Animosity or Alliance? Identifying the Factors that Promote Black and Latino Electoral Coalitions

by

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TO MY PARENTS: HERMAN M. AND JOAN M. BENJAMIN

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The Best Kept Secret

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

"I don't know what taking an endorsement means." – Michael Bloomberg[1]

"In many ways, the candidates' policy ideas were in sync on transportation, flooding, economic development and other issues, leading voters to pay more attention to endorsements and attacks."[2]

New Political Context

The population of the United States is changing: in many places non-Hispanic Whites are no longer the clear majority and increasingly, in many locales throughout the country, Blacks are no longer the *only* minority.[3] Over the past few decades, immigration from Latin American and Asian countries has risen dramatically (Frey 2006, 2). As these population changes continue, we will need to understand how Whites, Latinos, Blacks, and Asians relate to one another with respect to levels of political

[1] Bloomberg Is Said To Get Nod From Mayor The New York Times October 27, 2001
[2] Mayoral Race Voters delve into hopefuls' personalities Campaign that ends Saturday pits Locke, Parker in tight contest voters: Election is Saturday The Houston Chronicle December 11, 2009
[3] Yet, none of these groups should be thought of as monolithic. There is a lot of in-group variation. See *Blacks,*
Latinos, and Asians in Urban America; status and prospects for politics and activism. 1994. Jennings, James eds.Westport, CT: Praeger Press. Additionally, work has been done which looks at how West Indians and Blacks Identify in the US see Thomas, T., & Deaux, K. (in press). Black immigrants to the United States: Confronting and constructing ethnicity and race. In R. Mahalingam (Ed.), *Cultural psychology of immigrants*. Mahwah, NJ.: Lawrence Erlbaum and Waters, M. (1999). *Black identities: Immigrant dreams and American Realities*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

incorporation, racial attitudes, voting behavior, policy preferences, and the development of possible coalition partnerships at the local level. This project will focus on local elections, but it is possible that there are important lessons for both state and national politics as well. Previous research on biracial coalitions might be instructive on this question, but this literature has mostly been limited to the study of Whites, Blacks, and to a much lesser extent Latinos, in cities where the Black population ranged from 5% to 45% and the Latino population ranged from 5% to 21% (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984, 21). Today, Blacks and Latinos make up about 28% of the population of the United States.[4] Demographers report that Latinos are now the largest minority group in the United States and that in many major cities Blacks and Latinos compromise a plurality or majority making cities a great place to address the question of minorities and potential coalitions (see details on the distribution of the Black and Latino populations in Appendix 1). In metropolitan areas like New York, NY; Los Angeles, CA; Chicago, IL; Miami, FL, Houston, TX; and Dallas TX, Blacks and Latinos comprise 37% to 56% of the population (see Appendix 1). In light of these demographic changes, this project seeks to gain a better understanding about the prospects for coalitions between these two groups. It is often assumed that given their shared circumstances as disadvantaged minorities, relative to Whites, that Blacks and Latinos should work together. That is, they seem to be natural allies. Yet, evidence from recent elections in four cities where Blacks and Latinos make up a plurality of the population show a mixed pattern of electoral alliances.

[4] Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2004, "U.S. Interim Projections by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin," <http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/usinterimproj/> Internet Release Date: March 18, 2004

Recent Elections

It is instructive to begin with an examination of some of the recent mayoral elections in Los Angeles, New York, Houston and Miami. In 2001, Jim Hahn, a White candidate, was elected Mayor of Los Angeles. Black voters overwhelmingly supported Hahn (80%), while Latino voters overwhelmingly supported Antonio Villaraigosa, his Latino opponent (82%). Fast forward four years to 2005 and Villaraigosa defeats Hahn in a rematch of their 2001 mayoral contest, only this time a majority (58%) of Blacks voted for Villaraigosa. Latino support for Villaraigosa remained stable and exceptionally high across both contests, as shown in Table 1.1. Why did a Black-Latino electoral coalition emerge in 2005 but not in 2001?[5]

[TABLE 1.1 ABOUT HERE]

The variability of Black/Latino electoral coalitions is not just confined to Los Angeles. In New York, for example, Blacks and Latinos often vote for the same candidate, but the levels of support fluctuate. In 2005 when a Latino candidate, Fernando Ferrer, ran for Mayor, many Blacks and Latinos voted for him at 53% and 63% respectively. However, in 2001, the vast majority (75%) of Blacks supported the Democratic candidate Mark Green, whereas Latinos were almost evenly divided between Green and Republican Candidate Michael Bloomberg (see Table 1.2).

[TABLE 1.2 ABOUT HERE]

[5] At least part of the reason that Black voters abandoned Hahn in his reelection bid was because he did not reappoint the African American chief of police. This was not, however, the only factor as pre-election polls also showed that Blacks preferred Villaraigosa on some policy domains. Less than half of Blacks attributed their vote to the Parks situation.

An even starker racial divide emerged in Houston. In 1997, the mayoral election produced four contenders: Lee Brown, a Black candidate, Rob Mosbacher, a White candidate, Gracie Saenz, a Latina candidate, and George Greanias, another White candidate. Blacks overwhelmingly supported Brown (97%), while Latinos gave a majority of their support to Saenz (69%) and Whites split their votes between Mosbacher and Greanias with 51% and 30% respectively (Table 3). The election was forced into a runoff, which pitted Brown against Mosbacher. This time, Blacks and Latinos supported Brown (97% and 66% respectively) while 77% of Whites voted for Mosbacher. Brown became the first Black mayor of Houston. In 1999 he was easily reelected. However, in the 2001 runoff election, Brown faced a Republican candidate of Cuban descent, Orlando Sanchez. Blacks and Latinos each overwhelmingly supported the candidate from their own group (97% and 70% respectively), but Brown was able to get close to 28% of the Latino vote (see Table 1.3). Brown defeated Sanchez in a close race, 52% to 48% in overall votes.

[TABLE 1.3 ABOUT HERE]

In Miami Hispanics, and particularly Cuban- Americans, represent the majority of the population and so there are fewer incentives to form Black-Latino coalitions. Indeed, because Blacks are overwhelmingly Democratic and Cubans are typically Republican, the two groups are usually on opposite sides of the political divide. However, race and ethnicity appear to trump partisanship in this city. For instance, in 1996, Arthur Teele, a Black Republican faced Alex Penelas, a Cuban Democrat in the mayoral election. Sixty-

percent of Latinos voted for Penelas while 84% of Blacks voted for Teele (see Table 1.4). Penelas won the election, with 60% of the total vote to Teele's 40%. However, even in Miami these two groups have been known to form short-term coalitions on occasion. For example, Blacks and Latinos worked together in 1992 to change the county commission elections to increase representation for each community (Grenier and Perez 2003, 81).

[TABLE 1.4 ABOUT HERE]

Why is it that Black-Latino coalitions emerge in some cities but not others or in some elections but not others? There seems to be no clear pattern from one election to the next, even when voters are faced with the same candidates (e.g. the Los Angeles mayoral elections of 2001 and 2005). In the next chapters, I will demonstrate that the extant literature has failed to provide a satisfactory answer to these questions. I argue that this is primarily due to researchers overlooking the important role that endorsements from ethnic and racial group organizations provide in explaining the variation in voting patterns among Blacks and Latinos.

In this dissertation, I will explore the relationship between endorsements and candidate preferences. More specifically I will examine the circumstances under which endorsements are persuasive enough to voters to encourage them to support the endorsed candidate (see Figure 1.1). That is, this dissertation seeks to determine if a coalition has formed among Black and Latino co-ethnic leaders and this alliance is publicized through endorsements, will voters respond by supporting the endorsed candidate?

[FIGURE 1.1 ABOUT HERE]

Literature Review

In order to best understand coalitions, one must first understand the process of incorporation. For purposes of this work, an electoral coalition is an agreement between one or more racial/ethnic group leaders or organizations with the common goal of getting their preferred candidate into office. It should be noted, that coalitions can also develop from the bottom up, however, this dissertation will focus on top down coalition formation. Given that a coalition has formed, can racial/ethnic group leaders deliver voters? This project focuses on Black-Latino voting blocs, but the framework developed in this dissertation could be applied to any set of politically cohesive groups.

Early work on ethnic incorporation by Dahl (1961) suggested that groups would go through three stages in order to achieve full incorporation into city politics (34). In the first stage, because of low wage jobs, high homogeneity in terms of socio-economic status, and political homogeneity, all group members would vote alike and eventually get one or two members of their own group into low levels of city politics (Dahl 1961, 34-35). In the second stage, the group begins to get heterogeneous as some group members move up in terms of socio-economic status. Soon group members get major party nominations and rely on ethnic appeals to get the votes needed to win the election (Dahl 1961, 35). Finally, in the third stage, the group members are now part of the middle class, they have friends outside of the ethnic group, and ethnic voting seems like a less effective strategy (Dahl 1961, 36). Whether or not these stages, designed with recent European ethnic groups in mind, applies to Blacks and Latinos remains to be seen (although see Browning et al. 1984 for a critical view). Most importantly, however, Dahl's model makes no mention of coalitions. Early European immigrants simply passed through these

three stages to achieve incorporation. For ethnic and racial minority groups, time alone did not lead to incorporation into local politics. Determining the specific route to incorporation is important because it has implications for the prospects of bi-racial electoral coalitions. If ethnic and racial minority groups face more opposition to incorporation than earlier European immigrants, then under some conditions it may be strategic for Blacks and Latinos to form electoral partnerships.

Previous scholars of minority incorporation have stressed the necessity of coalitions in order for minorities to achieve full incorporation into local politics. That is, in order for racial minorities to become involved in politics, achieve representation, and enact policies that benefit their group, they needed to form coalitions. The seminal work in this area was the study of ten Northern California cities by Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (1984). The study found that certain conditions were required in order for incorporation to occur. These factors include the size of the minority population, the proportion of Democrats in the city, and the level of support among Whites and Hispanics for public policies that benefited minorities. Most importantly, Browning Marshall, and Tabb found that coalitions were necessary for minorities to achieve incorporation in cities where Whites were the majority (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984, 31). For Browning, Marshall, and Tabb, coalitions with liberal Whites were needed to achieve full incorporation.[6]

From this work, we can find mention of three factors that appear necessary for biracial coalitions to form:

[6] Browning, Marshall, and Tabb measured incorporation by looking at whether the percentage of Blacks and Latinos on the city council was representative of the population in the city, the types of legislation that was passed once officials were elected, and how city council members voted on certain legislation. Pp 272-276.

1. Population size. There must be a sufficiently large minority-voting bloc to achieve incorporation (31).
2. White liberals and minorities needed to have shared political interests, which are generally operationalized as being unable to get into the local government (37).
3. There needed to be a critical mass of White Democrats and White liberals. Moreover, these Whites and minorities needed to have a shared ideology, which was measured by opposition to racially conservative policies. It was such that both groups had similarly liberal ideas about government.

Soon scholars began to wonder if Browning, Marshall, and Tabb's findings were unique to Northern California and not perhaps generalizable to other cities in the United States such as Cleveland, Chicago, and New York. In these locales, perceived polarization between Blacks and Whites prevented any biracial electoral alliances from forming. This prompted Sonenshein's (1993) study of Los Angeles to see if biracial coalitions were indeed dead (1). He selected Los Angeles because of its size and well-known conservatism, which meant his test was even harder than the more liberal cities of Northern California (Sonenshein 1993, 7). Studying the period from the mid-1960's to the early 1990's, he found high levels of Black incorporation based on a coalition of "Black and White liberals of which Latinos and Asian-American have become increasingly important members" (Sonenshein 1993, 7). According to Sonenshein, the biracial coalition was not dead in Los Angeles and in fact, "the success of biracial electoral coalitions between Blacks and white Liberals depends primarily on ideology[7], but with crucial roles for interest[8] and leadership" (Sonenshein 1993, 10). He is careful to note that racially liberal ideology is necessary but not sufficient, interests must also be in line: "interest alliance, or at least the absence of interest conflict, is a condition

[7] Defined as: "the enduring and solid character of biracial coalitions based on common beliefs." Or "Ideology—specifically racial ideology—is a set of beliefs that deeply affects political opinions. Ideology shapes opinion, even at the expense of immediate self-interests." Ibid.
[8] "Interests are the glue of coalitions, at best, short lived tactical compromises between self-centered groups." Ibid.

required for a strong biracial coalition" (Sonenshein 1993, 10). Finally, he writes, "leaders and organizers have an impact on how group interests are perceived" (Sonenshein 1993, 10).

The primacy that Sonenshein provides to ideology over interests and his addition of the importance of leadership stood in stark contrast to Ture and Hamilton (1992 [1967]). According to these authors, politics is almost entirely about the pursuit and defense of group interests. That is, groups want what is good for their own group. Politics then is about "conflicts of interests, not of consciences" (Ture and Hamilton 1967, 36). This is significant for Ture and Hamilton because Blacks and Whites did not always want the same things, so that eventually, moral connections would fade in light of concerns about interests. These authors then go on to identify four conditions needed for a viable coalition with Blacks (Ture and Hamilton 1967, 79-80).

1. Each group realized that the other group had its own "self-interests."
2. Each group recognized that the coalition is more beneficial than forming an alliance with another group.
3. Each group has its own "independent base of power" and each group makes its own decisions.
4. Coalition is formed to deal with "specific and identifiable—as opposed to general and vague—goals."

In this way, coalitions are seen as temporary alliances to achieve specific goals that benefit each group, but cannot be achieved without the support of each group.

In the latest edition of their edited volume, *Racial Politics in American Cities*, Browning, Marshall and Tabb (2003) return to the question of minority incorporation in various cities and whether or not it has been achieved. Through the course of the volume, various scholars of racial politics at the local level offer their expertise on certain cities to assess the extent to which minorities have achieved incorporation and to offer

suggestions for how this goal might be met in the future. Again, the focus of the work is not coalitions per se, but many of the chapters address coalitions as the route to which incorporation may or may not be achieved. However, this work is important because of their focus on numerous cities and the ways in which minority incorporation might be achieved. In chapter two, Sonenshein (2003a) returns to Los Angeles to find out what happened there once the Bradley biracial coalition ran its course. He finds that in the years after Bradley left office that even though there were more Latinos than Blacks, they were not as successful at achieving incorporation.[9] Given their secondary supporting role in the biracial coalition, this is not that surprising. He also notes that as time went on and relations between Blacks and Jews became strained, the biracial coalition fell apart. Then in 2001, when Villaraigosa ran against Hahn, Villaraigosa sought out Jews as coalition partners, but that did not work out as planned as the Jewish vote was evenly split between the candidates. Blacks remained loyal to Hahn, in part because of his father's ties to the Black community, and he won the election. The lesson learned from Los Angeles since the original biracial coalition was formed is that groups are less stable in terms of their coalition commitments. The coalition is not permanent and as a result, groups may be looking for new coalition partners more often than once thought (Ture and Hamilton 1967). This is important for thinking about the prospects of a Black and Latino coalition because it means we should not stop looking for them just because they have not happened yet or have not continuously been active.

Keiser (2003) discusses the role of multiracial coalitions in Philadelphia. Although the residents of Philadelphia are largely Black or White, over time Latinos became an important political group because they could make or break elections when a

[9] Though we know that today, they have in fact elected and re-elected a Latino Mayor in Los Angeles.

White candidate ran against a Black candidate. The first Black mayor of Philadelphia knew this and sought out the Latino vote in 1983. This example illustrated another reason why some coalitions form: necessity. If Whites and Blacks are equal in terms of population, each group may seek out Latinos to help them win. That is, one of the two larger groups will try to form a coalition with the smaller third group. In the case of Latinos in Philadelphia, they mostly joined with Blacks because Black leaders agreed to help create a community review board for the police. Blacks in short, found an issue that Latinos felt strongly about and adopted that issue in an attempt to get their votes. This indicates that perhaps we may find Black and Latino coalitions forming in locales where two groups are neither group is large, one group being Whites, and where the third group will be the deciding factor in elections.

Mollenkopf (2003) considers New York City and the possibility of biracial coalition formation there. What he finds is that Browning, Marshall, and Tabb's (1984) conditions have long been in place, but there has been little evidence of the biracial coalition. Citing the political machine, interethnic competition, and co-optation as reasons for the failure of biracial coalitions in New York, Mollenkopf is clear that situational factors led to the 1989 election of Dinkins, which was due largely to Black, liberal White and Latino support. This explains why he was not re-elected, as the city returned to the regular way of thinking about politics. While Mollenkopf is quick to write off the party machine as a hindrance to the biracial coalition, he still discusses internal party politics to give voice to Blacks and Latinos within the party, and this explains why Blacks and Latinos have achieved some levels of incorporation in the city.

Turning to Chicago, Pinderhughes looks at politics in the city and shows that for a short time, there was a biracial coalition, but that it ultimately was not sustained (2003). Initially Chicago politics was about White ethnics fighting over political office among themselves, but overtime, they unified. By the 1980s, Black leaders and organizations formed a broad coalition. In terms of population, Blacks and Whites are pretty equal (35% and 40% respectively) which leaves Latinos as the pivotal group as a possible coalition partner (Pinderhughes 2003, 148-150). In the early 1980s, Harold Washington was able to form a successful Black and Latino coalition and was elected the city's first Black mayor in 1983. However, after his death, Latinos largely voted for White candidates. The lessons learned from Chicago are similar to Philadelphia in that organizations played a key role in the coalition formation and that Latinos, although smaller in terms of population became the key members of the coalition that led to the election of a Black mayor.

Recent works that look at minority politics at the local or city level emphasize the role of racial attitudes between Blacks and Latinos and the implications these have for the likelihood of coalition formation between these two groups. In Kaufmann's (2004) book, *The Urban Voter: Group Conflict and Mayoral Voting Behavior in American Cities*, she lays out her Group Interest Theory of local voting behavior states that, "heightened perceptions of racial conflict make racial group interests politically salient" (3). That is, when group members perceive that levels of racial conflict are high, they are more likely to think that out -group members interests are bad for their own group. However, this theory was not designed with Blacks and Latinos in mind. Kaufmann's data show that in New York, for example, Blacks and Latinos consistently think that race relations are

generally bad (Kaufmann 2004, 142). This is the mechanism Kaufmann uses to explain White voting behavior, but given the lack of variance on these attitudes among Blacks and Latinos, the theory cannot be applied to these two groups.

Kaufmann has, in other work, also explored the prospects for multi-racial coalitions between Blacks, Latinos, and Whites. She examines the possibility of Blacks and Latinos forming coalitions and argues that there are shared "economic objective circumstances in the United States" between Blacks and Latinos, but she concludes that coalitions are not likely to form because of the lack of commonality felt by Latinos towards Blacks (Kaufmann 2003a, 199). However, the data do not show that Latinos feel all that differently about Blacks or Whites, which begs the question of which groups would be good coalition partners for them if Kaufmann is correct. According to this work, one route to Black-Latino coalitions is through co-ethnic leaders in the Black and Latino community. If leaders can foster a sense of commonality, then there is a chance for Blacks and Latinos to form coalitions. The burden of creating this commonality falls on Latino leaders who must first foster a sense of pan-Latino identity among the various national groups and then foster a sense of commonality with Blacks.

Kaufmann's work is not the first to consider the relationship between racial attitudes and the possibility of Black and Latino coalition formation. Previous research has considered Black attitudes towards Latinos and Asian Americans and Black support for coalitions with those groups (Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Jackson, Gerber, and Cain 1994). Using data from the Los Angeles Racial Group Consciousness study and then comparing it to data collected in the 1984 wave of the National Black Election Study, Jackson et al. find that older Blacks are much more favorable towards coalitions

with other groups (Jackson, Gerber, and Cain 1994). In the Los Angeles study, Blacks were quite positive towards other groups. In addition, 64% felt that is was very important to work through minority parties to achieve racial progress, while only 25% felt it was important to work through an all Black party. Only 15% of Blacks felt it was important to work through an established party (Jackson, Gerber, and Cain 1994, 282). When Jackson et al. compared these results to a national sample they found that nationally Blacks felt closer to Whites, than Latinos. Blacks in Los Angeles then are more favorable towards other minorities and are more likely to favor coalitions with other minorities than Blacks generally.

The public opinion literature is unclear about the prospects of Black-Latino coalitions because Blacks have shown a mixed record of support for the idea and there is not as much work on Latinos (although see Kaufmann 2003a, 2003b, and 2004). In order to address this, Jackson et al. construct a model of coalitional attitudes. They predict that age, income, education, and feelings towards other groups will help explain Black attitudes towards coalitional and non-coalitional political strategies. They find income and education also help shape coalitional support. Finally, feelings about other groups shape preferences for coalitions with these groups. These feelings are shaped by interactions with other groups, as those Blacks who live in integrated parts of the city are more positive towards other groups. This is consistent with Kaufmann's (2003a) findings. According to this article, we should not give up on the possibility of a Black-Latino coalition. However, they do not provide any data on Latino support towards other groups and coalitions, it is also not clear when we should expect to see Black-Latino coalitions.

In order to address the lack of public opinion data from Latinos, McClain et al. (2006) conducted a study that included Blacks, Latinos, and Whites in Durham, North Carolina. The south is an interesting place to look at race relations as it has been predominantly composed of either Blacks or Whites, until recent immigration resulted in an increase in Latinos living in many southern states (571). McClain et al. note that Latinos' negative attitudes towards Blacks may originate in their home countries, but hypothesizes that perhaps as contact between the two groups increases, these negative attitudes may diminish and that with more time spent in the US, they may feel closer to Blacks (2006, 575). Using data from the Durham Survey of Intergroup Relations, they set out to determine the cause of these attitudes.

The McClain et al. piece considers Latino's stereotypical views about Blacks and a measure of closeness that Latinos exhibit towards other groups, as well as the degree to which Latinos feel a sense of Linked Fate with other Latinos. This is a direct test of Kaufmann (2003a), which suggests that Latinos who feel a pan-Latino identity are more likely to also feel close to Blacks, which makes coalitions more likely. McClain et al. find that Latinos' attitudes towards Blacks are more negative than those of Whites towards Blacks. (2006, 578) They find that education reduces these negative attitudes and that female respondents are less negative than males. That is, more educated Latinos have less negative feelings towards Blacks than those Latinos with less education. Similarly, Latinas have less negative feelings towards Blacks than Latinos. Linked fate with other Latinos also leads to more negative views about Blacks. As for Blacks, they also hold negative attitudes towards Latinos, but education and being male can reduce these. The data also show that while Latinos feel they have the most in common with

Whites and the least in common with Blacks, Whites are more likely to feel greater commonality with Blacks. Blacks feel about the same sense of commonality towards Latinos and Whites. What this all seems to suggest is that Blacks and Latinos in Durham are not too fond of one another and that Latinos do not feel they have much in common with Blacks. These data suggest that Blacks and Latinos do not feel favorably towards one another and these feelings have the potential to limit the possibility of Black and Latino coalition formation. What is less clear is how these attitudes influence candidate preferences especially in light of the vote patterns we discussed at the beginning of the chapter.

Some of the previous work has tried to explore the relationship between attitudes among Blacks and Latinos and support for cross-racial coalitions. Using data collected in Providence, Rhode Island, Orr and West (2006) asked questions about racial attitudes towards out groups and levels of support for coalitions with out groups. Orr and West find that Blacks and Latinos are more likely to support multi-racial coalitions than Whites (2006, 213). They also find that among Blacks and Latinos, levels of tolerance towards others and feelings of discrimination are good predictors of support for coalitions" (Orr and West 2006, 214). While other works speculate about the relationship between racial attitudes and coalition formation, this work is instructive because it actually asks about coalitions so that we can predict coalition support with the measures of racial attitudes. This work, much like the Jackson et al. piece (1994), supports Kaufmann's (2003a) theory that there is a relationship between racial attitudes and coalition formation. However, it should be noted that in both the Jackson et al. (1994) study and Orr and West (2006) there seemed to be support for such coalitions.

Moving Beyond the Previous Literature

Incorporation and Coalitions

Although Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (1984) suggest a clear set of conditions that are needed in order for Blacks, Latinos, and liberal Whites to form a multi-racial electoral coalition, based on their study of 10 cities, the ideal outcome will not occur very often. They found that one of the ten cities exhibited the ideal biracial coalition (Berkeley). Though the primary focus of their work was to determine the extent to which incorporation was achieved, the route to incorporation may also be instructive. That is, even with a different goal, perhaps getting a particular candidate into office, how likely is it minorities and liberal Whites in other cities would meet their goals? The city of Berkeley is quite is unique: minorities made up 25% of the population and 70% of the Whites in the city opposed proposition 14, a "statewide initiative to appeal the Rumford Act which had prohibited racial discrimination in housing built with public assistance, and to prevent the state or any locality from adopting fair housing legislation, which was the proxy for support for Black interests (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1084, 35-37, 39). It seems that it would be hard to find many cities today where such a large fraction of Whites are racially liberals. However, Sonenshein's findings in Conservative Los Angeles, suggest that maybe there is room for flexibility when it comes to ideology.

