

**A Study in Futility:
Why Perpetually Losing Voters Keep
Coming Back on Election Day**

A Thesis Presented By

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Abstract

Whereas many studies of political participation have focused on voter behavior, none have addressed the effect that winning and losing has on turnout. In this study I investigate why chronic losers continue to participate in elections despite the fact that they have little to no chance of their candidate winning. A series of tests based on data gathered from the 2004 National Annenberg Election Survey and my own survey administered through the Amazon Mechanical Turk system will form the basis for analysis for this study. In this research I find that there is reason to believe that perpetual losers participate in elections for different reasons than people who are chronic winners or who live within highly competitive Congressional Districts. This is accomplished through reviewing several motivations and beliefs that have been posited to influence voting behavior. I find that a false sense of competition, habitual voting behaviors, and strength of partisanship are significant contributors to the political participation of chronic losers.

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Preface

During the week leading up to the Presidential election of 2008, my wife and I were discussing politics and I asked her whom she planned to vote for in the election. She just laughed at me and then proceeded to tell me that she had no intention of voting because it was a waste of time. At first I thought she was crazy because voting, to me, is one of the most important things in my life. Then, as I began to think about what she said, I realized that our Congressman, Senator, and Governor were from the opposite party of the one with which we identify. As a matter of fact, our party had not held a single major office other than President for the eight years we had lived in our house. I thought, “[w]ell, at least we’ve won the presidential election,” but we hadn’t. Our state had given its electoral votes to the same party for eight years as well. This is when I began to ponder why it is that some people who are never able to experience victory at the polls continue to vote while others choose not to. When I began to study political science in college I was introduced to Anthony Downs’ theory regarding rational voters. I knew immediately that the theory was flawed, even before I understood the calculus, because people like me existed. According to Downs I should not be participating in elections. From that point until the writing of this paper I have been looking for the answer to why I still feel the desire to vote in elections. With any luck this paper will answer that question for myself and others who still show up on Election Day, despite the insurmountable odds against us.

Acknowledgements

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I **Introduction**

Many electoral districts in the United States (U.S.) show a pattern of one party winning the majority of elections by sizeable margins. In fact, since 1982, thirty-six Congressional Districts have experienced landslide elections (elections won by a margin greater than twenty percent) in more than fifty percent of their elections.¹ After the election, the winning candidate assumes a position in government while the supporters develop into either “individuals who belong to the political majority—the political ‘winners’... [or the] political minority—that is, the ‘losers’” (Anderson and Tverdova 2001, 322). According to rational theories of voting behavior, we would expect this recurring pattern of one-sided victories to provide little incentive for supporters on either side to continue voting. These theories also suggest that extended periods of one-sided losses would depress voter turnout due to a sense of futility on the part of losing voters and a lack of competition for the winners. Psychological accounts of behavior lead us to expect such recurring defeats to be emotionally dispiriting and motivate a withdrawal from political life. At the very least, it is likely that perpetual losers would be better served placing their energy in political activities outside the realm of voting.²

However, despite all of this, many chronic losers continue to vote. Why, then, do citizens who support the persistently losing party in their district continue to vote in elections? Scholars have failed to investigate this question to date. Research on voters who have no prospect of winning in elections is important for the American notion of democracy because it will enrich

¹ Election data gathered via CQPress for all presidential, congressional, and gubernatorial elections ranging from 1982 through 2010.

² I use the terms “chronic losers” and “perpetual losers” interchangeably throughout this thesis to refer to those citizens who find themselves on the losing side of the vast majority of major elections over a long string of years. These may be thought of in a similar manner to sports fans who experience the wins and losses of their team in personal ways.

the understanding of what it is that makes people take time out of their busy lives and participate in the election. Furthermore, for political scientists this not only means a new area of exploration, but also suggests other potentially promising avenues of future research on voting behavior. What if other groups in society also participate in elections for different reasons or in different ways than modern theories or one-size-fits-all empirical studies have suggested? Also, political campaigns will be better equipped to motivate chronic losers to participate in elections if they understand what motivates these voters. If they succeed, then voter turnout may be increased and a previously unheard from segment of society will have a voice in elections. After all, if this country is to truly be a representative democracy then all of its people should make their opinions known so that representation does not favor any one type of citizen but instead stands for all citizens.

I expect that the motivations that cause perpetual losers to participate on Election Day are markedly different from the motivations of both voters in competitive districts and perpetually winning voters. I will test this expectation by examining what role several hypothesized factors—civic duty, social networks, mobilization, habit, and expressive desires—play in motivating citizens to vote across these different groups. In addition, I posit that the multi-level nature of U.S. elections—federal, state, and local—can provide an alternative motivation to vote even when prospects of victory are grim at one or two levels of electoral competition.

II **Political Losers**

Until now there have been no studies specifically to evaluate the voting decisions of electoral losers in particular. However, there has been some work done on how losing affects a person's sense of political efficacy. Christopher Anderson and Yuliya Tverdova (2001) describe political efficacy as "the feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process...the feeling that political and social change is possible, and that the individual citizen can play a part in bringing about this change" (325). Efficacy can be broken down into two different types: internal efficacy and external efficacy, or political trust. "Internal efficacy...is based upon people's beliefs about how much say they personally have in politics and about their ability to understand politics," while external efficacy "is defined in terms of people's beliefs about legislators' interest in their views and whether legislators maintain contact with their constituents" (Lambert et al. 1986, 706). "When we look at the differences between winners and losers...we find that there is very little difference in their levels of...efficacy" (Anderson and Tverdova 2001, 330). Thus, in a comparative study of democracies, they conclude that winning or losing does not substantially affect a person's level of political efficacy. Anderson and Tverdova go on to show that "on average, the internal efficacy gap between those in the majority and those in the minority is a negligible 1.3 percent" (330).

However, in an analysis of the effects of winning and losing on political trust, or external efficacy, Christopher Anderson and Andrew LoTempio (2002) suggest that voters behave differently depending on the type and quantity of wins and losses they experience. They divide participants into four groups based on the elections voters won and lost. If the voter won in one type of the election but lost in the other, they were identified as partial winners and then further

segregated as “partial presidential winners” or “partial congressional winners” depending on which election it was their candidate won (344).³ However, if their voting resulted in winning both the presidential and congressional elections they were labeled “double winners” and, conversely, if voters lost in both elections they were cast as “double losers” (344). Anderson and LoTempio found that, on the issue of political trust, what mattered most to a person was whether or not their presidential candidate won. If this is the case, then we would expect that any voter who experienced a presidential loss, or a presidential loss in conjunction with multiple other losses, would experience a decrease in political trust. This directly contradicts Anderson and Tverdova who said that neither internal nor external efficacy are greatly affected by a voter’s wins or losses in the election.

Thus, while there is a small literature on how electoral losses affect voters, it suffers from at least three weaknesses in addressing the question of this study. First, prior studies have examined the impact of losses on feelings of efficacy and system legitimacy, but not on political participation. Second, the findings with regard to efficacy are contradictory. Third, prior studies only consider the immediate impact of one round of electoral losses, not the impact of persistent losses over a period of years or decades. This underscores the necessity for greater understanding of the role losing has on voters and what it means for their long-term participation in elections. A starting point for thinking about such research is in the modern theories regarding political participation and especially efforts to explain voter turnout. Through these theories it may be possible to identify ways in which chronic losers differ from other voters.

³ If the voters presidential candidate won, but congressional candidate lost they were identified as partial presidential winners. Conversely, if their congressional candidate won, but their presidential candidate lost they were categorized as partial congressional winners.

III **The Theories**

While research directly examining the impact of repeated electoral losses on participation is limited, a substantial body of work dedicated to the study of mass voting behavior may help to shed light on factors that shape the decision of chronic losers to participate or not. There are three types of theories regarding voter turnout: rational, resource, and social. Rational theories believe that the act of turning out at the polls on Election Day is a calculable equation and that for every member of society the equation is solved in the same way. Resource models, while less strict in their mathematics, emphasize the relatively fixed or slow-changing attributes of a person's socioeconomic standing in predicting what they will do on Election Day. The most flexible of these models are the social models. These take account of the wider variety of individual experiences, beliefs, and motivations that can cause a person to be more or less likely to participate on Election Day. We can begin with rational theories.

Anthony Downs (1957) stated that every decision we make, including the decision to vote, is made by calculation. If the benefits of the decision outweigh the costs we go ahead, if not we don't. In regards to the decision to vote, Downs supplies us with the formula $V = pB - C$ where V is the decision to vote, B is the benefits a person receives from voting, C is any associated costs of voting, and p is the probability that the voter will cast the decisive vote in the election. However, this calculus fails to model actual voter participation well. The difficulty lies with the variable p . Because elections are collective decisions and the expected benefits are also collective, a person's decision to vote hinges on the anticipated size of those benefits only to the extent the person expects his or her vote to affect the outcome (i.e., break a tie). Since this probability reduces the value of B to near zero as the number of voters grows, any costs

associated with the act of voting outweigh the small value of pB , leaving the conclusion that nobody is expected to vote.

