On the Evolution of Collective Enforcement Institutions: Communities and Courts

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\textbf{ABSTRACT}

We analyze the capacities of communities (or social networks) and courts to secure cooperation among heterogeneous, impersonal transactors. We find that communities and courts are complementary in that they tend to support cooperation for different types of transactions but that the existence of courts weakens the effectiveness of community enforcement. Our findings are consistent with the emergence of the medieval Law Merchant and its subsequent supersession by state courts as changes in the costs and risks of long-distance trade, driven in part by improvement in shipbuilding methods, altered the characteristics of merchant transactions over the course of the Commercial Revolution.

JEL classification: D02, D71, N43, P48

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I. Introduction

The realization of scale economies and gains from specialization that underlie economic development inevitably requires both the expansion of trade beyond an individual’s immediate circle of acquaintances and the flexibility to respond to new trading opportunities. But trade between individuals who have only a transitory association is hazardous: With no stake in maintaining an ongoing relationship, transactors have little incentive to honor deals or respect property rights. State-sponsored legal systems can provide the security necessary to support impersonal exchange. But significant opportunities for gainful trade sometimes lie outside the boundaries of effective governmental authority. Such was arguably the case during the late-medieval Commercial Revolution in Europe (roughly the 11th to 14th centuries (Lopez, 1971)) when long-distance trade blossomed in an environment of small and fragmented political units.

The puzzle of how merchants and traders managed to govern their affairs without the benefit of state enforcement led scholars to focus attention on the role of self-enforcing, nongovernmental institutions. Among these was the *lex mercatoria*, or Law Merchant, commonly described as a spontaneously arising system of customary rules governing trade among merchants that was administered by private judges chosen for their familiarity with commercial practices (Berman, 1983: 333-56). Descriptions and analyses of the medieval Law Merchant have ascribed to it a host of positive attributes, including “its universal character, its flexibility and dynamic ability to grow, its informality and speed, and its reliance on commercial custom and practice” (Benson, 1989: 654). Despite its many purported virtues, however, “[t]he Law Merchant system of

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1 Prominent contributions to this literature include Milgrom, North, and Weingast (1990); Greif (1993, 2006); and Greif, Milgrom, and Weingast (1994).
judges and reputations was eventually replaced by a system of state enforcement” (Milgrom, North, and Weingast, 1990: 20).

The supersession of the Law Merchant by state courts — a system notably deficient in most of the qualities attributed to the Law Merchant — highlights a shortcoming of much of the literature on institutions: its “system-specific” nature (Dixit, 2003: 1294), that is, its tendency to offer explanations for the existence or emergence of a particular institutional outcome at a particular time and place, when what we (ultimately) want is a theory that can explain variations in institutional arrangements and the dynamics of institutional evolution: Why do particular institutions, out of the set of potential arrangements, appear (and fade) when and where they do? Williamson has raised this criticism with specific reference to the Law Merchant: “The subset of products and organizations that satisfy the parameter values for the Law Merchant System strategy as a sequential equilibrium strategy is never described….What were the characteristics of these transactions and what explains the breakdowns?” (1991: 169).

We seek to address this criticism by analyzing factors affecting the relative capacities of communities (or social networks) and courts to secure cooperation among heterogeneous, impersonal transactors. To do so, we draw on a framework introduced by Dixit (2003, 2009). Specifically, we adopt Dixit’s device of a circle economy to capture differences in the knowledge and abilities (trading attributes) of transactors who (periodically) face opportunities to transact with new and unfamiliar trading partners. The model allows us to consider ranges of potential trading partners for which collective enforcement by communities and courts can sustain cooperation and to identify characteristics of

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2 See, also, Tabellini (2008) and Baron (2010), who exploit Dixit’s framework to analyze the capacity of guilt and altruism to sustain cooperation, Leeson (2008b), who endogenizes the transactors’ location on the circle, and Prüfer (2012), who studies the impact of formal organizations (associations) on cooperation.
the economy such as value of trade and the degree of shared knowledge (“connectedness”) of transactors that affect those ranges.³

Our main findings relate to transactor heterogeneity and, in particular, to how “distance” or dissimilarity of transactors — in knowledge, ability, resources, location, or other economically relevant dimensions — affects the likelihood of meeting, the value of cooperating, and the dissemination of information about prior transactions. Among other things, we find that courts and communities are complementary in the sense that they tend to support cooperation for different types of transactions. We also find that the availability of community sanctions supplements court enforcement, allowing cooperation over a range of transactions for which court enforcement alone would not be adequate. The reverse, however, is not true: The existence of courts diminishes the effectiveness of community enforcement. Although the possibility that formal, legal enforcement may “crowd out” informal, reputational enforcement has been suggested before, the reason for such “crowding” differs in our analysis: The availability of courts reduces the reputational consequences of opportunism, and thus the effectiveness of community enforcement, by encouraging some transactors to trade who, in the absence of effective court enforcement, would have refused to deal with someone who had defected in a prior transaction.⁴

³ We use the term collective or multilateral enforcement institutions to describe institutions for the enforcement of agreements involving others than just the parties to the transaction themselves. These institutions encompass both Dixit’s external governance (enforcement by courts or other organizations) and self governance (enforcement by communities or social networks). Greif (2006) uses the term contract enforcement institutions for both types of enforcement. Consistent with the legal definition of contract, we reserve the term contract only for agreements that would be legally binding in a public court of law.

⁴ Among those noting the potential for formal enforcement to crowd out informal arrangements, Macaulay (1963: 64) suggested that appeal to formal legal obligations stood to interfere with cooperation in business dealings by signaling a lack of trust. Signaling is also at the heart of Bénabou and Tirole’s (2006) analysis showing how explicit incentives can undermine reputation by creating doubt about the extent to which good behavior was a response to incentives rather than personal moral character. Closest in spirit to our finding, Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1994)
With insights from the model in hand, we revisit the history of the medieval Law Merchant. Whereas prior accounts have associated the Law Merchant’s dominance and demise with (exogenous) changes in the quality of state enforcement institutions — emerging of necessity when governments were weak and withering as state power and interests in commercial activity made community enforcement obsolete — our analysis suggests an explanation in which the Law Merchant’s emergence and subsequent subordination to state courts could have arisen endogenously: Progressive reductions in the risks and costs of transportation over long distances, driven in part by improvements in shipbuilding methods, stood to alter the value and composition of long-distance trade in ways that initially favored and later undermined community enforcement.

The next section provides an overview of the issues, including a brief description of the Law Merchant. Section 3 introduces the basic model and then characterizes behavior under, and compares the effectiveness of, community and court enforcement. Section 4 interprets the history of the Law Merchant in light of our results. Section 5 offers conclusions and suggests additional applications. Proofs appear in an appendix.

2. Courts, Communities, and Commitment

A central theme of the literatures on both institutions and organization is the obstacle to trade and cooperation posed by opportunistic behavior: Two (or more) parties stand to gain from transacting, but differences in the timing of actions and the accrual of benefits leave one or both exposed to the risk that the other will not uphold his end of the bargain. Whereas analyses of organization, show that the availability of sufficiently effective explicit contracts can undermine what would otherwise be effective self-enforcing agreements by reducing the bilateral punishment for defection. For an overview and discussion of the literature on crowding out in the context of contracting, see Gilson, Sabel, and Scott (2010).
and of contracting in particular, emphasize efficient exchange between specific parties over a limited period, the analysis of institutions involves a shift in orientation to reflect, among other things, the generally broader scope and greater durability of institutions compared to organizations. Because institutions operate over an array of transactions comprising an economy (or, possibly, industry), the distribution of heterogeneous skills, knowledge, and locations of transactors in an economy, and not just the attributes of a particular transaction, become relevant. The greater durability of institutions, in turn, means that analyses of institutions entail time frames that exceed the duration of most transactions and must therefore account for the dissolution of old relationships and emergence of new trading opportunities. As opportunities for advantageous trade beyond the clan or village to the region and beyond increase, and the capacity of bilateral interactions to sustain cooperation correspondingly decreases, the need for some form of multilateral enforcement mechanism rises.

Communities and courts represent two such mechanisms. Our conception of a community is similar to Cooter’s (1996: 1646): “A community of people is a social network whose members develop relationships with each other through repeated interactions. The modern economy creates many specialized business communities. These communities may form around a technology such as computer software, a body of knowledge such as accounting, or a particular product such as credit cards. Wherever there are communities, norms arise to coordinate the interaction of people.” Communities may be informal (e.g., the jazz community (Phillips, 2009)) or formal (e.g., the New York Diamond Dealers Club (Bernstein, 1992)). The important defining characteristics of a community

5 Whereas we focus on institutions supporting trade, a number of studies, beginning with Demsetz (1967), have sought to explain the emergence of the institution of property rights, which also may be supported by formal or informal sanctions. Examples include Alston, et al. (1996), Anderson and Hill (2004), and Casari (2007). See also, Allen (2011).
— (i) frequency of interactions\(^6\) and (ii) shared knowledge or interests of members — introduce the possibility that opportunistic behavior by or toward one member will be learned of by others who may respond by refusing to transact with transgressors.\(^7\) To the extent this occurs, the existence of communities can deter defection from cooperation.

Courts, or more generally, governments differ from communities in two respects. First, whereas the severity of sanctions that a community can impose on defectors is constrained by the value of ongoing future cooperation, courts can invoke governmental powers to coerce behavior and therefore may be able to impose larger sanctions.\(^8\) Second, public officials usually are not members of the communities of disputants, or at least cannot be members of every community, and are therefore at a disadvantage relative to community members in determining whether an infraction has occurred and the nature of the infraction.