In addition, in the cities where the Latino population was the largest, there was protest and exclusion (Stockton), temporary co-optation/protest and exclusion (San Jose), and weak minority mobilization (Daly City and Hayward). In the two cities with the

largest Black populations they found co-optation (Richmond) and protest and exclusion (Oakland), which delayed incorporation.[10] Browning and his colleagues argue that it is important that there be a sizeable minority population in the city, but these results suggest that too large of a minority population might undermine incorporation. This suggests that group population size matters, but we should think about groups separately, not minority populations as a whole, because in the cities where those populations were the largest, we did not see coalitions at all. That is, relative group size matters and group size interacts with the other requirements of the coalition. Population size was seen as linear here, as it increases, we should find coalitions. However, given the size of the minority populations in Oakland and Richmond, the relationship might be curvilinear. Kaufmann also suggests that there is a threshold for diversity for White voters by which moderate levels of minority populations should "be more receptive to minority candidates than should White voters from cities with large minority populations, all else equal" (Kaufmann 2004, 31). These works suggest that up to some point, increases in minority population will encourage coalition formation with Whites, but then it can actually hinder the possibility of coalition formation. It is not clear what this means for the possibility of Black and Latino coalition formation.

Sonenshein (1993) places the most emphasis on ideology and leadership as the key conditions to a biracial coalition. For him, interests are secondary. In contrast, Ture and Hamilton, suggest that interests were the real key to any coalition with Blacks. However, Ture and Hamilton provide little empirical support for their theory. Sonenshein, on the other hand, provides some support for his theory prioritizing the role

[10] Note that although incorporation was achieved in Oakland, it was not done with a biracial or co-optation coalition.

of ideology but it focuses primarily on one city thereby raising concerns about generalizabilty. In spite of this concern, I suspect that there is an important role for leadership in coalition formation (Golder 2006; Varshney 2002). There is considerable evidence that elites can shape mass opinion (Chong 1991; Zaller 1992; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Lee 2002). By studying minority attentiveness to elite cues we can try to better specify the causal mechanism of the relationship between elite and mass behavior.

In their 2003 edited volume, Browning, Marshall and Tabb attempt to tackle the deficiency in the literature by including chapters on various cities. However, since different authors wrote these chapters the result is not a systematic study of coalitions in numerous cities. While some chapters try to speak to one another, the book presents a very city specific account for the outcomes instead of a global or general explanation that could be applied to more cities. For example, while many of the chapters discuss the importance of organizations in coalition formation and incorporation, the authors do not explain what the organizations did to aid in the process. Also, it is not clear how different types of organizations helped more than others. One goal of this project is to determine the relationship between different types of community organizations/and ethnic group leaders and coalition formation between Blacks and Latinos.

Racial Attitudes and Coalitions

Research by Jackson et al. (1994), Kaufmann (2003a), McClain et al. (2006), and Orr and West (2006) emphasize that the real barrier to coalitions between Blacks and Latinos is the negative racial attitudes felt between the two groups. Jackson et al. (1994) and Orr and West (2006) find that when the feelings are positive, there is support for

coalitions among Blacks and Latinos. However, the works that find negative attitudes are likely to thwart coalition formation do not directly test for, nor define coalitions. So it is not clear what the relationship is between negative racial attitudes and coalition formation. Although there is evidence of a link between positive racial attitudes and support for coalitions politics, there is little evidence to show that in cities where Blacks and Latinos have failed to develop viable coalitions it is because of negative feelings towards one another. Alternatively, there is no evidence to show that in other cities, where Blacks and Latinos have developed successful coalitions it is because they have positive feelings towards one another. Recent works by Hutchings et al. (2006) suggest that even though Blacks and Latinos may have some competitive feelings towards one another, these groups feel more competitive with Whites. Previous work by Bobo and Hutchings (1996) shows that Blacks and Latinos in Los Angeles are also more concerned with Asians than one another.

Recall that Kaufmann (2003a) suggests that if Latino leaders can help promote pan-Latino identities among the various national groups that make up this broader category then it is more likely that they will feel commonality with Blacks. Yet other works by Kaufmann (2004) and Gay (2006) underestimate the notion that elites can shape perceptions of shared interests and ideology. Kaufmann cites multiple voices among minority group leaders as one reason why leaders are not as important as they once were.[11] Recent work by Liu (2006) on majority Black cities in the south has found evidence of similar coalitions between more moderate Blacks and Whites. Still, even if

[11] Though it should be noted that in her 2003a work, Kaufmann does give credit to elites for their ability to shape group identities. Kaufmann, Karen M. 2003. "Cracks in the Rainbow: Group Commonality as a Basis for Latino and African-American Political Coalitions" *Political Research Quarterly*, Vol. 56, No. 2., pp 208.

there are multiple voices from one minority community that does not mean that coalitions are not important. Instead, it might mean they have changed. Given that historically biracial coalition consisted of liberal Whites and Blacks, these new coalitions of moderate Blacks and conservative Whites may already challenge the concept of the old biracial coalitions. These could serve as evidence that groups are looking for new coalition partners, especially when we consider the populations within each city. In cities where Blacks and Latinos are a large portion of the population, we might expect them to seek one another out as coalition partners because they realize that by coming together they can win the election.

The importance of leadership was the major contribution made by Sonenshein's work in 1993. His emphasis on this concept represented a significant departure from the Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (1984) study. These new works do not directly test attentiveness to elite cues and even though previous works demonstrate the importance of elite cues (Zaller 1992,268). By not testing this condition directly, it is hard to accept the conclusions made about why elites and leaders are no longer important for coalition formation. If these works are meant to be an extension of Browning, Marshall, and Tabb, Sonenshein, and or a test of Ture and Hamilton, of the relationship between Blacks and Latinos and the possibility of coalition formation at the local level, they fall short of fully testing the old theories in the new context.

Previous work by Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (1984) and Sonenshein (1993) included the study of coalition formation as a necessary condition for minority incorporation. By ignoring coalitions, recent works (Gay 2006; Kaufmann 2004; McClain et. al 2006) fail to speak to the works of the past. Even if minority communities

are not as united as they once were, as Kaufmann (2004) and Gay (2006) suggest, it is not impossible to think about a candidate forming a coalition with members of another group who have shared ideology and interests with the candidate. This would still be a coalition by the standards set in previous works. That is, even if there were one coalition in Denver of Blacks, Latinos, and liberal Whites, it would not mean that another coalition of Conservative Blacks and moderate Whites could not also form.

Research by Kaufmann (2003a) suggests that some of the conditions, like partisanship and ideology, which are supposed to lead to biracial coalitions, may not apply to Blacks and Latinos, but because she does not directly test for coalition formation, it is hard to accept her conclusions about the likelihood of observing Black and Latino coalitions. What is most problematic about this work is that it only assumes one of the conditions is met today (shared interests) without testing it further. The emphasis in this literature on the pivotal role of racial attitudes is also not convincing. As the Los Angles example shows, although Blacks and Latinos voted differently in 2001, they largely supported the same candidate in 2005. This indicates that there is more at work than negative racial attitudes. After all, it is unlikely that Black and Latino attitudes changes significantly in this four-year time period. Precisely because they are not studying coalitions directly, some previous work in this literature has missed the broader view of multi-racial coalitions offered by Sonenshein, Browning and his colleagues and even Ture and Hamilton. By placing emphasis on one condition and not considering the conditions together these new works are not really comparable to the work of the past. Moreover, scholars emphasizing racial attitudes have also generally ignored other works

that actually asked about coalition politics (Jackson et al 1994; Orr and West 2006) found that groups had positive attitudes towards one another and support for coalitions.

While the research by Jackson et al. (1994) only asked Blacks about their feelings towards Latinos and Asians, their conclusions that Los Angeles Blacks are much more favorable towards out -groups than Blacks nationally, which might lead one to wonder if these findings are generalizable to other cities. One benefit of this study is that the survey has actual measures of feeling towards coalition political strategies. This is a step in the right direction if one wants to demonstrate how racial attitudes may or may not affect coalition formation. The national data relied upon in the Jackson et al. study is not promising for Black-Latino relations. It is also not clear that the one would expect a national sample of Blacks to feel closer to Latinos than Whites, given that at the time the data were collected many Blacks outside of urban areas did not live near Latinos.

As indicated above, McClain et al. and her colleagues (2006) also examined racial attitudes in Durham, NC, and found that Latinos and Blacks do not necessarily hold positive views of one another. However, because this work does not have a direct measure of support for coalitions or even provide a context for politics in Durham, it remains unclear what kind of predictions should be made about relations between these groups. The authors do not draw any implications for coalitions or politics in general. The work by Orr and West (2006), although based on a single city, is helpful in showing that there is a relationship between racial attitudes and support for coalitions. This work shows that Blacks and Latinos are more supportive of coalitions with one another.

Moving forward

How do we account for this fluctuating pattern? On the one hand, we have scholars like Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (1984), and Sonenshein (1993) who found that in order for Blacks, liberal Whites, and Latinos to form an electoral coalition, certain conditions must be met. These conditions include commonality of interests, compatible ideologies, and entrepreneurial leadership. On the other hand, we have another group of scholars who focus almost exclusively on the racial attitudes of Blacks and Latinos and the role they play in determining the chances these two groups will form coalitions. In short, for Kaufmann (2003a) and others (Gay 2006; McClain et al. 2006; Orr and West 2006) racial attitudes will make or break the possibility of coalitions between Blacks and Latinos. How can we reconcile the differences between those scholars who cite ideology, interests, population, and leadership as the basis for coalition formation and those who appear to prioritize racial attitudes above all other factors? Is it the case that racial attitudes matter more than interest, ideology, population size, and leadership?

Next Steps

This dissertation seeks to answer many of the questions that have been raised in this chapter. Subsequent chapters in this study will consider the conditions under which Blacks and Latinos form electoral coalitions in local elections. It is often assumed that given their shared circumstances as disadvantaged minorities, Blacks and Latinos should work together routinely. That is, they seem to be natural allies. However, as recent

elections in Los Angeles, Houston, Miami, and New York suggest, sometimes Blacks and Latinos coalesce behind the same candidate and sometimes they do not. What explains this difference in voting behavior from one election to the next? In chapter 2, I answer this question and provide the theoretical foundation of this project: that elite cues/ heuristics/endorsements from local ethnic/racial leadership/organizations and coalition formation matter to Black and Latino voters such that when information about candidates is low, Blacks and Latinos use this information when casting their votes. By gaining an understanding of what elites do, we can better understand the conditions under which Blacks and Latinos do or do not form electoral blocs at the local level. In chapter 3, I look back at some of the major elections in Los Angeles, New York, and Houston in the last decade. Using newspaper articles and exit poll data I investigate the relationship between racial salience in campaigns, endorsements from co-ethnic leaders and organizations matte, and vote choice. Using regression analysis, I find that the relationship is not conclusive. Further, I present data on the timing of endorsements and how many times endorsements from particular racial/ethnic group leaders/organizations are mentioned to enhance the previous research on endorsements. Again, using regression analysis, the number of times the endorsements are mentioned is not conclusive either. In Chapter 4, I rely on data from an experiment to show that when race is made salient in an election, cues and endorsements from co-ethnic leaders provide Black subjects with important information about vote choice. However, when race is not salient in the election, these cues matter less. In Chapter 5, I provide experimental data from Latino subjects, which shows that endorsements are persuasive to Latinos, when the endorsed candidate is White and when race is not salient. When it comes to candidate evaluation, endorsements from

co-ethnic leaders are provide information for Latinos as well. Finally, in Chapter 6, I offer some final thoughts on the role of racial/ethnic leaders/organizations endorsements and how they can help explain the variation we see in Black and Latino vote choice in real world elections.

Table 1.1: Los Angeles % Voted

	1997		2001		2005	
	Riordan (White)	Hayden (White)	Villaraigosa (Latino)	**Hahn** (White)	**Villaraigosa** (Latino)	Hahn (White)
Blacks	19	75	20	80	58	42
Whites	71	26	41	59	57	43
(Jews)	71	26	46	54	N/A	N/A
Latinos	60	33	82	18	86	14
Asian Am	62	35	35	65	42	59

1993-2001 Sonenshein and Pinkus[12], 2005 The Center for the Study of Los Angeles
Winner

Table 1.2: New York % Voted

	1997		2001		2005		2009	
	Giuliani (White)	Messinger (White)	**Bloomberg** (White)	Green (White)	**Bloomberg** (White)	Ferrer (Latino)	**Bloomberg** (White)	Thompson (Black)
Blacks	20	79	25	75	46	53	23	76
Whites	76	21	60	38	67	30	67	29
Latinos	43	57	47	49	34	63	43	55

1993-2001 Kaufmann[13], 2005 New York City Mayoral Election Study, 2009 New York Times[14]
Winner

[12] Sonenshein, Raphael J. and Susan H. Pinkus. 2005. "Latino Incorporation Reaches the Urban Summit: How Antonio Villaraigosa Won the 2005 Los Angeles Mayor's Race." PS October 2005, pp 713-721.
[13] Kaufmann, Karen M. 2004 *The Urban Voter* **:** Group Conflict and Mayoral Voting Behavior in American Cities. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
[14] "Profile of New York City Voters" *The New York Times* November 4, 2009.

Table 1.3: Houston % Voted

	1997 General Election				1997 Runoff Election		2001	
	Mosbaeher (White)	Brown (Black)	Saenz (Latino)	Greanias (White)	Mosbacher (White)	**Brown** (Black)	**Brown** (Black)	Sanchez (Latino)
Blacks	1	97	1	1	3	97	90	10
Whites	51	14	4	30	77	23	N/A	N/A
Latinos	3	16	69	12	34	66	28	72%

1997 McKeever[15], 2001 Vaca[16]
Winner

Table 1.4: Miami % Voted

	1996	
	Teele (Black)	**Penelas** (Latino)
Blacks	84	3
Latinos	2	60

1996 Grenier and Castro[17]
Winner

[15] McKeever, Matthew. 2001. "Interethnic Politics in the Consensus City." *In Governing American Cities*. Michael Jones-Correa (Ed). New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Pp 240-243.
[16] Vaca, Nicolas. 2004. The Presumed Alliance. The Unspoken conflict between Latinos and Blacks and what it means for America. New York. Harper Collins Press. Pp 168.
[17] Grenier, Guillermo J., Max Castro. 2001. "Blacks and Cubans in Miami: The Negative Consequences of the Cuban Enclave on Ethnic Relations. ." *In Governing American Cities*. Michael Jones-Correa (Ed). New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Pp.138.

Figure 1.1


Coalitions and Voter Mobilization
Leaders From Group A
Coalition
Leaders From Group B
Endorsements
Endorsements
Voters From Group A
Voters From Group B
Votes
Votes
Candidate C

CHAPTER 2

Theory

Introduction

Recent mayoral elections in Los Angeles, New York, Houston, and Miami, demonstrate that there are instances when Blacks and Latinos vote for the same candidate and other instances where they do not support the same candidates. We know from National and State level elections that most Blacks and Latinos often vote for Democratic Party candidates. However, local elections offer a different perspective on voting behavior because they are often either non-partisan (Los Angeles, Houston) or dominated by one-party rule (New York until recently) (DeSantis and Renner 1991). Thus, for the most part, partisanship alone, cannot explain voting patterns in local elections.

In the previous chapter, I asked, how do we account for the varying degree of shared candidate support among Blacks and Latinos in local elections? One subset of the previous literature suggests that we should consider factors such as commonality of interests, compatible ideologies, and entrepreneurial leadership (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984; Sonenshein 1993), while yet another subset of the literature suggests that levels of racial antagonism between Blacks and Latinos can explain the variation in voting (Gay 2006; Kaufmann 2003a; McClain et al. 2006; Orr and West 2006). While important, neither approach has been able to fully explain the vote patterns observed in

the real world. One problem with relying upon commonality of interests, compatible ideologies, and entrepreneurial leadership is that these variables are often relatively static. In other words, when focusing on different contemporary elections within the same city, it is not likely that ideology, interests, or leaders change so much from one contest to the next that they would account for the ebb and flow of bi-racial coalitions. Thus, it seems unlikely that these factors can fully explain the changes in vote patterns among Blacks and Latinos. Similarly, studies that focus on ideology/racial attitudes do not seem to have it quite right either, as these feelings are also fairly stable from election to election, yet, the voting patterns are not (Kaufmann 2004).

Building on the incorporation literature and the racial attitudes literature, this work attempts to move beyond explaining liberal White-Black/Latino political collaborations to understanding and clarifying the conditions under which Black-Latino political collaborations may form. That is, what if any, are the prospects for Blacks and Latinos to make political gains in local politics together? Can Blacks and Latinos go it alone, without liberal Whites? The goal of this project is to offer an explanation for Black and Latino voting patterns observed in local elections by taking into account the incorporation literature (Browning, Marshall and Tabb 1984; Sonenshein 1993) which suggests that population, interests, and ideology matter for coalition formation along with the racial attitudes literature (Jackson et al. 1994; Kaufmann 2003a; McClain et al. 2006; and Orr and West 2006), which suggests that the way Blacks and Latinos feel about one another matter for coalition formation. The explanation needs to be dynamic enough to account for short-term changes in electoral coalitions. While population, ideology, interests, and racial attitudes are fairly stable, leader endorsements and the candidates

who run in each election are not static. In fact, different leaders may respond to different candidates based on issues or community perceptions of the candidate. As noted in the previous chapter, Latino populations are on the rise and Blacks and Latinos are now at least the plurality, if not the majority of many large cities. Yet it is unclear if the literature that focused on Black-White coalitions can be applied to Black-Latino coalitions. Indeed, there are reasons to believe that in some cases, Black and Latino coalitions might come about under a different set of conditions depending on the leader endorsements, the racial/ethnic characteristics of candidates, and the racial context of an election.

Theoretical Foundations – Elites, Endorsements, Persuasion and Candidates

Previous research demonstrates that elites can sometimes exert profound influence over public opinion through framing and priming (Chong 1991; Chong 1993; Converse 1964; Druckman 2001; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Lee 2002; Zaller 1992;). Throughout this dissertation, I adopt a definition of elites that is drawn from the work of Zaller: "politicians, higher level government officials, journalists, some activists and many kinds of experts and policy specialists" (Zaller, 6). In short, elites are people who are knowledgeable about politics and in positions to *influence* politics. Lee (2002) offers a complimentary, although perhaps more nuanced, definition of elites precisely because when groups are not a part of the mainstream political system, yet want to influence that political system, they may not start out as 'elites' in the traditional sense, though they move into that position as they become

involved in making changes to the political system (10). Though Lee's work considers times of political unrest, it is applicable to Blacks and Latinos in local political environments that are working to get candidates elected into offices that both groups have been kept out of in the recent past.[18] Lee says: "elites are best identified not by who they are…but rather by what they do (that is, by their leadership, their ability to persuade and mobilize, and their flexible adaptation to and exploitation of rapidly changing circumstances)" (2002, 10). Taken together, these definitions provide a sense of who might influence politics in minority communities: ministers, people active in community organizations, racial/ethnic news outlets, and other prominent members of the community (Rogers 2006; Wong 2006). Though, we do not want to go so far as to say everyone is an elite. Quite the contrary, we are interested in people and organizations that seem influential to others in political contexts. Finally, it is important to note, that elites may have their own incentives in seeking to influence other people in political contexts. While there may be instances wherein elites are truly thinking about the community or what is best, there are also instances when elites feel they are competing with one another for influence. Harris-Lacewell suggests that "Black ideological elites perceive themselves as competitors in a marketplace of ideas and they attempt to sell their ideological product to African American masses" (2004, 205). Admittedly, Harris-Lacewell is not referring to endorsements, but her conceptualization of elites as competitors is important when we think about the election cycle and the ways in which elites compete with one another to win the favor of candidates and voters. That is, in any given election, some Black leaders will endorse one candidate while other Black leaders

[18] Los Angeles elected its first Latino Mayor in 2005 (Villaraigosa), while New York elected it's first Black Mayor in 1993 and has yet to elect a Latino to that office.

will endorse another. The same is true for Latino leaders. It is then up to the voters to decide which endorsements, if any, are persuasive.

One political context where these types of elites may exercise influence is non-partisan local elections. In many of these elections, voters are unable to rely on partisanship and may look for other sources of information (cues) to make vote choices. Previous research has shown that when voters have low levels of information about an issue, knowing where particular groups stand on the issue acts as a cue or heuristic, allowing voters to vote as though they were fully informed (Gerber and Phillips 2003; Lupia 1994). Other studies have shown that voters are able to identify where various groups in society stand on political issues with great accuracy (Brady and Sniderman 1985). Voters, then, are only required to know how they feel about a particular group and then depending on that feeling, they know how they should feel about the issue. Taken together, voters are often competent enough to use pieces of information, such as known elite preferences and knowledge of group positions, to produce vote choices that appear to be in line with their own preferences. For example, Kuklinski and Hurley demonstrate that it matters who gives the cue as well as the information contained in the cue (1994). In fact, they found that for African Americans, the race of the person giving the message matters. That is, Black respondents think Black leaders (as cue-givers) will more often than not have their best interest at heart (749; see also Campbell et al. 1960; Zaller 1992). Research on Latino voting behavior shows that Latinos are more likely to be persuaded by endorsements from organizations that work to the benefit of the Latino community (Latino Decisions 2008).[19]

[19] http://www.pacificmarketresearch.com/ld/pdfs/latinodecisions_california_0807.pdf

Returning to the recent mayoral elections in Houston, Los Angeles, and New York mentioned in the previous chapter, we saw that Blacks and Latinos did not always agree on candidates from one election to the next. One possible explanation for the various shifts in Black and Latino voting behavior may be that Black and Latino elites offer their support (via endorsements) to different candidates from one election the next. For purposes of this project, an endorsement is a formal, public announcement of support for a particular candidate by a community leader or organization.[20] In elections where Blacks and Latinos supported the same candidate, it is possible that Black and Latino elites endorsed *the same* candidate. In elections where Blacks and Latinos did not support the same candidate, it is possible that Black and Latino elites supported a *different candidate* in those elections. According to Downs, in an ideal world, voters would have full information about candidates and make decisions based on their perceptions of the benefits of the one candidate over another (1957, 37). Yet, we know that voters are not all that informed (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). Therefore, without full information, endorsements can fill the information gap for voters. Endorsements may serve as a cue to voters and may allow voters to update their candidate preferences, without recalling 100% of the information about the candidate (Lodge, Steenbergen and Brau 1995).

Previous research on the effectiveness of endorsements has been inconclusive. It is unclear what endorsements actually mean to voters and whether or not voters find them persuasive. Indeed, as the quote at the beginning of chapter one suggests, candidates are also not sure what endorsements mean. Rapoport, Stone, and Abramowitz (1991), found

[20] This is not an exhaustive definition of an endorsement. Endorsements may take the form of pictures with the candidate or public appearances, but that is beyond the current scope of this project.

that during the Democratic caucuses in 1984, endorsements from labor and teacher unions mattered for in-group members: labor and teacher union members were more likely to support the endorsed candidate. However, endorsements from women's groups are not as persuasive, suggesting that gender endorsements alone are not as persuasive (Rapoport, Stone, and Abramowitz 1991). One major benefit of this research is that it focuses on the Democratic caucuses and allows us to move beyond partisanship as a cue. This research also highlights the important role that group membership may have in the relationship between endorsements and voter preferences. In the Rapoport et al. piece, members of labor and teacher unions were persuaded by the endorsements made by labor and teacher unions. Thus, the salience of group memberships (which can vary depending on the circumstances) may also be important. That is, when group identity (here, labor and teacher union membership) is made salient, we would expect the types of cues or endorsements, mentioned above to be more persuasive.

It is not clear, from this research, whether or not endorsements from racial/ethnic leaders will be persuasive like union endorsements or not as persuasive like endorsements made by women. However, trying to sort out the circumstances where non-partisan identities become important in a local election is complicated because there are so many factors that might influence candidate evaluations (incumbency, campaign spending, issue positions). Work done at the national level has provided some support for the notion that endorsements matter. Erickson (1976) found that the endorsements provided by newspapers for Johnson in 1964 led to roughly a five percent increase in votes for Johnson (217). Yet, this research is over three decades old. Taken together, there is some evidence to suggest that endorsements can influence voter preferences, but what is

less clear is when to expect this. In a later section, we will return to the relationship between group membership and identity salience in local elections.

Building on previous endorsement research, McDermott (2006) found that endorsements from the AFL-CIO[21] encouraged self-identified liberals to vote for the endorsed Democratic candidate, but made self-identified conservatives less likely to support the candidate. This suggests that endorsements can send messages to in-group members for whom to vote for as well as messages to out-group members whom to avoid. McDermott also found that labor endorsements for Republican candidates did not seem to influence voter preferences, liberal or conservative. This is most likely because the message did not match the messenger (Kuklinski and Hurley 1994). This suggests that in order for endorsements to work, or be persuasive, there are several requirements that must be met.

The research on communication and persuasion provides a foundation for how co-ethnic leader endorsements may work in a political setting (Hovland, Janis, and Kelley 1953). There are at least four key moving parts of persuasive communication. First we have the communicator—the person giving the information. In the context of my interest in Black-Latino electoral coalitions, it is the person or group giving the endorsement. Second, there is the content or the message contained in the appeal. For purposes of this dissertation, the endorsement itself constitutes the relevant message. Third, there is the way the audience (those receiving the message) responds. If the message was persuasive, the audience response should be in line with the content of the message. For this project, the response is measured by voters' preferences for the endorsed candidate. Though, it should be noted that some research suggests that the messages may not be retained long

[21] The AFL-CIO is admittedly a liberal organization.

term (Druckman and Chong 2008). In this study, we will consider the effectiveness of endorsements given throughout an election cycle as well as those given utilizing an experimental design. In both cases we will assess how persuasive the endorsements are by the willingness of voters and respondents to prefer the endorsed candidate to the non-endorsed candidate.

