CONTEMPORARY STUDENT ACTIVISM:
THE EDUCATIONAL CONTEXTS OF SOCIALLY-RESPONSIBLE CIVIC ENGAGEMENT

by

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DEDICATION

To my family for their support, patience, and love.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAC&amp;U</td>
<td>Association of American Colleges and Universities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAUP</td>
<td>American Association of University Professors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACE</td>
<td>American Council on Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACIU</td>
<td>Academic Consortium of International Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACLU</td>
<td>American Civil Liberties Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFL-CIO</td>
<td>American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Collective Action sample</td>
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<tr>
<td>CGEU</td>
<td>Coalition of Graduate Employee Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLC</td>
<td>Collegiate Licensing Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLA</td>
<td>Fair Labor Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPEDS</td>
<td>Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System</td>
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<tr>
<td>LSAHE</td>
<td>Learn and Serve America Higher Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCAA</td>
<td>National Collegiate Athletic Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCSCBHEP</td>
<td>National Center for the Study of Collective Bargaining in Higher Education and the Professions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEA</td>
<td>protest event analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>RP</td>
<td>Recruitment-participation sample</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDS</td>
<td>Students for a Democratic Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITE</td>
<td>Union of Needletrades Industrial and Textile Employees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAS</td>
<td>United Students Against Sweatshops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIF</td>
<td>Variance Inflation Factor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WRC</td>
<td>Workers Rights Consortium</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
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ABSTRACT

CONTEMPORARY STUDENT ACTIVISM:
THE EDUCATIONAL CONTEXTS OF SOCIA LLY-RESPONSIBLE CIVIC ENGAGEMENT

by

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Contemporary higher education leaders tend to view campus based activism as an outgrowth of an educational experience that inspires and leads students to engage in civic action for the purpose of alleviating systemic social, economic, or political injustices. Accordingly, this study explores the relationships between the structural characteristics and the educational contexts of campuses relative to the occurrence of student mobilization. Using a concurrent embedded mixed-method design, this study focuses primarily on a random sample of 149 U.S. campuses that had the potential for becoming involved in the student anti-sweatshop movement between the years 1998-2002. A supplemental data set involving 1,245 U.S. public and private four-year institutions is used to perform a multinomial logistic model that identifies those campus characteristics that predict whether a campus would have some degree of involvement with an external social movement organization in the institutional field. Additionally, a qualitative newspaper content and frame analysis (conducted on the N=149 sample) characterizes the manner in which contemporary student activism is enacted and understood on those campuses that experienced mobilization. The results indicate that diversity requirements in the undergraduate curriculum, along with having robust area studies programs contribute to the likelihood that campuses will mobilize. Further, the forces in the external institutional environment were found to have the equivalent effect to the influence of the campus context in predicting whether student mobilization ensued. Findings also demonstrate that student activists frame their movement involvement as an extension of their local internal organizational identities, and tend to enact movement strategies which are educationally oriented and symbolically important. Overall, this research contributes to theories of socially-responsible stakeholder collective action, and further elucidates movement dynamics within particular types of social institutions. The study concludes with recommendations for practice for college educators who seek to foster an educational experience that promotes civic engagement.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

*Purpose*

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the particular organizational characteristics and contexts of campuses that are associated with student activism. This study evaluates the relationship between campus-wide educational strategies, which are deliberately designed to foster students’ capacities for engaging in socially-responsible collective action, and the occurrence of student mobilization on campus. Additionally, this study functions to delimit the manner in which contemporary student activists frame their concerns and offer remedies to the problems they seek to address. Theoretically, this study uses social movement theory to expand our collective understanding of the mechanisms at work as organizational members pressure their institutions to pursue socially-responsible institutional practices and policies. I use quantitative analytical techniques to pinpoint the educational contexts that are linked to subsequent student mobilization; and I use qualitative techniques to describe the salient features of contemporary student collective action.

*Student Activism in the Higher Education Context*

Student activism and mobilization is an ever-present topic in the field of higher education. The periodic review of news accounts provides numerous examples. Already

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1 For the purpose of this study, social responsibility is conceptualized as expressing concern for the larger welfare of the community, and choosing to behave in ways that contribute productively to the community, or in ways that affirm and reinforce community values and democratic principles.
in 2011, there have been reports of students: staging a sit-in on campus to protest the state’s cut to the higher education budget (Inside Higher Ed, 2011); organizing for the ethical treatment of campus food service employees in California and Louisiana (Daysog, 2011; Evans, 2011); sitting-in as a means to demand stricter sexual assault policies on campus in Pennsylvania (The Chronicle of Higher Education, 2011); and still others protesting the administration to recognize a gay-straight alliance student group in New York (Trapasso, 2011). In broad terms, each of these campus issues – the allocating of state funding, the rights of labor, or the rights of identity-based groups like women or gays and lesbians – can be conceptualized as the student versions of larger social movements present in our contemporary political discourse. Even so, it is compelling that on some campuses, college students find ways to claim these issues as their own, and choose to take action locally on their campuses.

*Historical Origins*

College student activism and mobilization have a long history in U.S. higher education. In 1766, the infamous, Bad Butter Rebellion occurred as Harvard men rioted over the poor quality of food in the commons (Moore, 1997). Their riot began symbolically as a concern about dining, but quickly escalated into a debate with the governor and board of overseers that reflected the prevailing political concerns of the time related to having to “obey an unjust sovereign” (Moore, p. 110). Throughout the Revolutionary era, student activism was typically directed toward national politics with their widespread anti-British and anti-Stamp Act sentiments which led to multiple commencement protest rallies throughout the colonial colleges (Rudy, 1996).
From 1780-1850, student protests were directed locally toward frustrations over the faculty's restrictive religious orthodoxy (Rudolph, 1990; Rudy, 1996). Stemming from the philosophy of freedom espoused during the Revolutionary era, students displayed a penchant for deism, atheism, and religious indifference, views that countered the traditional theological orientation of most colleges (Rudolph, 1990). Students expressed these concerns with rebellious and provocative acts such as hosting mock Lord’s Suppers, burning Bibles, gathering in secret at night for revolutionary readings and chants, and occasionally, calling for the ouster of the president in favor of one who was freed from religious indoctrination (Rudolph, 1990). The protest events (or rebellions and riots as they were referred to at the time) of the early nineteenth century were documented as having been particularly violent, where brawls sometimes resulted in the death of a student or college leader (Baxter Magolda & Magolda, 1988; Rudolph, 1990; Shoben, 1970)

In the ramp up to the Civil War, some students’ concerns mirrored national issues, either advocating for anti-slavery or state’s rights; and during the war itself, students became vocal with their anti-conscription concerns (Rudy, 1996). Even so, it was more typical for students to highlight local issues such as an unpopular university president, problems with the town’s authorities, or having a say in university decision making (Lipset, 1971; Wood, 1974). At the close of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth, students began to seek more social and cultural freedom, and pushed back against the *in loco parentis* approach of colleges; (an approach where colleges asserted strict morality and behavioral expectations over the private lives of students in attempt to function as a type of proxy parent) (Braungart & Braungart, 1990; Wood, 1974).
Some scholars argue the first broad student movement began to really take shape in the 1930s when students began to organize into political groups that referenced a national affiliation (Braungart & Braungart, 1990; Laufer & Light Jr., 1970). This movement was prefaced on the common grievances students held about an overly materialistic culture, censoring of the student press and free speech on campus, and concerns over deterioration in the quality of education and in American life generally (Braungart & Braungart, 1990). As the twentieth century progressed, students joined together to air their concerns in both the broader political arena (as students mobilized over war and foreign policy), in addition to lofting criticisms of restrictive and bureaucratic campus policies (Astin, Astin, Bayer, & Bisconti, 1997; Rudy, 1996). In the 1960s, a flurry of student sentiments boiled over into activism that spanned a range of issues, most prominent however, were mobilizations regarding civil rights and the Vietnam war (Astin, Astin, Bayer, & Bisconti, 1975; Astin et al., 1997; Rudy, 1996).

**Individual Attributes of Student Activists**

Typically, when higher education scholars have studied student activism, they have been concerned with the individual aspects of student mobilization domestically (Altbach, 1981; Altbach & Laufer, 1972; Lipset, 1968; Lipset & Altbach, 1969; McAdam, 1992; Rhoads, 1997, 1998a, 2003), and at times internationally as well (Lipset, 1967; Lipset & Altbach, 1969; Rhoads, Lee, & Yamada, 2002; Rhoads & Mina, 2001). This literature has provided many insights about the student activists themselves, with respect to their identities, participation, occupational outcomes, background characteristics (Cole & Stewart, 1996; Dauphinais, Barkan, & Cohn, 1992; Shay, 1992; Stewart, Settles, & Winter, 1998), or political socialization (Dey, 1997; Duncan &
Stewart, 1995; Lipset, 1969; Wood, 1974). Even though the higher education community has learned a great deal about why some students are predisposed to activism, relatively little attention has been devoted to deeply exploring modern student mobilization in higher education at the organizational level. Aside from mentions of graduate student labor unions (i.e. a form of collective organizing) and the geographical spread of activist claims on various campuses (Rhoads, 1998a; Yamane, 2001), or the flurry of writing dedicated to the administrative ‘problem’ of student unrest in the late 1960s (Bolling, 1970; Budig, 1971; Kerr, 1970; Lammers, 1977; Muller, 1970), scholars in higher education have given preference to student activism as an individual phenomenon.

Campus Organizational Attributes Related to Activism

At a basic level, some prior research provides a cursory understanding of the organizational features of campuses that are related to acts of student mobilization. Studies of student activism that have included organizational or institutional variables have demonstrated that activism tends to be associated with institutional size, where protests are more likely to occur at schools with larger enrollments (Astin et al., 1975; Blau & Slaughter, 1971; Lipset, 1971, 1993; Long & Foster, 1970; Peterson, 1970; Van Dyke, 1998). Elite and prestigious institutions continually tend to be associated with greater incidences of student protest as well (Lipset, 1971, 1993; Soule, 1997; Van Dyke, 1998, 2003). Institutional type has also been associated with greater incidence of student protest, but results have varied across studies. Peterson (1970) found evidence that public institutions are associated with greater instances of student activism; Long and Foster (1970) found that private secular institutions have slightly more protests than public institutions.
Other studies have focused on the importance of the geographic location of the university as a predictor of student protest (Flacks, 1970; Long & Foster, 1970; Peterson, 1970; Van Dyke, 1998; Van Dyke, Dixon, & Carlon, 2007), but locations have been operationalized in variety of ways, and thus have generated inconsistent findings. There is also some evidence that campus based activism is connected to the degree of political intolerance in the community (Gibson, 2003; Norr, 1971, 1977). In particular, campus rules or state laws prohibiting political action on campus have the effect of repressing the expression of dissenting views, or displaying acts of protest (Gibson, 2003). Additionally, guidelines limiting the involvement of political persons on campus also depress the chance that students will engage in protest activity (Norr, 1977).

There is mixed evidence that incidences of protest are shaped by the race of the student protesters. McAdam’s (1988) research on Freedom Summer showed that a disproportionate number of White students were involved on account of their interest in the cause, but more so as a function of their structural availability in having fewer social restraints on movement participation, and being associated with other likeminded students. Alternately, Levine and Cureton’s (1998) contemporary research on student activism has demonstrated that minority students are more likely to mobilize than White students, and African American students are the most inclined to mobilize among minority groups. Levine and Cureton’s findings regarding the ethnic identity of protesters coincide with Rhoads’ (1998a) work regarding the role of personal identity as a galvanizing force to mobilize underrepresented students in the pursuit of their common grievances. However, Rhoads contends that the identity-based student activism has been multicultural in its focus, where the underrepresented students sought to build movements
characterized by their inclusiveness. Accordingly, collective identity-based mobilization
should not be thought of as being restricted to groups on account of their racial, ethnic,
gender, age, or sexual orientation; rather these distinctions can be facilitative in
connecting one’s self to others (Rhoads, 1998a). Rhoads anticipated that students will
continue to “advance a sense of self bound to others” (p. 242) using potentially other
forms of collective identity criteria in order to best align their actions in the pursuit of
democracy.

Looking at the research on student activism en masse, a great deal of it was
pursued in response to university leaders’ and public officials’ desire to address the
problem of student unrest in the 1960s and 1970s (Astin et al., 1975; Foster & Long,
1970; Scranton, 1970). The violence and disruption during the campus protests of the
free speech movement, the civil rights struggle, and the Vietnam era startled many
university leaders and society generally, and academic analyses were used to provide
explanations for student activism and the university’s response to it. In fact, the largest
attempt to inventory campus unrest at that time (conducted by scholars representing the
American Council on Education and funded by the National Institute of Mental Health),
was publicly criticized for being an attempt for the university elite to find a way to
control the problem protesters or to find a way to “deal” with them (Astin, 1970; Lauter,
1969, 1970). After the dust settled from the preceding turbulent activist era, a conceptual
shift began to emerge in some of the writing concerning student activism. What was
once construed as problematic was beginning to be viewed as beneficial. Altbach
(1990b) and Rojas (2003; 2007) both concluded that student activism functioned to
expand university academic offerings as it advanced the causes of establishing Women’s and Black studies on many campuses in 1970s and 1980s. Similarly, the activist identities that were once viewed as significant contributors to the campus unrest problem, were beginning to be thought of in constructive developmental terms, where activism was a reflection of cognitive, moral, and identity maturation (Hunter, 1988). Further, some campus administrators started to perceive student activism as a result of placing young people in an educational environment that “fosters serious questioning about the role and status of society, as well as demands for change” (Brown, Miser, & Emmanuel, 1987, p. 57).

**A New Perspective on Contemporary Student Activism**

Within the frame of contemporary mobilization, the conventional thought about college student activism is decidedly more optimistic than it once was, with educators increasingly describing it as a desirable form of civic engagement. Anecdotal stories of student movements have been lauded by higher education leaders as civic engagement success stories, authors are quick to point out the importance of students’ educational experiences as being essential for inspiring activism (Ehrlich, 2006; W.K. Kellogg Foundation, 2009). The logic holds that when college students mobilize, campus leaders tend to interpret it as a strong signal that the campus conditions have been ripe for students to integrate their knowledge, skills, and identities with a broader appreciation for the processes of civic engagement upon which democratic participation is based. Colleges utilize courses, program curricula, general education requirements, and campus programming as catalytic experiences to facilitate student learning with respect to politics, history, power and privilege, economics, foreign affairs, and individual versus
community responsibilities. These efforts amount to colleges and universities attempting to stimulate students thinking so that they develop a principled philosophy of morality, which compels them to use their intellectual and interpersonal skills to be civically engaged. More and more, educators and leading higher education organizations (e.g. AAC&U, AASCU) praise student activism and mobilization, and purport that such actions are a consequence of the extent to which a campus embraces civic engagement programs and projects. Therefore, at this point in time, it would seem that the relationship between the study of student activism and its subsequent implications for university administrative practice appears to be in transformation.

*Civic Engagement Manifested Through Student Activism*

Civic engagement proponents are eager to attribute student activism to the virtues or the quality of the campus educational experience or contexts. In an address to the American Association of State Colleges and Universities American Democracy Project, Thomas Ehrlich showcased Duke undergraduate Tico Almeida’s involvement in the student anti-sweatshop campaign of the later 1990’s as an idealized version of what college can do to catalyze students’ civic engagement (Ehrlich, 2006). Ehrlich attributed Almeida’s participation in a campus experiential learning program, which combined coursework with community service and field work internships, as the impetus for Almeida’s subsequent leadership and campus activism regarding sweatshop issues in the collegiate apparel industry. Similarly, the W.K. Kellogg Foundation featured Almeida’s anti-sweatshop activism as an exemplar of the type of learning and civic action that emerges when “students ask important questions about community leadership and civic engagement and then explore the answers” (W.K. Kellogg Foundation, 2009). Further
the Duke University alumni magazine and departmental newsletters used Almeida’s participation in its Service Opportunities in Leadership program and his subsequent student activism as a heart-warming anecdote of the kind of learning and involvement that emerges when a committed learner and a rich educational environment coalesce through higher education (Baerman, 2002; Duke Policy News, 1998). Effectively, Almeida’s story has become one of the civic engagement success stories of higher education in almost mythical proportions. It stands as a glowing example of what is possible when educational experiences inspire and lead students to civic action for the purpose of alleviating systemic social, economic, or political injustices. The challenge with this interpretation, or framing student activism as an individual civic engagement achievement or outcome, is that it tends to undermine the inherently collective and organizational nature of the type of civic engagement that educators hold in high regard.

As higher education draws on anecdotes like Almeida’s, the tempo for pursuing civic engagement in higher education has hastened, as evidenced by a steady stream of calls for college educators to invest more fully and effectively in this ambition (Association of American Colleges and Universities, 2002; Colby, Ehrlich, Beaumont, Rosner, & Stephens, 2000; Ehrlich, 2000; Hollister, Wilson, & Levine, 2008). Campuses have responded to these calls by formally stating that a prominent part of their missions are to produce citizens who can apply their cognitive skills to social issues in a global community. University educators embrace the notion that liberal education functions as a broad instrument for encouraging active and involved citizenship. The general assumption is that when activism and involvement are realized to their full potential, liberal education becomes a means for emboldening students with the courage and
conviction to pursue their beliefs as a collective through social movement activity or mobilization.

In sum, much of the prior student activism literature in higher education stands in contrast to the contemporary civic engagement idealized view of student activism in the sense that it either: 1) operates implicitly on the notion that activism is problematic, 2) conceptualizes activism as an individual phenomenon, or 3) does both. Historically, a great deal of student activism scholarship in higher education has been pursued in response to university leaders’ and public officials’ desires to address the problem of student unrest in the 1960s and 1970s (Astin et al., 1975; Foster & Long, 1970; Scranton, 1970). These analyses coincided with the broader social-psychological disciplinary influences of the era, and treated activism as a personal pathology of sorts. As a result, the pool of campus student activism literature stressed protesters’ identities, antecedents of participation, background characteristics (Duncan & Stewart, 1995; Stewart et al., 1998), and political socialization (Lipset, 1969; Wood, 1974). Through these prior works, the higher education community has learned a great deal about why some students are predisposed to activism; however, relatively little attention has been devoted to deeply exploring modern student mobilization in higher education at the organizational or campus level. The literature has generated some recurring insights about campus characteristics such as size and selectivity as being associated with protests, but other organizational features such as institutional type, location and the diversity of the student body have produced varied findings. All of these issues merit additional inquiry with a research design specifically intended to dissect the relationship of campus organizational features and student mobilization.
Further, the current body of student mobilization research tends to overlook the educational characteristics of the university environment that create favorable or not-so-favorable conditions for students’ to exercise their consciences through collective activism. This shortcoming in the current scholarship undermines the reality that student mobilization and activism is inherently a collective endeavor that draws on common meanings and frames. Moreover, an in-depth organizational or campus level examination is needed to yield findings that provide educators with insights about contemporary educational practices that may influence students’ proclivity for civically minded collective mobilization.

Research Questions

Although research is increasingly focused on linking certain educational efforts (such as service learning, liberal education curricula) with students’ acquisition of civic engagement attitudes (AAC&U, 2006; Association of American Colleges and Universities, 2002; Colby, 2008; Colby et al., 2000; Dey & Associates, 2008; Hollister et al., 2008), the leap to whether campus practices actually encourage activism and collective mobilization is underspecified (Bickford & Reynolds, 2002; Bouman, 2006; McPherson, 2006; Prince Jr., 2008). When the campus context is especially supportive, the logic holds that education, awareness and aptitude become primers for student activism. Even with this rational conception of educational contexts serving as a springboard to activism, the field lacks empirical cross-case evidence that demonstrates this relationship. As a result, the over-arching question for this study is: How are colleges and universities educating students for collective mobilization and student
activism? More specifically, campus leaders and educators need help finding an answer to the following questions:

- **What role do campus characteristics and contexts (in particular, educational programs and curricular offerings) have in shaping the likelihood that students will engage in collective action?**

- **How is contemporary mobilization enacted by students?**

- **How does the organizational context of a campus contribute to students’ understanding of, or justification for collective mobilization activities?**

This study is designed to focus squarely on these questions by drawing from a contemporary example of an instance where students on 150 college campuses were confronted with the political opportunity to engage in a broader social movement, specifically the student anti-sweatshop movement.

The following research has been designed to address the characteristics and contexts of colleges and universities as organizations, as a lens for extending our collective understanding of the processes that cultivate student mobilization and activism. The campus-based element of the anti-sweatshop movement represented a widely dispersed political opportunity structure consisting of varying college and university contexts, climates, and programs. Campus-based activism of this kind functioned as tool to link the ideals and social justice ambitions of a broad network of labor and human-rights sympathizers to alter the manner in which U.S. universities involved themselves in corporate dealings.

The analysis is constructed as an effort to consider campus-based activism theoretically and methodologically, as a mode for developing a deeper and more nuanced understanding of: 1) the educational conditions and characteristics that explain variations
in students’ collective mobilization behaviors from campus-to-campus; 2) to examine the particular features of the college experience that are most compatible with student activism; and 3) the efficacy of civically minded student mobilization efforts. While the global anti-sweatshop movement is compelling on a variety of levels, I am less interested in explaining the impetus of the anti-sweatshop movement from an economic, political, or geographic perspective; scholars in other disciplines have done so with attention towards world trade issues, the apparel industry, human rights, and labor policy (Cravey, 2004; Esbenshade, 2004; Mandle, 2000; Micheletti & Stolle, 2008; O'Rourke, 2003; A. Ross, 2003). Instead, I am situating my study about contemporary student mobilization in the context of the student anti-sweatshop movement in order to examine the educational contexts and characteristics associated with campus activism.

Plan for the Dissertation

This manuscript begins with an orienting context for the study. In Chapter II, I provide summative details regarding the rise and progression of the student anti-sweatshop movement as a situating context for considering the organizational features of contemporary student activism. Following the anti-sweatshop movement information, I present the relevant theoretical literature regarding the study of institutions, along with information about considering higher education as a particular type of social institution. My review of the literature proceeds by outlining the relevant theories and critiques of social movement theory. At the end of Chapter III, I integrate the literature and offer a model describing my overall approach to this research. In Chapter IV, I explain my methodological approaches with information about my samples, variables, and analytical techniques. Chapters V, VI, and VII consist of the presentation of my findings. I then
use chapter VIII to present an analysis of the results. Finally, in chapter IX, I discuss future directions for subsequent research, as well as the corresponding implications for practice that are an extension of this study.
CHAPTER II

THE STUDENT ANTI-SWEATSHOP MOVEMENT

Situating Event

In a May 2000 feature in the Chicago Tribune, journalist Bonnie DeSimone wrote:

The escalating debate about sweatshop labor and university athletic gear and how to enforce the varsity letter of the law can be viewed in many contexts. It signals a resurgence in student activism. No single issue has galvanized campuses in these numbers in two decades. It marks a new beachhead for organized labor, which for years has been trying to make its goals understandable to a younger constituency. It has prompted a very public spat between Nike and several large universities, and brought into focus the moral choices consumers face in a way that even a spate of murders of young people over designer sneakers and jackets did not. It has split the dizzying array of groups working for sweatshop labor reforms, although activists on both sides say they disagree only on the means, not the ends. It has not--at least yet--made a difference in the price of T-shirts.

The anti-sweatshop movement of the late 1990s came into full view because of a series of media attention regarding horrific sweatshop conditions at garment factories that manufactured apparel for celebrities (i.e. Kathy Lee Gifford) or large, household labels (i.e. Gap, Nike, Guess, Disney) (Esbenshade, 2004). Although leaders in unions and human-rights groups collaborated with the Department of Labor in 1996 to establish a code of conduct following consumer and public outrage, the code which they crafted, the Apparel Industry Partnership (later known as the Fair Labor Association or FLA) was ultimately viewed by anti-sweatshop activists as insufficient to ensure that apparel was made in sweat free conditions (Esbenshade, 2004; Featherstone, 2003; A. Ross, 2003; R. Ross, 2004b). Although the FLA code included provisions for apparel manufacturers that
addressed workers health and safety, child labor, forced labor, anti-harassment and nondiscriminatory practices, freedom of association, and collective bargaining, the code did not address external monitoring, and the inclusion of a living wage (A. Ross, 2003). In the broader global anti-sweatshop movement, labor and faith groups were quick to identify omissions in the FLA code, and sought to push corporations to adopt more comprehensive codes.

The origins of the spread of the global anti-sweatshop movement to the higher education sector appeared in 1997. In the summer of 1997, Tico Almeida, a Duke University student participating in a curricular and experiential learning program, Service Opportunities in Leadership, was encouraged by his professor to participate in an internship through the American Federation of Labor – Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) summer program (Featherstone & United Students Against Sweatshops, 2002; Krupat, 2002; R. Ross, 2004a; R. Ross, 2004b; Van Dyke et al., 2007). Almeida’s specific placement was with UNITE (the Union of Needletrades, Industrial, and Textile Employees), serving in a role in the Garment Workers’ Justice Center (Boris, 2002). According to Almeida, he was impressed with UNITE since they provided assistance to workers towards improving working conditions while assisting them with their English skills (Featherstone & United Students Against Sweatshops, 2002). As Almeida and eight of his fellow college student interns from other campuses learned more about the garment industry, they began to examine the connections between apparel makers and their universities. As a result, these students began strategizing ideas for university students to conduct anti-sweatshop campaigns (Almeida, 2002; Boris,
The student anti-sweatshop movement reflected the broader global anti-sweatshop movement, and was conceived as an attempt to persuade university officials to use their financial power and brand recognition to force corporations to take social responsibility for improving the working conditions of the workers that produced university licensed apparel (R. Ross, 2003; Krupat, 2002; Mandle, 2000; R. J. S. Ross, 2004b). When the student anti-sweatshop movement began, collegiate apparel was a 2.5 billion dollar industry (Featherstone, 2003). During the 1998-1999 school year students began organizing in response to the shortcomings in the FLA code. Specifically, student activists sought to pressure their universities to adopt codes of conduct that included three additional criteria beyond the FLA code: 1) that workers receive living wages (as opposed to the legal minimum wage which did not support a basic subsistence for workers); 2) that factories be subjected to external monitoring (as opposed to independent or self-regulated monitoring); and 3) that factory locations be disclosed (Mandle, 2000; A. Ross, 2003). As time progressed, students claimed that the way to achieve the goal of including these additional provisions was for their campuses to join the Workers Rights Consortium (WRC). The WRC was an entity created with the specific intent “to assist universities with the enforcement of their labor rights codes of conduct, which were adopted to protect the rights of workers producing apparel and other goods bearing university names and logos” (Workers Rights Consortium, 2009). On many campuses local anti-sweatshop student groups and chapters of the United Students Against Sweatshops (USAS) began forming to help further the students’ collective aims to get
Many different accountings of the student anti-sweatshop movement attribute its start to the pressure Duke University students placed on the University president to establish a code of conduct for its apparel vendors (Featherstone & United Students Against Sweatshops, 2002; Krupat, 2002; A. Ross, 2003; R. Ross, 2004a). Simultaneous with the Duke mobilization, the Collegiate Licensing Company (CLC), a third party broker for apparel licensing, adopted a de facto FLA code for all of its university clients, which also sparked interest among other campuses (A. Ross, 2003). Although various accounts differ on the number of campuses that actually mobilized for the anti-sweatshop cause, it is clear that the student movement went national and involved campaigns that embraced a range of tactics from sit-ins to occupations to petitions to nude-optional demonstrations (claiming “I’d Rather Go Naked than Wear Sweatshop Clothes”) (Featherstone & United Students Against Sweatshops, 2002). Table 1 below chronicles a timeline of the anti-sweatshop movement milestone from its earliest rumblings in 1995 through 2002.

A notable feature which emerged from the student anti-sweatshop movement has been the creation and sustained existence of the USAS. In 1999, over 200 students attended an inaugural meeting in Washington D.C. to focus on the sweatshop problem and to formalize the USAS organization (USAS, 2009b). Some authors regard the emergence of USAS as the most prominent progressive student movement in recent history (Featherstone, 2003; A. Ross, 2003; J. Ross 2004a; 2004b). Despite the prominence of USAS campus chapters involved in the student anti-sweatshop movement,
campus mobilization on the anti-sweatshop issue was not the exclusive purview of USAS; local groups of student activists engaged in the mobilization as well. This research is, in fact, an in-depth example of activism based in the anti-sweatshop cause that includes the dynamics of local campus-based mobilization.

In terms of the extent to which the student anti-sweatshop movement actually contributed to securing sweat-free apparel, there were some accomplishments. The USAS claims that because of student activism, Nike (being the first among several apparel vendors) began disclosing the locations of its factories so that external monitoring could occur (United Students Against Sweatshops, 2009b). In Esbenshade’s (2004) critical comparison of the content of the FLA and WRC codes, she notes that 112 universities joined the WRC and 177 universities joined the FLA by 2003; she does not however make any attribution about the impetus for these memberships. Nevertheless, Esbenshade does suggest that changes to the FLA’s positions on monitoring, women’s rights, and worker education in 2002 may have been due to the presence of the WRC, which by extension was a part of student activists’ anti-sweatshop pursuits.

In 2002, the student anti-sweatshop movement evolved once the FLA changed its position to include external monitoring. In the absence of the original student anti-sweatshop ambition to pressure universities to adopt the WRC code because of its superior focus on monitoring, USAS turned its attention to labor issues more broadly along with other progressive causes (Featherstone, 2003). Presently, USAS chapters still exist on a number of campuses, but their activist ambitions represent a much broader set of labor and global economic concerns (USAS, 2009a).
Table 1. *Student Anti-Sweatshop Movement Timeline and Milestones*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Milestone</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Charles Kernaghan, head of the National Labor Committee, exposed celebrity Kathie Lee Gifford's Wal-Mart clothing line and its relationship to child labor in Honduran sweatshops</td>
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<td>Summer 1996</td>
<td>John Sweeney, President of the AFL-CIO announced the Union Summer internships to train college students in union organizing</td>
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<td>August 1996</td>
<td>Clinton Administration formed the Apparel Industry Partnership to look into problem of sweatshop labor in the apparel industry</td>
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<td>June 1997</td>
<td>Duke University student activists challenged the administration to take action against apparel vendors for labor abuses</td>
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<td>September 1998</td>
<td>ACLU and co-sponsors from various campus student legal groups filed a legal petition against the US Department of Labor complaining of the hypocritical nature of dismissing domestic sweatshop abuses while trying to alleviate international ones</td>
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<td>March 1999</td>
<td>The White House sponsored Apparel Industry Partnerships group recruited 17 campuses to start the Fair Labor Association to oversee the conditions of apparel factories</td>
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<td></td>
<td>American Council on Education (ACE) issued letters to 1,800 member campuses, cautioning their response to student activism (Stan Ikenberry advised that the FLA is sufficient coverage to allay concerns regarding sweatshops in collegiate apparel manufacturing)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spring 1999</td>
<td>University of Michigan adopted the most stringent code of conduct for apparel vendors to date, and sets the bar for responding to sweatshop concerns</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 1999</td>
<td>USAS organized a meeting in Washington D.C. with college student activists; over 100 campuses present; attendees protest on the steps of the U.S. Department of Labor</td>
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<td>Fall 1999</td>
<td>The <em>Independent University Initiative</em> began: Harvard, University of California, University of Michigan, Ohio State University, and the University of Notre Dame commissioned a report to provide a summary of the status of labor conditions in apparel factories in nine countries. Price Waterhouse</td>
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Coopers selected as auditing firm; with additional independent auditors selected as well - the Business for Social Responsibility Education Fund of San Francisco, the Investor Responsibility Research Center of Washington, D.C., and Massachusetts Institute of Technology environmental policy Asst. Prof. Dara O'Rourke

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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tr>
<td>October 1999</td>
<td>Nike disclosed factory locations; first major label to do so The USAS published a 'Workers Rights Consortium' Document- includes a demand for better wages, public disclosure of factory locations, and independent external monitoring. This document was basically a plan for an improved alternative to the Fair Labor Association's code of labor standards.</td>
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<tr>
<td>November 1999</td>
<td>Seattle World Trade Organization, Ministerial Conference of 1999, protest - with emphasis on anti-sweatshop sentiments; included campus participants</td>
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<td>March &amp; April 2000</td>
<td>Nike questioned contracts with campuses adopting WRC code; terminated Brown U. hockey team contract, suspended negotiations with U. of Michigan for a contract renewal; Nike CEO Phil Knight suspended his personal philanthropy toward the University of Oregon</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spring 2000</td>
<td>Nike sponsored a trip abroad to 41 factories for 10-11 selected college students; students write a report of their findings</td>
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<tr>
<td>February 2000</td>
<td>Stan Ikenberry of the American Council on Education sent a letter to all two and four-year college presidents endorsing the FLA</td>
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<td></td>
<td>In a deliberately coordinated act, three Big Ten schools signed on to the WRC, the U. of Michigan, U. of Wisconsin, and Indiana U. – they agree to be members provisionally provided that the WRC move towards making a difference with its approach to monitoring</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 2000</td>
<td>Workers Rights Consortium founding meeting held in New York, NY</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 2000</td>
<td>Washington D.C. protest outside the World Bank &amp; International Monetary Fund meeting. Students attended rallying for the anti-sweatshop cause.</td>
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<tr>
<td>September 2000</td>
<td>Economic, Legal, and Trade Scholars authored letter to university presidents to encourage them to hesitate before responding to student activists' challenges</td>
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</table>
October 2000  | Price Waterhouse Coopers audit published the Independent University Initiative report. Their findings document labor and worker abuses in apparel factories in 9 different countries (report was the product of a year of study, and commissioned by the University of California, Harvard, Notre Dame, Ohio State University, and the University of Michigan)

The Verite report published. It evaluated the labor standards implementation of five apparel vendors (report commissioned by Boston College, Duke University, Georgetown University, UNC-Chapel Hill, the University of Southern California, and UW-Madison).

December 2000  | Workers Rights Consortium named executive director

January 2001  | The Worker's Rights Consortium sent a team on a fact finding mission to Mexico, and found many labor abuses

Spring 2002  | FLA adopted more consistent guidelines for its codes of conduct and monitoring to better match the WRC processes, even though organizational structures remain different

Background Literature Regarding the Anti-Sweatshop Movement on Campuses

Recently, Van Dyke, Dixon, and Carlon (2007) placed a sociological lens on student anti-sweatshop mobilization as a context for looking at the under-explored phenomenon of how discontent can be encouraged via professionalized and bureaucratic social movement organizations (a phenomenon first described by McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Zald & McCarthy, 1987). Van Dyke and her colleagues used the student anti-sweatshop movement as an instance of a situation where grassroots actors were not collectively mobilizing their individual common grievances, based on the authors’ view that “students would probably not directly benefit from the implementation of labor reforms such as anti-sweatshop policies” (p. 198). Van Dyke et al. argued that the anti-
sweatshop movement activism that took place on campuses in the late 1990s and early 2000s was largely attributable to the AFL-CIO’s concerted efforts to get college students involved in labor issues. The specific tool the AFL-CIO used was the Union Summer internship program. Van Dyke et al. utilized a channeling argument (Eskridge, 2001; Jenkins, 1998; Jenkins & Eckert, 1986), or an explanation that assumes that a group attempts to control or exploit a movement for its own benefit, by directing its resources in such a way to achieve these ends. In the case of the anti-sweatshop movement, the AFL-CIO amplified its agenda by putting its resources into training college students as labor organizers, with the subsequent effect of encouraging students to engage in labor advocacy surrounding the textile industry.

Van Dyke and her collaborators used a logistic model to examine predictors related to the formation of a USAS campus chapter, and to the occurrence of student protest. They found that basic campus demographics (enrollment size, institutional type, urbanicity of a campus) were generally not predictive of protest, but the presence of a chapter of USAS and having a Students for Democratic Society (SDS) chapter in the mid-1960s did predict protest. Particularly interesting was that after controlling for the presence of a USAS chapter, campus participation in the AFL-CIO’s Union Summer program did not have an effect on student protest.

Although, the Van Dyke et al.’s study was useful in terms of advancing sociological social movement theory, it did not include some of the essential features of the institutional context of higher education organizations that are critically important to understanding student mobilization and the educational contexts that may support mobilization. I contend that the authors’ assumption that students did not stand to
directly benefit from their collegiate apparel anti-sweatshop activism is based on a narrow definition of motivational frames for social movement activity. While students certainly would not yield any benefit from an hourly wage increase since they were not making the apparel themselves, that certainly did not mean that students didn’t have a very personal stake in their claims making. One of the student leaders in the anti-sweatshop movement at the University of North Carolina- Chapel Hill, Marion Traub-Werner, described her sense of students’ motivations to become involved in the anti-sweatshop movement on her campus:

USAS focuses on direct links to the university and uses student leverage to influence labor conditions. It attracts students because they can feel that their actions are making a concrete change. In some way, the USAS movement builds on the student/consumer paradigm. USAS seeks to construct the student as the ultimate conscientious consumer. And we want the university to be responsible. (Traub-Werner quoted in Krupat, 2002, p. 119)

Traub-Werner’s comments suggest that students do see a substantial benefit from mobilizing and asserting their power. The benefit they seek to obtain is a type of truth in advertising that universities must fulfill. University communities regularly claim they are concerned with ethical and moral action, contributing to the common good, excellence, academic integrity, and embracing diverse perspectives (Dey & Associates, 2008), as a result, any incongruent action taken by the university becomes an opportunity to call it to account. Fostering a collective sense of personal and social responsibility is a hallmark of universities’ institutional identities. Thus, as Traub-Werner described, students saw the inconsistencies between rhetoric and action as an opportunity to make change for the better and to ask their communities to live up to their publicly espoused standards. Van Dyke et al., describe students as being conscience constituents (J. D. McCarthy & Zald, 1977) in the anti-sweatshop movement cause with the implied understanding that being a
conscience constituent, rather than the directly aggrieved party, relegates students to that of a secondary stakeholder.

Additionally, Van Dyke et al.’s finding that USAS chapters, and a prior history of student activism on campus (the SDS variable) predicted student protest, appear to speak to the educational climate on campus. Campuses that have USAS chapters can be construed as possessing educational characteristics which create college contexts that foster civic engagement in ways that are conducive to global understanding, social justice, and political efficacy. Similarly, a history of past activism as a predictor for subsequent action can be construed as evidence of the enduring characteristics in the university’s educational environment that are friendly to student collective mobilization. These are both alternative explanations worthy of further exploration. When the Van Dyke et al. findings are considered in light of these alternative explanations, the manufactured dissent argument (on the part of the AFL-CIO) that Van Dyke et al. espouse (by virtue of the significance of the Union Summer variable) is subjected to some scrutiny. When the campus contexts variables enter their model (USAS chapters and past activism), the manufactured dissent responsibility shifts from the external environment (AFL-CIO) to internal campus causes. Thus, these results give preliminary credence to the idea that a campus context that supports activist ideas, skills, and resources can foster students’ mobilization tendencies.

Aside from Van Dyke and her colleagues, a few other researchers have focused on universities as situating contexts for anti-sweatshop movement activity, but only a handful of researchers have incorporated aspects of the campus educational context. Einwohner and Spencer’s (2005) study touched on the consequences of a local university
culture and variations in student mobilization. They used campus newspaper data from two campuses to argue that local campus culture with its specific normative values shaped the manner in which student activism was enacted. Their research demonstrated that the manner in which campus leaders characterize problems leads to different tactical approaches in the way students mobilized. Their findings were novel in the sense that they were able to observe an instance where the overall mobilization claims were essentially the same but the contentions were different. One campus viewed the sweatshop issue as a moral concern that students and campus leaders as a group would take responsibility for remedying, and the other campus viewed the sweatshop issue as a bureaucratic and financial concern that administrators would deal with rationally. Interestingly, in both cases, the movement goals and outcomes were the same – both campuses joined the WRC – but the authors speculated that the manner in which the sweatshop problem was given meaning according to each local university culture may have had a differential effect on whether students would subsequently chose to take action on controversial issues.

Recently there have been a few other efforts to elucidate campus anti-sweatshop mobilization dynamics (DeWinter-Schmitt, 2007; Ginter, 2003; Ono, 2002). The challenge with each of these efforts was the limitations inherent to the research designs of the studies. All three of these analyses relied on a case study format with a participant observation data gathering approach. This research design has limited usefulness for comparing student mobilization phenomenon across cases. Even so, Ono’s (2002) study is helpful by virtue of the manner in which he observed that the local university context rendered the student mobilization efforts unsustainable. Among the factors he cited
included the commuter setting of the university, the students’ weak identification to Georgia State University, the lack of a progressive political culture on campus, and the lack of a structure for the anti-sweatshop group as a campus organization to secure economic resources.

Summary

In the existing literature that considers the student anti-sweatshop movement in depth, there are a few difficulties. First, the sociologically oriented literature appears to not approach the topic in a manner that fully suits the unique institutional context of higher education. However, the sociological literature employs a methodology that allows one to make cross case comparisons, which is important when thinking about the manner in which student activism influences the field of higher education. By comparison, the higher education student anti-sweatshop literature follows the trend of much of the other contemporary literature on student activism in higher education (Quaye, 2007; Rhoads, 1997, 1998a, 1998c, 2003; Rhoads & Mina, 2001; Rhoads, Saenz, & Carducci, 2005), in the sense that it tends to explore a solitary case in-depth. The case approach is useful, but it is limited in the extent to which research implications for the administrative practice of higher education can be broadly applied. Moreover, the research described above has made important contributions to theory and our understanding of social movement phenomenon; nevertheless, it serves as only a beginning to accessing the unique contemporary dynamics of socially-responsible campus mobilization.
CHAPTER III
SUPPORTING LITERATURE AND THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

This chapter provides an overview of the major theoretical elements that inform my conceptual approach for this study. I begin with a brief overview of organizational theory as an access point for considering an organizational phenomenon that is situated in a unique institutionalized setting. I then provide details describing higher education as a particular type of social institution, one which prefaces its legitimacy upon conducting its activities in a socially-responsible manner. Following the details regarding higher education as the institutionalized setting for my study, my discussion turns sharply to a review of important theoretical considerations regarding the study of social movements. I coalesce these elements into a presentation of a model that informs my approach to this research.

Organizational Level Analyses

Traditionally, organizational analyses have been used for evaluating observable phenomena within and across organizations, including their structures, functions, and resources; the mechanism and unique features of organizational life (McAdam & Scott, 2005). Historically, organizational analyses have relied on three broad perspectives, the rational, natural, and open systems views (Scott, 2003). Rational perspectives emphasized technical functions, formal roles, and organization goals used to maximize organizational efficiency; natural systems perspectives focused less on formal hierarchy
and structure and more on the actual activity of the organization, even if it diverges from formal processes; and open systems built on the rational and natural systems perspectives and invited analysis that valued the influence of environmental factors on organizational and field level activities (Scott, 2003). Scott describes open systems perspectives as those theoretical positions that view “organizations [as] congeries of interdependent flows and activities linking shifting coalitions of participants embedded in wider material-resource and institutional environments” (Scott, p. 29).

**Institutions as a Situating Context for Research**

*Institutional theory.* Emerging from the open systems perspective, institutional theory gained considerable attention as an inclusive perspective that is tremendously useful for understanding organizational phenomenon. The institutional theoretical perspective reified a view of organizations as having formal structures that were concomitant with a picture of rationalized bureaucratic processes (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1975). In addition to its structural interpretation of organizations, institutional theory also gained prominence for the degree to which it affirmed the influence of the environment on the organization or its field (Scott, 1991; 2003). Scott noted that flexibility in interpretation coupled with an awareness of environmental influences makes the institutional theoretical frame a productive lens for explaining internal and external dynamics, competing ideas that influence organizational action, and resource acquisition, reliance, or use (Scott, 1975; 1991).

*Neoinstitutional theory.* Meyer and Rowan (1977) were particularly influential in expanding institutional theory and contributed to the framing of new institutionalism. Their scholarship built upon former interpretations of institutionalism and placed greater
emphasis on the role of culture and shared cognitive systems in explaining organizational behaviors and activities. Meyer and Rowan stressed how taken-for-granted “rules, understandings, and meanings attached to institutionalized social structures” (Meyer & Rowan, p. 343) contribute to the norms of rationality used to dictate organizational structure and legitimacy. They noted that organizations’ positions, policies, and programs produce rationalized myths, and that these myths emerged from diverse sources such as the educational process, social prestige, legal and legislative processes, public opinion, elites, professions, ideology, accreditation and certification, regulatory policies, and government among others (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1991). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) further expanded on institutional theory by emphasizing the coercive, mimetic, and normative isomorphic pressures organizations are subjected to from their institutional environments. In their view, it is incumbent on organizations to conform to these three types of environmental forces to maintain their organizational legitimacy and thus continue to survive. Coercive pressure is emitted by powerful actors such as the state, mimetic pressure emerges when marquis or successful organizations adopt practices which other similar organizations feel compelled to copy, and normative pressure has typically been thought to come from constituent groups who desire to assert control over organizations (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Rojas, 2003). In each of these contexts, the isomorphic pressures are imbued with particular cultural meanings that exceed rational theories of efficiency because legitimacy is born from a more complex dynamic of environmentally embedded meanings (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977).
Scott (2001) has further advanced neoinstitutional theory with the idea that the work and activities of organizations manifest according to cognitive, normative, and regulative constraints present in their institutional environments. These three features impose taken-for-granted meanings onto the social interactions that organizations engage in (Scott, 2001). Of these three aspects of organizations, some scholars have emphasized the importance of normative pressures present in institutional environments as having a particular role in specifying how organizations understand and enact social responsibility (Bieri & Boli, 2011; Marquis, Glynn, & Davis, 2007). Lee (2011) suggests that normative pressures for organizations to behave in a socially-responsible fashion, are likely to emerge from constituent or stakeholder groups in the institutional environment who are especially good at reflecting institutional values. Scott (2007) argues that the cognitive, normative, and regulative influences inherent to the institutional landscape are what dictate the social fitness of an organization, and thus operate to provide stability and consistency in institutional fields over time and across contexts.

The Institution of Higher Education

The precise relevance of the neoinstitutional perspective in my analysis is that I am centrally interested in higher education as a particular social institution that is of special consideration when studying social movement action. Higher education is a novel social institution that derives its legitimacy on its field-level commitments (Lounsbury & Pollack, 2001) to excellence, integrity, ethical conduct, and moral authority in the broader society. In fact, higher education as a social institution has gleaned its legitimacy prefaced on its ability and duty to foster citizenship and cultivate individual character among its members (Gumport, 2000).
Colleges and universities have become explicit about their socially-responsible aims and intended outcomes, employing missions that aspire to produce citizens who can “be people of integrity possessed of a sense of responsibility to society . . . . [with] a sense of humanity as well as a commitment to the common good with a conviction that there is something more important than oneself” (Thomas, 2002, p. 30). In other words, it has come to be widely understood that the metaphorical ‘public charter’ of higher education is centrally prefaced on educating the community for civic engagement (Kezar, 2004).

At a very cursory level, the civic engagement ideal for higher education is inextricably linked to an assumption about the collective benefit derived from a skillful, well-informed, broadly, and liberally educated society; the essential argument amounts to the idea that society as a whole prospers because educated people possess critical, analytical, and problem solving skills, and the ability to synthesize and evaluate information with sensitivity towards multiple political, moral, and ethical dimensions of situations. Gumport (2000) describes these social virtues of the institution of higher education, as having been widely held historically, and as having functioned to maintain, reproduce, and legitimate the activities of colleges and universities. The role of higher education does indeed have a long history, most notably extending from the work of education’s philosophical patriarch John Dewey, with his espousal of the moral imperative for educators to prepare students for an active civic life (Dewey, 1909, 1916). Both the historical and contemporary considerations of civic engagement claim that the nature and substance of higher education brings with it a duty to act in the best interest of the community and to work consciously toward improving the conditions of society at
large. The logic is that with education, awareness and aptitude become primers for civic action.

Universities approach the task of educating students for socially-responsible civic life quite deliberately. Institutions publicly profess their aspirations and common values, providing a vision of the competencies and character traits that they’d like to cultivate in their students, similar to those views expressed below:

At Earlham College this education is carried on with a concern for the world in which we live and for improving human society. The College strives to educate morally sensitive leaders for future generations. Therefore Earlham stresses global education, peaceful resolution of conflict, equality of persons, and high moral standards of personal conduct. (Earlham College, 2011)

Miami University is a scholarly community whose members believe that a liberal education is grounded in qualities of character as well as of intellect. We respect the dignity of other persons, the rights and property of others, and the right of others to hold and express disparate beliefs. We believe in honesty, integrity, and the importance of moral conduct. We defend the freedom of inquiry that is the heart of learning and combine that freedom with the exercise of judgment and the acceptance of personal responsibility. (Miami University, 2002)

Notably, these two statements serve as two colleges’ (as organizations) endorsements of students integrating their knowledge with a broader sense of moral purpose to improve their communities in ways that respect difference and equal treatment of all people. Organizational ambitions such as these extolled in mission statements are rather generic, but also normative throughout the field of higher education (Morphew & Hartley, 2006; Ouimet & Pike, 2008). Across institutional types, Morphew and Hartley (2006) found that higher education institutions were consistently inclined to include specific educational aspirations related to diversity (on many dimensions) and cultivating civic values in their missions statements. Their study cited a great deal of variation within the construct of ‘civic values’ ranging from complying with civic duties to actively transforming society. Despite the wide variation in institutional interpretations of civic
values, Morphew and Hartley’s research provided strong support for the concept that promoting civic values and engagement however defined, and regardless of whether this aspiration is enacted purely symbolically or exercised functionally through organizational decision making, is in fact, a distinguishing characteristic of the social institution of higher education.

However, the goal of educating students for socially-responsible civic engagement is not simply conveyed through institutional rhetoric, but quite deliberately reflected in the formal structures and subtle cultures of the higher education institution. The socially-responsible values and ideals are underscored throughout colleges’ approaches to adopting curricula and course offerings and promoting an intellectually and interpersonally diverse educational atmosphere (King, 1997). The desired cumulative effect of this process is that students’ university experiences result in prompting them to acquire sufficient cognitive and interpersonal complexity to exhibit: intellectual competence for productive performance in the labor force; an understanding of the nuances of interpersonal interactions in contemporary society; and a principled philosophy of morality, which compels them to equate ethical behavior with being a competent adult (Geary Schneider & Shoenberg, 2006).

The process of educating students for social responsibility positions colleges and universities as an institutional sector comprised of organizations that have a peculiar ability to unite structural with cultural meanings to cultivate deep and enduring connections between and among members. It is often the case that on account of members’ similar experiences, goals, values, and symbols of the organizations, members develop a strong psychic affinity to their organization (Tompkins, 1986). This common
culture in higher education organizations fosters a strong sense of shared values among all members of the campus community (see Becher, 1984; Kezar & Eckel, 2002; Peterson & Spencer, 1990; Tierney, 1988). Further, as university community members continually adopt shared cultural meanings over time, the common values and goals are preserved and perpetuated through stories that stand as symbols for these meanings (Clark, 1972). For some students, the collective identity that emerges from their strong identification with the university’s espoused values and goals, prompts them to expect consistency in the university’s rhetoric and behavior as an actor.

Strong cultures invite individual connections and cultivate collective identity (Ashmore, Deaux, & McLaughlin-Volpe, 2002). Mael and Ashforth (1992) observed strong organizational identification among university members, or “the perceptions of oneness with or belongingness to an organization, where the individual defines him or herself in terms of the organization(s) in which he or she is a member” (p. 104). This concept is an extension of social identity theory, specifically collective identity (Ashmore et al., 2002), that applies to membership in a specific organization. Chase’s (2001) research demonstrated that college students exhibit common identities which mirror the university’s values and social justice ideals; and that these identities emerge out of campus “discourse, policies, curricula, organizations, and everyday practices – [and] frame possibilities for members’ actions, speech, identities, and learning” (p. 155).

The most salient quality of organizational identification is that, in the event that harm comes to the group, or its image deteriorates, members of the group experience a psychic loss to one’s self (Ashmore et al., 2002; Mael & Ashforth, 1992; Mael & Tetrick, 1992). In instances where students strongly identify with the socially-responsible
organizational ideals their institutions claim to represent through their actions and rhetoric, it is fathomable that some students would become incensed and prompted to take collective action. Further, when considering that organizational identification is distinct from organizational internalization or commitment because it combines the passion of adopting the organization’s values with the willingness to exert effort on the organization’s behalf (Mael & Ashforth, 1992; Mael & Tetrick, 1992), it is possible to see the potential for a group of conscientious and civically engaged students to perceive themselves as having a stake in the outcome of their mobilization efforts.

The idea that the context of higher education engenders a unique and powerful collective identity within its community by cultivating organizational identification lends itself well to thinking about the processual side of collective mobilization dynamics. The study of the role of collective identity in movement organizing is not new (see Holland, Fox, & Daro, 2008; S. A. Hunt & Benford, 2004; Polletta & Jasper, 2001 for a few examples), but there has been little attention to thinking about collective identity from an educational perspective. For example, if universities deliberately offer curricular and co-curricular experiences that are intended to further civic engagement aspirations among members of the campus community, universities are essentially institutions that are doing the job of developing students’ civic engagement identities through organizational processes. If campuses excel in this task, they can shape the form of the collective identity to embrace institutional values (in this example, valuing civic engagement) through the way they deliver education formally and informally in the curriculum and co-curriculum.

*Literature Regarding the Study of Social Movements*
Social movements are “the mobilization of sentiments in which people take actions to achieve change in the social structure and the allocation of value” (Zald & Useem, 1987, p. 249). While the conception of social movements has remained constant in the sense that they are still regarded as collective processes which seek social change, the explanations for movement activity have varied.

*Genesis of Movement Action*

The classical view of social movements tied movements to their members and member participation to grievances and deprivation (McCarthy & Zald, 1987). This classical view of mobilization has tended to stress individual grassroots emergent forms of collective action over other institutionalized forms (McCarthy & Zald, 1987). Presently, many sociologists regard social movement mobilization as a part of the fabric of legitimate civic activities, and claim that it has become institutionalized and thus a taken-for-granted part of participatory citizenship (Meyer & Tarrow, 1998; Schussman & Soule, 2005; Soule & Earl, 2005; Tarrow, 1998). Evidence of institutionalization of social movement ambitions abound; the proliferations of professional, non-profit, volunteer, and philanthropic associations, along with lobbyist groups have served to formalize and structurize social movements goals (McCarthy & Zald, 1987; McCarthy, 2005; Zald, Morrill, & Rao, 2005). Even so, institutionalization is not wholly prefaced by the presence of formal structures; Tarrow (1998) emphasizes that there is “no single model of movement organization” (p.135). Tarrow’s scholarship endorses Kriesi’s (1996) analysis of social movement organizations as being divided along two continua; one, that indicates the extent to which the aims of the movement are intended to influence authorities; and the other being the ‘mode of participation’ referring to the extent of
indirect or direct action on the part of the participants that seek the change. This typology is intended to be inclusive and to make theoretical space for the variety of forms of mobilization.

Moreover, collective mobilization has earned social legitimacy as both a path to and a consequence of its institutionalization. As a result, it is incumbent on the targets of collective-action claims to notice the mobilization regardless of the origins or impetus. Whether the genesis of the collective mobilization emerges from oppressed grassroots mobilizers, bureaucratic structures seeking to advance their affiliated organizational interests, or empathetic community organizers, the act of engaging in collective mobilization has become institutionalized and has firmly taken root as a legitimate mode of modern civic participation.

Analytical Perspectives

Generally speaking, there are three dominant theoretical lenses utilized in social movement analysis – political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes (Davis, McAdam, Scott, & Zald, 2005; McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996b; Morris, 2000). McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996a) regard political opportunity analysis as a manner of interpreting social movements or revolutions through the spectrum of a “broader set of political constraints and opportunities unique to the national context in which they are embedded” (p. 3); political opportunity theory often isolates the political impetus for collective social action.

Analyses that consider social movements through a framework of mobilizing structures attend to both the manner in which groups “mobilize and engage in collective action” as a function of their common grievances, and the processes of organizing
resources which is commonly referred to as resource mobilization (McAdam et al., 1996b). Mobilization as a tangible phenomenon is defined as, “the process by which a group secures collective control over the resources needed for collective action” (Jenkins, 1983). Theoretically, resource mobilization focuses squarely on the rational and purposive aspects of collective organizing, and the role that collective groups have in advancing social change objectives (Pichardo, 1988). Although resource mobilization theory initially emerged with two distinct and somewhat opposing threads, the professional operational model (McCarthy & Zald, 1977) and the political process model (McAdam, 1983); these two views have been resolved to affirm their most basic tenets, that resource mobilization inevitably involves political behavior, and groups derive their power from within institutions (Pichardo, 1988).

The third analytic perspective in social movement analysis involves framing processes, which give analytical attention to the common interpretations that social movement actors attribute to a situation. Frame analysis is often utilized to showcase the linkages between the ideas and ideologies that drive movement ambitions. Benford and Snow (2000) stress that frames are not merely static perspectives, but they are actively being shaped through the process of collective action; they write, “frames are constructed in part as movement adherents negotiate a shared understanding of some problematic condition or situation they define as in need of change, make attributions regarding who or what is to blame, articulate an alternative set of arrangements, and urge others to act in concert to affect change” (p. 615). These three prevailing conceptions of social movement phenomenon are each theoretically distinct. However, in the classical social
movement perspective, mobilizing structures coincide with political opportunity, and framing processes fuel the claims.

**Critiques**

In recent years, some (Campbell, 2005; Morris, 2000) have argued that the strong emphasis on the political process model of resource mobilization, which is typical in social movement scholarship, has underestimated the force of the organizational dimensions of collective action by relying on rationalistic biases. Morris notes that:

> The political process model has largely ignored the central role that a challenging group’s agency-laden institutions and frame lifting, leadership configurations, tactical solutions, protest histories, and transformative events play in producing and sustaining collective action. . . . When these factors are discussed, they are conceptualized as movement dynamics rather than as independent triggers of collective action. (p. 447)

Morris (2000) claims that presumed biases have undermined the objective evaluations of mobilization phenomenon in a thorough manner since many assessments have tended to assume that mobilization is “discontinuous with institutional and organizational behavior” (p. 445). Campbell (2005) reinforces Morris’ critique noting that much of the social movement literature has overlooked mechanisms that link political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes to outcomes. Likewise, McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001) suggest that future research should explore a broader range of mechanisms that could more fully explain the path to collective mobilization, and that scholars consider whether there are additional mechanisms that are constitutive of each of the traditional analytical lenses.

Currently, the theoretical space for explaining collective mobilization mechanisms is expanding in ways that account for the reality that activism emerges amidst the imposing culture of enduring institutions. In particular, scholarship on protest
participation has begun to illuminate the processual side of mobilization that concerns the microstructural and social-psychological dimensions of activism (Diani, 2004; Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta, 2004; S. A. Hunt & Benford, 2004; Klandermans, 2004; Kurzman, 2008; Polletta & Jasper, 2001; Schussman & Soule, 2005; Snow, 2004). Kurzman points out that the mobilization emerges within contexts or institutional settings that shape people’s understanding and worldviews, which ultimately functions as a resource that may spark action or contestation. The meanings that people ascribe in contentious social movements are especially revealing of the dominant norms and world views that lead actors to their:

Moral understandings of right and wrong, cognitive understandings of true and false, and perceptual understandings of like and unlike, social understandings of identity and difference, aesthetic understandings of attractive and repulsive, and any other understandings that we may choose to identify through our own academic processes of meaning-making. (Kurzman, 2008, p. 1)

Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta (2004) further extend the idea that social movement action can be catalyzed by contextual meanings perpetuated and sustained within institutions, as they describe moral emotions in social movements as being reflective of cultural variations and indicators of “complex cognitive understandings and moral awareness, reflecting our comprehension of the world around us and sometimes of our place in it” (p. 422).

Klandermans (2004) underscores Kurzman (2008) and Goodwin et al.’s (2004) points about activists’ meaning-making with a more systematic depiction of the social-psychological processes of collective mobilization. He describes the dynamics of mobilization including a demand side and a supply side. The demand side acknowledges that actors are embedded in their communities and their interests are conditioned by its history, such that any feelings of moral indignation or injustice are a function of the
institutional context, individual and collective identities, and the social construction of emotions. Klandermans further explains that social movements become carriers of meaning and tend to situate their claims in a manner that builds on ideologies which correspond to broader cultural themes and values. The supply side of mobilization attends to more structural matters of movement organizing, historical legitimacy, skillfulness, and viability of tactics in a given society or community (Klandermans, 2004). When demand and supply meet, mobilization ensues. Moreover, Klandermans claims that it is only when the demand and supply sides, or structural and processual aspects, of mobilization are considered that one can improve upon the existing explanatory mechanisms of the dynamics of collective action.

**Underlying Theoretical Concerns**

Amidst the differing origins of social movement pursuits, analytical frames, and critiques of social movement action are fundamental, and at times contrasting, views on theories of collective action. First and foremost there are imposing realities in contemporary movements that must be addressed, such as the institutionalization of social movement action as a legitimate mode of civic participation, one which is available to an array of actors, such as grassroots organizers who stand to personally benefit if claims are met, intermediary professional staffers facilitating the mission of a bureaucratic organization, and third-party advocates for a community cause. Each of these circumstances commands the acknowledgement that collective action can and will occur in organizational and institutional contexts; and thus has prompted critics to invite renewed considerations of social movement phenomena that extend and link traditional analytical approaches.
Scholars are also concerned with creating stronger ties between movement
dynamics to outcomes. This interest in outcomes is often couched in the growing number
of contemporary examples where social movements have been pursued by professional
advocacy organizations or third-party empathetic actors (embedded in institutionalized
contexts), under the shroud of justification as being pursued for the sake of the public or
common good. Understanding, the public good rationale of social movement action,
including understanding mobilization when it represents a particular idealized version of
what is in the common interest, calls upon scholars and researchers to revisit the
fundamental explanations for collective action in the name of the public good.

The foundational writing on this issue is Mancur Olson’s (1965); he forever tied
the idea that people acting in cooperation to foster some public good presents a
theoretical dilemma. Olson’s argument, prefaced by his rational and utilitarian economic
background, lead him to conclude that rational people tend not to take action to help
support the public good since those goods once secured will be available to all. He
argued that there must be some incentive exclusive to the group to inspire its members to
act on behalf of the public good, collective action was a matter of the individual’s cost
benefit calculation. Ferree (1992) describes Olson’s theory as overly individualistic,
citing instances of movement action where actors did not personally benefit, but rather
placed some intrinsic value on the social movement goals.

Even though many scholars have scrutinized, tested, and responded to Olsen’s
theory, questions about collective action in the name of the public good remain. For
example, Williams (1995) articulates three prominent cultural rhetorical frames, each of
which describe an idealized conception of the public good. He points out that actors
using these public good rationales fuel modern social movement ambitions, and are largely acting in a manner than exceed the personal benefit logic of collective action. Williams goes on to explain [as Klandermans (2004), Kurzman (2008), and Goodwin et al. (2004) have argued as well] that social movements built on a ‘common good’ meaning or justification in organizational and institutionalized settings operate under a set of internal dynamics (similar to the demand or processual side previously described). These cultural or internal dynamics recombine and moderate the more structural or supply side/external modes of social movement analysis. Moreover, additional research is necessary to better understand and scrutinize the intersection of internal/external and processual/structural side of movement dynamics, especially in a contemporary political and cultural landscape where the justification/ motivation for collective action is increasingly prompted by the pursuit of collective benefits such as the common good, rather than individual gain.

*Conceptual Approach to Research*

Throughout my study, I have deliberately designed it to address the structural and the processual dynamics of collective mobilization, and I have attempted to build on existing social movement theory by focusing on the organizational aspects of these dynamics. In a recent empirical study that also sought to improve the theoretical explanations for structural and processual movement dynamics, the analysis was limited to the individual dimension (Schussman & Soule, 2005). The study concluded by calling for future research examining the organizational contexts in which mobilization takes place to better specify the mediating effects of varying opportunities for political engagement and structural availability for mobilizing.
In this study, I am considering student mobilization as emerging from varying campus contexts according to: their traditions and history regarding past mobilizations, their specific organizational approach to fostering a campus climate that embraces civic engagement lessons and models to different degrees; and their traditional structural compositions (such as size, selectivity, student body characteristics). I assert that the varying civic engagement efforts of campuses are a reflection of the dominant cultural norms and meanings that students’ are immersed in, on account of their organizational settings. These dominant norms are more and less effective in establishing a baseline for moral awareness and civic-mindedness within educational communities, and thus function to influence the extent of and manner in which students (actors) mobilize.

