Politeness Strategies in Plautus and Terence

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Introduction

This thesis is a study of the effects of politeness on the structure of conversation in Latin Comedy, Plautus’ *Casina* and Terence’s *Andria* in particular.

A significant portion of the study relies on the Brown and Levinson face-politeness theory, and its claims on the purpose of specific conversational strategies. Brown and Levinson’s analysis relies on the concept of “face”, consisting of the outward image that every person desires to express (Brown and Levinson, p. 61.). This “face” is further separated into positive and negative components. Positive face consists of actions that serve to compliment an interlocutor or otherwise give them more confidence about their position or status. For specific characters, this is their claimed “positive consistent self-image or personality” (ibid.). Negative face corresponds to the interlocutors’ desire to be free, autonomous, and unimpeded by other speakers. In the terms of Brown and Levinson, this is the characters’ “claim to territories, personal preserves, and rights to non-distraction” (ibid.). Within this framework there are means of directing a conversation toward an intended goal, such as making a request or influencing another interlocutor to act. The decision of a conversation member to choose one strategy or another depends on the social environment of the conversational setting: factors such as social distance between the characters and the degree of imposition that an action has may cause characters to choose specific verbal strategies.

Watts suggests there are exactly five of these factors: the “type of social activity in which the participants to the interaction are engaged,” the “speech events
engaged in within the activity,” the “degree to which the participants share a common set of cultural expectations with respect to the information state within which the strip of interaction is developed,” and the “social distance and dominance relationships in force between the participants prior to the interaction,” (p. 51). Within these conversation options opportunities for manipulation of other interlocutors also arise.

Brown and Levinson’s positive politeness strategies address one aim by the speaker: to perform a Face-Threatening Action (FTA) “on record” while offering attention to the wants of the hearer, i.e. the hearer’s positive face (p. 101). By “on record”, Brown and Levinson mean that the speaker conveys an indisputable intent to perform an action, that is, no witness would believe that the speaker does not intend to follow through (ibid., p. 68). There are three avenues by which to accomplish this aim: claiming common ground, conveying cooperation, and satisfying a goal of the hearer (ibid., p. 101). In the first the speaker attempts to convince the hearer that both interlocutors are members of some group that desires a certain goal of the hearer. The second avenue has the speaker indicating to the hearer that both characters are working together with respect to some activity (ibid., p. 125). The speaker wants to convey that cooperation will accomplish both of their goals, regardless of whether or not the two individuals have the same goal. The last refers to the speaker directly offering to satisfy some goal of the hearer, showing that the speaker also desires the fulfillment of this goal.

A speaker may utilize a number of strategies to convince the hearer that they possess common ground. First, the speaker can publicly notice facets of the hearer’s
current condition, ones which are acceptable for the speaker to notice and approve of, such as a change in appearance (ibid., p. 103). In addition, a speaker can place additional emphasis or exaggeration on the interest, approval, or sympathy held with the hearer, often accomplished by intensive modifiers or change in word intonation and stress (ibid., p. 104). A third way in which the speaker may use this avenue of positive politeness is to increase the hearer’s interest in him or her, by adding exciting or engaging content to the conversation (ibid., p. 106). The speaker may also attempt to draw the hearer as a participant in this content, with phrases requesting the hearer’s agreement or opinion (ibid., p. 107). These three strategies are connected to each other by the speaker’s intent to convey some aspect as worthwhile or interesting to the hearer, whether it be a facet of the speaker’s condition or something generated by the speaker.

The fourth strategy of the “common ground” group has the speaker using language specific to a group to which the hearer belongs, such as address forms, slang, and jargon (ibid.). This language can soften or “hedge” the impact of a request or command, reducing pressure on the hearer to comply. Code-switching behavior, wherein an individual changes languages, dialects, or registers in the midst of conversation, can fall under this strategy (ibid., p. 110). Another way for the speaker to utilize this strategy is by leaving out information in the expectation that the hearer will still comprehend the shortened material, marking both individuals as members of a group that uses the abbreviated language (ibid., p. 111).

A final group of strategies in the “common ground” category are linked by the speaker’s wish to display agreement with the hearer’s beliefs or opinion. The first of
these strategies allows the speaker to do so by seeking the agreement through suggestive or low-risk conversation (ibid., p. 112). Once the other interlocutor (the hearer) has established something with which the speaker can agree, the speaker voices this concurrence. The speaker may also avoid dissenting with the hearer. This can be accomplished by agreeing with the hearer, followed by a reversal of the agreement or a qualifier that limits the original agreement in a “yes, but...” format (ibid., p. 114). The next strategy of this kind operates by assuming agreement with the hearer, or making a presumption, acting as if both individuals already believe it (ibid., p. 122). The last kind involves the speaker making some kind of joke: in order for the joke to be effective, there must be some shared understanding or knowledge; the successful completion of the joke clarifies this shared knowledge.

Brown and Levinson observe three avenues for transmitting the feeling of cooperation to the hearer. In the first, a speaker may demonstrate awareness and concern for the hearer’s wants, showing a willingness to connect the desired outcomes of both individuals. The second calls for the speaker to “claim reflexivity”, by making some offer or promise to the hearer, by showing trust that the hearer will cooperate, asking for or giving reasons, or by using a collective or inclusive form for both individuals where only the speaker or the hearer is meant (ibid., p. 125-128). The third avenue is to assume or claim reciprocity from the hearer, in either a potential (if I do this, you do that) or retrospective way (I did this, so you do that) (ibid., p. 129.).

Brown and Levinson’s negative politeness is similar to positive politeness, still having the speaker perform the FTA “on record”, but with attention instead
dedicated to the hearer’s desire not to be impeded (ibid., p. 131.). The speaker has five avenues of negative politeness: directness, avoiding presumptions, avoiding coercion, communicating a desire not to impose on the hearer, or offering social “compensation” to balance the impedance of an FTA (ibid., p. 131.). This social “compensation” may be in the form of a debt to the hearer (I owe you), or the speaker may make an appearance of lowering his or her status relative to the speaker (ibid., p. 209-210.). Directness can be accomplished by “conventional indirectness”, that is, indirect speech with a contextually dependent direct meaning that decreases the imposition of the FTA (ibid., p. 132.). The speaker may avoid presumptions by qualifying his or her statements with limiting words or particles (ibid., p. 145-172.). The speaker can avoid coercing the hearer by using one of the two prior strategies, “conventional indirectness” and “hedging”, or by expressing doubt about the hearer’s willingness or ability to accomplish the FTA (ibid., p. 172-173.). Two other ways to avoid coercion are to make the imposition seem less significant with diminutive modifiers, and to convey that the hearer has higher status than the speaker (regardless of the truth of this claim) (ibid., p. 178.).

Communicating the desire not to impose gives the speaker four different options: apologizing to the hearer, impersonalizing, stating the FTA as a universal rule, and nominalization of phrases (ibid., p. 187-207.). An apology itself has various ways of being carried out. The speaker may admit knowledge of the infringement on the hearer’s autonomy, seem reluctant to infringe, offer extreme or superlative justifications, or ask forgiveness (ibid., p. 187-190.). Impersonalizing offers the speaker a way to soften the FTA by removing or reducing emphasis on the agent, by
using impersonal or passive constructions, and by replacing “I” and “you” with nouns or addresses (ibid., p. 190-206). Generalizing the FTA allows for the speaker to avoid accusing the hearer directly, while nominalizing, similar to impersonal statements, gives the hearer or speaker less agency in a phrase (ibid., p. 207-208).