In an effort to overcome the weakness of this model, William Riker and Peter Ordeshook (1968) added a new variable to the Downsian calculus. The new formula is $V = pB - C + D$, in which D represents the five satisfying elements that voters receive from their participation in elections. These include “the satisfaction from compliance with the ethic of voting,” “the satisfaction from affirming allegiance to the political system,” “the satisfaction from affirming a partisan preference,” “the satisfaction of deciding, going to the polls, etc.,” and “the satisfaction of affirming one's efficacy in the political system” (Riker and Ordeshook 1968, 28). While this does resolve the problem with the Downsian model that practically eliminates all voters from participating in elections, it does not address the root problem. All Riker and Ordeshook did was allow the values pB and C to continue to cancel each other out and allow D to be the entire determinant to whether a person votes or not. In other words, any number of individual or situational factors—a grandmother’s admonition, the social camaraderie of going to the polls with friends, a rainy day—can tip the scales between voting and not (Aldrich 1993; Rosenstone 1982; Schlozman et al. 1995; Schier 2000). What this points out, then, is that while trying to explain voting behavior as a rational decision, Downs, Riker, and Ordeshook show that it is actually the psychological motivations that play the largest role in voters deciding to participate in elections. With this in mind, we can move onto resource theories.

Resource theories suggest that it is the things like education, income, age, and geographic location that impact a person’s decision to vote. Raymond Wolfinger and Steven Rosenstone (1980) stated that a person’s resources are one way to identify the reason some people vote while others do not. The resources that were used for the “classification of people is limited to

demographic characteristics (age, income, place of residence, and so forth) and to some contextual variables (such as voter registration laws)” (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, 1). Of these characteristics, only a few have a significant impact on a person’s decision to vote. The most important trait was the level of education a person possesses. Wolfinger and Rosenstone’s study suggested, “education increases one’s capacity for understanding complex and intangible subjects such as politics, as well as encouraging the ethic of civic responsibility” (102). This finding is supported in multiple studies regarding the importance of education on voter turnout (Krupnikov 2009; Wattenberg 2002). In addition, Steven Finkel (1987) shows that “younger, more highly educated and more left-wing individuals are more likely to participate aggressively in politics” (458). These studies seem to make it clear that education is, in fact, important to determining whether or not a person will vote, but why?

D. Sunshine Hillygus (2005) not only confirmed that education is an exceptional indicator of a person’s likelihood of voting, but also expanded on the idea. First, by examining the effects of high scores on the SAT, “there appears no evidence that general intelligence influences political activity” (36). Instead, it is a person’s educational exposure to studies in the social sciences that “has a consistent, positive and statistically significant effect” on measures of participation (37). These results imply that there is a correlation between exposure to an education that develops civic interest and skills and a person’s likelihood to vote. Therefore, as in the case of rational theory, we are left with the suggestion that it is mainly one’s sense of civic duty that encourages voter participation. However, the relationship between education and participation is not infinite. The amount by which education makes a person more likely to vote seems to stop as soon as the level of education becomes higher than the average education of the other people around the voter, suggesting a role for social networks and selective mobilization,

topics to which we shall turn momentarily (Nie et al. 1996). Since both rational and resource theories point to the importance of civic duty let us move on to social theories by first examining civic duty.

Because of Riker and Ordeshook, civic duty is often associated with rational voting theories. For instance, Robert Salisbury (1975) suggests, “it is quite rational for people to vote out of a strong sense of civic duty despite a lack of effective policy alternatives, so long as the personal value derived from fulfilling civic duty looms larger than whatever costs the voting act entails” (333). However, where rational and resource theories suggest possible reasons that people are *able* to vote, social theories seek to explain why it is that people would *want* to vote (Verba et al. 1995). In short, they focus on motivations. Many campaigns use advertising to increase the public’s feeling of civic duty, which in turn should make it more likely that viewers of the advertisement participate on Election Day (Geys 2006). Cindy Kam (2007) studied the ways in which citizens reacted to appeals of citizen duty from the candidates. The study’s goal was to “determine the extent to which a call to citizen duty in campaign discourse can encourage citizens to devote more cognitive effort to thinking about politics” (19). Kam found that “on average, subjects in the citizen-duty condition learned more, thought more, and sought information in a more open-minded way” (26). This conclusion, taken in tandem with the idea that the more information a voter is exposed to in a campaign, the more likely they are to vote, suggest an indirect means by which duty may prompt losers to continue to participate in elections, as well as the direct motivation to adhere to the social norm that suggests good citizens vote. Furthermore, one study suggests that high levels of civic duty had the ability to get voters to the polls despite explicit negative costs such as rainstorms on Election Day (Knack 1994).

In addition to civic duty, scholars of social, or psychological, voting behavior suggest other potential contributing characteristics that have a measurable impact on a person's decision to participate in elections. One of these is a person's social network and the enticements and pressures it creates to please others. "In an ABC-Harvard poll conducted in 1983 (Alderman 1983), 37% of respondents—including 41% of voters—cited as a reason for voting the statement 'My friends and relatives almost always vote and I'd feel uncomfortable telling them I hadn't voted'" (Knack 1992, 137). Furthermore, Hahrie Han (2009) found that "citizens are more likely to participate in politics, and more likely to intend to participate in the future, the more they talk to other people" (283). The social network theory of voting behavior suggests that it is due to social discussion that voters are motivated to vote (LeDuc et al. 2002). One of the things that increase a person's ability to engage in social discussion is close relationships within a person's neighborhood (Wattenberg 2002). The idea is that these relationships "provide external encouragement to vote, as well an enhanced sense of an election's meaningfulness" (Teixeria 1992, 36-37). In addition, social groups provide voters with information that they may not have had access to within their own means which assists them in being more informed about the election and therefore more likely to participate (McClurg 2003).

Some scholars have suggested that as voters age their propensity to turnout increases due to their habit of participating on Election Day. The data from one paper suggests, "a mobilization campaign that stimulates 1000 people to vote in the current election produces an additional 887 votes in elections that follow" (Gerber et al. 2003, 549). John Aldrich et al. (2011) ran a series of tests in which strong levels of habit were able to affect the impact that traditional resource and social factors had on voter participation. This suggests chronic losers may continue voting, while opposition seems to be insurmountable, because it is habitual. After all, if a voter were

encouraged to participate in elections when their district was competitive, and habit is a legitimate factor in determining a person's propensity to vote, we would expect that individual to continue voting even after their district has become less competitive. However, it has also been argued that participating in the election and losing to the majority party "may frustrate citizens such that they will become ever more politicized and involved in the process with the aim of bringing about change in a system that appears stacked against them—that is, losers may make their voice heard" (Anderson 2005, 51). Therefore, let us turn to information regarding expressive voting.

A further motivation that may explain perpetual losers choosing to participate despite the odds is to use their vote to communicate a message to other people. In one study of expressive voting, Thomas Piketty (1999) suggests that some voters use their electoral voice in order to communicate something to people about elections to come in the future. Piketty (1999) submits that there are at least three different channels through which 'communicative voting' can influence future elections:

1. Voters expect mainstream parties to move towards their expressed views;
2. Voters want to learn the strength of each candidate so as to better coordinate their future votes;
3. Voters try to influence others' opinions by expressing their political beliefs (169).

However, in addition to Piketty, Geoffrey Brennan and Loren Lomasky (1993) point out that expressive voting may have nothing to do with long-term impact. Instead they show that occasionally people may participate "from a desire to express feelings and desires simply for the sake of the expression itself and without any necessary implication that the desired outcome will be brought about thereby" (33). While this type of voting is probably most commonly associated

with supporters of third parties that hold very little hope of achieving national prominence, it could also be a factor in members of the Democratic and Republican parties when they are geographically located in areas where their political opinions are not represented. One reason may be that, even in these areas, chronic losers are still actively pursued by election campaigns. This pursuit is characterized by what Steven Rosenstone and John Hansen (1993) referred to as mobilization.

Rosenstone and Hansen suggest that various political forces actively mobilize voters. These can include candidates running for election, mobilization from one's own political party, or exposure to politically driven issues. In addition, mobilizing agents may be dependent on the very people they hope to motivate. Sidney Verba (1967) suggests that voters must not only be exposed to the things that affect their decision to vote, but when "messages are sent...they may or may not be received and acted upon. Much depends on the people to whom the messages are sent" (66). Verba goes on to show that the responsiveness of a voter can be characterized by their resources, motivation, structural conduciveness, and cultural conduciveness (67). If a voter is politically dependent for their job, for instance, they have a high likelihood of accepting mobilizing messages.

Furthermore, according to some survey data, it appears that when a minority of Democrats are living within a majority district of Republicans they tend to be more mobilized than Republicans in a Democratically dominated area (Gimpel et al. 2004). In fact, "different studies on different elections at different times using different methods have all found that political mobilization—variously labeled voter contact, get-out-the-vote (GOTV), or the voter canvass—matters" (Goldstein and Ridout 2002, 3). This concludes the reflection on the five common

motivational factors typically considered by social voter models. However, I would like to propose one more possible motivation before moving on to my own research.


In addition to characteristics of voters themselves, the election process itself may also be capable of mobilizing voters on Election Day. To begin with, elections are not held in isolation from each other and so each election is “oftentimes influenced by more than one electoral context” (Gilliam 1985, 348). Some of these contexts may be local ballot proposals, a close friend running for public office, or the way voters attach importance to particular elections. Though turnout rates suggest that voters are more attracted to “major” races such as presidential, gubernatorial, and congressional elections, some voters may be more deeply engaged with local and state affairs.