The period of commercial development as Europe emerged from the Dark Ages (roughly 5\(^{th}\) to 9\(^{th}\) centuries) illustrates the problems of sustaining

\(^6\) The relationships constituting membership in a community should be understood in terms of the frequency of interaction with any member of the community as distinct from relationships developed through repeated interactions with particular individuals.

\(^7\) The assumption that community sanctions are limited to expulsion or ostracism excludes well-known examples of organizations that use violence to enforce cooperation (e.g., Skarbek, 2012). Less drastically, associations may “fine” members for misbehavior. In voluntary communities at least, the size of such punishments is limited, in expected terms, by the value of continued membership in the community. For an analysis of such associations, see Prüfer (2012).

\(^8\) Mobility — of individuals generally and traders in particular — constrains the effective power of governments as well as of communities. The desire to attract merchants, for example, induced rulers in the Middle Ages to adopt laws and policies favorable to merchants, including “safe-conducts, trading right and protections, and extraordinary remissions of normal laws” (Kadens, 2004: 48). Marketplaces that failed to provide an attractive legal environment “perished, because no traders attended the market” (Bindseil and Feil, 1999: 745, quoting Feger, 1958:12). Although our model draws a stark distinction between court and community enforcement, differences between the two are much blurrier in the commercial world, especially, as will become evident in section 4 below, in the period of the medieval Law Merchant. Implications of the model should thus be thought of as favoring more “court-like” or “community-like” enforcement, the distinguishing properties of real world institutions being matters of degree.
cooperation among impersonal transactors needed to realize the benefits of expanding trade. The economic decline and stagnation precipitated by the fall of the Roman Empire was followed, beginning in the 10th century, by a period of increasing agricultural productivity, urbanization and, eventually, intercity and overseas trade. Merchants wishing to engage in such trade faced numerous obstacles, however: “[T]he merchants of Medieval Europe…were separated from one another by geographic barriers, by cultural diversities and by dissimilar profit goals…. [T]he sanctions applied by local communities in subsistence economies no longer represented a realistic control over transregional trade…. Medieval merchants could avoid their creditors by transacting within new markets, by moving their wares to distant fairs and impersonal guilds. The risk of ‘evil men…entering the realm of the trusted’ evolved as a realistic threat to inter-community trade in medieval society” (Trakman, 1983: 17).

 Merchants responded to these challenges by developing an array of private institutions that served to secure agreements and facilitate trade, one of which, according to the prevailing view, was the system of mercantile courts known as the Law Merchant. Standard accounts portray the operation of the Law Merchant in decidedly complimentary terms. Because merchant courts were typically administered by merchant judges chosen “on the basis of their commercial experience, their objectivity and their seniority within the community of merchants,” rather than by professional jurists (Trakman, 1983: 15; see also, Berman, 1983: 346), decisions were sensitive to the needs and understandings of the merchants. Regardless of the forum, the “law” of the lex mercatoria reflected the customs of the merchants, rather than local, or later, centralized state law (id.). Most important, Law Merchant hearings were free of formalistic procedures. Most disputes were resolved within a day or two (Gross, 1906: 243-4; Sachs, 2006: 685) and appeals were often forbidden (Berman, 1983: 347; Gross, 1906: 236): “In all types of commercial courts the procedure was marked by speed and
informality” (Berman, 1983: 347; see also Baker, 1979: 300-4). Finally, the Law Merchant was seen as offering a solution to the problem of weak and ineffective state enforcement: Merchants who failed to comply with merchant court decisions risked ostracism from the merchant community (Benson, 1989: 649; Trakman, 1983: 10; Milgrom et al., 1990: 5).

As rendered in these accounts, the medieval Law Merchant represented a community-based enforcement institution that permitted the expansion of intraregional trade during a period of fragmented and often weak states. According to Trakman, the Law Merchant “offered the medieval merchant an ideal solution” to the many challenges posed by international commerce (1983: 11). Founded on commercial customs and operated by the merchant community itself, the Law Merchant closely mirrored merchant needs. “Justice and fairness, speed and informality, low cost and amicability all prevailed as interdependent variables, reflective of the commercial environment under investigation. These attributes together emphasized that the primary source of the Law Merchant lay in mercantile values and practices as incorporated into law” (id.: 13).9

Even if the Law Merchant did not operate as adroitly as its most ardent admirers suggest, the system seems to have operated well enough for interregional trade to prosper for much of the 11th and 12th centuries. Gradually, however, the functions of the merchant courts began to be taken over by public courts.10 Although state courts initially sought to retain the Law Merchant’s most desirable properties — particularly its speed, informality, and reliance on commercial customs — over time the rigid procedures and strict adherence to uniform

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9 Some descriptions of the Law Merchant border on utopian. See, for example, Benson (2002: 127-131).
10 Despite its “ideal” nature, “the Medieval Law Merchant failed to prevail entirely in its original form” (Trakman, 1983: 17). “Toward the end of the medieval period the local mercantile courts suffered a decline” (Baker, 1979: 306).
substantive doctrines associated with modern courts came to dominate.\textsuperscript{11} The challenge posed by the history of the Law Merchant is to identify what conditions may have contributed, first, to the emergence of the Law Merchant and, later, to its absorption and supersession by state courts.

3. The Model

Our analysis of the capacities of communities and courts to sustain cooperation draws on Dixit (2003), whose model compactly incorporates several dimensions of economies relevant to the performance of enforcement institutions: heterogeneity in the value of trade among transactors, stochastic opportunities for impersonal trade, conflicting incentives within transactions, and localized information. Specifically, transactor heterogeneity is represented by the location of transactors around a circle, distances along which can be interpreted as representing differences in relevant economic or social variables such as technological or resource endowments, knowledge or expertise, or kinship or other social or cultural affinities, as well as geographic location.\textsuperscript{12}

Formally, the economy in our analysis consists of a continuum of transactors uniformly distributed on a circle with a circumference of 2, as depicted in Figure 1. The mass of transactors per unit arc length is normalized to 1, implying a mass 2 population in the economy.\textsuperscript{13} “Distance” between two

\textsuperscript{11} In England, for example, local maritime courts were superseded by centralized courts of Admiralty appointed by the Crown, the first references to which occurred in the mid-14th century (Plucknett, 1956: 661). The procedure of these courts, which dealt with both commercial and maritime matters, “was of the slower civilian type” and were subject to criticism (id.: 661-2). During the 16th century local admiralty courts largely succumbed to the central Admiralty, which, in turn, increasingly surrendered jurisdiction over commercial matters to the common law courts (id.: 663-4). See also, Trakman (2003: 276-81).

\textsuperscript{12} For analyses emphasizing the role of kinship and ethnicity in supporting cooperative trade, see Landa (1981, 1994).

\textsuperscript{13} Dixit specifies a circumference of 2L, but as he notes, his model has an extra degree of freedom such that an increase in the size of the world, L, is equivalent to a decrease in the unit in which
transactors, $X$, measured by the shorter of the two arc lengths between them (hence, $X \leq 1$), affects three considerations in the model: (i) the probability of meeting a given transactor, (ii) the potential gains from trade, and (iii) the probability of receiving information about the previous behavior of other transactors. We define (i) and (ii) here, and define (iii) in section 3.1.

**Matching.** First, we assume that individuals are more likely to meet and discover an opportunity for gainful cooperation the closer they are in attribute space. Specifically, the probability that any two players $i$ and $x$ are matched in any given period is

$$
\mu = \frac{e^{-X}}{2(1 - e^{-1})}.
$$

(distance is measured (2003: 1299). Consistent with this, distance in our model should be understood as being relative to the size of the relevant trading space. Our model also differs from Dixit’s in several other technical respects described in more detail below.)
In words, the probability of a match between two transactors decreases exponentially with their distance $X$.\(^{14}\) In keeping with our focus on impersonal trade, matching is independent across periods.\(^{15}\)

**Gains from trade.** A central feature of the model is that potential gains from trade are also related to distance. Specifically, the potential payoff to a given transactor $i$ from trading with a transactor at distance $X$ is $he^{\theta X}$. Gains from trade may thus be increasing or decreasing in distance depending on the sign of the parameter $\theta$: For $\theta > 0$, potential gains from trade increase with distance, and for $\theta < 0$, trade is more valuable between closer transactors. Gains from trade might increase with distance (or dissimilarity) because of the benefits accruing to specialization, while gains decreasing with distance could result from high transportation costs or because dissimilarity in, say, language or knowledge impedes communication or the understanding necessary to recognize gainful opportunities (c.f., Dixit, 2003: 1297)

**Conflict in exchange.** As noted earlier, the existence of gains from trade does not guarantee their realization. We capture the possibility of opportunistic behavior with the assumption that, in each period, matched transactors play a noncooperative trade game as follows:

Stage 1: Transactors decide simultaneously whether or not to transact. If either chooses not to transact, their payoffs are zero and the period ends for these transactors.

\(^{14}\) Our use of exponential functions in distance is for comparability with Dixit (2003). Prüfer (2012) shows that results using this framework are robust to the substitution of linear functions in distance.

\(^{15}\) In a more general model, traders might affect the probability of matching through efforts or investments. For our purposes, however, all that is necessary is that there remains some stochastic element of matching.
Stage 2: If the matched transactors agree to transact, each decides whether to cooperate (perform) or defect (renege). The payoff to each transactor is $ae^{\theta X}$, where $a$ is determined for each transactor from the following reduced-form payoff matrix:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$i / x$</th>
<th>Cooperate</th>
<th>Defect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cooperate</td>
<td>$h, h$</td>
<td>$l, w$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defect</td>
<td>$w, l$</td>
<td>$d, d$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

where $w > h > 0 > d > l$ and $2h > w + l$.

