

**WHEN DO HUMAN RIGHTS MATTER?  
FINDING A PLACE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN FOREIGN POLICY**

by

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## **Dedication**

To my parents, Ora and Louis Giacobbe, my siblings, Louie and Joanie, and the rest of my family.

And to Rick, Julia, and CJ.

## **Acknowledgments**

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## **Chapter 1**

### **Introduction**

In the early morning hours of December 8, 1982, fifteen suspected dissidents were taken from their homes in Suriname's capital, Paramaribo. By nearly all accounts, they were tortured and killed by their military captors just a few hours later. Within two days, the Netherlands, Suriname's key economic aid provider, severed its aid program in response to this case of human rights abuse. Aid was resumed in the late 1980s following democratic reforms (Gillies 1996). Why did the Dutch respond to the extrajudicial killings of 15 Surinamese with the immediate suspension of economic assistance? How did their reaction in this case compare to its response to other instances of violations? How does the Dutch reaction compare to other major donor countries' behavior in the face of serious human rights abuses? These questions form the basis of this dissertation research.

In the sections that follow, I will detail the research question that I address in this dissertation. I will then provide a brief outline of the remaining chapters of this dissertation.

#### ***1.1 The Puzzle***

Many traditional definitions of the state – e.g. Westphalian, Weberian, Hobbesian – view the government as king; by and large, traditional notions of sovereignty allow for government control over domestic population, permitting the use of force if necessary (c.f. Henkin 1979). External criticisms of domestic issues are illegitimate. States often

view any attempts to change a country's internal affairs through coercion or imposition as violations of Westphalian sovereignty (Krasner 1999).

Yet, despite the strongly held norm of non-interference, claims about atrocities abroad have motivated states' foreign policy for centuries. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Britain used foreign policy tools in its fight to abolish the slave trade (Krasner 1999; Kaufman and Pape 1999). Since World War Two, a large body of international human rights law has come into existence. Through a variety of human rights agreements, states have committed themselves to respecting the human rights of their own citizens. Over the same time period, it has become increasingly commonplace for states to consider the human rights records of other states in foreign policy decisions, such as official development aid (ODA), or to publicly criticize other states' human rights records. In 1968, Norway, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden forced Greece to resign from the Council of Europe following violations of the European Convention's human rights provisions at the hands of the Greek's military government (Sikkink 1993b). In the mid-1980s, Norway used a package of positive incentives to pressure Sri Lanka to change its human rights practices (Egeland 1984). In 1977, the United States government used section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to suspend military aid to a number of South American countries in response to human rights violations in these countries (c.f. Sikkink 1993b). States also use economic sanctions to pressure human rights violators to improve conditions. Of the 186 economic sanctions analyzed in their book, Hufbauer et al. classify the goals of over 50 of them as improving human rights (Hufbauer et al. 2007).

States have many foreign policy tools at their disposal with which to criticize and pressure human rights violators. These tools range from relatively costless, and therefore more common, diplomatic condemnation to extremely rare and costly military intervention. Most existing empirical work, which I will discuss in Chapter 2, focuses on the intermediate policy options, such as restrictions on military and economic aid. As Gillies (1996) points out, even within this class of policy tools, there is a wide range of assertiveness: from cutting aid entirely to withholding only new aid to simply placing vague conditions on aid. Although these policies may not directly contradict Westphalian notions of sovereignty, they are tools with which states attempt to change the internal politics of other states.

There are also numerous examples of states failing to respond to violations in other states. American support for Latin American dictators irrespective of their numerous human rights violations and the international inaction during the Rwandan genocide in the 1990s provide just two examples of states failing to respond to human rights atrocities abroad. More recently, human rights advocates criticize the strong United States relationship with an oppressive Chinese regime, one that they say is not doing enough to prevent human rights atrocities in the Darfur region of Sudan. Especially interesting to note is that some of the same states that do attempt to punish violators, as in the above examples, often do nothing in the face of severe violations. It is, therefore, not simply characteristics of particular states that predispose them to pressuring violators.

In light of this, I ask: when, and why, will states take action to criticize and punish human rights violators? In this dissertation, I will focus on direct government-to-

government official development assistance will ask, more specifically, under what conditions do donors withhold or limit aid to recipients who violate the human rights of their citizens?

## ***1.2 Outline of Dissertation***

This dissertation proceeds as follows. In Chapter 2, I will review the existing theoretical and empirical understandings of the role of human rights in foreign policy. Although many scholars have tackled the question of how the promotion of human rights fits in foreign policy goals, the existing literature is mainly mixed on whether human rights influences foreign aid decision-making. In addition, I find that comprehensive, large-N comparative studies of human rights and foreign aid are rare. Those that do exist largely neglect the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or fail to develop a theoretically-compelling causal story for how NGOs influence foreign aid policy-making.

In Chapter 3, I will detail my explanation, beginning with a discussion of foreign aid decision making in general and moving on to place human rights in the broader context of foreign policy goals. My explanation centers around the opportunity costs of using foreign aid to promote human rights, in terms of policy aims not pursued. I argue that a low opportunity cost is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for policymakers to punish human rights violators. Not only must the cost be low, but the leaders must perceive some benefit to acting. The activities of NGOs provide an incentive for leaders to act, but only when costs are low. I also argue, in contrast to the existing literature, that the effect of human rights on foreign aid is largely mediated through NGO mobilization. That is to say that donors respond to violations that are publicized, rather than simply to

the violations themselves. I also explore the role of donor political institutions in shaping how susceptible leaders are to NGO pressure to punish human rights violators.

In Chapter 4, I provide the variables, methods, and models I use to test my hypotheses. One contribution of this dissertation is that I am testing my hypotheses using a comprehensive dataset, covering all OECD donors and all recipients from the years 1980-2000. Most of the existing literature (Neumayer 2003 is the exception) focuses on a handful of countries, either using qualitative or quantitative analyses.<sup>1</sup> In Chapter 4, I discuss the methodological challenges in dealing with this dataset, namely issues of non-independence. In addition, I develop a test for the NGO mediation explanation, examining if the effect of human rights is mediated through NGO mobilization.

I present my results in two chapters. First, in Chapter 5, I explore donors' decisions to give aid at the gate-keeping stage. The empirical focus of this chapter is to ask whether donors withhold aid to human rights violators, conditional on characteristics of the donor-recipient relationship and donor political institutions. Briefly, I find support for my argument that non-governmental organizations mediate the effect of human rights on foreign aid. In addition, I find that whether NGO mobilization affects aid disbursement depends on how the donor values the relationship with the recipient. If the recipient is geographically close to the donor or is a former colony, then the donor is less likely to withhold aid even if the recipient's human rights record has drawn the attention of NGOs. I also find that donors are not more likely to react to NGO pressure as the donor's electoral permissiveness increases.

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<sup>1</sup> Barratt (2008) also does a large-N quantitative test, but she uses a pooled-sample where the observation is recipient-year, with aid from all donors pooled. She cannot, therefore, test donor-specific characteristics.

In Chapter 6, I consider the second stage of foreign aid decision-making, the allocation stage. This chapter focuses on the question of how much aid donors give to recipients and whether human rights violators receive less aid, all else equal. I find additional support for my hypothesis that the effect of human rights on foreign aid - in this case the share of aid a recipient receives - is filtered through the publicizing role of NGOs. I also find that the effect of NGO mobilization on the share of aid depends on context. Donors give less aid to recipients who are subject to NGO pressure, but only if the recipient is not an important strategic partner, not a significant petroleum exporter, or if the recipient is geographically distant.

Finally, in chapter 7, I will offer conclusions, as well as a discussion of the implications of my findings and next steps for future research. I explore ideas for future research to address some of the weak or anomalous findings. I also address some of the broader implications of my theory and findings.



## **Chapter 2**

### **Human Rights in Foreign Policy**

Historically, human rights - and moral issues in general - did not draw much attention in foreign policy and international relations literature. Traditional realist scholars argued that it was inappropriate for states to consider moral issues in foreign policy (Kennan 1985; Morgenthau 1979). Further, pursuing a moral foreign policy would likely come to the detriment of state interests, traditionally defined in security and material terms (c.f. Morgenthau 1979). In addition, entrenched norms of state sovereignty dictated that leaders had internal autonomy, permitting the use of force within borders if necessary. As legal scholar Brierly puts it: "no rule [prior to 1945] was clearer than that a state's treatment of its own nationals is a matter exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of that state, is not controlled or regulated by international law" (quoted in Kamminga 1992, 1). States jealously guarded their internal autonomy and deemed any criticism of domestic policy and conditions to be illegitimate. For example, in response to international criticism regarding its treatment of the Armenian people, the Turkish government repeatedly declared the matter part of internal politics and called any intercessions inappropriate (c.f. Kamminga 1992).

Although there are some notable pre-World War II exceptions such as the abolition of slavery, it was not until after World War II that human rights took a more prominent role in international relations and international institutions. Articles 1, 55 and 56 of the United Nations Charter forms the foundation for the international human rights

regime that emerged following World War II. Article 1 states that the United Nations shall encourage “respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms” (United Nations 1995, 143). The Charter also calls for “universal respect for, and observance of, human rights” in Article 55 (United Nations 1995, 144). Article 56 lays out the duties of member states “to promote international cooperation, including cooperation in the human rights field” (United Nations 1995, 7). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a legally non-binding declaration, soon followed and enumerated what the drafters saw as universal rights. In addition, there are seven core UN human rights agreements, each focusing on a different set of rights, and several additional agreements covering various liberties.

Despite the inclusion of human rights rhetoric in important international documents, this did not immediately translate into strong enforcement of human rights norms globally. As a result of lobbying by the United States and United Kingdom, the UN documents were largely aspirational in nature. Donnelly (1986) concludes that the international human rights regime is largely declaratory or promotional, rather than containing strong enforcement mechanisms. The U.S. and U.K., despite advocating for human rights in the Atlantic Charter, were concerned about the implications of binding legal standards. The southern Democrats in the US Senate provided the oppositional voice in the United States, while the British had imperial interests to protect (c.f. Simmons 2009).<sup>2</sup> The UN Charter, although highlighting the importance of human rights in its preamble and Article 55, also enshrines the doctrine of non-intervention in Article 2(7). Although states were urged to protect the rights of their citizens, these agreements

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<sup>2</sup> A strong force against ratifying the core UN human rights treaties in the United States was the Bricker Amendment, which limited presidential authority with respect to treaties in an effort to protect states’ rights (c.f. Forysthe 1990; Sikkink 1993b).

were essentially “toothless,” lacking any enforcement mechanisms of their own, especially with the UN Charter explicitly not authorizing intervention in domestic affairs.

### ***2.1 Enforcement of Human Rights Norms***

Scholars recognize the enforcement of international human rights law as particularly problematic compared to other areas of international law (c.f. Simmons 2009; Moravcsik 2000; Hafner-Burton 2009). Issue areas like trade and arms control, for example, can depend on reciprocity as a tool for enforcement. Because the potential for mutual gains from cooperation exists, treaties in these issue areas- such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the Basic Principles Agreement between the United States and USSR (Keohane 1986) - are essentially self-enforcing. If one state defects in pursuit of a short-term gain, another state can defect as a punishment strategy. Cooperation occurs then, because the long-term costs of punishment outweigh the short-term gains from cheating (Keohane 1984). This strategy does not typically fit with human rights for two main reasons. First, there is not a clear mutual gain to be had from pursuing human rights norms. In other words, it is not clear how, for example, Sweden benefits from Canada protecting the human rights of its citizens. Second, the strategy of reciprocity does not apply to human rights treaties. If one country does not comply with the provisions of a human rights treaty, another state cannot logically punish it by violating the rights of its own citizens. Actors wishing to enforce human rights compliance are left to find other strategies. In her book, Simmons (2009) argues that the main path to enforcement of human rights treaties is through the empowerment of domestic actors and institutions. She further argues that collective action problems, as well as a lack of incentives to incur costs to enforce human rights norms, mean that

international enforcement, or “peer accountability,” is likely to be both weak and underprovided.

Regardless of the empirical accuracy of Simmons’ assertion that international enforcement is unlikely, there is evidence that states at least sometimes do attempt to punish human rights violators and this remains a puzzle. The existing literature on foreign policy and human rights highlights the various foreign policy tools that states can use to encourage other states to protect the human rights of their citizens. These tools can be used either as “carrots,” to reward states that protect human rights, or “sticks,” to punish states that violate the human rights of their citizens. Foreign policy tools range from diplomatic to economic to military. At one end of the spectrum, states can use diplomatic condemnation to express their disapproval of another state’s human rights records (see Kamminga (1992) for both historical and contemporary examples of diplomatic intercessions). States also use international organizations as forums for condemning human rights records. For example, states use the United Nations Commission on Human Rights to “name and shame” human rights violators (Lebovic and Voeten 2006). Since the early 2000s, preferential trade agreements (PTAs) have been used to promote human rights norms by making trade conditional on human rights conditions (Hafner-Burton 2004; Hafner-Burton 2009). States have also used economic sanctions to punish human rights violators. Of the 186 cases of economic sanctions they analyze in their book, Hufbauer et al. classify 50 of them as motivated, at least in part, by human rights (Hufbauer et al. 2007). Just to name a few examples, the United States and the United Kingdom sanctioned Uganda in the 1970s as a result of Idi Amin’s repressive policies. Beginning in 1976, the United States used sanctions to coerce Uruguay to

improve its human rights conditions. Finally, at the extreme of the spectrum of policy options, are military interventions. Military action in response to human rights violations is rare and typically conflated with geopolitical and other explanations for conflict. For example, politicians framed the interventions in Iraq, Somalia and Kosovo in humanitarian terms (c.f. Henkin 1999; Pease and Forsythe 1993), regardless of other motivations for these conflicts.

This begs two questions: first, why would states want to influence the domestic human rights policies of other countries? Second, do states actually use foreign policy tools to enforce human rights norms? For the most part, scholars tend to focus on the latter question. In particular, there is much empirical literature looking at the relationship between foreign aid and human rights. Other foreign policy tools are not as well studied. From a theoretical perspective, on the other hand, answers to the former question are less common and, often, incomplete.

## ***2.2 Theoretical Foundations for Human Rights Foreign Policy***

International relations scholars have long debated the appropriate role of morality and human rights in foreign policy. Scholars of the realist tradition typically take the view that human rights do not belong in foreign policy. Morgenthau (c.f. 1951; 1978; 1979) makes the claim that moral principles cannot be imposed on other states and that, to the extent that moral considerations are part of foreign policy, that they are subordinate to power politics. Because the primary role of the state - from the realist perspective - is to preserve its continued existence, foreign policy necessarily must focus on national security and power, rather than moral issues (Kennan 1985). Further, because a state's respect of its citizens' human rights "provides little or no direct benefit to other states,"

realists would not expect states to take any costly action to encourage compliance in other states (Hathaway 2002; 1946).

Yet, we do observe cases of states reacting to human rights violations in other states and taking costly action to encourage improved conditions. The realist approach suggests two reasons why we might observe states taking action to incorporate morality into foreign policy, including the promotion of human rights abroad. First, these efforts are “cheap talk” and states use this rhetoric to legitimize traditional realist behavior, such as pursuing other geopolitical interests (Hathaway 2002, 1946). This explanation is derived from the realist belief that power and security drive foreign policy (c.f. Carr 1946; Morgenthau 1966). Second, human rights regimes and subsequent pressures to comply may reflect some powerful states’ genuine commitment to human rights, as these powerful states attempt to impose their beliefs on others (Waltz 1979). Krasner (1999), for example, highlights how stronger states used coercion to impose respect for minority rights, such as for Christians in the Ottoman Empire. However, this second point begs the question: why are these states committed to human rights and why would they decide to use their power to impose their normative preferences – in favor of human rights – on other states?

Although realists are skeptical about the appropriate role of human rights in foreign policy, other scholars recognize that states do sometimes make genuine attempts to improve human rights in other states. In her work on preferential trade agreements, Hafner-Burton (2004) argues that states select human rights institutions to solve the cooperation problem they face. States that seek to influence other states’ human rights behaviors – she names “influencers” – represent one of four reasons for including human

rights standards in PTAs.<sup>3</sup> She argues that rich, democratic states are most likely to have the “economic resources, political will, and the bargaining authority” to be influencers (Hafner-Burton 2004, 17). Further, she argues that these states will use non-reciprocal PTAs with hard human rights standards to impose human rights obligations on recipient states (Hafner-Burton 2004). Although Hafner-Burton considers how “influencers” operate - through PTAs - she does not delve into *why* these states would choose to do so. In other words, what is it that motivates these rich, democratic states to tie trade terms to human rights? In the follow-up book, Hafner-Burton (2009) argues that states incorporate human rights conditions into PTAs for “political gain, by paying rents to bootleggers or solving other political problems, regardless of their own moral conviction on the issue, and they often use moral language to justify their views” (82).

In a detailed comparison of European and American human rights policies, Sikkink identifies the United States, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden as countries that explicitly integrate human rights into foreign policy calculations (Sikkink, 1993b). Sikkink explains the adoption of these policies using the concept of “principled ideas” in changing foreign policy-making calculus. Sikkink argues that the atrocities committed during World War II led the Western European countries to develop ethically sound foreign policies. Sikkink (1993b) argues that, in the United States, anti-communism, isolationism, and segregationist sentiment postponed the adoption of a strong human rights foreign policy until 1973. In the early 1970s, American elite public opinion changed as a result of a series of events (e.g. Watergate, Vietnam, Civil Rights

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<sup>3</sup> Hafner-Burton (2004) identifies three other reasons for using PTAs: “to gain legitimacy at home or abroad (legitimizers), to secure economic benefits (conceders), to make credible domestic polity commitments (binders), or to maximize influence over other states’ human rights behavior (influencers)” (4)

movement), leading to the institutionalization of human rights concerns in foreign policy (Sikkink 1993b).

This elite-driven, “principled ideas” approach, however, does not explain the variation in human rights foreign policy. Sikkink’s explanation, with the exception of her description of US policy, does not account for changes over time. Sikkink recognizes the importance of Cold War politics for the US as superpower and argues that the US did not truly develop an external human rights policy until the period of détente (Sikkink 1993b). However, with respect to the Western European countries, she claims that “the Western Europeans have held fast to the human rights regime” (Sikkink 1993b, 166). Yet, of the Western European states that Sikkink identifies as developing external human rights policies - Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden - there are numerous cases where these states turn a blind eye to violations. Although, for example, the Netherlands responded strongly to human rights violations in its former colony of Suriname in 1982 following the killing of fifteen civilians who opposed the current government, it did not do the same when Indonesia, another former colony, repeatedly violated the rights of the East Timorese (c.f. Gillies 1996).