In my quantitative analyses, I operationalize some of the constructs inherent in cultivating a community which values social responsibility and civic engagement. In this portion of the study, I hypothesize that the greater extent to which a campus embraces curricular and co-curricular civic engagement educational efforts, the greater the likelihood that the campus will engage in collective mobilization. In the qualitative portions of my study, I take a more in-depth approach to understanding the features of contemporary campus movement dynamics, by exploring the extent to which student activists implicitly or tacitly ascribe structural and/or processual meanings as a foundation for framing their movement activities. I use a frame analysis to tap into the contextualized meanings perpetuated within campuses, and the extent to which student activists construe their activism as being an extension of their membership in their campus community.

Model
Figure 1 provides a graphic model depicting the impetus for contemporary student collective action as a function of the campus organizational context, mediated by its movement vulnerability. Operating alongside the local campus context are various dimensions of movement vulnerability both internal to campus and externally derived. Movement vulnerability is typically characterized as how susceptible an institution is to delegitimation (B. King, 2008; Luders, 2006; Micheletti & Stolle, 2008; Walker, Martin, & McCarthy, 2008). I contend there are two types of internal social movement vulnerability that contemporary campuses are subjected to, thus exerting important influences over the extent to which a campus will mobilize around a salient issue; these are structural and processual vulnerabilities. The structural vulnerability of an institution is evaluated by the amount of risk that an institution assumes as consequence of its material resources, (in)actions, policies, or practices directly related to the matter of interest. In the case of this study the key structural vulnerability related to the anti-sweatshop movement manifests as the level of financial expenditure on athletics. The greater the spending, the greater the chances that a campus deeply embroiled in the athletic apparel industry will face the threat of sweatshop conditions emerging as a problem in the manner that their logoed apparel is manufactured.

Admittedly, campuses are potentially structurally vulnerable to social movement activity on account of other structural features as well. These structural characteristics can range from anything such as the formalized leadership hierarchy on campus, the institutionalized policies and practices of the institution; and for this issue in particular social movement, the campus administrative approach for managing the logo and

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2 The campus characteristics included in this conceptual model, such as size, selectivity, types, and the demographic composition of students, are certainly structural features or the organization (campus) as well.
Figure 1. A Model of Contemporary Movement Action in Colleges and Universities

**Organizational Level Forces: Campus Characteristics and Contexts**

**Internal Organizational Characteristics:**
- Campus history and/or culture of prior activism
- Campus compositional characteristics
- Campus curricula and Co-curriculum

**Movement Vulnerability**
- **INTERNAL**
  - Structural Vulnerability:
    - (Campus Athletic Expenditures)
  - Processual Vulnerability:
    - (Commonly held contextualized meanings and perceptions or moral indignation and injustice)

**EXTERNAL**
- Institutional Environmental Vulnerability
  - (AFL-CIO Intervention)

**Outcome:**
- Collective Action

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**Intermediary (Field-level) Forces:** Peer campuses, higher education organizations, organizational partners/colleagues

**External (Institutional environment) Forces:**
- Community groups (labor, religion, etc.);
- Domestic and international law and policies;
- Corporate behaviors, professional or advocacy organizations
college/university identity. For this study, I have limited my conception of structural vulnerability to essentially a measure of resource dependency relative to the anti-sweatshop movement, which is the campus athletic expenditures. This approach is typical of research which is centrally concerned with collective action. Further, as I will discuss in Chapter IX, I explored the idea of including data the campus administrative approach to logo management, but the data quality for such a measure was suspect.

*Processual vulnerability* is the relative risk of delegitimation on account of the contextual meanings perpetuated and sustained within institutions. The overall processual vulnerability is the culminating impact of an organization’s sustained approach to disseminating or imparting its values and ideals either explicitly or implicitly, such that it engages in the collective social construction of what is normatively perceived as social injustice or moral outrage. Campuses generate these meaning through their rhetoric and via the curriculum, co-curriculum, the relevance of the historical context to contemporary actions, and the normative understanding of who comprises the campus community (i.e. the outcome of particular enrollment patterns).

Both structural and processual vulnerability manifest as institutional dynamics; these vulnerabilities are internal or localized to the field of organizations (campuses in this case). There are also other types of movement vulnerability that institutions are subjected to, such as external vulnerability emanating from the institutional environment. In the case of the student anti-sweatshop movement, the external movement vulnerability comes namely from an external advocacy organization (the AFL-CIO) with a vested interest in the outcome of the overall global labor movement. In the model, I have also situated the field-level and institutional-level environmental forces as features which
exert pressure or influence on the campus as an organization, but visually I have depicted their presence as peripheral or external, since my study focuses more pointedly on the organizational features of campuses rather than these other types of influences.

Each campus to some degree knowingly (or unknowingly) generates a degree of vulnerability for student collective action, structurally, processually, or both. Thus, for campuses that do not mobilize, the model would imply that their campus movement vulnerability was insufficient to yield such a result. It is also important to note that this model showcases the act of collectively organizing as the outcome, rather than an outcome of realizing particular movement ambitions. For civic engagement advocates and educators, providing a collegiate ‘experience’ that results with students organizing their communities to act in institutionally resonant ways is in and of itself a desirable educational outcome. This act of taking collective socially-responsible civic action, in effect, could be construed as the pièce de résistance of contemporary higher education institutional values.
CHAPTER IV

METHODOLOGY

Research Design

Broadly speaking, I seek to understand student collective action at the organizational or campus level to ascribe the appropriate unit of analysis necessary to move beyond the individual outcome emphasis that has dominated the scholarship in this area. I am also interested in conducting a study that is theoretically and methodologically relevant to both the study of higher education and to the broader field of social movement scholarship. Further, I desire to overcome the one-dimensional nature of much of the student activism scholarship in higher education so that I can make comparisons across cases which are nuanced and detailed, and can further enrich the practical importance of my study. With these objectives in mind, my methodological approach incorporates both quantitative and qualitative data collection and analytical strategies, and utilizes multiple data sets. Moreover my study is a mixed-method one. By definition, a mixed-method research design is:

The class of research where the researcher mixes or combines quantitative and qualitative research techniques, methods, approaches, concepts or language into a single study. . . . Its logic of inquiry includes the use of induction (or discovery patterns), deduction (testing of theories and hypotheses), and abduction (uncovering and relying on the best of a set of explanations for understanding one’s results. (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 17)

My use of a mixed-method approach is intended to capitalize on the strengths inherent to each method. Using a quantitative approach allows the researcher to evaluate the
probability of an event and generate subsequent predictions; and the qualitative approach allows the research to scrutinize the context of an event in order to gain valuable insights into the meanings and attributes embedded in said context (Creswell & Garrett, 2008). When these methods are utilized in tandem, the results generated can provide insights that speak to organizational practice as well as the social and cultural dynamics that shape practice (Croninger & Valli, 2009).

Essentially, my study incorporates a concurrent embedded research design where the sequencing of the quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis phases occur simultaneously with one another (Creswell, 2003; Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). The primary method driving my study is a quantitative approach, where I perform bivariate and multivariate analyses on a random sample of four-year U.S. institutions. I embed qualitative procedures within the context of the quantitative aspects of the study. For example, I use qualitative analysis to transform newspaper article data into a numeric form suitable for quantitative analyses. However, I do not stop my qualitative analyses with the data transformation, I also use the qualitative newspaper data I collected as a secondary data source to perform a qualitative frame analysis.

The timing of each of these quantitative and qualitative procedures occurs concurrently, such that the findings and analyses inform and shape my interpretations of the data. In the process of progressing through my mixed-method research design, I also pursue additional analyses to augment and improve my understanding of the results. Therefore, I have embedded an additional quantitative analysis in my study as a means of enriching the findings from my primary and secondary methods. This layered and iterative approach to mixing the methods to enhance the interpretation of the data is
Creswell (2003) specifically highlights the resource intensiveness of a research strategy such as mine, which I will concur is, in fact, true. That said, I believe it is important to note that a crucial tool in pursuing this research design involved the efforts of many capable and hard working research assistants. In particular, five talented undergraduate students assisted me for two years to carry the numerous components out my study. Their assistance afforded me the opportunity to employ the concurrent embedded strategy.

In the following sections, I will discuss my approach to sampling, and describe the data in my samples. To aid the reader in the following presentation of information, I will present information about two data sets; one I will refer to as the collective-action (CA) sample, and the second I will refer to as the recruitment-participation (RP) sample. I will provide details about all the dependent and independent measures I utilized in all my quantitative models. In addition to providing information about the primary and secondary sources I used to construct my data sets, I will provide important details about the selection of these variables as important to understanding campus collective action, along with the student anti-sweatshop movement from 1998 – 2002. I will then detail the quantitative analytical procedures I employed along with the qualitative techniques I utilized for the content analysis portions of my study.

---

3The following students from the University of Michigan Undergraduate Research Opportunity Program (UROP) worked on my research team: Kathryn J. Burt (September 2009-April 2010); Rohan Dharan (September 2010-April 2011); Matthew Merlo (September 2010-April 2011); Megan Pratt (September 2009 – April 2011); and Paul Schreiber (September 2010-April 2011).
Figure 2. Convergent Embedded Mixed-Method Diagram Examining Student Activism

**Quantitative**
Collective Action Data (N=149)

**Goal**: Predict campus collective action

**Procedure**: Collect data primary & secondary sources

**Analysis**: Bivariate and multivariate

**Qualitative**
Collective Action Data (N=149)

**Task #1**

**Goal**: Data transformation

**Procedure**: Collect all newspaper articles regarding sweatshop mobilization for 149 campuses

**Analysis**: Review content, code dummy to signify sweatshop mobilization (23 / 149)

**Task #2**

**Goal**: Data transformation

**Procedure**: Collect all newspaper articles regarding '97-'98 (non-sweatshop) mobilization for 149 campuses

**Analysis**: Review content, code dummy to signify mobilization

---

**SECONDARY METHOD**

**Quantitative**
Recruitment-Participation Data (N=1245)

**Goal**: Predict campus AFL-CIO involvement as additional explanation for mobilization process

**Procedure**: Collect data from secondary data sources

**Analysis**: Bivariate and multivariate

**Qualitative**
Collective Action Data/Mobilized Campuses (N=23)

**Goal**: Analyze Students’ Enactment and Understanding of Mobilization

**Procedure**: Qualitative analysis of 638 articles describing the mobilization on 23 campuses

**Analysis**: Content & frame analysis, open-coding

---

**Embedded Method**
Data and Samples

As I stated above, I utilize two data sets in my study, although the more prominent of the two is the collective-action (CA) data set, rather than the recruitment-participation (RP) data set. The CA sample is my primary data set and consists of 149 campuses. This data set includes information on a vast array of variables that are essential for understanding both contemporary campus mobilization and the student anti-sweatshop movement in particular. The measures unique to this data set include information about student anti-sweatshop mobilization (between 1998–2002), along with variables accounting for campus civic engagement interventions. The variables in the CA data set describe: 1) the history and background of campus activism; 2) the relationship of the campus to the broader anti-sweatshop movement; and 3) the compositional characteristics of campuses (control variables). This data set also includes the primary variables of interest, those being the civic engagement educational strategies implemented via the curriculum and the co-curriculum. In addition to the groupings of variables listed above (which will be described in precise detail below), the CA data set also includes a secondary set of qualitative data set consisting of 638 newspaper articles describing the campus mobilization that emerged within the CA sample.

The recruitment-participation (RP) data set includes these aforementioned three clusters of variables (history, connection to sweatshop movement, campus controls), and excludes the curricular and co-curricular educational intervention variables. Beyond the differences in the composition of variables in the data sets, the greatest point of departure of the RP data set (compared to the CA sample) is that it features a larger number of campuses. In fact, the RP sample consists of the universe of four-year public and private
institutions who offer some form of intercollegiate athletics, or the group of campuses to which I would like to generalize my findings from the CA sample. I chose to generate the RP sample to better evaluate and conceptualize the role of the broader anti-sweatshop movement, which in turn was used to better inform my interpretations of the CA data. (I will elaborate on these details later in this chapter.) Moreover, I have used these two data sets together in this solitary study to enhance the quality of the findings.

Collective-Action Data

The collective-action data was drawn from the universe of campuses of all U.S. four-year public and private (non-profit) institutions (N=2177) retrieved from the National Center for Education Statistics Integrated Post-secondary Educational Data System for the year 2000. However, given that the specific campus mobilization in which I have situated my study (the student anti-sweatshop movement) took issue with university branded apparel that was either purchased in large quantities by the institution or marketed widely to the public for profit, I chose to select a sample from a population of campuses that reflected these functional realities while respecting the universe of schools to which I desired to make generalizations. Consequently, I developed my sampling strategy to elicit appropriate random variation, but to also provide consistency on one very important criterion; that being, that all campuses in my sample must possess an acknowledged stake in the apparel industry, a key criterion to control for when using the apparel industry as the situating context for exploring campus variations in campus activism.

From the 2177 four-year institutions, I reduced this group of U.S. institutions to include all campuses that participated in intercollegiate athletics of some kind, which
reduced this group to 1359 campuses. Effectively, I used intercollegiate athletic campuses as a way of identifying campuses with a vested and sustained interest in university logoed apparel. I then limited the group of 1359 campuses to include only those that fielded either a football or men’s basketball team and belonged to the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), which left 1020 campuses remaining. My decision to restrict the group of campus from which I would draw a random sample to only NCAA football and men’s basketball campuses, is motivated by the expectations that: 1) these institutions have a substantial stake in the apparel issue since these teams had a greater potential to compete in the high profile athletic championships (NCAA March Madness basketball tournaments, football post-season bowl games) and had greater notoriety, which both tend to foster a larger demand or production of licensed apparel; and 2) the media tended to cover NCAA team competition which would be helpful in my data collection efforts (see details below).

The group of 1020 campuses was remarkably similar (see Table 2 for complete details) compared to the universe of all athletic four-year institutions, especially in terms of the composition of the student body with nearly identical proportions of students according to gender, minority status, and financial aid status. There were slight differences in the universe of all four-year athletic campuses relative to overall enrollment size and percent of public and religious-affiliated institutions. The group of 1020 campuses included slightly more public institutions, and subsequently also included institutions with slightly larger enrollments.
Table 2. *Comparison of the Universe of Campuses with Sample Population Campuses*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>UNIVERSE: 4-Year (or above) Public &amp; Private Campuses (N=2177)</th>
<th>ALL ATHLETICS: 4-Year (or above) Public &amp; Private Intercollegiate Athletic Campuses (N=1359)</th>
<th>SAMPLE POP.: NCAA Football &amp; Basketball Campuses (N=1020)</th>
<th>COLLECTIVE ACTION SAMPLE: N=149</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent female</td>
<td>55% 1917</td>
<td>58% 1359</td>
<td>58% 1019</td>
<td>58% 148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent male</td>
<td>45% 1917</td>
<td>42% 1359</td>
<td>42% 1019</td>
<td>42% 148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Black, non-Hispanic</td>
<td>10.2% 1915</td>
<td>11.8% 1359</td>
<td>11.5% 1013</td>
<td>10.5% 147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent American Indian/Alaskan Native</td>
<td>0.7% 1915</td>
<td>0.7% 1359</td>
<td>0.5% 1013</td>
<td>0.7% 147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Asian/Pacific Islander</td>
<td>3.8% 1915</td>
<td>3.3% 1359</td>
<td>3.8% 1013</td>
<td>4.6% 147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Hispanic</td>
<td>4.1% 1915</td>
<td>4.1% 1359</td>
<td>4.4% 1013</td>
<td>4.9% 147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Percent Minority</td>
<td>19.4% 1915</td>
<td>19.8% 1359</td>
<td>20.3% 1013</td>
<td>20.7% 147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent receiving federal financial aid</td>
<td>34% 1585</td>
<td>33% 1332</td>
<td>30% 1003</td>
<td>30% 147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average enrollment size</td>
<td>4636 1917</td>
<td>6064 1359</td>
<td>7527 1019</td>
<td>7248 148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent public 4-year institutions</td>
<td>28% 2136</td>
<td>37% 1359</td>
<td>43% 1020</td>
<td>42% 149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious affiliation</td>
<td>42% 1920</td>
<td>43% 1359</td>
<td>34% 1020</td>
<td>33% 149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of campuses with athletics</td>
<td>71.0% 1915</td>
<td>100.0% 1359</td>
<td>100.0% 1020</td>
<td>100% 149</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3. Collective-Action Sample: Randomly Drawn from All Four-year Campuses with NCAA Football & Basketball Campuses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abilene Christian University</th>
<th>Georgia Institute of Technology-Main Campus</th>
<th>Southern Methodist University</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adrian College</td>
<td>Gordon College</td>
<td>Southern New Hampshire University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albright College</td>
<td>Hamilton College</td>
<td>Southwest Minnesota State University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alvernia College</td>
<td>Hampton University</td>
<td>St Lawrence University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American International College</td>
<td>Hood College</td>
<td>Stanford University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arcadia University</td>
<td>Immuculata University</td>
<td>Suffolk University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bates College</td>
<td>Indiana University-Bloomington</td>
<td>SUNY at Stony Brook</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bay Path College</td>
<td>Jacksonville State University</td>
<td>SUNY College at Potsdam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birmingham Southern College</td>
<td>King's College</td>
<td>Texas A &amp; M University-Commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bowdoin College</td>
<td>Knox College</td>
<td>Texas A &amp; M University-Corpus Christi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridgewater State College</td>
<td>Lesley University</td>
<td>Texas Christian University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butler University</td>
<td>LeTourneau University</td>
<td>Texas Wesleyan University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California Institute of Technology</td>
<td>Liberty University</td>
<td>The University of Tennessee-Martin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California Lutheran University</td>
<td>Long Island University-C W Post Campus</td>
<td>The University of Texas at San Antonio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California State University-Bakersfield</td>
<td>Lyndhurst College</td>
<td>The University of Virginia's College at Wise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California State University-Los Angeles</td>
<td>Lynn University</td>
<td>Trinity College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California State University-Sacramento</td>
<td>Massachusetts Institute of Technology</td>
<td>University of Alabama in Huntsville</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California State University-Stanislaus</td>
<td>Menlo College</td>
<td>University of Alaska Anchorage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calvin College</td>
<td>Methodist University</td>
<td>University of Arkansas at Pine Bluff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic University of America</td>
<td>Miami University-Ohio</td>
<td>University of California-Berkeley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centenary College</td>
<td>Michigan Technological University</td>
<td>University of California-San Diego</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Washington University</td>
<td>Montana State University</td>
<td>University of Hartford</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charleston Southern University</td>
<td>Murray State University</td>
<td>University of Hawaii at Hilo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chestnut Hill College</td>
<td>Murray State University</td>
<td>University of Illinois at Chicago</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clayton State University</td>
<td>Neumann College</td>
<td>University of Indianapolis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal Carolina University</td>
<td>New Jersey City University</td>
<td>University of Michigan-Ann Arbor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coker College</td>
<td>North Carolina A &amp; T State University</td>
<td>University of Minnesota-Morris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concordia College</td>
<td>North Dakota State University-Main Campus</td>
<td>University of North Alabama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concordia College at Moorhead</td>
<td>Northwestern State University</td>
<td>University of North Texas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUNY Queens College</td>
<td>Northwest Nazarene University</td>
<td>University of Oregon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware Valley College</td>
<td>Northwestern University</td>
<td>University of Pittsburgh-Bradford</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DePaul University</td>
<td>Oakland City University</td>
<td>University of Rhode Island</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican College of Blauvelt</td>
<td>Oakland University</td>
<td>University of Rochester</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earlham College</td>
<td>Paine College</td>
<td>University of St Thomas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Tennessee State University</td>
<td>Polytechnic Institute of New York University</td>
<td>University of the District of Columbia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Kentucky University</td>
<td>Radford University</td>
<td>University of West Alabama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Washington University</td>
<td>Regis College</td>
<td>Ursinus College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edgewood College</td>
<td>Rhode Island College</td>
<td>Washington and Lee University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emory University</td>
<td>Rhodes College</td>
<td>Washington College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Washington University</td>
<td>Rollins College</td>
<td>Washington State University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida Atlantic University</td>
<td>Rust College</td>
<td>Wayne State College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida International University</td>
<td>Saint Joseph's College of Maine</td>
<td>Waynesburg University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida Southern College</td>
<td>Saint Joseph's College-Suffolk Campus</td>
<td>Webster University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fontbonne University</td>
<td>Saint Joseph's University</td>
<td>West Virginia State University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fordham University</td>
<td>Salem State College</td>
<td>Westminster College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Lewis College</td>
<td>San Francisco State University</td>
<td>Williams College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framingham State College</td>
<td>Seattle Pacific University</td>
<td>Wilson College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franklin and Marshall College</td>
<td>Southern Arkansas University-Main Campus</td>
<td>Yale University</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Morris Brown College was dropped from the sample due to its inconsistent and unavailable data resulting from a criminal scandal that occurred between 1998-2002*
Another conceptual advantage that emerges from including only campuses with intercollegiate athletics and NCAA football and basketball programs, was this selection criteria also functioned to exclude a number of institutions that were fundamentally different from those to whom I would like to generalize any findings. Specifically, the athletic restrictions which I incorporated functioned to exclude most institutions which existed for the primary purpose of providing post-baccalaureate professional training or graduate preparation exclusively. The institutions I dropped on account of restricting the sample population to athletics consisted of omitting: 81% of the theological seminaries, 87% of the medical or health related institutions, 93% of the music or art conservatories/schools, 95% of the law schools, and 74% of the other types of specialized professional institutions.\(^4\)

Collective-Action Sample Campuses (N=149)

From the group of 1020 campuses, I drew a random sample of 150 campuses. I selected 150 cases/campuses as my sample size after conducting a power analysis.\(^5\) The 150 campuses are listed in Table 3. After reviewing the specific campuses in the random sample, I reduced the sample to include only 149 institutions. Specifically, I dropped Morris Brown College from my sample due to the inconsistent and unavailable information resulting from a criminal scandal that occurred on that campus during the 1998-2002 time period.\(^6\) Overall, the CA sample was

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\(^4\) These percentages are based on the universe of four-year institutions which included the following number of exclusively professional or specialized schools: 265 theological seminaries; 46 medical and 80 other health-related professional schools; 56 art or music conservatories/schools; 18 law schools; and 42 other (non-specified) specialized institutions.

\(^5\) Power analyses for logistic regression that includes a number of categorical covariates is somewhat cumbersome, and therefore, I erred on the side of collecting a greater number of cases rather than fewer.

\(^6\) The University of Arkansas- Pine Bluff, and Saint Joseph’s University- Suffolk Campus also have somewhat inconsistent data reported from IPEDS. Of the 149 campuses, the University of Arkansas-Pine Bluff in particular was especially difficult to obtain survey/telephone data from, which accounts for its missing data on some of the educational and curricular intervention variables.
comprised of: 42% of institutions that were public, with an average enrollment size of 7,248. Thirty-three percent of the campuses possessed a religious affiliation. The student body was 58% female and 42% male; and 20.7% of the students came from underrepresented or minority backgrounds.

Embedded Qualitative: Dependent Variable, Student Anti-sweatshop Campus Mobilization

In order to produce data that would allow me to perform quantitative analyses related to campus anti-sweatshop mobilization, I had to measure mobilization. As a result, I embedded qualitative procedures to analyze newspaper data articles which documented any instances of anti-sweatshop mobilization on the 149 campuses in my CA sample. Moreover, my secondary, collective-action newspaper data set included all instances of student anti-sweatshop mobilization on the 149 campuses in my sample between the fall semester of 1998 and the end of the spring semester in 2002. I used protest event analysis, which is the process of compiling and classifying accounts of collective-action events which are dispersed over time (Tilly, 2008). This technique has been a methodological staple of social movement and collective-action studies, and was used to build a quantitative measure of collective action or mobilization from a qualitative data set. The qualitative data set I built was comprised of national, local, and industry-specific newspaper articles describing incidences of anti-sweatshop mobilization.

The following sections will provide summary information about: protest event analysis and newspaper data; approaches utilized in controlling for potential bias; details about specific sources I used and the search criteria I employed; along with information about the construction of my primary dependent variable – student anti-sweatshop mobilization.

Protest Event Analysis
Tilly (2008) regards the classification of protest event accounts as a method that has a great deal of utility in evaluating the fluctuations of collective action incidence, spread, or intensity as a means for explaining variation. The technique for cataloguing and constructing a data set of collective-action events from public accounts is known throughout sociological social movement research as protest event analysis (PEA). This method is fundamentally a content analytic technique, but it is primarily concerned with compiling comparative quantitative data regarding social movements that are dispersed over time and geographic space (Koopmans & Rucht, 2002). The method involves analyzing newspapers, media, or public accounts of protest activities. Since its early application in the 1960s, the process has become increasingly sophisticated by comparing media accounts with complementary data sources to account for any selectivity biases that may be inherent when studying a solitary account. Initially, historical sociologists used PEA to catalog various social and political indicators to conduct international comparative social movement research (Tilly, 2004; Tilly, Tilly, & Tilly, 1975). Since its beginnings, PEA has grown to emphasize specificity in source selection, coding categories, and thorough documentation of rules and procedures. Moreover, it has emerged as a means to “systematically map, analyze, and interpret the occurrence and properties of large numbers of protests by means of content analysis” (Koopmans & Rucht, 2002, p. 231).

Sources

Newspapers have long been utilized to study social movement activity and collective mobilization and continue to be considered an appropriate and reasonable source of data (Earl, Martin, McCarthy, & Soule, 2004; McCarthy, McPhail, & Smith, 1996; McCarthy, Titarenko, McPhail, Rafail, & Augustyn, 2008; Oliver & Maney, 2000; Oliver & Myers, 1999; Olzak, 1989;
Rojas, 2006; Snyder & Kelly, 1977; Soule, 1997; Soule & Earl, 2005; Van Dyke, 2003; Van Dyke et al., 2007; Walker et al., 2008). In fact, newspaper event analysis in social movement research originally gained momentum as a data collection approach as means for remedying selection bias issues that occurred when researchers sampled on the dependent variable (i.e. choosing cases by occurrence of social movement activism) (Olzak, 1989). Earl and her colleagues (Earl et al., 2004) summarized the many ways that researchers have utilized newspaper data as an effective technique for exploring a variety of social movement phenomena, including: the development of the political process model, protest cycles, spontaneous forms of collective behavior, tactical innovation and diffusion, and some aspects of resource mobilization and political opportunity processes. Since the initial use of newspaper event analysis, researchers have begun to further explore the merits of this data collection technique (Earl et al., 2004; McCarthy et al., 1996; Myers & Caniglia, 2004; Ortiz, Myers, Walls, & Diaz, 2005). Specifically, concerns have been raised regarding the discretion that journalists and editors exercise when selecting whether mobilization and collective-action events will be covered (selection bias) and what type of information the articles will include (description bias).

Earl and colleagues’ (2004) work examining the integrity of newspaper data concluded that such data “does not deviate markedly from acceptable standards of quality. . . . newspaper data compare favorably to bias from non-response in surveys” (p. 77). Similarly, in Oliver and Myers’ (1999) work that considered local and regional newspaper coverage of university protest coverage, they found that the papers included upwards of 78% of rallies; which would be quite high if the data had been generated from survey data. Nevertheless, in an effort to reduce bias, Earl et al. (2004) recommend: 1) triangulating newspaper data with multiple sources to capture a
greater number of events, and to capture different details on the same event; and 2) to employ the use of electronic archive sources such as LexisNexis. Building on these recommendations, I incorporated such triangulation techniques into my data collection efforts in the hopes of limiting bias in my variable that was constructed from the newspaper archives.

Controlling for bias. One approach I used to reduce potential bias was through my selection of this particular student mobilization effort, the anti-sweatshop movement. McCarthy, McPhail, and Smith (1996) found that one of the strongest predictors of whether a protest event will be covered in the media is its importance to the current media attention cycle. The sweatshop labor issue gained tremendous media prominence, and became recognizable to the average American immediately preceding students’ adoption of the cause. Two key events in America brought the sweatshop labor issue to a critical level of consciousness in the public sphere, 1) the August 1995 U.S. Department of Labor raid on a sweatshop in El Monte, California, and 2) the May 1996 expose on Kathy Lee Gifford’s Wal-Mart clothing line that was linked to sweatshop labor (and specifically child labor) (Bender & Greenwald, 2004; Esbenshade, 2004; Featherstone & United Students Against Sweatshops, 2002; Greenberg & Knight, 2004; A. Ross, 1997; R. J. S. Ross, 2004b). The Kathy Lee Gifford sweatshop story in particular garnered massive public interest by virtue of it being situated at the intersection of popular news stories and entertainment news venues (Downs, 1972; E! Online, 1999). With the elevated level of media attention, accompanied by the broad popular interest in sweatshop issues at the time of the student anti-sweatshop mobilization, the situating context that I have selected (the student anti-sweatshop movement) was well positioned for newspapers to have a greater incentive to cover these mobilization events rather than the run of the mill campus protest topic.
Additionally, the campuses included in the sample were affiliated with the NCAA; and all of these schools fielded either a football and/or a basketball team that was eligible to compete in either the NCAA March Madness tournament or post-season bowl games. With the massive attention on these athletic programs, divisions, and championships, these institutions tended to draw broad public media interest. Moreover, the sample and the specific subject of the mobilization efforts that I have chosen possess multiple qualities that would appear justifiably desirable for news media to cover, resulting in more thorough coverage of campus anti-sweatshop mobilization.

In an additional attempt to control for potential bias, I selected multiple newspaper types as data sources. My qualitative data include a range of newspapers, including papers which cover broad interest news stories, industry specific news, national news, and local events. Some scholars have observed that the stability of the specific type of bias tends to be more problematic in local newspapers compared to national newspapers (Earl et al., 2004; Oliver & Maney, 2000). In prior studies it has often been the case that major national newspapers have served as the dominant data sources used to account for campus mobilization and/or activism (J. D. McCarthy, Martin, & McPhail, 2007; Rojas, 2006; Soule, 1997; Van Dyke, 2003, 2007; Walker et al., 2008). Conversely, some recent work has reinforced the added value and precision that can be generated by focusing on industry specific publications to yield a more comprehensive data set that reduces the chances of introducing bias on account of some incidences of activism going unreported in the national press (Walker, 2011). In effort to generate the best data possible, I have included a variety of types of publications (local and national) as my sources, along with the premier national trade journal for higher education, *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, a
publication that will be more inclined to highlight news in that sector. In sum, since I chose to work with a sample of 149 institutions, I chose to pursue a qualitative data collection strategy that would likely generate the most thorough set of news articles, consisting of multiple types of newspaper data (industry, local, campus, and national press).

Industry news. I selected The Chronicle of Higher Education to account for industry specific news coverage of campus collective action. This periodical was an ideal choice since it was designed to provide campus leaders with a national perspective on the contemporary happenings of higher education (Carnegie Corporation of New York, 2005). Currently, The Chronicle has emerged as the dominant industry trade publication for higher education, likening it to the Wall Street Journal in the business sector. Additionally, it is relevant to point out that The Chronicle began publishing in 1966, in part, to satisfy the industry need for coverage of news related to campus unrest and activism in that turbulent era (Carnegie Corporation of New York, 2005). In a forty year retrospective of The Chronicle, included among the most salient highlights of all the years of its publication, were the social uprisings at Kent State in 1971 and its special issue on South Africa during the campus divestment movement in 1986 (Carnegie Corporation of New York). Moreover, The Chronicle has a tradition of covering campus based mobilization.

Campus news. For local higher education news, I gathered data from the LexisNexis Academic, University Wire Database. This database began on September 1, 1997 and provides access to full text searches of the contents in over 350 campus student newspapers.\(^7\) Nearly one-quarter of all the campuses included in my sample have campus newspapers that are a part of this

\(^7\) Lexis Nexus does not provide coverage for two months, December 2001 and January 2002. Therefore data from these months is missing from the dataset.
database. See Appendix A for a listing of the specific campuses and affiliated student newspapers. LexisNexis has been used as a source for anti-sweatshop movement data in previous studies (DeWinter-Schmitt, 2007; R. J. S. Ross, 2004a, 2004b; Van Dyke et al., 2007) as well.

Local news. Given that the LexisNexis University Wire Database does not include all campuses in my sample, I also conducted a search of the Associated Press (AP) State and Local Wire. Oliver and Myers (1999) found that local newspaper coverage was positively predicted when the news events had a national affiliation with a social movement, there was some form of conflict element to the story, and the issue was related to the nearby university. According to the LexisNexis descriptor, the AP State and Local Wire provides full-text searches of “news from all 50 states, drawing news stories from 143 U.S. bureaus and from AP member newspapers and broadcasters,” and “provides coverage on a variety of regional topics such as information on state capitols, legislation and politics, local regional and state sports; cross-state issues; news analysis and entertainment.” Therefore, the AP State and Local Wire was likely to capture locally relevant stories related to the student anti-sweatshop movement even when campus newspaper data was unavailable. In the case of all institutions in the CA sample I was able to search a local paper that was published in a town ranging in distance from the institution between 0 – 185 miles. The average distance was 24 miles, and the median distance was 7 miles, and most frequently the local paper was actually located in the same place as the college or

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8 In total 65% of the 23 campuses that participated in some for of anti-sweatshop mobilization were campuses that also had their campus newspaper included in the University Wire database. The other 35% of the campuses did not have their local campus newspaper included, and thus the sources describing their campus anti-sweatshop mobilization came from either local, national, or industry-specific publications.
university. Appendix B provides a list of the distance of the local or regional paper in relationship to the location of the institution.

National news. As a further cross check, I also searched three broad interest national papers the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, and USA Today, through LexisNexis. These papers are among the top five national newspapers with the largest circulations, and the New York Times, and Los Angeles Times have been used in social movement research on multiple occasions (B. G. King & Soule, 2007; some examples include: McCarthy, Martin, & McPhail, 2007; Rojas, 2006; Soule, 1997; Van Dyke, 2003; Van Dyke et al., 2007; Walker et al., 2008). I also utilized the NewsBank database to further capture any other potentially missing news articles that might have been excluded from the other searches list above. Specifically, I gathered articles from the Access World News United States data source of NewsBank. This source is comprised of 2,669 local newspapers, of which 807 were available for the years of my study. All fifty states and the District of Columbia were represented by multiple local newspapers, with the exception of Delaware and South Dakota, which only had one local newspaper each.

Newspaper Search Criteria

I searched the AP and Local Newswire, University Wire, The Chronicle of Higher Education, and the three national papers simultaneously in LexisNexis Academic. Subsequently, I also searched NewsBank in a duplicative fashion such that I employed the same approach with both databases. My specific search terms included the following keywords: “sweatshop,” “Workers Rights Consortium” (and WRC), “Fair Labor Association” (and FLA), “United Students Against Sweatshops” (and USAS), variations on the word activism, “protest,” “rally,”
“demonstration,” “petition,” “riot,” and “sit-in.” 9 Each search term was entered individually with each of the 149 campus names “[UNIVERSITY NAME].” I used variations on many institutions’ names, especially in the case of campuses that regularly employed nicknames or were more often referred to by their abbreviations (ETSU, MIT, etc.). In the date field of the searches, I restricted my search to extract only news articles from August of 1998 to June of 2002. This time frame provided ample time for motivated campuses to seek WRC-like changes such as improvements in the monitoring of factories, working conditions, or campus codes for vendors. It is important to point out that in 2002, the FLA changed its approach to factory monitoring; thus changing the potential courses of action that might guide universities in their range of choices to respond to student anti-sweatshop mobilization or activism. Therefore, the overall conditions for claims making may have changed for some of the campuses in the sample after 2002. As a result, the time frame for my study ends in 2002.10

Coding for collective action. In order to select articles into my qualitative data set, I applied a very inclusive definition of student mobilization and collective action as a means for capturing the variation in tactics, approaches, and motivations. I kept articles if the story involved college students, it described coordinated behavior among two or more people, it was public, and it was focused (either primarily or secondarily) on making claims against sweatshop

9 Originally, I included a few other search terms which could describe various forms of collective mobilization. As I went through my search process, I determined that the words I ended up including were the best for retrieving associated with anti-sweatshop mobilization. The following terms were consistent in not producing campus anti-sweatshop articles: revolt, grievance, march, strike, teach-in, walkout, picket line, unrest, social movement. These search terms typically generated articles that discussed references to past activism (especially celebrations of the 30th anniversary of activism during the civil-rights era), as well as other forms of non-sweatshop or local community (non-campus) based activism.

10 In the spring of 2002, the Board of Directors of the Fair Labor Association adopted new guidelines that would provide greater disclosure of factory sites and the outcomes of monitoring. Additionally, the Board authorized the FLA staff to take a greater role in implementing both internal and external monitoring and to make field visits to assess compliance and factory conditions. Additional details can be found at: http://replay.waybackmachine.org/20020810215623/http://fairlabor.org/html/FLA_PR_April_2002.html
labor practices utilized in the apparel industry and would thus have implications for groups or individuals beyond the mobilized group that was lofting the claims. The definition I used was sufficiently broad to encompass many facets of collective action. It provided flexibility to count events that may not have been confrontational, as well as activities that ranged from rallies, protest, demonstrations, political theatre, sit-ins, hunger strikes, petitions, boycotts, letter writing, press conferences, intellectual forums on the subject, or pamphleteering.

I read and reviewed every article that was generated from the database searches to screen whether each article met the above criteria to serve as a story describing an instance of student anti-sweatshop related mobilization or collective action. In cases where I was undecided about whether the article sufficiently met the ascribed definition, I called upon one of my research assistants to serve as an independent second reader. \(^{11}\) We compared our interpretation of the article and discussed how suitable the article was to include in the data set, and then made a decision to keep it or drop it. Articles that were selected to be included in the data set were entered into a data base. The full text of the article, along with the title, author, date, publication source, and the name of the campus associated with the article. In some cases LexisNexis and NewsBank articles were duplicates of one another since there was some overlap in their data sources. If I determined an article was a duplicate, I only kept a single copy of it. In other instances, the searches produced a number of articles that focused on describing the general trend of anti-sweatshop campus mobilization across the field of higher education. These articles were included as individual database entries for each of the sample campuses mentioned in the article.

\(^{11}\) I trained my research assistants to utilize and apply my definition of mobilization by having them read 3 campuses sets of articles inclusively and independently from one another. All three of us read the same set of articles, and then compared and contrasted our determinations of how suitable each article was for meeting the definition of mobilization, and thus inclusion in the data set. Right from the start all three of us were very consistent in our interpretations or what constituted mobilization and those articles that did not meet the criteria.
Cataloguing articles by campus resulted in the creation of a portfolio of news articles which reported on various aspects of student anti-sweatshop mobilization (more discussion about how these portfolios of campus data were used is presented later). There were also several articles that referenced another campus in the sample, and drew comparisons between the activism on the first campus to the other campus. These articles were also entered under each campus as individual entries since the article functioned to convey some particular attribute or aspect of anti-sweatshop mobilization of each campus.

In total, my qualitative data set included 638 newspaper articles representing student mobilization and collective action on 23 campuses from the sample of 149 possible campuses. Each of the 23 campuses with article(s) that identified student anti-sweatshop mobilization was coded ‘1’ and the remaining 126 campuses were coded ‘0,’ indicating no evidence of anti-sweatshop mobilization. Table 4 details the names of the 23 mobilized campuses, and the accompanying count of articles associated with their activism. The summation of constructing this qualitative dataset of 638 articles, yielded the construction of my primary dependent variable, a dummy variable which accounted for campus mobilization between 1998-2002 for the 149 cases in the CA sample. In total, the mobilization dependent variable had a mean of 0.15, and a standard deviation of 0.36.
Table 4. Count and Frequency of Newspaper Articles Describing Anti-Sweatshop Mobilization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campus</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University of Michigan-Ann Arbor*</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>34.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Oregon</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yale University*</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of California-Berkeley*</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana University-Bloomington*</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwestern University*</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts Institute of Technology*</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Rochester*</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa State University*</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Williams College</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanford University*</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DePaul University*</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miami University-Oxford*</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of California-San Diego*</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of St Thomas</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Hartford*</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bates College*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emory University</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco State University*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinity College*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Rhode Island*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earlham College</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moravian College</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>638</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Campus Newspaper include in University Wire Database

Quantitative: Independent Variables

As I alluded to above, the independent variables that I’ve selected fall into four general categories: 1) the history of, or prior details surrounding aspects of campus mobilization; 2) the relationship of the campus to the broader anti-sweatshop movement; 3) the compositional characteristics of campuses; and 4) civic engagement intervention variables which encompass both educational strategies implemented via the curriculum and the co-curriculum. Table 5
provides a summary view of the variables used in my quantitative models and the various data sources I utilized. In the following sections, I provide justification for including each of the independent variables in my study, along with information about how I either retrieved or collected these data and prepared them such that they were suitable for use in my analyses.

**Prior Campus Mobilization Tendency**

The group of variables that I have included to depict the nature and history of prior campus mobilization, consist of measures that account for campus activism during the civil-rights era, the presence of academic labor unions on campus during the years of my study, the number of statutory political restrictions on dissent that campuses were subjected to by virtue of their presence in a given state, and the extent to which the students mobilized for any reason during the year prior to the years of this study (1997-1998).

*History of civil-rights era activism.* In Van Dyke’s (1998) recent study exploring the universities with a history or activism, she found that campuses with a history of student activism in the 1930s were four times more likely to have an SDS chapter in the 1960s. Therefore, in this contemporary study of student mobilization, I have included a measure that accounts for a history (or even an institutional legacy) of activism by including a control variable that accounts for campus student activism in its heyday, the 1967-1968 and 1968-1969 academic years. Senate staffers were charged with the task of compiling all incidences of campus protest from October 1967 to May of 1969 for the *Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations* (Harris, 1969). This itemization of United States college campus unrest was convened to investigate riots, civil, and criminal disorders. Staffers utilized local news media and “militant organization” (in this case social movement organization) publications to
Table 5. Description of Quantitative Variables and Accompanying Data Sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Data Source</th>
<th>Details</th>
<th>CA sample N=149</th>
<th>RF Sample N=1245</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Campus Mobilization</td>
<td>LexisNexis; NewsBank</td>
<td>638 newspaper articles from national, local, and campus, and industry publications</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers Rights Consortium Membership</td>
<td>Workers Rights Consortium</td>
<td>provided all WRC campuses from formal existence (1997) until 2002, and date campus joined</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair Labor Association Membership</td>
<td>Fair Labor Association, via Internet Archive</td>
<td>all campus members from formal existence (2000) until 2002</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical Prior Campus Mobilization</td>
<td>U.S. Senate Subcommittee Study</td>
<td>October 1967 - May 1969</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of Faculty Labor Union</td>
<td>NCSCBHEP, AAUP &amp; Contact Campus</td>
<td>confirm union existed during years of study</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of Graduate Student Labor Union</td>
<td>NCSCBHEP, CUE &amp; Contact Campus</td>
<td>confirm union existed during years of study</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count of Statutes regarding Campus Political Restrictions on Dissent</td>
<td>Gibson, 2003</td>
<td>assign value based on state location of campus</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweatshop Issue Conditions</td>
<td>AFL-CIO Union Summer, Dr. Nella VanDyke</td>
<td>1998 - 2003 summers</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campus Recruited by AFL-CIO for Union Summer</td>
<td>AFL-CIO Union Summer, Dr. Nella VanDyke</td>
<td>1998 - 2003 summers</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campus Athletic Funding (in million $)</td>
<td>NCES/IPEDS</td>
<td>1996-1997 (last year available in IPEDS)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campus Characteristics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Student Enrollment (in 1000s)</td>
<td>NCES/IPEDS</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Type (Public)</td>
<td>NCES/IPEDS</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious affiliation</td>
<td>NCES/IPEDS</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional selectivity (reputation)</td>
<td>NCES/IPEDS</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent undergraduates receiving federal financial aid</td>
<td>NCES/IPEDS</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Minority Student Enrollment</td>
<td>NCES/IPEDS</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent In-State Student Enrollment</td>
<td>NCES/IPEDS</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Engagement - Curricular Focus</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity Requirement in Undergraduate General Education Curriculum</td>
<td>AAC&amp;U &amp; follow-up survey/contacts</td>
<td>date established confirmation</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Number of Area Study degree recipients 98-02</td>
<td>NCES / IPEDS</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area Studies Emphasis</td>
<td>Index of College Majors, College Board; Contact Campuses</td>
<td>determine status of offering and years available</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Engagement - Co-curricular focus</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity Requirement in Undergraduate General Education Curriculum</td>
<td>Contact Campuses &amp; Internet Archive, NCES / IPEDS</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campus Compact Member 98-02</td>
<td>Contact Campus Compact and Campuses</td>
<td>determine if member was held during years of study</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSAHE Grant Recipient 98-02</td>
<td>LSAHE Reports &amp; Contact Campuses</td>
<td>Reports from 1998 &amp; 2002 covered study years</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* indicates dummy variable
determine the dates of disturbances, the types of grievances, the damages incurred to the college or university, the number of injuries suffered as a result of the campus disturbance, the administrative response to the disturbances, the methods or tactics used by the demonstrators, and the estimated costs of the disturbances. Using the Senate committee data, I created a dummy (‘1’ for having mobilized between 1967-1969) variable indicating whether the campuses in my sample mobilized between the fall of 1967 and the spring of 1969. The Senate data has been used before as a control for documenting historical instances of campus disturbances in at least one study, Gibson’s (2003) work on Vietnam War era student unrest on university campuses.12 Of the 149 campuses in the CA sample, 26 or 17% of the campuses mobilized between 1967-1969. Also, in this sample, the frequency of civil-rights era activism was indistinguishable based on institutional type (public or private). However, a greater number of secular campuses were privy to protests/disturbances compared to their religiously affiliated institutional peers; of the 26 campuses that mobilized in the civil-rights era, 85% held no institutional religious affiliation (with the remaining 15% possessing such an affiliation). Further, in this CA sample, campuses with a history of civil-rights era mobilization had larger enrollments (14,000 students on average, compared to non-mobilizers with average enrollments of 5,800 students), and tended to be more selective compared to those campuses that did not have a history of mobilization between 1967-1969.

Presence of academic labor unions. I chose to include measures that gauge the presence of academic unions on campus to serve as a means to assess the extent to which

12 It is worth noting that in prior anti-sweatshop analyses, the presence of a Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) chapter was used as a proxy for prior campus activism (Van Dyke et al., 2007). I chose the Senate data because I believe it is a superior measure since it appears to be more comprehensive in that it considered 2,374 colleges and identified 211 campuses that accounted for 471 campus disturbances. The SDS data accounted for only 124 colleges with SDS chapters between 1960-1965 (Van Dyke, 1998).
a campus has been sensitized to local labor issues. Generally, academic labor unions have materialized through collective mobilization, and thus provide somewhat of a template for organizing, and more specifically organizing on the topic of labor issues (Dixon, Tope, & Van Dyke, 2008; Julius & Gumport, 2003; Rhoades, 2006; Rhoades & Rhoads, 2003; Wickens, 2008).

I have included two variables that indicate whether a campus had an academic labor union, either a faculty union or a graduate student union between the years of 1998-2002. I obtained the union data from multiple sources. The first source of data was from the National Center for the Study of Collective Bargaining in Higher Education and the Professions (NCSCBHEP); this group maintains a directory of faculty and graduate student unions with many supplemental details including the years that the unions were established (Moriarty & Savarese, 2006). Specifically, I used the published directories from 1998 and 2006. The directories included data for all available years prior to their publication. The databases included (among other things) the year the initial and current local bargaining agents were elected, the year the initial bargaining agreement was ratified, as well as the expiration date of the current agreement. I have ensured the accuracy of the data by contacting all of the campuses in my CA sample via email and/or follow-up telephone calls to the campus to clarify whether a union existed, and if so, to confirm the year it was established. Based on my sample of 149 institutions, I found the NCSCBHEP data accurate. I had one of my research assistants collect the graduate union

13 The NCSCBHEP dataset has been used in prior research on academic labor unions, and there has been some question about its consistency over time (Julius & Gumport, 2003). Julius and Gumport used the data from NCSCBHEP from 1997 and noted that the center was defunct. Since that time NCSCBHEP has located to Hunter College and has had a more consistent existence. My sense is that these organizational changes may have lead to improved data quality.
data before we looked at the NCSCBHEP data, and the information she retrieved directly from the campuses matched perfectly with the NCSCBHEP data.

I also incorporated two other sources to confirm the presence of an academic labor union. Both the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) and the Coalition of Graduate Employee Unions (CGEU) maintain listings of campus labor unions. Specifically, the AAUP keeps a list of the faculty labor unions that are affiliated with its Collective Bargaining Congress, these labor unions are the AAUP Collective Bargaining Chapters (American Association of University Professors, 2009). The CGEU aims to track all graduate student unionizing activities. In the universe of graduate student unions, there are both campus-recognized and unrecognized organizations (Coalition of Graduate Employee Unions, 2009). In fact, there is some research that suggests that the graduate student unionization movement gained momentum during the same time period as the student anti-sweatshop movement (Dixon et al., 2008; Krupat, 2002). Therefore, for the purposes of this analysis, I only considered unions that the administration recognized as having a defined role in collective bargaining.\textsuperscript{14}

Both of the academic labor union variables were dummy coded, with ‘1’ indicating the presence of a union. In the CA sample of 149 campuses, 19\% of the campuses had a faculty union, and 7\% had a graduate union during the years of my study. The correlation between these two variables is 0.193 (p = 0.019), which in precise terms signifies that five campuses (or 3.4\% of all 149 campuses in the CA sample) had both a

\textsuperscript{14} In this CA sample, there were two graduate student unions that were working towards recognition during the years of my study, Yale University and Indiana University – Bloomington. I worked with one of my research assistants to conduct a supplemental analysis to examine the role of the graduate union on these campuses. After reviewing the newspaper articles that described the graduate student union aspirations on the two campuses between 1998-2002, I determined that the Yale union resembled more of an interest group of graduate students seeking to form a union. Conversely, the activities of the Indiana graduate union (although officially ‘unrecognized’) more closely resembled a traditional union whose activities were closely aligned with advocating and bargaining with administrators to address working conditions.
faculty and a graduate union. Compared to their non-unionized counterparts, the campuses with academic labor unions were typically associated with public institutional control (with few exceptions), especially those with larger enrollments. Additionally, faculty unions were typically present on slightly less selective campuses, and graduate unions were typically present on more selective campuses, relative to their non-unionized campus counterparts.

*State restrictions on dissent on campus.* Gibson’s (2003) recent scholarship examined the manner in which state governments responded to the campus unrest during the Vietnam war era. He took stock of the state statues that were passed in response to student protests, and coded them on the degree to which state statutes were designed specifically to repress and stifle dissent on college campuses, or the extent to which state policies reflected a politically intolerant climate in the state. Statutes which Gibson (2003) classified as having the effect of *restricting access to campus* included:

1. laws prohibiting actual interference in campus activities by outsiders; 2. laws making it illegal to enter a university with the intent to interfere in campus activities; 3. trespass; and 4. trespass upon notice — remaining upon or reentering a campus after being notified by the proper officials that to remain or reenter is a crime. (Gibson, p. 15)

Through his analysis of state policy responses, he also found that state legislatures instituted statutes that were intended to address collective action, or campus unrest, which had the potential to create an *interference in campus governance*; these statues included:

1. resolutions or statutes reassuring the academic communities that administrators had the power to make and enforce campus regulations; 2. orders to universities to develop and implement their own rules (often with the threat of losing appropriations for the failure to do so); and 3. statutes containing mandatory university rules and procedures. (Gibson, p. 16)

Based on his analyses of the legislative response to campus unrest, he created a score for each state that “indicated the degree of restriction on dissent on university campuses by
state governments” (p. 18). The scores were counts of the number of each type of legislation that the state adopted in the two categories described, *restrictions on access to campus* and *interference in campus governance*. He then standardized the variables and summed them to create a scale signifying restrictions on campus dissent which ranged from -2.05 to 3.08, where a higher score connoted a greater number of statutory restrictions on campus dissent.

In other student anti-sweatshop scholarship, controls for regional differences have been used without significant findings (e.g., degree of urbanicity, percent Republican state legislature, accreditation region, etc.) (Flacks, 1970; Long & Foster, 1970; Van Dyke et al., 2007). I contend that these measures may not have been controlling for the precise differences in local attitude variation regarding university protest and activism. As a result, I chose to use Gibson’s repression of dissent on university campuses scale to control for the geographic differences in the manner in which campus mobilization has been viewed formally in the state where each university resides. This measure assesses the structural (legislative) climate for student mobilization within the state that each university is located. The measure also functions to quantify the legacy of local attitudes that grew around the issue of campus activism and unrest.

Gibson (2003) also coded additional legislative actions in each state that emerged in response to Vietnam war era activism. He did not end up including these legislative actions in his specific study because the overall study was focused more broadly on mass public opinion, but he provided all of the civil and criminal statute coding in the footnotes of his study. The legislative actions he excluded offered more details regarding the state legislative response to campus unrest. These additional campus unrest values were
relevant to my study; therefore, I also included these additional values in the scale that I constructed in my data set. Specifically, the statutes Gibson coded (but excluded in his study) consisted of legislatures that responded by enacting civil measures such as:

(1) changes in admission policies to exclude potential and proven troublemakers-FL, LA, TX, WI; (2) requirements that teachers teach a minimum number of hours per week- FL, MI; and (3) grants of the power to create security departments and raise the status of security officers to that of peace officers- AL, AZ, CA, FL, IA, KS, KY, MD, MT, NV, NJ, NY, ND, TX, UT, WA. (p. 16)

And legislatures that responded by enacting the following criminal measures:

(1) weapons legislation (prohibiting weapons on campus, frequently even when licensed)- AL, CA, IL, NJ, NC, SC, TX, UT; (2) riot legislation – AR, LA, MI, NM, NC, OK, WV, WY; (3) statutes prohibiting advocacy of unlawfulness – FL, NV, OK; and (4) statutes regulating sound amplifying equipment- NC, WI. (p. 16)

Like Gibson, I have created a political restriction variable for each state. The variable itself is a simple sum of all the political restriction statues for a given state. I then assigned each campus the value for the state in which it was situated. The only location I did not have a political restriction on dissent score was for the District of Columbia, which was excluded in Gibson’s work. As a result, I have scores for 147 cases. Restrictions on dissent ranged between 0 and 9, with a mean of 4.69; and a median of 4.0.\textsuperscript{15}

\textit{Control for recent student activism orientation}. An important control measure when considering whether students mobilized around the anti-sweatshop issue included having a baseline measure that accounted for each university’s recent pattern of collective action participation for any cause. Accordingly, I constructed a variable that measured the degree of focus that a campus had on student mobilization in the year that

\textsuperscript{15} In personal communication with Professor Gibson, he advised excluding Washington D.C. since it is governed by Congress. He advised that the inclusion of federal restrictions would water-down the state-level geographic relationships and hypotheses. (Gibson, 2011)
immediately preceded the start of the student anti-sweatshop mobilization. In order to construct this variable, I called upon qualitative techniques again to perform data transformation of newspaper article data into a quantitative variable measuring 1997-1998 student activism. Effectively, I employed the same process as I used to create 1998-2002 campus anti-sweatshop mobilization dependent variable, with only minor modifications, to construct a newspaper data set consisting of all instances of activism (of any sort and regarding any issue) for my 149 campuses during the 1997-1998 academic year.

In my search for 1997-1998 campus activism, I again searched the AP and Local Newswire, University Wire, *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, and the three national papers (*USA Today*, *Los Angeles Times*, and *New York Times*) simultaneously in LexisNexis Academic; and I utilized a NewsBank search in the same fashion as I described above. My specific search terms included the following keywords: “protest,” “rally,” “demonstration,” “petition,” “riot,” “sit-in,” and variations on the word “activism.” As before, each search term was entered individually with each of the 149 campus names “[UNIVERSITY NAME]” including variations on campus names or abbreviations as needed. For this particular variable, I restricted the date field of the searches to August of 1997 to July of 1998.

In order to select articles into 1997-1998 prior activism dataset, I applied the same inclusive definition of student mobilization to again capture maximum variation in tactics, approaches, and topics. I read every article that was generated from the database and evaluated it for its suitability as a description of 1997-1998 campus mobilization of any kind. Selected articles were entered in a data set including the full text of the article,
along with the title, author, date, publication source, and the name of the campus associated with the article. The data set was carefully screened for duplicate entries, and when found, those data entries were dropped. In total, the 1997-1998 prior activism data set included 253 newspaper articles representing some form of campus collective action on 40 of 149 possible campuses, or 27%. Appendix C provides a summary of the campuses that reported incidences of activism in the 1997-1998 academic year. The prior activism variable was a count variable in order to serve as a proxy for the degree of activism during the year leading up to anti-sweatshop mobilization activities. Moreover, the mean for this prior activism variable in the CA sample is 1.49, with a standard deviation of 7.85.

Movement Vulnerability: Relationship to the Broader Sweatshop Issue

Union Summer recruitment and participation. Van Dyke, Dixon, and Carlon (2007) found that the AFL-CIO Union Summer program had a relationship to campuses forming chapters of USAS, one probable response for pursuing campus related sweatshop labor concerns. Union Summer was (and still remains to be) a short-term internship/educational program (approximately 6-10 weeks) where college students develop skills for and work on various labor organizing activities. In the summers of 1996-2001 the Union Summer program was specifically focused to build labor organizing capacity to put towards sweatshop labor concerns in the textile/apparel industry. For their 2007 study, Van Dyke and her colleagues obtained data from the AFL-CIO which identified all the campuses that were recruited to attend the Union Summer program, along with those campuses that actually sent participants to the
program. Nella Van Dyke generously provided me with these AFL-CIO Union Summer data that she had already collected for her earlier study.

The AFL-CIO data consisted of a categorically coded variable signifying: that there was no campus connection to the AFL-CIO Union Summer program (coded ‘0’); that a school was simply recruited by the AFL-CIO to the program (coded ‘1’); that a campus participated in the Union Summer program (coded ‘2’); or that a campus was both recruited by the AFL-CIO and chose to participate (coded ‘3’). My data cover the years of 1996-2001. I included the summers of 1996 and 1997 because having early or prior involvement with Union Summer, in addition to simultaneous involvement, was conceptually important. It often takes time for the seeds of campus mobilization to sow, so even an early connection to Union Summer may be important to control for, and to consider when understanding subsequent mobilization. In total, 6 campuses (4%) of the CA sample campuses were recruited to Union Summer (but did not participate); 16 campuses (10.7%) participated (but had not been recruited); and 26 campuses (17.4%) were recruited and participated. The remaining 101 campuses (67.8%) had no involvement with the AFL-CIO.

Campus athletic expenditures. In order to assess the vulnerability of campuses to any claims surrounding the use of sweatshop labor in its athletic apparel and sportswear manufacturing, I needed to include a measure that accounted for the scale of the athletic operation. Essentially, I am equating the amount of money spent on athletics to signify both the size of the athletic operations on campus (number of teams, athletes, investment in facilities, coaches’ salaries, etc.), and the relative demand that exists to sell additional logoed apparel by virtue of fan following. Providing an organizational measure of
vulnerability that each campuses has in the student anti-sweatshop movement is important for understanding which campuses were motivated to act. Vulnerability is the stake that each campus, in this particular case, has literally invested in the issue.

I drew my data from IPEDS, which provided the most thorough publically available data about athletic expenditures for the 1996 fiscal year.16 These data functioned to establish a baseline upon which the anti-sweatshop movement claims could be made in the subsequent time period of my study. My approach to constructing the athletic expenditure variable, mirrored Litan, Orszag, and Orszag’s (2003) approach utilized in their 2003 NCAA report. Specifically, I computed a sum comprised of four intercollegiate athletic spending variables accounting for auxiliary, instruction, student services, and corporate expenses. I then transformed the variable (by dividing it by a million) for ease of interpretation. I had eight cases with missing data for the 1996 fiscal year. In these instances, I was able to replace the missing values with the athletic expenditure data for the 1995 fiscal year for all but two of the eight cases, resulting in a total of 147 cases with useable data. In my CA sample, the average athletic expenditure was $2.61 million, with a standard deviation of $4.85 million.

Campus Characteristics

In an effort to account for campus characteristics that have been related to student mobilization, activism, or protest in prior scholarship, I have included variables that specify enrollment size, selectivity, institutional type, and some basic compositional characteristics of the campus community. I obtained the majority of these measures from IPEDS. Since the period of time of my study is relatively narrow, I expected to see little

16 Currently, extensive expenditure data is filed through the Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act (EADA) Survey to document the financial aspects of college athletics.
variation on these measures during these five years; therefore, I selected IPEDS data from 2000 only.

**Total enrollment.** I retrieved the total student enrollment, including both undergraduate and graduate students from IPEDS for the year 2000. I transformed this variable by dividing it by 1,000. In my CA sample, the average total enrollment was 7,220 (with a standard deviation of 7,800).

**Institutional type.** I created a dummy variable for institutional control, where a ‘1’ signified that an institution was under public control, and ‘0’ indicated it was privately controlled. The CA sample included 62 public (42%) and 87 private (58%) institutions. Similarly, I prepared a dummy variable indicating whether campuses possessed a religious or denominational affiliation (‘1’ for religious, ‘0’ for no affiliation). Religiously affiliated institutions consisted of 34% of the sample.

**Selectivity.** For my measure for selectivity, I used Barron’s *Profile of American Colleges 2004* measure (Barron's, 2003). This measure of selectivity deviates from prior social movement work which utilized SAT scores as a proxy for selectivity (Flacks, 1970). Bastedo and Jaquette’s (2009) recent evaluation of a variety of college selectivity measures demonstrated that the Barron’s measure has a long history and proves to be quite consistent over time, especially when compared to other similar measures (*U.S. News & World Report* rankings, Carnegie Classifications, etc.). The Barron’s selectivity measure is based on SAT and ACT scores, students’ high school grades, and college admissions actions; these criteria are used to classify colleges into six ordered categories from 6 to 2, where ‘6’ is Most Competitive, ‘5’ is Highly Competitive, ‘4’ is Very Competitive, ‘3’ is Competitive, and ‘2’ is Less Competitive (Bastedo & Jaquette, 2009).
I selected to use this selectivity measure primarily because it is a superior measure of selectivity compared to the other possible options; but I also chose to use it because it was readily available. The Barron’s 2004 selectivity data was prepared by my colleagues at the University of Michigan (Ozan Jaquette and Nathan Harris) and my advisor (Michael Bastedo) generously offered it to me for use in this study.

In cases where the Barron’s selectivity data was missing for the 2004 time point, I used the 1992 Barron’s data. Campuses with missing data for 2004 included: Calvin College, Concordia College at Moorehead, Neumann College, University of Texas at San Antonio, University of Alaska Anchorage, University of the District of Columbia, and West Virginia State University. In a few cases, the 1992 Barron’s data were not available; therefore the following substitutions were made: Texas A&M University-Corpus Christi and Wayne State College both consisted of the 1972 selectivity rating, and University of North Alabama consisted of the 1982. Slightly less than two-thirds of my CA sample consisted of either Less Competitive (21%) or Competitive (44%) campuses. Another 20% of the group accounted for the Very Competitive campuses, with the remaining 15% of the campuses balanced between Highly and Most Competitive Barron’s selectivity ratings (see Table 6).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Barron's Selectivity of Collective-Action Sample Campuses</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 Less Competitive</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Competitive</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>44.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Very Competitive</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Highly Competitive</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Most Competitive</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total =</strong></td>
<td><strong>149</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note*: mean = 3.37; standard deviation = 1.12
I transformed the Barron’s selectivity measure by collapsing some of the categories that were indistinguishable from one another. I created dummy variables for each of the five categories listed above, and performed five individual logistic regressions with each of the different outcomes to determine which of the categories, in this sample, were unique from one another. The Less Competitive and Competitive categories were collapsed into a single category (coded 1), as were the High and Most Competitive categories (coded 3); and the remaining middle category Very Competitive (coded 2) stood on its own. What remained was a three level variable denoting increasing levels of selectivity with a mean of 1.50, and a standard deviation of 0.75.

