Translating Quechua Poetic Expression in the Andes: Literature, the Social Body, and Indigenous Movements

by

Maria Elizabeth Gonzalez

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Comparative Literature) in The University of Michigan 2010

Doctoral Committee:

Professor Philip J. Deloria, Co-Chair
Associate Professor Santiago Colas, Co-Chair
Professor Bruce Mannheim
Professor Javier Sanjines
Associate Professor Gustavo Verdesio
To my inspiration, my son, the shining and brilliant Miguel, to my best friend and mother, a shining star, Leonor, to the shining pillar of stalwart principle, my father Ignacio, to my brothers in every path, Gonzalo and Ricardo, always, to my criollo Conservative Colombian ruling class grandparents whose code of conduct and its core of kindness led my mother, and then me, down all the right paths, Carlos and Elvira the eternal lovers of more than sixty years, to Faustina, my grandmother who minced no words and to whom I gave the gift of lecto-scripted literacy when I was a girl, while she taught me how to know goodness when I see it without erring, sunqulla, and to all my polyglot kin, my allies and friends.
Acknowledgments

To María Eugenia Choque, Ramón Conde, and Carlos Mamani I owe my gratitude for sharing with me what it all meant to them, for inviting me to share in all their THOA activities during my fieldwork, their ground breaking meetings among Indigenous Peoples of the Andean region and beyond; to all the CONAMAQ Mallkus whose presence inspired, and to all the Quechua and Aymara women who shared with good humor sunqulla. I want to thank my friend Tirso Gonzales, for introducing me to PRATEC: Eduardo Grillo, Jorge Ichizawa, Grimaldo Rengifo, and Julio Valladolid who had the courage to stand up to translate what Quechua cultivators were saying in their fields, tuning in, who shared their work and their friendship with generosity. To all the Quechua and Aymara speakers with whom I worked, the PRATECOS, the THOA Ayllu Runa I offer my gratitude. To the generous women and men, young people and children of Titicachi, Quechua speakers, my heartfelt thanks. To all my Quechua teachers, and especially to Alfredo Quiroz, I express my thanks for permitting me to hear elegant urban ceremonial Quechua, constantly. To all the Andean people who received me with warmth and generosity, sunq’uwan. Many thanks to my friends in Lima and La Paz who accompanied and who cultivated with me. To Bruce a special thanks for all the opportunities, for that love of the Andes I could always count on; to Javier many thanks for years of political conversation and genuine friendship. To Gustavo, I offer many thanks. To Santiago, for his ability to read like no one else, I offer my appreciation. To Phil my gratitude: it all had a rich source and it channels toward a field that flourishes: allin kawsaypaq. Finally, I take full responsibility for my theorized translational and comparative practice. I take full responsibility for the poetically expressed translations; all the translations from the Spanish to the English inflected by Quechua in a way not explicitly aligned with the science of linguistics, I also assume full responsibility for.
Table of Contents

Dedication............................................................................................................................................... ii
Acknowledgments.................................................................................................................................... iii
Introduction........................................................................................................................................... 1

Part I. Reading Quechua from the Western field: delimiting the critical Western theoretical field comparatively and translationally: the pre-liminary problem of Quechua translation, Western colonial encounter, and the nature of things/the things of nature

Chapter 1. Reading the translational and comparative intersession between a Quechua and a Western interdisciplinary intertextual field through Barthian “postmodernity” and westernized “postcoloniality”: “difference itself,” the aftermath and the body, poetic practice, and the colonial encounter ......................................................... 17

Chapter 2. Reading the intersession between a Quechua and a Western field through Foucauldian genealogy and archaeology: discontinuity, the event, and chance: the field in motion, the motion picture, social movement and the evasion of the colonial encounter ........................................................................... 63

Part II. Reading Quechua in the Western Field: the Problem of Quechua Translation

Chapter 3. Translation in the Western field at the intercession with Quechua: the task of the comparatist and the question of poetic expression and colonial difference ........................................................................................................... 99

Chapter 4. Translation in the Western field at the intercession with Quechua: Comparative and Translational Practice and the question of reconnaissance and the au de-là ....................................................................................... 147

Part III. Mestizo inscriptions translating Quechua & mestizo foundational fictions in the republican field

Chapter 5. The Westernized mestizo state aesthetic order, Peruvian mestizo literary history, and two political mestizo republican state projects as mestizo literary inscription: Vallejo’s Paco Yunque and Arguedas’ Agua ............... 183

Chapter 6. Mestizo translations of the cultural figuration “Indio” at the site of colonial encounter in the field: the indigenous question or “el problema del “Indio”,” the 20th century republican national project and its “criollo” global designs ....................................................................................... 225
Part IV. Quechua Intellectual Labor: Quechua encounters with the West

Chapter 7. Quechua difference, Quechua poetic expression, and Quechua translations of and for the West: the colonial encounter reduced ................................. 282

Chapter 8. Indigenous decolonizing intellectual labor: two indigenous Quechua/Aymara social movements and how the West may constructively intercede: the indigenous social body in Bolivia and Peru ............................. 332

Conclusion: “Iskay Yachay” ........................................................................................................... 387

Appendix A ................................................................................................................................ 403

Bibliography ................................................................................................................................ 415
Introduction

Epigraph: On the road to the Bolivian border, 110 kilometers from the city of Cusco, the Raqchi ruins alongside the community which today has the same name, but which, during the height of Inca civilization was called K‘acha (meaning "light," imperial elegance, apogee of knowledge) arises on the border between two suyukuna. The small agrarian community there has been able to transmit the history of the locality from generation to generation and the members of the community who hold this oral history in their memory still converse about its meaning and relevance for them. Travelling further and into Qolla Suyu, you encounter Puno, the nearest and largest city on the Lake Titicaca border with present day Bolivia, and after, Copacabana the first city one encounters crossing the border into present day Bolivian territory. This trajectory describes and spans only a portion of the expanse of the entire Inca Empire. Throughout this specific portion of Inca territory, centered on the "belly button" of the empire, the sacred city of Cusco, one can recognize the organizational schema and religious order of the Inca state.

The Inca Empire was organized around military, economic, and religious imperatives maintained with impressive rationality, technology, and discipline. The much recognized and still enigmatic architectural accomplishments of this civilization are readily recognizable once you observe the ecological and geographic obstacles which the Inca peoples adapted to in order to establish Inca state enclaves throughout this expanse of their territory. At altitudes ranging from 2,000 to 5,000 meters above sea level, the organizational system devised to impose one order among varied ethnies becomes easily impressed upon the observer. Cusco, the Sacred Valley, Raqchi, Puno and Copacabana all demonstrate aspects of this economic, religious, and military rationale which marked these places with what may aptly be called Inca civilization. The phenomenon, which is observable, is the confluence of economic rationality and religious order, both indigenous and later Spanish, by invasion, conquest, and colonization.

From Ollantaytambo, the Inca religious fortress which protected the entrance to the Sacred Valley and the capital city of Cusco and which marks the entrance to the more tropical expanse of the Empire, to Pisaq and the temple ruins found there, one finds foci where the Andean agricultural technology of terracing or "andenes" as well as ritual ceremonial temples are both present, not as two discrete realities, but as one. Cultivation of the sacred coca leaf is possible at both these sites, and it is said that the terraces at Ollantaytambo were largely devoted to its cultivation, in order to sustain religious ritual. The narrow roads carved out of the 3,000 - 4,000 meter high mountainside with a precipice

---

1 The Inka territorial expanse was called Tawantinsuyu, meaning that to traverse it you would pass through (-ntin) its four (tawa) territorial quadrants, (suyu.) Suyu plus the pluralizing suffix –kuna means more than one suyu or more than one of the four.
to one side are the remnants of the roads utilized by Inca messengers, “chaski,” and transporters, “cargadores,” of crops and other goods. Both ruins don ceremonial temples strategically located at astronomically measured points of intersection. Further southeast of the city of Cusco and the Sacred Valley one encounters the religious administrative state complex of Raqchi.

Raqchi is an impressive archeological site in that it demonstrates the organizational prowess of Inca state administration. It is one of the clearest examples of the confluence of state administrative economic policies that sustained the general well being of the communities within the empire, and the religious and mythological order which together, in a cultural consonance distinct to Inca governance imbued all organization and activity. This archeological and architectural monument is said to be the tallest in the Americas. The remnants of the columns of one of its edifices are 15 meters tall. The fact that the columns still stand after thousands of years, and two earthquakes during the modern era is testimony to the technology achieved in Inca architecture. It is also said to mark the border between Quechua and Qolla suyus. Three phenomena clearly depict the confluence of state administered technology and a mythico-religious order:

Raqchi was enclosed by 13-meter walls. This fortress, religious ceremonial site, and food storage center is also founded on the myth of origin involving Wiraqucha, the god of creation. An artificial lake was constructed to analogically represent the origin of Inca people from the mud of Lake Titicaca where Wiraqucha fashioned human beings. Great food storage constructions called qulqas subsist alongside sacerdotal dwellings and multiple ceremonial sites. Within what would have been 156 qulqas, the Empire stored corn, potato, quinua, tarwi, ch'uño, and ch'arki for periods of war or low production in order to stave off hunger or starvation. Through knowledge of the mountain sources of water, the Inca engineered a hydraulic technology whereby they were able to create bathing pools through an underground system that channeled the water to these sites. “Los baños del Inca” were also devised to reflect their religious order. And of course, the local population today subsists from agricultural production based on the “anden” or terrace agricultural technology.

Further southeast, about 200 kilometers from Raqchi, in Puno, I was able to observe the modern recuperation of anden technology more closely. The ayllu, the smallest organizational unit pre-dating Inca hegemony persists throughout the Andean region. It is not only a political order; it is also an economic order established within a relatively small locality. The subsistence of the ayllu depends on an economic organization culturally based upon a complex web of interdependence among community members founded on the ritualized exchange of labor. The ayllus surrounding the city of Puno have organized to recuperate the anden (terrace) technology in order to increase their productivity and strive beyond levels of mere subsistence. In other words, this indigenous technology is being utilized today as a form of local economic development.

The anden technology is a highly rationalized adaptation to this specific highland ecological niche. The terrace is constructed on the mountain slope, permitting the formation of a flat plot of land with a 90-degree wall built into the mountainside. The transference of fertile soil from valley regions further increases the probability of higher productivity. Deep within the depths of the terrace flattened land, rocks are arranged in a specific formation to filter excess water through its depths in order to prevent soil erosion. The sculpted mountain wall creates a natural protective barrier from environmental elements such as
sleet, hail, frost, and a scorching sun. A variety of seeds are planted according to millenary knowledge of their adaptation to specific ecological niches. The Andean farmer has produced an impressive biological diversity through the cultivation, over thousands of years, of a variety of seeds. This wealth of germplasm is stored in international banks and is the irreplaceable source of seed variety that the modern agricultural industry taps for its purposes.

Puno as well as Copacabana are both places in which Aymara and Quechua speaking peoples still coexist today. Copacabana, found within Bolivian territory was also part of Inca territory. Upon one of the greatest temples erected by the Inca to honor Pacha Mama, earth mother, is built a huge Catholic church honoring la Virgen de Copacabana. As is the case throughout the civilizations of the Latin Americas, Spanish missionary colonization took this impositional form. Rather than eradicate local temples, the Catholic Church built upon these temples, which derived meaning from local traditions but subsumed these meanings within Catholic theology. This transference or erasure, a colonial missionary translation of indigenous beliefs, was never complete, thus the endurance of the site of worship and its attendant meanings permitted “underground” and overt forms of local indigenous worship. The autochthonous social organization and local cultural artifacts and significations are therefore also confounded in Catholic symbolism and ritual religious tradition.

The observation and analysis of these phenomena of economic and administrative technologies infused with a mythico-religious order yields the possibility of a specific reading of Andean indigenous culture. Construed as forms of textuality, both the archeological site and the enduring Quechua ritual ceremonies tied to a productive agricultural cycle is the field of study. While the archeological site stands as a hermetic remnant of the apogee of Inca civilization, Raqchi in this case, the rituals still performed today shed light on the deep structures in which the Quechua traditions, material and immaterial, remain embedded. The historical resonance that links the two textualities is inevitably problematized by the presence of Spanish linguistic and cultural forms.

Reading Quechua civilizational landscape: Travelling through the Valle Sagrado: Cusco, Pisac, Urubamba, Ollantaytambo, and on to Raqchi: a first rapprochement, and a first translation (Gonzalez, report from the field for dissertation research. August, 1999)

Reading the Report at a limit of the Western field alongside Western critical theorists at the intercession of Western-Spanish and Quechua fields of knowing and experiencing: the colonial encounter and the nature of things: “Is the rock alive?” or Rumirumi2 or monument?

This report from the field carries my early perceptions in the field to a page. The very notion of report harks back to the journey that brought me to the field in the first place, and tells

---

2 Rumirumi is a word in Quechua that evokes the presence of many rocks assembled together. An approximation in Spanish might be pedregal. No exact translation would be possible for this Quechua word that gives a collection of rocks, given to be arrayed or given in an arrangement which lives, and where rocks have a different relationship to people in the Quechua field than they do in the Western world.
the reader that I trans- port souvenirs, memories from my travel, to the page, to be shared with other readers, specific readers, an audience thought of as that counterpart to the indispensable rhetorical relationship that the academic writer is bound to, his writing still esoteric, that reader that in some measure the writer, in effect, conjures. The report relays what was found by means of the travel the report references and attempts to chronicle. It cites my travel, in time, a seriality of moments that may be events, from one place to the next in the field, referenced and aligned within historical or developmental time: in this instance, this, in the next instance, that. But it also purports to translate the landscape observed, for I explicitly suggest, that I read it, that it can be read; indeed, that it is a text. The field is the place where travelers arrive, a three dimensional place where the traveler reposes to discern what is necessarily new and what it means, thereafter proposing, perhaps, to graph it, and in graphing it, purporting to carry it forth again, transmitting a re-port, that may become a citation. It is here that it becomes part of the textual field. The report is the traveler’s story, nevertheless, or the traveler’s theory, as the traveler unlike any other typifies the position before the unknown, which is to say that the traveler is a theorist.

The three dimensional field is also my narration of it, my textualization of its texture, my transcription of its appearance as I translate “it,” or even “them,” those things that appear, into words, as I read these “things.” And yet, if we were to agree that there is texture in that appearance, that it may also don that third dimension in the textual field, then we would grant that a text could be a swirl that unleashes things from their fixity, from the ponderous weight of authority and monumentality which crushes them into their oblivion, their two dimensional compactness in archival writ, in that memory of what once was, which we deposit and then perhaps forget. This kind of literacy, for the person who does not travel, becomes that which we cannot remember, for this archival reader may never have experienced what was in the Sacred Valley of Cusco, first hand, that is, today. This remains so for those of us who belong to the culture of literacy that would have much of what we learn formally take place through the reading of books.3

As Westerners marked by this modernity, we abide in what it is to be modern which, according to Barthes is to dwell while aware, “that one cannot begin again…”, (64 The Rustle of Language) that is, that we can never return to that first moment, nor can we return through the leviathan archive of modern history to the first moment, as if we were there, or as if we could navigate the many documents and tomes it gathers. In my report I submit, rather, in a manner of writing termed text, and if you prefer, textifying, that the rocks are speaking, and that I am their

audience. In this journey that purports to discern comparatively and translationally, what may be Western and what may be Quechua, and in this report that carries forward the disjuncture between the Spanish and the Quechua inscribed in this landscape, the question of whether the rock is alive or not becomes relevant precisely at that point where we may discern an intercession of Western knowledge and Quechua knowledge. This point is otherwise called, in interdisciplinary terms, from the Western Barthian (the term is meant as descriptive metaphor) perspective, the new object of knowledge emerging out of the intercession of two fields, an object I term, the colonial encounter, at the center of which the question remaining insistently becomes, whether viewed from one field or the other, is the rock alive? Our new object of study, stated in a way that theorizes the question is that rock enframed by a colonial encounter which stages the apparition or disapparition of the rock, or what the thing may be, and what it may ultimately be at the intercession of two fields of knowing, Quechua and Western. Stated in a way that simplifies the question, we may say that the interdisciplinary object of study is this colonial encounter, such as Western modernity understands the colonial, colonization, and even coloniality: invading, conquering, and colonizing such that the indigenous population is continuously and conveniently displaced and relegated to a subaltern position of racial inferiority and political, social, and economic disadvantage which has been theorized as racist or ethnocentric practice, with all of its attendant notions. The ultimate effect sought from this re-search of this colonial encounter as it emerges and reemerges in the field is therefore its effect on things, and how this effect can be measured by questioning whether the thing, the rock, or any thing, is alive, for each field, Western and Quechua.

This study will describe therefore the ways and means of Western knowledge that ensconce these racist practices deeply into its institutions, its field of knowledge, and its field of governance primarily through the systems of thought that have wrought and edified the philosophical concepts of Subject and Other as axiomatic norms traversing Western tradition and culture, but it will do so comparatively and translationally, at the intercession between Quechua and Western fields of knowing, experiencing, and governing. This study will also consistently inquire as to the life of things, as to the life of “others,” including nature. This study observes these knowledge practices through comparative and translational readings of specific theorists describing the Western field, permitting thereby the discernment of limits, limits which will assist

---

in the traversal from one field to the other. This interdisciplinary intercession, as I term it, between Western and Quechua fields by means of a translational and comparative practice observes the site of a colonial encounter where what is at stake is the life of things: the life of the body, the life of the social body, that is, the animation that makes all things ecstatic as well as the relationship between things which plays into this ecstatic animation. The specificity of these texts as well as the particularity of these texts selected is required in order to rigorously traverse the intercession between Western and Quechua fields of knowing both comparatively and translationally.

It is here that we can begin our inquiry into Western ways of knowing and Quechua ways of thinking and doing which gather knowing in a distinct way. We will temporarily suspend the question of the field of Quechua ways of knowing, explicitly, however, until further down our road. We will begin with a reading of a Barthian first, and then Foucauldian, (these terms remain descriptive metaphor,) delimitation of a scholarly field, decidedly Western, albeit performing critical readings of Continental Philosophy, for the moment, in order to situate our inquiry at this limit of a field best described as the field of Western philosophy or Western knowledge, more at, the field or the place where these two inquirers discern how this Western wisdom and knowing is apprehended and created in a theorized Western, “postmodernity.” In re-searching these two pivotal thinkers and writers, especially remarking on the textured theorizing taking place in the late sixties and throughout the seventies through specific Barthian and Foucauldian texts, this research will plot the field from within which we will translationally and comparatively read the intercession between Quechua and Western knowing practices that is the field of the interdisciplinary object of study, “colonial encounter,” the scene at which we will inquire as to the life of things. The insight guiding this selection of specific theorists and their particular écrits is the critical elements of the Quechua field that require translation, in tandem with the awareness of the pivotal turns effected by Western theorists that comparatively and in effect are the theorists most conducive to making evident what is real about the Quechua field, for the Western field, in this re-searcher’s estimation. In other words, in order to carry out this translational and comparative work, I place myself in an unruly relationship to a Western literary or theoretical cultural history that the canon makes obligatory, the sequential evolution of thought along the lines of “a Western debate” that determines when and what can be thought and why—albeit insistently in response to a Western and Westernized conversation. In this study, on the contrary, what guides my selection is the need to find performative limits which will take us where we need to travel to---the sides and points of intercession that articulate the colonial encounter for both fields—and not the “state of the art” of a Western conversation yet decisively unresponsive
to the Quechua field, most especially because it is in an important way disinterested in Quechua literacy other than to theorize about it.

It is Quechua that marks time---therefore---in this study that will deconstruct Western time, en passant. It is the Quechua field that will mark the relevance of certain theorists in this conversation that I stage as deconstructive re-search toward the colonial encounter at the intercession of Western and Quechua fields, performed comparatively and translationally. Part I will delve therefore into the fields I deem the most telling for purposes of researching this Western conversation so dominated by the colonial encounter, thereby drawing out the threads of a conversation not yet laid out in an intercessional field. It is not the evolution of Western thought in disciplinary terms that guides this study, in terms of the mapping and re-mapping of the disciplinary field. Rather it is the staging of this performative, comparative and translational theorizing practice, this traversal, that permits us to find the limits and articulations in the field that help us discern the colonial encounter at its intercession into the Quechua field, that help us discern the ways and means to converse at this intercession, that help us discern the measure of accomplishment we may achieve in comprehending what the effect of the colonial encounter may be and how we may move away from its toxic effects, for the sake of all things. This measure is attained by the observation of the colonial encounter from within the Western field, moving from this side into the Quechua field, observing the imposition of this Western history, which, from within the Quechua field is not begrudged the place it seizes, but rather, the Quechua field conditions the agenda for its translation in accord with its distinct and chosen coordinates, the Quechua coordinates which best articulate the intercession between the two fields, from this side. We will observe from the Quechua field--, in accord with its way of trans-ladere, its travel, its theorizations and theorists, its knowing, experiencing, and governing-- how the differences and the affinities will ultimately be proved to be real for us, the textual reader. It is from and in the Quechua field that the colonial encounter is most visible, as the Western field has absconded its awareness of its own pre-scriptions, precisely, by way of its practice of archiving deadened weight, by way precisely of its unwillingness to return again, its willfulness forward toward its totalizing truth, or what I call its complex of domination. It is this cutting willfulness that we re-search at the site of this colonial encounter that is traditionally Western.

In other words, I discern in certain Western disciplinary turns “forward,---” which from the perspective of traditional Western history signifies that I look back, I return to what was said too long ago, ostensibly to matter---the turns that take us the Quechua field. As a way of de-structuring this colonial encounter I take re-turns procured by the translational and comparative practice I perform. This practice does not abide in this field of traditional Western historical
practice, but rather, re-searches the Western textual and intertextual field in order to discern the
Western means to unpack what is Quechua poetic expression, and it is this that determines
whether any given theorist is followed and re-searched translationally or comparatively, and not
whether this or that theorist is most au current, or most responsive to a provincial, albeit
“current” Western debate. In one word, this practice is by definition, in disaccord with the
Western tradition and openly anachronistic, field-based in the now, and un-developmental: this
practice trans-lates whatever is required from the Western field in order to permit it to find a side,
a limit conditioning the intercession we term colonial encounter. I have selected these two
specific theoretical turns, Barthian and Foucauldian in particular because they intersect
productively with the Quechua field in the interest of de-structuring the colonial encounter—
comparatively and translationally---for the benefit of all things. The specific contribution of this
study is this: to map the field of this intercession between two fields, Quechua and Western,
assuming a radically equivalent status, equivalent reality, and equivalent footing, whereby critical
Western practices from the Western field intercede to disrupt the colonial encounter, and whereby
Quechua knowing and experiencing practices some times exclude, some times embrace, and
some times transform the colonial encounter in ways unprecedented, for the sake of the Quechua
field and for the sake of the Western field, effecting a Quechua intercession at this site of the
colonial encounter. By equal I am suggesting only the equivalence in status and position
accorded any being, in place, and not a mathematical equality. In order to performatively carry
out this comparative and translational practice, the Western tradition’s provincial debate cannot
take precedence over this responsive polyglot field of languaging, thinking, and doing. To
perform this translational and comparative practice in accord with this radical premise, this study
productively violates the contemporary terms of the Western academic debate, giving precedence
to the need to apprehend Quechua coordinates, through specific Western theorists and through the
particular texts most conducive to approximating the Quechua world view, from the Western
purview, and apprehending the Quechua elements which conform a Quechua way of knowing,
experiencing, and governing in order to traverse the intercession to an other Western side again,
thereby interceding into the Western field. Only then does it concern itself with the Western
“history of ideas” as Foucault puts it, tracing the movement of these critical turns in traditional
Western time for the purpose of de-structuring this colonial encounter, from within the Western
field and as it intercedes in the Quechua field, and traversing from this Quechua side to the
Western side, comparatively and translationally turning and re-turning, in order again to de-
structure and de-structure the colonial encounter for the sake of all things abiding here, which, for
our purposes is an intercessional, shared field (as distinct from an intertext.)
While performing this translational and comparative practice, I do deem that an overview of the Western academic debate of the last forty years in the humanities, through very specific theorists, and even very specific texts is not only necessary as per the methodological rigor I describe above, but it is appropriate in that the reader may assess where the coordinates I deem most conducive to this Quechua comparative translation may fit into a traditional Western historical evolution that proves real the persistence of this colonial encounter that is distinctly Western now, permitting us to track the steps and turns taken by the critical Western tradition of theory which has preoccupied itself most with deconstructing the colonial encounter, albeit still immersed in it. I select those theorists compelled to deconstruct this colonial encounter and preoccupied with language, which post-colonial theorists have not always been. My accompaniment of these Western deconstructive theorists will permit me to perform the translational and comparative practice that is in this re-turn interceded by a Quechua that accompanies but also similarly intercedes in my traditional Western selections, critical and deconstructive, by means of what I call a re-con-naissance, a creative and re-creative possibility germane to an alternative time and place called the Pacha Quechua field. This Quechua insight permits me to select theorists that delimit a field that is Western that through these turns permits us to see what is Quechua at the site of colonial encounter—Not from the perspective of the Western field---but by means of this translational and comparative practice, as I see from the Quechua field, and make a choice. In deed this practice presupposes my surrender to the Quechua field, a surrender I theorize through the Foucauldian element of “discontinuity” in Chapter Two. Quechua is therefore the guiding insight to my choice of theorists defined as traditionally Western, from my awareness in the Quechua field. This re-search through these Western theorists’ traversals through the textual field that can be seen to give specific terms, limits, and turning points most conducive to leaning what is Quechua, comparatively and translationally, and what may or may not be properly Western in terms of oppositional--colonized and decolonized--ways of knowing, experiencing, and governing, as the Quechua world instructs comparatively and translationally in its turn. Deconstructing this Western colonial encounter--, delimited by the turns these Western and Westernized theorists take---for it is by definition and practice perennially Western, and is even “post-colonially” adopted and adapted by Westernized “creole” classes ruling in emerging ex-colonial nations---deconstructing is so necessary to this process of learning what Quechua is—-that this theorist traveler in the field finds the colonial encounter the object of study---without which it becomes impossible to stage the place where this intercession between the two fields, Quechua and Western, may take place.
It follows that this accompaniment of certain Western critical theorists of the last forty years, as re-search, will yield a re-reading which is yet, an alternative translation, in this instance decisively nourished by a productive comparison with Quechua. There is a problem of language and translation set forth here, which it becomes necessary to unravel in terms that bring to the forefront the questions of orality and its traditionally Western association with “pre-history,” the question of literacy and its association with Western history and republicanism, and thereafter the problem of what I call “aurality” with Barthes and with the new histories which Foucault proposes to write, which lead to questions of new “ethnographies,” ultimately posing the question in my mind, of their necessity and their avoidability. I tentatively conclude that this de-constructive traversing, with the colonial encounter—mine, alongside specific Western and Quechua practices—leads us to de-structuring moves that are necessary for the health of the Western psyche and therefore for the planet in that we practice the de-structuring of the colonial encounter and its attendant complex of domination. This comparative and translational practice I perform also leads—-not just to a post-nationalism content with the hopscotch to an from the ‘intervals’ that the colonial encounter stages through an undeniable and strange hybridity based on all three terms in Hegelian thought, staging reversals which the affirmation of one side creates as a negation of the other side, with all the liminal spaces in between at work, where sublated transformation or annihilation vie for supremacy, the “possibilities” post-colonial theories have left for us—-most exceptionally deferred when they provide the grain of the local reality—-de-con-structive moves which do not re-move us away from our compulsion to continually abide with the colonial encounter however syncopated, interrupted, variegated, liminal our engagement.

This study—-it is my hope—-leads to de-structuring re-turns through which we learn to practice abiding in non Western time, practices which can begin to dismantle this toxic colonial encounter, this traditional Western structure. These re-turns are places and things conceived in ways unprecedented for the West now, but embedded in the shared journey of all things earthly, Quechua and Western, for which there are now traces we can follow. It is my desire to find these re-turns in the earthly field by this specific and particular traversal through the texts and world as text of Western writers, including the most ostensibly constructive of the colonial encounter, Kant and Hegel. It is in this sense that this study does not operationalize the traditional academic conventions, but departs from them in order to perform this re-search, translationally and comparatively, guided by the insight of Quechua Yachaqkuna, holders of a Quechua knowing. It is here, perhaps, that my work may not quack like the duck a dissertation is intended to be. I prefer, rather, to think that it whinnies and neighs like a horse, and that it travels like one, and not always at a gallop, with a free ranging spirit that travels toward a language that achieves poetic
expression. This study is therefore, traversal and theorization, performance and practice, Quechua rule and some conventionality that is de rigeur.

Chapter Two marks an intersession where the discontinuity between Chapter One and Chapter Two assists in staging yet another framework for observing the intercession between Quechua and Western fields, thereby disjointedly continuing the traversal that commenced in Chapter One in order that other limits, through other intercessions between Western theorists and Quechua theorists who we may call native narrators may be seen, continuing a traversal that began with the epigraph, the first inscription, with my report from the field, that is, the first carving, and in a sense which will become clearer, the first crime, as the etymology of the word epi-graph reveals. This series of discourses takes us to the possibility of delimiting a differently wrought field of theoretical practice in that Chapter One has already delimitated the intercessional field of a Quechua and Western doing and knowing which carve out a place for themselves in a specifically regional way that we may call Andean, just as later, the intercession of Westernized Peruvian criollo knowing and indigenized and de-professionalized Peruvian natives who reconfigure the traditional colonial encounter of so many accounts and theorizations, unearth this specific colonial encounter, making evident the limits of resonance and the limits of dissonance yielding one of the balances this study seeks to find through its comparative and translational traversal. Chapter Two yields the limits of an intercessional field which proves that an order based upon the possibility of the fragment is real for the Western field of specific theorists, (Barthes) while Quechua order has been fragmented and negated at the site of colonial encounter, and the intercession in Chapter Two proves that this is real alongside Quechua, Peruvian mestizo, and Bolivian Quechua/Aymara native narrators, (and if we were to hopscotch, which is possible intertextually, then also in comparative and translational relationship to its restoration with PRATEC in Chapter Seven, which will be taken up in greater depth in Chapter Eight.)

This fragmentation is proven real as disorder, comparatively and translationally from the Western field limits we discern in Chapter One and Chapter Two, to the Quechua field limits which are in turn difficult to find when we abide next to the Quechua, mestizo or Quechua/Aymara native narrator of Chapter Two. The Western critical theorists, Wlad Godzich, Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, alongside Post-Colonial theorists, also Western or Westernized that delimit the intercession in Chapter Two between this Western field and a fragmented Quechua native narrator’s field permits us to observe how the colonial encounter and the life of the Quechua community, and the life of the Quechua runa or Quechua (human) person survives this fragmentation, or not, both “post-” modern and “post-” colonial. In sum, Part Two takes as its investigation the observation of these intercessional instances, limits,
and practices in order to discern how the colonial encounter, where the life of things is affirmed or contested, poses the insistent question “how should we govern ourselves for the sake of the life of all things?” This stake may be discerned by comparatively and translationally re-searching alongside textualizations, Western and Quechua, which have delimited the fields that prove that this Quechua restoration and fragmentation are real.

Part 2 is yet again a specific reading, comparative and translational, first of the Peruvian fictional writers Vallejo and Arguedas’ particular écrits, “Paco Yunque,” and “Agua,” “short stories” respectively mapping the field of this violent and chaotic fragmentation and utopic restoration of the Quechua field as colonial encounter in Chapter Three. This study of Quechua fragmentation and restoration in the two theorizations found in Vallejo’s and then Arguedas’ texts describe the practices that evidence that these distinct “fictionalized” political projects emerging out of what is delimited as the Peruvian mestizo republican field violently fragment Quechua order in specific ways, while aspiring to suture the cut that divides those that govern from the governed, that is, the social body, through this literature, this textualization, or as I submit, through this textification, a combination of testifying, denunciating, and proving the reality of the dispute for the reader to come to the scene of this trial, this ordeal, as participant judge and jury, or as citizen spectator reader. Chapter 4 delimits the field of the order that the mestizo republican social theorist, José Carlos Mariátegui in particular, specifically delimited as a proposal for confronting the fragmentation of Quechua order by means of separation and ignorance, his own included, which takes place at the site of colonial encounter found here, in the first half of the twentieth century in the Peruvian republican field, and extending, as we shall see, well into the latter half of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first. Mariátegui’s mestizo republican social project is one of the most enduring mythologized and symbolic arcs of Westernized and nativized Peruvian regional and social expressions of the “Indio”—the name imposed upon the native population conquered on the basis of the Euro-colonizer’s ignorance in the sixteenth century, and in accord with Western time: thinking they had arrived at India where they sought easy access to a partially globalized commodity exchange market, the Spanish “conquistadores,” that is, the name these travelers donned, the conquerors instead found themselves circumnavigating a world they had no idea was round instead of flat. “‘Indio’” in an important sense may just as well have been the flatland of this imaginary, and may have been disposed of just as easily as the conqueror imagined this physical and psychological displacement.

From this fragmentation traversed in Part Two, we traverse disjointedly to Part Three where the research takes us to specific practices of the restoration of Quechua order, in Chapter Five observing the particular practices of the native anthropologist team Valderrama/Escalante
and their efforts to address the brutal “acorralamineto/corraling” that Arguedas and Mariátegui in their own ways denounced, which in this case expresses a poverty this team of anthropologists want to confront, and who, in doing so traverse the globe in their attempt to establish what I would term an *aural centric conversation* involving the graphing of a life, biography, by the man whose life is narrated, but through the mediation of these interlocutor ventriloquist translators, but also, gathering the “myths” of the Quechua speaking of the Valle del Colca, offering the global village the benefit of this contemporary interpretation of “globalization” from the Quechua field which engages it, for the benefit of all. In this same chapter, the Bolivia-localized “non-governmental organization,” NGO, more at, indigenous movement and indigenous “think-tank,” Taller de Historia Oral Andina/Workshop on Andean Oral History sets out to respond, in an important measure, to the utopic project that emerged out of the Andean imaginary that Quechua, Aymara, and Guarani all inscribe, also in response, that is, *aurally engaged* with the Peruvian and other social-ist utopias nourishing these bi-cultural indigenizing Quechua, Aymara, and Guarani speaking intellectuals who throughout the decade of the 80’s recover their own history of colonial resistance, traversing highland, plateau, and sub-tropical localized regions speaking to elders, researching in archival writs, legal and state sponsored as well as historical, committed to the project of writing this alternative history, their own, in their own discursive practice, albeit delimited by Western knowledge practices, to a point they deem appropriate. The “Reconstitución del *Ayllu*”/the reconstitution of the *Ayllu* is the end result of this movement to recover their history of resistance: an active process of reenacting their traditional forms of governance takes place, facilitated by THOA intellectuals who achieve this extraordinary accomplishment which becomes express not only in the respective *Marqas* and *Ayllus* re-turning to the *Ayllu*, but an organized representation of elders/authorities that dialogues with the Bolivian state is conformed: Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qollasuyu, CONAMQAQ.

The anti-developmental project that PRATEC initiates as a process of Quechua restoration, reindigenization, and deprofessionalization, in this same chapter takes up the research of the Machaca Mendieta siblings, Marcela, Magdalena, and Gualberto and their Quispillaccta neighbor, Juan Vilca Nuñez with whom they track the Pacha field of their world view, tracking the steps and words of their elders, in this way researching their own ways of knowing, experiencing, and governing in Quechua, translated into Spanish for a reader they invite to share in their world. This *Pacha field* they follow in accord to four central elements: the first is book/chapter one centering on the festival that initiates the agricultural year in September, tracing the poetic expressions of Water/*Yarqa Aspiy* creative and recreative, the second book/chapter is entitled Affection and Respect/the Way of Cultivation, a way that this chapter recovers from the
elders as the expression of the good life resulting from this continual attentiveness, what Quispillacctinos call conversación to all that is alive in their fields, and then to the third chapter/book where plants and animals are cared for in their respective fields, Chacra and Kancha respectively, and permanently held in the heart, Sunqulla/Con Kancha y Chacra en el Corazón where the mountain elders named Apus and Wamanis instruct and guide as permanent members of the Pacha field, relatives and neighbors, allies in the recreation of the entire Pacha by being Ayllu, a togetherness in all moments of life, for the continuation of the life which is the Ayllu, which leads us to the final book/chapter which tells us clearly that—even—“La Muerte No es la Cesación de la Vida/Life is not the Cessation of Life.”

Chapter Eight accompanies two Quechua/Aymara social movements spurred by an indigenous Quechua/Aymara social movement, a movement whereby Quechua and Aymara neighbors joined in the protest and denunciation, which took place in Bolivia in the year 2001. This movement not only gave a voice to the social body, reclaiming it, but it also laid claim to the precedent that Bolivian territory is Quechua/Aymara territory; as THOA inhered in this process, so did the Evo Morales cocalero/coca cultivator movement, resonating somewhat with the sharecropper and the migrant worker we associate with the Cesar Chavez/Dolores Huerta farmworkers’ movement. What is remarkable is the vocabulary that seizes the public domain, a vocabulary that is not only decolonizing in radical ways, but a vocabulary whose antecedents can clearly be found in THOA’s intellectual labor. The effect of this emerging Quechua/Aymara poetic expression is a re-indigenizing of the Bolivian territory in ways that are a direct and unresolved affront to what in previous chapters in Part 3 appears to be a conflictive mestizo republican project, in the case of Peru, and which, in the Bolivian context, as Sanjines has argued is more of a mirage of a Bolivian mestizo republican project, as the title of his book suggests. And yet, embedded in this eventful expression is also the Westernized cocalero movement speaking out through an indigenized appropriation of the Western syndicalist resistance, the resistance presaged by Marx in the form of the union of the workers presenting one unified repudiation of the oppression of a bourgeois, albeit in this case, mining elite ruling class which had been expropriated by the state and which in its turn had driven the industry into bankruptcy, displacing these miners into coca production, workers who in 2001 alongside other indigenous sectors of the country successfully truncate all throughways to and from Sucre, Santa Cruz, Oruro, Cochabamba and La Paz through traditional “bloqueo” with stones, women, men, and children obstructing the highways armed with slingshots, “ondas.” The last half of Chapter Eight takes up the PRATEC founders and their theorization of the Andean cosmovision of ever, taking up Western developmentalist expressions of the colonial encounter, reduced by the cultural
affirmation which takes place through a new PRATEC research and *Ayllu making practice* which takes as its desired effect, a re-turn to the agri-cultural practices remembered and still practiced by the elders in what PRATEC alongside participating communities will designate *Nucleos de Afirmación Cultural Andina/Nuclei of Andean Cultural Affirmation*, or NACAS. This Quechua/Aymara movement of decolonization and reindigenization directly addresses the Quechua and Aymara speaking way of knowing, experiencing, and doing as it becomes express in a particularly theorized *Quechua poetic expression*.

A Quechua field emerges translationally and comparatively alongside the writings of Western thinkers first of all, and out of the writings of bi-cultural Western writers of traditionally defined Western fictional and nonfictional literature written in Spanish and finally, where the field of an emerging social body rustles and protests out of the discursive textuality of bi-cultural thinkers and scriptors who are also bilingual, Quechua and Spanish, and who render the Quechua world through the Western pen and the Western institutions of governance they seize and through which, by seizing them on their own terms, begin to formulate a post-coloniality heretofore unseen and un heard by any Latin American Western liberal democracy, however hybridly conformed they may be. What is critical for the Andean region is this Quechua/Aymara emergence not only in idiom, a Spanish that is Quechua/Aymara inflected, but in governance, for liberal governance is bent into a clear political agenda that is Quechua/Aymara—or its is accepted as another person with whom a conversation may take place, agendas not only of affirmation, but of difference and from within difference as vindication and autonomy, or something alter-native. These Quechua/Aymara movements, in social and idiomatic power displace or reduce Western cultural forms and practices, directly and indirectly, from within their own language, from within their own world view, from their bodies and their collective social body, and from their own places, thereby combating reference, citation, and stereotype about what may be Quechua/Aymara, doing so fully corporeally and performatively, that is, in a language that defies the pre-dominance of the written word, giving the transcription of the event the cadence of the Quechua/Aymara oral expression emerging powerfully, both politically and poetically. While we could say that THOA stages a listening that re-turns and pro-duces the *field* from which the *Ayllu* is reconstituted, PRATEC continually recovers the *Andean field* by actively practicing the *Andean cosmovision of ever*, actively recovering it through Quechua/Aymara Westernized knowledge and languaging practices, which permit them to share it with the Westernized world, translating it, but at the same time actively recovering this Quechua/Aymara knowing, territory (governance), and cultural place (experience.) Out of the intercession not only is a de-structuring of the colonial encounter taking place, but by necessity a new language is emerging, a language
that performatively and ideationally may be said to re-turn to poetic practice, or may other-wise
be called, *Quechua/Aymara poetic expression.*

---

5 There is a historical precedent for this articulation of an Andean Quechua/Aymara alliance, or
reindigenization, renewed kinship and alliance evidenced in the 1781-1783 rebellions of the Quechua
speaking movement led by Tupac Amaru, and a series of relatives who took on the leadership of this
movement and for whom kinship was vital, and Tupac Catari or Katari, the Aymara leader who found
himself in similar straits as a merchant in the contiguous Aymara speaking region and who is said to have
allied himself with Tupac Amaru against the infringements of colonial order. See O’Phelan-Godoy,
Regionales Andinos “Bartolomé de Las Casas” and Lima: PetroPeru, 1995
Part 1: Reading Quechua from the Western field: delimiting the critical Western theoretical field comparatively and translationally: the pre-liminary problem of Quechua translation, Western colonial encounter, and the nature of things/the things of nature

Chapter 1: Reading the translational and comparative intersession between a Quechua and a Western interdisciplinary intertextual field through Barthian “postmodernity” and Westernized “postcoloniality”: “difference itself,” the aftermath and the body, poetic practice, and the colonial encounter

Reading the stone with Barthes…

All citations will come from the compilation of essays first published as Le bruissement de la langue by Editions du Soleil in 1984, whose subsequent translation copyright belongs to Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, Inc. in 1986. The English translation, printed with permission from Farrar, Straus and Giroux Inc. in 1989 was given the translated title of The Rustle of Language. I cite exclusively from Section 2 of this compilation entitled From Work to Text, an ensemble of previously published work gathered in this section around the theme that the play with words in its title elicits, aspiring consistently to finding the play in works, or pleasure rather than work, or simply, from work to play in an encounter with the notion of “Text.” As the French editor of this edition, François Wahl suggests, Barthes’ “accession… to a project of joining writing ever more emphatically to the body” or to a specific materiality is unfolding in the texts compiled in Section 2. These previously published écrits span a period from 1968 to 1975, the dates of the original publication of these texts. It is this materiality that I seek to discern in Barthes as we inquire as to the lifelessness or not, of the rock, from within what we may call for now, the Western field, a metaphor which will gather specific meanings.

For the moment then, we part from an interdisciplinary field, one that both Barthes and Foucault find as they position themselves as observers and researchers at the margins of Western tradition. In keeping with the practice of re-search, as a practice of re-reading, Barthes’ words

---

propose the following in 1972 a propos of his study and observation, stemming from semiology, of what his research project could be, and to what effect, that is in order to arrive at interdisciplinarity. This is an apt point of departure for the reflections that begin to observe this limit of the Western field we seek. As an introduction to the publication of his students’ research in its early phases, Barthes says the following, about his research project:

Research is done in order to be published, thought it is rarely published, especially in its early phases, which are not necessarily less important than its conclusion: the success of a piece of research—especially textual research—does not abide in its “result,” a fallacious notion, but in the reflexive nature of its speech-act; at every moment of its trajectory, a piece of research can turn language back upon itself and thereby overcome the scholar’s bad faith: in a word, [it can] displace author and reader…. By publishing fragments of initial research, we hope… to release not only the author of the article but his reader, for the reader…is also caught up in the division of specialized languages. Research must no longer be that parsimonious task performed either in the researcher’s “consciousness” (a painful autistic form of monologue) or in the impoverished oscillation which makes the “director” of a research project its only reader. Research must join the anonymous circulation of language, the dispersion of the Text. …These studies [his students’ research studies] are research in that they seek to renew reading (the reading of older texts). To renew reading: not to substitute new scientific rules for old constraints of interpretation, but rather to imagine that a free reading might become, finally, the norm of “literary studies.” The freedom in question is of course not just any freedom (freedom is in contradiction with “just any”): the claim of an innocent freedom revives a memorized, stereotyped culture (the spontaneous is the immediate field of the already said, the déjà dit): this would inevitably be the return of the signified. The freedom “staged” in this issue is the freedom of the signifier: the return of words, of word games and puns, of proper names, of citations, of etymologies, of reflexivities of discourse, of typographies, of combinative operations, of rejections of languages. … Interdisciplinary studies, of which we [still] hear so much, do not merely confront already constituted disciplines (none of which, as a matter of fact, consents to leave off). In order to do interdisciplinary work, it is not enough to take a “subject” (a theme) and to arrange two or three sciences around it. Interdisciplinary study consists in creating a new object, which belongs to no one. The Text is, I believe, one such object. (71-72) [Underlined emphasis mine]

Barthes devised a way of reading that observes and recreates (with) text--, as opposed to the traditional concept of “work,” and the attendant forms of criticism attaching to it--., which comes to be through a peculiar collation of traces of language that rustles, that is, through a situation that would create the field of the signifier.

… [T]he signifier must not be imagined as “the first part of meaning,” its material vestibule, but rather, on the contrary, as its aftermath; similarly, the signifier’s infinitude does not refer to some notion of the ineffable (of an unnameable signified) but to a notion of play; the engendering of the perpetual signifier in the field of the Text is not achieved by some organic process of maturation, or
hermeneutic process of “delving deeper,” but rather by a serial movement of dislocations, overlappings, variations; the logic governing the Text is not comprehensive (trying to define what the work “means”) but metonymic; the activity of associations, contiguities, cross-references coincides with a liberation of symbolic energy (if it failed him, man would die.) The work (in the best of cases) is moderately symbolic: a work whose integrally symbolic nature one conceives, perceives, and receives is a text. (59) (Boldface emphasis mine.)

The last phrase is of some importance and will acquire more and more significance as we move forward. Suffice it to say, that this notion of language “restores [the Text] to language,” and grants that Text, like language, “is structured, but decentered, without closure,” wherein “we have discovered a paradoxical idea of structure: a system without end or center.” (58) The Barthian project submitted in the latter decades of the 20th century that textuality is the occurrence of something distinct and lively taking place in a field that it claims, through the very textual dimensions which trace passions, an ability to suffer, to palpate, to move and traverse that delimit a field, not out of proprietary rule, but by an affective propulsion, however structured, however provisionally and creatively confined, symbolically and temporarily. This is as close to a revival of things buried in oblivion as the West has come nearest to realizing, secularly, that is, without recurring to metaphysical divination, to belief. While it may be true that the pre-modern forms of metaphysical divination may be revived in our times, in literary studies such as Barthes finds the field some fifty years ago, modernity in the literary is marked by the Death of the Author, much in the way that Nietzsche declared that “God is Dead” in his 19th century treatise on poetry, translated as The Gay Science by Walter Kaufman.7 Marked by the death of the Ur-text of the organized, religious world view characterized by the belief that the breath of God himself speaks sacredly through the holy book and the holy writ, the impossibility of this mythology expresses itself first as the death of God, and then as the death of his modern individualistic and positivistic personification, the Author. In the intertextuality to be found here, the intercession between the Nietzschean and the Barthian textual fields, we find the symbolic figure of the itinerant poet, the practitioner of language who places recitation, creation, and recreation, from place to place-- at the center of this marginal Nietzschean and Barthian Western world enunciated.

While Nietzsche perceives the classical Latin world replacing god, (wishing to revive the ancient Greeks instead,) Barthes will reenact the death of god in late twentieth century Western thought as the death of its hypostasis, the author, but in order to install the itinerant poet. It is his mobility that is sought, his ability to render the symbolic, from place to place, as well as his

---

rendering, however innovative every time, and yet from a memorized repertoire. Out of the fixity of the concept, the meta-physical peculiarly defined in a modernity we will ascribe to Hegel’s *Phenomenology of the Spirit* and Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* in particular, Barthes would have that the signifier moves from place to place, constantly at play, rendering the symbolic that adheres to any given moment of utterance, as the aftermath of rendering, granting the signifier the ability to be played by the listener, the reader, *the place* into which it is uttered. As Simon During puts it, meaning or content precedes form, or the signifier, and communication, shared or common meaning, precedes revelation, that is, something other than divine inspiration is at play. (126) Absenting divine origin or one fixed and final meaning, language as open structure and the practice of a specific sort of recitation become the way we are also moved to apprehend the world, without guaranty or divine protection, without a belief in metaphysical provenience, surrendering instead to this symbolic play in language. It is not meaning per se that is repudiated, for without man’s ability to think associatively, and act associatively, creating common meaning in the field of experience, about this experience, as Barthes puts it, man would die. Rather, it is the fixity of meaning that is repudiated, the very function of stultifying meaning attributable to the edifice of Western conceptual thinking that is interrupted.

We will take firstly, the border that Barthes will arrive at through his theorizations, his travel to the edge of the Western field at the latter end of the twentieth century to better view the Western field itself, from this limit, and we may find here, how, through textuality, its travel, Barthes finds specific stakes driven into the Western field. We begin with the notion of what Barthes calls “Text.” Text, as Barthes theorizes it as he travels to a border of Western tradition, must disrupt the “Author’s empire.” He explains, through an abridged literary genealogy, that

> [t]he author is a modern character, no doubt produced by our society as it emerged from the Middle Ages, inflected by English empiricism, French rationalism, and the personal faith of the Reformation, thereby discovering the prestige of the individual, or, as we say more nobly, of the “human person.” Hence it is logical that in literary matters it should be positivism, crown and conclusion of capitalist ideology, which has granted the greatest importance to the author’s person. (49-50)

What is meant by the Barthian project, and we will give it this name metaphorically-- is worth recreating, as it situates this study at a limit of the modern Western literate projects which in Barthes’ view culminate with positivism, for they remain, arguably, the projects of the present. This limit to the Western ideational and material field will become one of the sides from which we may commence a fruitful comparison with the Quechua field. Before transcribing a description of what Barthes meant by *text*, it is worth noting that at the heart of the Barthian matter, and he repeatedly submitted that he was a reader of his times, and of the works produced
by the cultural practices of his time, is the realization of the oblivion to which the ancient and modern works were relegate, shards remaining from another time, shelved in massive libraries and archives attesting to their monumental and material fixity. Were they to be read for text --- and out of the fixity of their oblivion in the past, -- were they to be read as text and thereby drawn out of their fixity within the Empire of the Author and his positivistic functions, and were they to be read outside of their fixity as works, that is, outside and inside their three dimensional character as bound and glued pages that are perceived as objects, commodities, metaphorical shards left over from another time, these inanimate words could come to life is the suggestion.

The Barthian text is a constitutive field: it creates and recreates in unintended defiance of the fixity of Western (philosophical, knowledge based) concepts and in unintended defiance of academic disciplines, and what others have called tradition, sociologically speaking, and what yet others have called discourses, linguistically and politically speaking. By sociologically I mean that which would insure that the inequality between the masters of the word as concept, science, or whatever idiom is granted authority, that is legitimacy, maintain the social inequality that divides the governed by means of a separation which also deprives the social body of the word, relegating it to the status of mass, of body alone, the strange and dubious emblems of this tradition that denies the social body its freedom to say, pre-scribing what is true and known. This is a limit of the field that gathers the colonial encounter from within the Western field as Subject and Object operationalizing this conceptual institutional knowing whereby the Subject colonizes the Object making what is known not only fixed, but binding. By politically is meant the power to govern by deploying discourses such as those I reference in my description of the social: discourses that determine and appropriate things in statuesque and monumental fixity. My descriptions, from within the Western field, resonate with the Marxian Hegelian dialectics of spirit and matter that also traverse the preoccupation with text that Barthes at one point in time wrote about. As I read this dialectic, it is intertextually woven into Barthes’ considerations, and it does place us at a necessary limit point for this study: how do we express what may be, according to a Western worldview, as both spirit, the intangible, the dictum of the rule of (Hegelian) spiritual law, the law of the Western mind, (Kantian) and matter, the tangible, the remote presence of the body we observe out there, separate from mind? More to the point,

---


what then is text in regard to these modern, Western considerations when we consider that language, until the death of God, and after the death of the author may become something other than what it was, that is, the word guaranteed in its meaning, by its singular and only form—that is, its religiously guaranteed existence as the final word, where revelation preceded meaning?

The advent of modernity such as it is historically narrated and termed, out of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as a consolidating project arises out of what some authors have termed “the industrial revolution” which precipitated it, and what yet others have termed the specifically “French Bourgeois Revolution,” 10 both terms viewed as paradigmatically delimiting the parameters of a republican and liberal field of nationhood determined by the economic organization of industrial capitalism. Modernity such as I am defining it commences with the colonization by Euro-feudal monarchies, especially of the Americas, and is marked by the emergence and eventual installation of the vernacular and demotic languages as the languages of this Euro-centered colonial rule. More recently Benedict Anderson’s rich and complex historical assessment of the emergence of modern nations, Imagined Communities has tied print capitalism to the possibility of modern nation building, not only in Europe but everywhere that this Western, or what might be called euro-centric model of governance has been repeatedly exported and imposed and through the Euro-colonization of the American territories, North, Central, and South, but also through an extended colonization or “post-colonialism” called neo-colonialism or more recently, coloniality. 11 I term this middle phase of modernity spanning the late 18th century with the emergence of the French Revolution and the consolidating industrial organization of

10 The historiography of Harvey Goldberg is an excellent source of analysis, both of a history that is written with great texture and detail, and whose historical analysis also yields an understanding of the critical project of Marxian analysis of bourgeois culture.

11 Leftist intellectuals throughout Latin America theorized the neo-colonial, especially throughout the twentieth century in that the socio-economic relations of power which were sustained after political sovereignty from the colonial power was achieved maintained the ex-colony in a relationship of persistent dependence, the primary reason being that these relations determined the new republic’s economic solvency, to which its social project was ineluctably tied. Dependency theory is the other outcome of this “post-colonial” experience of continual colonial status. The left has recently experienced a resurgence of adherence through yet another wave of populist movements keen on addressing the plight of the social body, which have brought to power the Chilean socialist president, Bachelet, whose term just ended and who has been replaced by a neo-conservative liberal, two terms of socialist Argentinean presidents, husband and now wife, the Kischners, Daniel Ortega, former Sandinista in Nicaragua, a similar alternative in Guatemala, Colom-Caballeros, the left-leaning Hugo Chavez albeit incomparably non-ideological in important ways, and finally, the Quechua/Aymara president of Bolivia, as I would describe him, advised by a traditional Bolivian left, Evo Morales. Theorists of coloniality in Latin America abound, citing the coloniality of knowledge as the case in point, whereby Western knowledge is continually and up to the present moment the Euro-centric import that like other Western products, Anglo-American included, saturate the Latin American market of ideas and commodities. See: Coloniality at Large: Latin America and the Postcolonial Debate Moraña, Mabel, Enrique Dussel, and Carlos Jáuregui, Eds. Durham: Duke University Press, 2008.
human energies and planetary resources and extending well into the mid twentieth century, before the advent of cybernetically mediated language and the cybernetic exchange of financial capital, a colonial republican modernity. In comparison to the previously defined themes and notions characterizing a field of study generally to be found under the title “post-colonial studies,” I propose that our object of study, colonial encounter, may make evident that a colonial encounter delimits the field of Western knowledge and governance, and I will comparatively and translationally arrive at a series of metaphors that situate its performative locations: “epistemologically” and “phenomenologically,” that is, as knowing and as experiencing.

I propose that imminent in spite of the yet traditional notions of the social and the political that I delimit above and that poetically reach toward the beyond—toward what propels them to the ecstatic in these notions, toward the ecstatic move of following an ally, a companion embedded in the word “social’s etymology, and toward the opposite of what is embedded in the etymology of the word “political,” meaning its re-constructed difference: rather than the citizen being policed, the citizen allies himself with his neighbor. Comparatively and translationally, this “etymological” re-turn is part of the experience that every thing may be endowed with both Western concepts, which are traditionally not only discrete but conveniently separate: “spirit” and “matter.” This re-turn, not as a turning back to a beginning, but as turn toward something already known, unearths, or gives from the earth that—both matter—as social body, or body, and as all things--, and spirit-- as state rule and state knowledge institutions, as well as all life, traverse all things. The field as this theoretical clearing traversed or this traversed and thereby theorized clearing translated as field is the dwelling place of all things earthly, or what Western tradition now calls “the ecological,” and what we will term the earthly eco-field, translated as the earthly dwelling place of all things. In keeping with our basic question, and the theorizing of the question, “is the rock alive?” we may now add, “can the rock speak?” The theorization of this extension to our original question derives from the notion of print capitalism and the demotic languages that circulated at the time of these liberalizing revolutions in a middle period of an emerging, Euro-centered republican colonial modernity.

I align demotic languages, comparatively, with an orality abiding be-fore and next to a growing culture of printed literacy, that is the oral and communicational, otherwise termed doxical register that the demotic language may still have in relation to the social body, that is to “matter,” whereby communication precedes revelation, and the signifier as aftermath and symbol is the rule. At the same time, the printed domain emerging out of Western industrialized technologies will be aligned with the “spiritual” traditions that have governed the social body, underlining thereby the comparatively greater privilege and power expressed through, not only
printed literacy, but eventually the privilege of printing your own words, a privilege granted some, to the exclusion of others. Translationally, “matter” is associated with the social body, demotic languages, and orality, while spirit, religious rule hypostasized into its various representations within a republican state institutionality is aligned with the printed word, written literacy, privilege, legitimation, and power. To simplify, and perhaps one step outside of the Western field, or one step inside its deeper extra-modern archival sources, it is necessary to point out that in the simplest terms, spirit as a notion arose from the recognition that breath, that which was barely tangible or was veritably intangible, but yet could be discerned by its effects, that is, how a body was animated by it could be proved to be real, and wind, whose existence no one would doubt during a storm, but which was notwithstanding barely tangible, could also be discerned by its effect on things, how it moved them. Experientially, it is probable that we learned to symbolically represent this animation, with words like spirit, and other variations of similar notions which, I am not intending to translate here in general terms, but which we will broach in specific terms, guided by our question, throughout. Specifically, the Pre-Socratic turn of thinkers like Martin Heidegger12, and more mainstream pedagogical efforts such as Will Durant’s instructional manual on Western philosophy13, which calls this first documented reckoning with meaning, or wisdom “natural philosophy,” or what Simon During calls the transposition of God’s word into “natural language”14 which presages the problem of translation but also the problem of the plethora of languages, in spite of the Western monotheistic gesture enframing God’s word, all these registers conform the general province of this re-turn, to a before which places us before the problems of language, living, and the world, which we traverse here. Sensual perception, phenomenological as well, yielded our sense of matter: tactile confirmations, three dimensional vision, etc.

This division between spirit and matter is part of the way the Western field of knowledge is constituted from within its traditional knowledge practices, and it follows the project of understanding Kant edified, whereby the mind or spirit was the way station for all knowing, its representational mechanisms plotted out, wherein the Subject is constantly appropriating the object of its observation through its cognitive representations, in the interest of “understanding,” while in Hegel, all knowing would eventually be fulfilled completely, in time, by a similar appropriation of the material, for purposes of a spiritual knowing, which is a knowing that is the privilege of those who scribe it in the work of books, that is, it is the privilege of those who hold

12 Early Greek Thinking; Poetry, Language, Thought; On the Way to Language are three texts in point.
14 During, Simon. “Postmodernism and Postcolonialism Today.” Textual Practice (1)1, 1987
or are characterized by the “superiority” of a written “history,” defined as a printed history, a print literacy. These small reminders are of some significance to this re-reading of the Barthian and Foucauldian projects—which receive the tradition from a margin they deem instructive, a margin from which something new may occur, some interruption, some cessation, some beginning. For the moment we find ourselves there, alongside Barthes, especially in that, for our purposes, and for the moment, these considerations are not mediately germane to the Quechua field.

Barthes begins his explanation of text through 19th century novelists for whom producing the lively play of textuality was in part the luxury of their social status, but whose awareness of the socially creative process also permitted them the insight that their “authorial” voice was much less individual than it must requite the collective from which it sprung. Barthes cites Balzac’s utterances about this indebtedness, Mallarmé’s poetic project that, constantly displaced its authorial source, but he also returns to Greek tragedy, Greek drama, to describe what is at the center of text. While pointing out that Greek tragedy’s text is woven out of words with double meanings, words that each character interprets unilaterally, he points out that this misunderstanding between characters, which is what is tragic, is the privileged knowing of the audience. While none of the characters achieve awareness of this tragic occurrence, it is the listener, the audience, or reader, that brings this dramatic work to its full meaning, for only the listener hears the tragic deafness of each character to his counterpart, only the reader perceives the fallen word. In this vein, Barthes submits that it is here, at the site of the reader that

…we discern the total being of writing: a text consists of multiple writings, proceeding from several cultures and entering into dialogue, into parody, into contestation; but there is a site where this multiplicity is collected, and this site is not the author, as he has hitherto been claimed, but the reader: the reader is the very space in which are inscribed, without any of them being lost, all the citations out of which writing is made; the unity of a text is not in its origin but in its destination, but this destination can no longer be personal: the reader is a man without history, without biography, without psychology; he is only that someone who holds collected into one and the same field all of the traces from which writing is constituted. (54)

To Barthes’ words on the subject of the centrality of the reader, we could therefore claim for this field that is at once the reader gathering all the traces transmitted or disposed of through the writer, com-passion, for the field is a place where the reader surrenders to all that has been felt, to all that has been suffered, and he is poised there, receptive, waiting. In this way, the reader is with the writer’s passion, suffused with what is suffered, that is, what can be heard, what is felt, what is seen, what is tasted, imagined, thought, touched, as the reader reposes just so, here, for a moment, patiently registering what among all things felt, this writing may give or withhold.
Without the reader, the total being of writing cannot happen, cannot come to be. We will take the metaphor given, to our next phase of reflection as it provisionally responds to the question, how do we express our freedom to be other than “self” or “author,” or, other than “other” and body when there is this duality of spirit and matter, and how does text engage the dialectic that enjoins the two, spirit and matter, self and other, writer and text yet and still in a split persistence, sutured by the reader, for all that we need and for all that we remember an other embodiment? What or who is the reader? Is the reader the vivification that enjoins spirit and matter? What sort of dialectical engagement does Barthes figure? We may traverse Barthes’ way toward the limit that the dialectic engaged through text traces.

As my reading of the dialectics of Hegel and Marx suggest, the former fixated on the fulfillment of spirit in history, the latter on the fulfillment of material history, there is for me, not a question of freedom in fulfillment, that is, of a freedom finally realized in the fulfillment of spirit or an ideal utopia materialized. There is rather, a question of un-freedom, except that in the Barthian present, it is the passionate play of the text that overtakes un-freedom, liberating the (metaphorical) body of language, the signifier, foregoing any interest in Hegelian spirit in favor of the potential for symbolic meaning, however provisional, that the signifier can surrender as a given meaning, a release, when it is no longer enslaved to the fixity of authorized meanings, traditionally or discursively deployed and disciplining. In this sense, Barthian textual language is concerned not at all for the doxa that results from the prevalence of the colonial encounter in Western tradition, especially the doxa that print capitalism and print literacy bring into being at the stage of modernity Barthes observes, the sort of doxa that discourses of power such as religion and science or technology could deploy throughout the social body once print capitalism invades the social body by imparting this literacy institutionally. It is concerned, rather, for what language emerging as text may ingeniously convey as a possibility, not only for and from the Barthian open structure of language, but through what I term an intersessional resting place, where the symbolic may allow for the real social body to be released from bondage, from its un-freedom under the discipline of the master meaning, the idea, the concept, to gather other meanings. For Barthes, the hope is that the signifier as the aftermath, the residue, may become a lively symbol full of the play that would engage the (social) body which is otherwise bound away in the tradition’s “transcendence,” and “metaphysics.” This intersession, be-fore the signifier as communication, and after the signifier as signifier-symbol suggests an alternate relationship between spirit and matter where a communication that precedes this artificial division overtakes both the signifier as waylay station, but also takes over the orthodoxical and doxical meaning prescribed and derived from the pre-valent discourses of power.
Theoretically, liberating the signifier and making the reader the arbiter of meaning, the embodied referee of symbolic rule that loosens the silent body, for it is by definition receptive, from its split remoteness, permits the signifier to function as the residue that happens after translation, in the intercessional engagement between languages and cultures which permits forms and meanings, “signifiers” and “signifieds” to interact, though not through mathematical equivalencies: this is the necessarily oral communication that precedes the signifier, and the necessarily evoked trace that proceeds after textifying, a sort of comparative and translational practice whereby the signifier has an aftermath, a symbolic trace that remembers its communicational ways, that is, the meaning and the symbolic trace are a souvenir: we remember our ability communicate. Arguably, this symbolic trace is the re-turn to the social body’s communicated meanings---, in defiance both of the State’s demand for a print pre-valence and afterwards a print literacy, both pre-scribing meanings through particular state mechanisms and institutions, and also--- in defiance of the prevalence of such prescriptions in a widely print-literate demos proffering this state-pre-scribed modern public opinion, this state pre-scribed doxa. This division between spirit and matter, and oral and written literacy accords with the modern republic’s social stratification, class divisions effected by the absence or presence of alphabetical literacy, more starkly pre-valent when and where written literacy does not yet prevail. However Barthes’ project submits that an esoteric literacy, the alphabetic and scripted literacy of the ruling (bourgeois) class infusing the social body, the demos, by means of state institutional instruction through public education-- the conduit facilitating democratic participation by means of print literacy--- permeates the communication I compare to orality, and which I place before revelation alongside During with state orthodoxy in the latter half of the 20th century Barthes preoccupies himself with.15 These national doctrines and orthodoxies became a doxa as widespread as the literacy of the printed word well into twentieth century Europe, a public opinion imbued with the tenets and dictums of the discourses of power attempting to repress the social body into industrial

---

15 One of the now “classic” scholarly exposés elucidating the debates about religious education, public instruction, and institutional “esoteric” knowledge around turn of the century Great Britain is Mathew Arnold’s Culture and Anarcy, first published in 1869 and overhauled by Arnold, omitting much of the specificity that addressed the particular moment he analyzed around 1869, for a second edition which responded to the need to impart the general direction and framing for the education of the public, the second edition of 1875. It is read as part of the literary criticism of the discipline of Comparative Literature and it traditionally became, tellingly, a precursor and a guide to future sociological and literary criticism for both a British and U.S./American academic tradition for the commentator’s of its 1934 re-printing. (Arnold was a literary critic and a poet as well.) Arguably, and in my view, 19th century novelists like Charles Dickens, Gustave Flaubert, and Honoré de Balzac were also precursors to the sociological endeavor, their writings the result of their class placement and experiences, their access to printed literacy, and their response to an emergent bourgeois aesthetic and literary elitism chronicling also the disparity and tensions between the ruling class and the working class, suturing the rift through this “liberated” symbolic practice, a “textifying” still accessible to the relative few but presaging the scientific study of society.
and post-industrial productivity. In the latter half of the twentieth century, from his semiotic theory, Barthian text stages a site for a conversation among equals, readers who may acquire textual literacy, and for whom the liberation of the signifier, and the possibility to complete its symbolic meaning at once activates the body, merging the freedom to signify with the freedom to move independently, analogically suggesting that the textual word, the signifier, the sign, may bring about a certain unity of mind and body through this liberation: this liberation reenacts a simulated re-turn to the circulation of common meaning characterizing orality and the communication that sustains it, the raucous chatter of meanings in motion that may arrive at the waylay station that is the signifier, the oral and aural word, to become poetic in this liberated traversal, poetic as opposed to prescriptively conceptual, that is, repeatedly creative and recreative. Speakers remain expectant and breathless until the word is breathed into being, prescient and pre-scientific, effecting symbolic release and even a re-turn to the pre-monotheistic or an attempt at a post-monotheism. Access to this liberated signifier becomes access to a newly emerging word rendering meaning after the signifier, as the trace, signifier/symbol, loosening it from its authorial source in the dictionary, for instance, or in the disciplined and disciplining speech of the priest, the educator, or the statesman, becoming rather, a word in consonance with the reader’s desire, or the reader’s need for (symbolic) meaning, not outside of the relationship to the writer, but as the interlocutor that receives the word and gives it meaning after its traversal. In a way, language as text becomes a musical instrument that lets itself be played, by all listener-musicians, as Barthes tells it, and as the reader, in this way performs it. (62-63)

What Barthes calls the “death of the author” and the field that is text that emerges may take place through this acknowledged undecidability of language, the impossibility of it being finite, fixed, or closed. Theoretically, Text is not only sustaining transient meaning, but it is in motion in its interactive becoming with the reader, “its constitutive moment is traversal (notably, it can traverse the work, several works).” (58) In this sense, Barthes points out that because “the text must not be understood as a computable object” it cannot be held as separate from works; indeed text traverses works. He adds moreover, that text can be found in a work construed as classical, as much as it is found in a work deemed avant-garde. He goes further, submitting that the work, as “a fragment of substance” is according to the Lacanian distinction, “a reality” that shows itself, “[se montre,]” while text, as “a methodological field,” is “the real” that is proved, that proves itself to be what it is, “[se démontre,]” and the translators decision to keep the French original in brackets is telling. The real that the text proves that is, renders itself not by showing itself, rather it un shows, de-montre, we might say, thereby surrendering to its being, to what is real, so that in this way, it can be what it says, what it proves it embodies without the signifier:
this is textifying, that is, evidencing what is real. The signifier’s aftermath as a register in the real of the symbolic at play in the field is a symbolic revival of what shows itself to be in a traversal that is a re-member-ance that travels further to body, to the absence of the word altogether, and to that ecstatic animation in the field, that is, the other side, and not to the Western tradition’s self’s penchant to regulate and appropriate meaning such that it dictates that it is so. This other side cannot be communicated, but rather, remains the temporary resting place of the signifier, and ostensibly the intimation of a body, its re-member-ance with the aftermath, however silently. For the signifier to conduct itself so, it’s origin must not guarantee its meaning, that is, the author, “the noble human person” of Barthes’ abridged genealogy of the “history of ideas,” must have died, that is, the Subject must have died, and writing, the rustling aftermath of the absence of revelation or God’s voice or breath would have begun. A carving, une gravure. This is the way Barthes tells it:

…once a fact is recounted—for intransitive purposes, and no longer to act upon reality, i.e., exclusive of any function except that exercise of the symbol itself—[that is, once we have a civilization that archives such facts after their deployment,] this gap appears, [between the voice that originated the expression of the fact in accord with a reconfected religious worldview that is a modern worldview, and the loosened fact as the exercise of the symbol that will later be stopped in its tracks, or played by the reader] the voice loses its origin, the author enters into his own death, writing begins. (49) [Boldface emphasis mine]

Writing, in this sense, according to Barthes can be viewed as the real removal of the author, as the textuality of “distancing” in Brecht, for example, where the audience is consistently dissuaded that the work is anything but the real that it can show is becoming: the more the audience is invited to participate, the more the author recedes, the more the audience is a part of the ensemble of players, and the more language recedes to make room for what is taking place, for what text as players/writer and audience proves is real. The other side of the self in this textual methodological field is without language in that it is with place and body, so it would seem. Barthes adds that this “is not only a historical fact or an act of writing: it utterly transforms the modern text (or—which is the same thing—the text is henceforth read so that the author absents himself from it at every level).” [Italics mine] While the origin is lost in that it was authoritarian and appropriating, determining and castrating, the signifier thus conceived is so transitory that it has moved on and left as its aftermath an embodying sign in its place, the thing that is proven to be real in this field: the signal embodiments produced by the lively interaction between the audience and the players, now both enveloped in silence, that is, the place between the absence of dictated meaning, and the unusually indefinite and quiet receptivity of the audience: an in-stance, a place. Writing in this sense is an embodying, the metaphorical body
that the traversing signifier re-members and leaves behind as its aftermath, a symbol of the body, of what is embodied, proving that this is what is real. Stated another way, proving that breath infuses the word not with spirit, but rather that this symbolic embodying carries meaning forward, that is, that meaning and matter are in communication in this way, and that communication comes to inhabit matter, as symbolic meaning, at best, that is as embodied meaning where meaning can achieve the roundness of materiality, of body.

Yet, interestingly, writing as it is described here begins to occupy the place left open by “the pre-historic,” a pre-historic that, in contradistinction to what Western modernity posits as its progress into the future, never to begin again, notwithstanding persists next to Western prescribed signifying practices, and even next to Barthian textifying, as communication. This pre-historic is what the Western tradition had at one point deemed the time when no scripted and voice inspired alphabetical writing existed, e.g. translationally, ‘the primitive’ so descriptively alluded to in Hegelian terms as, for example, the comparatively small stature of all societies other than the Western, where the South American jaguar, underdeveloped and prehistoric, for instance, could not compare to the Euro-Western lion or tiger, developed and historic. This stratified “primitive past” when the oral prevailed, and no (Western) revelatory voice translated into “natural” language and transcribed into holy (God-driven, state-driven, and authorially driven) writ existed is the historical bias of Barthian textifying as well. It is not only the stratification which is a bias, for it has been overcome with “post-processual” archeology for instance, affected by this Euro-centered theoretical post-modernity. It is the “developmental” and “progressive” linearity that remains embedded and Eurocentric in the construct of Euro-centered colonial self— even in Barthian analysis--, in spite of his desire to eliminate origin, psychology, and history—which is objectionable.

Text-ual modern writing attempts to loosen itself from the voice, from Western “spirit,” and yet something simulating the oral transpires, as the aural, for writing moves from its prison house of identity between meaning and word, the house of the Self appropriating the other for the sake of its completion, that is, its identity to itself, to becoming an other that stands in for the possibility of the body that may only listen, silently auguring that matter may speak inaudible but meaningful enunciations that engage this listener through its gravures, its inroads into meaning creation, but as traces of symbolic and embodying meaning—ultimately still nostalgic, for both the body, and what it may mean, for it still has no place and no voice of its own. The Barthian project does stop here—at this gap—at this silent holding place of the possibility that the utterance may join the body that it proves could still be there—in the experiential world, the one that does not have the time of Western History marking it, other than as the mark of its resistance.
to its subjection, not voiced, and not entirely able to recover the body, arrested at its emergence as *transient embodying symbol*: the re-member-ance of what it may have once been, for the modern tradition cannot begin again. Circumventing the perceptual and conceptual dictums of Western Reason and History, the procedure of modern thought replacing the procedure of pre-modern and earlier religious inspiration—in order to play (with) signifiers as the transitory shells that may receive meaning but move on, implies that there can be no identity between the other and the self, if there is no definable origin for the self, other than “difference itself,” and if the other is silent, *listening*, at the brink of possibility, or simply, at a symbolic possibility to be *what it is*: the *thing* that the textual field as methodological field proves is real: a thing akin to nothing, as we hear next to nothing or the thing as it is registered in this slightest of symbolic evocations of its materiality, or in its vain if valiant attempt to re-member both voice and body. Stated another way, this is a failed attempt for meaning to precede the word, that is, for what is material to inspire the word, rather than god and all its hypostases in Western tradition.

From the point of view of the colonial encounter, Subject and Object, Master and Slave, self and other, writer and reader, signifier and signified, the comparatively and translationally Western philosophical expressions, more at, concept metaphors of such an encounter, Barthian signifier shells have lost the force of subjection, perhaps because the receptivity they posit doesn’t kill, but also does not pro-duce but the slightest of cries, of echoes, of intimations. They are improvised in that they are not staged within Western conceptual frameworks, and are thus arbitrary, and the meanings that may reside in them may be as varied as the symbol, the symbol that helps tame reality, that is, the sign of what is proved to be real by the listener or reader receiving them, who is in turn as varied as all the intertextuality he conforms. As a theorist observing post-colonialism points out, while reading postmodernity’s intercession into the field of Latin American literary practice and “post-colonial” nation building, the Western transition from a religiously inspired, linguistically transcribed “revelation”-based world view, to the modern linguistic liberalized and equalizing that takes place through print capitalism and the secular state, the arbitrariness of the signifier is already a historical event. Not only is it incipient, or re-emergent, but it will eventually trans-late to the limit of its expression, as a non-expression, that is, into the im-possibility of forging national identity in that self cannot ever bring the other, to itself, cannot ever bring it into an identity with itself, and cannot thus appropriate it. Barthes’ possibility is in fact and in this regard the expression of this impossibility, a fissure in the agenda of the nationalist project, which Barthes welcomes in that it disrupts the repressive confinements of the Western tradition of logical reasoning, prescriptive meaning and the imperative for identity as the imperative to know, to subject the other to its mechanisms of apprehension, for the
subject’s sake alone, almost entirely displacing difference. In the context of Latin American post-colonial nations, the imperative for a separate identity, that is, for replicating the modernity of the ex-colonizer in order to achieve the auto-nomy of its independent republican state, the imperative for a separate identity plays itself out as the failure to achieve it, from the point of view of Barthian postmodernity as we have just deconstructed. The secular national languages installed and installing Western relations of subject and subjected other are not but a failed project from the point of view of the arbitrariness of the sign produced and the impossibility of anything but the slightest of meanings, and even of embodied meanings, as we have heard—next to nothing for the subject to appropriate as other, ultimately a failure at producing difference long enough to create identity. This is called an escape. The Euro-centric print based literacy of a capitalist modernity mines the possibility of nation building on the basis of identity. It empties the play of difference out of its languaging practice to such an extent that identity as distinct, born by its play with difference, becomes impossible.

While the Euro-localized place of the post-modern project has no interest in totalizing identity in its world-weary position of subjective confinement and isolation, post-colonial nations and all national projects in this decisive measure are doomed to the transitory and arbitrary construction of meaning modernity conceals by the hypostasis of a succession of guarantors: god, the state, the human person, the subject of knowing, and by the more or less widespread existence of print capitalism. Both post-colonizer and post-colonized nations may be doomed as well to the depressing and violent meaning making this pervasive Western colonial encounter anticipates: the violence of its policing, the violent isolation and othering which is damning and deadening, where there can be no allies, no neighbors communicating, and where its economy and jurisprudence also collapse the joy of satisfying basic needs by alienating all things from what they may be, collapsing them into mathematical equivalencies that imply that every vegetable is all vegetables, and every case is tried in a court of justice where only the trace of its difference from the letter of the law may exist, and where the administration of justice is never made adequate to every real difference and not just “difference itself.”

While post-modern Europe is nostalgic for body, for the roundness of embodiment, the post-colonial world, so recently subjected, and so consistently reduced to matter, to object, to subjected other, yet, so symbolically and therefore really still economically, politically, socially, and culturally subjected, for the language of the yet colonizing power is too often the language of the liberated colony, and the residue and aftermath of the failed identitary project—at any rate through this Western meaning making machine,—this dissonance, translational and comparative, between the homeland of the colonizer, its landscape, its geography, its cultural practices and its
knowledge systems, and the native language’s worldview is a gap that is felt quite materially more like a cut in the colonized people’s landscape and geography, their cultural practices and their knowledge systems, and it is from this violent fragmentation that restoration into a unity rather than a totality becomes necessary--, if at all possible. The symbol that the arbitrariness of the signifier leaves as its aftermath, the sign that deictically proves that what is in the field is real, and it is “difference itself” that permits its trace, and textification that makes it evident, for the post-colonial nation which so often speaks the language of the colonizer as its own--, native languages having been brought to extinction or having been displaced suffering from the absence of the aliment of social and cultural interactions given anything but demeaned status--. this symbolic cannot ultimately have an aspirational register, but becomes too often, inevitably inundated with the colonial oppression of this persistent colonial encounter, an inundation felt acutely in the “x” colonized social body, the social body and the social landscape without its own language and branded “x,” thereby enduring yet the cut of colonial subjugation: linguistic domination, identitary denial, alimentary deprivation, political dependence, ultimate desperation and imminent devastation. It is possible to say that the Latin American social body begins to drown in the throes of the aftermath of this sustained symbolic colonial encounter.

Just as we have deconstructed the experiential effects of Barthes’ tentative reach toward the body and toward its consonance with speech in a textually theoretical and therefore real historical situation superseding first-- orality, and secondly-- conceptually determined authorial works or archival or legal writ, in order to achieve thirdly, writing, or gravure--, the critical turn away from the present that History and Reason abscond, and the critical turn toward what I would call revivifying or addressing the absence of life—defined and viewed as animation and motility—(the quantum particle---) is a necessary turn to the release of difference, even if it is a release only of “difference itself,” sans voix, sans corps. This turn away from the subjection of the other into lifelessness is a response to the practice or ethic of “othering to death” which ultimately also affects this nostalgic and depressed Westernized-localized subject, who may only utter a cry for difference. This psychically afflicted Westernized subject is by turns susceptible to this nullifying procedure, being othered by the state through its institutions, and especially by the deepened alienation from body that the superabundance of financial capital implies, -- especially at the apex of global imperial colonial power among the nations designated the Global Eight or the Global Twenty-Five, a clear Obama democratizing gesture, a gesture intending to salvage the humanist project-- either through wages, salary, or savings, a system that banks symbolic energies depressing the body and the voice even further, and a banking network that oversees this “capital” flow as it traverses in closest proximity to the immediate needs of the body, and as remote from it
as we have been able to imagine as a society, stepping into derivatives or bundles of capital investment instruments which bundle the good and the bad diversifying the risk and catapulting symbolic energies to the level of gambling on the outcome of reality, that which would prove it may be real through textification, and finally, the technological cyber flow that makes this fastest and most ephemeral flow of capital possible—as fast as light, as dispersed as the splitting of a light ray, as random and as invisible. Regarding this Barthian post-modern theoretical move, Simon During provides a deconstruction of the ultimate effect of print capitalism on nation building and national languages and literatures from the prism of post-modern language theorizing, in the following manner:

Of all the works that created the new print languages, none had more authority than the sacred books. A whiff of heresy attaches itself to the story at this point. The sacred books, as vehicles of God’s word, cannot be translated. No doubt, when God reveals himself in natural language, transposition of a kind has already taken place, but the human language becomes divine through the breath of God’s voice, the trace of his hand. To deliver the Bible (or the Koran) to any demotic language is not just to allow nationalism to overpower the old church, but for meaning to precede form, for communication to precede revelation—it is to admit, in fact, the arbitrariness of the sign…. Once the sign becomes arbitrary, once divine self-revelation becomes transferable across secular languages, then not only may national identities attach to the print language, but language itself no longer permits of any proper identity. If one language can be translated into another, if there is no such thing as a dead language, what untranslatable residue remains to be the property solely of those who speak it; its form which cannot be communicated in—as one says—any other form? Yet an identity granted in terms of the signifier (which I use, as it is often used, as a figure for form as such) is an identity that necessarily cannot be communicated. It would seem to be written into the fate of nationalism as print capitalism that national identity is conferred in the form of its own death warrant. Indeed there are moments in our culture where an unquenchable nationalist pathos confronts its own mortality: one thinks of Hölderlin’s poetry. (126) [Boldface emphasis mine.] (From “Postmodernism or Post-colonialism Today” Textual Practice (1)1, 1987.)

Deeply embedded in both this “pre-modern” and “modern” (During) as well as “post-modern” (Barthes) conception of the world derived from what could be called the pre-modern esoteric and vernacular language, and then the modern vernacular, (esoteric) liberal, bourgeois, and industrially derived---print imaginary---is a transformation of language that registers these possibilities and impossibilities in its respective imaginaries and its linguistic pre-modern and modern Western voice-scripted expressions as well as in its post-modern gravures. That is to say, that what Barthes discovers as the historic emergence of text and of writing is something During finds pre-imminent in a Western tradition permeated with what he calls the “whiff of heresy.” Arguably, even when the trans-position of God’s voice into natural language has taken
place, a translation that humanized God is discernible in ways that the tradition does not reveal as contradictory or dubious. This transposition no matter how shrouded in a mantle of religiosity is as well the first trans-voice expression into trans-scription, a trans-lation. It is difficult to obviate the ruse, let alone the heresy. Comparatively and translationally this trans-positional gesture is yet and all a part of the pre-modern gesture that trans-lates ‘holy spirit’ into “ancient languages” such as Arabic, Hebrew, Greek, and Latin and then trans-lates this ‘holy writ’ into vernacular languages, and then again trans-lates these procedures of holy writ “trans-position” into the modern hypostasis of this holy voice, this holy breath as the writ of History and Reason, extending into even post-modern reenactments of this sort of aurality trans-scribed, unable to recover communication, but able to recover the listening receptivity of the body, barely removed from the necessary other of History in that in the post-modern in-stance a cry for and from the body torn away from spirit may be heard, whereas the other of history may be totally receptive: repeated reenactments of slightly varied in-stantiations of the colonial encounter also expressed in this original division, spirit/matter. This split Western tradition would halve everything up to the Barthian silent intimation of embodiment, as trans-scribed “spirit.” The only thing that Barthes achieves is to squelch voice and intimate that the body may be there to receive the meaning of the word, but at the expense of cadence, of sound. Translationally and comparatively, from the pre-modern phase or developmental stage to the post-modern phase of this modern Western historical reality that submits that you cannot begin again, the colonial encounter is persistently maintained: God, the Colonial Crown, the Modern State, History and Reason, and the signifier are all selves, a Self, in search of converting, subjecting, appropriating, understanding and destroying, or saving the Other.

Trans-positionality may be a movement from point to point, before the two sides are created, or it may simply function as the point that the tradition denies or invents as its origin, not ever being able to avoid an originary point, due precisely to its concepts and procedures, linear, logocentric, progressive, domineering, and imaginary which can aptly be summarized as a colonial encounter as a way of being, knowing, and governing that is Western. Interestingly, During’s description of God’s breath and his hand resemble the figure of the quasi-embodied writer in Barthes’ post-modern gesture: inaudible but for its rustle or what I would call its nostalgic cry, it’s repressed vocal cords, and yet there is enough breath to cry a disembodied cry, but for a hand, the fragment also tracing a movement I have called an engraving across a blank slate. More critically, the arbitrariness of the sign such as Barthes finds it, does preserve difference, “as difference itself,” as its shadow and not its full embodiment. From During’s point of view the identity based premise for national and print languages is that language is identical to
itself, especially in that mass production in print capitalism collapses the uniqueness of any scripture, equalizing all words and all works, in the same way that the subject-object duality splits in order to incorporate all objects totally, making the other exactly equivalent to the self. What During calls the death warrant for nationalism is that all meaning production through this conception of language and identity, especially such as it is performed through the liberal grid of mathematical identity expressed in Self-and-Other imposed on Western national languages, including those exported and imposed through Euro-dominant colonization. In this Western Modernizing Grid of Colonizing Identity through archaic, vernacular, and national languages, the pretense that words equal their meaning fully is operative, in spite of the condition known as “Babel,” that is, the plethora of diverse languages that traverse the globe, our dwelling place(s) whose equivalencies among and between them make this Western Grid a chimera. The Grid remains susceptible to analysis through the methodological field of text, notwithstanding, and from a limit. Barthes proposes that for text the presence of textifying words in any given place--work or the world---is arbitrary relative to the order of the Western self other colonial encounter, their meaning symbolic and a result of the play between the work’s concepts, and the world’s reality, while this meaning is as mobile and transitory as it is dependent on the intertextuality which the reader gathers. And yet, “difference itself” is what becomes traceable for both signifier and signified are beholden to the play between the writing and the reader.

Something external to the modern language project insures that identity can be forged, and it may be the privilege of access to print, as much as it may be legitimated discourses of power such as Science and Religion which may still hold the body and the word in their sway, both symbolically evoked in the reality of the book. The post-modern project, Barthes’ in particular, could be described as a project of possibility, the possibility to escape from secular humanism, that is, an escape from self into a mobile and transient other marked by a plurality of signifieds which come and go to and from signifier stations, imparting their particular meaning and departing also, so that the next reader can conduct themselves similarly, but whose trace upon their departure is difference itself. It can be said to be a failure in that the writer, the self, who surrenders or lends himself to the reader, the other is placeless, a distinct disadvantage for the nationalist post-colonial project. The Euro-localized and internationally trans-migratory modern and post-modern matrix for knowing—the rubric of the self and the other—as colonial encounter--yields a fallen outcome, both in a Barthian Euro-localized reality and in the post-colonial field of the emerging “new republic.” It is a doubly failed project from which the other as the colonized, “post-colonial” does not escape displacement-- both psychical and physical from place--, colonization of place, and appropriation of place by the colonizer, though the colonized
escapes total appropriation and annihilation by virtue of a religiosity that “saves his soul,” and by the Euro-localized and exported “liberal bourgeois revolutionary project” that brings his freedom as a gift from transitioning colonial metropolises, albeit through wars of independence in large part waged against the representatives of the metropolis, the loyalists installed on the native and colonized territory. The longstanding Latin American political sectors or divisions called “liberal” and the political sector called “conservative” hold sway up to the present, especially where the Crown installed a Vice Royalty throughout the Central and South American territories. Comparing this modern and post-modern Euro-localized export with colonial and post-colonial Latin America is a textual possibility born out by the myriad ways in which feudalism may still be present today in the crevices and edifices of European societies, while its imported version persists also in Latin America today. Ultimately, this theorization of the question of the colonial encounter takes as its passage not the actual trans-Atlantic voyage, but a trans-literary and comparative trans-lation from side to side which knows no historical bounds. This is the reach of textuality and intertextuality, now.

This post-colonial other, in turn faces the promise of nostalgia and the death warrant of this possibility of achieving identity through the printed word as soon print capitalism becomes the prevalent source of indoctrination and formation of a national democratic doxa and orthodoxy in the emerging republics, regionally, of North, Central, and South America. The Subjecting, now republican and liberalized metropolis dispersed across national boundaries and exercising its colonial authority though varied circuitry is mobile and transient, while maintaining the imperative to totalize, to appropriate, to prescribe meaning. For the post-colonial other the binding economic dependence that is never severed in spite of the symbolic freedom granted through emancipation subjects the freed colony to a form of indentured servitude: the gross national product is produced for the metropolis’ consumption, in other words whatever means of production precedes emancipation is extremely difficult to move to respond to local needs which are also dependent on the large transfers of capital that occur in trans-global capitalist transactions. This persistent economic colonization ensues to often catastrophic effect for the reconfected social body of the republican yet colonized; in turn, the Subjecting republican and liberalizing creole, more at criollo, in a yet again displaced colonial encounter with a “mestizo” or “Indian” population both erases and appropriates identity and territory. The Latin American-regional localized field, the “mestizo” is divided from the ruling class, by a particularly measured distance, while the ““Indio”,” the descendant of the pre-colonial peoples indigenous to these
territories contends with yet another colonial encounter, this time republican.\textsuperscript{16} In North America, the colonizer “plays Indian” as the historian P. Deloria tells us, as an expression of his emancipation from the lord’s dictums over the commons, translating his Euro-localized relationships and imaginary from one side of the Atlantic to the other into this symbol of commoner emancipation and nativization, and into the shortened distance between the “noble savage’s” freedom and the liberal aspirations of the revolutionary statesman.\textsuperscript{17} This new Northern American localized colonial territory provides the Euro-trans-lated colonizer the colonized territories’ landscapes and meanings for appropriation, permitting the emergence of this localized colonial encounter.

For the Central and South American territories disease, gun powder, horses and Catholicism so dramatically aid in the decimation of a large part of the indigenous population that the colonial encounter here is an assault with no illusions of nobility to impute to “the savage,” to an important extent because of how comparatively superior the “civilizations,” “citadels and castles,” and “centralized states” of the Inca, Aztec, and Maya territorial expanses of governance were in their ability to creatively and adequately address the life of all things in the interest of the life of all things under very different circumstances than the descendants of the “Fertile Crescent,” the Mediterranean basin dependent on rainfall for its cyclical agricultural cycle. This is to say, Crown-defined “feudal nobility” was conferred as a comparative trans-lation, to the local regional ruler, the Inka, while eliding the fullness of the others’ meanings or practices, let alone a full perception of who or what a ruler may be in these “discovered” territories, yet another export imposed upon local meanings and landscapes, though “alien” and retrograde status was notwithstanding given by rule of this comparatively and translationally colonial---invasion, domination, displacement, colonization and appropriation--encounter. The distance between the colonial modern republican “mestizo” and the colonial modern Quechua population, and we translate the word “modern” to a Quechua field not so that it gives meaning to the Quechua field but so that it can be seen comparatively to abide with it im-positionally, as a trans-im-position, this distance between the “mestizo” demos and the Quechua speaking population is marked by the im-position that shoves the Quechua speaking to the margins of the meanings, institutions, and monuments of the liberal state project, while systematically displacing the Quechua speaking

\textsuperscript{16} Taller de Historia Oral Andina. \textit{Ayllu: Pasado y Futuro del Pueblos Originarios}. La Paz: Aruwiyiri, 1995. The defense of the Ayllu, generically translated as peasant community, or “comunidad campesina” took place as fiercely during the Republican phase of colonization as during the colonial period. This text explains succinctly how what were being combated were individual property ownership and a legal system that disavowed any other valuation of the land.

\textsuperscript{17} Deloria, Philip J. \textit{Playing Indian}. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998.
population and appropriating territory. The ruling class is sharply delineated and vastly separated in *colonial modern* economic and cultural terms that almost reproduce a Euro-centric modern aristocracy on the Latin American continent, though the transposed “Jacobinian” element of this Euro-localized liberal bourgeois revolutionary import emerges as well, while the Central and South American-localized loyalist feudal oligarchs—under republican rule remain and persist loyal to what later becomes Spain, though they remain on the colonized territory as—conservatives—conserving the values, meanings, and practices of earlier *colonial modern* rule.

Modern language mediated by industrial printing practices and the liberal ideology of (mathematical) equality analogous to the collapse of the differences between things which the assignment of abstract (mathematical) commodity value achieves also elides the interactive dialectic, the communicational dialogue that the abstract signifier agrees to leave behind when it permits form to be filled by any or many identities, all of them equal and therefore empty of meaning. Favoring the mathematical equality of logic which stands in for the arbitrary sign—albeit guaranteed by state law—which in turn also functions through the same form of mathematical equivalencies—installs at the same time the arbitrariness of the signifier as equality, and as the death warrant to any modern nation’s attempt to forge a nationalist identity, let alone a totalizing identity, according to During’s reasonable reading, the inevitable outcome of a nationalist agenda which is traversed by pervasive print capitalism. Ostensibly, it is in the post-colonial world that one may find fields of yet emerging realities that evidence alternatives to this Western literacy, precisely because of illiteracy with regard to Western knowing and its printed practices.¹⁸ This Euro-localized and exported *modern and post-modern* matrix for the practice of thinking and languaging based upon Self and Other, upon *colonial encounter* and which we have termed *re-search as colonial encounter* leads to a balance that absents the possibility of meaning and identity that the nation as state-ly self is predicated upon, in counter-distinction in turn, and by “necessity” in comparison to other nations: territorial divisions are predicated and secured upon the basis of these identitary processes which the printed word in its effects effaces. The importance of class divisions and racial stratification in creating national identity can by extension be noted, for here we have the interested ideological creation of the master subject posing as its hero, the first and true prodigal son, *the national self*, rationalizing appropriation and mastery by *this self over an other*, thereby distributing power and access to economic and other

¹⁸The reader is reminded that language is the translational and comparative conduit through which *this colonial encounter* is analyzed in the interest of the life of all things. As Alfred W. Crosby tells us in his book *Ecological Imperialism*: “Even if we accept the highest estimations of Afro-American and Amerindian populations, more than three of every four Americans in the southern temperate zone are entirely of European ancestry.”
resources in accord to the invention of racial categories and racialized and racializing concepts which separate and make inferior, *selves over others*. This classification and discriminatory practice does not only inhere upon the distribution of so-called economic resources. It also gives meaning to the nation, and gives meanings in the interest of the nation by making operative an orthodoxy (institutionally binding) and a doxa (public opinion) more readily filled with this prescriptive-symbol of racist-nationalism, and the tautologies may indeed collapse difference, as the racial meanings, categories, and concepts may eventually escape appropriation by the arbitrary signifier of print capitalism and post-modern text, reconstructing ponderously through the “weight of Western tradition” and its mechanisms of enforcement. This prescriptive orthodoxy, in effect, makes possible the co-existence of “equality” and rampant racism *at the same time*. The doxa that circulates and infuses the demos must in turn embrace and repudiate both racism and equality.

Theoretically, according to the textual methodological field from within which we re-search this relation Self-Other as myriad and specifically engraved colonial encounter(s), the other is increased, but not in order for the self to derive meaning for itself, but so that self and other, writer and reader complete the meaning of language through the other’s receptivity. The self does not realize the Euro-localized traditional fulfillment of identity through the absorption of the entirety of the other, into its totality, (Hegel) nor does the self appropriate the cognitive representation of the other in the interest of its understanding, (Kant.) On the other hand, the other in the Barthian textual field is not creative in the strictest sense; it only co-creates through a receptivity that does not grant it voice or the fully corporeal roundness of a body, granting only the swirling hand over paper or keyboard: the other is yet just the possibility of these things, cadence of sound and full body, or the transient imminence of many symbolic meanings, or what I am calling traceable difference, or what Barthes terms “difference itself.” At the same time, the self has surrendered its authority without gaining meaning or identity of any but a transient sort, a sort doomed to fall and fail as the comparative difference between things is displaced in favor of its mathematical equivalence or commodity value, or what During reminds us must ultimately remain-- the empty vessel of the signifier--, a vessel that *must* remain empty through this radical equality, and empty for the entire matrix to operate as it is intended to: in the interest of containing all difference. The self as signifier or form recedes entirely from view, only to be replaced arbitrarily by another signifier, another self; the other is transient and the self is arbitrary, collapsing difference into a nothingness that exhausts the meaning creation of language completely: this is the outcome that During calls a death warrant. Motion need not be linear, and trigonometry and intertextuality remind us that one reader may be playing at hopscotch, leaping
from square to square, from field to field, which Cortázar demonstrates is the experience of the reader through his textualized post-modern nouvelle écriture, Rayuela. And yet, oddly, in all cases, notwithstanding, the prevalence of the pre-historic such as I have outlined it persists: according to During, communication precedes revelation to the self, (and also self-reflexivity) and meaning precedes the anointed word. An arbitrary signifier as self without an origin—, that is, after it is released from its forced labor as a fragment of substance or a fact owned and authored by a Subject—, alongside a multiplicity of signifieds, where travelling and transient albeit necessary symbolic meanings are the other, --- both happen suspended as they are in the gap between authorial voice and the beginning of writing; the gap gives a necessary albeit transient meaning that releases symbolic energy. This gap is compelling and this re-search will return to it. For the moment, how Barthian text is read is the position that the reader must assume in order that s/he is enjoined to play and to fulfill the meaning of this ludic text. As we all know, this is misreading, or what Barthes calls a free reading, although now we have revisited how it misses, what makes this missing happen, and how this nostalgia is possible.

As Barthes describes the shift from work to text, Text no longer designates the classically defined operations of recording, observation, representation, or “painting.” Rather, Reason and History would occupy the place of these functions, determining that thought follows the procedures of Reason, and that History’s goal is to avow the existence and continuity of Reason, and ultimately this and only this process of thinking and language practice would create this Western world. Text on the other hand, critically turns toward the absence of such a hypostatic self, and surrenders this tradition’s self in the act of writing, that is, through the voiceless and embodied movement perpetuated through writing: “the modern scriptor is born at the same time as his text”. (52) The modern writer is furnished with a being that is not whole, but fragmented, and for whom there is no time other than the time of the “speech act” in the “here and now.” The modern writer is permanently in the performative stance of the lyric utterance “of the earliest poets,”: “I sing.” He is the itinerant poet whose voice is the inscription, the carving of a place in the now, or what the tradition has called, the “oral,” except that here, with Barthian text, there is the oral inscribed.

… the modern scriptor, having buried the Author, can therefore no longer believe, following the pathos of his predecessors, that his hand is slower than his passion…[H]e is not furnished with a being which precedes or exceeds his writing, he is not the subject of which his book is the predicate;… for him, on the contrary, his hand, detached from any voice, borne by a pure gesture of inscription (and not of expression), traces a field without origin—or at least with no origin but language itself, i.e. the very thing which ceaselessly calls any origin into question. (52) [Boldface emphasis mine]
Once the work as ‘fragment of substance’ is disengaged from its application and this utterance loosens the word from its author altogether the gap is established, the plethora of languages permits that the signifier is arbitrary, and language is not identical to itself, and meanings--- as other—however transient may be enlivened in the field of text. “[T]he fragment of substance,” for Barthes, the “work” is the other that serves as the computable object of science. The scientific fact is enlivened while it applies in the experiment, but dead when it is archived, enlivened again when the gap between its use and its authorless, potentially symbolic circulation begins. It is in this way that the fragment of substance is in an important way deadened, we may conclude, while language on the other hand, as received by the reader, and as embodied through the writer is poised through the movement of the hand, a voiceless utterance, an inscription, that is enlivened, ecstatic. Staid facts become that ponderous burden of archival evidence buried in inactivity that may never be unearthed again, which also constitutes the ‘death warrant’ presaged by the eventual effects of print capitalism, as emptying, just as mathematical equality presages the collapse of difference and the affirmation or possibility of the identity of all things to one another, their sameness becoming form, language itself, in full identity with itself---making racism and equality the traditional meaning of this form, the one that precedes its use and its usage. This practice, this ethos, is both a function of the necromantic of the ruling class, and the conceptual edification of “Language usage.” In the post-modern project, the aspirational beyond of this totalitarian regime of governance and knowing, the task of the writer becomes mediate materially: there is no inside from which to press out the writer’s voice; there is no meditative pause permitting his oversight over form, or if there is one, the writer is infused with it and can only be a Barthian writer if he surrenders to the infusion of thought into movement, and to the lack of authority, that is, to the lack of origin/thought/identity/self guiding this action. In a manner of speaking, it is language, albeit dis-authorized and open-ended, which embodies the writer. The writer’s hand and the inscription are one “speech act,” to borrow the metaphor from linguists, except that all intentionality is lost, all origin is lost, hence Barthes submits, there is no “expression,” in the traditional voice inspired sense, in the sense of a tradition that is metaphysical and logo-centric, because first it was “spiritual” and voice-trans-posing, from god and revelation to the trans-position through “natural language” onto tablets, and then trans-lating, from this spirit god, into vernaculars, and onto paper. The Western tradition is marked by the belief that the voice is in-spired and then in-scribed, first by God “transposed” into holy writ by means of natural language, then interpreted as the one and only truth, or what the tradition calls “hermeneutics.” And yet, Barthes tells us, these are just black scribbles on a white page, which
the reader alone makes sense of for himself, holding within herself, as may meanings as the
intertextual existence of culture itself may hold.

This is yet and still a reenactment of another sort of colonial encounter: the Other is the
lives of others as object of psychological observation, for the audience is invited to debate
individual conduct, as a quasi psychologist in search of a human truth, while at the same time the
unexpected actions of the players who are inserted into this experiment, however orchestrated,
resemble the arbitrary circulation of the signifier giving a symbolic signified, here and there in the
déroulement of the human experiment, releasing symbolic energy, necessarily, just as the
audience experiences that erstwhile symbolic energy, the Aristotelian catharsis (of Greek tragedy
as Barthes read it as well.) This is not necessarily the re-creative play that Text permits as
musical instrument, for now the player is a quasi-psychologist audience, though the rigor and
style of textifying it may portend to have as the conveyance of ‘everyday experience’ would be
the hand of producers, writers, and directors at play. We are yet in the realm of this undecidable
moment, at a Barthian border that signals what the sign may do at a limit of the Western field
only if and when text, as the peculiarly performative and recreative play of signs is loosened from
the edifice of Western reason or released from its bondage as a commodity, freed from its status
as a fragment of substance that circulates through capitalist circuits of exchange, and yet we
swing right back to the other side of the Western field as it quasi embodies through its practice,
this colonial encounter as a way of Western knowing, for this is reality/analysand discourse and
not play/tragedy. There is no disjuncture, no detachment from the modernity that “the post-” in
post-modernity may leave behind, for History and Reason as psychology persist. “Reality shows”
demonstrate that Psychology has become a part of everyone’s perception of reality, as both
History and Reason of the Individual Mind, while it proves that reality is real and psychological.
“Reality shows” found emerging out of the Barthian methodological field of text prove that the
audience does not fulfill the “reality” performance, but may rather be engaged in reproducing
doxa, psychologically informed public opinion, for the misreadings are the drama of life as
“reality shows” or a “show of the reality” of the the fallen word. This reality is what both the
audience in an almost complete identity with the actors now plays with: both have achieved the
equality of the average citizen, albeit as the front, behind whom, those who orchestrate document
for public consumption.

One could say that the Barthian program retrieves language from the pre-modern
penchant of the lyric utterance of the itinerant poet, nostalgic for any meaning other than the one
prescribed, and places this possibility into the strangely ordered languaging practice of post-
structuralist, semiotic, open ended, language structure. The apparently secular philosophical field
of bourgeois modern language and governing practice is decidedly metaphysical. This bourgeois modern practice revives an ancient practice of necromancy, revisioning it, whereby disbelief is suspended in the interest of making the voices of the spirits of the dead augur the future, speak the people’s destiny, except that, in the gods’ stead, authority is imputed to the monotheistic hypostasis, Reason and History, whose voice speaks in the interest of facilitating the emergence of the modern bourgeois state. This facilitation makes the colonial encounter the matrix of its institutionality: its institution for knowing (universities), for governing (politics), for ruling (law), and for fulfilling basic needs, however unevenly and irrationally (economy). Viewed from the horizon of the Marxian perspective, we could say that Marx warned us of this ruse, denouncing the fact that the classes vested in preserving their power staged this masquerade, this “mystification,” beneath the new name for the old tradition, that is, for the historically newly devised discourses of power, one name being “Idealism,” now speaking through the voiced ideas of Reason (Kant) and the inspired ideas of History (Hegel) transcribed. Marx would have been poignantly warning, to translate the message that would denounce this displacement of god in the interest of reason and history, that is, in the interest of the emerging practices of a bourgeois ruling class which, like all ruling classes would devise an esoteric knowledge which would conform a world-view, in this case ensconced in a complex of domination I am calling the colonial encounter. Marx warned that the body would be enslaved: workers would become alienated from their means of producing, and thereby reproducing themselves, first by losing their ownership of the means of production that prevailed in a pre-industrial Euro-localized reality: the tools which organized their labor around the apprenticeship of journeymen associated in guilds. Having lost their ownership of this means of production and reproduction, craftsmen would become industrial laborers whose bodies would become commodified as energy made equivalent to time; craftsmen would become wage laborers, the wage being the mathematical value placed on the unit of energy expended by an individual person measured by the abstract unit of time assigned the movement of all things in this time. This critical turn from autonomous ownership of his body and his creative energy, and his lived time, would make a man “alienated” from his own body, creative energy, and lived time to become the pawn of “the relations of social production and reproduction” in which the “capitalist means of production” ensconced all of (philosophical) man’s endeavor.

In a word, Marx denounced the masquerade of the hidden “interests” of “the classes” in power embedded in their “ideas,” their esoteric knowledge in order to prove that the reality in the material field, as concerns “matter,” was that the social body has no real say anymore, no volition that is its own, no autonomy, no self-naming, and the word has been disembodied, as revelation, instead of vulgar communication and meaning, in order that it can continue to feign the revelation of the word of god, as the word of idealist reason, or the reenactment of the necromancy through which the spirit of the dead may speak in an elaborate staging of their dictums, deployed in the interest of the maintenance of the power of the ruling class. The body as well as the communicational (vulgar) (pre-historic) word would no longer have any say or any play in a field of Western Reason whose intention was to appropriate it and then own it in fragmentary units of matter, (space) made equivalent to a unit of time (serial/developmental historical time) assigned a value, a price. These fragmentations of matter/space could be known, as more and more specialized knowledge focused on members, fragments, crosscut sections, the material roundness of things held hostage. The emergent discourse of science and the evolving discourse of enlightenment philosophy relied on this ruling class reconceptualized practice of staging what I am calling acts of necromancy, whereby those in power “revived” the voices of the “past,” institutionalized them as liberal republican dictum, in a word, as “knowledge” purveyed in the interest of the ethne, the race, the nation emerging and dividing a previously differently mapped Euro-localized territory, for the “benefit” of the masses, and the vulgate of the social body to be ruled in this colonial encounter, of Republican State/(Esoteric) Knowledge as Subject and social body/demos/vulgate as Other. This transition coincides as well with the movement from Latin as the predilect language for knowing, or the belief that philosophy could only be thought, voiced, and scribed in Latin, to the belief that the prevalence and predominance of the demotic/vernacular/languages was the new predilect language for knowing. This growing belief that philosophy could be thought, voiced, and scribed in the Euro-localized territory for each emerging ethne conforming into a nation state, in that territory’s vernacular, well after the fall of the Roman Empire, and after Latin as lingua franca of the ruling class was displaced by the interests of the emerging nation states made “belief” coincide with what proved to be real in the field.  

---

21 As the etymology tells, esoteric is “in” by which the tradition signals inside, essence, voice and in this case, inside the ruling class, secluded, excluding. “Late Latin esotericus, from Greek esōterikos, from esōterō, comparative of eisō, esō within, from eis into; akin to Greek en in—more at IN. Date: circa 1660.” (Merriam Webster Dictionary, on-line.)

22 This transition will be comparatively and translationally researched through Derrida’s following texts in Chapter Two: Derrida, Jacques. El lenguaje y las instituciones filosóficas. Trans. Grupo Decontra.
Marx de-monstrated that beneath these esoteric discourses that the masses should now believe in secularly, in God’s stead, were real and material, social relations of power that made certain, that the social body remain oppressed. This is the reality that Marxian texts proved to be real and it is in this sense that Marx wrote as is so often pointed out regarding The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte23 where he is said to wax poetic, that is to textify. It is in this reversal of the privilege of the polis witnessing Greek drama as the audience aware of the fallen word, that this bourgeois staging showed what should be and would be in reality, as the pretentious resuscitation of the fallen word, as During has pointed out, through a complex of domination whose projection is an institutionality of en-forcement I designate colonial encounter. As soon as the demotic languages are the conduit for this revealed word of god, the arbitrariness of the sign begins as the deliberate concealment of its arbitrariness, and in a Barthian sense, it begins as a post-modernity, a post-modernity that has no legitimacy, by definition, but also by practice: it cannot but intermittently perform the liberation of the signifier that this textuality portends, for it abides alongside the language and the knowing deployed through the Western institutionality of the colonial encounter, and when it is enforced, liberation is deferred, and when liberation is operative, the colonial encounter in language and knowing is merely deferred: equality and racism vie for this space. What is proved to be real in the methodological field of text, a possible, arbitrary and transient liberation, and what is made to be by dint of force, a violent colonization of the social body, both are produced and performed in accord with the emerging interests of a newly formed ruling class, Marx tells us. This new modern historical site for the deployment and enforcement of ideas became the site where privilege was decided in a specific way, the site where only some accessed, interpreted, and imposed tradition, masking this operation where only some were privy to the “expressions” of “the spirits” of the past, which Marx called “mystification,” and establishing a tradition where only one reading insured that this Self could appropriate its Object/Other for itself. The colonial encounter stages the designs of a predatory self. This necromancy asserted in this new manner of modern traditional knowing, that “the spirits” of the past spoke to the “high priests” of the secular yet colonial and yet emerging modern state in order to “foretell” the future, “the destiny” of the nation as one that permitted this Self to conquer, possess, devour, incorporate, assimilate all Objects/Others.

Beneath these rarified hermeneutics of voice and spirit, or what Barthes calls “expression,” whose other traditional names are “truth,” and “reason(s) of state,” lay the material

---

23 Marx, Karl. The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. New York: International Publishers, 1984 reprinting. (This was written in 1852.) Arguably and I would argue this elsewhere, Marx was writing text.
reality of this oppression Marx denounced. With the advancement of widespread printed literacy tied to the emergence of mass reproduction through print capitalism, and with the consolidation of republican liberal democracies that this enables at turn of the nineteenth to twentieth century Euro-localized and Euro-centered ex-colonial territories, Barthes takes us decades later to the complicated juncture where an uncontrollable plurality of printed works and texts, as well as the technologically mediated works and texts invading every citizen’s everyday life through the advent of the radio and the television— all these prescriptive works authorized by the institutions of the state coupled with the institutions of knowing and mass media technology foment what Barthes calls widespread “mythologies,”--- his term for the modern reconstitution of the functions and discontents ordered by myth—and in modernity, imbued with the official meanings of Reason and History. According to Barthes, this post-modernity, in its turn, brings to the fore post-industrial “phraseologies” or “ideolects” as he puts it, --the mythologizing function of the state’s institutions translated into public opinion, doxa, advancing his semiological studies beyond his term “mythologies” with what he presages is the movement toward a post-modern deadening discursivity, no longer a matter of signs, but of phrases, sentences, and even stories. According to Barthes, these “ideolects” and “phraseologies” are to be found in all sectors of public and private life, produced by a plethora of technological media, mystifications which in turn insinuate themselves into the habits and consciousness of the social body with a great force for what he calls “compactness” and “homogeneity.” For Barthes, that late twentieth century social body he observes must carve a place for the gesture of inscription, what I term oral inscription or gravure that pronounces the here and now or the Heideggerian ecstatic and now popular “being there,” in its round and lyrical embodiment, without the master meaning (Spirit) fixing the body (Matter) and the present (History) in its grip. The social body should be saved before the story foretold through the modern and even post-modern state’s necromancy may be fulfilled. This be-fore is another word for post- in a time that is simply not historical: it’s a place that abides next to the space that the demos is transfixed on, while our bodies still, abide there: it is a place be-fore the wicked fulfillment of the necromantic destiny. It is the post—after which we know without knowing-- that we may be free. Something else calls the shots.

Within the horizons of Barthian self-reflection, a place or a field for matter, that is, for the other, with spirit or the self must be found, where the two, involved in a textual signification engagement can fulfill the expenditure of symbolic energy, without violent repression. In other words, a place where the aftermath of the signifier as symbol can re-member in-to a sort of embodiment, a field where changing meaning can be trans-ported by a sort of embodiment on a traversal with what proved itself to be real, here; this is what Barthes tells us is needed. The body
is the way out, the way to express the release of the mind from its trap inside the body, as expression, as inspired voice: the mind needs to be “outed,” and within the Western tradition its only place to escape to is the body. According to Barthes this is required in order to interrupt the compacting and homogenizing course of the nation State’s Reason, its inevitable History: its institutions and works expressed through its peculiar construal/knowing through language must be interrupted. Text according to Barthes is needed in order to throw off the oppression of reconstituted mythologies more compact and more rapidly deployed, idiolects infusing social places and public discourse with new and improved conduits for mystification and for a greater compression of difference of any kind, suppressing all heterogeneity further. The Text is thus a field taking a place, I would argue, that is already given; the text takes a place that it pronounces has no guaranty provided by any mythological Being, God for example, or the State’s all-knowing predictive attributions—and it does so as a languaging practice. Text is a place desolate of any metaphysical assurance, but a place traversed by the order that the symbolic purveys from language, however provisionally, as it plays itself out in this field, com-passionately, with the writer’s passion surrendered to its fulfillment in the reader, and given forth here and now, in a quasi embodiment.

Barthes called his project a theory of semiotics, adhering in his own way to the practices that delimit method and research, but pushing against the weight of this prescriptive Western tradition. In confronting the “ideolects” that had replaced mythologies, he describes this program for liberation from this border where the West could self reflect-- as a moment of overcoming the previously required “mythoclasm”--, and the Hegelian dialectic ensues--- reenacting by means of this self before its other (self,) one now the other to arrive, this self-centered colonial encounter. What is required, he submits in 1971 is a “semioclasm,” that is, what he calls “the destruction of the sign,” and we will translate, the destruction of the sign that the ruling class reads and fixes in its meaning as the privileged authority deciding the social body’s destiny. This change, according to Barthes is taking place in this late twentieth century field whose authoritative and disciplining traditional signs are so prevalent in every place, so widespread had this tradition’s idiolectal practice become. The places where his theory of semiotics would confront this contemporary proliferation of mystifying “ideolects” would become so numerous and would cover such a broad geographical expanse that in effect the research field expanded in the following way:

The historical field is thereby extended: it is no longer French society, but far beyond it, historically and geographically, the whole of Western (Greco-Judeo-Islamo-Christian) civilization, unified in one and the same theology (essence and
monotheism) and identified by the system of meaning it practices, from Plato to France-Dimanche. (67) [Underlined emphasis mine]

His desire, not surprisingly is for writing text that is literary, notwithstanding that text as methodological field can be found in any volume of any kind of printed document or other cultural practice. To Barthes, the literary is the antidote to myth, that is, to mystification, or as he puts it, “mythic discourse,” the “dense language” that “can be apprehended in the cross fire of the trans-writing whose still literary ‘text’ [is] the antidote to myth.” [Boldface emphasis mine.] He expressed the desire, that this still literary text:

…would occupy the pole, or rather the region—airy, light, open, spaced, decentered, noble, free—where writing deploys itself against the idolect, i.e. at its limit, and combats it there. (68)

From sign, he proposed that “a general theory of the language of writing, of the signifier” “must extend its object to take in the sentence, or better still, to take in sentences…” According to Barthes,

…the mythic is present wherever sentences are turned, where stories are told (in every sense of these expressions): from interior monologue to conversation, from the newspaper article to the political speech, from the novel (if there are any left) to the advertising image—all utterances that can be included in the Lacanian concept of the image repertoire. (68)

Within the arc of the mythological he targets as the object of contention, an increasingly more penetrating “ideoloectology” as the object emerging out of a post-industrial reality, requires the practice of grasping difference from the gap, the new critical activity to be written out. The operative concepts of these ideoloectologies are “no longer sign, signifier, signified, and connotation, but citation, reference, and stereotype,” [boldface mine] according to Barthes. It is the task of this new semiology:

…no longer merely to reverse (or to correct) the mythic message, putting it right side up, [Hegel/ Marx] with denotation at the bottom and connotation at the top, nature on the surface, and class interest deep down, but to change the object itself, to engender a new object, point of departure for a new science. (68) [Underlined emphasis mine]

To this re-searcher, the program Barthes proposed has relevance for us today at this turning point, where it signals the emergence, the birth of a new research practice with a new object which Barthes calls “social speech.” This turning point is of relevance in that it begins to embrace the role of language in conforming social realities, specifically with and through stories, narrations that are a prescriptive citation, an oft used reference, the repetitive compactness that seeps into stereotype, or as Barthes puts it, sentences. It is in the social field that we can begin to
operationalize the methodological field of text with a new object that points to sentences that may prove what is real for the social body, permitting us to discern how to release it from its unfreedom. At the same time, this study purports to observe the way in which intellectual traditions, traditions that recover the author from the “death” that the writing Barthes would have us deploy would have surrendered him—whose footprints can be tracked—such that this positivistic individual, the so-called human person can be compared with what may be deemed other, and what can be proven to be other than the self in the real, in order to learn what evades the Western self’s mastering appropriation. It is at this preliminary disjuncture between Western and Quechua fields, this limit, that much of this relevance can be read. The Western citations, references, and stereotypes which yet and now over-determine the Quechua field, continue to place it either—within the history of Western “progress” toward Hegelian fulfillment, all that is to be known, that is, other, will be known, thereby appropriating the Quechua world also, in this “inevitable,” “perpetual,” and barely relenting colonial encounter bringing with it the Western bias of Quechua subalternity and backwardness, a Quechua otherness to be appropriated as the object of study for various disciplines, still and yet. It is this insidious and ubiquitous racialization whereby that which must be mastered is “masterable,” that is, sufficiently made inferior, such that the superior force of the Western Subject or positivist individual or noble human, all translations of the same concept “Subject,” may still “cynically” implement this practice in various Western academic disciplines, to quote Barthes’ sense of what is cynical, with more or less awareness, with more or less conscious deployment of the compact and homogenizing idiolects of the Western academic tradition, the citations and the references that continue to relegate the Quechua world, not only to the convenient obscurantism of this “inadvertent” silencing, but to the deepening formalization of the stereotype thereby superimposed over a reality that is not only comparatively dissimilar to the Western world, but in myriad ways remains wholly disinterested in Western ways. This is how the compilation of rocks I found within the Peruvian landscape in the valley still called sacred, and still called Inka spoke to me: upon the Inka Quechua structures were superimposed Spanish structures, to summon how the rocks spoke to me, and how they were differently ordered, rumirumi.

