A Dangerous Euphemism: The Dark Side of Peacekeeping Missions

A Case Study of the United Nations Missions to the Democratic Republic of Congo

By

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At the heart of this project is a belief,
one I share with the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM),
that violence against women “is not inevitable: it is a problem with a solution.” (2008)
I dedicate this to the women of the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Abstract

United Nations peacekeepers are supposed to improve the areas to which they are deployed; however, their presence can have negative consequences for the local populations. This has been the case for the peacekeeping operations to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), a region that has struggled with violent conflict for the past fifteen years. In addition to the fighting, the country has suffered from widespread sexual violence by combatants and by civilians who are now habituated to violence. Beginning in 2003 peacekeepers serving in the United Nations Organization Mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) have been accused of committing sexual abuse and exploitation against hundreds of Congolese women and girls. Reports of allegations have continued despite a variety of deterrence efforts by the UN and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).

My thesis argues that peacekeepers have not improved the situation of sexual violence in the DRC, and I aim to substantiate this claim by evaluating three hypotheses. First, that the United Nations gender reform, officially in place since 2000 when the Security Council adopted Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, has not been implemented to a degree at which it deters sexual violence by peacekeepers, combatants or locals. Second, that peacekeeping operations in the DRC have demonstrated militarized masculinity, a gendered attitude that tolerates and even encourages sexual violence. Third, that there is a pattern of sexual abuse and exploitation within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the missions to the DRC.
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Preface and Acknowledgements

Two years ago I was responsible for completing a research project as part of the Michigan In Washington Program of the Political Science Department. Nicholas Kristof had just released his book *Half the Sky* and after reading it, the topic of sexual violence in war caught my attention. I continued to research and found that sexual violence in war was more pervasive than I expected. At times I considered finding an easier subject, one that was less disturbing and disappointing. I realized that to tell a story about rape “requires going to a dark place”, as written by Roxanne Gay in her article “The Careless Language of Sexual Violence.” (2011) Yet, over time I became accustomed to this dark place and, with the support of my friends and family, found the determination that I needed to extend that project into my honors thesis.

Over time the focus of my thesis narrowed from analyzing strategies of wartime rape, to rape in the ongoing conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to the influence of peacekeepers on the situation of sexual violence in the DRC. I assumed, or rather I hoped, that peacekeepers would have a positive influence on the situation. I discovered not only that UN personnel had participated in sexual violence, but also that the cases in the DRC were part of a larger pattern of abuse by UN personnel.

There were many people that aided me on my journey to complete my thesis. Senior Gender Affairs Officer, Elsie Effange-Mbella, graciously provided me with information without which I could not have as accurately analyzed the implementation of the gender reform in the DRC. I would specifically like to thank Professor Andrei Markovits for his patience and direction. His confidence and excitement about my project inspired me throughout this past year. I would like to thank my advisor, Sarai Aharoni, who took a chance on a student she had never met and then became the most influential person on the design, approach and perspective that I took with this thesis. I would also like to thank Mark Chesler, my third reader, who has long supported my passion in gender and social identity studies. I would like to thank my friends who served as soundboards, supporters and editors, particularly Marianna Golovan and David Wells. I would also like to thank my sister, Danielle Behr, who reminded me that this thesis meant something more than just a grade or an extra cord at graduation.
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>AI</td>
<td>Amnesty International</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDT</td>
<td>Conduct Disciplinary Teams</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEDAW</td>
<td>Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women</td>
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<td>DAW</td>
<td>United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration</td>
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<td>DPKO</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>FARC</td>
<td>Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>FDLR</td>
<td>Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda</td>
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<td>HRC</td>
<td>Human Rights Committee</td>
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<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<td>ICTR</td>
<td>International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda</td>
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<td>ICTY</td>
<td>International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia</td>
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<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti</td>
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<td>MONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organization</td>
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<td>OGA</td>
<td>Office of Gender Affairs</td>
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<td>OIOS</td>
<td>Office of Oversight Services</td>
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<td>OSAGI</td>
<td>Office of the Special Advisor on Gender Issues</td>
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<td>PCC</td>
<td>Police-contributing-country</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>RI</td>
<td>Refugees International</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEA</td>
<td>Sexual Exploitation and Abuse</td>
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<tr>
<td>SGSR</td>
<td>Secretary-General Special Representative</td>
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<td>SVU</td>
<td>Sexual Violence Unit</td>
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<td>TCC</td>
<td>Troop-Contributing-Country</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>UNIFEM</td>
<td>United Nations Development Fund for Women</td>
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<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Food Program Assistance</td>
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<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Cambodia</td>
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<td>WFT</td>
<td>World Food Program</td>
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Introduction

Since the establishment of the United Nations (UN) in 1945, the practice of peacekeeping has become an increasingly important tool for international interventions. Peacekeepers are deployed into war zones, political uprisings, humanitarian crises and natural disasters. We expect peacekeepers to be “model citizens” that improve the regions to which they are deployed (Division on the Advancement of Women [DAW], 1995). The UN also expects that peacekeepers act in accordance with all UN policies, codes of conduct and mandates. Prince Zeid of Jordan, the author of a famous report about peacekeepers and sexual violence, wrote that the UN “should not in any way increase the suffering of vulnerable sectors of the population, which have often been devastated by war or civil conflict.” (2005) Despite these expectations it is evident that in many situations, peacekeepers can have negative and unintended consequences on host nations, those nations that accept the assistance of a UN peacekeeping operation. One such consequence is sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), which commonly presents itself as prostitution (Bellamy & Williams, 2010). Peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have reportedly been involved with SEA since 2003. Thus, the aim of this thesis is to show how peacekeepers have not improved the situation of sexual violence in the DRC.¹

Sexual violence has a long history in war and the phenomenon continues today. The twentieth century alone provides dozens of examples of how combatants can use sexual violence, specifically rape, as a weapon of war. Some of the more infamous instances of this occurred in World War II, the civil wars in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and now the ongoing conflict in the DRC. In WWII during the occupations of Berlin by the Russians and Nanking by the Japanese, soldiers committed massive amounts of rape to punish and take revenge on their enemies.

¹ I use the phrase “situation of sexual violence” to describe the holistic environment relating to sexual violence in the DRC. This includes the identities of victims, perpetrators, the prevalence, forms of sexual violence, the attitude towards and deterrence of sexual violence.
enemy. During the breakup of Yugoslavia, Serbs used rape as a tool to ethnically cleanse the Muslim population. In the 1994 Rwandan genocide, Hutu combatants raped hundreds of thousands of Tutsi women and those that were not killed were often left with sexually transmitted diseases, HIV/AIDS or unwanted pregnancies. These instances of sexual violence in war have been made progressively more public due to globalization and the spread of technology. Feminist, humanitarian aid and human rights organizations have also responded to these situations by putting more pressure on the international community. In 1946 the UN provided the much-needed forum for states to finally start addressing the problem of sexual violence in war. The United Nations Charter (1948), the Declaration of Universal Human Rights (1948) and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979) are a few examples of how the UN has responded to demands for anti-sexual violence policies. Gradually the international community has recognized sexual violence as a violation of human rights, a crime against humanity and a crime of war.

Building upon years of policy development, the UN launched its most recent gender reform in 2000 with the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1325. This “breakthrough” resolution established the policy of gender mainstreaming, which compels both the UN system and its Member States to recognize how men and women experience conflict and resolution processes differently, to adopt a gender perspective in all activities and to work towards gender balancing or the inclusion of more women employees, particularly in decision-making positions (Security Council, 2000). Security Council Resolution 1820 reinforced the gender reform in 2008 and “calls for immediate action for the protection of civilians, inter alia, women and girls from all forms of sexual violence.” (MONUSCO, 2011) Resolution 1820 further provided the strategic framework for how women should be incorporated into peace building and security
activities. The UN and several non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have monitored the implementation and effectiveness of both resolutions. Although certain improvements have been made—for example the inclusion of gender advisers and gender units on missions—it is clear there is still much work to be done at the global level and in the DRC, where ongoing fighting and widespread sexual violence have hindered the full implementation of the UN gender reform.

**Research Question**

The DRC provides a valuable opportunity to analyze the influence of peacekeepers on sexual violence. Since the 1996, the Congolese conflict or “Africa’s World War” has claimed over five million lives and displaced several million more (Doss, 2009). The situation of sexual violence throughout the country has worsened in recent years with widespread systematic rape and the normalization of sexual violence into the Congolese culture in what Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called a “staggering epidemic of rape.” (Lynch, 2004)

In 1999 the Security Council authorized the United Nations Organization Mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) and mandated that the mission maintain a ceasefire between the many fighting groups in the county. Additionally, their mandate both required that peacekeepers attempt to prevent sexual violence and that they incorporate the gender mainstreaming goals established by Resolution 1325. In response to the changing situation of the DRC conflict, in July 2010 the UN Security Council deployed the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), which also incorporated a concern for gender and sexual violence.

Despite the enhanced attention of the UN and the DPKO to gender and sexual violence, peacekeepers themselves have been accused of committing sexual violence. Since 2003 more than 600 allegations have been filed against MONUC personnel (General Assembly, 2005; 2006;
2007; 2008; 2009). SEA has actually been characteristic of many peacekeeping missions and the allegations in the DRC show that this practice is continuing. In fact, the overall number of allegations of SEA against UN peacekeepers increased from 2008 to 2009 and most of these allegations were against MONUC staff (Ospina, 2010).

In September 2010 the UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, Atul Khare, visited the DRC and declared that the UN peacekeepers had “failed” the women of the DRC (BBC, 2010d). This thesis evaluates the truth of the Assistant Secretary-General’s claim, specifically with a focus on sexual violence. Has the UN peacekeeping force failed the women of the DRC and if so why did they fail? How can the situation be worse if the UN gender reform has been in effect for more than ten years? In this paper I will address those questions as I defend the claim that peacekeepers have not improved the situation of sexual violence in the DRC.

**Theoretical Framework**

Throughout this thesis, I consider my research question through multiple theoretical lenses. First I consider sexual violence and peacekeeping in terms of globalization. As a result of globalization and the establishment of the UN, there is a debate within international relations over whether universal norms should take priority over cultural practices. Another way I consider sexual violence is in terms of human security, an idea that justifies international intervention if humans are being threatened. Additionally, I use a feminist approach to international law, feminist jurisprudence, to examine the treatment of women and sexual violence within international relations.

Globalization describes the process by which all nations have been pulled into a community of interconnected and interdependent states. According to Mingst and Karns, *globalization* “is the process of increasing worldwide integration of politics, economics, social
relations, and culture.” (2007) This process also describes the spread of institutions, education, language and technology. The UN is the only international intergovernmental organization “of global scope and nearly universal membership that has an agenda encompassing the broadest range of governance issues,” and, as a result, is one of the primary mechanisms of globalization (Mingst & Karns, 2007). The UN has a strongly influential role in world politics. It provides a forum where all 192 Member States can participate in the development, debate and collective legitimizing of international norms. The UN is also influential because it serves as a global governing force. For example, the UN can strongly encourage, although cannot force, its will onto Member States through the application of sanctions, the deployment of military personnel and the international condemnation of nations that do not conform to international norms.

The UN remains influential in world politics and globalization, particularly when it comes to human rights, women’s rights and sexual violence. Yet, some have accused the UN of threatening traditional state sovereignty and cultural differences (Mingst & Karns, 2007). Ambassador Ahmed Kamal of Pakistan describes this dilemma as “the Universality of Norms verses Cultural Differences.” (2008) Universalism is “the view that all values, including human rights, are entirely universal, in no way subject to modification in light of cultural or historical differences.” (Donnelly, 2007) The opposing ideology, cultural relativism, argues that the cultural differences of societies, such as distinct norms, practices, languages, politics and religions, must be respected. Sexual violence is currently one of the most heated topics within this debate. Should the perspectives of the UN regarding women’s rights and sexual violence

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2 For example, the UN was very active in pushing colonialism and imperialism outside the realm of international norms in the latter half of the twentieth century (Donnelly, 2007).

3 Ambassador Ahmed Kamal was a guest professor for Sociology 350, the United Nations and Human Rights, which I took during my senior year. He served as an ambassador the UN from 1989 to 1999 and held a variety of high ranking positions, including Vice President of the General Assembly and President of the Economic and Social Council.
trump the cultural practices of Member States? In my research I consider both the universalistic perspective of the UN and the cultural perspective of the DRC with respect to gender and sexual violence.

Another relevant theory to this thesis is human security, an idea that evolved from the concept of collective security. Bellamy and Williams explain that collective security has been a cornerstone of international relations and it describes how the security of one member of a system is a concern for the entire system (2010). Thus, if one nation is threatened by an aggressor nation, the international community has a responsibility to collectively react against the aggressor. In response to the devastation of World War II and the Holocaust, the frame of collective security expanded. The international community established a collective responsibility to protect every human. Human security views that poverty, economic inequality, development opportunities, natural disasters, the environment and war all affect the security of individuals and the international community as a whole. Human security reflects a broader discourse within international relations focused on empathizing and valuing all people and nations. Elazar Barkan explains that fueling the discourse of empathy and focus on human security is “the guilt of nations.” (2000) He argues that moral issues have now become a priority for the international community because of the shame nations felt after WWII. For example, in 1979 President Jimmy Carter recalled the Holocaust and stated “we must forge an unshakeable oath with all civilized people that never again will the world stand silent.” (Power, 2002) Thus, now the international community has an obligation to intervene when individuals and their human rights are threatened.

A final theory behind my research is feminist jurisprudence or feminist legal theory. Rather than providing a single perspective, feminist jurisprudence signifies an interest in gender,
a focus on women as individuals, a political agenda based on equality, a critical perspective on masculinity and patriarchy and a method of understanding and reforming law so that women are more equally included. According to Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin and Shelley Wright this approach argues that the domination and subordination of women is upheld by the international legal order, which “reflects a male perspective.” (1991) Cynthia Enloe explains that international relations were created with a “total disregard for feminist revelations about how power depends on sustaining notions about masculinity and femininity.” (1989) Feminist jurisprudence challenges that disregard and evaluates how women are kept invisible within the legal discourse and how “women’s concerns,” like rape and sexual violence, are marginalized within the global discussion on human concerns (Garner, 2010).

Road Map and Methodology

The topic of peacekeepers and sexual violence lies at the intersection of several developing fields that are currently shaping our political realities. In the first four chapters I will provide the literature on the historical and political context of four of the field in which I set my research. Chapter One explains the many types, victims and perpetrators, causes and effects of sexual violence. In Chapter Two I show how the situation of sexual violence can be exaggerated in war, for example when combined with genocide, ethnic cleansing or strategies like revenge and punishment. In Chapter Three I outline the development of anti-sexual violence policies on the international stage, which was fueled by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), feminist movements and the establishment of the UN. In Chapter Four I will provide a brief history of peacekeeping, an explanation of how UN peacekeeping operates and an account of the occupation and life of a peacekeeper.
The second half of this paper focuses the Democratic Republic of Congo; the case study of my research. In Chapter Five I will provide an overview of the country, its conflict and the situation of sexual violence since 1996. Throughout the fifteen years of conflict, the UN estimates that 5.4 million have died and 200,000 have become victims of sexual violence (MONUSCO, 2011a). I will also examine the two peacekeeping missions that have attended to the conflict since 1999.

The ultimate question of this research asks whether the UN peacekeeping operations to the DRC have really improved the situation. Inspired by both the continuing violence throughout the country and the reports of peacekeeper-perpetrated sexual violence, I argue that the UN operations to the DRC have not improved the situation and that there are three reasons this has occurred. The first reason, which I will address in Chapter Six, is that the gender reform has not been implemented enough to deter sexual violence. I explore the status of the implementation in the DRC and the DPKO using a number of UN reports and evaluations. The second reason I argue peacekeepers have not improved the situation of sexual violence is because peacekeepers maintain militarized masculinity, an attitude universally encouraged by militaries, which results in the perpetuation of SEA. First I will establish that like national militaries, the DRC peacekeeping operations are primarily militaristic and male-dominated. Secondly, I explore what information is needed to conclude that this environment has resulted in the militarized masculinity and whether these attitudes have led peacekeepers to engage in SEA. Lastly, in Chapter Eight I argue that peacekeepers in the DRC have continued the pattern of SEA, which has been characteristic of peacekeeping operations in general. To do this I use the number of

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4 The gender reform is the umbrella term I use to refer to the gender mainstreaming and gender balancing policies established by the UN.

5 I will use the reports of MONUC, MONUSCO, the Office of the Special Advisor on Gender Issues (OSAGI) and the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) to assess the current state of the reform in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and in the DRC peacekeeping missions.
allegations documented by the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) for the DPKO and MONUC. I examine the effects of this pattern on the operation and locals in the DRC and I argue that it has directly exacerbated the prevalence of sexual violence and indirectly strengthened the atmosphere of acceptance and impunity.

In order to complete this analysis I relied heavily on information provided by multiple United Nations bodies. In this way I developed a keen understanding of the UN’s perspective on gender, sexual violence and peacekeeping. As this perspective may be inherently biased, I also utilized a substantial amount of academic scholarship, news reports and reports of NGOs.

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6 UN sources included the Security Council, the Secretary-General, the General Assembly, the DPKO, the OSAGI, the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) and the UNIFEM.
7 The NGOs I utilized included Human Rights Watch (HRW), Amnesty International (AI), Security Council Reports, Save the Children-UK and Refugees International (RI).
Chapter One – Sexual Violence

In order to grasp the complexities of the situation of sexual violence in the DRC, it is useful to understand sexual violence as a global and multi-faceted issue. Sexual violence is a form of gender-based violence that is practiced in every society. Men and women can suffer from and perpetrate sexual violence, however, women are the primary victims and men are the primary perpetrators. Victims suffer from an array of harmful physical, cultural, economic and political consequences. The causes of sexual violence are highly debated today and one of the few things scholars and politicians agree on is that there is no single theory that can satisfactorily explain all instances of sexual violence. Sexual violence is problematic during times of peace but the next chapter will show how conflict can further exacerbate the situation of sexual violence.

A. What is Sexual Violence?

Sexual violence is currently one of the heated topics in the debate between universal norms and cultural differences. There are many different understandings of sexual violence because the definition varies according to the time, culture and geographic location. In this research I will use the definitions provided by the UN, the leader in the development of universal norms and the independent variable of this analysis. This section provides those definitions and shows how sexual violence is an umbrella term for a variety of acts.

Sexual violence is a subset of gender-based violence, which according to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) is,

Violence that is directed against a woman because she is a woman, or violence that affects women disproportionately. It includes acts that inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and other deprivations of liberty. (1993)
Gender-based violence has been endemic throughout human history and continues worldwide today in all kinds of private and public settings. The UN describes it as “one of the most pervasive and systematic human right violations in the world today” and estimates that one out of every three women will be raped, beaten, forced into sex or otherwise abused in her lifetime (UNIFEM, 2008). Manifestations gender-based violence include infanticide, female select abortions, trafficking in women and girls, forced and early marriage, female genital mutilation, crimes against women committed in the name of honor, domestic abuse, marital rape and maternal mortality (Kristof & WuDunn, 2010; Secretary-General, 2006). The manifestations of this kind of violence are influenced by social, cultural, economic and political factors.

As a form of gender-based violence, sexual violence is generally understood as gender-based violence committed of a sexual nature. According to Secretary-General, this includes rape, sexual slavery or trafficking, enforced prostitution, sexual assault and sexual threats (2006). Other forms of sexual violence are gang rape, coerced undressing, non-penetrating sexual assault, sexual mutilation, the abuse of elder women, forced sterilization, forced abortion, forced pregnancy, a deliberate transfer of HIV/AIDS, punctured vaginas and the removal of breasts and fetuses from wombs (Hynes, 2004; Wood, 2006). Rape is one of the most prominent forms of sexual violence “during which the body of a person is invaded, resulting in penetration, however slight, of any part of the body of the victim, with a sexual organ, or of the anal or genital opening of the victim with any object of other part of the body.” (Save the Children-UK, 2008)

Another form of sexual violence that is particularly important to this research is sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA). The UN describes sexual exploitation as “any actual or attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability, differential power or trust, for sexual purposes, including, but not limited to, profiting monetarily, socially or politically from the sexual exploitation of
another.” (Zeid, 2005) Even if a sexual encounter appears consensual, according to the UN it is still sexually exploitative if includes participants of grossly different positions of power, like peacekeepers and women from host nations. Sexual abuse is “actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual nature, whether by force or under unequal or coercive conditions” (Zeid, 2005). Throughout this paper I pay close attention to SEA, as it is one of the most common forms of sexual violence perpetrated by peacekeepers in the DRC.

B. Victims and Perpetrators

Any person can become a victim of sexual violence regardless of sex, gender, race, age, class, health, ethnicity or religion. Women are the primary victims and girls (women under 18) are even further at risk. UNIFEM estimates that nearly half of all sexual assaults worldwide are directed at children aged 15 or younger (2008). In a similar way that virtually anyone can become a victim of sexual violence, so to can anyone become a perpetrator of sexual violence. According to the Secretary-General (2006) and the UNIFEM (2008), the most common form of gender-based violence worldwide is intimate partner violence. In peacetime sexual violence tends to occur more in private by family members and intimate partners. In times of war, this kind of violence, and those kinds I have already discussed, continue but can be exacerbated by the serious disruptions to family life caused by fighting, displacement and death. War can destroy societies and families and loosen restraints on potential perpetrators. Combatants, government officials, rebels, warlords, bandits, local community members and peacekeepers have all been identified as perpetrators in war (Save the Children-UK, 2008). For the purposes of my research, I will focus mainly on two groups of perpetrators: combatants and peacekeepers.

8 The distinction between women and girls is solely based on age. Many international and national laws, including the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1990) and the Congolese Family Code, deemed that anyone under 18 years of age is legally a child.
C. Cause and Effects

*What causes sexual violence?*

The cause of sexual violence is an issue of heated scholarly debate and there are several competing schools of thought. These schools give varying degrees of responsibility to biology, masculinity, patriarchy, militarization, gender relations, propaganda, opportunity, incentive, desensitization to violence and poverty (Farwell, 2004; Gottschall, 2004; Wood, 2006; Brownmiller, 1975). Four of the most relevant theories to this research include the Feminist Theory, the Strategic Rape Theory, the Cultural Pathology Theory and the Biosocial Theory. Before discussing some of the more notable theories, it is important to note that among scholars there is relative agreement that no single theory can satisfactorily explain all instances of sexual violence in war (Gottschall, 2004). As such, I will not endorse a particular theory when analyzing the sexual violence perpetrated by combatants or by peacekeepers in the DRC. Rather, I will note the similarities between these theories and the violence in the DRC. In Chapter Five I address the specific strategies that combatants use sexual violence for and in Chapter Eight I address the environmental and motivational factors that incite peacekeepers to commit SEA.

In her pioneering book, *Against our Will*, Susan Brownmiller (1975) presented the Feminist Theory. She argues that men commit rape not because of their unrestrained and violent sexual desires but rather because of their desire to exert power, control and dominance over women. According to Jonathan Gottschall, patriarchy teaches men to hate and distrust women so when given the opportunity, particularly in situations with loosened social constraints; men take out their hatred of women through rape (2004). Farwell argues women are targeted because female sexuality has cross-culturally and historically been a marker of masculinity and male

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9 Other theories include the biological theory, psychoanalytical theory and the social constructionist theory (Farwell, 2004; Gottschall, 2004; Skjelsbaek, 2001). One of the earliest and most discredited of these is the biological theory, which argues there is a natural and inevitable urge for men to commit sexual violence.
ownership (2004). Within patriarchal societies a perpetrator can declare his manliness, emasculate the men to whom the woman is associated or claim ownership of her body. Although the Feminist theory is one of the more radical theories in the literature on sexual violence, many following theories integrated the idea that sexual violence was not about sexual desire.

In more recent scholarship, theorists have emphasized the social and cultural causes of sexual violence. Ruth Seifert endorses what is known as the Cultural Pathology Theory, which views sexual violence as the eruption of a society’s social and cultural development (1994). Gottschall explains that this theory “looks into a nation’s history to see what developmental factors conspired to cause men to rape.” (2004) The Secretary-General notes that there are many causes, social identities, environmental and risk factors and that can lead to sexual violence. In line with the Cultural Pathology theory, he finds that it “is a manifestation of the historically unequal power relations between women and men reflected in both public and private life.” (2006) With this perspective the sexual violence is a tool of patriarchal societies that men use as a “mechanism for maintaining male authority.” (Secretary-General, 2006; Seifert, 1994)

Another theory that emphasizes social causes of sexual violence is the Biosocial Theory, which argues, “all behavior is acutely sensitive to and influenced by environmental cues.” (Gottschall 1994) This theory puts a social twist on the long discredited Biological Theory, which argued there is a genetic, natural and inevitable urge for men to commit sexual violence. Unlike Feminist theorists, Biosocial theorists claim that a prominent motive for men to commit rape is biological, which could be simple sexual desire (Gottschall, 2004). Elisabeth Wood (2006) argues that this perspective cannot account for many instances of sexual violence that are

10 The Secretary-General noted how social identities, specifically race, ethnicity, class, gender, sex and sexuality, could increase the risk for sexual violence depending on the context (2006).
excessively violent, like include gang rape or object rape, because those actions can fit into a larger strategy or pattern of sexual violence, which leads into the final theory I will discuss.

