

**Character and Rhetorical Strategy: Philip II of Macedonia in
Fourth Century Athens**

by

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Philip II, the man who conquered the Greek world and initiated a new age in the history of the Mediterranean, remains something of a mystery despite the breadth and variety of source material concerning his life. Indeed, in some ways the plethora of sources has complicated rather than clarified assessments of Philip. The ancients themselves came to widely differing conclusions in attempting to understand what kind of a man could take Macedonia from a backwater kingdom to the verge of being the most powerful nation in the known world. Modern scholarship has largely followed suit. Assessments of Philip's character and abilities have ranged from claims that he was the greatest king of Europe to comparisons with Hitler.¹ Evaluations of his historical importance in relation to his more famous – but perhaps no more singular or brilliant – son Alexander have only exacerbated the problem.²

¹ The former was the assessment of Diodorus Siculus; *Diod.* 16.95.1; a more measured but in principle similar conclusion was recently reached by Worthington: see Ian Worthington, *Philip II of Macedonia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008): 187-203 and Nicholas G. L. Hammond, *Philip of Macedon* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994): 188-91. On Philip as Hitler (or perhaps more properly on Hitler as Philip) see A. M. Adam, "Philip alias Hitler," *Greece & Rome* 10 (1941). That paper was only written in 1941; it is by no means, however, alone in seeing parallels between the two: see John Buckler and Hans Beck, *Central Greece and the Politics of Power in the Fourth Century B.C.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008): 253. The question of Philip's motives in his dealings with Greece have largely centered around his sincerity in negotiating peace with Athens in 346 BCE, which has been portrayed as either a sincere attempt to establish peace or a backhanded way of assuring Athens' unreadiness for Philip's incursion into central Greece. See for example T. T. B. Ryder, "The Diplomatic Skills of Philipp II," in *Ventures into Greek History: Essays in Honour of N. G. L. Hammond*, ed. Ian Worthington (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) and M. M. Markle, "The Strategy of Philip in 346 B.C.," *Classical Quarterly* 24 (1974).

² So for example Worthington, *Philip II*, 203: "Philip was a charismatic leader whose merits far outweighed his faults, though the latter were plentiful... he deserves to live beyond the shadow of his more famous son."

This study turns away from the traditional questions posed by biographers of Philip and historians of late 4th century Macedonia.³ I focus instead to the responses elicited by Philip's unprecedented career in the Athenian world, the same impressions from which our own interpretations of Philip are largely derived. I examine these responses as the product of a complex interaction between culturally-loaded symbolic categories and historical reality. For Philip - Macedonian but also Hellenic; king but also member of the Amphictyony; political outsider but also conqueror of Greece – was, above all, an individual who broke culturally-assigned identity categories.⁴ How then did Philip fit – or not - into the Greek, and specifically Athenian, cognitive framework? How, in short, did Athenians understand Philip's rise to power?

The study of the political response to Philip's rise is made possible, but also inevitably delimited by, the source material available. The late 4th century is rich with evidence for the Athenian political discourse concerning Philip's Macedonia. It includes speeches delivered by Demosthenes, Aeschines, and Hyperides as well as Isocrates' and Speusippus' pamphlets and letters. The variety of approaches the orators employed in discussing Macedonian policy allows us to develop a coherent picture of the political and

³ For biographies of Philip see most recently Worthington, *Philip II*; also Hammond, *Philip of Macedon*; Gerhard Wirth, *Philipp II* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1985); G. Cawkwell, *Philip of Macedon* (London: Faber & Faber, 1978); J. R. Ellis, *Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism* (London: Thames & Hudson, 1976); Paul Cloché, *Un Fondateur d'empire: Philippe II, roi de Macédoine* (Saint Étienne: Éditions Dumas, 1955); A. Momigliano, *Filippo il Macedone* (Firenze: Le Monnier, 1934).

⁴ On the construction of Greek identity against the image of a barbarian "Other" see especially Lynette Mitchell, *Panhellenism and the Barbarian in Archaic and Classical Greece* (Swansea: Classical Press of Wales, 2007); Thomas Harrison, ed., *Greeks and Barbarians* (New York: Routledge, 2002); Jonathan Hall, *Hellenicity. Between Ethnicity and Culture* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002); Irad Malkin, ed., *Ancient Perceptions of Greek Ethnicity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001); Jonathan Hall, *Ethnic Identity in Greek Antiquity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Pericles Georges, *Barbarian Asia and the Greek Experience. From the Archaic Age to the Age of Xenophon* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press: 1994); Jacqueline de Romilly, "Les Barbares dans la Pensée de la Grèce Classique," *Phoenix* 47 (1993): 283-292; Edith Hall, *Inventing the Barbarian. Greek Self-Definition through Tragedy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); François Hartog, *The Mirror of Herodotus. The Representation of the Other in the Writing of History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).

sociological framework within which the ‘problem’ of Philip was addressed. Notably, both a popular view – as articulated in the speeches of Demosthenes, Aeschines, and Hyperides, all delivered before a popular audience – and an elite view - as articulated by Isocrates and Speusippus – are represented. I will show that the popular and the elite views of Philip had much in common in terms of the rhetorical resources upon which they drew; what primarily separated their views of Philip’s rise was their approach to national versus panhellenic ideals. The public orators spoke to a body of Athenians, and thus their rhetorical framework was Athenian; the philosophers, on the other hand, addressed themselves to a panhellenic audience and therefore preferred to emphasize the shared elite values of the Hellenic aristocracy, whose close personal ties had never quite been subsumed by local political loyalties.⁵ At the same time, all these individuals are Athenians (and, of course, they are all necessarily male Athenians of citizen age) and thus reflect an Athenian viewpoint even when articulating a larger, panhellenic agenda.

This study focuses on the Athenian perspective on Philip. Because of this admittedly self-imposed limitation, I have not dealt in depth with Theopompus’ *Philippica*, even though his account is central to Philippic studies in general.⁶ As a Chian who seems to have had no love lost for Athens, Theopompus’ impressions stand quite apart from Athenian discourse. I have, however, noted Theopompus’ scathing eyewitness report of Philip’s character and habits in some instances where it dovetails with the portrait of Philip presented by Demosthenes. Such parallels hint that some Athenian responses to Philip would have found agreement among other, non-Athenian

⁵ See especially Hall, *Hellenicity*, ch. 6 on the interplay between Hellenic and national identities and elite international relations; notably, Hall argues that suspicions of Medizing were aimed at the Greek elite rather than the Persian Other.

⁶ On Theopompus see Michael Flower, *Theopompus of Chios: History and Rhetoric in the Fourth Century BC* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).

voices of the Hellenic world; indeed, I will also argue that Isocrates' portrayal of Philip was meant to appeal to a wider Hellenic audience. Considering such parallels would form a natural continuation of my project, though it is unfortunately outside of its current scope. Inasmuch as one of my main goals here is to look at the nature of Athenian political discourse via interpretations of Philip's character, Theopompus will play only a minor role in the following discussion.

A central premise of my argument is that explanations of Philip's rise to power are to be sought in articulations of his ἦθος. That is, interpretations of an individual's political action - in this case Philip's - were founded on interpretations of his 'character', loosely defined as his social and cultural identity melded with his unique individuality.⁷ *Ethopoieia* was a key component of Greek rhetoric that served not only to affect the emotions of the audience but also to provide a key 'proof' of the plot as narrated by a litigant. So, for example, the gravity of Meidias' punch – and therefore of Demosthenes' suit - hinged on Meidias' elite socio-economic standing, an identity that was associated with hubristic tendencies.⁸ Demosthenes' reinterpretation of Meidias' action allowed him to tap into widely-held Athenian fears over aristocratic behavior. In much the same

⁷ For a history of ἦθος through Aristotle see Frédérique Woerther, "Aux Origines de la Notion Rhétorique d'ἦθος," *Revue des études grecques* 118 (2005) and Eckart Schüettrumpf, "The Model for the Concept of Ethos in Aristotle's Rhetoric," *Philologus* 137 (1993). Aristotle's discussion of ἦθος is too limiting to be truly useful in this case, however, as he only deals with character as it applies to the speaker himself in an effort to persuade the audience: see William Fortenbaugh, "Aristotle on Persuasion through Character," *Rhetorica* 10 (1992). Jeremy Trevett, "Aristotle's Knowledge of Athenian Oratory," *Classical Quarterly* 46 (1996), discusses the philosopher's general lack of engagement with the "practical" (i.e., forensic and deliberative) branches of oratory.

⁸ See Donald Russell, "Ethos in Oratory and Rhetoric," in *Characterization and Individuality in Greek Literature* ed. Christopher Pelling (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990): 197-212 and A. R. Dyck, "The Function and Persuasive Power of Demosthenes' Portrait of Aeschines in the Speech *On the Crown*," *Greece and Rome* 32 (1985). On Demosthenes' *Against Meidias* see Douglas McDowell, ed. and trans., *Demosthenes: Against Meidias* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990). See also Jon Hesk, "The Rhetoric of Anti-rhetoric in Athenian Oratory," in Simon Goldhill and Robin Osborne, eds., *Performance Culture and Athenian Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), concerning the susceptibility of professional orators to being characterized by their peers as greedy logographers or manipulative sophists.

way, Philip's success and ultimate power over the Greek world demanded *ethopoieic* explanations. By rearticulating Philip's character through shared culturally-assigned categories, orators attempted to impose a particular narrative on the historical situation and thereby impel the Athenians to adopt a course of action fitted to that narrative. As I will show, these narratives could be quite different: while Demosthenes, for example, presented Philip as a barbarian diametrically opposed to everything the city of Athens stood for, Aeschines could laud the king as a philhellene quite at home with Athenian social *mores*. Nevertheless, each characterization of Philip, directed at Athens' citizen body and articulated by statesmen competing against one another for prominence and prestige, should be analyzed as a (re)articulation of Athenian values.⁹

At the same time, each political speech was part of a larger, ongoing discussion within the Athenian political realm. Modern political theorists have shown that once an issue is framed in reference to a certain value, continued deliberation tends to employ the same frame – and that this is true for both proponents and opponents of the issue.¹⁰

⁹ I am in fundamental agreement with Josiah Ober, *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens: Rhetoric, Ideology, and the Power of the People* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), that the mostly elite professional statesmen addressing the *demos* were constrained by the norms of popular rhetoric and ideology and with his further argument in *Political Dissent in Democratic Athens: Intellectual Critics of Popular Rule* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998) that elite criticism of democracy took place for the most part from within an Athenian discourse and without impinging upon their basic loyalty to the city. On elite conformity to popular norms see also Mogens H. Hansen, *The Athenian Assembly in the Age of Demosthenes* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), pp. 85-86. At the same time, the parallels between intellectuals typically characterized as elites, such as Thucydides and Isocrates, and public speakers such as Demosthenes, make it clear that ideas percolated between popular and elite rather than flowing either from the bottom up or from the top down.

¹⁰ Framing and framing effects has been widely studied by political scientists in recent years. See especially Dennis Chong and Paul Druckman, "Framing Theory," *Annual Review of Political Science* 10 (2007); Paul R. Brewer and Kimberly Gross, "Framing and Citizens' Thoughts about Policy Issues: Effects on Content and Quality," *Political Psychology* 26 (2005); James N. Druckman and Kjersten R. Nelson, "Framing and Deliberation: How Citizens' Conversations Limit Elite Influence," *American Journal of Political Science* 47 (2003); James N. Druckman, "On the Limits of Framing Effects," *Journal of Politics* 63 (2001); William A. Gamson, *Talking Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Interest in comparing modern and ancient discursive norms is prominent in the work of Josiah Ober, especially *Democracy and Knowledge. Innovation and Learning in Classical Athens* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). See also Hesk, *The Rhetoric of Anti-rhetoric*, 201-208; Josiah Ober and Charles Hendrick,

Testing this hypothesis for Athenian politics is, it is true, difficult because of our lack of source material: even for most of the extant court cases, where we would most expect a directly confrontational rhetoric to emerge, we have only one side of the story; and for debates in the *ekklesia*, where presumably more than just two opinions would have been voiced on any given topic, we are never privy to more than a single point of view in any given debate. Unfortunate as well is the fact that in the two court cases where we do have both sides (that concerning the embassy to Philip and that concerning Demosthenes' crowning in the theater), there are discrepancies between what each side says his opponent is going to say - or even what each side says his opponent *has* said - and the actual content of the opposing speech. The existence of such obvious untruths in the representation of others' forensic speeches - where an orator would have the greatest likelihood of being caught in such a lie - have led some scholars to the conclusion that the speeches are entirely unreliable in their accounts of the historical and political atmosphere in which they were ostensibly delivered.¹¹

I do not believe, however, that the picture need be quite so bleak. In the rest of the introduction I would like to focus on two instances where we are given some inkling of the orators' method of persuasion. The first is the newly discovered Hyperides' *Against Diondas*, which features several startling parallels to Demosthenes' *On the Crown*; the second is contained in Aeschines' *On the Embassy* and concerns

eds., *Demokratia. A Conversation on Democracies, Ancient and Modern* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996) and the essays in J. Peter Euben et al., eds., *Athenian Political Thought and the Reconstruction of American Democracy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994).

¹¹ See Ian Worthington, "Greek Oratory, Revision of Speeches, and the Problem of Historical Reliability," *Classica et Mediaevalia* 42 (1991); P. Harding, "Rhetoric and Politics in fourth-century Athens," *Phoenix* 41 (1987), also argues for heavy revision of the speeches prior to their publication. The length of some speeches - particularly of Demosthenes' *On the Crown*, which is 324 sections long - is another argument used in favor of extensive revision. See also K. J. Dover, *Lysias and the Corpus Lysiacum* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968) 167-170.

Demosthenes' manipulation of the claims made by his rival Ctesiphon. I hope to show that from such instances as these we can get an inkling of how the give and take of Athenian political debate might have actually sounded like. While the orality of ekklesiastic debate has recently become a matter of increased interest, and work on the fora for Athenian political discussion have also increased our knowledge of the physical setting in which policy decisions were made, narratives within the speeches themselves which detail such debates have, on the whole, been underutilized.¹² Such narratives, though they need not be taken literally, nevertheless disclose the rich texture of Athenian political life, in which each speech, shaped by ideology as much as by historical and political exigencies, became a layer in the ever-growing and ever-changing discourse at the heart of Athens' democracy.¹³

But while consistency and accuracy were certainly not in and of themselves priorities for Athenian politicians, the discovery of Hyperides' *Against Diondas*, which contains startling parallels to Demosthenes' *On the Crown*, prompts a reanalysis of such evidence as we do have.¹⁴ Instances where the orators reflect on a prior argument and others in which they describe their opponents' arguments should be studied for the

¹² For discussions of the spoken nature of Athenian politics see especially Judith Tacon, "Ecclesiastic 'Thorubos': Interventions, Interruptions, and Popular Involvement in the Athenian assembly," *Greece & Rome* 48 (2001); Adriaan Lanni, "Spectator Sport or Serious Justice? οἱ περιστηκότες and the Athenian Lawcourts," *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 117 (1997); Edith Hall, "Lawcourt Dramas: the Power of Performance in Greek Forensic Oratory," *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies of the University of London* 40 (1995); and C. Joachim Classen, "The Speeches in the Courts of Law: A Three-cornered Dialogue," *Rhetorica* 9 (1991). On the physical settings in which orators spoke see especially Mogens Herman Hansen, *The Athenian Assembly in the Age of Demosthenes* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987) and Alan L. Boegehold, *The Athenian Agora. Results of Excavations conducted by the American School of Classical Studies at Athens* (Princeton: American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1995).

¹³ On the way orators manipulated even seemingly straightforward narratives see especially E. Badian and Julia Heskell, "Aeschines 2.12-18: A Study in Rhetoric and Chronology," *Phoenix* 41 (1987).

¹⁴ See for example Judson Herrman, "Hyperides' *Against Diondas* and the rhetoric of revolt," *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 52 (2009) and S. C. Todd, "Hyperides' *Against Diondas*, Demosthenes' *On the Crown*, and the Rhetoric of Political Failure," *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 52 (2009). The text is available in Chris Carey et al., "Fragments of Hyperides' *Against Diondas* from the Archimedes Palimpsest," *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 165 (2008).

methods by which the orators attempted to persuade, deride, confuse, and otherwise do what they did best: turn facts, as well as the fictions created by their peers, into useful weapons for themselves. Knowledge of the rhetor's method can also lead to an understanding of the kinds of arguments to which they were responding. In the final analysis, orators were much more prone to using material obtained from the arguments of their fellows, which they could turn to their own ends, in the course of debate than in crafting speeches "from scratch". While factual accuracy was not a priority, interaction with the themes, arguments, and even turns of phrase employed by political allies and enemies was critical. Having once arrived at this conclusion, it will become possible to situate descriptions of Philip in the orators within their appropriate political context.

The case for which Hyperides composed the *Against Diondas* was known even before the discovery of the text.¹⁵ The situation bears many similarities to Aeschines' prosecution of Ctesiphon. In 338, before the battle of Chaeronea, Hyperides and Demomeles, Demosthenes' cousin, jointly moved a proposal to crown Demosthenes for his services to the state. Their proposal was challenged in a *graphe paranomon* by Diondas, just as later Ctesiphon's proposal in 336 to crown Demosthenes would be challenged by Aeschines. Both cases would also have years to wait before finally coming to trial: Diondas' suit was probably tried in 334/3, while Aeschines' languished for six years, until 330/29.¹⁶

The Archimedes Palimpsest contains a portion of the speech Hyperides gave in defense of his and Demomeles' motion to crown Demosthenes. The extent to which the

¹⁵ Before the discovery of the papyrus, rather garbled evidence for the existence of the case was known from *Dem.* 18.222, [Plutarch] *X Or.* 848F and 846A, Eusebius *Praep. Evang.* 10.3.14-15 (i.564 Mras), and the scholia to Demosthenes 20.52.

¹⁶ Carey et al., "Fragments of Hyperides' *Against Diondas*," 3.

Against Diondas prefigures arguments used by Demosthenes four years later in the Crown speech is remarkable.¹⁷ Following up on a suggestion of Peter Rhodes, Stephen Todd posits (pp. 165-166) that *On the Crown* was not vastly innovative in its rhetorical strategy, as it had been previously thought, but was rather symptomatic of a particular strain in Athenian political discourse – of which both Hyperides’ *Against Diondas* and Demosthenes’ *On the Crown* are exponents - that attempted to come to terms with the overwhelming defeat at Chaeroneia.

To take but a single example, one of the most well known arguments in Demosthenes’ crown speech claims that fortune (τύχη) was ultimately responsible for the failure at Chaeroneia: leading, for example, to Demosthenes’ famous comparison of himself to a ship owner whose shipwreck was caused not by poor preparation on his part but by τύχη (*Dem.* 18.194); again, Demosthenes argues that he should not be blamed for the strength of a god or of τύχη, if the generals failed, or if the city was betrayed (*Dem.* 18.303). This argument from τύχη was previously seen as an innovation developed by Demosthenes; indeed, it has been acclaimed as part of the oratorical mastery of the Crown speech.¹⁸ In light of Hyperides’ *Against Diondas*, however, the argument from τύχη turns out not to be quite as innovative as had previously been supposed.¹⁹ For Hyperides, too, argues that Demosthenes deserves to be honored because τύχη, not bad policy on the part of Demosthenes, was the real reason for Athens’ defeat:

¹⁷ Todd, “Hyperides *Against Diondas*,” 165, comments on the frequency with which the decyphers of the text brought up parallels with *On the Crown*.

¹⁸ For this view of Demosthenes’ *On the Crown*, see for example Harvey Yunis, “Politics as Literature: Demosthenes and the Burden of the Past,” *Arion* 8 (2000-2001) 104.

¹⁹ Nevertheless, even if we now know that Demosthenes’ *On the Crown* was not wholly innovative in this respect, it certainly greatly expanded on this theme: τύχη occurs 29 times in the *On the Crown*, by far the most instances of any other known speech. Moreover, Demosthenes - as oppose to Hyperides - also uses τύχη to refer to his own *personal* (mis)fortune: see H. Wankel, *Demosthenes. Rede für Ktesiphon über den Kranz* (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1976) 1106 and 1174; this was evidently Demosthenes’ new twist on the theme.

δεῖ δὲ τῶν κινδύνων πάντων τὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς ὑποθέσεις εἰς τοὺς πράττοντας ἀναφέρειν, τὰ δ' ἐκ τούτων ἀποβαίνον(τα) εἰ(ς) τὴν τύχην. Διώνδας δὲ τούναντίον ἀξιοῖ γενέσθαι μὴ Δημοσθένην τῆς προαιρέσεως ἔνεκα ἐπαινέσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐμὲ τῆς τύχης ἔνεκα εὐθύν(ας) δοῦναι.

Initiatives and plans ought to be credited to those who propose them, but their outcomes credited to fortune. But Diondas thinks the opposite should happen – that Demosthenes shouldn't be praised for his policy, but that I should be held to account because of the workings of fortune. (*Ag. Dion.* p. 2, 2-9)

Other parallels in wording between Hyperides' and Demosthenes' speeches are equally striking, including the description of the Thebans welcoming the Athenians (*Hyp. Ag. Dion.* pp.1,1-6; *Dem.* 18.215) and the list of Greek traitors (*Hyp. Ag. Dion.* pp. 6,32 – 7,2 and *Dem.* 18.294-296). In sum, comparing the speeches inevitably leads to the conclusion that either Hyperides and Demosthenes were working closely together, or that the body of rhetorical *topoi* within which they were operating was stylized to such a high degree that even certain phraseology was part of its common stock – stylized enough, in any event, to leave them open to accusations of plagiarism by Porphyry (frag. 408 lines 73-85).

The argument for stylization rather than plagiarism or intensive collaboration is supported by the appearance of arguments from τύχη elsewhere. So, looking further back, τύχη is also present in Aeschines' defense of himself in the speech *On the Embassy*, long before the *Against Diondas* or the *Crown* speeches. Here too Aeschines uses the *topos* to play down the orator's influence over the outcome of a given political policy. He argues that he didn't have the power to avert the destruction of Phocis and Cersebleptes: rather, he states, τύχη and Philip are responsible for this, while he was merely responsible for his loyalty and his speech as an ambassador (*Aeschin.* 2.118). The presence of this *topos* in Aeschines' speech should alert us to the fact that the argument

from τύχη was a known part of a rhetor's arsenal long before Chaeronea.²⁰ The tension between originality and the use of familiar material apparent in the political speeches is, rather, the same as that outlined for the funeral oration by Nicole Loraux: "insofar as the *topoi* are units – necessary, but interchangeable – of civic speech, originality... has no other means of expression than through them."²¹

Yet for all that political communication was grounded in a body of shared *topoi*, it was also the product of a specific debate occurring in a particular historical context. To acknowledge that the argument from τύχη is a *topos* not original to a post-Chaeronean or Demosthenic context does not negate the particular importance it gained in that particular period, and for Demosthenes in particular. For although the argument from τύχη was employed by Aeschines, it was not at the forefront of his argument; *Aeschin.* 2.118 is, in fact, its only appearance in that speech. By contrast, Demosthenes made fortune's role a centerpiece of his defense. We do not have enough of Hyperides' *Against Diondas*, unfortunately, to say how critical τύχη was to his argument. Yet there is reason to believe, given the parallelism throughout the two speeches, that their shared use of τύχη was also more particular than the fortuitous use of a broadly shared *topos* would explain.²² What this connection between the two speeches might be is more difficult to define; at the very least, it can be reasonably argued that τύχη took on added importance and a particular meaning in the aftermath of Chaeronea for those politicians who had

²⁰ There are similar parallels in oratory that have not gone unnoticed: those between Demosthenes' *On the Crown* and Demosthenes' *Funeral Oration*, as well as the latter speech and the *Funeral Oration* of Hyperides, for example, have been remarked on by Nicole Loraux, *The Invention of Athens. the Funeral Oration in the Classical City* trans. Alan Sheridan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986) 166. Cecil Wooten, "The Ambassador's Speech. A Particularly Hellenistic Genre of Oratory," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 59 (1973), presents the similarities in the speeches of ambassadors in 4th century through Hellenistic times and argues on that basis that the ambassador speech was a highly stylized medium.

²¹ Loraux, *Invention of Athens*, 311.

²² For further parallels see Carey et al., *Fragments of Hyperides' Against Diondas*, 15-19 and Todd, *Hyperides' Against Diondas*.

advocated war with Macedonia. It would have made sense for Demosthenes and Hyperides, as long-time political allies, to work together in crafting the best speech possible in a situation such as Diondas' indictment, where a loss would have reflected badly on them both. It would also have been perfectly reasonable for Demosthenes in 336, while crafting his defense for Ctesiphon, to employ arguments that had been successful for Hyperides a few years previously.²³ All of these factors may have been at work here. We should hardly expect less from *any* group of political allies, who would have benefited from presenting a united front before the public eye. There were always precedents which an orator could call up to memory to either emulate or avoid, and always a larger framework within which the orator was operating. Conformity, not innovation, gave the speaker the greatest probability of relating to his audience in ways which they could readily understand on the basis of past experiences in the *ekklesia*. This is not to say that inventiveness was not a prized quality in speechmaking, but that originality was checked by the need to be clearly understood.²⁴ Any given political speech was part of the broader discourse that engendered it and framed the major issues at hand.

Such redeployment of arguments is apparent not only between political allies like Hyperides and Demosthenes. Political enemies, too, refashioned the arguments of their opponents to suit their narrative of events: twisting an opponent's words is arguably a

²³ Could it even be that the argument from τύχη took on a new importance in explanations of Chaeronea more broadly, and that in localizing it to Demosthenes and Hyperides we are again giving too much weight to extant sources?

²⁴ See Stephen Usher, *Greek Oratory. Tradition and Originality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), who particularly traces the orators' usage and innovation of *topoi*. The use of rhetorical *topoi* might have also made it easier to be heard by the whole assembly: their use meant that any given assemblyman need not actually hear every word the rhetor said in order to understand his meaning. For the realities of debate in the *ekklesia* see Mogens H. Hansen, *The Athenian Assembly in the Age of Demosthenes* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987): 69-72.

much more powerful tool than the invention of strawmen.²⁵ A comparison of Demosthenes' and Aeschines' speeches on the embassy of 346 and on Demosthenes' crowning have sometimes uncovered such rearticulations: so, for example, Aeschines' analogy of politicians as ferrymen at the Salamis crossing (*Aeschin.* 2.158) has been seen as fodder for Demosthenes' vivid portrayal of himself as the ship-owner whose ship is wrecked by a storm (*Aeschin.* 3.194).²⁶ But, in this case, as elsewhere, it is difficult to tell whether Demosthenes is alluding directly to his opponent's argument or not: both images may simply derive from the oft-used "ship of state" analogy, without any more specific implication. We gain firmer ground in the narrative passages of Aeschines' *On the Embassy*. Here Aeschines portrays Demosthenes employing fancy rhetorical footwork to satirize the other ambassadors. These provide some of our best evidence for what Athenian political debate might have been like.

After his account of the meeting between the ambassadors and Philip, Aeschines recounts the ambassadors' opinions concerning the king. He also narrates their report of the meeting and their impressions of Philip to the Athenian *ekklesia*.²⁷ I will consider Aeschines' full account of this episode later (pp. 136-161). Right now, only the comments of one ambassador in particular, Ctesiphon, need concern us. Over the course of *On the Embassy* Aeschines will show us how Demosthenes gradually reduced Ctesiphon's remarks into utter nonsense in an effort to discredit the ambassadors. Thus

²⁵ See also Hesk, *Rhetoric of Anti-rhetoric*, on the orators' uses of 'spin'. Hesk focuses on the orators' characterization of their opponents as logographers and sophists and their defenses against such attacks.

²⁶ Stephen Usher, *Demosthenes. On the Crown* (Warminster: Aris & Phillips, 1993): 237; Harvey Yunis, *Demosthenes. On the Crown* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001): 216; Wankel, *Rede für Ktesiphon*, 915.

²⁷ This is the so-called first embassy of 346 BC, sent to Philip with the purpose of sounding out his sentiments on a peace treaty with Athens. The opinions of the ambassadors are allegedly elicited by a trick played on them by Demosthenes.

Aeschines portrays one kind of rearticulation that orators could employ in denigrating their opponents.

According to Aeschines, while the ambassadors were dining at Larissa on their way back from Macedonia Ctesiphon called Philip pleasant (ἡδύς) and lovely (ἐπαφρόδιτος) (*Aeschin.* 2.42); and during the ambassadors' subsequent report, Ctesiphon openly voices his approval of Philip's appearance (ιδέα) (*Aeschin.* 2.47). In essence, he seems to have been employing Philip's appearance as a gauge for his character. Ctesiphon's vocabulary during the private dinner at Larissa makes this connection between appearance and morality clear: ἡδύς has a general meaning of being "sweet" or "pleasant"; ἐπαφρόδιτος, though connected with the favor of Aphrodite, more generally denotes loveliness or charm.²⁸ Ctesiphon's remarks thus quite clearly refer to Philip's character in addition to his appearance. Before the *ekklesia*, however, Ctesiphon speaks more broadly about Philip's ιδέα, a choice of vocabulary that would have indicated most immediately, though not exclusively, outward appearance rather than inner character or the mind.²⁹ In the repetition of his initial comment to the *demos*, then, the object of Ctesiphon's remark is more specifically oriented – at least in Aeschines' version of events - to Philip's outward appearance. It is likely, however, that Ctesiphon

²⁸ For example, ἐπαφρόδιτος would used as the Greek version of Sulla's epithet *Felix* (*Plut.* 34.2).

²⁹ Interestingly enough ιδέα is not a common word in the orators: a TLG word search brings up 22 instances, 15 of them from Isocrates; but the other 7 instances all plainly indicate physicality: so *Dem.* 19.233 complains that Aeschines prosecuted Timarchus because as a youth he was "better than average in appearance" [τις ὦν ἐφ' ἡλικίας ἑτέρου βελτίων τὴν ιδέα]; and Aeschines in the *Against Timarchus*, in discussing Athenian attitudes to physical beauty, claims that Demosthenes will say that it would be strange "if everyone about to have children prayed that their unborn sons would be noble in appearance and worthy of the city" [εἰ τοὺς μὲν υἱεῖς τοὺς μηδέπω γεγονότας ἅπαντες εὐχεσθε οἱ μέλλοντες παιδοποιεῖσθαι καλοὺς κάγαθοὺς τὰς ιδέας φῦναι καὶ τῆς πόλεως ἀξιῶν] (*Aeschin.* 2.134), but that once they were born their beauty became a possible cause for disenfranchisement.

still meant to suggest some analogy between Philip's pleasing exterior and his apparent moral worth.

Ctesiphon's comment was taken up and employed against him by Demosthenes. According to Aeschines, Demosthenes plotted against the other ambassadors to make them appear foolish before the *demos*: he waited until they had all said their fill concerning their favorable impressions of Philip and then accused them of wasting valuable time with "foreign gossip" [ὑπερόριος λαλιά] (*Aeschin.* 2.49). Laughing at their remarks, Demosthenes argued the case that Philip was no better or worse than some notable Athenians. Among the others, he also parodied Ctesiphon: ἐδόκει Κτησιφῶντι τὴν ὄψιν λαμπρὸς εἶναι, ἐμοὶ δ' οὐ χείρων Ἀριστόδημος ὁ ὑποκριτής [In appearance [ὄψις] he [Philip] seemed splendid [λαμπρὸς] to Ctesiphon, but to me no worse than Aristodemus the actor] (*Aeschin.* 2.51-52). While describing Philip simply as λαμπρὸς could encompass more than just physical beauty, coupled with ὄψις Demosthenes' word choice reinterprets Ctesiphon's primary concern as being on Philip's physical appearance. With a subtle shift of vocabulary, Demosthenes has narrowed the focus of Ctesiphon's commentary to pure visual perception. This narrowing of focus makes sense in light of Demosthenes' alleged purpose: his goal was to devalue the ambassadors' report. While assessing Philip's character on the basis of his appearance could be an important component in judging his trustworthiness, a simple description of his looks would hold no such value and would indeed be 'mere foreign gossip'.

In its final appearance, Aeschines recounts how Demosthenes reduces Ctesiphon's remark *ad absurdum*: during the second embassy to Philip, when each ambassador had the chance to speak, Demosthenes allegedly tried to appear better than

the others by once again distancing himself from their style of reportage. With respect to Ctesiphon, he comments: οὐκ εἶπον, ὡς καλὸς εἶ· γυνὴ γὰρ τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶ κάλλιστον [I did not say that you are beautiful [καλὸς]; for a woman is the most beautiful of beings] (*Aeschin.* 2.112). Aeschines' Demosthenes has thus denigrated a potentially important comment concerning Philip's character into pure sexual innuendo. This process is one type of reinterpretation to which an orator's statements could have been subjected by his opponents. Moreover, Aeschines' narrative shows that orators had a remarkable capacity to remember each other's arguments and to refashion them at will. Indeed, even if we cannot trust the narrative itself, Aeschines' own care in constructing this verbal repartee – I note, too, that the narrative of the second embassy is a good 50 sections after the narrative of the first – is equally telling of the orators' care in their craft. In sum, speakers employed and redeployed each others' arguments – sometimes in similar and non-agonistic ways, after the fashion of Demosthenes and Hyperides, and sometimes in more sinister ways, as Demosthenes did to Ctesiphon's remarks. While the paucity of our sources has doubtless severely limited our ability to identify those places in which such revisions and reinterpretations have taken place, we should be wary of assuming that orators fabricated their opponents' arguments wholesale or that originality was particularly prized in public speechmaking.

Chapter 2 looks to Macedonia and Philip's self-presentation before the Greek world. I argue that Philip was not radically innovative in crafting his political identity. Rather, the developing nature of Macedonian kingship and Argead identity allowed Philip great leeway for interpreting his civic and social roles. Macedonia had always been a locus for ideological exchange between Greek, Macedonian, and Near Eastern

ideas, and this is particularly clear in the institution of the βασιλεία and the civic structure of Macedonia. The ease with which Macedonians traditionally adopted foreign ideologies gave Philip the freedom to embed himself within Greek systems of power without abrogating his traditional Macedonian roles. Over the course of his reign Philip took on an amalgam of positions in the Greek world which were not in and of themselves new, though their consolidation in a single man was certainly unprecedented. In crafting the League of Corinth, moreover, Philip followed in the footsteps of the Persian King, whose overwhelming influence on the Greek politics of the early 4th century BCE Philip had supplanted.

The following two chapters form a closely-knit pair, as both deal with Athenian public discourse and the way that discourse evolved over the course of Philip's reign. Chapter 3 turns to Athens and political speeches concerning Philip and Macedonia composed before the watershed Peace of Philocrates of 346 BCE, while Chapter 4 examines the evidence we have for the political debate of the post-peace period. The division of the speeches into those composed before the year 346 BCE and those composed afterward is not arbitrary. There are both historical and source-based reasons for doing so. First, the year 346 BCE marks a watershed moment in Philip's reign, as it was in that year that he put an end to the Third Sacred War and, in consequence, became definitively involved in the politics of southern Greece.³⁰ Second, Philip and Athens concluded the fateful Peace of Philocrates during this year, the negotiations over which were crucial in forming the Athenians' understanding of the Macedonian situation. Third, the vast majority of the pre-peace speeches dealing with Macedonia that have come down to us are Demosthenic and deliberative, while the later speeches dealing with

³⁰ See below pp. 133-134, on the importance of 346 BCE for Philip's relations with the Greek *poleis*.

Philip, by contrast, are for the most part forensic speeches drawn from the both Demosthenes and Aeschines. Forensic debates were highly elaborated affairs where speakers had much more time to present their arguments and in which character-building was much more important than in deliberative oratory. By contrast, deliberative speeches focused on the Athenian *polis*, the nature of its citizens, and the policy dictated by that nature.³¹ My own differences in focus between the two chapters thus naturally mirror the distinctions in the nature of the evidence. There are thus real qualitative differences to the evidence of each chapter in addition to changes in the political reality of mainland Greece.

In Chapter 3 I focus on the way Demosthenes used two culturally loaded typologies, that of the barbarian Other as a natural Athenian enemy and the structural antithesis between democracy and monarchy, to inform his discussion of Philip. Both typologies draw on previous articulations of similar issues during the 5th century, and thus a particular goal of the chapter will be to position Demosthenes' rhetoric in relation to these time-tested themes as we know them from Herodotus and Thucydides. I also show the way Philip's ῥήθους in Demosthenes' speeches complemented the importance Demosthenes placed on his own role as the wise advisor in democratic deliberation. In Chapter 4 I expand upon the interconnection between the individual orator, the political setting in which the orator was operating, and the consequences for his view of Philip's ῥήθους. In addition, where in Chapter 3 I concentrate on the older 5th and 4th century

³¹ These are broad generalizations, of course. For an overview of the conventions governing forensic oratory see Michael de Brauw, "Forensic Oratory," in *A Companion to Greek Rhetoric*, ed. Ian Worthington (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008) and for deliberative oratory see Stephen Usher, "Symbouleutic Oratory," in *A Companion to Greek Rhetoric*, ed. Ian Worthington (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008); on the conventions of Greek oratory more broadly see Stephen Usher, *Greek Oratory: Tradition and Originality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1999) and George Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton: Princeton University Press: 1963).

conceptions evident in Demosthenes' rhetoric concerning the king, Chapter 4 is much more focused on the contemporary influences shaping the expression of Philip's ἤθος. I argue that Aeschines conceives of Philip as a kind of orator, a character type familiar to his audience, with whom they might have felt at ease; Demosthenes, on the other hand, distances Philip, rejecting his speaking ability and portraying him rather as the prototypical Other.

The consequences of these constructions of Philip's ἤθος are far-reaching. For Aeschines, portraying Philip as an orator bolsters his presentation of international debate of the sort conducted on the embassy as an extension of Athenian debate in the *ekklesia*, which, in turn, limits the ability of the politician to act contrary to the will of the people. Even outside the *polis* the politician is always under the watchful eye of the *demos*. As a consequence, the *demos* is able to judge equally well about events that occur outside the *polis* as about matters inside the city. For Demosthenes, the case is just the opposite. In his view, the world outside of Athens is an essentially foreign space and the *demos* stands in need of the wise advisor to perceive international developments clearly and to make accurate judgments about them. Because of his privileged role as mediator between the outside world and the *polis*, the advisor in Demosthenes' discourse takes on a much more powerful role in public debate than Aeschines' speaker. In the end, Demosthenes even uses the threat posed by Philip's monarchy to argue that the wise advisor should – at least in certain circumstances - be granted control over the political process itself. Within these forensic debates, Philip's ἤθος is a key element in the competing visions constructed by Aeschines and Demosthenes of the Athenian political process as a whole.

Chapter 5 turns to Isocrates, a political thinker who wrote advice to Philip on handling his affairs with respect to the Greek world, and, specifically, Athens. Like Demosthenes and Aeschines, Isocrates constructs Philip's ἥθος in a way that complements his own self-presentation as a political thinker. In particular, I show that Isocrates presents Philip as a philosopher in training whose political ideas are naturally quite close to Isocrates' own way of thinking. Moreover, as a political outsider whose source of power lies beyond the traditional boundaries of the Greek world, Philip mirrors the position of the elite critic of the Athenian democracy, whose lack of participation in the messy politics of the *ekklesia* gives him a broader perspective on the state of Greece and sounder political sense. Isocrates constructed a favorable presentation of Philip's ἥθος from the perspective of an elite Athenian. In doing so, he articulated a discursive framework which allowed elites to accept and even endorse Philip's activity within Greece.

With Isocrates, then, this study returns full circle back to the realities of Philip and his court. In Macedonia as in Athens, presentations of Philip's ἥθος were critical to policy-making and, more broadly speaking, to fostering relations – whether amicable or hostile - between Macedonia and Greece. In pursuing the way Philip's ἥθος was described by a range of Athenian voices, we gain insight into the ideological and political framework within which his rise to power to Greece could be viewed by his Greek contemporaries. In short, focusing on Philip's ἥθος in the orators discloses the inner workings of Athenian political discourse. At the same time, disclosing the peculiarly Greek, specifically Athenian, and finally individual concerns which governed the way

each orator reconceptualized Philip, uncovers the distance between Philip and the sources which so critically bear on his life as we understand it.

Chapter 2: Models of Macedonian Monarchy

Introduction

While my project as a whole concerns the Greek confrontation with Philip as a Macedonian and as a king, in this chapter I examine the development of the Macedonian monarchy as a Macedonian phenomenon. Because much of what we know about Macedonia comes from Greek sources, uncoupling the Macedonian from the Greek perspective is particularly difficult. Yet the role of the monarch within Macedonian society is a vexed issue in its own right, quite apart from the orators' impressions of Philip's monarchy which I will be exploring in later chapters. For Philip's refashioning of Macedonian kingship and, later, his participation in Greek political organizations forms the backdrop against which the Athenian discussion concerning Philip took place. At the same time, discussing the orators' assertions about Philip acquires new importance when seen against the continuous redefinition of the monarchy within Macedonia: in a sense, Philip and the orators both participated in a larger dialogue over the potential role of a Macedonian monarch in Greece. The connection between Athenian ideology and Philip's policy is perhaps clearest in the rhetoric of Isocrates, whose speech and letters, though composed for Philip's benefit, are couched in unequivocally Athenian terms. Yet inasmuch as the leading Athenian orators travelled in the same international political forum as Philip, their voices too had the potential to considerably impact the king's image and, in consequence, his policy toward Greece.

The early goal of this chapter will be to show that Macedonian notions of monarchy were still in a developmental stage in the 4th century, formulated largely in response to Greek and Persian political ideologies. I particularly highlight the role of the Argead ruling house in creating and disseminating the notion of a Macedonian state ruled by an Argead monarch. We should view Philip and his shaping of the monarchy not as a unique chapter in Macedonian history but as part of a tradition of ideological exchange between Macedonia, Greece, and the Near East. In the latter sections I examine Philip's reign more closely to illuminate how he crafted his role, first within Macedonia, and later within the larger Greek world. Indeed, he never seems to have wanted to impose his rule over the *poleis*, though that is, in effect, what he would accomplish by the end of his life. Even so, Philip never imposed monarchy on the Greeks; rather, he employed Greek traditions and systems of social organization to achieve his ends.

The Macedonian ethnos and the Argeads

Who were the Macedonians, and what made them uniquely Macedonian? The question seems basic, and yet it cannot be answered clearly.³² Early Macedonian history is more myth than reality. As best we can tell, the future Macedonian kingdom first gained importance at about the same time as the foundation of Greek colonies on the coast of the Chalcidicean peninsula, that is, during the mid to late 7th century BCE.³³ Strabo links the expansion of the Argeadae Macedones to a colonizing push by the

³² It has also been muddled by the interests of modern politics: for the latest developments see <http://macedonia-evidence.org/> and Andreas Willi, "Whose is Macedonia, Whose is Alexander?," *Classical Journal* 105 (2009). For an overview of the fraught history of modern Macedonia as it has influenced classical scholarship see Eugene Borza, *In the Shadow of Olympus: The Emergence of Macedon* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), ch. 1. For the way nationalism has pervaded recent Macedonian archaeology see Yannis Hamilakis, "La trahison des archéologues? Archaeological Practice as Intellectual Activity in Postmodernity." *Journal of Mediterranean Archaeology* 12 (1999), on the work of Manolis Andronikos.

³³ The first colonies were probably Methone, Dicaea and Mende (Strabo 488).

Chalcidians, who apparently founded as many as thirty cities during this period, around 650 BCE.³⁴ The fact that the colonists appear to have been unconcerned by local threats of violence against them also seems indicative of amicable relations between the colonizing Greeks and the native populations.³⁵

The importance of the Argeadae Macedones as the nucleus of the future Macedonian state is confirmed by the family name of the future kings of Macedonia, who formed the so-called Argead dynasty. The claims that the Argead name derives from the city of Argos and that the Argeads were descended from the Argive Temenids, should not be taken at face value.³⁶ It is much more likely that the Argead kings were natives who rose to prominence along with the growing fortunes of their tribe and that their name came from a local source.³⁷ The friendly relations between the Argeadae and the Greek colonists may indicate that the Argead claim to Temenid ancestry was of 6th century origin, though our earliest sources for it derive from the later half of the 5th century (see below, pp. 27-32).

It may be the case that both the Argeadae and the colonists also found common purpose against the Illyrians, who had become dominant in the area c. 800 BCE but whose power, to judge by archaeological remains, decreased significantly around this

³⁴ Strabo 7a.1.11. Nicholas G. L. Hammond, *A History of Macedonia, I: Historical Geography and Prehistory* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 432, posits that Strabo's source here was Hecataeus.

³⁵ See Miltiades Hatzopoulos, "Royaume de Macédoine et Colonies Grecques: Langues et Institutions," *Cahiers du Centre Gustave-Glotz* 7 (1996): 16-7 and B. Isaac, *The Greek Settlements in Thrace until the Macedonian Conquest* (Leiden: Brill, 1986).

³⁶ In the earliest version of the myth, the Macedonian royal family was supposed to be descendants of Perdiccas, a Temenid from Argos; so the royal family could also be referred to as the Temenidae (*Hdt.* 8.137; *Thuc.* 2.99). Later versions introduced a founder by the name of Archelaos and one by the name of Caranos: see Nicholas G. L. Hammond and G. T. Griffith, *A History of Macedonia, II: 550 – 336 B.C.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 3-14 (contra Borza, *Shadow of Olympus*, 80-4).

³⁷ It has been argued that the Argead name comes from an Orestian Argos, in Upper Macedonia: see Jonathan M. Hall, *Hellenicity: Between Ethnicity and Culture* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 155-156.

time.³⁸ Greek manpower may very well have been the key to the Illyrians' diminishing influence and concomitant Argead expansion. Indeed, in latter times we know that the Macedonians were not at all shy of taking advantage of Greek military force against their enemies; Amyntas I, for example, offered Hippias the Pisistratid a place to settle in Anthemous, an area the Macedonians had difficulty controlling at that time.³⁹ Amyntas probably aimed to employ Hippias in helping subdue the area, given the strategic importance of the city.⁴⁰ Though Hippias refused, the offer gives us an inkling as to what benefits the early Argeadae could have seen in the establishment of Greek colonies in their neighborhood.⁴¹ In any event, it appears likely that the rise of the Argeadae Macedones should be tied to the establishment of the Greek colonies in the area, and that the Argead rulers took advantage of Greek military power against their traditional local enemies.

Greek colonization soon became helpful to the Macedonians not only militarily, but also economically. While the earliest Greek settlements in the north were agricultural in nature, by the early 5th century their focus was increasingly shifting to the wealth of wood and precious metal with which their new environs abounded. Wood from the area around the Strymon River and further south on the Pierian mountains seems to have been especially prized for its quality.⁴² The Athenians in particular looked to the northern Aegean as a source of wood; their interest in Macedonian timber may have begun as

³⁸ Hammond, *History of Macedonia, I*, 423.

³⁹ This occurred after the Spartans' unsuccessful bid to restore Hippias' tyranny at Athens. I note too the strategic alliances between Perdiccas and, alternately, Athens and Sparta mentioned at *Thuc.* 2.80.6; 4.79.2; 4.83; 4.124.1; 7.9.1.

⁴⁰ Anthemous was a coastal city on the border between Chacidice and Mygdonia, an area that the Macedonians did not have full control over at this time. See Hammond, *History of Macedonia, I*, 190-1.

⁴¹ Hippias refused Amyntas' offer, as well as a similar offer made him by the Thessalians. Interestingly enough, Peisistratus is said to have gone to Rhaecalus in Macedonia during his second exile, though we do not know why (*Arist. AP* 15.2); see Borza, *Shadow of Olympus*, 116.

⁴² *Theoph.* 1.9.2; 4.55; 5.2.1; 7.1-3.

early as Themistocles' initial development of the Athenian navy.⁴³ The Argeadae Macedones, settled at this period in the Haliacmon valley, were well positioned to take advantage of the trade opportunities with the south which were opened up by the colonists. Themistocles was evidently on friendly terms with Alexander I, who ruled Macedonia during the Persian War era, since we know that he spent time in Macedonia during his exile.⁴⁴ Interestingly enough, Herodotus' Megabazus explicitly expresses the fear that if such a ready supply of wood as was in Macedonia should fall into Greek hands, it would be detrimental to the Persians.⁴⁵ While the Persians' fear may be more telling of Macedonian circumstances during Herodotus' lifetime than during the actual Persian War period, Macedonian wood was certainly used for the Athenian navy relatively early. By the late fifth century, Athenian interests in Macedonian timber were well developed: we know, for example, that Athens had an agreement with Perdiccas II for exclusive rights to Macedonian oars, and that she rewarded his heir, Amyntas III, with the status of πρόξενος and εὐεργήτες for special access to the timber supply.⁴⁶ The timber trade increased the interdependence between Macedonia and her immediate Greek neighbors on the Chalcidice. The Chalcidicean ports acted as convenient trade hubs between northern resources and southern Greeks, though the export of wood increasingly became a source of tension between the Macedonians and the colonists.⁴⁷ In addition to

⁴³ On the trade in timber between Macedonia and Athens see Eugene Borza, "Timber and Politics in the Ancient World: Macedon and the Greeks," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 131 (1987).

⁴⁴ *Thuc.* 1.137.

⁴⁵ *Hdt.* 5.23.

⁴⁶ For the agreement between Athens and Perdiccas see *IG I*³ 89; for the treaty between Athens and Amyntas see *IG II*² 102 = M. N. Tod, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions, II: from 403 to 323 B.C.* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948): no. 129. The importance of Amphipolis, founded by Athens in the northern Aegean in 437 BCE, was partially based on the foothold it gained for its mother-city in the timber trade (*Thuc.* 4.108).

⁴⁷ An inscription found at Torone, a Greek city on the Chalcidice, for example, records the purchase of seven talents of wood: see Cambitoglou, "Military, domestic and religious architecture at Torone in

wood, gold and silver deposits from the eastern part of Macedonia around the Strymon River were also mined from at least the 5th century. These Macedonian mines would continue to be a source of vast wealth for the Antigonids and the Romans.⁴⁸ Wood, gold, and silver fueled Greek interest in Macedonia and became a primary factor in the development of Argead power.

It may have already become clear that in discussing the rise of “the Macedonians” what I really mean is the rise of the tribe of Argeadae Macedones and their royal family, the Argeads. To speak of an expansion of Macedonians more generally is in some respects inaccurate, as this might seem to imply some prior notion of geographic or institutional unity among the Macedonian tribes.⁴⁹ This was, however, not the case. Among the peoples of the area local designations seem to have had greater valence than any overarching ethnic identity. It is not even clear whether many of the local ἔθνη who would later become identified as Macedonians considered themselves as such before their conquest by the Argeads. This is most evident to us in the area of Upper Macedonia, where the rugged terrain made stable systems of communication difficult and whose tribes were therefore the last to come under Argead influence. For the ἔθνη of Upper Macedonia would not be fully integrated into the Argead kingdom until Philip’s time; and even so, local affiliations retained their organizational force well into the Roman

Chalkidike,” in *Excavating Classical Culture. Recent Archaeological Discoveries in Greece*, ed. Maria Stamatopoulou et al. (Oxford: Archaeopress, 2002), 26.

⁴⁸ See Borza, *Shadow of Olympus*, 53-4.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 28-9; contra Hammond, *History of Macedonia I*, who pointedly begins his exploration of Macedonia with a study of its geography. See also Michael Zahrnt, “Makedonien als politischer Begriff in griechischer Zeit,” *Thetis* 11-12 (2005) who makes the distinction between Macedonia and Thrace: the former used by the Greeks to refer to a political entity and the latter used to refer to (an overarching) geographical entity.

period.⁵⁰ Strabo, for example, could write in reference to three such northern tribes that “the Orestai, Pelagones, and Elimiotai [became] a part of the Macedonians, some willingly and some unwillingly” [οἱ μὲν ἐκόντες οἱ δ’ ἄκοντες, μέρη καθέσταντο... Ορέσται δὲ καὶ Πελαγόνες καὶ Ἐλιμιῶται Μακεδόνων] (9.5.11). To complicate matters still further, Hecataeus (*FGrH* 1 F 107) called the Orestai a Molossian tribe, while Thucydides identifies the Elimiotai as simply Macedonian (2.99). There appears, then, to have been no real consensus on the ethnic identity of individual tribes such as the Orestai or Elimiotai. It is probable that the tribes of Lower Macedonia had similarly shifting notions of their identity, but at an earlier time period, before their sense of ethnic independence was lost under Argead rule. As the power of the Argeadae Macedones grew, the identity of the tribes surrounding the ‘original’ Macedonian kingdom shifted.⁵¹ It is thus best to define the entity “Macedonia” prior to Philip’s reign as that area under the control of the Argeads at any given time period rather than as a state with well defined geographic or ethnic borders.

The foundation myth of the Argeads offers further insight into the development of the Macedonian state as a product of tribal warfare and external Greek power. The earliest account of the Macedonian royal family’s descent from the Argive Temenids comes down to us in Herodotus.⁵² It’s appearance at a time when the Persian Empire was

⁵⁰ On the organization of Upper Macedonia see Miltiades Hatzopoulos, *Macedonian Institutions under the Kings* (Paris: de Boccard, 1996): 77-104.

⁵¹ Unfortunately, archaeology is of little help in advancing our knowledge on this point: even in the historic period “Macedonians” are characterized by an eclectic culture which is not readily identifiable. There are, on the other hand, reports of marriages between the kings of Macedonia and of Elimeia, for example, dating to this period: a scholiast reports that Dardas I, king of Elimeia, was the cousin of Perdikkas II (*schol. Thuc.* 1.57.3). On Macedonia and Elimeia see Ellis, *Philip II*, 37-8.

⁵² Ernst Badian, “Greeks and Macedonians,” in *Macedonia and Greece in Late Classical and Early Hellenistic Times*, ed. B. Barr-Sharrar and Borza (Washington, DC: National Gallery of Art, 1982), 34 and Eugene Borza, “Athenians, Macedonians, and the Origins of the Macedonian Royal House,” in *Studies in Attic Epigraphy, History, and Topography presented to Eugene Vanderpool by Members of the American*

retreating from Europe is probably no accident. During the early 5th century Macedonia had, at least nominally, accepted Persian rule. Xerxes' defeat and withdrawal from Greece impelled Alexander I to enact a policy of rapprochement with the Hellenic world.⁵³ So, for example, Alexander participated at the Olympics and patronized Pindar in an attempt to present himself as a Greek aristocrat.⁵⁴ The story of Alexander's Argive descent, which connected him to the Temenids and thus finally to Heracles, would have been yet another way for the king to foster amicable relations with Greece.

Herodotus tells the tale in order to prove that Alexander is in fact a Greek because of his Argive descent. In his narrative, a young Perdikkas and his two brothers, cast out of Argos and sent northward, entered the household of an (unnamed) Macedonian king at Libaea, a city in Upper Macedonia, as laborers. Because portents predicted Perdikkas' future kingship, the king decided to send him and his brothers away. Instead of giving them their wages, the king pointed to a patch of sunlight coming through the smoke hole of his house and told the boys that that patch of light would be their wages. While his

School of Classical Studies (Princeton: American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1982) doubt the historicity of the myth and argue that this story should be dated to Alexander I's reign; contra Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia II*, 3-7 and Hammond, "The Early History of Macedonia," *Ancient World* 27 (1996): 69-70; for a more recent note to the same effect see Angeliki Kottaridi, "Discovering Aegae," in *Excavating Classical Culture. Recent Archaeological Discoveries in Greece*, ed. M. Stamatopoulou and M. Yerolanou (Oxford: Archaeopress, 2002), 78.

⁵³ Alexander and his father, Amyntas, had both been nominal subjects of the Persian Empire since c. 510 BCE (see *Hdt.* 5.17-21). The connection was solidified by a marriage between Gygaea, Amyntas' daughter, and Bubares, a high-ranking Persian. I am unconvinced by Borza's claim that this tie was one of alliance rather than outright subjection (*Shadow of Olympus*, 102-3) and that the Macedonians were not Persian subjects until Mardonius' expedition (*Hdt.* 6.42-5). Herodotus was clearly partial to Alexander's line of propaganda, which sought to minimize or eliminate the extent to which Macedonia was connected to the Persian Empire, and this should make any evidence he brings against Macedonia's willing subjection to Persia into question. As a territory at the very edge of the Empire, it is only natural to expect that the Persian hand there would have been light or even nominal. Yet the Persians evidently had enough clout, and interest, in the area to build a new city on the Strymon River (*Hdt.* 5.23-4).

⁵⁴ On the importance of the Olympics as a marker of hellenic identity see Hall, *Hellenicity*, 154-168. Alexander's actual participation in the Olympics, at least as Herodotus describes it, is fraught with problems (*Hdt.* 5.22). See Borza, *Shadow of Olympus*, 110-3; Badian, *Greeks and Macedonians*, 34-35; P. Roos, "Alexander I in Olympia," *Eranos* 83 (1985): 162-168. Pindar produced an encomium for Alexander, preserved as frags. 120-1.

brothers stood dumbstruck, Perdiccas accepted the king's offer and drew a circle around the patch. The boys left, foiling the king's subsequent attempt to pursue and kill them. Perdiccas settled in another part of Macedonia and Herodotus states that he eventually conquered "the rest of Macedonia." [τὴν ἄλλην Μακεδονίην] (*Hdt.* 8.138). The abrupt ending to the story has surprised many commentators, who have assumed that it must have been condensed by Herodotus.⁵⁵ Also surprising is the fact that Herodotus' account has little actual bearing on the point the historian himself is attempting to prove – namely, that the Argead house was indeed Argive in origin. Indeed, the narrative spends almost no time on Perdiccas' provenance – we don't even hear the reason why Perdiccas and his brothers were exiled from Argos, a point that would seem of critical interest to a Greek audience. Instead of Perdiccas' origins or his latter military conquests, the myth emphasizes his stay with the Macedonian king at Libaea.

I suggest that the emphasis on Perdiccas' adventures in Libaea points to another, Macedonian reading of the myth quite different from the Herodotean, hellenic reading. While the hellenic reading employed the myth as proof of the Argeads' Argive ancestry, in its Macedonian context the story was aimed at establishing the Argead's claim to rule a unified Macedonia. The clue to this Macedonian reading lies in the geography of the story. The Macedonian king whom Perdiccas met lived in Lebaea, a city located somewhere in Upper Macedonia;⁵⁶ when Perdiccas first fled the king's household, Herodotus relates that he went to the country round about 'the Gardens of Midas', which the historian also calls "another part of Macedonia" [ἄλλην γῆν τῆς Μακεδονίης] (*Hdt.*

⁵⁵ See for example Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia II*, 7. Also telling is the lack of resolution to the stories of Perdiccas' brothers; it seems likely that they would have been the eponymous ancestors of other Macedonian tribes.

⁵⁶ The precise location of Lebaea is unknown.

8.138.2). This area, Herodotus explains, lies near Mt. Vermion, a mountain directly northwest of the Haliacmon plain and Aegae: that is, the center of Argead Macedonia as Herodotus and his contemporaries would have known it. Only after gaining control of this area does Perdicas return to Upper Macedonia to ‘reclaim’ his kingdom from the aboriginal Macedonian king. In short, the myth reveals the existence of *two* Macedonian lands – that controlled by the king at Lebaea, explicitly called “Upper Macedonia” [ἡ ἄνω Μακεδονίη] (*Hdt.* 8.137.1), and the ‘other’ Macedonian land, the plain below Mt. Vermion. The latter area must be synonymous with Lower Macedonia, even if Herodotus does not explicitly call it so. Thus the story sets up a distinction between Lower Macedonia and Upper Macedonia. This geographic distinction only became critical during the latter 5th and 4th century history of the country, when the Argeads of Lower Macedonia were attempting to assert their claim to Upper Macedonia, and would certainly not have been current in the 6th century, when the mythic Perdicas was supposed to have reigned; as I have already mentioned, even the identity of the Upper Macedonians as Macedonians was contested until the end of the 4th century.⁵⁷ Here, then, the Macedonian implications of the story become clear, along with the confusion between the two Macedonian lands mentioned by Herodotus: the myth’s aim is to establish the claim of the Argeads of Lower Macedonia to Upper Macedonia, both explicitly through Perdicas’ acquisition of the patch of sunlight and implicitly by identifying the inhabitants of Libaea as Macedonian.⁵⁸ Again, it is only for Herodotus that the critical

⁵⁷ So Thucydides says that in the time of Perdicas, Alexander I’s son, the Lyngestai and Elimiotai, tribes of Upper Macedonia, were allies and subjects of the lowland Macedonians but had their own kings [Τῶν γὰρ Μακεδόνων εἰσὶ καὶ Λυγκησταὶ καὶ Ἐλιμιῶται καὶ ἄλλα ἔθνη ἐπάνωθεν, ἃ ξύμμαχα μὲν ἐστί τούτοις καὶ ὑπήκοα, βασιλείας δ’ ἔχει καθ’ αὐτά] (2.99).

⁵⁸ This interpretation solves the geographic confusion which the Perdicas story has sometimes caused. Hammond, partially on the basis of this myth, sees the lands of Herodotus’ native king as an ‘original’

importance of the myth lies in Perdiccas' Greek origins; the narrative itself has almost nothing to say on that score. Divorced from its Herodotean context, the myth discloses another meaning that asserts Alexander's ancestral rights to supremacy over the whole of Macedonia - as he understood it to be.⁵⁹

Of course, the Greek and Macedonian readings of the story are not mutually exclusive. Alexander's bid to assert his ancestral right to "the whole of Macedonia" (whatever he and his contemporaries understood that to be) would have been relevant to a Greek as well as a Macedonian audience. By giving the Argeads Greek roots and by asserting their right to rule over the tribes of Upper Macedonia, the Perdiccas myth argued for favorable relations between the Argeads and the Greeks. Unlike any neighboring tribes who might try to curry favor for themselves among the Hellenes, the Argeads could claim Greek sympathy for themselves based on their kinship. The hellenically-oriented myth of Perdiccas was probably only one among any number of different interpretations of the past and present of Macedonia; even the Perdiccas myth, in mentioning the boys' detour into Illyria before their arrival at Libaea, seems to indicate that at one point Perdiccas may have had an Illyrian rather than a Hellenic origin.⁶⁰ At different times and in different circumstances, non-hellenic orientations would have served the Macedonians better. One only has to glance at the sweep of Macedonian history to note the plethora of claimants to the Macedonian throne who were wont to

Macedonia and conjectures that when Perdiccas flees he "[is] no longer in ἡ Μακεδονίς γῆ; indeed it is the one place in which [he] must not be. But Herodotus is in a hurry to end the digression" (*History of Macedonia I*, 434). This plainly contradicts the text. Borza, though he rejects that the myth is a literal account of Macedonian history, nevertheless interprets its geography as a memory of early Macedonian expansion (*Shadow of Olympus*, 81-2).

