricted immigrant receiver sample.
education to be negatively correlated with anti-immigrant attitudes and support for the radical right. I specify human capital and the “liberalizing” effect of education using (1) level of education, which is an ordered variable rescaled to range from 0 to 1. I specify skill level (another form of human capital) using (2) skilled occupation, which a dummy variable to represent that a respondent is a skilled worker. I specify economic insecurity using (3) unemployment, which is a dummy variable indicating the respondent is currently unemployed. I expect education level and skill level to be negatively associated with both anti-immigrant attitudes and far right ideology, while I expect the third variable – unemployment – to be positively associated with both anti-immigrant attitudes and far right ideology.

I also include a dummy variable for sex (1=female), to control for a variety of theories that suggest women are less likely to vote for radical right parties. As Norris (2005) has pointed out, gender consistently has a negative relationship with radical right voting in European countries. The causal mechanism for this relationship is disputed, but all explanations predict that fewer women will support the radical right. For the

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34 I used the coding scheme employed by Hainmueller and Hiscox, who generously provided me with their assistance on coding this variable (any mistakes in coding are my own). The coding scheme I borrow from Hainmueller and Hiscox follows O’Rourke and Sinnott (2001), who use the ISCO88 categories to create a dichotomous skill variable (1=ISCO88 category 3, 4, or 5; 0=ISCO88 category 1 or 2). The ISSP 2003 uses only ISCO88 categories. The ISSP 1995 does not have a consistent set of skill variables. Rather, it has ISCO68 codes, ISCO88 codes, as well as national categorizations. I coded the ISCO68 and national coding schemes to match the categorizations of the ISCO88. I would be happy to provide coding to anyone interested.

35 In his work on attitudes towards immigration in France, Germany and the United States, Fetzer (2000a, 2000b) argues that experiencing “marginality or oppression oneself creates sympathy for other marginalized or oppressed groups, even if they do not belong to one’s own group” (Fetzer 2000a, p. 7). Fetzer contends that members of such marginalized groups, such as women, should be more favorable toward immigrants out of sympathy. However, others have pointed out that most survey data finds little difference between men and women in terms of nativist attitudes (Mudde 2007, Coenders et al 2004), suggesting that innate caring for marginalized groups is not what explains the gender gap in radical right voting. Others (Wilcox et al. 2003) suggest that women do not vote for populist radical right parties because their ideology of traditional family is antifeminist. This argument assumes that women hold more progressive views on gender relations. Lastly, others (e.g. Mudde 2007) support a theory of political
purposes of my study, I control for these alternative explanations for radical right support by controlling for sex, which I expect to be negatively related with far right ideology.

3.2.3 Measures – Dependent Variables

The first dependent variable is anti-immigrant attitudes. The ISSP modules have a rich set of variables that measure attitudes toward immigrants, including generalized attitudes about immigration level, attitudes about cultural impact of immigrants, attitudes about economic impact of immigrants, attitudes about immigrants and crime, and attitudes about immigrant rights. Following the approach of other scholars (Sniderman et al. 2000, Carter and Perez 2008), I create a measure of hostility toward immigrants that operationalizes a consistent tendency to denigrate immigrants. Given this operationalization, the measure will allow me to analyze respondents who are hostile to immigrants systematically, not those who oppose immigration policy or immigrants for more particularistic reasons. This fits best with my concept of anti-immigrant attitudes.

The variables included in the index of anti-immigrant attitudes are: 1) agree/disagree immigrants should be permitted to own land, 2) agree/disagree immigrants benefit society with new ideas and culture, 3) agree/disagree immigrants are good for the economy, 4) agree/disagree immigrants take jobs from natives, 5) immigration should be increased/reduced and 6) agree/disagree that immigrants increase crime. This measure includes several theoretically important types of hostility toward immigrants, including hostility toward immigrant rights, toward “foreign” culture, toward immigrants’ economic impact, and fear of immigrant crime. I constructed a summated scale index of efficacy, which argues that due to lower political interest and perceived efficacy of women, they are more likely to vote for established parties than new parties, such as the radical right. The causal mechanisms differ between these theories, but they all predict a negative relationship between female sex and radical right support.
anti-immigrant attitudes that averages these variables in both years. An increase in the index is an increase in hostile attitudes toward immigrants. The measures have good levels reliability ($\alpha=0.70$ in ISSP 1995 and $\alpha=0.68$ in ISSP 2003).\textsuperscript{36} In the 1995 ISSP module, the mean level of anti-immigrant attitudes is 3.33 with a standard deviation of 0.73. In the 2003 module, the mean level of anti-immigrant attitudes is 3.27 with standard deviation of 0.70.\textsuperscript{37}

The second dependent variable is far right ideology. As stated earlier, this measure is the standard measure used in scholarship on the radical right and is measured as self-placement at the farthest right pole of the left-right ideology scale. Using the 5-point ideology scale in the ISSP modules, I recoded those that placed themselves as a five, or what is labeled as “far right” in the question wording, as those with radical right ideology. All others who placed themselves elsewhere on the ideology scale were codes as non-radical right. According to this measure, which is standard in the scholarship, far right is categorically different from other ideologies, including moderate/mainstream right. This is a dichotomous measure coded as one for radical right ideology and zero for all others. The mean level of radical right ideology in 1995 is 0.02 and the mean in 2003 is 0.04. In other words, ideological identification as “far right” is quite rare in both years.

\textsuperscript{36} I also conducted a principal factor analysis of all anti-immigrant attitude questions in both modules, which included eight questions in the 1995 module and ten questions in the 2003 module. In both cases, only one factor was retained with an eigenvalue of greater than 1.0. In 1995, the six measures included in my measure were retained at a factor loading of greater than 0.50. In 2003, the factor retained five of the six questions used in my measure at a factor loading of greater than 0.50. The one question that did not load onto the factor at this level was agree/disagree that immigrants take jobs from natives; its factor loading was 0.40. I retained all six questions in both years to enhance comparability, and reliability levels (see above) indicate that these measures are highly reliable.

\textsuperscript{37} Note that there is no base-level increase in anti-immigrant attitudes between 1995 and 2003. Some have suggested that 1995 and 2003 cannot be compared due to events that took place between the two time points, such as the terrorist attacks in New York and Madrid and attempts by Turkey to enter the European Union, which some expect would increase levels of anti-immigrant sentiment. However, the mean levels of both anti-immigrant sentiment and exclusionary national identity are virtually the same in the 1995 and 2003 samples.
3.3 **Statistical Model**

In my analyses of anti-immigrant attitudes, I use linear-interactive OLS models with clustered standard errors to correct for country-level effects and adjust for heteroskedasticity. For my analyses of radical right ideology (a dichotomous variable), I use a probit interactive model with clustered standard errors. These methods are as simple and accurate as possible given my data parameters. According to Franzese (2005), two-step, separate-subsample estimation (such as HLM) is not more practical or effective given my dataset dimensions. When analyzing interactions between individual level data and contextual level data using datasets that are large (hundreds to thousands of observations) with independently randomized surveys of individuals pooled across a few countries, such as the ISSP modules, pooled-interaction with clustered-heteroskedasticity strategies are suitable (Franzese 2005). I adjust for country-level effects using a clustered-heteroskedasticity strategy, and all standard errors in my analyses below reflect these adjustments. As Franzese (2005) states, “if researchers aim to estimate the effects of micro- and macro-level factors and their interactions (…) little argument has yet arisen against estimating pooled OLS models specified to reflect those interactive propositions. OLS offers unbiased and consistent, although inefficient, coefficient estimates.” This is precisely the type of model that I would like to test, my sample degrees of freedom are favorable, and clustered standard errors increase the efficiency of my coefficient estimates.

3.4 **Cultural Threat Hypothesis Analyses**

3.4.1 **Anti-Immigrant Attitudes**

In order to test my cultural threat hypothesis that the relationship between exclusionary national identity and anti-immigrant attitudes will be primed by cultural
threats, I ran an interactive model in each ISSP module. Model 3-1 tests the cultural threat hypothesis.

Model 3-1: Anti-Immigrant Attitudes = $\beta_0 + \beta_1$National Identity + $\beta_2$Migration Change + $\beta_3$National Identity x Migration Change + $\beta_4$Controls + $\varepsilon$

The individual coefficients in my results tables (see Table 3-5) do not assess the marginal effect and statistical significance of exclusionary national identity according to these models.

INSERT TABLE 3-5 HERE

Rather, the marginal effect of exclusionary national identity for Model 1 is calculated according to Equation 3-1:

Equation 3-1: Marginal Effect of National Identity = $\beta_1 + \beta_3$Migration Change

In other words, the coefficient on exclusionary national identity ($\beta_1$) by itself only tells us what the marginal effect of exclusionary national identity is when migration change is equal to zero, which is never the case in the samples. Similarly, it is not possible to determine whether this marginal effect is statistically significant without access to the variance-covariance matrix. The standard error of the marginal effect of exclusionary national identity for Model 3-1 is represented by Equation 3-2:

Equation 3-2: Standard Error of Marginal Effect of Exclusionary national identity:

$$\sigma_{\hat{Y}_{\text{Model 3-1}}(\hat{\beta}_1 + \hat{\beta}_3 \cdot \text{Migration Change})} = \sqrt{\text{var}(\hat{\beta}_1) + \text{var}(\hat{\beta}_3) + \text{cov}(\hat{\beta}_1, \hat{\beta}_3) \cdot \text{cov}(\text{Migration Change})}$$
The same is true for the calculations of the marginal effects and standard errors for all of
the interactive models discussed in this paper (Brambor et al. 2005). Therefore, just
looking at the standard errors in the results tables is of limited usefulness for interpreting
my results.

As stated above, I hypothesize that exclusionary national identity predispositions
will be activated by a cultural threat to those identities; exclusionary national identity’s
relationship with anti-immigrant attitudes should be significant – substantively and
statistically speaking – only in a context of cultural threat.38 The results for my models
accounting for cultural threat are shown in Table 3-5. As suggested by Equation 3-1, the
individual coefficients in Table 3-5 cannot illustrate the interaction between individual
identity predispositions and migration or migration change. Moreover, as shown in
Equation 3-2, the statistical significance of the marginal effect of exclusionary national
identity cannot be assessed by looking only at the standard errors on the individual
coefficients ($\beta_1$ and $\beta_3$). Therefore, I have created figures that illustrate the calculations
for the marginal effects of exclusionary national identity across the range of migration
change rates observed in the datasets for each of my models.

Figure 3-1 shows the marginal effect of a one-unit change in exclusionary
national identity on anti-immigrant attitudes conditioned on cultural threat in the 1995

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38 My measure of cultural threat indicates a comparative boost in migration levels. While such increases in
the levels of migrants typically occur in immigrant receiver countries, this is not necessarily the case.
Therefore, I also did my analyses in the restricted samples of immigrant receivers to see if there were
substantive differences. What I found was that in the immigrant receiver countries, my results for my
models of radical right ideology were virtually identical with respect to the relationship between national
identity, cultural threat, and radical right ideology. In the case of anti-immigrant attitudes, in immigrant
receivers the magnitude modifying effect of cultural threat was slightly higher in 1995 and slightly
diminished in 2003. These results suggest that the relationship between national identity, cultural threat,
and both anti-immigrant attitudes and radical right ideology are robust regardless of whether a country has
historically been an immigrant receiver.
sample and Figure 3-2 shows the marginal effect of exclusionary national identity conditioned on cultural threat in the 2003 sample.

These figures show substantively very different stories. In 1995, the modifying effect of cultural threat is substantively insignificant. The effect of exclusionary national identity on anti-immigrant attitudes is only 2% higher at 0.41 when at high migration change (one standard deviation above the mean) compared to low migration change (one standard deviation below the mean), where the marginal effect is 0.40. In other words, exclusionary national identity has a relatively stable and statistically significant positive relationship with anti-immigrant attitudes, regardless of cultural threat. Cultural threat has no modifying effect. These results are not consistent with the cultural threat hypothesis.

Figure 3-2 shows that in 2003, the modifying effect of cultural threat is substantial, such that there is no statistically significant relationship between exclusionary national identity and anti-immigrant attitudes when cultural threat is very low, but this relationship is strong and statistically significant at relatively as cultural threat increases. The marginal effect of exclusionary national identity on anti-immigrant attitudes at a relatively high level of migration change (one standard deviation above the mean) is 52% larger than the effect at a relatively low level of migration change (one standard deviation below the mean). Substantively speaking, the effect of exclusionary national identity is 0.31 and statistically significant at a high level of migration change. On the other hand, the effect of exclusionary identity is 0.21 and at a relatively low level of migration change. These results are consistent with the cultural threat hypothesis. Note that there is
a significant discrepancy in support for the cultural threat hypothesis in the two years of
the survey, which I discuss in section 3.4.3 below.

3.4.2 Radical Right Ideology

In this section, I discuss tests of the cultural threat hypothesis for models of radical right ideology. The probit models for radical right ideology tested throughout this paper and the marginal effect of exclusionary national identity conditioned on the environmental threat variables – cultural threat and economic threat – are represented by Model 3-2 and Equation 3-3 below:

Model 3-2: Radical Right Ideology = \( \lambda_0 + \lambda_1 \text{National Identity} + \lambda_2 \text{Environmental Threat} + \lambda_3 \text{National Identity} \times \text{Environmental Threat} + \lambda_4 \text{Controls} + \varepsilon \)

Equation 3-3: Marginal Effect of National Identity = \( \lambda_1 + \lambda_3 \text{Environmental Threat} \)

The models discussed below for radical right ideology are probit models, so I must use the coefficients to calculate the predicted probabilities and the change in predicted probabilities conditioned on exclusionary national identity and each environmental variable. I discuss both marginal effects and predicted probabilities below for each model of radical right ideology. Figures 3-3 and 3-4 illustrate the marginal effects of exclusionary national identity on radical right ideology show whether the effect of exclusionary national identity is conditioned on migration change.

INSERT FIGURES 3-3 AND 3-4 HERE

Figure 3-3 shows the marginal effect of a change from the mean level of exclusionary national identity to one standard deviation above the mean of exclusionary national identity (a change of 0.6 units of exclusionary national identity) on radical right
ideology conditioned on cultural threat in 1995. Figure 3-3 shows that the effect of
exclusionary national identity is positive and statistically significant, and is relatively
stable as cultural threat increases. To calculate predicted probabilities, I calculated the
probabilities at mean levels of economic threat, age, nationalism and education for
unskilled, employed men. At the mean level of migration change (0.9), a change from
one standard deviation below the mean for exclusionary national identity to one standard
deviation above the mean for exclusionary national identity increases the probability of
having radical right ideology from 0.00 to 0.04, or an increase of 166%. At one standard
deviation above the mean for migration change (1.4), the same shift increases the
probability of having radical right ideology from 0.02 to 0.05, or an increase of 134%. In
other words, the marginal effect of exclusionary national identity on the probability of
having radical right ideology is lower at higher levels of cultural threat. This difference is
not statistically significant. As with the anti-immigrant attitudes model in the 1995
sample, these results do not support the cultural threat hypothesis.

Figure 3-4 shows the marginal effect of a change from the mean level of
exclusionary national identity to one standard deviation above the mean of exclusionary
national identity (a change of 0.6 units of exclusionary national identity) on radical right
ideology conditioned on cultural threat in 2003. As with anti-immigrant attitudes in 2003,
the effect of exclusionary national identity changes from statistically not significantly
different from zero for countries that have relatively low levels of cultural threat to
positive and statistically significant as cultural threat increases. To calculate predicted
probabilities, I calculated the probabilities at mean levels of economic threat, age,
nationalism and education for unskilled, employed men. At mean levels of migration
change in this sample (0.92), a shift from a standard deviation below the mean for exclusionary national identity to a standard deviation above the mean for exclusionary national identity increases the probability from 0.02 to 0.06 of having radical right ideology, or an increase of 149%. At one standard deviation above the mean for migration change (1.2), the same change in exclusionary national identity increases the probability of having radical right ideology from 0.03 to 0.09, or an increase of 191%. These results are consistent with the cultural threat hypothesis.