Upon the Inka stone that had remained standing, there were not only the overdetermination of various colonial impositions, but a confluence of colonizing republican forces whose textured imposition reveals the conditions of their existence within the field of Peruvian History. The stereotype of national tourism also deepened, underlining that-- the

---

24 Etymology of learn: “… akin to Old High German lernên—to learn, Old English last footprint, Latin lira furrow, track /Date: before 12th century” www.merriam-webster.com/
prescriptive (Western) historic *spacial* placement of these “ruins” in the historical grid of *mathematical time* where the concept is made to precede matter was the remote---, in *this Westernized Peruvian field*, especially *this* “civilizational past” gave meaning in one continuous mythological arc---, not to the direct descendants of the Inka, or the descendants of smaller and other ethnies who also thrived and/or resisted the Inkas, and for whom the so called “ruins” meant something else entirely, but rather---, *this* continuous mythological arc gave meaning to the contemporary Peruvian citizen, linking him to the Inkas that once lived, an arc which rationalized, through a five hundred year process of miscegenation, the disapparition of the life of contemporary Quechua-speaking indigenous peoples. This is an unabashedly cynical gesture that dissimulates the reality of *the colonial encounter’s violence*. Sustaining such a mythological arc of national identity throughout almost five hundred years, conveniently making the descendants of those compactly and homogeneously conquered, racialized, and displaced native peoples cynically elided is to obviate the violent reality of Hegelian “sublation,” the annihilation of the other in the interest of the Self. The interest in *this* mythological arc of Westernized Peruvian-local continuous and totalizing national history, a civilizational genealogy wherein the conquerors’ violence, his pillaging, rape, destructive displacement and racialization are made mute and moot and his violent appropriation of Inka territory suppressed in the interest of possessing it Himself, yet and still *reenacts the Western colonial encounter whereby the Western Subject elides and re-conquers the contemporary Quechua speaking through this national tourist narrative*. It is this *touristic story*, where there is a turn away from what is textured and real in the Western field, and where there is diffuse in every form of mass media *citing* from the national archive of stories and current *references* available, deploying as well, any and all discursive or story-making technologies which prove in the methodological field of text that the colonial encounter cuts Self and Other in Western terms entirely. *These* Euro-centered Peruvian national narratives do not just silence, making the other--*, in this case Quechua speaking indigenous peoples--*, silent by means of a Spanish that suppresses Quechua, but silent also through the imminence of their disappearance by means of their archaic backwardness, all the ideolects deployed by means of the mechanism of colonial encounter which requires their disapparition after indentured servitude in the interest of mestizo, that is, homogeneous national identity. *This* subaltern character, unbelievably, *Quechua civilization* is appropriated for the sake of Peruvian History’s current designs, in effect negating and displacing this Quechua speaking people’s past, present, and future, not to mention their permanent present, thereby making contemporary
Peruvian *criollos*25 and *mestizos*26 the Subject/self/citizens of the national narrative that the tourist story subscribes to in accord with Peruvian contemporary republican institutions.

*Miscegenation* is one of the stories of this disapparition of the Quechua speaking from the field of Peruvian republican life, alongside touristic nationalist narratives that give “Inka civilization as origin.” Tourism is yet another story of the glorious civilizational past that defines the “Peruvian” nation today, as much as it is also another story, telling of the Quechua speaking population’s erasure, while the cynicism is expressed through the poverty that forces Quechua speaking families, orphaned from the *Ayllu* or *dis-placed* Quechua speaking people today to pose, alive in the present, for photographs whose very gesture captures what once took place and may be preserved, the visual aid that assists the tourist in recreating this story about the Quechua past whose present is absconded, in exchange for some *soles*, Peruvian monetary currency: the Quechua speaking child agrees to be what has passed, and the past whose passage is a time assigned a value which the Quechua person’s keen grasp of Western commodification makes evident by the price extolled from the tourist. For the Quechua speaking entering the Western machine, not of mechanical but of cybernetic reproduction putting into instantaneous circulation this digital photographic image captured as a fragment of Peruvian national tourism, an *ideolect* charging rapidly across the globe, the Quechua speaking as Western Other is no longer the photographic image as monotheistic sign, or its negative as its essence, but the particle pixels deeply suppressed into the digital image on the website or the tourist’s computer slideshow citing and referencing the Peruvian national--tourist’s story, where the Peruvian state and the tourist partner in the same way that the audience and the actors in a reality show co-terminously recreate the colonial encounter of Self observing the object that is the other. This cybernet pixel “essence” becomes the uncontrollable minuteness of a new compactness, an even deeper collapse into an essence that so covers the social body and social speech that it is gathered in the large narratives of reenactments called citation, reference and stereotype now inundating the other so overwhelmingly that her/his/its saturation may in effect drown the other entirely, unless the other has some thing to hold to, can find the branch of a deeply rooted tree to hold on to.

---

25 “Criollo” is a word widely used in the Latin American context which names first of all the descendants of the sixteenth century colonizer, traditionally the ruling class controlling major commercial trade as well as large expanses of land producing for commercial exchange. It is this signification being alluded to.

26 “Mestizo” is a word widely used in the Latin American context which names the descendants of the miscegenation between Native Latin Americans and the Colonizing members of the Spanish Crown primarily as a question of racial ascendance that historically imply problems of collective--especially national identity--post independence and which engage racialization that begin with the arrival of the first colonizers as the myriad chronicles of the colonial period evidence.
The reference and citation to be found in the Western traditional academic fields of knowledge and in the mass media field of information production would have the Quechua speaking narrated through the work of books, newspapers, journal articles, documentaries, anthropological and archaeological monographs, etc. explaining who the Quechua speaking were, not just yesterday, but as the Quechua speaking have been appropriated in order to satisfy the self’s unquenchable desire to know in order to fulfill its historical destiny to know all that is there to be known. This is the other’s death warrant, in this Western colonial encounter mitigated however slightly by the aftermath of textual Western languages practice, which unlike the totalizing and annihilating illusion of Western Reason’s and History’s (necromantic) language practice, revive the aftermath of text as the residue of meaning that language takes from printed language in that printed literacy cannot contain the vastness of language: the sheer number of languages it embraces, the fact that language, to which this diversity belongs is never and cannot ever be identical to itself, always exceeding itself. This aftermath, this excess can be read and it is Barthes who provides the method whereby the aftermath is an afterlife of sorts that can be proven to be real in the methodological field of text. That language cannot be identical to itself is what the Western tradition’s operative illusion of totality and completion places under its necromantic obnubilation. This residue or aftermath is also the saving grace of translation, not only as traversal from language to language, but also as the escape from the persistent hollowed out emptiness of printed language, the “afterlife” that Benjamin wrote into the traversal of translation.27 The distinction of Quechua as a language is not just that it is not primarily a printed language whose communicational ability, to remain in During’s analytical framework, as well as its meanings are intrinsic to its language practices, in accord with this orality, but this felicitous non-Western historic and ahistoric literacy and language practice is also beholden to its distinct Quechua linguistic performative practices.

The outcome of this Barthian theory of writing and reading text which designates as its object of study a unit of language other than sign and signifier is that we encounter a reader of that which departs from the repetitions and reenactments of idiolectal narration, which is in its turn the prescribed literacy of what is written as expressed Idea. We find a reader who in a co-creative process completes the work of the writer. The central role of the reader is thus finding textuality in order that a new, free reading co-creates the provisional and symbolic release of the meaning of the text. Barthes differentiates between “the work” as he defines it and as Westerners know it as an “object of consumption,” where the work is consumed for its “qualities,” and where

it is not the “actual operation of reading which can make differences between books: ‘cultivated’
reading is not structurally different from reading on trains.” For Barthes, consequently, what
makes text distinct is the possibility to bring the reader into play:

The Text (if only by its frequent “unreadability”) decants the work (if it
permits it at all) from its consumption and recuperates it as play, task, production,
practice. This means that the text requires an attempt to abolish (or at least to
diminish) the distance between writing and reading, not by intensifying the
reader’s projection into the work, but by linking the two together into one and
the same signifying practice…. “Playing” must be taken here in all the
polysemy of the term: the text itself “plays” (like a door that “plays” back and
forth on its hinges; like a fishing rod in which there is some “play”); and the
reader plays twice over: he plays at the Text (ludic meaning), he seeks a practice
which reproduces it; but, so that his practice is not reduced to a passive, interior
mimesis (the Text being precisely what resists this reduction), he plays the Text;
we must not forget that play is also a musical term; the history of music (as
practice, not as “art”) is, moreover, quite parallel to that of the Text; there was a
time when, active amateurs being numerous (at least within a certain class), “to
play” and “to listen” constituted a virtually undifferentiated activity;…. Today only the critic executes the work (pun intended). The reduction of reading
to consumption is obviously responsible for the “boredom” many feel in the
presence of the modern (“unreadable”) text, the avant-garde film or painting: to
be bored means one cannot produce the text, play it, release it, make it go.(63)
[Underlined and boldface emphasis mine]

The revivification I conjure with the word “revival,” revival of matter, of body requires revisiting
now, as does the secularity of the practice that Barthes proposes. “Revival” rings with
fundamentalist overtones, with a tradition’s orthodoxy, (if that coupling is not tautological).
Notwithstanding, revival is a good way to describe the resuscitation of what may have once been
said and done, in this case, not because it ever died, but because it may not have been heard, so
enthralling was the command of its priestly necromantic interpreters, so compelling the
prescription of the ideolect. It is possible too, that a kind of world-weary predatory boredom
ensues when what is to be consumed proves thorny, prickly to the throat, and therefore
unpalatable, inconsumable. What was not read because it was not heard, and what requires
animation may have become suppressed by a censorship that proceeded after the reader became a
consumer, habituated to deafness, albeit never entirely. Without symbolic release, release from
symbolic repressions, man would die, to paraphrase Barthes. Revival for our purposes happens
instead, when the ear is stirred and what may have moved a given person or persons---movements
that are the Textuality which abides in those archaic works, those archived books—leaving the
footsteps of affections, passions, intimations, the musicality and cadence which moved the work
into text, and escaped the fixity of the work as it became co-opted into the tradition—these
vibrations can make themselves heard again by the listening and playing reader Barthes describes.
Two elements of textuality make this removal from monotheism, or “monistic philosophy” or monistic exegesis possible: “intertextuality” and “difference.” In describing text, what it may be as what it does, interestingly, Barthes uses his perceptions while he strolls down a path, albeit as a “paper author,” a carver, a playful character in his own narrative, to attest to what textuality is as a plurality of sounds, distinctly combined in one moment:

The text is plural. This does not mean only that it has several meanings but that it fulfills the very plurality of meaning: an irreducible (and not just acceptable) plurality. The text is not coexistence of meaning, [e.g. interpretation: this means that,] but passage, traversal; hence, it depends not on an interpretation, however liberal, but on an explosion, on dissemination. The plurality of the text depends, as a matter of fact, not on the ambiguity of its contents, but on what we might call the stereographic plurality of the signifiers which weave it (etymologically, the text is a fabric) [to the musical performer, another practitioner: the weaver]: the reader of the Text might be compared to an idle subject (who has relaxed his image-repertoire): this fairly empty subject strolls (this has happened to the author of these lines, and it is for this reason that he has come to an intense awareness of the Text) along a hillside at the bottom of which flows a wadi (I use the word to attest to a certain alienation); what he perceives is multiple, irreducible, issuing from heterogeneous, detached substances and levels: lights, colors, vegetation, heat, air, tenuous explosions of sounds, tiny cries of birds, children’s voices from the other side of the valley, paths, gestures, garments of inhabitants close by or very far away; all these incidents are half-identifiable: they issue from known codes, but their combinative operation is unique, it grounds the stroll in a difference which cannot be repeated except as difference. This is what happens in the Text: it can be Text only in its difference (which does not mean its individuality): its reading is semelfactive (which renders any inductive-deductive science of texts illusory: no grammar of the text) and yet entirely woven of quotations, references, echoes: cultural languages (what language is not cultural?), antecedent or contemporary, which traverse it through and through in a vast stereophony. The intertextuality in which any text is apprehended, since it is itself the intertext of another text, cannot be identified with some origin of the text: to seek out the “sources,” the “influences” of a work is to satisfy the myth of filiation; the quotations a text is made of are anonymous and irrevocable, and yet already read; they are quotation marks without quotation marks. ... Hence, confronting the work, the Text might indeed take for its motto the words of the man possessed by devils: “My name is legion, for we are many” (Mark 5:9) The plural or demonic texture which sets the text in opposition to the work may involve profound modifications of reading, precisely where monoligism seems to be the law: certain “texts” of Scripture, traditionally adopted by theological (historical or analogical) monism, may lend themselves to a diffraction of meanings (i.e., finally, to a materialist reading), while the Marxist interpretation of the work, hitherto resolutely monistic, may become more materialist by pluralizing itself (if, of course, Marxist “institutions” permit this). (60-61) [Emphasis through boldfacing and underlining mine]

It is here that we arrive at the limit of the field of textuality that Barthes traces out of the gestures of Continental Philosophy, especially the cultural turn precipitated by the intercession of Freud
upon Marx, and Marx upon Freud, an intercession performed later in this tradition, where work, having been juxtaposed with play, can now be comparatively and translationally theorized. This new “object” to be observed, and this new theoretical practice emerging out of the methodological field of intertextuality and difference is operationalized by this Barthian writer, the scriptor, and its counterpart, the reader that plays the text that is there:

In multiple writing, in effect, everything is to be disentangled, but nothing deciphered, structure can be followed, “threaded” (as we say of a run in a stocking) in all its reprises, all its stages, but there is no end to it, no bottom; the space of writing is to be traversed, not pierced; writing constantly posits meaning, but always in order to evaporate it: writing seeks a systematic exemption of meaning. Thereby, literature (it would be better, from now on to say writing), by refusing to assign to the text, (and to the world-as-text) a “secret,” i.e. an ultimate meaning, liberates an activity we may call countertheological, properly revolutionary, for to refuse to halt meaning is finally to refuse God and his hypostases, reason, science, and the law. [Boldface and italics emphasis mine.] (54)

In a global culture of diverse languages and literacies, and in a culture of colonial modern Western literacy, as Barthian work, where the word in its printed register has replaced oral transmission of tradition, (journeyman to apprentice for example,) by means of the primacy of author-ity, intellectual property, (instruction through the textbook) and the exclusiveness (and widespread inclusiveness as more and more of the demos learns to read, and read more widely) granted the lecto-scripted Western tradition that Barthes describes as it emerges as “work,” “text” emerges nevertheless as an alternative still well ensconced in the same Western lecto-scripted tradition that “work” is found, except that it is the conditions that limit their apprehension, that is the Western field of “history of ideas,” “philosophy” or “epistemology” that limit what “the work” may do in the (methodological) field of the world as text. Text emerges out of the same Western field but finds difference as opposed to traditional Western “ontological” and “epistemological” identity, finds the field as intertextuality as opposed to what I have called the continuous mythological arc of Western civilization, in a word, finds difference itself as the escape from the predatory designs of identity-making through the Western self.

Barthes proposes a “countertheological, properly revolutionary” program in that instead of the pre-scribed definition of the word by means of the procedures of modern Western knowing, especially typified in Kant and Hegel, the metaphysical Subject and its hypostases which,

---

28 A good example of this is Herbert Marcuse’s *Eros and Civilization*, where he aligns Eros with the pleasure principle, and work and the reality principle with Thanatos, the death instinct, proposing a libidinal reality principle coincident with having overcome need, via the Hegelian dialectic, where need is sublated. Marcuse, Herbert. *Eros and Civilization: a Philosophical Inquiry into Freud*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1955.
legitimize the predominance of Concept, all, but especially the disembodied monad that the
critical tradition signals is the human, all who are susceptible to this Western languaging practice
may provisionally counter this predominance by means of textifying and bringing difference and
the plurality of intertextuality into play. The “Subject” is the languaging choice made by the
instantiations of privilege governing in modern colonial Western societies whether through
public or private institutional governing position. However, while everyone may be susceptible
to othering, there seems to insistently be an overseeing Subject, the governing Subject(s), while
all other subjects may be submitted to forms of indoctrination appropriated from previous
practices re-confected, such as, apprenticeship which becomes mentorship, religious instruction
which becomes higher education, moral guidance which becomes what Barthes calls doxa or
public opinion, remembrance of the past and the form that embraces the meanings it is given as
myth, which becomes History, ethical governing projections into the future, become state policy
or “reasons of state,” and in capitalist societies, state policy is often responsive to “necessary”
capitalist market speculation, and listening and playing or communication become “consuming
the work---” translationally and comparatively.

As During suggests while confronting post-colonial theory and post-modern theorization
of language, this Barthian post-modern languaging project may serve only to stall the death
warrant inherent in the traditional Western languaging practices that assert that Language is equal
to itself, and that there is no residue whatsoever. The residue that ensues after (Barthian)
difference is at play could be said to stand in for the plurality of languages that interweave and
whose difference, one from another is an afterlife produced by translation, which proves in the
methodological field of text that language is never equal to itself, nor are languages ever equal to
one another, that is, cannot give mathematical equivalencies between words in one language, and
another, let alone from one language to another. What is more, as During points out, one of the
ironies of the post-modern is that it only forestalls the emptying that takes place through a print
capitalism responding to the mathematical imperative toward equality of space and time, but that
post-modernity, like post-colonial society is also keen on apprehending difference, and yet can
only do so as the abstract, difference itself.

[t]he appeal to what is unexchangeable in language is especially tempting under
capitalism, which deals with things and words for their exchange value. (126)

About the post-colonial situation of pre-colonial colonial/post-colonial language, During exposes
what I would call the post-colonial, not as after republican independence, but as the colonial
encounter which will traverse the colonial and republican periods in the Regions of Americas in
the field of language, or the world as text, or the field of textuality:
Pre-colonial language shelters all the particularity elided over by colonial stereotyping, by modernist valorization of the primitive and by anthropology. In return, as identical to itself, national language excludes the web of contacts, the play of sameness and difference which weave one society into another. It does so in having the advantage that it is not unique. (127)

It is uncertain whether the Barthian practice safeguards the modern Western tradition’s Other from consumption in all its variations through transience and the plurality of meanings--, of others--; however, the aftermath, the residue, or what Barthes calls what “cannot be repeated except as difference itself” may be that fragment found at this limit of the Western field where a change can be effected, an alter-native can be found through our co-creating the world as it gives itself as text and as we listen and play it. Regarding the post-colonial literary writer, During suggests that as s/he writes, the vicissitudes of traditional national Western vernacular print languages will overwhelm the project of decolonization—unless this Barthian difference is deployed, unless the residue turns into the place for play—we can conclude, much more optimistically than During. The traditional Western national, international, and globalized languaging practices taking place, especially in English, do construct a far reaching form of denial of the Other, of difference, whereby the emptiness produced by this Western traditional language practice and its ultimately failed communicative promise through dialogical or dialectical procedures is not even stalled, but is rather in the process of total consumption, or what many have called a global–fill in the blank--crisis. The crisis is first of all, a crisis of meaning, a crisis of language, and a crisis of symbolic release not taking place adequately due to the afflicting and oppressive nature of this Western colonial encounter. This denial of the counterpart to the Subject, not only in Hegelian dialectic, whose metaphors Master and Slave are translations of Subject and Other respectively, but also in the Kantian project of “understanding” or “cognition” through the “faculty of reason,” where all things perceived, cognitively “represented” and through specific “mental” procedures “understood” are Other to the Subject willing to know and “capture” these cognitive representations, that is consume them, for its-self.

Barthes’ musician/listener/reader and musical instrument/musician/writer produces the movement of text from one meaning to an other meaning, from note to note, just as in the Barthian “stroll,” this traversal being the mode through which the comparative difference

29 I am borrowing this play on the word alternative, from a journal by the name AlterNative, An International Journal of Indigenous Peoples: www.alternative.ac.nz/

30 When comparing Indian, New England, Australian or Irish English, During points to the difference that is in play between and among them, but also points to their proximity to the language of power, this English that engulfs its other slightly differing variation in that this language of power, globally performs for all English variations what the national language achieves as emptiness and fallen (print and cybernetic) language.
between words, becomes the difference that cannot be repeated except as difference. The opening of this possibility in language is effected at a threshold where the labor, the work of the concept of reason and history has stopped and the gap as a lapse in this conceptual work and the possibility of textual play commences. This lapse in the activity of conceptual work that fixes this work in one time and one place, that is, in abstract relations of space and time that collapse space into time--- produces this gap---, after the facts are said and done. This gap produces a plurality of meanings: endless traversals, re-quotations and re-citations from within the methodological field of intertextuality within the text. The gap, it would seem, cannot commence until the enslaved other, the factual work of the enslaved word ends, not necessarily by being consumed, though this is also the goal of the totalizing project on hand, but because the work has stopped: it has become fixed. Making it fixed may not be consuming it, but it does fix the work of this enslaved word within the confines of one meaning, one Western archive, and one totalizing project, at the same time. Given the meandering movement of text, entwined as we find it among the linguistic fields of work also, for example the disciplinary discourses of history and law, where relative to the law, history may seem to have more play, and given that the world as text gives us not only a way to read the world, but the very textured dimensions of its reality, it is possible that the gap may be less a gap, and more a cessation through fixity, and less an open space in between, than the way a fold might conceal the way a textile curves into itself only to unfurl on the other side as more of the same. Theoretically it should be possible to release the words, the sentences, and the story of a work from bondage, if given a proper misreading. At the same time, the possibility of text burrows in the folds of the field of the work where and when the monumental works of the tradition in all their fixity dipped into the gap for inspiration, an inspiration that rings like cadent music that the reader can hum to. The gap would not have to lead then to textuality, necessarily, except that in that one freeing move, you could contemplate one other meaning, other than the one that is the property of the author that wrote it and whose equivalency with its word is not only total, but completely fulfills the word, that is, the subject to whom it belongs entirely. Just one move away from the Western tradition’s anxious search for certainty is the Barthian joy of uncertainty. Of course, there is the impossibility of either total fulfillment or total equivalency, and there is also, the emptiness left in the wake of fleeting meanings. Both languaging practices are Western and both are ensconced in this colonial encounter.

The field of Western languaging practices, the work’s practice and the text’s practice admits of both possibilities as it curves and unfolds, as the mantle with which we cover the world in language may help us feel embraced, as well as exposed: how fragile the connection between a
daunting and mighty planetary nature relative to our small creaturely stature, and what a frightful turn the West took in attempting that “man” dominate such an awesome and moving power. The “work” is by its turn keen on “understanding” the world, and the “text” is by its turn away from the work’s “understanding,” keen on sensually and playfully co-producing with the world, veritably dancing to its music and its flow, nostalgic for the matter at the heart of things, and not the essence: in recreating the flow and the movement of something absconded from the devouring Self, the Other that is matter, body, all things, including our “selves” as they take their turn at being “other” Barthes hopes to rescue us, and especially the body from this bondage. However, this shared concern for the world is worth deconstructing. Both “work” and “text” emerge our of the same Western field, a shared abode, a shared field of practice, which the work calls being, or ontological, a field of and for knowing, that the work calls “epistemological,” and for both, the shared field of a “methodological” tracking of footsteps, in and through language, or as the etymology of “method” tells us it is “a way” that “cedes,” and with which we concede what the way shows or proves is in the field as search or re-search. The consequences for the world, of one languaging practice compared to an other are decisive.

The work stymies, fixes, and relegates—as much as it dominates, totalizing everything that is alive-- in its image, --for its image, --by its image, its image called the Self. It may just be the case, that the other narrowly escapes, or it may just be that text stages an interaction between writer and reader though which a co-production that revives things takes a provisional place, inhabited long enough to release them from the bondage of Western traditional knowledge practices. It is probable that it is both a narrow escape from the operations of ideolect chasing the operations of text, in the field of Western language, as much as it may be, that at the limits of the modern Western field of knowing, and because language is not what the Western tradition would determine that it is, it in a matter of multiple others being co-produced in the flow of a language that still rustles with com-passion, where the reader and the writer co-produce these others, these things, poetic utterances that escape capture. In the methodological field of the world as text it may be that both are at work. Narrow escape, or to translate the co-production of others that rustles with compassion, we have what I will call for the moment, comparatively and translationally, a poetic practice emerging out of the textual field, by definition a collective field, a collection of all cultures, utterances, citations, references, languages, idioms, imaginaries—all the metaphors the West uses to explain the depository of a tradition. Symbolic release of collective

Etymology of “method” : “Middle English, prescribed treatment, from Latin methodus, from Greek methodos, from meta- + hodos way.”
http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/method?show=0&t=1285258563
propulsions: the admission by writers divested of the totalitarian notion of author and Self that a
collective speaks through them. It is no wonder that the Aztec statesman was also a poet, and that
disputes in the Middle East were and are resolved by poetic combat, and that this practice also
resolved disagreement in medieval Europe.

Barthes suggests, notwithstanding, that this compactness of ideolectal transmission
through multiple media effects the transmission of this modern Western identity intent on
consuming all others in the density of the one ideological message, meant in the Althusserian\textsuperscript{32}
sense. This dense and compacted transmission of the tradition is a collapse of the difference he
describes in the passage I transcribe above, as difference itself. In other words, the Western
tradition grants, firstly, that you may compare for identity, but not for difference, but secondly,
you cannot discern in the engulfing consumption of the Western traditional ideolect, difference
itself for its has been consumed.\textsuperscript{33} This collapse of difference itself into the oppressive monolith
of a vast network and means of invading and prevailing in both the private and public sector,
whereby the law of the state such as we’ve described it above, disciplines and ordains as a
peculiarly Western knowledge system that prevails over all other possibility, alternative, or
plurality, and decisively, over all difference is what Barthes decries. This is yet another turning
point in the theoretitization of the methodological field of text: it revives difference itself,
interestingly, in the abstract terms that the western tradition speaks in. The things encountered on
the stroll are only apprehendable because of this difference and not because of what they may—
do. The monologism Barthes decries is the outcome of the individual, privileged as an author and
an authority, whose essence and origin are the same and equally controlled by a religion of “the
one,” to put it succinctly. Viewed from the methodological field of world as text, the traditional
Western knowledge practice of producing the work that suppresses all difference totally---
socially suppresses the other in the reductive illiteracy of social body, the social body doesn’t
speak and cannot be read, and politically represses the other beneath the stratification that grants
esoteric literacy to the ruling class and doxical literacy to its citizens, the elite can trans-pose and
trans-late the breathed word of the dead, in order to guide the masses.

In the textual field of language whose structure has no center, no origin, and no end, the
Barthian textual program proves real the possibility and the reality of an animated and flowing

\textsuperscript{32} See especially Louis Althusser’s book, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, New York: Monthly
Review Press, 1971
\textsuperscript{33} One is reminded of the post World War Two trauma which precipitated the creation of the discipline of
Comparative Literature on the European continent, where the imperative to find identity became the
prevailing impulse for research given the rift between and among nations that were unable, not surprisingly,
and in accord to this analysis of the colonial encounter, to find common ground.
co-production of meaning between reader and writer which also intimates that this movement is not only resuscitation, but a kind of corporeality: the hand that writes and the ears that listen, the hands that play the flute, and the listener who sings along---unlike at any other moment because he knows the words: he has tuned in to bodily need, his mind is therefore toned, is the implication. Western language practices that produce “the work” suppress the possibility that elides the dictum of “the one,” and that permits from the gap between words or signs, comparatively between Self and Other, translationally between writer and reader, the sensual and compassionate play which proves that what is there in the methodological field of text requires two: the writer and the reader creating the world-as-text. Comparatively and translationally the difference between one word and another word, between self and other, and between the self and the world is a productive difference, a creative engagement, a co-production of something never sensed before: this is poetic practice: engaging the other from the gap, becoming other to the other from the gap, coproducing meanings together. To play this way instead of conceptualize the ways that we have been taught to “execute the text,” releases its mellifluous possibilities, the possibility of movement that is body, and not concept. The simplicity of Barthes’ stroll in the park, his meditation transcribed through a surrender to the stereophony that entered through his senses exemplifies this textual play taking place between the world as text and its reader. All things apprehended in stereophony on this stroll were part of the revivification of difference, and this difference approximated an embodiment through the listener’s senses, and all things apprehended this way received equal play, stones included.
Part I. Reading Quechua from the Western field: delimiting the critical Western theoretical field comparatively and translationally: the pre-liminary problem of Quechua translation, Western colonial encounter, and the nature of things/the things of nature

Chapter 2: Reading the intersession between a Quechua and a Western field through Foucauldian genealogy and archaeology: discontinuity, the event, and chance: the field in motion, the motion picture, social movement and the evasion of the colonial encounter

Reading the stone with Foucault...

Having found with Barthes a turn that would conform a Western field, we turn to Foucault and especially to the tasks of genealogy and archaeology which he describes at some length, especially in the following two, and even three writings, compiled variously. For the section on genealogy, following, all the citations come from “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” published originally in 1971, and recovered in the compilation entitled The Foucault Reader, edited by Paul Rabinow and published in 1984 by Random House. It is noteworthy that this compilation is published in the year Foucault died, especially in that the “reader/textbook” is an instrumentalization of his work in the interest of the transmission of the tradition he strove indefatigably to interrupt. For the section on archaeology, all the citations come from the compilation, The Archaeology of Knowledge & The Discourse on Language, the latter title is a separate écrit appended to the preceding work, The Archaeology of Knowledge. I am especially keen on searching with Foucault for the field of the Western “history of ideas” which is what Foucault calls what is traditionally termed, the philosophical subfield of “epistemology,” but also, “philosophy” and “history.” In order to stand at a distance from this tradition, Foucault will not only describe the tradition in terms other than its own, but he will also devise tasks that may in their deployment begin to conform a sort of systematization of a way to read and re-search the Western tradition, especially to discern its boundaries: its inclusions, its exclusions, its rules, its taboos, the themes, as he calls them, and mechanisms that have suppressed—chance---and the

---

possibility that language, knowledge, and action have a materiality that unleashes powerful forces, and a relationship to one another that precisely, defies fixity.

It is also concomitantly concerned, hence the appendix, with how the task of the historian can attain to this force, discursively, and how then, the Marxian “mutation,” as Foucault terms the Marxian turn effected upon “the history of ideas,” can be pushed further toward a real and material history, as opposed to the Hegelian history of spirit, to the point, “history of ideas.” It is with these notions that these sections will query concerning the lifelessness or not of the stone, as we move nearer to the intercession between Western and Quechua fields. The concern here remains, as we listen to Barthes along the Foucauldian way also, comparatively: what or who speaks and is this metaphorically Foucauldian enunciation embodied in some material way, and how might this materiality imply the social body, and can it or does this imply that the stone speaks? The legibility of the remains at Ranchi is not questionable from the disciplinary perspective of Archaeology, in turn from within the Western field’s purview. That the Western archaeologist, by tradition, gains a literacy whereby he reads the archaeological field, within which there is a material dig to decipher, and instruments with which to measure and dissect is also a given from the Western field. What is in question is rather, whether the stone has a language that it speaks, whether the stone is animate, that is, alive by the Western disciplinary definition of life, the tradition that would have that the stone is inanimate, more at fixed and at the disposal of the knower to be dominated.

For yet another materialist revival, alongside Barthes’, we are also indebted to yet another re-searcher, namely Michel Foucault, yet another reader of Nietzsche’s The Gay Science, of Nietzsche’s treatment of what Nietzsche termed the genealogy of morals. In the field of Western thought, Foucault’s predilect metaphor construes the Western tradition as a tradition that fixes its relics, as ideas, ideas so unmovable and staid that they become a stone, the monumental foundation of Western thought, for Foucault’s métier in the field of language he delimits, he names archaeology. The metaphor’s heuristic value for us is that it signals the monumentality of memory conserved, made staid by the edifice of a tradition built upon it. Foucault searches, “self-consciously” re-searching, exploring as he encounters and describing the palimpsests of “rock” that have made Western tradition a fixed matter, he concludes, by means of three fundamental impositions, or three fundamentals in one peculiarly Western, domineering position: 1.) “the subject” as the origin of all consciousness and action, 2.) “universality” as origin and rule, and 3.) the notions of continuity, development, and ultimate totalization or fulfillment, and its attendant notion or theme of “identity,” expressed as the imperative for oneness or sameness.
Genealogy: re-search through Foucault’s reading or finding Foucauldian literacy: translating the stone with genealogy

Re-search as genealogy is practiced as a reading, a literacy peculiarly Foucauldian in that it departs from the common meanings of the Western tradition, to find an other kinship of one thing to another at this site for which an origin cannot be certain, but from which this practice of enunciation he terms discourse constructs knowledge relies. This interdisciplinary metaphor, genealogy, situates the researcher at the crossroads of the metaphor of archaeology and biological anthropology discovering as its new object discourse. The practice of genealogy searches the monumentality and fixity of the Western tradition’s edifice, as it is written, and in this sense, re-cited, in an important way, comparatively arriving at something resembling Barthian Text.

Genealogy is gray, meticulous, and patiently documentary. It operates on a field of entangled and confused parchments, on documents that have been scratched over and recopied many times. (Foucault 139)

What is decisive however, and what recalls Barthes is that this recitation is given the tense of the present, and therefore moves, albeit Foucault in this sense plays the documents of the past, as if they were musical instruments, by means of procedures which in their combination devise practices from the tradition of Western scholarship intended to disrupt it, to encounter the way that permits these documents to intimate how they once moved, and what passions moved them. The Foucauldian project intends to find, in other words, how the rock has moved, archaeology, and how in that movement people have in turn been moved, (biological) anthropology: this is the genealogy of morals Foucault traces. It seeks to find the customary practices that have moved people in accord or not to the movements of the “natural” world, animate or inanimate conceived, that is, what Nietzsche’s translators have called morality and what we may call customary, traditional, or institutionalized practices, which at this point are all translationally found on the same traversal. Genealogy is in this Nietzschean sense tracing the history of morality, in a way drawn to the details that betray movement and not the stagnation of the fixity of tradition, thereby permitting us a glimpse, a limited but linguistically available access to the sensations that moved people to receive, reject, accommodate, transform the morality that moved through their times. In this sense, and in the field of language such as Foucault follows it, while listening to Nietzsche and others, he writes:

[I]t…was wrong to follow the English tendency in describing the history of morality in terms of a linear development—in reducing its entire history and genesis to an exclusive concern for utility. [This approach] assumed that words had kept their meaning, that desires still pointed in a single direction, and that ideas retained their logic; and […] ignored the fact that the world of speech and desires has known invasions, struggles, plunderings, disguises, ploys. From
these elements, however, genealogy retrieves an indispensable restraint: it must record the singularity of events outside of any monotonous finality; it must seek them in the most unpromising places, in what we tend to feel is without history—in sentiments, love, conscience, instincts; it must be sensitive to their recurrence, not in order to trace the gradual curve of their evolution, but to isolate the different scenes where they engaged in different roles. (139-140) [underlined emphasis mine]

In the following remarks Foucault intimates what the nature of language may be if it is to yield this clearing where the passions that move escape their fixity in Western tradition, thereby permitting the Foucauldian historian a glimpse at the real people who are at play, and who, moved by passions reveal the morality that bound them, engendering comparative relationships with this morality. In this sense, as Lacan submitted, beyond the satisfaction of need, there is desire, and it is this passion that contended with the order of morality, or what he called the symbolic order that is sought, which is what the Foucauldian genealogist seeks in the present that once was. In these traces of passion, the field of the entangled parchments of the past are found through this reading to yield a history that proves itself real, to continue in a Lacanian vein, and thereby brings this reading to this scene of Foucauldian animation, where sentiment, desire, emotion prove what morality was exercised here. Genealogy is as endless as the metaphor that gathers its practice: the archeological dig may never yield all its elements, nor the movement that linked them, and disjointed them, and the sites are innumerable in that language and the past remain an open field.

The practitioner and his practice in this field is described by Foucault as follows:

Genealogy, consequently, requires patience and a knowledge of details and it depends on a vast accumulation of source material. Its “cyclopedian monuments” are constructed from “discreet and apparently insignificant truths and according to a rigorous method”; they cannot be the product of “large and well meaning errors.” In short, genealogy demands relentless erudition. [Foucault quotes Nietzsche.] (140)

Not accidentally, Nietzsche inspires the search for text, as the metaphor quoted out of The Gay Science instructs poetically how to find a way out of the tradition: “cyclopedian monuments” stand out as the one eyed, repetitively circular education, paideia, as the eternal recurrence of the same morality fixed in this institution, as Castoriadis would call it, this traditional Western monumentality revealing nothing of the passions that the textual field proves moved people in the past. This repeated and same memory of tradition may become discernible through a vision that has two eyes, rather, Foucauldian eyes that seek the detail, the full-bodied tension, the affect that moves against the tradition that might repress it, making this morality visible, as what it did, comparatively: the idea is found, through this re-search, this traversal, by way of what the body does in response to it. But the project does not end here. In opposition to that fixity of Western
tradition when it treats with its own written story, that is with history, Foucault goes further to suggest that a particular notion of language must be at play in order to release the passions that are what is critical about following the history of morality for late twentieth century Westerners who recover the Nietzschean project:

> Genealogy does not oppose itself to history as the lofty and profound gaze of the philosopher might compare to the molelike perspective of the scholar; on the contrary, it rejects the metahistorical deployment of ideal significations and indefinite teleologies. It opposes itself to the search for origins. (140)

It is this sheer incommensurability of the past, the very undecidability of its origin, or the impossibility of beginning again, as Barthes would put it, which places the Foucauldian historian, metaphorically, the genealogist of morals, another word for historian, translationally, before this contrast between the ideas, what is pronounced as law, or what is hushed while the disruptive events unleashed reveal the rule they resist, the symbolic order repressing. The Foucauldian reader is still, observant, rigorously attentive to the details, to the movements of passions and affect, the footsteps that help her traverse the field of this vast textuality to see what really happened in the textual narrating the past, “the past” of the textual field that is written. It is the ultimately undecidable possibility of their respective projects, Barthes’, Foucault’s, which in my view makes them ever more lively, ever more near the ability of the writer and the reader to achieve an interplay that conjures ludic, three dimensional, corporeal conversations in the present moment, *with the past of what has been written*. In deed, the devil may be in the details, the plurality that would disseminate a plethora of *intercessions* and *intersessions*, minutely wrought by the gaps from which difference would make itself felt as a rustle, as this distinctive propulsion moving people contrapuntally alongside a tradition so recalcitrantly opposed to affect, passions, and creativity, let alone re-creativity—so stubbornly opposed to what is free and what it cannot devour for its-self. Barthian play inheres in the genealogical search, and finding play we find the way that morality, symbolic repression, did not hold sway entirely and in doing so, we find the human, the all too human (Nietzsche) in the world of the past, animated and real.

**Archaeology: re-search through Foucault’s writing or Foucauldian literacy transcribed:**

translating the stone with Foucauldian archaeology or finding the stray and unexplained shard, the stone wedged between Being, the concept, and beings, those susceptible to experience, to life, now and then…. (The pun is intended.) From the gap to the shard…. In addressing the possibility of writing a different history, what Foucault calls a “general history” accounting for “series of series,” or in other words “what ‘tables’ it is possible to draw up”—when discerning convergences, divergences, relations, “what vertical system [these series] are capable of forming,” “what interplay of correlation and dominance exists between” series, “in
what distinct totalities certain elements may figure simultaneously,” in addressing this new
possibility of writing a history that departs from the tradition, Foucault deconstructs identity,
sameness, and the tradition’s deep anxiety regarding discontinuity—and difference. The
“epistemological mutation” in the Western tradition willing to address discontinuity, which he
tells us can be traced back to Marx, is not yet complete, nor has it been completed, though
Foucault submits that at least in linguistics this mutation has been reflected upon. It is in the field
of history that he traces the most profound reluctance to face discontinuity, history being what re-
marks upon ideas, in the following way:

It is as if it was particularly difficult, in the history in which men retrace their
own ideas and their own knowledge, to formulate a general theory of
discontinuity, of series, of limits, unities, specific orders, and differentiated
autonomies and dependencies. As if, in that field where we had become used to
seeking origins, to pushing back further and further the line of antecedents,…we
felt a particular repugnance to conceiving of difference, to describing separations
and dispersions, to dissociating the reassuring form of the identical. (12)
[underlined emphasis mine.]

But let’s pause to observe how Foucault describes the field of-- the history of ideas--, for this is
his preoccupation, and in deed it is his focus throughout an extensive project that will concern
him, for the rest of his, one hesitates to say, scholarly career. How this history may be written,
and what may sway language into the way of this particularly important discourse could become
the interminable project for generations of scholars to come. There is a Foucauldian way of
systematizing this search for this Western genealogy through the practice of archaeology, through
specific and rigorously operationalized principles, which through this métier that exercises a
necessary comparison, difference may be dislodged. Digging through the field of “references,
citations, and stereotypes” to borrow from Barthes, could be endless without this systematized dig
that yields new insight through comparison, just as my comparison here, between Barthes and
Foucault furthers our inquiry into Western knowledge systems and the question of the body,
matter, as well as spirit, and animation. Comparison as we shall see is intrinsic to the
systematization that Foucault will deploy to unearth from its staid burial in Western
monumentality, the mausoleum pronouncing its revered past, that is, its burial in unquestioned
authority and institutionality. The new histories sought and wrought through this Foucauldian
archaeological practice rely upon comparison as a critical mechanism whereby we can begin to
discern what moved people in the past to be tied down or unbound, or how, the way is always
wrought with both, though the West would enthrone only one.
There is according to Foucault, what I would call a centrifugal and centripetal effect that concerns historians, both traditional and Foucauldian, and that is *discontinuity*. It is centrifugal in the Western tradition being conserved, even today, and centripetal in the impulse and the energy that Foucault would have discontinuity unleash in the new histories that must be written in order to throw off the impositions that petrify it. As he describes the uneasily discerned comingling of discontinuity, both with the traditional practices of the history of ideas and particularly with its imperative toward continuity, and the notion of discontinuity Foucauldian history writing might operationalize, he tells us this:

> The notion of discontinuity is a paradoxical one: because it is both an instrument and an object of research; because it divides up the field of which it is the effect; because it enables the historian to individualize different domains but can be established only by comparing those domains. And because, in the final analysis, perhaps, it is not simply a concept present in the discourse of the historian, but something that the historian secretly supposes to be present: on what basis in fact, could he speak without this discontinuity that offers him history—and his own history—as an object? [9] [underline emphasis mine]

One might conclude, as I am, that this intimation is intrinsic to the practice of the writing of history, its ethos, both because of the activity it portends, and the portent the activity delivers—, not because of “the fragment of substance” the “work” will become, nor necessarily because of the textuality the work may engender, but rather, because of the effect of its activity upon not only the writer, but the reader, and the institutions that will address it, the deciding factor in its reception being the register of difference—the register of *discontinuity* acceptable to this discursive audience. Let’s pause again to permit Foucault to elaborate further on how this new history emerging out of the field of the history of ideas of his time has appropriated the radical notion of discontinuity—especially in that this tradition is yet so invested in continuity and identity, the “pawns” Foucault might warn us, for repetition and sameness of institutionality, morality, and a symbolic repression sustaining traditions which don’t permit alteration—fearfully—, albeit the pawns legitimized and draped in laurels:

> One of the most essential features of the new history is probably this displacement of the discontinuous: its transference from the obstacle [to continuous histories] to the work [of history] itself; its integration into the discourse of the historian, where it no longer plays the role of an external condition that must be reduced, but that of a working concept; and therefore the inversion of signs by which it is no longer the negative of the historical reading (its underside, its failure, the limit of its power), but the positive element that determines its object and validates its analysis. (ibid)

---

A vicissitude, for this “new historian” who embraces discontinuity, avowing, perhaps, the discontinuity that would make it possible for him to discern ‘the event within the story’ in the first place, a story that is not his own as soon as it is written; this new historian encounters a danger when deploying discourse about discourse, or when he beholds his own finitude, his own discontinuity, uncelebrated and without laurels, avowing his inability, as discontinuity instructs, ever to be able to fulfill the dream of oneness, of total identity with the other. Or uncannily, beholding the discontinuity that would make of his own story, just another story, for to write it, he must become separate, discontinuous from all that makes it, into whatever it may be. Discontinuity makes his story other, a thing outside himself that he may behold, and that was always different from him, separated from him through the lacunae of discontinuity. The historian must decide, “new” or archaeological, what to cite, what to describe, what to include, and what to exclude, more or less aware, more or less desirous to be aware, for ours is a society not only with a will to truth, at play in a vast discursive field, but the historian in particular is poised vertiginously on the boundary between his own story and the history he may write. The two poles which draw the historian may be described as the reassuring monumentality of continuity and the relative horror of what is uncontrollable, what is by definition, out of his reach altogether: discontinuity. Can or should the historian surrender to discontinuity? Is it possible, as Foucault’s re-search implies, that even what we observe will not let “itself” be tamed, and the rock will speak its own language, in spite of me, or you, or him or us or her? Whether you are “a new historian,” Foucault himself, or me, the danger from within or at the limit, wherever Foucault may have found himself, for he may have been in the thick of a discursive ensemble, rigorously obtaining to his three primary objectives for archéology: “to question our will to truth” such as the tradition defines it, I must add; “to restore to discourse its character as an event; [and] to abolish the sovereignty of the signifier,” (229) the danger would remain this discontinuity, in accord with this Western tradition’s anxiety, a discontinuity which as Barthes instructs is that gap from which play begins, where the reader produces the text with the writer, or where the writer surrenders him-self to the written, and language wins the contest over totalization, leaving us this provisional sign that the writer “lets” the reader decide, may be this or that, and where language cannot be contained.

Or perhaps, you, or I, or “a historian” could just as tentatively be formulating a discourse that would accomplish these, shall we face it, daunting objectives, with discourse, not as an instrument, but as a conduit that flows away, that flows against, that barges into enclaves unexpected, unforeseen, and yet always already there. And is this archaeological historian willing, or is it a matter of surrender, to pay the price of outright condemnation, of discipline and
punishment, for his outrageous dereliction of conventional duty, for flouting the current morality? Or does the new historian dissipate his tribulations before discontinuity, his deep unease, feigning a fearlessness in the face of “the monstrosity” Western modernity has effectively evaded for some five hundred years? In Foucault’s case, you may face the risk of having to confront a public that makes its repudiation felt in a society where an intellectual is public, such as French society. To wit, here is Foucault, comme il s’exprime, as he expresses himself, or perhaps we would rather say, as he enunciates about his own discourse on the discourse of the history of [Western] ideas, on finding himself within the ensembles of discourse that he has encountered in his traversal, those that traverse the field of the history of ideas, but that show their character, so to speak, in the angular re-association which Foucault’s archaeological practice proves real:

…I have tried to define this blank space from which I speak, and which is slowly taking shape in a discourse that I still feel to be precarious and so unsure. (17)

You could say that this text rustles with undecidability, with, lo and behold, uncertainty.

Apart from our terrifying and inviolable separation, our discontinuity, in the West described, that is, structured as the separation between being and Being, a single unit taming discontinuity, and even between beings and Being, or between Self and Other, or between matter and spirit—creating a dominating machine that will tame discontinuity. The tradition strives mightily to master discontinuity, because it cannot see it as a source of regeneration, of re-creation, and engendering. Instead, it proposes to will its taming through these concepts structured within an abstract box of occurrence, willing a truth that is so contrived that its symbolic repression is literally killing us and the world we live in. “The promise of fulfillment” held in the abstract by these truths we will to be through an identitary necromantic machine deploying these meanings and procedures these concepts that commandeer, within that fury that is the Western tradition that envelops us, or blindfolds us, or underlines our discontinuity as it obsessively suppresses it, so anxious has it become to Be continuous, One and the Same---so anxious has it become to bring all that it has “lost” through discontinuity unto its Self that it has constructed a colonial encounter everywhere reproduced, so deeply entrenched in the perceptual horizon of the West that it has become its burning consumption. Rather than view the lacunae of discontinuity as possibility, the colonial encounter edified to tame it and to return all things lost to the self-- would tame and devour all others bringing them in full and total identity with the Self. Quite apart from our terror and our mighty penchant to suppress what terrifies us, what about discourse is this discontinuity that must be suppressed, must be prohibited, limited or excluded? To point to where this particularly Western series of events begins, the impulse for it being fear, Foucault explains that
ever since “the activity and commerce of the sophists,” --- “their paradoxes were muzzled, more or less securely,” ---

it would seem that Western thought has seen to it that discourse be permitted as little room as possible between thought and words. It would appear to have ensured that to discourse should appear merely as a certain interjection between speaking and thinking; that it should constitute thought, clad in its signs and rendered visible by words or, conversely, that the structures of language themselves should be brought into play, producing a certain effect of meaning.

(227)

To explain this yet decisive, yet strained enjoining, this strained play for unity, what is, by comparison to the paradoxes with which the sophists thrived a limitation, an exclusion, and a restriction, Foucault explains that it is discourse-- as event— as enunciation here and now, and now and then---that is being suppressed, and it is the signifier which is granted sovereignty to determine what is meant by what is said, in consonance for example with the fundamentalist move of devising a dictionary, or an *encyclopedia*, where *the continuity of meaning and knowledge are sought*. It is this enthroning of the Western concept, the Western word, so to speak that quite simply thwarts what moves, what tips discourse into action, what the tradition calls thought, tied to the word. Stated in terms that speak to the field of “the history of ideas,” and even the discipline, and in some measure, almost all disciplines, he states that the “elision of the reality of discourse” takes on the guise of “themes” which still persist today:

Whether it is [1] a philosophy of a founding subject, [2] a philosophy of originating experience, or [3] a philosophy of universal mediation, discourse is really only an activity, of writing in the first case, of reading in the second, and of exchange in the third. [These activities] never involve anything but signs. Discourse thus nullifies itself, in reality, in placing itself at the disposal of the signifier. (228) [underlined emphasis mine]

Foucault attributes these “taboos” to a “profound logophobia,”:

a sort of dumb fear of these events, of this mass of spoken things, of everything that could possibly be violent, discontinuous, querulous, disordered even and perilous in it, of the incessant, disorderly buzzing of discourse [which frightens us.] (229)

Wherein according to Foucault, again, the agenda for the *archaeological history* to be written, is “to question our will to truth; to restore to discourse its character as a an event; to abolish the sovereignty of the signifier.”

In deconstructing the activity that reverences discourse’s sovereignty as signifier, a purported Western “logophilia,” Foucault describes the Western logocentric project in the following way with regard to the history this tradition writes, again, describing the consequences
feared, were it to be otherwise. The reversal Foucault proposes runs counter to this fear as it is expressed here when he describes what may be at work in the continuous, subject-centered Western historian, unable to a-scribe to his object, to the other, his own anxiety, thereby avowing that the time of the other is the same as his own, if only because what he does share with the other is discontinuity and all that it unleashes, and all that it procures if its effects are accepted, let alone regarded. According to our theorists, the real that has been proven through the very act of commencing the story—by writing it, telling it, reporting it—is that-- without this discontinuity--, the re-searcher, the person desirous or needing to know, must become in this way radically other to himself through the activity, by means of the traversal that is writing whose effect is a surrender to the other, in order to know, and even to be, harmoniously, not too big, not too little. The writing of history, any story is thus characterized: writing begins where we end and the other begins. Stated another way, language or discourse begins where we end and others begin; where what is other begins, we are without language: for the historian this other is his écrit and the others de-scribed here commences her traversal in such a way that her character is proven real: she is in the time of the historian. This discontinuity gives the difference that renders everything distinct--, etymologically: by being pricked becoming separate, and somehow urged to move--and in moving encountering the other: our own discontinuity that permits us to begin writing this difference, as other. This is how I get to know you.

Our “object of study” de-scribed, that is, as what proves to be real in the Foucauldian theoretical field that is written as other, and at the same time, what proves that what is other than our self is there: this is the rupture from the Western practice of fulfilling the identity of the self through the “others” who return to the self: that other that is there, cannot be the self: the event is the possibility for there to be an event out there: I surrender to the place you occupy fully, surrendering to the pain of our discontinuity, which is the only way I can know you. The act or event of writing, to bring Barthes and Foucault into a comparative and translational practice permits text and discourse a freedom from the self which had not hitherto been theorized, and gives language a status that in Barthes’ case returns to it-- its symbolic force, in the moment, responsive to one reader’s symbolic body, but with a needed release from this symbolic repression---airy, intermittent symbolic order---which because of this and the return of movement, simulates the re-turn of the body. In Foucault’s case, this deconstruction of Western logo-philiac discourse releases language from the grip of the signifier through the discursive event that may be written or spoken but which yields this effect: the other, in discontinuity, finds itself inextricably linked to the present of the one speaking or writing, not by a force, and not forcefully, but entirely de-pendently: we hang in the balance between us, in the balance afforded
the prolific lacunae, in this way, together, albeit discontinuously. In this way, the speaker and the
writer share the abode of the other, completing together the task of language traversing them
radically, that is, in a time hitherto not theorized other than as play or sacred (symbolic) time,
sharing the abode of the field that makes possible this (interdisciplinary) (anachronic) exchange
permitting us a real glimpse at the other: eventful, corporeal, meaningful. This is not equality or
sameness as mathematics or the philosophy of identity would halve it, the Western history of
ideas would have it, and halve it as colonial encounter. The cut takes place in another way,
proffering another abode, one that may harbor how we tremble with the fear, the hatred or the
love of this discontinuity, this separation, but one that proves itself real, and is proved to be real
any time we may behold discontinuity, with the other. It is this difference, rather, that gives us all
the same place, the same dwelling. It is this fear, hatred or love for the other that pro-poses itself,
as we face the other, and as the other faces us, facing one another in the same way, however
distinct we may be—and offering us a choice. Regarding the choice before the Western historian
and his dilemma concerning discontinuity, Foucault writes:

[“The Western tradition” writes history] as if we found it difficult to construct a
theory, to draw general conclusions, and even derive all the possible implications
of these concepts of thresholds, mutations, independent systems, and limited
series—in the way in which they had been used in fact by historians. As if we
were afraid to conceive of the Other in the time of our own thought.

There is a reason for this. If the history of thought could remain the locus of
uninterrupted continuities, if it could endlessly forge connexions that no analysis
could undo without abstraction, if it could weave, around everything that men say
and do, obscure synthesis that anticipate for him, prepare him, and lead him
endlessly towards his future, it would provide a privileged shelter for the
sovereignty of consciousness. (12)

And finally:

Continuous history is the indispensable correlative of the founding function of
the subject: the guarantee that everything that has eluded him may be restored to
him; the certainty that time will disperse nothing without restoring it in a
reconstituted unity; the promise that one day the subject—in the form of
historical consciousness—will once again be able to appropriate, to bring back
under his sway, all those things that are kept at a distance by difference, and find
in them what might be called his abode. (ibid) [underlined emphasis mine]

The consequence of these preferences and the outcome that the Foucauldian task must disperse is
this:

Making historical analysis the discourse of the continuous and making human
consciousness the original subject of all historical development and all action are
the two sides of the same system of thought. In this system, time is conceived in
terms of totalization and revolutions are never more than moments of
consciousness.
So succinctly does Foucault read the peril of Hegelian thought, the strangeness of this repetitive desire to suppress difference through what Hegel terms “sublation,” so obscurantist a regard do we have for the other, and so odd is the result of the exercise of our “perception” through the edifice of cognition that Kant invents in order that Reason be sovereign, and sovereignly, singularly, and solely the privileged abode of the State and its attendant institutions, including its word. Logophiles and all the inheritors of this history of morals are enamored with the abstract, the concept with the duplicitous “ability” to perform yet another laborious bid for synthesis, unity, identity, by means of a transcendence that dispenses with the other through a representational procedure that takes this represented in a lofty movement into the heavens where proper meanings may be assigned. This critical theoretical turn, Foucault’s, Barthes’ implies, through the comparison made possible by discontinuity, by what can be distinct and other, this critical reading of this Western tradition of knowing tells us rather, that what is devoured in this fearful Western plodding is actually “discontinuity,” that is, what is feared and absconded into a system that must contain it. Perhaps the thing that must make us all tremble-- for fear that we may be “othered”—is that whatever becomes the object of this Western knowing procedure, theoretically all that is other than the subject—will suffer some form of annihilation—as, in effect—what procures its distinction, even its visibility, its sensual availability is all devoured by a Subject that is universally one in that separation, where, discontinuity has been devoured. The concept, in this sense, devours what is other, insisting that its universalizing abstraction can and must encircle and swallow “it,” the other, the object, in its plethora of moving meanings, must be devoured by this on-going, ravenous gluttony from its unmovable place. The other becomes, in this fearful way prescribed by the Western history of ideas, the abhorrent result of discontinuity: it is left over and unreal, as, it is still there: this is actually Western monstrosity: that the residue is the maimed part that the monster cannot swallow, the vestige of what is left of a world that functions in and through the balance procured by discontinuity, an-nihilated by the predatory Western subject of the colonial encounter. After the reasoning mind transcendentally knows what “the heavens” dictate, (Kant) or the historical dialectic progresses to its total fulfillment in self-knowledge, (Hegel) all that the abstract concept was not able to appropriate is the nuisance that cannot be, and in that it is negated in order that identity conquer, and in that all that is of value has been returned to the Subject of consciousness called Spirit, there is no more to say, to know, to tell, and this is the (Hegelian) end of history, the Subject’s ultimate devouring; there is no more to eat. The thing is dismembered, and these fragments are everywhere strewn, for those with sufficient sensibility, available with-out the mesmerizing and compact force of the idiolect.
The modern Western tradition of knowing, through its conception of the word ex-preses its desire for unity with such vehemence that the other cannot exist in the subject’s own time, in spite of the fact that the other is proved real with and through discontinuity and the effect of any activity that produces language: reporting, discoursing, conversing, writing, as Barthes and Foucault point out—critically, for this theoretical practice is yet compelling, for the sake of the world. The other, in accord with these colonial modern Western calculations is not and cannot be co-present, lest it escape appropriation. In a word, it may and will be destroyed in the interest of truth: in order to be certain of what it is we can mar and maim it to our fancy, cloaked by a symbol called the concept, and the pretense that it was alive, yesterday, and not today, that is by prescribing this word, its signifier, which only functions as we have designed it to function, and “after it is authored.” In order to gage the consequences of this turn in thinking, and in the relationship between “man” and “nature” we may fathom the extension of the pervasiveness and dominion over what can and will be thought, as per our theorist Foucault. In a sense, it is the grandeur and stature of the monuments build around this Western thought procedure that may gloss over the destruction by superimposing the edifice of Western monuments and institutions, its symbols, the steely cloak placed fiercely over the other,36 just as I witness at Raqchi, an apogee of an other thought procedure establishing another relationship with the other, out of the lacunae of discontinuity. In our time, as the Marxian mutation has been taken up from a field that intercedes with Freudian psychoanalysis, the subject, the self, the Western knower has become so solipsistic that he is caged inside his thoughts, painfully isolated to the point of substantial disease; the additional deprivation of his material means of creating, his hands and his body have both been reigned in or absconded in the interest of the reign that must be supreme--- of “this Western form of language,” this Western procedure whereby the body is immaterial, punished and suppressed—that is, disappeared, absconded, erased, this encounter between “Man” and his own nature which is colonial. “Man,” in accord with this Western critical mutation comparatively and translationally bringing Marxian criticism and Freudian psychoanalysis together has suggested that “he” has been forced into the mechanized “randomness” of a commodity in a capitalist market, a randomness that makes him an “object,” in effect, as what he becomes is merely, the energy from his labor, granted a calculated market value, that is, bought

---

36 There can be no question as to the “othering” of nature, or what we call the planetary abode called Earth, beginning with the fact that it is the object of our physical and biological sciences. For a fine (post) modern parcment in video media documenting the devastating effect of this “othering” see the documentary Food Inc., regarding people, animals, and monological food production, Dirt, the movie, regarding how and what we know how to harvest from the ground we plant in; and Blue Gold about what we have commodified to our own detriment: water.
and sold for a price, in the service of facilitating the functioning of a great machine that requires
and produces servile monads for those invested in the outcomes of this production, or what I
call the great machine of a modern necromancy staging the incessant colonial encounter through
which it will be accomplished.

In this consists the fixity of the “field,” the “object,” the “subject” and the “methodology”
of the history of Western ideas or knowledge: it is a monument to a paralyzing fear. This is not to
say, however, that the procedure of investigation these elements render is not viable, for it is
practiced by both Barthes and Foucault and all researchers who investigate, this process where we
follow the footsteps, we track the signs of what went before us, which is what is ahead, in that it
is what we can see, and what is in our time: the difference lies in the actuality of the field, the
subject, and the object, that is, in what the elements stand in for, or what is returned to language
as its power, fearlessly, in the hear and now, where you and I, abide in the same time, in this way,
of play, and of sacred knowing that all beings are in the same way always: always discontinuous.

Foucault takes on Hegelian time, that is, continuous history, voracious for its total completion,
and the subject that has become the operation of Kantian transcendental and reasoned thinking---
as a way out of the Western edifice. In the Western tradition that Foucault traces, there can be no
events, for they originate in human consciousness firstly, and they can only be experienced by
that same human consciousness, with one fixed origin, one fixed end inside the thinking subject,
and one mutilated and therefore appropriated object, even when that other may be the Hegelian
other of this dialectic. This monumentality is then the monumentality of the human being that
has thoughts, and “translates” those thoughts in the mechanics that Foucault describes above,
rendering them through the veritable immediacy of the signs that would wear words that agree to
evince these thoughts in an almost perfect identity with what was thought, somehow. It is this
shortened distance between thought and word that Foucault bemoans, not satisfied only to
complain.

Though the métier of the historian places him before the vicissitude of discontinuities,
alerts us Foucault, his own first of all, the Western tradition would not grant the other, a time such
as is his, for then it must be an agonizing and disrupted time, in this way radically the same, albeit
differentiated, but sharing in the same condition of the discontinuous, failing to attain the
continuity the Western tradition aspires desperately for. In the latter tradition, all that is
inexplicable or escapes the logocentrism we purport to abide with in love is suppressed: most
especially, the West suppresses this particularly Western fear, this deep anxiety, or what Sartre

---

37 The work of Herbert Marcuse, Max Horkheimer, and Theodor W. Adorno, members of the Frankfurt
School is what this writer has in mind.
has termed, its bad faith, what Barthes decries is cynical. We enunciate love, so that we may belie our fear. This uneasy relationship with what is other, and what is out there, quite apart from us, (or from a Western perspective, the monstrosity of you being a slice of me us, just as we may be a slice of them) that is, what may be other and outside of a hermetic consciousness that the West fixes as impermeable, this uneasy relationship between one self and an other is traversed by this deep anxiety, this deep fear which, according to Foucault is repressed deep within the illumined view it delivers as its product. It is this that decisively characterizes the Western tradition, a tradition that suffers, literally, from a rampant depression. And this anxious and overdetermined relationship with the other, this illumined “view” deemed of “the highest order” reduces what is ecstatic in “man” and represses what is vibrant and motile in him. It is for those privileged and powerful enough to portend that this confining abode may be “universal,” though “knowing” this is restricted to special knowers, high priests, and the power to make it the only abode may also be exercised through the will to this truth that the colonial encounter stages.

“Understanding” this “illuminated” view is the purview of those invited to join the esoteric circle, and if they are without real power, they may be aspirants who join, initially as sycophants or what I earlier termed necromantic priests, initiates at first and facilitators later in that they effect the grand obnubilation of what the promise of this modern Western light dissimulates as its very structure: a colonial encounter. The suppression to which this edifice submits the body and the psyche would prompt us to suggest that only a sycophant would profess to transmit it, for unless you are the profiteers of the necromantic monument, it is hard to see anyone invested in such an operation which by definition implies, the destruction of others, but also the destruction of the selves, that is, its priests and its profiteers. Foucault describes this strange contradiction in the following deadening way:

At first sight it would seem that, to discover the movement of a logos everywhere elevating singularities into concepts, [light] finally enabling immediate consciousness to deploy all the rationality in the world, is certainly to place discourse at the center of speculation. But, in truth, this logos is really only another discourse already in operation, or rather, it is things and events themselves which insensibly become discourse in the unfolding of the essential secrets. Discourse is no longer more than the shimmering of truth about to be born in its own eyes; and when all things come eventually to take the form of discourse, when everything may be said and when anything becomes an excuse for pronouncing a discourse, it will be because all things having manifested and exchanged meanings, they will then all be able to return to the silent interiority of self-consciousness. (228) [underlined emphasis mine]

And we return:

Whether it is the philosophy of a founding subject, a philosophy of originating experience or a philosophy of universal mediation, discourse is really only an
activity, of writing in the first place, of reading in the second and exchange in the third. This exchange, this writing, this reading never involve anything but signs. Discourse thus nullifies itself, in reality, placing itself at the disposal of the signifier. (ibid)

This activity that translates thought in a peculiar way that fearfully inhibits, prohibits, and excludes any other consideration for its creation apart from the one mechanically described above transfers meaning into the dress signifier that is most suitable-- the preordained uniform worn-- to make pre-ordained meaning or “thought” visible, not only mastered but masterful---in effect, absolute and sovereign. There is another way to discern signs in their fullest corporeality and out of discontinuity. The Quechua speaking Quispillactans will show us this way in the beginning of Chapter Six, where Quechua/Aymara indigenous social movements emerge as fully embodied poetic expression.

Not surprisingly, Foucault’s novel reading of what may have happened in the past seeks as its four principles, searching for (1) “reversal,” or searching for what has been cut out, what has been rarefied from discourse; searching for (2) “discontinuity,” which is not to say that at the edge of continuity is a vast sea of silenced discourse, which it would be the task of this historian to “restore to speech,” and it is not a matter either of talking about what is thought or said in some past moment, as something unsaid, or unthought, “floating about the world,” but rather it is the awareness that discourse is a “discontinuous activity,” “its different manifestations sometimes coming together, but just as easily, unaware of, or excluding each other”; (3) “specificity”: “there is no pre-discursive fate disposing the word [written or spoken in the past or in the present] in our favor”, that is, making it legible or transparent, but rather, “[w]e must conceive of discourse as a violence that we do to things, or at all events, as a practice we impose upon them; it is in this practice that the events of discourse find the principle of their regularity” the terrifying but proven real abode of our discursive practice, and the “transparency” or mastering and sovereign word that can thus be disrupted; and finally, (4) “exteriority” whereby “we are not to burrow to the hidden core of discourse,” but rather we are to take its “appearance and its regularity” looking for its “external conditions of existence, for that which gives rise to the chance series of events and fixes its limits.” (229)

Foucault is evidently advocating for restoring to discourse not its fatality in the “work,” to use Barthes’ term, but its liveliness as it acts out in history what these series and assemblages would make evident as the outcomes of discontinuities, divergences, intercessions, interruptions, breaks,--- the consequences strung out for view, as a result of this activity, as a result of being de-scriptured. And while the point is not to burrow inside discourse to encounter the transparency of Western thought as it traverses the very short distance between “it” and the Western word, it is
the task of this archaeological historian to regain access to what made these discourses pulsate and propel events and things into motion, in a time that is the same as our own, disrupting the notion that discourse is that closet to the self, when as we have seen it is in deed, separation, discontinuity, other. What is more, the awareness of this character of discourse renders it possible for us to grasp, to apprehend that this “other” operates in “our time” due effectively, to a shared abiding with discontinuity. This discontinuity portends that our time is a shared abode, as I stated earlier: it may be a present, in the sense of gift, a gift that is always given, but that has a limited duration, at the same time.

From another perspective, the perspective that lets discourse speak us, to one another, this Foucauldian theorization also tells us that [t]his historian must fearlessly behold the possibility that all things happen in the way they do in our time, not as a universal rule, but as a shared condition, and as that which conditions: perhaps chaotically, as opposed to traditional Western order; perhaps inexplicably, that is, permitting us only to describe “it” as it is poised before us, that is, permitting us only to re-port, to carry it from one place to an other, through discourse, which is a trans-formative-event, and which leads to other trans-portations that prompt other traversals through what I call a trans-lation, a going from one side (of discontinuity,) to that other side (of discontinuity,) from here, to over there, or here, or there again---, transformations and traversal that are always only possible “through” discontinuity with the other. This is Foucauldian discourse, and the stuff of the cacophony of our everyday discourse with one another. It is this revival that Foucault seeks, in dis-order, in order, in my view, to unearth and to see (with other than Western eyes, the cyclopedic eyes) the consequences that followed from these very Western decisions, discursive and real, and the destiny or desire they project, the ultimate consequence that they foresee and forestall, all registers of a colonial modern Western necromancy, which Foucault reads, and which has gone further and further into “insensibility” as we surpass a moment of modernity into a post modernity, from a mythology to an ideolectology of story, from genealogy to archaeology.

These Barthian and Foucauldian practices portend to erode the Western edifice that kills: they are theoretical practices, actions taken to stall the deathly blow to the animation inherent in all that we may think, say, or do corporeally, with and abiding in our bodies, discontinuous from, and because of this, with others. From all of these instantiations, or what Foucault will call “positions,” to their re-port, their traversal from thought to language, and from one thing to an other, granting that in this theorization we may be speaking of a self, or a subject, whose identity is through this deed I describe, disrupted, such that the commandeering modern Western Subject bent on assimilating all that is other to its Oneness, its Identity, becomes, rather, a situation where
all things, be they what they may, share the abode of discontinuity, abide and can only be, abiding in this same way, in this same condition, the only real “equivalence” we share: a discontinuous condition. It is this discontinuity that surrenders the self, the subject, to the other in a process, in a way, that has made Westerners respond in a paralyzing fear: at the potential loss of control, over all the things that are needed, and are lost, and after all needs have been fulfilled, over all things that desired, and cannot be had: all losses that echo, resound with what the Western subject feels as His Loss which He cannot sustain. Discontinuity instructs that loss is the rule. Acceptance of this displaces fear and opens up the possibility of an alternative, an other way. We may say that “the violence” that discourse actually and eventfully engenders, through discontinuities, is a transformative force that surrenders to a small death, all selves, after which it, whatever we may have become through this transformative trans-lation from one side of discontinuity to another, is a creative and continual, sustaining and perduring reality. What Foucault intimates is the real life of discourse begins, not with I, but with the violence that surrenders the I entirely, so that the self that utters or writes, ends, and that which is other may begin, in order for me to know, to live with. What proves itself to be real in this field of trans-lation such as I delimit it, is that the trans from one side, the self, to ladere, that side, the other’s, this surrender of the self given by the possibility that discontinuity provides has been construed as a loss, whereby the self may never return to be what it should be is one way, the Western way of putting it, for why otherwise would a recovery of all that had been “lost” to the self be desirable, or even, necro-man[1]ically necessary?

Following in the Marxian epistemological mutation that brought the question of the discontinuous incompletely to the task of the historian through its disruptive focus on materiality, Foucault departs toward a materiality as well. To return to what the Western historian has to leave behind, to what the historical project-- would, Foucault’s choice, ---could, the consequence of his choice-- no longer be, thereby to affirm what it may become, Foucault tells us the following:

The fundamental notions now imposed on us are no longer those of consciousness and continuity (with their correlative problems of liberty and causality), nor are they those of sign and structure. They are notions, rather, of events and of series, with the group of notions linked to these; it is around such an ensemble that this analysis of discourse I am thinking of is articulated, certainly not upon those traditional themes which the philosophers of the past took for ‘living’ history, but on the effective work of the historian. (230)

The archaeological historian is effective at de-scribing the traditional palimpsest, thereby unraveling and evidencing the effects of ensembles of series that speak differently, once you find the reversals, the sometimes obviously shared discontinuity, or the discontinuity that bespeaks the
accident and or action, the grain of detail and specificity that gives texture, and the sheen of active exteriority, and not of intentional, original interiority associated with essence and “‘living’ history,” the stuff that ordains but leaves nothing lasting in your full corporeality, but rather, as we have seen, slowly empties the vessel we abide in, the word, the body. In describing the event that topples monumentality, which is the real object of the historian, the thing that she proves is real, Foucault clarifies that:

History has long since abandoned its attempts to understand events in terms of cause and effect in the formless unity of some great evolutionary process, whether vaguely homogenous, or rigidly hierarcised. It did not do this in order to seek out structures anterior to, alien or hostile to the event. It was rather in order to establish those diverse converging and sometimes divergent but never autonomous series that enable us to circumscribe the ‘locus’ of an event, the limits to its fluidity and the conditions of its emergence. (230)

It is the regularity of discursive violence that divulges the limits around which the event finds its centrifugal force, though the way of this historian is to trace the elements that have been centripetally dispersed, in order then to find this locus. While the historians Foucault describes may have avoided these unifying, continuous, and taming qualities associated to the imperatives of the history of ideas that would own the rights to tell the story, even the shift he describes grapples with the tendency toward that unity, over and against the force of discontinuity. The less control in the history, the more textual, and the more textual, the more chaotic a centripetal scattering, the easier to weave back to the locus of an event, and eventful outcome of a self that does not interfere with the necessary surrender of self, which will yield to the other the field of a telling that gives what is really there, what really happened. This renunciation of self permits what is other to be known. And yet there is a power exercising limits upon the event, conditioning its possibility of emergence that also helps to circumscribe the event taking place for this historian who traces its path, confined by elements within this particular field. Before the tradition’s neglect of the event, and before the difficulty of finding the event when Western discourse is the object of the historian’s search, that is, the object as Foucault construes it as “ensembles of discursive events,” rather than one mono-lithic discourse, Foucault submits the following: “events are not corporeal” and yet

...an event is certainly not immaterial; it takes effect, becomes effect, always on the level of materiality. Events have their place; they consist in relation to, coexistence with, dispersion of, the cross-checking accumulation and the selection of material elements; it occurs as an effect and in material dispersion. (231)
In order to deal with the discontinuity, the shared condition which makes of all discourse, *Foucauldian discourse*, whether in series or not, discourse in that sameness of its regularly occurring discontinuous traversals, distinct in *this* discontinuity where the other is the conditions, and even further discontinuity between series, sometimes in an ensemble that shares those conditions, relating to other ensembles, variously interceding discontinuously with yet others---, Foucault concludes the following about the discontinuous, materiality, and the event, naming the practice of the historian, his métier, a “philosophy of event”:

Let us say that the philosophy of event should advance in the direction, at first sight paradoxical, of an incorporeal materialism. If, on the other hand, discursive events are to be dealt with as homogeneous, but discontinuous series, what status are we to accord this discontinuity? Here we are not dealing with a succession of events in time, nor with the plurality of thinking subjects; what is concerned are those caesurae breaking the instant and dispersing the subject in a multiplicity of possible positions and functions. Such a discontinuity strikes and invalidates the smallest units, traditionally recognized and the least readily contested: the instant and the subject. Beyond them, independent of them, we must conceive—between these discontinuous series of relations which are not in any order of succession (or simultaneity) within any (or several) consciousnesses—and we must elaborate—outside of philosophies of time and subject—a theory of discontinuous systematization. Finally, if it is true that these discursive, discontinuous series have their regularity, within certain limits, it is clearly no longer possible to establish mechanically causal links or an ideal necessity among their constitutive elements. We must accept the introduction of chance as a category in the production of events. There again, we feel the absence of a theory enabling us to conceive the links between chance and thought. (231)

The task of this Foucauldian historian is then to turn inside out the Western tradition, outing its fear, aligning the métier with the task of overcoming and then overwhelming the source of anxiety the West has based its traditional history of ideas upon, a complex which the historian should confront, aware that his own effectiveness depends upon it: the fear of discontinuity, of difference cannot be the *archaeological historian’s* for not only is it discontinuity that gives the historian a chance to narrate, but the historian must face discontinuity as what is proved real, and around which all that is material clusters but also moves. In order to find himself plainly without the false shelter of continuity and identity, aware that to be effective, he must not only be fearless, Foucault goes further to collapse the subject and the traditional Western time that has swallowed up space, as an extension of time, bringing back into phenomenological witnessing, (textifying in) *the field*, what many have called “place.” In order to do this, (which Einstein also did for us, with regard to light) he must refract the smallest conceptual units of analysis, the subject and the instant, the horizontally developmental, in order to get at the event, vertically, in order to permit its movement to take precedence over time and subject as the pillars of Western monumental
history. It is therefore the *caesura* occasioned by *discontinuity* that become the conduit for the evasion of all that is fundamentally Western, making of the subject---multiple subjects, making of the instant,---multiple instants---, and here is the *kairos*, the critical turn---turning our attention to just one, distinct, necessarily different subject—from the unifying monological subject of traditional Western history split into pieces---giving us this homogeneous unity of a single subject, among many others, where discontinuity’s effect, is the creative product of the caesura: the specificity and texture of this single subject’s distinct being and acting in a time that has become so still we can see what she did. Caesura, are what I previously called lacunae, and yet, caesura is that ceasing that we deconstructed with Barthes, and lacunae is that place that gives fluidity, and fluidly, as in the movement and motility which is an index of animation and ecstatic life given from discontinuity, through loss of self. Embracing this discontinuity becomes the practice of this Foucauldian historian, the choice the historian makes to embrace discontinuity, permitting the *caesura* to be illustrative, to be the force permitted entry into a place between thought and word and action, by chance, the place that one single subject among many others takes, while the event takes place and the caesura gives in a time that seems to be held still for the historian to apprehend the event.

Discontinuity is also a way of thinking of the Other in the time of the historian, that is, in the time of his present, placing the historian and the other equally and inevitably before the element of chance. Foucault reminds us that we have not fully tamed discourse, nor is this arguably possible, though the West has been incredibly successful through the *Western mechanisms of unified, subjective, and totalizing control* that Foucault traces carefully. Foucault also reminds us, by consequence of his tracking and his arrival at chance, that a necessarily disruptive relationship between thought and chance interrupts the Western theoretically strange closeness it stages through its traditional modern philosophical edifices, between thought and the word, not because they may not be close, but because they are so radically distant from the material, and even from the body. Though the relationship between thought and word as chance has not yet been theorized, a philosophy that accounts for the chance, so to speak, to think of the subject as having been interceded by a creative possibility that does come, is given, from this immateriality called the caesura is the theorization that Foucault leaves us with. This caesura that separates him, or her, or perhaps even it, from the other, as much as the other is divided from him or her or it, a philosophy that theorizes that there is no such thing as Western unity is at hand through both Barthes’ study of the *gap* and Foucault’s discovery of *caesura*. This theory notwithstanding would have to escape the insensibility through which all discourses become appropriated by the great Western monologic machine. This is the task of the contemporary
historian or ethnographer, and according to Barthes, this task is best taken up by what he calls, and what we call today, the literary, and what I have called poetic practice.

There is this unhindered potential, the chance that the caesura gives, if the seer or the sensor chooses to behold the (Barthian) gap—chooses to face discontinuity and its real consequences, seeking discontinuity as Foucault has, or as I have proposed, seeking a way of a being with any other, or any thing, in that the field is populated, textures, conditioned by all things there. This poetic emerging can only happen when there is an ability to surrender self to a transformative field lived with the other, and for the sake of all things’ sustenance and sustaining, a cultivating creative and recreative practice. In Foucault’s procedure we might say that he took a shard from his dig, and stopped the Western epistemological machine from running on fear, the fear that fixes it into a dead monumentality, placing this fragment of stone between the subject and the object, proving that what happens between them is where the potential for life burgeons, only if we are willing to spilt unity with discontinuity: the shard he places there is this materiality of discontinuity in its practice: the practice that renders the effect of singular subjects carrying out specific actions, conditioned by other singular subjects, be they a building, a rock, a cave, a tree, another man, a woman, all things conditioning the event of this singular still (camera) shot of a subject in action in the field that conditions this event. Keeping the caesura the object of the historian’s search in order to unleash the materiality of the event is the Foucauldian métier. The chance to think without Western concepts is in deed radical, or as Foucault puts it, it is the measure of the historian’s effectiveness in this practice, where the archaeological evidence is a textification that has it that the rock is not fixed but moves and is animated by ecstatic life now, if we are to narrate a history worth telling—according to Foucault—one that is fearless. The chance to think outside of the Western philosophy of the subject and (teleological, or fatefully completed) time is indeed “a discontinuous systematization,” a way of observing how the discontinuous operates the effect of unleashing what is/was alive, from that gap that must be difference, (because we are so ineluctably discontinuous) from the caesura that discontinuity provokes, those caesura which are that creative gap: hence the bit of shard we use, to stand in for any thing that by chance may emerge, here, from there, from the chance, from the gap.

This metaphorical shard splits the Subject-Object colonial encounter into a chaotic and disperse set of possibilities involving very small and very specific “subjects” engaged in a swirl of conditions that s/he/it responds to. For Foucault it is the effectiveness, the practice that is critical, and not the knowledge, the idea, the consolation that is nothing if not a false consolation. The practice and the event, the effects of both which are the job of the historian to read/write has consequences for the world. The event that becomes visible in our time is proffered by shattering
the subject into pieces, by surrendering the Self, so that all selves may have their stories in that chaotic swirl in which our small “human” selves can only see one such story, one such small subject around whom life in the field centrifugally swirls and whose actions centripetally disperses. This is the task of the historian, and to be effective, this historian must systematically seek the discontinuity that makes any event possible. For Foucault this event becomes possible through the multiple “subject positions,” each of them unified in the conditions and effects surrounding this series of elements, held together by the locus of energy called, a given event, in ways which take place in a time that is neither developmental, nor abstract, a time that is immemorial, that is the time of the present of the other; it is the time of the writing, but also a time that has never required memory in that we can live it again, now, through our surrender to the other, that is, to the discontinuity that facilitates our trans-lation to the other, our trans-formative traversal. The time these events take place in resembles the time of the sacred so theorized by anthropologists as they observe and witness the ethnographic ritual practices of this other in the anthropological field.38

According to Foucault, it is these three notions, chance, discontinuity, and materiality, which “ought to permit us to link the history of systems of thought to the practical work of historians; three directions to be followed in the work of theoretical elaboration.” (231) (Underlined emphasis mine.) From thought abstracted to the point of the abolition of contact with the material, we may reestablish, or prove in the methodological field, the reality of the material. From the encounter with the historian’s own discontinuity, an encounter that must remain the permanent ethos or perhaps, rather, the permanent sensibility of her practice, we are able to behold difference, the other as chance instantiations of an other position at an event that has the nature of our time, that comparatively therefore, could be in our time, but is not: which is at once, perhaps the only, and our fragile link to one another. From the chance that we are poised just here, be-fore there, by that very discontinuity that places us be-fore the other that is ineluctably separate, and with the “blindness and insight” that characterizes that fraction of an instant, so radiant is the present that we behold the materiality that traverses the event albeit from our blindness, and we discover how necessary is the dark caesura for there to be sensibly there, what we behold, in order that we choose vibrantly and sensibly in tune, what we say and do when we behold, what is over there, all those things that we are on the way to visiting and to knowing, on our way. The dimension of what is human cannot exceed the dimensions of what is greater than

what is human still: nature. It may be in this way, where nature as we call it, the mountains and all that shelters us in the physical and material world enters this scene, here, where a chard or a shard emerges, animately, two expressions that emerge from the split Western Subject of the colonial encounter, where the difference between the c and the s produce animate materiality nonetheless, a la Barthes, that is, from the gap, as the needed play of difference itself to be found in the world as text. Foucault brings the event into motion by recreating place, the field conformed by the conditions that surround the locus of an event, where multiple subjects are at play, in a dimension and a time that gives the field of the motion picture: the event in the field as movement, and even as the social bodies in movement, trees, and humans, buildings and streetlights, all subjects inhering upon the re-construction of this social event, this social movement: the subject split into particles of light in motion in a scene, in a place. Art as we know it in the West does not exhaust its effects. Perhaps a little understood effect is that it creates reality, the text as world is actually the reach of language in our lives, and poetic expression the greatest responsibility we have to the question of how to govern ourselves for the sake of all things.

Notwithstanding, Foucault, in effect, it would be more apt to say perhaps re-inserts the possibility of another inheritance: the inheritance of calling out the monstrous dismemberment created by the modern colonial encounter, critically to be faced, unearthing from its fearfully and overwrought obnubilation not only our bodies, but a decolonized mind. It is the inheritance of the colonial modern that it has decidedly forgotten or actively suppressed difference: “discontinuity,” “the gap,” the “caesura” all the experientially real phenomena in the field are the prescient precursor to all that is, out of difference, which the West has suppressed in the interest of domination, in the interest of controlling chance and possibility, in the hopes of bringing to itself all that it has lost through separation—the caesura, the gap, discontinuity. This is the how all fare in accord to the will to this peculiar truth, and the particular designs and construct that the Self/Other structure enact as the world as text that Barthes, Foucault, and now Godzich, translationally and comparatively make evident through this re-search. What Foucault in attempts to do, at best, wandering inside the walls of institutionality, in the clinic, in prison, in the domesticity we call a register of our sexuality is precariously to disperse the Western Colonial Subject and its eternal companion, continuous and also universal time, from its smallest unit the instant, both the entrapment of the Other. Time, for the Western Subject afraid to keep all that it has recovered from the loss it believes it can recuperate—from a discontinuity it cannot finally control, but which it does neurotically deny. This procedure becomes such a deep source of angst, that the culture poetically expresses it, releasing its pressures through the conduit of
language, just such as Barthes has described it as the arbitrary and provisional release that a succession of symbolic meanings released through language create as they conceive and receive what proves to be real in the textual field in this—what I call—textifying. The threat to the Subject’s predatory totalizing and continual greed to know it all and have it all at its disposal—that is to become one with everything produces an angst about time which the following common expressions poetically release: “time is running out,” “time is spent too quickly,” someone “not having enough time,” etc. While it is an expression of angst it is a real response to the way the West has also attempted to dominate time: we calculate its passage to the fraction of a second and we make our lives equal these units of “time.”

This may be the most Self-destructive Other in the Western modern colonial encounter, time, rivaled only by space. We have brought ourselves into a strange mathematical relationship to time which presses us inordinately and which supersedes other notions and even different experiences of time that prove to be real in the textual field as world. Space we are still trying to conquer and the consequences that ecologists and environmentalists, the professional and scientific stewards of the natural (colonial modern) world that first discovered the web of life sustaining the natural world, which these researchers call systems are the critical theorists channeling nature’s cry, this Other’s cry, and warning us of the consequences to our own abode, should we continue to conduct ourselves as we have throughout modernity. The territoriality that has characterized the national field has also made difference inevitable from border to border and has therefore also sponsored the violent othering averted by—translational and horizontally comparative practices. But it is strangely the humans? racialized and this phrase does poetically express the paradox of a Western field belying both its rule, its orthodoxy, “human,” and its doxa “racialization” leading us as theorists to conclude there is a para-dox at work here or what I can obnubilated necromantic practices, the functionaries assigned the task of sewing what has been cut, of rationalizing the contradiction between the orthodoxy and the doxa as a paradox. The treatment of the racialized Other is just this paradox, and this above all else establishes a radical distance between the search for the aftermath of difference, a residue, or a symbolic ‘difference itself,’ and the catastrophic assault endured by the people racialized—which is indeed, and in accord to what is proven to be real in this textual field the blunt attempt to disappear the other, through a paradoxical conduct, a conduct that can at its convenience be an accessory to the state rule or to the common opinion as required by the necromantic accessory before theorized who is the arbiter of the fate of those racialized, that is, those expendable, those susceptible to disappearance. ‘Exploiting natural resources,’ as we poetically say, is the Western rule that environmentalists have decried, not just the professionalized and interdisciplinary scientists,
though science still inspires faith among believers. Submitting racialized others to this exploitation does say something about the place in ‘the hierarchy of species’ we assign racialized others, stories we have heard told and retold throughout modernity whose effects have been as horrifying as the Rwandan genocide, and at the same time questions the validity of the humanist orthodoxy, the humanist rule of universality and equality.

Foucault splits this Western colonial modern subject into many possible subjects. All these proportionately small and therefore real selves share in the same condition, and are thus equivalent to one another, however distinct their compelling ex-volvement in the event. All are donned with speech that is querulous and unprecedented, that is traversed by the distance between thought and chance, somewhat prepared to come into being as event, that is, moved by the possibility of blindness and insight in the moment, the moment that has split the second into non-conceptual pieces. The place of the other is an other self given by discontinuity in any given fraction of an instant, poised there to think, say, and do, and be done with. The conditions are always contingencies surrounding and shaping the possibility of the event, as a way of becoming, albeit a constantly becoming other. Rather than staying put, staid, in the monumentality of the Western subject, in a monolithic identity, and all its attendant handmaidens, chance makes it possible for any thing to move or be moved, or to discover how any thing was moved, albeit restrained by nature, by what the West has called the biological, that is, the conditions that shape or limit the field in which the event takes place. This is as much as we can know about the other through this Foucauldian schema. Arguably, this eternal plight is taken up by Foucault in such a way that by chance, the radical sensibility which engulfs the split self in less than an instant while on the verge of speech procures-- that we may achieve some greatness by means of the greatness of regarding without flinching, our own discontinuity, by overcoming our wild fears, or our fears of the wild.

**Intrasessional intertextuality: Barthes and Foucault comparatively and translationally speaking**

Is it possible that this Barthian and Foucauldian métier exhausts itself trying valiantly to overcome the oppressive edifice of Western knowledge, a culture ubiquitously bent on dominating the other which, as we have seen is ultimately a denial of our self as other, as incommensurably separate, and separated from ourselves, in the moment in which we speak? Are they effective at doing more than placing a shard, a symbolic escape of symbolic energy that keeps the most recondite, the most ponderously concealed and guarded door open, content only to precipitate a fissure in the edifices buttressing Western monumentality? Or from this fissure do
we begin to tell the new histories effectively, and if this fissure can or should widen could we cave in the edifices from within, systematically making the walls have play in order that they eventually tumble? What do we make of the 15-meter walls of Raqchi, which have withstood more than one earthquake: chance or design? How many archaeological scholars would it take to bring down the monument, or is this what we need to achieve? Is it enough to create the methodological field from which we may find a new object of study, and is this gesture nothing but a replication of our original dilemma of “man” before his discontinuity, albeit willing to face his finitude? Can beholding mean, being held, as I have suggested? How are we held together in the moment of our greatest fears and our greatest angst? Is it not the discontent of our Western civilization that they lament, not inactively? And are these discontents, fearlessly observed, a way to encounter the other with less contrite and protracted conflict?

Foucauldian archaeology is the closest the West has come yet, in what is now traditional, however non-traditional, to bringing discourse back to its mordant life, that is, to its status as event, theoretically, deconstructively. One could argue that it has become traditional in that Foucauldian history such as he proposes to re-write the history of ideas, that is, to transcribe his trans-lation from discontinuity to a site remote from totalizing and continuity, aware of the discontinuous as it breaks the Western edifice or at any rate chisels away at its fissures, though perhaps some of us are still attentive to this deconstructive project. The moments when the Western edifice cannot help itself, and by chance, proves its “weakness,” its unseemliness, its seams, in my view, call for an awareness of how to respond to the opportunity. This Foucauldian procedure, however radical it may be is now transmitted as canonical knowledge and not as the strategic deployment of a systematized discontinuity in the interest of the event, of what is alive, of the materiality of this movement. It is certainly questionable whether we have survived the Western edifice at all. His attempt to think through a theory of the relationship of thought to chance as the guide for writing a con-temporary history of the very specific past has become the métier of several within the academy, albeit restrained and constrained by the political economy of the institution that preserves itself, in reality, through its disciplinary identities, that is, by means of its veritable and still legitimised monumentality, especially as a public institution beholden to a public, that is the state’s well defined interests projected upon the demos, the social body, however this body is strategically split, paradoxically, that is as among those assigned privilege and entitlement which avails them of the nation’s resources, and those who are

paradoxically assigned the place designated for disapparition by deprivation, starvation, purposeful impoverishment.

The question to be asked therefore, may be, how alive can these new histories become if their readers are so few and so rarefied that they ultimately remain confined within the hallowed halls of the ivory tower where erudition finds its limits and its reclusive or receding field, bound by the conditions that delimit as well as propitiate its emergence? Is the Gramscian organic intellectual40 germane to this academic institutional field in theory or practice, after the advent of Foucault or Barthes? Can what Gramsci in translation calls “the simple” interact effectively with what is deemed high culture? Is Barthes’ stroll symbolically an attempt to make all this esoteric knowledge the patrimony of all, the textification that is more than a cry, or a lament in the field, especially as the post-colonial republican field proves real? Is Foucault’s keen interest on the mistakes, the passions, the envies the way to make the high priests look as frail as everyone else, making the social body the subject observing the other, the everyday smaller man in a proportional dimension to his frailty before a much more powerful nature, still? Is this other, this time a member of the intellectual caste of any emerging social class, at first organic, and then idealized, as Gramsci suggested? Is this Foucauldian way the only way these new histories can maintain life, be convivial among rarefied audiences bent on the death of traditional monumentality, or is this penchant possible for this intellectual class representing the technocratic arm of the State? Are North American intellectuals public intellectuals in any real, proven sort of way, if we were to agree that the public could be a social body waiting to be released from the interests of the state or the private sector, no matter how much this democracy stages a negotiation between the rule for the minority, or for the majority? Where are their (public intellectuals’) discourses engaged, and are these places always public, or can these discourses, as Foucauldian fearless speech, precipitate movement from the social body, events in which they seize the word over and against legitimated discourses, that is, as poetic practice, as fearless speech in turn? If the places that Foucauldian discourse and Barthian Text engage are private are they made esoteric and therefore “private” by the literacy they presuppose, or by the “hegemony,” to quote Gramsci that this “private” sector can exercise by means of its control of (social) (re-) production? If there is a question of literacy at stake can this literacy be widely taught such that the entire social body tips into action, that is, deploys discourse as event in its

own interests, and wildly, fearlessly? Is a Barthian lament sufficient to overturn the harm done to the other, who is inevitably subject, and then other again?

As a partial response to some of these questions we return to the question, not of materiality, but of conviviality, of how we live with the wild, or “our biological nature,” or simply, “nature,” and simply, we return to the question, “Is the rock alive?” We began our discussion with Nietzsche’s genealogy of morals, and we return to it to continue to ask, how then do we govern ourselves when faced, primarily, with all that is nature, and all that we have over time inherited from our kin. Who or what is nature, and can there be any question that we are actually destined to relate to “it”? What is more, can there be any question about whether the conditions that Foucault and many others have theorized about include an enormous component and a nano component of what I have called the wild, or what we may provisionally call nature, perhaps even, a nature impossibly absconded? In an important way, the modern Western tradition seems to have collapsed nature into the other, unwilling to deal with the reality of the wild, while at least in the classical Western tradition and up to seventeenth century Europe (Fearless Speech 112) still being able to address the bio without the logical as an important component of the relationship of the self to other. Especially the self’s relationship to that which seemed other to the self, that is, the bio side of the self, the lived side, the body in motion which the Greco-Roman classical man reigned over through his mind or through his spirit is the wild that the Western tradition accounted for. (Fearless Speech 85, and for the Epicurean take on self and bio see page 135.) Of course in the Freudian world as text, text as world, the instinctual drives were that wild with which the symbolic struggled in order to forge the real. Language consequentially carries this symbolic potential to release as a way of taming the wild, the West might say.

To address our central concern—can Foucauldian discourse revive the rock, as a part of this nature? If the metaphor of choice is the rock that tells, archaeology, does the rock have language, and does it stand in a co-equal relationship to post-modern man, if we can posit a post, that is, if we have overcome modernity, modernity as colonial modernity, that is, as colonial encounter? Can Barthian text revive the rock, and is reviving the body enough to revive the rock, assuming that we have not now moved far from Barthes and Foucault and we have furthered their projects? From sensual perception to text, Barthes offers the texture of the rock, but as part of the stereophony of the world as it registers itself in us as play through a somatically porous entry which may weave and wind partially satiated by play and ritual repetitions recreated in Text. The stone is there, says Barthes on his stroll, and we accompany him as readers, fulfilling his text, sensing the rock in the background, as part of the rich texture of a scene that speaks to all the
senses, but especially to the ear. The play of difference between one thing and an other enlivens the rock: without the rock, there would prove to be no resistance to the water’s flow, without the water’s flow encountering resistance from the rocks, we wouldn’t hear the water’s sound, the child’s laughter, in comparison, could not make itself singular. It is in the gap, now in some important immeasurable measure, a Foucauldian gap as well called the caesura, it is in this discontinuity, that all things may be, all things may be procured, procured in its etymological sense: given for care. It is here that Foucault takes us further, and yet and all, to a limit: “we feel the absence of a theory enabling us to conceive the links between chance and thought.” Except that perhaps we near one by deconstructing the Western edifice that absconds discontinuity with such paralyzed fear, and except that we have deconstructed discontinuity to discern its inevitable certainty which can only be explained by chance if we forego metaphysical explanations, notions of origin that portend an eventual completion or fulfillment. As it turns out, the critical tradition we re-search makes evident that the self must be sacrificed in order to save it all--- although it does not manage to surrender the self, as close to arriving at this possibility through a progressive, that is forward moving provisional meaning production, fueled by chance, and as much as it shatters the Self it reproduces the positionality that is the self’s and the tradition that never turns away from the self in that it still depends on a strange surrender of the self to the other, whose recompense remains, procedurally, the traditional epistemological structure whereby what is not known, is known. The other’s time may be ours, but only through our surrender to the other, can we know what the other is, has done, and how it was moved, just like we might have been moved. The Self and Other are intact, albeit interrupted, reversed, susceptible to transcendence or sublation after all is said and done.

What would have interceded between my thought, and the chance that brought me before the stones at Raqchi in the Inka Sacred Valley, and what may have precipitated the thoughts I had by chance while I also arrived at a place in front of the stones at Raqchi, from where I also then later, trans-scribed, trans-lated by means of my and all your most ineluctable discontinuity, surrendered myself to the other that became the re-port. This story that according to our accompanying of Barthes and Foucault, never catches up with the “me” that wrote it, as it is either me and the writing at the same time, or it is me surrendered to the movement in the field in that I systematically trace discontinuity to write this other life. And yet this remains a story that stands in for “me” anyway, by way of the Western tradition here present also, as this, “my” story is taken by institutional mechanisms to its representational destination, a space where a report is required, not simply of me, but by me. Or is it possible that this “archaeological site, Raqchi” prodded and dug into by Italian and British and Peruvian and American archaeologists was not
that at all for me, nor for the local young man who spoke to me extensively about his version of Raqchi, handing me a pamphlet which gathered his own people’s version of Raqchi, orally transmitted to him, in addition to documenting the record of archaeological intercessions into the site, from which this young man also derived a knowing, which he duly interpellated into his narrative about Raqchi. Did I describe the way the rocks at Raqchi spoke to me as other than me, or was it what they said that moved me to write, that moved me to discourse, to textification, after they were traversed by the young man’s narrative too, a narrative that belied the official “archaeological story,” or at any rate made it undecidable, uncertain, whether one should take precedence over the other, while a discursive wrangle ensued?

According to Barthes and Foucault, and many other ethno-graphers, narrators of the ethne, narrators of the Western culture, “civilization,” or nation, concerned for this project of Western re-writing of the Western tradition, its correlate description from the margins of its textile, that is, accompanying its threads wherever they led not by its pretentious and stated intentions and authority, but by the interruptions and discontinuities that revealed passionate eruptions, where the thread was bare, or a knot intervened, in between the lines writing these investigative notes that do seem to end up at the margins of the field, as a mere field note. Daring to see the historical other, this personage—outside--- the history of ideas, and also a person in our time, Foucault and other such writers courageous enough to know that they write themselves as other, while writing “about” others for those translating and transcribing a “reality” that proved real in the field, the Barthian and Foucauldian project has been furthered: the ethnographers, such as Clifford Geertz, James Clifford and George E. Marcus, alongside Mary Louise Pratt, Renato Rosaldo, and others, and later, Dennis Tedlock and Bruce Mannheim who explicitly note the co-creational role of the field-note, as well as Ruth Behar, who wrote about the other convinced that the other expressed the Chicana difference that made the informant the same, could well have been the anthropo-logician who coexisted in the same time, and with whom they conversed “dialogically.”

Foucault and Barthes’ projects have been taken further. Behar has embraced this project’s reality to the extent that she makes evident her awareness that-- the observer is engaged by whom she observes, sensibly, emotionally, affectively, as well as logically, reasonably, embracing the story written as her own self surrender, writing about the other in her own time,

while the story, we would add, re-turns to her as well, in a mutually constitutive translation facilitated by discontinuity and the interruption of the colonial encounter.43 In the dialogic (Bakhtinian) imagination, the dialogue that ensues between observer and observed co-produces the *fieldnote*, to begin with decentering the privilege given the ethnographer’s *écrit, the ethnography*, as the authoritative and documented source of the events that proved to be real in the field, say Tedlock and Mannheim, and an important group of like-minded anthropologists.44

And what of the project the historian Philip Deloria brings to textual vibrancy while having asked the question, and I translate, ‘why do Westerners play Indian?’, “why do they play the other?”, as if he were a ghost of times past, and where he becomes instead of the monument, the mask, the costume, the stand in for the Indian passing on, and away, and then revived again at the colonial settler’s convenience?45

These listeners who heed the Foucauldian call to observing the discontinuous, or the violence of the continuous, and by consequence, the violence of discourse—-, as the Western mask we place upon the ghost of that which we assume has been buried—-, do they revive the things that the gap permits to arrive propulsing into the textual field, the discursive event, bringing the word, the stories, discourse itself back to life as *the event*, the event of a kind of restoration of language, to its “real” being? Has discourse become a creative and re-creative action, variously, diversely attempting a project of seriously productive listening translated into a sort of scripture—that hand that scribes by means of the palm and the fingers that are sensibly moving alongside the convivial thought and the convivial paper, by sheer chance traversed by the palimpsest and plethora of our collective traversals? Courageous scholars may they all be, who, aware of the discontinuity that engenders their epistemological projects in the first place, behold the other in their own time. This we can say. For all these re-searchers in the field of Western ideas or *ethnography*, yet another name for the “history of ideas,” this has become the challenge that they have risen to face.

However remote or close the distance between thought, action, and words—in effect—there is yet that shared Western inability to accept the procured and wild nature of the relationship among all things given by discontinuity. The Western tradition remains content still to stage how

---

43 See: Behar, Ruth. *The Vulnerable Observer: Anthropology that Breaks Your Heart*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1996; as well as *Translated Woman: Crossing the Border with Esperanza’s Story*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1993. Also part of the coherence of her traversal as an intellectual is her documentary of her family’s story of migration, the story of her family’s diaspora from Cuba to New York City, which I viewed several years ago here in Ann Arbor.


the self “permits” what proved itself to be real to emerge in the place that conditioned it, by
devising the proper field, the proper object and the proper method “permitting” this to take place.
What the Barthian project seems to elide is that this writer is in a sense, nothing more than the
other who once read, who, as part of that intertextual depository of all that was ever said and
done, now moves across the page as a hand whose volition, whose wish and position is that the
only symbolic (truth) it produces is in black and white, the slightest of gravures. It is not difficult
to imagine that the writer surrenders to that collectivity, but it is difficult to deny the perhaps
untamed wish to say. Foucault takes things further by attempting to destroy the Western Subject
of the tradition of “history of ideas” he deconstructs, the Subject we witness as driven by the
obsession to devour all that it encounters in an attempt to know all and to be all. He destroys
Western Time, which is nothing less than the collapse of all that is the material place where
things may abide, conditioned by this abode, for Time has become Space in Western History.
Barthes cannot renounce linear time, while Foucault understates that there is no Western time
through the activity of discontinuity, expressed as the *caesura* that render singular, smaller, sole
subjects viable, and which render subject/conditions/place, that is, the event as he defines it also
viable. Reading history as event through a discursive literacy that systematizes discontinuity as
its practice instructs, once this picture moves, that chance precipitates the configuration of a new
concatenation of conditions and subjects, subjects as conditions, conditions as subjects-- rustling
together with a new (non-traditional) sensibility, the sensibility of something more abrupt than
“now,” and closer to us than “here”: a sensibility which we must follow to its ultimate
consequences in order to ascertain what choice we have, in effect, *made real*. The stakes are
already high.

For the post-industrial self who is weighed down and overdetermined by the oppression
of the edifice ponderously insisting that it is not a tombstone, who, which, through all that has
been buried must speak through every subject, paradoxically, as necromantic state rule, the
promise of fulfillment given as consolation to this burdened Subject is no consolation at all, as we
have found. *This traditional Western self* feels bereft and laments its solitude because the promise
from the rule of this edifice of ultimate restoration of all that has been lost is constantly deferred
and even paradoxically sustained between that which affirms the promise, the orthodox humanist
rule, and that which contradicts it, the *doxical* racialization where the paradoxical accessory to the
subversion of the orthodoxy has beforehand assigned social status by means of a colonial
encounter. Would this make of Western laments, the long and languorous lament of desire
unfulfilled, simply? Courageous re-searchers one and all who take on the monument, and
denounce the fallacy of the tombstone, or call the edifice what it is, fearlessly, seizing *fearless*
as their discourse, at the expense of discord, the “unacceptable” querulous interjection barely permissible whose strange declarative diagnosis as the absence of balance, to those invested in the fallacy is something resembling heresy, though in recalling During, this is in no way surprising. Courageous, they do so in the interest of harmony, aware or not, able or not to articulate what they desire. While this is insistently the métier, to disrupt the edifice’s operations, to erupt out of its interiority, not to express one’s “consciousness,” but to release what is actually out there, what proves itself to be here perhaps just to begin with, through our utterances, through the event of discourse and the stereophonic texture of especially literary texts completed by readers who with the writer fulfill the promise of corporeality which this language that rustles intimates is possible. Certainly through the jarring effect of a systematic search for discontinuity we trip into the wild, our Western anxiety about death, and our sense of profound abandonment inside our erstwhile and very Western, idealized mind. It may be possible that this all gets articulated in our longing to inhabit our erstwhile body, in the field that is our home, that is, in nature, and not space as absconded place.

These discourses are fluid notwithstanding, however rigorously systematized this traversal between thought, chance, and the word may have become, and at the same time these discourses are disciplined, as this discourse is. There is this shared concern for how we may observe and describe others, who are like ourselves in that discontinuity traverses their way also, and this other is not only the same as us in this way, but all that is alive shares in this discontinuity. We can view them as if they were living in our time, because we all share in a similar condition: a wild nature that is our body and the body of the planet, which are our abodes. How we narrate our stories as we behold and how this sensibly apprehended figure of the other takes its place may be decisive for how we govern ourselves. The question of whether the rock speaks persists. We may have established that what I sensibly apprehended was not only legible, but it spoke in its way: the stones depicting a palimpsest of rock first of all, but also of parchments, erased, scraped, and perhaps even worn away, the layers of culture, material and lively, a la Marxian epistemological mutation. This archaeological shard that is Raqchi does not yet tell us whether the rock, caught between Quechua and Spanish speaks, other than be-speaking the silence embedded in the colonial encounter, outside of the discipline of biology, one of the avatars of the “the history of ideas.” What we can say is that Raqchi can be read as that shard that keeps us aware of the gap: that there is something more there, where the Spanish impose their matters upon the Quechua speaking.

---

Geologists may confirm that stone moves in the longest of durées, and they may even debate, departing from the definitions of the discipline of biology, that life, animate and tonified, began in microbial life, has been found even in the deepest recesses of the earth’s stone crevices. As we prospect even outside our earthly atmosphere, astrobiology, it is this we seek as a form of life: the tiniest form of microbial life tells us there is the potential for life to be sustained as human life especially and in a repetitive way, alone. A-priori, a legitimated Kantian move, it was decided, that the privilege of animation, that is, of signs and thought and movement is only given to humans, to the exclusion of all others. This is not simply the imposition of the history of the sovereign idea upon all objects of study, but this is the decisive move that isolated the human, as master of the universe, who speaks for all as it will eventually, in (Hegelian) time, know all. This also makes it impossible for the rock to have spoken, to have used a set of its own signs to speak; the rock is other. The question will for now remain in a Western sense answered, except that in this interstice between Quechua rocks and Spanish rocks we have encountered an interdisciplinary field of inquiry with its object becoming that encounter, an occupational and impositional encounter which can aptly bear the name colonial encounter.

Something is given from the field, through caesura, cessations, and we suspect that it approximates materiality, or abides next to or with materiality: we have set out to prove that this may be so in our methodological field: the field of colonial encounter, Quechua, Spanish which presupposes the need for newly performed practices which not only deconstruct or dismantle but which de-structure this traditional Western construction: comparison and translation. “Translation” connotes cognitive activity where mental representations are trans-lated, by means of travel, association, interruption, cessation, in one word discontinuity, as in the translation of what is perceived into narrative, as well as in the activity of transfer, traversal, but especially, as trans-ladere from the side of the self to the side of the other made possible by discontinuity. The comparison between a chard and a shard is not that silly: the difference between the ch- and sh-evokes the difference which renders the differential gap between one word and another, ever more slight, giving textualization an amplification through which in this minutiae, this detail, the possible spuriousness of what the word may actually do only as difference itself, and what the gap actually gives may be discernible. In other words, is it a matter of our myriad dictionaries, lexicons, syntactical analyses, phonetic and morphological studies, Barthian theorization granting permission, or is it a matter of what the gap gives? Is it a matter of both?
Part II: Reading Quechua in the Western Field: the Problem of Quechua Translation

Chapter 3: Translation in the Western field at the intercession with Quechua: the task of the comparatist and the question of poetic expression and colonial difference

...[T]he Text does not stop at (good) literature; it cannot be caught up in a hierarchy, or even in a simple distribution of genres. What constitutes it is on the contrary (or precisely) its force of subversion with regard to the old classifications. How to classify Georges Bataille? Is this writer a novelist, a poet, an essayist, an economist, a philosopher, a mystic? The answer is so uncertain that handbooks of literature generally prefer to leave Bataille out; as a matter of fact, Bataille has written texts, or even, perhaps, always one and the same text. If the Text raises problems of classification (moreover, this is one of its “social” functions), it is because it always implies a certain experience of limits. ...[T]he Text is what is situated at the limit of the rules of the speech-act (rationality, readability, etc.). This notion is not rhetorical, we do not resort to it for “heroic” postures: the Text attempts to locate itself very specifically behind the limit of the doxa (is not public opinion, constitutive of our democratic societies, powerfully aided by mass communications—is not public opinion defined by its limits, its energy of exclusion, its censorship?); taking the word literally, we might say that the Text is always paradoxical. (Barthes 58)

There is not a theoretical approach to literature; there are more or less consciously held theoretical tenets. Wlad Godzich, "Emergent Literature and Comparative Literature," (1988) The Culture of Literacy. (1994)

Introduction:

My reading of Godzich suggests that the literary object of study resists the Western epistemological procedures Barthes and Foucault describe and denounce, not the least of the reasons for this being that the object of study “literature,”--- as it has been traditionally defined as fiction,--- and as its discursive practice exceeds the edifice of Reason while traversed by it---, cannot be grasped through scientific methodology because its activity is distinct and different. In this sense it is text, whose auxiliary is not the arbiter between the violation of humanist orthodoxy.
and the validation of racist doxa, as we have seen as the paradoxical othering that racialized persons are submitted to, quite analogously to the procedures used to exploit natural resources, an object, as distinct from what we have previously called the wild. It is probable the limit that Text gives which is paradoxical functions as an arbiter also, and in some measure, of what is wild, but let us proceed with the re-search of Godzich’s écrit. At the moment in which we begin to read Godzich here, he addresses the crisis in Western knowing in the field of literary studies in the late 1980’s, whereby “theory,” (such as we’ve read it in both Barthes and Foucault, for instance,) or as it may be termed---, loosely aligning it for the moment with the Western, traditional notion of methodology, its companion concepts being “field,” “object of study,” and of course, “discipline,”----“theory” seemed to be making an unprecedented move to become, both “object of study” and “method,” thereby staking a claim to another place altogether within the organization and institution of Western knowledge, “autonomizing” itself to the point where it would disrupt “the disciplines” themselves, and by consequence, the institution, the university itself. Where would all disciplines be if “theory” claimed to be the methodology and the object of study, and if literature claimed to be the object of all fields, by consequence of---- albeit a rarefied and at the same time relevant definition of “literature” as discourse or text? Has this already happened, and if so, what has happened to the traditional disciplines? Does this Godzichian unpacking presage the state of affairs in the Humanities today?

One of the most compelling arguments Godzich makes, especially in the introduction to the compilation of his articles in which the cited article is published is the question of literacy such as it is posed at the moment of this crisis, especially in departments of English, but in some measure in all departments of language and literature. The “crisis of literacy” which appeared to be a reaction to the crisis that the “autonomization of theory” engendered, was actually what I will call a political crisis from within and from without the profession. Godzich suggests that the crisis of the “autonomization of theory” was used to masquerade the real crisis engendered by the prevalence of low academic performance measures, across the board, but handily imputed to the upsurge of underrepresented “minority” students by academics in the field of language and literature unwilling to look deeper, and unwilling to accept that their teaching could be at fault. (2-11) In my view, the crisis of literacy channeled a racialized, reactionary response against the juridical measures applied throughout the country by Federal Affirmative Action legislation that granted remediation for historical legal harm inflicted upon communities of underrepresented minorities, legally defined through the legislation, who arduously fought for decades for

reparation due to the harm inflicted to their/our communities for disenfranchisement, segregation, and the concoction of race as the subterfuge utilized to evade applying the democratic principles in the constitution to the sectors of the social body conveniently racialized, thereby to hoard and control resources among a few, non-racialized social and political classes. Interestingly, during the recent economic crisis, unleashed precipitously in 2008, members of the non-racialized social class have appeared in the public media as avatars of this non-racialized political class in order to attribute this crisis, the proportion of blame deemed irrelevant, to the financial illiteracy of these “minority” social classes sometimes granted predatory loans, that is victimized, and sometimes granted loans devised by President Clinton precisely for the sole purpose of assisting especially African American in purchasing homes.

And yet, the impact felt by this crisis of literacy a mere two decades ago is in some measure what we take up here, except that we do so following the research of some pivotal investigators in this “theorization” and “literacy” crisis, while attempting to discern the ultimate consequences of the theoretical and literate kairos behind and before us, for the question of the Other attending to these apparently related and politically unrelated crises is critical, unresolved, and relentlessly problematic. It is especially the focus we place in the Western tradition on the categories which we have followed as Barthes and Foucault de-scribed them, that in my view must yet concern us, and concern us urgently: our disruption of the categories or concepts of Subject and Other caught in the persistent kiasmatic intercession of Hegel and Kant which is so constitutive of all that we call modern must extend beyond the debates of the 60’s and 70’s I have

48 I am a member of just such a minority group, called Mexican American first, Hispanic later, and Latino now, though the original term reflects the direct involvement of that community, mine, in the passing of Affirmative Action legislation, as well as Civil Rights legislation. This membership will become relevant as my discussion alongside Godzich of the problem of the Other and the Discipline of Comparative Literature ensues as an extension of Part 1, Chapter 1 regarding the role of Theory, such as Foucault’s and Barthes’ in the discipline and outside the discipline, and especially with regard to the other, as Godzich takes up this very specific question quite frankly, that is, fearlessly. This is what anticipates the elaboration of who or what may be the colonial other, and how we may arrive at the notions which I describe as: the colonial encounter, colonial difference, and Quechua difference—all terms unpacked in this chapter.

49 The very same underrepresented groups still seeking proportionate representation in institutions of power and equitable access to resources, however more “quietly” today, have recently been accused, indirectly or directly, of helping to bring down the financial sector which tailspun into a fantastic collapse in 2008, right before Obama was elected—due to their “financial illiteracy.” Sources out of the conservative media abound, but I am referring to mainstream media, where this “blame” was “reported,” but also where this “blame” was distributed variously among or to the exclusion of non-racialized majority, while maintaining racialized minority social classes tacitly or explicitly among those to be blamed given the discursive series to which the absence of “minority blame” speaks of. To the extent that these “minority” social classes appear to be on the “stages of power” a new minority political class may be emerging, not as a subaltern social class, especially if was given an opportunity to purchase a home, but perhaps as a subaltern political class. The distinction between a Gramscian social class and a political class will become evident as we accompany Godzich in his analysis of the theoretical movements I describe in Part I and now in Part II.
permitted Barthes and Foucault to be the symbols of by choosing them as opposed to other similarly eruptive theorists, for specific theoretical reasons: the particularity was a requirement in performing a translational and comparative practice, their deep forays into what we call “classical studies” placed their projects in the unique translational situation I sought: one that brought out from as deep or as far back as possible the pillars and the productive caesura or gaps which would most thoroughly permit us to arrive at the intercession I call the *colonial encounter* between the Quechua and the Western field. In this Chapter, Godzich, De Man, Derrida, and Deleuze and Guattari will help us discern the particularities of this colonial encounter in the fields we will analyze in subsequent chapters: Part 3, Chapter 5 will delve in the literary field, Peruvian, bilingual Spanish/Quechua, traversing particular texts only, again in that the translational and comparative practice performed requires an anchor in specific words especially, and in translational theoretical turns, as well as ethically divergent comparative practices which will be elaborated upon in Chapter 4. The specific texts traversed will be “Paco Yunque” the short story written by César Vallejo, and “Agua” the short story written by José María Arguedas, accompanied by various and diverse other theorists. Chapter 6 will delve into the creole theorization of the emerging republic, “creole” understood as the nativized Euro-descended ruling class in the context of the independence sought by these emerging Andean republics, especially the theorization that marks the turn from colonial to republican rule. This Part III especially concerns itself with the “Indio” population of Peru as one theorist in particular expressed the indigenous problem: José Carlos Mariátegui, the word “Indio” not always denoting, in one field or another, a pejorative reference to the indigenous Quechua speaking populations of Peru and Bolivia.

Part IV, Chapter 7 delves carefully and in detail with the Quechua language and knowing that *native narrator* convey, while looking closely at the efforts of the *Taller de Historia Oral Andina*, technically a Non-Governmental Organization, but in the textual field, a collective of indigenous Aymara and Quechua and Guarani speaking theorists and practitioners who return to particular *Markas* and *Ayllus* to gather the local indigenous way of knowing and past events in order to reconstitute territorial governance by their kin. In Chapter 7 I delimit the knowing and textual practices which led to this recovery, while in Chapter 8 I elaborate on its expression in the *republican mestizo* field as a part of an indigenous social movement for which this research throughout the decade of the 80’s became the field of its poetic expression, decisively changing the terms of public discourse in Bolivia, and the place from which the terms for this indigenous social movement emerged. Today we can see how all these events have led to the first Aymara-speaking President of the Republic of Bolivia. In the Peruvian case, we re-search the work of the
team of “native anthropologists” who gather the myths of the Valle del Colca Quechua speaking people throughout many years of fieldwork. The work of the group of indigenous intellectuals who organized PRATEC, Proyecto Andino de Tecnologías Campesinas is also re-searched in order to observe the way this eventual field in which PRATEC forges a very specific solidarity with what are termed “Indigenous Peoples,” also transforms the worldview of the professionals who thought of themselves as mestizo, and who recover their indigeneity in a critical turn.