### ***2.3 The Empirical Record***

Empirically, skeptics point to the inconsistent application of U.S. foreign aid requirements – such as Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 – as evidence that human rights cannot trump security and economic concerns. The policies of the United States and its application of laws such as Section 502B have been subject to a number of empirical studies, with mixed results. Many scholars do find results consistent with the realist critique: that economic and military aid patterns are, at best, unrelated to



the human rights record of receiving states and, at worst, positively correlated with human rights violations (Stohl, Carleton and Johnson, 1984; Regan 1995). On the other hand, others find that the United States has considered human rights in military and economic aid decisions (c.f. Poe 1992); Although they do not find that the United States put human rights above all other considerations, Apodaca and Stohl (1999)– using the most comprehensive dataset to date – do find that the human rights records of potential recipients impact both the decision to give aid and the level of aid given for the Reagan and Bush administrations, but not the Clinton and Carter administrations. Much of the disagreement between the two camps studying US foreign aid and human rights lies in specification issues. In particular, there is disagreement over which recipients to include or exclude for various reasons, as well as how best to measure human rights.<sup>4</sup>

Only looking at United States’ foreign policy ignores the actions of other initiator states. As the world’s sole superpower, the United States is in a unique position. Other states, living under the security umbrella provided by the hegemon, may have more freedom to pursue other foreign policy goals, such as the advancement of human rights. In some of the few quantitative, comparative pieces, Neumayer (2003) considers the relationship between foreign aid and human rights for OECD donors. He finds that some

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<sup>4</sup> For example, Cingranelli & Pasquarello (1985) find a positive relationship between US foreign aid and human rights conditions in Latin American recipients in the 1980s, but other scholars raise concerns about their human rights measure and case selection. Upon reanalysis, both Carleton & Stohl (1986) and Mitchell & McCormick (1988) find that Cingranelli & Pasquarello (1985) results are not robust. El Salvador is a particularly challenging case due to its strategic importance to the US during the 1980s and results vary substantially with its inclusion (c.f. Poe et al. 1994). Mitchell & McCormick (1988) find that including El Salvador results in a negative, but insignificant, relationship between human rights and US economic and military aid. Carleton & Stohl (1986) argue that the logic leading one to exclude El Salvador - that it was a “nonroutine” case for the US - should also lead to the exclusion of Nicaragua, Honduras, and Jamaica. These scholars also raise concerns with Cingranelli & Pasquarello’s reliance on State Department reports for their measure of human rights, citing political bias. In their reanalysis, they find both of these decisions - to exclude El Salvador and to use the State Department human rights measure - are critical to the statistically significant results Cingranelli & Pasquarello find. Lifting either of these controversial assumptions results in insignificant results (Carleton & Stohl 1986).

types of human rights matter at some times, but that there is no consistent pattern. In particular, he finds that civil and political rights matter at the gate-keeping stage for most donors, while personal integrity rights only matter for a few donors at this stage.<sup>5</sup> While at the aid allocation stage a few donors seem to respond to good human rights records by allocating more aid, many allocate more aid to countries that do not respect these rights. What is especially interesting about Neumayer's findings is that the so-called "like-minded states" - Canada, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden - do not exhibit any consistent concern for human rights in their aid decision-making, contrary to expectations and rhetoric from these countries.<sup>6</sup> What is missing from his explanation is a theoretical expectation of why *some* donors *sometimes* take human rights into consideration in foreign aid decisions.

In a series of comparative case studies, Gillies (1996) tests the hypothesis that states only act assertively in response to human rights violations when the costs of doing so are perceived to be low relative to other national interests. Gillies (1996) selects three "internationalist" states – Canada, the Netherlands, and Norway – precisely because these cases provide a "hard test" for the realist proposition. He argues that if any states will promote human rights through foreign policy, we would expect states that maintain a strong tradition of internationalism and leadership on moral issues to lead the pack (Gillies 1996, 13). Gillies argues that states are more likely to respond to violations with

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<sup>5</sup> Neumayer (2003) finds that France, the United States, Denmark, and Australia are more likely to give aid to countries that respect personal integrity rights, while Sweden, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, and Switzerland are actually less likely to give aid to countries that respect these rights.

<sup>6</sup> Olsen (1998) and Gates & Hoeffler (2004), for example, predict that the Nordic countries will condition aid on human rights more so than other countries. In their own analysis, Gates & Hoeffler (2004) find that of the Nordic countries, only Denmark gives less aid to violators. From a theoretical point-of-view, Egeland (1984) asserts that "small states with less non-moral foreign policy interests in international conflict areas should conversely invest more resources in actively and directly trying to influence the human rights situation in the actual frontlines" (212).

assertive policy when (1) the violating state is not in a position to retaliate, (2) competing commercial or security interests are absent or minor, and (3) reaction would not pose a cost to other vital interests. Gillies considers the reactions of Canada, the Netherlands, and Norway to a series of cases of human rights violations. Gillies finds that, contrary to their publicly stated foreign policy goals, these states do not put human rights considerations above commercial interests in decisions about official development aid. Barratt (2008) similarly finds that human rights concerns do not trump economic and strategic concerns. Due to data limitations, Barratt's quantitative analysis employs pooled foreign aid data, limiting her ability to draw conclusions about donor characteristics outside of her three country cases.

The empirical literature sets human rights considerations alongside other foreign policy goals, such as economic and security interests. The absence of strong competing economic or security interests emerge as a necessary condition for the incorporation of human rights into foreign aid decisions. Barratt (2008) and Gillies (1996) also briefly introduce the role of interest groups and non-governmental organizations. The Norwegian response to human rights violations in Sri Lanka was driven, in part, by a vocal Tamil population in Norway (Gillies 1996; Egeland 1984). Barratt (2008) briefly suggests that human rights groups can "increase the salience of human rights as a policy issue" (45). The discussion of the casual mechanism - how do NGOs influence policymakers to use foreign aid to punish human rights violators - is largely underdeveloped. As I discuss in the next chapter, these are important first steps in placing human rights into a broader framework of foreign policy. What is still missing from this literature, however, is a comprehensive theory of how these factors interact and

how domestic institutions play a role in providing incentives for policymakers to pursue human rights-orientated foreign policy. Finally, I will also contribute to the literature empirically by providing a new comparative quantitative examination of the relationship between human rights and foreign aid.

## **Chapter 3**

### **Putting Human Rights in Context: Understanding the Role of Human Rights in Foreign Policy**

#### ***3.1 Introduction***

In this dissertation, I ask under what conditions donors will punish human rights violators by withholding foreign aid or reducing the amount of aid given.<sup>7</sup> Although previous literature has tackled this question, as discussed in Chapter 2, the findings are mixed. Some scholars find that human rights matter for some donors (Neumayer 2003), for certain leaders (Apodaca and Stohl 1999), or when there are few commercial or strategic ties between the donor and recipient (Barratt 2008; Gillies 1996); others find that foreign aid and human rights are uncorrelated or that poor human rights records lead to more foreign aid (c.f. Stohl, Carleton and Johnson, 1984; Regan, 1995). I argue that to understand why and when states react to human rights violations abroad, we must consider the domestic political context that policymakers in the donor country face, as well as the relationship between the donor and recipient. In brief, I argue that donors will be most likely to punish human rights violators who are the focus of NGO mobilization, but only if the donor does not seek valuable policy concessions from the recipient. In addition, I examine how the donor's political institutions influence its response to human rights violations. I expect that institutional structures that favor national level public goods - namely, high district magnitude systems - will be more likely to respond to NGO pressure to punish violators. The decisions to use foreign policy tools to pursue a human

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<sup>7</sup> More specifically, I focus on economic aid in the form of official development assistance.

rights agenda are part of a larger framework of foreign policy decisions. Incorporating a broader understanding of foreign policy, and the domestic political context that informs foreign policy, will provide a more robust understanding of human rights foreign policy. Looking at human rights outside of this context ignores the relationship that human rights has with other foreign policy goals and produces an incomplete picture of human rights foreign policy.

In the previous chapter, I highlighted the role of human rights in international politics and foreign policy in general. In the sections that follow, I build from that discussion to develop a theory of human rights foreign policy that places its role among other foreign policy goals. First, I explore the motivations for foreign aid in general, before introducing human rights as a possible foreign policy goal. Then, I consider the relationship between the donor and recipient, as well as the domestic benefits the donor expect. I argue that donors will carefully consider the costs of pursuing a human rights foreign policy. In particular, donors need to consider whether the policy concessions the recipient has to offer the donor, in terms of its traditional foreign policy objectives of economic advancement and national security, are too valuable to sacrifice in the pursuit of a human rights-friendly foreign policy. Once I outline the potential costs, I will explore the conditions under which policymakers in donor countries perceive a benefit to acting. Finally, I examine how donor political institutions structure the incentives for policymakers to punish human rights violators.

### ***3.2 Motivations for Foreign Aid***

To explain the role that human rights plays in foreign aid decisions, we must first understand the political decision-making process behind bilateral aid decisions more

generally. The perhaps naïve view of foreign aid is that donors target the most needy countries, with the goal of assisting economic development and eradicating poverty in the recipient country. In fact, this is rarely the driving force behind aid decisions.<sup>8</sup> Instead, aid decisions tend to center on the economic and strategic interests of the donor, rather than recipient need.

Donors use foreign aid, in part, to maintain good relationships with important trading and security partners. Foreign aid may help open export markets to donor industry, maintain a sphere of influence, or help strengthen relationships with alliance partners (Barratt 2008). Providing foreign aid to investment or trading partners helps promote growth in recipient countries, which in turn has positive externalities for the donor's economic well-being (Maizels and Nissanke 1984). Tied foreign aid has a more direct result on the donor's economy, often requiring that the aid be used to purchase goods from the donor economy (Barratt 2008).

We can also identify domestic constituents who have an interest in foreign aid policy. Milner and Tingley (2009) argue that, just as international trade policy creates winners and losers in the domestic economy, so does foreign aid policy. "Foreign economic aid, like trade, is one part of an internationalist foreign policy that seeks to maintain a stable, open world economy; hence, groups that benefit from such openness tend to support aid" (4). Foreign aid is a transfer of capital from capital-rich to capital-poor countries. According to the Stolper-Samuelson and Heckscher-Ohlin theorems capital owners in donor countries should support foreign aid while unskilled labor should

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<sup>8</sup> There are some minor exceptions in the current literature, for example the Nordic countries tend to give more to poorer recipients. Literature on foreign aid in the 1970s often distinguished between "recipient need" and "donor interest" models and found little to no support for "recipient need" explanations for bilateral foreign aid (c.f. McKinlay and Little 1977).

oppose it (Milner and Tingley 2009). Representatives of capital-rich districts should support foreign economic aid. Looking at the United States House of Representatives from 1979 to 2003, Milner and Tingley (2009) find evidence to support this contention.

In addition to fostering economic ties, foreign aid can also strengthen strategic relationships between donors and recipients. Donors may use foreign aid to solidify political and security alliances. Foreign aid may entice recipients to provide donors with access to military bases, fly-over rights, and other privileges that assist the donor's strategic agenda. A classic example of using aid to secure security outcomes is U.S. aid to Israel & Egypt following the Camp David Accords. In fact, nearly a third of US aid goes to Israel and Egypt (Alesina and Dollar 2000). In the United States, there is a substantial constituency concerned with relationships with Israel and its neighbors and foreign aid is an important part of US foreign policy in the region. Another example of using foreign aid for geopolitical objectives was Cold War policies in the United States and its allies to contain communism (Barratt 2008).

Donors also tend to foster strong aid relationships with former colonies. For example, Portugal almost exclusively gives to former colonies and France and Japan also have strong preferences for their former colonies (Alesina and Dollar 2000). Countries may feel a sense of moral obligation to former colonies and these strong historical ties often lead to significant foreign aid packages after independence (Gillies 1996). Donors, acting with self-interest, may also use foreign aid to maintain their political influence in former colonies. Alesina and Dollar (2000) find that former colonial status seems to matter more than level of democracy, finding that "a non-democratic former colony gets about twice as much aid as a democratic non-colony" (55).



Another approach to understanding foreign aid looks at aid as a means for donors to buy policy concessions from recipients (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009). If a recipient can provide some concession to the donor – such as fly-over rights, access to military bases, assistance with military operations, access to raw materials, access to markets for goods, UN votes, etc – then the donor may attempt to “buy” a policy concession using foreign aid. In this model of foreign aid, money flows from donors with large winning coalitions who are seeking to provide a public good such as security or economic well-being to recipients with small winning coalitions who can easily be bought with foreign aid money (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009).

That donors give aid for policy concessions from recipients does not deviate too far from the more traditional explanations of foreign aid. However, what Bueno de Mesquita and Smith do is explain *why* those policy concessions are important for the domestic politics of the donors themselves. In other words, to say that donors seek policy concessions from recipients does not go far enough to say *why* donors buy these concessions. What do decision-makers in the donor country gain from these concessions? How do these concessions help a politician maintain office and win re-election? Using the Selectorate Model, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009) explain that leaders of countries with large winning coalitions are more likely to buy policy concessions, because often these policy concessions take the form of a public good. As the Selectorate Model predicts, leaders who answer to large winning coalitions must provide public goods to stay in office. The strategic, political, or economic policy concessions that donors buy from recipients help the leaders of the donor country stay in power by providing a public good to the winning coalition.

In the recipient country, leaders who answer to small winning coalitions are more likely to accept the aid in exchange for policy deal because they stay in power by providing private benefits to the small winning coalition. The aid, in many cases, can be funneled into private benefits for the small winning coalition, thus keeping the leader in power despite making what may be unpopular policy concessions (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009).

The Selectorate Model is not necessarily incompatible with the idea of other scholars that economic and strategic motivations drive foreign aid. In fact, the Selectorate Theory approach provides an explanation of the domestic political factors that influence policymakers to use economic and strategic considerations in determining foreign aid. Taken together, the Selectorate Theory suggests that donors will use aid to buy policy concessions that translate into public goods, while the traditional approach illustrates the nature of the policy concessions.

### ***3.3 Human Rights and Foreign Aid***

Where, then, do human rights fit in the explanations of foreign aid? As argued above, foreign aid is meant to achieve certain foreign policy goals that are traditionally defined in economic and security terms. The promotion of human rights is another goal that is often, but not always, in competition with these other foreign policy goals. In the cases where using aid to promote human rights comes into conflict with security and/or economic goals, I expect human rights to be put aside in favor of pursuing these other goals. However, human rights will most likely be incorporated into foreign aid decisions when the promotion of human rights complements other foreign policy goals.

To ask, as some of the literature on human rights and foreign aid seems to, for human rights to trump other foreign policy goals is unrealistic. The existing empirical findings that are mixed or conclude that human rights conditionality is applied inconsistently should not be surprising (c.f. Stohl, Carleton, & Johnson 1984; Regan 1995; Apodaca and Stohl 1999; Neumayer 2003). The context of violations will largely determine whether a donor decides to punish a recipient in response to a particular set of human rights violations. In particular, the security and economic relationship between the donor and recipient, as well as the domestic political pressures decision-makers face, should matter. As leaders face the decision whether to punish a recipient for violating human rights, they must weigh the consequences of such an action. In many respects, the costs can be measured in terms of the other foreign policy interests the donor has with respect to the recipient. For example, the United States would be unlikely to punish Egypt for human rights violations given the strong interest the U.S. has in regional security. Similarly, many donors turn a blind eye to Chinese human rights violations as a result of China's economic power. On the other hand, Sweden's economic and security well-being did not depend on its relationship with Sri Lanka, making punishing Sri Lanka a low-cost response to violations there (Gillies 1996). All else equal, therefore, I expect donors to punish recipients with whom they have few economic or strategic ties. The absence of these ties reduces the opportunity cost of punishing human rights violations. As I will discuss below, I believe this is a necessary but not sufficient condition. There must also exist some domestic political pressure in the donor country to encourage policymakers to punish a violating recipient.

In the sections that follow, I develop a more detailed discussion of the economic and security ties that I expect to matter. I develop a series of interactive hypotheses that condition the role of human rights on foreign aid on the salience of economic and strategic relationship between the donor and recipient. Following that, I outline an explanation of the source of benefits for decision-makers to condition foreign aid on human rights. I argue that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) provide information and pressure that gives leaders incentives to respond to human rights violations. I introduce NGO activity as a mediating variable, through which I expect human rights to influence foreign aid. In contrast to existing literature, I place less emphasis on the human rights conditions in the recipient country. Instead, as I will argue below, the mediating factor for donors is the extent to which violations are publicized. In the absence of publicity, I argue that policymakers in the donor countries are unlikely to perceive a political benefit to acting even in cases of severe violations.

### ***3.4 At What Cost? The Salience of Donor-Recipient Relations***

Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009) assert that leaders use foreign aid to buy policy concessions. Further, they argue that the salience of these policy concessions is one key determinant of whether a donor provides aid to a potential recipient and, if aid is provided, how much aid is allocated. I argue that donors consider the salience of these concessions when deciding whether to punish human rights violators. If a donor decides to punish a potential recipient by withholding or reducing aid, the opportunity cost of such action is losing the policy concession. I expect, therefore, that as the value of the concessions increases, the probability that a donor decides to punish a violator decreases.

I conceptualize the salience of policy concessions using two dimensions: security and economic ties.

### *3.4.1 Security Ties*

Many scholars place national security at the top of any list of foreign policy goals (c.f. Morgenthau 1951; Waltz 1979; Kennan 1985). It would be too idealistic to assume that human rights concerns can trump national security concerns in making foreign policy. In fact, punishing human rights violators may be counterproductive to security goals. For example, violators may respond to being punished by retaliating in such a way that hurts the donor's national security interests. For example, a recipient may restrict donor access to military bases or air space. In a 1979 lecture on foreign policy and human rights, Morgenthau states:

We have a great interest in continuing the normalization of our relations with mainland China, and for this reason we are not going to hurt her feelings. On the other hand South Korea is an ally of the United States, it is attributed a considerable military importance, and so we are not going to do anything to harm those relations. (Morgenthau 1979: 7).

Another example of the strategic importance of foreign aid lies in Cold War foreign policy. In particular, western donors were concerned that cutting foreign aid could precipitate a fall to communism. For example, the United States used its foreign aid program during the Cold War to prop rightist regimes in the western hemisphere to contain communism (c.f. Carleton & Stohl 1986; Apodaca & Stohl 1999; Regan 1995). In addition, foreign aid often directly or indirectly supported repressive regimes over leftist opposition (Regan 1995). In these cases, cutting aid would have clear negative implications for the donor's strategic interests. Morgenthau's concern – and he is not alone (c.f. Gillies 1996) – is that criticizing or punishing a human rights violator would

very likely harm relations with that country and, in turn, the soured relationships could hurt the strategic or material interests of the donor.

When donors use foreign aid to punish human rights violators, that foreign aid cannot be used to buy important policy concessions. This represents the opportunity cost for using foreign aid as a punishment tool. If a donor has an interest in buying a policy concession from a recipient, then it is unlikely to manipulate its aid policy to punish human rights violations when, instead, it needs to provide aid to buy the policy concession. One way to conceptualize the strategic importance of potential donors is security alignment. Donors are more inclined to buy policy concessions from states with which they are closely aligned than enemies. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009) find that “recipients who are moderately aligned with the donor receive the most aid” (331). If security alignment signifies the presence of important policy concessions, then it follows that close allies are unlikely to be punished for human rights violations because these countries can offer the donor valuable policy concessions. For example, until the mid-1970s, the United States consistently turned a blind eye to rights violations by South American dictators with whom the U.S. was allied.