⁵⁹ The myth was also important as an aetiology for the sacrifices which, according to Herodotus, the Argeads offered the river which they crossed while being pursued by the native king's horsemen. According to the myth, after the brothers had crossed, the river rose to such an extent that the horses were unable to cross it (*Hdt.* 8.138.1).

⁶⁰ As suggested by Hammond, *History of Macedonia, I*, 434, on the basis of *Hdt.* 8.137.

challenge the heir apparent with the support of some outside power – whether Greek, Thracian, or Illyrian.⁶¹ I have stressed, as well, the claims of some Upper Macedonian tribal kings to autonomy, and they too would have looked to their Thracian and Illyrian neighbors to support their independence. In acknowledging the myth of Perdiccas as it is presented to us by Herodotus, one would be buying into a specifically Argead vision of the Macedonian kingdom.⁶²

The effectiveness of Argead propaganda in disseminating a politically-loaded geography of Macedonia is also evident in Thucydides' account of Macedonia. Thucydides, who agrees with Herodotus' on the Argeads' Temenid ancestry, presents his interlude on Macedonia as a historical narrative of Argead expansion. Each Argead conquest is followed by the expulsion of the indigenous population. He employs geographic nomenclature as proof of the prior ownership of the land by original non-Macedonian peoples. The passage is particularly interesting in its evident confusion over Macedonian identity, which is alternately defined either geographically or ethnically. I suggest that Thucydides' apparent desire to conform the geographic with the ethnic basis of Macedonian identity stems from Argead sources, as comparison with another possible articulation of Macedonian expansion, which has come down to us in Strabo, will show.

Thucydides' excursus on Macedonia forms a digression from the story of Sitalces' invasion of Macedonia during the reign of Perdiccas, Alexander I's son, in 429/8 BCE:

⁶¹ So, for example, the Thracians' invasion in 429 BCE was nominally an effort to gain the throne for Amyntas, Perdiccas' nephew (*Thuc.* 2.95, 2.100).

⁶² This would be true whether or not the audience was Greek, and might explain the curious fact that Herodotus has Perdiccas travel first to Illyria before descending to Lebaea. Could another, perhaps earlier, version of the myth have featured an Illyrian Perdiccas? Given the former power of the Illyrians in the area, such a version, if it existed, would certainly have been useful to the Argeads. Both Hammond, *History of Macedonia I*, 433 and Ellis, *Philip II*, 35 suggest as much, though both end by taking the myth as Herodotus' recounts it more or less at face value.

Ζυνηθροίζοντο οὖν ἐν τῷ Δοβήρῳ καὶ παρεσκευάζοντο, ὅπως κατὰ
 κορυφὴν ἐσβαλοῦσιν ἐς τὴν κάτω Μακεδονίαν, ἧς ὁ Περδίκκας
 ἦρχεν. Τῶν γὰρ Μακεδόνων εἰσὶ καὶ Λυγκησταὶ καὶ Ἐλιμιῶται
 καὶ ἄλλα ἔθνη ἐπάνωθεν, ἃ ξύμμαχα μὲν ἐστί τούτοις καὶ ὑπήκοα,
 βασιλείας δ' ἔχει καθ' αὐτά. Τὴν δὲ παρὰ θάλασσαν νῦν
 Μακεδονίαν Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ Περδίκκου πατὴρ καὶ οἱ πρόγονοι
 αὐτοῦ, Τημενίδαι τὸ ἀρχαῖον ὄντες ἐξ Ἄργους, πρῶτοι ἐκτῆσαντο
 καὶ ἐβασίλευσαν ἀναστήσαντες μάχη ἐκ μὲν Πιερίας Πίαρης, οἱ
 ὑπερον ὑπὸ τὸ Πάγγαιον πέραν Στρυμόνος ὤκησαν Φάγρητα καὶ
 ἄλλα χωρία (καὶ ἔτι καὶ νῦν Πιερικὸς κόλπος καλεῖται ἢ ὑπὸ τῷ
 Παγγαίῳ πρὸς θάλασσαν γῆ), ἐκ δὲ τῆς Βοττίας καλουμένης
 Βοττιαίου, οἱ νῦν ὄμοροι Χαλκιδέων οἰκοῦσιν· τῆς δὲ Παιονίας
 παρὰ τὸν Ἀξιοῦ μέχρι Στρυμόνος τὴν Μυγδονίαν καλουμένην
 Ἠδῶνας ἐξελάσαντες νέμονται. ἀνέστησαν δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς νῦν
 Ἐορδίας καλουμένης Ἐορδούς, ὧν οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ ἐφθάρησαν,
 βραχὺ δὲ τι αὐτῶν περὶ Φύσκαν κατῴκηται, καὶ ἐξ Ἀλμωπίας
 Ἀλμωπας. ἐκράτησαν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐθνῶν οἱ Μακεδόνες
 οὗτοι, ἃ καὶ νῦν τι ἔχουσι, τὸν τε Ἀνθεμοῦντα καὶ Γρηστωνίαν καὶ
 Βισαλτίαν καὶ Μακεδόνων αὐτῶν πολλήν.

So they [i.e., the Thracians] gathered and made their preparations in
 Doberus, so that from that height they could attack down into Lower
 Macedonia, which Perdikkas ruled. The Lynkestai, Elimiotai, and other
 tribes of the Macedonians, who are allies and subjects of the lowland
 Macedonians but have their own kings, inhabit the highlands. The current
 land of Macedonia by the sea was first conquered by Alexander,
 Perdikkas' father, and his ancestors, who were Temenidae from Argos.
 They were the first to hold and rule this land after having uprooted the
 Pierians from Pieria, who later settled Phagres and other places by Mount
 Pangaeus beyond the Strymon River (and even now the land from Mount
 Pangaeus to the sea is called the Pieriean bay). They also uprooted the
 Bottiaians, who are now the neighbors of the Chalkideans, from Bottiaia.
 They also conquered the strip of Paionian land near the Axios River that
 stretches to Pella and the sea, and the land called Mygdonia beyond the
 Axios that stretches to the Strymon, having expelled the Edonians. They
 also uprooted the Eordians from what is now called Eordia - many of
 whom died, though a few of them settled near Physca - and the Almopians
 from Almopia. These Macedonians also conquered other tribes, whom
 they rule even now: Anthemion and Grestonia and Bisaltia and a lot [of the
 land] of the Macedonians themselves. (*Thuc.* 2.99)

Thucydides attempts to link geographic areas with the people who had been originally
 settled in those areas; their expulsion, and the consequent expansion of the Macedonians
 themselves, results in a situation where all of the land under Argead rule is now settled by

ethnic Macedonians.⁶³ These new settlers, however, are not natives, and the geography of the land reflects this non-Macedonian history. Thucydides concludes the passage by stating that the Macedonians conquered ‘other’ tribes and ruled Anthemion, Grestonia, Bisaltia, and “much of Macedonia proper”. I note first the oddity of Thucydides’ awkward transition between conquered peoples to territory controlled - ἐκράτησαν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔθνῶν οἱ Μακεδόνες οὗτοι, ἃ καὶ νῦν τι ἔχουσι, τὸν τε Ἀνθεμοῦντα καὶ Γρηστωνίαν καὶ Βισαλτίαν καὶ Μακεδόνων αὐτῶν πολλήν (emphasis added). The sentence structure is strange enough in itself to give pause, but its purport is equally unclear: what does it mean that the Argeads conquered these ‘other peoples’ and, in conclusion, ‘a lot [of the land] of Macedonia itself’? What is Thucydides’ notional Macedonia based on – what makes this land properly Macedonian? For that last phrase – namely, that the Argeads had conquered “a lot [of the land] of the Macedonians themselves” – implies that there was still a portion of the Macedonian people not (yet?) under the domination of the Argeads even after all of the earlier conquests.⁶⁴ Thus even as Thucydides tries to clarify the meaning of Macedonia by equating its current geographic and ethnic borders, the meaning of the term slips away.

⁶³ On the accuracy of the passage see Hatzopoulos, *Macedonian Institutions*, 169-71. He concludes that Macedonian territory was divided into two categories, that settled by the conquering Macedonians themselves and the territories of subject non-Macedonians. See also Ellis, *Philip II*, p. 41, who rightly throws water on the idea that the Macedonians conquered, expelled, and resettled the area that comprised the Macedonian state in the 5th century. Rather, he sees the kingdom as “a conglomerate of tribal territories interspersed with small settlements acquired piecemeal over many generations. There can have been little sense of cohesion.”

⁶⁴ Noted by Hammond, *History of Macedonia I*, 437, who explains the oddity thus: “who are these Macedones, of whose territories only a part had been acquired? They can hardly be tribes of Macedones, other than the Argeadae Macedones, living in their homeland in northern Pieria; for it is inconceivable that the homeland was not entirely under Temenid rule. Accordingly they must be the Macedones of Upper Macedonia, that is the Macedones of 2.99.2.” See Borza, *Shadow of Olympus*, 84-89.

Precisely what relation do the people have with the land, and what relation does either ethnic or geographic designation have with the Macedonian kingdom?⁶⁵

Thucydides' stress on the Macedonian ethnicity of the people under Argead rule appears to be a rearticulation of Argead propaganda, and his confusion a result of that propaganda.⁶⁶ As I have already shown in relation to Herodotus' myth of Perdiccas, the Argeads were keen to define the borders of Macedonia to their own advantage as well as to legitimize Argead rule. That we can clearly see the same Argead influence in Thucydides' description of Macedonia is evident from his reference to the Upper Macedonian peoples as subordinates (ὑπήκοοι) of the Argeads. For this was not really the case: in the same breath, in fact, Thucydides also calls them allies (ξύμμαχοι) of the Argeads and says that they had their own kings; this interpretation of the relations between the Upper Macedonians and the Argeads is closer to the truth. Indeed, Thucydides elsewhere records that, when Perdiccas set out to subdue Arrhabaeus, the king of the Lyncestan Macedonians, he first had to buy the help of Brasidas and the Peloponnesians (4.83); clearly Arrhabaeus did not consider himself Perdiccas' subordinate. The status of the tribes of Upper Macedonia within a larger Macedonian

⁶⁵ Both Hammond, *History of Macedonia I*, 435-40 and Borza, *Shadow of Olympus*, 84-9, attempt to see in Thucydides' description a historic narrative of the Macedonian kingdom. I note, too, that while Thucydides' goal in the passage as a whole is geographical in nature – that is, he wishes to delineate the extent of Macedonian territory – it is an end that evidently could not be reached without ethnographic and historic components: hence we learn that Macedonia was acquired by Perdiccas' ancestors only slowly, and that in the process they had conquered and expelled various indigenous tribes. Evidently, neither a description of the area nor a list of subject tribes would do. Such debates about geographic and ethnographic borders were a major concern for the historians of the fifth century: I note for example *Hdt.* 2.15-17, where Herodotus engages in precisely the same kind of debate over the borders of Egypt; like Thucydides, Herodotus argues that Egypt *ought* to comprise that territory inhabited by Egyptians (2.17).

⁶⁶ Thucydides, of course, was not particularly interested in the details of Macedonian history and politics, as his agenda lay elsewhere. But he may very well have been familiar with Argead claims: his family connections lay in the north, in Thrace, and he seems to have spend much of his exile there (*Thuc.* 1.1, 4.105.1; *Hdt.* 6.39.1).

state thus seems to have been liminal at best. Calling them subordinates of the Argeads and ethnically Macedonian was to buy into an Argead viewpoint.

The politically charged rhetoric implicit in Thucydides' description is further illuminated by comparison to our other major source for the expansion of the Macedonian kingdom, namely Strabo. In discussing the peoples inhabiting the area of the western Haliacmon valley, in Upper Macedonia, Strabo concludes: "the Orestai, Pelagones, and Elimiotai [became] a part of the Macedonians, some willingly and some unwillingly" [οἱ μὲν ἐκόντες οἱ δ' ἄκοντες, μέρη καθέσταντο... Ορέσται δὲ καὶ Πελαγόνες καὶ Ἐλιμιῶται Μακεδόνων] (9.5.11). Thucydides and Strabo's accounts disagree on a fundamental level concerning the development of the Macedonian kingdom. Whereas Thucydides explains the growth of Macedonia as an expansion from an original homeland into areas formerly occupied by other peoples, Strabo posits that, instead, Macedonian influence impelled neighboring peoples to adopt a Macedonian identity.

It may be objected that Strabo focuses on tribes from Upper Macedonia, whereas Thucydides' list concerns the conquest of Lower Macedonia and the coastal region; taking this line of reasoning, we might conclude that the Argeads simply went about their early conquests in a different way than they did their latter acquisitions.⁶⁷ Yet while such an explanation as possible, it seems to me to be a too-neat resolution that explains away the fundamental ideological distinction between the accounts without giving either its due. On the one hand, Thucydides' explanation of Macedonian expansion posits that all peoples currently subject to the Argeads are part of the Macedonian ἔθνος; Strabo's

⁶⁷ As argued by Hammond, *History of Macedonia I*, 435-40. Hammond argues that Strabo's source here is Hecataeus and that we should interpret the differences between Strabo's partition of Macedonia and Thucydides' version as reflective of the state of affairs in c. 500 BCE and c. 450 BCE, respectively.

account, on the other hand, claims that the Macedonian kingdom was built by incorporating *different* ἔθνη into the singular political entity which had no driving force but the self-aggrandizement of the Argead rulers and their clan. Once again, the identity of Macedonia is at issue, and the borders of Argead Macedonia are at stake.⁶⁸ Thucydides' version of Macedonian expansion would have supported the Argead claim to a Macedonian state comprised of both Lower and Upper Macedonia, on the grounds that all the peoples living therein were ethnic Macedonians and thus subject to Argead rule, as per Perdiccas' historical precedent; Strabo's version would have no such politically charged implication.

By positing a Macedonia that is ethnically cohesive, Thucydides' narrative supports the Argead claim to a Macedonian kingdom with borders that extend from the coast to the tribes of Upper Macedonia. In other words, Thucydides' description aims to equate "Macedonia" with the "Macedonians" and bring both into at least nominal subjection under the ruling Argead king. Like Herodotus, Thucydides' geography of Macedonia shows the hand of Argead propaganda in its assumption that the Argead royals had a right to rule over the disparate 'Macedonian' tribes. Thucydides' narrative of ancient Macedonian conquest, like the myth of Perdiccas, is evidence for the subtle ways in which Argead discourse penetrated Hellenic ideas concerning Macedonia. Both

⁶⁸ The argument over the borders of the Macedonian state continues along much the same lines as the ancient debate to this day: consider the fact that Hammond opens his *History of Macedonia* with the statement "Our first need is to define Macedonia not as a political area but as a geographical entity... as a geographical entity Macedonia is best defined as the territory which is drained by the two great rivers, the Haliacmon and the Vardar, and their tributaries." On the other hand, Borza, *Shadow of Olympus*, 28, considers Hammond's a "narrow definition, even geographically" and proposed instead to define Macedonia as "the territory so called both by the Macedonians themselves (insofar as we have any information about this) and by those who wrote about them in antiquity" – thus essentially throwing the question back to the ancients who themselves, as we see, could not agree on this point. Zahrnt, *Makedonien als politischer Begriff*, has more recently pointed out that the term "Macedonia" always refers to the political entity, whereas geographically this area was included in what was called "Thrace"; contra Nicholas G. L. Hammond, "Connotations of 'Macedonia' and of 'Macedones' until 323 B.C.," *Classical Quarterly* (1995): 120-22.

stories come from relatively late, Argead sources; moreover, both use a common mythic trope: on the one hand the exiled progenitor hero, and on the other expulsion of a native population whose earlier presence now acts as an aetiology for a particular place name or names. In Thucydides' and Herodotus' accounts we see evidence of the Argeads claiming control over an ethnically cohesive Macedonian state. Inasmuch as the acceptance by the international community of a notional Macedonian state encompassing both Lower and Upper Macedonia facilitated Argead power, the spread of such claims throughout the Hellenic world went far in making those claims a reality.

Macedonian institutions and the early monarchy

The previous section examined the growth of a specifically Argead notion of the Macedonian ἔθνος from the 6th through the 5th centuries. Illuminating the political significance of a notional Macedonian ἔθνος for the Argeads has critical implications for assessing the institutions of early Macedonia. Up through the mid- and even the late-twentieth century, the question of the nature of Macedonian institutions has worked from within the supposition that the Macedonians were a well-defined ethnic category.⁶⁹ The question of Macedonian institutions thus became one of locating power on a sliding scale between the monarch on the one hand and the Macedonian people on the other. In this form it came to be known as the 'constitutionalism question'. Proponents of the constitutionalist position argued that Macedonian institutions were based on a traditional and fixed hierarchy of power; they also tended to claim a powerful role for the Macedonian people within the government, based on a set of well-defined, if unwritten,

⁶⁹ Where 'being Macedonian' could mean either ethnic belonging or belonging by virtue of being a "citizen" of the Macedonian state. For the latter view see Hammond, *Connotations of 'Macedonia' and of 'Macedones'*; rebutted by Edward Anson, "The Meaning of the Term Makedones," *Ancient World* 10 (1985): 67-8, who supports the former view.

rights. The anti-constitutionalists, on the other hand, stressed the autocratic nature of the kingship and saw the power of the Macedonian people as circumstantially rather than legally defined.⁷⁰ In presenting the problem in this way, however, both sides fundamentally missed the mark. For, in taking for granted the existence of an ethnically defined Macedonian people, the ‘constitutionalist question’ located civic tension between a minority and a majority of ‘citizens’ or ‘would-be citizens’.⁷¹ Once the notion of a relatively simple definition of Macedonian peoplehood is dispelled, however, one side of that scale – that is, the Macedonian common citizenry – disappears from view.⁷²

⁷⁰ These early arguments over Macedonian constitutionalism have been well summarized by Borza, *Shadow of Olympus*, 231-236. Hammond has argued the constitutionalist position quite recently: see Nicholas G. L. Hammond, “The Continuity of Macedonian Institutions and the Macedonian Kingdoms of the Hellenistic Era,” *Historia* 49 (2000): 141-160, and *Connotations of ‘Macedonia’ and ‘Macedones’*. For the anti-constitutionalist position see Edward Anson, “Macedonia’s Alleged Constitutionalism,” *The Classical Journal* 80 (1985): 303-316 and R. M. Errington, “The Nature of the Macedonian State under the Monarchy,” *Chiron* 8 (1978): 77-133.

⁷¹ The notion that a state is composed of its citizens is itself intrinsically Greek. Thus Aristotle begins his exploration of types of government by stating that a state is defined by the *number* of its citizens [ἡ γὰρ πόλις πολιτῶν τι πλῆθος ἐστίν] (1274b l. 41). He applies the same model to a monarchy: see for example 1313a l. 1-17, 1315a l. 31-40. As applied to Macedonia by modern scholars, this model (perhaps unconsciously) also mirrors the Greek obsession with (barbaric) tyranny versus (enlightened) Greek democracy. It seems to me that those arguing for ancient Macedonian constitutionalism also tended to assert the Macedonians’ “enlightened” status as almost-Greeks and thus, ultimately, attempted to justify the Macedonian conquest of the “free” Greek world. This critique of the constitutionalist position is also made by Borza, *Shadow of Olympus*, 239, who writes that “clearly there is insufficient evidence to describe the relationships between the king and others in terms that derive from the analysis of... city-states... it will do neither to follow a “noble savage” model, nor to describe Macedon in terms of Greek... city-states, with which Macedon had little in common.”

⁷² A dispassionate view of Macedonian history, keeping in mind that actual history is inevitably messier than the historian’s narrative of it, bears this out: the simple fact is that the strongest argument for a Macedonian citizenry – the apparent right of the army to elect or at least ratify its next king – is an illusion. For one thing, there is not a single smooth succession in the history of Macedonia that we have evidence for: if this is a system, it certainly wasn’t a functional one: see Elizabeth Carney, “Regicide in Macedonia,” *La Parola del Passato* 38 (1983): 261-272. Second, the narratives of acclamation by the army make sense even without a constitutionalist reading: no claimant to the Macedonian throne had any chance of success without an army, whether it was one drawn from the populace of Macedonia or a foreign one. The army thus had *de facto* power, and a claimant had to make sure that he had the support of an army – though almost any army would do; thus the army’s legitimacy in king-making stemmed from its ability to defeat the armies of rival claimants rather than from the notion that it represented the Macedonian people. See also Alan Samuel, “Philip and Alexander as Kings: Macedonian Monarchy and Merovingian Parallels,” *American Historical Review* 93 (1988): 1270-1286, who compares the Argeads to the Merovingians and comes to much the same conclusion – namely that successful leadership was based on the personal effectiveness of the king, particularly in terms of his military accomplishments, and his influence on the aristocracy and the people.

Another model has recently been championed by Hatzopoulos. Instead of focusing on the king's relationship with the people, Hatzopoulos locates the political tension in Macedonia between national/monarchic and local forces.⁷³ He also argues that local Macedonian civic institutions were modeled on Greek *poleis*, and were therefore democratic in nature. While Hatzopoulos is right to emphasize the importance of local civic bodies within Macedonia, I will argue in this section that local forces need not, and indeed in the case of Macedonia should not, be equated with democratic forces.⁷⁴ To argue as Hatzopoulos does is, again, to assume a Greek viewpoint – namely, that urban spaces foster democracy and that monarchies and democracies are inherently at odds with one another. I suggest instead that we should look to Persian Ionia - where Greek *poleis* and Persian monarchy had coexisted, for the most part peaceably, for centuries - rather than mainland Greece as another potential model for Argead urbanization. The source of tension within the Macedonian kingdom came from the opposition between the monarch's desire for unification and the locals' desire for greater autonomy.

Hatzopoulos' earliest sources for the tension between national and local forces come from the reign of Archelaos (c. 413-399 BCE) - as indeed they must, since the reign of Archelaos provides very nearly all of our evidence for Macedonia's institutions prior to Philip's ascension. At the heart of the reforms instituted by Archelaos was an effort to

⁷³ See Hatzopoulos, *Macedonian Institutions*. Hatzopoulos' arguments were already prefigured in the 1970s by Ellis, *Philip II*, 41, who rightly argued that Macedonia was "anything but homogeneous".

⁷⁴ Hatzopoulos' argument is based for the most part on his examination of Antigonid and Roman epigraphic material. His use of such late sources to make assertions about the institutions of early Macedonia is the most distressing feature of *Macedonian Institutions*. Indeed, he seems to see no break between Argead and Antigonid Macedonia at all. This makes for rather confused reading and seriously undermines his conclusions. Partly, of course, this is a problem of sources: we simply cannot know what Macedonia of the 6th and 5th centuries looked like on the level of local organization, though the growth of archaeological interest in Macedonia may eventually change that.

assuage regional tensions through an innovative building programme. Thucydides relates the following:

Καὶ οἱ μὲν Μακεδόνες οὗτοι ἐπιόντος πολλοῦ στρατοῦ ἀδύνατοι ὄντες ἀμύνεσθαι ἔς τε τὰ καρτερὰ καὶ τὰ τεῖχη, ὅσα ἦν τῇ χώρᾳ, ἐσεκομίσθησαν. ἦν δὲ οὐ πολλά, ἀλλὰ ὕστερον Ἀρχέλαος ὁ Περδίκκου υἱὸς βασιλεὺς γενόμενος τὰ νῦν ὄντα ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ ὠκοδόμησε καὶ ὁδοὺς εὐθείας ἔτεμε καὶ τᾶλλα διεκόσμησε τὰ [τε] κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἵπποις καὶ ὅπλοις καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ παρασκευῇ κρείσσοι ἢ ξύμπαντες οἱ ἄλλοι βασιλῆς ὀκτώ οἱ πρὸ αὐτοῦ γενόμενοι.

With a large army marching against them, the Macedonians were unable to defend themselves and shut themselves up in such strong places and fortifications as there were in the country. There were not many [of these], though later Archelaos the son of Perdiccas upon his ascension as king built those which are there now, cut straight roads, and provided for other matters in warfare –horses, hoplites, and other provisions – to a larger degree than all the other eight kings who had come before him. (*Thuc.* 2.100.2)

As a result of Archelaos' reforms, then, he was able to muster a larger force of cavalry and heavy infantry than any previous Macedonian king. This was no minor achievement, as prior Macedonian military might was not very great: the Argeads had certainly never been able to match a Greek hoplite force and could hardly subdue even their non-Greek neighbors when operating on their own.⁷⁵ As I have argued above (pp. 10-11), early Macedonia depended heavily on engaging the help of its Greek neighbors in wartime. By reorganizing his kingdom, Archelaos was able to achieve military independence.

Yet Archelaos' reforms also effected non-military changes in the Macedonian state. The creation of fortified places created civic centers for the rural population, while

⁷⁵ The machinations of Perdiccas II, Archelaos' father and predecessor, are revelatory in this respect. He continuously switches allegiances and induces his neighbors to come to his aid (Thucydides 1.57-8; 1.61; 2.29; 2.80; 4.79; 4.132); most tellingly, he bribes Brasidas to help him subdue the neighboring Lyncestian Macedonians and when Brasidas decides to parlay with them, Perdiccas is unable to do anything about it (4.83). Perdiccas' army consisted mainly of horsemen and some hoplite forces enlisted from the Greek cities within his kingdom – though not very many of the latter (see 2.100.5) – along with a large force of light-armed men (2.80.7; 1.62-3; 4.124). On the Macedonian army during this period see Hammond, *History of Macedonia II*, 141-148.

better roads eased communication between the king and the hinterland. Both developments would have spurred economic growth within the kingdom.⁷⁶ Moreover, by allowing for urbanization and better communication above the local level, Archelaos' reforms opened up the way for greater cohesion in Macedonia as a whole. Archelaos' additional building projects in Pella, which would become the largest city in Macedonia during his reign (*Hellenica* 5.2.13), give further evidence of his desire to create a more cohesive Macedonian state.⁷⁷ The site of Pella in the central plain between the Haliacmon and Axios rivers, close to the center of the kingdom as it would have been in the late 5th century and also well off the coastline, points to Archelaos' concern for the inland, 'backwards' areas of his kingdom.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ On the connectedness of military reforms with economic and social reforms in Macedonia see J. R. Ellis, "The Dynamics of Fourth-Century Macedonian Imperialism," *Archaea Makedonia II* (1973): 106-108. Archelaos' reign saw enormous economic growth in Macedonia, as evidenced by his coinage: see William S. Greenwalt, "The Production of Coinage from Archelaos to Perdiccas III and the Evolution of Argead Macedonia," in *Ventures into Greek History* edited by Ian Worthington (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 105-134. As argued by Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia II*, 140, Thucydides' language makes it clear that Archelaos did not merely repave older roads but actually cut new ones into the interior of the country. I am not, however, convinced by Greenwalt's suggestion that Archelaos' reforms indicate a transition between transhumant pastoralism and agriculture (see William S. Greenwalt, "Archelaos the Philhellene," *Ancient World* 34 (2003): 135-6). There is no concrete evidence for such a shift, and to argue for its occurrence based on Hansen's model of the development of the Greek citizen-hoplite, as Greenwalt tries to do, is both using a model that is not unassailable in its own right as well as translating a paradigm into a completely different context, where it simply doesn't belong. Whereas one might imagine that the Greek yeoman farmer had a stake in obtaining hoplite armor and defending his own *polis*, participation in the *polis*-like urban spaces of Macedonia does not necessarily imply a willingness to defend a distant Macedonian king. The situation in Macedonia is simply too different for this analogy to work. I wonder, too, whether instead of a growth of a 'hoplite middle class', as Greenwalt argues, we shouldn't see Archelaos' civic centers as innovations in efficiency, which were better able to organize individuals who were *already there* but who had not previously participated in civic/military functions. In other words, I do not find it an obvious conclusion that just because Perdiccas II, Archelaos' father, was unable to field a hoplite army, that means that "there were not enough yeomen farmers and "middle class" businessmen within his realm to man a hoplite army." (135).

⁷⁷ Pella was, however, a significant city even before Archelaos' ascension; both Thucydides (2.99.4; 2.100.4) and Herodotus (7.123) mention it.

⁷⁸ On Pella's continental orientation see Borza, *Shadow of Olympus*, 169-70 and Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia II*, 150. The geography of the central plain around the Haliacmon and Axios rivers are difficult to determine; silt carried from the rivers and drainage projects both combined to shift the landscape dramatically during the Greek and Roman periods. In the fifth century Pella lay directly on the shore of the Thermaic Gulf (*Hdt.* 7.123), but probably by the time of Philip II this part of the gulf was silted over and one had to sail up the Ludias River, to the Lake of Ludias, in order to reach Pella's port. See Hammond, *History of Macedonia I*, 142-154 and Borza, *Shadow of Olympus*, 42-44.

While there is evidence for increasing urbanization and prosperity among the Macedonian population over the course of Archelaos' reign, it is not at all certain that we should link this increasing prosperity with the spread of democratic ideology.⁷⁹ The Greek paradigm of government was not the only one available to the Argeads. The Thessalian and the Persian monarchs – and to some extent even the Thracian kings – were also dealing with just such issues of the role of the monarch in ruling an urban (or increasingly urbanized), and in some cases Greek, population; any of these monarchic or quasi-monarchic systems could have provided alternative solutions to marrying urban spaces with kingship. Archelaos certainly developed ties with the Aleuadae of Thessaly, as we know from the fact that he would later intervene on their behalf in Thessalian affairs.⁸⁰ Perhaps more important as a potential model, however, was Persia. The Macedonians had had first-hand experience with Persian rule and with the Persian court during the Persian wars. While direct Persian influence receded along with the Empire, it appears that cultural links continued, or were renewed, between the Macedonian nobility and Persia during the late fifth century. So, for example, the Macedonian kings partook in lion hunts resembling those of the Persian monarchs; and again, the institution of the Royal Pages may indicate an Argead attempt to model the Macedonian court on that of the Persian kings.⁸¹ Moreover, Archelaos' coinage, unlike that of his predecessors, was

⁷⁹ As Hatzopoulos, *Macedonian Institutions*, has done - he states, for example, that Macedonian modernization during this period "meant above all the mass introduction of methods, institutions and attitudes developed in the most advanced states of that time, the city-states of southern Greece, and which were indissolubly linked to the phenomenon of the *polis* in all its aspects: economic, social, political, military and cultural" (467). Greenwalt, as I have already mentioned above, also equates Archelaos' 'civic centers' with southern Greek *poleis*. Fanoula Papazoglou, "Polis et Souveraineté," *Ziva Antika* 50 (2000):169-176 critiques Hatzopoulos' interpretation of the Beroia gymnasiarch law – which in any case can prove nothing concerning our period - on these grounds.

⁸⁰ On Archelaos' intervention in Thessaly see Borza, *Shadow of Olympus*, 164-166.

⁸¹ On lion hunting see Pierre Briant, "Chasses royales macédoniennes et chasses royales perses: le theme de la chasse au lion sur la chasse de Vergina," *Dialogues d'histoire ancienne* 17 (1991): 211-255; his

made to conform to the Persian standard.⁸² None of this evidence, of course, can conclusively show Persian influence on the Macedonian institutions of this time period; it does, however, suggest that the Argeads could look elsewhere for models of successful government at the civic level besides southern Greece. Persian rule over Ionia proved that Greek, and consequently Greek-like, *poleis* and Greek culture could live relatively peacefully under the subjection of a monarchy.

The case of Pydna is suggestive for the way Archelaos handled the problem of ruling over a Greek, formerly autonomous *polis* and for how he viewed his programme of urbanization as a whole. Pydna was a Greek colony within Macedonian territory which rebelled against Argead rule during Archelaos' reign. Having subdued the revolt, Archelaos moved the whole city several miles inland.⁸³ In doing so, he presumably meant to reduce the autonomy which came from Pydna's easy access to the sea. Pydna's rebellion need not indicate that urban populations were in and of themselves incompatible with monarchy: as a large and powerful Greek colony, Pydna would have had other incentives toward autonomy besides a desire for democratic rule, incentives that would not have existed in the newly built civic centers of the Macedonian interior. Native Macedonian communities, without the history and independent connections of a Pydna, would hardly have had the same relations with their Argead monarchs. Indeed, the fact that Pydna's revolt early in Archelaos' reign did *not* dampen his subsequent efforts at

discussion of the lion-head coins seems particularly convincing (236-40). On the royal pages see Nicholas G. L. Hammond, "Royal Pages, Personal Pages, and Boys trained in the Macedonian Manner during the Period of the Temenid Monarchy," *Historia* 39 (1990): 261-290; however, Hammond's finding is not ironclad – it depends on the veracity of much later sources. For somewhat later (late 4th century-early 3rd century), but more secure, connections see Stavros A. Paspalas, "On Persian-Type Furniture in Macedonia: the Recognition and Transmission of Forms," *American Journal of Archaeology* 104 (2000): 531-560 and, of course, Dietmar Kienast, *Philipp II von Makedonien und das Reich der Achaimeniden* (Munich: Fink, 1973) on the influence of Persian monarchy on Philip's Macedonia.

⁸² Hammond, *History of Macedonia II*, 138. However, cf. Greenwalt, "Production of Coinage," 112-6.

⁸³ *Diod.* 13.49.1.

urbanization suggest that the king did not see a growth in anti-monarchic sentiment as the inevitable result of his policies.⁸⁴ In sum, there is little reason to suppose that urbanization necessarily promoted democratic thinking among the Macedonian populace.

In addition to his civic reforms, Archelaos also increased the efforts at hellenization that had characterized Argead rule at least since the time of Alexander I. The most concrete evidence of Archelaos' hellenizing efforts was the construction of a new palace at Pella, painted by no less than Zeuxis.⁸⁵ In addition to the famous artist, Archelaos gathered a veritable cohort of Greek cultural icons at his court.⁸⁶ Like Alexander I, he revisited the myth of Argead origins, with an Archelaos now taking the place of Perdiccas as the founder of the dynasty.⁸⁷ Moreover, he established an Olympic festival, complete with sporting and dramatic contests, at Dion, in Macedonia, in honor of Zeus and the Muses.⁸⁸ As participation in games was a critical component of Hellenic identity, the establishment of this festival was an unmistakable statement of Macedonia's equal participation within the Hellenic world.⁸⁹ The games would also have served a

⁸⁴ For all we know, the civic structure of a Greek colony under Macedonian rule may have been different than that of a native Macedonian city. Again, the Persian Empire could provide a model for the rule of disparate peoples, with their own local civic structures, by an overarching Persian organization.

⁸⁵ Ael. *Var. Hist.* 14.17. Pella has been extensively excavated; see especially Petsas, Photios M. *Pella. Alexander the Great's Capital* (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1978).

⁸⁶ Besides Zeuxis, we know of Choerilus of Samos, the epic poet, (*Athen.* 8.345d; Suid. *Choerilus* (X 595); Timotheus of Miletus, the musician (Plut. *Mor.* 177B); Agathon, the tragedian from Athens (Ael. *Var. Hist.* 2.21, 13.4; Schol. Aris. *Frogs* 85; Plut. *Mor.* A/B; and Euripides (Ael. *Var. Hist.* 13.4; Aris. *Pol.* 1311b; Athen. 13.5998 d-e; Plut. *Mor.* 177 A; St. Byz. *Bormiskos*).

⁸⁷ So Euripides, *Archelaos*, which connects the original Archelaos with the foundation of Aegae.

⁸⁸ There is some confusion as to whether the Olympics were held at Aegae (as stated by *Arr.* 1.11.1) or at Dion (so *Diod.* 17.16.3-4). Hammond, *History of Macedonia II*, 150, proposed that Archelaos merely moved the Olympic festival from Aegae to Dion. We know, however, that there was a sanctuary to Zeus at Dion: for bibliography see Borza, *Shadow of Olympus*, 173-4.

⁸⁹ Badian, "Greeks and Macedonians," 35, has seen a connection between these games and Greek antagonism to Archelaos' hellenicity, concluding that these games were *de facto* a "counter-Olympics" probably set up after Archelaos had tried, and failed, to gain entry into the games at Olympia. I think his conclusion makes too much of the fact that Thrasymachus called Archelaos a barbarian (frag. 2); the plain fact is that the Argeads could be either Greeks or barbarians depending on the given speaker and the given circumstances, and Thrasymachus' comment need not be reflective of an (unknown) decision of the *hellenodikai* concerning Archelaos. I agree here with Greenwalt, "Archelaos the philhellene," 145-6, that

unitive function, as participants from all over Archelaos' kingdom, both native and Greek, would have been encouraged to congregate at the games.⁹⁰ It follows that we might also imagine the foundation of *palaestrae* and local systems of education on a new scale in Macedonia.⁹¹ Thus Archelaos' games furthered the same basic agenda as his other reforms: namely, the unification and urbanization of his kingdom.

There was, however, another possible motivation behind Archelaos' establishment of games. For while participation in the games was open to all, some pursuits, especially chariot racing, served rather to indicate those individuals of high social status who could afford to own and train horses for such pursuits.⁹² Victory in such high status competitions bolstered one's social standing and could even serve as justification for autocratic rule. Athenian history gives eloquent testimony to the connection between games and political standing, and the same was true for the rest of the Greek world.⁹³ Seen in this light, the two Olympic victories of Alexander I, even if they were in the footrace and in the pentathlon, take on new meaning not only as proof of his Greek origins but also as indicators of his noble birth and his right to the throne. It

the point of the Olympics at Dion was to allow participation for *non-Argaeid* Macedonians alongside the Argaeid rulers.

⁹⁰ See Greenwalt, "Archelaus the philhellene," 145-149.

⁹¹ See *ibid.*, 146-7 and David Pritchard, "Athletics, Education, and Participation in Classical Athens," in *Sport and Festival in the Ancient World*, ed. David Phillips and David Pritchard (Swansea: Classical Press of Wales, 2003), 293-349, for an Athenian parallel. Certainly there was a well-developed system of sports and education at the local level in Macedonia by the mid-2nd century BCE, as the gymnasiarch law of Beroia shows. Whether this can be used as evidence for the late 5th century, however, is another matter. On the gymnasiarch law see Philippe Gauthier and Miltiades Hatzopoulos, *La Loi Gymnasiarchique de Béroia* (Paris: de Boccard, 1993). cf. also Papazoglou, "Polis et Souveraineté."

⁹² On the importance of games for Hellenic and aristocratic identity see Hall, *History of the Archaic Greek World*, 270-73 and Nigel James Nicholson, *Aristocracy and Athletics in Archaic and Classical Greece* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

⁹³ Cylon's attempted *coup* came after his Olympic victory in the footrace (*Thuc.* 1.126.3-7); so too, Peisistratus allowed Cimon to return from exile in return for being declared the Olympic victor for a chariot race Cimon had won (*Hdt.* 6.103); Alcibiades begins his speech on behalf of the Sicilian expedition with an account of his Olympic victories (*Thuc.* 6.16.2): see Mark Golden, *Sport and Society in Ancient Greece* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), ch. 5. On shifting paradigms of aristocratic control of athletics and victory in the 5th and 4th centuries see Nicholson, *Aristocracy and Athletics*.

seems possible, too, that Archelaos' establishment of a Macedonian Olympics could have added to the prestige of the Argead clan within the Macedonian aristocracy, whose members were becoming increasingly prosperous along with the country as a whole. So too, we know from Arrian that the sacrifices to Zeus at Dion, which were held alongside the games, had special importance for the Argead clan (1.11); adding games would have augmented the prestige of the festival, and consequently of the Argeads themselves.⁹⁴ While such arguments must remain largely in the realm of speculation, it seems possible that the Olympics at Dion might have played a dual role in bringing together geographically diverse members of the Macedonian kingdom and, at the same time, reinforcing Argead preeminence in the social hierarchy.

Some conclusions about the nature of the early Macedonian monarchy can now be drawn. Most importantly, the idea of a pan-Macedonian kingship was an Argead ideology disseminated by the kings and had no *a priori* validity in the Macedonian context. As the Argeads extended their influence over the course of the 5th century, they were confronted by tribal organizations on the one hand, and Greek colonies on the other hand, none of which had any prior commitment to a Macedonian state or an Argead king. It follows that the Argeads' most pressing problem during this time of expansion and unification was the tension between national/monarchic forces and local concerns. This disunity among the people subject to Macedonian rule was the fuel for Archelaos, who sought to strengthen the Macedonian military. In the process, he also urbanized and Hellenized the kingdom he had inherited. The Hellenic influence on Macedonia and the

⁹⁴ I am reminded, for example, of the Peisistratids' involvement in the Panathenaic games, which it is likely that they did in order to garner popular good will and foster Athenian civic identity. See Donald Kyle, *Athletics in Ancient Athens* (Leiden: Brill, 1987), 28-31. On the goodwill and popularity a tyrant could hope to garner from staging games, and for an interesting parallel between kingship and archonship at the games, see Xen. *Hiero* 9.

Argead court, however, should not blind us to the other monarchies, and particularly Persia, which served as models for the successful integration of Greek culture within a monarchic system of government.

The Kingship of Philip II

The previous examination of early Macedonian kingship has several important consequences for the reign of Philip II. For one thing, Philip II, like his predecessor Archelaos – and indeed like most of the Macedonian kings – was faced with a disunited kingdom when he came to power.⁹⁵ One of his primary concerns throughout his reign was to create unity out of an ethnically, socially, and economically disparate people. Paradoxically, however, this disunity created a certain freedom in redefining the king's role: a king of Macedonia could have just as much institutional power as he could manage to take and, furthermore, could adopt non-Macedonian traditions. Indeed, it is noteworthy that the kings of Macedonia – unlike neighboring kings – were not styled ὁ βασιλεύς, but rather were addressed by name. The lack of a formal title supports the idea that the king's power was individual rather than institutional.⁹⁶ It follows that non-Macedonian paradigms of Macedonian kingship had the potential to palpably affect Macedonian reality. We have already seen this tendency in Alexander I's claims to kingship over a greater Macedonia and in Archelaos' reforms: both kings used Greek and

⁹⁵ Archelaos' success proved to be of short duration – he was assassinated in 399 BCE, and Macedonia sank back into dysfunctional turmoil for the next 40 years. Disunity was thus once again the first and foremost problem which confronted Philip when he ascended to the throne in 360 BCE. On the date of Philip's ascension I follow Miltiades Hatzopoulos, "The Olevni Inscription and the dates of Philip II's reign," in *Philip II, Alexander the Great, and the Macedonian Heritage*, ed. W. L. Adams and Eugene Borza (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1982), and disregarding the fact that Philip in these first years may only have been acting regent for his nephew Amyntas rather than king in his own right; Amyntas' youth means that Philip was *de facto* king, whatever his title.

⁹⁶ See Errington, *Macedonian Royal Style* and also Carney, *Legitimacy and Female Political Action*, 370.

Persian ideologies at their own convenience to bolster their own power. In this respect, too, Philip followed in the footsteps of his predecessors.

Like Archelaus, Philip was an innovator; at the same time, the reign of Philip has left us much more evidence from which to calculate the extent of these changes. Like Archelaus, Philip's primary aim was military – explicitly so in the reforms which he instituted in the very first years of his reign – though, again, they also brought about a range of social and economic changes.⁹⁷ My focus here is primarily on the social changes that occurred during Philip's reign, and their implications for the way Philip understood and recast his role as king of Macedonia; but it is important to note at the outset that the majority of these changes were probably made out of concern for, or are the results of, military reforms.⁹⁸ Like Archelaos, Philip brought greater unity and organization to his kingdom through a multi-faceted approach that combined population movements with the creation of strong personal ties between Macedonians of various social levels and the king.

Philip's reign saw a remarkable widening in the number of individuals actively participating in the civic institutions of Macedonia. This widening is evident from the lowest to the highest ranks and appears to have begun in the first year of Philip's reign, when he had the pressing task of filling the ranks of a Macedonian army decimated by the Illyrians in advance of another Illyrian incursion.⁹⁹ While it is unclear how exactly he

⁹⁷ See Griffith's eloquent summation, *History of Macedonia II*, 405-408. Ellis, "Dynamics of Fourth-Century Macedonian Imperialism," persuasively argues that the growth of the Macedonian army and its nearly constant activity proved a powerful unifier of peoples and tribes under Philip's rule.

⁹⁸ Philip's military reforms have come under close scrutiny. See particularly Hammond, *Philip of Macedon*, ch. 3; Griffith, *History of Macedonia II*, 405-449.

⁹⁹ Diodorus 16.2.5 reports that more than 4,000 Macedonians had died in the battle. Even if this number is exaggerated – and doubtless it is – this was an incredible loss for Philip to make up for in just a year. Nevertheless, he had a force of 10,000 footsoldiers and 600 cavalry with him in his next encounter with the Illyrians (*Diod.* 16.4.3).

accomplished this feat, Philip's actions following the victory against the Illyrians and his subsequent annexation of Upper Macedonia are indicative of his concern to access new sources of manpower. Thus Philip founded the city of Heraclea Lyncestis in Upper Macedonia at this time, providing that rural territory a civic center which could make it easier to organize the local population and, consequently, draft men into the army.¹⁰⁰ While this is the only foundation we can be sure of, it seems likely that it was not Philip's only initiative in city-building. He also allowed Upper Macedonian nobility to gain positions of importance in his court, thus tapping into pre-existing sources of local power.¹⁰¹ Philip's employment of Upper Macedonian hierarchies in his own service also points to the success of Argead propaganda, which had always sought to assert the Argeads' right to rule over Upper as well as Lower Macedonia.

The foundation of Heraclea Lyncestis in Upper Macedonia is symptomatic of Philip's continuation of the policies that had made Archelaus' reign so successful. Located in a mountainous area, with a transhumant population and difficult systems of communication, the city linked the upper echelons of Macedonia's centralized government (e.g., the king and his court) and the local civic administration of the Lyncestian populace.¹⁰² Local authorities would have been in charge of drafting men into the army, which was arranged according to regional groupings.¹⁰³ By providing soldiers with weapons and armor rather than expecting them to carry their own, as was the

¹⁰⁰ On Heraclea Lyncestis, see Hammond, *Philip of Macedon*, 27; R. Katičić, "Lynkos und die Lynkestes," *Beiträge zur Namenforschung* 13 (1962): 126-143.

¹⁰¹ See Griffith, *History of Macedonia II*, 396. In this context, one might also take note of Alexander's famous allegation that 'Philip found the Macedonians as uncivilized pastoralists and created out of them a modern, civilized fighting force' (*Arr.* 7.9.2).

¹⁰² Indeed, Heracleia Lyncestis remained the only major center in Lyncestis through the Roman period. See Hatzopoulos, *Macedonian Institutions*, 88. Hatzopoulos, *Macedonian Institutions*, 96-104 argues that the local institutions of Upper Macedonia remained much the same from archaic to Roman times, being based throughout on federations of villages [κώμαι].

¹⁰³ *Arr.* 3.16.11 and *Diod.* 17.57.2. See Griffith, *History of Macedonia II*, 426.

practice of the Greek states and probably of his predecessors, Philip was able to co-opt the poorer classes into the army and thereby increase the levy.¹⁰⁴ Like Archelaus, too, Philip followed the practice of population transplants. Philip would settled Macedonians – in greater or smaller numbers – in the predominantly Greek cities which came under his control.¹⁰⁵ Such a policy not only secured the loyalty of areas that would have chafed under Macedonian rule, but also increased the number of loyal propertied Macedonians by redistributing land seized in war – men who could subsequently be expected to provide their own weapons and armor in the service of the king.¹⁰⁶ The lower classes could expect to be rewarded for service with spoils of war along with pay, if not grants of newly-acquired land.¹⁰⁷ The best soldiers might also serve among the king's Foot Companions [πεζέταῖροι], a professional force which was active year round, unlike the rest of the army.¹⁰⁸ All these reforms show that Philip, like Archelaos, succeeded in drawing on a larger pool of landed men capable of serving in the army, and in doing so more efficiently, than had any of his predecessors. As his conquests multiplied, Philip would have been able to offer his troops ever larger possibilities of material gain and advancement.

Philip's reign also saw the opening of new opportunities for advancement among the aristocracy. Philip's court and the ranks of the king's Companions, the ἑταῖροι, included men from Upper Macedonia and Greeks of various backgrounds in addition to

¹⁰⁴ See *Diod.* 16.3.1. It seems unlikely that Philip was able to do so early in his reign, however, because this would have required substantial funds which Macedonia simply didn't have at the time of his ascension.

¹⁰⁵ Philip's population transplants are described by *Just.* 8.5.7-6.2; see also *Diod.* 8.6 on Crenides (Philippi) and *Steph.* 666 on Philippi and Philippopolis. On Philip's policy toward Pydna and the cities of the Chalcidice see Hatzopoulos, *Macedonian Institutions*, 179-199.

¹⁰⁶ See Hatzopoulos, *Macedonian Institutions*, 270.

¹⁰⁷ We know that Alexander's army was paid, and paid according to their rank; it is justified to see this as a continuation of his father's policy: see Ellis, *Philip II*, 54-55; Hammond, *Philip of Macedon*, 39.

¹⁰⁸ *Theop.* F 348; see Griffith, *History of Macedonia II*, 414-419 and Ellis, *Philip II*, 53.

the traditional aristocrats of Lower Macedonia.¹⁰⁹ Even Theopompus' and Demosthenes' excoriating accounts make clear that Philip prized skill in war and diplomacy above origin and ancestral rank.¹¹⁰ Because many of these individuals – such as many of the Upper Macedonians, for example - would not have been drawn to the courts of Philip's predecessors, the sheer number of Companions at Philip's court was probably greater than it had ever been before.¹¹¹ No distinction, again, seems to have been made between Upper Macedonians and Lower Macedonians.¹¹² The fact that the Argeads had claimed supremacy over these peoples for more than a century must have only further confirmed the equality of the disparate Macedonian tribes within Philip's court.¹¹³ By expanding the ties of personal loyalty that had already been in existence between the aristocracy and the king before his ascension, Philip was able to unify the disparate elements of the Macedonian kingdom under his control.

Marriage was another key aspect of Philip's policy of unification. The practice of polygamy among Macedonian royalty allowed the monarch to use marriage as a guarantee of the loyalty of his subject peoples and his neighbors.¹¹⁴ Philip was, of

¹⁰⁹ Though it is noteworthy that no Greeks appear in positions of military importance.

¹¹⁰ *Theop.* F 224; *Dem.* 2.17-19; also *Isoc. To Philip* 18-19.

¹¹¹ See *Theop.* F 224-5, which estimates the number of Philip's Companions at something under 800. Theopompus' calculation was based on the latter part of Philip's reign. That Alexander further enlarged the ranks of the Companions by extending the title to much of his cavalry is also suggestive for his father's policy: see *Anaxim.* F 4.

¹¹² Though it is interesting to note that under the surface regional tensions probably continued to simmer: see A. B. Bosworth, "Philip II and Upper Macedonia," *Classical Quarterly* 21 (1971): 93-105, who suggests that Philip was murdered by an Upper Macedonian conspiracy precisely because his last marriage to a woman of Lower Macedonian ancestry, Cleopatra, raised old rivalries that had not been a factor earlier in Philip's reign.

¹¹³ The same can be said of the Royal Pages, for which see especially Nicholas G. L. Hammond, "Royal Pages, Personal Pages, and Boys Trained in the Macedonian Manner during the Period of the Temenid Monarchy," *Historia* 39 (1990): 261-290.

¹¹⁴ Probably all the Argead monarchs practiced polygamy, though we have virtually no information on any royal wives before Philip's reign. See especially Elizabeth Carney, *Women and Monarchy in Macedonia* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2000) and William Greenwalt, "Polygamy and Succession in Argead Macedonia," *Arethusa* 22 (1989): 19-45.

course, not the first Macedonian king to use marriage as a way of assuring his political alliances.¹¹⁵ He does, however, seem to have employed this political tool on an unprecedented scale: by the end of his life he had married a total of seven wives. Five of these marriages were contracted in the early years of his reign, when he most needed to establish himself and make friendly connections.¹¹⁶ While not all of Philip's marriages were made on or after campaigns, all of them were to some degree politically motivated.¹¹⁷ Royal marriages were contracted as a matter of political expediency and created a personal relationship between the two families involved. Thus Philip's use of marriage bolsters the view that his kingship, as well as that of every Argead, was founded on personal loyalty and relationships contracted directly with the king.

Philip seems to have employed much the same policy of building strong individual connections in his dealings with the Greek world. This is, indeed, the way Polybius interpreted the connections between Philip and many of the leading Greeks of his day. Arguing against Demosthenes' view that these individuals were traitors, Polybius affirms that such men were simply trying to benefit their own *poleis* in creating personal ties to Philip (18.14). Again, Philip was not an innovator in this respect: we

¹¹⁵ So for example the sister of Alexander I married Bubares, a high-ranking Persian, during the period of Macedonian subjection to Persia before the Persian Wars: *Hdt.* 5.21. The marriage of the Bacchiad Eurydice, Philip's mother, to Amyntas similarly was an attempt to solidify the northern border of Macedonia: see William Greenwalt, "Amyntas III and the Political Stability of Argead Macedonia," *Ancient World* 18 (1988): 35-44.

¹¹⁶ On Philip's marriages and their political nature see Carney, *Women and Monarchy*, 3.

¹¹⁷ The notion that Philip married κατὰ πόλεμον is that of Athenaeus in his famous passage concerning Philip's marriages (*Deipnosophistai* 13.557b-e), and it has been notoriously problematic: see Adrian Tronson, "Satyrus the Peripatetic and the Marriages of Philip II," *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 104 (1984): 116-126. Also vexing is Satyrus' notion that Philip's last marriage, to a Macedonian named Cleopatra, was a love-affair; this interpretation has been, however, discredited; The marriage was probably contracted to solidify Philip's position among the Macedonian aristocracy while on the Persian campaign; see Carney, *Women and Monarchy*, 70-75 and Elizabeth Carney, "The Politics of Polygamy: Olympias, Alexander and the Murder of Philip," *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte* 41 (1992): 169-189. See also Ernst Badian, "The Death of Philip II," *Phoenix* 17 (1963): 244-250 on the politically charged implications of the marriage of Philip's daughter Cleopatra shortly thereafter.

know of a number of private contracts made between individuals and previous Macedonian kings.¹¹⁸ Argead patronage of the arts went hand in hand with the development of such personal friendships with members the Greek aristocracy. I have already mentioned this policy in connection with Archelaus (see above, p. 45); Philip, too, was well known as a patron of artists – so much so, in fact, that actors were specifically targeted as particularly efficacious envoys to Philip’s court.¹¹⁹ Yet both patronage of the arts and personal friendships with Greeks were informal connections and did not guarantee the king influence over southern Greek politics; indeed, in democratic states they might actually prove harmful, as Philip’s connections lay among the aristocracy.¹²⁰

In Macedonia, Philip solidified his rule and unified his holdings by fostering personal relationships with individual Macedonians of all social levels and regional affiliations. He also built on the success of his predecessor Archelaos by establishing cities and organizing the population under his rule. Yet such strategies by themselves were not enough to garner Philip influence over the Greeks; he would have to find new ways of building control over and accessing the resources of the south. In the next section, I turn to Philip’s bid for formal power within the Greek world, and in particular to his relations with the Thessalians and the establishment of the League of Corinth. While Philip’s engagement with the Greeks is a much more complex topic than I can fully address here, I take these two events - that is, Philip’s election as *tagos* of the

¹¹⁸ Thus Andocides attempted to use his relationship with Archelaus to secure a deal for oars for Athens and thereby gain return from exile (*Andoc.* 2.11). Amyntas III gave a gift of timber to the general Timotheus for his services to Macedonia (*Dem.* 49.26-30). As well, I mentioned above the close connections that existed between the Argeads and the Peisistratids (ff. 18).

¹¹⁹ See *Aeschin.* 2.15 concerning Aristodemus the actor; Aeschines, of course, was a former actor himself. See also *Dem.* 19.10 on Ischander and 19.192-195 on Satyrus.

¹²⁰ Perhaps most telling in this respect is Demosthenes’ allegation that Xenophron, son of one of the Thirty Tyrants, lived in Pella (19.196). Aeschines, however, calls him a Macedonian (2.4, 2.153-8).

Thessalian League and his role in establishing the League of Corinth - as symptomatic of his negotiation of a new role for the Macedonian king within the Greek context. I argue that the Argead ability to co-opt Hellenic and Persian paradigms set a precedent for Philip's success in crafting his new relations with the *poleis*.

Philip and Thessaly

Arguably Philip's most important step in gaining access to the Greek political world was his assumption of leadership in Thessaly. It was in this guise that his serious involvement in the politics of central Greece began, thus setting off a chain of events that would lead him down the path to becoming the greatest power in mainland Greece. Although previous Macedonian kings had involved themselves in the confused politics of Thessaly, Philip's assumption of leadership over the Thessalians was a unique event.¹²¹ The details of Philip's early engagement in Thessaly are difficult to piece together, but the end result is secure: Philip was elected to the position of *tagos* by the Thessalian League, probably in 352 BCE and certainly by 349/8 BCE.¹²² His new position gave him the use of the famous Thessalian cavalry, access to a large source of tax revenue as well as the strategic port of Pagasae, and some control over the Thessalians' votes in the Amphictyonic League.

¹²¹ Alexander II, the son of Amyntas and Philip's older brother, had attempted to impose his own rule on Thessaly in the early 360s after being invited in by the Aleuadae of Larissa (*Diod.* 16.14.1). On the extraordinary nature of Philip's election see also Griffith, *History of Macedonia II*, 285-95.

¹²² Philip intervened on behalf of the League as early as 358, at which point he also married Philinna of Larissa. In 353/2 he intervened decisively on the League's behalf by defeating Onomarchus the Phocian, who had been called in to Thessaly by Pherae, and seizing Pherae itself. He also married Nikesipolis of Pherae. He was most likely elected *tagos* of the League at this point. The *tagos* was the special title given to leaders of the Thessalian League, who were sometimes also called kings, *archons*, or *tetrarchs*: see Bruno Helly, *L'État Thessalien, Aleuas le Roux, les théâtres et les "Tagoi"* (Lyons: Orient Méditerranéen, 1995), ch. 1 on the origin and use of the word *tagos*. On Philip's early involvement in Thessaly see Thomas Martin, "A Phantom Fragment of Theopompus and Philip II's Early Campaign in Thessaly," *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* (1982): 55-78, G. T. Griffith, "Philip of Macedon's Early Interventions in Thessaly (358-353 B.C.)," *Classical Quarterly* 10 (1970): 67-80, and Thomas Martin, "Diodorus on Philip II and Thessaly in the 350's B.C.," *Classical Philology* 76 (1981): 188-201.

The growth of Philip's power in Thessaly is a testament to his unique combination of military and political skill, a combination that he had already honed in his dealings with Macedonians. As before, military victories played a vital role in endearing him to the Thessalians: Philip's defeat of the Phocian Onomarchus in 352 BCE, after having suffered a spectacular set-back at the hands of that general just one year earlier, was particularly critical. Yet various sources also testify to Philip's political acumen in uniting and holding on a position of leadership in the Thessalian League. By all accounts, the Thessalians were not easy to deal with.¹²³ Philip's approach to the seemingly intractable rivalries which regularly tore Thessaly apart is also similar to that he employed in winning over the disparate tribes of Macedonians.

Philip's success in Thessaly need not be ascribed solely to his own genius. There are fundamental correspondences between Thessalian and Macedonian institutions which helped Philip move readily from the one to the other. Thessaly's evolution from a tribal to a *polis*-dominated culture was slower than that of the other Greeks to the south, and even in the 4th century traditional aristocratic families dominated a landscape of *penestai*, or serfs, a small contingent of poor but free Thessalians, and the *perioikoi*, weak Greek ἔθνη who lived around the borders of Thessaly proper.¹²⁴ The Thessalian League, and with it the position of the *tagos*, was probably instituted in the late 6th century. The *tagos* was elected to his office and in origin seems to have been a military leader responsible for a specific campaign. The role of the *tagos*, however, quickly outstripped these

¹²³ Isoc. *Epistle* II 20; *Dem.* 1.22.

¹²⁴ On the development of early Thessaly see Marta Sordi, *La Lega Tessala Fino ad Alessandro Magno* (Rome: Istituto Italiano per la Storia Antica: 1958); also Thomas Martin, *Sovereignty and Coinage in Classical Greece* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), ch. 3 and H. D. Westlake, *Thessaly in the Fourth Century B.C.* (London: Methuen, 1935), chs. 1 and 2.

boundaries.¹²⁵ For example, the *tagos* came to be a life-long position, and his power became such that Herodotus and Pindar called the leader of Thessaly a king.¹²⁶ In addition, both Thessaly and Macedonia had been urbanized late, and even then never to the extent of the southern Greeks; both were created out of an amalgam of members from a single powerful ἔθνος surrounded by tribes or other ἔθνη who were at various times more or less dependent on the rulers of the central ἔθνος; both were dominated by an aristocratic class and both were led by an individual whose power could also vary depending on historical circumstance.¹²⁷ Thus there was much similarity between the two regions socially, if not economically. The institutional parallels between Thessalian and Macedonian society go far in explaining the ease with which Philip crossed the boundary between them, as the skills which Philip had honed in his early years at the Macedonian court were easily translatable into a Thessalian context.

Philip employed a mixture of astute propaganda and force to consolidate his newfound power.¹²⁸ The greatest problem confronting Thessaly at the time was an ongoing feud between the Aleuads of Larissa and the tyrants of Pherae; indeed, it was the Aleuads who had originally invited Philip in to help them defeat Pherae. The cessation of civil strife was thus the most important concern of the new *tagos* - and strong leadership

¹²⁵ On the Thessalian League and the *tagos* as a military institution see Helly, *L'État Thessalien*, passim; Marta Sordi, "I *tagoi* tessali come suprema magistratura militare del *koinon* tessalico," *Topoi* 7 (1997): 177-82; Fritz Gschnitzer, "Zum *Tagos* der Thessaler," *Anzeiger für die Altertumswissenschaft Humanistischen Gessellschaft* 7 (1954): 191-2.

¹²⁶ *Hdt.* 5.63.3; 7.6.2; Pindar *Pyth.* 10 l. 3.

¹²⁷ Helly, *L'État Thessalien* pp.26-27, has also collected evidence for the appearance of *tagoi* as then nomenclature for local magistrates in Macedonia. The evidence is Hellenistic, but gives further weight to the existence of a particularly strong connection between Thessalian and Macedonian social and political structures.