Chapter 8 also observes the discourse preceding and surrounding the “encercamiento”/corraling of La Paz in 2001, the indigenous social movement which proves to be the reenactment of allied Quechua and Aymara resistance for which the name Quechumara emerges as poetic expression out of the field of indigenous social movement, a word strategically deployed throughout the literature, proving real that THOA and PRATEC practices echo what for hundreds of years these two indigenous groups in particular have sustained comparatively and translationally and that is an interecessional practice between Quechua and Aymara theorists and Western theorists in order to choose and act in the field, not just collectively, but allied in the interest of recovering the territory to which their knowing practices are germane in radically similar ways.  

Returning to the concern that guides our accompaniment of Godzich at this time, I ask, struck by the strangeness of the expression, “so constitutive of” written above: can something be “so constitutive”? To the extent that the methodological field we find ourselves in as we follow this critical turn to de-constitute the Western edifice, separating its parts from their artificial and abstract continuity, we underline how unreasonable this Western penchant is, how the parts brought together by this caprice express this “so,” this desirous intensity. This is no spurious distinction. If we may now accept that the confrontation with the wild or what we have provisionally named nature, with the help of our Quechua theorists, is the oldest and most ineluctable “facing” we must do and practice doing, then de-constituting the parts artificially and violently sewn together opens up an opportunity to position ourselves to make—an other choice, a choice which we continue to trace, by traversing the intercession, translational and comparative, of the Western and the Quechua field in the interest not only of the well-being of the social body, which Barthes and Foucault struggle mightily to revive from its “feigned” or “premature” death, but in order that the choice does not remain a choice between a feigned or premature death, that is, in order that we choose whereby we decide how best to govern ourselves, without the crutch and the subterfuge of this chimera as I call it, an “illusion” as Godzich names it, as you shall see.

50 The Eighteenth century is often seen as the century of the last Indigenous rebellions in Bolivia and Peru, led by Tupac Amaru (Peru, Quechua-speaker and his allied kin) and Tupac Katari, one Aymara speaking man from the Bolivian Altiplano who joined forces with Amaru to counteract colonial incursions detrimental to both their indigenous communities. See: Scarlelt O’Phelan Godoy’s work.
Concerned with modernity and the Western field, we are obligated to face how insistent and how ingrained these two systems of thought, the Hegelian and the Kantian have become, to borrow from Barthes, as ideoelectologies, and to the extent that we have heard our own loud lament for a prolonged period of time, the 1960’s and 1970’s and into the 1980’s and the 1990’s, and to the extent that in my view, the state of the world such as we know it has not dramatically changed, we may say, that this *kiasma* is still insistently “so constitutive” of what we oppose when we dream of what the post-modern may be, that is, what I will call, particularly and specifically, *the au-de-là*. The theoretical notions so adeptly and eruditely deployed have not exhausted their impact, as Foucault’s unearthing the deep fears and anxieties that buttress the Western edifice have not toppled these fears or the edifice, as Godzich intimates from the outset, as he starts out by analyzing the crisis that proves to be real in the eventual field of literary studies within American, that is US universities. We remain uncertain in any case about whether making the Western edifice fall, part by part, is actually the *but*, (signaling the French word which means goal, but whose spelling in English agrees with our interruptive impulse, especially at the intercession of the oral and the written, or the kiasma that *is language*) that is, the objective. The stakes are high for us all, as we have spend perhaps all of forty and hopefully more years in one long theoretical lament, for the lament is far better than the re-consolidation of this Western edifice, and if we trace the leftist ‘Marxian epistemological mutative’ turn in our modern history, we’ve spend far longer struggling to throw off the very real oppressions of the body and the mind, to reduce ourselves to the Western categories targeted in these investigations, the re-search that does concern us. There have been far more seismic disruptions, accompanied by suffering and pain in the Southern Hemisphere of our world due to what I will later unpack as this Western *complex of domination*, commonly expressed now as “neo-liberalism” by all social and political classes in these societies, with the exception perhaps of the ruling political class in Peru, openly embracing its practices, while the ruling political class in Bolivia pronounces it as the enemy, disrupting its control over this territorial region, while obligated to negotiate with its institutionality access to its own economic and political control over globally coveted *capital/natural* resources. Latin America as this territory is called, difficultly, as the notable absence of the Indigenous Peoples and their Territories makes problematic the name, Latin America is the region of the world this study does center on *comparatively* and *translationally*. 
The conditions affecting the eventual field of literary studies after Barthian and Foucauldian turns, now, in the 1980’s and 1990’s

In the academic article we will traverse, the article cited above, "Emergent Literature and Comparative Literature," Godzich will make the case that the problem is not one of displacing “literature” as the object of study as it was traditionally defined, but rather, the problem is one of field. He will take up the question of field through a compelling deconstruction of Kant’s Critique of Judgment and of Hegel’s Phenomenology of the Spirit, along with Aristotle and Heidegger in tracing an experiential field, or better, a field of “givenness.” Before we involve ourselves with his argument, it would be important to point out what impact the cultural trajectory from the 60’s and 70’s into the late 80’s and early 90’s may have on our discussions, by way of delimiting a specific sort of literary history. It is relevant to consider that in the late 1980’s the inherence of Barthes’ and Foucault’s contributions to the project of interrupting the imperatives for domination inherent in Western knowledge practices had wreaked a certain amount of havoc in the disciplinary boundaries of the University, the institution reproducing Western knowledge practices, especially in the disciplines of English, the disciplines of the study of other national literatures, such as French and German primarily, but certainly Spanish, Italian, etc. as well as the disciplines concerned with narration and language, such as linguistics, history, and “ethnography” as Clifford Geertz\(^\text{51}\) decides to call anthropology, not surprisingly in his work entitled, Works and Lives: the Anthropologist as Author published also in 1988. If we were to define this theoretical project as a contestation of the colonial or dominating or even imperial practice of Western knowledge, as the calamitous theoretical practice (I do embrace), then the work of many other “philosophers,” or disruptive philosophers, if you will, other theoretical practitioners working out of diverse traditions could be cited as contributors to the Theoretical practice Godzich will extend, many of them indebted to the “philosophical mutation” that Marx effected, to quote Foucault, such as Baudrillard, Lyotard, Godzich himself, and then De Man, Derrida and Lacan, alongside the anthropologists mentioned in the previous section, working through other disruptive theoretical projects, along the lines of the dialogical notion of Bakhtin, a compelling and interruptive formalist, including the historian Phil Deloria or the specific and compelling work of Chicana theorists of difference such as Gloria Anzaldúa; alongside other literary theoretical practitioners working out of Spanish, such as Santiago Colas, Javier Sanjines, Jose Rabasa, Walter Mignolo, Gustavo Verdesio, and the interesting anthropologist historian Fernando Coronil whose metaphors of popular movement and activity are recurring in his

theorization, all these latinamericanists, intersecting with other concerns and divergent practices; alongside other disruptive Latin American theorists working out of their national academic institutional frameworks beholden in an always creolized way to a Eurocentric tradition of Western knowledge practices, such as Bonfil Batalla, Nestor García Canclini, Gustavo Esteva. Of course this theoretical disruption is in turn indebted to the blindness, many times disruptively or quietly avowed throughout the course of decades of re-searching, and assuredly indebted to the insight of the theorists of the Frankfurt School, who delved into the intercessions of Freudian psychoanalysis and the Marxian materialist “mutation,” Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, and to their inimitable contemporary Benjamin, who departed early. Even Cornelius Castoriadis, a theorist of the political, the social, and the psychoanalytic is disruptive, as much as his metaphors were at one point considered spurious, though, at yet another point, contemporary, he is recovered by Latin American social scientists compelled by the possibility of a theory of self-naming, of political autonomy held in the fire of “the imagination,” not surprisingly.

And before these theorists, there were contemporary and earlier theorists preoccupied with similar disruptions to domination and colonial rule, such as Frantz Fanon, and earlier, Aimé Césaire, Edouard Glissant, and C.L.R James, and in Latin America, Jose Vasconcelos, Jose Carlos Mariátegui, Fernando Ortiz, and later the incisive and unflinching Octavio Paz, alongside the indefatigable Vine Deloria Jr., all, theorists of the disorder that the Continental Theory and its subsequent “Theory” that Godzich alludes to marshaled in with consistent regularity, in a wave of specific and rigorous re-search—throughout the decades of the 60’s, 70’s and 80’s, and into the 90’s, disruptive theory which would sustain the needed critique to modernity we may loosely call, the call to a post modernity, or what Godzich calls the project of a Critique of Political Reason, departing from the Kantian oeuvre. About these theoretical practitioners, as we will call them henceforth, an important assessment, however uncalculated but careful must be made regarding their discursive practices, and by implication my own. Godzich is instructive in this regard, for the criticism wielded upon the practitioners of the last four decades, transcontinental a bunch as they are, the trans-continental traversal focused on by Godzich being an “old world” to “new world” traversal marking all these practitioners however variously with Continental Philosophy such as we know it traditionally, as this is its frank traversal, point in fact, through colonial expedition with an imperial design. Godzich tells us:

54 The continental “Europeans” who “discovered” “Indians” in the fifteenth century according to how the West tells time, were seeking an unobstructed water throughway to the land of tea and spices, India, commodities so coveted by the monarcy and the aristocracy ruling over the fiefdoms of the “European” of
...[A] remark on the discursive stakes of theory is in order. One of the most common attacks upon theory has criticized its esoteric terminology, its jargon as it has become known. It should now be apparent [and the words should ring truer now,] that a philosophical debate is also a struggle to impose discursive modes, procedures of argumentation and demonstration, rhetorical and pedagogical techniques and strategies. Every philosophical battle has been carried out by questioning the philosophical authenticity of the discourse of one's opponent. Theorists have followed this venerable path, but they have had to be especially wary and thus particularly innovative in their own discourse [hence part of Foucault’s hesitation, tentativeness] since their opponent was nothing less than the present organization of knowledge: their challenge could not be stated in the language sanctified by this organization but had to systematically subvert it. (25)

We may conclude for the moment, that all these theoretical practitioners, spanning about a century of re-search address the problem of the violent domination ensconced in Western knowledge practices, and as a consequence, ensconced as well in the institutional avatars of this Western edifice of knowing upon which we base our institutions of governance, practices which shade the political and social experience that the Theory of the 60’s and 70’s re-posed before a reading public, generally from the left of a modern political spectrum, about the problems for the work and the lives that were impinged upon by the deeply rooted edifice of Western thought, wherever modernity and even a “postmodernity” has been said to thrive.

I argue that it is this paradoxical and in an important way anachronic co-existence of modernity alongside a postmodernity variously defined and whose signs we read, which still stumps us. We cannot fathom what it may be for instance to write about the other in the language of our own time, because, I sense we have not fully accepted that we are the Other, in that, most radically and decisively, we live in the same place, and that same place conditions our living. This is the kairos that I have indicated has propelled-- “man” is simply too reductive a term—so that we will favor person, in the Quechua sense (from translation)—persons to fearlessly face their death, their discontinuity. The closest we, and now I invoke the Quechua speaking as living in my time, and as being the same as me, albeit separate from me, where my body begins and after theirs ends, obviating for the moment the question of grammatical number, the closest we have come, in this traversal through the Quechua and the Western field comparatively and translationally is the instruction imparted by our Quechua theorists—of difference—for sure, and of relational practice that sustains a living harmony, to be sure. What they instruct us of, and

the time, just as we have seen the U.S. bellicosely prospecting for tobacco, coffee and sugar in 1898, just as we have too often heard a US “history” that suppresses that the first commodity sought was land, and the First Peoples displaced in order to obtain the prized possession by hook or by crook were the so called “Indians.” Let’s speak frankly. Mining interests displaced most of the Native American Nations of the Great Plains and up to the Pacific Ocean.
what the non-traditional “classical studies” practiced by Barthes and Foucault also underline, instructed in turn by the most non-traditional classicist of our time, Nietzsche, my erstwhile relation, what the Quechua theoretical practitioners instruct us of is that Western time and Western space, the Western Idea and the Western Object simply do not exist, or if they do, they, better than any theorist so far instruct us that the stake of proving this Western edifice to be real is harmony, the harmony their *four elements in convivial sustenance embrace*, for a kind of nourishment and a kind of sustainability is implied in this, rather than a *motion*, (the word I originally used in Chapter 1,) or rather, holding in its liveliest or healthiest state, a motion of sorts. It should be known that within this Quechua field in Quispillaccta and in the Andean region that speaks Quechua and Aymara, harmony is health.\(^{55}\)

This post-- what we know to have been our past-- but whose embodiment yet eludes us, as uncertain about our future, and as blind as anyone in our shoes might be about our own present, and a post-- this recent past; it is this dilemma which recreates a traditional split or cut between theory and practice, which extends the first cut between spirit and matter, to the detriment of matter. Gramsci in particular preoccupies himself with this dilemma especially, wanting to assess how quickly, how effective, how instructive theory can be if its labor is so laborious and drawn out, and perhaps prison heightens this “disjuncture” for Gramsci. Foucault’s attempt to revive the event as a *discursive* event could be heard as the attempt to *give theory praxis through discourse*, fully aware of the political stakes involved. There are numerous theories as well about the portentous advent of the post-modern, based on world system analysis, the political economy of the globe, the acrobatics of a financial sector whose metaphoricity has run away with our materiality leaving us with dollars and cents signs in our income statements of every sort, and then reminding us of its runaway ideality when there is not materiality to back up those dollars and sense, in the eventual field, after all: the 2008 Wall Street Crisis, (preceded and quite possibly proceeded by the same (the next) cyclical sort of crisis moving in crescendo from a humble material beginning to the highest metaphoricity of the commodity: sky rocketing financial capital so detached from the earth that when it crashes matter slaps everyone in the face.) Post modernity has also been theorized as the infusion of every space imaginable with and by the tendrils of this post-hegemony to such an extent, that empire is no longer a radical assertion which nation states and neo-colonial/capital prospecting strategies could belie, but rather, empire is what has actually become imminent, emerging as our proven reality out of every pore of the entire social body become the avatar of the machine.

\(^{55}\) See Appendix A.
We have with relative certainty theorized this post-modernity, from our position in what looks like modernity, perhaps only because we can barely move forward anymore: we’ve exhausted “land” to expand upon, “natural resources” to exploit, and we have “cornered” every commodity and labor market, including the language market gauging from what our theoretical practitioners tell us about the meaning making machine, (while yet others, De Man, Heidegger, and Derrida warn us about-- when we think about language and thinking and knowing.) We have theorized about a postmodernity as the following seriality of discourses, interrelating, and cutting each other off, and perhaps lending each other a hand: postmodernity and its arrival, or its overtaking, or its utter saturation of certain places, or of all space, and even of time. And yet, it seems to me that the what proves to be real in the field for most of us is yet and all a confluence of what we have come to call modernity, along with that which we know tugs toward a future that remains unpredictable but that does aptly get expressed in certain metaphors, why not list some of them: “globalization,” “a new world order,” “avatars,” “the matrix,” “global environmental crisis,” “global warming,” “energy crisis,” “Blue Gold,” “Dirt, A Story with Heart and Soil” “biological and cultural diversity,” “nuclear disarmament,” “Indigenous Peoples or First Nations,” “Secretariat of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues of the United Nations,” “Race in America.” If some of these metaphors sound “antiquated” to the reader, it is precisely this that proves my point: that which was a great sign of progress and what was modern, perhaps mid twentieth century or even for time immemorial, remains a part of what concerns us now, yet again, or persistently, for these are also the metaphors that stand as signs of the coming, the arrival of postmodernity, the signs of an implosion, and the prohibited explosion: the system, we have been told, has reached its limit.

The modernity that Barthes and Foucault describe, and the post-modernity that they announce is being ushered in are what escalate their projects, in Barthes’ case as the move from discerning mythologies to finding ideolectologies, and in Foucault’s case, as the move from the concern for the ensembles of discourses to be disrupted, to our later concerns for what he called fearless speech and power, or more precisely differentials in power driven by what I call the eventual field into multiple subject positions variously and distinctly addressing power, the concerns that he espoused as a highly visible public intellectual. Perhaps the most telling differentiation I could make regarding the incidences and location of modernity and post-modernity would depart from the study of literacy that Godzich undertakes from 1982 to 1988, and up to 1995, wherein he delimits what I will call postmodernity as the moment in which specialized languages, mutually unintelligible among themselves, derived from the very efficient disciplines which generate them, are born from an institution that is the foremost proponent of the
humanist project of transparent and universally intelligible language, the university; this moment
in which these specialized languages function as autonomous and disconnected avatars of this
universalism, as the University reaches a limit of the growth propelled by its logic, thereby
overtaking the humanist project, that is, the moment which Godzich calls, the Hegelian, absolute
fulfillment of all matter, by spirit, that is, by knowledge, happens in the following way:

It will be recalled that Hegel sought to describe the relation of knowledge to the
material world as a process whereby what he called the Spirit progressively
invested itself in the material world, making it increasingly conscious of itself
until such a time when all of matter would be so invested and the distinction
between matter and Spirit would no longer obtain. This process of investment
unfolds over time and traces the delineation of a history during the course of
which there arise different figures that represent epochal moments in the relation
of spirit to matter. The final moment is marked by the advent of Absolute
Knowledge, in which the intermediate figure of the State withers away to be
replaced by self-regulating and autonomous institutions of knowledge that no
longer need to communicate with each other, for they all partake of Spirit and do
nothing more than manage its day to day investment in the world. This moment
corresponds to the post-historical state. Absolute Knowledge is operative in this
world under a myriad of specialized guises that ensure that whatever problems
arise, they are immediately referred to and “solved” by the appropriate instance
of Knowledge. In such a world, Knowledge is no longer surprised by anything
since the Spirit is coextensive with all there is to be known, and the only
problems that remain are problems of local management. There are no longer
any discoveries to be made, and neither the nature nor the direction of the
historical process is worthy of speculation, for both have become manifest.

It is readily apparent that the new literacy, [the literacy to be taught in
English departments as composition or rhetoric, though what is meant is writing
efficiently in the various specialized codes of the professions, or their subfields,
while conveniently blaming and once again excluding the “inept” minority
students obstructing progress, or rather, interfering with the privileged class’s
access to “its” resources, paradoxically, and all one has to reflect on is
Proposition Two, the plebiscite measure which just passed in the State of
Michigan to reckon with the legitimacy of this reactionary racism] though
advocated by persons ignorant of Hegel’s grand design, not only conforms to it
but seeks to implement it. Blindly, it has put forward a notion of linguistic
competence consonant with a state of affairs where the concerns of a democratic
state, that is, a state still concerned with its own direction, purpose, and the
adequation of its means to its goals, are superceded by an all-encompassing
concern with efficiency and competence that takes the form of exclusive and
specialized practice and rejects as inefficient any broader concerns. Fukuyama’s
original essay and subsequent writings have made clear that the vaunted anti-
statism of the Reagan administration was directed at the historical figure of the
state and sought to hasten the advent of the posthistorical state whose fate, it
bears recalling, is to wither away and let its space be occupied by the managerial
forces of globalization. (13-14)
I will call *postmodernity*, this slope, this tendency toward *globalization*, by means of a specialization, an efficiency that accelerates the fated obsolescence of the state, as its Self becomes absolutely fulfilled in the knowledge of Itself, becoming that knowledge, or its Spirit, in the fulfillment of its institutional Avatars. This *postmodernity* is accompanied by the advent of mutually unintelligible technical idioms that whittle away at the humanist project, for better or for worse. As current events may reveal, the blindness of the present moment’s significance ever-present while the other senses could be put to work or play, it is possible to describe the slope of modernity at work in the present as well, as the call to the revival of history, to a grand narrative that enjoins us all to face a moment of crisis together, based upon the universal precepts that the tradition beckons us to embrace, including its attendant concepts and institutional realities, such as the state, its university, etc. is still at work now, however powerfully obstructed by the by the paradoxical auxiliaries to the necromantic project staging a strong reaction to the first President of the United States who comes from a traditionally racialized “minority” group. It is not accidental that Obama’s discourse is riddled with just such metaphorical aspirations, and that the reformist legislation he has formulated places desire to situate the State squarely at the helm of power, over and above the capitalist interests with whom the State has, since 1898\textsuperscript{56} been imperially working in tandem with, notwithstanding. Whether we are concerned for the pendulum, the Hegelian dialectic or time immemorial, an anachronism achieved outside this Hegelian fulfillment, arguably, an event has taken place in spite of this Hegelian historical fulfillment which has installed at the helm of power, the paradoxical African American President who has its two arbiters, legal orthodoxy avowing his legitimacy, while a sector of the public espouses the doxa of racialization and vociferously point out the President’s inferiority, his alleged alien status, his

\textsuperscript{56} The Spanish American War in 1898 during which the US Navy stages a skirmish with the Spanish navy that is barely able to defend its colonies, Puerto Rico and Cuba, so weakened has it become from its protracted wars against independence in its Central and South American colonies, that Puerto Rico, Cuba, and the Philippines readily become U.S. territory at a price, that is, the Spanish are forced to sell these territories at the victor’s price. This event marks the second bid that this newly formed creole nation makes for imperial control of global resources, in this case coffee, sugar, tobacco. At this point it has already waged a war with the Native American nations east of the Mississippi River and displaced all of the native nations from their homelands by means of the now infamously cruel measure taken by Andrew Jackson, “the Indian Removal Act” of 1831 where the Choctaw, then the Seminole, then the Creek, and finally the Cherokee Nations (1838) were displaced all the way to “Indian Territory,” or present day Oklahoma in what is referred to as the “Trail of Tears.” Jackson took this measure in order that immigrant and poor local European farmers would possess this land. The Mexican American war of 1846-1848 displaced Mexican citizens from a substantial portion of what became the southwest US territory, primarily Texas, New Mexico, and California, by means of a US war against Mexico and the forced sale of these territories. By 1890 the Great Plains Indian Nations were “conquered” and the “closing” of the American frontier was “official,” especially after what was termed the “Massacre at Wounded Knee” where the last of the Plains Indian Nations who were gathered in designated “Indian Territory” were attacked and killed by U.S. soldiers. It was after the displacement of the so-called “Indian” nations of the North American Continent that the U.S. made its second imperial bid in 1898. See: Vine Deloria Jr. historical exts.
impoverished judgment, and his ultimate “illiteracy” with regard to state rule. In one word, the paradoxical has been installed into power and perhaps this is the clearest sign of a post-modernity, when and if, poetic practice will have the day. What President Obama’s Presidency proves to be real in the field is that he currently cannot find a language with which to express this au-de-là, stuck as he has become between the language of state orthodoxy, that is the law, but also humanist orthodoxy espousing the grand narrative of History, ostensibly, as if History had not yet been fulfilled, and the reactionary and racializing public discourse of the *doxa* “powerfully aided by mass media.” It is indeed hard to argue that this racializing *doxa* is in any important way reduced by its supposed “minority” status, or its fewer numbers.

There seems to be at work at the present moment, perhaps a misguided attempt to revive the regulatory powers of the state, rivaled yet vertiginously by the imperatives of global financial capital, or, perhaps this rivalry is simply the necromantic staging of the same priests officiating a new broader ranging marriage of the two, or for the first time stages its marriage globally linking separate nation states together, say as the G25 and our banking and monetary financial capital systems, back stage, behind closed doors, on new terms, though the calamity that the huge financial firms experienced brought them out from behind the state curtains. The social body did surrender its energies to save these entities and the state that partners with them. At the same time, and this may be the most critical *kairos* for this modernity whose position iterates that we cannot begin again for it is confronted from within this specialized and simultaneously globalized world--- with the problem of the exhaustion of planetary resources, interestingly, energy resources which have fueled modernity’s ecstatic extension into its fulfillment, and the beginning of what comes after. Is it a mere (conceptual) coincidence or a monstrous (practice) coincidence that just as we say we have pillaged nature to the point of its exhaustion, nature being the West’s first Other, we are enduring an obesity epidemic in the pinnacle of the fulfillment of First World Subjectivity—however pragmatic—that is, in the US?

Not only have we deployed every weapon available to us and our Western partners from the military/industrial complexes that *are* our State(s) in their manifest Hegelian fulfillment, not only have we deployed an enormous amount of wealth in deploying an enormous amount of weaponry in a war to secure oil from the tyranny of those we have *othered/racialized* or kept criminal in our stead by granting them limited permission to defend our interests as our lackeys, or avatars, or sycophants, whichever you prefer, while we have kept hungry that social body that continues to be ignored and silenced by and through our hoarding---, for Westerners, am I---but

---

57 Does any institution in this country know—even approximately—how many Iraqi people have died or been displaced since this war began? Has the US public heard on any kind of basis through the media
we have plunged into the depths of the ocean, depths and lengths we’d never resorted to before and had no real knowledge of before, proving that the eventual field is the best teacher and that the only way we have ever really learned what fire is—is by getting burned—for this experiment has gone awry, and we are haunted by our memories of the prospecting and bedeviling scientificity of the nineteenth century where we were fascinated and spellbound by what we did not know, and we dared to rummage where no one had rummaged before, sometimes finding “gold,” sometimes finding a pebble. The oil spill in our Gulf Coasts is astounding error in the interest of this mathematical grid. And in keeping with the Barthian lament, and in keeping with the instruction of our Quechua theoretical practitioners, in accord with what that these Quechua theorists teach, We weep. Our problem is stemming an unprecedented flow and compounding our error with greater chemical toxicity; we have treated no thing and no one with care and respect, until the catastrophic results of our bio-prospecting bit us back, and we did not maintain that where we live, lives inside us, indeed is us in that, just as it holds us, we hold it affectionately, in a mutual sustenance and intelligibility/sensibility which sustains harmony. We weep. We may lament and cry in modernity, but we are led to as we near its limit and we fall down its slope into postmodernity, yet another, further fall—from which---we may recover?

The theoretical practice is still in play, although arguably, we may have moved in the direction that Godzich foresaw in his work compiled some fifteen years ago, and that is that the confrontation of the literacy of efficiency, competence, and mutual unintelligibility among the languages of specializations harbingers the imminent demise of the universal literacy of a traditional and even scriptural hermeneutics, an aesthetics and politics which the humanist project sustained as true, immediate and transparent, intelligible to all---that is--- democratic. This confrontation has only served to affirm either pole of this dialectic, tells us Godzich, in its eternal movement dialectically, progressively, and teleologically forward, renegotiating what Other would be sublated, (Hegel) and what new terms would represent (Kant) the old. In a word, Godzich tells us how, in the 1980’s and even the 90’s this theoretical practice would stand in, by necessity, that is, in the interest of self-preservation of the traditional disciplines of the Humanities, (as the literacy being taught in English departments across the country to address “the illiteracy” of especially every racialized other provoking the crisis in the first place, the literacy being taught in newly appended composition or rhetoric departments across the country collapsing language into these specialized languages, in fact, alienating all that was “critical” about this important reality, especially as we think through the consequences of Subject/Other in the Western edifice? Does Public Television honor the Iraqi soldiers that die everyday in this struggle taken place on Iraqi territory?
about theory, from any discussion concerning language, let alone literature,) but also in the interest of safeguarding the democratic institutions, the universalist, humanist, subjectivist and identity driven project that insured that this lingua franca of the demos insured also the solvency of the democratic liberal project, which still placed the State at its helm, and which did not permit the machine to overtake even the political—by imploding the state and history all at once, to name one current of the implosion. Godzich described the professionalization of the theorist, as much as we have signaled that the Foucault Reader may be a sign of his passing, as a part of his traversal ending, as one possible manifestation of the “absorption” of theoretical practice into the inner workings of the avatars of the machine, now totalized and now functioning out of its satellites: an empty center, its avatars running on the pilot that is the fulfillment of knowledge in spirit, managing only the most local of affairs. Godzich states this danger of the professionalization of theoretical practice succinctly and his doing so brings the effort and the critical moment of this écrit into focus: to continue to face the problem of the Other that Theory extends:

It seems to me that this is the gravest menace to theory today: its professionalized simulacrum, well ensconced in the system of knowledge, usurping the voice of the Other while silencing it and the practice of resistance that is genuine theory. The appearance of a professionalized conception of theory would mark the advent of a total culture of literacy, [of efficiency] in which theory, far from challenging the system of the posthistorical state, would be content to flourish in the sphere that was assigned to it. (33)

Theory perhaps then has an afterlife: if we have lamented all along, does weeping bring the healing required? Do we now have places, that is, localities, instead of sweeping enormous and continuous spaces, (and times) in which to find our particular fields, and our particular selves? How effectively can the avatars of History and Reason be at managing us, especially locally, assuming that us is the social body, completely known? What sort of freedom do unregulated cyberspaces represent with regard to these fully policed localities, albeit the policing takes place in that our minds are thoroughly colonized? As Godzich proceeds to translate, to traverse the place of theoretical practice in the discipline of Comparative Literature, we will find the field that he discovers from within the Western tradition as fertile ground from which to extend the practice of theory, once again, and perhaps not incidentally, “the project” as I had up to now named it, in order to face once again, this problem of the Other, from a “political” perspective, from the perspective of the turning point I have called choice, (after chance and before chance) the choice concerning how we may govern ourselves, and now grammatical number may be impertinent.
In some measure then, the propeller flight of theory, caught as we may still be, between theory and practice, the delay of one, (theory) and the postponement of the other, (practice) at best has become the serious play in the interest of materiality and the social body, and in favor of the materiality of an energetic deployment of discourse, in the interest of contesting power, prohibition, repression, displacement, elimination, all the criminality of the Western edifice we have up to now decried, whose pinnacle expression we are calling the colonial encounter, thus, colonization. It may have only served to affirm the Hegelian poles of Master-Slave, Subject-Object, and caged subject caught in the representational cognitive machine of Kant, in spite of all that we now research about the human mind, through technological media such as Magnetic Resonance Imagery that helps us test what happens in the brain in response to external stimuli, and in spite of what we now know about the intelligence of every cell in the body, that is, what we know about the relay, communicational, intelligent, between all cells in the human body: we’ve discovered intelligent matter, a highly complex network of communication relaying that very sensibility which we have been indefatigably reviving through our theorizations. But perhaps most importantly, we have unearthed the ne object of colonial mastery and that may well be the supremacy of the particle, the atom, and what in the Humanities we metaphorically express as the fragment, for which there is in the field a reality proven to be real based upon a new mastery of the shattered subject for which the particle becomes the avatar, just as the in the socio-historical field the fulfillment of History signifies that Reason is shattered in order to install multiple avatars of Reason everywhere in the field. We will return to the question of what this means for the other.

Godzich describes the effect of Theory, before this calamitous implosion, interrupting the project of dominance and power by emitting from the gap what the project of difference made possible and what we have up to now called the lament, and what Godzich calls “the cry,” the cry of the victim, the Slave, the other. (26-30) Translated into other terms, and drawing out the implications of the various practices of Theory, which he summarizes pointedly as the practice of the theorists of difference, he turns to the content of what he calls the “Critique of Political Reason,” again through Hegel, acknowledging the institutionality of Kant’s philosophical edifice as it permeates Western modernity as well, contesting its ability to safeguard the polity when Hegel intercedes, without this Critique of Political Reason that. According to Godzich, this extension of Kant is what the theorists of difference or of the Other may contribute eventually to the history of ideas, or what Godzich unabashedly calls, alongside Foucault as well, “philosophy”:
Turning now to the content of this Critique of Political Reason, I must begin by reiterating that I am not trying to impose upon the very diverse views of all those who have become engaged in theory some adventitious unity of purpose or intention that would not stand up to examination. It is not a matter of reducing all theory to one school, of imposing a seamless sameness upon thinkers of difference. It is simply a matter of recognizing that the common reference to Hegel has to do with the Other that has not allowed herself or himself to be fully colonized, or that has been produced as Other by a system that could not stomach him or her. Before identifying this Other with an actual group of people, the theorists of this period have sought to describe difference itself, the very difference that calls upon our thought from the vantage point of that which escaped Hegel. (25)

Paying tribute to the contestatory work of Nietzsche, yet again, which guided and spurred much of Theory along, Godzich goes on to say:

Thinking difference is a way of listening to the movement, not of the concept but of that which is emerging, to what Nietzsche called the “innocence of becoming.” It is a way of committing oneself to the destruction of the presumption of unity, of meaning, by accepting that transformations in the social sphere and in the organization of knowledge must affect philosophical discourse and indeed all discourses of legitimation. The thought of difference posits a radically different relationship between knowledge and action, between theory and praxis, than the one posited by Hegelian thinking. It takes difference to be irreducible to the interplay of analysis and synthesis and to the operations of power. It designates gaps, excesses, remains, radical alterities. (25-26)

Proceeding further alongside Nietzsche, Godzich explains the theoretical focus on writing as a further extension of what he calls the “philosophy of the cry,”-- not unlike what we have unearthed metaphorically out of our Barthian and Foucauldian re-search in Part I--, the name Godzich gives the discourse of the theorists of difference, as this theory responds to “transformations in the social sphere” and as Godzich himself permits this theory, this transformation in “the organization of knowledge” to “affect philosophical discourse” and “all discourses of legitimation” by avowing its place in the field, except that for our purposes we would amend to extend this name in the following way: our concern is for the philosophy of the cry of the Other, which implies the Subject, such as we have seen in Part I. Godzich resorts to Nietzsche’s work on Greek tragedy to describe what the relationship between writing and the philosophy of the cry points to. Not coincidentally, Barthes and Foucault also turn to Nietzsche’s reading of poetry as an other choice, a paradigm for the social compact or morality that may traverse what is in effect “the innocence of becoming,” or what is commonly called “life,” ostensibly the life that the other, as “victim” is robbed of, deprived of, violently taken away from, disappeared, and never heard from. Through Nietzsche and the works that the Western tradition chose to construct, transmit, and designate as fiction, as opposed to truth, Godzich elaborates on
the “philosophy of the cry” of the “victim” and how this conforms “a Critique of Political Reason,” the final outcome of how Theory may transform the Western organization of knowledge and its discourses of legitimation, evidently, into a legitimate alteration, but from that margin from which he advises us, the practicing theorist, especially the practicing and theorizing other must claim yet, as his position.

In his study of Greek tragedy, Nietzsche examines the relationship of the cry to the concept and sees writing as crying on the surface of the text, the coercion of which it feels itself to be the victim. Writing as usually practiced [think Barthes’ and Foucault’s descriptions] excludes difference, Nietzsche recognizes, but such a writing cries out this exclusion; it cannot do more than cry it out, for it must submit to the ways of that which excludes its difference if it is to be heard at all. To understand writing requires then that one apprehend the cry and the difference, to apprehend difference as cry, a cry of life against the death that is propagated by the system. …

Difference, then, is not a word and certainly not a concept; it is a cry. And one must inquire into the nature of this cry, into its force of resistance and the violence that surrounds it. The cry that theory has become attentive to…as Levinas puts it, [is] the cry let out by an injured person even if there is no one to hear it. Such a cry is a difference that cannot be contained in the unity that is presupposed by immediacy. It is beyond absorption. … Theory recognizes that the cry cannot expose itself otherwise than as a cry, for the ways of dialectical language occult it and bar it from presentation. [This resonates with the rhetorical status granted parrhesia according to Foucault, my Chapter 1.] In fact, dialectics seeks to provide such a cry with a representation, a spokesperson, that will replace the crying voice with a disciplined and policed voice that will know how to respect the required decorum of properly organized intercourse. [According to Godzich] theory sought to give a linguistic body to this cry, [but that does not mean] that it wished to speak for it. The cry is neither a Kantian synthesis nor a Hegelian dialectic; it escapes all discursivity, all the classical types of intelligibility, forcing thought to abandon the ground of a purely theoretical reason. The cry is excess and excessive in order that something may happen, that something be pro-duced [in order that something be led forward, held and then given for care, as I state it in Chapter 1.] …

The victim cannot be designated by a being, but by an activity, by its efficacy [in forward leading, or, for becoming.] Theory could be taken as a way of coming to terms with the proposition that the concept [Hegelian, Kantian, etc.] generates victims. The term “victim” is meant to bring to mind registers of suffering, of enduring, of coercion, and the work of theory must begin with the victim—how to pay attention to the victim when dealing with a system that knows how to make it disappear. One cannot proceed by means of juridical thought, which originates in the system. … The problem of the victim must be dealt with outside the law, for it is not a matter of dealing with the victim of something but with a pure victim as the figure of irreducible difference. … The result is that our conceptual landscape is radically altered: on the one hand we have the law and its agents, the judge and the executioner, and other derivatives of the system, which include the scholarly study of notions of repression, of rejection, of marginalization, all coming together to form a complete and coherent definition of the victim that can be readily stated in a set of norms. Facing this side there is the victim whose cry fissures the system, this all-too-coherent system, in a cry that reveals its
monstrosity. To listen to this cry is to get under way a Critique of Political Reason; it is to vivify the cry of the victim by tracing the arrangement of potential solidarities. (27-29) [Underlined emphasis mine.]

My study continues to take up this call in that I depart from the premise that we have disrupted modernity insufficiently, albeit in the midst of a continued situation of an alleged “posthistory,” however much Obama and the popular demand in the field that brought him to the presidency may prove real that modernity persists. At best, we may begin to make an argument for, we may begin to theorize the burgeoning conformation, tentative at best, of a new social class, a posthistorical class attempting to design new potential solidarities heeding the sound of that cry, even and especially if it is our own. Reactionary as it may appear, there is a populist solidarity conforming out of the “Tea Partiers” as I will name them, a name which we would do well to unpack by carefully reading Phil Deloria’s chapter on “Patriotic Indians and Identities of Revolution,” in which I read the symbolic re-possession of sovereignty over the land through the romantic representation of an “Indian” who is already, in some decisive way, ideally dead, but whose image is deployed for the sake of swaying the colonizing Euro-commoner who needs incentive to permit the ruling elite to deploy him as its foot soldiers, the Revolutionary militiamen whose dream it is to own the European commons, as their European lords once did, and for whom playing Indian is enacting this possession of the “an Indian commons,” however differently these Native American nations construed the land they lived with. Two positions that Godzich summarizes guide our analysis of the current state of affairs in that they persist as part of the practice of theory today:

The idea of the textbook rests upon the assumption that the experience of one human being can be conveyed to another by means of language, and that assumption further presupposes that human being are similarly constituted and are substitutable for each other. These are the underlying assumptions of modernity, and they lead to notions such as the progress of learning and of humankind. The critique of language practiced by the likes of Paul De Man, focused on the fact that the very social success of this approach had elevated language to the role of universal mediator and equivalent, that is, to a situation where there is universal reliance of language without any reflection upon the price we pay for such a reliance. [Think Foucault’s lucubration on discourse.] The research strategy of literary theorists has been to reestablish that language is indeed universally relied upon in modernity, leading some of the opponents of theory to accuse its practitioners of being language-obsessed. The second step in the strategy has been to draw attention to those aspects of human experience that existing discourses and languages were unable to convey, such as gender and race. (18-19)

And yet we find ourselves perhaps before the triple dilemma of what we may have accomplished if in deed we have been able to avert the first dilemma, the professionalization of
the practice of theory, that is, has it been designated a place at the center of institutionally legitimated discourse? When taking up the question of whether other “aspects of human experience” such as “gender” and “race” is now ably conveyed through the practices of theory, what could we say? Before we turn to Godzich’s still useful lucubration of the concept of the “Other” to unpack where we may be with regard to the edifice of Western thought which concerns us, and the task of listening to the cry which the Critique of Political Reason presupposes, especially with an ear for the experiences of those racialized or gendered, let’s linger a while with Kant and Hegel, how Godzich reads them, and how he arrives at the Critique of Political Reason which he then proposes. The foray is instructive about the functioning of the concept of Other, and why Kant and Hegel are the “conceptual landscape” that is yet the eventual field conditioning our discussion, at this time, or how we may have arrived here, specifically through them:

…To sum up, theory has sought to differentiate itself from, and indeed subvert, an organization of knowledge ruled by a Hegelian inheritance. At the heart of this organization one finds the Concept, which gathers to itself all of the metaphorics of light, enlightenment, sight, and vision that have constituted the Western notion of knowledge. The Concept defines the conditions under which one may have knowledge of beings. It carries within itself the project of an exhaustive ordering of things and of practices. The work of the Concept is accomplished by negation, for it is through negation that identity can recover its fullness, its unity. [Read negation of the Other.] Finally, Hegel treated history and society in the way in which space had been treated in philosophy earlier: as a totalization within which the dialectic is charged with the task of gathering.

It is not difficult to see that this critique of Hegel is actually Kantian in origin; it amounts to relegating the Hegelian dialectic to a transcendental illusion. [The chimera as I name it as a necromantic practice in Chapter 1.] All of the major theorists have remarked, in their writings, upon this return of Kant, for it has provided them also with a basis for their interest in issues of epistemology and of aesthetics, but this return should not hide from us the fact that it is not a matter of recovering Kant against Hegel, but rather, as I suggested earlier, of extending his task by writing collectively and dialogically the Critique that Kant never thought of writing: a Critique of Political Reason. (24-25) [Underlined emphasis mine]

It is negation of the Other through the exhaustive work of the Concept that assures the Subject that his fulfillment, as Foucault advises us, can be achieved by returning to him, the subject, all that discontinuity has deprived him of, such that in this total fulfillment, where knowledge of himself is completed by possessing all that is other, all that had to be known, he will have been given the home the West longed for in having denied discontinuity, and all that had been lost to this Subject of continuous and Totalizing history by the work of difference, which, by means of the concept will overcome discontinuity and all will be restored to him. This
abode as Foucault tells us is lifeless and has absconded the vivacity of chance, of materiality, of event. As Godzich puts it, there is nothing more to be known, the progress of learning and of humanity can stop. All others, who, in the Hegelian dialectic are in reality “victim” in accord with the way in which the eventual field has in thought been shaped by this Hegelian and Kantian worldview, as Godzich describes it, are superfluous. In the postmodern condition that Godzich tells us is projected by the prevalence of an imperative for efficiency in the accumulation of capital, an imperative which precipitates the mutual unintelligibility of specialized languages, or this new postmodern (i)literacy, the institutions which Reason/State/God guided to fulfillment through the humanist project of universally transparent and immediate truth, now become separate and self sustaining avatars. In this total possession of the conquering subject, the other that proves to be real in the eventual field, persists, and must be policed, albeit from the localities which the avatars of Reason now manage. Can we trace the potential solidarities arranged in accord with the eruption of the cry? How can we write, collectively and dialogically the potential solidarities conformed in the field as we pose the disruptive question, in the manner of a choice as I have delimited it in Chapter One about how we may govern ourselves? Foucault shattered the Subject into many positions, each alternate, each precipitated by chance and an engagement with materiality in the event of discourse. This event may be the way of writing the potential solidarities that emerge collectively and dialogically in the field that conditions the event of discourse.

This eventual field would now have to deal with the dialogical and with the arrangement of potential solidarities we may call collective. Does the cry, we ask again, sufficiently arrest the procedure of the specialized institution which now serves as the State and its branch of law and knowledge, in itself, as avatar, and at the same time? Does the local management of the social body presuppose the diminution of the forces of power to be confronted? Does the locality foster greater potential for collective solidarities precipitated by the dialogue that greater intimacy in this locality, a place, rather than the totalizing space yet longed for in modernity, and fulfilled in postmodernity—as place? As a preliminary answer to these questions, we turn to the two other dilemmas of racialized and gendered others, albeit able to assert, that the actively listening to the cry of a pure victim, a victim that laments the abduction of difference, pro-poses, or proffers the possibility for us to be held there, for care from and for one another, if in this case, we should decide, that Quechua rule should apply: holding the other in ourselves, sunqulla, as field for the Quechua speaking, and everything alive in it, is in effect, another Person, which in turn has held us, the collectivity of all persons, including nature and animals, in its harbor, Pacha. In effect we would even know how to carry on this dialogue, and to what end: we would do it with care and
respect, for the end of achieving *harmony* which is also health, well-being, for the welfare of all persons harbored, or as Godzich puts it, gathered, in this case in *Pacha* rather than the monstrously real consequence of the edifice of Western Reason most especially on the other that has up to now concerned us as the social body, but which now takes on the character of a nature, or *nature*, all Persons within her included, especially if Quechua were to instruct: *Pachamama*.

To continue to accompany Godzich to what I read as his *kairos*, and to what I call a moment of fearlessness, or of what has otherwise been called frankness by Foucault as he explains what *parrhesia*, fearless speech, may be construed as today, Godzich tells us what has led to this problem of the Other, while the theoretical practitioners we have accompanied have decried the advent of the post-modern, that is, the progress of the machine to its fulfillment:

Turning now to the content of this Critique of Political Reason, I must begin by reiterating that I am not trying to impose upon the very diverse views of all those who have become engaged in theory some adventitious unity of purpose or intention that would not stand up to examination. It is not a matter of reducing all theory to one school, of imposing a seamless sameness upon thinkers of difference, It is simply a matter of recognizing that the common reference to Hegel has to do with the Other that has not allowed herself or himself to be fully colonized, or that has been produced as Other by a system that could not stomach her or him. Before identifying this Other with an actual group of people, the theorists of this period have sought to describe it as difference itself, the very difference that calls upon our thought from the vantage point of that which has escaped Hegel. (25)

Latinamericanists preoccupied with a persistent *colonial encounter*, and now the notion gathers other meanings, abundantly theorized through the Marxian epistemological mutation of materiality, of Spirit turned upside down, or the Idea overturned in favor of an explanation that would render evident the social relations of production materially relegating Latin America to its subaltern position of Slave or Other before the Continental Metropolis, and the irony of the Continental metaphor I use to remind us of Continental Philosophy should persist. One is reminded also of the Cuban writer Roberto Fernandez Retamar’s theorization of the devouring that takes place in Latin America through his metaphor of Calibán, the result of the juxtaposition of Shakespeare’s Ariel and Prospero as an allegory of the process whereby Latin Americans become, not cannibals, with all of the pejorative associations to be made, over and against civilization, but rather, Calibans, Lezama Lima’s gourmands who can relish the metaphysical feasts of Ariel as much as they can palate the alchemical (“pre-modern”) feasts of Prospero, a *textualization* also of Latin America’s status in the Aristotelian, Hegelian, and Kantian order of

---

species, or the arc of Latin American failure or success at modernizing, that is, of propelling itself into its own History, and yes, of writing therefore. This Latin American textification of and about its condition has preoccupied an important tradition of Latin American, almost by Gramscian definition, organic intellectuals, poised, seemingly always, at this moment where Latin America awaited the possibility to write (our) its own History, waiting in effect, for its History to begin. Just as the creole nation to the north, the United States, it also had to await the moment in which its Literature would become universally acknowledged as Literature, a moment that really came into fulfillment, when Latin American writers obtained to the genres, that is mastered them and even transformed them. The acclaim that Gabriel García Márquez gained internationally, that is universally seems aptly to signal this turning point with tellingly, Cien años de Soledad/One Hundred Years of Solitude, though as magical realism would give it, it may just as well have been two hundred, or one second, from the moment of Colombia’s independence from the metropolis, to this narration’s first publication.

Fernández Retamar’s move is taken further in a dialogic and combinatory move, by Nestor García Canclini who, through his biological metaphor of “hybridity” tells us that Latin America not only devours but deploys specific strategies to move in and out of modernity as it navigates the field that Fernández Retamar may have symbolized as Ariel’s and Prospero’s but which García Canclini tells us is a vast textile of mutually constitutive genealogies, which render difference before the erstwhile Metropolis, but which at the same time are a specific and particular description of a miscegenation that produces difference locally, difference made strategic political practice in the every day by particular and distinct collective solidarities. But one is also reminded of Javier Sanjines’ important elaboration on mestizaje, and the Latin American stark inability to stomach its others, still and yet, especially as they may be the indigenous people displaced after colonization, Andean Quechua or Aymara speaking, or Amazonian Guarani speaking, or one of more than 40 identifiable languages spoken in Peru alone, where, the traditionally conquered Other, to state it in these colonial terms, of colonization and displacement, this Other remains present and alive, as we have read, and the problem of stomaching persists in modern territories like Bolivia and Peru, because the indigenous inhabitant was not effectively “disappeared” here, in these eventual fields. As the focus on “Afro-Cuban, Afro-Caribbean, Afro-Columbian, and Afro-Brazilian” “other” re-search at present

---

makes evident, the interdisciplinary object of the Transatlantic has emerged, as an object gathered from all manner of literature. This re-search is local, in the sense of specifically Latin American localities of investigation and search, while some of the collective solidarities dialogically emerging in situ do look to U.S. critical race theories as well, and derive inspiration from the U.S. Civil Rights movement. U.S. Environmental Justice Movements combining the traditional activism of the communities of impoverished racialized others who mobilized for Civil Rights, with the decades long preoccupation with US territorial natural resources and the environment whose turning point in the U.S. may be named Silent Spring, the book, the work, the text or its other name, silenced spring, are also being dialogued with, by an arrangement of local, Latin American, country and region specific, collective solidarities bearing the brunt of environmental toxic waste in their backyards. Inter-nationally dialoguing between the local resistance by the minority and poor, that is, the racialized others forming specific collective solidarities in specific localities of the US with, other minority poor, that is the racialized others of specific localities in specific nations in Latin America has brought this dialogic and collective writing of the critique of political reason to an expression which is decidedly local, but extends the arc of this resistance from continent to continent, from north to south, and from south to north, however tentatively or unevenly.

The problem of stomaching its Others persists in Latin America today as much as it may have at the inception of its republics and well into the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, as Part III will prove real in the eventual Peruvain republican criollo field in the first half of the twentieth century and well into the latter half. It is entirely probable that race relations in the U.S. prove real in the eventual field, that stomaching the Other is still a problem in the United States, and that the conciliatory pull of the humanist project will not effect the necessary affirmation of difference that this theoretical practice seeks, although this also remains to be seen. Perhaps, the solidarities expressed collectively and dialogically in Part IV may continue to express translationally and comparatively how the colonial encounter yet persisting in Latin America where the Quechua speaking who are the focal point of our theoretical practice may evidence how new solidarities given in experientiality may outline a new field of governance as well. For the moment we will move forward with Godzich’s description of the colonial encounter he unearths as the role of racialized and gendered others in the academy as they take up the theoretical practice whose past and present field we now delimit by describing how and what this writing does as it departs from difference, the difference that the theorists of difference we have accompanied translate:
Thinking difference is a way of listening to the movement, not of the concept but of that which is emerging, to what Nietzsche called “the innocence of becoming.” …Writing suspends all the familiar ways of organizing thought and experience: the genres of discourse, the distinction between disciplinary and disciplining modes of thinking, such as that between literature and philosophy. It opposes principles of classification and is against normative rules upheld by so many institutions that live off them without any qualms [without following the consequences of administering these norms to their ultimate consequences in order to decide their viability or effect, that is, uncritical of these norms]. It proceeds from another center of gravity than that of meaning or of vision. It attempts to render visible all the language that has been erased by the imperatives of transparency, thus becoming a labor of opacification, of restoring opacity where it has been glossed over. It does not contain what it says: there always takes place a spill-over that it does not control. We all know, after Derrida, that writing does not translate a spoken word; it does not work instrumentally as a different mode of expressing the unity and the integrity of thought that can be expressed in a variety of ways without being affected by any of these ways. On the contrary, writing designates a work space; it delimits and affects regions of knowledge and their political effects. It struggles against the privilege accorded to pure thought, to presence and truth. As an operator of destabilization, it liberates a space within which the separation between the sensible and the intelligible which has been mapped upon the distinction and the association of language to thought can no longer function. It breaks up closure by producing signs of the effect of closure. It produces an immanence of its own, which excludes that of a meaning prior or exterior to the process of writing itself. It is a form of autonomy, to be sure, but one that protests against the concept, for it both represents and is difference. (25-27) [Underlined emphasis mine. “/” designates where I create an intertextual citation, displacing one sentence from another paragraph into this one for the purpose of amplifying the sounds of difference.]

The theoretical practice of writing difference begins to echo, all that Barthes and Foucault have so far instructed to be the methodological field in which an interdisciplinary object of study could be found which revived a corporeal materiality made possible by denouncing closure through the written sign of “caesura,” of “the gap.” But it also resonates with the theoretical and political implications we discovered in our search through the Quechua field where we pro-posed that what was procured, given to be held in the Quechua field emerged out of a creative practice actualized through the conversation among persons taking place in this field and which we named “poetic expression.” The resonation is not surprising as Godzich navigates the theoretical field of difference as the yet Western, for our purposes field where difference operates specifically, where the “shard” stands in as a sign of the materiality absconded from the traditional Western edifice, while we found, comparatively and translationally, through the investigation carried out by Quechua theorists, that a “chard” stands in for an other person in the field, in actuality, in the eventual field, for the giving, that is, the creative or poetic power of the Quechua language here procures, gives to be held, an organic person, Water, or as I have suggested translationally,
moving in and out of the Western and the Quechua field. The “chard,” is a sign of the enduring opening that gives what is always already alive in the Quechua field, a field that creates and recreates all the fruits of harmony by sustaining a continual, respectful and caring conversation, where the field becomes the person, Sunqulla, at the same time as it harbors the person, wherein Ayllu can be Pacha by Quechua rule of person-all governance. In other words, from the Quechua field emerges through the innocence of becoming what I have called poetic expression in that it is both creative and political at once: this language recreates the activity, the person, and the rules that govern the world in language. There are suffixes that in the process of that linguistic agglutination named nesting give the care and the respect required to express the most tender and reverent care to all the persons alive and sharing in this convivial world that is Quechua. The collective solidarities that find themselves in a dialogic and collective interaction are a sign that the subject may be many, and that difference holds them together from the caesura and from the gap: in other words they are held from and in difference. While the latter more aptly describes a Godzichian colonial difference, the Quechua field gives Quechua difference. As Godzich puts it “[d]ifference, then, is not a word or a concept; it is a cry. And one must inquire into the nature of this cry, and its force of resistance and the violence that surrounds it.” The “cry” now stands in as the sign of difference, just as our first forays into Barthes and Foucault in Part I intimated were the pain and suffering which anticipated all that required unearthing and revivification. Our first traversal and translation from Part 1 to Part II has affirmed the echo of that cry, or what I called “a lament.”

Let us continue our re-search, our investigation through Godzich’s 1995 theorization of the consequences and effects of the operation of this colonial difference in a critical Western field, a field preoccupied with destabilizing the traditional Western edifice, decrying the coloniality resisted by its others which, we painstakingly described as we accompanied Barthes, Foucault, and the native narrators who we could now say is their difficult foray into that intercession we visit also as the field of comparative and translational intercession between the Western and Quechua fields which up to now has not given but an affirmation of what is emerging in the field, which is attentive to “the innocence of becoming” which preoccupies both fields, conforming an intertextuality working translationally and comparatively. This practice stops short in the critical Western field, but flows through to an encountering with an organic possibility of harmony that the Quechua theorists taught, and not simply the arrangement of a collective solidarity which may become express incidentally, for in the eventual Quechua field, this harmony is the rule to be obtained and held to. We may now answer some of our questions regarding the erstwhile Western lament, languorous or compassionate, as I earlier proposed, and
as I later proffered as a query. To do this we must accompany Godzich’s traversal through the critical Western field of difference or the cry:

Theory [what we call theoretical practice] recognizes that the cry cannot expose itself otherwise than as a cry, for the ways of dialectical language occult it and bar it from presentation. In fact, dialectics seeks to provide such a cry with a representation, a spokesperson that will replace the crying voice with a disciplined and policed voice that will know how to respect the required decorum of properly organized intercourse. [This could be the echo of the ground zero that parrhesia occupies as a rhetorical non-figure.] [And it may be worth repeating, as resonance:] When I said that theory sought to give a linguistic body [more echoing from Barthes and Foucault to here] to this cry, I did not mean that it wished to speak for it. The cry is neither Kantian synthesis [representation] nor a Hegelian dialectic; it escapes all discursivity, all the classical types of intelligibility, forcing thought to abandon the ground of a purely theoretical reason. The cry is excess and excessive in order that something may happen, [the Foucauldian event…] that something be pro-duced [Barthian rustling which gives the play of text]. One must be tempted at this point to say: but who is this crying victim? The question does not make sense, for it presupposes an ontological answer [and yet we wonder why these theorists were reluctant to mention these “others” victimized, and why they became difference itself…, or what procedure would have provoked that these others would become difficult or impossible to stomach…]. The victim cannot be designated by a being, but by an activity, by its efficacy […] though this is theoretically impeccably reasoned, from Barthes to Foucault, to Godzich, it begs the question—to do what?—efficaciously? To throw off, to do what with, or to resist coloniality?] / The problem of the victim must be dealt with outside of the law, for it is not a matter of dealing with the victim of something [, are we sure?,] but with a pure [theoretical?] victim, as the figure [discursive theorization] of irreversible difference. / [To explain what may be meant by outside the law, Godzich reaches toward Foucault’s discursive theorization in his work, book, the written field for and of his labor, Discipline and Punish to distinguish between the law, and what field this victim abides in, as distinct from the Western traditional field of Legal Jurisprudence or the Law of Pure State Reason. He tells us that:] This is not the victim that theory has been concerned with. As Foucault recognizes at the end of Discipline and Punish, “the notions of institutions of repression, rejection, exclusion, marginalization, are not adequate to describe, at the very center of the carceral city, the formation of the insidious leniencies, unavowable petty cruelties, small acts of cunning, calculated methods, techniques, ‘sciences’ that permit the fabrication of the disciplinary individual.”… The result is that our conceptual landscape is radically altered: [aha] on the one hand, we find the law and its agents, the judge and the executioner, and the other derivatives of the system, which include the [traditional Western] scholarly study of notions of repression, of rejection, of marginalization, all coming together to form a complete and coherent definition of the victim that can be readily stated in a set of norms. [The exercise of the Jurisprudence designed in accord with the application, “the exercise” of Pure Reason.] Facing this side there is the victim whose cry fissures the system, this all-too-coherent system, in a cry that reveals its monstrosity. [Echo from Chapter One to Chapter Two.] [And we arrive again, from another direction:] To listen to this cry is to get under way a Critique of Political Reason; it is to vivify the cry of the victim by tracing the arrangement of
potential solidarities. [27-29] [Underlined emphasis mine; “/” designates an intertextual citation to amplify, to echo.]

This is a cry that echoes our labor in the written field of this écrit so far: its efficacious pro-duc-ing is the evidence of the Western edifice’s monstrosity. We must take a moment now to ask who this theoretical practitioner may be, as we have heard say that he could be one of those others, gendered or racialized, who may have infiltrated the University, though the University may not have been able to, then and now, stomach these racialized others, in spite of the resistance that pro-duced not just a cry, but a formal and legal corrective, “amending” the Western Edifice of Reason such that the demo-cratic Constitution of the U.S.A, for instance, received the corrective of an affirmative action legislation that reminded the descendants of the forefathers’ descendants, that “man” meaning a universal man, including woman as a subal tern detail, an idea man that precluded that particular men, be they black, brown, red, yellow, purple, and green---be excluded from the eligibility of the universal man, to his human privileges, that is, his rights. This “truth” was held to be “self-evident,” and yet the doxa of those who enjoyed these privileges while racializing others who could not, and could not by dint of a subversion of “the letter of the law,” held, rather, in the field, that the doxa’s common wisdom, was real, and not a mythology at all. The reality proved in the field was that the constitution did not uphold its Reason of State in all places and at all times---the rule of Reason. We must grant, notwithstanding, that this bold (North) American, pragmatic experiment, this praxis, like all revolutionary moments, erupted into Philosophy, disrupting all that was principled or orderly about it, upholding the impetus of its break from tradition, by traversing a prolonged chaos. (This revolution also preceded the order that the Kantian edifice would enable, later.) In this case, nevertheless, the stark contrast between this Republican constitution-al theory to its practice belied its own Truth for 188 years, notwithstanding its beginning, unavoidably chaotic, from the Declaration of Independence written in 1776 to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibiting racial segregation or discrimination in public spaces and places. The popular or collective irruption that fissured the necromantically disseminated doxa, whose arbiter was the necromantic and paradoxical state functionary or accessory included by a ruling class to administer its affairs--- or what I have called the subterfuge concealed behind its necromantic reenactments of ruling class rationalization for oppressing others through the ruse of its constructed superiority--- may have to be addressed as the labor of Subjective activism. We could trace the arrangement of this collective and Subjective solidarity as the theorization of the efficacious activity of difference and its effect, just as we can do so for the Objectified and Other theorization of the efficacious activity of difference and its effect on the part of the racialized
others who deployed such resistance as well, although we might rather be talking about endurance as well, or in the first place. Godzich, like the critical Western theorists before him elides the question of who particularly these others may be, preferring to displace the question of their reality, though he does devise a program for “them” and a real and difficult field of practice within an academic discipline and among colleagues who “see” him or her as “other” incarnate. The colonial encounter persists, notwithstanding all the theorizations that avert it. Here again the Quechua theoreticians are instructive: their investigating is a tracing, a tracing of how all others, including themselves speak, for what sustains the nurturing conversation creative of harmony is there are no selves and no others: what is vital and engaging is the conversation. It is the conversation that is what I call indigenous---kinship and alliance---the con-viviality sustaining all things.

Perhaps what is needed is a theorization of endurance and then of resistance, for the cry barely does but lament, and this “reminder” is remarkably remote from the suffering actually endured in the eventual field. We can barely avoid the stark relevance of what was also proven to be real, in the eventual field, and that is that a social class of “subjects” had effectively colonized these racialized “others” for one hundred and eighty-eight years. This “Subjective” arrangement of collective solidarity, arguably also pro-duces a theorization of difference which the last fifty years of resisting Affirmative Action Legislation abundantly evidence as real, especially in that the civil rights of this “majority” of others are being violated by the deployment of this attempt at a theorization of difference, through an affirmative action which might have sanctioned “difference” but which was engulfed by the project of identity in that it was deployed in the discourse of Reason. This affirmation would never be effective ensconced within the Edifice of Identity. This is the lesson of the theorization of difference that pro-duces something else, albeit, an apparently small cry. The discourses that narrate how the privileged are the victims also abound, because this discourse is the legitimate discourse of the Edifice of Reason. As P. Deloria reveals in his first chapter about the question of the American need or desire to play Indian, entitled Patriotic Indians and Identities of Revolution, this mechanism’s opacity and brilliance, this problem of identity and difference, so long as it is operationalizing Hegelian dialectics and Kantian representation, it is in actuality collapsing, just as much as it is disappearing, not a pure cry of pure difference, but a real arrangement of collective of solidarity or violent fragmentation of racialized others, for the opposition to totality is “in effect” a fragmentation, whether theoretical, as in the “post-modern” theorizations which give the pieces, or whether it is in enabling the conformation of fragments of the social body into insurrectional force, or whether it is breaking the fragile economy of the psyche, which we now know is ineluctably the whole
called the psyche/body into pieces, fragments which we treat medically but which also express break downs, disease, cuts into the whole being of persons, persons in the *Pacha* sense. The Quechua field practices as knowing are instructive again. The Western duality falls short of understanding how all things, that is, all *persons* abide with one another from their wholeness, and not in response to one thing over and against another.

“Men,” in effect and in practice, this practice of theoretically revolutionary difference practiced by the colonial men of European descent in North America pro-duced the exclusively different Euro-American revolutionaries who could then conveniently don the mask of “Indians,” as they became the sovereign owners of “Indian territory,” systematically displacing all the “Indian” nations from their homes through a set of tenets that were outside of the indigenous peoples of this North American continent’ knowing. What both Euro-American colonizer and Native American Peoples had in common was the desire for harbor, for shelter and protection from within the natural environment. However, only those of European descent or of necromantically prescribed “racially superior caste,” underlining the troubled bourgeois revolution that had been exported to America, that is, to the English colony by the French revolutionaries who supported the American radicals who would enjoy the effect of this theorization of difference in the field would come to enjoy, at the dire expense cruelly effected on others, namely the indigenous peoples in North American land at the time of this colonizer’s arrival. “Haitians” as well as the so-called “Indians” colonized would be excluded and racialized as others, yet again, and it is frankly doubtful that “the cry” was a necessary reminder to them of the reality of their oppression. The cry is a reminder for the discomfited subjects of difference called the “theorists of difference,” I argue. A cry that recalls that the Self can and is at any time the other, and never purely anything, let alone, the instance in which it may be purely itself---in the eventual field where everything flows with life, everything is alive because it is moved. Melancholically, it is also the pain of the sustained “certainty” that all will be returned to the Subject of History, the Self, just as soon as all that is other is conquered and restores a neurotically enacted desire for continuity, for unity, for oneness—once and for all. Living in this perennial fear of loss is the element that precipitates not only the melancholia, but also the obnubilation of all that is different and all that is alive because of it---in the Western field. What these colonized others endure, and it is no longer a matter of the necromantic and fearful ruse of race but a matter of worlding a place, a field of experientiality where the rule is violence, a cutting, fragmenting violence. This is the re-membering that the cry calls for, and not just a reckoning with the monstrous. All the crises that denounce monstrosities must be traced in the field and the constructs sustaining the monstrosity, not just de-constructed to create more
fragments, but de-structured to disable their efficacy altogether, and this implies the activity of theorization I am practicing: translational and comparative traversals that trace the various and diverse expressions of the colonial encounter at real and localized places. The textual field remains in this sense, the field within which Quechua theorists investigate, trace the footsteps of its kin in order to know how to govern today, and in order to remember the sustaining and cultivating conversation that makes it possible to live with all persons in harmony. Harmony is not just the jingle that the John Lennon song has become. It is something practiced without a name, without proprietary ownership, and without selves and others vying for supremacy or for the ability to hoard the most.

Did the public University welcome the racialized other into its midst, that other that it could not “stomach” for one hundred and eighty-eight years? Was it easier to “stomach” the gendered but not racialized other into its midst? As a fragment of those deemed “men” in the actual field where the doxa that some men were not men reigned supreme, “women” were only “women” as a part of that Reasoned and Historically constructed totality intending to eliminate all others. The notion or descriptor “white” is what is commonly used to describe this doxical and orthodoxical racist order, though the orthodoxical order portends a “humanity” that is “all” inclusive, but which in effect, in the eventual field excludes systematically and necessarily, for that is its logic: those it deems “others” must be excluded, consumed, or as Godzich puts it, “disappeared.” “Women” therefore is white woman as fragment, as property of white man, recalling also the proximity of the racialized other to the natural resource exploited. Viewed from the purity of critical Western theorization, there is room for “white woman,” as fragment only, as I have indicated, a quite powerless condition to be relegated to—only until---the fragment becomes the rule, as in the post-historical Western world as text. This explains, not a singular incident, but the co-incidence of the post-historical Western world and the emergence of “white women” into power, not only in greater numbers, but as the logical “look” of power in the post-historical world that would have theoretically absented the state helm “white man,” fulfilled as this Subject is, while his avatar, “white woman” as fragment, manages the local avatar that no longer needs centralized oversight to carry out the project of History and Reason which has been fulfilled.

And yet, the answer to the question about whether others were “admitted” into the academic institution would be yes, so long as that gendered other was prevalently the heterosexual counterpart of the male non--racialized Subject now dispersing power, the “white woman” counterpart to the “white man” reigning supreme in absentia now. As it turns out, male and also racialized white legislators occupying the Subject position of power in the Hegelian
Dialectic playing itself out in the Political Field, capitalization marking this provisional field with a status between the field of the Critique of Political Reason that Godzich proposes, the Western field that specific theorists of difference have de-scribed and de-limited, and the Quechua field so far not comparatively or translationally engaged with this new field of practice, the Political Field, the contested field of racialized others and privileged subjects where the resistance written about is proven real and where there are paradoxical arbiters and auxiliaries at work.

The field where the colonial encounter emerges again and again is an embattled and agonizingly difficult and painful field, as we shall have to see, if our eyes can stand it, and as we shall have to hear, if our ears can, and if our hearts can sustain it, lest they fissure and break before the Western edifice does. Witnessing is no small part of the breakdown, and it is why Fearless Speech becomes dangerous still, but radically necessary. I am irreparably haunted by the real cries of the victims of the Rwandan genocide, a genocide precipitated by differentiations so ingrained on the basis of the toxicity of racialization that the indigenous peoples who suffered European/Western colonization in this Rwandan field, two distinct groups, turned against one another through the poisonous conduits of this racialization deeply embedded in the Rwandan field through its particular and enduring colonial encounter, an endurance that could no longer be sustained and which erupted into an irrational but organically necessary release, and we will be reminded that we are all susceptible to dying without this release, and the Quechua field and its way of knowing intimates that nature herself, Pachamama, as the person who harbors us, is just as much a person as any Runa or Deity. So tremendous was the pressure placed upon the necromantically staged opposition between these groups who before colonial encounter had not regarded one another in this way were unable to throw off the colonizing enacted by a “Subject” not present but in absentia strategically designing how to displace and channel this pressure, this imminent repudiating force called violence cunningly channeled by the colonizer onto the second collective of solidarity it conquered and colonized. How easy could it have been, and how calculated a tactic to deploy in order that the violence that should have been directed at the oppressor himself, would be diverted to another oppressed group, through the unreasonable, but Reasoned “idea” of difference-- as racial “superiority”—imputed now, to one colonized people in order for it to be inflicted on another colonized people. This yet another subterfuge reenacted by the necromantic priests that are not only deploying the vision of a fulfilled destiny for an “all” that is in reality a chosen few, but who are armed to the hilt with the best and the most advanced weaponry, the object of study upon which they pour their Reasoned and calculating ingenuity, when they’re not pouring all of their Reasoned cunning into the ponderous task of devising stratagem after stratagem for keeping the racialized other oppressed, that is, disappeared, and out
of the way. It does beg the question of whether this is creative and recreative energy at work or play, at all.

The colonizer “masterfully” deflects the mighty force of the violence required to throw off Any colonizer, upon the second racialized nation to be colonized making of this second racialized other, distinguished by its difference, the exploitable weapon of the ruling subjects, duly spreading the infection of racialization—-as difference!—- while deflecting the lethal force of the internal pressure about to explode to throw off the unbearable pressure of the oppressor—- upon the second colonized victim—- dispersing this explosive and inevitable violence, alongside the infection which spawned the notion of this colonial violence in the first place, among what Fanon calls the natives, the natives colonized. From the purview of the Quechua field, this is tantamount to exploding weapons of mass destruction in or near Pacific Islands deemed “remote,” exploding weapons of mass destruction in New Mexico while they were being aggressively scientifically “discovered,” constructed, and tested, in that from the Quechua field the island would have been populated by all persons, from what we call nature, with persons who are forest, mountain, water, animals of every sort, and deities. In a word, the Quechua field could not conceive the possibility of these explosions, nor would this field sustain the kind of Reason and Science germane to this Western Colonial Field. The Rwandan genocide proved to be the real effect of a colonial difference rationalized into a tactical racialization that pitted one victim against another to the pitch of an uncontrollable explosion of violence, silent in a radical way, other than as incomprehensible cry, riveted as either actually colonized “collective of solidarity” became by the need to displace the intolerable erasure of coloniality, for any person or collectivity.

This necromantic subterfuge made diffuse among the othered, in this case the racialized and colonized social body, the body that the theorists of difference would like to recover, from violence of another sort, life threatening, but where the Self abides is its monadic way yet physically unharmed. Can this post-modern revival of the body ever be compared to the relentless punishment that the colonized as other endure in the actual field of what are termed second and third tier territories, “remote” from Reason and History, “in fact”? Is the cry of othering suffered by “white men”--- who are part of the demos expected to fight for the necromantic rulers in the interest of this limited membership in supremacy that belies state republican laws, let alone their word---and can the cry of othering suffered by “white women,” the fragmentary and subaltern status of these persons relative to “white men”--- be compared to the relentless and totally life threatening attempt to deny the non-white, racialized other---the all out attempt to take the very place s/he dwells in fully as a person? It is in the metaphor “white”
where we find the place in the eventual field, for the effects of this “pure cry” to be evidenced as real: in the real—this “pure cry” barely compares to the events that are genocidal and which are evaded by the very narrations of Reason and History entirely—for deeply set within its logic is the justification, indeed the need, for this total and destructive consumption to take place, as we have seen. The “pure cry” is indeed a far cry from what is required to address the devastating effect upon every “other” deemed “non-white.”

I find the expression of that kind of colonial violence, an effect whose source is so deeply buried in our ability to deny, to turn away from our guilt—let alone face our terrific fear—that it is the deepest morality we can unearth from our own history, as Foucault instructs. The fragmentary and subaltern position of “white women,” and any number of combinatorial permutations of fragmentation and subalternity would likely elude similar responses in the actual Western field where Self/Other, Subject/Object, and where Colonizer/Colonized are operative, however interrupted the domination reenacted. This fragmentary subaltern position has as an effect of resentment and petty envy, the effect of the thwarted desire to be included in the playground games, and not excluded, so to speak. As Agamben explains in *Infancy and History*, the fragmentary is often associated to toys, to the ritual object, to another time other than that of serious adult work which the Western necromantic priest has prescribed in order to exploit the labor of the bodies it must deploy to hoard wealth and preserve power, apparently. The effect of resentment and petty envy hardly compares to the effects of the extreme pressure that non-white directly colonized others must endure, catastrophically. The Rwandan genocide is a horror for which there can be no utterance in language, and for which the cry is nothing but a *mere* lament, too pure a lament, in keeping with the etymology of “mere,” too pure a mourning to address this catastrophic event in the field. Just as nothing could prevent the sociopathic and toxic deflection stratagem deploying “pure difference” from occasioning this catastrophic effect, for the difference imported to the post-colonized territory was an export of a particular sort, there are also no words, no signs that could stand in for such horror, interestingly—none from the Western field which bears the contradiction of its letter of the law being violated in common, democratically designed public spaces in these Western fields—none in that just as in the Quechua field, no *person* can endure this much pressure accumulating without releasing it, as Barthes, Fanon, and Castoriadis instruct, without dying. The terrible measurement at work here through the stratagem is that if enough pressure is exerted, death will occur.

---

The monstrosity is of course the colonizer’s stratagem: for this we have words and the theoretical practitioner of difference must now contend with the socio-patho-logical choice of this necromantic subject, who can no longer be hiding behind the scenes, the arbiter of the persistent colonial encounter who Barthes openly calls cynical and whose steps Foucault follows, tracking the predator, the one precipitating these actions upon others. In accord with our tracing the intercessional possibility where the question of how we may govern ourselves is a matter of a choice for which we must also trace consequences, the Quechua field remains instructive: the differential in power between persons, defined as Subject and Other in the Western field, albeit even when able to face “your” self as other, and “your” self in the time of the other, fearlessly, by chance aware and vigilant of the blindness occasioned by the brilliance of the present, and the lesson of its opacity, even then, we are unable to de-structure—by all the procedures of Theorists of difference so far re-searched—we are unable to de-structure the construction of difference as hierarchy, as a strange vertical arrangement if we observe from the field of experientiality, the field of what is given. Rarely do we find any thing abiding above another in dominance if we observe the web of relationships needed to sustain the life of one thing, let alone all things. This differential in power between to or many or all things, according to Quechua rule is sensed as an imbalance, a sign of unhealthy living. Yet, sadly, even what intends to “heal” from with the Western field understands disease as something to be disappeared as well, failing to see its organic reality as intrinsic to all that is alive, and as an expression of living that can also be conversed with on the way to restoring harmony, which is the Quechua speakers knowing about disease: it is part of the healthy that became by wrongful and stubborn turn, unresponsive to the health implied in harmonious conversation.64

The Western approach taken to medical practice, which while clinical, that is, practiced is still theoretically violent: disease is attacked much like the other must be controlled, dominated, or eliminated. The Quechua field of knowing observes this imbalance as it observes all persons, and converses with it; through this conversation, and the knowing held from the field, in memory or in the onk’oy yachaq, the knower of dis-ease, this imbalance is restored to balance.

Y en las comunidades campesinas si una persona, planta o animal, cerro, laguna, está en su ritmo vital se considera que está en su esplendor que le es propio (‘ayrini”), y si no está bien, se dice que ha perdido su ‘ayri,’ se hizo manso o se ve cansado. El ‘unquy’ (enfermedad) denota varias condiciones. Es el estado de desarmonía por la que le ha tocado vivir a una persona (humana, naturaleza, o deidades). (Los Ánimos de la Enfermedad, Plantas Medicinales, manos, y Sitios Sanadoras.  Machaca 11)

And in the peasant/cultivator community if a person, plant or animal, hill, lagoon, is in its vital rhythm it is considered that this person is in their splendor which is their own (“ayrinpi”), and is this person is not well, it is said that this person has lost their “ayri.” The “unquy” (disease) denotes various conditions. It is the state of disharmony that a person (human, natural, or deity) has had to live.

This differential in power, which proves to be a real *ruse* in the field, is the first form of toxicity, the first register of pathology disrupting in the case of the Quechua field, harmony. From the Western field, Fanon’s “treatise” on what he calls the *Wretched of the Earth*, the colonized racialized other is in actuality the clinical evidence of the psychological realities of colonial rule, proved real in the field of war for independence from colonial rule, not of a theorized sort, but of the sort that lets the real damage in the field tell the story of what the real effects of colonial rule upon the psyche are. In a sense, this book is Fanon’s annotation from the field, or the results of his work in the clinical field in which he practiced the profession he had been trained to practice, psychiatry, but which the pain and rage he encountered had not prepared him for, except that Fanon experienced the position of other in the field that proved the reality of his own oppression as other, however mitigated by the status granted Western professionalization. Chapter 8 will elaborate on this process of other theorization. As it turns out, the colonial encounter that takes place in the eventual field may actually be, in its effects, ultimately unbearable, to both—the Western body and mind.

Gramsci, to name one theorist, unpacks in his chapter on the Machiavellian Prince, precisely this sort of stratagem, or what I call subterfuge. The unbearable horror of this explosion of rage, shame, and sorrow is pain beyond the theorized cry we write about, beyond unspeakable and indescribable. Have these racialized others amenably joined forces with other theorists of difference, and how has this traversal as the other within the Subject’s ivory tower suited this racialized other, and what has this racialized other abiding in the Edifice’s institution of higher learning, the place where the necromantic priests and other scientific researches gather, some theorists of difference, some not, (for the term may be applied as much to the humanist, as to the social or physical or biological scientist,) been able to do? What could we call this conduct that up to now has been a sheer description of necromantic theatrics without a sense of their real effects in the eventual field, especially upon the Western other, who, as we are discovering, as colonial other can be no more than a victim, of varying toxicities or crimes, or better yet, for our theorizations—socio-pathologies—toxicities installing an invented hierarchy, a stratification within the social body which creates dis-ease, imbalance, a disruption of harmony.
Godzich suggests that as the literary critic approaches the literary object of study, the critic sustains theoretical tenets, which more or less consciously assist in the process of understanding the literary work, the implication being that the work itself defies the ability of any one tenet definitively to unearth its significance, that is, the work itself defies the critic’s ability to grasp the work through any one methodology. Unlike other objects of study, “literature” cannot readily or easily be “understood” through one reading, one analysis, one final and determining definition of its meaning. In some measure, Godzich’s assertion alludes to the fact that “literature” evades this final and definitive understanding, by its very nature, and more obviously than other objects of study. The other implication of Godzich’s statement is that the critic must in this way suspend her or his control, ostensibly methodological, therefore scientific, so that the work may yield its meanings and implications, albeit in a limited way. The critic must strike this balance between the limited efficacy of any methodology, and the inexhaustible proliferation of meaning that a work preserves, and even extends, through translation, as Benjamin suggests. In effect, literature, in a larger horizon, which will become part of the discussion of the Western field, evades the history of ideas that purveys the imperative of identity, in a specific way. If in effect the afterlife of a work is yet vibrant, as Benjamin suggests, in that second traversal we call translation, the first one being understanding as a first translation of another sort, than what is literature if is not some kind of radical difference, some kind of disruption of the discursive order of logocentrism through which science also expresses itself? Perhaps here we could say, having arrived somewhere, that what is at stake within the Western field is the other that the tradition refuses as anything other than itself; what is at stake is the insoluble difference of what is other, what by definition, must be different, if it were to survive Western civilization. Literature in Godzich’s sense, escapes the totalizing force of the imperative to ordain all as identical, the same, especially in the eventual fulfillment of its “essence,” its “spirit,” it’s Being.

It is at this crossroads where a discussion about an Andean oral tradition may open up, in that in multifaceted ways, the Andean oral tradition has an afterlife, through the multiple, multilingual and multicultural translations it has sustained. The Quechua oral tradition which is here observed and read becomes manifest in architectural structures, archeological mapping, oral to written transcription, Quechua to Spanish and Spanish to Quechua translation, in summary, the multiple and varied registers of what I term a civilizational landscape, albeit a landscape that has suffered multiple and varied interventions. While the relevance of many of these manifestations
cannot be denied, and are in fact part of the palimpsest of structures from which Quechua poetic expression emerges, this study is concerned with the emergence of printed forms of Quechua expression, that is, what is of concern here is an archive of written translation of these Quechua oral traditions in which even the transcription is a translation. Literature for this purpose is defined as printed word, and this five hundred year old archive of printed registers of this Quechua oral tradition is defined as an archive of texts.

The printed word maps the field of what I call Quechua poetic expression in a particular way. My study of Quechua expression and the archive of Quechua oral tradition intends to begin to outline the emergence of what I theorize as poetic expression, an expression which is both creative and political. The literary, for our purposes, signifies, however provisionally, a verbal expression whose published status gives it a literary characteristic, relating it loosely to the tradition of Western definitions of "literature." However, the "literary" or "cultural," as poetic expression, will extend both the aesthetic and the traditional political compass to a horizon of verbal expression, which, through the act of enunciating is potentially creative and re-creative. Poetic expression signifies the political implications of the act of naming, saying, telling, that is, of politics as a form of self-governance or autonomy, of self-naming and self-legislating. As we shall see, Quechua poetic expression, even when brought to print retains both its dialogical and mutable sources. This study will focus on the emergence of Quechua poetic expression, that is, three written instantiations which register Quechua difference in order to evidence this “modern” conformation of colonial encounter: 1.) literature, in its traditional definition as fictional writing; 2.) testimonial forms mediated by scholarly interpretation, including Quechua speaking intellectuals’ studies of Andean reality published as scholarly work, often as bilingual texts; and finally, 3.) a contemporary, indigenous social and political movement.

Poetic expression is discernible through a specific reading practice, through a specific literacy. These readings address theoretical questions that concern the place of this Quechua ethnic production, traversed by global forces, the most decisive and seismic of which was the “discovery” of this “new” world, the colonial encounter that echoes in all these contemporary and “modern” instantiations of Quechua poetic expression by observing the manner in which the colonial encounter and colonial and Quechua difference sustain the possibility of the archive, the emergence of this contemporary Quechua poetic expression. This archive observes the event of publications of Quechua expression in mediated, bookish form. The place from which this expression emerges, maps the colonial encounter that yet sustains relations between the two communities, the Spanish speaking and Quechua speaking, and which has endured in
contemporary Andean societies until the present time in specific and ineluctable ways. The colonial encounter marks every emergence of Quechua expression in specific ways.

However, the way to discern the means used to negotiate the hegemonic force of this colonial encounter is at the same time the place to discern colonial difference, textually. This study will make possible the observation of two facets of the construction of what I term a colonial difference that sustains either 1.) a repeated process of invasion and sometimes violent and sometimes subtle form of imposition, where difference is in opposition to national republican identity, and 2.) a difference wrought at the moment of colonial encounter, where Quechua is not suppressed, and a specific Quechua difference (rather than identity) persists ironically beneath the colonizer’s ignorance and oblivion. It is possible to encounter this Quechua difference by tracing the continuities which throughout all three textual instances evidence a Quechua oral tradition that expresses itself in spite of the repressive mechanisms in place to suppress it, especially those which intend to represent it. Quechua difference as I theorize it, expresses a difference which is distinct from the hegemonic Western definitions of national identity and difference operative in these Andean societies.

Two questions arise from the parameters of space and time that these cultural products defamiliarize. All efforts to assimilate and even transculturate Quechua traditions must now appear as repeated reifications of mestizo national identity, for neither the ascribed “archaic” nature of Quechua culture buried in a distant past is possible before the current and entirely novel articulation of Quechua indigenous knowledge, by Quechua speaking indigenous intellectuals, nor is the incorporation of Quechua speaking individuals into republican nation states as citizens possible either, before the claim to nationhood made by Quechua speaking groups today. This properly Quechua political autonomy, manifest in the most recent historical events brings to the foreground the ethnic question in a decisive global way. If the Quechua speaking were for a very long time, not heard, or silenced, does this resilient reemergence, echoing globally, signify a postcolonial moment? Does this new cultural Quechua cultural form emerging signify that ancient civilizational practices from the Andean region can now be better understood because it is the will of contemporary indigenous Quechua speaking communities to translate them for our benefit, and theirs? What implications does this historical event have upon debates about coloniality and postcoloniality, and more importantly, for the recognition of diverse forms of political governance which can take into account the emergence of an increasingly vocal, decolonized global majority? Does this emerging Quechua cultural literacy signal the urgent need for a global, ethnic literacy that confronts longstanding questions concerning marginality, “minority,” and social and economic inequality? Does the contemporary emergence of this
Quechua, indigenous movement challenge the sustainability of Western models of governance founded upon a “modernity” whose contradictions are becoming more and more apparent, and progressively more devastating to the planet?

It seems necessary then to begin to locate the current state of affairs in the discipline of Comparative Literature, generally, in order to discern how one might frame the task of concern here. The field of Comparative Literature, such as Wlad Godzich, one of its most compelling theorists, delineates it, is a field which is "the enabling condition of cultural elaboration," (Godzich 28) making possible, in effect, the discernment of difference, and Quechua difference, as we shall see. The contemporary moment to be read in all three instantiations of emerging Quechua poetic expression reveals what colonization as a global historical event inaugurated in this region, but also new definitions of globalization in which new social actors begin to produce and disseminate global cultural meanings which could not be heard, other than through contemporary trans-national or trans-ethnic movement and circuitry, the globalized means whereby indigenous communities now seize the word, representing themselves, within the republics that confine them, and within international fora. The transnational becomes conceptually problematic in ways specific to the Andean region, where the suppressed ethnic group, or nation, emerges, time and time again, similarly, affirming and sometimes asserting an identity that remains in critical ways foreign to the contemporary inhabitants of these Quechua peoples’ places, and in important ways, had remained foreign or silent, to the world at large. In this sense, what I term Quechua difference is systematically traced in all three cultural articulations of Quechua poetic expression.

Reading, therefore, ultimately becomes a relevant theoretical question, not only from the perspective of a disciplinary practice, but also from the perspective of acquiring a necessary cultural literacy. Reading as a disciplinary practice, in this sense becomes acquiring a necessary cultural literacy. Engaging with this contemporary textual archive involves not only this necessary linguistic and cultural literacy, but a scholarly practice that is directly moved by the critical consequences of translation, and representation, both cultural and political, and by an awareness of the mechanisms facilitating the emergence of poetic expression in two traditions, the Western and the Quechua. Acquiring the Quechua language, and a Quechua cultural literacy are as important as acquiring a Western literacy, and acquiring languages germane to this tradition. It is the colonial encounter here present that requires this competency.

How, beyond having acquired these cultural literacies is Quechua difference to be discerned, recognized in the textual field, and how, will it become possible for Quechua to translate the Occident? By returning to Godzich’s assessment of the state of the discipline of
Comparative Literature, we will revisit the problem of “field” as he delimits it. By taking Godzich’s persistently cogent lead, the purpose of the story from the field, which grounds and inaugurates this chapter, will become apparent. Godzich is a critical reminder that modern Western scholarly traditions have their own unique set of practices, with inherent tension, contradictions, and potential pitfalls. His deconstruction of the field’s precursive cultural turns reminds us that the tradition is highly idealized and ideological, prone to tendencies which preclude a more balanced observation of what is before us. Godzich reminds us, as he maps the process whereby the Western tradition observes, that, in a fundamental way, occidental traditions of scholarship construct an object of study through the regulative functions of methodological and theoretical debates current and past which center on the subject’s perception and understanding of that object, but as a form of control, so overwrought that it too often turns its back on what is observed. Following in Godzich’s still pertinent path, and departing from his yet useful delimitation of the comparatist’s (literature) "institutionalized knowledge practice," I open this discussion by re-visiting the problem of field that Godzich delineates in 1988.

A summary of his critical assessment of the state of affairs at the time his article was published is instructive. It is instructive because it yet situates us at a conjuncture which continues to yield a generative reading, and which I contend, gives a clearing, a field that is necessary, and from which and within which we may be able to discern Quechua difference. By generative reading is meant, the possibility that any expression, in the Deleuzian register of this word, as well as in the linguistic and discursive, carries it with it a poetic inflection, a poetic inflection that creates from an imaginary an entirely novel or disruptive creation, that is, what I term a poetic expression. In terms of the particular history of the discipline of Comparative Literature, Godzich signals a moment in its historical unfolding, which in his view inaugurated a crisis in which only "Comparative Literature provided an institutional setting from which [a] challenge [to]…a certain theoretical hegemony…could be mounted." (23) The danger that Godzich signals is precisely that of making the work of literature secondary, and even spurious given the persistent temptation to privilege the ideas and methods used to interpret it. Explicating the anxiety that the threats and risks that an imminent "autonomization" of theory posed to literary practitioners, Godzich delineated a deeper problem inherent in the Western tradition of thought, that is, philosophy, which this anxiety signaled and the opportunity that as a result, in his view, emerged. Departing from Godzich’s problem and identifying the field he signals as the opening required for our assessment of Western tradition relative to Quechua is the first of our concerns. The challenge posed by the “autonomization” of theory, such as Godzich signals it is in my view also the persistent obstacle to understanding other traditions. The problem Godzich
maps remains therefore instructive and of critical importance to the task of discerning, reading, Quechua difference. Moreover, it yet proposes to remind us of the determinations underpinning the subject and the object in Western tradition, as well as the ethos of the comparatist’s subject position, (Foucault) or the problem of the ethics of the subject position or, the practice of the comparatist.

**The Kantian experiential field: recovering difference and an other literacy**

One of the first difficulties that Godzich points to regarding the deeper problem the danger of autonomization of theory signals is that the literary object of study, such as it had been defined up to that moment, and such as it has been appropriated today, in multiple ways is elided, ironically, through the critical awareness that specific theoretical imperatives in currency have made axiomatic. The critical awareness that the object is constructed, that it is artificial in that its meanings are either overtaken or overdetermined by the cultural meanings that are hegemonic in a society, which in turn grant the socially constructed object a specific value are what Godzich assumes most practitioners are aware of. Demystifying the value granted the literary object, that is, its socially constructed value becomes the move that inadvertently tempts the critic to avoid, and ultimately to suppress what is actually there, presencing in the object observed. Godzich warns that this consistently prevalent criticism pointing to the constructedness of “literature” collapses the work of literature, as a work of art, supplanting its work as art, with the functional uses of language as discourse, as the object being observed.

Although Godzich mentions New Literary Criticism, we could trace the archeology of this emergence to the work of theorists such as Roland Barthes and others in the late sixties, as an important cultural expression emerging from Continental Philosophy, that is, the modern Western tradition. Alongside Barthes as well, however, Godzich preserves the artful work of language by signaling the pitfall of erring on the side of constructedness, social hegemony, when observing art. Language, or discourse, the object of study which supplanted "literature" as object of study, in attempting to demystify the process of social and political construction which produced the privileged status of “literature,” at the same time collapsed the work of this object of study as art, thereby occluding its resistance to use value, to facile interpretation or definition. Godzich construes the place occupied by art within the Western tradition as strategic as well as undeniable. An earlier philosophical position within the Western tradition redeeming the work of art, alternatively, for its philosophical value, can be found in the philosophical work of Schelling and the literary writing of the German Romantics. Although the latter proposal incorporates art
within the labor of philosophical thought, or the discipline of philosophy, it does so, maintaining art’s poetic expressive force.

Stated in another way, this new object of study made it impossible to recover something more substantive than an analytical difference necessary to make present, the distinct character of art forms, traditionally defined. The debate that Godzich frames in a still timely way engages an aesthetic tradition that is the ostensibly long Western tradition of perceiving art forms, tied almost inextricably to a Western philosophical, ultimately scientific tradition of scholarship, otherwise conceivable as the Western history of cognitive practices, practices which train perception, through Western maps of philosophical cognition and representations. Godzich seeks to establish an archeological mapping of the tradition, a mapping whose palimpsests are traceable. For our purposes, this Western tradition can be traced to both the emergence of the European and Western colonial empires in question, as we observe both the historical moment of invasion and colonization of the Andean South American region in the first half of the 16th century, as a the beginning stages of a modern colonial order, and while the colonial and republican periods in the region that sustain the colonial inscription in contemporary Andean reality in which the three instantiations of Quechua poetic expression emerge, the 20th and 21st century as being marked by a consolidating Western modernity. We could go further in suggesting, that this may, for our purposes, be defined as the imposition of a Western modernity upon the region. Again, Godzich is instructive as he traces the crisis he calls the “autonomization” of theory, to a more deeply embedded problem, inherent in the modern Western traditions of philosophical thought which have produced, that modern conversation called Continental Philosophy, to which the Americas have contributed. Under the epochal demarcation of "modernity" or the "age of technology," that is, of science and industry, Godzich defines the Western philosophical delimitations within which such debates and mappings arise. For Godzich, the Western philosophical precursors of such an age are Kant and Hegel, and recursively, though in distinct ways, Heidegger and Aristotle. Godzich reads the Western archive through Heidegger, and extends further into the past, by reading Aristotle. Heidegger’s phenomenological writings also read Aristotle. We are dealing with the reading of the ancient, the archive, which inaugurates the modern, in Western tradition.

What is distinctive about the modern epoch then is its peculiar way of reading, or perceiving what is given in experience, and what becomes cognitive representation, in accord and within the Western tradition. The crisis engendered by the threat of the "autonomization of theory" is in fact, a crisis of knowing, a crisis of practices of perception or cognition, engendered, precisely, by the matrix upon which the Western, modern tradition of scholarship or "institutionalized knowledge practices" such as we know them are ensconced. It is a crisis, which
according to Godzich threatens our ability to work with what is given in the field. The play for autonomy presaged by the predominance of reasoned cognition, with its attendant representations, that is by theory, threatens to overtake the field of experience, and the other that is there, in specific ways. This is what Godzich calls the “autonomization of theory.” The aim of this study is not however, to salvage art from the grip of a Western tradition’s turns, scientific and ideational turns which, some would argue were prevented by a turn toward the riches of multicultural diversity, its indomitable and rapid proliferation, and by the deposits of creative and alternative sources of perceptual practices found in the “post-colonial” archive, and even by the plethora of infinite difference to be found in some theorizations of “post-modernity.” Rather, what is of interest theoretically in this study is how to identify the experiential field that leads to both Quechua poetic expression as I define it, as well as to the clearings that assist us in discerning the field, such as Godzich defines it, within the Western tradition. In the interest of a generative reading which yields a translation which implies a particular comparative practice, this study’s aim is thus to extend Godzich’s problem into a proposed field. It is of concern therefore, at the moment, to continue following Godzich as he traces the Western cognitive map that yields, once more, the field of experience.

By analyzing the Kantian model of (modern) cognition through the three Critiques, Godzich establishes the underlying epistemological crisis that the theoretical challenge mounted by post-structuralist critique engenders, a crisis that Godzich proposes to resolve through a generative reading of Kant’s Critique of Judgment, his third critique. Godzich cites the Kantian judgment of art as the resting place for the possibility he seeks to redeem, the possibility for the scholar to situate herself, yet again, in the field of experience. For Godzich, demystifying the "constructedness" of the object of study disrupts the positioning of the scholar in the modern, Kantian, cognitive practice, of the exercise of pure reason. While Godzich aptly points out that the factuality of this "constructedness" does not elude most practitioners, it does critically disrupt the linear construction of object and subjective methodological/reasoned practice, first one and then the other, or vice versa. This relationship that Godzich intends to guard as the relationship between observer and observed, signals critically, nevertheless, that the Kantian map of cognition through reason, the map found in Kant’s first two Critiques stipulates that the exercise of reason takes place independently of influence external to the subject of cognition, that is, the understanding, reasoning subject of Kant's first two Critiques, that is, the Western, modern philosopher, read scientist scholar. In the Kantian model, the knower observes without external influence, as his observation is in this sense the exercise of pure reason.
At the same time, Godzich utilizes Heidegger's reading of modernity to point out that yet again, this Kantian, modern, relationship between the observer and what is observed is according to Heidegger, a modern *framing* of what is given, in which the relationship between the subject and what is given in experience is defined *epochally*. This epochal framing of the relationship between a subject for whom what is given is given as object is a framing in which what is observed becomes an object totalized in such a manner as to yield to the control of the observing, reasoning subject, that is, the object that is given and which is framed in order "to perform specified cognitive operations." (25) What Aristotle submits, the final figure which Godzich’s archeology of knowledge cites, is that the given in experience, yet admits resistance, yet is, some other, some thing that can neither be controlled or accounted for; it simply is. As distinct from the Kantian object, the Aristotelian “object” that Godzich locates is not yet susceptible to the control of the observing, reasoning subject, in other words it is not susceptible to modern, or *epochally conformed framing*. Kant's cognitive model on the other hand, …acknowledges the given but grants it the status of otherness, that is, as both constitutive of and a challenge to the knowing instance (24)

that is, the subject. That which is other is thus brought within the sphere of influence of the subject, and while constituting the subject it also represents a challenge to this subject. Godzich points out, however, that "givenness" cannot sufficiently be accounted for by the subject. If that which is perceived, this other, is not only that which in this way escapes the subject’s control, but even precedes and makes possible the very constitution of this subject, then the fundamental model of knowing the modern Western tradition outlines which posits ‘the given’ as "object" is but a limited and limiting stand-in for the given in experience.

With regard to Hegel, Godzich suggests that the desire to stave off the distance between the given as object, and the subject is resolved in the following formulation:

Hegel's solution was to hold out the hope, to be fulfilled in the fullness of time, of all givenness to be invested by Spirit--his designation for the knowing instance--so that ultimately given and known would coincide in Absolute Knowledge. (25)

For Godzich then, the demystification effectuated by signaling the constructedness of all objects of study, reflects a longstanding anxiety inherent in the Western, modern model of cognition which

---

leads to a heightened sense of the importance of the constructed in all knowledge and to the powerful urge to turn one's back on all givenness.

The irreducible character of ‘the given’ is superseded or set aside by the imperative desire to logically ordain the known conceptually. The theoretical or cognitive practice of Western modernity is impelled both "structurally and historically" toward greater reduction, or a greater autonomy, in Godzich's terms, that is, a freedom from the uncontrollable designs of ‘the given.’

It is in the domain of the Western aesthetic tradition rather, in Kant’s *The Critique of Judgment*, the work that maps the perception of the beautiful and the sublime, where Kant provides the non-transcendental, non-subjective ground for the reasoning, knowing subject of the first two *Critiques*. It is in the *Critique of Judgment* that Kant establishes the ground for the subject to know through the rule of reason, as the ground of the sphere of experience, the ground of experientiality. In the realm of the foundational act of judging, the beautiful and the sublime, Kant identifies the ground potentiating the reasoning subject. This “givenness,” which is not purveyed by the subject, can have no content precisely because it is not understood through the mechanisms available to the knowing, reasoning subject.

What is thus given to experience is what the first Critique established as the very condition of experience, experientiality itself. And since experientiality defines subjecthood, the experience of experientiality constitutes subjects. (26)

"Givenness" is but the fact of its being in place and time. (26) In other words, the ground for constituting a subject in the first place is the ground of experientiality. Paul De Mann, Godzich clarifies, calls what it is possible to perceive here as “inscription.”

Godzich submits that the Kantian tradition holds to the premise that in judging, what is discerned has no content or form but is rather that spatial temporal position constitutive of subjects, one and all, that is, what is “other” to the subject. Sympathy, or shared understandings, or prevailing wisdom may be construed as the ground for the exercise of pure reason, the cognitive practice of the first Critique. Therefore, Godzich submits, “givenness,” precedes culture, indeed, “animates it:” “…[givenness] determines not only the conditions of [culture’s] emergence but the dimensions of the field in which it evolves.” (Italics mine.) (28) Givenness is thus an active principle, and not a passive one. "It does not manifest itself as such within the culture, for culture is a construct in response to it." The subject therefore is grounded in what is given in the field, by the active rule of givenness. Culture, as a response to the observer’s confrontation with what is “other” is a response to this original confrontation. Therefore, this cognitive practice, such as the Kantian, Western exercise of reason in the act of knowing, is a cultural practice. Godzich states further:
If [givenness] has any existence within the culture, it is figural, although it may be better to view it as the operator of certain effects. (28)

Godzich ultimately puts forth a claim that is a point of departure for this study seeking to ascertain the point of intersection from which to inaugurate a nonhegemonic, performative, and implicitly comparative translation practice:

…the "field" of Comparative Literature is [this] field. [Italics mine.] In other words, I take it that, within the prevalent organization of knowledge, it is incumbent of comparatists to inquire into the relationship of culture to givenness, to its other.
Part II: Reading Quechua in the Western Field: the Problem of Quechua Translation

Chapter 4: Translation in the Western field at the intercession with Quechua: Comparative and Translational Practice and the question of reconnaissance and the au de-là

What are scholars involved in then, as they assume their culturally diverse positions, within their respective, historically and even epochally framed traditions, in relationship to what is given, what is in the field? Are all scholars, in a modern Western tradition, in some measure, necessarily, the cognizing, reasonable subjects somewhat and dangerously oblivious to the given, as his analysis might imply, should theory “overtake” the given, the “other”? Is this epistemological crisis on going, and if it is not, what responses have arisen to this epistemological, and disciplinary Western crisis, now? Is interdisciplinarity an effective response, and/or what kind of response is it, and is it possible to carry it out, given the imperatives of the transmission of tradition in scholarly institutions, from this space in-between? What narratives are scholars telling, and how are these narratives situating them with respect to the historical frame of modernity, as the epoch we persist in? What effects does the confluence of these narratives have upon the meanings animating our field? What does the field now, tell us about modernity? How might we read, translate, write these stories, whenever they do purport other figural inscriptions--, as they would, by definition? Is the scholarly narrative we would want to engage in a representation, or should it be a translation? Have the many cultural turns “theory” has taken brought us to the possibility of situating ourselves, again, in the field, as Godzich defines it? However provisionally, I would submit, that the enterprise of comparatists, according to Godzich is then, a re-telling of other “stories,” of the inscriptions we encounter, of the figurations that we may engage with, as they emerge, as they are given, in the field, and as they create certain effects. It is the comparatist’s task then to discern the effects they generate, the effects they signal, in turn, modifying, not only our cognitive practices in the disciplinary fields we work in, but shaping, beyond one cultural form of cognitive practice, diverse cultural forms. The task of the comparatist is not only to discern inscriptions, but also to discern from these figurations, their effects.
It is this task of the comparatist that, not only resembles the task of the translator as Benjamin describes it, but is the task of a translator, in that, this practice of reading inscription and figuration, and telling of its effects is the movement from here to there, not only from language to language, effectuated by the translator’s first task, but it is a movement in the field, tracing the effect in the field, from here to there, a trans-ladere. The unique enterprise of the comparatist is therefore, as witness to the figurations, the bounded definition of place and inscriptions of the times that emerge therein, in whatever instance they emerge, translating this witness, through a movement of re-con-naissance, an abiding with a re-birth in the telling, a translating, a movement, where even the steps taken to trace its effect moves like a translation, from here to there, thereby establishing the dimension of the field emerging, through what it bounds and limits, and whose movements, traced and surveyed, can be mapped. In this manner, the task of the comparatist, is the task of the translator, and, I would submit, the comparatist’s practice is an inevitable translation. By necessity, the figural inscriptions that emerge in the field precipitate cultural forms that shape scholarly practices, and engender new theoretical delimitations and limitations, landscapes of civilizational representation, the translation of which, we may also map. The task therefore in discerning Quechua difference is to read the figural inscriptions of Quechua poetic expression emerging, in this field and to translate them by rendering clearly their relationship to the given, and its effects, the task of the comparatist.

In reading Quechua emergent poetic expression, in the field, we are engaged in the process of devising multiple translations, which in turn render effects. These translations may be gesturing theoretically, averting the process of the autonomization of theory, whereby the theory does not do all the telling. Rather, the artful work’s figural inscription is read, and its effects gauged, measured, however qualitatively, however provisionally, in historical time, and it is this telling that continues to remain, however playfully, within the designs of the discipline of literary, or poetic analysis, however flexibly. In a word, Godzich would have us read “literature” as the artful work that is a special “sign of the times.” This reading is a translation of that sign, and a re-telling of the meaning of the sign, for the times. The cultural imperative of Godzich’s ostensibly academic agenda is a cultural translation whose necessity is intrinsic to the course of history, in that the agents of history require signs in order to know the way, inevitably toward, and into the future, accompanied by the memory of the past. The field is the privileged domain of the comparatist, especially as the comparatist in the field of comparative literature, knows multiple languages, multiple disciplines, and is a translator, a traveler across borders, by traditional practice. But we must infer, that Godzich also means the actual borders, in givenness, in the field of experientiality. All else is culture, as the response to givenness. What is critical to our re-con-
naissance of Quechua cultural forms is the ability to read Quechua poetic expression from the field, that is, to have Quechua literacy. Reconnaissance is the emerging/flowering translation of the comparatist in the field.

In the simplest terms, this practitioner of translation, the comparatist, reads the shifting figural inscriptions emerging from the field and translates their effects, wherever possible, as inchoate theoretical shifts. The theoretical shift is not only the cultural response to what takes place in the field, as other, but it is also an experience in the field effectuated by the positioning of those who speak or write, whatever language, in multiple fields of experientiality, of givenness. Arguably, all historical actors may seize other cultural forms from multiple fields of experience, to express, to conjure responses to, and within the West, as an instantiation of the complex circuitry of this practice of translation. Ostensibly, the comparatist is such an actor, with a particular literacy, that is, in the practice here being outlined, the ability to practice reconnaissance, of figural inscriptions and their effects, as they emerge in the field, and the ability to translate them, to move them from here to there, from language to language, from place to place and to trace their movements, from here to there again, mapping again therefore, the newly emerging field they trace. The effects of global, “post-colonial,” figural inscriptions, for example, may be read in the second, mestizo instantiation studied, in the mouths of the children in Vallejo’s or Arguedas’ stories, as re-con-figurations of power, by which the children are seized, or which the children actively resist, within highly racialized societies, whose effect in the field is chaos and destruction, in Vallejo’s telling, and conflict and displacement, in Arguedas’ telling. For this theorization of the practice of the comparatist on the border between modernity and its beyond, coloniality and its beyond, “Post-coloniality” is not therefore, that the Other seizes the word, but it is rather, that she always did, and it is our task to devise the ways to read, and translate the urgent stories that emerge from the field. The children go to school or to the town plaza, not as anthropologists to observe, but rather as witnesses who tell of these effects, whose provenance is this field. The writers are narrators of these events in the field. The poetic expression that emerges is then a telling, through a way of knowing, to be translated, by and through its figurations, its inscriptions, as a cultural cognitive operation which in turn which can be mapped, and through which the limits of a political project are discernible, the boundaries eliciting a specific project of governance is prefigured. Textiles, ceremony, traditions of agri/field-cultural practice, and other inscriptions, may be translated as this distinct emergence from givenness, from the field. It is my task as a comparatist then, to translate these configurations given within the field stories through this practice of re-con-naissance, the midwifery permitting the story to be retold elsewhere.
There is a theoretical, Western corpus of literature through which I intend to discern the constructedness of specific objects of study, such as the literary genres, anthropological ethnography, as well as social movements and political projects of governance, however, in this comparative way, in an attempt to discern the givenness that may animate them. In this sense, the constructions or concepts of religion, ritual, post-modernity, post-coloniality, indigenous spirituality, political and aesthetic representation are viewed as signs, and also as operators of effects in the field, in that they emerge from the field, rather than as pure conduits for reasonable understanding. These cultural forms are read then, rather, as inscriptions. Discerning the relations of predominance, prevalence, preponderance, and the persistent practice of domination in question through what I term the colonial encounter and colonial and Quechua difference are also what emerge from the field of “postmodern and postcolonial globalization” as this practitioner reads the disciplinary and undisciplined telling purveyed by intellectual practitioners and, readers, engaged in cultural practices which are ultimately responses to experience, to the other with whom a relationship is already in place. As Godzich puts it:

If a culture is formed by the cognitive operations performed within a field, its internal economy stands in a particular relationship to the givenness that led to the constitution of the field in the first instance. This givenness is not part of the culture, since it precedes it, yet it pervades the culture, since it could be said to animate it inasmuch as it determines not only the conditions of its emergence but the dimensions of the field within which it evolves. (28)

The internal economy of the cognitive operations performed in the field include the instantiations I observe and analyze as modalities of the ways in which the West has negotiated Quechua cultural forms in the field of colonial encounter and in confrontation with Quechua difference. I use negotiation as a provisional term that may describe this internal economy. Colonial encounter as confrontation with Quechua difference is a provisional description of the effect of what emerges from the field. These modalities are assumed to sustain an internal economy, just as the internal economy derived from this study hinges on the operationalization of a distinct relationship to the given, to what emerges from the field, and to a distinct scholarly practice called the translation practice. This study as scholarly practice purports therefore to read through multiple theorists, Western and Quechua, what may be given in the field, construing three textual and discursive instantiations as three instantiations, critically chosen, of what emerges in this field of Quechua poetic expression. The central aim of this study however is to discern not only how the given is perceived through cultural cognitive practices, but what dimensions and delimitations the given yields and how these cognitive modalities attempt to suppress or permit the emergence of, what is expressed, what emerges in the field. This
negotiation, which is how I describe this internal economy is grounded on the ability of the other to procure responses to the scholarly and cognitive practices exercised in and upon the field. In other words, I take it that in the realm of language,

[1]Translation thus ultimately serves the purpose of expressing the central reciprocal relationship between languages. It cannot possibly reveal or establish this hidden relationship itself; but it can represent it by realizing it in embryonic or intensive form. (Benjamin 72)

In other words this translation practice purports to map the field of reconnaissance, to arrive at the clearing where what is, emerges creatively, that is, it purports to map the field from which poetic expression emerges. In order to perform this translation, the positioning of this reader will be that of a translator, in multiple languages, through distinct cognitive practices, and diverse positioning, travelling, moving from here to there, tracing the boundaries of the field.

Not only will it be possible to read and translate certain theories and theoretical gestures, their figurations and their effects in the field, but also it will be possible to translate theoretical gestures through the delimitations and limitations of the field, of what is given as Quechua poetic expression. In other words, rarifying the concepts germane to Western cognitive practices or philosophical edifices, by transposing them into new environments or submitting them to the limitations and the dimensions of the given in a specific place and time as well as language is yet a practice of translation as I define it. The first, mestizo instantiation of telling is just such a field, where mestizo writers tell about the Quechua other. At the same time, the Quechua scholars’ telling, that is the second instantiation will similarly defamiliarize Western cognitive practices, but in this instance through the prevalence of a tradition of Quechua cultural and cognitive practices. This contrapuntal dance is the scholarly practice of translation that this comparative project engages, in order to stave off the hegemonic force of familiarity, or the authoritative dominance of the known, with the force of intimacy, intimacy with both Quechua and the West.

This scholarly practice takes as a premise that the internal economy within any field leaves open a non-discriminatory possibility: that the Other is always translating its observer, and that the other, in the field, yields an infinite potential for translation, in the embryonic form sustained by the Benjaminian kinship of languages. At the same time, this creative force in givenness yields to the humble traveler, the boundary crossing trans-lator, its limits, only in intimacy and a specific surrender to the distinct, that which awakens the observer in the field. This is the position from which the practice of translation is performed in this study, in order that the given in the field yields, not only its meanings, but also, its boundaries and dimensions. As Godzich puts it,

The question of the "field" of Comparative Literature can be asked again, but it cannot be answered in the theoretical or methodological way in which it was
reached, since the field we have uncovered is the ground upon which the theoretical [cognitive, knowing] gaze is formed and thus conditioned by it. We must attempt to address this field by means of the givenness that animates it. (31)

Finally, the third instantiation to be read, an indigenous political and social movement will read the inscriptions and map the effects of the figurations to be found in the field. In other words, this performative reading, the practice of the comparatist as a practice of translation, maps what the effects that these figurations presage, what alternatives they project, and what direction therefore they signal, what way they begin to open.

The ways of knowing or cognitive practices that are animated by the field differ, and yet must be delimited. Godzich’s proposal is a response to a long conversation sustained by what the Western tradition terms Continental Philosophy. Undoubtedly, what it rescues is the place from which comparative practices in their most conducive registers were long ago inaugurated and sustained, as continental observers travelled, translated, and compared creatively, that is, with a degree of needed innocence, a degree of linguistic and cultural literacy, as well as a degree of rigor, the rigor of some form of sincerity, of the ability to move but also to be moved. The field Godzich recovers provides the ground for reestablishing the theoretical clearing necessary to establish a theory of translation and its practice, as the practice of the comparatist. What is more, in my view this field is the portal from Western to Quechua traditions, through which performing a translation of what emerges in the Quechua field, whether bilingual or monolingual is made possible. There are a number of theoretical turns I could make as I map the field of this practice, but I have chosen two primarily, the Derridean practice of reading the Western tradition as the starting point for one, and the Deleuzian/Guattarian reading of the subject’s expression as another.

Having arrived at this point in the mapping of this epistemological practice, various questions emerge. Is the field now, the historically particular whose plethora of traces conform the field? Is the field now, the ground itself, the very primal instantiation, in place and time, in nature, for survival? What materiality, even as an effect, does the field give? While operator of effects, through the cultural ways of knowing, of which thinkers, theorists, writers, singers, poets, shall we discern this internal economy, and what project is this internal economy the matrix for? What inscriptions do the figurations of the field proffer, though not always, through the traditional aesthetic form, nor even as the work of art or the artful work, but rather through poetic expression, and especially, Quechua poetic expression? How do Quechua ways of knowing emerge from the givenness of this field of experientiality? What Quechua cultural forms can we discern through specific figurations and inscriptions found in multiple, and trans-cultural forms
emerging in and from the field? Do the boundaries or limits of this operation of effects change, depending on the field, and depending on the cultural forms emerging from that field? Is there a universally experienced, experientiality being alluded to here? Or is universality a cultural form, or an impossibility before that which animates all emergence form an earthly field in time? Is there a place and time specific givenness, and distinct cultural forms, which emerge from this specific givenness, this field? Is the internal economy “the order” that leads to the answer to the question of specific and distinct cultural forms, and even, from one cultural way of knowing, and from, another? Does the order prescribed delimit what may be observed? Is the effect produced a symptom, and is each emergence an urgent sign of the times? What does the field sustain, and do the cultural forms reveal their sustainability through the internal economy engendered between the cultural way of knowing, and that given in the field?

For the moment, it can be said that Godzich’s field, may be subject to perpetual delimitation, and limitation, in that, what is there given, as an operator of effects is given in experientiality. What emerges in the field is by definition something distinct in each and every emergence, something that pricks the viewer into re-cognition, and thereafter, as the task of the comparatist, of translation as reconnaissance. The three instantiations are read as specific moments of emergence, in specific places, and in time. We may say, that experiences in the field animate new conversations between cultural forms and happenings, which rustle, in the field. Stated another way, the task of the comparatist is the task of translating the meaning of that prickly figuration, the task of reading that DeMannian inscription but also of gauging and delimiting its effects. Provisionally then, the task of the translator is to hear difference, as it emerges from the soundlessness of the language of the field, from a position of innocence.

The Western field at the margin of the Quechua field: moving into the au de-là: marking time with difference: Derrida and Deleuze & Guattari:

The relationship between reading as interpretation, but also as a scene of encounter, through the conduit of language and of travel is intrinsic to current scholarly practices, but also to the problem of translation, such as I will delimit it. (Van Den Abbeele, Derrida, Benjamin, DeMann, Derrida, Behar, Clifford) The problem of translation begins here, for purposes of this prolonged study, of what is Quechua difference as it emerges in the field. Between what the Western tradition of thought would have as historical, beholden to the finite, to human frailty, that is, the entangled morass of the particular, the so called rhizome,---and the tradition’s metaphysical aspirations, grounded in a foundational displacement, of all things thought, onto the Idea---, the problem of translation as I delimit it may find a boundary which furthers our purposes, first of all,
at the edge of Derridean reading as writing the supplement, a specific practice marking the place and the pace of what we may call the ever displaced advent of post-modernity, for specific reasons or desires.

[I]t is necessary to read and reread those in whose wake I write, the “books” in whose margins and between whose lines I mark out and read a text simultaneously almost identical and entirely other, that I would even hesitate, for obvious reasons, to call fragmentary… (Positions 4)

The Derridean practice reads the Western tradition, surrendering to the circuitous flow of “the idea,” spoken out loud in Western philosophical writings, wanting to express “truth” as a way of walking around its limits. To Ronse’s query about these limits, Derrida speaks to the practice of this walking in Positions:

Ronse: Can there be a surpassing of this metaphysics? Can a graphocentrism be opposed to a logocentrism? Can there be an effective transgression of closure, and what would be the conditions for a transgressive discourse?
Derrida: There is not a transgression, if one understands by that a pure and simple landing into a beyond of metaphysics, at a point which also would be, let us not forget, first of all a point of language or writing. Now, even in aggressions or transgressions, we are consorting with a code to which metaphysics is tied irreducibly, such that every transgressive gesture reencloses us—precisely by giving us a hold on the closure of metaphysics, within this closure. (12)

This Derridean standing next to, and listening, while at the same time engaging the messy events which precipitate the publication of Western traditions in the form of books, gives us the first site of translation, that is, the events of publishing and University commerce as a translation, a trans ladere, a movement from here to there: here, where I listen to you write what your voice says, in accord with what we may term Western desire, that is, there is a deconstruction; and there, where I account for the institutional delimitations of power, the order sustaining the authority whereby the events bringing about the production, and circulation of the book, took/place--, a reconstruction.66 This story that Derrida tells, as he accompanies these texts on a particular quest, the text’s and his, is a receptive and creative process which produces this new telling, this translation, or his scribbles on the margins of the Western Philosophical Book. I would argue, that the Derridean practice is an inscription emerging from the field of différance. I will return to this point shortly.