Furthermore, one particular aspect of context is that, in each election year, candidates at every level of government, from sheriff to president, contribute large sums of money on campaign advertising. Because of this the average voter is barraged daily with reminders to vote for someone, or something, on Election Day. The district attorney may have yard signs while the city mayor purchases a billboard. Then while watching prime time television an ad spot supporting a particular presidential candidate may come on. Voters may find mailers from candidates for the House of Representatives or Senate. While each of these items only represent one particular candidate or ballot proposal, they do not exist independently from one another. Instead, I believe that each of them increase the likelihood that a person will choose to participate on Election Day.

First, each interaction with political rhetoric is a reminder to participate. Additionally, in conjunction with my opinion that the multi-level nature of elections is what matters, each exposure increases the possibility that the voter will find something they believe is worth

showing up for on Election Day. One example of how one election can affect voter turnout in other elections is illuminated by the drop off in voter turnout in years other than presidential elections illustrated in Figure 1.⁴

Figure 1 Voter Turnout by Voter Eligible Population



⁴ This figure is drawn from voter turnout data taken from Dr. Michael McDonald's United States Elections Project.

IV Research Design

In this study I compare the beliefs, motivations, and behavior of chronic losers to those residing in competitive districts and to those who perpetually win. In order to do this I first categorize voters into levels of competition. Next, I evaluated how these data speak to earlier contradictory results regarding the political efficacy of electoral losers. Then I will examine turnout patterns, to see if there is any validity to the expectations of rational and psychological theories that voter hopelessness drives down voting in districts where one party dominates. Finally, I will test hypotheses about the role of several motivational factors in sustaining voter participation, by examining both the presence of these motivations and their explanatory power through the lens of district partisan competitiveness. I will be analyzing each of these steps with data from the 2004 National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES) and an original survey administered through the Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) system from March 2 through March 10, 2012.

Let us begin by establishing how voters are sorted into partisan competitiveness categories: chronic losers, chronic winners, and all others. Congressional Districts were classified using voter turnout data from the CQ Press Voting and Elections Collection. From this information, I created two tables: one table tracked how many losses a party experienced by a margin of twenty percent or more, and the other table recorded every loss regardless of margin. Each table marks whether Republicans or Democrats lost in each Presidential, Senatorial, House, and Gubernatorial election. Republican losses were then subtracted from the Democratic losses and divided by the total elections in that district. Therefore, a negative number identifies districts

where Republicans perpetually lose and a positive number indicates districts where Democrats perpetually lose.

Because the two surveys used in this study are from different periods of time, the time period used to determine chronic competitiveness for each is different. For the NAES survey, election data are from the period between 1982 and 2004. Meanwhile, the MTurk election data covers the period from 1982 through 2010. Finally, respondents were classified, according to their district's level of competition, into roughly equally sized groups. For instance, in the NAES table, group one includes approximately twenty percent of the respondents and represents districts where Democrats win the most. Similarly, group five also includes around twenty percent of the respondents, but identifies districts in which Republicans dominate elections.⁵

The NAES survey was selected from several other major potential surveys between 2000 and 2010 including those by the American National Election Studies, the General Social Survey, and the Cooperative Congressional Election Study. The 2004 NAES National Rolling Cross-section was administered to 81,422 respondents between October 2003 and November 2004. It was selected for this work because it covered current theories on voter participation fairly well and because its large sample size ensured dispersion of many voters across diverse Congressional Districts. The benefit of the NAES sample size is that, as the number of respondents rises, it becomes easier to observe even modest differences across voters and districts with greater confidence. However, there are also drawbacks to the 2004 NAES. The questions available on the 2004 NAES survey do not address any of the modern theories adequately and some of the most promising questions were asked only during a portion of the year, undercutting some of the benefits of sample size. Therefore, I will use the MTurk survey to

⁵ See Appendix A for all tables related to this section.

both check the results gained from the NAES survey and to improve the depth and scope of concepts measured.

MTurk is an online service in which Internet users (workers) are paid small fees to perform Human Intelligence Tasks (HIT's). Workers can be recruited to complete surveys programmed in Qualtrics in order to give random assignment to experimental conditions. The only requirements for respondents are a computer with Internet connection and to be at least 18 years old. Subjects received 40 cents for completion of my 12-minute survey. The MTurk system, available on Amazon.com, enables researchers access to a larger and often more diverse (e.g., educationally, geographically) pool of respondents than is normally available for the standard undergraduate surveys, which tend to be limited to university students. In addition, MTurk offers the ability to recruit a good number of respondents in a matter of days.⁶ A similar study on a university campus may provide half the number of respondents in a matter of weeks or even months. However, in comparison to an expensive study like the 2004 NAES, the number of respondents available and affordable through MTurk is much lower. Yet the latter provides an opportunity to improve the quality and suitability of the questions for this research. By doing so it is possible to collect data on respondents related to each of the theories of voting behavior.⁷

Both the NAES and the MTurk surveys were evaluated in a similar manner. First, in order to illuminate the effect that competition has on political efficacy and demonstrate that voter fatigue is not as high as expected by rational theories in districts dominated by a single party, individual questions will be analyzed based on district competitiveness. Then I will examine the

⁶ My MTurk survey was able to gather 866 respondents in one week. Respondents were eliminated from analysis for failing to pass compliance tests. These tests included how much time the respondents took to complete the survey, how much time they spent on a complex ranking question, and how much time they took to answer a trigger question. Furthermore, if a respondents exact Congressional District could not be determined by the zip code they responded they were exempt from analysis.


⁷ A copy of the survey administered through MTurk has been included in Appendix C.

way in which the hypothesized factors affect political participation based on competition. Groups of questions will be arranged into a series of three linear regressions (one for big losers, one for big winners, and one for competitive districts).

IV **2004 NAES findings**

In this section I will analyze respondent's answers to a large national survey, through the lenses of modern voter theories, in order to focus in on the ways in which behaviors of chronic losers are different from other voters.⁸ However, as mentioned before, the 2004 NAES does have a few limitations when it comes to evaluating voter motivations, but its large sample size does hold the promise of greater analytical leverage over the elements it covers. Recall that Anderson and Tverdova (2001) stated that winning and losing had no effect on political efficacy and that Anderson and LoTempio (2002) showed that winning and losing did have an effect on political trust. The NAES offers three questions by which it is possible to evaluate these two claims. All three are political efficacy questions with one being based on external efficacy, or political trust, and two based on internal efficacy. In Figure 2, the responses to these three questions are shown in three groups based on their electoral win-loss record. Because each of these questions is answered with either yes or no, the scale on the vertical axis represents the proportion of yes answers to each of the three questions. As the figure shows, Anderson and Tverdova's (2001) findings are supported by the 2004 NAES, as level of competition has almost no identifiable difference on the three questions. In fact, the largest spread between any of the competition categories is less than two percent.

⁸ See Appendix B for information regarding the way in which the 2004 NAES data was coded.

Figure 5.1 Measures of Political Efficacy

Next, I used the 2004 NAES to determine whether winning and losing has an effect on voter participation. As mentioned before, modern theories of voting behavior suggest that over the course of time the perpetual winners and losers should both experience a measureable fatigue in their turnout behavior. In order to measure this, four measurements of political turnout will be used. For the sake of thoroughness both simple losses (those elections where the voters experienced a loss no matter what percentage the margin was) and big losses (elections that were lost by a spread of at least twenty percent) are used to show the proportion of voters that participated. Figures 3 through 6 illustrate the answers of the respondents to questions regarding political turnout, categorized by the level of competition in their districts, based on twenty-two years of election history.

Figure 5.2 Proportion of Respondents Registered




Figure 5.3 Proportion of Respondents who Intend to or Already did Vote in the Primary




Figure 5.4 Proportion of Respondents who Intend to Vote in the 2004 General Election





Figure 5.5 Proportion of Respondents Voted in the 2004 General Election

Figure 4: 2004NAES Voted in General Election



Looking at these figures we should expect to find an inverse parabola of voter turnout according to both rational and psychological theories of turnout. An inverse parabola would demonstrate that voter fatigue occurs at both the level of perpetual winner and perpetual loser while turnout in competitive districts remains higher than both. However, what we find in the NAES is quite different than this expectation. Instead, where there is a change in voter turnout, levels of voter participation show a linear fatigue where the highest levels occur where the voters party dominates the district and, where a voters party is dominated, participation is lower. This occurs in all but one instance. The greatest range in voter turnout occurs among Democrats in Figure 2. In this case participation drops from 67% where Democrats dominate elections to 58% where Republicans control the district.⁹ Meanwhile, in the question regarding a voters intention to vote in the general election Republicans showed no change in turnout across all three categories of competition in both the simple loser and big loser scale. Therefore, while in most of the cases there is a slight drop off in participation in districts where the party is dominated, in none of the examples do the perpetual winners show any sign of fatigue. While this does not bode well for previous theories, for our purposes it is good news. Not only are chronic losers continuing to vote in the face of staggering opposition, they are doing so at levels near or at those of competitive districts. Now let us try to determine why.