Stage 3: Transactors proceed to the enforcement stage corresponding to the relevant institution as described in the following sections.\(^{16}\)

Finally, we assume that time (between periods) proceeds in discrete intervals, $t \in \{0, 1, \ldots, \infty\}$, and that transactors are risk-neutral, have infinite horizons, and have a uniform per-period discount factor $\delta \in (0,1)$.

3.1. Community Enforcement

Consistent with our emphasis on impersonal exchange, the probability that any particular pair of transactors will actually encounter each other again is zero in our model.\(^{17}\) Consequently, in the absence of courts (or other third-party enforcement institutions), the only punishment that a transactor can impose on a partner who defected is to report the partner’s misbehavior with the aim of affecting the behavior of future transactors. Such reports can be effective, however, only to the extent that a future transactor matching with the offending transactor has learned of the partner’s prior defection and responds in a way that “punishes” the defector for his earlier misbehavior.

\(^{16}\) As described below, community enforcement technically takes place in stage 1 of the next period when each transactor decides whether or not to transact with his new trading partner.

\(^{17}\) This feature of the model is a crucial difference with the literature on relational contracting (e.g., Baker et al., 1994).
We model the dissemination of information through a transactor’s “community” as a function of the transactor’s location. Specifically, we assume that (i) following each transaction, every transactor reports the identity of his partner and the partner’s behavior chosen from the message space \{*cooperated, defected, did not trade*\}; and that (ii) the probability that transactor \( y \) “hears” transactor \( x \)’s announcement is

\[
\eta_{x,y} \equiv \kappa e^{-\beta |Y - X|},
\]

where \(|Y - X|\) is the distance between transactors \( y \) and \( x \), and \( \kappa \in [0,1] \) is a parameter reflecting transactors’ overall “connectedness” to other transactors on the circle.\(^{18}\)

As is standard, in deciding whether to cooperate, transactors trade off the gains from defection in the current transaction against the present value of potential lost trading opportunities in the future. From the payoff matrix above, the current-period gain from defection is \((h - w)e^{\theta X}\). The future cost of today’s defection, meanwhile, depends on the expected value of future trade, the probability that future transacting partners with whom you are matched have learned of your previous defection, and the reactions of those transacting partners to that knowledge. For purposes of the analysis, we define the following strategy.

**Community Enforcement (CE) Strategy.** Let \( V(w,h,\theta,X,\delta,\kappa) \) represent the present discounted value to transactor \( i \) of cooperating in period \( t \) relative to defecting in period \( t \). For player \( i \) matched with partner \( x \):

- in period \( t = 1 \), player \( i \) transacts and cooperates with partner \( x \) if \( V(\cdot) > 0 \), and does not transact otherwise;

\(^{18}\) We assume the parameter \( \kappa \) to be the same for all transactors. Prüfer (2012) shows that, if transactors have different \( \kappa \)'s, cooperation is dependent on the \( \kappa \) of the less well-connected transactor (smaller \( \kappa \)) but results remain qualitatively unchanged. As is common in the literature (see, e.g., Kandori, 1992; Kali, 1999; and Dixit, 2003), we also assume that reporting is truthful. A model in which detecting the veracity of reports is easier the closer the source of the report to the recipient would yield qualitatively similar results.
• in every subsequent period, player $i$ transacts and cooperates with partner $x$ if $V(\cdot) \geq 0$ unless player $i$ has received news that his current match $x$ defected in period $t - 1$, or if player $i$ himself defected in period $t - 1$ and his match $y$ learned about it.\footnote{For purposes of the model, we assume that transactors who defected in a previous period know whether their new trading partners learned of that defection.}

In effect, the CE strategy calls for a transactor to transact with his current match if cooperation is individually profitable ($V(\cdot) > 0$) unless either has learned that the other defected in the previous period. If players follow this strategy, the cost to player $i$ of deviating in period $t$ will be the expected loss from not transacting in period $t + 1$: Transactor $i$ knows that if he defects, his next period match $y$ will learn about it with probability $\eta_{x,y}$, and that if $y$ does learn about $i$’s defection, the CE strategy requires that $y$ not interact with $i$. This gives $i$ a payoff of zero in period $t + 1$, which means that he loses $\theta^y_i$ compared to mutual cooperation. Given that transactor $i$ does not know in period $t$ the type of his match in period $t + 1$, his future foregone payoffs depend on the distance of his new match, which may lie in one of four ranges of $X$ (depicted in Figure 1). Specifically, expected loss to player $i$ of not transacting in period $t + 1$ is the forgone value of transacting weighted by (i) the probability that $i$ is matched to $y$ in $t + 1$ and (ii) the probability that $y$ received news from $x$ that $i$ defected in $t$, or

\[
L = \delta \int_0^Y \frac{e^{-Y_i}}{2(1-e^{-1})} \kappa e^{-(X-Y_i)} h e^{\theta Y_i} dY_1 + \int_0^Y \frac{e^{-Y_i}}{2(1-e^{-1})} \kappa e^{-(Y_1-X)} h e^{\theta Y_i} dY_2 \\
+ \int_{-X}^1 \frac{e^{-Y_i}}{2(1-e^{-1})} \kappa e^{-(X-Y_i)} h e^{\theta Y_i} dY_3 + \int_0^{1-X} \frac{e^{-Y_i}}{2(1-e^{-1})} \kappa e^{-(X+Y_i)} h e^{\theta Y_i} dY_4. 
\]  

A transactor who believes that other transactors will follow the CE strategy will therefore cooperate with his current trading partner if and only if
or equivalently, if

\[ V(w, h, \theta, X, \delta, \kappa) = L - (w - h)e^{\theta X} \geq 0. \]  

An immediate implication of this result is that, because \( L(\kappa=0) = 0 \), transactors will not transact with transactors who are not “connected” \( (i.e., \text{if } \kappa = 0) \), underscoring the importance of communication in environments of impersonal exchange where, despite infinitely repeated exchange, the likelihood of any two transactors meeting again is too low (here, zero) for bilateral sanctions to sustain cooperation. It is also straightforward to show, given the definitions of \( L \) and \( V \) in equations (4) and (5), that \( \partial V / \partial (w-h) < 0 \), \( \partial V / \partial \delta > 0 \), and \( \partial V / \partial \kappa > 0 \). In words, the relative value of cooperation decreases in the gains from defecting and increases with the discount factor (time horizon) and transactors’ “connectedness.”

In Appendix A.1, we show that the CE strategy constitutes a Markov perfect equilibrium to this infinitely repeated game for which mutual cooperation occurs for some transactions and trade breaks down for other transactions. More specifically, defining the “scope of cooperation” as the range of distances between two players for which trade and cooperation constitutes an equilibrium, and \( X^* = \{X \mid V = 0\} \) as the boundary of the scope of cooperation, we prove the following proposition.

**Proposition 1 (The scope of cooperation under community enforcement).** For \( \kappa > 0 \), community enforcement will support cooperation in equilibrium if and only if \( X \leq X^* \) for \( \theta > 0 \), and if and only if \( X \geq X^* \) for \( \theta < \theta^* < 0 \).

Proposition 1 implies that, for \( \theta > 0 \), there exists an upper bound, \( X^* \), on the distance between partners up to which it is rational for \( i \) to cooperate. For larger distances, expected future punishment for defection is too small to
overcome the short-term gain. This occurs because (i) future punishment depends on the transmission of information, captured by $\eta_{x,y}$, and the probability of being matched to a community member of $x$ in the next period, captured by $\mu$, both of which are decreasing in distance; and (ii) gains from defecting in a current transaction are a function on potential gains from trade, which increase with distance when $\theta > 0$.

For $\theta < \theta^* < 0$, that is, if larger distances between matched transactors sufficiently decrease the value of the transaction, a lower bound $X^*$ exists above which player cooperation is rational. This implies that, despite the higher incidence of matching and communication among nearby transactors, the connectedness of $x$ may not be enough to induce $i$ to cooperate if the partners are located so close to each other that the payoff from defecting (which increases with the value of a transaction) exceeds the expected punishment.

Figure 2 illustrates this result using a numerical example. In the illustration, community enforcement is effective — transactors have an incentive to cooperate with each other ($V > 0$) — in the southwest and northeast corners of the graph but not in the other regions. In words, community enforcement is able to sustain cooperation for transactions between “nearby” partners when $\theta$ is positive and for transactions with “distant” partners for (sufficiently) negative $\theta$ transactions. Finally, Figure 2 also illustrates the ambiguous region, $\theta \in [\theta^*, 0]$, where community enforcement may generate an upper or lower bound (or both) on cooperation, the cause of which is conflicting effects on $V$ of the three parameters, $\eta_{x,y}$, $\mu$, and $\theta$, that enter as coefficients on $X$, making $V$ nonmonotonic in $X$ (see Appendix A.1). We will return to the implications of these results after considering court enforcement.
3.2 Court Enforcement

Consistent with our earlier characterization, we model courts as having the ability to investigate claims of defection and the power to levy damages on defecting parties. Moreover, because courts in our model are “generalist” — that is, they lack the “local” expertise and knowledge of transactors in the economy — courts may not be able to determine fault as accurately as would members of a community. More specifically, we assume that the capacity of courts to adjudicate disputes is related to the characteristics and complexity of transactions.

