The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki has a complex history closely intertwined with the postwar experience of Japan. Simply described, it is a 2 hour 45 minute science documentary about the aftermath of the atomic bombings from a scientific perspective. Shot in 1945 and finished in the first months of 1946, it represents the first full-fledged documentary on the atomic bomb attacks. However, its meaning expands far beyond this. Since surfacing from its maboroshi existence, it has been picked apart and appropriated by countless feature films, documentaries, books, magazines, and television reports. Its images have even been converted into other media, such as still photography, animation, and the special effects of feature films. These appropriations have turned The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki into the source for many of humanity's images and icons for the atomic bomb attacks. Had the suppression of this film been successful, every single film about the bombings would be different. More importantly, our very memory of the events would be radically altered. In this sense, we can say The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki is the starting point for hibakusha cinema . . . ironic for a film often described as 'an accumulation of scientific facts [that] eliminates the human factor altogether.'

This writer refers to the cold, scientific tone from which the documentary never wavers, an astoundingly insensitive treatment of its subject matter which has made an already complicated history even more confusing. There are both claims and accusations regarding its authorship. Upset viewers and historians want to give credit for the film's inhuman, scientific approach to the victorious Americans of the occupation. Photographers (and their biographers) want to take credit for recording its epochal images while emphasizing their distance from postproduction. The filmmakers closest to positions of power and responsibility
reveal a much more nuanced perspective. All these versions clash at different points, creating gaps and fissures that make the messiness of history emerge in force. In the end, we are left with the troubling reality of two atomic bombs and an overwhelmingly contradictory discourse from which to look back and survey the chaos, a precarious tripod to be sure. Before examining the film and its recontextualizations, we would do well to carefully piece the story together as best we can, for each twist and turn in the course of production deeply affected the very shape of the film and how it has been interpreted.

Part of this history's messiness derives from the sheer difficulty of writing about the bomb; all representations of the atomic bombings face the specter of *impossibility*. This problematic appears insurmountable for those of us so far removed from the experience of the attack. If there is anything striking about the historical record of the atomic bomb film, it is the reticence of historians to write, their reliance on the memories of those with first hand experience. Facing the failure of their tools of representation they – we – turn to those with direct experience, those whose relationship to the attacks is not already mediated by others in the first place, whether it be through written texts, sounds, images, or even the shadow of a human being etched in stone. There is a desire to let those with direct experience speak. This decision to defer to the apparent authority of these texts also exposes a need to commit the personal experience to public memory. This is invariably history-in-the-first-person, for there is something about the epicenter – what is there – that inevitably converts narration into *testimony*. When historians have reprocessed these contentious testimonies into narrative, they have had to smooth out the contradictions, leading to quiet distortion for the sake of a sense of completeness. By way of contrast, a textual patchwork of these first-person histories will preserve some degree of the complexity of the film's tangled production history, and more importantly, make palpable the multiple points of view bearing down on these 19 reels of sound and image.

The day after a single plane attacked Nagasaki, discussions for a documentary began at Nippon Eigasha (Nichiei), the primary producer of nonfiction films during WWII and one of the few production companies remaining at the end of the war. Ito Sueo (director): 'On August 10, 1945, I was in the Culture Film Unit of Nippon Eigasha in Tokyo’s Ginza. Shimomura Masao and Uriu Tadao from the our News Unit came to see me. We talked about the damage from the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima on August 6th and Nagasaki on August 9th, news of which had been coming in from the Domei Tsushinsha desk. They said that this disastrous scene ought to be recorded; simply put, they suggested we appeal to the world by communicating the inhuman facts through the International Red Cross in Geneva. I agreed, and finally spoke with producer Kano Ryuichi, director of the Culture Film Unit Tanaka, and Production Chief Iwasaki. They agreed. However, five days later on August 15th, the surrender of Japan was announced and the possibility of appealing to the world through the International Red Cross disappeared.'

With the end of the war, government production capital dried up and whatever funds remained were devoted to survival. Despite the uncertain future of their company, the intention of making a documentary to reveal the destruction of the bomb to the world remained strong at Nichiei. Discussions continued, and the head of planning, Aihara Hideji, kept a proposal in a *furoshiki* wherever he went. At the beginning of September, Toho's Mori Iwao and Yamanashi Minoru from Eigahaikyusha met the president of Nichiei, Negishi Kan’ichi, and asked why Nichiei wasn't making an atomic bomb documentary. Negishi called in Aihara and explained the plans they had already developed, as well as their money problem. Through the quick efforts of Toho and Eigahaikyusha, they arranged for somewhat informal financing. With a budget in place Iwasaki Akira (head of production) and Kano Ryichi (producer) worked feverishly on preproduction while director Ito set out for Hiroshima and Nagasaki to pave the way for the arrival of the film crew.

Ito: ‘On September 7, 1945, I put three days' worth of rice in a rucksack and departed Tokyo alone. I had been informed about the harmfulness of radioactivity, so I flinched when I got off at Hiroshima Station in the middle of a field whose entire surface was burned. First, it took a day to push the prefectural and city offices. I talked with them about food and the construction of housing for the film crews to follow, but they had their hands full with relief for surviving citizens and took no notice of me. I was consuming the rice I had brought and feared I would simply starve, so I put off Hiroshima until later... and went to my home in Nagasaki prefecture.... I contacted Nichiei’s home office in
As a result, I discovered from the Tokyo home office that the plans for the shooting of the atomic bomb film had taken a big change of course. Nippon Eigasha's independent photography would stop, and acting together with the Special Committee to Study the Damage of the Atomic Bomb formed by the Ministry of Education (Monbusho), we would shoot the contents of their investigation. . . . Shooting would begin in Hiroshima, and after finishing there move to Nagasaki. Because lost time was precious, I insisted on beginning to shoot in Nagasaki. The home office decided it was all right to begin photography with cameraman Kurita Kurotada from the Fukushima branch, but later assistance director Mizuno Hajime and assistant cameraman Sekiguchi Toshio would be sent from Tokyo.  

On September 15, the Nichiei film crews headed for Hiroshima, accompanying the scientists of the Monbusho investigation team. They began their shoot despite rumors about radiation effects, and the photography proceeded smoothly. Most fears were in people's minds; Aihara: 'I couldn't shoot more than half of what I wanted to. There was always this struggle over whether I should shoot this or not. That was my own problem, my impression at
that time. Inside, there was the problem of exposing military secrets, an awful feeling as if I were benefiting the enemy.\(^{16}\)

However, other members of the production team were absorbed in other thoughts as they hauled heavy equipment across the remains of Hiroshima; Kikuchi Shu (second camera assistant for cinematographer Miki Shigeru): ‘We started from the epicenter.... Here and there across the city were corpses. Wooden homes were completely crushed and burned. The only shapes remaining were buildings reinforced with steel and iron frames.... Miki would walk quickly - sutakora sutakora - to some far off place until his body would become small. He'd boom out “Hey, over here, over here,” and we followed along as best we could.... We were shocked by the shadow of a handrail burned onto Bandai Bridge, as well as the clearly carved shadow of human beings walking on the bridge. This had to be a characteristic of the atomic bomb. One day, I think we were shooting at Hiroshima Castle, and we came upon the “corpses of a horse,” and remembered Fighting Soldiers.\(^{9}\) All over the place there were what seemed to be shadows of human bodies; it left quite an impression.... About 20 days passed. Kaneko Haji and I packed up the exposed film and took it back to Nichiei’s home office in Tokyo. Miki took the Palbo Camera, large format still camera, and tripod, and set out for Nagasaki.\(^{10}\)

Back in Tokyo, Iwasaki and Kano watched the rushes as they came in from Hiroshima; Iwasaki recalls, ‘Every frame burned into my brain.\(^{11}\) While the teams of scientists and cinematographers worked in Hiroshima, Ito had been on his own in Nagasaki. Ito: ‘Shooting started on September 16. We were most concerned with the effects (eikyo) on human bodies. Because more than a month had already passed since the bombing, the corpses had all been dealt with. Most victims were staying in the hospitals of nearby cities, towns and villages. .... We got to know some victims while shooting, and days later when we called on them, they were already gone. Corpses were carried down to basement rooms. It was a terrible scene we’d want to look away from.... I diligently walked and shot what was left among the burned fields. With the coming of October, people from the units that had finished shooting in Hiroshima gradually came to Nagasaki. I was put in the physical structures unit, but didn’t participate and continued to photograph according to my own plan.\(^{12}\)