The candidates are also an important part of the equation when assessing the importance of elite endorsements. In the recent elections in Houston, Los Angeles, and New York, we have the benefit of several elections where at times one or more of the same candidates ran in different elections, even though the voters did not always respond to the candidates in a consistent manner. This suggests that there are several criteria that voters might use when evaluating candidates while casting their ballots and that voters may call on different criteria at different times. Previous research suggests that voters often think Black and female candidates are more liberal than men and non-Blacks (McDermott 1998). Based on the evidence from the real world mayoral elections, the only consistent pattern that emerges is that when there is a Black candidate, Black voters invariably support that candidate and when there is a Latino candidate on the ballot, Latino voters routinely support their co-ethnic candidate. What is less clear is what prompts Black voters to support Latino candidates and Latino voters to support Black candidates.

Context

The political context, as defined by Walton, is "a thesis which postulates that political behavior at either the individual or the group level is not independent of the political environment (a particular time period and a particular place) in which is occurs" (1997, 7). Indeed, it would be difficult to study Black and Latino voting blocs absent the context of each election. Though it would be easy to consider the factors that make each election unique and offer an explanation for voting behavior in that election, it would not add to our understanding of Black and Latino voting preferences in the larger sense, nor would it provide us with rules or conditions that could be applied to future elections. That is, we want to think about the context of these elections, collectively. We want to move beyond candidate specific attributes in a particular election, campaign spending in a given year, and campaign issues that are important at the time of the election. This is not to say that these factors are unimportant, but if we want to be able make informed predictions about how Blacks and Latinos will respond to candidates in local elections, we have to think about contextual factors that are present in each election.

Kaufmann uses the political context in local elections to explain voter preferences. She seeks to "identify the contextual factors that tend to trigger racially and ethnically polarized voting within the domain of local elections and to use these insights to construct a theory of local voting behavior" (2004, 9). As indicated in the previous chapter, she is less interested in Black-Latino voting blocs, but she uses survey data about racial attitudes and or attitudes about race relations more generally, to show that "during periods of heightened conflict—especially when minority groups challenge status quo power relations—members of dominant groups become more attuned to group-based competition and are more likely to coalesce on this basis" (39). This work does a great

job explaining how White voters respond to shifting perceptions of racial conflict, but given that these perceptions are far more stable among racial minorities, this theory is less conclusive about Black and Latino voting patterns in local elections. Consequently, it may be that highlighting race in these elections is sufficient to prompt Blacks and Latinos to rely on group based voting criteria. Taking this idea of racial salience in campaigns a step further, Reeves, writes that "according to sociologist Paul Luebke, racial appeals 'are present in a campaign if one candidate calls attention to the race of his or her opponent or opponent's supporters of if the news media covering a campaign disproportionately calls attention to the race of one candidate or of that candidates supporters'" (1997, 21). This definition moves beyond the conflict-focused definition derived from Kaufmann's work and permits race to become salient in a wider variety of contexts. In order to test the claim that heightened media attention to race or racial issues may lead to increased racial group bloc-voting, we would need to classify each campaign as either an election where race was highlighted or an election where it was not. Then, we could look at voting preferences for Blacks and Latinos in these two types of elections to see if any patterns emerge. For this project, race can become salient in a campaign a number of ways: highlighting racial and or ethnic issues such as "crime," "welfare," "English only" or "citizen" by candidates or people who work for the campaign; when there is a Black or Latino candidate *and* the media draws attention to the race of the candidates while reporting the news; when ads are run with racial cues; when candidates bring race/ethnicity into the campaign, or when voters perceive that race/ethnicity is important in the campaign.[22] I will use the media mentions of race/ethnicity in a campaign for chapter three and the use of racial/ethnic issues for chapters four and five.

[22] See Mendelberg Tali (2001), Reeves (1997), Valentino et al. (2002); or Huber and Lupinski (2006)

The main reason for use of racial/ethnic issues in chapters four and five are primarily a function of resources. It was not feasible at this time to test all aspects of racial salience. Future projects can address this concern.

Taken as a whole, there are three moving parts, which might explain Black and Latino voting blocs in local elections: elites and possible endorsements, candidates (race and/or ethnicity), and context.

Ethnic Politics: A Comparative Perspective

Sociologists, anthropologists, and political scientists have all sought to better understand the relationship between national, ethnic, racial, religious, and linguistic identities and political systems (Anderson 1991; Deutsch 1966; Gellner 1983). In some countries, this has meant the development of ethnic, linguistic, or religious political parties (Horowitz 1985;Varshney 2002). Indeed, the foundation of consociational democracies is to reinforce the social cleavages of the country by allocating seats to groups based on population size or some other arrangement. This system is largely about the relationship between elites, who must cooperate with one another and the relationship between elites and the masses. That is, the masses trust the elites to manage potential societal conflict via political office. Yet, this type of political arrangement has been found to be most successful in smaller states. Though local elections in the United States are not consociational, these types of arrangements highlight the ability of ethnic, religious, linguistic, or racial identities to be a part of the electoral process. That is, if the masses trust that elites have their best interests at heart, then we can expect the masses to trust the political arrangements elites make.

Another way that societies can manage potential ethnic, racial, linguistic, and religious political conflict is to have electoral rules that make it impossible for one group to win an election without support from out group members (Horowitz 1991). This is very different from consociational democracies in that these types of systems, candidates and party leaders must seek out support from members of all groups, not just from members of their own racial, ethnic, religious, or linguistic group. Most mayoral elections are winner take all, so this is much closer to what we might see in local elections in cities in the United States. The question then becomes, how do members of one group appeal to voters in another group, *if* group identity is an important factor? Although, cities in the United States are not full of ethnic conflict per se, when partisanship is not an easy cue or heuristic, voters may rely on ethnic or racial identities to guide candidate preferences. If these racial and ethnic identities become important in any given election, then we would expect candidates to find ways to seek out support from their own racial/ethnic group as well as members of other racial/ethnic groups. The literature on Blacks and Latinos suggests that identity does influence political decisions. We will explore the role of race and politics for both Blacks and Latinos in the next section.

Black Politics

Previous research on Black political behavior has been quite conclusive: conceptions of Blackness or group consciousness are a strong predictor of Black political participation and Blacks tend to vote fairly cohesively at the National level (Dawson

1994; Tate 1993; Walton 1985). Walton found that at the individual level, levels of group consciousness among Blacks are a major explanation for Black voting behavior (1985). Verba and Nie concur, that for Blacks, group consciousness can overcome socioeconomics explanations for voting behavior (1987). Miller et al. found that group consciousness is associated with higher levels of participation when group members realize their status relative to other groups (1981). Black voters will typically support Black candidates and work by Bobo and Gilliam found that Blacks that live where there are Black mayors are more politically active than Blacks who live in areas where Blacks are not in positions of power (1990). That is, having a Black mayor increases political activity among Blacks. Finally, church membership has been found to increase Black political participation (Tate 1993).

Though there is much consensus on the state of Black political behavior, some research has shown that there are instances when Blacks do not behave in such a cohesive manners. Cohen finds that there are several issues related to sexuality and health that have not been incorporated into the 'Black Agenda' even though the issues may have real implications for the Black community (1999). Rogers finds that once we account for immigration from the Caribbean, there is less support for immigrant candidates in New York City (2006). Yet, at the core of this research is the notion that conceptions of Blackness may need to be more flexible than was the case in the recent past. However it also suggests that elites may need to set the tone for changes within the community.

Latino Politics

With the increase in the Latino population in the United States over the last three decades, more work has been done on Latino voting patterns (Census 2000). One of the early studies of Mexican Americans, or Chicanos, found that, much like African Americans, they professed overwhelming support the National Democratic Party (Garcia and Arce 1988). Unlike African Americans, some Latinos may face barriers to political participation: citizenship status and language (Jones-Correa 1998, Tam Cho 1999).[23] Although some types of political participation require a particular residency status, Bean et al. find that children of Mexican immigrants can incorporate into the political process in the United States (2006). Leal found that non-citizens did participate in non-electoral related activities, but not at the same levels as citizens (2002). Yet, campaign contributions and volunteering do not require Latinos to be eligible to vote, so on some levels there may be realms in which Latinos are politically active that will help ease the transition from political volunteer to political participant.

The literature on Latino politics finds that Latinos can and do behave like a voting bloc under certain conditions. In the mayoral elections discussed in the last chapter, we saw that when there were Latino candidates (Miami 1996 and 2000, New York Democratic Run-Off 2001, Los Angeles 2001, New York 2001, Houston 2003, and New York 2005), Latino voters overwhelmingly supported these candidates. Barreto finds that when Latino candidates run for office, Latino voter turnout also goes increases (2007). Barreto later states: "Latinos are more likely to side with other Latinos on matters of political significance, even ones whom they have only the term "Latino" in common" (p 427. See also Barreto 2009). Yet, Latino candidates alone are not the only way to

[23] Though Puerto Ricans are citizens and may not face the same language hurdles given the status of Puerto Rico are a US Territory.

increase Latino vote turnout. Michelson found that when Latino campaign workers contact potential Latino voters, they are also more likely to turnout in elections (2006). That is, like Blacks, there is a sense of shared experience (See also Leal 2002). This sense of group consciousness not only leads to increased voter turnout for co-ethnic candidates, it also influences Latino political attitudes about political issues that are related to ethnicity (Sanchez 2006).

Theory

In order to account for the development of Black-Latino electoral coalitions (voting blocs), I argue that in the absence of partisan cues, when race becomes salient in an election, candidate endorsements by co-ethnic leaders should prompt minority group members to vote for a particular candidate, even if the candidate is from another ethnic group.[24] I expect that whenever an African American or Latino candidate is running, Black and Latino voters will overwhelmingly support the candidate belonging to their racial or ethnic group, regardless of leader endorsements. However, if there is one White candidate and one Latino candidate, I expect the Black vote will be determined largely by Black leader/organization endorsements. Thus, when a Black/Latino coalition has formed, I hypothesize that this has occurred because of electoral cues sent by co-ethnic leaders and so I would expect to find the preponderance of local Black leaders/organizations endorsing the Latino candidate. Similarly, if there is one White candidate and one African American candidate, I expect the Latino votes will be determined largely by Latino leader/organization endorsements. And, as with the

[24] For the content analysis, racial salience is measured by the number of times the media mentions the race of the candidate in connection with that candidate's attempt to be the first Black or Latino mayor.

previous example, when Black and Latino voters coalesce behind an African American candidate, my theory holds that this is due to co-ethnic elite cues indicating that Latinos should support this candidate. When minority voters are confronted with two White candidates, I expect Latino votes to be determined by Latino leader/organization endorsements and Black votes to be determined by Black leader/organization endorsements. The campaign context is also an important factor in my theory such that it will likely enhance all of the processes described above. That is, when racial or ethnic issues are particularly salient in the campaign, then elite endorsements should be especially influential. If race is not salient in an election, endorsements will have less of an effect.

Next Steps

In the next chapter I systematically examine recent elections in New York, Los Angeles, and Houston in an attempt to determine the relationship between elite endorsements, candidates, and the racial context and Black-Latino voting preferences. Highlighting the factors that are present in every election will bring us one step closer to developing a cohesive explanation for the voting patterns among Blacks and Latinos in recent local elections.

CHAPTER 3

Endorsements - A Content Analysis

Introduction

In chapter one, we saw that recent local mayoral elections yielded no clear pattern of voting behavior for Blacks and Latinos from one election to the next. That is, in some elections, a plurality of Blacks and Latinos supported the same candidate and in other elections Blacks and Latinos supported different candidates. Recall that cities like Los Angeles, Houston, New York, and Miami are great places to explore the possibility of Black-Latino voting coalitions because together these two groups comprise between 38-58% of the population of those cities (Appendix 1). In Chapter two, we saw that there are three factors that might explain the variations in Black and Latino voting patterns in local elections: Elites and their endorsements, the quality and demographic characteristics of the candidates, and the political context (racial salience). This dissertation project considers a range of conditions that may encourage Blacks and Latinos to form electoral coalitions in local elections. This chapter will focus on the three potential determinants, discussed in the previous chapter.[25] Specifically, this chapter will consider the

[25] None of these groups should be thought of as monolithic. There is a lot of in-group variation. See *Blacks, Latinos, and Asians in Urban America; status and prospects for politics and activism*. 1994. Jennings, James eds.

relationship between local ethnic leadership/organizations and Black-Latino voting preferences and whether or not heightened racial salience makes these endorsements more influential. Given that these elections take place in the real world, I cannot control the race of the candidates, but we will still discuss the ways in which the race of the candidate may also be important for Black and Latino voters. What can we learn from recent city elections that show a mixed record of Black and Latino voters supporting the same candidates? By examining the real world elections and the voting preferences of Blacks and Latinos in those elections, we can try to better specify the relationship between elites and their endorsements, candidates, and the role of racial salience and voting preferences. The ensuing discussion of local election will be largely descriptive, but will build the foundation for two survey experiments designed to test these three factors in a more rigorous manner.

[TABLE 3.1 ABOUT HERE]

This chapter begins with a focus on Los Angeles, where in 2001, Jim Hahn, a White candidate, was elected mayor. Black voters overwhelmingly supported Hahn (80%), while Latino voters overwhelmingly supported Antonio Villaraigosa, his Latino opponent (82%).[26] However, four years later in 2005 Villaraigosa defeated Hahn in a rematch of their earlier contest, only this time Black support for Villaraigosa rose from

Westport, CT: Praeger Press. Throughout this dissertation, the term Latino references a group with a shared language, a shared immigration history, and a shared sense of identity. The term Black refers to African Americans as well as peoples of African descent who identify as Black.

[26] It should be noted that Hahn's father served on the L.A. County Supervisor's Board for many years, and represented a majority Black district. As a result, younger Hahn had great name recognition. Therefore, it may be that Blacks were not voting against Villaraigosa as much as they were voting for Hahn who, in a way, had received his own endorsement from the Black community via his father.

20% to 58%. Latino support for Villaraigosa remained stable and exceptionally high across both contests. What happened between 2001 and 2005 that made Blacks more supportive of Villaraigosa? Recall, that Hahn did not appoint Bernard Parks, an African American, for a second term as police chief, thereby contributing to this loss of popularity among Black voters. Although some commentators have suggested that this was the only factor in Hahn's loss of support among Blacks, the Los Angeles Times poll data suggest that these voters actually believed that Villaraigosa was better suited to the office of Mayor (as determined by policy preferences). Less than half of Blacks attributed their vote to the Parks situation. That is, it was not the only reason Blacks voted for Villaraigosa.

[TABLE 3.2 ABOUT HERE]

The volatility of Black and Latino votes in local elections are not just confined to Los Angeles. In New York City, for example, Blacks and Latinos often vote for the same mayoral candidate, but the levels of support vary across elections. In 2005 when a Latino candidate, Fernando Ferrer, ran for Mayor against an incumbent, many Blacks and Latinos voted for him at 53% and 63% respectively. However, in the 2001 mayoral contest featuring two White candidates, the vast majority (75%) of Blacks supported the Democratic candidate Mark Green, whereas Latinos were almost evenly divided between Green and Republican Candidate Michael Bloomberg. This division among Latino voters is most likely due to what many regarded as Green's ethnically inflammatory campaign against Fernando Ferrer during the Democratic Primary.

[TABLE 3.3 ABOUT HERE]

In Houston in 1997, the mayoral election produced four candidates: Lee Brown (a Black candidate), Rob Mosbacher (a White candidate), Gracie Saenz (a Latina candidate), and George Greanias (another White candidate). Blacks overwhelmingly supported Brown (97%), while Latinos gave a majority of their support to Saenz (69%) and Whites split their votes between Mosbacher and Greanias with 51% and 30%, respectively. The election was forced into a runoff, which pitted Brown against Mosbacher. This time, Blacks and Latinos supported Brown (97% and 66% respectively) while 77% of Whites voted for Mosbacher, a Republican. Brown became the first Black mayor of Houston. In 1999 he was easily reelected. However, in the 2001 runoff election, Brown faced Orlando Sanchez, a Latino Republican. Blacks and Latinos each supported the candidate from their own racial ethnic group (97% and 72% respectively) and Brown was only able to get 28% of the Latino vote, while Sanchez received only 10% of the Black vote. Brown defeated Sanchez in a close race, 52% to 48% in overall votes.

[TABLE 3.4 ABOUT HERE]

Unlike Houston, Latinos have held the mayor's office in Miami as they are the largest racial group population in the city. In 1996, Arthur Teele, a Black Republican faced Alex Penelas, a Cuban Democrat in the mayoral election. Sixty-percent of Latinos

voted for Penelas, while 84% of Blacks voted for Teele. Penelas won the election, with 60% of the total vote to Teele's 40%, without much support from Black voters. However, even in Miami these two groups have been known to form short-term coalitions on occasion. For example, Blacks and Latinos worked together in 1992 to change the county commission elections to increase representation for each community.[27]

[TABLE 3.5 ABOUT HERE]

Patterns from Recent Elections

Endorsements and Exit Polls: Methods and Data Analysis

In order to assess the campaign environment in multiple local mayoral contests to determine whether or not endorsements might account for the pattern in levels of candidate support from Black and Latino voters, I considered elections in New York, Los Angeles, Houston, Chicago, and Miami. Recall, these cities were selected because the Black and Latino populations range from a plurality to a majority. They are also the top five cities where Blacks and Latinos live (See Appendix 1). I selected elections starting in the late 1990s through the most recent (2009) mayoral elections because they pick up where the literature left off (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 2003). For all competitive elections in New York (1997, 2001, 2005, 2009), Los Angeles (1997, 2001, 2005, 2009),

[27] Grenier, Guillermo J. and Lisandro Pérez. 2003. *The Legacy of Exile: Cubans in the United States* Boston: Pearson Education. Pp. 81.

Miami (1996, 2000, 2004), and Houston (1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009), I used *The New York Times*, *The Los Angeles Times*, *The Miami Herald*, and *The Houston Chronicle*, to search newspaper articles regarding the election 60 days before the general election. These newspapers were selected because they represent the newspapers with the largest circulation in the selected cities (see Appendix 4). I did not include Chicago elections, Los Angeles 2009, or the Houston elections in 1999, 2005, and 2007[28] as they were not competitive.[29] Finally, the local newspapers in Miami (1996) and Los Angeles (1997) failed to yield any data on endorsements in their respective mayoral contests. As a result, these elections are also removed from the analyses presented below. Initially, I searched the newspapers listed above 60 days prior to the mayoral election using the terms: mayor and election. If parties held primaries or run-off elections, I extended the search dates beyond the 60 days to include the full election period, until the city elected a new mayor. Then I coded endorsements for candidates by looking for the words, 'endorse,' 'endorsed,' 'endorses,' and 'endorsement.'[30] Recall, that an endorsement is a formal, public announcement of support for a particular candidate. In this chapter, the newspaper articles will serve as the public space. I then created a dataset with information about which organizations or leaders endorsed each candidate in an election.[31] If the race/ethnicity of the organization or endorser was not explicitly stated in

[28] In 1999, Houston mayor Lee Brown won with 67% of the votes. In 2005 Bill White won the mayoral contest in Houston (?) with 91% of the votes. In 2007 Bill White won with 87% of the votes. Los Angeles in 2009, Villaraigosa was easily re-elected with 55% of the vote.

[29] By competitive, I mean a real opposition candidate emerging to face the incumbent. For example, in Chicago, Richard Daley has been easily re-elected several times, regardless of endorsements.

[30] I did not code for the words 'support/s, 'supported,' 'back/s,' or 'backed' because it could be argued that those were not real endorsements and I wanted to adopt a more conservative test of my hypothesis.

[31] I recognize that all endorsements are not created equal, but for simplicity sake I have adopted this more conservative assumption. In later iterations of this project I hope to explore how and why some endorsements may be more effective than others.

the newspaper article, I did research to determine this information.[32] Sometimes this information was not available. When this information was not available, I left 'race/ethnicity' blank in the dataset. Endorsements without race/ethnicity information were not included in the summary below. To the extent that vote return data were available by racial/ethnic group, the endorsement data were then compared to the exit poll data. Note that not all exit poll data were available for all cities.

Racial Saliency in the Campaign

After coding for the co-ethnic candidate endorsements, I considered the articles together as a whole to determine in which campaigns race was made salient (See Table 3.6).[33] There are a variety of ways to determine if race was salient in a particular campaign. This can occur for the following reasons: when either the candidates or their surrogates emphasize racial/ethnic code words such as "crime," "welfare," "English only" or "citizen" are used; when there is a Black or Latino candidate *and* the media draws attention to the race of the candidates while reporting the news; when ads are run with racial cues; when candidates bring race/ethnicity into the campaign, or when voters perceive that race/ethnicity is important in the campaign.[34] An example of a candidate bringing race into the campaign and making race salient is found during the New York 2001 Democratic run-off when Mark Green questioned Ferrer's ability to be mayor, given his ethnicity. Similarly, some newspapers emphasized the race/ethnicity of the

[32] Fortunately, many people cite their racial or ethnic background on their websites with statements about being the first African American or Hispanic to hold an office or they say they are members of particular racial/ethnic groups.
[33] There are about 650 articles total for all the elections.
[34] See Mendelberg Tali (2001), Reeves (1997), Valentino et al. (2002); or Huber and Lupinski (2006)

candidates while highlighting that the candidate had the opportunity to become the first mayor from that racial/ethnic group. For the analyses in this chapter, I will focus on newspapers drawing attention to the race of the candidate and when candidates bring race into the campaign. In the elections covered in this chapter, the media mentioned the race of the candidate as many as 10 times, with the mean number of mentions being five and the least number of mentions being none. Based on this information, I decided to treat campaigns where race was mentioned more than five times as racially salient, while contests where race was mentioned fewer than five times were considered to be campaigns where race was not salient.[35]

Briefly, I will provide a short summary of the racial saliency in each campaign. During the 1997 New York campaign, Messinger had to balance her relationship with Black Civil Rights leader, Reverend Al Sharpton, and his relationship with some community leaders who were accused of anti-Semitism.[36] This put Messinger in the awkward position of trying to appease both White voters and Black voters at the same time. By connecting her to a Black community leader, race was made salient in the campaign. In a similar instance involving the 2001 Democratic New York run-off campaign, Green sent out negative campaign literature that seemed to question Ferrer's ability to be the mayor of New York given his background as a Puerto Rican.[37] Green later apologized for this and in the end, Ferrer offered Green his endorsement during the general election. Consequently, in the 2001 New York general election campaign, race

[35] In the next section, I will treat racial salience as a continuous variable, but for the qualitative discussion, it made more sense to make a cut off point.
[36] "The Mayor Mars Columbus Day." October 15, 1997 *The New York Times* Section A; Page 22.
[37] Murphy, Dean E. and Michael Cooper. "Bloomberg Sees Overtones of Race in Final Days of Green Effort." October 17, 1997 *The New York Times* Section D; Page 5.

was not salient.[38] In the 2005 New York campaign, race was made salient because the news media drew attention to the Ferrer campaign and the possibility that he would be the first Latino mayor of New York if elected. Finally, race was not salient in the 2009 mayoral election. Neither candidate drew attention to race, because New York had already elected an African American mayor in 1993, the media did not highlight Thompson's race (he is Black).

In the 2001 Los Angeles campaign, race was made salient by the media, which highlighted that Villaraigosa was the first Latino candidate for mayor since 1872. As noted at the beginning of the chapter, in the 2005 Los Angeles campaign, race was made salient after the second African American police chief in the history of the city, Bernard Parks, was fired. Los Angeles Times poll data suggest a plurality (48%) of Blacks voted for Villaraigosa because of the Parks incident (Table 3.2). Although many Blacks preferred Villaraigosa on policy grounds, it might be that Black leaders wanted to punish Hahn for firing Parks and this is why they offered their endorsements to Villaraigosa.

[TABLE 3.6 ABOUT HERE]

In the 1997 Houston general election campaign, race was not ignored in the election, but Brown reached out to all groups and ran a campaign that seemed to downplay his race. Mosbacher didn't seem to try to highlight Brown's race. The newspaper did not draw much attention to the fact that Brown could be the first Black mayor of Houston (Table 3.6). However, by the time the 2001 Houston campaign came

[38] It should be noted that this campaign and the election took place in the wake of the 2001 9/11 attack. It is likely that race took a back seat to other concerns at that time.

along, race was salient in this campaign. It was Blacks versus Latinos and both Sanchez and Brown sought out their racial/ethnic voter base, thus highlighting race and ethnicity in the campaign. I was able to code newspapers for the Houston 2009 election, but have not been able to locate exit poll data by racial/ethnic group. Overall, race was not salient in that election, which featured the first openly gay mayoral candidate and as a result, sexuality and morals became the focus of the election. Finally, race was salient in the 1996 Miami mayoral campaign as both Teele and Penelas sought their racial/ethnic voter base.