¹²⁸ Philip set up garrisons in some Thessalian cities (*Dem.* 1.21-2; 19.260; [*Dem.*] 7.32); particularly telling is the case of Gomphi, which changed its name to Philippopolis; he change of name suggests that the city rebelled and was later refounded by Philip (*Steph.* s.v. "Philippoi"). On Philip's military interventions in Thessaly see also Griffith, *History of Macedonia II*, 218-30.

and a knack for unification was precisely what Philip had to offer. The close historical links between Macedonia and Thessaly would have made Philip less of a foreign presence here than he would be further to the south. Philip's personal demeanor, moreover, appealed to the Thessalians, who had the same aristocratic culture and heavy drinking practices as their northern neighbors.¹²⁹ Philip could also leverage his Heraclid ancestry in his favor, as the Aleuads of Larissa also claimed descent from that hero. Finally, Philip contracted two strategic marriages, the first of which connected him to the Larissaeans and the later to the tyrants of Pherae.¹³⁰ These two marriages would have indicated to the Thessalians, and particularly to the Pheraeans, that Philip meant to be evenhanded in his policy toward the rival factions.

Philip also employed Thessalian religious sentiment to portray himself as a rightful leader. His use of specifically Thessalian sacred precedent is evident in the famous story of the battle of the Crocus Field.¹³¹ According to Justin's account, Philip ordered his men to crown themselves with laurel in honor of Apollo before their battle against Onomarchus and the Phocians, thus symbolizing Philip's role as champion of

¹²⁹ *Theop.* F 162. On the distinctive nature of Macedonian *symposia* as oppose to Greek *symposia* see Elizabeth Carney, "Symposia and the Macedonian elite: the Unmixed Life," *Syllecta Classica* 18 (2007): 129-180.

¹³⁰ Philip married Philinna of Larissa probably in 358 or 357 BCE. Whether she was a member of the Aleuad clan is in question, but equally unlikely are the claims that she was a whore (Plut. *Alex.* 77.5; *Just.* 9.8.2, 13.2.11; *Athen.* 13.578a). See Carney, *Women and Monarchy*, 61-2 and Griffith, *Philip of Macedon's Early Interventions in Thessaly*, 69-72.

¹³¹ This has been argued by Slavomir Sprawski, "All the King's Men: Thessalians and Philip II's designs on Greece," in *Society and Religions: Studies in Greek and Roman History*, ed. Danuta Musial (Torun: Nicolaus Copernicus University, 2005), 40-42. That Philip's use of religious precedent was suggested by his Thessalian friends seems reasonable, though it is obviously not a claim that can be proven. It is also reasonable to suppose that Philip, with his love of games, would have found the tradition a particularly compelling one. The Battle of the Crocus Field was one of the most important events in the Third Sacred War, which initially began as a dispute between the Phocians and the Thebans. It pitted the Phocians, with the Athenians and Spartans as their major allies, against the Amphictyony as represented by the Thebans, with the Thessalians and later Philip on their side. See John Buckler, *Philip II and the Sacred War* (Leiden: Brill, 1989); on the outbreak of the war see also Buckler and Beck, *Central Greece and the Politics of Power*, ch. 14.

Delphi.¹³² Onomarchus lost, and all survivors were thrown into the sea as punishment for their sacrilege.¹³³ While Philip's assumption of the role of Apollo's champion has obvious significance within the larger Hellenic world, it also has particular Thessalian connotations.¹³⁴ During the Pythian Games, it was a custom for a sacred procession to go from the Tempe Valley in Thessaly to Delphi carrying laurels for crowning the winners; the Pythian Games themselves were held in honor of an Amphictyonic victory over the sacrilegists of Krissa. The crowning of Philip's soldiers with laurel in order to avenge a sacrilege against Delphi, then, could be seen as a reenactment of this Thessalian tradition. We know, moreover, that Philip personally supervised the Pythian Games held in 346 BCE, after the Phocians' capitulation: this also would have had symbolic importance as a further reenactment of the Thessalian tradition. It thus seems likely that Philip's actions at the battle of the Crocus Field were meant to cast him in a specifically Thessalian role. In the story of the laurel wreaths we should see another of Philip's efforts to identify himself as a legitimate *tagos*, one who defended the Thessalians' reputation and interests abroad and who was conversant with Thessalian tradition.

Philip's reorganization of the Thessalian *tetrarchies* also points to the way he employed native Thessalian traditions to his own benefit without seeking to impose the monarchic control that he enjoyed over Macedonia over the Thessalians. While early in the history of the League Thessaly had been divided into *tetrarchies* under the control of the *tagos*, in the 5th century each *tetrarchy* came under the jurisdiction of an annually

¹³² *Just.* 8.2.1-4.

¹³³ *Diod.* 16.35.6; 61.2.

¹³⁴ The role of Apollo's champion was one that Philip himself had an affinity for, as the cult of Apollo in Macedonia was quite strong; see Ulla Westermark, "Apollo in Macedonia," in *Opus Mixtum: Essays in Ancient Art and Society*, ed. E Rystedt et al. (Stockholm: Paul Aström, 1994), on the head of Apollo on Macedonian coins.

elected *polemarch*.¹³⁵ Philip instituted *tetradarchs*, who were to be appointed by the *tagos* rather than elected by the League – as the original *tetrarchs* seem to have been.¹³⁶ While this shift was perceived by some, such as Demosthenes, as the stifling of Thessalian freedom, it could also have been favorably viewed as a return to a more traditional form of organization.¹³⁷ Indeed, that Demosthenes' horror stories of Thessalian slavery are wild exaggerations is further confirmed by the continuing production of individual city coinage within Thessaly.¹³⁸ Philip's appropriation of tax revenue from trade, another mark of outrage for the orator, was also a reasonable prerogative for a *tagos* who had to defray the costs of his campaigns, and was probably well within Philip's rights.¹³⁹ The Thessalian League itself retained some independency from the Macedonian *tagos*, as is particularly clear in its foreign policy decisions. In sum, Philip worked within the traditional parameters of the *tagos* – modifying those parameters, it is true, when he felt it necessary, but doing so in accordance with Thessalian tradition rather than against it.

The Amphictyony and the League of Corinth

Thus far I have shown that Philip's use of Thessalian norms and customs speaks to his desire to integrate himself as seamlessly as possible into Thessalian society. I have also argued that the similarities between Macedonia and Thessaly allowed Philip to employ political strategies that he and his Argead predecessors had successfully employed in Macedonia. The problems which Philip faced in his dealings with the

¹³⁵ See Fritz Gschnitzer, "Namen und Wesen der Thessalischen Tetraden," *Hermes* 82 (1954):451-464 and Sordi, *Lega Tessala*, 313-320.

¹³⁶ See Helly, *L'État Thessalien*, 39-68.

¹³⁷ See *Dem.* 9.26. Demosthenes' argument (and his reference to a phantom Thessalian 'dekarchy') are discussed by Helly, *L'État Thessalien*, 55-62 and Griffith, *History of Macedonia II*, 527-34.

¹³⁸ As argued by Martin, *Sovereignty and Coinage*.

¹³⁹ See *Dem.* 22.

southern Greeks, however, proved quite different. Philip had no desire to establish a monarchy over the *poleis*; nor does he appear to have been particularly interested in expanding his direct power over these Greek *poleis*. Philip's policy was, above all, geared toward protecting Macedonian interests, and that included protecting Macedonia and the northern Aegean from southern Greek meddling. In the hopes of establishing his right to these lands, Philip sought to create a panhellenic treaty which would force the Greeks, and particularly the Athenians, to acknowledge his claims to the Chalcidice. Yet Philip had to find new structural solutions for enforcing his will over the fractious *poleis*: direct rule of the sort he exercised in Macedonia and Thessaly was simply not a viable option, even had he wanted it. The establishment of the League of Corinth, which effectively solidified Philip's claim to primacy among the Greeks, stands as a testament to the king's ingenuity in integrating the Greek *poleis* into the Macedonian sphere of influence.

Philip's innovative approach in trying to expand his influence south of Thermopylae is apparent in his settlement of 346 BCE, the year he single-handedly put an end to the Third Sacred War by forcing the latest (and last) Phocian general to flee the country, thus leaving Phocis unprotected. In gratitude for Philip's help, the Amphictyonic council, led by Thebes and Thessaly, decided to give the Phocians' two votes in the council to Philip and his descendants. The king also received a host of other honors: a place among the *naopoi*, who were responsible for the upkeep of the temple, the presidency of the Pythian Games, and the right of *promanteia*, which the Athenians had formerly enjoyed.¹⁴⁰ Philip's inclusion among the Amphictyonic members solidified his newly gained prestige within the panhellenic community and acknowledged the

¹⁴⁰ *Diod.* 16.60.1-4 and *Justin* 8.5.4-6.

shifting balance of power in the Greek world. At the same time, it gave Philip the ability to participate in Greek affairs in his own right rather than as the representative of the Thessalians.¹⁴¹

It is unlikely that Philip saw his newfound position within the League as a springboard for further aggrandizement in Greece at this time.¹⁴² Instead, he seems to have desired a cessation of the constant conflicts that plagued the *poleis* and, in turn, the security of his own territory from Greek, and particularly Athenian, machinations.¹⁴³ After the defeat of the Phocians, Philip meant to turn his military aspirations elsewhere: notably, Diodorus links the end of the Sacred War with Philip's plans to make an expedition against Persia.¹⁴⁴ Indeed, after Philip had settled Greek affairs in 346 he turned his attention eastward, to Thrace and beyond.¹⁴⁵ There is no reason to suppose that Philip thought he needed Greek military support, rather than simple assurance of

¹⁴¹ See Peter Londey, "Philip II and the Delphic Amphictyony," *Mediterranean Archaeology* 7 (1994): 25-34 on Philip's possible motives for acquiring the votes. While I think it plausible that Philip wanted to use the Amphictyony to impose peace on the Greeks, Londey's emphasis on the inclusion Philip's himself rather than the Macedonian state into the Amphictyony seems forced; agreements between 'Macedonia' and Greek *poleis* were always made in the king's name, and while it is somewhat peculiar that Philip is placed among a list of ethnic designations, it is in keeping with the Greeks' general practice with respect to the Macedonians – who were, moreover, not considered Greek, as oppose to Philip himself. The argument made by Nicholas G. L. Hammond, "Were 'Makedones' enrolled in the Amphictyony in 346 BC?," *Electronic Antiquity* 1 (1993), that the Macedonian state, and not Philip, was actually given the seats in the Amphictyonic council, is equally at odds with the evidence. The settlement of 346 BCE also saw a Macedonian military presence established in central Greece: see Bucker and Beck, *Central Greece and the Politics of Power*, 268.

¹⁴² M. M. Markle, "The Strategy of Philip in 346 B.C.," *Classical Quarterly* 24 (1974): 262, proposes a similar end goal for Philip's policy at this time. Contra Julia Heskell, "Macedonia and the North, 400-336," in *The Greek World in the Fourth Century: From the Fall of the Athenian Empire to the Successors of Alexander*, ed. Lawrence A. Tritle, 167-188 (Oxford: Routledge, 1997), Hammond, *Philip of Macedon*, 95-7, and Griffith, *History of Macedonia II*, 463-468.

¹⁴³ He had also just come to a peace agreement with Athens in the Peace of Philocrates, thus apparently ending the rivalry over the north Aegean.

¹⁴⁴ *Diod.* 16.60.5.

¹⁴⁵ Diodorus has him campaigning in Illyria in 344/3 BCE (16.69.7) and then in the Hellespont, where he attracts the Persians' attention (16.74.2-77.3).

Greek non-intervention in his affairs, for an expedition against Persia.¹⁴⁶ Philip did not actively seek the complete subjugation of Greece at this time, but rather wished to guarantee Macedonian autonomy and the cessation of Athenian machinations in the northern Aegean.¹⁴⁷ Philip's actions make clear that, at least in 346 BCE, the king had no desire to impose his rule over the Hellenic world.

The settlement of 346 BCE, and particularly the concessions which Philip had forced upon the Athenians in the Peace of Philocrates, made, however, for a short-lived peace. Yet even after its failure Philip appears to have had no real inclination to impose his will militarily on the Greeks. It has sometimes been argued that Philip masterminded the 4th Sacred War in order to have an excuse to invade central Greece in 339/8 BCE.¹⁴⁸ The evidence, however, points even at this late date to Philip's desire for a peaceful settlement with the *poleis*. The 4th Sacred War began with a series of accusations of sacrilege leveled first at the Athenians and then at the Amphissans, who were a close ally of Thebes.¹⁴⁹ The details are confusing; nevertheless, it is alleged that because the

¹⁴⁶ This is true with the exception of the Thessalian cavalry, which both Philip and Alexander used extensively. On Philip's use of Greek forces see Griffith, *History of Macedonia II*, 431-8.

¹⁴⁷ In this analysis I follow Ellis, *Philip II* ch. 4 and "Dynamics of Fourth-Century Macedonian Imperialism," and Griffith, *History of Macedonia II*, ch. 13; Markle, *Strategy of Philip* and Borza, *Shadow of Olympus*, 221-5, are also ultimately in agreement on this point as well, though I find each of them to be less than satisfactory: I am unpersuaded by Markle's argument that Philip wished for Athens' support rather than Thebes', and I find no evidence, as Borza claims, that Philip meant the Peace of Philocrates to be a κοινή ειρήνη (rather, this is closer to the suggestion made by the Athenian allies (*Aeschin.* 3.70), though even their proposal is less comprehensive, in terms of the city-states that would share in the peace, than a κοινή ειρήνη agreement ought to be). See however Cawkwell, *Philip of Macedon* chs. 8 and 9, who argues that in 344/3 Philip offered to make the Peace of Philocrates a common peace. It has also been argued that Philip wished to establish a κοινή ειρήνη in the Amphictyonic peace agreement concluded after the 3rd Sacred War, but this seems equally unlikely: see G. T. Griffith, "The So-Called Koine Eirene of 346 B.C.," *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 59 (1939):71-79. For the argument that Philip did desire the subjection of Greece as early as 346 see Buckler and Beck, *Central Greece and the Politics of Power*, 267-268.

¹⁴⁸ Griffith, *History of Macedonia II*, ch. 18.

¹⁴⁹ *Aeschin.* 3.113-29 gives an account of the Amphictyonic meeting and its aftermath. Allegedly, the Amphissans were going to accuse the Athenians of sacrilege but Aeschines prevented it and with a piece of brilliant rhetoric convinced the Amphictyons to vote rather that the Amphissans had been guilty of sacrilege for farming the plain of Cirra. The next day, at the instigation of the Amphictyons, a group of

president of the council at this time was a Thessalian, and because Philip theoretically could control the majority of the votes in the council, we should see his hand at work behind these events.¹⁵⁰ A number of points, however, make this scenario unlikely.¹⁵¹ For one thing, Philip was in Scythia at the time the conflict first broke out, and thus much too far away to have foreseen and provided against the many eventualities that could have arisen during the explosive meeting of the Amphictyony. As well, Philip's involvement in the conflict cannot have been a foregone conclusion, at least not at the early stages of the conflict: the Amphictyons, led by Thessaly, at first tried to gather an army and force Amphissa to pay the fine on their own (*Aeschin.* 3.128-9). Only when this initial effort failed to produce results did the Thessalians ask for Philip's help in the matter. Thus it would be a mistake to see the Thessalians in the council acting as mere agents of Philip's, rather than as first and foremost representatives of their own, local concerns.

I suggest, furthermore, that even after Philip crossed Thermopylae, he did so with an eye to a peaceful settlement rather than to the drastic change in the *status quo* which the battle of Chaeronea and the League of Corinth came to represent. First, Philip attempted to negotiate with Thebes, who had supported the Amphissans against the Thessalian-led Amphictyons. The fact that Philip tried to negotiate with Thebes at all – when he had already crossed Thermopylae – points to his reluctance to impose a settlement through the direct use of military force. In doing so he still looked to the

Delphians ravaged Cirra and a skirmish broke out. The Amphissans subsequently refused to pay a fine that had been levelled against them. They were supported in this decision by Thebes, and also, peculiarly, by the Athenians, who were apparently convinced by Demosthenes that supporting Thebes rather than the Amphictyony was in their best interest. There are obvious problems with this account, most prominently with the volte-face of the Amphictyons and, later, of the Athenians in response to the conflict; given our lack of other sources, however, thus far convincing solutions to these problems have not been found.

¹⁵⁰ A Thessalian, Cottyphus, was presiding over the council during these outbreak of war; he was also the man elected as general of the Amphictyonic forces against Amphissa the following year.

¹⁵¹ As argued more fully by Peter Londey, "The Outbreak of the 4th Sacred War," *Chiron* 20 (1990): 239-260.

Amphictyony as a centralized body with the potential to exert authority over the panhellenic world, just as he had done in 346 BCE. Philochorus provides proof of this view: he relates that Philip sent an embassy to Thebes, which asked that the fortress of Nicaea – a major bone of contention between Thebes and the Thessalians - be given to the Epikmenidian Locrians, a neutral party, in accordance with a decree of the Amphictyony. In reply, the Thebans sent ambassadors to negotiate with Philip.¹⁵² Thus at this point in time Philip was still employing the Amphictyony and its decrees as the basis for a potential future settlement between Greek states. Only with the Thebans' alliance with Athens against Philip and the other Amphictyons did the inefficacy of the Amphictyony as a panhellenic adjudicating body become patent.

The escalation of the 4th Sacred War from a petty dispute into a panhellenic war prompted Philip to establish a new panhellenic council - namely, the League of Corinth - which, with Macedonian backing, could enforce the panhellenic peace that Philip had been aiming to establish since 346 BCE. The League of Corinth was created in two parts, first in a κοινὴ εἰρήνη agreement among the major powers of Greece and second in the establishment of a *synedrion* which was to oversee proper adherence to the peace agreement. The end result was an innovative structure that drew on established Greek panhellenic systems while at the same time allowing for well-regulated oversight of individual *poleis*, something that had been significantly hampered the previous serious attempts at establishing a κοινὴ εἰρήνη. The κοινὴ εἰρήνη itself was a peculiar feature of

¹⁵² *FGrH* 328 F 56b. Demosthenes corroborates the presence of a Macedonian embassy in Thebes (18.211-16); notably, he states that the Macedonian ambassadors gave the Thebans the option of remaining neutral in the upcoming conflict between Philip and Athens, an option that is repeated in Hyperides' account of the events of 338 in *Against Diondas* l. 13-5. The Thebans were actually quite reluctant to ally with Athens against Macedonia at this time. Philip was prepared to deal with the Amphissans as a local affair and overlook the recalcitrance of the Thebans, with whom he was still allied; the machinations of the Athenians, however, made this impossible.

the 4th century Greek political landscape which had, as its object, the creation of panhellenic peace.¹⁵³ Such a peace agreement was first realized in 386 BCE under the influence of the Persian king, whose holdings in Asia Minor and the islands were protected under the arrangement and who, in fact, became the guarantor of the treaty. The King's Peace, as it is also known, stipulated the autonomy of the participating states; thus in theory the agreement was meant to establish a balance of power in Greece. In fact, however, it only perpetuated the Spartan hegemony, since the Spartans took it upon themselves to guarantee the "autonomy" of the Greeks on behalf of Persia.¹⁵⁴ Despite this serious flaw, the principles on which the King's Peace was established can be found in many later multi-state agreements, perhaps most notably in the Second Athenian League.¹⁵⁵

The agreement between Philip and the rest of the Greek states participating in the peace – which included all major parties except for Sparta – is explicitly called a κοινή εἰρήνη.¹⁵⁶ Philip knew the political value of crafting policy on the basis of tradition. In

¹⁵³ Isocrates particularly was a champion of the κοινή εἰρήνη, though such a panhellenic agreement was probably also a prevalent desire among the lesser Greek states, to whom it promised greater autonomy than they generally enjoyed. See M. Jehne, *Koine Eirene: Untersuchungen zu den Befriedungs- und Stabilisierungsbemühungen in der griechischen Poliswelt des 4. Jahrhunderts v. Ch.* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1994) and T. T. B. Ryder, *Koine Eirene: General Peace and Local Independence in Ancient Greece* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965) on the idea and development of the κοινή εἰρήνη over the course of the century. Buckler, "Philip II, the Greeks, and the King," *Illinois Classical Studies* 19 (1994): 119-22, examines the use of the term in the sources.

¹⁵⁴ On the King's Peace (also known as the Peace of Antalcidas) and the idea of κοινή εἰρήνη see Katrin Schmidt, "The Peace of Antalcidas and the Idea of the Koine Eirene: A Panhellenic Peace Movement," *Revue Internationale des Droits de l'Antiquité* 46 (1999): 81-96. On the circumstances of the peace more broadly see Ernst Badian, "The King's Peace," in *Georgica: Studies in Honor of George Cawkwell*, ed. Michael Flower and Mark Toher, 25-48 (London: Institute of Classical Studies, 1991).

¹⁵⁵ On the Second Athenian League see Jack Cargill, *The Second Athenian League: Empire or Free Alliance?*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981) and G. L. Cawkwell, "The Foundation of the Second Athenian Confederacy," *Classical Quarterly* 23 (1973): 52-4. On the League's similarities with a κοινή εἰρήνη agreement see Shalom Perlman, "Greek Diplomatic Tradition and the Corinthian League of Philip of Macedon," *Historia* 34 (1985): 159-60 and *passim*.

¹⁵⁶ See P. J. Rhodes and Robin Osborne, eds. *Greek Inscriptions 404-323 BC* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 76 and [Dem.] 17.6, 10, 15-6; the later speech deals with Alexander's reestablishment of the

some ways he functioned ‘merely’ as the replacement of the Persian King in his role as the “impartial” instigator of a panhellenic agreement.¹⁵⁷ While the treaty guaranteed Philip’s holdings for himself and his descendants, this could, again, find a parallel in the assurances given to the Great King in the treaty of 386 BCE.¹⁵⁸ So too, Philip is not explicitly named as the executive of the treaty; only after the formation of the League was he voted the status of ἡγεμῶν. Nor was Macedonia itself a member of the *synedrion*: as was customary, the king and his descendants are mentioned on behalf of the kingdom as a whole. Thus Philip did not take the opportunity to try to legitimize the Macedonians as part of the Greek world, or to have his absolute power over Greece explicitly recognized. While the League of Corinth came into being and continued to exist because of the Macedonian power behind it, in its form and function it was adapted to a Greek panhellenism that had been on the rise throughout the century.

Nevertheless, several key innovations in the treaty make it a different and more intrusive agreement than those that had come before it. For one thing, the peace prohibited the instigation of revolutions in the participating *poleis* in addition to attempts to subvert the rule of the Argeads in Macedonia.¹⁵⁹ For another, the creation of a new League and a *synedrion* which was to act as a kind of judicial body to oversee proper adherence to the peace treaty had no direct panhellenic precedent.¹⁶⁰ Its establishment

peace after Philip’s death, but the peace agreement seems not to have been modified in the process. See also Buckler, *Philip II, the Greeks, and the King*, 113-5.

¹⁵⁷ Buckler, *Philip II, the Greeks, and the King*, examines the relations between Macedonian and Persian policy in Greece during this period and concludes that Philip’s settlement of 338/7 was remarkable as a common peace which managed to exclude Persia from Greek affairs.

¹⁵⁸ Considering the near constant Greek involvement in Argead politics, this clause more than almost any other in the agreement shows just how far Philip had come over the course of his reign.

¹⁵⁹ See Rhodes and Osborne, eds., *Greek Inscriptions*, 76. This clause gave Philip and later Alexander a legal right to interfere in the affairs of individual *poleis*.

¹⁶⁰ Perlman, *Greek Diplomatic Tradition*, 85, however, notes that the Second Athenian League had a *synedrion* of the allies which could make independent, though Athens always had the final say.

fixed the major flaw in the King's Peace of 386 BCE. The *synedrion* of the League of Corinth was more than a mere cover for Macedonian power, despite the fact that its first action was to elect Philip ἡγεμῶν for an expedition against Persia. Just a few years later we can find, for example, an Athenian orator appealing to the κοινὴ εἰρήνη to excoriate Alexander's actions in Messene.¹⁶¹ Moreover, Philip's settlement must have been particularly welcome to the smaller *poleis*, whose autonomy was most in need of protection.¹⁶² Many, therefore, would have approved of the agreement, even if they did not necessarily approve of its instigator.

Conclusion

The Macedonian state and the Argead monarchy evolved from humble beginnings. What Philip's predecessors lacked in strength, they made up for in expansive claims backed by cunning politics. At various points in time the Argeads wished to gain the aid of the Illyrians, the Greek colonists, the Persians, and later the southern Greek *poleis* in establishing their rule over a greater Macedonia; to do so, they co-opted the rhetoric of these non-Macedonian traditions in order to establish themselves as rightful claimants. For example, both Herodotus in his account of Alexander I's ancestry and Thucydides' geography of Macedonia show the influence that Argead claims had on the way southern Greeks conceptualized their northern neighbor. The Macedonian adoption of Persian court practices, such as lion hunts and the creation of the Royal Pages, had the same goal of bolstering Argead power by analogy with the might of Persia.

¹⁶¹ [*Dem.*] 17.

¹⁶² The reactions to Philip's settlement among the larger and smaller states is discussed by Kondrat'uk, M. A., "The League of Corinth and its role in the political history of Greece in the thirties and twenties of the fourth century B.C.," *Vestnik Drevnej Istorii* 140 (1977): 25-42

The story of Macedonia from the sixth to the mid-fourth century is one of continuous struggle for the unification of the territory claimed by the Argeads into a single state. Disunity and warfare with Macedonia's neighbors were consequently the biggest threat to the Argeads, as well as to Philip himself upon his ascension. Philip solidified his position as king and the position of the Macedonian state in the northern Aegean through a mixture of military and social reforms whose antecedents we can already discern in the reforms of Archelaus at the end of the 5th century.

The fact that the role of the kings in the Macedonian state was malleable and the power of the state was focused around the person of the individual ruler gave the Argeads a certain freedom to redefine their place within society. Indeed, the Argeads had long been open to outside influences, taking on at the same time iconography of Persian kingship and the prerogatives of a Greek aristocratic family. Philip, as well, adapted the character of a Greek aristocrat to suit his own needs, patronizing the arts and displaying his accomplishments at sports. Throughout his reign, he also assumed roles whose nature closely bound them to a specifically Greek, rather than Macedonian, identity: thus he first became Thessalian *tagos* and, later, was voted a seat in his own right on the Amphictyonic council. Philip's assumption of such roles posed no threat to his Macedonian identity, even as Greeks could portray it as a complete reversal of hellenic norms.

Yet Philip had no desire to force the Greeks to accept a king; throughout his dealings with the Greek world his policies show a willingness to work within hellenic traditions in order to achieve his ends. Thus when he reorganized Thessaly, he most likely did so under the banner of a return to tradition. Moreover, he attempted to exercise

power over the *poleis* through traditional Greek structures of power: the Amphictyony first of all and, when that failed, through the League of Corinth, which itself was based on previous hellenic organizations. Even the League was established through a κοινή εἰρήνη agreement whose antecedents went back to the early part of the century and to whose ideals most Greeks were sympathetic. Philip's power, while quite real, was thus never quite overt - and in this form was accepted by a large number of the *poleis*, who found their own interests furthered by Macedonian rule. The following chapters turn to Athenian responses to Philip's increasing influence over Greek politics and, concomitantly, his assumption of Greek roles within the hellenic world. What was simple good policy – indeed, normative policy – for the Argeads and Philip was assuredly not such a simple matter for the Athenian politicians and intellectuals who were faced with explaining Philip's growing power.

Chapter 3: Philip in the Political Discourse before 346 BCE

Introduction

This chapter turns from Macedonia to the constructions of Philip's ἦθος presented before the Athenian public. The current chapter examines the speeches which were delivered before the Peace of Philocrates of 346 BCE, while the next chapter turns to those delivered after the peace agreement. I argue that Demosthenes' portrayal of Philip developed out of an older, 5th century rhetoric concerning Athens' enemies, both the barbarian Persians and the Spartans. In this way Demosthenes frames the conflict between Macedonia and Athens as an ideological struggle over the Athenians' character and their role in the wider scheme of interstate politics. Illuminating the ways in which Demosthenes positioned the current Macedonian crisis within this traditional framework also forms the background for the next chapter, which will turn in part to the orator's innovation and development of these older typologies.

In this chapter I will also argue that Philip's character served as a vehicle for voicing internal, Athenian concerns about the democratic ethics and the role of the rhetor in the *polis*. Philip's identity as a barbarian outsider lent itself to arguments over Athens' position as the cultural and moral center of Greece.¹⁶³ Each characterization of Philip,

¹⁶³ See Nina Johannsen, "Der Barbarenbegriff in den politischen Reden des Demosthenes," *Tyche* 22 (2007): 79-84 for a typical interpretation of Philip's role in these terms. Demosthenes would surely have agreed with the Periclean vision of Athens as the cultural and moral center of Greece: λέγω τήν τε πᾶσαν πόλιν τῆς Ἑλλάδος παιδευσιν εἶναι... [I say that the whole city is a school for Greece...] (*Thuc.* 2.41). Compare, for example, *Dem.* 9.73: τοῖς μὲν ἐν Χερρονήσῳ χρήματ' ἀποστέλλειν φημί δεῖν καὶ τᾶλλ' ὅσα ἀξιοῦσι ποιεῖν, αὐτοὺς δὲ παρασκευάζεσθαι, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους Ἑλληνας συγκαλεῖν,

directed at Athens' citizen body and articulated by statesmen competing against one another for prominence and prestige, should therefore be analyzed as a (re)articulation of Athenian values. Moreover, Philip came to represent a negative model for the orator himself - who, in activating his right as ὁ βουλόμενος to speak in the *ekklesia*, represented due democratic process.¹⁶⁴ In the next chapter I will show how in his political maturity Demosthenes would press this antithesis between Philip and the ideal orator still further to articulate a radical notion of the politician's role in enacting, as well as his traditional role in crafting and articulating, Athenian policy.

Demosthenes' deliberative corpus, presented orally before the *demos* during the course of its deliberations, is a convenient place to start an exploration of Athenian rhetoric concerning Philip because they constitute our most immediate source for popular Athenian discussion of the Macedonian problem. The deliberative speeches were, if not delivered nearly verbatim orally, at least constructed in such a way as to present the appearance of oral delivery.¹⁶⁵ These speeches reflect the political atmosphere and

συνάγειν, διδάσκειν, νοθετεῖν· ταῦτ' ἐστὶν πόλεως ἀξίωμα ἐχούσης ἡλικὸν ὑμῖν ὑπάρχει. [I say that we must send relief to the Chersonese and do whatever else is necessary, and to prepare ourselves, and to call together the other Greeks, and bring them together, and teach them, and advise them; because this is the prerogative of a city as greatly esteemed as ours]. Demosthenes' admiration of Thucydides was well-known to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and is equally acknowledged today: see for example Felipe Hernández-Muñoz, "Tucidides y Platón en Demóstenes," *Cuadernos de filología clásica. Estudios griegos e indoeuropeos* (1994): 139-160 and Usher, *Demosthenes, On the Crown*, 22-24.

¹⁶⁴ Josiah Ober, *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens: Rhetoric, Ideology, and the Power of the People* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), argues that the role of the professional rhetor had no legal status apart from the citizen rights he shared with the rest of the Athenians. For the identity of the rhetor see also P. J. Rhodes, "Who Ran Democratic Athens?," in *Polis & Politics. Studies in Ancient Greek History*, ed. P. Flensted-Jensen et al. (Copenhagen: Museum Tusulanum Press, 2000), 465-477; Harvey Yunis, *Taming Democracy: Models of Political Rhetoric in Classical Athens* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996): 7-12; Mogens H. Hansen, *The Athenian Assembly in the Age of Demosthenes* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), 49-88; Shalom Perlman, "The Politicians in the Athenian Democracy of the Fourth Century B. C.," *Athenaeum* 41 (1963): 327-355.

¹⁶⁵ The issue of the deliberative speeches' closeness to the actual harangues delivered before the *demos* is a hotly debated issue which important implications, but hardly any absolute answer. I am inclined to see these speeches as drafts crafted prior to delivery and only cursorily edited before publication: see Jeremy Trevett, "Did Demosthenes Publish his Deliberative Speeches?." However, extensive revision on the grounds of stylistic differences (particularly in the *Fourth Philippic*) has been more recently championed

arguments of a time very nearly, if not entirely, contemporaneous with the issue at hand.¹⁶⁶ Demosthenes' portrayal of Philip was designed to appeal to a broad spectrum of the Athenian citizenry rather than a particular subset of the community or a panhellenic audience.¹⁶⁷ Each speech was situated in the context of a specific policy debate during the course of which other speeches by other orators would also have been delivered. Thus, while each speech is given in the voice of a particular orator, lurking in the background are the many other voices that would have been involved in the discussion in the *ekklesia* and in response to which a given speech was composed.¹⁶⁸ In this way

by Worthington, *Greek Oratory, Revision of Speeches, and the Problem of Historical Reliability*. Stephen G. Daitz, "The Relationship of the De Chersoneso and the Philippica Quarta of Demosthenes," *Classical Philology* 52 (1957): 145-162, following Charles D. Adams, "Speeches VIII and X of the Demosthenic Corpus," *Classical Philology* 33 (1938):129-144 argued that changes prior to publication account for the near *verbatim* parallels between *On the Chersonese* and the *Fourth Philippic*.

¹⁶⁶ The fact that deliberative speeches are so closely tied to a particular time and place invites the question why deliberative oratory was published at all. In this respect published deliberative speeches are different from epideictic and even forensic oratory, which could serve as an advertisement for the speechmaker. Nevertheless, published forensic oratory is useful as a comparandum: see particularly Dover, *Lysias and the Corpus Lysiacum*; Ian Worthington, "Once more, the client/logographos relationship," *Classical Quarterly* 43 (1993): 67-72; Stephen Usher, "Lysias and his clients," *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies* 17 (1976): 31-40. It is probable that the practice of publishing deliberative oratory caught on only with Demosthenes; in any case, it was never extensive. A history of published deliberative oratory can be found in Kennedy *Art of Persuasion*, 203-206. See also John Buckler, "Demosthenes and Aeschines," in *Demosthenes: Statesman and Orator*, ed. Ian Worthington (London: Routledge, 2000), 148-154. What is missing from the written speech is any hint of the delivery (however, see Dover, *Lysias and the Corpus Lysiacum*, 163-167) which would of course have colored each speech in a way that is almost entirely impossible for us to reconstruct (the deliberative speeches present obstacles in this respect even greater than the forensic speeches). For a discussion of how much delivery could have added to or even changed the interpretation of the text see James Fredal, "The Language of Delivery and the Presentation of Character: Rhetorical Action in Demosthenes' *Against Meidias*," *Rhetoric Review* 20 (2001): 251-267; Nancy Worman, "Insult and Oral Excess in the Disputes between Aeschines and Demosthenes," *American Journal of Philology* 125 (2004): 1-25; Edith Hall, "Lawcourt dramas: the power of performance in Greek forensic oratory," *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 40 (1995): 39-58. I imagine, however, that, given the unique nature of deliberative oratory and its greater limitations in terms of time, the orators had less scope for the kind of theatrics that they could employ in the lawcourts.

¹⁶⁷ Ober, *Mass and Elite*, argues that the Athenian masses exercises a strong ideological control on speechmaking by the professional orators: typical, for example, is his statement that "the ideological control of the elite by the Athenian citizen masses was not a perfect system, but on the whole it worked remarkably well." (332). See also Dover, *Lysias and the Corpus Lysiacum*, 54-56.

¹⁶⁸ Mogens H. Hansen, *The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Democracy: Structure, Principles, and Ideology* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991):143-145 suggests that, of the approximately 6000 citizens at an assembly, perhaps a few hundred would have been semi- or fully-professional rhetors. See also Mogens H. Hansen, "The number of ῥήτορες in the Athenian ἐκκλησία 355-322 B.C.," *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies* 25 (1984): 123-155. Any given debate would have probably involved only a few of

Demosthenes' speeches illuminate how the Athenian, adult male audience who frequented the assembly, along with the politicians who addressed them, employed familiar culturally-loaded typologies to discuss Philip.¹⁶⁹

How, then, did Demosthenes and his contemporaries talk about Philip? We must acknowledge, to begin with, that in many cases they did so without direct knowledge of Macedonia or the Macedonian king. Demosthenes, for example, had never seen Philip or been to Macedonia before 346 BCE, but that did not impact his ability to talk about the situation and about Philip from a position of authority.¹⁷⁰ For a speaker's authority was not only based on a specialist's knowledge of the matter at hand, but also on his ability to articulate the norms of the majority and to apply mass *mores* to a given situation – that is, to frame an issue in terms of normative social values – in order to find the most expedient solution.¹⁷¹ This basis for a rhetor's competency has important implications for the

them: see Hansen, *The Athenian Assembly*, 54-61 and Ober, *Mass and Elite*, ch. 3. For the social background of prominent rhetors see also Ian Worthington, "Rhetoric and Politics in Classical Greece: Rise of the *Rhetores*," in *A Companion to Greek Rhetoric*, ed. Ian Worthington (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 255-268.

¹⁶⁹ For the composition of the audience see Hansen, *Athenian Democracy*, ch. 5. Adriaan Lanni, "Spectator Sport or Serious Justice? οἱ περιεστηκότες and the Athenian Lawcourts," *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 117 (1997): 183-189, discusses the role of bystanders in the lawcourts.

¹⁷⁰ The ideal speaker in the *ekklesia*, the *idiotes*, was specifically valued for having no more knowledge than the average Athenian; too great a familiarity with the non-Athenian world could imply that the speaker was not in tune with the needs and desires of his audience, and thereby diminish, rather than augment, his authority. On the preeminence of mass wisdom see Ober, *Mass and Elite*, ch. 3. Demosthenes does refer on occasion to witnesses from whom he derives his accounts (1.22, 2.17, 2.19, 8.14, 10.8, 11.8-10, 11.12), but he never identifies these witnesses by name, rendering their actual existence somewhat suspect; in any case, he certainly did not need such accounts to make his claims. On the importance of first-hand information in the *ekklesia* see Sian Lewis, *News and Society in the Greek Polis* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 102-9; also Gerhard Thür, "The Role of the Witness in Athenian Law," in *The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Greek Law*, eds. Michael Gagarin and David Cohen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 146-169, for the ancillary role of the witness in forensic oratory.

¹⁷¹ The idea that the orator was not supposed to be a specialist is best seen in the (never institutionalized) separation between orators and generals in the 4th century democracy: thus Aristotle, *Politics* 1305a, explains that while generals were experts in foreign affairs, their control of politics was curtailed for fear that their power would develop into a tyranny. See also Mogens H. Hansen, "The Athenian 'Politicians', 403-322 B.C.," *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies* 24 (1983): 33-55; contra: Debra Hamel, "Strategoi on the Bema: The Separation of Political and Military Authority in Fourth-Century Athens," *Ancient History Bulletin* 9 (1995): 25-39. However Lisa Kallet-Marx, "Money Talks: Rhetor, Demos, and the Resources of the Athenian Empire," in *The Athenian Empire*, ed. Polly Low (Edinburgh: Edinburgh

deliberative speeches as sources of information. While they cannot be used in a straightforward manner as historical evidence, they can tell us a lot about how the Athenians perceived Macedonia, and, it follows, a lot about the political situation within Athens itself.¹⁷²

But political attitudes were not static. Rhetorical evidence needs to be understood from within an ever-evolving discourse. The discourse concerning Philip, in particular, lends itself to an analysis of how political rhetoric on a given issue developed since we have speeches concerning Macedonia from early on – the *First Philippic* was composed in 351 BCE, seven years after Philip’s ascension to power – until well after Philip’s assassination in 336 BCE. The politics of the Greek mainland and Macedonia underwent a dramatic shift during that time, and the Athenians’ rhetoric developed accordingly. In the introduction, I discussed the way Athenian politicians may have adapted, added to, and responded to each other’s arguments with respect to Philip’s ἤθος. Orators would employ or reject previous characterizations of Philip given by themselves and by other

University Press, 2008), 185-210, has argued that the authority of the rhetor in fiscal matters did rest on his privileged knowledge of how the Athenian system worked. The two positions are not necessarily incompatible: orators may well have had different levels of competence in different areas. It would have been easier to acquire knowledge about the internal concerns of the *polis*, for example, than about external affairs.

¹⁷² Because the orator’s primary goal was to convince the *demos* to accept his point of view, there was a great incentive for them to lie about the facts. This incentive was only augmented in discussions of foreign policy, since the majority of the Athenians would have little direct knowledge of the places and people under discussion. Still, orators could not travel too far beyond the preconceived notions (whether right or wrong) which the *demos* itself brought to the *ekklesia*, and against which the orator’s statements would be tested: see Ober, *Mass and Elite*, 43-45. Arguing for a set of facts which the people believed strongly to be false could backfire, and then the orator would be caught in an ostensible lie. Thus speakers always had to balance their desire to win their case against the need to *appear* to be telling the truth, at least in so far as the *demos* understood it. Whenever possible, it would be in the orator’s best interest not to lie outright. However, Philip Harding, “Rhetoric and Politics in Fourth-Century Athens,” *Phoenix* 41 (1987): 25-39, argues for a pessimistic view of the truth-value of the speeches; Ian Worthington, “Greek Oratory, Revision of Speeches and the Problem of Historical Reliability,” *Classica et Medievalia* 42 (1991): 69-70, has approached this problem by looking at the revision of the speeches, but he comes to the same conclusion. The problem of rhetoric as evidence, and the various attempts at a solution to it, has been described by Stephen Todd, “The use and abuse of the Attic Orators,” *Greece and Rome* 37 (1990): 159-178; see also Edward M. Harris, *Aeschines and Athenian Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), ch. 1.

orators; their views, in turn, would be assessed against the discursive backdrop they had helped create.¹⁷³ In the following speeches, I examine each articulation of Philip's ῥήθoς in view of the rapidly changing historical and political realities and more slowly evolving collective values.

I begin with Demosthenes' earliest mentions of Philip, one in the forensic speech *Against Aristocrates* and a second in the deliberative *On the Freedom of the Rhodians*. These set the stage for the rest of the chapter because their ancillary treatment of Philip may well show how the Athenians were predisposed to think of him without any particular 'guidance' from the professional orator. From there I turn to the speeches more properly concerned with the Macedonian question: Demosthenes' *Philippic I*, delivered in 351 BCE, and the three *Olynthiacs*, composed over the course of 349 BCE. These speeches have also been particularly important for the reconstruction of Demosthenes' early career before his rise to prominence during the negotiations of 346 BCE.¹⁷⁴ They mark the beginning of Demosthenes' sustained involvement with Macedonian policy. The early speeches show Demosthenes experimenting with various types of arguments, some of which he would develop further later in his career.¹⁷⁵

Philip before 351 BCE

In 351 BCE, when Demosthenes delivered his *Philippic I*, the threat from Macedon was real but still distant. Less than a year beforehand Philip had embroiled

¹⁷³ Kallet-Marx, *Money Talks*, expresses a similar sentiment with respect to Athenians' financial knowledge (197): "Athenian listeners would have been predisposed to respond in a certain predictable way to financial information because their attitude toward Athens' public finances had already been shaped and was constantly being reinforced through a complex interaction between speakers and listeners."

¹⁷⁴ For Demosthenes' early career see Raphael Sealey, *Demosthenes and His Time: A Study in Defeat* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), chs. 4-6 and Ernst Badian, "The Road to Prominence," in *Demosthenes: Statesman and Orator*, ed. Ian Worthington (Oxford: Routledge, 2000): 9-44.

¹⁷⁵ Lionel Pearson, *The Art of Demosthenes* (Chico: Scholars Press, 1981), ch. 4 discusses Demosthenes' stylistic experimentation in the early deliberative speeches.

himself in the Sacred War, coming to the aid of the Amphyctiony and claiming for himself the prestige of being the defender of Delphi. While there was reason at the time to believe that Philip was pursuing a specifically anti-Athenian policy – for one thing, the Amphyctiony was led by Athens’ rival Thebes, and in addition Philip had recently refused to cede the city of Amphipolis to Athens – Philip’s influence had not yet spread south of Thessaly.¹⁷⁶ More importantly, the Sacred War was far from being concluded in the Delphians’ favor in 351: the Phocians, despite recent losses, still had access to all the sacred treasuries of Apollo. As long as Athens guarded the key pass at Thermopylae, Philip would be unable to penetrate into Central Greece.

Demosthenes was probably exaggerating, then, when he began his *Philippic I* by voicing frustration with just how often, and how fruitlessly, Athenian policy toward Macedonia had come under discussion (*Dem.* 4.1). The Athenians were certainly not ready to commit resources and men to a prolonged war in the north; and besides, they had other problems to deal with closer to home.¹⁷⁷ Plutarch tells us that the leading orator of the 350s and 340s, Eubulus, favored a quietist approach to foreign policy and a focus on Athens’ economy rather than her military might (*Mor.* 812f).¹⁷⁸ Indeed, historical precedent would have justified this approach: no Macedonian king yet in the 4th century had died a natural death, and all the Argeads had had to contend against a seemingly

¹⁷⁶ Athens had colonized Amphipolis east of the Chalcidice in the 5th century but had lost control over it during the Peloponnesian war. Since then Athens had almost continuously, but for the most part unsuccessfully, attempted to regain control of the city. On the early conflict between Philip and Athens over Amphipolis see Worthington, *Philip II*, ch. 5.

¹⁷⁷ The Athenians had just fought the grueling Social War against some reluctant members of their League in the early to mid 350s, leaving the city in dire financial straits. On the Second Athenian League and the Social War see Jask Cargill, “Hegemony, not Empire. The Second Athenian League,” *Ancient World* 5 (1982): 91-102. On the war’s consequences see Raphael Sealey, “Athens after the Social War,” *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 75 (1955): 74-81.

¹⁷⁸ On Eubulus and the prevailing political policy of the time see G. L. Cawkwell, “Eubulus,” *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 83 (1963): 47-67 and Sealey, “Athens after the Social War.”

continuous stream of legitimate or illegitimate claimants to the throne; Philip himself had put down several rivals in the early years of his reign. Against this backdrop of internal turmoil, Philip might well have appeared as little more than a transitory threat who would soon be brought low without any help from Athens.¹⁷⁹ Two Demosthenic speeches composed prior to 351 support the conclusion that the Athenians had thought little about Philip up to this point. Both the forensic speech *Against Aristocrates* and the deliberative speech *On the Freedom of the Rhodians* mention Philip in a cursory way and in derogatory terms that might just as well have been leveled against any other petty barbarian king in the region. At this point Philip was still nothing more in the public discourse than a typical vehicle for the expression of community solidarity in the face of a foreign Other.¹⁸⁰

Demosthenes composed the *Against Aristocrates* around the year 353 for delivery by one Euthycles. Euthycles had accused Aristocrates of illegality for proposing a decree that would have made it a criminal offense to kill the general Charidemus. Charidemus was an adventurer, a minister to the Thracian king Cersobleptes, and most recently a newly minted Athenian. A large portion of the speech is concerned with Athenian policy in Thrace and argues that Cersobleptes is faithless and not to be trusted. In the course of this argument Demosthenes introduces several comparisons between Cersobleptes and Philip. The Athenians, Demosthenes argues, should be wary of allying themselves too closely with Cersobleptes and look to the example of Olynthus, a Greek state that had been too trusting of the barbarian king Philip and now regrets their choice (*Dem.* 23.107-

¹⁷⁹ For the early history of Macedon, see Hammond, *Miracle that was Macedonia*, 1-31; Errington, *History of Macedonia*, 1-40; Ellis, *Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism*, 40-47.

¹⁸⁰ I will be touching upon aspects of 5th century Athenian notions of barbarism throughout this chapter insofar as they relate to the discourse concerning Philip. See above, footnote 4.

8). Since Demosthenes was attempting to disparage the Thracian king, such a comparison would have worked best if Philip was indeed especially hateful to the Athenians [ὁ μάλιστα δοκῶν νῦν ἡμῖν ἐχθρὸς] (*Dem.* 23.121). Demosthenes must have trusted Euthycles' audience to take the charges against Philip as a matter of course if he wanted them to transfer their ill-will from the Macedonian to the Thracian king.

Preeminent among Philip's characteristics, according to Demosthenes, is a desire for aggrandizement rather than security, despite the great risk to himself: μικρὰ λαμβάνειν καὶ τοὺς ἀπίστους φίλους καὶ τὸ κινδυνεύειν ἀντὶ τοῦ μετ' ἀσφαλείας ζῆν ὁρᾶτε προηρημένον αὐτόν. [You see that he has chosen small gains, faithless friends, and danger instead of living in safety] (*Dem.* 23.112). Again, Demosthenes explains Philip's choice of the smallest potential gain over a life of safety by citing Philip's greed [τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν ἐπιθυμία] (*Dem.* 23.133). Another element of Philip's ἦθος in the *Against Aristocrates* is his faithlessness. According to Demosthenes, Philip had promised that he would hand Amphipolis over to Athens when he gained control of it, but in the end annexed not only Amphipolis but Potidea for himself (*Dem.* 2.116). While the king had released Athenian prisoners and sent a letter to Athens declaring his desire for an alliance (*Dem.* 2.121), these professions of goodwill had proven to be entirely false. Philip's greed overcome all considerations of honor and trust. Demosthenes' portrayal of Philip as a grasping and faithless tyrant conforms to the established character of the barbarian monarch, who is passionate rather than rational and nothing if not lawless in the intemperate gratification of his own desires.¹⁸¹ That the orator adduces Cotys (*Dem.* 23.118-9) and Alexander of Thessaly (*Dem.* 23.120) as other

¹⁸¹ As Herodotus' Spartans say, "there is no trust or truth among the barbarians." [βαρβάροισι ἐστὶ οὔτε πιστὸν οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὐδέν] (*Hdt.* 8.142). On the paradigm of the barbarian monarch see Hall, *Inventing the Barbarian*, 93-98; Romilly, "Les Barbares," 283-286.

examples of faithless rulers alongside Philip also indicates that the Macedonian's characterization is drawn in a straightforward manner from the culturally-shared paradigm of the bad barbarian monarch. In sum, there is nothing particularly special or unique about the way Demosthenes presents Philip here.

A passing reference to Philip in *On the Freedom of the Rhodians* conforms to the view of the king presented in *Against Aristocrates*. Here, too, Philip is cast as a weak and transient opponent. This deliberative speech is concerned with the situation in Rhodes, where the democratic party had asked the Athenians to intervene against the oligarchs. The oligarchs were supported by Queen Artemisia of Caria, a vassal of Persia, and those opposing the motion apparently feared disrupting relations with the Great King. Demosthenes, however, argues that helping the Rhodian democrats would not destabilize Athenian relations with Persia. At the same time, he also claims that the Athenians ought to increase their participation in international affairs more broadly, taking as his representative examples the Athenians' discontentment with both the Great King and Philip of Macedonia:

οὐτ' οὖν ἐκ φανεροῦ κεκράτηκεν οὐτ' ἐπιβουλεῦσαι συνενήνοχεν αὐτῷ. ὁρῶ δ' ὑμῶν ἐνίους Φιλίππου μὲν ὡς ἄρ' οὐδενὸς ἀξίου πολλάκις ὀλιγωροῦντας, βασιλέα δ' ὡς ἰσχυρὸν ἐχθρὸν οἷς ἂν προέλῃται φοβουμένους. Εἰ δὲ τὸν μὲν ὡς φαῦλον οὐκ ἀμυνούμεθα, τῷ δ' ὡς φοβερῷ πάνθ' ὑπείξομεν, πρὸς τίνας, ᾧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, παραταξόμεθα;

So [the Persian King] has plainly never beaten us nor has his plotting gained him any advantage. I see some of you frequently disparaging Philip as of no account, yet fearful of the King as a powerful enemy to whom it pleases him. But if we don't guard ourselves against the one as being weak, and we obey the other in everything because he is formidable, against whom, Athenians, will we ever stand our ground? (*Dem.* 15.24)

The antithesis created between Persia and Macedonia highlights the latter's weakness.

Demosthenes' point is not that Philip is stronger than he appears, but that the Athenians

will not send out expeditions even against their most insignificant enemies. Again, because Philip is not the main concern of the argument here, it is likely that Demosthenes drew on a commonly held opinion in crafting his antithesis; the contrast would have worked quite as well had Demosthenes chosen any other ostensibly weak barbarian king.

The disparagement of Macedonian power in *On the Freedom of the Rhodians* aligns with the overall impression in *Against Aristocrates* that Philip was merely a transitory and insignificant threat. The king is portrayed in as a typical barbarian: greedy, faithless, and weak. His amoral nature, moreover, ensures that he will never be a match for a real Athenian force. It was this impression of Macedonian weakness which Demosthenes would do his best to shatter when he took up the anti-Macedonian cause in *Philippic I*. Nevertheless, when Demosthenes turned his full attention to the Macedonian problem, he did not abandon this characterization of Philip in its entirety. Philip's amoral nature, for example, as well as his greed, continue as central traits in his ἥθος. Rather than abandoning Philip's ἥθος as a typical barbarian, Demosthenes plays which these traits – bringing out new comparisons, and placing them within new frames of reference – in a way that ultimately transforms Philip's character and breaks the intimate connection between his amoral nature and his weakness.

Philippic I: 351 BCE

Philippic I, Demosthenes' first speech directly concerned with Macedonia, was probably delivered not long after *On the Freedom of the Rhodians*. If the Athenians were as unconcerned about Philip as Demosthenes' earlier speeches would indicate, then he clearly had an uphill battle to prove to them that they should muster not one but *two* citizen armies to pursue their war in the north. He would have to shunt aside the

argument that Macedonia was militarily weak, an argument that he himself had employed earlier that same year, as we have seen, in *On the Freedom of the Rhodians* (Dem. 15.24). In *Philippic I*, Demosthenes emphasizes Macedonia's growing power even as he continues to castigate flaws in Philip's ἦθος, such as ὕβρις, typical of barbarian monarchs. While Philip is presented as a moral failure who is successful in action despite his immorality, the Athenians display the very opposite characteristics: though knowing and willing to do the right thing, they are supremely lethargic.¹⁸² Both Philip's and the Athenians' characters are thus based on an imbalance between their actual activity and the appropriateness of their motive/deliberation. Just as Philip's constant victories belie his inner depravity, so the Athenians' sound judgment in the *ekklesia* is at odds with their failure abroad.

Demosthenes expresses the resultant tension between intention and accomplishment by juxtaposing speech/deliberation (λόγος) with action (ἔργον), a favorite schema of Athenian thought. Thus Demosthenes' use of the λόγος/ἔργον rhetoric shows how he molded his innovative ideas within a traditional and well-established framework. Furthermore, a discussion of Demosthenes' λόγος/ἔργον rhetoric is doubly important because it points to Demosthenes' inheritance of a fifth-

¹⁸² This choice of argument on Demosthenes' part also results in a relatively more lenient approach to Philip here than in subsequent speeches concerning Macedonia. While this relative leniency was noted even in ancient times by Hermogenes, *On Types of Style*, recent explanations for it have tended to be biographical and not credit Demosthenes for his choice of argument. Thus Sealey, *Demosthenes and his Time*, comments that *Philippic I* "is not imbued with the earnestness of the later *Philippics*" because Demosthenes had not yet "discovered his mission" in life" (133); see also Jacqueline de Romilly, *A Short History of Greek Literature*, trans. Lillian Doherty (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1985), 116-7. I agree rather with Galen Rowe, "Demosthenes' First Philippic: The Satiric Mode," *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* 99 (1968): 361-374, who looks at the character of the Athenians in the speech as a deliberately constructed inversion of their 'typical' national character. Mader, expanding upon Rowe's thesis, considered this role reversal as it applies to Philip and concluded that Philip is used "as contrastive foil to the supine Athenians:" see Gottfried Mader, "Quantum mutati ab illis...", *Philologus* (2003): 58. For Demosthenes' use of comic tropes elsewhere see Galen Rowe, "The Portrait of Aeschines in the Oration on the Crown," *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* 97 (1966): 397-406.

century typology best known from Thucydides. While Demosthenes' debt to Thucydides has long been known, the particular debt which the orator owed the historian has not often been sufficiently discussed.¹⁸³ In the following section I will therefore consider how what kinds of connections can be drawn between Thucydides and Demosthenes, employing the characterization of Philip in *Philippic* I as a kind of case study for the larger problem. The paucity of evidence with respect to 5th century deliberative oratory has obscured the nature of the connection between the orator and the historian. I argue that Demosthenes' debt is not so much to Thucydides himself as to the rhetorical and political traditions of which Thucydides was an exponent, and for which he is our best source.

After examining the place of *Philippic* I vis-à-vis 5th century rhetoric, I turn to the space which the speech creates for Demosthenes within the contemporary political scene. For Demosthenes' focus on the misalignment of moral character with its resultant action was useful for his own self-presentation within the speech. As a young rhetor with little experience in debate on matters of foreign policy, Demosthenes needed to assert his worth as an advisor. Creating an imbalance between outcomes and inner motives allowed him to enhance his own value as the orator who could see beyond the realities of mere action into the shadowy world of Philip's depraved morality. Thus the λόγος/ἔργον paradigm both defines the conflict between Athens and Macedonia and, in the breakdown of the connection between deliberation and action, secures Demosthenes'

¹⁸³ See Hernandez-Munoz, "Tucydides y Platon," 142-144, who argues that Demosthenes adapts the Thucydidean method of historiography based on politics and psychology in crafting his speeches. See also Pearson, *Art of Demosthenes*, 114-115 and Yunis, *Taming Democracy*, ch. 9. Yunis focuses his comparison on Demosthenes' use of Pericles as a model for his self-characterization as the ideal rhetor in the *Crown* speech. According to Plutarch, Demosthenes was compared to Pericles in his own day in terms of his difficult style (*Dem.* 6.5) and in his courage (*Dem.* 20.1).

usefulness as a knowledgeable σύμβουλος.¹⁸⁴ From Demosthenes' very first foray into Macedonian policy, then, we can see that his characterization of Philip benefited his self-fashioning as an orator. Philip's ἦθος reflects Demosthenes' concern with the role of the speaker and the nature of democratic debate in Athens.

Demosthenes presents the older, 5th century framework within which he will be discussing the Athenians' conflict with Macedonia up front. Right after the prooemium (*Dem.* 4.1-2), Demosthenes harks back to the traditional roles of Athens and Sparta as polar opposites and traditional enemies. In their war against Sparta, Demosthenes claims, the Athenians had conducted themselves in a manner worthy of the city and therefore were able to defeat the Spartans; he goes on to contrast this previous war with the current war between Athens and Macedonia, where the situation is just the opposite: it is Philip who has taken on the action-ready character of old Athens, while the Athenians assume the character-type of their traditional antagonists, interchangeably Spartan and barbarian.¹⁸⁵ The chiasmic structure between the characters of Philip and the Athenians is thus emphasized from the beginning. Moreover, in contrasting the current situation with a previous conflict between Athens and Sparta, Demosthenes employs a typology closely associated with the Peloponnesian War and, at least to our modern ears, with Thucydides.

In that former conflict, Demosthenes argues, Sparta and Athens had taken on their traditional roles: the former was overwhelmingly powerful and domineering, while the

¹⁸⁴ Gottfried Mader, "Foresight, Hindsight, and the Rhetoric of Self-Fashioning in Demosthenes' Philippic Cycle," *Rhetorica* 25 (2007): 343-8, discusses the way Demosthenes bases his credibility as an orator on his foresight, and stresses the way Demosthenes is able to play up his own foresight against the backdrop of Athenian laxity and Philip's tyrannical action.

¹⁸⁵ The character-types of the Spartan and the barbarian could be elided by virtue of being the 'ultimate' Athenian nemesis in either instance. Elsewhere, however, Spartan society is also said to have barbaric undertones: so Herodotus, for instance, connects the Spartans with various barbarians by genealogy (*Hdt.* 6.53-4) and practice (*Hdt.* 6.58-60), and Spartan commanders were notorious for "going barbarian" (for example Thucydides' Pausanias, *Thuc.* 1.130-131).

latter ‘[stood] up for justice’ [ὑπεμείνειν ὑπὲρ τῶν δικάϊων] and won out ‘because it turned its attention to the situation’ [ἐκ τοῦ προσέχειν τοῖς πράγμασι τὸν νοῦν] (*Dem.* 4.3). Considering that Demosthenes calls this a “recent” conflict [ἐξ οὗ χρόνος οὐ πολὺς], the options seem to be either the Corinthian War of 395-86 or Agesilaus’ invasion of Boeotia in 378, but specificity is hardly important – indeed, I would suggest that specificity would have been detrimental - for Demosthenes’ purpose.¹⁸⁶ By alluding to this conflict Demosthenes prepares his audience to use the same categories of “us = Athens” and “them = Sparta” (and all the associations that those categories would conjure up) for the war against Philip. These categories, moreover, had formed and crystallized during Athens’ great struggle against Sparta in the Peloponnesian War. Now Athens, Demosthenes claims, should stand up to Philip’s ὕβρις just as it had formerly stood up to Spartan ῥώμη (*Dem.* 4.3). Yet, we quickly learn, that is not what is actually happening; instead, the Athenians are so panicked by Philip’s apparent might that they cannot think straight [ταραττόμεθα ἐκ τοῦ φροντίζειν ὧν ἐχρήν] (*Dem.* 4.3), a far cry from the mindfulness they had displayed in the past. Spartan-Athenian relations thus provide a model for Athens’ war with Philip. That Demosthenes chose to start off with an example of a 5th-century Athenian ideal makes the character inversion he goes on to articulate between the present-day Athenians and Philip all the more patent and shocking.

Philip’s assumption of a properly Athenian character is expressed through a constant need for action. Demosthenes holds up Philip’s energetic consolidation of power as a model for his audience:

¹⁸⁶ Cecil Wooten, *A Commentary on Demosthenes’ Philippic I* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 48, considers Agesilaus’ invasion more likely, since Demosthenes appears to imagine that some of his audience would have been participants in the war.

Εἰ δέ τις ὑμῶν, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δυσπολέμητον οἶεται τὸν Φίλιππον εἶναι, σκοπῶν τό τε πλῆθος τῆς ὑπαρχούτης αὐτῷ δυνάμεως καὶ τὸ τὰ χωρία πάντ' ἀπολωλέναι τῇ πόλει, ὀρθῶς μὲν οἶεται... Εἰ τοίνυν ὁ Φίλιππος τότε ταύτην ἔσχε τὴν γνώμην, ὡς χαλεπὸν πολεμεῖν ἔστιν Ἀθηναίοις ἔχουσι τοσαῦτ' ἐπιτειχίσματα τῆς αὐτοῦ χώρας ἔρημον ὄντα συμμάχων, οὐδὲν ἂν ὧν νυνὶ πεποίηκεν ἔπραξεν οὐδὲ τοσαύτην ἐκτήσατ' ἂν δύναμιν.