*Federal student aid.* In an effort to provide a measure that characterized the campus in terms of its representation of working-class students, I included a measure that accounted for the percent of students receiving federal grants for the year 2000. The average percentage of students on campus receiving federal grants in my CA sample was 29.87%, with a standard deviation of 15.87% (N=148 for this variable).

*Minority student enrollment.* The racial and ethnic composition of the campus student body has been shown to be an influential variable in the study of campus-based social movement activity (Levine & Cureton, 1998; McAdam, 1988). Therefore, I included the percent of students who were from a minority or underrepresented background (African-American, American Indian/Alaskan Native, Asian/Pacific Islander, and Hispanic). On average, the CA sample campuses had 20.5% minority student enrollment (sd = 19.92).

*In-state enrollment.* The final campus characteristic variable I included in my data set was designed to demonstrate how connected the student population was to local state
concerns. Given that labor issues in general are often connected to geographical
dynamics such as the local industries – being more or less unionized; or states having
Right to Work statutes (Hunt, 1977) – I thought it appropriate to consider to the degree to
which a campus student population emerges from these dynamics. As a result, I included
the percent of first-year student population that resided in-state. On average, the CA
sample campuses enrolled a first-year class of 66% in-state students, but the range was
vast, from 1% to nearly 100%.

**Civic Engagement Curricular Focus**

In an effort to gauge the degree to which campuses provide a formal intellectual
climate that reinforces civic engagement ideals, I have selected variables that measure
social awareness in the general education curriculum, and the extent to which the formal
curriculum has been shaped by broader social movement forces in the field of higher
education.

**Diversity general education requirement.** Recently, there have been concerted
efforts to encourage college campuses to reconsider their undergraduate general
education requirements with a civic-engagement perspective (Association of American
Colleges and Universities, 2009a, 2009c; Gaff, 2004; White & Cohen, 2004). AAC&U
has been leading the charge with its recommendations, study groups, tools and resources
for campus committees charged with curriculum review, and monographs and essays
espousing the philosophical merits of devising a general education program that fosters
liberal education- which in turns fosters citizenship and civic engagement (Association of
American Colleges and Universities, 2009a). Essentially, general education revision and
refinement is viewed as a curricular tool for facilitating desirable students learning
outcomes, such as fostering students’ knowledge, skills, and attitudes in ways that contribute to democratic engagement.

During the time period of my study, a specific general education curricular innovation – the diversity requirement – was gaining attention as a particularly important strategy designed to teach students about social inequities, pluralism, and diversity (Humphreys, 1998). AAC&U commissioned a report on diversity courses and requirements in undergraduate general education (Humphreys, 1997), and collected data from campuses on their diversity requirements (Association of American Colleges and Universities, 2009b). The 1998 AAC&U report was based on a survey of 543 campuses that asked whether campuses included a diversity requirement in their undergraduate general education curricula; 51 of these campuses were also part of my CA sample.

In an effort to collect data about the diversity requirements in the undergraduate curriculum for my study, I worked with AAC&U to obtain campus-level identifiable data from their survey. AAC&U provided me paper copies of all the surveys that they still possessed (they did not have electronic copies). Despite AAC&U’s generous help and support, their records were sparse at best, consisting of information for only 19 of the 543 campuses; and of the 19 schools with data, only two of these were also in my sample. Given the state of the data, I enlisted the assistance of my research assistants to contact the remaining 147 schools to obtain information about campus diversity requirements between 1998-2002.

To collect the diversity requirement data, I obtained the necessary campus contact information / email addresses for campus registrars (or the professional equivalent depending on the institution’s organizational structure) through the college websites. I
contacted the registrars via email to solicit their participation in a survey that asked them to duplicate the information from the 1997 AAC&U survey (see Appendix D for survey details). Each registrar received a personalized message with a link to an electronic survey. In cases where I did not receive a response after ten days, I sent a follow-up personalized email with a second request to respond (along with the text of the first request forwarded in the body of the second request). Finally, for those campuses that remained non-responders, I sent a final personalized third email to request their participation. From this process, I obtained responses for 87 campuses. After my email contacts, I was left with 60 campuses for whom I needed information about their diversity requirements.

To obtain information for the remaining campuses, I relied heavily on my research assistants for help. We went to each of the campus websites to look for information about current general education requirements to pinpoint the likely location of information. In some cases, we were able to find complete information about general education requirements with the dates that the requirements were adopted. In instances where there was applicable information regarding the years of my study, we used the information from the college website to complete the survey. In instances where the years of adoption were unavailable, we looked to see if the campus currently had a diversity requirement. If the website information provided information about a current diversity requirement, but did not list information about the year it was adopted/implemented, a phone call was made to the registrar’s office to inquire about the year of adoption, and to obtain information about the nature of the requirement per the survey questions. In circumstances where there was no present requirement, we assumed
that the campus did not have a requirement from 1998–2002. Nevertheless, research assistants also contacted the registrar’s office to confirm that the lack of a diversity requirement in the past (1998–2002).

Once the necessary information for the remaining 60 schools was secured, I constructed a dummy variable; coded ‘1’ if a school had a diversity requirement during the years of my study, and coded ‘0’ if there was no such requirement. In total, 56 or 38% of the campuses in my CA sample had a diversity requirement. The presence of a diversity requirement in the general education curriculum does not differ on the basis of institutional control, religious affiliation, or selectivity, or the percentage of minority students present on campus.

**Area studies.** Several scholars have showcased the manner in which student mobilization and activism has been connected to the founding of, funding for, spread of, or sustenance of area studies programs - from Women’s to Black to Chicano to Gay studies (Altbach & Cohen, 1990b; Bickford & Reynolds, 2002; Lemonik Arthur, 2011; K. McCarthy, 1985; Proietto, 1999; Rhoads, 1997, 1998a, 1998b; Rojas, 2003, 2007). Consequently, I included data in my study that characterized the nature of area studies offerings on the campuses in the CA sample. This information served as gauge for measuring the extent to which a campus was susceptible to broader national movement action that was targeted toward the higher education sector. Also, and perhaps more importantly, including data about area studies showcased the manner in which issues of social identity – be they aspects of nationality, ethnicity, race, geography, physical attributes, or culture – had a presence in the campus curriculum. In general, I consider area studies to be comprised of ethnic, cultural, or gender based studies in the
undergraduate curricula (this category of curricular offerings is hereafter referred to as ‘area studies’ as an abbreviation).

I crafted two variables pertaining to area studies. The first variable is what I refer to as the critical mass or a depth measure of area studies. The variable consists of the average number of area studies degree recipients from 1998 – 2002. I retrieved this variable from IPEDS, and took the mean value across the five years of my study. The sample mean is 9 students, with a standard deviation of 31 students. The logic behind measuring area studies this way is to account for the salience of area studies, and how this identity-based and often interdisciplinary approach to learning shapes the broader community. Simply put, the measure provides a means for evaluating at what threshold the area studies curricular offering begins to influence the community beyond just the individual students studying the content. It is akin to assessing the size of other majors – business, engineering, science – and how much institutional focus there is on these offerings.

The second way I measured area studies was to construct a scale that accounted for the breadth of curricular offerings available for students to pursue. Initially, I retrieved data from the College Board Index of Majors which described the area studies offerings to determine which of the campuses in my CA sample offered area studies in their curricula. After identifying campuses with such offerings, we contacted the appropriate academic program office(s) or department(s) by phone and email to confirm that the campus provided said curricular offerings for the years of my study (1998-2002). In addition to asking the campus contact about the specific area studies

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17 My Undergraduate Research Opportunity Program (UROP) research assistant, Kathryn Burt, played a major role in assisting me with the data collection pertaining to area studies.
offerings, we also asked basic questions (see Appendix E for complete details) about whether undergraduate students had the option to major or minor in these curricular offerings, along with questions about the institutional status of each area studies offering. By status, I am referring to the level of institutional formalization around the curricular offerings in said area. Although area studies curricula are typically organized as programs over the more traditional structure of academic departments (Lattuca, 2001; Lemonik Arthur, 2011), I considered the variety of institutional patterns of supporting these academic options. The various area studies status options I considered consisted of the curricular offering being provided via a department, a program, or an interdisciplinary approach. Each of these three categories represented a decrease in the order of the formality and status of the area studies offerings. I deemed a department as a stand alone academic unit with dedicated faculty; a program was nested within another academic unit with perhaps a few (or a solitary) faculty member/s of note; and an interdisciplinary offering was a structure that allowed students to construct a major or a minor by taking classes that were listed across a range of disciplines, and thus constituting a curricular emphasis on a specific area studies topic.

Quickly, my research assistant observed many inconsistencies between the College Board data and the level of information that campuses were able to provide. Given that the College Board is an index of majors, the minors and interdisciplinary-only offerings were often excluded. In other instances, the College Board omitted some of the majors that campuses offered and occasionally the College Board provided information regarding an area studies offering that was not offered during the years of my study. In total, of the 149 campuses in the sample, my research assistant identified 63 campuses
with various inconsistencies with the College Board data. Moreover, I determined it necessary to contact every campus in the study to ensure accuracy.

Overall, 85 campuses provided some form of area studies offerings in their curricula. I used the area studies data about major, minors, and the status of the curricular offering to construct a measure called the area studies emphasis scale. This measure reflects the scope of these types of curricula offerings on each specific campus. For each campus, I generated a simple count of the number of majors and minors offered, in each of the three status categories department, program, or interdisciplinary offering. I assigned each major a weight according to whether its status, with a weighted value of 6 for a department, and a corresponding weighted value of 5 for a program, and 4 for an interdisciplinary offering. I treated the weighting of minors based on their status as well by assigning either a weighted value of 3, 2, 1 (denoting department, program, or interdisciplinary offering respectively). The weights for the majors were double that of the minors to denote the status of a major possessing a substantively more prominent role in the curriculum compared to a minor. Finally, I summed the value generated from the major and minor weighted calculations. In sum, the area studies emphasis scale served as a measure of the breadth of an institution’s area studies programs. This variable ranged from 0 to 85, with a mean of 11, and a standard deviation of 16.

*Civic Engagement Perspectives- Educational Interventions*

Student organizing index. Collective mobilization may be associated with the extent to which a campus created a context that is supportive of collective participation. Therefore, I created a variable called the student organizing index. This variable was a ratio of the total number of student organizations, to the total campus student enrollment.
Typically the division of student affairs has a student activities office that provides a detail listing of the campus student organizations on its website. Therefore, I gathered the student organization data by first examining the campus websites, and then utilizing an electronic internet archive resource (http://web.archive.org/collections/web.html) to obtain the student organization data from the year 2000. I selected the year 2000 since there was likely to be very little fluctuation in the number of student organizations between the years 1998-2002. Upon reviewing the websites, if there was sufficient information, I took a simple count of all the student organizations (both undergraduate and graduate). In cases where I could not confirm the accuracy of the data through the campus website, we contacted the student activities office directly for this information. In addition to asking campus administrators about the number of campus student organizations for the year 2000, we also asked administrators for clarification to ensure that my student organization number was inclusive of both undergraduate and graduate student organizations (in cases where campuses enrolled graduate students). I used the total student enrollment data from IPEDS (see details above) to calculate the ratio of organizations to the size of the student body. The average campus organizing score was 0.02, with a standard deviation of 0.03.

Service-learning measures. The scope and the prominence of service-learning initiatives often indicate the extent to which a campus has invested in civic engagement learning in the co-curriculum. During the time period of my study, limited service-learning data were available; presently there are a number of useful measures regarding the level of campus engagement around service-learning, but these options were less

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18 My research assistant, Megan Pratt, took leadership for obtaining this data once I trained her in the task. We met weekly as she was collecting to go over any question or idiosyncratic details related to the number of student organizations.
plentiful during the years of my study. Therefore, I chose two measures that were available on a national scale, and accounted for institutional commitments to service-learning on campuses. These measures included campus membership in Campus Compact and being among the selected campuses that applied for and obtained a grant from Learn and Serve American Higher Education (LSAHE).

Campus Compact was established in 1985 by a coalition of college presidents as a national organization:

Dedicated solely to campus-based civic engagement, Campus Compact promotes public and community service that develops students’ citizenship skills, helps campuses forge effective community partnerships, and provides resources and training for faculty seeking to integrate civic and community-based learning into the curriculum (Campus Compact, 2011, para. 1).

We contacted the state affiliates of Campus Compact to obtain information about the membership for the campuses in my CA sample. For those campuses which did not have membership information available via the state Campus Compact affiliates, we contacted the service-learning administrative office on campus via phone and/ or email. Ultimately, we were able to obtain information for 148 of the 149 campuses. If a campus was a Campus Compact member from 1998-2002, it was coded with a ‘1,’ and non-members were coded ‘0’. In total, 49 campuses, or 32.9% of the CA sample were Campus Compact members during the time period of my study.

I also obtained data directly from Learn and Serve America Higher Education (LSAHE). Learn and Serve America is a national program that promotes community service in all sectors of education, by providing grants, training, resources, and research all related to service and community engagement. Learn and Serve America is administered by the Corporation for National and Community Services – the entity which

19 West Virginia State University has missing data for the Campus Compact variable.
also oversees AmeriCorps and Senior Corps (Learn and Serve America, 2009). LSAHE is the higher education component of the program. LSAHE awards competitive grants to individual campuses or consortia of institutions for specific service-learning initiatives. One eligibility criteria for these grants was that campuses were required to demonstrate that they had the ability to cover fifty percent of the cost of the program via matching funds from local, state, or private resources. Given these criteria for grant consideration, campuses that applied had an established institutional commitment to service-learning. Further, those campuses that rose to the top of the application process and were selected for a grant were ostensibly those with the most comprehensive and well-developed service-learning programs and projects. Consequently, LSAHE provided me with the 1998 and 2001 directories of its grant recipients. These directories spanned the grants made to higher education institutions for the years 1997 through 2002. In most cases, the directories were clear about which campuses received grants. In others, we had to follow up with individual grantees to determine if the campuses in our sample were among the consortia grantees. For example, if a grant description listed a primary contact person for a non-sample campus, but the details indicated that campuses in the Indianapolis metropolitan area were responsible for different components of the project, we would contact the primary person (along with all the sample campuses that had the potential to be a part of the grant on the basis of their geographic proximity) to accurately determine if sample campuses were in fact, cooperating or sub-grantees. If a campus in the CA sample was ever a LSAHE grant recipient from 1997-2002 I coded the variable ‘1’, non-grantees were coded ‘0’. In total 44 campuses (29.5%) of my CA sample received a LSAHE grant at some point during the years 1997-2002.
The descriptive statistics for all of the quantitative variables in the CA sample described in the paragraphs above are listed in Table 7.

Table 7. Means and Standard Deviations of Variables in the Collective-Action Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DV: Campus Mobilization~</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History/Prior Campus Mobilization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-1969 Campus Riot or Disruption~</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count of Statues regarding Campus Political Restrictions on Dissenta</td>
<td>4.69</td>
<td>2.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of Faculty Labor Union~</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of Graduate Student Labor Union~</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count of News Coverage of Campus Mobilization 1997-1998</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>7.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweatshop Issue Conditions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of AFL-CIO Union Summer Campus Involvement</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>1.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campus Athletic Funding (in million $)</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>4.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campus Characteristics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Student Enrollment (in 1000s)</td>
<td>7.22</td>
<td>7.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Type (Public)~</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious affiliation~</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional selectivity (reputation)</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent undergraduates receiving federal financial aidb</td>
<td>29.87</td>
<td>15.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Minority Student Enrollment</td>
<td>20.50</td>
<td>19.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent In-State Student Enrollment</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Engagement - Curricular Focus</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity Requirement in Undergraduate General Education Curriculum~</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Number of Area Study degree recipients 98-02</td>
<td>8.75</td>
<td>30.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area Studies Emphasis</td>
<td>10.76</td>
<td>16.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Engagement - Co-curricular Focus</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student Organization Participation Index</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campus Compact Member 98-02~a</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSAHE Grant Recipient 98-02~</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N=149; unless a : N=147; or b : N=148

- indicates dummy variable

Quantitative Analyses: CA Sample

Before describing the analytical techniques utilized in the CA sample, it is useful to recollect the overall research design of this study. The CA sample is intended to be used to explore questions related to campus mobilization, and to consider the campus
characteristics and contexts which have a conceptual and empirical relationship to mobilization. To meet this goal, my analyses required multiple phases, such that each phase informed the next. Practically speaking, my CA analyses began with a bivariate exploration of the data to evaluate the characteristics of mobilized with non-mobilized campuses, followed by a series of exploratory multivariate analyses to assess the role that each conceptual cluster of independent variables had to the mobilization outcome. As I will describe in greater detail later in this section, my final set of CA multivariate analyses depicts a full blocked logistic regression model of mobilization. This final blocked model was determined after both the exploratory CA sample analyses and a set of analyses using the RP sample that explored factors predicting campus AFL-CIO involvement.

Sample Size Considerations

In the CA sample, I had very little missing data, with two or fewer cases missing for any particular variable, so missing data analyses were unnecessary, overall I used 147 cases in my analyses. The number of cases I have in my CA models can be considered somewhat on the small side for logistic regression. In the case of small sample sizes, analysts must pay particular attention to any potential multicollinearity issues present across the predictor variables, as well as the condition of the baseline dependent variable (D. Long & Foster, 1970; Peng, So, Stage, & St. John, 2002). When estimating coefficients in logistic regression models, the maximum likelihood (ML) method is utilized. ML estimation is preferred for its asymptotic properties of consistency, efficiency, and normality. That is, as sample sizes become larger each of these properties improve and have the tendency to become more similar to the true population parameters.
Long (1997) notes that the properties of maximum likelihood estimation are less well known in small sample sizes.\textsuperscript{20}

In small samples, Long (1997) recommends that analysts pay particular attention to the potential for collinearity between independent variables. Typically, tolerance and the variance inflation factor (VIF) statistics are the primary collinearity diagnostic tests to assess whether collinearity is an issue. Collinearity problems can lead to situations in which the model fit statistics are significant and large, but individual predictor variables are not significant (O'Brien, 2007). I examined all the variables in my models to test for potential multicollinearity issues, using the statistics recommend by Long. All VIF values were less than 2.0; typically, a VIF greater than 10 suggest problems related to collinearity. I therefore concluded that collinearity presented little concern for my analyses.

In the case of the condition of my baseline dependent variable and its relationship to my small sample sizes, I needed to allot some attention in my analyses to address this concern. The distribution of my binary outcome of interest ($Y = \text{mobilization}$), can be construed as being somewhat lopsided in the sense that only 23 of the 147 cases can be identified as ‘1’. In circumstances such as mine, it is especially important to be conscientious about how many predictor variables are included in one’s regression models. There is no authoritative equation for determining the maximum number of predictor variables to the minimum number of observations for a study, but there are a handful of recommendations. Peng, So, Stage, and St. John (2002) summarized that the prevailing recommendation coincides with utilizing a sample no smaller than 100 for logistic regression. They further conclude that most analysts utilize a rule that roughly

\textsuperscript{20} Long (1997) discusses small sample size and ML estimation on p. 53-54.
resembles a minimum ratio of 10 (case) to 1 (independent variable) when determining the number of predictors that will produce stable coefficients (Peng et al., 2002). Typically, there is consistency in this recommendation with only modest variation, with various research all producing similar outcomes via different approximations (Peng et al., 2002). Peng et al. describe the 10 to 1 ratio as being a conservative recommendation, and found that there is wide variation in the higher education literature as to how closely this recommendation is followed.

Further, in instances where a small sample size may put models at some risk for instability, it is advisable to present the logistic regression parameter estimates with their accompanying standard errors in order to allow the reader to fully evaluate the findings. In my regression analyses I have chosen to generate my models with robust standard errors, which serve to compensate for a moderate departure from normality in the error terms (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). Robust standard errors also help protect against the possibility of omitted variable bias and heteroskedasticity associated with this bias – an especially salient matter when a small sample size like mine constrain the number of predictor variables a model can include. When using robust standard errors, it is also advisable to use model fit statistics other than the likelihood ratio test, such as the Bayseian Information Criterion (BIC), since using robust standard errors relaxes the assumption required for the validity of the likelihood ratio test. As a result, when I consider the model fit of models in the CA sample, I also calculated the pseudo log likelihood, Wald Chi-square, and the BIC.

Bivariate Analyses
Keeping in mind the restrictions I am presented with on account of my small sample size (N=147), I approached my analyses in a very sequenced fashion to best understand the relationship of the clusters of variables relative to my outcome of interest, mobilization. In the first phase of my analyses, I sought to simply explore and describe the campus contexts of mobilized campuses and non-mobilized campuses. This exploration began with the use of bivariate techniques, specifically cross-tabulations with chi-square statistical tests and t-tests to explore the contemporary campus characteristics and contexts of mobilized campuses (compared to their non-mobilized counterparts). I also generated Pearson correlation coefficients for all the variables in my study to further pinpoint the potential direction and magnitude of the relationships between variables.

Exploratory Multivariate Analyses

My primary outcome of interest, student anti-sweatshop mobilization is a dichotomous outcome; therefore binomial logistic regression is the best multivariate method to consider the relationships between the independent variables in my study and the outcome of mobilization. Generally speaking, binomial logistic is a useful analytic technique because it generates estimates such that I can calculate odds ratios and perform post-estimation analyses, including generating predicted probabilities regarding particular variables of interest. Generating predicted probabilities is especially helpful in translating the findings into easily interpretable information, that provide useful insight for examining relationships between campus characteristics and students’ collective mobilization.21

21 For all of the multivariate analyses I utilized STATA software.
Exploration: Conceptual clusters of influence. Before pursuing a full regression model predicting mobilization, I needed to evaluate each of the five conceptual groupings of variables in order to determine whether they had any empirical relevance to my outcome variable. In this exploratory phase of my analysis, I generated five distinct binomial logistic regression models, one for each conceptual cluster of independent variables: 1) prior history and background mobilization campus characteristics (variables accounted for a history of 1967-1969 civil rights, the number of political restriction on dissent, the presence of a faculty or graduate student union, and 1997-1998 campus mobilization); 2) anti-sweatshop movement vulnerability (variables accounted for the level of campus involvement with AFL-CIO, and athletic spending); 3) campus compositional characteristics (variables accounted for total student enrollment, institutional type, institutional religious affiliation, selectivity/reputation, and percent of students receiving federal financial aid, percentage of minority students enrolled, and percentage of in-state residents enrolled); 4) civic engagement, curricular interventions (variables accounted for a diversity requirement in the undergraduate general education curriculum, the average annual number of students receiving degrees in area studies, and the institutionalization or emphasis on area studies); and 5) civic engagement, co-curricular interventions (variables accounted for the student organizing index measure, and service-learning emphasis variables consisting of campus membership in Campus Compact and the campus receiving a LSAHE service grant). Given my small sample size of only 147 cases, I had to perform these exploratory analyses to appropriately determine whether I could eliminate any of the conceptual clusters of variables. All regressions
were performed using robust standard errors. Similarly, I calculated odds ratios for the independent variables in each model.

Post-estimation analyses. In order to visualize the relationships between the five distinct conceptual clusters of variables and my outcome, mobilization, I generated predicted probabilities for significant independent variables and graphed the results. To evaluate the model fit of the five binomial regression models, I calculated the BIC for each model. Further, given the somewhat small number of cases in my CA sample, I calculated the Hosmer-Lemeshow (HL) statistic to compare the predicted probabilities generated in the five models with the observed data, to further evaluate the model fit of each model. In calculating HL statistics I used groups of 10, and I also generated locally weighted scatterplots (or lowess graphs) to observe the predicted probabilities in these smaller subsets of data (J. S. Long & Freese, 2006). I also produced receiver operating characteristics curve analyses which measure the predictive ability of a logistic regression, and provide a summary of the sensitivity (degree to which model correctly classifies event when event occurs) and specificity (degree to which model correctly predicts non-event when non-event occurs) of a given logistic model (Cleves, 2002).

Throughout these exploratory analyses, I chose to be overly conservative with my interpretation of p-values on account of the small number of cases in the CA sample, and the corresponding potential for producing inefficiencies in my models. Relying on smaller p-values is helpful in avoiding the possibility of rejecting the null hypothesis (that there is no relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variable) when it isn’t appropriate to do so.

Embedded Quantitative Method: Recruitment–Participation Data and Analysis
Sample

The recruitment–participation (RP) data are drawn from the universe of campuses of all U.S. four-year public and private (non-profit) institutions (N=2177) retrieved from IPEDS for the year 2000. Like the CA sample, I reduced this group of institutions to only those which offered intercollegiate athletics as a means to identify campuses with a vested and sustained interest in university logoed apparel, thus exhibiting the potential for the anti-sweatshop cause to have some relevance for the campus community. Therefore the overall sample consisted of 1359 four-year campuses.

The purpose of conducting analyses on this larger sample was to evaluate the extent to which campuses were vulnerable to anti-sweatshop movement activity by virtue of their connection to the AFL-CIO. By considering the factors that predict recruitment to the AFL-CIO’s Union Summer program and / or participation in the program, I generated information about the characteristics and contexts that made campuses vulnerable to collective-action and mobilization activities. In large part, the RP analyses were driven by a desire to overcome the inherent limitations of the CA sample size, with only 147 cases.

Independent Variables

The independent variables which I included in the RP sample consisted of the four general categories I included in the CA sample: 1) the history of or prior details surrounding aspects of campus mobilization; 2) the relationship of the campus to the broader anti-sweatshop movement; and 3) the compositional characteristics of campuses. The measures from these three categories were from secondary data sources and were available for this larger sample of cases. I chose to exclude only one of the prior campus
mobilization variables from the RP data which was included in the CA data. This excluded variable was the count of news coverage of campus mobilization from 1997-

Table 8. Means and Standard Deviations of Variables in the RP Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Description</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DV: Campus AFL-CIO Involvement Type</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History/Prior Campus Mobilization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-1969 Campus Riot or Disruption~</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count of Statues regarding Campus Political Restrictions on Dissent</td>
<td>4.49</td>
<td>2.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of Faculty Labor Union~</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of Graduate Student Labor Union~</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweatshop Issue Conditions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campus Athletic Funding (in million $)</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>4.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campus Characteristics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Student Enrollment (in 1000s)</td>
<td>6.41</td>
<td>7.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Type (Public)~</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious affiliation~</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional selectivity (reputation)</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent undergraduates receiving federal financial aid~</td>
<td>32.15</td>
<td>18.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Minority Student Enrollment</td>
<td>19.85</td>
<td>21.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent In-State Student Enrollment</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcomes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers Rights Consortium Member</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair Labor Association Member</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: N=1245; ~ indicates dummy variable

1998. From a data collection perspective this variable would have been the only primary data sourced variable, by virtue of it needing to be built from scratch. In order to create this variable I would have needed to conduct a content analysis of newspaper data for the 1100+ remaining campuses (or all of the 1359 campuses with the exception of the 149 campus I already had data for from the CA data set). The means and standard deviations for the variables in the RP sample are listed in Table 8.

Missing Data Analysis
**Selectivity measure.** The all four-year athletic campus sample (N=1359) had a consistent pattern of missing data on the institutional selectivity measure; with 101 campuses with missing data. When I examined the pattern of missing data, the selectivity missing data was associated with enrollment and institutional control. I looked more carefully at these 101 cases, and determined that 60% of them were religiously affiliated and 42 of the 46 theological seminaries in the overall RP sample were included among these missing data. Given that there was no apparent relationship in my exploratory CA analyses between mobilization and institutional religious affiliation, and that the movement itself had little relationship to religious ideals, I decided to drop these cases from my analysis.

**Federal financial aid.** Of the 27 cases that were missing data on the percentage of students receiving federal financial aid variable, I was able to produce imputed values for 19 cases by computing the mean of the percentage of student federal financial aid from 1999 and 2001. The remaining 8 missing cases were dropped from the RP analysis.

**Percentage in-state students.** Of the 19 cases with missing data on this variable, I was able to generate values for 9 cases by using the same values from the IPEDS 2001 data. The same residency data were not available for 1999 in IPEDS, so rather than generate a mean value based on 1999 and 2001 to impute a value for 2000, I simply used the 2001 values for 9 cases with available data. The remaining 10 missing cases were dropped from the analysis.

Aside from the missing data on these variables, there was also missing data for one case in the athletic spending variable; I also dropped this case. In total, I had 1245 usable cases for my analysis in the RP sample.
Dependent Measure

AFL-CIO level of involvement. As I described in the CA sample, the AFL-CIO level of involvement variable indicated whether a campus had no interaction of involvement with AFL-CIO (coded ‘0’); was only recruited to the Union Summer Program (coded ‘1’); participated in the Union Summer program (coded ‘2’); or was both recruited to and participated in the Union Summer program. The distribution across cases in each category of the level of AFL-CIO involvement variable in the RP sample was quite similar to the CA sample, with 70.28% of campuses having no AFL-CIO involvement (CA = 67.8%); 3.45% of campuses having been recruited by the AFL-CIO (CA=4%); 12.29% of campuses having participated in Union Summer (CA=10.7%), and 13.98% of campuses having both been recruited and having participated in Union Summer (CA=17.4%), see Table 8. The means and standard deviations were also extremely similar between the two samples, which bodes well for my ability to make inferences from the smaller sample after having been informed by the patterns emerging from the larger sample.

Analyses

Preliminary analyses. Initially I performed bivariate analyses on the RP sample data to compare the nature of campus background contexts and characteristics associated AFL-CIO level of involvement. These analyses included cross tabulations with chi-square statistical tests for categorical variables, and one-way analysis of variance for continuous variables. I also examined all pair-wise correlations of the variables included in the RP sample, and looked at the variance inflation factor scores to confirm that
 multicollinearity would not be problematic. The mean VIF = 1.94, with the majority of values were less than 2.0, and only 2 variables with a value between 3.0 – 3.5.

*Multivariate analyses.* The level of AFL-CIO involvement dependent variable was categorical, which made it suitable for a multinomial logistic regression model. This analytical technique was an appropriate choice because the AFL-CIO dependent variable was comprised of four distinctive categories (no AFL-CIO, recruited, participated, both), that were not ordered, and would therefore not satisfy the parallel regression assumption necessary to properly estimate an ordered logistic regression (Long, 1997). Further, multinomial logistic regression provides the analyst with the opportunity to estimate binary logits for each of the comparisons in the equation; multinomial logistic regression is effectively a multi-equation model. It is worth noting that a multinomial logit is superior to performing a series of binary logistic regressions because these individual equations would be based on differing sample sizes due to the varying number of cases on each level of the outcome variable; and thus, and inefficient process. Moreover, the multinomial regression model is a superior estimating technique because it creates these same comparisons as many binary logistic regressions, but does so by fitting them to one constant sample size.

In this study, the multinomial model allowed me to generate estimates for each of the independent variables based on the possibility of a campus having had some level of interaction/involvement (non-involvement) with the AFL-CIO. Specifically, the multinomial model I used compared each of the three distinctive types of AFL-CIO involvement (recruitment, participation, or both) with the outcome of no AFL-CIO
involvement; this no involvement group thus served as my base outcome and primary comparison group.

Formally, the multinomial regression model is represented as:

$$\ln \left[ \frac{Pr(Y=m|x)}{Pr(Y=b|x)} \right] = \alpha + xB_{m|b} + \epsilon \quad \text{for } m=1 \text{ to } J$$

Where Y refers to the probability of a particular type of AFL-CIO involvement, and ln is the natural log. Each of the outcome categories of AFL-CIO are represented by m, with J alternatives; in this case there are 3 distinctive outcome groups to be estimated (recruitment-only, participation-only, and recruitment-and-participation). The base outcome, represented by b, is the no AFL-CIO involvement reference group. The alpha and betas are parameters to be estimated, and the error is logistically distributed. The specification of a base outcome group is important to interpreting the odds ratios which are generated for each of the independent variables. The odds ratios for this multinomial model convey the odds of a particular level of AFL-CIO involvement occurring, relative to that event not occurring.

From the multinomial model generated in this RP sample, I sought to evaluate whether campus contexts and characteristics had a substantively different influence over the extent of AFL-CIO involvement. The results of this RP analysis were intended to serve as a type of exploratory analysis to better inform my work in creating a model that could predict campus mobilization in the CA sample. Working through some of these movement vulnerability issues on a larger RP sample would provide an improved starting point to pursue these more small scale analyses performed on the CA sample, where I could explore a number of civic engagement educational interventions.
Post-estimation analyses. In an effort to determine whether there were substantive differences between the types of movement vulnerability categorized in the AFL-CIO involvement variable, I performed the likelihood ratio test to determine whether all the coefficients, except the intercepts, for the various combinations of outcomes and reference groups were equal to zero. This test allowed me to determine whether I could combine or collapse categories of my outcome variable.

Modeling Mobilization on the CA Sample

Post-RP Sample Exploratory Analyses

Before establishing a full model of campus mobilization, I had to consider the CA exploratory analyses along side the results of the RP sample analyses. Based on the exploratory analyses in the CA sample, and the RP sample analyses, I first identified the significant background and control variables that were common to both sets of analyses. I then fitted a model with these common variables along with the AFL-CIO involvement type variable as a movement vulnerability control. I compared this model to a model with only the AFL-CIO involvement variables as the only predictor. Following the creation of a base-line model, I included the athletic expenditure independent variable as a conceptual control for the anti-sweatshop movement, and I calculated model fit statistics to examine the overall fit when including athletic spending.

In order to better rule out the remaining control variables that were significant in the CA exploratory analysis, and significant in the RP sample analyses, I generated models which included these few remaining variables (number of campus political restrictions on dissent, faculty and graduate student unions, and institutional type, percent minority student enrollment), and compared it against the baseline/athletic expenditure
model. I was able to confirm that these control variables (with the exception of one, percent of minority students enrolled) were not as useful as the ones I had already confirmed to be important predictors of mobilization in the base-line/athletic expenditure model. These additional analyses adequately prepared me to both empirically and conceptually develop a full model of campus mobilization.

*Full Model Specifications for Modeling Campus Mobilization*

In my last phase of analysis, I sought to generate a full model that included the campus characteristics contexts identified in the exploratory analyses, alongside the movement vulnerability variables, and curricular educational characteristics (my primary variables of interest). I generated a series of five, blocked binomial logistic regressions which calculated parameter estimates, and served as a basis for which I could compare the goodness-of-fit of each model as it was entered sequentially towards the development of my full binomial regression model.

Formally, my final, full blocked regression model of campus mobilization is best represented as:

$$\ln \left[ \frac{P}{(1-P)} \right] = \alpha + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_3 + \beta_4 X_4 + \beta_5 X_5 + \epsilon$$

Where P is the probability of campus mobilization, and (1-P) is the probability of no mobilization occurring; ln is the natural log. The alpha and betas are parameters to be estimated. The term $X_1$ is the AFL-CIO type of campus involvement; $X_2$ is the set of baseline variables indentified from the exploratory analyses; $X_3$ is the campus anti-sweatshop movement vulnerability variable, or total campus athletic expenditures; $X_4$ is the set of variables that were identified by the exploratory analyses to have significant, but differential effects on mobilization and AFL-CIO involvement outcomes (in this case...
percent of minority students enrolled) \(^ {22} \); and \( X_3 \) is the set of civic engagement, curricular variables of interest. The error is logistically distributed.

This modeling process involved generating restricted and unrestricted regression models, and using model fit statistics such as the likelihood ratio tests, pseudo \( R^2 \), and BIC, and other post-estimation techniques to assess which model better fit the observed data (Long, 1997). Specifically, I performed likelihood ratio tests, and considered the difference in BICs between models, with the inclusion of each block in the regression equation. With the use of such tests, I was also able to statistically isolate the variables that mattered most to my outcome. In turn, I was able to add precision and utility to my interpretation of the results which would allow me to make precise recommendations for practice.

**Hypothesis testing.** Given that my variables of interest were the educational characteristics that campuses utilize to foster students’ aptitude and capacity for civic engagement, I sought to use my analyses to understand the unique role of these educational characteristics. Therefore, I performed hypothesis tests. Specifically, I tested the equality of coefficients between the AFL-CIO involvement type variable and educational characteristic variables in the model. My objective was to test whether the effect of the AFL-CIO campus involvement on campus mobilization was equal to the effect of the educational characteristics of the campus (null hypothesis \( H_0: \beta_{\text{AFL-CIO involvement}} = \beta_{\text{educational characteristic}} \)).

\(^{22}\) Differential effect on mobilization and AFL-CIO involvement implies that the direction of the coefficients decreased the odds of mobilization in the CA sample exploratory analyses, and the same variable increased the odds of AFL-CIO type of involvement in the RP sample analyses.
Residual analysis. Again, since my CA sample had only 147 cases, it was important to examine the patterns of data that emerged. Accordingly, I examined the residuals of my full model of campus mobilization with the campus contexts, characteristics, vulnerability, and educational campus characteristic parameters.

Secondary Method: Qualitative Protest Event Analysis

The secondary method of my overall research design involved conducting a content and frame analysis of the 638 newspaper articles describing the anti-sweatshop collective action on twenty-three campuses in my CA sample. This analytical strategy was designed to help answer my research questions about the manner in which contemporary student activism was enacted and understood on campuses. What follows below is a discussion of the particular strategies I employed for analyzing my qualitative data.

Qualitative Data Preparation

Prior to conducting any coding I prepared a portfolio of information for each of the twenty-three cases which included the full text of newspaper articles, columns, editorials, daily briefings, etc. Along with the full text for each entry, I also catalogued the source name, author name, title of article, date of article, college or university named in the article, and the database from where I retrieved it (since I used multiple sources). In circumstances where several campuses were mentioned in one article (i.e. in The Chronicle of Higher Education), the article with multiple campus mentions was part of the portfolio of articles for each campus mentioned. For the first several campuses analyzed, I prepared three hard copies of the case packets; one for me, and one for the
two research assistants I had assisting me. Together, the three of us coded (this process is described in the following sections), compared, and refined our analyses in such a manner that we were able to obtain a very complete and through coding of the data (especially for cases which were quite large), and were able to resolve inconsistencies in the coding process. After the three of us became consistent, we then transition to a process where I had only one research assistant coding along side me for the remaining campuses.

Newspaper data content analysis. The overall objective in the qualitative portion of my study was to: 1) describe the prevailing organizational patterns for enacting contemporary student activism across the twenty-three mobilized campuses; and 2) to narrow in on the unique contexts, or local campus meanings related to collective action; and to consider these local contexts alongside one another to look for patterns and themes that spoke to some of the internal contextualized organizational forces that exert an influence on contemporary student activism. Like other researchers before me (Einwhoner & Spencer, 2005), I deliberately chose to use newspapers as my data sources because they are collective or social representation of events which offer access to local actors’ impressions of the anti-sweatshop problem and their responses to it. Newspaper reporting of anti-sweatshop related events and rhetoric involves a range of organizational members, from student activists, faculty, general (non-activist) students, administrators,

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23 Prior to conducting qualitative analysis, I spent several weeks training my two research assistants. I prepared them by reading and discussing relevant literature related to the anti-sweatshop movement and qualitative analysis. After providing this background, we practiced coding excerpted portions of articles to align our perspectives and processes.

24 My decision to include only one additional coder, rather than two, was a practical choice. One of my undergraduate research assistants became sick and had to leave campus for several weeks to recuperate. Given the significant amount of training time I would have had to invest in preparing another student to assist me, I dropped back to one additional coder. When the second student returned to campus, he assisted me with the remaining campuses needing to be analyzed.
alumni, and contracted vendors, culminating into a type of “community forum”
(Einwhoner & Spencer, 2005, p. 254).

Analytical Process

In the qualitative portion of my study, all cases were evaluated systematically and objectively according to four content categories which are typically associated with protest event analysis. The categories consisted of information describing: 1) the mobilization group; 2) the targets of the claims (board of trustees, administration, president, etc.); 3) the claims the mobilization group were attempting to advance; and 4) the intensity of mobilization. My selection of these categories was informed by both the background literature and by conducting a pilot phase of coding newspaper data prior to developing this study. When theory informs the creation of coding categories a priori, content analysis is the most appropriate analytical technique (Neuendorf, 2002; Stage & Manning, 2003); therefore my analytic strategy was primarily content analysis, with some more precise applications of it as well.

The four categories (mobilizing groups, targets, claims, intensity) as a collective whole spoke to the two dimensions of contemporary students’ activism that I sought to evaluate – how it was enacted and how it was understood in the context of the local culture of the campus. In newspaper reporting, the mobilizing groups and targets categories, along with descriptions of campus tactics were often objectively reported in the article text, which allowed for a rather routine identification of these elements. However with respect to my other two categories of interest, intensity and claims, details were reported with less uniformity since these involve more evocative aspects of
movements rather than basic story elements of who’s complaining about who (mobilizing group and target), and what did they do to express these concerns (petition, protest, etc.).

Intensity. With respect to the intensity category, it is essentially an aspect of movement action which relies heavily on assessing the severity of tactics utilized. Consequently, intensity is best understood when analyzed in the context of the other aforementioned movement elements. Those things that are considered ‘intense’ on one campus may be considered ordinary on another, after considering the local contextualized meaning of movement activities comprehensively. Newspapers do not uniformly report intensity in each article, thus the analysis of intensity requires a subjective evaluation of the various elements of social movement activity (Olzak, 1989). To assess intensity, we identified units of text which described tactical details denoting the scale (or size) of a described event, the duration of the event, the local (campus) level of controversy or concern over the way the students were pursuing their claims, and the timing or level of strategic organization on the part of the students mobilizing. I derived these criteria from prior social movement research that focused on similar operational interpretations of intensity, and conform to established definitions of social movement intensity which involve size, violence, and duration (Myers & Caniglia, 2004; Snyder & Kelly, 1977).

Claims. Identifying the local understanding of movement claims also involved a greater degree of subjectivity over cataloguing the mobilizing groups, targets, and tactics, and thus required the incorporation of a frame analytic technique. Frame analysis in the study of social movements is well established, and functions to give analytical attention to the common interpretations that social movement actors attribute to a situation (Benford, 1997; Benford & Snow, 2000; Johnston, 2002; Johnston & Noakes, 2005;
Benford and Snow (2000) specify the active nature of framing processes; in that, ideas are not merely static perspectives, but guiding frames influence how collective action takes shape from ideas. Frame analysis is distinctive from framing processes however, as the analysis provides a means by which the researcher can examine the “meanings associated with relevant events, activities, places, and actors” (Snow & Lessor, p. 6). Often in newspaper data, frame analysis is used to sort out ‘common knowledge,’ or “what people think and how they structure their ideas, feelings, and beliefs about political issues” (Neuman, Just, & Crigler, 1992, p. 3). Frame analysis of newspaper data in this study was implemented by engaging in a review of the full text of all materials for each case, as a way of capturing the meaning that each local campus community attributed to students’ collective mobilization.

The frame analysis portion of my study was designed to expand Einwhoner and Spencer’s (2005) research methodology to a larger set of cases. Their analysis was limited to a full text review of campus newspaper texts on the topic of student anti-sweatshop mobilization for two campuses. I conducted this type of analysis for all twenty-three mobilized campuses in my CA sample. Einwhoner and Spencer’s analytical approach consisted of repeated readings of the text, identifying themes, rereading texts, and further refining themes into analytical categories; essentially applying an inductive, modified grounded theory approach (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Their analytical purpose was to identify concepts that spoke to the local culture of each campus, and to identify units of text that provided evidence of “locally bounded understandings of the problem of sweatshops,” and “local actors’ sense of how the problem should be solved in each
community” (Einwhoner & Spencer, p. 254), I used the same approach. In their study, Einwhoner and Spencer noted that the frames that emerged from their newspaper analysis served as “particularly clear examples of meaning-making in each campus environment, and therefore help illustrate the local ‘culture-in-practice’ at each school” (p. 252).

Coding and Categorization Process

The coding and categorization process of content analysis was born from a conventional approach to research (Stage & Manning, 2003). Historically, content analysis emerged out of the need to quantify newspaper events for statistical purposes, but it has since evolved substantially allowing the researcher to make interpretations according to theoretical frames of reference (Krippendorff, 2004).

In order to systematically code the content of the cases, each case portfolio was read and reread in its entirety. During each reading, coders identified units of text which provided information about each of the four a priori categories (mobilizing groups, targets, claims, intensity). Following the identification of units of text, labels were generated to classify units that represented a theme under the broad heading of one of the four categories (Neuendorf, 2002). Following multiple readings, unit identification, and theme labeling, we generated a written summary profile for each case with bulleted codes and units of text under each of the four category headings. In order to make sense of the story of each case, the researchers also produced a written timeline of the student anti-sweatshop movement activities on the case summary notes. These timelines were especially useful for considering the four categories of movement activity in relationship to one another, and ultimately ended up being quite helpful tools in the more advanced stages of the analysis. Additionally and importantly, each case profile included an
interpretative and integrative prose section which infused elements of the four categories together to generate a more comprehensive narrative (Weiss, 1994) regarding the locally understood claims and intensity of the local student mobilization. The prominent integrative themes were identified as headers in the prose sections.

With the addition of each case, the themes that emerged from the coding were revised, supplemented, and refined. All themes were entered into a spreadsheet with a working descriptor of the idea, along with a field denoting which of the four categories the theme was classified under. This iterative process of developing themes involved inductive evaluations of the coded units of text, that resembles a grounded theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) approach (yet the process could not be construed as grounded theory since the initial categorization process was decided a priori). Throughout the theme development process, columns were added for each of the twenty-three cases and each campus was tagged indicating whether the theme was present. This process of cataloguing is in fact one of the merits of content analysis which proves itself so useful for organizational level studies. The analysis phase included theme tagging such that it was easy to assess the prevalence or patterns of the data across the twenty-three mobilized campuses.

Integration and Summation

The extent to which the coding and categorization process was iterative and cumulative can not be understated. With the analysis of each case, it was also necessary to revisit the other case texts, as well as the units, codes, and themes that had already been identified to evaluate the level of precision and distinction of any particular theme that was created. Further, throughout this coding and analysis phase I was careful to
take notes and construct memorandums about my overall impressions of the data across campuses and between the four categories (mobilizing groups, targets, claims, intensity). Also, the involvement of my research assistants was profoundly constructive; among the various forms of support to my analytical process, we engaged in a continuous conceptual dialogue about the patterns developing across cases.

The later stages of my analysis involved very intentional cross-case comparisons in order to build abstractions that could offer generalized explanations (Merriam, 1998) of the four movement phenomenon (mobilizing groups, targets, claims, intensity). In this phase I generated larger headings which clustered themes into broader constructs. I consulted the case summaries extensively, and looked at the sequencing of movement activities across cases to determine if there were salient emerging patterns in the way groups acted, claims were pursued, targets identified, or the intensity of the movement manifested.

Limitations

Before presenting the results of this study it is useful to pause and acknowledge some of the potential limitations associated with the manner in which this study was constructed. First, the two sample construction of this study is perhaps the most imposing limitation on any inferences drawn from this study. With a larger sample, it would be suitable to specify a structural equation model that could account for the iterative nature that the organizational characteristics and contexts have to a campus’s AFL-CIO involvement, and the potential direct and indirect effects that these potential pathways have on subsequently predicting campus mobilization. The challenge for constructing
such a model is based primarily in the intensive resources necessary to construct a data set that could account for all the independent variables in the CA sample.

Other potential limitations could perhaps also be remedied through sampling as well. At the outset of this study, I simply did not know the distribution of my primary dependent variable – the presence of anti-sweatshop campus mobilization. The creation of this variable was only accessible through qualitative analytical techniques to ensure that each news article referencing a form of mobilization fit all the criteria to be included as evidence of anti-sweatshop mobilization. The process of evaluating all the news obtained from doing targeted searches of the news indexes resulted in several articles being eliminated. This process certainly showcased that it is not sufficient to trust search engines to determine pertinent matches; all documents retrieved (news articles in this case) must be examined for quality and relevance. As a result of these data realities, scaling the sample size up is a crucial matter of resource availability. Even in light of these limitations, this study is still sufficiently worthy of contributing useful insights for theory and practice.

Summary

The methodology of this study utilized multiple sets of data and analytical approaches. The CA sample consisted of 147 cases and was used to explore questions about campus mobilization, considering basic comparisons of campuses that mobilized with those that did not; and the relative role various campus characteristics and contexts had in encouraging the probability of mobilization. The CA sample, was also used to generate an embedded qualitative methodology to explore the localized enactment and understanding of contemporary campus mobilization on the 23 campuses where it
occurred between 1998-2002. The RP sample analyses were used a supplemental approach to expose some of the potential limitations of the small size of the CA sample. In particular, the RP sample considered the campus characteristics most closely associated with movement vulnerability.
CHAPTER V

QUANTITATIVE RESULTS

Overview

This chapter provides results generated from all phases of the quantitative analyses performed in this study. The first section provides findings which emerged from the exploratory CA sample (N=147) analyses. I present the bivariate analyses as a way of painting a portrait of the campus characteristics and contexts which are typically associated with campuses that engage in contemporary mobilization. I then provide the results derived from a series of exploratory multivariate analysis in the CA sample. These exploratory analyses were used to consider each of the five conceptual clusters of variables separately (prior history, movement vulnerability, campus compositional characteristics, curricular interventions, co-curricular interventions) relative to the outcome of campus mobilization. Following these exploratory multivariate analyses, I present findings from the RP sample (N=1245) which convey a more nuanced understanding of organizational factors contributing to campuses’ movement vulnerability. Finally, I return to the CA sample, with the insights gleaned from the exploratory CA sample analyses. In the final regression model performed on the CA sample, I present the findings gleaned from a full model of campus mobilization using a five-level blocked binomial logistic regression. In brief, the models demonstrate that the
external institutional influence of the AFL-CIO is equivalent to the influence of particular
campus curricular interventions in terms of predicting whether student mobilization will
occur on campus.

**Bivariate Results: The Nature of Contemporary Student Mobilization**

The results in this section are derived from the quantitative analyses performed on
the CA sample, N= 147. These data compare the campus characteristics and contexts of
those campuses that engaged in contemporary mobilization contrasted against those that
did not.

**Prior Campus Mobilization**

More than half of the campuses that mobilized in the anti-sweatshop campaign
were among those that also mobilized in the civil- rights era, as evidenced by the 56.5%
of campuses that also had a campus riot or disruption between 1967 – 1969 (Table 9).
Only 10% of the non-mobilized group of campuses had a history of civil-rights era
disruption. This relationship between prior campus disruption and contemporary
mobilization was also substantially correlated with a Pearson correlation coefficient of $R^2$
= 0.440 ($p < 0.000$), see Table 9.

Campuses that mobilized around the anti-sweatshop cause between 1998–2002
were also inclined to have a greater number of student collective-action events pertaining
to other campus issues (non anti-sweatshop mobilization) during the year prior to the
anti-sweatshop movement. Mobilized campuses had an average of 8 events, whereas non-
mobilized campuses had, on average, less than 1 event. The correlation between
1997–1998 mobilization and anti-sweatshop mobilized was 0.364 ($p < 0.001$, see Table
9). Mobilized campuses also differed in the extent to which they had graduate student
unions, 30.4% of mobilized campuses compared to only 3.2% of the non-mobilized campuses had graduate student labor unions; this difference was significant with a correlation of 0.377 ($p < 0.001$). There were also contrasts in the percentage of campuses with faculty unions, with a greater percentage (21%) of non-mobilized campuses having faculty labor unions (compared to only 8.7% of mobilized campuses). Despite the sheer comparison of the percentages being seemingly different, they were not significantly different. Both mobilized and non-mobilized campuses had, on average, 5 political restrictions to which they were subjected to on account of state law.

Table 9. Comparison of Mobilized to Non-Mobilized Campuses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prior Campus Mobilization</th>
<th>$d$ Did Not Mobilize</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1967-1969 Campus Riot or Disruption--</td>
<td>56.50% ***</td>
<td>10.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count of Statues regarding Campus Political Restrictions on Dissent</td>
<td>5.08</td>
<td>4.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of Faculty Labor Union--</td>
<td>8.70%</td>
<td>21.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of Graduate Student Labor Union--</td>
<td>30.40% ***</td>
<td>3.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count of News Coverage of Campus Mobilization 1997-1998</td>
<td>8.35</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sweatshop Issue Conditions

| Type of AFL-CIO Union Summer Campus Involvement | 2.38 *** | 0.49 | 0.79 |
| Campus Athletic Funding (in million $) | 8.71 *** | 1.54 | 2.61 |

Campus Characteristics

| Total Student Enrollment (in 1000s) | 15.36 *** | 5.77 | 7.22 |
| Institutional Type (Public)-- | 39.10% | 41.10% | 42.00% |
| Religious affiliation-- | 21.70% | 36.30% | 33.56% |
| Institutional selectivity (reputation) | 2.3 *** | 1.36 | 1.50 |
| Percent undergraduates receiving federal financial aid | 20.09% *** | 31.14% | 29.87% |
| Percent Minority Student Enrollment | 19.83% | 20.48% | 20.50% |
| Percent In-State Student Enrollment | 48.92% ** | 68.77% | 65.80% |

Civic Engagement - Curricular Focus

| Diversity Requirement in Undergraduate General Education Curriculum-- | 60.90% * | 33.10% | 38.00% |
| Average Number of Area Study degree recipients 98-02 | 44.67 ** | 2.23 | 8.75 |
| Area Studies Emphasis | 32 *** | 6.99 | 10.76 |

Civic Engagement - Co-curricular Focus

| Student Organization Participation Index | 0.024 | 0.025 | 0.02 |
| Campus Compact Member 98-02-- | 47.80% | 30.60% | 33.00% |
| LSAHE Grant Recipient 98-02-- | 47.80% * | 26.60% | 30.00% |

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
~Denotes dichotomous dummy variable
Anti-Sweatshop Movement Vulnerability

As is to be expected, mobilized campuses exhibited a much greater financial stake in the athletic apparel manufacturing issue, averaging expenditures of $8.71 million, to the non-mobilized campus average of only $1.54 million. Additionally, the bivariate analyses indicated that the mobilized campuses had a much stronger connection to the AFL-CIO as demonstrated by a mean of 2.39; which indicated that mobilized campuses were much more inclined to have been recruited to and / or participated in Union Summer. Non-mobilized campuses had a mean of 0.49 indicating their relatively lower inclination to have had some type of AFL-CIO involvement.

It is interesting to consider these AFL-CIO involvement figures in terms of raw numbers (see Table 10). It has been argued before that AFL-CIO was instrumental in advancing its broad labor agenda in the apparel industry by targeting colleges and universities to engage in labor organizing (Van Dyke et al., 2007). Of the 16 campuses that participated in Union Summer, only one-fourth of them mobilized in the anti-sweatshop movement, and the remaining three-fourths did not. Similarly, only one-third of the AFL-CIO recruited campuses subsequently mobilized. Although the sample size was small, one might speculate, that based on these data, recruitment to Union Summer was just as useful (or perhaps even slightly more useful) of an approach as participation in terms of encouraging subsequent anti-sweatshop mobilization. These data were somewhat counterintuitive, since one might assume that participation on its own would build skills for organizing, and cultivate a depth of knowledge of the issues – both essential tools for generating a campus campaign. It seems that recruitment by
Table 10. Cross Tabulation of Campus Mobilization and Level of Union Summer Involvement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mobilization Type:</th>
<th>No AFL-CIO Involvement</th>
<th>Recruited for Union Summer</th>
<th>Participated in Union Summer</th>
<th>Recruited to &amp; Participated in Union Summer</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nonmobilized campuses</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Mobilization</td>
<td>78.6%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within AFL-CIO Union Summer Recruitment</td>
<td>98.0%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>75.0%</td>
<td>42.3%</td>
<td>84.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>66.4%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>84.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mobilized campuses</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Mobilization</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
<td>65.2%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within AFL-CIO Union Summer Recruitment</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>57.7%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>101</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Mobilization</td>
<td>67.8%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within AFL-CIO Union Summer Recruitment</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>67.8%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
comparison, based only on these bivariate statistics, was approximately as productive as participation for fostering campus mobilization.

In cases where campuses were recruited and also chose to participate in Union Summer, more than half (57.7%) of them ultimately pursued an anti-sweatshop campaign on campus (Table 10). These numbers seem to suggest that the combination of recruitment to and participation in the union Summer program were especially important to furthering the student anti-sweatshop movement.

Looking at the three different types of AFL-CIO involvement (recruitment-only, participation-only, and recruitment-and-participation) and seeing the near equivalent levels of subsequent mobilization for the recruitment-only and participation-only groups, along with the close to doubling of subsequent mobilization for the recruitment-and-participation group; it seems that there might in fact be an identification of two types of channeling influences. The influence that might come from recruitment would be a more of a framing or ideological influence; and the influence that comes from participation may in fact be more functional and skill based. Each would have a particular effect, but in tandem they extend to integrate both the cognitive and affective dimensions necessary to thoroughly motivate collective organizing. I will return to additional data that provide information about these issues in the multivariate presentation of the results.

**Compositional Characteristics of Mobilized Campuses**

Structurally campuses that mobilized, compared to their non-mobilized peer institutions, had three times the enrollment, with an average enrollment of 15,356 (non-mobilized average enrollment = 5,770). With respect to institutional selectivity, mobilized campuses included a greater number of “high” or “most” competitive schools,
with a mean of 2.3, compared to the less competitive schools comprising the ranks of the non-mobilized (mean = 1.36). Additionally, according to the percentage of in-state student enrollment, mobilized campuses were more cosmopolitan with the average in-state student enrollment being 20 percentage points (48.92%) below that of non-mobilized campuses (68.77%). Mobilized campuses tended to be comprised of a student body which was slightly more affluent than their non-mobilized institutional peers.

Roughly 22% of mobilized campuses had students receiving federal financial aid, while 31% of the non-mobilized campuses had students receiving a comparable form of financial aid, which indicated that greater financial need was concentrated within the non-mobilized campuses. Across all the campus compositional characteristics I considered in my analyses, selectivity/reputation and then, institutional size were the most strongly correlated with mobilization, with $R^2 = 0.458$ (p < 0.000), and $R^2 = 0.447$, (p ≤ 0.000), respectively.

Civic Engagement Educational Efforts

Curricular interventions. The comparison of mobilized and non-mobilized campuses yields stark contrasts in terms of the relative extent to which mobilized campuses adopted institutionalized practices intended to generate desirable civic engagement educational outcomes. As was evident in Table 9, the majority of campuses that mobilized (61%) adopted diversity requirements in their general undergraduate education requirements, whereas only 33% of the non-mobilized campuses did so.

Similarly, campuses that mobilized had far more students completing degrees in an area studies field, with on average, 45 students annually compared to just 2 students annually from the non-mobilized campuses. Also, mobilized campuses not only produced more
area studies degree recipients, but their curricular offerings reflected greater variety to incorporate interdisciplinary perspectives into students’ academic programs. On average, campuses that mobilized had an area studies emphasis value of 32, compared to the non-mobilized campuses with a value of 6.88. Recall, that these values were a weighted measure of the extent to which a campus offered majors or minors in area studies and situated them organizationally as departments, programs, or interdisciplinary offerings; therefore, the larger values denoted that mobilized campuses typically had more extensive area studies academic offerings. Further, the area studies curricular offerings were supported institutionally with a greater degree of formal organizational structure, with the higher score more likely to include formalized departments.

Among the variables I considered in this study, the area studies variables yielded some of the largest correlations to campus mobilization ($R^2 = 0.502$, $p \leq 0.000$ for the number of area studies degree recipients; and $R^2 = 0.559$, $p \leq 0.000$ for the area studies emphasis). The magnitude of these correlations far exceeded any of the respective correlations between mobilization and the campus compositional characteristic variables or the prior history of campus mobilization characteristics. Further, the notable correlations observed for the area studies variables, along with the significant correlation between mobilization and campus diversity requirements suggests that institutionalized civic engagement efforts embedded in the curriculum assert an important role in fostering an educational context that facilitates mobilization and collective action.

**Co-curricular interventions.** The other campus co-curricular educational contexts I examined, which held the potential to exhibit a relationship to student mobilization, provided signs of only a modest relationship. The extent to which students had ample
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>DV: Campus Mobilization~</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1967-1969 Campus Riot or Disruption~</td>
<td>0.44***</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Count of Statues regarding Campus Political Restrictions on Dissent</td>
<td>-0.112</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Presence of Faculty Labor Union~</td>
<td>-0.110</td>
<td>-0.040</td>
<td>-0.047</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>-0.117</td>
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<td>-0.020</td>
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<td>0.049</td>
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<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.098</td>
<td>0.166</td>
<td>0.152</td>
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<td>0.464***</td>
<td>0.425***</td>
<td>0.568***</td>
<td>0.547***</td>
<td>0.542***</td>
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<td>-0.195</td>
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<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>-0.025</td>
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<td>0.065</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.170</td>
<td>-0.292***</td>
<td>0.253***</td>
<td>-0.292***</td>
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N= 147; Notes: ~ indicates dummy variable; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
Table 11. Correlations of Variables in Collective Action Sample (continued)

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<td>1967-1969 Campus Riot or Disruption~</td>
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<td>Percent Minority Student Enrollment</td>
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<td>Diversity Requirement in Undergraduate General Education Curriculum~</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.109</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

N= 147; Notes: ~ indicates dummy variable; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
opportunities for getting involved in clubs and organizations was nearly identical on both mobilized and non-mobilized campuses. With respect to service learning, being an institutional member of Campus Compact was not a distinguishing characteristic for mobilized and non-mobilized campuses. However, nearly half (47.8%) of the mobilized campuses were also those institutions that received a grant from Learn and Serve America Higher Education (LSAHE). These grants were based on the institution’s prior commitment to service learning, as well as the merits of their proposed projects to advance their institutional commitment and scale of their service-learning efforts. Only one-fourth (26.2%) of the non-mobilized campuses received similar grants. Therefore, based on these data, it appears that campuses that mobilized were also among those that were likely to adopt in-depth and comprehensive service-learning programs in their educational communities.

*Exploratory Results from the Collective-Action Sample*

Given that my CA sample consisted of 147 cases, and I only 23 of these campuses mobilized, I had to very carefully scrutinize the independent variables in my models to properly identify those which have an important role in predicting the likelihood of mobilization. As a result, my first task was to perform exploratory analyses as a way of understanding the relationships between my five conceptual clusters of variables and campus mobilization. I generated five distinct binomial regression models to determine whether a significant relationship existed between each specific conceptual cluster [a) background of mobilization; b) movement vulnerability; c) campus compositional characteristics; d) curricular contexts; and e) co-curricular contexts] and campus mobilization. By identifying those clusters of variable that had an important relationship
to contemporary mobilization, I could determine which clusters were worthy of greater examination and scrutiny, and were thus appropriate for use in a subsequent full model of campus mobilization. On a basic level, the results generated by these five exploratory models were included as part of my overall analytical process simply to help me explore and conceptualize the patterns of relationships between variables, before further elaborating a final and full model of mobilization. The results in this section walk the reader through these five separate exploratory regression models. In subsequent sections of the results (and following a presentation of the results from the RP sample analyses), a full model of mobilization that is presented using the insights gathered from this exploratory phase.