Race of the Candidate

The theory outlined in the previous chapter assumes that most Blacks will vote for Black candidates, regardless of endorsements and racial saliency and that most Latinos will vote for Latino candidates regardless of endorsements and racial saliency. From the election return data for the elections studied in this chapter we see that Black voters overwhelmingly supported Black candidates (Miami 1996, Houston 1997 and Houston 2001). It is also clear that Latino voters overwhelmingly supported Latino candidates (Miami 1996, Houston 2001, Los Angeles 2001, Los Angeles 2005, New York Democratic Run-off 2001 and New York 2005). Previous research suggests that Black voters are more likely to vote for Black candidates (Walton 1985) and Latinos are more likely to vote for Latino candidates (Barretto 2009). Are Blacks more or less likely to support a White candidate or a Latino candidate for mayor, all else equal? The data in this chapter show that in three elections, Black voters supported Latino candidates (New

York Democratic Run-off 2001, New York 2005, and Los Angeles 2005). However, in the 2001 election in Los Angeles, they supported a White candidate over a Latino. Similarly, in the absence of partisanship cues, are Latinos more likely to support a White or a Black candidate for mayor? The data in this chapter show that in Houston 1997, Latino voters supported the Black candidate (Table 3.4). Similarly, in New York 2009, Latino Voters supported Thompson, a Black mayoral candidate, with 55% of the vote (See Table 3.3).

Preliminary Data Analysis: A Qualitative Approach

In New York City in 1997, Rudolph Giuliani, a White candidate, received five endorsements from Black leaders/organizations, while Ruth Messinger, another White candidate, received six endorsements from Black leaders/organizations (Figure 3.1). Neither candidate received endorsements from Latino leaders. In the election, Giuliani received 20% of the Black vote and 43% of the Latino vote. Messinger received 70% of the Black vote and 57% of the Latino vote. This shows that even though the Black endorsements were basically split, the Black vote was not, indicating that endorsements had little influence in this election. Latino leaders/organizations did not offer any endorsements and the vote was relatively close, though in the end Messinger received more support from this group. At least in the case of African Americans, the evidence was contrary to my theoretical expectations. Despite race being salient in the election, the endorsements were not influential when it came to votes. It should be noted that this is one of the few elections considered in this chapter that featured two White candidates.

It is unclear if this influenced voter behavior, even though race was made salient. That is, is racial saliency different when there are two White candidates? Further research may shed some light on this.

[FIGURE 3.1 ABOUT HERE]

In the Democratic run-off election in New York in 2001, Fernando Ferrer, a Latino candidate, received six endorsements from Blacks leaders/organizations, while Mark Green, a White candidate, only received one endorsement from Black leaders/organizations (see Figure 3.2). Ferrer received one endorsement from a largely Black and Latino organization, while Green did not receive any endorsements from Latino/Black organizations. Ferrer received one endorsement from Latino leaders/organizations, while Green did not receive any endorsements from Latino leaders/organizations. In the election, Ferrer received 71% of the Black vote, while Green received only 29%. Ferrer also received 84% of the Latino vote, to Green's 16%. In this case, the candidate with the most endorsements from Black and Latino leaders/organizations also received the most votes from those groups. However, recall, that we would expect that Ferrer would receive the majority of the votes from Latino voters, as he is a Latino candidate.

[FIGURE 3.2 ABOUT HERE]

In New York in 2001, Michael Bloomberg, a White candidate, received three endorsements from Black leaders/organizations, while Mark Green, also a White

candidate, received one endorsement from Black leaders/organizations (see Figure 3.3). Bloomberg received six endorsements from Latino leaders/organizations, while Green received one endorsement from Latino leaders/organizations. Green did receive one endorsement from the largely Black and Latino union. In the election, Green received 75% of the Black vote, while Bloomberg received only 25%. Bloomberg received 47% of the Latino vote, while Green received 49% of the Latino vote. In this case, the candidate with the most Black leader/organization endorsements did not receive the majority of Black vote. Similarly, the candidate with the most Latino leader/organization endorsements did not receive the majority of the Latino vote. Race was not salient in this campaign. For Latino voters, they split their votes, even though Bloomberg received six endorsements from Latino leaders and organization. Green only received three Latino endorsements.

[FIGURE 3.3 ABOUT HERE]

In the 2005 general election in New York City, Michael Bloomberg, a White candidate received five endorsements from Black leaders/organizations, while Fernando Ferrer, a Latino candidate, received ten endorsements from Black leaders/organizations (see Figure 3.4). Bloomberg received five endorsements from Latino leaders/organizations, while Ferrer received four endorsements from Latino leaders/organizations. Ferrer also received one endorsement from a largely Black and Latino organization. In the election, Bloomberg received 46% of the Black vote and 34% of the Latino vote, while Ferrer received 53% of the Black vote and 63% of the Latino

vote. Given that Ferrer received so many more Black endorsements than Bloomberg, his share of the vote does not match the level of endorsements. In this election, the candidate with the most Black leader/organization endorsements barely received the majority of the Black vote. Race was salient in this campaign and we do see some support for the alternative hypothesis, that racial and ethnic group leader endorsements do not influence votes.

[FIGURE 3.4 ABOUT HERE]

The New York 2009 mayoral election featured Bill Thompson, the city comptroller and an incumbent Michael Bloomberg. Thompson, an African American, received three Black endorsements, including one from President Barack Obama (See Figure 3.5). He received 76% of the Black vote, which is expected based on my theory. Bloomberg received no Black endorsements and 23% of the Blacks vote. There were not any Latino endorsements mentioned in the newspaper.[39] Thompson received 55% of the Latino Vote and Bloomberg received 43%. With neither candidate receiving any Latino endorsements, we cannot draw any conclusions about the relationship between endorsements and candidate preference is in this election.

[FIGURE 3.5 ABOUT HERE]

[39] Though, Fernando Ferrer did endorse Thompson, via New York One, the local television news channel, it was not covered in the articles I read for this content analysis.

Turning to Los Angeles in 2001, we see that both James Hahn, a White candidate, and Antonio Villaraigosa, a Latino candidate, received two endorsements from Black leaders/organizations (see Figure 3.6). Villaraigosa did not receive any endorsements from Latino leaders/organizations, while Hahn received one endorsement from Latino leaders/organizations. In the election, Hahn received 80% of the Black vote, while Villaraigosa received 20% of the Black vote. Villaraigosa received 82% of the Latino vote to Hahn's 18%. Here, Hahn received the majority of the Black leaders/organization endorsements and captured a majority of the Black vote. Villaraigosa did receive the majority of the Latino vote, even without the majority of Latino endorsements, which is expected given that he is a Latino candidate. Race was salient in this election because of the news media mentioned that Villaraigosa's potential to be the first Latino mayor in more than 100 years. In this election, there is not evidence of a Black-Latino coalition. Although Black voters and Black endorsements went to the same candidate, it was for Hahn, the White candidate.

[FIGURE 3.6 ABOUT HERE]

During the 2005 election in Los Angeles, the same candidates, Hahn and Villaraigosa, faced one another again (see Figure 3.7). This time, Villaraigosa received five Black leader/organization endorsements and no Latino leader/organization endorsements. Hahn received one Black leader/organization endorsements and two Latino leader/organization endorsements. In the election, Villaraigosa received 58% of the Black vote, while Hahn received 42% of the Black vote. Villaraigosa received 82%

of the Latino vote, to Hahn's 14%. In this case, the candidate with the majority of the Black leader/organization endorsements did receive a majority of the Black votes. However, Villaraigosa received a majority of the Latino vote, even without a majority of the Latino leader/organization endorsements, though that is expected because he is a Latino candidate. In this case, the apparent effects of endorsements appear consistent with my theory.

[FIGURE 3.7 ABOUT HERE]

Turning our attention, now to Houston in 1997, we see that Robert Mosbacher, a White candidate, received no Black leader/organization endorsements and six Latino leader/organization endorsements (see Figure 3.8). Lee Brown, a Black candidate, received eleven Black leader/organization endorsements and three Latino leader/organization endorsements. In the election, Brown received 97% of the Black vote and 66% of the Latino vote. Mosbacher received 3% of the Black vote and 34% of the Latino vote. In this case, we expect the Black candidate to receive the majority of the Black votes and that is true. The candidate with the most Latino leader/organization endorsements did not receive majority of the Latino vote, contrary to the expectation of my theory. However, race was not salient in this campaign, so I would expect the effects of endorsements to be less influential.

[FIGURE 3.8 ABOUT HERE]

The election in Houston in 2001 was a contest between Lee Brown, a Black candidate and Sanchez, a Latino candidate (see Figure 3.9). Recall, that there is no expectation of a Black/Latino coalition here, as each group will just vote for the candidate from their own ethnic/racial group. Brown received six Black leader/organization endorsements and four Latino leader/organization endorsements. Sanchez received no Black leader/organization endorsements and two Latino leader/organization endorsements. In the election, Brown received 90% of the Black vote and 28% of the Latino vote. Sanchez received 10% of the Black vote and 72% of the Latino vote. In this case, the candidate with the majority of the Black leader/organization endorsements received a majority of the Black vote, while the candidate with the majority of the Latino leader/organization endorsements did not receive a majority of the Latino vote. Given, that the candidates were Black and Latino, we would expect that Blacks supported the Black candidate and Latinos supported the Latino candidate.[40]

[FIGURE 3.9 ABOUT HERE]

Racially Salient Campaigns and Endorsements

In some elections, when race was salient in the campaign, endorsements did seem to matter (New York 2001 Run-Off, New York 2005, Los Angeles 2001, and Los

[40] We cannot say much about the 1996 Miami election because of missing data at this time (see Table 1I). I was able to collect vote return data for 1996, but there were no endorsements in *The Miami Herald*. In the subsequent elections, there were candidate endorsements, but no vote return data were available.

Angeles 2005). In other elections, where race was not salient in the campaign, the endorsements did not seem to matter. As we saw in New York 2001 and Houston 1997 when race was not salient, those candidates with the most co-ethnic leader endorsements from a particular ethnic group did not receive a majority of votes from that ethnic group. In the elections where a Black candidate faced a Latino candidate, Black and Latino voters seemed to support their co-ethnic candidates (Miami 1996, Houston 2001), as expected. In New York in 1997, race was salient yet the endorsements did not seem to matter in that election. This election stands out as the only election where there were two White candidates and racial salience in the campaign did not seem to influence voters. Though, the Black endorsements were virtually split, a deeper look at the endorsements may add some clarity that is masked by simply counting the number of endorsements given to a particular candidates. We will turn to this in the next section. In summary, these data suggest that the evidence is mixed regarding my theory that co-ethnic leader endorsements will matter when race becomes salient in a campaign.

Preliminary Data Analysis: A Quantitative Approach

The previous section provided a rich look at individual elections. Yet, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the goal of the project is to move beyond individual elections and explanations for Black and Latino electoral support for a particular candidate. To that end, I consolidated the information from the previous section and performed a regression analysis to see if there are larger patterns that emerge. In Chapter 2, we saw that there are three factors that might explain the variations in Black and

Latino voting patterns in local elections: Elites and their endorsements, the quality and demographic characteristics of the candidates, and the political context (racial salience). Given that I am interested in Black-Latino electoral alliances, when Black and White candidates face one another in an election, I am interested in Latino votes and leader endorsements. If the election features a Latino and a White candidate, I am interested in the Black votes and leader endorsements. In elections where there were two White candidates, I used both Black and Latino votes and leader endorsements for the more Liberal candidate. This happened in New York in 1997 and in 2001. The votes and endorsements for Blacks *and* Latinos were used for Messenger (1997) and Green (2001). The primary dependent variable is Minority Candidate Percent Vote, which can range from 0-100 and is the percent of the vote the minority (or more liberal) mayoral candidate received. The independent variables are: Minority Candidate, where a 1 represents the presence of a Minority candidate in the election, 0 otherwise; Minority Endorsements, where a 1 represents that the minority (or liberal candidate) received a majority of the endorsements from minority leaders and organizations, 0 otherwise; Racial Salience, where I include the number of times the media made mention of the racial/ethnic minority candidate being the first racial/ethnic mayor in the city if they win. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 3.7.

[TABLE 3.7 ABOUT HERE]

The table shows that of the three factors that might explain the variations in Black and Latino voting patterns in local elections, the coefficient on endorsements is

the only one that is large, positive and statistically significant. This means that receiving a majority of the leader/organization endorsements increases the minority (liberal) candidate's vote share. The coefficient on the number of times the media makes mention of the race/ethnicity of the candidate (racial salience) is also significant, but it is negative, which means that as the more the media devotes attention to the race of the mayoral candidate, the less well this candidate does among minority voters. For example, if there is a White candidate and a Latino candidate, we are interested in the percent of the Black vote that the candidate receives. Based on the results in Table 7, if the Latino candidate receives a majority of the Black leaders and organizations endorsements and the race/ethnicity of the candidate is mentioned one time, we expect the Latino candidate to receive roughly 76% of the Black vote (61.16+22.61-4.08-3.63). If the race ethnicity of the candidate is mentioned 10 times, that would decrease the Black vote by roughly 36%, holding all other variables constant. If the race/ethnicity of the candidate is not mentioned at all then the percent of the Black vote would be roughly 80% of the Black vote (61.16+22.61-4.08). By contrast, if the Latino candidate did NOT receive a majority of the Black leaders/organization endorsements, we expect the Latino candidate to receive roughly 54% of the Black vote (61.16-4.08-3.63). Thus, consistent with expectations, co-ethnic leader/organization endorsements seem to matter to Black and Latino voters although increases in racial salience do not have a positive effect, as I anticipated.

Endorsements – A Deeper Look

The preliminary data presented in the previous section demonstrated that there does not seem to be a relationship between elites and their endorsements, the race of the candidate, the political context and voters' candidate preferences. However, the previous analysis provides only a big picture view: the number of endorsements noted by newspapers during the campaign period. This information is useful, to the extent that we can test the aggregate relationship between endorsements and vote choice when race is salient and when it is not salient. Another way to think about the influence of endorsements is to take into account the number of times the newspapers mention a particular endorsement (person X endorses candidate Y) and on what dates these endorsements were mentioned during the campaign season. That is, are some leaders' and elites' endorsements mentioned more than once? Are they mentioned close to the elections or weeks in advance? Previous works on endorsements (McDermott 2006; Rapoport, Stone, & Abramowitz 1991) make no mention of timing or count in their analyses. By delving a little bit deeper and moving in from the larger picture, we may be able to gain an even better understanding of the role that co-ethnic leader endorsements may play for Blacks and Latinos when race is made salient in campaigns.

Relying on the same newspaper articles I used in the previous section, I re-coded the endorsements given to candidates by Black and Latino leaders and organizations, only this time I noted the date the endorsement was mentioned, the page number the endorsements was mentioned, and the number of times an endorsement was mentioned within a given news story. This provides a richer description of newspaper coverage of endorsements during the campaign cycle. While the previous section provides an overview of the number of endorsements given to a candidate, where a leader

or organization is only able to endorse one candidate in an election, the descriptive analysis in this section provides more information about the coverage of those endorsements. Although campaigns may publicize the endorsements a candidate receives, the newspaper is a source that offers free publicity (both positive and negative) of candidate endorsements. The data do not show a pattern for timing of endorsements.

In order to test the relationship between the number of times minority endorsements are mentioned and the percent vote, I performed a similar analysis to the one above. Again, the primary dependent variable is Minority Candidate Percent Vote, which can range from 0-100 and is the percent of the vote the minority (or liberal) mayoral candidate received. I used the same independent variables: Minority Candidate, where a 1 represents the presence of a Minority candidate in the election, 0 otherwise; and Racial Salience, where I include the number of times the newspapers mentioned that the candidate had the opportunity to be the first racial/ethnic mayor if they win. However in this analysis, instead of the Minority Endorsements, I used the Number of Times the Minority Endorsements were mentioned, which is a count of the number of times the candidates endorsements from racial/ethnic minorities were mentioned. These ranged from 2 to 39. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 3.8.

[TABLE 3.8 ABOUT HERE]

Turning to Table 8, we can see that the coefficient on the number of times the minority endorsements are mentioned is small, positive, and slightly significant. By contrast, the coefficient on the number of times the newspaper makes mention of the

candidates' race/ethnicity (racial salience) is negative, large, and significant. If a White candidate faced a Black candidate, we would be interested in the percent of the Latino vote the Black candidate received. The results in this analysis suggest that each time the Latino leader/organization endorsements were mentioned would increase the percent of the Latino vote by 0.77%. Similarly, each time the newspaper mentioned the race/ethnicity of the Black candidate that would reduce the percent of the Latino vote by 3.34%. So for example, if the Black candidate's Latino endorsements were mentioned 10 times (10 x 0.77) and the newspaper made mention of the Black candidate's race two times (-3.34x2), we would expect the percent of the Latino vote to be roughly 56% (61.43+7.7-6.68-6.15). By contrast if the Latino endorsements for the Black candidate were mentioned 39 times, which was the highest value in this dataset (39 x 0.77) and the newspaper mentioned the Black candidate's race 10 times, which was also the highest value in this dataset, we would expect the Latino vote for the Black candidate to be roughly 52% (61.43+30.03-33.40-6.15). In sum, this analysis also suggests that there is some relationship between co-ethnic leader endorsements, racial salience and vote choice among Blacks and Latinos. However, the results for the former are positive and thus consistent with my theory whereas the latter run in the opposite direction, contrary to expectations.

Preliminary Conclusions and Limitations

The data presented in this chapter relied on information from newspaper coverage of real world mayoral elections in New York, Los Angeles, Houston, and Miami. These data allow me to investigate my theory: there are three factors that might explain the

variations in Black and Latino voting patterns in local elections: elites and their endorsements, the quality and demographic characteristics of the candidates, and the political context (racial salience). Relying on a content analysis of the newspaper articles yielded some preliminary conclusions are that endorsements seem to matter to voters when voting, when race is salient. Converting that into quantitative data allowed me to further test this claim and demonstrated that co-ethnic leader endorsements do influence Black and Latino vote choice, while racial salience in campaigns did not seem to matter.

One clear critique of the preliminary data presented in this chapter is the inability to determine causality. Is it the case the leaders form coalitions and then bargain for endorsements so that voters know whom to support? Is it possible that certain candidates were already popular among voters, such that ambitious racial/ethnic leaders can capitalize on giving an endorsement to that candidate to remain in the favor of voters? The truth is that the direction of the causal arrow is unclear using content analysis. In order to address this concern, I conducted an experiment to try to address this question.

Next Steps

In Chapters four, I will present data from an experimental design testing the effects of co-ethnic endorsements, racial climate, and candidate ethnicity on African American voters.

Table 3.1: Los Angeles % Voted

	1997		2001		2005	
	Riordan (White)	Hayden (White)	Villaraigosa (Latino)	**Hahn** (White)	**Villaraigosa** (Latino)	Hahn (White)
Blacks	19	75	20	80	58	42
Whites	71	26	41	59	57	43
(Jews)	71	26	46	54	N/A	N/A
Latinos	60	33	82	18	86	14
Asian Am	62	35	35	65	42	59

1993-2001 Sonenshein and Pinkus[41], 2005 The Center for the Study of Los Angeles

Winner

Table 3.2: Los Angeles Poll

March 8, 2005 Primary Exit Poll			
Which Actions taken By Hahn Contributed to your vote today?			
	Blacks	Latinos	Whites
Appointing Bratton over Parks	48	25	22
Secession of SFV and Hollywood	20	25	37
Neither	39	56	53

Los Angeles Times Poll

[41] Sonenshein, Raphael J. and Susan H. Pinkus. 2005. "Latino Incorporation Reaches the Urban Summit: How Antonio Villaraigosa Won the 2005 Los Angeles Mayor's Race." PS October 2005, pp 713-721.

Table 3.3: New York % Voted

	1997		2001		2005		2009	
	Giuliani (White)	Messinger (White)	**Bloomberg** (White)	Green (White)	**Bloomberg** (White)	Ferrer (Latino)	**Bloomberg** (White)	Thompson (Black)
Blacks	20	79	25	75	46	53	23	76
Whites	76	21	60	38	67	30	67	29
Latinos	43	57	47	49	34	63	43	55

1993-2001 Kaufmann[42], 2005 New York City Mayoral Election Study, 2009 New York Times[43]

Winner

Table 3.4: Houston % Voted

	1997 General Election				1997 Runoff Election		2001	
	Mosbacher (White)	Brown (Black)	Saenz (Latino)	Greanias (White)	Mosbacher (White)	**Brown** (Black)	**Brown** (Black)	Sanchez (Latino)
Blacks	1	97	1	1	3	97	90	10
Whites	51	14	4	30	77	23	N/A	N/A
Latinos	3	16	69	12	34	66	28	72%

1997 McKeever[44], 2001 Vaca[45]

Winner

[42] Kaufmann, Karen M. 2004 *The Urban Voter* **:** Group Conflict and Mayoral Voting Behavior in American Cities. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
[43] "Profile of New York City Voters" *The New York Times* November 4, 2009.
[44] McKeever, Matthew. 2001. "Interethnic Politics in the Consensus City." *In Governing American Cities*. Michael Jones-Correa (Ed). New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Pp 240-243.
[45] Vaca, Nicolas. 2004. The Presumed Alliance. The Unspoken conflict between Latinos and Blacks and what it means for America. New York. Harper Collins Press. Pp 168.

Table 3.5: Miami % Voted

	1996	
	Teele (Black)	**Penelas** (Latino)
Blacks	84	3
Latinos	2	60

1996 Grenier and Castro[46]
Winner

[46] Grenier, Guillermo J., Max Castro. 2001. "Blacks and Cubans in Miami: The Negative Consequences of the Cuban Enclave on Ethnic Relations. ." *In Governing American Cities*. Michael Jones-Correa (Ed). New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Pp.138.

Table 3.6: Summary of Campaign Context (Racial Salience)

City	Election Year	Race Salient	Endorsements
New York	1997	Yes	Messinger received most Black endorsements and votes
			There were no Latino endorsements given and the vote was split
			Race Salient: Giuliani brings race into campaign
New York	2001 RunOff	Yes	Ferrer received most Black endorsements and votes
			Latinos also overwhelmingly supported Ferrer
			First Latino/Hispanic Mayor Mentioned 2 Times
New York	2001 Gen	No	Bloomberg received most Black endorsements, but not Black Votes
			Bloomberg received most Latino endorsements, Latino vote split
			Race Not Salient
New York	2005	Yes	Ferrer received majority of Black endorsements and a slight majority of Black votes
			Latinos supported Ferrer
			First Latino/Hispanic Mayor Mentioned 10 Times
New York	2009	No	No Latino Endorsements Mentioned
			Race Not Salient
Los Angeles	2001	Yes	Black endorsements split, Blacks voted for Hahn
			Hahn received more Latino endorsements, but Latinos voted for Villaraigosa as expected
			First Latino/Hispanic Mayor Mentioned 8 Times
Los Angeles	2005	Yes	Villaraigosa received most Black endorsements and votes
			Latinos supported Villaraigosa
			Race Salient: Hahn upsets Black voters: RE Parks
			First Latino/Hispanic Mayor Mentioned 4 Times
Miami Dade	1996	N/A	Black vs. Latino candidate, no expectation for a Black/Latino shared candidate support
Houston	1997	No	Blacks supported Brown
			Mosbacher received most Latino endorsements, but not Latino votes
			First Black African American Mayor Mentioned 4 Times
Houston	2001	N/A	Black vs. Latino candidate, no expectation for a Black/Latino shared candidate support
			First Latino/Hispanic Mayor Mentioned 0 Times

Table 3.7: Regression of the effects of Minority Candidates, Minority Endorsements, and Racial Saliency on Percent Vote in Mayoral Elections

Intercept	61.16*** (11.28)
Majority of Minority Endorsements	22.60* (3.12)
Minority Candidate	-4.09 (7.67)
Racial Salience	-3.64* (1.15)
N	10

Notes: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ for one-tailed test, except for constant. Elections: New York: 1997, 2001 Democratic Run-Off, 2001 General Election, 2005 General Election, and the 2009 General Election; Los Angeles 2001 and 2005 Elections; and Houston 1997 Election.

Table 3.8: Regression of the effects of Minority Candidates, Number Times of Minority Endorsements Mentioned, and Racial Saliency on Percent Vote in Mayoral Elections

Intercept	61.43*** (10.01)
Number of Times Minority Endorsements Mentioned	.72+ (.33)
Minority Candidate	-6.15 (9.48)
Racial Salience	-3.34* (1.38)
N	10

Notes: +p < 0.10, * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 for one-tailed test, except for constant. Elections: New York: 1997, 2001 Democratic Run-Off, 2001 General Election, 2005 General Election, and the 2009 General Election; Los Angeles 2001 and 2005 Elections; and Houston 1997 Election.