If any of you, Athenians, seeing the magnitude of his power and that our lands have all been lost, thinks that Philip is difficult to fight against, he thinks correctly.... if however Philip then had held this opinion - that it is difficult to fight against Athenians who have so many defenses while his own land was bereft of allies - he would have accomplished nothing of what he has now completed nor would he have acquired so great a power. (*Dem.* 4.4-5)

The reversal of roles comes to a head toward the middle of *Philippic* I, where Philip's assumption of an Athenian ἦθος becomes still more explicit. Some god, Demosthenes claims, has endowed Philip with constant energy [φιλοπραγμοσύνη]; he is incapable of choosing peace [ἡσυχία], and instead is always reaching for more [τοῦ πλείονος ὀρεγόμενος] (*Dem.* 4.42). Inasmuch as Demosthenes had voiced the similar opinion in the *Against Aristocrates* that Philip's hunger for power was insatiable (see above, pp. 78-80), *Philippic* I builds upon the previous discourse concerning the king and, indeed, conforms to the Greek ideology that assigned hubristic tendencies to barbarian kings.

Yet *Philippic* I develops the idea of the king's insatiable drive for more in a radical way. For, at least since the time of the Peloponnesian War, energetic activity, or πολυπραγμοσύνη – synonymous with φιλοπραγμοσύνη - was appropriated by Athens as part of her national ἦθος, while its opposites, ἀπραγμοσύνη and ἡσυχία, were connected with Sparta.¹⁸⁷ The *locus classicus* for this vision of Athenian society is

¹⁸⁷ The term φιλοπραγμοσύνη does not seem to have been used in the fifth century – its earliest extant use is in Cratinus (fr. 27) - but became common in the fourth. Aristotle, *Topics* 2 111a, 9, states that the two terms are interchangeable. Demosthenes uses φιλοπραγμοσύνη exclusively, though not often even then: it occurs four times in the extant speeches (*Dem.* 1.14, 4.42, 21.137, 39.1): the first two of these instances in characterizations of Philip, the other deployed in repudiations of sycophancy. The history of

Thucydides 1.70.8-9, where the Corinthians, seeking to goad the Spartans into war, describe the Athenians:¹⁸⁸

Καὶ ταῦτα μετὰ πόνων πάντα καὶ κινδύνων δι' ὅλου τοῦ αἰῶνος
μοχθοῦσι, καὶ ἀπολαύουσιν ἐλάχιστα τῶν ὑπαρχόντων διὰ τὸ αἰεὶ
κτᾶσθαι καὶ μήτε ἐορτὴν ἄλλο τι ἠγεῖσθαι ἢ τὸ τὰ δέοντα πρᾶξαι
ξυμφορὰν τε οὐχ ἦσσαν ἠσυχίαν ἀπράγμονα ἢ ἀσχολίαν
ἐπίπονον. ὥστε εἴ τις αὐτοὺς ξυνελὼν φαίη πεφυκέναι ἐπὶ τῷ μήτε
αὐτοὺς ἔχειν ἠσυχίαν μήτε τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους ἔαν, ὀρθῶς ἂν
εἴποι.

And they struggle in all these matters with toil and danger throughout their lives, and they don't enjoy what they have because they are always striving for more, and they consider doing what is necessary a festival, and they prefer painful industry to peaceful quiet. So, in a word, it would be simply right to say that they are born neither to keep quiet themselves nor to allow other men to do so.

Both Demosthenes' Philip and Thucydides' Athens are characterized by the self-same inability to live peacefully and quietly. Even in their mode of expression, both descriptions employ similar turns of phrase to express the idea of their subject's constant activity: so Philip toils and endangers himself [πονεῖν καὶ κινδυνεύειν] (*Dem.* 4.5) and cannot keep quiet [ἠσυχίαν ἔχειν] even if he has gained his end (*Dem.* 4.42), just as the Athenians struggle with toil and danger [μετὰ πόνων πάντα καὶ κινδύνων] and, again, are naturally ill-suited to keeping quiet [ἔχειν ἠσυχίαν]. Demosthenes' employs a set of traits that were paradigmatic of a specifically Athenian nature in describing Philip.

It is true that energetic activity was not necessarily considered an inherent good; so, for example, Thucydides' Corinthians are obviously no friends of the Athenians, and

πολυπραγμοσύνη is considered by Ehrenberg, "Polypragmosyne;" ἀπραγμοσύνη and ἠσυχία are discussed by Carter, *Quiet Athenian*, who concludes that "apragmosyne grew out of the Athenian democracy – as a product of it and as a reaction against it... [it] was a contradiction of what was most characteristic in the democracy." (p. 187) Mader, "Quantum mutati ab illis," also discusses Philip's energetic character in connection with Thucydides 1.70: pp. 59-62.

¹⁸⁸ Mader, "Quantum mutati ab illis," 59-62, also discusses Philip's energetic character in connection with Thucydides 1.70. Pericles' funeral oration eulogizes the Athenians' active nature (*Thuc.* 2.36-2.41), and condemns the quietist (*Thuc.* 2.40). For the inherent natures of Athenians and Spartans in Thucydides see Walter R Connor, *Thucydides* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 39-42.

in the later fifth century the Athenian πολυπράγμων was often satirized on the comic stage.¹⁸⁹ Yet even when πολυπραγμοσύνη is disparaged in Comedy, it nevertheless indicates a specifically Athenian, democratic failing: the figure of the πολυπράγμων is quintessentially an Athenian *overdoing* the democratic process. The connection between πολυπραγμοσύνη and the Athenian national ἦθος continued strong in the 4th century as well. Isocrates, for example, melds the two when he considers τῶν ἀττικιζόντων πολυπραγμοσύνη as the parallel fault of τῶν λακωνιζόντων ὕβρις (*On the Peace* 108). Πολυπραγμοσύνη was an Athenian quality irrespective of whether it was being used positively or negatively and, as such, would shock the Athenian audience when applied to the barbarian Philip.

Philip's self-aggrandizing motives lead him into excesses similar to those which ultimately proved to be the Athenians' downfall during the Peloponnesian War.¹⁹⁰ With each success his ἀσέλγεια grows (*Dem.* 4.9), and he is nothing if not a ὑβριστής (*Dem.* 4.37, 4.50). Philip's problem, typical of successful empires and their leaders, is that he does not know how or when to stop: indeed, we have already seen greed as a major part of Philip's ἦθος in the *Against Aristocrates*. In Demosthenes' later speeches, as well, πλεονεξία will continue to play a critical role in descriptions of Philip (*Dem.* 2.9, 6.8, 6.12, 9.7, 10.2).¹⁹¹ For Thucydides and other critics of the Athenian Empire, the same natural penchant for activity which had led to Athens' acquisition of an empire would

¹⁸⁹ Thus, for example, Aristophanes' Sycophant claims that πολυπραγμονεῖν is more beneficial to the city than ἡσυχίαν ἔχων ζῆν ἀργός (*Wealth* 913-22).

¹⁹⁰ Demosthenes' also holds out the hope that Philip's power stems as much, if not more, from the Athenians' apathy as from his own machinations: so he claims, for example, that even if Philip were to die, the Athenians would create themselves a new Philip quickly enough [καὶ γὰρ ἂν οὗτος τι πάθῃ, ταχέως ὑμεῖς ἕτερον Φίλιππον ποιήσετε] (*Dem.* 4.11).

¹⁹¹ On the evils of empire as portrayed in Athenian discourse see Christopher Tuplin, "Imperial Tyranny: Some Reflections on a Classical Greek Metaphor," *History of Political Thought* 6 (1985): 348-375; also Fisher, *Hybris*, on the connection between ὕβρις, "thinking big", and honor/dishonor.

lead inevitably to her downfall if it went unchecked.¹⁹² Thus for Thucydides part of Pericles political wisdom was his advice that Athens should hold on to, but not expand upon, the empire that it had already acquired (*Thuc.* 2.65.7). In other words, a hunger for power could lead to success, if only that hunger was controlled and not allowed free reign: even greed is good in moderation.¹⁹³ While greed was certainly not out of place in characterizations of Philip as the barbarian monarch, then, it is difficult to say whether the Philip of *Philippic* I is more barbarian or fifth-century Athenian in his insatiable need for conquest. Whether barbarian or Athenian, Philip's moral failings are at odds with his success and offer Demosthenes' audience the hope that his comeuppance is nearing. In sum, Demosthenes presents Philip with the strength in action characteristic of the Athenians themselves and with the typical shortcomings of a dominant, often tyrannical power, whether Athenian or barbarian.

The Athenians' ἦθος in *Philippic* I is similarly based upon a tension between their internal capacity to do good and their inability to actualize their decisions. According to Demosthenes, the Athenians seem to know what they *ought* to do, but are unwilling to follow through on that understanding. They can deliberate appropriately (λέγειν), but they fail in the deed (ἐργάζεσθαι). Again, Demosthenes' rhetoric seems to be hearkening back to a rhetorical framework exemplified in Thucydides, who had articulated the notion that the success of the Athenian democracy was based on a

¹⁹² Part of Pericles' political wisdom was for Athens to hold on to, but not extend, the empire she had already acquired, thus putting a check on the city's hunger for power (*Thuc.* 2.65.7).

¹⁹³ Thus Ryan K Balot, *Greed and Injustice in Classical Athens* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 177, sees a tension in Thucydides' view of πλεονεξία: "on the one hand, [greed] has led Athens to incur sizable moral burdens. On the other hand, Thucydides admires the Athenians for organizing greed out of domestic politics... this is the closest any ancient author comes to saying that greed is good; that greed is responsible for human progress." Ambiguous or even positive connotations of πλεονεξία are also in evidence outside of Thucydides: see Christian Bouchet, "La πλεονεξία chez Isocrate," *Revue des études anciennes* 109 (2007): 475-490, on its use in Isocrates.

harmony of λόγος and ἔργον.¹⁹⁴ The Mytilenean debate is particularly important as a point of comparison. Here Thucydides focused on the worsening state of deliberation in the *ekklesia* even as overly hasty action is about to determine the islanders' fate. Both the speeches of Diodotus (*Thuc.* 3.42.5), who argues for clemency toward the Mytileneans, and Cleon (*Thuc.* 3.38.4), who argues for a death sentence, posit that the Athenians' Athenians' words ought to match their actions.¹⁹⁵ In its concern for the imbalance between Athenian λόγος and ἔργον, the Mytilenean debate provides an important precedent for Demosthenes' view of Athenian deliberation in *Philippic I*.¹⁹⁶

The connection between Demosthenes' *Philippic I* and the Mytilenean debate appears also at the surface level. Cleon's speech, in particular, shows distinct linguistic similarities with Demosthenes' *Philippic I*, and begs the question of how we should understand the relation between Demosthenes and Thucydides' text. In particular, both Cleon and Demosthenes employ a satiric mode of discourse to highlight the Athenians' failings.¹⁹⁷ In the course of his speech, Cleon highlights the dysfunctional nature of

¹⁹⁴ See Adam M. Parry, *Logos and Ergon in Thucydides* (New York: Arno Press, 1981).

¹⁹⁵ It is an interesting peculiarity of the Mytilenean debate that the arguments presented by both Cleon and Diodotus are so similar in form, though obviously worlds apart in purpose. In addition to their use of the λόγος/ἔργον dichotomy is both orators' assumption of the Periclean premise that the Athenian empire is a tyranny (Cleon: *Thuc.* 3.40.4; Diodotus: *Thuc.* 3.47.5), as well as their rejection of arguments of right and justice in favor of the argument from expediency (Cleon: *Thuc.* 3.40.2-3; Diodotus: *Thuc.* 3.44.1-4). For the Athenian empire as a tyranny see Jacqueline de Romilly, *Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1963), 160-163. Some scholars have attempted to read justice back into Diodotus' speech: see Clifford Orwin, *The Humanity of Thucydides* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 152-53, Yunis, *Taming Democracy*, 92-101, Arlene Saxonhouse, *Free Speech and Democracy in Ancient Athens* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 160-163. Nevertheless, Diodotus' Hobbesian view of human nature (*Thuc.* 3.45) make such explanations difficult.

¹⁹⁶ Mader, "Quantum Mutati ab illis," 64-68, has shown how Thucydides' idealized Athens is inverted in *Philippic I*: "In Demosthenes, conversely, the refrain-like *disjunction* of deliberation and action, λόγος and ἔργον (*vel sim.*), signals precisely the failure of rational politics..." (66)

¹⁹⁷ On the satiric mode in Demosthenes' *Philippic I* see Rowe, "Demosthenes' First Philippic" and Gottfried Mader, "Fighting Philip with Decrees: Demosthenes and the Syndrome of Symbolic Action," *American Journal of Philology* 127 (2006): 367-386.

Athenian deliberation by incongruous juxtapositions of seeing and hearing with speaking and doing:

αἴτιοι δ' ὑμεῖς κακῶς ἀγωνοθετοῦντες, οἵτινες εἰώθατε θεαταὶ μὲν τῶν λόγων γίγνεσθαι, ἀκροαταὶ δὲ τῶν ἔργων, τὰ μὲν μέλλοντα ἔργα ἀπὸ τῶν εὖ εἰπόντων σκοποῦντες ὡς δυνατὰ γίγνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ πεπραγμένα ἤδη, οὐ τὸ δρασθὲν πιστότερον ὄψει λαβόντες ἢ τὸ ἀκουσθὲν, ἀπὸ τῶν λόγῳ καλῶς ἐπιτιμησάντων.

You are to blame as the bad institutors of these competitions [in the *ekklesia*], you who are accustomed to watch speeches being made, and to listen to action. You scope out ways to bring about future deeds from fine speeches, and concerning what has already been done, you do not so much trust that which has been done in your sight as what you have heard in a critic's pretty speech. (*Thuc.* 3.38.4)

Cleon's strained language – the Athenians “watch” speeches and “listen” to deeds and put their trust in words rather than in the evidence of their own eyes – employs a satiric mode of argument that is strikingly close to that of Demosthenes in *Philippic* I.

Compare, for example, Demosthenes' remark that the Athenians' use “letterary” forces [ἐπιστολιμαίους ταύτας δυνάμεις] (*Dem.* 4.19) instead of real citizen armies. Toward the end of *Philippic* I Demosthenes continues in the same strain:

ἐπειδὴν δ' ἐπιχειροτονῆτε τὰς γνώμας, ἂν ὑμῖν ἀρέσκη, χειροτονήσετε, ἵνα μὴ μόνον ἐν τοῖς ψηφίσμασι καὶ ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς πολεμῆτε Φιλίππῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις.

And when you vote on your resolutions, vote, if it please you, in such a way that you fight Philip not only in your decrees and in your letters, but also in your deeds.¹⁹⁸ (*Dem.* 4.30)

Demosthenes' imagery of the Athenians fighting “with letters” rather than “in deeds” is certainly much more daring than that of Cleon. Yet both orators juxtapose the

¹⁹⁸ See also *Dem.* 4.20: the Athenians, “thinking everything less than what is needed, chose the largest proposals on paper but accomplish not even the smallest thing in action” [πάντ' ἐλάττω νομίζοντες εἶναι τοῦ δέοντος, καὶ τὰ μέγιστ' ἐν τοῖς ψηφίσμασιν αἰρούμενοι, ἐπὶ τῷ πράττειν οὐδὲ τὰ μικρὰ ποιεῖτε]. The Athenians' penchant for “letterary” forces is a theme throughout *Philippic* I and appears again at *Dem.* 4.45. For another discussion of the satiric in these passages see Rowe, “Demosthenes' First *Philippic*,” 364-367.

ekklesiastic ‘actions’ of listening and voting with the ‘real action’ of seeing and doing, and thereby point to the Athenians’ delusional conflation of the real with the merely “letterary”. Demosthenes’ satiric mode thus has a clear precedent in Thucydides’ Cleon; and, I suggest, it is no accident that both orators employ a similar discourse to make a similar point. Demosthenes was working with, and pushing the boundaries of, a familiar discourse that goaded the Athenians into action through satiric inversion.

The parallels between Demosthenes and Cleon confront us with questions concerning the relation between Demosthenes’ and Thucydides’ text. Relations between Demosthenes and Thucydides have most often been constructed around the figure of Pericles, whom Thucydides admired and whom Demosthenes emulated. In consequence, the close ties between Demosthenes’ and Thucydides’ rhetoric have been ascribed to what Gottfried Mader has called Demosthenes’ “Periclean-Thucydidean orientation.”¹⁹⁹ Demosthenes, it is supposed, read Thucydides with an eye toward Thucydides’ presentation of Pericles; his admiration for Pericles, and by consequence his attitude toward the political atmosphere in Athens during the Peloponnesian War, was shaped by the historian’s narrative. Yet here, in *Philippic* I, Demosthenes is apparently employing the rhetorical strategy of Cleon, an orator Thucydides openly reviled as a failed caricature of Pericles. If Demosthenes had meant to follow in the footsteps of Thucydides’ Pericles, then Thucydides’ Cleon ought to be the very last politician whose rhetorical strategies he would want to use.

In fact, there is no reason to see Demosthenes looking specifically to Thucydides as his only, or even primary, source for fifth-century Athenian politics or for information

¹⁹⁹ Gottfried Mader, “Praise, Blame and Authority: Some Strategies of Persuasion in Demosthenes, *Philippic* 2,” *Hermes* 132 (2004): 56. On Demosthenes’ emulation of Pericles see Plutarch *Dem.* 6.

on Pericles. Rather, Demosthenes' use of themes present in Thucydides' text suggests a much more complex interaction between the Demosthenes, Thucydides, and 5th century orators than a simple emulation of Pericles can explain. In the next chapter, I will come back more specifically to Demosthenes view of himself as a 4th century Pericles and unpack the orator's supposed "Periclean-Thucydidean" orientation further (see below, pp. 175-182). Suffice to say for now that, instead of direct emulation of Thucydides' text, the parallels between Cleon and Demosthenes derive from the shared tradition of deliberative rhetoric inherited by 4th century orators from their 5th century predecessors.²⁰⁰ Demosthenes did not borrow directly from Thucydides' Cleon; rather, they both drew from a shared body of rhetorical strategies.

Demosthenes' satiric tone highlights the paradox between the Athenians' deliberation and the absence of any outcome in their decision-making. This apparent inability on the part of the Athenians to substantiate their resolutions renders them susceptible to characterization as the barbarian/Other:

οὐδὲν δ' ἀπολείπετε, ὥσπερ οἱ βάρβαροι πυκτεύουσιν, οὕτω
πολεμεῖν Φιλίππῳ. καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνων ὁ πληγεὶς ἀεὶ τῆς πληγῆς
ἔχεται, κὰν ἑτέρωσε πατάξῃ τις ἐκεῖσε εἰσὶν αἱ χεῖρες·
προβάλλεσθαι δ' ἢ βλέπειν ἐναντίον οὔτ' οἶδεν οὔτ' ἐθέλει.

You fight against Philip the very same way a barbarian boxes: for when hit he claps his hand on the place that has been struck, so that wherever he is stricken, that's where his hands are; he doesn't think, he doesn't even wish, to hold his hands up or to hit back. (*Dem.* 4.40)

²⁰⁰ Such an interpretation of Demosthenes' relationship with the Thucydidean speeches has important implications for our understanding of Thucydidean text: if Demosthenes were not drawing inspiration from the *History* itself, but from rhetorical discourse, then it would appear that Thucydides was in fact more or less accurate in his portrayal of deliberative discourse, or at least that he crafted speeches in accordance with the rhetorical conventions, both formulaic and linguistic, of the Athenian *ekklesia*. For the view that Thucydides was a more rather than less accurate reporter of speeches see Maruice Pope, "Thucydides and Democracy," *Historia* 27 (1988): 285-7.

The Athenians and Philip have changed roles, with the Athenians taking the place of the ignorant barbarian and Philip as the expert Greek boxer. Like the Spartans in the Corinthian's speech (*Thuc.* 1.71), the Athenians have fallen into a debilitating βραδυτής (*Dem.* 4.8, 4.37) and ῥαθυμία (*Dem.* 4.8) in their vain attempt to be peaceful.²⁰¹ The Athenians' failure to act has thus rendered them susceptible to the argument that they have lost a proper balance between deliberation and action. They can be accused of having exchanged their traditional character for that of their worst enemy.

Yet despite these accusations of laziness, Demosthenes holds out an important ray of hope to the Athenians: if only they learn their lesson and begin to prosecute the war against Macedon in earnest, they can reverse the switch between themselves and Philip. The Athenians' lethargy, and with it the whole reversal of character laid out over the course of the speech, is posited as a mere temporary state of affairs. Indeed, Philip's Athenianness itself is undermined by Demosthenes' conviction that the Athenians hold the key to reestablishing world order. It is the Athenians – despite their inactivity – who retain ultimate control over the situation:

καὶ γὰρ ἂν οὗτος τι πάθη, ταχέως ὑμεῖς ἕτερον Φίλιππον
ποιήσετε, ἄνπερ οὕτω προσέχητε τοῖς πράγμασι τὸν νοῦν· οὐδὲ
γὰρ οὗτος παρὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ ῥώμην τοσοῦτον ἐπηύξηται ὅσον
παρὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἀμέλειαν.

Even if [Philip] were to die, you would quickly create a new Philip if you continue to think this way; for he has not grown to such strength so much by his own power as through your lack of care.²⁰² (*Dem.* 4.11)

What matters is the Athenian outlook on the world, which has the potential to change the larger political landscape. Philip, on the other hand, is rendered inconsequential as an

²⁰¹ Thucydides' Corinthians accuse the Spartans of simply waiting in the face of Athenian aggression, thinking to simply keep the peace [ῥησυχίαν], while their inactivity [βραδυτής] is really bringing everyone only harm (*Thuc.* 1.71) .

²⁰² See also *Dem.* 4.7.

individual, since he is effectively interchangeable with any other Athenian enemy. Philip is thus left with no real agency over the world, for all his frenzied activity. His very ἦθος itself is either the product of the Athenians' laxity or of the machinations of some god, working on behalf of the city, who wishes to galvanize the Athenians out of their lethargy (*Dem.* 4.42). In the end, Philip's insatiability for power only reinforces his lack of control over the situation and especially over his own character: not only will he not stop, but he truly *cannot* stop his advance (*Dem.* 4.42-43).²⁰³ Demosthenes tempers his vision of a topsy-turvy world where Philip is Athenian and the Athenians are barbarian by pointing to an underlying system that realigns the present situation with a normative Athenian world-view of themselves and their enemies.

Thus far I have argued that at the heart of *Philippic* I is a misalignment of λόγος and ἔργον that drives Demosthenes' narrative of Athens' war with Philip forward. The Athenians have not followed through in deed what they have voted on in word; Philip, too, conceals behind his Athenian-like actions a rationale (λόγος) fit only for a barbarian. In their ability to act the Athenians and Philip have taken on each others' roles, a theme upon which Demosthenes expands with biting satire. Beneath it all, however, lies the hope that the Athenians will righten the balance – that is, they will put their words into action – and return the world back to normal. So too, I have shown that Demosthenes' mode of argumentation has clear precedents in Thucydides and suggested that the orator was using a much older and well-established framework within which to portray Philip. I turn now to another feature of *Philippic* I with roots in Thucydides: Demosthenes' reflection on the place of the orator in deliberation. Because

²⁰³ This tactic also negates any hope of an outcome apart from a military confrontation, if not in Macedonia or Central Greece, then in Attica (*Dem.* 4.49).

Demosthenes' fashioning of the orator's role is founded on the misalignment between λόγος and ἔργον he has created, it is an important element in understanding how the speech works as a coherent whole. Additionally, because Demosthenes in his latter speeches will tie his own role as an orator and a σύμβουλος to his characterization of Philip, *Philippic* I can be seen as a testing ground of sorts for Demosthenes to present his own political situation vis-à-vis Philip.

While creating a misalignment between λόγος and ἔργον is central to Demosthenes' characterizations of the Athenians and Philip, it also bolsters his own self-fashioning as a competent orator. Demosthenes claims authority for himself on the premise that his advice alone will allow the Athenians to reconnect their actions to their noble intentions. Demosthenes also presents himself as the only one able to look beyond Philip's surface successes to the terrible motives which will eventually lead to his failure. In short, Demosthenes based his role as σύμβουλος on the possession of specialized knowledge. As we will see in the next chapter, this was not the case for all politicians: specifically, Aeschines takes a very different view of the speaker's role in public deliberation and policy making (see below, pp. 136-161).

As a young orator who had never spoken about Macedonia previously, Demosthenes naturally needed to establish his credentials before being taken seriously. Demosthenes' concern to portray himself as a knowledgeable speaker is evident in the basic structure of *Philippic* I. Thus he devotes substantial passages to a discussion of military strategy (*Dem.* 1.16-23; 1.28-29) and another to a discussion of Aegean geography (*Dem.* 1.31-32), arguments that establish his credibility for discussing Macedonia and foreign policy. By contrast, most of his other deliberative speeches (both

earlier and later) are not nearly as detailed in terms of their proposal or the “facts on the ground.”²⁰⁴ In the same way, describing Philip’s ἦθος could bolster Demosthenes’ credibility: being able to infer the king’s future course of action from his character was obviously a useful skill when assessing a given policy towards Macedonia.²⁰⁵ Thus Philip’s ἦθος is key not only to Demosthenes’ presentation of his actual proposals, but also to his self-fashioning as a competent σύμβουλος.

Demosthenes’ juxtaposes his own specialized knowledge with the *demos*, whom he characterizes as either ignorant of the facts or unable to correctly interpret them. Contrasting the wise advisor with the foolishness of the *demos* was, again, a traditional *topos* in Athenian political discourse. Thucydides’ Diodotus, for example, defines the orator’s role in similar terms:

Χρὴ δὲ πρὸς τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ἐν τῷ τοιῷδε ἀξιούν τι ἡμᾶς
 περαιτέρω προνοοῦντας λέγειν ὑμῶν τῶν δι’ ὀλίγου σκοπούντων,
 ἄλλως τε καὶ ὑπεύθυνον τὴν παραίνεσιν ἔχοντας πρὸς ἀνεύθυνον
 τὴν ὑμετέραν ἀκρόασιν.

But with respect to the most critical affairs and in such a case as this, one ought to consider that we speakers forecast future events more carefully than you who have a narrower view; and we are accountable for our advice, whereas you who listen are not. (*Thuc.* 3.43.4)

Diodotus emphasizes the special knowledge and abilities that the orator possesses. Still, he sees the *demos*’ need for the orator’s foresight as contingent on Athens’ current

²⁰⁴ On the orator’s knowledge of policy see Peter Hunt, *War, Peace, and Alliance in Demosthenes’ Athens* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 11-12. Mogens H. Hansen, “Two notes on Demosthenes’ symbouleutic speeches,” *Classica et Medievalia* 35 (1984): 58, calls *Philippic* I “exceptional” for this reason. However, I do not agree with his conclusion that *Philippic* I was the only speech Demosthenes delivered that had a specific proposal attached to it. I find Sealey’s comment that he finds the speech “distressingly vague” puzzling (*Demosthenes and his Time*, 132); the fact that it glosses over important details such as funding surely do not make it any less vague than any of the other speeches in the deliberative corpus.

²⁰⁵ Demosthenes defines a good politicians’ basis of knowledge in these very terms in *On the Crown* 173. See also Mader, “Foresight, Hindsight.” The strategy of lambasting the character of one’s enemy in order to showcase one’s own virtues is well-known in forensic rhetoric: Craig Cooper, “Forensic Oratory,” in *A Companion to Greek Rhetoric*, ed. Ian Worthington (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 210-214.

problems: once the immediate issues facing Athens are resolved, the need for the orator's special insight vanishes. At the same time, Diodotus concludes that if only the *ekklesia* as a collective would hold themselves accountable for their mistaken judgments in the same way they hold speakers accountable for their advice, they *all* would rise to the challenge of being insightful (*Thuc.* 3.43.5). In other words, all Athenians had the capacity for intelligent assessment - if only they would turn their minds to that task. This might all be wishful thinking on Diodotus' part, but the underlying idea that the Athenian collective was intelligent and *would* make the right decision given the proper chance was critical in Athenian democratic ideology.²⁰⁶ It is peculiar, then, that Demosthenes holds out no such ray of hope: the only way the Athenians have out of the current mess is to follow Demosthenes' own advice.²⁰⁷ Collective intelligence never supersedes the individual knowledge of the specialist. Demosthenes' critique of Athenian debate in *Philippic* I is leveled not so much at other orators who confuse and blind the populace, as on the confused populace itself.²⁰⁸ Downplaying the ability of the *demos* to judge issues

²⁰⁶ See Ober, *Mass and Elite*, 156-160.

²⁰⁷ However, Demosthenes does suggest that if the Athenians were to fight for themselves in the army rather than hiring mercenaries, they would be able to see for themselves what was happening in their affairs:

πῶς οὖν ταῦτα παύσεται; ὅταν ἡμεῖς, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀποδείξητε στρατιώτας καὶ μάρτυρας τῶν στρατηγουμένων καὶ δικαστὰς οἴκαδ' ἐλθόντας τῶν εὐθυνῶν, ὥστε μὴ ἀκούειν μόνον ὑμᾶς τὰ ὑμέτερ' αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρόντας ὄραν.

How, then, can this situation be stopped? When you, Athenians, make yourselves soldiers, the witnesses of your generals' actions, and, having come back home, the jurymen at their audits, so that you not only hear about your business from them, but you also see it in your own presence. (*Dem.* 4.47)

The knowledge they would gain, however, is limited to the state of their army. Demosthenes' point is not so much that they would have a better knowledge of foreign affairs as that the Athenians would be better able to judge the competency of their generals.

²⁰⁸ Demosthenes does intimate at one point that Philip has friends among the citizens who report back to him (4.18), but this is his only mention of possible wrongdoing on the part of his opponents. Demosthenes' may also have wanted to avoid deliberately antagonizing his opposition at this stage in his career.

of foreign policy brings to the fore the orator's own unique status as the only citizen able to help the city against the Macedonian threat.

Instead of thinking critically and making independent decisions, the Athenians engage in fruitless gossip. Demosthenes imagines Athenian conversations concerning Philip, with each man asking the other for news (*Dem.* 4.44) and debating whether Philip is dead or just gravely ill (*Dem.* 4.11). He returns to the issue toward the end of *Philippic* I and repeats his complaint against rumor-mongering:

ἡμῶν δ' οἱ μὲν περιόντες μετὰ Λακεδαιμονίων φασὶ Φίλιππον
πράττειν τὴν Θηβαίων κατάλυσιν καὶ τὰς πολιτείας διασπᾶν, οἱ δ'
ὡς πρέσβεις πέπομφεν ὡς βασιλέα, οἱ δ' ἐν Ἰλλυριοῖς πόλεις
τειχίζουσιν, οἱ δὲ λόγους πλάττοντες ἕκαστος περιερχόμεθα.

Some of us say that Philip is planning the Thebans' destruction and the break up of their polity with the Lacedaemonians; some that he has sent ambassadors to the Great King; others that he is fortifying cities in Illyria; and so each one of us goes about fabricating rumors.²⁰⁹ (*Dem.* 4.48)

The Athenians are unable to ascertain and to process information from outside the city. News from foreign territory, in other words, requires authentication and interpretation by an advisor who can pick out the truth from the falsehood.²¹⁰ Demosthenes argues that the Athenians should stop listening to rumors and focus their energies on the problems inside the city, since the cause of Philip's rise to power is their own inactivity (*Dem.* 4.11-12). Meanwhile, the world outside the *polis* should be left to the wise advisor, who

Certainly he will grow less shy of accusing other rhetors of misleading the populace in latter speeches in the wake of the Peace of Philocrates.

²⁰⁹ All these claims seem to have had some basis in reality. See Sealey, *Demosthenes and his Time* (for Thebes: 129-30; for the Illyrians: 161-2). Wooten, *Commentary on Demosthenes' Philippic I*, 116, suggests that Demosthenes' inclusion of himself in the rumor-mongering [περιερχόμεθα] shows an effort on his part to soften his criticism.

²¹⁰ In his capacity as a purveyor of "privileged" information, Demosthenes' role rather resembles that of the historian. See Marincola, John, *Authority and Tradition in Ancient Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1997), ch. 2, on the historian's authority.

can avoid being taken in by false rumors because he can accurately judge the truth by looking at Philip's character.

Indeed, Demosthenes disparages the *demos*' current opinion of Philip. He offers his own belief concerning the Macedonian's future by contrasting it to the supposed thoughts of some of his audience:

ἐγὼ δὲ οἶμαι μὲν, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς ἐκείνον μεθύειν τῷ μεγέθει τῶν πεπραγμένων καὶ πολλὰ τοιαῦτα ὄνειροπολεῖν ἐν τῇ γνώμῃ, τὴν τ' ἐρημίαν τῶν κωλυσόντων ὀρῶντα καὶ τοῖς πεπραγμένοις ἐπηρμένον, οὐ μὲντοι γε μὰ Δί' οὕτω προαιρεῖσθαι πράττειν ὥστε τοὺς νοητοτάτους τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν εἰδέναι τί μέλλει ποιεῖν ἐκείνος· ἀνοητότατοι γὰρ εἰσιν οἱ λογοποιοῦντες.²¹¹

But by the gods I think, Athenians, that that man [Philip] is drunk with the greatness of his deeds and his mind is filled with many such dreams, since he sees that there is nobody to stop him and he is excited by what he has accomplished, and indeed, by Zeus, he will not chose to do what the idiots among you think he will do; for the rumor-mongers are most idiotic.
(*Dem.* 4.49)

The rumor-mongers look to Philip's actions – his political alliances in Greece and in the east, as well as his movements in the north – only to draw false, pessimistic conclusions from them. Demosthenes himself, on the other hand, looks past the greatness of Philip's accomplishments [τῷ μεγέθει τῶν πεπραγμένων] to the character flaws which leave him permanently unsatisfied with his current state, and on that basis predicts a happy outcome – if only the Athenians would follow his lead. Again, Demosthenes appropriates for himself a unique position of authority in Macedonian policy-making based on his ability to read Philip's ἦθος. Demosthenes' interpretation of Philip's character is key to his self-presentation as a competent orator.

²¹¹ Wooten, *Commentary on Philippic I*, 118, argues that “νοητοτάτους must be a misprint for ἀνοητοτάτους. Otherwise, the sentence does not make any sense.”

Philippic I was not a success. Despite this, Demosthenes would return to the themes of character reversal and the λόγος/ἔργον imbalance which he introduced in *Philippic I*. They allowed Demosthenes, and his listeners, to come to terms with Philip's successes while still holding out hope that all was not yet lost. The role of Philip's ἦθος would continue to be important in Demosthenes' self-fashioning as the wise advisor able to see beyond the surface of the king's many victories into his inner nature. While *Philippic I* harks back to traditional rhetorical paradigms also evidenced in Thucydides, its central themes informed much of Demosthenes' later thinking concerning Philip and the Macedonian situation.

The First Olynthiac: 349 BC

While Philip's characterization in *Philippic I* features faults, like ὕβρις, typical of tyrant powers, his political role as king was less important to Demosthenes at the time than describing the corrosive greed latent behind his military might. In the *Olynthiacs*, Demosthenes changes tactics. The three Olynthiac speeches were delivered sometime in the summer of 349 BCE in response to an Olynthian embassy sent to ask for Athenian help against Philip.²¹² Demosthenes was sympathetic to the Olynthian cause. To persuade the Athenians to intervene on the Olynthians' behalf, the orator contended that Athens' democratic government gives the city an advantage over Philip's Macedonia. The *Olynthiacs* systematically explore the relative strengths and weaknesses of Athenian

²¹² At the time, Philip was besieging Olynthus. For an overview of the conflict see Worthington, *Philip II*, ch. 7 and Sealey, *Demosthenes and His Time*, 137-143. See also Cawkwell, *Defense of Olynthus*, 130-140; John M. Carter, "Athens, Euboea, and Olynthus," *Historia* 20 (1971): 418-429; and Edmund M. Burke, "Eubulus, Olynthus, and Euboea," *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* 114 (1984): 111-120.

democracy and Macedonian monarchy.²¹³ Demosthenes concludes that while Philip as king may have the advantage over Athens in terms of prosecuting war, he will ultimately fail because of his primitive governing and economic systems. The *Olynthiacs* are thus rooted in earlier traditions of Athenian political thought which saw monarchy and democracy as antithetical systems of government perennially at odds with each other. As well, it becomes increasingly obvious that what Demosthenes had to say about Philip as a king had nothing to do with the reality of Macedonian monarchy. Like *Philippic* I, the *Olynthiacs* show Demosthenes' adaptation of inherited Athenian ideas to the current situation and to his own point of view. Before considering the substance of Demosthenes' argument, however, I turn to a consideration of the speeches' composition. I argue that the *Olynthiacs* were conceived of as a single unit and that the argument of each individual speech complements the others'. Understanding the three speeches as a unit will allow me to build a coherent picture of Philip as he is portrayed over the course of the speeches.

It has been the norm to view the *Olynthiacs* as separate entities bound together merely by the ultimate goal for which they were composed – namely, the aid of the city of Olynthus. This view arose because, despite the evident chronological proximity of the speeches, on the face of it the *Olynthiacs* have little in common in terms of either their rhetorical strategy or their specific proposals. For a long while, then – indeed, as early as the Demosthenic scholiasts - the major scholarly question concerning the *Olynthiacs* has been the order in which they were delivered.²¹⁴ Various arguments tending toward one or

²¹³ Demosthenes' focus on Philip as king in the *Olynthiacs* was underscored by J. W. Leopold, "Demosthenes on Distrust of Tyrants," *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies* 22 (1981): 227-246.

²¹⁴ Dionysius Halicarnassus gives the order of the speeches as 2-3-1 (ep. *Ad Ammaeum*. i.4.), while the scholia to *Olynthiac* II argue for the 'traditional' order of 1-2-3 (schol. Dem. 2.1a).

another order have been proposed. 19th and 20th century scholarship secured the identification of *Olynthiac* III as the last in the trilogy, but the order of the first and second remained in contention.²¹⁵ More recently, however, Christopher Tuplin has questioned the premise that the three speeches were composed individually and in a particular, historically important, order.²¹⁶ By comparing the individual organization of the speeches Tuplin comes to the conclusion that “the whole point” of the trio was “that the three speeches can – so far as definable external circumstances are concerned – be exactly contemporary and afford an example of the same situation being rhetorically addressed three times and in three different ways” (280).²¹⁷ Tuplin’s arguments, getting away as they do from a strictly historical approach to the speeches, stresses a reading of the deliberative corpus that finds meaning in the orator’s manipulation of facts as well as in those facts themselves.

I argue that the *Olynthiacs*, in addition to the structural parallels elucidated by Tuplin, also show coherence at the thematic level. Each of the three speeches is focused on one aspect of the Olynthian problem currently facing Athens: *Olynthiac* I is largely concerned with the current military situation in the Chalcidice and outlines Demosthenes’ proposed plan of attack; the second deals with Philip’s political situation in Macedonia;

²¹⁵ See Robert Whiston, *Demosthenes, with an English Commentary* (London: Whittaker & Co., 1868), 68-78; Henri Wiel, *Démostenè. Les Harangues* (Paris: Hachette, 1881), 170; Ellis, J. R., “The order of the *Olynthiacs*,” *Historia* 16 (1967): 108-11; Christoph Eucken, “Reihenfolge und Zweck der olynthischen Reden,” *Museum Helveticum* 41 (1985): 193-208.

²¹⁶ See Christopher Tuplin, “Demosthenes’ ‘Olynthiacs’ and the Character of the Demegoric Corpus,” *Historia* 47 (1998): 276-320.

²¹⁷ Tuplin argues that the three speeches show three different types of composition: I is composed of corresponding elements in ring composition; II is based on a bipartite structure; III features a tripartite structure. He also points out that the three *Olynthiacs* employ a larger proportion of similes than the rest of the corpus. Hartmut Erbse, “Zu den Olynthischen Reden des Demosthenes,” *Reinisches Museum* 99 (1956): 364-380, also argued that the three speeches were conceived of as a unit, but his further claim that they must have also been delivered at the same meeting of the *ekklisia* (379) cannot be adequately proven and need not follow from their having been composed together.

and the third turns to the internal - mostly financial - problems in Athens itself.²¹⁸

Besides the basic message that the Athenians should intervene in the Chalcidice, then, the three speeches appear to have virtually nothing in common – each is concerned with one specific topic that bears on the overall question. The tripronged nature of Demosthenes’ argument in the *Olynthiacs* was perceived as early as Ulpian in the early 4th century CE, who considered each of these (military, political, and financial) points in his *Prolegomena* to Demosthenes. In the end, however, Ulpian concluded that the one concerning the military situation was the most important aspect of the three. Interpreting the *Olynthiacs* with a view to Demosthenes’ rhetorical strategy rather than as historically accurate or biographically-motivated texts thus clarifies the chronological problems posed by the speeches. There can be no question that the three speeches were conceived of and composed together, and that to speak of any chronology in terms of their *composition* would be wrong. We can, on the other hand, identify the order in which they would have been delivered. I identify *Olynthiac* I as the first of the trilogy based on its exposition of the tripronged nature of the argument to follow. A holistic understanding of the *Olynthiacs* will also point to Demosthenes’ tripartite view of government. For the orator, government is identified as an entity responsible for the military, for political decision-making, and for the financial obligations of a polity.

Demosthenes establishes the tripartite focus of the *Olynthiacs* at the beginning of *Olynthiac* I as he outlines his advice to the audience:

ἔστι δὴ τὰ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα, ψηφίσασθαι μὲν ἤδη τὴν βοήθειαν, καὶ παρασκευάσασθαι τὴν ταχίστην ὅπως ἐνθένδε βοηθήσετε (καὶ μὴ πάθητε ταῦτόν ὅπερ καὶ πρότερον), πρεσβείαν δὲ πέμπειν, ἥτις ταῦτ’ ἐρεῖ καὶ παρέσται τοῖς πράγμασιν.

²¹⁸ The speech includes Demosthenes’ famous demand that the Athenians take money from the Theoric Fund in order to pay for the war (*Dem.* 3.11-13; 29-31).

These suggestions seem the best to me: to vote for an expedition now, and to prepare it as quickly as possible so that you may be of help there (and so that you don't allow the same thing to happen as before), and to send an embassy which would inform [the Olynthians] of these things and would be present during the event. (*Dem.* 1.2)

Demosthenes' recommendation thus includes the actual war effort, the preparations - presumably financial - necessary for that war effort, and an act of diplomacy toward the Olynthians.²¹⁹ The equally necessary nature of each action to the successful prosecution of the war is mirrored by their syntactic equality (ψηφίσασθαι... παρασκευάσασθαι... πέμπειν).

Concomitantly, each of these tasks is assigned to a particular group within the larger Athenian community:

Πάντα δὴ ταῦτα δεῖ συνιδοντας ἅπαντας βοηθεῖν καὶ ἀπωθεῖν ἐκεῖσε τὸν πόλεμον, τοὺς μὲν εὐπόρους, ἵν' ὑπὲρ τῶν πολλῶν ὦν καλῶς ποιῶντες ἔχουσι μικρὰ ἀναλίσκοντες τὰ λοιπὰ καρπῶνται ἀδεῶς, τοὺς δ' ἐν ἡλικίᾳ, ἵνα τὴν τοῦ πολεμεῖν ἐμπειρίαν ἐν τῇ Φιλίππου χώρᾳ κτησάμενοι φοβεροὶ φύλακες τῆς οἰκείας ἀκεραίου γένωνται, τοὺς δὲ λέγοντας, ἵν' αἱ τῶν πεπολιτευμένων αὐτοῖς εὐθυναὶ ῥάδιαι γένωνται, ὡς ὅποι' ἄττ' ἂν ὑμᾶς περιστῆ τὰ πράγματα, τοιοῦτοι κριταὶ καὶ τῶν πεπραγμένων αὐτοῖς ἔσεσθε.

All of us, having considered these matters, ought to provide help and to carry the theater of war over there [Olynthus]- on the one hand all the wealthy, so that, for the sake of the wealth which they possess, by spending a small portion they will be able enjoy the rest; and all those in the prime of life, so that in carrying the theater of war into Philip's territory they will become the feared defendants of a safe homeland, and all the speakers, so that the politicians' audits will go easily, and you will judge them according to the same circumstances in which you yourselves stand. (*Dem.* 1.28)

²¹⁹ The exact nature of the embassy is unclear - was its purpose to administer the oaths necessary for an alliance, or would it be sent merely to inform the Olynthians of the Athenians' imminent arrival? - but it need not be read as evidence that the alliance between Olynthus and Athens had not yet been concluded (so Tuplin, "Demosthenes' Olynthiacs," 277 contra Ellis, "Order of the Olynthiacs," 108). As Eucken, "Reihenfolge und Zweck der olynthischen Reden," 195, rightly points out, "in allen drei Reden lautet - bei Hinweisen auf eine zum Gebrauch gegebene Symmachie (I 10; II 2; III 6) - der die Olynthier betreffende Vorschlag allein, Hilfe zu schicken, nicht aber ein Bündnis zu schliessen."

Again Demosthenes has outlined the three elements – financial, military, and political - necessary for Athenian success: the rich must provide money for the expedition; the adult men must serve in the military; and the politicians must serve (and be judged) honestly. As we will see, he returns to the same idea of a tripronged war effort in *Olynthiac* II and in *Olynthiac* III.²²⁰ Inasmuch as *Olynthiac* I introduces the three speeches as a whole by laying out Demosthenes’ overall plan at the beginning, it must have been delivered as first of the three.²²¹

The military, financial, and political arms described by Demosthenes with respect to the Athenian polity are also prominent in his account of Macedonia. As head of the state - and therefore the Macedonian equivalent of the Athenian *demos* – Philip, according to Demosthenes, has three functions: he is at once the στρατηγός, the δεσπότης, and the ταμίης of the Macedonian state (*Dem.* 1.4). These three facets of Philip’s position mirror the tripartite division of the Athenian citizenry which, as we have seen, Demosthenes had identified at *Dem.* 1.2 and 1.28: both Philip and the *demos* have military, financial, and political responsibilities. Yet while different segments of the Athenian population have different roles to play in the success of their community, given the nature of monarchy, Philip alone must fulfill all three functions of government. In short, Philip’s role as king brings the Athenians face to face with a paradigm of

²²⁰ *Dem.* 2.31 restates the idea that each citizen ought to do what they can, first in terms of their financial contribution, second in terms of serving in the army, and thirdly in terms of their accounts and in terms of making policy decisions. *Dem.* 3.35 explains how his policies will establish order in the city’s taxes, military, and lawcourts, [εἰς τάξιν ἡγαγον τὴν πόλιν, τὴν αὐτὴν τοῦ λαβεῖν, τοῦ στρατεύεσθαι, τοῦ δικάζειν] and in general having each member of the state do what he can as his age and he circumstances require.

²²¹ The tripartite role of government finds a parallel in the political theory of Plato’s *Republic*, which also divides the constitution – and the soul – into three: the appetite, the spirit, and the rational. In choosing to portray the constitution as divided into three parts, Demosthenes may very well be responding to Platonic political theory in the *Olynthiacs*. For arguments connecting Demosthenes to Plato see Hernández-Muñoz, “Tucídides y Platón,” pp. 154-160; Yunis, *Taming Democracy*, ch. 9.

leadership which is utterly at odds with their own. Indeed, monarchy is not without its own merits: Demosthenes acknowledges that Philip's complete control over the government allows him to be militarily successful. The king's military success in the *Olynthiacs* thus continues with the characterization of Philip as an active ruler in *Philippic I*. In the *Olynthiacs*, as in the earlier speech, Demosthenes' primary interest in Philip's character lies in its capacity to illuminate the workings – and stumbling blocks – of the Athenian political system. In the *Olynthiacs*, Demosthenes will argue that Philip's eventual failure (which, of course, is not in doubt) stems from his lack of ability at two of his roles as monarch: namely, in his capacity as governor and steward.

Olynthiac I sets out the tripartite schema of the entire *Olynthiacs* while also focusing on the military aspect of the war against Macedonia. A large portion of the speech is devoted to outlining Demosthenes' proposed expedition, which is supposed to create a double front, one army sent to help the besieged Olynthians and the other sent to ravage Macedonia itself (*Dem.* 1.16-18). These two armies are to be paid for from the military fund (*Dem.* 1.19-20).²²² The main purpose of the speech is to convince the Athenians that if they do not immediately send an expedition to the north, they will eventually be faced with the necessity of fighting Philip on their own soil (*Dem.* 1.15, 1.25-26).

Demosthenes' characterization of Philip in the *Olynthiacs* certainly draws on *Philippic I*. So, for example, *Olynthiac I*, just like *Philippic I*, explains Macedonia's rise to power via Philip's insatiable desire for conquest (*Dem.* 1.12-13); here too Philip disdains relaxation [οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ ῥαθυμεῖν ἀπέκλινεν] (*Dem.* 1.13) and his

²²² While Demosthenes voices his disapproval of the Athenians' spending on festivals, he does not explicitly object to the Theoric fund here (as he will do in *Olynthiac III*), but does reject the notion that he is putting up a proposal to divert money from that fund to the Military fund.

φιλοπραγμοσύνη makes peace impossible for him [ύφ' ἧς οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως ἀγαπήσας τοῖς πεπραγμένοις ἡσυχίαν σχήσει] (*Dem.* 1.14). Additionally, as in *Philippic* I, Demosthenes contrasts Philip's activity with Athens' laxity: if the Athenians had done as they ought from the first, Demosthenes argues, Philip would never have gained the power he currently has (*Dem.* 1.9). Nevertheless, the orator suggests, the Olynthian war presents the Athenians with a "spontaneous opportunity" [καιρὸς αὐτόματος] (*Dem.* 1.9) to reverse course and take back their ancestral superiority.²²³

Yet whereas *Philippic* I focused on the respective characters of Philip and the Athenians, the *Olynthiacs* turn to systems of governance as a source of contrast. Demosthenes offers a critique of monarchy and compares it to democracy and democratic leadership.²²⁴ Demosthenes suggests that having a single ruler responsible for all the tasks incumbent upon proper governance in war, politics, and finance actually *benefits* Philip, at least when it comes to making war:

τὸ γὰρ εἶναι πάντων ἐκεῖνον ἓνα ὄντα κύριον καὶ ῥητῶν καὶ ἀπορρήτων καὶ ἅμα στρατηγὸν καὶ δεσπότην καὶ ταμίαν, καὶ πανταχοῦ αὐτὸν παρεῖναι τῷ στρατεύματι, πρὸς μὲν τὸ τὰ τοῦ πολέμου ταχὺ καὶ κατὰ καιρὸν πράττεσθαι πολλῶν προέχει, πρὸς

²²³ The idea that the Olynthian war was a perfect opportunity that had come about "spontaneously" for the Athenians is present also at *Dem.* 1.7, where a vivid metaphor introduces the speech: ὁ μὴν οὖν παρῶν καιρὸς, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μόνον οὐχὶ λέγει φωνὴν ἀφίεις ὅτι τῶν πραγμάτων ὑμῖν ἐκείνων αὐτοῖς ἀντιληπτέον ἐστίν, εἴπερ ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας αὐτῶν φροντίζετε [The present circumstance, Athenians, all but says to you, even though it has no voice, that you must help the state of your affairs [in the North], if you think at all about their safety].

²²⁴ It may be argued that the distinction between monarchy and tyranny, which as Aristotle expresses it (*Pol.* 1279b1-10) is the perversion of a good monarchy, ought to be applied to Philip's case; yet the distinction between monarchy and tyranny is not carefully observed in the non-theoretical discourse, and cannot be uniformly applied to the demagogic speeches: as Hugo Montgomery, *The Way to Chaeronea: Foreign Policy, Decision-Making, and Political Influence in Demosthenes' Speeches* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), p. 17 so aptly put it, "Demosthenes' statements when assessing the domestic strength of Macedonia... are not those of the political theorist. He is no neutral spectator... unlike Aristotle, the scientific observer of *Politica*, he is not concerned with specifying political events... in order to arrange them in an evolutionary system." See also Sara Forsdyke, "The Uses and Abuses of Tyranny," in *A Companion to Greek and Roman Political Thought*, (ed.) Ryan Balot (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2009), 241-245. I use monarchy in discussing Philip's rule rather than tyranny because, in the practice of the *ekklesia*, there is hardly any distinction between the two.

δὲ τὰς καταλλαγὰς ἅς ἂν ἐκεῖνος ποιήσαιτο ἄσμενος πρὸς Ὀλυνθίους, ἐναντίως ἔχει.

For it benefits that man [Philip] to be alone master of public and secret affairs, and to be at the same time general and ruler and steward, and to oversee the army as a whole himself, and to act in matters of war quickly and at the right time; but with respect to the reconciliations which he would readily make with the Olynthians, the situation is the very opposite. (*Dem.* 1.4)

The fact that the duties of a king encompass all three facets of governance – military, politics, and finance – is thus beneficial to him in his military endeavors. Philip’s complete control of the state gives him the ability to act quickly and at the right time [ταχὺ καὶ κατὰ καιρὸν πράττεσθαι] in matters of war – which is precisely what the Athenian *demos* seems incapable of accomplishing.²²⁵ Philip’s claim to martial prowess is reinforced as Demosthenes lists the places Macedonia has already conquered (*Dem.* 1.8-9; 1.12-13). Demosthenes’ apparent endorsement of monarchy (at least when it comes to making war) ought not be dismissed as a momentary ploy on the orator’s part; rather, it makes sense as an integral component of the overall schema of the *Olynthiacs*. Demosthenes will, moreover, return to this very argument in later speeches (*Dem.* 19.185-6; 18.236). The appearance of Philip’s apparent military superiority here must therefore be given due weight as part of Demosthenes’ system of political thought, over and above its value as a strategy to shock the Athenians into immediate action.

Indeed, the claim that Philip is, by the very nature of his political role, better able to conduct war than Athens can *is* quite shocking. Moreover, in arguing that a monarch had certain advantages in wartime, Demosthenes may well seem at odds with most

²²⁵ The unified control of the king over his domain contrasts with the democratic system, whose principle was to spread the responsibility for governance across the body of citizens. This dissimilarity in political structure bred mutual distrust between a monarch and a democracy [καὶ ὅλως ἄπιστον, οἶμαι, ταῖς πολιτείαις ἢ τυραννίς, ἄλλως τε κἂν ὅμορον χώραν ἔχωσιν], as is indeed the case between Philip and the Olynthians (*Dem.* 1.5).

popular Athenian discourse on monarchy, which tended to view the sole ruler through the dark lens of the Peisistratid tyranny or the Persian Wars.²²⁶ But popular views of monarchy in Athens were more complex than a model of complete vilification can accommodate.²²⁷ The benefits of monarchy were, in fact, articulated in a variety of sources - not all of them favorable to monarchic rule. Looking into the antecedents to Demosthenes' claim will help us to understand his reinterpretation of traditional Athenian norms within the context of the Macedonian debate.

The earliest classical justification of monarchy, Darius' speech in Herodotus' constitutional debate, is probably also the best known. I would stress at the outset that the Greek idea of monarchy within which Herodotus and Demosthenes worked was radically different from the reality. We have seen that the critical problems facing the Macedonian kings were the integration of the peoples under their rule and the creation of infrastructure to ease communication between the center (the monarch) and the periphery (the subjects).²²⁸ Both Herodotus and Demosthenes take such issues of communication and identify for granted; instead, they focus on structural issues, juxtaposing monarchy with democracy and, in Herodotus' case, oligarchy. Individual and collective freedom, or lack thereof, becomes paramount. Herodotus' Darius emphasizes the fact that sole rule allows the good man, as king, to excel in all aspects of government: the people will be pleased with him, and the social strife which plagues oligarchies and democracies will

²²⁶ The Persian War narrative opposed free and democratic Greece to enslaved and monarchic Persia. Monarchy thus also became a hallmark of a barbarian society: so in Atossa's dream of Xerxes and his chariot (*Pers.* 270-318) Aeschylus articulates the same idea of the barbarian as one whose slavish nature is best suited to monarchic rule as Aristotle a hundred years later (*Pol.* 1285a): see Hall, *Inventing the Barbarian*, 99-98 and 154-159. On negative views of tyranny see Forsdyke, "Uses and Abuses of Tyranny," and Carolyn Dewald, "Form and Content: the Question of Tyranny in Herodotus," in *Popular Tyranny: Sovereignty and its Discontents in Ancient Greece*, (ed.) Kathryn Morgan (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003), 25-58.

²²⁷ A thesis argued by Davie, "Herodotus and Aristophanes."

²²⁸ See above, pp. 38-55.

cease to exist (*Hdt.* 3.82.3-4), since the king’s status is unique.²²⁹ Darius’ speech also stresses the king’s ability to keep his plans secret from his enemies (*Hdt.* 3.82.2). In this respect his argument is a forerunner of Demosthenes’ view that Philip is “alone master of public and secret affairs” [ἓνα ὄντα κύριον καὶ ῥητῶν καὶ ἀπορρήτων] (*Dem.* 1.4).²³⁰ While Darius does not explicitly discuss the king’s role in wartime, he does point out that it was through the (military) exploits of a monarch – Cyrus – that the Persians became great. Military might was clearly integral to the king’s role, and this impression is borne out by Herodotus’ narrative of the Persian Wars as a whole.²³¹

The Athenian Empire provided another important precedent for the idea that monarchic rule was most apt for military success. By the mid-5th century, when the Empire was at its height, the Athenians had come to associate their newfound power with tyranny.²³² At the same time, they understood that firm control over the islanders was

²²⁹ What Darius’ speech lacks is any concern for the lawfulness of the monarch’s decision-making, despite the fact that the charge of lawless self-gratification was leveled at monarchy by Otanes (*Hdt.* 3.80); as such Darius’ argument fails to answer the most important 5th century critique of monarchy, that of the ruler’s ὕβρις. What Darius does do is narrow the discussion to a monarchy where the ruler is the “best man”, thus presaging the 4th century elite arguments which sought to differentiate between the monarch and the tyrant. So, for example, Aristotle says in the *Politics* that if there is a man that is by far the best in a given society then it is only just that he rule alone (1288a15-32). See also Ryan Balot, *Greek Political Thought* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 185.

²³⁰ Secrecy was potentially important for the monarch, just as for democracy: on secrecy in democratic settings see Rahul Sagar, “Presaging the Moderns: Demosthenes’ Critique of Popular Government,” *Journal of Politics* 71 (2009): 1396, who notes however that Demosthenes is the only one to ponder the political significance of secrecy in democratic deliberation.

²³¹ The wartime leadership provided by a monarch was considered critical even in many ethnically Greek circles. Homeric kings gained power through military prowess: see Hans Van Wees, *Status Warriors: War, Violence, and Society in Homer and History* (Amsterdam: J. C. Gieben, 1992), chs. 3 and 4; Spartan kings also provided the city with critical leadership in wartime: see Ellen Millender, “Herodotus and Spartan despotism,” in *Sparta: Beyond the Mirage*, (eds.) A. Powell and S. Hodkinson (Swansea and London: Classical Press of Wales and Duckworth, 2002), 1-61; Hellenistic kings also defined their role in military terms: Arthur M. Eckstein, “Hellenistic Monarchy in Theory and Practice,” in *A Companion to Greek and Roman Political Thought*, (ed.) Ryan Balot (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2009), 249-50.

²³² See particularly Thuc. 2.63.2, 3.37.2, and Aristoph. *Knights* 1111-4. On the debate over Athenian imperialism see Balot, *Greek Political Thought*, 156-76.

absolutely critical to maintaining the military might of the city and for resisting Sparta.²³³

The strength of the Athenian Empire could be opposed to the loose organization of the Peloponnesian League. Pericles, according to Thucydides' account, articulates this problem as one of several that hamper the Peloponnesians in their prosecution of the war:

μάχη μὲν γὰρ μιᾷ πρὸς ἅπαντας Ἕλληνας δυνατοὶ Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἀντισχεῖν, πολεμεῖν δὲ μὴ πρὸς ὁμοίαν ἀντιπαρασκευὴν ἀδύνατοι, ὅταν μήτε βουλευτηρίῳ ἐνὶ χρώμενοι παραχρῆμά τι ὀξέως ἐπιτελῶσι πάντες τε ἰσόψηφοι ὄντες καὶ οὐχ ὁμόφυλοι τὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτὸν ἕκαστος σπεύδῃ· ἐξ ὧν φιλεῖ μηδὲν ἐπιτελὲς γίγνεσθαι. καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν ὡς μάλιστα τιμωρήσασθαι τινα βούλονται, οἱ δὲ ὡς ἥκιστα τὰ οἰκεῖα φθεῖραι. χρόνιοί τε ξυνιόντες ἐν βραχεῖ μὲν μορίῳ σκοποῦσιν τι τῶν κοινῶν, τῷ δὲ πλέονι τὰ οἰκεῖα πράσσουν, καὶ ἕκαστος οὐ παρὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀμέλειαν οἶεται βλάψειν, μέλειν δὲ τινὶ καὶ ἄλλῳ ὑπὲρ ἑαυτοῦ τι προΐδειν, ὥστε τῷ αὐτῷ ὑπὸ ἀπάντων ἰδίᾳ δοξάσασθαι λαθάνειν τὸ κοινὸν ἀθρόον φθειρόμενον.

In a single battle the Peloponnesians and their allies could stand up to the whole of Greece, but they are incapable of fighting a war against a dissimilar hostile force since they do not have a single council to quickly produce a decisive action, they all have an equal vote, and, since they are not of the same nationality, each one of them looks out for his own interest. It generally happens under such circumstances that nothing is ever accomplished. For some wish to avenge themselves above all, while others are concerned to suffer no loss themselves. They meet for a short time to look to the common good, but most of the time they go about their personal business, and while each one of them thinks that he isn't doing any harm through his own carelessness, thinking that someone else will look to his interests, so that since this same idea is held by all of them, nobody ends up considering that the common good is suffering. (*Thuc.* 1.141.6-7)

Pericles stresses the League's inability to make quick decisions, exactly the same critique that we have seen Demosthenes level at his Athenian audience and for which he praises Philip in *Olynthiac* I (*Dem.* 1.4). Also key to the Peloponnesians' failure is their national

²³³ See *Thuc.* 2.63.2. Aristophanes' Prometheus, in eulogizing the maiden Basileia, calls her the guardian "of good council, good laws, wisdom and the navy" [καλλίστη κόρη... ταμειεύει... τὴν εὐβουλίαν / τὴν εὐνομίαν τὴν σωφροσύνην τὰ νεώρια] (*Aristoph.*, *Birds* 1537-40). For other Aristophanic praise of monarchy see John N. Davie, "Herodotus and Aristophanes on Monarchy," *Greece and Rome* 26 (1979): 163-167.

disparity. This lack of unity prevents the Peloponnesians from taking any interest in the other members' well-being. In criticizing the Peloponnesian League, Pericles implicitly justifies the tyrannical organization of the Athenian Empire, where the Athenians would require contributions from all the islanders for the war effort without, however, allowing them much say in the way the war was prosecuted.