Along with the scientists and film crews, the military occupation also arrived in Nagasaki. The investigations, data collection, and its photography proceeded smoothly until October 24, when Sekiguchi Toshio, Ito’s assistant cameraman, found himself at the center of an incident that once again radically changed the course of the film. Sekiguchi: ‘It was around here ... there were plants coming up in the burned area. This was unusual so I was taking a closeup with my Eyemo. While I was shooting an MP came up. He asked, “What are you doing?” and things like that. I told him I was shooting the burned areas. “By whose order?” he asked. I told him I was with staff from Nippon Eigasha which was shooting a documentary film on the atomic bombing with Dr. Nishina. Taking me away, he had quite a look on his face. I was led over there to talk with someone, I don’t remember the name, but they had translators and it was quite friendly. Then I was brought back to the previous place. They confiscated film, too. I had been shooting still photos with a Leica. They asked, “What’s this?” I replied, “I’ve been shooting the burned area.” They told me to take out all the film.\(^{13}\)

Ito had been off searching for locations during this time, and didn’t hear Sekiguchi’s story until later; Ito: ‘That night communication from the Nichiei home office in Tokyo came in to the Domei Tsushinsha Nagasaki Branch Office: Photography was suspended by order of the occupation forces. On October 27, a command came from the Nagasaki Communications Office of the American military for a shooting supervisor to report to their office in Katsuyama public school. I went with Aihara, the planning supervisor for the physical sections. In the principal’s office, which was being used as the commander’s office, where a pistol was laying on the desk, we had a long conversation through a Japanese American translator. In conclusion, filming was canceled. All personnel were evacuated. It was decided that everyone would return to Tokyo.\(^{14}\)

By the time shooting was interrupted, Nichiei filmmakers had exposed 26,000 feet of film about all aspects of the bombing. The photography was nearly complete, but they were on the verge of losing everything. In the course of shooting, the Surgeon General’s Joint Commission for the Investigation of the Effects of the Atomic Bomb bumped into one of the crews in a Hiroshima hospital and became aware of the film. And they wanted it. One of the doctors of this group, Averill Liebow, had a keen interest in the footage. In his published diary - a rather odd account of

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*Hibakusha Cinema*
the effects of the bomb from the point of view of a pathologist – the doctor records a deceptively disinterested account of his relationship to the film; Liebow: 'I was also informed that a documentary film had been prepared at Hiroshima by the Nippon Eigasha in late 1945, but this had not been completely developed. After much discussion with Messrs. Kobayama [AMN – Okuyama?] and Aihara of that company, the film was developed and on December 19 it was viewed in the Surgeon General’s Office. As expected, it was a remarkable record. Its possible use for propaganda purposes was not difficult to visualize. . . . A copy was retained and sent to the United States for use by the American component of the Joint Commission.\textsuperscript{15}

In fact, the situation was somewhat less benign. Aihara distrusted Liebow’s intense interest, and ignored the doctor’s many messages.\textsuperscript{16} At the same time that Iwasaki Akira negotiated with the headquarters of the occupation, Liebow pursued the film through official channels with memos to GHQ asking for the film’s confiscation on the behalf of the Surgeon General; Liebow: ‘1. Request that motion picture films concerning Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the possession of Nippon Eigasha be procured for the Atomic Bomb Commission of this office . . . 3. These films, which were made beginning late in August 1945, are said to contain much documentary medical material of great importance to the Atomic Bomb Commission.’\textsuperscript{17} Though one would not know it from his diaries, Liebow’s efforts resulted in the first confiscation of \textit{The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki}. On December 18, GHQ confiscated the film as per Liebow’s request and sent it to the Surgeon General’s Office.

During the course of these negotiations, the Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) arrived on Japanese soil to investigate the results of Allied bombing raids on the home islands, including the attacks on Nagasaki and Hiroshima. Among the USSBS staff was Daniel McGovern, an Army-Air Force cinematographer who had shot William Wyler’s \textit{Memphis Belle}. He was to make a visual record for the Survey. While in Nagasaki, a lingering Nichiei employee approached McGovern and explained their troubles with GHQ. Reasoning it was a waste to duplicate Nichiei’s work, the USSBS joined negotiations for the film.

At this point, the historical record turns from the memoirs of the filmmakers to internal memoranda passing between offices of the American military. In a flurry of screenings and memos, the fate of the film was decided (for the time being). Both the Surgeon General’s Office and the Strategic Bombing Survey were asking for control over the unedited film. The Surgeon General’s Office asked that ‘the entire negative’ be forwarded to their Washington office ‘in view of the fact that medical aspects are of foremost importance,’ a suspicious claim considering the fact that the medical portion amounted to a mere 6,000 feet and that they already had a positive copy of this footage.\textsuperscript{18} At the same time, the USSBS offered an argument that Iwasaki had been making ever since shooting had been halted; McGovern: ‘In its present form this heterogeneous mass of photographic material is practically valueless, despite the fact that the conditions under which it was taken will not be duplicated, until another atomic bomb is released under combat conditions. Several weeks will be required properly to edit, cut, caption this material in such a manner that it will have a scientific value as atomic bomb research material. The only individuals qualified to do this work are the cameramen who exposed the film, the individuals who were members of the Japanese research party, and able translators working in conjunction with the Nippon Newsreel Co.’\textsuperscript{19}
On January 2, 1946, representatives from NAVTECHJAP, G-2, USSBS, and the Surgeon General’s Office met and decided that NAVTECHJAP would help Nichiei complete location photography, while the Strategic Bombing Survey would supervise Nichiei’s postproduction. The Surgeon General would receive a new work print of the 8,000 feet of medical film they already possessed. This meeting was actually the most crucial juncture in the history of The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The decision to allow Nichiei to finish their film for the USSBS meant the Surgeon General’s Office would lose its claim and receive only unedited rushes. This footage is now maboroshi; had the decision weighed in the favor of the American doctors, it is likely Nichiei’s moving images of the atomic bombings would have been lost forever.

After this narrow miss, GHQ officially directed the USSBS to manage and fund Nichiei’s postproduction under the supervision of McGovern and Dan Dyer. Ironically, Dyer had been Chief Target Analyst for Major General LeMay’s superfortress squadrons, and had been in charge of target selection at the end of the war. Presumably this included Hiroshima and Nagasaki. GHQ also ordered the ‘confiscation’ and shipping of all materials to the Pentagon.20 On January 11, a memo to Iwasaki officially directed Nichiei to finish their film, asking for a complete budget for ‘services rendered,’ including all materials, expenses, labor and still photography. The memo also contained the following provision: ‘All caption material and research matter will be included and also all short ends and excess negative will be put in containers and marked with a number . . . All phases of the picture, Hiroshima, Nagasaki and the medical section will be completed and ready for turning over to the USSBS Motion Picture Project on or before 1 March 1946 . . . No other organization will be permitted to confiscate or remove the material from the Nippon Newsreel Company.’21

This memo came as quite a shock to the Japanese filmmakers, and has achieved considerable notoriety in the history of Japanese cinema.22 In fact, multiple versions of the incident have circulated over the past 50 years. Many writers, Nichiei filmmakers and historians alike, describe a scenario months later near the end of postproduction, in which Nichiei is suddenly informed that every picture, Hiroshima, Nagasaki and the medical section will be turned over. Some histories describe the signing of an oath of silence. Nearly all of them suggest an atmosphere of oppression. This memo to Iwasaki at the beginning of postproduction suggests these stories are somewhat inflated.23