*Note on reporting results.* In the following paragraphs, I discuss results mainly in terms of odds ratios. Specifically, reporting odds ratios allows me to describe the relationship between a one-unit change of a particular independent (predictor) variable relative to the change in odds of my dependent variable. In the following models, the reported odds ratios specify the probability that a campus will experience mobilization divided by the probability that no mobilization will occur. Specifically, an odds ratio is determined by transforming the logged odds coefficients generated in a logistic regression model; in very practical terms, this requires exponentiating the regression coefficients to showcase the relationship of the independent variables on the odds of an event occurring or not occurring (Pampel, 2000). Moreover, when considering the magnitude of an odds ratio associated with a predictor variable, when using an exponentiated coefficient there is a multiplicative effect (J. S. Long, 1997; Pampel, 2000). Those odds ratios which are less than 1.0 signify a reduction in the odds that an
event will occur (in this case mobilization); and conversely, those results indicating an odds ratio greater than 1.0 convey an increased likelihood that the event (mobilization) will occur (Pampel, 2000). The percentage change in odds is another useful metric when reporting results derived from the odds ratio metric. Reporting percentage change in odds is determined by taking the odds ratio (or exponentiated coefficient) and subtracting 1, and then multiplying it by 100. Formally, this is described as:

\[
\% \Delta = (e^b - 1) \times 100
\]

For example, if an independent variable has an odds ratio of \(e^b = 1.50\), then there is a 50% increase in the odds of an event occurring when the independent variable increases by 1 unit ceteris paribus.

**Exploratory Model A: History and Prior Mobilization Characteristics**

Among the prior campus mobilization characteristics I considered in my study, the campus history of 1967–1969 mobilization and the count of political restrictions on dissent both exhibited a significant relationship to contemporary mobilization (Table 12). When holding all the other prior mobilization characteristics constant, campuses that had a history of disruption during the civil-rights era had 5.74 higher odds of exhibiting contemporary mobilization, compared to campuses that did not organize in the civil-rights era. Stated another way, the odds of students engaging in collective action regarding the anti-sweatshop movement were 474% greater when campuses had a background of civil-rights era protest activity.
Table 12. *Estimating Contemporary Mobilization with Prior Mobilization History*

| Variable                                           | Odds Ratio | Robust Std. Error | z     | P>|z|  | Odds Ratio 95% Confidence Interval |
|----------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------------|-------|------|----------------------------------|
| 1967-1969 Campus Riot or Disruption~               | 5.7422     | 4.6252            | 2.1700| 0.0300 | 1.1843 27.8418                   |
| Count of Statues regarding Campus Political Restrictions on Dissent | 0.7290     | 0.0940            | -2.4500| 0.0140 | 0.5661 0.9387                   |
| Presence of Faculty Labor Union~                   | 0.2648     | 0.2918            | -1.2100| 0.2280 | 0.0306 2.2948                   |
| Presence of Graduate Student Labor Union~         | 2.6022     | 4.4752            | 0.5600| 0.5780 | 0.0894 75.7209                  |
| Count of News Coverage of Campus Mobilization 1997-1998 | 1.4135     | 0.3368            | 1.4500| 0.1460 | 0.8861 2.2548                   |

Number of Observations | 147  
Log pseudolikelihood | -40.95  
Wald Chi-square with 5 df | 17.23  
Prob >Chi-square | 0.0041  
Pseudo R-square | 0.3578

Campuses situated in states where they were subjected to fewer statutes regarding political restrictions on dissent were more likely to engage in contemporary mobilization. Specifically, after holding all other prior mobilization characteristics constant, each additional statutory restriction lowered the odds of contemporary mobilization by a factor of 0.73. Table 13 outlines the specific probabilities associated with the varying number of political restrictions on dissent when the other prior mobilization independent variables were set to their means. Based on Table 13 it is evident that in circumstances where campuses exist in states without political restrictions on dissent, the probability of contemporary mobilization was 0.36. In campuses with a range of 3 to 5 political restrictions on dissent, the predicted probability of contemporary mobilization was between 0.18 and 0.10; and for campuses with 6 or more political restriction on dissent, the predicted probability of contemporary mobilization falls to less than 0.08 (see Table 13). Alternatively, in circumstances where a campus had both a history of civil-rights era protest (remember odds of mobilization increase, see above), and campuses resided in a location where there were no restrictions on political dissent (holding all other
background characteristics constant at the mean), the predicted probability of mobilization was as high as 0.70 (marginal effect, -0.0661).

Table 13. Predicted Probability of Mobilization Based on the Number of State Political Restrictions on Dissent

<table>
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<th>No. of Restrictions</th>
<th>Pr(Mobilization)</th>
<th>Marginal effect</th>
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<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.3589</td>
<td>-0.0727</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0.2899</td>
<td>-0.0651</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>0.2293</td>
<td>-0.0559</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>0.1783</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>0.1366</td>
<td>-0.0373</td>
</tr>
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<td>5</td>
<td>0.1034</td>
<td>-0.0293</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>0.0775</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<td>-0.0129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.0315</td>
<td>-0.0097</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* All other history/background characteristics are set to their means (1967-1969 disruption, faculty union, graduate student union, 1997-1998 prior activism).

**Exploratory Model B: Movement Vulnerability**

The movement vulnerability characteristics I considered in my analyses had a dramatic relationship to the probability of anti-sweatshop mobilization. Holding other variables constant, for each individual unit increase in the level of AFL-CIO with a campus (‘0’ no AFL-CIO involvement; ‘1’ campus recruited to Union Summer by AFL-CIO; ‘2’ campus participated in Union Summer; and ‘3’ campus was both recruited to and participated in Union Summer); the odds of subsequent mobilization increased by a factor of 3.25 compared to the odds of not mobilizing (see Table 14). Stated another way the odds of a campus mobilizing in the anti-sweatshop movement increased 225.3% when a campus had involvement with the AFL-CIO Union Summer program. This
finding indicates that any influence from the AFL-CIO vastly increased the likelihood that a campus would mobilize in the anti-sweatshop cause.

When considering the other institutional vulnerability variable, campus athletic expenditures, it functioned in the manner that was to be expected; holding the AFL-CIO variable constant, each additional dollar of athletic expenditure increased the odds of campus mobilization by a factor of 1.23. Moreover, the greater the athletic spending, the more vulnerable or at risk the institution became to experiencing student collective action.

Table 14. *Estimative the Probability of Mobilization Using Movement Vulnerability Characteristics*

| Variable                                      | Odds Ratio | Std. Error | z    | P>|z| | Odds Ratio 95% Confidence Interval |
|-----------------------------------------------|------------|------------|------|------|-------------------------------|
| Campus Involvement with AFL-CIO Union Summer Program | 3.2534     | 0.8262     | 4.650 | 0.0000 | 1.9778 5.3518 |
| Campus Athletic Funding (in million $)         | 1.2361     | 0.0936     | 2.800 | 0.0050 | 1.0657 1.4338 |

Overall, in terms of assessing institutional vulnerability to the sweatshop issue, AFL-CIO involvement and athletic expenditures provided strong momentum for increasing the odds that a campus will mobilize. However, it is more useful to consider the manner in which each level of AFL-CIO involvement interacted with campus athletic expenditures to produce a predicted probability of anti-sweatshop mobilization; Figure 3 provides this interpretation graphically. When examining Figure 3, it is apparent that the athletic expenditure variable, independent of the AFL-CIO influence, set a campus on a modest path to potential mobilization; see the bottom line (square marker). Simply stated, the greater the spending, the greater the predicted probability of subsequent anti-sweatshop mobilization. Basically, athletic spending on its own, at the highest levels
created a fifty-fifty chance that subsequent mobilization would occur (Figure 3, square tagged line).

**Figure 3. Predicted Probability of Mobilization Based on Campus Vulnerability to the Anti-Sweatshop Movement**

In the upper three lines of Figure 3, where the AFL-CIO influence emerged, the campus vulnerability to the anti-sweatshop movement increased, and the predicted probability of mobilization increased sharply with each added level of AFL-CIO involvement. When a campus was merely recruited to Union Summer (triangle symbol) but did not actually participate in it, the probability of mobilization rose above 0.50 at about the $15 million dollar mark. For those campuses that chose to participate in AFL-CIO’s Union Summer program (even though they weren’t recruited, denoted by the dash symbol in Figure 3), the probability of mobilization rose above 0.50 at roughly the $9 million-dollar level of athletic expenditures. In cases where campuses were recruited by
the AFL-CIO for the Union Summer program, and subsequently participated, the chance of mobilization was much greater despite their much lower levels of vulnerability on account of their athletic expenditures. When campuses were recruited to and participated in Union Summer the probability of mobilization surpassed the 0.50 probability level with athletic expenditures of only $3 million dollars; further, when these campuses were at the $10.25 million dollar expenditure level, the probability of mobilization was 0.75 and continued to edge well above that level as campus athletic spending increased (see diamond tagged line).

**Exploratory Model C: Structural Campus Compositional Characteristics**

Institutional size and selectivity (or reputation) both increased the likelihood that a campus would mobilize; meaning larger institutions exhibited higher odds of experiencing contemporary mobilization as did more selective institutions (Table 15). Holding all other variables constant, the odds of mobilization (compared to the odds of not mobilizing) increased by a factor of 1.45 for each one percentage point increase in total student enrollment; and for each one-unit change in institutional selectivity (moving from low – to medium – then to high competitiveness) the odds of a campus experiencing mobilization increased by a factor of 6.09.
Table 15. *Campus Characteristic Estimates of the Probability of Contemporary Mobilization*

| Variable                                         | Robust Odds Ratio | Std. Error | z    | P>|z| | Odds Ratio 95% Confidence Interval |
|--------------------------------------------------|-------------------|------------|------|------|-----------------------------|
| Total Student Enrollment (in 1000s)              | 1.4534            | 0.1261     | 4.3100 | 0.0000 | 1.2262 - 1.7229           |
| Institutional Type (Public)-                     | 0.2658            | 0.3102     | -1.1400 | 0.2560 | 0.0270 - 2.6171          |
| Religious affiliation-                          | 1.1336            | 1.0003     | 0.1400 | 0.8870 | 0.2011 - 6.3904         |
| Institutional selectivity (reputation)          | 6.0913            | 4.2969     | 2.5600 | 0.0100 | 1.5285 - 24.2750        |
| Percent undergraduates receiving federal financial aid | 1.0599           | 0.0321     | 1.9200 | 0.0550 | 0.9989 - 1.1247         |
| Percent Minority Student Enrollment              | 0.8987            | 0.0502     | -1.9100 | 0.0560 | 0.8054 - 1.0027         |
| Percent In-State Student Enrollment              | 0.0070            | 0.0143     | -2.4300 | 0.0150 | 0.0001 - 0.3841        |

Number of Observations 147
Log pseudolikelihood -30.0635
Wald Chi-square with 5 df 67.4000
Prob >Chi-square 0.0000
Pseudo R-square 0.5285

Figure 4. *Predicted Probability of Mobilization Based on Institutional Size & Selectivity*
To better understand the relationship of institutional size and selectivity relative to the chance that a campus would mobilize, it is useful to consider the data patterns graphically. For the very large campuses, the predicted probability of mobilization stayed nearly constant above 0.80 once enrollment exceeded about twenty-seven thousand students (see Figure 4 where all three lines merge closer to a probability of 1). However for campuses with enrollments ranging between ten and twenty-five thousand students, there were more noticeable differences in the predicted probability based on institutional reputation (this pattern is depicted in Figure 4, where the differential shifts in the probability for the groups of less competitive/competitive institutions, very competitive, and high/most competitive). Those institutions that were the most prestigious (left most line in Figure 4, labeled with a triangle) had a greater probability of mobilization, at much lower levels of enrollment. For example, the most prestigious institutions had a greater than 90% chance of mobilizing when enrollment was 16,000; whereas the 90% predicted probability of enrollment for moderately prestigious institutions occurred at larger enrollment levels of 21,000 or more, and at 27,000 or more for the least prestigious institutions (provided all other structural campus characteristics were held constant).

Another campus characteristic which had a significant relationship to the odds of experiencing mobilization was the percent of in-state students present on campus. Generally speaking, increases in the percentage of in-state students were associated with a decreased chance of campus mobilization. For each percentage point increase in the concentration of in-state students on campus, the odds of the campus mobilizing decreased by a factor of 0.007. Essentially, the more cosmopolitan or regionally diverse
a campus was in its student body, the more likely a campus was to mobilize. Holding all other campus characteristics constant, this finding demonstrated that geographic diversity in and of itself can serve as an influential aspect of structural diversity in an educational community.

Exploratory Model D: Civic Engagement Curricular Contexts

These results generated in the exploratory model of campus curricular contexts suggest that area studies curricula have an influence on the occurrence of campus mobilization. In the case of both the average number of area studies degree recipients a campus produces annually, and the amount of emphasis or institutional commitment to area studies that a campus exhibits, these two predictors increased the likelihood that campus mobilization would occur. Holding the other civic engagement variables constant, for each additional area studies degree recipient a campus produced, the odds that the campus would mobilize increased by a factor of 1.08 (compared to a campus experiencing no mobilization), see Table 16. Likewise, the greater extent that campuses had institutionalized area studies academic offerings increased the odds that a campus would mobilize increase by a factor of 1.04.

Table 16. Civic Engagement Estimates of the Probability of Contemporary Mobilization

| Variable                                             | Odds Ratio | Robust Std. Error | z    | P>|z|   | Odds Ratio 95% Confidence Interval |
|------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------------|------|-------|----------------------------------|
| Diversity Requirement in Undergraduate General Education Curriculum | 3.2264     | 2.0345            | 1.8600 | 0.0630 | 0.9374 11.1040                  |
| Average Number of Area Study degree recipients 98-02 | 1.0828     | 0.0341            | 2.5200 | 0.0120 | 1.0179 1.1518                   |
| Area Studies Emphasis                                | 1.0410     | 0.0212            | 1.9700 | 0.0490 | 1.0002 1.0834                   |

Number of Observations: 147
Log pseudolikelihood: -37.3168
Wald Chi-square with 3 df: 34.4700
Prob >Chi-square: 0.0000
Pseudo R-square: 0.4148
Each of these predicted probabilities are depicted graphically for both the average number of area studies degree recipients (Figure 5) and the level of area studies emphasis that a campus adopted (Figure 6). As the average annual number of area studies degree recipients approached, and then exceeded a value of 80 people, the predicted probability became very close to 1.0. Figure 5 only graphs through 100, since the probability remained constant (at 0.99 or greater) above that value.

In Figure 6, it is apparent that the predicted probability of mobilization increased in small increments based on the campus level of area studies emphasis until it hit a value of about 40. Then, the predicted probability increased more sharply with higher levels of area studies emphasis, which is apparent with the near linear line from values of about 40 to 85.

**Figure 5.** Predicted Probability of Mobilization Based on the Average Annual Number of Area Studies Degree Recipients
Figure 6. Predicted Probability of Mobilization Based on the Campus Area Studies Emphasis

Exploratory Model E: Civic Engagement Co-Curricular Contexts

Based on the values in Table 17, there is little reason to assume that the co-curricular campus characteristics included in this analysis had very much influence in predicting campus mobilization. The extent to which campuses provided opportunities for students to organize into clubs and organizations, along with the measures accounting for the institutionalization of campus service-learning efforts (campus membership in Campus Compact, or the campus receiving a Learn and Service America Higher Education grant) failed to demonstrate any significant relationships to subsequent campus mobilization.
Table 17. Probability of Campus Mobilization Using Civic Engagement Co-curricular Characteristics

| Variable                        | Odds Ratio | Robust Std. Error | z    | P>|z| | Odds Ratio 95% Confidence Interval |
|---------------------------------|------------|-------------------|------|------|-------------------------------|
| Student Organization Participation Index | 0.2489     | 1.8716            | -0.1800 | 0.8530 | 0.0000 | 627624.1000 |
| Campus Compact Member 98-02~     | 1.7916     | 0.8806            | 1.1900 | 0.2350 | 0.6837 | 4.6948 |
| LSAHE Grant Recipient 98-02~     | 2.2379     | 1.0981            | 1.6400 | 0.1010 | 0.8554 | 5.8546 |

Number of Observations 147
Log pseudolikelihood -61.0770
Wald Chi-square with 3 df 5.5400
Prob >Chi-square 0.1361
Pseudo R-square 0.0421

Summary

Each of the clusters of independent variables I considered, with the exception of the co-curricular variables, included variables that were significant predictors of mobilization. Therefore, it is reasonable to say that campus mobilization is shaped by a number of organizational contexts and characteristics, including – the prior history of mobilization, the political restrictions on dissent; as well as the size and geographical composition of the student body, and the campus selectivity/reputation; and the breadth and depth of area studies offerings on campus. Also, campuses that mobilized for the anti-sweatshop cause were also those institutions that were structurally vulnerable by virtue of their athletic expenditures, and their recruitment to and/or participation in the AFL-CIO Union Summer.

Model Fit: Evaluating the Exploratory Models of Mobilization

In an effort to consider the quality of each of the conceptual clusters of variables in predicting students’ campus mobilization, I evaluated the model fit statistics. Table 18 provides a summary of these statistics for each of the five models I generated in the exploratory CA sample analyses. When reviewing the results listed in Table 18, the most noticeable finding is the poor fit of the model including the co-curricular independent
variables (the student organizing index, campus membership in Campus Compact, and LSAHE grants for service learning). The Wald $X^2$ and the likelihood ratio statistics for this model were not significant. Although, the pseudo $R^2$ measure is only a rough guide to explain goodness-of-fit of a model, it is notable again that among the five models I evaluated, only the co-curricular variable model stood out as having a particularly poor pseudo $R^2$ measure (0.042), thus suggesting that the independent variables with these observed parameters (measures of the student organizing index, Campus Compact membership, and LSAHE grant) did little to improve the likelihood of producing the observed data compared to independent variables parameters which were equal to zero. The only evidence I have that conflicted with these findings was the Hosmer-Lemeshow statistic for the co-curricular education interventions civic engagement model. The Hosmer-Lemeshow statistics was not-significant, but in the case of this particular statistic such a finding implies that a non-significant result denotes a suitable model fit. With some additional follow up analyses of the co-curricular parameter model, where I generated a graph comparing the predicted probabilities generated by this model to a moving average of the portion of the cases that are one (J. S. Long & Freese, 2006), I observed that the graph failed in predicting the lowest probabilities of mobilization.

Moreover, other than the solitary exception of the poor fit of the model just discussed, the first four exploratory models listed in Table 18 were indeed useful, as evidenced by their significant likelihood ratio values and Wald test statistics. Further, the areas under the receiver operating characteristic curves were remarkably similar for each of the four models - background characteristics, vulnerability to the sweatshop issue, campus characteristics and curricular civic engagement interventions – all roughly
Table 18. Model Fit Statistics Summarized for Each Exploratory Model of Campus Mobilization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conceptual Clusters of Independent Variables Modeling Mobilization</th>
<th>History/Prior Campus Mobilization</th>
<th>Sweatshop Issue Conditions</th>
<th>Civic Engagement - Curricular Focus</th>
<th>Civic Engagement - Educational Interventions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Log pseudolikelihood</td>
<td>-40.950</td>
<td>-34.559</td>
<td>-30.064</td>
<td>-37.317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald $X^2$</td>
<td>17.230</td>
<td>28.080</td>
<td>67.400</td>
<td>34.470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald Prob &gt; $X^2$</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo $R^2$</td>
<td>0.358</td>
<td>0.458</td>
<td>0.529</td>
<td>0.415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood full model</td>
<td>-40.948</td>
<td>-34.559</td>
<td>-30.063</td>
<td>-37.317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood ratio</td>
<td>45.628</td>
<td>58.407</td>
<td>67.398</td>
<td>52.891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood ratio df</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prob &gt; LR</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area under LROC Curve</td>
<td>0.902</td>
<td>0.927</td>
<td>0.939</td>
<td>0.891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hosmer-Lemeshow $X^2$</td>
<td>4.010</td>
<td>4.880</td>
<td>8.400</td>
<td>11.280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hosmer-Lemeshow df</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HL Prob &gt; $X^2$</td>
<td>0.856</td>
<td>0.850</td>
<td>0.299</td>
<td>0.127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>-621.755</td>
<td>-649.504</td>
<td>-633.543</td>
<td>-638.998</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Hosmer-Lemeshow statistics were calculated based on groups of 10. N=147
valued at 0.90. In sum, these four models (prior campus history of mobilization, movement vulnerability, campus compositional characteristics, and civic engagement curricular interventions) are useful tools for providing an initial understanding of characteristics that contribute to the likelihood that students will engage in collective action on their campuses. Conversely, the co-curricular model does not appear to be a helpful guide for understanding the campus mobilization phenomenon.

In light of these findings from the four useful models, how do these various conceptual interpretations of organizational contexts intersect with one another to provide a more complete understanding of the role of campus mobilization? In other words, what is the appropriate composition of a complete model of mobilization controlling for these various conceptual factors? In light of the relatively small number of cases in the CA sample, and the fact that my study is somewhat exploratory in this regard, I needed to be both conceptually precise about the battery of characteristics I included in a model predicting mobilization. I also must be especially attentive to the possible problems in the computed standard errors if I overspecify a model of mobilization by including unimportant parameters. In light of these concerns, I turn to an additional set of analyses with a larger number of cases, the RP sample, to better identify the relationships between campus characteristics and movement vulnerability. In performing these analyses on a larger sample, I can better scrutinize and evaluate the nature of the relationships between the campus characteristic and prior history variables to the structural vulnerability generated via the AFL-CIO’s involvement with campuses. Then, once I have a more in-depth understanding of the determinates of movement vulnerability, I can then better
develop a model to test the usefulness of my civic engagement variables in predicting subsequent campus mobilization.

Recruitment – Participation Sample

The dependent variable for my RP sample analysis was the type of AFL-CIO involvement on campus. The distribution across cases in each category of the AFL-CIO involvement type variable in the RP sample was quite similar to the CA sample, with 70.28% of campuses having no AFL-CIO involvement (CA = 67.8%); 3.45% of campuses having been recruited by the AFL-CIO (CA=4%); 12.29% of campuses having participated in Union Summer (CA=10.7%), and 13.98% of campuses having been both recruited to and having participated in Union Summer (CA=17.4%), see Table 19. The means and standard deviations were also extremely similar between the two samples, which bodes well for my ability to make inferences from the smaller sample after having been informed by the patterns emerging from the larger sample.

Characteristics of AFL-CIO Involved Campuses

Recruitment-and-participation in Union Summer. It is reasonable to assume that those campuses that were both recruited by the AFL-CIO and also participated in the Union Summer program were, practically speaking, the campuses that had the most substantial interactions with AFL-CIO, and were potentially the most vulnerable to subsequent anti-sweatshop mobilization. This recruitment-and-participation group (compared to the other groups: no AFL-CIO involvement, recruitment-only, or participated-only) had the highest percentage of campuses with a civil-rights era disruption (47.7%), had the greatest presence of graduate student labor unions (15.5%), spent the most money on athletics ($6.5 million), had the largest average enrollment
Table 19. Comparison of Campus Characteristics by Type of AFL-CIO Involvement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No AFL-CIO Involvement</th>
<th>Recruited Only</th>
<th>Participated Only</th>
<th>Recruited &amp; Participated</th>
<th>Mean 100%</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(n=875)</td>
<td>(n=42)</td>
<td>(n=152)</td>
<td>(n=173)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-1969 Campus Riot or Disruption~</td>
<td>4.60%*</td>
<td>30.20%*d</td>
<td>16.30%*a</td>
<td>47.70%*</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count of Statues regarding Campus Political Restrictions on Dissent</td>
<td>4.408</td>
<td>4.872</td>
<td>4.356</td>
<td>4.945</td>
<td>4.49</td>
<td>2.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of Faculty Labor Union~</td>
<td>12.80%*c</td>
<td>14.00%</td>
<td>26.10%</td>
<td>29.90%*c</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of Graduate Student Labor Union~</td>
<td>1.00%*c</td>
<td>4.70%b</td>
<td>7.80%a</td>
<td>15.50%*</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campus Athletic Funding (in million $)</td>
<td>1.211*</td>
<td>3.256b</td>
<td>3.331a</td>
<td>6.488*</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>4.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Student Enrollment (in 1000s)</td>
<td>4.092*</td>
<td>8.317b</td>
<td>8.614a</td>
<td>15.671*</td>
<td>6.41</td>
<td>7.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Type (Public)~</td>
<td>29.80%</td>
<td>41.90%</td>
<td>55.60%</td>
<td>59.80%</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious affiliation~</td>
<td>50.50%*c</td>
<td>39.50%</td>
<td>24.20%</td>
<td>13.80%*c</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional selectivity (reputation)</td>
<td>1.290*</td>
<td>1.560b</td>
<td>1.540a</td>
<td>1.900*</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent undergraduates receiving federal financial aid</td>
<td>33.141*</td>
<td>34.628</td>
<td>30.811</td>
<td>27.759*</td>
<td>32.14</td>
<td>18.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Minority Student Enrollment</td>
<td>16.320*</td>
<td>36.810d</td>
<td>23.480</td>
<td>30.370a</td>
<td>19.81</td>
<td>21.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent In-State Student Enrollment</td>
<td>0.692*</td>
<td>0.664</td>
<td>0.677</td>
<td>0.626*</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

~Denotes dichotomous dummy variable
Mean of AFL-CIO outcome variable = 0.700; standard deviation = 1.14

Note: Significance differences of p<0.05 are denoted with the following labels to signify differences found in the following the comparisons:
*: difference found between all four groups;
a: Participation compared to Recruitment & Participation;
b: Recruitment compared to Recruitment & Participation;
c: No AFL-CIO compared to Recruitment & Participation;
d: Recruitment compared to Participation
and were the most selective in their institutional reputations, 1.9 denotes a larger number of very competitive or more prestigious selectivity (see Table 19). By contrast, those groups without any AFL-CIO involvement, those that were arguably the least vulnerable to mobilization, had the fewest civil-rights era campus disruptions (4.6%), were the smallest (averaging 4,100 in enrollment), were the least selective, and the had the lowest percentage of minority student enrollment (16.32%).

Recruitment-only compared to both. The recruitment-only group refers to those campuses that the AFL-CIO communicated with about the Union Summer program, but the campus never sent student representatives to attend. These campuses, compared to the recruitment-and-participation group, were much smaller (averaging an enrollment of 8,300) amounting to nearly half the average size of said comparison group. Additionally, these campuses devoted only half the average spending on athletics compared to recruitment-and-participant campuses ($3.26 million), had a much smaller graduate student union presence (only 4.9% of recruitment-only campuses had graduate student unions), were less selective, and had fewer campuses with a history of civil-rights mobilization (30.2%). Alternatively, the recruitment-only campuses differed from their recruitment-and-participation group counterparts in that, they had a three times greater percentage of religiously affiliated campuses (39.5%), compared to only 13.8% of the recruitment-and-participation campuses possessing religious institutional affiliations.

Participation-only compared to both. The campuses that were not recruited by AFL-CIO for participation in Union Summer, but chose to attend anyways (participation-only) differed in almost all the same ways that the recruitment-only campuses compared to recruitment-and-participation campuses, with few exceptions. Participant-only
campuses were smaller in terms of enrollment, devoted less spending to athletics, were less selective, had a lower percentage of graduate student unions, and had fewer institutions with a background of civil-rights era campus disruption. Unlike recruitment-only campuses however, participation-only campuses did not exhibit any difference from the recruitment-and-participation group according to institutional religious affiliation.

**Recruitment-only versus participation-only.** Most notably there were very few descriptive differences in the RP sample according to those campuses in the recruitment-only group, and those campuses in the participation-only group. Specifically, these groups were distinct on two criteria. Campuses that were recruited-only had the highest percentage of minority student enrollment (36.81%) among all four comparison groups, and this figure was thirteen percentage points higher than the participation-only group, and six percentage points higher than the recruitment-and-participation group. Additionally, the recruitment-only group had nearly double the percentage of participation-only campuses with a history of civil-rights era campus disruption (30.2% to 16.3% respectively). While the recruitment-and-participation group had the highest percentage of campuses with a history of protest (47.7%), the recruitment-only group also had a substantive number of campuses with a similar past. These results signifying the close resemblance between the recruitment-only and the participation-only groups strongly suggest that subsequent evaluations of a multinomial regression model must carefully scrutinize whether these two groups could be combined into one.

**Multinomial Regression Results**

Table 20 provides the coefficients generated from the multinomial logistic regression model comparing the success of either recruitment-only, participation-only, or
recruitment-and-participation in Union Summer to the reference group of no AFL-CIO campus involvement. Generally speaking, relationships of the independent variables to the AFL-CIO type of involvement dependent variable are discussed in terms of odds ratios, however data tables are provided that present the logged odds regression coefficients (Table 20), as well as a separate table listing the odds ratios ($e^b$, see Table 21).

Of all the results in Table 20, the most notable appears to be the lack of a significant relationship between campus athletic expenditures and type of AFL-CIO involvement. It appears that the AFL-CIO would have a strong motivation to engage campuses that were seemingly the most structurally vulnerable to the anti-sweatshop movement (by virtue of their expenditures on athletics); or that students from campuses that had the most dramatic financial ties to the apparel industry would seek out the resources of the AFL-CIO. However, the data in Tables 20 and 21 suggest that athletic expenditure structural vulnerability has limited or no relationship to AFL-CIO involvement.

In large part, the campuses that participated in Union Summer, as well as those campuses in the recruitment-and-participation group (compared to the no AFL-CIO involvement reference group), exhibited similar patterns of relationships with the independent
Table 20. **Multinomial Logistic Regression Coefficients Associated with Levels of AFL-CIO Involvement compared to no AFL-CIO Involvement**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Recruitment</th>
<th>Participation</th>
<th>R&amp;P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>Std. error</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-1969 Campus Riot or Disruption~</td>
<td>1.385</td>
<td><strong>0.419</strong></td>
<td>0.562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count of Statues regarding Campus Political Restrictions</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
<td>0.060</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of Faculty Labor Union~</td>
<td>-0.174</td>
<td>0.557</td>
<td>0.524 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of Graduate Student Labor Union~</td>
<td>0.955</td>
<td>0.923</td>
<td>1.141 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campus Athletic Funding (in million $)~</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>0.040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Student Enrollment (in 1000s)</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td><strong>0.035</strong></td>
<td>0.073 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Type (Public)~</td>
<td>0.177</td>
<td>0.658</td>
<td>0.707 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious affiliation~</td>
<td>0.359</td>
<td>0.510</td>
<td>-0.159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional selectivity (reputation)</td>
<td>0.680 *</td>
<td>0.294</td>
<td>0.626 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent undergraduates receiving federal financial aid~</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Minority Student Enrollment</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td><strong>0.009</strong></td>
<td>0.021 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent In-State Student Enrollment</td>
<td>-0.491</td>
<td>0.942</td>
<td>-1.378 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-5.161 ***</td>
<td><strong>1.016</strong></td>
<td>-2.893 ***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of Observations: 1245
Log Likelihood: -816.31
LR Chi-square with 36 df: 600.33
Prob > Chi-square: 0.00
Pseudo R-square: 0.2689

Note: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
Table 21. *Odds Ratios Associated with AFL-CIO Involvement (Compared to No Involvement)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Recruitment (v. no AFL-CIO)</th>
<th>Participation (v. no AFL-CIO)</th>
<th>R&amp;P (v. no AFL-CIO)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OR (e^b)</td>
<td>OR for 1 SD unit change in x</td>
<td>OR (e^b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>OR for 1 SD unit change in x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count of Statues regarding Campus Political Restrictions on Dissent&quot;</td>
<td>0.990</td>
<td>0.972</td>
<td>0.990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of Faculty Labor Union~</td>
<td>0.841</td>
<td>0.937</td>
<td>1.689 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of Graduate Student Labor Union~</td>
<td>2.597</td>
<td>1.206</td>
<td>3.130 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campus Athletic Funding (in million $)^a</td>
<td>1.013</td>
<td>1.057</td>
<td>1.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Student Enrollment (in 1000s)</td>
<td>1.106 **</td>
<td>2.216</td>
<td>1.076 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Type (Public)~</td>
<td>1.194</td>
<td>1.090</td>
<td>2.028 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious affiliation~</td>
<td>1.432</td>
<td>1.194</td>
<td>0.853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional selectivity (reputation)</td>
<td>1.974 *</td>
<td>1.595</td>
<td>1.870 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent undergraduates receiving federal financial aid&quot;</td>
<td>0.985</td>
<td>0.755</td>
<td>0.997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Minority Student Enrollment</td>
<td>1.043 ***</td>
<td>2.486</td>
<td>1.021 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent In-State Student Enrollment</td>
<td>0.612</td>
<td>0.889</td>
<td>0.252 *</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
variables included in the model. The direction and significance of the regression coefficients for these two groups were the same for all but two independent variables in the model; those exceptions being the history of civil-rights era campus disruption (significant for recruitment-and-participation), and institutional type (significant for participation-only).

Prior Mobilization Characteristics

Union presence. The regression coefficients generated in this model indicated that the logged odds of campuses participating-only in Union Summer or being both recruited and then participating were higher for campuses with faculty unions or graduate student labor unions compared to campuses that did not have such a union. In Table 21, the odds ratios indicate that the presence of a faculty union increased the odds of participating (compared to having no AFL-CIO involvement) by a factor of 1.69; and likewise the odds of a campus both being recruited to and participating in Union Summer were 2.0 times higher compared to a campus having no AFL-CIO involvement. On average, the relative influence of the presence of a graduate student union was more pronounced than the faculty union influence. When a campus had a graduate student union, the odds of participating in Union Summer are 3.13 times higher than the odds of a campus not having any AFL-CIO involvement; and the odds of being recruited and participating were 4.03 times higher, ceteris paribus.

The relationships between unions and AFL-CIO participation (or recruitment-and-participation) in Union Summer make practical sense from the perspective that it was likely that established labor unions on campus provided activist students exposure to a preexisting legitimate and functioning collective-action organization. Faculty
(especially) and graduate students are role models on campus, and campus union activities have typically been associated with collective action, or at least collective bargaining. The presence or institutionalization of unions in the campus educational environment can function to passively (or actively in cases where there are strong ties between unions and student organizations) endorse students’ participation in other corollary labor activities or organizing such as the AFL-CIO Union Summer program. Providing a climate where labor unions exist may send the message that labor organizing is appropriate and worthy of participation in other contexts. It is also notable that the presence of faculty and graduate student unions was not a significant predictor of AFL-CIO recruitment-only to Union Summer (compared to no AFL-CIO involvement). This result suggests that the presence of unions on campus leads to participation-only (as well as recruitment-and-participation) in Union Summer for reasons other than just the convenience of these labor unions being communication conduits of the AFL-CIO (which coordinate information and outreach to recruit college students into their programs). Union presence prompts campuses to actually participate in programs (Union Summer) geared toward helping students to build skills for organizing and mobilizing.

History of dissent. The regression coefficients and significance levels for campuses with a history of civil-rights era protest were nearly identical for the recruitment-and-participation group, and the recruitment-only group ($b = 1.383$, $p \leq 0.001$; $b = 1.385$, $p \leq 0.001$, respectively). Compared to campuses with no AFL-CIO involvement, the odds of recruitment-only or recruitment-and-participation were 3.99 times higher. These results appeared to indicate that an institutional legacy of past
activism prompted the AFL-CIO to seek out those campuses for Union Summer involvement.

*Campus Compositional Characteristics*

*Campus characteristics.* The public or private institutional type distinction is only a factor in increasing the odds of AFL-CIO involvement, for the participation-only group. Public institutions exhibited 2.0 times higher odds of participating in Union Summer compared to the odds of having no AFL-CIO involvement whatsoever. Institutional selectivity and reputation increased the odds for all types of AFL-CIO involvement (compared to no involvement). For participation-only campuses, greater selectivity was associated with a 1.87 increase in odds; for recruitment-only campuses, a one-unit increase in selectivity was associated with a 1.97 increase in odds; and for campuses that were both recruited-and-participated, a one-unit increase in selectivity corresponded to a 2.85 increase in odds; (all groups compared to no AFL-CIO involvement). In the cases of all three types of AFL-CIO involvement considered in the model, greater selectivity corresponded to an increase in that chance that a campus would somehow be involved with the AFL-CIO.

*Student body demographics.* Similar to the history of campus disruption variable, the percent of minority students on campus increased the odds of the two outcome groups by the same amount. The odds of a campus being recruited-only and the odds of a campus being recruited to and participating in Union Summer were 1.04 times higher than the odds of no campus AFL-CIO involvement with the addition of each percentage point increase in minority student enrollment. Recalling that the mean percentage of minority student enrollment was 32.14, and the standard deviation is 18 (see Table 8), a
one standard deviation unit increase in enrollment increased the odds of recruitment-only, or recruitment-and-participation 2.5 times (compared to no AFL-CIO involvement). The same 18 percent increase (or one standard deviation unit) in the percent of minority students present on campus raised the odds that a campus would participate in Union Summer by 1.5 times compared to the odds of a campus having no AFL-CIO involvement (Table 21). These findings indicate that AFL-CIO campus involvement was more likely when a campus had a diverse student body.

Each percent increase in the volume of in-state student enrollment slightly decreased (0.06 factor decline) the odds that a campus would be recruited to and participate in Union Summer. The pattern was similar for campuses that participated-only in Union Summer, only it was more pronounced; each percentage point increase in in-state student enrollment was marked by a 0.25 factor decrease in the odds that the campus would participate (compared to having no AFL-CIO involvement). Moreover, these results suggest that geographic homogeneity within a campus student body functions to suppress the chance that a campus would get involved with the AFL-CIO Union Summer program through participation, even when the AFL-CIO encourages the campus to do so (i.e. recruits the campus).

**Recruitment-only compared to participation-only.** The main model utilized a reference group base outcome of the no AFL-CIO involvement, but I was also able to generate regression coefficients and odds ratios for comparisons between all outcome groups in the model. Among these comparison groups, my particular interest was focused on considering two issues: 1) how do the recruitment-only and participation-only groups differ; and 2) were these two comparison groups in fact, distinct empirically?
Despite the notable differences in the percent of campuses that had a history of a civil-rights era disruption for the recruitment-only and the participation-only groups (30.2%, compared to 16.3% respectively, see Table 19), there was not a significant difference in the regression coefficients for these two groups when put into the multinomial model. Likewise the same pattern was true for the percent minority student enrollment variable relative to the comparison between the recruitment-only and participation-only outcome groups. Further, the likelihood ratio tests used to evaluate the appropriateness of combining outcome categories (Table 22) indicated that the recruitment-only and participation-only categories were not empirically distinct from one another, and that these categories were functionally equivalent. This conclusion is based on the relative non-significant result of the chi-square test (\(p \leq 0.095\)) comparing these two outcome groups.

Table 22. Likelihood Ration Test Evaluating Whether AFL-CIO Involvement Categories Can be Combined

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alternatives Tested</th>
<th>(X^2)</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>(P&gt;\chi^2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R v. P</td>
<td>18.744</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R v. RP</td>
<td>33.507</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P v. RP</td>
<td>88.041</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R v. None</td>
<td>81.128</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P v. None</td>
<td>151.897</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RP v. None</td>
<td>519.549</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The abbreviations denoting alternative outcome categories are as follows:
None: No AFL-CIO involvement; R: Recruitment-only; P: Participation-only; RP: recruitment and participation

When considered together the results comparing the recruitment-only with the participation-only groups, along with the results discussed earlier where the outcome groups were compared to the no AFL-CIO involvement reference group, indicated that both a prior history of civil-rights disruption, and the percentage of minority enrollment
were strongly associated with recruitment, rather than participation. Given that the coefficients, odds ratios, and significance levels were identical for the recruitment-only and recruitment-and-participation outcome groups (as described above), and the recruitment-only and participation-only groups were not distinct from one another, leads me to conclude that a past history of mobilization and the percentage of minority students were strong factors influencing whether the AFL-CIO actively recruits a campus to Union Summer.

Summary

The effect of campuses involved with the AFL-CIO (compared to campuses with no AFL-CIO involvement) was significant at the 0.001 level (LRX² = 600.33, df=36, p ≤ 0.001). Additionally the model demonstrated that the recruitment-only and participation-only groups were not empirically distinct from one another. In order to summarize the odds ratios of the significant parameters in the regression model, Figure 7 provides a pictorial display.

In Figure 7 the relative odds of each of the variables are situated on horizontal lines to communicate the odds of certain outcome groups compared to others. For example, N represents the odds of ‘no AFL-CIO involvement’ outcome. On any line, when a letter appears to the right of another (in this case, look at the fourth line representing total student enrollment where the letters R P and B are to the right of N), it means the a one-unit increase in the variable represented by that line (total enrollment) results in an increase in the odds of that outcome category compared to the letters to the left. So, the same one-unit increase in total enrollment, increased the odds of a campus participating-only (P) in Union Summer compared to no AFL-CIO involvement (N); and
that same one-unit increase in enrollment increased the odds of a campus being recruited-only (R) compared to the odds of participation-only (P); and likewise the odds of the outcome of both recruitment-and-participation (B) were greater than the odds of recruitment-only (R). The distance between letters conveys the relative magnitude of the change in odds for the outcome groups being compared. Conversely, if a letter appears to the left of another, the odds of that outcome are smaller than the reference group.

Looking at the positions of the letters vertically conveys the relative magnitude of any change in odds relative to the independent variables. In this graph, it is clear that a one-unit change in any of the independent variables listed on the horizontal lines yielded the same chance that a campus would participate-only (P) in the AFL-CIO Union Summer program, since the Ps all appear to be vertically stacked. Alternatively, the Bs (both recruited-and-participated in Union Summer) are differentially aligned, denoting that the
independent variables differentially influenced the chance that a campus would be recruited and subsequently participate.

**Collective-Action Sample: Modeling Campus Mobilization**

When considering the earlier CA exploratory results examining the five conceptual clusters of variables related to mobilization, along with the RP results considering the relationship between campus background contexts and compositional characteristics and type of AFL-CIO involvement, I am presented with a set of empirical data that fit nicely alongside my conceptual grounding. Essentially combining the information gathered from the first two phases of analysis, allows me to build a better model of mobilization that is suited to explore the manner in which campus civic engagement educational interventions shape student collective action.

The RP analysis indicated that the recruitment-only and the participation-only outcome groups in the AFL-CIO involvement variables can be combined. Therefore, in the CA sample, I recoded the AFL-CIO variable into three groups: no involvement (coded ‘0’), one type of interaction with AFL-CIO (either recruitment-only or participation-only, coded ‘1’), and both types of interactions with AFL-CIO (recruitment-and-participation in Union Summer, coded ‘2’). This recode resulted in 67.35% of the CA sample as having no involvement, 15% of the sample with one type of AFL-CIO involvement; and 17.7% of the sample with both recruitment-and-participation involvement. The mean for the AFL-CIO recoded variable was 0.503, with a standard deviation of 0.780.
Table 23. Summary of Odds Ratios and their Significant for Results from CA and RP Exploratory Analyses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>History/Prior Campus Mobilization</th>
<th>CA Sample</th>
<th>Outcomes</th>
<th>RP Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1967-1969 Campus Riot or Disruption</td>
<td>increased*</td>
<td>increased***</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count of Statues regarding Campus Political Restrictions</td>
<td>decreased*</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of Faculty Labor Union</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>increased*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of Graduate Student Labor Union</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>increased*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count of News Coverage of Campus Mobilization 1997-1998</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sweatshop Issue Conditions</th>
<th>CA Sample</th>
<th>Outcomes</th>
<th>RP Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level of AFL-CIO Union Summer Campus Involvement</td>
<td>increased***</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campus Athletic Funding (in million $)</td>
<td>increased**</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campus Characteristics</th>
<th>CA Sample</th>
<th>Outcomes</th>
<th>RP Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Student Enrollment (in 1000s)</td>
<td>increased***</td>
<td>increased**</td>
<td>increased***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Type (Public)</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>increased*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious affiliation</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>increased*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional selectivity (reputation)</td>
<td>increased**</td>
<td>increased*</td>
<td>increased***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent undergraduates receiving federal financial aid</td>
<td>increased</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>increased***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Minority Student Enrollment</td>
<td>decreased*</td>
<td>increased***</td>
<td>increased***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent In-State Student Enrollment</td>
<td>decreased*</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>decreased*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: ~ p<0.10; * p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Factors Explaining the Probability of Campus Mobilization

Based on Table 23, it is evident there was some overlap between the variables associated with mobilization, and those variables which were also strongly linked to AFL-CIO involvement type. My first task was to develop a very basic model of campus mobilization controlling for the vulnerability to the anti-sweatshop movement connected to the type of campus AFL-CIO involvement (see Model 1, Table 24). In Model 1, without controlling for any other campus characteristics or contexts, the odds of mobilizing were 7.17 times greater when there was AFL-CIO involvement, compared to the odds of not mobilizing. This model alone correctly classified 87.07% of the observed data. The pseudo $R^2 = 0.354$ (p ≤ 0.001), as well as the other model fit statistics (see Table 24) suggest that this basic model is useful, but has room for improvement with additional parameter specifications.
Table 24. Collective-Action Sample: Binomial Logistics Models Predicting Campus Mobilization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sweatshop Issue Conditions</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type of AFL-CIO Union Summer Involvement</td>
<td>7.169 ***</td>
<td>3.174 *</td>
<td>3.623 *</td>
<td>7.235 **</td>
<td>5.472 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.305)</td>
<td>(1.595)</td>
<td>(1.891)</td>
<td>(5.241)</td>
<td>(4.442)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campus Athletic Funding (in million $)</td>
<td>1.124</td>
<td>0.955</td>
<td>0.884</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.103)</td>
<td>(0.074)</td>
<td>(0.094)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History/Prior Campus Mobilization</td>
<td>1967-1969 Campus Riot or Disruption~</td>
<td>2.380</td>
<td>2.093</td>
<td>6.628 *</td>
<td>5.199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.633)</td>
<td>(1.468)</td>
<td>(4.949)</td>
<td>(5.222)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campus Characteristics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Student Enrollment (in 1000s)</td>
<td>1.158 **</td>
<td>1.100</td>
<td>1.367 **</td>
<td>1.469 **</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.066)</td>
<td>(0.067)</td>
<td>(0.135)</td>
<td>(0.191)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional selectivity (reputation)</td>
<td>2.297</td>
<td>2.200</td>
<td>2.672</td>
<td>3.366</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.092)</td>
<td>(1.107)</td>
<td>(2.212)</td>
<td>(3.134)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent In-State Student Enrollment</td>
<td>0.011 *</td>
<td>0.0223 *</td>
<td>0.004 *</td>
<td>0.001 **</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Minority Student Enrollment</td>
<td>0.868 *</td>
<td>0.837 *</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
<td>(0.094)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Engagement- Curricular Characteristics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity Requirement in Undergraduate General</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7.583 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Curriculum~</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(6.513)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Number of Area Study degree recipients</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.070 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area Studies Emphasis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparisons Between Models:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comparisons Between Models:</th>
<th>2 v. 1</th>
<th>3 v. 2</th>
<th>4 v. 3</th>
<th>5 v. 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BIC difference</td>
<td>4.282</td>
<td>2.685</td>
<td>6.532</td>
<td>6.711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Ratio</td>
<td>24.789 **</td>
<td>2.305</td>
<td>11.522 ***</td>
<td>8.260 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LR (df)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prob &gt; LR</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.129</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.041</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note 1: r.s.e refers to the "robust standard error" term

Note 2: * p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

In Model 2, I sought to control for the four variables which functioned as both predictors of campus mobilization and AFL-CIO involvement, these included: a campus history of civil-rights era disruption, total student enrollment, institutional selectivity, and percentage of in-state students enrolled. I compared the basic Model 1 (which included only the AFL-CIO involvement parameter) with Model 2 which added in the aforementioned four independent variables. In Model 2, I observed a dramatic change in the parameter estimate for the type of AFL-CIO involvement after controlling for these other important campus characteristics. The odds of mobilization increased only 3.17
times for an increase in AFL-CIO involvement (compared to the odds of no mobilization), after controlling for 1967-1969 campus disruption, student enrollment, institutional selectivity, and percent in-state enrollment. Just as I observed in the CA exploratory analysis, an increase in total student enrollment was associated with greater odds of mobilization, and an increase in the percentage of in-state residents enrolled was associated with a decrease in the odds of mobilization (compared to the odds of no mobilization). However, unlike the CA sample exploratory analyses, both the prior history of civil-rights era protest and the selectivity of an institution had no significant effect on the chance a campus would mobilize. Further, with the inclusion of these four parameters, the overall model fit improved over including the AFL-CIO involvement variable alone. The improved model fit was demonstrated by the log pseudolikelihood of Model 2 (-28.803) being closer to zero than Model 1 (-41.198). Additionally, the difference in the BIC’s of the two models (4.282) indicated that there is positive evidence that Model 2 is superior to Model 1. This same finding is reflected in the larger negative value of Model 2 (BIC = -646.04) compared to Model 1 (BIC = -641.217).

Although any interpretations of the likelihood ratio test should be considered with caution based on the fact that I estimated my models using robust standard errors (on account of my small sample size), the likelihood ratio test comparing Model 2 to Model 1 was significant (lr test = 24.789, p ≤ 0.001), providing further evidence that Model 2 fits the observed data better. Further, the pseudo $R^2$ for Model 2 ($R^2 = 0.548$, p<0.001) improves over that of Model 1.

Long and Freese (2006) draw from Rafferty’s (1996) guidelines from evaluating the strength of evidence that difference in the BIC, BIC’, or BIC$^2$ statistics of two nested regression models. Any BIC differences with values ranging from: 0-2 provide weak evidence; 2-6 provide positive evidence; 6-10 provide strong evidence; and values greater than 10 provide very strong evidence that the model including more variables should be favored.

25 Long and Freese (2006) draw from Rafferty’s (1996) guidelines from evaluating the strength of evidence that difference in the BIC, BIC’, or BIC$^2$ statistics of two nested regression models. Any BIC differences with values ranging from: 0-2 provide weak evidence; 2-6 provide positive evidence; 6-10 provide strong evidence; and values greater than 10 provide very strong evidence that the model including more variables should be favored.
Anti-Sweatshop Vulnerability

Model 3 consisted of all the previously mentioned variables with the addition of the athletic spending independent variable, given that it was conceptually important to the anti-sweatshop movement, and it was also empirically determined to be important from the CA sample exploratory analysis. Similar to the phenomenon I observed in the RP sample analysis, the amount of campus athletic expenditure did not have a significant effect on the likelihood of campus mobilization. The fit for Model 3 was quite similar to Model 2, but the BIC value of -643.359 suggests that the probability model including the athletic expenditure variable did not fit the observed data as well as the model excluding this variable. Likewise, the BIC difference between Models 3 and 2 (2.685), along with the non-significant likelihood ratio test comparing the two Models also provided evidence that Model 2 fit for the observed data better. However, that said, given the conceptual importance of this athletic expenditure variable to the anti-sweatshop movement in particular, it was essential to include it in any model examining the probability of campus anti-sweatshop mobilization.

Modeling Mobilization with Campus Characteristics and Contexts

After entering the remaining variables gleaned from the CA exploratory analysis (number of political restrictions on dissent), and the RP sample analysis (faculty and graduate student union presence, institutional type, and percentage of minority students), I generated the results depicted in Model 4. The percentage of minority students enrolled on campus emerged as an important predictor of mobilization, and was thus included in Model 4. The percentage of minority student enrollment appeared to assert a suppressor effect (Menard, 2002) on the 1967-1969 campus disruption variable; meaning, that this
historical variable was significant only when controlling for the percentage of minority student enrollment on campus. Functionally, the results of Model 4 indicate that an increase in minority student enrollment decreased the odds of mobilization 0.868 times (compared to the odds of a campus not mobilizing). The influence of this variable on mobilization was the opposite of its influence on predicting the probability of the type of AFL-CIO campus involvement; those results indicated the percentage of minority students on campus increased the odds of AFL-CIO campus involvement.

Functionally, Model 4 was the model of campus mobilization that explained and controlled for the campus contexts, characteristics, and vulnerability criteria critical for predicting the probability of mobilization. By comparison with the previous models, Model 4 identified many of the key factors related to mobilization, and exhibited a superior model fit, with a log pseudolikelihood of -21.889, a Wald $X^2 = 21.00$ (df=7), $p<.001$; a BIC = -649.981, and a pseudo $R^2 = 0.657$. Further the BIC$^*$ difference, comparing Model 4 to Model 3 was 6.532, thus providing strong evidence that Model 4 generated a better fit; and the likelihood ratio test comparing these two models was significant as well (lr test = 11.522, $p < 0.001$).

**Full Model: Effects of Curricular Educational Characteristics on Campus Mobilization**

The complete model, Model 5, consists of all Model 4 variables along with the addition of the cluster of curricular educational characteristics (diversity requirements in the general education curriculum, average annual number of area studies degree recipients, and area studies emphasis).\textsuperscript{26} While there is a slight chance that this probability model may be empirically somewhat less representative of the observed data

\textsuperscript{26} I did not test the co-curricular characteristics given their non-significant relationship to mobilization in the CA sample exploratory analysis.
than Model 4, by virtue of some of the model fit statistics being less representative of the observed data (with a larger Wald \( X^2 = 38.6 \) (df=10), \( p < 0.001 \)), it is useful to the extent that it is conceptually important. Specifically, Model 5 provides a preliminary consideration (albeit on a small sample, N=147) of the curricular characteristics of institutions alongside the campus historical context and compositional characteristics, while controlling for movement vulnerability, to provide insight about the role that institutional educational practice had in supporting student collective action.

The results in Model 5, demonstrated that the odds of mobilizing were 7.58 times higher for a campus that included a diversity requirement in the undergraduate general education curriculum (compared to campuses without such a requirement), holding all other variables in the model constant. Also, with each additional degree recipient in an area studies field, the odds of mobilization were 1.07 times higher than the odds of a campus not mobilizing (and holding the other variables constant). The area studies emphasis independent variable did not generate a significant relationship to mobilization in Model 5.

Despite the larger Wald \( X^2 \) model fit statistic noted above, the other goodness-of-fit tests indicated that Model 5 provided a better fit to the observed data compared to Model 4. The BIC\(^*\) difference was 6.711, which reflected strong evidence that Model 5 was a superior fit, and the likelihood ratio test comparing the two models was significant (lr test = 8.260, \( p \leq 0.041 \)). Finally, the log pseudolikelihood was closer to zero compared to the prior models (-17.759), and the pseudo \( R^2 \) was larger (0.722) than pseudo \( R^2 \) of the other models as well.

*Predicted Probabilities*
Using this model to generate predicted probabilities can provide useful clues for building a campus which favors civic engagement and democratic participation, as exemplified through mobilization, based in its organizational characteristics. I will first turn to the favorable institutional contexts for encouraging student mobilization under the institutional compositional constraints of: 1) (relatively) small, medium, or large total student enrollment; and 2) a homogenous student body. For the purpose of generating probabilities, I will consider small institutions those with an enrollment equaling 4,000; medium institutions with an enrollment equaling 12,000, and large institutions with an enrollment equaling 20,000. The model I have generated provides especially interesting predictions relative to school size and educational characteristics.

*Small schools.* In the case of small schools, educational characteristics (the number of annual area studies degree recipients and the presence of a diversity requirement in the curriculum) can have a dramatic influence on the probability of mobilization. In circumstances where there are area studies graduates, but no diversity requirement, the probability of mobilization edges above a 50% chance with about 140 area studies graduates annually. When a campus has a diversity requirement the probability of mobilization exceeds a 50% chance with only 110 area studies graduates annually (Table 25). What is especially note worthy is that the institutionalization of these two educational characteristics make the probability of mobilization quite high in small schools. The probability of mobilization is greater than 0.75 when more than 125 students graduate with area studies degrees and the institution has a diversity education requirement. In purely theoretical terms, these results suggest that campuses seeking to develop students’ capacity for collective action as an engaged citizens should promote
area studies programs to generate larger enrollments, and adopt diversity requirements in the general education curriculum.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of AS degree recipients</th>
<th>Pr(Mobilization) Without diversity requirement</th>
<th>Marginal effect</th>
<th>Pr(Mobilization) With a diversity requirement</th>
<th>Marginal effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.341</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.505</td>
<td>0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>0.210</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.668</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125</td>
<td>0.271</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.739</td>
<td>0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130</td>
<td>0.343</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.799</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>135</td>
<td>0.424</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.848</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140</td>
<td>0.508</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.887</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>145</td>
<td>0.592</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.917</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150</td>
<td>0.670</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.939</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* All other variables are set to their means

In practical terms, the recommendation to grow the area studies enrollment and subsequent area studies degree attainment in small schools is an overly narrow application of these results. Small schools will naturally tend to have fewer area studies graduates, so as a matter of organizational implementation, it is more useful to consider the influence of other institutional factors on the probability of mobilization in the context of graduating between 0 – 100 area studies students annually. For small schools, which are displayed in Figure 8, the probability of mobilization, increases very little for schools with fewer than 50 area studies degree recipients with and without a diversity requirement (see the diamond and square tag on Figure 8). However, when campuses have interactions with AFL-CIO involvement, there are marked increases in the
probability of mobilization for small schools with fewer than 50 area studies degree recipients. In fact, having only one type of AFL-CIO involvement increases the probability of mobilization when there are about 22 area studies graduates; and when a campus is both recruited to and participated in Union Summer, the probability of mobilization increases with very few area studies graduates. In sum, there is a connection between curricular educational characteristics and the probability of mobilization in small schools, although the external involvement from the AFL-CIO appears to have a more dramatic influence on these types of institutions.

**Figure 8. Probability of Mobilization for Small Schools Based on Institutional Characteristics**

*Medium schools.* In the case of medium schools, the number of area studies degree recipients increases the probability of mobilization to about 50% somewhere between 80-100 graduates; and with the addition of a diversity requirement in the curriculum the 50% chance of mobilization occurs between 60-80 area studies graduates.
(see Table 26). Again, like the small campuses, it makes the most practical sense to compare predicted probabilities for medium sized campuses with a constrained number of area studies degree recipients. Therefore, the probabilities for Figure 9 are based on the average annual number of degree recipients ranging between 0 – 150.

Table 26. Predicted Probability of Mobilization Based on the Average Annual Number of Area Studies Degree Recipients on Medium Campuses with No AFL-CIO Involvement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of AS degree recipients</th>
<th>Pr(Mobilization) Without diversity requirement</th>
<th>Marginal effect</th>
<th>Pr(Mobilization) With a diversity requirement</th>
<th>Marginal effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0017</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.0064</td>
<td>0.0004</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>0.0246</td>
<td>0.0016</td>
<td>0.160</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>0.0891</td>
<td>0.0055</td>
<td>0.426</td>
<td>0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>0.2756</td>
<td>0.0136</td>
<td>0.743</td>
<td>0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>0.5965</td>
<td>0.0163</td>
<td>0.918</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>0.8518</td>
<td>0.0086</td>
<td>0.978</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140</td>
<td>0.9572</td>
<td>0.0028</td>
<td>0.994</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150</td>
<td>0.9778</td>
<td>0.0015</td>
<td>0.997</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All other variables are set to their means
Figure 9. Probability of Mobilization for Medium Schools Based on Institutional Characteristics

Figure 9, like the pattern observed for small campuses in Figure 8, is that the educational characteristics take the probability of mobilization to a certain point, and then the AFL-CIO involvement really accentuates the probability. In circumstances where a campus is either recruited-only or participated-only to Union Summer (see the triangle labeled line), as few as 40 area studies degree recipients on a campus of 12,000 (when the campus also has adopted a diversity requirement, and has average percentages of in-state and minority students) can take the probability of mobilization to about the 0.50 mark. Similarly, if that same campus (compositionally) was to have been both recruited to and participated in Union Summer (see the circle labeled line), the probability of mobilization would be about 0.85.

Large campuses. In the case of large campuses, the addition of each area studies degree recipient dramatically increases the probability of mobilization. Figure 10
demonstrates this effect graphically; it is notable that even when there is no AFL-CIO involvement, no diversity requirement in the campus curriculum, and all other variables in the model are set to their mean (see diamond tagged line), there is nearly a direct positive linear relationship between the number of area studies degree recipients and the probability of mobilization when the number of area studies graduates ranges from 0 –100. When adding in a diversity requirement into the curriculum and changing nothing else, the starting probability begins at 0.215 (square tagged line); whereas adding in one type of AFL-CIO involvement (and changing nothing else, see triangle tagged line), the starting probability begins at 0.165. In both of these two scenarios, the predicted

Figure 10. Probability of Mobilization for Large Campuses Based on Institutional Characteristics

![Figure 10: Probability of Mobilization for Large Campuses Based on Institutional Characteristics](image-url)
probability pattern of mobilization is the same, but it showcases that in some circumstances institutional characteristics (e.g. the inclusion of a diversity requirement) can have a more substantial influence on the chance of mobilization compared to the external outside influence of the AFL-CIO. Only in situations where a large campus has a diversity requirement in its curriculum, and the campus was also recruited to and participated in Union Summer (asterick tagged line), that the average number of area studies degree recipients had a very small influence on shaping the probability of mobilization. Moreover, in situations where large campuses were not recruited to and participated in Union Summer, regardless of whether they adopted a diversity requirement, the addition of each individual area studies graduate (up until about 65) functions to increase the probability of mobilization in an upward almost linear fashion (Figure 10).

*Homogenous student bodies.* In the CA sample, the average percentage of in-state students enrolled on campus was 65%, and the average percentage of minority students enrolled on campus was 20%. The regression model indicated that the general pattern for these enrollment variables, was to observe decreases in the odds of mobilization as campuses exhibited increases in their percentages of in-state and minority student enrollment (when everything else was held constant in the model). Intuitively, it makes sense that a more geographically homogenous student body could stifle mobilization. However, decreases in the chance of mobilization on campuses that were more racially and ethnically diverse makes less intuitive sense. However, upon examining the patterns of relationships with predicted probabilities I found that the change in predicted
Figure 11. Probability of Mobilization Based on the Percentage of Minority Students and Changes to AFL-CIO Involvement and Campus Educational Contexts

Note: If variable value not indicated in data label, then it is assumed to be set to its mean.
probability of mobilization was nearly flat with changes in the values of these enrollment variables.

The lines displayed in Figure 11 are very useful in communicating the relative influence of various campus characteristics and contexts across the range of values of the percentage of minority students on campus. First, this graph conveys that even with a variety of changes in the campus characteristics and contexts (denoted by each point on the graph) the pattern of relationships between the percentage of minority students enrolled and the predicted probability of mobilization is very similar regardless of the actual percentage of minority students enrolled. More plainly stated, the shape and placement of the lines are virtually unchanged regardless of the percentage of minority students.

Secondly, Figure 11 demonstrates the remarkably similar effects that AFL-CIO involvement and educational characteristics had on the predicted probability of mobilization. The predicted probability of mobilization for campuses that were recruited-and-participated, but did not provide any civic engagement educational characteristics (area studies graduates = 0, and there was no diversity requirement in the curriculum) the predicted probability of mobilization is approximately 0.337 for all values of the percentage of minority students (holding in-state enrollment to its mean, and all other variables to their means as well). In the absence of AFL-CIO involvement, when there are 25 area studies graduates and the campus includes a diversity requirement in its curriculum, the predicted probability of mobilization is approximately 0.278, ceteris paribus. These values are quite near to one another and provide evidence that institutional
curricular characteristics have a remarkably similar effect to the external influence of the AFL-CIO.

The last two data points on Figure 11, demonstrate the effect that slight changes in the campus contexts and characteristics have on the probability of mobilization. In the absence of AFL-CIO campus involvement, with only 25 area studies degree recipients annually and a campus diversity requirement in the undergraduate curriculum (and all other variable are set to their means), a five percentage point change in the composition of in-state students from the average of 65% to 60% edges the predicted probability of mobilization up to approximately 0.375, or a predicted probability which is equivalent to the probability when a campus had been recruited-and-participated in Union Summer.

In a similar scenario, where again there is no AFL-CIO involvement, but the average annual area studies degree recipients increases by five people, and the in-state enrollment is lowered to 55% (all other variable held to their means), the probability of mobilization exceeds 0.55. A predicted probability of 0.55 on its own is only marginally better than a 1 in 2 chance of mobilization; but the dramatic increases in the predicted probability based on the educational characteristics and small shifts in enrollment patterns demonstrate the relative importance of these criteria to empowering students to engage in collective action built on principles of socially-responsible civic engagement. In other words, educational characteristics and contexts appear to have similar effects to those generated through the AFL-CIO campus involvement.