A final section of Brown and Levinson’s analysis presents examples that speakers perform “off record”. Brown and Levinson characterize these “off record” actions by the absence of a clear motive of the speaker (ibid., p. 211.). This type of speech act allows the speaker to influence the hearer without culpability. “If a speaker wants to do an FTA, but he wants to avoid the responsibility for doing it,” Brown and Levinson suggest, “he can do it off record and leave it up to the addressee to decide how to interpret it” (ibid.). Off record, a speaker may either suggest meaning to the hearer via hints and other clues, or the speaker may be vague and ambiguous (ibid., p. 213-227.).

In my application of the Brown and Levinson theory, some parts of my analysis will follow a structure similar to the analysis of Rolando Ferri in his “Politeness in Latin Comedy: Some Preliminary Thoughts”. Ferri follows examples in which an interlocutor initiates a conversation or attempts to change the conversation’s topic. Ferri analyzes differences in conversation between works of Latin Comedy in order to support his conclusion that these can provide examples of linguistic politeness beyond polite modifiers such as *quaeso* or *rogo* (p. 15). In his identifying of these scenarios, Ferri begins to explain what kinds of polite strategies are employed in situations of higher risk. A structuring of these strategies within the context of Latin Comedy offers examples of face-threats that are specific to the
Roman social context; a minor strategy in this context may have greater weight in another language or culture.

As in the original Brown and Levinson theory, Ferri acknowledges that linguistic politeness of this sort aims to minimize imposition on the hearer (p. 16). With regard to indirectness, Ferri cites differences in pragmatic and literal meanings of phrases, and the use of a past tense in place of the present (ibid.). Such examples weaken the amount of pressure placed on the hearer, and allow the hearer to be in a position where a response contrary to the wishes of the speaker seems more acceptable.

Ferri describes the initiation of a conversation with regard to politeness. The act of initiating a conversation requires investment, and this investment comes in a form of address, to be returned with some notification of acknowledgement (p. 18). An example of this is found in Plautus’ *Mostellaria*, wherein Simo says: *Saluos sis, Tranio*. Ferri believes this to be a means of “ingratiating” Tranio in order to set up the request to visit his house (p. 19). The speaker expects a similar response, *saluos sis* or *salue* (ibid.). The next example cited is *eu or euge*, suggested by Ferri to be spoken mostly by slaves or young men in informal settings (ibid.). The third example holds greater weight than the previous two, being a question from a slave to a non-slave man. This example includes the additional polite modifier *quaeso* (ibid.). Some other examples utilize *heus tu*, a construction only usable for characters on familiar terms (ibid.). *Sed quid ais?* or *quid tu?* and its similar constructions show interest by the speaker in the interlocutor (p. 20).
In many of these scenarios, as Ferri notes, the politeness aspects are lead-ins for potentially more threatening actions (p. 21). In Plautus’ *Mostellaria*, a conversation between Theoripides and his neighbor Simo has this structure; in Ferri’s words, “the polite scenario has a psychological point, because it shows Theoripides’ cautious and tactful manner of approaching the crucial question he is about to ask, whether or not Simo has received enough money from his son Philolaches to sell his house” (ibid.). This lead-in can alter the outcome to the conversation significantly, as seen in the contrast between Gorgias’ and Pyrrhias’ conversations with Sostratos in Menander’s *Dyskolos* (p. 22). The former character successfully navigates the politeness map, conveying the “impression both of Gorgias’ honorable status and his seriousness”, which results in a polite response (ibid.). The servant is unsuccessful: clearly his politeness strategy does not match the expectation of his interlocutor. Class distinctions can alter the successfulness of conversation strategies; Ferri suggests alternate registers for upper and lower class individuals (ibid.).

Ferri expands his “conversation beginning” category to include “moving on to a different subject.” This new subject often contains the original intent of the conversation’s initiator, with the former, old subject being an aspect of politeness strategy (p. 23). The subject change is a risk, however; as Ferri remarks, the interlocutor may have limited interest in the new subject, or could desire more conversation on the current subject (ibid.). The new subject may be a request or suggestion, as in Plautus’ *Trinummus*: the servant Stasimus recommends that Philto, an old man, not purchase a cursed estate from his master (ibid.). In these changes of
subject the characters are more concerned with negative politeness and respecting their counterparts' autonomy (p. 25). Phrases such as nisi molestum or nisi forte non vis and expanded use of conditional and potential forms signify an increased concern for the interlocutors' independence (ibid.).

The principal strategies of interest in this study, however, are those used by characters that are making a command or request. By applying the rules of conversation outlined by Brown and Levinson, I will also attempt to show that the characters in Casina and Andria select their mode of conversation deliberately, and that their chosen strategies are oriented toward a specific goal. Such a goal may be the realization of a command or request, as well as affecting or manipulating a character's opinions, beliefs, or emotions. It is useful to contrast character-type behavior in the works as well, for example, the amount of disagreement a slave is permitted to openly display to a superior.

As explained earlier, social distance can be a factor in the politeness choices of the interlocutors. Forms of address and behavior throughout the play provide material for analyzing the interrelations between characters. By interrelations I refer to the aggregate evaluation of two specific characters' attitudes toward each other, perceptions of each other, social distance, and influence over each other. This evaluation of interrelations may be separated into two groups: static and temporary. Included in the static evaluation are factors such as social distance and its corollary, power or influence over the other character. The temporary sphere includes those factors dependent on situation or environment: mood swings and offensive actions fall into this category.
Eleanor Dickey’s *Latin Forms of Address* aids in the analyzing of characters. For Dickey, the main two elements that determine the appropriateness of an address form are the “relationship of the speaker and addressee” and the “social context of the utterance” (p. 7). Dickey’s relationship definition includes the “identities” of both individuals: she cites age, sex, status, familiarity, kinship, and membership of a group as factors (ibid.). Dickey also makes an important observation that registers of words relate to social perceptions of the language’s usage. In her study, Dickey limits her material to vocatives and nominatives used in place of vocatives (p. 22). She also avoids addresses to gods absent from the tangible environment. Dickey describes a Latin address system based on three characteristics: the type of interaction, the register being used, and the time period (p. 32). By organizing different address systems in this way, Dickey can produce claims for changes in register: a character may shift to a lower register in an enraged state, for example (ibid.).

The use or avoidance of personal names reveals information about character emotions and intentions, among other details. For example, Simo and Sosia use each other’s names to convey a sense of familiarity. The use of names is more frequent in certain literary registers; Dickey believes these to be closer to conversational Latin and less stylistically contrived (p. 43). In the more stylized genres, she suggests that authors replaced the general name address with more interesting variants (ibid.). On slight differences in usage of names, Dickey draws this conclusion:
Names are widely employed as a standard form of address: names are used unless the relationship between speaker and addressee is one which specifically calls for other terms such as titles or kinship terms, or unless insults or other marked addresses are warranted by the context...the precise rules determining which relationships require avoidance of names vary from one author to the next, but on the whole there is more agreement than disagreement on this point. (p. 44)

In examining the commands and requests, Rodie Risselada’s *Imperatives and Other Directive Expressions in Latin* provides much useful material. Risselada observes variants such as the types of “directive speech acts”, their form of expression, the situation in which the speech acts occur, and the relationship between the interlocutors. In analyzing the types of directive speech acts, Risselada makes distinctions based on the “content of the directive in relation to the speaker’s and addressee’s interests,” and the “extent to which the action that is specified in the content of the directive is forced upon the addressee” (p. 46). These distinctions relate to Brown and Levinson’s study and the “degree of imposition” factor. In structuring the organization of these directives however, Risselada avoids other criteria, for example, that which is primarily situational.