3.4.3 Discussion of Cultural Threat Hypothesis

These results taken together indicate that there is mixed support for the cultural threat hypothesis. The substantive modifying effect of cultural threat on both anti-immigrant attitudes and radical right ideology differs greatly between the two samples. In the 1995 sample, the effects of cultural threats on anti-immigrant attitudes and radical right ideology are non-existent. On the other hand, the modifying effect of cultural threat is substantively and statistically significant in the 2003 sample. Taken together, it is unclear how much cultural threat alone matters in priming the relationship between exclusionary national identity and anti-immigrant attitudes. The 2003 results indicate that this relationship between exclusionary national identity and anti-immigrant attitudes is primed by cultural threats, but the 1995 results indicate that exclusionary national identity has a relatively stable, positive relationship with anti-immigrant attitudes regardless of the existence of cultural threats. These results are consistent with past scholarship that sometimes finds migration matters, and others not. Thus, it seems clear that the cultural threat hypothesis is inadequate for explaining the relationships between exclusionary national identity and both anti-immigrant attitudes and radical right ideology.
3.5 Economic Threat Hypothesis Analyses

3.5.1 Anti-Immigrant Attitudes

Next, I test the economic threat hypothesis with respect to anti-immigrant attitudes. The model that I will test is:

Model 3-3: Anti-Immigrant Attitudes = \( \hat{\beta}_0 + \hat{\beta}_1 \text{National Identity} + \hat{\beta}_2 \text{Annual Change in Unemployment} + \hat{\beta}_3 \text{National Identity} \times \text{Annual Change in Unemployment} + \hat{\beta}_4 \text{Controls} + \epsilon \)

The results for this model can be found in Table 3-6 for immigrant senders and receivers and Table 3-7 for the restricted samples of receivers only.

As I discussed in Chapter 2, as trade attitudes and protectionist behaviors are different in importing and exporting countries, the economic threat hypothesis predicts immigration attitudes in times of economic downturn will be different in immigrant sender and receiver countries. In immigrant receiver countries, economic threats should make national identity salient in forming attitudes towards immigrants. In immigrant sender countries, native minority groups will be scapegoats during times of economic threat. The marginal effect and standard error of the effect of exclusionary national identity are calculated according to the formulas given in Equations 3-1 and 3-2 (substituting unemployment change for migration change). I first will test Model 3-3 using the full sample in both years, where I predict that there will be no effect of economic threat, since the economic threat hypothesis proposes that this threat should only prime the relationship between exclusionary national identity and anti-immigrant attitudes in immigrant receiver countries. I will then test Model 3-3 using the restricted samples of immigrant receiver countries.
Figure 3-5 shows the marginal effect of exclusionary national identity on anti-immigrant attitudes conditioned on economic threat in 1995 in both immigrant receivers and senders, while Figure 3-6 shows the marginal effect of exclusionary national identity conditioned on economic threat in 2003 in both immigrant receivers and senders.

Figure 3-5 suggests that the conditional effect of economic threat on exclusionary national identity is substantively and statistically significant, but in the opposite direction than we would expect according to the economic threat hypothesis. As unemployment change increases, the relationship between exclusionary national identity and anti-immigrant attitudes decreases. In 1995, the effect of exclusionary national identity at one standard deviation above the mean level of unemployment change is 25% lower than the effect at one standard deviation below the mean of unemployment change. The effect of exclusionary national identity is 0.34 at high levels of unemployment change, compared to 0.45 at low levels of unemployment change.

On the other hand, the conditional effect of economic threat is substantively and statistically significant in 2003. In 2003 (Figure 3-6), as unemployment change increases, the statistical and substantive relationship between exclusionary national identity and anti-immigrant attitudes increases. In this sample, the effect of exclusionary national identity at one standard deviation above the mean level of unemployment change is 42% higher than the effect at one standard deviation below the mean of unemployment change. The effect of exclusionary national identity is 0.29 at high levels of unemployment change, compared to 0.20 at low levels of unemployment change.
Figure 3-7 shows the marginal effect of exclusionary national identity on anti-immigrant attitudes conditioned on economic threat in immigrant receiver countries in 1995, while Figure 3-8 shows the marginal effect of exclusionary national identity conditioned on economic threat in immigrant receiver countries in 2003 (also see Table 3-7).

INSERT FIGURES 3-7 AND 3-8 HERE

The conditional effect of economic threat is negative, but substantively insignificant, in 1995, while it is positive and substantively insignificant in 2003. In other words, substantively, the modifying effect is not significant in either year in the immigrant receiver country samples. In 1995, the effect is -15% higher at levels of relatively high unemployment change compared to low unemployment change. In 2003, the effect is 16% higher at levels of high compared to low unemployment change.

Taken together, the results for these models provide little support for the economic threat hypothesis. The results for the economic threat models indicate that economic threat does not prime the relationship between exclusionary national identity and anti-immigrant attitudes in immigrant receiver countries; the modifying effect is substantively insignificant. The results in senders and receivers are mixed. The results for the 1995 sample of receivers and senders show a negative modifying effect of economic threat, which is inconsistent with the economic threat hypothesis. On the other hand, in the 2003 sample, economic threat does matter substantively as a positive modifying variable. This is not consistent with the economic threat hypothesis, since it predicts we should only see such a result in immigrant receiver countries, where the results in 2003 show a weak modifying relationship if any. In sum, these analyses provide little support
for the economic threat hypothesis, and are consistent with past scholarship that finds mixed support for the effect of economic threat on demand for the radical right.

### 3.5.2 Radical Right Ideology

Next, I discuss my test of the economic threat hypothesis on the relationship between exclusionary national identity and radical right ideology (see Tables 3-6 and 3-7). Figure 3-9 shows the marginal effect of a change from the mean level of exclusionary national identity to one standard deviation above the mean of exclusionary national identity (a change of 0.6 units of exclusionary national identity) on radical right ideology conditioned on economic threat in 1995 in both immigrant receivers and senders.

**INSERT FIGURE 3-9 HERE**

Here, the effect of exclusionary national identity changes from not statistically significant for countries that have decreasing levels of unemployment to be to positive and statistically significant as change in unemployment increases and becomes positive. To calculate predicted probabilities, I calculated the probabilities at mean levels of cultural threat, age and education for unskilled, employed men. At mean levels of unemployment change (-3.4%), a shift from one standard deviation below the mean for exclusionary national identity to one standard deviation above the mean for exclusionary national identity increases the probability of having radical right ideology changes from 0.01 to 0.04. At one standard deviation above the mean for unemployment change (7.6%), the same shift increases the probability of having radical right ideology from 0.03 to 0.07.

Figure 3-10 shows the marginal effect of a change from the mean level of exclusionary national identity to one standard deviation above the mean of exclusionary national identity (a change of 0.6 units of exclusionary national identity) on radical right
ideology conditioned on economic threat in 2003 in both immigrant senders and receivers.

**INSERT FIGURE 3-10 HERE**

Here again, the effect of exclusionary national identity changes from statistically and substantively not significantly different from zero for countries that have decreasing levels of unemployment to be to positive and statistically significant as change in unemployment increases. To calculate predicted probabilities, I calculated the probabilities at mean levels of cultural threat, age, nationalism and education for unskilled, employed men. At mean levels of unemployment change (2%), a shift from one standard deviation below the mean for exclusionary national identity to one standard deviation above the mean for exclusionary national identity increases the probability of having radical right ideology from 0.02 to 0.06, or a 151% increase. At one standard deviation above the mean for unemployment change (13%), the same shift increases the probability of having radical right ideology from 0.02 to 0.07, or a 211% increase.

Figure 3-11 shows the marginal effect of a change from the mean level of exclusionary national identity to one standard deviation above the mean of exclusionary national identity (a change of 0.6 units of exclusionary national identity) on radical right ideology conditioned on annual unemployment change in 1995 in receiver countries only.

**INSERT FIGURE 3-11 HERE**

As Figure 3-11 shows, the effect of national identity is substantively very low at low levels of change in unemployment, and becomes positive and substantively significant at high levels of change in unemployment. To calculate predicted probabilities, I calculated the probabilities at mean levels of cultural threat, age, nationalism and education for
unskilled, employed men. At mean levels of unemployment change (-3%), a shift from one standard deviation below the mean for exclusionary national identity to one standard deviation above the mean for exclusionary national identity increases the probability of having radical right ideology from 0.01 to 0.03, which is a 144% increase. At one standard deviation above the mean for unemployment change (7%), the same shift increases the probability of having radical right ideology from 0.03 to 0.07, which is a 166% increase.

Figure 3-12 shows the marginal effect of a change from the mean level of exclusionary national identity to one standard deviation above the mean of exclusionary national identity (a change of 0.6 units of exclusionary national identity) on radical right ideology conditioned on annual unemployment change in 2003 in receiver countries only. Here, the effect of exclusionary national identity is statistically significant at all levels of economic threat, but becomes substantively larger as change in unemployment increases. To calculate predicted probabilities, I calculated the probabilities at mean levels of cultural threat, age, nationalism and education for unskilled, employed men. At mean levels of unemployment change (6%), a shift from one standard deviation below the mean for exclusionary national identity to one standard deviation above the mean for exclusionary national identity increases the probability of having radical right ideology from 0.02 to 0.06, or a 164% increase in probability. At one standard deviation above the mean for unemployment change (17%), the same shift increases the probability of having radical right ideology from 0.02 to 0.07, which is a 230% increase in probability. This is a very modest modifying effect.
3.5.3 Discussion of Economic Threat Hypothesis

Taken together, what do these results suggest about the economic threat hypothesis for explaining the relationship between exclusionary national identity and both anti-immigrant attitudes and radical right ideology? In the case of anti-immigrant attitudes, I found little support for the economic threat hypothesis. The tests of the hypothesis in immigrant receiver countries were inconsistent with regards to whether the effect was positive or negative, and substantively speaking was insignificant in both years. In senders and receivers, the results were similarly inconsistent. With regards to the economic threat hypothesis and radical right ideology, the results are more consistent with the economic threat hypothesis. In the sender and receiver samples, at low levels of economic threat, the modifying effect of unemployment change was statistically and substantively zero. As economic threat increases, the modifying effect became statistically and substantively positive. When the samples are restricted to immigrant receiver countries only, the results are relatively consistent. In immigrant receiver countries, the relationship between exclusionary national identity and radical right ideology is primed by economic threat. The relationship changes from a substantively weak and barely statistically significant relationship between exclusionary national identity and radical right ideology at low levels of economic threat to a substantive and statistically significant relationship at high levels of economic threat.

The support for the economic threat hypothesis is stronger in the case of radical right ideology than it is for anti-immigrant attitudes. Those with exclusionary national identity do appear to be more likely to adhere to radical right ideology under conditions of economic threat. However, this is not the case with regards to anti-immigrant attitudes. These results are consistent with past scholarship that comes to mixed conclusions about
the role that economic threat plays in modifying the relationship between exclusionary national identity and radical right attitudes.

3.6 Economic-Cultural Threat Interaction Hypothesis Analyses

Lastly, I will test the economic-cultural threat interaction hypothesis, represented by Model 3-4.

Model 3-4: Anti-Immigrant Attitudes = µ₀ + µ₁National Identity (N) + µ₂Economic Threat (E) + µ₃Cultural Threat (C) + µ₄NE + µ₅NC + µ₆EC + µ₇NEC + µ₈Controls + ε

Unlike in the previous models, this model has a three-way interaction rather than a two-way interaction. This means that the effect of exclusionary national identity is calculated according to Equation 3-4, and the standard error is calculated according to Equation 3-5.

Equation 3-4: Marginal Effect of National Identity = µ₁ + µ₄E + µ₅C + µ₇EC

Equation 3-5: Standard Error of Marginal Effect of National Identity =

As with a two-way interaction model, the statistical significance of the marginal effect of national identity must be calculated according to the formula in equation 3-5, meaning simply looking at the significance of individual coefficients cannot illustrate at what level the marginal effect of the interaction is statistically significant. The coefficient on exclusionary national identity alone (µ₁) can only tell us the effect of exclusionary national identity when economic and cultural threats are both zero, which is never the
case in the samples. Table 3-8 records the results of the models, but since the individual coefficients alone convey limited information, the figures are more helpful in illustrating the marginal effect calculations and standard errors.

**INSERT TABLE 3-8 HERE**

In deciding the best way to test the threat interaction hypothesis, I looked again at my data from ISSP 1995 and 2003. My hypothesis is that the interaction of high economic and cultural threats will prime the relationship between exclusionary national identity and both anti-immigrant attitudes and radical right ideology. When I checked the distributions of my context variables in the two datasets, I found that there are zero incidents of both high (as measured by one standard deviation above the mean or greater) economic and cultural threat in the 1995 dataset. In other words, in the 1995 sample, there are countries with high cultural threat and low economic threat, countries with high economic threat and low cultural threat, and countries that are low on both cultural and economic threat, but there are not countries that are high on both cultural and economic threat. Therefore, I would be unable to test the economic-cultural threat interaction hypothesis using the 1995 dataset alone. The 1995 dataset did have a distribution of countries in other theoretically interesting categories, particularly low economic and low cultural threat cases that were rare in the 2003 dataset. Therefore, rather than throwing away the data from 1995, I pooled the two datasets into one and tested the hypothesis on the pooled dataset. Therefore, the analyses below are based on the pooled ISSP dataset.

### 3.6.1 Anti-Immigrant Attitudes

Figure 3-13 illustrates the test of Model 3-4 with respect to anti-immigrant

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39 Not surprisingly, I ran the 3-way interaction models in both years, and found support for the hypothesis in 2003 but not in 1995. This was unsurprising given that there were no countries in 1995 that were simultaneously threatened both economically and culturally.
attitudes.

The figure shows the marginal effect of exclusionary national identity across the complete range of cultural threat on the x-axis, and each line represents the marginal effect of exclusionary national identity conditioned on cultural threat at different levels of economic threat. The mean level of economic threat – as measured by percent change in unemployment – is zero, with a standard deviation of eleven, so the five lines represent the marginal effect of exclusionary national identity at the mean, one standard deviation above and below the mean (11% and -11% respectively), and two standard deviations above and below the mean (22% and -22% respectively). At two standard deviations below the mean, the effect is not statistically significant at low levels of cultural threat. At one standard deviation below the mean, the effect is significant at all levels, but the substantive effect of exclusionary national identity is steady across all levels of cultural threat. In other words, at one standard deviation below the mean for economic threat, the effect of national identity is stable and not substantively modified by cultural threat. At the mean level of economic threat, the effect of exclusionary national identity increases as cultural threat increases, and is a significant effect across the ranges of cultural threat. At one and two standard deviations above the mean level of unemployment change, the slope of the marginal effect of exclusionary national identity on anti-immigrant attitudes increases as cultural threat increases. In other words, an economic threat combined with increasing cultural threat is also associated with an increase the relationship between exclusionary national identity and anti-immigrant attitudes. In terms of the marginal effect of exclusionary national identity, which is calculated according to equation 3-4, the
effect of exclusionary national identity at the mean levels of economic and cultural threat is 0.33, while the effect is 0.37 at one standard deviation above the means for migration and unemployment change. This is a 13% increase in the effect of exclusionary national identity on anti-immigrant attitudes. This result is a modest increase in the effect of national identity. This is consistent with the economic-cultural threat interaction hypothesis that at low levels of both economic and cultural threat, exclusionary national identity will have a negligible effect on anti-immigrant attitudes, while at high levels of both cultural and economic threat, the relationship between exclusionary national identity and anti-immigrant attitudes will be primed by this context of threat.