Be that as it may, the word ‘confiscation’/‘bosshu’ meant something quite different to each side. In the world of the American military men, it was hardly unusual vocabulary; it meant picking up services rendered from Nichiei.24 From the perspective of the Japanese filmmakers, this ‘bosshu’ was akin to theft. After all, the bulk of the film had been shot and developed with Japanese money before the Americans arrived on the scene. They reasoned they at least deserved a copy, and naturally feared their film would never see the light of a projector once in the possession of the American military. As Ito recalled, ‘When the confiscation order was issued, I thought this inevitably meant that the material would never be returned.’25

While the Nichiei filmmakers edited the footage and recorded an English-language soundtrack, the staff kept asking the producers if there was nothing they could do to prevent the confiscation. Kano: ‘Don’t you have to agree without resistance that all the film of the atomic bomb film will be taken away without a trace? . . . Anyway, quickly, we made arrangements to secretly preserve one rush print. In order to proceed with complete secrecy it was crucial that this be accomplished through few hands. We thought about that. When film production nears the completion stage, it is complicated and rushed. Around this time, errors can be made. That’s it. With a voucher request to the laboratory, a duplicate could be made by mistake. Iwasaki, Kano, Ito, and Matsuda from the production desk: only these four people knew this mistake.’26

Ito: “This print was placed in the lab operated by Miki Shigeru, who had retired from Nichiei. We never made the situation clear to him. Those days, people going against orders of the occupation forces were assigned to hard labor in Guam or Okinawa as punishment. The four of us agreed to be ready for 10 years of hard labor in the case of being discovered.’27

This quiet, courageous act of defiance assured that moving images of the atomic bombings would be preserved for future generations, no matter what happened to the materials they were about to hand over to the American military. It has been called ‘the moral equivalent to vengeance,’28 and the filmmakers have even been compared to the 47 ronin of Chushingura.29 This
incomplete, silent print remained in Miki Shigeru's ceiling until the end of the Occupation; rumours about it circulated in the Japanese film world, but the filmmakers were never arrested and sent to Okinawa.

They were, however, caught. McGovern knew they had kept a print for themselves, but looked the other way.\(^{30}\) He was happy with their finished film, felt it was the Japanese filmmaker's work, and thought it only appropriate that a copy remain in Japan. Furthermore, while the greatest fears of the Japanese filmmakers were correct - the film was destined to become \textit{maboroshi} in the hands of the United States government - they misunderstood the intentions of the USSBS. The 'confiscation' did not mean 'suppression'... yet.

McGovern was convinced that Americans should see the destruction caused by their atomic bombs. He liked the Nichiei film and had grand plans for its wide release in America. To pave the way, he arranged for a Tokyo screening, paying the expenses out of his own pocket. He invited foreign correspondents to create advance publicity back home. Mark Gayn, the \textit{Chicago-Sun Times} correspondent and author of \textit{Japan Diary}, filed a story with detailed descriptions of the film, including the budget.\(^{31}\) Meanwhile, Nichiei reluctantly packed seven wooden boxes with the photographs, film, and negative, and delivered it to the Americans.

Back in the States, McGovern started distribution negotiations with Warner Brothers and began arrangements for official permission. A screening was held at the U.S. Navy Science Lab in Anacosta, Maryland. Pentagon officers, public relations specialists, and representatives from the Manhattan Project attended. At the end of the screening, the Manhattan Project people raised objections to the public release of the film on the grounds that it contained the height at which the bomb had been detonated. The diligent filmmakers and scientists had triangulated atomic shadows to make their calculation and had come within 50 feet of the correct altitude. As a result, the film was classified \textit{SECRET RD}.\(^{32}\) Today it is difficult to believe this suppression was not motivated by the same fears expressed by Dr. Liebow. In the 'wrong' hands, this footage could be used to end the U.S. government would not approve of. However, this would not explain why a few of the most violent images were subsequently released to \textit{Paramount News} to accompany images of the explosions on Bikini. In any case, the film, negative and photographs were confiscated one more time, only this time it seemed to be for keeps. The fate of this material remained unknown, \textit{maboroshi}, until 1994.\(^{33}\)

This was precisely what McGovern feared. Like his Japanese colleagues, he undermined the power structures putting pressure on the film. In an act of resistance as brave as that of the Nichiei filmmakers, he struck a 16mm composite print of the film, took it to the USAF Central Film Depository at Wright Air Force Base, and quietly deposited the print. Had he obeyed his orders, we might have been left with only the silent, incomplete reels hidden in Tokyo. Both acts of resistance are of equal gravity. However, the consequences are far different. For while the Nichiei print has been continually suppressed one way or another,\(^{34}\) the McGovern print ended up as public domain material deposited in the U.S. National Archives, one of the most accessible film archives in the world.\(^{35}\)

The film left in the wake of this bewildering, serpentine story - \textit{- The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki} - is a 2 hour, 45 minute epic that minutely investigates the destruction wrought by the two atomic attacks. Although it was initially conceived of as an appeal to the world to recognize the horror of the bombs and the tragedy of their victims, the final film \textit{seems to appeal to no one in particular}. It is only a cold, hard examination of the effects of the bomb from a ruthlessly scientific point of view. The bulk of the film is devoted to buildings and plant life. The images of human beings have been disparagingly, and quite appropriately, compared to police mug shots.\(^{36}\) Thus, in the end it would seem the American supervision overpowered the intentions of the Japanese filmmakers. This has been the assumption of everyone who has seen the film, however, a closer reading will find markers that throw this conclusion into doubt. Indeed, the Americans entered the production near the completion of location photography, and few historians have considered the plans under which the shooting actually took place. Determining the responsibility for this 'inhuman approach' is far from simple.

The complexity underlying the assumptions of 'authorship' are condensed in the issue of the film's title and its translation into Japanese. Issues of power always circulate around the practice of translation between languages and their cultures. Because trans-
The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was rendered into Japanese as 『ヒロシマ、ナガサキに落ちる原子爆弾の後期』(Hiroshima, Nagasaki ni okeru genshibakudan no koka). This appears to be a simple, direct translation, however, its last word has proven extremely controversial. *Koka* /effect also means 'results.' It strongly implies the people in Hiroshima and Nagasaki were used as guinea pigs in a cruel experiment. The author of this translation is unknown; however, Japanese have automatically attributed it to the victor of the war. They have taken the title to be powerfully emblematic of the callous attitude expressed in the film. For example, Kogawa Tetsuo argues, 'From the beginning [the Americans] openly used the word *koka,* and by using this title they had already decided that they were not going to depict human beings as human beings. As the title indicates, they are mere research material.'37 Writing in the turbulent 1960s when the film was still *maboroshi,* Noda Shinkichi speculated that the title had to be attached by the Americans. His suspicions get the better of him and he makes a telling slip at the end of his article: instead of *koka,* he substitutes *seika,* or 'fruits' (of one's labor)!38 The ugly irony that this mistranslation introjects reveals Noda’s rage at the Americans. Just as telling is the incident when the McGovern print was returned to Monbusho in 1967. The ministry changed the title translation from *'koka'* to *'seika,'* or 'effect.' While this word can imply effect, it was really meant to remove the impression of experimentation and introduce a vague, even metaphysical, feeling to the title. Monbusho intentionally designed its misprision to create a misreading of the film; nervous about their complicity with the project, they even diffused their credit, cut out all the scenes of human suffering, and to this day allow no one to see the print except medical researchers. On the other hand, Noda's unintentional misprision exposes his projection of guilt for crimes against humanity onto the Americans. Finally, in 1994 a citizens' movement organized by director Hani Susumu and many others began raising money to create a Japanese-language version of the film, which they renamed *Hiroshima, Nagasaki ni okeru genshibakudan no saigai,* or 'disaster.'39 Like Noda, Kogawa, and pretty much every spectator since the end of the war, they need to re-read the film as a further victimization of the citizens of Nagasaki and Hiroshima.