The Strategic Rape Theory explains how combatants and militants have used sexual violence for a greater purpose. They have used sexual violence to spread terror, demoralize and humiliate a community, take revenge and distribute punishment. Some have used it as a method of genocide or ethnic cleansing by interrupting a community’s ability to reproduce, by contaminating the women or by forcing them to birth children of their own ethnicity (Seifert, 2004; Gottschall, 2004). Wood explains that sexual violence does not have to be explicitly ordered for the violence to be considered strategic (2006). With this perspective rape is not motivated by desire; in fact Seifert reports that a third of rapists actually experience difficulty performing sexually during the act (1994). In Chapter Two I will explore several instances where rape was used as a strategic weapon of war.

What are the effects of sexual violence?

Sexual violence affects victims physically, psychologically and emotionally. Common physical effects include bruising, torn or cut tissues, internal bleeding, fractures, traumatic fistulas, incontinence, pregnancies, HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted diseases. Victims can also develop gastrointestinal and gynecological disorders, urinary tract infections or pelvic inflammatory disease (Secretary-General, 2006). Sexual violence frequently leads to death resulting from injuries, disease, maternal mortality or suicide. Common psychological effects for victims include depression, anxiety and central nervous system disorders, rape trauma syndrome and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (Cook, Dickens & Thapa, 2005). Victims can have

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11 A fistula is a tear in the vagina, bladder and rectum (Ward & Marsh, 2006).
difficulty functioning sexually and socializing with others. Many become dependent on drugs and alcohol (Secretary-General, 2006).

Many victims are scared of further victimization or stigmatization so they do not seek medical attention at all. The medical and psychological attention that victims require is often not obtainable or available by local medical facilities. Rojnik, Andolsek-Jeras and Obersnel Kveder argue that even humanitarian aid programs do not normally provide the full range of care required by a victim (1995). Victims need emergency care, contraception and other reproductive health care, HIV precautions, testing, and treatment, psychosocial assistance and protection from perpetrators (Ward & Vann, 2002; Vojdik, 2007). Most of the time, victims are left to fight for their own survival.

With regards to communities, sexual violence can weaken the bonds between family and community members. In response to sexual violence, some community members ostracize the victim by treating them as unclean, damaged or as having “lost their value”, reflecting the significant priority that societies have universally placed on virginity (Ward & Marsh, 2006). Communities may also accuse the victim of inviting or enjoying the sexual encounter. Husbands have refused to accept their wives back into their home or take a new or second wife, which has serious impacts on family structures and the children of victims (HRW, 2005). The stigmatization of victims can be so severe that their families and community chase them out.

Victims can voluntarily isolate themselves from their communities after being attacked and this can have severe social and economic consequences for their families and communities. A victim can have trouble caring for their family, socializing and working. Victims may also be hesitant to seek educational, employment and political opportunities (Secretary-General, 2006).

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12 Traditional aid has concentrated on providing food, clothes and basic medical equipment (Rojnik, 1995).
Sexual violence impacts the larger economy as well by adding to the costs on social services and justice systems, health-care agencies and employers. In some countries, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States for example, the costs of sexual violence can total in the billions of dollars.\footnote{In Canada the annual costs of violence against women were estimated at $684 million for the criminal justice system, $187 million for police and $294 million for the cost of counseling and training, totaling more than 1 billion a year. In the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, the cost of domestic violence was estimated to be 23 billion pounds sterling (£) per year or £440 per person (Secretary-General 2006). The cost of intimate partner violence in the US was $5.8 billion in 2008 (UNIFEM).}

As I have shown in this chapter, sexual violence is a serious, complex and global issue that primarily targets and harms women but also has serious ramifications on society in general. Despite the debate on the causes of sexual violence, there is agreement that no single theory can explain all instances of sexual violence. There is also little debate about the increased dangers of sexual violence in war, which I explore in the next chapter.
Chapter Two – The History of Sexual Violence in War

This chapter first addresses the differences between conflict, civil war and genocide and secondly, how these practices intersect with sexual violence. War can exaggerate and exacerbate the motivations and manifestations of sexual violence. History is full of examples of how, when combined with war, sexual violence can be committed to a terrifying degree. Some of the most notable examples occurred immediately following World War II with the Soviet occupation of Germany and the Japanese occupation of Nanking. Following WWII and the Cold War, the nature of war has changed from being fought between states to being fought within states and against civilians. In such intrastate wars sexual violence can also be widespread, as was the case during the wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda and now in the DRC.

A. Aspects of War

Conflict and Civil War

The term *conflict* refers to the exchange of arms but also to the pre-war period of preparation and the post-war period of recovery and transition towards stability (Hynes, 2004). The conflict in the DRC has been described as a civil war and in the available literature there is a general, though not strict, consensus about the qualifications a conflict must meet to be considered a civil war. A *civil war* must have caused more than one thousand deaths, occurred within the generally recognized boundaries of a state, involved the state as one of the principal combatants and experienced effective resistance from rebels (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000; Elbadawi, 2000; Walter, 1997).¹⁴ Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler explain that the effective resistance must include the development of large rebel organizations that can generate financial support (2009). They explain that the most common ways of generating financial support involve

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¹⁴ Two additional characteristics include the challenge to the sovereignty of an internationally recognized state and the concern on behalf of both parties about living together in the same political unit after the end of the war (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000; Elbadawi, 2000).
selling natural resources or the informal taxation of the royalties on primary commodity exports such as diamonds, cocaine and timber. This will be important when discussing the role of natural resources and export minerals in the conflict of the DRC.

**The Changing Nature of Conflict**

Following WWII and the Cold War, there was a gradual change in the nature of war. The setting of war changed from being fought on a battlefield between two armed groups to being fought in villages and communities against civilians. Hynes (2004) explains that in these “new” or “dirty” wars, combatants target civilians instead of opposing armed groups or militaries (Bellamy & Williams, 2010). Combatants aim to disassemble a society by attacking civilian areas, looting, torturing and committing sexual violence. These attacks can literally level a society. Homes, churches and schools are destroyed and positions in the economic, political and social structures of a society are left empty (Hynes, 2004). Medical facilities and personnel are directly targeted, leaving the victims without the supplies and support they need to survive. In these settings, the difference between public and private combatants is blurred (Bellamy & Williams, 2010).¹⁵ Men and boys can easily join the fight and many are forced to join. Combatants frequently abuse or are coerced into abusing women, particularly targeting those who have lost their male protectors to death or the war effort. The results of these wars are devastating. By 1995 90% of war victims were civilians, most of whom were women and children, who died directly from being attacked or indirectly from injuries, starvation or disease (Rojnik, Jera & Obersnal-Kbever, 1995; Hynes, 2004).

Bellamy and Williams explain that new wars are more driven by ethnic and religious differences rather than political differences (2010). Combatants aim to terrorize, expel, kill and

¹⁵ A private combatant describes those combatants of established militaries and other security contractors. Public combatants include those members of rebel groups and militias.
rape civilians. One of the worst forms of new wars occurs when groups, motivated by ethnic or religious differences, commit genocide against another group (Hynes, 2004; Wood, 2006). In her book *A Problem from Hell*, Samantha Power traces the historical development of genocide in war and international politics (2002). She explains that although genocide had been practiced throughout human history, the practice was not named until the 1943. Raphael Lemkin, a Polish lawyer, coined the term *genocide* following the Nazi Holocaust and the mass murder of approximately six million Jews, Poles, Slavic, homosexuals, Gypsies, political opponents and other “undesirables.” Lemkin wanted this word to capture the magnitude of the horror while inspiring enough moral judgment to deter something like the Holocaust from ever happening again (Power, 2002).\(^\text{16}\) His definition does not require that people be physically killed to be applied. To him, genocide also described a situation when a group of people was “stripped of all cultural traces of their identity.” (Power, 2002)

Despite the moral revulsion that Lemkin hoped his word would inspire, there are numerous examples of genocides that occurred following the Holocaust.\(^\text{17}\) During Cambodia’s civil war between 1975 and 1979, Pot Pot’s Khmer Rouge regime massacred roughly two million people. In the Balkan Civil War in the former Yugoslavia, 10,000 people were murdered as part of the Serbian campaign to ethnically cleanse the population of non-Serbs, specifically Muslims and Croats (Power, 2002). Although Power provides a thorough collection of genocide examples from the last century, she ignores how sexual violence has been used as a method to commit genocide.

\(^{16}\) Lemkin settled on a combination of *geno*, the Greek word for tribe, and *cide*, a Latin derivative for killing.

\(^{17}\) Additional examples of genocides of the twentieth century include Ottoman massacre of more than one million Armenians in WWII, Saddam Hussein’s campaign to target the Kurdish minority during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s (Power 2003).
B. Conflict in Africa

Africa has experienced a high prevalence of conflict in recent history. In the last two decades there have been more than twenty major conflicts in Africa, including a number of civil wars (Addison, Le Billon, & Murshed, 2000). Ibrahim Elbadawi and Nicholas Sambanis developed a regression model that measured the probability of civil war and found that in any one year, we can expect that eight African countries involved in conflict (2000). Elbadawi and Sambanis observed that Africa not only has the highest prevalence of civil war, but that this prevalence has increased in the last three decades (2000). As one of the leaders in global aid and humanitarian assistance, the UN has responded to this conflict heavy region by deployed six of its fifteen ongoing peacekeeping operations to Africa (DPKO, 2011).18

According to Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, when compared to other developing regions, Africa has clearly experienced a rising trend of conflict (2009). Many scholars have attempted to discover the reason why Africa has so much conflict and a number of causes have been identified. These include ethnic diversity, religious diversity, poverty, government instability, economic homogeneity and natural resource dependence (Addison, Le Billon, & Murshed, 2000, Elbadawi & Sambanis, 2000).19 There is currently a lively debate over the influence of ethnicity in these conflicts, which is most likely fueled by the recent conflicts in Rwanda and the Sudan. Scholars like Inger Skjelsbaek (2001) and Lisa Sharlach (1999) mainly credit ethnicity for initiating these conflicts while many others argue that economic factors have a much greater influence (Collier & Hoeffler, 2009, Addison, Le Billon, & Murshed 2003, Elbadawi & Sambanis, 2000). James Fearon and David Laitin argue that ethnic violence is

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18 Current African missions include UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), African Union-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI, UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) (DPKO, 2011).

19 In 2009, the average per capita income was approximately $2,000 for an African (Collier and Hoeffler, 2009).
uncommon than many scholars admit. They explain that throughout Africa’s history, the cases of actual ethnic violence were vastly fewer than cases of potential ethnic violence, or environments where there are two or more distinct ethnic groups interacting. They also explain that most ethnic groups cooperate with the assistance of institutional mechanisms that allow each group access to information, opportunity and the benefits of peace (1996).

The 1994 conflict in Rwanda provides one of the most recent and horrific pictures of how civil war, genocide and sexual violence can manifest in Africa. Rwanda has been separated into two ethnic groups since the time it was a Belgium colony– the majority Hutu and minority Tutsi. The country experienced violent and relatively frequent conflict due to the extreme ethnic fractionalization and this eventually culminated in the 1994 civil war, which broke out within hours of Hutu President Hayarimana’s mysterious place crash.20 Hutu combatants had carefully pre-planned the genocide, stored up thousands of weapons and used the media to spread anti-Tutsi propaganda. The attacks were swift in the countryside but in more populated areas where foreigners and the UN were present, the Hutu combatants used a slow and steady attack strategy so as not to attract as much suspicion. Most of the genocide was completed within a month, which was just about the length of time it took the UN to declare that genocide was occurring. Within three months approximately half a million people died either from genocide or from disease, thirst and/or starvation (Kuperman, 2001).

Only a few short years after the genocide in Rwanda, conflict in the DRC began again. The high influx of Rwandan refugees and Hutu combatants directly contributed to the instability of the DRC. Unlike Rwanda, in the DRC there is not a clear binary between the warring parties

20 On April 6, 1994, Hayarimana’s plane mysteriously crashed and no one took responsibility for it. Instead, Hutus blamed the crash on a Tutsi conspiracy to weaken Hutu power and many Tutsis have guessed that Hutus actually shot the plane down to have an excuse to begin the genocide. Regardless of the cause, it was the direct catalyst for the implementation of the genocide, which began within four hours of the crash (Kuperman, 2001).
nor does there appear to be intent to commit genocide of a certain people. It began as an intra-state civil war with the government fighting rebels that was technically resolved in 2002. The post conflict situation has become much more complex with the increase of armed groups, the involvement of neighboring countries, the exploitation of natural resources and the massive refugee crises. In Chapter Five I will explain the conflict and the sexual violence that has accompanied it in further detail.

C. The Intersection of Sexual Violence and War

*Manifestations of Wartime Sexual Violence*

In addition to the forms of sexual violence I have already discussed, there are certain manifestations of sexual violence that are particularly prevalent during and post-war. Vojdik explains that sexual violence in war is “an extreme manifestation of the unequal power relations between men and women during peacetime in most societies.” (2007) Similarly Farwell explains, “Wartime rape is viewed as an intensification, an extreme iteration, of the sexual violence that exists even when armed conflict is not present.” (2004) Both stress the extremity of the sexual violence during war and this can be the result of breakdown in community systems, social norms and legal processes (Ward & Vann, 2002). This social and moral collapse of society allows perpetrators, whether they are combatants or ordinary citizens, to feel they have more opportunity, more incentive and less chance of punishment to commit sexual violence (Ward & Marsh, 2006). Wood explains opportunity is increased due to weakened social controls, particularly on sexual aggression, and frequent interactions between combatants and civilians. Wood also explains that war increases the incentive to commit sexual violence because state and other institutions are often dismantled and men may rely on violence to reestablish gender roles and fill the vacuum of power (2006). Perpetrators may also feel they won’t be punished or face
harmful consequences for their crimes because of the weakness of societal institutions, a situation known as impunity (Higate, 2007).

In war sexual violence can be committed in any setting: alongside raids, in brothels, in sexual slave rings, within concentration camps, in soldiers’ barracks or at random. Perpetrators may refer to their victims as bush wives, girlfriends or prostitutes, however, the situation qualifies as sexual slavery (HRW, 2002). Civilians can also perpetrate sexual violence, a common characteristic of post-conflict environments. In a post-war setting, sexual abuse and violence can become normalized in a society because people are used to fighting and death. As a result, the overall level of violence (domestic, sexual, etc.) can actually increase post-war among civilian populations. Farwell explains that a long-term effect of war is the militarization of society, which I will discuss at length in Chapter Seven. When a society is militarized a common pattern is the emphasis on patriarchal values to ensure cohesion and the power structures that developed during war, such as the overt domination of women by men (2004).

In war and post-war situations, Save the Children-UK found that younger children are more at risk for sexual violence than older children and girls are more at risk than boys (2008). This risk for sexual violence becomes even greater if a child becomes a refugee, which is particularly troubling because children currently make up 50% of the global population of refugees (Rojnik, Jera & Obersnal-Kbever, 1995).

The Situation for Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

In modern wars, an increasingly common occurrence is that civilians are displaced from their communities and forced to flee. Refugees live precarious lives and many die from disease, thirst, hunger and exhaustion (Rojnik, Jera & Obersnal-Kbever, 1995). To ease the situation for these people the UN, governments and refugees often organize camps to create a temporary
community and center for the distribution of aid. In refugee settings, women and girls are the most at risk due to “their subordinate status in nearly all cultures and societies.” (Ward & Vann, 2002) Traveling increases the chances of being attacked by bandits, border guards, insurgents and combatants who control most of the roads and checkpoints (Ward & Marsh, 2006). If and when they are able to reach the camps women and girls continue to face a high chance of being sexually assaulted, exploited or trafficked by locals and/or humanitarian aid workers. Ward and Marsh attribute this to the overcrowded conditions, close proximity of toilets and bathhouses, poor lighting and unequal access to resources (2006). Combatants target groups to prey on women and to kill or recruit men so women take a risk whenever they go outside the camp to find firewood and other necessities. The dangerous situation for women in refuge camps is evident today in Haiti, where thousands have lost their homes due to the 2010 earthquake. In the fall of 2010 Refugees International (RI) reported that domestic violence, sexual violence, sexual exploitation and rape are rampant within the camps (Parry, 2010). Many find they have no other option but to exchange sex for food and other vital necessities to support their families; a phenomenon known as “survival sex” that I will discuss in Chapter Eight.

Recent African conflicts have shown a tendency to create large refugee populations and as a result a more dangerous environment for women. In Rwanda, roughly two million abandoned or were forced out of their homes and fled to neighboring countries during the genocide. In the DRC nearly one half of a million people have fled the fighting and in the eastern region of the county alone there are about 1.9 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) (MONUSCO, 2011a). With its many conflicts, Africa now houses one third of the world’s refugees, which is an made even more concerning of an issue when we consider the added risk of sexual violence for refugees (Rojnik, Jera & Obersnal-Kbever, 1995). For example, during the
Sierra Leone conflict in the early 1990s, 50,000 to 64,000 IDP women were sexual victimized (Ward & Marsh, 2006). Even Romeo Dallaire, the Force Commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR), saw many refugee women and children became prey to men in the camps (2003).

Causes of Wartime Sexual Violence

The causes for sexual violence during and after war can vary. Many of these causes fall in line with the Feminist, Cultural Pathology and Strategic Theories that I discussed in Chapter One. Sexual violence in war has been practiced for centuries and many consider it an inevitable and natural aspect of war. Armies have long treated women of the losing side as the “spoils,” and “the booty” of war (Brownmiller, 1975). Brownmiller explains, in line with the Feminist Theory, that these ideas are reflections of male dominance and the patriarchal logical that women are the natural property of men (1975). During war women can be viewed as extensions of the enemy soldiers, which relates to the role of women in traditional societies as being the property or dependents of men. Norman Naimark explains that the rape of a woman is a “theoretical castration of men who couldn’t protect their women” (1995). This is a continuation of the Brownmiller’s argument that “the body of a raped woman becomes a ceremonial battlefield” (1975). As the battlefield, women provided an opportunity for soldiers to take revenge and punish their enemies. Fighters may be weary of fighting, upset over the loss of comrades and family, or unable to restrain the violent behaviors they developed while fighting. Additionally, sexual violence is used during war to extract information, to humiliate and terrorize groups of people and to force communities into submission (Secretary-General, 2006). Combatants can also use sexual violence strategically as a way to commit genocide by purposely impregnating or transferring HIV/AIDS to women.
Variation of Sexual Violence in War

Sexual violence can vary significantly between conflicts. Some conflicts display little to no sexual violence, which is the case in the conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians and the United States wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. On the other hand, there are cases where sexual violence occurs on a massive scale. In WWII both the Russian and Japanese forces committed widespread sexual violence in their occupations of Berlin and Nanking, respectively. In Chapter Five I will show how the sexual violence committed by the combatants in the DRC shares many similar characteristic with the violence committed by these two armies.

Following the German surrender, the Red Soviet Army entered Berlin and occupied the city from May 1945 to 1947. According to Seifert, cautious estimates of the number of women raped by in the city average around 110,000 (1994). Women were raped in gangs, in their homes and in front of their families and neighbors (Wood, 2006). Alcohol played a significant role in the rapes as many were committed while soldiers were binge drinking (Naimark, 1995). Rapes were indiscriminate and affected young, adult and elderly females. Norman Naimark explored the occupation in his book Russians in Berlin. He argues that Russians raped out of anger and frustration, to get revenge for their lost family members and to punish the Germans for believing their race was superior (1995). As a result of the occupation and rape, many women contracted sexually transmitted diseases, depression, unwanted pregnancies and/or committed suicide.

The Japanese are responsible for another infamous example of sexual violence during WWII. In December 1937 the Japanese Imperial Army entered Nanking and began an eight-week occupation known as “The Rape of Nanking”, during which soldiers raped and killed between 20,000 and 80,000 women (Wood, 2006). Additionally from 1931 to 1945 the military organized a widespread system of brothels for its soldiers. Women in these brothels were sexual
and domestic slaves. These so-called “comfort women” were raped, sometimes dozens of times a day, surgically sterilized to avoid pregnancy and had their breasts removed. The military captured approximately 200,000 women from Korea, China, Indonesia and the Philippines (Hynes, 2004). The women were mostly between the ages of 14 and 18. The Japanese thought by using younger women they would increase the chance of virginity thus limiting the spread of venereal diseases (Barkan, 2000). The motivation behind the system was twofold: to provide a necessary sexual outlet for soldiers and to discourage the rape of women from areas of occupation, thus maintaining more positive relations with local populations (Harrington, 2010). At the end of the war, most of these women had either been killed or forced to commit suicide.

Recent wars in Africa have exhibited virtually all forms of sexual violence but the most common one is rape. The Secretary-General (2006) reported that the wars in the Sudan, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Uganda and Rwanda all experienced high incidences of rape (Ward & Marsh, 2006). In Sierra Leone between 1991 and 2002 and Liberia between 1989 and 2003, 50% of all women may have suffered sexual violence (Bellamy & Williams, 2010). In the Rwandan civil war scholars estimate there were 250,000 to 500,000 rapes (Sharlach, 1999).

War, conflict and genocide can create extremely dangerous situations for women and children, as was evident throughout history and a number of recent conflicts. During war the motivations, opportunity and incentive to commit sexual violence can increase and post-conflict it can become normalized into a community. Although sexual violence can become more common in war, the prevalence of sexual violence varies with each conflict. Fortunately, the international community started to deal with this issue in the mid twentieth century with the gradual creation of human rights, women’s rights and finally anti-sexual violence policy.

21 By 2000 approximately 67% of Rwandan rape survivors had contracted HIV/AIDs (Ward & Marsh, 2006). Also, the wide range of this estimate shows one of the most hindering deficiencies to this research: the lack of statistical data, which I will discuss in my Conclusion.
Chapter Three – Sexual Violence in International Policy

The international community began acknowledging the issue of sexual violence in conflict in the latter half of the previous century. This was in part due to increasing attention, research and discovery relating to human rights, sexual violence and gender equality. It was also the result of continued and very public atrocities against women and children during conflict and the increasing influence of feminist movements on the international stage. This chapter tracks the development of international anti-sexual violence policy starting with the establishment of the United Nations. The UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights reframed the idea of human rights as an issue for the international community. Gradually, the international community learnt to consider sexual violence as a violation of human rights and of women’s rights in particular. Sexual violence also gained recognition as an aspect of a woman’s experience of war and, with the verdicts of the International Criminal Tribunals of Yugoslavia and Rwanda in addition to the establishment of the Rome Statute, a war crime and a crime against humanity. In 2000 the UN launched its revamped gender reform when the Security Council adopted Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security. Resolution 1325 set goals for UN peacekeeping missions. I will discuss the implementation of these goals in Chapter Six.

A. Human Rights

Prior to World War II, the central foci of international relations were collective security and the sanctity of state sovereignty. State and intergovernmental agencies operated under a policy of nonintervention in order to preserve respect for every state’s autonomy within its borders until one nation acted too aggressively against another (Donnelly, 2007). The

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Nonintervention is the international policy that regulated the practices of the League of Nations and the United Nations is in first days. This policy obliges that states and organizations do not intervene in matters that are within the international or domestic jurisdiction of a sovereign state (Mingst & Karns, 2007).
international community considered human rights as an issue of internal or domestic politics until the Holocaust. Barkan argues that after WWII “a new moral space in the world” appeared and filled with the international community’s overwhelming guilt and newfound empathy for the suffering of individuals. Although the League of Nations was operational, the international community wanted a new and more effective international forum. On June 26, 1945 fifty nations established the United Nations with the adoption of the UN Charter in San Francisco. The international community’s new morality is evident in the first lines of the UN Charter:

We the Peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind…hereby establish an international organization to be known as the United Nations. (1945)

The Charter effectively framed human rights as a priority for the international community. Article I of the Charter outlines the Purposes of the UN which include maintaining international peace and security, fostering friendly relationships between nations, encouraging cooperation in problem solving and respect for universal freedoms and human rights and facilitating the work of the Member States towards these goals. The Charter further designates in Article 56, albeit vaguely, that each nation is responsible for the “joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization” in achieving the “universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion” set out in Article 55(c) (1945). This laid the foundation for international human rights law and the idea that the UN should lead the world in the protection, enforcement and governance of human rights (Buergenthal, 1997).