In Risselada’s analysis, the first type of distinction separates directives that order, request, or make a plea from those that offer a suggestion or advice. The former benefit the speaker, while the latter examples benefit the addressee. In the middle ground are proposals, invitations, and similar directives, from which both
interlocutors may benefit. The second specification separates orders from requests, since only in the latter may the addressee determine the success of the directive. Risselada suggests that prayers and supplication have some similarity to orders, comparing their “urgency” to the forced compliance of an order. Advice and suggestions occupy somewhat different spaces; the latter is optional while the former is “binding”. Directives that are difficult to place include “granting permission” and “challenges”; the one depends heavily on other elements of the conversation, while Risselada calls the second a “sarcastic directive” that does not follow ordinary language use.

Risselada catalogues the directive speech acts grammatically—imperatives, second person subjunctives, plural subjunctives, interrogatives, and other modal phrases—and analyzes them in various illocutionary contexts. Under the imperative label, Rossalanda lists the simple imperative, future imperative (or imperative II, as Rossalanda prefers), second person present and perfect subjunctives, and the first person plural subjunctives. Another category, named “declarative directives”, contains the future indicative in first and second person, and the gerundival periphrastic with and without agents. The interrogative type, rather than including a specific verb type, instead utilizes interrogative particles, of which the most common are -ne, nonne, and num. Interrogative directives also include sentences without these particles, in which case the directive nature of the statement may be revealed by context or other means.

A final category of directives contains those expressions in which a “matrix predication” or auxiliary verb combine with a dependent predication, which
completes the directive (p. 235). These "lexical expressions" separate into three
groups, "performative", modal expressions, and "non-modal evaluating
expressions". Examples of performative expressions list the speech act in the
context of the speaker's conversation motive (p. 242). As examples, Risselada lists
phrases like *dic quid velis* and *cave [ne] cadas*. The second group, modal expressions,
contains modal verbs such as *velle*, *debere*, and *posse*. Although the expressions in
the last group exhibit similarities to the modals, they may pertain to aspects
different from the thoughts of the interlocutors regarding the evaluation of their
environment (p. 322). An example of a non-modal, lexical directive is Simo's
presentation of his actual request to Sosia: *tuomst officium* (*Andria*, 168). This
outlines Sosia's 'active involvement' in the realization of the situation (Risselada, p.
323).

As a last note, it is worthwhile to consider these works in the context of their
performance. Costumes and roles of characters, along with the play's storyline,
would be set and unchangeable, with each mask having distinguishable
characteristics (Collins p. 12). The types of characters would determine their
costume and dress; this made typical roles such as the *senex amator* or *servus
callidus* recognizable in the play's context. Monaghan, in his analysis of Plautus,
claims an interactive element of the actor in his role:

"Here the fact of performance and the personality of the performer are
evident, despite the mask and costume, and the resulting pleasure for the
spectator lies in the recognition and enjoyment of theatrical signs, of which the primary sign is the masked performer himself or herself.” (p. 118)

The language and gesture of the actors convey the characters’ locations within the play’s structure. Language and the playwrights’ manipulations of it would hold much of the information in the play. For this reason, politeness analysis in Latin Comedy can be especially useful.
Chapter 1 – Conversation Introduction and Anticipation of Request

In Terence’s *Andria* and Plautus’ *Casina*, Simo and Lysidamus, the masters, have similar exchanges with their inferiors, Sosia and Chalinus. The two interactions have similar structures. Both begin with the master speaking positively about the inferior, following with an acknowledgement or reminder of benefits the master has provided in the past. This procedure sets up a request in both situations, after which the master dismisses his inferior.

In spite of similarities, these interactions end differently. Simo succeeds in securing Sosia’s agreement to keep silent about the dissolution of the marriage arrangement between his son Pamphilus and his neighbor Chreme’s daughter. Simo intends to convince Chremes to reinstate the marriage offer, after Pamphilus agrees to the marriage. Intending to give Casina to his slave Olympio, Lysidamus fails to convince Chalinus to give up his marriage claim to her. To explain this difference in outcome, I will analyze the differences in the master-inferior relationship, as well as the characters’ conversational strategies and language.

The master in both works begins the interaction by demonstrating an interest in his inferior:

*SIMO*: *Sosia,*
*ades dum. paucis te volo.* *SOSIA*: *dictum puta:*
*nempe ut curentur recte haec?* *SIMO*: *immo alius.* *SOSIA*: *quid est quod tibi mea ars efficere hoc possit amplius?*
*SIMO*: *nil istac opus est arte ad hance rem quam paro,*
*sed eis quas semper in te intellexi sitas,*
*fide et taciturnate.*

*SIMO*: Sosia, stay here a moment. I want a few words with you.  
*SOSIA*: Consider them said. You want me to see the food’s properly cooked?
SIMO: No it’s something else.
SOSIA: What else is there on which my art could be better employed?
SIMO: It’s not your art that’s needed for what I have in mind, but those qualities which I have always known you to possess, loyalty and discretion. *(Andria, 29-34)*

CHAL: *Te uxor aiebat tua me vocare.* LYS: *ego enim vocari iussi.* CHAL: *Eloquere quid velis.*
LYS: *primum ego te porrectiore fronte volo mecum loqui; Stultitia est ei te esse tristem, cuius potestas plus potest. Probum te et frugi hominem iam pridem esse arbitror.*

Chal: You called me, so your wife said.
LYS: Yes, I asked to have you called.
Chal: What do you want? Speak out.
LYS: In the first place, I want to see less of a scowl on your face while you talk with me; it’s absurd for you to be sulky with one who’s your superior in point of power. For a long time now I have regarded you as an honest and worthy fellow. *(Casina, 279-282)*

Anticipating their own requests, the masters Simo and Lysidamus emphasize the good qualities of Sosia and Chalinus. By doing this, they aim to increase their inferiors’ confidence in the context of this conversation; this is a positive politeness strategy. This strategy allows the master to gauge the proper point in the conversation to present the request, while raising the level of familiarity between the interlocutors in order to balance out the request’s threat to the recipient’s self-image or face. This follows a cross-cultural norm, according to Brown and Levinson: “The FTA of making a request is normally preceded by an interim of small talk on safe topics, (...) as a way of reassuring [the hearer] that you didn’t come simply to exploit him by making a request, but have an interest in general in maintaining a relationship with him” (p. 112).

A few noteworthy details appear in the conversation between Lysidamus and Chalinus. The first we may call an ‘improper address’ from Chalinus to Lysidamus:
Chalinus fails to act properly in his master’s presence. The directive expression that Lysidamus uses, a ‘first-person volitional expression’ governed by *volo*, yields a binding command to Chalinus to correct his behavior (Risselada, p. 281-2). This is simply a preference by Lysidamus that the addressee, Chalinus, understands as a command. Wishing to keep Chalinus in favorable spirits prior to his request, the master only issues a minor rebuke with *stultitia est*... According to Dickey, *stulte* is a rather mild insult of low to high register, “often used in rebukes for those acting foolishly” (p. 176, 360). The possible offensiveness is diminished further by the nominalization of the insult to *stultitia* and use of passive (Brown and Levinson, p. 187-190). This act of reducing emphasis on the agent is a negative politeness strategy, to account for the FTA of the insult, which threatens the autonomy of the hearer, Chalinus.