Figure 3. 1: New York 1997



Figure 3.2: New York 2001 Dem Run Off



Figure 3.3: New York 2001 General Election



Figure 3.4: New York 2005



Figure 3.5: New York 2009



Figure 3.6: Los Angeles 2001



Figure 3.7: Los Angeles 2005



Figure 3.8: Houston 1997



Figure 3.9: Houston 2001



CHAPTER 4

Black Experiment

Introduction

In chapter one, we saw that recent mayoral elections in Houston, New York, Los Angeles, and Miami yielded no clear pattern of voting behavior for Blacks and Latinos from one election to the next. Black and Latino voters supported the same candidates in some mayoral elections, but in some others their preferences diverged. In chapter two, I presented a theory designed to account for the development of Black-Latino electoral coalitions. Briefly, I argued that in the absence of partisan cues, when race becomes salient in an election, candidate endorsements by co-ethnic leaders would prompt minority group members to vote for a particular candidate, even if the candidate is from another ethnic group. I expect that whenever an African American or Latino candidate is running, Black and Latino voters will overwhelmingly support the candidate belonging to their racial or ethnic group, regardless of leader endorsements. However, if there is one White candidate and one Latino candidate, I expect the Black vote will be determined largely by Black leader/organization endorsements. Thus, when a Black/Latino coalition has formed, I hypothesize that this has occurred because of electoral cues sent by co-

ethnic leaders and so I would expect to find the preponderance of local Black leaders/organizations endorsing the Latino candidate. Similarly, if there is one White candidate and one African American candidate, I expect the Latino votes will be determined largely by Latino leader/organization endorsements. And, as with the previous example, when Black and Latino voters coalesce behind an African American candidate, my theory holds that this is due to co-ethnic elite cues indicating that Latinos should support this candidate. When minority voters are confronted with two White candidates, I expect Latino votes to be determined by Latino leader/organization endorsements and Black votes to be determined by Black leader/organization endorsements. The campaign context is also an important factor in my theory such that it will likely enhance all of the processes described above. That is, when racial or ethnic issues are particularly salient in the campaign, then elite endorsements should be especially influential. If race is not salient in an election, endorsements will have less of an effect.

In the previous chapter, I presented content-analysis data that explored my theory about the relationship between co-ethnic leader endorsements and vote choice in recent elections in New York, Houston, and Los Angeles and Miami. Using qualitative and quantitative data, I showed that for the most part, when race is made salient in a campaign, the number and direction of co-ethnic leader endorsements appear to be associated with candidate preference among Black and Latino voters.[47] It was when race is not salient in a campaign that co-ethnic leader cues typically mattered less.[48] When I

[47] This approach is rather cautious, as all endorsements are not created equal. That is, it will likely understate the value of some endorsements and overstate the value of others.
[48] However, two elections (New York 1997 and Los Angeles 2001), race was made salient in the campaign and co-ethnic leader endorsements did not influence vote choice in those elections.

put those qualitative data to the test using quantitative methods, the results were supportive of my theory. For example, the 2001 Los Angeles mayoral election pitted Kenneth Hahn, a White candidate against Antonio Villaraigosa, a Latino candidate. Race was a salient feature in this campaign as Villaraigosa's ethnicity was often mentioned in the media because he was the first viable Latino candidate to run for mayor in Los Angeles in this century.[49] During this election, various Black leaders publically endorsed Hahn and Villaraigosa at comparable levels, with each candidate receiving two endorsements from Black community leaders (See Chapter three). In that election, Black voters supported Hahn, giving him 80% of the African American vote.[50] However, by the time the two candidates faced off again in 2005, race was also salient in this campaign after Hahn did not reappoint Bernard Parks, an African American, to another term as police chief. Black leaders were not happy about this decision. In turn, African American leaders gave Villaraigosa five endorsements to Hahn's one. In this election, 58% of Black voters voted for Villaraigosa over his opponent, which represents a shift in support of almost forty percentage points, relative to the 2001 campaign.[51]

The previous chapter suggests that in some elections, where race was salient, the candidate who received the most endorsements from African American community leaders also received the most votes from Black voters (e.g. New York 2001 Run-Off, New York 2005, Los Angeles 2001, and Los Angeles 2005). In elections where race was not salient, endorsements seemed unrelated to Black votes (e.g. New York 2001). In and

[49] It should be noted that Hahn also tried to link Villaraigosa to drug dealers. See Orlov, Rick "Fight to the Finish; Candidate Criss-cross city; Two Years of campaigning gets Down to the Final Hours" June 3, 2001. *The Daily News of Los Angeles*. Page N1.
[50] It should be noted that many Blacks liked and respected Hahn's father who was also a prominent politician in Los Angeles with longstanding ties to the Black community.
[51] 1993-2001 Sonenshein and Pinkus, 2005 The Center for the Study of Los Angeles

New York 1997, race was salient and Black endorsements were split, but the African Americans voted overwhelmingly for one candidate (e.g. Messinger in New York 1997). Though it is likely that there are election-specific reasons which can help explain the outcome in New York in 1997, the larger message is that there appears to be some relationship between the race of the candidate, endorsements, and racial saliency that will help us understand the real world voting behavior observed in recent mayoral elections, but the real world elections do not allow us to fully test these conditions.

While the results from chapter three inconclusive, the data are problematic because there is no way to determine causality. That is, it is unclear if candidates were already popular among voters and then received endorsements from co-ethnic leaders or if co-ethnic leaders formed coalitions with candidates and then provided endorsements. An ideal way to determine the arrow of causality is through an experiment. In this chapter, I will provide results from such an experiment focusing in particular on endorsement cues delivered by African American leaders and their effect on Black voters. In the following sections I describe my hypotheses, explain the experimental design as well as present and discuss my findings. My results will show that co-ethnic elite endorsements are an effective tool for mobilizing cross-racial electoral coalitions and, consistent with my hypotheses, these cues are more influential under some conditions rather than others.

Hypotheses

Although generally consistent with expectations, the results presented in Chapter three could not provide firm support for the causal relationship between race of

the candidate, elite endorsements and racial saliency and candidate selection. First, one goal of the experiment is to determine if the race of the candidates matters to Black subjects, even when neither candidate is a member of their racial group. In the real world elections, we saw that Black voters were often willing to support Latino candidates (e.g. New York Democratic Run-off 2001 and Los Angeles 2005). Yet in other elections, this support was much weaker (e.g. New York 2005). Previous research suggests that Black voters are more likely to vote for Black candidates (Walton 1985). Indeed, in the real world elections we saw that Black voters overwhelmingly supported Black candidates (Miami 1996, Houston 1997 and Houston 2001). We know that in state and national elections, Blacks have voted overwhelmingly for non-Black candidates, often because of the absence of credible African American candidates at this level. What is less clear is, in the absence of partisanship cues, are Blacks more or less likely to support a White candidate or a Latino candidate, all else equal? Additionally, newspapers and television news often report on the highly tense relationship between Blacks and Latinos. Some scholars even question the likelihood of Blacks and Latinos forming political coalitions given the negative feelings group members have towards one another (Gay 2006; Kaufmann 2003a; McClain et al. 2006). I argue that such predictions are overstated and that under the right circumstances, Blacks will support a Latino candidate for Mayor.

The second goal of the experiment is to determine the extent to which endorsements from co-ethnic leaders matter to Black subjects. Previous research suggests that elites can shape public opinion (Chong 1991; Chong 1993; Converse 1964; Druckman 2001; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Lee 2002; Zaller 1992). But opinions are not the same as candidate preferences. There is strong evidence

to suggest that when given certain cues, generally uninformed voters can still vote in a manner consistent with their interests (Gerber and Phillips 2003; Lupia 1994). Yet, the endorsements literature has not been conclusive: sometimes they matter and sometimes they do not (McDermott 2006; Rapoport, Stone, and Abramowitz 1991). In the last chapter, we saw that in at least some elections, the candidate who has amassed the greatest number of Black co-ethnic leader endorsements also received the most votes from Black voters (New York 1997, New York Democratic Run-off 2001 and Los Angeles 2001). In the context of local elections, where partisan cues are often missing, when co-ethnic leader endorsements are provided, are Black voters more or less likely to support the candidate that receives the endorsement?

The third goal of the experiment is to determine if racial saliency matters in the context of local elections. Heightened racial saliency in a campaign may increase racial and ethnic identities and for Black and Latino subjects, the political influence of racial identity may become enhanced under such conditions (Barreto 2009; Campbell et al 1960; Gilens 1999; Kaufmann 2004; Mendelberg 2001; Reeves 1997; White 2007). Looking again to the recent mayoral elections we saw in the last chapter, race was salient in many of the campaigns (New York 1997; New York Democratic Run-off 2001; New York 2005; Los Angeles 2001; Los Angeles 2005). In the context of local elections, where racial saliency is heightened, are Black subjects more likely to be supportive of a candidate who is sensitive to racial issues?[52] Again, this is a more narrow definition of racial salience, but due to resource constraints, the experiment was designed to test only one aspect of the definition provided in the previous chapter.

[52] Recall, by racial salience I mean issues relevant to Blacks (when the candidates are White/Latino or White/White) and issues that are relevant to Latinos (when the candidates are White/Black or White/White). This is not the same way I coded racial salience in a campaign in the last chapter.

The three main conditions listed above overlap in the real mayoral elections we looked at in the last chapter. This makes it difficult to accurately specify the conditions under which Blacks would be more likely to support a Latino candidate. Recall though, that the theory outlined in chapter two argues that when all three conditions are present (Latino candidate/Endorsement given/Racial Salience) Black support for Latino candidates will be particularly strong. That is, if the theory is correct, the Latino candidate will get more support than the similar White candidate when race is salient and there is an endorsement provided by an African American leader/organization. The design allows us to test many hypotheses: How do subjects respond when both candidates are White and when a White candidate faces a Latino candidate? How do subjects respond when there are endorsements as opposed to when there are no endorsements? How do subjects respond when race is salient and when race is not salient? With my experimental design I can test each of the following hypotheses.

H_1: Latino candidates will receive more support among Black voters than White candidates.
H_2: Candidates with endorsements will receive more support than candidates without endorsements.
H_3: When Race is Salient, candidates who are portrayed as more racially sensitive will receive more support than the candidate who is characterized as less racially sensitive.
H_4: When race is salient, and endorsements are given, Latino candidates will receive more support than the similar White candidates.
H_5: When race is salient, and endorsements are given, the Latino candidate will be perceived as more sympathetic to Black issues.

Methods and Procedures

In order to the test the hypotheses laid out above, I developed a 2X2X2 experimental design (see Kinder and Palfrey 1993 for the benefits of using experiments in the social sciences). As indicated above, I manipulated the ethnicity of the more liberal candidate, the extent to which the campaign focused on racial issues, and whether or not an African American political group endorsed the more liberal candidate. In order to determine if the race of the candidate will influence candidate preferences among Black subjects, the more liberal candidate is depicted as White in half of the experimental cells and as Latino in the other half. Second, I seek to ascertain the influence of endorsements on candidate preferences and so half of the treatments provide no endorsement from African American groups while in the other half the more liberal candidate is the unambiguous choice of Black political elites. Finally, to determine whether or not highlighting racial issues in a campaign will encourage Blacks to view the more liberal candidate more favorably, half of the treatments focus on a non-racial issue whereas the other half highlight candidate disputes on explicitly racial policies.

[TABLE 4.1 ABOUT HERE]

In order to deliver the treatment I designed eight mostly identical newspaper articles, complete with photographs of the candidates, which differed only along the three factors identified above. In every article, one of the candidates is Jeremy Boardman (he is always the more conservative candidate) depicted in the accompanying photograph as a middle-aged White American male. In four of the articles, the other candidate is Henry Brewer, also depicted as a White middle-aged man. Finally, in four articles the other

candidate is named Anthony Gonzales, who is pictured as a middle-aged Latino man. In four articles, endorsements are given to either Brewer or Gonzales from the "Local Association of Black Leaders." In order to determine the role of racial saliency, all of the articles focused on an environmental company seeking to renew its trash burning contract. Boardman always supports the contract renewal because the city needs more time to develop a recycling program. Brewer or Gonzales always oppose the contract renewal and supports an immediate recycling program. The story ends with a fact about how the percentage of voters who felt the environment was important in the election. The articles where race is not salient focus only on the environmental company. In the articles where race is salient, the articles still focus on the environmental company and the contract renewal except in these versions the story also says that the company "received the contract, despite several bids from minority companies and a promise from the city to use the newly enacted Affirmative Action laws." All the candidates still oppose or support the contract for the same reasons listed in the environment only articles. The versions of the story that highlight the racial issues also end with a fact about the percentage of voters who felt Affirmative Action was important in the election (See Table 4.1A and 4.1B). The photos of the candidates that accompanied the article are presented in the appendix (See Appendix 6).

Data were collected at several locations: Ann Arbor, MI; Detroit, MI; Pontiac, MI; Chicago, IL; Las Vegas, NV; and New York, NY. Research assistants and the author approached various people who appeared to be African American or Black and asked them to participate in a short political survey. The newspaper article was on the first page, followed by the survey questions. Surveys were administered on paper on the spot.

Most subjects were able to complete the surveys in less than 20 minutes. Subjects were offered a $5 incentive. The randomization worked as designed for most of the relevant demographic and attitudinal variables, but there were some notable exceptions. In order to ensure that any results uncovered are not due to the uneven distribution of some variables across cells, these variables will be added to the analyses as controls.[53]

In all, 266 subjects participated in the survey. The sample ranged in age from 19 to 65. Seventy-two percent identified themselves as Democrats (24% strong Democrats, 38% identified themselves as Democrats, and 10% identified themselves as weak Democrats), 23% identified themselves as Independents, and the other 5% Republicans.[54] The mean income was between $40,001 and $50,000. The subjects were more educated than a representative cross-section of African Americans with 29% indicating they had some college, 29% reporting that they completed college, and 19% indicating that they had advanced degrees. A majority of respondents self identified as liberal (19%) or extremely liberal (28%) and 27% said they were moderate or middle of the road. Fifty-seven percent of the subjects were women.

Latino Candidates, Endorsements, and Racial Saliency

Candidate preference was measured with the following question: "If the election were held today, which candidate would you vote for?" Response options for cells a, c, e, and g were "Jeremy Boardman," "Henry Brewer," or "Undecided." In cells b, d, f and

[53] Controls include: partisanship, age, income, education, and several racial attitudes variables (See Appendix 1). The controls actually decrease the effects of my independent variables.
[54] No respondents selected Strong Republican. Eighty-five percent of Blacks in the 2008 American National Election Study (ANES) survey said Democrat, 47% reported that they were strong Democrats. So my sample is slightly less Democratic than a representative national sample.

h, response options were "Jeremy Boardman," "Anthony Gonzales," or "Undecided." Responses were recoded into a dichotomous variable where "1" indicates the respondent selected "Henry Brewer" or "Anthony Gonzales," and a "0" indicates the respondent selected “Jeremy Boardman” or "Undecided." Roughly 40% of the subjects said they would vote for either Brewer or Gonzales.[55]

My initial hypotheses involve the variation in support for these candidates by the race of the candidate, endorsements, and racial saliency. In order to test the hypotheses, I used logistic regression analysis to estimate support for candidate 2 (i.e. Brewer or Gonzales) by the three main effects: race of the candidate, endorsements, and racial saliency, as compared to the control group. In the control group, subjects read an article where there was no endorsement, two White candidates, and race was not salient: No endorsement, White vs. White, Race Not Salient (cell a). I then performed a logistic regression analysis that included the treatments where the only factor that changed relative to the control were the race of the candidate (b), the endorsement (c) and making race salient (e). In addition to the treatments, I also included the following control variables: age, income, education, and some racial attitudes variables.[56]

[TABLE 4.2 ABOUT HERE]

In Table 4.2, I examine the independent relationships between the race of the candidate, the role of endorsements, and the role of racial saliency in the campaign and

[55] Only 20 people said they would vote for Jeremy Boardman.
[56] More good Jobs for Latinos means less good jobs for others, More influence for Blacks means less influence for others in politics, Black Linked Fate, Perception that Blacks are discriminated in housing. The controls used in this analysis (Table 2 and Figure 1) are those were not randomized against these treatment cells (a, b, c, and e). The controls actually decrease the effects of my independent variables.

the dependent variable: preference for candidate 2 (Brewer or Gonzales). The only treatment that is significant is the Endorsement variable. The effect is large (1.77), positive, and significant (at the $p < .05$ level for a two-tailed test). This offers support for hypothesis two that candidates with endorsements will receive more support than candidates without endorsements. Table 4.2 also shows that Race of the Candidate and Racial Saliency are positive, small, but not statistically significant. At this time, there is not enough evidence to support hypotheses one or three that Latino candidates will receive more support than White candidates or that the presence of racial saliency will lead to more support for the candidates who are portrayed as more racially sensitive.

[FIGURE 4.1 ABOUT HERE]

Since the interpretation of logistic regression coefficients is not intuitive, I have provided a figure of predicted probabilities based on Table 4.2 (See Figure 4.1). Here we can see the magnitude of the main effects on candidate preference. In the baseline condition, (cell a), the probability that subjects will prefer candidate 2 is 0.17. When subjects read an article with a Latino candidate, the probability of preferring candidate 2 is increases, although significantly, to 0.33. When subjects read an article with an endorsement the probability of preferring candidate 2 rises sharply, relative to the baseline, to .52. Finally, when subjects read an article where race was salient, the probability of preferring candidate 2 increases, although not significantly, to 0.34. The figure illustrates that endorsements are an important factor in determining candidate preference, while the other two factors, on their own, are not as important.

Candidate Preferences

The results above in Table 4.2 and Figure 4.1 indicate that endorsements are important for African Americans in determining candidate preference. What is less clear is what happens when these factors work together. The experimental design allows me to test hypothesis four: When endorsements are provided, race is salient in the campaign, and when one of the candidates is Latino, Blacks will be more likely to support this candidate alongside the presumed support the candidate will receive from voters of his or her own ethnic group.[57] In order to examine the effect of each treatment on candidate preference (same dependent variable as above), I again use logistic regression analysis. The main independent variables are the full range of treatment groups (see Table 4.1). Responses were recoded such that subjects who received the treatment were coded as "1" and all other responses were recoded as "0". The baseline or control group represents those subjects who read the version of the story featuring two White candidates, with no African American endorsements, and no heightened salience for racial issues (cell (a) in Table 4.1). All comparisons, unless otherwise noted, will be made to this group. In addition to the treatments, I also included the following control variables: partisanship, age, income, education, and several racial attitudes variables (See Appendix 7).

[TABLE 4.3 ABOUT HERE]

In Table 4.3, I examine the effect of each treatment on candidate preference. Immediately what stands out is that the results are consistent with the fourth hypothesis:

[57] Based on recent elections, it is assumed that Latinos will support the Latino candidate.

when an endorsement is provided by an African American political organization, the candidate is Latino, and race is a salient characteristic of the campaign, Blacks are particularly inclined to support the liberal candidate. The last row of the table shows that the effect of cell (h) Endorsement, White vs. Latino, Race Salient, is large (3.41), positive, and highly significant ($p<.001$, for a two-tailed test). This result provides strong support for hypothesis four. However, we know from the previous analysis, that the race of the candidate and racial saliency alone are not that important in determining candidate preference. Fortunately, we can look at the cells where an endorsement was given, where the candidate was Latino, but race was not salient (Endorsement, White vs. Latino, Race Not Salient (d)) to determine the effect of the interaction between endorsements and the race of the candidate. Here I find that the effect is also large (1.94), positive, and significant ($p < .01$, for a two-tailed test).[58] This suggests that for these subjects, endorsements and race of the candidate, together, do matter for candidate preference. We can also look at the cell where an endorsement was given, where both candidates were White, and race was salient, Endorsement, White vs. White, Race Salient (g), to determine the effect of the interaction between endorsements and racial saliency. What I find here is that the effect is positive, small (.93) and not significant which suggests, that together, endorsements and racial saliency do not matter for candidate preference among these subjects. Also, note that none of the cells with only one factor (b, c, or e) are significant.

[58] When shifting the baseline to cell (d), I find that the results in cell (h) remain significant. This suggests that an increase in the racial salience of a campaign results in a statistically significant increase in the probability of voting for the more liberal candidate even relative to a contest where the candidate is Latino, and has been endorsed by Black elites.

[FIGURE 4.2 ABOUT HERE]

Given the complexity of interpreting these results, I have provided a figure of predicted probabilities from Table 4.3 (See Figure 4.2). Here we can see the magnitude of the effect by the treatment groups. Subjects who read the control article had a predicted probability of 0.31 of preferring candidate 2. Subjects who read article h (Endorsement, White vs. Latino, Race Salient), had a predicted probability of 0.93 of preferring the second candidate. Similarly, subjects who read article d: (Endorsement, White vs. Latino, Race Not Salient) had a predicted probability of 0.76 to prefer the second candidate. The next highest predicted probability is for cell c (0.57), which confirms what I reported previously in Table 4.2 and Figure 4.1: endorsements matter, while race of the candidate and racial saliency matter only in the presence of endorsements. Most importantly, Figure 4.2 illustrates that when all three factors are present, as in cell h, the probability that subjects will prefer candidate is very high, as predicted by hypothesis four.

Candidate Evaluations

The results above show that together, race of the candidate, endorsements, and making race salient in a campaign (as in cell h), influence candidate preference, but that is only one way to evaluate the validity of my theory. Candidate preference is very important, as it represents the closest measure to voting in this study. However, it is also important to know how these three factors shape the way Black voters perceive candidates and their ability to represent their interests in politics. This is important

because it helps to account for why campaign racial context, candidate race, and elite endorsements can lead to the development of cross-racial electoral coalitions. As indicated in hypotheses five, I maintain that the interaction of these factors is important in part because they signal to Black voters that a candidate will address group-specific concerns, even if they are not members of their racial group. The candidate trait that I focus on in the following analyses is sympathy for (racial) group concerns.

Candidate evaluation was measured with the following question: "Which candidate cares about people like you?" As in the previous analyses, response options for cells a, c, e, and g were "Jeremy Boardman," "Henry Brewer," or "Undecided." In cells b, d, f and h, response options were "Jeremy Boardman," "Anthony Gonzales," or "Undecided." Responses were recoded into a dichotomous variable where "1" indicates the respondent selected "Henry Brewer" or "Anthony Gonzales," and a "0" indicates the respondent selected "Undecided." Roughly 30% of the subjects said either Brewer or Gonzales cared about people like them. The results from the previous analysis suggest that when candidates are endorsed and the candidate is Latino, Black subjects are more likely to prefer the Latino candidate, compared to situations where there are no endorsements and both candidates are White. We will now test hypothesis five: when race is salient, and endorsements are given, the Latino candidate will be perceived as more sympathetic to Black issues.

[TABLE 4.4 ABOUT HERE]

In Table 4.4, I examine the relationship between the treatments and candidate evaluation. Similar to the previous analysis, we see that cell h (Endorsement, White vs. Latino, Race Salient) is positive, large (4.67), and significant ($p<.001$, for a two-tailed test).[59] This provides strong support for hypothesis five. We also see that cell d (Endorsement, White vs. Latino, Race Not Salient) is positive, large (2.54) and significant ($p<.05$, for a two-tailed test). However, what is surprising is cell g (Endorsement, White vs. White, Race Salient). Here cell g is positive, large (3.09) and significant $p < .01$ for a two- tailed test). The previous results for cell (g) in Table 4.3 fell short of statistical significance, and so the results for this condition were unexpected here. It appears that the combination of elite endorsements and racial salience are enough to prompt Blacks to view the liberal candidate as concerned about their needs, even when he is depicted as White. This result does not lend support for hypothesis five.

[FIGURE 4.3 ABOUT HERE]

The coefficients presented in Table 4.4 are not easy to interpret, so I provided Figure 4.3 to illustrate the magnitude of the effects by treatment groups. Subjects who read the control article had a predicted probability of 0.07 of saying the second candidate cares about people like them. The figure illustrates the strong support for hypothesis five as well. Subjects who read article h (Endorsement, White vs. Latino, Race Salient), had a predicted probability of 0.89 of saying the second candidate cares about people like them. Subjects who read article d (Endorsement, White vs. Latino, Race Not Salient) had a predicted probability of 0.49 of saying the second candidate cares about people like them.

[59] The results in cell (h) are also statistically significant relative to cells (d) and (g) ($p < .01$; two-tailed test).

The subjects who read article g (Endorsement, White vs. White, Race Salient), had a predicted probability of 0.62 of saying the second candidate cares about people like them. This is interesting because racial saliency seems less dependent on the race of the candidate as we found in Table 4.3 for the results for candidate preference. The predicted probabilities for cells d and h are consistent with the previous finding, although the predicted probability for cell d is not as large as it was in Figure 4.2 above. On its own, the results for cell d add more evidence to suggest that endorsements coupled with the race of the candidate matter. The large effect in cell g, where there was an endorsement, two white candidates, and race was salient, suggests that in the presence of an endorsement, racial salience matters, with respect to candidate evaluations. One possible reason for the difference between this analysis and the previous one is that the threshold for preferring (or voting) for a candidate may be higher than simply perceiving that a candidate cares about your group and may be able to represent your group interests. Although cell h provides strong support for hypothesis five, cell g complicates that conclusion, as the candidate in that cell is White.

Conclusion

In the previous chapter, it became clear that three factors seemed to influence vote choice for Black voters and to a lesser extent, Latino voters in recent mayoral elections: the presence of endorsements, the race of the candidate, and racial saliency in the campaign. However, I was unable to establish a causal relationship based on content analysis data. In this chapter, I presented experimental data designed to address this

shortcoming in the previous chapter. Focusing only on African Americans, I demonstrated that endorsements provide one of the most influential factors for subjects in this study when evaluating candidates. That is, all else equal, subjects who received information about an endorsement were more likely to prefer the endorsed candidate compared to subjects who did not receive any endorsement information. The next two factors (the race of the candidate and racial saliency) did not seem to produce the same results. That is, alone, neither factor was enough to influence candidate preference. Once we looked at the relationship between all the various treatments and candidate preference, this was further confirmed. That is, although the presence of all three factors resulted in the greatest levels of support for candidate 2, subjects who read about the Latino candidate who also received an endorsement, but not in the midst of a racially salient campaign, were almost as supportive of candidate 2 (see Figure 4.2).