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23 The League of Nations (1919-1947) was the predecessor of the UN that was founded by the Treaty of Versailles and at its peak had 58 members. It received massive critique for being an ineffective forum for international diplomacy and unable to prevent WWII (Mingst & Karns, 2007).
The UN continued leading the development of human rights law with the General Assembly’s adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. This non-binding resolution carefully described all of the human rights granted to each individual and, more importantly, it specified how and why each nation was obliged to protect those rights (Buergenthal, 1997). Although this was a step in the right direction, some, like Ambassador Kamal, have criticized this Declaration for not being “universal” because only a small group of nations participated in Declaration negotiations and determined what was to be considered a human right (2008). Discussion and criticism over human rights continued in the 1950s and 1960s, a period of massive decolonization of African and Asian states and significant growth of UN membership. These discussions showed that there were serious disagreements over which human rights were more important. Developing countries emphasized the importance of economic rights like the Right to development, food and migration while the Western nations emphasized political rights like the Right to vote and assemble (Kamal, 2008). This debate manifested in the development of two separate but related human rights covenants in 1966 – the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. These two covenants and the Universal Declaration are collectively known as the International Bill of Human Rights (Donnelly, 2007).

The previous policy developments created a foundation for international human rights norms; however, neither the UN nor any other body has the authority to ensure and enforce their protection. In order to monitor the global status of human rights, the UN created the Human Rights Committee (HRC) in 1976. Many human rights and feminists activists followed suit and established a collection of NGOs. Human rights NGOs are private political organizations that

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24 Some include the rights to life, education, public hearings for crimes, to be innocent until proven guilty and the freedoms to own property, of thought, of expression and of movement (UN, 1948).
advocate for victims, research and publicize human rights violations and lobby for political
development (Donnelly, 2007). Some of the most well known NGOs include Amnesty
International (AI), Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Refugees International (RI).

Both NGOs and the UN were highly influenced by the western and global feminist
movements. First wave feminists were primarily from the western nations of United States,
Canada and the United Kingdom. Some of the more notable figures include Susan B. Anthony,
Sojourner Truth and Virginia Woolf. These feminists were active during the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries and their main focus was the eradication of state-mandated sex
discrimination, namely through gaining women the right to vote. As this first group of feminists
transitioned onto the international stage, they brought their “First world”, imperialistic biases,
racism and classism with them. As a result, in the 1970s feminist activists created a new
movement that was more culturally sensitive and global in scope.

Second wave feminists, like Catharine MacKinnon, Cynthia Enloe and Sandra
Whitworth, are researchers, politicians and advocates who seek to establish gender as a central
category of analysis in the discussions of foreign policy, security and global political economy
(True, 2002). This generation of feminism works “within a new, increasingly inter and multi-
disciplinary IR [international relations] field” (True, 2002). The second generation marked the
feminists’ response and adaptation to globalization. They recognized the need to include the
“Third World” in international relations and broadened the their focus. At the micro level they
included the concerns of women in less developed countries, such as the sexual autonomy and
education, and at the macro level by evaluating the ways laws, alliances, governments,
organizations and global power relations all affect women (True, 2002). These feminists fueled
the growing international discourse of empathy and human security. They also stressed the need
for the world, particularly the UN, to acknowledge the legitimacy and importance of every individual regardless of their power in society.

Human rights and feminists NGOs had considerable influence on international relations and the UN. These organizations pushed the international community to recognize that human rights were established as *men’s rights* and that is was critical to incorporate women’s rights in the discussion. As Karen Garner explains, these organizations were essential in,

Establishing the empowerment and advancement of women as a focal point within the system of the UN and in connecting broad intergovernmental initiatives promoting peace and conflict resolution, economic and social development, and democracy and human rights to women’s roles and status in society. (2010)

In the following section I will show just how the UN incorporated the empowerment and advancement of women into the organization and its activities.

**B. Growing Recognition of Violence Against Women**

The UN first acknowledged the danger that war imposed on women in 1949 when it adopted the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in time of War. Then in 1974, the UN created the Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Armed Conflict. Both addressed several forms of sexual violence, including rape, forced prostitution and indecent assault, but they framed these as attacks on the honor of a women (Farwell, 2004). This reflects the male-centric understanding of sexual violence. Patriarchal systems measured a woman’s value on her *honor*, which usually meant her virginity if she was unmarried and her chastity if she was. Thus, one of the main goals of second wave feminists was to reframe sexual violence as physical violence and torture, which are both human rights violations. They succeeded with the passage of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms
of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which is internationally regarded as the women’s bill of rights. This convention explains how discrimination against women violates human rights and that states must try to prevent this from happening. According to CEDAW, discrimination against women is:

Any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field. (1979)

In 1982 the UN established the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, which was a treaty body responsible for monitoring the implementation of CEDAW. CEDAW also assigned the responsibility to protection of women’s legal rights onto the international community, particularly the UN. This treaty created a legal framework for the standard of women’s rights as human rights. In line with feminist jurisprudence, this treaty called attention to the position of women in international law and demanded greater gender equality.

C. Growing Recognition of Sexual Violence

The 1990s witnessed both significant political developments and continued atrocities related to sexual violence. On the one hand there was a large increase of attention and research going into the subject of sexual violence. Many scholars and feminist advocates, like Rebecca Cook and Alicia Yamin, evaluated the ways that sexual violence hinders a woman’s right to reproductive health, which is defined as the absence of disorders but also as a state of physical,

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25 The establishment of CEDAW was one of the biggest successes of the United Nations Decade for Women, which formally started in 1975. The goals for this decade were to establish greater quality, development and peace within the international political push of women’s rights.
mental and social well-being (Cook, 1993; Yamin, 1996). This definition allows reproductive health to be framed in terms of empowerment, which allows a woman to experience health through a sense of control over her physical and psychological well being, her sense of dignity, her power within society and her ability to seek treatment (Yamin 1996). B. Rojnik explains how a reproductive health is a reflection of a woman’s cultural and economic value to her society (1995). These definitions expanded women’s health from a medical concept to a more inclusive social, political and economic concept.

Two additional anti-sexual violence policy developments came with the judicial proceedings following the wars in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. In 1993 the United Nations Security Council held the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), the first international war crimes tribunal since Nuremberg. The ICTY ruled that Serb troops used sexual violence as a tool of genocide against 20,000 to 50,000 Bosnian, Croat and Muslim women because they intended to disrupt the community’s ability to reproduce by contaminating the women and forcing them to birth children fathered by Serbs (Harrington, 2010; Secretary-General, 2006). The ICTY declared that the sexual violence practices of the Serbian forces were crimes against humanity. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was held in 1994 and this tribunal also found that the massive rape of Tutsi women by Hutu militants constituted genocide. Combined, the ICTY and the ICTR transformed the Nuremberg from an isolated incident into a precedent of international justice (Donnelly, 2007). The ICTY and ICTR put legal and punishable boundaries on what unacceptable sexual behaviors by declaring wartime sexual violence a crime against humanity, an act of genocide and a war crime. These tribunals also enhanced the international community’s role in directly prosecuting perpetrators of sexual

26 The Nuremberg Trials were a series of military tribunals held by the Allied Powers from 1945 to 1946 that tried dozens Nazi Germany leaders. This was one of the first international war trials in history (Donnelly, 2007).
violence, showing a greater dedication to protecting women’s rights and a willingness to use the legal process to do so (Farwell, 2004; Secretary-General, 2006; Ward & Vann, 2002).

Following the landmark duo of international criminal tribunals was the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing and the resulting adoption of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action by the 189 participating countries. The Beijing Declaration declared that violence against women, particularly trafficking, prostitution and sexual violence, were violations of women’s rights and barriers to their human rights (Secretary-General, 2006). Then in 1998 the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court (ICC) ruled that rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization and other acts of sexual violence were both war crimes and crimes against humanity (HRW, 2002; Secretary-General, 2006). The ICC provided the first permanent international judicial body with the power to prosecute individual who violated human and collective security.

Jacqui True explains that the global feminist movement was one of the most influential parties throughout the development of the body of anti-sexual violence policy. The global feminist approach to international relations examines “how gender is constructed at the global level in diplomatic practices and through the diffusion of institutional norms and regulations.” (True, 2002) The UN provides global feminists with a space to challenge gender inequalities and discrimination against women, in addition to asking that male-dominated governing bodies recognize the subordinate status of women in their nations (Garner, 2010). The UN has helped global and second wave feminists define “global women’s issues” starting with the reframing of

27 The four crimes the ICC has jurisdiction over include crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression (Donnelly 2007).
28 The International Court of Justice of the UN was established in 1945 but only had the compulsory power over cases between states. The international criminal tribunals of Nuremberg, Yugoslavia and Rwanda were ad hoc and temporary mechanisms with which individuals were prosecuted for egregious crimes (Donnelly 2007).
women’s rights as human rights (Garner, 2010). More recently introduced topics include honor killing and female genital mutilation. With the influence of global feminists and the burgeoning body of anti-sexual violence policy, the international stage was set at the turn of the century for the UN to make its most impressive stance on women’s rights to date.

D. United Nations and the Road following Resolution 1325

On October 31, 2000 the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. This resolution and its eighteen recommendations created a new framework for how UN and Member States approach the roles and concerns of women in conflict (Secretary-General, 2006). Resolution 1325 recognized the different experiences that males and females have during conflict and specifically acknowledged the risk of females suffering from sexual violence. The resolution described how women and children in conflict environments suffer from sexual and gender-based violence and from being excluded from decision-making processes (Security Council, 2000). This resolution also established the cornerstone of UN reform efforts today – gender mainstreaming.

The UN describes gender mainstreaming as a strategy for achieving gender equality or the equal and human rights, responsibilities and opportunities for women and men (OSAGI 2010). In addition to considering gender in all UN activities, there is to be more gender balancing throughout the UN, meaning that more women are represented and appointed, but particularly in peacekeeping operations. Resolution 1325 mandated that peacekeeping operations include more women in field and military operations, establish further procedures to protect women from sexual and gender-based violence, such as gender units, and for more effective training of the DPKO personnel to limit the misconduct by peacekeepers, specifically SEA (Security Council,

See Appendix 1 for the full text of Resolution 1325.
2000). Finally, peacekeeping operations are to provide more opportunities for women to participate in peace and reconstruction processes (Whitworth, 2004).

In June 2008 the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1820, signaling the international community’s greater recognition that sexual violence in war is a direct threat to international peace and security (Kelly, 2010). The MONUSCO website explains that this resolution is one of the most relevant and recent policies that assists in “the development of a strategic framework for the promotion of women’s contribution to peace and security and addressing gender-based violence.” (2010) With regards to gender-based violence, Resolution 1820 “Demands the immediate and complete cessation by all parties to armed conflict of all acts of sexual violence against civilians with immediate effect.” (Security Council, 2008) The resolution further encourages all involved parties (troop contributing countries, host-countries and the UN) to demonstrate a heightened awareness towards the issues of sexual violence and that work together in the effort to protect civilians. It also directly addressed the issue of peacekeepers committing sexual violence and how the UN must strengthen its zero tolerance policies and that troop contributing countries (TCCs) take more responsibility for educating their troops about gender and for punishing those that are caught in sexually exploitative behaviors.

As directed by Resolution 1820, the Secretary-General released his first report on the status of the implementation of the resolution in July 2009. This report recognizes the many significant challenges that impede the implementation of the resolution, including the dangerous regional conditions in the DRC and the difficulties in statistics gathering specifically that many victims die before reporting their attack (MONUSCO, 2011a). Then in September of 2009 the Security Council adopted Resolution 1888 as a compliment to Resolution 1325. Resolution 1888

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30 See Appendix 2 for the complete text of Resolution 1820 that was co-sponsored by thirty-six member states.
reiterates the call for zero tolerance, effective punishments for perpetrators, greater educational and financial support for women and women’s organizations and gender balancing in peacekeeping operations (Security Council, 2009). It also suggests that the UN adopt institutional mechanisms to improve coordination and gender equality throughout the organization. Combined with its predecessor, Resolution 1888 strengthens the strategic framework that the UN and members states take to address the widespread sexual violence (Security Council, 2009).

The development of anti-sexual violence policy was the culmination of years of effort from multiple fronts including policy development advocacy on behalf of human rights, human security and women’s rights, pressure from feminist movements, and the establishment of international criminal justice mechanisms. The UN has been at the forefront of international anti-sexual violence policy and the Security Council has increasingly addressed how dangerous sexual violence can be in war and at the hands of UN personnel, as was demonstrated by Resolutions 1325 and 1820. In the following chapter I turn from the policy development at the UN to its peacekeeping practices and in Chapter Six I will address the effectiveness of the gender reform throughout the UN and in the DRC.
Chapter Four: Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping is one of its primary tools the UN uses to protect human rights, human security and collective security. Yet, the term peacekeeping is not actually defined in the UN Charter. The practice of peacekeeping existed before the UN but the frequent application of UN missions following the Cold War has made it a routine form of intervention we see today. Peacekeeping is a constantly changing, growing and challenging practice. It requires huge amounts of financial, logistical and personnel support from Member States and the UN system. A peacekeeper’s role varies according to the mission. However, an underlying responsibility is that a peacekeeper does not worsen the difficult situations to which they are deployed. In recent years the UN has increased prohibitions against peacekeepers engaging in SEA. Unfortunately it appears that sexual exploitation has long been a characteristic of peacekeeping operations and remains a characteristic today, especially in the DRC, which I will show in Chapter Eight.

A. The Development of Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping is an umbrella term that describes a collection of interventions. Peacekeeping operations vary according to the intervening parties, the reasons for intervention, the methods used to intervene and whether they are initiated on a unilateral or bilateral fashion (Bellamy & Williams, 2010). In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries many countries and governmental organizations sent peacekeeping missions to various regions that operated independently of the UN.  

It is important to note that the term peacekeeping does not appear in the UN Charter. The Charter did specify the international community’s joint responsibility to protect human rights and the Security Council role as a leader in this effort. The Charter also provided the grounds for interventions in Chapters VI and VII. Chapter VI discusses the peaceful investigation, settlement and resolution of disputes. Chapter VII gives the Security Council the authority to declare a party an aggressor and to commit Member States to take enforcement measures against aggressors like economic sanctions and the deployment of an international coalition of military forces (Mingst & Karns, 2007). The Security Council rarely used its authority under Chapter VII prior to the Cold War; however, with a greater dedication to protect human rights and security, it has taken much more liberty with applying its Chapter VII power and activating the UN’s global governance capabilities. Many recently authorized missions, including those deployed to the DRC, have been permitted to use more forceful measures to ensure the fulfillment of their mandates.

According to Paul Diehl, Daniel Druckman and James Wall there are two generations of peacekeeping and there is a strict difference between the two (1998). First generation or traditional missions focused on establishing ceasefires and preventing war. Although UN field operations have been operating under a “largely unwritten body of principles,” (DPKO, 2008) first generation missions followed three unofficial principles: that parties or host nations must consent to the deployment and presence of a mission, that peacekeepers and the UN remain impartial with regards to the fighting parties and that personnel never use force except in instances of self-protection. Traditional peacekeeping operations were sent in the middle of war zones to maintain fragile peace treaties. Examples of first generation operations are the United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM) in the mid 1960s and United Nations

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32 There is substantial debate in the literature on peacekeeping regarding the generations or distinctions between missions. I use the perspectives of Diehl, Druckman and Wall because UN documents like the Capstone Doctrine discuss a two-generational growth within peacekeeping operations.
Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) which was established during the Iran-Iraq War in the late 1980s (DPKO, 2011). Although first generation missions were useful during interstate conflicts, they were not sufficiently responding to the changing nature of international conflict. In light of the failure of UNAMIR in the Rwandan genocide, the international community began to support a more Chapter VII authorizations and well-armed operations.  

The second generation of peacekeeping operations formed in response to the new wars of the post-Cold War era. These missions aim to provide a much more diversified and comprehensive form of intervention with multifaceted and case-specific mandates that often include components focused on to human rights, economic development and nation building (Diehl, Druckman & Wall, 1998). For example, the UN missions deployed to Haiti over the last twenty years have dealt with observing elections, stabilizing the political transition following the 1991 coup, negotiating peace between fighting factions and assisting civilians following the 2010 earthquake (DPKO, 2011).

Bellamy and Williams explain that in addition to the three traditional peacekeeping principles (consent of parties, impartiality, no use of force), second generation operations are highly influenced by current ideas in international relations. These include that the great powers have a unique role in maintaining international peace and security, the international community should protect collective security and that humanitarian issues be a global priority (Bellamy & Williams, 2010; DAW, 1995). The precedent for humanitarian interventions has quickly grown, which according to Donnelly “reflects not only the growing spread and deepening penetration of

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33 The UN deemed UNAMIR a failure because the UN personnel were not able to curb the genocide and literally stood by and watched the massacre of thousands of people (Dallaire, 2003).
international human rights norms but also new post-cold war conceptions of security.” (2007, Mingst & Karns, 2007) The conception of security that Donnelly is referring to is human security, which “incorporates human rights, development, international security, and the environment.” (Mingst & Karns, 2007) These missions also promote greater economic equality, sustainable development and more respect for human rights (Mingst & Karns, 2007).

In 2000 UN peacekeeping entered yet another era in its development with the release of the Brahimi Report, which was the first comprehensive review of peacekeeping operations.35 The report provided many recommendations to the Security Council and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), one of which was the need to reform relationships between DPKO and UN member bodies, field missions and Member States (Bellamy & Williams, 2010). Greater attention to the inter-organizational relationships was necessary because of the vast growth of peacekeeping and the highly complicated process through which missions are approved and supported.

The UN has gradually increased the frequency, size and mandates of peacekeeping operations. In terms of frequency, the DPKO initiated 46 of its overall total 64 missions in just the last twenty years. In terms of size, the numbers of total troops continues to rise each year. For example, from 2008 to 2009 the number of peacekeeping troops increased from under 30,000 to 80,000 (Bellamy & Williams, 2010). In response to the increasing use and size of peacekeeping missions, the Security Council has created more complex and demanding mandates. These mandates tend to expand even further once troops are deployed, a phenomenon known as mission creep (Bellamy & Williams, 2010). For example, if a mission is deployed initially with a mandate to assist in negotiations and once deployed the missions helps distribute

35 This report is named after the former Algerian Foreign Minister Lakhtar Brahimi who led the expert panel in creating recommendations for UN peacekeeping.
humanitarian aid even though they are not mandated by the Security Council to do so, this is called mission creep. Mission creep can put significantly more pressure and responsibility on peacekeeping operations, which tend to already struggle with spreading attention, personnel and resources too thin.

In 2008 the DPKO released the Capstone Doctrine, which highlighted the sixty years of peacekeeping missions and clarified the purposes and types of UN operations. The Capstone Doctrine explained that peacekeeping is one of the five tools the UN can use to establish peace and security (DPKO, 2008). The first is *conflict prevention*, which uses diplomatic measures to prevent the outbreak of fighting. Once fighting has begun the UN can then use diplomatic measures to encourage the fighting parties to negotiate, which is called *peacemaking*. If diplomacy fails, the UN can then use *peacekeeping*, which involves a combined deployment of military, policy and civilian personnel to create the foundation for negotiations and hopefully peace. If even more aggressive action is needed, the UN will use its *peace enforcement* capability and send the military to impose the will of the UN. The final tool at the disposal of the UN is *peacebuilding*, which includes a variety of measures directed to reduce the risk of fighting and failed negotiations (Bellamy & Williams, 2010). Thus peacekeeping is one of the more aggressive measures the UN can take to create an environment with the potential for peace.\(^{36}\) Although the Security Council mandated the missions in the DRC to be highly staffed and aggressive peacekeeping operations, the foundations of peace are still very delicate and rare.

\(^{36}\) Conflict prevention and peacemaking include primarily diplomatic efforts of the UN, peace enforcement is the use of military to enforce the decisions of the Security Council and peace enforcement describes diplomatic efforts to encourage negotiations between fighting parties and peacebuilding includes a variety of efforts which aim to prevent future conflict (Bellamy & Williams, 2010).
B. Peacekeeping in Action

Each peacekeeping mission is built from the ground up since the UN does not have a permanent army. The power to authorize peacekeeping missions lies with the fifteen members of the Security Council. If at least nine members support a mission and none of the five permanent members exercises veto power, a mission is authorized. The Security Council then provides each mission with a mandate that explains the purposes, responsibilities and expectations of that mission (Whitworth, 2004).

Once a mission is authorized and assigned a mandate, the Secretary-General then appoints a Force Commander and a Special Representative to the Secretary-General (SRSG) who runs the mission. The UN provides high level military personnel including senior military officers, staff officers and military observers, but Member States are requested to provide most of the support for peacekeeping missions. Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) and Police Contributing Countries (PCCs) provide all kinds of personnel, logistical and financial support for missions. Peacekeeping is now one of the largest spending areas of the UN and it has shown dramatic and continuous growth.\(^\text{37}\) For example, in 1986, the expenditures on peacekeeping were US$242 millions and by 2004, the total expenditures increased to US$3,345 millions (Mingst & Karns, 2007). The use of peacekeeping measures is likely to continue to grow and influence the regions of deployment for many years. It is thus extremely important that the UN constantly evaluates and recognizes the positive and negative effects of its peacekeeping practices to ensure they are as effective as possible.

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations controls the actual implementation and direction of a peacekeeping mission. In addition to the main office, the DPKO has several sub-

\(^{37}\) From 1948 until 2008 the UN spent US$54 billion on peacekeeping operations (Bellamy & Williams, 2010).
offices including an Office of Planning and Support, a Field Missions Procurement Section, a Situation Room and a Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit. The DPKO frequently reports to the Secretary-General, Security Council and General Assembly. It also works closely with other UN entities such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Program (WFP) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (Bellamy & Williams, 2010). DPKO also coordinates efforts with international and local NGOs while on the ground. Bellamy & Williams argue that part of the reason peacekeeping missions rarely run smoothly is a result of the vast amount of coordination and parties involved in operations (2010).

**C. Who are United Nations Peacekeepers?**

Peacekeeping operations cover a range of activities and can have up to five different kinds of personnel, all of which follow different rules and procedures. This thesis focuses on members of the national military contingents that are volunteered by their home countries to serve for the armed forces of the UN. Of the 192 Member States of the UN, 132 are TCCs and have provided over one million peacekeeping troops throughout the organization’s history (Bellamy & Williams, 2010). These troops have served in sixty-eight missions, fifteen of which are ongoing (DPKO, 2011). Since the end of the Cold War, troops have increasingly come from the smaller or middle powers of the world. These TCCs are often motivated by desires for financial gain, the opportunity for their soldiers to receive training and preparation for combat and recognition as a legitimate military force from the global community (Whitworth, 2004). In recent years, developing nations like India, Pakistan, Nigeria, Ethiopia and Bangladesh have provided more and more peacekeepers (Bellamy & Williams, 2010). The involvement of these

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38 The five categories include UN staff, UN civilian police and military observers, members of national military contingents, UN volunteers and individual contractors (Zeid, 2005).
smaller nations shows that the western and modernized nations do not hold the monopoly over global governance that they did prior to the Cold War. The enforcement of international norms and policies has now become a shared responsibility throughout the international community.

Each peacekeeper operates according to the terms negotiated between its home country and the UN. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the UN and the TCC negotiates the terms of a peacekeepers involvement in a mission. The MOU explains that peacekeepers are immune from being prosecuted by the UN or the host country; however, the TCC is expected to prosecute its own nationals should they commit a crime (Kent, 2007). If a peacekeeper commits or is accused of committing a crime, the only course of action the UN can do is to repatriate the peacekeeper to their nation of origin. From that point on, the TCC controls any investigations, criminal proceedings and prosecutions. Yet, TCCs do not have to move forward with such measures and as a result, many peacekeepers go unpunished (Kent, 2007). TCCs may not be willing to prosecute their own nationals, they may not consider what their nationals did a crime or they may not have the logistical capabilities to conduct an investigation in a foreign country. This can have serious effects on the situation of sexual violence within the host countries of operations, particularly if personnel are committing SEA, mainly because it adds to an environment of impunity among UN personnel.

Peacekeepers have a very “dangerous, demanding and exceptional” job and they are deployed to some of the most dangerous and unstable countries (Zeid, 2005). Troops of modern day missions must also negotiate with high levels of conflict and violence although missions are sent not only in the middle of wars but also to a variety of unstable and dangerous situations. Whitworth explains that peacekeepers must frequently operate in states whose government and economic institutions have failed, like Haiti and Sudan, where there is frequent fighting along
ethnic, racial, religious, social, cultural and linguistic lines (2004). In addition to the physical danger and demanding work, Whitworth also explains the personal and emotion hardships peacekeepers can experience while deployed: they are separated from their families and home countries; they can face shame from their own militaries; suffer from depression and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD); and addictions to drugs and alcohol (2004). Although these hardships do not excuse peacekeepers for their misconduct, it is important to recognize the potentially motivating factors behind misconduct. This will allow for more realistic expectations and deterrence policies on behalf of the UK and the DPKO.