Lysidamus here uses a combination of negative politeness strategies to indicate the impropriety of this disrespect. However, I suggest that Chalinus is likewise operating within the parameters of negative politeness, having a greater probability of offending his master in the course of the conversation due to social status differences.1 This may seem unlikely, due to the apparent stubbornness of Chalinus as the conversation continues; still, the slave clearly limits himself to boundaries of politeness. In the two examples of his speaking shown above, Chalinus exhibits a form of ‘conventional indirectness’. The real intent of Chalinus’ speech acts is clear, but communicated subordinately: *tu me vocabas* becomes *te me*

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1 This power imbalance depends on two factors, the interlocutors’ “material control (over economic distribution and physical force)” and “metaphysical control (over the actions of others, by virtue of metaphysical forces subscribed to by those others)”; Brown and Levinson, p.77.
vocare in the context of *te uxor aiebat*, and *quid velis* is given with *eloquere*. The imperative *eloquere* here is not rude, as its use is not connected with “particular contextual environments” (Risselada, p. 111). However, Chalinus only shows as much respect as he is required.² This balance of direct meaning in an indirect structure comes from a desire of the speaker, Chalinus, to perform the FTA (i.e., to request the purpose of his summoning and acquire information) on record while avoiding the appearance of authority or coercion (Brown and Levinson, p. 130).

Lysidamus responds to Chalinus’ initial indirect phrase with a similar phrase of his own, with an emphasis on his authority. Like Chalinus, he reconciles the FTA of claiming authority over the slave by being indirect. Lysidamus’ use of *enim* here shows his agreement and acknowledgement of the prior statement, as well as appealing to the “involvement and cooperation of the addressee in the speech-event” (Kroon, p. 184). In the context of the play, this statement by Lysidamus also displays an assertion of household power over his wife, under whose direction Chalinus has been promised the girl Casina. Lysidamus here wants to assure the slave that his word holds the greater authority.

An inverted example of FTA minimization occurs in Simo’s initial greeting of Sosia. This time, the master attempts to lighten the impact of his FTA on his inferior. He adds *dum* to his request that Sosia remain, *ades*. His use of *dum* here likely refers to a relatively short amount of time, an amount that ought not inconvenience the freedman. He follows this statement with a similar minimization, one of content rather than time, *paucis*, which Ferri agrees is a usage of negative politeness (p. 22).

² A more polite option would be have a addition such as *si*, demonstrating concern for the hearer’s wants; Ferri, p. 23.
As his conversation with Sosia will serve to outline the play's background to the audience, more than *paucis verbis* are to be exchanged; however, both of these additions together serve to diminish Simo's intrusion on Sosia's autonomy and suggest that *ades* is partially non-binding.

The selection from *Andria* does not contain the same level of illocutionary rigidity as *Casina*. The master Simo speaks his intent immediately, and uses Sosia's name. Usage of his name in address conveys informality, and has a softening effect (Ferri, 21). Similar to Chalinus, Sosia speaks indirectly, using "conventional indirectness", but the freedman implies that he already knows the request. Demonstrating the strength of his relationship with Simo, Sosia predicts (albeit incorrectly) what the master intends to request, offering a question to confirm: this action falls under the avenue of cooperative positive politeness. Paired with this presupposition is an offer from Sosia to complete the action, and Sosia provides an assurance that what Simo wishes to effect, he himself desires as well.

Chalinus' inclusion of *uxor* in the initial phrase offers Lysidamus a means of ending the conversation without Chalinus incurring the risk of offense. Any misunderstanding could be attributed to miscommunication between Lysidamus and Cleostrata, his wife, or Cleostrata and Chalinus. In this way, the friction possible from this speech act could only be external, and not between the active interlocutors. Alternatively, the slave's inclusion of *uxor* could suggest that he respects her authority more than that of Lysidamus.

A final aspect of politeness at this point in *Casina* appears in the ordering of personal pronouns. As Plautus' works resemble colloquial speech, the emphasis of
personal pronouns and their location is deliberate and serves a social purpose. The first example in this selection regards Chalinus’ emphasis on *te* or Lysidamus, placing it at the front of his phrase on line 279, in spite of its grammatical relevance to the subordinate clause at the end of the phrase. This fronting of *te* places as much structural space in the phrase as possible between the two personal pronouns, *te* and *me*, granting some semantic deference to the master. Following this, Lysidamus also emphasizes his person, placing *ego* – the presence of which already signals personal emphasis – before *te*, and the corresponding verb *volo* before that of the other, *loqui*. This emphasis on personal pronouns is notably absent from Simo and Sosia’s interaction.
Chapter 2 – Presenting the Request

When Simo and Lysidamus present their requests, each feels sufficiently confident in his relationship with the inferior to expect his consent. This confidence has resulted from evaluating the other interlocutor with different politeness strategies over the course of the conversation; their greatest risk is denial of the request. The masters will delay presenting the request until they feel that its FTA has been sufficiently accounted for. Lysidamus and Simo must change the course of the conversation in order to raise their requests:

SOS: Exspecto quid velis.
SIM: Ego postquam te mi, a parvolo ut semper tibi apud me iusta et clemens fuerit servitus
scis. Feci ex servo ut esses libertus mihi,
propterea quod servivae liberaliter.
Quod habui summum pretium persolvi tibi.
SOS: In memoria habeo. SIM: Haud muto factum. SOS: Gaudeo si tibi quid feci aut facio quod placeat, Simo,
et id gratum fuisse advorsum te habeo gratiam.
sed hoc mihi molestumst; nam istae complen zeros
quasi exprobationem immemori benefici.
quin tu uno verbo dic quid est quod me velis.
SIM: Ita faciam. Hoc primum in hac re praedico tibi:
quas credis esse has non sunt verae nuptiae.
SOS: Quor simulas igitum? SIM: Rem omnem a principio audies.

SOS: I await your instructions.
SIM: Ever since I bought you, when you were a small child, you know how just and kind I have been to you as a master. You were my slave, but I gave you your freedom, because you served me with the spirit of a free man. I bestowed upon you the highest reward that was in my power.
SOS: I haven’t forgotten.
SIM: And I don’t regret it.
SOS: I’m delighted if anything I’ve done, or do, pleases you, Simo, and I’m grateful that my behaviour has found your favour. But now you disturb me. Your reminder sounds like a reproach for ingratitude. Why don’t you tell me in a word what you want me to do?
SIM: I will. The first thing I want you to know about the situation is this. The
wedding which you believe is taking place is not a real one.
SOS: So why pretend it is?
SIM: I'll tell you the whole story from the beginning. (Andria, 34-48)

CHAL: Intellego.
Quin, si ita arbitrare, emittis me manu?
LYS: Quin id volo.
Sed nihil est, me cupere factum, nisi tu factis adiuvas.
CHAL: Quid velis modo id velim me scire.
LYS: Asculta, ego eloquar.