In real world elections, there seemed to be instances where race was made salient where negative comments were implied about the ethnicity or race of a particular candidate (e.g. New York Democratic Run-off in 2001 where an advertisement sponsored by Green questioned Ferrer's ability to run the city because of his Puerto Rican background) and other instances where race was made salient only by mentioning the race of the candidate (Los Angeles 2001 where it was noted that Villaraigosa might be the first Latino mayor of Los Angeles in over 100 years).[60] The way I created racial saliency focused only on an issue that has been important to African American's historically (affirmative action) and not negative racial commentary. The reason for this is that the experiment was not designed to take negative feelings into account. If I had

[60] Murphy, Dean E. and Michael Cooper. "Bloomberg Sees Overtones of Race in Final Days of Green Effort." October 17, 1997 *The New York Times* Section D; Page

made race salient through the use of negative racial commentary, how could I then compare those cells to the control? This might explain the reason why racial saliency did not matter as much as predicted.

Candidate evaluations offered more support for the theory. Endorsements were a very important factor in candidate evaluations. That is, all else equal, subjects who received information about an endorsement were more likely to believe the endorsed candidate cared about people like them, compared to subjects who did not receive any endorsement information. Subjects who read an article where there was an endorsement and race was salient were more likely to say that candidate 2 cared about people like them regardless of the race of the candidate (see cells g and h in Figure 4.3). Subjects who read an article with endorsements and a Latino candidate were more likely to believe that candidate 2 cared about people like them, than those who did not (see cells d and h in Figure 4.3). The results showed that candidate evaluations are also strongly influenced by endorsements, especially when coupled with all three factors (cell h) and also one other factor: racial saliency in cell g and race of the candidate in cell d.

It is important to note that these articles are designed to mimic a low information contest. That is, the candidates are unknown, the local organization is unknown, and there is no information about the partisanship of the candidates. Previous research suggests that low information contests, voters rely on information short cuts or stereotypes and it's possible, still make decisions that are beneficial for their self-interest (Lupia 1994; McDermott 1997). Yet, because I was interested in trying to determine the factors that might facilitate a Black/Latino coalition, it was important to try to prevent outside information from influencing subjects' opinions. Indeed, given the high profile

of many of the real world mayoral elections studied in the previous chapter, it is likely that under more real-world circumstances voters might possess more crystallized opinions about the candidates.

Next Steps

What is promising is that these data take us one step closer to trying to understand some of the factors that might explain the variation in Black and Latino vote choice from one election to the next, in recent mayoral elections. It is clear that endorsements matter. In each analysis (candidate preference and candidate evaluation), that factor remained strong. As predicted by hypotheses four and five, the effects were greatest when all three factors were present. In both candidate preference and candidate evaluation, race of the candidate and racial saliency mattered when coupled with endorsements. In the second half of the experiment, Latino subjects will be given very similar articles, only in some of the articles the second candidate, Andre Jackson, will be depicted as an African American. The racially salient issue in those articles will focus on the environmental company's use of an English Only policy

Table 4.1A: Description of News Stories

Description	White vs. White, No Endorsement (a)	White vs. Latino, No Endorsement (b)	White vs. White, Endorsement (c)	White vs. Latino, Endorsement (d)
Headline			**Brewer Endorsed by Association of Local Black Leaders**	**Gonzales Endorsed by Association of Local Black Leaders**
Candidates	Jeremy Boardman	Jeremy Boardman	Jeremy Boardman	Jeremy Boardman
	Henry Brewer	**Anthony Gonzales**	Henry Brewer	**Anthony Gonzales**
Stance	Brewer opposes contract renewal.	Gonzales opposes contract renewal.	Brewer opposes contract renewal.	Gonzales opposes contract renewal.
Endorsement			**Brewer mentioned during the debate that his position was supported by the Local Association of Black Leaders, who have also endorsed his candidacy.**	**Gonzales mentioned during the debate that his position was supported by the Local Association of Black Leaders, who have also endorsed his candidacy.**

Table 4.1B: Description of News Stories

Description	White vs. White, No Endorsement (e)	White vs. Latino, No Endorsement (f)	White vs. White, Endorsement (g)	White vs. Latino, Endorsement (h)
Headline			**Brewer Endorsed by Association of Local Black Leaders**	**Gonzales Endorsed by Association of Local Black Leaders**
Candidates	Jeremy Boardman	Jeremy Boardman	Jeremy Boardman	Jeremy Boardman
	Henry Brewer	**Anthony Gonzales**	Henry Brewer	**Anthony Gonzales**
Stance	Brewer opposes renewal.	Gonzales opposes renewal.	Brewer opposes renewal.	Gonzales opposes renewal becomes an important issue in this election
Endorsement			**Brewer mentioned during the debate that his position was supported by the Local Association of Black Leaders, who have also endorsed his candidacy.**	**Gonzales mentioned during the debate that his position was supported by the Local Association of Black Leaders, who have also endorsed his candidacy.**
Facts	In a recent poll, 63% of voters felt that **Affirmative Action** had become an important issue in this election.	In a recent poll, 63% of voters felt that **Affirmative Action** had become an important issue in this election.	In a recent poll, 63% of voters felt that **Affirmative Action** had become an important issue in this election.	In a recent poll, 63% of voters felt that **Affirmative Action** had become an important issue in this election.

Table 4.2: Logistic Regression of the Effects of Race of Candidate, Endorsements, and Racial Saliency on Candidate Selection

Intercept	-5.13** (1.99)
Latino	.92 (.82)
Endorsement	1.77* (.70)
Racial Salience	.96 (.82)
Log likelihood	-49.61
N	190

Notes: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 for a two-tailed test, except for constant. Model also controls for, age, income, education, and the following racial attitudes questions: Latino Jobs, Black Politics, Black Linked Fate, and Housing Discrimination faced by Blacks (See Appendix 7). None of the controls are significant.

Treatments (Number of Cases Per Cell)

No endorsement, White vs. White, Race Not Salient (a) (33), No Endorsement, White vs. Latino, Race Not Salient (b) (35), Endorsement, White vs. White, Race Not Salient (c) (30), Endorsement, White vs. Latino, Race Not Salient (d) (36), No Endorsement, White vs. White, Race Salient (e) (32), No Endorsement, White vs. Latino, Race Salient (f) (32), Endorsement, White vs. White, Race Salient (g) (32), Endorsement, White vs. Latino, Race Salient (h) (36)

Table 4.3: Logistic Regression of the Treatment Effects on Candidate Selection

Intercept	-2.64 (1.39)*
No Endorsement, White vs. Latino, Race Not Salient (b)	-.23 (.87)
Endorsement, White vs. White, Race Not Salient (c)	1.08 (.77)
Endorsement, White vs. Latino, Race Not Salient (d)	1.94** (.75)
No Endorsement, White vs. White, Race Salient (e)	.44 (.78)
No Endorsement, White vs. Latino, Race Salient (f)	-.29 (.83)
Endorsement, White vs. White, Race Salient (g)	.93 (.74)
Endorsement, White vs. Latino, Race Salient (h)	3.41*** (.93)
Log likelihood	-98.66
N	190

Notes: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 for a two-tailed test, except for constant. Model also controls for partisanship, age, income, education, and the following racial attitudes questions: Latino Housing, Black Jobs, Black Politics, Black Housing, Black Linked Fate, Closeness to Latinos, Housing Discrimination faced by Latinos, Job Discrimination faced by Blacks, and Housing Discrimination faced by Blacks (See Appendix 7). None of the controls are significant.

Treatments (Number of Cases Per Cell)

No endorsement, White vs. White, Race Not Salient (a) (33), No Endorsement, White vs. Latino, Race Not Salient (b) (35), Endorsement, White vs. White, Race Not Salient (c) (30), Endorsement, White vs. Latino, Race Not Salient (d) (36), No Endorsement, White vs. White, Race Salient (e) (32), No Endorsement, White vs. Latino, Race Salient (f) (32), Endorsement, White vs. White, Race Salient (g) (32), Endorsement, White vs. Latino, Race Salient (h) (36)

Table 4.4: Logistic Regression of the Treatment Effects on Candidate Evaluation

Intercept	-3.19 (1.81)
No Endorsement, White vs. Latino, Race Not Salient (b)	.81 (1.30)
Endorsement, White vs. White, Race Not Salient (c)	.92 (1.37)
Endorsement, White vs. Latino, Race Not Salient (d)	2.54* (1.23)
No Endorsement, White vs. White, Race Salient (e)	2.12 (1.29)
No Endorsement, White vs. Latino, Race Salient (f)	1.21 (1.27)
Endorsement, White vs. White, Race Salient (g)	3.09** (1.29)
Endorsement, White vs. Latino, Race Salient (h)	4.67*** (1.35)
Log likelihood	-81.26
N	190

Notes: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ for a two-tailed test, except for constant. Model also controls for partisanship, age, income, education, and the following racial attitudes questions: Latino Housing, Black Jobs, Black Politics, Black Housing, Black Linked Fate, Closeness to Latinos, Housing Discrimination faced by Latinos, Job Discrimination faced by Blacks, and Housing Discrimination faced by Blacks (See Appendix 7). None of the controls are significant.

Treatments (Number of Cases Per Cell)

No endorsement, White vs. White, Race Not Salient (a) (33), No Endorsement, White vs. Latino, Race Not Salient (b) (35), Endorsement, White vs. White, Race Not Salient (c) (30), Endorsement, White vs. Latino, Race Not Salient (d) (36), No Endorsement, White vs. White, Race Salient (e) (32), No Endorsement, White vs. Latino, Race Salient (f) (32), Endorsement, White vs. White, Race Salient (g) (32), Endorsement, White vs. Latino, Race Salient (h) (36)

Figure 4.1: Probability of Support for Candidate 2 (Race of Candidate, Endorsement, Racial Saliency)



Note: Predicted probabilities derived from Table 3. The analyses also control for partisanship, age, income, education, and the following racial attitudes questions: Latino Housing, Black Jobs, Black Politics, Black Housing, Black Linked Fate, Closeness to Latinos, Housing Discrimination faced by Latinos, Job Discrimination faced by Blacks, and Housing Discrimination faced by Blacks (See Appendix 7).

Treatments (Number of Cases Per Cell)

No endorsement, White vs. White, Race Not Salient (a) (33), No Endorsement, White vs. Latino, Race Not Salient (b) (35), Endorsement, White vs. White, Race Not Salient (c) (30), No Endorsement, White vs. White, Race Salient (e) (32)

Figure 4.2: Probability of Support for Candidate 2 by Treatment



Legend
Treatments (Number of Cases Per Cell)
No endorsement, White vs. White, Race Not Salient (a) (33), No Endorsement, White vs. Latino, Race Not Salient (b) (35), Endorsement, White vs. White, Race Not Salient (c) (30), Endorsement, White vs. Latino, Race Not Salient (d) (36), No Endorsement, White vs. White, Race Salient (e) (32), No Endorsement, White vs. Latino, Race Salient (f) (32), Endorsement, White vs. White, Race Salient (g) (32), Endorsement, White vs. Latino, Race Salient (h) (36)
Note: Predicted probabilities derived from Table 3. The analyses also control for partisanship, age, income, education, and the following racial attitudes questions: Latino Housing, Black Jobs, Black Politics, Black Housing, Black Linked Fate, Closeness to Latinos, Housing Discrimination faced by Latinos, Job Discrimination faced by Blacks, and Housing Discrimination faced by Blacks (See Appendix 7).

Figure 4.3: Predicted Probability of Candidate Evaluation by Treatment



Legend

Treatments (Number of Cases Per Cell)

No endorsement, White vs. White, Race Not Salient (a) (33), No Endorsement, White vs. Latino, Race Not Salient (b) (35), Endorsement, White vs. White, Race Not Salient (c) (30), Endorsement, White vs. Latino, Race Not Salient (d) (36), No Endorsement, White vs. White, Race Salient (e) (32), No Endorsement, White vs. Latino, Race Salient (f) (32), Endorsement, White vs. White, Race Salient (g) (32), Endorsement, White vs. Latino, Race Salient (h) (36)

Note: Predicted probabilities derived from Table 3. The analyses also control for partisanship, age, income, education, and the following racial attitudes questions: Latino Housing, Black Jobs, Black Politics, Black Housing, Black Linked Fate, Closeness to Latinos, Housing Discrimination faced by Latinos, Job Discrimination faced by Blacks, and Housing Discrimination faced by Blacks (See Appendix 7).

CHAPTER 5

Latino Experiment

Introduction

As noted in previous chapters, an examination of multiple mayoral contests around the country finds that Black-Latino electoral coalitions are typically unstable. In chapter two, I presented a theory designed to account for the variation in Black-Latino electoral coalitions. I maintain that in the absence of partisan cues, when race becomes salient in an election, candidate endorsements by co-ethnic leaders will prompt minority group members to vote for a particular candidate, even if the candidate is from another ethnic group.[61] Based on the data from real world elections, I predict that Black and Latino voters will overwhelmingly support the candidate belonging to their racial or ethnic group, regardless of leader endorsements. If there is an election featuring one White candidate and one Black candidate, I expect the Latino vote will be determined largely by Latino leader/organization endorsements. If a Black/Latino electoral coalition has formed, I expect Latino leader to convey this to Latino voters through their endorsement of the Black candidate. Similarly, if an election features one White candidate and one Latino candidate, I expect Black leader/organization endorsements to

[61] Recall, by racial salience I mean issues relevant to Blacks (when the candidates are White/Latino or White/White) and issues that are relevant to Latinos (when the candidates are White/Black or White/White).

influence Black votes, such that when Black and Latino voters coalesce behind an Latino candidate, this is due to co-ethnic elite cues from Blacks indicating that Black voters should support this candidate. Finally, when Blacks and Latinos vote in an election with two White candidates, the theory predicts that Latino votes will be determined by Latino leader/organization endorsements and Black votes will be determined by Blacks leader/organization endorsements. Recall that the theory also predicts that the campaign context is important such that when racial or ethnic issues are highlighted in the campaign, then elite endorsements should be especially influential. If racial/ethnic issues are not highlighted in the campaign, endorsements will be less influential.

Chapter three provided some preliminary support for the claim that when race was salient, the candidate who received the most endorsements from African American community leaders also received the most votes from Black voters (e.g. New York 2001 Run-Off, New York 2005, Los Angeles 2001, and Los Angeles 2005). In elections where race was not salient, endorsements seemed unrelated to votes (e.g. New York 2001 and 2009, Houston 1997). However, for Latinos, the relationship is not as clear. In the Houston 1997 election, race was not salient, and the candidate that received the most endorsements from Latino leaders and organizations, Mosbacher, did not receive a majority of the Latino vote. Latinos supported the Black candidate, Lee Brown. In the New York 2009 election, there was not much information about endorsements in that election, but again, Latinos offered their support to the Black candidate, Bill Thompson. The New York elections do provide one piece of additional information: Michael Bloomberg has been a candidate in the last three mayoral elections in New York. Since 2001, Bloomberg's percentage of the Latino vote has been: 47% in 2001, 34% in 2005,

and 43% in 2009. In the 2005 election, there was a Latino candidate, which offers some explanation for the percent of the vote in that election. The percentage of the vote for the other candidates that ran against Bloomberg: Green received 49% of the Latino vote, Ferrer received 63% of the Latino vote, and Thompson received 55% of the Latino vote. So the difference between the Latino votes for Bloomberg and the more liberal candidate in each election is 2% in 2001, 29% in 2005, and 12% in 2009. Again, none of this in definitive, but it does lead to the question: under what conditions will Latino voters prefer a more liberal candidate to a conservative candidate?

The results from the real world elections suggested that endorsements do matter, but inconclusive when it came to the role of racial salience in the campaign and the data cannot be used to determine causality. As discussed in the last chapter, there was no way to know if candidates were already popular among voters and then received endorsements from co-ethnic leaders or if co-ethnic leaders formed coalitions with candidates and then provided endorsements. One way to address this concern is through an experiment. In the previous chapter, I presented data from a survey experiment I fielded among African Americans in the summer of 2009. The survey experiment design allowed me to test the theory among Blacks and overall was supportive of most of my hypotheses. Recall, for the Black subjects, endorsements were rather persuasive, especially when the endorsement was given to a Latino candidate. In fact, when that endorsement was given to a Latino candidate and Race was highlighted as a part of the campaign, Blacks subjects were even more likely to support that Latino candidate.[62] Chapter four also demonstrated that Black subjects thought that endorsed candidates cared about them,

[62] Recall that there was a difference between the two treatments: Endorsement, White v. Latino, Race Not Salient (d) and Endorsement, White v. Latino, Race Salient (h).

though this was the case for both White and Latino candidates. In this chapter, I will provide results from an experiment focusing, in particular, on endorsement cues conveyed by Latino leaders and their effect on Latino voters. In the following sections I describe my hypotheses, explain the experimental design as well as present and discuss my findings. My results show that co-ethnic elite endorsements are not as effective for mobilizing cross-racial electoral coalitions among Latinos. The data suggest that endorsements from Latino leaders shape the way Latino subjects evaluate candidates and that Black candidates who have been endorsed by Latino leaders receive higher positive evaluations when compared to similar White candidates.

Hypotheses

The results presented in chapter three, provided some suggestive evidence that for African American voters, elite endorsements coupled with racially salient campaigns influences candidate selection. The results from chapter four provided even more support for this relationship. However, the real world data for Latinos was less certain. One reason for this is that I only have data on two elections where Latinos had the opportunity to vote for a Black candidate. By contrast, I have data on four elections where Blacks had the opportunity to vote for a Latino candidate. The experiment is designed to address these concerns. The first goal of the experiment is to determine if the race of the candidates matters to Latino subjects, even when neither candidate is a member of their racial group. In the real world elections, we saw that Latino voters were willing to support Black candidates (Houston 1997 and New York 2005). Of course, they were also very supportive of Latino candidates (e.g. New York Democratic Run-off 2001,

Houston 2001, Los Angeles 2005, Miami 1996). Previous research has shown that when Latino candidates run, Latinos are mobilized to participate and that being contacted by other Latinos increased Latino voter turnout (Barreto 2007 and 2009; Michelson 2006). What is less clear is whether or not Latinos will prefer a White or a Black candidate when there are no Latino candidates in the race and when partisanship cues are absent. In chapter one, we saw that some scholars, because of the negative feelings Blacks and Latinos may have towards one another, concluded that the likelihood of Blacks and Latinos forming political coalitions is not very high (Gay 2006; Kaufmann 2003a; McClain et al. 2006). I argue that that under the right circumstances, Latinos will support a Black candidate for Mayor.[63]

The second and third goals of this experiment are very similar to the goals of the experiment in the previous chapter: to explore the relationship between Latino leader endorsements and candidate preference among Latino voters and the extent to which racial/ethnic issues can influence candidate preferences among Latinos. In the real mayoral elections we looked at in the chapter three the three conditions discussed above always overlapped, making it hard to accurately specify the conditions under which Latinos would be more likely to support a Black candidate. Recall though, that the theory laid out in chapter two argues that when all three conditions are present (Black candidate/Endorsement given/Racial Salience) Latino support for Black candidates will be particularly strong. That is, if the theory is correct, the Black candidate will get more support than a similar White candidate when race is salient and there is an endorsement provided by a Latino leader/organization. Just like the previous design, this allows us to

[63] In an analyses that included the Racial Attitudes about Blacks, I found support for such a claim in this dataset.

test many hypotheses: How do subjects respond when both candidates are White and when a White candidate faces a Black candidate? How do subjects respond when there are endorsements as opposed to when there are no endorsements? How do subjects respond when race is salient and when race is not salient? With my experimental design I can test each of the following hypotheses.

H_1: Black candidates will receive more support than White candidates, all else equal.
H_2: Candidates with endorsements will receive more support than candidates without endorsements.
H_3: When Race is Salient, candidates who are portrayed as more racially sensitive will receive more support than the candidate who is characterized as less racially sensitive.
H_4: When race is salient, and endorsements are given, Black candidates will receive more support than White candidates.
H_5: When race is salient, and endorsements are given, the Black candidate will be perceived as more sympathetic to Latino issues.

Methods and Procedures

In order to the test the hypotheses laid out above, I developed an experiment almost identical to the experiment in chapter four. As indicated above, I manipulated the ethnicity of the more liberal candidate, the extent to which the campaign focused on racial issues, and whether or not a Latino political group endorsed the more liberal candidate. In order to determine if the race of the candidate will influence candidate preferences among Latino subjects, the more liberal candidate is depicted as White in half of the experimental cells and as Black in the other half. Second, I seek to ascertain the influence of endorsements on candidate preferences and so half of the treatments provide no endorsement from Latino groups while in the other half the more liberal candidate is the unambiguous choice of Latino political elites. Finally, to determine whether or not

highlighting racial issues in a campaign will encourage Latinos to view the more liberal candidate more favorably, half of the treatments focus on a non-racial issue whereas the other half highlight candidate disputes on explicitly racial/ethnic policies.

[TABLE 5.1 ABOUT HERE]

I delivered the treatments in the exact same manner as the experiment described in the last chapter. Once again, there is one White candidate, Jeremy Boardman, who is in every treatment. He is the more conservative candidate. In four of the articles, the other candidate is Henry Brewer while in four articles the other candidate is named Andre Jackson, who is pictured as a middle-aged African American man. In four articles, endorsements are given to either Brewer or Jackson from the "Local Association of Latino Leaders." The articles still focused on an environmental company seeking to renew its trash burning contract. Boardman always supports the contract renewal because the city needs more time to develop a recycling program. Brewer or Jackson always oppose the contract renewal and supports an immediate recycling program. One difference between this design and the previous design was the way race was made salient. In the articles where race is salient, the articles still focus on the environmental company and the contract renewal except in these versions the story also says that the company "received the contract, despite several concerns about the company's English Only policy and a promise from the city to end business with such companies." All the candidates still oppose or support the contract for the same reasons listed in the environment only articles. The versions of the story that highlight the racial issues also

end with a fact about the percentage of voters who felt English Only policies were important in the election (See Table 5.1A and 5.1B). The photos of the candidates that accompanied the article are presented in the appendix (See Appendix 6).

Data were collected at several locations: Ann Arbor, MI; Los Angeles, CA; San Diego, CA; New York, NY; Sacramento, CA; Fremont, CA and Vermont. 103 of the surveys were conducted in person. Research assistants and the author approached various people and asked them to participate in a short political survey. In some cases, the author contacted Latino organizations and asked them to participate. At no time were participants told that they were asked to participate because they were Latinos. 138 of the surveys were taken in an online format.[64] In order to deliver the survey in this format, the author targeted Latino groups, organizations, and list-serves. Again, no mention was made about being contacted because the organization served Latinos. Instead, the recruitment information simply asked people if they would like to participate in a short political survey. There is no correlation between the way the survey was administered, where the survey was taken, and the dependent variables.

In all, 241 subjects completed the survey, but only 193 of them identified as Latino. As a result, the data used in this chapter only come from the 193 subjects who self identified as Latino. The newspaper article was on the first page, followed by the survey questions. For the paper and pencil surveys, surveys were administered on the spot. For the online survey, respondents were sent a link to access the survey. Most subjects were able to complete the surveys in less than 20 minutes. Subjects were offered a $5 incentive. The randomization worked as designed and no controls are needed for the analyses presented in this chapter.

[64] Using Qualtrics, an online survey program.

The sample ranged in age from 18 to 67. The 65 percent identified as Democrats (16% said Strong Democrat, 38% said Democrat, and 11% said Weak Democrat). The mean income was between $50,001 and $60,000. The subjects were very educated, with 36% indicating they had some college, 31% reporting that they completed college, and 24% indicating that they had advanced degrees. A majority of respondents self identified as liberal (35%) or extremely liberal (15%) and 19% said they were moderate or middle of the road. Sixty percent of the subjects were women. Additionally, 70% of the subjects reported being born in the United States, 14% reported being born in Mexico, and 7% reported being born in Puerto Rico. In terms of language use in the home, 50% reported speaking Spanish at home and 50% reported speaking English at home. Finally, in terms of hot topics, 23% said immigration levels should be increased a lot, 26% said it should be increased a little, and 26% said immigration levels should remain the same.

For the sake of comparison, we can look at some descriptive data from the Latino National Survey, which had over 8,000 respondents.[65] In that national sample, the ages ranged from 18 to 97. Only 36% identified themselves as Democrats, while 11% said they were Republicans and 17% said they were Independents. The rest said they did not know or supported some other party (36%). In terms of place of birth, only 29% of the sample was born in the United States and 66% said they were born in some other country. Of the 66% born outside of the US, 67% were born in Mexico. Additionally, 35% preferred to use the term Hispanic to identify themselves, 33% said either Latino or Hispanic was fine, and only 13% preferred the term Latino. Finally, 62% asked that the

[65] Fraga, Luis R., John A. Garcia, Rodney Hero, Michael Jones-Correa, Valerie Martinez-Ebers, and Gary M. Segura. Latino National Survey (LNS), 2006 [Computer file]. ICPSR20862-v4. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2010-05-26. doi:10.3886/ICPSR20862.

survey be administered in Spanish. In the next section I will test my hypotheses using the experimental data.