On missions, peacekeepers are identifiable and known as “blue helmets” (Dallaire, 2003; Csáky, 2008). The helmet is a symbol that a peacekeeper is not a soldiers in the traditional sense, whose objective is to kill and win, but rather that they are a “warrior-prince-of-peace.” (Whitworth, 2004) Whitworth explains that peacekeepers are supposed to be “benign, altruistic, neutral, and capable of conflict resolution in any cultural setting.” (2004) The contradictory role of a peacekeeper can lead to confusion and misconduct among personnel, which I will discuss more in depth in Chapter Seven. The UN recognizes the unique non-militaristic responsibilities of these troops in its training materials. DPKO trains peacekeepers to always respect the environment, customs and populations of the host country, be aware of social and religious issues in that country and to help the sick and weak (DPKO, 2003a). Peacekeepers are also prohibited from abusing their position, getting involved with illegal activities or doing something that could harm the local population or the mission.

In addition to all the previous expectations mentioned, the UN has also established a number of policies that prohibit peacekeepers from engaging in sexual relations with minors, sexual exploitation and sexual abuse. The Secretary-General established a zero tolerance policy
that prohibits sexual and/or consensual relationships between UN personnel and locals because these relationships are “based on inherently unequal power dynamics.” (2003)\(^{39}\) The DPKO trains peacekeepers that they are not to “become involved in sexual liaisons which could affect our impartiality, or the well-being of others.” (DPKO, 2003a) These peacekeepers are also expected to uphold Resolutions 1325, 1820 and 1888 to the best of their abilities.

United Nations peacekeeping has developed from a relatively rare form of intervention based solely on state security into one of the primary tools used by the international community used to address a variety of state security, collective security and human security issues. It involves coordination from Member States, particularly TCCs, local and international organizations and a multitude of UN entities. Peacekeepers have a very challenging job and must fulfill wide mandates ranging from peace negotiations and rebuilding to the monitoring of elections and providing of humanitarian aid. As representatives of the UN, peacekeepers are also held to very high standards of behavior and are directed to never harm the local community and the credibility of the operation. Despite these expectations, peacekeeping has had and continues to have negative unintended consequences on host communities. One of consequences is a cycle of sexual abuse and exploitation, a consequence observed within the missions to the DRC.

\(^{39}\) The Letter from the Secretary General to the President of the Security Council reads, “The basic policy is clear: zero tolerance of sexual exploitation and abuse of any kind.” (Secretary-General, 2005)
Chapter Five – The Democratic Republic of Congo

The ongoing conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo provides a unique opportunity to evaluate the impact of UN peacekeepers on sexual violence. Before analyzing that impact, it is necessary to have an understanding of the country, its conflict and the sexual violence that has accompanied the conflict. It is also necessary to have an understanding the purposes, demographics and activities of the two peacekeeping missions that the UN deployed to the conflict, which I discuss in the second part of this Chapter. The United Nations Organization Mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) lasted from 1999 to July 2010 and was replaced by the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo (MUNOSCO), which is currently ongoing.

A. The Country and its Conflict

Country Profile

The DRC is a large central African country, roughly the size of Western Europe, that shares borders with Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Rwanda, Sudan, the United Republic of Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia (as shown in Figure 1). Many of its borders, particularly those on the eastern side, are highly porous and this had allowed for a large degree of migration and travel between countries. The borders have also allowed refugees from within and outside of the DRC to escape from the various conflicts and violence that has plagued the Sub-Saharan region. The eastern portions of the country, particularly North and South Kivu, are where most of the fighting, natural resource exploitation and sexual violence take place. It is also the region where the UN focuses a majority of its efforts.
The DRC houses 68 million people of 250 different ethnic groups. The official language of the nation is French, but there are several native languages represented, including Lingala, Swahili, Kikongo and Tshiluba. The majority of the population is Christian, with 50% Catholic and 20% Protestant. The remaining population practices Dimbanguist, Muslim or aboriginal forms of religion. The lifestyle for most people is hard and many are severely impoverished despite the nation’s richness in natural resources. The land offers large variety and quantity of natural resources including copper, cobalt, diamonds, gold and petroleum. Both the diversity of ethnic groups and natural resources has fueled the decade long war that continues today.

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The per capita GDP for a Congolese citizen in 2009 was only US$171 dollars whereas in the United States the per capita GDP is $47,400 (Bureau of African Affairs, 2010).
The War

The DRC has a turbulent history that is characterized by violence and political turmoil. As a Belgium colony from the early twentieth century until the 1960s, its struggle for independence was particularly destabilizing, as the regions throughout the country ended up fighting one another for power (BBC, 2010b). In 1965 Joseph Mobutu took power and re-named the nation to Zaire. Mobutu’s rule became increasingly desperate and volatile as he took advantage of the country’s resources for his own personal gain and as assurance that he would retain power. His poor leadership, the shaky central government and the 1994 Rwandan genocide proved to be a deadly combination. Many Tutsi fled to the DRC to escape the Hutu and the genocide. Roughly two million Hutu militants followed these refugees into the DRC through its eastern borders. These militants, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), quickly offered their support for Mobutu’s failing regime to win his support and continue their genocide campaign. The nation succumbed to war in 1996 as Tutsi combatants fought back against the Hutu and the Congolese government force with the support of Ugandan groups and eventually overthrew Mobutu. In his place they established Laurent Kabila as President who renamed the country to the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 1997 (BBC, 2010b).

Despite the new leadership, the Hutu militia remained in the DRC and carried on killing. In order to protect his position President Kabila reached to his allies in Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola, and in 1998 war broke out for a second successive time. Troops from the three allied nations joined the fray with Congolese, Rwandan and Ugandan combatants. By 1999 the Rwandan and Ugandan combatants had seized control of many provinces in the DRC and this that led to a spike in opposition and pressure from the international community. Succumbing to this pressure, several parties participated in the 1999 negotiations that resulted in the Lusaka
Peace Agreement. This agreement established a ceasefire and timelines for the withdrawal of combatants from five foreign countries involved in the conflict (MONUSCO, 2011a). The ceasefire was broken almost immediately but some troops had already begun to withdraw. As the involved parties finalized Lusaka in 2001, President Laurent-Désiré Kabila was assassinated. Joseph Kabila, his son and the previous commander in chief of ground forces, succeeded him and remains the country’s president today. By 2002 troops from Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe had withdrawn from the DRC, however, the Rwandan and Ugandan troops remained. In 2002, South Africa hosted Rwandan-DRC peace talks, which resulted in the Preoria Accords. Later on that year, Rwandan troops officially withdrew from the DRC, and the following year the remaining Uganda troops withdrew as well (Bureau of African Affairs, 2010).

One reason the conflict has been so difficult to resolve is the number of fighting factions. In 2004 Amnesty International (AI) reported there were around twenty armed groups fighting in the DRC and in 2009 Alan Doss reported that number was closer to fifty. Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported on the backgrounds behind several of the most prominent and dangerous groups, which vary according to their countries of origin, who supports them and the reasons for their involvement. HRW reported that the three groups that are known for their propensity to rape are the FDLR, the FARDC and the Mai Mai. The FDLR still have a large presence in the DRC despite the official withdrawal of Rwandan troops and they have been one of the longest

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41 The main players in these talks were the DRC and Rwanda; however, Angola, Namibia, Uganda and Zimbabwe and two rebel groups also signed the Lusaka Agreement (Bellamy & Williams, 2010).
42 The Lusaka Accord was officially finalized in 2003.
43 HRW also provided information on the other eight parties of the conflict. Uganda supported three groups; the RCD-ML, the MLC and the FAPC. The RCD-ML are the Congolese Rally for Democracy-Kisadngani-Liberation Movement. The MLC is the Movement for the Liberation of Congo who has a powerful influence in the transitional government. Rwanda supported two other groups: The RDC-G, the LDF and the UPC. The RCD-G is the Congolese Rally for Democracy and they have a large role in the transitional government. The LDF, or Local Defense Forces, separated from the RCD-G and have since dissolved into other groups. The UPC is the Union of Congolese Patriots and compared to other groups is much smaller and they focus on promoting the interests of Hema, a small ethnic group from Ituri (HRW, 2005).
and most violent groups of perpetrators.\textsuperscript{44} The Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) is the newly developed national army and another of the most powerful players in the conflict.\textsuperscript{45} The Bureau of African Affairs reported in 2010 that the FARDC were responsible for 81\% of the cases of sexual violence in conflict areas and 24\% in non-conflict areas (2010). This is particularly disturbing because the FARDC is the government military and as such as they receive a significant amount of attention, training and logistical support from the UN. The third group of frequent perpetrators is the Mai Mai, a loosely connected Congolese force with a vague purpose to oppose what they view as foreign occupation.\textsuperscript{46}

On top of the numerous fighting factions another reason the conflict has lasted so long is because the DRC holds numerous valuable natural resources. All of the previously mentioned groups, in addition to smaller rebel gangs and profiteers, have been accused of exploiting the situation and even using the war as a cover in order to illegally extract these resources (BBC, 2010b). Armed groups, especially the FDLR, use the extracted minerals to fund their fighting and looting activities and even the governments of Rwanda and the DRC have been accused of supporting the exploitation (Bureau of African Affairs, 2010).

Although the conflict continues today, in 2008, fighting factions again attempted to establish peace with the signing of an agreement between the DRC government and armed rebel groups in Goma (Security Council Reports, 2011). The war earned its name “Africa’s World

\textsuperscript{44} The FDLR are one of the most formidable groups with foreign support. This group contains former Rwandan refugees, members of the Rwandan army and other Hutu combatants that are rumored to have been involved in the 1994 genocide.

\textsuperscript{45} This army is comprised of President Kabila’s forces, which were formally known as the FAC or Congolese Armed Forces, and forces from several of the rebel groups that signed the Pretoria Agreement in 2002. The leadership of the FARDC originally transitioned in 2005 from the FAPC, which is the People’s Armed Force of Congo (HRW, 2002).

\textsuperscript{46} The Mai Mai does not have a centralized command and will fight almost any other group involved in the conflict and will perpetrate sexual violence indiscriminately (HRW, 2002). Another local force is the FDD, the Forces for the Defense of Democracy. This group used to have ties with the largest Burundian Hutu rebel group and the support of President Kabila (HRW, 2002).
“War” due to the number of nations involved, the duration of the fighting and vast numbers of fatalities – as of 2010 approximately 5.4 million people have died. The situation of refugees and IDPs has also been a massive consequence of the war. Congolese refugees, which number near 445,000, escaped into the eight neighboring nations but the DRC continues to host 175,000 refugees from seven of those countries (MONUSCO, 2011a). In July 2010, the Bureau of African Affairs found that there were 1.9 million Congolese IDPs, most of which are from North and South Kivu. Despite the precarious situation, President Kabila made it clear that he wants MONUSCO to withdraw by the end of 2011 (Dean, 2010).

**Sexual Violence in the DRC Civil War**

From 1998 to 2003 combatants used sexual violence as a weapon of war and systematically attacked civilians. Despite the official end of the war in 2003 and an additional peace agreement in 2008, sexual violence continues in the DRC. Militant and belligerent forces on all sides have committed sexual violence (HRW, 2002). In the beginning of the conflict the risk of victimization was greater if someone was related to a certain combatant group but the attacks gradually became indiscriminant, regardless of age and sex. The majority of victims have been adolescent girls and the HRW estimates that in 2009, 65% were children or persons less than 18 years of age (2009). HRW (2005) estimates that 10% of the victims were less than ten years of age and there have even been reports that combatants have attacked infants only a few months old and elderly women in their 70s (Ward & Marsh, 2006). As the fighting continued men and boys have also become increasingly targeted (BBC, 2010a).

Attacks can happen virtually anywhere. As I discussed in Chapter 2, conflicts have left the traditional battlefields and are increasingly being fought against civilians, particularly in villages and refugee camps. During an interview with Elisabeth Rehn and Ellen Sirleaf, a UN
official in Goma provided the following description of what the situation of sexual violence is like for women:

Women take a risk when they go out to the fields or on a road to a market. Any day they can be stripped naked, humiliated and raped in public. Many, many people no longer sleep at home, though sleeping in the bush is equally unsafe. Every night there is another village attacked, burned and emptied. It could be any group, no one knows, but always they take women and girls away. (Rehn & Sirleaf, 2002)

As this quotation alludes, women and communities have developed a number of strategies to decrease the risk of experiencing rape and sexual violence. Women in some areas don’t leave their houses after 6:00pm and don’t travel anywhere, even to the fields, unless they are in a group accompanied by men (McCrummen, 2010). Some women even wear extra layers of clothing in order to make the attack more difficult for a perpetrator (HRW, 2002). Despite these protective measures, women continue to be subjected to sexual violence in huge numbers.

One of the most disturbing characteristics of the sexual violence in the DRC is the level of brutality employed by combatant perpetrators. There have been many reports of combatants raping women with sticks, knives and bayonets (Kristof & WuDunn, 2010). Additionally, some perpetrators fire their guns into victim’s vagina or kill them. Many women are kidnapped and taken back to their perpetrator’s bases where they are held, sometimes for months and years, and used as sexual slaves and domestic servants in a similar way that the Japanese forces used comfort women in WWII.

A few researchers have tried to find what leads these perpetrators in the DRC to such violence. Ward and Marsh found that DRC combatants blamed their poverty. They claimed were not paid enough to be able to pay a woman for sex “so we have to make them obey us so we can
get what we want.” (2006) McCrummen also reported that soldiers were frustrated the poor treatment from the army and so attacked women out of anger (2010). The HRW did conclude that soldiers often live on meager incomes, around US$41 a month, and can lack food, water, adequate housing and proper medical care (2009). The HRW also reported that soldiers often turn to drugs and alcohol to deal with the trauma of their occupation. Although it is important to understand what makes soldiers motivated to participate in sexual violence, just as it is important to understand what may motivate peacekeepers to commit SEA, these conditions do not excuse or lessen the criminality of their actions.

Even with increased international attention and several attempts to establish peace, sexual violence continues to be a serious problem in the DRC. In an Oxfam and Harvard Humanitarian Initiative Report, researchers argued that the levels of violence have actually increased, reporting a “17-fold increased in attacks” between 2004 and 2008 (2010). In 2008, the UNFPA estimates that there were roughly 16,000 instances of sexual violence and in 2009, the UN estimates that in the province of South Kivu alone, 5,000 women were raped and that there were at least 8,300 rapes nationwide (UNFPA, 2008; HRW, 2009; Pflanz 2010; BBC, 2010a). Overall the UNFPA (2008) estimates that at least 200,000 Congolese women and girls have suffered sexual violence and MONUSCO estimates that 36 are victimized per day (2011). In light of these numbers, it is easier to understand why Margaret Wallstrom, the UN special representative on sexual violence in conflict, described the DRC as “the rape capital of the world.” (BBC, 2010c)

Sexual violence has been practiced for so long and to such a widespread degree that it has become a norm in Congolese Culture. The Harvard Humanitarian Initiative & Oxfam Report found that in 2004, civilians perpetrated only 1% of rapes but by 2008 the proportion of civilian-perpetrated rape rose to 38% (2010). The armed rapes are mostly concentrated in the east but
sexual and gender-based violence has now spread throughout of the country (Bureau of African Affairs, 2010). Dr. Margaret Agama is the UNFPA representative for the DRC and in 2008, she explained that “now sexual violence is unfortunately not only perpetrated by armed factions but also by ordinary people occupying positions of authority, neighbors, friends and family members.” (2008) A dangerous effect of this cultural norm of sexual violence is the spread of HIV/AIDS and other STDs due to a higher risk of genital injuries than consensual sex. In 2006, HRW estimated that 60% of the combatants in the DRC were HIV positive. Today, after several more years of fighting and violence in addition to the normalizing of violence, the rates of HIV positive Congolese have probably increased.

Another characteristic of the situation of sexual violence in the DRC are the small proportions of victims that seek medical attention and/or justice through the courts. An estimated 50% of victims don’t have access to appropriate medical treatment and many more refuse to seek treatment out of fear of further victimization or stigmatization (Bureau of African Affairs, 2010). Congolese culture demands that unmarried women protect their virginity and that married women are entire chaste. Thus, virtually every woman can expect to be harshly condemned and accused of being immoral if she is raped.

In terms of women seeking justice, the Bureau of African Affairs estimated that in 2010 only 2% of all cases of sexual violence were taken to court. This is partially the result of inherent sexism within the legal system. As second-class citizens, a woman cannot bring a claim unless she has the permission of her husband (HRW, 2009). This is highly problematic considering the frequency of broken families and the severe stigma attached to rape. A rape is viewed as an attack on a woman but also attack on a man’s ability to control and protect his wife. Thus, the public shame and humiliation that accompanies rape restricts both victims and husbands from
filing a claim. Victims also recognize the court’s inability to adequately protect witnesses and keep testimony confidential. Victims are, again, often too scared of stigmatization to report.

**Sexual Violence Laws in the DRC**

The DRC is party to a variety of international agreements related to human rights, women and girls. Many of these instruments declare sexual violence a crime of war and a violation of women’s and human rights. Despite their apparent agreement with these international norms, the national laws and cultural attitudes are still severely lagging.

The Congolese Family Code legally assigned women a secondary and subordinate status to men. According to these laws, women are legally obligated to obey their husbands, submit to having their wealth controlled by their husbands and are more harshly punished for committing adultery than their husbands. Traditionally, rape was resolved by having the perpetrator either marry or pay the victim (HRW, 2002). In 2006 the launched a legislative and judicial reform with the government’s passage of laws that were friendlier towards women and less tolerant of sexual violence. Fortunately, in 2006 the DRC government revamped its anti-sexual violence laws. The Congolese Penal code prohibits rape, which is defined by penetration in addition to the insertion of objects into a vagina, sexual mutilation and sexual slavery. Rape is punishable with prison a prison sentence of 5 to 20 years and harsher penalties were established for indecent

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48 According to Article 352 of the Code, women are legally allowed to marry at the age of 15 while men are not permitted to marry until the age of 18 (AI, 2004). Article 490 explains that husbands manage all wealth for the couple and that women must obey their husbands (AI, 2004; HRW, 2002). Women cannot require their husbands wear condoms during sex, which increases their risk for contracting HIV/AIDS and other STDS because extramarital sex is common among married Congolese men (HRW, 2002). According to Article 467, if a wife commits adultery then she will be jailed for six months to one year and have to pay a fine while a husband who commits adultery will only be punished if the adultery is particularly offensive (AI, 2004).
assault, which does not include penetration (HRW, 2002).\textsuperscript{49} The new laws also criminalize having sex with a child less than 18 years of age and guarantee more protection for the well being of victims and witnesses in criminal proceedings (Ahlenius, 2007).

Despite the progress of these laws, the Bureau of African Affairs reports that there have been very few successful prosecutions for rape and indecent assault (2010).\textsuperscript{50} The Congolese people continue to hold their traditional views and practices that discriminate against women. The DRC is a fitting example of how cultural norms and attitudes are retained in spite of the influence of international norms and universalistic views on gender and sexual violence. With an understanding of how the culture, conflict and sexual violence have shaped the situation on the ground in the DRC, I now turn to examine the two consecutive peacekeeping operations that have attended to the nation’s crises for the last eleven years.

B. United Nations Peacekeeping in the DRC

\textit{MONUC – The United Nations Organization Mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo}

In November of 1999 Security Council established MONUC with the adoption of Resolution 1279 and authorized this mission under Chapter VII, allowing personnel to take “the necessary action,” including lethal force, to fulfill their mission, protect themselves, other personnel, civilians, UN equipment and the effectiveness of their operations (MONUC, 2010). MONUC established its headquarters in Kinshasa and liaison offices in Pretoria, South Africa and Kigali, Rwanda. By April 2010, the mission had a fairly established presence in the eastern portion of the country, a vast and volatile region that experienced the most fighting and sexual

\textsuperscript{49} Indecent assault is punishable with 6 months to 20 years.

\textsuperscript{50} There have been modest successes with sexual violence convictions. For example, in 2003, two combatants were charged with rape in a Gbadolite trial. The court found them guilty and sentenced one defendant to one year in prison and the other to ten months. The glaring problems with this case are that there were originally twenty perpetrators and the court never requested testimony from the victims (HRW, 2005).
violence, with bases and headquarters in various cities throughout the country.\textsuperscript{51} Alan Doss, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative to the DRC, explained in 2010 that MONUC concentrated more than 95\% of its force, roughly 23,275 military troops, in the eastern regions of the country (DPKO, 2010). This region is heavily forested, home to many isolated villages and communities and hard to navigate due to the lack of roads (Doss, 2010).

More than forty TCCs provide the personnel for MONUC operations and the primary contributors are India with more than 4,000 troops and Bangladesh, Pakistan and Nepal, all of who provide more than 1,000 troops (Loyn, 2008).\textsuperscript{52} The Security Council’s initial authorization included 5,537 troops, 500 military observers and a civilian component. The force of MONUC steadily increased over the years and by January 2004, the total number of personnel was at 12,413. By 2008 the size of the mission increased to over 22,000 and MONUC was became the world’s largest, most expensive and well-armed peacekeeping force (Loyn, 2008). Figure 2 shows how the strength of MONUC increased from 2004 until its final authorization in June 2010 (DPKO 2011b).\textsuperscript{53} In that time span the total number of personnel has almost doubled, reflecting both a greater commitment on behalf of the UN and an acknowledgement of the significant mission creep MONUC faced.

\textsuperscript{51} See Appendix 4 for a detailed map of where MONUC had established itself by April 2010. This map denotes headquarters and bases in addition to the nationalities of the peacekeeping troops in each location. Doss also describes this region as being three times the size of France (MONUC, 2011)
\textsuperscript{52} Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, France, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Tunisia, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Yemen and Zambia (MONUC, 2010).
\textsuperscript{53} See Appendix 3 for the monthly MONUC Personnel Allocations from 2004-2011 (DPKO, 2011b).
It is important to note that this increase marks one of the first times the Security Council increased the strength of a mission even though local combatants were overrunning the peacekeeping operations. The Security Council continued to allocate more troops to the mission despite the fatal attacks the mission suffered in 2005 and 2006.\textsuperscript{54} This newfound dedication could reflect a deepening commitment of the Security Council and UN to fulfilling their missions and not allowing situations like Rwanda and Somalia to occur again.\textsuperscript{55}

The Security Council originally mandated MONUC to observe the ceasefire and disengagement of forces established by the Lusaka Peace Accord (MONUC, 2010). The mandate of MONUC increased along with its strength as the Security Council outlined additional responsibilities for troops. Alan Doss, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for MONUC, explained that that MONUC has the “longest list of mandated tasks – 41 – all told – ever handed down to a mission by the Security Council,” (2009) many of which were focused on human rights protection. For example, the mission set up human rights monitors in several parts

\textsuperscript{54} From 2004 to 2006 the number of fatalities continued to increase from 25 to 98. The most recent estimate is that 160 (DPKO, 2010).

\textsuperscript{55} The Security Council mandated a withdrawal of troops from the missions to these regions when faced with a direct threat from local rebels. Both missions were viewed as failures.
of the country and performed investigations into potential violations (HRW, 2005). Peacekeepers also performed day and nights patrols from more than 90 bases on foot and in vehicles in order to protect humanitarian supplies and discourage violence in the nearby areas (Doss, 2010).

The Security Council expanded the mission’s mandate to include greater cooperation and training with local government forces. In 2007 the Security Council ordered MONUC to help train and build up the capacity of the Congolese army, police forces and government (HRW, 2009). Peacekeepers then held military and legal training that lasted three months but the effectiveness of the training is unclear. McCrummen accused the UN of arming Congolese government soldiers and then letting them loose in the countryside where they are “not so much hunting rebels as hunting women.” (2009) Additionally, HRW reported that Congolese remained confused about what consent was even after they received gender training, assuming that sex with minors was consensual so long as the minor was paid (HRW, 2009).

Many reporters, politicians and Congolese have criticized MONUC for being ineffective and unable to protect civilians from violence. Murder, rape, torture and kidnapping has continued and arguably increased despite the presence of UN peacekeepers. Alan Doss claimed that the mission’s troubles are a result of logistical and geographical limitations. He points to the delays of reports of fighting due to the terrain and even if the mission does receive punctual word of violence, the force is already spread incredibly thin. Bellamy & Williams explain that there was too large of a gulf between the mission and its mandate (2010). The mission had to deal with multiple crises at once like the increasing number of refugees, mass killings, natural resource exploitation, disease, widespread sexual violence and the continued fighting between complex networks of fighting factions. It has also proven dangerous for peacekeepers themselves.

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56 Alan Doss estimates that in 2010 there was only 1 peacekeeper for every 110,000 people (Doss, 2010).
According to UN records, a total of 160 MONUC personnel were killed throughout the ten-year mission (DPKO, 2011b).

**MONUSCO - UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo**

On May 28, 2010, the Security Council passed Resolution 1925 which replaced the ten-year-old MONUC with MONUSCO and again applied their Chapter VII authorization of force. The UN intended that the change to a stabilization mission reflect the changing nature of the situation in the DRC. Their mandate included continued support of the government with the peace consolidation and stabilization efforts, the fight against the impunity with which human rights violations have been committed and the protection of UN personnel, other humanitarian personnel and civilians (MONUSCO, 2011d).