*Hypothesis 1: Donors are less likely to punish recipients as the strategic alignment between them increase, all else equal.*

### *3.4.2 Economic Ties*

Just as donors will be reluctant to put a strain on ties with an important strategic partner, they will be hesitant to punish a key economic partner. The consequences of punishing an important economic partner are both indirect and direct. As with security relationships, there is a risk that the recipient will retaliate, damaging the donor’s economic interests. Recipients may react by restricting access to markets or to raw

materials. Reduced aid also has indirect costs associated with its effect on the recipient's economy. . Official development assistance affects the terms of trade, allowing capital-poor countries to purchase more capital-intensive goods from capital-rich countries (Milner and Tingley 2009). If the recipient's economy is sufficiently hurt by the suspension or reduction in aid, then the recipient will be less able to engage in trade with the donor country. Direct costs are also possible, as cutting certain types of foreign assistance directly affects firms that initially benefited from tied aid or development projects in the recipient country. Finally, as discussed in the context of security salience, there is an opportunity cost associated with cutting aid. If the donor was using the foreign aid to buy valuable policy concessions - such as access to markets or raw materials - then cutting aid to punish violators may directly affect the donor's ability to obtain the policy concession it sought.

Building economic relationships is often a primary objective of foreign assistance, especially for the so-called "middle powers". According to Gillies (1996), Dutch, Canadian, and Norwegian official development assistance to China was strongly driven by economic interests, "using aid to help domestic firms gain a foothold in an enormous market" (Gillies 1996, 161). Following the Tiananmen Square incident, donors faced the challenge of finding "some middle ground by choosing actions that would convey moral conviction but would not isolate China, damage nurtured relations, or risk reprisal" (Gillies 1996, 168). In fact, Gillies (1996) argues that Norway, the Netherlands, and Canada reacted to China's human rights abuses in the Tiananmen Square incident more than one would expect, given its commercial interests. He argues that the fact each country was not acting alone provided, in a sense, some political cover for taking a stance

against China. At the same time, these countries chose which policy levers to use selectively to minimize the potential damage to domestic interests. This was especially true in Canada's case. Canada chose to shut down some funding projects, but kept the most lucrative ones going. Indeed, Canada was able "to set what seemed like morally principled restrictions on aid and credits, but which actually imposed few real costs on Canadian exporters" (Gillies 1996, 171).

Donors were reluctant to employ assertive policy tools to punish China for its human rights violations largely because of strong commercial ties. In contrast, the Dutch did not depend heavily on their economic ties to Suriname and exerted strong pressure without concern for the commercial costs of such assertive policy. The Dutch also convinced the United States, Canada, Brazil, and Venezuela to suspend aid to Suriname. This was largely a symbolic move because the value of the aid from these donors to Suriname was quite low and, perhaps more importantly, these donors did not have other vested interests in their relationships with Suriname. In comparing their reaction to human rights violations by two former colonies, the Dutch harshly punished Suriname, but refrained from punishing Indonesia, which was an important commercial partner (Gillies 1996).

Based on the above discussion, I expect that if the donor's economy depends heavily on its relationship with the violating state, then the probability that the donor takes a costly action against the violator decreases. I focus on two types of economic ties that could be particularly salient to the donor country. First, I consider the importance of the recipient as an export market for the donor. If the recipient is an important export market for the donor, then there are likely donor stakeholders who would be hurt if that



export market was lost. This creates a cost for the policymakers in the donor country if aid was no longer used to buy that policy concession and access to that market was lost. Similarly, I also look at the amount of oil the recipient exports. As an important commodity, this is another potential policy concession a donor may seek from potential recipients. If the potential recipient is a high oil exporter, then donors may be less willing to punish it for fear of losing access to this important natural resource. The above discussion leads to two hypotheses:

*Hypothesis 2: As the share of exports from a donor to a recipient increases, the donor becomes less likely to punish recipients, all else equal.*

*Hypothesis 3: As the potential recipient's level of petroleum exports increase, donors are less likely to punish the recipient, all else equal.*

### 3.4.3 Other Measures of Salience

With these first three measures of salience - alignment, export share, and recipient oil exports - I attempt to capture the nature of the potential policy concessions. In other words, alignment captures the value of potential strategic policy concessions, and export share and oil exports capture the value of economic policy concessions. Another way to measure salience is to ask what characteristics of recipients increase the potential value of policy concessions. Rather than capturing the nature of policy concessions, either strategic or economic, this approach identifies potentially valuable recipients. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009) argue that donors will place more value on policy concessions from “geographically closer, more populous countries” (324). They also assert that donors will value policy concessions from former colonies more than recipients without these historical ties.

Following the logic I outlined with respect to the strategic and economic salience variables, I would expect donors to be least likely to punish recipients who have the

potential for offering valuable policy concessions. This leads to the following three additional hypotheses:

*Hypothesis 4: As the distance between the donor and recipient increase, the donor becomes more likely to punish the recipient, all else equal.*

*Hypothesis 5: As the recipient's population increases, the donor becomes less likely to punish the recipient, all else equal.*

*Hypothesis 6: Donors are less likely to punish recipients who are former colonies than those who are not, all else equal.*

### **3.5 Applying Pressure: Exploring the Role of Non-Governmental Organizations**

Low opportunity costs to acting are a necessary condition, but not a sufficient condition to explain whether a donor will punish a violator. In this section, I examine the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in creating incentives for donors to punish human rights violators. Given the myriad foreign policy objectives that policymakers face, they need some impetus to pay attention to human rights. By drawing attention to a case of violations, NGOs can apply pressure - either directly or indirectly through constituents - to urge policymakers to take action. In the absence of this mediating factor, I argue that policymakers are unlikely to punish human rights violators.

In the absence of strong economic or security ties, cutting foreign aid is a low cost way for a donor to express moral outrage at human rights violations. Yet the question still remains: what are the incentives for a donor country to express its condemnation for human rights abuses? I argue that if there is substantial public pressure to respond, policy-makers in the donor country may be compelled to act primarily to avoid the negative repercussions of failing to act. Rather than acting only out of concern for the human rights conditions in the violating country, policy-makers act to avoid negative domestic political consequences. This appearance of an altruistic foreign policy has

political benefits for policymakers. Framing foreign policy in moral terms provides “an accessible and easily understood rationale” (Meernik, Kruger, and Poe 1998) for the public to support foreign policy agendas. Forsythe (1990) underscores this point, referencing members of Congress who gained positive publicity through human rights foreign policy: Stephen Solarz and Richard Lugar for their work in the Philippines and Christopher Dodd and Nancy Kassebaum for sponsoring legislation on South Africa and Liberia. That some policymakers may have underlying preferences for a moral foreign policy is not incompatible with these assumptions. The commonly-held assumption that leaders wish to maximize their ability to gain and hold office suggests that leaders may not always act on their personal political preferences, but will act to maintain electability (c.f. Bueno de Mequita et al. 2003). For this reason, leaders who prefer to use foreign policy to promote human rights should behave similarly to those who do not, allowing us to focus on the political incentives these leaders face in determining whether they will use foreign aid as a tool to punish violators.

To capture the potential political benefits for politicians, I look at human rights advocacy efforts. I argue that if there is little or no effort on the part of human rights advocates to draw attention to violations abroad, then leaders are unlikely to receive any benefit from acting on these violations. They would, therefore, be unlikely to take any action against the violating state. This provides a contrast to existing literature, which typically argues that donors respond primarily to changes in the actual human rights conditions in recipient countries. Instead, I argue that NGOs play an important mediating role and that donors are more likely to punish violators when NGOs pay significant attention to the violations. If human rights advocates are successful in drawing attention

to a case of violations abroad, then leaders may perceive a benefit to acting. NGOs matter because the presence of publicity gives governments an incentive to do something about human rights violations.

Unlike policymakers who must respond to a range of demands, NGOs focus on a narrow set of concerns, giving them leverage on certain policy issues. As Ann Marie Clark points out, NGOs “have become skilled at mounting such pressure by feeding information into pertinent public and governmental channels” (Clark 1995, 509). In the 1970s, Amnesty International and other NGOs took the lead on fact-finding missions to document the emerging trend of “disappearances” in Argentina. The United States, along with France and Sweden, used the information gathered by the NGOs to base decisions to denounce Argentinean abuses and cut aid (Sikkink 1993a). On the other hand, NGOs did not investigate and document abuses in Mexico in the late 1960s, which meant that other governments did not have credible information or pressure from NGOs to act (Sikkink 1993a). International non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and transnational actors also played an important role in the abolition of slavery in the United States (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Keck and Sikkink (1998) argue that the pressure applied by human rights NGOs is largely responsible for the development of human rights policies. For example, Amnesty International was heavily involved in the human rights advisory committees set up by European governments in the 1990s (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Advocacy groups “provide access, leverage, and information” and “convince international human rights organizations, donor institutions, and/or great powers to pressure norm-violating states” (Risse & Sikkink 1999, 18).<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> It is important to note that Amnesty International’s formal policy prohibits the organization from requesting that a donor suspends aid as a punishment for human rights violations. Its internal sanctions

In sum, I argue that leaders respond to human rights advocacy efforts to avoid domestic political costs that these advocates would impose on leaders that fail to act in the face of violations. The assumption I make is that leaders who defend human rights abroad will be heralded by these advocates and should, all else equal, receive a benefit from this publicity. This argument does not necessarily depend on a strong pro-human rights constituency in these states, nor is it necessarily only relevant to democratic states. The assertion that, all else equal, a pro-human rights foreign policy would benefit leaders is relatively benign. Simply put, I assume that absent other constraints and costs, people would like other people to be treated well. As Goldsmith and Posner succinctly state, “people in states care about people in other states, and sometimes, especially in democracies where voter preferences matter, these cares influence government action” (Goldsmith and Posner 2005, 109). Further, official development assistance is not a foreign policy tool that is very visible to the average citizen. If a government wants to claim that it is “doing something” about human rights abuses, it can point to cuts in aid. Yet, it is not likely to resort to this tactic unless it is under pressure to “do something”, or what Baehr and Castermans-Holleman (2004) refer to as the “mobilization of shame”.<sup>10</sup> Western, civilized governments do not want to appear complacent with human rights violators; policymakers, therefore, are more likely to act when violations have been

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policy is summarized as: “*AI takes no stand on the legitimacy of military, economic or cultural relations being maintained with countries where human rights are violated, unless AI can show that such relations can be reasonably assumed to contribute to human rights violations*” (Susan Waltz, personal communication, August 16, 2010). Although Amnesty does not directly recommend using aid to sanction human rights violators, it is in the donor’s discretion to apply (or not apply) pressure as it sees fit.

<sup>10</sup> A question that plagues the literature on foreign aid and human rights - and likely policymakers addressing the issue - is whether cutting aid might lead to a deterioration of human rights. The actual effects of foreign aid on human rights is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Yet, what is relevant to the current research is if policymakers believe that cutting aid could be deleterious to conditions, then they may increase aid in response to violations rather than cut aid. Ultimately, this is an empirical question. If I do not find that donors cut aid in response to violations, this may be an alternative explanation to be explored in future research.

publicized to avoid the appearance of complicity. The Netherlands reacted to Suriname abuses, in part, out of a “moral desire to avoid complicity” (Gillies 1996, 69).

Policymakers “are more likely to be persuaded to act on behalf of human rights, in the face of media attention or the threat of it” (Baehr and Castermans-Holleman 2004, 120). Absent this attention, the “mobilization of shame” is not activated, leaving policymakers little political incentives to act to punish violators.

Unlike previous literature, I argue that consideration of the level of human rights violations themselves are secondary in donor decisions to punish. Instead, I hypothesize that donors pay attention to NGO mobilization and act when policymakers believe that failing to act would be politically damaging. This desire to avoid complicity drives decisions to respond to human rights violations more than the actual human rights violations.<sup>11</sup> The relationship between the severity of rights abuses and NGO mobilization provides enough separation to test this claim. Although the actual human rights conditions are one significant determinant of Amnesty International activity, they are not the only factor influencing mobilization. Ron, Ramos, and Rodgers (2005) find that Amnesty International pays more attention to abuses by powerful states. NGOs act to capitalize on “windows of opportunity” and increase their own visibility (Ron, Ramos, and Rodgers 2005). By focusing on abuses by powerful countries, Amnesty International and other NGOs may be able to build more momentum and make a bigger difference (Ron, Ramos, and Rodgers 2005).

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<sup>11</sup> For this reason, I am also not concerned here with the effectiveness of using foreign aid as a tool to punish human rights violators. I would suggest that donors do not necessarily pick the most effective tool, but rather the least costly tool to demonstrate their moral outrage. Of course, the effectiveness of foreign policy tools for influencing human rights is an interesting topic of its own; but it is beyond the scope of this dissertation.

Further, I argue that there is an interactive relationship between NGO mobilization and the salience of policy concessions. When donors value policy concessions the recipient can provide, it is unlikely that donors will punish violators even if they are the focus of NGO mobilization. In this case, the opportunity cost of losing the policy concession outweighs any benefit the policymaker might earn by punishing a human rights violator. As I discussed in the previous section, the opportunity cost of punishing recipients increases as the salience of the policy concessions increase. I expect, therefore, that donors will be most likely to punish recipients who do not have valuable policy concessions to offer. At the same time, this is a necessary but not sufficient condition. The presence of NGO pressure provides donor policymakers with an incentive to act. From the preceding discussion, I derive a new hypothesis and rephrase the existing hypotheses to reflect the interactive nature of the explanation:

*Mediation Hypothesis: The direct effect of human rights is mediated by NGO pressure.*

*Hypothesis 1: Recipients are more likely to get punished as NGO pressure increases, but this relationship becomes less pronounced as the strategic importance of the recipient to the donor increases.*

*Hypothesis 2: Recipients are more likely to get punished as NGO pressure increases, but this relationship becomes less pronounced as the share of exports from the donor to recipient increases.*

*Hypothesis 3: Recipients are more likely to get punished as NGO pressure increases, but this relationship becomes less pronounced as the recipient's petroleum exports increase.*

*Hypothesis 4: Recipients are more likely to get punished as NGO pressure increases, but this relationship becomes less pronounced as the distance between the donor and recipient decreases.*

*Hypothesis 5: Recipients are more likely to get punished as NGO pressure increases, but this relationship becomes less pronounced as the recipient's population decreases.*

*Hypothesis 6: Recipients are more likely to get punished as NGO pressure increases, but this relationship is less pronounced if the recipient is a former colony of the donor.*

The *Mediation Hypothesis* reflects my argument that NGO activity is a critical link in the causal process connecting human rights conditions in the recipient country and donor decision-making with respect to foreign aid. The remaining hypotheses illustrate the interactive nature of my explanation. As I argued, when policy concessions are salient to the donor, the opportunity cost of punishing recipients increases. Each hypothesis corresponds to a different operationalization of the salience of the policy concession. The interactive hypothesis captures my argument that donors will use foreign aid to punish violators when it is a low cost way to express moral outrage.

### ***3.6 Promoting Human Rights as a Public Good: The Role of Political Institutions***

Hafner-Burton (2009) argues that ignoring the political institutional context of foreign policy making neglects the important process by which preferences are translated into policy. She points out that although policy-makers may have a given set of policy preferences – either their own inherent preferences or preferences derived from interest group pressure – the structure of the political institutions in that country determines how these preferences are aggregated and translated into policy. I focus on how certain electoral structures are more likely to incentivize concern for human rights and, by extension, vulnerability to NGO pressures to respond to human rights violations. Policies to promote and protect human rights abroad fall in the category of public goods - these policies are non-rivalrous and non-excludable. Additionally, unlike many other issues, there are not specific geographical implications to promoting and protecting human rights abroad. For example, trade policy often has geographically-specific constituents (e.g. the



steel belt in the United States has strong preferences for raising tariffs to restrict the import of steel from other countries). It is not clear, on the other hand, that a concern for human rights would have geographically-specific constituencies. I would expect, therefore, that political institutional structures that encourage the promotion of national, public goods interests over narrow, regional interests would be more likely to punish human rights violators.

Before discussing the institutional incentives for policymakers to pay attention to human rights abroad, it is important to provide some rationale for why I expect constituents to care about human rights abroad. Here, I apply Inglehart's theory of postmaterialism to explain why constituents in particular countries - notably post-industrial societies - are likely to care about the human rights conditions of people in other countries. In a post-industrial society, individuals have high levels of existential security, relieving them of an immediate concern of survival. Once this threat has been removed, individuals can "focus on problems that are not of an immediate concern to themselves" (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 33). In particular, individuals in post-industrial societies value freedom and autonomy. Inglehart and Welzel "argue that self-expression values are not *egocentric* but *humanistic*: they emphasize not only autonomy for oneself, but for *others* as well, motivating movements for the rights of children, women, gays and lesbians, handicapped people, and ethnic minorities and such universal goals as environmental protection and ecological sustainability" (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 12). Although they only briefly mention human rights, Inglehart and Welzel do extend their concept of "self-expression" values to caring about others in general and human rights in particular (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). I expect, therefore, that concern for human rights

is a self-expression value and will be prevalent in post-industrial societies. Survey results in post-industrial countries support this assumption.<sup>12</sup>

The Council on Foreign Relations 2006 survey finds that 86% of Americans believe that promoting and defending human rights abroad should be at least a “somewhat important” goal of US foreign policy while only 28% believe it is “very important” (Council on Foreign Relations 2006)<sup>13</sup>. Not surprisingly, this concern consistently ranks behind other foreign policy goals, such as protecting American jobs and maintaining a strong military (McFarland and Mathews 2005). The January 1996 *Eurobarometer* survey found that between 73 and 88% of respondents in European Union countries believed that “promoting the defence of human rights” should be a “key priority” for the European Union (Eurobarometer). In a November 2001 survey, European respondents said that it was important that prospective EU members respect human rights and the principles of democracy (Eurobarometer). This pattern extends to other OECD members. A 2005 survey in Australia found that 85% of respondents think “promoting human rights abroad” is an important or very important foreign policy objective (Cook 2005). In 1994, 60% of Japanese respondents said that Japan “should help promote human rights in the Asia-Pacific region” (United States Information Agency 1994). These public opinion findings support the assumption that, in many countries, voters think promoting human rights abroad is an important foreign policy

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<sup>12</sup> Unfortunately, I cannot compare the results from post-industrial to industrial societies because questions about the promotion of human rights abroad were only asked in post-industrial countries. Surveys from Afrobarometer, Arab Barometer, and Asian Barometer did not ask respondents about human rights as a foreign policy goal. In the Latin American Barometer the question was only asked in reference to shared priorities with the United States. The fact that surveys in these regions do not ask this question may support the point that the promotion of human rights is not on the foreign policy agenda in these countries.

<sup>13</sup> Taking the average response in polls between 1974 and 2002, 42% Americans ranked promoting and defending human rights as “very important” and 22% as “somewhat important” (McFarland and Mathews 2005).

objective, although they tend to prioritize it lower than traditional economic and security goals. Cingranelli and Filippov (2010) argue that “as long as human rights are a concern for most voters but a lesser concern than some other issue... politicians elected in single-member districts would be expected to do less to protect human rights than politicians elected under proportional representation” (246). Although they seek to explain electoral incentives to protect human rights domestically, I would argue that we can apply this logic to promoting human rights abroad. These public opinion survey results cited above support the contention that human rights fit the pattern Cingranelli and Filippov describe, namely that voters care about human rights but not above other issues.