3.6.2 Radical Right Ideology

Next, I test the economic-cultural threat interaction hypothesis with respect to radical right ideology. As in previous sections, I tested this relationship using a probit model, since my dependent variable is a dichotomous one. The results of the model are illustrated by Figures 3-14 to 3-16 and recorded in Table 3-8.

INSERT FIGURES 3-14, 3-15 AND 3-16 HERE

Figure 3-14 shows the marginal effect of exclusionary national identity across the range of cultural threat at a low level of economic threat (one standard deviation below the mean, or -11%). Figure 3-15 shows the marginal effect of exclusionary national identity across the range of cultural threat at mean level of economic threat (0% change in unemployment). Figure 3-16 shows the marginal effect of exclusionary national identity across the range cultural threat at one standard deviation above the mean of economic threat (11% increase in unemployment).

First, Figure 3-14 shows that at low levels of cultural and economic threat, the
effect of exclusionary national identity on radical right is not statistically significant. As migration change increases to around one (which is equivalent to no change in migration) while economic threat is low, the effect of exclusionary national identity on probability of having radical right ideology is weakly positive and statistically significant, but again becomes statistically insignificant at high levels of change in migration. In terms of predicted probabilities, the probability at one standard deviation below the means for migration change (0.6) and economic threat (-11%), the probability of having radical right ideology is 0.025, while at one standard deviation above the mean for migration change (1.2) and low economic threat, the probability of having radical right ideology is 0.023. This is a decrease in probability of -10%. Substantively speaking, these are very low probabilities, and the effect is only statistically significant at average levels of change in migration.

Second, Figure 3-15 shows the marginal effect of exclusionary national identity at mean economic threat across the range of cultural threat. At low levels of cultural threat, the effect of exclusionary national identity on radical right is substantively extremely low and barely statistically significant. As cultural threat increases while unemployment change is at its mean, the effect of exclusionary national identity on probability of having radical right ideology increases to be positive and statistically significant. In terms of predicted probabilities, the probability at one standard deviation below the mean for migration change (0.6) and mean unemployment change (0%), the probability of having radical right ideology is 0.02, while at one standard deviation above the mean for migration change (1.2) and mean unemployment change, the probability of having radical right ideology is 0.042. This is an increase in probability of 51%.

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Third, Figure 3-16 shows the marginal effect of exclusionary national identity when economic threat is high across the range of cultural threat. At low levels of cultural threat and high economic threat, the effect of exclusionary national identity on radical right is substantively and statistically not significant. As migration change increases to around one (which indicates no change in migration) while unemployment change is high, the effect of exclusionary national identity on probability of having radical right ideology becomes positive and statistically significant. In terms of predicted probabilities, the probability at one standard deviation below the mean for migration change (0.6) and high economic threat (11%), the probability of having radical right ideology is 0.03, while at one standard deviation above the mean for migration change (1.2) and high economic threat, the probability of having radical right ideology is 0.073. This is an increase in probability of 138%. Note that substantively speaking, this is almost double the probability of having radical right ideology at high cultural threat and mean level of unemployment change.

Taken together, the results illustrated by Figures 3-14 to 3-16 indicate that there is support for the economic-cultural threat hypothesis with regards to the relationship between exclusionary national identity and radical right ideology. At low levels of economic and cultural threat, there is no substantive or statistically significant relationship between exclusionary national identity and radical right ideology. At high levels of both economic and cultural threat, there is a substantive and statistically significant relationship between exclusionary national identity and radical right ideology.

### 3.6.3 Within Country Analyses

In both the cases of anti-immigrant attitudes and radical right ideology, the pooled
sample tests found support for the economic-cultural threat interaction hypothesis. To further test the implications of this hypothesis, I explore whether these pooled results are consistent with the within country dynamics. I broke down the sample of countries into a matrix according to their threat variable levels (economic threat and cultural threat) in order to select ideal cases to test the hypothesis within the countries. I would expect that there would be either zero relationship or a very weak relationship between exclusionary national identity on the one hand and anti-immigrant attitudes or radical right ideology on the other in countries that fall within the ranges of both low cultural and low economic change. Similarly, I would expect that there would be a strong and significant relationship between exclusionary national identity and both anti-immigrant attitudes and radical right ideology in countries with high cultural and economic threat values. Table 3-9 shows where countries are categorized in ideal categories given their levels of economic and cultural change.

INSERT TABLE 3-9 HERE

In order to assess the economic-cultural threat interaction hypothesis within countries, first, in each country I used a non-interactive OLS model to test the relationship between exclusionary national identity and anti-immigrant attitudes controlling for the same variables that I controlled for in previous models (see Table 3-10).

INSERT TABLE 3-10 HERE

These within country tests illustrated in Table 3-10 show that the relationship between exclusionary national identity and anti-immigrant attitudes in low economic and low cultural change countries is statistically significant in Canada 1995 and Norway 1995, but
not in Spain 1995. In Spain 1995, the relationship was negative and statistically insignificant. In the high economic and cultural threat countries, the relationship between exclusionary national identity and anti-immigrant attitudes was statistically significant and positive in all three cases of France 2003, Denmark 2003, and Switzerland 2003. In terms of magnitude of the effects, the magnitude is substantially higher in France 2003 and Denmark 2003, which are the most ideal cases for simultaneously “high” cultural and economic threat. These results only support part of the economic-cultural threat hypothesis. While these within country results do suggest that it is the case that in high economic and cultural threat countries the relationship between exclusionary national identity and anti-immigrant attitudes is always strong and significant, it is not the case that there is never a relationship between exclusionary national identity and anti-immigrant attitudes in the low threat condition. In some of the cases of low threat countries, there was still a statistically significant and positive relationship between exclusionary national identity and anti-immigrant attitudes, although the magnitude of the relationship was lower than in the ideal high threat countries.

Second, I used a non-interactive probit model to test the relationship between exclusionary national identity and radical right ideology in these countries. In testing the model in the low economic and cultural threat countries – Norway 1995, Spain 1995 and Canada 1995 – the outcome variable did not vary from zero. In other words, in all of these countries, not a single respondent identified themselves as “far right” on the ideology scale. This suggests that very few individuals in such countries identify as radical right, which is what we would expect given the economic-cultural threat interaction hypothesis, but this complete lack of variation does not allow me to test my
hypothesis in these ideal low cultural threat/low economic threat countries. Therefore, I selected several countries that were less ideal cases in that they are only low on one of the threat variables and average on the other – Bulgaria 1995, Australia 2003, and Germany 1995. See Table 3-11 for the results of these within country probit model results.

INSERT TABLE 3-11 HERE

Bulgaria 1995 is low on economic threat and average on cultural threat. In this case, the coefficient on exclusionary national identity in the probit model was not statistically significant, suggesting that it has no relationship with radical right ideology. Similarly, Australia 2003 is low on economic threat and average on cultural threat. In Australia 2003, exclusionary national identity is not statistically significantly related to radical right ideology. Finally, I tested the relationship in Germany 1995, which is average on economic threat and low on cultural threat. In this case, the relationship between exclusionary national identity and radical right ideology again was not statistically or substantively significant. These results provide strong support for the economic-cultural threat interaction hypothesis, which suggested that there should be no relationship between exclusionary national identity and radical right ideology in the absence of simultaneous economic and cultural threats.

In the cases of the countries that were high on both economic and cultural threat, I ran probit models of the relationship between radical right ideology and exclusionary national identity. As is shown in Table 3-11, in every case of high economic-cultural threat, the coefficient on exclusionary national identity was substantively and statistically significant. I also calculated the change in predicated probabilities of a one standard deviation change in exclusionary national identity, setting nationalism, education, and
age at their means for unskilled men in each of the three countries. In France 2003, the probability of being radical right at mean exclusionary national identity is 0.06, and increases to 0.19 when increasing exclusionary national identity by one standard deviation. This is a 202% increase in probability of being radical right. In Denmark 2003, the probability of being radical right at mean exclusionary national identity is 0.18, and increases to 0.28 when exclusionary national identity increases by one standard deviation. This is a 58% increase in probability of being radical right. In Switzerland 2003, the probability of being radical right at mean exclusionary national identity is 0.01, and changes to be 0.07 when increasing exclusionary national identity by one standard deviation. This is a 556% increase in probability of being radical right. These within country tests of radical right ideology support the economic-cultural interaction threat hypothesis, since exclusionary national identity has a strong relationship with radical right ideology in these countries with simultaneously high levels of cultural and economic threat.

3.6.4 Discussion of Economic-Cultural Threat Interaction Hypothesis

These analyses both of the pooled ISSP data and within country analyses are relatively robust in providing support for the economic-cultural threat interaction hypothesis. In the pooled sample analyses, in the case of both anti-immigrant attitudes

\[ \text{Note that with regards to goodness of fit, the economic-cultural threat interaction model for anti-immigrant attitudes had a higher adjusted R-squared than the models for economic threat or cultural threat. Similarly, the economic-cultural threat interaction model for radical right ideology has a higher McFadden's adjusted pseudo R-squared than the models for economic threat or cultural threat. R-squared measures the proportion of the variation in the dependent variable accounted for by the explanatory variables. Unlike R-squared, adjusted R-squared allows for the degrees of freedom associated with the sums of the squares. Therefore, even though the residual sum of squares decreases or remains the same as new explanatory variables are added, the residual variance does not. For this reason, adjusted R-squared is generally considered to be a more accurate goodness of fit measure than R-squared. Similarly, McFadden's adjusted pseudo R-squared mirrors the adjusted R-squared in OLS by penalizing a probit model for including too many predictors. If the predictors in the model are effective, then the penalty will be small.} \]
and radical right ideology, a context of simultaneous economic and cultural threat primed the relationship between exclusionary national identity and both anti-immigrant attitudes and radical right ideology. In the absence of both economic and cultural threats, the relationship was weak and/or statistically insignificant. In the within country analyses, for both anti-immigrant attitudes and radical right ideology, a context of simultaneous economic and cultural threat also primed the relationship between exclusionary national identity and both anti-immigrant attitudes and radical right ideology. In the case of radical right ideology, in the low threat conditions, there was no relationship between exclusionary national identity and radical right ideology. In the within country analyses of anti-immigrant attitudes, in some of the low threat cases, there was still a relationship between exclusionary national identity and anti-immigrant attitudes. This was the only result that was inconsistent with the economic-cultural threat hypothesis, and even in this case, the magnitude of the relationship between exclusionary national identity and anti-immigrant attitudes was much higher in the ideal high threat countries than the low threat countries.

3.7 Conclusions

These findings help to explain the mixed conclusions in past scholarship on the relationships between exclusionary national identity, objective national threats, anti-immigrant attitudes and radical right ideology. To understand the breeding ground for the

relative to the added information of the predictors. However, if a model contains predictors that do not add sufficiently to the model, then the penalty becomes noticeable and the adjusted R-squared can decrease with the addition of a predictor, even if the R-squared increases slightly. The adjusted R-squared for the anti-immigrant attitude models are: 0.135 for the cultural threat model, 0.127 for the economic threat model, and 0.142 for the economic-cultural threat interaction model. The McFadden’s adjusted pseudo R-squared for the radical right ideology models are: 0.026 for the cultural threat model, 0.035 for the economic threat model, and 0.041 for the economic-cultural threat interaction model.

41 As I argued in chapter 2, my theory assumes that elites disseminate messages about these conditions as threats to citizens. Thus, I would also expect perceived threats to play the same role, although I don’t explore citizens’ perceptions here.
radical right, or when beliefs about exclusionary national identity can be successfully 
manipulated by radical right party elites to foment demand for radical right issues, we 
must take into account the interactive relationship between individual level and 
environmental level factors. Moreover, as these results suggest, we must also properly 
specify the interaction between environmental level threats. Cultural threats alone or 
economic threats alone do a poor job of explaining when the relationship between 
exclusionary national identity and both anti-immigrant attitudes and radical right 
ideology will be primed, but taken together these threats create an ideal environment for 
radical right elites to make appeals to exclusionary national identity. Those that adhere to 
exclusionary – some might say ethnocentric – beliefs about national identity are not 
necessarily going to be more likely to hold attitudes consistent with the radical right than 
those who don’t have restrictive beliefs about national identity. In fact, given the absence 
of such threats, the best individual level predictors of both anti-immigrant attitudes and 
radical right ideology are gender, occupation skill level, and level of education. However, 
economic threats combined with simultaneous cultural threats to the nation-state create 
conditions suitable for astute radical right elites to prime fears about immigrants taking 
jobs and destroying native culture among those with strong beliefs about exclusionary 
national identity. In other words, economic self-interest is a good predictor of both anti-
immigrant attitudes and radical right ideology when countries are unthreatened 
economically and culturally, but when economic and cultural threats (such as increased 
influxes of migrants) coincide, citizens with exclusionary views will be more susceptible 
to anti-immigrant symbolic political appeals. Under such conditions of threat, nationalists 
are more likely to hold anti-immigrant attitudes and radical right ideology.
However, while this chapter helps us to better understand when we expect demand for the radical right to be high, giving the radical right parties a good breeding ground for their anti-immigrant platforms, both anti-immigrant attitudes and radical right ideology alone do not do a satisfying job in explaining the *electoral* success of radical right parties. In other words, while I might conclude based on this chapter alone that radical right rhetoric is universally dangerous in a context of economic crisis and migration growth, an astute observer of the radical right in countries like Canada or Britain would point out to me that these parties have a long history of failure to get into office regardless of the degree of anti-immigrant sentiment among citizens or threats to the country. Once again, the context matters. In the next chapter I focus not on the economic or the cultural threat context, as I did here, but rather on electoral context. Electoral institutions will modify whether anti-immigrant attitudes and radical right ideology are likely to be expressed in vote choices, or whether a sincere vote for a radical right party will be a “wasted” vote. In countries with non-permissive electoral laws – e.g. Single Member District Plurality (SMDP) electoral systems – the electoral system punishes smaller nationalized parties, such as radical right parties. In the next chapter, I explore how political institutions modify the effects on radical right voting of the both anti-immigrant attitudes and radical right ideology discussed in this chapter.
### Table 3-1: Countries in ISSP 1995 and 2003 National Identity Modules

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>missing</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
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<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>missing</td>
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<td>Israel</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
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<td>Japan</td>
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<td>missing</td>
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<td>Latvia</td>
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<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
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<td>Norway</td>
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<td>Poland</td>
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<td>Portugal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
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<td>South Korea</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
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<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
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<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
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</table>
Table 3-2: Principal factors analysis of national identity variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Factor Loading 1995</th>
<th>Factor Loading 2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Important born in country</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important have citizenship</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important most of life in country</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important speak language</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important be a religion</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important to respect political institutions</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important feel a member of country</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important have ancestry</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of observations</td>
<td>25896</td>
<td>38044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retained Factors</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor Eigenvalue</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>2.87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3-3: Principal factors analysis of nationalism variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Factor Loading 1995</th>
<th>Factor Loading 2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rather be a citizen of country than anywhere else</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Few things about country make ashamed</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World would be better if more people were more like (nationality)</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generally, (country) is better than others</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would support country even if wrong</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of observations</td>
<td>24264</td>
<td>37089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retained Factors</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor Eigenvalue</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Table 3-4: Independent and Dependent Variable Descriptive Statistics