This scene of encounter, precipitated by travel, in the Derridean practice, as the circuitry of a chain of events, as well as the palimpsest of orders traversing the event of transcribing the

---

66 Derrida’s reading in Le langage et les institutions philosophiques accompanies both the relationship of philosophical institutions to language, as well as the process of publication through his reading of Descartes, Kant, and Schelling.
spoken truth, e.g. the practice of Western metaphysical philosophy, or “thought,” according to Derrida’s telling, is in an important way, the scene of a reconnaissance67 of knowing in the Western way, but also the scene of a Derridean translation. This scene is distinct from the scene of “interpretation” which in some measure, and in his way, Derrida reenacts as a reading, as a double, and entitles this practice, what Western tradition calls itself, be it “method,” be it “philosophy” be it “science, intending to be present as it births textually, as well as institutionally as book.” This reading as reenactment is performed, only to stage the movement whereby Western metaphysics claims it came to be, what it is. As a manner of speaking, Derrida finds the director of this theatrical production, and follows his staging, tracking the actors’ movements. This procedure is not interpretation in the traditionally Western, metaphysical sense, but rather, a form of travel, from a boundary, to another, from this limit, to that, always at this margin, along sides, always at this place we could call the scene of différance, by chance, luck, or fate, it seems, and by desire, situated at the margins of Western tradition, where it, this Derridean reading is given, finds its place. Before accompanying Derrida’s text, to see and feel perhaps, certainly the movements of his desire, but also where he arrives, however provisionally, let us underline the fact that this Derridean form of reading, presupposes a journey, a quest, a scene of encounter, and this telling, his writing, is a translation: a limit of the problem of translation as I delimit it. I am suggesting that Derrida translates this transgression, a movement next to Western metaphysics, at its limit, as the place of différance. In his words:

…[B]y means of the work done on one side and the other of the limit, the field inside is modified, and a transgression is produced that consequently is nowhere present as a fait accompli. (Positions 12) [Boldface emphasis mine]

This scene of différance is the field from which a recognition of difference becomes possible, and it is in this scene that we have a distinct event of knowing taking place. In a manner of speaking, what may be interpreted as the trope of travel, whereas we may understand this as the trope rhetorically performed in order to interpret meanings, that is, the method through which we could re-cognize this representation, becomes rather, through an other way, the dilemma of the one who travels without knowing where he may arrive. The interpreter has previous knowledge; he has not only what is given, but disciplined training that would permit, by definition, understanding. The Derridean traveler is one who surrenders to where discourse leads, in every instance of this déroulement radically present in order that she can see what is given through this cultural practice

67 Here Reconnaissance is meant instead of recognition, as Derrida steers clear of the logocentric connotation of cognition derived from reason in the metaphysical tradition. What is here meant, then, is a naissance, birth, beginning, emergence, con-, with, re-, again.
of knowing in the Western way, alongside which the Derridean reader wends. The traveler’s is the ethos of Derrida’s practice as translator, for what is ineluctable about the traveler who travels through known or unknown territories is that the traveler is always newly where she finds herself, surrendering to where the way ends, forestalling or finally arriving at knowing only until she is there. The traveler is always by definition, far from home. The traveler, by necessity translates, traveling from the unfamiliar, to the familiar by way of an intimacy that grows at every step. This is a scene of suspended Western understanding, in a Derridean way and sense, or, more rigorously, for purposes of this translation problem, the surrender to not knowing, in the interest of affirmation, that is, a trans-ladere that moves toward the affirmation of difference. Derrida’s knowledgeable reading, performs this surrender, without irony, situating itself, at the margin, where the vicissitudes of inscription as writing the Derridean supplement can take place: the site of difference, a place from which a reconnaissance can take place. What is of interest in the problem of translation as I delimit it is the scene of différance. Poised at this limit, we will accompany an alternative literacy, a Quechua literacy.

The other limit that the problem of Quechua translation confronts, then, de-limits the field, as a problem of “alternative literacies” and “linguaging practices” as Walter Mignolo suggests it, traversed as he would have it by historic forces which are, according to him, the forces of those in power over others, the force of those who would legitimize certain literacies, and suppress others, through the hegemonic use of one literacy, to which an alternative literacy is disadvantageously compared, or which may become entirely suppressed, or indefinitely displaced or institutionally and systematically ignored or, excluded. Mignolo and others cite as the reservoir of this hegemonic comparison and suppression, a colonial occidental imaginary.

68 Many attempts to comprehend this alternative Quechua literacy have been made, through the traditional academic practices of Western scholarship. The first missionaries devised dictionaries and grammars, modeled upon the scholarly practices of an emerging renaissance tradition, on the European Western continent. Holguín’s and Toledo’s work are exemplary of this tradition. Responses to these efforts which were undoubtedly driven and shaped by the agenda of “the extirpation of idolatries” have emerged since then, primarily in the last two centuries. There are Lira’s, Lara’s and Cusihuaman’s dictionaries, and in Cusihuaman’s case also a grammar, as the latter was a professor of linguistics in the Univesidad San Francisco de Abad, the primary traditionally Western academic research institution in Cusco, Peru. There is the work of Rodolfo Cerron Palomino, who mapped the regional linguistic variations of Quechua within Peru, devising regional dictionaries alongside other scholars and Quechua speakers. The work of Bruce Mannheim has greatly contributed also to the unpacking of this alternative Quechua literacy, from the perspectives of the discipline of linguistic anthropology, alongside other scholars and Quechua speakers. Many other efforts, primarily anthropological have attempted to understand this alternative Quechua literacy, from the limit of its properly Quechua literacy, and not as a transposition of the Quechua language’s components, onto the scholarly forms of the Western epistemological tradition, an appropriation as a practice of translation. Rather, the anthropological efforts have taken as their object of study the quipu, the way of recording, and transcribing, events and accounts, in both the numerical and the historical sense. The work of Gary Urton and Frank Salomon alongside other scholars and Quechua speakers is exemplary.
devising terms through which all that could be unfamiliar would be understood, thereby inscribing colonial difference. This inscription has cultural form in cultural constructions prefiguring a “Manichean” dominance whereby all things in the world, especially the unknown world can be known through the prism of the Western category of “universality.” This center from which all things peripheral would return, has been termed, the metropolis, and its outlying outposts, in the colonial vision of the world, the periphery. Certainly, one register of this colonial site of translation as appropriation took place in the Quechua Andean region, some one hundred years after the invasion. The Western ontological binary of universal and particular, translated as the Manichean metropol and its peripheral colonies created the fertile ground for a historic homogenization, emerging from this colonized field. In attempt after attempt to confront the invader, by learning Castilian, by hiring translators and transcribers, the Quechua speaking become, the homogenous identity, Quechua, before the conqueror, the crown. This figuration becomes an inscription, and The Quechua emerge, while the conquerors and colonizers claim indigenous territory, and while later, republican criollos and a plethora of citizen métis, mestizos claim this Quechua territory: out of the Inca imperial rule from diversity, one homogeneous identity “Quechua” emerges. Territorial invasion, and expropriation of land are the effect of the figuration colonial difference and the inscription the Quechua. This is what may be translated as a site of colonial encounter with an internal economy of ignorance and domination.

Quechua literacy, I propose, has one limit at the scene of différance, where Quechua difference begins as a Quechua literacy. In other words I take it that the limit of the field of difference is the place where it would be possible to practice reconnaissance and translation in the field of “comparative literature,” in the process of being newly delimited, but necessarily, with Quechua literacy. At the margins of the Western Philosophical book, we find an intersessional field from which we may hear the embryonic heartbeat of an other, another tradition, Quechua poetic expression. While as a first step we would want to discern Quechua difference in the second instantiation read, the itinerant movement of différance is the limit from and with which we leap. What Mignolo’s research agenda yields is the problem of Quechua literacy, in the contentious site of a colonial encounter. Construing the field of différance at least provisionally as the field of reconnaissance, we may say that Quechua literacy, to extend Mignolo’s project is the translational conduit to the field of a reconnaissance of Quechua difference by way of Derridean travel, by accompaniment and by witness to the happenings that precipitate emergence, birth, poeisis. I mean to suggest that a Western re-cognition of difference, within an order and a complex of domination, at a site of colonial encounter does not permit a Quechua literacy, for a Quechua literacy cannot be understood, its difference cannot be affirmed inside Western
metaphysics and the problem of identity and difference there embedded. I propose that re-connaissance is a practice germane to the field of différance and I propose that it averts the prevalence of colonial rule in this field. This other limit of the translation problem I outline bounds the place where diverse and multiple limits from which I attempt this reading and translation of three instantiations of Quechua poetic expression which seek to discern not only Quechua difference, but Quechua poetic expression. The field, at the border with a field of difference, yields a difference that is yet Western, albeit transgressed into a birthing, a re-connaissance from within the field of différance which may be an affirmation, what something is, and not, what it is not which is the effect of coloniality upon the object it observes: a recognition of deficiency, relative to the content of the form of a category, an institution, and thereby, a negation of what Is, there, that is Other.

There is yet another limit to the problem of translation as I outline it which deals with the “assemblage” (Deleuze and Guattari) of coloniality or empire, historically, again, as a site of colonial encounter or otherwise stated, an order of empire, which from this boundary gives the neurotic repetition of this order of empire as a complex of domination. The desire for a beyond coloniality, spurs the event of the formation of republican Latin American states in the 19th century. The criollo’s burden is the burden of humanism, and the curse of the mestizo or the return of the repressed. The criollo’s deviant and repressed desire, to be “natural,” to be “animal,” as opposed to “human,” “purely reasonable” and “decent” perversely, this desire to be “a dog,” in a word, to be “‘Indio’”69 takes the imaginary form of the mestizo, the site where the “‘Indio’” may return, however ambivalently. This is the assemblage that orders criollo desire and inscribes the indigenous, into the colonial tradition in the Andean region. Vallejo’s short story “Paco Yunque” maps the status and place of the indigenous and the mestizo lucidly, through the innocent eyes of its characters mapping this assemblage of the complex of domination as the destruction of the Quechua speaking youngster. More telling takes place in the grander narratives of the liberatory independentistas, from the theorists of the first Latin-American republics, to a series of vanguard theorists all seeking the beyond coloniality, through and out of the complex of domination, where, the escape is continuously the return of the repressed, the “Indio”, the “Indio” trace as savage freedom of the animal, albeit unconquered and dignified, or alternatively, the bedeviled mestizo,-- who as a split subject, neither “Indio” nor criollo, becomes the mongrel outsider in the early colonial period, and later, the utopian site of reconciliation in specific

69 A study of this desire in the Northern EuroAmerican context can be found in Phillip Deloria’s, Playing Indian, an important “archaeology” of this desire. The circuitry traced for the Northern Euroamerican field is distinct from the circuitry in the Southern Euroamerican field.
national projects, where the mestizo becomes the way to recover the fortitude of the ““Indio”,” as the source of a new “native,” indigenous identity. All these mestizo and criollo expressions are “the escape” from colonial rule or the complex of domination through the appropriation of Quechua speaking people’s land, and through the desire to be “Indio”.

Much in the way of German Romantics, whose spokesman became Schelling, all things instinctual, all things natural from which Kant would have divorced reasonable man return in the text of Western metaphysics, and take their place at the site of the human (Kantian then Schellingian) imagination. Within an outside of the edifice of Reason that Kant constructs, the instinctual and the imaginative take place in aesthetic judgment, of the beautiful or the inarticulate, grotesque, and monstrous sublime. And yet, at the site of colonial encounter, the natives colonized barely escape the status of the grotesque, and barely escape the realm of “natural animal.” Columbus’ description likening the natives to dogs is an early example of the animal inhuman, a translation presaging modern cultural forms which continue to extend the meaning of “Indio”, and a moment of travel which situates the colonial observer at one of the limits of translation, the beginning, the place of the unfamiliar and the unknowable grotesque, or the figural absence of Quechua literacy.

In the first instantiation, José María Arguedas’ short story “Agua,” as well as many of his other narratives depict the nostalgia for this “natural animal,” in a metaphorical language that continuously likens the “Indio” to animals, however dissonant for the Spanish reader, however scarce his Quechua reader, and however impossible his desire to reconcile the Quechua meaning inscribed in animal with the Western colonial difference inscribed at the site of colonial encounter. This inscription of the animal unfamiliar however, brings with it not an escape, but a neurotic dilemma, not only returning in Arguedas’ prose, but also cutting through the prose as a psychic break.

Animals, as Arguedas knows, have a very distinct mythological character for Quechua speaking peoples. This translation is transcribed in his prose in Spanish in the story Agua except that it ultimately inscribes a psychic break when there is no reconciliation between this Quechua language figuring animals differently, and Arguedas’ obvious repugnance for what is dirty, what is indecent, but more importantly what is in-human, what is animals. Caught as he is in the complex of domination, Arguedas will liken the imagined “Indio” to all that is unkempt, animal-like, and indecent, while at the same time he transcribes his knowledge of Quechua cultural practice by evincing distinct relationships to animals in the Quechua language entwined in his prose, never achieving a reconciliation between these two world views, but rather, inscribing this colonial split. This is yet another way the repressed within the site of colonial encounter, the
indecent as this imagined “Indio” returns. Arguedas’ agonie prose inscribes, more importantly, the figuration impossibly inhuman through his knowing. Arguedas successfully stages the break between Quechua native signs and worlds and the colonial “criollo” world as, the figuration of Quechua difference emerging poetically from within the site of colonial encounter in his narrative telling, where, the “criollo” world surrounding, corralling, isolating and attempting to dominate the Quechua world it, cannot suppress the emergence of Quechua difference, even when the criollo world professes no desire to know the Quechua world in any way that is not colonial, precisely because in this instantiation, Arguedas does know. Arguedas has no place to go from here however because having already arrived at knowing, his translation of Quechua difference runs into the wall of his own split identity. It becomes impossible to embrace that which is hated by those abiding in the complex of domination, the criollo elite, because Arguedas is their descendant, raised by a father who is a member of this caste. On the other hand, or outside the boundary of “criollo” coloniality, Arguedas is raised by Quechua ayllu runakuna, in the absence of his biological mother. The métis in Arguedas’ telling is notably absent, so irreconcilably split are Spanish “criollo” and indigenous Quechua persons, a figuration that is inscribed as El zorro de arriba y el zorro de abajo, the title of Arguedas’ last imaginative telling, where the complex of domination at the site of colonial encounter is the scene of irreconcilably different, zorros, foxes. The boundaries and limits put forth by Arguedas’ telling yields a map of an emergent cultural conformation marked by this psychic break, as melancholia, but also as social, schizophrenic break into the animality of the fox.

Thus the traveler effecting a translation in the field, however provisionally, however tentatively, must be an orphan, in the sense given Kafka’s writings in Deleuze and Guattari’s (D&G’s) reading, in Toward a Minor Literature. Orphan here is meant as “rupture,” the “schizo break,” that permits the Kafkaesque solitary individual to remember her/his self as someone, other than the Freudian subject driven compulsively to break the Oedipal law, as well as someone, other than a reified subject/object of (techno-military) industrial relations of production, that is the alienated Other, doubly displaced by an “ethnic” mark, in Kafka’s case, as the Jewish migrant. Kafka, according to D&G’s reading of Kafka’s “expression” through this ethnic “Oedipal assemblage,” breaks away, as D&G tell us, through the figuration dog, but also, as an orphan, that is, as a person not bound by the law of the Father. We leap out of the field of the Western Freudian psychoanalytic myth, (Barthes) and the interpretive constructions of Western science, Kantian science, through the orphan, that is, in the simplest sense, a person without a home, a father, a person orphaned of tradition, and of a place, a home—a person who has not yet arrived at knowing. The traveler therefore, for purposes of this comparative
translational practice must ultimately be an orphan because she cannot be the daughter of one or another tradition, but she is rather, a traveler with kinship to all other travelers and who arrives at knowing only provisionally, and in time, in instantiations.

Additionally, in the limit demarcated by the Deleuzian and Guattarian reading, what is meant by a minor literature devises a limit which expands away from the Freudian Oedipal complex, where Kafka’s dog-like orphanhood is distinct, pricks the reader, and finds itself, through other travel, through an other way, at the margin of the German tradition of thought, and the German imagined community, and its actual borders, as from a minor register, as from, a minority expression, a poetic expression in a minor key. Orphaned migrant, emerges from this field, where “Kafka” is displaced, has no home land, no language that is his but in a socially diminished, culturally minor way, where, as a migrant foreigner, he is forced to speak the dominant language, in a “mongrel” German. Orphaned migrant breaks away, from, not yet knowing toward where, while visiting within every instantiation on the way. I want to introduce as a boundary to the problem of translation I outline, Gregorio Condori Mamani, Quechua cargador/burden carrier, or the invaded, expelled, and dominated, who becomes an orphaned migrant, “a minority” however, in his native field. The question of a minor literature and how it implies mestizo and criollo writers and translation will be taken up later and is an “order” within the problem of translation, at the site of a colonial encounter: the order or complex of domination, pertaining to coloniality. For the moment, our conduit to a Quechua escape, from the field engaging Western metaphysical terms via Kafka’s dog is Gregorio Condori Mamani, Quechua cargador, the figuration of a Quechua person with coloniality on his back.

The quest for Quechua difference which emerges from the field as the site of colonial encounter, and through the assemblage of a complex of domination neurotically repeated, seeks through four languages, an escape, a transgression, or a break from this field: French, English, Spanish, vernacular tongues of (pre-)modern colonial empires, and of modern nation states, and Quechua. This mapping of the problem of translation inscribes the problem of literacy in that the Quechua difference sought may be found through, a “linguistic competency,” and furthermore, through the practice of such a literacy. The question here becomes, at this limit of the problem of translation that I map, in this field, where différance becomes our rhizome, and minority texts may escape traditional ontotheological cultural concepts alongside the burrows in Quechua by means of which we seek the au de-là. The search for Quechua difference brings us to Gregorio

70 The “au de-là” not as beyond, but as, from here to there, still seeking where; this translation is inspired by the Spanish translation of Derrida’s Le langage et les institutions philosophiques,(1990) by Grupo Decontra, Ediciones Paidós, I.C.E. de la Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona, Spain, 1995.
Condori Mamani, Quechua cargador, or the way Quechua translates the West, the Occident, or, we arrive at the limit of our translational mapping of the comparative field, Quechua translation.

As a comparatist, the three European and European-American literary traditions, languages, and histories (English, French, and Spanish,) facilitates an understanding of the Spanish speaking world which, as Mannheim so aptly puts it in accord as well with José María Arguedas’ repeated denunciations of this experience-- surrounds the Quechua speaking regions. (Mannheim 383-4) This encircling also facilitates the occurrence of certain cultural figurations that emerge from the field at the site of colonial encounter which undergird, a mestizo translation of the imagined “Indio”. This figuration emerges in the first instantiation in the literary texts, in the Western sense of the literary, of César Vallejo and José María Arguedas respectively, in particular, “Paco Yunque” by Vallejo, and “Agua” by Arguedas. In “Paco Yunque,” the complex of domination is a force in the assemblage that emerges from Vallejo’s telling at the site of colonial encounter. The complex of domination is the order of colonial domination persisting in the early 20th century narration of Paco Yunque’s, the young Quechua speaker’s first day at a state sponsored, public school, this character being Vallejo’s reading of the imagined “Indio.” “Agua” reenacts the site of colonial encounter through a direct confrontation between the mistis, the name given to persons outside of the Quechua speaking world by Quechua speaking peoples, and comuneros, the name given the persons in the Quechua speaking world, by those outside this world. Arguedas, as a bilingual speaker of Spanish and Quechua, effectuates this translation as a figuration emerging from the site of colonial encounter, and as an inscription of Quechua difference. What emerges from these distinct textual fields, are the experiences of these characters, at the site of colonial encounter, where the force of this assemblage traces not only desire, but the culmination of the confrontation of characters, through the force of the complex of domination in each textual field. In a word, the confrontation staged at the site of colonial encounter projects an imaginary world, whose internal economy produces the outlines of two distinct political projects.

In Vallejo’s imaginary world, the privileged son of the mayor, the English Grieve, (the imperial sheriff) a new criollo, Paco Farina, (milled flour) the mestizo boy from the provincial town, and Paco Yunque, (the anvil) the indigenous Quechua speaker from the remote rural areas surrounded by the Spanish speaking world, contend for place, a forceful confrontation which ultimately ends in a scene of chaos, and destruction. For Vallejo, the political project emerging as the inscription of the internal economy of and in this field, is the failure of the political project due to the violent repetition of the complex of domination resulting in: chaos and, destruction. In Arguedas’ imaginary world, mistis control the precious resource, agua, water, which the
comuneros need. T, and in the confrontation between the decadent mistis literarily and figuratively intoxicated by their privileged place of power are confronted by the driven comuneros, who re-claim their right to access to this basic resource, usurped by the mistis, water. The internal economy of the figuration emerging in this textual field, inscribes the complex of domination as decadence. The narrator of this story is a young boy, of unknown provenience, the storyteller, though there is also a narrator embedded in the textual field. He resembles the orphaned migrant. The storyteller translates the interactions between the two worlds as he travels between both, though most critically he is the character “translator” who is also the prodigal son who escapes the rhizome of conflict into the vast horizon outside this town, where two different ayllus, Quechua communities, await him as a form of independence from the colonial vestiges still present in the republican field. The political project that emerges from the internal economy of this textual field is a utopia, from the Western conceptual field, or an imaginary return of the re-suppressed Quechua, for the comuneros are suppressed through deprivation, or the expression of, a place beyond the site of colonial encounter, an au de-lá, with a Quechua inflection, ayllu.

These stories, emerging from the field of mestizo experience, and conformed through the prisms of Western cultural forms, already inflected with Quechua, give cadence to a language that emerges already, as a translation, a mestizo translation. This mestizo inscription is neither a completed project of trans-culturation, nor a completed national project, of autonomy, self-naming, or self-rule. Rather, the figuration failure of a national project emerges from both these textual fields. In the realm of the literary, such as it is defined in the Western tradition, no writer confronts both the questions of translation and of the colonial encounter, a project of trans-culturation, between Quechua speaking peoples and Peruvian Spanish speaking creoles, more agonistically than José María Arguedas. One of the clearest figurations of this trans-culturation emerges from Arguedas’ text “No soy un aculturado,” where he inscribes himself as the trans of trans-culturation, the inarticulated mestizo for whom this conflict is irresolutely manhandled. In this text, Arguedas repeatedly proposes himself as the bridge between the criollo and the imagined “Indio,” inscribing trans—a political agenda whereby the two cultures, and in Arguedas’ terms, the two civilizations may be moved, to recognize one another, may be moved to travel across, from one boundary into the other’s field. The reconciliatory figuration emerges in this text as the inscription Quechua Modern from this Arguedian field of Quechua translation in which now, Quechua “Indio” becomes the burrow through which escape is effected, through which the orphanhood from all imperialist order, and the assemblage of paternal domination is expressed.
At the same time, in no other mestizo writer is the spectre or spirit of the imagined “Indio” more animate than in Vallejo’s tender evocations of the familiar, inflected by Quechua expression. Spectre or spirit, in that the figuration of the violent repetition of the complex of domination at the site of colonial encounter is undecided: Paco Yunque is the anvil receiving the violent blows of this repetition, but it is undecided whether Paco Yunque persists, his spirit alive and animate, infusing the text of this new colonial world of an early twentieth century Peruvian republic, or whether, in the thereafter, Paco Yunque is nothing but a ghost. A Quechua translation is needed. If Paco Yunque were to be a spectre, than he would most definitely be animate, in the Quechua world inscribed in Quechua stories: a Quechua spectre is always alive and well in the realm of the invisible, and often makes an apparition, in the visible world, in cultural forms familiar in Quechua and often as an animal. Paco Yunque’s spirit might also be dealt with, but at the site of Catholic resurrection, if imagined and so-called “Indios” have souls, or speak Spanish, which Paco barely did. Paco is a newly arrived Quechua speaker to this provincial Spanish speaking town, from the remote field he hailed from, migrant with coloniality on his back, bereft of any protection: as his mother is powerless to protect him from the violent assaults, literally real, of the Grieve boy upon him as anvil, Yunque, orphaned of father for he has left him behind in the oblivion of that remote field and in the oblivion of his conquest, an oblivion that the republican mestizo field accomplishes through the performance of the word “Indio” ideolectologically—a history deployed as the symbolic imposition of what the Quechua speaking peoples are. This racialization is both an ideolectological suppression both of meaning and of real Quechua speaking people in the world as text that Vallejo gives. In the Spanish-speaking town his mother is a servant and is entirely disenfranchised of social position or power. Paco Farina, Yunque’s mestizo schoolmate can offer no reconciliation, no respite for Paco Yunque, in spite of his bread like goodness, Vallejo’s predilect metaphor for simplicity but also for communion wafer, the hostia, the host. In keeping with the ideolectology at work, mestizo here presupposes the disapparition of “Indio” insofar as the liberal progressive state project is concerned in this Peruvian field. In fact, as his namesake and as Vallejo’s Catholic metaphor may suggest, Farina ingests the body of what is imagined to be “Indio,” presaging Yunque’s spectre-like state.

In its effect, the Quechua inflection this imaginary mestizo poetic expression registers defies the Western traditional categories of literature, especially in the sense of national literature, precisely because the disruption may be more cut, than escape, due to the order of domination which the colonial encounter marks distinctively as separation, cut with, in the Andean world rather than escape. (Wretched of the Earth, Fanon) Mestizo literature cannot be
minor literature, moreover, in that it is written by Spanish speakers who are citizens of the Peruvian nation, in this case, for more than one hundred years, and in that, national Peruvian literature’s conventional traditions recognize the contributions of mestizo writers, albeit with mestizo in its successive forms under the erasure Peruvian (citizen), the citizen that mestizo anticipates. However, yet it can be said that this literature yet purveys some of the effects of minor literature, in the figure of the Quechua migrant and the orphan without a mother, in the larger scene of globalization, and within the confines of the still living Quechua world, where being without a mother is the second loss after conquest, and is prefigured in the first loss of land, a loss reenacted through successive, repeated, and continual loss of land. These minor effects stemming from this literary mestizo field figures characters that do not speak Spanish well enough, but more importantly include characters who do not speak the language of the complex of domination, and whose indigenous language suffers a colonial silence.

Additionally, the Western literary history that the mestizo text confronts problematizes the literary itself and situates Latin American literature in a place at variance with Western traditions of literature. Mestizo literature in the sense of the Western tradition of the literary emerges within and in spite of discussions over national identity, over and above assertions about this literary expression as the figuration of foundational narratives of epic evolution and progress, it finds itself outside discussions which a colonial difference marks as “other” emergent poetic expressions, such as the study of subaltern cultural production or as postcolonial discourses might suggest as the condition or status of this writing. The debate framing the emergence of Arguedas’ literary production, situating his work alongside the work of other Latin American boom writers is in Arguedas’ consideration, a source of conflict and puzzlement as he states elaborately in his journal entries in El Zorro de Arriba y el Zorro de Abajo. The emergence of Latin American regional literature in the latter half of the 20th century was framed by the Western tradition’s hierarchized comparative assessment, where the terms for measurement and comparison were prescribed by the “more advanced” --in terms of Hegelian fulfillment-- Western countries such as the European former colonial powers, and also based upon a presumed superiority. In other words, the comparison was racialized by diminishing or assimilating the “underdeveloped” world’s emerging literary tradition. By these pre-scribed standards mestizo literature was deemed to have achieved an equal aesthetic value when compared to European literature71, the standard through which Northern Euro-American literature is judged as well.

71 See a position paper written by Mario Vargas Llosa conserving the status of the aesthetic as non functional non utilitarian, properly at the service of suturing the rift between the state and the social body and underlining the aesthetic character and valuation of even indigenous characters in Latin American
Finally, the figuration mestizo literature could be read as operating within a Western Hegelian frame intrinsic to the colonial encounter, whereby mestizo expression becomes the fulfillment of spirit in a historical dialectic where displaced Quechua speaker and criollo “native,” sublate this imagined “Indio” and mestizo comes to be the harbinger of autonomous development, at long last, Arguedas’ inscription Quechua Modern.

It is in this sense that I am concerned therefore with the specific poetic and political enterprise that literary as opposed to non-literary, and cultural texts outline as public works, as poetic expressions, mediated through various historical events inering upon the field, as experienced in the field, including multiple translations from diverse and distinct positionings. Provisionally then, the palimpsest of sociohistorical orders conveying cultural forms, shape both literary and any other cultural forms. The transcription, translation, and publication of these texts as books does frame these cultural expressions as public works submitted to a number of material transformations that also imply a cultural translation, inside and outside of the distinct text. These cultural translations purvey distinct Western representational practices that are delimited by the field from which they emerge, and that implicate cultural practices such as the events of inscription, transcription, and publication in the bookish form. Because this study does center on the textuality emerging and shaped by the bookish cultural form, it is especially important to observe in the second instantiation, the ways and practices through which the “properly indigenous” becomes the object of ethnography.

According to many descriptive and theoretical analyses of Quechua expression—, that is, both linguistic expressions in Quechua, as well as material things, such as textiles, and the things used in ritual—, the events and meanings of Quechua tradition are expressed ludically, onirically, ritually, and experientially through the Quechua word and ways of knowing, and its translations, thus defying our attempts to ascribe to them a determined allegiance to a particular ideological and historically specific construct, that is Western or Quechua. In other words, “the properly indigenous” seems to imply that “the indigenous” may not become encumbered by Western cultural forms, except if “propriety” implies the property, intellectual, of the gatherer of this “properly indigenous,” and except that a certain ethos for the graphing of an ethnie may be implied, whereby either the representation, in the Western sense of the word overtakes the “properly indigenous” or the very propriety implies such sanitation as may be transformative, and

literature. This argument elides the denunciatory character for which both Arguedas’ and Vallejo’s short stories became acclaimed. In fact they are used as textifications of what has oppressed the indigenous populations in Peru by teachers and scholars who make these literary texts a part of the arc of Mariateguian justice. Vargas Llosa, Mario. “La Utopía Archaica.” Centre of Latin American Studies, University of Cambridge. Working Papers No. 33, 1978.
therefore encumbering of what is other in the field, to the anthropologist observer. The difficulty that scholars encounter in delimiting or categorizing Quechua expression does not desist, even when deconstructing the Western apparatus mobilized to objectify, appropriate, graph, record, transcribe, translate, publish, and archive it. This is yet another Western cultural form of representation. The question of Quechua translation is therefore rarely outside of the site of colonial encounter, that is, the unequal and undifferentiated encounter between two distinct cultures where the methodological imperatives Godzich alerts us to become, in certain instances, the purest exercise of scientific reason, and the clearest attempt to exercise control over the uncontrollable designs of that which is given in the field as other. Quechua expression as indigenous is also rarely outside of the complex of domination, whereby in this instantiation, the Western subject’s scientific and methodologically framed desire to know in the field inscribes the figure of a dominating subject whose effects are felt also. Not only can the Western scientific practice be read as a cognitive cultural form imbued with the force of the complex of domination, but in the field of Quechua expression, it is rarely outside of the site of a coloniality of knowledge, as Quijano and Mignolo theorize the inferior status assigned the scholarship of the “underdeveloped” world, or the imposition permitted the “developed” world in determining the terms of assessment for everyone by means of the totalization inherent in the colonial encounter as well as the universalist ideology that assigns a developmentalist humanity to the West’s other. The recovery of Quechua expression finds its way through the text of “The Autobiography of Gregorio Condori Mamani,” through a circuitry that reveals the internal economy of the cultural form which emerges, “book,” and the givenness, the field of experience or the experience in the anthropological field from which it emerges, and from the globalized field at stake in this translational practice.

The instantiation of translation of the properly indigenous through an ethno-graphy takes place at the site of colonial encounter, now, in the globalized field as well. In the colonial encounter, a dominant imperative for identity—, the Western subject in relation to its Western object, where the object may be constitutive of the subject—, vies for the space that difference may claim. While what is distinct about “the object” submits to the imperative of a reasoning subject who may be, in identity with its object, if the universality of the truth of the idea

---

72 The anthropologist traveler, especially the novice anthropologist departs with “the certainty” that he or she can “master” what is to be known in the field, for how else can that person claim to have succeeded academically? This remains consistently necessary in spite of the limitations of the anthropologist and the attendant and most preposterous of proposals: that the native wants to inform, will inform faithfully, and that moreover this “mastering” visitor is welcome. In this case the effect may be traumatic for both the novice anthropologist and the “native informant.”
predominates, what is distinct in the “object” recedes; difference is deferred. Stated another way, the Western subject makes all objects subservient to the universality of the idea, and from within this universality, collapses its difference in favor of, in the interest of, a purported identity with the idea, and the subject. Is its difference its materiality, in the field, or is its difference its irreducibility as a being given in the field, distinctly, or is it a matter of both? The internal economy of the site of colonial encounter is the violence necessary to de-colonize, resisting the violence of being colonized, the violence of an apparent dispossession and displacement, which stand one to the other in an internal economy of radical overthrow through the exercise of the desire to repossess territory, or place. The internal economy in the field of coloniality is in other words--, colonial violence. Is identity, then, in the field of the idea this enforced silence of the indigenous tongue? Is the field of property the counterpart in the internal economy of the site of colonial violence, where the colonizer forcefully imposes the field of the idea, the force of the subject? Is this why the criollo elite negotiate independence with the colonial power, but extirpate idolatries from the natives? 73

The enforced silencing, or delegitimization of a language forms a part of the state order conforming a national identity, and emerges as part of European national/state order in the philosophical debates which took place in the 17th century, debates which Derrida deconstructs, annotating in the margins, the debate about whether the French language, for Descartes and his interlocutors, could supersede Latin as the language of philosophy, and as the purveyor, in turn, not only of philosophical truth, as Derrida reveals in his deconstruction. Derrida unearths that the debate had more to do, rather, with the imperatives of an emerging elite at the site of French modern state formation and that the dismantling of Latin’s privileged place translated into the creation of a properly French state order. 74 In the Andean region, the “criollo” republic which emerges in the 19th century at the site of colonial encounter, in similar fashion to the French state order which so inspired Latin American republicanists displaces the Quechua language by state order, surrounding the places where it is spoken by “acorralamiento,” cornering, and corralling, as Arguedas would describe the practice of exclusion of the Quechua language, by making it possible for many to be ignorant of it as it has been made forcibly as inaudible as possible, the more remote and removed it can be made, from modern history, from the modern world. In the case of Quechua, it is not that it is superseded, but rather that it is institutionally and systematically silenced. When purveyed by the state, as a part of state order, this is an act that leads to an enforced silence, or a silence enforceable by state violence. When state order inscribes

73 See Frantz Fanon The Wretched of the Earth
74 See Jacques Derrida El lenguaje y las instituciones filosóficas
a cultural form that becomes traditional practice, as cultural forms do, than the illegitimacy and degradation of Quechua as a state language can become common cultural practice. In this way, state order at the site of colonial encounter is enforced by a delegitimization that eventually utilizes race to rationalize the unhinged desire to appropriate, to possess Quechua speaking peoples’ territories, much in the way that the emergence of the identity Quechua had as its effect the expropriation of land and territory. The violence of this racialization is in direct proportion to the violence required to colonize, rape, and pillage, where the configuration of a coloniality of power merges the state order with traditional colonial practices and where its effect is again expropriation of lands and territories belonging to Quechua speaking peoples, alongside a state ordained extirpation of idolatries where now the mark of degradation is not different spiritual practices but a racial comparison which finds the “Quechua race” inferior. This republican state order abides in traditional anthropological translations of Quechua expression that involve recording, coding and recoding categorically. Transcription is one of the first Western translations of Quechua in that the first grammarians were Spanish missionaries whose efforts at understanding Quechua took place through the hegemonic comparison of coloniality. This transcription is moreover a practice of translation into a Western academic literacy, a translation through interpretation what would eventually become, in Western scientific categories, a movement from the oral registry of Quechua practices to the subjection to Western categories of thought through Western scientific cognitive practices. Finally, the appropriation of Quechua cultural forms is framed in modern Western representational forms, culturally defined narrative forms such as biography, literature, and even the book itself, as artifact, as commodity fetish, as archive.

Notwithstanding, Western anthropological practice remains also, a historical, contrapuntal response, to enforced silence at the site of colonial encounter in the globalized field, where the native or indigenous ethnie, can be translated into Western academic categories of knowledge through Western academic practices, and can thereby accedes to a Western form of representation, sometimes political, and sometimes aesthetic which strangely defies this colonial silence. At the same time, enforced silence of Quechua inhabits the world of everyday actions and experience today, however variously practiced, in an abiding site of colonial encounter and is therefore encountered in “the anthropological field” as well. It is possible moreover, that this enforced silence is also the harbor that shrouds the community from any further violence, incursion, imposition, and appropriation, and that their territorial and statist marginalization has served better than anything else to preserve Quechua cultural practices. One could say, on the one hand, that no travel, transport, transfer, or trade, no displacement, condensation, or expansion, no
one aspect or description of the practice of translation approximates the act of violence which enforces silence in the colonial encounter. Rather, the anthropological inscription translates enforced silence as ethno-graphy.

Colonial silence is a figuration that remains only as inscription at the site of the ethnographic book that emerges as a cultural form from the attempt to scientifically master experience in the anthropological field. Arguably, no amount of shared authorship or field living obviates the colonial silence inscribed and abiding in the assemblage of the anthropological métier from Montaigne forward. The Western voyage that Montaigne imagined, brought from the nether lands an Other through which continental thought could question (h)its own cultural forms. This voyeuristic translation is the trope of theorizing that Van Den Abbeele traces as the practice of specific continental thinkers, creators of Western expression made staid in its arcival cultural forms, while the flow of translation and theorization goes on. Clifford’s analysis of his interlocutor, the taxi driver, Khamees the Rat’s positioning in a globalized world, through which Clifford discerns a Westernized native whose imaginary is just as nourished by Western forms as it is by bookish and poetic accounts which posit distant lands that imply him, as his provenance, but from which he has become displaced, and which, surprisingly, he refuses to travel to, suggests to Clifford that the informant wants to stay native, as in, native to the place that he stands in—now. Mexican indigenismo, a prolonged and sustained historical treatise of the extraordinary indigenous character of Mexican national identity, whose theorists evolved discussions wherein Mexican identity was forged in the mirror image of the “imagined Indio” also traces the circuitry of colonial silence. (Marti, Paz, Rabasa, Sanjines) The Nietszchean recovery of the pre-Socratic Greeks in order to disrupt Western metaphysical consciousness, and

75 The range of anthropologists’ positions about this possibility intersects directly with the problem of the coloniality of knowledge traversing Western representational practices inhering upon “the uncontrollable designs of what is given,” in this case, in the anthropological field, where what is other is the “native informant,” the object of the anthropologist’s study. Undoubtedly, the primordial face to face is between one being and another, wherein the Western world privileges the regard of human toward an other, sometimes human, sometimes not. Kant underlines in his Critique of Judgment that the unknowable is monstrous, sublime, and that which can be known and judged is the beautiful. In accord with this logic, that which can be mastered provides the pleasure of beauty in that its “truth” can be known, its “truth” succumbs to the mastery of the knower. Not surprisingly, beauty, pleasure, mastery, and truth come packaged in the Western world as object of desire, of the desire to know, to tame, to discipline. More recently, objects consumed are packaged to represent this possibility, but by means of an ever more rapid fulfillment of desire or what has been coined as instant gratification, and this branch of industry indeed may very well be designing desire as well. As Continental philosophers guided by Marx, Hegel, Freud, critics of modernity who were members of the Frankfurt school would have warned, we have even become consumers of one another, so alien from ourselves and each other have we become, so alienated from what grounds us—our body/place—transporting us instead into a space wherein we can no longer find a distinct place that was always already given in the field.

in order to sense, reflected in them, the emergence of some one Other than the European man of his time are yet the recovery of the silenced precursors to Socrates, and conform disruptions which are yet instructive today, but which also trace a colonial silencing; Canclini’s and Bhabbas postmodern hybridity as a searc for different and emerging identities forged in the heat of confrontations too multiple to tame, or name, and fragmented into minority groupings claiming collective, community identities to counterpose to the monolithic dominant “white” individual culture are yet a form of address to the inscription colonial silence; Artaud’s voyage to Mexico, where the recovery of the “Tarahumara” was another agonic cry for an other identity; forged in the heat of this encounter with difference, Artaud’s is a plea for the case of difference, the distinct, which bears also the inscription of colonial silence in the case of the Tarahumara; Behar’s reciprocal translation as she faced her native informant, mediated by Chicana feminist postmodernist theories engaging difference also inscribes colonial silence while attempting to represent it; Arguedas’ agonic cries, caught as he found himself in this insidious mêlée between ruling elite and silenced “imagined Indio”, and who never fully broke out or escaped this tortuous in-between inscribes this colonial silence.

This fort-da assemblage which, could be said to be the internal economy pro-pulsed by the force of a sense of dis-placement, or a searc for an other “identity,” an other name in and from the field may be a primal scene through which the Western form identity emerges, and where the distinct form or forms of the other, and the Other are taken over by a desirous, egoic erasure, in the interest of Western identity. This mirror stage confrontation, in the interest of identity, and even propriety, and property dominates the native, the indigenous, her place, and place itself, this Other emerging irreducibly and distinctly from the other field, the field of givenness. Is it possible to suggest, that in this series of instantiations where a cultural form prevails over an other cultural form in the interest of identity, another name for the fort-da assemblage, while the O/other is suppressed, whomever and whatever the O/other may have been, we have a reenactment of colonial encounter, colonial silencing, colonial violence, and colonial difference? And is this fort-da assemblage the force inscribing the complex of domination throughout a Western civilizational landscape we have so far been mapping by tracing the movements of this historical progression of Western cultural forms? Is complex of domination the inscription we may be translating from the field of modern Western history in this practice of translation as reconnaissance? Is the epistemological crisis that Godzich alerts us to a sign of the confluence of modern Western science, governance, and culture as a civilizational practice bent on dominance, violence and destruction?
Many translation theorists have described and analyzed translation through categorical descriptions when attempting to confront the colonial inequalities that may inhere in the process of translation. The numerous allusions made by translation theorists to the recourse of an inarticulate but enabling language aiding in the process of translation--, the recourse constantly deferring untranslatability--, cannot account for the violent silencing which is the effect of colonial violence. Therefore, this (also) traditional practice of translation, of and in itself, cannot re-present colonial and enforced silence; it cannot translate colonial silence. This colonial silence is an inscription that emerges from the site of colonial encounter of concern in this field, but it does not have a language that may articulate it. And yet, only the practice of translation in the field situates the possibility of sensing this violently imposed and enforced silence, as an inscription at the site of colonial encounter in the order of domination by the Republican State emerging as the internal economy of the cultural forms and the experiences given in the globalized field. This practice of translation brings the inscription of colonial enforced silence from under erasure signaling what traditional cultural frameworks of translation could not account for currently in their reckoning with the colonial encounter. Even the analytics that observe the problem of the translation of colonial silence, as a question of a “comparative hegemony” or a colonial comparison, wherein no other “subject” achieves reason or equality to the ideal other than the colonizing “subject,” are nothing more than what could be called, the inscription of colonial difference or the colonial ruse. Enforced colonial silence cannot be accounted for by-- even an otherwise necessary Quechua cultural literacy, an affirmative practice. Colonial violence carries with it the desire to overtake place, as the demand for territory, and the construction of space as the outcome of the designs of the prevailing ego, with a lower case “e.”

The Western cultural form of representation is a form to attend to. Viewed as material cultural construction, the bookish character of certain “representations” are cultural forms now to be found in the Western archive of cognitive practices and they register several concerns about ‘representation,’ material or discursive. Whereas the archive harks back to vaults, digs, and material, yet not material artifacts, the discursive register which concerns us also situates the bookish character of the book, material or not, within the horizons of constructed spaces of influence, and the palimpsest of orders which traverse them. One example of such a space is the anthropologically disciplined field, as we follow the inner economy of the emergence of the book entitled “The Autobiography of Gregorio Condori Mamani” in the globalized field. Within this purview of a deconstruction of representation, is the book the fetish of Western practices as commodity, or is it the fetish of Derridean writing as supplement, the spectre of a writing yet to be, in that it is and is not caught, as it is placed without a place, between Being and beings, the
idea and the thing? (Derrida) Are we just as fictional as the *representational* book? Gregorio Condori Mamani is a *Quechua Speaker* who cannot write Quechua, as the State reforms that taught Quechua in certain historical periods in its public school system, more or less pervasively, more or less widely, evaded him. He would have been taught a Quechua as standardized as the first colonial, missionary grammars and dictionaries would have begun to make it, and which, as subsequent grammars and dictionaries would have transcribed it and preserved it at later moments, all the way up to the present moment. He would have been taught a statist classroom Quechua, including and excluding other Quechua parlances germane to their *fields*, including the Quechua fields from which Quechua speaking teachers hailed. He would have been able to learn, that is, this statist classroom Quechua would have been accessible only to the *Quechua speakers* with Western *lecto-scripted literacy*, Quechua speakers permitted to acquire *Quechua literacy*.  

How did Gregorio Condori Mamani graph his life, after all? And how does the text of the book travel, in and through multiple translations?

As a telling, *willay*, from Gregorio Condori’s lips to Ricardo Valderrama’s and Carmen Escalante’s ears, bilingual anthropologists, Quechua/Spanish, and *cusqueños*, from *Cusco* to the paper, and through the re-organization into a chronology, a Western chronicle, to the English translation, the book becomes *an autobiography*. *Mestizo anthropologists* claim, for Gregorio Condori Mamani *the place of the book at the site of colonial encounter where colonial silence is displaced, deferred, as autobiography*: a *reconnaissance* emerges: new *mestizo* is born, *native anthropologist* with “*Indio*”, known as “The Autobiography of Gregorio Condori Mamani.” Through globalized circuitry *the (bookish) space is repossessed* and figures *Quechua ex-pressed from colonial silence* through the global academic network of (activist) *native anthropologists* emerging in the *globalized field* whose effect is this mutual inscription as *the practice of a ventriloquism*. What *effects* does this *distinct textual practice* have upon our knowledge and language practices, and what bearing do *place, territory*, and the *indigenous* as figurations emerging from this anthropological field have upon *the field* as what is actually given, or not, in the field of experientiality? Is *a place* at stake in the Western traditional cognitive practice of representation as well as in the Western conceptual cultural form of anthropological, and even political representation, bookish or not? How does this play itself out in the *globalized field*? And of concern for *field*, is this figuration, this deviant *example* now, a part of that supplement, that scribble on the margins of *coloniality*? Is *this place* where we may stand, in order to leap?

---

77 There is an elitist, or exclusionary character of Quechua/Spanish bilingualism, the irony of Hacienda owners being the privileged users of Quechua, within the lettered Spanish circles, the sort of socio-economic privilege necessary to precipitate this privilege, until these reforms were passed.
Might we find actual territory, that which is indigenous through this escape from the assemblage of fort-da, now that colonial silence is broken, albeit through a strange ventriloquism?

Our travels through the discursive disciplinary communities that conform and re-conform the object of study, the material circulation and reception of the artifact or exemplar in the globalized field posit a still unknown resting place for the book, this arce book, traversed by two voices, and even three. Its disapparition from material cultural form, may be the outcome in the au-de-là, and yet the traditionally Western representational practices which the book gathers are of concern. The traditional representational practice at work here, at the site of the book, either for sensual consumption, (aesthetic) or for the political practice of standing in, portraiture, or advocacy brings into play the tensions which render the effect of readings of the moment, whose practice would derive from the possibility to register what is alive and changing, the oral, and what may become staid and relatively permanent, the written, from the site of the ventriloquist book, a book able to cross the border of oral literacy into scripted literacy, Quechua and Quechua cultural forms into Spanish and then English, Western vernacular cultural forms. From within the Western tradition, it could be said that the lecto-scripted tradition appropriates the Quechua oral tradition. We may ask, however, how does this Quechua tradition become convivial, how does it come alive—framed as it is in Valderrama/Escalante’s Gregorio Condori Mamani as ventriloquist autobiography, and how does it come alive in any of the other two instantiations of representations or translations of Quechua which we will observe?

There is tension between the bookish material, and the bookish non-material, inanimate written, the arcival document, the habeas corpus writ, and the animate written inflected by the Platonic true voice; the oral animate, the enunciation today inflected, and the oral inanimate, the telling of what has been witnessed. In accord with Quechua or Western traditions, the site of the ventriloquist book figures this oral/written confluence as an initial trans-ladere in the field, at a first landing place. The internal economy animating this emergence in the field is the question revolving around this strange book, which prefigures the difference, between fetish commodity book, and fetish conversation book. The fetish is the ventriloquist doll as commodity book, through which we have either the porter of the “false representation,” in that it is not re-cognizable, that is, has no clear identity, or, capitalist/Freudian substitution, the strange movement of the commodity fetish in capitalist circulation, whereby the identity in value from one commodified thing to another, creates a strange spectre named fetish through which all commodities are indistinguishable and all commodities because they have this value are the same, have no personal value; Freudian substitution because the object of desire, unattainable, gets substituted by something other upon which the desiring, neurotic ego fixates its desire, in stead
of, as mirage--, a procedure which becomes a neurotic repetition of this failure, assuaged by *mirage*. The fetish is the ventriloquist doll as conversation book, whereas no book stages a conversation with such obvious authorial instantiations circulating in the text *distinctly* and claiming their place in the book, for each other, translated into an ambassadorial field, and in some still limited manner, diplomatically con-versing. Is this strange *ventriloquist book* circulating globally, spurred by an assemblage sustaining the desire for a conversation, even if this desire is still operating through a fetish? Is the confluence of these two and even three *traditions* talking to and through each other and to others, proffering this event, without any clear design or intention other than the substitution through which conversation begins to stand in for book, and book for conversation, distinctly, putting all these traditions at play? Can this contentious play about fetish as falsity, whereas (Western) religion’s legitimacy is counterposed to the local and widespread Quechua indigenous spiritual practices deemed as superstitious falsehood, can the *assemblage of fort-da* here operative in the *complex of the fetish* be stalled, can the real contention over the book as commodity or conversation be overcome? Can the compulsion of the commodity fetish’s forceful circulation, whose logic is *endlessly foreseen* in Western traditional circuits be overcome by the small audience projected and, however indirectly solicited by this conversation book?

The texts read in this study, as three instantiations of the emergence of *Quechua poetic expression* in the *field* are figurations of *Quechua speaking* that operate specific effects. They generate specific meanings not only about the Quechua speaking, but also about the Andean region in national and global context. However provisionally, *the recovery of the properly indigenous* has given the figuration *place*, territory, and even indigenous language, as the *language of (a) place*, defining that which is indigenous as the kinship from within, down, which begets kin, the language of a person indigenous to a place, in kinship with that place, in kinship with what is given in the field. Is the *Quechua language* indigenous to a place? Is *Quechua* the indigenous language of the Andean region perduring before and after colonization? In the third instantiation, the autonomous Quechua practice, as Quechua speaking and Quechua ways of knowing maps *Quechua*, as *indigenous*, that is, as sustaining kinship with place, which these texts inscribe as *Quechua field*. Rather than departing from a stock, dictionary, or constructed definition of the indigenous that currently circulates, we depart from the moment when *Quechua* gives content to “indigenous,” rather, from within the place for speaking, *the Quechua field*. This self-naming practice enacts an auto-nomos, a self-naming as taking place, as taking political position as a form of self governance, but distinctly, as it is collective “self” naming that arises
out of the life force that sustains the conviviality, indeed *the Quechua conversation* among all collectivities. It is in this sense that in this instance what emerges from the *(indigenous) Quechua field* is decisively and ultimately, less encumbered, Quechua poetic expression, that is Quechua poetic expression not laden with *colonial difference*, . In the case of PRATEC, writers transcribe Quechua orality from within the Quechua field, enacting the ethos of testifying to what was once said and done, a practice from the *Quechua field* enacted within the Western field the Quechua speaker is now inhabiting, textually. In the third modality Quechua political positioning and *collective-naming is Quechua practice*, in that both “self-naming” and “self-governance” give *Quechua collectivities* in this instantiation in the *field*. This Quechua appropriation of the Western representational practice, *auntonomy*, also frames the possibility for *the indigenous*, that which speaks from the *Quechua field* in order to confront the colonizer effectively in this third instantiation, that is, breaking *colonial silence*. The Quechua field therefore gives the figuration *Quechua autonomy*, an autonomy which is also exercised by the native Quechua speaking bilingual, translating Quechua into Spanish, when necessary or desired, or not. This *Quechua practice of translation at the site of colonial encounter* disrupts *colonial difference* and the *complex of domination* through the translation of *Quechua* into Spanish, thereby inscribing a *Quechua translation of the West*.

There are several historical events and social movements that antecede this more contemporary relation of power inscribed in the *Quechua field*. These events and movements, as we have seen, have rearticulated relations of power between *the republican state and indigenous peoples* which, reenact *the colonial encounter*, or what is otherwise termed, *coloniality*. (Quijano, Miñolo) Indigenous Peoples’ resistance to this *coloniality* is longstanding. The number of indigenous communities, that is, collectivities organized in accord with traditional *indigenous Quechua knowledge and institutions*, collectivities that *auntonomously* exercise *Quechua governance* has grown over the last decades (Rengifo.) The social movement which grew in momentum in Bolivia, from the 1980’s onward around “la reconstitución del ayllu,” the reconstitution of the *ayllu*, the seed of all Andean life for both Aymara and Quechua communities continues today in the form of an active coalition of traditional indigenous leaders, *malkukuna* representing the multiple *ayllus and Markas’ interests’ before the republican Bolivian state, *Consejo de Ayllus y Markas del Collasuyu, CONAMAQ*. (Choque, Mamani, THOA) Other movements of cultural affirmation such as PRATEC, widespread throughout multiple regions of Peru are also an affirmative form of intellectual labor aligned with the interests of *indigenous communities* in a process of “acompañamiento,” (PRATEC) a walking side by side with, facilitating the collection and systematization of indigenous knowledge systems grounded on an
understanding of *pacha*, place and time, that is, the world, but also *pachamama*, the portion of the world visible on the surface of the earth, the portion that offers harbor to multiple collectivities of living beings. The work of *el Taller de Historia Oral Andina* THOA, and other work by indigenous intellectuals trained in Western Academic institutions also translates Western categories and traditions variously into Quechua, while translating Quechua practices as legitimate and existing *indigenous Quechua knowing* into the Western field. (Machaca)

The third instantiation is *the site of Quechua texts* that perform a *distinct* and potentially alternative way of listening to, conversing with, and abiding in kinship with *the Quechua world* in *the Quechua Field*. *The Quechua Field* gives the figuration *Quechua re-connaissance*, the limits that bound how these Quechua texts may surrender to and/or resist cultural translations, and even social assimilation, through what Pratec and others call “cultural affirmation.” But more importantly these Quechua practices map the Quechua field in which, because all that lives in this world is not only in a relationship of horizontal equality, or what can best be translated as kinship, and all that lives in this world is infused with spirit, or what may be aptly translated as essence or soul, Quechua re-con-naissance has as its effect the possibility of a language that translates the language of all living beings such that *Quechua re-con-naissance is at once the field of Quechua translation of the language of all living beings, all persons: a distinct field*. The practice of *Quechua reconnaissance* inscribes what Benjamin calls the hidden and central reciprocal relationship between languages, whereby all languages are translatable. However, he specifies that the field of its practice is language:

> This representation [the translation] of hidden significance through an embryonic attempt at making it visible is of so singular a nature that it is rarely met with in the sphere of nonlinguistic life. (72)

The Quechua way of listening to, conversing with and abiding in kinship with *the Quechua world of living collectivities in the Quechua Field* has the effect of creating a Quechua language conversant with all living beings, a Quechua language which translates the language of all living beings into its *Quechua poetic expression*. Marcela Machaca’s agronomical study, not only appropriates the limits of the field of Western agronomy, but it translates and expands them, bringing to the dimensions of the Quechua field the welcome observations of Western scientific traditions, while at the same time expressing the essential or spiritual relationship to the living being that is Water, for example. In accord with *Quechua knowing* from within *the Quechua field*, all beings must be conversant in the language of Water, in this case, as this is the Quechua way to listen and respond to Water—that is, in a word-- to converse with her, for Water is a female being.
The Quechua speaking themselves are autonomously making use of Western mechanisms of representation, which they translate, creating distinct effects in a historic process of “self-naming,” more at collectivity-naming, translated into Spanish. At the same time, traditional Quechua forms of communal living such as the ayllu persist today, and integrate within this Quechua field what Western epistemologies divide into the discrete concepts of “economy,” “society,” and “governance.” This integration could aptly be called the sustainability of spirit or the spirit of sustainability78 in the Quechua field in that the practice of Quechua re-con-naissance is the very process whereby the life in all beings as a whole, regenerates, and recreates, and the Quechua speaking make no exception of Western forms: they too are alive and must be nurtured. This integration is practiced as a knowing that all living beings relate in kinship, sharing in a common ground where distinct beings dwell in the harmony procured by a continual, reciprocal, and horizontal conversation among equal living beings that enjoins all living beings to this act of mutual nurturance among all collectivities of beings, for the welfare of all, allin kawsay, the good life. This Quechua speaking practice convokes all collectivities of beings to kinship by one inviolable rule: sustaining this permanent and receptive conversation among living collectivities, thereby vigilantly and carefully procuring balance and harmony among all living beings whose life force is in a constant state of re-con-naissance of the spirit that animates all things sustainably, together, abiding with and within this caring field, pachamama, that ensures that the spirit of all living beings is well nurtured. This integrative worldview emerges in a ritual cycle of cultivating the Quechua field, pachamama, and extends into urban sectors through an indigenous Quechua diaspora.

While the Western concept of “campesino” or “peasant” has for several decades identified this Quechua speaking historical actor within the field of Western disciplinary theory, as an extension of the category of class, and in order to explicate questions of the role of women through the category of gender in the rural sector, the Quechua speaking have been engaged in this active process of affirmation and recovery on terms at once linguistic, epistemological, and ontological, terms which are not bound by the limits of the field to which they are germane, the Western field. This concept, campesino, is a translation of the concept “peasant” or “peasantry” and its translation is a superimposition which renders under erasure a distinct and even different historical actor. This inadequate translation is yet another register of the coloniality of knowledge practices diffuse throughout the region since the colonial encounter. More importantly, it

dislocates the primary labor of indigenous Quechua\textsuperscript{79} communities organized in accord with an understanding of the ecological landscape of these territories which far exceeds the purview of ecological questions. “Campesino” is a term that obviates the integrating knowledge practices of \textit{indigenous Quechua spirituality} as they emerge from a worldview, or \textit{Quechua cosmovision}--- as they emerge from an intimate knowledge of \textit{this} natural order, \textit{this field, an ayllu field}.

This Quechua site of translation is sustained by \textit{a Quechua natural order}, where Quechua gathers through its language and its traditional knowing or \textit{spiritual practices}. This \textit{Quechua Andean natural order}, which is how it is accessible today is shared with Aymara and many other indigenous languages of various \textit{ordered places}, in that its path, its way marks a transversal crossing which traverses the coastal region, the Andean highland region, and the Amazonian region, the circuitry and place of Inca orderly practice. \textit{The Quechua natural order} is not conceived of longitudinally, but rather transversally. (Valladolid) Not only are those who cultivate the earth not farmers in that they do not lease land, but they are also not farmers in that they are not sedentary, as per the contemporary definition and practice of Western “farmers” and “farms.” The Quechua cultivator conceives of her and his labor as cyclical and in a state of permanent motion, as trans territorial, and trans regional, as it also moves along seasonal cycles, and in accord with these changes, physically moves from place to place in the landscape, remaining thus in a permanent situation of change in place and time. It is this way that the Quechua person, or \textit{runa} walks with \textit{kawsay mama}, the living mother, the living seed, in its multiple paths, through which this diversity becomes a spiritual Quechua practice of \textit{sustainability} \textit{in the Quechua field}. Diversity signifies that in conversing with many seeds--, seeds that come to visit--, and seeds that are invited to stay--, the cultivator makes \textit{the Quechua field}, the \textit{chakra}, a new home for the seed alongside a diverse array of kin whose distinct attributes correspond and best converse with this seed, with this soil, with distinct manifestations of water, etc.\textsuperscript{80}

The paradigmatic shift that this world (\textit{Natural Field}\textsuperscript{81}) order inscribes is a cycle of the conviviality of beings sustained by spirit in an elliptical transversal motion, tilted in accord to the movements of all living beings, in \textit{pacha}, in place and time, dwelling and protected, harbored by \textit{pacha mama}, or \textit{the spirit of sustainability}, or \textit{the sustainability of spirit}. Just as \textit{ayllu} and \textit{kawsay mama} are terms that are not conceptual in accord with Western philosophical ideas, as the

\textsuperscript{79} Aymara communities may also be inferred here in that the \textit{ayllu} is present as a seed of Andean life in both fields of practice and the word is used in both languages.

\textsuperscript{80} The work of gathering this knowing is published through PRATEC.

\textsuperscript{81} My translation.
ontology of Western thought would have it, this natural world order is an expression of the world in whole, and in distinct difference, not through a division of Being, and beings, but rather, as a whole sustaining distinct collectivities of beings, dwelling within harbor together, sharing the same place, a place proffered without mediation from within the Quechua field, a clearing whose plenitude is manifest through the conviviality of all beings, distinct and in communion keenly in conversation, one with an other, in distinct languages which the Quechua speaking translate. Nor is the spirit or Being of any being considered in terms of the division of the animate in contrast to the inanimate; rather, all beings are animate, and within spirit, and with spirit. What emerges in pacha is this sustained distinction, abiding in collective conviviality, a unison of spiritual movements regenerating this diversity permanently marked by movement also; all collectivities of beings persist distinctly and in harmony and balance with place and time, with pacha, through relations of cultivation, nurturance, and conversation.

The dismembering inscribed in the term métis or half, utilized to refer to the mestizo or part “Indian” and part “Western” or colonial subject is not what is being thought from, nor dwells within this natural world order, pacha. In stead, there is a re-membering taking place from within a cycle of movement sustained by and in spirit. The resonance of all beings within spirit is de-termined by this confluence of distinct collectivities of beings in equal standing within the Quechua field. This equity sustains the movement of harmony and balance, for every collectivity of beings distinctly, within the field of pacha, the field where all distinct collectivities of beings reach down begetting kin. Allin kawsay, or this Quechua well-being is the accommodation required in accord with Quechua knowing, a knowing about the life sustaining effects of cultivation and nurturance procured through intimate conversation in Quechua translations, and with all living collectivities. The effect of this Quechua internal economy of intimate conversation is longstanding sustainability that the figuration I discern in this Ayllu Field, Quechua intimacy conveys. Allin kawsay, Quechua wellbeing, is the way that the welfare of all beings may be practiced through intimacy with all living beings through the practice of cultivation, nurturance, and conversation. The integrative spirit of these knowledge practices, can be seen as far back as the Inka, whose personage is the cultivator, (MacCormack) as is any runa--, or member of the Quechua speaking collectivity, listening, translating, conversing, doing in place and time, in pacha-- a cultivator. Neither the republican criollo, as liberated colonial subject, nor the mestizo, as a split colonial subject is at a play in an indeterminate in-between, or a liminal beyond, a “post” colonial, or modern, for all these aspiration must first contend with the colonial complex of domination. In the Quechua Field the mallku is the ayllu in that he protects and nurtures the ayllu; the mallku performs mullu in that he follows the path of the seed, mullu,
walking from household to household in the *ayllu* to converse with mothers and fathers and children about their needs, [THOA] in order to address their welfare, *allin kawsay*; in other words, the *mallku* follows the path of *kawsay mama*. This Quechua way is the spirit of sustainability or *pacha mama*, as much as it is, the sustainability of spirit or *kawsay mama*.

*Quechua poetic expression* emerging from this *pacha* field inscribes a nurturing relationship between all that is given in the field, between all *Quechua* living beings. Quechua cultural practices are marked by an absence of re-presentation in that all beings are animate and all beings speak: no displaced image is required, and no ventriloquism is needed: a permanently occurring primordial translation. The limit of the site of Quechua translation becomes Quechua poetic expression, as a horizon in the field that precedes and procedes, before and through Western reasoning to a beyond reconciled to its past, a remembering which is the perpetual knowledge practice emerging from the intimate conversation among all living collectivities, with an ear for the inaudible, eyes for the invisible, and a humility before the unknowable, that is, what is in due time and place, through travel, on the way. This is what may be called *Quechua rule*, *Quechua governance*, as figural inscription also emerging from the *Quechua field*: “*ayllu,*” “*kawsay mama,*” “*pacha mama,*” “*pacha,*” signs travelling from the *Quechua field* to the Western field, whose translation is our task. Clearly the task is not to translate Quechua into Spanish, or English, for then we would remain in Gregorio’s ventriloquism, another way of carrying forward coloniality on our backs. *Quechua rule* may very well be, the site from within, deep down, we beget kin, the site of the indigenous marked by distinction in a moment, by harmony and balance within our dwelling with the spirit of sustainability, and within the sustainability of spirit, poetically, that is creatively expressed by the *Quechua speaking in conversation*. This is *Quechua poetic expression*.

Perhaps the urgency of this translation stems from the urgency of re-membering who we are. What relationship exists between the way of creating and recreating distinct traditions practiced at their respective fields or world orders of experientiality and how might the difference between them be expressed? What kind of writing is this *Quechua translation in the form of Quechua poetic expression*? Can we leap outside--- the site of colonial encounter, and escape the assemblages of a (post-)industrial military complex whose economic circuits trace the desire of the individual identity exercised through a complex of domination, a relationship to the Other ensconced in the assemablage of the fort-da--- through the exercise of a Quechua cultural literacy? What benefit for the globe may this current *Quechua translation pre-figure* and what effects does it now convey in the global field? Does this Quechua way of knowing map the field of a new eco criticism in that the global stakes involve the earth, an earth that is cultivated by the
Quechua speaking, rather than dominated by the Western vernacular archive? What sort of book is this book of Quechua translation and what possibilities, limits and delimitations does it map for the emergence of a non-colonial eco-spiritual book? What would the world look like, if the global field had as its order Quechua rule?

For a discussion of the Western responses sought to the global ecological crisis see: EcoSpirit: Religions and Philosophies for the Earth; Ed. Laurel Kearns and Catherine Keller; Fordham University Press: New York, 2007
Part III: *Mestizo inscriptions* translating Quechua & mestizo foundational fictions in the republican field

Chapter 5: The *Western mestizo state aesthetic order*, Peruvian *mestizo literary history*, and two political *mestizo republican state projects as mestizo literary inscription*: Vallejo’s “Paco Yunque” and Arguedas’ “Agua”

The *global field of colonial encounter*: *archaeological literary history*, *humanist utility*, and *criollo-imperial designs*: a *global colonial aesthetic*

This emergent *archaeological literary history* is resonant, for example, with the framing, the artifact selection, and the Western institutionality and legitimacy of the Harvard University Peabody Museum archive of Peruvian Pre-Colombian archaeological and ethnological artifacts, whose history of collection spans from the mid to late 19th century, through to an expansion during the late 1930’s and into the mid 1940’s when the exhibit grew as as researchers were banned from the “Old World,” e.g. continental Europe due to war. Its 1982 Peruvian Pre-Columbian exhibit frames the archival collection through slightly different museological institutional meanings. The 1982 exhibit entitled “The Andean Heritage: Masterpieces of Peruvian Art from the Collections of the Peabody Museum” underlines the Western civilizational and aesthetic ideologies still traversing Western discourses, however distorted or negotiated, that is creolized, thereby propitiating the emergence of the *mestizo Peruvian republican field*, as much as the *mestizo Peruvian republican field* propitiated the aesthetic interpretation embedded in this Harvard Univeristy 1982 exhibit of Pre-Columbian artifacts by what Fernando Ortiz named the (global) counterpuntal. This Western institutionalized geographic narration of Peruvain culture resembles the geopolitical narrative underpinning the *mestizo state aesthetic order* in Peru in the ecological field: parallel to the perceptions echoed by Peruvian intellectuals, and the Western knowledge systems yet ignorant of the Quechua agricultural technologies and knowledge practices adapting cultivation to otherwise “hostile” highland terrain, Westernized scholars in both the United States and Peru project that the highlands can produce nothing but poverty. It is
precisely this geographic mapping of the universally Western destiny of Peru that permits the Harvard University exhibit to narrate the indigenous Quechua speaker as destined for poverty and as unsuccessful cultivator of hostile terrain. The university exhibit directly parallels the gestures that would affirm the inclusion of the indigenous Quechua speaker as expansively as Carrillo attests that Arguedas would have imagined it, and ostensibly, Mariátegui before him in that the “civilizational and artistic accomplishment” of the pre-Columbian work reterritorializes it into Western universal patrimony, through a Western archeology, underlining the Quechua speaker’s ascension into the status of “human,” reterritorializing him not just for purposes of mestizo national identity, but for purposes of rationalizing the circuitry that would make this reterritorialization a global phenomenon with global designs: in the interest of Historical global fulfillment also interested in commercial fulfillment. In this way, the indigenous Quechua speaker is susceptible yet again to appropriation by the sons of the Western father, the succession of creolized foreigners, who after migrating to Peru in the 20th century through the conduit of large capital investment, and the fluidity of indigeneity as the Concept “Indio,” not only participate but exploit this Western universal patrimony which has become their right, to which they are, by dint of superiority in modernity and progress, in technology and industry, entitled. Indeed they are at times also viewed as benefactors assuming charge of “the white man’s burden.” Vallejo’s character, Dorian Grieve typifies this historical actor as Mariátegui would have signaled him. Not only did this universal Western aesthetic permit “criollos” to frame their republican constituencies as mestizo in the interest of this appropriation, but Lima, the viceroyal lettered city extends its expropriated nourishment to the European and US metropol as much as this metropol maintains its Westernized aesthetic state order duly instructed in its arts, its global hegemony in the south ever in place. This “contrapuntal” dynamic the cogent Cuban intellectual, (historian and anthropologist) Fernando Ortiz83 eloquently lays out in a form of textification that stages this confrontation by opposing two distinct discourses, an allegorical and critical-analytical one in order to to make apparent that the colonial encounter brings with it a dialogue that proves itself rife with pressures to submit and pressures to resist.

This late twentieth century cultural turn is preceded by and reenacts earlier and especially 19th century republican “liberatory” appropriations of geographic territory, accompanied by the construction of imaginative narrations of this territory rendering it at the mercy of these forces of Western progress, in the name of the imagined mestizo nation, the achievement of one race, and one ethnic/national identity out of many. However, the continual exploitation of “natural

resources” for reasons of “universal patrimony” and the political economy of imperial power justified through discourses which design exorbitant levels of humanist utility as the rationale for this expropriation would continue to characterize the fatherland that the Mariateguian criollo repudiates, while in turn the son claims as his native territory what his father had once already reterritorialized as his before his son’s conquest. While this criollo son intensifies his claim to American territory as his, while the father first conquered the pre-colonial peoples, the son claims “Indio” identity in the act of emancipation, of separation and individuation from his father, as he claims to be native to the territory, as he claims to be native by his own design, the republican criollo design of a mestizo republic.

Several decades later, the pressures of the extractivist ex-colonialist exogenous colonial father in the first half of the 20th century, turned now, “imperialist” father in the first half of the 20th century, for the colonial project persists through insistent and repeated (capitalist) global designs—still inhering upon the grid of the lettered city84 imposed upon the New World prompting the criollo son to intensify his territorialization in that he is yet conquered; he must somehow overtake the animality imputed to the “indigenous son” by his colonial father, the status animality he must have tamed when the republic claimed the “Peruvian territory” as “the patrimony of the republic.” Claiming “Indio” animality as his own, the criollo must also evade the animality that makes him prey—a schizophrenic move most indelibly inscribed by Arguedas in “Agua” and in his trajectory as a public intellectual. It is this schizophrenic break that propitiates and precipitates the indigenous Quechua speakers ascension into humanity in the 1970’s, (and later “full citizenship,” as yet another appropriation and reterritorialization,) and it is this schism that figures and later inscribes mestizo. Mestizo is the reterritorialization of “Indio” as mestizo in the interest of “criollo” independence from a now imperial, resource exploiting metropol/father whose persistent disperse colonial global designs persist. As Vallejo points out, “criollo” conformations do not abate, and all European investors with global designs have access to this criollo status and criollo privilege, precisely in designing the mestizo republic which would provide the necessary workers to carry on “natural resource extraction” or other lucrative enterprises. For Vallejo, what the Grieve exploit is secondary: the fact that they are Brittish “ex-patriots” who have come to invest in Peru, and the fact that they have come to rule as well, as governor of his fictional provincial capital, both these fictional truths and what they signal is what is primary.

The aesthetic that sustains the emergence of the Peabody Museum’s Peruvian Pre-Columbian archival exhibit inheres globally and contrapuntally upon the configuration of the mestizo Peruvian republican field by means of the political economy of a global coloniality we term empire. This mid to late 20th century emergent “aesthetic” figures and inscribes humanist utility, an inscription from which we have not yet recovered and one that still conducts the Mariateguian arc of justice. This imperial aesthetic is framed within the logics of a type of “Columbian” or transatlantic exchange that moves the Eurocentric racist mythology and logics for colonial and imperial conquest forward—hegemonically, thereby suturing the political and economic imperatives aligned with the interests of globalized capitalist profit and power—with the rationalizations of the complex of domination germane to the field of colonial encounter, inflicted upon the Peruvian mestizo social body, a reenactment whose progenitors are European continental philosophers of the 18th and 19th centuries, the readers of antiquity deconstructed and de-structed in Part 1.85 It is important to note, that the Derridean limit of this field of mestizo republican order is also a deconstruction based on the translational and comparative methodological practice of “the transcribed orally derived inspiration” or what the European tradition calls writing through divine inspiration, a hermeneutics yet marking Western institutional traditions in the first half of the 20th century, certainly within educational institutions both within the creole North and South and ensconced within myriad other social institutions, notably the state and its larger educational institutional apparatus well into the second half of the 20th century, and arguably, beyond. We would note here, that Kant and Hegel narrate a racist story in their footnotes, in vainglorious comparisons of Old and New World found in their orally transpired inscriptions. What is consistent throughout these orally transpired inscriptions to be found at the Derridean limit of this field of translation is a comparative hegemony “outside” of their philosophical edifices, right next to them, bolstering them, in spite of and while undermining their universalist claims to ownership of universal truth. The very distinctions they cite might be the very unraveling of such a racist story, especially as the comparatively inferior creatures are to be found outside the margins of “civilization.” The very possibility of forgetting the colonial encounter, the moment of witnessing the radical new is what begins the story of appropriation, understanding, and expropriation that follow. Subsuming the new creatures within the

85 Thomas Jefferson’s journal on legislation regarding slaves divides as separate and distinct his discussion between “political” concerns and “philosophical aesthetics,” the later being the frame through which Jefferson reasons/rationalizes the expulsion of black slaves from the US as a political measure, based upon the aesthetic theories through which the superiority of whites on the basis of aesthetic accomplishment comparatively leaves African slaves in inferior stages of development. “Notes on the State of Virginia,” (1785)
conquering and colonizing systems of knowledge may be one of the most insidious and egregious forms of domination to have ever been effected.

This oral emission transcribed in response to the sacred voice that inspires, these symbolic narrations of “our Lord” become the de-facto guarantor of the unquestionable inevitability of the conqueror’s moral right and superiority. “Outside” these western, european, philosophical edifices, departing from the margins of the telling footnotes unfolds the real story projected by the Western ego upon the legions of comparatively inferior castes of creature susceptible to suppression, repression, and domination—dwellers within the savage unconscious—and more to the point of this analysis, all victims of this Western colonial encounter. The philosophical edifices suture the demands and the interests of the creole state, and the outcry and needs of the social body are negotiated between conscience and ravenous hunger for “the philosophical truth.” This is one of the stories that we may reconstruct by following Derrida’s investigative footsteps alongside western philosophical texts, audibly telling as he walks, and we hear, next to him, what we read, noting what signals, willanakuy. We read as well through the Latin American laberinthyne way through the D&G rhizome, the inherited task of “criollos” and “mestizos” alike as they variously and convolutedly face “el problema del Indio” and his jungles, his mountains, “impenetrableness,” as criollo/mestizos negotiate the indigenous Quechua outcry, his/her counterdemands, his/her articulate silence for the criollo/mestizo ignorance of Quechua is tantamount to the indigenous Quechua speaker’s silence, while his silence is also his disinterest in all things Western, his harbor, and his affirmation, his RUNA resistance through the Western labyrinth of criollo and mestizo “bad conscience” and “redemption.” The Mariateguian arc of justice is not but a Roman Catholic redemption, the resuscitation of the son himself.

From this global field of colonial encounter, the Western science of eugenics emerges in full force, coincident with the emergence of the “New World” Southern American republics as well in the latter half of the nineteenth century, just as the Peabody Museum has as its precursor the American Museum of Natural History, a Teddy Roosevelt project imbued with the racialized stratification which sought origin and purity in “the animality” of the African continent, both its

---

It should be noted that Derrida’s analysis of the philosophical debates that would replace Latin as the language of philosophy, with the vernacular, French, is the first creole gesture we can cite in the long trajectory of imperial/colonial domination whose origin is the relatively small European continent.

Octavio Paz’s El laberinto de soledad, Lezama Lima’s Paradiso, Gabriel García Marquez’s “Macondo,” Santiago’s longing for “el Indio” in The Space in Between, all echo Marti and Bolivar, but more importantly are all part of the republican western rhizome Latin American criollo’s grapple with in healing the burden of guilt they inherit inevitably from their fathers: how can we be—long--- where we have displaced Quechua speaking native Peoples from their land, land which we ransacked and took?
people, and its fauna. (Haraway) The plunder of African “artifacts” and “animals” in the interest of a search for origins and identity, is a plunder reenacted “during the famous scientific expedition to Central and South America undertaken in 1871 in the vessel Hassler [which] provided the Peabody Museum with the first articles of its textile collection, which now ranks among the finest in the world, and its splendid ceramic holdings.” (Bawden and Conrad 1) This aesthetic of humanist utility is the seed of the criollo state reappropriation of native Quechua land, and of criollo humanist reterritorialization of “a humanized “Indio”” as named mestizo in mid 20th century Peruvian republican debates. Within the Mariateguian arc of justice, “Indio” is Peruvian as human, and within the Arguedian arc of justice, “Indio” becomes “Quechua Modern” or mestizo citizen, de facto human, as Arguedas himself became the guarantee of Quechua humanity. This describes the internal economy of the mestizo Peruvian republican field: all that is indigenous can remain the object of the conqueror’s desire: “indigenous territory” is reappropriated, from colonial father to republican son. The internal economy of republican Peru throughout the throes of its emergence and as it negotiates its identity and rule of law becomes a now axiomatic complex of domination at the repeatedly reenacted site of colonial encounter.

Some decades later, according to its designers and reviewers, the 1982 Peabody exhibit of “Pre-Columbian Peruvian” artifacts departed dramatically from the scholarly and pedagogically oriented exhibits of these artifacts in the 1880’s “South America Room,” where “little effort was devoted to arranging the items in a visually stimulating or interpretive display.” (Bawden and Conrad 2) The 1982 exhibit, by contrast, was “visually stimulating” and provided an “interpretive display,” as

[the relatively few items on display are merely a representative sample of the finest objects from these multifaceted collections, selected not only to illustrate the exquisite quality of Peruvian artistic expression but to best explain the broader cultural systems of which they were integral components. (ibid 3)

Compelling similarities could be established between the story of the arrival and reception of the The King Tut exhibit within the United States between 1977 and 1979 as told by McAlister. Not only was Egypt mapped onto the US sphere of geopolitical influence through the appropriation of Egypt as civilizational origin, echoing the universal Teddy Bear Patriarchy embedded in the ideation of the Museum of Natural History which began with the art of taxidermy almost 100 years earlier in the masterful craft of Carl Akeley, but the museological aesthetic purveyed resonates with the interest in depicting “representationally,” exquisite “mastery and beauty,” that

is to say “civilization,” or “human artifact” susceptible to the global designs of humanist utility. It was precisely the representational character of the pieces selected to typify beauty, a beauty already interpreted for the viewer, which were readily perceived as “fragments,” shards or properly speaking, “fetishes” of “ancient” civilizations whose worship anticipated our own. Both the Tut Exhibit and the newly confected Peabody exhibit reterritorialized in one case as African Egyptian origin, and in the other as the indigenous origin, in the case of the U.S., along racial lines through which now the consumer purchased black origins, and in Peru, Quechua indigenous was part of the ancestral past to be consumed as well, both museum exhibits proffered a rationalization for the contemporary historical moment.

The commodity machine ensconced in this post “age of mechanical reproduction” reproduced not only the representative pieces, but also the black culture mapped onto the King Tut trinkets and t-shirts, parodied for its irony by comedians like Steve Martin, and marking a shift in American US culture whereby black would be white, and “Indio” would be criollo, in this instance, through the ability of the “representation” to become commodity fetish. The commodity parses the emerging identity for consumption: white devours black; criollo devours “Indio” and mestizo is available for consumption. White America could now consume contemporary black culture as part of itself, much in the way Peruvians of the last decades wear Inca paraphernalia and t-shirts, project their identity from their imagined “Quechua indigenous origin.” Just as the King Tut exhibit overlay America’s political influence over the Middle East, “Inka—Peruvian---indigenous” was manufactured through the national tourist industry re-territorializing Cusco as commodity festish within the tourist industry, investors invading Cusco and slowly displacing the local population away from the center it occupies, and where criollo investors literally buy land and intellectual property rights in Lima, where nationalist pride is also expressed through the new business center of town that is Miraflores, donning an indigenous market much like the ones to be found everywhere in Mexico City and where “Indio origin” is a source of national pride and identity and an instrinsic component of this national narration. This is also the pretentious middle class which routinely parodies “cholos” in the everyday Peruvian, slang vernacular, parodying the affection which characterizes Andean codes of conduct, or more sardonically parodying the divide that still separates this Quechua nation surrounded by just such mestizo citizens, through cartoons or television shows performing a similar parody of this modern, insistently ironic mestizo nationalist identity. The irony is of course that both blacks and the native Quechua speaker sustain unmitigated prejudicial treatment: separation and undue
reprimands and sanctions, legal or social, to which, Vallejo and Arguedas signal, and to which contemporary comedians are willing to signal as well.\footnote{While the example chosen establishes the parallel between the creolization of “classical Western civilizational aesthetics” through these museum narratives, and an analogy exists between the discourses of literary Peruvian traditions and other creolized Western traditions such as the American/USA, it is the contrapuntal relationship that exists that is being underlined, a relationship that characterizes the multiple couplings of this sort, in multiple places.}

Just as white United States America could consume contemporary black culture as fetishized origin, as a “part of itself,” as paraphernalia from its “origin,” purportedly constitutive of its “identity,” the King Tut exhibit overlays America’s political influence over the Middle East, making a case for its right to ownership of (this human patrimony and needed economic resource, petroleum,) confounding the political and economic in this figuration of the aesthetic of humanist utility with creole imperial design. The auto-nomous gesture inherent in this pronouncement and this assessment of “universal human value” of both Middle Eastern Civilization and petroleum characterizes the ownership taken by Peruvian criollos of Peruvian Quechua riches or its translation, “civilizations.” The Peabody exhibit shared and avowed the legitimacy of the representational gesture ensconcing “exquisite” beauty as the patrimony of all peoples worthy of the name “civilization,” providing in addition the “interpretive” framework which would also facilitate a Peruvian republican archealogical literary history in the interest of republican humanist utility. The contrapuntal relationships intercessionally actual in this field establishes and repeatedly expands the colonial encounter well into the 20th century, with its attendant translations: the Latin American Continent begins to speak of imperialism while the debate between autonomy and dependence continues, while the psychoanalytic of criollo individuation is not fully realized. In the interest of autonomy, the position that these criollo and republican sons vie for, the imagined “Indio” is institutionally appropriated while his land is reappropriated by the criollo cultures of an emerging, republican Latin America, just as Marti, and later Fernandez Retamar would remind us of. Marti would look the “‘Indio’” in the eye, as Mariátegui did, and Fernandez Retamar would acknowledge the imagined “Indio’s” assimilation in his predilect metaphor, his translation being a “devouring.” Yet the predatory desire of this criollo elite is not entirely enacted in the real without a cost and a period of respite for the native Quechua speaking population of Peru. As we have seen, the Velazco regime, in a period that resonates with the publication of Vallejo’s and Arguedas’ Paco Yunque and Agua, alongside bilingual educational reform, grants the incidental so-called “Indio” the legal status of comunidad campesina, a negotiated instance of republican identity that acknowledges two fundamental realities: the Quechua speaking rural communities are yet organized strongly along the lines of their
attachment to a collective and land-based identity, that is the Ayllu. For the period in question, indigenous Quechua speakers would actually be able to become citizens as property owners under their new name, “comunidad campesina.”

It would appear that art, such as Arguedas had proposed it would remain the conduit used to establish an apparently innocuous ideological bridge between criollo interests and desires and indigenous Quechua land and territory. The archeaological record devised as the origin of this Peruvian literary history, an archive comprised of fragments and pieces, among which some are selected as emblematic of civilizational accomplishment performs the Manichean observation through which the categories of Western art and aesthetics exercise a final judgment concealing its ultimately political designs: criollo rule over geographic territory and human resources, the exercise of what Martin Luther King Jr. called “the deadly Western arrogance.” In other words, what was imagined “Indio” could continue to be appropriated and creolized just such as this mid to late 20th century mestizo field I am delimiting would have it, would translate it, while yet “cleanly” separating the literary from the political. Notably, the activist spokesperson for this neurotic republican reenactment of the complex of domination at the site of colonial encounter as mestizo possession and translation was the person who embodied the irreconcilable contradictions of this mestizo project: Arguedas. It is at the university, La Universidad Nacional de San Marcos where he last teaches after beginning his career as an educator in a small city inside the Department of Cuszco, that Arguedas commits suicide, leaving a note that underlines the fact that the Western, portentous, and purportedly “universal” applicability of Western humanist values are not in actuality applicable to the Quechua speaking world, as these humanist values are contravened by the assemblage of a complex of domination at the site of a repeatedly colonial encounter between criollo elites and indigenous Quechua speakers that ultimately refuses what is there and what is different. At this moment of keen awareness, sadly, Arguedas laments the failure of art to reconcile “Quechua” and “criollo” peoples, as he bears witness through his last words, inscribing in his note the tenor of all the events that belied this universality, translated in this way: the laberinthine rhizome that the mestizo assemblage creates at that historical moment precluded any such reconciliation between “Indio” and “criollo,” but rather, for Arguedas, proffered another escape. What Arguedas confirms is what Vallejo signals in his literary narrative Paco Yunque: the attempt to establish a national project on terms that acknowledged colonial mestizos, criollos, and foreign investors would not leave room for the “backward” ill understood native Quechua speaker. Art would become a facile escape for criollo hegemony:

---

90 American Rhetoric A Time to Break Silence (Declaration against the Vietnam War)
http://americanrhetoric.com/speeches/mlkatimetobreaksilence.htm
assimilating the mark of difference by appropriating a mestizo indigenous Quechua aesthetic in
the interest of criollo/republican individuation and independence left little room for real Quechua
speakers. Aware that the part of him that not only understood but had been nourished by deeply
Quechua values had no place in the emerging republican mestizo field I describe most agonically
and poignantly narrated this placelessness in the journal entries of El zorro de arriba y el zorro de
abajo.

Santiago de Chile, 10 de mayo de 1968
En abril de 1966, hace ya algo más de dos años, intenté suicidarme. En mayo de
1944 hizo crisis en mi una dolencia psíquica contraída en la infancia y estuve casi
cinco años neutralizado para escribir. El encuentro con una zamba gorda, joven,
prostituta, me devolvió eso que los médicos llaman “tono de vida.” El encuentro
con aquella alegre mujer debió ser el toque sutil, complejísimo que mi cuerpo y
alma necesitaban, para recuperar el roto vínculo con todas las cosas. Cuando ese
vínculo se hacía intenso podía transmitir a la palabra la materia de las cosas.
Desde ese momento he vivido con interrupciones, algo mutilado. El encuentro
con la zamba no pudo hacer resucitar en mi la capacidad plena para la lectura.

This psychic malady elaborates the impossibility to reconcile this emerging republican orthodoxy
bringing Quechua under decided erasure, and the erasure that trans-positions itself in Arguedas’
psyche, feeling this affliction poignantly in his relationship to language, Spanish in particular.
While mestizo, from Arguedas’ imaginary was conformed variously, though most cogently and
coherently as a “Quechua Modern,” his desire for a mestizo citizen as Quechua modern would
echo well into the 21st century though not yet realized except perhaps in specific places of the
Andean Quechua (and Aymara) speaking world, through exceptional events such as the election
of congresswoman Hilaria Supa in Peru, and most pervasively in the Bolivian field emerging in
the last ten years through the election of Evo Morales, Aymara, as president of the Bolivian
republic. However, it is clear also that the republican and criollo negotiations of indigenous Peru would also express themselves in the most aesthetic of discourses in the capitalist economy of late 20th century: tourism. From this mestizo republican field would emerge representations of Peru that would aestheticize the real lives of Quechua speaking people. In the last decades of the 20th century and well into the 21st Quechua has been devoured by criollo culture and circulates as a commodity that can be purchased by 20th century mestizo citizens. Peruvians proudly don their Inca indigenous identity, the mark of their difference, their humanity, and their excellence, in commodities that exhibit the artifacts of “Inca Civilization.”

Late in his career, Arguedas was associated with the Latin American boom, feeling sorely at its margins, and identifying much more closely to the Mexican author, Juan Rulfo, a man who like him had travelled throughout Mexico as a functionary of the state, as Arguedas had actually done, alongside his father, and then later as an educator and an anthropologist.

[Alejo Carpentier, is who he alludes to at the outset here in his journal entry, addressing Juan Rulfo in particular:] Es bien distinto a nosotros! Su inteligencia penetra las cosas pero de afuera adentro, como un rayo; es un cerebro que recibe, lucido y regocijado, la materia de las cosas, y él las domina. Tú también, Juan, pero tu desde adentro, muy de adentro, desde el germen mismo; la inteligencia está: trabajó antes y después. (20)

He is really different from us! His intelligence penetrates things but from the outside to the inside, like lightning; he is (it is the case of) a brain that receives, lucid and rejoicing, the materiality of things, and he dominates them. You too, Juan, but you do it from the inside, from well inside, from the seed itself; the intelligence is there: it worked before and after.

Rulfo photographed and narrated what he witnessed as a government bureaucrat on assignment throughout remote Mexico, that is the Mexico remote from the capital, in non-fiction prose, narrative fiction, and photography. Arguedas had as a child accompanied his father, who also travelled the Andean regions by State assignment. Arguedas actually lived within “remote Peru,” deep Peru, remote from Lima, remote from the Viceroyalty and the liberal republican parliaments centered in Lima, in provincial Peru, (the lands that Clorinda Mattos de Turner would turn into liberal democratic pastoral indigenist landscapes,) and most importantly within Quechua indigenous ayllus, as a child. It is this seeded experience, as traveller, from the materiality or actuality of things, that Arguedas established a parallel between himself and Rulfo as writers, but also as members of a caste of intellectuals and Jacobins that could not and would not co-mingle in certain social castes, in spite of their international recognition, and their ability to in effect co-

91 Of importance to this discussion, current debates about the competence of the congresswoman revolve around language, around whether Congresswoman Hilaria Supa speaks, reads, and writes Spanish adequately. Source: http://nilavigil.wordpress.com/2009/04/23/que-subnivel-senor-mariategui/
mingle, and it is this relationship to language which also established this difference decisively. The linguistic project that the “seed” of their creative projects sows is born of a different relationship to things, a relationship distinct from the liberal republican grid that established the colonial encounter as its cornerstone. Arguedas had been left on the other side of the “corral” fence that separated the “criollo” nation from the “Indio” nation when he became orphaned of his biological mother, a description of the separate nations which he pronounces in his acceptance speech in 1968. His childhood is imbued with the ayllu Quechua poetic expression found on the other side of the corral fence and “Agua” expresses agonically in his bilingual fictional narrative Arguedas’ ardent desire to reconcile the “india” (animal) mother92 at whose breast he suckled and the “criollo” (human) father whose statist rule of law possessed and dominated Quechua ayllu land.

In these mestizo readings or translations of Quechua, I seek to discern Quechua difference, which resonates for its absence, except in mestizo pieces, like the archeaological shard, though more often through traces and inscriptions requiring another literacy, a fourth limit of translational practice as I delimit it, the transformational practice of a comparative and translational deconstruction that goes beyond, to enter the au de là, the movement of thought and expression not beholden to Western history, whether it interrupts, intersects, intercedes with it or not. The first three writers take on what in Latin American and other social science theory would be termed “imperialism” directly or indirectly in that they all abide within the colonial encounter. In the latter Peruvian instance located within a mid twentieth century interculturality characterizing relations between the Andes and the capital, Lima, the republican colonial claim to territory emerges as republican mestizo and may be reiterated and reenacted by archeaologically digging deeper, unearthing from a more remote “indigenous” past, the roots that differentiate contemporary Peruvians from the still invasive, economically and politically colonial and exploitative “Metropol” of the 20th century, thereby appropriating Indigenous Peoples’ territories, reterritorializing them as mestizo territory, while appropriating indigenous Inca civilization as the mark of Peruvian nationalist difference, a necessary claim for a separate, national identity. In the Peruvian national mestizo field we are delimiting, a new republican mythology emerges, as the figurative inscription mestizo Peruvian nation that conveniently swallows or destroys especially the indigenous Quechua that is then collapsed into mestizo.

92 Arguedas establishes analogies between commoners and animals, sometimes mediated by bilingual translation, sometimes lost without translation on one or the other side of the divide between Quechua and criollo nations. The effect is ghastly for the humanist Western reader; for the Quechua literate, something else could happen.
The Bolivian field we may delimit carries with it less colonial burden to the extent that its Colonial Viceroyalty remained under Viceroyal influence less time, though it belonged to the Virreinato/Viceroyalty del Rio de la Plata between 1777 and 1810 which comprised the current territories of Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Bolivia. Another way of stating this is to suggest that the lettered city did not embed into the Bolivian field in the same way that it did, especially in Lima. Sanjines, a theorist of Bolivian cultural textual fields concludes that mestizo is but a mirage in the Bolivian field in that republican hegemony was never consolidated, the indigenous Katarista Movement he submits as a historical instantiation that cuts through this possibility. I agree that mestizo is but a mirage, but would submit that the Katarista movement only partially disrupts the viability of mestizo. This Bolivian movement is so deeply ensconced in a Western European field of resistance as the utopia of working class Marxist hegemony, that it fails to permit the fourth translational limit which I designate as transformation. Dialectical opposition such as the opposition set forth in Marxist theory, materialized in social movements or otherwise materialized is but an affirmation of the opponent, especially as “sublation,” of “Indio” in the interest of “mestizo.” There is no denying the resistance to conquest and to invasion perpetrated by the Katarista movement, but the Katarista difference remains caught in the Spanish speaking nationalism that permits this Katarista difference as “difference itself” and which cannot “understand” but as annihilation or assimilation the Katarista activist before him. Historically we witnessed that the attempt fails, however much the actions resonated with the deepest sentiments of those invaded and conquered for nearly four hundred years. More importantly, there is no proposal based upon an affirmation and the transformative and creative possibilities inherent in the nurturance of the seed of something other, whereas instead the Aymara speaking Tupac Katari carrying on his merchantile activity in present day Bolivian territory allies with Quechua speaking Tupac Amaru and a succession of his kin in the most important and the last such rebellion against the colonial Crown in defense of their merchantile activity. An action against the invader, a situation that reinstates and reinstalls the colonial encounter, this situation places the Katarista movement and all such movements at a terrible disadvantage: the Katarista movement will at every step encounter the manipulated instantiations owned and deployed at will by the “authorities” portending a justice, a justice which as we shall see is nothing but the whim of the necromantic priests overseeing their project of rule for the sake of individual exploitation. This fourth limit to the practice of translation emerges from the Bolivian field later, especially during the 1980’s through the social movement led by a group of young Indigenous theorists and practitioners who gather the alternative history narrated by Quechua, Aymara, and Guarani elders who recount the story of the past from the indigenous field; this movement eventually sets out to
to “Reconstitute the Ayllu”[^93] as a way of recovering *indigenous Aymara Quechua and Guarani governance and life in the field.* (THOA 1995) Rather than resist the fictional narrative of the Liberal Republican Grid from the inside, trapped inside it as a dissident, an insurgent, and all other terms designating the “criminality” which justifies the Law of this concocted order in the first place, in the territory which is yet *indigenous to them,* they step by step reconstruct their *fields of governance and life.* Yet and still, in every instantiation located in this larger mid twentieth century *mestizo field,* the order of domination of the colonial encounter is operative. The *mestizo* “indigenous question” is ultimately the stake in both the imagined “emancipator’s desire” to be native effected in the field through the appropriation of indigenous lands and territory, but also in the mythologies of state that continue to delimit the translational field, and the *mestizo* republican imaginary that from there emerges as national literature, or national rationalization suturing the social body dominated and the duplicitous ideology of an “interested” criollo ruling class. The colonial encounter persists in being a criollo problem, one side being the “indigenous question,” and the other the mythologies and policies of state which can continue to sustain an order of suppression of Quechua difference and Quechua others alongside the re-possession and reterritorialization of land, otherwise called “expropriation” by Mariátegui, both cultural and geographical, in the name of the republican nation state and its *mestizo* citizenry.

**The field of Peruvian literary history**

There is a continuity between the works of Vallejo and Arguedas, but more importantly between what Vallejo’s literature signals and Arguedas’ legacy, his influence over academic movements which mirrored the political projects spurred and sponsored by the left leaning social movements of the times as well as the literary rationalizations that accompanied them. Carrillo, just such a literary critic indicates that under Benavides’ regime, one of the first compendiums of Quechua literature was commissioned. Basadre was seen as one of the great “recopiladores,” gatherers, and as from his and others’ efforts, this required *mestizo national literature* was created. (Carrillo *Literature Quechua Clásica* 13-19) This effort is the poetic expression and the poetic practice emerging from the social and cultural times and is the fruit of the *mestizo* political project that Arguedas supported with such perseverance albeit from a precarious and conflicted positioning. He stated unequivocally when he received the Premio Inca Garcilaso in his acceptance speech, transcribed as “No soy un aculturado” that he was “unaculturated,” but that

moreover he professed a “Quechua Modern” identity, thereby attempting valiantly to resucitate the Quechua speaking populations not only surrounded, but also under erasure and overdetermined by the mestizo state narration representing these communities as archeological shard, indeed the convenient aftermath or residue of the liberal linguistic practice Barthes explicaded as the persistence of the trace of difference itself. He acknowledged his unacculturated condition as “/un demonio feliz/a happy devil” who speaks “en cristiano y en “Indio,” in Christian tongue, e.g. Spanish, and in native tongue, e.g. Quechua, a colloquial turn of phrase still used in contemporary Peru (and elsewhere in Latin America) to refer to Spanish. Embodied in his pronouncement is the irreconcilable in Western reality: “the Christian” and the “Indio” which tellingly emerges from the field conformed in the present that is yet a site of colonial encounter. In “No soy un aculturado,” it is clear that Arguedas is poised between the two nations, “the Quechua” and “the criolla,” his terms, proposing within his own person to be the bridge that would join them, not only with his voice, but through this self-professed identity, Quechua Modern, (Arguedas 13) that he expressed through his literary works, in his role as an educator, and as a gatherer of the tradition in his roles as an anthropologist. He states forcefully, moreover in his acceptance speech that his literary project is part of an emergent national project, taking up the banner of Mariátegui before him, and inscribing Quechua Moderno. He attributes his success to two things: the influence of socialism through Mariátegui and Lenin, and the inspiration to be found in Peru’s diversity, a diversity which propels him to state: “Imitar desde aqui [Peru] a alguien resulta escandaloso.” “To imitate anyone when you are from here [Peru] is scandalous.” (Translation mine) (Arguedas 14) Not only does this lay claim to what is “Indio” as the mark of this divergence and difference from the metropol, but it is also a claim to autonomy, to a distinct socio-historical field of provenience.

Arguedas states unequivocally that he, as “Quechua Modern” is this emblem of national sovereignty, of a concerted resistance to imperialism through the appropriation of Quechua culture in the specific registers of art. His refusal of acculturation is at once a release from the personal agonies of maternal orphanhood, at the same time as it is the “vindication” of the difference which would set the Peruvian nation apart and therefore independent from the dominant identity imposed upon this Latin American nation by “colonialism” and “imperialism.” In Arguedas’ words, how could any of the metropolitan, colonizing “first world” nations rival the imagination of the Peruvian mestizo citizen, nourished by the inconquerable Quechua imagination? According to Arguedas, in this imagined identity, the Peruvian nation would emancipate itself from colonial, now imperialist hegemony, a colonization of the mind that if overturned would release Peru to its own destiny, refusing its subservience to the investments and
political imperatives of the European and American nations which intended to subsume Peruvian sovereign potential beneath their dominant political economies. Accordingly, only the incorporation of “the Quechua” within the imagined collective of citizens could constitute a Peruvian Modern capable of resisting the forces of imperialist oppression, read the sublation of imagined “Indio” and even Quechua, as “the Slave” “the Master” misunderstood, as per Hegel’s metaphors, as Arguedas is in himself the dialectical bridge that understood Quechua. The gesture emerges from the larger field constructed from the experience of criollo libertarian movements of emancipation from the Spanish Crown. Many patriots before, including the “liberators” of the Latin American republics in the late 19th century profess the need to deal with the native indigenous populations but only in that in freeing them, republicans could redistribute land yet again in accord to liberal private property, land everywhere become part of the republican patrimony by means of liberal purchase and sale of parcels of land. Arguedas’ appropriation of “Indio” some decades later as Quechua fulfilled the dialectic, and the cry for sovereignty was exercised as autonomy, self-naming. It did not enlist the need to free the imagined “Indio” but rather the need to be, that is displace the “Indio,” but so that the projected new citizen, the new man, what Arguedas calls the “Quechua Moderno” or what could be called the colonial modern mestizo citizen.

In grand Hegelian dialectic, “las dos naciones” “India y Criolla,” Arguedas’ terms, would be synthesized, and he, compelled by history itself to carry this burden, symbolically surrendered himself to the sublated instance, “Quechua Modern,” which would forge one Peruvian nation proffered by the dialectic between the two, the Criollo and the Quechua nation. The synthesis would be a Peruvian Modern, a new Peruvian national identity that could stand alone, that could successfully obtain the autonomy that would release it to its proper destiny. But the dialectic was not only Hegelian, but also Marxist, as Arguedas avows that this influence stirred his imaginative projects as well as his anthropological agendas. Socialism becomes the ideational precursor of the inscription Quechua Modern and this socio historical field bound by the “socialist agenda” designed in these times constructs the limits that bound and propulse his literary political projects. Arguedas brought the Quechua nation to the Criollo nation by means of literature and anthropology, his efforts to gather Peruvian folklore, Quechua popular lyric poetry, and even to write his own poetry in Quechua and translate it into Spanish.94 For him, art, and in particular Quechua art forms could make the difference that could be sublated into the new identity: it was Quechua art that would be the substance conveyed by the bridge, and it was art, inoffensive, pleasing, and “apolitical” which would, in effect, buttress the national narration of the Criollo

---

elite, rendering it eminently appropriable through the logics of “Western civilization.” In a word, Arguedas sets the stage for the state aesthetics that would confect a mestizo citizen that would have already consumed Quechua as colonial difference, just as earlier the Crown’s colonial narrations had consumed Quechua as what they conveniently imagines was the false name given the colonized, that is, “Indio.”

The literature, both colonial and republican will use the term “Indio” matter-of-factly for a very long durée that does extend into the present. Literary critics of every political aesthetic tendency will use the word as social category as well as ethnic epithet in combination with definitions of literary history which must narrate national distinction all too often on the basis of this kind of appropriation of the “pre-colonial” Indigenous Peoples’ lands and cultural practices, while these conveniently ignorant and insensible names and interpretations bring real other-speaking and acting peoples under erasure and displacement in their own fields. Arguably, a non-hegemonic comparative and translational practice can bring Quechua meanings and practices not only in the abstract, but in the field out from the cruel consequences of this erasure, and can testify thus how this procedures serves to more deeply ensconce the colonial encounter to the detriment of both the colonizer and the colonized, and most importantly for the sake of the creative and recreative life of all things. “Indio” has a performative meaning and effect when Mariátegui uses the word, a performative meaning and effect with continuity and discontinuity through and with the same word--- used in diverse, distinct, and multiple fields which condition its performance, its reality as part of an event, and indeed as an event in its performance. Only those registers of the word, in this case “Indio” that are recorded and re-ported are available to the investigator. The word performed in the present is a matter that brings with it a degree of blindness. Arguably, and at any time, the word gathers some traceable pre-colonial registers, some traceable 19th century registers out of Ricardo Palma Limeño lips, some traceable satirical registers in cartoon, etc. in and from the intertextual field. Our task here is to de-structure its colonial performance by means of this non-hegemonic comparative and translational practice that does operate with a knowing, not only of bookish Quechua, but also of Quechua in and from the field, a Quechua nourished by the field.

In order to achieve the socialist utopia imagined by Mariátegui, and which Arguedas embraces to a certain key, he would have to appropriate Quechua identity for himself, personify its attributes, and literarily, and in the world as text, re-present the “Indio” culture for the Peruvian elite in such a manner that would bring from out of erasure those things that Arguedas deems the criollo elite will palate, or as Godzich puts it, will “swallow,” namely and only “art,” such as it is prescriptively delimited, that is defined, and as we have seen, deployed in turn, an
easthetic directly implicated, not only in necromantic practices, but in the functioning of the
cultural products such as “literature and art” that rationalize the state’s infringements upon
the social body and any Other, the stories that help aesthetisize state policies. The way that Arguedas
territorializes Quechua is deeply troubled however; the social costs of being “Indio,” if only as
half of his Western existence or being, for these are the hegemonic terms in play, *mestizo not only
in name but in real effect*, are overwhelming for Arguedas, not only because the social status of
what is “Indio” is irrevocably conveniently devalued and whenever necessary disdained in the
*criollo field*, but also because maternal abandonment is confounded with the gesture
territorializing Quechua identity. Arguedas’ indefatigable efforts to gather, translate, produce and
reproduce “this art” are well known. But the status of his literature, so hotly debated in his times
and afterwards was not just the product of individual genius, and here we may recall the intertext,
but it performed the colonial encounter between so called “Indio” and “criollo.” In this
translational and comparative practice tracing the steps involved in the reenactment of the
colonial encounter, “Quechua” and “Modern” are new Hegelian syntheses, overcoming specific
prejudices, notwithstanding entirely ensconced in a Westernizes colonial encounter. His practice
aligns itself with the liberal state’s aesthetic practice. It is representation in the political and
aesthetic sense: he was senator as well as ambassador, bilingual that he was, while ventriloquist,
mime, and writer. Perhaps most of all, he was poet, harbinger of the future, expressing the past
and the present which such deep investments, however contrary. He created the poetic expression
from which the newly forged Peruvian national identity was mythologized. Arguedas’ Quechua
tradition would be gathered into the emerging inscription, differentiated, that is *authentic
Peruvian National Literature*, reinscribing the Western myth of origin, universality, continuity
and totality, or what many have called “essentialism,” a term in my view limited in scope and
unable to step outside the problem of matter and spirit which is also colonizing.

Carrillo’s introduction to his *Literatura Quechua Clásica*, the first volume in a series,
*Enciclopedia Histórica de la Literatura Peruana 1*, is an outline of the project of recovery that
Arguedas imagines and initiates, alongside others. Carrillo’s text reveals the broadest strokes of
its incorporation as assimilation and institutionalization. The entire effort heeds Arguedas’ call,
and constructs a literary history that responds to this call directly. Carrillo dedicates his
anthology of Classical Quechua literature to Arguedas, with whom he sustained, he states,
numerous conversations regarding the topic, receiving Arguedas’ knowing words on the subject.
But he goes further, submitting “all revaluing (“revalorización”) of the Quechua people would
forever be imbued with his [Arguedas’] generous and living recognition.” [translation mine.]
(Carrillo, Dedication, 31) Two gestures make possible the realization of Arguedas’ project as
Carrillo conceives it in his introduction: 1.) bringing archeaological and anthropological products to bear upon the conformation of the literary history he proposes; 2.) expanding the definition of “literature” to include Other genres: in one word, appropriating, translating, and legitimizing transcribed and archived forms of the Quechua oral tradition as “literature.” In his introduction, Carrillo is at pains to point out the existence of poetry, history/epic, and theater in early pre-Columbian forms, translating the meaning and status of archival material into the categories of Western literature, including non-fictional categories, much as “the classical tradition” is invented in the West, and by necessity interdisciplinarily understood through archeology, history of art, and literary interpretation, but folded into his 1980’s effort at incorporating Quechua into national literature through a patently Foucauldian archeaological arc: what Foucault systematizes through discontinuities and series of discourses, Carrillo constructs, and edifies, through that rhizome he will organize into series, enlisting the categories primarily of literary history, but appropriating anthropological and archeological themes to enact the functions of the archeological shard deconstructed in Part I. Undoubtedly, this gesture reenacts Arguedas’ desire to project a symbolic Modern Quechua identity as well, as this archeaological lineage will embrace contemporary registers from its descendants.

Carrillo points out, notwithstanding, that the archeaological record sustains that there was more than one language spoken in today’s Peruvian territory, many centuries and even millennia ago, though he elides the contemporary nature of the territorial boundary, the republic of Peru relative to the geographical vastness and different limits that the archeaological record actually spans and sustains. It is the descendants of the many “ancient,” read “classical,” “civilizations” that conform the multilingual and multiethnic nature of the archeaological archive he accesses which crowns Peruvian literary history, without ever questioning how this multiethnic scene actually negotiated identity and difference, and without ever questioning whether his projection of an identity lineage which he redesigns is resonant with that past, and to what extent that actual diversity in the eventual field makes any difference with regard to his attempt at decolonization. This Manichean perspective characterizes this humanist vision in that the (Western) imperative for identity overrides the possibility that difference was dealt with distinctly all those many years ago, by these civilizations deemed worthy of the name by dint of prescription. It also “errs” on the side of knowing, in the interest of domination, as most modern knowledge does, separate as it has traditionally become from the mystery of the sacred, the province of “religion.” A Western literacy would halve this world of religious mystery and secular knowledge, but it is possible that the lacunae that all scholars encounter merits a presence
in our ideations permanently, as permanently as our longstanding need for “religious” harbor would intimate is somehow necessary, or our vital need for symbolic release.

Carrillo submits by implication, nevertheless, that the archeological record demonstrates that Peruvians are the descendants of every ethnic group that ever inhabited “Peru.” By extension, he suggests, but with little clarity about the relative smallness of Peruvian territory, that Quechua literature, read the “literature” produced under the rule of the Inka, derived from an expansive culture that was inclusive, accepting of its multiethnic and multilingual nature, a fact implied by what he does submit explicitly, and that is that Quechua was a lingua franca during the period of Inka rule during which the Quechua language coexisted with many other ethnies/nations’ respective languages. This resonates with findings not coincidentally correspondent with multiple anthropological sources on the subject. (Rowe, Bauer, Mannheim, etc.) This becomes the anthropological intertext Carrillo’s work draws on, alongside the specifically archaeological intertext in order to substantiate his claim for an indigenous “Literatura Quechua Clásica,” as the title of his “Enciclopedia Histórica de la Literatura Peruana, Vol. 1” would imply the Western categories of knowledge which would legitimate the Quechua presence within modern horizons of knowledge practices and literacies. Peruvian mestizo national identity is made possible through this, Carrillo’s effort, and Mariátegui’s as well as Vallejo’s and Arguedas’ before him.

At the end of his introductory article in Vol. 1 Carrillo provides a chronology of the successive, sometimes intersecting and sometimes parallel, (anachronic and diachronic do not suffice as categories to interpret this instance of rhetorical time space positioning,) presence and civilizational evolutions which took place on Peruvian territory; in effect the chart is an emblem of Foucauldian discontinuous seriality. With this gesture, Carrillo appropriates this past for 20th century literary history inside the Peruvian republican field that gathers the modern tradition of conforming national identity through Literature within it, however late in its development, first edition, 1986, relative to the other Creole nation in North America, the United States. His chronology begins in 40,000 B.C. and ends with the Inka “culture” which began, according to Carrillo’s sources in 1400 A.D. and ended in 1532 which, as is well known is when Gonzalo Pizarro arrived at the northern extension of the Inka sphere of governance, that is the moment of European invasion and conquest, or what is generally understood as the Colonial period.

In Carrillo’s literary history, saliently, it is the more anthropological, ethnographic efforts that yield and are redeemed as the most “authentic” sources, especially of the exemplars categorized as folkloric and popular Quechua expressions of this literary tradition. However, this anthropological privilege may be seen as nothing more than the reenactment of colonial
difference at the site of the colonial encounter in that the “classical” Inka is associated to the imperial, and the “folkloric” is accessible to the anthropologist and associated to the resistance to the imperial. This division is questionable as a source of distinction in Quechua ideation, while it clearly reproduces the colonial differential in power that enacts conquest, or reenacts as I state it, the complex of domination, at the site of colonial encounter neurotically. The “classical” is “the origin,” “the foundation” for the civilizational logics of humanist utility from a Manichean perspective. Anthropological practices buttress the Arguedian agenda to bring the “Indio” nation to the “criollo” and marks the anthropological practice with the republican agenda that stages the deployment of nationalist mestizo desires. We shall have opportunity to discern how the purportedly Quechua tradition is much more the same, than the mestizo appropriators would ha(l)ve it, and how, academic interventions have done nothing to overturn what the archival record, as well as contemporary Quechua speaking peoples still tell in Part III. Carrillo’s encyclopedic effort to include Quechua poetic expression as classical resonates with The Peabody Exhibit’s attempts to fold Peruvian artifacts into the civilizational logics and matrix of the West. Both the encyclopedia and the exhibit emerge from the mestizo field that would co-opt others into “humanity” in the interest of humanist utility. The latter half of the 20th century seems to bring to fruition Arguedas’ dream, if only from a broader, republican, read criollo mestizo field.

The Quechua tradition, however violently disrupted by conquest, remains continuous and the same in a distinct way: the cycle and interdependent reproduction is in every culture expressed variously, distinctly, but it signals the same thing. For purposes of this study that would be the symbolic that Barthes relates as a release that takes place through language, a release that insures not just that the pressures of unity or uni--meaning can be disrupted, but that the penchant for continuity does accompany discontinuity, but not toxically, as Foucault deconstructs with regard to foundational Western tradition which compulsively and violently must know, must have all that is separate from it, returned to it, restored to it as the total fulfillment of continuity. The “decrease” expressed in symbolic release is both a welcome discontinuity, and released continuity. Given the pressure exerted by the prescriptions of a fearful, compulsive and neurotic Western tradition, release, surrender to discontinuity is not just vital organically, but a penchant, as I put it, a slope, that responds to the need to restore balance. Too much Western continuity requires more discontinuity---a balance restored by increase and decrease of a given expanse of substance. Too much discontinuity is the slope of the fragment that During warns is that small and insufficient residue that Barthes tells us gives only “difference itself” or what Godzich theorized as “the cry.” All systematic deployments of an excess of continuity, will requite discontinuity; all systematic deployments of an excess of discontinuity, will requite
continuity. As a creative and recreative sustaining relationship that never abates or lets down but requires responsiveness and limits it is the relationship that engages all life and that harbors in the same way everywhere, and every time. This is what is the same.

This same relationship starts in one place and mirrors endlessly its performative way of creating meaning and a way of governance, as expressed in the diverse and distinct forms of topographical variations that characterize landscape, the field in which this relationship engages sustainably everywhere: this is what is the same: an equality of availability of convivial relationship, for all things, at all times. The Quechua and Aymara speaking theorize it as one seed, expressed in multiple ways, and travelling to myriad places to engage with all things. Whether translated as “Inka,” “the monarch,” or the “comunero,” “classical civilization” and “imperial hymns,” or “folkloric” and “popular” Quechua “poetry,” these are categories, and ultimately translations imposed upon an Andean millenary tradition. The Quechua world, and this sameness from which all diversity is given in place can be discerned in the poetic expression of a site, Raqchi as it was envisioned in the Andes. The distinct inscription of K’acha emerging from the topography itself, at once inscription and oral articulation is the light that is reflected in the lake beside Raqchi, the lake from which Viraqucha, the source of all creation is to be seen and reflected endlessly, mirrored, hence K’acha, meaning light, and apogee of knowledge, for this story attaches to this topography: it is given, there inscribed, and there held in a relationship that sustains and harbors it in the same way in more than one place. The lake is this mirror that permits this process to become evident as a way that all things live together sustainable, carefully harbored in the same way. This will be re-searched through Kancha Chakra Sunqulla in Chapter 7. What I call this sameness, Sabine MacCormack discerns in the governance of the Inka, who as cultivator, is all cultivators.

The mestizo literary inscription in the globalized Peruvian mestizo field: the indigenous Quechua body erupts into the literary mestizo scene

Vallejo writes from the Andes where he grew up, the Province of Huamachuco that nourishes his imaginary. Literary documentation of the field derives into an archive of sorts, the limit from which we may discern a Derridean order as well as rhizome from which Vallejo’s...
desire emerges, however truncated, however it may evince-- no escape. Comparatively, mestizo readings are found in other parts of Latin America as the colonial encounter can be represented as miscegenation, as the legend of la Malinche in Mexico would situate a field from which mestizo inscriptions emerge. As is still debated, Malinche is an Aztec princess who is also a polyglot and who becomes Cortes’ translator and “courtisan.” But she is the inscription emerging from the site of colonial encounter through the complex of historically colonial domination, delimiting the vicissitudes of a vanquishedcivilizational literacy in its confrontation, however negotiated, with the imposed literacy of the Spanish Crown. Just as her body registers this negotiation, her translational practices continue to delimit the field from which mestizo inscriptions will retell the colonial encounter, repeatedly.

Vallejo leaves no room for doubt about who he inscribes as mestizo, and who is the extension of a colonial, now criollo elite. The imaginary Andean province in which the short story’s characters play out the colonial encounter within the complex of domination there delimited give three clear inscriptions of mestizo, criollo, and “Indio”. Paco Farina is the “mestizo boy;” Paco Yunque is the “Indio” boy,” and Humberto Grieve is the “criollo boy,” this time haling from the imperial metropol of turn of the 19th and 20th century imperialism; Vallejo inscribes London with Grieve. The republic, according to Vallejo’s telling is ruled by the extension of the metropol’s interests, English in this case, however nativized, once again, to Peru and germane to the Peruvian Andean provinces outside of Lima, extending and representing Lima’s colonial republican interests. Social roles and economic relations of power are evidenced in this literary mestizo and “postcolonial” republican field. The short story delimits the field as one where Paco Yunque hails from the remote and “deep” Peruvian landscape from which Quechua speaking natives had historically found refuge, and where also, Quechua speaking natives had become “corralled” or had become surrounded. (Mannheim, Arguedas) Paco Yunque, the Quechua speaking boy travels from his home, previously surrounded by silence and living relatives, to the shocking and strident noise of the provincial city, the enclave of the republican extension of the site of colonial encounter.

...Paco [Yunque] estaba con miedo, porque era la primera vez que venía a un colegio y porque nunca había visto a tantos niños juntos…. Paco estaba también atolondrado porque en el campo no oyó nunca sonar tantas voces de personas a la vez. En el campo hablaba primero uno, después otro, después otro, y después otro. … Pero no. Eso no era ya voz de personas, sino otro ruido, muy diferente. Y ahora sí que esto del colegio era una bulla fuerte, de muchos. Paco estaba asordado. (19)

Paco [Yunque] was frightened, because it was the first time he was going to a school and because he had never seen so many children together. Paco was also dazed (stunned) because in the countryside he had never heard the sound of so many people’s voices at once. In the countryside, first one person would talk, then another, then another, and then another. But no. This was no longer the voice of people, but instead some other noise, very different. And now this thing about school was really a strong ruckus, of many. Paco was deafened.