Following Cingranelli and Filippov (2010), I consider the policymaking incentives produced by electoral rules. Scholars, building on the framework provided by Duverger’s Law, note that “majoritarian rule favors local public good provisions over national public good provisions whereas under the proportional rule it is the opposite” (Rausser and Roland 2009, 13). Specifically, electoral permissiveness - often measured as district magnitude - matters. Electoral permissiveness determines whether the candidates internalize votes in non-marginal districts. In majoritarian - or single member district plurality (SMDP) - systems, the margin of victory is irrelevant; once a candidate receives more than 50% of the votes, the remaining votes are inconsequential. In terms of the trade-off between public goods and redistributive transfers, this incentivizes policy-makers in SMDP electoral systems to focus policies on the median voter in the median district, since winning there tips the scales in his favor. Redistributive transfers are an efficient way to target these voters. As Rausser and Roland (2009) argue: “...proposing local public goods targeted to the pivotal voter in the pivotal district is

electorally “cheaper” than proposing national public goods” (13).

On the other hand, in proportional representation (PR) systems with high district magnitudes, the margin of victory matters. Emphasizing redistributive policies in high district magnitude systems, therefore, comes at a higher cost. Although there is still an incentive to offer redistributive policies to swing voters, the level of redistributive transfers depends on the size of the swing group since giving more to one group means there is less revenue available for public goods for the remaining voters (Persson and Tabellini 1999). “This is because, in order for transfers to be a profitable strategy against the public good, a majority of the voters must receive transfers that exceed the value of the public good; the resource constraint then dictates that the remaining voters receive correspondingly lower transfers” (Lizzeri and Persico 2001, 234). Further, in a proportional system, “[s]ince national public goods have many externalities, they may deliver more utility per voter per unit of tax revenue.” (Rausser and Roland 2009, 13). All else equal, then, majoritarian systems are expected to provide a lower supply of public goods than proportional representation systems (Persson and Tabellini 1999; Lizzeri and Persico 2001). By the logic presented here, if we accept that promoting human rights abroad is a public good, then states with permissive electoral rules should be more likely to provide this public good.<sup>14</sup>

In addition, many scholars note that proportional representation systems allow for greater representation of diverse interests, because smaller parties can win seats and participate in government coalitions by representing these “niche” interests. In contrast, in SMDP systems where only the candidate with the highest number of votes wins a seat,

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<sup>14</sup> For example, the Netherlands is characterized by its high electoral permissiveness and one of its political parties, D66, includes the promotion of democracy and human rights abroad in its 2006 election platform. [http://www.d66.nl/d66nl/item/d66\\_internationaal](http://www.d66.nl/d66nl/item/d66_internationaal)

these small parties would not be able to win seats and influence policy (c.f. Bawn and Rosenbluth 2006). The relevance of human rights promotion as a national foreign policy goal is, I would argue, likely to be greater in multi-party systems where “niche” interests are more likely to be represented. Meguid (2005) defines niche parties as those that “reject the traditional class-based orientation of politics” and “often do not coincide with existing lines of political division” (347-348). Even when they fail to gain seats in the national legislature, these parties influence the agendas of mainstream parties by introducing issues and forcing mainstream parties to respond (Meguid 2005). The two most common types of niche parties are Green and radical right. Green parties have, in some instances, adopted the promotion of human rights abroad as a platform issue. The Green Party of the UK, for example, has a “human rights spokesperson” and includes multiple mentions of human rights in its platform.<sup>15</sup> The foreign policy section of the Canadian Green Party also discusses the importance of protecting human rights.<sup>16</sup> The Green Party of the United States similarly advocates for the protection of human rights abroad.<sup>17</sup> Aside from being a part of Green Party platforms, the defense of human rights is also a key point of the Dutch D66 party mission and platform.<sup>18</sup>

Based on the above discussion, I hypothesize that as electoral rules become more permissive, policymakers are more likely to punish human rights violators.

*Hypothesis 7: Recipients are more likely to get punished as NGO pressure increases, and this relationship becomes more pronounced as the donor’s district magnitude increases.*

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<sup>15</sup> <http://policy.greenparty.org.uk/mfss/mfssip.html>;  
[http://www.greenparty.org.uk/assets/files/EU\\_Manifesto\\_2009.pdf](http://www.greenparty.org.uk/assets/files/EU_Manifesto_2009.pdf)

<sup>16</sup> <http://greenparty.ca/group/foreign-policy/intro>

<sup>17</sup> <http://www.gp.org/platform/2000/index.html>

<sup>18</sup> [http://www.d66.nl/d66nl/item/d66\\_internationaal](http://www.d66.nl/d66nl/item/d66_internationaal)

### **3.7 Conclusion**

A few scholars (Barratt 2007; Gillies 1996) argue that the inconsistent application of human rights conditionality to foreign aid is largely explained by commercial and security interests. These two key pieces of literature also suggest that domestic and NGO pressures to act matter, however neither scholar examines the relationship between costs – in commercial and security terms – and benefits in a systematic way. To advance this literature, I develop an argument that integrates the potential costs of punishing human rights violators with a discussion of a source of benefit. In particular, I acknowledge, as Barratt and Gillies do, that donors fear the negative consequences of punishing violators. These costs, be they direct or indirect, may damage donor commercial or security interests. I argue that as the donor's dependence on these relationships increases, the less likely it will be to punish a violator because the opportunity cost increases. The hypotheses, presented in Table 3-1, illustrate particular economic and strategic relationships that I expect to matter. Specifically, recipients that account for significant trade with the donor or are a source of natural resources are less likely to face punishment due to the economic costs the donor may suffer. On the security side, military alliances are the key dimension along which I expect donors to measure the potential costs of punishing a violator. I also consider characteristics of the recipients that increase the value donors place on the policy concessions. Regardless of the nature of the concession - economic or strategic - Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009) argue that donors will simply value the concessions more when they are from geographically proximate countries, more populous countries, or former colonies.

Low costs may be a necessary condition for donors to punish recipients; they are not, however, a sufficient condition. I argue that we also need a systematic explanation

of the potential benefits that donors perceive for punishing human rights violators. In other words, why would policymakers in a donor country, even in absence of high costs, decide to reduce or eliminate foreign aid to a recipient who is violating the human rights of its citizens? Unlike potential economic and strategic costs, the possible benefits to policymakers are intangible and difficult to conceptualize. When donors punish human rights violators, they do so primarily to avoid complicity with violators and to present at least the impression of a moral foreign policy. The need to avoid complicity increases with the salience of the violations. Violations that are relatively unknown to the donor public are unlikely to create enough of a moral desire to act. I argue, therefore, that as NGO activity pertaining to a set of violations increases, donors are more likely to act.

**Table 3-1: Main Hypotheses**

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Mediation Hypothesis: The direct effect of human rights is mediated by NGO pressure.

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Hypothesis 1: Recipients are more likely to get punished as NGO pressure increases, but this relationship becomes less pronounced as the strategic importance of the recipient to the donor increases.

Hypothesis 2: Recipients are more likely to get punished as NGO pressure increases, but this relationship becomes less pronounced as the share of exports from the donor to recipient increases.

Hypothesis 3: Recipients are more likely to get punished as NGO pressure increases, but this relationship becomes less pronounced as the recipient's petroleum exports increase.

Hypothesis 4: Recipients are more likely to get punished as NGO pressure increases, but this relationship becomes less pronounced as the distance between the donor and recipient decreases.

Hypothesis 5: Recipients are more likely to get punished as NGO pressure increases, but this relationship becomes less pronounced as the recipient's population decreases.

Hypothesis 6: Recipients are more likely to get punished as NGO pressure increases, but this relationship is less pronounced if the recipient is a former colony of the donor.

Hypothesis 7: Recipients are more likely to get punished as NGO pressure increases, and this relationship becomes more pronounced as the donor's district magnitude increases.

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As discussed above, I diverge from the existing literature in the level of importance I place on NGO activity. More specifically, I argue that, *ceteris paribus*,

NGO publicity acts a mediating variable through which human rights conditions influence foreign aid decision-making. I argue that policymakers are responding more to the publicity of violations than to the violations themselves. Additionally, I argue that this mediating effect depends on the salience of the policy concession. At high levels of salience, donors are unlikely to risk losing the policy concession to punish recipients even under significant NGO pressure. Further, I present an argument that political institutions play a modifying role. Donors with more permissive electoral rules are more likely to respond to NGO mobilization for two reasons. First, in these countries, legislators prioritize national public goods over regional ones. Second, proportional representation systems encourage multi-party systems. In contrast to a two-party system produced by majoritarian electoral rules, multi-party systems leave room for different policy issues to have national salience through the role of niche parties.



## **Chapter 4**

### **Research Design**

In this chapter, I will discuss the research methods I use to test the hypotheses I presented in the previous chapter. The trend in the foreign aid literature is to divide foreign aid decisions into two stages: the gate-keeping stage when donors decide whether to give aid to a potential recipient and the allocation stage when donors decide how much aid to give to recipients that pass the first stage (c.f. Neumayer 2003; Apodaca and Stohl 1999). Chapter 5 will examine the former, while Chapter 6 will explore the allocation stage. This chapter will proceed as follows. First, I will discuss the variables I use in the models. Second, I will present the models tested in the following chapters, as well as discuss the methods used.

#### ***4.1 Variables***

##### ***4.1.1 Dependent Variable***

I first ask the question whether donors punish human rights violators by withholding aid in a given period. I use the data collected by Bueno de Mesquita and Smith from the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) official development assistance records (2009). For the analyses in Chapter 5, I use a variable, *AnyAid*, which captures whether the donor gave any aid to the recipient in a given year. This is a dichotomous variable, coded as a 1 if a recipient received aid and a 0 otherwise. In 67% of the nearly 50,000 dyad-year observations in the dataset, the recipient receives aid.

In Chapter 6, I will explore donor decision-making at the allocation stage. The existing literature approaches this question primarily using two dependent variables. Most scholars (c.f. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009; Gates and Hoeffler 2004; Barratt 2008; Carleton and Stohl 1986) simply use total aid, or the natural log of total aid. Neumayer (2003) uses aid to a recipient as a share of total aid from the donor. I agree with Neumayer (2003) that: “[s]uch a dependent variable probably represents the actual decision-making process best. There is a fixed aid allocation budget that decides which recipient country receives how big a share of the total cake, if anything” (107). Since my explanation and hypotheses center on the donor decision-making process, it makes the most sense to use a dependent variable that captures the constraints on the donor (budget for foreign aid) and the subsequent decision to grant a share of that aid to a particular recipient.<sup>19</sup> I calculate the dependent variable by finding the total aid given by each donor and then, for each dyad, I divide aid from donor to recipient over total donor aid. In its original form, this variable is highly skewed. The mean value of the share of total donor aid a particular recipient receives is 0.01 (in other words, the average recipient receives 1% of the donor’s total aid), while the median is 0.002. To account for the skewedness of this variable, I use the natural log of the share of aid as my dependent variable in Chapter 6.

#### *4.1.2 Independent Variables: Human Rights*

The first key independent variable of interest reflects the human rights conditions in the recipient state. I use the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset to capture recipients’ human rights records. The CIRI database includes measures of

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<sup>19</sup> I also test for robustness using the natural log of total aid as the dependent variable.

government practice on 13 internationally recognized human rights in 195 countries over 25 years, 1981-2006. This data has the advantage of being comprehensive in its coverage of human rights practice, as it uses both the United States Department of State *Country Reports on Human Rights* and Amnesty International's reports to code violations. In this analysis, I will focus on physical integrity rights, which include forced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, political imprisonment, and torture. I focus on physical integrity rights because - although many human rights scholars avoid assigning a hierarchy to human rights - there are certain rights that are deemed "non-derogable" and cannot be violated even in a state of emergency (c.f. Baehr and Castermans-Holleman , 2004, 8).

For each component of physical integrity rights, the CIRI data codes frequent violations of a given human right in a given year as a "0", occasional violations as a "1", and no violations as a "2". The physical integrity rights measure aggregates the four component scores, resulting in scores ranging from "0" (frequent violators of all four rights) to "8" (no violations in any of the four categories). For ease of discourse, however, I invert this scale. Since I am interested in how donors respond to human rights violations, it is more intuitive to operationalize "frequent" violations as an "8" and no violations as a "0". I use the physical integrity score as my human rights variable, *HR*. The average human rights score is 3.67, with a standard deviation of 2.3. I also create one-year lag of the *HR* variable. In making aid allocation decisions for year  $t$ , donors would be looking at human rights conditions from  $t-1$  at the most recent.

#### *4.1.3 Independent Variables: Value of Policy Concessions*

I hypothesized in the previous chapter that the economic importance of the recipient to the donor matters. First, I consider how valuable the recipient is as an export

market for the donor.<sup>20</sup> As the value of the export relationship to the donor increases, I expect the donor to be less likely to punish a recipient who violates human rights.<sup>21</sup> I draw on the Gleditsch (2002) trade data to construct a variable to capture the importance of the recipient as an export market for the donor. I calculate the total exports from each donor. Then, for each observation, I divide the export from donor  $i$  to recipient  $j$ . The mean value of the share of total donor exports to recipient  $i$  is 0.004, meaning that 0.4% of a donor's exports goes to the recipient. The median value is 0.0003, showing a skewed distribution. I create a variable, *export share*, which is the natural log of value of the donor exports to the recipient divided by total donor exports.<sup>22</sup> I expect that as this value increases, the likelihood of punishing a violating recipient would decrease.

The second measure of economic salience is the potential recipient's level of petroleum exports. Using data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration, I created a variable of the total amount of refined petroleum products the recipient exported in a given year.<sup>23</sup> This variable is measured in thousand barrels per day. Not surprisingly, this variable has a highly skewed distribution, with a mean of 53 (standard

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<sup>20</sup> I focus on export market importance here because looking at trade total risks confounding protectionist sentiments with concern over human rights. In other words, if the recipient provides a significant amount of imports into the donor country, there may be protectionist pressures to limit those imports. Therefore, reducing aid wouldn't be considered a net cost in this case.

<sup>21</sup> Another potential measure of economic importance is the level of imports from recipient to donor. Similar to Hafner-Burton's (2009) argument about business interests favoring preferential trade agreements for economic rather than moral reasons, import-competing industries in the donor may push policymakers to punish human rights violators for protectionist reasons. I save this argument for future research.

<sup>22</sup> I first add 1 to every value, to eliminate any  $\ln(0)$ , since there are some dyads with zero donor exports to the recipient.

<sup>23</sup> At this point, I only measure total oil exports of the recipient, rather than exports from a particular recipient to each individual donor. Conceptually, this assumes that if a recipient has oil, the donor has an interest in maintaining good relations and access to that oil even if they are not actively buying from that recipient at that time. Specific dyadic petroleum data is not readily available.

deviation is 166) and median of 0.489 thousand barrels per day. I take the natural log and create the variable *oil*.<sup>24</sup>

In addition to economic value, I hypothesize that the salience of strategic policy concessions modifies donor's responses to human rights violations. The simplest way to capture strategic importance is by measuring the donor-recipient alignment (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009). I use Kendall's global tau b score as a measure of security closeness between donor and recipient and name this variable, *alignment*. This variable can range from -1 to +1, but in this dataset the actual range is -0.36 to 1. To create an easy to interpret elasticity, I convert this variable to the natural log. To be able to calculate the natural log of this variable, I do a monotonic transformation, adding 1 so that all values are positive.<sup>25</sup> Then I take the natural log.

In addition to these three variables measuring the salience of policy concessions, I will also include Bueno de Mesquita and Smith's measures of the potential value of policy concessions. They argue that donors will value policy concessions more from closer and more populous recipients, as well as former colonies. If the policy concessions from these recipients are valued more, then I would expect donors to be less likely to punish these recipients. Using their data, I will use the natural log of the distance (in miles) between the capital cities of each donor and potential recipient, *distance*, and the natural log of the recipient's population, *population*. Finally, the *colony* variable is coded as a 1 if the recipient was a former colony of the donor and 0 otherwise.

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<sup>24</sup> I also add 1 to every value to eliminate zeros.

<sup>25</sup> Because the actual range is -0.36 to 1, I do not encounter a problem with taking the natural log of 0. The results are substantively the same with the unlogged tau, but using the natural log allows for an ease in interpretation since the dependent variable, share of aid, is also logged.

#### *4.1.4 Independent Variables: NGO Pressure*

Next, I operationalize the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Ron, Ramos, and Rodgers (2005) count the total number of Amnesty International (AI) news releases on a given country in a given year from 1986-2000. One significant drawback to this variable is that it measures the activities of only one NGO. Also, it does not consider the activities of AI in a specific donor country, but the overall efforts of the international secretariat. In other words, if Amnesty targets messages to one particular donor, this variable does not capture this differentiation. Despite these important disadvantages, Ron, Ramos, and Rodgers's data provides a useful starting point in examining the mediating role of NGOs. Amnesty International is the largest NGO dedicated to human rights and has a reputation for being a reliable and trustworthy source of information (Ron, Ramos, and Rodgers 2005). I generate a measure of NGO pressure using Ron, Ramos, and Rodgers (2005) data. The data on Amnesty news releases is highly skewed. It ranges from 0 to 50, but 70% of cases have no news releases. I therefore transform this variable into its natural log, after a monotonic transformation where I add one to eliminate the zero. I take the natural log of the total of news releases put out by AI in a given year as a continuous variable, *AINR*.<sup>26</sup>

#### *4.1.5 Independent Variables: Electoral Permissiveness*

The best existing measure of electoral permissiveness is district magnitude. As district magnitude increases, the electoral permissiveness of the system increases (Cox 1997). I use Johnson and Wallack's (2007) measure of the average district magnitude of

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<sup>26</sup> There is an endogeneity concern with the use of AI data; Ron, Ramos, and Rodgers (2005) and Ron, Ramos, and Thoms (2007) test whether Amnesty is more likely to issue releases on violators that receive foreign aid. They do not find any support for this hypothesis, which suggests that receiving foreign aid does not increase the likelihood that AI issues a release on a violator.

the donor's lower house.<sup>27</sup> This variable ranges from zero (single member district plurality systems) to 150 (Netherlands single country-wide district); the mean is 14 and median is 7. I take the natural log of the district magnitude variable "to capture the intuition that the marginal effect of district magnitude is smaller as district magnitude increases" (Clark and Golder 2006, 689).

#### *4.1.6 Control Variables*

It is important to control for recipient regime type for a number of reasons. There are two theoretical explanations for the link between recipient regime type and foreign aid. First, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009) hypothesize that donors will be more likely to give aid to recipients with small winning coalitions, since these leaders can pay their small winning coalitions to support unpopular policy concessions. In addition, there is evidence that donors pay attention to the political institutions in recipient countries and punish non-democratic outcomes - such as political terror and election fraud - by withdrawing aid (Boulding and Hyde n.d.). Additionally, there is a long-standing literature linking regime type to a country's human rights conditions (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Henderson 1991). Excluding a measure of regime type could lead to omitted variable bias, since it is likely correlated with both the dependent variable of aid and the independent variable of human rights. I, therefore control for recipient's democracy, using Bueno de Mesquita et al.'s (2003) measure for winning coalition, which ranges from 0 to 1.

Existing literature on foreign aid often considers whether aid has a poverty reduction goal, or if aid is simply used to promote donor interests. At the same time, it is

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<sup>27</sup> I use the Particularism dataset (Johnson and Wallack 2007) because it includes countries outside of Western Europe, unlike Matt Golder's dataset.

often argued that poor countries may lack the capacity to have strong human rights records (Poe and Tate 1994; Henderson 1991). Including recipient need as a control variable is important both to address the debate in the literature on whether needy countries get more aid and to avoid potential omitted variable bias. To capture recipient need, I control for the logged GDP/capita of the recipient (Penn World Tables). Recipient income is the best available proxy for need; it has wide availability and is highly correlated with other potential measures of need, such as life expectancy (Neumayer 2003). If needier recipients do, in fact, get more aid, this variable should capture that effect.