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exclusionary national identity</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration change ratio</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>1.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent unemployment change</td>
<td>-3.4%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>-28%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>-2.1%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>-21%</td>
<td>29%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education level</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Skill level</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.49</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unemployment status</td>
<td>0.05</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.25</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.50</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>98</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anti-immigrant attitudes index</td>
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<td>0.73</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>0.70</td>
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<tr>
<td>Radical right ideology</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
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<td>----------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Exclusionary national identity</td>
<td>0.391** (0.116)</td>
<td>0.087 (0.133)</td>
<td>0.407** (0.173)</td>
<td>0.085 (0.264)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration Change</td>
<td>0.183 (0.373)</td>
<td>-0.949** (0.332)</td>
<td>0.389 (0.591)</td>
<td>-0.336 (0.784)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NID x Migration Change</td>
<td>0.013 (0.103)</td>
<td>0.185 (0.128)</td>
<td>-0.067 (0.144)</td>
<td>0.294 (0.240)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Change</td>
<td>0.012* (0.007)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.005)</td>
<td>0.027* (0.014)</td>
<td>0.004 (0.007)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>0.002 (0.038)</td>
<td>0.066** (0.029)</td>
<td>-0.260** (0.096)</td>
<td>-0.068 (0.047)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.412** (0.118)</td>
<td>-0.342** (0.085)</td>
<td>-0.202 (0.302)</td>
<td>-0.075 (0.229)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled</td>
<td>-0.145** (0.028)</td>
<td>-0.081** (0.021)</td>
<td>-0.104 (0.092)</td>
<td>-0.184** (0.078)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.016 (0.024)</td>
<td>-0.026 (0.016)</td>
<td>-0.029 (0.085)</td>
<td>-0.121** (0.048)</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>0.098 (0.063)</td>
<td>0.086** (0.039)</td>
<td>-0.028 (0.111)</td>
<td>-0.075 (0.128)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.002)</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.001)</td>
<td>-0.000 (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.005** (0.002)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.362** (0.397)</td>
<td>3.376** (0.327)</td>
<td>-2.241** (0.433)</td>
<td>-2.024** (0.887)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>11527</td>
<td>18999</td>
<td>9803</td>
<td>15267</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.190</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>0.041</td>
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</table>

** $p \leq .05$  * $p \leq .10$
Table 3-6: Results – Economic Threat Hypothesis: Senders and Receivers

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exclusionary national identity</td>
<td>0.373** (0.057)</td>
<td>0.238** (0.051)</td>
<td>0.348** (0.077)</td>
<td>0.336** (0.068)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Change</td>
<td>0.027† (0.016)</td>
<td>-0.012 (0.011)</td>
<td>0.024 (0.028)</td>
<td>-0.021 (0.015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NID x Unemployment Change</td>
<td>-0.005 (0.006)</td>
<td>0.004 (0.004)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.007)</td>
<td>0.008 (0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration Change</td>
<td>0.225 (0.166)</td>
<td>-0.368 (0.269)</td>
<td>0.181 (0.427)</td>
<td>0.614** (0.285)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>0.003 (0.037)</td>
<td>0.065** (0.029)</td>
<td>-0.259** (0.096)</td>
<td>-0.071† (0.047)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.412** (0.120)</td>
<td>-0.349** (0.084)</td>
<td>-0.200 (0.304)</td>
<td>-0.079 (0.231)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled</td>
<td>-0.146** (0.028)</td>
<td>-0.081** (0.022)</td>
<td>-0.105 (0.093)</td>
<td>-0.185** (0.047)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.016 (0.024)</td>
<td>-0.025† (0.016)</td>
<td>-0.090 (0.085)</td>
<td>-0.119** (0.049)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>0.095† (0.061)</td>
<td>0.087** (0.039)</td>
<td>-0.028 (0.109)</td>
<td>-0.074 (0.126)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.001)</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.001)</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.002)</td>
<td>-0.005** (0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.411** (0.252)</td>
<td>2.901** (0.340)</td>
<td>-2.061** (0.278)</td>
<td>-2.834** (0.438)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>11527</td>
<td>18999</td>
<td>9803</td>
<td>15267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.190</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>0.041</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** p ≤ .05  * p ≤ .10  † p ≤ .15
<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exclusionary national identity</td>
<td>0.365** (0.063)</td>
<td>0.284** (0.038)</td>
<td>0.337** (0.107)</td>
<td>0.324** (0.085)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Change</td>
<td>0.030 (0.020)</td>
<td>-0.002 (0.011)</td>
<td>0.011 (0.026)</td>
<td>-0.023 (0.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NID x Unemployment Change</td>
<td>-0.003 (0.006)</td>
<td>0.002 (0.004)</td>
<td>0.008* (0.005)</td>
<td>0.008 (0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration Change</td>
<td>0.390* (0.196)</td>
<td>-0.521* (0.276)</td>
<td>0.329 (0.407)</td>
<td>0.734** (0.358)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>0.019 (0.037)</td>
<td>0.087** (0.029)</td>
<td>-0.260** (0.114)</td>
<td>-0.075 (0.054)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.551** (0.098)</td>
<td>-0.386** (0.098)</td>
<td>-0.466 (0.389)</td>
<td>-0.034 (0.266)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled</td>
<td>-0.135** (0.027)</td>
<td>-0.088** (0.021)</td>
<td>-0.027 (0.068)</td>
<td>-0.193** (0.094)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.036 (0.026)</td>
<td>-0.029* (0.017)</td>
<td>-0.098 (0.090)</td>
<td>-0.111** (0.052)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>0.064 (0.053)</td>
<td>0.027 (0.041)</td>
<td>-0.031 (0.137)</td>
<td>0.023 (0.150)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.003* (0.001)</td>
<td>-0.002** (0.001)</td>
<td>-0.002 (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.005** (0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.389** (0.251)</td>
<td>2.890** (0.360)</td>
<td>-1.931** (0.332)</td>
<td>-2.901** (0.559)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>9457</td>
<td>14693</td>
<td>8280</td>
<td>11194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.225</td>
<td>0.200</td>
<td>0.082</td>
<td>0.047</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

** p ≤ .05  * p ≤ .10  † p ≤ .15
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exclusionary national identity 0.246** (0.119)</td>
<td>0.067 (0.151)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cultural Threat: Migration Change -0.419 (0.302)</td>
<td>-0.623† (0.418)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic Threat: Unemployment Change 0.030 (0.043)</td>
<td>0.056 (0.062)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exclusionary national identity x Cultural Threat 0.094 (0.115)</td>
<td>0.296** (0.141)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exclusionary national identity x Economic Threat -0.007 (0.016)</td>
<td>-0.025 (0.020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cultural Threat x Economic Threat -0.029 (0.038)</td>
<td>-0.072 (0.057)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exclusionary national identity x Cultural Threat x Economic Threat 0.007 (0.013)</td>
<td>0.034** (0.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nationalism 0.027 (0.026)</td>
<td>-0.126** (0.052)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education -0.292** (0.075)</td>
<td>-0.192 (0.193)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Skilled -0.130** (0.021)</td>
<td>-0.128** (0.062)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female -0.022 (0.016)</td>
<td>-0.118** (0.046)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unemployed 0.108** (0.034)</td>
<td>-0.084 (0.098)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Age -0.001 (0.001)</td>
<td>-0.004** (0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constant 2.811** (0.333)</td>
<td>1.540** (0.449)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Observations 30526</td>
<td>25070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R-squared 0.143</td>
<td>0.045</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** p ≤ .05  * p ≤ .10 † p ≤ .15
### Table 3-9: Levels of Economic and Cultural Threat Within Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low Cultural Change</th>
<th>Average Cultural Change</th>
<th>Economic Threat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low Economic Change</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada 1995</td>
<td>Germany 1995</td>
<td>Norway 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain 1995</td>
<td>Russia 2003</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway 1995</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Economic Change</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria 1995</td>
<td>Great Britain 2003</td>
<td>Portugal 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia 2003</td>
<td>Canada 2003</td>
<td>Germany 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Threat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia 1995</td>
<td>Sweden 1995</td>
<td>Finland 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain 1995</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 3-10: Anti-Immigrant Attitudes Within Country Analyses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory Variable</th>
<th>Low Economic-Cultural Threat Cases</th>
<th>High Economic-Cultural Threat Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Norway 1995</td>
<td>Canada 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spain 1995</td>
<td>Denmark 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>France 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Switzerland 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusionary national identity</td>
<td>0.396** (0.041)</td>
<td>0.250** (0.041)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>0.173** (0.030)</td>
<td>-0.065** (0.031)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.506** (0.101)</td>
<td>-0.530** (0.133)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled</td>
<td>-0.184** (0.045)</td>
<td>-0.162** (0.056)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.153** (0.038)</td>
<td>-0.029 (0.047)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>0.103 (0.110)</td>
<td>-0.100 (0.250)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.001)</td>
<td>-0.009** (0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.053** (0.155)</td>
<td>3.247** (0.205)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>846</td>
<td>624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.155</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** p ≤ .05    * p ≤ .10    † p ≤ .15
Table 3-11: Radical Right Ideology Within Country Analyses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory Variable</th>
<th>Low/Average Economic-Cultural Threat Cases</th>
<th>High Economic-Cultural Threat Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exclusionary national identity</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.269)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>0.233</td>
<td>-0.200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.190)</td>
<td>(0.127)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-2.171**</td>
<td>0.607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.980)</td>
<td>(0.607)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled</td>
<td>-0.775*</td>
<td>-0.624**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.442)</td>
<td>(0.326)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.857**</td>
<td>0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.337)</td>
<td>(0.231)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.195</td>
<td>0.930**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.504)</td>
<td>(0.381)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.028**</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.272</td>
<td>-1.835*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.891)</td>
<td>(1.104)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>589</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** p ≤ .05  * p ≤ .10  † p ≤ .15

42 No women were also radical right in Switzerland, so Stata dropped all the observations of women. The results reported here are of the model without female controlled for, so that I can maximize the number of observations. The substantive effect of national identity was unchanged in these two models, and in fact was slightly higher in the restricted, male only model.
Chapter 3 Figures

Figure 3-1: Marginal Effect of Exclusionary National Identity on Anti-Immigrant Attitudes Conditioned on Cultural Threat 1995

Figure 3-2: Marginal Effect of Exclusionary National Identity on Anti-Immigrant Attitudes Conditioned on Cultural Threat 2003
Figure 3-3: Marginal Effect of Exclusionary National Identity on Radical Right Ideology Conditioned on Cultural Threat 1995

Figure 3-4: Marginal Effect of Exclusionary National Identity on Radical Right Ideology Conditioned on Cultural Threat 2003
Figure 3-5: Marginal Effect of Exclusionary National Identity on Anti-Immigrant Attitudes Conditioned on Economic Threat in Senders and Receivers 1995

Figure 3-6: Marginal Effect of Exclusionary National Identity on Anti-Immigrant Attitudes Conditioned on Economic Threat in Senders and Receivers 2003
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Figure 3-8: Marginal Effect of Exclusionary National Identity on Anti-Immigrant Attitudes Conditioned on Economic Threat in Immigrant Receivers 2003
Figure 3-9: Marginal Effect of Exclusionary National Identity on Radical Right Ideology Conditioned on Economic Threat in Senders and Receivers 1995

Figure 3-10: Marginal Effect of Exclusionary National Identity on Radical Right Ideology Conditioned on Economic Threat in Senders and Receivers 2003
Figure 3-11: Marginal Effect of Exclusionary National Identity on Radical Right Ideology Conditioned on Economic Threat in Immigrant Receivers 1995

Figure 3-12: Marginal Effect of Exclusionary National Identity on Radical Right Ideology Conditioned on Economic Threat in Immigrant Receivers 2003
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Figure 3-14: Marginal Effect of Exclusionary National Identity on Extreme Right Ideology Conditioned on Cultural Threat at Low Economic Threat in 1995 & 2003
Figure 3-15: Marginal Effect of Exclusionary National Identity on Extreme Right Ideology Conditioned on Cultural Threat at Mean Economic Threat in 1995 & 2003

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Chapter 4
Supply Side of Radical Right Support:
Modifying Effects of Electoral Laws

4.1 Introduction

Although demand for the radical right is an important necessary condition for the success of the radical right, demand for political parties does not automatically translate into electoral success for those political parties. Duverger’s (1954) hypothesis is that the number of parties in a given country is fundamentally a function of societal demands. As Duverger (1954, p. 205) states, the most decisive influences on the number of parties “are aspects of the life of the nation such as ideologies and particularly the socio-economic structure.” Consistent with this first part of Duverger’s hypothesis, I argued in the last chapter that nationalist ideologies and socioeconomic threats combine to create radical right party demands that will be the driving force of whether these parties are successful or not. The best empirical measures in the scholarship on the radical right of these societal demands for radical right parties are anti-immigrant attitudes and far right ideology.

Given this ideal breeding ground, or demand, for the radical right described in the last chapter, I contend that electoral laws will largely determine whether this breeding ground is fertile or barren land for radical right political entrepreneurs. According to Duverger’s (1954) hypothesis, we expect to see more parties in countries where the electoral laws do not put a brake on societal demands for new parties. Thus, we expect
emergence and success of radical right parties in countries where the ideal breeding ground is combined with permissive electoral systems. On the other hand, an implication of Duverger’s hypothesis is that disproportional electoral systems should put a brake on social demands for the radical right (Clark and Golder 2006, Golder 2003, Duverger 1954). Yet, with regards to the success of the radical right, many studies have concluded precisely the opposite (Arzheimer and Carter 2006, Swank and Betz 2003) based on empirical findings that proportionality of electoral systems has a negative effect on the electoral success of the radical right. This has led many (e.g. Mudde 2007) to dismiss the importance of electoral systems and look to other political opportunity structures to explain radical right success.

However, while it is certainly the case that many political opportunity structures matter in explaining success and failure of political parties, including the radical right parties, this decision to discard electoral systems as our best institutional explanatory variable is a hasty one. Duverger’s hypothesis is not that proportionality of electoral systems automatically means radical right success. Rather, social demands are modified by electoral system permissiveness – this is an interactive hypothesis (Clark and Golder 2006, Golder 2003). Golder’s (2003) study is the only empirical examination that models aggregate radical right success as an interaction between social forces and electoral systems, and properly interprets the interactive variables in the model. Golder (2003) concludes that electoral system permissiveness does increase radical right party support at the aggregate level. Golder (2003) notes that he cannot make conclusions about what is going on at the individual level, since this would lead to an ecological inference problem. In this chapter, I test the individual-level implications of Duverger’s hypothesis and
extend Golder’s (2003) analysis. Given that societal demands for the radical right will be dampened by non-permissive electoral systems, I suggest that at the individual level, attitudes that predict radical right support (e.g. anti-immigrant attitudes, far right ideology, and exclusionary national identity) will be associated with radical right vote intention as permissiveness of the electoral system increases.

This hypothesis – the Electoral Systems Hypothesis – was laid out in Chapter 2:

The effect of anti-immigrant attitudes, far right ideology, and exclusionary national identity on radical right voting will be dampened in non-permissive electoral systems. Therefore, the relationship between exclusionary national identity, far right ideology, and anti-immigrant attitudes and radical right vote will be negligible in low district magnitude systems. The relationship between exclusionary national identity, far right ideology, and anti-immigrant attitudes and radical right vote will be substantively positive in large district magnitude systems.

Figure 2-9 (see chapter 2) illustrated this hypothesis, and Equation 4-1 below expresses the theoretical model I will be testing for each of these attitudes associated with radical right demand throughout this chapter:

Equation 4-1:
\[
\text{Radical Right Vote} = \delta_0 + \delta_1 \text{Attitudes} + \delta_2 \text{District Magnitude} + \delta_3 \text{Attitudes} \times \text{District Magnitude} + \delta_4 \text{Controls} + \epsilon
\]

4.2 Data and Measures

I will test my hypotheses using the ISSP 1995 and 2003 datasets, which are cross-national ISSP modules on national identity. As my argument is that electoral context matters, these datasets provide a sufficiently large sample of countries at more than one point in time to permit me to get significant variance on the levels of district magnitude. The 1995 dataset covers twenty-three countries and the 2003 dataset covers thirty-three countries (see Table 4-1).
As I described in Chapter 3, both datasets include measures of respondents’ national identities, anti-immigrant attitudes, ideologies, and vote intentions.