Aptly, the story narrates the “Indio” Paco Yunque’s first day at Peruvian public school, the place where we may witness a reenactment of the site of colonial encounter through the internal economy of the complex of domination found in the expression of this encounter, a microcosm, the republican classroom. In keeping with the colonial encounter hear staged, Vallejo provides a clear image of what this mestizo demos is, and where the criollo falls outside of the rule of liberal law. This embattled ground is described thus by Vallejo at the very beginning of the story, but as home, that is “homeland”:

Various alumnus, pequeños como él, se le acercaron a Paco, cada vez más tímido, se pegó a la pared y se puso colorado. Qué listos eran todos esos chicos! Que desenvueltos! Como si estuviesen en su casa. Gritaban. Corrian. Relan hasta reventar. Saltaban. Se daban de puñetazos. Eso era un enredo.

Various pupils, small like him, got closer to Paco, who, ever more timid, clung to the wall and blushed. How smart were all these kids! How outgoing! As if they were at home. They hollered. They ran. They laughed until they burst. They leaped. They punched each other. This was an entangled mess.

Arguedas on the other hand narrates a dialectical tale of decadence and renewal, entwining three narrative strands through his use of Quechua and Spanish throughout the short story, “Agua.” Not only does Arguedas acknowledge that he identifies with the child narrator Ernesto, but he consistently, throughout 30 years of teaching, ethnological work, and professional and fictional writing underlines his return to that most telling and innocent self, his childhood self, the self that learned Quechua alongside those who would be raised in Quechua, runas, the Quechua speaking. He clarifies that this short story, “Agua” is one of his first attempts to self-consciously create what Peru required, and that is that its historically bilingual mestizo write fiction, produce a properly Peruvian literature. Having personally and professionally outlined the parameters for understanding the Andean culture that was Quechua and Spanish speaking through his ethnological work, keenly aware that an Andean mestizo was not a coastal mestizo,

---

98 In “Un Método Para el Caso Lingüístico del Indio Peruano,” written in 1944, Arguedas submits that the difference between the coastal mestizo and the Andean mestizo—, mestizo defined as the person who is the descendant of a criollo and Indian miscangement, and who is therefore, often bilingual— can be found in the geographic and economic conditions that characterize the cultural experiences of each group. Not only does this definition resonate with Mariátegui but it also finds echo in the Peabody narratized exhibit’s explanation of the cultural, topographic, and economic conditions that the artifacts are a product of.
embarks upon one of his first literary adventures, “Agua” insisting that he is unable to fully or adequately express his understanding of the world he wants to tell about in his fictional prose, in Spanish. “Agua” is not well received as fictional prose when it is first published, but finds the light of publication again in the 80’s, when it can be perceived as part of the national identity then being affirmed, a national identity that had already assimilated “Indio” in the interest of mestizo “independence;” mestizo. (Wilfredo Kapsoli, Nostros los meastros on Arguedas.) Undoubtedly, the imperative Arguedas responds to emerges out of the mestizo field I delimit above which, Arguedas himself helped to shape.

Both writers express a keen interest in focusing on the indigenous question, bent on traversing the Mariateguian arc of justice so prevalent in the discussions of their young adulthood and their first forays into intellectual discussions about their Peru. I would argue that Vallejo’s and Aregudas’ works, Paco Yunque and Agua are the indigenist literature that Mariategui envisioned.

El “indigenismo” de nuestra literatura actual no está desconectado de los demás elementos nuevos de esta hora. Por el contrario, se encuentra articulado con ellos. El problema indígena, tan presente en la política, la economía, la sociología, no puede estar ausente de la literatura y del arte. (300)

The “indigenism” of our contemporary literature is not disconnected from the rest of the elements of this hour. On the contrary, it finds itself articulated with these elements. “El problema indígena,” so present in politics, the economy, the sociological, cannot be absent from literature and art.

The Vallejo field of a mestizo republican project: presaging the destruction of the native Quechua speaker in the first half of the 20th century

According to Vallejo’s telling, the Peruvian nationalist project is undermined by an elite that inhabits a peripheral margin from which it wields political, economic, and social power unsteadily. Vallejo narrates that instability in terms of the recent English migration that creolized itself through economic and political investments in power and proprietary possession as governance, relative to the nativized, mestizo population, the Spanish-speaking creole, mestizo. This distance between the English hegemony operative in the short story, and the hegemony of a Spanish speaking criollo elite insistent on its Spanish aristocratic ascendency creates the inscription mestizo, or Spanish criollo playing Indio, a precursor of Arguedas’ more radical turn, and more displaced desire, the Quechua Modern. However it is the relative distance from Spanish speaking elite, the “criollo” aspiring to be native, figured in the inscription mestizo, to the more recent, creolized, English, imperial presence which creates the political instability inscribed in Vallejo’s story. Arguably, the distance between the Spanish descended criollo and the creolized English, imperial presence underlines the instability of all criollo rule as Vallejo’s
inscription of a political project makes evident. Such as Vallejo portrays it, the foreign
dependencies that this elite protects are the cause of an incommensurate grief, Grieve, for the local
population, be they “mestizo” or indigenous Quechua. Ostensibly, what stands in the way of
Peruvian criollo rule is the absence of a tame citizenry and the presence of precolonial
indigenous populations of any kind, at any time, according to Vallejo. We have moved however,
from the bucolic, “latifundista,” Spanish criollo liberal and progressive reformism of Clorinda
Matos de Turner’s “indigenista” reformism, to the ironclad imperatives of global capitalism and
Peruvian nationalist, modern, industrial designs. The Grieve are building a railroad.

In this provincial city, Grieve father is the mayor and the administrator of railroad
interests. The classroom distills, additionally, the need for military repression of the
contradictions the inequality that this society sustains, not only in an insouciant attempt to
mitigate for the tension between a Spanish speaking elite, and an English derived hegemony,
however national and local, but additionally to suppress the emergent strife which repulses this
complex of domination over the locals, a complex that translates the inequalities into the empty
liberal justice of equality. The character of the teacher expresses this militaristic repression,
reproducing the liberal republican state order, through the institution of public state run
education. The nation’s pedagogy relies on mimickry, on the sort of rote reproduction that would
project a homogeneous, unitary, individual national identity: the assignments constitute
replications: students must copy what the teacher writes on the blackboard, faithfully, without
error, reproducing through this practice, Peruvian state rule based on the singularly Peruvian
conceptual and abstract, e.g. universal national identity procuring the needed susceptibility to
control mestizo citizen. At the same time, just as in the social construction of public education
today, the teacher, as in the short story, reproduces a militarized education, a prescriptive practice
enforced by the threat of violence: in one word military training in defense of the nation.

El profesor entró. Todos los niños estaban de pie, con la mano derecha levantada
a la altura de la sien, saludando en silencio y muy erguidos. (20) El profesor
miró a todos muy serio y dijo como un militar: ---Siéntense! (37)
The teacher entered. All the children were standing up, with their right hand
raised at the height of their forehead, saluting in silence and very straight. (20)
The teacher looked at all of them very seriously and said like a military
commander: ---Sit down! (37)

In the reality proven real in Vallejo’s text, Paco Yunque is in deed and in fact the best
student in the class, but this fact is erased by the privilege that provokes the servile attitude of the
teacher, who, will not acknowledge that he gives hypocritically privileged treatment to Grieve at
the expense of the reality every student witnesses. It is this textification that Vallejo stages: the
ruling class’s children don’t have rules. For them, they are broken. Grieve steals Vallejo’s
dictation assignment, signs it in his own name, and for it wins the recognition of being the best student in first grade. Paco Yunque is further humiliated by yet another affront from Grieve, who up to that point has insisted that Paco Yunque sit next to him as his servant, recreating in the liberal classroom the oligarcic relations reproduced and sustained in Grieve’s mayoral home, however liberal the office is, relations which the teacher permits Grieve to reproduce without penalty. Grieve has hit Yunque many times, forced him to be the leapfrog he bounds over, and kicks him ceaselessly until everyone on the playground responds to Paco Fariña’s outrage in a fray that was also the beginning of the story in the form of the din of so many voices—and the tumult of the mestizo demos bustling, a noisy din, or what Vallejo calls “un enredo” or an entangled mess. The fray that anticipates the closing of the story, where students from every grade level begin to throw punches regardless of what began the fray, Vallejo calls an entanglement, “un enredo” again. The scene extends from the twenty kicks that Grieve gives Yunque as he leapfrogs over him, to Fariña’s outcry—demanding from Grieve that he stop----to everyone else coming around, solicitously wiping Yunque’s tears and consoling him, while the rest begin to intermingle to from the tumult of children the story begins with:

Se formó un tumulto de niños en torno a Paco Yunque y otro tumulto en torno a Humberto Grieve y Paco Fariña. [Here symbolically depicting the liberal republican responses to “el problema del “Indio”: Fariña confronts Grieve because Liberal law does not apply to him; rather, he reinstallst the oligarchic relationship to the “Indio” that Mariategui will denounce. Other mestizo citizens will face “el problema del “Indio” sympathetic, humanely.] Grieve le dio un empellón brutal a Fariña y lo derribó al suelo. Vino un alumno más grande, del segundo año, y defendió a Fariña, dándole a Grieve un puntapié. Y otro niño del tercer año, más grande que todos, defendió a Grieve, dándole una furiosa trompada al alumno del segundo año. Un buen rato llovieron bofetadas y patadas entre varios niños. Eso era un enredo.

A tumult of children formed around Paco Yunque and another tumult around Humberto Grieve and Paco Fariña. Grieve brutally shoved Fariña toppling him over and onto the floor. Along came a bigger student, a second year student, and he defended Fariña, giving Grieve a kick with the point of his shoe. And other student, a third year student, bigger than all of them, defended Grieve, giving the second year student a furious punch in the face. A good while it rained slaps and kicks among various kids. This was an entangled mess.

You could say that the intervention of a number of other children symbolically proves real the presence of other nations involved in what is clearly a political economy with distinct social implications. It is Grieve who is saved by the strongest and biggest child, or it is this English speaking investor’s homeland, which rescues their interests in spite of Grieve’s Peruvian citizenship implying liberal equality of treatment and status. Just as the story begins with Paco Yunque’s stunned fear, it ends with his stunned and literally pummeled and humiliated self,
orphaned and without protection. The last line of this short story is: “Pero Paco Yunque seguía llorando agachado./But Paco Yunque kept crying, head down.” (40)

Yunque’s academic ability falls apart as soon as identity—national, liberal and humanistic—falls apart: Paco Yunque is radically different from the point of view of Western state sponsored identity and interest, which is not the same as Quechua sameness as empathy and kinship, a sameness that relies on difference, in actuality, but sameness in shared experiences, in the field and in accord with a rule that underlines harmony procured through equality of placement and the distinctive and needed role of every person’s participation: nothing is superfluous. Paco Yunque’s difference, as he is the figuration of all that is “Indio” within this liberal mestizo state order, which is all that is different and superfluous, signifies that Western military liberal nation state order carries with it an imperative for identity in the interest of management, of control, of domination; this is it’s internal economy. Difference is violently repressed, as Paco is Yunque, “anvil,” and as much as his mestizo classmates would like to welcome him inside their circle of liberal sameness, the relationship that Paco and his mother have with the Grieve, as conquered people, indentured slaves, cuts through this possibility. According to Vallejo, the cut is decisive, and engenders a state of orphanhood that is unmitigated and renders the “Indio” homeless inside the liberal mestizo state: the indigenous Quechua speaking have no proper place. Not only does the liberal state leave Paco Yunque and his kin outside, but according to Vallejo, Paco Yunque’s mother is also radically disenfranchised from her role of protector, and source of cultural transmission of Quechua richesses. In Vallejo’s telling, Paco Yunque has left behind his father in the remote Andean highlands to join his mother who is a domestic servant at the mayor’s house, Dorian Grieve, a chance also to learn Western culture as well, though the story does not narrate his reason for being there as this one. Paco Yunque has been called to the provincial capital to keep Humberto Gieve, the spoiled son company. As opposed to the “mestizo” children, Yunque’s mother is powerless to defend him against Humberto’s imperious commands, in the midst of a liberal classroom portending liberal equality, while Yunque’s mother is entirely disenfranchised of agency, as is by consequence her son. Paco Fariña and his kind, Vallejo’s imagined mestizos are guaranteed by a mother whose status as a mestiza citizen is secure. The cut for Paco Yunque is so radical that it could be said to endanger his viability as a citizen risking his erasure within the liberal framework while the ruling class maintained oligarchical relations maintaining the native population’s servitude. This is textualized in the story through the stream of thought that Vallejo writes as the child’s frightened query and frightened thought:
Yunque empezó a fastidiarse. A qué hora se iría a su casa? Pero el niño Humberto [Grieve] le iba a dar una patada, a la salida del colegio. Y la mamá de Paco Yunque le diría al niño Humberto: “No, niño. No le pegue Ud. a Paquito. No sea Ud. malo.” Y nada más le diría. Pero Paco tendría colorada la pierna de la patada del niño Humberto. Y Paco se pondría a llorar. Porque al niño Humberto nadie le hacía nada. Y porque el patrón y la patrona le querían mucho al niño Humberto, y Paco Yunque tenía pena porque el niño Humberto le pegaba mucho. Todos, todos, todos le tenían miedo al niño Humberto y sus papas. Todos. Todos. Todos. El profesor también….La mama de Paco. …Le pegaría también el patron al papa de Paco Yunque? Que cosa fea esto del patron y del niño Humberto! (33) [Boldface emphasis mine]

Yunque began to get irritated. When would he go home? But the young Humberto [this appellative “El niño” is tantamount to a title marking Humberto’s membership in the ruling caste.] would give him a kick, as soon as they left the school. And Paco Yunque’s mother would tell the young Humberto: “No, young sir. Don’t you hit Paquito. Don’t be a bad boy.” And she would say nothing more. But Paco’s leg would be red from the young Humberto’s kick. And Paco would begin to cry. Because no one did anything to the young Humberto. And because the lord and the lady [approximate translation as imposition of Euro-localized feudal titles.] loved the young Humberto a lot, and Paco Yunque was saddened [or embarrassed] because the young Humberto hit him a lot. Everyone, everyone, everyone was afraid of the young Humberto and his parents. Everyone. Everyone. Everyone. The teacher too. …Paco’s mother…... Would the lord hit Paco’s father as well? What an ugly thing this matter of the lord and young Humberto, (his son)!

In Vallejo’s story, denying the mother installs the father’s rule. Not only can Yunque’s mother not protect him, but this fact surrenders Yunque to the rule of the paternal state, nativized English criollo rule under which Yunque will be pressed into whatever the state needs, through the steely butt of a rifle, or the repeated blows of a classroom ruler, and ultimately, by the provincial capitalists replicating the feudal relations of the “hacendado,” the feudal system that Mariátegui denounces is still present and still enforcing unremunerated labor as a part of its privileges when it comes to “Indios” or “pongos.” The town mayor, Grieve, is barely dissimulating the “gamonal” status a still feudal rural, political reality confers him. Vallejo inscribes a placeless Quechua speaking native, while the Grieves have taken possession of indigenous Quechua land and even of Quechua richesses: Paco Yunque’s mother is placeless as well. Vallejo foretells that this native population has no place in this liberal republican mestizo state project emerging in the first half of the 20th century.

The metaphor is not incidental. The railroad is being built within this state project on the native Quechua speakers’ back, his knowledge, his richesses. Paco Yunque finishes the homework he is assigned, with excellence, while Humberto Grieve is so petulant and spoiled that he has never learned anything, exempt as he is from the teacher’s rule, that is, from state rule.
Vallejo imaginatively makes a claim for Paco Yunque’s Spanish literacy, in the interest of showing that his Paco Yunque’s knowledge exceeds Grieve’s. Though Humberto may be in a position of puerilely imposing sovereign criollo order, literally grieving the “Indio” boy, Paco Yunque nevertheless exceeds Humberto’s mastery through his knowledge of the homework assigned in class. Vallejo seems to be imputing to the indigenous Quechua speaker the status of the Hegelian slave, able to overturn his master as he cannot live without the slave’s knowledge of a given industry. Vallejo may have been inscribing a Marxist redemption of the worker, whereby Yunque’s labor becomes the skilled labor of the journeyman in a guild, whose apprenticeship gives him ownerships of skills, and holds the promise of ownership of the tools of his trade.

Humberto Grieve is enslaved by his ignorance, Vallejo seems to be telling his reader. Young Humberto does however expropriate the fruit of Paco Yunque’s labor, and here is where Vallejo reinstallsl the feudal regimen ensconced within mestizo liberal state order, as an irreconcilable criollo sovereign rule for Paco Yunque is not paid for services rendered, but rather is fed and sheltered while he serves. Humberto Grieve steals Yunque’s homework and calls it his own, receiving accolades and recognition from both his teacher and his classmates. This theft takes place through subterfuge and deception and must be hidden, according to Vallejo; the liberal rule of the classroom is maintained as the appearance of egalitarian rule, as private property must also be held as sacrosanct to enlist the participation of mestizos as workers, while this sort of theft is concealed through more complex subterfuge. The fact that Humberto beats and orders Paco Yunque inside this liberal classroom, as if he had a foot servant next to him does cause disruption, a disruption that the teacher can barely contain, as Humberto’s father “owns the town.” However, Humberto is forced to steal to gain recognition in accord with the liberal mestizo state rule of the state run classroom, that is, he must deceive everyone into believing that the work is his in order to be rewarded by the liberal state run school system.

Dorian Grieve, father, mayor, and manager for a transnational corporation has become the new “extirpator of idolatries” and the sheriff, as the philology of the word reveals, interestingly.99 Vallejo places the weight of Western tradition, as figured through this creolized Peruvian (English) character through his poetic word choice. The railroad is being built upon the reenacted possibility of the native population’s disapparition, for people must be displaced off the land in order to build and to invade again. Yunque’s orphanhood from the mother land, from his place inside pachamama, but also as alienated from his own Quechua cultural richeses, from his mother’s possibility to transmit this, a person dispossessed of his native land, replicates how this

99 The Oxford English Dictionary registers the ecclesiastic, juridical, and governing instantiations of the word in its philological history, especially pointing to “sheriff” as its most common register.
mestizo appropriation implies language and place. Society, government, human and national community, all of these Western Spanish vernacular republican mestizo terms contrive to undermine Yunque’s place, his abode and protection within the embrace of his original home, next to a mother who can offer him both, protection and place. According to Vallejo, the only outcome possible for this dissonance between the liberal mestizo republican project and the criollo sovereign rule that violates it forcefully in the interest of continuing to exploit the advantages that destructive power of this sort proffers is a riotous conflict created by this incomprehensible hypocrisy: the “mestizo,” Fariña and the “Indio” Yunque alike, look to one another to “fight out” the impossibility of reconciling the identitary rule of republican liberal law, as they are both Pacos, to its unstable, inconsistent, and disruptive applications in a mestizo field governed surreptitiously by the criollo feudal sovereignty granted a Dorian Grieve, a source of permanent grief for the mestizo social body that comes to blows as a result, blows that make of the entire fray an entanglement, “un enredo.” This situation also reflects the field that registers this intercession of Spanish and Quechua mediatized through the liberal mathematical grid of equality which is enframed by the imperatives of a ruling class entirely disinterested in the unity of the republic, save insofar as it is able to extract its profit from this “x” colonial topography, this field sustaining the Western colonial encounter in its myriad expressions, especially the exploitative.

The last scene in the short story implacably portrays this brutal dominance. Grieve forces Yunque to play leapfrog and insists on beating Yunque as he leaps. The culmination of Humberto’s “griev-ances,” to which mestizo Fariña and all other mestizo classmates are witness throughout the déroulement of Yunque’s first day produced in the end an irrational chaotic fight which reflects the incommensurability of the violent exception made of the Quechua speaking native before the republican mestizo liberal rule that portends equality before the law, and the unstable, absolutist power exercised in accord with criollo sovereign rule. It’s as if Vallejo were depicting transparently, a translation through the eyes of innocent children, of what adults appear to be oblivious of, begging the childlike question—why would this irrationality characterize a humanist, rational, liberal state? Vallejo seems to be inscribing criollo rule of law, in the mestizo Peruvian field, as a frenzied, schizophrenic, and erratic state order provoking the collapse of personal and collective order, an imposition so foreign to “human” nature that it would provoke a break in human composure, human rationality, in purportedly humanist order. And it is this brutal and inequitable relationship which is mirrored everywhere: from the chaotic din of voices, to the cacophonous contradiction between the military rule meant only to protect some, to the violation of a liberal merit system by dint of overt theft and appropriation, and finally, the
violence unleashed upon the most unwelcome other, for reasons no one can understand. There is no coherent narration that would suture the social body and the state, and Vallejo presages that these contradictions will result in violence, again and again, as well as in the exposure that this indigenous Quechus population will suffer, continually displaced from the Ayllu, lands seized systematically, or through the propertied relations imposed on the “community” as Mariátegui calls it, left without a cultural home and without a physical home, which is where the absence of maternal protection leads in this case. For Vallejo, the contradictions that are inherent in the criollo sovereign order that proffers a mestizo liberal republican foundational fiction as the narration suturing the social body and the state will fail to suture and will erupt into violent and chaotic conflicts, within the space where young or even new citizens are indoctrinated about the nation: state run schools. These contradictions and blatant violations of liberal law take place however, without military supervision, that is, outside the classroom, during the recess from the state military oversight attempting to suppress this contradiction, and they blossom from the depository of instincts more readily accessible to children. In a word, Vallejo warns that criollo sovereign rule is unsustainable and because of it, dangerously unstable: it is the colonial encounter paired with a blatant necromantic performance—side by side---which reveals what relationship is the same and mirrored everywhere, instead of concealed in a prescriptive structure which represses a-priori any potential complaints, by raising believers.

Not only can Yunque never be welcomed into liberal citizenship, but Vallejo’s mestizo cannot but feel the economic, social, and political cut that the imperial power’s presence as distant overseer creates between himself and the the unwanted Quechua speaking person. Grieve is foreign investment, but with a Peruvian citizen’s face. This strange distance is yet an unfathomable proximity, and it underlines the distance between the two Pacos as strangely inadequate, though their equality is express, articulated in the similitude of their first names, and significantly not in their last names. One of the Paco’s may belong by accident to the republican nation; the other may not, but as we have also seen, is not necessarily interested in belonging. Nevertheless cruelty of the liberal state is wielded in multiple ways, its final outcome also being made express as a reality in Vallejo’s text: its rule is corrupt and indeed decadent. To the repeated query from Paco Fariña as to the whereabouts of Paco Yunque’s homework, which Yunque can do nothing about, as, when Grieve takes his notebook authoritatively away from him, he rips out the homework page signing Yunque’s work as if it was his own, returning Yunque’s notebook to him with the page ripped out, and responding thus, according to Vallejo: “Paco Yunque no contestaba nada y estaba con la cabeza agachada./Paco Yunque did not answer and kept his head down.” (40)
The “criollo’s” ubiquitous citizenship, indeed its global sovereignty is incommensurate to the pedestrian, liberal, mestizo citizenship of Paco Fariña, nor is it commensurate to the criollo transregional citizenship sustaining the coastal Limeño criollo’s access to his landed property in the (Andean) provinces. The Grieves are veritable imperial citizens, and the contradiction is borne by the liberal mestizo republican Peruvian field inadequately. The mark that language makes in this story, Grieve as opposed to Yunque, and to Fariña, is the mark of the colonial legacy, colonial continuity, and the impossibility of realizing a liberal republican state, or national project: all these characters are colonial subjects. This sovereign class must oversee the chaos that it generates through its unwillingness to enforce liberal law, upon itself, and upon the majority of its indentured native Quechua speaking population. Vallejo suggests that doing so is impossible to the extent that it may not serve its interests, conjuncturally or with respect to maintenance of power, but moreover, this sovereign class must repress and keep in line this dissonant conformation, through military enforcement. It reproduces colonial relations of domination, without the ideological solvency of Catholicism or monarchy. But it maintains a longstanding separation between castes by a recognition of purity of lineage as well as a cultural elitism grounded on distinctions as old as the Inquisition, and as novel as the more modern racializing practices still emerging from the 18th and 19th century Western continental field of metaphysical racism alluded to in Part 1 and II above. The squabble among the boys who are members of these castes that ends this short story by Vallejo is emblematic of the inevitable conflict that the contradictions in this dubious state project will engender. The real politic of the material, of the social body Vallejo depicts, reveals that the liberal republican ideal of the rule of law is betrayed: the criollo enforces the law conveniently. It is the innocent witness of the children that makes visible, in a distilled and unprejudiced way, the reality negotiated in this society still ensconced in the colonial encounter, albeit a colonial encounter that no one is working to conceal through necromantic stagings. The reader is invited to witness, think, and feel, through the innocence of the children how it may recover an adult innocence with which to address the cruel and unacceptable.

Arguedas’ “Agua”: Mestizo Inscription of utopia, el Ayllu as no place: a mestizo republican project in Quechua inflected Spanish

Arguedas elaborates a discourse that departs from his contemporary twentieth century definition of mestizo, to embrace the arc of Mariateguian justice, which he declares himself an avid and impassioned proponent of. Arguedas’ awareness that he is a Peruvian bilingual that has Quechua and Spanish language, indigenous heritage and Spanish inheritances permits him to
articulate the Mariateguian social solution to the “problema del Indio y de la tierra” in terms that are personally painful, socially embattled, and ultimately, however agonically, embodied in Arguedas himself. So deep is Arguedas’ investment in this union, on becoming in himself the “self” that would embody a bridge between the two nations abiding in the republic of Peru, Quechua and Spanish speaking, that he aesthetically and in reality decides to be, a Quechua Modern, the bridge between the one and the other nation. The mestizo foundational fiction that circulates in his time can maintain both real proveniences and heritages as an ethnographic truth. Not surprisingly, in 1963 Arguedas completes his doctoral thesis entitled Las comunidades de España y del Peru, compelled by the ethnological method that would permit him to trace the origin of his Andean culture in Spain, while he made Spain a provincial origin through the equalizing lens of “comunidad.” However, Arguedas’ poetic expression as a political and aesthetic project by our definition, a poetic expression aligned with the Mariateguian arc of justice propounding a social solution is also poetic expression, as strategy. Arguedas is keenly aware of the assemblage of criollo desire underpinning the mestizo foundational fiction: the desire to bring the Quechua nation’s richesses into its domain, bringing the culture into a rapid process of disapparition. His strategy, such as he outlines it in “No soy un aculturado” represents, for mestizo consumption, yet another confrontation of the inscriptions emerging from the mestizo field, of colonial difference and colonial encounter which have as an objective, the erasure of “inferior”-- Quechua poetic expression, as well as the (eventual) disapparition of the “inferior” Quechua speaking populations. About the latter, Arguedas, “the anthropologist,” responds in ethnological terms in remedying this assault intending to disappear the “lesser” nation, counterposing the lesser nation’s decay into oblivion or obsolescence with the reality of the vitality and importance of the Quechua speaking nation, for the Peruvian project:

Y el camino no tenía por qué ser, ni era posible que fuera únicamente el que se exigía con imperio de vencedores expoliadores, o sea: que la nación vencida renuncie a su alma, aunque no sea sino en la apariencia, formalmente, y tome la [cultura] de los vencedores, es decir que se aculture. (14)

And the path had no reason to be, nor was it possible for it to be solely the path that was imperiously required by plundering conquerors, that is: that the conquered nation renounce its soul, even if it were only in appearance, formally, taking that of the conquerors, that is that it acculturate.

Again Arguedas wields this confrontation, to critical effect, within the imaginative, literary field: the field of art, of aesthetics. In the same speech, Arguedas asserts about the mimetic Western tradition cutting through the artistic creation in an Argeudian Peruvian field that he defines with the indigenous Quechua speaker, and not without what he calls “Indio”:
Imitar desde aquí a alguien resulta algo escandaloso. En técnica nos superarán y dominarán, no sabemos hasta qué tiempos, pero en arte podemos ya obligarlos a que aprendan de nosotros y lo podemos hacer incluso sin movernos de aquí mismo. (14)

To imitate anyone [when you are, or come] from here is something rather scandalous. In technology they may exceed and dominate us, we know not until what times, but in art we can now oblige them to learn from us and we can do this even without moving from right here.

He posits the “acorralamiento,” corralling/cornering of the Quechua speaking population, of the so-called “Indios” and the existence of the “acorraladores,” those who corrale/corner, and “los acorralados,” those corralled/corenered/ or surrounded, an image derived from the reality of nation states conforming a sort of corral, by definition, encompassing a people, a rathe absurd thing he seems to be saying in that coralling is not for humans. But corralling is what is done by the colonizer, colonial encroachment and displacement, both physical, psychological, political, and economic is what the Quechua speaking Runa endure. What Arguedas decries as lamentable treatment, Mariátegui proposed to re vindicate:

…: se había convertido en una nación acorralada, aislada para ser mejor y más fácilmente administrada y sobre la cual sólo los acorraladores hablaban, mirándola a distancia y con repugnancia o curiosidad. (Zorro 13)

…: it had become a nation cornered, isolated in order to be better and more easily be administered and about whom only the isolationers spoke, looking at it from a distance with repugnance or curiosity.

He signals the source of differentiation between the two nations, “india” and “criolla” as a difference wrought by a forceful separation, a physical and geographic distance between the two nations, imposed by the Peruvian state order in power which, by dint of this forceful exclusion ratified the mestizo foundational fiction, that is, the misunderstanding and ignorance about the reality of the real “Indio” nation’s existence, and their evolved and civilized character. About the Quechua speaking nation’s response he says:

Dentro del muro aislante y opresor, el pueblo quechua, bastante arcaízado y defendiéndose con el disimulo, seguía concebiendo ideas, creando cantos y mitos. (ibid)

From within the isolating and oppressive wall, the Quechua people, quite arcaecized and defensing itself by dissimulating, continued to conceive ideas, creating songs and myths.

In what appear to be unassumingly modest remarks, delivered at a moment when Arguedas is honored for his literary contributions, he points to the two axes of exclusion driving the Peruvian liberal mestizo nationalist project to place the real indigenous Quechua and bilingual speaker under mestizo erasure: the imperative for progress and modernization submitting the archaic or obsolete character of Quechua culture, and secondly, the unbridled desire to be certain that
Quechua inferiority would conclude in Quechua disapparition, an aggression that prompted the Quechua nation to dissimulate its creations, its vital resistance and flourishing culture.

But Arguedas does not stop there. He proclaims that he embodies this vital Quechua culture that is Peruvian: he states before his audience that he is a Quechua Modern. He resuscitates what is Quechua from the mestizo comma inflicted on it, and like a redemptive savior, indeed like the Phoenix that arose from ashes before Jesus survived his crucifixion through ascension to become nothing less than god, through his speech, Arguedas revived a moribund Quechua into the social mythology of the Peruvian nation, just as General Velasco’s military forces, de facto, deposed the liberal mestizo regime of Fernando Belaunde Terry, the elected president of the republic of Peru through a military coup d’etat, October of 1968, a regime that for political reason enacts the law avowing the legal existence of communal property, as “comunidad campesina,” but also begins bilingual reforms.

Arguedas makes evident, in accord with the Mariateguian arc of justice conducting the social solution to the “Indio” problem he defines and focuses on and the concomitant problem of land, the fact that the real indigenous population was through the mestizo foundational fiction under a violent erasure. The tacit authors of the liberal mestizo nationalist project, its primary beneficiaries, the criollo soverieign, suppressed the reality that Quechua speakers continued to enjoy and that was (and is) that Quechua culture and governance was (and is) alive and well. Arguedas indefatigably attempts to bring the two nations together and devotes his adult professional life, through various state bureaucratic roles, to do just this: to bring the two nations together, in actuality. In this sense, Arguedas was attempting to bring the mestizo foundational fiction to fruition as Quechua Modern.

Acepto con regocijo el premio Inca Garcilaso de la Vega [the first famous mestizo] porque siento que representa el reconocimiento a una obra que pretendió difundir y contagiar en el espíritu de los lectores el arte de un individuo quechua moderno que, gracias a la conciencia que tenía del valor de su cultura, pudo ampliarla y enriquecerla con el conocimiento, la assimilación del arte creado por otros pueblos que dispusieron de medios mas vastos para expresarse.

I accept with joy this Inca Garcilaso de la Vega prize because I feel that it represents the recognition of a work that had as its goal to disseminate and communicate to the spirit of the readers of the art of an individual Quechua Modern who, thanks to his awareness of the value is culture had, could widen it and enrich it with knowledge, and the assimilation of the art created by other peoples who had at their disposal of vaster means through which to express themselves. (1)

---

100 Founder of the centrist, liberal democratic political party, Acción Popular, an architect, coming from a long lineage of State functionaries, touted a member of the bourgeoisie, and educated in the U.S. This Peruvian political party has won the most presidential elections and has spent the most time in this office. It currently holds the majority mayoral positions throughout the country.
His literature would narrate this suturing of the state and the social body, but in reality the failure of his attempts would be cruelly felt by Arguedas’ himself. When receiving the prestigious “Inca Garcilaso de la Vega” prize for his literary contribution at the end of his career, some months before he commits suicide, an honor ensconced in the colonial mestizo tradition that Garcilaso de la Vega may be emblematic of, the side of the noble savage, the two nations remained separate in reality, underlining a persistent and useful colonial difference. Arguedas had spend the previous three decades assuming a discursive position, through his professional roles as teacher, state functionary, anthropologist, and writer of fictional literature which, would propagate the ideas and the facts of Quechua culture and civilization. Arguedas, like no other, had made diffuse and legitimate, especially through the arts and through the ethnology that made possible the revitalization and the recognition of Quechua cultural and artistic contributions to Peruvian society, that the Quechua speaking were alive in the present, that they were indeed a flagrantly ignored part of the social body. About his youthful ambition to bring the two nations together, Arguedas signals that:

La ilusión de juventud del autor [he says to his live audience, referring to himself in the third person,] parece haber sido realizada. No tuvo más ambición que la de volcar en la corriente de la sabiduría de un pueblo al que se consideraba degenerado, debilitado, o “extraño” e “impenetrable” pero que, en realidad, no era sino lo que llega a ser un gran pueblo, oprimido por el desprecio social, la dominación política y la explotación económica en el propio suelo donde realizó hazañas por las que la historia lo consideró como gran pueblo. (ibid 13)

The dream of this author in his youth [he says to his live audience, referring to himself in the third person,] appears to have been realized. He had no more ambition than to pour into the current of wisdom of a people considered degenerate, debilitated, or “strange” and “impenetrable” but who, in reality, was nothing but what is actually a great people, oppressed by social disdain, political domination and economic exploitation in the very soil where it performed feats for which history considered it a great people.

Implicit in Arguedas’ framing of the differentiation is an investment in specific definitions of “civilization,” Western, as well as the sense that the corralling could be due to both conquest, where the indigenous populations are encroached upon to the point that they are cornered and surrounded, as well as misunderstanding, where the Quechua speaking remain

101 An important and nuanced deconstruction of this assemblage of desire to be Indian on the part of the colonizers of the Americas is to be found in Phillip J. Deloria’s book, pp. 20-22, Playing Indian. Deloria pointedly signals that this contradictory relationship to real Indians is expressed in a discourse that derives from the ideational horizons of Europeans and oscillates between noble savage, and the alien other that colonists encountered, ambivalences that center around rationalizing the immorality of quite un-Christian treatment of Indians, and the need to feel indigenous, native to their colonized spaces.
separated from the conqueror’s fields through linguistic as well as cultural barriers. Implicit ultimately in this attempt to heal this rift is also the desire to overturn the comparative hegemony which would stratify Quechua relative to criollo culture as inferior, a stratification which effects the marginalization also implicit in the “corralling” Arguedas alludes to. It is worth noting that “surrounded,” Mannheim’s term, a translation of this corralling is a more apt description, a more apt metaphor for describing the military conquest embedded in this Andean field, as well as the separation, by choice, and by force, of one culture from the other. Corralling implies a shepherd, and the sheep he tends to, while being cornered implies victimization, and near total conquest. Being surrounded, at a minimum, signals the encroachment of invasion and the imminence of conquest making visible the violence of that differentiation in the form of domination, an outcome of colonial power that persists.

In Agua Arguedas makes evident once again, paradoxically, the characterization of the indigenous conquered, as animalistic, as outside and beneath, firstly, the colonial conqueror, and then the republican criollo ruler, the human. Ascribing animality as opposed to humanity is clearly a degradation from the status attributable to the civilized, the human, a gesture that is disdainful and assumes superiority and inscribes a Western, essential difference, while it is also an indictment of the cultural Quechua difference, marking one culture as distinct from the other. Ascribing to Quechua culture, in addition, a backwardness, a lack of development, is a schizophrenic break whereby that which precedes breaks with what proceeds through what I term anticuarian anachronism. The term anachronism is imposed in the strictest sense: the indigenous Quechua speaking peoples do not as yet obtain what in foreign, modern terms of progress places them behind the times, passé, within the present, a clear break with the logic of the déroulement of time in place, and an absurdist gesture. The anachronistic measure imposed finds verification in the empirical evidence of the difference between the two cultures, Quechua and criollo, and that empirical difference “found” as “evidence,” circularly proceeds toward verification of “backwardness” by means of the essential difference. In other words, the convenient rift created between the physical and the metaphysical, the political and the aesthetic, a rift that is at once also a schizophrenic break, makes it possible to narrate the truth detached from the matter that confines, delimits, and shapes it. The schizophrenic break is the neurotic cycle of violence reenacted to elide one’s own oppression, by oppressing another. Its precursor is fear, and its premise is abandonment, isolation, and desamparo: the modern death of what is omnipotent and creative, what is mysteriously life-giving and unknowable. The separation from body, from matter, releases all things from their belonging in their being and brings them into the field of
metaphysical modern appropriation, the reterritorialization of the modern monad, the modern Western individual.

The debate about animals and souls is incarnate in the criollo perception, according to Arguedas, in the apparition or “discovery” of “Indio.” Arguedas’ narrative prose in *Agua* moves from metaphors that are soulful, aesthetic, that is, essential, when dealing with his utopic vision, the master narrative that projects the republican national project as a beyond the contest between criollos and Indios as the resolution of the master/slave dialectic, in favor of the ideal ayllu. When narrating the real politic, the crude reality of the slave, he confounds don Braulio, the criollo alcalde/governor hoarding access to “the provincial town’s” essential resource, water, with the animalistic metaphors the criollo vision associates with “comuneros.” Arguedas imputes to Don Braulio, the misti/alcalde, Ayllu outsider/sheriff, the decadence otherwise imputed to the so-called “Indio” by portraying a character that is slovenly, spiraling into a violent state of drunkenness, a decadence from civilized decorum, humanist ideal. And yet, Arguedas establishes an analogy between the Quechua speaking and animals, which hovers between the Spanish he writes in, and the Quechua he performs throughout the short story. The Spanish he narrates with engages the criollo vision of the indigenous Quechua population as decadent, not only in that criollos desire that so-called “Indios” be in decay, but that they believed that Indigenous Peoples are more susceptible to control if they are devised as beastly, as animals requiring domestication, a textual strand traversing the conflict “Agua” narrates: the comuneros are vulnerable, are made susceptible to criollo/misti control in that mistis control the territory and its resources while the indigenous Quechua population does in fact appear on the brink of extinction in that scene, “inevitably” beaten, somehow inherently deficient and decadent in their defeat. Reversing these terms by making Don Braulio a decadent, unenlightened drunkard does not fully erase the cultural texts which precede and proceed from this portrayal of the “comuneros”/”Indios”. There is one decisive narrative strand disrupting the ambivalent dialectic between master/slave that Arguedas situates at the center of the story, in the plaza of the lettered city. Arguedas attempts to disrupt the assignment of criollo to the role of master, and the so-called “Indio” to the role of slave, but the real policing taking place in that provincial town does in effect perform the control over the vitalest of resources, water, which does in fact endanger the comuneros lives, albeit through cheating its own criollo rules. What most effectively trumps the institutional assignment of roles is the presence of Quechua, the narrative strand in the short story that attempts to establish an analogy between the Quechua speaking and animals, which signals a Quechua difference. However ambivalently Arguedas underlines the inappropriateness of the criollo’s assessment of the native Quechua population’s bestiality, given the slovenly, violent state of the
drunken, criollo, alcalde/governor, don Braulio, Arguedas articulates and thereby acknowledges this Quechua difference by pronouncing the Quechua vision of animals as relatives, in Quechua.

The Arguedian field is marked with this ambiguity: this Quechua perception of animals cannot be reconciled with the Hegelian/ Marxist dialectic he plays out in the master/slave narrative of comuneros vs. mistis, “Indios” v. “criollos,” Quechua speaking cultivators vs. those who are not Quechua. This mark of Quechua difference, the vision of animals as relatives, disrupts the narrative that is propulsed by a Hegelian/ Marxist dialectical assemblage. This Quechua difference, rather, is embedded in another narrative current in which the young narrator recounting what he witnesses, “Ernesto” is implied. This narrative current emerges out of a separate dialectic, entwined between the aesthetic Hegelian Marxist dialectically propelled narrative of the short story plot, and the gritty and carnal narrative of the young Arguedas, “Ernesto,” and the adult Arguedas, “Jose Maria Arguedas.” Ernesto’s affiliation is not entirely clear; he is young, and finds much in common with the provincial town children as well as the “comunero” children; at the same time, he does not appear to belong to either the criollo/”mistí” or “comunero”/”Indio.” He resembles Arguedas as a boy, that is, the border crossing youth who had been tossed over the fence separating “Indio” and Criollo nations, tossed into the corral encircling the “Indio” nation, and back to the Criollo nation intermittently. At the same time, he bespeaks the ambivalence deeply cutting through Arguedas as conscious adult: the narrator that omnisciently flows around Ernesto describes the dirtiness of animals with all the disgust and repudiation that only a Criollo subscribing to “decency” could muster, while at the same time, this very same adult Arguedas/omniscient narrator inscribes the empathy and amity which characterizes the Quechua relationship to animals as the Quechua mark, as Quechua difference inscribed in this Arguedian field as well. The latter gesture can be found in the fixation on animals within his prose, in both positive and negative registers.

---Don Braulio es como zorro y como perro---(11)
---Don Braulio is like a fox and a dog--
---Carajo! Mistís son como tigre!
---Dam! Mistís are like tiger!
---Comuneros son para morir como perro. (19)
---Comuneros are for dying like dogs.
---Sólo el Viejo no se reía; su cara seguía agestada, como si en el corredor apestase un perro muerto. (17)
---Only the Old Man didn’t laugh; his face was one grimace, as if in the passage a dead dog stunk. [Tayta Vilkas, Varayuq/Elder authority who is against there being disrespect toward authority, in principle.]

Ultimately, from the voice of the omniscient adult Arguedas narrator witnessing comes the overtly self-conscious and lucid witness of the adult Arguedas narrator that makes a similar
distinction between the Zorro de Arriba and the Zorro de abajo, in that narrative novella; this later figuration of the adult Arguedas narrator self-consciously journaling his adult experiences and foraying into carnal animalesque experiences, in contraposition to a “criollo decency” which the adult Arguedas also embraces which is also an ironic commentary on the misti in that the fox in Quechua mythos is a thief. This Arguedian assemblage of manic polarization inscribes the deep melancholia of the split subject, in this case, embodied in Arguedas: Quechua is his mother; Criollo is his father. The dog registers the fate of the comunero, and his smell strikes the Varayuq just as something strikes the comunero as if he were a dog; at the same time, Don Baulio is a fox and a dog, wanting to escape perhaps the indecency of criollo sovereign rule—which he enforces, he has become a dogged drunkard. Finally, the Zorro of his last literary work is an urban creature, an urban middle class “criollo” of the sort everywhere to be found in even certain sectors of a provincial city, especially a port city, a “criollo” such as Palma first described this saucy and amenable, mordant but accepting Limeño criollo. This union of Quechua Mother and Criollo Father and its progeny cannot exist but in a deep melancholia, emerging as it does from the mestizo field of a national republican project in the second half of the 20th century such as we have permitted the literary field of text to prove real the cruelty of the colonial encounter embedded in the mestizo national project. For Arguedas, what Vallejo presages as the destruction of the “Indio” becomes what wreaks dissonance and discord within the synthesis that Arquedas would like to incarnate, the Quechua Modern. The dog cannot effect the escape necessary for there are two option, a dead dog, the “comunero,” or a fox, the “criollo” thief, either from the Andean city or the coastal city, the topographic caste and political economy which the Peabody Museum also narrates. The criollo perceptions of “Indio” eventually overtakes Arguedas’ idealized Hegelian project, which, as Godzich tells us would hold out the hope that “Indio” would be known fully by Criollo in the following dialectical fulfillment:

Hegel's solution was to hold out the hope, to be fulfilled in the fullness of time, of all givenness to be invested by Spirit--his designation for the knowing instance--so that ultimately given and known would coincide in Absolute Knowledge. (25)

There are no dogs in Arguedas’ last literary work, El zorro de arriba y el zorro de abajo. Instead, Criollo would suppress the native Quechua population through a form of destruction presaged in Vallejo in the field of politics or citizen policing, submitting the universal and humanist aesthetics and metaphysical ideals of the West to the unharnessed designs and desires unleashed in the emerging field of mestizo republican national project as overseen by criollo sovereign rule. Arguedas is prepared, more than any criollo invested in the mestizo reterritorialization of “Indio” to see the crude irreconcilability of the aesthetic and the political
positions assumed within this *Westernized Latin-American* metaphysical and physical tradition extending into the latter half of the 20th century: “Indio” sublation would also be “Indio” negation, as assimilation rather than inclusion, as exclusion and destruction and suppression. This republican criollo colonial modernity would confront the ethnic question of the “Indio” with *this mestizo enframing*. The savage/animal trace left from *the colonial enframing* concerning the indigenous people’s soul and its attendant policing, “the extirpation of idolatries” anteceding “republican independence” becomes in *the mestizo enframing* the question of citizenship/inclusion at the expense of Quechua difference, a form of destruction and policing characteristic of this republican epoch, of the order, the internal economy, and the assemblage conforming the power exercised in *the mestizo field*. The story ends with the repression of the comuneros, Ernesto’s heroic intervention and escape, and his journey toward *the ayllu, as utopia, no place*, while that place of Arguedas’ youth, and of Arguedas’ defeated aspirations become projections defeated by the reality of the policing state. Vallejo presages the destruction of *Indio* when it is collapsed next to *mestizo*. At the end of his life, the rift between *criollo* and *Indio* overwhelms Arguedas himself. The history of this short story’s publication reveals that it is responsive to the emerging *mestizo national project*. “Agua” is first published in 1935, but finds publication anew in 1954 and later on in 1971, not unlike Mariategui or Vallejo’s work, repackaged as the emancipatory gesture that releases Peru to its independence by incorporating the native indigenous peoples, a strongly held position entrenched in *the Peruvian national field* by the late 80’s, at least a decade after he commits suicide in 1969.

---

102 Cornejo Polar, Antonio, Alberto Escobar, Martin Lienhard, William Rowe. *Vigencia y Universalidad de José María Arguedas*. Lima: Editorial Horizonte, 1984. In remarking on the three editions of “Agua” Escobar underlines this sociopolitical “repackaging:” “…los cambios que se han hecho en Agua o en cualquiera de los cuentos, están guiados por un sentimiento que hace del lenguaje en Agua el recipiente o el recinto donde se encuentra fijada la ideología.” (37)
Part III: *Mestizo inscriptions* translating *Quechua* & *mestizo* foundational fictions in the republican field

Chapter 6: *Mestizo translations* of the cultural figuration ““Indio”” at the site of colonial encounter in *the field*: the indigenous question or “el problema del “Indio”,” the 20th century republican national project and its “criollo” global designs

Introduction: the literary field and the Mariateguian are of justice

The question of translation is at the center of the colonial encounter, that is, the unequal and undifferentiated encounter between two distinct cultures. In the colonial encounter, a dominant imperative for identity vies for the space that difference may claim: an act of violence that leads to an enforced silence. The intracultural encounter abides in language, in *the field*, as it inhabits the world of quotidian actions and experience, such as the two short stories written by two widely acclaimed Peruvian authors evince from within their respective literary and imaginary fields. “Mestizo” and “criollo” expressions of the first half of the 20th century inscribed in the literary works of Cesar Vallejo’s, “Paco Yunque,” and Jose Maria Arguedas’ “Agua” also devise *the escape* (Deleuze and Guattari, Minor Literature) from colonial rule which is the effect of the desire to displace the colonial identity of the father, the crown’s logic, in order, ideationally to become “Indio”103 a desire still persisting in the republican imaginary as the emancipatory gesture, the son’s rebellion, however repressive of indigenous Quechua speaking populations in reality, and however much this desire facilitates the appropriation of pre-colonial land and territory by republican “criollos.” This desire to belong in the colonized territory prefigured in Vallejo as the destruction of the indigenous population and figured in Arguedas as a republican utopia to be found in the Quechua speaking *ayllu*104 are both inscriptions that emerge from within

---

103 The inspiration to distill on the basis of this insight concerning this desire to “play Indian” within the Andean context derives from Phillip J. Deloria’s *Playing Indian.*

104 *Ayllu* is the Quechua appellative for the place, the dwelling, the *pacha* that is the world where the seed of all life engenders a convivial community of live beings, protected by deities, and living with one another in harmony, as a rule. The word is expressed in like manner in Aymará. It has been translated most commonly and prevalently into Spanish as “comunidad campesina.”
the field of mestizo translations of Quechua.\textsuperscript{105} They are literary expressions of the epically foundational desire to be native embedded in the mestizo mappings of a Peruvian Republican national project emerging from both these short stories from the first half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. They are also emblems of the epoch, in Heideggerian terms, registers of a culturally diffuse Western idiom expressed as a local response to (capitalist) imperial designs, an ostensibly “post-colonial” “criollo” response. They are germain to the territorial bounds that the republic of Peru delimits, and beyond these bounds, they traverse a region “liberated” by the same criollo sons of the Colonial Spanish Crown, “los libertadores,” José de San Martín and Simón Bolívar firstly, and many subsequent designers of this liberation. These literary mestizo inscriptions anticipate the mestizo turns of the latter half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century and the movements into the 21\textsuperscript{st} after the revolutionary war for independence, “La Guerra por la Independencia,” results in a break from Spanish Colonial Rule, at least in name and legislative word.

“Paco Yunque” was first published posthumously in 1951, (Silva-Santisteban y Moreano XXXV) and “Agua” was first published in 1935, and was published again years later in 1954, and yet again, posthumously in 1971. (Cornejo Polar, Escobar, Lienhard, Rowe 37) It is telling that Vallejo’s denunciatory tale of the the indigenous Quechua speaker status as “yunque” or anvil finds the light of publication as witness around the same time that Arguedas’ work “Agua” is gaining similar recognition through Arguedas’ second revision of the story, revisions which continue to engender debate as to the political design of his literary oeuvre.\textsuperscript{106} I would argue that the figuration that Vallejo’s short story inscribed could only be published in 1951 for various reasons. At the same time, reading Vallejo with Arguedas is unavoidable: no two writers confront the questions of translation and the colonial encounter between Quechua speaking peoples and Peruvian Spanish speaking criollos\textsuperscript{107} more agonistically than they do, and the period

\textsuperscript{105} The language has become the monolithic identitary appellative created during the colonial period for the “Indio” as per my Part 1, an appellative which collapses differences into a monolithic “Indio” population. Therefore “Quechua,” in this sense is both the Quechua speaking people, and the language.

\textsuperscript{106} Alberto Escobar remarks in Vigencia y Universalidad de José María Arguedas: “El cambio de un cuento a otro puede subrayar diferencias, manifestar distancias, y, en general se puede decir que en la primera fase de esta obra, el trabajo con el lenguaje es un trabajo con la ideología.” Escobar concludes with a query I find remarkable and telling: “Cuando pasamos al último libro estamos en un horizonte que, aparentemente, es contradictorio del primero, “porque si antes había dicho Arguedas que no quería que los personajes andinos hablaran como domésticos de Lima, ahora, esos aparecen hablando en Los Zorros de esa manera?...”

\textsuperscript{107} By criollo is meant a Latin American ruling class whose agenda and conformation has consistently aligned itself along a conservative oligarchy whose interests have been investments in large land holdings and monarchic/catholic values, on one hand, or along a liberal republicanism whose interests have aligned with the principles of the French “bourgeois revolution” as well as the emerging “democratic” values of the first such new world creole republic, the United States of America. “Criollos” are traditionally understood as the sons of the Spanish colonizer, affiliated to a colonial legacy whose traditions persist, in spite of rebellion against them.
in the middle of the 20th century when both these literary works emerge together is pivotal in addressing the indigenous question. The emerging 20th century Peruvian republican identity is articulated through the ethnic strife Arguedas and Vallejo inscribe by means of their literary poetic expression. No writer presages the effect of the violence the Quechua speaking endure with greater empathy or lucidity than Vallejo, and in “Paco Yunque” the writer inscribes the figuration of the institutional matrix that would purvey this violence, a violence deemed expedient in addressing “el problema del Indio”, as well as in fulfilling the capital investments spurring the global designs of this ruling class. Arguedas’ Agua echoes that strife but proposes a political alternative, an alternative for self-naming, autonomy, and for self-governance.

This chapter maps mestizo inscriptions of colonial and Quechua difference in a 20th century Peruvian field traversed by criollo and mestizo global designs, (Mignolo) poignantly expressed through “Paco Yunque” and “Agua.” Analyzing the political projects emerging from this mestizo literary field through these short stories written in Spanish, and showing how this field abides with the indigenous Andean Quechua speaking allows me to discern mestizo translations of Quechua inscribed therein. The Peruvian literary field delimited through this first instantiation of a mestizo reading of the Quechua speaking is, I would argue, yet another translation of “Indio.” The socio-historical moment inscribed in the field that the literary work delimits does not bear literary periodization in the Western, standard, and traditional way for our purposes, the way for example, that Francisco Carrillo and other Peruvian literary critics would propose to confect a periodization utilizing traditional Western terms, framing pre-Columbian Quechua poetic expression, as “classical literature,” subsuming this poetic expression, to a place within a category. Rather, a deconstruction of the history of publication makes evident the order granting authority to these representations of Peruvian provincial life, while at the same time unpacking the political and economic stakes driven into the field of these emerging republican discourses with global designs, these literary expressions being one register of these strategic narrations, while at the same time exceeding these discursive boundaries, as what I term, poetic expression. It is notwithstanding, this other order spanning several decades that emerges, alternatively, after having tilled the field for the rhizome through which mestizo discourses mark republican Quechua difference with an apparently ineluctable colonial difference, effecting “criollo” escapes from their Colonial forefathers.

Mariátegui, one of the most important Peruvian theorists, a citizen of Peru, of national Peruvian reality from what he terms a social perspective---, and perhaps the most cogent way of translating his term would be “social,” a “social” perspective---, holds much relevance for both mestizo authors, Vallejo and Arguedas, grounding the political projects embedded in these short
stories in a palimpsest of debates that also spanned several decades. Between the turn of the
nineteenth century, into the twentieth and up to the Velazco military regime installed in 1968,
decades during which the mestizo republican field becomes clearly bound, the three authors are
linked by a preoccupation for the indigenous question on (Marieteguian) social terms, not in a
historical chronology, but rather, in an alternative history, a veritable story that traces the
conformation and evolution of the same imagined territory whose intersecting fields precipitate
similar mestizo inscriptions centering on what Mariátegui termed the social solution to the
Peruvian republic’s “problema del Indio.” Mariátegui, in this Foucauldian archeaological sense
affords an arc of understanding and legitimation through which both writers, Vallejo and
Arguedas traverse, an arc which makes adequate one inscription to this other, an arc of just
adaptation, or of what we will term, Mariateguiian justice. This chapter puts forth therefore, the
limits of this emerging mestizo translational field based upon an analysis of the translational
boundary of 1.) publication and state order; 2.) the suppression of one literacy, Spanish, over
another, Quechua, through the exercise and abuse of state power: the aesthetics of state order; 3.)
the internal economy operant inside the mestizo republican field and at its borders, where
“coloniality” as well as Western ideation are pushed back, utilizing Quechua translation as the
linchpin of “criollo” negotiations for republican identity centering on the autonomous, self-
naming, “Peru,” and the figuration, mestizo; 4.) the global designs embedded in an always
already colonial encounter between a succession of Peruvian “criollos” germane to the field of
the Eurocentric Peruvian capital, Lima, and the global, transatlantic and northern “imperial
metropolis” that continues to purvey colonial domination through a Western utilitarian aesthetic
humanist regime.

Publication and state order

The history of the publication of these three works is revealing. Mariátegui writes in
1928, “Seven essays interpreting Peruvian reality,” (my translation,) a book that becomes the seed
of numerous debates, and a continuously re-published book, arguably because it continues to
show the way toward Peruvian indigenist108 republican independence.109 Mariátegui’s book is a

108 By indigenist is meant not the specific literary, political, or social movements by that name emerging
out of the Peruvian field, but rather the mestizo nationalism I am in the process of unpacking translationally
as it emerged in the late nineteenth to mid twentieth century and beyond. Indigenist is therefore the
ideational imagining of criollo republican aspirations.

109 The name “indigenist” in italics is an apt description also of the creolized Marxian reading Mariátegui
performs through the prism of a Peruvian reality he perceives also through the “new world” vision of 19th
century “criollo” “próceres de la patria,” founding fathers of criollo republican independence such as Jose
Marti, (1853-1895) authors sympathetic to the “Indio” and whose heightened awareness of their own
compilation of his own design, of a number of previously written essays whose beginning and frame is the political economy of this territory, from colonial times, to the republican turn marked officially as taking place in 1821, to the turn of the 20th century. In accord with Mariátegui’s reading of the the political economy of this territory, Peruvain reality moves him directly to the indigenous problem, or “El problema del Indio,” and then to the problem of land, “El problema de la tierra,” and on to institutions, such as public education, “the religious factor,” regionalism and centralized governance, all institutions articulating the aspirations of contemporary as well as past Peruvian republican criollo rule, institutions that culminate, in Mariátegui’s treatise, with the problem of literature, literature, in the traditionally Western register of fictional writing. His compilation expresses, through its table of contents, the institutional order the Peruvian state will create as it installs its republican regime into the governmental seat of power. Not only is his table of contents telling, but it also becomes the rubric of a political discussion and an ideational mapping whose discourse does not yet abate; it conforms a foundational narration of the emerging republican state order. Arguably, this “reality” persists even today, and in similar ways in neighboring republics like Bolivia who share similar concerns centering on the same “indigenous question” insofar as the problem of consolidating a republican national project is concerned. Mariategui’s table of contents can be read as a matrix for Peruvian state governance. The continual discussion of its constitutive parts in this mestizo republican field through time maintains and advances this state order, not just in terms of the academic categories devised therefrom, but also as the source of a public agenda of social concerns still inhering upon varied public institutions, including the ones Mariátegui initially names. The emergence of proposals, turns, reforms, in a word changes that inhere upon the mestizo republican field mark moments of poetic expression as well: these debates, in specific instantiations, do in deed and word articulate

“slavery” to their European “master” aligned them with the interests of those in reality conquered, “surrounded,” and already appropriated: the natives to the lands the criollo independentistas were claiming as theirs. However, Mariátegui takes the “Indio” as the expression of a socialist possibility for Perú as well.

110 The term is derived from the theoretical horizon of Doris Somer’s insight into the reasons why “romance” fictional narrative became the means through which the designers of republican liberation from colonial rule, such as I designate them earlier, would deal with the vicissitudes of nation formation. In this case however, we are identifying criollo translations of “Indio,” taking place through literary as well as political/public discourses alike, or through what we have termed, poetic expression. These designers of republican liberation purveyed this poetic expression through a practice of essay writing well known throughout Latin America, and who were, according to Joseba Gabilondo, a cultural critic, writers “invested in the process of speculative discourses…centered on the issue of the nation,” a current, he adds, emerging under a new label in the early 20th century both in Latin America and in Spain: “intellectuals.” [from Afterword to the 1997 Edition of The Cosmic Race/La Raza Cósmica by Jose Vasconcelos, with an introduction by Didier T. Jaén, the purportedly Chicana/o translation.] Tellingly, the Spanish writers investing in this speculative discourse were doing so after the loss of Puerto Rico, Cuba, and the Phillipines to the United States in 1898.
new and creative responses to Peruvian reality. It is in this way that the Mariáteguian discursive political agenda delimits a mestizo geo-political field from which the constructive and destructive institutional agendas of social movements, rule of law, autonomous governance, and territorial definitions emerge in the everyday within public discussions in Peru then, and today.

What is axiomatic in this field is the imperative to claim indigeneity and consolidate ownership of territory through appropriations and reappropriations of land. For Mariátegui, “el Indio” is the collective identity that is capable of resisting the oppressive force of colonial rule firstly, and oligarchic republican rule secondly, especially in that the latter fails to consolidate a bourgeois project built upon a Peruvian industry with independent economic means and solvency, the one factor that, in accord with the Marxian Mariateguian analysis of Peruvian political economy subverts the installation of bourgeois rule. (Mariátegui 68-72) This failure is decisive in Mariátegui’s view. In the absence of a viable, that is massive, wage earning, working class, the reality that should attend a pervasive national industrial base, he identifies “el problema del Indio” as the linchpin of Peruvian revolutionary possibilities, at once identifying the “way out” of this local republican failure, while appropriating “el “Indio” as the autochthonous, properly Peruvian social response to the imperatives of post-colonial republicanism--, eurocentric as his analysis ultimately becomes in the mestizo field. “El problema del Indio” becomes the poetic expression of a desire for a potential socialist reality to come to fruition, and is at once also, the singularly most important problem facing Peruvian governance, especially in that it is the overwhelming “social problem” that Mariategui tirelessly points to. Mariategui’s desire to see a native Peruvian working class emerge, a working class that always already functioned “almost” in a socialist manner, out of the Quechua speaking traditions that subsist in the Indigenous Peoples demographic majority is Mariategui’ translation of what Marx envisioned as a working class that would articulate collective interests solely in order to confront a bourgeois class otherwise bent on exploiting workers alienated from the means of production. In this Mariateguian poetic expression, returning to the indigenous Quechua population the land that they are in every cultural practice adapted to cultivate, according to this, Mariategui’s perception is the one thing that would set Peruvian material history on its way. This is the Mariateguian, creolized translation of a Marxian working class, a laboring class expressing collective interests in opposition to a ruling and oppressive minority, and a class that through this consolidation would address the single most startling social problem in the Peruvian republic: “el problema del Indio.”

The Marxian working class in this Mariateguian poetic expression would be inflected with a Peruvian mestizo mark: this confluence of criollo and Indio worlds would have to become mestizo. This new governing class, the provisional dictatorship of the working class would forge
the exceptional alliance between Peruvian criollo and native Andean Quechua speakers, a new citizen we will also call *mestizo*. This favorable acknowledgement of indigenous Quechua population revolutionary potential is a *reconnaissance* preceded and proceeded by the silence of the vanquished indigenous population, a silence broken only by the recognition of the *social* reality of the “Indio” in Mariátegui’s narrative, and the arc that stems subsequently from this analysis of Peruvian reality, through writers like Vallejo and Arguedas. Mariátegui stands with intellectual integrity, before a reality too many other intellectuals chose and choose still to elide, a reality others choose to bring systematically under erasure, as Vallejo and Arguedas will demonstrate, however consciously or unconsciously, however overdetermined by Western interests the real Quechua speaking population becomes. The consequences are both nefarious and liberating. However, for Mariátegui, and consequently through the arc that stems from him, the indigenous Quechua speaker is an ineluctable reality. This *reconnaissance* will persist through the arc of Mariáteguian justice until today, albeit as an *mestizo* *translation*, unavoidably. This figuration of Peruvian reality, with all its attendant inscriptions, this Mariáteguian arc will delimit a specific field of *mestizo translation* of “Indio.” Mariátegui’s book marks the emergence of an arc of understanding through which part of the republic would envision its possibilities for *republican rule* for decades to come with this distinct “Indio” presence, a *social problem* that would and should disturb criollo order. Mariátegui’s unflinching recognition of this indigenous Quechua majority, and his acknowledgement that it would have to be dealt with socially, as an unavoidable, advantageous, and *real* part of the Peruvian imagined community would never leave the Peruvian field of nation building as one primordial register of Peruvian *mestizo translation*.

The publication of Mariátegui’s seminal work institutionalizes a distinct understanding of “Indio,” one inscribed in Vallejo’s *Paco Yunque* and Arguedas’ *Agua* as well: “Indio” is translated as the depository of the required, alternative origins, different from the Spanish colonial empire, that is, *republican*, and different from the successive waves of “other European colonizers” investing in “Peruvian” soil, both with capital and with egoistic desire, making “Indio” the mark of criollo indigeneity, or what is here termed *mestizo*. Most importantly, it permits the *reconnaissance* of “Indio” that Mariátegui effects to be variously institutionalized, invariably permitting there to be significant breaks in the silence surrounding indigenous Quechua speaking persons’ reality. Republican *criollo rule* would confect the *mestizo nation state*, and Mariategui would be inscribed within the *contentious fields* vying for prevalence during the first half of the twentieth century, especially in that the Bolshevik revolution stirred the imaginations of all the designers of a Western liberation of this time. However, what is
remarkable in Mariategui’s case is this willingness to have “Indio” as the indigenous Quechua population be the intrinsic, indeed central part of the Marxian national field he imagined, a willingness arguably grounded in what Mariategui considered an unavoidable majority, the very basis for the demos of the bourgeois state imagined through French revolutionary ideals by the designers of republican creole freedom at the turn of the century, but in Mariategui’s case, the very basis for how, specifically in Peru, he saw that the indigenous majority ignored was the very possibility for Peru to make its own revolutionary way forward. The indigenous problem, that is, the indigenous majority precipitated not only the need to address an unavoidably “social solution,” to the local, Peruvian, republican problem, but it promised to ground Peruvian revolutionary possibilities on a properly Quechua field of cultivation: Mariategui wanted the Inka state’s agrarian foundation to propel the country forward economically and even, socially. This is Mariateguian mestizo.

This Mariateguian creolized Marxian narration inscribed his reconnaissance in the figure of an Indio that he translated as a figuration of a Peruvian social body constitutive of the nation he imagined within this Mariateguian mestizo field, a field from which a distinct socialist potential, a potential intimately linked both to the “character” of this “Indigenous Civilization,” its collective and agri-centric forms of governance especially, but a unique socialist potential linked directly to the fact that the indigenous population was the demographic majority constitutive of the social body bearing an unresolved and illegitimately placed burden on its back. In other words, for Mariategui there was no way forward, no teleological progress toward a realization of Peruvian material history without facing this substantive burden being placed on the back of this primordially Peruvian social body, the unavoidable “social” problem he termed “el problema del Indio.” Conversely, the successive generations of colonizers during the republican era, such as we define it, symbolically from the 28th of July of 1821 to the present, whose ascendancy from the time of invasion and colonization by the subjects of the Spanish Crown in the 16th century and forward would be nativized through a variant “Indio” metaphor, through which republican citizenry would be theorized, a metaphor that likened the real indigenous people to any idea convenient to the republican nation being understood. In this sense, “Indio” was appropriated, understood and then trans-lated first, literally and figuratively, as the ineluctable social body to be governed. Divergent narratives inscribing a figuration of this populace of newly forged liberal subjects which, we have termed mestizos, became the way of imagining, understanding, and theorizing the ultimate and the required citizen protagonist in any criollo foundational narration. Imagining, (poetic) understanding (ordered) and theorizing (metaphorical) all became Western measures intended to discipline, bring or impose order to the
emerging popular identities, attempting thereby to suture the divergence between the imperatives of this social body and its attendant poetic expressions, and narrations, and the state order legitimizing or discrediting these narrations through publication.

These *mestizos*, are to be distinguished from the demographic majority of *Indios* Mariátegui continuously alludes to as the majority of the population of the Peruvian territory in his seven interpretive essays, assessing in mordant and incisive analysis the social condition of the *Indigenous Peoples* under more than one hundred years of republican rule, (1821 to 1925) and another two hundred fifty of Colonial rule, (1530 to 1821.) In assessing the relevance of an emergent “indigenist literature,” (“el indigenismo en nuestra literatura”) Mariátegui substantiates its relevance, not through aesthetic concerns, but rather through the overwhelming demographic reality of the indigenous population in no small measure constituting the *demos* of the emerging republic, but entirely disadvantaged both socially and economically, indeed deemed both “inferior” and “enslaved,” in spite of the demographic majority of the indigenous population in Mariátegui’s time, and in accord with his assessment. This *Mariateguian* social imperative to territorialize and reterritorialize by claiming “indigeneity” through this *Mariateguian Indio* who was demographically real, and as well the majority of the ostensibly emerging Peruvian republican citizenry would stand as a counterpoint to a foundational narration which would favor the *myscegenzation* that ensconced a *mestizo* figuration as the imagined citizen, the *demos* prefiguring a fully realized republican liberal democracy. This confluence of investments and forces becomes a *republican Western field* where the complex of domination delimits a *republican state aesthetic order*.

La onda de la revolución era continental: no era casi peruana. Los liberales, los jacobinos, los revolucionarios peruanos, no constituían sino un manípulo. La mejor savia, la más heroica energía se gastaron en las batallas y en los intervalos de la lucha. La República no reposaba sino en el ejercito de la revolución. Tuvimos, por esto, un accidentado, un tormentoso periodo de interinidad military. Y no habiendo podido cuajar en este periodo la clase revolucionaria, resurgio automáticamente la clase conservadora. Los “encomenderos” y terratenientes que, durante la revolución de la independencia oscilaron ambiguamente, entre patriotas y realistas, se encargaron francamente de la dirección de la República. La aristocracia colonial y monárquica se metamorfoseó, formalmente, en burguesía republicana. El régimen económico-social de la Colonia se adaptó externamente a las instituciones creadas por la revolución. Pero la saturó de espiritu colonial. (Mariátegui 222)

---

10 The term is used primarily in reference to Mariátegui’s definition of the “Indio” problem, as a social problem, and less emphatically as the imagined communal resistance the “Indio” might one day conform as a creolized Peruvian proletarian class.
The revolutionary wave was continental: it was scarcely Peruvian. The liberals, the Jacobins, the Peruvian revolutionaries, didn’t but constitute but a handful. The best and most vital thinking, the most heroic energy, was spent on the battles and the intervals between struggle. The Republic did not but repose/rely upon the army of the revolution. We had, because of this, a wrecked and tempestuous period of military interim rule. And unable to consolidate a revolutionary class during this period, the conservative class resurfaced automatically. The “encomenderos” and “terratenientes” who, during the revolution oscillated ambiguously, between patriots and royalists, openly took charge of the direction of the Republic. The colonial and monarchical aristocracy metamorphosed, formally, into a republican bourgeoisie. The economic-social Colonial regimen adapted itself externally to the institutions created by the revolution. But it saturated them/it with a Colonial spirit.

In spite of and even through this Mariateguian arc, “Indio” would eventually be made adequate to mestizo citizen, representationally, that is, aesthetically, and the latter half of the 20th century would eventually witness how the state finally consumes the Quechua speaking population within its matrix, where no longer are there ““Indio”s,” but only Peruvian citizens, with the exception of the legal entity, persisting today, “comunidad campesina.” As Vallejo and Arguedas poignantly unpack this unfolding project and its two possibilities in their short stories. In Vallejo’s story this state aesthetic order is inscribed in the militarized suppression of “Indio,” brutal force will prevail through state institutions and rule of liberal law as this convenient disapparition of “Indio” repressing the chaos that results from the contradictiona and paradoxes which defy this state aesthetic order, contradictions that are played out within and upon the social body. Arguedas will inscribe a new conveyor of liberation with reconnaissance of Quechua that will take the republican project to a new, Quechua inflected field, the ayllu field. In summary, and to the point for our current discussion, what is axiomatic in this mestizo field becomes a succession of historic and contemporary translations of “el problema del “Indio.”

In No soy un aculturado, the speech delivered in October of 1968 in acceptance of the Inca Garcilaso de la Vega prize, Arguedas advanced the figuration of a “Quechua modern,” a term that affirmed a mestizo indigenist citizen that did not gain currency during his lifetime. Not only does Arguedas underline that the Quechua speaking have survived until the present, in spite of the debilitation the oppression of a feudal system still aspiring to enslave them inflicted, but their art, according to Arguedas, remained vital and rivaled any European artistic expression in accomplishment. A Quechua Modern is what Arguedas himself wanted to model and embody,
was Arguedas’ distinct aesthetic translation of ““Indio”,” a term devoured\textsuperscript{112} by the term “Peruvian” in ways that advantageously disavowed Quechua reality and legitimacy, to quote Mariátegui, by folding Quechua difference into “citizen” in the interest of the fundamentally “criollo,” and persistent mestizo national project. Arguedas was a proponent of this alternative Peruvian mestizo citizen, with an “Indio” mark, indigenist, and expressed as much agonically during his acceptance speech, in these terms:

…intenté convertir en lenguaje escrito lo que era como individuo: un vínculo vivo, fuerte, capaz de universalizarse, de la gran nación cercada [the ““Indio”” nation] y la parte generosa, humana, de los opresores [the “criollo” nation]. El vínculo podia universalizarse, extenderse; se mostraba un ejemplo concreto, actuante. El cerco [separando las dos naciones] podia y debía ser destruido; el caudal de las dos naciones se podia y debía unir. (13-14)

…I attempted to turn into written language what I was as an individual: a live, strong like, capable of universalizing itself, of the great nation surrounded, [the ““Indio”” nation] and the generous, humane part of the oppressors [the criollo nation]. His link could be universalized, extend itself; a concrete example, in action, showed itself. The fence could and should be destroyed; the current of the two nations could and should be joined.

Even though Arguedas affirmed this possibility, in himself, as taking place through him, ultimately the mestizo citizen emerging from the Peruvian republican mestizo field would continue negotiating the place of the Quechua speaking, and it would continue relating foundational narrations of the sort that continued to displace Quechua from mestizo citizen. “Quechua Modern,” e.g. the alternative Arguedas himself embodied like few others in the public Limeño stage would ultimately have no currency within the internal economy of the mestizo field being mapped. Perhaps it is one of the greatest, precisely modern ironies that shortly after this speech, Arguedas, one could say, “tragically” ends his life, as a poet “suicided by [his Peruvian] society,” as Antonin Artuad coined the term in reference to Vincent van Gogh. While “tragedy” was the predilect aesthetic performance of the social contradictions overcoming the individual in the Greek polis, the harbinger of modernity, a modernity ensconcing the individual as the apex of all societal life, and the genre adopted by Western civilization as its artistic representation of political rule, it falls far short of explaining the kind of contradiction Arguedas had the fervent desire to embody in the interest of preserving, safeguarding, the ““Indio”” nation.

Vallejo, on the other hand was much more blatant in denouncing the imminence of this destruction of Quechua when he named his “Indio” character, Paco, like his “mestizo”

\textsuperscript{112} This is an allusion to Roberto Fernández Retamar’s imaginative theorization of what Latin America does with its “foreign” influences: it devours them. In this context, I take seriously this procedure, suggesting in this case that “Quechua Modern” was part of the process of turning the status assigned the indigenous populations of these territories before colonization--“Indios--” into citizens.
counterpart, Paco Fariña--, anvil, Paco Yunque, the “Indio” character whose patrimony, whose asendancy would only foretell his pain, the need to sustain the blows through which the nation hammered out its identity. Paco Yunque would become a figuration starkly depicting the real blows that would transform the Quechua speaking while inscribing the cost of turning the indigenous community into a mestizo citizen’s home: his tears, anticipating his destruction. Paco Farina, Vallejo’s mestizo character, on the other hand, will suffer a different sort of transformation, a relatively gentler process depicted through the metaphor of milling wheat to make flour, Vallejo depicts the goodness of bread, but from a liberal perspective, the collapse of all differences by dint of this quasi industrial process, whitening, homogeneous. Vallejo underlines the inauguration of modern irony, wherein the “Indio” will sustain all the appropriate transformations in order to be shaped, by melting heat, blow by blow, into the iron base of capitalism. The mestizo republic would begin its transformative inception by collapsing distinctions into a Western, traditional, identitary homogeneity--, a republican Western liberal equality submitting all citizens to mestizo republican order. Vallejo’s is a clear denunciation of the violence, injustice, and cruelty of those blows as they were used to shape the republican state upon the backs of real Quechua indigenous peoples insuring its ultimately criollo order would invade this space, ultimately take her and his place. Notwithstanding, Vallejo’s indigenist mestizo narration brings “Indio” to the scene of republican nation formation, distinctly, visibly, audibly, and as would have pleased Mariátegui, conforming an important part of Peruvian reality, while signaling the failure of this emerging mestizo nation state in addressing the social “problema del Indio.” The arc of Mariateguian justice persists in Arguedas’ character Ernesto as well, the child narrator who is also a child character, and not, by servile replication, the omniscient narrator of 19th century Western novelistic tradition, nor the narrator of post-structuralist narrative theory, but an Ernesto whose relationship to his namesake Ernesto “Che” Guevara is acknowledged by Arguedas in his critical essays, as is the avowal that in some measure this Ernesto is him, the child who witnesses this violent transformation from within and without the ayllu—Ernesto the boy narrator who appears to be able to move in and out of this ayllu, as Arguedas had learned to do during his childhood. (Arguedas, Nosotros los Maestros) Ernesto, in Agua, is the literary construction of a witness, albeit an indigenist witness willing to put forth a Mariateguian social solution. In this sense, Ernesto is necessarily a trans–lator, a character capable of moving inside and outside the world of the Quechua speaking, the personage who will decry the vicissitude of the national dilemma conforming the mestizo field: what is to be done about “el problema del Indio” and can the mestizo nation understand Quechua in order to recognize the “Indio” as a member of the Peruvian nation? Not only can this young boy, Ernesto,
a *quechua modern* convince a readership harbored in the social body that a social solution can be proferred, but could they accept the *socialist indigenist solution* that his short story proposes through a utopic Quechua *ayllu*?

From both these literary fields, Vallejo and Arguedas will reply, sustaining that the indigenous question is unavoidably two sided. “El problema del “Indio” is not just the ethnic question that the republican state confronts as it seeks an identity, but it is at the same time, the problem the state and its order will present to the republican social body as the aesthetically construed “problema del “Indio.” From a position resembling the authority of Arguedas’ position in real life, as a state public school teacher, and later as an anthropologist, *el Dr. Arguedas* is also in some important measure the narrator of this short work of fiction, “Agua.” This peculiar narrator falls outside of traditional Western literary conventions as he is a combination of witness, translator, ambassador, teacher/anthropologist and defense attorney, subversive of a society that refuses to confer liberal equality to this so-called *Indio* non-person, non-citizen, the comunero in his short story, a term that is reminiscent of the European, Western, feudal commons. This peculiar Arguedian narrator also bundles, strangely, a literary narrator that observes from the position of an analyst, listening to the discourse of the young boy narrator, Ernesto. In this sense, this narrator that seems to guide the young Ernesto narrator, conducts his acts from the space of the *mestizo field*, realistically bound inside the polarities of the struggle played out in “Agua” between “comuneros,” the feudalistic translation of “Indio” into “castellano,” and *mistis* the Quechua word for the colonial and republican agressor, staging the reconciliation that the *mestizo state* would have to continue to negotiate in this reenacted scene of colonial encounter.

No matter how dialectically interactive *criollo* and Quechua speaker become in this Arguedian literary field, however re-placed through this mutual translatability that suggests the possibility of repositioning their roles, an intercultural dialogue facilitated by this exercise of Arguedas’ full bilingual literacy, the Mariateguian socialist arc of justice persists, but through Hegelian sublation of a House” and the absolute fulfillment of this dialectic in the utopia of the *ayllu* the *mestizo (indigenist) citizen* Ernesto would become. Ernesto is the Quechua Modern. This mutual translatability is what is coherent about the term “Quechua Modern,” and this is how something other than “Indio” is heard in Arguedas’ poetic expression, however suppressed Quechua speaking will ultimately remain under the erasure of the inscription *mestizo Ernesto*, the purported reconciliation between the two nations, the bilingual, Spanish/Quechua child able to embrace Arguedas’ utopic *ayllu*. Well ensconced in Western metaphysics, this absolute fulfillment in the utopic *ayllu* is narratively as well as theoretically, no place. Ernesto never
arrives at this ayllu. The story, rather, ends with Ernesto, unable to resolve the injustices he just witnessed inflicted upon his friends the comuneros, friends who are being barbarically deprived of water, Ernesto merely finds himself, consoling himself, on the way to the ayllu. In keeping also with the Mariateguian arc interpreting Peruvian reality, Arguedas in his epigraph dedicates the story to “real “Indio”s,” reminding his reader that the anthropologist, but also the social, anthropological, and even psychological analyst is present to acknowledge his childhood experiences, within a very Peruvian reality, but also to make sense of them, in the interest of the comuneros who nurtured him as a child:

A los comuneros y “lacayos” de la hacienda Viesca, con quienes tembé de frío en los regadíos nocturnos y bailé en carnavales, borracho de alegría, al compass de la tinya y de la flauta. A los comuneros de los cuatro ayllus de Puquio: K’ayau, Pichk’a-churi, Chaupi y K’ollana. A los comuneros de San Juan, Ak’ola, Utek’, Andamarca, Sondondo, Aucará, Chaviña y Larcay. (Arguedas 11)

To the “comuneros”/commoners and “lackeys” of the Viesca hacienda/plantation/estate, with whom I trembled with cold in the nightly irrigations and with whom I danced during carnivals, drunk with joy, to the beat of the “tinya” and the flute. To the “comuneros” of the four “Ayllus” of Puquio: K’ayau, Pichk’a-churi, Chaupi y K’ollana. To the “comuneros” of San Juan, Ak’ola, Utek’, Andamarca, Sondondo, Aucará, Chaviña y Larcay.

Mutual translatability, movement from one civilization’s side to the other is yet part of the Mariateguian arc of justice in that the social solution to the early republic’s dilemma with a majority ““Indio”” population it does not understand, will not contemplate, and sets aside, in Arguedas is fully present in his literary mestizo field and becomes an important part of Peruvian reality, daring even to invade Spanish narration with the Quechua language itself, and in deed, narrating Quechua practices as well. One is reminded again of Mariátegui’s first impulse: incorporating the indigenous population into his creolized Marxist narrative of historical materialism.

The Mariateguian arc of justice persists today in the contemporary publication of Mariátegui’s book; this enframing of a Peruvian and to an extent, Latin American modernity marked by this mestizo indigeneity can be read in the fact that Mariátegui’s book has been published in a hard cover Spanish edition as late as Marc of 2008; it has been edited and published more than once, of course in Peru, but also tellingly both in Mexico and Venezuela, where “Indio,” in the case of Mexico is the proud heritage that distinguishes Mexicans, and in the case of Venezuela, “criollo” is the Bolivarian project that confounds all that the republic will fold into its identity having already folded native American populations into its project as citizens without having to concern itself in actuality, and until recently with native Amazonian nations, or
with imported African slaves, or the racism attendant to their presence in the Venezuelan nation.113

“Paco Yunque” was published posthumously in 1951, and circulated widely. However, it was written around the same time that Mariátegui’s essays circulated. Vallejo’s widow, Georgette de Vallejo, published it posthumously and it would become one of his most widely distributed stories. (Silva-Santisteban y Moreano, XXXVI) His short story narrates the first day of state run public school in the life of a Quechua speaking young boy who migrates from his remote ayllu to the provincial capital where his mother works as a domestic servant in the home of the English “criollo” mayor, Grieve. We are able to discern through the institution of state run public education how “el problema del “Indio” is translated through “el proceso de la instrucción pública,” and how this translation helps negotiate the emergence of a homogeneous and hegemonic Peruvian national identity, while it rationalizes the exclusion and suppression of the indigenous population in spite of human witness. Arguedas publishes “Agua” first in 1934, and then again in 1954, 1961, and 1971, a time during the mid 20th century when Arguedas’ and others’ efforts to continue Mariátegui’s inquiries and debates also propitiate a place for Vallejo’s story within the mestizo field. Vallejo’s story becoming cogent and being conformed critically, politically and culturally within the mestizo field through publication and readership is possible, I would argue, because the inscription Paco Yunque resonates clearly with discussions germane to the politics and literature of the time approximately three decades after being written, discussions which revolve around the continual republican focus on the “problem del “Indio,” especially as “the native population interferes with the realization of liberal republican aspirations and while a critical sector of Peruvian society continues to translate “Indio” through the Mariateguian arc of justice as the oppressed class whose rights would have to be restored. This period in the mid twentieth century begins to shape a mestizo field in which this sort of testimonial or what we will call signal literature114 can emerge from the fertile field of Arguedas’ indefatigable if melancholy

113 I would argue that the so-called “left turn” being made by Latin American republics at the turn of the 20th century is in an important measure taking place because the “leftist” analysis of Latin American reality maintains its legitimacy as an arc of justice, not only because of its cogence and reach, but because the geopolitical coordinates of the field it maps are still very much in contention, both politically and psychologically: the continent is not just the body whose veins are split open, Galeano’s metaphor, but the psyche that is still colonized, still endures a “crise de conscience” from which it has not yielded but two solutions: the repressive imposition of order by almost autocratic governance, or the Mariateguian-socialist projection, a project proposing a social solution. The so-called left turn, I would argue is currently, an amalgam of these two responses, with two exceptions: real governmental initiatives recovering successful aspects of the Cuban political project, and the emergence of a radically different Quechua/Aymara social movement in Bolivia.

114 This use of “testimonial” here is at variance with later works from other regions as well as Peru defined as “testimonial literature.” For this reason the neologism “signal literature” will be used to designate
attempts to bring Quechua art to the awareness of a Peruvian “criollo” elite in Lima, an effort that is the result of Arguedas’ negotiation between Peruvian state aesthetic order and the anthropological, pedagogical, and politically social agenda he purveyed through the Mariateguian arc of justice so distinctly.

Vallejo’s narrative oeuvre is often criticized for lack of aesthetic accomplishment, the primary detractor being that his narrative art is beholden to his social conscience and moral vision more than it is subservient to Western, Eurocentric aesthetic principles. For instance, Vallejo’s literary gestures through his work, the novella El Tungsteno, an artistic curtsy toward the socialist Soviet author, Féodor Gladkov’s novel, El cemento (1925) is criticized as “foul play” in that it is in some measure appropriating another author’s work. Worse yet, Vallejo’s novel compares badly to this work it “imitates.” In accord with imported 19th century European Romantic notions, the attempt to imitate the genius of another author would inevitably fail. This type of Eurocentric criticism is wielded against Vallejo even at the turn of the 21st century, however implicitly.

En el caso de Vallejo, vemos que si bien mantuvo intacta la calidad literaria y la independencia ideológica respecto a su poesía,… respecto a su narrativa y su teatro su conducta no fue tan impecable. La adhesión a una causa en la cual creía lo llevo a contaminar y esquematizar su creación, como en el caso de la novela El tungsteno…. Para comenzar ni siquiera el título de la novela es original. Recordemos que El cemento (1925) de Féodor Gladkov, un best seller soviético, publicado en traducción castellana por la misma editorial comunista Cenit que prohijó El tungsteno, tuvo una amplia difusión en castellano. La corta novela de Vallejo, tan distinta de la extensa novela de Gladkov, intentaba con su título aprovechar el aura de este libro, cuya vasta difusión en España y América propició la publicación de nuevas ediciones. (Silva-Santisteban XXVIII)

In Vallejo’s case, we see that while he maintained the literary quality and the ideological independence intact with regard to his poetry,... with regard to his narrative and his theater his conduct was not as impeccable. His adherence to a cause he believed in led him to contaminate and schematize his creation, as in the case of the novel “El Tungsteno”…. To begin with not even the title is original. Let us recall that “El cemento” (1925) de Féodor Gladkov, a Soviet bestseller published in Spanish translation by the same communist editorial Cenit which adopted “El tungsteno” was widely read in Spanish. The short novel by Vallejo, so different from Gladkov’s extensive novel was attempting through its title to exploit the aura of this book whose vast readership in Spain and America precipitated the publication of new editions.

Arguably, Vallejo is making no attempt to imitate, but is in fact signaling his political alliances in a subversion of the state aesthetic order whose literature still domesticates the social body Arguedas and Vallejo desire to release from bondage. Certainly, Vallejo violates the Western aesthetic rule that would have Peruvian national literature, at a minimum, be original. He is

---

literature, fiction and non-fiction, whose inscriptions in the field constitute “signs of the times,” as defined in Part 1.
altogether “excused,” notwithstanding, for the lack of artistic accomplishment in “Paco Yunque” in 1999, forty years after its first posthumous publication in 1951 when his complete oeuvre is published by the most prestigious academic institution in Peru, La Pontificia Universidad Católica de Lima, by the editor of three volumes respectively compiling Vallejo’s theater, his poetry, and his narrative prose, Ricardo Silva-Santisteban, in collaboration with Cecilia Moreano. The domestication of Vallejo’s most disorderly work, his narrative and his theatrical oeuvres is ultimately absorbed into the canon of Peruvian national literature when it becomes inoffensive, and after it has been duly suppressed at moments of negotiation and rationalization. Moreover, literary scholarship ultimately “absolves” Vallejo of aesthetic insolvency in my view, not only because his poetry had so clearly performed a poetic practice that broke ground, enacting an aesthetic that was at once “masterful” and original, that is, mestizo, but Vallejo is once again “absolved” because the the Mariateguian arc of justice was already absorbed into Peruvian mestizo literary canon, a tradition whose practice enconces what is past, into a continuously confected and even contentious literary history beholden also to national projects suturing mestizo republican rule through its national literature, the ultimate negotiation and rationalization of “el problema del Indio” and the social body that remains, Quechua speaking, even and perhaps most especially, today. It is precisely the Peruvian criollo ruling class’s eurocentrism that permits the right and the left in Peruvian politics to come together in the interest of placing Quechua under erasure beneath varied translations of “Indio,” including the already institutionalized efforts of a left leaning critic like Francisco Carrillo, whose work Literatura Quechua Clásica, part of a series entitled, Enciclopedia Histórica de la Literatura Peruana, Volumen 1 is published in 1986. This assimilation does harbinger the disciplining of Vallejo’s oeuvre, as much as it signals that “Indio” has been translated into “Classic,” antiquarian and outdated, albeit originary of this mestizo nation. This literary institutionalization marks its territorialization, the appropriation of Vallejo’s Paco Yunque and Arguedas’ Agua into the palimpsest of the Peruvian mestizo representational field as part of the republican state aesthetic order permitting Argueda’s and Vallejo’s literature to emerge as mestizo national literature.

“Paco Yunque” and “Agua” emerged from the state aesthetic order of the Peruvian mestizo field abiding as these stories did to two persistent imperatives: artistic achievement in accord with the values of Western republican aesthetic rule, variously defined, and the inscription of an indigenous distinctive mark that translated ““Indio”” into this mestizo field, in the interest of mestizo republican identity. Mestizo, as its consolidation and institutionalization evolved

8 I am referring specifically to Vallejo’s oeuvre, Tríce, which has by all literary standards to date placed him among the premier modernist poets of our times.
throughout the 20th century was the republican translation of “Indio,” that is, mestizo is one of various translations of “Indio” subsequent to one of its first translations during the pre-republican period as described in Part I: the collapse of distinct groups sharing in Quechua as lingua franca, into the monolith “Quechua.” The pre-republican translation of “Indio” remains operative throughout the extended and evolved colonial encounter, imbuing 20th century republican Peruvian mestizo with the attributes of the alien, newly colonized indigenous Quechua population of the colonial period, a personage so “unfamiliar” within the colonial imaginary of the “conquistador” that it was inscribed in the chronicles and commentaries well before republican independence variously, but consistently anomalously, and indigenist, in the Mariateguian sense. This argument suggests therefore that the mestizo figure emerging out of the cultural and literary imaginary of the first half of the twentieth century eventually creates the mestizo literary inscriptions of the latter half of the twentieth century, while yet gathering the meanings of the pre-republican, that is colonial translation of “Indio.” This republican mestizo figuration grows out of its roots in the persistent colonial field from which Republican conquest proceeds, and it expands and extends well into the 20th century through the enframing colonial encounter. These intersecting fields produce Western creolized cultural forms that eventually institutionalize mestizo meanings, while yet maintaining the comparative hegemony of criollo translations of “Indio” inscribing colonial difference as an intrinsic part of the republican mestizo aesthetic state order.

The suppression of Quechua by means of mestizo state aesthetic order: foundational narrations117, “el problema del “Indio”” and land, and the arc of Mariateguian justice

Both colonial and republican imagined “Indios” were borne by differing translational practices sharing in the limit I define as Western colonial power, resonating with Mignolo’s

---

116 The colonial chroniclers could be said to have stayed two fundamental courses, with few exceptions, when it came to representing “el Indio”: 1.) an analogous interpretation whereby the Inka world was read through 16th century constructs familiar to the chroniclers; 2.) the “unfamiliar” so called Indio that more often than not was deemed barbaric or savage, and whose animality “cried out” for colonial Spanish rule. In other words the first and the second course conducted the rationalizations through which Spanish colonial rule could become expropriation and appropriation, deterritorialization, and territorialization, both courses enlisting a violent suppression as a means of facilitating exploitation, and both courses a mechanism whereby the colonizer was able to place himself outside of his own field of moral adjudication, both means whereby the colonizer was exculpate from sin. The irreconcilability of these 2 positions, one which read the Inka world as orderly, albeit an order imposing exogenous meanings upon the Quechua world, or as I term it, the conformation of the colonial field, and the other which read the radically different Inka world as so alien that it might actually not be human—or as I term it, colonial silence. These positions are typified in the infamous debate about whether “el Indio” had a soul or not, as much as they are typified by the persistent rationalizations for dominance based on the mythologies of racial superiority and progress prevalent then and today.

117 The use of this term in this context is inspired by Doris Summer's work by the same title, Foundational Fictions: the National Romances of Latin America, 1991.
discussions on the suppression of what he calls “alternative literacies.” In 1951 the figure “Paco Yunque” responds to the consolidating mestizo claim that vindicates the dogged colonial “Indio,” the soulless figuration of the colonial era, however conveniently this mestizo incorporation would harbinger the disapparition of Quechua difference in a sea of identitary liberal republican citizenship, a shift confronting colonial difference from an indigenist Mariateguian analysis of “el problema del ‘Indio’” as “el problema de la tierra.” Decades after Paco Yunque’s first redaction in the beginning of the 20th century, the heated 19th century discussion framing the imagined Peruvian republic within the polarities of “dependence or autonomy” (Espino Reluce 9,) Paco Yunque is finally first published in a journal, Apuntes del Hombre, No. 1 in July of 1951. By the time Georgette de Vallejo, César Vallejo’s widow releases all his prose narrative for publication for the first time in 1967, this edition becomes “for a very long time, the most utilized and the authorized edition.” Paco Yunque’s aesthetic value is no longer questioned, but rather becomes institutionally legitimized within the previously negotiated mestizo field in which, defending the poor aesthetic value of this short story was impossible, heralding that, with its incorporation into state aesthetic order it can now be authorized to relate a foundational narration accesible to a much larger and better consolidated mestizo citizenship. “Paco Yunque” could be published arguably because it could be read through the Mariateguian arc of justice within the mestizo field of the nationalist debates that Mariátegui spurred and framed ultimately because the mestizo state in the middle of the twentieth century confronted the legitimacy of liberal ideas that denied the indigenist social solution that Mariátegui had proposed in assessing the reality of a majority ““Indio”” population. Mariátegui’s analysis of the Andean “comunidad” under mestizo state order indicated in 1928:

> Hemos visto ya cómo el liberalismo formal de la legislación republicana no se ha mostrado activo sino frente a la “comunidad” indígena. Puede decirse que el concepto de propiedad individual casi ha tenido una función antisocial en la República a causa de su conflicto con la subsistencia de la “comunidad.” En efecto, si la disolución y expropiación de ésta hubiese sido decretada y realizada por un capitalismo en vigoroso y autónomo crecimiento, habría parecido como una imposición del progreso económico. El “Indio” entonces habría pasado de un regimen mixto de comunismo y servidumbre a un regimen de salario libre. Este cambio lo habría desnaturalizado un poco; pero lo habría puesto en grado de organizarse y emanciparse como clase, por la vía de los demas proletariados del mundo. En tanto, la expropiación y absorción graduales de la “comunidad” por el latifundismo, de un lado hundía más en la servidumbre y de otro destruía la institución económica y jurídica que salvaguardaba en parte el espíritu y la materia de su Antigua civilización. (72-3)

---

We have seen already how the formal liberalism of the republican legislation has not proved active but before the indigenous “comunidad.” [Mariátegui puts quotes around the word, and I choose not to translate it.] It can be said that the concept of individual property has almost had an antisocial role in the Republic as a result of its conflict with the subsistence of the “comunidad.” In effect, if the dissolution and expropriation of the “comunidad” were to have been decreed and put in effect by a capitalism in a vigorous and autonomous development, it would have appeared to be an imposition of economic progress. The “‘Indio’” would have passed on then, from a mixed regime of communism and servitude to a regime of free salary wages. This change would have de-natured/disnaturalized him a bit, but it would have placed in a situation where he could have organized and emancipated itself as a class by way of the same routes taken by all the proletariats of the world. Such as it is, the expropriation and gradual absorption of the “comunidad” by “latifundismo,” on the one hand sunk the “comunidad” deeper into servitude, and on the other, it destroyed the economic and juridical institution which in part safeguarded the spirit and matter of its Ancient Civilization.

It was in accord with this recognition of the republican liberal state’s failure to eliminate “la comunidad,” but rather to deform it beneath the indentured servitude propitiated by the latifundio that “‘Indio’” re-entered the imagined citizenry of the republican nation, in 1969, only after its deformation upon the anvil, and only after its deformation beneath the oppression of the unresolved mestizo liberal state conflict between autonomy and dependence. In fact, Paco Yunque’s first publication antecedent another event traversing the Mariateguian arc of justice: land reform that recognized a newly conformed mestizo republican legal entity, the “comunidad campesina” within mestizo state order. This state measure enacted by the populist coup d’etat regime of General Juan Velazco Alvarado, the de-facto president of the republic, passed into rule of law in 1969 land reform favoring the assimilation of “la comunidad indígena” into the mestizo state by creating the legal personage of “the comunidad campesina,” a variant translation of “‘Indio’” traversing the Mariateguian arc of justice granting “‘Indio’” the status of social actor that cultivates the land and can now own the land that had originally been tilled by Quechua speakers for Quechua speaking communities, collectively.

Agrarian reform was a longstanding component of the indigenist agenda of mestizo order most pointedly because from the eighteenth to the twentieth century Quechua speaking cultivators had been resisting the servitude to the latifundio as an unacceptable alternative to losing their access to land.119 What I underline here is that while Marietegui’s and Vallejo’s contemporary, the founder of Peru’s Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) Party, Victor Raúl

119 Substantive and compelling research has been carried out on the topic of the resistance of the originary peoples of these territories, including alternative histories compiled by Quechua and Aymara leaders and intellectuals in both Peru and Bolivia.
Haya de la Torre shared, alongside Mariátegui, in an indigenist political agenda, Mariátegui’s and Vallejo’s literary projection understood that the latifundio, in the former’s assessment, and the imperial presence of creolized foreign investors, in the latter’s assessment would both deform “‘Indio’” irreparably, and regrettably. Mariátegui’s and Vallejo’s social analysis of the problem stemmed from a reconnaissance of “‘Indio’” whose outcome was not necessarily decideable, but whose disapparition was undesirable, just as destruction was undesirable. Vallejo’s Paco Yunque wept miserably after he had been pummeled by his child master, Humberto Grieve, and after this same character had stolen his homework, and his mestizo counterpart Paco Fariña could not console him, and his mother, indentured servant, could not protect him. Mariátegui’s vision preserved la comunidad as the very cell for an authochtonous socialism. The Peru of the 1920’s could anticipate transformation in that its “‘Indio’” population was starkly present, demographically and through mass resistance, and it became therefore the linchpin of revolutionary possibilities that could be, precisely, indigenist, that is, “indigenist” in the sense of a criollo and mestizo appropriation of “‘Indio’” as a category that would be “analyzed” in the interest of consolidating one political project, or another. This would become the continuity enlisting all discourses to the cause of a mestizo order. Very much in line with the historical antecedents which had precipitated a Jacobinian radicalism during the bourgeois French Revolution, Haya de la Torre would herald the interests, and indeed formulate the aspirations of this “mestizo” class in Peru, a class that would over forty years decide the “undecidability” concerning Paco Yunque’s viability and Paco Fariña’s ability to decide it. Mariátegui’s legacy would persist especially in that, like Vallejo, Mariátegui did not deny, suppress, assimilate, destroy “‘Indio’.” “‘Indio’” would persist squarely on the side of autonomy, without any theoretical negotiation concerning “Indio” reality, just as the real “‘Indio’” could not be denied. The “American Revolutionary Popular Alliance” would pro-pose a movement toward a necessarily constructed, collapse of difference, all kinds of difference, under the flag of “Indoamérica,” the emblem of this continental movement for republican liberation from empire, literally and figuratively. Like his ideological ally in Mexico, José Vasconcelos, Haya de la Torre would spend a significant portion of his political career in exile, just as the author of La Raza Cósmica would. In his analysis of the confluence of criollo and mestizo forces and “Andean peoples’” resistance, Steve Stern summarizes the situation from the 1920’s and up to 1969 the following way:

The revolts of Andean peoples and the challenge of labor, creole radicals, and the Left had already made themselves felt during the 1920’s. It was not by accident, for example, that indigenismo came of age as a powerful intellectual and political movement in the Peru of the 1920’s, nor was it by chance that the same period
produced Peru’s two great radical mentors: Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre and José Carlos Mariátegui. Yet once the promise of these years fizzled, Peru would have to await a crisis which combined national political scandal with military soul-searching and fresh memories of peasant struggle and guerrilla war to produce finally, in 1968, a modernizing revolution serious enough to attack the highland oligarchy. (Stern 328) (Emphasis through underlining mine)

Undoubtedly what makes both Peru’s mentors mestizos is this unrelenting push toward progress, this deep investment in modernity.

The Mariateguian metaphor for this original, that is, different as well as originary Peruvian, autochthonous, collective identity embodying socialist principles and practices was “comunidad.” The liberal mestizo state order of the late 60’s institutionalized Mariátegui’s translation of “el problema del ‘Indio’,” as an issue of social as well as liberal and legal collective identity, comunidad indígena, translated yet again at the end of the decade of the sixties as “el problema del “Indio’” and “el problema de la tierra” into comunidad campesina. For Mariátegui, land, and land use in the interest of national autonomy accounted for the peasants’ role in a socialist utopia already at hand, and yet what made it originary was that comunidad had always already been here, before the newly “formed” republic of Peru had come “to be,” by chance, and in this sense, it was not a u-topia, a no place. On the contrary, it was the fortuitous real place for the socialist revolution in Peru to begin. It was in this sense, out of the comunidad’s distinct reality that Peru was undeniably “‘Indio’” and that the indigenist social solution pro-posed itself—as reality, to Mariátegui. The figuration comunidad campesina took, trans-lated the original comunidad into a Marxian working class, but in this particular conjuncture of mestizo state aesthetic order the land reform was taking place when the shock value of Vallejo’s anvil “Indio” was diminished by the failure to truly “liberate” “Indio”’s that Mariátegui had denounced had become the status quo for several decades. Vallejo’s work could see the light of publication after the massive “Indio” social body had effectively been suppressed by the 1920’s, just as Mariátegui had once projected it, granting “Indio” an uneasy status in the mestizo republic, one that demanded change by the late 60’s. The resolution to the chaos

120 In his historical materialist analysis of the “problema del Indio,” and more specifically his analysis of the problem of land, Mariátegui claims that his adherence to the material condition of “el Indio” absolves him of all “lyricism” and “littératurismo,” claiming that the country’s social and economic problem is the Spanish importation of feudalism and the “latifundio,” the large feudal landholding that the colonizer adapted to its conquered territory. Mariátegui therefore claims for “Indio,” land, “the Indio’s” land, especially and inasmuch as the country stagnates economically and socially beneath the weight of the persisting Spanish colonial feudal rule, well into the republican era. He also identifies “Indio” as a dweller that lives communally and therefore identifies “Indio” as “comunidad,” concomitantly, because of the “Indio’s” ties to the land, the most self-evident of ties according to Mariátegui, he is able to suggest the fact that his translation of Indio, “la comunidad” the indigenous community, is an originary cell of socialism in his native Peru. (pp. 35-93)
precipitated by the contradictions between liberal state rule and oligarchic indentured slavery for “Indio”’s was suppression, just as Vallejo had originally narrated it in *Paco Yunque*. As Steve Stern summarizes the events of turn of the 19th to 20th century Peru, the moment Vallejo first penned the Paco Yunque tale, the situation for ““Indio”” was this:

In much of highland Peru and Bolivia, the great wave of effective republican hacienda expansion occurred late, in the closing decades of the nineteenth century and early years of the twentieth. The revival of the Bolivian mines and their food markets, the expansion of wool markets from Peru, and the growth of Peru’s cities and mining camps all made such [hacienda] expansion attractive, and the work of governments to modernize transportation and the army, and to promote hacendado interests, turned the attractive into the possible. By the 1920’s the great landed estates had locked their iron grip over lands controlled by indigenous communities during much of the nineteenth century. A cycle of major indigenous revolts erupted…. These rebellions constituted important reference points for national political debates. (328)

By the time Paco Yunque was published this short story was a morality tale about the mestizo state’s need to incorporate “Indio” into the social fabric, on mestizo terms, a moral imperative to which the mestizo state was already prepared to respond, and a tale which would still remain a part of literary circles especially, at least initially. Narrating this need for “Indio” incorporation was permitted only when it was acceptable to recognize “Indio” as part and parcel of the liberal mestizo state, that is, when real politics could consider this “Indio” assimilation into the mestizo state order, as a fait accompli. Three distinct pieces of legislation would anticipate the legislation that would initiate agrarian reform under Velazco. Arguably, agrarian reform on the part of social democratic parties, and even this populist, albeit military regime under “el Gobierno Revolucionario de las Fuerzas Armadas,” a period of military rule that began with Velazco in 1968, agrarian reform was deemed necessary precisely because centrist democratic mestizo republican parties wanted to avoid the left taking hold of the already embattled rural, “campesino” sectors.

The literary national aesthetic by which Vallejo may have originally been judged in the first half of the twentieth century shifts, as nationalist ideologies do, and it shifts in favor of autonomy, and against dependence. This emerges as an autonomy for which ““Indio”” again becomes the decisive mark, except that this time ““Indio”” is no longer exotic, but is reterritorialized as within republican state order, as “comunidad campesina.” This mestizo field appropriates ““Indio”” land in the interest of national, autonomous identity. Republican liberators name this independent national citizen, comunidad campesina, native to Peru, thereby nativizing ““Indio””, in the interest of creating an (“Indio”) mestizo citizen. Mestizo can fulfill its liberating promise as Peruvian national within the mestizo field emerging independently from the imperial
metropolis: the “criollo” elite assimilates ““Indio”” into the figure of mestizo in keeping with what the republican, Eurocentric left, socialist and social democratic designed as its national project, however militarized this imposition would need to become in order to consolidate its nationalist hegemony. Velazco’s populist military regime incorporated the metaphorical working masses imagined through the Mariateguian arc of justice within this emerging mestizo field as comunidad campesina. While this representational regime would displace the centrality of criollo oligarchical power, displacing the criollo personage from its protagonist role within this emerging nationalist foundational narration, “el problema del “Indio”” was being addressed through yet another translation of ““Indio”,” this time promulgating its Mariateguian protagonist role in the nationalist foundational narration of socialist utopia, as peasant community. It may be said therefore, that this effort at forging a new nationalist aesthetic in the midst of twentieth century Peru had as its precursor, decades earlier, even in his analysis of Vallejo, Mariátegui, and it is this arc of justice that leads “Paco Yunque” to find its place in the mestizo republican field through its eventual legitimation by publication. As Mariátegui proclaims about Vallejo, undersigning the words of a fellow essayist:

No exagera por fraternal exaltación, Antenor Orrego, cuando afirma que “a partir de este sembrador se inicia una nueva época de la libertad, de la autonomía poética, de la vernácula articulación verbal.” (Mariátegui 280)

In spite of his fraternal exaltation, Antenor Orrego does not exaggerate when he affirms that “from this cultivator a new epoch of freedom and poetic autonomy initiates itself from the vernacular verbal articulation. [a Peruvian, Quechua inflected Spanish, for which Vallejo is known here called a vernacular, in opposition to Euro-localized Castillian Spanish.]

Vallejo will typify the narrator and the aesthetic representations of this emerging mestizo citizen capable of galvanizing Peruvian autonomy through his distinct vernacular diction, but not until 1951.

Paco Yunque found an audience and could be read by the projected citizenry emerging from the republican mestizo field that sought the reformist and socialist reach of the works of Mariátegui and even Arguedas, seeking autonomy through ““Indio”” richesse,121 that is, a richesse construed from the arc of Mariateguian justice. Vallejo’s “Paco Yunque” echoes Arguedas’ Mariateguian humanist sympathies, however problematically embedded and entangled Arguedas’ expression became throughout his emergent Quechua translational practice and poetic expression, an expression that emerged from within and from without the mid twentieth century mestizo field. Vallejo’s short story performs Quechua, in some measure, exogenously, as Vallejo

---

121 The word in French is chosen in lieu of “riches” in that in French there is an allusion to cultural patrimony as well as material wealth.
is a provincial writer partaking in the intersecting fields of Quechua speaking from remote corners deeply embedded in Quechua Andean tradition, and the Spanish speaking, variously feudal and indigenist, variously liberal reformist and feudal conservative, colonially inflecting state rule in provincial Andean cities removed from Lima. It is this Quechua empathy that is a distinct register in Vallejo’s work which grants Vallejo, according to Mariátegui, his “Indio” character, the mark that would make Vallejo a much needed mestizo narrator at the moment that Mariategui imagines his autonomous, Peruvian, socialist nation state. About this emerging “Indio” language, nativizing Vallejo’s Spanish, Mariategui says, comparing him to another poet appropriating Quechua cultural riches, Melgar:

Vallejo is the poet of one lineage, one race. In Vallejo is found, for the first time in our literature, indigenous sentiment virginally expressed. Melgar— a larval sign, frustrated— in his “yaravíes” is yet a prisoner of the classical technique, a writer rejoicing in Spanish rhetoric. Vallejo, in contrast, achieves a new style in his poetry. The indigenous sentiment has its own modulation in his verses. His song [lyric] is integrally his own. It is not enough for this poet to bring a new message. He needs to bring a new technique and language as well. His art does not tolerate the erred and artificial dualism of essence and form. …The indigenous sentiment is in Melgar something that you can glean at the bottom of his verses; in Vallejo it is something that one can see fully flowering, changing the very structure of the verse. In Melgar it is but the accent; in Vallejo it is the verb. En Melgar, ultimately its is not but an erotic lament; in Vallejo it is metaphysical endeavor. Vallejo is an absolute creator. “Los heraldos negros” [Vallejo’s first published collection of poetry] could have been his sole, his most unique work. Not for this would he have not inaugurated a new epoch in the process of the [emergence] of our literature. In these portal verses of “Los heraldos negros” could we say that Peruvian poetry begins. (Peruvian in the sense of indigenous.)
Mariategui’s claim that Vallejo inaugurates a new era of Peruvian national literature yet situates this literature within the Spanish language, tracing this emergence squarely within the *mestizo field*, so “naturally” and seemingly inevitably does it emerge in Spanish. Spanish, in this instance, translates ““Indio”” as “indigenista” through the *mestizo idiom operative*, defining “indigenist” as, proponent of ““Indio”,” so long as ““Indio”” serves multiple *mestizo aesthetic national state* agendas. Notwithstanding the conformation of a new *indigenist* narrator for the foundational fiction inaugurating a new properly Peruvian literature, Vallejo’s work in “Paco Yunque” does not evade nor mince words when depicting the sorry fate of “el “Indio”. ” ““Indio”,” as the character Paco Yunque, suffers expropriation and appropriation, again, this time under republican rule, as conquered subject, reterritorialized as indigenous source of the Peruvian mark of difference, as *richesse*, as Peruvian difference before the *colonial empirial metropolitan identity* the Peruvian nation state struggles to become autonomous from. Vallejo’s ““Indio”” character, Paco Yunque is palpably suffering the blows of the *mestizo state* taking shape out of “criollo” and foreign investments that aligned, and that eventually become indistinguishable as foreign investors so completely are they creolized by the *mestizo state aesthetic order*. *Foreign investors* became “criollo,” and in accord with the erasures inherent in the *mestizo foundational fiction*, became nativized by blurring the sharp distinctions between the dubiously autonomous “criollo” *foreign investor* ruling class, and the imagined *mestizo citizen* brought about, according to Vallejo, by pummeling the social body. And though the character Grieve is clearly an English foreign investor who comes to police his investments through the repressive mechanisms of this *mestizo state*, that is, as Sheriff, which is what a medieval Grieve is he is also the mayor of this provincial capital, as he oversees the extraction of his profits.

And yet Grieve, who in Vallejo’s fictional narrative “Paco Yunque” is already nativized as Peruvian, native Grieve is not absolved of this physical brutality. The end of this short story begins with Grieve’s merciless and humiliating submission of Paco Yunque who is *conquered subject* hovering between indentured slave and slave, wherein the contract ensuring his labor in exchange for shelter and food does not seem to have an expiration date, Vallejo’s literary *figuration of colonial encounter*. The literary figuration of this *complex of domination* at the site of *colonial encounter* is the creolized child, Humberto Grieve, forcing the ““Indio”” child, Paco Yunque, to sit next to him in class, an “Indio” child who, by dint of the threat of a beating, responds to the creolized child Grieve’s every request, in this state run liberal republican classroom.122 However, Grieve is not exempt from the brutality necessary to enact the *mestizo*.

---

122 One is reminded of a critical interpreter of the republican aspirations translated from the French bourgeois revolution by one of the founding fathers of Latin American liberal republicanism, Rafael
state agenda. This state aesthetic order would have that all citizens are citizens of a liberal republic, individuals subject to an identity that makes no distinction between one or another citizen, meeting out equal status to all. These are mestizo citizens and it is in the mêlée proffered by the contradiction between this foundational fiction and the real and divergent class interests operative in the social body that Vallejo’s representation of inevitable social chaos finds expression. The short story ends with a small riot among the children in the state run school playground and it expresses the inevitability of the violence that state repression in the interest of mestizo identity would elicit from the social body, a violence that Grieve would suffer as well.

The “new world” continues to offer opportunity for European and Northern European colonizers to nativize and expropriate at the same time, and mestizo aesthetic state order facilitates this process. Vallejo’s Peruvian-English character Grieve is emblematic of the global designs of the Eurocentric metropolis, Lima, and the Peruvian “criollo” elite underpinning the mestizo enframing of the national Peruvian project. And whereas eventually, national literature would be permitted to suture this rift between the power of the social body and the militarized repression of the nation state suppressing it, at the moment that Vallejo transcribes what he witnessed and what would much later be published, and sanitized, Vallejo could be said to be denouncing the impossible contradiction between a national narrative of unification through autochthonous identity, marked by Quechua difference, and the radical differences among divergent sectors within the social body, repressed through state violence of every sort, a violence especially targeting real Indigenous Peoples and ultimately extending a meta narrative that continues to rationalize the first colonial pillage, and all subsequent others. Since this is only evident if “Indio” really exists, and the social body’s eruption into the seamless foundation of republican fiction, the notion “Indio” constantly returns, or interrupts this narrative. It is precisely in the second wave of “Andean people’s rebellions” according to Steve Stern, that Vallejo’s short story finds the light of publication. Vallejo presages the cycle of repression, assimilation, and liberation as a destruction of the real Quechua speaking peoples of the Andean region. According to Vallejo’s narrative it is this that would characterize the emerging Peruvian modernity we term a continuation of colonial encounter through a complex of domination: the blows perpetrated on the back, the anvil, that are the real indigenous/”Indio”/originary peoples of the republic of Peru. Cesar Vallejo tellingly depicts that the aspiration and respiration of a vital social body will be brutally repressed in the interest of violently conforming the “achievement” of a mestizo Peruvian identity, however much this telling will eventually also align with the

Urdaneta, Venezuelan, 1788-1845 one of the first theorists of what role education should play in a strong, democratic republic.
progressive and nationalist designs of the Mariateguian arc of justice, the designs which would bring this story into the legitimized and institutionally mediated field of published text. And while Vallejo’s story denounces, at its first redaction that Quechua speaking indigenous peoples are being beaten into suppression by the national socio-economic imperatives of this foreign creolized ruling elite, later Vallejo’s published “Paco Yunque” will signal this violent erasure and physical repression poignantly, but after the fact. By the time Vallejo’s story is published in 1951, the imagined “Indio” is on the verge of being appropriated by the mestizo aesthetic state order as “comunidad campesina,” through the arc of Mariateguian justice then taking legitimacy by force, through a militarized populist movement fairly typical of the “liberalizing designs” of “modern” Latin American republics of that time seeking a reconciliation between a battered social body, and the contending forces of a dependent conservatism and an emerging social autonomy. Incorporation would devour this native Quechua speaker also.

Vallejo is a provincial “serrano” moved by Quechua, for the sensibility he holds to maintains that Paco Yunque is alive, is him, or as Mariátegui suggestively submits, Vallejo is Peruvian “‘Indio’.” While eventually Vallejo will be appropriated as Peruvian “Indio”, in the interest of creating a national literature and national autonomy through publication, Vallejo emerges distinctly from this mestizo field, before publication, claiming poetic expression in the

123 And of the present moment, the prime example being Hugo Chavez, a military officer who has come to power with a similarly populist agenda, or arguably, because the social body now pushed back without any suturing ideology, and through a fuller ownership of the mechanisms of power in liberal republics. The other vein through which the social body propels forward a leader articulating its resistance is through union leadership, “dirigentes sindicalistas,” such as Silva de Lula in Brazil, and Evo Morales in Bolivia, who is also uplifted by a genuinely indigenous, that is Quechua/Aymara social movement, and a union imbued with “Quechua/Aymara” cultural practices.

124 “Serrano” is an identitary epithet that distinguishes the Andean dweller from the Limeño dweller that aspires to the progressive modernity that republican liberal projects hold out as a promise. “El problema del Indio” is intrinsically tied to dislocation, or what Deleuze and Guattari call the reterritorialization of native land previously understood within a Pre-Columbian world-view, as heterogeneous as it may have been. “Serrano”s counterpart is “costeño” and it is this geo-narration that marks the separation between “Indio” and “criollo” to this day, with variation. “Serrano” is an epithet that does speak to a sort of regional pride, conflicted in some measure about the separation that it implies. While it underlines the Mariateguian conceptualization of the regional Peruvian problem, it reenacts a geopolitical map that remains a source of deeply seated contention in the mestizo field upon which Peruvian, non-Peruvian, and “indigenous intellectual” scholars continuously inhere.