I also control for donor wealth, using GDP per capita data from the Penn World Tables. My research question focuses on the decision-making process of the donor country. For this reason, it is important to account for donor wealth as a component of this decision-making. All else equal, one would expect wealthier donors to give more aid. Finally, donors often favor particular recipients in foreign aid policy. First, donors favor former colonies (Alesina & Dollar 2000); therefore, I include a *colony* control variable. Finally, I control for Egypt and Israel, as aid to these countries is determined by their unique geopolitical importance, particularly to the United States (Alesina & Dollar 2000).<sup>28</sup>

All independent variables, except for colony, distance, and donor wealth, are lagged 1 year to account for the information that policy-makers would have available when making foreign aid decisions.

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<sup>28</sup> Bueno de Mesquita and Smith's (2009) dataset included these control variables.



## ***4.2 Statistical Methods***

### ***4.2.1 Gate-keeping Stage***

The structure of the data, as time-series cross-section (TSCS), presents statistical challenges because panel heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation and contemporaneous correlation are all likely. For the gate-keeping models, the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable adds to this challenge by rendering many fixes to the TSCS involving Ordinary Least Squares Regression inappropriate. Following the advice of Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998), I include temporal variables - in this case temporal spline and previous “failure” variables - to account for the temporal dependence, after diagnostic tests indicate that the data are strongly temporally dependent. Previous literature (c.f. Barratt 2008; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009) fails to account for this temporal dependence at the gate-keeping stage and this could have strong implications for their findings, producing inefficient estimates.<sup>29</sup> Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) conclude their article by saying that:

Temporal dependence in BTSCS [binary time-series cross-section] models is not a minor problem that can be ignored at the cost of a small error. And there is no reason to commit these errors. The inclusion of temporal variables in the specification is a simple solution, available to all researchers, providing a low cost cure to the problem of temporally dependent BTSCS data (1284).

The inclusion of the temporal variables captures the logical assumption that whether a recipient receives aid in one period depends on whether it received aid in another period. The log-likelihood test of the restricted model - without the temporal variables - and the full model confirm that there is strong temporal dependence. I use Tucker’s STATA add-on file to create natural cubic splines, which are included to model the temporal

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<sup>29</sup> Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) show that failing to account for temporal dependence can be very consequential. They re-assess Oneal and Russett’s (1997) findings regarding the liberal peace and, although the re-analysis supports the findings with respect to regime type and peace, they do not hold for the relationship between trade and peace.

dependence.<sup>30</sup> To mitigate the problems associated with panel heteroskedasticity, I will use Huber-White standard errors (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998).

The nature of my dataset presents a few additional challenges in applying Beck, Katz, and Tucker's solution. First, repeated events are common. In other words, most recipients receive aid in multiple years. The temporal variable approach assumes that second and subsequent events are independent, an assumption that is unlikely to hold in my data. They propose a simple solution of including a variable that is simply a count of the number of previous events. I include a variable that measures previous "failures," which counts the number of previous years the recipient received aid from that donor. The second potential problem is left-censoring. If all dyads were equally left-censored, then the approach is appropriate (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998); that is not the case, however, for my data. Especially with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, there are a number of recipients that enter the sample in 1991. It would be inappropriate to count the years prior to entering the sample as years in which the country did not receive aid. For countries that enter the sample mid-way, the spell-identification variable begins with the year the country enters the sample rather than the beginning of the sample. For example, after re-gaining its independence in 1991, Latvia enters the sample. Therefore the first year of its "spell" will be 1991 rather than 1981.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) note that temporal dummy variables that "mark the number of periods (usually years) since the start of the sample period or the previous occurrence of an "event" (such as war)" (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998, 1261) are another correction for temporal dependence in logit & probit models. They have a preference for splines because one can get a smooth baseline hazard function and use fewer degrees of freedom than the temporal dummy variable approach.

<sup>31</sup> Of the nearly 160 potential recipients in the sample, 28 of them enter after 1982.

#### 4.2.2 Allocation Stage

Potential heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation and contemporaneous correlation as equally problematic in the case of the allocation models, which have a continuous dependent variable. Following much of the literature (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009;), I correct for these problems using a lagged dependent variable, as well as donor fixed effects.<sup>32</sup> In addition to correcting for serial autocorrelation, the lagged dependent variable represents the idea that foreign aid giving is “sticky” - without a significant change, foreign aid from one period should largely determine foreign aid in the next. I use donor fixed effects because my explanation and hypotheses focus on donor decision-making. I also test for robustness using ordinary least squared regression and robust standard errors, without the donor fixed effects.<sup>33</sup>

#### 4.3 Models: The Mediation Effect of NGO Pressure

In the models that follow, I conduct two separate analyses using each of the salience variables interacted with my measure of NGO pressure, Amnesty news releases. The two models serve to test the hypothesis that NGO pressure is a mediating variable and whether its mediation effect is modified by the salience of the policy concession.<sup>34</sup> Figure 4-1 diagrams the mediating effect of NGO attention on whether the donor punishes the violator. In Figure 4-1, the path labeled “c” represents the direct effect of human rights on foreign aid. The conditional indirect effect of human rights on foreign

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<sup>32</sup> In fact, many scholars do not correct for both problems, sometimes including only a lagged dependent and sometimes offering no corrections for the problems presented by TSCS data (c.f. Gates and Hoeffler 2004; Barratt 2008)


<sup>33</sup> Ideally, I would use Beck and Katz’s (1995) panel-corrected-standard-errors to correct for these problems. Unfortunately, due to the severely unbalanced panels and size of my dataset, I was not able to use this procedure. Due to countries entering and leaving the sample (e.g. the dissolution of the Soviet Union), the dataset has unbalanced panels. I was, therefore, unable to use the casewise PCSE estimation. And, the computing power required for pairwise PCSE prohibited this technique.

<sup>34</sup> In the experimental psychology literature, this is referred to as “moderated mediation” or sometimes “conditional indirect effect” (c.f. Muller, Judd, & Yzerbyt 2005). These tests ask “is there a mediated effect” and “is the mediated effect different at different levels of the modifying variable”?

aid is the effect that is mediated by NGO attention, which is moderated by salience.<sup>35</sup>

The causal process I am testing is: first, a potential recipient violates human rights and then, in some cases, will be subject to NGO attention. If the value of the policy concessions the donor seeks is low, then I expect donors to respond to the NGO pressure by either withholding aid or reducing aid.

**Figure 4-1: The Mediating Effect of NGO Pressure, Modified by Salience**



Testing for mediation is a multi-step process. First, I estimate each model without the mediating (AINR) and moderating (salience) variables and the interaction term. This will estimate the total effect of human rights on foreign aid. Next, I need to show that human rights conditions are correlated with NGO attention; in other words that path “a” in Figure 4-1 is statistically significant. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to develop a theoretical model for predicting NGO attention, there is evidence that the two are significantly related. Ron, Ramos, and Rodgers (2005) find that human rights conditions are a significant predictor of AI news releases. In my own dataset, the correlation between the two variables is 0.37 and statistically significant. Finally, I

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<sup>35</sup> I will test the argument that the mediation effect of NGO pressure is modified by district magnitude rather than salience in a separate model, discussed below.

estimate the models including the Amnesty variable for NGO attention, the salience variable, and their interaction term (Baron and Kenny 1986; Judd and Kenny 1981). If NGO attention does, in fact, mediate the effect of human rights on foreign aid, then the direct effect of human rights in the set of models that include Amnesty news releases and salience would approach zero.<sup>36</sup>

In addition to testing for mediation, I am also examining whether the value of policy concessions modifies the mediating effect of NGO attention. In short, I am arguing that the marginal effect of NGO attention will be negative only when the salience of the policy concessions is low. When testing for this conditional indirect effect, therefore, I interact the NGO pressure variable, *AINR*, with the salience variable. This results in six models, one with each measure of salience.

The general models, testing for the mediation effect of Amnesty news releases modified by salience are as follows<sup>37</sup>:

**Equation 1:**  $Foreign\ Aid = \beta_0 + \beta_1HR + \beta_2RecipientGDP/Cap + \beta_3lnDistance + \beta_4lnRpop + \beta_5Egypt + \beta_6Israel + \beta_7Colony + \beta_8RecipientWinningCoalition + \beta_9DonorWealth + \varepsilon$

**Equation 2:**  $Foreign\ Aid = \beta_0 + \beta_1AINR + \beta_2Salience + \beta_3AINR*Salience + \beta_4HR + \beta_5RecipientGDP/Cap + \beta_6lnDistance + \beta_7lnRpop + \beta_8Egypt + \beta_9Israel + \beta_{10}Colony + \beta_{11}RecipientWinningCoalition + \beta_{12}DonorWealth + \varepsilon$

The first model, Equation 1, excludes NGO attention and salience, thereby testing the total effect of human rights on foreign aid. The second model, Equation 2, includes Amnesty News Releases as a mediating variable modified by the salience of policy

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
<sup>36</sup> The strongest version of the mediation argument implies that the only effect of human rights on foreign aid is through NGO pressure. In this case, I would expect the direct effect of human rights in the mediated models to be zero. This is unlikely to be the case; instead NGO pressure may be one mechanism by which human rights affects foreign aid. In the latter case, I would expect the coefficient on human rights in the mediated models to be closer to zero than in the unmediated models, although not necessarily zero.

<sup>37</sup> I do not include the control for donor wealth in the allocation models, because it makes little sense to ask how donor wealth affects the share of aid to a particular recipient since I am accounting for the donor's aid budget in the denominator of the dependent variable.

concessions. In Chapter 5, I will estimate each model with the dependent variable *AnyAid*, once for each measure of the potential value of the policy concession. The six proxies for policy concession salience are: export share, recipient oil exports, security alignment, distance between recipient and donor, recipient population, and former colonial status. In Chapter 6, I will estimate each model using the dependent variable measuring the share of total donor aid to each particular recipient.

In the previous chapter, I also presented a hypothesis that political institutions matter. In particular, I argued that a donor is more likely to punish human rights violators as the electoral permissiveness - measured as district magnitude - increases. Not unlike the salience moderation tests discussed above, I conceptualize this relationship as one of moderated mediation. In other words, I expect NGO pressure to play a bigger role in donors with higher district magnitudes. Figure 4-2 illustrates this argument.

**Figure 4-2: Mediating Effect of NGO Attention, Modified by Donor District Magnitude**



The models to test the political institutions argument are:

**Equation 3:**  $Foreign\ Aid = \beta_0 + \beta_1 HR + \beta_2 RecipientGDP/Cap + \beta_3 \ln Distance + \beta_4 \ln Rpop + \beta_5 Egypt + \beta_6 Israel + \beta_7 Colony + \beta_8 RecipientWinningCoalition + \beta_9 DonorWealth + \varepsilon$

$$\text{Equation 4: } \textit{Foreign Aid} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \textit{AINR} + \beta_2 \textit{DN} + \beta_3 \textit{AINR} * \textit{DM} + \beta_4 \textit{HR} + \beta_5 \textit{RecipientGDP/Cap} + \beta_6 \textit{lnDistance} + \beta_7 \textit{lnRpop} + \beta_8 \textit{Egypt} + \beta_9 \textit{Israel} + \beta_{10} \textit{Colony} + \beta_{11} \textit{RecipientWinningCoalition} + \beta_{12} \textit{DonorWealth} + \varepsilon$$

Where Equation 3 tests the total effect of human rights on foreign aid, without the mediating effect of NGO pressure. Equation 4 tests the mediating effect of NGO attention on foreign aid, conditional on district magnitude.

#### **4.4 Conclusion**

In this chapter, I have detailed the variables and methods I will use to test the explanation and hypotheses I presented in Chapter 3. I have also discussed the statistical challenges, particularly as they pertain to the time-series-cross-sectional nature of this data. I presented the methods I will use in the following chapters to mitigate these statistical concerns, as well as to test the mediating effect of NGO pressure on foreign aid. The next chapter will explore the effect of human rights at the gate-keeping stage, asking whether donors respond to violations - and, specifically, to violations that are publicized by Amnesty International news releases - by withholding aid. Chapter 6 will examine how human rights and NGO pressure affects the amount of aid recipients receive, given they pass the gate-keeping stage.

## **Chapter 5**

### **Human Rights at the Gate-keeping Stage**

In this chapter, I start by examining whether human rights violators are less likely to get aid than non-violators, conditional on the contextual relationships I discussed in Chapter 3. Testing the mediating effect of Amnesty news releases, as well as the modifying effects of the salience of policy concessions and donor electoral institutions, requires two steps. First, I will present the unmediated model, which shows the total effect of human rights on the probability a country receives foreign aid. This is without the mediating effect of NGO pressure and its interaction with policy concession salience or district magnitude. In the remaining sections, I present the results of the mediated models, each with NGO pressure modified by a different salience variable and, in the final section of results, donor district magnitude. By comparing the direct effect of human rights in the mediated models to the total effect in the unmediated model, I demonstrate that the effect of human rights on foreign aid is mediated through NGO mobilization. I will also show that most measures of the salience of the policy concessions do modify the effect of NGO attention on the likelihood a recipient gets aid. In some cases, however, these conditional effects are contrary to my hypothesized predictions.

#### ***5.1 Unmediated Models***

I expect that the effect of human rights on foreign aid is mediated through NGO mobilization and that the value of the policy concession modifies the effect of NGO



mobilization on aid. In this section, I establish the baseline model to which I will compare the mediated models in the following sections. This model includes human rights as an independent variable, but does not include the mediating effect of NGO pressure. This captures the total effect of human rights on foreign aid and is the first step in testing a mediation effect (c.f. Baron and Kenny 1986; Judd and Kenny 1981). The unmediated model is:

$$\textbf{Equation 5: } Pr(AID) = \beta_0 + \beta_1HR + \beta_2RecipientGDP/Cap + \beta_3lnDistance + \beta_4lnRpop + \beta_5Egypt + \beta_6Israel + \beta_7Colony + \beta_8RecipientWinningCoalition + \beta_9DonorWealth + \beta_{10}PreviousFail + \beta_{11-13}Splines + \varepsilon$$

In this model, and subsequent models in this chapter, I include four variables to account for the temporal dependence of the dependent variable. As I discussed in chapter 4, I use three temporal splines as recommended by Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998). In addition, because there are multiple “failures” for each observation - in this model “failure” is when the dependent variable equals one or when a recipient gets aid - I include a control variable *PreviousFailure*, that captures the number of previous “failures”.

The second column of Table 5-1 presents the results of the probit analysis testing the unmediated model. The effect of human rights in this model is negative and statistically significant. Since this is a probit model, I calculate the predicted probability of receiving aid at different levels of human rights scores, while holding the other variables at their means or modes, and present this in Table 5-2. Although the effect of human rights is statistically significant, the substantive effect is very small. A change from the mean level of violations (3.6) to one unit above the mean reduces the probability of receiving aid by less than 0.5%.

**Table 5-1: Probit Results, Unmediated Model & AINR Modified by Alignment**

	Unmediated Model	Model 1a Modifying Variable: Alignment
AINR, logged	--	-0.223*** (0.018)
Alignment, logged	--	0.217** (0.086)
AINR*Alignment	--	-0.345*** (0.103)
Human Rights	-0.012*** (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)
R GDP/Cap, logged	-0.214*** (0.009)	-0.199*** (0.009)
Distance, logged	-0.126*** (0.012)	-0.129*** (0.013)
Recipient population, logged	0.121*** (0.006)	0.143*** (0.007)
Egypt	0.012 (0.090)	0.002 (0.089)
Israel	-0.085 (0.090)	0.070 (0.088)
Colony	0.760*** (0.059)	0.750*** (0.060)
Recipient winning coalition	0.177*** (0.031)	0.172*** (0.031)
Donor GDP/cap, logged	0.389*** (0.032)	0.426*** (0.033)
Spline 1	0.016*** (0.001)	0.017*** (0.001)
Spline 2	-0.028*** (0.001)	-0.029*** (0.001)
Spline 3	0.023*** (0.001)	0.024*** (0.001)
Previous Failure	0.157*** (0.003)	0.163*** (0.003)
Constant	-2.26*** (0.352)	-2.896*** (0.357)
# of Observations	42, 842	41, 834
R <sup>2</sup>	0.45	0.45

\*\*\* p<0.01 \*\* p<0.05 \* p<0.1  
Standard Errors in parentheses

**Table 5-2: Predicted Probabilities, Unmediated Model & AINR Modified by Alignment**

	When Human Rights is at its Mean	When Human Rights is one unit above the mean	Change in Probability
Predicted Probability of Receiving Aid (Model A)	0.746	0.742	-0.004***
Predicted Probability of Receiving Aid (Model 1a)	0.752	0.752	0.000

Note: All other continuous variables held at their mean, dichotomous variables held at their mode  
\*\*\* p<0.01 \*\* p<0.05 \* p<0.1

The control variables also present some noteworthy findings. Contrary to the conventional wisdom in the foreign aid literature, my results indicate that donors are more likely to give aid to needy recipients.<sup>38</sup> The effects of other control variables are as expected.<sup>39</sup> Donors are more likely to give aid to recipients who are geographically close, more populous, and former colonies. Wealthier donors are also more likely to give aid than poor donors. Finally, the results on the temporal variables show that there is strong temporal dependence and, importantly, indicate that the inclusion of these variables was necessary.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>38</sup> I attempted to account for this different finding by comparing my sample and specification to models that found a positive relationship between recipient income and aid. Alesina and Dollar (2000) show a positive correlation between aid per capita and recipient income in their sample, where my sample produces a negative and statistically significant correlation. This would suggest that the divergent findings are, at least, in part a function of the exact sample used. Other findings that call into question the poverty-alleviating goal of foreign aid either use different variables for need (Buono de Mesquita and Smith 2009 use life expectancy) or have restricted samples (e.g. McKinlay and Little 1977 only look at the United States, while Maizels and Nissanke (1984) look at the U.S., United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Japan).

<sup>39</sup> The coefficient on recipient winning coalition is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that recipients are more likely to get aid as their winning coalition increases, a result that is consistent with the literature arguing that donors reward democratic governance. Buono de Mesquita and Smith (2009), in testing their argument that recipients with small winning coalitions are more likely to “sell” policy concessions, include a quadratic term and find no relationship between recipient winning coalition and whether a recipient receives foreign aid. When I include the quadratic term in my model, I find the same results, while the results on the other variables remain unchanged.

<sup>40</sup> To avoid repetition, I will note here that these results on the control variables are consistent throughout the subsequent models.

## 5.2 Saliency of Policy Concessions

In this section, I present the results of the mediated models where the effect of NGO pressure is modified by six measures of policy concession saliency. My argument is that donors are more likely to punish recipients when there is NGO pressure to do so, unless the donor seeks valuable policy concessions from the recipient. I derive the following general hypothesis:

*General Hypothesis: Recipients are less likely to get aid as Amnesty International News Releases increase, but this relationship becomes less pronounced as the value of the policy concessions the donor seeks increase.*

As the saliency of the policy concessions increases, the effect of NGO pressure - measured here as Amnesty news releases - should diminish. In the sections that follow, I test this argument using six different measures for the saliency of policy concessions, as I detailed in Chapter 3. Security alignment captures the potential value of strategic policy concessions. Donor export share and recipient oil exports each capture the potential saliency of economic policy concessions. Finally, the distance between donor and recipient, recipient's population, and former colonial status measure how much the donor might value concessions from a particular recipient compared to other recipients.