Radical right vote intention – the dependent variable in my models – is a dichotomous variable coded as one for those who responded that they would vote for a radical right party in their country if an election were held next week, and zero if the respondent would vote for any other party. Note that the ISSP question does not measure an actual vote for the radical right, but rather a respondent’s stated intention to vote for the radical right. The question asked respondents which party they would vote for if there were an election next week. While this is not a perfect measure, the dataset does not ask respondents which party they voted for in the last election, so this is the closest approximation of vote for a radical right party. The parties considered radical right parties are listed in Table 4-2.

I used Mudde’s (2007) classification system to code whether or not the parties in the ISSP dataset are radical right parties. Mudde (2007) conducted qualitative analysis of official party publications to determine which parties are radical right. Mudde (2007) only coded radical right parties in Europe (Western, Eastern and Central), so I looked to Norris (2005) to code radical right parties in the handful of countries outside of Europe. Norris coded parties as radical right based on whether they score higher than 8.0 on the combined 10-point Lubbers (2000) expert judgment scale. The mean level of radical right vote intention is 0.04 with a standard deviation of 0.21. In other words, radical right vote intention is rare.
Anti-immigrant attitudes, far right ideology, exclusionary national identity, and control variables are coded as in previous chapters. To review, anti-immigrant attitudes are measured by an index variable ranging from 1-5, where five is maximum anti-immigrant sentiment. Extreme right ideology is coded as one for those who place themselves at the farthest right pole of the five-point ideology scale and zero otherwise. Ideology is an ordinal variable ranging from 1-5, where one is “far left” and five is “far right.” Thus, an increase in the ideology variable is an increase in conservatism. Exclusionary national identity is measured by an index variable ranging from 1-4, where four indicates the highest possible level of exclusionary beliefs about national identity. As in Chapter 3, I control for nationalism in any analysis that tests the relationship between exclusionary national identity and radical right vote. Nationalism is an index variable ranging from 1-5 where a five indicates maximum agreement with statements about the international superiority of the respondents’ nation-state.43

To measure permissiveness of the electoral system, I am using logged median district magnitude in my models, which ranges from 0 to 2.2 in my dataset. The mean level of logged median district magnitude is 0.95 with a standard deviation of 0.78. I gathered median district magnitude data for the countries in the 1995 ISSP from the Democratic Electoral Systems Around the World, 1946-2000 dataset (Golder 2005) and for the 2003 ISSP from the Contituency Level Election Archive (CLEA 2009). Golder’s dataset only covers elections up to 2000, which is why I use two different sources for this data. Table 4-3 lists the average and median district magnitudes used for each country in the two datasets.

43 For more information, please see Section 3.2.2 on measurement of independent variables and the descriptive statistics for these measures in Table 3-4.
For electoral systems with one electoral tier, the measure in my model is the logged magnitude of the median legislator’s electoral district. I follow Golder (2003) in using the median rather than the average district magnitude first because the median offers a better measure of central tendency in non-normal distributions (Golder 2003, Amorim Neto & Cox 1997). Because the marginal causal effect of a one-unit change in district magnitude is smaller when district magnitude is high, I use the log of the median district magnitude. Moreover, since I am extending Golder’s (2003) analysis to explore the impact of electoral institutions on individual level radical right voting decisions, it is best to use measures that are consistent with the measures used in his study. Past research suggests that the existence of an upper electoral tier – which increases proportionality of translating votes to seats – positively increases the national radical right vote share (Golder 2003). For example, while median district magnitude in the lower tier of the German parliament (the Bundestag) is only one (equivalent to SMDP systems), Germany’s Mixed Member Proportional system generates highly proportion outcomes by compensating for the lower tier disproportionality in the upper tier using a party-list proportional system. Thus, I must also account for the positive modifying effect of upper tier seats in my measure of logged district magnitude. For two-tier and mixed electoral systems, following Salmond (2006), district magnitudes were calculated using a weighted average of district magnitudes of the upper and lower tiers. For example, in Russia, 50% of the parliament is elected at a lower tier with a median district magnitude of 1, and 50% is elected at an upper, national tier with a district magnitude of 225. Thus, the overall district magnitude for Russia is coded as a weighted average of these two, or 113. Again,
these weighted district magnitudes are logged in my analyses. My contribution will be to
test the modifying effect of electoral institutions on individual-level attitudes and
intention to vote for the radical right. Note that my substantive results do not change
when I use average district magnitude instead, indicating the results are robust to
different measures of electoral permissiveness.44

4.3 The Statistical Model

As discussed in the last chapter, far-right ideology and anti-immigrant attitudes
are the best attitudinal predictors of radical right support. Given our understanding of
among whom (those with exclusionary national identity) and when (under conditions of
threat) these attitudes will emerge, when will voters who hold these sincere anti-
immigrant and extreme right ideologies express these attitudes in a vote for the radical
right? In this section, I test the hypothesis that these attitudes are more likely to be
expressed in votes for the radical right in systems with permissive electoral systems.

In order to test this hypothesis, I want to test the relationship between radical right
vote intention as my dependent variable and anti-immigrant attitudes, extreme right
ideology, median district magnitude, the interaction between these attitudes and logged
median district magnitude as the independent variables of my model.45 The model that I
test below, then, is expressed by Model 4-1:

44 Golder (2003) also found this to be the case in his aggregate analyses.
45 One might be concerned that anti-immigrant attitudes and extreme right ideology are highly correlated
and are both capturing a similar underlying attitude that predicts radical right party support. If this were the
case, including them in the same model would create a multicollinearity problem, which could greatly
influence the coefficient estimates on these independent variables. However, the bivariate correlation and
running the model with only one of the independent variables at a time suggests this is not the case. The
bivariate correlation between anti-immigrant attitudes and extreme right ideology is very low, or 0.10.
When I ran the model excluding extreme right ideology and its interaction with district magnitude, the
coefficient estimate on anti-immigrant attitudes is 0.40 (compared to 0.38 in Model 4-1), and this estimate
is both substantively and statistically significant at p>0.05 (which is also true of the coefficient estimate on
anti-immigrant attitudes in Model 4-1). The interaction term coefficient estimate between anti-immigrant
Model 4-1:
Radical Right Vote = $\beta_0 + \beta_1$Anti-Immigrant Attitudes + $\beta_2$Log Median District Magnitude + $\beta_3$Anti-Immigrant Attitudes x Log Median District Magnitude + $\beta_4$Extreme Right Ideology + $\beta_5$Extreme Right Ideology x Log Median District Magnitude + $\beta_6$Education + $\beta_7$Skilled + $\beta_8$Female + $\beta_9$Unemployed + $\beta_{10}$Age + $\varepsilon$

My model is a probit interactive model with clustered standard errors to correct country-level clustering effects and adjust for heteroskedasticity. The data is a pooled dataset of the 1995 and 2003 ISSP modules. There were no substantive differences when I explored the relationships discussed in this chapter by testing the models on the datasets separately rather than pooled, suggesting that the relationships found here are robust across time. As in Chapter 4, this method is as simple and accurate as possible given my data parameters. According to Franzese (2005), this method is practical and effective given my dataset dimensions and the hypothesis I am testing, which is that individual level attitudinal variables interact with a country level variable.

### 4.4 Anti-Immigrant Attitudes

First, I will discuss the relationship between anti-immigrant attitudes, electoral permissiveness, and radical right vote. The marginal effect of anti-immigrant attitudes is calculated according to Equation 4-2:

attitudes and logged median district magnitude is slightly higher at 0.11 (compared to 0.09 in Model 4-1) and becomes significant at $p>0.10$ in the model excluding extreme right ideology. Therefore, Model 4-1 loses significance on my interactive hypothesis, but substantively the results are similar. In other words, when I control for extreme right ideology and its interaction with electoral permissiveness, the statistical significance of the interaction term on anti-immigrant attitudes and electoral permissiveness is reduced. When I run the model excluding anti-immigrant attitudes and its interaction with logged median district magnitude, the coefficient estimate on extreme right ideology is substantively and statistically significant (at $p>0.05$) at 2.34, which is very similar to the coefficient estimate in Model 4-1 of 2.30 (significant at $p>0.05$). The coefficient estimate on the interaction term between extreme right ideology and district magnitude is -0.06 and not statistically significant, which is similar to the result found in Model 4-1 of a coefficient estimate of -0.05 and not statistically significant. Based on these checks, I conclude that these variables are not measuring one underlying attitude, but rather are distinct attitudinal predictors of radical right support. In fact, as I discuss in section 4.6, some scholars have suggested that anti-immigrant voters and extreme right ideologues constitute two subelectorates with very different motivations for voting radical right.
Equation 4-2:
Marginal Effect of Anti-Immigrant Attitudes = $\beta_1 + \beta_3 \text{Log Median District Magnitude}$

As with the marginal effect, the standard error of my variable of interest cannot be assessed without taking into account the variance-covariance matrix of $\beta_1$ and $\beta_3$. The standard error for the marginal effect of anti-immigrant attitudes is calculated as follows:

Equation 4-3: Standard Error of Anti-Immigrant Attitudes =

$$\frac{\partial \hat{Y}}{\partial \hat{X}} - \sqrt{\text{Var} \beta_1 + \text{Var} \beta_3 + 2 \text{Cov} \beta_1 \beta_3}$$

The same is true for the calculation of the marginal effects and standard errors for all of the interactive models discussed in this chapter.  

Table 4-4 (Model 4-1) shows the results of this analysis.  

I have created an illustration of the marginal effect of anti-immigrant attitudes on radical right vote across the range of logged median district magnitude in the dataset (see Figure 4-1).  

---

46 Therefore, just looking at the standard errors in the results tables is of somewhat limited usefulness for interpreting my results.  
47 Note that with regards to goodness of fit, the electoral system interactive model performed better than a basic model that does not include variables for the log median district magnitude and its interaction with the attitudinal variables discussed here—anti-immigrant attitudes and far right ideology. McFadden's adjusted R-squared mirrors the adjusted R-squared in OLS by penalizing a probit model for including too many predictors. If the predictors in the model are effective, then the penalty will be small relative to the added information of the predictors. However, if a model contains predictors that do not add sufficiently to the model, then the penalty becomes noticeable and the adjusted R-squared can decrease with the addition of a predictor, even if the R-squared increases slightly. The McFadden’s adjusted R-squared for the non-interactive model is 0.17, while the McFadden’s adjusted R-squared for the electoral systems interactive model discussed here is 0.19. Thus, this model is a better fit than the non-interactive model.
As Figure 4-1 shows, anti-immigrant attitudes do have a positive and statistically significant relationship with intention to vote radical right at all logged district magnitude levels. The marginal effect of anti-immigrant attitudes on radical right vote in non-permissive systems is substantively low, and increases to be substantively significant (almost twice as large as at low levels) at high logged district magnitude. This is consistent with the electoral systems hypothesis.

I calculated the predicted probabilities of voting radical right for men at mean levels of age and education and the modes for the other control variables (unskilled, non-extreme right, and employed). In systems with median district magnitude of one (e.g. SMDP), a change from the mean (3.3) to one standard deviation above the mean for anti-immigrant attitudes increases the probability of voting radical right from 0.05 to 0.08. This is an increase in probability of voting radical right of 69%. Substantively, however, both probabilities are quite low. In other words, in low median district magnitude systems, radical right voting is rare, so even a substantive shift in anti-immigrant attitudes does not translate into a high probability of voting radical right. Next, I increase logged median district magnitude by one standard deviation, which would be an electoral system with a median district magnitude of 6. At this level of district magnitude, a change from the mean to one standard deviation above the mean for anti-immigrant attitudes increases the probability of voting radical right from 0.05 to 0.09. This is an increase in probability of voting radical right of 83%. In systems with this moderate level of district magnitude, the probability of voting radical right is relatively rare, but higher than in low district magnitude systems. Moreover, the impact on the probability of voting radical right of an increase in anti-immigrant attitudes is greater in these systems compared to lower district
magnitude systems. Finally, increasing electoral permissiveness two standard deviations to a district magnitude of 35.5, a change from the mean to one standard deviation above the mean for anti-immigrant attitudes increases the probability of voting radical right from 0.05 to 0.11, or an increase in probability of 98%. Although these probabilities are still relatively low – since voting radical right is rare – these probabilities are substantially greater in absolute terms than in lower district magnitude systems. For prospective voters with high levels of anti-immigrant attitudes, the probability of voting radical right in a comparatively permissive system (0.11) is 132% higher than the probability of voting radical right in a non-permissive system (0.07). The impact of an increase in anti-immigrant attitudes on voting radical right is greater as district magnitude increases.

4.5 Extreme Right Ideology

Second, what is the relationship between extreme right ideology, electoral system permissiveness, and radical right vote? In order to calculate the marginal effect of extreme right ideology on the probability of voting radical right, I cannot simply look at the individual coefficient on my variable for extreme right ideology in Table 4-4 (see column labeled Model 4-1). The marginal effect of extreme right ideology is calculated as follows:

\[
\text{Equation 4-4: Marginal Effect of Extreme Right Ideology} = \beta_4 + \beta_5 \log \text{Median District Magnitude}
\]

The standard error is calculated in the same manner anti-immigrant attitudes in the previous section. The equation for the standard error of the effect of extreme right ideology is as follows:
Equation 4-5: Standard Error of Extreme Right Ideology =

\[ \sigma_{\beta}^2 = \text{var}(\beta_1) + D^2 \text{var}(\beta_2) + 2D \text{cov}(\beta_1, \beta_2) \]

Figure 4-2 illustrates the marginal effect of extreme right ideology on the probability of voting for the radical right party across the observed ranges of logged median district magnitude.

As Figure 4-2 shows, the effect of extreme right ideology has a very stable, statistically significant and positive relationship with the probability of voting radical right across all levels of logged district magnitude. In other words, electoral permissiveness does not modify the relationship between extreme right ideology and radical right vote intention.

I calculated the predicted probabilities of voting radical right conditioned on whether one espouses extreme right ideology for men at mean levels of age, anti-immigrant attitudes, and education and the modes for the other control variables (unskilled and employed). In systems with a median district magnitude of one (e.g. SMDP), a change from not holding extreme right ideology to holding extreme right ideological views increases the probability of voting radical right from 0.05 to 0.73. This is a huge substantive increase in the probability of voting radical right. Increasing logged median district magnitude by one standard deviation to a system with a median district magnitude of 6, a change from not having extreme right ideology to having extreme right ideology increases the probability of voting radical right from 0.05 to 0.76. Again, this is a huge shift in the probability of voting radical right. However, when I compare these
changes in probabilities, they are virtually identical, regardless of electoral permissiveness.

This is not consistent with the electoral systems hypothesis. In fact, it appears to contradict the electoral systems hypothesis. According to my hypothesis, extreme right ideology should be associated with radical right voting *more so* in systems that are permissive, where such attitudes can sincerely be expressed in votes that are not “wasted.” However, the results show the opposite. Extreme right ideology is strongly and stably associated with probability of voting radical right in low district magnitude systems. As district magnitude increases and the system is more permissive, the relationship between radical right ideology and radical right voting remains unchanged.

Why might this be so? I could conclude that the electoral systems hypothesis is incorrect. However, I did find support for the hypothesis with respect to anti-immigrant attitudes. What may be different about extreme right ideology?