125 We would argue that this reading aligns itself with Catholic religious values and a similarly religiously motivated “secular” humanism, both emerging from the mestizo field taking shape throughout the twentieth century in this region. This peculiarly Latin American religious arc purveyed an understanding which purported the metaphysical equality of beings, and the telos of a unification as one, divided into two spheres: 1.) the nation state, or liberal republic, where the state would conceive of the social body as a body of citizens, all the same, and equal in this sameness; and 2.) the religious sphere of state rule, understood as sovereign (autonomous) rule, whereby the state would punish its citizens equally, for violating Catholic commandments that the state would also adopt as its rules of governance, albeit without anyone’s oversite, as state sovereignty aligned itself with the sovereign rule of God. The state becomes ungoverned, in that it is sovereign, and the social body is pummeled into indifferent equality.
interest of the welfare of all, but also as Catholic humanist, a dissenting Spanish speaking voice
jarring an incipient mestizo aesthetic order during the first half of the twentieth century. This
jarring poetic expression is what places Vallejo’s story, “Paco Yunque” at the limit, at the “au-
dela,” announcing that actions and things poised in this present, can be taken from here,
somewhere, but the question is a matter of an imagined “there.” The state project embedded in
Vallejo’s story denounces that a particular choice is leading to social chaos, to the social body
repelling the current forms of state repression, and that moreover “Indio” bears the brunt of
“transformational force,” conceived as he is in the mestizo imaginary as an obstacle to
reterritorialization and appropriation. At the same time, the appropriation of this story’s
meanings through publication, and subsequent literary interpretations places the story squarely
within the Mariateguian arc of justice emerging concretely from the mestizo field presaging
Velazco’s de facto regime mid to later century. The translation aiding in our deconstruction at
the boundaries of this mestizo field, of this mestizo reterritorialization of “Indio” is “Indio”
richesses. This reterritorialization has as its object of desire native Quechua speaking peoples’
cultural wealth and land, though Mariategui did not write about but the symbolic appropriation of
this richeses, with “Indio” and not without, as reconnaissances.¹²⁶

The figure Paco Yunque is not just incidentally a child, nor is he just any child. As
Quechua speaking child he is the future of the Quechua speaking people, prefigured, as much as
this fictional character may later become, as a part of sanitized literary history, the metaphor for a
needed liberation of the indigenous peoples so that they may become the guarantor of the mestizo
citizen’s validity as indigenous subject of liberal republican rule. The imagined “Indio” is now
repressed, as the story read before publication tells, echoing its moment at redaction and before
publication. Indian Vallejo is emblematic of the assimilation of the Quechua speaking indigenous.
Now “Peruvian Vallejian Indian” must be liberated from the constraints of the
imperial metropolis and the feudal oligarcical conservatives and the sold out criollo ruling class
giving away Peruvian Indian richeses to the highest foreign bidder, folding this foreign investor
into the nation as de-facto statist sovereign. All colonizers aspiring to be native, become mestizo
citizen, the half breed that can be half dog, or half human depending on the design of its
indianness, or the rhizome through which the native finds its way to an escape from retributive
responses from the social body. And this it barely escaped as the tumult from the 1920’s to the
1970’s evidences. In the Catholic/humanist secularist mestizo state emerging, dog, as unruly

¹²⁶ Though this dissertation concerns itself with the Quechua speaking, in specific ways and for specific
reasons, it is probable that similar arguments could be made for the Amazonian indigenous peoples’ culture
and territories.

253
dweller, alien other, remains an escape, much as it does for Kafka in Deleuze and Guattari’s reading of his literary work and life, except that in this case the relationship is inverted: in Latin America, and Peru in particular this minority is the ruling class, whereas Kafka’s diasporic Jew escapes his dogged status by embracing the plausible displacement of his identity, outside of the Western metaphysics of identity and difference onto animality, literally and in an important way literally, a dog. On the other hand, in order for an emerging Peruvian nation to claim its autonomy, its apparent sovereignty, through this ‘Indio’ object, it must be non-human, and in this case a dog is apt continuity. Peruvian (Vallejian) indigenous Quechua speaker can become filled with the meaning of the always already protagonist of a Marxist historical materialism, but from within the Peruvian Republican nation state, complicated and contested as in reality the criollo class reproducing sovereignty is not in deed replicating the liberal projects of consolidated bourgeois state projects in Europe, or North America. On the contrary, it is reproducing the autocratic rule of the feudal sovereign, donning the costume of a republican liberator in the interest of a variegated and contested field wherein a mestizo republican nation becomes the only foundational narration able to suture the ponderous rifts inside this social body, though barely.

Vallejo’s indigenous character, Paco Yunque, becomes the metaphor for Mariategui’s translation of the indigenous, Quechua speaking populations of “Peru” in need of real liberation from the oppression of a decadent criollo class, bent on selling “national patrimony,” made national precisely through expropriated Quechua richesse. Comunidad campesina emerges as the social translation, over time, of Peru’s Mariateguian dream of autonomy, its dream of freedom from the imperial designs of the capitalist European or North American or Peruvian Eurocentric metropolis of the twentieth century. It would seem that the Quechua speaking, both in the mestizo foundational narration as well as in reality, pay the price for this freedom. And yet, the mestizo national project is impossible without a Mariateguian reconnaissance of this uniquely liberal collective subject, la comunidad campesina in the interest of appropriating Quechua richesses and re-appropriating land, for mestizo Peru. It is also the way to responde to Quechua speaking resistance, and the reality of Quechua soeaking originary peoples’ manifest interests.

Before publication, Vallejo’s redaction denounces the humiliating and repressive treatment, by the conqueror, the colonial subject,127 in this case a recently nativized English

---

127 My translation of colonial subject, the colonial subject, is a term that takes the meaning of colonial subject—the person subjected to colonial rule, that is, conquered and dominated—by means of the gloss the-- to the “modern” Western philosophical sense of “subject” (and “object”) also attaching to the term colonial subject such that we take the ambiguity, the ambivalence present at the end of Vallejo’s short story which narrates this ambiguity, as the way that state repression molds the social body into mestizo, at once engendering indiscriminate violence among all modern “subjects.” The continuity discerned is the colonial and republican conquest of the social body by means of Western institutionality and state
“criollo,” that is, a republican colonizer, and makes certain that his reader understands that this destruction is executed with impunity, and that this is the real cost of implementing republican mestizo rule, yet another extension of colonial rule, a cost that is evident when it comes to “the “Indio”,” that is, Paco Yunque. Not only is Paco Yunque’s cultural riches exploited. Paco Yunque’s well executed homework is expropriated by the child, Humberto Grieve, who reenacts Yunque’s mother’s domestic servitude at the Grieve home, within the public state-run classroom. As colonial subject, conquered, Yunque’s land is the territory upon which the English nativized “criollos” have built their home, not coincidentally as mayor of the fictional provincial capital of Vallejo’s story. The Grieve are nativized foreign investors who become Peruvian republican state rulers. Through the eyes of children, Vallejo creates a narrator that finds the violent repression facilitating this expropriation appalling, just as a child might readily see. Vallejo achieves this by narrating the story through the perspective of children, that is, through the innocence of children, creating a narrator that is adult but seeks to see with an innocence recovered from childhood, an adult innocence informed by adult experience. The message is that Paco Yunque is treated like an anvil, and “"Indio"” is the materia prima from which sovereign republican rule will be realized, land and cultural patrimony, both expropriated by blows in the interest of mestizo aesthetic republican state order. The story evidences that there is nothing that would or should exculpate the perpetrator, as Vallejo is holding moral court by making a child the judge, and the Catholic, Spanish literate readership must contrast their religious values with this ineluctable child like judgment.128

Vallejo elicits the presence of a reader who observes with impartiality and who cannot assign greater or lesser value to any character presented in his story. This is expressed through the innocence of the other boys in Paco Yunque’s first day of class, eliciting the identification of the reader with Yunque’s plight through the witness of the other, unmistakably “mestizo” children and their innocent, immediate, if perplexed rescue of their classmate Yunque. Vallejo mechanisms of repression and violence. The collapses the distinction between the colonizer and the colonized, making apparent the victimization of the social body, but also the victimization of all modern subjects. We take this to be Vallejo’s insight into the effects of conforming and imposing mestizo aesthetic state order within the republic of Peru, and we take this to be in deed Vallejo’s inscription of the matrix for all such liberal gestations in the multiple fields of Latin American republics. The colonial subject and colonial subject are construed as metaphoric poles, tracing a trans-ladere, from colonial to republican period, gathering Vallejo’s depiction at the end of his short story as a literary metaphor we translate in this way, a metaphor with this heuristic force. These two terms are the figuration that emerges to express the difference between the imagined “colonial subject” of foundational fictions, in this instance mestizo citizen in the case of this argument, that is, the protagonist of what we would term (colonial) republican mestizo fictions, and the real victims of this violence, the entire social body, ostensibly every “subject,” including the person intending to dominate.

128 Vallejo aspired to be a priest.
depicts the *mestizo* matrix out of which Quechua destruction is presaged especially because the “mestizo” children in his story are unsuccessful at rescuing Yunque from Grieve’s cruelty, a cruelty that ultimately Grieve himself will have to endure. The chaotic schoolyard fight with which the story ends is the *disorderly* outcome of the contradictions sustained by the social body. Vallejo’s *mestizo* matrix takes its purview from the reality of the early decades of the twentieth century and would have *signaled* the destruction of the real Quechua speaking indigenous person while proposing that the “criollo” class was in the throes of confecting *mestizo*, but he announces that this will take place at a price that the oppressor will also have to pay. Interestingly, “*Paco Yunque*,” this testimonial sign of the times could only see the light of day after yet another phase of pillage and destruction, republican, had taken place in the manner that Vallejo presaged it: as repression, suppression, and subsequent assimilation inside *mestizo* and “criollo” led institutions such as public schools and other *mestizo* republican institutions. Even “comunidad campesina,” while somewhat empowering within the *mestizo field* conforming yet, folds Quechua into the *mestizo state order* emerging out of the real conflict between dependence and autonomy that the populist regime of a General Velazco militarily contains, in the interest, however provisional but nevertheless “necessary,” of both the social body, otherwise neglected, or actively resisting, and state order, otherwise collapsing beneath these contradictions.

Vallejo’s empathy, before publication, gives assimilation as destruction in that “mestizos,” in his telling, are not ““Indio”” and are yet *the colonial mestizo*, the personage whose subjechhood during the colonial period was not debated, but rather whose “decencia,” or legitimacy and therefore agency within “society” was contested.129 The fact that Paco Farina, Vallejo’s “mestizo” character shares in Paco Yunque’s first name reveals to the reader the proximity, not only of both *the colonial mestizo* to the ““Indio”” in terms of provenience and sympathies, but it also marks an emerging distinction, one that places the ““Indio”” outside and “the mestizo” inside the republic, this time as legitimate, as the acknowledged *citizen* of the newly forging *mestizo republic* of Vallejo’s telling. At the time Vallejo wrote “*Paco Yunque*” “mestizos” had finally been accepted as a constitutive part of Peruvian society, in the interest of the republic, much in the same way as the colonial imaginary “Indio” would eventually be assimilated. The *mestizo citizen* would conform a projected social body whose constituents would become susceptible to the force of *sovereign criollo rule*, and concomitantly, to the

---

129 The Bolivian historian, Rossana Barragan’s works with 19th century legal institutions and documents and has traced the institutional, legal meanings of “decencia” as does the work of Marisol de la Cadena, *La decencia y el respeto: raza y etnicidad entre los intelectuales y las mestizas cuzqueñas*. 

256
economic interests of this criollo sovereign order\textsuperscript{130}, as the story makes starkly evident. In Vallejo’s poetic expression, the majority of Paco Yunque’s classmates are like Paco Farina\textsuperscript{131}, susceptible, all purpose milled flour, the basic ingredient of daily bread: the projected, obedient, identical citizens partaking in the republican economy as workers, and more to the point in this story, becoming indoctrinated citizens of the state through its public educational institutions,\textsuperscript{132} through this emerging mestizo state order.

By contrast to the illegitimate colonial mestizo, this emerging republican mestizo being conformed within the republican mestizo field of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, propelled by late 19\textsuperscript{th} and turn of the century debates revolving around “dependence” and “autonomy” would sustain the publication of “Paco Yunque,” especially in that it sustains the one continuity between the colonial and the republican period: a state aesthetic order relying on the possibility to fill the otherwise empty signifier “Indio” with meanings convenient to the emerging fields from similarly sovereign orders. The Mariateguian arc of justice interpreting the word “indio” as intrinsic to a distinctly Peruvian reality made this publication possible, in the interest of Peruvian autonomy, but the fact of symbolic and real mestizo assimilation of republican “mestizos” by the middle of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century and into the latter half, retracted from Vallejo’s story’s the moral sting of its deictic denunciation of the real destruction of a Quechua speaking person’s place, on and for its own terms, within the real, imagined, and contested field of mestizo Peruvian republicanism, a mestizo republicanism that claimed and continues to claim “indigeneity” for itself at the expense of the real Quechua speaking and their land, and in the interest of enlisting “colonial mestizos” into the working, republican social body. Comunidades campesinas may appear to defy Western traditional liberal subjecthood in that its collective will was envisaged as the Peruvian version of the role of the working class in overturning bourgeois rule, especially through the Marietaguian arc of justice, and conveniently through the prism of a republican liberal project negotiating its independence on ultimately mestizo terms, led by a creolized “criollo class,” that is a criollo class

\textsuperscript{130} Criollo sovereign order is my deconstructive translation of republican mestizo state order, poised at the limit of the au de-là.

\textsuperscript{131} “farina” would be the pre-republican pronunciation of “harina,” which means flour, milled, that is processed wheat.

\textsuperscript{132} This pattern of indoctrination is well known and well documented for the English case in Mathew Arnold’s classic work, Culture and Anarchy, 1\textsuperscript{st} edition on the subject published in 1869, practically a canonical text of Comparative (Eurocentric) Literature until perhaps recently, as well as, in the case of a “creole” project such as the United States, through the more recent scholarship, the work of Elizabeth O’Leary, To Die For: The Paradox of American Patriotism, 1999 though the latter is more an archival dig knitting the experiences of small organizational interests into the larger text of an emerging national(ist) public educational system, and the concomitant desire and pragmatic necessity for a “unified” national identity.
betting on the nation’s autonomy and not its dependence. However, this legal entity “comunidad campesina” is yet folded into the arc of Western understanding construing the Western subject as individual entity in that this collective is treated as one legal personage before a republican court of law. The Quechua speaking remain an originary collective set apart, or “surrounded,” and yet submitted to the arc of Western understanding installing and purveying this complex of domination and the ethos of the colonial encounter as these span the colonial period and are trans-lated into the republican period: they are invaded, conquered, displaced, and finally suppressed to varying degrees of destruction by a regime that presumes to order in accord to other forms of exploitation. About the Bolovian originary peoples’ confrontation with republican rule, Tristan Platt has written the following, demonstrating the unintelligible “nature” of the indigenous population to liberal republican rulers at the time of independence, at the moment that the indigenous population became, de facto, “citizen.” While noting that the Indigenous native peoples contested liberal republican taxation on the basis of “capitalist” ownership, they embraced “what they considered the equitable principle of the Tributary State, based on their right to dispose collectively of their ayllu lands in exchange for the labor prestations and tribute they provided,” ostensibly wanting to preserve, the parts of the Spanish colonial system that had aligned themselves, however conveniently for the Spanish ruler, with ayllu rules of reciprocity and collective labor exchanges, mita, and ownership.

This position appeared to some creole authorities as resistance to the Republic as such, attributable to the lack of “enlightenment” (ilustración) that afflicted a class unprepared for “real” (i.e. liberal) freedom. If the Indians wished to be treated as legal minors, it only remained to hasten their “maturity.” Hence the “re-Indianization” [a return to their former Colonial status under the Spanish Crown] of the Andean population after independence cannot simply be blamed on creole economic interests (as is often assumed): equally important was the Andean defense of an alterantive model of state-community relations. (286-287 The Andean Experience of Bolivian Liberalism. ...Ed. Steve Stern)

This turn of the century republican mestizo field conveniently conferred citizenship to the imaginary and therefore “manageable” “indio” after attempting to suppress Quechua speaking populations in ways all too similar to the harassment and repression seen in germ form in Humberto Grieve, the mayor’s son’s actions toward Paco Yunque, the anvil. The apparatus of republican state aesthetic order, one of its institutions being state run public school is deployed to forge this republican citizenry upon the Quechua speaking peoples’ backs. The republican mestizo field of the middle of the twentieth century became the fecund ground, through the Mariateguian arc of justice for coincident and negotiated land reforms that would assist the mestizo state’s legal personage, the “comunidad campesina,” to recover land lost through a
perpetuated *colonial encounter*, a recovery facilitated by the left leaning agenda of Eurocentric *mestizo order*. By the time Vallejo’s manuscript of “Paco Yunque” gets recovered in the 50’s and widely circulates for many years after, what it points to is the *unjust* suppression of the Quechua speaking “‘Indio’,” a particularly republican supression, well after the fact. It is this deconstruction that unveils the destructive repression. What we may draw as a conclusion from the sustained effort to assess *Resistance, Rebellion, and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World*, as the title reveals about the efforts of very empirically driven historians, “the Andean republican world” was the inheritor of late Colonial period district divisions which centered on the toutedly fertile valley between the Andean highlands and the coast, relegating the Andes to a status of relative civilization. According to Florencia Mallon’s assessment of turn of the century Andean communities’ responses to Chilean invasion into the southern parts of Peruvian territory, effective resistance to the invaders could be analyzed to determine a creole landowning class’s ability to establish alliances with “peasant Andean” populations and conversely, this peasant Andean population’s ability to formulate autonomous state projects. Interestingly these two alternatives, such as I posit them coincide with the possibilities that this war presented for these two castes to ally against the invader, or to antagonize one another, and ally themselves variously with state resistance to the invaders. In her empirically specific analysis of a northern highland sector in Cajamarca and the central southern highland sector of Comas Inka influence as well as post war unification efforts would favor the Comasinos abilities to maintain a stalwart and unified resistance to landowner/hacendado hegemony, and in turn to propose an alterantive state republican project aligned with Comasino community interests. Conversely, because the Cajamarquino landowning/ hacendado class confronted a weak peasant community that they were able to control insofar as the condition every *hacienda* had to fulfill to maintain its profitability and its ability to reproduce oligarcic values and comforts: a controllable and massive labor force. After the war, republican unification could only be realistically established in the highlands along the lines of this hacendado class, and in the case of the Comasino peasant confederation, that hacendados:

> [f]aced with such a strong class challenge, the regional oligarchy in the central sierra did not have the basis for independent power that would have allowed a pact with the post-1895 state similar to that developed in Cajamarca. Instead, they participated in the process of national unification in exchange for state repression of the peasantry and assistance in labor control. (Stern: Mallon 267)

Notwithstanding this real defeat for the pesant communities of the central Andean Highlands around Cusco, at a fundraiser intended to recover Tacna and Arica from the Chileans after the War of the Pacific, a renouned criollo orator, essayist, and poet, the succesor of Ricardo Palma in
the oversite of the Biblioteca Nacional, says the following in projecting the freedom Peru should obtain as an autonomous nation, and narrating, yet again, a territorial relation of the colonial territorial narration of Peru, in order to propose an indigenist political alternative, yet again:

…The real Peru is not made up of groups of creoles and foreigners who inhabit the strip of land between the Pacific Ocean and the Andes; the nation is made up of the Indian multitudes spread along the eastern slopes of the mountains. (1915:78) (Mallon 267)

This post publication symbolic recovery of otherwise repressed “Andean peasants,” after repeated acts of expropriation, this reenactment of yet another reterritorialization makes possible the conformation of a distinct and separate state actor, a provisional “‘Indio’” member of the republic who has already been forced on numerous occasions after the first colonial expropriation to negotiate her/his “ownership” of her/his native land and territory, that is of all their richesses. This new and provisional translated “Indio” is a symbolic constituent member of the mestizo nation through the mestizo identity, “they,” members of the ayllu are granted. It is Martí’s, González Prada’s, as well as Mariátegui’s notion of “indio” that is preserved, and liberated, in the interest of autonomous mestizo national identity. Land lost and cultural patrimony under destructive pressures is a constant for the Quechua speaking communities from the 16th to the 20th century, alongside their resistance. Restoring the arc of justice Mariátegui inaugurates means that the Quechua speaking “comunidad campesina” will be provided with a means to recovering land and territory, as individual republican citizen, albeit collective:

Estatuto Especial de Comunidades Campesinas; D.S. 37-70-AG and others allows [this mestizo legal personage] to take legal recourse and make legal claim to land through the state’s judicial apparatus. This continues to take place well after the land reform of the 1970s inaugurated a legal instantiation through which this indigenous “right” could be claimed.133 (Gonzales and Gonzalez )

The consequences of this reform are symbolic and tactical for Quechua speaking ayllus translated as “comunidades campesinas.” This emerging mestizo citizen is translated yet again, within the liberal juridical domain as a legal personage within mestizo state republican rule, for purposes that serve the republican mestizo state order, the foundational narration which is the strategy of criollo sovereign rule and order, whether for left or right leaning reasons, in order to unify but also in order to continue to exploit. Both Vallejo and Arguedas evince sympathetic depictions of the indigenous populations and both could readily be found to resonate in harmony with the arc of Mariáteguian justice in that both writers acknowledge the richesses of Quechua
speaking peoples, and the brutal exploitation they suffer under republican rule. Notwithstanding, the purposes for which this richesse would be employed, as envisioned by all three left leaning thinkers is yet subservient to the imperatives of this emerging mestizo republican state order. Mariategui evinced a republic that would liberate the indigenous masses, fully aware that that mass of people was the vast majority populating the Peruvian national territory. But he was also painfully aware, that republican rule, what I call mestizo republican state aesthetic order, otherwise translated as the statist folklore made diffuse by criollo sovereign rule in the form of impositional and repressive state institutions, Mariategui knew that republican rule had none of the virtue of Spanish colonial rule, and all of the repressive mechanisms that Spanish colonial rule required in order to effectively exploit Quechua richesses. In 1928, Mariategui assessed the field of post republican independence in Peru in the following way:

El programa liberal de la revolución comprendía lógicamente la redención del “Indio”, consecuencia automática de las aplicación de sus postulados igualitarios. Y, así, entre los primeros actos de la República, se contaron varias leyes y decretos favorables a los “Indio”s. Se ordenó el reparto de tierras, la abolición de los trabajos gratuitos, etcétera, pero no representando la revolución en el Perú el advenimiento de una clase dirigente, todas estas disposiciones quedaron sólo escritas, faltas de gobernantes capaces de actuarlas. (42, emphasis mine.)

The liberal program of the revolution included, logically, the redemption of the “”Indio”, the automatic consequence of the application of egalitarian postulates. And thus, among the first actions of the Republic, there were a certain number of laws and decrees that favored the “”Indio”s.” The distribution of lands was ordered, the abolition of free labor, etcetera, but in that the revolution in Peru did not represent the advent of a ruling class, all these [legal] dispositions remained only in writing, lacking governors capable of actualizing [exercising, acting on] them.

Further evidence of criollo sovereign rule is found in Mariategui’s seminal work as well, underlining the field as one instilled with the complex of domination infusing the colonial enounter with a dynamic and persistent brutality. In elaborating the outcomes of the Peruvian revolution for independence, in which he signals the important role of indigenous soldiers, and one indigenous leader in particular, Pumacahua, he underlines what happens after the decrees and laws remain inoperative formalities, relegated to the books, while in actuality criollo sovereign order is installed:

La aristocracia latifundista de la Colonia, dueña del poder, conservó intactos sus derechos feudales sobre la tierra y, por consiguiente, sobre el “Indio”. Todas las disposiciones aparentemente enderezadas a protegerla, no han podido nada contra la feudalidad subsistente hasta hoy. [This would be the year 1929.] (ibid)

The “latifundista” aristocracy from the Colonial Period, owners of power, conserved its feudal rights over the land intact, and as a result, (conserved its rights) over the ““Indio”” (intact also.) All of the [Republican] dispositions
apparently arranged to protect it, have been unable to change the feudalism that subsists until today.

The crux of the problem for Mariátegui, and Velázco’s triumphant ascension into office, albeit by a military, populist, coup d’état, does achieve the actualization of the material, that is, the socio-economic ends that Mariátegui projected for the liberal Peruvian republic. Mariátegui assessed its failure compared to the success of other national, liberal projects, as cited earlier. He anticipates the failure that liberal juridical categories would confront before the collective organization of Quechua speaking peoples, yet furthering the socialist, and more specifically, historical materialism that guides his analysis of the Peruvian liberal national project: Mariátegui is convinced that the Colonial oligarchical—economic—structure must be abolished, before any liberal, truly independent, authentically Peruvian state project can be on course, thereby effecting the redistribution of land upon which the liberation of ““Indio”s” depends:

El carácter individualista de la legislación de la República ha favorecido, incuestionablemente, la absorción de la propiedad indígena por el latifundismo. La situación del ““Indio””, a este respecto, estaba contemplada con mayor realismo por la legislación española. Pero la reforma jurídica no tiene más valor práctico que la reforma administrativa, frente a un feudalismo intacto en su estructura económica. La apropiación de la mayor parte de la propiedad comunal e individual indígena está ya cumplida. La experiencia de todos los países que se han salido de su evo-feudal nos demuestra, por otra parte, que sin la desolución del feudo no ha podido funcionar, en ninguna parte, un derecho liberal. (ibid 36-7, emphasis mine.)

The individualistic character of the Republican legislation has unquestionably favored the absorption of indigenous property by “latifundismo.” The situation of the ““Indio”” with respect to this was contemplated with greater realism by Spanish legislation. But juridical reform does not have greater practical value than administrative reform before a feudalism intact in its economic structure. The appropriation of the greater part of communal and individual indigenous property has already been done. The experience of all the countries that have exited their feudal conditions demonstrate, on the other hand, that without the dissolution of the fiefdom, it has been impossible for liberal law to function anywhere.

Velázco’s regime, inspired by Tupac Amaru II’s rebellion,134 certainly fulfilled the expectation that liberal jurisprudence would acknowledge ““Indio”” collectivity, and would return land to the originary Quechua speaking cultivators of this land, an idea professed by Haya de La Torre repeatedly, and a reality that both leaders knew would have to be addressed in the interest of consolidating more conservative, and more centrist solutions to the problems of this chaotic Peruvian state transformation of the mid twentieth century. This republican mestizo

134 See O’Phellan-Godoy
actor, this mestizo republican citizen, “comunidades campesinas” is notwithstanding, yet another colonial subject. Unquestionably sympathetic neighbors such as Vallejo, Arguedas, and Mariategui certainly attempted to mitigate the blows perpetrated on the “‘Indio’” anvil. However the liberal enframing that would continue to enforce this progressive destruction would regulate incorporation, and even “liberation,” inevitably in accord with its eurocentric designs. Perhaps the most eloquent expression of what remains can be traced beyond, au-de-là de Mariategui’s materialist deconstruction of “race,” or what I term, the Western ruse. Mariategui rails against vain attempts at understanding the thorny impasse impeding Peru’s authentic progress by misunderstanding “the indigenous question” through theses that consider the following factors “unilaterally or exclusively”: “administrative, juridical, ethnic, moral, educational, ecclesiastic.”

(36) In incomparably acerbic prose he deconstructs racism with incisive precision, but also deconstructs the mestizo republican project yet de-meaning “‘Indio’” for its purposes, situating himself, for our purposes, at a border, facing the au de-là:

Mestizo “Indio” from this Mariateguian field is not only an empty signifier, filled by any narrative deployed to suture the rift between the social body and state order, liberal or otherwise, designed to impose its rule, in this case Western, Eurocentric rule. The Quechua native is not just part of the social body, inasmuch as he most certainly receives the forceful suppression and sometimes brutal repression of the institutions of the governing class. It is more precisely “‘Indio’” materia prima for Western thought, word, and action, in that, upon its destruction

135 While it could be said that turn of the century conceptualizations of race were more aligned to the superiority of culture, the superiority of “civilization” ensconced in the aesthetic discourses of the time, rather than genetic selection, Darwinian eugenics translated into the social, I am collapsing the discursive specificity of certain subject positions’ authorized versions of race, in favor of a simple definition: the comparative hegemony of the colonial encounter positing the subject colonizing as superior to the invaded and colonized other, the differentiation effected on the basis of power, thereby deciding “race.”
depends the reconstruction of one regime, the Colonial, and then another, the Republican, except that the father does not transmit but the same Eurocentric matrix for being, a matrix which dictates Quechua speaking people’s destruction, in every register in this colonial field, Colonial or Republican through its complex of domination. For Mariategui’s purpose, as much as Vallejo’s and Arguedas,’ notion of “Indio” is what is used for any and all purposes. Out of this fodder, mestizo is confected and cathected. Its uses are in the mestizo field, multiple and interminable, unless “bodily resistance” is interposed. It is this field that is ultimately in contention, a field bereft of Quechua speaking peoples.

The translational mestizo field\textsuperscript{136}: the internal economy of the complex of domination as Peruvian mestizo colonial domination

What is of concern here is this field, and not an archeology of knowledge that traces intellectual provenience, “kinship,” or “descendants.” The field is conformed by four translational limits, four gestures that sustain the possibility for specific inscriptions to emerge, signal moments of poetic expression emerging out of the site of colonial encounter expanding into the first half of the twentieth century and well into the second. These textual inscriptions which foretell, and these translational limits which persist through the complex of domination there embedded yet continue to frame the mestizo translation of the Quechua speaking native in the interest of a political project whose internal economy is propulsed by the criollo desire to become indigenous in order to politically claim legitimacy and propertied native Peruvian. The process is ironically facilitated by the separation that Arguedas and Vallejo depict poignantly, between the invader and the invaded, as this separation extends well into the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. This separation facilitates a territorialization that from the first had global designs, from within the republican territory of Peru, and formerly, during the rule of the Spanish Crown, where present day Chile, Argentina, and Bolivia were encompassed in this viceroyalty named Peru (1542-1824) whose center of governance was Lima, and later the Rioplatense Viceroyalty which included present day Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay and Paraguay (1776-1811). Lima, this viceroyal Colonial capital, turned center of republican governance, Lima, a position for a moment rivaled by Cusco in the Central Highlands, remains the articulation between the Western world and the Quechua world, articulating the expressions that betrayed a deleterious and imaginary view of the

\textsuperscript{136} This deconstructive effort signals that the field is by definition assessed in accord with the comparatist’s ethical practice of translation, whose focus is the trace of Quechua difference and the way this difference pushes the boundaries of Western—understanding, over and against which we counterpose, re-connaissance, a midwifery taking place at signal moments of poetic expression grounded in the field of experience taking as its point of departure, the genealogy of “field” Godzich puts forth in "Emergent Literature and Comparative Literature."
Quechua speaking originary peoples and imposed this vision upon this local population throughout the republican era through the designs of Peru’s criollo elite. Not only does the promise of the “new” world and of emerging republics draw still the ambitions and hopes of European immigrants, investors, and other aspirants seeking new capitalist horizons for expansion, as well as new opportunities to break out of limited social and political possibilities harnessed in an “old” Europe, but the very nature of the separation between the criollo elite and the imaginary Indio maintains the criollo escape permanently open, as it maintains the doors to investors also liberally open.

In this way, being native Peruvian becomes possible in a distinct way, in a distinct instantiation in time, as mestizo. The figure and inscription mestizo is conformed within this republican, nativized, Peruvian field. The Peruvian mestizo field described so far bears the inscription of Mariátegui, Vallejo, and Arguedas as pivotal coordinates of a mestizo national project registering destructive and constructive forces operant in negotiations taking place in the field through a Mariateguian arc of justice. The figuration mestizo emerges from the inscriptions of mestizo that Vallejo and Arguedas prefigure as the emerging republican, nativized, Peruvian citizen in the early part of the twentieth century. In other words, both “Paco Yunque” and “Agua” are inscriptions borne from the mestizo Peruvian field taking shape throughout the 20th century, from Vallejo’s inscription of the indigenous Quechua speaker’s destructive shaping, after the fact of this destructive shaping, to Arguedas’ utopian Quechua Modern,137 presaged in “Agua’s” child narrator, Ernesto’s (el Che’s) flight to the ayllu, to the mestizo return to the re-imagined Indio mark of fully realized republican identity, an imperative for which the imaginary possibilities of the colonizer’s conjured “Indio” serves multiple roles as Other within the colonial encounter reenacted by the criollo elite governing the Republic. The literary fields that register these political Criollo national projects offer a Marxian sympathetic indigenism, which Mariategui consistently and ultimately names, and I translate, “the social solution” to “the problem of the Indio and land” to which all these literary inscriptions become adequate as they traverse this distinct Mariateguian arc of justice.

La solución al problema del “Indio” tiene que ser una solución social. Sus realizadores deben ser los propios “Indio”s. (45)

137 “Quechua Modern” becomes a figuration elicited in Arguedas’ acceptance speech, at the Inca Garcilaso de la Vega literary award ceremony, later transcribed and entitled, “No soy un aculturado,” I am not (an) acculturated (citizen) many years after writing and publishing Agua. It could be said to have derived from his deconstruction of the bilingual speaker in Peruvian society. An interesting compilation of his writing with a view to give a place to his pedagogical and educational preoccupations, an aspect of his professional trajectory which was central is at the same time an important source of reflection about the role of the bilingual writer, speaker, and citizen. See: Arguedas, José María. Nosotros Los Maestros. Lima: Editorial Horizonte, 1986.
The solution to the problem of the “Indian” has to be a social solution. The creators of this solution must be Indians themselves. [Translation mine.]

That the creators of this national project must be the Indigenous Peoples themselves is an aspiration that has yet to breathe life into the current Peruvian republic or any of the republics emerging throughout the 20th century in Latin America with the notable exception of Bolivia.

The term “mestizo” such as it is commonly understood as racial miscegenation does not therefore, for our purposes, delimit mestizo. Rather, mestizo gathers the meanings that emerge from this field through the auto-nomous gesture, this independent Peruvian process of self-naming in opposition to a yet colonial, now “imperial” metropolis in the Republican era, as distinct from the Spanish Crown. The escape from the colonial period through the rhizome of a coloniality donning the animality of a Bolivarian dog, the unruly revolutionary “criollo” takes shape here, in this mestizo Peruvian field through an unfolding of the reterritorialization of the imagined and narrated “Indio,” this time, for the sake of national republican identity, and as part of a radically nativized Marxian/Hegelian material dialectic, that is, a social movement which becomes the Mariateguian rule for transformation. What is radical in Mariátegui’s proposal is that the Peruvian native cannot be a “criollo,” or the miscegenated “mestizo.” 138 For Mariátegui, the only solution is in the hands the Indigenous Peoples displaced by the Spanish Crown’s colonizer. Notwithstanding Mariátegui’s reconnaissance, the Republican era divulges the internal economy of the colonial encounter, unconsciously, and then in reality, as the acceptable destruction and assimilation inscribed in mestizo, where “imaginary Indio” is sublated time and time again within the horizon of the Westernized Peruvian (republican) state order and state rule, proving real in the text as world that in reality, the real Quechua speaker is suppressed and repressed. The inscription peasant, or as we shall see, Arguedas’ inscription of comunero, and the oppositional Quechua response to the person from outside the Quechua world, misti, found in “Agua,” are all stages or resolutions to the dialectic of master/slave embedded at the site of colonial encounter persisting throughout the republican period according to Arguedas’ narration in “Agua.” Misti can be found to be a part of the Mariateguian arc of justice here delimited in a distinct discourse also emerging from this mestizo field: indigenous discourse. Counterposed to the republican mestizo foundational fiction narrated from within the “criollo” conflicts for hegemony, we find the Mariateguian arc of justice espousing as the central Peruvian actor, a socially embodied —indigenous population---, preparing, according to Mariategui to become the

138 For a fascinating account of who Limeños were, royalists, criollos, mestizos, etc. in the years anticipating the emergence of the Peruvian republic, dated as beginning, by decree, in 1824 see Alberto Flores Galindo, La Cuidad Sumergida: Aristocracia y Plebe en Lima, 1760-1830.
The material force of social change required to move the republic of Peru into an autonomous state of indigenist sovereignty, instead of its persistent condition: mired between oligarchical feudalism and vain liberal aspirations, due unavoidably to social material conditions, according to Mariáteguis analysis. From within the Mariateguian arc, the indigenous majority would give meaning to liberal republicanism and its French bourgeois revolutionary—republican tenets—liberty, equality, fraternity—by recovering land as not only an, but the alternative “means of production” to be staged by the majority indigenous population—as a “working class”—observing in Peruvian reality at the turn of the nineteenth into twentieth century that these elements could come together to eventually express a socialist alternative, albeit based upon agricultural production. This materially driven historical actor could precipitate a social revolution that would advance distinctly toward a real and autochthonous, that is, Peruvian communism, especially in that the indigenous proved to be both, “naturally” socialist, and the demographic majority in Mariátegui’s time.

La propagación en el Perú de las ideas socialistas ha traído como consecuencia un fuerte movimiento de reivindicación indígena. La nueva generación peruana siente y sabe que el progreso del Perú será ficticio o por lo menos no será peruano, mientras no constituya la obra y no signifique el bienestar de la masa peruana que en sus cuatro quintas partes es indígena y campesina. (45)... Nuestro primer esfuerzo [de definir “el problema del “Indio”” en términos socialistas] tiende a establecer su carácter de problema fundamentalmente económico. Insurgimos primeramente, contra la tendencia instintiva –y defensiva—del criollo o “misti,” a reducirlo a un problema exclusivamente administrativo, pedagógico, étnico, o moral, para escapar a toda costa del plano de la economía. ...Comenzamos por reivindicar, categóricamente, su derecho a la tierra. (46)

The propagation of socialist ideas in Peru has resulted in a strong movement for indigenous, that is ““Indio”” revindication. The new Peruvian generation feels and knows that Peru’s progress will be fictional or at any rate will not be Peruvian insofar as it may not be the work and insofar as it may not mean the well-being of the Peruvian masses which is four fifths indigenous, that is, ““Indio””’peasants.’ (45)

Our first effort [at defining “the problem of the ‘‘Indio’’ in socialist terms] tends to establish its character as fundamentally economic. We vigorously stand against, firstly, the instinctive—and defensive—tendency of the criollo or “misti,” to reduce it to a problem that is exclusively administrative, pedagogical, ethnic, or moral in order to escape at all cost its expression in the economic field....We begin by categorically revalidating the “Indio”’s right to land. (46)

The perverse escape from the rhizome of republican strife on “Peruvian” territory centering on the tension between dependence and autonomy, republican liberalism and oligarchic conservatism is not resolved without complication or vicissitude, and the indigenous Quechua speaker is either the tacit articulation or the imaginatively named, “Indio,” or the explicit, necessarily embattled field,—as liberating actor, a cultivator of land, and the actor to whom that
land is entrusted---all registers of the word “Indio” in Mariátegui’s narrative. This is what the Mariáteguian arc of justice would render as indigenous social field, over time, however remote this possibility remains in its expressions in the field of Peruvian reality throughout the twentieth century, until more recently. Mariátegui acerbically and directly points to the state criollo ruling class rationalizations provoking the “defensive” stance Mariátegui rebels against undersigning, counterposing what he proves is real in the Peruvian field: the majority indigenous population with the greatest skill at cultivating land, a matter of their cultural ascendency in Inka, that is a Cultivator “civilization.” Not only does he prove that both these phenomena are real, but he also denounces the republican state’s unwillingness to face the loss of revenue139 were it to acknowledge the citizenship or the nation building potential in this skilled majority population he cites as “Indio,” not the least of the reasons being that a demos is just that: all citizens, the majority that expresses itself democratically in a republic. Nothing native, Mariategui asserts, can ever take place in a properly Peruvian way without the movement of this social actor, the indigenous Peruvian Quechua/Spanish speaker. Under the Mariateguian arc, the two short stories textify and delimit this embattled Mariateguian mestizo field, where indigenous Quechua speaker must become citizen, whereby we gather as the meaning of mestizo the colonial encounter which effects the assimilation of more and more of the Quechua speaking population through the rivaling ideologies of republicanism and communism; ironically, the Crown manages to safeguard the Quechua speaking more systematically than the invasive republican order that would collapse all difference into the mathematical equality that characterizes the republican grid deconstructed in Chapters 1 and 2: equal citizenship in word and deed as colonial encounter in the Peruvian republican field becomes mestizo through repeated sublation of the imaginary and imagined “Indio.” More ethically speaking, what emerges from this Peruvian mestizo field notwithstanding is the result of a practice taking place in this field: a mestizo translation of

139 In THOA’s publication on the Ayllu, previously cited, underlines the importance of the “tributo Indio” the tax intended to reproduce the Euro-localized feudal practice upon the Inka-localized “peasant” population, the “reducciones” and other colonial practices, including laws that protected and recognized the relative autonomy of the Ayllu, but laws that THOA verifies through elders were too often ignored are ways in which the Crown incurred a direct economic benefit from the “Indio.” The Republican era brings a similar assault on the Ayllu, whose ambition is actually to make every “Indio” a citizen and a property owner and to force all Ayllus to sell their common lands, to parcel the Ayllu in accord to market forces, etc. Its explicit goal, as per the historical research of THOA was to eliminate the Ayllu. As THOA’s research uncovers, the Republican state must rescind on its first Bolivarian republican citizen aspirations for all people on the Peruvian and Bolivian territory, after whose “independence” in 1821 and 1825 Simon Bolivar decrees the equality of the citizen, in spite of their being diverse castes: “españoles, criollos, mestizos, e Indios.” (15) This decree suppressed the “tributo Indio” but the emerging republican states soon ran out of revenue and José Antonio de Sucre revokes Bolivar’s decree and reinstates the “Indio tribute” under a new name: “Contribución Indigenous.” What the text underlines is the defense of the Ayllu against all “invaders” is the way the THOA history narrates this transition from colonial to republican rule. (11-22)
indigenous Quechua speaking person is performed. The object remains the Mariáteguian possibility he names “Indio” in imaginary terms that he projects could be real.\textsuperscript{140}

The concern here is not therefore whether the texts evidence orthodoxy in ideological discourse, whether for instance a correct reading of Marx abides in Mariátegui, Vallejo, or Arguedas, for the arc is Mariáteguian, that is Peruvian, at the border between the Western field and the \textit{indigenous Peruvian Field} that Mariátegui projects. The central concern is rather for the co-incidence of similar poetic expression and practice in all three authors, who, in the republican interest of re-appropriating and reterritorializing this \textit{indigenous land}, (after the first colonial taking) self-consciously represent this repossession at \textit{the site of a colonial encounter} reenacting \textit{the complex of domination}, revealing unconsciously that they repeat \textit{the Western colonial encounter} by means of the useful category “Indio” repeatedly invaded and conquered in the interest of fulfilling Peruvian national identity—and impacting Quechua speakers deleteriously as the world of these literary texts proves real. In other words, \textit{mestizo translational practice} entails representing the desire to be indigenous, to become native, once again, schizophrenically deteritorializing what is colonial, only to re-territorialize as republican what was once colonial. (D&G 13-14) These “fictional” and “non-fictional” narratives folding \textit{indigenous} into the figuration \textit{republican mestizo} through the intercession of \textit{meztizo state aesthetic order} take place again and again. In this process, the attempt to singularly include the \textit{indigenous} albeit within a yet Western paradigmatic form of governance ensconced in Hegelian dialectics becomes a reterritorializing and repossessing, albeit through negotiations that both confront the “defensiveness” and at the same time embrace the rationalizations that underpin the nationalist republican, \textit{criollo project}.\textsuperscript{141} This \textit{mestizo Peruvian field} responds to the desire and the designs

\textsuperscript{140} Real and imaginary will later become confounded especially for theorists preoccupied with the way that a historical materialism and a Marxian analysis will arrive at the limit of the separation of interior and exterior, as the categories of commodity and capital flow collapse any distinction between structure and superstructure. This sort of “globalization” purports the foreclosing of the role of literature in explaining/rationalizing/interpreting/representing—ultimately suturing—the rule of the nation-state and the social body, thereby foreclosing the distinction between fiction and non-fiction. The collapse of the role of literature in devising this suture also foregrounds the importance of \textit{poetic expression} in signaling the figurations and inscriptions, social and cultural that presage imminent change. In a word, poetic expressions, textual, and as world as text become signs of the times that anticipate future \textit{social} changes. One example of this is Alberto Moreiras’ assessment as he reads Jameson, Wallerstein, Lacan to assess the state of the field of Latin American Studies.

\textsuperscript{141} It should be remembered that Mariátegui decries the failure of the bourgeois project in Peru because of the entrenched nature of the feudal relationships imposed by the Spanish invasion. Notwithstanding his “socialist” recovery of the “Indio” as “comunidad,” the dependence that prolongs the extractivist economic practices of the criollo elite allied with foreign investors continues, as exemplified through Vallejo’s character Grieve, and as exemplified variously in the negotiations of \textit{criollo power} that the Fujimori,
of the *criollo* Peruvian class in tensioned strife with a newly defined “mestizo,” and the required *mestizo* citizenry throughout the aftermath of the colonial period, marking the beginning of a republican re-conquest of the Quechua speaking nation surrounded.142 (Mannheim)

*Mestizo* gathers specific meaning through this reading; the italics *signal* the gathering metaphoricity of this term within this reading, mine. Confronting “the indigenous question” is from a Western perspective fundamental to the conformation of a national project in that national identity is yet to be found within the nationalist imperial design that emerged with Roman republicanism, a hegemony with which emerged the attendant moral claims to territory bound by what has been described as the territorializing designs of the Western “subject” and “ego” that European philosophers constructed and legitimized, *after* the national projects in Europe consummated the hegemony of one vernacular language over all others, and *after* one state was conformed to impose “order” upon all the ethnies that would be subsumed beneath the dominant *ethne*, the one *national (vernacular) state aesthetic*. This is a *trans-ladere* in space and time.

“Indigeneity” becomes the central problem of *colonial western national identity* and it is more often than not the aesthetic discourse designed by literary traditions written in the national/dominant vernacular language which begin the process of rationalizing this foundational dominance over others, or stated another way, begins to suture the rift between the state and a social body in dissonant relationship to this hegemony. Indigeneity is the central problem of western imperial, (national) identity in that this problem is bound by a search not only for an object for the individual ego to possess, but it is bound also by the desire to *territorialize* space as the object, that is, to own it through the dominance and investments of the *individual ego*.

Indigeneity in this sense is an *imperial discourse*, expressed through “the foundational fictions,” understood as a plethora of narration responding to the imperatives of *state aesthetic order, in no small measure the necromantic theatrics the state stages to insure its predominance, in no small measure the necromantic theatrics the state stages to insure its predominance* for which designs “literature” becomes a client and the nation’s (literary) institutional traditions written in a national/dominant/vernacular language, the language that also conquered—provides Barthian mythologies, ideolectologies, at least in their effect in creating a popular *doxa* that tames the social body. Other languages, are displaced also, and the ponderous national archive is deployed as a legitimating instrument, however staid the archive will become, however much this language

---

of national identity carries with it During’s death warrant, its inevitable meaninglessness. This *aesthetisized telling* in the case of Peru begins the process of suturing a de-territorialization, *colonial to republican*, and a re-territorialization, the consolidation of a *republican hegemony* that cannot ultimately mask its victims, its dispossessed, however much it may attempt this rationalization through literary (and other symbolic) representations. The persistent Mariateguian arc of justice yet sustains——, albeit interceded by negotiations effected through the imperial designs of the Western subject——, and the various official discourses it deploys, academic, political, literary through *its state aesthetic order* that there is yet the escape from this rhizome, an escape called “*imagined India,*” that is, imagined indigeneity or nativization.

For our purposes then, *Mariateguian Peruvian mestizo* as it is conforming over decades through *the arc of Mariateguian justice* is the inscription that emerges from a desire, on one hand, to salvage “the conquered,” the disenfranchised, and for our purposes, *the indigenous Quechua speaker*, through sympathetic narratives such as the ones we term *indigenist*, precisely, in the name of the nation, as *the historical, that is that which has passed, and not past, which is the origin of Peruvian citizen*, a foundational Western move. The ambivalent term “*comunidad campesina,*” a legal instantiation conferring legitimacy by the *Peruvian mestizo state order* to a collective citizen, undermines the Westernized nation state’s project in that it cedes territory to the actual Quechua speaking peoples who it has maintained as separate——by conquest, rationalization and racialization, while at the same time, conferring liberal identity to a Quechua people for whom the liberal mathematical grid is yet a colonization. This ambivalence does not obviate or mitigate for the legitimacy and efficacy with which this *Mariateguian mestizo* becomes the inscription that emerges from a *field* that remains willfully, that is in a Westernized way invested in a colonial encounter that denies the Quechua speaking population——only one instantiation of this denial expressed again through the utility of the concept “*Indio.*” The *Mariateguian mestizo* is ultimately delimited in accord with “criollo” state interests and investments, more akin to Ricardo Palma’s ironic inroads into a new Lima *criolla*, and also more akin to the so-called petit bourgeois interests of an emerging, *criollized* mestizo middle class, and it is these boundaries that endow mestizo with new meaning, with currency.

From our perspective, *the Mariateguian arc* remains *indigenist* in the sense described in the previous paragraph in that this *indigenous Quechua speaker* folded into a “socialist” project constitutes yet another erasure of Quechua, notwithstanding his unwavering ability to deposit all his hope in this very real contemporary man he called “el Indio.” The *mestizo citizen* which miscegenation offers the republican project is the result of a long and complex response to the relatively earliest of globalizations: the Spanish Crown’s imperial colonization. Though the
colonial mestizo evolves into the republican mestizo, this personage remains subject to each state’s rule of law, variously, dissonantly, depending on where real people situate themselves within the social body, what social position they may elect or are assigned. This deconstructivist, reconstruction of one gesture amidst the history of publication, one that reveals the Mariateguian arc of justice, permits us on one side, to define the translational field that this reading delimits. Translations performed thus to discern the aesthetic state order emerging from the Peruvian republican mestizo field by way of its figurations and inscriptions, and by identifying signal literature, at the same time unearth the deeply eurocentric tendencies guiding the axiomatic Westernized and westernizing traditions propulsing the Western, individual, egoistic desire and investment cathecting the mestizo field, almost by default, allowing us in turn to discern, through this performative reading, the internal economy of the order borne by the mestizo republican field.

Vallejo’s attention to the boundaries imposed by criollo power demarcates the third limit of this translational practice and evinces a phantasmatic colonial, absolutist and sovereign enframing of the real activity of the republican ruling class, presence of, termed, aptly, “neo-colonial,” or neo-imperial during this 20th century period of what we may term a Peruvian colonizing (“Indio) and colonized (Peruvian) modernity purveyed through a Peruvian criollo ruling elite, which, much like its predecessor the royalists that resisted independence from the Crown, remained distant enough from the new world, and during the Republican period could aptly be said to exercise sovereign criollo rule. Inside this criollo framework of power, as Vallejo signals, the performance of liberal institutional practices rings false and procures the chaos that the important contradictions between state aesthetic order and the social body precipitate, thereby subverting order. In other words, the internal economy of this persistent colonial complex of domination is a newly emerging mestizo colonial domination purveyed by a criollo imperial ruling elite barely dissimulated by a republican costume, whose sometimes intermittent, sometimes itinerant, and some times constant response becomes the (militarized) imposition of state order.

**Mestizo colonial domination and Peruvian archeological literary history**

At the turn of the century and well into the first half of the twentieth, a mestizo foundational fiction began to be articulated through the published assessments of various members of the Peruvian intelligentsia providing explanations for the republic’s floundering attempts to resolve the conflict between the imperatives of a republican, liberal democracy, a la French Revolution, and a variant of constitutional monarchy, minus the crown, and the commons,
the local and well ensconced vice royal oligarchy with its feudal latifundios. Peruvian literary history begins to anticipate its institutional existence in the work of Ricardo Palma especially in that with this essayist, journalist writer an important register of the mestizo foundational fiction finds expression: the ideological territorial divide between “sierra,” the Andean region, and “costa,” that is Lima. About Palma’s clear, republican, democratic tendencies, creolized in Lima, and Lima especially, Mariátegui eloquently and incisively situates the “Limeño criollo” who is so central a protagonist in the mestizo foundational fiction emerging in the first half of the 20th century in the following way:

Las Tradiciones [Limeñas] de Palma tienen, política y socioalmente, una filiación democrática. Palma interpreta al medio pelo. Su burla, roe risueñamente el prestigio del virreinato y el de la aristocracia. Traduce el malcontento zumbón del demos criollo. La sátira de las Tradiciones no cala muy hondo ni golpea muy fuerte; pero precisamente por esto, se identifica con el humor de un demos, blando, sensual y azucarado. Lima no podía producir otra literatura. Las Tradiciones agotan sus posibilidades. (221)

The Traditions [from Lima] compiled by [Ricardo] Palma have a democratic filiation, socially and politically. Palma interprets the average Limeño, looked down upon by the aristocratic caste. His mockery, laughingly corrodes the prestige of the viceroyalty and the aristocracy. He translates the discontented buzz of the criollo demos. The satire found in Traditions doesn’t cut too deep, nor does it hit too strongly; but precisely because of this, it identifies with the humor of a demos that is soft, sensual, and sugarsweet. Lima could not produce another literature. The Traditions exhausts its possibilities. [Translation mine.]

Mariátegui succeeds, not only at characterizing a “Limeño criollo” incomparably well, through Palma as well describing a continuity that still imbues the Lima of today with this sardonic but conciliatory charm, but he inscribes the mestizo negotiation afoot as an emerging post War of Independence mestizo citizen, imagined and wrought. “Criollo” here, in Mariátegui’s text, is not the criollo sovereign of our translation practice, in this textual field, but he is an imagined, an incipient mestizo citizen as Mariátegui makes clear in the following passage found in his description of “indegenist literature:”

El criollo no está netamente definido. Hasta ahora la palabra “criollo” no es casi mas que un termino que nos sirve para designar genéricamente una pluralidad, muy matizada, de mestizos. (302)

The “criollo” is not clearly defined. Until now the word “criollo” is not much more than a term that serves to generically designate a plurality, too well blended, of mestizos. (302) [Translation mine.]

In creating especially Limeño traditions, Palma must respond to the social body, and Mariátegui makes this evident through descriptors such as the humor of the people, of the social body, a sensual perception of its sweetness, or of the sweetness with which it must be tamed, disciplined, shaped, precisely, as demos. Palma’s political agenda, according to Mariátegui is to
narrate Lima as the epicenter for liberal democracy, albeit with every kind of native, territorial influence present in a viceroyal city, embracing republican democracy. Again, for Mariátegui, there is no consolidated national identity, for the mass of *indigenous Quechua speakers* that conform the *demos* unavoidably, cannot be ignored! And however cosmopolitan Peruvian national literature becomes, and every writer that Mariátegui signals within his analysis of “El proceso de la literature” is an understanding of the emerging Peruvian nation, this emerging “criollo” national is not but a *mestizo* who in one way or another fails to account for the component of this *demos*, which according to Mariategui makes up 4/5 of the population. So serious a problem is this majority, that “el problema del Indio” is the difference between a successful or failed Peruvian national project. And yet, the distance between this “criollo” national and the *indigenous Quechua speaker* only grows as Peruvian national literature consolidates its creole voice in accomplished fiction that merits the Western title of literature. What consolidates is the validity of the *mestizo foundational fiction* we signal, while indigenous Quechua speakers becomes more and more alien from the reality of the nation’s governance and direction, and where the “indigenist” Quechua speaker in *mestizo literature* becomes more and more emblematic of an authentic “Peruvian” national literature. In accord with his own analysis of the Peruvian nation, or more to the point, Peruvian reality, Mariategui will assess “national” literature with regard to its ability to register “Indio” in its fictionally narrated interpretations of reality, which is in a word, Marietegui’s ethical practice as a scholar. A Peruvian national identity that cannot register its majority indigenous population is not properly Peruvian, according to Mariategui. (300) In other words, you cannot have a viable *demos* for a liberal republican national project, nor for a socialist state, without accounting for the the indigenous Quechua speaker who is the majority of this *demos* in your *foundational fictions*. You would be failing, according to Mariategui’s interpretation to address moreover its expression as the social body you intend to govern, democratically. Howeve, as we have seen, lecto-scripted tradition remains yet more remote than the ideal democratic nation might require in reponse to its humanist universalizing foundations and functions. In other words Quechua speakers don’t yet speak Spanish that well, but *indigenist literature* is needed.

Mariategui brings his analysis to full realization within the literary field when he arrives at his interpretation of an incipient “indigenist literature.” He ensconces the difference between “sierra” and “costa,” which he is aware is ideologically constructed through “Lima,” while attempting to situate the source of this indigenist literature, squarely in the Andes, or at any rate Andes inspired. About the Palma “criollo Limeño,” who Mariategui has clarified is no more than
a mestizo, and a mestizo, for it is the latter that Palma is imagining, as ( Limeño) mestizo citizen, he tells us:

El criollo presenta aquí una serie de variedades. El costeño se diferencia fuertemente del serrano. En tanto que en la sierra la influencia telúrica indigeniza al mestizo, casi hasta su absorción por el espíritu indígena, en la costa el predominio colonial mantiene el espíritu heredado de España. (302)

The “criollo” presents a series of varieties here. The “costeño” [the citizen dwelling and marked by his dwelling place in the coast] strongly differentiates himself from the “serrano.” [The citizen or “the indigenous Quechua speaker” dwelling and marked by his dwelling in the highlands.] To the extent that in the highlands the telluric influence indigenizes the “mestizo,” almost to the point of being absorbed by the indigenous spirit, [the the indigenous Quechua speaker’s spirit] in the coast, the colonial predominance maintains the spirit inherited from Spain. [Translation mine.]

Indigenist literature is mestizo literature, but it must be imbued with indigenous Andean spirit as it is tied to the earth, to the land; it must be imbued in other words with serrano mestizo sensibility in order to be indigenist in the Mariateguian sense. Driving his material analysis home, Mariátegui underlines the social character of the political-economic problem Peru faces if it cannot confront the majority of its population: the indigenous Quechua speakers: “el problema del Indio.” Insofar as the role of literature in this national project, and the critical role that an indigenist literature could play, Mariategui is clear that the mestizo literature achieving the title of Western, universalist and cosmopolitan, and even the literature that is local, and Westernized and westernizing, for instance depicting “traditions” “a la Palma,” or local customs as other national literature such as “costumbrismo” or national literature characterized as “folkloric” are literary trends that fail to achieve this Mariáteguian indigenist literature needed in the interest of consolidating a Peruvian national republican project enlisting the majority in the demos. To unpack what he sees as an indigenist literature, he explains:

…lo que subconscientemente busca la genuina corriente indígenista en el “Indio”, no es sólo el tipo o el motivo pintoresco. El “indigenismo” no es aquí un fenómeno esencialmente literario como el “nativismo” en el Uruguay. Sus raíces se alimentan de otro humus histórico. Los “indigenistas” auténticos—que no deben ser confundidos con los que explotan temas indígenas por mero “exotismo”---colaboran, conscientemente o no, en una obra política y económica de reivindicación—no de restauración ni de resurrección. (303-4)

...what the genuine indigenist current seeks unconsciously in the ““Indio””, is not only the type or the picturesque motif. Indigenism/el indigenismo here is not an essentially literary phenomenon as in the “nativismo” [nativism, literary current] in Uruguay. Its roots are nourished by another historical soil. The authentic “indigenists”—who should not be confused with those who exploit indgenous themes for mere “exoticism”—collaborate, consciously or not, in a political and economic labor of revindication—and not of restoration or resurrection. [Translation mine.]
With consistency and coherence, Mariátegui articulates the role of literature in the national republican project in terms that revert to the original “social” character of “el problema del “Indio”” which he underlines as the source, of both, the problem obstructing the realization of a republican democratic (bourgeois) project in Peru, and the source of its solution. He further clarifies:

El “Indio” no representa únicamente un tipo, un tema, un motivo, un personaje. Representa un pueblo, una raza, una tradición, un espíritu. No es posible, pues, valorarlo y considerarlo, desde puntos exclusivamente literarios, como un color o un aspecto nacional, colocándolo en el mismo plano que otros elementos étnicos del Perú… Lo que da derecho al “Indio” a prevalecer en la visión del peruano de hoy es, sobre todo, el conflicto y el contraste entre su predominio demográfico y su servidumbre—no solo inferioridad—social y económica. La presencia de tres a cuatro millones de hombres de la raza autóctona en el panorama mental de un pueblo de cinco millones, no debe sorprender a nadie en una época en que este pueblo siente la necesidad de encontrar el equilibrio que hasta ahora le ha faltado en su historia. (304)

The ““Indio”” does not represent only a type, a theme, a motif, a character. He represents a people, a race, a tradition, a spirit. It is not possible, thus, to value him or consider him, from exclusively literary points of view, like a national color or another national aspect, placing him in the same field as yet another ethnic element of Peru…. That which gives the ““Indio”” the right to prevail in the vision of today’s Peruvian is above all, the conflict and constrast between his demographic predominance and his servitude—and not only his inferiority---both social and economic. The presence of three to four million men of the authochthonous race in the mental panorama of a people who number in the five million should not surprise anyone in an epoch in which this people feels the need to find an equilibrium which up to now has been missing in its history. (304) [Translation mine.]

In a utopic declarative, Mariategui asserts what for us constitutes a mestizo inscription intrinsic to the Mariateguian arc we trace in the Peruvian mestizo field and anticipates the figurations of the imagined indigenous Quechua speaker that emerge in Vallejo and Arguedas’ narrative fiction:

El indigenismo, en nuestra literatura… tiene fundamentalmente el sentido de una reivindicacion de lo autóctono. No llena la función puramente sentimental que llenaría, por ejemplo, el criollismo. Habría error, por consiguiente, en apreciar al indigenismo como equivalente del criollismo, al cual no reemplaza ni subroga. …Si el “Indio” ocupa el primer plano en la literatura y el arte peruanos no será, seguramente, por su interés literario o plástico, sino porque las fuerzas nuevas y el impulso vital de la nación tienden a reivindicarlo. (304)

“El indigenismo”/Indigenism in our literature…has the fundamental sense of a re vindication of what is authochthonous. It doesn’t fulfill a purely sentimental role such as “el criollismo” might fill, for example. There would be error, therefore, in valuing “el indigenismo” as equivalent to “el criollismo,” which indigenism neither displaces nor substitutes….If the ““Indio”” occupies the primary field in Peruvian literature and art it will not be, surely, dues to its
literary or plastic interest, but because the new forces and the vital impulse of the nation tend to revindicate him. (304)

In taking measure of the Peruvian territory, in describing the way that his country narrates itself, not only does Mariátegui describe a geo-political narration that is mestizo in the interest of a republican state order which criollo desire, but he delimits a mestizo field which will throughout the ensuing decades of the twentieth century sustain an indigenous Quechua alternative to the recurrent crises of the Peruvian republican project he describes at the turn of the century. He describes this mestizo field, in describing the new and vital forces in the nation compelled to account for the indigenous Quechua reality thusly:

El fenómeno es más instintivo y biológico que intellectual y teórico. Repito que lo que subconscientemente busca la genuina corriente indigenista en el “Indio” no es sólo el tipo o el motivo y menos aún el tipo o el motivo “pintoresco.” (305)...El desarrollo de la corriente indigenista no amenaza ni paraliza el de otros elementos vitals de nuestra literatura.... La literatura indigenista no puede darnos una version rigurosamente verista del “Indio”. Tiene que idealizarlo y estilizarlo. Tampoco puede darnos su propia anima. Es todavía una literatura de mestizos. Por eso se llama indigenista y no indigena. Una literatura indigena, si debe venir, vendrá a su tiempo. Cuando los propios “Indio”s estén en grado de producirla. (306)

The phenomenon is more instinctive and biological than intellectual or theoretical. I repeat that what the genuine “indigenista” current seeks subconsciously in the “Indio” is not only the type or the motif and even less so the “picturesque” type or motif. (305) ...The development of the “indigenista” current does not threaten or paralyze the development of other vital elements of our literature.... “Indigenista” literature cannot give a rigorously veritable version of the “Indio”.” It must idealize and stylize him. It cannot give us his own anima. It is still a literature of “mestizos.” This is why it is called “indigenist(a)” and not indigenous. An indigenous literature, if it must come, will come in its time. When the “Indio”s themselves are at the point of producing it. (306)

Prefiguring in this inscription the importance of recognizing indigenous Quechua persons within mestizo foundational fictions as more than a decorative garland on the Peruvian landscape, as more than mere local color, Mariátegui not only projects Peru’s potential progress toward the realization of its industrial, bourgeois republic, the theorized paradigm for this possibility deriving from the French Revolution and Marxist analyses of the potential for socialist transformation when specific material realities come into historical being, but he also foresees the consequences of ignoring “el problema del Indio,” the primary “social problem” that Peru must confront, in reality, in order to “progress” at all. Indigenist literature becomes a place, according to Mariátegui’s rendering, where this social problem must be addressed, and to merely to suture, but to world as text. He is clear about the form this reivindication must take: revolution. The last
vestiges of Peru’s feudal colonialism must be eliminated in order to liberate the indigenous Quechua person to her real destiny, and indigenist literature can anticipate the shape that destiny can take.

You cannot make equivalent, (compare, construe as the same,) in the final analysis, today’s indigenist current to the old colonialist current. Colonialism, a reflection of the feudal caste, amused itself through the nostaligic idealization of the past. “El indigenismo,” instead, has roots in the present. It extracts its inspiration from the protest of millions of men. The viceroyalty was. “El “Indio” es. And while the liquidation of the residue of colonial feudalism imposes itself as an elementary condition for progress, the reivindicación del “Indio”, y por ende de su historia nos viene insertada en el programa de una revolución. (306-7)

Peruvian literary history invests in the same manner in what I term a mestizo translation, a mestizo instantiation of a nationalist project emerging in the middle of the 20th century in Peruvian academic circles whose endeavors continue to invest in imagined “Indio” as the mark of autochthony, extending the desire for independence and autonomy into the 20th century metaphorically, and even conceptually as a reenactment of the colonial encounter—upon the backs of real Quechua speaking communities. The concept “Indio” facilitates every nationalist move toward fulfillment, toward identity, permitting this indigenous Quechua literature to be emptied and filled in accord with the narrative of independence and self naming necessary for the nation to consolidate its project, territorially and ideologically, geographically and politically. The intellectuals thinking of the literary are thinking of national institutions to be constructed through Peruvian vernacular Spanish, institutions anticipated through literary inscriptions in the emerging mestizo field. These state aesthetic concerns are the very figurations of the political and economic republican mestizo field upon which the imagined nation is negotiated and created. This intelligentsia recovers fragments of the Quechua tradition, designing an archeological literary history, gathering what I will term “biblio-artifacts,” a process marking the Derridean limit of translation in the following manner.

It is remarkable that literary critics and literature professors, inheritors of the debates of the 19th century that extend into the twentieth articulate in the sixties and seventies a literary...
history marked by the 19th century debate about dependence or autonomy. The literary history that follows the arc of Mariáteguian justice especially will unearth as classical, the indigenous Quechua past accessible through arqueology, especially insofar as carbon dating reaches back deeply, and anthropology, especially as Peruvian and other anthropologists gather the Quechua oral tradition, just as aficionados and missionaries did this before them. It is these biblioartifacts that conform an archaeological literary history especially devoted to building a foundational fiction upon the emptied signifier “Indio” with a special Mariateguian inflection in accord with this arc. There is a current of Peruvian literary history that follows the Mariateguian arc of justice through the meaning of indigenous Quechua speaker rendered in his work. It is a literary history whose keeper is most distinctly Arguedas, (1934-1968) and whose inheritors are Francisco Carrillo (1961- 1991), a literature professor and critic affiliated to the Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Andres, and a serrano writer, at one point professor of Literature and Linguistics at the Universidad Nacional del Altiplano, and literary critic, Jorge Flores-Áybar, (1969-2004) who submits about the Peruvian literary history he sees:

“Aquí no hay sino dos literaturas: la una, iniciada por Concolorcorvo hasta Mario Vargas Llosa; y la otra, iniciada por Manco Cápac hasta José María Arguedas.”
(Flores-Áybar, quoted on the book-cover)

“There are but two literatures here [in Peru]: the one, initiated by Concolorcorvo and up to Mario Vargas Llosa; and the other, initiated by Manco Cápac and up to José María Arguedas.”

In the small archive of Quechua marked “biblio-artifacts,” these literary critics begin to recover past and contemporary poetic expression of Quechua speakers, variously mediated: identified, gathered, transcribed, rhetorically and logically ordered, chronicled as per the conventions of Western history and in accord with other Western canonical and academic rubrics, it is interpreted and archived,—in a word, trans–lated into the complex of emerging, republican, creolized Peruvian Spanish—, reenacting Western knowledge systems, and at all times, affirming distinct translations of Mariateguian “imaginary Indio.” These Peruvian literary critics keen on recovering Quechua tradition, reenact the tasks of the western literary agent— be he critic, professor, writer, or publisher—, but in Peru, the critic to be found operating beneath the Mariateguian arc will have turned to Arguedas first, and would become Western literary critic turned quasi-anthropologist, turned regionalist, that is, Andeanist when confronted with what could become “the Quechua archive.” It is noteworthy that Arguedas was not only a writer of literature, in the sense of novel, short story, that is, fictional prose and poetry expressed in the

---

Western tradition’s representational genres as well as the Quechua tradition’s cultural practices, but he was also a teacher, a University professor, a state functionary placed strategically in places that would preserve native “Peruvian culture,” playing various reformist and leadership roles regarding public education through the Ministry of Education, carrying out the role of Director of el Instituto de Estudios Etnológicos which is today the Museo Nacional de la Cultura Peruana. His first “ethnological project,” though it was an incipient expression of his “natural” vocation for “ethnology” was an endeavor to gather “el folclor local” alongside his students at a public school in Sicuani, a small city inside the Departamento de Cuzco while he was there between 1939-1941.

Much in the same manner that the site of colonial encounter is the field from which all instantiations of Quechua difference emerge in the long durée from 1532 forward, this literary archeology repeats the colonial gesture through which mestizo is also appropriation of indigenous Quechua land, expressed culturally, or as we have termed it, it is the appropriation of Quechua richeses, though the appropriation is institutionally republican as manifest by the term in the legislation cited, “comunidad campesina.” As the continued negotiation of the status of the indigenous Quechua speaker this expression finds its conduit through both the Mariateguian arc of justice, whereby this legal entity does indeed recover land for the Peruvian Indigenous Quechua speaker and dweller, just as Mariategui desired this in the interest of a consolidated Peruvian state. It is yet a mestizo conduit that displaces Quechua speaking peoples. As Mariategui analyzes “el problema de la tierra” in accord to Marxian historical materialism:

La antigua clase feudal—camouflada o disfrazada de burguesía republicana—ha conservado sus posiciones. La política de desamortización de la propiedad agraria iniciada por la revolución de la Independencia—como una consecuencia lógica de su ideología—no condujo al desenvolvimiento de la pequeña propiedad. …Sabido es que la desamortización atacó más bien a la comunidad. …Las expresiones de la feudalidad sobreviviente son dos: latifundio y servidumbre. Expresiones solidarias y consustanciales, cuyo análisis nos conduce a la conclusión de que no se puede liquidar la servidumbre, que pesa sobre la raza indígena, sin liquidar el latifundio. (47)

The old feudal class—camouflaged or dressed up as republican bourgeoisie—has conserved its positions. The policy of seizing agrarian property initiated by the revolution for Independence—as a logical consequence of its ideology—did not lead to the development of small property….It is well known that this confiscation attacked, rather, “la comunidad campesina or indigena.” ...The surviving expressions of feudalism are two: “latifundio” [large estate, somewhat

144 “This concept, campesino, is a translation of the concept “peasant” or “peasantry” and its translation is a superimposition which renders under erasure a distinct and different historical actor. This inadequate translation is one register of the coloniality of knowledge practices diffuse throughout the region since the colonial encounter.” From Berkshire encyclopedic entry co-authored by Tirso Gonzales and Maria E. Gonzalez
“Comunidad Campesina” will become the mestizo state order responding liberally to this problem. Nowithstanding, its impact will go a ways in addressing Mariategui’s assessment of the problem of land, directly attached to the problem of the Quechua language and culture, or what we term the question of Quechua richeses.

It is in the realm of the literary, the representational, that archeaological literary history appropriates Quechua oral poetic expression, however mediated, and notwithstanding the resounding absence of a Western written/literate record of a pre-colonial literary or biblio-graphic archive. Archeaological literary history actually creates the bibio-graphic record where none of that nature would have existed, except as varied Spanish Colonial interpretations and translations of this Quechua poetic expression, and the narrations from native informants acquired through fieldwork in situ—perhaps the decisive factor counteraction the perception of what is Quechua as passed, and past, that is Historically—dead and gone. Viewed from the perspective of literacy, the alternative Quechua literacy of q’ipus and other engraved record such as the ones to be read in textiles, as well as what might be forcibly collapsed into the western category architecture are not taken into account but disciplinarily, by academic specialty reverting permanently to anthropology and archeology, and to colonial Spanish chronicles and documents as its interpretive rubric. This archeaological literary history is a translation that superimposes the hermeneutics of Western tradition upon the fragments or “shards” of Quechua oral expression tactically placed in this confected archive of “biblioartifacts.” Accomplishing this Western recovery of Quechua difference suppresses the possibility of discerning Quechua literacies as their erasure. Archeological literary history therefore harks back as far in the past as the archeaological record will permit, e.g. the “prehistoric,” that is, and in accord with a definition that still stands, if complicated by post-processual or post-modern archeology, “prehistoric” in the sense of-- without written/alphabetical record, and without “civilization” in the sense of the existence of a ruling cenral state and of “advanced” aesthetic accomplishments, that is, the existence of “masterpieces” of art. The “prehistoric” that preceded present-day Peruvian territory, spans some 40,000 years before Christ, 20,000 years BC marking the arrival of “man” to the Andes, and some 1,532 after Christ, the end of the pre-Columbian era (Carrillo 31-42). 145

145 These evolutionist and religious historical demarcations have been replaced in scientific circles with yet evolutionist categorization: a derivative of the Gregorian calendar, BC has become “Before the Common/Christian Era)” with the need to designate a point before and after which one can begin to talk
Part IV: Quechua Intellectual Labor: Quechua encounters with the West

Chapter 7: Quechua difference, Quechua poetic expression, and Quechua translations of and for the West: the colonial encounter reduced

What is properly “Peruvian” indigenous, and persistently the imagined “Indio”: anthropological readings in the field and the conformation of a Quechua field

The character of the representations now to be found in the archive brings to mind several concerns about representation. Whereas the archive harks back to vaults, digs, and material, yet not material artifacts, the discursive register which concerns us also situates the bookish character of the book, material or not, within the horizons of Foucault’s constructed spaces of influence, which as we have seen in the emergent mestizo field bring about submission, through the rigors or the duplicity of the mathematical liberal grid intrinsic to both the state and its institutions, and applied unevenly to everyone, targeting mainly the social body; and whose construction as we have so far deconstructed is the repeatedly reterritorialized colonial encounter. Land and representation are intimately linked with the demands for territory. Place--, situated in land, and space--, the way we represent place through cartography and land deeds are wrought with real and ideological contention: either instance has violent or pacific implications to the extent that the contention, yet another expression of the colonial encounter in the instances to be observed, may result in accommodation, assimilation, suppression, or repression, in accord, precisely the the

about human presence, and human mastery of tools and by extension, of nature and the social body to the extent that states and “accomplished” art are both indexes of “great” human evolution. While this evolution would be “universal” or “common” to all “humans,” arguably, the indexes for human accomplishment have not varied.

146 This is an allusion to the word “reducción,” the Colonial Spanish practice of controlling the Andean localized population by means of a process called “reducciones” whereby the Ayllu is reduced to “pueblos” in order to facilitate the use of the mit’a, a system of labor exchange utilized by Inka governance to cultivate effectively, and adopted by the Crown for their exploitative purposes with regard to mining especially, and where the “reducción” served to facilitate the Quechua speaking population’s taxation through the “tributo indígena.” At the same time, reduction is an action taken to restore balance to a colonial encounter in violation of the Quechua rule of relating among “persons,” all alive, all valued in the same way.
colonial encounter. But it could result in something anomalous to the colonial encounter, alternative and extrinsic, and yet fully able to relate to Westernized forms, even if this relationship involves a lack of engagement with its complex of domination. Our travels through the discursive disciplinary discourses that conform and re-conform this imaginary notion “Indio,” inside and outside of its material circulation and reception as material artifact, and before its final resting place or its ideological disapparition has so far taken successive forms of ‘Indio and land’ re-territorialization, both symbolic and real. What gathers these practices in the field, whose internal economy is the complex of domination of the colonial encounter is this Western vision of the world. The Western representational practice at work here, implying a certain conception of language, either for sensual consumption, (aesthetic,) economic consumption (commodity/fetish,) or for the political practice of standing in for the other, or others, in particular the social body, thereby creating portraiture of/for the other, or in defense or advocacy of/for the other bring into play the tensions at play here in the experiential field of governance. As I submitted earlier however, the political is more lucidly the deployment of legitimated discourses of power, that is from the ruling class that stands outside of the system it edifies in order to rule, as we have seen in the Western instances we have re-searced, ruling takes place in order to conveniently, as Barthes might put it, cynically, and duplicitously garner advantages in fulfilling the interests of this ruling class. In particular I deconstruct the Western edifice of thought and language or what Foucault calls the “history of ideas” as a process reconfecting the necromancy performed by the ruling classes of the past, whereby the “spirit” of the dead, or in the case of the Western staging of such predictive and interested practices, the hypostasis of monotheistic divinity stand in for this predictive projection ultimately benefiting the ruling class staging the necromantic session. In the case of the West, this is the legitimated reading of the vast arcival deposit of written “voice/spirit scripted” tradition.

Training for contemporary readings, readings of the moment whose practice derives from the possibility to register what is alive and changing, the oral, and what is staid and relatively permanent, the written is the task of the trans-lational comparatist in the field. The voice inspired lecto-scripted tradition appropriates the Quechua oral tradition, even when a Barthian or textual reading is applied, and yet to read either the Western or the Quechua tradition, the immediacy of what emerges in the field as a sign must be discerned, what in the previous chapter I term signal literature, what Barthes calls “difference itself” or the signifier as aftermath, and what Foucault calls a discourse through which you stage and event, which tips the balance of energies. This signal literature renders deictically what is there, in the methodological field of text proving what is real, or in the best critical Westernized reading, reading the world-as-text whereby its
methodological textual field yields the thing, as the thing proven to be real in the methodological field of text only insofar as within the Western edifice the thing may begin to be—only if it averts being devoured as part of the self’s identity. As Foucault deconstructs for us, this is how the (modern) Western self fearfully brings every thing into its sphere of compulsively continual influence, thereby bringing it into identity with itself, thereby recovering from the Western world’s fear of discontinuity: a discontinuity construed as an affliction, a deficiency, an obstruction to the fulfillment of the desire to be whole, total, one. It would be hard to imagine that a crew of tiny men staged this, or as is often caricatured, “a brain” staged such a dire ordeal as the field of life. A misguided necromancy is at work here unfolding out of the roots that nourish it, just as there are myriad possibilities to deconstruct, for the sake of us all, as the choice that stages another, alter-native becoming in the world. It is this alter-native becoming in the world that this chapter concerns itself with, especially as social movement emerging from Quechua/Aymara responses to this Western colonial encounter.

Quechua Difference, Quechua Translation, and the Peruvian Literary Tradition: Mariategui/Arguedas and the folkloric/popular anthropological practice: Ricardo Valderrama and Carmen Escalante’s work

This chapter delves into what the division that Carrillo postulates, between the folkloric anthropological, what I term the popular but fragmented tradition, and the Inka classical, as ideological “restoration” of Quechua governance as the identitary, “ancestral” and “civilizational” source for mestizo national may continue to give as Quechua difference. How does Quechua come alive—framed as it is in Ricardo Valderrama and Carmen Escalante’s, anthropologist’s by day, and their “native informant’s” neighbor by night, sympathies and indigeneity to the place so clearly marked by Quechua speaking and trans-lation of Gregorio Condori Mamani’s story? The comparative and translational analysis of mestizo literary construction of national identity shows that a criollo caste exercising what I have theorized as reconfected necromantic practices pursues its imperial designs through global networks which also appropriate local-belonging, place and globalized space appropriation by garnering citizenship, and by appropriating Westernized locally defined liberal republican state positions of power from within a liberal

---

147 I specifically focus on two texts written by this husband/wife bilingual Quechua/Spanish Peruvian anthropologist team: Gregorio Condori Mamani: Autobiografía and La Doncella Sacrificada: Mitos del Valle del Colca

148 Many texts are compelling in the way that they delimit the divergence between the Western lecto-scripted disciplinary traditions and the Quechua oral tradition transcribed. The Ramos Mendoza compilation of stories, catalogued dutifully in accord with Russian formalist categories of folk story analysis are nevertheless a source of signal literature, of the ways in which Quechua speakers read the world, but also of the way in which the West read (past tense) Quechua in a given moment in time. Tschopik’s anthropological linguistic analysis of Manuela Ari’s oral rendition of her life story is also another such source, for both reasons.
republican grid out of which they operate, only conveniently beholden to its rules or categories, as Vallejo makes evident in the emerging mestizo republican field his text proves real. Interestingly, the bi-cultural and bilingual mestizo fictional literature, the literature that troubles the national literary canon but at the same time constructs a particular national identity (especially Mariateguan,) bringing from out of their convenient concealment, the third party in the trilateral political relation ensconced in the Western colonial encounter, the ruling class exempt from the law, staging the necromantic state institutional foundation whereby the Westernized state institutions determine, (binding order) delimit, (map) and define (conceptual ideation) the colonial encounter as the pervasive complex of egoic (self-conscious-driven) domination of all that is other-ed. The “autobiography” of Gregorio Condori Mamani stages a different trilateral relation that reaches toward a global circuitry that translates this book, from Quechua, to Peruvian Spanish, into the language of global power, English,\(^{149}\) in the interest of giving voice, what I have called ventriloquism, to the indigenous Quechua way of knowing. In contrast to what Carillo outlines as part of the arc of a Mariateguan/Arguedian literary tradition, he cites the imperial nature of prevalent Westernized Peruvian literary criticism and production, also part of a trilateral relation deconstructed in Part One, over and against which he posits the anthropological/popular tradition we deconstruct here:

Comparatively and translationally, there is a peculiar tension in this Condori Mamani/Valderrama/Escalante endeavor shared among three interlocutors whose source, or “native informant” is a Quechua speaker “cargador,” (which I translate as burden carrier,) whose telling is appropriated by the Westernized form “autobiography,” whose Western authorship is absconded, through the construct “native informant” in spite of the literary endeavor “autobiography” being Condori Mamani’s, while copyright belongs to a research institution that publishes the work, and promotes the well-being of Quechua speakers. At the time that he is interviewed, Gregorio Condori Mamani is a wage earner (eventually unionized) who makes a living carrying primarily wares and food products to and from the market on a daily basis, and who, as Valderrama and Escalante’s neighbor, begins to recount his life story, which these Cusqueño anthropologists begin to record and then transcribe, with his trust and consent. This endeavor, its bookish material/non-material registers and figurations moves-- from what Barthes calls the work, and what, in this attempt to transcribe, defies the traditional practices that bring about the book as fragment of substance, especially its authorial imperative--, to the textuality that might render that cry of difference whenever the narrative as text evades Valderrama and Escalante’s ordering and editorial labors to give its Quechua, ‘Condori Mamani’ difference as aftermath. This work as political project also moves to the oral historical telling that is alive as Valderrama and Escalante’s (Foucauldian other) discontinuity surrenders their selves---to the discursive telling of a man’s story—not as if that story was their other---but rather,--- as a story that they tell for someone else---, an oral history--, which is also termed an “autobiography”— where the self that tells his own story, must tell it with the anthropologists’ aid---as translators, but also as translators between the Quechua language and the Quechua world it expresses, and as translators among Westernized academic disciplinary traditions—anthropological, historical, autobiographical---and genres--, autobiography and ethnography. This translation of world orders and ways of knowing and saying, facilitates this Quechua intercession into the Western field, edited and reconstructed for the Westernized reader’s sense of familiarity, that is his aesthetic, but which stands in after that translation, from Quechua telling to Western telling, as a prickly poetic expression, that is, the residue called Quechua difference.

This work as political project challenges a reconciliation with a Mariateguian justice, and with both the Quechua or Western worldview, so fragmented, so orphaned is this evocation---in
relation to its appropriation and fetishization through the vessel of the book, where Condori Mamani, Valderrama, and Escalante, all lose out on intellectual property (copyright) in 1977, and gain relative advantage in its circulation as commodity. The book is also a strange “anthropological stand-in” for Quechua practice, from the perspective of Quechua practice, but also as an amalgam of political-economic and poetic Western representation where the staging is not necromantic—the dead ancestors don’t speak—the descendants of the Carrillo literarily inspired, Mariategui-Arguedian Peruvian ancestors—, who are alive, Condori Mamani, Valderrama, and Escalante, all Quechua speakers—, speak,--- the two anthropologists as self professed writers and anthropologists seeking a disciplinary practice that balances what is out of balance---, and the textification of the Quechua speaker’s “desamparo” or orphan status when the Ayllu falls apart for the Quechua speaker becomes the signifier symbol: fragmentation and fragment---in this intercession between two disciplinary fields, literature/history and anthropology, but also an intercession of the Quechua field into the Western field, an intercession staged by two Quechua indigenous Peruvian anthropologists who delimit a Quechua field that decries Condori Mamani’s colonial burden: his fragmentation from the ayllu, as orphan, his continual displacement from one “job” to another, whereas he is seeking a place to be long, and not a “job,” the long wandering journey that takes him from punishment to punishment as he encounters misti after misti, until he finally arrives in Cusco. Condori Mamani’s perceptual world as he encounters the landscape colonial Spaniards and colonial Republicans have cut is the traversal that his autobiography tells, from ayllu/community Quechua field to westernized Peruvian provincial capital, Cusco. While Gregorio Condori Mamani, Quechua speaker and Quechua world dweller is reduced to wandering, looking for a place to be harbored and to dwell safely, pacha-sunq’ulla, in lieu of pachamama, for he is displaced, a fragmentary wanderer bereft of harbor from within the whole Quechua world the Quispillaqta neighbors and theorists tell us about.

Condori Mamani/Valderrama/Escalante’s text, multi-authored, intertextual, but also intercessional narrative, this oral history reduces the colonial encounter, not only because the recorders are allied with the speaker, but also because Condori Mamani’s fragmented Quechua world belies Western continuity and totality, for he remains Quechua speaking and “impenetrable,” while he is forced to live within the westernized Peruvian misti field: he cannot be devoured, but he is yet violated. This “auto-biographical” text decries colonial violence incisively—without violence---where the comparative and translational difference staged here, between two fields, is no longer simply a linguistic, translational residue. Valderrama and Escalante stage a work as political project that denounces the failure to make adequate Peruvian reality--, what Mariátegui proved to be real in the emerging Peruvian republican field of nation-
making—, to the Maristeguiuan political project that proposed that the Quechua-““Indio””-citizen was the social solution—, demographically the natural demos and socially communitistic—, the social solution to the conservative oligarchical faction contending unproductively with the liberal progressive and modernizing factions of Peruvian nation making unable to consolidate a bourgeois class, let alone viable capitalist production. They also stage a work as political project where the Quechua Modern is nowhere close to being fulfilled due to the violent displacement and marginalization that the Quechua speaking as a population are susceptible to, although as literature, more broadly defined by Carrillo to include this work, can now reterritorialize this Quechua narrative as Peruvian literary production. Carrillo responds to the aesthetic assimilation that Arguedas proposes, but Valderrama and Escalante respond to the Maristeguiuan nationalist project’s proposal, citing the case of Gregorio Condori Mamani as its failure.

Quechua translation of and for the West: the Quechua oral tradition transcribed and nation-building

Whereas the debates about these now arcival sources at the latter half of the 20th century moved from Arguedas’ struggle to unify the two nations, marking national identity with a Quechua difference before a colonial metropolis, to Carrillo’s efforts to provide a literary history with archeological dimensions in time, suturing the rift between the social body now including the “Indio,” as Maristegui intended, to the Valderrama/Escalante team of Peruvian anthropologists who gather for the archive in the name of that difference, and in the name of Quechua national identity in the interest of preservation and diffusion in written form, that is, nation building—what I have termed restoration—-all these efforts give the oral tradition transcribed, as a tradition insistently marked with the striking consistency and persistence of Quechua oral tradition. Quechua difference emerges as the poetic expression Quechua oral tradition, however transcribed. This is how it is included in Carrillo’s Peruvian literary canon, both as ““Indio” problem” resolved by inclusion in the (leftist) literary canon, as an other citizen rendering its Peruvian story, and also as persistent Quechua difference expressing itself orally in a tradition that would incidentally transcribe it in the interest of republican national identity or tactically transcribe it in the interest of Quechua national identity. The Escalante/Valderrama endeavor is unique in that it goes so far as to propose that the Quechua enter into communication with the Western field by means of their translation, furnishing the Peruvian westernized demos and ruling caste the chance to know the Quechua speaking nation surrounded through this three-way conversation. This in-stance of textification, a Foucauldian discursive event, gives way to a conversation book, the resting place emerging from the interecessional field created by the work
of Valderrama and Escalante, which begins to give way to the legitimated emergence of certain forms of Quechua translation and Quechua difference, enframed as conversation book.

In this instantiation in the field, “the properly indigenous,” though not the mestizo, where questions of authenticity and individuation are at play, we are at the margin, next to the fence still erect between the two nations, the Westernized colonial space limit where Gregorio Condori Mamani lives, and the place where he lands, just outside of the Ayllu and into the liberal republican grid. Whereas the world-weary self can only revive the cry of the other, his nostalgic alarm, translation rather than signification, as ventriloquism, situates communication before text and language, as part and parcel of the signifying process through the enthno-graphic practice. Authenticity is conferred in this westernized process, by anthropological disciplinary rule, but more importantly by the very trans-scription: the authorial and authoritative legitimacy and value granted to the printed word begins the ideological representations which will suture the divide between the state and the will of the indigenous social body which it disciplines, the scene of Vallejo’s conformation of the Peruvian national project, except that now the indigenous speaks, albeit edited, but the scene also of Arguedian utopia traversed by Mariateguian justice: the indigenous is social body, (and is not left out of the social body like the Vallejo-an indigenous Paco Yunque,) by virtue of trans-scription, a literary place gained through institutionally legitimated practices and the space gained in the Peruvian national imaginary. The scaffolding of the westernized institutions do not subvert Quechua orality entirely in that the anthropologist’s carry on their proper practice of graphing the oral ethne.

One gesture and this gesture alone recreates the colonial encounter decisively, surrendering the entire endeavor to the liberal grid, and maintaining the distance between the Quechua field and the Western Peruvian field viable, in force: though this text is Gregorio Condori Mamani’s “autobiography,” this Quechua cargador is not the author of what in Western tradition is properly autobiographically his story. It is for the indigenous as object, not only of anthropological analysis but of national imperative for identity through the other that is origin, however realistically impoverished and fragmented, that the endeavor becomes appropriated in the interest of—not only the liberal republican grid---but for global imperial consumption: this difference will also be devoured by the global capitalist machine churning out metaphors for its universal identity, that is, reenacting the colonial encounter: “global village,” still disadvantaged co-optations such as “sustainable development” which appropriates Andean-local Quechua knowledge and agricultural practices for itself, yet and still not collaborating, not compensating, not communicating with the Quechua speaking as equal partners in any of these
endeavors. While the written archive grows with bookish instances of the emerging anthropological canon of Peruvian mestizo literature, one is nevertheless struck with how consistently it renders a Quechua speaking tradition, in accord with an arc of Mariateguian/Arguedian justice: a Westernized Peruvian mestizo national tradition that recovers orally emerging Quechua art, self-consciously eliding questions of the economy, that is, land, and questions of Quechua autonomy and governance, that is, territory. As we have seen take place in the textual field, the field of language that implies the world, a tradition that speaks in an idiom imbued with a Quechua speaking world from the past, about and squarely in the present, while extending into the future is rustling with alternatives that point to the au de-là and to the midwivery of re-con-naissance. Re-searces in these alter-native fields are called upon to perform this critical translational and comparative practice in order to creatively procure the place for a conversation that is not colonized by the Western and Westernized varied reenactments of colonial encounter, too longstanding, too toxic, and too destructive. As Martin Lienhardt points out in his introduction to La Doncella Sacrificada, in spite of the lamentations of the elders of these Colca communities, it is evident that the Quechua speaking tradition remains legitimate, that is, a Quechua order that is practiced conscientiously in a Quechua world, sustaining this world, or as I put it, recreating it. To document and preserve, but also to transcribe in order beckon communication is to acknowledge the separation still existent between the two nations, the Quechua speaking and the Spanish speaking and to affirm and reaffirm the strength and perdurance of the Quechua oral tradition in this case, through the intervention, translation, and mediation of bi-literate, bi-lingual, and bi-cultural comparative trans-lators with sameness as equality in mind.

Quechua difference and translation as mediation: what then is this Quechua speaking and does it interrupt the colonial encounter?

However, as Valderrama/Escalante point out also, the Quechua speaking tradition, the tradition consistently imbued with an idiom with a very long duree of experience, knowledge, and a distinct worldview is not readily available, as it was not readily available throughout these last 500 years. Even for those for whom it may have appeared to be at hand at its most “pure” or undiluted, the Spanish chroniclers, and the later “colonial mestizo” chroniclers, the tradition was

150 I am adopting the metaphor of a Native (North) American Journal of that name. ….
151 Valderrama, Ricardo and Carmen Escalante. Eds. La Doncella Sacrificada: Mitos del Valle del Colca. Arequipa: Universidad Nacional de San Agustin, 1997 and Lima: Instituto Francés de Estudios Andinos, 1997 and Ricardo Valderrama and Carmen Escalante; copyright is shared among these three parties, Valderrama/Escalante together constitute the third. This is the third tome of a series entitled, interestingly, “Mounumenta Quechua,” sponsored by an association called “Arcivo de la Tradición Oral Quechua,” or ATOQ.
and has remained elusive. Neither the demographic collapse of the indigenous population, nor
the Spanish Colonial and enduring Republican imperative to consolidate a Quechua oppositional
and more or less homogeneous identity have brought the Quechua tradition forthrightly from
within the walls in which, according to Arguedas, it had been corralled. While it has been
susceptible to forces that may have eroded it or even destroyed it the Quechua speaking tradition
persists. Notwithstanding, at the site of colonial encounter in the mestizo republican field
Quechua is repressed insofar as it conflicts with the identitary imperative of the nation state, in
symbolic as well as real terms, that is, aesthetically and politically, however divided the ruling
elite may have remained between proponents of autonomy and proponents of a dependence or
investment in the colonial institutions that conserved certain sectors’ interests, for as we have
seen, in either the liberal or the conservative in-stance the indigenous functions to consolidate
national identity, symbolically; the indigenous that is notwithstanding proved to be real in the
Vallejo and Arguedas’ textification of his real Quechua (speaking) inflected existence in the
Peruvian Republican liberal and conservative (oligarchic) field, as outside the social (liberal)
body (Paco Yunque) or as socialist ayllu-topic alternative (Agua) to a conservative oligarchy.

The archeaological and anthropological recovery of the properly indigenous as Quechua
difference in the interest of Peruvian national autonomy, that is, independence from the imperial
metropolis, even after the republican revolutionary wars, mitigates in no way for the
appropriation of Quechua oral tradition in the interest of inevitably Westernized mestizo
nationalism, as an expression of the colonial encounter deconstructed throughout and which is
deeply embedded in this localized Peruvian field. Quechua oral tradition is appropriated through
this archeaological and anthropological recovery as part of the emergence and symbolic
realization of mestizo national identity as the recovery of the properly Peruvian indigenous.
Domination and suppression remain therefore the arc of this “universalized,” Western totalizing,
developmental progression within a site that remains because of this, a colonial encounter. The
indigenous is now disciplined symbolically within the fields of archeology and anthropology in
the interest of the autonomous Peruvian mestizo nation; this is the meaning of Carrillo’s pluralist
interest in including “popular expressions” of Peruvian “Quechua literature.” At the same time,
this is the imperative of the Valderrama/Escalante endeavor, even when their awareness of the
lack of purity in the tradition today may still be intent on conservation in arcival form: their
awareness of the global/local inherence places the endeavor once again in an ever widening
colonial encounter, though there is no cynicism here.
At best, in this republican national field, indigenous is folded into mestizo marked by Quechua difference, the residue and the aftermath of this translation and textifying practice that is the appropriation of Quechua oral tradition in the interest of conservation, in print form, and in Western tradition. The interest for deciphering this impurity, this proliferation rustles with the post-modern wave that destabilized the disciplines of anthropology and archaeology, or at the very least acknowledges the difficulty in disentangling the textual threads of what I call the fragmented Quechua tradition presents. It is difficult not to acknowledge a pervasive fracturing in all things that together signal Quechua persistence. Not only are there small fissures and larger fractures, but the co-mingling of multiple cultures is proved real in remote rural sectors or Andean provincial urbanized centers, however less compelling the notion of hybridity becomes as you alienate it from its more metropolitan or urban field of emergence. In Andean rural enclaves of Quechua proliferation, a vital ability to trans-late and comparatively assimilate some Westernized culture, and by comparatively I mean the equitable comparison, sans stratification, whose assessment yields a practical and welcoming Quechua reconnaissance of all things, not as other at all, but as part of the emerging field, in these Andean enclaves you will find Westernized practices and artifacts, by con-vivial choice.

At the same time, this rural Quechua enclave inheres upon the trans-migratory pattern of the Quechua speaking, which parallels the arc of their bilingualism, Quechua to Spanish all the way to the metropolis and to the cosmo-politan: Quechua speakers acquire “licenciaturas,” “maestrías,” y “doctorados,” they often purchase city plots and education with the sale of livestock and thus continue to re-turn to the rural Quechua enclave to culturally, socially, and economically replenish, and they cybernetically join the internet information highway, as much as they transact with their wares and artcraft internationally. It is in the metropolis that the colonial encounter will likely be reinstalled, for which there are everyday practices that Quechua speakers
utilize to deflect and resist the varying forms of “othering” which will take place where the liberal grid of the capital cities takes colonial encounter as the logic of its liberal grid just it has so far been deconstructed. The colonial encounter persists as the arc of conflict and separation so long ago deposited as a colonial, self-centered imaginary substantively and otherwise dissimilar to the Quechua worldview. In my field experience in Titicachi, Bolivia the women would literally put on their La Paz costume, my appellation, as they prepared to leave their Quechua rural enclave to trans-act with liberalized Paceño culture, as per their personal communication. Whereas they wore clothing that they had woven and embroidered themselves, the accomplishment that they achieved in this textilization signifying status and kinship, for skill and membership in their community were equally valued, indeed were an expression of one and the same valuation of this kinship. To go to La Paz they would where the traditional urban Aymara “pollera,” with the “mantilla,” and typical shoe, a ballet slipper/leather soled pump.

Quechua translation, textification, and dissemination

Notwithstanding, Valderrama and Escalante are critical and pivotal: their endeavors will begin a cultural turn that appears incidental. Their eventually well recognized and better funded efforts to recover the Quechua oral tradition also unveil what the academic fields both within Peru and outside Peru may be reluctant to acknowledge. Perhaps because they re-searc in the name of the preservation and well being of Quechua, and Quechua speaking peoples in the interest of not only conserving, but also making diffuse its oral traditions in written form they elide what the national mestizo agenda has inscribed as the future of the Peruvian “‘Indio’” at this time within the Peruvian national mestizo field: symbolic provenience and existence only.

152 The are important efforts by Frank Salomon and Gary Urton to read the Qhipus, the yet undeciphered records left by the administrators of pre-columbian affairs that are not part of the discussion of oral and written traditions here delimited. The oral tradition, relative to the quipus, presupposes a legibility by way of a mediating event, the event of alphabetization of the Quechua language during the Colonial era, and saliently, another period of alphabetization which took place during the period we have paused to observe, a period during which bilingual educational reforms also took place, in tandem with the juridical conformation of the legal entity “comunidad campesina.” This took place notably under the Velasco regime.

153 Though it falls outside the scope of the latter half of the 20th century insofar as the discursive designs and inscriptions that are traced, it is evident at the turn of the 20th and 21st century especially, that academic discourses turn toward a national pluralist discourse that incorporates the anthropological Quechua, and the anthropological Quechua oral tradition into governmental ministries’ goals and constituencies as well as into the discourses of tourism to which specific economic development projects attach, and yet they do so from within the mestizo republican Peruvian field. There has been no challenge to this field in that it continues to produce discourses that suture the persistent discontent of the social body, especially as expressed by native groups such as the Amazonian more recently, while the state, by ignoring claims outside the field of the significations of mestizo rule of law, continues to marginalize and castigate groups that are still under this violent erasure. There has as yet been no substantive challenge to the mestizo Peruvian state liberal rule of law even in Bolivia through the political movement led by Evo Morales.
Here it is worth underlining the process of publication, which I have so far remarked upon in footnotes, alongside Valderrama’s and Escalante’s methodological advice about how to gather this oral tradition in the field, advice based on rigorous disciplinary practice—donned with the unique ability that these two scholars bring to the laborious task of disentangling the *multi-layered textuality* of what is Quechua today. Apart from their bilingual, Quechua/Spanish anthropological endeavors with specific investments in the Andean, “lo serrano” as opposed to “lo Limeño,” and lo Cusqueño as opposed to any other provincial Andean capital, and apart from their personal Quechua inheritance, their work also falls within the economic development projects and interests that still concern governmental ministries and still draw the attention of myriad international Non-governmental organizations keen on investing surplus capital in endeavors which may also yield other benefits such as “indigenous knowledge,” “ecologically sound stewardship practices,” etc. In this *Indigenous Andean field* Escalante and Valderrama declare without declaring, *how*, while in the field---, a field in which they are much more rooted than other anthropological practitioners, and a field in which, by necessity they must “make a living” and in which by choice, they profess a Quechua-localized and national-localized investment---, the Colca Valley becomes *a field from within which they beget kinship*.

En enero de ese año [1985] nos trasladamos a vivir al pueblo de Chivay, capital de la provincia de Caylloma, para trabajar en el equipo de promoción del PRVC-DESCO (2). A partir de esa fecha recorrimos, premunidos de grabadoras y de cassettes, cada uno de los pueblos, comunidades y asentamientos de la provincia de Caylloma. Nuestra labor de promoción nos permitía largas estadías en las comunidades, entablando amistad con sus habitants, al compartir no sólo las alegrías y los riesgos de la vida en el campo sino sobre todo apostando por un programa de desarrollo y lucha contra la pobreza. Después de las duras y fatigantes jornadas, nos reuníamos al calor de la conversación, bajo un techo de paja o bajo aquel silencioso cielo azul intenso, de estrellas relucientes. Alrededor de un fogón, o de un manojo de coca, comabtíamos el frío. Los relatos se suscitaban trasladándonos a una realidad mágica de cerros que hablan y ríos voluntariosos, de piedras que caminan, y combates ancestrales. (xxi)

In January of that year [1985] we moved [trans-ladere] to live in the town of Chivay, the capital of the Province of Caylloma, to work with the promotional team of PRVC-DESCO (2). From that date forward we traversed, equipped with recorders and cassettes, every one of the towns, communities, and settlements of the Province of Caylloma. Our promotional tasks permitted us long stays in the communities, establishing friendship with the dwellers, as we shared in not only the joys and the risks of life in the countryside, but above all betting on a program of development and on the struggle against poverty. After the difficulty and exhausting workday, we would get together around the warmth of conversation, beneath a straw roof or beneath that silent intensely blue sky with sparkling stars. Around a bonfire, or a handful of coca leaves, we staved off the cold. The stories were incited transporting us [trans-ladandonos] to a magical
reality of mountains that speak and willful rivers, of stones that walk, and ancestral combat.

Perhaps especially because they abide in this field, and because they live outside the ayllu, there are at least three registers that mark the distance between the mestizo, misti world, and the Quechua world. Not only in the first instance is the Quechua tradition not available because of the intentional effort of its keepers, but secondly, it is also imparted variously, to outsiders. Valderrama and Escalante are able to enter this sequestered domain, and they are uniquely invited to do so, not only by social position and cultural affiliation, but by institutional agency. On the one hand, as trained anthropologists, they garner a social status that permits them entry into international endeavors that intend to address the questions of development which center around poverty in the rural sectors, and especially the Andean regions of Peru. As completely bilingual mestizos, their intimate relationship with their own ancestry, and the ability to abide in Quechua from this perspective and the perspective of lived socio-cultural and political experiences and commitments bring them closer to the Quechua tradition which they also abide in ostensibly more closely than “criollos” or mestizos. This shortened distance presupposes a given kinship, albeit a still conditioned one. They are neither “comuneros” or Runas dwelling in the Ayllu. Notwithstanding, this is what they recommend as method for gathering oral tradition in the field, a comprehensive proposal so specifically demanding that it would be a challenge to fulfill for most anthropologists, let alone those who are unfamiliar with “criollo,” “mestizo” or “misti” Spanish reality, a necessity when deconstructing the layers of interactions and too often one-sided communications between Spanish speakers and Quechua speakers and bilingual speakers.

Es importante igualmente registrar todas las tradiciones orales de la comunidad, o todo el corpus mítico de una zona: ahí se ve cuánto es de carácter local, cuánto ha sido influido por el sistema de comunicación hegemónico, y cuánto es recreado o mantenido por la comunidad. (xxii)

It is important to similarly/at the same time register all of the oral traditions of the community, or all the mythic corpus of a zone: it is here/this is how you can see how much is of a local character, how much has been influenced by a hegemonic system of communication, and how much is recreated or sustained by the community.

Their process of publishing from the Gregorio Condori Mamani text in 1977, where the copyright belongs to a research center, while its English translation pays its debt to their intellectual labor and property in 1996, to the struggle to get this work, La Doncela Sacrificada sponsored, let alone sustained within a circumstance which permitted this couple to live with and “compartir la misma pulga/share the same flea” as Felipe Quispe, an Aymara Bolivian leader, mallku, puts it, while remunerated by an agency. Notably, while they began their work in 1985, it
was not until 1994 when “la Universidad Nacional San Augustin de Arequipa hizo posible nuestra estadía en Colca, etapa en la cual recopilamos nuevas versiones, the UNSA of Arequipa made possible our stay in Colca, the stay during which we gathered new versions [of the myths]” that they were able to take up their comprehensive work of gathering multiple versions, and doing so over time, certainly part and parcel of the sustained efforts of “deep” anthropological work, but also the limitation imposed by the scarcity of resources for researc in a country like Peru. This implies of course that they operate in a relative disadvantage to foreign researchers who come well endowed by their respective academic department’s purse or the access to a superabundance of financial capital available through private sector foundations and public sector researc grants. What is more, there is a certain amount of limitation insofar as access to methods and technologies innovated in their academic field of researc to the extent that again, there is a relatively greater abundance of resources allocated in more affluent societies, relative to a society like Peru’s for sustained efforts devoted entirely to researc. Here is how they describe their relative advantage and disadvantage:

En las comunidades se dan circunstancias especiales en las que el discurso es vital. Los que vivimos en medio de esta realidad, tenemos el privilegio de acceder a estas circunstancias, pero no obstante tenemos el problema de no manejar las herramientas adecuadas, de no tener el tiempo suficiente para tartar el tema y por supuesto, carecemos de financiamiento para dedicarnos a su estudio. (xxi)

In given special [specific] circumstances a vital discourse emerges in the communities. Those of us who live in the midst of this reality, have the privilege of acceding to these circumstances, but notwithstanding we have the problem of not using [having access, not being aware in order to use the latest methodologies or technologies, we are subject to the coloniality of Western knowledge] the adequate tools, of not having enough time to deal with the subject and of course, we lack the funding in order to be able to dedicate ourselves to its study.

Valderrama and Escalante apoint out that the Quechua tradition is delimited discursively, in situ, and that it is also the task of the ethnographer methodologically to discern the variations and instantiations when meaning will shift in accord with the movement of matter, alongside which the word shifts in meaning, a procedure which augurs a re-turn to communication from the point of view of Barthian textuality, whereby place and things belonging in place together communicate meaning. The oral Quechua tradition is delimited discursively through social demarcations of place and role. When speaking to family members, for purposes of nurturance and education, the tradition is imparted unequivocally, matter-of-factly. When conveyed to outsiders, who are welcomed as outsiders, the tradition is imparted with qualifications such as, “it is believed,” “long ago it was told,” “we remember that once upon a time,” as if to clarify, that
the Quechua speaking acknowledge the difference that marks them as otherwise “impenetrable,” “unbelievable,” such as they remain, in the present, for “moderns.” The more remote the Quechua speaker can make her/his own tradition in this instance, the less the Quechua speaker is obliged to explain how her/his view of the world may be ever present, today, and ever different from the Peruvian mestizo national in this instance. The clash of civilizations is not just a metaphor, but an experience registered in these Quechua speaker’s qualifications and negotiations. And finally, be-fore and after Carrillo’s pluralist attempt to ensconce, if in a strained way, any of these expressions from this oral tradition into literary or academic genres, or the field of archaeology, the Quechua language is practiced variously, where things and their comportment sway words, Valderrama and Escalante point out. In ritual, words used in the everyday do not mean the same things. Outside of the community and within the vastness of the Andean peaks, a Quechua cultural landscape populated by the personages of the mountains, Apus who oversee and protect the affairs of all Quechua communities, a man may express his affiliation, his relationship to what he considers his, in another manner altogether. (xxii-xxiii) This methodology implies the depth of immersion and the length of time they sustained in kinship with the community members, which they deem necessary, methodologically, to ascertaining the mythical corpus of a given region, in this case “el Valle del Colca.”

Interestingly, Martin Lienhard, a well known Andeanist whose endorsement in writing the prologue signals the global importance of the Valderrama/Escalante work, Lienhard goes beyond Carrillo in signaling the continuity and discontinuity out of which a discursive narrative is possible, as a way of framing the “fragments” of the tradition that Valderrama and Escalante gather in a way that displaces the concept in its ability, precisely out of the multiplicity of versions, the continuity of persons, and the variety of perspectives, to engender sufficient heuristic force to tame the proliferation of mythic fragments signaling a sameness not caught in one word, one idiom, one inscription, but in many. Lienhard describes it in the following way:

De modo más general, parecería que apenas se distinguen conceptualmente los géneros narrativos. Se diferencian, más bien, las modalidades comunicativas. (xiii) [Underlined emphasis mine.]

In a more general way, it seems that you can barely conceptually distinguish narrative genres. What are differentiated, rather, are communicational modalities.

The fragmentary nature of the tradition transcribed also harks back to the period during which Lienhard first assessed the academic and literary importance of the Valderrama/Escalantes compilation, a period in literary and social science theory and criticism during which Nietzsche was in vogue, postmodernity was marked by the discovery of difference, and even differâance.
Foucault had enlightened scholars with the notion of an archeology of knowledge, a discursive palimpsest with political implications, and attendant positions and positionings. Who could argue that this frame was better suited to interpellating this tradition, within its consistencies and accidents, from the Western viewpoint, from the archive it delimited on its own terms? Except that Lienhard takes the enunciations about this tradition, from the Quechua speaking who transmit and practice their tradition, as poetic expression. Interestingly, words from the Quechua language that have been translated “conceptually” into Spanish and other conceptual print languages, Lienhard discerns as not having the significance the Westernized and Western totalizing conceptual traditional readings give them when found in La Doncella Sacrificada.

...*historia* no remite a la historia escrita que se puede leer en los manuals historiográficos. ...Empleado en otras zonas como sinónimo de “cuento,” [asunto que he escuchado también de mi profesor de Quechua cochabambino, quien participó activamente en las reformas educacionales bilingües] *willay* no aparece con este significado. ...*Rimay*, por ejemplo, vocablo que remite también al lenguaje en general, se aplica a la comunicación colectiva, mientras que *willay* traducido generalmente por “avisar,” se refiere a los consejos, las amenazas o las moralejas que alguien le tributa a otro. (xiii)

...“*history*” does not refer to the [Western] written history that can be read in historiographic manuals. Utilized in other regions as a synonym for “(short) story,” *willay* does not appear with this meaning. ... *Rimay*, for example, a word that refers also to language in general, is applied in regard to collective communication, while *willay*, which is generally translated as “letting someone know,” refers to advice, admonishments, or the moral that someone gives to another.

**Quechua language and the Quechua field: translating Spanish and translating place: the colonial encounter reduced**

Lienhard also traces the relationship between place and the Quechua language and its relationship to Spanish language and culture. The adoption of Spanish words into Quechua language Lienhard submits is related to “geography,” the earthly place of the enunciation, and “sociological linguistics,” the inherence of the social upon the meanings of enunciations, that is, what is with text, or context. In that regard Lienhard submits that the more remote from the valley, the valley that sustains the most intercession from the Western and Westernized field, the closer the Quechua language becomes to what he calls its seed. That is to say that the as language changes and shifts from valley all the way up to the highlands, the regions most remote where there is generally “animal husbandry,” the less there is Spanish interference in the Quechua spoken. This registers not only for the names of natural places, say a river or a lagoon which closer to the valley may have adopted the Spanish word, but closer to the high lands as Quechua
climbs to its “seed” even the words relating to world view such as “familia” which is adopted in the valley and substituted in the highlands for “Ayllu.” Lienhard summarizes it this way:

A grandes rasgos, el viaje en ascenso por el valle del Colca es también en terminus lingüísticos, un viaje a la semilla. Los relatos que pertenecen a las comunidades de la zona alta se ven mucho menos interferidos por el español que los de la zona más templada, plagados de terminos y construcciones de origen español que no se explican simplemente por la necesidad de dar cuenta, en un idioma arcaico, de la modernidad. (xv-xvi)

In broad strokes, the ascending traversal up the valley of Colca is also in linguistic terms, a traversal to the seed. The stories that belong to the communities of the highest altitudes (the highlands) are less interrupted/interceded by Spanish than the more temperate zone, plagued with terms and construction of Spanish origin that cannot be explained simply by the necessity to account for modernity in an archaic idiom/language.

But the relationship to things is more than geography and more than sociolinguistics. I recall a situation where one of my Quechua teachers in Cusco who had been raised by grandparents in a traditional Quechua community setting, had a very difficult time with one of my classmates utilizing a Quechua action word, strictly referring to a specific activity—, literally an action that was part of a network of activity to which the action belonged, and without which the whole endeavor did not make sense—, as an abstract “conceptual” verb, in an abstract circumstance. Enough conceptualization and generalization may have taken place in the intercession between Euro-centered Westernization on the localized “Peruvian” field from the Colonial period to the Republican present. The Spanish Crown’s first conquering gesture was the consolidation of one “homogenous” Quechua identity, the first grammars and dictionaries being part of the imperial design to homogenize through the printed word.154 Later, bilingual education, Spanish/Quechua, and the “acquisition” of Quechua not only as a written language, which is what the reform addresses insofar as the Quechua speaker gaining Western printed literacy is concerned, but “second language acquisition programs” addressing the need for the Peruvian or

---

154 The first notable grammars and dictionaries were published by Fray Doming de Santo Tomás on January 10, 1560, and Diego González de Holguín who first published his “vocabulary” in 1608. A notable dictionary that registers the dialectical variations of four regional Quechuas, “Cuzco, Ayacucho, Junin, Ancash” and establishes through this publication a relationship which in the eventual field proves real an important intercession between the Aymara and Quechua speaking, this multilingual, Quechua/Aymara/Spanish dictionary first published in 1905 by Franciscan missionaries by the title Vocabulario Poliglota Incaico is “normalized” in 1998 in accord with bilingual reform alphabetization by one Peru’s most important linguists, a scholar indefatigably dedicated to gathering Quechua-localized idioms in the interest of Quechua speaking—archival preservation and the lively diffusion of this knowledge, Rodolfo Cerrón Palomino. His and his technical team’s efforts were sponsored by the Peruvian Ministry of Education under the direct supervision of the Dirección Nacional de Educación Inicial y Primaria/National Directory of Initial and Primary Education, and the Jefe de la Unidad de Educación Bilingüe Intercultural/Chief of the Bilingual and Intercultural Education Department.
international scholar to “acquire” the Quechua language also submits the Quechua idiom to a conceptual homogenization reflected in my classroom experience. The comparative and translational problem is the trans-position of a communicatively imbued language, where meaning pre-cedes the word that arises out of the activity in the eco-field, that is, specifically a Quechua field, as we shall see in more detail further below, rather than the opposite, which is what takes place for printed language. The deconstruction of Barthes’ theory of textual signification evidenced as real for the Westernized textual field that in attempting to escape the Western self, and the fixity of the signifier the self is an emblem for, while meaning proliferates as “difference itself” in the Barthian textifying practice, the groundlessness/placelessness (not as Western origin or foundation, but as earth) and immateriality of the referential activity of Western print languages fails to procure a thing, and more importantly does not procure a relationship to any thing, other than one of transience, and a terrible nostalgia for materiality, for the reality of the social body, or any thing, to be fully enunciated in the roundness and cadence of the word, a fullness and a cadence that my Quechua teacher cried out in alarm was missing in my classmate’s “conceptual” “use” of the Quechua action-specific word.

It is questionable that Valderrama and Escalante deem that Quechua is “archaic,” as it is questionable to me in that Quechua speakers everywhere thrive in their daily and ritualized social intercourse in Quecha, a phenomenon proven real in the textual field describing Valderrama and Escalante’s work alongside Quechua speakers for a very long time, sharing their joys and their risks, growing to be friends, abiding with one another as neighbors and allies. Suturing the dissonance between the Peruvian social body and the nation state was expressed through the assemblage of Peruvian national identity we have termed mestizo, an assemblage felt in the field as the blows Paco Yunque receives as anvil, as indigenous sadly. It is this “archaic” status precisely that erases Paco Yunque, and which makes Quechua unable to translate modernity, a modernity that the Quechua speaking know how to embrace as we have seen throughout this text and its intertextuality. The Peruvian criollo nationalist aspirations that would bring modernity to the nation would be fulfilled by Carrillo’s Arguedian revaluation of the place of the Quechua oral tradition in the mestizo Peruvian literary tradition, on the backs of “Indio”s” like Gregorio Condori Mamani as the guarantor of a Peruvian criollo idigeneity. As his “autobiography” attests, Gregorio Condori Mamani wanders aimlessly down the road that is now asphalted and under a sky traversed by iron birds, (insert quote) orphaned155, without shelter, placeless, that is,

155 Orphanhood traverses all Quechua lyrical instantiations, from the colonial so-called hymns Carrillo and Lara gather, for example, to the waynus sung today. Orphanhood is one of the most devastating events a runa may encounter, and it applies in some measure to widowing (Tsopik’s transcription of Manuela
desamparado. He ultimately arrives in Cusco where his colonial displacement remains the criollo’s reterritorialization of what might have been the Quechua speaker’s place, her/his home, a displacement effected by means of the symbolic mestizo citizen as the slight but needed -- difference itself-- separating the Peruvian nation from the Bolivian nation, or more importantly from Spanish and Euro-centered but dispersed imperial metropolis—yet and still. It could be said, that Gregorio Condori Mamani carries this colonial burden quite literally on his back, where the world as text proves that this burden is not only real, but injustice upon injury.