At its initial strength of 24,043, MONUSCO is the largest peacekeeping mission ever established by the UN. A total of forty TCCs supply the personnel and those with the largest number of volunteers are India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Uruguay and South Africa (MONUSCO, 2011a). MONUSCO personnel were concentrated in the eastern portion of the country, which continues to be the most volatile region.

In August 2010, Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon has acknowledged the “exceptionally difficult environment” in which MONUSCO personnel are operating (BBC, 2010a). Peacekeepers have engaged in fighting directly with combatants on numerous occasions despite the fact that the mission is not yet one year old. Already eight MONUSCO personnel have died

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57 The Original TCCs for MONUSCO include Algeria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, France, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Tunisia, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Yemen and Zambia (MONUSCO, 2011).

58 The mission established offices in Beni, Butembo, Bukavu, Bunia, Goma, Kalemie, Kananga, Kikwit, Kindu, Kisangani, Lubumbashi, Mahagi, Matadi, Mbandaka, Mbuji-Mayi, Uvira (MONUSCO, 2011).
and numerous more have been wounded (DPKO, 2011b). The Secretary-General also admitted that the UN needed to do more to protect civilians and change the situation of widespread human rights violations (BBC, 2010a).

Peacekeepers and Sexual Violence in the DRC

In 2004 the international media reported that more than one hundred local women throughout the DRC complained that MONUC personnel had committed a variety of sexual crimes. The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) investigated 72 allegations, all of which originated in Bunia, and were only able to substantiate seven claims (Nair, 2005). Despite the OIOS investigation in 2005, peacekeepers continued to commit sexual violence and in 2006 local women filed an additional 217 allegations (Ahlenius, 2007). In response to these allegations, MONUC established further restrictions on their personnel such as a non-fraternization policy, a curfew for military personnel, off-limits areas and the requirement of military personnel wearing their uniforms at all times when they are outside of their base (Bellamy & Williams, 2010). Despite the anti-SEA policies the UN has created, which I discussed in the previous chapter, and these additional prohibitions of MONUC, the UN reported that MONUC was primarily responsible for the increase in allegations of SEA from 2008 to 2009 (Ospina, 2010). IN 2010 AFP reported that OIOS was in the investigation phase of two new allegations of SEA against MONUC personnel.

As a result of the continuing reports of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers in the DRC, I was inspired to evaluate the impact on MONUC/MONUSCO on sexual violence. The thesis of this paper argues that peacekeepers have not improved the situation of sexual violence DRC. To measure the validity of this claim, I evaluate three hypotheses in the following chapters starting with UN gender reform in the DRC.
Chapter Six: The Mixed Implementation of the Gender Reform

We can no longer afford to minimize or ignore the contributions of women and girls to all stages of conflict resolution, peacemaking, peace-building, peacekeeping and reconstruction processes. Sustainable peace will not be achieved without the full and equal participation of women and men. - Secretary-General Kofi Annan (DPKO, 2005)

The Security Council intended that the gender reform, which includes the directives of Resolutions 1325, 1820 and 1888, would radically reframe the way the UN and Member States consider gender and the participation of women. Peacekeeping missions received many specific goals such as the greater inclusion of women on field operations, the incorporation of a gender perspective in resolution and peace-building activities and more resources for local women. More than ten years have passed since the establishment of gender mainstreaming and there have certainly been some positive developments. Yet, the UN has determined that overall the results of the implementation are “mixed.” (Ospina, 2010) This chapter analyzes the development and gaps between gender reform policies and its implementation on the DRC. I consider the positive interventions that have so far been established, the remaining gaps and the obstacles that are blocking the full implementation of the gender reform. Finally, I discuss what, if any, additional information is necessary in determining whether the peacekeeping operations in the DRC have implemented the gender reform enough to effectively deter to sexual violence, both by combatants and peacekeepers.

A. The Gender Reform – Gender Mainstreaming and Gender Balancing

The issue of gender equality has been a characteristic of the UN since its establishment in 1946. Although Article 8 of the UN Charter calls for the equal participation of men and women throughout the organization, women have been highly underrepresented in the UN headquarters and field operations, which have caused some to accuse the UN of being run by the “old boys
network.” (Harrington, 2010) The Secretary-General first acknowledged this issue in 1985 and since then the UN has made strides towards a more equal presence of women within the Secretariat. In 1995 the UN expanded their efforts to achieve gender equality with the General Assembly’s establishment of the concept of gender mainstreaming. In 2000 Resolution 1325 further solidified gender mainstreaming as an official and multi-faceted strategy of the UN (Muir, Jogoo & Rieper, 2010). The Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Gender Issues (OSAGI) offers the following definition:

Gender Mainstreaming is a globally accepted strategy for promoting gender equality. Mainstreaming is not an end in itself but a strategy, an approach, a means to achieve the goal of gender equality. Mainstreaming involves ensuring that gender perspectives and attention to the goal of gender equality are central to all activities. (2011)

The OSAGI touches on two of the central goals of gender mainstreaming: gender balancing and the universal inclusion of a gender perspective. The UN obligates entities inside and outside of the UN system, including regional organizations, NGOs and Member States, to reconsider and reframe issues relating to women, gender and sexual violence. The UN encourages all entities to put more effort into gender balancing and making the proportions of men to women more equal

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59 Article 8 of the United Nations Charter reads “The United Nations shall place no restrictions on the eligibility of men and women to participate in any capacity and under conditions of equality in its principal and subsidiary organs.” (1946)

60 Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar recognized this issue back in 1985 he established goal markers for the greater inclusion of women. These included having 30% of P Level positions appointed to women by 1990 and then to 35% by 1995. He also aimed to have 25% of D-1 level positions appointed to women by 1995 (Whitworth, 2004). These goals were not met by 2002 and although there was progress in the following years, in 2007 women only comprised 13% of all decision-making positions in the Secretariat (Kent, 2007).

61 “Gender equality refers to the equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities of women and men and girls and boys. Equality does not mean that women and men will become the same but that women’s and men’s rights, responsibilities and opportunities will not depend on whether they are born male or female. Gender equality implies that the interests, needs and priorities of both women and men are taken into consideration, recognizing the diversity of different groups of women and men.” (OSAGI, 2011)

62 These activities include policy development, research, advocacy, dialogue, legislation, resource allocation, and planning, implementation and monitoring of programs and projects.
The UN hopes this result not only with the greater involvement of women but also in the greater involvement of women in high level and decision-making positions (Whitworth, 2004).

Despite the years of attention the UN has given to gender equality and gender mainstreaming, the DPKO has been and continues to be male-dominated. The UN acknowledges, “The need for women peacekeepers is more pressing than ever” yet women lack representation at the leadership, military and civilian levels (DPKO & DPI, 2011). In terms of leadership, in 2004 only 6 of the 57 total missions had female Chief of Missions (Whitworth, 2004; Kent, 2007). With the military between 1957 and 1989 there were only 20 women out of 20,000 total personnel, or 0.001%, and most of served as nurses (DAW, 1995). By 1992 the total number of women rose to 255 but this was still less than 1% of all military personnel.

The current status of women in peacekeeping has improved but there is a long way to go. In the last couple of years the UN has appointed a handful of leadership positions to women. These positions include the Chief of Mission to Liberia, four Deputy Chiefs of various missions, three SRSGs and three Deputy SRSGs (Bellamy & Williams, 2010; UN & DPI, 2011). Among international police personnel the percentage of women has reached 8% and among civilian personnel the percentage has reached 30% (Harrington, 2010). As for the military, by January 2011 women were 2.4% of military personnel and 3.3% of all positions throughout the DPKO (DPKO, 2011a). Figure 3 shows how the percentage of female personnel of the DPKO missions has increased and almost doubled from 2005 to 2010. Yet, at 3.33% (3,297 positions out of the total 99,926), the presence of women is still extremely small compared to men (DPKO, 2011a).63

63 Although these percentages have increased, the number of peacekeepers has also steadily increased as is shown by the following annual numbers: 67,807 (2005), 74,847 (2006), 83,328 (2007), 88,576 (2008), 95,419 (2009), and 99,926 (DPKO, 2011a).
In addition to gender balancing personnel, the DPKO has also incorporated a gender component in all mission mandates since the adoption of Resolution 1325 mandates and developed a number of tools for peacekeepers in the field. At all times, peacekeepers must carry the Gender Resource Package, the DPKO Gender Policy Statement and the Code of Conduct, which states the zero tolerance policy (DPKO, 2005). Missions have incorporated gender mainstreaming with gender units, which are staffed with gender advisers or gender focal points that are responsible for monitoring and implementing gender mainstreaming on the ground.⁶⁴ Focal points are assigned to peacekeeping missions that don’t have gender advisers and although they are full time employees with similar responsibilities, they do not have the same training or resource capacity as gender advisers. Gender Units, which are also called Office of Gender Affairs (OGA), assist in the gender balancing efforts by monitoring the appointments of mission staff and advocating for the increased participation of women within the mission and in local communities. Gender staffs build partnerships, provide advice for gender related issues and

⁶⁴ Similarly to the concept of gender mainstreaming, gender units were established prior to the adoption of Resolution 1325 on two missions. In 1999 the UN established Gender Units in both United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) (Whitworth, 2004).
coordinate activities with the local women’s groups, NGOs and civil society organizations (DPKO, 2005). Finally, gender advisers provide guidance on all gender-related issues and strategies within a mission. This includes training peacekeepers, dealing with survivors of sexual violence and consulting mission leaders on how to address the differing needs of men and women in the region (DPKO, 2005).

Global Implementation - Can it ever be achieved?

In 2010 the UN released two evaluations of gender mainstreaming. Jan Muir, Nishta Jogoo and Helge Rieper authored a thematic evaluation of gender mainstreaming in the UN Secretariat from October 2009 to July 2010. After analyzing the activities of the Secretariat, public documents, survey data and interviews, the authors offer a “mixed verdict” on the implementation of the gender reform (2010). There are plenty of policies that express the commitment of the UN to the gender reform and there was evidence that that every Secretariat program had established structures and processes to implement gender mainstreaming, although there varied between programs. There was also evidence that the gender reform was more accepted by staff and was positively impacting the work processes of the UN.

Muir, Jogoo and Rieper identified numerous weaknesses in the UN-wide implementation of gender mainstreaming. These include weak leadership and accountability processes, the fact that a gender perspective was still not visible in all public documents and that there remained “considerable gaps in the meaning, purpose and practical implications of gender mainstreaming.” (2010) Even with the DPKO, Muir, Jogoo and Rieper found mixed results.65 The department made progress in its policy and structural development but there remained many critical initiatives that had not yet been established. In general they found that results were lacking. For

65 See Appendix 5 for the Implementation of Gender Mainstreaming by the DPKO in the evaluation framework developed by Muir, Jogoo, & Rieper (2010).
example, the DPKO had not allocated all of its funds towards the reform or completed a gender audit within the last five years.\textsuperscript{66} The report concludes with a powerful statement on the current status of the UN gender reform:

> Nearly 15 years after the initial General Assembly resolution on gender mainstreaming, every Secretariat program has responded to it, but the implementation of gender mainstreaming has been uneven and its contribution to gender equality has been unclear. (Muir, Jogoo & Rieper, 2010)

Sofi Ospina of the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section of the DPKO authored the second important evaluation, which evaluated seven different areas of gender mainstreaming.\textsuperscript{67} After analyzing each of these areas, Ospina also offers an overall “mixed verdict.” Progress has been made in the security sector, in supporting the participation of women in electoral processes and in establishing polices and mechanisms to support gender mainstreaming (Ospina, 2010). For example, the DPKO developed guidelines for the peacekeeping operations and a department-wide action plan to implement Resolution 1325, the progress of which are monitored by a gender-task force. There has also been some progress with respect to peacekeeping operations in the field. By 2005, gender units and gender advisors had been established in ten of the eighteen ongoing missions (DPKO & DPI, 2005). By 2010, gender advisers had been established in ten multi-dimensional peacekeeping missions and gender focal points had been established in six traditional operations. The DPKO has also created Conduct and Discipline Teams (CDTs) to handle the allegations of sexual violence perpetrated by peacekeepers, monitor UN staff,

\textsuperscript{66} I have tabled the result of Ospina’s study for the DPKO in Appendix 4. This table shows both the initiatives in place and those not in place at the time of her publication in 2010.

\textsuperscript{67} These seven areas include including the participation of women in peace negotiations and peace agreements, the participation of women in politics, the integration of a gender perspective into disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), gender-sensitive reforms in the security sector, the implementation of legal and judicial reforms, sexual and gender-based violence, and the protection of women IDPs (Ospina, 2010).
particularly those in managerial positions, to make sure that they conduct themselves in accordance with departmental standards and observe the zero tolerance policy (Ospina, 2010). CDTs work with Gender Units to provide cultural sensitivity and gender awareness training for military and civilian field staff. By 2009, the UN had established CDTs in seventeen missions, including the missions in the DRC, Burundi, Liberia and Sudan (Rúden, 2009).

Both evaluations show that gender mainstreaming is slowly being implemented throughout the UN-system and within the DPKO. They also show that a number of gaps remain. In fact, skepticism remains as to whether the gender reform can ever be fully achieved. Whitworth notes that there is still confusion about what gender mainstreaming actually entails, how it can be implemented and who is responsible for its implementation (2004). We must also consider the debate within international relations over whether cultural differences or universal norms should be the priority. As a forum for all types of nations, there are significant clashes at the UN on the subjects of women and sexual violence. Many nations have cultural practices, like the DRC, that do not align with the norms and policies sponsored by the UN. Ward and Vann explain that there is a “lack of worldwide commitment to acknowledging the effect of such violence on health and human rights, and to taking the necessary legal, policy, and programming steps to eradicate it.” (2002) Therefore, it could be that the international community is not ready for such egalitarian measures. Whether or not this is the case, the UN should continue implementing, monitoring and evaluating the gender reform throughout their activities.

**B. The Implementation of the Gender Reform in the DRC**

I now turn to evaluate the status of gender reform within the peacekeeping operations of the DRC. I anticipate that the reform will be mixed in a similar way that it is mixed at the departmental and organizational levels. I specifically assess those reform efforts focused on the
deterrence of sexual violence. To evaluate the positive developments and remaining gaps in the DRC operations, I rely on the information provided by the DPKO, MONUC and MONUSCO in addition to materials provided by Elsie Effange-Mbella, the Senior Gender Adviser of Office of Gender Affairs (OGA) for MONUSCO. After analyzing the developments, gaps and current obstacles of the gender reform, I will apply my findings to the framework established by Muir, Jogoo and Rieper using seven thematic categories before determining whether the available data supports my hypothesis.

Positive Developments

With respect to gender mainstreaming, the MONUSCO website claims “MONUC has set the example by integrating the gender dimension into its programs and activities.” (2011c) In this section I provide a number of examples of how the UN peacekeeping missions in the DRC have demonstrated a willingness to apply the gender reform.

1. Gender Units, Sexual Violence Units and Conduct Discipline Teams

In March 2002 the UN established a Gender Unit in MONUC and by December the unit was equipped with five employees. As it stands today, there are now fully staffed regional OGAs in Kinshasa, Goma and Bukavu. The offices are supported by gender focal points that function as the intermediaries to regions where the OGA is not represented. The staff strongly emphasizes outreach by meeting with locals, listening to their stories and spreading the “gender message,” (OGA, 2010) which includes the protection of women and their rights, the increased

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68 This information includes the Ten-year Impact Study on Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and an interdepartmental PowerPoint presentation by the OGA on the status of the situation.

69 The five employees included a senior gender adviser, one gender affairs office, two UN volunteers and one local administrative assistant (Whitworth, 2004).

70 The Kinshasa office has a Senior Gender Affairs Officer, a Gender Affairs Officer, Information and Communication Officer, a Research and Training Officer and a Gender Assistant. The Goma office has a Gender Affairs Officer and a Gender Assistant while the Bukavu office has a Gender Assistant (MONUSCO, 2011b).
participation of women in peace processes and the incorporation of a gender perspective in communities. The Gender Unit also establishes relationships with local women’s organizations and government agencies (MONUSCO, 2011d).

Another important office is the Sexual Violence Unit (SVU) located in Goma. The SVU “facilitates the prevention, protection and response to sexual violence across the country” by coordinating the efforts of the government ministries, mainly the Ministry of Gender, UN agencies, donors and the local and international civil organizations (MONUSCO, 2011e). The SVU is also highly involved in the implementations of the Comprehensive Strategy on Combating Sexual Violence in the DRC, which I will discuss in the next section.\footnote{The SVU monitors, regularly reports, solves problems, provides advice, creates budgets and initiates mobilization plans for the resources dedicated to the Comprehensive Strategy’s implementation.}

Three Conduct Discipline Team (CDT) sub-offices in the eastern DRC support the OGAs and SVU. As I previously explained, the main role of these offices is to receive and handle complaints of sexual misconduct by peacekeepers (Ospina, 2010). The DPKO established these units in 2006 and in the three years following, the numbers of allegations against peacekeepers dropped and have not returned to the 2006 levels. The table below shows the number of SEA allegations against MONUC personnel from 2004 to 2009.\footnote{Sources for Table 1 include the following: General Assembly (2005), General Assembly (2006), General Assembly (2007), General Assembly (2008), General Assembly (2009), General Assembly (2010), Nair (2005) Ahlenuis (2007) and Zeid (2005).}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Allegations of SEA against MONUC Personnel 2004-2009}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\hline
# Of Allegations & 72 & 217 & 176 & 59 & 40 & 59 & 623 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

Although I cannot conclude that the presence of the CDT offices was in fact the cause of the decrease in allegations following 2006, Ospina argues that their presence encourages local
women to submit claims to the UN (2010). If this is the case we can hope these offices will result in an overall improvement of reporting and monitoring mechanisms in the DRC.

2. The Office of the Senior Adviser and Coordinator on Sexual Violence and the Comprehensive Strategy on Combating Sexual Violence in the DRC

In 2008 the UN appointed a Senior Adviser and Coordinator for Sexual Violence (SACSV) to develop the Comprehensive Strategy, to coordinate the efforts of the involved UN entities, peacekeeping operations and the government of the DRC. The Comprehensive Strategy serves as a “common framework and platform for action for all those combating sexual violence in DRC in line with Security Council resolutions.” (MONUSCO, 2011a) Resolution 1820 called for more effective preventative and response measures to deal with sexual violence and the Comprehensive Strategy is comprised of four inter-related components that are led by various UN bodies (SACSV 2009). These components include:

1. Protections against and the Prevention of Sexual Violence – UNHCR

2. Combating Impunity for Cases of Sexual Violence – MONUC and OHCHR

3. Security Sector Reform and Sexual Violence – MONUC SSR


The DPKO later created an Operational Plan to implement the Comprehensive Strategy and this plan incorporated a fifth component; that the UNFPA lead the efforts to increase the collection and analysis of sexual violence data. Figure 4 shows which bodies work together on the individual mechanisms and the direction of how operations are to occur at the provincial and national levels (MONUSCO, 2011e).

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73 I will henceforth refer to this as the Comprehensive Strategy.
74 The government endorsed the Comprehensive Strategy on April 1, 2009.
75 The Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR)
76 Security Sector Reform (SSR) is a “broad term often used to describe the structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the management, provision and oversight of security in a country.” (MONUSCO, 2011f)
Figure 4

Coordination Mechanisms for Combating Sexual Violence

Remaining Gaps

Although there have been positive interventions, there are a number of gaps and initiatives that the operations in the DRC have not yet begun or fully implemented. Gender balancing in the military personnel has not been consistently or successfully applied. There are also a number of obstacles, mainly logistical and cultural, that the UN missions have not been able to overcome. The continuation of SEA by peacekeepers is another indication that the deterrence efforts so far established by the reform are not compellingly effective.

1. The lack of Gender Balancing

To evaluate whether women were increasingly incorporated into the peacekeeping operations in the DRC, I accessed the Gender Statistics Archives from the DPKO website, which
provide a monthly breakdown of the numbers of men and women personnel across all missions. Figure 5 shows the compiled statistics of military personnel in MONUC/MONUSCO, which is roughly 75% of the total UN personnel in the DRC, from 2006 to 2011 (DPKO, 2011a).\textsuperscript{77}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure5.png}
\caption{Percentage of Women Military Personnel in MONUC/MONUSCO 2006-2011}
\end{figure}

I expected to find a similar pattern of improvement as was shown Figure 3 in Section A of this chapter on the percentage of women personnel throughout the DPKO operations. Figure 3 showed a gradual and steady increase of women, starting at 1.5% in 2005 and ending at 3.3% in late 2010. The results for the operations in the DRC are much more static and do not show a significant increase in the inclusion of women. In fact the percentage of women serving in the MONUSCO military forces is actually lower than it was five years ago.\textsuperscript{78} Additionally, the percentage of women personnel drops in late 2006, late 2008 and in early 2010. These drops and the overall inconsistent incorporation of women are reflective of a lack of commitment to gender balancing by the UN, TCCs and PCCs. In 2011, the UN and DPI reported the UN recognized the

\textsuperscript{77} These archives only provide information back to 2006. See Appendix 6 for the monthly MONUC/MONUSCO Gender Demographics from 2006 to 2011 (DPKO, 2011a).

\textsuperscript{78} In August 2006 women held 2.0% of military positions and in January 2011 women held 1.9% of all MONUC military positions (DPKO, 2011a).
slower pace of gender balancing and was working with contributing countries to increase the number of women they volunteered. MONUSCO did report that more women officers were participating in management and decision making processes; however, due to the results in this graph I conclude that the military component of the peacekeeping operations in the DRC have not successfully implemented gender balancing as part of the gender reform (2011c).

The lack of gender balancing in MONUC/MONUSCO is particularly troubling for several reasons. First, women peacekeepers can offer substantial contributions in operations. According to the UN “it is not simply a question of gender balance and numbers; it is also a question of the differences women can make.” (DAW, 1995) The presence of women peacekeepers can motivate local women to mobilize and participate in decision-making processes, foster greater trust from local communities and provide a reminder to all personnel to remain attentive to gender and human rights issues (DAW, 1995). According to the DPKO, women may be better suited than men to perform certain tasks such as assisting female ex-combatants to demobilize and reintegrate into their communities, mentoring female personnel and working in women’s prisons (DPKO & DPI, 2011).

Women peacekeepers can also influence the situation of sexual violence in host country. The UN suggests that women are better suited to help victims of sexual and gender based violence. Their presence may increase the number of reports submitted by women and girls because many victims prefer to or are only able to submit claims of abuse to other women (Kent, 2007). In some cultures women are not allowed to speak to men because they are unmarried or they are not permitted to speak with men outside of their family. Thus, women peacekeepers may help the UN collect a greater number of reports and more accurate reporting on sexual violence in general.
A final reason that the lack of gender balancing in the DRC is troubling is because of the amount of allegations that peacekeepers have received since 2003. According to the Division on the Advancement of Women (DAW) women peacekeepers can actually act as “a deterrent to the abuse of power, including sexual harassment [including sexual exploitation] and rape.” (1995) Harrington, however, warns against assuming that the mere presence of women peacekeepers will decrease sexual violence. She argues that the perspective of the DAW frames the issue of sexual violence in terms of unrestrained masculinity and assumes that women are essentially less prone to commit violence. Harrington writes, “We should not be seduced by the illusion that women inevitably display better conduct or that women cannot be violent, sadistic and lascivious.” (2010) I wanted to see if the evidence from the DRC supported either perspective so using information from Table 1, I compared the annual average of the percentages of women military personnel in MONUC to the number of allegations from 2006-2009 to see if there was any correlation.79

Table 2: Allegations of SEA against MONUC Personnel and The Presence of Women Military Personnel 2005-200980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td># Of Allegations</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Women</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Looking at Table 2, I am unable to determine if there has been a relationship or any degree of correlation between the presence of women and SEA by peacekeepers. Neither data set appears to have a consistent direction, which could reflect changing situations on the ground or

79 Although I have access to the numbers of allegations from 2003 onward, the information about the presence of women in MONUC was not made archived until 2006 (DPKO, 2011a). Another possible way of evaluating the presence of women on SEA allegations would have been to compare the month by month data provided by the DPKO. I assumed the annual data would show whether I could expect any correlation, which I believe it accomplished.

80 Sources for Table 2 include the following: General Assembly (2006), General Assembly (2007), General Assembly (2008), General Assembly (2009), General Assembly (2010), Nair (2005) Ahlenuis (2007), DPKO (2011a) and Zeid (2005).
issues with reporting mechanisms (more so for the allegations than the percentages). From 2006 to 2007 the percent of women increases and as the UN expects, the number of allegations decreases. This pattern, however, is not repeated in the following years. From 2007 to 2008 the number of women and allegations fall but then both values rise between 2008 and 2009. At this time I cannot substantiate the claim that women have a deterrence effect on SEA. Further research and more accurate reporting mechanisms are needed to make this determination.