Equation 1 represents the model that I will estimate for each measure of saliency.

**Equation 6:**  $Foreign\ Aid = \beta_0 + \beta_1 AINR + \beta_2 Saliency + \beta_3 AINR * Saliency + \beta_4 HR + \beta_5 RecipientGDP/Cap + \beta_6 \ln Distance + \beta_7 \ln Rpop + \beta_8 Egypt + \beta_9 Israel + \beta_{10} Colony + \beta_{11} RecipientWinningCoalition + \beta_{12} DonorWealth + \beta_{13} PreviousFail + \beta_{14-16} Splines + \varepsilon$

Throughout this chapter, I will also test the *Mediation Hypothesis* from the previous chapter, regarding the mediating effect of NGO attention. Once I account for the mediating effect of NGO attention, the direct effect of human rights on the probability of receiving aid should approach zero.

*Mediation Hypothesis: The direct effect of human rights is mediated by NGO pressure.*

In the sections that follow, I will compare the direct effect of human rights to the total effect in the unmediated model presented in Table 5-1 to test the *Mediation Hypothesis*. Using the interaction term in Equation 6, I will test how the salience of policy concessions modifies the effect of NGO pressure on the likelihood a recipient receives aid.

### *5.2.1 Salience of Strategic Policy Concessions*

The first mediated model I test asks whether the value of the strategic policy concessions modifies the effect of NGO pressure on the probability a recipient gets foreign aid. In this section, I test the hypothesis that donors are less likely to punish potential recipients who are close strategic allies. These recipients are likely to be able to offer valuable policy concessions to the donor, for example access to military bases or fly-over rights. The opportunity cost of punishing a strategic ally is higher than it is for punishing a non-aligned recipient. Only if the potential recipient is not a strategic ally and there is Amnesty publicity, do I expect the donor to punish the potential recipient by withholding aid. I re-word *Hypothesis 1* from the previous chapter to reflect this chapter's dependent variable:

*Hypothesis 1a: Recipients are less likely to get aid as Amnesty News Releases increase, but this relationship becomes less pronounced as the strategic importance of the recipient to the donor increases.*


I find support for the *Mediation Hypothesis*. Once I account for the mediating effect of NGO pressure, the direct effect of human rights on foreign aid is zero.<sup>41</sup> Column

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<sup>41</sup> In the Appendix, I present the results of the mediation model without any modifying variables (Table A-1). The coefficient on AINR is negative and statistically significant, while the coefficient on human rights is indistinguishable from zero. . The results suggest that Amnesty news releases do mediate the effect of

three of Table 5-1 presents the raw results from the probit analysis of Model 1a and shows that the direct effect of human rights is not statistically significant. In addition, as shown in Table 5-2, a one-unit increase in violations from the mean has no effect on the predicted probability of receiving aid. Comparing this result to the effect of human rights in the unmediated model provides evidence that NGO pressure mediates the effect of human rights on foreign aid. Once I have controlled for the effect of Amnesty news releases, conditional on alignment, the direct effect of human rights reduces to zero.

**Figure 5-1: Marginal Effect of AINR on Aid as Alignment Changes**



This model also shows that the effect of NGO pressure on foreign aid depends on the potential strategic value of policy concessions the donor may seek from the recipient, however this effect is in the opposite direction than I predicted in *Hypothesis 1a*. Figure 5-1 illustrates the marginal effect of AI news releases as alignment changes. The marginal effect is statistically significant and negative, which suggests that recipients

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human rights on the likelihood that a recipient receives foreign aid. And that the effect of NGO attention is negative; countries whose human rights records are subject to NGO mobilization through news releases are less likely to receive aid.

subject to NGO mobilization are less likely to receive aid, however the conditioning effect of alignment is small. Donors appear more likely to punish potential recipients by withholding aid when they are closely aligned. Again, these substantive effects are not very large, but they do provide some evidence that donors react to NGO mobilization.

### 5.2.2 *Salience of Economic Policy Concessions*

In this section, I will test whether the salience of economic policy concessions modifies the effect of NGO pressure on foreign aid. The relevant hypotheses from the previous chapter are re-worded to account for the dependent variable in this chapter:

*Hypothesis 2a: Recipients are less likely to get aid as Amnesty News Releases increase, but this relationship becomes less pronounced as the share of exports from the donor to recipient increases.*

*Hypothesis 3a: Recipients are less likely to get aid as Amnesty News Releases increase, but this relationship becomes less pronounced as the recipient's petroleum exports increase.*

In this section, I capture the value of policy concessions the donor may wish to buy from the recipient in economic terms. Namely, I expect that donors will be less likely to punish countries that are important export markets or significant petroleum exporters. As with security alignment, these measures capture the potential salience of policy concessions and, therefore, what the donor could lose if it withholds aid.

I present the probit results for models 2a and 3a in Table 5-3.<sup>42</sup> In the model with export share as the salience variable, the mediating effect of NGO mobilization disappears. In fact, the direct effect of human rights controlling for AI news releases modified by export share is greater than the total effect in the unmediated model and is statistically significant. Table 5-4 shows that the substantive effect of a one unit increase

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<sup>42</sup> Due to data availability, the numbers of observations in the economic salience models are substantially lower than in the other models. To make sure that these results are not an artifact of the smaller sample size, I re-estimated the unmediated model with the restricted sample to find that the results hold.

in human rights violations from the mean (3.6 to 4.6) reduces the probability of aid by 0.6%, once I controlled for the NGO mobilization and its interaction with export share.

**Table 5-3: Probit, AINR Modified by Economic Salience**

	Model 2a Modifying Variable: Export Share	Model 3a Modifying Variable: Recipient Oil Exports
AINR, logged	-0.186*** (0.023)	-0.124*** (0.028)
Export Share, logged	2.478*** (0.600)	--
AINR*Export Share	-0.833 (1.241)	--
Recipient Oil Exports, logged	--	-0.056*** (0.009)
AINR*Recipient Oil Exports	--	-0.022*** (0.008)
Human Rights	-0.018*** (0.005)	0.010* (0.006)
R GDP/Cap, logged	-0.243*** (0.011)	-0.092*** (0.016)
Distance, logged	-0.086*** (0.017)	-0.213*** (0.015)
Recipient population, logged	0.134*** (0.008)	0.196*** (0.010)
Egypt	0.099 (0.099)	-0.045 (0.108)
Israel	0.157 (0.096)	0.014 (0.108)
Colony	0.806*** (0.076)	0.859*** (0.094)
Recipient winning coalition	0.157*** (0.039)	0.158*** (0.039)
Donor GDP/cap, logged	0.466*** (0.039)	0.167*** (0.039)
Spline 1	0.017*** (0.001)	0.014*** (0.001)
Spline 2	-0.030*** (0.002)	-0.023*** (0.001)
Spline 3	0.026*** (0.002)	0.019*** (0.001)
Previous Failure	0.158*** (0.004)	0.148*** (0.003)
Constant	-3.184*** (0.421)	-0.892** (0.449)
# of Observations	28, 283	31, 920
R <sup>2</sup>	0.47	0.51

\*\*\* p<0.01 \*\* p<0.05 \* p<0.1

Standard Errors in parentheses




**Table 5-4: Predicted Probabilities, AINR modified by Economic Salience**

	When Human Rights is at its Mean	When Human Rights is at 1 standard deviation above its mean	Change in Probability
Predicted Probability of Receiving Aid (Model 2a)	0.774	0.768	-0.006***
Predicted Probability of Receiving Aid (Model 3a)	0.787	0.790	0.003*

Note: All other continuous variables held at their mean, dichotomous variables held at their mode  
 \*\*\* p<0.01 \*\* p<0.05 \* p<0.1

Figure 5-2 illustrates that export share does not modify the effect of NGO pressure on the likelihood a country receives foreign aid. Regardless of the level of export share, the marginal effect of Amnesty news releases is consistently negative. This result is inconsistent with *Hypothesis 2a*, which expected that donors would be less likely to withhold aid from recipients that are key export markets for the donor regardless of NGO pressure. Instead, donors consistently punish recipients who are subject to NGO mobilization regardless of the export relationship between the two countries.


**Figure 5-2: Marginal Effect of AINR on Aid as Export Share Changes**



I also use recipient petroleum exports as a proxy for the salience of economic policy concessions. In this model, the direct effect of human rights on foreign aid is actually positive. This implies that, once controlling for NGO pressure and its interaction with recipient oil exports, violators get more aid. This result is only statistically significant at the 0.1 level and is substantively small (only a 0.5% increase after a one unit shift from the mean level of violations).

Figure 5-3 illustrates the marginal effect of AI news releases on the probability a recipient receives foreign aid and the results are contrary to my expectations in *Hypothesis 3a*. I predicted that donors would be less likely to withhold aid from high oil exporters, yet results show the opposite. High oil exporters who are subject to NGO attention are less likely to receive aid and this result is statistically significant at high levels of oil exports.

**Figure 5-3: Marginal Effect of AINR on Aid as Recipient Oil Export Changes**



### 5.2.3 Other Measures of Policy Concession Salience

I also include Bueno de Mesquita and Smith's (2009) measures of the potential value of policy concessions as alternate measures of salience. These tests provide a useful complement to the other measures of salience I introduced by identifying characteristics of the recipient that makes policy concessions valuable. According to Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009) donors will value policy concessions more from recipients who are geographically close, more populous, and/or former colonies than those who are not. My argument follows, then, that donors will be less likely to punish these same recipients precisely because of the value the donor places on the policy concessions. The following three hypotheses reflect this argument:

*Hypothesis 4a: Recipients are less likely to receive aid as Amnesty News Releases increase, but this relationship becomes less pronounced as the distance between the donor and recipient decreases.*

*Hypothesis 5a: Recipients are less likely to receive aid as Amnesty News Releases increase, but this relationship becomes less pronounced as the recipient's population increases*

*Hypothesis 6a: Recipients are less likely to get aid as Amnesty News Releases increase, but this relationship is less pronounced if the recipient is a former colony of the donor.*

Across these three models, the direct effect of human rights is indistinguishable from zero. In Table 5-5, the coefficients on human rights are close to zero and not statistically significant. Table 5-6 further shows that the change in predicted probability as human rights abuses increase one unit from the mean is zero for all three models. This provides additional support for the hypothesis that NGO pressure mediates the effect of human rights on foreign aid.

**Table 5-5: Probit Results, AINR Modified by Other Salience**

	Model 4a Modifying Variable: Distance	Model 5a Modifying Variable: Recipient Population	Model 6a Modifying Variable: Colony
AINR, logged	1.022*** (0.184)	-0.229** (0.098)	-0.220*** (0.018)
Distance, logged	-0.078*** (0.014)	--	--
AINR*Distance	-0.151*** (0.022)	--	--
Recipient Population, logged	--	0.143*** (0.007)	--
AINR*Recipient Population	--	0.001 (0.010)	--
Colony	--	--	0.754*** (0.064)
AINR*Colony	--	--	-0.039 (0.162)
Human Rights	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)
R GDP/Cap, logged	-0.197*** (0.009)	-0.199*** (0.009)	-0.199*** (0.009)
Distance, logged	--	-0.128*** (0.013)	-0.129*** (0.013)
Recipient population, logged	0.145*** (0.006)	--	0.143*** (0.006)
Egypt	-0.002 (0.088)	0.012 (0.088)	0.011 (0.088)
Israel	0.030 (0.089)	0.079 (0.088)	0.078 (0.088)
Colony	0.747*** (0.060)	0.745*** (0.060)	--
Recipient winning coalition	0.177*** (0.031)	0.175*** (0.031)	0.178*** (0.031)
Donor GDP/cap, logged	0.429*** (0.033)	0.427*** (0.033)	0.428*** (0.033)
Spline 1	0.017*** (0.001)	0.017*** (0.001)	0.017*** (0.001)
Spline 2	-0.029*** (0.001)	-0.029*** (0.001)	-0.029*** (0.001)
Spline 3	0.024*** (0.001)	0.024*** (0.001)	0.024*** (0.001)
Previous Failure	0.164*** (0.003)	0.163*** (0.003)	0.163*** (0.003)
Constant	-3.401*** (0.362)	-2.932*** (0.357)	-2.940*** (0.357)
# of Observations	41, 834	41, 834	41, 834
R <sup>2</sup>	0.45	0.45	0.45

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01 \*\* p&lt;0.05 \* p&lt;0.1

Standard Errors in parentheses

**Table 5-6: Predicted Probabilities, AINR modified by Other Salience Variables**

	When Human Rights is at its Mean	When Human Rights is at 1 standard deviation above its mean	Change in Probability
Predicted Probability of Receiving Aid (Model 4a)	0.752	0.752	0.000
Predicted Probability of Receiving Aid (Model 5a)	0.751	0.751	0.000
Predicted Probability of Receiving Aid (Model 6a)	0.729	0.729	0.000

Note: All other continuous variables held at their mean, dichotomous variables held at their mode  
\*\*\* p<0.01 \*\* p<0.05 \* p<0.1

Contrary to *Hypothesis 5a*, the recipient’s population has only a small conditional effect of the marginal effect of AI news releases. As Figure 5-5 shows, regardless of population size, the probability of getting aid is reduced by about 5% for a one unit change in AI news releases. Finally, the results for the modifying effect of historical colonial ties are as expected in *Hypothesis 6a*; recipients who are not former colonies of the donor are more likely to have aid withheld if they are subject to AI news releases (when colony is zero, the coefficient on AINR is negative and statistically significant). A one unit increase in Amnesty news releases reduces by 4% the likelihood of receiving aid for a recipient that is not a former colony. For a former colony, the marginal effect of Amnesty news releases is not statistically significant.


Figure 5-4 illustrates the marginal effect of Amnesty news releases as the distance between the donor and recipient increases. Consistent with *Hypothesis 4a*, donors are not likely to punish recipients who are geographically close to them even if they are the focus of Amnesty news releases.<sup>43</sup> In fact, recipients are more likely to receive aid if they are geographically close and the subject of NGO mobilization than if they are not. As the

<sup>43</sup> The range on the distance variable (natural log of distance between the capitals, in miles) is 4.18 to 9.4.


distance between the two countries increases, recipients are less likely to receive aid as Amnesty news releases increase.

Contrary to *Hypothesis 5a*, the recipient's population has only a small conditional effect of the marginal effect of AI news releases. As Figure 5-5 shows, regardless of population size, the probability of getting aid is reduced by about 5% for a one unit change in AI news releases. Finally, the results for the modifying effect of historical colonial ties are as expected in *Hypothesis 6a*; recipients who are not former colonies of the donor are more likely to have aid withheld if they are subject to AI news releases (when colony is zero, the coefficient on AINR is negative and statistically significant). A one unit increase in Amnesty news releases reduces by 4% the likelihood of receiving aid for a recipient that is not a former colony. For a former colony, the marginal effect of Amnesty news releases is not statistically significant.

**Figure 5-4: Marginal Effect of AINR as Distance between Recipient and Donor Changes**



**Figure 5-5: Marginal Effect of AINR as Recipient Population Changes**



### 5.3 Electoral Incentives

Finally, I test whether donors with larger district magnitudes are more vulnerable to NGO pressure and, consequently, whether they are more likely to withhold aid from violators who are subject to NGO mobilization. In Chapter 3, I argued that promoting public goods qualifies as a national public good and that donors with high electoral permissiveness will be more likely to provide this good. An auxiliary explanation is that the promotion of human rights is a niche interest. I would expect, therefore, that donors with larger district magnitude systems - those that allow more for the representation of niche interests through a multi-party system - would be more likely to respond to NGO pressure to punish violators. The marginal effect of Amnesty news releases should be strongest when the donor's district magnitude is larger. When the donor has a small district magnitude, the marginal effect of Amnesty news releases should be either be insignificant or small.

*Hypothesis 7a: Recipients are less likely to receive aid as Amnesty News releases increase, and this should be more pronounced as the donor's winning coalition increases.*

**Equation 7:**  $Foreign\ Aid = \beta_0 + \beta_1 AINR + \beta_2 DM + \beta_3 AINR * DM + \beta_4 HR + \beta_5 RecipientGDP/Cap + \beta_6 lnDistance + \beta_7 lnRpop + \beta_8 Egypt + \beta_9 Israel + \beta_{10} Colony + \beta_{11} RecipientWinningCoalition + \beta_{12} DonorWealth + \beta_{13-15} Splines + \varepsilon$

**Table 5-7: Probit Results, AINR Modified by District Magnitude**

	Model 7a Modifying Variable: District Magnitude
AINR, logged	-0.298*** (0.031)
Donor District Magnitude, logged	-0.055*** (0.007)
AINR*District Magnitude	0.039*** (0.014)
Human Rights	0.001 (0.004)
R GDP/Cap, logged	-0.189*** (0.009)
Distance, logged	-0.159*** (0.013)
Recipient population, logged	0.146*** (0.007)
Egypt	-0.030 (0.090)
Israel	0.059 (0.089)
Colony	0.701*** (0.060)
Recipient winning coalition	0.188*** (0.032)
Donor GDP/cap, logged	0.443*** (0.033)
Spline 1	0.016*** (0.001)
Spline 2	-0.029*** (0.001)
Spline 3	0.024*** (0.001)
Previous Failure	0.162*** (0.003)
Constant	-2.860*** (0.361)
# of Observations	40, 663
R <sup>2</sup>	0.46

\*\*\* p<0.01 \*\* p<0.05 \* p<0.1  
Standard Errors in parentheses



Consistent with the hypothesis that NGO pressure mediates the effect of human rights on aid, the direct effect of human rights in Model 7a is essentially zero (Table 5-7).

Table 5-8 also illustrates this result.


**Table 5-8: Predicted Probability of Receiving Aid, AINR Modified by District Magnitude**

	When Human Rights is at its Mean	When Human Rights is at 1 standard deviation above its mean	Change in Probability
Predicted Probability of Receiving Aid (Model 7a)	0.756	0.756	0.000

Note: All other continuous variables held at their mean, dichotomous variables held at their mode  
 \*\*\* p<0.01 \*\* p<0.05 \* p<0.1

Contrary to *Hypothesis 7a*, donors with smaller district magnitudes are more likely to withhold aid to recipients who are subject to NGO mobilization. Figure 5-6 illustrates this relationship, showing that the marginal effect of AI news releases approaches zero as donor district magnitude increases. The marginal effect of Amnesty news releases is consistently negative, implying that as NGOs publicize violations, countries are less likely to get aid. This result weakens as the donor district magnitude increases. The donors that are most likely to punish potential recipients are those with single-member district plurality (SMDP) systems (natural log of DM=0).

**Figure 5-6: Marginal Effect of AINR as Donor District Magnitude Changes**



#### **5.4 Conclusion**

In this chapter, I found some evidence that the effect of human rights on the probability a recipient receives foreign aid is mediated by NGO pressure. As the number of Amnesty news releases highlighting human rights abuses in a particular country increase, the probability of that country receiving aid decreases under many conditions. The exceptions are when the donor seeks salient policy concessions from the potential recipient. Only two of the measures for policy concession salience - distance and colonial status - behaved as I expected, modifying the effect of NGO pressure on foreign aid. As the potential value of policy concessions increased because the recipient was geographically close to the donor or a former colony, the marginal effect of AI news releases became insignificant or, in the case of geographical distance, positive. Alignment also modified the effect of AI news releases, although the effect was small and in the opposite direction than predicted. Donors were slightly more likely to withhold aid to recipients who were subject to NGO mobilization if they were closely

aligned. Similarly, donors were more likely to withhold aid to recipients subject to AI news releases if they were high oil exporters - also contrary to my predictions. Finally, recipient population did not modify the effect of AI news releases. The marginal effect of Amnesty news releases was negative and essentially unchanging as population increased.