*Hypothesis Testing*

To determine whether the effects of the compositional characteristics and educational contexts of campuses were equivalent to the effects of AFL-CIO
involvement, I turned to a series of hypothesis tests which evaluated whether two particular coefficients generated in my final fitted model were equal. My specific interests were intended to test the following hypotheses addressing whether the AFL-CIO involvement coefficient, was equal to each of the coefficients for the average number of area studies degree recipients, and a diversity requirement in curriculum. A significant finding suggests that effects were equal; and conversely, an insignificant finding implies the coefficients were not equal.

Curricular characteristics. The findings indicated that the effect of the average annual number of area studies degree recipients on campus mobilization was equal to the effect of AFL-CIO involvement at the 0.05 level ($X^2 = 4.00$, df = 1, $p = 0.046$). Alternately, the effect of AFL-CIO involvement on campus mobilization was not equal to the effect of a campus having a diversity requirement ($X^2 = 0.06$, df = 1, $p = 0.812$). These findings suggest that at least one educational curricular practice (the number of area studies degree recipients) had a similar effect as the external influence of AFL-CIO campus involvement, in terms of predicting that a campus would mobilize.

Comments on Movement Outcomes

With only 23 campuses that mobilized it was unrealistic to generate a regression model accounting for the variations in outcomes among those campuses that advocated on behalf of the anti-sweatshop cause. Nevertheless, there were some analyses I performed that began to paint a picture of the relationship between campus characteristics and contexts and movement outcomes. These analyses were performed in the CA sample to provide perspective on potential relationships between movement behavior, educational contexts, and movement outcomes.
Within the CA sample, I was able to consider whether there were descriptive differences between campuses that joined the Fair Labor Association and those that joined the Workers Rights Consortium. As I discussed earlier, the ambitions of the broader student anti-sweatshop movement were focused on persuading campus administrative leaders to adopt WRC membership, which made this outcome an important one to assess. In terms of other outcomes, campuses chose to respond to the sweatshop issue in a number of ways, as I just mentioned joining the FLA, WRC, and in some cases both; or taking some other form of administrative action (such as adopting a campus code of conduct for vendors), establishing a working group or committee to work on the problem of sweatshop manufacturing of campus collegiate apparel, or doing nothing. Given that the CA sample is only 147 cases, the variety of these potential outcomes were represented in very small groups, which made testing the differences in these groups potentially quiet unreliable and biased. Even in terms of the two most likely outcomes of the movement, joining the FLA or WRC, of the 147 campuses only 25 joined the FLA, and 14 joined the WRC, and those campuses that did both were included in each of these respective groups.

Further, during the developmental stage of my study, my data collection process consisted of gathering information from campus administrators responsible for campus licensing or logo usage. Collecting data from these individuals was intended to obtain information about the range of possible campus responses to the sweatshop issue. This information turned out being questionable in its quality. Specifically, when interacting with the campus licensing administrators, I was intrigued by the extent to which many of these administrators were unable to precisely identify the process by which the campus
handled marketing or trademark/licensing for their logos and likenesses, both currently and especially during the 1998–2002 timeframe. Additionally, there were several instances in my communications with these administrators where I found myself questioning the face validity of the information I obtained. Noting that the campus representatives I communicated with had such limited knowledge of what I was asking about, I turned to the WRC and FLA membership lists exclusively for consistent confirmation indicating a particular outcome of what occurred on campus. Based on the realities of the data quality, I limited my attention on movement outcomes to just two actions, consisting of either: a campus joining the FLA, or joining the WRC.

I worked directly with the WRC staff to obtain the complete lists of all campus members from the fall of 1999 (when their formal records were institutionalized) through the spring of 2002. Although I solicited the FLA staff in providing me with campus membership records on numerous occasions via phone and email (and in once in person), I was never able to obtain a membership list directly from the FLA staff. Nevertheless, as the technology built into the internet archive web search tool improved over the duration of my study, I was able to effectively search for and obtain historical membership lists of FLA members for various time points between the fall of 2000 through the fall of 2002.

*Fair Labor Association Membership*

There is very little statistical evidence suggesting that campuses that joined the FLA are different from those that did not join between 1998-2002. Of the 25 campuses that joined the FLA, only 12% of them actually had students on campuses that engaged in any type of collective action or mobilization for the anti-sweatshop cause. The only
significant difference I observed for campuses that joined the FLA, was that they had a lower AFL-CIO involvement average compared to the non-joining campuses, 0.24 compared to 0.56 respectively (Table 27). The lower average value indicates that the campuses that joined the FLA were more likely to have not had any AFL-CIO involvement, compared to the non-joiners. Further, when I tested to determine if the predicted values from the fitted regression model (Model 5, Table 24) generated any difference for the FLA joiner and non-joiner campuses, I did not yield any significant results.

Table 27. Collective-Action Sample: Comparison of Mobilization Outcomes (N=147)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Joined FLA (n=25)</th>
<th>Did Not Join FLA (n=122)</th>
<th>Joined WRC (n=14)</th>
<th>Did Not Join WRC (n=133)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prior Campus Mobilization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-1969 Campus Riot or Disruption~</td>
<td>8.00%</td>
<td>19.70%</td>
<td>57.10% ***</td>
<td>13.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count of Statues regarding Campus Political Restrictions on Disent</td>
<td>4.76</td>
<td>4.70</td>
<td>5.57</td>
<td>4.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of Faculty Labor Union~</td>
<td>20.00%</td>
<td>18.90%</td>
<td>7.10%</td>
<td>20.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of Graduate Student Labor Union~</td>
<td>8.00%</td>
<td>7.40%</td>
<td>28.60% **</td>
<td>5.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count of News Coverage of Campus Mobilization 1997-1998</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>9.93</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweatshop Issue Conditions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of AFL-CIO Union Summer Campus Involvement</td>
<td>0.24 *</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>1.57 ***</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campus Athletic Funding (in million $)</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>9.09 **</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campus Characteristics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Student Enrollment (in 1000s)</td>
<td>6.26</td>
<td>7.47</td>
<td>18.194 **</td>
<td>6.115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Type (Public)~</td>
<td>40.00%</td>
<td>41.00%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious affiliation~</td>
<td>40.00%</td>
<td>32.80%</td>
<td>21.40%</td>
<td>35.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional selectivity (reputation)</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>1.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent undergraduates receiving federal financial aid</td>
<td>28.88%</td>
<td>29.52%</td>
<td>19.64% ***</td>
<td>30.44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Minority Student Enrollment</td>
<td>15.00%</td>
<td>21.48%</td>
<td>25.29%</td>
<td>19.86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent In-State Student Enrollment</td>
<td>65.29%</td>
<td>65.74%</td>
<td>57.19%</td>
<td>66.56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Engagement - Curricular Focus</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity Requirement in Undergraduate General Education Curriculum~</td>
<td>28.00%</td>
<td>39.30%</td>
<td>57.10%</td>
<td>35.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Number of Area Study degree recipients 98-02</td>
<td>5.79</td>
<td>9.50</td>
<td>49.74</td>
<td>4.569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area Studies Emphasis</td>
<td>9.28</td>
<td>11.24</td>
<td>36.64 ***</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Engagement - Co-curricular Focus</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student Organization Participation Index</td>
<td>0.0256</td>
<td>0.0247</td>
<td>0.0263</td>
<td>0.0247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campus Compact Member 98-02~</td>
<td>44.00%</td>
<td>31.10%</td>
<td>57.10% *</td>
<td>30.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSAHE Grant Recipient 98-02~</td>
<td>28.00%</td>
<td>30.30%</td>
<td>42.90%</td>
<td>28.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campus Mobilized</td>
<td>12.00%</td>
<td>16.40%</td>
<td>78.60% ***</td>
<td>9.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, ***p ≤ 0.001
~Denotes dichotomous dummy variable

Workers Rights Association Membership

Based on the results presented in Table 27, campuses that joined the WRC differed according to their level of sweatshop-movement vulnerability. These campuses
were much more inclined to have had involvement with the AFL-CIO, averaging 1.57 (signifying that they had either been recruited-only, participated-only, or both to Union Summer). Also, campuses that joined the WRC spent much more money on athletics, averaging slightly more than $9 million, to the non-joiners average of only $2 million.

The history and prior mobilization backgrounds of the campuses that joined the WRC differed on two criteria, 57% had a history of civil-rights era protest, and 29% of these

Table 28. Correlations with FLA and WRC Outcomes (N=147)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FLA</th>
<th>WRC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prior Campus Mobilization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-1969 Campus Riot or Disruption~</td>
<td>-0.115</td>
<td>0.335 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count of Statues regarding Campus Political Restrictions on Dissent</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of Faculty Labor Union~</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>-0.098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of Graduate Student Labor Union~</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.260 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count of News Coverage of Campus Mobilization 1997-1998</td>
<td>-0.057</td>
<td>0.339 ***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Sweatshop Issue Conditions     |           |           |
| Level of AFL-CIO Union Summer Campus Involvement | -0.153    | 0.446 *** |
| Campus Athletic Funding (in million $) | -0.025    | 0.428 *** |

| Campus Characteristics         |           |           |
| Total Student Enrollment (in 1000s) | -0.058    | 0.454 *** |
| Institutional Type (Public)~    | -0.008    | 0.061     |
| Religious affiliation~         | 0.057     | -0.086    |
| Institutional selectivity (reputation) | -0.042    | 0.366 *** |
| Percent undergraduates receiving federal financial aid | -0.016    | -0.207 *  |
| Percent Minority Student Enrollment | -0.126    | 0.083     |
| Percent In-State Student Enrollment | -0.007    | -0.11     |

| Civic Engagement - Curricular Focus |           |           |
| Diversity Requirement in Undergraduate General Education Curriculum~ | -0.088    | 0.132     |
| Average Number of Area Study degree recipients 98-02 | -0.045    | 0.431 *** |
| Area Studies Emphasis            | -0.045    | 0.512 *** |

| Civic Engagement - Co-curricular Focus |           |           |
| Student Organization Participation Index | 0.011     | 0.015     |
| Campus Compact Member 98-02~          | 0.102     | 0.164 *   |
| LSAHE Grant Recipient 98-02~           | -0.019    | 0.092     |
| Campus Mobilized                      | -0.045    | 0.562 *** |

*p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01, ***p ≤ 0.001
—Denotes dichotomous dummy variable
campuses also had a graduate student union (compared to 13.5% past campus disruption, and 5.3% graduate student unions on the non-WRC joining campuses).

Compositionally, the campuses that joined the WRC were larger, averaging 18,000 students (compared to 6,000 for non-WRC campuses), and had more affluent student bodies averaging only 20% of their students receiving federal financial aid grants compared to the 30% average percentage of students receiving comparable aid at the campuses that did not join the WRC. In terms of the educational contexts of the campuses, WRC members had a much greater institutional emphasis on area studies evidenced by an average value of 36.64 to only 8.2 (higher numbers indicate a greater number of major and minor area studies offerings and well as a tendency to organize these offerings into departments or program verses interdisciplinary cross listings). The campuses that joined the WRC were also campuses that joined the Campus Compact at higher rates, with 57% of them also holding Campus Compact membership, compared to only 31% of the non joining WRC campuses holding the same membership.

**Mobilization and outcomes.** Most notably, campuses that joined the WRC were also those campuses that experienced much higher levels of student mobilization for the anti-sweatshop cause; 78.6% of the campuses that joined the WRC experienced mobilization, whereas only 9% of the campuses that did not join experienced mobilization. Additionally, among all the variables considered in this analysis, the strongest correlation with a campus joining the WRC, was the correlation coefficient associated with campus mobilization ($R^2 = 0.562, p < 0.001$, Table 28). Without suggesting any kind of causality per se, the varying rates of mobilization for WRC joiners and non-joiners, and the strength of the correlation between mobilization and joining the
WRC suggests that campus collective action may have been successful in fulfilling its broad scale anti-sweatshop ambitions.

When I tested to see if there were any differences in the predicted probabilities I obtained from the fitted regression model (Model 5, Table 24) for WRC joiner and non-joiner groups, I found a significant difference. The campuses that joined the WRC had an average predicted probability of 0.681, compared to the non-joiner average of 0.101; the difference was significant at the \( p \leq 0.001 \) level. Although any inferences should be reviewed with great caution based on these particular data findings, these results support the general contention that my fully fitted regression model explaining campus mobilization, also has a small role in explaining the outcome of said mobilization.
CHAPTER VI
QUALITATIVE RESULTS: MOBILIZING GROUPS AND MOVEMENT TARGETS

This chapter presents results that describe the manner in which contemporary student activism is enacted. In particular, the following data depict the broad patterns of organizing related to the student activists’ mobilizing groups and movement targets.

Mobilizing Groups

The student anti-sweatshop movement was pursued by preexisting and newly formed student groups that all possessed a desire to collectively express their concerns about the issue. Of the twenty-three mobilized campuses in my sample, twenty worked to advance their activist ambitions through formal student organizations and alongside likeminded collaborator groups. In the remaining three cases, newspapers reported incidences of loosely formed groups of students ranging in size from a handful to thirty individuals taking sustained action on behalf of the anti-sweatshop cause; these groups functioned as entities without a formal group identity or name per se. Aside from this broad generalization, I observed distinct patterns of organizational alliances that speak to the composition of the prominent mobilizing groups and their partner organizations. These patterns provide insight about important organizational structures that describe contemporary student mobilization.
These data indicate that contemporary campus mobilization is built from the preexisting organizational infrastructure that students rely on to go about pursuing their interests and extracurricular activities, namely student clubs and groups. Concerns about sweatshop conditions in apparel factories were often initiated and sustained by a group with a very pointed interest in the issue— as was evidenced by the names of many of organizations that bore the major organizing momentum (No Sweat! Anti-Sweatshop Coalition, University Coalition Against Sweatshops, Students Organizing for Labor and Economic Equality, Student Labor Action Coalition, Yale Students Against Sweatshops, etc.). These organizations did not act in isolation, but rather, they drew momentum from likeminded collaborators to advance and propel their cause. In fact, the action of a primary mobilizing group forming alliances on campus with other existing campus clubs was a common practice across the mobilized campuses in my sample. This was exemplified in an article about the mobilization at Indiana University: “The coalition of anti-sweatshop groups and kindred organizations included No Sweat, Indiana Jobs with Justice, the IU College Democrats, Amnesty International and Anti Racist Action” (Indiana Daily Student, November 8, 1999).

Partnerships, whether campus based, local community affiliated, or nationally organized, reflected the key issues central to the anti-sweatshop movement at the time. Reflecting their common interest in a particular aspect of the movement, the activists’ alliances tended to highlight multiple layers of the substantive problems therein. For instance, some partnering groups focused on broader intellectual and social topics such as labor, economic, government policy, international human rights, and minority rights issues. Other partner groups emerged on account of their localized concerns about
Table 29. Summary of Mobilizing Groups by Type: Primary Organizing Group and Allied Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Issue Group</th>
<th>Campus Allies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Activist Student Union</td>
<td>Amnesty International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amnesty International</td>
<td>Anti-Racist Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Sweatshop Coalition</td>
<td>Campus Action Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign for Labor Rights</td>
<td>College Democrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campus Chapters of USAS</td>
<td>Earlham Environmental Action Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights Alliance</td>
<td>Earlham Socialist Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Sweat / No Sweat Coalition</td>
<td>Fairly Traded Coffee Campaign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student Labor Action Coalition</td>
<td>Indigenous People’s Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students for Social Change</td>
<td>Scholars, Artists, Writers for Social Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students for Social Responsibility</td>
<td>Student Alliance to Reform Corporations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students Organizing for Labor and Economic Equality</td>
<td>Student Direct Action Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Trauma Relief</td>
<td>Student Environmental Action Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Coalition Against Sweatshops</td>
<td>Students for a Democratic Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Students for Environmental and Ecological Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Students for Labor Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Students for Social Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Students groups for Schools of Law, Public Health, or Fashion/Design Depts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Students Organizing for Justice in the Americas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Various Associated Student Government Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Various Faculty Groups, such as Faculty Against Sweatshops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Whose Responsibility is it?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Worker’s Rights Project</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Amnesty Intl is considered both a primary issue group and a typically campus ally because it served in both roles depending on the campus.
campus power dynamics, student voice, or the role of social justice in an educational community. In either case, these key issues prompted a kindred passion for particular causes and created a mechanism for joining student activists’ alliances. A summary of primary mobilizing groups and their allied partners are listed in Table 29.

**Insider Alliances – Student Groups and Clubs**

Student activists coalesced as a collective-action group in issue-specific organizations for the anti-sweatshop cause. However, their partnerships with other student groups were common and ultimately useful in advancing and sustaining their mobilization. In large part, campus mobilizing groups pursued their movement ambitions from the perspective of organizational insiders. In other words, they drew upon the resources of the internal, campus based organization groups to assist in advancing their movement ambitions. At times student activists simply sought out likeminded campus groups, and in other instances organizational alliances were born from individual student leaders with dual membership in various clubs. To this point, organizer and senior Kirk Scirto of No Sweat and Amnesty International commented to the campus paper, “We hope to take issues out of dark corners and throw them into the light. . . to focus [them] and show the students that they can make a difference”(Campus Times, March 29, 2001).

Across the array of student groups, two dominant trends emerged which provide insight into contemporary movement activity, the involvement of Amnesty International campus chapters and mainstream student groups.

**Amnesty International.** Amnesty International is a broad human-rights organization with regional, state, local, and campus based affiliates. The group’s mission is “to conduct research and generate action to prevent and end grave abuses of human
rights and to demand justice for those whose rights have been violated” (Amnesty International, 2011). Given such a mission, campus affiliates of Amnesty International had an undeniable influence on the campus based anti-sweatshop organizing, both as leaders and supporters of the cause. The range of activities pursued by local formally recognized campus chapters of Amnesty International ranged from simple efforts to build awareness about sweatshop labor in collegiate apparel manufacturing to serving as the central organizing group for sustaining the cause over an extended period of time.

In the case of Emory University, the local Amnesty International student group was one of the marquis organizers of a human-rights week awareness effort that focused attention to the anti-sweatshop cause. The campus newspaper summarized, “The week, which ends tomorrow afternoon, was sponsored by 22 on-and-off campus organizations, including Emory's Chapter of the Student Environmental Action Coalition, College Council and Amnesty International” (The Emory Wheel, April 5, 2002). In other contexts, such as Moravian College, Amnesty International was the driving organization behind assembling students and faculty to attend a national protest in Washington D.C. where participants could express their concerns about sweatshop labor in apparel manufacturing (The Morning Call, April 19, 2000).

Student activists for the anti-sweatshop cause viewed Amnesty International as a natural source to find willing collaborators. For example, the United Students Against Sweatshops activists at Earlham College viewed Amnesty International as among the groups that would be inclined to offer a substantial contribution to advancing the movement. When reflecting on the process of drawing up the code, the leader of Earlham’s USAS noted:
Realizing that the code should not just be written by an individual or an individual organization, he [the leader of Earlham USAS] sent out invitations to meet with the on campus Amnesty International, ESA, Indigenous People’s Movement (IPM), Student Direct Action Coalition (SDAC) and Earlham Environmental Action Coalition (EEAC). About twenty students from these various organizations met in the Community Action Center (CAC/The Center) and ran through the draft and line by line suggested changes. (campusactivism.org, 1999)

At times, Amnesty International student activists also took on the major responsibility for negotiating their sweatshop labor concerns with campus administrators. At the University of Rochester, Amnesty International members carried out much of the collective action seen on that campus. The University of Rochester chapter of Amnesty initiated their collective efforts by sponsoring an open forum and dialogue on the sweatshop issue with Charles Kernaghan, Executive Director of the National Labor Committee. This talk was designed to build momentum for the anti-sweatshop cause and to raise campus awareness of the issue. Later in the movement, the University of Rochester President affirmed Amnesty’s prominent position as a leader in the anti-sweatshop cause by selecting student representatives for a sweatshop advisory committee from the Amnesty International chapter. Further, throughout the student activists’ campaign at the University of Rochester, Amnesty International authored editorials in the student press, petitioned, collaborated with other campus and local organizations, and convened demonstrations.

*Mainstream and student government organizations.* Not only did anti-sweatshop activists collaborate with likeminded campus organizations (like Amnesty International) to fuel their cause, but there was a clear pattern that student activists were also comfortable aligning themselves with mainstream, typically moderate (or even rather benevolent or conservative) groups like the campus student government. This cooperation stood out as an important signal denoting the legitimization of contemporary
student activism. It also served as a strong signal that student activists interpreted the issue from the vantage point of an organizational insider.

Activists’ efforts to build alliances with mainstream campus groups were not only aimed at realizing symbolic ends. These efforts also engaged student governments as active partners for mobilizing the anti-sweatshop movement. For example, in the student anti-sweatshop movement it became fairly commonplace for the student government to pass a resolution in favor of the activists’ ambitions. In one instance, as the movement was gaining momentum at Northwestern University, the “Associated Student Government senators passed an emergency bill at Wednesday's meeting urging NU to join the Worker Rights Consortium, an anti-sweatshop group that stresses stringent inspections of working conditions and fair labor practices” (Daily Northwestern, May 11, 2000). Their actions affirmed the general support from the student body for the activists’ pursuits. In other instances, the mainstream student government was a (if not the) prominent campus group professing students’ concerns about the sweatshop issue. Campus activists at UCSD propelled such a process when they brought forth “a resolution to the A.S. Council recommending that the UC Board of Regents does not drop its membership with the Worker Rights Consortium. . . . [which has] already passed by councils at UCLA and UC Berkeley” (The Guardian, May 7, 2001).

In another approach to engage the student government as a mainstream mobilizing group, activists used the formal process of student government elections to their benefit. As a vehicle to conduct opinion polling of students, elections provided an opportunity to place anti-sweatshop referenda on student government ballots in order to gauge the level of support for the cause. At the University of Oregon, the press noted
that, “student voters overwhelmingly approved a campus referendum urging the university to join” (The Oregonian, March 31, 2000). Another article indicated that the margin of approval was 1,237 to 404 in favor of the University of Oregon joining the WRC. Likewise, from an initiative backed by Student Against Sweatshops, the mechanism of student government elections allowed activists to quantify the mainstream student sentiment for the cause. In April 2000, an article declared:

Yale undergraduates have approved by wide margins three referendum questions proposing improved monitoring of foreign sweatshops where Yale clothing is manufactured. Students Against Sweatshops on Friday released the results of the weeklong vote, saying the response proves they have widespread student support. (New Haven Register, April 15, 2000)

Student government at the University of Michigan also became a mobilizing group for the anti-sweatshop cause in the sense that it was the body that institutionalized the claims of the movement. Specifically, the Michigan Student Assembly (MSA) partnered with the administration via a new committee designed to provide a sustainable process for addressing sweatshop concerns over time:

The new committee will be primarily responsible for reviewing the compliance of those companies contracted by the University with the WRC and advising University President Lee Bollinger and University General Counsel Marvin Krislov on how to handle violations. "The committee was started because we wanted a long-term solution to student input concerning sweatshops," former MSA President Bram Elias said. . . . The committee will have the dual responsibility of recommending what types of policies the University should implement as well as what should be the consequence for violating those policies. MSA Rep. Rodolfo Palma-Lulion said that the University sets its own standards within the guidelines of the WRC and that, "the new committee will be setting the course for how the University will handle people going against the WRC." The committee will play an important role in setting a precedent both within and outside of the University on how violations of the WRC will be handled. In an attempt to maintain a steady watch over contracted companies as well as remain well informed on the University's implementation of the WRC, appointment to the committee requires a two-year commitment [for students]. (The Michigan Daily, May 30, 2000)
MSA, as a mobilizing group, coupled with Michigan’s prominence in the national anti-sweatshop cause reinforced student government involvement as an important component required to properly respond to the situation.

**Insider Alliances - Faculty Connections**

Consistent with past research demonstrating that faculty played a modest role in campus activism (Bayer, 1972; Kezar, 2010; Light, 1977; Slocum & Rhoads, 2008), contemporary campus activists found some of their most constructive allies from among their faculty communities. With regards to the student anti-sweatshop movement, campus faculty took up allied activities in various capacities. Some faculty served as co-members in the activist organizations that were led by the students. Other faculty members formed their own groups which acted in solidarity with the students activists’ ambitions. Faculty also used existing university governance bodies to express support for the activists’ ambitions.

Before proceeding, it worthy of mention to note that the type of faculty involvement presented in the following paragraphs does not consist of instances when faculty were appointed by the president to serve on a committee charged with addressing the sweatshop apparel issue. Many campuses utilized faculty on committees in this way, but I considered this type of involvement as routine service; the type in which faculty are typically asked to engage. The mere involvement of faculty in an anti-sweatshop or labor committee did not, in and of itself, constitute as faculty engagement with a student movement. Rather, the data I provide here entail concerted efforts by faculty to advance particular claims about the sweatshop issue, or to act in cooperation with their colleagues to assert influence institutional decisions surrounding the sweatshop labor controversy.
Cooperative actors. Student activists were adept at finding clever ways to build alliances with faculty who were willing to act in solidarity alongside them. In April 2001, student activists and faculty at the University of Rochester integrated faculty support into their collective action:

After holding a demonstration on the steps of Wallis Hall Friday, the No-Sweat Coalition submitted petitions signed by faculty and staff to UR President Thomas Jackson. The demonstration focused on persuading the University Apparel Manufacturing Committee to vote for public disclosure of UR’s manufacturing sites. No-Sweat announced during the demonstration that a new group had formed “UR Faculty and Staff for Full Public Disclosure” which will push for human rights amelioration. Junior and No-Sweat President Kirk Scirto said 34 faculty and staff members created and signed the petitions. “The new group illustrates their continued and expanding support and it is particularly important in that the voices of respected faculty members is more difficult to deny than those of the average student,” Scirto said. “I do not wish to be complicit in the exploitation of the workers who produce these garments. Full disclosure is necessary in order to ensure that the basic rights of all workers are protected,” said Professor of Anthropology Robert Foster, who signed the petition. Students also signed 497 petitions. (Campus Times, April 5, 2001)

Similarly, faculty at Stanford co-signed a letter with activist students addressed to the President citing concerns over Stanford’s dealings with Nike:

In a letter sent Tuesday to Stanford President John Hennessy, more than 80 professors, students and other members of the university community said Stanford should not do business with Nike because of sweatshop conditions at its contractors’ overseas factories, particularly in Southeast Asia. . . . students and faculty accuse Nike’s subcontracted companies overseas of using child labor, paying inadequate wages, firing union organizers, allowing sexual harassment and forcing overtime. (San Jose Mercury News, April 4, 2001)

Collaborative faculty did not just air their grievances about sweatshop issues via co-signing petitions or letters, behaviors that could be construed as somewhat passive strategies. They also worked alongside student activists and did some of the heavy lifting in the movement’s activities. At the University of California San Diego, a newspaper account described concerned faculty collaborating with activist students to draft their suggested revisions to the UC Code of Conduct for trademark licenses that would be
among the materials considered by the presidential appointed advisory committee dealing with the issue (The Guardian, June 1, 1999).

Although not a frequent occurrence, faculty also demonstrated their solidarity with students by literally protesting with them. In an instance at Moravian College, faculty were an instrumental part of the protesters’ experiences, and facilitated post-protest discussions with the student activists. Together students and faculty: “gathered Tuesday at the Haupert Union Building on the campus to share their experiences. . . . [where] Amy Baehr, professor of philosophy at Moravian, challenged the students to carry what they learned at the demonstrations into their lives” (The Morning Call, April 19, 2000). Likewise, at Yale, an article described an anti-sweatshop themed conference as consisting of “a mixture of punkish graduate students, clean-cut undergraduates, burly construction workers in union parkas and graying faculty members and labor leaders” (Harvard Crimson, 1999). In these examples faculty not only functioned as a mobilizing group to convey their anti-sweatshop positions to the administration, but they also used their educational expertise to facilitate student learning, by helping students understand both the dynamics of protest and the substantive content of the issue at hand.

Separate, but powerful allies. In other instances, faculty mobilized as a separate group, but in a complementary manner to the student activists’ mobilization efforts. At Northwestern University:

Faculty members took out a signed advertisement in The Daily Northwestern urging NU to join [the WRC] while movement leaders met with administrators to discuss the sweatshop issue. Fifty-six faculty members from across the university signed the letter from Northwestern Faculty Against Sweatshops, an organization formed to support students and influence university policy. "We have a strong feeling when your students are fighting for social justice and democratic values, they should be supported," said Scott Durham, a French professor and NFAS member. "A lot of complaints these days are about how apathetic students are and
how uninterested they are in other people's needs. It's really our obligation to step up and support them when they are doing something positive." (Daily Northwestern, May 15, 2000)

The faculty involvement signaled strong solidarity, and served as validation of the cause and a clear depiction that faculty aspired for the same outcomes as the student activists.

In an attempt to provide public comment on the anti-sweatshop issue, faculty also responded through their formal structures. During a discussion at the Stanford Faculty Senate meeting, faculty implored the Stanford President to respond to their concerns about Nike, where faculty raised issues such as: "Do we want to be in the business of advertising Nike? They have committed severe violations of labor and human rights. Can't we get rid of this?" (San Jose Mercury News, December 26, 2000).

The utility of faculty as a mobilizing group came from their ability to amplify the student activists’ issue by ensuring that administrative attention would be drawn to the topic. Faculty involvements appeared to command and compel administrators to respond. For example, at Northwestern, an article depicted the administrative response to the faculty statement about sweatshop concerns in the campus paper this way:

Eugene Sunshine, senior vice president for business and finance, said administrators were taking faculty input seriously. "I thought it was a very thoughtful statement," he said of the faculty letter. "I was very appreciative of the faculty's concerns and value very highly what those individuals think and say." (Daily Northwestern, May 15, 2000)

Similarly, Stanford’s faculty functioned as an important constituency for prompting the President to engage with the activists’ issue. In some ways, since they were a powerful body (or at least symbolically powerful), faculty involvement as a mobilizing group became a tactic in and of itself.

*External Alliances – Non-campus groups*
In addition to aligning with student organizations and faculty, student activists interacted with community organizations to advance their movement ambitions. A typical representation of an external community alliance was detailed in the Indiana University student paper: “The national day of action was organized by United Students Against Sweatshops, No Sweat! and Local 4730 of the Communications Workers of America” (Indiana Daily Student, October 23, 2001). Like the student organization partners listed in Table 29, the types of community allies ranged from issue-specific groups like Sweatshop Watch, or ideological groups like the Communist Party affiliate, to labor unions.

Student activists typically mobilized with their community allies to expand campus knowledge and awareness of sweatshop issues. The case of Williams College exhibited a typical partnership between campus and community groups in their cosponsored event, “Students for Social Responsibility and Berkshire Citizens Against Sweatshops Benefit Concert: Goodrich Hall, Route 2, Williamstown, 7 p.m., to support local efforts to eliminate sweatshops” (North Adams Transcript, November 7, 2000). Additionally, collaborations with local organizations served as a means for student activists to engage with the topic beyond the confines of their campus environs, and to attend to the sweatshop matter by acting from the perspective of an external stakeholder. Specifically, campus activists were compelled to work with their community allies in protests directed at external targets such as particular apparel vendors. This was the case for University of California – Berkeley students participating in a national day of anti-sweatshop protest locally “organized by the Global Sweatshop Coalition, the Global Exchange and Wetlands” (AP State and Local Wire, March 16, 1999). Other
collaborations resulted in students and community members organizing protests during the holiday season of 1999 to encourage consumers to be more conscientious with their purchases. In many of these instances, partnerships with community groups helped to raise public awareness about individual consumer culpability in sweatshop labor matter. Moreover, such collaborations with external campus groups tended to provide opportunities for the student activists to gain skills and experiences from the vantage point of being outsiders – a contrast to student activists’ notable insider role when pursuing the anti-sweatshop movement on campus.

*Intersecting Alliances*

*United Students Against Sweatshops.* It will come of little surprise that campus activists aligned themselves with the United Students Against Sweatshops (USAS) to advance their cause. Although the simple act of campus activist organizations affiliating with USAS is to be expected, the particular sequencing of the affiliation provides a more robust picture of the dynamics involved in contemporary campus mobilization. Furthermore, the sequencing also reflects contemporary student activists’ local meaning and interpretation of affiliating with USAS.

Up until this point, the alliances I have described occurred in a rather sequenced fashion. First an issue-specific group of activist students rallyied for the anti-sweatshop cause, this act was followed by the activist group affiliated with one of more likeminded campus organizations (often including Amnesty International or the student government) or faculty groups. Then, as opportunities emerged, the activist student group(s) would cooperate with local community organizations regarding nearby related anti-sweatshop issues. With respect to USAS, in most cases, local campus affiliates of USAS
materialized following students’ activism via locally established groups such as No Sweat!, the Student Labor Action Coalition, Students for Social Justice, or Students Organizing for Labor and Economic Equality. These local campus groups appeared to have been responsible for much of the primary and localized campus mobilization; and then, only following their initial attempts to cultivate momentum for the cause, did USAS enter into the picture. As far as identifying the pattern of sequencing then, the qualitative data suggest that local campus activism spurred subsequent USAS affiliation.

From my quantitative data, I know that 14 of my 23 (61%) of the mobilized campuses had an affiliation with USAS at some point between 1998 - 2002 (compared to only 5.6% of the non-mobilized campuses). Likewise, in my larger recruitment sample of 1,245 cases, the USAS membership was only 11.6% among all those campuses. These figures reflect that USAS membership was not commonplace at that time, but rather campus membership in USAS was an exception to the rule. Therefore, it is also notable that the decision to affiliate with USAS on the part of any one of the 23 mobilized campuses was indeed an exceptional action.

Although USAS was founded in 1998 (Van der Werf, 2000), my qualitative data suggest that USAS was not attempting to colonize campuses. Rather, local campus organizations sought out affiliation as an affirmation of their local mobilization efforts. For example, a campus newspaper, described the typical sequencing of events in this way: “NSAS [Northwestern Students Against Sweatshops] began last April as an offshoot of the Peace Project, a coalition of student activist groups dedicated to improving human rights. Organizers said they aimed to educate students and improve working conditions for sweatshop laborers” (Daily Northwestern, April 5, 2001). This
sequencing was important for highlighting the distinctively insider quality of the anti-sweatshop movement. Student activists first organized themselves from the perspective of being local organizational insiders. Students then expanded their movement strategies to more externally oriented approaches. One of these external approaches involved affiliating with USAS. Formally embracing USAS was a way for campuses to merge their local movement ambitions with a relevant external structure (USAS); a structure which provided additional resources and networks for pursuing their overall anti-sweatshop movement ambitions.

The Broader Meaning of Mobilized Alliances for Collective Action

The types of alliances across campus clubs with local (internal) and external organizations signify that contemporary mobilization does not appear to have been isolated either to those actions of a solitary radical campus group, or to a few students on the ideological fringe of contemporary issues. The widespread nature of campus collaboration across special issue groups, mainstream campus governments, and with faculty support implies that contemporary activism was an extension of a diverse community of collective actors with the presence of mind to cooperate and acknowledge the interrelationships between their broad and narrow niche issue concerns.

In several instances, the activists became more contemplative over time about the significance of their cooperation with likeminded allied mobilizing groups. In the data, activists provided reflection on their cooperation with other groups and how such interactions benefitted their immediate campus community:

"It's expected [referring to students expressing concerns about sweatshops] because we have a lot of activist groups, but until very recently we weren't working very hard on coalition building," said Neel Ahuja, a member of Northwestern Students Against Sweatshops. "There were a lot of individual
causes out there but not a broad collection of students." Ahuja, a Weinberg junior, said NU student leaders started a progressive alliance last spring in which leaders of progressive groups get together for biweekly meetings to assemble event calendars. Student activists hope this will create more unity on the campus and make up for NU's smaller student population. "NU is not as big as the some of the Big Ten schools," said Blaine Bookey, Weinberg sophomore and programming director for Women's Coalition. But NU activist leaders see hope in the future of activism on campus. (Daily Northwestern, October 30, 2000)

Similarly, activists appreciated the growing sense of community that their widespread collaboration on the issue provided, "‘Not only have we gained a sense of a strong community among ourselves and our supporters, but we also have the chance to connect with students and workers at the DePaul Loop campus,’ said senior English major Megan Wells” (The DePaulia, May 8, 2000).

**Movement Targets**

As has been the case in prior instances of campus activism (Soule, 1997), students identified proximate targets, namely campus administrations, as a mean of pursuing their anti-sweatshop movement ambitions. Proxy targeting involves “the strategy of protesting or disrupting one institution in order to effect change in a secondary, removed target” (Walker et al., 2008, p. 45). In practice, proxy targeting consists of student anti-sweatshop activists targeting local campus administrations as an indirect route to changing corporate practices which perpetuate sweatshop manufacturing conditions globally. In some instances student activists’ direct ambitions were quite evident in the selection of campus groups’ adopting such names as ‘Student Alliance to Reform Corporations.’ These monikers acknowledge students’ broad movement ideals. Their day to day work however, consisted of indirect movement activity and persuading “colleges to more closely monitor the conditions in factories that make clothing sold with institutional logos” (Schmidt & Van Der Werf, 1999).
Student anti-sweatshop activists identified their campus communities as proximate targets as a way of doing their part for the overall ideals of the global anti-sweatshop movement. Even though campus administrations were institutionally situated as indirect targets in the context of the overall anti-sweatshop cause, student activists exerted the bulk of their efforts internal to their local campus communities, but they pursued external targets as well, although typically subordinate to the importance of acting locally in their campus communities. In the following sections, I will describe the various targets student activists selected as being either locally versus externally situated.

**Local Internal Targets – Campus Constituencies**

Of utmost importance in the student anti-sweatshop movement was the pursuit of local, internal campus targets. In fact, asserting local pressure on campus administrations was the primary task of anti-sweatshop student activists in all but four of the twenty-three mobilized campuses in this sample. The most prevalent patterns of local targeting included targeting administrative power brokers, and calling upon student peers to act.

*Campus leaders, targeting power.* Initial efforts to target the “administration,” quickly evolved such that students identified particular surrogates or the designated administrative officials deemed to have decision making authority to address the activists’ sweatshop concerns. Localized administrative targets typically emerged from such organizational roles as the director of licensing and trademarks (or the equivalently named position), the campus bookstore manager, the vice president for business and finance, or the legal / general counsel on campus. In more seldom scenarios, an athletic administrator or athletic department head was targeted. On the occasion when an athletic administrator (or department) was identified as a target of activists’ concerns, it was
somewhat infrequent and only on campuses with high profile athletic programs (e.g. Stanford, University of Michigan).

Generally speaking, the most visible and specific target of student activists efforts was to challenge the college or university president to take action in the sweatshop matter. In at least thirteen of the twenty-three mobilized campuses, activists called out their president by name, and made recurring attempts to prompt presidential action. By comparison, fewer campuses attempted to target their governing boards regarding the issue. Even so, the role of governing boards being targets of student activism (of any sort) takes on real practical importance given their broad oversight powers to dictate the institutional policies and financial relationships arranged with external parties. When examining which particular campuses targeted their boards, there was a notable tendency for this to occur at campuses with a certain set of characteristics. Namely, those campuses that targeted their boards were institutions that were embedded in structurally complex, and well-established institutionalized sub-systems in the field of higher education systems (e.g., the University of California system, the Big Ten conference, the Ivy League).

At the University of California–San Diego, student activists did not need to advocate for joining the WRC, by virtue of their institution being a member of the UC system, and were thus regulated by the policies and practices that the Regents adopted system-wide. Prior to the student activists at UCSD becoming engaged with the sweatshop issue, the UC system Regents had already adopted a code of conduct for apparel vendors and had joined the WRC on behalf of all UC institutions. Early on, the UC Regents were likely institutional targets given that they had already taken
responsibility for setting policy and addressing sweatshop matters system-wide. The UC campuses generally, with UCSD being no exception, were quick to target their Regents:

A.S.[Associated Students] President Jeff Dodge submitted a resolution to the A.S. Council recommending that the UC Board of Regents does not drop its membership with the Worker Rights Consortium. . . . The resolution condemns the regents’ advisory committee, stating that it contains only one professor and two students, with the remainder of the committee comprised of administrators. It also states that the dearth of students and professors is a violation of university policy. (The Guardian, May 7, 2001)

The work of the UCSD activists mirrored that of the work by other UC system campus activists who also targeted the Regents: “UCSD’s A.S. Council has been presented with a resolution already passed by councils at UCLA and UC Berkeley” (The Guardian, May 7, 2001). UC students were uniformly hoping to influence their Regents towards both maintaining an anti-sweatshop stance, and increasing the voice of non-administrators in matters surrounding sweatshops.

At two of the Big Ten conference campuses (of the three in the sample), student activists included their institutional governing boards among their targets. In the case of Northwestern University, the “University President Henry Bienen told students he would discuss the issue with the NU Board of Trustees at its June meeting” (Daily Northwestern, May 15, 2000). His public commitment to engage the trustees came shortly after the students met with the President and Senior VP to discuss their concerns about the FLA, and after the activist group staged a demonstration showcasing the prices of Northwestern apparel and the wages paid to make it, collected signatures for a petition, and held a candlelight vigil. Within days of the President acknowledging his willingness to engage the trustees, a campus newspaper column summarized the student activists’ impressions and concerns about their administrative and trustee targets in the following manner:
Take a look at how Northwestern is run. Dictators (the president and the board of trustees) control a hierarchical bureaucracy, which imposes their commands. Student input is allowed but rarely heeded (see the administration's unresponsiveness to thousands who asked it to join an effective anti-sweatshop monitoring agency and a similar disdain for the concerns of Hispanic studies students). The desires of the people who work for the food service or the cleaning staff are given even shorter shrift. (Daily Northwestern, May 22, 2000)

As time progressed, student activists at Northwestern were able to actively engage the trustees with their movement concerns. The campus paper reported (note that this was reported approximately a year after the activists extreme frustration had been printed in the student paper, listed above), “NSAS members also have repeatedly met with administrators and university trustees over the past year to discuss either switching membership into the WRC or participating in both groups concurrently” (Daily Northwestern, April 5, 2001).

At another Big Ten campus, the University of Michigan student activists were strategic with their targeting efforts by finding a way for the Board of Regents to notice them. The students staged one of their most notable demonstrations (a thirty student, fifty-one hour sit-in in the President’s office) to coincide with the Regents scheduled meeting (Michigan Daily, March 22, 1999). This particular Regents’ meeting was relevant to the activists’ cause because it was slated to include the University President unveiling his proposed policies for handling the sweatshop apparel matter. The campus paper reported:

After a series of negotiations between University administrators and Students Organizing for Labor and Economic Equality negotiators in the weeks and days before the office occupation, Bollinger presented the University's policy for its expectations of licensed manufacturers at Thursday's University Board of Regents meeting... Bollinger said Thursday at the regents' meeting that the University is proud of its code. "It will ensure fundamental freedoms for these workers, including decent and safe working conditions, and protection from coercive, exploitative conditions," Bollinger said. (Michigan Daily, March 22, 1999)
During the sit-in Michigan activists were certain to publicly express their concerns with
the contents of the policies being presented to the Regents:

SOLE members said they are upset with parts of the University code of conduct
for licensed manufacturers that Bollinger presented at Thursday's University
Board of Regents meeting. "The policy statement the University released at the
regents' meeting does not represent an agreement between the students and
President Bollinger," said SOLE member Peter Romer-Friedman, an LSA
sophomore. "We're upset, however, we know that this code is the strongest in
the nation and its existence is due solely to the efforts of U of M students,"
Gardner said. Members participating in the sit-in said they will remain in the
president's office overnight. (Michigan Daily, March 19, 1999)

Effectively, Michigan student activists targeted the Regents by strategically timing their
sit-in and public statements as a way of highlighting their disagreements with the
University President. The implicit reasoning for appealing to the Regents in this way was
owed to their capacity for directing the priorities for University President. In essence,
student activists realized that the Regents held power to advise or instruct the President to
take stronger actions that were better aligned with the activists’ ambitions.

Although Yale was the only Ivy League institution in my sample, it was an
example of another institution that targeted its governing board as a means of advancing
remedying the sweatshop issues. Similar to the strategies employed at Big Ten
institutions, Yale student activists publicly challenged the responsibility of the governing
board in their rhetoric:

At a place like Yale, it's going to be a long battle, and it's going to take that kind
of pressure." Since 1972, Yale has had a policy of considering the ethical and
legal conduct of the corporations in which it invests. The university also has an
Advisory Committee on Investor Responsibility, made up of students, alumni, and
faculty and staff members. However, Yale's governing board does not release
details about how it invests the university's endowment, said Tom Conroy, a Yale
spokesman. Because no one can independently monitor the investments, Ms.
Lawson-Remer [a student activist] said, Yale's policy "has no teeth." (The
Chronicle of Higher Education, November 26, 1999)
Further, like Michigan and Northwestern, the Yale President chose to publicly acknowledge that the Yale Corporation was engaged in the anti-sweatshop topic: “Levin said during last weekend’s meeting of the Yale Corporation, the trustees were brought up to date on the sweatshop situation and are ‘comfortable with the position of the administration’” (New Haven Register, April 19, 2000).

Although the act of targeting governing boards was not a universal strategy among the twenty-three mobilized campuses, it was a significantly successful approach to mobilizing anti-sweatshop activities at an institutional level. Governing boards are an organizational feature of enormous import given the extensive reach board decisions and policies have over the financial and contractual affairs of institutions. Also, there has been mounting public pressure since the early 1990’s for trustees to be more hands-on (Bing & Dye, 1996) and to “monitor all aspects of institutional performance – academic, financial, social, and ethical” (Altschul et al., 1992, p. 8). In the student anti-sweatshop movement, student activists implicitly endorsed the idea of boards getting involved in the matter by targeting them, thus seeking to draw boards into the debate.

_Campus peers – Targeting awareness and inspiring action._ Activists most certainly targeted their student peers as a path to building momentum for their cause by cultivating a community of sympathizers. Targeting peers in the campus community tended to be a subordinate strategy to targeting the administration, but student activists were mindful and selected the peer community deliberately. One DePaul student activist was particularly succinct in describing the relative importance of the movement’s priorities:

"We have three main objectives," said Haeffner, a sociology major. "One is to implement a code of conduct for university licensing, the second one is to raise
consumer awareness about sweatshops and the DePaul community. The third is to network with other schools and organizations around the city and across the nation.” (The DePaulia, September 30, 1999)

In the case of the University of Rhode Island (URI), student activists had a great deal of trust in the administrative leaders to follow up with their claims and appeared to be at ease with the Collegiate Licensing Company’s (CLC) handling of the sweatshop matter (CLC was the company URI administration retained to attend to apparel and logo management). An activist leader stated, “Dougan [the URI Vice President for Student Affairs] and the bookstore are currently looking into the nature of the production okayed by the CLC, as well as the pros and cons of the WRC” (The Good Five Cent Cigar, March 20, 2002). The URI activists appeared to have faith that the administration could evaluate the sweatshop problem satisfactorily, a perspective which was not always popular with other campus activists who often chose to pursue their own investigations into the situation. With the URI activists’ fairly positive view of how the administration and the CLC were handling the sweatshop contractual and policy matters, the students turned to their peers to build student support for the cause. One activist noted:

"The energy of URISSC, at this time, is, the harnessing of more student support for this measure, in case the administration or the bookstore begin to balk at the idea," Stetson said. "Look for us in the Union with petitions and information more frequently in upcoming weeks." (The Good Five Cent Cigar, March 20, 2002)

For the URI activists, targeting and building student support was a way of creating a type of insurance policy against losing momentum for their cause on campus, or to prepare themselves for more being more aggressive / assertive with the administration if future circumstance should require doing so.

At Iowa State University, students were notably less assertive with their targeting of, and claims made against the administration relative to the activities of other
campuses. Nevertheless, the ISU activists invested a great amount of effort in targeting their peers, and they did so in a very incremental fashion. Over a series of three semesters the conversation about sweatshops (primarily evidenced in activists’ editorials in the campus newspaper) evolved dramatically. It originated in basic pleas for students to care about something (anything), and grew to reminding the student community of their past activist successes (regarding other non-sweatshop issues). The conversation then evolved to messages designed to idealize the anti-sweatshop activism pursued by familiar peer institutions (e.g., large Midwestern state schools, Iowa, Michigan, and Wisconsin). Next, the activists introduced specific information about the sweatshop problem in detail, individual consumer based solutions to it, and subsequently institutional and corporate remedies to the sweatshop problem. Then, in the spring semester of 2002, student activists began asserting themselves beyond cursory meetings with campus licensing and legal administrators, by posting and distributing fliers around campus to further build student awareness (Iowa State Daily, April 25, 2002).

Yale University activists also targeted student peers specifically by authoring strategic editorials in the campus paper. Each editorial was timed to appear just days before their major campus demonstrations. Through these editorials, the Yale activists made their case to the student community to stress why activism should matter to them. It seems that the student activists sensed a tenor of apathy within the student body, or perhaps a lack of confidence for being efficacious when pursuing causes. Therefore the editorial in the paper on February 10, 1999 was written to inspire students to act and issued a call to action:

Students at a growing number of schools across the country have decided to take action about the fact that their school logos are sewn onto clothing by poorly-paid,
often-mistreated workers in sweatshops around the world. Now, I can't read your mind, but I imagine you're thinking what I thought when I first heard about these sit-ins: why? Of course sweatshops are a serious problem. It's horrible that global capitalism causes so much suffering around the world while we enjoy the highest standard of living anyone has ever had. But, you might be thinking, is there really anything we can do? . . . Students at many universities have been organizing campaigns to put pressure on their schools about sweatshops for about the past year. . . . There is no reason why we can't be like the students of Duke, Madison, Georgetown, UNC, and Brown. All we have to do is momentarily suspend our cynicism. And when the stakes are as high as they are here, with children working under horrible conditions in secret around the world to make our clothes, surely a momentary suspension of cynicism is not too much to ask. (Yale Daily News, February 10, 1999)

Only days after this editorial, a well attended knit-in demonstration occurred on Yale’s main Beinecke Plaze. In the following semester, the same scenario played itself out. The Yale Daily News published an editorial on September 9, 1999 which again targeted the student community by making a plea for the anti-sweatshop cause in terms of the moral or principled imperative of the issue. Jess Champagne, a well recognized anti-sweatshop activist on campus argued that students need:

To convince companies, and Yale, to give us the power to make moral choices, we must join together to make our voices heard. We can write letters, gather in demonstrations, and educate others to demand that companies at least throw the doors open so that we can see who's making our clothes. . . . We have to come together to exert pressure collectively and tell companies, and Yale, that we expect them to make the moral choice (Yale Daily News, September 9, 1999)

Soon after this plea, the activist group at Yale collected 1700 student signatures and delivered a petition to the President demanding factory location disclosure, a living wage for factory workers, and external independent monitoring of factories which manufactured Yale apparel.

For ISU and Yale the editorial medium was a very productive strategy for targeting their community of peers. The sequencing of events at Yale, especially, suggests there was a very strong relationship between activists communicating their call
to action in the campus paper and generating greater sensitivity and interest for the anti-sweatshop cause among within the student body.

In another example of working to heighten peer awareness, at Indiana University, “Three members of NO SWEAT!, an anti-sweatshop student group, sat in and distributed educational material at a Gap information session Wednesday at the Career Development Center” (Indiana Student Daily, December 3, 1999). When the paper asked one of the activists to describe their motivation for taking action at the career center, it was very much focused on targeting their peers’ consciousness (as opposed to simply railing against The GAP per se); an activist was quoted saying:

"Everyone needs a job, and we weren't trying to discourage anyone from working at the Gap," said junior Jessica Abel, a member of NO SWEAT!. "We just want them to be aware of the fact that the company they're going to work for supports human oppression and misery for the sake of profit” (Indiana Student Daily, December 3, 1999)

In the same article, another IU activist reflected on the event and stated, "I just hope it inspired some thought," a clear signal that the activists sought to target their peers first, rather than the company.

The case of Williams College campus activists targeting their student peers deviated from the familiar trend of student activists pursuing the campus administration as the primary target, and peers as a subordinate target. Effectively, activists focused on two characteristics of the institution to develop their strategy. First, Williams exhibited a relative lack of material structural vulnerability with regards to receiving no revenue from logoed apparel. Williams total athletic expenditures were less than $3 million, and the institution did not derive any profit from licensing its logo. The campus newspaper explained:
According to Jim Mahon, associate professor of political science and chair of the political economy program, “Williams differs from Penn and many other schools in two respects. Firstly, the College does not own a bookstore from which it sells Williams-logo goods. Secondly, the College does not license its name to retailers or manufacturers of branded goods. Thus, as I understand it, the College does not make a profit, either by commercial gain or by license fees, from the use of its name or logo on items for sale.” (The Williams Record, February 29, 2000)

Second, the institutional identity at Williams was characterized by the fact that its students came from a largely privileged social class background. Combined, these factors prompted Williams activists to select their peers as a de facto primary target of the campus anti-sweatshop movement. On account of this structural positioning, student activists rallied around a concerted effort to promote self-awareness for acting in a socially-responsible manner regarding the sweatshop issue.

The targeting of student peers was a local phenomenon that was pursued quite purposefully by campus activists. Student activists carefully crafted their messages based on the relevant local sentiments of their peer group as a way to inspire and encourage peers to take notice and engage with the issues for which they were concerned. Noticeably, the generic calls for action preceded the particular sweatshop related rationales, suggesting that the approach of targeting peers is a broad technique that could be useful to get students mobilized, or to recruit sympathizers related to any matter requiring movement action, not just the anti-sweatshop cause.

*External Targets: Corporations*

The most notable feature of student anti-sweatshop activists’ direct targeting of corporations was the sequencing of it. The selection and degree of emphasis on corporate targets corresponded to progress of the campus mobilization. Essentially, before campus administrators took some ameliorative action regarding the sweatshop manufacturing of university branded apparel, student activists exerted only modest effort to directly target
the corporation with whom the campuses held their manufacturing contracts. The student activists’ focus was first and foremost on internal campus matters. Then, as opportunities presented themselves, student pursued small incidences of direct corporate targeting to exemplify their concerns about university contracts. Alternately, a second round of corporate targeting involved companies that did not hold apparel licensing contracts. These data provide evidence that once student activists were beyond the initial major push to prompt their campus administrations’ into some sort of ameliorative action (e.g., via joining the FLA, WRC, adopting a Code of Conduct for vendors, etc.), the anti-sweatshop activists turned their attention to directly targeting externally based corporations. This type of corporate targeting extended beyond the local construction of the sweatshop problem within the campus community. It functioned as a way for students to interpret their anti-sweatshop ambitions at another level of abstraction, or the external community of which corporations were a part.

Targeting the local problem of corporate vendors. Typically with regards to movement action in higher education, corporations have been thought of as external campus entities rather than local entities. This is primarily due to the fact that corporations represent an institutional sector separate from colleges and universities. However, in these data certain corporate targets were selected based exclusively in their relationship to the local context of the campus. For instance, corporations were chosen for being vendors that held contractual relationship with the college. In the eyes of student activists, this vendor-client relationship tied corporations to responsibility for the local sweatshop problem confronting the campus. In this sense, particular corporations were structurally external, but locally meaningful internal targets.
The process of students targeting vendors with whom their campuses held contracts was largely an extension of targeting their campus administrators. In this particular sample of campuses, the specific vendor relationship usually involved Nike. Nike was an easy corporate target in the collegiate apparel student anti-sweatshop movement given that it held contractual partnerships with 200 college and universities at the time of this study (Konigsmark, 2000). Student activists’ decision to directly target Nike was subordinate to larger efforts targeting their institutions. For example, student activists were quick to name and begrudge Nike in their flyers, demonstration chants, or movement slogans. But such disparagements were most often used under the guise of targeting administrators to address sweatshop labor conditions by putting contractual pressure on the company. In effect, it was less common for student activists, in the midst of working toward getting their campus administration to act, to also launch direct movement activity targeting Nike. Nike was simply the campus vendor being publically shamed alongside the student activists’ claims against the administration.

Even though direct targeting of Nike was less frequent than targeting campus administrators, it did occur but in the context of what was happening locally on campus. For example, at Stanford, campus activists picketed Nike with slogans such as "Shame on Nike" when Nike CEO Phil Knight (who was also a Stanford Business School alumnus), spoke on campus in the spring of 1998 about Nike’s labor policies (The Stanford Daily, February 10, 1999). Even in this instance of direct corporate targeting, it was evident that the targeting Nike grew out of the local circumstance and convenience of Knight coming to campus.
Corporations beyond campus. The onslaught of direct corporate targeting which student activists pursued following the response of their campus administration was an especially poignant finding in these data. It appeared that gaining the attention of the administration opened the flood gates for student activists to subsequently pursue their activist ambitions externally. In effect, having honed their capacity for launching a mobilization effort within familiar territory (i.e. their own university campuses), student activists appeared to have gleaned the requisite confidence to take their contentions to less familiar ground, and beyond the proverbial walls of their colleges and universities, to corporations in the community. As the movement coalesced or came to a natural transition point locally on campus, student activists began to think about their activities differently. As one campus paper reported, “The point of the anti-sweatshop movement is not just to target the workers making apparel for Northwestern or North Carolina. . . . The next step is to move from Northwestern to Wal-Mart. Then you're going to change the world” (Daily Northwestern, May 1, 2001).

The University of California – Berkeley was notably the first campus to adopt a vendor code of conduct in the fall of 1998. This action amounted to the UC system being among the first in the field of higher education to take significant remedial administrative action to address the sweatshop issue (Daily Californian, March 21, 2000). Although Berkeley student activists remained substantially engaged and active around the anti-sweatshop issue after the code adoption (advocating for tougher standards in the code, etc.), the administration’s adoption of a code of conduct in 1998 was a clear signal that it was sympathetic to the anti-sweatshop movement ambitions and were willing to act in an ameliorative fashion. Soon after the code of conduct was adopted, students turned to
protest The GAP as a prime target on account of it having been one of “18 U.S. retailers named in a $1 billion lawsuit filed in federal court in January on behalf of 25,000 past and present Saipan garment workers. The suit cites abuses of Saipan workers including involuntary servitude, beatings, and forced abortions” (San Jose Mercury News, March 7, 1999). Among the 250 protesters present at the rally, the same article noted, “At the Berkeley store on Telegraph Avenue, a coalition of 50 student, labor and senior activists picketed the store chanting ”Gap, Gap, get a clue. Cheating workers just won't do’” (San Jose Mercury News, March 7, 1999).

Drawing upon a parallel example, student activists at the University of Michigan turned to the direct targeting of corporations after more than a year of targeting the campus administration. The shift from targeting university administrators to targeting external corporations came after the institution joined the WRC, joined the FLA, and enacted other anti-sweatshop organizational measures in response to the students’ campus-based mobilization efforts. In the fall of 2000, ten University of Michigan student activists were subsequently arrested when protesting outside of a local Kohl’s store. The students were:

Charged with trespassing after they refused to leave the Lohr Road store after warnings from the Pittsfield Township Police and the Kohl's personnel. The controversy centers around the Chentex factory, one of Kohl's manufacturers located in Managua, Nicaragua. Protesters claim that the company is guilty of exploiting workers with low wages, poor conditions and union busting. Monday's action at the Ann Arbor store is part of a nationwide drive by the National Labor Committee for Worker and Human Rights to secure a living wage and fair treatment for the workers. (The Michigan Daily, October 3, 2000)

Similarly, In March of 2000 DePaul University also joined the WRC. Soon thereafter, student activists joined with other community Chicago based groups (including faith based, union, community groups, and Loyola University anti-sweatshop
student activists) to extend support to the striking workers of the Five Star Hotel Laundry who were trying to overcome the anti-union tactics of company officials (Chicago Tribune, September 3, 2000). As a result, DePaul activists, sustained their momentum for working towards social justice and reportedly, were still advancing community based labor causes a year later. Only this time they were accompanied by Northwestern University student activists as well (Northwestern joined the WRC in the spring of 2001). In the fall of 2001, Northwestern and DePaul students rallied to the aid of striking “workers at Carousel Linens in Highwood, who are mostly Latino immigrants and speak little English” and had been fighting for the “right to form a union, picketing outside the business every morning and holding rallies on Fridays” (Daily Northwestern, November 19, 2001). In addition to supporting the workers, student activists from these Chicago campuses tried to meet with the Carousel owner, but were prohibited. Specifically, the news article documenting these events showcased the student activists’ transition from an internal campus-based focus to a broader external community-based focus in their targets, noting “NSAS's involvement with Carousel is a change for the group” (Daily Northwestern, November 19, 2001). The paper highlighted this change by quoting a student activist as saying “‘Sometimes student activism is criticized for being idealistic and abstract and out there trying to save the world,’ Gore said. ‘But when you do it locally [off campus in the community], you can really see the difference’” (Daily Northwestern, November 19, 2001).

These examples display a sequencing mechanism that is typical of contemporary campus mobilization. The overall pattern in these data denoted an evolutionary process

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Incidentally, I know from the quantitative data that Loyola University also joined the WRC in the spring of 2000, even though I do not have any qualitative data about this institution since they were not selected into my collective action sample of 149 institutions.
where students first received validation from their campus administrators that the central matter of concern had been either acknowledged or addressed. In turn, this validation freed up or empowered student activists to turn their focus externally.

External Targets: Government and Policy Institutions

Lawmakers and government officials. Some student activists chose to take their anti-sweatshop ambitions to government officials. Most notably, the San Francisco State University United Students Against Sweatshops group was well positioned to not only advocate for their cause on campus, but was geographically well positioned to target elected officials as well. Specifically, the 2000 Democratic National Convention was being held in Los Angeles. Consequently, SFSU USAS activists spearheaded much of the plans to demonstrate at the Democratic National Convention in an effort to pressure nominee Vice President Albert Gore to come out in favor of the WRC, despite the FLA having been a Clinton White House backed initiative. The campus activists were directly involved in a very prominent manner, engaging in civic discourse by virtue of invoking their freedom of expression on a major national stage. Their SFSU activists’ preparation involved not only coordinating students, but also organizing a broader range of local and national anti-sweatshop sympathizers.

In a somewhat less high profile sense, but noticeable nonetheless, University of California–Berkeley and University of Oregon activists were among the many campus constituencies of anti-sweatshop activists gathered in Washington D.C. in the summer of 1999 for a United Students Against Sweatshops meeting. During this meeting, activist students from these campuses (as well as others):

Gathered outside the U.S. Labor Department Friday calling for full disclosure of the location of overseas sweatshop factories and a living wage for overseas
garment workers sewing goods for American companies. The students delivered a letter to U.S. Labor Secretary Alexis M. Herman calling for open monitoring of foreign textile factories (USA Today, July 12, 1999).

Aside from targeting governmental officials via demonstrations, Yale law students used the tactic of filing a legal motion to challenge:

The Clinton administration’s illegal policy of protecting domestic sweatshop operators. By allowing sweatshop owners to pay slave-wages, the policy depresses wages for all U.S. workers. The sweatshop workers are often paid at about half the minimum wage or are not paid at all under the threat that their employers will report them to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) for deportation, according to Shayne Stevenson, student director of the Yale Law School Workers’ Rights Project.

The petition specifically challenges a memorandum of understanding between the INS and the federal Department of Labor that requires labor officials investigating labor violations to hand over to the INS the names of suspected undocumented immigrants potentially leading to their deportation. (New Haven Register, September 18, 1998)

The direct targeting of the Clinton administration via the legal system was a particularly clear example of the manner in which Yale students were able to integrate their academic legal skills with their collective convictions about social justice in an effort to elevate sweatshop concerns internal to their campus, and to take a leadership role in the anti-sweatshop conversation within the national movement. Yale was the only campus I came across who pursued an external target via the legal system.

Policy and banking institutions. External policy changes were pursued more typically when students publicly condemned the finance and trade policies which were perceived to perpetuate sweatshops. This strategy was pursued by targeting the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Trade Organization (WTO), and the policies of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In my sample, several campuses had groups of activists participate in national demonstrations designed to target these entities. Occasionally, the campus groups coordinated logistical planning with a community group who held the same movement ambitions (such was the case of campus
activists traveling from Trinity and Bates Colleges). In other circumstances, campuses that were geographically close in proximity chose to pursue similar external targets (the World Bank and IMF). At an April 2000, Washington D.C. protest, there were twenty anti-sweatshop organizers from the University of Hartford, one hundred from Yale, as well as a group of student activists from Trinity College (as well as representatives from campuses not included in my sample).