2. Remaining Obstacles

When discussing obstacles that inhibit the implementation of the gender reform, it is necessary to understand that the UN cannot control or easily influence all of the factors that contribute to the situation on the ground in the DRC. For example, the UN cannot easily control the ongoing conflict, the rampant attacks on civilians and the growing numbers of refugees and IDPs (OGA, 2010). Also, the UN only has a limited influence on the government of the DRC.

On the other hand, there are a number of obstacles that MONUC/MONUSCO has the ability to overcome but have not yet been able to successful do so. From a logistical perspective, the expectations are huge for a staff limited in numbers, geographical reach and resources. For the entire country of the DRC, which has a huge landscape and a population of 68 million, the DPKO has only established a handful of offices and appointed about a dozen staff to handle all gender and sexual violence related issues. This small group of people must also assist the operation, one of the largest ever created that currently stands around 17,000 in size, in all gender mainstreaming activities. Until the UN devotes more staff, offices and resources to the gender mainstreaming efforts in the DRC, we can expect that the reform will occur very slowly.

The implementation efforts have been significantly affected by the lack of donations provided by the UN and the international community. Currently, the funding provided for this
strategy is at approximately US$11.2 million, which is only 20% of the requested US$56 million (MONUSCO, 2011a). Although OGA reports that increasing international attention to the issue of sexual violence has at least increased the donations in recent years the gender staff must coordinate their initiatives with the Ministry of Gender, which only receives 0.02% of the national budget (OGA, 2010).

An additional logistical limitation is the fact that many of these efforts are being developed in a “strategic void both on the part of the UN system and the DRC government.” (OGA, 2010) No framework or precedent had been established for fighting sexual violence in the DRC prior to the Comprehensive Strategy. Although the government signed onto a number of international treaties relating to women, children and sexual violence, it has yet to effectively ratify these treaties within the country. For example, even though government revamped its anti-sexual violence laws in 2006, MONUSCO reports there is still a lack of political will within the DRC judicial and executive branches to fulfill those laws (2011e).

The culture of the DRC is another obstacle for the implementation of the gender reform and deterrence of sexual violence. The people hold strongly patriarchal and rigid ideas about gender roles (Kelly, 2010). Women have been legally, economically, politically, socially and culturally treated as less valuable than men and as a result, women have not had the same educational, political or economic opportunities as men (AI, 2004). The cultural views towards sexual violence, like blaming the victim and excusing the perpetrator, have also made the implementation of the reform and anti-sexual violence policies more difficult. It is this same culture that MONUSCO reports must adopt “a major role in accompanying, whistle blowing,

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81 In 2004 women held 0.25% of the seats in the Senate, that is 3 out of 120, and directed six of the transitional government’s 36 ministries (AI 2004). In 2010 women only held 5% of the seats in the Senate and 8% in Parliament. At the provincial level, there are on average 1.5 women in the 11 provinces (OGA, 2010). In terms of educational inequality, in 2010 the Bureau of African Affairs reported a 21% difference between literacy rates for men, of which 76% could read, and women, of which 55% could read (2010).
securing, fighting stigmatization and installing counseling officers for the victims [of sexual violence] in collaboration with justice.” (2011e) Community efforts may facilitate nation-wide acknowledgement and respect of the federal anti-sexual violence laws, justice for victims and an end to the environment of impunity.

The OGA recognizes that the impunity for perpetrators of SGBV, whether they are civilians, combatants or international personnel, is another major obstacle (2010). The UN cannot directly prosecute personnel that commit SEA and has long acknowledged the limited jurisdiction it holds over its peacekeeping personnel due to the MOUs. There is currently discussion about how to encourage tougher responses on behalf of TCCs, PCCs and UN the cases of SEA and other forms of misconduct.

C. Discussion

At the beginning of this analysis I assumed that the implementation of the gender reform in the DRC peacekeeping operations would be mixed in a similar way that the implementation of was mixed at the departmental and organizational levels. I have already discussed some positive developments and remaining gaps of MONUC/MONUSCO and I now apply my finding to the seven-part thematic framework developed by the OIOS. Table 3 shows that there have been many initiatives put in place by the peacekeeping operations in the DRC. Using the categories and initiatives of the OIOS, it actually appears that there have been a significant number of initiatives put in place compared to those not in place, at least of those initiatives that I have knowledge of. In the final column I have designated the initiatives of which I do not have information or a status. I was also surprised that the framework of the OIOS did not include an area for gender balancing.
### Table 3 - The Implementation of Gender Mainstreaming by the MONUC/MONUSCO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluated Category</th>
<th>Initiatives(s) in Place</th>
<th>Initiative(s) Not in Place</th>
<th>Initiative Status Unknown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Policy</td>
<td>Policy or strategy in place</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Structure</td>
<td>Program-level gender unit/specialist</td>
<td>Gender unit or adviser in each field location</td>
<td>Program-level non-gender specialist focal point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gender focal points in each division</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Advice and assistance from gender focal points/gender unit given to staff</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Tools</td>
<td>Central guidelines for implementation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Guidelines tailored to subprograms, regions and/or countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Resources</td>
<td>Training for gender focal points</td>
<td>Mechanism tracking devoted human resources</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Training for staff</td>
<td>Allocated funding</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mechanism tracking devoted financial resources</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Capacity Development</td>
<td>Clear lines of accountability</td>
<td>In Electronic Performance Appraisal System (e-PAS) documentation for gender focal points</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In e-PAS documentation for staff</td>
<td>In recruitment documentation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Accountability</td>
<td>Collection of sex-disaggregated data</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dissemination of best practices, suggestions and examples</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gender audit or evaluation conducted within the last five years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gender-sensitive indicators</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Monitoring and Reporting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Considering the information available on the status of the reform, I conclude that its implementation in the DRC is mixed. There have been many successful efforts on behalf of

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82 The information of this chart was extracted from the 2010 OIOS UN-wide evaluation that identified which entities implemented or did not implement the listed mechanisms (Muir, Jogoo & Rieper, 2010). The OIOS has not completed a similarly structured analysis for MONUC and MONUSCO to date, which partially accounts for the lack of data on the subject.
MONUC/MONUSCO to implement gender mainstreaming and to discourage sexual violence. In terms of policy, the operations have developed training procedures for peacekeepers, established the Comprehensive Strategy and the complimentary Coordination Mechanism (shown in Figure 4). There have also been many structural developments like the establishment of the OGA, SVUs, three CDTs and the appropriate staff for each. Table 3 showed that the DRC operations also have several initiatives in place for tools and capacity building. In light of all the initiatives in place, it seems that the peacekeepers in the DRC have taken steps towards a more egalitarian and safer environment for Congolese women and their operations. What remains to be seen is how these structures and policy have, if at all, impacted gender relations, opportunities for women and the prevalence of sexual violence. As Muir, Jogoo & Rieper conclude in their report, “The effectiveness of gender mainstreaming must ultimately be judged by its results.” (2010)

Over a decade has passed since the gender reform began and it seems that the UN has not yet been achieved the goals of the gender reform at the headquarters, the DPKO or with MONUC/MONUSCO. The UN and gender staff must overcome a number of obstacles before they can hope to effectively implement the reform in such a massive peacekeeping operation and large country. The UN and the DPKO must also consider the serious lack of gender balancing with peacekeeping personnel in the DRC and of women throughout the DPKO operations (See Figures 3 and 5). I discussed numerous assumptions of ways that a greater involvement of women can positively impact a mission but we will not know the validity of those assumptions until more women are included in peacekeeping operations.

In terms of the overall impact of the mixed gender reform on the situation of sexual violence in the DRC, I am unable to determine if the reform has or has not improved the situation. It is unlikely the reform has worsened the situation with all of the political, structural
and monitoring efforts in place. It is possible, however, that the reform has not yet affected the situation. In Chapter Five I found that the situation of sexual violence, specifically the violence perpetrated by combatants and civilians, has significantly increased over the years and become normalized into the Congolese culture. Thus it does not appear that the reform has decreased the sexual violence perpetrated by the Congolese. There is a possibility that the reform has affected the prevalence of violence perpetrated by peacekeepers. As Table 1 indicated, the numbers of allegations have decreased in the past few years and have not returned to 2006 levels. It is difficult to say whether the decrease in annual allegations is a direct or even an indirect result of the reform because of all of the other factors involved (the conflict, refugee crisis, etc). Although I cannot determine what the cause of the decrease in allegations was, this information does show that further research is necessary and accurate reporting mechanisms are essential to evaluating the effectiveness of the gender reform in general and on the situation of sexual violence in the DRC.
This chapter evaluates whether peacekeepers in the DRC demonstrate militarized masculinity, a social identity characteristic of national militaries. I begin by discussing the theoretical understandings of gender, masculinity and femininity. I then examine the development of militarized masculinity and how this identity can encourage sexually violent behavior. To determine whether the peacekeeping operations in the DRC exhibit militarized masculinities, I establish two important parallels between MONUC/MONUSCO and national military practices that are conducive to the production of militarized masculinity: they are primarily militaristic and they are male-dominated. Finally I assess what information I need to conclusively determine whether this environment has in fact encouraged and sustained the militarized masculinity of peacekeepers in the DRC.

A. The Concepts of Gender and Militarized Masculinity

*Gender, Masculinity & Femininity*

Gender is a socially constructed identity that designates differences, roles and characteristics between women and men (Secretary-General, 2006). Gender is not a natural or biologically determined identity but rather one that is assigned by society.\(^{83}\) UN Women explains that gender is time and context specific so it can vary significantly between societies (2010).\(^{84}\) Social identities are intersectional, meaning the have significant influences on one another. For example, race, class and religion all heavily influence gender. Societies also create hierarchies of

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\(^{83}\) Ethnicity, religion, nationality, class and ability are examples of other social identities.

\(^{84}\) The UN established this entity in July 2010 and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women.
power according to social identities. Patriarchy, the systematic domination of women by men, is the traditional hierarchy of gender that has been institutionalized in legal and political frameworks, local and global economies, cultures and religions (Secretary-General, 2006). This system adversely affects women with respect to their health, decision-making opportunities, activities, responsibilities and access to resources within a society (OSAGI, 2010). Men can maintain this system by exploiting and controlling the sexual and reproductive capacities of women.

Patriarchal systems influence how people understand gender and more specifically what is feminine or masculine in society (Bellamy & Williams, 2010). These terms are used to describe how a person of each gender looks, behaves, works, thinks, speaks and relates to others. Femininity refers to those characteristics and roles associated with being female (Shepard, 2010). Feminine characteristics generally include being emotional, gentle and passive. Feminine roles include motherhood and professions such as nursing and teaching. Masculinity describes characteristics like aggression and physicality, which are associated with males and roles like hunting, conducting business and serving as soldiers.

It is important to acknowledge the dangers of framing ideas of gender in terms of an “essentialist arguments,” or arguments that assume men are inherently similar to one another and inherently different from women (Enloe, 1989). Carpenter explains that gender essentialism describes “tropes associating men and women with mutually exclusive and oppositional attributes.” (2005) An example of this is the assumption that in war all men are killing soldiers and all women are vulnerable victims. I’ve already discussed that when it comes to sexual violence, anyone can become a victim or a perpetrator and in this section when I discuss femininity and masculinity, I discuss them not as all encompassing tropes but rather as commonly observed gendered behaviors that both sexes are capable of performing.
The Militarization of Masculinity

*Militarized masculinity* refers to an understanding of masculinity that is strongly associated with soldiering. Militarized masculinity is present in a society in the absence of conflict because most societies have a standing military. Thus most children grow up in the presence of soldiers and as a result develop an association between masculinity and soldiers. Families, teachers, media, literature, sports and children’s games teach what Whitworth calls “soldiering myths” (2004). These myths teach children that a soldier is proud, disciplined, adventurous, strong and patriotic *man* who never shows weakness, fear, sadness, guilt or remorse. Children also recognize the less glorified aspects of militarized masculinity; soldiers are violent, risk-taking, dominating and sexually active (Wood, 2006).

War is a male-centric activity that encourages overt demonstrations of militarized masculinity. War generally excludes women from the initiation, engagement and resolution of fighting but that is not to say that women never participate in war activities. Enloe describes that in a patriarchal world when war occurs “masculine men and feminine women are expected to react in opposite but complementary ways.” (1989) Usually societies experience the “sexual division of war”, where men leave to train and fight while women remain at home (Cockburn, 2010). Thus, not only do gender roles become more divergent, there is a high degree of physical separation between the genders.

On the male side of the sexual division, Whitworth notes that contemporary military training practices are very similar across nations (2004). A military’s objective is “the creation of men-and some women-who will be warriors, who are prepared to kill, and die, for the state.”

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85 A notable example is the involvement of women in the orchestration and implementation of the genocide in Rwanda. Two powerful women, First Lady Agathe Habyalimana and the Minister of the Family and Promotion of Women, assisted in the planning of the mass murder while many other Hutu women fought alongside men and directly assisted in murder and sexual violence (Sharlach, 1999).
(Whitworth, 2004) To accomplish this, militaries isolate men from society and make them complete intensive boot camp training where they are subjected to humiliation, degradation and physical training. In these training environments soldiers are ordered to demonstrate and reinforce the qualities of militarized masculinity.

_Militarized Masculinity and Sexual Violence_

There are several aspects of militarized masculinity that can lead to or encourage sexually violent behavior. A soldier’s job requires that he be a violent, aggressive and willing to kill others. Christopher Browning studied the effects of violence on the behavior of soldiers in his book *Ordinary Men.* He found the Nazi soldiers of Reserve Police Battalion 101, even many who were initially hesitant to kill Jews, gradually became more brutal as a result of the amount of violence they witnessed, experienced and distributed (1992). Rehn and Sirleaf note that the presence of the military, weapons and impunity fuel this cycle of brutalization (2002). They explain that violence becomes a “new norm” to soldiers. Thus, soldiers may commit sexual violence because they are used to brutality.

Another aspect that can lead to sexual violence is the repressions of any thoughts or behaviors traditionally considered feminine. Brownmiller argues that a woman suffers sexual violence during war “precisely because she is a woman, and _therefore_ an enemy.” (1975) Militaries enforce militarized masculinity by rewarding men for demonstrating masculine behaviors and punishing them if they demonstrate feminine behaviors. Soldiers that fail to be masculine enough are called sissies, ladies, women, faggots, whores, etc (Whitworth, 2004). Gendered insults humiliate soldiers and teach them that feminine is their opposite, their enemy. By committing sexual violence, a soldier can reassert his masculinity by showing he is willing to be aggressive, just as a solider must be, and also that he has contempt for the feminine other.
Another way that the indoctrination of soldiers is gendered is because they are encouraged to be sexually active and promiscuous. Rúden explains, “Heightened sexual consumption is an unfortunate characteristic of militarized masculinities.” (2009) As a social identity, militarized masculinity is static and unstable, thus it requires constant reinforcement (Whitworth, 2004). In patriarchal systems, because women serve as it “a hallmark of masculine success”, a solider can reinforce his masculinity each time he has sex with a woman (Brownmiller, 1975). Militaries have reinforced this understanding of women as fuel to masculinity. Enloe describes that militaries have in general acknowledged the need for “a steady supply of women’s sexual services to convince their soldiers that they are manly.” (1989) Thus when the Japanese military systematically organized military brothels they could have been insuring the fulfillment of their soldiers masculinity in addition to harnessing their uncontrollable sex drives, which is what military officials used to justify their actions.

A solider can also have his masculinity reinforced by his peer group or fellow soldiers, who establish norms and expectations of behavior (Browning, 1992). Sometimes the intensive demand on a soldier to constantly and publicly reinforce his masculinity can lead them to what Whitworth calls “explosions of militarized masculinity.” (2004) Overwhelmed by their own inability to consider themselves masculine, some soldiers go to extreme and dangerous lengths. Some examples of these explosions include the abuse of spouses and children, the torture of enemy troops or civilians and sexual violence.

B. Militarized Masculinity in the DRC Peacekeeping Operations

Historically, UN peacekeeping has placed significant emphasis on military interventions. As I discussed in Chapter Four, peacekeeping missions were almost entirely militaristic until
after the Cold War. Whitworth argues that peacekeeping is itself a contradiction because of its almost exclusive reliance on soldiers.

Soldiers are not born, they are made; and part of what goes into the making of a soldier is a celebration and reinforcement of some of the most aggressive, and most insecure, elements of masculinity: those that promote violence, misogyny, homophobia, and racism. (Whitworth, 2004)

Peacekeeping is also militaristic because the volunteers sent by TCCs tend to be “combat trained military men” and the DPKO continues their military training once they are deployed on a mission (Higate, 2007). Farwell argues, “The military, largely a masculine institution in terms of its members and policies, determines and reinforces hierarchies of power within and among states, thereby reinforcing and re-creating gender relations and patriarchy.” (2004) Thus, if it is true that peacekeeping is similar to militaries, this can have several implications for host communities that permit UN peacekeeping operations.

Yet the traits that make a good soldier do not necessarily make a good peacekeeper. Whitworth explains, “on the one hand, it depends on the individuals (mostly men) who have been constructed as soldiers, and on the other hand it demands that they deny many of the traits they have come to understand being a solider entails.” (2004) After the Cold War peacekeeping mandates began to incorporate humanitarian aid, human rights and development initiatives. Second-generation missions gave more attention to civilians and the long-term stability of a nation’s central institutions (economic, political, governmental). Following the adoption of Resolution 1325, peacekeeping operations have increasingly incorporated the protection, incorporation and consideration of women and sexual violence into mandates. As a result, modern peacekeepers must balance between their soldiering and humanitarian responsibilities.
Kent explains, “a peacekeeper must combine the qualities of a soldier with those of a social worker.” (2007) A peacekeeper must be a “warrior-prince-of-peace” who provides support, hope, sensitivity and aid for the desperate people of host nations (Whitworth, 2004).

Whether or not peacekeeping operations are in fact structured in a way that could reinforce the hierarchies of power, gender and masculinities in host communities, as Farwell argues, these operations do not always provide the same opportunities for direct combat and soldiering that are offered national military service. For example, peacekeepers have traditionally been lightly armed and the policy of impartiality only permitted the use of force in cases of self-defense. Whitworth explains that peacekeeping can actually be a poor equivalent for “real soldiering” and thus peacekeepers do not have the same ability to assert their masculinity as soldiers do. Without being able to assert their masculinity through fighting and battles, Whitworth argues that peacekeepers end up resorting to SEA to prove to themselves and their peers that they are still sexual, promiscuous and therefore masculine. As a result of their contradictory roles, some peacekeepers may feel unable to fulfill their masculinity. Therefore, peacekeepers may consider buying a prostitute or committing sexual violence opportunities to reestablish their masculinity, sexual competency and identity as a soldier without directly interfering with their responsibilities.

Paul Higate cautioned against focusing too much on the concept of military masculinities as it can distract from the social-structural context that peacekeepers operate within. Instead, he suggests using the “notion of a particularly oppressive ‘social masculinities’” because this allows for greater recognition of the intersectionality of gender, power and sexuality (2007). Although I

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86 Rwandan Hutu combatants killed 12 Belgian peacekeepers during the genocide and this was during the time when impartiality was central to UN interventions (Dallaire 2003).
will continue using the term militarized masculinity, I recognize how many different identities and situational factors intersect to produce the pattern of SEA by peacekeepers.

I now turn to a more direct evaluation of the peacekeeping operations in the DRC. To determine whether the environment is conducive to the development of militarized masculinity, I first establish two parallels between the peacekeeping operations in the DRC and national militaries: they are primarily militaristic and they are male-dominated.

*The Military Focus of MONUC and MONUSCO*

To determine the degree of the military focus of the two DRC peacekeeping operations, I graphed and tabulated the monthly allocations or percentages of personnel from 2004-2011, which were accessible from the DPKO electronic archives.

**Table 4: MONUC/MONUSCO Military Personnel Percentages** (DPKO, 2011b)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent Military</td>
<td>86.6</td>
<td>87.0</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>75.7</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>73.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As I expected, the data show that both peacekeeping operations are comprised of more than a majority of military personnel. Figure 6 shows how the allocation to military forces is significantly higher than the allocation to all non-military positions. The table makes the difference between the allocations even more evident. Throughout the seven years the UN allocated at minimum 74.6% of its personnel to the military. What I did not expect to find was that the percentage of military personnel has steadily decreased since 2004 from 86.6% in January of 2004 to 73.3% in January of 2011. It appears MONUSCO has had less of, although not significantly, a military focus that its predecessor.

The Security Council authorized both MONUC and MONUSCO under Chapter VII, permitting peacekeepers to carry arms and use force to protect themselves, the mission and civilians. There have been many reports of peacekeepers using their authorization by directly engaging in combat with combatants in the DRC, which has led to fatalities on both sides. The Security Council Report, a watchdog NGO, reported on several battles between peacekeepers and rebels in just the past year.\(^{87}\) Thus Whitworth’s argument that peacekeeping does not offer the same opportunities for a peacekeeper to establish his masculinity through fighting does not describe the situation in the DRC. Then again, the fact that peacekeepers do have to engage in fighting may fuel other aspects of militarized masculinity, such as acclimatization to violence, risk-taking and killing, which can still lead to the encouragement of sexual violence.

It appears that the peacekeeping operations in the DRC are in fact primarily militaristic, both in demographics, mandate and activity.\(^{88}\) I now turn to the presence of women within those

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\(^{87}\) In February of 2010 MONUC and the FARDC launched joint operations to protect civilians and limit the threat of a rebel attack in the North and South Kivu provinces. In April these joint forces responded to a rebel attack on the governor’s residence and were able to overcome the rebels, however, three MONUC officers were killed. In October 2010 a large group of men, potentially Mai-Mai combatants attacked a MONUC base in North Kivu but were overcome by peacekeeping troops (Security Council Report, 2011).

\(^{88}\) The original mandate for MONUC was to monitor the ceasefire and withdrawal of troops in accordance with the
MONUC and MONUSCO to see if they are a minority and whether they have been increasingly included as a result of gender balancing. Lastly, I will examine what additional evidence, if any, is necessary to determine whether militarized masculinity has encouraged peacekeepers in the DRC to engage in SEA.

The Presence of Women Personnel in the DRC

Throughout the history of the UN, peacekeeping operations have been male-dominated, especially the military arms of operations. This is partially due to the tendency for TCCs to send only men from their own national military for UN field operations. Some TCCs even have laws prohibiting women from participating in UN peacekeeping. The UN has little control over the troops and personnel TCCs send for operations and didn’t specifically request that TCCs send women peacekeepers until 1994 (DAW, 1995). On the occasion when women have been present in peacekeeping operations, it has generally been in a lower-level capacity, administrative support or nursing.

As a modern and ongoing mission that has long established gender mainstreaming and balancing goals, I was interested in seeing what kind of presence women have in MONUC and MONUSCO. Figure 5 in Chapter Six revealed the how static the incorporation of women in the operations has been since 2006. Their involvement has ranged from being only 1.3% to 2.4% with an annual average percentage of involvement at 1.9%. Even more surprising than the wide ranges of involvement is the fact that the latest numbers do not necessarily show improvement in

Lusaka Agreement. Additional militaristic responsibilities included a continuous liaison with the field headquarters of all the parties’ military forces; the collection and verification of military information on the parties’ forces, the maintenance of the cessation of hostilities and the disengagement and redeployment of the parties’ forces, the comprehensive disarmament, demobilization, resettlement and reintegration of all members of all armed groups, to work with war, military captives humanitarian agencies; to supervise parties’ forces and the release of all prisoners and verify the disengagement and redeployment of all parties.

89 The Secretary-General established the greater involvement of women in peacekeeping with A/50/691, which had a goal target of having 50% women in UN field missions (DAW, 1995)
the involvement of women. In January of 2011, women held only 337 out of the total 17,876 of military positions within MONUSCO, a mere 1.9%. Considering the small proportion of women personnel, I conclude that the peacekeeping operations in the DRC are male-dominated.

**Evaluating the Militarized Masculinity of Peacekeepers**

In the previous sections I have demonstrated that the peacekeeping operations in the DRC are similar to national militaries through their military focus and male-dominated personnel. Although this environment seems that it would be conducive to the development of militarized masculinity, it is not enough to prove that MONUC and MONUSCO personnel have demonstrated these attitudes and that these attitudes have encouraged peacekeepers to commit SEA. In order to prove that it seems the most effective method of analysis would be through observing and interviewing Congolese locals, particularly women and girls who have been victimized, and peacekeeping personnel, including military troops, civilians and staff from the gender offices in the country. Instead I report on the findings of Sarah Martin, who in 2003 and 2004 conducted interviews in several African countries and the findings of Paul Higate, who in 2003 interviewed locals and peacekeepers in the DRC.