However, before we accept this attribution of cinematic aggression, we must turn back to the issue of translation once more. All Japanese commentators have treated the words *'koka'* and *'effect'* as interchangeable, a one-to-one correspondence in meaning. Native English speakers will be hesitant to reduce the meaning of *'effect of the bomb'* to *'result of an experiment.'* While there is certainly truth to the claim that the bombings were to some degree spurious experiments, this is not necessarily implied by the *'effect'* of the film's title. Furthermore, the *'influence'* of the bomb would seem to refer to the political and social ramifications of the attacks. Around the English word *'effect'* spins a tangled Japanese critical discourse informed by mistranslation and misunderstanding, exposing a dynamic of presumption and projection.

This body of sound and image is shrouded by high-running passions and a mass of contradiction, all in tune with the quality of Japan-America relations at a given moment in history. Examples abound. Noda—a leftist filmmaker and the most suspicious of our 'translators'—writes at the height of the Aman Security Treaty protests. At about the same time, Monbusho arbitrarily changed the title because of the Japanese government's sensitivity toward foreign relations, and probably their own policies (public and otherwise) concerning nuclear power, nuclear arms and the war in Vietnam. In the 1980s, Kudo Miyoko was inspired to write her biography of cameraman Harry Mimura out of anger when she misunderstood the 1940s English in the film's narration; she presumed 'primitive hospitals' implied Japanese were considered barbarians, and that 'hospital inmates' meant they were nothing but 'prisoners.'40 Tanikawa Yoshio suspected ulterior, political motives to explain why only a 16mm print was returned to Japan and not the original 35mm negative, and why it was returned to the conservative Monbusho rather than Nichiei. 41 Some historians refer to Sekiguchi's questioning—which he describes above as 'friendly'—as an arrest. Blame for the insensitive attitude of the film, along with its suppression, is often displaced onto the USSBS supervisors. The 'confiscation' is dramatically inflated with MPs and the like.42 Actually, Mimura struck lasting friendships with his American colleagues, and both Ito and McGovern characterized their relationship as friendly and professional.43 When asked if the Americans interfered with the work of the Nichiei staff at any point, Ito replied, 'Absolutely
not. I think it was probably the same for the others. I don't remember hearing that kind of story from either Iwasaki or Kano. It was shot freely the way we wanted to.\textsuperscript{44}

Ironic and unfathomable though it may be, \textit{The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki} is, in all its inhumanity, \textit{a Japanese film}. If we can push through all the suspicions and analyze the film itself, there are different perspectives from which we can learn much about both this particular documentary and all \textit{hibakusha} cinema.

Once we acknowledge that \textit{The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki} was produced according to the plan of Japanese filmmakers, the film looks less and less mysterious. Affinities between the film and other documentaries of its time suddenly appear, and it becomes possible to see the Nichiei effort as continuous with long-standing practices of documentary filmmaking in Japan. In the late 1930s, a split developed in the Japanese documentary world. It formed partly due to the influence of a 1937 translation of Paul Rotha's \textit{Documentary Film}, and deepened when the government made the screening of documentaries mandatory as part of the war effort. Lines were drawn between filmmakers who valued a directness in documentary, and followers of Rotha who took the liberty of 'dramatizing reality.' The former valued cinema's ability to transmit actuality faithfully, while the latter filmmakers deployed editing, music, sound, and photography to build multiple readings and layers of meaning into their films. In the immediate postwar era when the Nichiei filmmakers were planning their atomic bomb film, we can still see these two streams continuing over the breach of the surrender. Kamei Fumio was busy reworking wartime newsreels for \textit{The Tragedy of Japan (Nihon no higeki, (1946)}, making them say things far different from their original design through creative montage.\textsuperscript{45} Filmmakers with inclinations toward the direct method were working on the atomic bomb documentary project. Only two of these filmmakers had been full-fledged directors before the end of the war. Ito was known for films with, in the words of Noda, a 'structural hardness.'\textsuperscript{46} Okuyama Dairokuro learned filmmaking with Ota Nikichi, the pioneer of the \textit{kagaku eiga}, or science film.

The \textit{kagaku eiga} was the genre deployed in the atomic bomb film, and represented the extreme end of the approach that makes the direct representation of reality an uncompromising value.
burns extend over wide area, hair loss, diarrhea, 40 degree fever. - In film scene, lies sleeping on side, burns and thinning body, pitiful, it’s thought survival is difficult. (at Red Cross Hospital)

3. 23 years old, sanitation corps of Main Army Hospital, rays from behind while gathering with education group for morning greetings. Lost ear from burns. High level of hair loss, diarrhea, fever, spots. Level two burns, miraculously survived. (at Red Cross Hospital)

4. Takeuchi Yone (Mother, 31 years old), Takeuchi You (Daughter, 13 years old). Yone, purple spots, bleeding gums, cough, breathing difficulties. Condition turned serious while nursing daughter. 2, 3 days after shooting died? Daughter You, hair loss, diarrhea, fever. Right elbow separated, outside of right knee – lower left thigh has external wounds, showing condition of ulcers. (at Oshiba Public School, temporary evacuation place)

These notes reveal a tension between the conventional demands of the kagaku eiga and the filmmakers working within those strictures. In at least one point in these notes, Kikuchi fails to suppress his emotional response in the process of turning human bodies into representation – or more specifically, as he converts human beings into data. This kind of emotional response seems perfectly evacuated from the film itself, begging us to examine the difference between the media of ‘memo’ and ‘cinema.’

We can approach this problem by rooting the point of view out of each document. As the product of an individual, the Kikuchi memo presents few difficulties. Like any writer, he thinks of his audience and the controversial demands of the genre in which he works; in his role as a camera assistant, he records information on shots and their location for his directors and editors. For the scientists and writers, he includes information on medical aspects. However, as the producer of this writing, he is also capable of injecting a more personal response that sums up his feelings: pitiful.

With a staff of over 30, not including the scientists, supervisors and bureaucrats, the point of view of the film is far more complicated, far less obvious. A useful tool is the term ‘documentary voice’ proposed by Bill Nichols. We can think of a documentary’s voice as the site of enunciation from which the film is produced, the place from which it speaks. The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki offers the viewer an explicit point of view in its introductory sequence. It begins with a short narrative of the attack, followed by a bird’s eye view of Japan via maps, gradually zeroing in on Hiroshima. Once on the ground images of rubble ‘which testify more eloquently than anything else to the enormous destructive power of the new bomb,’ accompany narration that locates us: beginning with images from 15 kilometres away from the epicenter, the film moves the spectator steadily in a single direction to 10 kilometers, 8, 5, 4, 2, then, 1,500 metres, 1,000, 800, 300 ... and as the film
escorts us to the zero point, a truck loaded with filmmakers and scientists converges on this very same spot. They all jump out of the truck, and with much pointing of fingers and scientific instruments and still cameras, their investigation – and the kagaku eiga – begins.

This is a classic arrival scene in the tradition of anthropology, a trope that taps deeply into the ‘first contact’ metaphor. It is a new world of strange and awesome powers that they enter. Even ‘Thus Spoke Zarathustra’ plays in the background, indicating a novel kind of will to power with an unintentional irony Nietzsche would not have appreciated. Having staged an explicit point of view for the film in introducing these scientists, the filmmakers constantly reinforce it with scenes of the scientific teams walking through the rubble, making measurements, picking flowers, peering into microscopes, gathering up bones, treating horrific injuries, and conducting autopsies in dark, makeshift sheds. The narrator stands in for the scientists, speaking for them in the strange, unnervingly technical language of specialists. In terms of authorship the Monbusho scientists are placed in positions of textual authority; in addition to their on-screen presence, their names and institutions are included on the titles introducing every section. Although the film offers them as the point of view governing the filmic investigation, we must remember that the documentary voice is usually hidden by the work of the film. Behind the narrator, behind the scientists, the enunciation of The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki comes from a far different place.