Most notably, the main venue that campus activists used to target international finance and trade policy groups was the April, 2000 World Bank and IMF protests in Washington D.C. (There was also some evidence that anti-sweatshop campus groups also organized constituencies to attend the Seattle 1999 World Trade Organization meeting.) Broadly speaking, these protests were intended to express dismay over a variety of trade, finance, and policy concerns. Although such efforts were not focused specifically on university issues, campus anti-sweatshop activists interpreted these events as quite compatible with their specific anti-sweatshop movement ambitions. In the activists’ views, the World Bank and the IMF were worthy of targeting because they functioned as tangible artifacts of social institutions who exacerbated and perpetuated the existence of sweatshops. “The protesters, many of them college students” were described as demonstrating against:

What they say is an emerging "global corporatism" that ignores the plight of working people and the poor. They say that World Bank and IMF projects and policies have created sweatshop conditions for workers, squeezed spending on health and education needs, and devastated the environment. (Philadelphia Inquirer, April 17, 2000)

More specifically, a local newspaper documented Moravian College anti-sweatshop activists’ motivation for targeting the World Bank and IMF on account of these organizations: “burdening poor countries with crushing debt payments, unsafe food,
environmental destruction, and sweatshops” (The Morning Call, April 19, 2000).

Similarly, Bates student activists traveled to Washington D.C. to attend the demonstration, and characterized the World Bank as a target by virtue that it:

“Failed in its mission to eliminate poverty and has created more poverty,” said Ensner, a 21-year-old senior, [and]... that shutting down the meeting this weekend "is the most blunt way to say we've got to stop . . . that some serious structural changes" need to occur within the World Bank, IMF and WTO. (Portland Press Herald, April 13, 2000)

Admittedly, the Moravian and Bates activists’ grievances were not isolated to sweatshop concerns, but these issues were certainly central among a potentially long list of policy matters encompassed by the work of the World Bank and IMF.

These external targets were an important tool that prompted students to both tangibly translate the sweatshop problem into a global socio-political matter of concern, as well serving as a platform to gain first hand awareness of what it meant to stand up against major governmental, financial, or corporate institutions in contemporary society.

One of the University of Oregon students who attended the April 2000 Washington D.C. protest was interviewed by the New York Times about the relative impact of his experience at the demonstration. The Times summarized:

Mike Saltz, 22-year-old student at University of Oregon, is one of 600 people swept up in mass arrest of demonstrators near International Monetary Fund in Washington, DC; Saltz spent Saturday night and Sunday morning in holding cell before paying $50 fine and being freed; he says it gave him time to ponder his part in the weekend's street protests in Washington, in diffuse movement for 'economic justice,' and police reaction to it. (New York Times, April 17, 2000)

The Oregon student spoke specifically about how his college courses prompted him to study globalization, which led him to the Washington demonstration. Correspondingly, his experience with targeting the powerful World Bank and IMF also taught him lessons about the expression of dissent in contemporary society, noting "'I was really shocked,'
he said. ‘When it comes to disagreeing with the dominant view, your rights are really out the window. They can do whatever they want -- they're the police’” (New York Times, April 17, 2000). Further, the Oregon student reflected that his own motivations for attending the rally were different than others who attended, describing the overall rally as “‘a strange coalition’” comprised of “a collection of advocates for ecology and self-declared anarchists, traditional leftists and mainstream labor unions and dozens more groups deeply skeptical of the forces of globalization” (New York Times, April 17, 2000).

Utilizing external targets also played an important role in developing more localized movement sentiments. In my early presentation of the results regarding mobilizing groups, I noted that Moravian anti-sweatshop activists were also joined by some of their campus faculty at the Washington D.C. protest. Upon returning to campus the activists and the faculty met collectively to “share their experiences” (The Morning Call, April 19, 2000) and to consider the implications of the issues and their protest participation. In particular, faculty played a notable role in helping the Moravian student activists consider next steps in terms of determining appropriate targets to advance movement concerns. Faculty instigated deliberations by discussing with students “such options as finding out if Moravian College has any World Bank bonds in its portfolio and investigating if clothing sold in the bookstore comes from sweatshops” or (The Morning Call, April 19, 2000).

External Targets: Community Consumers

Another targeting pattern, although quite subordinate in frequency to the type of strategies already discussed, was the directing targeting of generic consumers. In 1999,
students on a handful of campuses chose to target shoppers at major brand retailers as a way to raise consumer awareness. In large part, the timing of student activists’ focus on consumers coincided with several key elements. These included two federal class action and two civil-rights law suits citing human and labor rights violations at a major apparel manufacturer, The GAP (Indiana Student Daily, December 3, 1999; San Jose Mercury News, March 7, 1999); along with the onset of the 1999 winter holiday shopping season. Student activists at UC-Berkeley and Yale were among the campus groups that engaged in consumer awareness efforts, with the ultimate goal to shape shopper behavior (New Haven Register, December 16, 1999; AP State & Local, March 6, 1999). One news article captured the extent to which Yale activists were efficacious in elevating consumer awareness of sweatshop labor, thus being successful by altering consumers’ purchasing decisions. The journalist noted:

Shoppers interviewed at New Haven's branch of The Gap, a clothing store targeted by Yale students as allegedly selling "sweatshop" products, provided a mixed bag of responses. "I don't think about it when I'm shopping," said Thea Grant of New Haven. "But if I picked up a sweatshirt and I knew a 9-year-old girl in Guatemala got paid 8 cents to make it, I'd throw it back on the damn rack!"

Two other Gap shoppers, Juanita Jones, 16, and Lolita Jenkins, 14, were not at all concerned about such issues. Jones said she only gets annoyed about the high costs of some clothing. Jenkins said, "I like the name brands" regardless of their origins. Katie Rodgers, 25, visiting from Philadelphia, said she won't buy Nike shoes because years ago her college professor showed her evidence they were made by Indonesians for less than a livable wage. She noted Nike pays huge sums of money to wealthy sports figures who endorse the company's products.

Rodgers' companion at The Gap, 25-year-old Jason Drebitko of New Haven, said Kathie Lee Gifford's ties to Central American sweatshop clothing has made many Americans aware of the issue. (New Haven Register, December 16, 1999)

UC-Berkeley activists targeted consumers during the fury of purchasing at the post-Thanksgiving pre-holiday sales. Activists sought to “Hit the epicenter of Bay Area consumerism on its busiest day and urge consumers not to consume” (West County
The activists were especially creative in targeting shoppers, as a news article accounted:

“Carolers offered a different message. To the tune of "Jingle Bells," they sang, "Free yourself, free yourself, from the corporate way; put down all your credit cards and go outside and play" . . . [and] the group belted out its take on ""The Twelve Days of Christmas"" a mock paean to a global economy: "'Pre-sweated pants, slave labor shoes, toys made by kids, and gifts made in sweatshops overseas!" (West County Times, November 27, 1999).

These consumer consciousness raising efforts, like those pursued by Yale activists, seemed to have a relatively limited impact on individual consumers. One shopper was quoted as saying: "'Actually, it's kind of comical,' said Maureen Krau of Alameda, who sat nearby, shopping bag in hand. 'It's a kind of entertainment. It's not going to influence me’" (West County Times, November 27, 1999).

**Field-level Patterns of Targeting**

Campuses in the anti-sweatshop movement displayed a strong sense of connection to similar activism happening throughout the field of higher education, especially relative to patterns in target selection. As mentioned earlier, the campuses in the Big Ten and the UC-system enacted a similar pattern of targeting by focusing attention toward their governing boards. Similarly, northeastern campuses targeted the World Bank and IMF. Overall, these data provide a sense that student activists were compelled to exhibit targeting patterns based in the likeness or mutual prestige that their institutions shared with other campuses in the field.

There data illustrated that students felt a strong sense of community with activists at other higher education institutions, which conflated the boundaries of what could be interpreted as local or external targets. At times, student activists interpreted their targeting of other campus administrators as almost an extension of their local aspirations.
This was exemplified in the views of the Northwestern activists. One of the important rallying activities for the Northwestern anti-sweatshop activists was coming to the defense of their anti-sweatshop compatriots at the University of Wisconsin-Madison (also a Big Ten school). Northwestern activists believed the campus police at UW-Madison were especially harsh with the student activists there who had staged an anti-sweatshop sit-in:

Just before dawn on Sunday, police in riot gear ordered the [UW-Madison] students out and, when most refused to go, police dragged them away, according to witnesses and media accounts. Some 54 students were jailed, but all were bailed out by Sunday night. The story spread like wildfire, and a volley of e-mails expressing outrage over the arrests hit the campus from students in schools all over the map. Meanwhile, the same speedy communication was churning through Northwestern’s campus in Evanston, where students prompted by an e-mail account of the Wisconsin arrests shot off their own electronic missives to President Henry Bienen, asking him to contact Wisconsin's chancellor to urge him to drop charges against the arrested students. University spokesman Alan Cubbage said, "As a matter of professional courtesy, we don't tell other college administrations how to handle their affairs." The Wisconsin situation has galvanized the normally low-key Northwestern campus. (Chicago Tribune, February 23, 2000)

The anti-sweatshop activists at Northwestern indirectly targeted the UW-Madison administration, but did so in a localized manner by asking their own President to intervene. This example conveys that the camaraderie of the Big Ten schools was more than a function of athletic contests, academic collaborations, and proximity. It also applied to alliances born from the similar sympathies of student activists on these campuses, along with a larger sense of community within the field-level structure, in this case the Big Ten.

The conflation of local campus relevance to include other similar campuses was not just inferred from the way activists interpreted anti-sweatshop phenomenon. It was also a prominent feature of the data itself. Throughout the newspaper articles I examined
for the three Big Ten campuses in my sample, there was a profound tendency to reference one another along with the other Big Ten institutions’ anti-sweatshop activism, including University of Wisconsin-Madison, Indiana University (also in this sample), Ohio State University, and Michigan State University. The press as a type of community forum, was quick to draw parallels between campuses similarly situated in the field. Undoubtedly, these comparisons played into the local understanding of student activism and had some degree of influence over the subsequent enactment of the movement.

*Progress internally prompts field involvement.* Following the local successes of their movement actions on campus, universities were also spurred to take action in the field. These field-level activities had a more distinctively external feel, as activists seemed to pursue action directed towards other campus administrations only after their local movement activities had come to a natural conclusion, of sorts. Only days after Miami University joined the WRC, student activists became interested and willing to connect externally with the broader student anti-sweatshop movement, thus pursuing opportunities at a nearby campus. Miami student activists allied themselves with the Purdue anti-sweatshop activists to help them persuade that administration to take action. Some Miami activists traveled “2 1/2 hours to West Lafayette to camp out with the Purdue protesters” (Watertown Daily Times, April 6, 2000). Likewise, after gaining WRC membership, the Northwestern activists turned their efforts to other campuses, notably outside of the Big Ten, by staging a call-in to “the Harvard president and two deans to advocate their support” (Daily Northwestern, May 4, 2001). Northwestern activists justified the selection of the Harvard administration as a target based on their
interpretation that the student anti-sweatshop movement was a matter for their concern on account of their solidarity within the field of higher education:

Although the members of NSAS said they achieved their primary goal when the administration joined the Worker Rights Consortium, they are still fighting for anti-sweatshop student groups at other schools. "Just because we have a win for the WRC here, it doesn't mean we shouldn't extend that support to colleges across the nation," Krepel said. (Daily Northwestern, May 4, 2001)

Further they justified their actions from an external perspective as well, with another activist noting, “The point of the call-in is to let the Harvard administration know that the world is watching” (Daily Northwestern, May 4, 2001).

Summary

Typically, student activists selected a primary target which was locally relevant to the sweatshop conditions on campus. Most often primary targets were the campus administration, represented by the President, governing board, or particular administrative official charged with the task of coordinating apparel contracts. As students attempted to stimulate changes on campus, they were often motivated to target the corporations with whom their universities held apparel contracts, or their peers who they sought to motivate to act. An important sequencing trend emerged in these data where once there was some acknowledgement that activists’ efforts were noticed on campus, students shifted their focus towards pursuing external targets. These external targets were deemed an extension of the movement ambitions in other contexts, be they other campuses, the community, or corporations.
CHAPTER VII

QUALITATIVE RESULTS: MOVEMENT FRAMES AND INTENSITY

Movement Frames Built on Diagnostic, Prognostic and Motivational Claims

Benford and Snow (2000) identify that the core framing tasks of any movement is to advance diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational ideas in order to urge others to take ameliorative action. Movement actors make claims which: speak to the specific attribution of a social problem (diagnostic); the proposed remedy for said problem (prognostic); and provide a justification or rationale for movement involvement generally (motivational) (Benford & Snow, 2000). In these data all three core framing tasks were utilized by asserting claims that emphasized the institutional context of higher education and the local campus contexts.

As I described earlier, the student anti-sweatshop movement was conceived as an attempt to persuade university officials to use their financial power and brand recognition to force corporations to improve the working conditions for workers that produced university licensed apparel (R. Ross, 2003; Krupat, 2002; Mandle, 2000; R. J. S. Ross, 2004b). Therefore, in practical terms, it was no surprise that the mobilized campuses in this sample tended to put forth diagnostic claims objecting to their institutions’ complicit roles in sweatshop manufacturing on account of the related licensing contracts for university logoed athletic apparel. Practically speaking, the student activists’ corresponding prognosis of this problem generally translated to advocating that their
institutions join the WRC, rather than the FLA. Even so, there were also specific interpretations of the sweatshop problem which translated into more nuanced and locally specific claims. Aside from these generalizations about the diagnostic and prognostic framing of the anti-sweatshop cause, student activists drew heavily on resonant motivational claims that were embedded in both campus organizational identities and common assumptions about the socially-responsible role of higher education institutions in society.

**Prognostic Framing**

For many campuses, prognostic framing involved campus activists endorsing claims that their institutions change administrative policies in order to prevent sweatshop labor practices from entering the university logoed apparel supply chain. Eighteen of the mobilized campuses called upon their administrators to adopt specific institutional practices that were essentially various components of the general platform of claims covered by the WRC. Activists articulated specific claims ranging from asking their institutions to: join the WRC as a founding member or to join it generally; stay with the WRC instead of moving to the FLA; join the WRC on top of the institution’s membership in the FLA; or adopt particular practices associated with the WRC (e.g., creating a campus specific code of conduct for apparel vendors or requiring factory disclosure for contracted vendors). Still, even though campus activists might have phrased their claims in a variety of ways, the core sentiment driving the movement ambitions were ideals of the WRC – pressuring institutions for factory location disclosure, a code of conduct for manufacturers, external monitoring of factories, living
wage provisions for workers, exclusion of apparel vendors in the governance of the WRC, etc.

Aside from solutions mirroring WRC ideals, campuses proposed secondary and/or additional remedies to the problem of sweatshops. Building from the WRC rhetoric, the proposed remedies were usually tied into aspects of the local institution’s organizational identity. MIT and Williams College both provide interesting examples of prognostic framing situated in such a manner; and they highlight the tendency for students to favor educationally-based solutions.

*Educational Approaches for Addressing Social Problems*

*Research.* Even though MIT student activists’ primary solutions to the sweatshop problem included calling for the creation of a campus code of conduct for vendors and joining the WRC and FLA, activists were also very astute to tap into a prognostic frame rooted in MIT’s organizational identity. Specifically, student activists proposed that MIT administrators create an organizational infrastructure to translate the ideals of the movement into the academic enterprise by providing funding for faculty and students to study labor issues. The theme of activists calling for dedicated funding to research the sweatshop issue was reiterated over time and throughout the students’ campus anti-sweatshop campaign. The primary student group responsible for leading the action on campus, United Trauma Relief, was especially clever in invoking the campus identity to propose a MIT-specific solution. By requesting funds for research support, student activists sought to place the institution’s trademark organizational identity of generating new knowledge to contribute solutions toward broad scale social problems to help resolve the sweatshop issue long term. A student newspaper editorial summarized:
Long-term support for research into this extremely complex but crucial issue may well be among the most important contributions that MIT can make for improving conditions in factories. Support for both students and faculty who wish to pursue research and direct action in the field of labor rights is clearly critical to the building of our understanding of the problems involved in these issues and to the creation of new, better solutions. (The Tech, February 19, 2002)

This particular research–focused prognostic frame which student activists adopted, was a strong signal that there was a collective sentiment in the MIT culture which endorsed the view that knowledge creation is a critical component of the social change process. The solution of investing in research to remedy the substantive problem of sweatshop labor also showcased student activists’ awareness that social change emerges from long-term institutionalized changes alongside the more near-term approaches of adopting WRC-like policy changes.

*Increase personal knowledge and awareness.* Similar to MIT, Williams College student activists also advanced claims related to their administration taking policy action (i.e., adopting a code, joining the WRC, or joining the FLA) to remedy the sweatshop problem. However, different from MIT, Williams student activists’ prognostic claims-making proposed that a key solution to alleviating the sweatshop problem was to change the hearts and minds of their student peers. Williams’ activists described their solution to the sweatshop issue being an alternate to the policy, or “explicitly political” approaches pursued through labor standards and/or trade agreements. Students explained that alternatively, their mode for addressing the sweatshop problem was “indirectly political, because it entails an organized campaign to make people aware of the issues. However, its ultimate goal is to act through free, though enlightened, choices in the marketplace” (The Williams Record, May 1, 2000).
Williams student activists’ prognostic framing is best understood as having emerged out of their diagnostic or underlying explanations for the causes of sweatshops. Specifically, in 2000 and 2001 student activists used the common social and demographic characteristics of Williams’ students, along with prevailing attitudes in the student body, to articulate an organizational identity at Williams which valued socioeconomic privilege, and stressed personal achievement and financial success over other more selfless matters. A student activist elaborated on the cause of the problem of sweatshops:

I do know one thing: the way some individuals in our society live their lives, especially that part of society that Williams and those other elite schools supply, is undoubtedly and mercilessly destroying the environment and the lives of many people around the world. . . . We all know that many of us are driven by the will to be rich and successful without regard to those who don’t share these privileges nor have any hope of obtaining these privileges. And we know there is nothing wrong with what we have. . . . Nonetheless, we are so privileged, so protected, that the fact we don’t have to worry about anything but ourselves and our immediate surroundings blinds us. Even those of us who aren’t privileged by birth are blinded by what we have obtained at Williams. We are here at Williams to position ourselves in order that we may “maximize our utility.” That’s it. . . . However, from the three and a half years that I have lived this fortunate life it has become clear to me that these privileges are the blinding lights that obscure our understanding and compassion for life beyond our own. We are trained to worry about ourselves and better our lives. While we are living our privileged lives; the blind exploitation of this privilege is destroying the environment and the lives of many people around the world. For example, how many of you know that Nike, Gap, Wal-Mart, Tommy Hilfiger, The Limited, J. Crew and Polo Ralph Lauren have been accused of operating sweatshops or have settled claims for operating sweatshops? How many of you know that the clothes you are wearing might be stained by the blood and sweat of a little girl who lost her finger sewing that shirt and working 60 hours a week in the harshest conditions? How many of you care? How about that last dining hall meal? How many paper napkins did you use? How much food did you throw away? (The Williams Record, February 22, 2000)

What is especially interesting is the manner in which the article invoked the use of the term ‘we,’ and how the article appeared to speak of the Williams’ privilege in a very presumptive and collectively understood manner. This framing was common throughout the comments from Williams’ activists. The aspects of organizational identity invoked to
frame the anti-sweatshop cause at Williams were not necessarily the ideals expressed in a
campus mission statement or educational program, but an espoused organizational
identity that emerged as a result of the local composition of the students attending
Williams. This example demonstrates how aspects of organizational identity which are
seemingly antithetical to the movement itself, can also be infused into the movement
claims such that they serve as a driving motivator to justify the movement actions.

Given the activists’ guiding concern that the ‘Williams experience’ may blind
student peers to the problem of sweatshops (or similar economic and social injustices),
their remedy was raise peer awareness about the substantive issues. Activists saw
individual awareness as a path to socially-responsible decision making in the market
place, thus reducing or ceasing business practices that would perpetuate the sweatshop
problem. One activist summarized this view (italics added for emphasis):

“The concern is more about the fact that students who go to Williams are the ones
who end up graduating and going on to become leaders in corporations,
governments and big organizations. But what we saw was that a lot of students
were very narrow-minded, and it just seemed like they were on one tract. They
were just so focused on their education and becoming successful that they didn’t
seem to be concerned about what was going on around them.” . . . "If people want
to be successful business people, there is really nothing wrong with that,” he said,
"as long as when they are making their decisions -- you know, when they are the
CEO of GE and they are deciding to close a factory in Pittsfield -- they make a
socially aware decision, and one that is not destructive. "Making money can't be
the sole reason for making a decision, he said. "If making money is so important -
- why is it so important? If people make a lot of money to live a good life, how
can you live a good life by hurting someone else?” (The Berkshire Eagle, May
14, 2000)

Given the activists’ prognostic frame of building personal awareness, their movement
framing was supported with tactics consisting mostly of educational and informational
approaches. Specific tactics included an ongoing intellectual series about social
responsibility, hosting benefit concerts to eliminate sweatshops, sponsoring community
forums with sweatshop and labor experts, writing editorials in the student press, and organizing an ad hoc committee to discuss the substantive issues.

One other consideration in the Williams College example is the extent to which the structural vulnerability of the institution influenced the diagnostic and subsequent prognostic framing of the sweatshop problem. In the results presented in the preceding chapter pertaining to movement targets, I noted that Williams total athletic expenditures were less than $3 million (see Table 30) and that the institution did not derive any profit from licensing its logo. With this structural positioning, I assert that the institution’s relative lack of movement vulnerability may have allowed non-administrative targets to take precedence over administrative targets. Alternately, it could also be the case that the students’ frustration with the dominant organizational identity was so strong that it preempted the institution’s structural positioning as the driving force motivating involvement in the movement. In a sense, student activists’ passion for the cause and their frustration with the shortcomings of the prevailing organizational identity may have incensed them to act.

Both the MIT and Williams examples showcase the strength of a collective organizational identity to shape the manner in which student activists pursue their claims. Therefore, these cases reify the relative importance of processual vulnerability within institutions. The educationally-focused solutions which student activists were immediately drawn to were born directly out of the culture of the institution. Moreover, the particular enactment of their educational ideas was extremely representative of the specific local organizational context that students experienced day in and day out as members of those specific campus communities. The types of movement solutions
proffered at MIT and Williams were very much based in the unique organizational identities that these educational institutions engendered (either implicitly or explicitly) via the composition of the student body and the prevailing educational ideals and practices pursued on campus. The undertones of poignant organizational identities – one which viewed research as a way forward (MIT), or one that passively fostered a sense of privilege or entitlement (Williams) – were natural entry points for student activists to situate the claims of their movement activities.

Finally, other prognostic frames present in the student anti-sweatshop movement involved activists advocating solutions based in raising general consumer awareness, pressuring corporations/vendors to change their practices, and persuading international and governmental organization to make policy changes. These frames were either implicitly advanced through the selection of movement targets (as I described earlier in the prior chapter), or they emerged out of the prognostic claims which evolved from the diagnostic framing of the issue, which will be discussed in greater detail below.

Diagnostic Framing

Across the twenty-three mobilized campuses, campus activists pursued claims which utilized diagnostic frames that typically featured the relative structural vulnerability of the institution to the problem of sweatshop labor in collegiate apparel manufacturing. Additionally, claims that put forth broad based explanations related to corporate greed, consumerism, or financial and trade policies were also used to frame the campus anti-sweatshop movement.

Structural Vulnerability to Movement
From the quantitative results presented previously, it was evident that campus athletic expenditures had little to do with recruitment and/or participation in the AFL-CIO’s Union Summer program (see the analyses generated in the RP sample, Table 20). Similarly, structural movement vulnerability was also not a predictor in the full model predicting mobilization in the CA sample (see Table 24). Nevertheless, since the fundamental problem about sweatshops in colleges and universities was intimately tied to the scale and scope of athletic logoed apparel manufacturing, it is important to consider the manner in which the qualitative data speak to how student activists attended to this particular diagnostic frame.

Objectively speaking, the twenty-three mobilized campuses exhibited varying levels of structural vulnerability to the sweatshop issue. In other words, the amount of institutional athletic expenditures varied accordingly from approximately $500,000 to $33 million (see Table 30). Beyond the basic fact that every mobilized campus had some financial involvement with athletic apparel manufacturing, campuses approached the process of licensing their logos with various contractual arrangements. For example, on certain campuses individual coaches in different sports chose particular apparel manufacturers to supply their team apparel so that the licensees could vary from one corporation to another (e.g. Nike, Reebok, Adidas, etc.). In other circumstances, athletic departments negotiated exclusive apparel manufacturing contracts with an individual company (such as Nike) to outfit all of their varsity teams. In each of these situations, campuses would receive athletic apparel, and other contractual incentives such as certain agreed upon shares of the revenue of overall logoed apparel sales. Among the twenty-three campuses, there were also institutions that had apparel agreements with
Table 30. Relative Financial Vulnerability to the Sweatshop Problem

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campus</th>
<th>Athletic Expenditures in Millions of Dollars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University of Michigan-Ann Arbor</td>
<td>32.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Oregon</td>
<td>21.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana University-Bloomington</td>
<td>20.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwestern University</td>
<td>19.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanford University</td>
<td>17.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of California-Berkeley</td>
<td>16.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa State University</td>
<td>13.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miami University-Oxford</td>
<td>7.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yale University</td>
<td>6.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco State University</td>
<td>6.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Rhode Island</td>
<td>6.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DePaul University</td>
<td>5.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts Institute of Technology~</td>
<td>4.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Hartford</td>
<td>3.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Williams College~</td>
<td>2.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Rochester~</td>
<td>1.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of California-San Diego</td>
<td>1.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bates College</td>
<td>1.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moravian College and Moravian Theological Seminary</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of St Thomas</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emory University</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earlham College</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinity College</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: ~ university declared that no revenue was obtained from from its logoed apparel

manufacturers but did not yield any profits or revenue from the institutional logo. Rather, these schools coordinated agreements to simply specify appropriate use of a college or university logo. Lastly, there were mobilized campuses that did not arrange exclusive contracts for athletic apparel with any manufacturers. Instead, agreements were
coordinated through the coaches, the university bookstore, or with nearby vendors on an as-needed basis.

In one form or another, campus activists exhibited familiarity with their institution’s particular structural position to the sweatshop issue, and subsequently advanced diagnostic claims attributing the cause of the sweatshops to these structural realities. Several campuses provide clear examples of diagnostic framing relative to these local structural distinctions as they related to claims making – the University of Michigan, the University of California–San Diego, and Northwestern University.

Numerous news articles stressed the University of Michigan’s dominant role in the sweatshop movement as having the most relevant financial concerns to the substantive sweatshop matter. Structurally, “the University reported more than $5.7 million in revenue from licensed merchandise last year - more than any other school reporting such information” (Michigan Daily, March 15, 1999). In fact, the structural importance of UM in the broader anti-sweatshop movement can not be understated; 56% of the 199 news articles in my data set which described the anti-sweatshop campaign at Michigan, were articles that referenced the progress of UM’s campaign. This percentage indicates that somewhere in these articles, the content included a reference to UM as a marquis example of how the movement was progressing nationally. The University of Michigans’s structural positioning prompted other anti-sweatshop stakeholders to carefully observe any and all movement developments at UM. This structural positioning also functioned to raise the profile of the Michigan student activists’ activities. For example, the executive director of the National Labor Committee, Charles Kernahaghn, sent a fruit basket to student activists staging a 51-hour sit-in in the President’s office as a
symbol of solidarity. Likewise, the coordinator of UNITE described the UM student activists as “confronting the most powerful university on this issue” (Michigan Daily, March 19, 1999).

Student activists at UM took to heart the structural realities of their campus being situated as a high-profile player in the national movement on account of its financial position. In accordance, UM activists embraced a definition of the sweatshop problem that incorporated concerns about being first in the field to take bold action as a model for the national student movement. Throughout the movement, UM student activists asserted this bold, first responder diagnostic frame, noting that part of the overall problem at Michigan was that other campuses were waiting to see what UM would do before pursuing solutions:

Members of Students Organizing for Labor and Economic Equality said they were told by other campus anti-sweatshop organizers that college administrators nationwide are looking to the University for leadership on this issue, adding that what happens in Ann Arbor will set the tone for rest of the nation. (Michigan Daily, February 24, 1999)

Under the guise of situating the problem as one that included being the first to act, the UM student activists pursued an evolving sets of claims which pushed the movement nationally. First, UM “Campus activists said they want the nation's universities to stand for a stronger code that includes calls for public disclosure of factory locations and ownerships and a wage that takes local living factors into consideration” (Michigan Daily, February 24, 1999). Once UM adopted the toughest code in the nation, campus activists reframed the problem as one focused on code enforcement which required factory disclosure. On account of Michigan requiring Nike to disclose factory locations, other apparel manufacturers were prompted to follow suit, thus resulting in a major
milestone in the national student movement. Then, UM activists turned to situating the problem as being among the first members of the WRC, noting:

“Early participation in the WRC is a great opportunity for the University ‘to be a leader’ in the fight for sweatshop code regulation,” because the other five interested schools, “cannot match the University in terms of apparel licensing clout, SOLE members maintain that the University’s participation is essential to the WRC’s success.” (Michigan Daily, February 3, 2000)

At the University of California−San Diego, activists formulated their claims relative to the structural vulnerability of their institution. As noted in the previous chapter, UCSD student activists did not need to advocate for joining the WRC, by virtue of their institution already being a member of the UC system and thus being regulated by the policies and practices that the Regents adopted system-wide. In a very real sense the UC system had already enacted a policy that was the idealized goal in the national movement. Despite this fact, UCSD students were still compelled to become active in the anti-sweatshop movement. As a result, student activist constructed a local interpretation of the problem situated in the particular details relevant to UCSD. Students at UCSD chose to target their Regents, and by being “extremely critical of the Fair Labor Association” (The Guardian, May 7, 2001). The problem was construed as preventing the Regents from dropping the WRC membership. The data suggest that, structurally, there appeared to be very little real threat of the Regents actually abandoning the WRC.

I also know from the quantitative analysis that UCSD possessed many of the educational contexts that would make it a likely institution to mobilize; the calculated predicted probability of mobilization was 0.94 for UCSD. Considering this fact, and in light of the lack of any pressing structural rationale to pursue mobilization, concerned students were still able to construct a diagnosis of the problem to justify their
involvement. Moreover, the UCSD example highlights the dynamic influence of particular types of educational contexts as being particularly conducive for creating conditions that encourage collective action.

At Northwestern University, as student activists started to gain interest in the issue, the campus administration rationalized NU’s FLA membership as a preemptive strategy for avoiding sweatshop abuses. The administration presented its particular approach to apparel manufacturing as a more appealing alternative compared to how other Big Ten universities, such as Michigan and Wisconsin, were handling the issue. (Big Ten institutions were NU’s peers in many ways, but in this case the scale of their total athletic expenditures and their athletic conference membership stood out as salient comparisons.) Administrators indicated that the NU contract with Adidas was less problematic on account of the commitments the company had made to ensuring appropriate labor practices. Further, NU administrators voluntarily joined the FLA as a method to circumvent any potential problems with sweatshop labor. NU administrators highlighted their contractual arrangement with Adidas, noting:

Northwestern is an Adidas campus and is in its third year of a five-year contract with the international corporation. NU is one of five schools that have complete Adidas contracts. Before Adidas, NU had contracts with different companies depending on the sport. After the Rose Bowl, NU was looking to transfer football success to all athletics and Adidas was most interested, said Rick Taylor, director of university athletics. "It's been a godsend to all of our 18 sports," Taylor said. An Adidas spokesman declined comment on its labor practices or future intentions. But an Adidas statement said, "Business partners shall not employ forced labor, whether in the form of prison labor, indentured labor, bonded labor, or otherwise." The statement also forbids the employment of children younger than 15 or 14 years old, depending on the country's labor laws. "Yes, (team clothes) come from Southeast Asian workshops, but it's not just athletic apparel," he said. "It is all apparel." Taylor also said at the time NU was dealing with Adidas, labor practices were not a large concern. "I think you have to look at labor practices now," he said. NU is part of the Collegiate Licensing Corporation, a group that oversees licensing practices for all colleges. According to Taylor, NU
joined after Duke and other schools in order to establish parameters to avoid sweatshops. (Daily Northwestern, November 19, 1999)

Given this seemingly responsible approach to negotiating an apparel contract, especially in contrast to what was happening on other Big Ten campuses, Northwestern student activists (like the administration) also assessed the sweatshop problem as being one that needed to be prevented rather than solved. Activists thus made claims that NU should join the WRC by either “switching membership into the WRC or participating in both groups concurrently” (Daily Northwestern, April 5, 2001). Encouraging dual membership highlighted the students’ prognostic framing which focused on prevention, rather than naming and shaming vendors, a strategy more consistent with the WRC. The activists’ interpretation of the problem appeared to be palatable to the administration, and displayed a certain level of trust or confidence in the prior efforts the administration already pursued to address the sweatshop matter. Rather than discounting the constructive steps previously adopted by the administration, activists chose instead to critique the FLA openly, and encourage the institution to do more by becoming a WRC campus. “Although the bill asks NU to join the WRC, it does not call for NU to drop out of the Fair Labor Association, which senators said has not done its job to regulate working conditions” (Daily Northwestern, May 11, 2000).

In sum, student activists were attentive to the specific structural relationships that their institutions had to the sweatshop labor issue. Even though mobilized campuses tended to seek similar remedies aligned with the ideals of the WRC, their diagnostic claims were framed to their administrations in a manner that acknowledged the structural realities unique to their campuses. These variations reinforced the manner in which structural vulnerability and movement strategy intersected in order to satisfy both the
local matters and the broader movement objectives. Further, student activists advanced the broad sentiment of the national anti-sweatshop movement, but did so from an insider perspective. The primary strategy used to this end involved dissecting the problem of sweatshops on their campuses and conjuring up definitions of the problem that were attentive to the particular contractual and financial conditions of the institution, or to prior administrative action.

**External Vulnerability Present in the Institutional Environment**

*Corporate greed, consumerism.* In a similar vein to the Williams example above where activists viewed their peers’ wealth and privilege as a barrier to socially-responsible action in the marketplace, student activists elsewhere made claims about the general social trend of mounting corporate greed and excessive consumerism. Students considered greed and consumerism as key explanations contributing to the perpetuation of sweatshops. Such diagnostic claims were salient because student activists understood that the supply chain issues which made campuses complicit in sweatshop apparel manufacturing were also part and parcel of the textile industry writ large. Many campus activists sought to incorporate these broader consumer greed diagnostic frames into the composite of anti-sweatshop claims put forth in the campus rhetorical arena. The general tenets of the excessive greed diagnostic frame were: 1) human rights should be respected thus implicating any type of sweatshop manufacturing; 2) consumers should be aware of their complicit endorsement of sweatshops on account of creating a demand for low-cost goods; 3) corporations are greedy by virtue of emphasizing profits at all costs, and to the demise of workers; and 4) international finance and trade organizations (World Bank,
IMF, WTO, NAFTA) have a policy role in dismantling the economic pipelines that perpetuate sweatshops.

On some campuses, the diagnostic claims about consumerism were advanced by raising questions to student peers in a rhetorical fashion. For example, a student newspaper columnist at Iowa State University articulated the activists’ positions in somewhat basic terms, noting the problems with consumerism and alluding to the supply chain process which is culpable in the sweatshop issue: “I walk into the Disney Store and see parents grubbing like crazed gophers for stuffed animals made in third world sweatshops by children who make 14 cents an hour” (Iowa State Daily, December 9, 1999). Months later, in a subsequent column, as the campus anti-sweatshop efforts continued to gain momentum at Iowa State, claims framed problems with the broader construct of capitalism. The claims noted that its effect is to erase “beauty, morality, family, compassion and the worth of the individual. In place of these, capitalism gives us the commodity, that thing which can be bought and sold,” with the worst effects found in:

Sweatshops in India, where children are separated from their families and work for pennies a day. Go to Malaysia, where old growth rainforests are cleared to make room for resorts and golf courses for rich Europeans and Americans. Go to the advertising room of any toy company, where psychology is put to use to manipulate children and turn them into consuming machines (Iowa State Daily, February 3, 2000)

In this example, student activists used an external diagnostic frame that was present in the institutional environment to address the problem of sweatshops. However, they enacted the frame in the local campus context by targeting their peers with the messages.

Campus activists working for change also raised concerns beyond the proverbial campus walls, “The IMF and World Bank started out with good intentions at the end of World War II, but right now their policies are so out of control,” said Nate Gray, 20, a
sophomore at the University of St. Thomas” (Philadelphia Inquirer, April 17, 2000). A number of campus activist groups (including groups from Bates, Moravian, Trinity, and the universities of Hartford, St. Thomas, and Rhode Island) made a concerted effort to make use of the claims coming from the larger anti-sweatshop, pro-democracy, and anti-corporate national movements. On each of these campuses, student activists chose to embrace externally focused explanations of the sweatshop problem. Their claims amounted to a contention that corporations and banks were responsible for: “destroying the environment through dams and other projects, allowing sweatshops and imposing harsh debt-repayment programs that prevent poor countries from spending on social programs” (New Haven Register, April 16, 2000). Using an external environmental frame allowed campuses to engage with the issue, but to do so in a way that down played the local aspects of it. The result of pursuing diagnostic claims in this way was to advance the overall movement ideals without creating a contested and confrontational tone. For some campus activists, externalizing the problem of sweatshops appeared to be a very safe entry point to claims-making, without taking responsibility for implicating any local organizational blame in the issue.

Summary of Prognostic and Diagnostic Framing

The very existence of campuses that mobilized, but did not have a strong structural justification based on the level of athletic financial expenditures, emphasized the tremendous importance of processual vulnerability. Namely activists framed the sweatshop problem as a matter of local cultural relevance to a particular campus community. The qualitative data suggest that substantial structural vulnerability is neither required or a necessary criteria to implore students to mobilize. If there is a
relevant processual rationale for mobilizing, students will draw on it and make accompanying claims to support it. Such was the case in the MIT, Williams, and UCSD examples. Further, student activists’ roles in pursuing claims involving external issues (such as corporatism, consumerism, or greed) reinforced that movement sympathizers can adapt their justifications for collective action to embrace broader external rationales which are salient to the movement. These external diagnoses can function to relieve students from the pressure of having to create a locally contested environment by making claims that implicate their institutions’ policies and practices.

**Motivational Framing**

The motivational claims which student activists adopted in the anti-sweatshop movement were intimately linked to students’ conception of the values of higher education institutions. Across the twenty-three mobilized campuses, there was a profound ability of campus activists to connect their anti-sweatshop movement claims to the prevailing organizational identities of their campuses, or what Williams (2008) would describe as activists’ motivational frames being very culturally resonant to their local campus contexts. The motivational claims tended to be based on: 1) symbolic representations of the local campus-based organizational identity, such as a religious mission, a college or university logo, or displays of leadership; 2) conceptions of higher education as a uniquely social responsible institution; or 3) fundamental concerns about the local power dynamics between students and administration.

**Motivational Framing – Symbolic Representations of Organizational Identity**

*Religious values and ideals.* In some cases, as exemplified by DePaul University and Earlham College, student activists called upon the institution’s religious mission and
ideals as the appropriate backdrop for rationalizing involvement in the anti-sweatshop movement. DePaul activists believed that advocating for workers’ rights was a kin to:

Upholding the Catholic values of DePaul University,” said Lyndsay Boyle, a senior international studies major. “At this point the FLA does not live up to the standard of the mission of our university. I do not believe some committee members had workers’ rights in mind when the decision was made to join the FLA” (The DePaulia, May 8, 2000)

Likewise, Earlham student activists couched their movement concerns in terms of doing what was right in terms of adhering to Quaker values and philosophy. At Earlham, since sweatshops were incompatible with Quaker ideals, there was little apparent discussion or contention in the community of whether the substantive problem of sweatshops was a legitimate concern. From the start, this motivating frame provided the activists legitimacy to their activities. With the legitimacy of the issue put aside, the substantive campus issue between activists and administrators became how well the proposed solution (a draft Code of Conduct) accurately reflected the institution’s principles and values, namely the aforementioned Quaker values.

Meaning represented by the logo. Student activists were undoubtedly motivated by the concerns that their most outward representation of their universities, their logo and university names, would come to be associated with labor abuses. Anti-sweatshop campaigns were justified by referencing their logos. An activist noted, "I just don't think that people want the NU logo to stand for sweatshop labor -- and paying less than a living wage is sweatshop conditions" (Daily Northwestern, May 15, 2000). In addition to advancing logo-based motivational claims, the Northwestern activists incorporated their sentiments into corresponding movement tactics such as, “hanging NU apparel next to The Rock and listing both the price of the clothing and the wages paid to the workers who made it” (Daily Northwestern, March 28, 2001). Similar logo misuse claims
abounded on other campuses as well, and were often invoked to inspire a feeling that all students were equally invested in the matter, noting:

"Every student has some kind of UC clothing, but we have little idea under what conditions these items are made," said Smriti Rana, a student activist at the University of California at Berkeley. "The college shirts and hats that we wear with pride shouldn't be manufactured in demeaning and abusive conditions." (The San Francisco Chronicle, April 17, 1999)

Still in other instances, students invoked the symbolism of the institution’s name, "When I say that I am from the University of Michigan, I don't want to be associated with blood," sophomore protester Jason Keydel of Detroit told The Michigan Daily, the school's student newspaper. (AP Archive, March 18, 1999). Students weren’t the only ones concerned about the logo, administrators were also receptive to claims that logos shouldn’t be tarnished by labor abuses. President Levin of Yale was quoted saying, “We are appalled by the possibility, and reality in some cases, of licensed apparel bearing the Yale name, that has been produced by workers in improper conditions” (New Haven Register, April 13, 2000).

The symbolism and importance of leadership. Campuses were quite mindful of how the anti-sweatshop movement was evolving on other campuses elsewhere in the nation. This was especially evident in the way labor groups and many college and universities were watching the University of Michigan on account of its unprecedented contract with Nike. On other campuses, it was inspiring for campus activists to preface the importance of their own involvement as a way to display leadership within the field of higher education. Student activists at schools such as Indiana University and Miami University of Ohio (among others) had a keen sense of the critical leadership their actions had in the broader movement.

One activist at IU justified membership in the WRC by saying:
"We look forward to getting the ball rolling for the WRC," said senior Matt Turissini, a member of NO SWEAT! "If we get on board soon, it could have a tremendous landslide effect, drawing in other Big Ten schools that have been wavering, such as Michigan and Wisconsin." (Indiana Daily Student, February 17, 2000)

The administrative response to the IU activists emphasized the resonance of the leadership frame as worthy justification for taking action, as evidenced by the IU President’s calling the Presidents of Michigan and Wisconsin to talk about uniting together to join the WRC. President Brand was quite clear in choosing to position IU as a leader in the issue:

Indiana University President Myles Brand and his counterparts at the Wisconsin and Michigan held discussions this week that resulted in the decision to bring their universities into the organization together. "It is important that we make WRC successful, which requires a number of universities to join," Brand said. "It would be beneficial if IU can play a role in getting more to join and that's where we are headed." AP State & Local Wire, February 18, 2000

At IU, as was the case on many other campuses as well, there was a strong match between the activists’ leadership frame and the tangible administrative response to the sweatshop problem. This means that administrators were willing to take ameliorative action and rationalize their response according to the importance of being a leader in the field. The congruence in movement framing and the administrative response cultivated a great deal of good will between the target and the mobilizing group. Student activists spoke of the administration with sentiments such as: "Their heart [the administration] is in the right place," and "I would just like to convey the sentiment that we think the administration is on the way to implement a tough code of conduct," (Indiana Daily Student, November 8, 1999). Activists also publicly expressed confidence in their dealings with the administration, noting, "I'm fairly confident in the administration and in its sincerity," Turisini said. ‘I believe they will follow through and join the WRC. We
both share the same goal -- ending the University's complicity in human suffering’’

(Indiana Daily Student, February 17, 2000). Likewise, administrators described activists as behaving “very appropriately and personably” (Indiana Daily Student, December 3, 1999). Toward the end of the major push of the movement, student activists reflected back on their efforts noting how the mobilization functioned as a community builder of sorts: “It’s really been a community effort at IU in getting the university to take some steps to look at how its clothing is being manufactured,” Maidenberg said. "I have to give credit to the IU administration.” (Chronicle –Tribune, April 10, 2000). At IU, any prior assumptions about campus contention being hostile or tense certainly dissipated under the cooperative leadership frame which inspired the movement and the target’s response.

In a slightly different approach to applying leadership as a motivational frame, student activists and administrators at Miami University viewed the educational community as one that prided itself on helping students become leaders. Miami’s committee responsible for deliberating a solution to the sweatshop problem overtly acknowledged that an important justification for Miami’s involvement in the WRC’s founding was that the administration wanted to affirm Miami students’ leadership and willingness to get out in front of the problem. The paper reported:

The university committee that heard MUSAS's urgings, called the Fair Labor Committee, which is comprised of several administration members, liked the fact that Miami students are involved with the fight against sweatshop labor and have the opportunity to be involved in the founding of the WRC, according to Richard Little, senior director of communications. (The Miami Student, March 28, 2000)

Further, the administration relied heavily on the rationale of supporting students’ leadership as a justification for WRC membership. Accordingly, they gave this rationale nearly as much emphasis as the basic problems with sweatshops. When commenting on Miami’s WRC membership, the university spokesperson summarized the university’s
response by stating, "The important thing is to recognize this whole sweatshop issue and that students are a big part of the reason that so much attention has been brought to it" (The Miami Student, March 28, 2000).

The imperative of socially conscious leadership appeared to have been something that was characteristic of Miami’s local organizational identity. A Miami faculty member reflecting on campus activism over the past thirty years noted how Miami students have stood out: “‘Kids today have fewer opportunities for engagement in a social struggle,’ Momeyer says. ‘Miami has some very able and conscientious students’.” He then went on to affirm the students’ current leadership regarding the sweatshop cause, noting that “We are one of the first two dozen schools to sign on with the Workers Rights Consortium against sweatshops” (Dayton Daily News, April 7, 2000). The faculty member’s characterization of students as conscientious, coupled with the administration’s supportive stance in favor of students acting as leaders, implied that the Miami educational community fostered a strong sensibility that embraced acts of student leadership.

Campuses were motivated by frames inspired by symbolic facets of their local organizational identities. Campuses invoked their religious missions, the representative meanings of their logos and institutional names, and the importance of symbolic leadership to set their institutions (or students) apart. Invoking these representations of organizational identity showcased the intrinsic organizational attributes that provided sufficient motivation for the anti-sweatshop cause. There was virtually no contestation about whether these motivational claims were legitimate. Thus, these claims served to
advance the cause and cultivate respectful and mutual goals between the activists and targets.

Motivational Framing – Social Responsibility

Higher education advocates for human rights. Student activists rationalized their campaigns as a manifestation of the principles upon which the social institution of higher education rests. The particular principles representative of higher education were explicitly conceptualized as respecting and affirming the rights of all people independent of their social status. At IU, one activist described this sentiment by saying, "As an institution of higher learning, Indiana University should respect the rights of people," he said, "whether they pay tuition, live in the state, work in one" (Indiana Daily Student, January 28, 2000). Similarly, MIT’s United Trauma Relief activist organization prefaced its anti-sweatshop petition with a statement of the movement’s fundamental principles: “We feel that as an academic institution with stated interests in human progress and social welfare, MIT holds a responsibility to improve global conditions, beginning with increased oversight into the production of MIT-licensed clothing” (MIT Petition, August, 2001). Likewise, when discussing the movement, a Yale activist framed anti-sweatshop activism by simply claiming that as “an institution that should be both ethical and responsive” and that “we expect them [the University administration] to make the moral choice” (Yale Daily News, September 9, 1999). Each of these examples applied a normative collective duty (Williams, 2008) justification for socially-responsible action; meaning that activists categorically applied a moral obligation to adhere to human rights, on account of their belonging to the social institution of higher education.
Although Williams College student activists spent the bulk of their campaign primarily targeting their student peers (compared to the approach of targeting the administration); activists still used the motivating frame that, as Williams graduates, students should be implored to take a virtuous stand for human-rights and socially-responsible action. An activist remarked:

“A Williams education does involve assuming certain responsibilities…. our responsibility seems to involve recognition of the fact that the circumstances of individual lives affect other lives in ways that can be positive as well as negative, and that our most basic obligations are those based on the claims of human existence and our responsibility to each other” (The Williams Record, May 8, 2000).

The Williams activists translated the broader human-rights higher education ideal into a localized imperative with implications for Williams’ graduates. Additionally, the student activists at Williams used the general human-rights motivational frame that was typical in the field and repurposed it to meet their local prognosis of the sweatshop issue (getting peers to act). This resulted in a claim that amounted to a version of a “do unto others,” or “being your brothers’ keeper” message to inspire socially-responsible awareness and action. Moreover, the Williams motivational frame applied the language of individual duty oriented claims encouraging their peers to subordinate desires for profits and personal benefit to a moral obligation affirming and respecting human rights.

By embracing a human-rights imperative for inspiring socially-responsible action, student activists saw their work as purposeful. An activist described his rationale for getting involved stating, “Generally, I want to be involved in the kind of social movements that improve people's lives” (Chronicle-Tribune, April 20, 2000). Student activists’ motivation to yield real tangible results in addressing the sweatshop problem highlighted their ability to tap into the unique processual vulnerability of higher
education institutions. The processual vulnerability emerged from the inherent cultural resonance that higher education institutions possessed a common duty, or a categorical moral obligation, to act in a manner that respects and affirm the rights of all people independent of social status.

Legitimacy of social responsibility based motivational claims. Based on the resonance of the moral human-rights motivational frame, students had a strong sense that their concerns about sweatshops would not fall on deaf ears. A Miami student activist described this sentiment in the following manner (italics added for emphasis):

“We feel it’s our duty to do what we can to help these workers,” said Ben Johnson, a Miami freshman, coming off a two-day hunger strike. “We’re part of the larger movement but the reason we’re focusing on the university is that we feel like this is something we can definitely change right now.” (The Cincinnati Post, March 14, 2000)

Likewise, Yale students saw their activist commitments as “applying pressure where it counts. Ultimately, university actions can spur larger changes -- both by bringing an issue to the surface of national consciousness and by establishing a paradigm of action that others emulate” (Yale Daily News, October 20, 1999).

In many instances of campus mobilization, students were entirely right in anticipating that the human-rights moral justification claims used to advance socially-responsible action would be perceived as legitimate and would resonate such that administrators would be motivated to act. Administrators endorsed the student activists’ socially-responsible claims. For example, at the University of Michigan, the President’s comments clearly reflected and legitimized the student activists’ motivational claims. He said: “‘We believe that workers should receive wages that at least meet their basic needs and respect their basic human rights,’ Bollinger said. ‘Human rights is a concept that we highly value as an institution’” (AP State & Local, March 18, 1999). Throughout the
movement, the UM President and other administrators continued to support the human-rights, socially-responsible motivational frame. In essence, UM’s President supported the most basic principles for which the student activists were fighting.

At times in the campaign a particular administrative response was different what the activists hoped would occur. Even in these situations, administrators would describe their decisions as being inspired or aligned with the socially-responsible claims that were motivating students’ activism. The UM President rationalized his rather unfavorable decision to join the FLA (among other ameliorative steps the institution had already taken as well) by stating, “‘It is imperative that we keep this process moving forward,’ Bollinger said. ‘The University has a long-withstanding commitment to ethically sound business practices and fundamental human rights’” (Michigan Daily, August 7, 2000).

At Yale, in defending the administrative response, the University spokesperson stated, “‘We have the same goal as the students who held a rally today [referring to the activists’ human-rights concerns]’ said Yale spokesperson Tom Conroy. ‘We just have a different approach as to how best achieve it’” (New Haven Register, March 1, 2000). In many situations, campus administrators philosophically supported and believed in the principles and values that student activists projected in their socially-responsible motivational claims. However, administrators often found themselves having to explain themselves, or specify how the same principle underscored a policy or response that deviated from what the activists’ had hoped to see.

The whole notion that higher education institutions categorically assumed a collective duty to act in a manner motivated by social responsibility, was stated quite plainly by the University of California President. He took this collective duty idea and
anchored it to the institutional legitimacy of his higher education institution, describing the UC-system’s response to the sweatshop issue as being a policy which sets:

"Workplace standards in areas including wages and benefits, working hours, overtime compensation, child labor, forced labor, health and safety, nondiscrimination, freedom from harassment or abuse and freedom of association." . . . Atkinson added that the policy is designed to maintain "the university's social responsibility as an agent serving the public trust." (The Guardian, June 1, 1999)

Effectively, rationalizing ameliorative actions to the substantive movement issue with a socially-responsible motivational frame was concomitant with fulfilling the institutional obligations for which colleges and universities derived their legitimacy and were thus accountable to uphold.

Administration not receptive to motivational claims. Based on the prevalent endorsement of the mobilized campuses affirming the student activists’ social responsibility motivational frame (either explicitly or implicitly), and the fairly widespread acknowledgement that institutional actions based in such claims were entirely appropriate and legitimate, it was quite interesting to come across an instance of a campus where this was not the case. One university in particular, the University of Rochester, stood out as a clear example where the administration did not subscribe to the idea that higher education institutions assumed a categorical moral obligation to affirm human rights and to act out of social responsibility.

Student activists at the University of Rochester situated their rationale for the institution acting on the sweatshop matter as one of fulfilling the University’s responsibility to be socially responsible and to act morally in its contractual dealings. In fact, UR activists were devastated by the reaction they received from the UR President, where he encouraged concerned students to pursue their own individual actions against
sweatshop labor (such as a traditional consumer boycott). The President was explicit in clarifying his stance that it was entirely not appropriate for the University to take action by virtue that such behavior would be construed as political and it would undermine the academic principles upon which UR (or higher education writ large) gleaned its legitimacy. In a public letter to the UR community, published in response to the No Sweat Coalition’s actions, the UR President wrote:

> The issues of whether workers in third-world countries are better or worse off because of jobs that would not pass standards of developed countries such as the United States, are not within the particular competence of academic administrators to decide. (Nor is the issue of whether the condition of those third-world workers rises to the relevance of jobs or security for workers in this country.) These issues, in my view, are much better left to political decision making, or to the forces of the market (including boycotts by interested individuals), than to actions by academic institutions, unless and until they affect "core" academic missions. The wisdom of the University of Chicago's 1967 Kalven Committee still holds true: a university "is a community which cannot take collective action on the issues of the day without endangering the conditions for its existence and effectiveness." (UR Presidential Communication, March 20, 2000)

Over time, even as the student activists’ tactics escalated – by parodying the President, editorializing the issue in the student press, partnering with local Rochester labor unions, gathering a petition with 497 signatures (including 34 faculty and staff), demonstrating on the main administration building, and staging a sleep-out – the President retained his view that a university’s response to a matter such as the sweatshop issue would be entirely inappropriate on the basis that is was antithetical to the core academic mission of a university. President Jackson understood what the student activists were asking for and flatly told them their ambitions were wrongly directed:

> I believe, much of what the members of the No Sweat Coalition want most - the moral support of the University - is precisely the danger for us as a special kind of institution, when that moral support is not tethered either to our own academic
governance or to the health and welfare of our own population (UR Presidential Communication, April 26, 2001)

In effect, the President drew a proverbial boundary around the institution, defining the perimeter of influence by which it was appropriate for members of the university community to expect moral conduct. He clearly delineated his interpretation of the line between individual and collective duty, squarely noting that any collective duty claims and subsequent actions were not appropriate activities for higher education institution based on the notion that it would threaten the legitimacy of the institution. The UR President also attempted to justify his rationale and his accompanying decision not to take ameliorative action by subtly suggesting that doing so was the industry standard in the field. The campus paper noted that, “Jackson pointed out that of the 35 private universities on the U.S. News and World Report top 50 list, more than half do not belong to the WRC or FLA. His decision for UR is therefore not ‘unrepresentative of that taken by our peers’” (Campus Times, November 21, 2000). Student activists were very aware that their University President’s position was outside the norm of what was happening elsewhere in the movement. They even went so far as to assert that the President’s lack of claiming institutional social responsibility amounted to the President failing “to live up to the intellectual and professional standards” (Campus Times, November 21, 2000). Eventually, some student activists conceded, “the university will not be taking a moral stance on the issue of sweatshop labor; something it is unwilling to do” (Campus Times, March 15, 2001).

Administration nudged by faculty. In some instances, students mobilized but had not yet articulated any sort of socially-responsible justification for their actions. Additionally, in several of these situations, students’ administrative targets had not yet
been very responsive to claims about devaluing the school name/logo. Only when faculty began to deliberately engage as a mobilizing group did core principles of higher education emerge as motivational claims in the movement rhetoric. Both Stanford and Northwestern stood out as poignant examples of situations where the faculty’s involvement served to weave socially-responsible human-rights based motivational claims into the local movement. With the faculty’s introduction of a socially-responsible narrative, students were increasingly able to articulate and link the specific sweatshop issue to broader socially-responsible human-rights principles. The socially-responsible motivational frame, coupled with the status of faculty getting involved in the movement, helped to legitimize the activism and the associated movement demands. These two specific cases are described in greater detail below.

**Stanford.** It was evident that even prior to students airing sweatshop concerns, the Stanford faculty had been expressing dismay about too much corporate influence and commercialization in Stanford athletics. As the anti-sweatshop issue began to gain momentum with the student activists, the faculty held similar sentiments. Concerned faculty regarded Stanford’s relationship with Nike as a matter of ethical and educational institutional principles, rather than purely a practical matter of business or legal logistics – an alternative interpretation that the administration advanced to justify their dealings with Nike. Faculty likened the contract with Nike as equating all that Stanford represents with violations of labor and human rights. In a December 2000 article, the position of the allied faculty was described as:

Rehm and others take issue with Stanford being too dependent on any corporation. They question whether Stanford should be in the business of selling itself to the highest bidder. “It’s kind of cheap to sell student athletes to this kind of deal,” Rehm said. (San Jose Mercury, December 26, 2000).
Faculty speaking out helped to connect the dots between institutional values, external influence such as corporate money, and individual action. Further, faculty propelled the idea that the institution represents ideals and values. Thus, Stanford’s contract with Nike functioned to force student athletes into being walking endorsements. Through faculty involvement, the overall narrative justifying mobilization evolved and became more symbolic and principled integrating matters of organizational and institutionalized ideals.

Even though students invested great effort in mobilizing their labor concerns for a sustained period of time, it was not until the Stanford faculty acted collectively alongside the students that the organizational and institutional principles were infused into the local campus movement. In the spring of 2001, concerned students and faculty penned an open letter to the President. The letter framed the Nike labor abuses and Stanford’s contract with the company as a matter of fundamental principles, describing “the pending Nike contract [as being something that] ‘threatens principles and proprieties that the university should, and indeed claims, to uphold’” (The San Francisco Chronicle, April 6, 2001). The faculty mobilizing with students through this letter helped to justify the movement’s claims by shaping the narrative into one that aligned institutional values and principles with institutional action (or inaction). It appeared that faculty collaboration played a role in helping advance the campus discourse about the interplay between collective action, institutional principles, and subsequent calls for modifications to organizational behavior. Moreover, the faculty’s role helped to solidify a very important lesson for students about mobilization and democratic values.

Administratively, Stanford leaders were resistant to framing the issue of using Nike as a matter of institutional principle. In response to the open letter, the Provost
presented the institutional perspective about the Nike issue showing resistant to the principle based claims. Instead, he identified the matter as one of purely business cost terms. Published in the campus paper, the Provost’s letter emphasized that external guidelines for resolving the matter. Namely, he emphasized that vendors should follow the local laws adopted in the nations where the apparel is manufactured, implicitly suggesting that any further guidelines imposed by Stanford were unnecessary. Further, he stressed that if Stanford were to address the Nike issue, then it would be obligated to do the same across the board with all vendors and contractors, across the board – an impractical business exercise. The Provost also emphasized that the administration had researched the issue and had concluded that there were improvements on Nike’s part. The Provost’s comment about having researched the issue seemed intended to reinforce some of the opposing commentary put forth in the higher education stratosphere, which discouraged administrators from being persuaded by collective action. For example, some Stanford economists and lawyers served on the Academic Consortium of International Trade (ACIU). This group urged campuses that were experiencing collective action or mobilization around the sweatshop issue to ‘research’ the problem first, rather than responding emotionally to the sit-ins or other forms of impassioned collective action pursued by students.

In another administrative hand-off, the senior associate athletic director provided a nuanced explanation for not dropping Nike with a kind of ‘our hands are tied’ explanation. Specifically, she noted the impractical side of renegotiating with Nike, or dropping them all together, on account of Stanford negotiating deals individually with coaches (unlike the multi-sport contracts used at other schools). This athletic
administrator stressed the business impracticalities as a sufficient rationale to circumvent the claims of the concerned faculty and students. Athletic officials also stressed that a change from Nike would also impact Stanford’s business practices institution wide, which was a sufficient rationale for not dropping Nike or for taking some other action.

Stanford’s President did address the concerns raised by faculty in the Faculty Senate. Doing so was a symbolic gesture of engagement and signified the faculty’s prominence as a collective political or powerful body. However, when the President responded to the Faculty Senate, it was in far-reaching, ambiguous terms. Such ambiguity failed to claim any social responsibility for cooperating with Nike. Overall, in the few instances when the President had spoken out about sweatshop concerns regarding Nike, he merely acknowledged that the issue as a matter of concern. He expressed that “we’d like to extract ourselves from corporate sponsorship” (San Jose Mercury, December 26, 2000). The President’s message was purposefully vague, serving to satisfy the faculty’s concerns while not elaborating detail about how he conceptualized the issue. Rather, he merely noted that Stanford will “continue to struggle with the Nike issue.”

This somewhat benign institutional response verbalized by the President, accompanied with the inaction to remove Nike or to deal with the issue in any number of proactive solutions being pursued by other prestigious peer institutions (joining FLA, WRC, creating a code of conduct, etc.), highlighted the competing narratives in the debate at Stanford.

It is interesting that the President chose to address the issue in the Faculty Senate, but did not address it elsewhere. It was only through the faculty’s involvement that the President was provoked to publically engage with the topic. The President’s attention at
the Faculty Senate appeared to be merely symbolic given his failure to take a position or endorse one, and his choice to not weigh in on how the issue was characterized in the community discourse. This left the door open for having his surrogates shape the conversation. Ultimately, the President’s surrogates emphasized the business aspects of the issue over other interpretations. Moreover, it could be surmised that Stanford’s faculty collaboration with student activists, via penning a letter, played an essential role in helping to convey the importance of linking institutional action with institutional values. The strategic involvement of faculty as a mobilizing group appeared to force a response from the President, functioning to display the tension and disconnect between espoused values and institutional action. The political force of faculty as a mobilizing group expanded the nature of the discourse about the issue and was essential for modeling important lessons about collective action and subsequent democratic participation that were not otherwise being advanced by the administrative leadership on the issue.

_Northwestern._ As mentioned above, Northwestern joined the FLA as a preventative reaction on the administration’s part to some of the broad scale national momentum for responding to the sweatshop apparel situation. The campus spokesperson was quick to note NU’s membership in the FLA as a response to these broader anti-sweatshop concerns: “Cubbage said he hadn’t heard of any student action yet and noted that the university is a member of the Fair Labor Association, a group that came out of a Clinton administration initiative on sweatshop issues in the mid-1990s” (Chicago Tribune, February 23, 2000). When the administration first acted, it also affirmed its position that sweatshops were bad in theory, although they did not justify their response
on the basis of acting in a manner congruent with academic principles or institutional social responsibility. Administrators merely described sweatshops as being undesirable. At least publically the administrative rationale was a little vague, but nonetheless complementary to the activists’ claims and ambitions of wanting to eliminate sweatshop labor from collegiate apparel manufacturing, “Although Northwestern is affiliated with the FLA, the school may, in the future, consider joining the WRC as well, Sunshine [VP for Business and Finance] said. ‘We're not married to either organization,’ he said. ‘We're married to the objective’”(Chicago Tribune, May 9, 2000).