Pericles' argument need not imply anti-democratic sentiment. Extolling a tyranny's ability to take decisive action could stand as the logical extension of the ideal of consensus [ὁμόνοια]. Consensus was a key democratic ideology, which promoted agreement even between groups, such as the rich and poor, who did not normally see eye to eye.²³⁴ At the same time, however, there was a tension between the principle of ὁμόνοια and the freedom of speech promoted by democratic discourse. Indeed, democracy could come under fire if it was perceived to favor freedom of speech over consensus. Thus Cleon only takes Pericles' words to their logical conclusion when he says that democracy is incapable of ruling over others because the decision-making process stalls and the public is prone to changing its opinion (*Thuc.* 3.37.1). Only consensus on the part of the polity could create quick, decisive action, whereas prolonged debate and different or changing opinions produced a *polis* incapable of action. Demosthenes advocates exactly this type of consensus when he calls upon all Athenian citizens – rich and poor, young and old, rhetors, generals, and ordinary citizens - to act together to protect Olynthus (*Dem.* 1.6; 1.28; 2.29-30; 3.35). It is precisely this need for consensus-building which the monarch obviates in his singular leadership role.

²³⁴ See Ober, *Mass and Elite*, 297-298. More recently Josiah Ober, *Democracy and Knowledge: Innovation and Learning in Classical Athens* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), chs. 3 and 4, provides a model for how the Athenians could in fact create consensus in a participatory democracy.

While monarchy is beneficial in matters of war, Demosthenes argues that it harms Philip's position in other respects. Notably, monarchs have trouble in establishing diplomatic relations with non-monarchic systems of government. The king is, for example, unable to deal politically with the Olynthians, who distrust him because of his tyranny (1.5). Demosthenes even suggests that Philip had not actually wished to go to war against Olynthus, but had hoped to cow them with a mere show of force (1.21) – a rather puzzling turn that seems at odds with Philip's otherwise warmongering nature, but which in any case points to Philip's weakness on the political front.²³⁵ Moreover, the Paeonians and Illyrians are in rebellion, allegedly because Philip is an ἄνθρωπος ὑβριστής (1.23). Financially Philip's position is also unsound: he is having troubles with newest subjects, the Thessalians, who act against his wishes and refuse to pay a share of their port fees into Macedonian coffers; their refusal jeopardizes Philip's ability to pay his men (1.22). These statements exemplify Philip's failings on the political and financial fronts and will be the bases for Demosthenes' arguments in *Olynthiacs* II and III, respectively.

In sum, the Athenians' war against Philip must be waged on the military, the political, and the financial fronts. The division of civic obligation into the military, the political, and the financial spheres allows Demosthenes to address Philip's successes on the battlefield in a new way: he can admit that Philip is better at the art of war than the Athenians, while at the same time giving Athens the edge in the other two spheres of the war effort - that is, in politics and in finance. While an acknowledgement of Philip's military prowess may appear at odds with the most prominent popular views of

²³⁵ We cannot demand complete consistency from the orators; at 1.21, towards the end of his speech, Demosthenes may be trying to tone down his rhetoric and thereby bolster the Athenians' confidence; he had ended in a similarly hopeful tone, for example, in *Philippic* I.

monarchy, it builds upon 5th century roots that urged the Athenian *demos* to achieve *ὁμόνοια* rather than waste time and energy in fruitless bickering. Demosthenes adds to this idea of democracy's failing by comparing it with the monarch's ability to put his will into action.

The Second Olynthiac: 349 BCE

Demosthenes turns his focus in *Olynthiac* II from the military to the political situations at Athens and in Macedonia. He sets forth two related goals for the speech: to prove, first, that the Athenians are wrong in their assessment of Philip; and, secondly, to provide a countering view of the king and his political situation (*Dem.* 2.4-5). While other politicians are blinded by Philip's apparent power, Demosthenes claims that, in reality, Philip's monarchy is onerous to his people and his allies, and his position as king has a debilitating effect on his court. To prove his point Demosthenes highlights a tension between Philip's role as monarch and his potential usurpation of Greek (and Athenian) heroism. What is particularly innovative in the present speech is the disjunction Demosthenes articulates between Philip's usurpation of Athenian qualities and his un-Athenian role as monarch. Yet inasmuch as Demosthenes shows Philip taking on characteristics generally applied by the Athenians to themselves, *Olynthiac* II proves to be a continuation of the kind of rhetoric Demosthenes employed in *Philippic* I: namely, pointing to an inherent tension or oddity within Philip's ἦθος which requires rightening and which portends Philip's ultimate destruction. As in *Philippic* I, Demosthenes' reinterpretation of Philip's ἦθος also serves his own self-presentation as a knowledgeable orator. *Olynthiac* II is more explicitly concerned with the nature of *ekklesiastic* debate, however, than was *Philippic* I. I begin with Demosthenes' evocation

of the wider debate against which he sets his own speech before examining his characterization of Philip in greater detail. As I show, Demosthenes sets up an aura of ‘real’ debate between himself and his opponents. The engagement which *Olynthiac* II seeks to advance between Demosthenes and the other politicians is a far cry from the vitriol which we see the orator level at his opponents after the Peace of Philocrates.

In and of itself, the existence of politicians speaking out against intervention in Olynthus is unsurprising. Some wouldn’t have seen Philip as the pressing threat which Demosthenes made him out to be. At the same time, Olynthus’ relationship with Athens had historically been less than amicable, though the Olynthians had been interested in peace - and possibly an alliance - with Athens some years prior to 349.²³⁶ Demosthenes himself mentions a time when the Athenians had allied themselves with Macedonia *against* Olynthus (*Dem.* 2.14). Moreover, by the end of the year 349 the Athenians would be embroiled in Euboea, where they also had interests and which was much closer to home.²³⁷ The high cost of intervening in the Chalcidice was without a doubt an additional factor in the Athenians’ decision-making.²³⁸ All of these reasons help to account for the evident reluctance with which the city finally sent help to Olynthus: neither of the two expeditions that sailed out over the course of the summer of 349 actually engaged Philip (the first did not find him there, and the second came too late).

²³⁶ On the pre-war relations between Olynthus, Philip, and Athens, see Hammond, *Philip of Macedon*, 50-52, and Ellis, *Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism*, 93-95.

²³⁷ Demosthenes mentions a Euboean embassy at 1.8, but it refers to events of the year 357 BCE; otherwise he does not mention Euboea in the *Olynthiacs*. On the importance of Euboea to Athens see Burke, “Eubulus, Olynthus, and Euboea,” 118-9. The relative chronology of Athens’ expeditions to Olynthus and to Euboea has been a matter of considerable debate. On the basis of Demosthenes’ silence the consensus seems to be that at least the first two, and possibly all three, of the *Olynthiacs* were delivered before the Athenians involved themselves in Euboea: see Sealey, *Demosthenes and his Time*, 139-141, and Carter, “Athens, Euboea, and Olynthus.” For the relations of Athens and Euboea at this time see P. A. Brunt, “Euboea in the Time of Philip II,” *Classical Quarterly* 19 (1969): 247-251.

²³⁸ See Burke, “Eubulus, Olynthus, and Euboea.”

There seem to have been many possible objections, then, that Demosthenes' opponents could have leveled (and probably did) against his interpretation of events.

Demosthenes does not refer to his opponents specifically; rather, he ascribes the opposing view to an unspecified segment of the Athenian collective. According to Demosthenes, his opponents' central argument rests on Philip's might.²³⁹ They consider Philip to be some invincible being [ἄμαχόν τινα] (*Dem.* 2.5); he seems great in wars and battles [μεγάν... τοῖς πολέμοις καὶ ταῖς στρατείαις] (*Dem.* 2.15); even his hangers-on appear to be wondrous [θαυμαστοί] and knowledgeable in warfare [συγκεκριροτημένοι τὰ τοῦ πολέμου] (*Dem.* 2.17); finally, he seems a fearful opponent [φοβερόν προσπολεμῆσαι] (*Dem.* 2.22). Demosthenes does not repudiate these views as inherently false or their proponents as traitors, as he would do so vociferously in the aftermath of the Peace of Philocrates;²⁴⁰ rather, he contends that his opposition is deluded in their assessment of the situation (*Dem.* 2.4), leaving open the possibility that they are merely ignorant rather than willfully misrepresenting the situation. At one point he even claims that he himself was almost taken by the illusion that Philip was fearful [φοβερόν] and wondrous [θαυμαστόν] (*Dem.* 2.6). Despite the disingenuousness of the claim, the

²³⁹ That Demosthenes does not specify his opponents should not blind us to the existence of a number of anti-interventionist politicians against whose arguments the *Olynthiacs* were aimed. The dialogue created between orator and Athenian citizenry in our extant deliberative speeches is an illusion; hidden behind it is a more complex dialogue between the orator, the orators aligned against him (who need not have been all of the same view, either), and their audience. A deliberative debate was a 'multi-cornered dialogue': cf. C. Joachim Classen, "The Speeches in the Courts of Law: A Three-Cornered Dialogue," *Rhetorica* 9 (1991): 195-207. The lines between orator, opposition, and audience were constantly blurred in an effort to create the illusion of consensus (ὁμόνοια).

²⁴⁰ He would later decry the men who had opposed aid to Olynthus as bribed traitors (5.5). It may be that at this point in his career (349/8) Demosthenes simply did not have the political power he would have a few years later, after the Peace of Philocrates; the nature of the debate in the *ekklesia* itself may also have turned more vicious after the demise of the peace effort. In any case, there is a distinct break between Demosthenes' rhetoric concerning his opponents before and after the Peace.

speech as a whole sets up an atmosphere of serious engagement with Demosthenes' opposition.

To counter his opponents, Demosthenes argues that he alone is privy to specialized knowledge about Macedonia, which also allows him to better assess the situation. One of his methods for proving his superior knowledge in *Olynthiac* II is his description of the character of Philip and his court. Demosthenes even claims that he has access to first-hand accounts of life in Macedonia: "I heard [about Philip and his court] from a man who had been in that country, a man not given to lying" [ἐγὼ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ χώρᾳ γεγενημένων τινὸς ἤκουον, ἀνδρὸς οὐδαμῶς οἴου τε ψεύδεσθαι] (*Dem.* 2.17). Demosthenes' citation of his source becomes a particularly pointed argument when viewed against a political culture where proving the reliability of one's sources was relatively unimportant.²⁴¹ Since Demosthenes had not yet been to Macedonia himself, his access to a type of information which could not be construed as 'public knowledge' – in this case, the inner workings of Philip's court – established the credibility of his advice.²⁴²

Demosthenes' access to such sources of inside information complements, rather than replaces, his ability to see beyond Philip's appearance to his true character. We have seen the latter argument in action already in *Philippic* I, where I argued that describing Philip's ἦθος was key to Demosthenes' self-presentation as the wise advisor.

²⁴¹ On the importance and assessment of first-hand accounts see Lewis, *News and Society*, ch. 4; on the emphasis attached to them, see 102-109. On second-hand accounts in the orators see Victor Bers, *Speech in Speech: Studies in Incorporated Oratio Recta in Attic Drama and Oratory* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997), ch. 2.

²⁴² What Demosthenes chose to mention concerning his informant is also intriguing: we hear about his character but without any particulars and, perhaps most importantly, no name; this is also true of other second-hand reports in the other deliberative speeches (so *Dem.* 1.22, 8.14, 10.8, 11.8-10, 11.12). Similarly, Aeschines 3.77 claims that when Demosthenes first heard of Philip's death from the spies of the general Charidemus, he pretended to the people that that knowledge had come to him from a god. Interestingly enough, this story corroborates the impression that leading orators did in fact have sources of information unavailable to the public; Demosthenes could only pretend that a divinity had foretold the future to him if he was sure nobody else in the city would know the information thus 'prophesied'.

In general terms, *Olynthiac* II follows the same pattern. At the same time, Demosthenes uses a somewhat different articulation of Philip's ἥθος to prove his point. Instead of presenting a tension between Philip's Athenian-like actions and his barbarian λόγος, Demosthenes here turns to a new contrast between Philip's "Athenian" activity and his (barbaric) role as monarch. Rather than employing a λόγος/ἔργον dichotomy, Demosthenes focuses attention on the institutional differences between democracy and monarchy. This focus on the differences in governance between Macedonia and Athens is, of course, in keeping with the orientation of the *Olynthiacs* as a whole. Ultimately, Demosthenes argues in *Olynthiac* II that a monarch (like Philip) who pursues democratic virtues on the battlefield will cause strife among his people and destabilize his own rule. Politically, Philip's role as a monarch harms rather than helps him.

I begin with a key section of the speech which redeploys a *topos* Demosthenes had previously used in the *Against Aristocrates* (see above, 78-80).²⁴³ A comparison of the two highlights Demosthenes' innovative claims about Philip's ἥθος. In the *Against Aristocrates*, Demosthenes had painted a scathing portrait of Philip:

ἴστε δήπου Φίλιππον, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τουτονὶ τὸν Μακεδόνα...
 μικρὰ λαμβάνειν καὶ τοὺς ἀπίστους φίλους καὶ τὸ κινδυνεύειν ἀντὶ
 τοῦ μετ' ἀσφαλείας ζῆν ὁρᾶτε προηρημένον αὐτόν. τί δὴ ποτ'
 αἴτιον;... οὐδ' ἔχει τῶν εὖ πραττόντων οὐδεὶς ὄρον οὐδὲ τελευτὴν
 τῆς τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν ἐπιθυμίας.

You know that Macedonian, Philip, Athenians... you see that he has chosen small gains, faithless friends, and danger instead of living in safety. What is the reason?... the successful know no bounds in their desire for gain. (*Dem.* 23.111-2)

Demosthenes here stresses the enormity of the risks Philip accepts in return for the slightest of gains. The inequality of this exchange serves to show the insatiable greed

²⁴³ The *topos* will appear for a third time in the *Crown* speech. See below, pp. 178-82.

[πλεονεξία] which compels Philip into extraordinary and foolish risk-taking.²⁴⁴ Philip's greed casts him in the standard mould of the barbarian king who ignores all wise advice in pursuit of his megalomaniacal goals. There are two shifts of focus that occur between the *topos* as deployed in the *Against Aristocrates* and as reused in *Olynthiac II*. First, in *Olynthiac II* Demosthenes redefines the object of Philip's desire as a goal worthy of the greatest risks, which ennobles Philip's struggle; and secondly, Demosthenes emphasizes Philip's role as king, in keeping with his overall interest in governmental structure in the *Olynthiacs*. The consequent confrontation between Philip's pretensions to a Greek ideal and his role as monarch complicate his characterization as typical barbarian king.

Demosthenes argues, in contrast to the prevailing opinion in the city, that Philip's subjects are becoming restive. He turns to the king's ἦθος for proof:

Μὴ γὰρ οἴεσθε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῖς αὐτοῖς Φίλιππον τε χαίρειν καὶ τοὺς ἀρχομένους, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν δόξης ἐπιθυμεῖ καὶ τοῦτο ἐζήλωκεν, καὶ προήρηται πράττων καὶ κινδυνεύων, ἂν συμβῆ τι, παθεῖν, τὴν τοῦ διαπράξασθαι ταῦτα ἃ μηδεὶς πώποτε ἄλλος Μακεδόνων βασιλεὺς δόξαν ἀντὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἀσφαλῶς ἠρημένος· τοῖς δὲ τῆς μὲν φιλοτιμίας τῆς ἀπὸ τούτων οὐ μέτεστιν, κοπτόμενοι δὲ ἀεὶ ταῖς στρατείαις ταύταις ταῖς ἄνω κάτω λυμποῦνται καὶ συνεχῶς ταλαιπωροῦσιν.

For you must not think, Athenians, that Philip and his subjects do well in these affairs; but he desires a reputation and he strives for this end, and he would choose to be pained, should it so happen, while toiling and endangering himself, since he chooses a reputation for doing what no other Macedonian king has ever done instead of living in safety. But those who do not get a share in the honor from these [victories] are completely wretched because they are constantly beaten down and harassed in the army marching up and back. (*Dem.* 2.15-16)

Instead of the small gains and faithless friends that he had striven for in the *Against Aristocrates*, here we find Philip grasping after a reputation [δόξη] and even honor

²⁴⁴ The putative choice between toilsome war and quiet peace is also part of Philip's characterization in *Philippic I* (4.4-5). See above, pp. 85-89.

[φιλοτιμία]. Demosthenes has thus valorized Philip's motives. Indeed, the rearticulation of the *topos* transforms Philip into a kind of ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός, who was commonly portrayed choosing the renown dependant upon heroic death instead of obscure safety.²⁴⁵ The heroic ideal of the ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός was co-opted into the ideology of democratic Athens most prominently in the funeral oration, where it became the vehicle for extolling the community rather than the individual.²⁴⁶ Demosthenes has thus staged a confrontation between Philip's democratic pursuit of glory and his monarchic politics. His language heightens the tension: the lengthy delay of δόξη in the participial clause and its final placement next to his allusion to Philip as Macedonian king, stresses the unusualness of a king – and a Macedonian one, no less! – in pursuit of such a noble aspiration [τὴν τοῦ διαπράξασθαι ταῦθ' ἄ μηδεις πρόποτ' ἄλλος Μακεδόνων βασιλεὺς δόξαν ἀντὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἀσφαλῶς ἡρημένος].²⁴⁷ Demosthenes' imagery would have been striking to the ears of an audience used to having the heroic ideal applied to themselves and their own war dead. I begin by exploring the cultural context against which Demosthenes' used the paradigm of the ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός, followed by the new understanding which this insight brings to Philip's characterization in *Olynthiac* II.

In the fourth century καλοκάγαθία came to designate a constellation of virtues that defined the ideal male citizen, the ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός.²⁴⁸ These virtues were enshrined

²⁴⁵ On the heroic exchange of death for renown see for example *Il.* 12.310-328; see Gregory Nagy, *The Best of the Achaeans: Concepts of the Hero in Archaic Greek Poetry* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), chs. 9 and 10.

²⁴⁶ See Loraux, *Invention of Athens*, especially ch. 2.

²⁴⁷ I also note Demosthenes' later gibe that Macedonians don't even make useful slaves (*Dem.* 9.31)

²⁴⁸ On the history of the καλὸς κάγαθος see F. Bourriot, *Kalos Kagathos – Kalokagathia* (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1995). While it began as a Spartan term and, in the 5th century, was used of a certain class of aristocrats, in the 4th century it was co-opted by democratic sources as a term for civic virtue unattached to a particular class. So Demosthenes uses καλοκάγαθία of the average πολίτης: 18.278, 18.306, 21.218, 40.46.

and disseminated through the institutionalized ἐπιτάφιος λόγος, whose purpose was to substantiate the everlasting glory which the dead had gained for themselves and, in turn, for their city (*Dem.* 60.2). The rhetoric that Demosthenes uses to describe Philip at 2.15-16, which juxtaposed a peaceful life with the pursuit of glory, is common to the ἐπιτάφιοι λόγοι. So Pericles, for example, says that the war dead considered suffering better than saving themselves and thought that in death they had not merely escaped reproach but rather reached the pinnacle of glory (*Thuc.* 2.42.4). Again, Demosthenes in his funeral oration over the dead at Chaeronea asserts that the fallen were afraid of being shamed and therefore chose a noble death instead of a disgraceful life (*Dem.* 60.26).²⁴⁹ The formulaic juxtaposition of the choice between a peaceful life and glory in death that Demosthenes uses at *Olynthiac* 2.15-16 thus situates Philip's pursuit of honor within the familiar context of the ἐπιτάφιος λόγος.²⁵⁰

Yet employing the language of the funeral oration for a subject such as Philip is – and was clearly supposed to be – disconcerting. The choice between a life of shame or a glorified death, like the ἐπιτάφιος λόγος as a whole, was closely connected to an Athenian, democratic context.²⁵¹ Demosthenes, for example, in his own ἐπιτάφιος λόγος insists that the nobility of the dead was instilled in them by the democratic principles of their government:

²⁴⁹ See also *Lys.* 2.24-25.

²⁵⁰ See Ryan K. Balot, “Pericles’ Anatomy of Democratic Courage,” *American Journal of Philology* 122 (2001): 505-525; Loraux, *Invention of Athens*, 101-104. On military prowess as a democratic virtue see Joseph Roisman, *The Rhetoric of Manhood: Masculinity in the Attic Orators* (Berkeley: University of California Press: 2005), ch. 5; Ryan K. Balot, “Courage in the Democratic Polis” *Classical Quarterly* 54 (2004): 406-423. Demosthenes rhetorical homage to the funeral oration is even more obvious in an expanded version of this same *topos* in *On the Crown*: see below, 175-182.

²⁵¹ So Loraux, *Invention of Athens*, 16: “an epitaphios is... closer to the speech-memory of the aristocratic societies than to democratic speech-dialogue, and more directed toward action, [but] this oration is nevertheless a political speech, marked with the seal of democracy... the speech is an act of collective praise and... the speaker is officially appointed by the city.” See also Roisman, *Rhetoric of Manhood*, 133-4.

διὰ πολλὰ δ' εἰκοτῶς ὄντες τοιοῦτοι, διὰ τὴν πολιτείαν οὐχ ἥκιστ' ἦσαν σπουδαῖοι. Αἱ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τῶν ὀλίγων δυναστεῖαι δέος μὲν ἐνεργάζονται τοῖς πολίταις, αἰσχύνην δ' οὐ παριστᾶσιν· ἡνίκ' ἂν οὖν ὁ ἄγων ἔλθῃ τοῦ πολέμου, πᾶς τις εὐχερῶς ἑαυτὸν σώζει, συνειδῶς ὅτι, ἐὰν τοὺς κυρίους ἢ δώροισι ἢ δι' ἄλλης ἡστινοσοῦν ὀμιλίας ἐχαρέσῃται, κἂν τὰ δεινότατ' ἀσχημονήσῃ, μικρὸν ὄνειδος τὸ λοιπὸν αὐτῷ καταστήσεται.

It stands to reason that these men came to be so excellent for many reasons, but not least because of their form of government. For oligarchies inspire fear in their citizens, but they do not cause shame; so when battle approaches, each man coolly saves himself, knowing that if he appeases his masters with presents or with some other means, even if he should disgrace himself most terribly he will receive only a minor rebuke afterward. (*Dem.* 60.25)

The glory gained by a portion of the democratic citizenry on the battlefield redounded to the whole *polis*; the citizens of an oligarchy, on the other hand, have no such connection with their city. The renown of the citizen and of the democratic polity as a whole are intimately related in a way which, Demosthenes asserts, is simply not true for an oligarchic polity.²⁵² Only the democratic citizen could gain glory, and hence the status of ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός, by means of a glorious death.

If the pursuit of glory is incompatible with an oligarchic context, then it is doubly out of place in a monarchy. Demosthenes in the passage quoted above calls the leaders of an oligarchy the “masters” [τοὺς κυρίους] of the populace, creating a similar relationship between the citizen of an oligarchy and his polity as between Philip and his subjects. In so doing, he taps into a shared Athenian logic which ascribed moral and physical weakness to the citizen of a tyrannical government. Thus Herodotus explains

²⁵² This is also an argument that could just as well be used against tyranny: Demosthenes calls the leaders of an oligarchy the “masters” [τοὺς κυρίους] of the populace, in the same way that Philip is master of his people. So too Herodotus explained the military failure of the Pisistratid tyranny by citing the notion that none of the citizens wished to go to war for the benefit of the tyrant, while under the democracy everyone felt that they were struggling for their own (common) benefit [δηλοῖ ὧν ταῦτα ὅτι κατεχόμενοι μὲν ἐγελοκάκεον ὡς δεσπότη ἐργαζόμενοι, ἐλευθερωθέντων δὲ αὐτὸς ἕκαστος ἐωυτῷ προεθυμέετο κατεργάζεσθαι] (*Hdt.* 5.78).

the military failure of the Peisistratid tyranny by citing the notion that none of the citizens wished to go to war for the benefit of the tyrant; under the democracy, on the other hand, everyone felt that they were struggling for their own (common) benefit, and Athenian fortunes immediately improved (*Hdt.* 5.78). The success of the democracy is dependent upon each citizen's knowing that his action directly affects the community as a whole. In a tyranny or an oligarchy, however, the number of people who have this sense of being bound up with the community is smaller: in the oligarchy, only those in power would feel this sense; in the monarchy, only the monarch.²⁵³ The fact that the citizens of a tyrannical polity do not relate to the community in the same way as the tyrant leaves the latter in an odd position indeed. Philip's quest for glory may appear justified on the grounds that the king constitutes the state, just as the body of citizens constitute the state in a democracy; yet, by virtue of being the *only* one with such a relationship to the Macedonian state, the ἀγών in which Philip 'participates' is proved to be no real competition at all. Instead of promoting the overall nobility of the polity as the democratic ἀγών over glory would do, Philip ends by creating strife between himself, his subjects and his allies. His subjects grow weary of constant battle because the honor [φιλοτιμία] for which they are fighting is not their own (*Dem.* 2.16). Their concerns, which are in the private business and in trade – that is, outside the battlefield - are being harmed by Philip's heroic pretensions

²⁵³ Compare Euripides: "all of the barbarians are slaves except for one" [τὰ βαρβάρων γὰρ δοῦλα πάντα πλὴν ενός] (*Eur. Helen* 276). Also Aristotle:

ὅταν οὖν ἡ γένος ὅλον ἢ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἓνα τινὰ συμβῆ διαφέροντα γενέσθαι κατ' ἀρετὴν τοσοῦτον ὥσθ' ὑπερέχειν τὴν ἐκείνου τῆς τῶν ἄλλων πάντων, τότε δίκαιον τὸ γένος εἶναι τοῦτο βασιλικόν καὶ κύριον πάντων, καὶ βασιλέα τὸν ἓνα τοῦτον.

So when a whole family or some individual from among the rest happens to be so outstanding in virtue as to surpass the rest, then it is just for this family to be kings and to rule over all, or for that one individual to be king. (*Pol.* 1288a17)

(*Dem.* 2.16). The Macedonian system of government is inherently at odds with Philip's attempt to win renown for himself.

Philip's relations with his allies are also made problematic because of his role as monarch. Demosthenes rejects the notion that simple force on Philip's part could ever tame populist opposition, claiming instead that a monarch can never hope for stability among his subjects:

Καὶ μὴν εἴ τις ὑμῶν ταῦτα μὲν οὕτως ἔχειν ἠγεῖται, οἶεται δὲ βία καθέξειν αὐτὸν τὰ πράγματα τῶν χωρίων καὶ λιμένων καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα προειληφέναι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς οἶεται. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ὑπὲρ εὐνοίας τὰ πράγματα συστήῃ καὶ πᾶσι ταῦτα συμφέροντα τοῖς μετέχουσι τοῦ πολέμου, καὶ συμπονεῖν καὶ φέρειν τὰς συμφορὰς καὶ μένειν ἐθέλουσιν ἄνθρωποι.

And if indeed any one of you thinks that this is the case - if he thinks that [Philip] will be able to control matters because he has seized lands, harbors, and the like - he doesn't think correctly. For when affairs are based upon good will and they are to the benefit of all who partake in the war, people wish to toil together and to bear misfortunes and to stay steadfast. (*Dem.* 2.9)

The reasoning behind the allies' insubordination mirrors that of the Macedonians themselves: neither party sees its interests advanced in the war. A lack of common purpose between Philip and one of his allies, the Thessalians, was already introduced in *Olynthiac* I. There Demosthenes claimed that the Thessalians did not wish to give Philip the profits from their trade "because it ought to go to the common benefit of the Thessalians, not be taken by Philip" [τὰ γὰρ κοινὰ τὰ Θεσσαλῶν ἀπὸ τούτων δέοι διοικεῖν, οὐ Φίλιππον λαμβάνειν] (*Dem.* 1.22).²⁵⁴ In short, they would not accept the

²⁵⁴ One of the six traditional problems posed by the *Olynthiacs*, as enumerated by Tuplin, "Demosthenes' *Olynthiacs*," 276-8, is the Thessalian question. Succinctly put, according to Demosthenes' description of events in *Olynthiac* I, the Thessalians are demanding back Pagasae, have prevented Philip from fortifying Magnesia, and refuse to give him the tax collected from their ports and markets (*Dem.* 2.22); yet in *Olynthiac* II, Demosthenes says that the Thessalians are only "now" discussing what they should do about Pagasae and are discussing what to do with Magnesia; he also does not mention taxes. *Olynthiac* III omits any mention of the Thessalians at all. Because Diodorus records that Philip made an expedition into

enslavement that governance by a monarch generally entailed (*Dem.* 1.23, 2.8).²⁵⁵ In *Olynthiac* II, Philip is thus left toiling for his own benefit without the support of either his subjects or his allies (*Dem.* 2.13). The very qualities which might have made him an ideal soldier in a democratic context have made him very much less than an ideal king.

The idea that Philip's pursuit of a good reputation is in fact detrimental to the kingdom is reinforced in a description of the Macedonian court that follows directly on the heels of the "ἐπιτάφιος" passage. Here Demosthenes argues against the idea that Philip's courtiers are in any way remarkable or worthy of fear:

οἱ δὲ δὴ περὶ αὐτὸν ὄντες ξένοι καὶ πεζέταιροι δόξαν μὲν ἔχουσιν ὡς εἰσὶ θαυμαστοὶ καὶ συγκεκριμένοι τὰ τοῦ πολέμου, ὡς δ' ἐγὼ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ χώρᾳ γεγενημένων τινὸς ἤκουον, ἀνδρὸς οὐδαμῶς οἴου τε ψεύδεσθαι, οὐδένων εἰσὶν βελτους. εἰ μὲν γὰρ τις ἀνὴρ ἔστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς οἷος ἔμπειρος πολέμου καὶ ἀγώνων, τούτους μὲν φιλοτιμία πάντας ἀπωθεῖν αὐτὸν ἔφη, βουλόμενον πάντα αὐτοῦ δοκεῖν εἶναι τάργα (πρὸς γὰρ αὖ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τὴν φιλοτιμίαν ἀνυπέρβλητον εἶναι).

The men at his court, both foreigners and his Companions, have the reputation of being wondrous and knowledgeable in warfare, but as I heard it from a man who had been in that land – a man not at all given to lying – they are no better than anyone else. For he said that, if there is a man among them who is experienced in war and battle, then Philip drives

Thessaly while the siege of Olynthus seems to have been still on-going (*Diod. Sic.* 16.52.9), it has been supposed (Ellis, "Order of the Olynthiacs," 110; Worthington, *Philip II of Macedonia*, 76-8; and more cautiously by Sealey, *Demosthenes and his Time*, 139) that *Olynthiac* III was delivered much later than the first two, after Philip's intervention in Thessaly. This is, however, an argument from silence and has been rightly condemned as such (J. L. Cawkwell, "The Defense of Olynthus," *Classical Quarterly* 12 (1962): 134). More pressingly, the trouble in Thessaly has appeared to some less drastic in *Olynthiac* II than in *Olynthiac* I (Ellis, "Order of the Olynthiacs," 110-1). But, as Eucken, "Reihenfolge und Zweck der Olynthischen Reden," 195 points out, the Thessalian situation serves different purposes in the two speeches, and this can explain their differences; moreover, I would add the argument that the description of the Thessalian situation in *Olynthiac* II could have been based on newer, more accurate information than that given in *Olynthiac* I. The Thessalian situation does not, therefore, necessarily suggest a particular order in which the *Olynthiacs* were delivered; nor does it help pinpoint when they were delivered during the year 349/8 BCE.

²⁵⁵ On Philip and the Thessalians see above, pp. 55-60. In the same vein is the Olynthians realization of the full import of the war: "for it is clear to the Olynthians that they are not now fighting for repute or for a piece of land, but concerning the ruin and enslavement of their fatherland" [δηλον γὰρ ἐστὶ τοῖς Ὀλυνθίοις ὅτι νῦν οὐ περὶ δόξης οὐδ' ὑπὲρ μέρους χώρας πολεμοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἀναστάσεως καὶ ἀνδραποδισμοῦ τῆς πατρίδος] (*Dem.* 1.5). Subjection to monarchy as enslavement is a leitmotif of anti-monarchic Greek sentiment from very early on (see Hall, *Inventing the Barbarian*, 57-60; 93-98).

him away because of his ambition [φιλοτιμία], since he wishes that all his successes be ascribed to himself (for among other things he is not to be outdone in his ambition [φιλοτιμία]). (*Dem.* 2.17-18)

Philip's φιλοτιμία, a source of contention between himself and his subjects, is here directly responsible for the poor quality of his companions.²⁵⁶ At the same time, Philip's status as king prevents him from pursuing glory in an appropriately agonistic context. For if the right setting for the struggle over good repute takes place within a community of equals, then it stands to reason that, in an unequal community such as a kingdom, the king should fear lest others attempt to position themselves as his equals by participating in the contest. Creating a real ἀγών over φιλοτιμία in which more than one contestant participated would place the king's supreme power in jeopardy; this is true not just of the common citizens, we now learn, but also of the aristocrats who are part of the king's coterie. By this reasoning Demosthenes proves that Philip's companions are not at all superior in the art of war; many of them are, in fact, nothing more than robbers, flatterers, lewd drunkards, and Athenian rejects (*Dem.* 2.19).

Demosthenes' rhetoric concerning Philip rests, therefore, on a paradox: the problems inherent in Philip's system of government, which must eventually lead to his downfall, come about because of his assumption of laudable democratic characteristics, that is, his pursuit of glory and honor. In a democratic context, Philip's pursuit of glory would have been praiseworthy; in a monarchic context, it spells his ruin. It is true that even in the midst of such ostensible praise Philip is not without faults that will also cause him trouble - in section 2.9, for example, Demosthenes adduces πλεονεξία and πονηρία

²⁵⁶ Again, Demosthenes' ideas concerning Philip's court are a far cry from the Macedonian reality; I note again, for example, Argead participation in the Macedonian Olympic games (see above, pp. 45-48) and the eclectic nature of Philip's court (see above, pp. 49-55). Disparaging Philip's associates, and in particular the Greeks who resided at Pella, seems to have been a common theme for those who disapproved of Philip: compare in particular *Theop.* F 224.

as the cause of the Macedonians' discontent. Yet it is notable that in sections 15-19, the central description of Philip in *Olynthiac* II - much of which reiterates an argument in the *Against Aristocrates* that *emphasized* Philip's greed – the argument from *πλεονεξία* is absent. Demosthenes reworked the *topos* in such a way as to highlight the unusual, even shocking, contrast between Philip's role as monarch and his assumption of Athenian democratic virtues. In doing so, he was able to provide proof that Philip was in fact not fearsome at all and, in so doing, counter the arguments of his opponents. The institutions of the Macedonian government themselves would cause the king's demise.

The Third Olynthiac: 349 BC

As *Olynthiac* II looked to the situation in Macedonia and abroad, *Olynthiac* III turns back inwards, toward the Athenians' own situation and in particular the state of the city finances.²⁵⁷ In many ways, however, it builds on the arguments concerning Philip begun in *Olynthiac* II, and, inasmuch as it contains no new interpretations of Philip I, I will deal with it quite briefly. In *Olynthiac* III Demosthenes imagines an Athens exactly counter to the picture of Philip and Macedonia he had painted in *Olynthiac* II. Philip and Athens are reassigned to their rightful characters – Philip as the loathsome barbarian, Athens as the noble hero striving for honor. Athens herself will only succeed against her enemy through that self-same consensus building which Demosthenes had shown to be lacking in the monarchic world of Macedonia (*Dem.* 3.35). *Olynthiac* III portrays the world as it had been in the (distant) past and as it ought to be in the future.

²⁵⁷ In particular, Demosthenes argues against the Theoric Fund (*Dem.* 3.11-13; 3.19-20; 3.33-35) as a welfare system which pays the Athenians for nothing; instead, he concludes, the citizens should be paid in equal proportion to the service they render to the city.

Olynthiac III presents Philip as the barbarian monarch and reassigns the role of the ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός back to the Athenian context in which it belongs. The conflict between Philip and Athens is presented unequivocally in terms of the Persian Wars. Demosthenes addresses Philip as a barbarian (*Dem.* 3.16; 3.24) and blames the Athenians for being more concerned with interhellenic wars than with their war against such an outsider (*Dem.* 3.20). Harking back to Philip’s inappropriate heroic modeling in *Olynthiac* II, Demosthenes exhorts the Athenians to look to their own Athenian 5th century past and specifically to their might during the Peloponnesian Wars for actions worthy of their emulation (*Dem.* 2.23-25). If in *Olynthiac* II Demosthenes pointed to the paradox inherent in Philip’s pursuit of an ethic of nobility, in *Olynthiac* III Demosthenes rightens the balance by employing encomiastic discourse for the Athenian heroes of old. Thus he claims that in the 5th century Athenians ruled over the other Greeks willingly, that they had more than 10,000 talents collected in the Acropolis, and that the Macedonian king obeyed them; they alone among men left a reputation [δόξαν] through their deeds that was superior to envy [μόνοι δὲ ἀνθρώπων κρείττω τὴν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔργοις δόξαν τῶν φθονούντων κατέλιπον] (*Dem.* 3.24).²⁵⁸ The 5th century Athenians, again, are the ones who gained honor through many and good dangers [οἱ πρόγονοι τῆς ἀρετῆς μετὰ πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν κινδύνων κτησάμενοι], leaving their descendants with the duty to do the same (*Dem.* 3.36). Indeed, Demosthenes claims that the 4th century Athenians did have the chance of regaining their supremacy among the Greeks after the battle of Mantinea; instead of making good on this opportunity,

²⁵⁸ For comparison see *Thuc.* 2.45. See Hernandez-Munoz, “Tucídides y Platón,” 153.

however, they sat back and allowed Philip to gain power (*Dem.* 3.27-8) – a barbarian from the outside, who has no right to vie for supremacy in the Athenian world.

Thus *Olynthiac* III once again portrays Philip as the ultimate outsider who has no business meddling in Greek affairs alongside the Athenians, the Spartans, or the Thebans. The parameters of the ἀγών for supremacy lie firmly among the foremost of the Greek *poleis*, and among the citizens of these *poleis*. Having thoroughly derided Philip's modeling of Greek agonistic heroism in *Olynthiac* II, Demosthenes now reaffirms the Athenians' right, as Hellenes with a first-rate pedigree, to participate in that contest.

Conclusion

The close of *Olynthiac* III marks a convenient pausing point in a survey of the public rhetoric concerning Philip. It is the last speech to have been written before the Peace of Philocrates, which indelibly changed Athenian relations with Macedonia. Equally as important, the negotiations for the peace served as an opportunity for several prominent Athenian politicians, Demosthenes among them, to personally travel to Macedonia and meet Philip. As I have argued, Demosthenes' pre-peace Philip represents not so much the realities of Macedonia and its king as the norms of the Athenian world in which and to which Demosthenes was speaking. As well, his authority in discussing foreign affairs was founded for the most part on his own capacity for unique insights rather than personal experience. Demosthenes' trip to Macedonia would add a historiographical dimension to his rhetoric after the negotiations: he could now bolster his claims through the use of (ostensibly) personal information and anecdotes. Another key distinction between the pre- and post-peace period lies in the nature of our sources. The majority of the speeches concerning Philip's character from the post-peace period come

from forensic rather than deliberative rhetoric. The forensic debates between Demosthenes and Aeschines, in particular, feature a vast array of dramatic episodes with an *ethopoieic* focus – whether on the character of Aeschines, or Demosthenes, or Philip.

Demosthenes' use of Philip in the speeches thus far has not been static, and the portrait that emerges of the king cannot, therefore, be treated as a monolith. Rather, the particular interests of the individual speech have dictated the way Philip's ἦθος is portrayed: thus, broadly speaking, the interest of Philip's character in *Philippic* I lies in the impropriety of his 'Athenianness', while in the *Olynthiacs* his role as king is Demosthenes' primary concern. In both, however, Philip becomes a model for the Athenian *demos*. Philip is a blank canvas on which political theories can be 'tested': what is the best way to enact a political decision? What virtues don't belong in Macedonia, but rather in Athens? What does the orator need to know in order to give correct advise to the *demos*? In sum, Philip has served as a convenient model for Demosthenes to explore the things that interest him as an Athenian politician: the role of Athens in the outside world and the role of the orator himself on the *bema*.

Philip is a model for the Athenian *demos*, who need to regain the will to action which they had lost and which Philip has assumed in their place. In both the *mundus perversus* of *Philippic* I and in the *Olynthiacs*, and particularly *Olynthiac* II, Philip adopts the agonistic virtues which epitomize the aristocratic hero and the Athenian democracy of the 5th century. Yet, as Demosthenes shows, Philip is not a collective, and so is prone to the faults which typify the aristocrat. Thus he is also the ὑβριστής motivated by a personal rather than a communal agenda. His relations with those around him falter, in short, precisely because of his aristocratic inclinations.

As a monarch, Philip's role in the polity stands in contrast to Demosthenes' own role as an leader of the *demos* (albeit only an aspiring leader up to this point). Rejecting the view that politics is an individual contest for glory, Demosthenes establishes a role for himself as the mediator and interpreter for the *demos*. He is a privileged, because knowledgeable, observer who can see beyond the surface of events and into their inner causes; because of this ability he can temper Philip's invincible exterior, evident to all, with an insider's view of the king's personal faults, visible only to Demosthenes and to those who can see truly [τὶς ἄν... δίκαιος λογιστῆς] (*Dem.* 1.11). Demosthenes' stress on his own unique position in these early speeches paves the way for his later narrative of a personal contest between himself and Philip as leaders of their respective states. Where Philip fails to mediate between himself as an aristocratic individual and the collective (that is, his subjects), Demosthenes, by the very act of rising to the *bema*, will come to embody the proper symbiosis between the individual and the *demos*.

Chapter 4: Philip in the Political Discourse from 346-330 BCE

Introduction

This chapter turns from the early speeches concerned with the Macedonian question to those composed after the Peace of Philocrates. The negotiations over the peace agreement mark a watershed moment in my study for a number of reasons. First, it has historical significance because it marked a critical moment in the growth of Philip's power in Greece: in the year 346, partly because of the Peace of Philocrates, Philip established a presence in central Greece and his right, as a newly minted member of the Amphictyony, to participate in the Greek world. As Philip's involvement in interstate Greek politics seems to have been precisely what the Athenians were hoping to avoid, the Peace of Philocrates also saw a break in the Athenian political rhetoric concerning the Macedonian question. Where before Philip had been a distant figure, of growing but not central importance, in the aftermath of the year 346 Philip became a pressing problem whose presence was made all the more real by the fact that during the negotiations over the peace a number of Athenian politicians, among them Demosthenes, met the king in person for the first time. Along with these historical considerations, the Peace of Philocrates marks an important turning point in the sources we have for this period. While thus far our knowledge of Philip's ἦθος has come exclusively from the speeches of one orator, Demosthenes, and almost exclusively from deliberative oratory, after the peace we have speeches from other orators alongside those of Demosthenes that bear on the issue, including examples from all three types of oratory – deliberative, forensic, and

epideictic.²⁵⁹ Our field of vision into the debate over Philip's character thus expands exponentially. The plethora of differing sources requires a change in approach. This chapter will be much more thematic than chronological in scheme, composed of two sections, the first of which will look at pro-Macedonian rhetoric as represented in the speeches of Aeschines, and a second which looks at the anti-Macedonian rhetoric of Demosthenes. The latter section will pick up on issues of Philip's ἦθος, such as his role as monarch and his assumption of properly Athenian qualities, which we have already seen in Demosthenes' rhetoric in the previous chapter.

Thus far I have argued that Demosthenes' description of Philip presented a model of civic government and national ἦθος which allowed him to ask uncomfortable questions of his Athenian audience. In *Philippic I* Demosthenes portrayed Philip usurping the Athenian national character in order to show the Athenians their own faults; in the *Olynthiacs* he focuses on the way Philip's monarchy was paradigmatically at odds with Athenian democracy. Philip is consistently presented in relation to the Athenian *demos* – most prominently as its enemy and its antithesis, though at times also as a usurper of its ancestral role and character. The Philip of the speeches that are the focus of this chapter is fundamentally different. We will see the king take on an individual as well as a national identity; he is Philip the man as well as Philip the embodiment of the Macedonian state. This shift in focus may be due to the fact that forensic, as oppose to deliberative, speeches comprise the body of evidence for this chapter. For forensic discourse is naturally concerned with individuals and private contests - to which national questions, while they may be the catalyst for a trial, are nevertheless secondary – and so it

²⁵⁹ Speeches concerning Macedonia have survived from both Aeschines and Hyperides. Dinarchus also makes some mention of Philip, but only in a cursory way.

should come as no surprise that Philip, an important individual player in the narrative of these speeches, is treated with a descriptive care not shown in deliberative oratory.²⁶⁰

Both Aeschines and Demosthenes posit an agonistic relationship between themselves and Philip. The nature of this contest, however, is in each case vastly different and their characterizations of Philip are therefore equally dissimilar. Aeschines and the pro-peace ambassadors portrayed Philip as an orator and their contest with the king as a political altercation no different from normal political debate in the *ekklesia*. Philip is portrayed as conversant with Athenian norms and *mores*. In other words, Aeschines and the ambassadors describe Philip on the model of an Athenian politician and their debate with him as if it were an altercation between Athenian orators. Portraying Philip in the guise of an Athenian speaker served to make him readily accessible to Aeschines' and the ambassadors' Athenian audience. The *demos* needed no special knowledge to analyze Philip beyond that which they had naturally as citizens in a participatory democracy.

In contrast to Aeschines and the pro-peace ambassadors, Demosthenes distances Philip so far from Athenian norms of discourse that he ultimately becomes not merely non-Athenian and non-Hellenic, but actually inhuman. Demosthenes' contest against Philip is worlds away from that of two opposing orators in the *ekklesia*. Because

²⁶⁰ There are a number of factors which may influence this contrast between forensic and deliberative oratory. First, there is an important element of the dramatic in the forensic speech which ties it to drama and may factor into the greater focus on individual character: see Hall, "Lawcourt Dramas," 45-54. Forensic speeches crafted for political suits also had more allotted time, as befit the higher stakes of the contest. On types of lawsuits and their relative importance in terms of time and possible penalty see Hansen, *Athenian Democracy*, 191-196. It is also possible that the deliberative speeches as we have them were rougher sketches of what the orator would have said than the forensic speeches, and that details would have been added in speech that are simply not there in writing (on some problems of editing oratory see above, pp. 3-5). Similarly, Fortenbaugh, "Aristotle on Persuasion," 231, speculated that Aristotle omitted to mention character assassination in the *Rhetoric* because it had more to do with forensic rather than deliberative oratory.

Demosthenes' Philip is more sinister in his role as barbarian, monarchic Other, Demosthenes concludes by imagining himself as an extraordinary leader who is much more than just an orator. His latter speeches thus further develop and radicalize a theme already present in his' earlier rhetoric: the Athenians stand in need of a wise advisor – Demosthenes – who can truly see and understand Philip. For Demosthenes, placing Philip so far outside of Athens also necessitates - at the same time as it explicates - his characterization of himself as a leader who stands above the normative democratic system.

The King as Orator

It seems that even before the fall of Olynthus, during the summer of 348, Philip had indicated his interest in an alliance with Athens.²⁶¹ After Olynthus fell that autumn, the actors Aristodemus and Ctesiphon, sent on separate occasions to Philip's court, returned with the news that the king was interested in concluding peace with Athens.²⁶² The Athenians, however, were of two minds about how to receive such protestations of good-will. Philocrates proposed that Philip be allowed to send a herald and ambassadors to Athens, but was indicted as soon as the motion passed. With help from Demosthenes,

²⁶¹ Philip's interest in peace was intimated to the Athenians by an embassy from Euboea (*Aeschin.* 2.12), another area where Philip's influence had been growing, to the detriment of traditional Athenian interests: see Brunt, "Euboea in the Time of Philip II" and G. L. Cawkwell, "Euboea in the Late 340's," *Phoenix* 32 (1978): 42-67. Philip's sincerity in offering peace, however, has been questioned: see in particular Ryder, "Diplomatic Skills of Philip II;" Markle, "Strategy of Philip II;" Cawkwell, "Peace of Philocrates Again."

²⁶² The details of these missions are related by Aeschines (2.12-2.17). In the first instance, an Athenian, Phrynon, was captured by pirates and after his release by Philip persuaded the Athenians to send Ctesiphon along with himself back to Macedon to recover his ransom money. Aristodemus was sent by the assembly to negotiate for the release of the Athenian prisoners captured at the fall of Olynthus. On the relative chronology of these embassies, see Badian and Heskell, "*Aeschin.* 2.12-18."

whose rationale for supporting the peace effort remain obscure, Philocrates was acquitted and drafted a decree for the selection of ten men to the embassy.²⁶³

The stakes in the peace negotiations between Philip and Athens were particularly high due to both parties' involvement in the Third Sacred War.²⁶⁴ Philip, who had already defeated the Phocians once on behalf of the Amphictyony at the battle of the Crocus Field, was now again turning his attention southward. Although Phocis was still nominally Athens' ally, it was becoming an increasingly embarrassing liability for the Athenians as the Phocian leadership plundered the sacred treasury at Delphi to pay for its mercenary armies. A peace treaty with Philip would have indicated that Athens was disassociating itself from the Phocians' cause.²⁶⁵ In practical terms, it would mean protection for Athens' other interests if the Phocians lost the war, as appeared increasingly likely. In the aftermath of Phocis' destruction, however, Athens' unhappiness with the Phocians was forgotten and the proponents of the peace would be accused of abandoning an Athenian ally.

Ten envoys, including Philocrates, Demosthenes, and Aeschines, were elected to travel north to Pella to meet with Philip in the spring of 346. They returned with favorable news and with Macedonian envoys who reiterated Philip's desire for peace. Once the treaty had been drafted, a second embassy was elected to travel north to receive

²⁶³ The events that led up to the peace, already complex in the original, are made even more difficult to piece together because much of our evidence comes from the conflicting accounts of Demosthenes and Aeschines in their speeches on the embassy after the peace had already fallen apart, in 343/2: for reconstructed accounts see most recently Worthington, *Philip II* pp. 82-99, but also Buckler, "Demosthenes and Aeschines;" Carrier, *Démosthène*, ch. 4; Sealey, *Demosthenes*, pp. 143-159; Hammond, *Philip II*, ch. 8.

²⁶⁴ On the Third Sacred War see above, pp. 44; 46-9.

²⁶⁵ Adding to the Athenians' discontent with the Phocians was the fact that the Phocians had refused to hand over Thermopylae to be defended by forces from Athens and Sparta after having asked the Athenians and Spartans to do so (*Aeschin.* 2.132-3). On the Phocians as a consideration for the Peace of Philocrates see Buckler, *Philip II and the Sacred War*, ch. 6 and Wolfhart Unte, "Die Phoker und der Philokratesfrieden," *Hermes* 115 (1987): 411-429.

Philip's and his allies' oaths. After some confusion and delay - Philip was off campaigning against King Cersebleptes of Thrace, another of Athens' fair-weather allies - the ambassadors obtained the necessary oaths and returned to Athens with both the news of their success and of Cersebleptes' fall. The Athenians at this time approved another of Philocrates' motions, which strengthened the peace agreement into an alliance. A third embassy, on which neither Aeschines nor Demosthenes served, was sent to inform Philip of the good news.

Demosthenes, though initially a proponent of the Peace of Philocrates, quickly distanced himself from it as the failure of Athenian hopes became increasingly apparent. He even initiated a prosecution against Aeschines in 345 BCE for misconduct on the Second Embassy. Aeschines countered by charging Timarchus, Demosthenes' ally, for prostitution. Aeschines won his case and Demosthenes' indictment lay dormant for three years before being finally brought to trial in 343/2 BCE. Philocrates had just fled into exile instead of facing a similar charge of treason, and Demosthenes must have felt that he could win his case against Aeschines in view of the rising tide of anger against the supporters of the Peace; prosecuting Aeschines would also conveniently remind the Athenians that he, Demosthenes, had repudiated his part in the negotiations. Thus the speeches on the Embassy, while critically concerned with the events of 346 BCE, were composed in the hindsight afforded by the year 343/2 BCE. In the event, Aeschines was narrowly acquitted.²⁶⁶

Toward the end of his speech *On the False Embassy*, Demosthenes summarizes his accusation against Aeschines. Demosthenes states that Aeschines, after having been

²⁶⁶ For the trial itself see Douglas M. MacDowell, *Demosthenes: On the False Embassy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 14-22.

bribed by Philip on the first embassy, came before the Athenian people with a series of claims. Aeschines' arguments convinced the *demos* to make peace under conditions that favored Philip. Demosthenes recounts Aeschines' purported speech, and concludes:

[ἔφη] εἶναί τε τὸν Φίλιππον αὐτόν, Ἡράκλεις, Ἑλληνικώτατον ἀνθρώπων, δεινότατον λέγειν, φιλαθηναϊότατον· οὕτω δὲ ἀτόπους τινὰς ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ δυσχερεῖς ἀνθρώπους εἶναι, ὥστε οὐκ αἰσχύνεσθαι λοιδορουμένους αὐτῷ καὶ βάρβαρον αὐτὸν ἀποκαλοῦντας.

[He said], by Heracles, that Philip himself was the most Hellenic of men, a wondrous speaker, a lover of Athens; but that there were some individuals so tasteless and surly in the city that they were not ashamed to slander him and call him a barbarian. (19.308)

Demosthenes focuses his audience's attention on three of Aeschines' claims about Philip: the king's Hellenic behavior, his speaking ability, and his love for Athens. Why is speaking ability on this list? The other two statements are readily understandable: Philip's Hellenic pretensions are clearly an argument against those orators (like Demosthenes) who "[slandered] him and [called] him a barbarian"; and claiming that Philip was friendly toward Athens is an equally self-evident argument that sought to build trust between Philip and the Athenians. An argument concerning Philip's ability to speak, however, seems, if not out of place, at least less important than Aeschines' other two claims. Yet as I will show, Philip's speaking ability was of critical importance for both Demosthenes and Aeschines in the Embassy and Crown debates. Demosthenes' inclusion of Philip's speaking ability alongside Hellenic identity and love for Athens as features of Aeschines' pro-peace rhetoric points to the importance of this aspect of the debate over Philip. It is with this in mind that I take Philip's speaking ability as a starting point for my discussion of Aeschines' *On the Embassy*.

In the abstract, Athenian civic ideology and later Greek political thought connected speaking ability to a Greek, and more specifically to an Athenian, identity. Thus for example post-classical rhetoricians located the origins of oratory, like Hellenic identity itself, in Homer. So too, Corax and Tisias were said to have invented the art of rhetoric because of the increase in litigation that followed the establishment of democracy in Syracuse (Cicero *Br.* 46-48).²⁶⁷ The story of Corax and Tisias showcases the close ties between rhetoric and democracy. Shortly after its creation rhetoric was brought to Athens, which rapidly became the uncontested center for the art.²⁶⁸ Praising a man for his speaking ability was thus closely connected to assertions of Hellenic – and, in Athens, Athenian – identity.²⁶⁹

Conversely, rhetoric was not generally thought to subsist outside of a Greek/Athenian, democratic setting. So Demosthenes could argue that when Aeschines spoke before the Amphyctions, he spoke to an audience “unaccustomed to speeches and without foresight for the future” [ἀνθρώπους ἀπείρους λόγων καὶ τὸ μέλλον οὐ προορωμένους] (18.149). Demosthenes’ claim, while in and of itself rather unbelievable, is a singular expression of the Athenians’ pride in their own expertise in

²⁶⁷ Cic. *Br.* 40, 50; Quint. *Inst.* 10.1.46; see G. A. Kennedy, “The Ancient Dispute over Rhetoric in Homer,” *American Journal of Philology* 78 (1957): 23-35; and A. J. Karp, . “Homeric Origins of Ancient Rhetoric,” *Arethusa* 10 (1977): 237-258.

²⁶⁸ The historicity of Corax and Tisias has rightly been questioned: see in particular Thomas Cole, “Who was Corax?,” *Illinois Classical Studies* 16 (1991): 65-84. On the early history of rhetoric more generally see Michael Gagarin, “Background and Origins: Oratory and Rhetoric before the Sophists,” in *A Companion to Greek Rhetoric*, (ed.) Ian Worthington (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 27-36; and Kennedy, *Art of Persuasion*, ch. 2.

²⁶⁹ In addition, exceptional rhetorical ability might be seen as both a product and a mark of high social status. Not all rhetors, certainly, were elite, but many of them were: see Hansen, *Athenian Democracy*, 271-4; cf. Ober, *Mass and Elite*, ch. 6. The Athenian elite could certainly afford the rhetorical education which their poorer compatriots could not: see Teresa Morgan, “Rhetoric and Education,” in *A Companion to Greek Rhetoric*, (ed.) Ian Worthington (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 303-319.

rhetoric.²⁷⁰ If even the Athenians' Greek neighbors could be considered ignorant of rhetoric, then non-Greeks were all the more readily branded as such. A lack of rhetorical knowledge was also associated with undemocratic contexts on the rationale that there was little need for the art of persuasion outside of a democratic context. Kings and tyrants did not need to persuade because they could command: we have already seen this forcefully argued by Demosthenes (*Dem.* 2.14-5). Such a dim view of a king's speaking ability is widely portrayed in popular sources.²⁷¹ Thus for example Herodotus' Xerxes does not need to persuade his court that going to war against Greece is a good idea; even though the Persians remain unpersuaded by his speech (*Hdt.* 7.8), their reluctance is superseded by the King's will.²⁷² Aeschines' ascription of rhetorical ability to Philip is particularly striking when viewed against this general lack of rhetorical skill ascribed to barbarians and monarchies in popular Greek ideology. I argue that describing Philip as a persuasive speaker familiar with the art of rhetoric also made him a familiar figure for the Athenian audience. Both Aeschines in 343/2 BCE and the ambassadors in 346 BCE had their own reasons for crafting Philip as an orator, but both had a vested interest in making Philip a sympathetic and approachable character.

For Aeschines, giving Philip a voice was a tactical consideration tied to the circumstances in which he found himself in 343/2 BCE: because of the Athenian disillusionment with the peace, instead of arguing that making peace was the best course

²⁷⁰ Thucydides' Pericles also lauds Athenian decision-making (2.40.3). See John Heath, *The Talking Greeks: Speech, Animals, and the Other in Homer, Aeschylus, and Plato* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), ch. 4, on the capacity for speech as central to Athenian male identity; also Deborah Levine Gera, *Ancient Greek Ideas on Speech, Language, and Civilization* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

²⁷¹ Though this was not the case in 4th century elite discourse on kingship, which argued that for a monarchy to be successful the king had to be responsive to his subject's desires and, by consequence, use means of persuasion alongside coercion: see for example Xenophon's *Hiero* or Isocrates' *To Nicocles*.

²⁷² Herodotus' constitutional debate, an anomaly, comes closest to democratic discourse in a barbarian context: persuasive speeches are given, after which votes for or against are cast (*Hdt.* 3.80-83).

of action, Aeschines claims that he ought not to take the blame for its lackluster results. By rights, he suggests, the failure of the peace was a *collective* Athenian failure. So, for example, Aeschines dares Demosthenes: “and indeed, if you wish, you will make this accusation against the assembly of other Athenians” [καίτοι ταύτην, εἰ βούλει, τὴν κατηγορίαν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων δημοσίᾳ κατηγορήσεις] (*Aeschin.* 2.164).²⁷³ If so, and the *polis* as a whole was to blame, then it was manifestly unfair for Demosthenes to single Aeschines out for punishment. Aeschines’ success in proving his argument depended on his ability to show that Philip was an artful manipulator who could, in fact, have completely taken in the ambassadors with his sweet-talking ways without the use of bribery, as Demosthenes had alleged. Instead of employing underhanded schemes to get his way, Philip had simply bested the ambassadors in a fair fight. It follows that if the Athenian people were to imagine that Philip was able to dupe some of Athens’ best politicians, then it would have been on their own footing – that is, in rhetoric. Aeschines’ narrative of the actual meetings between the ambassadors and Philip was designed to substantiate his characterization of Philip as an artful speaker.

Yet Philip’s speaking ability is not an argument that Aeschines crafted in a vacuum or for the sole purpose of this trial. The fact that, as we have seen, Demosthenes ascribed the use of this same ploy to Aeschines’ rhetoric of 346 BCE (*Dem.* 19.308) – at least three years before the delivery of the trial speech – proves that speaking ability was a major component of the original debate concerning the Peace. While it is true, then, that focusing on Philip’s speaking ability was part of Aeschines’ argument in 343/2 BCE,

²⁷³ Indeed, much of Aeschines’ case rests on delineating the limits of his power; thus he questions Demosthenes’ claim that he was responsible for Cersobleptes being cut out of the treaty because as a rhetor he had no authority to do so (*Aeschin.* 2.86); and, again, he argues that he did not have the authority to ‘disenfranchise’ Demosthenes by shouting him down in the *ekklesia*, as Demosthenes had claimed (*Aeschin.* 2.121-3; 19.23).

it was also a major part of the earlier debate in 346 BCE. We can discern the way in which a previously important theme shifted in emphasis and implication in reaction to new developments. For the ambassadors, crafting Philip's persona as that of an orator was a way of making him a familiar, even domestic figure for their Athenian audience. It gave Philip a persona that the Athenians, as avid frequenters of the *ekklesia* and the lawcourts, could judge in their own right on the same bases they would use in judging their own politicians. Philip the orator was a comfortable figure that could gain the Athenians' trust in way that Philip the barbarian king could never have done. For Aeschines in the year 343/2 BCE, presenting Philip as a consummate speaker who did not need bribery in order to get his way absolved the ambassadors from the suspicion of having been suborned by the king.

Aeschines structures his account of the embassy as a contest of words: between the ambassadors and Philip and also between the ambassadors themselves.²⁷⁴ On the one hand, the ambassadors participated in a competition with Philip over the terms of the peace; on the other hand, the ambassadors competed to see which one amongst themselves could deliver the best possible speech before their audience (that is, before Philip). Aeschines reports that even before the meeting with the king there was some fear among the ambassadors that Philip would get the better of them in the argument (*Aeschin.* 2.21).²⁷⁵ This fear was evidently not groundless, since in the aftermath of the embassy Aeschines would recount to the *demos* that Philip was a wondrous speaker [δεινὸς εἰπεῖν/λέγειν] (*Aeschin.* 2.43; 2.51), who spoke with a good memory

²⁷⁴ In much the same way, debate in the *ekklesia* could be envisioned in agonistic terms: see Roisman, *Rhetoric, Manliness and Contest* and James Fredal, *Rhetorical Action in Ancient Athens: Persuasive Artistry from Solon to Demosthenes* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2006), 22-35.