The findings with respect to alignment, export share, recipient oil export, and recipient population all run counter to my hypotheses. I expected that these measures of salience would eliminate the negative effect of NGO pressure on foreign aid. This was not the case. One possible reason for some of these findings is that in addition to capturing the value the donor places on policy concessions from the recipient, these variables may also capture the potential leverage that the donor has over the recipient. Donors may be more likely to punish recipients over whom they can exercise leverage, either as a security or trading partner, because they could arguably have more of an influence in these countries. An important next step in this research agenda would be to parse out the effects of policy concession salience, on the one hand, and donor leverage over the recipient on the other.

With respect to the mediation hypotheses, many of the models presented support the argument that the effect of human rights on foreign aid is actually mediated through NGO pressure. I argued in Chapter 3 that policymakers are more likely to punish violators when those violations are publicized. These results provide some evidence to suggest that this is true. Although not all models showed these results, in 5 of the 7 models controlling for AI news releases conditional on salience or district magnitude, the direct effect of human rights was indistinguishable from zero. The total effect of human

rights (shown in the Table 5-1 and Table 5-2 results for the unmediated model) is substantively very small, but consistent with the first step of testing a mediation effect, is statistically significant. Since it is not statistically significant in most of the mediated models, this provides some support for the hypothesis that AI news releases mediate the effect of human rights on foreign aid and, in many cases, is conditional on the potential value of the policy concessions.

## Chapter 6 Decision-making at the Allocation Stage

The previous chapter explored the donor decision-making process at the gate-keeping stage, when donors decide whether to give aid to particular recipients. In this chapter, I examine the donor's decision at the allocation stage: given that a country receives aid, how much does it get?<sup>44</sup> As I discussed in Chapter 4, the dependent variable of interest is the share of total donor aid a particular recipient receives. This best captures the question of aid allocation from the donor perspective. The donor has a budget for foreign aid and must allocate it among various recipients. If we find that human rights matter, then donors should allocate a smaller share to recipients who violate human rights and, more specifically, who are subject to NGO mobilization but are not of strategic or economic value to the donor.

### *6.1 Unmediated Model*

First, I test the total effect of human rights on the share of foreign aid, without the mediating and modifying variables. This model will provide the baseline by which I will compare the mediated models.<sup>45</sup>

$$\text{Equation 8: } \textit{Foreign Aid} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \textit{HR} + \beta_2 \textit{RecipientGDP/Cap} + \beta_3 \textit{lnDistance} + \beta_4 \textit{lnRpop} + \beta_5 \textit{Egypt} + \beta_6 \textit{Israel} + \beta_7 \textit{Colony} + \beta_8 \textit{RecipientWinningCoalition} + \beta_9 \textit{LaggedDV} + \varepsilon$$

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<sup>44</sup> The sample in this chapter is a subset of the sample in Chapter 5. Only countries that receive aid - or passed the gate-keeping stage - are included.

<sup>45</sup> As I laid out in Chapter 4, I use donor fixed effects and include a lagged dependent variable to account for the problems associated with non-independent observations. For all the models in this chapter, I test for robustness using ordinary least squares regression with robust standard errors and the results are similar. I also test for robustness using the natural log of total aid as the dependent variable and the results are robust.

**Table 6-1: Share of Foreign Aid**

	Unmediated Model	Model 1b: Modifying Variable: Alignment
AINR, logged	--	-0.025** (0.010)
Alignment, logged	--	-0.047 (0.057)
AINR*Alignment	--	0.120** (0.056)
Human Rights	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)
Recipient GDP/Cap	-0.110*** (0.007)	-0.109*** (0.008)
Distance	-0.059*** (0.010)	-0.061*** (0.011)
Recipient Population	0.091*** (0.005)	0.092*** (0.005)
Egypt	0.082 (0.054)	0.087 (0.055)
Israel	0.118* (0.068)	0.133* (0.070)
Colony	0.387*** (0.033)	0.390*** (0.033)
Recipient Winning Coalition	0.108*** (0.023)	0.101*** (0.024)
Share Aid, lagged	0.826*** (0.003)	0.825*** (0.003)
Constant	-0.565*** (0.112)	-0.575*** (0.117)
# of Observations	27, 987	26, 620
R <sup>2</sup>	0.78	0.78

\*\*\* p<0.01 \*\* p<0.05 \* p<0.1  
Standard Errors in parentheses

The second column in Table 6-1 presents the results of the unmediated model, which show that human rights abuses are associated with a decrease the share of aid a recipient receives. The substantive effect, however, is very small. A one-unit increase in human rights violations decreases the share of aid a recipient receives by less than one

percent.<sup>46</sup> Most other variables in this model behave as expected. Donors give a greater share of aid to recipients who are closer and more populous. More aid is also given to former colonies, as well as to recipients with large winning coalitions. This latter point could be explained in two ways. First, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009) argued that more aid needs to be given to leaders with larger winning coalitions so that leaders can provide their winning coalition with private benefits to offset the unpopularity of the policy concession. Other scholars (Boulding and Hyde n.d.) argue that donors reward democratic institutions with more aid. Not surprisingly, the lagged dependent variable is statistically significant and relatively large. Foreign aid appears to produce its own inertia, where aid from the previous period largely explains aid in the next.<sup>47</sup> Finally, one result runs contrary to expectations. Much of the existing literature (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009; Alesina and Dollar 2000) bemoans the common finding that aid does not consistently flow to needy recipients. These results show that recipients with higher GDP per capita get smaller shares of aid. In other words, donors do seem to provide aid to needy recipients.<sup>48</sup>

## ***6.2 The Salience of Policy Concessions***

The unmediated model suggests that there is, however small, a negative total effect of human rights conditions on the share of aid a recipient receives. In this section,

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<sup>46</sup> Since the dependent variable is logged and the independent variable of interest, human rights, is a level, I interpret the coefficient as the percent change in the dependent variable (share aid) for a one-unit increase in the independent variable, here human rights. Holding the other independent variables at their means (or modes for the dichotomous variables), the share of aid at the mean level of human rights is 0.002328 and drops to 0.002314 when human rights violations increase by one unit.

<sup>47</sup> The correlation between share of aid in time  $t$  with share of aid in  $t-1$  is .89 and statistically significant.

<sup>48</sup> As discussed in Chapter 5, one reason for this different finding may be the exact sample used. Alesina and Dollar (2000) use as their dependent variable a 5 year average of bilateral aid flows from 1970-1994. They present a positive correlation between aid per capita and recipient income (measured as real GDP/capita). In my sample from 1980-2000, I find a negative correlation between recipient GDP/capita and share of aid received.

I will test a series of hypotheses to see if this effect is mediated by NGO pressure. I expect that at least part of the causal story linking a recipient's human rights conditions and the share of aid it receives rests with the role of NGOs in publicizing abuses. At the same time, I argue that the effect of NGO mobilization on foreign aid is modified by the value the donor places on policy concessions from the recipient. If donors use foreign aid to purchase policy concessions from recipients, then cutting aid may limit the concessions the recipient is willing to provide to the donor. As the value of the concessions increases, I would expect the donors would be less willing to risk losing the concession. This leads to the following general hypothesis:

*General Hypothesis: Recipients will receive a smaller share of donor aid as Amnesty International News Releases increase, but this relationship becomes less pronounced as the value of the policy concessions the donor seeks increases.*

In the sections that follow, I test this general hypothesis with each measure of policy concessions salience. Equation 9 presents the model I will use in each section. As I discussed in Chapter 4, I include a lagged dependent variable and I use donor fixed effects in these models to account for the non-independence of observations.

**Equation 9:**  $Foreign\ Aid = \beta_0 + \beta_1 AINR + \beta_2 Alignment + \beta_3 AINR * Alignment + \beta_4 HR + \beta_5 RecipientGDP/Cap + \beta_6 lnDistance + \beta_7 lnRpop + \beta_8 Egypt + \beta_9 Israel + \beta_{10} Colony + \beta_{11} RecipientWinningCoalition + \beta_{12} DonorWealth + \beta_{13} LaggedDV + \epsilon$

In each section that follows, I also compare the total effect of human rights in the unmediated model to the direct effect in the mediated models. If Amnesty news releases mediate the effect of human rights on aid, conditional on the salience of the policy concession, then I expect the coefficient on human rights to approach zero in these models.

*Mediation Hypothesis: The direct effect of human rights is mediated by NGO pressure.*



### 6.2.1 The Effect of the Saliency of Strategic Policy Concessions


First, I test whether the saliency of strategic policy concessions modifies the mediating effect of NGO pressure on the share of foreign aid a country receives.

Specifically, I test the interactive hypothesis that donors are less likely to punish potential recipients who are close strategic allies, even if they are subject to NGO mobilization.

*Hypothesis 1b: Recipients will receive a smaller share of donor aid as Amnesty News releases increase, but this relationship becomes less pronounced as the strategic importance of the recipient to the donor increases.*

In column three of Table 6-1, I present the results of this model.<sup>49</sup> The coefficient on human rights is not statistically significant, providing some support for the hypothesis that its effect is mediated through NGO pressure. In addition, I find some support for *Hypothesis 1b*, that the effect of NGO pressure on aid is modified by the security relationship between the donor and recipient. Figure 6-1 shows the substantive interpretation of the interactive terms.

**Figure 6-1: Marginal Effect of NGO Mobilization, Modified by Alignment**



<sup>49</sup> In the appendix, I present the results of the mediation model without modifying terms (Table A-2). The coefficient on AINR is negative and statistically significant, demonstrating that recipients receive less aid as the number of Amnesty news releases focusing on their human rights conditions increase. Also, the coefficient on human rights is insignificant, supporting my argument that the effect of human rights on aid is mediated through Amnesty attention.

There is support for my hypothesis that donors are more likely to punish recipients who are not close strategic allies as the number of Amnesty news releases increase. The marginal effect of AI news releases is negative and statistically significant for recipients who are strategically distant from the donor. For recipients who share few security ties (alignment is one standard deviation below the mean) with the donor, a one percent increase in Amnesty news releases reduces aid by about 4.5%.<sup>50</sup> For recipients at the mean alignment with the donor, a one percent increase in Amnesty news releases reduces aid by just below 3%. As expected, those recipients that have strong security ties to the donor (anything above a tau score of zero), there is no statistically significant reduction in share of aid. This is consistent with my hypothesis that donors who seek strategically valuable policy concessions from close allies will be unlikely to punish these recipients even in the face of NGO mobilization. The results with respect to the control variables are consistent with the unmediated model presented in the previous section.

### 6.2.2 *Effect of the Salience of Economic Concessions*

Next, I examine how the salience of economic policy concessions conditions the effect of NGO mobilization on foreign aid. In particular, I ask whether donors give less aid to recipients who are the focus of AI news releases only if they are not important

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<sup>50</sup> The remaining independent variables of interest are all in natural log form. Therefore, these coefficients would be interpreted as elasticities. In other words, a one percent increase in the independent variable corresponds to a percent increase in the dependent variable of the value of the coefficient. Because the remaining models are all interactive, the coefficient on AINR, by itself, only indicates the effect of AINR when the corresponding salience variable equals zero. Instead I interpret the conditional coefficient on AINR as  $\beta_1 + \beta_3 \text{Salience}$ . In other words, a one percent increase in AINR corresponds to a  $(\beta_1 + \beta_3 \text{Salience})$  percent increase in share of aid, rather than a  $\beta_1$  since the effect of AINR on foreign aid depends on salience.

export markets for the donor or high petroleum exporters themselves. The relevant hypotheses are:

*Hypothesis 2b: Recipients will receive a smaller share of donor aid as Amnesty News releases increase, but this relationship becomes less pronounced as the share of exports from the donor to recipient increases.*

*Hypothesis 3b Recipients will receive a smaller share of donor aid as Amnesty News releases increase, but this relationship becomes less pronounced as the recipient's petroleum exports increase.*

Like *Hypothesis 1b* above, these hypotheses reflect the conditional nature of NGO mobilization and the value of economic policy concessions. In addition, I still compare the direct effect of human rights in these models to the total effect in the unmediated model, in Table 6-1, to explore whether Amnesty news releases mediate the effect of human rights on foreign aid, the *Mediation Hypothesis*.

The results again indicate that the effect of human rights is mediated, as the coefficient on human rights in both models is indistinguishable from zero (Table 6-2). As illustrated in Figure 6-2, export share does not modify the effect of AI news releases as predicted by *Hypothesis 2b*.<sup>51</sup> The effect of export share when there are no Amnesty news releases is positive and statistically significant, indicating that important export markets do get a greater share of aid. In this model, Israel also receives a greater share of aid even after controlling for these other factors. The effect of the recipient's winning coalition is also no longer statistically significant in this model.

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
<sup>51</sup> When export share is zero - i.e. the donor does not export anything to the recipient - the marginal effect of AINR is negative and significant at the 0.10 level.

**Table 6-2: Human Rights Mediated by AINR: Modified by Economic Salience**

	Model 2b Modifying Variable: Export Share	Model 3b Modifying Variable: Recipient Oil Exports
AINR, logged	-0.023* (0.012)	-0.040*** (0.015)
Export Share, logged	0.136 (0.749)	--
AINR*Export Share	0.601 (0.582)	--
Recipient Oil Exports, logged	--	-0.049*** (0.006)
AINR*R Oil Exports	--	0.009** (0.004)
Human Rights	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)
Recipient GDP/Cap	-0.118*** (0.009)	-0.056*** (0.011)
Distance	-0.048*** (0.014)	-0.082*** (0.012)
Recipient Population	0.101*** (0.006)	0.130*** (0.007)
Egypt	0.103* (0.058)	0.141** (0.062)
Israel	0.220*** (0.074)	0.115 (0.078)
Colony	0.415*** (0.038)	0.389*** (0.037)
Recipient Winning Coalition Share Aid, lagged	0.036 (0.028)	0.103*** (0.026)
	0.812*** (0.004)	0.823*** (0.004)
Constant	-0.736*** (0.150)	-1.131*** (0.143)
# of Observations	19, 102	21, 658
R <sup>2</sup>	0.77	0.78


\*\*\* p<0.01 \*\* p<0.05 \* p<0.1  
Standard Errors in parentheses

**Figure 6-2: Marginal Effect of NGO Mobilization, Modified by Export Share**



I also hypothesized that a recipient’s petroleum exports would modify the effect of Amnesty news releases, as donors would want to maintain access to petroleum resources. The results support *Hypothesis 3b*. Donors give a smaller share of aid to recipients who are subject to Amnesty news releases, but only if they are not significant oil exports (Figure 6-3). The median value for this independent variable is close to 0. As Figure 6-3 illustrates, the marginal effect of NGO pressure is negative and statistically significant for all recipients with oil exports below the median. In this model, unlike the export share model, nearly all the other control variables behave as in the unmediated model. The only exception is that the dummy variable for Egypt is statistically significant in this model, suggesting that Egypt is likely to get a greater share of aid, once I control for recipient oil exports.

**Figure 6-3: Marginal Effect of NGO Mobilization, Modified by Recipient Oil Exports**



### 6.2.3 Other Measures of Policy Concession Salience

In this section, I test the modifying effects of distance, recipient population, and colony on the effect of Amnesty news releases on foreign aid. These variables are additional proxies for the salience of potential policy concessions from the recipient. The hypotheses tested in this section are:

*Hypothesis 4b: Recipients will receive a smaller share of donor aid as Amnesty News releases increase, and this effect will be more pronounced as geographical distance between the donor and recipient increases.*

*Hypothesis 5b: Recipients will receive a smaller share of donor aid as Amnesty News releases increase, and this effect will be less pronounced as the recipient's population increases.*

*Hypothesis 6b: Recipients will receive a smaller share of donor aid as Amnesty News releases increase, but this relationship is less pronounced if the recipient is a former colony of the donor.*


**Table 6-3: Human Rights Mediated by AINR: Modified by Other Salience Variables**

	Model 4b Modifying Variable: Distance	Model 5b Modifying Variable: Recipient Population	Model 6b Modifying Variable: Colony
AINR	0.120 (0.111)	-0.022 (0.052)	-0.021** (0.010)
Distance, logged	-0.053*** (0.012)	--	--
AINR*Distance	-0.017 (0.013)	--	--
Recipient Population, logged	--	0.094*** (0.005)	--
AINR*R Population	--	--	--
Colony	--	--	0.410*** (0.037)
AINR*Colony	--	--	-0.053 (0.043)
Human Rights	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)
Recipient GDP/Cap	-0.108*** (0.007)	-0.108*** (0.007)	-0.108*** (0.007)
Distance	--	-0.061*** (0.011)	-0.061*** (0.011)
Recipient Population	0.094*** (0.005)	--	0.094*** (0.005)
Egypt	0.078 (0.053)	0.081 (0.053)	0.081 (0.053)
Israel	0.128* (0.068)	0.135** (0.069)	0.137** (0.068)
Colony	0.389*** (0.033)	0.389*** (0.033)	--
Recipient Winning Coalition	0.105*** (0.023)	0.105*** (0.023)	0.105*** (0.023)
Share Aid, lagged	0.826*** (0.003)	0.826*** (0.003)	0.826*** (0.003)
Constant	-0.652*** (0.125)	-0.583*** (0.117)	-0.583*** (0.113)
# of Observations	27, 497	27, 497	27, 497
R <sup>2</sup>	0.78	0.78	0.78

\*\*\* p<0.01 \*\* p<0.05 \* p<0.1  
Standard Errors in parentheses

With respect to these measures of the potential salience of policy concessions - distance, recipient population, and colonial status - there is additional evidence that NGO mobilization mediates the effect of human rights on foreign aid and, further, that this effect is conditional on the potential value of the policy concession. In each of these models, the direct effect of human rights is indistinguishable from zero (see Table 6-3).<sup>52</sup> The modifying effect of distance is as predicted; recipients who are further away from the donor are more likely to be punished - by receiving a smaller share of aid - than closer recipients. As illustrated in Figure 6-4, a one percent increase in Amnesty news releases corresponds to a 3.4% decrease in share of aid received by the recipient when it is far from the donor (distance is one standard deviation above the mean).

**Figure 6-4: Marginal Effect of NGO Mobilization, Modified by Distance Between Donor & Recipient**




<sup>52</sup> At the same time, the marginal effect of AINR is not significant across a wide range of distance or population values. This implies that the modifying variables of distance and population are responsible for much of the causal story.



The modifying effect of recipient population is relatively flat, as seen in Figure 6-5, but is statistically significant for medium levels of recipient population. For these recipients, a one percent increase in Amnesty news releases reduces the recipient's share of aid by 2.3%. Finally, the conditional effect of former colonial status is contrary to the expectations in *Hypothesis 6b*. The marginal effect of Amnesty news releases is negative and statistically significant whether the recipient was a colony of the donor, but the marginal effect is higher for former colonies (7.4% compared to 2.1%).