Therefore, we move to examining the ways in which the six theories of voter participation are reflected in the respondents to the NAES. By doing so this study may show what it is that motivates voters to participate regardless of the level of competitiveness in their district. In order to evaluate resource and social theories of participation, let us examine six dependent measures of voter turnout. These measures include the same four used to evaluate

⁹ Percent based on big loser data. Turnout ranges from 65% to 58% for simple losers.

rational theories (registered, intend to or already did vote in the primary election, intend to vote in the general election, voted in the general election) plus chance of voting in the primary election and chance of voting in the general election.

Independent variables, referred to in Tables one through six as key variables, are constructed in four different ways. Attend religious service, ideological extremity, and social exposure at work place are taken from single questions. Both attendance of religious services and social exposure at work are being used in this test to account for a persons social influences by measuring how often that person is in contact with potential political interactions. Meanwhile, ideological extremity, along with strength of partisanship, is interpreted as a measure of a person's expressive character.

Strength of partisanship and percent life at residence were both constructed using the answers to multiple questions. Strength of partisanship is built by combining the responses to three individual questions about the respondent's party identification to create a seven-point scale with strong republican on one end and strong democrat on the other. The party identification scale was then folded to create a four-point scale ranging from no party identification (independent) to strong party identification. This scale is what is represented in the term strength of partisanship. Percent life at residence is a simple calculation of a person's age response divided by their response to a question asking how long the person had been living in their residence. The purpose of this variable is to try to evaluate how connected the respondent feels to their community.

Finally, the variables discussed politics in social circle ($\alpha = 0.71$) and feelings about candidates ($\alpha = 0.35$) represent averages of the responses to multiple questions. Discussed politics in social circle combined responses to three questions asking how many days in the last

week the respondent had discussed politics with a) friends or family, b) workmates, and c) people online. The intention of including this question is to capture the respondents mobilizing agents, but could also be seen as groups within a person's social network. Feelings about candidates combines two questions that are nearly identical. Each question asked how favorably the survey taker felt about a) George W. Bush and b) John Kerry. This variable is interpreted to reflect the respondent's attitude towards the multi-level nature of elections. In other words, regardless of the issues, does a person's attitude about a candidate's character encourage them to participate on Election Day.

Table 5.1 Determinants of Voter Registration (2004 NAES Survey)

	Competition Category		
	Big Loser	Competitive	Big Winner
Key Explanatory Variables			
Feelings About Candidates	0.042** (0.011)	0.034** (0.005)	0.041** (0.009)
Strength of Partisanship	0.097** (0.011)	0.053** (0.005)	0.088** (0.008)
Ideological Extremity	-0.004 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.009 (0.007)
Discussed Politics in Social Circle	0.128** (0.016)	0.105** (0.008)	0.099** (0.012)
Percent Life At Residence	0.123** (0.016)	0.104** (0.007)	0.133** (0.012)
Social Exposure at Workplace	0.030** (0.008)	0.022** (0.004)	0.021** (0.006)
Religious Attendance	0.061** (0.010)	0.047** (0.005)	0.037** (0.007)
Control			
Age	0.373** (0.024)	0.344** (0.012)	0.354** (0.019)
Sex	0.016** (0.006)	0.017** (0.003)	0.018** (0.005)
Education	0.147** (0.013)	0.127** (0.006)	0.141** (0.010)
Income	0.121** (0.016)	0.068** (0.008)	0.075** (0.012)
Married	0.034** (0.007)	0.024** (0.003)	0.025** (0.005)
Black	0.009 (0.013)	-0.002 (0.006)	0.016* (0.008)
Minority	-0.053** (0.014)	-0.050** (0.007)	-0.050** (0.010)
Hispanic	-0.033** (0.015)	-0.026** (0.007)	-0.040** (0.011)
Adj R-squared	0.1297	0.0994	0.114
<i>N</i>	8753	31118	13113

Coeff., (Std. Err.), ^ = $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

**Table 5.2 Determinants of Intend to or Already Voted in Primary Election
(2004 NAES Survey)**

	Competition Category		
	Big Loser	Competitive	Big Winner
Key Explanatory Variables			
Feelings About Candidates	0.008 (0.018)	0.019* (0.009)	0.027^ (0.014)
Strength of Partisanship	0.230** (0.017)	0.198** (0.008)	0.193** (0.014)
Ideological Extremity	-0.004 (0.015)	0.005 (0.008)	0.008 (0.012)
Discussed Politics in Social Circle	0.173** (0.026)	0.129** (0.013)	0.158** (0.020)
Percent Life At Residence	0.125** (0.025)	0.104** (0.013)	0.129** (0.019)
Social Exposure at Workplace	-0.000 (0.013)	0.021** (0.007)	0.002 (0.011)
Religious Attendance	0.113** (0.015)	0.096** (0.008)	0.062** (0.012)
Control			
Age	0.522** (0.038)	0.540** (0.020)	0.559** (0.030)
Sex	0.020* (0.010)	0.029** (0.005)	0.031** (0.008)
Education	0.057** (0.020)	0.044** (0.010)	0.083** (0.016)
Income	0.013 (0.025)	0.054** (0.013)	0.056** (0.020)
Married	0.041** (0.011)	0.026** (0.006)	0.006 (0.009)
Black	0.051* (0.021)	0.081** (0.010)	0.102** (0.013)
Minority	-0.019 (0.022)	0.003 (0.011)	0.035* (0.017)
Hispanic	0.011 (0.023)	0.032** (0.012)	0.025 (0.019)
Adj R-squared	0.0876	0.0779	0.084
N	8508	30263	12750

Coeff., (Std. Err.), ^ = $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

**Table 5.3 Determinants of Chance of Voting in Primary Election (2004
NAES Survey)**

	Competition Category		
	Big Loser	Competitive	Big Winner
Key Explanatory Variables			
Feelings About Candidates	0.060 (0.038)	0.098** (0.021)	0.082** (0.031)
Strength of Partisanship	0.365** (0.037)	0.244** (0.019)	0.231** (0.031)
Ideological Extremity	-0.032 (0.034)	-0.032^ (0.018)	-0.020 (0.027)
Discussed Politics in Social Circle	0.209** (0.062)	0.194** (0.033)	0.268** (0.049)
Percent Life At Residence	0.133* (0.057)	0.061* (0.029)	0.125** (0.044)
Social Exposure at Workplace	0.013 (0.031)	-0.003 (0.016)	0.001 (0.023)
Religious Attendance	0.164** (0.034)	0.113** (0.018)	0.058* (0.027)
Control			
Age	0.246** (0.088)	0.316** (0.045)	0.402** (0.067)
Sex	0.085** (0.022)	0.087** (0.012)	0.090** (0.018)
Education	-0.038 (0.045)	-0.040^ (0.024)	-0.036 (0.036)
Income	0.040 (0.056)	0.055^ (0.030)	0.028 (0.044)
Married	0.048^ (0.025)	0.005 (0.013)	0.023 (0.020)
Black	0.104* (0.046)	0.125** (0.024)	0.141** (0.028)
Minority	0.000 (0.053)	-0.029 (0.027)	0.116** (0.042)
Hispanic	0.067 (0.059)	0.080** (0.029)	0.093* (0.044)
Adj R-squared	0.1394	0.1133	0.1263
<i>N</i>	1402	4632	1986

Coeff., (Std. Err.), ^ = $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

Table 5.4 Determinants of Intend to Vote in General Election (2004 NAES Survey)

	Competition Category		
	Big Loser	Competitive	Big Winner
Key Explanatory Variables			
Feelings About Candidates	0.013 (0.012)	0.031** (0.006)	0.028** (0.008)
Strength of Partisanship	0.077** (0.011)	0.044** (0.005)	0.047** (0.008)
Ideological Extremity	-0.003 (0.010)	-0.012** (0.004)	0.000 (0.006)
Discussed Politics in Social Circle	0.084** (0.016)	0.059** (0.007)	0.061** (0.011)
Percent Life At Residence	0.018 (0.016)	0.009 (0.007)	0.033** (0.011)
Social Exposure at Workplace	0.007 (0.008)	0.005 (0.004)	0.012^ (0.006)
Religious Attendance	0.011 (0.010)	0.026** (0.004)	0.017* (0.007)
Control			
Age	0.161** (0.025)	0.073** (0.011)	0.099** (0.017)
Sex	0.008 (0.006)	0.006* (0.003)	0.005 (0.004)
Education	0.076** (0.013)	0.066** (0.006)	0.067** (0.009)
Income	0.067** (0.017)	0.020* (0.007)	0.030** (0.011)
Married	0.000 (0.007)	0.006^ (0.003)	0.007 (0.005)
Black	0.025^ (0.014)	0.011^ (0.006)	-0.009 (0.007)
Minority	-0.017 (0.015)	-0.031** (0.006)	-0.006 (0.009)
Hispanic	-0.002 (0.015)	-0.004 (0.006)	0.006 (0.011)
Adj R-squared	0.0704	0.0454	0.0559
N	3632	12997	5390

Coeff., (Std. Err.), ^ = $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

Table 5.5 Determinants of Chance of Voting in General Election (2004 NAES Survey)