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20 These assumptions distinguish court enforcement in our model from that of “external enforcement” in Dixit (2003), in which courts lack the power to coerce performance and are able only to detect (perfectly) and report incidents of cheating.
(relative to the court’s inherent ability) but not to the location of the transactors: Transactors’ locations have no differential effects on the effectiveness of courts. We capture differences in the difficulty of adjudicating a dispute through a single parameter $\tau \in [0,1]$, which can be thought of as the probability that a plaintiff with a valid claim is able to satisfy the burden of proof necessary to win its case.\textsuperscript{21}

If a court rules for the plaintiff, the court requires the defendant to pay the plaintiff damages, $D$. If the plaintiff fails to prove its case, the court finds for the defendant and no damages are rewarded. In the event that both parties sue, the court evaluates each party’s claim and assesses damages independently, so that each party’s payoff is the sum of outcomes of each suit. Finally, both filing and defending suits are costly: Plaintiffs incur costs $c$ and defendants $g$.\textsuperscript{22}

Given these assumptions, the expected payoff to a transactor from filing suit depends on both his behavior and that of his partner in the central transaction. Specifically, a transactor’s expected payoffs from filing suit as a function of his own and his trading partner’s behavior in the central transaction are as follows: A transactor who cooperated while his partner defected would expect $\tau D - c$ from filing suit and have a payoff of $-g$ if sued by his (defecting) partner. A transactor who defected while his partner cooperated would expect $-\tau D - g$ from being sued and have a payoff of $-c$ were he to sue his (cooperating) partner. If both transactors cooperate or both defect, the plaintiff gets $-c$ and the defendant $-g$, and thus each would receive $-c-g$ if both filed suit.

\textsuperscript{21} Our model allows only for “type-2” (false negative) judicial errors. We assume that courts (i) are able to compel payment through, for example, the threat of imprisonment for failing to obey a court order; and (ii) are impartial and nonstrategic: Their decisions are rule-based and not dependent on the identities of the parties or on inferences from the strategies of the litigants.

\textsuperscript{22} We assume that litigants bear their own costs regardless of who wins the case, the so-called “American rule.” Results would not be materially affected under the requirement that the loser pay the prevailing party’s litigation costs — sometimes referred to as the “English rule” — which is common outside of the United States.
Based on the above, we can show (see Appendix A.2) that court enforcement will sustain cooperation if and only if damages $D$ satisfy

$$D \geq \max \left\{ \frac{c}{\tau}, \frac{(w-h)e^{\alpha x} - g}{\tau} \right\}. \quad (6)$$

The main implication of this inequality is that, for cooperation to be sustained through court enforcement (as part of a subgame-perfect equilibrium), two conditions must be satisfied. First, the damage payment a transactor expects to receive must be large enough to justify the cost of filing suit. Second, the damage payment a defector expects to have to pay has to be sufficiently large relative to the gain from defection to deter defection. If either condition is violated, court enforcement will fail to support cooperation, and the unique Nash equilibrium at stage 1 is for the parties not to transact.

*Expectation damages.* As is well known, with sufficiently large damages, courts could assure cooperation in every transaction. For both practical and doctrinal reasons, the damages that a party can expect to pay for breach of contract are typically limited. 23 For purposes of our analysis, we assume, as is true in many contexts, that courts award expectation damages, which, given the payoff matrix in the central transaction above, equal $D_{\text{exp}} = (h - l)e^{\alpha x}$ in our

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23 Although available in principle and used in some contexts, courts infrequently employ punitive damages or specific performance for breach of contract and, in some jurisdictions, even prohibit transactors from agreeing to “penalties,” that is, liquidated damages that exceed the other party’s reasonable expectations. Harsher sanctions, including corporal punishment, for contract violations were more prevalent in medieval times. But a greater severity of punishments was likely offset (and perhaps justified) by a lower probability of locating and returning a merchant engaged in long-distance trade. The severity of punishments would likely also have been constrained by state competition for traders; see note 8 above. There is, of course, a large literature on contract damages. For an overview of the law and economics literature on contract enforcement, see Hermalin et al. (2007, 99-126).
model. The following proposition (proved in Appendix A.2) characterizes the range of transactions for which court enforcement will sustain cooperation.

**Proposition 2 (The scope of cooperation under court enforcement).** Court enforcement will support cooperation in equilibrium if and only if the distance between transactors, \( X \), satisfies the following conditions:

**Case \( \theta > 0 \):** \[
X \geq \Phi \text{ if } \tau \geq \frac{w-h}{h-l} - \frac{g}{(h-l)e^\theta},
\]

\[
X \in [\Phi, \Gamma] \text{ if } \frac{w-h}{h-l} - \frac{g}{(h-l)e^\theta} > \tau \geq \frac{w-h-g}{h-l};
\]

**Case \( \theta < 0 \):** \[
X \leq \Phi \text{ if } \tau \geq \frac{w-h-g}{h-l},
\]

\[
X \in [\Gamma, \Phi] \text{ if } \frac{w-h-g}{h-l} \leq \tau < \frac{w-h-g}{h-l};
\]

where

\[
\Phi = -\frac{\ln \left( \frac{c}{(h-l)\tau} \right)}{\theta}, \quad \text{and} \quad \Gamma = -\frac{\ln \left( \frac{g}{(w-h) - \tau(h-l)} \right)}{\theta}.
\]

For high values of \( \tau \), as defined by equations (7) and (9) above, the range of transactions for which court enforcement supports cooperation is delimited only by \( \Phi \). For \( \theta > 0 \), \( \Phi \) represents a lower bound on the distance at which the partner \( x \) may be located from player \( i \) for mutual cooperation to be rational. For distances \( X \) less than \( \Phi \), transactors defect at stage 2 knowing that prospective damages are too low to justify the expense of filing suit. Consequently, they do not transact at stage 1. For \( \theta < 0 \), the threshold for filing suit is satisfied for transactions with closer (and therefore more valuable) trading partners. In this case, \( \Phi \) represents an upper bound on distance for cooperation instead. Provided that courts are sufficiently proficient at determining liability (\( \tau \) is sufficiently
high), court enforcement has no upper bound because a defendant’s expected cost of being sued will be high enough to deter defection even for high value transactions. Court enforcement has a lower interior bound, however, because the cost to plaintiffs of filing suit may exceed the expected damage payment if the value of the underlying transaction is too low.

For lower levels of \( \tau \), transactors’ maximization behavior in the central transaction may yield an upper bound on cooperation defined by \( \Gamma \) (equation (11)): If the distance \( X \) is too high (in the case of \( \theta > 0 \)) or too low (for \( \theta < 0 \)), the gains to defection will be too large relative to the expected damages to sustain cooperation. In this event, cooperation fails, not because courts are too expensive (the stakes are too small to justify use of court enforcement), but because they are insufficiently effective in assessing liability to deter defection (the stakes outstrip the capacity of courts to detect and deter opportunism).

3.3. Comparing the Scope of Community and Court Enforcement

Our models of community and court enforcement contain several institution-specific parameters that influence the effectiveness of community and court enforcement in largely transparent ways: Greater transactor connectedness (\( \kappa \)) and more accurate adjudication (\( \tau \)), for example, increase the range of transactions for which community and court enforcement, respectively, sustain cooperation. Our primary interest, however, is in the effects of the underlying economic variables common to both models, in particular, dissimilarity or “distance,” \( X \); and the relationship between distance and the value of cooperative trade captured by the parameter \( \theta \), with respect to which the analysis of the preceding sections yields a number of novel insights. First, contrary to Dixit’s speculation that, for negative values of \( \theta \), “trades will unambiguously best be carried out using automatic self-governance in small communities each of which has homogeneous membership” (2003: 1297), we find that increases in the gains to reneging (defection) that accompany increases in the value of “local” (low-\( X \)
trade when \( \theta < 0 \) may outweigh the greater likelihood that nearby transactors learn about previous defections, resulting in the breakdown of cooperation. This finding is illustrated in Figure 2, which shows community enforcement sustaining cooperation for negative \( \theta \) only for the relatively low-value (high-\( X \)) transactions in the northeast corner.

Second, in contrast to Dixit’s model, in which external governance substitutes for self governance (community enforcement) and expands the “scope of honest trade” (cooperation) only for large enough economies, courts and communities in our model are complementary in the sense that they tend to support cooperation for different sets of transactions: Community enforcement works best for relatively low-value transactions, and court enforcement for relatively high-value transactions. This complementarity appears in Figure 2 for positive values of \( \theta \) (the left-hand side of the figure), where community enforcement supports cooperation with relatively nearby (low-\( X \)) transactors in the southwest corner while court enforcement sustains cooperation between more distant (high-\( X \)) transactors in the northwest corner.25 As seen in the figure, an implication of the complementarity of communities and courts is the possibility

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24 The contrast with Dixit’s results derives from his conception of external governance, which operates, in effect, as an intermediary providing complete information on traders’ previous behavior (Dixit, 2003: 1309). Whereas the effectiveness of self governance (community enforcement) is limited by the size of the economy in his model, his external governance sustains cooperation universally for any size economy, but at an administrative cost proportional to the size of the economy (id.).