**Figure 6-5: Marginal Effect of NGO Mobilization, Modified by Recipient Population**



### 6.3 The Effect of Political Institutions

Finally, I test whether donor political institutions influence how responsive donors are to NGO pressure. I expect that donors with larger district magnitudes will be more likely to punish recipients who are subject to AI news releases. I argued in Chapter 3 that the promotion of human rights abroad is largely a national public good and, therefore, I expect systems that emphasize the allocation of national public goods - over regional ones - would be more likely to punish human rights violators who are subject to

NGO mobilization. Further, anecdotally, Green parties have heralded human rights as a foreign policy objective. I expect systems with larger district magnitudes, which encourage the formation of multi-party systems, to be more likely to incorporate human rights into foreign aid decision-making. This leads to the following hypothesis:

*Hypothesis 7b: Recipients will receive a smaller share of donor aid as Amnesty News releases increase, and this effect will be more pronounced as the donor's district magnitude increases.*

**Table 6-4: Human Rights Mediated by AINR: Modified by Donor District Magnitude**

	Model 7b Modifying Variable: Donor District Magnitude
AINR, logged	-0.026* (0.015)
Donor District Magnitude, logged	0.035 (0.024)
AINR*DM	0.002 (0.006)
Human Rights	-0.003 (0.003)
Recipient GDP/Cap	-0.106*** (0.008)
Distance	-0.061*** (0.011)
Recipient Population	0.091*** (0.005)
Egypt	0.075 (0.055)
Israel	0.117* (0.070)
Colony	0.382*** (0.033)
Recipient Winning Coalition	0.104*** (0.024)
Share Aid, lagged	0.829*** (0.003)
Constant	-0.619*** (0.122)
# of Observations	25,981
R <sup>2</sup>	0.78


\*\*\* p<0.01 \*\* p<0.05 \* p<0.1  
Standard Errors in parentheses

In Table 6-4, I present the initial results of the following model, which includes the interactive term for Amnesty news releases and district magnitude:

**Equation 10:**  $Foreign\ Aid = \beta_0 + \beta_1 AINR + \beta_2 DM + \beta_3 AINR * DM + \beta_4 HR + \beta_5 RecipientGDP/Cap + \beta_6 \ln Distance + \beta_7 \ln Rpop + \beta_8 Egypt + \beta_9 Israel + \beta_{10} Colony + \beta_{11} RecipientWinningCoalition + \beta_{12} LaggedDV + \epsilon$

The direct effect of human rights continues to be not statistically significant, as it was in the previous mediated models. Again, this provides at least some support for my hypothesis that the effect of human rights is mediated by NGO pressure. The modifying effect of donor district magnitude runs counter to my expectation. In fact, small district magnitude donors appear more likely to punish recipients by giving a smaller share of aid. The marginal effect of Amnesty news releases on foreign aid is negative and statistically significant for donors with logged district magnitudes less than about 2.5. These donors give about 2.5% less aid to recipients for a one percent increase in Amnesty news releases (Figure 6-6).

**Figure 6-6: Marginal Effect of NGO Mobilization, Modified by Donor District Magnitude**



#### **6.4 Conclusion**

Although the total effect of human rights in the mediated model is very small, it is statistically significant. In the mediated models, the direct effect of human rights was consistently not statistically significant. This provides, at least some evidence, that the effect of human rights is mediated through NGO pressure. This suggests that, rather than responding to the actual human rights conditions in recipient countries, policymakers act when there is NGO pressure to do so. One important step for future research is to develop additional measures of NGO pressure. Although Amnesty International is a trustworthy and reliable NGO, it still operates under strategic constraints and limited resources (Ron, Ramos, and Rodgers 2005). To further its mission, it requires resources and visibility, which sometimes means reporting on states with higher visibility - namely richer and more powerful states - and paying less attention to other violators. A more comprehensive measure of NGO pressure is, therefore, one important step for future work.

The other set of findings in this chapter shows that NGO pressure appears to be conditional on the potential importance of the recipient in terms of the value of policy concessions. Although this is not true for all measures of salience I employed in this chapter, I do find that donors are less likely to punish recipients who have potential strategic value, as measured by security alignment. Donors also give a smaller share of aid to recipients who are subject to NGO mobilization provided they are not significant oil exporters. The measures of salience that Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009) employ - distance, recipient population, and colony - all appear to modify the effect of Amnesty news releases on foreign aid, although not always in the direction I predicted. Donors are less likely to punish recipients who are geographically close, as predicted. However,

donors are also less likely to punish recipients with smaller populations and those that are not former colonies, two results that run counter to my expectations. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009) argue that former colonies and recipients with larger populations are more salient to donors; I would expect, therefore, that donors would be least likely to punish recipients with these characteristics. My results did not support this; instead donors are more likely to punish medium and large population recipients and former colonies.

One possible explanation for these findings is that some of these measures of salience also proxy for the leverage that a donor has in a recipient country. Donors may actually be more likely to punish recipients with whom they have closer ties because the donor feels that its efforts may be more successful in countries with which it has a stronger relationship. Another important step for future research is to identify a way to parse out these various effects: salience and leverage.

## **Chapter 7 Conclusion**

### ***7.1 What is the role of Human Rights in Foreign Aid?***

This dissertation asked, under what conditions do donors condition foreign aid decisions on human rights conditions in the recipient country? Most literature on foreign aid finds that donors tend to focus on “donor interest” factors in making aid decisions, with the objective of advancing economic and strategic foreign policy goals. My objective in this dissertation was to build upon this existing literature and identify the conditions under which donors incorporate the promotion of human rights abroad into their broader foreign aid agenda. I argued that donors are most likely to punish human rights violators when the opportunity cost of doing so is low and NGOs have mobilized to create an incentive for policymakers to act. The opportunity cost of acting will be low, I argued, when donors do not seek salient policy concessions from the recipient. For example, when there are few security and economic ties between the donor and recipient, the donor is more likely to punish a recipient whose human rights record has been attacked by an NGO. In addition, I presented an argument that political institutions matter. In particular, electoral rules that encourage the representation of niche interests and allocation of national public goods will be more likely to incorporate human rights into foreign policy objectives.

### ***7.2 Findings and Contributions to the Literature***

One important contribution of this dissertation is a theoretically developed explanation for the role of NGOs. Existing literature (c.f. Gillies 1996; Barratt 2008)

recognizes that NGOs play a role in human rights foreign policy, but does not provide a detailed theoretical rationale for the causal process. I provide a comprehensive discussion of both how and under what conditions NGOs influence policymakers to respond to human rights abuses. First, I argued that NGO pressure acts in a mediating role and that policymakers, rather than responding directly to human rights abuses, respond when NGOs shine a light on abuses. Although the relationships are not strong, the empirical results do provide preliminary support that Amnesty International (AI) news releases mediate the effect of human rights on foreign aid, both at the gate-keeping and allocation stages. Once I account for the mediating role of Amnesty news releases, the direct effect of the human rights score in the recipient country is no longer significant in most of the models I present. The causal story linking human rights conditions to foreign aid, therefore, depends on the mobilization efforts of Amnesty International. The reason for this, I argue, is that leaders act primarily to avoid the appearance of complicity with violators. By publicizing abuses, Amnesty International activates the “mobilization of shame” and, under certain conditions, lead to donors taking action.

The second component of the role of NGO pressure is the conditions under which I expect it to matter. In Chapter 3, I began with a more general discussion of foreign aid in order to place human rights as a foreign policy goal in a broader context. I then consider the conditions under which I expect states to incorporate human rights into foreign aid decision-making. Although the existing literature recognizes the relevance of donor interest variables in foreign aid giving, I argue that the importance of the strategic and economic relationship between the donor and recipient conditions NGO pressure and that this relationship is best conceptualized as an interactive one. In particular, I argue

that the effect of NGO pressure on foreign aid is conditioned by the strategic and economic value of policy concessions the donor seeks from the recipient. When policy concessions are very valuable to the donor, even strong NGO pressure is unlikely to offset the opportunity costs of punishing human rights violators. Because the salience of policy concessions is a difficult concept to measure, I employ six different proxies to capture the value of policy concessions. In Chapter 3, I hypothesize that three measures - alignment, donor export share, and recipient petroleum exports - will condition the effect of AI news releases. I also include three measures of salience introduced by Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009): geographical distance between recipient and donor, recipient population, and former colonial status.

Overall, I find that donors do react when Amnesty International draws attention to human rights abuses. The marginal effect of AI news releases on foreign aid is negative at both the gate-keeping and allocation stages in most of the models tested in this dissertation. Even in some instances that I did not expect, the marginal effect of Amnesty news releases on foreign aid is negative. For example, I expected close strategic allies to receive aid even if their rights abuses were highlighted by Amnesty International (*Hypothesis 1a*). In fact, the opposite was true; strategic allies were less likely to receive aid as Amnesty news releases increases compared to countries not closely aligned with the donor. Similarly, I expected high petroleum-exporting countries to continue to receive aid even under NGO scrutiny (*Hypothesis 3a*). Instead, it was precisely these countries that were less likely to receive aid as the number of Amnesty news releases increased.



Amnesty news releases no longer have an effect on the likelihood a country receives aid under two conditions: when the recipient is geographically close to the donor (*Hypothesis 4a*) or is a former colony of the donor (*Hypothesis 6a*). At the allocation level, Amnesty news releases no longer reduce the share of aid a recipient receives if the recipient is a close strategic ally of the donor (*Hypothesis 1b*), is a significant oil exporter (*Hypothesis 3b*), or is geographically close (*Hypothesis 4b*). Under these conditions, the opportunity cost of forgoing a policy concession is too high. These findings were consistent with my theoretical expectations.

### **7.3 Gate-keeping versus Allocation Decision-Making**

A puzzle arises from my empirical findings when I compare the results of the two dependent variables. Many of the modifying variables have different effects at the gate-keeping stage than the allocation stage. This suggests that there are certain causal mechanisms at work at the selection stage. Once a recipient has been selected, however, different causal mechanisms tell the story at the allocation stage.

**Table 7-1: Table of Results**

	Gate-keeping Stage DV: Any Aid	Allocation Stage DV: Share of Aid
Mediation Hypothesis	Mostly supported (6 of 7 models)	Supported
Hypothesis 1 (Alignment)	Not supported	Supported
Hypothesis 2 (Export Share)	Not supported	Not supported
Hypothesis 3 (Recipient Oil Export)	Not supported	Supported
Hypothesis 4 (Distance)	Supported	Supported
Hypothesis 5 (Recipient Population)	Not supported	Not supported
Hypothesis 6 (Former Colony)	Supported	Not supported
Hypothesis 7 (Donor DM)	Not supported	Not supported

In Table 7-1, I briefly list the results of my hypotheses. In three cases - export share, distance, and population - were the results for the modifying variables for policy concession salience consistent across the two dependent variables. In the remaining models, the results point in opposite directions at the gate-keeping and allocation stages. First, I hypothesized that donors with security ties to recipients would be less likely to punish them. This seems to hold at the allocation stage; donors give less aid to recipients who are subject to Amnesty news releases only if they are not strategic allies. At the gate-keeping stage, however, this relationship is reversed. Donors are less likely to give aid to countries subject to Amnesty news releases when they are strategic allies. The same pattern emerged with respect to recipient oil exports. I predicted that donors would be unlikely to punish recipients who are significant petroleum exporters. This is only true at the allocation stage.

On the other hand, one modifying variable exhibits the opposite pattern. The hypothesis for colonial status is supported at the gate-keeping stage, but not supported at the allocation stage. I expected that donors would be less likely to punish former colonies even if they are subject to Amnesty news releases. I did find that former colonies are less likely to receive aid as Amnesty news releases increase. The negative marginal effect of Amnesty news releases on the amount of aid former colonies receive is higher than it is for recipients who are not former colonies, suggesting that former colonies are punished at the allocation stage more than non-former colonies.

One possible explanation for the opposing findings may rest with the opportunity cost associated with the two different punishments. If foreign aid is used to buy policy concessions, then withholding aid entirely means that the donor loses access to the policy

concession. On the other hand, allocating a smaller share of aid may simply mean the donor is purchasing a less valuable policy concession.<sup>53</sup> Withholding aid at the gate-keeping stage is a harder-line stance than allocating a smaller share of aid and, consequently, has a higher opportunity cost associated with it. The results, therefore, may suggest that donors put different weights on the various types of policy concessions at the two decision-making stages.

A related explanation, one that I discuss in the Future Research section below, is that some of these variables may be measuring the leverage that a donor has over a recipient. For example, donors may punish strategic allies by withholding aid because the donor perceives that the potential effectiveness is higher than the same punishment towards a country with whom it is not strategically tied. However, once the decision to give aid has been made, the donor will be less likely to punish strategic allies to avoid the opportunity cost in terms of policy concessions. As I discuss below, an important next step is to parse out the effects of these measures to distinguish between characteristics that increase the donor's leverage over the recipient from those that increase the salience of policy concessions for the donor.

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<sup>53</sup> Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009) use the example of the United States attempting to buy a policy concession from Turkey to help prosecute the war in Iraq. The U.S. may have ultimately preferred to have access to bases in Turkey, but this was a policy concession Turkey was not willing to give (because it was too costly domestically for Turkey). The U.S. still used foreign aid to buy a policy concession - ability to rescue downed pilots out of NATO bases in Turkey - because it was cheaper. This example illustrates how donors can essentially select from a range of policy concessions that fit (a) what the donor is willing to spend and (b) what the recipient is willing to sell. Therefore, a donor may punish a human rights violator by giving it less aid, but the opportunity cost is that the donor is buying a less valuable policy concession than it would have otherwise. Although this is certainly an opportunity cost, it is a smaller cost than getting no policy concession.

#### ***7.4 Future Research***

The findings in this dissertation suggest that human rights do influence foreign aid, although perhaps not in the way expected by other scholars. One reason for the inconsistent existing empirical findings may be because scholars have missed the mediating role that NGOs play. If it is true that policymakers respond more when violations are publicized through NGOs, then simply looking at human rights conditions misses this important causal story. With future research, I would want to produce a more comprehensive measure for NGO pressure that mitigates the selection problems inherent in the Amnesty measure. This would provide an additional test for the mediation hypothesis. Since state power is a significant determinant of Amnesty news releases (Ron, Ramos, and Rodgers 2005), this may confound the results. The exact countries that Amnesty is reporting on are the same that donors may be reluctant to punish because of economic or strategic ties. A more comprehensive measure that takes into account other NGO activity or other forms of pressure may produce different results.

It will also be important to parse out the potentially confounding effects of my measures of policy concession value. I chose these measures as ones that capture the value a donor places on its relationship with the recipient, either in a strategic or economic sense. It is possible, however, that these same measures also depict the influence a donor has over a particular recipient. For example, on the one hand, security alignment may serve as a proxy for strategic policy concessions - such as flyover rights or access to bases - a donor may purchase from a recipient. At the same time, however, a donor may also interpret this same relationship to suggest that it can influence the recipient to change its human rights behavior. In the latter case, I might expect donors to

be more likely to punish recipients who are strategically close. The same could be true for measures of economic ties. A critical piece of future research would require parsing out these two competing effects to identify measures that more succinctly capture the value of the policy concessions to the donor. As I discussed in the previous section, this may also have important implications for the causal mechanisms at different stages of decision-making.

Another important step for future work is to conduct donor-by-donor analyses. This set of analyses is important to examine whether donors react differently to human rights violations, conditional on the salience of policy concessions. For example, much of the literature on human rights and foreign aid expect the Nordic countries to place a greater premium on human rights (c.f. Olsen 1998; Gates & Hoeffler 2004). Many also assume that the United States, as a superpower, approaches foreign aid differently (c.f. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009).

Finally, my results with respect to political institutions failed to support either the gate-keeping hypothesis (*Hypothesis 7a*) or the allocation hypothesis (*Hypothesis 7b*). Donors with larger district magnitudes were actually less likely to withhold aid to countries who were subject to Amnesty publicity (contrary to *Hypothesis 7a*). District magnitude did not have much of an impact on the marginal effect of Amnesty news releases on the share of aid a recipient received. The small effect that was present also ran counter to my hypothesis (*Hypothesis 7b*); donors with small district magnitudes gave less aid to recipients as the number of Amnesty news releases increased. Although I believe that incorporating a discussion of political institutions is an important contribution of this dissertation, future research needs to reconsider the role of political

institutions. One alternative approach is to use the concept of veto players. Foreign aid policy tends to persist: whether aid was given in a previous year and previous levels of aid largely determine aid in the following year.<sup>54</sup> Changes to foreign aid policy, therefore, require a change to the status quo. The underlying principle of the veto players theory is that as the number of veto players - those actors who must agree to a policy change - increases, the status quo becomes more stable (Tsebelis 2002). Future research could address this alternative political institutions argument: are donors with fewer veto players more likely to punish human rights violators as NGO pressure increases?

### ***7.5 Conclusion***

I began this dissertation asking under what conditions do donors punish human rights violators by withholding or restricting foreign aid. Although the substantive influence of human rights may be small relative to other foreign policy goals, there is evidence that human rights do have an impact on foreign aid decision-making through NGO mobilization. The preliminary finding that NGO pressure matters is important not only as a theoretical explanation, but also as a practical finding for those seeking to influence foreign aid policy. The findings of this dissertation help to understand how and when NGO pressure can influence foreign aid decision-making. Advocates for human rights may be better able to harness the power of NGOs to pressure donors to punish human rights violators.

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<sup>54</sup> The correlation between AnyAid<sub>t-1</sub> and AnyAid<sub>t</sub> is 0.81 and the correlation between ShareAid<sub>t-1</sub> and ShareAid<sub>t</sub> is 0.89.

## Appendix

**Table A- 1: Mediated Model, Without Modifying Variables**

	DV: Any Aid Mediated Model
AINR, logged	-0.221*** (0.018)
Human Rights	-0.001 (0.004)
R GDP/Cap, logged	-0.199*** (0.009)
Distance, logged	-0.129*** (0.013)
Recipient population, logged	0.143*** (0.006)
Egypt	0.011 (0.088)
Israel	0.076 (0.088)
Colony	0.745*** (0.060)
Recipient winning coalition	0.178*** (0.031)
Donor GDP/cap, logged	0.428*** (0.033)
Spline 1	0.017*** (0.001)
Spline 2	-0.029*** (0.001)
Spline 3	0.024*** (0.001)
Previous Failure	0.163*** (0.003)
Constant	-2.939*** (0.357)
# of Observations	41, 834
R <sup>2</sup>	0.45

\*\*\* p<0.01 \*\* p<0.05 \* p<0.1  
Standard Errors in parentheses

**Table A- 2: Mediated Model, Without Modifying Variables**

	DV: Share of Aid Mediated Model
AINR, logged	-0.023** (0.009)
Human Rights	-0.004 (0.003)
R GDP/Cap, logged	-0.108*** (0.007)
Distance, logged	-0.061*** (0.011)
Recipient population, logged	0.094*** (0.005)
Egypt	0.081 (0.053)
Israel	0.135 (0.068)
Colony	0.389*** (0.033)
Recipient winning coalition	0.105*** (0.023)
Lagged DV	0.826*** (0.003)
Constant	-0.582*** (0.113)
# of Observations	27, 497
R <sup>2</sup>	0.78

\*\*\* p<0.01 \*\* p<0.05 \* p<0.1  
Standard Errors in parentheses



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