CHAL: I see. Well, that being so, why don’t you set me free?
LYS: Well, that’s what I want. But my desire to do so doesn’t signify, if you
don’t help by what you do yourself.
CHAL: All I should like to know is what you’d like.
LYS: Listen here; I will speak out. (Casina, 283-287)

After Simo rejects Sosia’s presumption nempe..., Sosia ceases that strategy of
politeness. Rather than demand that Simo eloquere, as Chalinus has done to
Lysidamus, Sosia focuses on his subservience: exspecto. This speech act relates to
Chalinus’ in that it is a “conventionally indirect” expression of negative politeness,
demonstrating the speaker’s desire to acquire this information without coercing the
hearer. However, Sosia removes any directive force from his expression. The
absence of this force, present in his earlier dictum puta, shows a slight change in
atmosphere. Sosia attaches to his statement a sense of deference: he wishes to
demonstrate Simo’s “rights to relative immunity” while indicating that he is not in a
position to influence Simo and simultaneously continuing the prior assurance of
cooperation with the master (Brown and Levinson, p. 178).

In Casina, Chalinus makes a suggestion that Lysidamus free him: quin, si ita
arbitrare, emittis me manu? After validating his master’s compliments, Chalinus
suggests this as a reward for his behavior. Quin here shows that this statement does
not merely inquire about a fact, but is an exhortation or command (Allen and Greenough, §449). *Quin* also implies shades of “reproof and vexation”, distinguishing it from a simple imperative (DeWitt, p. 455). According to Risselada, this is a “binding interrogative directive”, for which non-compliance is not an option (Risselada, p. 217-219). Additionally, this interrupts Lysidamus, demonstrating Chalinus’ predisposal not to cooperate and disregard for his master’s positive and negative face wants (Brown and Levinson, 67).

The rudeness of this command with *quin* is only mollified by its condition. *Si ita arbitrare* has a “hedging” function, limiting the command *quin emittis* to one situation and minimizing the FTA of the command. By using this conditional, however, Chalinus essentially produces a situation uncomfortable for Lysidamus; the master must expose his former statement as untrue, or reconcile the slave’s exhortation. Chalinus doubts that Lysidamus actually believes the words with which he exalted the slave earlier: the master surely would have freed his trusted bailiff, Olympio, prior to manumitting Chalinus.

In reconciling Chalinus’ command, Lysidamus must choose the avenue that produces the least threat to the slave’s face, intending to set up his own request. Risselada offers three possible reactions: “compliance, refusal, and ‘problemizing reactions’ [sic]” (Risselada, p. 58). Lysidamus in this instance exhibits a “problemizing reaction”, in that he responds, without refusing, that he would allow this command to be realized if his wish were granted. Risselada suggests that such evasion occurs more frequently than a direct refusal (p. 59). I suggest that this occurs due to the opportunity for integration of polite strategies in a sequence
different from that of refusal. In refusal scenarios, a character may decline and offer causes for the choice to do so. But the refusal itself represents a face threat to the owner of the directive. The “problemizing reaction” instead offers both interlocutors a way out, by giving conditions by which the directive would be realized. Such a reaction minimizes face threat and pressure in the conversation; therefore, Lysidamus chooses this option.

Producing a “problemizing reaction”, Lysidamus attempts to connect the wishes of the two characters. He wants to show that he and Chalinus can accomplish both of their goals by cooperating. Lysidamus conveys that he wants to set Chalinus free, but is unable to do so: the conditions to do so have not yet been satisfied. Lysidamus’ desire to free Chalinus depends on the behavior of the slave; deeds hold more importance than wants. Lysidamus attempts to minimize his role in this process, appearing to give Chalinus the choice to attain freedom, *sed nihil est, me cupere factum*. This phrase contains an “off record” search for Chalinus’ disposition. Lysidamus deliberately uses ambiguous phrasing to delay his request. Either the slave is willing to ‘help’ and cooperate, or Lysidamus will resort to other methods of accomplishing his goal.

Lysidamus has yet to answer Chalinus original query: *eloquere quid velis*. Thus, Chalinus repeats himself, more politely. Like Sosia, Chalinus uses conventionally indirect speech and focuses on his subservience. However, Chalinus uses *modo id velim me scire* in the place of Sosia’s *exspecto*. His use of subjunctive here emphasizes the reluctance to inhibit Lysidamus, the addressee. According to Risselada, “by using *velim* in combination with a controllable state of affairs the
speaker presents his expectations with respect to actual realization of this state of affairs as low, and thus exerts relatively little pressure on the addressee to bring about realization” (Risselada, p. 290). Additionally, *modo* emphasizes that Lysidamus’ wish, the reason for which Chalinus was called, is the focus in this conversation. Perhaps this also holds an “off-record” suggestion that the master truncate his explanation; this suggestion would explain the master’s affirmation that he is getting to the point in *ego eloquar*.

The shift to indirectness from the commands earlier in the conversation signifies some kind of shift in Chalinus’ expectation. The slave’s adoption of more polite strategies shows that he has something new to gain by being polite, i.e., manumission. This possibility did not exist in the beginning of the conversation: Chalinus expected a simple command. Lysidamus’ polite behavior, along with his claimed detachment from the situation, increases Chalinus confidence in the possibility that he may gain freedom. Lysidamus quickly detects Chalinus’ change in temperament and follows up with a presentation of the problem.

By presenting manumission as a reward for Chalinus’ cooperation, Lysidamus sets up a positive politeness strategy of reflexivity. What Chalinus wants, i.e., freedom, Lysidamus claims to want for the slave, with the intent of aiding its realization. It is also likely that Chalinus could have suggested another aim (goods, privilege, etc.) and Lysidamus would have reacted similarly. Detecting Chalinus’ change in attitude – his adopting of more polite language, signifying a greater investment in the conversation – Lysidamus feels sufficiently comfortable to utilize a politeness strategy with more risk, reciprocity, as he advances toward his request.
Chalinus’ approval of Lysidamus’ reflexivity gesture convinces the master to move toward reciprocity, also a positive politeness strategy, albeit with greater risk of ineffectiveness. The nature of the risk in implementing this strategy is that Lysidamus asks Chalinus to potentially make a sacrifice if his contribution inhibits his wants in some way. Lysidamus, having already known this to be the case—that Chalinus’ part in reciprocity is a significant inhibition of the slave’s autonomy—has been sluggish to reveal his intentions, gauging Chalinus’ likelihood to cooperate.

Unlike Lysidamus, Simo progresses directly from giving attention and approval to Sosia’s condition, a low-risk positive politeness strategy, to using reciprocation, which has a higher risk of ineffectiveness. The former strategy’s low risk is due to a low probability of rejection by the hearer of the speaker’s approving him. The speaker typically addresses some aspect known to the hearer, which seems as though the hearer desires to have it approved (Brown and Levinson, p. 103). In his use of reciprocation, Simo lists Sosia’s benefit first, similar to Lysidamus. Just as in Casina, the benefit to the inferior is manumission, the only difference being that this has already occurred; Sosia is a freedman. The difficulty in this kind of retroactive reciprocity is that Sosia would be accounting for his benefit twice: Simo had freed him only due to his service, but now calls him to account again.

In order to make this exchange seem more balanced, Simo emphasizes his former contribution, as this is his only bargaining mechanism. This exaggeration or overstatement serves as an “off record” suggestion that Sosia was perhaps overly remunerated for his services as a slave, and the manumission was in part due to Simo’s generosity. Being “off record”, however, this statement is subject to Sosia’s
interpretation. Making minimal assumptions, Sosia initially acknowledges the implicature without revealing a specific interpretation: *in memoria habeo*.

Simo claims that he freed Sosia to change the dynamic of their relationship: *ut esses libertus mihi*. As his *libertus*, Sosia's associations with Simo are now less compulsory: the freedman's cooperation with his patron is a decision based in choice. Sosia should have been freed because he acted *liberaliter*, with the mindset and morality of a free man. Simo freed his slave by *manumissio vindicta* out of respect for the man's character, so that the two could benefit from a voluntary relationship.¹ This situation differs from that of Lysidamus and Chalinus.