Martin found that due to the male-dominated nature of peacekeeping operations, two significant patterns of behavior developed: a hyper-masculine culture that encouraged SEA and a “tradition of a wall of silence” that allowed this environment to flourish. She argues that this wall of silence is characteristic of other male-dominated environments such as militaries, police departments and fraternities. In such environments members try to protect their fellows from

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90 Military positions include military experts and troops but do not include individual police and formed police units. In November 2009 the DPKO changed the format of the Gender Statistics by Mission to include police units. This chart does not include police or overall statistics.

91 It is important to note that militarized masculinity is not the same as “hyper-masculinity” which Shepard described as the “exaggeration of characteristics or modes of behaviors that are associated with being male.” (2010)
accusations of bad behavior from outside of the group (2005). As peacekeeping operations are male-dominated environments, Marin’s findings could partially explain why SEA by peacekeepers only became visible in the 1990s and why reporting is still uncommon.

Martin also analyzed the effects of the “boys will be boys” attitude on SEA in her report, which describes the tolerance of men soliciting prostitutions or finding girlfriends when they are away from home because they need a sexual outlet. Martin explains that this attitude, which was endorsed by the UN as late as the 1990s, has slowly begun to change within UN peacekeeping (2005). Martin did find evidence of this attitude in MONUC personnel and reported that troops were more concerned with protecting their national honor, or their reputation within their home country and among the international community, than the women and children who were involved in the prostitution in the DRC. This again reminds us that militarized masculinity may be an important component in the gendered attitudes of DRC peacekeepers and needs to be addressed more directly by the UN.

Paul Higate’s ethnographic research in the DRC yielded several important conclusions. He concluded that SEA was ongoing in the DRC and that it had seriously effects on the women, children and communities (Higate, 2007). The goal of his research was to analyze how peacekeepers made sense of their masculinity and their sexual involvement with local women. He found that peacekeepers view their involvement in a variety of ways: as business, as a reprieve from their lonely and/or difficult lives, as charity for the less fortunate women and children or as victim hood from the aggression of predatory women. Peacekeepers reported that as a result of the advances of local women they felt a sense of attractiveness and sexual appeal, thus masculinity, which they did not normally feel. Higate explains how in the DRC peacekeepers view women and girls as enthusiastic and at times predatory in their pursuits of
retaining clients or “peacekeeper boyfriends.” (2007) Higate stressed, however, that we cannot and peacekeepers should not assume their enthusiasm reflects the control they have in the situation because we would misinterpret their desperation, hunger and lack of options (2007). Finally, Higate noted their behavior, attitudes and justifications for committing SEA “has much in common with the activities of the so-called ‘sex-tourist.’” (2007)

D. Discussion

After considering the available data on the allocations and demographics of personnel in MONUC and MONUSCO, it appears that the operations are primarily militaristic and are male-dominated. I conclude that these, on top of the many other similarities between peacekeeping and military operations, have created an environment in which militarized masculinity can develop. The relevant literature, particularly the work of Sandra Whitworth, Sarah Martin and Paul Higate, shows that peacekeepers have demonstrated militarized masculinities in a number of operations, particularly in Africa. The work of Martin and Higate even showed that there can be a direct link between a peacekeeper’s sense of his masculinity and his involvement in SEA. In order to prove that a similar and direct link exists between the gender ideologies of peacekeepers in the DRC and SEA, it would be necessary to either conduct interviews with Congolese locals and peacekeepers or have access to the findings of more recent interviews. During my research I was unable to find any interviews from the DRC conducted more recently than 2003.

At this point in time I am not able to conclusively determine whether peacekeepers in the DRC have demonstrated militarized masculinity and whether there is some sort of connection between their militarized masculinity and the continuing pattern of SEA. It may be true that militarized masculinity is a contributing factor for those peacekeepers that have engaged in or contributed to the tolerance of SEA. If peacekeepers do hold militarized masculinity attitudes,
this could help explain why the gender reform has been only implemented slowly and why the pattern of SEA has continued undocumented for as long as it has. More research is required before I will be able to substantiate these claims and my hypothesis.
Chapter Eight: A Pattern of Sexual Exploitation

The revelations last year of sexual exploitation and abuse by a significant number of United Nations peacekeeping personnel in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) shocked and angered us all and have done great harm to the name of peacekeeping. These abhorrent acts are a violation of the fundamental duty of care that all United Nations peacekeeping personnel owe to the local population that they are sent to serve.

- Secretary-General Kofi Annan (2005)

Sexual exploitation occurs whenever a person uses a position of power over another for a sexual purpose. There have been many instances of peacekeepers engaging in sexual exploitation despite the many UN policies that explicitly prohibit such behavior. Peacekeeping missions are deployed to some of the most unstable and dangerous situations where many are struggling to survive. Out of desperation, some locals exchange sex with peacekeepers for basic necessities—a phenomenon known as survival sex. This phenomenon has serious impacts on the health and well-being of the local population, specifically with the spread of HIV/AIDS and children fathered by peacekeepers. In this chapter I argue that peacekeepers in the DRC continue the pattern of SEA by peacekeepers, a pattern documented by internal UN documents and NGO reports. As a result, peacekeepers directly and indirectly exacerbate the overall situation of sexual violence in the DRC.

A. The History of Peacekeepers and Sexual Violence

According to Prince Zeid of Jordan, the Secretary-General’s Adviser on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, “Sexual exploitation and abuse by military, civilian police and civilian peacekeeping personnel is not a new phenomenon.” (2005) 92 The missions to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, Eritrea, Haiti, Liberia, Kosovo, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Somalia,

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92 The UN defines sexual exploitation as “any actual or attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability, differential power, or trust, for sexual purposes, including, but not limited to, profiting monetarily, socially or politically from the sexual exploitation of another” while sexual abuse is defined as “actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual nature, whether by force or under unequal or coercive conditions.” (2003)
Sudan, Timor-Leste and the DRC have all been tainted by allegations of misconduct (Borger, 2005; Vojdik, 2007; Zeid, 2005). The UN mission to Cambodia, UNTAC, provides one of the earliest instances of widespread SEA by peacekeepers. Following the arrival of 23,000 foreign personnel in 1991, the number of prostitutes grew from 6,000 to more than 25,000 in only a couple of years. Accompanying this drastic rise in prostitution, locals reported an increase in the number of brothels, purposely established near UNTAC bases, trafficking of women and girls, sexual harassment, domestic violence, abuse, assault and rape (Whitworth, 2004).

UNTAC also shows how SEA harms operations and the relationship between the host nation and the UN. Many Cambodians reacted to the situation with anger and distrust for UNTAC. They saw the all-male military force as an “army of occupiers” who were trying to colonize their country and take advantage of their vulnerability (Whitworth, 2004). Yushi Akashi, the SRSG of UNTAC, dismissed the issue with the popular explanation that “boys will be boys.” (Martin, 2005) Akashi’s comment prompted a whirlwind of negative publicity towards the UN but this also pushed the issue of peacekeeper perpetrated SEA onto the international stage as a new global women’s issue and an expansion of the concept of human security.

Growing Recognition of the Pattern of SEA by Peacekeepers

In 2005, Washington Post writer Julian Borger wrote that the sexual misconduct of UN peacekeepers “has become an increasingly high profile, political problem.” NGOs were a large part of this and in the past decade have released an impressive collection of reports exploring and

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93 The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia was as Whitworth described “the first in a growing post-Cold War trend for the UN: enormously complex missions involving the vast expenditure of both resources and personnel” (2004). Pol Pot and his Khmer Rouge party had already ravaged the country and in killed between 1.2 and 2 million people. The mission was mandated to assist in the implementation of the Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict in addition to improving the situation of human rights and refugees (DPKO). Officially the UN deemed UNTAC a success.

94 Estimates based on the Cambodian Women’s Development Association (Whitworth, 2004).
exposing the issue. In addition to the reports by Sarah Martin of Refugees International and Paul Higate, Save the Children-UK did a significant amount of research into the issue. Their first report was a joint effort with the UNHCR in 2002. This report found “extensive” evidence of SEA of refugee children in Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone. This report caused an international uproar due to the number of perpetrators who were members of the international humanitarian aid community, including the UN and UNHCR.

In 2008, Save the Children-UK released a report written by Corinna Csáky who interviewed hundreds of locals from several countries with ongoing foreign assistance programs including southern Sudan, Côte d’Ivoire and Haiti. Csáky found that “significant levels of abuse of boys and girls continue in emergencies, with much of it going unreported.” (2008) One of the most shocking facts of this report is that locals identified perpetrators as being from of 23 different humanitarian, security and peacekeeping missions and in certain areas DPKO peacekeepers were the primary perpetrators. The range of sexual violence committed by international workers and volunteers included verbal sexual abuse, oral sex, lesbian sexual displays, child pornography, forced and traded sex, child prostitution and sexual slavery. She also found that sexual exploitation and survival sex were rampant (2008).

This collection of reports shows a burgeoning recognition of the pattern of SEA by peacekeepers in scholarship. The UN has also done a substantial amount of research into the issue but before examining the reports of the OIOS, Secretary General and General Assembly on the how the issue manifests in the DRC, I investigate how SEA operates in general within peacekeeping operations.

95 Simic specifically identified nine empirical studies on peacekeepers and SEA between 2002 and 2008 (2009).
B. How Peacekeepers become Perpetrators

In Chapter One I discussed several theories that explain the cause of sexual violence. When it comes to peacekeepers perpetrating sexual violence, particularly SEA, there is no one theory that can fully explain how this happens. Rather, there are numerous environmental and relational factors that create situations ripe for SEA.

Peacekeeping operations typically operate in failed states among desperate populations. These states can experience any number of crises including financial corruption, ethnic fractionalization, genocide, ongoing fighting between armed groups, the breakdown of legal systems and community values, the spread of disease and growing populations of refugees and IDPs (Butler, Gluch & Mitchell 2007; Allred 2009). The combination of these factors offers a sense of impunity not normally experienced in stable societies. Additionally, when peacekeepers are inserted into failed states, they carry a significant amount of influence within the local communities with whom they have close and frequent interaction. They are the providers of hope, food, protection, medical care and “much-needed physical security within contexts of extreme fragility.” (Save the Children-UK, 2008) Some of the most desperate sectors of the population, such as orphaned children, may view peacekeepers as replacement protectors or parents. Thus the environment of a failed state combined with a desperate population and close proximity with international aid workers, can significantly increase the risk of SEA.

SEA is the most common form of sexual violence perpetrated by peacekeepers. There appears to be general consensus that one of the primary causes of SEA is the extreme economic inequality between peacekeepers and the local communities (Zeid, 2005; Ahlenius, 2007; Whitworth, 2004; Brownmiller, 1975). The OIOS explains that prostitution is a “supply and demand situation” that is common in areas where desperate populations interact with well-paid
international personnel (Ahlenius, 2007). On the supply side are women and children who suffer from an extreme lack of economic and livelihood options (Simic, 2009). In order to survive and support their dependents, many feel their only option is to trade sex—a situation known as 

*survival sex*. Save the Children-UK found that children would trade sex for goods and other necessities like food, money, soap, clothing and even souvenirs (2008). People may also trade sex for promises of protection or other services (Ahlenius, 2007). Whether these women call themselves prostitutes, wives or girlfriends we cannot ignore the lack of control they have over their lives; as Brownmiller said of the prostitutes during WWII “the lure of the dollar to starving women…was coercion enough.” (1975. The distinction between survival sex and rape can become blurry in these kinds of situations and Allred explains that sometimes the exchange of goods only occurs after forced sex to give the encounter the appearance that it was consensual.

The UN has stated that when peacekeepers engage in sexual relations with locals, regardless of whether the situation appears consensual, whether there is a transaction involved or whether there is a relationship involved, peacekeepers are committing SEA.

On the demand side are peacekeepers that, according to Rúden, can earn as much as fifty times more than members of the local population (2009). In addition to having more resources than the local population, peacekeepers have given a number of reasons for why they participate in SEA, many of which I discussed in Chapter Seven with Higate’s findings (generosity, loneliness, pressure, etc.). An additional motivation, one that even the UN has deemed legitimate, is the lack of hobbies or structured activities. The OIOS recommends that peacekeepers be provided with recreational outlets, sports and team activities to keep them busy during they are off-duty to serve as a preventative measures for SEA (Ahlenius, 2007). Simic disagrees as these outlets simply isolate the UN personnel from the local community, which does
not facilitate the development of trust or communication, and implies that male peacekeepers are not able to control their sex drives (2009). As I demonstrated in Chapter One, this kind of biological explanation for sexual violence has been long discredited among scholars.

Refugee camps are typically one of the main settings that peacekeepers interact with civilian populations. In Chapter Two I discussed the dangers extra dangers and risks that these camps pose for women and children and in the DRC nearly 75% of all refugees and IDPs are women and children (MONUSCO, 2011b). Camps lack structure, safe borders and reliable surveillance (Nair, 2005). Within such environments peacekeepers have frequent and informal interactions with locals, which increase the chances for SEA.

OIOS noted that “peacekeeper babies” were a concerning effect of the situation of SEA in the DRC. Peacekeeper babies are those children fathered and ultimately abandoned by peacekeeping personnel. During the UN mission to Liberia, Rehn & Sirleaf estimate that 6,600 children were fathered by peacekeepers between 1990 and 1998 (2002). These children and their mothers are often stigmatized, pushed to the margins of their community and even refused citizenship. Rüden finds that the situation surrounding peacekeeper babies can negatively impact the peace-building process in the DRC (2009). For example, in 2003 there were disputes between locals and peacekeepers over the paternity of some of these children, which caused hostility towards the UN operations.

The OIOS found that another harmful effect of peacekeeper-perpetrated SEA was the increased risk of transmission of HIV/AIDS throughout the DRC. In Chapter Five I described that HIV/AIDS was already rampant among combatants and that the risk of contracting the disease was higher with sexual violence. Kent explains that peacekeepers can actually serve as a “bridging group” for the disease to spread between international personnel and locals (2007).
This is in part because peacekeepers can actually bring the disease with them to host communities. The decision to test personnel lies with the TCC and the UN cannot know which, if any, of their personnel are positive carriers of HIV/AIDS or other STDs (Rehn & Sirleaf, 2002). Rúden finds the higher transmission rates of HIV/AIDS throughout host communities is proof that peacekeepers are engaging in high-risk sexual activities; either by having sex with multiple partners or by having sex with prostitutes (2009).

Which Peacekeepers become Perpetrators?

During my research I was curious to see if there was any correlation between the national origins of peacekeeper and their likelihood of becoming a perpetrator. Or does the situation of gender in the peacekeeper’s nation of origin manifest itself into sexual violence during their deployment? Unfortunately, the UN has yet to make or provide a public record of which peacekeepers have been accused of committing sexual violence. This is in part a result of the UN trying to keep positive relationships with the TCCs by not publicly shaming the peacekeepers they provide. It also is a result of the fact that the criminal jurisdiction over peacekeepers lies exclusively with the TCC.

Despite the fact that the UN has not provided the information regarding the specifics of allegations or which troops have been accused, I have gathered my own data from my survey of the literature and reports related to SEA by peacekeepers\(^\text{96}\). I then ranked them according to the Global Gender Gap Index 2010 rankings so I could analyze the spread of those nations with peacekeepers who were accused/convicted of sexual violence while deployed (Hausmann, Tyson

\(^{96}\) See Appendix 7 for the results of my data collection on peacekeeper-perpetrated sexual violence as it compares with the Global Gender Gap Index of 2010.
I found that peacekeepers alleged to have committed violence came from sixteen nations: six from Europe, three from Africa, two from North America, Asia and the Middle East and one from South America. From the information I gathered, it appears that perpetrators come from virtually any nation, regardless of how egalitarian the society is. Perpetrators are from more egalitarian nations like the United States and Denmark and from less egalitarian nations like Pakistan and India. MONUC perpetrators, according to various reports, have been from South Africa, France, Uruguay, Tunisia, India, Morocco and Pakistan. Although peacekeeper perpetrators seem to come from all sorts of cultures, to make a judgment on whether the situation of gender in one’s home country or the relations between the home country and host state of the mission influence the chance that a peacekeeper will become a perpetrator, a significant amount of research and data collection is needed on behalf of the UN and NGOs. If this research does not yield a correlation between nationality and propensity to commit violence, this could tell us that the problem of SEA by UN personnel is a systematic problem. Instead, I address the efforts the UN has sponsored so far in regards to the allegations against MONUC personnel to determine whether the pattern of peacekeepers perpetrating SEA has continued.

C. Reports of Peacekeepers committing Sexual Violence in the DRC

There are four UN reports that have addressed the issue of MONUC/MONUSCO personnel committing sexual violence in the DRC: two from OIOS (2005 and 2007), Prince

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97 The Global Gender Gap Index was introduced by the World Economic Forum in 2006 and according to the authors it “benchmarks national gender gaps on economic, political, education- and health- based criteria, and provides country rankings that allow for effective comparisons across regions and income groups, and over time.” (Hausmann, Tyson & Zahidi, 2010)

98 Europe: France, Denmark, Germany, Slovakia, Italy and Ireland. Africa: South Africa, Tunisia and Morocco. North America: United States and Canada. Middle East: Pakistan and Jordan. Asia: India and Nepal. See Appendix 6 for each Gender Gap Ranking and Index, the time, setting and description of the violence committed by each.
Zeid’s 2005 report and a series of annual General Assembly reports on the Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse.

In 2003 the DPKO reported to the UN that it investigated allegations of SEA against five staff and 19 military personnel in the DRC (Zeid, 2005). Then between May and September 2004 MONUC received allegations of SEA against four civilian personnel and 68 military personnel in Bunia. The OIOS investigated a total of 72 allegations and closed 44 because investigators were unable to identify either victims or witnesses. The OIOS investigated 20 individual cases that implicated 51 military personnel but only seven of these were substantiated. 99 A majority of these cases involved children, girls between the ages of 12 and 16. Many of the cases also involved men and boys ranging in age from eight to 25 who operated as “procurers or pimps” for the girls by arranging their meetings with the peacekeepers and retaining some of their payment (Nair, 2005). Among its general findings, the report notes that the problem of SEA was “serious and on-going.” Even more disturbing was that “despite knowledge that the investigation was ongoing, sexual activities between the military and the local population apparently continued.” (Nair, 2005)

As a result of that first investigation and the negative press that the UN was receiving, the Secretary-General requested that Prince Zeid of Jordan report on the situation of SEA in UN peacekeeping operations (2005). His report marked the first time the UN sponsored a comprehensive analysis on the issue and his report showed “an alarming picture of a wide spread and largely tolerated phenomenon.” Prince Zeid interviewed victims and personnel in the DRC and found that survival sex, rape and peacekeeper babies were serious issues in the DRC. Girls would have sex with peacekeepers in exchange for food, jobs or, on average, US$1 to US$3 per

99 Of the remaining 13 cases, the OIOS found that in 2 of the cases the perpetrator’s identity was not “fully corroborate” and in the other 11 victims and witnesses could not positively identify the perpetrator although there was evidence of SEA (Zeid 2005; OIOS 2005).
encounter. Others experienced “rape disguised as prostitution” and were given money or food after being raped so that the exchange appeared to be consensual (Nair, 2005). Prince Zeid concluded his report with recommendations for more effective punishment for violators including termination and reconsideration of the MOU so that TCCs are legally obligated to punish those who are found guilty of violating local laws and UN policy (Nair, 2005).

The second OIOS investigation in the DRC started in Bunia with reviewed efforts into the original allegations, however, the OIOS received 217 allegations between January and February of 2006 of MONUC peacekeepers committing SEA against girls under 18 years of age (Ahlenius, 2007). The OIOS was able to identity 54 victims and determine that 75 peacekeepers were responsible for the allegations. Ten allegations were from girls who either impregnated by or gave birth to children fathered by peacekeepers. Their report confirmed that SEA by peacekeepers was an ongoing and potentially worsening situation in the DRC, despite the fact that all of the MONUC personnel had received SEA awareness training both prior to their deployment and upon their arrival to the DRC (Ahlenius, 2007).

The General Assembly started documenting allegations of SEA by department and field operation on an annual basis starting in 2005. I created the following table using those reports from 2005-2009, which shows both the number of allegations by MONUC and throughout DPKO, in addition to the number of allegations provided by the two OIOS reports. These reports also noted allegations in several other UN departments.

100 The number for the year of 2006 was taken from the GA annual report, not the OIOS report. The reasons for the different numbers could be due to the OIOS only investigating claims in Bunia and not the entire country.

101 OCHA, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; OIOS, Office of Internal Oversight Services, UNHCR, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; UNDP, UN Development Program; UNICEF, UN Children’s Fund; UNFW, UN Fund for Women; UNRWA, UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East; UNU, United Nations University; UN Volunteers Program; WFP, World Food Program.
Table 4: Allegations of SEA by MONUC, the DPKO and the UN from 2004-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>MONUC Total (%) DPKO</th>
<th>DPKO Total (% UN)</th>
<th>UN Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>72 (68.6%)</td>
<td>105 (86.7%)</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>134 (39.4%)</td>
<td>340 (91.2%)</td>
<td>373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>176 (49.3%) (GA) or 217 (OIOS)</td>
<td>357 (96.2%)</td>
<td>371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>59 (46.5%)</td>
<td>127 (80.1%)</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>40 (48.2%)</td>
<td>83 (74.8%)</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>59 (52.7%)</td>
<td>112 (72.7%)</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>430 (38.3%)</td>
<td>1124 (87.3%)</td>
<td>1287</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are several important findings derived from the above table but first it is important to note that these numbers represent the number of allegations received by the peacekeeping missions, the DPKO and the UN. This does not represent the number of investigated or substantiated claims. It also does not represent the actual number of instances of sexual abuse and exploitation by UN peacekeepers and UN personnel. The first OIOS investigation showed how difficult it was to substantiate allegations in the DRC; out of 72 allegations they were only able to thoroughly investigate and substantiate seven claims. This is because there are many difficulties in trying to conduct an investigation involving international personnel in a country torn by war and the difficulties involved in investigating sexual violence in general. The OIOS explained that the inability to identify perpetrators, victims and witnesses contributed to the lack of investigations. The hesitance of victims and witnesses to testify also contributed to this. Still, the above information may provide a glimpse of the real situation in the DRC.

Sources for Table 4 include the following: General Assembly (2005), General Assembly (2006), General Assembly (2007), General Assembly (2008), General Assembly (2009), General Assembly (2010), Nair (2005), Ahlenuis (2007) and Zeid (2005).

The total number of missions that received allegations are as follows: 2004 – not available, 2005 – not available, 2006 – 12 missions total, 2007 – 9 missions total, 2008 – 5 missions total, 2009 – 11 missions total.

The OIOS explained that the inability to identify perpetrators, victims and witnesses contributed to the lack of investigations. The hesitance of victims and witnesses to testify also contributed to this (Nair 2005).
According to the data available, MONUC received allegations of SEA for every month, save one (August of 2008), between 2006 and 2009. This consistency can either reveal more improved reporting mechanisms or the continuing pattern of SEA by peacekeepers. MONUC was also responsible for a large majority of the allegations received by the DPKO for the years evaluated. Out of eleven missions that received allegations of SEA against peacekeeping personnel in 2009, MONUC was responsible for 52.7% of the total allegations the DPKO received. Ospina noted that “the overall number of allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) against DPKO/DFS staff increased in 2009 compared with 2008, with MONUC in DRC accounting for most of the increase” (2010), all of which is verified by the information above.

The table also reveals that the DPKO has been responsible for a large majority of the annual allegations against UN personnel. Out of the six years with information available, the DPKO was responsible for a total of 87.3% of the allegations against UN personnel, which also means that MONUC was responsible for almost 40% of all allegations of SEA throughout the UN. It appears that not only is there a pattern of sexual violence throughout the DPKO but also that the pattern is most apparent in the DRC.

Although annual General Assembly report on Special Measures from SEA for 2010 has not yet been made public, I was able to find a some news reports and press releases that described number of allegations and investigations for 2010. According to the AFP, UN spokesman Farhan Haq explained in July of 2010 that the OIOS was investigating two allegations of SEA against two MONUC personnel (2010). I anticipate that more information about the 2010 allegations and general situation of sexual violence with more time and as a result my analysis is mainly restricted to between 1999 and 2009.
D. Discussion

The UN has certainly acknowledged, condemned and begun to seriously monitor the issue of peacekeepers committing sexual violence, particularly SEA. In Chapter Four I explained the many policies prohibiting peacekeepers from engaging in SEA and in Chapter Six I discussed the gender reform efforts specifically intended to deter sexual violence, including the CDTs, SVUs and Gender Units. After evaluating the reports of various NGOs, news companies and UN entities, I conclude that despite the efforts of the UN, there is a pattern of sexual violence by personnel within the DPKO and that this pattern is ongoing in the DRC operations.