The atomic bombings obliterated the meaning held by both cities' topography; all the landmarks, grids of road, natural terrain, and buildings were instantly rendered insignificant, even if they survived the blast. Suddenly, the city maps came to rely on an imaginary point: the Epicenter. The Hypocenter. Ground Zero. Anything straying from the sphere of this powerful point became meaningless and unseen. Even though the cities have long been rebuilt and their citizens live by new maps, outsiders still cling to the Epicenter. All creators of representations of the atomic bombings, no matter their physical or temporal location, inevitably feel the demanding pull of this point, this originary space in the air. The canisters of steel known as ‘Little Boy’ and ‘Fat Man’ may have vaporized in their own self-annihilation, but they still demand the privilege of ultimate reference point, leaving only that powerful magnetic, imaginary point we call the Epicenter. The necessity of resisting this demand raises the potential impossibility of adequately representing the horror of the atomic bombings. Writers, musicians, and filmmakers alike have worked to resist the call of the Epicenter for half a century, insisting on different meanings while struggling to overcome the seeming impossibility of any such attempt. The reason that The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki is the single most important film about the atomic bombing – the reason why its appropriations ultimately ‘fail’ while being better films – the reason we must force ourselves to watch the original – is that it remains the only film that expresses no need to give human meaning to the bombing. This is to say, the film gives voice to the point of view of the bomb itself. Nothing is more terrifying.

There is no attempt in [this film] to “think from within the wounds” and to apply the lessons of human suffering, even if there are many images of actual wounds,” wrote Tsurumi Shunsuke, referring to the Americans he assumed were responsible for the film’s inhuman attitude. In fact, this perfectly describes the point of view of the bomb which inflicted the wounds in the first place. If one attempts to ‘think from the place that inflicts wounds,’ the difficulty of adequately portraying extreme horror vanishes. The problematic of the impossibility of representation did not exist for the Nichiei filmmakers because they obeyed the call of the bomb. Working within the conventions of the kagaku eiga, they portrayed the cataclysmic events in Nagasaki and Hiroshima with the logic of the Epicenter. From this departure point of view there is nothing particularly challenging about describing the interaction of molecules and their effect on rock, wood, and living tissue.

This returns us to the differences between the media of ‘memo’ and ‘film,’ the most crucial of which are the respective technologies of representation. It must be acknowledged that, unlike the memo’s ‘pencil and paper,’ the cinematic apparatus consisting of ‘mechanism and light’ is deeply linked to the point of view we confront at the Epicenter. Devices like Marey’s camera gun and the ‘camera guns’ invented to shoot WWII air battles from the point of view of aircraft machine guns reveal this connection in the very roots of cinema. Furthermore, artists of all political persuasions have been fond of comparing cinema to weaponry ever since the silent era. However, these are only surface
7.7 Trees that resisted the downward blast point to the imaginary point of the Epicenter. (McGovern Collection.)

examples that point us somewhere deeper, more fundamental. Referring to The Effects of the Atomic Bomb, Nibuya Takashi notes, 'In this film, which was earnestly made as a medical report, the absolute indifference of camera/film is violently exposed, nullifying the good will or passions of the photographers.' When the Nichiei filmmakers submitted to the demands of the Epicenter, their technology of representation found its perfect match in the bomb. The film they produced represents a meeting of subject and object escaping the consciousness of its human producers. Documentary theory has dealt exclusively with the meaning humans invest in sounds and images of reality. This focus frequently has blinded us to the absolute indifference of the sounds and images themselves. The complicated apparatus that captures, preserves, and reproduces light is fundamentally inhuman, like the bomb itself. Only in the brief vacuum of meaning when all human maps were obliterated by the extreme violence of the atomic explosions could a film like this be made.

At the same time, this does not foreclose the possibility of resistance to the epicenter's insistent tug. If we attend to the film more closely, peer into the spaces between the frames and reach behind its words, we may find an impressive will to resist. I have emphasized Nichiei's complicity with the Epicenter, as it perfected the codes of the kagaku eiga that enabled the meeting of apparatus and atomic bomb. However, this circle was not complete. Most viewers of the original film note a decisive difference between the Hiroshima and Nagasaki sections which cleaves their experience of the film in two. The Nagasaki half seems vaguely more humane. Kogawa Tetsuo describes this sensation: 'When I saw the Nagasaki part, especially the images of the Urakami church and the statue of the Christ, I couldn't help thinking that the influence of the Americans had been particularly strong. It seems that the filmmakers expressed a feeling of anger and indignation in these images. This is certainly because of Nagasaki's relationship to Christianity. I felt that Nagasaki had been looked at through Western eyes.'

More likely, it was seen through the eyes of a native of Nagasaki, Ito Sueo.

Each segment of the atomic bomb film was accomplished through the teamwork of scientists and cameramen. They shot the footage together, and the images were assembled according to scenarios penned by the scientists. As the senior director, Ito was placed in charge of postproduction, and put extra effort into the Nagasaki section. Ito had grown up in Nagasaki, and was outraged at what had happened to his home. As we saw above, Ito worked by his 'own plan' on location... in what was left of his home town. The other filmmakers assumed the perspective of the Epicenter, translating it faithfully to the screen and reserving any misgivings they might have felt for other media, such as memos, diaries, and face-to-face human conversation. On the other hand, Ito built his anger into the fabric of the Nagasaki section, to which he devoted special attention. He - and certainly others at Nichiei - treated the point of view of the bomb like a masquerade. Trapped by the powers of both Monbusho and the American occupation military, they worked within the limits of the kagaku eiga while subverting its conventions from the inside.

The Nagasaki half, like the Hiroshima section preceding it, opens with a brief sketch of the city before its annihilation. It emphasizes the city's historical importance as a gateway between Japan and the outside world, showing a travelogue of prebomb views of Urakami Cathedral and environs, and pointing out, per-
haps with a touch of irony: ‘Surrounded by house-covered hills, Nagasaki is, or rather used to be, one of the most picturesque port cities of Japan.’ As in Hiroshima, the bomb obliterates all this, replacing it with the epicenter as all-powerful reference point.

The Nagasaki section relies on the spherical guidelines surrounding the epicenter, but reveals things there which the filmmakers of the Hiroshima section left out as irrelevant. The plants examined in Nagasaki are in the newly planted garden of a man who, according to the narration, lost his house, his wife and his daughter, but who refused to leave his home. The scientists find the garden useful data for their investigation of radioactivity on seeds and plant life; the filmmakers use the garden to add a touch of melodrama that momentarily undermines the scientific tone of the *kagaku eiga*.

There are no moments like this in Hiroshima, where ‘things’ are treated only as ‘data.’ Without the slightest irony, the Hiroshima section on Blast notes in passing that one of the sturdier buildings at the epicenter was a hospital. However, the damage the structure sustained is more important than its preblast function. The latter is irrelevant to the logic of the bomb. The comparable sequence in the Nagasaki section is quite different. While careful to follow the rule of listing the radius of each building from the epicenter, the narrator never fails to record how many human beings were killed in each structure in Nagasaki. Moreover, the buildings were clearly chosen with care: schools, prisons, hospitals and, with a legible tone of irony, the factory that produced the bombs dropped on Pearl Harbor.

The Nagasaki sequence on Heat also carefully selects objects charged with meaning. It opens with a longshot of Urakami Cathedral, gradually drawing nearer and nearer, and ending with the closeup of a statue scarred by the bomb’s heat. Dark burns on its stone face look like tears. This structural movement between distance and closeness, between indifference and the potential for emotion, is repeated throughout the Nagasaki half of the film.