### 4.6 Radical Right Subelectorates

An alternative explanation for this result for extreme right ideology is that those with anti-immigrant attitudes who vote radical right are casting instrumental “support” votes, while those with far right ideological views are casting expressive “protest” votes against mainstream parties. Some scholars suggest that there are two broad subelectorates of the radical right – support (xenophobe) and protest (political resentment) voters (e.g. Mudde 2007, Betz 1994), and that their existence “is relevant because of their (potential) effects on empirical research in the causes of electoral success” (Mudde 2007, p. 225). With regards to the results in this chapter, it may be the case that electoral permissiveness creates different incentives for the “support” voters than for “protest” voters.
According to the scholarship on support vs. protest subelectorates of the radical right, radical right party support voters may be casting a vote for these parties because support voters expect radical right parties to implement anti-immigrant policies. Since radical right parties run on campaigns against immigration, those with anti-immigrant attitudes in more permissive electoral systems will have their votes “count” towards policy change. Thus, those who support the radical right because of their anti-immigrant views are more likely to vote for radical right parties in permissive systems. This is the prediction of my electoral systems hypothesis, and was born out in the results.

On the other hand, if it is the case that another subset of radical right voters are “protest” voters who intentionally cast their votes to send a signal of their discontentment to mainstream parties, we might expect protest voters for the radical right to exist even in less permissive systems precisely because in these non-permissive systems voters with far right ideology feel alienated by mainstream parties. Kang (2004, p. 84) uses Hirschman’s classic exit, voice and loyalty theory to explain this phenomenon of what he calls voters who “exit with voice” in plurality rule elections (such as SMDP). Protest voters exit the mainstream, traditional parties and voice their protest by voting for another party, in this case the radical right party, even if that party has little chance of electoral success. According to this explanation, less permissive systems alienate those on the ideological poles and create incentives for the casting of protest votes.

One way to roughly test whether subelectorates exist in the radical right voting population is to run a model that interacts anti-immigrant attitudes with extreme right ideology across different levels of logged median district magnitude. This three-way interaction model is represented by Model 4-2 below:
Model 4-2: Radical Right Vote = \( \theta_0 + \theta_1 \text{Anti-Immigrant Attitudes} + \theta_2 \text{Log Median District Magnitude} + \theta_3 \text{Anti-Immigrant Attitudes} \times \text{Log Median District Magnitude} + \theta_4 \text{Extreme Right Ideology} + \theta_5 \text{Extreme Right Ideology} \times \text{Log Median District Magnitude} + \theta_6 \text{Anti-Immigrant Attitudes} \times \text{Extreme Right Ideology} + \theta_7 \text{Anti-Immigrant Attitudes} \times \text{Log Median District Magnitude} \times \text{Extreme Right Ideology} + \theta_8 \text{Education} + \theta_9 \text{Skilled} + \theta_{10} \text{Female} + \theta_{11} \text{Unemployed} + \theta_{12} \text{Age} + \varepsilon \)

By testing Model 4-2, I can explore whether those who express extreme right ideology without anti-immigrant attitudes have a different probability of voting radical right in different electoral environments than those who do not ascribe to extreme right ideology but hold anti-immigrant opinions in those same environments. As with other models, I will test this model using a probit interactive model with clustered standard errors to correct country-level clustering effects and adjust for heteroskedasticity. The results of this model can be found in Table 4-4 (see Model 4-2). The marginal effects of extreme right ideology and anti-immigrant attitudes are calculated as follows:

Equation 4-6: Marginal Effect of Extreme Right Ideology = \( \theta_4 + \theta_5 \text{Log Median District Magnitude} + \theta_6 \text{Anti-Immigrant Attitudes} + \theta_7 \text{Anti-Immigrant Attitudes} \times \text{Log Median District Magnitude} \)

Equation 4-7: Marginal Effect of Anti-Immigrant Attitudes = \( \theta_1 + \theta_3 \text{Log Median District Magnitude} + \theta_6 \text{Extreme Right Ideology} + \theta_7 \text{Log Median District Magnitude} \times \text{Extreme Right Ideology} \)

Figures 4-3 through 4-5 illustrate the marginal effects of extreme right ideology at different levels of anti-immigrant attitudes (one standard deviation below the mean, the mean, and one standard deviation above the mean) conditioned on logged median district magnitude, and Figures 4-6 and 4-7 illustrate the marginal effects of anti-immigrant
attitudes conditioned on logged median district magnitude for those who ascribe to extreme right ideology and those who do not.

INSERT FIGURES 4-3 THROUGH 4-7 HERE

Figures 4-3 through 4-4 illustrate that in terms of substantive and statistical significance, the marginal effect of extreme right ideology on radical right vote intention is stable and substantively significant for those with low and modest levels of anti-immigrant attitudes. This is consistent with the hypothesis that those with extreme right ideology (but not comparatively high anti-immigrant attitudes) constitute a subelectorate of true ideologues willing to “waste” their votes to voice their protest of mainstream politics by voting for radical right parties. However, when anti-immigrant attitudes are high (Figure 4-5), the effect of extreme right ideology is not statistically significantly different from zero. For anti-immigrant voters, the marginal effect of holding extreme right ideology on probability of voting radical right is non-significant and indistinguishable from zero. It is anti-immigrant attitudes that best predict radical right vote intention for this subgroup.

This is also shown in Figures 4-6 and 4-7, which illustrate that anti-immigrant attitudes only have a substantive and statistically significant effect on radical right vote intention among those who are not extreme right ideologues. For those who are not extreme right ideologues, the effect of anti-immigrant attitudes on radical right vote intention increases as the permissiveness of the electoral system increases (see Figure 4-6). This is consistent with the hypothesis that those with anti-immigrant attitudes constitute a support subelectorate voting for instrumental reasons. However, for those who are extreme right ideologues, the marginal effect of anti-immigrant attitudes on
radical right voting is neither statistically nor substantively significant (see Figure 4-7).
The effect of anti-immigrant attitudes for extreme right ideologues is not different from zero. The results of this model are consistent with the theory that electoral permissiveness influences “support” voters in the way we expect according to the electoral systems hypothesis, but that “protest” voters are willing to cast an expressive vote against mainstream parties regardless of electoral permissiveness.

In terms of predicted probabilities, I calculated the probabilities for employed, unskilled men with the mean levels of education and age. In systems with a median district magnitude of one (e.g. SMDP), i.e. a non-permissive electoral system, the probability of radical right vote intention for those with extreme right ideology and low levels of anti-immigrant attitudes is 0.60, while those with both extreme right ideology and high levels of anti-immigrant attitudes have a probability of voting radical right of 0.82. This marginal effect of increased anti-immigrant attitudes among extreme right ideologues is a mere 35% increase in probability. In other words, the effect of extreme right ideology on the probability of voting radical right is substantial regardless of whether one holds anti-immigrant attitudes even in low district magnitude systems. In systems with a median district magnitude of one, the probability of radical right vote intention for those who are not extreme right ideologues with low levels of anti-immigrant attitudes have a probability of 0.02 of voting radical right, while those who are not extreme right with high levels of anti-immigrant attitudes have a probability of voting radical right of 0.07. This marginal effect of increased anti-immigrant attitudes among non-extreme right ideologues is a 207% increase in probability. While both probabilities
are low, anti-immigrant attitudes have a significant effect on the probability of voting radical right even in low district magnitude systems.

At two standard deviations above the minimum level of logged median district magnitude, or a relatively permissive system with a district magnitude of 35.5, the probability of radical right vote intention for those with extreme right ideology and low levels of anti-immigrant attitudes is 0.54, while those who are extreme right with high levels of anti-immigrant attitudes have a probability of voting radical right of 0.85. Again, the effect of extreme right ideology is substantively powerful, and comparable to the effect in low district magnitude systems. The change in electoral permissiveness does not modify the relationship between extreme right ideology and probability of voting radical right. In comparatively high district magnitude systems, the probability of radical right vote intention for those who are not extreme right ideologues with low levels of anti-immigrant attitudes have a probability of 0.02 of voting radical right, while those who are not extreme right with high levels of anti-immigrant attitudes have a probability of voting radical right of 0.10. This is a 324% increase in probability. This increase in probability is 57% greater than the increase in probability due to a change in anti-immigrant attitudes in low district magnitude systems, which suggests that electoral permissiveness substantively matters in influencing the behavior of voters who hold anti-immigrant attitudes.

These predicted probabilities show that those with extreme right ideology – at both low and high levels of anti-immigrant attitudes – are as likely to vote for the radical right in lower district magnitude systems, as the “protest” subelectorate theory suggests. On the other hand, for those who do not express extreme right ideological views, at low
levels of anti-immigrant attitudes in both non-permissive and relatively permissive electoral systems, the probability of voting radical right is extremely low (0.02). However, for those who do not express extreme right ideological views, but do express strong anti-immigrant sentiments, the probability of voting radical right increases substantially as electoral system permissiveness increases. This is consistent with the view that the anti-immigrant subelectorate of the radical right consists of “support” voters who vote for instrumental reasons. Thus, this test suggests that the electoral systems hypothesis is not falsified, but rather that the voting incentives created by electoral systems affect these two subelectorates in different ways.

4.7 Exclusionary National Identity

Finally, I explore the relationship between exclusionary national identity and radical right vote intention. As noted earlier, exclusionary national identity is assumed to be the driving force of radical right voting. In the last chapter, I explored how exclusionary national identity is associated with radical right demand, such as anti-immigrant attitudes and extreme right ideology, only under conditions of threat. Here, I explore how electoral systems also modify the effect of exclusionary national identity on radical right voting.

In Chapter One (see Table 1-1), I showed that exclusionary national identity and nationalism had no substantively or statistically significant relationship with radical right voting. Here, I test how logged median district magnitude modifies the relationship between exclusionary national identity – the driving force behind anti-immigrant attitudes
and extreme right ideology – and radical right voting. According to the electoral
systems hypothesis, exclusionary national identity should only be associated with radical
right voting in permissive electoral systems. The model I test here is:

\[ \text{Model 4-3: Radical Right Vote} = \chi_0 + \chi_1 \text{Exclusionary National Identity} + \]
\[ \chi_2 \text{Logged Median District Magnitude} + \chi_3 \text{Exclusionary National Identity} \times \]
\[ \text{Logged Median District Magnitude} + \chi_4 \text{Nationalism} + \chi_5 \text{Education} + \chi_6 \text{Skill} + \]
\[ \chi_7 \text{Female} + \chi_8 \text{Unemploy} + \chi_9 \text{Age} + \tau \]

Therefore, the marginal effect of exclusionary national identity is:

\[ \text{Equation 4-8: Marginal Effect of Exclusionary National Identity} = \chi_1 + \chi_3 \text{Logged Median District Magnitude} \]

The standard error of this marginal effect is calculated in the same way as in past models.
The results of this model are recorded in Table 4-4 (see the column labeled Model 4-4),
and Figure 4-8 illustrates the marginal effect of a one standard deviation increase in
national identity from its mean level (3.1) across the observed levels of logged median
district magnitude.

INSERT FIGURE 4-8 HERE

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48 Since anti-immigrant attitudes and extreme right ideology are mediating variables between exclusionary identity and radical right vote (see Figure 2-8), I excluded them from the model here to show the full effect of exclusionary identity. In the Appendix, I include the results for the model when I include anti-immigrant attitudes, extreme right ideology, and the interaction terms between these attitudes and logged median district magnitude. See Table A-4 and Figure A-8 for the results. The effect of national identity is not substantively or statistically significant across all levels of logged median district magnitude when I control for the mediating variables, which is what I would expect given the causal path I proposed.

49 Note that with regards to goodness of fit, the electoral system interactive model performed better than a basic model that does not include variables for the log median district magnitude and its interaction with exclusionary national identity. The McFadden’s adjusted R-squared for the non-interactive model is 0.027, while the McFadden’s adjusted R-squared for the electoral systems interactive model discussed here is 0.034. Although this difference is slight, for other probit goodness of fit statistics – such as the Cox-Snell R-squared and the McKelvey and Zavoina’s R-squared – the electoral systems interactive model is a better fit. Thus, the result that the electoral systems model is a better fit than the non-interactive model is robust across various measures of goodness of fit.
As Figure 4-8 indicates, the substantive effect of this increase in Exclusionary National Identity on the probability of voting radical right is positive and substantial in high district magnitude systems, while it is substantively and statistically insignificant in low district magnitude systems. This is consistent with the electoral systems hypothesis. In terms of predicted probabilities, I calculated the probabilities for men at mean levels of age, nationalism and education and the modes for the other control variables (unskilled and employed). In SMDP systems and systems with a median district magnitude of one, a change from not holding extreme right ideology to holding extreme right ideological views increases the probability of voting radical right from 0.029 to 0.033. This is a very small increase – only a 16% increase in probability – and both probabilities are substantively very small and not statistically significantly different from zero (see Figure 4-8). Increasing logged median district magnitude by one standard deviation to a system with a median district magnitude of 6, the marginal effect of an increase in exclusionary national identity increases probability of voting radical right from 0.039 to 0.051. This is an increase in probability of voting radical right of 32%, and although both probabilities are substantively quite low, the marginal effects of exclusionary national identity on radical right vote intention are statistically significant at this level of median district magnitude.\(^{50}\) Finally, increasing two standard deviations to a district magnitude of 35.5, a change from the mean to one standard deviation above the mean for exclusionary national identity increases the probability of voting radical right from 0.053 to 0.078, or an increase in probability of 47%. While these probabilities are not substantively large, they are almost twice the magnitude of the probabilities for low district magnitude

\(^{50}\) The effect of exclusionary national identity on the probability of radical right voting only becomes statistically significant at median district magnitude of slightly greater than three.
systems and statistically significant (while the effect is non-significant in low district magnitude systems). Electoral permissiveness has a positive modifying effect on the marginal effect of exclusionary national identity, as predicted by the electoral systems hypothesis.

4.8 Discussion

Taken together, the results above suggest that anti-immigrant attitudes and exclusionary national identity have less of an influence on the probability of voting radical right in low median district magnitude systems compared to in high median district magnitude systems. These results indicate that, as the electoral systems hypothesis suggests, individual-level demands for the radical right are substantially modified by the permissiveness of the electoral system. Demands for the radical right are more likely to translate into votes for the radical right when electoral systems are permissive. Non-permissive systems do appear to put a brake on these demands.

However, the results for extreme right ideology appear at first glance to be inconsistent with the electoral systems hypothesis. One explanation for this – the subelectorate explanation – suggests that this result reflects the fact that electoral incentives not to “waste” votes in less permissive electoral systems will not affect protest voters in the same way as radical right party support voters. According to this view (Kang 2004), protest voters in non-permissive systems may intentionally “waste” their votes by voting for a party with little chance of electoral success because they are using their vote as a way to exit mainstream politics while still voicing their discontent to mainstream parties. In other words, protest voters are voting for expressive rather than instrumental reasons. If this were the case, these results that appear to falsify my hypothesis would
actually be consistent with the strategic effects of Duverger’s hypothesis. As the results of Model 4-2 show, the data supports this alternative explanation.