25 An artifact of Dixit’s exponential gains from trade specification, which we also adopt, is that, holding other parameters constant, the gains from trade for \( \theta \leq 0 \) (the maximum of which occurs at \( X = 0 \)) are always less than or equal to the gains from trade for \( \theta \geq 0 \) (the minimum of which also occurs at \( X = 0 \)). Balancing potential gains from trade for positive and negative \( \theta \)’s (by, for example, varying \( h \) appropriately) would show court enforcement to be effective in sustaining cooperation for low-\( X \) transactions when \( \theta < 0 \) (for sufficiently high \( \tau \)). The overall increase in expected gains from trade in the model as \( \theta \) rises is broadly consistent with the expansion of wealth that accrues to decreasing costs of and barriers to trade associated with “globalization.”
that a range of distances exists for which neither communities nor courts alone can sustain cooperation.26

The analysis to this point has examined the range of transactions for which courts and communities are capable of sustaining cooperation individually, that is, without considering whether the existence of one enforcement institution affects the performance of the other. Typically, however, transactors will have access to both communities and courts, and defectors may be subject both to community sanctions, \( L \), and to damages plus litigation costs, \( \tau(h - l)e^{\theta X} + g \). The consequences of the simultaneous availability of both institutions for cooperation depends on the distance between transactors in their current match, \( X \), and can be divided into three cases or regions corresponding to whether cooperation is (i) supported by courts alone, (ii) supported by communities alone, or (iii) not supported by either institution alone. For transactions in the interval \( X \in [\Phi, \Gamma] \) (\( X \in [\Gamma, \Phi] \) for \( \theta < 0 \)), for which courts in isolation sustain cooperation, the additional availability of community sanctions has no effect: Under the conditions set out in Proposition 2, filing suit is individually rational in this region, and the threat of court enforcement is sufficient to support cooperation without the addition of community enforcement. Outside this interval, however, the co-existence of communities and courts will support cooperation for some transactions that could not be sustained by either institution individually. Specifically, for \( X > \Gamma > X^* \) (\( X < \Gamma < X^* \) for \( \theta < 0 \)), the expected punishment for defecting is the sum of \( L \) and \( \tau(h - l)e^{\theta X} + g \): In this region, filing suit against a defecting trading partner is individually rational but enforcement is insufficiently accurate (\( \tau \) is too low) and, therefore, the expected court sanction too small, to deter cheating for high-value

\[ \text{26 Also possible, but not illustrated in Figure 2 (except at a point on the } X \text{ axis for } \theta = 1 \text{), is that the ranges covered by communities and courts overlap.} \]
transactions. For distances outside but close to $\Gamma$, however, the addition of community sanction $L$ will be enough to make defection unprofitable.\textsuperscript{27}

Finally, whereas the existence of communities supplements court enforcement, the existence of courts diminishes the effectiveness of community enforcement.\textsuperscript{28} Recall that $L$, the punishment to transactor $i$ for defection in the current period under community enforcement, is the loss associated with the possibility that transactor $i$’s next-period match, $y$, will refuse to trade with $i$ (as defined by equation (3)). With the existence of courts, however, a next-period match $y$ in the interval $Y \in [\Phi, \Gamma]$ ($Y \in [\Gamma, \Phi]$ for $\theta < 0$) will find it profitable to trade with $i$ even if $y$ received a message that $i$ defected in the previous period because $y$ knows that the threat of court enforcement will induce $i$ to cooperate in the new ($t+1$) transaction. The fact that trade will occur with next-period matches on the interval $[\Phi, \Gamma]$ regardless of a transactor’s current behavior implies that the community punishment for defection when courts are available will be less than it would have been if court enforcement were nonexistent. Accordingly, the range of transactions for which community enforcement can sustain cooperation when court enforcement is also available will be smaller than if courts did not exist. In Figure 2, the effect of the existence of effective court enforcement on scope of community enforcement is depicted by the dashed curve.

\textsuperscript{27} Because the upper bound on effective court enforcement, $\Gamma$, does not occur for the parameter values used in Figure 2, the expansion of the range of court-supported cooperation with the introduction of communities does not appear in that figure. For parallel reasons, the combination of court and community sanctions would also be large enough to deter defection for some transactions outside but close to $\Phi$. Filing suit is not rational in this area, however, because expected damages are too low to justify litigation costs, and consequently, only community sanctions are operative.

\textsuperscript{28} We thank Robert Gibbons for drawing our attention to this “crowding out” effect. Cooter and Landa (1984) offer a model in which increased effectiveness of court enforcement reduces membership in trading groups — their analog to community enforcement in our model — but, because the probability of member performance declines with the size of trading groups (by assumption), the resulting smaller group size enhances, rather than diminishes, the effectiveness of trading groups.
extending down from $X^*$ at $\theta = 0.4$ to the horizontal axis; for the parameters in the illustration, the existence of courts causes the region for which communities can sustain cooperation to contract by the area below $X^*$ and to the left of this dashed curve.

In sum, communities and courts in our model tend to be effective for different transactions, implying that cooperation will tend to be supported over a broader range of transactions when both institutions exist than with either alone. But whereas the availability of community sanctions supplements the effectiveness of weak (low $\tau$) court enforcement, the effectiveness of community enforcement decreases as the range of transactions for which courts are effective, $[\Phi, \Gamma]$, increases. Of particular note, changes in the effectiveness of enforcement institutions, both individually and in relation to each other, result in this analysis from changes in the relationship between distance and the value of trade (embodied in $\theta$) and not because of changes in the inherent qualities of the institutions themselves (such as $\tau$ or $\kappa$).

4. Communities, Courts, and the Commercial Revolution

As Richman (2004: 2335) has remarked, private enforcement systems may arise for either of two broad reasons: “because reliable state-sponsored contract enforcement is unavailable” or because “public courts are available but…private law is preferable.” Richman, like most prevailing treatments, places the medieval Law Merchant in the former category, that is, among the set of “commercial networks [that] resort to self-enforcement because state contractual enforcement is not a reliable option” (id.: 2335-6). Milgrom, North, and Weingast similarly portray the Law Merchant as a solution to the problem of securing merchant bargains “prior to the rise of large-scale third-party enforcement of legal codes by the nation-state” (1990: 4; cf., Benson, 1989: 647).

If the absence of effective state enforcement occasioned the rise of the Law Merchant, it stands to reason that the growth and extension of state authority
would lead to its decline. Over time, it is argued, states acquired both an interest in shaping commercial law and the coercive power to enforce state court judgments. Such coercive power gave state courts an advantage over community enforcement: “Rather than depend for punishment upon the decentralized behavior of merchants, state enforcement could seize the property of individuals who resisted paying judgments, or put them into jail. If judgments could be enforced this way, then, in principle, the costs of keeping the merchants well informed about one another's past behavior could be saved” (Milgrom et al., 1990: 20-1). At the same time, states were showing an increasing interest in commercial trade, so that, by the 16th century, “great and powerful kingdoms with definite commercial policies of their own, began freely to declare and to modify the law” (Mitchell, 1904: 157).

29 See, e.g., Cooter (1996: 1648): “as the English legal system became stronger and more unified, English judges increasingly assumed jurisdiction over disputes among merchants.”

30 As this statement suggests, the state ascension hypothesis has two versions. One holds that states’ wrestling of control of courts from merchants was hegemonic: Although merchant courts were more efficient, states were intent of centralizing authority (e.g., Benson 1989: 651-3; Mitchell, 1904: 157). The other, more benign, version is that, as state court administration and enforcement capacity improved, merchants gravitated from merchant courts to the now superior state courts. This second explanation corresponds to an improvement in $\tau$ (and possibly an increase in the size of damages, $D$) in our model.

31 Despite emphasizing the absence of effective state enforcement in the rise of the Law Merchant, Milgrom et al. ultimately attribute its demise to increasing information costs of running the system as the volume of trade increased (1990: 21):

To the extent that the costs of running state adjudication and enforcement were roughly similar to the costs of running the private system and to the extent that taxes can be efficiently collected, a comprehensive state-run system would have the advantage that it eliminates the need for each individual to pay [the cost of using the centralized information system] each period. As the volume of trade increased in the late middle ages, the cost saving from that source would have been substantial. Thus our approach suggests that the importance of the role of the state enforcement of contracts was not that it provided a means of enforcing contracts where one previously did not exist. Rather, it was to reduce the transaction costs of policing exchange.

Their argument differs from ours in that theirs emphasizes the volume of trade whereas ours turns on the composition of trade.
States undoubtedly gained power and expanded their reach over the course of the second millennium. Far less clear, however, is whether state courts became significantly more effective or less costly over time, or what interest states had in using contract enforcement as a vehicle for regulating commercial transactions. Indeed, rather than imposing state authority over contract disputes on resistant merchants, states appear to have taken on the function of contract enforcement reluctantly. Twelfth-century royal courts in England, for example, exercised jurisdiction over property, tort, and criminal matters but deliberately eschewed enforcement of contracts: “it is not the custom of the court of the lord king to protect private agreements, nor does it even concern itself with such contracts as can be considered like private agreements.”

Before the 15th century, “[t]he King’s court was not very fond of contract” (Plucknett, 1956: 637). States clearly had the capacity to enforce merchant contracts long before they assumed that role.

4.1. The Evolution of Trade and Enforcement Institutions in Medieval Europe

As described above, an implication of our theoretical analysis is that the effectiveness of enforcement institutions varies with the value of trading with “distant” transactors: In settings where the most valuable trade is local (corresponding to $\theta < 0$ in the model), community enforcement is effective for a range of relatively low-value transactions, but voluntary trade either cannot be sustained or, for the highest-value projects, requires enforcement by a third party with coercive power. When, by contrast, the relationship between the profitability of trading opportunities and the distance (or dissimilarity) of transactors turns positive and increases ($\theta < 0$), community enforcement initially suffices for

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transactors with sufficiently similar attributes and knowledge but is eventually undermined as the range of transactions for which court enforcement is effective expands.