²⁷⁵ The embassy was also viewed as a conflict over the terms of the peace by Demosthenes: so, for example, he contrasts the success of the Athenian embassy with that of the Thebans (*Dem.* 19.139-142).

[μνημονικῶς] and ably [δυνατῶς] (*Aeschin.* 2.48).²⁷⁶ Aeschines' narrative of the actual meeting with Philip was crafted to corroborate such claims. After all the ambassadors had spoken in their turn, Aeschines describes Philip's response:

Ὡς δ' εἰσήλθομεν καὶ ἐκαθεζόμεθα, ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρὸς ἕκαστον τῶν εἰρημένων ἐνεχίρει τι λέγειν ὁ Φίλιππος, πλείστην δὲ εἰκότως ἐποίησατο διατριβὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἐμοὺς λόγους· ἴσως γὰρ οὐδὲν τῶν ἐνόητων εἶπεῖν, ὥς γε οἶμαι, παρέλιπον· καὶ πολλάκις μου τοῦνομα ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὠνομάζετο· πρὸς δὲ Δημοσθένην τὸν οὕτω καταγελάστως ἀπαλλάξαντα οὐδ' ὑπὲρ ἐνὸς οἶμαι διελέχθη.

After we came and sat down, Philip set out to say something in response to each of the speeches from the beginning, and of course he gave the greatest care to my speech; for I did not leave out, I think, nearly anything of what ought to have been said. And he often named me in his speech. But I think he did not make any rebuttal at all in response to Demosthenes, who had spoken so laughably. (*Aeschin.* 2.38)

Aeschines' narrative shows Philip to be μνημονικός in his ability to remember each speech in turn and δυνατός in the proper emphasis he places on replying to Aeschines' speech while entirely glossing over Demosthenes' failure. If the Athenian jury judging the case in 343/2 BCE were to judge based on the evidence given them by Aeschines, they too would have had to agree with his positive assessment of Philip's skill in rhetoric. Aeschines presents Philip as a consummate politician who could beat seasoned Athenian orators at their own game.

Aeschines' account further enhances both his own and Philip's rhetorical ability by placing it in contrast with that of Demosthenes.²⁷⁷ After a retelling of the speech he

²⁷⁶ Δεινὸς εἶπεῖν/λέγειν is the standard expression for a clever speaker – an orator *par excellence* – both in a good or in the bad sense. See Jon Hesk, “The Rhetoric of Anti-Rhetoric in Athenian Oratory,” in *Performance Culture and Athenian Democracy*, eds. Simon Goldhill and Robin Osborne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 201-230. On Philip's memory and his able speech cf. *Dem.* 2.277.

²⁷⁷ Demosthenes' failure is also the antithesis of Aeschines' own speech before Philip, which he recounts in glowing detail (*Aeschin.* 2.25-33); cf. Plutarch, *Demosthenes* 16.1. Needless to say, I find it hard to agree with T. T. B. Ryder, “Demosthenes and Philip II,” in *Demosthenes: Statesman and Orator*, ed. Ian Worthington (Oxford: Routledge, 2000), 60-2, who concludes, based on the fact that Demosthenes' *On the False Embassy* does not contain a rebuttal of Aeschines' allegation, that Aeschines' was a fair assessment of what actually happened; I hope to have shown by the end of my analysis that this episode should be

had delivered himself, and to which Philip would spend so much effort responding, Aeschines turns to the speech delivered by Demosthenes – the last of the ambassadors to speak.²⁷⁸ Having risen, Demosthenes is completely overwhelmed and manages only a few words before he is lost in silence. Philip has thus quite literally gotten the better of Demosthenes in an argument – so much so that Philip even takes pity on his opponent:

Φθέγγεται τὸ θηρίον τοῦτου προοίμιον σκοτεινόν τι καὶ τεθνηκός [δειλία], καὶ μικρὸν προαγαγὼν ἄνω τῶν πραγμάτων, ἐξαίφνης ἐσίγησε καὶ διηπορήθη, τελευτῶν δὲ ἐκπίπτει τοῦ λόγου. ἰδὼν δὲ αὐτὸν ὁ Φίλιππος ὡς διέκειτο, θαρρεῖν τε παρεκελεύτο καὶ μὴ νομίζειν, ὡσπερ ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις, διὰ τοῦτο [οἶεσθαί] τι πεπονθέναι, ἀλλ' ἡσυχῇ καὶ κατὰ μικρὸν ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι καὶ λέγειν ὡς πρείλετο. ὁ δ' ὡς ἅπας ἐταράχθη, καὶ τῶν γεγραμμένων διεσφάλῃ, οὐδ' ἀναλαβεῖν αὐτὸν ἐδυνήθη, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάλιν ἐπιχειρήσας λέγειν ταῦτὸν ἔπαθεν.

This brute, dying from cowardice, mouthed out some obscure proem, and having proceeded a ways into matters suddenly stopped and lost himself, finally completely deprived of words. Philip, seeing what had happened to him, told him to take courage and not to think that he had suffered a reverse because of it, as in the theater, but to calmly and little by little remember and speak what he had predetermined to say. But he, when once thrown off course and forgetting what he had written, was not able to righten himself, but in trying to continue speaking suffered the same reverse. (*Aeschin.* 2.34-35)

Demosthenes' inability to handle the pressure of the situation shows him to be the very opposite of a competent and professional orator; even those words he does manage to say are distinctly lackluster. Particularly when contrasted with Aeschines' speech Demosthenes effort appears to be an abject failure.

Philip, however, is also no mere silent auditor to Demosthenes' failing. Instead, he takes on the role of an indulgent teacher, patiently encouraging his frightened student

neither “a sad disappointment to historians” nor “fertile ground for psychologists” who seek material on Demosthenes' ability to extemporize (62), but rather another example of an orator hard at work building a particular *kind* of (rhetorical) reality.

²⁷⁸ Aeschines claims that the ambassadors spoke in order of age, from the oldest, Ctesiphon, to the youngest, Demosthenes (*Aeschin.* 2.22).

to continue with his lesson.²⁷⁹ His advice is worth unpacking in detail, as it has much to say not just about Philip’s role in the narrative but also about rhetorical training and preparation in Athenian ideology. I argue that Philip’s advice – to calm down and take the speech piece by piece, according to what Demosthenes had predetermined to say – is entirely appropriate and, moreover, showcases his knowledge of rhetorical craft. Philip’s suggestion resembles, for example, Aspasia’s rhetorical method in Plato’s *Menexenus*:

ΣΩ. Ἀσπασίας δὲ καὶ χθὲς ἠκροώμην περαινούσης ἐπιτάφιον λόγον περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων. ἤκουσε γὰρ ἅπερ σὺ λέγεις, ὅτι μέλλοιεν Ἀθηναῖοι αἰρεῖσθαι τὸν ἐροῦντα· ἔπειτα τὰ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμά μοι διήει, οἷα δέοι λέγειν, τὰ δὲ πρότερον ἐσκεμμένη, ὅτε μοι δοκεῖ συνετίθει τὸν ἐπιτάφιον λόγον ὃν Περικλῆς εἶπεν, περιλείμματ’ ἅττα ἐξ ἐκείνου συγκολλῶσα.

Socrates: But just yesterday I listened to Aspasia delivering a funeral oration on these very things. She had heard the story that you told, that the Athenians were going to choose their speaker; and then she discussed with me the sort of things he ought to say, some things off the cuff, and some that she had arranged beforehand - when, it seems to me, she composed the funeral oration which Pericles gave - encompassing what she had pieced together from it. (Plato, *Menexenus* 236 a-c)

Aspasia breaks up her speech up into smaller units in just the same manner as Philip counsels Demosthenes to do for ease of memory. Both Aspasia and Philip take for granted the fact that at least a part of a speech would have been considered, and perhaps memorized, before delivery: Aspasia divides her speech into ‘some things [spoken] off the cuff’ [τὰ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμά] and ‘some that had been arranged beforehand’ [τὰ δὲ πρότερον ἐσκεμμένη]; Philip in a similar vein counsels Demosthenes to speak as he had chosen beforehand [λέγειν ὡς πρεῖλετο]. Both acknowledge that there were parts of the speech that had been given previous consideration and were not created on the spur of the moment.

²⁷⁹ On oratorical schooling see Morgan, “Rhetoric and Education,” 303-309.

The suggestion made by both Philip and Plato that at least some part of a speech was spoken according to a prearranged plan is noteworthy. Most importantly, it implies that preparation before the delivery of a speech may not necessarily have been negatively perceived by Aeschines' Athenian audience. Athenians, certainly, valued the ability of the orator to speak with a passionate immediacy that was by definition antithetical to the long hours of care required for a *written* speech; but considering appropriate arguments and how best to frame did not necessarily involve any laborious memorization of exact wording.²⁸⁰ Neither Aspasia nor Philip reference writing as the medium for prior preparation. It is also probable that the amount of preparation that would have been acceptable may very well have differed according to the occasion of delivery: the strictures of a funeral oration, as in Aspasia's case, and of an ambassador's speech, as in Philip's, would have been known to the speaker before the event - unlike a situation in the *ekklesia*, where the *ὁ βουλόμενος* was, at least putatively, responding to information that was entirely new to him. There is therefore nothing inherently suspicious about Philip's suggestion that Demosthenes follow 'the prearranged plan' of his speech, and much that shows his knowledge of the preparations required of the orator.

Noteworthy too is the fact that while *Philip* makes no mention of writing, Aeschines, continuing the narrative in his own voice in the next section, *does* implicate Demosthenes in having written out his speech: he claims that despite Philip's advice Demosthenes is unable to continue "having once been thrown off track and having lost the thread of *what he had written*." [ὁ δ' ὡς ἅπασ ἐταράχθη, καὶ τῶν γεγραμμένων διεσφάλη] (emphasis mine) (*Aeschin.* 2.35). Philip himself, however, does *not* make

²⁸⁰ For the Athenians' attitude to rhetorical education and preparation, see Ober, *Mass and Elite*, 156-191; Yunis, *Taming Democracy*, 237-247.

any such accusation.²⁸¹ Rather, Aeschines' Philip is imagined to be familiar with rhetorical methods and with rhetorical mentorship; if Demosthenes failed even on his second attempt at speaking, it is because of his own lack of skill and not for any lack of useful advice from the king.

Philip is also quick to point out the benefit of making a speech in a private setting rather than in a public arena, where a single misstep could spell the politician's doom. He casts himself and his court as the antithesis of a crowd in the theater always ready either to be led by or to shout down an actor based on the pleasure it derived from his performance (*Aeschin.* 2.35). The comparison is particularly well suited to Philip's character because of his well-known interest in drama. However, the analogy does not need to be understood so narrowly. The close – sometimes too close – ties between the goings-on in the *ekklesia* and the theater appear often in Athenian discourse.²⁸² The theater and the *ekklesia* were also conflated in more immediate ways: political meetings were occasionally held in the theater and actors often crossed the boundary into politics in the late 4th century.²⁸³ The distinction Aeschines' Philip draws between himself and an

²⁸¹ An anecdote by Plutarch may be a later conflation of this 'proper' method of preparation and the improper use of writing: according to Plutarch, Demosthenes admitted that his speeches were neither completely written nor completely unwritten [οὔτε γράφας οὔτε ἄγραφα κοιμιδῆ λέγειν ὠμολόγει] (*Dem.* 8.5). On Demosthenes' ambiguous reputation in antiquity as an orator who finely crafted his speeches see Craig Cooper, "Philosophers, Politics, Academics: Demosthenes' Rhetorical Reputation in Antiquity," in *Demosthenes: Statesman and Orator*, ed. Ian Worthington (Oxford: Routledge, 2000), 224-245 and Yunis, *Taming Democracy*, 244-7. Lionel Pearson, "The Development of Demosthenes as a Political Orator," *Phoenix* 18 (1964): 95-109 and "The Virtuoso Passages in Demosthenes' Speeches," *Phoenix* 29 (1975): 214-230, are modern arguments for Demosthenes' development as an orator over the course of his career.

²⁸² Hall, "Lawcourt Dramas," discusses the influence of drama on forensic speeches. More generally on the connection between drama and political rhetoric see Anne Duncan, *Performance and Identity in the Classical World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), ch. 2; Josiah Ober and Barry Strauss, "Drama, Political Rhetoric, and the Discourse of Athenian Democracy," in *Nothing to do with Dionysios? Athenian Drama in its Social Context*, eds. John Winkler and Froma Zeitlin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 237-270. ; Victor Bers, "Tragedy and Rhetoric," in *Persuasion: Greek Rhetoric in Action*, ed. Ian Worthington (Oxford: Routledge, 1994), 176-195.

²⁸³ On the theater used as a place of assembly see Frank Kolb, *Agora und Theater, Volks- und Festversammlung* (Berlin: Gebr. Mann Verlag, 1981), 88-99. Aeschines came under fire from

audience in a theater could thus be understood not only in terms of his own predilections, but as part of a widely shared understanding of the parallels between the skill of the orator and the actor. In sum, Philip's advice to Demosthenes serves to establish his knowledge of an orator's craft and in so doing solidifies his role as a competent adversary for Aeschines and the other Athenian ambassadors. Aeschines has presented Philip as a character fully conversant with Athenian political debate and society.

The theater analogy also makes clear one of the peculiarities in Aeschines' narrative which arises from Philip's assimilation to the role of an orator: the king has a dual role in the rhetorical contest as both participant and audience. Inasmuch as the debate rests between the ambassadors and Philip over the terms of the peace treaty, Philip is an active participant; as audience and judge for each individual speech presented before him by the ambassadors, he also 'stands in' for the Athenian *demos*. That I divide Philip's role in this way ought not imply any inherent disjunction between the orator and his audience; the distinction between the two was always fluid, lasting for no longer than the duration of a speaker's speech, at which point in time he would be reabsorbed back into the collective. For Aeschines, certainly, Philip's dual role does not appear as a source of tension.

A passage from Hyperides' *Against Diondas*, however, shows that Philip's dual role as participant and auditor could sometimes be interpreted as a problem. In the *Against Diondas* Hyperides asks the jury to imagine what would happen if Philip were to

Demosthenes for having been an actor before he turned his talents to the *ekklesia*; Aristodemus (Aeschin. 2.15-19, 3.83, Dem. 18.21 19.12), Neoptolemus (Dem. 5.6, 19.12), and Ischander (Dem. 19.9, 303) were actors by profession but also involved in the peace negotiations with Philip; and Aristodemus and his troupe went to Thessaly and Magnesia to stir up hostility against Philip when the Peace of Philocrates had gone sour (Aeschin. 3.83). Actors also made good negotiators and ambassadors because their itinerant lifestyle would have made them known and welcome everywhere; while they made particularly good negotiators with Philip because of his love of theater, this was not the only cause in which they were employed.

bring a suit against the Athenians. As in Aeschines' *On the False Embassy*, Philip takes on two roles: he acts as both litigant and jury. The demarcation between a litigant and the jury - as opposed to the position of the orator in the *ekklesia* – was clearly defined, and Hyperides' does his best to highlight the impossibility of Philip taking on both roles:

Καὶ μὴν κάκειν(ο) σκέψασθε, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ παρὰ Φιλίππῳ συλληφθέντες ἡμεῖς ἐκρινόμεθα, τί ἂν ἡμῶ(ν) κατηγορεῖ; οὐχ ὅτι [Β]υζάντιον μὲν αὐτὸν ἐκωλύσαμεν λαβεῖν, τὴν δ' Ἐϋβοίαν ἀπεστήσαμεν, τὴν δὲ πρὸς Θηβαίους ὑπάρχουσαν αὐτῷ συμμάχίαν καθείλομεν, ὑμῖν δὲ συμμάχους ἐποιήσαμεν; τί δ' ἄν(τ)επάθομεν ἂν ὑπ' ἐκείνου; ἄρ' οὐκ ἂν ἀπεθάνομεν; ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι.

And look to this too, Athenians: if you were arrested and brought to court by Philip, what would he accuse you of? Would it not be that we prevented him from capturing Byzantium, that we made Euboea revolt, and that we destroyed his existing alliance with the Thebans and made them our allies? How would he punish us? Wouldn't we be killed? I certainly think so. (*Hyp. Against Diondas* 136r)

The effect Hyperides creates is quasi-comical – this is clearly no proper court of law because of the untenable conflation of Philip's role as both prosecution and jury.²⁸⁴

Philip's dual role is rather the dream job of the sycophant and base politician, who is regularly portrayed suborning the jury in order to secure a conviction.²⁸⁵ Hyperides'

Athenian jury is invited to equate themselves with Hyperides, the defendant, and equate Philip with Diondas, the unjust prosecutor who seeks to circumvent the law in order to assure his own victory. At the same time, Hyperides' imagined scene works because it presents Philip in a context and in a role that would have been familiar to his Athenian audience. Thus, like Aeschines, Hyperides presents a Philip who speaks out loud in the character of an - albeit morally wrong - orator. As we will see, this tactic of likening

²⁸⁴ See also *Dem.* 19.214, which imagines Aeschines defending himself against Demosthenes where Philip is the jury.

²⁸⁵ See for example *Dem.* 19.1; 21.4.

Philip to a (good or bad) orator is diametrically opposed to Demosthenes' characterization of Philip in the forensic speeches.

Philip's Appearance and Deportment

I have shown how Aeschines fashioned Philip as a knowledgeable speaker. Yet it may be argued that being an orator involved much more than the mere capacity to speak, or even the ability to speak persuasively. An orator also had to embody Athenian ideals of masculinity, power, and self-discipline to persuade his audience that his argument was worth listening to.²⁸⁶ His body and his life were on display and subject to debate by the audience; his social graces went hand in hand with his skill at addressing the crowd. He had to embody the model citizen whose example should be followed and any flaws in his lifestyle could provide ammunition for his opponents. So, for example, Aeschines virtually begins his attack on Timarchus by relating the story of his most recent act of gross misconduct:

Οὔτοσί δὲ οὐ πάλαι, ἀλλὰ πρώην ποτὲ ρίψας θοίμάτιον γυμνὸς ἐπαγκρατίαζεν ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, οὕτω κακῶς καὶ αἰσχρῶς διακείμενος τὸ σῶμα ὑπὸ μέθης καὶ βδελυρίας, ὥστε τοὺς γε εὖ φρονούντας ἐγκαλύψασθαι, αἰσχυνθέντας ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως, εἰ τοιοῦτοις συμβούλοις χρώμεθα.

This man at one time – not long ago, but just recently – ripped off his cloak and leaped about naked in the assembly, so badly and grossly was his body overcome by wine and lewdness, that the right-minded covered their eyes, ashamed that we have such a man as advisor for the city.
(*Aeschin.* 1.26)

Timarchus' lack of propriety in drink and deportment are given as proof of his inability to act as an appropriate σύμβουλος to the people. His body bears witness to his debauchery: Timarchus' unseemly lifestyle can literally be read from the repulsiveness

²⁸⁶ See Roisman, *Rhetoric of Manhood*, ch. 6; Fredal, *Rhetorical Action*, 32-35; Duncan, *Performance and Identity*, ch. 2. All these qualities beyond speaking ability that a good rhetor had to possess fall under the category of ἦθος in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* I.2.3-4.

of his body and in his mannerisms (*Aeschin.* 1.61, 189). One's appearance is proof positive of one's morality.²⁸⁷

To return to the *On the Embassy* speech, Aeschines' Philip excels not just in the art of speaking; the ambassadors, Aeschines insists, based their positive assessment of Philip on more than his words. During their report to the assembly they also spoke of Philip's pleasing "appearance" [τῆς ἰδέας αὐτοῦ] and his "drinking ability" [τῆς ἐν τοῖς πότοις ἐπιδεξιότητος] (*Aeschin.* 2.47). Personal appearance and drinking ability – that is, a man's deportment in a sympotic setting - were crucial features of a man's self-presentation.²⁸⁸ Consequently the ambassadors in their report, and Aeschines in his speech *On the Embassy*, presented Philip as a man fully conversant with Athenian norms of behavior in order to prove that he was a man the Athenians could trust politically. It is these qualities that I will consider below.

According to Aeschines it was Ctesiphon, the oldest of the ambassadors, who praised Philip's appearance. I have used Ctesiphon's remarks and their refashioning by Demosthenes previously as one example of a rhetor's possible method in replying to his enemies (pp. 13-16). Here, however, I would like to emphasize the substance of Ctesiphon's remarks. Aeschines relates that Ctesiphon aired his views on Philip's appearance twice, first at a private dinner party before the other ambassadors where he

²⁸⁷ It was, however, sometimes acknowledged that visual clues of a man's character could be difficult to read. So Aeschines says that Demosthenes and a certain general, both of whom argued on Timarchus' behalf, would claim that personal beauty in a youth should not be automatically suspect (*Aeschin.* 1.126; 133-4). See Fredal, *Rhetorical Action*, 157-172, for a lengthier explication of this passage as well as of Aeschines' characterization of Demosthenes in the *Against Timarchus* as rhetorical self-fashioning. See also Hesk's discussion of physiognomic deception: Jon Hesk, *Deception and Democracy in Classical Athens* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 219-27.

²⁸⁸ On male identity see the articles in Lin Foxhall and John Salmon, eds., *Thinking Men: Masculinity and its self-representation in the Classical Tradition* (London: Routledge, 1998); Roisman, *Rhetoric of Manhood*; Kenneth Dover, *Greek Popular Morality in the time of Plato and Aristotle* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), ch. 3; on various aspects of the symposium see the articles in Oswyn Murray, ed., *Sympotica: A symposium on the Symposium* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).

claimed that “in all his long life he has never seen such a pleasant and lovely fellow” [ἐν τοσοῦτῳ χρόνῳ καὶ βίῳ οὐ πώποθ’ οὕτως ἡδὺν οὐδ’ ἐπαφρόδιτον ἄνθρωπον ἔωρακῶς εἶη] (*Aeschin.* 2.42) and then in public before the *ekklesia* where he praised Philip’s “appearance” [τῆς ἰδέας αὐτοῦ] (*Aeschin.* 2.47). In terms of Philip’s actual body, calling Philip pleasing in his appearance would have been wildly out of keeping with his actual physical state. He had lost his right eye during the siege of Methone in 354; at some point – it is unclear whether this happened before or after the Peace of Philocrates - he would also sustain serious injuries to his collar-bone, arm, and leg.²⁸⁹ The resultant sight would hardly have come close to the Greek ideal - or anyone’s ideal - of physical beauty. If the Athenians knew anything at all about Philip’s appearance prior to the ambassador’s report, Ctesiphon’s description ought to have read as impossibility.²⁹⁰ That it did not – and that, in fact, it apparently seemed acceptable to Ctesiphon and the other ambassadors – warrants additional remark. Evidently Ctesiphon’s comments were not quite as incompatible with Philip’s physical state as they appear at first.

²⁸⁹ On Philip’s eye see *Dem.* 18.67, Theopompus *FGrH* 115 F 52, Marsyas *FGrH* 135 -6 F 16, col. 12 49-50. For a comprehensive list of Philip’s possible injuries see *Dem.* 18.67. It appears likely that the injury to Philip’s collar-bone is corroborated in Isocrates *Epistle* II 1-12, if both events are indeed to be dated to 345 or 344 BCE. See also Riginos, *The Wounding of Philip II of Macedon*, pp.103-119. Latter sources (Didymus *in Dem.* Ix 22, col. Xiii 3-7, Plutarch *Mor.* 331b and 739b no.4) suggest that Philip’s leg injury had made him lame.

²⁹⁰ Demosthenes, for example, mentions an apparently life-threatening illness suffered by Philip on his Thracian campaign of 351 BC (*Dem.* 1.11, 3.5), though this has never been conclusively identified with any one of the bodily injuries he received. We may also suppose that the Athenians who had previously gone on embassies to Macedon and, quite possibly, any Athenian prisoners kept for ransom in Macedon would have known and possibly talked about Philip’s appearance. While this constitutes very little in the way of proof, it seems to me hard to suppose that the ambassador’s report was the first time Philip’s appearance was brought up in the assembly.

In fact, to reduce Ctesiphon's remark to an estimation of mere outward beauty would be misrepresentative.²⁹¹ On the contrary, Ctesiphon's original claim was only vaguely physical and was chiefly meant to reassure the Athenians that Philip *looked* trustworthy. Ctesiphon conflated the physical with social/moral qualities, just as Aeschines had done when pointing to Timarchus' body as an indicator of his debauchery.²⁹² Ctesiphon's original remarks were founded on an entirely traditional linking of social *mores* with physical terminology. A substantiation of this reading is provided by a similar comment on the tyrant's appearance in Xenophon's *Hiero*. Hiero, tyrant of Syracuse, has complained to Simonides that being tyrant is a wretched state rather than the prized life of leisure and plenty that it appears to be. He has, in particular, claimed that he is unable to enjoy good company and that the tyrant's court breeds dissention, greed, and slavishness. Simonides disagrees, and adds the following:

ἀλλ' ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ καὶ ἐκ θεῶν τιμὴ τις καὶ χάρις συμπαρέπεσθαι ἀνδρὶ ἄρχοντι. Μὴ γὰρ ὅτι καλλίονα ποιεῖ ἄνδρα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον ἥδιον θεώμεθα τε ὅταν ἄρχῃ ἢ ὅταν ἰδιωτεύῃ, διαλεγόμενοί τε ἀγαλλόμεθα τοῖς προτετιμημένοις μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς ἐκ τοῦ ἴσου ἡμῖν οὔσι. Καὶ μὴν παιδικὰ γε, ἐν οἷς δὴ καὶ σὺ μάλιστα κατεμέμψω τῇ τυραννίδι, ἥκιστα μὲν γῆρας ἄρχοντος δυσχεραίνει, ἥκιστα δ' αἰσχροσ, πρὸς ὃν ἂν τυγχάνῃ ὁμιλῶν, τούτου ὑπολογίζεται. Αὐτὸ γὰρ τὸ τετιμηθῆναι μάλιστα συνεπικοσμεῖ, ὥστε τὰ μὲν δυσχερῆ ἀφανίζειν, τὰ δὲ καλὰ λαμπρότερα ἀναφαίνειν.

But it seems to me that respect and some kind of charm falls to the ruler from the gods. Not only does [tyranny] make a man more handsome, but we perceive him as being more pleasing when he rules than when he is a common citizen, and in conversation we take delight in those that are

²⁹¹ Aeschines' narrative about Demosthenes' parody of Ctesiphon is based on just such a mischaracterization of Ctesiphon's meaning: according to Aeschines, Demosthenes claimed that Ctesiphon's eulogy was better suited to a woman than Philip (*Aeschin.* 2.112). As I have argued earlier (pp. 14-16), part of Demosthenes' joke involved mistranslating Ctesiphon's original argument into purely physical terms and thereby degrading it; Ctesiphon's original words concerned a more general and ethically-motivated in nature rather than concerned with the king's actual physical appearance.

²⁹² As Simon Goldhill put it, "'stature' is a visible, social quality." Simon Goldhill, "The Seductions of the Gaze: Socrates and his Girlfriends," in *Kosmos: Essays in Order, Conflict, and Community in Classical Athens*, eds. Paul Cartledge et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 105.

more esteemed rather than those that are of the same rank as us. And indeed in matters of love, with respect to which you especially blamed the tyrant's situation, old age hampers the ruler least of all, and least of all is any ugliness set to the tyrant's account by whoever he happens to be conversing with. For the respect he gets itself adorns him, so that whatever is ugly is hidden, and whatever is beautiful appears more visible. (*Hiero* 8.4-6)

In arguing that the tyrant's social position makes even his body appear differently in the eye of the beholder, Xenophon's Simonides essentially agrees with the implicit underpinning of Ctesiphon's remarks on Philip: inner worth and status materially affect the way the body is viewed. Ctesiphon's claim that Philip's appearance was lovely adds to the overall impression the ambassadors presented the king as a figure who quite literally 'looked the part' of a trustworthy Athenophile.

In addition to praising Philip's rhetorical abilities and personal appearance, the ambassadors also voiced their approval of Philip's lifestyle and social manners. Specifically, Aeschines encapsulates this aspect of Philip's character by citing his "dexterity at drinking" [ἡ ἐν τοῖς πότοις ἐπιδεξιότης] (*Aeschin.* 2.47). To be wondrous at drinking could imply more than simply the ability to drink a lot, just as being beautiful encapsulated much more than simple physical appearance: Plutarch perhaps makes this clearer in his rendition of this same episode (*Dem.* 16) when he says the ambassadors praised Philip for being "a most suitable companion to drink with" [συμπιεῖν ἱκανώτατον] and thereby emphasizing the social aspect of the drinking party. When latter in Aeschines' narration Demosthenes dismisses the ambassadors' praise on the grounds that Philocrates could drink as much as Philip (*Aeschin.* 2.52), and then asserts to Philip's face that "I do not say... that you are a great drinking companion because I consider this to be praise for a sponge" [οὐκ εἶπον... ὡς δεινὸς συμπιεῖν, σπογγιάς

τὸν ἔπαινον ὑπολαμβάνων τοῦτον εἶναι] (*Aeschin.* 2.112), Demosthenes is comically degrading the ambassadors' original meaning to its lowest denominator.²⁹³ Being “a good drinker” implied much more than the simple ability to drink in great quantity and could therefore be politically significant.²⁹⁴

Philip was not the only one whose sympotic behavior was being narrowly watched. Macedonian symposia appear to have been particularly fruitful for Demosthenes and Aeschines as settings for morally deviant acts.²⁹⁵ We have already seen Demosthenes attack the lewdness and license of Philip's court (*Dem.* 2.18-9) in order to persuade the Athenians to help Olynthus. Indeed, such tales appear to have been more true to the reality of the Macedonian court than many other such stories.²⁹⁶ Yet the orators employed Macedonian excess to a characteristically Athenian end. Thus in the speech *On the False Embassy*, Demosthenes regales his audience with the tale of a banquet at the house of one Xenophon in Macedonia at which Aeschines in a drunken rage mocked and almost beat an Olynthian woman (*Dem.* 19.196-8).²⁹⁷ The combination of a foreign setting and an anti-democratic host serve as the corrupting influence that can

²⁹³ Philocrates was known for his drinking ability, hence Demosthenes' comparison (*Dem.* 19.46).

²⁹⁴ See James Davidson, *Courtesans and Fishcakes: the Consuming Passions of Classical Athens* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 147-59. On sympotic behavior in Comedy see also Nick Fisher, “Symposiasts, Fish-Eaters and Flatterers: Social Mobility and Moral Concerns in Old Comedy,” in *The Rivals of Aristophanes: Studies in Athenian Old Comedy*, eds. David Harvey and John Wilkins (London: Duckworth, 2000), 355-396.

²⁹⁵ Probably, of course, it was simply easier to set such outrageous acts in a foreign land, far away from the eyes and ears of the Athenian *demos*. On sympotic wrong-doing more generally see William John Henderson, “Men Behaving Badly: conduct and identity at Greek symposia,” *Akroterion* 44 (1999): 3-13. See also M. Noël, “‘Symposion’, ‘philanthrōpia’, et empire dans la ‘Cyropédie’ de Xénophon,” in *Φιλολογία: Mélanges offerts à Michel Casevitz*, eds. Pascale Brillet-Dubois and Édith Parmentier (Lyon: Maison de l’Orient et de la Méditerranée, 2006), on Cyrus' sympotic behavior in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*.

²⁹⁶ Philip's drunkenness, like that of the Macedonian royalty in general and his son Alexander in particular, was of legendary proportions: see Carney, “Symposia and the Macedonian Elite,” and above, pp. 53-54.

²⁹⁷ Demosthenes claims that he was the son of one of the Thirty Tyrants; Aeschines, however, claims that the man's name was Xenodocus, and that he was a Macedonian (*Aeschin.* 2.4, 153-158).

bring out into the open an inner depravity kept hidden within the bounds of Athens.²⁹⁸ Demosthenes' emphasizes Aeschines' immoral behavior by juxtaposing it with another sympotic story set in Macedonia. In the latter tale, a Greek by the name of Satyrus successfully begs Philip to release two Olynthian women into Satyrus' custody instead of selling them into slavery (*Dem.* 19.192-5). The sympotic setting is thus used by the orators to illuminate a man's social competency, which in turn provides a direct commentary on his inner worth.

While stories about Macedonian symposia highlight drunkenness, drinking too little could also fall under suspicion. Not drinking enough could give rise to accusations of hardness of character: thus Demosthenes complains that Philocrates accused him of being stubborn and stringent [δύστροπος καὶ δύσκολος] because he was a teetotaler (*Dem.* 6.30; cf. 19.46). Both extremes show that what might have concerned the Athenians about over- or under-drinking was not so much the quantity of drink in and of itself as the inappropriate social responses which each extreme was presumed to elicit: drunks were prone to acts of ὕβρις; the dry, such as Demosthenes, to severity. In light of this discourse, the ambassadors' praise of Philip's drinking becomes further clarified. Philip's good drinking behavior indicated his ability to maintain appropriate social interactions with others.

Deriving political relevance from social activity, however, was no sure-fire argument. It too was open to re-interpretation by one's opposition. Thus Demosthenes,

²⁹⁸ Heavy drinking, such as Aeschines supposedly engaged in at Xenophron's house, was also sometimes thought to reveal a man's true nature: see W. Rösler, "Wine and Truth in the Greek *Symposion*," in *In Vino Veritas*, eds. Oswyn Murray and Manuela Tecusan (Oxford: Alden Press, 1995), 106-112. Symposia, as private, elite settings, were also particularly open to suspicion by the *demos*: see Fisher, "Syposiasts, Fish-eaters, and Flatterers." See also Ann Steiner, "Private and Public: Links between Symposion and Syssition in Fifth-Century Athens," *Classical Antiquity* 21 (2002): 347-379, on the occurrence of elite symposiastic behaviors in public spaces.

for example, could brand the ambassadors gossip-mongers for discussing Philip's drinking habits (*Aeschin.* 2.49-50). An episode from Aeschines' earlier speech *Against Timarchus* is particularly illuminating in this respect. Aeschines complains of a recent altercation between himself and Demosthenes on the subject of a Macedonian banquet. The episode deserves note not only for its treatment of a Macedonian feast, but also for its complex layering of speech within speech:

ὡς γὰρ τὰς ἐμὰς εὐθύνας βλάπτων, ἄς ὑπὲρ τῆς πρεσβείας μέλλω δίδοναι, φησί με, ὅτ' αὐτὸς πρῶην πρὸς τὴν βουλὴν ὑπὲρ τοῦ παιδὸς Ἀλεξάνδρου διεξήει, ὡς ἐν τῷ πότῳ [ῆμῶν] κιθαρίζοι καὶ λέγοι ῥήσεις τινὰς καὶ ἀντικρούσει πρὸς ἕτερον παῖδα, καὶ περὶ τούτων ἂν δὴ ποτε αὐτὸς ἐτύγχανε γινώσκων πρὸς τὴν βουλὴν ἀπεφήνατο, οὐχ ὡς συμπρεσβευτήν, ἀλλ' ὡς συγγενῆ τοῖς εἰς τὸν παῖδα σκώμμασιν ἀγανακτῆσαι. ἐγὼ δ' Ἀλεξάνδρῳ μὲν εἰκότως διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν οὐ διείλεγμαι, Φίλιππον δὲ νῦν μὲν εἰκότως διὰ τὴν τῶν λόγων εὐφημίαν ἐπαινῶ· ἐὰν δ' ὁ αὐτὸς πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις γένηται, οἷος νῦν ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς ἐπαγγέλμασιν, ἀσφαλῆ καὶ ῥάριον τὸν καθ' αὐτοῦ ποιήσει ἔπαινον. ἐπετίμησα δ' ἐν τῷ βουλευτηρίῳ Δημοσθένει οὐ παῖδα ἐκθεραπέυων, ἀλλ' ἐὰν τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀποδέχησθε, ὁμοίαν νομίζων τὴν πόλιν φανήσεσθαι τῇ τοῦ λέγοντος ἀκοσμίᾳ.

For in order to harm my audit, which I am about to give concerning the embassy, he [Demosthenes] says that when, just lately, he was going on about the boy Alexander before the *boule* – talking about his playing on the cithara while we were drinking and reciting some speeches and debates with another boy – and when he was declaring whatever he happened to know about it to the *boule*, I grew angry at the jokes concerning the boy not as befitted a member of the embassy but as befitted a relative. It was not proper for me to discuss Alexander because of his youth, but I now properly praise Philip because of his auspicious words; and if he acts in deed towards us in accordance with his letters, he will make his own praise safe and easy. I found fault with Demosthenes in the bouleuterion not to flatter the boy, but because I thought that if you approved of such things, the whole city would appear to equal the speaker in impropriety.²⁹⁹ (*Aeschin.* 1.168-9)

²⁹⁹ Alexander's behavior in and of itself seems to be in keeping with Greek sympotic norms. Youths at symposia might entertain the group with lyre-playing and moralizing songs, and recitation would presumably serve the similar purpose of showing a boy's mastery of the rhetorical training he would need to take up his position as a (Greek) male. See J. M. Bremmer, "Adolescents, Symposion, and Pederasty," in *Symptica: A Symposium on the Symposion*, ed. Oswyn Murray (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 135-148 and Fredal, *Rhetorical Action*, 59-60.

Aeschines' argument is predicated on the Athenians' interest in Macedonian sympotic behavior as an important component of the debate concerning the peace treaty: Demosthenes' original account of the Macedonian banquet took place before the *boule*, though in what specific context we do not know.³⁰⁰ It appears, at all events, that Demosthenes was making some sort of sexual joke aimed at Alexander, doubtless as a means of disparaging Philip and Macedonia as a whole. In so doing he opened himself to the criticism of being a gossip, just as he himself had criticized the ambassadors for their character sketch of Philip (*Aeschin.* 2.49-50). Aeschines' critique of Demosthenes' joke is made precisely on these grounds: he questions the relevance of the story and attempts to redirect the focus back to Philip and the peace process. Like the ambassadors' description of Philip, however, Demosthenes' story had claim to immediate relevance as a tale that impugned the elite status of a member of the Macedonian royal family and, therefore, Macedonian social norms in general.³⁰¹

Aeschines' rebuttal of Demosthenes' story in the *boule*, as well as his narrative of the episode in the speech *Against Timarchus*, portrays Demosthenes as a typical boor who lacks refinement and learning [ἄμουσός τις οὗτος καὶ ἀπαίδευτος ἄνθρωπος ἐστὶ] (*Aeschin.* 1.167). According to Aeschines, Demosthenes derives an inappropriate pleasure from Alexander's performance and is wrong to put the boy on display before a group of grown men. The boy's age, Aeschines claims, ought to prevent his name and his actions from being bandied about in public. By stressing Alexander's young age – Aeschines calls him a παῖς five times over the course of the anecdote – he reinforces the

³⁰⁰ Demosthenes was a member of the *boule* in the year 347/6 (*Aeschin.* 3.62).

³⁰¹ On the role of unofficial reports in the workings of the Athenian democracy see Lewis, *News and Society*, ch. 4.

inappropriate nature of Demosthenes' innuendo and seeks to re-establish Alexander's status as an elite boy worthy of the same consideration as any proper Athenian youth.³⁰²

Demosthenes, according to Aeschines' account, in turn found fault with Aeschines' disapproval on the grounds that it displayed a too-sensitive regard for Alexander's character. Given that Demosthenes seems to have been casting these aspersions with a view to his recent indictment of Aeschines for misconduct (*Aeschin.* 1.168), it may be that his goal was to cast Aeschines' over-sensitivity and bluster as the result of being bribed by Philip. Demosthenes would employ a somewhat similar argument years later, insinuating that Aeschines was a born flatterer by accusing him of making too much of his relationship with the Macedonian royal family (*Dem.* 18.51). In view of the rhetorical similarities between the two episodes, it is possible that Aeschines' narrative in the *Against Timarchus* preserves an instance where Demosthenes attempted to point to Aeschines' 'fawning' over the Macedonian royal family as proof of his corruption. In any event, the episode as a whole shows how an account of a Macedonian banquet initially told with a view to Macedonian policy could quickly devolve into a personal argument.

It thus becomes clear than in focusing their remarks on the main aspects of Philip's character - his speaking ability, his appearance, and his social skills – the Athenian ambassadors were pursuing a path of inquiry that could have been viewed as highly relevant to Athenian public policy. In painting Philip as a consummate speaker both pleasing to look at and adept in the social graces, the ambassadors sought to portray him as a trustworthy figure to their Athenian audience. Indeed, Aeschines' and the

³⁰² Alexander's propriety and the respect that was its due would have been particularly clear to an audience who had just been regaled with a laundry list of Timarchus' youthful and not-so-youthful failings.

ambassadors' treatment of Philip is comparable to the way they might have praised any Athenian orator. They placed Philip within the self-same Athenian framework that their Athenian audience would have been used to using in judging their own speakers.

To the portrait of a trustworthy Philip Aeschines' narrative of 343/2 BCE adds a new layer of complexity. By not only telling his audience what the ambassadors' opinion of Philip was but also narrating the embassy in such a way as to show Philip speaking and acting in his own right, Aeschines allows his audience to implement their own judgment in testing the ambassadors' conclusions about Philip's ἦθος against the Philip of his narrative. Aeschines' speech sets Philip on display before the jurors: Philip engages in a conversation with the Athenian ambassadors comparable to, if somewhat more sedate than, a debate in the *ekklesia*. Setting Philip on display as well as giving the ambassadors' opinion of him served Aeschines' immediate ends in the trial: showing that the ambassadors' had come to the same conclusion about Philip as the Athenian *demos* itself would have come to had it been able to interact with Philip face-to-face, Aeschines absolves himself and the other ambassadors from wrongdoing or even simple stupidity. Any Athenian, Aeschines' narrative suggests, would have thought Philip trustworthy upon meeting him; the fault for the Peace therefore lies with the collective and not with the individual ambassadors. Thus Aeschines' Philip is above all a familiar Athenian entity, one that the Athenians are capable of seeing and judging for themselves. This Philip differs radically from Demosthenes' barbarian king who requires the mediation of a wise advisor to be properly understood by the Athenians.

Demosthenes' Philip

In the last chapter I explored how Demosthenes' early anti-Philip speeches drew from older paradigms of the Athenian enemy – both Spartan and Persian – to present the conflict between Athens and Macedonia in dramatic, oppositional terms. I further argued that Demosthenes located himself within this schema as the wise advisor able to mediate between Macedonian foreignness and Athenian understanding. The experience and stature Demosthenes gained during the peace process and over the course of the next fifteen years strengthened his position in the *polis* and, as we will see, enabled him to manipulate cultural norms with greater freedom. More than the wise warner who mediates between the outside world and Athens, in his later speeches, culminating in *On the Crown*, Demosthenes re-imagines himself as a leader taking part in a cosmic contest against Philip. For, if Aeschines and the ambassadors attempted to bring Philip 'to Athens' – that is, to make him familiar and thereby non-threatening to the Athenians – Demosthenes attempted to do exactly the opposite: to silence and alienate Philip, thereby magnifying the threat that Macedonia supposedly posed. Instead of being created in the eminently Athenian role of an orator, Demosthenes' Philip becomes the ultimate foreigner. Concomitantly, the more alien the threat from Philip became, the more the Athenians stood in need of a Demosthenes to lead them onto the path of victory. In magnifying Philip's power Demosthenes validated his own privileged role as the wise leader and representative of Athens in the political battle against Macedonia. Demosthenes' uniquely strong leadership was acceptable within a democratic context if and only if the idea of Philip as an extraordinary, alien threat was first accepted. Demosthenes' ἦθος and his characterization of Philip are thus dependent on each other.

The following section traces the evolution of Demosthenes' presentation of Philip from barbarian king to other-worldly threat. I will then argue that this escalation in Philip's alienness also marks Demosthenes' gradual assumption of more and more power over the deliberative process as the only Athenian able to counteract the Macedonian threat.

In the earlier deliberative speeches Demosthenes had discussed the conflict with Philip as a public, collective struggle between the king, who acted as the representative of the Macedonian state, and the Athenian *demos*. In the later forensic speeches, Demosthenes focuses on the personal struggle between himself as leader of the Athenians and Philip as leader of the Macedonians. In some ways, Demosthenes' ἀγών with Philip even replaces the public struggle as it becomes evident that the Athenian *demos* stands no chance of victory unless Demosthenes himself is victorious.³⁰³ Demosthenes and Philip are thus engaged in a private political duel. The serious nature of their struggle is emphasized through Demosthenes' use of traditionally agonistic terminology.³⁰⁴ Thus in *On the Crown* Demosthenes presents an account of his conflict with Philip in the following manner:

καὶ μὴν τὸ διαφθαρῆναι χρήμασιν ἢ μὴ κεκράτηκα Φίλιππον·
ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ ὠνούμενος νενίκηκε τὸν λαβόντα, ἐὰν πρίηται,
οὕτως ὁ μὴ λαβὼν {καὶ διαφθαρεὶς} νενίκηκε τὸν ὠνούμενον.
ὥστε ἀήττητος ἡ πόλις τὸ κατ' ἐμέ.

And in the matter of being bribed with money or not I defeated Philip; for just as the one looking to buy defeats the one taking the offer if the sale comes through, just so the one refusing the offer [and not getting bribed] has defeated the one looking to buy [him]. So the city remained undefeated because of me. (*Dem.* 18.247)

³⁰³ This is clearer in *On the Crown* than in the *On the False Embassy*.

³⁰⁴ Slippage between political and military language is common in narratives of both kinds of conflicts: see Roisman, *Rhetoric of Manhood*, 142-5; also Ryan Balot, "Courage in the Democratic Polis," *Classical Quarterly* 54 (2004): 406-423, on the way Athenian ideology transferred courage from the military to the civic sphere of action. Hyperides' *Against Diondas* 136r, as well, translates the military contest between Philip and Athens into the political world of the courtroom and thus testifies to the close ideological parallels between military and political conflict.

The king and the politician are locked in a fierce personal combat. The metaphor Demosthenes employs of the prospective buyer further clarifies the personal immediacy of the ἀγών. The use of market imagery might have also engendered a sense of familiarity in the Athenian audience, who would have had to navigate the ἀγορά themselves and take part in business transactions on a regular basis.³⁰⁵ Notably, Demosthenes does not use the political terminology of the courtroom or the *ekklesia*, as do Aeschines and Hyperides, in discussing his ἀγών with Philip. The fact that he does not do so fits Demosthenes' general rejection of Philip's ability to speak and portrayal as an orator. Demosthenes, in short, presents his confrontation with Philip as an extra-rhetorical conflict of two individuals, each one of whom is looking out for their own private interests.

Demosthenes sought to repudiate the construction of Philip as an orator by the pro-peace politicians. Where Aeschines crafted a Philip who spoke and thus took part in a rhetorical contest against the ambassadors, Demosthenes posits a king who rejects open communication with Athens. Remarkably, he portrays the suppression of Philip's voice as the king's own choice: Philip, according to Demosthenes, realized when the negotiations over the Peace began that he could not win a competition of words against his Athenian opponents. Demosthenes reenacts Philip's decision to use covert trickery before the Athenian jury as an imaginary inner monologue by the king:

ἦδει δὴ σαφῶς, οἶμαι, τοῦθ' ὅτι νῦν, ἤνικ' ἐστασίαζε μὲν αὐτῷ τὰ
 Θετταλῶν, καὶ Φεραῖοι πρῶτον οὐ συνηκολούθουν, ἐκρατοῦντο δὲ
 Θηβαῖοι καὶ μάχην ἤττηντο καὶ τρόπαιον ἀπ' αὐτῶν εἰστήκει, οὐκ
 ἔνεστι παρελθεῖν, εἰ βοηθήσεθ' ὑμεῖς, οὐδ' ἂν ἐπιχειρῆ, χαιρήσει, εἰ

³⁰⁵ Demosthenes' representation of his immediate struggle against Aeschines is similarly fiercely agonistic: see D. Ochs, "Demosthenes: Superior Artiste and Victorious Monomachist," in *Theory, Text, Context: Issues in Greek Rhetoric and Oratory*, ed. Christopher Lyle Johnstone (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 140-3.

μή τις τέχνη προσγενήσεται. πῶς οὖν μήτε ψεύσωμαι φανερώς,
μήτ' ἐπιорκεῖν δόξας πάνθ' ἃ βούλομαι διαπράξωμαι; πῶς; οὕτως,
ἂν Ἀθηναίων τινὰς εὖρω τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἔξαπατήσοντας· ταύτης
γὰρ οὐκέτ' ἐγὼ τῆς αἰσχύνης κληρονομῶ.

[Philip] clearly knew, I think, that now, when the Thessalians were embroiled in civil disputes, the Pheraians in particular were not falling in line, and the Thebans were beaten - they had lost a battle and a trophy was set up over them – that he could not invade if you sent help, nor, should he attempt it, would he have any success, unless some trick were to be used. “How, then, can I accomplish everything I want without openly lying or appearing to perjure myself? How? In this way – if I find some Athenians to deceive the Athenians; this way I will not be touched by the stigma.” (Dem. 19.320)

Philip’s silence is explained by his fear perjuring himself: he remains silent so that Athenian traitors can speak, and then take the blame, on his behalf (Dem. 19.68). Philip’s silence is consistent with Demosthenes’ presentation of him as a barbarian and a monarch, divorced from all things Athenian and therefore also lacking the capacity for persuasive speech which was the *sine qua non* of Athenian democratic participation.³⁰⁶ Indeed, Demosthenes’ use of *oratio recta* in this passage ironically highlights Philip’s desire for silence: what better time to have Philip ‘speak’ before the Athenians than at the very moment he decides to *hide* his voice from the Athenian public for fear of betraying himself?³⁰⁷ By revealing Philip’s voice at this particular moment, Demosthenes points to his own ingenuity in ‘forcing’ Philip to ‘betray’ himself to the *demos*. Only Demosthenes has the power to make Philip ‘speak’ - even if the king doesn’t want to. By

³⁰⁶ See Heath, *Talking Greeks*, 192-201, on silence as the marker for barbarian otherness. In the same manner, particular speech patterns were thought to characterize particular character types: see Nancy Worman, *The Cast of Character: Style in Greek Literature* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2002), who traces a particularly “Odyssean” and “Hellenic” type of speech through various portrayals of Odysseus and Helen.

³⁰⁷ Philip’s thoughts in *oratio recta* continue at 19.323 and 19.324, as he outlines the rest of his plan for world domination; nowhere else in the speech does he speak in *oratio recta*. On Demosthenes’ use of *oratio recta* more generally see Bers, *Speech in Speech*, 149-217; Jeremy Trevett, “The Use of Direct Speech by the Attic Orators,” in *Lo Spettacolo delle voci*, eds. Francesco de Martino and Alan H. Sommerstein (Bari: Levante, 1995), highlights *oratio recta* as the stylistic choice of the individual rhetor. René Nünlist, “Speech within Speech in Menander,” in *The Language of Greek Comedy*, ed. Andreas Willi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), studies the same phenomenon in Menander.

recreating the king's initial decision to bribe his way into power instead of losing in a rhetorical contest, Demosthenes argues both for Philip's essential otherness and for the necessity of his own acumen in combating the king's nefarious schemes (19.315-319).

The rest of Demosthenes' speech *On the False Embassy* is built on the premise that Philip desires to keep silent. Philip hardly ever speaks in his own voice, and never again in *oratio recta*, as he did above; rather, his method of persuasion is the bribe, a necessarily clandestine affair opposed to the openness of speech.³⁰⁸ The political duel Demosthenes thus opens up between himself and Philip is paradigmatically opposed to that Aeschines envisioned between Philip and the ambassadors in his speech *On the Embassy*. Demosthenes replaces Aeschines' battle of wit and word with underhanded bribes and trickery. For Demosthenes, the contest between king and politician hinges not on the better argument but on the bribe, offered by the (silent) king, and either accepted or (verbally) rejected by the politician. This monetary contest between king and politician is, for example, articulated in the speech *On the False Embassy* when the Thebans prevail over Philip by refusing to accept his bribe; instead, they ask the king to redirect his 'kindness' to the welfare of their city (19.139-41). Demosthenes similarly wins a victory by asking Philip, who had attempted to bribe him, to use that same money toward the ransom of some Athenian prisoners then in Macedon (19.168).³⁰⁹ In the same

³⁰⁸ On accusations of bribery see Joseph Roisman, *Rhetoric of Conspiracy in Ancient Athens* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), ch. 6; F. Harvey, "Dona Ferentes: Some Aspects of Bribery in Greek Politics," in *Crux: Essays in Greek History Presented to G. E. M. de Ste. Croix on His 75th Birthday*, eds. Paul Cartledge and F. D. Harvey (London: Duckworth, 1985); and Douglas McDowell, "Athenian Laws about Bribery," *RIDA* 30 (1983): 57-78. On allegations of bribery directly more specifically against Philip see Ryder, "Diplomatic Skills of Philip II" and Lynette Mitchell, *Greeks Bearing Gifts: The Public Use of Private Relationships in the Greek World, 453-323 BC* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 181-6.

³⁰⁹ Philip had attempted to give the gift openly as a mark of hospitality to the ambassadors, but Demosthenes had refused it; he claims, however, that Philip had then privately sent that money about to the other ambassadors. When Demosthenes then asked the king to employ his 'gift' to ransom the prisoners,

vein Demosthenes recounts an episode in which the actor Satyrus was able to free the two daughters of Apollophanes from slavery by confronting Philip publicly through speech (19.193-5). Demosthenes' narrative offers proof that those who combat Philip with speech come out victorious against him. The king can only achieve his ends by bribery, not by persuasion.

Philip's desire to avoid open debate stems from a fear of harming his public image. So, for example, the reasons for Philip's concession to Satyrus lie in the public opinion of those around him:

ὡς δ' ἀκοῦσαι τοὺς παρόντας ἐν τῷ συμποσίῳ, τοσοῦτον κρότον
καὶ θόρυβον καὶ ἔπαινον παρὰ πάντων γενέσθαι ὥστε τὸν
Φίλιππον παθεῖν τι καὶ δοῦναι.

When the guests at the symposium heard [Satyrus' request], there arose such applause, cheering, and praise among everyone that Philip was moved and granted the request. (*Dem.* 19.195)

It is the guests' reaction to Satyrus that finally persuades Philip to give in to the request, superseding even the eminently powerful motive of revenge – as Demosthenes states, the Apollophanes whose daughters Satyrus saved was the same man who had killed Philip's brother Alexander (*Dem.* 19.195).³¹⁰ Looking back to Philip's initial decision to stay silent, here too he is reluctant to lie 'openly' [πῶς οὔν μήτε ψεύσωμαι φανερώς] (*Dem.* 19.320) because he fears being caught in a lie: better have others do the dirty work, and run the risk, for him (*Dem.* 19.323). Even Philip's letter to the Athenians,

Philip could not admit that the money had been given in secret to the bribed ambassadors, and was forced to act as if it was still in his possession.

³¹⁰ Revenge, particularly in such a case of sibling homicide, was a natural motive. We might imagine that Demosthenes' Athenian audience would probably have felt some sympathy for Philip's loss and would have perceived his desire for revenge as eminently reasonable - although one wonders whether taking revenge on a man's now orphan daughters would have been perceived as socially acceptable. On revenge in Athenian ideology see Fiona McHardy, *Revenge in Athenian Culture* (London: Duckworth, 2008); Werner Riess, "Private Violence and State Control," in *Sécurité Collective et Ordre Public dans les Sociétés Anciennes* (Genève: Fondation Hardt, 2008), 49-94; Gabriel Herman, "Athenian Beliefs about Revenge: Problems and Methods," *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* 46 (2000): 7-27.

according to Demosthenes, had to be written secretly by Aeschines lest Philip perjure himself (19.36-38).³¹¹ Thus Demosthenes portrays a Philip who is hyperconscious of others' judgments about him. The king is constrained to silence lest he disclose something of his sinister motives.

Demosthenes' portrayal of Philip as a silent, secretive figure is not confined to his forensic debates against Aeschines. He also rejects Philip's speaking ability in *Philippic II*, composed in 344 BC in the hopes of inciting the Athenians to abandon the Peace of Philocrates.³¹² The evidence of this speech reflects the same interest in Philip's speaking ability during this time period which we have already seen in Aeschines' and Demosthenes' forensic debates. *Philippic II* thus supports my conclusion that Philip's speaking ability was a primary concern in the debate over the Peace of Philocrates.³¹³ Demosthenes' argument is additionally important because it showcases an amalgam of themes from his earlier deliberative discourse and the later forensic debates:

ὕμεις οἱ καθήμενοι, ὡς μὲν ἂν εἴποιτε δικαίους λόγους καὶ λέγοντος ἄλλου συνείητε, ἄμεινον Φιλίππου παρεσκευάσθε, ὡς δὲ κωλύσαιτ' ἂν ἐκεῖνον πράττειν ταῦτα ἐφ' ὧν ἐστὶ νῦν, παντελῶς ἀργῶς ἔχετε.

You seated here, you are better prepared than Philip to make just arguments and to comprehend a speaker, but you are completely idle when it comes to preventing him from doing what he is about. (*Dem.* 6.3)

Demosthenes returns to the *λόγος/ἔργον* typology from his earlier deliberative discourse, which was, as I have argued, a familiar *topos* for politicians bent on chastising

³¹¹ Aeschines would reject this claim by asking the audience whether it was possible that neither Philip nor his advisors were capable of writing a letter for themselves (*Aeschin.* 2.124-5).

³¹² On the historical context of the speech see M. M. Markle, "Demosthenes' Second Philippic. A Valid Policy for the Athenians Against Philip," *Antichthon* 15 (1981): 62-85. For a literary analysis see Wooten, *Commentary on Demosthenes' Philippic I*, 123-36.

³¹³ Sealey, *Demosthenes and his Time*, 171-2, also notes the occurrence of ἐπανόρθωσις [a setting right] in *Philippic II* in Demosthenes' characterization of the policy of his opponents with respect to the peace agreement. Sealey argues that this may be a reflection of the pro-peace politicians' slogan during this period.

the Athenian populace (see above, pp. 85-96). What is new here is that Demosthenes combines this censure with the claim that the Athenians are better at debate than Philip. Again, the argument that Philip is a poor speaker is consistent with his characterization in the Demosthenic corpus as a foreigner and a monarch. Demosthenes rejects the notion that Philip could be conversant with the norms of rhetoric as understood by the Athenians. The king's ignorance of the Athenian deliberative system provides Demosthenes with the grounds to reject even the possibility of peace between Philip and the Athenian community. While Demosthenes' argument concerning Philip's lack of skill in debate is readily comprehensible in and of itself, it takes on added value when viewed as part of a larger Athenian debate over Philip's speech during this period. Philip's ability to speak was a central element in the debate over the Peace of Philocrates. Demosthenes points to Philip's silence in order to characterize the king as a foreign entity with whom productive debate was impossible.

In the aftermath of the Peace of Philocrates, the Athenians were left much worse off than they had hoped. With Phocis destroyed and the Spartans voluntarily excluding themselves from panhellenic affairs, Athens appeared to be at the mercy of the Thebans, newly bolstered by Philip's forces of Macedonia. Moreover, the legitimacy of Philip's meddling in Greek affairs was secured by the Amphictyons decision to give the votes of the Phocians to Philip.³¹⁴ The change in the king's role in Greek affairs is marked by an escalation in Demosthenes' vitriol against Macedonia. The latter *Philippics* not only emphasize Philip's role as an outsider and a barbarian (*Dem.* 6.25; 9.30-1) on the Persian model (*Dem.* 6.11), but also magnify his power to almost inhuman proportions. He is pervasive as a disease (*Dem.* 9.29) and as unlooked for as a hailstorm (*Dem.* 9.33). Philip

³¹⁴ See the Third Sacred War and its aftermath see above, pp. 60-64.

becomes a threat to the whole world, Greek and barbarian alike (*Dem.* 9.27); he is *worse* than just any barbarian (*Dem.* 9.31). Demosthenes' magnification of Philip's otherness coincides with his own growing importance on the Athenian political scene.³¹⁵ As I will show in the rest of the chapter, Demosthenes' rhetoric concerning Philip served as a foil for his own self-image as the foremost orator of his day.

Demosthenes 18.66-67

Demosthenes' articulation of the struggle between himself and Philip comes to a head in his speech *On the Crown* which was delivered in 330 BCE, eight years after the fateful battle of Chaeronea and six years after Philip's death and Aeschines' indictment of Ctesiphon on the charge of *paranomia*.³¹⁶ Demosthenes' speech on Ctesiphon's behalf is much more concerned with what it means to be an Athenian involved in politics than with the actual legal issue over the crown.³¹⁷ I begin with a key passage that elaborates on a *topos* we have seen Demosthenes use twice before, once at *Against Aristocrates* 112 and again at *Olynthiac* II 15-6 (see above, pp. 78-80; 119-126). This passage is particularly useful because it packs within it all the various strands of Demosthenes' thought on Philip that I have been tracing thus far. Teasing out these strands will show how Demosthenes came to understand Philip's character after the king's death as well as illuminate Demosthenes' stance on his own career as an anti-Macedonian politician.

³¹⁵ See Sealey, *Demosthenes and his Time*, 174-93, on Demosthenes' activity during this period (344-339 BCE).

³¹⁶ For historical accounts of the period see Worthington, *Philip II*, ch. 11; Harris, *Aeschines and Athenian Politics*, ch. 7; Sealey, *Demosthenes and his Time*, ch. 8. On Demosthenes' actions between 338 and 330 see particularly G. L. Cawkwell, "The Crowning of Demosthenes," *Classical Quarterly* 19 (1969): 163-180. On the legal background of the speech see also Yunis, *Demosthenes. On the Crown*, 7-17.

³¹⁷ Yunis, "Politics as Literature," has brilliantly argued that 'the facts' of the case are of little concern to Demosthenes, and they apparently were of as little concern to his audience, who overwhelmingly voted for Ctesiphon's acquittal. If the trial had only been about the legality of Ctesiphon's proposal, then Aeschines ought to have won.