4.9 Conclusion

My results suggest that political supply-side factors – electoral systems – modify individual-level demands for radical right parties in ways that are for the most part consistent with the electoral systems hypothesis. My hypothesis is derived from a long-standing explanation in political science, Duverger’s hypothesis. Contrary to some scholars who have concluded that electoral systems do not work in the ways we would expect in the case of radical right politics, I find support at the individual level for precisely what political scientists should expect given Duverger’s hypothesis, with the exception of those who hold extreme right ideology. In more permissive systems where demand exists for the radical right, those who have attitudes – anti-immigrant attitudes, and exclusionary national identity – that align with the radical right will be more likely to vote for radical right parties. In non-permissive electoral systems, the electoral laws put a brake on these demands, and those who have attitudes that line up with the radical right platform will be less likely than those in permissive systems to vote radical right. The only exception to this “rule” was the subelectorate of the radical right that self-identify themselves as located at the far right pole of the ideology scale. These voters appear to be true believers willing to “waste” (from an instrumental perspective) their votes in low district magnitude systems as a form of protest, or “exit with voice” (Kang 2004). This is a puzzling finding consistent with past scholarship on radical right subelectorates that warrants further investigation, as I discuss in my concluding chapter.
Note that with two of my measures of demand for the radical right – extreme right ideology and anti-immigrant attitudes – even in low district magnitude systems, having these attitudes is still statistically significantly associated with the probability of voting radical right. Permissive electoral systems clearly increase the probability that those whose attitudes are consistent with the radical right party platforms will be more likely than others to vote for the radical right party, but even in non-permissive systems these attitudes are statistically significant predictors (albeit substantively relatively weak in the case of anti-immigrant attitudes) of radical right voting. Only for exclusionary national identity was the relationship between attitudes and vote intentions completely negligible in low median district magnitude systems. My findings indicate that both attitudes (demand) and institutions (supply) are essential for understanding among whom and under what institutional conditions the radical right will be most successful.
### Table 4-1: Countries in the ISSP 1995 and 2003 modules

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<th>Country</th>
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<th>2003</th>
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<td>x</td>
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<td>x</td>
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N/A – Not available. In these countries there are radical right parties, but the ISSP did not list these parties as an option for respondents.
Table 4-3: District Magnitude Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1995 median district magnitude</th>
<th>1995 average district magnitude</th>
<th>2003 median district magnitude</th>
<th>2003 average district magnitude</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria*</td>
<td>88.7</td>
<td>88.3</td>
<td>88.7</td>
<td>88.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>7.74</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7.74</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>missing</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark*</td>
<td></td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany*</td>
<td>172.5</td>
<td>172.5</td>
<td>missing</td>
<td>missing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary*</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6.2</td>
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<td>missing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>missing</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy*</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Japan</td>
<td>missing</td>
<td>3.96</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>missing</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>missing</td>
<td>missing</td>
</tr>
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<td>Norway*</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>missing</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland*</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>missing</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia*</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>missing</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>missing</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa*</td>
<td></td>
<td>113</td>
<td>111.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea*</td>
<td></td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6.73</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden*</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>missing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>6.88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Countries with mixed electoral systems or two-tier electoral systems.

---

51 Following Salmond (2006), district magnitude for mixed and two-tier electoral systems were calculated using a weighted average of district magnitudes of the upper and lower tiers. For example, in Russia, 50% of the parliament is elected at a lower tier with a median district magnitude of 1, and 50% is elected at an upper, national tier with a district magnitude of 225. Thus, the overall district magnitude for Russia is coded as a weighted average of these two, or 113. Austria has a multi-tier electoral system with two upper
### Table 4-4: Probit Models of Radical Right Vote

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory Variable</th>
<th>Model 4-1</th>
<th>Model 4-2</th>
<th>Model 4-3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Immigrant Attitudes</td>
<td>0.38**</td>
<td>0.38**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Median District Magnitude</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Immigrant Attitudes x Log Median District Magnitude</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extreme Right Ideology</td>
<td>2.30**</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.68)</td>
<td>(1.69)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extreme Right Ideology x Log Median District Magnitude</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.48)</td>
<td>(1.06)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Immigrant Attitudes x Extreme Right Ideology</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.35)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusionary National Identity</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusionary National Identity x Log Median District</td>
<td>0.14*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magnitude</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>-0.24†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.11*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.23**</td>
<td>-0.23**</td>
<td>-0.23**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.14†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.00†</td>
<td>-0.00†</td>
<td>-0.01**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.85**</td>
<td>-2.87**</td>
<td>-1.65**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.47)</td>
<td>(0.50)</td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>18784</td>
<td>18784</td>
<td>23281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R-squared</td>
<td>0.266</td>
<td>0.267</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** \( p \leq .05 \) \quad * \( p \leq .10 \) \quad † \( p \leq .15 \)

tiers. In weighting for the upper tier vote share, I treated the upper tier district magnitude as 183 (the national upper tier district magnitude) rather than 20.3 (the regional upper tier district magnitude), since the multi-tier vote allocation system is compensatory such that the national tier compensates for any disproportionality remaining after local and regional district votes have been allocated. I ran the analysis treating the district magnitude as if it was 20.3 at the upper tier, and this did not affect the substantive conclusions. Note that in Poland, the second tier was eliminated in an electoral reform in 2001, so this weighted coding scheme was only used for the first wave of the ISSP.
Chapter 4 Figures

Figure 4-1: Marginal Effect of Anti-Immigrant Attitudes on Radical Right Vote Intention Conditioned on Logged Median District Magnitude
Figure 4-2: Marginal Effect of Extreme Right Ideology on Radical Right Vote Intention Conditioned on Logged Median District Magnitude
Figure 4-3: Marginal Effect of Extreme Right Ideology on Radical Right Vote Intention Conditioned on Logged Median District Magnitude (Low Anti-Immigrant Attitudes)

Figure 4-4: Marginal Effect of Extreme Right Ideology on Radical Right Vote Intention Conditioned on Logged Median District Magnitude (Median Anti-Immigrant Attitudes)

Figure 4-5: Marginal Effect of Extreme Right Ideology on Radical Right Vote Intention Conditioned on Logged Median District Magnitude (High Anti-Immigrant Attitudes)
Figure 4-6: Marginal Effect of Anti-Immigrant Attitudes on Radical Right Vote Intention Conditioned on Logged Median District Magnitude (Non-Extreme Right Ideologues)

Figure 4-7: Marginal Effect of Anti-Immigrant Attitudes on Radical Right Vote Intention Conditioned on Logged Median District Magnitude (Extreme Right Ideologues)
Figure 4-8: Marginal Effect of Exclusionary National Identity on Radical Right Vote Intention Conditioned on Logged Median District Magnitude
Chapter 5
Conclusion

5.1 Introduction – Why Conditional Extremism Matters

This dissertation began with a puzzle: despite the increasing success of radical right parties running on nationalistic ideology and anti-immigrant agendas, citizens with exclusionary views about national identity are not necessarily more likely than other citizens to denigrate immigrants or support radical right parties. Given the growing success of the radical right in the last several decades and the extreme, xenophobic nature of their campaign slogans and policy platforms, it is particularly important for political scientists to understand the psychological and institutional causes of the rising support for the radical right. Scholars have typically explored individual psychological predispositions purported to explain radical right support, such as exclusionary national identity and anti-immigrant attitudes, separate from environmental and institutional explanations, such as migration levels, economic crisis, globalization, and political institutions. I contend that it is important to bring together individual and environmental level explanations to understand when we should expect latent predispositions, such as nativist conceptions of national identity, to manifest themselves in support for the radical right and anti-immigrant sentiments. In other words, rather than looking only to environmental conditions or individual voter characteristics to understand the success of
In order to investigate this question, I used survey data from the ISSP Modules on National Identity, which contained good measures of national identity, nationalism, ideology, and vote intention. The ISSP modules were conducted at two different points in time – in 23 countries in 1995 and 34 countries in 2003. I also gathered country-level data on migration, unemployment, and electoral median district magnitude for the years and countries surveyed in the ISSP modules. I tested my hypotheses on the modifying effects of cultural and economic threats in 20 countries in 1995 and 30 countries in 2003 spanning the regions of Western Europe, Eastern Europe, the Americas, and Australasia. I tested the electoral systems hypothesis in 19 countries in 1995 and 24 countries in 2003 in the regions of Western Europe, Eastern Europe, the Americas, East Asia, Australasia and Africa.

I find that the confluence of economic threats – such as increased unemployment – and cultural threats – such as increased migration – create a “perfect storm” for the radical right to prime the relationship between exclusionary national identity on the one hand and anti-immigrant attitudes and support for radical right ideals on the other. Given this fertile breeding ground of high demand for the radical right during times of national threat, I also find that political institutions – i.e. non-permissive electoral systems – can put a brake on these social demands for the radical right. According to my findings, the radical right will be most successful capitalizing on the convergence of economic and cultural threats in countries with permissive electoral systems.
In sum, it is not the case that those with exclusionary national identity necessarily are “extremists” or xenophobes that support the radical right. Rather, those with exclusionary national identity are susceptible to radical right appeals under conditions of economic and cultural threat, and even given these conditions, voters with exclusionary national identity will be more likely to support these parties in permissive electoral systems where their vote will “count.” Hence, those with restrictive views of national identity are conditional extremists who are vulnerable to the radical right’s xenophobic messages only under certain conditions.

5.2 Implications for Scholarship on Anti-Immigrant Attitudes and the Radical Right

These findings have implications both for scholars of the radical right as well as social identity theory. First, for scholars of the radical right electorate, the modifying role of electoral permissiveness should be carefully considered before looking to other political institutions to explain variation in radical right success. Past studies have come to contradictory conclusions about the role of electoral institutions partly because studies (with some exceptions, e.g. Golder 2003) often do not look at electoral institutions as modifying variables; scholars should look at how country-level institutional variables interact with individual-level demands for the radical right. Demand – in the form of anti-immigrant attitudes and radical right ideals – is necessary but not sufficient for radical right support. My findings suggest that the lack of success of the radical right in some countries at some points in time with permissive electoral systems should not lead us to conclude that electoral institutions do not matter. Rather, scholars should first account for

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52 I would not argue that other political opportunity structures are unimportant. Rather, I suggest that we should not dismiss the importance of electoral laws based on conflicting research findings for the reasons given above.
the level of demand in different countries at different points in time, and explore how those demands interact with electoral laws. My findings suggest that electoral laws either encourage the expression of or put a brake on social demands — exclusionary national identity and anti-immigrant attitudes — for the radical right in the ways predicted by Duverger’s hypothesis. In times of economic and cultural threat, non-permissive political institutions can mitigate these demands for extremist politics. Interestingly, I also find that non-permissive systems do not discourage “protest voting” by those who self-identify as at the far right of the ideology scale. This suggests expressive voters, or “true believers,” are willing to “exit using voice” (Kang 2004) regardless of electoral permissiveness. These voters signal (i.e. voice) their frustration with mainstream parties by voting for radical right parties regardless of the likelihood of electoral success of these parties. This puzzling finding may also help to explain the contradictory results in past scholarship. I discuss the potential for future research on this question in section 5.4 below.

Second, my findings on exclusionary national identity have implications for both radical right scholarship and social identity theory. The radical right scholarship categorizes parties as radical right depending on whether these parties make appeals to exclusionary national identity based on the assumption that a restrictive view of national identity underlies anti-immigrant politics. Identity is also often used as a framework for studies of prejudice more broadly, and exclusionary national identity in particular is used to explain prejudice against immigrants. For some time, traditional social identity theory has been found wanting because in-group identification — through the mechanisms of in-group favoritism and positive distinctiveness — is not necessarily associated with negative
attitudes towards out-groups. In the case of the puzzle I explore, even so-called restrictive identities, such as national identities based on predominantly ethnic and/or exclusive characteristics, are not necessarily associated with anti-immigrant attitudes or support for anti-immigrant political parties. The results from my analyses in Chapters 3 and 4 suggest that exclusionary national identities and anti-immigrant prejudice cannot be adequately understood without considering the context of group relations. Identities can be latent and “harmless” in terms of their relationship with prejudice against out-groups or, under conditions of (perceived or actual) threat and group competition, these identities can manifest themselves in prejudice and support for political mobilization against out-groups.

The mechanism through which national context influences identities seems quite similar to that uncovered in work on authoritarian personality – another psychological predisposition often purported to be associated with both prejudice and radical right support. Stenner (2005) finds that authoritarianism becomes activated when circumstances of threat challenge that personality predisposition. Similarly, I find that the way in which exclusionary national identity is translated into prejudice against out-groups is a dynamic process in which individuals’ identities interact with changing environmental conditions. According to Stenner, “the relationship between the predisposition and its manifest products depends upon the environment, that is, that societal conditions affect the extent to which those predispositions are expressed in racist and intolerant attitudes and behaviors” (Stenner 2005, p. 13). I also find that for those with exclusionary conceptions of national identity, perceived deleterious changes in the
balance between natives and migrants combined with poor economic conditions activates the expression of anti-immigrant attitudes and support for the radical right.

The political consequences of individual psychological predispositions are best understood within their social contexts. The implication for scholarship on the relationship between identities – racial, ethnic and national – and prejudice is that researchers should carefully consider the context in which those identities are formed and shaped. Since environmental conditions are in flux, we should be wary of assuming the relationships between identities and prejudice or radical right support are static. Contradictory findings on the relationships between these variables may reflect changing environmental conditions rather than indicating that identities do not matter in shaping prejudicial attitudes and radical right support. Scholars should also be cautious in stating firm conclusions about these relationships based on studies from one point in time or in one social context.

5.3 Implications for Contemporary Politics

In addition to implications for scholarship, there are also implications for political actors. Currently, developed democracies are facing one of the worst global economic downturns in decades. Many developed democracies continue to be destinations for immigrants, and due to the recent financial crisis, unemployment rates are extremely high in most of these countries. According to the implications of my findings, the current conditions should be highly favorable for continued growth in radical right demand and electoral success. There are several implications, then, for contemporary politics.

First, I will discuss the implications for mainstream right parties. During times of high economic and cultural threat, particularly in countries with permissive electoral
systems, mainstream right parties will have to decide whether to co-opt radical right positions on immigration and national identity, or leave the door open to radical right parties to capture right voters by running on these issues. In Chapter 3, France was one of the cases with high simultaneous cultural and economic threat during the period when the 2003 ISSP module was in the field. In 2002, the French radical right party Front National (FN)’s leader Jean-Marie Le Pen gained the second highest number of votes in the first round of the French presidential election. Since this political event, the largest mainstream right party in France – the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) – has been very attentive to issues that were normally the bread and butter of the FN. For example, amidst the current global economic crisis, the UMP-led government in France initiated a three-month series of discussions about French national identity beginning in November 2009. Eric Besson, the Minister for Immigration and National Identity, stated that, “[w]e must reaffirm the values of national identity and pride in being French,” and Besson “says it's important for an increasingly diverse France to define its essential unifying values and reclaim a national pride and patriotism that the National Front co-opted long ago for its own xenophobic purposes” (Crumley 2009).

These discussions about French national identity are not without policy implications. Following the public debate on French identity, a French parliamentary committee in January 2010 recommended a partial ban on women wearing face veils in hospitals, schools, government offices, and on public transportation. “The commission called on parliament to adopt a formal resolution stating that the face veil was ‘contrary to the values of the republic’ and proclaiming that ‘all of France is saying no to the full

53 Note that the first round of the French presidential two round system electoral system is relatively permissive.
veil” (“France MPs,” 2010). In other words, the UMP-led government is striving to more formally define French identity in ways that exclude certain Muslim practices, which has angered many French Muslim women and those on the left. The Socialist opposition has come out against the ban, dividing the mainstream French political parties on the issue of how to define and express French national identity.

The French case illustrates how mainstream right parties, particularly in countries with permissive electoral systems during times of economic crisis and high migration, will have to wrestle with their platforms on national identity and immigration policies. In the case of France, the UMP has taken what is considered by many to be an “extreme” position against Muslims and in favor of exclusionary conceptions of national identity traditionally more characteristic of the FN. Given the rising success of the radical right and the current poor economic conditions, it is likely that we will see other mainstream right parties who do not want to cede political power to radical right parties grappling with how to align on these issues. According to my findings, this problem is particularly pressing for mainstream parties in permissive systems.