After Simo assures Sosia of his satisfaction with the manumission, the freedman wishes to dispel the possibility that he has disappointed his patron. First he answers Simo's expression of contentment with one of his own, confirming a mutual understanding of their relationship. The freedman uses similar language to liken the two men's emotional response: *gaudeo/placeat* and *gratum/gratiam*. He places *gaudeo* at the fore, emphasizing this sentiment. In his response, Sosia avoids presumption: he is pleased and grateful if Simo appreciates his actions, but he does not assume that this is the case. Sosia highlights Simo's person in these positive statements, particularly with *advorsum te*. He uses his master's name, softening his expressions with some informality, as Simo did before (Ferri, p. 21). The freedman communicates that he notices Simo's appreciation, and derives gratification from it: by this gesture he intends to increase Simo's confidence in the authenticity of their interaction and his shared investment in Simo's interests.

¹ *Manumissio vindicta*, a ceremonial freeing of a slave during the master's life. Barrow, p. 179-180.
Sosia's affirmation of their relationship in the beginning of his response serves to minimize the effect of his subsequent expression of discomfort. In this expression, Sosia impersonalizes his statement *hoc mihi molestumst*, removing Simo from agency and thus decreasing the possibility of it being perceived as an accusation. While *istaec* does reference Simo as the originator of the *commemoratio*, Sosia softens the negativity of *exprobratio* with *quasi*, implying a belief that this interpretation is not intended by the master. Such a complex latticework of positive and negative politeness shows a desire by Sosia to express his discomfort or anxiety without accusing the master directly.

Sosia ends his response with another suggestion that Simo relay his objective. Although this phrase resembles a command of Chalinus in *Casina*, its use of *quin* has no underlying tone of annoyance (Allen and Greenough, §449). An “optional interrogative directive”, this phrase is a non-binding suggestion, giving the hearer the choice of whether or not to comply (Risselada, p. 214). Continuing the progression of indirectness from *dictum puta* and *exspecto quid velit*, Sosia adds another layer: *quid est quod me velit*. With *dic uno verbo* Sosia implies “off record” that Simo has been taking too long to express himself, without having to say it explicitly. *Quin* here asks the question ‘why not’ with the assumption that Simo would comply if he has no reason not to (Brown and Levinson, p. 125-128).

Finally prepared to make his request, and aware of (perhaps due to Sosia's hints) his sluggishness in doing so, Simo's last polite strategy provides the reasoning for his request. This occurs in the context of a dramatic story (providing the background for the remainder of the play). The telling of the story allows the master
to “intensify” his interest to Sosia, who will presumably favor his perspective, hearing a biased re-telling of events. This positive politeness strategy involves the hearer in the emotional situation of the speaker by hearing his opinion firsthand.
Chapter 3 – Realization of the Request

The success of the request depends on the masters’ use of politeness strategy and their relationships with their inferiors. Both Lysidamus and Simo have used polite techniques in determining an acceptable point in the conversation to present their requests. Yet Simo succeeds in convincing Sosia to cooperate with him while Lysidamus fails:

SIM: _sin eveniat quod volo,_  
in Pamphilo ut nil sit morae, restat Chremes  
qui mi exorandus est, et spero confere.  
nunc tuomst officium has bene ut assimules nuptias,  
perterrefacias Davom, observes filium  
quid agat, quid cum illo consili captet. Sos: _sat est,_  
curabo. SIM: _eamus nunciam intro. I prae, sequar._

SIM: If things turn out as I wish and Pamphilus offers no resistance, I've only Chremes to persuade, and I'm confident that that can be done. Now, it's your job to maintain the pretence of the marriage, scare Davus off, and keep an eye on my son's doings and on any plan the two of them conceive.  
SOS: All right. I'll see to it.  
SIM: Let's go in now. You go first. I'll follow. (Andria, 168-172)

LYS: _Casinam ego uxorem promise vilico nostro dare._  
CHAL: _At tua uxor filiusque promiserunt mihi._ LYS: _Scio._  
sed utrum nunc tu caelibem te esse mavis liberum  
an maritum servom aetatem degree et gnatos tuos?  
optio haec tua est: utram harum vis condicionem accipe.  
CHAL: _Liber si sim, meo periculo vivam; nunc vivo tuo._  
de Casina certum est concedere homini nato nemini.  
LYS: _Intro abi atque actutum uxorom huc evoca ante aedis cito,_  
et sitellam huc tecum efferto cum aqua, et sortis. CHAL: _Satis placet._  
LYS: _Ego pol istam iam aliquovorsum tragulam decidero._  
nam si sic nihil impetrare potero, saltem sortiar.  
ibi ego te et suffragatores tuos ulciscar. CHAL: _Attamen_  
mi obtinget sors. LYS: _Vt quidem pol pereas cruciate malo._  
CHAL: _Mi illa nubet, machinare quid lubet quo vis modo._  
LYS: _Abin hinc ab oculis?_
LYS: I promised to marry Casina to our bailiff.
CHAL: Yes, but your wife and son promised her to me.
LYS: I know. But which do you prefer now – to stay single and be set free, or
to marry and pass your life in slavery, you and your children, too? This is
your choice: take either alternative you like.
CHAL: If I were free, I should have to live at my own costs; as it is, I live at
yours. About Casina my mind’s made up – I won’t yield her to a single soul on
earth.
LYS: In with you and call my wife out here in front of the house at once. Quick!
And bring an urn of water out here with you, and the lots.
CHAL: That suits me well enough.
LYS: By the Lord, I’ll soon spoil that shot of yours one way or another! I’ll tell
you what, if I can’t carry my point by persuasion, I’ll leave it to the lots,
anyhow. There’s where I’ll get square with you and your partisans.
CHAL: Only the lot will fall to me.
LYS: Yes, by gad!—the lot of death by torture dire.
CHAL: I’m the man she’ll marry, plot as you like in any way you want.
LYS: Leave my sight, will you! (Casina, 287-302)

Lysidamus’ illusion of reciprocity fails when he presents the problem of the
bailiff to Chalinus. He does this in the most direct way possible, emphasizing his own
self (ego) as the source of this situation. Lysidamus does not attend to this
statement’s effect on Chalinus with any redress of face. Contrary to his expectation,
this statement troubles Chalinus, who cites a prior agreement with his wife and son,
challenging Lysidamus’ promisi with promiserunt. The at in Chalinus’ statement
marks a disagreement or objection with Lysidamus’ prior words and blocks
resolution of the exchange.¹ Chalinus has no knowledge of Lysidamus’ motive in
giving Casina to Olympio, and so he sees no reason for Lysidamus to contest a prior
agreement. Lysidamus’ acknowledgment of this former promise with scio sustains
the objection and allows the conversation to proceed.

¹ At signaling the introduction of a challenging reactive move; Kroon, p. 334.
Lysidamus wishes to convince Chalinus that he still intends to bring about the slave's wants. Erroneously, he believes that Chalinus' desire to be free is greater than his wanting to marry Casina. Acting on this assumption, he presents the slave with an ultimatum, stressing Chalinus' choice in the matter: *optio haec tua est.* However, rather than convey a shared goal, Lysidamus gives a clear indication that he means to coerce Chalinus. The slave recognizes this coercion, commenting on it later with *machinare quid lubet.* Instead of giving Chalinus the explicit option not to renounce his claim to Casina, Lysidamus adds a threat to the refusal. If Chalinus does not comply, neither he nor his progeny will be free; by marrying the slave girl Casina, he ensures that his children will be born into slavery (Bodor, 402).