Economic conditions in Europe in the Middle Ages largely conformed to this progression. By all accounts, the period preceding the Commercial Revolution in Europe, roughly the 5th to 9th centuries, was one of general economic contraction, leaving Europe with “little room for investment over and above the preservation of life” (Lopez, 1971: 59). The collapse of the Roman Empire, barbarian invasions, and coastal piracy combined to make travel and transportation, already hazardous, even more dangerous. With the Muslim conquest of the north coast of Africa shipping between the southern and northern Mediterranean effectively ended (McCormick, 2001: 110, 118-19); in the rest of the Mediterranean trade was “absolutely marginal” (id.: 574).

The factors contributing to the reinvigoration of European trade are numerous (and disputed) but among them were (i) increased agricultural productivity and associated population growth, and (ii) the attenuation of the barbarian threat and strengthening of states, which improved security for both persons and possessions. Gradually, trade routes began to reopen and opportunities for profitable long-distance trade reemerged. The limitations of ships and general risks of sea travel limited the volume and range of goods suitable for interregional trade, however. To be profitable to transport, goods had to be valuable enough to justify the cost of transportation (high value to weight) but not so valuable that their loss would be ruinous.33 In the Mediterranean, goods meeting these criteria included incense, spices, and silk from the Near East and furs, swords, and slaves from Europe (McCormick, 2001: 662, 729-735;

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33 McCormick (2001: 407) notes that, under Rhodian Sea Law, “Merchants who freighted heavy or expensive cargoes aboard old ships were not entitled to indemnification.”
Williamson, 2010: 11); in Northern Europe, interregional trade before the 13th century consisted primarily of such high-value-to-transport-costs products as wax, furs, wine, and cloth (Hybel, 2002: xviii; Campbell, 2002: 6).34

The growth in long-distance trade accelerated further with a series of innovations in shipbuilding technology beginning in the late 12th century that significantly lowered transportation costs and expanded the types and volumes of goods that could be economically traded. Historical and archeological studies estimate that the largest, early-medieval commercial ships had had maximum capacities under 75 tons (Bill, 2002: 102-3; McCormick, 2001: 95-6, 415-6). Around 1180-1200, however, shipbuilders began to adopt a new method of construction involving the insertion of horizontal beams that protruded through the planking of the ship’s sides (Bill, 2002: 105). Such “through-beam” construction and other improvements, followed by a second wave of major innovations in the 15th century, allowed shipbuilders to construct cargo ships that were not only significantly larger but sturdier, safer, and cheaper than their predecessors (id.: 105-112; Unger, 1980: 216-21). Maximum cargo capacities, which had been essentially static before 1150, roughly doubled at the end of the 12th century and continued to rise throughout the late Middle Ages and beyond, reaching capacities of at least 500 tons in the north and more than one thousand tons in the Mediterranean by 1600 (Bill, 2002: 102, 112; Unger, 1980: 221).

The reduction in transportation costs that accompanied larger and safer ships increased the volume but also changed the nature of commerce. First, no longer limited to relatively high-value-to-transport cost products, later trade also included heavier and lower value cargoes, with commerce in bulk commodities

34 Verlinden (1965: 127) lists products regularly traded at fairs in Flanders and Champagne in the early 12th century as including cloth, silk, leather, fur, linens, spices, wax, sugar, alum, lacquer, and dye-woods.
such as stone, pottery, timber, and grain “develop[ing] from an incidental activity to regular trade during the two and half centuries from 1150 to 1400” (Hybel, 2002: xvii). Tariff lists and other records attest that “the supply of goods in the period 1200-1350 became quite differentiated” (Poulsen, 2002: 35). Second, as the volume and variety of traded goods grew, so did the number of markets serving that trade.\textsuperscript{35} Initially, a few prominent cities and ports and a relatively small number of organized fairs served as the principal venues for long-distance trade. The expansion of trading opportunities for merchants, however, also created profit opportunities for rulers and landlords, who stood to gain from the collection of rental fees, customs, and tolls as well as from increased business for their tenants (Britnell, 1981: 221; Kaden, 2004: 49). In England, for example, the crown granted over 300 licenses for new markets between 1200 and 1349 in twenty-one counties alone (Britnell, 1981: 209-10).\textsuperscript{36} Although most of these new markets were inland and not directly related to long-distance trade (\textit{id.}: 215), coastal and riparian markets also proliferated: “The growth of long-distance trade … accounts for the exceptionally rapid growth of markets on advantageous sites,” especially along rivers and the sea coast, which became “colonized as never before with markets….” (\textit{id.}: 213-14).

The decline in transportation costs and expansion of long-distance trade opportunities during the Commercial Revolution and thereafter corresponds to an increase in $\theta$ in our model, from negative during the early Middle Ages, when limited opportunities and high risks depreciated the value of trade over long

\textsuperscript{35} Berman (1983: 335) cites estimates that the number of merchants in Western Europe also increased dramatically, from “the thousands” in 1050 to the “hundreds of thousands” by 1200.

\textsuperscript{36} These twenty-one counties represented 55\% of the land area of England (Britnell: 209). Two-thirds (219 of 329) of the markets licensed in this period survived into the 16th century (\textit{id.}: 210, 219). On the increase in medieval market towns in Normandy, see Hilton (1985), and in Germany, see Bindseil and Pfeil (1999). On the proliferation of fairs in the late Middle Ages, see Epstein (1994).
distances, to progressively more positive values as shipping technology and the
safety and security of merchants and their cargoes improved. In the earliest
period, “agriculture was paramount, commerce and industry were adequate but
marginal, security and stability rather than growth were the supreme ideal of the
ruling classes” (Lopez, 1971: 57). What trade did take place was necessarily local
and of modest value, for which community enforcement was likely to have been
sufficient, with the most valuable investments — fortifications, water mills, and
churches, for example — undertaken under the direction and control of the local
lord. Improving circumstances resulted in trade over increasing geographic
distances but, because the range of traded products and the number of markets
remained limited, transactions tended to occur within relatively stable
communities of merchants, whose “proximity” (low $X$) in terms of knowledge,
experience, and acquaintances were conducive to community enforcement.
Gradually, however, the proliferation of markets and products accompanying the
continued decline in transportation costs (and increase in $\theta$) after 1200 increased
opportunities for, and the value of, trade in diverse goods in disparate markets,
transactions for which community enforcement would have been less effective but
for which court enforcement was relatively well-suited.  

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37 On the conditions of pre-Commercial Revolution Europe generally, see Volckart and Mangels

38 We do not mean to suggest that this progression was monotonic; wars and plagues, among other
factors, interrupted and not infrequently reversed the general trends. But the long-term direction
was toward expanding opportunities for long-distance trade. Compare Lopez’ (1987: 375)
distinction between inner and outer areas of trade in the 14th century: “The ‘outer’ area was a field
of large risks and large profits, a frontier where good luck was almost as important as good
management…. In the ‘inner’ area of long-distance trade, however, commerce had now ceased to
be an adventure. It was a highly competitive market, where success depended mainly on
efficiency, quickness and almost meticulous weighing of transport charges, tolls and marketing
conditions. Investments were comparatively safe and profits were usually moderate, even if
judged according to modern standards. Distance was not always the dominant factor in drawing
the border between ‘outer’ and ‘inner’ areas, since war could at any moment render trade
extremely dangerous even at the gates of a commercial metropolis.”
4.2. Law Merchant Procedure

As noted above, another way in which the Law Merchant differed from state courts was in its speed and its use of good faith standards for adjudicating disputes (e.g., Kerr, 1929: 355; Berman, 1983: 348, 353-4). Merchant courts offered “expeditious procedure especially adapted for the needs of men who could not tarry for the common law…[,] an exemption from, or a short circuit through, the delays of due process” (Baker, 1979: 301-02). “Most importantly, merchant procedure was equitable procedure. It relied not on the rigor of the law but on judging ‘ex aequo et bono,’ according to that which is fair and best for the parties and doing so in the simplest possible fashion. By this standard, the particular needs of the parties governed a given dispute rather than strict adherence to established law or precedent”[39]

The nature of Law Merchant procedure likely contributed to its demise for reasons that parallel the limitations of community enforcement in our model.40 First, assessing good faith performance in light of “the particular needs of the parties” is fact intensive, requiring familiarity with merchant customs and practices as well as knowledge of the parties and their circumstances, attributes that adjudicators who are themselves community members are more likely to

39 Kadens (2004: 57); cf., Berman (1983: 347). Ex aequo et bono “means what is just and fair or according to equity and good conscience. Something to be decided ex aequo et bono is something that is to be decided by principles of what is fair and just. A decision-maker who is authorized to decide ex aequo et bono is not bound by legal rules but may take account of what is just and fair.” (http://definitions.uslegal.com/e/ex-aequo-et-bono/).