	Competition Category		
	Big Loser	Competitive	Big Winner
Key Explanatory Variables			
Feelings About Candidates	0.047** (0.013)	0.058** (0.006)	0.055** (0.009)
Strength of Partisanship	0.088** (0.011)	0.056** (0.005)	0.057** (0.008)
Ideological Extremity	-0.005 (0.010)	-0.010* (0.005)	0.007 (0.007)
Discussed Politics in Social Circle	0.112** (0.017)	0.092** (0.008)	0.090** (0.011)
Percent Life At Residence	0.029^ (0.017)	0.012 (0.008)	0.035** (0.011)
Social Exposure at Workplace	0.005 (0.009)	0.010* (0.004)	0.012^ (0.006)
Religious Attendance	0.025* (0.010)	0.032** (0.005)	0.018* (0.007)
Control			
Age	0.205** (0.026)	0.135** (0.012)	0.152** (0.018)
Sex	0.007 (0.007)	0.010** (0.003)	0.011* (0.004)
Education	0.095** (0.013)	0.081** (0.006)	0.084** (0.009)
Income	0.093** (0.017)	0.037** (0.008)	0.044** (0.012)
Married	0.007 (0.007)	0.009* (0.003)	0.009^ (0.005)
Black	0.026^ (0.014)	0.011^ (0.006)	-0.007 (0.007)
Minority	-0.038* (0.015)	-0.033** (0.007)	-0.016 (0.010)
Hispanic	-0.018 (0.015)	-0.011 (0.007)	0.001 (0.012)
Adj R-squared	0.1161	0.0859	0.097
N	3632	12995	5387

Coeff., (Std. Err.), ^ = $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

Table 5.6 Determinants of Voted in General Election (2004 NAES Survey)

	Competition Category		
	Big Loser	Competitive	Big Winner
Key Explanatory Variables			
Feelings About Candidates	0.043* (0.085)	0.034 (0.041)	0.042* (0.076)
Strength of Partisanship	0.098 (0.079)	0.054** (0.035)	0.088* (0.056)
Ideological Extremity	-0.005 (0.068)	-0.003 (0.034)	-0.01 (0.052)
Discussed Politics in Social Circle	0.128 (0.106)	0.106** (0.049)	0.099 (0.075)
Percent Life At Residence	0.124 (0.107)	0.105* (0.054)	0.134 (0.088)
Social Exposure at Workplace	0.030 (0.058)	0.023 (0.029)	0.021 (0.041)
Religious Attendance	0.061 (0.071)	0.048** (0.033)	0.037 (0.053)
Control			
Age	0.373* (0.170)	0.345* (0.086)	0.355* (0.125)
Sex	0.017^ (0.046)	0.018^ (0.022)	0.018 (0.034)
Education	0.148 (0.092)	0.128** (0.045)	0.141^ (0.064)
Income	0.121* (0.107)	0.069** (0.058)	0.075** (0.080)
Married	0.034 (0.050)	0.025 (0.025)	0.026 (0.037)
Black	0.010 (0.090)	-0.003* (0.047)	0.017 (0.057)
Minority	-0.054^ (0.103)	-0.051 (0.045)	-0.051 (0.076)
Hispanic	-0.033 (0.125)	-0.027 (0.048)	-0.041 (0.080)
Adj R-squared	0.1211	0.1817	0.1157
N	171	645	268

Coeff., (Std. Err.), ^ = $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

For each of these six measures of participation, it appears that many of the factors that explain voter participation are the same for big winners, losers, and competitive districts. Strength of partisanship seems to be the most consistent measure that distinguishes chronic losers from other groups. In five of the six measures of turnout strength of partisanship is statistically significant (99% confidence). For these five instances, voters are between three and ten percent more likely to participate in elections due to their strength of partisanship if they are big losers. This suggests that expressive desires may play a larger role in motivating chronic losers compared to other voters.

In addition, there is some evidence, albeit more mixed, that age and income are strong predictors for perpetually losing voters. Age being significant could hint at either habit or some sense of civic duty. However, it is not readily apparent why wealth would make more of a difference to a chronic loser than other voters. As the resource theories stated, it could be a matter of the voter's resources outweighing the negative costs of voting. However, making an educated guess at this juncture is premature for a few reasons.

To conclude this section, while a few variables show promise at identifying ways in which perpetual losers participate, this analysis does not offer the opportunity to make such a claim. To begin with, the questions that were used to evaluate respondents in these regressions were not written specifically for this study. Therefore, they do not address all of the concerns associated with why some voters participate in elections while others choose to stay home. Furthermore, the few questions that were usable from this survey provided weak measures for analysis. Consequently we must turn to a study designed specifically for the purpose of measuring why it is chronic losers continue to vote. For this purpose I have designed a survey


and administered it through the Amazon Mechanical Turk system. Let us now turn to the results of that survey.

V MTurk Findings

In this chapter I will build on findings from the 2004 NAES by first comparing the ways in which winning and losing create differences in people's behaviors. Then I will run a series of regression analyses in order to ascertain the factors that influence voter participation across competition groups. It is important to remember that while the questions asked in the MTurk survey are written specifically for this study, and therefore address this study's particular needs, the sample size is much smaller than that of the 2004 NAES. As a sample size increases, it offers greater power to detect differences of any size. The NAES also is more representative of the population. However, even with the small sample size, there is much that can be learned from the MTurk survey due to the improved depth and breadth of measurement of key concepts.

To begin, respondents were asked for their subjective perceptions of competitiveness and electoral success in their district. This was accomplished by asking participants to indicate, on a slider ranging from zero to one hundred percent, how often the candidates they preferred won. As Figure 6.1 illustrates, respondents located themselves all along the scale with the highest concentration of answers stating that the respondent's chosen candidates win between forty and sixty percent of the time.

Figure 6.1 Respondent's Measure of Competitiveness in Their District




However, in Figure 6.2, when the respondents are broken down by groups of competition based on their district history, we find that the perception of the respondents does not correspond with the objective measure of partisan competitiveness. Instead, we find that chronic losers, perpetual winners, and people that reside in competitive districts all feel that their candidates win about the same amount of the time. This suggests that chronic losers may have a self-inflated sense of competition within their district.¹⁰ In addition, perpetual winners have a deflated sense of victory given that their preferred candidate wins by a landslide the majority of the time. If this is the case, then what we are seeing is that, for some reason, voters in landslide districts believe

¹⁰ It is also possible that the equal perception of competition is due to data or measurement problems. If respondents misreported their zip codes then their answers would be compared with the wrong district. Furthermore, it be that because my basis for actual levels of competition are only based on major elections, I am missing a considerable component of winning and losing in very localized elections (ie. school board, mayor, city executive, etc.). Finally, it is possible that an error occurred while I was coding the survey data.

that their district is competitive. This could be one reason why we did not see any strong differences between the three groups in the 2004 NAES data. After all, if all three groups believe themselves to reside in a competitive district, then all three would be expected to behave in a similar manner. Let us see if all three categories of competition behave the same way in this study as well.


Figure 6.2 Subjective Perceptions of Competitiveness by Objective Competition Category



This study again measured internal political efficacy in order to compare to earlier findings. Remember that the 2004 NAES results suggest that winning and losing had no significant impact across three measures of political efficacy. In this study, it appears that there may be some effect on efficacy after all. When respondents were asked to agree or disagree with the statement “I feel I have a pretty good understanding of the important issues facing our country” the distance between low and high is around five percent ($p < 0.1$) between perpetual losers and winners. However, when asked to agree or disagree with the statement “[s]ometimes

politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what is going on” the spread is quite large. Perpetual losers were nearly nine percentage points higher ($p < .01$) in their average responses than people in competitive districts. Furthermore, the average responses of perpetual losers were four percent higher ($p > .1$) than perpetual winners. This implies that being in a lopsided district as opposed to a competitive district lowers one's sense of political efficacy and that effect is greater, although not significantly, for the losers in those one-sided districts. If there is a difference in political efficacy between this study and the 2004 NAES, perhaps we will find a difference in voter turnout as well.

Figure 6.3 Measures of Political Efficacy



Once again I have broken down the sample population into groups that represent the competitiveness and party dominance of Congressional Districts. Respondents have been grouped into either Republican dominated, competitive, or Democrat dominated districts. Again,

if voter fatigue occurs in the manner that rational and psychological theories suggest then we would expect to see an inverse parabola with the two non-competitive groups reporting significantly lower turnout levels than the competitive group. In five out of the twenty measurements we do find these inverse parabolas. One of these five measurements is turnout among Democrats (BL) in the 2008 general election. The other four occur among Republicans, including for voter registration (SL), intention to vote in the 2012 general election (SL), and turnout in the 2008 and 2010 general elections (BL). However, like the 2004 NAES results, most of the turnout results show minimal fluctuations between the three groups (6.31% is the average distance between furthest points).

Figure 6.4 Proportion of Respondents Registered




Figure 6.5 Proportion of Respondents who Intend to Vote in 2012




Figure 6.6 Proportion of Respondents who Voted in 2008





Figure 6.7 Proportion of Respondents who Voted in 2010

Before moving on to a regression analysis examining the predictors of voter turnout, it may be useful to consider how, if at all, the motivations and perceptions of losers differ in the first place. For this purpose, Figure 6.8 illustrates five scales that are derived from thirteen questions in the MTurk survey. These scales are shown because they represent the instances where the answers of perpetual losers were significantly different (at least $p < 0.1$) from both chronic winners and people in competitive districts.¹¹ The first scale measures the extent to which participants believe that elections matter ($\alpha = 0.62$).¹² The next taps enjoyment from the act of voting itself, based on a single branched question asking how strongly respondents like or

¹¹ Since the focus of this study is on the voting behaviors of chronic losers results in which chronic losers are not significantly different are not reported. These results are available from the author upon request.