For the first half of 2000, the student activists also didn’t seem to conceptualize the anti-sweatshop issue as being a matter of high ideals or educational values. However, when students sought the support of faculty, the Northwestern Faculty Against Sweatshops group, the public rationalization of the sweatshop concerns evolved. The faculty letter to the president (signed by 56 faculty members), as well as in their subsequent public statements, expressed solidarity with the students activists because of:

1) their substantive objections to sweatshop labor; 2) their commitment to supporting educational ideals; and 3) their views about the symbolic significance of what the NU logo should stand for:

We have a strong feeling when your students are fighting for social justice and democratic values, they should be supported,” said Scott Durham, a French professor and NFAS member. "A lot of complaints these days are about how apathetic students are and how uninterested they are in other people's needs. It's really our obligation to step up and support them when they are doing something positive." … "It's obviously something that will have to be different from country to country or region to region, but it's something that's necessary," Durham said. (Daily Northwestern, May 15, 2000)

Faculty mobilization at NU was a real turning point for activists with respect to the manner in which they argued for and conceptualized their mobilization efforts. By
the fall of 2000; students started connecting the sweatshop issue to the rationale of taking action in the name of broader institutional ideals. Students began to describe their action in more principled ways alongside arguments about the anti-sweatshop cause specifically. Following the homecoming protests, one student was quoted justifying his participation by saying that “he wanted to participate in the display ‘to take a second to stand up in public for what you believe in’” (Daily Northwestern, October 17, 2000).

In sum, the Stanford and Northwestern examples demonstrate the importance of faculty mobilizing groups as fulfilling a constructive educational role. The faculty groups were able to more clearly articulate the role of activism as a driver for principled based change within institutions that possess a social responsibility. In both of these cases, the public administrative responses were more or less pragmatic and focused on logistical matters in their apparel supply chains or campus business practices. Once faculty modeled a socially-responsible narrative, the students were more able to approach their activism in a manner that affirmed these motivational frames. As a result, student activists were able to yield more administrative responsiveness to their cause.

_Cooperation justified by socially-responsible motivations._ With few exceptions, administrations were inclined to affirm activists’ claims referencing a categorical social responsibility to human rights. This was exemplified, in part, by their almost instinctive approach to embracing and seeking out other higher education institutions as collaborators in an effort to pursue solutions aimed at achieving the most good. In effect, the mobilized campuses attempted to engage in a sort of field-level collective action as a tool for socially-responsible change. The Williams ad hoc committee on sweatshops and
College purchasing was particularly eloquent in describing the socially-responsible justification for institutions working together:

Yet we are proposing to act not alone, but in concert with other institutions behind common codes of conduct and monitoring procedures. The goal of this association is precisely to coordinate our market power—and thus, to have consequences. Besides, a big part of social responsibility is becoming aware of how our small choices (paper or plastic?) are not as inconsequential as they may seem. (The Williams Record, May 1, 2000)

Similarly, Yale’s licensing administrator consistently voiced the importance of cooperation among concerned institutions:

Kauder said it would have proved foolish to produce an all-inclusive labor code separate from the efforts of other universities. "Going off basis from everyone else wasn't as good as being part of a movement with critical mass," she said. "We need [that mass] to leverage our power to call on companies to adhere to higher standards in the workplace." (Yale Daily News, March 23, 1999)

Cross institutional collaboration indicated that administrators were not only responding with localized tangible actions (codes of conduct, requiring factory disclosure, membership in the WRC, or FLA) that affirmed students’ collective sense of obligation for their campuses to take social responsibility for their logoed apparel; but they were also serving as organizational role models, demonstrating the power of institutions acting from a place of core principles as a way to maximize their impact.

Motivational Framing – Campus Power Dynamics with the Administration

Up until now, the anti-sweatshop motivational frames described thus far were often accepted by the targets as legitimate, and thus served as sufficient rationales for sustained involvement and ameliorative action. However, in relatively few cases student activists justified their activism on the basis of claims that the administration did not take them or the issue seriously, or that administration didn’t extend students enough influence over important campus issues.
In the University of Rochester example described above, the student activists’
claims morphed once they accepted the fact that the President was not sufficiently
motivated to act based on the claims they had put forth. In January of 2002, after
sustained activism for two years prefaced on socially-responsible claims, student activists
had made no progress. In light of their stalled attempts to persuade the President, student
activists alternatively sought out other 19 other social-justice groups on campus to
advance the claim that there was an acute need for better communication mechanisms for
students to air their concerns about a variety of institutional matters (of which the
sweatshop matter was a part). The newly formed coalition planned a “UR Concerns
Fair” meant to “create ‘an atmosphere of open communication’ between the students,
organizations and administration” (Campus Times, January 31, 2002). More specifically,
No Sweat organizers pursued this forum prefaced on the claim that:

There is no effective communication between UR administration and the student
body. The idea for the fair was born from the need to bring up the issues on
campus that previously had no forum. “We hope to take issues out of dark
corners and throw them into the light,” organizer and senior Kirk Scirto of No
Sweat and Amnesty International said. “To focus [them] and show the students
that they can make a difference.” “We think there’s been a lot of
misunderstanding that developed [in our past dealings with the administration],”
said Woodcock. (Campus Times, January 31, 2002)

Over the course of the two years of anti-sweatshop student activism, the student activists’
claims and movement ambitions became diluted and less bold. Essentially, each time
activists were confronted with dead ends from the President not acting and dismissing
their socially-responsible movement claims, the activists lowered the bar for their
movement ambitions. The activists weakened their demands from calling for founding
membership in the WRC, to advocating for the more basic request of disclosing
manufacturing locations. Thereafter, they succumbed to the idea that they shouldn’t ask
the institution to take a moral stance on anything, an idea they disagreed with at the core. Finally, they shifted their approach to an even more basic request for having the administration listen to their concerns.

At Yale, students felt as if they needed to nudge the administration to continue to take the sweatshop issue seriously. Even after the Yale administration endorsed the social responsibility claims of the activists and chose to become one of the founding FLA members, activists were motivated by a “concern among students that Yale has an interest in taking the easy way out. ‘Their interest is in looking good in the media and not in exerting the real pressure needed for change,’ she said” (Yale Daily News, March 23, 1999). Early in the campaign, the students didn’t feel as if the administration was at odds with them, as much as they felt like they had to shed light on the issue to compel the institution to maintain a sense of urgency and to take the problem seriously. However, after a year of unsuccessfully advocating for more action on the part of the administration (namely overcoming the problems with the FLA), and getting fewer opportunities to discuss the sweatshop matter with administrators, students became motivated by a rationale that the President was inaccessible and not very interested in cooperating. Activists adopted additional claims prefaced upon the idea that the students weren’t being taken seriously. Through these claims, the intensity of their collective action escalated. They saw mobilization as the only viable path to having their concerns noticed:

Bell said it has been very difficult for Yale activists to communicate their concerns to the administration. She compared it to "talking to a wall." "We feel like we really have to struggle to get a meeting with anyone in the administration," she said. "There's no regular way to communicate." Bell said Yale President Robert C. Levin met with protesters in the fall, but then broke off all contact until this month. Levin did not issue a response to yesterday's demonstration. A staffer in his office said Levin was on an alumni outreach trip yesterday and probably was not aware the rally was taking place. Yale protesters
said they have given the administration an ultimatum for taking action. If Yale does not withdraw from the FLA by March 27, student activists pledged to continue their public protest campaign. "If that deadline were to pass without a sign from the administration, we feel we would be forced to take more direct action," Bell said. (Harvard Crimson, March 1, 2000)

At the University of Oregon, the anti-sweatshop campaign evolved from one initially motivated by student activists’ socially-responsible ambitions to remedy labor abuses present in the collegiate apparel pipeline, to one motivated to act on account that the President was “out of touch with or indifferent to student concerns” (The Oregonian, April 6, 2000). The matter of students’ concerns being subordinate to other campus power dynamics was one of great importance at UO. The situation at UO became a lightning rod for raising questions about the relative independence of higher education institutions to take principled action in the face of other powerful stakeholder influences, namely influences coming from alumni (specifically donors).

At the start of the campaign at UO, students were motivated by socially-responsible aims and initially made no mentions of campus power dynamics. In fact, the University wide, twelve-person committee that recommended that the President join the WRC (which was subsequently his decision) included six students:

The university's decision was not made lightly. In March, a referendum sponsored by the student government yielded a three-fourths majority vote in support of membership. A committee accountable to the university president, David B. Frohnmayer, and made up of students, faculty, administrators and alumni, voted unanimously the same month in favor of joining. Then the University Senate, composed of faculty and student, passed a resolution calling for membership. It was only after all these steps that President Frohnmayer signed the university into membership. (New York Times, May 16, 2000)

Nevertheless, once the WRC membership decision was made, the events that transpired at UO inspired students to be motivated by claims that were far less altruistic and more directly concerned with their own power positions. In effect, student activists’
motivations became focused on “struggling for a larger principle -- more student power over university affairs” (The Oregonian, April 6, 2000).

Following UO President Frohnmayer’s decision to join the WRC, Oregon alumnus, CEO, and founder of Nike, Phil Knight, who had already:

Given $50 million to UO, was so angered by the move he pledged never to donate again. Knight said the consortium won't work with businesses, and he favors a rival monitoring effort UO declined to join, the Fair Labor Association.” (The Oregonian, August 18, 2000)

The situation became extremely contentious wrapped up in turf wars and stakeholder politics. It ultimately was resolved with UO possessing no membership in the WRC or FLA; UO abandoning the code of conduct which had previously been adopted for its logoed items; and Phil Knight reinstating his donations to support new construction on UO’s campus.

Student activists were fuming about the power dynamics that appeared to be playing out with the Nike / Phil Knight situation. The leader of the UO student government observed the seemingly democratic process that led to the President’s decision to join the WRC, and the markedly undemocratic fall out afterwards, describing it as:

"The university laid down the process, then violated it," said senior Jay Breslow, president of the Associated Students of the University of Oregon . "We're being steamrolled by a president who has one thing on his mind." One thing? Or one booster? Phil Knight. The power behind the throne. The alum with the checkbook. (The Oregonian, November 19, 2000)

Months later, the students were still organizing, but had developed a very strong sensibility about the contrast of their social responsibility motivated claims with the more pressing matter of being motivated by the apparent lack of student influence in University affairs. Simply stated, student activists’ views amounted to the belief that: "It's one more
gut punch from the university. It's just saying we're going to do everything we can to take away the voice of students, to say large donors have more power than students do” (The Oregonian, March 6, 2001).

Both UR and UO are examples of circumstances where the activists and the administration held conflicting interpretations as to where the internal/external organizational boundaries existed. In the case of Rochester, the President was quite exacting in articulating the internal limits or restriction of campus influence, and dismissed any activists’ claims which justified involvement on the basis of broader institutional obligations to get involved in the sweatshop matter. In fact, the President suggested that in no part did the organizational identity of Rochester include embracing a set of human-rights principles, a set of principles appropriate for an external political body rather than a higher education institution.

In a different scenario, the administration at Oregon expanded the previously understood internal organizational identity of the campus community. By allowing the traditionally democratic decision making process (which resulted in the campus joining the WRC) to be reversed, seemingly on the basis of one stakeholder’s (Phil Knight/ Nike) influence, the administration reshaped the boundaries of who had legitimate influence in campus matters. Knight had claims to a modest stakeholder influence by virtue of his alumnus and donor status, but these two identities were previously construed as exerting only a limited influence over internal campus policy matters. From the perspective of the student activists, Knight was considered to be an outsider to campus decision making (or at least an insider with a strong conflict of interest), given his professional position as Nike’s founder and CEO – roles which were typically considered entirely external to
campus decision making (in the absence of Knight’s alumnus/donor status). After the
events at Oregon, the local organization identity morphed. Initially, organizational
decision making was fairly universally assumed to be based on the input of faculty, staff,
students, along with a modest voice from alumni. Following the Knight episode, the
organization experienced a radical shift in reordering the importance of how input from
stakeholders would be prioritized. The new model included the aforementioned groups
along with a much more significant influence from donors with particular preferences. In
sum, the Oregon and Rochester examples function to demonstrate the manner in which
organizational identity intersects with movement ambitions.

Summary

Student activists are passionate. Across the number of motivational frames there
was certainly overlap. Activists used symbols of their organizational identity such as
religious missions, college names and logos, and the principle of leadership as a way to
justify the importance of their collective actions. Students were also eager to adopt
socially-responsible and human-rights motivational frames that grew from the external
environment of the field of higher education. Generally speaking, activists’ motivational
framing was intimately tied to a very strong collective sense of duty that students adhered
to and firmly believed in. There was also compelling evidence in the majority of cases
that administrators were just as willing as students to accept their organizational and
institutional responsibilities to act on inherent moral obligations, or risk undermining the
legitimacy of their organization/institution. In those cases where principles were not well
received by the administration, the campus leaders were quick to assert alternate
justifications for inaction.
Movement Intensity

Up until this point I have presented the results describing the patterns of mobilizing groups, targets, and claims present in the student anti-sweatshop movement. In each of these three sections there has been natural overlap of data, such as claims against consumerism and corporatism coinciding with the external targeting of apparel manufacturers or shoppers; the targeting of student peers coinciding with activists aligning with mainstream campus groups such as student government; or claims emphasizing a collective duty to be socially responsible. These points of intersection are the result of movement strategies operating rather seamlessly, and without formal points of departure. For the sake of analysis it has been useful to break the separate components into distinct sections despite the reality of campus collective action unfolding rather iteratively in life.

In large part the activists’ choices of mobilizing groups, targets, and claims functioned as movement tactics in and of themselves. In combination they yielded a certain level of overall movement intensity. Even so, as has been evaluated in these other three sections, it is appropriate to discuss movement intensity with a particular focus on its specific role in the overall mobilization. Therefore what follows is a presentation of the results related to the student activists’ tactical repertoires used to denote a level of intensity in their mobilization efforts.

Intensity of Movement Tactics

Naturally, the intensity of tactics that student activists utilized in the anti-sweatshop movement, like other social movements, can best be characterized along a continuum of increasing levels. Low intensity tactics consist of activities present in these
data which were orderly or peaceful, but nonetheless squarely focused on the sweatshop cause. The moderately intense tactics were those movement actions that created discomfort in the environs where the collective action took shape, often producing provocative psychosocial discomfort for community members (typically student peers, administrators, vendors) from being exposed to the reality of social inequities. The next increasing level of movement intensity consisted of activities that created outright disruption to the community, and interfered with the routine course of community life in some way. Finally, the tactics with the most extreme levels of intensity were those actions that evoked violence or fear in the community, or within the ranks of its members.  

In these data, the intensity of tactics that contemporary activists utilized can be described as consisting primarily of those behaviors which were *not* violent or fearsome. That said, there was a tendency for the news accounts or media attention to conflate any collective action into a sensational headline with an undertone that student activists behaved in an aggressive or violent/fearsome manner. The reality was that reading the cases in their entirety portrayed a notably less intense tone of the collective action, as conveyed through the comments of activists, administrators, and non-activist campus community members. For example, in a typical fashion, a headline would read, “Students Seize Bollinger’s [University President’s] Office” (The Detroit News, March 18, 1999). Then towards the end of the article, a quote from the university spokesperson noted that the “protest remained orderly.” In a follow up article, the same event was

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28 It is important to note that gauging the level of intensity was based on both the reaction of the community and the targets to said tactics, as well as the feelings and reactions of the activists to the community’s or target’s response. For example, activists engaging in a silent sit-in (a seemingly passive yet evocative protest tactics) could evolve into an intently disruptive or fearsome situation if police in riot gear were permitted to make arrests or intervene.
depicted as the University President having embraced the activists’ cause and specifically noted that the activists “occupying his office will not be evicted or prosecuted. ‘They remind all of us how important it is to consider our impact on others in the greater community we touch,’ Bollinger said (Michigan Daily, March 19, 1999). Still another article reported that “Both sides agree in principle” (AP State & Local Wire, March 18, 1999). Moreover, there was a propensity for news accounts to invent an expectation of extreme intensity through the headlining or beginning the story with a sensational summative statement. Such was the case even when the data embedded in the details suggested the intensity to be far less severe, contentious, or incongruent with the prevailing local frames and accepted behaviors of activist students.

The relative intensity of movement tactics exhibited in these student anti-sweatshop data progressed in intensity according to three general clusters. The least intense tactics were those aimed to develop individual cognitive knowledge and personal awareness about the substantive sweatshop problem. Moderately intense tactics included those that utilized speech or information as a mode of expressing discontent either through spoken, written, or visual communication. The most intense tactics in this contemporary student movement were those that could be identified as tactics where activists exercised free assembly. Again, it is important to note that even the most intense tactics fell short of the violent or fearsome level. The following paragraphs provide a more detailed description of the specific tactics which comprised each of these three categories.

*Promoting general cognitive knowledge and personal awareness (low intensity).*

The student activists’ tactics which were the least intense were those which were
primarily focused on promoting a general baseline awareness of the issue. Typically, general information and educational efforts regarding the sweatshop topic were pursued in a similar fashion as other topics of campus intellectual inquiry in a manner that was meant to be cognitively stimulating, analytical, but not confrontational per se. In a common scenario, activists targeted their fellow peers on an intellectual level by hosting a campus talk, such as:

The Political Economy Research Institute at the University of Massachusetts and author of the book “The Living Wage: Building a Fair Economy,” spoke to about 30 students gathered in Swift 104 about the idea of a living wage and how it relates to sweatshops (Daily Northwestern, May 1, 2001)

Other similarly low-intensity tactics involved activists sponsoring awareness concerts and informational fairs to promote the anti-sweatshop cause. All of these low intensity tactics had a tone of concern rather than confrontation, and communicated these concerns through education and information. In these low intensity endeavors, the activists themselves risked very little personally in their attempts to generate awareness, these efforts were motivated with the intent to be helpful and to provide an informational service to the community, all in the name of building a foundation of awareness about the problems of sweatshops. Some of these events were billed as entertainment in addition to awareness. For example, at Emory, activists’ Human Rights Week campaign included sponsored lectures, movie nights, a tabling fair which “provided information. . . and let people know what they could do to get involved” and concluded with a benefit at a restaurant which featured “artwork from refugees, human rights poetry, and a sweatshop striptease” (The Emory Wheel, April 5, 2002).

The low intensity intellectual events established a concrete path for student activists to spread the word, cultivate a community of sympathizers, and extend their own
knowledge of the issues. Moreover, such low-risk activities paved the way for activists to pursue a more intense and confrontational approach to their collective action either subsequently or concurrently. Across the twenty-three mobilized campuses, there was a pervasive presence of these low intensity activities which cultivated a basic cognitive familiarity or personal awareness across the campus community about the problem of sweatshops. In part, the wide-spread use of the intellectual forum and informational fair was likely a function of the institution in which this movement was embedded. Expert panels, intellectual discussions, and information about social issues are commonplace in an academic community; it is a normative format in college and university communities for building greater knowledge and awareness.

In particular, the expert lecture was a commonplace tactic, with a handful of usual suspects invited to speak – ranging from local campus faculty who studied labor issues to national labor and anti-sweatshop activists (e.g., Jim Keady, Director of the Living Wage Project; Charles Kernaghan of the National Labor Committee; or Medea Benjamin of Global Exchange). The impact of these low intensity events was that the attendees walked away with new impressions and additional knowledge. In particular, at the University of St. Thomas the student mobilization group on campus, a chapter of the Minnesota Public Interest Research Group, brought Jim Keady to campus. The event yielded an attendance of 200 St. Thomas students. An audience member recounted, “‘It was really amazing hearing their personal story and their individual experience in Indonesia of what sweatshops are really like and just how horrible they really are,’ said Merry, a College of Liberal Arts freshman” (Minnesota Daily, February 19, 2001). Low intensity tactics, similar to the St. Thomas intellectual forum/discussion and
informational event, were easily the most common movement tactics mobilized campuses utilized.

*Using provocative or accusatory words and images to advance change (moderate intensity).* Regardless of the intended target, student activists enlisted the power of words and images to express their movement ambitions on campus. Specifically, activists wrote advocacy columns or editorials in the student press, engaged in letter / email writing campaigns, posted flyers around campus, wore tee shirts with anti-sweatshop slogans around campus, generated petitions, and distributed anti-sweatshop pamphlets in public spaces to passersby. In fairly typical fashion, one campus paper described students’ efforts along these lines, noting: “In an effort to persuade NU administrators to sign on with the WRC, NSAS presented a student petition to the university last spring with more than 3,600 signatures.” (Daily Northwestern, April 5, 2001). The tactics in this category were more assertive than the lower intensity tactics previously described. This designation of increased intensity reflects the extent to which activists were advancing deliberate accusations against a target – the administration, a campus vendor, an external corporation, or student peers – that called out a problematic policy, practice, or attitude. Petitions, flyers, posters, and editorials pointed fingers metaphorically at the intended targets, and often asked the community to take a stand with the activists.

One article noted a student’s reaction to an anti-sweatshop flier that was posted on a campus bulletin board:

Not that there was anything visually or otherwise striking about it, just that its subject was interesting. Essentially it addressed a situation with some random athletic equipment manufacturer and some factories in a developing country. Actually, I think the company was Nike and the country Indonesia . . . I don't know the whole story of Nike factories, and I do understand that it's impossible to tell the whole story on an 8 by 11 sheet of paper. But we ought to think carefully
about what we intend to accomplish with such crusades. These clothing and footwear manufacturers have their products produced in these places because of cheap labor. (Iowa State Daily, April 25, 2002)

The crux of the student’s comments communicates the extent to which the words and images on the flier served the movement’s purpose. In this case, the evidence suggests by lofting accusations at Nike the activists were effective in prompting their Iowa State peers to take notice of problematic labor conditions. Based on the particular quote from this student, he didn’t appear to hold a fully sympathetic perspective to the anti-sweatshop activists’ assessment of the substantive problem. Nevertheless, the flyer was effective at stimulating his thought process about the topic. This was an important example of students’ collective action functioning to not only prompt tangible changes in the way collegiate apparel was manufactured. Additionally, this tactic also demonstrated the productive role that campus mobilization can have in stimulating critical thinking on campus about social problems in contemporary life.

Applying intellectual competencies to the substantive problem (moderate intensity). Another moderately intense tactic involved student activists’ efforts using and developing their own intellectually skills to build momentum for the cause while obtaining more expertise about the substantive issue. In particular, three tactics stood out for possessing these characteristics – preparing and issuing reports, organizing and attending movement focused conferences, and international trips to evaluate the problem of sweatshops.

On several campuses, student activists conducted extensive research about the scope and scale of the sweatshop problem relevant to their institution’s own corporate contracts or apparel manufacturing process. Their research would typically culminate in a comprehensive report which indicted the college or university in the sweatshop apparel
pipeline, followed by recommendations for institutional action often gleaned from the
efforts of likeminded student activists on other campuses. At Northwestern:

Efforts to convince NU to join the WRC culminated with a 43-page report titled "Recommendations Regarding Labor Rights and the Production of Northwestern Apparel," which was presented to administrators Jan. 29. The students presented a well-researched report, but it couldn't resolve the issue because NU has fundamental policy disagreements with the WRC, which NSAS students don't have the power to change, Sunshine said.” (Daily Northwestern, April 5, 2001)

Here again, students engaged those in power (often administrators) with the problematic organizational policies and practices by using their academic abilities to research the issue and present a slate of solutions.

Another moderately intense tactic that allowed students to exercise their intellectual skills consisted of sponsoring or participating in anti-sweatshop conferences. Admittedly conferences can take on many forms, some of which are very passive and more similar to promoting cognitive and personal awareness in the low intensity group of tactics described above. However, the examples of conferences that student activists became involved with went beyond these outcomes alone. As a tactic, conferences involved inviting experts and panelists to share ideas with activists from other locales; developing local, regional, and national movement strategy; drafting policy proposals; and providing student activists with organizing skills. The discourse at conferences was decidedly more action oriented, in that it cultivated participation among activists who were prepared to engage with the cause rather than just informing a general campus audience of an important social issue – as was often the case with the lower intensity talks described above.

Regardless of whether conferences were held locally or outside of the immediate campus locations, these tactics were squarely focused on advancing the movement in
their home environments. One campus paper noted that student activists from the University of Michigan, “Joined participants from 30 universities across the United States in travelling to New York last weekend to exchange information and ideas on collegiate anti-sweatshop movements” (Michigan Daily, July 13, 1998). In other examples, anti-sweatshop activists collaborated to simultaneously hold conferences: “To make theirs a nationwide effort, the Harvard students worked with students at Stanford in California and Kent State in Ohio, who also held labor-related conferences this weekend” (Badger Herald, September 28, 2000). These conferences had slightly different content, but coalesced around the common cause of labor and working conditions. Similarly in California, organizers at UC-Berkeley worked to involve their allies in the area to produce an anti-sweatshop conference in the fall of 1999:

In California, students are forming their own statewide coalition to bring pressure on the University of California, the largest public university system in the nation. The two-day conference at UC-Berkeley drew nearly 50 student leaders from 14 campuses across the state, including private schools such as Occidental and USC. The students toured a unionized garment shop in Oakland on Friday and met with a number of former workers from factories overseas. (San Jose Mercury News, October 23, 1999)

As the campaign evolved at the University of Oregon, local student activists and national organizers from USAS and the 180 Movement for Democracy in Education organization sponsored a conference discussing “topics from sweatshops to farm workers. . . . [and attendees] learned about political and environmental issues and discussed what goals liberal campus activists should pursue in the coming year” (The Oregonian, August 18, 2000). The campus and the community had a strong sense that these conferences were acutely focused on generating movement activity, and were not merely exercises in sharing information. In particular, during the Oregon conference an article noted, “The politics being discussed have led some officials to worry that the conference might attract
trouble” (The Oregonian, August 18, 2000). Essentially, officials anticipated that the conference held the potential for more intense and disruptive collective action on account of participants convening at the conference.

The third type of tactic used by students to apply their intellectual skills to advance the substantive issue was traveling abroad; an approach which provided activists the opportunity to gain first-hand knowledge of the problem, people, and organizations involved with sweatshops. These trips in some cases were formally pursued as international study abroad experiences, while other trips were supported by external funding. At Yale, the National Labor Committee helped to fund a summer El Salvador trip for Yale activists. One activist recounted her observations from her personal visits to the factories located there:

After all, this summer I was chased out of factories in El Salvador that made both products -- I got to briefly taste the fear and intimidation felt by the young women who work there. Now that I've seen the way that guns are intimately involved in the production process, I can't bear the idea of buying those brands again. . . . .

In El Salvador, I heard stories about both monitoring done by big U.S. accounting firms and by local non-profits. Not surprisingly, the workers trusted the local people who had exposed violations before enough to tell them the truth, while all they did for the suit-wearing gringos on the corporation's payrolls was smile, nod, and say what their supervisors told them to. (Yale Daily News, September 9, 1999)

In a more institutionally sanctioned example, a handful of student activists capitalized on a DePaul University study abroad opportunity in such a manner that they were able to pursue the sweatshop problem in hopes of advancing the movement. One woman described:

"I went to Mexico with foreign study over last winter break and we stayed with people who worked there,” said Haeffner. "We saw how (the workers) lived in Nogales and we visited factories. I learned about the movement going on across the nation through universities for the past two years and I spoke with the professor who went on this trip. (The DePaulia, September 30, 1999)
Three activists in particular then decided to take this first-hand knowledge and apply it to a DePaul honors senior seminar called Community Service, Volunteerism, Altruism and Social Activism. The student went on to comment about the class:

"We've been getting a lot of support from DePaul through this class," said Haeffner. "People are hearing about it by word-of-mouth. Also, we've been contacting people, e-mailing and talking to students in other colleges through United Students Against Sweatshops." (The DePaulia, September 30, 1999)

These three DePaul students used internal campus learning opportunities to facilitate their capacity for being leaders in the campus movement. As a result, with the help of the DePaul Activists Student Union and then later the larger DePaul USAS group, they led the call for a Code of Conduct for DePaul vendors, engaged in talks with administrative leaders about the problem, staged a sleep-out on the main campus plaza, and went on to advance similar labor causes in the Chicago land surrounding community. In the case of DePaul, the tactic of pursuing international travel was facilitated by an academic opportunity. Even so, the formal connection to school did not negate it as being an intentional act on the part of activist-minded students. The academic endeavor allowed activist leaders to gain a greater depth of understanding about the substantive problems, in anticipation of addressing the issue on a campus level.

*Symbolic acts of civic disobedience, invoking the power of assembly (greatest intensity).* Student activists were quite adept at staging and / or participating in demonstrations, protests, or rallies to communicate their concerns to their targets, most often the campus administration. The standard form of public assembly was a protest near a main administrative building on campus, where a crowd gathered with signs and heard speeches condemning practices that perpetuate sweatshop labor:

Yale students protested for an hour yesterday in front of Woodbridge Hall, a major administrative building. Protesters chanted, waved signs, shook soda-can
noisemakers and listened to speeches given by undergraduates, union representatives and faculty members, including noted professor of political science Rogers M. Smith. More than 300 students signed tiny blue paper T-shirts condemning the FLA. "The crowd was very excited and would just start spontaneously cheering," said Bell, who addressed the rally. (Harvard Crimson, March 1, 2000)

Other examples of public assembly featured students’ creative and symbolic approaches to presenting their anti-sweatshop message to campus administrators:

A group of students stripped to their underwear yesterday to urge the University of Oregon to stop licensing its logo and name on clothing and other goods made in sweatshops. Following a "sweatshop fashion show," the students marched to Johnson Hall, where top UO administrators have their offices, and took off clothing they said probably was made in foreign sweatshops. (Seattle Times, October 20, 1999)

Last spring, Cal students staged a "Sweatshop Fashion Show," on Sproul Plaza. The mock runway show, featuring dance music in the background, was a huge hit. (San Jose Mercury News, October 23, 1999)

A February protest simulated a makeshift sweatshop on the steps of Rush Rhees Library, complete with chicken wire and a bloody T-shirt. Another time, Scirto donned a mask of Jackson [University President] and pretended not to listen while other members beseeched him to join the WRC. (Campus Times, July 26, 2001)

In Friday's Homecoming parade, NSAS promoted its anti-sweatshop and pro-WRC messages in a display that brought dropped jaws from the crowd lining Sheridan Road. For the parade, three NSAS members stripped down to their boxer shorts and chained themselves to a shopping cart that carried Micek acting as Nike Chairman Phil Knight. (Daily Northwestern, October 17, 2000)

Rocking on their knees to simulate the harsh conditions of forced labor, three Miami University students recently knelt in the hub of the academic quad while others stood nearby pretending to whip them. Crowding around the actors, a group of 50 protestors - some with pink or green hair, many with preppy fleece jackets - clapped and chanted labor slogans. "Workers' rights we demand," a scraggly-bearded man shouted into a bull horn. "Sweatshop labor has to end." (The Cincinnati Post, March 14, 2000)

The anti-sweatshop crusaders mobilized on Beinecke Plaza, their spear-like tips glimmering in the sun. Three University police officers stood guard at Woodbridge Hall as the students nimbly manipulated their rods... Upwards of 30 Yale students spent their lunch hour yesterday participating in a peaceful "knit-in" aimed at ridding the University of sweatshop-produced apparel. (Yale Daily News, February 17, 1999)
These public assembly forms of tactics were most intense by virtue of the amount of public attention and focus they brought to their cause, and the spectacle or curiosity they created on campus. As I mentioned previously, these public assembly tactics tended to not become violent or fearsome. In addition to observing consistent patterns in the data, this intention was stated explicitly in the last example listed above, where the paper reported that the “Yale Police Chief James Perrotti said these situations rarely ‘reach the point of confrontation or violence’” (Yale Daily News, February 17, 1999).

Among the various public assembly tactics, sustained forms of public assembly were used by activists to really impress their concerns upon the targets. At the University of Michigan, student activists invoked a sit-in twice – once pursuing a 51-hour occupation in the President’s office (The Argus, April 6, 1999); and then later, a similar three day sit-in / demonstration in a Dean’s office where protesters “set up a mock sweatshop where it said it would produce anti-sweatshop T-shirts” (Michigan Daily, February 18, 2000). There were also instances where students built structures on the campus commons to create an ongoing disruption to campus life:

Yale’s Students Against Sweatshops climaxed a rally Monday by building a three-sided wooden "hut" on Hewitt Quadrangle and vowing to surround it with around-the-clock vigils. The hastily built structure, meant to symbolize the plight of sweatshop workers abroad who make Yale apparel, was hammered into place by several students as about 125 others cheered. “This will be a lasting presence that will not go until President (Richard) Levin listens and talks,” SAS leader Ari Holtzblatt said through a microphone while the planks were erected. (New Haven Register, April 4, 2000)

Even in the context of this sleep-out at Yale, which ultimately lasted for sixteen days, the protesters reiterated, “‘This is not meant to be confrontational. We don’t want to fight with the administration; we want to talk’” (New Haven Register, April 4, 2000). Additionally, they “did not expect the sleep-in to result in any arrests. ‘We're not
interfering with [Yale's] ability to do business,’ he said. ‘I don’t think he [the University President] could justify arresting us’” (Harvard Crimson, April 4, 2000).

The most intense protest situation that occurred on one of the twenty-three mobilized campuses occurred at the University of Oregon. To pressure the UO President to join the WRC, student activists built a tent city, hung anti-sweatshop banners on the main administration building, and occupied the building for three days, including 50 students who slept on the steps of the building overnight. During the protest:

Students locked arms in a circle and pledged to remain in the building until UO President Dave Frohnmayer agreed to a set of demands. But police carried them away after they ignored a request to leave Johnson Hall at closing time. All were given citations for second-degree trespassing and released. (Seattle Post Intelligencer, April 6, 2000)

In total, 14 students were arrested during the sit-in occupation of the administration building, and “the university's police department set up a booking facility in the basement of the building to expedite moving the students out” (Michigan Daily, April 6, 2000).

Outside of the on-campus public assembly protests/demonstrations, student activists who participated in the demonstrations targeting the World Bank / IMF demonstrations in April of 2000 or the WTO meeting in Seattle in the fall of 1999, appeared to be involved with the most intense movement tactics. These protests involved arrests and police prepared for riot conditions. During the Washington D.C. protests:

Police made around 50 blocks off limits, barring the public from getting past metal barriers. Police clustered at every barricaded intersection. Late in the day, with the standoff intensifying, riot-ready police appeared to pen in several hundred protesters in a blocked-off area, and led more than 60 away in handcuffs, placing them on waiting school buses. Police earlier in the day closed the protesters’ headquarters in a lightning raid after authorities declared the building unsafe and ordered it evacuated. (New Haven Register, April 16, 2000).

In total, reports documented about 1,300 arrested during these non-violent demonstrations in the capital (St. Paul Pioneer Press, May 10, 2000). Also, some groups
of student activists participated in the Seattle 1999 protests which were also quite intense, as one participant described:

We were surrounded on two sides by scores of riot police who - outfitted with black body armor, gas masks, and 4-foot-long truncheons - looked as if they had marched out of "Star Wars." This was happening in the so-called "no protest zone," in which civil liberties were suspended, including the right of free speech. No political signs were permitted; no banners. A defiant young man held up a "for sale" sign with the word "police" scrawled above in black marker. Sirens blared; blue strobes flashed from cruisers. A helicopter fwap-fwapped overhead, adding to the sense of a war zone. (The Hartford Courant, April 16, 2000)

The important difference between the intensity of the on-campus public assembly tactics and the off-campus tactics was the extent to which students were fully responsible for arranging and executing the activities. For example, at protests in Washington D.C. and Seattle students were simply participants. Thus, the stakes were lower if they fled during the times of greater intensity and arrests (such as some Trinity students suggested they might do). Whether student activists were present or absent, the intensity of the off-campus protest would still remain through the efforts of other protesters. In contrast, students were fully responsible for creating, organizing, and sustaining on-campus efforts. Therefore, every move the student activists made was watched and observed by the administration, student peers, faculty, and staff. Their public assembly tactics, and whatever level of intensity that emerged from these actions, were ultimately going to have a significant impact on the individual student protesters. Any aspect of anonymity was taken away in the on-campus context, which culminated in posing an increased personal risk to the student activists when engaging in on-campus public assembly protests.

Prevalence and Integration of Tactics
Across the twenty-three mobilized campuses, the intellectual forum or informational lecture, low intensity type of tactics, were almost universally utilized in some way by student activists. Following this form of tactic, the highly symbolic public assembly form of protest, rally, or demonstration or political theatre was the second most often utilized tactic, this includes the off-campus type of protests. Thirdly, moderate intensity tactics were used, but within this group the anti-sweatshop column or editorial in the student press was the tactic enlisted most frequently. These generalizations about the popularity or frequency of utilization of certain tactics should only be construed as approximations because student activists would include varying intensities of tactics together in their campaigns and sometimes over the course of one event. For example, it was common for a campus to engage in a public assembly type of event, but complement it with written communication, such as the example of Northwestern activists:

“Northwestern Students Against Sweatshops dressed in black and wore masks Wednesday in front of Norris University Center to represent the unseen faces of sweatshop workers, whom organizers said produce university apparel. NSAS members also distributed educational pamphlets and displayed sewing machines to celebrate National Student Labor Action Day, which falls a day before the one-year anniversary of NSAS’ first organizational meeting.” (Daily Northwestern, April 5, 2001)

In another example at IU, a demonstration involved the same approach where activists “held signs and passed out flyers at the event” (Indiana Daily Student, October 23, 2001). In these examples, distributing educational pamphlets can be construed as a rather low intensity tactic. However, when utilized along with a demonstration, the two tactics in combination yield a notably more intense approach.

Similarly, at the University of Oregon, the previously mentioned conference consisted of educational sessions aimed at working to develop and sustain the anti-sweatshop movement. The conference consisted of “workshops on topics that include the
organization of unions in Central America, race and the student movement,” and
"corporate greed at universities;” all typical content for a conference of this type.
However, the conference also featured opportunities for participants to engage in more
intense tactics, “On Sunday, some will attend a rally in Salem for immigrant amnesty. A
Monday demonstration about Nike and corporate influence on colleges is planned at
UO's Riverfront Research Park” (The Oregonian, August 18, 2000). Through these
examples of tactics adopted at Northwestern, IU, and Oregon, it is evident that student
activists combined tactical approaches of varying intensity as a way of fueling their
movement ambitions.

Tactics were also utilized to complement and advance one another. For example,
after returning to campus in the fall following the Yale activists’ summer trip to El
Salvador, activists put together a film and speaking tour about El Salvadorian
sweatshops. An October 1999 news report detailed these events, “a cross-country
speaking tour that began Tuesday at Yale University. The speaking tour features a
student–made video shot this summer in El Salvador and appearances by two workers
from Salvadoran apparel factories” (USA Today, October 20, 1999). The Yale student
activists’ trip abroad, film/lecture series, and a well timed editorial to promote student
involvement in the cause, coincided with the activists staging a major rally outside the
University President’s office. The local paper summarized these events:

Yale ’s use of foreign "sweatshop" workers to make its official apparel came
under mounting criticism this week, with personal testimonies by Salvadoran
workers Tuesday and a student demonstration Wednesday calling on
administrators to change the policy. "Living wage! Now!" shouted about 35
students who stood in a heavy rain outside Yale ’s Woodbridge Hall, where Yale
President Richard C. Levin has his office. Levin was out of town Wednesday.
"Last night's talk by the El Salvadoran workers described a prison-like factory and
being abused and yelled at by their bosses," said SAS coordinator Jessica
Champagne during the rally. "They are overworked and underpaid." Champagne, who spent the summer in El Salvador, said a Salvadoran woman will get paid just 3 cents for her work on a T-shirt that is sold here for $15 or $20. Champagne was one of two students who climaxed the noon rally by walking into Woodbridge Hall carrying a large mock-up of a check for 3 cents made out to Levin, along with a Worker Rights Consortium plan for independent monitoring. One of Levin's associates accepted the material. But during their talk at Yale Law School, Sonia Beatriz Lara Campos, 23, and Maria Eva Nerio Ponce, 26, said their Salvadoran factory requires workers to keep it from 6:50 a.m. until 7 p.m. And starting last April, Campos said, they were forced to work Saturdays and Sundays as well. "They told us we had to work hard - until we died," she said. The two women, who are on a national speaking tour, said they were fired by their company, Anvil Knitwear, for speaking out about workers' conditions. (New Haven Register, October 21, 1999)

Summary

Student activists' inclinations favored educationally based tactics above other more contentious or disruptive tactics. Their preference for such tactics didn’t necessarily relegate the movement intensity to a passive or benign level. Alternatively, student activists were effective in pursuing more contentious approaches that were notably more intense, but supplemented them with an underlying commitment to disseminating information that functioned to better inform and educate their campus community. Even as tactics escalated in intensity, via student activists using words and imagery to point a proverbial accusatory finger at their targets, such movement activities tended to evoke critical conversations in the educational community about the substantive sweatshop problems. Further, student activists used tactics such as writing and researching reports, convening conferences, and traveling abroad to exercise their intellectual competencies. The manner in which students were able to gather evidence and expertise made them more effective in critiquing the problems. The resulting rhetoric from these intellectual activities had the effect of intensifying the movement. Finally, students became quite creative in the manner in which they exercised free
assembly, using symbols of the apparel industry to impose the urgency or the scale of the problem. These public displays gained a great deal of attention on campus and presented some disruption, at times prompting authorities to stand guard or to take direct action to restore normality on campus. The intensity of the free assembly tactics presented varying levels of risk to the student activists based on whether students participated locally on-campus or at national level rallies.

**Brief Notes the Perceived Benefits of Campus Mobilization**

In some of the news articles students and administrators, alike, were motivated to reflect back on the significance of the campus mobilization, as an event in their educational campus community. Aside from the resulting action or inaction as a matter of policy (joining the WRC, FLA, or other remedial action), students’ and administrators’ comments and perspectives often underscored a theme of integration of the component parts emphasized in this analysis. Typically, students’ perspectives on the mobilization depicted either an acknowledgement that the mobilization process had enhanced the campus community, or that it provided a tangible and real-life context for understanding academic topics.

**Collective Benefit**

Students observed the benefits of mobilization, as consisting of more than just the administrative changes the asked for; they also observed benefits within their educational community. At DePaul, students had directly targeted their peers with the ambition of building community awareness. When an activist was probed by the student paper to comment on the relative impact of the campus activism, she spoke about their sleep-out
demonstration serving as a way to build camaraderie among students while also informing them about important issues:

"Not only have we gained a sense of a strong community among ourselves and our supporters, but we also have the chance to connect with students and workers at the DePaul Loop campus," said senior English major Megan Wells. "We don't often get the chance to link issues between campuses so this sleep-out has definitely been successful in this respect. By speaking about these important issues and addressing questions surrounded by our sleeping bags, bucket drummers and dancers, I feel we are taking a very active role in educating both DePaul campuses." (The DePaulia, May 8, 2000)

The activists’ efforts amounted to cultivating a greater sense of community and commitment around an organizational identity grounded in the common purpose and experiences enacted through mobilization. Further, the activism coalesced to strengthen the community by increasing personal knowledge, awareness, and cultivating a larger sense of purpose and commitment to a collective organizational identity based on socially- responsible, Catholic (in the case of DePaul), and human-rights principles.

The President at SFSU was also quick to point out the remarkable impact that mobilization, as a particular type of civic engagement, had on the higher education sector; an impact that exceeds the typical approach of putting “Band-Aids on society through community service” (ViewPoint, October 2, 2000). He further commented on the meaning of the mobilization that SFSU student activists (and their counterparts nationally) engaged, noting:

Students care about the world around them, even the world very far from them, as witnessed by the most successful student movement we've seen in a while: efforts to force manufacturers of licensed items (those bearing university names and logos) to end sweatshop conditions in overseas workshops. (ViewPoint, October 2, 2000)
Essentially, the President held a favorable view of campus mobilization as a process that was capable of bringing transformative change to social problems that far exceeded the boundaries of campus.

What Mobilization Taught

Students attributed the process of campus mobilization as being a conduit for learning about a vast array of topics. One student reflected back on the lessons embedded in the problem of sweatshops, and commented on their undeniably global and interdependent form, “In the past year, sweatshops have let us see the bigger global problems, from sexual harassment in the workplace to the growing disparity between rich and poor. 'This movement goes way beyond logos.’” (San Jose Mercury News, May 30, 2000). Another student activist described how getting involved and working with the substantive sweatshop issue helped him better understand the points of intersection of the various issues at play, "Once you start looking at global issues, you see how everything is tied to corporate power and how that power can undermine democracies everywhere." (San Jose Mercury News, May 30, 2000). This same student went on to add that his experience with mobilizing on campus taught him to “take the reins and make things happen. Like we did here with Nike. You make it an issue, and then you just start pushing” (San Jose Mercury News, May 30, 2000).

Admittedly, the data describing the benefits of mobilization that went beyond the policy changes enacted by campuses were limited in quantity. News articles don’t necessarily assume a responsibility to cover such perspectives. Nevertheless, when thinking about the outcomes of mobilization accessible through a qualitative analysis, the educational benefits of mobilization were a recognizable theme in the article texts.
Across the news articles presenting information about the impact or significance of mobilization, there certainly was a preponderance of data that suggested administrators and students, alike, considered mobilization to have been a productive endeavor; an endeavor that served to better educate those involved, and fostered a sense of common purpose or identity within the campus community.
CHAPTER VIII
DISCUSSION AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

Any discussion of the results presented in the previous chapters must be situated in the context of the questions driving this study, which are restated here: How are colleges and universities educating students for collective mobilization and student activism? With the supporting sub-questions of:

- What role do campus characteristics and contexts (in particular, educational programs and curricular offerings) have in shaping the likelihood that students will engage in collective action?

- How is contemporary mobilization enacted by students?

- How does the organizational context of a campus contribute to students’ understanding of, or justification for collective mobilization activities?

Overall, the quantitative results provided a template for identifying the campus characteristics and contexts that prompted campuses to engage in mobilization. Alternatively, the qualitative data offered a more in-depth explanation into the driving motivations behind contemporary mobilization and the prevailing strategies and approaches students used to pursue their social change ambitions. In the following sections I will discuss the findings from this study, as well as the theoretical implications embedded in these results.
Factors Encouraging Mobilization

The quantitative data firmly support the notion that campuses are more vulnerable to student mobilization on account of their internal processual campus features, compared to campuses’ structural relationship to a movement issue. In the final Collective-Action (CA) sample modeling campus mobilization, involving all the clusters of variables (Table 24), campus enrollment characteristics, a diversity requirement in the undergraduate general education curriculum, and the annual number of students who graduated with area studies degrees each emerged as internal campus organizational characteristics that played a prominent role in predicting the likelihood that campuses would mobilize. Alternatively, the structural variable accounting for the total campus athletic financial expenditures did not yield any significant effect on the likelihood of mobilization. Essentially, the scale of the campuses’ substantive sweatshop ‘problem’ was not deemed to be a significant factor influencing whether a campus became active around the sweatshop issue. Based on these findings, it is reasonable to conclude that contemporary campus mobilization is prefaced upon processual dynamics, namely the internal educational contexts and characteristics of a campus, more so than the degree of the structural resources that directly tie a school to a particular social issue.

In addition to the aforementioned internal campus educational characteristics and contexts, the extent to which campuses became vulnerable to the movement as a consequence of the level of their external involvement with the AFL-CIO, also emerged as a strong predictor of campus mobilization. Specifically, the greater the extent of the involvement a campus had with the AFL-CIO, the greater the probability that campus mobilization would ensue. This finding certainly is consistent with the explanation that
the AFL-CIO amplified its agenda by reaching out and working with campuses, subsequently prompting campuses to mobilize (Van Dyke et al., 2007). Nevertheless, even in light of affirming Van Dyke et al.’s prior research, my findings provide additional insight into expanding our collective understanding about contemporary campus activism. With the inclusion of the internal educational characteristic and context variables in my models, I was able to compare the effects of the external institutional field-level influences generated by the AFL-CIO with the internal organizational influences created by the campus experience. When I performed hypothesis tests on my final model, I observed the effect of the level of AFL-CIO campus involvement to be equivalent to the effect of the annual number of area studies degree recipients variable in terms of predicting campus mobilization. Simply stated, in terms of predicting the likelihood of campus mobilization, having a robust area studies program on campus, was just as productive as a campus having some sort of involvement with the AFL-CIO’s Union Summer program. This finding is an example of the external institutional field exerting the equivalent influence of a particular feature of the internal campus organizational context.

*Internal Organizational Considerations: Campus Characteristics and Contexts*

*Enrollment size.* Campus characteristics have a precise influence on predicting mobilization. In particular, larger institutions had a greater chance of experiencing mobilization, and the specific composition of the student body also served as a modest predictor of campus mobilization. Larger enrollments being associated with mobilization has been observed in past studies of student activism as well (Astin et al., 1975; Blau & Slaughter, 1971; Van Dyke, 1998). The inferences typically drawn from such findings is
that larger campuses tend to, just based in their sheer numbers, include a greater number of ‘activist’ type students, who provide a critical mass to pursue a collective-action agenda. In this study, I suspect that larger campus enrollments continued to include more ‘activist’ minded individuals, which in turn functioned to increase the chance of mobilization. Even so, as Lounsbury (2001) has astutely pointed out, with respect to collective action, campus size can operate as a proxy for a variety of other mechanisms which are tapped by size variables. Accordingly, enrollment size was significantly correlated with the majority of variables in the study. However, after controlling for size, the educational features of a campus emerged as the particular organizational attributes that were likely to increase the chances that a campus would mobilize.

This analysis provides two important insights that underscore the processes of contemporary campus mobilization. First, from the data in the RP sample it was evident that larger campuses were more likely to have some sort of involvement with the AFL-CIO; enrollment size was associated with a greater likelihood that a campus would be exposed to an external institutional influence. From the predicted probabilities generated from the CA sample results, it was apparent that small campuses were especially likely to benefit from external institutional influences like AFL-CIO campus involvement. In fact, if small campuses do not offer area studies or do not have a diversity requirement, it would be wise for educators to encourage civically minded students to seek out opportunities like Union Summer as a way of providing a compensatory educational effect for the lack of other campus offerings that would have otherwise helped to foster a constructive context for mobilization. Considering the RP and CA sample analyses in tandem, it is reasonable to conclude that enrollment size alone had the effect of
predisposing a campus to mobilization, but when a campus didn’t have size on its side to encourage recruitment, educators on small campuses should give students a friendly nudge towards externally based programs to support students’ civic engagement ambitions.

**Geographic diversity.** Among the campus characteristics considered in this study, greater geographic diversity in the student body was associated with slight increases in the probability of mobilization. In other studies, researchers have tended to construct broad geographic categories for campuses according to geographic location (northeast, southwest, etc.), or by the prevailing political affiliation of state elected officials or political party dominance in by district to control for prevalent location-based attitudes on a campus. Conceptually, I deviated from this trend and instead, chose to create a geographic variable associated with the state boundary. I used a percentage of in-state students as a proxy for the degree to which a campus was geographically sensitized to the normative economic / labor policies and perspectives in the state (i.e. adoption of a Right to Work statute; types of industries; scale and significance of organized labor groups in the state). The logistic regression results indicated that greater geographic diversity, meaning the lower percentages of in-state students, increased the chances that a campus would experience mobilization. This finding should be interpreted as a story about the educational effect that students from more varied backgrounds have in creating a community that embraces multiple interpretations of social problems. Any increase in the availability of divergent perspectives on social issues, in turn, cultivates a campus context which has a greater likelihood of validating social justice claims, thus providing a welcoming atmosphere to collective action associated with such claims.
Diversity requirements in the curriculum. Like in-state geographic diversity, the adoption of a diversity requirement in the general education curriculum played a prominent role in increasing the probability that a campus would mobilize. Other research has contributed similar findings about the impact of diversity courses, although not in the context of being so squarely focused on considering the likelihood of a campus mobilizing as an organizational outcome. For example, Gurin et al. (2002) provided evidence that diversity courses were associated with students expressing a greater desire to influence the political structure or social values (among other things). Likewise, a number of researchers found a strong positive relationship between diversity course taking and students’ beliefs about the importance of social agency, as conceptualized as having concern for social issues and the willingness to get involved with the issues (Hurtado, 2003; Nelson Laird, 2005). One study conducted by Nelson Laird, Engberg, and Hurtado (2005) found a strong relationship between diversity course taking and students’ willingness to “take actions in their communities and relationships in order to end social injustices” (p. 468), which was a very promising finding, but didn’t speak to whether social action actually took place in the presence of campus diversity courses. These studies each pointed out that diversity courses have the effect of cultivating attitude and commitments to social justice and action, but stopped short of delimiting the connection to tangible acts of civic engagement and mobilization.

The findings from my study speak to the role that diversity course requirements have in creating a campus context that is a place where social justice action and civic engagement actually occurs. When campuses included a diversity requirement in their undergraduate general education curricula there was a 658% increase in the odds that
mobilization would occur, compared to the odds of a campus not mobilizing. This is none other than a dramatic effect. As has been suggested by the previous studies cited, diversity courses have been associated with individual level effects in the sense that they support the acquisition or accentuation of students’ social justice commitments and attitudes, but this study takes this idea and looks at it as an aggregate or organizational impact perspective. Consequently, the institutionalized organizational effect of including a diversity requirement in the undergraduate curriculum functions to generate a campus context that has a much greater chance of seeing concrete acts of civic engagement in the form of collective mobilization.

Size of area studies. Similar to the civic engagement benefits (greater likelihood of campus mobilization) derived from including a diversity requirement in the undergraduate curriculum, there are organizational benefits from having robust area studies programs. With an odds ratio of 1.07 (see Table 24), the addition of each individual student who completes a degree in area studies in a given year is associated with the odds of a campus mobilization increasing by 7%. In this instance, an individual choice (a student choosing to complete an area studies degree) has a tremendous influence on predicting whether collective mobilization will manifest on campus.

This finding regarding area studies should be construed as strong evidence of the campus community experiencing a strong secondary effect on account of peers’ academic decisions. In very concrete terms, consider for example a large campus with an enrollment of 20,000 students that did not have a diversity requirement in the curriculum and did not have any involvement with the AFL-CIO. For such a campus my model suggests that the probability of mobilization rises above a 1 in 2 chance (meaning the
predicted probability rises about 0.50) when 50 out of 20,000 students complete their area studies degrees annually. The inclusion of each additional student continues to push this probability higher. These findings showcase the relatively dramatic organizational effect that only a modest number of students can have on the culture and context of a campus. From a critical mass perspective, it takes just 50 students finishing their degrees annually in an area studies program to begin creating some organizational momentum for civic engagement.

Functionally, I assert that a critical mass of area studies majors has the educational effect of injecting the student community with increases in the exposure to an interdisciplinary and interdependent understanding of social issues that account for a variety of cultural and material interpretations of complex social problems. Admittedly, there is wide variety in the content, pedagogy, and manner in which any one area studies curriculum is pursued on a campus (Hurtado, Milem, Clayton-Pedersen, & Allen, 1999; Pickert, 1992). Nevertheless, the foundation for area studies programs typically involve one or more of the following elements: a detailed examination of a particular nation or region, extensive knowledge of a specific society or identity group, and a focus on interdisciplinarity − typically involving history, political science, sociology, and economics (Hall & Tarrow, 2001). Appadurai (2000) notes that the effect of an area studies approach to knowledge is to provide students with “heuristic devices for the study of global geographic and cultural processes” (p. 7). Essentially, the annual number of area studies degree recipients represents the relative access the campus community has to an area studies cognitive schema for understanding complex issues, which is especially useful for surfacing social injustices. This particular schema or epistemological approach
enters the community discourse and gives life to interpretations of social problems that connect institutions, organizations, commerce, and human rights. It is these interconnections of social issues that give students greater cognitive access to explanations that demand an integrated conception of individual and collective social responsibility.

One more finding regarding area studies is worth comment. From looking at all five models produced in the final CA model (Table 24), it was evident that the inclusion of the educational characteristic variables (introduced in Model 5) appeared to mediate the effects of a campus’s past history or civil-rights era campus disruption in predicting contemporary mobilization (Model 4). In broad terms, mediation implies that in a direct relationship between two variables there is an intervening process that is assumed to be the cause for the effect of one variable upon the other (MacKinnon, Krull, & Lockwood, 2000). Empirically, given the relatively strong correlations between the area studies variables and prior history of mobilization (both approximately 0.47, p<0.001), and the lack of significance of the prior civil-rights era mobilization variable in the final model (Model 5, Table 24) despite its significance in Model 4, implies there is suitable criteria for identifying a mediation effect (MacKinnon et al., 2000). In more conceptual terms, previous research has firmly documented a link between historical campus social movement action and the founding of and spread of area studies programs (Altbach & Cohen, 1990a; Bickford & Reynolds, 2002; Lemonik Arthur, 2011; K. McCarthy, 1985; Proietto, 1999; Rhoads, 1997; Rojas, 2003, 2007). Therefore, it seems that it would be reasonable to assume that the resulting institutionalization of area studies programs are the fruits of past mobilization efforts, and thus reduce the importance of civil-rights era
campus protest for predicting contemporary mobilization. In some respects, the findings from this study suggest that campuses could simply mimic the educational practices (including area studies program in their curricula) that were born from past movements on other campuses, as a way to support civic engagement educational ambitions, even if a campus has no prior history of mobilization.

Organizational Processes

When interpreting the findings associated with the diversity requirement, or the annual number of area studies degree recipients, and the occurrence of campus collective action, it is appropriate to further contemplate the organizational processes associated with these educational contexts. Earlier I stated that it has been assumed that campuses with larger enrollments are likely to attract a larger volume of ‘activist minded’ students, thus these universities possess a greater capacity for convening a critical mass of people to mobilize around salient issues. In a similar vain, it is also possible that campuses with diversity requirements and/or popular area studies programs may attract students who value diversity and integrative perspectives, and thus tend to enroll a critical mass of students who are already inclined to pursue social justice collective action. Essentially, students whose values align well with the diversity / integrative educational values of the institution may self-select to attend such campuses. Such a self-selection process has certainly been the case relative to campuses that possess other types of organizational values. For instance, we see a greater presence of faithful students at denominationally affiliated institutions. Moreover, one organizational explanation as to why diversity requirements and robust area studies programs predicted mobilization was because
students who would be motivated to mobilize, consciously chose campuses with these curricular features.

Despite the potential for this alternative interpretation, the reality is at the present time, the field lacks an effective measure to gauge prospective students’ values in order to make a proper determination regarding the presence of a possible underlying self-selection process at work. Even so, there are some data from this study that speak to these dynamics. Specifically, it would seem reasonable that minority students may be inclined to favor institutions that adopt a diversity requirement in the undergraduate curriculum or have popular area studies programs. Therefore, minority students may self-select in greater numbers into colleges and universities with these curricula. I found no evidence of such a pattern; also, there was no significant correlation between diversity requirements or the annual number of area studies degree recipients and the percentage of minority students on campus.

When thinking about campuses expressing organizational commitments to social justice or valuing diversity and integrative perspectives, it is also important to consider the direct relationships between diversity requirements and the annual number of area studies degree recipients. The bivariate results from the CA sample (see Tables 9 & 11) indicated that there was no significant relationship between the two variables. This finding suggests that in terms of internal organizational processes or mechanisms at play, which encourage campus mobilization, there are two different types of dynamics functioning alongside one another. From an internal organizational perspective, the absence of a strong direct relationship between these two educational characteristics implies that campus practices, which stimulate civic awareness and action, occur along
two dimensions that are relatively distinct from one another. One path, the diversity requirement, functions as an organizational endorsement of legitimate and necessary knowledge which graduates need to be well-informed and appropriately educated individuals. The other path, the annual number of area studies degree recipients, functions as a representation of the extent to which the student community manifests a preponderance of interdisciplinary perspectives and knowledge by self-selecting (in various numbers) into these degree programs.

These two internal organizational and processual paths to campus mobilization can be considered the embodiment of two theoretical representations of organizational identity. Whetten and Mackey (2002) expose the often conflated yet distinctive understandings of the construct of organizational identity. One conception amounts to considering organizational identity as emerging out of institutionalized claims that confer a set of obligations or expectations “as if the collectivity were a single individual” (Whetten & Mackey, 2002, p. 395). The other conception is based on the idea of social aggregation, where shared perceptions of organizational members constitute the organizational identity (Whetten & Mackey, 2002). These two conceptions of organizational identity are both valid although different. The results here suggest that the diversity requirements emphasizes institutionalized claims about the university being an organization which values and believes in respecting all people and perspectives independent of their status. The university represents this perspective by adopting a diversity requirement. Alternatively, the relative strength of a particular campus’s organizational identity is contingent on the ability of a educational community to cultivate a shared perception that sweatshops are a social problem. In this case, having a
critical mass of area studies graduates annually increases the chances that students will start to see the sweatshop matter as problematic.

Internal Organizational Characteristics Which Discourage Mobilization

In this study, the percent of minority students enrolled on campus was associated with very slight decreases in the probability of campus mobilization. Typically, race is associated with student activism in the context of describing the composition of the protesters (Astin et al., 1975; D. Long & Foster, 1970). Past research has thus presented mixed findings, showing a propensity for students of a certain race to get involved in different movements (Levine & Cureton, 1998; McAdam, 1988; Rhoads, 1998a). In the RP sample analyses, modeling the probability of the type of AFL-CIO involvement, the percentage of minority students on campus became an important demographic predictor for any form of AFL-CIO campus involvement.

Based on the results of these two analyses, I would suggest two things. First, the percentage of minority students on campuses appears to have influenced whether campuses were open to some sort of external movement influence. Secondly, the anti-sweatshop movement was not substantively tied to matters of race. The issue itself was construed as an economic, labor, and human-rights issue for which students as a collective group who held stakeholder claims on account of their organizational identity pursued collective action. In fact, based on the qualitative data that stressed activists’ concerns about the blinding effect of socioeconomic or class based privilege (as exemplified in the discussion of Williams College activists targeting their peers), one might even conceptualize the anti-sweatshop issue as emphasizing components of class associated with White privilege (McIntosh, 1988) which might have more prominent
points of contention with a larger majority of White students. With these perspectives in mind, I suggest that the racial composition of a campus played a moderate diminutive role in predicting mobilization on campus, only after accounting for the more prominent role that it had in promoting AFL-CIO involvement.

**External Institutional Contexts Which Encourage Mobilization**

As I stated above, one of the more prominent findings from this study was that in terms of predicting campus mobilization, the external influence of AFL-CIO campus involvement was equivalent to the internal organizational influence exerted by the annual number of area studies degree recipients. More specifically, in my final model in the CA sample, when campuses exhibited some sort of involvement with the AFL-CIO Union Summer program, there was a 447% increase in the odds that mobilization would ensue (compared to the odds of a campus not mobilizing). External involvement played a crucial role in encouraging campus mobilization, but it *should not* be thought of as the defining influence determining mobilization, or as a force that occurs independent of what happens on campus.

I included the Recruitment-Participation (RP) sample in this study to provide some context for understanding the manner in which the internal organization characteristics (or the campus contexts) played a role in determining which colleges and universities would exhibit involvement with the external influence of the AFL-CIO Union Summer program. Most notably, structural economic vulnerability to the anti-sweatshop movement was *not* a factor in determining whether any type of campus AFL-CIO involvement occurred. This finding is extremely important in terms of considering contemporary student mobilization dynamics. The scale or magnitude of the substantive
movement problem appears not to have functioned as any kind of recruitment criteria for the AFL-CIO, or as a factor in promoting self-selection by campuses seeking involvement with the AFL-CIO. Simply stated, the rationale economic interest of an institution was not sufficient criteria for mobilization.

The results generated from the RP analytical model also indicate that the AFL-CIO targeted campuses for recruitment to its programs based largely on whether a campus had a past history or civil-rights era disruption or had a greater percentage of minority students on campus. These two campus contexts can thus be considered factors that make a campus more vulnerable to external influence emitted in the institutional environment.