Lysidamus' threat is an expression of power over and intimidation of his slave. Chalinus first responds by minimizing the value of his master's offer. Manumission would not significantly improve or change the slave's situation. This reduction of value gives Chalinus a reason for rejecting that *condicio.* By expressing his reasons for making the choice, the slave intends to soften the impact of the face threat of his rejection and demonstrate its reasonableness. Perhaps this action means to encourage Lysidamus to maintain support of Chalinus' wants, rejecting reciprocity but returning to a suggestion of reflexivity. Chalinus' use of positive politeness strategy here signifies his continued investment in the conversation.

In response to Lysidamus' ultimatum, Chalinus expresses his own will. Not only is manumission detrimental to his quality of life, but he will also yield no ground concerning Casina. Sensing that Lysidamus will not receive this rejection
well, Chalinus frames it indirectly: *de Casina certum est*. Chalinus’ avoidance of a pronominal reference to himself shows a desire to impersonalize this statement and de-emphasize his agency in it. Brown and Levinson suggest that expressions of this type, having an optional dative referent (*[mihi] certum est*), “intrinsically threaten face” (192). Chalinus’ use of *nemo* similarly reduces emphasis on any person. By using an indefinite term, Chalinus presents his refusal to yield Casina as not being limited to a particular situation or condition. With these procedures Chalinus attempts to reduce the face threat of his refusal, perhaps hoping that Lysidamus will compromise.

By rejecting Lysidamus’ offer, Chalinus retains some of his autonomy. Over the course of this conversation, it now seems that Chalinus has been somewhat reserved: he grants to Lysidamus only what is required for the motion of the conversation. Although he becomes partially invested in the possibility of cooperation, Chalinus takes care in retaining a way out. Unlike Sosia, he did not express thanks for the master’s praise of his behavior, only acceptance and then a challenging command with *quin*. Yet Chalinus never demonstrates to Lysidamus directly that he desires this manumission, although his *quin* command contains an “off record” suggestion of interest in it. Suspending his interest in this offer allows him to easily reject it later, once Lysidamus’ intent is clear. The slave’s challenging *at*, after Lysidamus has taken responsibility for the promise of Casina to Olympio, brings down the master’s positive face; this promise seems to be an error on the part of the master as he sustains it: *scio*. All of these actions culminate in a refusal to comply with Lysidamus: for McCarthy, “Chalinus’ rhetoric here is unsettling because
it demonstrates how a slave can use the master’s apparent show of generosity against him” (95). The corollary to Chalinus’ retention of face is Lysidamus sacrifice of it; believing that he is “buttering up” the slave to acquiesce, Lysidamus actually prepares Chalinus to make a stronger rejection than he would have before, had the request been delivered without redress to his face.

In Andria, after Simo completes his tale, he makes a simple request of Sosia to act as if the marriage were still to happen. In his presentation of this request to Sosia, Simo suggests that his plan will fail if the secrecy of the marriage’s dissolution were to be compromised. The covert quality of this scheme adds the element of in-group identity, increasing Sosia’s perception of his value to Simo. The face threat of the request, after these elements, seems minor, because Sosia already desires to bring about Simo’s intent.

Rather than inhibiting Simo’s autonomy, the request presents an opportunity to maintain this cooperation and in-group status. The strength of this cooperative element is evidenced in the absence of a request when Simo is prepared to deliver it. Simo simply relays what Sosia can do to ensure the success of this scheme, his officium in the plan. This assignment comes after Simo describes what he has assigned to himself: convincing his son to marry and Chremes to reinstate the marriage. By using mi exorandus est for his second self-assignment, Simo makes this procedure appear more like a sharing of responsibility instead of a command to Sosia. Therefore, the FTA actually serves as a mechanism of positive politeness: Simo has enough confidence in Sosia to offer him an active role in accomplishing this plan together. The subjunctive eamus, referring to both of them together,
confirms the cooperative environment: while it resembles a command, it also has a commissive element, partially resembling a proposal (Risselada, p. 158). The imperative *i* that follows, however, is a reminder that it is not an equivalent relationship.

The complete dissolution of the cooperative element in *Casina* is finalized in Lysidamus’ response to Chalinus expressing his wants. The desire of the slave for manumission, in which Lysidamus has expressed interest, has been rejected by Chalinus as unfavorable. At this point, Lysidamus ceases his politeness: *intro abi*. A string of commands tells Chalinus that Lysidamus no longer has interest in attending to the slave’s wants. The command *efferto* depends on the carrying out of the other two commands, *abi* and *evoca*; Lysidamus first wants Chalinus to leave his sight, and quickly, *cito*. Rather than suggesting less force, the “non-immediacy” of *efferto* observed by Risselada (p. 122) instead suggests a higher degree of formality in language and a higher register. Unlike Chalinus and Sosia’s progression into higher degrees of indirectness, this heightening of register does not imply “special respect and politeness,” as Dickey suggests (p. 16), focusing on the hearer. Instead it displays a change of language and separation on the part of the speaker, Lysidamus, who no longer wishes to convey a sense of camaraderie in speech and resorts to more typical masterly language: direct, “on record”, and absent of somewhat less binding volitional directives (Risselada, 283-4).

The commands and Lysidamus’ return to a more standard master-slave conversation style suit Chalinus: *satis placet*. These simple commands, not requiring the slave to compromise, are more comfortable, being what he expected when
Lysidamus first summoned him. The slave’s satisfaction no doubt comes in part from the fact that Lysidamus accepts his rejection of the offer: later in the play, he demonstrates his willingness to sacrifice freedom for a chance to foil his master’s plans and his rival, Olympio’s:

CHAL: *tribus non conduci possum libertatibus, quin ego illis Hodie comparem magnum malum quinque hanc omnem rem meae erae iam faciam palam.*

CHAL: I couldn’t be hired—for three freedoms—not to give those two a precious bad time of it to-day and not to go to mistress this minute with the whole story. (*Casina*, 504-506).

At this point the possibility of deception on Chalinus’ part seems all the more likely: of Olympio, whose abuse of his fellow slave and intent to steal Casina at the beginning of the play has not been forgotten, and against Lysidamus, against whose authority Chalinus must respond to protect his true supporters, Cleostrata and her son. His satisfaction *satis placet* is obvious when he has spoiled Lysidamus complex manipulations in politeness; he proves Lysidamus the fool when he rejects the request, having avoided sacrificing face in the conversation. For Segal this satisfaction in the humiliation of Lysidamus is based on a “concern for status”: according to Segal, “the Plautine slave is the essence of the comic spirit. To him, humble words are the highest payment... this is his richest reward” (p. 110-111). Chalinus’ “point of view is allowed to stand unanswered but is also left unsupported” (McCarthy, 95). Cooperation is no longer a possibility; Chalinus now enjoys the deference given to him by Lysidamus, who expects some sort of return for his politeness. This gesture displays the ridiculous nature of this scenario, with Lysidamus humbling himself with nothing to show for his efforts.
In his return to formality Lysidamus has exposed his attempted manipulation of Chalinus and reaffirmed his authority. Chalinus may have thought of the possibility of manipulation earlier, with Lysidamus being unusually civil toward him. Suspicious of Lysidamus, Chalinus may have suspected a plot to get rid of him, perhaps due to expense. This and similar reservations would explain the slave’s hesitation to sacrifice face in the conversation. The slave’s earlier skepticism about Lysidamus’ intentions was well founded: if the master had intended to free him, would he not have already done it to Olympio, being the trusted *vilicus*? Lysidamus’ quick regress into anger after Chalinus’ refusal does nothing to repair the possibility for cooperation; *impetrare* implies that he had been intending to impose his will from the conversation’s beginning.