Nowhere is this more strongly evident than in the Medical Section, where an accumulation of destruction and violence overcomes the film’s own cold scientific framework. Earlier, the effects of the atomic bomb on human bodies were introduced in Hiroshima in brutally clinical terms. The Hiroshima section is long, complicated, and with its frigid medical terminology the narration is incomprehensible to the lay person. Human bodies are put on display; victims pose before the camera, exposing their wounds. The Hiroshima human effects section climaxes with autopsies and photomicroscopy of human tissue. In stark contrast, the Nagasaki section begins with music in minor mode and the jarring scene of two victims lying together – a mother and child. The music gives way to silence and the images reveal one victim after another. This time, the narration avoids scientific jargon and simply describes the wounds suffered by each person in the attack. Most of the victims are young girls. The music returns near the end with the images of two extremely sick sisters, and a little boy whose mouth was burned into a gaping hole. This gradual climax of horrifying violence ends quietly with the image of a youth – with little hair left – surveying open fields of rubble out the hospital window. Viewers may be numbed by this point over two hours into the film, however, the design of this sequence, which avoids scientific investigation to emphasize human pain, infuses the Nagasaki section with something less than indifference. This is to say, *The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima*
and Nagasaki never achieves a perfect representation of the point of view of the Epicenter. However, few films or videos have come closer to embodying the absolute indifference of the camera, and this is what makes it so powerfully, disturbingly, attractive to other filmmakers. For while it is difficult to admit, there are dangerous pleasures to be had here.55

The work of subsequent filmmakers, despite their honest intentions of resistance, is driven by the will to appropriate this veiled power and its charms. In this sense, we may think of the exploitation of The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki for ‘found footage’ as cannibalization. Ito and his colleagues, to the limited extent they were able, subverted the point of view of the bomb; subsequent filmmakers cannibalized their images. As an icon of imagined terror, cannibalism taps into a repulsion appropriate to our discussion at hand: a fear of one’s own death and victimization. Historically, cannibalism has been deployed as a hideous accusation that turns others into ‘barbarians’ but to understand how postwar filmmakers have made use of the atomic bomb film, I wish to approach it from another perspective. In ritualistic practice, the cannibal devours human bodies to incorporate the other’s magic. Appropriately enough, cannibalism has even occurred as part of ritualistic drama. It is a means to obtain certain qualities of the consumed, an appropriation absorbing the vitalities of other bodies. The cannibal reduces their power while making it one’s own. As a trope for adaptation and appropriation, both stereotype and practice powerfully converge.

Even before Nichiei finished its film, the cannibalization began. As the Nichiei filmmakers collected their images in Hiroshima, the Tokyo office used their rushes in a newsreel released on September 22, 1945.56 However, the next public cannibalization of its images exposes a viewership that has succumbed to the charms of the Epicenter. This was in the summer of 1946, when the U.S. government released the most horrific scenes of human victims to Paramount for its Paramount News reports of the Bikini experiments. A short newspaper article in the New York Times describes the film in a matter-of-fact tone which reveals a mixture of dread and fascination: ‘Most of the victims look as though they had been scarred by an acetylene torch.’57 We find a better clue to people’s reaction in the advertisements surrounding the article. It seems Paramount did not know how to handle the images for the ads graphically emphasize the Bikini Explosion, including the Nichiei footage while not calling attention to it:

Most Spectacular Pictures Ever Filmed
First Underwater Bomb Makes Cataclysmic Upheaval
Captured Jap Films Show After Effect of Atomic Blasted Hiroshima

This reserve did not last long. The powerful charms expressed in the meeting of Epicenter and apparatus immediately won viewers, and the next days’ advertisements responded in kind, switching Bikini to second billing and graphically appealing to the desires of potential spectators with larger, bolder print and spectacular word choice:

Films Show Terrible Suffering of Maimed, Burned Victims

This fascination with the absolute indifference of the Epicenter and its violence was possible in the wake of the bomb, but since then the atomic bombings have slowly become imbricated deeper and deeper into networks of human discourse, gradually moving out of the realm of the epicenter. The ‘original’ film becomes inseparable from and experienced through written histories, memoirs, and the fabric of other films. The point of view of the bomb has become veiled, and thus its potential power has increased dramatically.

After the silence of the occupation, filmmakers as diverse as Alain Resnais (Hiroshima Mon Amour, 1959) and Kamei Fumio (It’s Good to Be Alive, Ikite ite yokatta, 1956) began cannibalizing the silent print saved by the Nichiei conspirators. The print returned to the Japanese government in 1967 remains suppressed in the hands of Monbusho and the Nishina Institute.58 However, this is only a copy of the McGovern print from the U.S. National Archives, which has an unusually open policy allowing anyone from anywhere to copy films in the public domain. Once this film was deposited at the National Archives for all humanity, and protected by this institution which values access, film and video artists from around the world started to cannibalize its images, beginning with Paul Ronder and Erik Barnouw’s eloquent and understated Hiroshima, Nagasaki 1945 (1968).

While nearly all fictional filmmakers dare only to approach the representation of the atomic attacks in the most indirect terms –
Hibakusha Cinema

through metaphor or science fiction – documentarists courageously cut straight to the Epicenter, cannibalizing documentary images of human bodies that express the terrifying banality of the bomb. Despite this process of constant reappropriation and repetition, the images continue to tap into the absolute indifference of the Epicenter. Thus, they possess a powerful attraction for documentary filmmakers and viewers alike. Unlike their colleagues in fictional filmmaking, documentarists turn the impossibility of representation to their own advantage. By removing and consuming pieces of *The Effects of the Atomic Bomb*, documentarists incorporate its terrible power. They tear away the veil and offer a glimpse of the cruel, matter-of-fact violence of the bomb. Through the power they have made their own, they unleash the energy contained in these images only to divert it toward new kinds of resistance.

Through these precious efforts, filmmakers around the world have converted *The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki* into an archive of memory. As Kogawa suggests, our atomic bomb film has gone far beyond the categories of ‘film,’ ‘video’ or ‘television.’ Its images have been peeled from their tissue of emulsion and turned into a virtual body of atomic images available for cannibalization. The actual celluloid exposed by Nichiei in the remains of Hiroshima and Nagasaki remains *maboroshi*, but its images are now scattered over the Earth in every media possible, including our consciousness. I would like to think that despite the continuing production of nuclear weaponry by people living the logic of the Epicenter, one reason the fruits of their labor have not been used in attacks on human beings is that filmmakers have deposited the terrifying, indifferent images of *The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki* into the consciousness of each and every one of us.

This reworking of experience and replenishment of memory becomes all the more important as the real suffering of the hibakusha recedes into history. For this reason, the one appropriation of this film which escapes the magical logic of cannibalization is probably the most important one as well. In an act of real resistance that in some way continued and completed the defiance of the four Nichiei filmmakers before them, Japanese citizens began a movement to circumvent Toho's dubious legal claim to the film and its further suppression by the power of Monbusho. In the 1980s, they repatriated *The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki* and all the color footage shot by the USSBS by collecting donations and purchasing everything foot by foot from the U.S. National Archives. After buying the Nichiei film, they even arranged for its uncut television broadcast through regional stations. In the process of repatriating the original material, they made their own films and published books which resist the charms of the epicenter not by cannibalizing its power, but by redirecting us to a space all but forgotten (or simply avoided): the point of view of the victim.

Substituting the point of view of hibakusha for the Epicenter as the all-powerful reference point, they searched out the surviving people captured by Nichiei and USSBS cameras. They asked directly for permission to show the hibakusha's images publicly. Their films, books and screenings were centered on the experi-
Hibakusha Cinema

ences of the people who had been photographed. The images they appropriated – the callous mug-shots of The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki – were placed alongside contemporary movies and snapshots of the victims testifying about their experience... as well as images of them smiling and playing with their children. This opposition of representations expresses the tragedy of hibakusha without losing sight of their humanity. Despite its complex history of suppressions and all the competing intentions to which it has been subjected, this archive of memory has survived to bring us to this point. This, finally, is the origin of hibakusha cinema:

Taniguchi Sumiteru: ‘Even at the period of shooting, which was five months after the bombing, bloody pus flowed from both sides of my body every day. It was terrible. Before photographing my deep red back, the nurses wiped it clean. Before shooting, yo. Even though it was winter, maggots emerged daily, and picking them out was awful. The lights during shooting were hot, and any number of times I thought I’d faint, yo.’

Shibasaki Tokihiko: ‘They did this to my body. And they even took pictures!’