As we would expect according to my findings, the radical right parties in non-permissive systems, such as the British National Party (BNP) in the UK, appear to have more difficulty capitalizing on the current climate of economic and cultural threat than radical right parties in permissive systems. Thus, mainstream parties in non-permissive systems are not as hard pressed to consider the political costs and benefits of co-opting the radical right agenda. This is not to say that radical right demand is non-existent in these systems, or that mainstream parties in non-permissive systems have no cause for concern. For example, recent polls in the UK suggest that a vast majority of British
citizens believe immigration should be reduced, and anti-immigration lobbyists claim mainstream British political parties are out of step with voters on this issue (Boxell 2010). The BNP’s leader – Nick Griffin – recently announced his plan to stand for election in a borough where a less well-known BNP candidate narrowly lost in 2005. In the suburban town of Barking, the party “believes that white working-class alienation can best be exploited to gain a first crucial foothold in Westminster” (Baldwin and Hamilton 2010). In other words, amidst the current global economic crisis, the breeding ground is ideal for the radical right, and even in non-permissive systems the radical right is attempting to make electoral inroads. However, despite high demand for the radical right agenda, the BNP has yet to win a seat in the British parliament. Mainstream political parties in countries with non-permissive electoral systems have been much more successful than those in permissive systems at stemming the tide of radical right electoral success.

Second, my findings call for skepticism about tolerance of diversity during times of national crisis, even in so-called consensus democracies that traditionally have been seen as promoting consensus building and cooperation between ethnic groups. My findings suggest that exclusionary national identity has a strong relationship with anti-immigrant attitudes in the context of high economic and cultural threat. National identity is one of the most universal social identities, arguably because it is formally taught to schoolchildren from a young age in modern democracies. Given that national identity is a psychological predisposition strongly held by so many, those with exclusionary conceptions of national identity will be susceptible to political messages suggesting that national identity is under threat from “outsiders” to the nation, such as immigrants and
native “foreigners.” For example, during the current global economic crisis, polls show that a majority of the French favors the proposed ban on the face veil (Erlanger 2010). Similarly, a majority of Swiss citizens voted for the recent minaret ban. Given my findings that, controlling for other predictors of anti-immigrant attitudes, prejudice against immigrants among those with exclusionary national identity is quite strong under conditions of national threat, it will be difficult during crisis periods for political elites who embrace multiculturalism and diversity to stem the tide of nativism among a majority citizens who feel that their way of life is threatened by outsiders. During these periods in countries with permissive electoral systems and successful radical right parties, we should expect serious policy implications (such as the face veil and minaret examples) for immigrants and native minorities.

5.4 Future Research and Unanswered Questions

While my work contributes to the literature on the radical right by bringing together individual-level and environmental-level explanations, there are several questions left unanswered and potential areas for future research. First, I will address the limits of my research design and discuss some puzzling findings. I confronted missing data problems in terms of both migration data and median district magnitude data. As described in Chapter 3, migration data were missing particularly for less developed countries, and consequently my samples did not include the handful of cases surveyed by the ISSP in East Asia and Africa. While these regions do not have radical right parties, they are not wholly free of anti-immigrant sentiment and even violence among their citizens. For example, in April-June 2008, significant anti-immigrant violence erupted in Johannesburg and Cape Town, South Africa. Dozens of immigrants from neighboring
African countries were murdered in the mob violence. Media reports attributed the violence to spiraling unemployment. “With some estimates putting unemployment rates at close to 40 percent, some locals have become increasingly angry over perceptions that immigrants and refugees are stealing their opportunities. In recent years, this has spilled over into violence against foreigners: according to Yusuf Hassan, a senior spokesman for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), over the last two years 472 Somalis have been killed and 1,200 injured in what he sees as xenophobic attacks” (Gurney 2008). Since data limitations in this project did not allow me to explore the dynamics in these regions, this is clearly an area for future research. I also had missing median district magnitude data for the 2003 time period (see Table 4-3), though in this case the missing data was not systematic by region. In the future, as both CLEA and the Democratic Electoral Systems Around the World update their datasets to include more recent observations, replication of my analyses on the modifying role of electoral systems would be a useful robustness check on my findings.

In addition to data limitations, there were also some puzzling findings that warrant further exploration and testing. First, with regards to the relationship between exclusionary national identity and anti-immigrant attitudes, in both my pooled and my within country analyses, I find that this relationship is substantively and statistically significant even in some low economic and cultural threat cases. For example, we see this in Figure 3-13 and in the within country results for Norway (1995) and Canada (1995). This was not the case for the relationships between exclusionary national identity, economic-cultural threat, and far right ideology. While the relationship between exclusionary national identity and anti-immigrant prejudice was lower in magnitude in
these low threat cases compared to high threat cases, it was still substantive and statistically significant. In other words, cultural and economic threats boost this relationship, but the relationship does remain at modest levels even in some cases where threats are absent. This begs the question: what primes the relationship between exclusionary national identity and anti-immigrant attitudes in some low economic-cultural threat contexts but not others? There are several possible explanations. This relationship between national identity and anti-immigrant prejudice may be more “sticky” than the relationship between identity and ideology or vote choice, such that a modest relationship persists even after a wave of national threat has subsided. Alternatively, despite a lack of “objective” cultural or economic threats in these cases, elites may still foment perceptions of threat among citizens in these countries (a possibility I discuss in more detail below). Lastly, there may be some missing mechanism that I have failed to identify that primes this relationship in some low cultural-economic threat cases.

Second, as I discussed in detail in Chapter 4, the relationship between far right ideology and radical right voting is modified by electoral institutions in an unexpected way; the relationship between far right ideology and probability of voting for the radical right stable across all levels of electoral permissiveness. I suggested one alternative explanation from the scholarship on the radical right, which is that far right ideologues constitute a “protest” subelectorate (Mudde 2007, Kang 2004, Betz 1994). I find support for the subelectorate explanation. This puzzling finding about how electoral incentives influence the relationship between far right ideology and radical right voting suggests this is an area for future data collection and analysis. If the “protest vote” subelectorate explanation accounts for this puzzling relationship, it would be interesting to explore
what accounts for why the radical right appeals to alienated, anti-system voters in both non-permissive and permissive systems. Are these voters in fact “true believers” in the radical right and its policy platforms, or are they simply voting for parties with little chance of electoral success to voice their discontent with the centrist mainstream parties? More broadly, this puzzling finding is of interest to political science scholarship on what motivates people to vote. What leads some voters to vote for expressive reasons and others to vote for instrumental reasons?

In addition to these puzzling findings, there are other potential areas for future research and unanswered questions. The first unanswered question is: how are messages about the economic and cultural threats communicated from elites to citizens? In other words, I have left in a black box the mechanism of elite frames, and looked instead at the relationship between national identity and radical right support as modified by objective measures of economic and cultural threat. In doing so, I have assumed that these objective conditions are framed as threats by elites – including the media and politicians – to the masses. I have not shown that it is elites who frame national conditions as threatening rather than citizens who readily perceive objective economic and cultural changes. Citizens may perceive economic threats due to job losses in their local communities, or cultural threats due to changes in the ethnic makeup of their local communities. In order to show that the mechanism works in the way I theorize, future research could explore whether, during times of economic and cultural threat, elite messages about immigrants and national identity increase in both quantity and/or change in quality to be more xenophobic in ways that my model predicts. Another interesting question is whether elites can prime fears about national threats in the absence of
objective economic and cultural threats. In other words, are objective perceived
deleterious changes in the economic and cultural national climate necessary conditions
for elites to prime the relationship between national identity and radical right support? Or
can elites foment fear absent these conditions?

As with any major political issues, there are several frames competing in the
political marketplace. I have not explored whether competing frames (such as
multiculturalist or tolerance frames) can or do mitigate nativist movements, or mobilize
opposition to the radical right. In addition, I have not explored what other economic or
cultural threat frames – such as increasing national inequality, decreasing wages,
decreasing social mobility, increasing inflation, increasing levels of refugees, etc. – might
be effectively manipulated by elites to activate radical right support among those with
exclusionary national identity. It would be interesting to investigate types of competing
frames and their effects on both the radical right electorate as well as electorates opposed
to the radical right agenda.

Second, my concept of cultural threat would be better tested if I had looked not
just at quantity of immigrants, but also qualities of immigrants. Past research suggests
that the degree of cultural difference of the immigrants matters greatly in whether
immigrant groups are seen as cultural threats. For example, in an earlier paper on the
subject of attitudes towards immigration in Europe (Potter 2007), I found the relationship
between exclusionary national identity and prejudice toward “poor non-European”
immigrants to be almost twice the magnitude of the relationship between exclusionary
national identity and prejudice toward “rich European” immigrants. Similarly, in their
study of American public opinion towards immigration, Brader et al. (2008) find that
reactions to news about the costs of immigration depend upon who the immigrants are; white opposition to news about the costs of immigration is significantly higher for Latino immigrants compared to European immigrants. Unfortunately, I did not explore this question because comparative data is extremely limited on the countries of origin of immigrants. In the future, it would be interesting to explore how the type of immigrant influences the relationship between national identity and prejudice against immigrants within countries where data on immigrant background is available. Alternatively, an experiment manipulating the qualities of the immigrants – race, country of origin, language, religion – in questions about attitudes towards immigrants embedded in a cross-national survey similar to the ISSP could also shed light on this question.

Finally, some of the research that informed my puzzle suggests that it is not just national-level variation, but also subnational-level variation that matters in modifying the relationship between exclusionary identity and anti-immigrant attitudes. For example, in Belgium, the effect of Belgian identity on anti-immigrant attitudes differed for those living in Wallonia as compared to those living in Flanders (Maddens et al. 2000). In the United States, the relationship between exclusionary national identity and anti-immigrant sentiment was strong for white, but not black, Americans (Carter and Perez 2008). While my findings suggest that national-level economic climate, migration climate, and electoral institutions modify the relationship between national identity and radical right support, if the theoretical mechanism of threat works in the ways I suggest, it should also be the case that regional and local level differences in these variables also account for variation in radical right support and anti-immigrant sentiment. It would be interesting to explore whether exclusionary national identity is expressed more in some regions than
others and among some native groups compared to others. Future research could explore whether support for the radical right is most pronounced in regions with the highest levels of unemployment and migration. In addition, electoral institutions often vary depending on whether elections are legislative or executive, as well as whether they are national, federal, state or local. Scholars can explore how variation in electoral laws within a country influences the degree of success of the radical right at local vs. national levels, or in elections for the legislature as opposed to the executive.

5.5 Conclusion

I contribute to the scholarship on national identity and the radical right by showing how identities interact with environmental variables to shape anti-immigrant attitudes and radical right support. This research has implications for scholars of the radical right, identity/ethnic politics, and social identity theory, as well as implications for what we might expect to see in contemporary political competition between mainstream parties and the radical right. I also suggest that there remain several puzzles to solve and questions to answer, and I hope that future research will help us to better understand the growing support for radical right parties and their brand of “extreme” identity politics.

The lesson of my findings is that we should not think of radical right electorates as built firmly upon a foundation of nationalistic xenophobes. Rather, average citizens with restrictive views about national identity are vulnerable to extreme, anti-immigrant appeals only under certain conditions. Love of one’s homeland need not manifest itself in hatred of foreigners. On the other hand, given conditions that threaten the way of life and economic dominance of “native sons,” stemming the tide of intolerance of outsiders will be challenging in contemporary democracies. Under conditions of threat (particularly in
countries with permissive electoral systems), a “kinder, gentler form of democracy” (Lijphart 1999, p. 275) may be a pipe dream.
## Table A-1: Results for Ideology as Dependent Variable – Cultural Threat Hypothesis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exclusionary national identity</td>
<td>0.33** (0.13)</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration Change</td>
<td>0.32 (0.36)</td>
<td>-0.45 (0.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NID x Migration Change</td>
<td>-0.12 (0.11)</td>
<td>0.28 (0.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>0.01 (0.05)</td>
<td>0.07** (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.20* (0.11)</td>
<td>0.14† (0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled</td>
<td>0.07* (0.04)</td>
<td>0.08* (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.07* (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.08** (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>-0.27** (0.07)</td>
<td>-0.21** (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>-0.00 (0.00)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>2.30** (0.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
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<td>15574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
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</table>

** p ≤ .05  * p ≤ .10  † p ≤ .15
Table A-2: Results for Ideology as Dependent Variable – Economic Threat Hypothesis

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exclusionary national identity</td>
<td>0.26** (0.06)</td>
<td>0.18** (0.04)</td>
<td>0.28** (0.07)</td>
<td>0.24** (0.05)</td>
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<td>-0.02 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NID x Unemployment Change</td>
<td>0.01† (0.00)</td>
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<td>0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.01)</td>
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<td>Nationalism</td>
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<td>0.07** (0.02)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.05)</td>
<td>0.04† (0.03)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
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<td>0.08 (0.12)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Skilled</td>
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<td>0.06† (0.04)</td>
<td>0.11* (0.06)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.06* (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.08** (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.07** (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.11** (0.03)</td>
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<td>Unemployed</td>
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<td>R-squared</td>
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** p ≤ .05  * p ≤ .10  † p ≤ .15
Table A-3: Results for Ideology as Dependent Variable – Economic-Cultural Threat Interaction Hypothesis

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<th>Explanatory Variable</th>
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<th>Coef. (RSE)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exclusionary national identity</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Threat: Migration Change</td>
<td>-0.31</td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Threat: Unemployment Change</td>
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<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusionary national identity x Cultural Threat</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusionary national identity x Economic Threat</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Threat x Economic Threat</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusionary national identity x Cultural Threat x Economic Threat</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>0.04*</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.11†</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled</td>
<td>0.09**</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.08**</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>-0.24**</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
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<td>(0.00)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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** p ≤ .05  * p ≤ .10  † p ≤ .15
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<tr>
<th>Explanatory Variable</th>
<th>Coef.</th>
<th>(RSE)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Anti-Immigrant Attitudes</td>
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<td>(0.13)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Log Median District Magnitude</td>
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<td>(0.37)</td>
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<td>Anti-Immigrant Attitudes x Log Median District Magnitude</td>
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<td>(0.06)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Extreme Right Ideology</td>
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<td>(0.70)</td>
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<td>Extreme Right Ideology x Log Median District Magnitude</td>
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<td>(0.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusionary National Identity</td>
<td>-0.19**</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusionary National Identity x Log Median District Magnitude</td>
<td>0.18**</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
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<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
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<td>(0.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Pseudo R-squared</td>
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** p ≤ .05  * p ≤ .10 † p ≤ .15
Figure A-1: Marginal Effect of National Identity on Ideology Conditioned on Cultural Threat 1995

![Figure A-1](image1.png)

Figure A-2: Marginal Effect of National Identity on Ideology Conditioned on Cultural Threat 2003

![Figure A-2](image2.png)
Figure A-3: Marginal Effect of National Identity on Ideology Conditioned on Economic Threat 1995

Figure A-4: Marginal Effect of National Identity on Ideology Conditioned on Economic Threat 2003
Figure A-5: Marginal Effect of National Identity on Ideology Conditioned on Economic Threat in Immigrant Receivers 1995

Figure A-6: Marginal Effect of National Identity on Ideology Conditioned on Economic Threat in Immigrant Receivers 2003
Figure A-7: Marginal Effect of National Identity on Ideology Conditioned on Cultural Threat and Economic Threat Interaction in 1995 and 2003

Figure A-8: Marginal Effect of Exclusionary National Identity on Radical Right Vote Intention Conditioned on Logged Median District Magnitude (controlling for anti-immigrant attitudes and extreme right ideology)
Bibliography


Maddens, Bart, Jaak Billiet and Roeland Beerten. 2000. “National identity and the