Black Candidates, Endorsements, and Racial Saliency

First, I set out to test the first three hypotheses: Black candidates will receive more support than White candidates, candidates with endorsements will receive more support than candidates without endorsements, and when race is salient, candidates who are portrayed as more racially sensitive will receive more support than the candidate who is characterized as less racially sensitive. The main dependent variable, candidate preference, was measured and recoded in the exact same manner as in the previous chapter, where a 0 indicates a preference for "Boardman" or "Undecided" and a 1 indicates a preference for "Brewer" or "Jackson." Roughly 52% of the subjects said they would vote for either Brewer or Jackson.[66] However, my initial hypotheses involve the variation in support for these candidates by race of the candidate, endorsements, and racial saliency. In order to test the hypotheses, I used logistic regression analysis to estimate support for candidate 2 by the three main effects: race of the candidate, endorsements, and racial saliency, as compared to the control group. In the baseline article, subjects read an article where there was no endorsement, two White candidates, and race was not salient: No endorsement, White vs. White, Race Not Salient (a). I then performed a logistic regression analysis that included the treatments where the only factor that changed relative to the baseline treatment were the race of the candidate (i), the endorsement (j) and making race salient (l). I will discuss the results in the next section.

[66] Only 15 respondents said they would vote for Jeremy Boardman.

[TABLE 5.2 ABOUT HERE]

In Table 5.2, we can see the relationship between the race of the candidate, the role of endorsements, and the role of racial saliency in the campaign and the dependent variable: preference for candidate 2. None of the coefficients is significant; none of them are large, though they are all positive. Given this, the data indicate that at this time, there is not enough evidence to support hypothesis one, that Black candidates will receive more support than a similar White candidate; that elite endorsements will be persuasive to Latino voters, and that highlighting a racial/ethnic issue will influence Latino vote choice.

[FIGURE 5.1 ABOUT HERE]

Although none of the results are significant, I still provided a figure of predicted probabilities based on Table 5.2 (See Figure 5.1). This will give us a sense of just how similar the results are, indicating that there are not any discernable differences in candidate preference among the Latinos in this sample. When subjects read the article with no endorsement, two White candidates, and race was not salient (a), the probability of preferring candidate 2 is 0.46. When subjects read an article with a Black candidate, the probability of preferring candidate 2 is 0.61. When subjects read an article with an Endorsement the probability of preferring candidate 2 is .62. Finally, when subjects read an article where Race was Salient, the probability of preferring candidate 2 is 0.47. The

figure illustrates that none of the main factors influences candidate preferences among Latinos in this sample.

Candidate Preferences

The results in Table 5.2 provide evidence that the relationship between elite endorsements, racial characteristics of the candidates, and highlighting ethnic issues in campaigns is not strong among Latino subjects. Recall, that hypothesis four predicts that it is when these factors are all present that we expect the largest result. The experimental design allows me to test hypothesis four: When endorsements are given, race is salient, and when one of the candidates is Black, Latinos will be more likely to support this candidate alongside the presumed support the candidate will receive from voters of his or her own ethnic group.[67] Using the same dependent variable as above, I examine the effect of each treatment on candidate preference using logistic regression analysis. Just as in the last chapter, the main independent variables are the full range of treatment groups and responses were recoded such that subjects who received the treatment were coded as "1" and all other responses were recoded as "0" (see Table 5.1). The baseline or control group represents those subjects who read the version of the story featuring two White candidates, with no Latino endorsements, and no heightened salience for racial issues (cell (a) in Table 5.1). All comparisons, unless otherwise noted, will be made to this group.

[TABLE 5.3 ABOUT HERE]

[67] Based on recent elections, it is assumed that Latinos will support the Latino candidate.

In Table 5.3, I present the results of the effect of each treatment on candidate preference. We can see that there is no support for hypothesis four at this time. The coefficients are small, none of them are significant, and two of them (cells l and m: when there is no endorsement provided and race is salient, for both the Black and the White candidates) are negative. The negative results suggest that when subjects read these treatments, they actually preferred the other candidate (Boardman) or not voting! At this time, these data offer no support for hypothesis four, that when a Black candidate is endorsed, and an ethnic issue is highlighted, Latino voters will prefer that candidate. Given that none of the coefficients on the treatments are significant, endorsements for a White candidate when race was salient was also not persuasive to Latinos in this sample.

[FIGURE 5.2 ABOUT HERE]

The results presented in Table 5.3 are difficult to interpret, so I have provided a figure of predicted probabilities based on Table 5.3 (See Figure 5.2). Although none of coefficients is significant, it might be useful to explore the predicted probabilities for the other treatments to see if we can learn anything about what may influence voter preferences in this sample. Using figure 5.2, we can compare the magnitude of the support for candidate 2. When subjects read the baseline article: no endorsement, two White candidates, and race was not made salient (a), the probability of preferring candidate 2 is 0.46. When subjects read an article with no endorsement, a Black candidate, and race was not salient (cell i), the probability of preferring candidate 2 is

0.62. This is also the same predicted probability as when subjects read an article with an endorsement, two White candidates, and race was salient (cell j). That is, for these subjects a Black candidate, with no endorsement and without highlighting race/ethnicity garnered the same support at a White candidate with an endorsement and a racially salient campaign. Yet, when subjects read an article with an Endorsement, a Black candidate, and race was made salient (cell o), the probability of preferring candidate 2 is only 0.52. When subjects read an article with a Black candidate, with an endorsement and race was salient, the probability of preferring candidate 2 is 0.60. When subjects read an article with two White candidates, an endorsement, and race was salient, the probability of preferring candidate 2 was 0.52. Taken together, these results are not supportive of hypothesis four. Though the theory predicts that the Black candidate, with an endorsement, and making race salient would influence Latinos to prefer the Black candidate, the data show that Latinos in this sample did not prefer that candidate more.

Candidate Evaluations

Given the results above and to evaluate my theory more fully, we will explore the ways in which elite endorsements, race of the candidate, and racial saliency shape the way Latino voters perceive candidates and their ability to represent their interests politically. This is important because it helps to account for why campaign racial context, candidate race, and elite endorsements can lead to the development of cross-racial electoral coalitions. As indicated in hypotheses five, I maintain that the interaction of these factors is important in part because they send a cue to Latino voters that a candidate

will address group-specific issues and concerns, even if they are not members of their racial group. The candidate trait that I focus on in the following analyses is sympathy for (racial/ethnic) group concerns.

To explore this relationship, I used the following question: "Which candidate cares about people like you?" to create dichotomous dependent variable such that a 0 means the subject indicated "Boardman" or "Undecided" and a 1 means the subjects indicated "Brewer" or "Jackson." Roughly 37% of the subjects said either Brewer or Jackson cared about people like them.[68] We will now test hypothesis five: when race is salient, and endorsements are given, the Black candidate will be perceived as more sympathetic to Latino issues.

[TABLE 5.4 ABOUT HERE]

In Table 5.4, I examine the relationship between the treatments and candidate evaluation. This analysis is a test of hypothesis five: when race is salient, and endorsements are given, the Black candidate will be perceived as more sympathetic to Latino issues. Looking at the coefficients, we see that there is support for hypothesis five. Two of the four treatments with a Black candidate are significant: the Endorsement, White vs. Black, Race Salient (cell n) treatment has a coefficient of 1.95 and is significant at the $p < .01$ level, for a two-tailed test Similarly, the Endorsement, White vs. Black, Race Not Salient (cell k) treatment has a positive coefficient 2.19 and is significant at the $p < .01$ level, for a two-tailed test. That is, when an endorsement is given to a Black candidate, both when race is salient and when it is not, these subjects

[68] Only 7 respondents selected Jeremy Boardman.

perceived that Andre Jackson cared about people like them. However, these data also provide some support for the null hypothesis: in one of the treatments, Henry Brewer is also perceived as caring about people like them: Endorsement, White vs. White, Race Salient (cell n) treatment, the coefficient is 2.44 and is significant at the $p < .01$ level, for a two-tailed test.

[FIGURE 5.3 ABOUT HERE]

The coefficients presented in Table 5.4 are instructive, but not very easy to interpret, so I provided Figure 5.3 to illustrate the magnitude of the effects by treatment groups. Subjects who read the baseline article, no endorsement, two White candidates and race was not salient had a predicted probability of 0.11 of saying the second candidate cares about people like them. The figure illustrates the support for hypothesis five as well. Subjects who read articles where a Black candidate was endorsed, when race was salient (n) the predicted probability of preferring candidate 2 is 0.48. This offers some support for hypothesis five. In treatment (k), where there was an endorsement given to the Black candidate but race was not salient, the predicted probability of preferring the second candidate is 0.54. When subjects read the article with an endorsement, with two White candidates, and race was salient (n), the predicted probability of preferring the second candidate is 0.60. Taken together, this analysis offers support for hypothesis five.

Conclusion

In chapter three, I presented some evidence to show that three factors influenced Black and Latino vote choice in recent Mayoral elections: elite endorsements, the race of the candidate, and racial salience the campaign. However, this was more true to Black voters than for Latino voters. Recall that Latino voters, when given the chance did support Black candidates, but this was not clear that this was because of endorsements. Recall, I had no data on elections where race was salient and Latino voters had the opportunity to vote for a non-Latino candidate. In the previous chapter, we saw that for Blacks, endorsements were quite persuasive. In fact, when Latino candidates received an endorsement, Black subjects overwhelmingly supported that candidate. When it came to Blacks perceptions that candidates were sensitive to Blacks issues, again, Latino candidates were perceived as more sensitive, but the White candidate with an endorsement, when race was salient, also received some support as well. Overall, the data from the Black sample supported the theory outlined in chapter two.

The data presented in this chapter demonstrated that the relationship between elite endorsements, candidate characteristics, and racial/ethnic issues and vote choice among Latinos is weak. In testing the first three hypotheses, which deal with elite endorsements, race of the candidate, and racial saliency directly, we saw that endorsements that none of the factors mattered. This was very different from the data for African Americans in Chapter four. The data in this chapter, also did not offer much support for hypothesis four. In terms of candidate preference, Latinos in this sample did not prefer the Black candidate, with an endorsement when race was salient.

There was some support for hypothesis five; we see that Latinos in the sample did perceive the Black candidate with an endorsement when race was salient, as sensitive to their issues. This was also the case when race was not salient. Additionally, subjects also indicated that the White candidate with an endorsement when race was salient would also do a good job with Latino issues, though the result was not as strong. The subjects in this sample were willing to indicate that the endorsed Black candidate, regardless of racial saliency "cared about people like them." Though they were slightly more likely to say this when race was salient.

Finally, we should take note of the way racial salience was created in this experiment. While there were several options for issues that might have heightened racial or ethnic identity for Latinos, the English Only policy was selected because it was not as prominent in the media during the design phase of the experiment. It is not clear how salient the issue was to these subjects as there was no measure of policy preference on the issue. However, the data show that one half of the sample spoke primarily English in the home and the other half spoke primarily Spanish. The other issue that was considered was Immigration. As it turns out, Immigration was very salient in the news during the months this experiment was in the field. There are data from the survey about Immigration: 23% said immigration levels should be increased a lot, 26% said immigration levels should be increased some, 26% immigration levels should stay the same, 10% said immigration level should be decreased a little and only 2% said immigration levels should be decreased a lot. Future research will include a better specification on this dimension.

Table 5.1A: Description of News Stories

Description	White vs. White, No Endorsement (a)	White vs. Black, No Endorsement (i)	White vs. White, Endorsement (j)	White vs. Black, Endorsement (k)
Headline			**Brewer Endorsed by Association of Local Latino Leaders**	**Gonzales Endorsed by Association of Local Latino Leaders**
Candidates	Jeremy Boardman	Jeremy Boardman	Jeremy Boardman	Jeremy Boardman
	Henry Brewer	**Andre Jackson**	Henry Brewer	**Andre Jackson**
Stance	Brewer opposes renewal.	Jackson opposes renewal.	Brewer opposes renewal.	Jackson opposes renewal.
Endorsement			**Brewer mentioned during the debate that his position was supported by the Local Association of Black Leaders, who have also endorsed his candidacy.**	**Jackson mentioned during the debate that his position was supported by the Local Association of Latino Leaders, who have also endorsed his candidacy.**

Table 5.1B: Description of News Stories

Description	White vs. White, No Endorsement (l)	White vs. Black, No Endorsement (m)	White vs. White, Endorsement (n)	White vs. Black, Endorsement (o)
Headline			**Brewer Endorsed by Association of Local Latino Leaders**	**Jackson Endorsed by Association of Local Latino Leaders**
Candidates	Jeremy Boardman	Jeremy Boardman	Jeremy Boardman	Jeremy Boardman
	Henry Brewer	**Andre Jackson**	Henry Brewer	**Andre Jackson**
Stance	Brewer opposes renewal.	Jackson opposes renewal.	Brewer opposes renewal.	Jackson opposes renewal.
Endorsement			**Brewer mentioned during the debate that his position was supported by the Local Association of Latino Leaders, who have also endorsed his candidacy.**	**Jackson mentioned during the debate that his position was supported by the Local Association of Latino Leaders, who have also endorsed his candidacy.**
Facts	In a recent poll, 63% of voters felt that **English Only Policies** had become an important issue in this election.	In a recent poll, 63% of voters felt that **English Only Policies** had become an important issue in this election.	In a recent poll, 63% of voters felt that **English Only Policies** had become an important issue in this election.	In a recent poll, 63% of voters felt that **English Only Policies** had become an important issue in this election.

Table 5.2: Logistic Regression of the Effects of Race of Candidate, Endorsements, and Racial Saliency on Candidate Selection

Intercept	-.13 (.18)
Black	.61 (.48)
Endorsement	.64 (.46)
Race Salient	.53 (.44)
Log likelihood	-130.96
N	192

Notes: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ for a two-tailed test, except for constant.
No endorsement, White vs. White, Race Not Salient (a) (26), No Endorsement, White vs. Black, Race Not Salient (i) (21), Endorsement, White vs. White, Race Not Salient (j) (24), Endorsement, White vs. Black, Race Not Salient (k) (26), No Endorsement, White vs. White, Race Salient (l) (22), No Endorsement, White vs. Black, Race Salient (m) (24), Endorsement, White vs. White, Race Salient (n) (25), Endorsement, White vs. Black, Race Salient (o) (25)

Table 5.3: Logistic Regression of the Treatment Effects on Candidate Selection

Intercept	-.15 (.39)
No Endorsement, White vs. Black, Race Not Salient (i)	.64 (.60)
Endorsement, White vs. White, Race Not Salient (j)	.65 (.58)
Endorsement, White vs. Black, Race Not Salient (k)	.07 (.56)
No Endorsement, White vs. White, Race Salient (l)	-.03 (.58)
No Endorsement, White vs. Black, Race Salient (m)	-.18 (.57)
Endorsement, White vs. White, Race Salient (n)	.56 (.57)
Endorsement, White vs. Black, Race Salient (o)	.23 (.56)
Log likelihood	-130.68
N	192

Notes:* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ for a two-tailed test, except for constant..
No endorsement, White vs. White, Race Not Salient (a) (26), No Endorsement, White vs. Black, Race Not Salient (i) (21), Endorsement, White vs. White, Race Not Salient (j) (24), Endorsement, White vs. Black, Race Not Salient (k) (26), No Endorsement, White vs. White, Race Salient (l) (22), No Endorsement, White vs. Black, Race Salient (m) (24), Endorsement, White vs. White, Race Salient (n) (25), Endorsement, White vs. Black, Race Salient (o) (25)

Table 5.4: Logistic Regression of the Treatment Effects on Candidate Evaluation

Intercept	-2.03** (.61)
No Endorsement, White vs. Black, Race Not Salient (i)	1.12 (.78)
Endorsement, White vs. White, Race Not Salient (j)	.94 (.77)
Endorsement, White vs. Black, Race Not Salient (k)	2.19** (.72)
No Endorsement, White vs. White, Race Salient (l)	1.27 (.76)
No Endorsement, White vs. Black, Race Salient (m)	1.34 (.75)
Endorsement, White vs. White, Race Salient (n)	2.44** (.73)
Endorsement, White vs. Black, Race Salient (o)	1.95** (.73)
Log likelihood N	-116.47 193

Notes: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ for a two-tailed test, except for constant.
No endorsement, White vs. White, Race Not Salient (a) (26), No Endorsement, White vs. Black, Race Not Salient (i) (21), Endorsement, White vs. White, Race Not Salient (j) (24), Endorsement, White vs. Black, Race Not Salient (k) (26), No Endorsement, White vs. White, Race Salient (l) (22), No Endorsement, White vs. Black, Race Salient (m) (24), Endorsement, White vs. White, Race Salient (n) (25), Endorsement, White vs. Black, Race Salient (o) (25)

Figure 5.1: Probability of Support for Candidate 2 (Race of Candidate, Endorsement, Racial Saliency)



No endorsement, White vs. White, Race Not Salient (a) (26), No Endorsement, White vs. Black, Race Not Salient (i) (21), Endorsement, White vs. White, Race Not Salient (j) (24), Endorsement, White vs. Black, Race Not Salient (k) (26), No Endorsement, White vs. White, Race Salient (l) (22), No Endorsement, White vs. Black, Race Salient (m) (24), Endorsement, White vs. White, Race Salient (n) (25), Endorsement, White vs. Black, Race Salient (o) (25)

Figure 5.2 Predicted Probabilities Candidate Preference by Treatment



No endorsement, White vs. White, Race Not Salient (a) (26), No Endorsement, White vs. Black, Race Not Salient (i) (21), Endorsement, White vs. White, Race Not Salient (j) (24), Endorsement, White vs. Black, Race Not Salient (k) (26), No Endorsement, White vs. White, Race Salient (l) (22), No Endorsement, White vs. Black, Race Salient (m) (24), Endorsement, White vs. White, Race Salient (n) (25), Endorsement, White vs. Black, Race Salient (o) (25)

Figure 5.3 Predicted Probabilities Candidate Evaluation by Treatment



No endorsement, White vs. White, Race Not Salient (a) (26), No Endorsement, White vs. Black, Race Not Salient (i) (21), Endorsement, White vs. White, Race Not Salient (j) (24), Endorsement, White vs. Black, Race Not Salient (k) (26), No Endorsement, White vs. White, Race Salient (l) (22), No Endorsement, White vs. Black, Race Salient (m) (24), Endorsement, White vs. White, Race Salient (n) (25), Endorsement, White vs. Black, Race Salient (o) (25)

CHAPTER 6

Conclusion

Introduction

This dissertation project began with a simple puzzle: Why do most Black and Latinos voters sometimes support the same candidate in mayoral elections but at other times these groups are at odds? As indicated in chapter one, because both of these racial minority groups face similar economic circumstances many political observers have expected an enduring "rainbow coalition" to emerge. However, an examination of recent elections in Los Angeles, Houston, Miami, and New York suggest, show that Blacks and Latinos sometimes support the same candidates in one election, but not the next. How can we explain these voting patterns from one election to the next?

Previous research offers some insight into how to explain these vote outcomes. Some researchers maintain that racial attitudes, or the way Blacks and Latinos feel about one another, can explain why Blacks and Latinos vote the way they do from one election to the next (Gay 2006; Kaufmann 2003a; McClain et al. 2006; Orr and West 2006). This set of work maintains that given the negative feelings Latinos may have towards Blacks, Latinos will be less likely to support Black candidates or join a bi-racial coalition with Blacks (Kaufmann 2003a; McClain et al. 2006). Alternatively, other researchers

maintain that a shared sense of interests, compatible ideologies, and entrepreneurial leadership can explain Black and Latino coalitions (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984; Sonenshein 1993). This set of work maintains that if Blacks and Latinos have a shared sense of ideology, have a shared interest of getting into government, and leaders who can build coalitions, then we should observe a Black Latino coalition. However, neither approach seems to be able to explain the variation in vote choice observed in the real world elections. Racial attitudes among Blacks and Latinos are fairly stable, as are ideology and interests, especially when we consider that some of the elections take place in the same city (Bobo and Hutchings, 1996, Kaufmann 2004). Finally, though the previous literature emphasizes the importance of community leaders, it is not clear how decisions at the elite level are communicated to voters (Kaufmann 2003a; Sonenshein 1993). Leaders are dynamic: just as candidates may vary from one election to the next, leaders and whom they support may also vary by election.

In order to answer this question, I laid out a theory that was designed to explain the variation we observed in recent mayoral elections in Los Angeles, Houston, Miami and New York. Recall that the goal of the theory was to move beyond election specific explanations, which provide excellent information about one election, but cannot provide insight into another election, even in the same city. That is, I sought to provide a theory that might help explain larger patterns, found in multiple elections, in multiple locations, with various candidates. The basic premise of the theory is that there are three moving parts, which might explain Black and Latino voting blocs in local elections: elites and possible endorsements, candidates (race and/or ethnicity), and context. The theory

predicts that it is the interactions among these three factors that will provide the greatest explanation for Black and Latino voting behavior.

Theory

The theory I laid out in chapter two seeks to explain the voting behavior observed in recent mayoral elections in Los Angeles, New York, Miami and Houston. When partisanship is less prominent, and race becomes important in a election, I argue that endorsements from Black and Latino leaders and organization will be persuasive to Black and Latino voters, even if the candidate is not a member of the voter's racial or ethnic group. The theory predicts that Black voters will, on balance, support Black candidates and Latinos voters will support Latino candidates. When an election has a Black candidate and a White candidate, the theory predicts that Latino votes will be determined by Latino endorsements. Similarly, when an election features a Latino candidate and a White candidate, Black votes will be determined by be Black endorsements. If race/ethnicity are not an important part of the election, these endorsements will be less persuasive to Black and Latino voters.

Empirical Tests

In order to test the theory, in chapter three I relied on a content analysis of recent mayoral elections in New York, Los Angeles, New York, and Miami. I read the major newspaper's articles about the elections and coded them for the following content: which groups and leaders provided endorsements for candidates. I then investigated these groups and leaders to determine if they were Black or Latino groups/leaders. Next, I

matched those endorsements from co-ethnic leaders and organizations to exit poll data to see if Black and Latino voters supported the candidates with the most endorsements from Black and Latino leaders and groups. I also determined how race was raised in the campaign. This was accomplished by examining if race was made salient as a result of the news media drawing attention to the race of a candidate or if a candidate used race negatively to disparage a candidate. Finally, I made a note of the race of the candidates. Using these data, it was hard to determine if there truly was a relationship between racial/ethnic leader/group endorsements and vote choice among Blacks and Latinos. The larger pattern seemed to be that there was some relationship. For African Americans, there was some evidence to suggest that when race was salient, leader endorsements did matter as in the case of the New York 2001 Run-Off, the New York 2005 election, the Los Angeles 2001 campaign, and the Los Angeles 2005 contest. In elections where race was not salient, endorsements seemed unrelated to Black votes (e.g. New York 2001). For Latinos, the pattern was not as clear. Consistent with my expectations, when race was not salient endorsements did not seem to matter as in the Houston 1997 election, the New York 2001 race, and the New York 2009 contest. My sample only included one election where race was salient and there was not a Latino candidate (New York 1997), but I was unable to uncover enough Latino endorsement information. Finally, using a simple regression analysis, I determined that there was a relationship between elites and their possible endorsements, candidate race and/or ethnicity, and context. However, the content analysis data did not allow me to make strong causal claims and it was not clear if factors I had not accounted for might explain the vote returns for Blacks and Latinos.

In order to address these concerns, I conducted an experiment, which allowed me to control the information about a fictional campaign, with fictional candidates.

In chapter four, I presented data from the Black sample of my experiment. The results were very supportive of my theory. First, in terms of main effects I found that endorsements were the most consequential variable. Neither the ethnicity of the candidate nor the racial salience of the campaign had a significant effect on reported vote choice. The interactive effects of these variables, however, tell a different story. When a Latino candidate was endorsed and race was salient, that candidate was very popular among Black subjects. Even when race was not salient, and no endorsement was provided, the Latino candidate received more support than the White candidate. This pattern remained strong when we looked at candidate evaluations, however when racial issues were introduced into the campaign, endorsements also increased the favorability of the White candidate. In general, for Blacks in this sample, the endorsements seemed to be most effective when the relevant candidate was Latino. In short, for Blacks in this sample, a Black-Latino electoral coalition was more likely than a Black-White electoral coalition.

In chapter five, I presented data from the Latino sample of my experiment. The results were not supportive of my theory, at all. Latinos in this sample were not persuaded by co-ethnic endorsements, were not more supportive of the racially sensitive candidate, and did not seem to have a preference for the Black candidate. When I moved beyond the main factors and explored the interactive effects via the treatments, there was still no effect. However, when I looked at candidate evaluation, the results were more supportive of my theory. When the Black candidate was endorsed when race was salient,

Latinos in this sample thought that candidate cared about people like them. They also expressed this sentiment about the Black candidate with an endorsement when race was not salient. Finally, they thought that the White candidate, with an endorsement when race was salient cared about people like them. This is very similar to the results from the Black sample. The larger take away message is that although the Latino subject in this sample were not persuaded to prefer one candidate over the other in the context of voting, they were willing to say that the Black candidate with an endorsement (when race was salient and when race was not salient) cared about people like them.