Notes

1 I would like to thank Daniel McGovern, Erik Barnouw, Bill Murphy and Fukushima Yukio for their help in assembling research materials for this article.
2 Kogawa, 167.
3 According to the title of one biography, Miki Shigeru is the ‘Man Who Shot the Maboroshi Atomic Bomb Film.’ The jacket wrap of Harry Mimura’s biography cries, ‘I’m the one who shot the maboroshi atomic bomb film!’’ See Uno and Kudo.
4 Uriu (1981) describes some of the discussions preceding their meeting with Ito, pp. 2–11. He also offers some information about the other cameramen who shot footage in Hiroshima just after the attacks. In English, see Hirano (1993), as well as Hirano’s essay in this volume.
5 Inoue, 68.
6 Inoue, 69–70.
7 Kano (1968), 72.
8 Interviewed in Bosshu sareta genbaku firumu (Confiscated Atomic Bomb Film), TV Tokyo documentary.
9 This is a reference to a famous scene from Kamei Fumio’s Fighting Soldiers (Tatakau heitai, 1938), which Miki photographed. This long scene features a horse abandoned by the Japanese military in China. All alone on a country road, the horse drops to its knees and dies. Its pitiful death represented the suffering of both sides during the war in China. This scene was also one of the reasons the film was suppressed and Kamei was arrested.
10 Uno, 39–41.
11 Barnouw (1982), 342.
12 Inoue, 70–75.
13 Interviewed in Bosshu sareta genbaku firumu.
14 Inoue, 74.
15 Liebow, 194.
16 Interviewed in Bosshu sareta genbaku firumu.
17 Memorandum photographed in Bosshu sareta genbaku firumu. The original is in possession of Liebow’s spouse.
18 Schwichtenberg, Albert H. memo to G-2 GHQ AFFAC, APO 500, Advance (28 December 1945), [Daniel A. McGovern Collection]. Furthermore, that the doctors already possessed rushes of the medical aspects footage suggests there were ulterior motives.
20 Buck, Walter A. memo to Headquarters, United States Strategic Bombing Survey, APO 181 [atten. Lt. Col. Woodward], (3 January 1946), [Daniel A. McGovern Collection].
21 Castles, William I. ‘Subject: Documentary Atomic Bombing Film [atten. Mr. Akira Iwasaki, Manager], memo to Nichiei (11 January 1946), [Daniel A. McGovern Collection].
22 While this essay concentrates primarily on written documents, here I also refer to verbal discourses such as gossip and oral traditions of film lore. As for written texts, a cursory look at the various discussions contained in the bibliography below will quickly uncover differences. Oral discourses this writer has been party to in the 1990s are even more contradictory and oriented toward spectacle.
23 This doesn’t rule out other possibilities: Iwasaki misunderstood the somewhat vague wording of the English-language memo, or didn’t tell the others until the eleventh hour...
24 Clearly troubled by the stories of forced, or violent, confiscation, McGovern now emphasizes this perspective in the strongest terms, pointing to the purchase order that engaged Nichiei’s service. The ‘Receipt for Supply or Service’ amounts to US$20,158.66, and includes lines for hotel charges in Nagasaki for the film crew, train fare, raw film stock, sound recording, title production, insert and map design, music selection, translation, narration, lab, editing, overtime, transportation, equipment rental, and 604 still photographs (Procurement Number SC-8T-PD 200–46, dated 30 March 1946).
Hibakusha Cinema

This budget was derived by a memo signed by Iwasaki coming to ¥31,439 (Iwasaki Akira. 'Statement of the Production Cost on 'Effects of the Atomic Bomb,' undated). [both documents in Daniel A. McGovern Collection].

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Takikawa Yoshio, 220.

Ito, 86.

Lifton, 455.

Imahori, referred to in Lifton.

Interviews and correspondence with the author.

Gayn, 8. The story was also distributed by International News Service under the headline 'Atomic Bomb Film Epic Enroute to U.S.' but much of this report was incorrect. There is a newspaper clipping from the service, with no bibliographic information, in the McGovern Collection.

After the classification of the Nichiei film, McGovern and Dyer continued to pursue the possibility of creating films from the colour footage they shot with Mimura and Susson. In addition to five training films, the project included a feature length documentary to be produced by Warner Brothers for a wide public release. The studio offered to make the documentary 'for indoctrination purposes, showing the effects on the economic, cultural, and political life of Japan resulting from strategic air attack by the Army Air Forces' (Anderson, Orvil, 'Subject: Preparation of Documentary and Training Films for the Army Air Forces,' memo to Commanding General, Army Air Forces [10 July 1946]). The Warners project eventually fell through, however, the footage was momentarily downgraded from 'Secret' to 'Confidential' long enough for McGovern to complete five training films: The Effect of the Atomic Bomb Against Hiroshima, The Effect of the Atomic Bomb Against Nagasaki, The Medical Aspects of the Atomic Bomb, The Effect of Strategic Air Attack Against Japan, and The Effect of the Aerial Mining Program (Austin, Gordon H., 'Subject: Classification of U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey Training Film Project,' memo to Commanding General, Air University, Maxwell Field, Alabama [12 April 1947]). These memoranda are in the McGovern Collection.

34

A short history of the Nichiei print: Throughout the occupation the U.S. military enforced a representational silence over the subject of the atomic bombings. The reels hidden by the four Nichiei filmmakers - 7 to 13 depending on which account you read - remained in Miki Shigeru's lab until the end of the occupation in 1952. Iwasaki, Kano and Ito went to retrieve the film only to find that Toho had beat them to it. After reorganization, Nichiei came under the umbrella of Toho and the studio made its claim for the film. Considering the support the production received from Monbusho and the USSBS, their claim to the rights is dubious. However, they keep a firm grip on the film to this day.

In the 1950s and 1960s, Toho limited its use to a handful of films, angering many who suspected both political motives and the fear of affecting their foreign markets. The first postwar appropriation of the film was an special issue of Asahi News (#363) released on the anniversary of the end of the war in 1953. Entitled Genbaku gisei dai ichigo (The First Atomic Bombing Sacrifice), it called Hiroshima a 'city of death' in which 'no trees or grass can be found.' The newsreel was shown to Japanese American audiences in Hawaii, where it came to the attention of the U.S. government. The U.S. embassy asked Nichiei-shinsha for an explanation, but there was nothing they could do as the occupation was over. The incident apparently ended when the Japanese company offered the U.S. a print (yet another copy that has disappeared). The response to this newsreel was so strong that Nichiei-shinsha made a 2-reel documentary, Genbaku no Nagasaki (Atomic Bombed Nagasaki), which was shown in Toho theaters (Uno, 43).

After this a number of other films drew images from the Nichiei print: Eien no Keiwa o (For Eternal Peace), Senso no kao (The Face of War), and the Swedish films Waga toso (Our Struggle), Zoku waga toso (Our Struggle Continued). The most important films to use material of the were Kamei Fumio's Ikite yokuatta (It's Good to Be Alive) and Alain Resnais' Hiroshima Mon Amour. Consciousness of the film grew, even among the general public, and calls to repatriate the film grew in hand. The Japanese government repeatedly asked the U.S. for the film, and their request was repeatedly turned down. When the McGovern print surfaced in 1967 (see note 35), the incomplete, silent Nichiei print was no longer precious as before. However, Toho continues to claim a legal right to the film, even though the U.S. government considers it public domain and makes the film freely available for purchase through the U.S. National Archives. Even so, when Fukushima Yukio and I screened the complete film at the 1991 Yamagata International Documentary Film Festival, we had to clear permission with Toho despite using the Peace Museum's print (which they purchased from the National Archives). Luckily, film and video makers outside of Japan are unaware of this problem and consider the film public domain.

A short history of the McGovern print: After the classification of the film, McGovern took all the black and white and color footage to Wright Field in Ohio. There he catalogued everything, and made four or five training films from the color footage. He struck the 16mm copy just before moving on to other work within the military. Although this could have brought him trouble, he felt it necessary to ensure that future generations would have the film even if the original materials disappeared (this is USAF 17679). The accession date for this hidden print is unclear. There are records in the National Archives that suggest it was declassified in the 1950s, but a BBC report claimed the print was moved in 1960 (Kudo, 209).