I conclude that peacekeepers exacerbate the overall situation of sexual violence in the DRC directly and indirectly. By engaging in SEA or other forms of sexual violence, peacekeepers are directly adding to the number and prevalence of sexual violence in the country. They are indirectly exacerbated the situation by sending a message to the host community and their fellow personnel that that SEA, the victimization of women and violence are acceptable behaviors. This increases the overall tolerance of sexual violence and adds to the atmosphere of impunity.
Conclusion

In this paper I have reported on how United Nations peacekeeping operations have affected the situation of sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo from 1999 to the present. My intent was to show that peacekeepers could negatively impact the situation of sexual violence through their actions and attitudes towards gender. My question was whether the UN operations to the DRC have really improved the situation. Inspired by both the continuing violence throughout the country and the reports of peacekeeper-perpetrated sexual violence, I anticipated that the UN operations to the DRC had not improved the situation.

I have shown that current status of the gender reform throughout the United Nations organization, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, MONUC and MONUSCO is inconsistent. There have been numerous political and structural developments that have laid the foundation for increased consideration of gender within UN activities, ideally leading to a greater involvement of women and giving hope to victims of violence. Yet there remain a number of important initiatives that the UN operations in the DRC have not applied. The most concerning is the lack of gender balancing, specifically the military forces. It is the UN’s position that the incorporation of women can positively affect the overall relations with the host community, especially communication about gender and human rights issues and the accuracy of sexual violence reports, but women are not being sent to places like the DRC where they are most needed. Empirical research needs to be done to statistically determine what impact women have in these areas and what proportion of women is needed to achieve each of the desired effects.

I have also shown that discussion of militarized masculinity is relevant when evaluating the peacekeeping operations in the DRC. Using the monthly statistics provided by the UN I was able to prove that the operations have two important similarities to national armies: they are
primarily militaristic and they are male-dominated. Previous research by Whitworth, Martin and Higate revealed that the attitudes towards gender could affect the likelihood that a peacekeeper will commit SEA or some other form of sexual violence. Whitworth explained that gendered attitudes of soldiers and peacekeepers could result in “explosions of militarized masculinity,” which can take the form of SEA (2004). Martin demonstrated how the “boys will be boys” attitude has been characteristic of many operations in Africa although it has decreased in the years following the initiation of the gender reform. Still, this attitude assumes peacekeepers, being men, require a sexual outlet and will protect one another out of loyalty from condemnations of misconduct from the host population. Finally, Higate showed that these attitudes affect how peacekeepers in the DRC view their sexual relations with locals while on missions. Through interviews, Higate found that peacekeepers viewed SEA as a consensual transaction that satiated both the “unquestioned masculinized biological sex drive” of the male personnel and the enthusiasm of local women to obtain goods and services.

The literature suggests that militarized masculinity could be a primary contributory factor in the phenomenon of SEA within the DPKO operations. Unfortunately, within the context of my argument I am not able to prove that their theories apply to the ongoing situation in the DRC because more current research has yet to be done. Thus, in order for me to definitively conclude that the male-dominated, and mainly militaristic, forces of MONUC and MONUSCO have indeed allowed for the development of ‘militarized masculinity,’ I would need the results of more recent interviews.

Finally, this paper demonstrated that there has been a pattern of SEA within UN peacekeeping operations and that this pattern has continued in the DRC. The OIOS, Secretariat and the General Assembly have all taken steps to report on the situation of SEA within MONUC
and/or monitor the number of allegations received by the mission. Using those reports I was able
to tabulate the allegations received by MONUC, the DPKO and the UN. The results revealed that
the UN consistently received allegations of sexual misconduct on a monthly basis for at least five
years. This information also revealed that MONUC was responsible for a majority of all
allegations received by the DPKO, and the DPKO was responsible for the majority of all
allegations received by the UN. The continuing pattern of SEA by MONUC peacekeepers has
negatively affected the host community by increasing the spread of HIV/AIDS, producing
peacekeeper babies, increasing the overall prevalence of sexual violence and sustaining a culture
of impunity and toleration for violence.

Although there has been a pattern of sexual abuse and exploitation by peacekeepers over
the years, not all peacekeeping troops are perpetrators. In fact, a majority of peacekeepers are the
model citizens we expect them to be. Additionally, many peacekeeping operations have
positively impacted host countries and the desperate populations they serve. Even missions that
are accused of SEA can have positive impacts on the region. MONUC and MONUSCO have
helped in the demobilization of troops, the distribution of essential aid, the establishment of
refugee camps and educational programs for children.

In their study of the effects of interventions on women, Mary Caproili and Kimberly
Lynn Douglass concluded, “Women fare no worse, but they fare no better.” (2008) With the
limited information and evidence currently available, I cannot conclude that peacekeepers have
worsened or improved the situation of sexual violence for the women in the DRC. My findings
do suggest, however, that there is a possibility that the UN peacekeepers in the DRC have not
improved the overall situation of sexual violence.
**Implications**

After exploring the issue of peacekeepers and sexual violence, it is important to step back and look at the larger picture. The United Nations is a highly influential and integral body within international relations and is at the forefront of the struggle to spread respect for human rights and women’s rights worldwide. Peacekeepers, as representatives of the UN, are supposed to be the guardians of these rights and human security. They are the manifestations of the discourse of empathy, the ‘never again’ attitude and feminist jurisprudence within international relations. It may first appear counterintuitive to think that peacekeepers can harm the local populations they are deployed to serve, yet, as I have demonstrated in this thesis, this has been the case in a variety of UN missions and is currently the case in the ongoing mission to the DRC. What does it mean that peacekeepers may be committing SEA, exhibiting militarized masculinities and not implementing gender reform? It means more must be done to ensure that peacekeepers abide by the foundational principles of the UN.

In 2005 the Under-Secretary-General for peacekeeping operations, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, said “If we fail… to approve decisive and visible steps to limit sexual abuse in UN peacekeeping, then it will have serious implications for the future of peacekeeping,” (Martin, 2005). Considering that the future of peacekeeping is on a trajectory of dramatic growth, it is imperative that the UN address and limit any negative effects their personnel have on local communities. The situation in the DRC shows how peacekeepers can harm a host community and the reputation of the United Nations. Prince Zeid explains that the UN cannot expect Member States to adhere to international norms and human rights standards if its own personnel do not adhere to those same standards (2006). By committing SEA or other forms of sexual violence a peacekeeper directly undermines legal, judicial and criminal reforms that the UN
generally tries to establish in host communities. These kinds of behaviors also have very negative consequences outside of the direct effects in host communities: they provide ammunition for critics, obstructionists and negative media campaigns: host nations may not be willing to allow peacekeepers within their borders if they expect their local population to be manipulated and abused by the international personnel; TCCs may supply fewer troops in order to limit the shame that might come to their nation if one of their nationals is involved in allegations of SEA; the DPKO may have to reconsider the process through which they accept volunteer personnel from TCCs or the way they train their personnel; the Security Council may not be as willing to authorize future missions if peacekeepers cannot be counted on to appropriately fulfill their mandates and represent the UN; and lastly, the UN may lose credibility as a supporter of human rights and legitimate forum for international relations if its personnel continue to be implicated in widespread abuse of locals (Kent, 2007).

Research Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research

The conclusions and methods of this research were strongly constrained by the timing of the undergraduate thesis program, the withholding of information by the UN and the inability to access the most up to date information due to the ongoing nature of the conflict. The purpose of this thesis was to shed light on a topic that is generally ignored and virtually impossible to document. I’ve already discussed how there are impediments to accurate reporting in many different ways. Victims can be too stigmatized, frightened and hurt to report an attack or may die before getting the opportunity. Depending on the location and culture, sexual violence may not be a crime and thus no legal or judicial outlets exist to support victims. Reporting is also difficult if the structures, procedures or mechanisms for collecting and investigating claims are weak, as
is characteristic of developing and war-torn nations like the DRC. Yet even US, a country with a stable and long-standing structure, is a far way from accurate reporting. In 2009 the FBI (2009) estimated there were 88,097 rapes and RAINN (2011) estimates that only 40% are reported to the police. The lack of information about sexual violence in the DRC is thus not unusual.

In the study of sexual violence and peacekeepers, there are a number of conflicts that could have served as additional or comparative case studies, but I found that the DRC offered a unique and interesting research opportunity; this is a conflict that has attracted years of international attention, because of the ongoing fighting and the continuing SEA by peacekeepers. Although I evaluated the political and structural deterrence efforts (gender reform, Comprehensive Strategy, SVUs), I did not focus on the judicial or criminal deterrence efforts on behalf of the UN or the DRC. Further research is needed on the investigations, proceedings and prosecutions of the sexual violence cases in the DRC to see if the 2006 laws are effective and helping women. Research is also needed on whether the allegations, investigations (by the UN and TCCs) and punishments are deterring peacekeepers from engaging in SEA.

Within this thesis I have already made reference to a few areas related to this topic that require more research. With respect to militarized masculinity, research needs to be done in fields to which peacekeepers are deployed (particularly through the use of interviews and direct observation) and at UN headquarters. Sandra Whitworth argues that up until 2004 there had not been discussion at the UN about the effects of masculinity or militarized masculinity. Therefore, an area of study related to my hypothesis would be the structure of the discourse towards gender, sexual violence and masculinity within the UN, the DPKO and peacekeeping operations.

In Chapter Eight I also briefly looked at the nationalities of peacekeepers that have been accused of committing SEA to see whether the cultural attitudes or nationalities of peacekeeping
troops affect their likelihood to commit violence. Do more perpetrators come from western nations, eastern or Asian nations? Or do the domestic politics or relations between a host country and TCC affect a peacekeeper’s behavior? This kind of research is made even more tempting after considering that more developing nations are supplying the personnel for UN operations.

Research also needs to be done on the correlation between the intensity of the conflict and the amount of sexual violence perpetrated by peacekeepers. To establish a sense of the intensity it would be helpful to have numerical data on the number of battles, combatants, fatalities and injuries. It would then be necessary to have reliable data of sexual violence perpetrated both by peacekeepers and combatants. This would allow for a comparison between the intensity of the conflict and the sexual violence on the two major parties of concern. Having this type of data might also provide an answer for another query; what is the percentage of sexual violence perpetration from peacekeepers and how does this compare to combatants? The answer to this could also establish whether militarized masculinity is more or less present in combatants compared to peacekeepers and whether this has an effect on committing SEA.

In a perfect world, all the research that I’ve discussed would be done, but given the nature of conflict even a portion of this could be influential in the understanding of the sexual violence in war and by peacekeepers. At the beginning of this research my hypothesis was that United Nations peacekeepers have not improved the situation of sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Even with the limited information available I was able determine that the gender reform and militarized masculinities may be legitimate influences on sexual violence and that peacekeepers in the DRC have perpetuated the pattern of SEA by UN personnel. In the end, I argue that more research must be done before I can conclude what the effect, if any, the UN peacekeepers have had on the situation of sexual violence in the DRC.
Appendices

Appendix 1: Resolution 1325 (Security Council, 2000)

The Security Council,


Recalling also the commitments of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (A/52/231) as well as those contained in the outcome document of the twenty-third Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly entitled “Women 2000: Gender Equality, Development and Peace for the Twenty-First Century” (A/S-23/10/Rev.1), in particular those concerning women and armed conflict,

Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the primary responsibility of the Security Council under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Expressing concern that civilians, particularly women and children, account for the vast majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict, including as refugees and internally displaced persons, and increasingly are targeted by combatants and armed elements, and recognizing the consequent impact this has on durable peace and reconciliation,

Reaffirming the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building, and stressing the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, and the need to increase their role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution,

Reaffirming also the need to implement fully international humanitarian and human rights law that protects the rights of women and girls during and after conflicts,


Emphasizing the need for all parties to ensure that mine clearance and mine awareness programmes take into account the special needs of women and girls,

Recognizing the urgent need to mainstream a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations, and in this regard noting the Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations (S/2000/693),

Recognizing also the importance of the recommendation contained in the statement of its President to the press of 8 March 2000 for specialized training for all peacekeeping personnel on the protection, special needs and human rights of women and children in conflict situations,

Recognizing that an understanding of the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, effective institutional arrangements to guarantee their protection and full participation in the peace process can significantly contribute to the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security,

Noting the need to consolidate data on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls,

1. Urges Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict;
2. Encourages the Secretary-General to implement his strategic plan of action (A/49/587) calling for an increase in the participation of women at decision-making levels in conflict resolution and peace processes;
3. Urges the Secretary-General to appoint more women as special representatives and envoys to pursue good offices on his behalf, and in this regard calls on Member States to provide candidates to the Secretary-General, for inclusion in a regularly updated centralized roster;

4. Further urges the Secretary-General to seek to expand the role and contribution of women in United Nations field-based operations, and especially among military observers, civilian police, human rights and humanitarian personnel;

5. Expresses its willingness to incorporate a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations, and urges the Secretary-General to ensure that, where appropriate, field operations include a gender component;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to provide to Member States training guidelines and materials on the protection, rights and the particular needs of women, as well as on the importance of involving women in all peacekeeping and peace-building measures, invites Member States to incorporate these elements as well as HIV/AIDS awareness training into their national training programmes for military and civilian police personnel in preparation for deployment, and further requests the Secretary-General to ensure that civilian personnel of peacekeeping operations receive similar training;

7. Urges Member States to increase their voluntary financial, technical and logistical support for gender-sensitive training efforts, including those undertaken by relevant funds and programmes, inter alia, the United Nations Fund for Women and United Nations Children’s Fund, and by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other relevant bodies;

8. Calls on all actors involved, when negotiating and implementing peace agreements, to adopt a gender perspective, including, inter alia:

(a) The special needs of women and girls during repatriation and resettlement and for rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction;

(b) Measures that support local women’s peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict resolution, and that involve women in all of the implementation mechanisms of the peace agreements;

(c) Measures that ensure the protection of and respect for human rights of women and girls, particularly as they relate to the constitution, the electoral system, the police and the judiciary;


10. Calls on all parties to armed conflict to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, and all other forms of violence in situations of armed conflict;

11. Emphasizes the responsibility of all States to put an end to impunity and to prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes including those relating to sexual and other violence against women and girls, and in this regard stresses the need to exclude these crimes, where feasible from amnesty provisions;

12. Calls upon all parties to armed conflict to respect the civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements, and to take into account the particular needs of women and girls, including in their design, and recalls its resolutions 1208 (1998) of 19 November 1998 and 1296 (2000) of 19 April 2000;
13. Encourages all those involved in the planning for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration to consider the different needs of female and male ex-combatants and to take into account the needs of their dependants;

14. Reaffirms its readiness, whenever measures are adopted under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, to give consideration to their potential impact on the civilian population, bearing in mind the special needs of women and girls, in order to consider appropriate humanitarian exemptions;

15. Expresses its willingness to ensure that Security Council missions take into account gender considerations and the rights of women, including through consultation with local and international women’s groups;

16. Invites the Secretary-General to carry out a study on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, the role of women in peace-building and the gender dimensions of peace processes and conflict resolution, and further invites him to submit a report to the Security Council on the results of this study and to make this available to all Member States of the United Nations;

17. Requests the Secretary-General, where appropriate, to include in his reporting to the Security Council progress on gender mainstreaming throughout peacekeeping missions and all other aspects relating to women and girls;

18. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
Appendix 2: Resolution 1820 (Security Council, 2008)

The Security Council,


Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Reaffirming also the resolve expressed in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document to eliminate all forms of violence against women and girls, including by ending impunity and by ensuring the protection of civilians, in particular women and girls, during and after armed conflicts, in accordance with the obligations States have undertaken under international humanitarian law and international human rights law;


Reaffirming also the obligations of States Parties to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the Optional Protocol thereto, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Optional Protocols thereto, and urging states that have not yet done so to consider ratifying or acceding to them,

Noting that civilians account for the vast majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict; that women and girls are particularly targeted by the use of sexual violence, including as a tactic of war to humiliate, dominate, in still fear in, disperse and/or forcibly relocate civilian members of a community or ethnic group; and that sexual violence perpetrated in this manner may in some instances persist after the cessation of hostilities;

Recalling its condemnation in the strongest terms of all sexual and other forms of violence committed against civilians in armed conflict, in particular women and children;

Reiterating deep concern that, despite its repeated condemnation of violence against women and children in situations of armed conflict, including sexual violence in situations of armed conflict, and despite its calls addressed to all parties to armed conflict for the cessation of such acts with immediate effect, such acts continue to occur, and in some situations have become systematic and widespread, reaching appalling levels of brutality,

Recalling the inclusion of a range of sexual violence offences in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the statutes of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals,

Reaffirming the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peacebuilding, and stressing the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, and the need to increase their role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution,

Deeply concerned also about the persistent obstacles and challenges to women’s participation and full involvement in the prevention and resolution of conflicts as a result of violence, intimidation and discrimination, which erode women’s capacity and legitimacy to participate in post-conflict public life, and acknowledging the negative impact this has on durable peace, security and reconciliation, including post-conflict peacebuilding,

Recognizing that States bear primary responsibility to respect and ensure the human rights of their citizens, as well as all individuals within their territory as provided for by relevant international law,
Reaffirming that parties to armed conflict bear the primary responsibility to take all feasible steps to ensure the protection of affected civilians,

Welcoming the ongoing coordination of efforts within the United Nations system, marked by the inter-agency initiative “United Nations Action against Sexual Violence in Conflict,” to create awareness about sexual violence in armed conflicts and post-conflict situations and, ultimately, to put an end to it,

1. Stresses that sexual violence, when used or commissioned as a tactic of war in order to deliberately target civilians or as a part of a widespread or systematic attack against civilian populations, can significantly exacerbate situations of armed conflict and may impede the restoration of international peace and security, affirms in this regard that effective steps to prevent and respond to such acts of sexual violence can significantly contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, and expresses its readiness, when considering situations on the agenda of the Council, to, where necessary, adopt appropriate steps to address widespread or systematic sexual violence;

2. Demands the immediate and complete cessation by all parties to armed conflict of all acts of sexual violence against civilians with immediate effect;

3. Demands that all parties to armed conflict immediately take appropriate measures to protect civilians, including women and girls, from all forms of sexual violence, which could include, inter alia, enforcing appropriate military disciplinary measures and upholding the principle of command responsibility, training troops on the categorical prohibition of all forms of sexual violence against civilians, debunking myths that fuel sexual violence, vetting armed and security forces to take into account past actions of rape and other forms of sexual violence, and evacuation of women and children under imminent threat of sexual violence to safety; and requests the Secretary-General, where appropriate, to encourage dialogue to address this issue in the context of broader discussions of conflict resolution between appropriate UN officials and the parties to the conflict, taking into account, inter alia, the views expressed by women of affected local communities;

4. Notes that rape and other forms of sexual violence can constitute a war crime, a crime against humanity, or a constitutive act with respect to genocide, stresses the need for the exclusion of sexual violence crimes from amnesty provisions in the context of conflict resolution processes, and calls upon Member States to comply with their obligations for prosecuting persons responsible for such acts, to ensure that all victims of sexual violence, particularly women and girls, have equal protection under the law and equal access to justice, and stresses the importance of ending impunity for such acts as part of a comprehensive approach to seeking sustainable peace, justice, truth, and national reconciliation;

5. Affirms its intention, when establishing and renewing state-specific sanctions regimes, to take into consideration the appropriateness of targeted and graduated measures against parties to situations of armed conflict who commit rape and other forms of sexual violence against women and girls in situations of armed conflict;

6. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Security Council, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group and relevant States, as appropriate, to develop and implement appropriate training programs for all peacekeeping and humanitarian personnel deployed by the United Nations in the context of missions as mandated by the Council to help them better prevent, recognize and respond to sexual violence and other forms of violence against civilians;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to continue and strengthen efforts to implement the policy of zero tolerance of sexual exploitation and abuse in United Nations peacekeeping operations; and urges troop and police contributing countries to take appropriate preventative action, including pre-deployment and in-theatre awareness training, and other action to ensure full accountability in cases of such conduct involving their personnel;

8. Encourages troop and police contributing countries, in consultation with the Secretary-General, to consider steps they could take to heighten awareness and the responsiveness of their personnel participating in United Nations peacekeeping operations to protect civilians, including women and children, and prevent sexual violence against women and girls in conflict and post-conflict situations, including wherever possible the deployment of a higher percentage of women peacekeepers or police;
9. **Requests** the Secretary-General to develop effective guidelines and strategies to enhance the ability of relevant United Nations peacekeeping operations, consistent with their mandates, to protect civilians, including women and girls, from all forms of sexual violence and to systematically include in his written reports to the Council on conflict situations his observations concerning the protection of women and girls and recommendations in this regard;

10. **Requests** the Secretary-General and relevant United Nations agencies, inter alia, through consultation with women and women-led organizations as appropriate, to develop effective mechanisms for providing protection from violence, including in particular sexual violence, to women and girls in and around United Nations managed refugee and internally displaced persons camps, as well as in all disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration processes, and in justice and security sector reform efforts assisted by the United Nations;

11. **Stresses** the important role the Peacebuilding Commission can play by including in its advice and recommendations for post-conflict peacebuilding strategies, where appropriate, ways to address sexual violence committed during and in the aftermath of armed conflict, and in ensuring consultation and effective representation of women’s civil society in its country-specific configurations, as part of its wider approach to gender issues;

12. **Urges** the Secretary-General and his Special Envoys to invite women to participate in discussions pertinent to the prevention and resolution of conflict, the maintenance of peace and security, and post-conflict peacebuilding, and encourages all parties to such talks to facilitate the equal and full participation of women at decision-making levels;

13. **Urges** all parties concerned, including Member States, United Nations entities and financial institutions, to support the development and strengthening of the capacities of national institutions, in particular of judicial and health systems, and of local civil society networks in order to provide sustainable assistance to victims of sexual violence in armed conflict and post-conflict situations;

14. **Urges** appropriate regional and sub-regional bodies in particular to consider developing and implementing policies, activities, and advocacy for the benefit of women and girls affected by sexual violence in armed conflict;

15. **Also requests** the Secretary-General to submit a report to the Council by 30 June 2009 on the implementation of this resolution in the context of situations which are on the agenda of the Council, utilizing information from available United Nations sources, including country teams, peacekeeping operations, and other United Nations personnel, which would include, inter alia, information on situations of armed conflict in which sexual violence has been widely or systematically employed against civilians; analysis of the prevalence and trends of sexual violence in situations of armed conflict; proposals for strategies to minimize the susceptibility of women and girls to such violence; benchmarks for measuring progress in preventing and addressing sexual violence; appropriate input from United Nations implementing partners in the field; information on his plans for facilitating the collection of timely, objective, accurate, and reliable information on the use of sexual violence in situations of armed conflict, including through improved coordination of United Nations activities on the ground and at Headquarters; and information on actions taken by parties to armed conflict to implement their responsibilities as described in this resolution, in particular by immediately and completely ceasing all acts of sexual violence and in taking appropriate measures to protect women and girls from all forms of sexual violence;

16. **Decides** to remain actively seized of the matter.

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<tr>
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<th>Total Personnel</th>
<th>Percent Military</th>
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</table>
Appendix 4: MONUC Deployment Map as of April 2010 (DPKO, 2010)
Appendix 5: The Implementation of Gender Mainstreaming by the DPKO\textsuperscript{105}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluated Category</th>
<th>Initiatives(s) in Place</th>
<th>Initiative(s) Not in Place</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Policy</td>
<td>Policy or strategy in place</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 2. Structure       | Program-level gender unit/specialist  
                    | Gender unit or adviser in each field location (where applicable)  
                    | Gender focal points in each division  
                    | Advice and assistance from gender focal points/gender unit given to staff | Program-level non-gender specialist focal point |
| 3. Tools           | Central guidelines for implementation  
                    | Guidelines tailored to subprograms, regions and/or countries | NA |
| 4. Resources       | Mechanism tracking devoted human resources | Allocated funding  
                    | Mechanism tracking devoted financial resources |
| 5. Capacity        | Training for gender focal points  
                    | Training for staff | Compulsory training |
| Development        | In Electronic Performance Appraisal System (e-PAS) documentation for gender focal points  
                    | In recruitment documentation | Clear lines of accountability  
                    | In e-PAS documentation for staff |
| 6. Accountability  | Collection of sex-disaggregated data  
                    | Dissemination of best practices, suggestions and examples | Gender audit or evaluation conducted within the last five years  
                    | Gender-sensitive indicators |
| 7. Monitoring       |                        |                           |
| and Reporting      |                        |                           |

\textsuperscript{105} The information of this chart was extracted from the OIOS UN-wide evaluation done by Muir, Jogoo, & Rieper that identified which entities implemented or did not implement the listed mechanisms (2010).
**Appendix 6: MONUC/MONUSCO Gender Demographics 2006-2011 (DPKO, 2011a)**

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<th>Female Military</th>
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<tr>
<td>Nov-06</td>
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### Appendix 7: 2010 Global Gender Gap Index and Peacekeeper-Perpetrated Sexual Violence

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<td>7, 0.7719</td>
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Reference List


Sheperd, L. (2010). *Gender Matters in Global Politics.* New York: Routedge,