¹² The scale combines answers from three questions: (1) are there differences between Republicans and Democrats, do you feel that elections have an affect on the issues, and do you feel your vote makes a difference.

dislike the process of voting. The next two scales measure the ways in which society can influence voter behavior. The social norms scale ($\alpha = 0.82$) taps into the general normative pressures a respondent may feel at having failed to live up to notions of civic duty or similar expectations.¹³ The scale of social pressures ($\alpha = 0.59$) measures the more personal and direct social pressures stemming from the desire to please (or not disappoint) someone the respondent knows.¹⁴ Finally, the last scale measures the desire to have one's voice counted ($\alpha = 0.74$), to capture at least one form of expressive voting behavior.¹⁵

Figure 6.8 shows the means of these five scales by competition category. For three of these scales, perpetual losers have a significantly lower ($p < .05$) average response than perpetual winners or respondents from competitive districts.¹⁶ Two of these scales relate to the benefits and costs associated with rational voter theory. According to rational voter theory since the perpetual losers benefit is lower and the cost reduction is lower (resulting in higher costs) the chronic loser is less likely to vote. Therefore, if rational voter theory holds for chronic losers then respondents believe that elections matter (benefit) and the extent to which they like the process of voter participation on Election Day (cost reduction) should show up as negative coefficients in the regression analysis. In addition to these two scales, Figure 6.8 reports that chronic losers stated that they have a lower desire to express their opinions than the other two groups. This may indicate recognition on the part of perpetual losers that it is unlikely that either their short term or

¹³ Scale of Social Norms represents: are you embarrassed if people find out you didn't vote, and if I miss an election, I don't care if other people know I didn't vote.

¹⁴ Scale of Social Pressures represents: I never feel pressured to vote just to make other people happy, when someone I know asks me to vote, I don't feel any added pressure to do so, and there are times when I turn out to vote mainly to please someone I care about.

¹⁵ Variable represents: if I know my side will lose the election, I see voting as pointless... and I want to cast my vote and make sure my views are counted, even if I know I am on the losing side.

¹⁶ The three scales are belief that elections matter, impact of liking the process, and scale of desire to have voice counted.

long term goals will come to fruition. In other words, there is a sense of giving up on the part of these respondents.

Finally, Figure 6.8 shows two measures of social influence on chronic losers. In the two variables regarding the influence of social networks the mean response of perpetual losers is even with that of competitive districts and statistically higher ($p < .05$) than the responses of perpetual winners. This means that chronic losers care more about the way their political behavior makes them look both to society as a whole and to their close social network (friends or family). However, whether or not this affects their decision to ultimately participate on Election Day is yet to be seen. It could be that chronic losers feel more guilty or more pressured by their social groups, but fail to do anything about it for some reason. Let us now turn to a different type of question that respondents encountered in this survey.

In order to further examine what is important to people at different levels of competition, the MTurk survey included a ranking question. In this question (see Table 6.1), respondents were asked to rank nine statements based on which considerations are more or less important when they decide whether they will turn out to vote. It is striking that all three groups ranked the options nearly identically with the exception of one selection. Thinking back to respondents' subjective perceptions of how often their own candidates won and how chronic losers identified their districts as competitive, it is interesting to see that chronic losers rank highest, out of the three groups, on the consideration of whether their vote will determine the outcome of the election. It appears that the group's perception that their district is competitive is strong enough to impact their factors for voting. After all, they represent voters that lose the most by margins of twenty percent or more and yet they perceive their district to be competitive and they report that they vote because they believe that their vote will determine the outcome of the election.


Figure 6.8 Mean of Voter Belief and Motivation Scales by Objective Competition Level

Table 6.1 Mean Subjective Ranking of Motivation Importance by Objective Competition Level

Big Loser		Competitive		Big Winner	
Express support for a candidate or cause	0.800 (0.21)	Express support for a candidate or cause	0.816 (0.21)	Express support for a candidate or cause	0.810 (0.22)
Believe the outcome of the election will affect you	0.759 (0.24)	Believe the outcome of the election will affect you	0.743 (0.23)	Believe the outcome of the election will affect you	0.721 (0.22)
Believe your vote will determine the outcome of the election	0.646 (0.27)	Desire to fulfill civic duty	0.655 (0.27)	Desire to fulfill civic duty	0.691 (0.28)
Desire to fulfill civic duty	0.622 (0.28)	Believe your vote will determine the outcome of the election	0.598 (0.28)	Believe your vote will determine the outcome of the election	0.587 (0.26)
Ease of participating in election	0.442 (0.26)	Party loyalty	0.472 (0.29)	Party loyalty	0.435 (0.30)
Party loyalty	0.417 (0.29)	Ease of participating in election	0.423 (0.27)	Ease of participating in election	0.416 (0.27)
Participate because I am encouraged by someone	0.301 (0.24)	Participate because I am encouraged by someone	0.292 (0.23)	Participate because I am encouraged by someone	0.314 (0.23)
Participate to make family or friends happy	0.257 (0.25)	I derives pleasure from the election process	0.254 (0.26)	I derives pleasure from the election process	0.269 (0.25)
I derives pleasure from the election process	0.255 (0.24)	Participate to make family or friends happy	0.246 (0.24)	Participate to make family or friends happy	0.258 (0.26)
Mean (Std. Err.)					

Now that we have examined the ways in which respondents answered the survey questions we can now turn to the regression analysis of four measures of voter participation from the MTurk survey, in order to see more objectively what factors predict electoral involvement in each competition category. In this analysis, we will examine fifteen key independent variables, and seven control variables. Many of the variables are scales derived from multiple questions on the MTurk survey.¹⁷ Rather than include every question in the survey as a variable in these regressions, scales were created to improve the efficiency of the regressions and provide more robust measurement of the concepts of interest. The four dependent measures include voter registration, intention of participating in the 2012 election, perceived chance of participating in the 2012 election (0 to 100%), and past voter turnout ($\alpha = 0.84$).¹⁸

¹⁷ Specific information regarding the scaling of these variables can be found in Appendix C.

¹⁸ Past voter turnout is a combination of respondent answers to: did you vote in 2008, did you vote in 2010, and how often in the past five years did you vote.

Table 6.2 Determinants of Voter Registration (2012 MTurk Survey)

	Competition Category		
	Big Loser	Competitive	Big Winner
Key Explanatory Variables			
Index of Mobilization	0.001 (0.030)	0.016 (0.023)	0.027 (0.022)
Elections Matter	0.045 (0.215)	0.145 (0.204)	0.241 (0.151)
Scale of Costs	0.251 (0.203)	0.003 (0.192)	-0.322* (0.159)
Scale of Local Elections	-0.035 (0.245)	0.076 (0.214)	-0.060 (0.208)
Political Discussion	0.139 (0.261)	0.252 (0.250)	0.027 (0.227)
Impact of Liking the Process of Voting	-0.006 (0.159)	0.049 (0.162)	-0.137 (0.130)
Scale of Civic Duty	0.201 (0.143)	0.074 (0.116)	0.014 (0.108)
Scale of Social Norms	0.177 (0.311)	0.172 (0.254)	0.043 (0.233)
Habit	0.730** (0.202)	0.218 (0.150)	0.242^ (0.127)
Index of Expressive Activity	-0.065 (0.149)	-0.049 (0.118)	-0.139 (0.112)
Scale of Partisan Commitment	-0.067 (0.173)	-0.050 (0.153)	-0.187 (0.137)
Respondent Voice Counts	0.083 (0.176)	0.253 (0.175)	0.432** (0.157)
Scale of Social Pressures	0.379 (0.279)	-0.228 (0.216)	0.623** (0.230)
Voting with Friends and Family is Fun	0.188 (0.164)	-0.198 (0.137)	0.444** (0.114)
Control			
Percent of Life Spent at Current Address	-0.074 (0.241)	0.157 (0.178)	-0.209 (0.207)
Age	0.017 (0.017)	-0.021 (0.015)	0.021^ (0.012)
Sex	-0.035 (0.075)	-0.062 (0.066)	-0.062 (0.057)
Education	0.221 (0.177)	0.431** (0.149)	0.347* (0.145)
Income	0.044 (0.140)	0.109 (0.138)	-0.149 (0.106)
Minority	0.030 (0.082)	-0.067 (0.082)	-0.237** (0.080)
Unemployed	0.054 (0.105)	-0.019 (0.097)	-0.040 (0.073)
Adj R-squared	0.2161	0.1674	0.324
N	135	155	153

Coeff., (Std. Err.), ^ = $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

Table 6.3 Determinants of Intention to Vote in 2012 Election (2012 MTurk Survey)