To briefly recount, the *topos* at its most basic, as at *Against Aristocrates* 112, argued that Philip is faced with a choice between a life of constant struggle and a life of peace. In *Olynthiac* II, where the *topos* was somewhat expanded, Demosthenes presented Philip as a king [Μακεδόνων βασιλεύς] choosing to strive for good repute [δόξη] and honor [φιλοτιμία] instead of a life of safety [τοῦ ζῆν ἀσφαλῶς]. As I had argued (see above, pp. 120-125), Demosthenes used language reminiscent of the funeral oration to create tension between Philip's role as monarch and the democratic ideals to which he aspires: as king, Philip cannot participate in an ἀγών over glory, as this struggle is bound to a democratic context. Philip's quest therefore causes debilitating strife between himself and his subjects rather than the communal ennoblement which heroic death engenders in the democratic *polis*. In *On the Crown*, Demosthenes elaborates the *topos* still further. He changes focus from the effects that Philip's quest for honor has in his kingdom to the consequences this desire has for his own person, as an individual. That is, Demosthenes points to the physical toll which Philip's desire for martial glory has on his own body, marrying this new focus with the contrast between Philip and the Athenian heroic dead already present in *Olynthiac* II. Demosthenes introduces the passage as the view of the political situation he had taken as a young man just beginning his career. Thus Demosthenes frames the *topos* with the impact it had on the trajectory of his own career. As such, the passage also invites a comparison of Demosthenes' and Philip's policies and their roles within their respective communities. I begin by unpacking Demosthenes' presentation of Philip before turning to the larger question of the way Demosthenes' view of Philip affects his own self-presentation as an Athenian politician.

Demosthenes has just concluded a brief account of the political situation of Greece before Chaeronea (*Dem.* 18.60-68). The present section begins as Demosthenes turns dramatically to address Aeschines:

Τί τὴν πόλιν, Αἰσχίνη, προσῆκε ποιεῖν ἀρχὴν καὶ τυραννίδα τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὁρῶσαν ἑαυτῷ κατασκευαζόμενον Φίλιππον; ἢ τί τὸν σύμβουλον ἔδει λέγειν ἢ γράφειν τὸν Ἀθηναίων (καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο πλεῖστον διαφέρει), ὃς συνήδεν μὲν ἐκ παντὸς τοῦ χρόνου μέχρι τῆς ἡμέρας ἀφ' ἧς αὐτὸς ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα ἀνέβην, αἰεὶ περὶ πρωτείων καὶ τιμῆς καὶ δόξης ἀγωνιζομένην τὴν πατρίδα, καὶ πλείω καὶ χρήματα καὶ σώματα ἀνηλώκυϊαν ὑπὲρ φιλοτιμίας καὶ τῶν πᾶσι συμφερόντων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἀνηλώκασιν ἕκαστοι, ἑώρων δ' αὐτὸν τὸν Φίλιππον, πρὸς ὃν ἦν ἡμῖν ὁ ἀγὼν, ὑπὲρ ἀρχῆς καὶ δυναστείας τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ἐκκεκομμένον, τὴν κλεῖν κατεαγότα, τὴν χειρὰ, τὸ σκέλος πεπηρωμένον, πᾶν ὃ τι βουληθείη μέρος ἢ τύχη τοῦ σώματος παρελῆσθαι, τοῦτο προίεμενον, ὥστε τῷ λοιπῷ μετὰ τιμῆς καὶ δόξης ζῆν;

What, Aeschines, ought the city to have done when it saw Philip scheming to obtain kingship and tyranny over the Greeks? And what ought a councilor of the Athenians to say or to propose (for these are very different) who saw his fatherland always fighting for primacy and honor [τιμῆς] and good repute [δόξης] from the beginning until the day he himself rose upon the speakers' platform, and having spent more money and lives [σώματα] for the sake of love of honor [φιλοτιμίας] and the common good than any of the other Hellenes have spent on their own behalf; and who saw Philip himself, against whom was our contest, having his eye stricken out, his collar bone broken, his arm and his leg maimed – everything which fortune might wish to take from his body [σώματος] - for kingship and sovereignty; giving this up, so as to live for the rest of his life with honor [τιμῆς] and good repute [δόξης]? (*Dem.* 18.66-67)

Unlike Demosthenes' use of the *topos* in *Olynthiac* II, here Philip's life choices are overtly juxtaposed with those of the Athenian forefathers. Philip's subjects, on the other hand, are no longer of any importance: Philip is competing for honor with the Athenians themselves, rather than against other Macedonians.³¹⁸ The closeness of the Athenians' and Philip's goals is emphasized by the repetition of τιμή and δόξα in Demosthenes'

³¹⁸ Harking back the past glory of Athens functions at the same time to goad the Athenian audience and to assuage their pride. Demosthenes will later argue, of course, that the Athenians "took back" the honor that was rightfully theirs at Chaeronea (*Dem.* 18.199-205); Philip did not win this ἀγὼν after all. On Demosthenes' use of the past in *On the Crown* see Yunis, "Politics as Literature."

account of their aspirations.³¹⁹ Indeed, it may almost appear that Philip's choice of a life of struggle is validated by the analogy – after all, he is *similar* to the Athenian forefathers in having chosen painful toil in return for a good reputation, a pursuit which is incontestably noble and, as such, is tirelessly lauded in the rhetoric of the funeral oration.³²⁰ Nevertheless, the consequences of the quest for military glory are vastly different for Philip and the Athenians. The outcome of Philip's attempt at realizing an 'Athenian' ideal shows that his participation in the ἀγών is illegitimate. As in *Olynthiac* II, it is Philip's role as monarch that prevents him from properly pursuing this democratic ideal.

Demosthenes focuses attention on the physical results of the contest to show how Philip's ostensibly laudable desire for martial renown exacerbates his otherness. Demosthenes' emphasis on the body [σώματα / σώματος] invites the audience to assess the physical toll exacted on the Athenians and Philip: where Athens sacrifices citizens in the quest for good repute, Philip sacrifices his own body parts. Thus the physical state of the Athenians' bodies merit no remark; like images of the dead, we must think of them as unblemished and youthful.³²¹ Philip's body, on the other hand, is mangled, disabled, and ugly. Indeed, by rights Philip *ought* to be dead: according to the heroic ideal only the ultimate sacrifice of death on the battlefield can grant the hero his

³¹⁹ See also Demosthenes' reflections on the Thebans' lack of τιμή and δόξα at *Dem.* 5.21.

³²⁰ On Athenian predecessors as models for the choice of glory over death see for example Thuc. 2.43.4-6 and *Dem.* 60.12. Here, as in *Philippic* I, Philip has somehow usurped – or at least attempted to usurp – the Athenians' place as inheritor of the forefathers' example: he is the one looking at the Athenians of old for moral guidance, even though it is the Athenians of Demosthenes' day who are constantly confronted with visual reminders of their forefathers' virtue (*Dem.* 18.68). There is an uncomfortable level of "Athenianness" in Philip's self-fashioning which, Demosthenes argues, the Athenians must mitigate by taking back their ancestral virtues for themselves.

³²¹ Mutilating the bodies of the dead was taboo: see Lawrence Tritle, "Hector's Body: Mutilation of the Dead in Ancient Greece and Vietnam," *Ancient History Bulletin* 11 (1997): 129-133; Charles Segal, *The theme of the Mutilation of the Corpse in the Iliad* (Leiden: Brill, 1971), ch. 2.

ultimate wish for undying renown. Athens was able to properly discharge this exchange by giving up σώματα for glory. The exchange of death for honor is an impossibility, however, for Philip: he *cannot* die if he is to achieve his goals, since in a monarchy neither his glory nor the power with which it is synonymous will redound to the credit of the Macedonian state at large after his death.³²² There is an imbalance, therefore, in Philip's attempted exchange of his body for glory. The sense that Philip is delusional in his pursuit is only heightened when Demosthenes reminds his audience that "such ambition" [τοσαύτην μεγαλοψυχίαν] as Philip's comes from Pella, "a small and insignificant place" [χωρίῳ ἀδόξῳ τότε γέ ὄντι καὶ μικρῷ] – his ambition is better suited, the orator implies, to Athens and her glorious history (18.68). The juxtaposition of Philip's grand ideas with his rightful place in life are indissolubly at odds. Just so, he has no place in the ἀγών over honor. In attempting to achieve a heroic ideal that is not his to achieve, Philip has become a kind of living dead and the ultimate perversion of the hero.³²³

How is the *polis*, and particularly the councilor of the *polis*, to react to Philip's unnatural pursuit of the heroic ideal? These are the two immediate questions which frame Demosthenes' description of Philip in the passage above (*Dem.* 18.66). The contest against Philip is thus posed as a double one, featuring both a public struggle between Philip and Athens and a personal struggle between Philip and the politician. The two contests are closely associated. The critical nature of the conflict between Philip and

³²² This is clear as well in *Olynthiac* II, as Demosthenes explicitly states that Philip's subjects are weary of constant warfare since they do not get any share of honor [φιλοτιμία] in return (2.16). We might imagine that Philip's progeny would succeed to Philip's power upon his death, but hereditary succession is curiously absent in Demosthenes' portrayal of the Macedonian monarchy.

³²³ Self-mutilation was most prominently viewed as an act of madness: so Oedipus's blinding is treated as an act of madness (*Soph. OT* 1251-1312), as is the self-mutilation of Attis (*Cat.* 63).

Demosthenes in determining the outcome of Athens' war against Macedonia will become the justification for the politician's outsized role within the polity. Demosthenes presents an understanding of his own subsequent policy proposals, as well as the Athenians' actions, as a response to this new and unnatural threat posed by Philip. Demosthenes justifies his own gargantuan role within the *polis* by pointing to Philip's power as sole ruler. In the final analysis, Demosthenes' ἦθος in the *Crown* speech is dependent on his characterization of Philip.

Leader of the Polis

I have noted previously that Demosthenes' self-fashioning has long been understood as the orator's engagement with a Periclean, or elite, model of leadership (see above, pp. 92-93).³²⁴ This idea essentially turns on two related points of congruity: first, Demosthenes' and Pericles' ability to instruct, and even criticize, the *demos*; and second the overwhelming strength of their leadership roles - to the point that, as Thucydides put it, "the democracy existed in name only, and was in reality the rule of one man" [ἐγίγνετό τε λόγῳ μὲν δημοκρατία, ἔργῳ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἀνδρὸς ἀρχή] (Thuc. 2.65.9).³²⁵ The *locus classicus* for the claim that Demosthenes' ἦθος presents a style of leadership modeled on that which Thucydides ascribes to Pericles is Demosthenes' account of the meeting after Philip's capture of Elatea at *Dem.* 18.169-79. The passage describes Demosthenes as the only man able to help the city through that crisis. He has just proposed that the Athenians send an embassy to the Thebans in order

³²⁴ Plut. *Dem.* 6.5, 9.2, 14.3; see also *schol. ad Dem.* 5.12. For modern scholarship see for example Gottfried Mader, "Dramatizing Didaxis: aspects of Demosthenes' 'Periclean' project," *Classical Philology* 102 (2007): 155-179 and Montgomery, *Way to Chaeronea*, 27.

³²⁵ These two points are not the same, though they are naturally closely linked: the first point exclusively concerns the relationship between the *rhetor* and the *demos*; the second concerns the "three-cornered" dialogue between orator, opposing orators, and *demos*. See Yunis, *Taming Democracy*, 247-268 and Mader, "Dramatizing Didaxis."

to convince them to join Athens in the upcoming war against Philip; having recounted the substance of his own speech, Demosthenes continues:

Σύνεπαινεσάντων δὲ πάντων καὶ οὐδενὸς ἐπόντος ἐναντίον οὐδέν, οὐκ εἶπον μὲν ταῦτα, οὐκ ἔγραψα δέ, οὐδ' ἔγραψα μὲν, οὐκ ἐπρέσβευσα δέ, οὐδ' ἐπρέσβευσα μὲν, οὐκ ἔπεισα δὲ Θηβαίους, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς διὰ πάντων ἄχρι τῆς τελευτῆς διεξῆλθον, καὶ ἔδωκ' ἑμαυτὸν ὑμῖν ἀπλῶς εἰς τοὺς περιστηκότας τῇ πόλει κινδύνους.

Everybody praised [my speech] and nobody spoke anything against it. I didn't speak without making a motion; I didn't make a motion without going on the embassy; I didn't go on the embassy without persuading the Thebans – from the beginning to the end I saw everything through, and I ranged myself against the dangers surrounding the city on your behalf. (*Dem.* 18.179)

Demosthenes presents his audience with a moment of perfect consensus in the *ekklesia* in which he has articulated a suggestion none can contest. Moreover, the orator has not only taken control of debate in the *ekklesia*; critically, he has taken control of the whole political process, both speech *and* the action that follows. He not only proposes to send an embassy to Thebes; he himself goes to Thebes and sees that the embassy meets with success. The normal processes of democratic government are streamlined into a seamless movement carried out “from beginning to end” by one man - Demosthenes.³²⁶

Everything revolves around Demosthenes' actions – indeed, his actions stand in for those of the Athenian people.

Harvey Yunis has recently argued that Demosthenes' self-presentation goes even further than the Thucydidean version of Pericles in its rejection of any nonconformance whatsoever with the leader's policy. He suggests that Plato's Pericles may in fact be a

³²⁶ As discussed by Ober, *Mass and Elite*, consensus [ὁμόνοια] was a democratic ideal constantly at odds with that other democratic ideal, freedom of debate [ἰσηγορία]: see particularly 72-3; 295-9. Thus it is important for Demosthenes to stress that Aeschines did have the *opportunity* to contradict Demosthenes' plan at this *ekklesia* if he had wanted to.

closer model for Demosthenes.³²⁷ Seeing such an elite thinker as Plato as a source for Demosthenic political ideology raises an intriguing issue: if we are to imagine Demosthenes articulating an elite model of democratic leadership – and I think we clearly must³²⁸ – then the question arises how such statements were to be successfully articulated before a non-elite audience with vastly different ideas about the relative roles of the *demos* and the orator. In particular, normative democratic ideology imagined the speaker, the ὁ βουλόμενος, as an average individual, whose value stems from his ability to articulate the will of the *demos*; additionally, it is up to the *demos* to follow through on the proposals it has adopted. Demosthenes’ vision of himself taking over the democratic process *in toto* – even if this were on behalf and with the consent of the people – presents a vision of leadership, and of the speaker’s role, almost antithetical to that of the normative democratic ideology.

There is a tension inherent in ascribing to Demosthenes a Thucydidean-Periclean orientation, and even more so a Platonic bent, which has not been fully acknowledged. Yunis seems to see a solution to this tension in Demosthenes’ argument that he was the most knowledgeable and most-experienced politician on that fateful day, and thus the only one who was capable of creating a successful policy (*Dem.* 18.170-2).³²⁹ Once the audience had bought into Demosthenes’ vision of himself as the best and most knowledgeable policy-maker, then it would be only reasonable for them to also buy into the argument that his policy was summarily agreed upon by the *demos*. Yet while

³²⁷ See Yunis, *Taming Democracy*, 276-7.

³²⁸ Although Jeff Miller, “Warning the Demos: Political Communication with a Democratic Audience in Demosthenes,” *History of Political Thought* 23 (2002): 401-417, has argued that in articulating such models Demosthenes was actually trying to *counter* traditional elite critiques (see particularly p. 403); his proof, however, seems too weak to be ultimately convincing and he appears unaware of Yunis’ argument.

³²⁹ Yunis, *Taming Democracy*, 269-275. See also Sagar, “Presaging the Moderns,” 1397-1399.

Demosthenes' ἦθος as the wisest politician is reason enough for the acclamation of his policy in the *ekklesia*, it can say nothing about the rapid-fire actions with follow: Demosthenes makes a motion, goes on an embassy, and persuades the Thebans – from beginning to end, Demosthenes takes charge of the whole political process that led Athens to the peace agreement with Thebes. Demosthenes on his own account is here more than a councilor; he does not merely *say*, he also *does*. Indeed, he points to the unusualness of his complete control over Athenian political affairs at this point in time still more explicitly: the Athenians, he claims, had had many great politicians before him, but never one who had so completely given himself to the state throughout the whole process – both proposing and seeing the proposal through to completion (*Dem.* 18.219). By what rhetorical sleight-of-hand was it possible for Demosthenes to argue that he took charge of Athenian *action* during this time period so completely? We must look beyond Demosthenes' ἦθος as the wise councilor to explain how he was able to make such an inherently elite model of leadership palatable to the Athenians.

The key to Demosthenes' self-presentation as a strong "Periclean" leader lies, I argue, with Demosthenes' presentation of Philip. I showed above that in the forensic debates Demosthenes develops the conflict between himself and Philip as a kind of doublet for the conflict between Philip and Athens. So, to reiterate, Philip's career leads Demosthenes to ask two questions, one concerning how the *polis* should deal with the Macedonian threat and one concerning how the politician ought to react to Philip (*Dem.* 18.66). Both the *polis* and the politician have their own, though related, conflict with the king. The parallelism between Demosthenes and Philip created in the forensic speeches, and particularly in the *Crown* speech, suggests that Demosthenes structured his role as

leader with a view to Philip's leadership, at least as he understood and articulated it. Demosthenes' "Periclean" leadership becomes the natural antithesis – equal in power, opposite in style - of Philip's kingship.

Demosthenes explicitly contrasts his leadership with that of Philip. Philip, Demosthenes claims, has numerous advantages over the politician. In describing the pre-Chaeronean situation, Demosthenes conflates the public Athenian contest with his individual struggle against Philip and proceeds with an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the parties involved. Once again, the *topos* is one Demosthenes had used previously (*Dem.* 1.4). In relation to the earlier passage, I discussed the way in which Demosthenes employed his articulation of Philip's power as king to critique the Macedonian system of government. (see above, pp. pp. 106-107). Demosthenes emphasized the contrast between Philip's quickness to act and the Athenians' lazy attitude. In *On the Crown*, Demosthenes adds a new layer of contrast to the *topos*:

τὰ μὲν τῆς πόλεως οὕτως ὑπῆρχεν ἔχοντα, καὶ οὐδεὶς ἂν ἔχοι
παρὰ ταῦτ' εἰπεῖν ἄλλ' οὐδέν· τὰ δὲ τοῦ Φιλίππου, πρὸς ὃν ἦν ἡμῖν
ὁ ἀγὼν, σκέψασθε πῶς. πρῶτον μὲν ἦρχε τῶν ἀκολουθούντων
αὐτὸς αὐτοκράτωρ, ὃ τῶν εἰς τὸν πόλεμον μέγιστόν ἐστιν
ἀπάντων· εἴθ' οὗτοι τὰ ὄπλα εἶχον ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν αἰεὶ· ἔπειτα
χρημάτων ἠπόρει καὶ ἔπραττεν ἃ δόξειεν αὐτῷ, οὐ προλέγων ἐν
τοῖς ψηφίσμασιν, οὐδ' ὑπὸ τῶν συκοφαντούντων κρινόμενος, οὐδὲ
γραφὰς φεύγων παρανόμων, οὐδ' ὑπεύθυνος ὢν οὐδενί, ἀλλ'
ἀπλῶς αὐτὸς δεσπότης, ἡγεμὼν, κύριος πάντων. ἐγὼ δ' ὁ πρὸς
τοῦτον ἀντιτεταγμένος (καὶ γὰρ τοῦτ' ἐξετάσαι δίκαιον) τίνος
κύριος ἦν; οὐδενός· αὐτὸ γὰρ τὸ δημηγορεῖν πρῶτον, οὗ μόνου
μετεῖχον ἐγὼ, ἐξ ἴσου προὔτιθεθ' ὑμεῖς τοῖς παρ' ἐκείνου
μισθαρνοῦσι καὶ ἐμοί, καὶ ὅσα οὗτοι περιγένοιτο ἐμοῦ (πολλὰ δ'
ἐγίγνετο ταῦτα, δι' ἣν ἕκαστον τύχοι πρόφασιν), ταῦθ' ὑπὲρ τῶν
ἐχθρῶν ἀπῆτε βεβουλευμένοι.

The affairs of the city stood thusly, and nobody would have any more to add beyond that; but look how affairs stood with Philip, against whom we were fighting. First, he himself ruled his subjects as sole ruler, which is the greatest advantage of all in wartime; then, his men were always under arms; and again, he was monetarily doing well and he could do whatever seemed best to him without putting his intention up to a vote, nor being

indicted by sykophants, nor defending changes of *paranomia*, nor being put under audit, but he was simply his own master, and leader, and commander of all. But I, who ranged myself against him, (and this too should, by rights, be closely observed) – what did I have under my command? Nothing. For, in the first place, I only had a share in the deliberations, and you gave equal shares of that to those who had sold themselves to him and to me, and whenever these men would beat me (and this happened often for various reasons), you would have made a decision benefiting the enemy. (*Dem.* 18.235-6)

While Demosthenes begins by discussing the public conflict with Philip [τὰ μὲν τῆς πόλεως... τὰ δὲ τοῦ Φιλίππου, πρὸς ὃν ἦν ἡμῖν ὁ ἀγών], this contest is quickly superseded by the individual struggle between Philip and himself [ἐγὼ δ' ὁ πρὸς τοῦτον ἀντιτεταγμένος]. The apparent naturalness of the transition heightens the sense that the public and the individual conflict are, in fact, one and the same. Where in *Olynthiac* I Philip's role as king was compared only to the abilities of the Athenians, here the prerogatives of his role are to be compared to those of the Athenians as well as those of Demosthenes himself.

For Demosthenes arrogates to himself the role of Athenian representative in the political battle against Philip. This personal battle, as Demosthenes envisions it, is fought over potential allies, foremost among them the Thebans (*Dem.* 18.237). The double conflict Demosthenes thus creates (one between Philip and Athens, and one between Philip and himself) becomes a key foundation for the heart of his defense in the speech *On the Crown*: whereas the Athenians incontestably lost the public confrontation at Chaeronea, Demosthenes claims that on the political front he, Demosthenes, trounced the enemy. In this – *his* – front of the battle, so Demosthenes claims, Philip was soundly beaten. He proves his point by showing that Philip was everywhere forced to impose his

authority militarily rather than politically (*Dem.* 18.237; 244-5).³³⁰ This political struggle between Philip and Demosthenes culminates in Demosthenes' account of his embassy to Thebes, where the orator confronts the Macedonian envoys who had come to convince the Thebans to adhere to their alliance with Philip.³³¹ Despite the Macedonians' persuasive arguments (*Dem.* 18.195, 213-5), Demosthenes prevails in what is the centerpiece of his anti-Macedonian effort. Demosthenes' political victory validates Ctesiphon's motion to crown him.

At the same time, Demosthenes narrative of a personal political struggle between Philip and himself also validates his own acquisition of extraordinary power over, and on behalf of, the *demos*. If Demosthenes is to be imagined confronting Philip with any semblance of success, then he must do so as the representative of the city; so too, if Philip's advantage comes from being the sole master of his affairs, then the politician who seeks to overcome him must have, or obtain, a similar control over the deliberative process. Qualitatively, of course, Demosthenes' leadership may be not at all like that of a king – we understand that he is no slave-master; but his ability to put his policy into play quickly and effectively is the same. Working within and on behalf of a democracy actually hampered Demosthenes' ability to match Philip blow for blow (*Dem.* 18.235-6). Indeed, Demosthenes' wish that his "share" of the discussion in the *ekklesia* had been larger than strict equality would have dictated comes close to critiquing the very foundation of the Athenian deliberative process (*Dem.* 18.236): giving politicians equal shares in the debate, Demosthenes contends, simply makes it too easy for the Athenians

³³⁰ Philip's apparent desire to win over allies politically rather than by military force finds an antecedent in *Dem.* I.4 and 21. The blame for the defeat at Chaeronea is transferred variously either to the generals or to fortune (on fortune see for example *Dem.* 18.193; on generals see *Dem.* 18.245-7).

³³¹ On Theban relations with Macedonia during this period see Buckler and Beck, *Central Greece and the Politics of Power*, ch. 16.

to fall under the spell of orators advocating bad policy. If Demosthenes was to beat Philip under such adverse conditions, then the normal deliberative processes in the *ekklesia* had to be circumvented by the orator who had the good of Athens at heart.³³² Only by arrogating to himself the ability not only to propose policy but also to put it into effect would the Athenian politician be able to successfully match Philip, political blow for political blow.

Demosthenes' mastery of the *demos* comes to a head at the pivotal point of his narrative, the panicked meeting of the people after Philip's march on Elateia. As I have noted, as Demosthenes magnifies his own role in the proceedings the deliberative process becomes streamlined and minimized: οὐκ εἶπον μὲν ταῦτα, οὐκ ἔγραψα δέ, οὐδ' ἔγραψα μὲν, οὐκ ἐπρέσβευσα δέ, οὐδ' ἐπρέσβευσα μὲν, οὐκ ἔπεισα δὲ Θηβαίους [I didn't speak without making a motion; I didn't make a motion without going on the embassy; I didn't go on the embassy without persuading the Thebans] (18.179). Demosthenes does what no politician has done before him (18.219) – he speaks *and* acts, taking complete control over Athenian policy making. His description of his own actions before Chaeronea thus suggest that he has gained the ability to act decisively on his ideas - precisely that ability which he had identified as the key to Philip's power as a leader.³³³ Demosthenes' control of Athens before Chaeronea

³³² Montgomery, *War to Chaeronea*, 76-78, brings together a number of instances where politicians went to political bodies other than the *ekklesia* to win their point. In terms of Demosthenes' rhetoric, one might also recall Diodotus' claim that the state of the democracy has so deteriorated that to do good for the city one *must* be deceptive (*Thucydides* 3.43.2-4). Aeschines accuses Demosthenes of blatant manipulation of the system (*Aeschin.* 3.125-6), though naturally this allegation can hardly be believed. Obviously, I do not believe that Demosthenes was advocating for the actual subversion of the democratic process, even under extraordinary circumstances; but I do think there are undemocratic underpinnings to his rhetoric that beg explanation.

³³³ Indeed, it is suggestive that in the end it is *Demosthenes* who gives up his whole being entirely for the city's benefit [ἔδωκ' ἑμαυτὸν ὑμῖν ἀπλῶς εἰς τοὺς περιεστηκότας τῇ πόλει κινδύνους] (*Dem.* 18.166-7). Could this be an "appropriate" sacrifice that counters Philip's "unnatural" sacrifice of body-parts?

matched Philip's control over his subjects. More than 'Periclean', Demosthenes' leadership as presented in *On the Crown* might be better characterized as 'Philippic'. Only Philip's extraordinary, potentially inhuman power and kingly leadership legitimizes Demosthenes' own singular role as uncontested leader of the polity.

Conclusion

Philip's character was a potent battleground for the orators of the late fourth century. Nowhere is this clearer than in Demosthenes' and Aeschines' prosecutions of each other: on the one hand we have Aeschines' well-spoken, handsome, and charmingly philhellenic Philip; on the other Demosthenes' mangled, greedy, and hubristic barbarian king. Yet even though these characterizations of Philip are worlds apart, they are nevertheless governed by the same imperative to define the role of the orator himself against the character of his antagonist. At the heart of the debate over Philip's character lies a debate over what it means to be an Athenian orator. Unsurprisingly, Aeschines and Demosthenes present differing visions of the orator's role in debate over international policy. While the *demos* could be expected, or at least imagined, to know something about affairs inside the *polis*, the transfer of information from abroad was outside the realm of common knowledge and thus much more easily co-opted into the specialized realm of the professional politician. In other words, the orator potentially had a lot more authority over information that came from outside the *polis* than from inside the community; and with this potential power also came the potential for its abuse. While Aeschines presented his and the other ambassadors' roles as that of simple transmitters who articulate easily understood information from Athens to Philip and back again, Demosthenes presents the politician as something much more: a highly knowledgeable

leader whose specialized knowledge of Macedonia allows him to judge policy more accurately than any of his compatriots. The reverse was of course also true: according to Demosthenes, the unscrupulous politician had the ability to completely bamboozle the *demos* without the people ever being the wiser. Thus Aeschines and Demosthenes articulate two competing visions of the politician's role in international affairs.

Aeschines attempted to minimize the power which he and the other ambassadors had over the negotiations. Not only did he deride Demosthenes' claim that he, Aeschines – a single man - could have derailed the peace, but the ambassadors of his narrative transfer information lucidly and openly from Macedonia to Athens. Aeschines' Philip is a visible and audible quantity: the Athenian jury to whom he was speaking in 343/2 can 'hear' the king speak, just as the Athenians in the *ekklesia* once 'saw' him through the verbal description of the ambassadors. The narrative portion of Aeschines' speech substantiates the claims of the ambassadors with respect to Philip's character. Aeschines' audience can 'verify' for themselves that the Philip Aeschines met had the same character that the ambassadors described to them on their return. The ambassadors' purpose in 346 was to convince the Athenian *demos* that Philip was trustworthy; Aeschines' task in 343/2 was to convince the jury that Philip had at least *appeared* trustworthy. Thus Aeschines' Philip is presented in terms drawn from the common Athenian democratic politics that the Athenians would readily understand and could easily relate to. Aeschines' Philip speaks like an orator and participates in dialogue with the ambassadors as an equal; in appearance and habits he also conforms to that ideal against which any Athenian politician would have been judged. This Philip, in sum, is presented in a type that Athenians were used to judging by themselves, in their own right. Aeschines' task,

and consequently that of the politician in general, thus becomes the ‘simple’ transfer of information from the outside into the *polis*; no further explication is necessary, because the Athenians need no specialized help to understand it.

Demosthenes, on the other hand, does his best to defamiliarize Philip. Presenting Philip as a persona foreign to Athens served a dual purpose: it both magnified the threat that Philip posed to the *polis* and enhanced the role (and need for) a knowledgeable orator who could contend against such an extraordinary enemy and explicate him to an Athenian audience. Thus Demosthenes’ Philip is explicitly secretive about his identity. Unlike Aeschines’, this Philip is obstinately silent and can only be brought to ‘speak’ to the Athenians under duress from the orator. No ordinary Athenian or even ordinary politician, with mere ordinary abilities and powers, could take on the extraordinary, virtually inhuman nefariousness that was Demosthenes’ Philip. By casting Philip as an inhuman force opaque to popular comprehension, Demosthenes sets himself up as the only possible – and hence privileged - medium between Macedonia and Athens. To combat the over-powerful Philip that he himself had crafted, Demosthenes needed more than the power to make informed decisions; he needed control over the whole of the policy-making process. Thus in the *Crown* speech Demosthenes goes still further in arrogating to himself ‘monarchic’ powers – albeit for a limited time, and under critical stress - to match Philip’s powerful leadership. Only by exercising a quasi-monarchic control over the political process in his own right could Demosthenes represent himself as the rightful antagonist, and victor, in the political contest against the king of Macedonia.

Philip's character was a battleground in the popular rhetoric of the late 4th century for more than just reasons of historical accuracy or personal opinion; instead, the debate over Philip was framed by a contested set of Athenian *mores* and democratic values. Both Aeschines' and Demosthenes' characterizations of Philip were shaped by their own perspectives as individual orators before an Athenian audience. Yet their articulations of Philip's ἦθος were also framed by the larger discourse concerning Macedonia which had evolved over the last twenty years and which would have included many more voices than those that have come down to us. Indeed, defining Philip's character was not critical only within the popular debate over policy occurring in the *ekklesia* and the lawcourts. In the next chapter I turn to Isocrates, an elite critic of Athenian democracy, who also came into contact with Philip. For Isocrates, too, defining Philip's role as a leader was a way for him to reconceptualize his own identity as an elite political philosopher.

Chapter 5: Isocrates and Philip

Introduction

The previous chapters have discussed Philip as he was perceived and interpreted by Athenian politicians before a general audience of Athenian citizens, whether in the *ekklesia* or in the courtroom. This chapter turns to Philip as presented in Isocrates' rhetoric, that is, in a speech and two letters (*Epistles* 2 and 3) the philosopher composed for the Macedonian king himself.³³⁴ Isocrates' elite perspective and his flattery of Philip have led to the marginalization of his works in Philippic studies, where they have generally been judged as a display of patent self-servience that could have had little or no impact on practical policy, either in Athens or in Macedonia.³³⁵ In the field of Isocratean rhetoric the *Philip* has fared rather better, as it contains important points concerning Isocrates' self-fashioning and his *παίδεια*, but the uniqueness of its political agenda is

³³⁴ Isocrates wrote the *Philip* in the year 346, shortly after the conclusion of the Peace of Philocrates. He also wrote a letter to Alexander (*Epistle* 5) and one to Antipater (*Epistle* 4).

³³⁵ One of the more ingenious analyses of the *Philip* has been that of M. M. Markle, "Support of Athenian Intellectuals for Philip: A Study of Isocrates' Philippus and Speusippus' Letter to Philip," *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 96 (1976): 80-99, who argues that if Isocrates addressed his speech to Philip "as practical advice and not as propaganda, then it ought to be dismissed as nothing more than the vain illusion of a senile pedant" (83). Markle proposes instead that the speech was meant primarily for Athenian consumption. For an overview of the question as it stood in the mid-20th century see Shalom Perlman, "Isocrates' 'Philippus': A Reinterpretation," *Historia* 6 (1957): 307-8. For disparaging analyses of Isocrates' advice among historians of this time period see for example Sealey, *Demosthenes and his Time*, 166-7 and Griffith, *History of Macedonia II*, 456-63. With respect to the *Philip* as an exercise in pandering, I note that *On the Peace* 22-23, which is addressed to the Athenians and was probably written in 355 BCE, councils the *demos* to give up their dreams of empire because this will improve their relations with Cersebleptes and Philip, who will in turn be persuaded to give back the territory they have conquered from Athens in order to maintain friendly relations. However delusional, the *Philip* was not simply an exercise in buttering up a potential patron.

often lost in this context.³³⁶ Because there is so little scholarship on the speech, and because Isocrates' articulation of Philip's ἤθος must be contextualized within his political philosophy as a whole to be fairly interpreted, my discussion will at times deal with issues more peculiarly Isocratean than Philippic.

Isocrates' *Philip* exhorts the king to unite the Greeks in a panhellenic war against the Persian Empire and thereby bring about an age of peace and prosperity. Panhellenic war against Persia was a policy that Isocrates had endorsed repeatedly in an address to the Athenians in the *Panegyricus* and in letters to various Hellenic kings.³³⁷ There is, it is true, a general similarity between Isocrates' proposal and the eventual course of action which Philip and Alexander would follow. Nevertheless, it would be simplistic to suggest that Isocrates' advice was literally taken at face value by the Macedonian monarchs. What mattered to them, as much as to Isocrates himself, was not so much the actual assumption of the political advice of the speech but the assumption of its underlying philosophy. In the present chapter I turn away from the question of whether Isocrates' policy was 'practical' or even 'practically possible' to examine the way Isocrates articulates his political vision to his audience: Philip and his court on the one

³³⁶ The last exploration of Philip in the context of Isocrates' rhetoric has been that of Gunther Heilbrunn, "Isocrates on Rhetoric and Power," *Hermes* 103 (1975): 154-178. While still extremely valuable, it is obviously dated. V. I. Isajeva, "The Political Programme of Isocrates in the *Philippus*," *Vestnik Drevnej Istorii* 128 (1974): 162-176, views Isocrates' Athenian loyalty as preeminent, and his exhortation to Philip as an ingenious method of safeguarding Athens from destruction. Perlman also examined the speech in the 1950s and 60s: see Perlman, "Isocrates' 'Philippus' – A Reinterpretation" and "Isocrates' 'Philippus' and Panhellenism," *Historia* 18 (1969): 370-374. For the *Philip* in larger works on Isocratean rhetoric see Un Lee Too, *The Rhetoric of Identity in Isocrates: Text, Power, Pedagogy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), passim; Ekaterina Haskins, *Logos and Power in Isocrates and Aristotle* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2004), passim; Takis Poulakos, *Speaking for the Polis: Isocrates' Rhetorical Education* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1997), passim. Georges Mathieu, *Les Idées Politiques d'Isocrate* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1966), ch. 13 examines Isocrates' speeches within contemporary politics and against Philip's policy, for which see also Mario Marzi, "Isocrate e Filippo II di Macedonia: L'autenticità della II epistola a Filippo," *Atene e Roma* 39 (1994): 1-10.

³³⁷ See *Epistle* I, to Dionysius of Syracuse, and *Epistle* IX, to Archidamus. Isocrates had also called upon the Athenians to institute a similar policy in his speech *On the Peace*.

hand and Isocrates' students on the other. Creating dialogue between them on the basis of a shared body of political ideals lay at the heart of Isocrates' project.

Isocrates' two audiences were not as dissimilar as their geography would suggest. In Chapter 2 I discussed the many ways in which the Macedonian court, in Philip's time even more than previously, had become closely connected to a panhellenic Greek aristocracy and the Athenian elite (see above, pp. 83-84). The Macedonian royals had also formed close bonds with Plato's Academy at Athens, and there are several strange stories told about the influence of Plato himself on the court of Perdiccas III, Philip's older brother.³³⁸ There was also Aristotle, of course, whose father had been court physician to Amyntas III and who tutored Alexander from 342 to 340 BCE.³³⁹ It is therefore a false dichotomy to posit that Isocrates had to address either his Athenian or his Macedonian audience to the exclusion of the other. Philip's court presented Isocrates with an amenable audience, one which was saturated with the modes of thinking of aristocratic Greece.³⁴⁰

Isocrates offers his audience a rationalization of Philip and his policy from within an elite rhetoric of panhellenism. As a positive rearticulation of Philip's policy, Isocrates'

³³⁸ Speusippus in his *Letter to Philip* claims that Plato took an interest in the strained relationship between the brothers. Platomay have been instrumental in getting Perdiccas to assign some territory to Philip's jurisdiction (*Athen.* 11.506f.). A letter from Plato to Perdiccas III, *Epistle V*, and another letter to Philip himself (thirty-first of the *Socratic Epistles*) are often considered spurious, though see Anthony Francis Natoli, *The Letter of Speusippus to Philip II: Introduction, Text, Translation, and Commentary* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2004), Appendix I. A pupil of Plato, Euphraeus of Oreus, also became something of a cultural arbiter in Perdiccas court (*Athen.* 11.115-9; *Caryst. Frag.* 1-2).

³³⁹ Plut. *Alex.* 7.2-5. Isocrates' *Epistle V*, which is addressed to Alexander, also suggests that Alexander consider 'supplementing' his studies with Aristotle with practical rhetoric.

³⁴⁰ It is difficult to say how much the contest between Isocrates' school and the Academy would have affected the patronage of intellectuals in Macedonia. It has been argued that Isocrates' *Philip* may have been meant to sway Philip away from his patronage of the Academy and toward a congenial attitude to his own school; this certainly seems to be the way Speusippus understood Isocrates' motives in his own letter to Philip, the viciousness of which in denouncing Isocrates evidently knew no bounds. On the other hand, Philip seems to have had no problem patronizing both Aristotle, a pupil of Plato, and Theopompus, a pupil of Isocrates.

argument did indeed have political importance within the elite Hellenic world. One wonders, indeed, how much Philip enjoyed, and how much he was amused by, Isocrates' sleight of hand. Yet Isocrates' *Philip* does not only rearticulate Philip's policy in a way that would have been pleasing to a Macedonian audience. It also tackles the conflict of loyalty which arose for the orator himself between his Athenian identity and his espousal of Macedonian interests in Greece. This conflict of loyalty was one which many Greek aristocrats would have felt as, in the mid and late 4th century, they found themselves increasingly drawn to the power and potential of Philip's court. Isocrates actively seeks to bridge the potential gap between Hellenic elites and the Hellenized aristocracy of Macedonia by dealing with Isocrates' own ostensible conflict of loyalties as an Athenian endorsing Philip's involvement in Greek affairs. Inasmuch as Isocrates' stated conflict of loyalty was not unique to himself, the *Philip* speaks for a certain subset of elite Hellenes - not necessarily Athenians - who also found it expedient to forward Philip's agenda. I argue that Isocrates offers two lines of reasoning to explicate his turning to Philip as a panhellenic leader: on the one hand, he highlights the affinity between his own political discourse and Philip's political activity, thus suggesting Philip's acuity and right thinking; and, on the other hand, he valorizes Philip's position as a political outsider who can solve the in-fighting which characterizes and degrades the politics of the Hellenic world.

I begin by examining the Amphipolis prologue (*Philip* 1-30), which sets out the background and the goals for the *Philip* and, I argue, connects Athens with Macedonia and Isocrates with Philip. These two relationships – between Athens and Philip on the one hand, and Isocrates and Philip on the other – serve as focal points for the rest of the

chapter. I highlight the parallels Isocrates builds between himself and Philip, first as political philosophers and then as outsiders to the Greek *polis*. Considering Philip's status as a Hellene and at the same time as monarch of a non-Greek community allowed Isocrates to explore his own role as the philosopher who has his city's interests at heart but who cannot participate in governance. Inasmuch as Isocrates' self-exploration turns on his construction of Philip's ἤθος, his method is quite similar to that of Demosthenes and Aeschines, who also employed Philip's ἤθος as a vehicle for expressing their own identities and political roles. Indeed, there are a number of noteworthy parallels specifically between Isocrates' and Demosthenes' rhetoric which I will tease out over the course of this chapter.³⁴¹ These parallels point to the percolation of political rhetoric from elite to public forums of communication (and visa versa). The results of Isocrates' exploration, however, could not be further from those of Demosthenes and the political dialogue of the *ekklesia*: his rhetoric addressed a panhellenic elite community of which Philip was not only a part but, if Isocrates had his way, its leader.

Amphipolis

The present *Philip*, Isocrates tells us, had been some time in the making.

Isocrates relates that he had been in the act of composing a speech to Philip about the merits of peace with Athens and the senselessness of the dispute over Amphipolis when

³⁴¹ Parallels between Demosthenes and Isocrates have been studied before: most recently, and perhaps most importantly, by Galen Rowe, "Anti-Isocratean Rhetoric in Demosthenes' *Against Androtion*," *Historia* 49 (2000): 278-302 and "Two Responses by Isocrates to Demosthenes," *Historia* 51 (2002): 149-162, posits Demosthenes' specific engagement with Isocratean ideas, particularly through the many pupils of Isocrates active in Athenian politics in the mid 4th century. Comparisons between them have been of long standing, though they have been explained variously: see Gabriele Bockisch, "Der Panhellenismus bei Isokrates und Demosthenes," in *Eirene: Actes de la XIIème conférence internationale d'études classiques* (Amsterdam: 1975), 239-246. See also Jacqueline de Romilly, "Eunoia in Isocrates or the Political Importance of Good Will," *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 78 (1958): passim; Isajeva, "Political Programme of Isocrates," 166 on the theme of Philip's power and 167 on the theme of ὁ καιρός.

Philip and the Athenians anticipated him by concluding the Peace of Philocrates.³⁴² Isocrates therefore had to scrap his initial attempt, and begin a new speech – the current *Philip* – in the hopes of making the peace between Philip and Athens a permanent one. Isocrates then continues to elaborate on his own considerations in writing and on the way his students received a preliminary draft of the current speech. This preface (*Philip* 1-30), in its seemingly exhaustive detail concerning the circumstances that prompted Isocrates to write to Philip, the contents of his old speech, and its reception, begs the question of why Isocrates included it in the current text. Indeed, the Amphipolis prologue is more than a perfunctory apology or an elaborate setting of the scene; rather, it is an integral part of the speech that has both Philip and an Athenian readership in mind. Moreover, this section is programmatic for the rest of the speech because it sets up the comparison between Philip and Athens as potential readers of Isocrates and panhellenic leaders.

As past commentators have noted, Isocrates' arguments concerning Amphipolis seem to be more Athenocentric than an address to Philip should warrant.³⁴³ Most obviously, Isocrates takes Athens' side in the Amphipolis conflict while offering Philip in return for the city nothing more tangible than Athenian goodwill (*Philip* 3-6). Moreover, Isocrates explicitly says that he has set out to write the current speech with a view to *Athens'* benefit (*Philip* 9). It is clear that Isocrates did have an Athenian readership, both students (*Philip* 7; 17-21; 23) and detractors (*Philip* 57; 93-4; 128-31), in mind. Yet

³⁴² Amphipolis was a key point in the Peace of Philocrates, at least from the Athenians perspective, though Philip had captured the city in 358 BCE and the Athenians didn't have the shadow of a hope of realizing their claims in 346.

³⁴³ For example, Markle, "Support of Athenian Intellectuals," 81-2, argued that the speech was aimed mainly at an Athenian audience and that Isocrates was *not* actively advocating Philip to go to war against Persia, largely on the basis of the Athenocentrism of Isocrates' digression on Amphipolis.

despite the blatant overtures to Isocrates' Athenian audience and Isocrates' own overt Athenocentrism, its audience need not have been exclusively Athenian.³⁴⁴ For one thing, even as Isocrates suggests that Philip ought to hand over Amphipolis to Athens (in the present *Philip*), everyone would have known that, in reality, the Peace of Philocrates had already ceded Amphipolis to Philip's control. As a common platitude among Athenian politicians eager to stave off accusations of disloyalty, such a demonstration of Athenocentrism was exactly the sort of argument that Isocrates' elite students of rhetoric and Philip might *not* be expected to take seriously (for a parallel, see Aeschines 2.27-33).³⁴⁵ Moreover, Isocrates actively endorsed diverse – even antithetical – readings of his speeches.³⁴⁶ What mattered was the ability to convincingly interpret the speech after one's own fashion, in a display of παιδεία that showed one's belonging to a geographically diverse but culturally connected elite. Such an exercise of reading a particular argument into a speech served to *build* rather than negate consensus. The *Philip*, like the rest of the Isocratean corpus, was meant to be read in diverse ways and thereby marry Macedonian and Athenian arguments together. I will come back to this

³⁴⁴ Indeed, I note as well that Isocrates' mention of his detractors at *Philip* 57 is addressed to his detractors in Macedonia, who might counsel Philip that Isocrates' proposal is too outlandish or too difficult to accomplish.

³⁴⁵ On this point I agree with Markle: see "Support of Athenian Intellectuals," 82.

³⁴⁶ In writing the *Panathenaicus*, Isocrates included a rereading of his speech by a Spartan, a former student of his, who reinterprets an encomium of Athens as praise of Sparta (*Panathenaicus* 234-263); after he is finished, Isocrates says that he praised the man's speech but did not come down on either side of the issue:

Οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ἐγὼ παρεστῶς ἐσιώπων, ἀλλ' ἐπήνεσα τὴν τε φύσιν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲν ἐφθεγγάμην ὧν εἶπεν, οὔθ' ὡς ἔτυχε ταῖς ὑπονοίαις τῆς ἐμῆς διανοίας οὔθ' ὡς διήμαρτεν, ἀλλ' εἶων αὐτὸν οὕτως ἔχειν ὥσπερ αὐτὸς αὐτὸν διέθηκεν.

Nor did I stand silently to the side, but I praised his aptitude and his cleverness. But I didn't say anything about any of the arguments that he had spoken – neither that he had hit upon the intention of my speech or that he had missed the mark – allowing him to maintain his opinion just as he had formed for himself (*Panathenaicus* 265).

On Isocratean ambivalence and *dissoi logoi* see also Too, *Rhetoric of Identity*, 61-73.

larger point concerning the whole of the *Philip* and its addressees later; for now, I will show that the Amphipolis prologue can be interpreted in a non-Athenocentric fashion in order to demonstrate the affinity between Isocratean and Macedonian policy-making.

The preface seeks to connect the policies advocated by Isocrates and Philip. Isocrates relates that he was first prompted to write to Philip upon seeing that both Philip's advisors and the orators in Athens held hawkish views, and that therefore neither the king nor the *demos* was being correctly counseled (*Philip* 2-3). In setting his advice apart, Isocrates elevates his own authority as an advisor: whereas the other councilors, whether Athenian and Macedonian, counseled wrongly, Isocrates had got it right in advocating for peace (*Philip* 3). Yet, it turns out shortly thereafter, Isocrates was *not* alone. In fact, Philip was also in the right in concluding peace with Athens – and he did so before he had the benefit of Isocrates' council in the matter (*Philip* 7-8). It is noteworthy in this regard that Isocrates never actually states how the matter of Amphipolis was resolved, though in point of fact, Amphipolis remained a Macedonian possession. In omitting to mention the denouement of the Amphipolis conflict – the only point on which, it would appear, Isocrates' and Philip's policies differed – the conformity of their political approaches is highlighted. One might thus apply the consideration which Isocrates ascribes to Philip also to the Athenians: that “to conclude this [peace], no matter how, was better than to suffer the evils that come about from war” [ὅπως γὰρ οὖν πεπραχθαι κρείττον ἦν αὐτὴν [τὴν εἰρήνην] ἢ συνέχεσθαι τοῖς κακοῖς τοῖς διὰ τὸν πόλεμον γιγνομένοις (*Philip* 7)]. The Athenians, too, would benefit from peace – even if it came at the expense of Amphipolis. Philip is shown to have arrived at

the same conclusion as Isocrates not only without the philosopher's advice, but even in *contravention* to the desires of his own advisors.

In connecting Isocrates and Philip as two bastions of appropriate thinking in a world (of orators and advisors) full of folly, the preface sets Philip up as a potentially sympathetic reader for the speech.³⁴⁷ For, in detailing his former speech and the circumstances surrounding the Peace of Philocrates, Isocrates shows that his advice is already not far from Philip's own policy. Now, under the guidance of the updated *Philip*, the Macedonian king has the opportunity to realize the full potential of the Peace of Philocrates by making it permanent and extending its benefits to the whole of Greece. At the same time, he will be able to turn his war effort towards the Persian Empire with the support of the Greeks. Inasmuch as pointing to the peace as Philip's own political success would have been pleasing for the Macedonian, the prologue is an effective *captatio benevolentiae* for Philip as well as Isocrates' Athenian audience.³⁴⁸

It may be argued that the Amphipolis prologue assigns credit for the Peace of Philocrates to both Philip and Athens equally, thereby mitigating the emphasis I have placed on the connection drawn between Isocrates' policy and Philip's political stance. Indeed, Isocrates does praise Athens as a willing participant and equally prudent in voting for peace (*Philip* 7). At the same time, however, the wisdom of Athens' conduct is undercut by the very fact that Isocrates turns to Philip – rather than Athens – to make the peace a permanent one. Isocrates claims that he is now afraid for the Athenians, who

³⁴⁷ While Isocrates is relatively gentle towards Philip's hawkish advisors, he has no such patience with Athenian proponents of war: see *Philip* 73; 81.

³⁴⁸ Isocrates will make the same point later on as well, extoling how much Philip had already achieved in his reign: see *Philip* 41; 98; 105. Heilbrunn, "Isocrates on Rhetoric and Power," 177-8, remarks on the similarity in Isocratean rhetoric between Isocrates' own quest for glory [δόξα] through his λόγος and the dynast's quest for glory through political and military success.

may quickly grow tired and once again turn to war-mongering (*Philip* 8); he voices no such qualms on Philip's behalf. Moreover, Isocrates alludes to his *Panegyricus*, which was addressed to the Athenians, as a forerunner of the present speech (*Philip* 9) even though he had addressed similar speeches to other Hellenic kings as well.³⁴⁹ That Isocrates refers to the *Panegyricus* specifically, I argue, points out his disillusionment with the Athenians as potential leaders of the Hellenic world and sets Philip up as the inheritor of the Athenians' former primacy among the Greeks.

Isocrates wrote the *Panegyricus* after the Peace of Antalcidas was concluded in 387 BCE.³⁵⁰ His speech called on Athens and Sparta to conclude a panhellenic peace and lead an expedition to Persia. The Athenians came in for particular praise, as they were to be the leaders of the Persian expedition. Isocrates' choice of the *Panegyricus* as the point of contrast for the *Philip*, instead of the many other speeches on the same theme he had written for various dynasts, calls attention to Athenian inaction as a negative paradigm for Philip. Athens, in short, had already had the benefit of Isocrates' advice and had failed the test. Linguistic parallels between the openings of the *Philip* and the *Panegyricus* secure the close interplay specific to these two speeches in the Isocratean corpus.³⁵¹ Thus Isocrates invites the reader to compare the way Isocrates has dealt with the same theme – panhellenic peace complemented by war against the barbarian – when

³⁴⁹ Isocrates does mention these previous attempts later on (*Philip* 93). He also particularly mentions his letter to Dionysius of Syracuse (*Philip* 81). His speech *On the Peace*, as well, advocated panhellenic peace and a resumption of Athens' position of leadership among the *poleis*. Nevertheless, the *Panegyricus* is particularly drawn out for comparison, here and in later sections of the *Philip* (see *Philip* 84, 129; see also *Epistle* 3.6). Speusippus remarked on the existence of Isocrates' other speeches that counseled panhellenic peace and war against the barbarian in his criticism of the *Philip*, citing Isocrates' exhortations to Agesilaus, Dionysius, and Alexander of Thessaly (*Letter to Philip*, 13). We have another letter to Archidamus, the son of Agesilaus, which may have preceded a similar speech.

³⁵⁰ The Peace of Antalcidas brought the Corinthian War, fought between Sparta and a coalition of Thebes and Athens, to a close. Ironically, it was backed by the Persian king Artaxerxes II and was supposed to be a 'Common Peace' for the whole of Greece. See Badian, "The King's Peace;" Jehne, *Koine Eirene*; Ryder, *Koine Eirene*.

³⁵¹ As detailed by Perlman, "Isocrates' 'Philippus' and Panhellenism," 371.

directed at two such different political players as the Athenians and Philip. By inviting his audience to read Philip against Athens, Isocrates highlights Philip's unique suitability to the task at hand. Philip comes to embody an attractive alternative to Athenian leadership, even though – and, indeed, because - he stands outside of the Athenian and the Hellenic world. Again, then, Isocrates' focus on the *Panegyricus* shows that the *Philip* was interested in capturing the goodwill of a Macedonian as well as an Athenian audience.

I have focused on two threads in the Amphipolis prologue: Isocrates' construction of his own relationship with Philip and Philip's parallelism with Athens as recipients of Isocratean advice. Thus far I have shown that Isocrates recommends himself to Philip on the basis of the evident sympathy between their political goals. Isocrates and Philip are differentiated from the common run of men who surround them, whether the demagogues in Athens or Philip's ἑταῖροι in Macedonia. Philip will take Athens' place in ushering in an era of panhellenic peace by building on the Peace of Philocrates and establishing goodwill [εὐνοία] as the basis and goal for his future relations with Greece.³⁵² Isocrates and Philip, and Philip and Athens, are comparisons which Isocrates will develop and complicate throughout the speech. Neither relationship is as simple as it might appear from the prologue and, as may already be evident, the two issues are closely interconnected.

Isocrates, Philip, and Philosophia

The connection Isocrates imagines between himself and Philip cannot be understood outside of Isocrates' self-presentation as a teacher and a political

³⁵² εὐνοία was the return that, Isocrates claimed, Philip would get by handing Amphipolis over to Athens (*Philip* 5-6).

(non)activist. On the surface, their relationship is structured along the well-trodden lines of the wise advisor and the politically active pupil. Such a relationship had an ancient tradition that had taken a new lease on life in 4th century elite thought.³⁵³ Isocrates himself had assumed the role of advisor to the monarch elsewhere in his corpus.³⁵⁴ In the *Philip*, Isocrates' repudiation of Philip's ἐπαῖροι is a fairly obvious bid to replace them himself (*Philip* 2; 18-19). Again, the Amphipolis preface is paradigmatic in its concern with Isocrates' influence on Philip's actions. Both philosopher and king choose peace instead of war, Isocrates in his speech and Philip in his actions. Furthermore, both of their initial efforts need to be further solidified: Isocrates' first speech, on the one hand, was only a beginning that must now be superseded by a new and better exhortation; so too, the Peace of Philocrates is impermanent and in its current state and needs to be restructured to include all of Greece (*Philip* 8). Isocrates' speech [λόγος] and Philip's action [ἔργον] are both necessary components to the creation of a real panhellenic peace. Yet the division of labor suggested by this distinction between Isocrates' speech and Philip's action is complicated over the course of the *Philip*. As Isocrates' role will become something more than that of the wise advisor, so too Philip will appear to have some of the qualities of a philosopher.³⁵⁵

³⁵³ On the *topos* of the wise advisor see R. Lattimore, "The Wise Adviser in Herodotus," *Classical Philology* (1939): 24-35.

³⁵⁴ The *To Nicocles* contains perhaps Isocrates' most pointed exhortation for the monarch to court the good advisor, "knowing that a good advisor is the most useful and the most monarchic of all possessions" [γινώσκων ὅτι σύμβουλος ἀγαθὸς χρησιμώτατον καὶ τυραννικώτατον ἀπάντων τῶν κτημάτων ἐστίν] (*To Nicocles* 53).

³⁵⁵ Isocrates was interested in the interplay of λόγος and ἔργον elsewhere as well. Their relationship was naturally critical for a writer crafting λόγοι ostensibly meant for oral delivery while at the same time, in as much as they were material, written documents, being ἔργα. See Michael Gagarin, "Λόγος as ἔργον in Isocrates," in *Papers on Rhetoric 4*, ed. Lucia Calboli Montefusco (Rome: Herder Editrice, 2002), 111-119, on the conflation of λόγοι and ἔργα in the *Antidosis* and for a fascinating look at Isocrates' reinterpretation of Thucydides.

Isocrates' inability to be politically active is a consistent feature of his ἦθος, in the *Philip* and throughout his corpus.³⁵⁶ In part, Isocrates' ἀπραγμοσύνη stems from his age; so, for example, he claims that the *Philip* should really have been written by a man of outstanding stature at the prime of his life (*Philip* 10-12). While Isocrates' age acts as a convenient excuse for any potential faults in his writing, it also taps into Isocrates' broader self-representation as a man without the nature [φύσις] requisite for public speaking, and hence normative public action. Nevertheless, the mental acuity which Isocrates has honed through education [παιδεία] makes his political advice invaluable.³⁵⁷ Thus, while he cannot actively participate in politics, Isocrates dispenses practical advice through writing.

In the *Philip* Isocrates confronts his inability to participate in the democratic debate and his consequent attempt to influence events by other means:

ἐγὼ γὰρ πρὸς μὲν τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι πάντων ἀφύεστατος ἐγενόμην τῶν πολιτῶν (οὔτε γὰρ φωνὴν ἔσχον ἰκανὴν οὔτε τόλμαν δυναμένην ὄχλῳ χρῆσθαι καὶ μολύνεσθαι καὶ λοιδορεῖσθαι τοῖς ἐπὶ τοῦ βήματος κυλινδουμένοις), τοῦ δὲ φρονεῖν εὖ καὶ πεπαιδεῦσθαι καλῶς, εἰ καὶ τις ἀγροϊκότερον εἶναι φήσει τὸ ῥηθέν, ἀμφισβητῶ, καὶ θείην ἂν ἑμαυτὸν οὐκ ἐν τοῖς ἀπολελειμμένοις ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς προέχουσι τῶν ἄλλων. Διὸ περ ἐπιχειρῶ συμβουλεύειν τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, ὃν ἐγὼ πέφυκα καὶ δύνάμαι, καὶ τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς Ἕλλησι καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοῖς ἐνδοξοτάτοις.

For I am by nature the least suited of the citizenry for practicing politics. For I do not have a ready voice nor the courage to deal with the crowd, and to become corrupt and throw around insults with the men hanging about the *bema*. But - even if someone should say that I speak boorishly [in saying so] - I argue that I have intelligence and am well educated, and I would place myself not among the worst but among the best men.

³⁵⁶ On Isocrates' characteristic ἀπραγμοσύνη see Too, *Rhetoric of Identity*, ch. 3.

³⁵⁷ Isocrates specifically cites his age, along with his lack of experience in the courts, as excuses for his imaginary public speech at *Antidosis* 26-7. For other remarks on Isocrates' age see *Epistle* 2.23, *Antidosis* 9-10, and *Panathenaicus* 3-4. On Isocrates' rhetoric in the broader context of Athenian thought on old age see Roisman, *Rhetoric of Manhood*, 210-12. On Isocrates' age as a chronological indicator that acts to organize his corpus see Too, *Rhetoric of Identity*, 43-48. See also Poulakos, *Speaking for the Polis*, 94-97, who argues that Isocrates put great stock in φύσις.

Because of this I have at least attempted to give council in whatever way I am naturally suited and able to, both to the city, to Greece, and to the most distinguished among men. (*Philip* 81-2)

Isocrates cites his “natural” inability [ἀφυστάτος ἐγενόμην] to engage in politics, claiming in its stead intelligence [τὸ φρονεῖν] and education [παιδεία]. Isocrates’ also focuses on his vocal weakness, which prohibits him from producing the ready and powerful speeches required of a politician in active life.³⁵⁸ The Isocratean rhetoric of the ‘small voice’ was a convenient fiction that allowed the philosopher to assume the mantle of elite critic while touting his παιδεία as practical knowledge useful to those who wished to speak in the ἐκκλησία.³⁵⁹ At the same time, Isocrates’ disability required that his ideas be championed by someone who did have the physical and practical know-how to put them into action (*Philip* 13). Indeed, Isocrates explicitly states that as Philip excels in action, so he himself excels in rhetoric (*Philip* 151). Theirs, it would appear, is a practical partnership for achieving what neither could accomplish alone.

Yet to divide Isocrates’ and Philip’s roles into speaking advisor and active advisee would be to oversimplify their roles. On the one hand, Isocrates’ rhetoric is itself an active agent, whose new written rather than spoken format makes up for, even as it points

³⁵⁸ Too, *Rhetoric of Identity*, aptly states that “for Isocrates, the representation of speaking in public as a political activity is the normative one” (87). On Isocrates’ weak voice see also *Epistle* 8.7 and *Panathenaicus* 9-10.