The work that Valderrama and Escalante have done together, while they feel it may have some technical deficits due to the “disadvantages” or the “disadvantaging” previously alluded, that don’t permit them to acquire “state of the Euro-centric—Euro-US-Americanized” conceptual practices is seen as an advantage from the point of view of this theorization of the Western colonial encounter. Interestingly, they view their work as a projection of the conversations that have been the necessary basis for their sustained work in the field, in order not just to deposit this emerging Quechua written tradition in the ATOQ Arcivo de la Tradición Oral Quechua, but also to stage the emergence of the conversation book more or less self-consciously—albeit mediated by intellectual property rights that nevertheless displace the author in the Foucauldian eventual field. This is the way they summarize the reach of their work, and the active benefits of its diffusion:

We consider it important to recuperate and reevaluate the oral traditions of the “peasant” communities, because they possess a mythic knowing, which has constant transformations which render/create a fusion of ancient and new significations, intervening in the re-reading they perform of global society. [Quechua theorization, transformational border

Ari’s, and Aymara woman’s life story,) as much as to a loss of parents, as in Gregorio’s case, but also, as in “the hymns” where the supplicant beseeches the sun, Inti, as father, as creator, not to abandon his child.
It is not only necessary to recuperate it, but it is necessary to publish and disseminate it in order to strengthen collective memory and our own identity.... With its publication we want to contribute to the cosmovision of the Quechua speaking “comuneros” being known. To contribute to the communication between “comuneros,” and between them and other sectors of the population (the idealized mestizo demos, or the separatist criollo caste?) in order that their vision of the world and history be understood.

Undersigning the mestizo republican project, and extending the Arguedian/Mariáteguian arc of justice, these Cusqueño indigenous—ably establishing locally-rooted neighborly relations--anthropologists are at the same time preventing the violent erasure that Vallejo decried eloquently through the child characters in his story Paco Yunque. The proposal is not a Quechua Modern, the product of a Hegelian synthesis that did entail the appropriation of the place and the labor of the slave, but which in reality does not prove that the total assimilation of the Quechua speaking, nor its oral traditions, is in any total way a reality, in spite of its some-times sustained subaltern and subjugated status, from within the Euro-centered Westernized imaginary of the Peruvian ruling criollo caste156, even and perhaps especially if he is foreign born.

This activity, the practice of preserving the Quechua communicational and communicated lesson, its knowledge practices and its knowledge is the aim of the restoration of its oral tradition, not only by making it diffuse, but also, by preserving it by arciving it, as if the lesson learned from the proselytizing Catholic missionaries who listened, learned, transcribed, and archived what would later help indigenous historians in Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador recover the history of their own people, the history never written in Westernized republican textbooks.

THOA, out of La Paz emerged out of a “grassroots” indigenous social movement of cultural affirmation taking place in the 1980’s which poetically expressed itself in the eventual field as a trans-lation, from social movement to indigenized institution, in the form of THOA, the Taller de Historia Oral Andina/the Workshop for Andean Oral History whose purpose was to gather this indigenous knowledge in order to re-turn to it for the sake of Quechua, Aymara, and Guarani speakers through radio diffusion, through pamphlets, through video and photograph and through

---

156 The use of the word “caste” in the current of thought involving “subaltern studies” especially brought about by the work of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and Dipesh Chakrabarty, an area of studies that Latin American and US intellectuals and scholars found correspondence with and thought through for the Latin American region; the Bolivian Andean field of Westernized historical researc did influence THOA’s reflections, and the word “caste” is used in their work reference to the republican ruling class—read “caste”--- that reproduced, trans-positioned, trans-lated and comparatively recreated the Colonial Period Indian Tribute in the Republican Period as the “Contribución Indigenal.” The word “caste” is used also primarily because it comparatively and translationally traces the continuous arc of feudal relationships that persisted from the colonial period into the republican period, in order to deconstruct it, citing its continual interruption by the intercession of a Quechua and Aymara field into the Western globalized and Westernized localized field, alongside the myriad events in the eventual field that precipitate transformation in the world.
the publication of historical re-searce works, books, and texts. Interestingly, these THOA re-searcers also enter the terrain of the book in that its governable territory is the domain of the republican statist, public, institutional field. It is in this terrain that a significant challenge to Westernized republican forms of institutionalized colonial encounters can be released, not in order to resist or deny Westernized forms per se, but rather to affirm Quechua and Aymara fields of practice and worldviews thereby strengthening the creative and re-creative poetic expressions and practices emerging out of these Andean fields. The Editorial that emerges alongside THOA’s conformation as an NGO is called Aruwiyrí, which translation is published textually as:

He who sets the voice on fire. The name of a bulletin (journal) that “Great International League of Indigenous Culture” directed by the ______ Felipe Pizarro en la década de 1910. Our editorial has wanted to rescue/recover this term in order to symbolize the incorporation of the written word into the trunk [reference to a tree] of our ancestral knowing from our ayllus. [Cover page: for the publication “Ayllu: Pasado y Futuro de los Pueblos Originarios.” Serie: Cuadernos de Formación, No. 5, 1995]

El que incendia la voz. Nombre de un boletín que publicaba la “Gran Liga Internacional de Cultura Indígena” dirigida por el preceptor Felipe Pizarro en la década de 1910. Nuestra editorial ha querido rescatar este término para simbolizar la incorporación de la palabra escrita en el tronco de los saberes ancestrales de nuestros ayllus. [Cover page: for the publication “Ayllu: Pasado y Futuro de los Pueblos Originarios.” Serie: Cuadernos de Formación, No. 5, 1995]

This affirmative gesture welcomes and convivially allies with another knowing. Lienhard also underlines the presence of the Western book in the “mythic fragments” which resemble the Nietzschean fragment in typographical lay-out and in Valderrama and Escalante’s interpretation of their global purpose. He attributes the book’s appearing in these mythic narrative fragments to the “prestige” the book acquired through “Christian preaching,” in “Quechua communities,” a prestige which these narrations translate as “quri libru,” golden book, “qulqi libru,” silver book. However, the mythic stories according to Lienhard also reveals an ambivalence about the book, and the written archive, the annals of legislation, as a form of decadence perceived by the Quechua speaker, but also, as a skill the mastery of which could change relations of power, such as CLR James explains powerfully in The Black Jacobins, the history that narrates the spread of the French Revolutionary ideals of “Liberté, égalité, fraternité,” as a result of the French lecto-scripted literacy of the Black Jacobin whose name speaks, Toussaint L’Ouverture, all saints in the field, in the clearing.157

Sin embargo, la actitud más común de los narradores ante la escritura y los libros es más bien ambivalente. Hablando del candidato presidencial Ezequiel Titu

---

Ataucusi, uno de ellos comenta, sin duda para distanciarse: “El es de los que creen en el libro de la Biblia.” (Chivay) El mismo narrador alude negativamente a la excesiva cantidad de leyes que existen actualmente, “escritas hasta en libros”. Por ese motivo, agrega, sutí musquypin musphashanchik runa (“los runas estamos delirando sonámbulos”). Los inkas también escribían, dice luego, pero no en papeles, sino en piedras ardientes que se enviaban con hondazos. Como se colige de otro relato (Tisco), la facultad de saber leer y escribir podría, sin embargo, contribuir a cambiar las relaciones de poder. El narrador indígena cita las palabras de un misti profesor: kay “Indio"kuna ashkhata yacharqunqaku chayqa paqariq qhipa p’unchawtan joderpawasunman (si estos “Indio”s aprenden mucho, mañana otro día, nos van a joder.) (xv)

Notwithstanding, the most common attitude of these [Quechua speaking] narrators before/regarding writing and books is more than anything/actually ambivalent. When speaking of the presidential candidate Ezequiel Titu Ataucusi, one of them comments, without a doubt, in order to distance himself: “He is of the sort that believe in the book of the Bible.” (Chivay) The same narrator negatively alludes to the excessive number of laws that exist currently, “written even in books”. Because of this, he adds, sutí musquypin musphashanchik runa (“we runas are deliriously sleepwalking”). The inkas also wrote, he says after, but not on papers, but on/in fiery rocks flung from slingshots. Just as _____ is gleaned from another relation (Tisco), the faculty of knowing how to read and write could, notwithstanding, contribute to changing power relations. The indigenous narrator cites a misti professor: kay “Indio"kuna ashkhata yacharqunqaku chayqa paqariq qhipa p’unchawtan joderpawasunman (if these “Indio”s learn a lot, tomorrow another day, they are going to screw us up.)

Undoubtedly the nationalist representational agenda of the mestizo literature previously mapped upon the social body was a gesture marked with the Quechua difference, as residue and aftermath, the needed difference to contravene dependence. And yet, this mestizo figuration of a new Peruvian citizen remained beholden to the sociohistorical field that sustained Western forms and institutions, western worldviews, denying and suppressing the Quechua and Aymara worldviews yet traversing republican culture, however recondite its most compelling presence, however degraded its place within national culture, in the real. The Arguedian Peruvian nationalist mestizo field inscribed a Quechua Modern, --- in spite of and beyond Arguedas’ desire to embody him through a dramatic and political, discursive positioning, --- mise en scène for his psychic break down as well --- the cut that he felt most acutely and tragically as the lack of understanding between the two nations, as he stated it, but also, as he narrates it in his journals, as the abandonment to which the emptiness in the Spanish words relegated him, so dissociated from things were they felt for Arguedas ---, (while Quechua found the pre-scribed criollo place augured in Vallejo, the “necessary” non-place in the republican social field which the mestizo citizen must overtake), --- an abandonment which does echo his childhood experiences, the psychic “ailment” he explains he “contracted as a child,” when he was tossed over the fence and into the Ayllu, and back into the misti world he could barely reconcile to the Quechua mother that raised
him when his own “abandoned him.” These gestures trace or bring out from under erasure what the modernity of the 20th century did in fact leave “behind” in the Peruvian mestizo national field as colonial difference. This erasure expresses itself violently upon the social body that Mariategui anticipated was by demographic majority an indigenous demos. At the same time, this separation and isolation alongside the ignorance that it could result in, ironically, and undoubtedly—painfully and joyously—led to the preservation and perdurance of this Andean Quechua field localized speaking, knowing, experiencing and governing. And as THOA will unearth out of the experiential and knowing field of the elders from whom it will recover Quechua, Aymara, and Guarani her/histories, in the déroulement of time, and alongside a time immemorial that creatively and re-creatively poetically expresses the Andean and Tropical earthly-local worldviews, the time of the sacred to which it re-turns since time immemorial, and to which it returns even now, THOA will recover the field of Ayllu governance as the seed of all life. This Valderrama/Escalante book is signal literature: it presages the Quechua voices in conversation that will emerge from the transformational boundary between Quechua speakers and Spanish/Quechua bilingual translators and writers. But THOA will plot the stakes for the Quechua, Aymara, and Guarani nations which will again and again choose their knowledge systems over and above Spanish impositions and intercessions, in a lucid avoidance of the colonial encounter there embedded, an avoidance accomplished primarily through an affirmation of its own field of knowing practice.

Western gestures, including the more contemporary searces for subaltern discourse, or for alternative languaging practices and even alternative epistemologies, or the continual presence of colonial institutions and practices now termed coloniality, none of these gestures have yet achieved a clear recognition, a reading which is able to practice re-con-naissance, the accompaniment whereby the Quechua speaking themselves address colonial rule with heart rending clarity, in the present, and through millenary knowledge that is legitimate in this present, while they converse with this modernity with an undeniable acceptance and wisdom which is as lucid as any academic assessment may ever aspire to be. The title of THOA’s publication on the Ayllu is telling: “Pasado y Futuro de los Pueblos Originarios.” The omission of the present is an acknowledgement that “history,” no written story can address the present, for the present is lived now—and cannot ever find itself expressed in writing other than as the past. In other words, Quechua poetic expression speaks from the past in the present for the future without conceptual or abstract mediation, thereby exercising a re-con-naissance and a midwivery of what emerges in its field of knowing practice, in some manner, without the decadence that the daily news intimates in its sound bytes, as it gives birth to the absence of inter-personal communication, and
irreconcilable distances which collapse this fragile interaction between present persons in caring and attentive conversation, for the sake of all life. In other words, Quechua poetic expression speaks words that are round and cadent with the material and earthly person they be-speak with, a re-con-naisance that establishes a vital link between words/thought and persons, for the Quechua world deems all things alive, which, the fallen Westernized conceptual categorical word will empty, so deep is its fear of loss, so domineering is its penchant to totalize and identify with its self, that is, to colonize, to take over all that is other in the interest of the self. And here is what is radical: the Quechua view of the world, as it is presented in these expressions, poetic, pertain today, as they did yesterday, without the strange necromantic practices that—modern irony of ironies—stage the emptying Westernized death warrant. Valderrama and Escalante not only want the Quechua speaking world to be understood but enact a scholarly practice of re-search intended to disseminate this Quechua knowing for the sake of the world, where the Quechua textual field may intercede to reduce the colonial encounter that frames the Western field.

And yet we abide in an intercessional field where Western and Quechua fields of significations and practices collide, where “a differential in power” seems to give that the colonial encounter will win the day, the night, the globe, the sun, the moon, the stars, and us. As we have seen, throughout the 20th century, the Peruvian mestizo field has persisted in conflict with the social body, suturing this rift with a national mestizo literature, fictional or anthropological, a symbolic narrative in stark variance with the Quechua speaker, and continually dispossessing this mestizo citizen of her/his culture and of his/her home, his/her land also, however incompletely the Westernizing modern project in the Peruvian field has been “achieved,” the incompleteness being a strong reason for joy, without a repudiation of the Western—just as our Quechua yachaqkuna/elder teachers tell and practice at the same time. It could be said that within the mestizo field, “Quechua” is abruptly appropriated in the interest of national identity, thereby interpellated into mestizo state hegemony, while in the field of the real, Quechua has been de facto translated into the authoritative institutionality and legitimacy of mestizo Western Peruvian forms. And yet, the text of Gregorio Condori Mamani however much he is mediated through a bilingual and bicultural ventriloquism yet stands as a Quechua poetic expression never before distilled in this way, dramatically, textually proving to be real the appropriation of the Quechua speaking peoples’ territories. In a culture inundated with words and discourses,---whose cacophony Foucault may have taught us to value, as opposed to its staid and disciplining, cruel and fixated deployment—there is within the Quechua tradition, a palpable runa heartbeat... for the attuned listener/reader/re-searcher. This rhythm gives place in a Quechua field: Kancha (lugar donde pastean los animales/pastoral/sheep/llama herding field) Chacra (parcela para
Intercession: A view from the Quechua field, *Kancha Chacra Sunq’ulla*: how the West may intercede

Is the textuality that any re-port brings to its audience through an account of events the undecidable ambivalence that the confrontation between Spanish and Quechua yet conjures in the palimpsest of archeological evidence that the landscape, the “monuments,” the structures made of stone piled upon stone reveal, with attendant parchments, texts, and discourses surrounding them? The study that this dissertation continues to perform suggests that this apparent ambivalence is not as ambivalent in the eventual (meaning contingent, conditional) field, that the contention between that which is Spanish, and that which is Quechua is constantly decided, and undecided, and that there is an integrative and a disintegrative way in which the two face, and face off. No Westerner could deny that the rock is not alive, that it is inanimate, and conveniently “fixed” by Western scientific, bio-logical definition, though the discovery of the lively “particle” has created shifts in the way we see. It may be conducive here to remind ourselves of the history of the word “science”: in its *genealogical* traversal; it is according to the Merriam Webster Dictionary, circuitously, last expressed before it became modern English from the Middle English, which is traced to its relation to the Middle French, and back further to the Latin “*scientia*,” which in turn comes from the present participle of “*scire*, to know”, “akin to L[atin], *scindere*, to cut, more at---SHED”. The Western scientific way of cutting into the field designated biology, creates “fragments of substance” while shedding what is in excess: some things are animate, and they concern the bio-logical, but all things inanimate do not.

The rock is in excess of the object cut out of the field of biology. In *comparison*, no Quechua speaker would deny the life of the rock. That the rock is not alive is a veritable impossibility. The rock is not only alive; everything that is a person is alive, and many “things,” that is, what the West would consider “things,” to the Quechua speaking person are other persons. The rock is for the Quechua speaking person, an other person, embodied in the *Urqu*, the mountain, which houses *Huamani* good spirits which care for animals and worry about humans, and *urqu* is also an *Apu*, a male deity with personality, dress, character traits, like the *Huamani*, who involves himself in the affairs of humans, intimately at times, befriending or courting human women, but primarily as the protector, the guardian of the region called the *Ayllu*, which is the name not only for the territory but for the part of *Pacha*, the world, that *Ayllu* is. *Ayllu* is all that lives and is held in harmony together in one place, and in this sense it is also conceived of as the seed of life, of Quechua life. For example, in her book/chapter that gives the
entire compilation its title, *Kancha Chaqra Sungulla*. [The field where I keep my animals, *Kancha*, and the field where I plant the seeds I’ve invited to join me, *Chacra*, these two places are in my heart, *Sung’u*, and in my heart alone, because with my heart alone I enjoin them and they enjoin me, and together, we live. (Translation mine)]

Magdalena tells us that both *Huamani* and *Apu* are *Ayllu*. She states it this way, in the context of describing the role of the *Huamani* in caring for the animal persons that human persons care for on the days of the festivities that honor the *Huamani* by offering him gifts and entrusting to him the animals.

It should be noted that for all that *Huamani* are the caregivers of all the animals, wild and domesticated, which they keep inside a cave with a special opening to the inside of the *urqu*, mountain, where the *Huamani* keep all animals safely, Quechua human persons have a horizontal relationship with them which is traversed primarily and which has as its rule, affectionate treatment as the required sign of harmony preserved between them, indeed cultivated. This affection is reverence, while at the same time it is evident that this person, the *Huamani* can insure the well-being of the animal as much as the human person, and in this sense he is the patron of their well-being, and is thereby endowed with a power that is how own, but does not exceed the Quechua human person’s in importance. Notwithstanding, the Quechua human person will speak to *Huamani* with the affection necessary to revere them, as they do other persons as well, as a rule, but they will also live with *Huamani* with great familiarity, knowing how the *Huamani* is, what he expects, and how he conducts himself. Magdalena indicates that the *Huamani* will “disappear” or literally take sheep or bulls from Quechua speaking persons if they are not well cared for, giving this animal to someone in need, say a widow, or an impoverished other human person, and the entire section on *Kancha* is dedicated to outlining what it takes to care for your animals, with your heart alone, as if *Kancha* was the abode of your heart. (135-143).

Ritual Festivity marks the relationship between Quechua human persons and Quechua deity persons: this commemoration of the relationship between in this case, animal persons, wild or domesticated, deity persons, and human persons through play and sacred ritual, work and dance and music on February of every year permits *Ayllu* to perdure through reverence, affection, and a process of marking the animals, with ribbons and other colorful attachments, for example to their ears, this naming them to incorporate them to *Ayllu*, to their most direct abode with both *Huamani* and human persons, welcomes them as another person, but does not signify that they are owned as property. They belong to the *Huamani*, their caregiver, who also cares for humans. The *Huamani*, Magdalena tells us, function this way, as protection, teacher, and figure of command insofar as they care especially for the animals, and worry about the humans in tandem with the *Apu*. The way humans and deities live together, getting to know one another, a
familiarity which permits them affection, and affection that permits them familiarity—this knowing each other and living together in affection—is Ayllu:

In this to do [the festivity in February when animals are marked, but by ribbons in their ears and a number of other decorations] you proceed and live together with your patron Huamani, in this festivity you offer, you chakcha everything you have, it is the festivity during which you get to know him the best and because of this he is your Ayllu also, he is always prepared to advise you, protect your animals, share at least a handful of coca leaves. [Exchanging Coca leaves is the gesture of welcome, "affection and respect" offered to all persons upon meeting/greeting them.]

This is why when you die it’s not only your relatives that sadden and cry but also your patron (Apu). When one goes away or disappears without him knowing, this absence worries him a lot and he begins to inquire, asking for his friend; this is why, in the case of someone deceased, when they know of it they [Apus] cry saying:

...ayyy...! carajo!!!! pobrecoito!, ha muerto el hombre con quien tomaba trago, que me daba su coquita, …pobrecoito! carajo! con el pasaba la vida (vidapasaqmasiy kara)

“Agua es persona.” Tells us Marcela in her book/chapter. Water is a person. In a publication that derived from the reseach for her agronomy Masters thesis,158 entitled bilingually:

158 Machaca, Marcela, Magdalena Machaca, Gualberto Machaca, and Juan Vilca Nuñez. Kancha Chacra Sunqulla. Con Kancha y Chacra en el Corazón: La Cultura Agrocéntrica en el Ayllu Quispillaccta. Lima, Machaca, Marcela, Magdalena Machaca, Gualberto Machaca, and Juan Vilca Nuñez with PRATEC [Proyecto Andino de Tecnologias Campesinas] 1998. The reader should note that the Quechua transcription here utilized may follow some normalization, that is, may appeal to some standardized version of written Quechua which in the case of the development of its writing goes as far back as the colonial period, to the earliest lexicon compiled by Fray Domingo de Santo Tomas in 1560; another important “Vocabulario de la Lengua General de Todo el Peru, Llamada Lengua QQichua, o Del Inca” first published in 1608 by Diego González Holguín; Jesus Lara’s and Jorge Lira’s dictionaries for Peruvian and Bolivian Quechuas respectively, mid twentieth century, and Cusihuaman’s linguistic work which is latter half to name only a few, some of the most widely known. The number of regional dialects have been painstakingly gathered, literally by travelling from region to region by the indefatigable Rodolfo Cerrón Palomino for the case of Peru, in tandem with many local speakers or experts. I have collected numerous other dictionaries
first Quechua, then Spanish, then the Western scientific language with which it converses:

*Kancha Chacra Sunqulla, Con Kancha y Chacra en el Corazón: La Cultura Agrocéntrica en el Ayllu Quispillaccta*, Marcela Machaca and her sister, Magdalena, and their brother Gualberto, and another community leader, Juan Vilca Nuñez relate how the Quechua speakers of the community of Quispillaccta speak of Water: water is a person who gives signs and who expresses himself variously. For the cultivators of the *chacra* and the *kancha* (the field or clearing where animals are gathered, corral in Spanish) and from the *ayllu* named Quispillaccta, the elders and neighbors who the writers, who are also from Quispillaccta speak with, and who in this case Marcela Machaca quotes say this:

“…Asi ve doña Ambrosia Quispe Machaca, del barrio Huertahuasi [huerta is “garden plot” in Spanish, and huasi is “house” in Quechua; this is an interesting intercession of Quechua and Spanish in the form of a bilingual compound word, the textuality of the intercession being the undecidability of the translation that suggests itself here: is “huerta” being seen as *chacra*, and then would it be this cluster, the house and the gardenplot which is actually a translation of what *chacra* conditions in its emergence?] This is how Mrs. Ambrosia Quispe Machaca sees, from the neighborhood Huertahuasi:

“…El agua es una persona, gente como nosotros, y tambien tiene un dia especial dedicado a él (su santo) y en la comunidad es durante Yarqa Aspiy, siete de septiembre que es el día de San Cristobal, y él celebra este dia, su santo.” (13)

*Water is a person, a person like us, and he has a special day dedicated to him, his birthday/his Saint Day and in the community this [takes place] is during Yarqa [water] Aspiy, [laughs in the infinitive, or, his laugh takes place, can be heard, here, or he is present this day for our benefit, the water is born as a beneficence given, to dwell in the ayllu, variation of the suffix –pu.] the seventh of September which is the Day of Saint Christopher, and on this day he [water] celebrates his birthday, his Saint Day. [Translation mine.]*

Not only is Water born, but the day of his birth is celebrated, literally as its birthday, it’s Saint’s day from the Catholic tradition, but it is also the day the Quechua speaking hold the most important festivity in his honor. *Yarqa Aspiy* is the day when in the agricultural cycle the canals are cleaned to facilitate Water’s arrival to the *chakra* to irrigate. It is a day of celebration and intense labor, with festivity and song, dance and food; it is both ritual and play. The seventh of September, Water’s birthday marks the beginning of corn planting for the season “en la region Qichwa,” in the Quechua region, Marcela Machaca tells us. (61-62) Water expresses himself or...
emerges on this day to commence an important phase of the agricultural cycle he agrees to benefit, for part of the mutually nourishing relationship between Water and Quechua speaking peoples is that Water must be addressed and coaxed through polite invitation, attentive preparation, and ritualized and joyful gratitude demonstrated on the day of his coming, when and how he comes to be, again and again, agricultural year after year, on his Saint Day. Marcela Machaca writes:

El agua es un ser vivo y vivificante a la vez (Grillo 1991), por tanto, necesita de cuidados y cariño; uno de esos cuidados es arreglar el camino y así pueda “caminar” sin quejas y ayudar a sembrar maíz. (60)

Water is a live and vivifying being at the same time (Grillo 1991), and as such, needs care and affection; one of those attentive shows of affection is to arrange the path [irrigation canals used by “los abuelos de los abuelos” the grandparents of grandparents] so that he can walk without complaint and thereby help plant the corn. [Translation mine]

Water is an important person in the community, whose arrival is celebrated, and who rejoices in his coming, but water is fully embodied in his traversal through the agricultural cycle, and his body is as unique as his comportment throughout his emerging and transformations. In this case, again, “doña Ambrosia Quispe nos dice:”

“...Sí, el agua es una persona muy especial, sin cintura y mira sólo hacia abajo, por eso siempre trata de escaparse hacia abajo,...claro, no puede subir cuestas porque se puede malograr o qubrar la cintura.” (13)

“...Yes, water is a very special person, without a waist and he only looks down, that is why he always tries to escape downward,...of course, he can’t climb uphill because he could injure or break his waist. (Translation mine.) [The transcription of what Mrs. Quispe says is in italics in the book. For the sake of consistency and readability I have placed Machaca’s transcription in quotes, and my translation in italics.]

Marcela Machaca gathers the testimony of more than one person, and in so doing can compare testimonies for repetition of similar enunciations and for distinction. Because one person may reiterate what another says, she verifies through these testimonial utterances that this Quechua knowledge has been transmitted from Quechua speaking cultivators of the past consistently, thereby giving credence to the effectiveness of the knowledge, and in an important way proving through this repetition, that its persistence also proves its usefulness. The coincidences in the content of the testimony verifies its pervasiveness, its character as shared knowledge and this is the goal of the investigation: to gather Quechua knowing, where the present progressive I choose to translate “knowledge” proffers the event the knowing takes place through: where this knowing is from, what is being known, how it is being known, and how it is being practiced and proven to be effective and then transmitted, and where it may or should be
reenacted--- which is the “knowledge” being sought here. The accuracy of the speaker’s testimony and not only its coincidences is in keeping with Quechua rule for testimonial utterance: it is in accord with Quechua rule to say what is known, when this sort of testimonial is being elicited. There is a testimonial suffix appended to such utterances to assure the interlocutor that the speaker is attesting to its reality, its eventful emergence in the field, to the best of her or his ability. Because this is what was actually heard, or actually seen, or in a word, this is what has been sensibly apprehended through a process of interaction between the persons in question, who by Quechua rule, also mutually nurture one another as a way of harmoniously sharing the same dwelling, and because they have conversed with one another in the interest of this harmonious and convivial living, the person speaking may attest that the source may be an elder, who in turn re-ports this knowledge. To tamper with what was seen or heard, with what was sensibly apprehended and relayed by one person to another by giving testimony other than what was seen or heard or sensibly apprehended and done is transgressing Quechua rule.

Quechua knowing is, as will become increasingly evident throughout Part 3, to borrow from the Western tradition, always already an event in its fullest expression: it is a practiced knowing, and a proven testifying directly from or in the field, and the distance between “in” and “from” is dramatically shortened by the Quechua rule the Quechua speaker is beholden to. The combination of veracity demanded both-- regarding the knowing expressed, and regarding the expression of this knowing--- as a rule--- makes of Quechua discursive enunciation, not only an event, but an event of the greatest importance, for the very livelihood of the Ayllu depends on this discursive event being entirely reliable. By Quechua rule, the speaker must qualify her remarks: her remarks should prove that there is doubt about what is being remembered, due to the remoteness of the event, the condition of confusion or inebriation which intercedes with the speakers remembrance of the events, etc. At the same time the Quechua language has at its disposal, not through dictionaries or other documented sources, but through the Quechua language that accompanies daily activities, festivities, work, play, song, ritual, and dance, none of these elements necessarily discreetly separate from the next one, and all of them at any point in time flowing into a festivity: the Quechua language gives what is already in the field as the event, in other words the event is taking place, and the appropriate Quechua words accompany it, as a rule. There is a Quechua idiom for ritual, where certain words take on the specific meaning for the ritual, which they would not in another; for daily agri-centric activities, to quote the Machacas and Vilca-Nuñez, there is another Quechua idiom, where the same words take on the meaning germane to this eventual field.
The Quechua language puts Quechua knowing into action gathered in words that are often derived specifically and explicitly for that action: no abstraction, even when dealing with the intangible. For example, a Quechua instructor who imparts/teaches the language in a Western classroom will look aghast, and has, in my personal experience, when the Western student takes a verb specifically derived from a very particular activity, and conjugates it as if it were abstract. What we may call the “sociolinguistic” context is not just an abstraction; it is simply incorrect, not viable, untrue, that this verb can be long but in its eventual field, without there being a question of a violation of rule, and of truth, albeit not of the Western sort. The penchant for abstraction is not here, though the Barthian symbolic is, permitting the gap to procure from the field the eventuality that the Quechua language would address with the required idiom for the occasion. Complexity in notional elaboration, in reasoning, and in comprehension is not lacking in any way, as is proven in these eventual fields, which are also the rule. Just as the Ayllu is the relationship between human person, which in Quechua is termed Runa, and the Huamani and the Apu, the Ayllu is also the territory, as well as the generative seed of all Quechua life, of all that may find its becoming in the Quechua field particularly as Ayllu in Pacha.

One example of practice yielding the word is the specificity with which, for example, Quechua words indicate how a person traverses: kutimuy is to return, but specifically from there to here; kuti is to return, but from here to there; riy is to go, and hamuy is come, (toward me). Lluksiy is to leave, from here toward there; lluksimuy is to leave from there toward here, where the speaker stands. Chayay is to arrive, from here, toward there; chayamuy is to arrive, from there toward here, where the speaker stands. The suffixes that designate place, such as --pi, (here, within this place), --manta, (from that place) --kama, (until that place or that time) --ntin, (surrounding or near that place), etc. are expressions deemed necessary to the very clear purpose of finding a person, in place, somewhere in the field. Even a word like Pacha in its complexity of meaning, for it renders a complex of creative forces which cannot be limited to time, space, or God has a role it is playing, is a word that emerges from a deep knowledge of all those things we have parsed into subsets of time, space, or god and knowledge. Pacha gathers all this “movement.” According to Juan Raúl Vilca Núñez who writes the last chapter/book:

Los seres vivos existen en la Pacha. Pacha es la casa del Ayllu. El Ayllu es todo cuanto existe en la Pacha, todos los elementos comparten los atributos de cualquier ser vivo, de simbiosis, de equivalencia, aquí no existe un mundo en sí que se diferencie de nosotros, tampoco existe separación alguna entre el hombre, la naturaleza, y las deidades. Por lo tanto, todos los seres vivos son animados,

---

159 These are grammatical constructions outlined in the “textbooks” distributed through the “Curso de Quechua, Nivel [Basico e] Intermediario” offered at the Centro de Estudios Regionales Andinos “Bartolomé De Las Casas” through their Escuela Andina de Postgrado in Cusco, Peru which I attended.
tienen su ánima, “alma”, que es capaz de entender, querer, y sentir la vida. Es decir, la Pacha tiene su anima y todo lo que es parte de ella. (151)

Live beings exist in the Pacha. Pacha is the Ayllu’s house. The Ayllu is all that exists in the Pacha, all the elements share the attributes of any being that is alive, of symbiosis, of equivalency, here there is no world in itself, that differentiates itself from us, and neither does there exist any separation between man, nature, and the deities. As such, all living beings are animate, they have their anima, “soul”, which is capable of understanding, loving, and feeling life. That is to say, the Pacha has her anima and everything that is part of her. [Translation mine]

The book I cite is a translation of Western practices and conventions, for Quechua-centered purposes, or the way these Quechua, if I may, organic intellectuals, who could carry forth the word with and in the simplicity that Gramsci suggests is lost once a class identity consolidates in Western bourgeois society, but which in the case of these Quechua organic intellectuals could continue forth, ad infinitum; also organic because what is favored here is the life, continued and continual, of all things, including spirits as well as the dead. (The reader is reminded that the Huamani are spirits.) This is no “communism,” let it be clear to my reader that this is not what this re-searcer proved to be real in the field, as many have tried to assert, and of neither the theoretical nor the practical sort. What we have here, a mon avis, in my mind, heart, and sensibility is a culture that is continuously poised at what Foucault tells us the ancient Greek world called, the kairos, “or the critical moment,” “the decisive or crucial moment or opportunity.” (Frealess speech 110) At every moment, and its duration is not quantified in the Western way, but seen, heard and sensed as its isgn appear, at every moment of the agricultural cycle, that is what we call the year, (which was also not so long ago marked by the actual agricultural cycle, and not just its remnants) and what in Quechua is wata, or what Julio Valadolid terms the Pacha-Ayllu-watacéntrico Quechua way, as opposed to the Antropo-individuocéntrico Western way of conserving agrobiodiversity in situ, every part of the Quechua year to put it this way is marked by a kairos, and I do intend the word to find new meaning in this new context, alongside what its ancient Greek field proffered for Foucault. Karios translated into this watacentrico deroulement of sign is the occasion given to respond to the signs in a way conducive to the creative and recreative cycles being observed and heard as they, as persons, express their signs.

The Quechua speaking dwelling in the Ayllu thus delimited in the Quechua field are engaged in agri-centered activity all year long, abiding closely with all other persons, and seeking through the signs given by all the living beings of the Pacha, face this kind of kairos, the decisive moment to plant, the decisive moment to move the seed higher or lower on the slope, the moment
in which to move the animal persons to higher land or lower land. In this sense, the Epicurean school looking for the uses of *parrhesia*, the ancient Greek practice of what we may erroneously call “free speech” today, and what Foucault unpacks, rather, as what he calls “fearless speech,” what the Epicurean school arrives at, as a *kairos*, according to Foucault, in the interest of improving community life does resonate with the Quechua practices we describe, but in the following way:

What is of interest here is that since Philodemus [the Epicurean writer] is now associating *parrhesia* with piloting and medicine, it is also being regarded as a technique which deals with individual cases, *specific situations, and the choice of the kairos or decisive moment*. [Foucault adds a footnote here that is also telling: “[Footnote]76: Fragment 226 of Democritus also associates *parrhesia* with *kairos*….(‘Freedom of speech is the sign of freedom; but the danger lies in discerning the right occasion’—K. Freeman translation)….’] Utilizing our modern vocabulary, we can say that navigation, medicine, and the practice of *parrhesia* are all “clinical techniques.” (111)

The general procedure here described, involving the practice and the evidence of the theory “fleshed out” in its specific cases, the case that proves that the theory is real in the field, clinically that is, in this clinical practice, this general procedure, with its decisive *kairos* for every instance or case does resemble what the Quechua speaking *Runa* carry out in their agro-centric year. What is yet distinctly Quechua is that what the *Runa* and other Persons abiding in the Pacha do is sustain a continual, convivial, and attentive conversation among what we could call *diverse subjects*, one and all, toward one another, as *other subjects*, one and all, cultivating with affection and respect, at all times, the relations among all beings which move the Pacha, which has reciprocally moved Runa and all other communities of beings in this world, toward a sustained harmony, also continuously in fulfillment of a harmony deemed the sustenance of the world.

We encounter another similitude, comparatively speaking, however slight, or what I call resonance, between the status of Quechua speech as event, and the non-status of *parrhesia* as a rhetorical figure, that is, as part of the repertoire of decorous and ceremonious speech or discourse which produces what the Western tradition calls a *rhetorical figure*, an entity designed and produced in conformity to the Western rules of *Language Usage*. Without belaboring what may be swallowed up by the sort of iridescence of language, a much more playful movement in language between its emptiness and its fullness, which, in my perception precludes all our efforts to capture it through classifications, linguistic, literary, or other, Quechua “usage” is not usage in

---

160 There is extensive documentation of these practices and this Quechua knowing, as I term it, in the present progressive of being in the field. PRATEC is in my view one of the most important sources of just such documentation, and what is more their work of what they call “accompaniment” as they’ve learned how to learn from the Quechua-speaking has yielded numerous volumes like the one I first cite.
the Western sense, that is, be means of a technified grammar, lexicon, linguistic rule, while we can submit any language to this apparatus, not without fruitful result. Quechua language practice is performative, especially in that it is primarily and yet still aligned with orality in its every, and every day, and ritual functions, since its written tradition is comparatively speaking, frankly scant relative to the monstrous archive of History and the History of Ideas scribed. More importantly, as we have seen, the Quechua idiom, for we are caring here for its accompaniment of Living Persons in the Quechua Field, and not for its abstract standing in the interstic between Quechua and Spanish, abides with the colonial encounter, and we are therefore attentive to how this Quechua idiom so very intimately attaches to what has indefatigably been “revived” from its premature death in the West, as materiality, corporeality, simply, the body, and critically for the West, the social body. The Quechua idiom, we will call it as it is expressed in the Quechua field is intimately at work with the body of all Persons who are alive in the Pacha. It is in this sense that the Quechua idiom has no rhetorical use, so intimately engaged is it with attentively, carefully, and respectfully conversing with other living beings, just as Foucault clarifies for us, that “parrhesia” has no rhetorical status, and is:

Parrhesia is thus a sort of “figure” among the rhetorical figures, but with this characteristic: that it is without any figure since it is completely natural. Parrhesia is the zero degree of rhetorical figures which intensify the emotions of the audience. (21)

…ostensibly the emotions that Foucault seeks to find in the history of ideas as clues for finding discontinuity, clues that lead to the disruption of a continuity falsely wrought, for what proved to be real and just like our time, about the time of others in the past is this discontinuity and this emotion. The Quechua festivity begins to make a powerful argument for a time that Foucault can barely explicate, let alone express: in the Quechua festivity there is ritual, work, song, play, inebriation, dance, joy: the world vibrates with a time that recreates the entire world, by being able to care for one of the aspects of it that requires attention at just this time, when Pacha is tilted in just this way.

Marcela, Magdalena, and Gualberto Machaca and Juan Vilca Nuñez’ compilation is not “the work,” “a book,” such as the Western tradition conventionally designates a book, especially in that the métier of researc, “investigación,” here expressed admits (permits entry to) a Western intercession upon the endeavor that the collective authors set out to fulfill in writing, in a limited way, alongside their co-sponsor of the endeavor-- not exactly a publishing house--- PRATEC, a non-governmental organization, generically speaking, of “de-professionalized” development experts who decided several decades ago already to begin to listen as carefully as they believed their development recipients at the time, campesinos, might have actually been listening, to what
they as experts were trying to teach them in order to dominate the agricultural field. It is an irony—an irony that they of all people deserve to speak about without any remorse or shame at their own ignorance—whereas for most of us this irony escapes us—it is an irony that the West has in any way found it appropriate to teach the foremost cultivators of the world that we share, the descendants of the Inka, *the Cultivator*, how to cultivate---without ever bothering to ask what the people in *this Quechua* field, the “campesino” or peasant, might have been doing. The group of—organic intellectuals—who founded the group called PRATEC, and they are also worthy of the name, for they are after decades still and yet, organic intellectuals; the idea of their new social class, if in fact their efforts or association can be called this just yet, has not overtaken the simplicity of their self awareness as a group of deprofessionalized practitioners who have agreed to be the so-called *campesinos*’ pupils instead, collaborating with the Quechua and Aymara speaking in a nationwide project of indigenous cultural affirmation and recovery of indigenous knowledge.

To their credit, after decades, they remain steadfast in their commitment to this project of mutual care in the interest of cultural affirmation and the affirmation of the *harmony* that is not only the Quechua, but the Aymara, and the Guarani way, for and in the world. One of the foremost “civilizations” in matters of agricultural cultivation, the Inka territory not only cultivated and created a vast “biodiversity,” but the masterful ability, meaning skilled, to deploy their ingenuity and their knowing, from their understanding of astronomy, to geology, to ethnobotany, to botany, to every known discipline invented by the West to dominate nature, these Inkas and their descendants, alongside the people encompassed within their Quechua rule had mastered to such an extent this thing we call agri-culture that they have yet to be completely understood in their knowing and techniques, and they are yet unmatched in their ability to have cultivated the germplasm bio-diversity which is now stored in “banks” as the universal patrimony of *humanity*, so precious is it to the sustainability of life such as we know it. The founding members of PRATEC decide to seize what Foucault asserts is actually fearless speech, speech that is free only because---in all circumstances---it is primarily truth saying uttered in a strict alignment to a duty to the well-being of others, or simply, duty to principle, and because this sort of truthful speech was invariably spoken at the risk of reprisal, social cost or consequence, up to an including death to the speaker, the speaker who, to utter this speech, would have to be fearless. (*Fearless Speech* 11-24) Fearless speech is the apt term here as the members of PRATEC have endured every register of social cost they possibly could have in the long durée of their accompaniment of their kin—the Quechua, Aymara, and Guarani speaking, the indigenous people
they have become also, as they have felt their place in the world in keeping with Quechua rule, as practitioners of this kinship with all that is alive in Pacha.

By remarking upon translation, the translation of Quechua knowing to Spanish, Grimaldo Rengifo Vásquez, a founding member of PRATEC who fulfills the function of editor, for this book, that is, the person officiating and sponsoring the gathering of these materials from “investigations” in the field remarks upon the difficulty and the reenactment of a colonial encounter, as unconcerned but aware as the members of PRATEC may be for the implications of this uneven encounter. This editor is also a “professor” to these “pupils” who acquired a university degree “de Segunda Especialización en Agricultura Andina que en el contexto académico de la Universidad Nacional de San Cristobal de Huamanga ofreciera el PRATEC hasta 1993”, that is, these are the “pupils” who acquired a degree in Andean Agriculture which was conferred by PRATEC from within the context of the University… until 1993. The editor’s affiliation is clearly, first to PRATEC, and then to the University that conditioned the course they designed.\footnote{The reader should be advised that I have been collaborating with PRATEC as a translator and an interlocutor sporadically throughout the last twenty years and have on many occasions discussed their relationship to Western institutionality, which is what is here in question.} It is important to deconstruct here the institutional translations moving through this encounter between these pupils, PRATEC, and the National University of Saint Christopher of Huamanga, our first opportunity to observe the Western and Quechua intercession we seek framed by the colonial encounter mapped upon it by the Western edifice of the university in this case.

The writers alongside the editor confront the Western intercession into their field, admitting its presence insofar as they utilize the Western archival convention of the document-book for their purposes, as well as for the purpose of sharing and communicating which the book stands in for additionally from within the Western field, though the readership this book addresses is delimited by choice and by design. Moreover, it is in this University setting that PRATEC and its “pupils” can begin that mutually edifying dialogue whereby the PRATEC founders, all of them credentialed professionals, can begin to ascertain how they can best listen, accompany, and support “campesino” efforts, while at the same time, they also impart Western tools and language with which to transfer their knowing and their knowledge to Spanish speakers, or any Western visitor, such that the silence that PRATEC once broke by—at the critical point—deciding to listen—can be broken again, until, it is this writers hope anyway, the terrible silence, (not always oppressive nor aggressive) can nevertheless be broken. This choice, made at a kairos moment by these Quechua speaking populations is a far more conducive alternative as will be
elaborated on in Part 3, than many others. Choosing to accompany and engage in a mutually edifying conversation which proffers harmony presupposes a translation, of the Quechua world and the Western world, not by means of seeking equivalencies between one field and another, but by seeking resonance, permitting the echoes of emotion and principle, care and respect which trans—ladere, which move from here to there the spoken practice from the Quechua field, into the Western field, without domination, aggression, or oppression, but rather, in accord with Quechua rule: the procurement of harmony. As we shall see in Part 2, criollo and mestizo culture is yet astoundingly Western in its penchant for dominance, which is as we can surmise at this point, tantamount to an insistent blindness, and we must add, deafness, for just as the Barthain and Foucauldian project pro-pose a listening, Quechua rule is operationalized through this listening which is working harmoniously also with all senses. Assimilation and tourist markets in downtown Lima filled with “Inka” knickknacks alongside artisanal labor does not yet explain the confluence of either and what purpose the state sees in this activity, other than the commodification of all things in accord with the logic of a capitalist market flow. Projecting an Inka glorious past identity in the interest of a burgeoning tourist industry and strong neoliberal investment in the country do not explain away what is happening to the Quechua speaking in the urban or Andean Quechua fields as they endure the force of modernization.

The writers denounce the inadequacy of the Western language and its traditional knowledge practices in relation to Quechua knowledge from and in the field: the writers are also cultivators in the field in which they dwell and they write for the sake of transmitting Quechua knowledge and knowledge practices, that is Quechua knowing. At times, they choose to express something only in Quechua as they are unable to find any sort of equivalent expression in Spanish, or the cadence, intensity and care expressed in Quechua is unacceptably lost in translation. This decision to exclude the Spanish reader at specific passages when the writers deem that the testimony given by their neighbors loses the important propulsion facilitated by Quechua excludes the non-Quechua reader; the decision to express something only in Quechua, while all else has already been resonantly translated into Spanish is the critical decision to include the Quechua reader, before excluding her in the interest of upholding a Western convention or knowledge practice which would render inadequate what is Quechua. Given the fact that these pupils could only access the mechanisms of Western knowledge production through the institution of the University and could only do this by acquiring Spanish literacy, there is a symmetry here in the decision to maintain what is germane to the Quechua field, in its place, a symmetry that speaks to an equality which is Quechua rule—all persons are alive and equally endowed with an anima, with creative force, albeit differently. Making this editorial
decision is a way of addressing the colonial encounter and what proves to be real in the field that conditions this encounter where Quechua admits the Western intercession by learning the conventions and language of what is Spanish and Western, but transforms the field, by adapting these conventions to what is proved to be real in the Quechua field.

These investigators and writers (especially in the Barthian sense in that this is by Western academic standards, traversed by what Barthes would call text,) translate Quechua knowing into a language that is not their own, and document in this book, whose instrumentality is arciving, communicating and transmitting, but do so through a “methodology” that parallels the way of knowing which is at once their object of study: they track how their relations track the steps already taken to find this knowing, or for this knowing to find them, as it proceeds in the present progressive alongside the utterances of their neighbor’s telling. This is also how, as we have seen, the agricultural cycle implies a specific practice of tracing signs, and acting at moments that are kairos, critical moments when a choice must be made. And yet, there are things in the Quechua field, and even ways of expressing the encounter with these things, at once the “method” and the “object” in this Quechua study, which exceed the Western field and are outside the intercession admitted from the Western field of knowledge and knowledge practices into the Quechua field. We may conclude for the moment, that these writers sensibly perceive that “things” from the Quechua field are simply not found in the Western field and cannot be transferred there by means of translation, though they are able to translate most things.162

Machaca writes:

Aunque los problemas de la traducción de los relatos, vivencias y testimonios fueron superados por la familiaridad con el idioma, todavía encuentro dificultades; pues en la lectura no hallo todas las emociones que acompañan las narraciones en el momento en que son contadas. No se puede expresar todo el cariño con el que me las relataron. En la traducción, el quechua pierde algo de su sabor local, de lenguaje vivido, hablado. Por ello he preferido transcribir algunas versiones solamente en quechua. (5)

Even though the problems of translating the récits, lived experiences, and testimonies were overcome by the familiarity with the language, or the idiom, I still encounter difficulties [or I still find it difficult]; for in the reading I don’t find all the emotions that accompany the narrations at the moment in which they

---

162 The status of bilinguals in Quechua/Spanish, first Quechua then Spanish needs to be noted. Like all bilinguals, there is a spectrum of competency as language acquisition theorists call it, from more or less competency in one or the other language to full competency in each, the latter situation being less common. The Machaca siblings are extraordinary in this sense, and yet are so obviously more comfortable in the Quechua field as we have up to now described it, insofar as –idiom- and –practice- are concerned. They are extraordinarily competent in Western cultural practices as well, and have been able to accomplish extraordinary improvements in their Ayllu life through the recovery of their Quechua traditional practices. This is in large part due to their descent from the important healers in the community. Frederique Marglin’s work documents especially Marcela Machaca’s narration of how this knowing being preserved in her family has had critical importance for her Ayllu, Quispillaccta.
are told. It is not possible to express all the affection with which they were relayed. In translation, Quechua loses something of its local flavor, of language lived, spoken. Due to this I have preferred transcribing some versions only in Quechua. [Translation mine]

The field that conditioned the emergence of this discourse, this intercession by Western practices into the Quechua field, an incursion permitted in the interest of preserving, storing, and transmitting this knowing, as well as to translate this knowing to Spanish speaking audiences proves in this newly formulated scholarly Quechua field that translating what is Quechua for the Spanish reader is at the same time the site of a colonial encounter where the Spanish dweller is not repudiated, but rather, is welcomed in the fullness of its practice, at any rate insofar as its functions and methods may coincide with Quechua needs, but also with its deficiencies. Quechua investigation of how to know and what to know tracks the footsteps of those who knew then and now, having access to the thoughts and the thinkers Foucault nudges from their continuous discourse into the discontinuous discourse which makes the time of the other, the subject’s, and which brings to the ear the animated and impassioned discursive event; these Quechua writers translate the meaning of this knowing still held by its yachaq, possessor of knowing, and can transcribe and translate what is heard for their Western reader, up to the point where Spanish is unable to convey Sunqulla, that is, how Chacra and Kancha are pro-cured, given for care, for the heart, and then returned to Pacha from the heart in order to recreate Ayllu. To carry on this Quechua scholarly endeavor,--- this “clinical practice” of gathering knowing, of investigating that is analogous to the cultivators reading, instead of to the discourse describing the telling of signs, (Barthes, Foucault,) so that at “critical” moments the best choices are made-- requires conceding greater margin, or all the margin required for this conveyance to the Quechua field, pushing back to its place, the Western intercession.

These Quechua investigators make interesting discursive choices that position them outside of the conventions of Western scholarship, those that pupils traditionally apprentice in. In that it is rendered primarily in Spanish, from within the general parameters of Western scholarly practice, and yet disruptive of it, not only in the sense of a break from Spanish, fully and exclusively into Quechua, but in the sense that the writing makes no pretense at wanting to recreate what Julio Valladolid calls Antropo-individuo-céntrico claims or subject positionings, or indeed, “objective” discursive claims, though they resonate with scholarly discourse that finds and that affirms what for them is not abstract but real and always expressed symbolically in the Barthian sense, the signifier stripped of its outer shell in order to make room for what is here really. This is the discursive event that takes place in this eventual field of colonial encounter on
This Quechua writing in Spanish is evidently an encounter with a lack, and compellingly, a lack of emotion, of natural propulsion, such as the sort that traverses the speaker, and distinctly, the speaker of Quechua, and this is “the object” also encountered in this process of staging the admittance of the Western colonizer, in an amicable way, but to a point: what is encountered is a lack of emotion, of creative propulsion, of attention for what the field gives, what this “investigation” procures for its Quechua listener first and then for its reader. The point is revealing: there seems to be an intercessional kairos where the West may not apprehend the Quechua way of knowing and being at all, and it is the very expression in Quechua which preserves that which Spanish lacks, according to these writers. Seen from this perspective this is neither the work of a traditional Western scholar, nor is it an endeavor disciplined by Western academic practices. The object is as much to understand the other, as it is to be understood by the other and the conduit becomes the Spanish language rustling with Quechua; at the same time the object is Western in the traditional—Foucauldian sense---in that these Quechua investigators set out to gather their own knowing, of themselves, and for themselves, in keeping with what delimits the Western field of knowledge Foucault describes as needed, but which is yet deferred: with the discontinuity that separates them from the elders and other neighbors they interview, this scholarly writing traversed so substantially with Quechua expression and knowing that becomes a reversal within the Spanish writing, arriving at the point where a Quechua writing in Spanish may begin, or what we may call in line with the Foucauldian agenda, a de-scriptur-ing not yet imagined in this way, from within or even at the margins of the interrupted or continuously voiced Western history of ideas.

This uncanny reversal does not postpone the lack, the space that will decisively separate the Quechua Field from the Spanish Field. We may consider that all Foucauldian reversals are a choice to systematically unmask what cannot be secured by the Western mechanics of divinity or civilization and that is that the other does not readily succumb to the mechanical appropriations of the Western knowledge apparatus, not because of, or through the disinterest of “discontinuity” its pure innocence, but rather, because this is proven real, in this Quechua field. What these Quechua writers do not permit us to elide is that from the Quechua Field to the Spanish Field, this travel that is also a theorization of translation from within the colonial encounter in the re-searc for what Kancha Chacra Sunqulla proves itself to be now, Spanish is found critically and decisively lacking: omitting it in favor of Quechua is a critical turn, a kairos, and a decisive choice. This Quechua investigation makes evident to the Western reader that the Quechua speaking in the Quechua field simply forgo the coloniality of the encounter between Quechua and Spanish in at least five important ways: 1.) the Spanish attempt to dominate by conquest fails,
not only because there is a critical absence of appropriation as a response to Spanish appropriation, but more importantly because the delimitation of a Quechua field becomes an amicable abiding alongside this Western scholarly endeavor, establishing as harmonious a conversation as is Quechua with this stranger who has come to dwell aggressively by displacement through conquest and colonization “of” the Quechua speaking; 2.) Quechua speakers and writers who translate Quechua into the Spanish language can embrace Western knowledge practices, while feeling no need at all to deny the difference between Quechua and Spanish; 3.) this recreation of Quechua rule in the midst of what emerges rather as “the shell” of Western practices—vacates these practices of their meaning, inserting Quechua meaning, making Spanish symbolic in a Barthian but also in a Quechua way; and finally, 4.) these Quechua writers find Spanish limited, lacking in a decisive way to express what is Quechua. Magdalena Machaca puts it this way:

Cuando la vida es un continuo proceder con las crianzas y con todos los que viven alrededor de ellas y más aún cuando éstas requieren de un profundo compromiso y delicadeza uno a veces se siente entristecido y hasta muchos piensan dejar la chacra e irse a las ciudades. Estas actitudes son propias de la gente desesperada, a ellos les llamamos sapan sunqu (individualista). Pero la vida es así. Así uno está acostumbrado.

Porque si pasas una buena vida al lado de tu Ayllu, tampoco la helada y la granizada se lleva toda la cosecha del año. Eso pasa cuando uno sabe entenderlos a ellos. [A la Granizada y a la Helada que son personas.] Por lo que se hasta ahora Quispillaccta no ha padecido una hambruna total.

Entonces la vida con las crianzas en la chacra y kancha es muy triste para un solitario porque los quehaceres siempre necesitan a alguien más, el Ayllu es compañía eternal de uno, aunque muera la esposa o esposo ellos siempre quedan para consolarte, hacerte reflexionar y ayudarte en tu caminar. (146)

When life is a continual proceeding with these cultivations and with everyone that lives around them-- and even more so when they require a profound commitment and delicacy-- one sometimes feels saddened, and many even think about leaving the chacra and going to the cities. These attitudes are proper to desperate people, we call them sapan sunqu (individualist.) But life is like this. This is how we are accustomed [to being].

Because if you live a good life next to your Ayllu, neither the Freeze nor the Hale [persons both] will take that year’s crop. This happens when you know how to understand them. From what I know, until now, Quispillaccta has never suffered a total famine.

And so life with all that we cultivate in the chacra and the kancha [this is a reference to all the Persons, and to all that is cultivated in the field, chacra, and the corral, kancha] is very sad for a solitary [person] because our chores always want of someone else, the Ayllu is one’s eternal companion, even if the wife or husband die they [those you are Ayllu with] remain to console you, help you reflect, and help you on your way, as you walk. [Translation mine, which includes adding punctuation not present in the original, and adding clarifications that are not necessary in the context of the entire chapter/book.]
Notwithstanding, like Western authors who create compilations of articles around specific themes, the four authors have contributed their écrits. The book, this work, has an introductory preface, just as the editor of a compilation writes this sort of introduction. However every “article” looks and presents itself as a separate book might, with a table of contents, parts embracing their respective chapters, so named, while at the same time, these smaller books, have become chapters of the book. Comparatively speaking, is this an organization that projects the organizational structures present in the Quechua field we have so far found, such that for instance, the Ayllu, which is conceived of as the expanse of territory embracing a community of inhabitants which together express Ayllu, while at the same time Ayllu is also the expression of the life force that compels all the living persons of the Ayllu, as the seed of its inception, into this harmoniously buzzing matrix of communal life that is again Ayllu? The smaller books are whole and differentiated, but together weave the web of the Ayllu, in an interdependence that is coincident with how these book personages gathered here interplay, converse, mutually nurture one another in order to become this book.

Water begins the investigation, [Chapter 1, (Book 1)] and moves toward the smaller and intangible practice of [Chapter 2, (Book 2)] “Cariño y Respeto,” Care, Affection, and Respect that are the Quechua practice that cultivates the agri-centric world, Pacha, that the persons who dwell in the Ayllu named Quispillaccta decide actively to create, which in turn leads to a small [Chapter 3, (Book 3)] that articulates the title given the entire book, Kancha Chacra Sunqulla, Con Kancha y Chacra en el Corazon, where the field observed is the heart, Sung’u, where Kancha and Chacra dwell. This heart is wedged between Quechua practices (Chapters/Books 1 and 2) and the cessation of the heartbeat at the end of a flow that recites that Chapter 4 (Book 4), “La Muerte no es la Cesación de la Vida,” Death is not the Cessation of Life…, and the flow may be said to continue, downward, into the Quechua field again, with the beginning, with the September festivity to water, Book1/Chapter 1—“El Agua y los Quispillacctinos,” for it is agri-centric life is rendered in the book, as an agri-centric field itself. In Book 2/Chapter 2 Gualberto Machaca outlines the activity of every month of the agricultural year, save the activities for September. This four element structure could be said to delimit the Quechua field in the following way: the Quechua Person Yarqa is the flow of continuity, symbolically and actively, in all its expressions; the enjoining to all things takes place through what we have found is emotion, propulsion, conviviality, but mastered, not in the sense of domination but in the sense of self-rule, or rule, mastered as the principles of care and respect: all Quechua persons deal with one an other in this way, by Quechua Rule; Book 3/Chapter 3 and the title of the entire book is Kancha Chacra Sunqulla, the deictic direction given the reader about what the work will point to: this is the
works critical turn, but more importantly, the place where all things that flow with life are cradled, where that which is beheld, takes momentary harbor, is permitted to emerge from the gap: this force that makes this possible is Sunq’u. This element is cosmic power: the world bubbles forth because this cannot be perceived but is forever sensed, is not, and is somehow here, and everywhere, as what procures, what is given to be cared for, while alive, but also as Book 4/Chapter 4 tells us, even when dead. Sunq’u never dies; dying is not its nature, which is how and why and where it Sunq’u cradles, permitting the “anima” Vilca Nuñez alludes to, to continue flowing on, to enjoy death as well, albeit as discontinuity that continues the flow forward differently, as another phase of an always continuous and discontinuous existence. What there really can be between one person, and another person, be they Runa, Spirit Deity, Animal, or Nature is Quechua Rule (Affection and Respect) and Quechua Harbor (Sunqulla) for all creatures in the continuous and discontinuous flow of Life in Harmony for All. Harmony is procured, given for care and for well-being through all four elements in convivial motion.

This book, exceeds its covers, not only because its textuality transgresses Western conventions but because these elements belong together and are an expression of what is actually in the Quechua region called Quispillacta: this Quechua field in the very déroulement of its emerging, both as this tracking of traces of Quechua knowing, which is at the same time the practice of Quechua knowing and its telling or its saying, depending on the directionality of the conversation between or among interlocutors, and it is at the same time the delimitation of what the Quechua field gives as real Kancha Chacra Sunqulla. What is more, what is proved to be there in reality was already known: the elders and other cultivators who can recall know it. This Quechua book serves the purpose of borrowing documentation practices for which all the instrumentality is available, however divergently it is operationalized in this case, but it is also a demonstration: ‘behold,’ it says, pointing, ‘this is Quechua knowing: the Western way of investigating is consonant with our tracing, our footsteps, except that, we are not intent on dominating or mastering what we find for it is given.’ This is a book that listens, and makes listening its object and its way from cover to cover, as method cannot be the translation of this procurement of harmony by means of listening continuously. It does not explicate how to listen; it demonstrates listening and that it listens: it listens to the elders and transcribes their words, holding their words in the book as a listening. In this sense there is no discontinuity within this Quechua field, as Vilca Nuñez clarifies. Rather, there is the the holding arc of Quechua rule embodied in Sunq’ulla: it holds the Kancha and the Chacra in its hearth and at the same time gives it for care, just as the book holds the elders words explaining how to hold together with all persons not only in, but from the Kancha Chacra being held by the cradle of of Sunqulla. This
gathering is the practice of listening actively at all times to all the persons gathered in the field which is not only their home, but is in a mutually re-creative conversation with them: the way to be together in this way, and not separate is the heart’s way, Sunqulla, only the heart, which is how discontinuity is given also: death is no terminal destination, but rather a place where transformation takes place, and another being is given for care, which is the nature, and moreover the cradling of all beings in Pacha: this is how they are held and given for care at the same time. This time is the time of recreation, which for the Quechua speaking as Magdalena will tell us below is always work, play, with care and respect, an abiding along with the joy and the pain of re-creative activity. This organization seems to express the way the authors follow the movement of the cradle that holds them, the dwelling place of the heart and in the heart: the pulse, its rhythm, its sensation, its feelings, its thoughts, its reasons, its rhymes, its becoming what is given for care and is cared for and cradled. This Quechua Book is the practice of re-creation: it is Kancha Chacra Sunqulla. This tacit agreement, this cradle that gathers in a Quechua way is the energy or power of Sunq’ulla which teaches, the harmony to sustain Allin Kawsay, “the good life” through the rule of affection and respect and all Quechua things are alive, including death. The “autonomy” or “self” naming of each book within the book is circumscribed by its belonging in the entire book: just as Ayllu is encircled by Pacha. And just as we may adduce that the “power” that makes this so is Sunq’u: the animating energy that traverses all beings and gathers them to Pacha bringing them from within and within this arc, this cradle, or as Bruce Mannheim says of the Quechua linguistic expression that agglutinates linguistically like other languages, Quechua enjoins in a way that resembles “nesting.”

The convention of publication is thoroughly Western, as is the performative act of gathering, documenting, and arciving taking place through this new Quechua book, and this is how this Quechua book dwells in the eventual field of Western publication. But what it documents, who facilitates its publication, alongside who its writers and even authors may be addressing is not suppressed in a seamless field of Western scholarly convention: it need not be unearthed; it is express, and more to the point, the intercession of Western Field into Quechua Field and Quechua Field into Western Field makes the interdisciplinary object the colonial encounter that makes all the unseemliness and seemliness all the inexistent sutures apparent: this is the strange affirmation that the book procures: in the lack in Spanish that the Quechua book encounters we find the absence of a conversation from the Spanish to the Quechua: no “togetherness” exists in the imposition of Spanish; on the contrary, the dwelling together that is Quechua rule is violated by imposition and finds no admittance in this Quechua field. Spanish is treated like a guest, another person who has arrived at the Quechua field to visit: differences are
acknowledged without trouble, for this is what listening is for, and the other person is treated with affection and respect for it/he/she is also cradled in and with *Sunqulla* which is Quechua rule.

How the book becomes the “intellectual property” which publication presupposes but which the writers and the facilitators of its publication also seem to be less preoccupied with as a professional convention is equally express in the sporadic details, sentences, and other enunciations which tell the reader the story that precipitated the publication into happening: the decision to enact an intercession between Western knowing and Quechua knowing through a PRATEC course emerging from the eventual field of the Universidad Nacional de San Cristobal Huamanga. According to their editor, and their “professor,” Rengifo, the book serves this purpose:

…Lo que hacen Marcela, Magdalena, Gualberto y Juan, es mostrar las vivencias de su pueblo, superando las barreras que ofrece el contarlas en un idioma que no es el suyo. En muchos pasajes, dado la dificultad del castellano—se lo hace en el quechua local, abriendo así la posibilidad a quien lee y habla el quechua ayacuchano, de penetrar en la conversación que hacen, tanto humanos, deidades y naturaleza.

Los textos que se ofrecen en este volumen, son ensayos de investigación que los autores han sustentado como tesis para obtener el título universitario de Segunda Especialización en Agricultura Andina… que en el contexto académico de la Universidad Nacional San Cristobal de Huamanga, ofreciera PRATEC hasta 1993.

*What Marcela, Magdalena, Gualberto, and Juan do is show--the realities [in the sense of finding what proves itself to be real] or--the lived experiences [the events that people ritually and playfully enact and reenact by choice and in conversation with others, that is, “experience” not in the Western sense that “experience” can only be mediated by the Western “subject.”] of their community, overcoming the barriers of telling them in an idiom that is not their own. In many passages—given this obstacle that is Spanish—telling them is done in the local Quechua, opening, in this way, the possibility for those who read and speak Quechua from [the “departamento” or the state of] Ayacucho to penetrate into the conversation that is carried out, [in this book] among humans, deities, and nature. [From the back cover of the book: where the end of the book is announced, as conversation, not necessarily its description] [Translation mine]*

A word on this traversal which is expressed, not from the inside of any Quechua person’s “consciousness” but from the enjoining arc, the harbor called *Sunq’ulla*. This *Quechua Quispillacctan field* delimited in this work could be construed as text according to the Barthian suggestion that the *Quechua difference*, the excess that escaped outside the bounds of the Spanish monolingual literacy here scripted would rustle. We could also say that the Quechua field receded only insofar as a bilingually Western reader, Spanish/Quechua, and the Quechua Western monolingual reader without knowledge of Spanish—(does such a person exist?)--- that the
Quechua field is outside of the dominion of Western knowledge, in a *decisive* way, in the eventual field. As we have seen, the Quechua/Spanish bilingual writers, and their collaborators did not evade this unseemly encounter, notwithstanding delimiting an *intercessional field of translation* gathering the Westerner within its field. The Quechua field is tangible and intangible but throughout its entire being or *recreates animately*, and Westerners are as much a part of the Quechua field as any other living person, being, or thing. *The Quechua field* sustains this permanent activity of conversation among persons dwelling here, a conversation animated by the heart, *Sunqulla*. This Quechua way is not the indefatigable labor of the Western philosopher of chance, trying to release movement from underneath the weight of the edifice squelching it, nor is this the way of the re-searcer of difference attempting to revive the materiality of the word or the scriptor who is compelled to escape the voice of Western oracular necromancy insinuated into the metaphysical domain of a Western knowing which purports to hold sway over language itself. This Quechua way evidently does not attempt to revive what is tangible, for the sake of the tangible, but rather *the tangible and the intangible are in a recreative conversation* we will call poetic expression. There is no “interest” in the “Other” and no “investment” or “desire” to control dominate, or colonize. Rather, we might say there is a *surrender to the creative force that gives all things for care and for well-being* and in so doing *harbors and cares for all things given in turn as this activity is its being*. This traversal is being with others in harmony, in health, for reciprocated care. Disease, pain, suffering and death are also alive and also welcome, and when they express a discontent that disrupts harmony a conversation about their disgruntlement ensues to remedy, to cure the disharmony.

This “reversal” cannot be a Foucauldian “reversal,” by delimitation, eventual, for it does not imagine discourse such as we have come to know it through Foucault. We have not accompanied the “discursive” rescue of the animate rock which can only animate in that it conditions the field out of which a historical event ay emerge through Foucauld’s discursive practice, and even then, the rock is a part of that play of difference which makes it as present as it may have been in Barthes stroll. This Foucauldian recovery of chance, discontinuity, and the materiality of the event rescues humans from fixity and asphyxiation and reminds us through our metaphorical shard that this fragment of substance which can perform as “fact” only in the experimental field, may actually stand in for the stirrings of a practice of the writing of the history of ideas that would find the field, specific, delimited, and conditioned that precipitated the event that left us this shard, and not just a memory, to remind us of the passions, motivations, and activity, to remind us of the corporeal materiality of the others we want to know (about), we want to re-member, we want to stand before us *in our time*, as a way, for us to “understand” them.
This practice in its own way, animates the rock, or gives language as discursive event greater materiality and animation than the abstract concept could give. Viewed from an other place, this Foucauldian procedure does not rescue the rock from the paranoid exorcism that the West performs on its anim-osity, for it seems ineluctably to gage that the rock is an enemy. On the other hand, who could today deny, given what has been proven to be real in the field of geology, through the activity in the experimental field, that the earth’s rock does move, does shift even if it may do so over periods lasting tens of thousands of years, which makes its movement ostensibly imperceptible except that our techniques have made this movement visible. We have also traced the movement of land and water on the globe, again through techniques that help us ascertain, through plainly rock palimpsest and iceberg age how all these masses may have traversed the globe over hundreds of thousands of years, which far exceed our notion of time as it is given over one lifetime, making the previously imperceptible, or impossible, perceptible, and possible.

In comparison, according to this Quechua way we have accompanied, the rock is the same as us, not because we bring it into ourselves so that it may become who we are, but it is the same and enjoined to us because the same “life” animates it, however distinct its soul may, this soul without shape or form which makes itself tangibly and intangibly here, just the same, and this is so, not only for the rock, but for the deceased. In the Quechua field as in the Foucauldian field of the history of ideas through an intercession which renders both Foucault and Quechua, the procurers of kinds of poetic expression, what is so in the field is what is true and this need be said fearlessly. The field adds a dimension heretofore unmentioned which also characterizes poetic expression: the need to make choices and decisions when faced with the conditions procured by the field makes of poetic expression also a choice about how we govern ourselves. No Quechua Person depends on something like a god, or Western spirit, or the idea as the abstract concept synthesizing the meaning or the knowledge/understanding and being of all things, in order to begin to be, and to complete its being from its Idealized origin. Nor do any of these Quechua Persons, according to the Quechua way of knowing require any sort of “internal” “mental” “representation” that verifies for the self, that one person is alive, and that it opposes itself to the first person, as an other, a threat of sorts, to the Identity of the Subject, a threat to that One that all will return to and be returned to for its fulfillment alone. Alone is a critical comparison between Quechua and Western fields. No Quechua person lives alone. This is not possible. Difference is not the new-found re-source for reviving the death. Difference is the fact of what makes one Person distinct from a second Person, and a third, and as many as live. All persons are conversed with, with care and respect in that all share in the same dwelling, Pacha. No person dwells alone: the Huamani come to advise, to help, or to sanction; the dead can form part of
tangible conviviality; the Apu oversees the well-being of all Runa and Animals and All Expressions of Animate Life here and now that are singular persons, who dwell together in the same place for the well-being that is harmony.

The cognitive representation of (Kantian) reason in movement inside the monad, the subject, is not what a person is--in accord with the Quechua way of knowing which is one with a being’s way, this continuum made possible with Sunq’ulla, swirling through all beings. This heart does not need to resuscitate or be resuscitated; it animates all beings, at all times, even in death. We may call what emerges from this Quechua field, poetic expression: that which is cradled in the arc of sunq’ulla, if given from there, for care: a creative and recreative act which is both an event and that which is a result of interrelational cultivation, the rule of Quechua care and respect. This poetic expression resonates with fearless speech as Foucault finds it in the Greco-Roman tradition. Poetic Expression permits us to apprehend how the caesura procure out of discontinuity between one person and another, not only events, but all things that Pacha, the world harbors, extending Foucault through Quechua instruction. Finally, Sunqulla recalls that Barthian gap which procures the play of difference, the activity that makes each thing situated at one or the other pole, which we will now translate as persons, a creative place that helps Westerners reconcile themselves to their separation from one another, and to the radical difference of the person before them such that domination may actually, in this eventual field, be out of the field.

For a tradition transfixed by the spirits it believes have infused the word with truth, through the spontaneity and breath-like emission of the voice it petrified within its edifices, fully controlling the oracle its necromancy staged at the center of its tradition, Western culture oscillates between the false pretense of the comfort of its own “continuity,” such as Foucault has described it, at the expense of the other which the “subject,” by its very functions and attendant reifications, to quote Althusser, must dominate in the interest of fulfilling his will to his own truth, or, it wails in anguish before the oppression of its body in productive labor,163 whether it admits the possibility that he is his own tyrant, for he only executes the other who is not complicit with his programmed machine, that is, he executes the erstwhile fearless speaker, for example, the whistle-blower, the truthsayer as Foucault puts it. In Quechua terms there is no such division between subjects and threatening others; rather, all Persons abiding in the Pacha, face one another from the arc/cradle of Sunqualla that gives them for care, to all persons in the Ayllu, and who practice care and respect in all matters of cultivation which consist of almost all Person’s activity, and from within the Pacha field, that has other names depending on whether it is expressing itself in the (Quechua) idiom of the time and place of festivity, or daily chore.

163 A treatise on this issue is Herbert Marcuse’s Eros and Civilization, first published in 1955.
We would have to admit, that the Quechua are far afield of the staging of this Western field that both Barthes and Foucault decry. The intercession of expression from the Quechua field into the Western field would be that expression finds its way not only to place, to the event as Foucault would have it, but also to the body, as Barthes would without having to endure the Western split between, essentially, Being, and beings in the field. Permitting the Quechua intercession into the Western field is to permit that other theorists, in this case Quechua theorists, that is, travelers, translators, readers, musicians, poets, comparatists, sensors and interlocutors show us the way of the voice that is free of the Western apparatus in which it has been caged, the voice that Barthes turns from as specifically Western “expression,” overdetermined by a metaphysical notion of voice, in favor of writing, which he attempts to resuscitate, or liberate, preferably restored to the body in order to find an other way out of the cage through the hand that scribes the play of text, the play of semiological difference. It’s as if we as Westerners were recovering play, music, and a heartbeat for all that we are saturated with all of these things, apparently.

Poetic expression then also because we are in a present that is known through convivial beholding and being held, belonging and being long, and because of the familiarity, of the time of the field. We find ourselves as Westerners walking alongside the Quechua travelers who create and recreate their world through attentive and careful cultivation that is respectful and considerate of all others, here in the Quechua field, entirely complicit in the joy, the ritual, the play, the work, the possible suffering, pain, and sickness of that conviviality, fearless even, of death itself. Quechua is expressed in the here and now with no tribulations about interiority or exteriority, fully occupying the vessel which is at once this strange arc that cradles the anima given with Sunq’ulla for care: Quechua language which speaks and listens intimates this creative and recreative movement in the eventual field harbored as Pacha. As the editor of Kancha Chacra Sunquilla writes:

La lectura de estos ensayos es una invitación a entrar, no en un mundo de fantasia ni de ficción sino de cariño y amparo. Grimaldo Rengifo Vásquez
Reading these essays is an invitation to enter, not a world of fantasy or fiction but of affection and harbor. [Translation mine]
Part 4: Quechua Intellectual Labor: Quechua encounters with the West

Chapter 8: Indigenous decolonizing intellectual labor: two indigenous Quechua/Aymara social movements and how the West may constructively intercede: the indigenous social body in Bolivia and Peru

Indigenous decolonizing movement one, in the Bolivian field: The practice of a transformational translational encounter: prevailing Wisdom or the Unveiling of Difference: reading the Ayllu Pachakuti Movement through Castoriadis, Fanon, Choque, Mamani, and Quispe

"…the Greeks always used metaphors as flute-playing, dancing, healing, and seafaring to distinguish political from other activities, that is…. they drew their analogies from those arts in which performance is decisive…" Between Past and Future by Hannah Arendt

The story to be told about the Quechua Aymara Indigenous Movement led by "el Mallku" in Bolivia on September of the year 2000 must begin with an account of the "creation of historical movement in the strong sense," (Castoriadis 160) in three movements: colonization, decolonization, and pachakuti. All three historical movements "lacerate" the "web of significations." "[T]he world, qua 'pre-social world,'---" that depository of "an inexhaustible provision of alterity,"--- lacerates the "web of significations" which had previously inscribed the world through "instituted" articulations and effects an irruption, (Castoriadis 152) a decisive and substantive change. These moments of laceration, are moments in which the "radical ground power...as manifestation of the instituting power of the radical imaginary" (Castoriadis 150) comes into light, as I will later demonstrate, as pre-v(e)ailing wisdom. The most dramatic lacerations are expressed in the form of revolutions, as the provisional de-formations that cut the deepest. Revolution exposes most nakedly the repressive mechanisms of society's institutions while it is also an instance that makes "the instituted" susceptible to human creation: it unveils, "the instituting in person," that is, radical difference itself, (Castoriadis 160) the manifest instance of an acting, individuated, collective autonomy.
Castoriadis helps tell this story through an appropriation of aspects of his political philosophy and theory that shed light on the events of September 2000. At the same time, aspects of Quechua and Aymara culture whose heuristic force is inherently theoretical will amplify Castoriadis' notions. Arguably, Castoriadis' constructs lose none of their coherence while the universality which they posit philosophically is examined or extended as it is confronted amicably with Fanon, Choque, Mamani and Quispe's thought. This mutually enriching exchange is the practice of a theoretical translation I perform in order to situate us neither in the Quechua tradition nor in the Western Philosophical tradition only, but in the liminal province in which both can and do commune, that is to say, in that province where they may share similar significations variously expressed and through which we may derive the outlines of a translation practice which has implications for theory and theorizing and for practices of documentation. This is therefore a Cultural translation in which all cultural constructs are treated equally as social expressions of specific geo-historic domains. This is yet social analysis, textually derived, which stands in as a form of Cultural translation in the broadest sense.

Fanon is read as the narrator of one revolutionary project of decolonization which took place historically before "ayllu- pachakuti." He is also read as the itinerant poet who decants a possible collective autonomy. In order to speak of these three singular moments of historical movement in the strong sense, that is, as radical moments of collective individuation or the overturning of heteronomy, it is necessary to talk about the socio-historical "magma" constitutive of all societies: the role of memory and the relationship between past-present and future which Castoriadis posits, as I will elucidate through a theoretical poetics. Colonization will be construed as the chosen point of origin, housed in memory, individual and collective, and drawn into the present of indigenous aymara/quechua social movement and documentation. Decolonization will be construed as the specter of the republic with respect to "Bolivia," an event documented in Choque and Mamani's texts. Fanon narrates the "sheer fact," of the historically specific events that took place in the North African society he describes. Through Fanon, the possible unification of a dominated, cut social body will be traced as a moment that gives rise to the possibility of an individuated collective autonomy. He will be read from that "given" historical moment, as a counterpoint to another society's "given" historical mo(ve)ment: Pachakuti, the "sheer fact" of the specific events which took place in a much more contemporary historical mo(ve)ment specific to Bolivian society as recounted by Maria Eugenia Choque, Carlos Mamani, and Felipe Quispe. Inasmuch as Fanon's account unveils the psychosocial economy of repression and violence, the idea brought forth by Felipe Quispe, el Mallku, of "brain-washing" will be elucidated through Fanon, as much as Fanon's account will be illuminated by Quispe's
narration of the events of September 2000. Quispe's use of the terms he devises such as "ideologia," "indianismo," and "reindianizar" will be analyzed through Castoriadis' conception of eidos, that is, "the form through which society creates itself, each time, singularly." (Castoriadis 147) The words and say-ings of the quechua-aymara people during the September movement will articulate the prevailing wisdom of the movement, in the sense that the laceration it inaugurates is at once "the interminable movement of thought which constantly tests its bounds and looks back upon itself," or what Castoriadis describes as the invention of "truth." Pachakuti expresses a truth, and brings forth the possibility of devising a political philosophy--, defined in Castoriadis' terms, not as the formulation of heteronomous truth, as identically repeated correctness, and the institutions it sustains--, but as the permanent questioning of the institution of society as such. (160) In this sense, the social movement that Quispe describes will reveal the uncanny similitude between this telling and the philosophical and theoretical edifice which Castoriadis constructs.

Castoriadis and Fanon are therefore both being read through Choque, Mamani and Quispe. While it will be possible to suggest, extending Castoriadis' thinking through Fanon, through the position outlined in Choque and Mamani's text as well as Quispe's interview that ideas travel, germinating creatively, the contrapuntal reading of Castoriadis and Fanon through Choque, Mamani, and Quispe conversely yields a cogent commentary on cultural translation, intellectual tradition, and processes of social legitimation and political and aesthetic representation. In this sense this is a commentary on the problems inherent in social documentation and disciplinary tradition. This performative reading is keenly aware of a necessary translation: Choque, Mamani and Quispe translate Castoriadis and Fanon. In other words, "story" is the metaphor for a political and textual analysis mediated by a necessary translation. While the stories we tell don't always reveal or are self-conscious of the values and systems of thought that sustain them, this one purports to navigate through various "stories" in order to elucidate the implications of an event, or otherwise tell it. The Andean texts read are in themselves social documents: one is a position statement submitted by an indigenous Non-Governmental Organization, Taller de Historia Oral Andina, and the other is an interview with the political leader whose actions marked the September 2000 events decisively. While it may not be the immediate conclusion that editorial, scholarly, or journalistic commentary would arrive at, the events that have unfolded in the last two decades in Bolivia do signify an autonomous political movement in the sense that Castoriadis would have us contend with and reflect upon theoretically and philosophically. The Pachakuti Movement in turn localizes Castoriadis. This reading purports to suggest an unfamiliar locus of theoretical and philosophical practice. This
locus is indigenous and is one that has persistently been construed as underdeveloped in several overt and less overt ways and yet inhabits a difference or otherness which we continue to attempt to recognize: the “Indio”, the Quechua, the Aymara. It is too often safely confined by categorizations and value judgements germane to specific scholarly practices which determine its legitimacy; this unquestioned practice is a translation; it verifies its validity by tailoring a different tradition's significations to categories not immediately operative within that tradition's cultural web of significations. In other words, its expressions are domesticated and disciplined. This reading observes this gesture and questions it implicitly, through the translation practice it performs. It is neither innocent nor guilty: it stands relationally in the liminal province that translation affords through reading. It will be perhaps frustratingly impossible to discern an object of study and so the reader is invited to relinquish the desire to identify one and is encouraged to surrender to the three movements in this story which contrapuntally and through a cultural translation successively reveal the import and the outline of the events of September 2000.

Finally, Choque and Mamani’s text recounts the ideas that make the "recovery of the given" (Castoriadis 150) manifest in Bolivian society through the activities of the Taller de Historia Oral Andina's (THOA) project of "Reconstitución del Ayllu." These activities anticipate the radical autonomy and new form of solidarity emerging through the events of September 2000. The translation of the significations put forth through this movement will make it possible to suggest, that ayllu-pachakuti, this project of individuated collective autonomy has a global vision; it offers possibilities for the globe.

Theoretical Translation: Inflection and Inscription: Affect or Colonization?

A suggestive theoretical inflection inscribed by the movement decanted in September of 2000 throughout the provinces and outlying rural areas surrounding the City of La Paz will be broached in this section through a reading of Castoriadis. The intent is to read Castoriadis

---

164 Workshop of Andean Oral History, (trans. mine) THOA, a Non-Governmental Organization composed of indigenous, quechua, aymara, and guarani intellectuals whose objective in 1983 was gathering oral histories through interviews with elders and leaders in the rural and urban communities.
165 Reconstitution of the Ayllu, (trans. mine)
166 "epi-," Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, 1983 ed.
through Quechua. The way that Quechua may extend or displace the concepts that inhere in Castoriadis' analysis leads in suggestive ways toward interpretive gestures which imply a souplesse particular to a specifically Quechua "explicit power," or to what I term a pre-ve(a)iling wisdom in and of a Quechua web of signification.

Castoriadis' theoretical designs delineate the poetics of his theoretical project as what I call theoretical inflection. The word is meant in both its denotations, the geometric and the linguistic. Geometrically, "inflection" describes "a change in curvature of an arc or curve from concave to convex, or conversely," which creates an "inflection point," a point on a curve "that separates an arc concave upward from one concave downward and vice versa." To inflect linguistically means to "vary (a word) by inflection," to "decline" or "conjugate." It also means "to vary the pitch of (as a voice)." Grammatically, inflection effects a change: it is "the change of form that words undergo to mark such distinctions as those of case, gender, number, tense, person, mood, or voice." 168 This is the figurative poetics of Castoriadis theoretical project:

In step with Castoriadis' analysis, the provenance of any given society is:

the world qua 'presocial world'--a limit for any thought--though in itself signifying nothing, is always there as an inexhaustible provision of alterity and as the always imminent risk of laceration of the web of significations with which society has lined it. (152) Castoriadis submits the notion that the world pours forth from this place, the arc from which, what Castoriadis appropriates from psycho-social theory as "push and drive" create movement. For Castoriadis, the timeless and spaceless miasma from which all socio-historical forms spring, the socio-historical imaginary, the world qua presocial world is the provenance of society as such.

Castoriadis tells us that society institutes itself in each instance as a singular form, eidos, and that moreover,

(t)his work always leans on the immanent properties of the being-thus of the [particular] world; but these properties are recreated, isolated, chosen, filtered, brought into relation, and above all, endowed with meaning by the institution and the imaginary significations of the given society. (147)

For the socio-historical, this is the (geometric) point of inflection, and the point where meaning reposes and is altered, (linguistically) inflected or expressed through societal institutions. According to Castoriadis, the source of all social-historical significations is the magma, the geological term and geometrical metaphor standing in for the limit of thought, the unknowable source of all socio-historical significations and the arc gathering the "radical instituting imaginary." This formless vessel arranging volatile layers depends on the absence or

presence of energy, of heat, to move, erupt, or harden. Society arises, however, only through the inflected relationship between itself and the individual.

Society is the work of the instituting imaginary. The individuals are made by the instituted society at the same time as they make and remake it. The two mutually irreducible poles are the radical instituting imaginary—the field of social historical creation on the one hand, the singular psyche on the other. (145-6)

The articulation of the instituted society can only arise in and through individuals whose pronouncement is inflected by the instituted society, and more deeply, by the magma of the socio-historical and psychical imaginary that it curves back into. Individuals and instituted society are thus given from the point of inflection between two curves: one that opens up, from which the "properties" of a society may be discerned and through which the inflected articulations of individuals are expressed, and another that opens down, from which arise socio-historical memory and other psychical impulsions from the radical instituting imaginary. Individual expression is inflected by society; in turn the institution is susceptible to the creative power of the individual. At the same time the individual is the concrete point of inflection between the radical instituting imaginary and the instituted.

Society can exist concretely only through the fragmentary and complementary incarnation and incorporation of its institution and its imaginary significations in living, talking, and acting individuals of that society. (145)

The radical instituting imaginary pours forth an energy, "affect," which generates the movement of the arcs from individual points of inflection. Castoriadis describes the source of all created institutions as motivated, set in motion, by the energy of affect, made manifest only through the expressions of individuals, that is, its societal institutions so expressed. In other words, he describes a pre-veiling wisdom, a condition necessary for anything to be created, expressed, presented. That is, for institutions in society to take form they must be incipiently conjured through and with affect. Affect trans-acted becomes the incarnated and incorporated manifestations of societal institutions, that is, the form of expression these take. Affect sets in motion the creation of institutions; it makes possible their expression: they can be said and done by individuals. Through affect social institutions are created and re-created.

For Castoriadis, the proto-individual is the psychical monad. The power manifest in society over individuals is articulated firstly in the Other, "generally, but not inevitably, the mother." (149) The foundational gesture of this "instituted" power occurs through the expression and the practice of what he terms paideia, "the nurturing, rearing, the education" of the newly
born. This power over individuals is without "explicit control," or "domination," and is therefore the most closely approximating the absolute, while at the same time it is ostensibly the most compelling, the least coercive. This originating power has the ability to persuade individuals to renounce responding to the commands of the psyche, effecting a bending, a supple curvature within which the psyche finds *souplesse*. Thus, the unique relationship between Other and the newly born inaugurates a reciprocally creative relation through which, bending to accommodate, a con-forming takes place. This necessary transaction holds the possibility of total violence and total surrender at bay through a mediating *souplesse*. If the ability to curb were not there, Castoriadis tells us from a psychotherapeutic and social perspective, the very existence of the psyche would be in peril. Without the curve, we annihilate: the psyche breaks under the weight of absolute domination. The movement in societies spurred by "the push and drive" is curbed in this case by this transacted affect. Alternatively, this trans-action is what permits the institution articulated or immanent through the individual to be susceptible to the instituting power, beyond mere biological survival.

In this mutually constitutive relationship, whose ground is philo-sophical, or whose proposition is ontological:

…”society is not a property of composition; neither is it a whole containing something more than and different from its parts, if only because these "parts" are made to be, and to be thus and not otherwise, by this "whole" which, nevertheless, can only be, in and through its "parts." (Castoriadis 145)

For Castoriadis, this process could be aptly termed radical or ground instituting, permanent inauguration of the unavoidably re-created and temporally new. Repetition for Castoriadis is only an appearance which the "traditional" institutions in any society, by definition, strive to uphold. The foundational and inflected gesture which inaugurates society, before this veil of re-presentation (appearance,) is nonetheless regulatory, reciprocally creative and re-creative, while it is also radical matrix:

This type of relationship, which has no analogy elsewhere, has to be reflected upon for itself, as principle and model of itself. (145)

To conjure the "thing" in thought, or to reflect upon it, itself, we may summarize: "The institution, and the imaginary significations borne by it and animating it, create a world." (146)

To render the explicative gestures of Castoriadis, we must bear in mind, finally, that:

…”to begin with the institution wields a radical power over the individuals making it up, and […] this power itself is grounded upon the instituting power of the radical imaginary and of the whole preceding history which finds, each time, in the institution as it is posited, its
transient outcome. Ultimately, therefore, we are dealing with the power of the social-historical field itself, the power of Outis, of Nobody. (150)

It is necessary now, to say a word about the linguistic inscription of this instituting power, effectuated by Castoriadis, in language. The unfathomable, spaceless and timeless expressions of a "world" are announced by: "it just so happens," that "there is." Favoring the French from which the phrase in English was translated, we are more properly dealing with, "il y a," a phrase more hermetic and at the same time, paradoxically, more telling. The phrase alone yields the power to conjure, what is "there." All French children know, that in response to the question, "what is 'there'?," they respond, "il y a...." This phrase which syntactically clusters three words into one commanding semantic field, when de-constructed, tells the following story, relationally: "y" is a pronoun, standing in for place, magmatic surface, the -epi ground; "a" is the third person conjugation of "avoir," the verb to have; "il" is the third person, singular, stripped of gender and person by that relational semantic transaction among the three words which disperses the authority to command throughout the utterance, "il y a." The linguistic inflection of person, voice, through this peculiar syntactical transaction bears a mark of disapparition. Person in this phrase becomes emptied person; the relational movement takes precedence over singular entities, that is, affect becomes the rule of linguistic expression, not person, or grammatical rule. Thus, "il" becomes no-person, nobody; disapparition is Outis. The phrase alone commands linguistically what is given there. This is how it inaugurates. "There is," in English, elides the linguistic inflection of person, yet necessitates a verb relationally transacting with the demonstrative, a place, ready to hold a thing. In English and especially in French, the power of Outis is represented linguistically in hermetic, inaugurative and commanding phrases. Quechua, on its own terms, tells us that the activity of being there, that which is held there, need not be inaugurated or commanded, to be there. It is self evident. The name makes the self of the thing in question evident; it reveals it of and from itself, giving without preamble or command what is there held. It bears no mark of disapparition, but one of im-mediate presence. Speaking of a third person in a profoundly oral Quechua tradition always involves giving testimony, avowing the fact of hearsay, of recounting events about that third person to the best of that person's recollection, or simply, transmitting this story as transmitted wisdom, or lastly, performing rituals which through words call into appearance the required presences. The Quechua ethics of telling circumscribe any commanding authority; ceremonial invocation makes present through the word. Quechua linguistic cultural practice reveals this persistent, deep structure. It is a structure which has resisted grammanarian's efforts to accommodate it to a written inscription's grammar, the colonizing gesture which took place in the 16th century through the first efforts to domesticate and
discipline the indigenous tradition in accordance with Spanish/European literate traditions. In Quechua then, pronouncing the name of that which is there, at once gives what is there: the word holds the power of affect to put forth: when it is said, it is done. "It" takes place otherwise in Quechua. The name in Quechua holds this "otherwise," which I am translating, and performs by speaking and doing the work of affect. All things are given by affect, even in verbal expression. The silence of Outis is heard, through translation from Quechua, as affect which silently gives.

"It just so happens," the other phrase that announces the power of Outis for Castoriadis, makes reference to the timeliness and effortlessness of the giving. This pronouncement that the "it" is given, now and with ease is the transcription of testimonial witnessing submitted to the imperatives of grammar, of inscription. The auto-poetics of the world, such as Castoriadis gives it, would be inaugurated with, "it just so happens," that "there is…..” Quechua articulates the word, with and from, pre-ve(a)iling wisdom; affect permeates the world and brings forth its being. The word performs what is there without an authority to avow it. The power of the word persists even when uttered: the only thing questioned about the third person alluded to in narration is the narrator, the veracity of the telling, not the word. For the Quechua speaking, pre-ve(a)iling wisdom, the knowledge of the power that creates--, Castoriadis' poetics--, may be said to inhabit the Quechua word that performs each and every time it is said. In Quechua, provenance is thus unveiled in and through the articulation itself and it is moved, like all else, by affect. This is Quechua inflection. The word that names gives what is there, actively performs in saying and doing, with affect. That this can be known, through and with articulation means that Quechua abides in this prevailing wisdom without having to pronounce it at all. Pre-ve(a)iling wisdom is provenance moving with affect in the saying; Quechua words are creative and recreative through the movement of affect. It is what is unveiled of the world, and rustles audibly, in the Quechua word. It is radically generative. And this is so, normatively: it is proper Quechua to elide any stand-ins. This is its inflection.

**Theoretical Questioning, "Political Philosophy" and Decanting: Intent: Poetry or Decolonization?**

Fanon, on the other hand, poetically decants what could not be: the failure of decolonization in Northern Africa is the poetic rendition of what might have been. Fanon's poetics are a decanting: chanting, song; an alchemical process involving carefully emptying from one decanter to another, separating sediments, high concentrations of liquids of varying density, modified by heat, poured through the curved lip of a decanter: the lip of the decanter, the corner
of an eye: poetic decanting as a way of seeing and saying: witnessing the event: testifying.\textsuperscript{169}

Fanon narrates the absconded possibility that he did hear and see at a moment of laceration: the irruption of a national movement of liberation in Algeria. He narrates the events that took place, documenting this social movement, recounting the events and situations that prefigured its suppression and its possibility. The beginning of a different collective autonomy defying the instituted heteronomy of violent domination, that is, of colonial rule begins by the rejection of the categorical boundaries, significations, imposed by the explicit power of domination:

Individualism is the first to disappear. The native intellectual has learnt from his masters that the individual ought to express himself fully. The colonialist bourgeoisie had hammered into the native's mind the idea of a society of individuals where each person shuts himself up in his own subjectivity, and whose only wealth is individual thought. Now the native who has the opportunity to return to the people during the struggle for freedom will discover the falseness of this theory. The very forms of organization of the struggle will suggest to him a different vocabulary. Brother, sister, friend---these are the words outlawed by the colonialist bourgeoisie, because for them my brother is my purse, my friend is part of my scheme for getting on. The native intellectual takes part, in a sort of auto-da-fe, in the destruction of all his idols: egoism, recrimination that springs from pride, and the childish stupidity of those who always want to have the last word. (Fanon 47)

Here, Castoriadis is instructive. Contending idols, contending webs of social significations in which one violently seals the other through the imposition, in this case, of an extrasocial meaning, inflicted upon "the native" web of significations. "Idols" are the first line of defense of the instituted society, in this case the colonial society.

In more agitated historical worlds, supplementary lines of defense are established. The denial of the alteration of society, or the covering up of the new by means of its attributions to mythical origins, may become impossible. (Castoriadis 153)

The native intellectual throws out the idols, the institutions imposed upon the dominated: "theories," "philosophies," "education," to translate some of the "idols" that Fanon alludes to in this case. The native on the other hand, Fanon tells us, either phantasmatically pits herself against the settler, that is, the colonizer, in re-enactments of struggles against mythical figures within her own web of significations. Her dominated socio-historical institutions are used in the service of a psychic economy of struggle against repression, and she struggles phantasmatically with ancestral, native, mythic figures thus substituting the name of one oppressor for another. In psycho-social terms she repels the violence in a word she understands. This deflection is a vital

The native is always on the alert, for since [s]he can only make out with difficulty the many symbols of the colonial world, [s]he is never sure whether or not [s]he has crossed the frontier. Confronted with a world ruled by the settler, the native is always presumed guilty. But the native's guilt is never a guilt which [s]he accepts; it is rather a kind of curse, a sort of sword of Damocles, for in [her]... innermost spirit, the native admits no accusation. [S]He is overpowered but not tamed; [s]he is treated as an inferior but [s]he is not convinced of [t]his inferiority. (Fanon 53)

The native sees, only from the corner of her eye. Instead of the instituted, not germane to the native's society, the "native intellectual" recovers what persists in spite of this imposition as it is revealed in his interactions with "the native." The native intellectual will recover from the instituted of her native society, the "substantive content" arising from this world of "different significations," and will thus recover her native society's eidos, or forms. (Castoriadis 147-8)

Just as it is impossible, as Castoriadis asserts, to "found a 'theory' of society and history" based on how one society and another "might appear identical or highly similar," though "universals stretching across the boundaries of different societies--such as language, the production of material life, norms, and values, etc.--certainly do exist," the absence of "substantive content," renders them false representations, totalizing universals which gain in this way the status of impositional meanings imputed with an other's heteronomous correctness, that is, they become (instituted) "idolatry," not only in their almost a-meaning for the native, but in their radical departure from what it just so happens, there is for her. Universals, whether "formal," as in the case of theoretical generalizations about all societies, or "specific universals," "concerning language and certain phonological laws" are nothing less than, the extrasocial idolatry, (religion,)-- in this case of European instituted heteronomy or tradition that remains unquestioned, and to which individuals in those European societies are bound. (Castoriadis 147-8) As Castoriadis tells us, "Tradition means that the question of the legitimacy of the tradition shall not be raised." (163)

In step with Fanon, we find the following description of individuals in "capitalist societies," read European traditional society:

In capitalist societies the educational system, whether lay or clerical, the structure of moral reflexes handed down from father to son, the exemplary honesty of workers... and the affection which springs from harmonious relations and good behavior--all these aesthetic expressions of respect for the established order serve to create around the exploited...
person an atmosphere of submission and inhibition which lightens the task of policing considerably. (38) [emphasis mine]

The violence exerted here is parallel to the idolatrous and violently equating imposition that the colonized native bears, and yet it is distinct. The process of transmitting orthodoxy gains a necessary aesthetic expression, a veil which facilitates the process of domination in the case of "capitalist societies." The aesthetic expressions are foregone in an important way for the native as the web of significations imposed is altogether foreign. The imposition cuts through the receiving social body and its web of significations. Colonization takes place without asking questions and through a prevailing coercive force. The native feels the imposition through the butt of a rifle, Fanon tells us poignantly. The colonizer would have the native society be identical to his, \( a = b \), akin to what Castoriadis calls "an asymmetric and antagonistic division of the social body". Domination in the sense inscribed by Fanon and Castoriadis entails a cutting. Above the native's tradition, the rule of identity cuts. For the European "citizen," the absolute mathematical rule of a forced "identity," the equating of all things in all places and all times through universalizing theories, is the rule of calculation. Fanon discerns behind the "aesthetic expressions of respect for the established order," expressions of/from what Castoriadis calls:

\[
\text{…true-to-form individuals, whose thought and life are dominated by repetition (whatever else they may do, they do very little), whose radical imaginary is bridled to the utmost degree possible, and who are hardly truly individualized. (163)}
\]

\[
\text{…and for whom "the covering up of the instituting imaginary by the instituted imaginary" is at once the intended "denial of the instituting dimension of society." For Fanon, the plasticity of these expressions is the artificial texture of the veils which obscure the repressive force of the imposed institution-- violent, abstract, and calculated equality--, which befalls individuals in capitalist society. It is this exacting command to behave in one way, to be the same at all times which is translated into the aesthetic expressions of a productive and manageable identity. Fanon dramatizes its unquestioned legitimacy. For Castoriadis, this identity is inconceivable insofar as what there is, whose radical provenance is also a plethora of difference.}
\]

\[
\text{seen […] by Fanon, he pours forth from this ocular decanter…] as absolute and total, the ground-power of the instituted society and of tradition is therefore, sooner or later bound to fail. This is a sheer fact which we are compelled to recognize: there is history, there is a plurality of [deeply] different societies. (Castoriadis151)}
\]
In the colony, Fanon tells us that in the movement of decolonization, "there is therefore the need of a complete calling into question of the colonial situation." This, for Castoriadis, is politics:

...politics properly conceived, can be defined as the explicit collective activity which aims at being lucid (reflective and deliberative) and whose object is the institution of society as such. It is, a coming into light, though certainly partial, of the instituting in person;... The creation of politics takes place when the established institution of society is put into question as such. (160)

The phrase, "de-colonizing the mind," takes on powerful meaning. What it says now, necessarily is that repressed social meanings must surface from the radical socio-historical imaginary, and that all institutions must continually be questioned. For decolonization to take place then, both the process of recovery from historical memory, and "the coming into light" of the forces of the radical instituting imaginary, in the present must take place through a questioning. Decolonization is articulated eidos, created from and in the past-present, reaching decisively toward the future society to be instituted. Fanon tells us what the native intellectual re-dis-covers, beneath the colonizer's prevailing and dominant idolatry:

Such a colonized intellectual, dusted over by colonial culture, will in the same way discover the **substance** of village assemblies, the cohesion of people's committees, and the extraordinary fruitfulness of local meetings and groupments. Henceforward, the interests [meaning borne by the imaginary] of one will be the interests [meaning borne by the imaginary] of all, for in concrete fact, **everyone** will be massacred—-or **everyone** will be saved. (47) [bold-face emphasis mine]

"Universals" may not be the foundation for a substantive theory of society and history. The "formal' universals" "such as language, the production of material life, norms and values, etc." as well as the "more specific universals," "e.g. concerning language and certain phonological laws", are like "writing with the same alphabet" : "they only work at the border of the being of society, which deploys itself only as meaning and signification." (Castoriadis 147-8) These are, in a word, "aesthetic expressions." No universal theory is possible, precisely because the **substantive**, germane to each and every social body is not universal, but historical and geographically specific. The collective in the **substantive** rendition that Fanon provides is the inflection that emanates from **African world**, to name the world provisionally. The native institution re-discovered beneath the veil of imposed idolatry bears a striking resemblance to "politics properly conceived." Fanon tells us:

Self-criticism has been much talked about of late, but few people realize that it is an **African institution**. Whether in the **djemaas** ["village
assemblies--trans." of northern Africa or in the meetings of Western Africa, tradition demands that quarrels which occur in the village should be settled in public. It is communal self-criticism..., of course, and with a note of humor, because everybody is relaxed, and because in the last resort we all want the same things. But the more the intellectual imbibes the atmosphere of the people, the more completely he abandons the habits of calculation, of unwonted silence, of mental reservations, and shakes off the spirit of concealment. And it is true that already at that level we can say that the community triumphs, and that it spreads its own light and its own reason [meaning, significations.]

The project of autonomy, Castoriadis tells us,

...is the unlimited self-questioning about the law and its foundations [about nomos] as well as the capacity, in light of this interrogation, to make, to do, and to institute (therefore also to say). (164) (bold-face emphasis mine)

This autonomy centers, however, on the collective as "self." The institution that articulates, that says, is "the people." The "intellectual" in this case is witness to lucid reflection and questioning of nomos, the legislative dimension of explicit power. "The spirit of concealment" is precisely that which is in force in European traditional society. For the native intellectual, to shed this spirit of concealment is to witness djemaas. The "unveling" for the native intellectual, is the removal of "colonial idols." Djemaas is the saying and the practice of the autonomous collective; it is pre-ve(a)iling wisdom, in the past present of African society in full public view. (Emphasis mine) Fanon submits, in a manner of translation, that Djemaas is the expression of the native, a native institution, which the native intellectual must recover, and in some measure must translate, as Fanon is doing. We may deduce, then, that if according to Castoriadis "politics" "pre-supposes that at least important parts of this institution have nothing 'sacred' or 'natural' about them, but rather that they represent nomos," and that this is by definition the creative act of individuals, then the project of autonomy, as such, is figured in djemaas. The locus of explicit power, Castoriadis tells us, is not necessarily the state, but may also be rooted "in the necessity to decide what is and is not to be done with respect to the more or less explicit ends which are the objects of the push and drive of the society considered." (155) The project of collective autonomy was inherent in the native traditional institution of Djemaas.

Yet and still, the failure of decolonization is inscribed in the movement that Fanon decants, precisely because the heat created by the violent confrontation between the "native" and the "settler" is cooled down. The language of the settler is violence for the native, as we have seen. The idea of compromise surfaces in the midst of this movement which engages both the
radical desires of the dominated---, in Fanon's telling they are "the [native] peasantry,"--- and the
disparate interpretive subjections effectuated by the nationalist bourgeoisie and the native
intellectual. Fanon describes the latter individuals' positioning as an intentional choice: shutting
themselves off "in a no man's land between the terrorists, [the peasantry, willing to radically
overturn the colonizer's institutions, and to recover their free accession to land and bread,] and the
settlers." (62) The nationalist bourgeoisie and the native intellectual who have "taken very good
care never to break contact with colonialism", (Fanon 62) continue to speak, "idolatry," (the
colonial power's "first line of defense," and in this way colonialism's "supplemental lines of
defense" become operative: "...the new can be subjected to a fictitious but nevertheless efficient
reduction with the help of commentary on and interpretation of [colonialism/decolonization]."
(Castoriadis 153) This reduction of the swelling masses becomes the violent and concrete
manifestation of the negotiation of intent, affect, and representation, as the transaction that
inaugurates the world. It also means that underneath the "veil of decolonization," stands
colonialism, and for Fanon, the de-facto silencing of the native peasants. "The lines of force,"
(Fanon 38) become the dividing line between those who have or have not, the "final word." For
Fanon, it need be said, the peasantry abides not by compromise. For them,

Colonization and decolonization are simply a question of relative
strength. The exploited man sees that his liberation implies the use of all
means and that of force first and foremost. (61)

What the peasantry understands is the violence of the settler: the rifle, the tank, the gun, concrete
violence whose meaning is none other than imminent massacre. The native wants to take the
place of the settler. He wants to depose the settler's word and express his own. The native
intellectual, on the other hand:

...has clothed his aggressiveness in his barely veiled desire to assimilate
himself to the colonial world. He has used his aggressiveness to serve
his own individual interests. (Fanon 60) [Emphasis mine]

"The political parties, and the intellectual or commercial elites," the forces which can open up
new outlets and engender new aims for the violence of the colonized people during this
mo(ve)ment of decolonization articulate, instead, this re-presentation, this aesthetic expression:

The national political parties never lay stress upon the necessity of a trial
of armed strength, for the good reason that their objective is not the
radical overthrowing of the [colonial institution]. On the specific
question of violence, the elite are ambiguous. They are violent in their
words and reformist in their attitudes. When the nationalist political
leaders say something, they make quite clear that they do not really think
it. (59-60)
The natives' response evoked by the settler is translated through the representations of the native elite into violent language, an aesthetic expression veiling the native elites' incorporation of the colonial power's idolatry. The learned "calculated interests" are cathected and this investment is veiled by the representation wrought in violent language. In the interest of order and protecting "economic zones" internationally acceded to, the fate of this originating irruption as sheer fact is not decolonization, or collective autonomy. Rather, Fanon tells us:

So we see that all parties are aware of the power of such violence, and that the question is not always to reply to it by greater violence, but rather to see how to relax the tension.... (73) Their purpose is to capture the vanguard, to turn the movement of liberation toward the right, and to disarm the people: quick, quick, let's decolonize.... Vote the constitutional framework for all Africa, create the French Communaute, renovate that same Communaute, but for God's sake let's decolonize quick. To the strategy defined by the colonized peoples, the colonialist replies by the strategy of encirclement--based on the respect of the sovereignty of states. (70-1) (underline and boldface emphasis mine)

The native's "intuition" that violence is the only way to depose the settler becomes a matter of representation. The onslaught of imposed meaning through concrete, violent domination, let it be clear, according to both Fanon and Castoriadis is the very assault that the psyche cannot sustain. Averting the radical irruption stemming from the peasantry means preserving the colonial institutions under new stand-ins, through interpretation, revised meanings, aesthetic expressions: in a manner of speaking, false representation. Colonialism as Decolonization becomes the "Republic of...." Veil upon veil, the push and drive are effectively repressed.

The first veil becomes the name of the new nation. Colonialism has the last word in the aesthetic expression, "decolonization." As Fanon re-tells it:

In their political speeches the political leaders give a name to the nation.
In this way the native's demands are given shape. (Fanon 68)

While the native's violence is contained, incarcerated, and repressed, its threat remains imminent. In this yet heated transaction, the native elites

become useless with their bureaucracy and their reasonable demands; yet we see them, far removed from events, attempting the crowning imposture--that of "speaking in the name of the silenced nation."...colonialism welcomes this godsend with open arms and transforms these "blind mouths" into spokesmen, and in two minutes endows them with independence on condition that they restore order. (Fanon 73) [all emphasis mine]
Holding sway over the native's violence means for the native elite making of this violence a "political slogan," and "this is the disgraceful thing," decants Fanon. In Fanon's decanting poetics, translation as testimony is axiomatic. While he documents the events that negated and suppressed the irruption of native significations, he discerns, as poets and theorists can, a space that was seized by the mediating native intelligentsia and elite. He signals to a space which lend itself, like any clearing might, the field, to the intentional act of translation effected by the native elite. Witness to this seizing, he documents what he saw as a "no-man's land;" in this case, the theoretician poet is informant; he documents. The metaphor is instructive. Caught between the irrupting, silenced significations of the native which are still his, and the imposition and incorporation of foreign significations, the native intellectual inhabits a field concealing mines, a field whose hostility lacks affect, and which moreover is wrought with the greatest danger. In other words, the individuated self cannot be realized as he is torn, just as the social body of native society suffers apartheid. Domination and calculated rule are the intended signification which is veiled by the aesthetic and to Fanon, disgraceful expressions which the native elite ultimately articulate, and practice, now as political representation. Expression inflected by this mediation between affect and negating intent is afflicted, or disgraceful. Situating himself in a liminal space that reading and witnessing provide, Fanon translates the language that the native elite speak. Violent language, he documents, is the intended representation created to suppress Djemaas. Decolonization was possible with the emergence of Djemaas, the recovery of a given native institution. Its suppression effected the failure of decolonization.

**Representation: Theoretical Translation or Silenced Difference Talks Back: Documenting Pachakuti or Collective Autonomy with Global Vision**

In 1992, the indigenous communities of Ingavi Province in Bolivia decide to inaugurate a process of self-governance centered on the performance of originary native communities (comunidades originarias) and ayllus, under the rule of their own traditional authorities, jilaqatas and mallkus, in this manner "re-taking" "the path of indigenous autonomy and freedom."

[Choque, Mamani, Taller de Historia Oral Andina (THOA) 1 (trans. mine)] Ingavi Province inaugurates a

"return to what is [Aymara/Quechua] and to the abandonment, almost vertiginous, of a form of organization imposed by the reformist State of 1952, the peasant union (sindicato campesino)." (Choque, Mamani)

The 'reconstitution of the ayl$$u,$' is expressed in an "organized political movement."
The position paper presented at the "Tercera Conferencia: El Ayllu y sus Autoridades: Perspectivas de las demandas y proceso organizativo indigena de los Andes de Bolivia,"170 by two indigenous intellectuals, Maria Eugenia Choque and Carlos Mamani, and a published interview with Felipe Quispe Huanca, el Mallku, will be analyzed as cultural texts that document the collective actions of Quechua and Aymara comuneros, (members of the ayllu, otherwise conceptualized as peasants,) from the project of "reconstitucion del ayllu," to the events of September 2000.

The lines of force, for Choque and Mamani/THOA,171 within the territory named Bolivia today persist in the socio-historical point of inflection, colonialism. Colonialism in this setting can no longer be construed as the occupation by a European Colonial Metropolis such as it was expressed in the given historical moment that Fanon documents. According to THOA, Spanish Colonial Rule and Bolivian Republican Rule provoke different moments of laceration, whose points of inflection remain colonialism. "Subject to foreign dominion el pueblo "Indio" (the Indian people/nation) have been, and continue to be." (THOA 2) While for Fanon,…there is no colonial power today which is capable of adopting the only form of contest which has a chance of succeeding, namely, the prolonged establishment of large forces of occupation (Fanon 40)

for THOA, the Quechua Aymara social body is cut by three periods of colonization as occupation: Spanish Colonization, and Republican Colonization before and after 1952.

1952 is an historic divisory point between a colonial period of exclusion of indigenous peoples from the idea of the nation State, and another of inclusion through assimilation. (THOA 1)

Under the eidos, emerging nation-state, "the native" or indigenous peoples continue to be silenced. Silence can now be understood as the event of imposing foreign significations to an extent that negates or suppresses the significations germane to the native society's web. Negation means that the native significations are subservient to other significations which dominate, that their value is denied in favor of others, that their meanings can be translated at will, through intentional appropriation and through representations which both aesthetically and politically serve the interests of those in power. Colonial domination elicits through its violence a violent response to this assault that becomes domesticated by translations cathected with the designs of

---


171 Henceforth the Position Paper cited will bear the name of THOA as the author. All translations of citations from this text and the Felipe Quispe Huanca Interview are my translation.
securing explicit power and the aesthetic expressions that sustain it. These representations, which intend both political and aesthetic occlusion stand in for politics and decisively repress the difference which makes autonomy, collective individuation possible. The possibility of inclusion forestalls negation, veils the intentions of the dominant power. The failure of decolonization is inscribed lucidly for THOA: Colonial Domination cut the socio-historic body through a racial divide. The articulated point of inflection for Spanish Colonial rule was the "extirpation of idolatries," whose continuity through the subsequent periods of Colonization is remarkable. The Republican (colonial) Movement before 1952 represented the "failure of decolonization" in its racialized articulation of "the indigenous"

As can be read in part of the introduction to the 1900 Census: "It is necessary to point out that long ago a phenomenon worthy of attention is operating in Bolivia: the slow and gradual disappearance of the indigenous race. In effect, as of 1878, this race has been mortally wounded. In this year, drought and hunger brought with them the plague that caused destruction in the indigenous race. On the other hand, alcoholism, to which indians are so inclined decimates its ranks in a remarkable way, and to the extent that the number of births do not compensate the rate of mortality…. Such that in a brief period of time, while we adhere to the laws of statistical progression, we shall have the indigenous race, if not totally erased from the scenario of life, at least reduced to a minimal expression. If this can be a good, it may be appreciated by the reader in that, if there has been a retarding cause in our civilization, we owe this to the indigenous race, essentially refractory toward all innovation and all progress." (Censo General de la Republica de Bolivia 1900: 35-36) (THOA 15)

In Fanon, the intent to massacre the "native" which functioned through the affliction of fear and panic in the native elite trans-actionally articulates the cathected representations of "the Republic of....," and Africanized European Idolatries. For the Bolivian Colonial Republic before 1952, "the failure of decolonization" becomes "the spectre of the Republic." Denial of failure, failure of the "nation-state project of autonomy," displaces "fear and panic" onto "el "Indio"" and recovers the colonial project of "extirpation of idolatries," under the cathected representation of "progress and modernity." Annihilation is the intent of Colonial rule before 1952. This denial of the validity of "Indio" institutions was at one and the same time their certain disapparition.

...since its creation, Bolivia planned nothing but the extermination, the form of depriving the "Indio" of his land. (THOA 2)

For the "native" "peasantry" in Fanon's decantation "land and bread" are the demands at the socio-historic moment of collective laceration. Colonialism, for THOA, at all three moments of socio-historic domination deprives the Quechua-Aymara of "tierra," land. The social body and
the land that over time has become Bolivia has been cut through, into, over, beside, and above the ayllu. Colonial domination is thus inscribed in this epi-graph. The ayllu, the native institution that gathers land and bread, they tell us, is:

a model of social organization whose prevailing force encompasses almost all the indigenous peoples of the andean region: Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia and Chile. It constitutes itself as model because it is jatha, seed, from whence germinated the Andean civilization and political structures such as Tawantinsuyu. The ayllu,… is up until today the unity with which our social and political organizational web ("red"-Spanish) is con[-]formed. It is the smallest, but the most important and it reflects also the organization of our State. In this matrix the markas and suyus con[-]form [themselves]. (THOA 5) (trans. and boldface emphasis mine)

The counterv(e)ailing force before colonialism is ayllu. It is at once, project of autonomy and pre-ve/ailing wisdom. Ayllu emerges from the depths of the radical imaginary as social representation and eidos while it is also the arc of provenance, matrix to all forms that are born, while it is instituting. We are reminded of the reciprocally creative relations which give the individuated self, which emerges from difference, without mediation and from affect. This self is the individuated self of a collectivity deriving its subsistence from an unmediated, affective relationship with its field of origin, ayllu, seed, land.

The collective ownership of the land and the communal possession of the land continue to be the principal pillars of the power of the Ayllu. Possession as well as ownership of the land mobilizes even to the extremes of violence. (THOA 10)

Decolonization as a project of autonomy takes form under the eidos or "idea," as THOA puts it, of "La reconstitucion del ayllu." The idea that forms the movement inaugurates a moment of unveiling: its explicit intent is to uncover beneath the dominant Colonial/Republican Institutions, not only the persistence and continuity of the ayllu, but the socio-historic memory which holds the inscriptions of the Quechua-Aymara collective socio-historical imaginary, inscriptions such as the ayllu. It strives to recover the given.

Non-indigenous [people], paradoxically, wrote the history of indigenous resistance, and thus it became patently necessary to learn of the past, to question our elders, consult document archives, to write our own history. THOA made its first incursions into historical investigation led by the idea of decolonizing historical indian (india) memory and with the objective of reconstructing at the same time india historicity, principally concerning 150 years of republican dominion which beneath the ideology of mestizaje concealed and disavowed the existence of aymaras, ghichwas, urus, guaranies (…). Thus the investigation concentrated on the century spanning from 1860 to 1950 characterized
by the crude re-emergence of colonialism under the republican form of the expansion of the *latifundio* which was resisted and arrested by the *ayllu*. (THOA 3)

They describe the reciprocally creative relationship that is collectively inaugurated as "a very fruitful dialogue between the present, of seeking to strengthen the identity [Aymara, Quechua, etc.], and the past, of restitution and [historical] defense of the *ayllu*." (THOA 4) We may say then, alongside Castoriadis, that the autonomy of the collective has been effected by the "instauration of an other relationship" between the lucid, reflective and decisive instance, and the other magmatic instances, that is between the present and the history that shaped the collective: this is properly named, historical movement in the strongest sense, or the *ayllu* *pachakuti* movement, which "washes the brain."