40 Whether the Law Merchant was in fact self enforcing, as many scholars have claimed, has been the subject of debate (see, e.g., Kadens 2004: 51). Our review of the literature reveals surprisingly thin documentary support for the claim that the threat of ostracism sustained merchant court decisions. Weak documentary evidence of ostracism in support of Law Merchant decisions could simply reflect the success of the Law Merchant in securing merchant compliance: Ostracism could have been rarely observed because it was so effective; no merchant would risk the loss of business by ignoring merchant court rulings. Merchant reputations undoubtedly mattered in other ways as well. The willingness of fellow merchants to testify on behalf of a litigant, and the credibility of that testimony, would likely have depended on the litigant’s and witnesses’ reputations and standing in the merchant community, for example. See, generally, Goldberg (2011).
possess. Second, compared to formal legal rules and procedures, equitable standards leave judges considerable discretion (Smith, 2010). Whether owing to associations with fellow community members or greater familiarity with the customs or circumstances of members than non-members, judges “residing” in a given community may be more apt to exercise that discretion discriminatorily or inaccurately when confronted with complex issues or heterogeneous litigants.41 As that prospect grows, the discretion-constraining property of formal legal rules and procedures become more attractive.42

The transactor and transaction attributes that undermine community enforcement in our model, and that we argue characterized late-Medieval European trade, appear to have had a corresponding effect on merchant-run courts. Although often described as a “universal law of trade” (e.g., Trakman, 1983: 11; Benson, 1982: 1), the merchant customs that comprised the medieval Law Merchant tended, in fact, to be location- and trade-specific.43 As long as the number of traded products and market centers were few, as in the early period of trade revival, merchant adjudicators were likely to be sufficiently well-informed about merchant practices and trade usages in a given community to provide accurate and unbiased decisions.44 As the heterogeneity of merchants and

41 See, for instance, Landes and Posner (2003: 335), who argue that interest groups play a larger role in the appointment of judges to specialized and semi-specialized courts than to generalist courts and that, consistent with this, the U.S. Federal Circuit, which handles patent appeals, “turned out to be a pro-patent court in comparison to the average of the regional courts that it displaced in the patent domain.”

42 See, for example, Smith (2010: 52; 2003: 1112), who characterizes formality in relation to the extent to which a law or system is invariant to context.

43 Referring to mercantile codes in medieval cities and towns, Baker (1979: 300) observes that “far from there having been a universal law throughout the world, the local variations seem as numerous as the coincidences.” See also, Ibbetson (2007: 159-60) and Kadens (2004: 62).

customs increased with the proliferation or products and markets after 1200, however, the likelihood of disputes involving unfamiliar customs and between member and non-member merchants rose, increasing the scope for opportunistic or ill-informed rulings. “[A]t the time of the formal homologation of customs in the sixteenth century” in France and Flanders, for example, “still many dozens of different sets of customs” existed (Ibbetson, 2007: 160). Increasingly, “the group interests of the [local] merchants led to systematic discrimination [against] foreign traders” and to “rent-seeking … directed against merchants from other towns” (Volckart and Mangels, 1999: 444). As a consequence, when adjudication of merchant disputes began to shift to state (as opposed to local) courts, it was often at the urging of merchants and with the aim of harmonizing disparate customs that resisted simple reconciliation (Kadens, 2010: 23-5, 32-3). Illustrative is Ibbetson’s description of the transition from merchant panels to state court enforcement of insurance contracts in 16th-century England, in which “a series of complaints by foreign merchants,” who saw themselves as “unfairly disadvantaged in the proceedings,” sought to have their cases moved out of the Mayor’s Court, in which “the power of adjudication was retained firmly in the hands of the merchants themselves” (2008: 293, 298). As cases became more complex and customs more diverse, it made little sense to leave resolution of disputes “where there was no settled practice…to the perhaps capricious decision of a group of merchants” (id.: 293-4). The increasing heterogeneity of merchants thus appears to have undermined the qualities that made merchant courts attractive, which, like community enforcement, depended on shared knowledge and information for their effectiveness.

5. Conclusion

Recent research has illuminated the ways in which a variety of self-enforcing institutions can support cooperation among impersonal transactors but has been criticized for failing to explore more systematically the conditions under
which particular institutions arise and fade. In this paper, we have sought to address that criticism by relating the effectiveness of two collective enforcement institutions—communities (social networks) and courts—to characteristics of economies. Specifically, drawing on a framework introduced by Dixit (2003), we model the ability of communities and courts to sustain cooperation among transactors for whom differences in location, knowledge, or other economically relevant attributes affect the likelihood and value of trading and their ability to communicate. Despite its highly stylized representation of court and community enforcement institutions, the model provides a number of new insights into the factors influencing the relative effectiveness of these institutions that do not depend on exogenous changes in the strengths or properties of institutions. In addition to showing that courts and communities tend to be effective for different types of transactions, and that the existence of effective court enforcement undermines community enforcement, our analysis predicts an initial expansion in the range of transactions for which community enforcement can sustain cooperation followed by gradual displacement of communities by court enforcement as the value of trade between distant or dissimilar transactors increases, a pattern that parallels the historical emergence and erosion of the medieval Law Merchant as improvements in the security of travel and innovations in shipbuilding progressively reduced the cost and risks of transporting goods over long distances.

Although we emphasize a particular setting, we believe that the model has broader application. Dean Williamson (2010), for example, describes an analogous shift in the structure of the contracts used to finance long-distance trade contemporaneous with our analysis. When trade involved repeated transactions in a limited number of widely traded products at a regular location (though not necessarily with the same merchants), as was the case with Venetian trade with Egypt in the 13th century, merchants were likely to have access to enough
information to allow *commenda* (sharing) contracts to operate satisfactorily despite their susceptibility to agent cheating. Where trade was more episodic and diverse, as with the Turkish emirates and with Egypt after 1291, the absence of significant regular trade made reliance on *commenda* too hazardous, and merchants shifted to debt contracts that were relatively easy to enforce in court and thus less reliant on informal, reputational sanctions. Parallels can also be found in Ellickson’s (1989) description of the operation and demise of 19th-century whaling communities, and in Bernstein’s (1999) discussion of trade association efforts in the late 19th and early 20th centuries — “a period during which many merchant industries had already become significantly national in scope” (717) — to harmonize and codify the customs and practices of their members, which varied by region within the same industry. The analysis also has potential policy implications for the introduction or strengthening of commercial court systems in developing economies.

Our formal analysis considers just two of the variety of institutions potentially available to support impersonal trade. Other institutions with origins in the Middle Ages include merchant guilds (Greif, Milgrom, and Weingast, 1994) and the “community responsibility system” (Greif, 2006), both of which, among other things, helped to secure property right protections beyond local jurisdictions. Our focus on institutions supporting voluntary exchange also led us to ignore institutions and organizations sustaining authority relationships. We know, for instance, that Rome shipped large volumes of grains, oil, and other products from Egypt and other Mediterranean ports. But such transfers were mainly the product of conquest and confiscation — vertical integration, if you will — rather than voluntary trade.45

45 *Cf.*, McCormick (2001: 83, 85): “Recent studies have emphasized that, in volume, the greatest shipments [in late antiquity] were non-commercial transports of state supplies… [T]he importance
Finally, in both our formal analysis and our discussion of medieval trade and institutions, we have abstracted away from much important detail to focus on general forces and trends. The patterns we discuss were neither uniform nor universal throughout Europe, proceeding at different rates, and sometimes directions, at different locations and times. General agreement exists, however, that mercantile courts facilitated trade during the early Commercial Revolution and that over time much of the adjudication of merchant disputes shifted to conventional state courts. The Law Merchant did not entirely disappear, however. A modern version, for example, continues to govern many international transactions (see, e.g., Trakman, 1983: chapters 2 and 3). Like its predecessor, however, efforts have been made to bring enforcement of international law merchant arbitration decisions under the domain of national courts through treaties such as the 1958 United Nations New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (see Leeson, 2008a). Signed by six countries in the first year, the Convention has gradually been adopted by 146 of the 192 UN Member States in the ensuing four decades. A better understanding of the considerations that make state versus community enforcement more or less attractive may shed light on such questions as why and when countries choose to ratify such agreements. This paper takes a step in that direction by analyzing, albeit in a highly stylized model, some of the factors likely to affect the relative effectiveness of community and court enforcement.

of state-imposed fiscal transports means that we must speak sometimes of exchange rather than commerce.” See generally, Richman (2004) on the need to consider vertical integration, in addition to courts and private ordering, when analyzing alternative enforcement mechanisms.
References


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Appendices

A.1. Proof of Proposition 1

The proof of Proposition 1 involves three parts: (i) establishing that the Community Enforcement (CE) strategy constitutes a Markov perfect equilibrium if played by all players; (ii) characterizing the relationship between $V(w,h,\theta,X,\delta,\kappa)$ and $X$; and (iii) identifying the conditions under which $V \geq 0$.

For (i): Define $s_{y,t}$ to be transactor $y$'s state variable before he chooses an action in stage 1 of period $t$, where $s_{y,t} = 0$ if player $y$ has received news that his current match $i$ defected in period $t - 1$, or if player $y$ himself defected in period $t - 1$ and his match $i$ learned about it. Otherwise, $s_{y,t} = 1$. Under the CE strategy, a player thus transacts and cooperates for every $t \geq 1$ if and only if $V(\cdot) > 0$ and $s_{y,t} = 1$.

Next, we denote an individual transactor’s expected gain from mutual cooperation, before the identity of his partner is known, by $G$. By the one-stage deviation principle, if player $i$ assumes that player $y$ plays the CE strategy, $i$ will cooperate in the central transaction of period $t$ if and only if the following incentive constraint holds:

$$he^{\theta X} + \delta G + \frac{\delta^2}{1-\delta} G \geq we^{\theta X} + (\delta G - L) + \frac{\delta^2}{1-\delta} G$$

(A1)

The left and right side of (A1) is $i$'s expected net present value of current and future trade from cooperating and from defecting in period $t$, respectively. The first term on each side is the present period payoff, which is larger for defection than cooperation. The second term is the payoff in the next period ($t + 1$), which is smaller for defection because $i$'s next match might not interact with a defector. The third term, the expected present value of trade from $t + 2$ forward, is equal for both sides because, under the concept of Markov strategies, actions in one period have an impact only on one subsequent period. Manipulation of (A1) yields equation (4) in the text.