*Abin hinc ab oculis* here, the final dismissal, is another “binding interrogative directive”, with which Chalinus must comply. The interrogative aspect comes from *abin*. This directive contains an “expressive element”, by which the speaker expresses disapproval of the action being spoken of, often with impatience (Risselada, p. 217-219). This command occurs after Lysidamus has already told Chalinus *abi*, with its dependent command *efferto*; this is the second time the master has told the slave to depart. At the end of their interaction, Lysidamus’s anger comes from a combination of frustration at his inability to persuade Chalinus, humiliation at his inability to control Chalinus, and the fact that he might lose Casina to an *armiger nili atque improbus*.

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2 Manumission due to expense was not uncommon. Barrow, p. 178.
Chapter 4 – Conclusion

The failure or success of Lysidamus and Simo in these conversations is partially due to the nature of their requests: Sosia was only asked to make minor changes to his future behavior, while Chalinus was commanded to sacrifice something already promised to him, for reasons of which he was not yet aware. Being a freedman of Simo, Sosia already had a certain level of trust and respect for his patron, which made him willing to cooperate from the beginning of the interaction. Chalinus and Lysidamus, however, had a mutual dislike, in spite of Lysidamus’ questionable praises. While Sosia would have acted simply for the benefit of his patron, Chalinus only became invested when a possibility for his personal gain appeared. Additionally, Lysidamus and his bailiff, Olympio, are the source of the problem for Chalinus – for what reason should he help them? Simo’s situation has no direct effect on Sosia; therefore, the freedman has less difficulty in applying himself for his patron’s benefit.

It is clear that the interlocutors adopt a procedure of politeness strategies based on their intent in a particular conversation. In these situations with a master intending to make a request of the inferior, the masters focused more on positive politeness techniques and the inferiors mostly utilized negative politeness strategies. This was expected, as the inferiors are more likely to offend their superiors’ sense of autonomy. If it were not for their intent to make a request, the masters most likely would have used more “raw” or “bald” “on record” statements, direct statements without concern for their effect on the hearer’s face, the hearer
being an inferior. The inferiors in that situation would likely have used politeness techniques with about the same frequency.

Based on the *eamus* instance and examples of indirectness in this paper, I suggest that the party with greater autonomy must confirm the social distance and level of familiarity. While either party may suggest cooperative procedures and claim ‘common ground’, the realization of this must be established by the more powerful of the two interlocutors. The lesser of the two must conform to the greater individual’s perception of their relationship. Because of this fact, Simo is able to create a feeling of debt for Sosia that did not exist before. Lysidamus is able (if only for a short time) to persuade Chalinus that he has held an opinion for a long period of time, when in fact he only has adopted it for manipulating the slave. Only the greater party may perform assertions of relative power; these assertions are analogous to expressions of deference by the lesser party (although the greater party may offer the illusion of deference).

Corollary to this determination of relationship is the speaker’s control of conversation movement. Being the initiator of the conversation in both scenarios, Lysidamus and Simo are expected to push the conversation forward, at least in the stages regarding its beginning and presentation of the request. This conversation directing can be attributed to their favoring of positive politeness. Such forward motion corresponds to Chalinus and Sosia’s passivity in the conversation.

The inferiors’ passivity in the conversations has multiple causes. Chalinus and Sosia have no knowledge of the purpose for which they have been detained. Sosia’s assumptions, had they been correct, would have given him some role in
directing the conversation. Chalinus, expecting a simple command, resigns his role in the conversation initially, perhaps hoping to resume whatever activity he was engaged with prior to his summoning.

Of course, the relationship between master and slave must be taken into account: the inferior characters do not step beyond a reasonable boundary out of respect (perhaps customary) for the masters’ authority. Sosia feels that his initial expressions of familiarity, being high-risk gestures of positive politeness, assume too much closeness to Simo. Sosia’s impression that this is somewhat excessive comes from Simo’s response, incorporating a corrective immo. Chalinus, on the other hand, is too flexible in his conversation, something ignored by Lysidamus in hopes that it will grant him a greater chance of success in his request. The slave responds to his master’s corrective speech (after acknowledging the compliment) with a sharp response of his own. It is not until the master suggests a reward—something unusual, no doubt—that Chalinus suspends his temerity in favor of negative politeness. Ferri suggests that Chalinus’ flexibility is part of a ‘Plautine element’, exhibiting distortions of typical politeness formula for comic effect (21). Neither Chalinus nor Lysidamus exhibit their typical relationship until the conversation’s end: the master, spouting commands, and the slave, eager to frustrate him, performing them almost at his leisure: “Lysidamus’ implacable power and the opposition to it” (McCarthy p. 95).

The interaction between Lysidamus and Chalinus would not have been identical outside of Plautus’ plays. The slave may still have been rebellious, but eventually, the authority of the master would most likely have forced the slave’s
compliance. It is not likely that the slaves have too much freedom in speech and action to be realistic, and that the humor lies in a distance from reality, as Stace believes (p. 73). Surely the slaves are exaggerated, but the situations are not entirely improbable. Amerasinghe scoffs at the slave’s control of the action in Plautus, and suggests that they are ‘heroes’ in his works (p. 62). But the slave’s usefulness in drama comes from his ability to violate a great many rules without being entirely implausible, and to invert the traditional positions of character types. In Segal’s words: “[Plautine Comedy] creates a new – albeit temporary – aristocracy, in which wit, not birth, distinguishes the ruler from the ruled” (p. 104).

A component of the inferiors’ passive contributions to these conversations is their inability to change the conversation’s direction. This is in part due to their favoring of negative politeness, which in turn is due to the social necessity of reducing their words’ imposition on their masters. Chalinus and Sosia may break the flow of the conversation’s progression by challenging an assertion or contribution from their masters, but they do not change the topic: this right is reserved for Lysidamus and Simo.

The speech acts of the inferiors, being less rooted in the purpose of achieving a request, likely resemble the speech between peers more than that of their masters’. The masters’ tendency toward positive politeness is not necessarily complemented by corresponding frequency of negative politeness as would be customary with peers. Although they make small concessions toward this end—Simo more so than Lysidamus—the masters do not necessarily need to respect their inferiors’ autonomy, making this aspect of politeness somewhat absent from these
conversations. In the speech of Chalinus and Sosia, on the other hand, we observe customary negative politeness gestures, perhaps even from a lower-class polite register.¹ In spite of the possibility that these are from a lower register, the customary negative politeness mimics a typical upper-class citizen’s desire not to coerce a peer, a feature emphasized in expressions such as nisi molestum and nisi forte non vis (Ferri, p. 25). The deference implied by the inferiors in similar expressions is only apparent in the masters’ lack of a similar response. Had they been peers, a response characterizing a mutual desire of the interlocutors not to impose on each other would be present, its absence being an offense.

¹ Examples such as Simo’s dictum puta and Chalinus’ quid velis modo id velim scire may fall into this category; Ferri, p. 22.
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