This *tarpuy* (sowing) of the seed, *ayllu*, is per-formed. As socio-historical representation of intent and affect it moves the social body. The name *ayllu*, becomes the movement *ayllu*, in its very expression. The word is no longer veiled with the cloak of oppressive significations. It gathers as its significations, aymara, quechua, guarani, etc. *ayllu*, reciprocally creating, through this seed, the cultivation of all *ayllus* to come, which give, Aymara, Quechua, Guarani…, with proper inflection. The reasoned, seasoned, nurtured, social body, moves and speaks.

The response expressed by the community was imperative: return to the community, to the *ayllu*. Then reconstitution materialized. With the *ayllus* and *markas* of the Province of Ingavi THOA initiated a cycle of work which leads through roads that traverse the wide Altiplano, the interandean valleys, as activists of a decolonizing process….The political option expresses itself in this walking for the construction of a movement which gathers the objectives of the *caciques apoderados*. [indigenous leaders of the past that THOA uncovered in their historical investigations had fought, politically, for "land," for the *ayllu*.] (THOA 5)

There is no imposition of an "extrasocial" signification, nor any recursive veiling. The political option also entails the abandonment of the historical disciplining underfoot, that is, it questions the translation effected by the elite in power whose national project silenced native history in the strong sense, that is as sheer fact, and which represented a "history" which suppressed moments of Aymara and Quechua resistance, that is, moments of laceration. What is more, THOA activists and intellectuals consciously translate their historical research, not into disciplinary results, the product of Western traditions of scholarship, that legacy and continued influence of the European Metropolis, but rather:

Researc, before being expressed in an academic result, was *translated* into the autonomy of historic memory. The "*Indio"s proved [effectively] that they did not only constitute the passive objects of *q'ara*
[men without faces, empty faces; e.g. the dominant elite] written history, but that they were also subjects of knowledge, who could in turn teach their brothers the fruit of their labor. (THOA 16)

In effect, they perform the sort of documentation and translation that Fanon decants. In stead of mimicking the practice of metropolitan scholarship and tradition, the say-ing of the people, prevailing wisdom, is performed; collective historic memory signifies that colonialism is the point of inflection for the long duree spanning from the 16th to the 21st century; an affirmation of the ayllu, the native institution which is both matrix, and is the point of inflection for Quechua, Aymara, etc. society becomes the true in this political movement (Castoriadis) which engenders an autonomous, individuated collectivity defining and questioning concerning its own explicit forms of legislation and governance:

The revaluing of the ayllu as a basic institution of indigenous life in the Andes, on the one hand, and the recognition of the colonial situation to which the indigenous peoples find themselves submitted to, on the other, constituted the foundation for the reconstitution of the ayllu which will ensue in the next decade. (THOA 16)

Under republican colonial rule numerous roles of pseudo authority were created for the ayllu as intermediaries between the State and focal and persistent ayllu governance. (Choque, Mamani) With the "Reconstitution of the ayllu" the roles carried out were changed and so did the relations. This change is called "pachakuti," "a new configuration of pacha" which means "time" and "space." (THOA 10) The Mallku, the traditional authority of the ayllu, symbolizes the power "that manifests itself in the distribution of food to the communities, their families, and children." (THOA 9) A double relationship of power characterizes the Mallku's authority: the endogenous dimension is one that expresses his concern for the well-being of the ayllu; the exogenous dimension signifies that "he personalizes the governing of the ayllu." This means primarily "to look out for (velar) (to appear/represent/veil/protect) the territorial integrity of the ayllu." This means at the same time, that he is all of these things in the way he appears, in his dress and his comportment. What he is, is at the same time what he appears to be, and this is the visible "exogenous," in the performance of his representational governance. His dress "symbolizes the responsibilities that his charge entail; he is "the historical and demographic memory which he holds in his q'ipi." (THOA 10) In other words, Mallku, is the performed expression of affect, as care giving authority. Alongside other ayllu authorities, the most important function the Mallku
has is *muyu*, a word that exists in both Quechua and Aymara. He must visit, home by home, "to interiorize [himself] of the problems that each family or person confronts." (THOA 11)

"El Mallku," Felipe Quispe Huanca, tells the story of the events that encircled the metropolis of La Paz during the month of September of 2000 in an interview. Wise to the "economic interests" which Fanon tells us encircled the emerging nations of Northern Africa in a compromised decolonization, the political strategy of El Mallku is to encircle the Metropolis: comuneros from the *ayllus* in the provinces of the Department of La Paz block the roads: men, women, and adolescents, armed with stones and slingshots, *ondas*, stand prepared and block the passage of all goods from entering La Paz. (Publically Quispe likened this "encirclement" "cercar," to a re-enactment of the encirclement that befell Tupac Katari, this time directed at the colonial republican elite.) In telling of the organization and Political Project of the Indigenous Aymara-Quechua Rebellion, he tells us that, "neoliberalism" predominated "in the healthy indigenous mind." (Quispe 163.) This "washing of the brain" (*lavaje cerebral*) (164) can now clearly be discerned as the lifting of impositional and repressive veils of extrasocial "idolatry." Quispe tells us this took place through an extended "*muyu*" with peoples from many *ayllus*.

When asked whether the movement which he had led resembled the "great movement led by Zarate Wilca in 1899" Quispe replied that he "could not make an anti-history." (164)

The project of autonomy which takes place in this indigenous political movement is guided by the "the discourse of *indianismo,*" that is its *eidos*.

...its that [discourse] that tells about their situation and of ourselves, perhaps sharing the same fleas, the same lice in the communities. For example in talking about water, considering that it's our *pachamama*’s milk; the same goes for territory, to have control of the soil, the subsoil, and the topsoil because our life is deposited there, our history, our future. (Quispe 169)

Land, pachamama, *ayllu*, that is given in and with affect, as it implies subsistence but also the affective relationships that make it possible, the social institutions sustained by the native web of significations. Land is not simply territory; it is *ayllu*. Quispe tells us that the movement was not effected through an ideal, that is, through a concept, a category. *Muyu* is imbibing one's self with the significations that emanate from the collective and which enter into a process of collective recognition and questioning through the *Mallku* who personifies the *ayllu*. It is enough to hear the comunero respond to the media's question, "why are you blockading the roads?" to discern the absence of veils, the unified expression of the collective becoming provenance and difference emerging in affect: pre-v(e)ailing wisdom is *pachakuti ayllu*: in this moment in time, we give

---

with affect, the ayllu which now repels colonial time and space. Quispe tells us the response was consistently the same every time, everywhere. [This reader heard the same things.]

"We don't want to pay for water; we don't want to pay for our land. We will plant coca for life; coca is our mother, we have no reason to raffle her off; we are the owners of this land."

Not only does muyu make the Mallku the person who "interiorizes" the concerns of the families in the ayllu, but his nurturing of all ayllu members is his rule, his nomos, as devised by the reflexively and lucidly discussed needs of the collective: affect, intent, and representation are transacted for the sake of the welfare of all throughout all indigenous institutions. Ayllu is seed to land. Cultivation is point of inflection of welfare. The pre-v(e)ailing wisdom, the say-ing of the people is political philosophy as defined by Castoriadis, in this historical instance. The moment of laceration which this interview documents releases from the reservoir of difference in the instituting imaginary, the expression which I term, as translation, pachakuti ayllu movement. Quispe puts forth an implicit argument about theory, philosophy, political and otherwise, as Western institutions, and idols, which underlines the stated intentions of this paper. He says:

Then these expressions have an ideological content. They're not just anything. At the same time, it was well articulated; that's what I've liked the most…. There was a general cohesion; there was only one thought and only one direction for struggle, especially here in La Paz. [Quispe 172]

Quispe, conscious of his elaborations, qualifies his remarks by clarifying that he has never liked being a "dialoguist" (dialoguista) or "legalist" (legalista) in reference to the liberal democratic traditions alluded to above which were washed away: "I was an enemy of legalist, officialist positions," e.g. the "blind-mouths" that Fanon described.

The comuneros alongside el "Mallku" faced the government negotiation teams, with their traditional clothing, and comportment. [Quispe's public performances were televised as often as he made them during this period alongside comuneros.] Just as THOA had, as in the practice of muyu, Quispe clarifies: "It's that we had gathered the ideology of the people. As a result, the ideology has come forth from the mind of the communal base, [the people;] they defined; they even wanted to go to an extreme, to a higher level." (Quispe 77) "Ideología" or ideology has a specific meaning here which I translate as the eidos of a Quechua, Aymara institution, or the point of inflection: ayllu pachakuti movement. Moreover it is a politically autonomous institution in that it is both individuated, born of difference, in the present, and self-questioning. Before the threat of army tanks and police interventions, similar to the "native" in Fanon's telling.
decantation, but in keeping with their *historic*, in the strongest sense, prevailing wisdom, the Aymara-Quechua expressed, what Quispe describes thus:

> Psychologically, they've understood that the enemy is not invincible, that he can be vanquished,…that you can capture the mental atmosphere. (Quispe 182)

**Ayllu Pachakuti Movement: Global Vision or Possibilities for the Globe**

As has now become visible, now audible, the project of autonomy sustains, by definition, a timely, singular, emergent and supple identity given in and from difference. The souplesse I ascribe to this movement arises from the reciprocal relation between the radical instituting imaginary and the socio-historical magma of significations with which it weaves the world into being, at each and every moment in a relation of affect, mutual and immediate recognition, and reciprocity: native Quechua and Aymara expression, representation, aesthetic and political, without colonial veils, such as I translate it, as possibility. Castoriadis' theoretical designs, are the inflected articulations of this movement, just as the germ of autonomy is decanted through the ocular lip of testimony through translation: we have heard tell that the germ of autonomy arises else-where on the globe from a different web of significations, where it is nurtured none the less, perhaps with greater immediacy, with greater affect, and in spite of the most violent and afflicted forms of repression, and perhaps importantly, through a local, indigenous translation, to which I give voice, through mine. With our ears wide open, we may hear and see it: we witness. One of the acts of violence which we may all fall prey to, is permitting the ear to become insensitive to the immediacy of difference, to the sway of its affect, and to the affliction of interpreting it away…. This is what Castoriadis calls: exorcism. (153)  Castoriadis tells us:

> I will not delve here into the necessary reciprocal implication of equality and freedom when the two ideas are thought rigorously, nor into the sophistries by means of which, for a long time now, various people have tried to make the two terms appear antithetical. (168)

It should be clear now that inferiority and superiority are racialized fictions enforced only by the veils of re-presentations cathected with the interests of domination, in direct opposition to the momentous expression of political performance in the auto-nomos sense. Untruth emerges with unquestioned institutions, unquestioned nomos, and perhaps most ironically with the traditional rule of identity. No thing bears comparison in that it arises every time from and in difference. In recognizing difference we acknowledge equality. Difference arises only in freedom from domination. Exercising equality is the recognition of individuated selves given without mediation, that is, in freedom from all forms of repression and re-presentations which colonize
the radical and socio-historic imaginary. No being emerges without being shaped and without shaping, but the rule of emergence is affect, primordially. If the ground for all worlds-in-themselves are entirely unconcerned but with affect, intent and representations, in the most sheer sense, than every other representation, becomes, a deceptive "aesthetic expression," an unuestioned idea or institution, that is, unuestioned nomos, the postponement of the question: how may we, legislate our selves and in turn how do we intend to govern our world? This is the question concerning autonomy. Only this standing in the world, brings to light the "radical grounding power" of the instituting imaginary. Only here may we create, the world. Creating, in the socio-historical field, is always, already, changing what is there, unabashed discernment of sheer fact, in a language that gives, what is there, in order to create anew with renewed or renounced intentions. This is the inflected articulation of "autonomy." The necessary reciprocal relation, equality-freedom, is the same as provenance as difference, or equality in the permanent freedom to create. Like politics, which is the natural realm for this occurrence, you cannot have one without the other, just as, you cannot expect to care for either one, without being in the realm of a radical discernment, with a keen ear, a readiness to decant, for everyone, which is at once the only possibility for you, in the realm of "politics properly conceived," that is in the realm of self-governance, for the welfare of all. This is the story that Castoriadis, Fanon, THOA, and Quispe tell. "Global Vision" is the inflected articulation.

Our task is to question, this project of autonomy, in the name of autonomy, engaging in the realm of politics, for the sake of the world.

Question: Now entering the final leg, you just spoke of the objective of the indigenous movement as taking political power, the formation of an indigenous government. In a country where the majority of people are indigenous, what would the position of those who are not indigenous be? Nowadays a colonial minority governs the immense indigenous majority. Given the probable case of the constitution of a government in the indigenous sectors, what would become of the other sectors, of q'aras and mestizos?

Response: If the indi[o] takes political power, he must think of the way to group everyone; the indigenous government must know how to calibrate, the situation of this country, because in this country we cannot substitute white racism with "Indio" racism. Here we must embrace everyone, indigenous or non-indigenous. Only in this way will we be able to live together, work together, produce together. (Quispe )

This performative reading stands in as a practice of translation which implies difficult problems in knowledge production and attendant problems inhering in the traditional practice of cultural translation which is unquestioned. Theorizing translation through its practice leads to the possibility of questioning how we produce knowledge, how we represent and document events, in
a word, how we transact in affect, intent and representation concerning our selves, others, and the world. The implications of a "globalized" world such as the one we currently inhabit makes imperative a political questioning of representation, the ineluctable problem of translation and the persistence of the hermetic complex of a dialectic between overdetermined, reified, and rhetorical appropriations of identity and difference. This paper submits through its practice that all writing installs a poetics as a conduit for rendering all forms of thought and critical questioning and that these "poetics" reveal in turn a specific form of representation which, barring all generic categorizations may elicit the sort of lucid reflection which is intrinsic to a political project of autonomy, a project, it should be evident, which grounds all self governance in a permanent process of inauguration and renewal in the interest of equality and freedom. Reviving or re-reading, as necessary, is recovery and translation, as required, in the interest of discerning more clearly and in order to document social and historic events that concern the stakes inherent in political autonomy. Political autonomy is not attainable without a consciousness of political and aesthetic representation. Lifting the repressive forces that effect silence is the first condition to be met in recognition of difference, equality, and freedom. Taking up the challenge of reading, witnessing, and documenting social events necessitates the most careful translation. Perhaps it is time to revive what yachaq, jilakatas, the ancients, always knew: the performing arts have the greatest kinship with creation, and by extension with the practice of creating our worlds. The project of autonomy, Ayllu-Pachacuti Movement, the name I give it in translation, in my view, is worthy of our reflection.

Indigenous and decolonizing movement two: in the Peruvian Field: Quechua Literacy and Epistemology: De-professionalized and Re-indigenized “development” practioners

Questions of legibility, translatability, orality, and literacy, specific to the Quechua Andean communities are central to an understanding of alternative ways of learning, alternative ways of knowing, and alternative ways of creating and re-creating worlds. The superimposition of colonial, national, and statist logics and literacies have been violent means whereby the Quechua speaking community has experienced an oppressive erasure and marginalization through which the Quechua speaking have been significantly depleted in economic, demographic, political and social terms, over centuries. The Western humanist and universalist vision of these successive expressions of a complex of domination structured around the experiential, knowledge and institutional governance of this colonial encounter, through this logic, construed this world as other, that is, backward, destined to servitude and inferiority, and therefore negligible, and has
thus, consistent with its logic, procured the means for its suppression, assimilation, or elimination, a fact that organizations like the Taller de Historia Oral Andina have preoccupied themselves with discovering in archival documents and legal edicts.

Just as we have also deconstructed, the other side of the project of suppression is the project of liberation, wherein it is not only possible but proscribed that liberal democracies will espouse the ideological tenets of equality and liberty, while they will also express the coloniality of oppression and racism, part and parcel of the working order of this colonial encounter. The concept or name “Indigenous Peoples” has a history within the circuits of Western institutions that have acknowledged the needs of a population that has endured, by choice and through various forms of resistance, outside of the liberal mathematical grid, while conversing with aspects of it, all along, as we have seen. While “indigenous” has been comparatively and translationally brought into this re-searc on the colonial encounter, in the field of international organizations such as the International labor Organization, the United Nations, and even a banking institution focusing on development such as el Banco Interamericano del Desarrollo, all have evolved working definitions of the object of their concerns, or the party with whom they negotiate, granting that “Indigenous Peoples” all over the globe share in a similar situation within the Western colonial encounter that enframes them: they have preserved their native languages, religions, cultural and knowledge practices and forms of governance, and they all submit a reclamation of their original territories and a restoration of the balance that maintained their well-being and integrity in the past. The provenience of the “concept” for Western and Westernized societies and international agencies is readily attributable to one of the longest studies on the conditions of marginalized or oppressed populations internationally: “One of the most cited descriptions of the concept of the indigenous was given by José R. Martínez Cobo, the Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, in his famous Study on the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations [, a] study that was launched in 1972 and was completed in 1986, thus making it the most voluminous study of its kind, based on 27 monographs.”173 In addition Cobo clarifies not only a set of basic ideas that would form the intellectual framework through which to understand “indigenous communities, peoples, and nations,” “which included the right of indigenous peoples themselves to define what and who is indigenous,” but he submitted the following clarification:

Indigenous communities, peoples, and nations are those which, having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing on those territories or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop, and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continual existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions, and legal system. (2)

Quechua literacy has endured, however, within the natural environment to which it is germane, the Andean highlands, and according to the mutual relations it inscribes linguistically between people and their physical environment. Quechua literacy is at once a knowing and a practice legible in things such as the quipu, the ayllu, and agricultural rituals. It is perhaps the illegibility of this Quechua world, or the refusal to acknowledge the legitimacy of its practices for many of its criollo observers which has permitted its specific forms of resistance and endurance to remain obscured and which may have in turn permitted the Quechua world to persist in spite of the consistent imperative to suppress it. The failure of development schemes, extensions of the logic of the liberal progressive ideals which fueled state and postcolonial projects for development, have brought the Quechua speaking communities out from under this insistent erasure. Local and indigenous knowledge now form part of a yet emerging field whose focal point is sustainable development, an extension of ecological, geographical, environmental, and cultural concerns about the exhaustion of the resources the mathematical liberal grid exploits for its “proper” functioning. A critical number of professionals in the field of development have turned away from knowledge institutions and practices---not only based on the mathematical Westernized capitalist grid whose most persistent expression is this colonial encounter throughout this re-search deconstructed---but have also turned away from the print-conceptual literacy so bent on emptying not only the word, but the field, as well as the life of peoples of the life of all things, and the vital and convivial connection to all those things. For these professionals, who by these turns de-professionalize and re-indigenize, turning away from these decadent western practices constitutes a choice to repudiate the unacceptable indifference and ignorance about what the persistence of indigenous peoples’ successful and harmonious adaptation to the materiality of the world means. To keep “materiality” as the Western point of intercession between Western & westernized and Quechua fields, is reducing the Quechua field to a subservience to Western preoccupations and interests, while it ignores the fullest significance given the material within relationship, immediate, with what the West has called the spiritual in the Quechua field.
The experience in the field, for certain development practitioners has led to the recognition of local indigenous peoples’ localized practices as a corpus of, in many cases millenary knowing which creates and recreates wholly and harmoniously environmentally sustainable indigenous practices which support a thriving world, un-fragmented into the discrete specializations characterizing Western knowledge, as we have seen. This has led some development practitioners to consciously re-indigenize-- become neighbors, beget kin and allies in the process of recreating life-sustaining relationships in specific places-- due to the re-connaissance that has led to the choice to foment sustainability through the millenary practices of specifically Andean Quechua speaking cultivators, among other indigenous peoples. What has not been studied extensively, however, is just what Quechua literacy engenders as an alternative knowing and practice for political, social, and economic organization, in that Western specialization gives these separate “fields of study” or “disciplines.” As an increasing and compelling interest in natural resource and environmental preservation grows, and while the success of millenary agricultural knowing practiced in the Andean regions is increasingly recognized as what led to the bio-genetic diversity of interest to the Western world, however much it has already been appropriated, Indigenous People’s worldviews and practices, their knowing surfaces as a matter of concern with respect to some of the most pressing questions of the day. The study of Quechua literacy permits us to account, not only for how the agriculural practices, which we can now begin to read, yield the diversity necessary for the proliferation of all biological life, but it would lead the way to knowing how to cultivate such a life proliferation, at once socially practiced and communally shared, that is benefitting to all lives including all life on the planet. In contradistinction to the abstract, anthropocentric—humanist and universalizing--literacy of Western institutional logic, Quechua literacy presents an alternative logic of social, political, and economic rationality and cohesion worthy of our concern. In a word, it presents the possibility for understanding and alter-native vision of the world.

Traditional forms of communal and collective existence such as the ayllu persist today, and integrate what Western epistemologies divide into the discrete concepts of “economy,” “society,” and “politic,” within this worldview. This integration could aptly be called the sustainability of spirit or the spirit of sustainability quite simply because what is be-fore Quechua speakers is traversed by the word in a communion that enjoins the spirit of the thing into conversation with the runa be-fore it: there is no division between spirit and matter but a conviviality whereby the spirit dwelling in “the body,” whose delimitations are not clear and are not necessarily limited, is in thoughtful, that is, careful conversation with the spirit dwelling in the runa where word and thought are articulated “care;” what is more, in the Quechua cosmovision,
death is transformational and continuity and discontinuity dwell together eternally, just as spirit and matter abide together through expressions that are not necessarily verbal and do not abide by any specific or prescribed shape or form. The _Apu_ is as close as we can approximate, a “deity,” but in the reality that proves to be real in Magdalena Machaca’s narrative, the _Apu_ is more like a powerful relative, an older and wiser neighbor and ally in life’s traversal. The _Apu_ however abides in the _urq ’u_, the mountain that _runakuna_ (many runa) walk next to in their daily chores, the same mountain that harbors all the animals that the _Apu gives for the runa to care for, and for the animals to care for runakuna, who he cares for in turn.

This integrative worldview emerges in a ritual cycle of cultivating the land, _pachamama_, and extends into urban sectors through an indigenous ethnic diaspora. While the concept of “campesino” has for several decades characterized this historical actor within the province of Western disciplinary theory, as an extension of the category of class and in order to explicate questions of the role of women through the category of gender, in the rural sector that Quechua and Aymara speaking cultivators have been dwelling in as _dwellers in Quechua and Aymara fields_, an active process of recovery and affirmation on terms, both linguistic and epistemological, and even ontological that are not bound by the limits of these categories or the Western edifice have been taking place as a process sustained by this Andean cosmovision, by the sustainability of this _SPIRIT IN KINSHIP WITH MATTER_. This concept, _campesino_, is a translation of the concept “peasant” or “peasantry” and its translation is a superimposition which renders under erasure a distinct and different historical actor. _This inadequate translation is one register of the diffusion of the colonial encounter_ and what some have called the _coloniality of knowledge practices_ diffuse throughout the region since the colonial encounter. More importantly, it dis-locates the primary labor of indigenous communities organized in accord with a knowledge of the ecological landscape of these territories, while it obviates the integrating knowledge practices of indigenous spirituality as they emerge from a worldview, or _cosmovision_— as they emerge from an intimate conversation with a natural order that communicates in a language intelligible to _Runakuna_ through begetting alliance, care, kinship with all that lives and is sheltered by _Pachamama_.

This section will focus on the Quechua natural order, where Quechua gathers through its language and its traditional knowledge or _Quechua spiritual eco-practices_. _This Quechua Andean natural order_, which is how it is accessible today is shared with Aymara and many other indigenous languages of various ethnies in that its path, its way, marks a trans-versal crossing which traverses the coastal region, the Andean highland region, and the Amazonian region. The
Quechua natural order is not conceived of longitudinally, but rather transversally. Not only are those who cultivate the earth, not farmers, in that they do not lease land, but they are also not farmers in that they are not sedentary, as per the contemporary definition and practice of Western “farmers” and “farms,” where land is cultivated through the right to lease or own it. The Quechua cultivator conceives of her and his labor as cyclical and in a state of permanent motion, as trans-territorial, and trans-regional. The Quechua cultivator or runa walks with kawsay mama, the living mother, the living seed in its multiple paths, through which diversity as a spiritual practice of sustainability is cultivated. At the December 2009 conference, “Primer Encuentro Nacional: Cambio Climatico, Soberania Alimentaria y Conservación In Situ de Plantas Cultivadas y Sus Parientes Silvestres” which took place in Huamanga, Departamento de Ayacucho, which I attended, the diverse Nuclei of Cultural Affirmation who conform Proyecto Andino de Tecnologías Campesinas shared their localized Andean cultivating practices where the seed’s adaptability to specific soil and ecological niche, in the trans-versal traversal from coast to Andean valley to highland to Amazonian forest, responding to the specific conditions wrought by the present expressions of the season would become the path traveled by the Andean cultivator in an accord with the seed’s acostumbramiento, or accommodation, that is, its comfortable dwelling in this or that distinct earthly ground and season.¹⁷⁴

The paradigmatic shift that this world natural order inscribes is a cycle of this conviviality of beings sustained by spirit in an elliptical transversal motion, tilted in accord to the movements of all living beings, in pacha, in place and time, dwelling and protected, harbored by Pachamama, or the spirit of sustainability, or the sustainability of spirit. Matter decays but perdures in transformation, just as spirit does: this is the harbored dwelling that Pachamama be-speaks. Just as ayllu and kawsay mama are terms that are not conceptual in accord with Western philosophical ideas, as the ontology of Western thought would ha(l)ve it, this natural world order renders, gives the world, in whole, and in difference not through a division of Being, or Spirit or essence, and beings, but rather, as a whole whose plenitude is manifest in the conviviality of all

beings, in difference and in communion, and by rule, in attentive conversation, one with an other, not as differently valued, that is stratified, or collapsed into a mathematical equality which is meaningless, but rather, who are equally valued, and in this way the same, which leads to the natural alliance based on mutual reliance, neighborly collaboration, lasting and reciprocal bonds akin to the bonds of mothers and their children, fathers and their children, brothers and sisters, a world of kinship sustained by caring and reciprocal ties that create and recreate all living things. Nor is the spirit or Being of any being considered in terms of the division of the animate in contrast to the inanimate; rather, all beings are animate, and with spirit. What emerges in Pacha is a sustainable unity from difference, and a unity generating diversity, in harmony and balance with place and time and all living beings, in pacha, through relations of cultivation, nurturance, and conversation, that is a knowing that is attentive and careful and communicational.

The dismembering inscribed in the term métis or half, utilized to refer to the mestizo or part “Indian” and part “Western”/“Spanish” or as colonial subject is not what is being thought from, and with-in this natural world order, Pacha. In stead, comparatively and translationally there is a re-membering, taking place, in a cycle of movement sustained by and in this SPIRIT IN KINSHIP WITH MATTER. The com-union of all beings in this spirit is de-termined by the confluence of different beings of undifferentiated value, of Same Value, in equity participating in a sustainable movement of harmony and balance, not orchestrated, controlled, or dominated by Runa but procured by a knowledge that derives from an intimate conversation with all that dwells in Pachamama, where increase or reduction become the practices of accommodation regulating proper creation and recreation, in response to Pachamama, or, what I call cultivation. Verification of this well-being is the accommodation required in the practice of cultivation, which is widely applicable, axiomatic and which is a matter of increase or reduction in repose to harmony and balance as natural rule, natural instruction, the knowing gained through conversation with Pachamama. This is Allin kawsay, well-being, the way that the welfare of all beings may be practiced through cultivation, nurturance. The integrative SPIRIT of all living things, can be seen as far back as the Inka, whose personage is the cultivator, as is any runa, in place and time, in Pacha. Neither the republican criollo, as liberated colonial subject, nor the mestizo citizen whose split identity is the symbolic suturing of nationalist projects at play, neither of these is at play in an indeterminate in-between, nor in a liminal beyond, a “post” colonial, nor has “the Other” been devoured in the interest of the Global Self’s identity.

Proyecto Andino de Tecnologías Campesinas/Project of the Andean Quechua Aymara and Guarani Cultivator Technologies, my translation in accord with the traversal followed
above] or PRATEC and the Nucelos de Afirmación Cultural/Nuclei of Cultural Affirmation or NACAS: a comparative and translational project in practice

From “inside” the national-localized Peruvian field, PRATEC re-searsces the “campesino field” and encounters the Andean cosmovision of ever, a place where, for indigenous Andean “campesino” communities, “culture” and “nature” are not separate, “spirit” and “matter” are not separate. The work of Proyecto Andino de Tecnologías Campesinas (PRATEC) and its associated Nuclei of Cultural Affirmation (NACA’s), growing throughout the Peruvian Andean and Amazonian regions during the last twenty years provides substantive and significant evidence of the reality of this in the field. PRATEC discovers beneath the erasure to which the indigenous communities have been relegated that an intrinsic component of the Andean cosmovision is the nurturance of life, as whole. Nurturance takes place within the local Pacha (place, in the Andean worldview), the living, natural collectivity comprised of all beings who are communities that associate in accord with their needs and abilities, interdependently: the Runa (Humans), Sallqa (Nature), and Apus/Wacas (deities) communities. Learning how to nurture and letting yourself be nurtured is a primordial principle and practice in the Andean worldview which engages the tropics, the valleys, and the peaks of this region. Nurturance is carried out through a conversation among all beings as “equivalent” beings, with respect, empathy, reciprocity and joy. All living beings complement one another through this mutual nurturance manifest in ritual and daily conversation whose outcome is the regeneration of life as a whole, where language is communicational in either in-stance, daily or regenerative ritual. Through this conversation Andean indigenous peasants elaborate sophisticated responses, in the moment, and from the locality, to the variability of beings dwelling in the chacra, the small plot of land at the center of daily practice and rituality. Balance and harmony are procured through this constant and daily mutual nurturance and conversation. In this way, the Andean worldview sustains the creation and recreation of diversity in all of its expressions and practices. Sustainability is intrinsic to this millenary worldview, PRATEC and NACAS affirm. This unique approach to life was not and

---

175 This term, “The Andean Cosmovision of Ever” is the way that PRATEC, expresses, and to a certain extent translated, the constancy and permanence of the regenerative cycle sustaining all indigenous Andean life, through language, nurturance, conversation, daily and ritual practice, centered on Pacha, the Quechua word for place/world, nurturing regenerative world.

176 This chapter uses the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and ILO Convention 169 definitions on Indigenous Peoples. Campesino lingers in PRATEC’s name in that its focus was from the first the problem of rural poverty, and the legacy of Marxist and Marxian analysis of the region’s dependence, neo-colonial condition, and failed Mariateguian project. The re-membrance of this territory through indigenization and deprofessionalization can make sense if what I call the cultivator is expressed as “campesino,” thereby establishing a mythologically adequate arc of continuity between this commun-ist national project (Mariateguian) centered on the “Indio,” and the present movement of Quechua, Aymara, and Guarani cultural affirmation that PRATEC actively participates in.
has not been understood by the Other subservient to the liberated creole, the *mestizo* citizen for whom ““Indio”” is abstract national identity, and for the global self that oversees the global market of ideas and commodities. This marginalization has been putting the Andean way of life at serious risk, arguably for the last five hundred years, while it has been colonized globally through the Western edifice called the *colonial encounter*. After a serious assessment of this persistent colonial encounter between Euro-American traditions and the Andean cosmovision of ever, as well as a critical assessment of their development oriented, professional, and life experiences, PRATEC and the NACAs’ members made a rewarding re-turn, confronted with the *kairos* of the failure of the Western development project. Eduardo Grillo\textsuperscript{177}, one of PRATEC’s founding members states it in these terms:

> En la actualidad, de manera oficial, el desarrollo no es otra cosa que el quehacer concreto de la empresa mundial montada por el imperialismo, después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial y bajo el liderazgo de EEUU, específicamente para homogeneizar al mundo con el propósito de explotarlo y controlarlo más fácilmente. Este empresa tiene a su disposición un asesoramiento y un aval académicos de excelencia desde——---para tartar de hacerla ideológicamente convincente y técnicamente inobjetable. Para el efecto se dispone de toda una doctrina basada en dos principios. El primero afirma que todos los pueblos sin excepción comformamos un mundo único en el que sólo cabe un único orden posible y correcto y al que le es inherente un solo proyecto universal, que por supuesto es de la propiedad privada y el mercado, que ha llevado a un puñado de países a encumbrarse sobre los demás y que, desde luego, requeriría del liderazgo y de la asistencia técnica de los “eficientes” países imperialistas. El Segundo principio asegura que el desarrollo es una cualidad homogenea entre todos los pueblos del mundo sin excepción alguna.

In the actual field, in an official way, development is not anything but a concrete chore of the global enterprise mounted by imperialism after World War II and under the leadership of the United States, specifically to homogenize the world with the intent of exploiting and controlling it more readily. [The role of the Spanish Crown’s “reducciones.”] This endeavor has at its disposal an advisory and academic guarantee of excellence——---in order to try to make it ideologically convincing and technically unobjectionable. To achieve this effect it disposes of an entire doctrine [the necromantic Western edifice] based on two principles. The first affirms that all of us, [distinct] peoples, without exception, conform one world in which there belongs only one order that is possible or correct and for which there is only one inherent and universal project, which of course is that of private property and the market, which has led a fistful of countries to encumber all others who, of course, require the leadership and technical assistance of the “efficient” imperialist countries. [What in the North American tradition has come to be known as the “White Man’s Burden” at turn of the century, 19\textsuperscript{th} to 20\textsuperscript{th}.] The second principle assures everyone that development is a homogenous quality among all of the peoples of the world, without a single exception. (4)

PRATEC and the NACAs’ local experiences are a unique process of “acompañamiento,” acompañamiento and regeneration of Andean native communities, where reindigenization and deprofessionalization displace the role of “development expert” and re-turns to a re-cognition that the relationship established between Runa cultivator and Sallqa and Apu/Waca communities in mutual nurturance, or cultivation, turns the Runa cultivator into ancestral kin, elder teacher, Yachaq, and kin with whom to ally and converse about how to live together in fulfillment of the basic needs of shelter, food, and joy, that is, the good life, Allin Kawsay, together, as the local, more at, indigenous way to achieve this good life, “for all,” or what I call Allin Kawsaypaq. This re-cognition produces myriad theorizations from the founding members, Eduardo Grillo, Julio Valladolid, Grimaldo Rengifo, and Jorge Ichizawa, textual theorizations in the Quechua, Aymara, and Guarani fields that bring, re-port and trans-late for a Western and Westernized national and international academic field of exchange, these responsive practices of accompaniment and communicational sustenance and sustainability for the sake of the well being of NACAS, and the planetary neighbors affected by all our practices in-situ. PRATEC’s movement of cultural affirmation began with this process of accompaniment and conversation in which “campesino” communities alongside PRATEC practitioners began recovering Andean knowing through a process of decolonization, manifest as deprofessionalization, thinking, writing, speaking through alter-native worldviews, alternative views that emerged through re-con-naissance, the process of “cultural affirmation,” through accompaniment, rather than efficient supervision or imposition, through dialogue rather than prescription, which could begin to recover local, native, Quechua, Aymara, and Guarani millenary knowing. Gathering this millenary cognitive corpus of knowing through the ‘cartillas de saberes,’ Picto-alphabetic-graphic, bi-cultural, and bi-lingual notecard became the process of midwivery made possible by this re-con-naissance, where all that has been re-searced has been co-written for the indigenous archive now growing, collaboratively, collectively, among NACAS and PRATEC founders. The archive is available and engages in conversation with the planetary neighbors for whom the global ecological crisis becomes more and more pressing, that is, the way that the mathematical liberal grid exploiting any and all natural “resources” required to maintain the “modern” and “post-industrial” world---, the world the Western world calls “the world---,” exploits planetary “resources” to the point of imminent exhaustion. The "cartilla," or booklet gathering chacra-centered knowing is created through this process of accompaniment and dialogue with the wisest members of the community, the yachaq (Quechua) or yatiri (Aymara), among others, who have this wisdom to share, where learning takes place among PRATEC practitioners and Andean natives in exactly the same way.

---

Ishizawa, 2006; Rengifo, 1998a
that everything is known in the Andean world, by a receptive and nurturing conversation that is creative and that is based not on the deposit or imposition of one understanding, as truth, but rather, on showing/proving how the elder has learned to do in the given field, in dialogue and in concert with all the beings present in the local *pacha*, with a proven regenerative (sustainability) and re-creative (*Allin Kawsay*) outcome.

PRATEC and NACAs’ unfolding work (local, national, and Andean region) is an example of culturally appropriate policies from what is given in the field, based on a cultural literacy of the Andean “cosmovision of ever.” It is the failure, in the field, of the mechanistic and impositional development policies and practices, yet another reconstruction of the colonial enounter, which led PRATEC to humbly recognize that the Andean cosmovision is the one decisive element which the West has systematically refused to acknowledge, let alone accept on its own terms, which in turn has led to the blind and ultimately disparaging negligence of the millenary knowing that Andean peasants practice. Every founding member acknowledges the disappointment and failure of their Westernized development efforts *in the field* as the impetus for this turn: the numerous occasions when a community would “receive,” for example, an irrigation system that appeared highly technologically advanced, effective, and efficient,—one which the community would kindly accept, and readily forego for the millenary practices which were much more adequate to the earthly niche and the season the “peasant” addressed responsively and attentively. Confronted with this turn away from Western development repeatedly, these development practitioners with a deep investment in the reversal of “campesinos’” poverty began to look more closely and to listen more attentively. Being able to acknowledge that this ability to relate with all difference in equity and harmony is an exceptional lesson on stewardship of agri-cultural place and the regeneration of vital bio-cultural diversity became the impetus for the process of accompaniment that PRATEC humbly began alongside Andean indigenous peasant communities.

Their/PRATEC’s labor grew, necessarily, to become-- making apparent what the differences between the Andean cosmovision of ever and the Western traditions and knowledge practices are, such that PRATEC could bring from under this elision, this Andean way, for the benefit of Andean peasant communities, and the West. In other words, without theorizing this process other than to signal its necessity, much like Ricardo Valderrama and Carmen Escalante felt compelled to trans-late for the archive, for the communities, for Peru, and for the world, the wisdom of the Quechua dwellers of the Colca Valley, the PRATEC founders began this necessary trans-lation in no small measure because pronouncing the reality of this failure constituted nothing less than the pronouncement of what Foucault calls Fearless Speech. With this deeply
ethical choice came all the attendant social costs, for the deepest racist and negligent currents of mestizó national culture repudiated the news of this failure, and all the repercussions this implied insofar as mestizó liberal governance was concerned, just as resolutely as it has invested in a liberal, now globalized colonial modernizing liberal project. This chapter highlights key components of this on-going PRATEC/NACAs project as a way of illustrating how the Andean cosmovision of ever persists and sustains an on-going success story of life regenerated as a whole, and for the whole. The outcomes of balance and harmonious living regenerating biocultural diversity that the Andean way procures is a lesson for Western professional practitioners everywhere, beginning with the members of PRATEC, their gift of fearless and integral scholarship, and certainly for the writer of this dissertation, on how sustainability, in an integrated and whole way may be achieved, that is may be achieved for our shared dwelling, the planet.

Indigenous Andean Peasant Communities in regional and historical Context: an answer to the global ecological crisis:

The spaces designated as the Americas: North America, Latin America, South America, and Central America are historically recent conceptual constructions within a western colonial imaginary, as we have seen, constructions which we have proved are enframed by the colonial encounter in the field. The pre-colonial foundations of today’s Latin American land-cultures can still be found within the indigenous land-cultures persisting today in their vital relationship to their currently appropriated and exploited lands. The sustainability blueprint for today’s Latin America is present, alive and regenerating within the various strongholds of indigenous communities’ land and even Ayllu cultures, languages, and cosmovisions, a situation that may not be visible to the population at large, nor to the westernized/developmentalist intellectual elites of the Americas who, “see” reality through the lenses of Euro-american centered approaches, but a reality that is acknowledged by THOA and PRATEC and the intercession of Quechua and Aymara worlds which share the word “Ayllu” as seed of this land-based cosmovision.

El ayllu es un modelo de organización social y su vigencia abarca a casi todos los pueblos indígenas de la región andina: Colombia, Ecuador, Perú, Bolivia, y Chile. / Se constituye en modelo porque es jatha, semilla de donde germinó la civilización y las estructuras políticas andinas como el Tawantinsuyu. (Choque, María Eugenia y Carlos Mamani. “Reconstitucion del ayllu y derechos de los pueblos indígenas: el movimiento “Indio” en los andes de Bolivia.” Working paper. La Paz: THOA, page 5)

The ayllu is a model of social organization and its legitimacy expands to almost all the indigenous peoples of the Andean region: Columbia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia and Chile. / It constitutes a model because it is jatha, seed from whence the civilization and the political structures such as the Tawantinsuyu germinated.
In contrast, the Euro-american centered approach provoked the rise and eventual crisis of the development enterprise of the last 60 years. The past and current colonization process in Latin America, including the development initiatives that partook in colonial assumptions such as Grillo signals has had a significant and deleterious impact upon the lives, cultures, lands, territories and nature of this region. Latin America’s total population is around five hundred and eighty million individuals, who live mostly in urban areas, detached and alienated from nature, or land-culture, as well as a sense of place that considers the whole as the attentive and caring kinship among all beings, for the well-being of all. According to conservative estimates, forty million people or less than ten percent of that total population is Indigenous Peoples. The total surface controlled by Indigenous Peoples throughout the Americas has shrunk significantly due to nation-state building the national localized reinstallation of the colonial encounter. Indigenous peoples were removed from their lands in order to make room for the emerging national citizens and their descendants, as we have seen in through the projections of the mestizo literary socio-political projects in Part Two. We thus attend, from the 1940s on in particular, to the outgrowth of space based, non-sustainable monocultures that relate to land through this erosive colonial encounter, which has challenged the sustainability rooted in indigenous places, ayllu-cultural regions in South America. While the abstract/space based, non-sustainable monocultures purveyed by dominant western cultures create the encroachment and imposition which is termed colonial encounter here, within Indigenous regions in South America, Andean ayllu-cultural places continue to be nurtured through the spiritual in kinship with the material values of the ayllu, a Quechua and Aymara word that implies that all living beings are harbored in place, local pacha, ayllu, where the natural collectivity of visible and non-visible living beings---, people, llamas, rocks, mountains, rivers, rain, etc.--. are nurtured, offered shelter, and cared for by pachamama, earth mother.

For Latin America, and particularly for the Andean-Amazonian region, indigenous places/ayllu-cultural regions are the core primary and secondary centers of the origin of biodiversity (Diversity, 1991; Greenpeace, 1999) that have been encroached upon, reduced, and marginalized by the Euro-american colonial worldview embedded within the Westernized, dominant cultures and societies of the Americas. Indigenous Peoples’ ayllu-cultural places in the Latin American region are populated by more than 400 ethnic groups, and more than 800 cultures (Toledo 2007), each one with its own distinct language, social organization, and cosmovision as well as diverse forms of economic organization and ways of production adapted to the ecological niches which they dwell in, regenerating life as a whole through daily practices and ritual. Indigenous Peoples’ cultural diversity is “highly correlated with biological diversity and agro-
biodiversity,” a factual statement underlining the Western colonial encounter termed “bio-
prospecting.” Indigenous Peoples’ places are therefore identified through Western concept-
ology as “gene-rich,” “protected areas.” Indigenous Peoples live in 80% of “ecologically
protected” areas in Latin America.

From a Westernized perspective, most of the Indigenous Peoples of Latin America are
considered “peasants,” subsistence farmers, a Western term which suppresses the fact that the
peasants cultivating this genetic diversity provide the very basis upon which the agricultural
industry gains huge monetary profit. (ETC Group, 2008) The plant germplasm found in the
diversity of seeds nurtured over millennia by Andean indigenous ayllu peasants has over
thousands of years generated what Western economies rely on for food security by expropriating
and exploiting it: the Andean seed: kawsaymama. Latin America is the richest continent in terms
of biodiversity and has therefore been susceptible to “bio-prospecting” since the “discovery” of
the Americas, or the “Columbian exchange.” The unique, Andean, integrative relationship
between nature and culture is notwithstanding the enduring and regenerative response to the
ecological crisis and the threat to food security that mono-agriculture poses, a responsibility
which has fallen upon the shoulders of a historical actor on the margins of a contemporary,
colonial modernity; this historical actor is the Indigenous People’s of Latin America.

Several historical events and social movements rearticulate relations of power between
the republican nation state and Indigenous Peoples that reenact the colonial encounter, or what is
otherwise termed, coloniality. Indigenous Peoples’ resistance is longstanding. The right to land
promulgated in state legislation in Peru in 1969, for example, empowers a legal entity, the
“Comunidad Campesina,” CC, “peasant community,” based on the Agrarian Reform Law D.L.
17716, to make a legal claim to land through the state’s juridical apparatus. This continues to take
place well after the land reform of the 1970s inaugurated this legal instantiation through which
this indigenous “right” could be claimed. The number of indigenous communities, that is,
collectivities organized in accord with traditional indigenous knowledge and institutions can be
shown to have grown over the last decades. In Peru, as of July 2001, 5,827 CC (Peasant
Communities), of which 4,224 have their property land titles registered at the Public Registrar
claim ownership of land as per state statute, covering a land surface of 18,149,812 hectares. In
1977, there were fewer than 2,837 legally constituted CC. Chacras, ayllu land, and “peasant
communities” make up 90% of the agricultural and pastoral units in the Peruvian Andean
territory. However CC own only 10% of the total agricultural land.

The social movement which grew in momentum in Bolivia, especially in the 1980’s and onward around “la reconstitución del ayllu,” the reconstitution of the ayllu, defined as the seed of all Andean life for both Aymara and Quechua communities, continues today in the form of an active coalition of traditional Andean indigenous leaders, malkukuna representing the multiple ayllus and markas’ interests’ before the republican Bolivian state, Consejo de Ayllus y Markas del Collasuyu, CONAMAQ.

La reconstitución del modelo social del ayllu expresado hasta hace poco como una utopía con escasas probabilidades de realización es ahora una realidad, cuya dinámica abarca espacios sociales y geográficos cada vez mayores. La fuerza con la que se desarrolla el proceso se sustenta en el regreso a lo propio, piki uskuñani amuyu puquñapataki para así revertir la desorganización y la colonización. Este regreso, en el nivel práctico, supone auto-gestión en todas las esferas de la vida del ayllu y en los niveles superiores de su estructura organizativa. / Bajo esta perspectiva el cuaderno Ayllu: pasado y futuro de los Pueblos Originarios está dedicado a las autoridades y líderes de las markas y ayllus de los andes, que protagonizan el proceso de reconstitución.

The reconstitution of the social model ayllu expressed until recently as a utopia with scarce possibilities of being realized is now a reality, whose dynamic covers social and geographical spaces ever increasing. The strength with which this process is developing is sustained by the re-turn to what is our own, piki uskuñani amuyu puquñapataki in order that the disorganization and colonization are reverted. This re-turn, at a practical level, presupposes self-rule in all the spheres of the life of the ayllu and in the superior levels of its organizational structure. / It is in accord with this perspective that the notebook Ayllu: pasado y futuro de los Pueblos Originarios is dedicated to the authorities and leaders of the markas and ayllus of the Andes who are the protagonists of this process of reconstitution.

Other movements of cultural affirmation such as PRATEC in Peru are also a form of re-indigenized intellectual labor aligned with the cosmovision of indigenous communities in a process of acompañamiento, walking side by side with, and facilitating the collection and systematization of indigenous epistemologies or ways of knowing grounded on an understanding of pacha, place in time, that is, the world, but also pachamama, the portion of the world visible on the surface of the earth.180 Andean traditional forms of communal and collective life such as the ayllu persist today, and integrate within the Indigenous Peoples’ worldview what Western epistemologies divide into the discrete concepts of “economy,” “environment,” “society,” and “politics.” This integrative worldview emerges with the vast majority of Andean Indigenous Peoples in a ritual cycle of cultivating the land, pachamama, and extends into urban sectors.

180 Personal communication from Felix Moscoso, descendant of a family of Quechua healers, pharmacologist and healer who explained this physiological expression of Pachamama and the presence of her mother, the grandmother, as the earth’s magma.
through an indigenous ethnic diaspora.

**A humble and necessary recognition of the failure of development in the Andes and the lesson of Pratec’s response**

Development oriented institutions and practitioners have raised serious concerns and questions regarding the failure of development projects for indigenous peasants. What has failed? Why have development projects not worked, especially after the project leaves the community? Is it just a question of method, or is it based rather on something, as Ishizawa stresses, that is taken for granted “in the scientific approach we adopt, or more generally, the way we approach life?” For PRATEC, after serious reflection, the answer seems to be the existence of different worldviews and ways of being, that is, of other ways of being, learning/knowing, and being related to the world. Arcaeo logical and ethnographic studies as well as Andean ancient stories provide evidence of the long-term presence of pre-colonial cultures throughout the central Andean region (Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador). More than twenty thousand years ago human populations began to occupy the territory that since 1821 is called Peru. A diversity of cultures adapted in a very intimate and dynamic dialogue with the specific, local conditions. This favored the flourishing of a rich mosaic of well adapted agri-cultures throughout the Andes, along the coast, in the highlands, as well as in the tropical lowlands, from zero to three thousand eight hundred meters above sea level. The landscape of the Andes encompasses these three regions, within which can be found 82 out of the 103 life zones existing on the planet as determined by Holdridge. According to a Western worldview, an “original civilization” was created in this Southern Andean region.

Andean life is fundamentally “agro-centric” or as I call it, *indigenous, rooted to the earthly begetting relationships of neighborly alliance, of kinship with all living things*. The Andean worldview goes back more than eight thousand years and it is intimately intertwined with place-specific Andean agro-centric daily and ritual practices. From the perspective of the Andean cosmovision of ever, as PRATEC discovered in their process of accompaniment and recognition of the Andean agri-cultural practices, the Andean territory continues to embrace these three regions: coastal, highlands, tropical lowlands. For most modern agricultural, national and international experts/specialists, however, Peru and the Andean region in general is understood as lands with a severely limited agricultural vocation, as the index of productivity is the Mediterranean basin from which rain based agriculture which has become paradigmatic of all
agri-culture. Such an appreciation can only be understood as a reading made through the colonial encounter of Euro-american centered, agri-cultural monoculture determining through its expert/specialist, the agricultural technician, that an inevitable decree of poverty is the diagnosis appropriate to the Andean bio-cultural landscape. From the point of view of this Western illiteracy of the Andean world view and knowing practice, “the hostility” attributable to this ecological environment stems directly from a lack of recognition of what is non-Western, from a blatant denial of what has succeeded beneath the West’s arrogant gaze and erasure, the “originary civilization” whose technology and knowledge produced the plant germplasm currently stored in a “seed bank” in Peru. This fatalistic prescription also stems from an unethical “civilizational” response to the marginalization and destruction to which colonization, monarcical or republican has submitted Andean Indigenous Peoples to date. Humbly accepting that PRATEC’s twenty year labor reveals an alternative way of approaching nature that conceives of humans as equivalent participants among all other beings intent also on the regeneration of life, a way different from the Western way, requires aperture, (as receptivity) acceptance, (as a way of seeing the material infused with spirit here, in the present,) and vision (as acceptance.)

In that context, many modern, rural, western, scientific agricultural development models have been proposed and carried out with very limited success by the international, regional and national institutions relating to indigenous peasant agri-cultures in general, and Andean cultures and their place-based agricultures in particular. The end result has been that in less than sixty years, dominant development and its transnational network of institutions have contributed to the archaeology of development in the Andean rural region. The failure can be attributed to the colonial encounter subverting the existence of any other, especially one doubly displaced, outside of colonial imperialism and republican imperialism, the name more adequately measuring the extent of colonial rule: its horizons are endless and the domination it envisions is a domination of the world, just as Part One has deconstructed. The refusal to observe the Andean peasant’ practices at work in this region as anything but negligible, primitive, and futile attempts to dominate nature are the single most telling assessment of the Andean Quechua, and Aymara ayllu-pacha practices, practices entirely remote from domination. These Western development models favored the continuation of a long-term, historical, colonial encounter, perpetuating the clash between two different worldviews/paradigms. Whereas some have argued that the very presence of something distinct and different provided the western paradigm with the opposition it finds necessary for its logic based on domination and conflict to perpetuate itself, for the Andean cosmovision of ever, this sort of domination and conflict remained antithetical to the logic and

---

181 Ecological imperialism—the narration of this bias. See: Crosby
practice of mutual nurturance and conversation among equivalent beings which procures 
harmony and sustains the Andean world.

What the work of PRATEC alongside NACAs reveals is that the Andean world, through 
its practices of regeneration of life as a whole is actually, always, already in concert with 
diversity, in that it affirms difference, and does not seek identity as assimilation or domination, 
and therefore, by Andean rule, admits that all the diversity of life participates in this on-going 
conversation for the welfare of all, in the same possible way. Further, Andean rule accepts that 
even the West, with its capitalist market, its catholic/evangelical religions, its westernized 
educational institutions is alive within the Andean world, and is therefore another lively, 
equivalent, interlocutor in that conversation that procures harmony sustainably. As Grillo 
suggests in his treatise on language in the Andean world, Andean indigenous peoples had no 
trouble understanding the colonizer, during colonial (1492- 1800) or colonial republican eras 
(1800 to date), even though they encountered no such Andean reciprocal empathy on the part of 
the West, for far too long. Rather, as has been suggested in a comparative study of the native 
seed and the agro-industrial hybridized seed, the very distinct way of relating to this fundamental 
component of life for the planet differs decisively and has, probably since the inception of 
development’s well meaning aspirations and expectations implied the demise of development 
strategies unable to recognize the millenary knowing of the Andean indigenous peasant, and more 
critically, the cosmovision in which the seed abides and regenerates.

The dominant Western worldview and the Ayllu Andean worldview of ever

The dominant Western worldview has made central the dichotomy and premises of the 
subject-object relationship. This worldview conceptualizes nature as inert, as exploitable for 
profit, and as an endless source of resources. It relies heavily on reductionist and fragmenting 
knowledge systems; it has detached the material world from the non-material world; it is 
homocentric and masculinist in its governance tendencies and determinations. It views the past as 
primitive and backward. The concept of sustainability is not part of the thread of such a 
worldview, as its basic impulse is the relationship of dominance implicit in the subject object 
split. Its key characteristics are in stark contrast with those of the Andean worldview of ever. The 
current global, political, social, economic, environmental, ecological, moral, ethical crisis is to be 
found wherever the Western colonial encounter so far deconstructed has been found.

The practice of sustainability, and the goal of sustainability have only recently begun to 
be defined (IUCN 1997) and have only recently become part of “development paradigms” still 
attached to a military industrial complex keen on securing survival through the domination of
nature. To an important extent, this notion of sustainability has been foreign to the dominant, Euro-centered and Euro-american worldview which has spanned the last 500 years, a modern colonial situation that suggests why we are facing a global, environmental, ecological, psychic, physiological, moral, and ethical crisis for the first time in human history. As the efforts of our indigenous and indigenized collaborators implicitly put forth, this crisis is propelled by a broken relationship between culture and nature, one that has become toxic and violently dominant and destructive of global eco-logical webs of interrelationships which are sustained by the rule of equilibrium and harmony, a rule outside of the deep seated fear and anxiety plaguing the Western psyche, and whose expression is this relentless desire for human dominion. All of the elements in the Quechua/Aymara field of ayllu-practice, however elusive they seem are intrinsic to convivial, responsive and responsible human conduct, a reality that proves itself real in the intertextual fields and the textual fields that prove that the Western work does not override the Barthian nostalgic cry. The planetary crisis we currently face evidences that the past and current Euro-american world view, a mechanistic, positivistic, homogenizing, and unsustainable way of knowing, being, and being related to the world which has been pervasively applied to life within western and westernized societies around the globe needs urgently to be revisited.182

One of the primary distinctions between the Western colonial encounter and the Andean Worldview of Ever is to be found in the difference between what language in the Andean world, be it Quechua or Aymara expresses, and what Western traditions may assess is being expressed in the Andean language, based on a universal assessment of all languages, understood through various Western academic disciplinary bounds and categorical assumptions. Rather, an Andean literacy is necessary in order to distinguish the specificity of Andean expression from and within its language, and especially from a particular language that gathers the Andean world in its own way. It is necessary to overturn as a valid premise, the Manichean center of universal truth that has become the paradigmatic prism of the Western colonial encounter based on the Self through which all that is other to the Western subject is viewed. It is possible, alongside the members of PRATEC, to researc for the position, comparatively and translationally evident, from which to witness another way of knowing, and arriving thereby at the re-con-naissance that knowing does not take place universally in only one way. Alongside the members of PRATEC as well, from a position of receptive and vision of acceptance of the material in kinship with the ayllu spiritual

182 Former USA Vice-President and 2007 Nobel Peace Prize Al Gore, in the film “Inconvenient Truth” missed the opportunity of further educating the lay public by not going beyond the symptoms of climate change. He never suggested, much less pointed out directly, that the drivers of climate change may very well be found in the template/worldview/blueprint underlying capitalist development.
permits us to learn as re-con-naissance, from our Andean interlocutors. We submit, moreover, that the translational relationships we may establish between the term sustainability, for instance, and an Andean worldview that is organized around the creative possibility of continuously and conscientiously regenerating life as a whole, in reciprocal relations of nurturance based on equality and difference, the seed of good life, or allin kawsay is but a translational approximation of what is meant by both words, and the worlds they imagine and create.

**Western Scientific Knowledge**

The dichotomy of subject-object, culture-nature, and man-nature is central in the dominant scientific discourse to obtain knowledge. For the individual to know the object under study, they have to detach from it, order it, and ultimately dominate it. In this process of knowing, the scientist tends to delimit what their senses perceive, thereby apprehending what they want to know. The scientist does not deal with the whole, but with an abstraction of it. Knowledge and truth are pursued in order to manipulate, transform, dominate and perfect reality, whereby the mind and reason impose order upon the chaotic outside world. The modern scientific approach seeks to generate a universal knowledge in that truth is the inviolable and universal outcome. However, the sum of the fragments of reality often fails to make the whole.

In this approach, the scientist is the only one who knows and the object is inert; reality has to be measurable, quantifiable, and tangible. Spirituality or metaphysical issues are rarely part of the scientific realm quoting Pannikar (20) notes ‘modern man fears that reality is his enemy. He trusts only in his power, his intelligence, in what he can control’. Rengifo notes that ‘from these perspectives we can advance very little in our understanding of learning in cultural contexts different from the Western one’. Ermine describes the Western search for truth and knowledge as a journey into ‘outer space’, where man is separated from nature. The anthropologist Jeremy Narby notes what his incursion into the ritualized practices of the Peruvian Amazon revealed to him:

> Western science has some difficulty with the possibility of both non-human intelligence and the subjective acquisition of objective knowledge… By digging into history, mythology, indigenous knowledge, and science, I had found clues pointing to intelligence in nature. This seemed like a new way of looking at living beings. I had grown up in the suburbs and received a materialist and rationalist education – a worldview that denies intention in nature and considers living beings as ‘automatons’ and ‘machines’. But now, there was increasing evidence that this is wrong, and that nature teems with intelligence.

**Peasant Saberes and Experimentation**

In the Andean-Amazonian indigenous world, learning and knowing, as well as their
underlying purposes, are fundamentally different than in the industrial world. Such activities are not circumscribed to a research laboratory and its methods and theories. With regard to language in Andean culture, and in particular, the relationship between Andean cosmovision and language, Grillo concurs that ‘the Andean cosmovision confers, transmits its way of being to Andean language’ In a world that is alive such as the Andean world is, everything is alive, including language: ‘We are presented with a language that is alive in a world that is alive. The word, the phrase, is alive.’ Language does not belong exclusively to the human community. Under the Andean cosmovision, everything speaks; everyone speaks.

To the Andean peasant, learning is a result of the process of cultivating and letting oneself be cultivated by a world that is alive. You dialogue with and nurture disease, water, animals, pestilence, colonization, and so on. The Andean peasant’s learning is not the result of a separation between subject and object. In the Andean world, los saberes (knowing) is a result of the here and now, of living in conversation with and between everyone and everything. Conversing and cultivating are not the exclusive privilege of the human collectivity. Andean indigenous culture is one of nurturance through a flowing and continual conversation among the three collectivities that comprise the local Pacha: Runas, Sallqa and Apus. These three collectivities cultivate ayllu (natural collectivity). Living in ayllu is living among relatives, as everyone is a daughter or son of pachamama. Kinship goes beyond bloodlines. In the Andean world everything is alive: mountains, clouds, rivers, wind and hail. Conversation takes place among equivalent beings, each with its own culture.

Humans are not outside of, or above nature. The chacra, cultivated land, is the centre of rituality where all the members of the natural collectivity (the ayllu) interact. During the agricultural year, wata in Quechua, life-learning or saberes emerge in line with the signs and seasons of the agrofestive ritual year as it evolves, and chacareros respond to all the groups of living beings who communicate through these signs. The agro-festive ritual year is ordered in accord with how distinct pacha in the past have understood and interpreted the signs that tell the chacarero when to plant, when to harvest, and so on. Chacareros celebrate these milestones, and rituals are the result of a constant tuning into the expansion and contraction of the cosmos in its entirety, phases of the moon and the sun, climate, soil, rain and insects. This Andean knowing is not a rational outcome resulting from the separation of subject-object or culture-nature, nor is there a separation of the subject from emotion. Rengifo points out:

[Andean indigenous] Knowing is not a rational act in which one proposes goals, such as is the case for someone who goes to a school to learn a technique. Tuning in to something commits [the Andean peasant] in a sensorial, affective, and emotional way. It is her/his senses which are at play when she/he cultivates, when she/he lives (translation
Grillo and Rengifo clarify this notion further:

When an Andean peasant pronounces a word, the word does not allude to a universal, a symbol, a concept, but rather to a concrete thing which makes itself present when it is pronounced. The word mentions the attributes of that to whom one is referring; it is not an image, nor a representation, but the thing itself. The [Andean] word names the particular without there being a hiatus between the word and that which is named (Grillo, 1991).

In [Andean] living, an abstract thought does not issue forth to order a represented reality. What is there, simply is. For the Andean peasant a rock that is present in a ritual mesa is not the representation of an Apu, [Andean deity/mountain protector] and neither is the illa of a llama the metonymic representation of the llama, in the way that an amulet might be, but rather, it is the llama itself (translation M. Gonzalez)

Knowing is dependent on what takes place in each chacra, where specific saberes are given. It is the result of the unique cultivation occurring in that place, the response to local pacha’s conversation and the conscientious, and the continual process of procuring harmony among all beings which is the Andean peasant’s task. Cultivating does not guarantee a result. Cultivating implies prueba, trial and sustained conversation. Trial involves ‘the process of “accustoming” the members of one collectivity, within the heart of members of her/his own collectivity, or another collectivity’. Conversation would be ‘the mutual relationships which are established among collectivities in order to encourage and accompany one another in the re-creation of life. The trial is an expression of this conversation’. Thus a trial, in the case of the incorporation of a new seed that is, the incorporation of this new person/being) may imply a period of three or five agricultural years between the seed becoming accustomed to the family plot and the chacras. This is a time to become acquainted through constant dialogue and courtship with all the members who make up the chacra: the water, the soil, the runa, the sun, the moon, the climate. After this period, the seed will decide whether to stay, having been well received, or whether to leave, having been badly received.

Given that Andean indigenous peasant culture is centred in the chacra, it is necessary to invigorate the chacra from within the Andean vision of the world that is part of an urgent process of cultural affirmation and the regeneration of the Andes as a whole. As Valladolid notes, the Andean peasants who work their chacras ‘do not need to re-indigenize themselves. We, the agricultural technicians who come from these rural areas and have gone off to university – we are the ones who need to re-indigenize ourselves’. Cultural affirmation is ‘the nurturing of harmony most adequate to the plenitude of the living world that we are where the person who decides to enter this process does not establish the agenda, nor the focus. Instead, the role of the person and
the skills that are required are fundamentally different from those of professional technicians. One of the central objectives is to ‘recover the knowledge and wisdom of nurturance still present in the memory of the elders of the community’. One tool that has helped to evoke dialogue between peasants is the use of cartillas (booklets) of Andean indigenous peasant saberes. The accompaniment and conversation that procured the booklets also led to the production of Agrofestive Ritual Calendars, constructed by locality, month, signs, crop, festivity, ritual, positioning of the moon, the sun, the constellations, and the Pleiades. In this rich diversity of agricultural, ritualized, and festive practices, we see the sophistication and complexity of the Andean agro-centric life.

Language is infused with a worldview, but also, through language, we express our view of the world and shape it. Just as there is not just one worldview, nor one way of doing agriculture, words such as seed, culture, kinship, health, illness, nurturing, nature, biodiversity, management of natural resources, earth, living world, do not find equivalent meanings in every language, worldview or cosmovision. The multiple words for “seed” to be found in the Quechua or Aymara indigenous Andean languages for instance, find meaning in each moment the seed is encountered, in relationship to all the communities the seed engages, within one chacra, cultivated land. This oral expression, transcribed to a written expression would have to describe this specificity of relations in place and time, in order to give meaning to the word for seed used in that specific instance. “Culture,” in the Andes, therefore, is not restricted to the human community.

The particularity of the Andean world is that this capacity to nurture or cultivate (which we would define here as culture,) cannot be exclusively attributed to the human community, but is rather the attribute of all the beings that dwell in the chacra and thereby in nature as a whole. This means that we are in a world where everyone is cultivated, nurtured, and every living being has culture. Culture could thus be defined here as the commitment on the part of all living beings to lovingly perpetuating life as a whole. (Rengifo, 1991a: 103)

This indigenous worldview expressed in a specifically Andean language is intrinsically a part of the world of cultivation that Indigenous Peoples’ land-cultures have sustained for millennia and is fundamentally different from the dominant Euro-american worldview. With regard to language in Andean culture, and in particular, the relationship between Andean cosmovision and language, Grillo submits that “the Andean cosmovision confers, transmits its way of being to Andean language.” In a world that is alive such as the Andean world is, everything is alive, including language. “We are presented with a language that is alive in a world that is alive. The word, the phrase, is alive.” Language does not belong exclusively to the human community. Everything
speaks; everyone speaks.

Learning, for the Andean peasant is a result of the process of cultivating and letting oneself be cultivated by a world that is alive. You dialogue and nurture disease, water, animals, pestilence, colonization, etc. The Andean peasant’s learning is not the result of a separation between a “subject” and an “object.” In the Andean world, “los saberes,” knowing, is a result of the here and now, of living in conversation with everyone and among all. Conversing and cultivating are not the exclusive privilege of the human collectivity. Andean indigenous culture is a culture of cultivation or nurturance through a flowing and continual conversation among the three collectivities that conform the local *pacha* (the micropresentation of the macrocosmos): *Sallqa, Runas, Huacas y Apus*. These three collectivities are and cultivate *ayllu*, that is, natural collectivity. There is here ayllu-based tri-lateral relations where the fourth and transformational limit is as Kancha Chacra Sunqulla has taught us, is transformational death. Living in *ayllu* is living among relatives, as everyone is a daughter or son of *Pachamama*. Kinship goes beyond bloodlines. In the Andean world everything is alive: mountains, clouds, rivers, wind, hale, etc. Conversation takes place among equivalent beings, each with her/his own culture.

Given that Andean indigenous peasant culture is fundamentally agrocentric, centered in the chacra, it is necessary to invigorate the *chacra* from the Andean vision of the world. This emphasis is multifunctional to the extent that while strengthening the *chacra*, bio-cultural complexity is strengthened also, as part of an urgent process of cultural affirmation and regeneration of the Andes\(^\text{183}\). Agricultural extension in the Andean peasant world, such as it has been propitiated by PRATEC’s labor in the context of Andean cultural affirmation, as the affirmation and re-creation of the Andean vision of the world or cosmovision centering on the *chacra* is the foundation upon which the Andean peasant community affirms itself and emerges, strengthened within its, *chacras, ayllus, pacha*, and “saberes,” knowing. In the case of PRATEC, agricultural extension plays a role which accords with Andean culture, language, and cosmovision. The Nuclei of Andean Cultural Affirmation, NACA, associated to PRATEC consist of a group of intellectuals and “university professionals of peasant extraction” whose most heartfelt desire is to serve the process of “Andean cultural affirmation, for which they decided to return to their communities, to reintegrate into rural life, and to collaborate with traditional authorities in the process of decolonization and re-generation [of life] from its grassroots bases”

\(^{183}\) The quantitative and qualitative importance of this sector within the Latin American region is recognized through serious reflections stemming from processes of accompaniment and strengthening of the chacra in order to affirm the indigenous culture and all of life in the Andes, as well as by scientific studies from various fields and disciplines—agroecology, ethnoecology, ethnobiology, the biology of conservation and by important international conservationist organizations.
As Julio Valladolid notes, the Andean peasants who work their chacras “do not need to re-indigenize themselves. We, the agricultural technicians who come from these rural areas and have gone off to university—we are the ones who need to re-indigenize ourselves.” PRATEC and NACAs’ members agree that cultural affirmation is “the nurturance of harmony most adequate to the plenitude of the living world that we are,” where the person who decides to accompany this process does not establish the agenda, nor the focus to be used. The role of the person who has decided to accompany and the skills that are required are fundamentally different from those of profesional technicians. One of the central objectives of the accompanist is to “recover the knowledge and wisdom of nurturance still present in the memory of the elders of the community.” The accompanist assists and facilitates the process of nurturance that has already been taking place in the chacras. One means which has helped evoke, remember, and propitiate dialogue among peasants are the cartillas/booklets of Andean indigenous peasant saberes, knowing. The accompaniment and conversation that procured the booklets has also propitiated the emergence of a rich diversity of Agrofestival Ritual Calendars, by locality, month, signs, crop, festivity, ritual, positioning of the moon, the sun, the constellations, the Pleiades. We see in this rich diversity of agri-cultural, ritualized, and festive practice the sophistication and complexity of the Andean agro-centric life. Alongside these efforts, it has been necessary for PRATEC, with support from the accompanists in the field, to promote courses for those who decide to accompany: certificate programs, and Masters programs in Andean peasant agriculture, Andean cosmovision, and development which position the new accompanists well, and which facilitate their reinsertion into the Comunidad Campesina, the peasant community.

From Development to Andean Cultural Affirmation and from Andean Cultural Affirmation to Andean Affirmation of Biocultural Diversity

One of the first affirmations of the Andean longstanding and integral relationship between nature and culture was the recognition of the millenary practices of the Andean worldview of ever, and its sustenance of vital bio-cultural diversity. The “Cartillas de saberes,”184/booklets recording Andean millenary knowing lecto-pictographically from the dialogue sustained among these PRATEC/NACA practitioners and accompanists and the ayllu

---

184 PRATEC has gathered 2,338 “Cartillas de sabidurías campesinas” recovered directly from the agriculturalists, women and men of diverse localities in the Peruvian, Ecuadorian, Bolivian, and Argentinian Andes, throughout many years of work and reflection, firstly, from the students of the “Curso de Formacion y Agricultura Campesina Andino-Amazonica,” and secondly from the participants and graduates of the certificate and masters programs developed by PRATEC. The “cartillas” reflect the nurturing/cultivating vision of the Andean person, as much as their valuing and caring for nature. (PRATEC 2008)
elders, yachaq and yatiri, and other ayllu members became the conduits for a re-valorization long overdue in these indigenous Andean worlds. They were also a response to the Andean ayllu members’ need to dialogue with the Western world. The booklets do not replace the local saberes. The central goal is to “stimulate reflection, to recreate the practice agreed upon, and to remember concomitant practices,” among community members. The cartilla is not part of a Western scientific research process as it does not follow the western scientific research protocol and the subject-object detachment. Zenón Gomel, Peruvian Quechua peasant from the Ayllus Colquejahua and Koriñahui, the current Promoter and official representative of the “Asociación Savia Andina Pukara” (ASAP), a NACA member, highlights the limits and possibilities of these means, the cartillas/booklets, pictures, videotapes: “Although you cannot stratify the effects procured through each means, you can assume that an image is better than a word, but nothing is better than the lived experience itself.” PRATEC became aware, as the ayllu members made their ways of knowing present through accompaniment and dialogue, that what Anthropology has persistently proposed as intercultural dialogue, was already part of the integrative practice for Quechua and Aymara speakers within this Andean cosmovision. The most recent affirmation of this is the conversation, video-recorded by PRATEC, on the subject of Iskay Yachay, two ways of knowing, the Western and the Andean, in which the Andean acceptance of difference in equity is again present through their efforts to express that Western as well as Andean ways of knowing need to be learned by Andean ayllu members.

The dismembering inscribed in the term métis or half, utilized to refer to the mestizo or part “Indian” and part “Western”/“Spanish” or as colonial subject is not what is being thought from, and with-in this natural world order, pacha. Instead, there is a re-membering, taking place, in a cycle of movement sustained by the dialogue through which all living beings express their needs, their needs to live and recreate as a whole, harmoniously. All beings in the Andean cosmovision of ever are de-termined rather, by how the confluence of distinct beings of undifferentiated value, in equity, flow together in the dynamic conversation that procures a sustainable harmony, and balance for the whole of life. Verification of this whole well-being is the conversed accommodation, harmonization, required in the practice of conversation and mutual cultivation among all living beings. Allin kawsay, well-being, is the way that the ayllu welfare of all beings may be practiced in this continued cycle of procuring balance. This integrative spirit can be seen as far back as the Inka, whose personage is the peasant, as is analogously, any runa/haqi/jaque, in place and time, in pacha. Neither the republican criollo, as liberated colonial subject, nor the mestizo as a split identity are at play, in an indeterminate in-between, or a liminal beyond, a “post” colonial or modern. Rather, the runa, holding an Andean
traditional authority role, the Bolivian Andean mallku, for instance, is the ayllu in that he nurtures the ayllu, and the ayllu nurtures him; the mallku performs mullu in that he follows the path of the seed, mullu, walking from household to household in the ayllu to converse with mothers and fathers and children about their welfare, in order to achieve ayllu welfare, that is allin kawsay. This traditional Andean authority follows the path of kawsay mama, the seed of nurturance and letting oneself be nurtured, the rule of regeneration in harmony: in this way the Andean authority is the ayllu. This Quechua/Aymara way is the spirit of sustainability of Pachamama, as much as it is, the sustainability of spirit, or Kawsay Mama, the seed of all life.

The healing ability of the process of cultural affirmation for both Euro-American peoples and Andeans engaged in this intercultural dialogue cannot be underestimated. PRATEC practitioners and ayllu members were made keenly aware of spiritual damage: PRATEC began a process of self-questioning which led them to a de-professionalization in concert with their labor of accompaniment, and ayllu members could finally begin a long overdue inter- and intracultural process of dialogue which implied a mutuality and reciprocity between their communities and the colonizer which had remained their way. For PRATEC the continued regeneration of the biocultural diversity present in the Central Andean Region is a central goal given the erosive impact of five hundred years of colonization in the Andes: the gathering and description of the scarce repertoire of autochthonous technologies, from and within each community, to be disseminated horizontally, so that in due time, in the words of Eduardo Grillo:

…a great portion of the autochthonous technological corpus can be working in a greater portion of the [Andean peasant] Communities. Only then will it be possible for the peasants themselves to recover the direction and shape of the unfolding physiology of such a technological corpus, and only then will they be able to reconstruct the parts missing, as well as increase this corpus of knowing practices in response to the welfare of the greater population. This is the legitimate meaning of Andean technology development. This way makes patent the Andean peasant wisdom that has been hidden and undervalued by the colonizers of yesterday and today. This Andean technological development springs from its own vital, recreative practices’ being, and by the very nature and practice of indigenous Andean knowing presupposes its rediscovery by peasants themselves and its diffusion among themselves.” (Grillo, 1990: 15)

For a disciplined professional, data gathering of peasant saberes would be Western—in its research design. Firstly, the western researcher would define the research object, elaborating a hypothesis to be tested, selecting research method(s) and technique(s,) validating data outcomes obtained through this rational, objective practice, and distributing for replication, the results to other experts and practitioners managing the development enterprise. For the Euro-American(ized) specialist/expert/technician it has been normative to qualify the Andean peasant
ways of learning and knowing, as systems of research and experimentation. However, no major Western institutional effort has been carried out so far to grasp the situation of specifically Andean ways of knowing, from within the Andean worldview and ways of living and “doing chacra.” The Andean “prueba” and “dialogue” do not align with the universalist, scientific practice, not only because the rationality of subjects and objects is in a disjunctive and dominant interaction, a representational practice antithetical to the integrative relationship established between all living beings in the Andean world, but also because universality is never possible in an Andean practice of knowing entirely held by the specific condition and moment of the chacra, and to the knowing how to converse with all the persons that dwell together covering to make chacra at that specific moment. All the kin living within and relating at that moment in chacra, be they wild or domesticated plants, animals, water, soil, rocks, deities, sun, moon, pleiades, etc are nurturing and being nurtured, are cultivating and being cultivated.

Andean language encompasses within its expressive horizons this knowing as well as this conversation. By extension, Andean peasants do not concede ‘cognitive authority’ to the West in their practices, but rather listen, and discern the signs expressed in conversation with every living person, be it a member of the sallqa, runa, or apu community. Consequently, for PRATEC, the recovery and development of Andean peasant saberes has implied various, unavoidable, decolonizing tasks. Among others, PRATEC has had to reassess and unveil from beneath an arrogant universalism, what the modern, dominant, mechanistic, western worldview and science deploys, while in turn becoming open to slowly discerning what the Andean worldview/cosmovision continuously, and without consultation regenerates. Their subtle task took on the question of technology and Andean integrative bio-cultural practice, theory and saberes in order to distinguish how each worldview’s tapestry presented a particular thread, warp, and weft in regards to knowledge, experimentation, and research. One of the direct consequences of this painstaking reflection, through dialogue, accompaniment, and combing of the oral and written archives, Quechua and Western, is that it allowed PRATEC to be clear about each worldview, while being able to contemplate what a sound, intercultural dialogue about sustainable ways of life and policies could look like, were a mutually responsive conversation to be facilitated between these long estranged communities.

As the timely article “How Do biodiversity and Culture Intersect?” suggests, a number of fields, disciplines and subdisciplines in the West are moving out of the unsustainable, fragmented, homocentric, post-cartesian, mechanistic western worldview towards eco-centric, holo-centric worldviews/paradigms. This will begin to break down an unnecessary wall that has been imposed as part of the dominant Euro-american centrism widespread throughout colonial and neocolonial
times—a coloniality of power and knowledge imposed upon indigenous Andean peoples. The field that opens up to the possibility of sustainability is accepting of difference, intrinsically pluricultural, intercultural, and to be sure, pluri cosmovisional. More importantly, it saves a place for all of us, in one world. Today, more than 90% of the world’s total population is non-indigenous. The culture-nature dichotomy for this sector entails a placelessness requiring a reindigenization/remembering/reconnecting, for the health of us all. In other words, “becoming native to this place’ (your locality, your country, earth mother is urgently on top of the sustainability-sustainable development agenda. What is more, it may be the most critical sign of how we may end the unsettling placelessness which permeates an all too pervasive Western “imaginary” inscribing the subordination of all others, to the detriment also, of those dominating the Americas, and the world as whole. For dominant westernized societies and productivist agriculture, the challenge is to learn from holocentric/ecocentric organic farming, permaculture, and agroecology on their way to closing the gap between culture and nature which has cut so incisively into the heart of Indigenous Peoples’ Ways, ways that are also instructive. All these approaches are steps in the direction of suturing the rift between Western human culture and nature. However, opening up to the intracultural and intercultural dialogue among equal partners, on equal footing, on a path toward the regeneration of the planet as a whole remains a matter that is pending. PRATEC helps us discern one way.
Conclusion: “Iskay Yachay”

What the Quechua practices we have traversed with in the fields to which they are germane prove is that this “agro-centric” culture gives a way of knowing that brings together all things that abide in a world conceived of as a shelter that nourishes so long as it is listened to carefully, and by means of this listening, permits participating in creating and recreating through this convivial and attentive conversation among all communities of things, Runa persons, Sallqa persons, and Deity persons, or perhaps, rather, embodied Quechua spirit persons. To the continual challenge not only of affirming a culture devalued still by an insistent Spanish and English erasure, a sustained unwillingness to see and accept what proves to be there in the Quechua field such as the Quechua texts read delimit, the Quechua speaking must add the pressure of this continually sustained physical and psychological displacement which too often results in a brutal impoverishment. Mestizo Westerners as part of a foundational fiction or as operative and actual rule continue to appropriate “Inca,” “campesino,” “ciudadano,” “orígen arqueológico,” “‘native informant’ or ‘reliquia viva/live relic’” for their mythological, ideolectical, hegemonizing and colonizing encounters. The colonial encounter persists.

Cultural affirmations as they are practiced by the republican liberal state such as we have researched in Part Three and as the arc of Mariateguian justice traces it continues to make space for Quechua recognition within the republican mestizo field, but it has yet to accomplish the reconnaissance and the au-de-là of place and language that PRATEC has achieved, nor have these mestizo state measures concede what movements like THOA have managed to reduce about the Western colonial encounter by recovering and re-indigenizing “territory” through the “Reconstitución del Ayllu.” Though overburdened, and though PRATEC’s and THOA’s choices have had high social, economic, and political costs, this courageous group of organic intellectuals accompanying, de-professionalizing, and reindigenizing bear the weight of the West’s symbolic and real, violent and blunt, blind, fearful, and toxic repression wherever and whenever it

---

185 This is the title of a DVD production carried out by members of PRATEC in collaboration with “La institución CEPROSI from Cuzco.” The latter organization has throughout many years worked with Quechua speaking “campesino” parents, as teachers, to discern what sort of education would honor cultural diversity. The title means Dos saberes/Two ways of knowing.
expresses itself. And yet, when asked what kind of education these Quechua speaking Cuzqueño cultivators deem necessary or important throughout the DVD *Iskay Yachay/Two ways of knowing*, and in accord with Quechua rule, the visitor, Western knowing is accepted, for the sake of the welfare of all, while insisting nonetheless, that Quechua practices be continuously nourished and sustained, affirming at every step that Quechua practices continue to make sense for the Quechua speaking communities, and indeed, sustain the worldview that honors the ways that preserved a viable and enduring relationship with all others. This is how this assessment on the part of Quechua speaking Cuzqueño cultivators is poetically expressed as the event that is this video:

Este video trae las voces y las mentes de campesinos del Cuzco. Nos explican qué escuela quieren para sus hijos, qué educación es la que hace falta para que la vida florezca y la fuerza de los tiempos de antes se transmita. (*Iskay Yachay*)

This video brings the voices and the minds of the Quechua speaking cultivators of Cuzco. They explain what schools they want for their children, what education is needed so that life will flower and the force of the times before can traverse the present time.

The intercession I stage of Western critical theorists and practitioners with Quechua indigenous theorists and practitioners provides the framework in Part 1 through which the observation and study of how Barthian writing and Foucauldian discourse delimit a Western field from whose limits we may traverse into the Quechua field, translating textual production of *difference itself* as a moment, however problematic, from which a traversal to the Quechua field is possible now in that not only does the quasi-corporeality of the signifier aftermath re-member spirit (voice) and body (linguistic engraving) together, but the Barthian gap provides the necessary interruption which procures a textuality and a language which steers away from the stolidity of the edifice of History and Reason which Foucault de-constructs, and which Barthes names the work. Barthian language practice gives what I call the gravure as a material trace distinct from the traditional Western language practice where “the idea” pre-scribed onto the word gives a dictated, universally applicable, humanist meaning. Barthian language practice stages a re-turning--- according to my practice and the practice that another notion of time is instructive of---to a tradition that would have the collective, the social body as reader play the role of receptive depository of all languages, cultures, citations and linguistic traces. This reader functions as the intertext from which the text may give a provisional meaning, from which the text may be read, played, or co-created as diversely as possible in order that a singular and transiting symbolic release gives transitory significance to what is proved to be real in the textual field now. The dialogue is one-sided in that the written may not reply, just as the reader completes but never gives but a transitory “misreading,” a reading that evades the traditional
Western prescription of meaning, but a reading that may never do anything but progress forward, never to return to an origin—the precepts of Western time such as we understand it. The re-turn is not only possible through the intertext, but it is also possible by conceiving another time, or the time of the other as our own, just as Foucault proposes. With Foucault, the materiality of the event takes place by three re-turns away from the traditional Western tradition defining discourse as a function almost entirely desensitized to the world, incapable of materiality, or of movement.

It is because these theorists’—Barthes’, Foucault’s,—texts unfold alternate practices for finding answers to the question of the field, the colonial encounter, and the life of the other— from inside the Western field that their particular texts have been selected and rigorously read translationally and comparatively at their intercession, the practice that this dissertation theorizes and performs from the outset, at the site of the colonial encounter, or the fundamental epistemological and ontological structure of traditional Western practice, the Subject-Object structure, while the Quechua field’s organizing principle persists as the relationship among all things and the conducive conversation that sustains it. This theorization, further unfolded in Part II as an emerging theoretical practice for the field of comparative literature, a field whose name in this case becomes a metaphor along the lines of the Foucauldian metaphor for epistemology, or philosophy, “history of ideas.” Simply, I argue that the field of comparative literature is no longer only the study of literature, as “fictional writing” but is rather the field that gives and has traditionally given serious play to writing derived from multiple disciplines and genres, operationalizing the critical practice of comparing, and necessarily involving the practice of trans-lation. Comparative literature has the potential therefore of over-turning the tenets it has also operationalized as the comparative practice whereby racial stratification gains a rotund affirmation, centering its practice on master Euro-centric texts, and construing all “other” texts as peripheral and beholden to the Euro-centered, humanist, universally totalizing rule. Derrida and Deleuze and Guattari provide us critical turns that also interrupt this process and these in turn assist us in finding a trans-lational intercession, a traversal between the Western and the Quechua fields, from one side to another, to yet another.

Both Barthes’ notion of “Text” and Foucault’s notion of “discourse” collapse the Western traditional definition of literature as fictional writing in ways that don’t occlude its actual existence or performative effects, or shall we say, its particular form of play, but rather, discern its activity as part of a larger field of cultivating and knowing practices that involve language, as well as the body and the social body, as well as movement, what I call motility. These critical theorists’ attempts to confront the notion of “voiced” or “spirited” Subject entrenched in Western thought and language practices by attempting to resuscitate the Other, “matter,” or “the body,”
make the presence of a self all that much more prominent as both theorists remain anchored by the poles of this duality. In effecting a translational and comparative practice whose ethos establishes a horizontal comparison of one field of knowing and another, by problematizing translation such that it is evident that the master narrative is in effect overturned by the very possibility of Babel, that is, by the plurality and diversity of languages and worldviews, we may continue deconstructing the ontological and epistemological foundations which have remained the conceptual terrain of Western knowing, as colonial encounter---beyond the indefatigable efforts to revive the body, to de-center the Subject, and to travel deconstructively alongside the Western tradition.

At stake is the life of all things, and how we may in turn govern ourselves in order to conceive the sustenance of the life of all things. The Western Subject is alternately this Other and is therefore permanently susceptible to the impositions and destructions which are the most dramatic expression of the Subject as the master of the other, the complex of domination sustaining this Western colonial encounter through fear, denial, and rationalization. At the same time, in the (Foucauldian) eventual field, the texture of the local elements in the field which condition “the locus of the event” are viewed, from the Quechua field, as a plurality of what I call things, a Quechua theorization which translationally and comparatively defies the monologism and logocentrism that im-mediately re-installs the colonial encounter by abstract and detached conceptualization, that is, by meta-physical truth making. It is the mediation, the intercession which this procedure elides: there is not real relationship in the field of givenness or experientiality at the site of the colonial encounter: no conversation, no conviviality among all persons. What post-coloniality has been able to contribute is this local and real texture in the actual field; it has contributed the compelling and personally ineluctable complexity of localized and particularly distinct intercessions, as I call them, which create openings, interruptions, etc. not otherwise foreseen by Western theorization concerning itself and the world, a localized texture impossible to discern without travelling now to those localities to intimate with what they say, responding through a knowing based on what I call aurality, what PRATEC calls “tuning in,” and what THOA calls “mullu” as the practice of the Mallku, again focusing on the conversation and not the dual terms of subject/object, no matter what content fills them.

All the researchers’ specific texts traversed, that is theorized, comparatively and translationally bring to the foreground the question of the social body and the body, of materiality and of its reinstallation into the Western field from which it is absconded by traditional Western institutionality by means of the pre-dominance of the concept, a situation from which the prevalence of the pre- as opposed to the post- is discernable. This pre- has been theorized as a
political and aesthetic practice wrought by the Western state’s ruling class in a peculiar way that I
term a reconfected necromancy, a staging of the rationalizations and justifications for a particular
order disfavoring the social body and favoring the ruling class’ interests as it ordains what the
body is and what it means, and while it orders where it must go and how it moves, (ontology,
epistemology.) The traditional term “literature” has in this traditional Western way served a
marginalized, servile, or suturing role in assisting the traditional Western State’s necromancy,
while our re-searcing Barthian “Text” and Foucauldian “discourse” has unearthed the texture—
the play, the materiality, the motility, and the different time--- re-installing this texture’s
pervasiveness, its encompassing phenomenological existence, anticipating their alternative
theorization of the role of a language whose effusion may yet elide the material, but whose
comparison and trans-lation into and with Quechua language practices within its fields intercedes
for the material compellingly.

Godzich’s reading of Kant in particular through Aristotle is a re-turn to the source of a
signifying practice from within the Western tradition that reanimates within “the field of
experientiality” and “givenness” what grounds Kantian reason in the first place. The Western
post-modern and Westernized post-colonial theorists that we have re-searced embrace the
Western tradition’s concept of republican nation state in that it is also predicated on the
tradition’s deep structure of subject/object, narrowly skirting the material, albeit effusively
conjuring the body and the social body, while its traditional Western—servile and suturing---
practices pervade every place, every thing, and everyone, one pole implying the other, in deed
making this bi-polar oscillation the rule of its expression in the field. The potential held within
what the Western tradition has maintained as fictional literature has been theorized instead as
poetic practice and what the Quechua field proves real with regard to its expression, not
prescribed and radically born by the real material and eventual fields, we have called poetic
expression giving this poetic register of language practice the central role in the alternative sought
as re-con-naissance and the au-de-là: a practice that brings language and things together in the
field that is in motion, by means of this convivial relationship sustaining the ecstatic motility and
vitality of all things. What we have found is that both the critical Western and the reconstitutive
Quechua fields respectively gather traditions in which utterances and actions in the field are
practiced as creative, that is as distinctly poetic responses to what is found to be given,
experienced, and real in the field. The sensible mediacy of the utterance restores a much more
intimate and aurally derived relationship between things, language, and action, where places,
locality, this texture becomes an intrinsic part of this receptive conversation and is no longer mere
content, as the Quechua field instructs. As a creative and affirming alternative to the state’s
necromancy, multiple and diverse re-turns as we traverse from side to side eliding all forms of violence, interceding on behalf of all that is denied fearfully and toxically is one outcome of this translational and comparative practice and theorization in the field, whether critical Western or Quechua such as we have read its particularities.

The various intercessions traced through specific texts and interceding in both Western and Quechua fields propose a knowing practice that is both the theorist’s as traveler, and the practitioner’s as traveler, from side to side, from field to field, inside the field as well as outside the field ostensibly at the same time--- for the degree of separation between the fields cannot be measured spatially, but from an other time become unable to install the inside or outside of any field. This project is also a decision-making project in that all of this traversing translationally and comparatively, back again, and again entails the decision to re-turn, to searc in the collective planetary archive for alternative forms of governance accepting what is found to be real in the field, and practicing an aural poetic, a theorization of the sensibly responsive that is at once a creative and re-creative practice. This traversal within these two fields, and from field to field, from side to side, and limit to limit, centers on the theoretical problem of self and other from the Western edifice of thought as especially Barthes and Foucault have read this problem, in that it is difficult to move out of the Western necromantic and dominating practice of colonial encounter without re-turning to some of its most lucid and most effective Western field de-constructors—the theorists who first named its conceptual stolidity specifically and particularly. From the Quechua fields we have found the relational practice that gathers together all beings in a knowing way held together by a listening conversation among equals upon whose responses the entire harmony as/and well-being of the world depends and it is its translational and comparative intercession into the Western field that reduces the imbalance that the colonial encounter installs.

Barthes is concerned for the circulation of the sign in Western culture, its symbolic potential to order reality variously and alternately, not incidentally, through the binary of the Western linguistic paradigm expressed as “signifier/signified.” Foucault is concerned for finding the discursive performance that will open the way to another practice of thinking, speaking, and (self) governing as action, a way of finding the event in historical re-searc, and a way of re-turning to the liveliness of language practice as action, precisely, as active intercession, for the ecstatic life of all things, and not just some. Both theorists depart from the stagnant Western edifice into alternative possibilities at its limits. While Barthes would have writing become the event pro-duced in language co-laboratively whereby the reader fulfills the text, for Foucault history writing requires re-creative aurality as well in that discontinuity requires that there be a surrender that stages the event of the story of the other becoming his-story—in his way staging a
conversation in which self and other are necessarily transitory, and in a different time—the same. The story of the other who abides in the historian’s time can only be discerned if we can deconstruct the genealogy of morals that stirred the passions of that time, as well as the discursive performances that surround the locus of the event sought from a field whose conditions shape those stories from the past, in themselves, and who are of themselves also a part of the discursive event. In this way, Barthes and Foucault provide the deconstructed building blocks of Self and Other, staging moves which depart from their regular functioning and which situate us at the limit of the Western field. Godzich’s re-reading of Hegel and Kant especially provide this study with a specific Western field from which we can de-structure the colonial encounter with the help, translational and comparative, of the re-turns of Barthes and Foucault into and with the specific Quechua fields we traverse, thereby de-structuring the colonial encounter.

We have therefore found the specificity of this or that expression of colonial encounter as we have found it in the textual and world-as textual fields we have traversed throughout every instantiation researced in every chapter. Moreover, we have found this colonial encounter at the translational and comparative intercession of both fields of knowing, Western and Quechua such as this re-searc delimited them along the way. This traversal finds the fields of knowing, the fields of doing, and the fields of governing that are specifically Western and specifically Quechua in order that the kairos, the critical turning points of this theorized and practiced colonial encounter are in this way unearthed and made earthly, translationally and comparatively, for the sole purpose of thinking about how the encounter’s imbalance can be restored to balance, especially permitting these indigenous theorists to instruct. Barthes, Foucault, Godzich, Deleuze and Guattari, Derrida, Machaca, Condori Mamani/Esclantante/Valderrama, Elders from the Valle del Colca/Esclantante Valderrana, Quispillacctan Elders/Machaca/Machaca/Machaca/Núñez Vilca, Castoriadis, Fanon, Choque, Mamani, Quispe, all these indigenous theorists seek a return to the body and to the field and all re-searc the relationships that bring us to one another as kin, as allies, as we re-searc them in their specific textual fields for the sake of this intercessional translational and comparative theorization and practice. What I have sought here, through this theorization and practice is not equality such as liberal democracies have traditionally defined this term, positivistically and mathematically, and therefore as it is a derivative of the totalizing concepts of Subject and Other. Rather, a notion of finite increase and finite decrease has been the operative principle sought in order to restore balance. In other words, this theorization has concerned itself with “materiality” or the social body, from the Western perspective, and for the life of all things from the Quechua perspective, so that we make our way through this translational and comparative traversal to a decolonization of the body, which elicits a decolonization of the mind,
which elicits the decolonization of our actions, centrally, such that it is evident that the way that we choose to act becomes the creative or destructive expression of how we govern ourselves. This study underlines therefore that these decolonized practices imply creative and recreative choices that are expressed as poetic practice or poetic expression which anticipate the world that we may dwell in—in intimate and aurally responsive relationships to all things. Quechua practices have instructed thus, and instruct moreover that these harmonious relationships sustained through mutually responsive conversations among all beings render, give, a world that is sustainable, as longstanding as the “Andean cosmovision of ever.” Quechua investigation and languaging practices aptly show the way, but require that we de-structure the colonial encounter in order that this practice, takes place, becomes an ethos, that is, a form of pervasive poetic, that is, creative, re-creative harmonious governance. I have demonstrated that these comparative and translational re-turns reindigenize our relationships to our physical place, the given field of our experience, helping us to reach deep and beget kinship, alliance, neighborly conviviality, conversation, proving real all the places and all the things that dwell there, in the creative and re-creative earthly, or Pacha. Finally, I have demonstrated, just as critical Western theorists through different—what I call re-turns—meaning wending down a familiar road again, as the traveler traverses, to encounter what is there anew— for the sake of what is needed now— also permits us to de-professionalize our endeavors, to permit them to respond to the needs found to be real in the field now—which is the instruction not only of Andean indigenous theorists— but also with the critical Western theorists concerned with the health of the mind, with its balance in relationship to body and world, “psycho-analytically.” Through the de-structuring of our Western notions of time and space, a de-structuring that permits us to surrender to the mutually nurturing and attentive conversation with all things which takes place in the field we are able to recover the real confluence of body and mind in the social field among all living things, especially as the Quechua world-as-text or worldview gives all things. We have re-seared, traversed, and found—translationally and comparatively— that the concomitant transformation of language anticipated by our first de-constructors, and on through all our other indigenous theorists both critical Western and Quechua speaking precipitate an alter-native literacy departing but also re-turning in a new way— from Barthian writing, Derridean de-constructing, and Foucauldian new, other, story making, to Quechua mutual cultivation for the sake of all living things— precipitate the alternative literacy that I call an aurality eliciting a poetic expression that responds intimately and sensually to the life of all things, in place, and in a time that is now, a continual now—a now enduringly attentive to all things, for the sake of the well being of all—of the Pacha, of the planet.
It is the Quechua responses that compel us to begin to de-structure a stagnant humanist/Humanities project, the colonial encounter that traverses it. It is the critical turns I select from the Western critical tradition that make the comparative and translational way toward the Quechua field possible—indeed viable as the intercession of one field into the other—as we have re-searced it from within and from outside as *intercession of one field in, out, for and from the other*. The Humanities are barely able to sustain the democratic dream of widespread literacy of the lecto-scripted sort, underlined by the traditional pre-scriptive and necromantic Western wisdom of History and Reason which through specific notions of space and time, subject and other once characterized the humanities as “universally true” wisdom. Not only is the democratic project founded on this generalized conceptual lecto-scripted literacy almost impossible to sustain now, but it inevitably moves from the pole of liberty to the pole of unfreedom, from the pole of equality to the pole of radical racism as the colonial encounter as its central and structuring form and expression has been proved real in every textual field re-searced. As Godzich warns barely more than a decade ago, the consummation of (Hegelian) history and the subsequent specialization that has made all subset expert languages mutually unintelligible makes not just the humanist project as the West’s traditional knowledge transmission project obsolete as the order of its edifice of knowing, but it threatens the republican state’s democratic order predicated upon the widespread and unifying literacy that the humanist project sponsored and sustained as the element facilitating democratic participation in a system whose meanings were shared by the demos, that is the body of citizens the traditional democratic Western state project depended on. Other forms of collective living and relating are required, and cyberspace-- blogging, the internet, and Facebook may all be steps in the direction of cyber collectivity--, and yet they barely decolonize, (its democratic radicalism is one side of its cyber field of existence,) while they sorely displace us further from the fields of place and belonging in neighborly and kinship alliance *here*, indigenously, preventing us from re-establishing ecstatic and mutually nurturing relationships with one another and with all living things in the actual (material) field. In a word, we need help in making the re-turn to the earthly, the earthly which we cannot ultimately evade, and which the earthly reminds us constantly is alive and responding to our violent disharmony with the violent climactic responses whose purpose, *Quechua Yachay* instructs is restoring balance, as I have suggested as increase and decrease.

This study brings to the foreground the need for a re-sensitized relationship between language and things, a new relationship that the Western tradition in its most current debates has asked for and perhaps unavoidably postponed---for lack of an answer---and because it is devoted to a de-con-struction of all things colonial while skirting the possible alternatives, as it remains
inside the Western field. Arguably its greatest promise still resides in a still fundamental conversation taking place, as Western space, yet only being nourished from the intertextual dialogue that Barthes stages, where all things become available to all who may have greater access to the archive of planetary knowing, but whose writing is yet restrained and corralled by conventions that require critical revisiting as well—the persistent index of this being how truly difficult interdisciplinary research is to carry out. At best, we write in the Barthian sense, creating Derridian black and white *gravures*, the traces that we may follow after we deconstruct, though we don’t know where that leaves us, and we remain nostalgic for place, or for world pictures, as many theorists have decried—turning away from the fragmentary research of theorists like Barthes, Derrida, in my view, failing to discern their actual indigeneity, their actual and factual responsiveness in the field—to the basic *thingly* needs. At worst, we find ourselves still within the confines of “the humanist (academic) debate,” still ensconcing History and Reason as its monologistic belief system, while stuck deconstructing the Self-Other colonial encounter which is its central and ordering principle—while the sciences wildly pioneer uncharted spaces, specialized fields that prove that what they find is real in the methodological textual field, spaces which re-de-fine what is finite and what is infinite, continuing to conquer as soon as these fragments of substance become arcival scientific fact. This *takes space*, while we in the humanities speak a language that no one deems necessary, while specialists of every disciplinary sort dwell in these private, that is, specialized, public domains resembling the isolated monad able to self-name on automatic pilot. The Humanities does decay as it stagnates by delimiting its field in accord with a stultified Western project of knowing: the fulfillment of the Western colonial encounter means the consummation of all there is—to be known, experienced, or governed—in its all consuming Self-fulfilling—destiny—as Hegel put it—and prophesy—as I put it. The Humanities are by dint of this irrevocable colonial encounter, obsolete. However, the field in all its layers still procures alternatives through re-turns which take us to the au-de-la through a re-connaissance that may be, in deed must be, in a distinctly *other time and place*, creative and recreative. One of the ways of arriving to the place we want to go, this new field that is whole, physical, and active is to take re-turns that include trans-lations and comparisons that are productive and reproductive. A renewed relationship between language and action becomes important therefore, where it is not enough that scientists are the post-colonial ‘new’ republican governors of objects whose very distinct and textured localizations defy their colonizing gesture. A new relationship between language and new ways of knowing, experiencing, and ultimately governing—that is—choice making become paramount in importance therefore—for the sake of all things.
This translational and comparative practice has not looked away from the question of language that concerns Western theoretical post-modernity and post-colonial studies in that the question of language does evoke our way of dwelling on the earth, that is, our ways of thinking, experiencing, and governing. This study takes up the critical theoretical turns most concerned with language precisely because the colonial encounter is being read as an intercession between a Quechua and Western field which is expressed in the world as language, and in language as world—as poetic practice first and then, again as yet an-other re-turn as poetic expression. As Fanon and Barthes declare, to name two exponents, through language we release symbolic energy without which our organic thingly nature would collapse. From the Quechua field, we prove real that an alternative way of seeing as sensing, and saying as listening delimits a distinct and alternative world to the Western world evinced through traditional colonial Western and Westernized language (practice.) Language---, as this study has proved real in the textual field, and in the world as text---language is practice. Not only does departing from a clear configuration of the colonial encounter in the textual field through Barthian and Foucauldian post-modernity and our other theorists’ post-coloniality both, permit the translational and comparative traversal which aid in the de-structuring of this colonial encounter, but the intercession in its turn of Quechua language practices makes the problem of balance much more clearly discerned as a matter of increase and decrease, as a matter of give and take or what is often called reciprocity in the Andean world. It is on this translational and comparative way---through more than one intercession and more than one specific field instantiation---that the need for an alternative language practice becomes evident and is also proven to be really practiced in the field: the Quechua languaging practice I name poetic expression proves real in the world as text that such practices are not only possible, but conducive to this de-structuring of the colonial encounter now. Needing to arrive at new forms of poetic expression means that a new language practice that conceives and gives from an acceptance of the world as it is here and now, alternatively is needed. This is to say that this study brings to the foreground the need for a re-sensitized horizon for expression---from the inside and out and from the outside and in, where ‘in’ and ‘out’ are not mutually exclusive and language acts as well as moves.

This study implies language and knowing in a planetary field about which one central question is decisive: how are all things alive on the planet to be related to, as a rule---for the welfare of all things alive on the planet? In posing this question locally, in Western/Westernized and Quechua fields respectively we bring to the foreground the need, first of all, for mutual reconnaissance between the two worldviews, for moving into an au-de-là the colonial encounter. This study begs the question of the need to overturn the greatest racist mythology still operative
as our dominant-Western-world-view—for the advent of the global as a horizon of analysis also signifies that we are hovering around one limit of a Western dualism which my study’s hopscotch elides. As Godzich warns, we can read that the world will now totalize its understanding as global along Hegelian dialectics—that is—consuming the globe now, instead of one portion of the world we deem Western or Westernized, however it may be expressed and tracked. We can no longer speak in regard to an other, any other, including the planet itself, from within this colonial encounter, and we must acknowledge the ineluctable need to begin learning from Quechua speakers about lasting planetary relationships with all living things, and make it our task to do this, necessarily, translationally and comparatively for the sake of all who must know—Western, Westernized, and for the sake of every distinct thing. We must make it our task to not only deconstruct, but to care-fully de-structure, permitting Quechua Yachay to instruct, finally becoming aware that Western time is not the only time, that Western space has become the facilitating conduit for an aggression to all planetary living things which is becoming dangerously pervasive, and that being indigenous and decolonized is a matter that the Quechua speaking we have re-searced translationally and comparatively prove real. This Quechua language and worlding practice can instruct infinitely more eloquently than the traditional Western fields which by definition and delimitation produce colonized objects of every variety through the perennial and obsessively sustained application of the colonial encounter. The mutual intercession I stage between various and diverse critical Western/ Westernized and Quechua fields comparatively and translationally through distinct theorists and specific écrits traverse through turns and re-turns whose effect is de-structuring the colonial encounter so debilitating to the Western mind and body,” so debilitating of planetary vitality, and so cruelly and needlessly punishing to all to which the status of “other” is inflicted—to destructive results. Repudiation of the intolerable pressure exerted on any one, or two, or three things/persons victimized by this othering emerges as the needed repudiation of the tremendous strife we in the Western world have come to consider “normal,” and even inevitable.

The field of comparative literature is a field through which to researc this history of ideas and languages now, and I argue that the way to do this is through a translational and comparative practice for which the critical theorists of the 1960’s, 1970’s, 1980’s and 1990’s paved the way. It is these critical turns, the kairos specifically sought, read, translated and compared through particular texts that I traverse as I researc the problem of Quechua translation. It is at the same time this translational and comparative practice that permits this searc, from within and next to the Quechua field in order that it may give its instruction, its way of knowing, but also thinking, doing, and governing. I depart openly from the premise that both fields gather a worldview with
specific consequences for the planet, making language, specific idioms, not the center of our inquiry, but the conduit through which these critical relationships do emerge, are created and recreated compelling us once again to question concerning language, but as what I call a re-turn to poetic expression--- not “out of” the Western field---but from an au-de-là where Western time is not supreme and Western space does not reign---but from the field of the au-de-là where we can begin this creative and re-creative conversation with the Quechua speaking and with so many other polyglots that must be re-searced, that is found through a re-connaissance, the birthing of a mutual and horizontal relationship the basis of which is Quechua inspired. This process of birthing with again brings non-Western-determined cultures wherever and however they may emerge from under Western obnubilation, Western fearful denial, Western violent domination by actively de-structuring this colonial encounter, for the sake of the welfare, of all things.

It is abundantly evident to just about any observer of a Latin American reality that the “the indigenous question” is the problem of the effects and persistence of the colonial encounter, of the absconded belonging with the world and all that is harbored there effected as displacement of others’ places in exchange for Western spaces, the displacement of local time with Western time. The problem of what was there before the Western colonial encounter overtook this landscape with its worlding colonial language is that what was there is still there, and this is the effect traced throughout the re-sear of this study in very specific instantiations where deconstructivist turns have become de-structuring effects through field intercessions performed translationally and comparatively. What has been proven real in these textual fields is that the encounter with what is not Western, what is “other” has taken the insistent form of the colonial encounter--with a variety of real “criollo” and suturing “mestizo” state responses where the social body that excludes whatever may be “other” in the field, includes the symbol of a Quechua world that accords with a national mythology which in reality creates a situation for indigenous peoples—in the national field----that is too often devastatingly, conveniently, and cynically negligent—a situation that the state is apparently blind to, and at the same time fearful of---in spite of the ineluctable fact that it stages all its necromantic possibilities, reenacting the colonial encounter again and again in order to perpetuate the order that reproduces specific possibilities to the exclusion of other possibilities violently. My focus in the latter half of this dissertation, I have re-searced the specific textual fields that prove to be instantiations of the colonial encounter in particular ways, expressed in what emerges as mestizo literature, textual, that is, both “fictional” and “non-fictional” in Part III, which focuses on three mestizo Peruvian writers, and their specific and seminal écrits, César Vallejo, José María Arguedas, and José Carlos Mariátegui, and thereafter in Part IV where I have focused on indigenous social movements in
Peru and Bolivia where I began to further unravel the effects and limitations of these various and diverse, mutual and horizontal Western and Quechua intercessions whose point of articulation is this colonial encounter which becomes increasingly reduced through this de-structuring. Every field re-searced finds this central Western traditional “structure,” the colonial encounter, and by means of the process of discerning the conditions that surround the “locus of the event” the eventual field that conditions it emerges. The colonial encounter becomes express in each of these particularly textifying instantiations that prove this colonial encounter is real, peculiarly configured, and yet, translationally and comparatively, mutually and horizontally, intercessionally, insistently reduced.

The need to de-structure the colonial encounter once now and for all becomes evident in the intercessional encounter, translational, comparative, and equitable, horizontal between Western/Westernized and Quechua fields. What the PRATEC and THOA practitioners prove is that the West continues to set the terms, that is, the language practice deemed legitimate for the debate, and both these indigenizing institutions at work in the field have only in a limited way been able to change the Western and “conceptual” terms of this discussion, largely, as I have argued, because their effort are rarely re-searced, leat alone trans-lationally or comparatively. Both these communities of Quechua and Aymara theorists have in practice moved structures away from the colonial encounter in ways unprecedented, and I dare say, not yet comprehended by a Western debate stuck in Western time and space and in what I call necromantic conventionality. In comparative ethical, that is, translationally practiced turns and ways I have evidenced that these THOA and PRATEC practitioners are far ahead of the theorists of coloniality, especially the Western cosmopolitan theorists whose point of reference remain Western concepts and fields to which everything else is compared. PRATEC and THOA theorists and practitioners, on the other hand, have already begun to read and write in ways that are radically distinct and which require and signal a new literacy and new translations, keenly, for the sake of the West! It is the purpose of this study to perform this translational and comparative practice as a way to bring these events to the awareness of intellectuals, with any luck, organic in the Gramscian way, intra and extra institutional, such that new language practices, namely poetic expression, effected with re-con-nassiance and with a socially concerted view to the au-de-la of real and horizontal equality effected and sustained by the cultivation of relationships guided by the Quechua Ayllu/Pacha rule re-searced may create new ways of knowing and new ways of governing.

Interestingly, it is worth noting that there is a social cost that both groups of theorists pay, PRATEC and THOA, in Peru and in Bolivia, and around the world, for speaking in this yet
strange---indigentizing poetic expression. It is the express task of this study to bring this language practice into the domains of knowing germane to the traditional academic institution, and especially to the field of the humanities in order that its knowledge practices become part of what conforms the disciplinary intertexts from which we may clearly discern interdisciplinary objects of study that prove to be conducive to the re-creation of a reality that may be as reductive of unfreedom and domination as our predecessors showed was possible however narrow the possibility. Our predecessors theoretical and practiced—performative turns—brought into comparative and translational consonance with other fields, such as the Quechua field may indeed produce a field of conviviality and movement that is brought about not by the repetition of a seemingly incessant duality, but by an awareness of multiple and simultaneous creative and re-creative conversations which intangibly sustain creative and re-creative thingly transformations perpetually, that is, for us, sustainably, for the sake of balance and harmony among us all. The locus of the event is this relationship, and not the terms: this Quechua Yachay instruction.

Both THOA and PRATEC offer ways of knowing and experiencing with which a specific language practice abides in harmony, and which at the same time sensibly, aurally, and intimately in relationship to all things brings a distinct world into being. What is at stake is not that we have “transcended” the need to symbolically order our realities, especially by means of a language conceived of only psychoanalytically, but rather, how we do this, how we effect this through a distinctly effective language practice pro-curing convivial relationships with all things, in sensibly ecstatic relationship to thought, action, and all things. De-structuring and not just de-con-structing the colonial encounter, which is our only solution to date to having to live with the violence of the colonial encounter, we content ourselves with pointing deictically to its constructs, afraid that by opposing it we affirm it, accepting for the moment that eliding or escaping it is satisfactory. We abide notwithstanding—sometimes horrified--, right next to the effects of this persistent and pervasive colonial encounter. De-structuring rather—it is the conviction of this writer—is urgently needed. It is insufficient to continue deconstructing everything colonial without pairing this activity, academic and theoretical, with the profound transformational power procured with and through other language and worlding practices such as the Quechua speaking alternatives this study brings to this readership, and with any luck, to a far wider readership.

It is critical now, not only to trace our footsteps up to now, but to begin a critical conversation with others which is competently translational and comparative, localized and responsibly worlding. The penchant that decried the fragment as an insufficient unit of analysis, and demanded the return of the total, the global picture that cultural critics opposing the
universalizing and totalizing of the subject/object self/other master/slave dualities had deconstructed are not “erring” with regard to the project of deconstruction, they are simply guided by an intrinsically insuperable and ever-present desire to conceive the world. The detail, in some measure, that is, the fragment is the rule of the locality, of its texture, and of its actual place and its real time, a rule regarding that which is small, which is beholden to all things, and not just one. The desire to conceive the world responds to a deep and ineluctable need to find largesse, that is, to find shelter, harbor, that which embraces and protects us. The locus of my research is an arrival through a traversal, a theorization and we have arrived at the relationship as the rule, and not the nature, being, or knowing about the thing as the locus of our practice. We need not de-construct the Western duality. As our Quechua yachay instruct it is the relationship established among all things that de-structures the colonial encounter: an aurally attentive, lively conversation that must be mutually nourishing, considerate, and respectful, in order that harmony be perpetually sustained among all things. This worlding practice procures a world that harbors gently and perpetually, if and when this rule of relationship is kept Sunqulla, close to the heart.

What we arrive at ---through Western translational and comparative intercession and Quechua translational and comparative intercession in turn, from side to side, where inside and outside are no longer comprehensible, and where travel is free and considerate---is that the locus of the event is the relationship sustained among all things. Most importantly we arrived at a place populated by things of diverse but undeniable spirit, intelligence, knowing, things with whom our kinship and alliance is as old as the planet, and likely older: the mountain, the trees, the animals, the people, all. This study does portend to make a part of a new field of awareness and acceptance, and not denial, all these Quechua poetically expressed possibilities, proven real in their textual fields, as I have traversed them comparatively and translationally, intercessionally with Western fields in order to make evident and to propose, that alongside the deep and lasting implications evident through these textual intercessions, there is an emerging poetic textifying that may be newly critical for what we choose to do, and for the life of all things, including those we consider a part of “nature,” the Pacha field that harbors us in perennial kinship.
Appendix A

A LIST OF PRIMARY TEXTS

SECTION 1: "LITERARY" TEXTS

Chronology of publications of Quechua "literature":

Key: A=anthology; AD=creative adaptation of Quechua oral tradition; CE=critical edition; OF=original fiction in Quechua; SC=sponsored literary competition; T=testimonial literature


1990  Orós Maxi, Claudio, comp.  Khuyapayakuq Apu y otros cuentos.  ["Este folleto fue elaborado por el Programa radial 'Mosoq Alpa' de la Casa Campesina 'Domingo Cabrera Lartaún.'  It is the result of the "Regional Competition of Campesino Narrative."  Cusco: Centro Bartolomé de Las Casas, 1990.  


404


Délétroz Favre, Alain. *Huk kutis kaq kasqa: relatos del distrito de Coaza (Carabaya-Puno.)* Cusco: Instituto de Pastoral Andina, 1993. **A**


Razzeto, Mario, comp. *Tutupaka Llakta o el Mancebo que venció al diablo: el relato oral andino del Perú*. Barcelona: (Instituto Andino de Artes Populares Convenio Andres Bello, Ecuador)/Azul Editorial, 1999. A


Gamarra, Eliana and Miguel Baca, ed. *Historias de mi pueblo: Ollantaytambo, Maras, Pumahuanca, Yucay*. [This pamphlet is the result of another competition intended to discern the creative/literary capacity of peoples of these localities.] Cuzco: PromPerú/Unión Europea/Centro de Estudios Regionales Andinos "Bartolomé de Las Casas," 1999. SC, A.


---. *El Teatro Quechua en el Cuzco en el Perú Moderno: Indigenismo, Lengua Literatura: Sumaq't'ika de Nicanor Jara (1899); Manco II de Luis Ochoa Guevara (1921)*. Tomo II. Cuzco: Centro de Estudios Regionales Andinos Bartolomé de Las Casas and Instituto Frances de Estudios Andinos, 2000. A


Berrocal Evanán, Carmelón. *Pirumanta Llinpisqa Willakuynka/Cuentos Pintados del Perú* Ed. Pablo Macera. [copywrite belongs to Pablo Macera and Deutsche Gesellschaft Für Technische Zusammenarbeit.]

NO DATE OF PUBLICATION AVAILABLE:
Takivninichista uvarina. 9 jisq’un.  [papmuplet/Grammar/silabario textbook given to me by an adolescent in Titicachi who identified this text as his language guide to Quechua; it presents the major unions in Bolivia, COB and CSUTCB, as well as Tupak Katari in its consecutive lessons; the text is designed for the speaker of Quechua who wishes to identify orthography, or wants to learn how to transcribe/write; it is therefore based, designed around discrete syllable sounds/spelling.]


SECTION 2: "CULTURAL" TEXTS


---. Sacapa (Malcom Allison,) graphics. Tawantinsuyo, graficado-- Basados en el libro "Taw Inti Suyu, Cinco siglos de guerra kheswaymara contra España de Wankar Ramiro Reynaga. 1996.


Albo, Xavier.  *…Y de Kataristas a MNRistas?: la sorprendente y audaz alianza entre aymaras y neoliberales en Bolivia.*  La Paz: CEDOIN/UNITAS, 1993.

*El Plan de Todos, (Resumen) MNR MRTKLI.* (pamphlet) 1993

*Plan de Emergencia, (Resumen) MNR Nueva Alianza.* (campaign material.) 2002.


La Mujer y la Organización "Domitila de Chungara." Cuaderno de Capacitación Campesina, No. 6. La Paz/Cusco: Edición peruana autorizada por UNITAS, CIDOB, CIPCA/Centro de Estudios Rurales Andinos Bartolomé de Las Casas.


SECTION 3: "THEMATIC" TEXTS: Subset A


SECTION 4: THEMATIC TEXTS: Subset B


Tatzo, Alberto and German Rodríguez. La Visión Cósmica de Los Andes. Quito: Proyecto de Educación Bilingüe Intercultural (EBI)/Ediciones Abya Yala, 1996.


Bibliography


During, Simon. “Postmodernism and Postcolonialism Today.” Textual Practice (1)1, 1987


---. The Archaeology of Knowledge & The Discourse on Language. Pantheon Book: New York, 1972


Valladolid Rivera, Julio. *Kawsay Mama, Madre Semilla, Proyecto In Situ: Crianza de la Agrobiodiversidad en los Andes del Peru*. Lima: PRATEC.