The CE strategy has the following features. First, it implies that the function $V(\cdot)$ must be nonnegative to generate cooperative behavior in the current period regardless of behavior in previous periods. If in period $t$ player $i$ does not receive news about the previous behavior of his partner $x$, and if $i$ himself did not defect in the previous period, or he defected but his partner did not learn about it,
then $s_{i,t} = 1$, and $i$’s behavior under the CE strategy is to cooperate if $V(\cdot) \geq 0$ and not interact if $V(\cdot) < 0$. However, if $i$ does receive news from player $y$ on the behavior of $x$ in $t-1$, then the CE strategy further conditions $i$’s behavior on previous period behavior: If $i$ learns that $x$ defected last period, he should punish the defector by not interacting with him. Moreover, not interacting is (weakly) incentive compatible for $i$ because the CE strategy requires a defector who knows that his partner knows about his defection to participate in his own punishment by not interacting as well; if $i$ deviated from the CE strategy by agreeing to transact with $x$ (and either cooperating or defecting), $i$ would not gain from this deviation because $x$’s choice not to interact leads to a period payoff of zero for both partners, independent of $i$’s action. Hence, adhering to the CE strategy is a (weak) equilibrium action for $i$.

For (ii): Differentiating $V$ with respect to $X$ shows that

$$\frac{\partial V}{\partial X} = \frac{(e^{-1})e^{(X+2\theta)}(w-h)(2-\theta)\theta^2 + (e^{\theta X} - 1)(e^{X+\theta} - e^{2X+\theta})(\theta - 1)\delta k h}{(e^{-1})(\theta - 2)\theta}.$$ (A2)

Define $\hat{\theta}(X) \equiv \{ \theta \mid \partial V/\partial X = 0 \}$. Evaluating (A2), we get $\partial V/\partial X > 0$, $\forall \theta < \hat{\theta}(X)$, and $\partial V/\partial X < 0$, $\forall \theta > \hat{\theta}(X)$. Substituting $X = 0$ and $X = 1$ into $\hat{\theta}(X)$ yields $\hat{\theta}(X = 0) = \hat{\theta}(X = 1) = 0$. However, $\hat{\theta}(X \in (0,1)) < 0$; see Figure A.1.

By making trading decisions (stage 1) of previous defectors dependent on whether their new partner learned about their prior defection, we “harmonize” the partners’ state variables: Either both players’ state variables take the value 1 or they both take the value 0. This assures that deviation from the CE Strategy is not incentive compatible and, at the same time, makes the expected loss from defection depend on the community information transmission technology, $\kappa$.

Our assumption that a player who is supposed to punish another player has no incentive to deviate from punishment is a common structure in repeated games of collective enforcement institutions; see Greif (2006, Appendix C) for details. It can be rationalized by supposing that a slight probability $e$ exists that not participating in one’s own punishment will be detected by other players, who would then be entitled to punish the uncooperative defector by not interacting until eternity. Alternatively, if the CE Strategy allowed a player who received information about his partner’s defection in period $t-1$ not to punish that partner in period $t$, both players would know that the same would hold for their respective matches in $t+1$. Consequently, they would not fear losing future trading opportunities by defecting in the current period, and mutual defection would become the unique Nash equilibrium in stage 2 of period $t$. In order to avoid the losses associated with this outcome ($d < 0$ in the central transaction), the unique subgame-perfect action in stage 1 of period $t$ would be not to transact. Hence, all trade would break down.
Define $\theta^* \equiv \arg\min \{ \hat{\theta}(X) \}$. It follows that, $\forall \theta > 0$, $\partial V / \partial X < 0$, that is, $V$ is monotonically decreasing in $X$ for positive $\theta$. It also follows that, $\forall \theta < \theta^*$, $\partial V / \partial X > 0$, that is, $V$ is monotonically increasing in $X$ for sufficiently negative $\theta$. For $\theta \in [\theta^*, 0]$, however, $V$ is non-monotonic in $X$. This area is illustrated in Figure A.1 by the region between the bold vertical lines at $\theta = 0$ and $\theta = \theta^*$.

Henceforth, we focus on the two monotonic cases, $\theta = 0$ and $\theta < \theta^*$.

For (iii): Substituting values in (5) shows that $V \geq 0$ if:

$$\frac{h}{w-h} \delta \kappa \geq \frac{(e-1)e(\theta-2)}{e^\theta - e^2} \text{ for } X = 0,$$

(A3)

$$\frac{h}{w-h} \delta \kappa \geq \frac{(e-1)e^\theta \theta}{e^\theta - 1} \text{ for } X = 1.$$

(A4)

Define $X^* = \{ X \mid V = 0 \}$. For $\theta > 0$, $\partial V / \partial X < 0$ and $X^*$ therefore characterizes an upper bound on cooperation in $X$-space. Three subcases must be distinguished. First, if (A3) does not hold, $V < 0$ for all $X$, and the players have no incentive to cooperate, implying $X^* = 0$. Second, if (A3) and equation reference

Figure A.1: Numerical example for $w = 1.4, h = \kappa = 1, \delta = 0.6$. 
goes here (A4) hold, \( V > 0 \) for all \( X \), and the players have an incentive always to cooperate, implying \( X^* = 1 \).

Finally, if (A3) holds but (A4) does not, a unique \( X^* \in (0,1] \) exists such that \( V(X \leq X^*;\cdot) > 0 > V(X > X^*;\cdot) \). Hence, the players have an incentive to cooperate for \( X \leq X^* \) but not for \( X > X^* \).

By contrast, for \( \theta < \theta^* \), \( \partial V/\partial X > 0 \), and \( X^* \) is a lower bound on cooperation in \( X \)-space. Again, we have three subcases. First, if (A4) does not hold, \( V < 0 \) for all \( X \) and the players have no incentive to cooperate, implying \( X^* = 1 \). Second, if (A3) and (A4) hold, \( V \geq 0 \) for all \( X \), and the players have an incentive always to cooperate, implying \( X^* = 0 \). Finally, if (A4) holds but (A3) does not hold, there is a unique \( X^* \in (0,1] \) such that \( V(X < X^*;\cdot) < 0 < V(X \geq X^*;\cdot) \). Hence, \( i \)'s incentive is to cooperate for \( X \geq X^* \) but not for \( X < X^* \).

A.2. Proof of Proposition 2

In this appendix, we show that behavior described in Proposition 2 constitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium. We begin by deriving equation (6). It is evident from the expected payoffs specified that filing a suit is not profitable if both transactors cooperated or if a transactor had defected himself. For a transactor who cooperated and whose partner defected, filing suit is profitable only if

\[
D \geq \frac{C}{\tau}.
\] (A5)

In the central transaction (stage 2), assume that player \( i \)'s partner, \( x \), cooperates. If \( i \) cooperates, his payoff is \( he^{\theta X} \). If \( i \) defects and is sued by \( x \), \( i \)'s expected period payoff is \( we^{\theta X} \) from defecting and \(- (\tau D + g)\) from the suit. It is therefore rational for \( i \) to cooperate if and only if

\[
he^{\theta X} \geq we^{\theta X} - (\tau D + g).
\] (A6)

Solving (A5) and (A6) for \( D \) yields (6).

Next, assuming that player \( i \)'s partner, \( x \), cooperates, it is also individually rational for \( i \) to cooperate if (A5) and (A6) hold. Substituting \( D_{\text{exp}} = (h - l)e^{\theta X} \) into these equations, it follows:

\[
(h - l)e^{\theta X} \geq \frac{C}{\tau}.
\] (A7)
(h-l)e^{\alpha x} \geq \frac{(w-h)e^{\alpha x} - g}{\tau}.
\hspace{1cm} (A8)

Solving (A7) for $X$ shows that, given that $i$ defected, it is rational for $x$ to file suit at stage 3 if $X > \Phi$ for $\theta > 0$ and if $X \leq \Phi$ for $\theta < 0$, where $\Phi$ is defined in Proposition 2. At stage 2, consider first $\theta > 0$. Condition (A8) holds if:

\[
\tau \geq \frac{w-h-g}{h-l} \quad \text{at} \quad X = 0,
\hspace{1cm} (A9)
\]

\[
\tau \geq \frac{w-h}{h-l} - \frac{g}{(h-l)e^{\alpha}} \quad \text{at} \quad X = 1.
\hspace{1cm} (A10)
\]

Both sides of (A8) are monotonic in $X$. Thus, if both (A9) and (A10) hold, it is rational to cooperate at stage 2, $\forall X > \Phi$. Note that the RHS of (A10) is larger than the RHS of (A9). Hence, (A10) is the binding constraint, proving (7). If (A10) does not hold but (A9) holds, there is an interior solution in $X$-space, $\Gamma$, which is found by solving (A8) with equality for $X$. This proves (8).

The proof for $\theta < 0$ is identical to the proof for $\theta > 0$ with three exceptions. First, $\Phi$ defines an upper bound, not a lower bound in $X$-space. Second, the RHS of (A10) is smaller than the RHS of (A9). Hence, (A10) is the binding constraint, which proves (9). Finally, if (A10) does hold but (A9) does not, there is an interior solution, $\Gamma$, which is a lower bound, not an upper bound, in $X$-space. This proves equation (10). 

\[\blacksquare\]