	Competition Category		
	Big Loser	Competitive	Big Winner
Key Explanatory Variables			
Index of Mobilization	0.035 (0.025)	0.025 (0.019)	0.026 (0.019)
Elections Matter	0.534** (0.176)	0.182 (0.169)	0.219^ (0.127)
Scale of Costs	-0.168 (0.166)	0.088 (0.159)	-0.084 (0.134)
Scale of Local Elections	-0.120 (0.201)	0.040 (0.178)	0.036 (0.174)
Political Discussion	0.272 (0.213)	0.263 (0.208)	0.461* (0.190)
Impact of Liking the Process of Voting	0.230^ (0.130)	-0.039 (0.134)	-0.151 (0.109)
Scale of Civic Duty	-0.017 (0.119)	0.124 (0.096)	0.076 (0.091)
Scale of Social Norms	-0.310 (0.256)	0.034 (0.211)	-0.200 (0.196)
Habit	0.371* (0.165)	0.068 (0.125)	-0.261* (0.107)
Index of Expressive Activity	0.120 (0.127)	-0.163^ (0.098)	-0.099 (0.094)
Scale of Partisan Commitment	-0.088 (0.142)	0.209 (0.127)	0.027 (0.115)
Respondent Voice Counts	0.182 (0.144)	0.558** (0.146)	0.478** (0.132)
Scale of Social Pressures	-0.062 (0.228)	0.037 (0.179)	0.513** (0.193)
Voting with Friends and Family is Fun	0.084 (0.135)	0.027 (0.113)	0.196* (0.096)
Control			
Percent of Life Spent at Current Address	-0.521** (0.197)	0.129 (0.148)	0.250 (0.174)
Age	-0.008 (0.014)	-0.004 (0.012)	0.004 (0.010)
Sex	-0.121^ (0.061)	-0.048 (0.055)	-0.067 (0.048)
Education	-0.070 (0.145)	0.061 (0.123)	0.408** (0.122)
Income	-0.043 (0.115)	0.081 (0.115)	-0.174^ (0.089)
Minority	0.057 (0.067)	-0.013 (0.068)	-0.046 (0.067)
Unemployed	0.296** (0.085)	-0.039 (0.081)	0.045 (0.061)
Adj R-squared	0.3585	0.2748	0.344
N	134	155	153

Coeff., (Std. Err.), ^ = $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

Table 6.4 Determinants of Chance of Voting in 2012 Election (2012 MTurk Survey)

	Competition Category		
	Big Loser	Competitive	Big Winner
Key Explanatory Variables			
Index of Mobilization	0.030 (0.020)	0.010 (0.018)	0.021 (0.018)
Elections Matter	0.431** (0.145)	0.203 (0.155)	0.247* (0.122)
Scale of Costs	-0.129 (0.136)	-0.041 (0.145)	-0.042 (0.133)
Scale of Local Elections	-0.046 (0.169)	0.137 (0.163)	0.081 (0.170)
Political Discussion	0.258 (0.182)	0.249 (0.190)	0.444* (0.182)
Impact of Liking the Process of Voting	0.128 (0.107)	-0.046 (0.123)	-0.134 (0.104)
Scale of Civic Duty	0.023 (0.099)	0.172^ (0.088)	0.092 (0.088)
Scale of Social Norms	-0.340 (0.209)	0.019 (0.193)	-0.173 (0.186)
Habit	0.411** (0.136)	0.153 (0.114)	-0.024 (0.102)
Index of Expressive Activity	0.135 (0.104)	-0.104 (0.090)	-0.086 (0.090)
Scale of Partisan Commitment	-0.011 (0.118)	0.204^ (0.116)	0.082 (0.110)
Respondent Voice Counts	0.348** (0.118)	0.457** (0.133)	0.429** (0.126)
Scale of Social Pressures	-0.121 (0.187)	0.028 (0.164)	0.383* (0.184)
Voting with Friends and Family is Fun	0.070 (0.110)	-0.011 (0.104)	0.211* (0.092)
Control			
Percent of Life Spent at Current Address	-0.402* (0.161)	0.109 (0.135)	0.038 (0.168)
Age	-0.003 (0.012)	-0.003 (0.011)	0.002 (0.010)
Sex	-0.048 (0.050)	-0.041 (0.050)	-0.053 (0.047)
Education	0.019 (0.119)	0.059 (0.113)	0.402** (0.117)
Income	-0.005 (0.095)	0.149 (0.105)	-0.169^ (0.086)
Minority	0.074 (0.056)	-0.013 (0.062)	-0.066 (0.064)
Unemployed	0.213** (0.070)	-0.058 (0.074)	0.080 (0.060)
Adj R-squared	0.5367	0.3855	0.4053
N	133	155	150

Coeff., (Std. Err.), ^ = $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

Table 6.5 Determinants of Past Voter Turnout (2012 MTurk Survey)

	Competition Category		
	Big Loser	Competitive	Big Winner
Key Explanatory Variables			
Index of Mobilization	0.006 (0.020)	0.018 (0.016)	0.038* (0.018)
Elections Matter	0.136 (0.139)	0.325* (0.144)	0.228^ (0.124)
Scale of Costs	-0.112 (0.129)	-0.125 (0.135)	-0.051 (0.130)
Scale of Local Elections	0.353* (0.156)	0.312* (0.151)	0.101 (0.169)
Political Discussion	0.013 (0.166)	0.251 (0.176)	0.295 (0.184)
Impact of Liking the Process of Voting	-0.025 (0.102)	0.042 (0.114)	-0.032 (0.106)
Scale of Civic Duty	0.087 (0.095)	0.225** (0.082)	0.147^ (0.088)
Scale of Social Norms	0.114 (0.198)	0.028 (0.179)	-0.026 (0.190)
Habit	0.464** (0.131)	0.227* (0.106)	0.489** (0.104)
Index of Expressive Activity	0.068 (0.096)	0.043 (0.083)	-0.055 (0.091)
Scale of Partisan Commitment	-0.059 (0.112)	-0.043 (0.108)	-0.160 (0.112)
Respondent Voice Counts	0.498** (0.113)	0.097 (0.124)	0.317* (0.128)
Scale of Social Pressures	0.062 (0.178)	-0.215 (0.152)	0.159 (0.187)
Voting with Friends and Family is Fun	-0.212* (0.105)	0.006 (0.096)	0.093 (0.093)
Control			
Percent of Life Spent at Current Address	-0.208 (0.154)	-0.038 (0.126)	0.034 (0.168)
Age	0.002 (0.011)	0.010 (0.010)	0.018^ (0.010)
Sex	0.034 (0.048)	0.032 (0.047)	-0.016 (0.047)
Education	0.400** (0.113)	0.342** (0.105)	0.386** (0.119)
Income	0.042 (0.090)	-0.055 (0.097)	-0.270** (0.086)
Minority	-0.083 (0.053)	0.038 (0.058)	-0.175** (0.065)
Unemployed	0.022 (0.067)	0.042 (0.069)	0.042 (0.059)
Adj R-squared	0.6241	0.5423	0.5205
N	134	155	152

Coeff., (Std. Err.), ^ = $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

The strongest predictor across all four measurements of voter participation is habit. The variable habit ($\alpha = 0.64$) is a combination of the questions asking how much respondents agree or disagree with the following statements: (1) “every time a new election comes around, it feels like I have to figure out where to go and what to do, almost like it’s my first time”; (2) “the process of going to the polls and filling out a ballot is so familiar to me, I feel like I could do it in my sleep.” For perpetual losers we find that habit is statistically significant (for three outcomes, $p < .01$, and the fourth, $p < .05$) in each case and has a coefficient more than twice as large as competitive districts and chronic winners in three of the four tables. However, these habitually voting chronic losers were not born habitual voters. At one time they had to vote for non-habitual reasons. They could have lived in another district that was competitive and then moved into their one sided district. This theory is supported by the strong ($p < .05$ and $p < .01$) negative impact that the percent of ones life in their home has on voter participation in two of the tests. Also these habitual voters could be remnants from a time when the district was more competitive and therefore established their pattern of voting before becoming a chronic loser. However, there is one other variable that, while it makes a weaker showing in the analysis, may contribute to perpetual losers participating and, thus, implementing a habit of involvement.

In two of the four measures of participation the importance of elections is significantly higher for chronic losers than for the other two groups ($p < .01$). Recall that, as seen in Figure 6.8, the mean level of such beliefs was lower among chronic losers than among perpetual winners and people in competitive districts. However, it appears that these beliefs may be more important in influencing chronic loser participation. This suggests that, for some reason, perpetual losers perceive a benefit associated with their participation. Behavior like this implies rational voting tendencies. However, in order to accept this, given the trouble that rational voter

theory has encountered, it is important to recall what we learned about the effects of winning and losing on chronic losers perception of competition. Recall that the p value in Downs' theory represented the likelihood that the voter will cast the decisive vote. Therefore, the more competitive the voter perceives their district to be the higher p will become. Given that chronic losers still perceive their districts as competitive, multiplied by the perceived benefit that chronic losers believe the election will provide them, it is possible that the costs associated with voting will be overcome and the chronic loser will vote.

Finally, I would like to point out a few variables that show some signs of being significant, but are consistent for all three groups of competition. Age and education both are two such measurements of voter participation. In addition, they exemplify why it is important to include control measurements in addition to hypothesized key measurements. Furthermore, the desire to have one's voice heard as a measure of political participation is significant in at least one competition category in all four of the voter turnout categories. Many of the measures of the MTurk analysis are still weak in the same way they were for the 2004 NAES. However, there is some reason to believe that should the large sample from the 2004 NAES be combined with the subject specific variables from the MTurk survey differences between chronic losers and other people would be demonstrated more robustly.