Another notable finding relative to the external influence of campus AFL-CIO involvement relates to how such involvement potentially shaped the outcomes of the student movement. In the CA sample, the findings associated with the campus patterns of FLA or WRC membership demonstrated that WRC members were more involved with the AFL-CIO, compared to those campuses that joined the FLA. Additionally, AFL-CIO campus involvement had a strong correlation to WRC membership (see Table 28, $R^2 = 0.446, p \leq 0.001$). These findings make a modest argument that the AFL-CIO used its external influence to amplify and facilitate the achievement of the overall WRC focused goals of the student anti-sweatshop movement.

There is one additional matter to address that speaks to data focusing on the external influence of the AFL-CIO. Across all 638 articles in the qualitative data describing the mobilization on the 23 campuses, the Union Summer program was only referenced in four articles. Each of these four articles was published in a regional paper.
summarizing an activist trend of campus organizing (the *Chicago Sun Times*, *San Jose Mercury News*, *Washington Times*, and the *Boston Globe*). My data set also included three subsequent articles that referenced the AFL-CIO in the context of it helping to mobilize its members and allied groups (including the United Students Against Sweatshops) to work towards holding New Era Cap company accountable for the domestic labor abuses that were cited in a WRC report in early 2002. What these qualitative findings reinforce is that the external influence from the AFL-CIO perhaps sensitized campuses to the movement, but the local campus activists didn’t outwardly attribute their movement aspirations or strategies to the external influence of the AFL-CIO.

**Summary**

Using the quantitative data as a lens for understanding the mechanisms driving contemporary student mobilization, the evidence indicates that it is reasonable to conclude that traditional structural dynamics are subordinate to the influence of processual dynamics in terms of determining whether a campus will mobilize. The total campus athletic expenditure structural variable was definitively *not* a factor in either predicting campus mobilization or predicting whether a campus would have a certain type of AFL-CIO involvement. Along with processual dynamics playing an important role in contemporary student mobilization, external institutional dynamics also asserted a dramatic influence, as exemplified by campuses with AFL-CIO involvement having a much greater likelihood of engaging in mobilization.

Processual features of campuses stood out as strong predictors of both student mobilization and a campus having some involvement with the AFL-CIO. In particular,
campus compositional characteristics such as enrollment patterns, institutional selectivity, and a history of civil-rights era mobilization served to encourage the likelihood of a campus having some type of AFL-CIO involvement. In terms of predicting campus mobilization, campus characteristics including the total number of students enrolled, as well as the percentages of in-state and minority students on campus emerged as important influences. Educational contexts, which functioned to encourage campus mobilization, were the inclusion of a diversity requirement in the undergraduate general education curriculum, along with larger numbers of students earning their degrees in area studies programs. Overall, my findings also indicated that the magnitude of the influence of the processual dynamics (number of area studies degree recipients) on campus mobilization were the empirical equivalent to the influence coming from the external institutional environment (AFL-CIO involvement). From a purely rational perspective, it would make sense that universities who are more complicit in the substantive sweatshop problem (on account of their level of athletic expenditures) would also be more vulnerable to critique and subsequent mobilization decrying the scale of their involvement in the sweatshop problem. The results of my study indicate that this was simply not the case. Rather, the context of the educational environment on campus as manifested in the curriculum and compositional characteristics were the driving organizational factors predicting student mobilization.

**Understanding and Enacting Mobilization**

Overall, the quantitative results emphasized the importance of processual dynamics as an explanation as to why student mobilization occurs on some campuses and not others. The qualitative results provide a more extensive picture of the processual
dynamics at work on mobilized campuses. Across the qualitative data, students enacted their movement concerns in ways that had a high degree of resonance to their local campus communities. From student activists’ choices to approach the problem as organizational insiders seeking sympathetic mobilization groups, to prioritizing targets internal to the campus community, to the inclusion of tactics which were educational in nature, to couching movement claims in the organizational values and symbols, students pursued mobilization in ways that made strong references to the organizational contexts of their campuses.

*Mobilization From Within*

Time and again, student activists enacted the anti-sweatshop movement from the vantage point of operating as knowledgeable insiders with a strong sense of how collective action would resonate effectively in their local campus communities. As strategic organizers, students pulled local campus clubs and groups together, and cultivated alliances based on the bastions of potential sympathizers available to them on campus. The formation of these alliances did not deviate from the existing scholarship on mobilizing structures in the respect that activist tapped into both their formal organizations as well as their informal personal networks (Schussman & Soule, 2005). The resulting composition of allied movement groups amounted to a representation of the various intellectual threads present in the sweatshop issue. Diverse campus groups with focuses on areas such as human rights, the environment, politics, social justice, or women’s issues found each other to be philosophical and activist allies. The coalitions between campus clubs showcased the deviating intellectual topics present in the
sweatshop movement, but their alliances also served as tangible evidence of students’ awareness of the intellectual points of intersection.

Student activists also preferred internal targets over several other likely external targets, namely apparel companies. The vast majority of mobilized campuses selected internal targets ranging from – the administrators/governing boards who had the authority to change campus policies and practices; to the students who could identify with the issue and thus act as allies in eradicating the sweatshop problem, or in some cases, a specific apparel vendor who exclusively supplied athletic merchandise to their school. Each of these targets had very specific local campus relevance to the sweatshop problem.

The dominant sequencing patterns that emerged in student activists’ movement strategy also reinforced the notably insider feel of the students’ movement. Student activists’ typically began by first addressing the problem of sweatshops from the perspective of creating change locally on their campus, followed by pursuing external approaches to solving the sweatshop problem. After the administration acknowledged or addressed the issue on campus, it was almost as if students were psychically freed to direct their attention to movement issues beyond the confines of campus. Time and again students worked locally on the movement issue and then transitions to more externally-based pursuits. Examples included: moving on from exclusively campus issues to partner with likeminded community labor organizations; protesting apparel vendor with whom the campus did not hold apparel contracts or even joining the USAS after a campus group became an established local anti-sweatshop advocate. The sequencing of these actions
suggested the student activists’ priority was to first direct their attention internally to campus, and then to any outside or external pursuits.

*Preferencing Educational Tactics*

Students’ natural approach to pursuing social change was to do so in ways that embraced the educational features available to them from their organizational contexts. Students enlisted the power of learning repeatedly; they used it to advance their claims, either by informing the campus community of the substantive issues or by applying their skills to it. Students researched the issues and produced extensive reports about the scope of the sweatshop problem, they planned and participated in conferences, and they sought out first-hand trips to apparel factories to gather ‘data’ on the problem. Across all the tactics employed, the almost universal tendency for activists to first educate and inform their communities by hosting panels and intellectual forums was their most instinctive approach to pursuing the issue. Additionally, I think it is no coincidence that campus newspaper editorials emerged as the most common moderate intensity tactic utilized. The results from this study provide evidence that, despite any current decline in newspaper readership, newspaper editorials in a local community still acted as a viable educational tool that actively contributed to the intellectual dialogue with the campus communities. The intentionality of student activists using the editorials as educational tools was abundantly apparent in the cases of Yale and Iowa State, where the content of the editorials provided an intellectual framework or schema for thinking about the problem and how collective action could operate as a means to address the problems. At times, the sequencing of the editorials was almost like clockwork where an editorial would appear, and then shortly after a planned demonstration functioned as an
appropriate outlet to enliven the ideas put forth in print. I would purport that these tight relationships between educational-inspired tactics and students’ collective action signify the salience of the local context in enacting a movement that is inspired from mainstream and normative organizational activities. The activists didn’t have to shock the system to pursue their cause, but rather they were wise in adopting tactics that were not questionable, and they were mindful by including organizationally legitimate and salient movement strategies.

It is reasonable to conclude from these data that the intensity of contemporary student activism is relatively calm and cooperative in nature. Yes, I did observe few instances of campus demonstrations that resulted in arrests, but overall the type of collective action tactics did not escalate to a violent or fearsome level. Typically, the intensity of tactics was more on the order of evoking intellectual or cognitive provocation by enacting educational approaches in one form or another. I would argue that this tendency towards cooperative collective action was also born from the activists’ insider approach, one that found legitimacy in pursuing movement strategies that were consistent with the organization’s educational norms and values. The educational tenet of pursuing controversy with civility is often articulated via campus educational experiences that highlight socio-cultural differences (Dugan & Komives, 2010); educational curricula of this type were identified in the quantitative models predicting the occurrence of mobilization. Therefore, the patterns of observing cooperative mobilization is likely a reflection of behaving in a manner that is congruent with what students have been taught to value.
Students comments about the collective action process showcased that the sweatshop ‘problem’ functioned as a type of springboard for making cognitive sense of the multifaceted dimensions of the issue beyond just concerns about logoed apparel; such as globalization, economic disparity, sexual harassment in the workplace, etc. I would argue that their awareness evolved from the intellectually diverse mobilizing structures and educational tactics. Activists were keen on creating coalitions with likeminded, but distinctive campus organizations that brought a different lens to the sweatshop issue. Activists also found unifying momentum from being a community of difference, or coalescing as a mobilizing group out of several niche causes that respect the various positions adopted by each group. There was fluidity and inclusiveness in the manner in which the movement was structured, as exemplified in the cooperation among mobilizing groups, which accounted for multiple perspective on the substantive problem. Their cooperation showcased the extent to which contemporary student activism doesn’t have to be solitary in its focus; in fact difference added value by generating more sympathizers and contributing to the various educational dimensions of the issue.

Reflecting Organizational Identity

In the qualitative data student activists drew heavily from their local organizational contexts to diagnose and present solutions to the sweatshop problem. They were quite adept at framing the local circumstances as problematic even if by objective standards they might not have been seen as problematic. Students were capable of tapping in to motivations for movement action that far exceeded rationale justifications for action prefaced exclusively in economic interests. The sharpest examples of this consisted of those campuses that were seemingly unlikely activists, yet active
nonetheless; as exemplified by the University of California San Diego student activists, where the problem in terms of the national anti-sweatshop goals had been remedied (with the UC systems adoption of a tough code of conduct, and joining the WRC), but students still found a way to identify a problem and get active.

Like the quantitative findings, the qualitative findings associated with students’ diagnostic framing stressed the nonessential nature of having a structural economic motivation to fuel the students’ mobilization. Rather, time and again, the manner in which students framed and justified why action was necessary served as strong evidence of activists’ desires to conflate organizational identity with organizational behavior.

Student activists’ motivational framing was embedded in the organizational identity of their campuses. Mobilized campuses drew upon a variety of prognostic frames, but there was a notable tendency for campuses to proffer an educational solution that affirmed the local campus organizational identity (like being a research intensive institution, or a community of students with excessive economic privilege), as a path for solving the substantive issue. Student activists were also very literal in presuming that their categorical merit or worth (by virtue of them being University students or graduates) would be diminished on account of the university’s name and logo being associated with sweatshop labor practices. Aside from the symbolic concerns about the logo, students drew meaning from other organizational symbols, like their religious missions or commitments to leadership, to justify and motivate action. In both contexts, student activists used symbols as representative signals that tied the meaning behind a common organizational identity with a justification to act in a principled socially-responsible manner.
All of the frames referenced in this section thus far drew meaning from the organizational identity as a justification for action, but in each of these examples the meanings were rather particular to the local campus, and internally focused. This finding is not surprising, given the student activists’ strong tendency to pursue an overall movement strategy that was primarily insider and internal in nature. Nevertheless, there was a particular finding related to organizational identity that deviated from the notably insider feel of the movement. Campus activists also gave concerted attention to aspects of their organizational identities that were situated in the legitimacy of higher education as an institution. Activists bridged the local insider meanings of organizational identity to justify the movement by supplementing it with a broader (and somewhat more external) adoption of the social responsibility and human-rights principles that afford higher education a unique type of status and accompanying duty in society. Students easily conflated their sense of local organizational identity as an extension of the institutionalized organizational identity. Therefore, the human-rights and socially-responsible motivational frames functioned as a highly resonant and consistent justification for taking ameliorative action that supported these principles.

Based on the qualitative findings, there was a pervasive sense that students and administrators agreed as a matter of principle (with few exceptions) that categorically, higher education as an institution should stand for human rights, which preserve and respect the dignity of all people independent of their social class or status. Selznick (1957) would likely describe this finding as strong evidence of an institution exceeding the constraints of its technical function (in this case the tasks of teaching and research) and progressing such that it assumes a set of values which make it especially capable of a
certain type of work. The specialized work for the institution of higher education would thus be, being stewards of human-rights and social justice. Scott (2000) conceptualized this process of institutions categorically integrating a set of uniquely suited values as being the foundation for organizational identity. Whetton and Mackey (2002) add that these institutionalized values that shape the institutions’ organizational identities function to proscribe their roles as social actors, thus providing a framework for how organizations interpret their own social accountability. Therefore, organizational identity becomes a window for “planning, explaining, and justifying collective action” (p. 397) since it translates to a commonly accepted coherent understanding of the institution’s “direct and indirect relationships with other organizations and institutions” (p. 396).

Whetton and Mackey (2002) have also argued (albeit in the context of firms, not higher education institutions) that organizations who preface their identities or reputations on socially responsibility tend to be more receptive to movement challenges which are situated in these ideals. My findings generally support such a claim. With few exceptions, the qualitative data indicated that the invocation of a social responsibility human-rights motivational frame prompted administrative leaders to endorse the movement based on the principles being pursed by the activists. Additionally, the modest data I have which addressed movement outcomes also affirmed that campus mobilization was closely correlated to joining the WRC, with 77% of the WRC member campuses also having experienced student activism.

Summary

Higher education has often looked at the prospect of civic engagement from the vantage point of the individual competencies gleaned from specific courses or curricula
that are intended to build skills and awareness (see discussion of diversity courses and area studies curricula above). However, very seldom have there been studies that provide a more introspective lens on these processes. What the findings from this study convey, especially in the qualitative data, is that in many instances where campuses actually engaged in collective action, students made sense of their mobilization as an extension of the organizational and institutional values regarding social responsibility and human rights. It is these values that define who these collective actors are, and how they should engage morally with respect to other people, organizations, and institutions. Further, on account of their strong organizational identification, students as stakeholders have expectations that their institutions act in congruent ways with what they’ve been taught and what the institution espouses in its practices, via the curriculum and the attributes of students who were included in the educational community.

Underlying Theoretical Implications

In the global anti-sweatshop movement, the primary target was the corporation who was likely to be challenged by the corollary primary collective stakeholder, which is labor. Therefore, proxy targets are by definition any entities who possess the ability to take influential actions regarding the issue but operate one (or more steps) removed from the primary target – challenger relationship (Walker et al., 2008). From the vantage point of the overall global anti-sweatshop movement, universities are proximate targets. Campus administrations enter into contracts with apparel manufacturers for the production of goods. In turn, universities have the prerogative of delimiting expectations over the manner in which merchandise brandishing their logos will be produced. From a resource dependence perspective (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), colleges and universities are
prominent stakeholders in the eyes of corporate apparel makers since contracts with universities generate large revenues from the scale of production, and yield reciprocal value from being showcased each time university athletes participate in competition. Moreover, the greater the national athletic prominence of a university should correspond to a greater likelihood that corporations will be swayed by pressure from campus administrators.

The absence of any notable findings which implicates the structural vulnerability of a campus as a prominent predictor in determining whether a campus mobilized bodes well for situating the findings from this study as being representative of the processes of contemporary student mobilization, rather than simply a study about the student anti-sweatshop movement. Scholars and practitioners alike are intrigued by the prospect of sorting out the mechanisms that provide insight into understanding contemporary student mobilization as a phenomenon; more so than just obtaining insights about a specific case study (albeit an extensive one) of a social movement (the anti-sweatshop movement in this case). Since a traditionally economic structural rationale didn’t operate as a necessary criterion to motivate collective action, then the mechanisms that predicted mobilization were a product of other factors. The results presented here further confirmed the relative unimportance of structural vulnerability as exhibited by a campus’s total athletic expenditures not predicting its involvement in the AFL-CIO Union Summer program. The evidence is very convincing that contemporary campus mobilization emerges from the institutional and organizational contexts more so than any type of organizational culpability to the substantive movement issue.
Without a strong structural explanation for mobilization it becomes more evident that the path to contemporary student mobilization is ignited by institutional and organizational behaviors and attributes. Morris (2000), Campbell (2005), and McAdam et al. (2001) each speculated that this was a likely explanation for movement activity but had yet to see it substantiated in the current body of scholarship. Essentially, the mechanisms that determine whether campuses become active are independent of a direct tie to the structural issue.

In order to make sense of the organizational characteristics and contexts underscoring contemporary student activism, it is abundantly important to account for the locally bounded meaning that students ascribe to their movement targets (university administrations), rather than assessing targets from an overall movement perspective. As I stated above, universities are proxy targets in the anti-sweatshop movement, which would thus imply that a decision to target them should be construed as indirect targeting in the overall sweatshop movement. However, as was evidenced in the qualitative data especially, student activists appear to be acting as organizational insiders in the manner in which they have access to and utilize existing campus groups and clubs to organize, select administrators and peers as their primary internal targets, use educationally oriented tactics, and adopt claims based on organizational symbols and values. 

**Insider and Outsider Challenger Dynamics**

Theoretically, the insider versus outsider distinction is grounded in assumptions about the inherent power that an activist group has relative to the organization/institution they wish to challenge. Traditionally, insiders are a constituency of collective actors which are typically afforded a say in organizational decision making processes; outsiders
are a constituency who are not provided access to decision making processes (McAdam, 1999). Students in higher education institutions can be construed as both insiders and outsiders. Functionally there are pathways for student input into campus decision making, such as through the student government, or having representatives on campus-wide committees. However, given these relatively modest opportunities, and the wide variation used to include students’ input in decisions based on the topic, students’ roles in decision making are often symbolic, or at best selectively applied relative to a set of circumstances. As a result, students appear to functionally resemble outsiders more so than insiders.

Organizationally, students are ostensibly members of their campus communities, but they are relegated to the fringes of organizational decision making. Collins (1986) would describe this position as being an outsider within the organization. With respect to contracting and licensing of athletic apparel, as is the case with many purchasing and financial decisions on campus, students have been marginalized and their input had been excluded. Students’ marginalization may in fact be just the thing that has made them ideal stewards of their campuses’ socially-responsible values and institutional commitments; they have an uncanny ability to assume an objective perspective on organizational decisions and actions such that they are well-suited to critique them. The idea of outsiders within serving as organizational critics is not new, it is just applied here to students as a class of individuals within the organizational structure of the academy. Collins (1986) drew upon the work of Simmel and Mannheim to generate a similar explanation of the potential organizational benefits of having outsiders within. Collins emphasized the especially productive and creative role that outsiders within can have on
their institutions; the tensions inherent in their marginalized positioning can serve to encourage and institutionalize “outsider within ways of seeing” (p. S29). In this case, student activists were working to institutionalize socially-responsible practices and policies as way of enacting the core organizational identities.

By straddling the line between insider and outsider status in the movement dynamics, students can adopt insider (and unproblematic) movement strategies thus legitimizing their claims (such as focusing on pursuing tactics which build knowledge and awareness, applying their intellectual skills to the problem through research, immersion study abroad experiences, and conference participation). Meanwhile their outsider status allows affords them credibility in their critiques and condemnation of organizational decisions, having been only peripherally (if at all) involved in creating the questionable policy or practice.

Recent scholarship on movements in educational contexts has directed attention to the insider/outsider classifications of movement actors as being to rigidly dichotomous in explaining movement challenger dynamics, based on the fact that educational insiders have been responsible for pursuing ambitious changes in their organizations (Binder, 2002; Grossman, 2005). In the case of Binder’s work, the movement actors were insiders who possessed formal and institutionalized authority in the decision making processes in the organization; and in Grossman’s work the movement actors were also insiders (teachers and administrators) but were somewhat marginalized in the decision making processes, however less so than college students by comparison. Additionally, in both Binder (2002) and Grossman’s (2005) research, the substantive movement issue was prefaced on defining institutional tasks related to curriculum and assessment respectively;
and thus, the insiders were working to create changes associated with the institutionalized core technical functions of the institutions (Selznick, 1957).

Based on the research presented in this study, I would concur with Grossman and Binder’s research in the respect that the insider – outsider construction should indeed be thought of as a continuum; rather than as a dichotomy. Insiders are certainly capable of asserting a challenger status. However, my work offers another alternative to the range of possible stops along such a continuum. Specifically, this study provides evidence of insider activism working to address an a outsider cause that exceeds the technical parameters of their institutions (tasks involving education). Student activists use the intrinsic organizational and institutional values to find a relevant internal connection to the outside problem.

For any issue where college students challenge the financial policies and practices of their administrators, they are likely to remain outsiders within, despite their modest insider status in the decision making process on campus. However, even in light of these organizational boundaries for member and challenger dynamics, students have strong claims as being an extremely important stakeholder group to their organizations.

Organizational Identity-Based Stakeholder Collective Action

Stakeholder theories of collective action (B. King, 2008; Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003) are quite helpful in thinking about the contemporary student activism portrayed in this study, on account that these theories exceed insider/outside distinctions based on the relative power of a challenger group. At a very basic level, Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003) describe a stakeholder group as collective of “multiple individuals who are conscious of the group” (p. 2003). Mitchell, Agle, and Wood (1997) summarize, that in
order to be considered a stakeholder, a constituent group must have power, legitimacy, and urgency relative to a focal organization. Students satisfy these criteria relative to their universities; they possess a modicum of power in organizational decision making, they have legitimacy on account of their insider status, and they have urgency as stakeholders because the university places importance on the relationship it has with them (Mitchell et al., 1997). More specifically, King (2008) expands on the power dimension of Mitchell et al.’s definition by identifying secondary stakeholders a groups comprised of those who lack control over organizational resources. Therefore, in King’s conception it seems reasonable to say that on account of students’ marginalized power they are secondary stakeholders.

Relative to stakeholder collective action, King (2008) asserts that secondary stakeholder mobilization is tied to their organizational identity, and it is this identity that allows stakeholders to challenge the firm’s socially-responsible performance. King also proposes that secondary stakeholder collective action is received more favorably by the focal organization when the organization encourages diverse and oppositional viewpoints, and where the firm has expressed a “prior commitment to socially-responsible activities” (p. 36).

Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003) provide more detailed insight about the possible mechanisms at work in stakeholder identity-based activism. They argue that a common organizational identity can serve as a prevailing motivational force for stakeholder collective action when the members of the constituent group interact with other particular members, and possess a “set of mutual understandings regarding the unique characteristics that distinguish them from nonmembers” (p. 208). In their conception of
stakeholder mobilization, Rowley and Moldoveanu assert three claims which I was able to confirm with my data. First, they claim that stakeholder mobilization exceeds rational interests when there is a strong organizational identity based on the ‘greatest common denominator’ of the group’s principles and values. My data confirmed this explanation, with campus athletic expenditures not emerging as predictors of mobilization, and why some campuses mobilized even when by all objective accounts their administrations had already addressed the substantive problem. Further the student activists were explicit in their conception of the substantive movement issue as being tied to very broad organizational symbols and values, as well as institutionalized human-rights socially-responsible principles. These motivational justifications certainly reflected the greatest common representation of their organizations and the institution of higher education.

Secondly, these authors assert that collective action is expressive more than instrumental when stakeholders are motivated by their organizational identity, meaning that the actual movement action “expresses the identity of the actor” (p. 211). This assertion was also confirmed in my data in the manner in which students enacted their movement strategy. Student activists showcased the principle of valuing all people by representing the movement with a range of views on the sweatshop issue (niche clubs, student government, faculty partners), along with favoring educational oriented tactics over other types. Additionally, my findings highlighted a sequencing process, where student activists focused internally before doing more externally focused strategies such as joining USAS or targeting external apparel vendors directly; this prioritizing of campus matters also affirmed that students as stakeholders were motivated to act as an expression of their organizational identities.
Rowley and Moldoveanu acknowledge that individuals belong to overlapping stakeholder groups. As stated before, Whetton and Mackey (2002) conceptualize organizational identity as being based in either “identity-as-shared perceptions among members,” or “identity-as-institutionalized claims” relative to their social accountability. On one hand, as a collective group of people concerned about sweatshop labor, students can adopt a collective consumer stakeholder identity on account of their common grievances about the wrongness of human-rights violations in the apparel industry. Such an approach is usually the case in discussions of social responsibility and stakeholder collective action (King, 2008). Alternatively, students chose to embrace the organizational identity derived from their membership in a distinctive type of organization that valued human rights and social responsibility. Rowley and Moldoveanu anticipated that in cases where there are overlapping stakeholder identities that the selection of a particular identity is done in order to “differentiate themselves on moral grounds from people who do not hold that identity, as evidenced by their nonmembership in the group” (p. 214). This was certainly true in my study, as students chose to pursue the movement locally on campus and within the field of higher education rather than acting in a manner that elevated the stakeholder status as consumers of Nike (or other apparel vendor) products as the primary motivator for their mobilization. Students didn’t dismiss their consumer stakeholder identities (there was some direct targeting, but it came later), it was simply secondary to the stakeholder mobilization motivated by the organizational and institutional identities.

This idea of selecting from among an assortment of overlapping stakeholder membership groups based on the distinctiveness of an organizational identity, helps
explain why I observed activists’ desire to also connect to the sweatshop movement at the field-level. In several instances, whether it was through student activists’ choices of targets, tactics, or claims, students deliberately connected their movement activities and ambitions to the natural field-level structures available to them. Most prominently, in these data, Big Ten campuses tended to reference the actions and events of their peer schools. However, other field-level sub-divisions were used as conduits and reference points in activists’ approaches as well, such as the University of California system writ large acting in solidarity, the Ivy league schools referencing each other and timing events so they coincided with one another, or more loosely formed regional activist collaborations by institutions located near one another. Throughout the movement, cross referencing claims, identifying similar targets, and sharing what minimal resources the student activists had with one another through acts such as cooperating on conferences or movement events or extending support for the sweatshop issue at another campus (like Northwestern did when they tried to persuade their President to influence the University of Wisconsin-Madison President, or Miami University protesters traveling to West Lafayette to help Purdue protesters), these field-level sub-systems helped to engender a sense of an extended community and affirm common values.

Student and administrators alike appeared to have a strong sense that the actions/inactions of their peers drew validation and legitimacy for their claims and strategies. Even in the example where administrators and students disagreed vehemently on the underlying principles at play in the movement (the University of Rochester), the President still attempted to legitimate his local inaction on the sweatshop issue, as being based in part on how UR’s field-level institutional peers were responding.
Other researchers have observed similar findings to those listed here. Of note, Lounsbury’s (2001) work paralleled these findings in the sense that the student activists, at what he called socially similar schools (based on similar campus demographics such as size and selectivity), made movement claims to their administrators which built upon the in/actions of their peer institutions. In this study, the social similarity of schools appeared to be related to the common stakeholder status as belonging to a distinctive social institution that valued socially-responsible actions.

Summary

Students may be universally marginalized in the decision-making processes of their institutions, but this does not relegate them to the periphery when it comes to matters of institutional and organizational values. In fact, their outsider status makes them especially adept in delineating where organizational actions deviate from espoused (and taught) organizational values. The apparent resonance of organizational values translates to a socially-responsible organizational identity for insiders or members. Members, as constituting a stakeholder group, expect their mutually agreed upon collective identity to be affirmed by the conduct and actions of their member organization. When the student stakeholder group observes organizational action that threatens this collective organizational identity, they join together.

The student anti-sweatshop movement was an interesting example of insiders working on an outside cause. The outside cause, labor abuses in the textile industry, became urgent to students on account of the values and principles they held as campus stakeholders. Students deemphasized any interest-based motivations they had as aggrieved consumer stakeholders to apparel vendors. Instead, they embraced identity-
based motivations to capitalize on their stakeholder status within their institutions as a way of enacting change and exercising the socially-responsible virtues of their organizational identities.
CHAPTER IX

FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRACTICE

In this closing chapter, I use the knowledge gained from this study as a springboard for considering future points of research that could build upon the findings presented here. Before concluding, I end this chapter by specifying some recommendations for educational practice, and I offer a few additional insights from the data that speak to policy matters.

Future Directions

Based upon this study there are three main lines of future inquiry that I propose. First there are a number of opportunities for further scrutinizing the campus context to provide insights for civic engagement education. Secondly, this study sheds light on the shortcomings of the administrative practice of managing a university logo, which is thus a prime area for additional study. Third, some of the data collection methodologies employed here may have been appropriate for the time period of the sweatshop movement, but they will likely not remain the best approaches for future research on contemporary student activism; consequently, more inquiry is necessary to find solutions to potential data collection problems.

Civic Engagement: The Study of Social Responsibility and Campus Contexts
From a very broad view, I think the findings from this study compel future research to further examine the relationships between particular curricula and socially-responsible collective behavior on campus. For example, just as area studies, diversity requirements, and geographic diversity of the student body had a supportive influence over socially-responsible mobilization; it would be productive to evaluate whether there are other areas of academic emphasis or curricula that have a similar effect. In the last five to ten years, higher education as a field has instituted much better data warehousing procedures for measuring other types of organizational features which might have a positive influence on predicting campus mobilization. For example, there have been systematic improvements for documenting the incidence of students studying abroad, and the Carnegie Foundation has recently introduced a Community Engagement Elective Classification (Carnegie Foundation, 2006). From a conceptual standpoint, both of these measures have the potential to involve relationships with campus mobilization for similar reasons espoused in this study.

Social responsibility is a desirable attribute for all graduates, given that there are inherent political, economic, and human-rights issues embedded in the creation and application of knowledge across all fields of study. Therefore, another productive question to address would be to evaluate whether there are areas of academic inquiry which inhibit socially-responsible collective action. In the context of a larger sample, it would be possible to compare the relative influence of particular areas of academic study (business, humanities, biological sciences, etc.) and their organizational relationship to student mobilization. Any insights drawn from such analyses could potentially help campuses improve their curricula in the spirit of encouraging socially-responsible action.
A larger sample would also create the appropriate conditions to further elaborate on some of the dynamics observed in these data. In particular, with a larger sample, it would be possible to insert additional structural variables which account for things such as the administrative approach to logo management. Also, with a larger sample it would be productive to include multiple variables that account for different pressures stemming from the external institutional environment. First among these could be the addition of political contexts associated with geography. In this study, I did use the in-state geographic composition of the student body as a proxy for capturing the prevalence of local state-specific attitudes toward labor. However, with a larger sample it would be possible to introduce other geographically bounded variables. These geographic measures could better account for the external political climate exerted upon a campus from the institutional environment; these measures might specify if a campus resides in a state where there were/are Right to Work statues, or the dominant political affiliation of elected officials from the district, state, or region where a campus is located.

Additionally, I think there would be immense value in expanding the years of this study to look at the same predictor variables and to see if the effects are constant as other socially-responsible movements were pursued by student activists. With contemporary social issues surrounding labor, corporate influence, sustainability, the environment, and the local food movement, there are many opportunities to see if student activists assert a socially-responsible frame in some form or another to address these various causes. There is also a need to see if a social-responsibility frame is utilized on a campus in a number of social causes over time; any findings that provide evidence of such a pattern would certainly strengthen the findings observed in this study.
Ideally, future studies could also improve upon my findings by trying to incorporate a model which accounts for the internal organizational influences, the external institutional environment influences, as well as individual-level student attitudes. With the addition of individual-level data, one could more directly answer questions surrounding diversity requirements and courses. With the appropriate multi-level methodological techniques, it would be possible to look at the matter of diversity requirements by having data on student attitude formation as a consequence of such courses, and the occurrence of collective action in one unified study. It would be possible to potentially identify both the relative individual and organizational impact of diversity requirements with respect to realizing civic engagement sensibilities and action.

*Explore Sequencing Mechanism*

In the qualitative data, the results provided a firm sense that internal, locally enacted activism precipitated cooperation with external mobilizing groups, or the act of reaching out to other campuses to assist them in their anti-sweatshop efforts. Aside from the sequencing pattern observed in the qualitative data, there may in fact be another institutional field-level influence asserting itself, a diffusion mechanism of some kind, which may encourage or prohibit the likelihood of campus mobilization in the field. In the future, it would be productive to try to replicate this finding with a quantitative model. Doing so would require much more specific measures according to time, such as a catalog of dates of protest events.

Creating a quantitative data set that retrospectively documents the specific timing of collective action events for a sample of campuses is extremely difficult given the inconsistencies in the manner in which the particular details of these things are described
in the media. On a number of occasions, I’d read about information in an article that would provide a crucial piece of the anti-sweatshop story for a certain campus, but it would have indeterminate timing details. For example, especially on the less prestigious campuses, an article would provide a detail indicating that in the fall semester the activist group submitted a letter to the administration about a proposed code of conduct for vendors, and then the article went on to discuss the details about a recent talk by a national labor leader. There was so much variation in how the unit of time could be constructed for each campus case, based on the variations in news article reporting, that standardization seemed like an insurmountable issue even with as few as twenty-three mobilized campuses. Perhaps future studies of contemporary student activism could employ a different approach to gathering digital data that documents various facets of campus mobilization with better sensitivity to the time dimension. In the future, methods of analysis incorporating student activists first hand accounts (such as social media) could provide greater integrity to the process of cataloguing the time dimensions of contemporary campus mobilization.

Practical Matters of the Collegiate Apparel Industry and Organizational Administration

Across the various data collection techniques I employed in my study, there was one area in particular where I found myself questioning the face validity of the data. As I asked the various campus administrators responsible for managing the college/university logo about their campus’s anti-sweatshop activism between the years 1998-2002, a number of administrators had a hard time recalling the details. In most circumstances, regardless of how knowledgeable the administrator was about the particulars of what occurred on their campuses during this time period, these individuals had not been
employed at the college or university during the time I was asking them to discuss. In instances where I asked to be connected with someone who might have been a more informed respondent, there were usually few to no alternatives to offer me. Also, as my conversations progressed with campuses that had engaged in some anti-sweatshop collective action, the campus administrator often pointed me to the news articles (that I had already obtained through my data collection) to better recall the specific information I was seeking (specific dates, types of collective-action behaviors). So effectively, rather than triangulating my data details, it often seemed that I was simply being redirected to my existing information. Through this data collection process, I surmised that in most cases the institutional memory seemed to be best preserved by the news articles, rather than through the individual responsible for managing the college or university logo. Also, when I asked about specific details included in the news articles, to determine if the university administrator could provide me with some counter-evidence or additional information about what transpired, the administrators were not inclined to debate the accuracy of the details from the news articles.

Throughout my data collection process, I came across a number of administrators who were especially interested in my research, noting that they rarely come across systematic information that allows them to compare the way they approach the college/university logo and trademark process with similar work being done on other campuses. In addition to communicating with campus administrators responsible for the college/university logos and trademarks I also reviewed the existing background literature on university licensing (which is sparse) in preparation for my study. Considering the limited availability of research, it seems that I have identified an area of
inquiry that is ripe for elaboration and relevant to a growth area of administrative practice. Future research is necessary to better elaborate on the administrative practices of trademark licensing, as well as university public relations more broadly (where many of these administrators are typically found in the organizational structures of their colleges or universities). Such research could be generally helpful for the substantive topic of this study, but it would also be valuable for building a model for practice that connects the administrative function of marketing and trademark licensing to desirable institutional outcomes such as: the level of the public’s good will for the institution, size of endowments or state appropriations, changes in selectivity or institutional status, or scope of university tech-transfer. Additionally, there is some work that could be pursued about whether licensing handled in the university public relations realm, versus being handled through the athletic department yields substantively different results for institutions. These are organizational questions that could prove quite useful for the work and practice of higher education.

The Future of Mobilization Data

When thinking about future research, I find it curious that some of the more notable details of what transpired relative to the student anti-sweatshop have been preserved through venues external to the university (news accounts) rather than within its formal channels. Granted, I did not ask administrators to go through their historical files, nor would I expect them to be willing to do so (only one person I interacted with offered to review their records to provide me with more detailed information – and in this case I had a modest personal relationship with the individual). As the future of news publications become invariably more diverse and fragmented through the inclusion of
main stream and boutique web-based publications, along with the explosion of social media and networked communications being used to document events and occurrences for specialized interest groups, the formal and institutionalized memory of events may be preserved in an even more scattershot manner than that which existed from 1998-2002. This reality creates real challenges for scholars interested in reconstructing the details of collective mobilization.

At present, a great deal has changed since the time period of my study, for which is seemed reasonable to rely primarily on mainstream news sources as conduits for documenting the evolution of campus activities. In fact, I selected the anti-sweatshop movement in part, because several newspapers had converted to digital form around 1997, which made the retrieval of newspaper data far easier. Since 2002, the web environment has continued to rapidly evolve, and has altered the nature of mass communication and technologies available for social organizing and collective action have increased dramatically (Biddix & Park, 2008). At this time, it seems the ever changing data realities for documenting mobilization are fundamentally important methodological concerns. However with the popularity of social networking applications such as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube, and the explosion of the blogosphere, the legitimate domains for documenting collective action are much more diverse and numbered. With these factors in mind, future research must address the multiple layers of accounting for contemporary mobilization in order to better match methodologies with the explosion in the availability of electronic and digital media.

**Recommendations for Practice**
The results gleaned from this study suggest that contemporary student activism is prefaces in students’ conceptions of the organizational and institutional values in higher education. From the manner in which they are motivated to act, to the manner in which they pursue their movement strategies, students rely on the characteristics of their campuses, as well as the educational features and ideals that they have learned and practiced during their time on campus. If educators seek to empower students to pursue collective action, they should advocate for diversity requirements in the curriculum, promote the area studies degree programs, and pay careful attention to the geographic diversity of the student body. Administrators can further support students’ socially-responsible civic engagement ambitions by: 1) encouraging the proliferation of campus organizations that represent an array of causes; 2) affirming their support for activism when it does occur; and 3) encouraging students to put their academic skills to work in the service of proposing solutions to social problems. In the absence of being able to do these things, educators can encourage students to seek external resources that build their understanding of social justice causes and organizing for change.

Students and administrators alike should acknowledge that while contemporary student activism may be provocative with some of its demonstration tactics (i.e. the sweatshop strip tease, etc.), students’ actions tend to be orderly, cooperative, and aligned with the mainstream principles that administrators and their peers claims to support. Students interested in getting active on their campuses, should look within their community first, to find already established campus groups as allies and partners. In terms of the types of tactics they should use, students should adopt educational
approaches in order to prepare themselves with knowledge of the issues, teach their peers, and seek guidance from faculty where questions remain.

*Educational Tools for Collective Action*

This study highlights the importance of processual dynamics as being profound contributors to the manner in which contemporary student activism occurs. Several of these processes are somewhat novel in the sense that these practices have not been typically associated with cultivating a campus community that supports collective action.

*Geographic diversity of the student body.* Among several notable findings, this study adds information to the body of knowledge that provides perspective on the collective educational benefits of diversity, specifically geographic diversity in this case. This dimension of diversity has not received much scholarly attention, and perhaps it should, given the productive relationship it had to campus mobilization.

On average, campuses in this sample enrolled 66% in-state students; whereas campuses that mobilized had an average of 49% in-state students, and non-mobilized campuses had 68% in-state students on average. The student body composition of campuses that mobilized was more geographically diverse, but the actual ratio of in- and out-of-state students was roughly split in half. With this in mind, and returning to the example represented in Figure 11, the graph provides a visual depiction of how the educational context can better support mobilization with only slight modifications in geographic diversity. When using rather conservative, and albeit realistic values, for the campus geographic composition of in- versus out-of-state students (such as enrolling 55% versus 60% of in-state students), in combination with other educational initiatives, campuses leaders can elevate their campus to one that makes the campus context more
friendly to, or supportive of mobilization (as was demonstrated by a predicted probability of mobilization rising above 50%, with in-state student enrollment set at 55%), or socially-responsible civic activism. Essentially, these findings suggest that educational leaders’ strategic enrollment decisions regarding the ratio of in- to out-of-state acceptances and subsequent enrollees are not only financial enrollment management issues, but they are decisions that can have substantive educational effects. Simply put, as a student body becomes more cosmopolitan and represents a more diverse array of geographic backgrounds in its students, the campus context becomes more conducive to student mobilization advocating for salient social concerns.

Consider the notion that students from each state have a particular impression of economic and labor issues on account of the mix of industries, labor organizing, and state politics. As students come together on campus and explore social and economic issues either formally or informally in the curriculum and co-curriculum, it is likely that the prevailing interpretation of the sweatshop ‘problem’ would reflect the common lived experiences or (normative explanations) projected in the local (state) economic environment. Alternately, with the added presence of students representing other economic and labor realities on account of their out-of-state lived experiences, they may be likely to interpret the same sweatshop ‘problem’ through a somewhat different lens. Note that out-of-state students would also be likely to include some students from places outside the United States; which would also contribute potentially even more divergent interpretations of economic and labor problems. Moreover, when the campus context

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29 Early in my study I attempted to obtain a measure of the percentage of students studying abroad, and a measure of the percentage of students who were international students. I was not satisfied with the consistency or quality of the available data for the years of my study, so I did not include such information in my study.
consists of a composite of individuals who bring a greater variety of lived experiences to serve as lenses for understanding and thinking about social problems, the requisite interpretations and attributions of the substantive problem expand. When there is a plurality of interpretations in the collective discourse, concerned individuals (student activist) have to align these layers of interpretations of the problem to bring forth a common collective narrative that has broad resonance in the community. A plurality of interpretations tends to prompt the community to dissect the discrepancies between views. In order to address the competing explanations and interpretations, students are forced to address the quality of said explanations. The subjective quality of an explanation is evaluated through the culturally available schemas that provide a framework for conceptualizing a definition of the greater good. Moreover, a greater plurality of economic and labor views available to the campus community, as evidenced by the campus composition being comprised of fewer in-state students, enhances the likelihood that students will mobilize.

Specific student organizations. Among the many allied mobilizing groups of the student anti-sweatshop movement, one particular student organization emerged as a real champion of the cause. Campus chapters of Amnesty International seemed to claim a ‘first-responder’ status in many respects, even before USAS affiliation or AFL-CIO involvement. The relationship of the movement to this specific campus organization was not surprising in retrospect, given its mission. It seems that the organization’s broad ideals and history of addressing a wide array of causes, suggest that Amnesty international is providing a co-curricular experience which is extremely compatible with the mission of higher education. Campuses seeking to further these ideals and their civic
engagement education would be wise to encourage student participation in this group. This might be especially advisable for practitioners who value civic engagement, but work on campuses which have not yet institutionalized practices which encourage mobilization. Perhaps, educators can compensate for some of the processual shortcomings of the educational environment by helping to establish an Amnesty International chapter.

Facility. Based on the findings from this study, faculty should recognize that they are truly a conduit for linking students’ burgeoning sense of collective moral indignation to organizational and institution principles and values. When faculty asserted themselves in the sweatshop issue, they did so as guides by pulling in perspectives, prompting students with questions, or by role modeling how to engage in contentious discourse with those in power while also making productive assertions regarding the substantive issues. The data provided evidence of even modest faculty involvement as being closely linked to fairly dramatic developments in students’ comprehension of the movement issue. The facts suggest that it would be wise for faculty to dialogue with students’ about conceptions of institutional and collective social responsibility.

If colleges and universities seek to teach civic engagement, then faculty are in key positions to teach some of the most powerful lessons by simply being unafraid to speak out, or minimally speak with the activists— even if it is to simply ask questions to help students think through their diagnosis of the problem and their proposed solutions to it. Think about the example of Moravian, faculty made themselves available to the activist students to debrief their observations of a protest event, and this act left the students with the inspiration to go ask particular questions so they could better understand the scope of
the local problem to determine their next steps. Although I didn’t mention this earlier, I think it is worth mentioning here; on three campuses (Bates, IU, and DePaul) the data indicated that retired professors were some of the most outspoken faculty regarding the sweatshop issue. I have to wonder if this observation was more than just a coincidence, the data didn’t provide details as to why it was that these individuals were speaking out, just that they did. One potential explanation for their speaking out could be that emeritus faculty face far less professional risk for being critical of the university than any other faculty rank. I think it is at least worth a pause for faculty to reconsider the tremendous educational lessons they can offer by commenting, or better yet acting. Likewise, it is important for administrators to explore any preconceived notions, prejudices, or assumptions they hold about faculty mobilization. It may be time for administrators to take a lesson from their own playbook and to reconceptualize faculty activism, as something that can be just as educationally constructive as student mobilization has been thought to be in recent years. Senior administrative executives committed to the educational goal of civic engagement and socially-responsible action, must think carefully about their implicit or explicit actions that may discourage faculty from feeling free to engage with students on matters of politics or contentious issues. The recent external attacks on faculty relative to the potential political discourse (Lederman, 2011; Schmidt, 2011) suggest that the institutional environment may be becoming more hostile to the type of constructive discourse and involvement that was evidenced in this study.

Profiles of campuses seeking to get active. The results from the RP sample analysis provide some insights into those campuses that demonstrated a desire to get involved in contemporary social justice causes. In particular, campuses that decided to
participate in the AFL-CIO Union Summer program, despite not being recruited, suggest that there are campuses that actively sought out opportunities to gain skills and attitudes that could help them become more civically engaged. These AFL-CIO participation-only campuses were like their counterparts who were recruited-to and participated-in Union Summer in the sense that they were more likely to be public institutions who had a faculty union presence, and some graduate labor union presence. However, the participation-only campuses were roughly half the size of recruited-and-participated campuses, with an average enrollment of about 8,600 students and were less selective; further their student bodies were less affluent and less diverse. These attributes don’t quite work out to projecting a perfect formula for determining campus interest in contemporary movement issues. Nevertheless, these data suggests that campuses without a strong history of prior mobilization still seek out opportunities to become involved in contemporary issues. Additionally, external social justice organizations (like the AFL-CIO) seeking allies should not overlook campuses which don’t have a strong record of past movement activism.

**Accompanying Policy Matters**

I would be remiss not to comment on a few findings in my data which deviate from my overall research questions, but are practical and timely relative to some of the recent conversations in the higher education discourse. The first issue addresses the role of academic labor unions and the second addresses statutory political restrictions on dissent. Both issues are salient to the extent that there are specific policy recommendations that should be acknowledged.
Academic labor unions. At this current moment in time, there has been some political will in the United States to discourage academic labor unions (Berrett, 2011b; Murphy, 2011), based on the idea that these group socialize students for liberal activism writ large (Berrett, 2011a). The findings from this study provide no evidence of such a link. In the exploratory analyses on the CA sample I tested to see if faculty unions or graduate student labor unions predicted anti-sweatshop campus mobilization (which is conceivably a movement that these unions would be able to cultivate sympathizers for if they desired to do so given the sweatshop issue is fundamentally a labor issue), with no significant effect observed. In the RP sample, I observed that academic unions were predictive of two of the three types of AFL-CIO involvement. When considering these findings together, it seems that 1) the academic labor unions may have given students easier access to the AFL-CIO program; however 2) the exploratory CA results indicate that the academic labor unions were not a factor in determining whether students would actually engage in local collective mobilization. Given the two sample construction on which these inferences are based, these implications are worthy of further inquiry. Even so, there is at least initial evidence that academic labor unions are not complicit in socializing students to pursue an activist agenda, despite what ever projections or assumptions are asserted in the broader discourse about the role of academic labor unions.

Statutory restrictions on political dissent. The statutory political restrictions on dissent variable did not emerge as a predictor of mobilization, or as a predictor of any type of AFL-CIO involvement. Also, the only significant correlation that this variable had with any of the other variables in my study was with total student enrollment, and it
was a small correlation. I would have expected these laws to have had an inverse relationship to mobilization, but rather, there was no relationship. Based on these findings, I would propose that the laws and restrictions which were born as a response to the civil-rights and Vietnam era student activism (Gibson, 2003) are of little consequence to contemporary student mobilization. The extent to which a campus was subjected to state laws related to accessing campus, interfering in campus governance, or experiencing civil and criminal penalties for particular forms of collective action (engaging in riots, unlawfulness, possessing weapons, etc.), were simply not factors in determining whether subsequent contemporary mobilization ensued.

These findings suggest a few of things. First, the historical adoption of such laws may have contributed to the field of higher education as a whole legitimizing the less disruptive and notably more benign forms of collective action that were evident in this study. This would be a potential explanation for the differential statutes having no effect on mobilization; in other words campuses as a whole became disinclined to engage in extremely hostile and aggressive tactics. Secondly, the particular content of the restrictions should be evaluated for the modern era. Specifically, any potentially suppressive effect that the restrictions have had on discouraging particular forms of mobilization may have also served to undermine or dissuade activists from pursuing mobilization writ large. If the external institutional environment includes statutory restrictions on expressing political dissent, the restrictions may have had the effect of dampening the potential for any type of (even peaceful) campus mobilization. The qualitative data certainly provided examples that campus mobilization provided many students with their formative impressions of participatory democracy through collective
action, as students commented on what they learned about the substantive issues, the process of activism, or the power dynamic that the activism elucidated. With that in mind, it is important to consider the external environment as exerting other types of influences over the propensity for students to perceive collective mobilization as a viable form of civic participation.

Conclusion

Situated within the institutional aspirations of higher education, college students are confronted by social and intellectual dilemmas everyday on campus. The interesting reality of college life is that for some students these dilemmas are abundantly apparent, and for others, they are simply white noise amongst the many things that are competing for students’ attention. Educators are poised with the task of intentionally prompting students to attend to the inherent moral and ethical dimensions of these dilemmas as a means for determining whether the current state of affairs appropriately serves the community. As students enrich their knowledge base and cultivate their cognitive skills, some are moved to act on the ethical and moral dilemmas as a means for making their communities better. At times, students pursue their passions for improving society by collectively mobilizing or engaging in social movement activities. When students mobilize, contemporary educators tend to interpret it as a strong signal that the campus conditions have been ripe for students to integrate their knowledge, skills, and identities with a broader appreciation for the processes of civic engagement upon which democratic participation in based.

In the case of the anti-sweatshop movement, some campuses were more capable of inspiring collective activism aimed at remedying the deplorable working conditions
and human-rights violations in factories that manufactured university licensed merchandise. For campuses, the problem wasn’t just about the sweatshops, it was tied to the most notable symbolic representation of the university, its marquis logo. Therefore, the issue served as a metaphor for institutional values contradicting institutional practice. In cases where students possessed a strong organizational identity with their university, an identity based on social responsibility and valuing human rights regardless of social class or status, students mobilized.

The normative reality of campus life, is that even in an institutionalized setting where the organizational legitimacy rests upon imparting socially-responsible skills and commitments to students; the processes by which this value is enacted locally plays a dramatic role in determining the extent to which students’ choose to pursue their socially-responsible civically engaged movement ambitions. As campuses choose different priorities in enrollment, or curricular initiatives, or extend support to various campus organizations, they end up creating an educational context which is more or less affirming of campus mobilization. For college students who are learning about socially-responsible collective action, and experimenting with it in the laboratory of the campus environment, they are learning about what it means to be a conscientious stakeholder, and how to express their common concerns about organizational and institutional accountability. The experiences of engaging in socially-responsible collective action during their time on campus can be profoundly constructive for imparting lessons about what should trigger mobilization against institutions in society. As students graduate and go off into other communities for which they will subsequently possess a degree of collective organizational identity (workplace, religious group, neighborhood, professional
association, etc.), they will be well served having been involved in collective action that is cooperative, based on educating and informing, and seeks to unite the greatest common denominator principles as a rallying motivation to inspire action.
APPENDICES
Appendix A. List of Campus Newspapers Included in the University Wire of LexisNexis Academic

Bates College
Bowdoin College
California State University- Los Angeles
California State University- Sacramento
Coastal Carolina University
DePaul University
Eastern Washington University
Georgia Institute of Technology- Main Campus
Hamilton College
Indiana University- Bloomington
Iowa State University
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Methodist University
Miami University- Oxford
Montana State University
Northeastern State University
Northwestern University
San Francisco State University

Southern Arkansas University
Stanford University
SUNY College at Potsdam
Texas Christian University
Trinity College
University of Alabama in Huntsville
University of Alaska Anchorage
University of California- Berkeley
University of California- San Diego
University of Hartford
University of Hawaii at Hilo
University of Illinois at Chicago
University of Michigan- Ann Arbor
University of North Texas
University of Rhode Island
University of Rochester
Washington State University
Yale University
## Appendix B. Proximity of Local and Regional Press to Campuses in CA Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>College or University</th>
<th>Local or Regional Paper</th>
<th>Distance from Campus (Miles)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Abilene Christian University</td>
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### Appendix C. Count of Newspaper Articles Describing 1997-1998 Prior Campus Mobilization

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>California State University-Los Angeles*</td>
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<tr>
<td>California State University-Sacramento*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rust College</td>
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<tr>
<td>Texas A &amp; M University-Corpus Christi</td>
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<tr>
<td>The University of Tennessee-Martin</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abilene Christian University</td>
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<tr>
<td>Centenary College</td>
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<tr>
<td>East Tennessee State University</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eastern Washington University*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Florida Atlantic University</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia Institute of Technology-Main Campus*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hampton University</td>
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<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>King's College</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long Island University-C W Post Campus</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moravian College</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rollins College</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Southern Methodist University</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>St Lawrence University</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas Wesleyan University</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Alaska Anchorage*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Illinois at Chicago*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Minnesota-Morris</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>252</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Campus Newspaper included in University Wire database
Appendix D. Excerpted Survey Items Used to Identify Diversity Requirements in the Undergraduate General Education Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Association of American Colleges and Universities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Survey on Diversity in the Undergraduate Curriculum</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Does your institution, either through a single course or through multiple courses, have a diversity requirement for undergraduates? Yes/No
2. If your institution does not have a requirement, are you in the process of developing one? Yes/No
3. If you have a requirement, for how long has it been in effect? _____ Years
4. Are there students or departments exempt from the requirement? Yes/No
5. How many courses must a student take to fulfill the diversity requirement? _____ Courses
6. Please check the type of courses a student may take to fulfill the diversity requirement. (Select all that apply.)
   _____ courses that addresses diversity in the U.S.
   _____ courses that addresses diversity outside of the U.S.
   _____ courses in which they study one or more non-Western cultures
7. In fulfilling your requirement, can students avoid studying issues of diversity in the U.S. by studying diversity outside of the U.S.? Yes/No
8. Of the following choices, which best describes the diversity requirement at your institution? (Select all that apply.)
   _____ At least one single course with a common syllabus and at least some commonly shared readings across all sections.
   _____ At least one required course selected by students among a list of courses from a variety of disciplines.
   From how many courses can a student currently choose? _____
   _____ Several required courses with significant diversity content as part of a curriculum.
   _____ At least one required diversity course within one or more undergraduate majors.
If you have a requirement that is not described above, please describe:
Appendix E. Civic Engagement Perspectives- Curricular Focus, Area Studies Emphasis

1) What campus are you working on?

2.) What category of area studies data are you referring to?

- African Studies
- American Studies
- Area Studies
- Asian Studies
- Balkans Studies
- Baltic Studies
- Canadian Studies
- Caribbean Studies
- Central and Eastern European Studies
- Chinese Studies
- Commonwealth Studies
- East Asian Studies
- European Studies
- French Studies
- German Studies
- Italian Studies
- Japanese Studies
- Korean Studies
- Latin American Studies
- Near and Middle Eastern Studies
- Pacific Rim Studies
- Polish Studies
- Regional Studies
- Russian Studies
3. What is the formal name of the area studies subject?


4. Does this subject fit under more than area studies category?

☐ Yes
☐ No

If so, which one?

5. Was this subject listed on the college board website?

☐ Yes
☐ No

Comments
6. Is this subject more closely related to a language program but still included on the college board website?

☐ Yes
☐ No
☐ Balanced
☐ Not Applicable

7. Does this subject stand alone?

☐ Yes
☐ No
☐ Not Applicable

Comment

8. What year was the area studies subject established?


9. Was the area studies subject available during all the years of the study 1998-2002?

☐ Yes
☐ No
☐ Not Applicable

10. Can undergraduates major in this area studies subject?

☐ Yes
☐ No
☐ Not Applicable

11. Can undergraduates minor in this area studies subject?
12. How can this area studies subject be classified?

- Department
- Program
- Interdisciplinary Offering
- Other

Notes
Appendix F. Newspaper Articles from Content Analysis Cited in Text


Beach, R. (1999, December 5). Seattle's legacy: Global trade issues can hit home; Area shoppers care about plight of Third World. *New Haven Register.*


Franklin, S. (2000, September 3). Labor's Front Lines - As Unions Fight for New Members, These Five are in the Trenches. *Chicago Tribune.*


Hernandez, R., & Tallmadge, A. (2000, April 6). Six more arrested at UO as a sweatshop protest moves into second day. *The Oregonian.*


Jackson, P. (2001, April 26). Apparel Manufacturing The University Manufacturing Apparel Committee (the "Committee"). *UR Presidential Communications*.


Kline, B. (2000, April 7). Miami stones honor activists or rights struggle- Many were trained at Miami in 1964. *Dayton Daily News*.


Mercury News Staff Reporter. (2001, April 4). 80 Students, Teacher Decry Arrangement with Nike. *San Jose Mercury News*


Straw, J. (2000, April 13). Yale still hesitant on labor group. *New Haven Register*


Tattersall, B. (2000, April 19). Local Protesters, Back from D.C., Share Stories at Moravian College - Students are Urged to Learn from the Experience. *The Morning Call.*


The Williams Record Staff Reporter. (2000, February 29). Anti-sweatshop protests heat up at colleges around the nation; Williams to join the fray. *The Williams Record.*


Appendix G. Campus Activists Inclination

I attempted to gather data that would allow me to obtain information about the culture of activism on a campus through the eyes of an informed institutional representative. Specifically I sought to obtain the impressions of the Dean of Students (or a comparable administrator – Vice President for Student Affairs, etc.), or the Dean’s designee to provide some basic information about the climate of student activism on a campus. I designed the survey, which is listed below in full, to function as a brief set of questions that would portray an administrative interpretation of the ethos surrounding campus activism in its recent past. The questionnaire probed the Deans to evaluate how frequent, how intense, and how important activism has been to the students at their universities.

I obtained the necessary campus contact information / email address through each campus websites.\[^{30}\] I then sent an introductory email asking for help with my study, and communicated that I would be forwarding a message with my questions in a survey, unless I received a replied indicating that I should alternately send the survey to a specific designee, or that I should arrange a telephone appointment to conduct the survey. In instances where I received no reply, I called the Dean’s office (and left a message, there were no cases where I actually got to speak with the individual at that moment), informing him or her that I sent a message about the survey and I planned on sending it, unless I heard otherwise.

\[^{30}\] My colleague, CSHPE MA alumna Sara Rechnitzer, volunteered to help me gather the contact information for all of the Deans. She entered it into a spreadsheet so I could spend my time contacting the appropriate individuals rather than searching for the contact information.
In very few cases (3), I administered the survey over the telephone. There were two individuals that indicated they their campuses had no interest in participating, so I did not pursue collecting data from these institutions. In a few other cases I was unable to connect with the contact or a subordinate that would likely also be an informed respondent (Assistant Dean, Director of Student Activities). By in large, the survey was distributed electronically to the CA sample. Each designated respondent received a personalized invitation with a link to the survey questions. In cases where I did not receive a response after ten days, I sent a follow-up personalized email with a second request to respond (along with the text of the first request forwarded in the body of the second request). Finally, for those campuses that remained non-responders, I sent a final personalized third email to request their participation. There were instances where I received return reply messages that the individual was out of the office for an extended period of time (maternity leave, three to four weeks vacation, etc.). In those situations, I took note of their return date, and started this data collection process anew upon their return date, rather than exclude them on account of their absence. In total, I collected 76 responses from the 149 CA sample, which yields a response rate of 51%. Given that I had missing data for nearly have of my sample, I decided to exclude this variable from my quantitative models.
Campus Activism Tendency

1. Campus Activism Tendency Questionnaire

Thank you for your willingness to complete this survey. Completing the survey will take you no more than 5 minutes.

This questionnaire is designed to gather your impressions of student activism and collective mobilization on your campus. This questionnaire is intended to be a type of thermometer to evaluate the past activist tendencies of students on your campus. It is not designed to address specific topics of activism at length.

Since my study involves only campus level information and does not include any individually identifying data regarding members, employees, or staff of the organizations (campuses) in my study. I have received an exemption from the University of Michigan Human Subjects Board (Study ID: HUM0035193).

If you have any question about this survey or my study in general, please contact me (Cassie Barnhart) via email at CassieBarnhart@umich.edu, or via phone at .

Thank you again.

2. Campus Activism Tendency Questionnaire

NOTE: "Student activism" or "collective mobilization" refers to activism or mobilization for any reason—whether it is in response to campus, community, local, national, or international concerns. It can also refer to activism or mobilization that is organized by students from your campus but may have taken place elsewhere (i.e. traveling outside of the campus enviros to advocate elsewhere in the community).

* 1. College or university name:

2. Currently (past 5 years), how would you rate the students on your campus in terms of the frequency with which they choose to collectively mobilize or become active on issues?
   - Never
   - Occasionally, student groups organize but it does not happen each school year
   - Sometimes, student groups organize a few times each school year
   - Often, student groups regularly organize around causes

3. In the past 15-20 years (since 1989), how would you rate the students on your campus in terms of the frequency with which they choose to collectively mobilize or become active on issues?
   - Never
   - Occasionally, student groups organize but it does not happen each school year
   - Sometimes, student groups organize a few times each school year
   - Often, student groups regularly organize around causes
## Campus Activism Tendency

4. When you think of past instances where students have mobilized on campus for any cause, what best describes the tone of that activism:

- Orderly or Peaceful
- Uncomfortable
- Disruptive
- Violent or Fearsome
- Not applicable

## 3. Campus Activism Tendency Questionnaire

NOTE: "Student activism" or "collective mobilization" refers to activism or mobilization for any reason, whether it is in response to campus, community, local, national, or international concerns. It can also refer to activism or mobilization that is organized by students from your campus but may have taken place elsewhere (i.e., traveling outside of the campus environs to advocate elsewhere in the community).

1. When you think of past instances where students have mobilized on campus for any cause, what best describes the scope of that activism:

- Insignificant, no one in the campus community cared or noticed
- Very few members of the campus community noticed the mobilization
- Many members of the campus community noticed the mobilization
- Important, the vast majority of the campus community noticed the mobilization and followed the issue

2. When you think of past instances where students have mobilized on campus for some cause, what best describes the role that the student activism had on influencing its intended goal:

- Student activism had no role on influencing its intended goal
- Student activism raised awareness about the intended goal
- Student activism helped further some of the ambitions of the intended goal
- Student activism was critical in achieving the intended goal
3. Since 1989, as a part of mobilizing around a cause, have students on your campus engaged in any of the following activities? (check all that apply)

- rallies
- petitioning
- protest
- boycott
- demonstrations
- sit-in
- picketing
- political theatre
- teaching
- letter writing
- silent protest
- building blockade
- strikes

4. What best describes students’ attitudes on your campus in the past five years:

- Students on this campus do not see themselves as needing to mobilize or get active on issues they are passionate about.
- Students on this campus view mobilization and activism as a realistic option only when the issues are really important to them.
- Students on this campus view mobilization and activism as a normal part of the college experience.
- Students on this campus view mobilization and activism as a natural extension of following through on issues they are passionate about.

5. Have students on your campus ever mobilized around concerns that their licensed collegiate apparel was made by vendors that were suspected of using sweatshop conditions in their apparel factories?

- Yes
- No

6. What types of issues (if any) has student activism been directed towards on your campus?


4. Thank you

Thank you for your participation. Please contact Cassie Barnhardt via email at cassbarn@umich.edu, or by phone at (734)972-4966 if you have any questions regarding this survey or the study in general.
REFERENCES


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Koigsmark, A. R. (2000, December 26). Standford's Athletes still 'Swoosh,' At Least Until Nike Contract Ends Critics of the Company's Labor Practices Hope the Cardinal Athletic Department's Endorsement Pact is not Renewed in June, and University President John Hennessy Expects to "Continue to Struggle" with the Issue *San Jose Mercury News*