Limitations

One of the major limitations of the experimental portion of this study is the lack of external validity. The results from the experiment are instructive, but unlike a representative sample, we cannot apply the findings to all Blacks and Latinos. The experimental design allows the researcher to control the information subjects have about particular candidates coupled with random treatment assignments. This gives the researcher the opportunity to investigate differences in outcomes and attribute any differences to the treatment. However, when coupled with the content analysis, which draws on real world elections and outcomes, we can make some connections between real world outcomes and the experimental data. That is, much like the real world data, Black subjects were very supportive of Latino candidates when those candidates received endorsements from Blacks leaders, although racial salience did not seem to matter. This is very similar to what we saw in New York and Los Angeles in 2005. The Latino subjects were not influenced by co-ethnic leader endorsements, regardless of the race of

the candidate or the saliency of race in the campaign. This is similar to the election in Houston 1997 and New York 2009. A study that followed elections in progress, monitored endorsements, took note of the racial salience in the campaign, and asked voters about their preferences might help address this lack of external validity.

Another limitation to the experiment was the way racial saliency was created. While designing the experiment for both Blacks and Latinos, it became clear that although racial salience entered campaigns through two main routes: media mentions of race or ethnicity and negative racial/ethnic attacks, it did not seem wise to recreate racial salience in that manner for the experiment. One the one hand, I did not want to address the ways in which negative campaigns may influence voters and on the other hand, varying the number of mentions of the race/ethnicity of the candidates also seemed problematic (See Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1997). That is, mimicking the latter would have meant saying the words Black or Latino many times and I was trying to limit the use of those terms. In the end, racial saliency was created in the experiment using a racial or ethnic policy. This decision may limit my ability to draw comparisons to real world elections. Future research will address this by using the number of mentions as a way to create racial saliency. Moreover, future research should also explore the role that negative racial campaigns play in structuring the vote choice for Blacks and Latinos.

The next limitation is related to the previous limitation, in that it is possible that race was made salient in all of the treatments with endorsements by merely using the terms Black and Latino in the names of the organizations providing the endorsements. The data for the Black sample showed that endorsements mattered for vote choice. However, when broken down by treatment, there were always endorsement treatments

where the endorsed candidate did not do well. For the Black sample, the White endorsed candidates did not do as well as the endorsed Latino candidate. For the Latino sample, endorsements were not persuasive at all. Though to be fair, the goal of this project was to determine the relationship between co-ethnic leader endorsements. However, to be clear, future research will explore co-ethnic leader endorsements without using the terms Black or Latino. Perhaps this can happen in a locale where I can use real leaders and organizations and I will not have to mention the race or ethnicity of the leader. Or alternatively, borrowing a strategy from the racial priming literature, future research might rely simply on visual cues as to the race or ethnicity of the endorsing organization rather than textual references.

Finally, the last limitation is related to the gender of the candidates. In the real world elections presented in previous chapters, only one election featured a female candidate, New York 1997. This is not representative of the real world. According to The United States Conference of Mayors, 20% of mayors are female.[69] This figure does not account for the number of female candidates who run for mayor, but are not elected to office. I did not vary the gender of any of the candidates in this experiment. This means that the data presented here can only offer insight in to perception of male candidates.

Conclusions

The data in this project provide a far more optimistic view than some previous research on the prospects for Black-Latino electoral coalitions. My results suggest that

[69] http://www.usmayors.org/about/women.asp

bi-racial coalitions of this sort are quite possible when co-ethnic endorsements are provided. For Blacks, the endorsements are even more persuasive when race is salient and the endorsed candidate is Latino. For Latinos, the endorsements are only persuasive when it comes to candidate evaluations, but not candidate preferences. At this time, the data suggest that the prospect for Black-Latino electoral coalitions is most likely to occur where there is a Latino candidate running against a White candidate and the Latino candidate can garner a majority of the Black endorsements. The theory predicts that Latinos will support their co-ethnic candidate. Racial salience does not matter here as we saw that the Latino candidate with an endorsement did well among Blacks in either case.

The results for candidate evaluations also offer some information about the prospects for Black-Latino electoral coalitions. Although the Black candidate did not do better than the White candidate in any of the treatments when it came to candidate preference, the Black candidate did well among Latinos when it came to candidate evaluations. That is, although Latinos did not want to vote for Andre Jackson, they did indicate that he cared about people like them, when he received an endorsement. This suggests that perhaps with the right policy stance or more information about the candidates, a Black candidate with a Latino endorsement may have a chance among Latino voters. If this is the case, then the prospect for a Black-Latino coalition, with for a Black candidate is also possible.

The data presented here also provide new information about endorsements more largely. Previous research suggested that endorsements from teacher and labor unions were persuasive to members of those groups, but that women were not persuaded by endorsements from women's groups (McDermott 2006; Rapoport, Stone, and

Abramowitz 1991). The data in this project place endorsements from co-ethnics in the former category: they can be persuasive to Blacks in terms of vote choice *and* candidate evaluation. For Latinos, this is only true with respect to candidate evaluation. This research has taken us one step closer to understanding the importance of endorsements.

Future Research

The basic premise of this project is that Black and Latino leaders will, under some conditions, seek to form an electoral coalition, but the project does not address this directly. In order to address this, future research will include interviews with candidates, community leaders and organizations who often provide endorsements, and campaign managers who may have intimate knowledge about endorsements during a particular campaign. The goal of these interviews is to gain an understanding about the bargaining process that may or may not take place between candidates, community leaders, and organizations regarding who will give endorsements to which candidates. Alternatively, these interviews will shed some light on what motivates candidates seek out endorsements from particular leaders and organizations.

Although this project has provided some evidence that endorsements matter for in-group members, it is not clear what endorsements may mean for out-group members. That is, what do Black endorsements mean for Latinos, Whites, and Asian Americans? What do Latino endorsements mean for Blacks, Whites, and Asian Americans? Previous research on out-group endorsements showed that they are not persuasive at all and may actually make out-group members prefer the other candidate (McDermott 2006). Future

research should address this by examining out-group endorsements in real elections and with an experiment. I plan to execute this project next.

One finding in this study is still perplexing: why would Latino voters opt not to vote for a particular candidate, but turn around and state that a certain candidate cares about people like them? It should be noted that the Latino sample presented here is admittedly not very large. I would like to collect additional data to see if I can flesh out this relationship between co-ethnic leader endorsements, racial salience and candidate characteristics and vote choice. Additional future research should include focus groups to explore the reasons Latinos prefer one candidate to another. I envision allowing focus group participants reading articles similar to the ones subjects read in the experiment, but allowing them to discuss the candidates and offer explanations for that preference. If focus groups are not possible, I would like to design another survey experiment that allowed subjects to provide an open-ended explanation for their candidate choice to offer more insight into this process.

In general, the Latino endorsement was somewhat persuasive for Latinos, it is not clear that this was the right identity group to target in the political sphere. The experiment used the term Latino and that was the identity subjects selected (otherwise, their data are not included). However, it may be that for Latinos, national identity is a stronger identity. That is, perhaps an endorsement from a Dominican organization means more to a Dominican than an endorsement from a Latino organization. Future research should explore this possibility among the larger national identity groups that are included in the term Latino: Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, and Cubans. Again, this will

take us one step closer to understanding co-ethnic endorsements and endorsements more generally.

Additional Implications

There are at least two additional implications from this work. First, this project creates a dichotomy between Black and Latino. Yet, there are Black Latinos. It is not clear what Black and Latino endorsements mean to Black Latinos in a political sphere. That is, when Black Latinos read about a Latino endorsement are they persuaded? What happens when they read about a Black endorsement? Although this is not a large population, it creates a unique space to explore identity politics in a way that has been limited by previous research.

Secondly, co-ethnic cues are used in many arenas, many of which are not political. One such arena is health and medicine. Campaigns are designed to inform various groups of people about their risk factors for specific diseases. Given that healthcare administrators often collect race/ethnicity, age, gender data, there is a lot of information about which groups are at risk for particular diseases. In an attempt to inform the public, campaigns are designed to target specific at risk groups. In a way, these campaigns are very similar to endorsements. They inform older White women that they should be aware of osteoporosis. They inform Black women that they should be aware of HIV, etc. Yet, it is not clear what these campaigns mean to out-group members. That is, do younger White women decide they can prevent osteoporosis? Or do they simply think, oh that only matters for older people!

Exploring the relationship between targeted health campaigns and out groups in a natural extension of this project.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1.1: Top 10 Metropolitan Areas for Latinos[70]

Metropolitan Area/City	Metro area 2004 population	(%)
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA	5,587,692	43.2
New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA	3,882,817	20.8
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach, FL	1,982,641	37
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI	1,725,685	18.4
Houston-Baytown-Sugar Land, TX	1,637,992	31.6
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA	1,580,457	41.7
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX	1,423,020	25
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ	1,056,145	28.4
San Antonio, TX	965,745	52.1
San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA	849,771	29

[70] Frey, William H. 2006. "Diversity Spreads Out: Metropolitan Shifts in Hispanic, Asian, and Black Populations Since 2000" in *Living Cities Census Series*, The Brookings Institution March 2006, pp. 1-28.

Appendix 1.2: Top 10 Metropolitan Areas for Blacks

Metropolitan Area/City	Metro area 2004 population	(%)
New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA	3,202,808	17.1
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI	1,694,518	18
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA	1,406,290	29.9
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV	1,335,823	26
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD	1,162,847	20
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach, FL	1,044,406	19.5
Detroit-Warren-Livonia, MI	1,026,048	22.8
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA	947,351	7.3
Houston-Baytown-Sugar Land, TX	848,221	16.4
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX	789,807	13.9

Appendix 1.3: Top 6 Cities with Latinos and Blacks

6 Cities with Latinos and Blacks	Black/Latino Population	%Black and Latino
New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA	7,085,625	37.9
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA	6,535,043	50.5
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI	3,420,203	36.4
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach, FL	3,027,047	56.5
Houston-Baytown-Sugar Land, TX	2,486,213	48
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX	2,212,827	38.9

Appendix 2: Table of Population Projections from Census[71]

Population or percent and race or Hispanic origin	2000	2010	2020	2030	2040	2050
% of Total population	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**
White alone	81.0	79.3	77.6	75.8	73.9	72.1
Black alone	12.7	13.1	13.5	13.9	14.3	14.6
Asian Alone	3.8	4.6	5.4	6.2	7.1	8.0
All other races 1/	2.5	3.0	3.5	4.1	4.7	5.3
Hispanic (of any race)	12.6	15.5	17.8	20.1	22.3	24.4
White alone, not Hispanic	69.4	65.1	61.3	57.5	53.7	50.1

[71] U.S. Census Bureau, 2004, "U.S. Interim Projections by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin," <http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/usinterimproj/> Internet Release Date: March 18, 2004

Appendix 3: Browning, Marshall, and Tabb Table 1 page 21

City	% Black	% Latino	Type of Coalition	Type of Incorporation
Berkeley	20.8	4.8	Bi-Racial Alliance	Strong
Stockton	10.6	21.1	Protest and Exclusion	Varied Incorporation
San Francisco	12.9	11.8	Co-Optation	Partial Incorporation
Richmond	45.4	9.5	Co-Optation	Partial Incorporation
Sacramento	12.9	14.8	Co-Optation	Partial Incorporation
San Jose	4.3	20.7	Co-Optation (Temp) Protest and Exclusion (Temp)	Partial Incorporation Varied Incorporation
Oakland	44.3	9.0	Protest and Exclusion	Varied Incorporation
Vallejo	18.5	7.6	Weak Minority Mobilization	No Incorporation
Daly City	9.8	17.9	Weak Minority Mobilization	No Incorporation
Hayward	4.9	19.0	Weak Minority Mobilization	No Incorporation

Appendix 4: Newspaper Circulation

Newspaper	Circulation
New York Times	1,683,855
Los Angeles Times	1,231,318
Houston Chronicle	692,557
Miami Herald	390,171

Appendix 5.1: New York 1997 – General Election

Candidate	Endorsement	Race/Ethnicity	Organization/Affiliation
Giuliani	Adam Clayton Powell 4th	B	City Councilman
Giuliani	Edolphus Towns	B	United States Representative
Giuliani	Floyd Flake	B	United States Representative
Giuliani	Priscilla Wooten	B	City Councilwoman
Giuliani	Thomas White Jr.	B	Democratic City Councilman from Queens
Messinger	Assemblyman Clarence Norman Jr.	B	The chairman of the Brooklyn Democratic Party
Messinger	Charles B. Rangel, Democrat of Harlem	B	United States Representative
Messinger	David Dinkins	B	Former Mayor
Messinger	H. Carl McCall	B	State Comptroller
Messinger	Rev. Al Sharpton	B	Civil Rights/Social Justice Activist
Messinger	Rev. Wyatt Tee Walker	B	Canaan Baptist Church in Harlem
Giuliani	Claire Shulman	W	Borough President of Queens
Giuliani	Richard Ravitch	W	A former chairman of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority and a Democratic mayoral candidate in 1989
Messinger	Al Gore	W	Vice President
Messinger	Peter F. Vallone	W	City Council Speaker
Messinger	Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan	W	New York's senior elected Democrat

Appendix 5.2: New York 2001 – Democratic Run Off

Candidate	Endorsement	Race/Ethnicity	Organization/Affiliation
Ferrer	Charles B. Rangel, Democrat of Harlem	B	United States Representative
Green	David Dinkins	B	Former Mayor
Ferrer	Grand Council of Guardians, a fraternal organization of black police officers, state troopers, correction officers and other law enforcement officials	B	Black Fraternity/Law Enforcement
Ferrer	Rev. Al Sharpton	B	Civil Rights/Social Justice Activist
Ferrer	Sonny Carson	B	Political Organizer
Ferrer	1199/S.E.I.U	B and L	Hospital Union
Ferrer	New York Police Department Hispanic Detectives Society	L	Hispanic Detectives Organization
Green	Alan G Hevesi	W	Dem Candidate for Mayor
Green	Claire Shulman	W	Queens borough president
Ferrer	Daniel Patrick Moynihan	W	Former Senator
Ferrer	Donald Trump	W	Businessman
Ferrer	Ed Koch	W	Former Mayor
Ferrer	Geraldine A. Ferraro	W	Former United States Representative
Green	Hillary Clinton	W	State Senator
Green	Mario M. Cuomo	W	Former Governor
Ferrer	Peter Vallone	W	City Council Speaker, Mayor Candidate
Ferrer	William J. Bratton	W	Former police commissioner

Appendix 5.3: New York 2001 – General Election

Candidate	Endorsement	Race/Ethnicity	Organization/Affiliation
Bloomberg	Amsterdam News	B	Black Newspaper
Bloomberg	Priscilla A. Wooten	B	Councilwoman Brooklyn
Green	The Council of Black Elected Democrats	B	Black Elected Democrats
Bloomberg	the Guardians Association	B	Black Police Officers
Green	Dennis Rivera/1199 SEIU	B and L	Hospital Union
Bloomberg	Bronx Dominican Coalition	L	Dominican Organization
Bloomberg	Dasdil Velez	L	Former Ferrer Campaign Manager
Bloomberg	Federation of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce	L	Organization of Hispanic Businesses
Green	Fernando Ferrer	L	Candidate for Mayor, Bronx Borough President
Bloomberg	Hispanic Clergy Association	L	Latino Clergy Organization
Bloomberg	Hoy and El Diario/La Prensa	L	Spanish Newspaper
Bloomberg	Olga Mendez	L	State Senator
Green	Roberto Ramirez	L	Bronx Democratic Chairman
Green	Bill Clinton	W	Former US President
Bloomberg	Gov. George Pataki	W	Gov
Green	Peter F. Vallone	W	City Council Speaker
Bloomberg	Rudy Giuliani	W	Mayor

Appendix 5.4: New York 2005 – General Election

Candidate	Endorsement	Race/Ethnicity	Organization/Affiliation
Bloomberg	Sing Tao Daily	Asian	Chinese Newspaper
Bloomberg	Pierre Sutton	B	Chairman of Inner City Broadcasting Corporation
Bloomberg	Ministers Mother A.M.E. Zion Church	B	Church Leaders
Bloomberg	Rev. Calvin O. Butts 3rd	B	Pastor of the Abyssinian Baptist Church
Bloomberg	Russell Simmons	B	Hip Hop Mogul
Bloomberg	Magic Johnson	B	Businessman
Ferrer	Rev. Al Sharpton	B	Civil Rights/Social Justice Activist
Ferrer	David Dinkins	B	Former Mayor
Ferrer	Rev. Clinton Miller	B	Pastor of Brown Memorial Baptist Church in Fort Greene
Ferrer	Percy E. Sutton	B	Percy E. Sutton, a former Manhattan borough president
Ferrer	100 Blacks in Law Who Care	B	Black Law Enforcement Organization
Ferrer	Kevin Parker	B	New York State Senator
Ferrer	David Paterson	B	New York State Senator
Ferrer	Jesse Jackson	B	American Civil Rights Activist
Ferrer	The Amsterdam News	B	Black Newspaper
Ferrer	Charles B. Rangel	B	United States Representative
Ferrer	Dennis Rivera/1199 SEIU	B and L	Hospital Union
Bloomberg	Margarita Lopez	L	City Councilwoman
Bloomberg	Jorge Santini-Padilla	L	Mayor of San Juan, Puerto Rico
Bloomberg	Roberto Clemente Jr.	L	Real estate broker, radio personality
Bloomberg	Latina Political Action Committee	L	Organization that Latina Engagement in Politics
Ferrer	Anibal Acevedo-Vila	L	Governor of Puerto Rico
Ferrer	National Latino Officers Association	L	Latino Law Enforcement Organization
Ferrer	Roberto Ramirez	L	Former Bronx Democratic Party chairman
Ferrer	El Diario/La Prensa	L	Spanish Newspaper
Bloomberg	Hoy	L	Spanish Newspaper

Appendix 5.5: Los Angeles 2001 – Run Off Election

Candidate	Endorsement	Race/Ethnicity	Organization/Affiliation
Villaraigosa	Bill Burke	B	Marathon Organizer
Hahn	Earvin "Magic" Johnson	B	Businessman, Former L A Laker
Villaraigosa	Mark Ridley-Thomas	B	City Councilman
Hahn	Yvonne Brathwaite Burke	B	Los Angeles County Supervisor
Hahn	Alex Padilla	L	City Councilman
Hahn	Nick Pacheco	L	City Councilman
Hahn	Richard Polanco	L	State Senator
Villaraigosa	Barbara Boxer	W	State Senator
Hahn	Bill Wardlaw	W	Partner at investment banking firm Freeman Spogli and Company
Villaraigosa	Cindy Miscikowski	W	City Councilwoman
Villaraigosa	Eli Broad	W	Billionaire/SunAmerica founder
Villaraigosa	Gray Davis	W	Governor of California
Villaraigosa	Lee Baca	W	Los Angeles County Sheriff
Hahn	Michael D. Antonovich	W	County Supervisor
Villaraigosa	Richard Riordin	W	Former Mayor of LA

Appendix 5.6: Los Angeles 2005 – Run Off Election

Candidate	Endorsement	Race/Ethnicity	Organization/Affiliation
Villaraigosa	Bernard Parks	B	City Council member
Villaraigosa	Yvonne Brathwaite Burke	B	Los Angeles County Supervisor
Villaraigosa	Maxine Waters	B	United States Representative
Villaraigosa	Earvin "Magic" Johnson	B	Businessman/Former L A Laker
Villaraigosa	Rev. Cecil Murray	B	First African Methodist Episcopal Church (Retired), Professor USC (current)
Hahn	Jan Perry	B	Los Angeles City Councilmember
Hahn	Rudy Bermudez	L	California State Assembly Member
Hahn	Ed Reyes	L	Los Angeles City Councilmember
Villaraigosa	Dennis Zine	W	City Councilman
Villaraigosa	Barbara Boxer	W	United States Senator
Hahn	Eric Garcetti	W	City Councilman
Hahn	Dianne Feinstein	W	US Senator

Appendix 5.7: Houston 1997 – Run Off Election

Candidate	Endorsement	Race/Ethnicity	Organization/Affiliation
Mosbacher	Martha Wong	Asian	City Councilmember
Brown	Asian-Americans For Lee Brown	Asian	Forty-five Asian-American civic and business leaders
Brown	Anthony Hall	B	City Councilmember
Brown	Ernest McGowen	B	City Councilmember
Brown	Sheila Jackson Lee	B	United States Representative
Brown	Houston Black American Democrats	B	Democratic Party Organization for Blacks
Brown	Afro American Sheriff's Deputy League	B	Black Law Enforcement Organization
Brown	Houston Black Firefighters Association	B	Black Firefighters Organization
Brown	The Gulf Coast AME Ministers Alliance	B	Religious Organization
Brown	Ministers from the Church of God in Christ Texas, South Central Jurisdiction	B	Religious Organization
Brown	Afro-American Police Officers League	B	Black Law Enforcement Organization
Brown	The Harris County Council of Organizations	B	One of the oldest African-American political organizations in Houston, representing various community groups.
Brown	Baptist Ministers Alliance of Houston & Vicinity	B	Religious Organization
Mosbacher	Councilwoman Gracie Saenz	L	Candidate in General Election
Brown	Jessica Farrar	L	State Rep.
Mosbacher	Houston Hispanic Chamber of Commerce political action committee	L	Hispanic Business Organization
Mosbacher	Comerciantes Latinos Unidos de Houston	L	Latino Business Organization
Mosbacher	Orlando Sanchez	L	City Councilmember
Brown	Mario Gallegos	L	Texas State Representative
Brown	Gerard Torres	L	Texas State Representative
Mosbacher	Houston Hispanic Coalition	L	35 Active Business Leaders
Mosbacher	The Mexican-American Sheriff's Organization	L	Latino Law Enforcement Organization

Appendix 5.8: Houston 2001 – Run Off Election

Candidate	Endorsement	Race/Ethnicity	Organization/Affiliation
Brown	Gordon Quan	Asian	City Councilmember
Brown	Harris County Council of Organizations	B	One of the oldest African-American political organizations in Houston, representing various community groups
Brown	Ron Kirk	B	Dallas Mayor
Brown	Carol Mims Galloway	B	City Councilmember
Brown	Jew Don Boney	B	City Councilmember
Brown	International Association of Black Professional Firefighters	B	Black Firefighters Organization
Brown	The Gulf Coast AME Ministerial Alliance	B	The alliance represents almost 36,000 members of 66 African Methodist Episcopal Churches in the Houston area
Sanchez	Latina P.A.C.	L	Political committee of Hispanic women
Sanchez	the Houston Hispanic Chamber of Commerce Policy Committee	L	Hispanic Business Organization
Brown	Henry Cisneros	L	Former Mayor of San Antonio
Brown	Tony Sanchez	L	Democratic gubernatorial candidate
Brown	Gabriel Vasquez	L	City Councilmember
Brown	John Castillo	L	City Councilmember

Appendix 5.9: Miami - Dade 2000 – Run Off Election

Candidate	Endorsement	Race/Ethnicity	Organization/Affiliation
Diaz de la Portilla	Jay Love	W	Businessman, Mayoral Candidate
Penelas	Pedro Adrian	L	Developer
Penelas	Miriam Alonso	L	County Commissioner
Penelas	Ileana Ros-Lehtinen	L	United States Representative
Penelas	Lincoln Diaz-Balart	L	United States Representative

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Appendix 6: Candidate Photos

Jeremy Boardman

Henry Brewer

Anthony Gonzales

Andre Jackson

Appendix 7: Racial Attitudes Controls

More good jobs for Latinos mean fewer good jobs for members of other groups.

1 Strongly agree
2 Agree
3 Disagree
4 Strongly disagree
7 Depends (vol.)
8 Don't know (vol)
9 No answer; refused

As more good housing and neighborhoods go to Latinos, there will be fewer good houses and neighborhoods for members of other groups.

1 Strongly agree
2 Agree
3 Disagree
4 Strongly disagree
7 Depends (vol.)
8 Don't know (vol)
9 No answer; refused

More good jobs for Blacks mean fewer good jobs for members of other groups.

1 Strongly agree
2 Agree
3 Disagree
4 Strongly disagree
7 Depends (vol.)
8 Don't know (vol)
9 No answer; refused

The more influence Blacks have in local politics, the less influence members of other groups will have in local politics.

1 Strongly agree
2 Agree
3 Disagree
4 Strongly disagree
7 Depends (vol.)
8 Don't know (vol)
9 No answer; refused

As more good housing and neighborhoods go to Blacks, there will be fewer good houses and neighborhoods for members of other groups.

1 Strongly agree
2 Agree
3 Disagree
4 Strongly disagree

7 Depends (vol.)
8 Don't know (vol)
9 No answer; refused

Do you think that what happens generally to Blacks in this country will affect what happens in your life...a lot, some, or not very much at all?

1 A lot
2 Some
3 Not very much at all
9 Don't know

How close do you feel in your ideas and feelings about things to Latino people in this country?

1 Very close
2 Fairly close
3 Not too close
4 Not close at all

How much discrimination would you say there is that makes it hard for Latinos to buy or rent housing wherever they want?

1 A lot
2 Some
3 None at all
8 Don't know (vol)
9 No answer; refused

How much discrimination would you say there is that hurts the chances of Blacks to get good-paying jobs …

1 A lot
2 Some
3 None at all
8 Don't know (vol)
9 No answer; refused

How much discrimination would you say there is that makes it hard for Blacks to buy or rent housing wherever they want?

1 A lot
2 Some
3 None at all
8 Don't know (vol)
9 No answer; refused

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