In any case, the U.S. government refused to release the film for
Hibakusha Cinema

political reasons. *The Miami Herald* cited unnamed sources to report that the U.S. wouldn’t release the film for fear of damaging U.S.-Japan relations (*The Miami Herald* [18 May 1967]: 11-A). It even published an editorial calling for the release of the film to inject some seriousness into the arms talks in the midst of a Middle East crisis (*The Miami Herald* [25 May 1967]). Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Herbert Susson, one of the American supervisors working under McGovern, pushed hard for the film’s release. As a network television journalist, he had powerful connections (from Murrow to Truman). However, none of them could (or desired to) do anything. Susson had also contacted McGovern for help, but McGovern was busy with his own career within the military, perhaps afraid of retribution considering his position. (Susson’s unflagging and frustrating efforts to have the film released from its suppression are detailed in Jaffe, 1983.) In any case, a 16mm reduction print, and a 35mm print and magnetic sound track, ended up in the National Archives. However, like most of their holdings, nothing ‘exists’ until someone asks for it.

The film emerged from its suppression in 1967, when a 16mm print was returned to Monbusho by the American government. At this point, it was a matter between governments. Monbusho initially set up screenings for the filmmakers (see Kano, 74) and various officials, but they censored the film. In addition to changing the name, they censored their own credit and cut all scenes of human effects. The latter was done in deference to the victims – at least that is what they claimed – but they did not reinsert the footage when hibakusha themselves made an issue of it. Monbusho allowed the censored version to be shown on NHK Education channel on April 20, 1968. The censorship was roundly criticized by writers and survivors, some on the strongest terms; Hayama: ‘Even twenty-three years after the war, parties affiliated with Monbusho and the Japanese government add to the criminal deed of the American government and those concerned with it who stole and kept the film, making it a double robbery.’ (Hayama, 122) Furthermore, Monbusho severely limited access to the film, stating ‘in order to avoid the film being utilized for political purposes, applications for loan of the film from labor unions and political organizations will be turned down.’ *Asahi Evening News* quoted in Barnouw, 1982, 92). Today, this print is held by the Nishina Institute; together they conspire to keep the print from public view by restricting its use to ‘scientific researchers.’ When the Yamagata International Documentary Film Festival asked to see it in 1991, our request was summarily denied.

When documentary film scholar Erik Barnouw heard of the controversy in Japan over Monbusho’s censorship, he decided to search for this *maboroshi* film. Expecting trouble, he went straight to the top and wrote Secretary of State Clark Clifford (letter dated 8 March 1968). He received an immediate reply from Deputy Assistant Secretary Daniel Henkin with a surprising response: the film was in the National Archives and available to anyone that asked

(letter dated 19 March 1968; Barnouw has left a file of this correspondence and other related materials at MOMA, the U.S. Library of Congress, the Imperial War Museum, London, and the Barnouw Papers, Special Collections, Columbia University Library). Barnouw bought the print and, with documentarist Paul Ronder, made *Hiroshima-Nagasaki, August 1945*, perhaps the finest documentary to use the Nichiel footage. Barnouw (1982, 1988) has described the enormous impact of this film in Japan, for it concentrated on the images that Monbusho had censored.

As for the original, classified materials, they were assigned control number USN MN 9151 and shipped to the military’s archive at Norton Air Force Base. With the post-Cold War cuts in the defense budget, Norton was closed and in the process of moving the archives to March Air Force Base many film prints were transferred to the National Archives in 1994. Among these wooden boxes sitting in Washington is USN MN 9151. According to shipping records, this control number includes a 16mm reduction print and a 35mm dupes neg with magnetic soundtrack (I would like to thank Bill Murphy of the National Archives for sifting through the shipping records for this information). As of this writing, boxes are simply waiting to be opened and catalogued. Which print is the earliest generation will not be determined until the codes on the film stock are investigated.

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36 Kogawa, 167.
37 Kogawa, 174.
38 Noda, 23.
39 ‘‘Maboroshi’’ no eiga Fukugen, Josei e,’ 4.
40 Kudo, 15.
41 Tanikawa, 221.
42 See, for example, Uno, 42-43.
43 Conversations and interviews with both filmmakers by Fukushima Yukio and myself, as we arranged a screening of the film for the Yamagata International Documentary Film Festival in 1991.
44 Fukushima (1991), 175.
45 This film also ran into severe difficulties and was finally suppressed.
47 This film is preserved at the Film Center of Japan.
48 Nagai, 39.
49 See Nichols (1983) and Nichols (1991), 128-133.
50 Kogawa & Tsurumi, 172-173.
51 See Virilio, Ueno, and Nornes.
52 Nibuya, 128.
53 Kogawa, 171.
54 This information comes from interviews and conversations between Ito and Fukushima Yukio when we researched the film’s history for the Yamagata Film Festival.
55 All screen violence draws on this quality of the apparatus, but
shrouds it in discursive conventions, routing viewers to the occasional, uncanny glimpse of this stunning indifference. While disturbing, we also confront the charms of the epicenter here. The enjoyable irony of Stanley Kubrick's subtitle for Dr. Strangelove – How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb – works because we understand this. Most recently, the point of view of the bomb, which the Nichiei filmmakers allowed to define the terms of their photography and editing, has been literalized through video cameras mounted in the noses of cruise missiles. During the Gulf War, as each bomb reached the city of Baghdad on its 'surgical' attack, it recorded its arrival at the Epicenter with grainy, silent, absolutely indifferent images. The world watched, transfixed and in awe while experiencing the point of view of the bomb. This fascination quickly wears off as the images are absorbed into human discourse; the voice of the bomb becomes veiled, both containing and increasing its potential power.

56 *Genshibakudan* – *Hiroshima no sangai* – Nihon News #257 (Atomic Bomb – The Disastrous Damage of Hiroshima – Nihon News #257). This newsreel was the subject of some controversy in 1994, when a reporter from *Asahi Shinbun* found some memos about it in the U.S. National Archives ('GHQ, genbaku eizo no joiuchisshi kento – kenetsu e no hanpatsu osore fumon ni,' 33). They describe an exchange between David Conde, the occupational official who controlled the Japanese film industry, and censor C. B. Reese. This was the period in which the censorship system was 'under construction' and had yet to be implemented. Conde had apparently seen the newsreel before he had the power to censor it. When he saw the film in the theater, some sections had been cut and he wondered who was responsible. He also recommended changes and a different title, however, they ultimately decided against censorship for fear of controversy. The newspaper describes the story in the vaguest of terms, as 'The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.'

57 'Reaction of humans to atom bomb in film,' 18.

58 See note 35 for more information.

59 They called the movement *Genbaku Kiroku Eiga 10 Fito Undo* (Atomic Bomb Documentary Film 10 Feet Movement). Calculating that 3,000 yen could buy 10 of the total 85,000 feet of film, they solicited donations around Japan and raised 1,800,000,000 yen in the first couple of years. With this they bought all of the color and black and white film, and made their own *genbaku eiga* with Hani Susumu and other filmmakers. In 1994, they reinvigorated the movement to make a Japanese language version of *The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.* The history of the movement is reported in Nagai, 1983.

60 There were four broadcasts in 1982.

61 Nagai, 42. Taniguchi appears in two shots, the first showing a doctor pointing at various parts of his back with a large tweezers, the second his face staring off into space. This with the narration, 'It was midsummer when the atomic bomb hit the heart of Hiroshima and the people were thinly clad. Many parts of their body were exposed. In fact, quite a large number were semi-nude. First-aid stations reported that 80 to 90 per cent of the cases handled by them immediately after the bombing were burns. Burns resulting directly from the atomic bomb were caused on the parts of the body which faced the rays. There were no burns on the opposite side.'

62 Nagai, 62.

**Bibliography**

The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki may be purchased from the U.S. National Archives, Motion Picture, Sound and Video Branch, 8601 Adelphi Road, College Park, Maryland 20740; Phone: 301-713-7060. The film can also be viewed in their reference room, but reservations should be made well in advance. The unedited color footage shot by Mimura, McGovern, Dyer and Susson (342 USAF, reels 11,000-11,079) may also be seen or purchased there.


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