³⁵⁹ That Isocrates’ ‘deficiency’ was part of a carefully constructed persona has been convincingly argued by Too, *Rhetoric of Identity*, ch. 3. Some of his students were, however, active politicians in the democracy; perhaps the most notable was Timotheus the general. Thus at the same time as Isocrates reneges on an active public life he also argues for the practical usefulness of his brand of philosophy. On Isocrates as critic of Athenian democracy see Josiah Ober, *Political Dissent in Democratic Athens: Intellectual Critics of Popular Rule* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), ch. 5. Isocrates’ definition of philosophy stands in opposition to that of Plato and his Academy, whose school of thought rejected Athenian democracy entirely and favored a φιλοσοφία based on fixed abstract principle rather than a malleable perception of reality. See Too, *Rhetoric of Identity*, ch. 1 and Niall Livingstone, “Writing Politics: Isocrates’ Rhetoric of Philosophy,” *Rhetorica* 25 (2007): 15-34, on Isocrates’ philosophy as the *politicus logos*.

out, its author's deficiency.³⁶⁰ Thus for example Isocrates can imagine his rhetoric as an act of war in itself: "employing whatever power I happen to have, I have persisted constantly in warring against the barbarians" [τῆ δυνάμει ταύτῃ χρώμενος ἢν ἔχων τυγχάνω, διατετέλεκα πάντα τὸν χρόνον πολεμῶν μὲν τοῖς βαρβάροις] (*Philip* 130). Isocrates casts himself as an active participant in the one issue which had become the driving purpose of his political agenda: namely, the unification of the Hellenic world against the Persian Empire. Paradoxically, then, Isocrates' ἀπραγμοσύνη turns out to be the best method for enacting real change. Indeed, Isocrates posits that finding an individual to champion his cause is more useful than speaking to the *demos* would have been; it is also more practical than composing imaginary constitutional states like the sophists:

ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐγὼ ταύτας τὰς δυσχερείας ὑπεριδὼν οὕτως ἐπὶ γήρωσ γέγονα φιλότιμος, ὥστ' ἠβουλήθην ἅμα τοῖς πρὸς σὲ λεγομένοις καὶ τοῖς μετ' ἐμοῦ διατρίψασιν ὑποδεῖξαι καὶ ποιῆσαι φανερόν, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ταῖς πανηγύρεσιν ἐνοχλεῖν καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντας λέγειν τοὺς συντρέχοντας ἐν αὐταῖς πρὸς οὐδένα λέγειν ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως οἱ τοιοῦτοι τῶν λόγων ἄκυροι τυγχάνουσι ὄντες τοῖς νόμοις καὶ ταῖς πολιτείαις ταῖς ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν γεγραμμέναις, δεῖ δὲ τοὺς βουλομένους μὴ μάτην φλυαρεῖν ἀλλ' προὔργου τι ποιεῖν καὶ τοὺς οἰομένους ἀγαθὸν τι κοινὸν εὐρηκέναι τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἔαν πανηγυρίζειν, αὐτοὺς δ' ὥν εἰσηγοῦνται ποιήσασθαί τινα προστάτην τῶν καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν δυναμένων καὶ δόξαν μεγάλην ἐχόντων, εἴπερ μέλλουσι τινες προσέξειν αὐτοῖς τὸν νοῦν.

But, disregarding these failings, I have become so ambitious in old age that I decided, in the words addressed to you, to show and make clear to my students that to tire the masses with panegyrics and to speak at the same time to everybody is in fact to speak to nobody, and that such

³⁶⁰ At times, Isocrates also imagines his own speeches as 'acting' in his stead. In the *Philip*, for example, Isocrates claims that his initial discourse to Philip would bring about the end of the war (*Philip* 7). The conceit of the *Antidosis* works on a similar principle: having been unable to win his case before a 'real' jury in his antidosis trial, Isocrates is now publishing his speech to plead his case for him, in the hopes that it will be more successful than he was himself: *Antidosis* 1-12. That a written speech can taken on a life of its own, divorced from that of its author, is most poignantly claimed by Isocrates in the *Panathenaicus*, which he wrote at the end of his life: see Gagarin, "Λόγος as ἔργον;" Too, *Rhetoric of Identity*, 124-7. On the other hand, Isocrates sometimes suggests that a written speech may be less persuasive than speech: see for example *Epistle* 3.4.

speeches are as ineffectual as the laws and constitutions written by the sophists. But those who do not wish to chatter in vain but do something practical, and who think that they have hit upon something that will be of universal benefit, should allow others to issue panegyrics while they themselves should find someone to champion their cause who is capable of both speech and action, and who has a widespread reputation, if they are to command attention (*Philip* 12-13).

Isocrates stakes out for himself the middle ground between the politicians of the Athenian democracy and the sophists. He argues for the preeminence of his approach on the basis of its ability to create both quick and far-reaching results.³⁶¹ Isocrates' brand of political disengagement turns out to be the best approach to real-world change, after all.

Just as Isocrates imagines his rhetoric as an active entity on the political stage, so too does he address Philip as a budding philosopher, exhorting him to deliberate and make judgments about policy in his own right. Already in the Amphipolis prologue we have seen Philip deliberating wisely and opting for peace without the benefit of Isocrates' advice (*Philip* 7). Later in the speech, Isocrates advises Philip on the way he is to approach the speech before him:

Οὕτω δ' ἂν ἀκριβέστατα καὶ κάλλιστα θεωρήσειας εἴ τι τυγχάνομεν λέγοντες, ἦν τὰς μὲν δυσχερείας τὰς περὶ τοὺς σοφιστὰς καὶ τοὺς ἀναγιγνωσκομένους τῶν λόγων ἀφέλης, ἀναλαμβάνων δ' ἕκαστον αὐτῶν εἰς τὴν διάνοιαν ἐξετάζης, μὴ πάρεργον ποιούμενος μηδὲ μετὰ ῥαθυμίας, ἀλλὰ μετὰ λογισμοῦ καὶ φιλοσοφίας, ἧς καὶ σὲ μετεσχηκέναι φασίν. Μετὰ γὰρ τούτων σκοπούμενος μᾶλλον ἢ μετὰ τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης ἄμεινον ἂν βουλευέσαιο περὶ αὐτῶν.

You will be able to best and most carefully consider whether I happen to have spoken something [to the purpose], if you set aside any prejudices

³⁶¹ Isocrates is perhaps alluding to Plato's Academy in his comment on the sophists. See Ober, *Political Dissent*, 248-256, on Isocrates' relationship to other critics of the democracy; I find particularly illuminating his conclusion, in discussing the *Antidosis*, that "Isocrates takes for himself the role of a concerned member of both the democratic and the critical communities, who seeks an appropriate means to reintegrate the interests of the upright individual and his polis" (272). See also William Benoit, "Isocrates and Plato on Rhetoric and Rhetorical Education," *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 21 (1991): 60-71, for a more specific comparison of Isocrates and Plato; also Shalom Perlman, "Rhetoric and Philosophy: a Chapter in Fourth-Century Literary Criticism," *Scripta Classica Israelica* 12 (1993): 86-93, who argues that Plato took a positive view of Isocrates in the *Phaedrus*.

against sophists and written speeches, and instead examine each point as you take hold of it in your mind, neither doing so lightly nor as an amusement, but with consideration and with that love of knowledge which they say you too have. For if you consider these things in such a manner rather than by following the common opinion of the masses, you will be better able to judge them. (*Philip* 28-9)

Isocrates imagines Philip as a philosopher and rhetorician – as he puts it, Philip already has an interest in philosophy.³⁶² So, at least, Isocrates says he has heard: he cannot claim direct knowledge of Philip’s character. In claiming that he had heard about Philip’s philosophical inclinations from others, Isocrates sets Philip within a larger social group composed of a well-educated Greek aristocracy. It is in the eyes of these others – and, from their report, in Isocrates’ view as well – that Philip gains his credentials as a social equal via his φιλοσοφία (which is to say, his παιδεία). It is the mode of thought shared by this elite that Philip should continue to follow rather than the “common opinion of the masses” [ἡ τῶν πολλῶν δόξη]. By studying Isocrates’ speech, Philip takes on the role of a student of political rhetoric and thereby also gains social acceptance from his Hellenic peers.

In the passage above Isocrates particularly suggests that Philip take hold of each point in the speech in his own mind and ponder it carefully. In recommending this method of reading to the king, Isocrates alludes to the kind of philosophical inquiry which he himself taught.³⁶³ For Isocrates, appropriate deliberation with the self [εὔφρονεῖν] was as much the mark of the wise man as appropriate speechmaking [εὔ

³⁶² Isocrates says the same of Alexander, whom he calls φιλόσοφος... καὶ φιλαθήναιος καὶ φιλόσοφος (*Letter to Alexander*, 2).

³⁶³ Isocrates positioned his philosophy in contravention to philosophy as understood in the Academy. On φιλοσοφία as a contested term between the two schools, and Isocrates’ understanding of it, see Livingstone, “Writing Politics;” Ober, *Political Dissent*, 248-56.

λέγειν].³⁶⁴ Moreover, private deliberation, as contrasted with the oratory put on for the masses, marked the philosopher as a man of a higher order than the mere public rhetor, who did not necessarily need to have a well-considered policy in order to put on a crowd-pleasing rhetorical display. In the *Antidosis*, for example, Isocrates valorizes those who can debate skillfully with themselves, in their own minds, above those who can only argue publicly (*Antidosis* 256). In the *Philip*, then, Isocrates argues that Philip should employ his own powers of discernment in ascertaining the best course of action; he is no mere automaton who is to act upon Isocrates' advice as upon law. Of course, implicit in Isocrates' advice is the supposition that if Philip considers the matter carefully he will come to agree with Isocrates' views. Unlike Isocrates' own students, who have already made the mistake of inconsiderate judgment (*Philip* 24), Philip ought to carefully study the whole of Isocrates' corpus in an unprejudiced manner and only then to deliberate on the specific policy proposal at hand (*Philip* 138).³⁶⁵ Philip too is something of a philosopher and able to employ Isocratean παιδεία for himself.

Philip is neither the mere recipient of Isocratean wisdom, nor simply the means by which Isocrates can attain his end.³⁶⁶ The champion for the cause of panhellenic peace must not only be able to speak and act, and be of good repute (*Philip* 13), but must also be a philosophically-minded individual in his own right. His own social position within the cultural Greek elite draws him into sympathy with Isocrates' views, just as acting on

³⁶⁴ Isocrates' school of thought taught students both to εὖ φρονεῖν and λέγειν: see Poulakos, *Speaking for the Polis*, ch. 4.

³⁶⁵ That Philip is encouraged to study the present speech alongside the rest of the Isocratean corpus also points to his role as a specifically Isocratean student-philosopher. Too, *Rhetoric of Identity*, has stressed Isocrates' view of his own corpus as a coherent whole; see particularly ch. 2.

³⁶⁶ Isocrates often portrays his students thinking for themselves, and sometimes contrary to his own ideas: so the general Timotheus, Isocrates' student who was later convicted of treason in the courts and went into exile, is portrayed in the *Antidosis* as a worthy leader who was nevertheless unable to conform his nature to Isocrates' advice (*Antidosis* 101-39, especially 32-8); in the *Panathenaicus*, Isocrates praises a Spartan former student of his for reading his discourse in a pro-Spartan fashion (*Panathenaicus* 234-63).

those views will serve to reaffirm his position within that social sphere. Philip thus becomes the ideal monarch as Isocrates understood him to be.³⁶⁷

Monarchy and Democracy

In mentioning the *Panegyricus*, Isocrates makes it clear that he had entertained similar hopes before of Athens becoming the panhellenic leader of a peaceful Greece (*Philip* 9). Moreover, as partners in the Peace of Philocrates, both Philip and Athens had the potential to be recipients of Isocrates' advice. The comparison between Athens and Philip implicit in the Amphipolis prologue is elaborated over the course of the speech. Ultimately, Isocrates attempts to show that Philip is indeed better suited to enacting his project than Athens. In arguing that Philip would be a better panhellenic leader, Isocrates vindicates his own choice of Philip over Athens, a choice whose moral implications for Isocrates himself I will discuss in the next section. First, however, I will explore the way the contrast between the Macedonian king and the Athenians helps to define Philip himself. Isocrates focuses his comparison of the two potential panhellenic leaders on constitutional issues. Isocrates portrays Philip as politically outside the Greek world, and claims that this gives Philip an advantage that Athens can never have. He also lauds Philip's capabilities as a monarch not bound by laws and community mores.³⁶⁸ While Isocrates only praises monarchy in so far as it is exercised over non-Greeks, he does

³⁶⁷ Compare Isocrates' advice to Nicocles:

ὅ τι ἂν ἀκριβῶσαι βουλευθῆς ὧν ἐπίστασθαι προσήκει τοὺς βασιλεῖς, ἐμπειρίᾳ μέτιθι καὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ φιλοσοφεῖν τὰς ὁδοὺς σοὶ δείξει, τὸ δ' ἐπ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων γυμνάζεσθαι δύνασθαι σε χρῆσθαι τοῖς πράγμασι ποιήσει.

Whenever you desire to thoroughly understand what kings ought to know, pursue it in practice as well as in study; for studying will show you the way, and training yourself in actuality will make you able to deal with matters. (*To Nicocles* 35).

³⁶⁸ Noted by Isajeva, "Political Programme of Isocrates," 166, who also contrasts Isocrates' view of Philip's power with that of Demosthenes' (166 n. 14).

claim for the monarchy the potential to be more successful than any other type of government.

In the *Panegyricus*, Isocrates had argued that Sparta and Athens ought to resolve their differences and lead a panhellenic expedition against Persia (*Panegyricus* 15-17). Despite this initial call for a partnership between the two cities, Isocrates spent the rest of the speech arguing that Athens had the better right to lead the Hellenic world. He rested his case on the innate superiority of the Athenians as well as on the city's past munificence to the rest of Greece. Athens, Isocrates argued, was unique among the other Greek *poleis* in the purity of its Hellenic descent: Athenian autochthony was the reason why "we alone among the Greeks can call [the city] our nurse, father, and mother" [μόνοις γὰρ ἡμῖν τῶν Ἑλλήνων τὴν αὐτὴν τροφὸν καὶ πατρίδα καὶ μητέρα καλέσαι προσήκει] (*Panegyricus* 25). Isocrates also credited Athens as the birthplace of human civilization, as emblemized by the twin gifts of farming and religion (*Panegyricus* 28-33), as well as the establishment of the Hellenic world through colonization (*Panegyricus* 34-37). Athens' preeminence is thus founded on ancestral right coupled with a continued record of benefaction to the rest of Greece.

Isocrates crafted Philip's merits – some current, some still potential - as an analogue to his praise of Athens in the *Panegyricus*. Thus Philip, too, has a claim to ancestral preeminence in Greece based on his descent from Heracles, the "benefactor of all of Greece" [ἀπάσης... τῆς Ἑλλάδος εὐεργέτης] (*Philip* 76).³⁶⁹ Like Athens, Philip is of prestigious lineage that assures him the goodwill of the entire Greek world. More

³⁶⁹ Isocrates also included in the *Philip* an encomium of Heracles (*Philip* 105-6; 109-112), which presents the hero as a model for Philip. Isocrates perhaps also wished to emphasize the myth of Philip's Heraclid ancestry because it was such a contested issue (see above, pp. 27-32); however, he (wisely?) makes no mention of the existence of such doubts.

particularly, Isocrates ties Philip to the four major cities of mainland Greece – Argos, Thebes, Sparta, and Athens - via his Heraclid ancestry (*Philip* 32-33).³⁷⁰ At the same time, Philip's Argead ancestors also materially benefited the Greeks. So the first Argead king – who remains unnamed in the *Philip* - had the benefit of the Hellenes in mind when he chose to travel beyond the bounds of Greece and exercise his rule in Macedonia, rather than imposing a tyranny upon his native Argos (*Philip* 106). Such, then, are Philip's ancestral rights to privilege; his own benefactions, Isocrates asserts, will be made manifest once he is able to bring the panhellenic world to a state of peace (*Philip* 68). At that point the Greeks themselves will willingly acknowledge his leadership (*Philip* 69; 95).³⁷¹ This is a task which, Isocrates asserts, would be impossible for anyone but Philip, whose ability to succeed at impossible tasks has already been proven (*Philip* 41). Finally, in leading the panhellenic expedition against the Persians, Philip will open up new land to be settled by the poor and migrant populations that now infest Greece (*Philip* 121-3). Thus Philip, like Athens, is of impeccable ancestry and will bring peace and prosperity to the Hellenic world. Philip's uniqueness as a benefactor of the Greeks is closely modeled on Athenian exceptionalism as presented in the *Panegyricus*.

Despite the parallelism between Athens and Philip, Isocrates does not stop at simply 'replacing' the former with the latter. Rather, he argues that in terms of his political situation Philip is even better suited than Athens for panhellenic leadership.

³⁷⁰ Isocrates list of the 'greatest cities of Greece' varied over his lifetime; in his *Panegyricus* for example, which features a similar proposal for all of Greece to turn their martial effort against Persia, the leaders of the expedition were to be Athens and Sparta (though cf. *Panegyricus* 64, which lists all four as the greatest). Isocrates' choice of these four cities, and particularly his elevation of Argos into the ranks of the greatest Hellenic powers of the day, was less practical than it was attuned to those places best connected to Philip's Heraclid ancestry – under which criteria, Argos is surely preeminent as the place of Argead origin (*Philip* 32).

³⁷¹ Isocrates never appears to consider the possibility of ingratitude; rather, a good act inevitably binds the recipient to gratitude, thus creating a bond of goodwill [εὐνοία] between the two parties. See de Romilly, *Eunoia in Isocrates*, esp. pp. 98-101.

Isocrates bases this claim on Philip's unusual position as a Greek king whose seat of power is outside the Greek world. Indeed, inasmuch as he is a Hellene ruling over a non-Greek people, Philip is unique among all the previous recipients of Isocreatan exhortations. A direct comparison between Athens and Philip again proves particularly telling in this respect. In the *Panegyricus*, Isocrates had argued that one of Athens' key benefactions to the Hellenes was the establishment of polities and laws, the twin foundations of appropriate human relationships:

Παραλαβοῦσα γὰρ τοὺς Ἑλληνας ἀνόμως ζῶντας καὶ σποράδην οἰκοῦντας, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ὑπὸ δυναστειῶν ὑβριζομένους τοὺς δὲ δι' ἀναρχίαν ἀπολλυμένους, καὶ τούτων τῶν κακῶν αὐτοὺς ἀπήλλαξε, τῶν μὲν κυρία γενομένη, τοῖς δ' αὐτὴν παράδειγμα ποιήσασα· πρώτη γὰρ καὶ νόμους ἔθετο καὶ πολιτείαν κατεστήσατο.

For, finding the Greeks living lawlessly and scattered about – either being violently oppressed by overlords or devastated because of anarchy, [Athens] released them from both evils, becoming mistress of the former and the model for the latter; for she was the first to set down laws and establish polities. (*Panegyricus* 39).

Thus Athens is credited with creating the *polis* structure and lawful government.

Isocrates also praises the city's love of justice and the equality between the rich and the poor which it engendered (*Panegyricus* 104-5). Monarchy and tyrannical leadership, on the other hand, come in for harsh criticism: in the passage above, for example, dynasts as well as anarchy oppress the Greeks.³⁷² Nevertheless, in the *Philip* Isocrates argues that a monarch is better positioned to accomplish great things than any individual constrained under the rule of a polity.

³⁷² See also Jean-Pierre Liou, "Isocrate et le vocabulaire du pouvoir personnel: roi, monarque et tyran," *Ktèma* 16 (1991): 211-217.

Isocrates lauds the freedom of movement afforded to Philip because of his kingship. Comparing his capability to that of other Greeks, Isocrates finds Philip's potential to be greater:

Ἄ περ ἐγὼ γνοῦς διαλεχθῆναι σοὶ προειλόμην, οὐ πρὸς χάριν ἐκλεξάμενος... ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἐώρων τοὺς ἐνδόξους τῶν ἀνδρῶν ὑπὸ πόλεσι καὶ νόμοις οἰκοῦντας, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐξὸν αὐτοῖς ἄλλο πράττειν πλὴν τὸ προσταττόμενον, ἔτι δὲ πολὺ καταδεεστέρους ὄντας τῶν πραγμάτων τῶν ῥηθησομένων, σοὶ δὲ μόνῳ πολλὴν ἐξουσίαν ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης δεδομένην καὶ πρέσβεις πέμπειν πρὸς οὓς τινὰς ἂν βουλευθῆς, καὶ δέχεσθαι παρ' ὧν ἂν σοὶ δοκῆ, καὶ λέγειν ὅ τι ἂν ἡγῆ συμφέρειν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ δύναμιν κεκτημένον ὅσῃν οὐδεὶς τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἂ μόνον τῶν ὄντων καὶ πείθειν καὶ βιάζεσθαι πέφυκεν· ὧν οἶμαι καὶ τὰ ῥηθησόμενα προσδεήσεσθαι.

Considering these things I chose to address you. I made this choice not because I wished to curry favor, but because I saw other distinguished men living in cities and bound by laws, unable to do anything save what was proscribed, and, moreover, unequal to the matter I am about to propose; but [I saw] that to you alone fortune had given the ability to send ambassadors to whomever you wished, to receive them from wherever seemed best to you, and to say whatever seemed to you to be most fitting; and, in addition to this, [I saw] that you had acquired wealth and power to a greater degree than any other Hellene, which are the most suitable things of all for persuasion and the use of force. These last, I think, are also needed for my proposal. (*To Philip* 14-5).

Isocrates establishes Philip's political freedom by specifically opposing it to the Greek political system of *polis* laws which constrained the individual.³⁷³ The king, by contrast, is free from the polity's laws; his actions are not under anybody's supervision.³⁷⁴ The

³⁷³ The constraint exercised by the *polis* on the individual was a hallmark of the Athenian democracy, at the same time lauded by the orators in public forums and lamented by the elites, who saw it as an encroachment into their private affairs: see Balot, *Greek Political Thought*, 57-63. Public officials, in particular, were constrained by the *eúthynai* that ensured their accountability; and there were a host of other potential ways of indicting a magistrate: see Hansen, *Athenian Democracy*, 212-24 on *εἰσαγγελία* and *εὔθυνα*.

³⁷⁴ The king is rather, as we will see, constrained by appropriate ethics. This is consistent with Isocrates' discourse on kingship and tyranny, particularly as articulated in the *To Nicocles*, where Isocrates argues that the tyrant's position is a disadvantage to him because he is not induced by the laws and by other social constraints to learn how to live ethically (*To Nicocles* 3-4). See also Balot, *Greek Political Thought*, 146-53, on ethics as a counterbalance to monarchic imperialism and Kathryn Morgan, "The Tyranny of the Audience in Plato and Isocrates," in *Popular Tyranny: Sovereignty and its Discontents*, ed. Kathryn Morgan (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003), 188-91 on 'constitutional slippage' and the consequent emphasis on ethics.

passage is particularly striking in its apparent repudiation of any and all Greek types of government dependent on the *polis*, whether tyrannical, oligarchic, or democratic. By taking aim at *poleis* and *nomoi* rather than Athenian democracy specifically, Isocrates seems to be criticizing the *polis* system as a whole - precisely that system which he had praised Athens for instituting in the *Panegyricus*.³⁷⁵

Isocrates' words are quite similar to those which Demosthenes employed to lament Philip's power in the *Olynthiacs* and *On the Crown* 235-6 (see above, pp. 106-107, 179-181).³⁷⁶ Like Demosthenes, Isocrates argues that Philip's freedom plays out in three areas of action. In the first place, Philip is able to send and receive embassies as he pleases. Philip's kingship thus leaves him free on the political front. His kingship also gives him unprecedented wealth and military power with which to persuade or force others to his will.³⁷⁷ In describing Philip's position, Isocrates uses the same tripartite schema employed by Demosthenes in his consideration of kingship in *Olynthiac* I.³⁷⁸ Isocrates and Demosthenes appear to be drawing upon a similar rhetoric concerning the efficiency of kingship, though in the event they use it to suit their own ends.

In his position as an outsider to the Greek *poleis*, Philip is of course following in the venerable footsteps of his ancestors. As I have already mentioned, Isocrates lauds the

³⁷⁵ Isocrates' critique of the *polis* rather than radical democracy is all the more pointed because he did not hesitate to criticise the latter elsewhere, even elsewhere in the *Philip*: see *Philip* 81-2. The *Areopagiticus* is Isocrates' most sustained critique of the 4th century democracy, counseling a return to the democracy 'of Solon and Cleisthenes' (*Areopagiticus* 20). On Isocrates' balance of oligarchic and democratic points of view see Isajeva, "Problem of πάτριος πολιτεία in Isocrates."

³⁷⁶ Also noted by Stephen Usher, "Isocrates: Paideia, Kingship and the Barbarians," in *The birth of the European Identity: the Europe-Asia contrast in Greek thought, 490-322 B.C.*, ed. H. Akbar Khan (Nottingham: University of Nottingham, 1994), 138.

³⁷⁷ It is interesting to note that Isocrates apparently sees bribery as a viable weapon in Philip's arsenal. That he was not averse to the monarch's use of wealth, presumably when used toward a good end, see also *Nicocles* 22.

³⁷⁸ In the *Nicocles*, Isocrates had also already argued that the monarch's freedom leads to a greater efficiency in government (*Nicocles* 22), precisely the point made by Demosthenes in lamenting the constraints imposed on him by the democratic process in *On the Crown*.

first Argead, who knew better than to try to establish his power over a Greek *polis* but chose rather to reign over the barbarians, whose temperament was eminently more suited to monarchy (*Philip* 106-8). Philip's ancestor did so, Isocrates states, because he knew that if he took power in Argos civic strife and factionalism would follow: thus the first Argead was avoiding the same kind of internecine wars that currently plagued the whole Greek world, albeit on a smaller scale (*Philip* 107).³⁷⁹ Like Philip, the first Argead is unique in his repudiation of a political position (whether simple citizenship or monarchy) within the framework of the Greek *polis*. Even more pointed is Isocrates' discourse on Heracles, whom he presents as a model for Philip. Heracles, like the Argeads, holds a unique position *vis-à-vis* the Hellenic world: though not part of its political structure, he is able to achieve the twin goals of panhellenic peace and victory over the barbarians (*Philip* 111-2). Heracles seems not to have been able to muster a truly panhellenic expedition against Troy precisely because of his lack of official status, though naturally what he lacked in manpower he made up for in skill. Instead of social hierarchy, the bond between Heracles and the Greeks is built on the basis of *εὐνοία* (*Philip* 114). Again, *εὐνοία*, a powerful political force in Isocratean philosophy, has displaced social or political position as the basis for true political power. The fact that Heracles and the first Argead, and now Philip, stood outside the Greek political world of the *polis* gave them the ability to change Hellenic politics for the better.

More particularly, the ability of Philip and his ancestors to create *ὁμόνοια* – that agreement which results from the growth of *εὐνοία* between two parties – is due to their position as nonpartisan arbitrators. Isocrates advances the notion that Philip's lack of

³⁷⁹ By gaining his kingdom outside of Greece, where he was in fact superior to those he ruled, the Argead founder also made his dynasty more stable and of longer duration (*Philip* 108).

loyalty to any one Greek city gives him an impartial perspective on Greek affairs. This lack of loyalty to a particular *polis* distinguishes Philip from among the other Greeks as a most suitable partner for Isocrates himself. Specifically, Isocrates contrasts Philip's position to that of other Heraclids, who might at first blanch appear to be Philip's rivals for the role of panhellenic leader:

Προσῆκει δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις τοῖς ἀφ' Ἡρακλέους πεφυκόσι καὶ τοῖς ἐν πολιτείᾳ καὶ νόμοις ἐνδεδεμένοις ἐκείνην τὴν πόλιν στέργειν, ἐν ᾗ τυγχάνουσι κατοικοῦντες, σὲ δ' ὥσπερ ἄφετον γεγεννημένον ἅπασαν τὴν Ἑλλάδα πατρίδα νομίζειν, ὥσπερ ὁ γεννήσας ὑμᾶς, καὶ κινδυνεύειν ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς ὁμοίως ὥσπερ ὑπὲρ ὧν μάλιστα σπουδάζεις.

It is fitting for the other Heraclids, who live under the constraints of a polity and her laws, to be partial to that city in which they happen to live. But it behooves you, as a man free from such mundane constraints, to consider the whole of Greece as your fatherland - just as your progenitor did - and to endanger yourself on her account just as you would about anything that especially concerns you. (*Philip* 127).

While Isocrates approves of the loyalty engendered by the *polis* in citizens such as the other Heraclids, this partisanship hampers the credibility of the citizen who might wish to become a panhellenic leader. That such national loyalty can harm the panhellenic agenda is evidenced by Isocrates' story of Agesilaus, whose ambition of conquering Persia stalled precisely because of his many personal ties within Greece. In helping his friends achieve power in their respective polities, Agesilaus embroiled himself and all of Greece in a war that sapped their collective strength (*Philip* 87).³⁸⁰ Philip's lack of ties to any one *polis*, therefore, allows him to transcend regional differences.³⁸¹ Moreover, Philip can explicitly model his relations with Greece on those of his father, Amyntas, who was on friendly terms with all four major powers (Sparta, Argos, Thebes, and

³⁸⁰ Isocrates' critique of Agesilaos is a repetition of a passage in his letter *To Archidamus* 13, which argues that while war against the barbarian and helping one's friends are equally laudable pursuits, they are incompatible.

³⁸¹ Also noted by Heilbrunn, "Isocrates on Rhetoric and Power," 161-2.

Athens) (*Philip* 106). In minimizing Philip's ties to any one Greek city, Isocrates could claim for him the right to the goodwill [εὐνοία] of all.³⁸²

Philip's independence from internal Hellenic politics is precisely what differentiates him from Athens as a potential panhellenic leader. While Philip – like Athens – has grounds to consider all of Greece his fatherland, he has the advantage over the city because he stands to the side of the petty internal wars which consume the Greeks. As I have shown, Philip's lack of loyalty to any single *polis* lends credibility to his role as arbitrator between the Greeks and concomitantly facilitates his assumption of a truly panhellenic position of leadership. Philip need only emulate the example of the founder of the Argead dynasty, who did not aspire to kingship over his native Argos precisely because such an action would foster strife and factionalism (*To Philip* 107), and of Heracles, who was the benefactor of all Greece equally. By comparison, Isocrates fears that Athens, deeply embedded as it was in the political tensions of the past hundred and fifty years, would be unable to refrain from factional strife – unless, of course, it was constrained to do so by Philip (*Philip* 8-9).³⁸³ While Isocrates does not reject native *polis* loyalty as a force for good among the common rank and file, he does argue that such

³⁸² See de Romilly, "Eunoia in Isocrates," who argues that Isocrates' rhetoric of εὐνοία should be read as a rejection of Thucydidean φόβος. Speusippus misses the point when he argues that, if Isocrates had really wanted to flatter Philip, he ought to have pointed to the nominal Athenian citizenship Philip gains as a Heraclid. Speusippus' claim, that Philip has a right to Athenian citizenship because Heracles became the adoptive son of Pyleus, is an obvious sleight-of-hand that takes no account of Athenian citizenship laws. Nevertheless, his entire point – that Isocrates could have insisted on a closer relationship between Philip and Athens – misses the mark, since this claim would in fact have been detrimental to Isocrates' larger argument that Philip had to transcend regional differences. I would suggest that the same holds with respect to Speusippus' argument that Isocrates ought to have mentioned Philip's involvement with the Amphictyony. It is true that at the time Isocrates was writing his *Philip* the 3rd Sacred War had played itself out, and therefore Isocrates had no way of knowing that Philip would receive the votes in the League that had formerly belonged to the Phocians; nevertheless, given Isocrates' rhetoric, it seems unlikely that he would have brought up Philip's new membership even if he could have done so, just as he had ignored Philip's 'citizen status'. Isocrates consistently counsels Philip to stand aloof from active participation in precisely such political strife as the Amphictyony was known to breed.

³⁸³ So also Isocrates *Epistle* III 2.

loyalties are detrimental for panhellenic leaders. Philip, whose ties to all major *poleis* are equal, has no competing loyalties to hold him back from making panhellenic peace a reality.

Panhellenism and Utopia

The political center of the Hellenic world has shifted. Athens is no longer to be the political model from which the rest of Greece learns laws and the ways of public life (*Panegyricus* 39-40), though in παιδεία it may still remain preeminent.³⁸⁴ Rather, it will be to Philip and the Macedonian court that the rest of Greece will turn for advice:

Τίς γὰρ ἂν ὑπερβολὴ γένοιτο τῆς τοιαύτης εὐδαιμονίας, ὅταν πρέσβεις μὲν ἦκωσιν ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων πόλεων οἱ μάλιστα εὐδοκιμοῦντες εἰς τὴν σὴν δυναστείαν, μετὰ δὲ τούτων βουλευῆ περὶ τῆς κοινῆς σωτηρίας, περὶ ἧς οὐδεὶς ἄλλος φανήσεται τοιαύτην πρόνοιαν πεποιημένος, αἰσθάνη δὲ τὴν Ἑλλάδα πᾶσαν ὀρθὴν οὔσαν ἐφ' οἷς σὺ τυγχάνεις εἰσηγούμενος, μηδεὶς δ' ὀλιγώρως ἔχη τῶν παρὰ σοὶ βραβευομένων, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν πυνθάνωνται περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν οἷς ἐστίν, οἱ δ' εὐχωνταί σε μὴ διαμαρτεῖν ὧν ἐπεθύμησας, οἱ δὲ δεδίωσι μὴ πρότερόν τι πάθης πρὶν τέλος ἐπιθεῖναι τοῖς πραττομένοις;

For what addition might there be to such good fortune, when the most distinguished ambassadors from the greatest cities come to your court and you deliberate with them about the common welfare – concerning which nobody will appear to have given as much forethought as you? And when you will see that all of Greece eagerly waits upon whatever you happen to propose, and everybody pays attention to your judgments - some asking how matters stand, some praying for you lest you fail in achieving your desires, and some fearing lest you suffer some accident before you accomplish what you have set out to do? (*Philip* 69-70)

In the new world order which Isocrates envisions after panhellenic peace has been achieved, Philip's court will dispense political wisdom, both through advice and through example, throughout the Greek world. The Greek world, in turn, will be attuned to news from the Macedonian court and will equate their own good with that of Philip.

³⁸⁴ The *Philip* makes no mention of Athenian cultural preeminence, but of course Isocrates himself, as a teacher remains firmly rooted in Athens.

Isocrates envisions εὐνοια, rather than any more formalized power relationship, as the basis for future relations between Philip and the Greeks.³⁸⁵ For the philosopher, the Peace of Philocrates foreshadows the new state which will be achieved once all the Greek *poleis* are at peace with each other. In the case of the conflict over Amphipolis, Isocrates argued that both Philip and Athens were wasting their energy in a contest where winning offered no practical advantage to either party, while peace would be useful to both (*Philip* 2-3). Furthermore, he argued that Philip ought to seek Athenian friendship [φιλία] (*Philip* 5) and goodwill [εὐνοια] (*Philip* 6). Isocrates' advice in the present speech seeks not only to make this peace between Athens and Philip permanent, but also to extend it to the rest of the Greek world (*Philip* 8). For the Peace of Philocrates is a model for Philip's future relations - not only with Athens but also with the other three major powers in Isocrates list: Sparta, Argos, and Thebes (*Philip* 7-9; 56). By fostering relations based on εὐνοια among the Greeks, ὁμόνοια, the concord that arises from mutual good will, would take the place of covetousness [πλεονεξία] as everyone came to realize that their mutual interest lay in the conquest of the Persian Empire.³⁸⁶ Ideally, Philip was to achieve his ends in Greece by persuasion [πείθειν], while the use of force [βιάζεσθαι] was to be redirected against the barbarians (*To Philip* 16).³⁸⁷ Philip's

³⁸⁵ See de Romilly, "Eunoia in Isocrates," on εὐνοια in Isocrates and the broader Athenian political discourse of the 5th and 4th centuries.

³⁸⁶ See Perlman, "Isocrates' 'Philippus' and Panhellenism," 372-3, who points out that in the *Philip* εὐνοια is the precondition – and not the result – of the panhellenic expedition against Persia. See de Romilly, "Eunoia in Isocrates," 98, and Perlman, "Isocrates' Philippus – a Reinterpretation," 310, on εὐνοια and ὁμόνοια. See Bouchet, "La πλεονεξία chez Isocrate," on Isocrates' use of πλεονεξία.

³⁸⁷ See also *Philip* 73-75. Nevertheless, Isocrates was not above acquiescing to Philip's use of force against the Greeks when the matter was a *fait accompli*: in his letter to Philip after the battle of Chaeronea, Isocrates acknowledges that the situation is now different from that of 346, when, he says, he had suggested the Philip persuade the Greeks to be well-disposed toward him:

Τότε μὲν οὖν ἄλλος ἦν καιρός, νῦν δὲ συμβέβηκε μηκέτι δεῖν πείθειν· διὰ γὰρ τὸν ἀγῶνα τὸν γεγενημένον ἠναγκασμένοι πάντες εἰσὶν εὖ φρονεῖν καὶ τοῦτω

authority would then derive from the willingness of the Greek states to trust in his foresight and his unquestionable superiority.³⁸⁸

Isocrates did not envision the world order resulting from Hellenic ὁμόνοια as a formalized organization.³⁸⁹ The practical ramifications of Philip's leadership, indeed, are left open to interpretation; on only one point is Isocrates positive: that Philip was not to achieve preeminence in Greece through conquest, as the demagogues were suggesting (*Philip* 73-5).³⁹⁰ Once the *poleis* could be brought to 'think clearly' [εὖ φρονεῖν], Isocrates contended, all would come to freely acknowledge that their collective advantage lay in an expedition against Persia. Philip would be the natural choice for leadership of the expedition because of his ancestry, his skill, and his standing as a political outsider in the Greek world.

ἐπιθυμεῖν ὧν ὑπονοοῦσί σε βούλεσθαι πράττειν καὶ λέγειν, ὥς δεῖ παυσαμένους τῆς μανίας καὶ τῆς πλεονεξίας, ἦν ἐποιοῦντο πρὸς ἀλλήλους, εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν τὸν πόλεμον ἐξευεγκεῖν.

That was a different situation, and now there is no more need for persuasion; for because of the battle [of Chaeronea], all are compelled to be prudent and to desire that which they suspect you wish to do and say – namely, to cease from the madness and the aggrandizement which guided their treatment of each other and to carry the war into Asia (*Epistle* 3. 2).

See Marzi, "Isocrate e Filippo II di Macedonia," who argues for the authenticity of the letter.

³⁸⁸ In this way Philip's relations with the Greeks mirror the ideal relationship of a king to his people, as envisioned by Isocrates elsewhere: see for example 2.24; 3.51-56.

³⁸⁹ The point that major states are to keep their independence is more openly argued in the *Panegyricus*, one of the models of the speech to *Philip*: see 17; 78-81. Nevertheless, this independence for the largest powers goes hand in hand with the rule of the smaller *poleis*. See, for example, Isocrates' defense of the Athenian Empire at *Panegyricus* 100-105. Perlman, "Isocrates' 'Philippus' and Panhellenism," also argues that Isocrates wished to redirect Philip's imperialism from Greece to Persia. On Isocrates' possible influence on the League of Corinth see Jacqueline de Romilly, "Isocrates and Europe," *Greece and Rome* 39 (1992): 11.

³⁹⁰ Here Isocrates' notably deviates from his argument in the *Panegyricus*, which stressed the propriety of Athens' empire (100-19). Isocrates justifies Athens' primacy in lawgiving justice (26-7; 39-40). See Isajeva, "Political Programme of Isocrates," 171, on εὐνοια as an antithesis for κράτος in the speech.

Political Disengagement

I have argued above that Philip's lack of attachment to a particular *polis* was precisely what made him best able to champion Isocrates' panhellenic point of view. In the present section I consider Philip's identity as a political outsider in the Hellenic world in relation to Isocrates' own espousal of a panhellenistic mindset. While the *Philip* was not the first speech in which Isocrates advocated panhellenism, the problems associated with this viewpoint are particularly felt in this speech. For previously, Isocrates had conveniently coupled panhellenism with Athenian preeminence: as the progenitor and capital of normative Greek life, as embodied by *nomoi* and *philosophia*, Athens became almost synonymous with the larger Hellenic world: thus, for example, Isocrates highlighted the openness of Athenian society to the rest of the Greek world (*Panegyricus* 38-45) and even called Athens the capital of Greece (*Antidosis* 299-300). In the *Philip*, however, it is Pella – not Athens – which is to become the heart of the future unified Greece. In *this* speech, where panhellenism is no longer synonymous with Athenocentrism - and, indeed, nationalistic fervor actually detracts from panhellenic sentiment - Isocrates' personal loyalty to Athens becomes newly problematic. For if panhellenism is best championed by a political outsider, where does that leave Isocrates the Athenian? Thus Isocrates poses no mere rhetorical question when he worries that, in addressing his speech to Philip, he will cast his loyalty to Athens into doubt (*Philip* 129-31). Envisioning a future where the mantle of panhellenism is taken up by a king whose seat of power is outside the Greek world seems at odds with Isocrates' persona as a proud

and loyal Athenian citizen.³⁹¹ That Isocrates argues for the *Philip* as a ‘new’ *Panegyricus* emphasizes this problem, since the earlier speech advocated so powerfully for a panhellenism coupled with Athenian preeminence. While Isocrates mobilizes a number of different strategies to resolve this crisis of loyalties, I will argue that the most sustained strategy he deploys is to be found in the parallelism between Isocrates’ and Philip’s political personae. Isocrates, like Philip, can be read as a political outsider whose impact on Athenian/Greek politics, while real, is as informal – in so far as it does not follow normative political channels – as he envisions Philip’s will be. Isocrates can espouse panhellenism because, like Philip, he *is* an outsider in Athenian political life.

There are a number of possible solutions to the tension between Isocrates’ nationalism and his panhellenism that are floated over the course of the *Philip*. Early in the speech, for example, Isocrates attempts to minimize the problem by framing panhellenism as a policy which would benefit Athens along with the other Greek cities. It ‘just so happens’ that Athenian needs will be best served by adopting a panhellenic policy (*Philip* 9).³⁹² Moreover, Isocrates stresses that the origin of his policy lies in Athenian concerns.³⁹³ Thus the question which the speech is designed to answer is specifically Athenian in outlook: how should *Athens* – not Philip or even all of Greece – remain at peace (*Philip* 8-9)? Nevertheless, this Athenocentric conceit falters rather quickly, to be replaced by concern for the welfare of all Greece (see for example *Philip*

³⁹¹ Too notes this tension but claims that for Isocrates, “just as being a quietist is in the end more important than being able to speak in public, being Athenian ultimately takes precedence over and eclipses being Greek” (*Rhetoric of Identity*, p. 129).

³⁹² A convenient elision, but one Isocrates was immensely fond of: see for example *Antidosis* 79.

³⁹³ Though in the latter portions of the speech Isocrates expresses concern for the whole of Greece: see *Philip* 149.

149-50).³⁹⁴ Moreover, even if the goal of Isocrates' policy is the benefit of Athens along with the other Greeks, this still does not deal with the fact that the position of leadership among the Greeks is to be taken by Philip, not Athens (*Philip* 128-31). Another strategy Isocrates briefly employs is to claim the approval of the gods for his plan: toward the end of the *Philip* he wonders whether it was not the gods that inspired him to write his speech and whether the gods will inspire Philip to action (*Philip* 150-1). He openly affirms that the gods must have been behind Philip's successes thus far (*Philip* 151-2), arguing that they had designed Philip's early career as a kind of testing ground to hone his skill on campaign. Again, it is τύχη that leads Philip to glory (*Philip* 152).³⁹⁵ Thus Isocrates attempts to deflect the agency for his proposals onto a deity, as well as to rationalize Philip's present success, by pointing to the influence of a higher power.

I suggest, however, that Isocrates saw a more fundamental resolution to the dilemma between panhellenism and loyalty to Athens in the symmetry he built between his own and Philip's relations toward Athens/Greece. I have already pointed in a previous section to the parallels between Isocrates' self-imaging and that of Philip; specifically, the philosopher presents both himself and the king as political thinkers. I also pointed to the characterizations of Isocrates and Philip in the Amphipolis prologue as lone visionaries in the woods, aiming at peace while the rest of the world, identified with the Athenian politicians and Philip's advisors, aims for war. Both understand the distinction between petty politics and a grander vision for Greece; both are at odds with the political world around them. I have already shown the Amphipolis prologue to be

³⁹⁴ Isajeva, "Political Programme of Isocrates," 170, has argued that Isocrates takes the position of impartial arbitrator between Athens and Philip.

³⁹⁵ Here again Isocrates' language is reminiscent of Demosthenes (or rather, Demosthenes is reminiscent of Isocrates): Demosthenes cites τύχη or divine influence as the reason for Philip's success on a number of occasions, though most prominently in the *Crown* speech.

programmatic for the *Philip* as a whole in other ways. The parallel between Isocrates and Philip in the Amphipolis prologue thus suggests that we should continue to read their political positions as symmetrical throughout the speech. For Isocrates' vision of Philip's future relations with the Greeks takes on new meaning when viewed as a parallel to Isocrates' own position in relation to the Athenian political world. Both Isocrates' and Philip's identities are founded on the tension between their insider and outsider status: thus Philip's status as a political outsider, as discussed above, acts as a validation for his panhellenic leadership. In the same way, Isocrates' renouncement of an active role in the Athenian democracy, a feature of his self-construction throughout his *corpus*, allows him to espouse Philip's panhellenic leadership in the *Philip*.³⁹⁶

A central section of the speech (*Philip* 72-82), in particular, focuses on the parallel political situations of Isocrates and Philip. Set off by a programmatic apology for the turn to a new and touchy topic (*Philip* 72), the section begins by examining the anti-Philippic views of the Athenian politicians (*Philip* 73-5) and ends with Isocrates' own self-identification as both an ἀπράγμων and a politician (*Philip* 81-2; see also above, pp. 200-202). Between these arguments is an exhortation to Philip not to ignore the slanders directed against him among the Greeks (*Philip* 78-80). By framing his advice to Philip with his views on Athenian politics and his own role therein, Isocrates literally embeds Philip in the political situation at Athens. Structuring the section in this way allows Isocrates to bring out the parallels between himself and the Macedonian king with respect to the contentious politics of the *ekklesia*.

³⁹⁶ In saying that Isocrates renounces an active political life I do not mean to suggest that he is apolitical. Isocrates' rhetoric is of course deeply political and even practical, in so far as it sought to create a better political discourse in Athens. See Haskins, "Rhetoric between Orality and Literacy," 163-4. Isocrates also participates in the *polis* in so far as his duties as a citizen are concerned; the conceit of the *Antidosis*, for example, finds Isocrates serving as a trierarch (*Antidosis* 5).

Isocrates consistently disapproved of the narrow, self-interested vision plaguing contemporary politicians and the Athenian *demos*. In the *Antidosis*, for example, he criticized the Athenians for creating a false dichotomy between Athenocentrism and the panhellenic policies espoused by the better rhetors (*Antidosis* 301-3). Elsewhere, he called the panhellenic agenda the more noble as well as the more difficult line of argument, opposing it to nationalism (*To Archidamus* 7). Isocrates' synoptic view of the Hellenic world is thus antithetical to the active politicians' narrower understanding of Athenian interests (*Antidosis* 3). In the *Philip*, as well, Isocrates' sets himself against Philip's detractors in Athens, whom he portrays discussing particular Macedonian policies toward particular cities instead of looking at the larger picture (*Philip* 73-77). The list of their arguments – Philip's rescue of the Messenians, Philip's involvement in the Third Sacred War, his relations with the Thessalians, Thebans, the Amphictyony; and the Argives, Messenians, and Lacedaemonians (*Philip* 74) - particularizes the Greek world in a way which is contrary to Isocrates' panhellenic view. Narrow Athenocentrism and the desire to look at the individual interests of various *poleis* are contrasted with Isocrates' broader, panhellenic vision.

Furthermore, a panhellenic viewpoint is fostered by Isocratean ἀπραγμοσύνη rather than the busy lifestyle of the active politician.³⁹⁷ Isocrates insists that his own abnegation of political activity is exactly what allows him to be the best advocate of his ideas (*Philip* 81). At the same time, Isocrates' own ἀπραγμοσύνη is different from the disengagement he ascribes to the sophists, who may be disinterested in active politics but

³⁹⁷ On ἀπραγμοσύνη as an Athenian cultural phenomenon see L. B. Carter, *The Quiet Athenian* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986).

who, at the same time, busy themselves in completely impractical pursuits (*Philip* 12).³⁹⁸ Isocrates charts for himself a middle course: though unable to harangue the *demos*, Isocrates has the judgment and παιδεία necessary to give proper council [συμβουλεύειν] through his written speeches (*Philip* 81-2).³⁹⁹ Thus Isocratean παιδεία displaces participation in *polis* politics as Isocrates' means of displaying his engagement with Athens/Greece.⁴⁰⁰ Indeed, for Isocrates παιδεία becomes as much an indicator of Hellenic identity as political activity was in normative Athenian ideology.⁴⁰¹ For example, in the *Evagoras* Isocrates can claim the Cypriots involvement in music and παιδεία as evidence of their Hellenization (*Evagoras* 47-50). In the *Philip*, Isocrates' valorization of παιδεία as an indicator of Hellenic identity is of course clear in the figure of Philip himself, who is an educated Hellene without, however, being part of a *polis*.⁴⁰² Hellenic identity as construed by Isocrates, in sum, is not dependent upon embeddedness in the political life of a specific *polis*. This rupture between engagement in *polis* life and

³⁹⁸ Isocrates famously wrote his *Against the Sophists* at the onset of his career as a rhetorical teacher to outline his own brand of practical παιδεία to potential pupils; the *Antidosis* speech is also a classic locus for Isocrates' rejection of sophistic rhetoric. See Ekaterina Haskins, "Logos and Power in Sophistical and Isocratean Rhetoric," in *Isocrates and Civic Education*, ed. David Depew and Takis Poulakos (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004), 84-103; also Poulakos, *Speaking for the Polis*, passim, on the novelty of Isocrates' παιδεία with respect to older and current sophistic models.

³⁹⁹ It is intriguing, in this light, that Isocrates claimed at the beginning of the section to speak on this touchy subject "with freedom" [μετὰ παρρησίας] (*Philip* 72).

⁴⁰⁰ See also *Antidosis* 80; 304-5. See Niall Livingstone, "The Voice of Isocrates and the Dissemination of Cultural Power," in *Pedagogy and Power: Rhetorics of Classical Learning*, ed. Yun Lee Too and Niall Livingstone (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 263-281. Being part of a *polis* was an expression of Hellenicity in the sense that *poleis* were civic structures unique to the Greek world. Engaging in the *polis* need not have meant overt political participation, but could take the form of engagement in religious, military, and other civic institutions. In Athens, however, membership in the community took on overtly political connotations with the advent of democracy. See P. J. Rhodes, "Civic Ideology and Citizenship," in *A Companion to Greek and Roman Political Thought*, ed. Ryan Balot (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, 2009), 57-69 and Balot, *Greek Political Thought*, ch. 1.

⁴⁰¹ It has long been noted that Isocrates' ideology of Hellenism foreshadowed the attitude of the Hellenistic world: see for example Perlman, "Isocrates' 'Philip' and Panhellenism." Isocrates' valorization of Hellenic culture is reflected most prominently in his reinterpretation of Pericles' statement that Athens was the 'school of Greece' to reflect Athens' cultural accomplishments: see *Panegyricus* 47-50; *Antidosis* 295-6. See also de Romilly, "Isocrates and Europe," 4-7.

⁴⁰² See Mathieu, *Les Idées Politiques D'Isocrate*, ch. 5.

Hellenism is not only key to Philip's identity, but also to that of Isocrates, who is an Athenian who does not contribute to the *polis* through normative political channels. By decoupling *polis* politics from Hellenism, Isocrates can self-identify as both an Athenian and an ἀπράγμων with a panhellenic sensibility. Indeed, because the Athenocentric viewpoint is so prevalent among the common people, it becomes precisely Isocrates' disengagement from active politics that allows him to see 'panhellenically'. Philip's Heraclid ancestry and lack of ties to any one *polis* on the one hand, and Isocrates' political ἀπραγμοσύνη on the other, has paradoxically made them the best champions of panhellenism.

Political disengagement, of course, did not entail complete apathy to the current political world, either for Philip or for Isocrates.⁴⁰³ I noted above that the central portion of this section literally embeds the king within a framework of Hellenic politics. The construction of the section, in placing Philip within Athenian politics, thus mirrors its central argument: namely, Isocrates' advice that Philip heed public opinion and make sure that he is well thought of by the masses (*Philip* 78-80).⁴⁰⁴ Indeed, the dangers of apathy could potentially affect Isocrates himself. That cultivating public opinion was a matter of critical importance for the philosopher is one of the main points of Isocrates' *Antidosis* speech. Thus the *Antidosis* finds Isocrates engaged in combating a similar set of misconceptions about himself and his school as are leveled at Philip by the Athenian politicians. According to the lengthy prologue of the speech, Isocrates was challenged to

⁴⁰³ The peculiar combination of ἀπραγμοσύνη with political engagement is also not unique to Isocrates: see for example Brown, "False Idles: The Politics of the 'Quiet Life,'" in *A Companion to Greek and Roman Political Thought*, ed. Ryan Balot, (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 495-8, on this tension as it plays out in Plato and Aristotle.

⁴⁰⁴ His good repute will, in turn, serve as the basis for a definitive relationship between Philip and the Hellenic world, such as that of the Spartan kings with respect to the Spartans or Philip himself with respect to his companions (*Philip* 79).

an exchange of property in the lawcourts, where he faced something of an identity crisis. While he had previously thought it unnecessary to defend himself and his φιλοσοφία because he thought that he already had the good opinion of the people, he soon realized that he was not well thought of and that, moreover, he could no longer ignore the general opinion:

Μέχρι μὲν οὖν πόρρω τῆς ἡλικίας ᾤομην καὶ διὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν ταύτην καὶ διὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀπραγμοσύνην ἐπεικῶς ἔχειν πρὸς ἅπαντας τοὺς ἰδιώτας· ἤδη δ' ὑπογυίου μοι τῆς τοῦ βίου τελευτῆς οὔσης, ἀντιδόσεως γενομένης περὶ τριηραρχίας καὶ περὶ ταύτης ἀγῶνος ἔγνων καὶ τούτων τινὰς οὐχ οὔτω πρὸς με διακειμένους ὥσπερ ἠλπίζον... τοῦ γὰρ ἀντιδίκου περὶ μὲν ὧν ἡ κρίσις ἦν οὐδὲν λέγοντος δίκαιον... ἔγνωσαν ἐμὴν εἶναι τὴν λειτουργίαν.

For I thought, until well past my prime, that because of this choice [to speak and write about topics of larger scope rather than private disputes (*Antidosis* 3)] I was tolerably well thought of by all individuals; but suddenly at the end of my life, when challenged to an exchange of property over a trierarchy and brought to court over this issue, I realized that some people were not so well disposed towards me as I had hoped... for even though my opponent said nothing just about the subject of the lawsuit... they imposed the liturgy on me. (*Antidosis* 4-5)

By means of the *Antidosis* speech Isocrates will now correct his error and take up the task of vindicating himself in the public eye (*Antidosis* 5-7).⁴⁰⁵ He thus imagines himself coming face to face with the problems created by his withdrawal from normative *polis* politics. The *Antidosis* speech is his response to the *demos*' fear that the philosopher espouses apathy.⁴⁰⁶ In the speech, Isocrates acts on the same advice that he would later give to Philip: not to ignore public opinion but to counter it (*Philip* 78-80).⁴⁰⁷ Isocrates'

⁴⁰⁵ See Ober, *Political Dissent*, 256-260, on the *Antidosis* as a discourse critical of the *polis* yet addressed to an imaginary mass audience.

⁴⁰⁶ It is therefore particularly jarring that the *Antidosis* was a written speech whose audience would have been drawn from the elite rather than the common individuals judging real court trials. See Haskins, "Rhetoric between Orality and Literacy," on Isocrates' use of the written medium to engage with, rather than reject, popular political discourse.

⁴⁰⁷ Isocrates claims that the same pitfall – namely, rejecting the importance of public opinion – brought about Timotheus' exile (*Antidosis* 129-39). As Isocrates' *protégé*, the parallels between Timotheus and Philip are obvious.

exhortation to Philip in *Philip* 78-80, as an echo of his portrait of himself in the *Antidosis*, brings their political identities together. Both Isocrates and Philip strive to create similar relationships between themselves and the Hellenes: relationships built on mutual trust and εὐνοία and fostered in turn by the political wisdom of the king/philosopher.

Conclusion

Isocrates lived long enough to see Philip defeat Theban and Athenian resistance at Chaeronea. He took the opportunity to write the king a letter of congratulations, exhorting him once again, now that he had the backing of Greece, to set out as quickly as possible on a Persian campaign.⁴⁰⁸ He relates the questions which he was asked about his own role in Philip's policy:

Καὶ πολλοὶ μυνθάνονται παρ' ἐμοῦ πρότερον ἐγὼ σοι παρήνεσα
ποιεῖσθαι τὴν στρατείαν τὴν ἐπὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους ἢ σοῦ
διανοηθέντος συνεῖπον· ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ εἰδέναι μὲν φημι τὸ σαφές, οὐ
γὰρ συγγεγενῆσθαι σοι πρότερον, πρότερον, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' οἴεσθαι
σὲ μὲν ἐγνωκέναι περὶ τούτων, ἐμὲ δὲ συνειρηκέναι ταῖς σαῖς
ἐπιθυμίαις.

Many ask of me whether I advised you to go on this expedition against the barbarians or whether I confirmed an idea you had already formed; I said that I did not rightly know, for previously I had not known you, but that I thought you had formed an opinion about these matters and that I had spoken in line with your desires. (*Epistle* 3.3)

Isocrates remains vague on assigning responsibility for the idea of a panhellenic expedition against Persia; he does not definitively say whether it was his own or Philip's plan. In doing so he once again highlights the affinity between his philosophy and Philip's policy, an argument central to the *Philip*, without being too specific about the nature of their relationship. No matter whether Isocrates or Philip had had the idea first,

⁴⁰⁸ Isocrates seems to take it for granted that that is Philip's intention (*Epistle* 3.3). Arguments against the authenticity of the letter have been generally unconvincing: see Marzi, "Isocrate e Filippo II di Macedonia;" also Ian Worthington, "Two Letters of Isocrates and Ring Composition," *Electronic Antiquities* 1 (1993).

Isocratean advice would help Philip realize desires that he had *already* formed. While Isocrates and Philip would have their own roles to play in bringing about panhellenic peace and the destruction of Persia, both were joined in their outlook on the world and their pursuit of a common political philosophy. If nothing else, *Epistle 3* makes clear that Philip's recent activity in Greece had not shaken Isocrates' perception of the king's motives and abilities.

Isocrates portrayed himself and Philip as unique exponents of panhellenic peace and the war against the barbarian. Moreover, both were connected by their peculiar position between belonging to the Athenian/Hellenic community and being, at the same time, apart from it - Philip because of his role as king of Macedonia, and Isocrates because of his ἀπραγμοσύνη. Just as Isocrates had rejected an active role in Athenian politics, so Philip was to refuse any position of formal power over the Greek *poleis*; his rule was to be based on the ὁμόνοια that would arise once everyone acknowledged his primacy and his right to lead. Isocrates' presentation of Philip reflects his own ἦθος.

The parallels I have traced between Philip and Isocrates recast Philip as an elite Hellene who is interested in philosophy. The king is also politically disengaged from the Greek world, though at the same time striving for the betterment of Greece. In presenting Philip as a philosopher king striving after Isocratean ideals, Isocrates reconstructs Philip in terms that would be sympathetic to elite Hellenes and Macedonians steeped in Hellenic culture alike. More than a discourse between a single philosopher and a king, the speech creates the basis for an exchange between the greater elite Hellenic world and elite Macedonia. At the same time, the speech would have presumably appealed to Philip himself as a favorable rearticulation of his identity and his policy. Thus the *Philip*, in

crafting the eponymous king as an elite Hellene, itself fosters that understanding and εὐνοια between Philip and Greece which it advocates.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

Philip's ἦθος stood at the center of a contest of values that tested the Hellenic and democratic paradigms on which Athenian identity was based. For Philip was not an individual who could be readily classified: a king from the non-Greek world, he beat Greeks at their own military and political game and single-handedly changed the face of the known world. Philip's success demanded *ethopoieic* explanation even as it defied the ready-made typologies of the hubristic barbarian and incompetent monarch. A consciousness of this crisis did not, of course, develop all at once; indeed, understandings such as that of Aeschines, who sought to recast Philip in familiar, and thus less threatening, terms, actively worked against it even well into Philip's reign. It is in Demosthenes' rhetoric, a body of speeches spanning roughly twenty years, where the development of the discourse concerning Philip's ἦθος becomes most clear. It was not hard for Demosthenes, at the beginning of Philip's reign, to portray him as a typical barbarian king with a greedy streak whose very nature would assuredly lead him to failure. Indeed, much of Demosthenes' early rhetoric is readily understandable in terms of older 5th century paradigms being put to use for a new, late 4th century problem. After 346 BCE, however, and the failure of the Peace of Philocrates, Demosthenes' rhetoric changes. In the aftermath of Chaeronea, Philip emerges as a being that defies all boundaries and, in doing so, compels the orator himself to do the same. Philip's success changed the way Athenians viewed themselves and their relations with the outside world.

For inasmuch as redefining the Other means redefining the Self (and visa versa), redefinitions of Philip affected, and were affected by, the speaker's self-identification. Thus Aeschines' Philip was a speaker and a politician, much like any other politician, participating in an equal contest of words with the Athenian ambassadors; Demosthenes, again, came to define Philip as a quasi-supernatural force whose undemocratic methods of success rationalized, and even demanded, Demosthenes' assumption of an equally strong position of leadership in Athens. So too, Isocrates saw in Philip a "new Athens", whose political success mirrored in the realm of policy what Isocrates had achieved in the realm of philosophy. At the same time, each of these articulations of Philip's ἦθος renegotiated the character of the Athenians themselves as they clung to an older, more imposing image of Athens even as their present power was being eroded away.

While the rearticulation of Philip's identity by the orators was Athenocentric in nature – that is, it was produced by and for Athenians, and dealt with Athenian paradigms - it was also a piece of a much larger dialogue between the Hellenic and Macedonian worlds centered, again, around Philip's changing role as monarch, *tagos*, Amphictyonic member, and finally guarantor of the panhellenic League of Corinth. Viewed from a Macedonian perspective, the unprecedented expansion of Argead power was only the latest in a centuries-long dialogue between Macedonian, Greek, and Near Eastern forces. The Argeads had always sought legitimation for their rule from outside sources, be they Illyrian, Persian, or Greek; in this respect Philip's acquisition of roles for himself that were not properly Macedonian conformed to the strategy of his predecessors.

In approaching the way a multiplicity of sources handled a particular theme – that is, Philip's ἦθος – I have sought to recapture the larger political framework within which

our extant speeches stood. As different as the constructions of Philip's ῥῆθος by Aeschines, Demosthenes, and Isocrates are, they operate on the basis of shared Hellenic, Athenian, and democratic frameworks and from within the same immediate political discourse. The responion between Demosthenes, Aeschines, and Hyperides in particular gives a sense of how frames of communication were continuously developed in the public arena; at the same time, the parallels between Demosthenes' and Isocrates rhetoric – and, for that matter, between Demosthenes and Platonic philosophy as well - point to the interaction between elite and democratic discourse. Each definition of Philip's ῥῆθος stands at the center of a complex of socially conventional typologies, individual predilections, and ways in which past discourse itself framed current articulations of a given issue.

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