VIII

Conclusions and Discussion

Throughout this study I have been trying to identify ways in which long-term winning and losing affects voting behavior. Although neither of the two test studies was optimal, I was able to leverage the strengths of each to arrive at some interesting implications that merit further study. First, doubt continues over whether losing has an effect on political efficacy. Because the measures of efficacy in the 2004 NAES were some of the items sufficiently written and the sample is more representative than the MTurk study I would tend to trust the results of that test more. Similarly, since the measures of voter turnout have no reason to be suspect, I stand by the argument that long-term one-sided districts create minimal drop-offs in voter turnout, contrary to what rational and psychological theories would lead one to expect.

I believe that part of this is due to the fact that regardless of what the reality is, most voters believe that their candidate has a fair chance of winning. After all, why should a decline in voter participation occur if nobody believes that they are winning or losing most of the time? Finally, there is evidence to suggest that habitual voting and strong partisan relationships contribute more to chronic losers participating in elections. It may be possible that the reason these are stronger predictors of turnout for perpetual losers is because they do not require chronic losers to acknowledge the reality of competition within their district.

Possible strings of research that could come from these findings are investigations into the development of false impressions of competition and the ways in which these impressions create habitual voting practices. Furthermore, it would be exciting to see the ways that other groups within the mass population differ in behaviors that affect voter participation. I think it is time that political scientists stop trying to identify predictors of voting behavior for voters as one

body and, instead, acknowledge that there are different groups that exist within the eligible population that participate for different reasons. Perhaps by examining these groups it will be possible to better encourage everyone to vote on Election Day and begin to tackle the extremely low voter participation rate in the United States.

Appendix A

<u>NAES District</u>	<u>Big Loser %</u>	<u>NAES District</u>	<u>Big Loser %</u>
Alabama District 1	0.276	California District 21	0.345
Alabama District 2	0.241	California District 22	0.207
Alabama District 3	-0.241	California District 23	-0.103
Alabama District 4	-0.207	California District 24	-0.207
Alabama District 5	-0.345	California District 25	0.000
Alabama District 6	0.034	California District 26	-0.310
Alabama District 7	-0.379	California District 27	-0.207
Arizona District 1	0.433	California District 28	-0.138
Arizona District 2	-0.100	California District 29	-0.414
Arizona District 3	0.533	California District 30	-0.345
Arizona District 4	0.500	California District 31	-0.379
Arizona District 5	0.467	California District 32	-0.379
Arizona District 6	0.320	California District 33	-0.069
Arizona District 7	0.250	California District 34	-0.345
Arizona District 8	0.350	California District 35	-0.069
Arkansas District 1	-0.400	California District 36	-0.069
Arkansas District 2	-0.267	California District 37	-0.103
Arkansas District 3	0.200	California District 38	0.000
Arkansas District 4	-0.267	California District 39	0.276
California District 1	-0.241	California District 40	0.345
California District 2	0.276	California District 41	0.276
California District 3	-0.172	California District 42	0.138
California District 4	0.000	California District 43	0.103
California District 5	-0.379	California District 44	-0.069
California District 6	-0.379	California District 45	0.310
California District 7	-0.414	California District 46	0.000
California District 8	-0.379	California District 47	0.125
California District 9	-0.379	California District 48	0.208
California District 10	-0.207	California District 49	0.000
California District 11	0.000	California District 50	-0.208
California District 12	-0.103	California District 51	0.167
California District 13	-0.414	California District 52	0.167
California District 14	-0.069	California District 53	-0.105
California District 15	-0.207	Colorado District 1	-0.276
California District 16	-0.414	Colorado District 2	-0.103
California District 17	-0.103	Colorado District 3	0.172
California District 18	-0.379	Colorado District 4	0.276
California District 19	0.207	Colorado District 5	0.414
California District 20	0.034	Colorado District 6	0.379

<u>NAES District</u>	<u>Big Loser %</u>	<u>NAES District</u>	<u>Big Loser %</u>
Colorado District 7	0.105	Georgia District 8	-0.267
Connecticut District 1	-0.448	Georgia District 9	-0.067
Connecticut District 2	-0.207	Georgia District 10	-0.100
Connecticut District 3	-0.379	Georgia District 11	-0.040
Connecticut District 4	0.172	Georgia District 12	-0.100
Connecticut District 5	-0.034	Georgia District 13	-0.100
Delaware District 1	-0.067	Idaho District 1	0.414
Florida District 1	0.036	Idaho District 2	0.379
Florida District 2	-0.321	Illinois District 1	-0.414
Florida District 3	-0.185	Illinois District 2	-0.414
Florida District 4	0.071	Illinois District 3	-0.379
Florida District 5	0.000	Illinois District 4	-0.207
Florida District 6	0.107	Illinois District 5	-0.345
Florida District 7	0.000	Illinois District 6	0.310
Florida District 8	0.357	Illinois District 7	-0.414
Florida District 9	0.286	Illinois District 8	-0.069
Florida District 10	0.286	Illinois District 9	-0.414
Florida District 11	-0.250	Illinois District 10	0.276
Florida District 12	0.259	Illinois District 11	-0.103
Florida District 13	0.321	Illinois District 12	-0.069
Florida District 14	0.107	Illinois District 13	0.310
Florida District 15	0.214	Illinois District 14	0.310
Florida District 16	0.074	Illinois District 15	0.241
Florida District 17	-0.393	Illinois District 16	0.207
Florida District 18	0.107	Illinois District 17	-0.172
Florida District 19	-0.357	Illinois District 18	0.207
Florida District 20	-0.217	Illinois District 19	-0.241
Florida District 21	0.261	Indiana District 1	-0.143
Florida District 22	0.174	Indiana District 2	0.179
Florida District 23	-0.261	Indiana District 3	0.214
Florida District 24	0.056	Indiana District 4	0.357
Florida District 25	0.056	Indiana District 5	0.429
Georgia District 1	-0.067	Indiana District 6	0.571
Georgia District 2	-0.333	Indiana District 7	0.464
Georgia District 3	-0.100	Indiana District 8	0.148
Georgia District 4	-0.233	Indiana District 9	-0.036
Georgia District 5	-0.433	Iowa District 1	0.379
Georgia District 6	0.100	Iowa District 2	0.207
Georgia District 7	-0.167	Iowa District 3	0.069

<u>NAES District</u>	<u>Big Loser %</u>	<u>NAES District</u>	<u>Big Loser %</u>
Iowa District 4	0.000	Michigan District 1	-0.267
Iowa District 5	0.414	Michigan District 2	0.267
Kansas District 1	0.793	Michigan District 3	0.133
Kansas District 2	0.414	Michigan District 4	0.300
Kansas District 3	0.586	Michigan District 5	-0.100
Kansas District 4	0.310	Michigan District 6	0.133
Kentucky District 1	-0.276	Michigan District 7	-0.067
Kentucky District 2	-0.207	Michigan District 8	-0.167
Kentucky District 3	-0.276	Michigan District 9	0.033
Kentucky District 4	0.069	Michigan District 10	-0.033
Kentucky District 5	0.241	Michigan District 11	0.167
Kentucky District 6	0.069	Michigan District 12	-0.200
Louisiana District 1	0.207	Michigan District 13	-0.267
Louisiana District 2	-0.483	Michigan District 14	-0.367
Louisiana District 3	-0.276	Michigan District 15	-0.367
Louisiana District 4	-0.172	Minnesota District 1	-0.036
Louisiana District 5	-0.167	Minnesota District 2	0.143
Louisiana District 6	0.138	Minnesota District 3	0.464
Louisiana District 7	-0.400	Minnesota District 4	-0.250
Maine District 1	-0.100	Minnesota District 5	-0.321
Maine District 2	0.100	Minnesota District 6	-0.036
Maryland District 1	-0.172	Minnesota District 7	-0.071
Maryland District 2	-0.034	Minnesota District 8	-0.321
Maryland District 3	-0.583	Mississippi District 1	0.233
Maryland District 4	-0.448	Mississippi District 2	0.033
Maryland District 5	-0.586	Mississippi District 3	0.133
Maryland District 6	-0.310	Mississippi District 4	0.100
Maryland District 7	-0.655	Mississippi District 5	0.172
Maryland District 8	-0.138	Missouri District 1	-0.250
Massachusetts District 1	-0.233	Missouri District 2	0.321
Massachusetts District 2	-0.633	Missouri District 3	-0.107
Massachusetts District 3	-0.500	Missouri District 4	-0.214
Massachusetts District 4	-0.600	Missouri District 5	-0.179
Massachusetts District 5	-0.533	Missouri District 6	0.107
Massachusetts District 6	-0.467	Missouri District 7	0.393
Massachusetts District 7	-0.633	Missouri District 8	0.321
Massachusetts District 8	-0.633	Missouri District 9	0.179
Massachusetts District 9	-0.633	Montana District 1	-0.143
Massachusetts District 10	-0.533	Nebraska District 1	0.516

<u>NAES District</u>	<u>Big Loser %</u>	<u>NAES District</u>	<u>Big Loser %</u>
Nebraska District 2	0.323	New York District 17	-0.552
Nebraska District 3	0.516	New York District 18	-0.483
Nevada District 1	-0.069	New York District 19	-0.207
Nevada District 2	0.276	New York District 20	-0.034
Nevada District 3	0.105	New York District 21	-0.207
New Hampshire District 1	0.382	New York District 22	0.069
New Hampshire District 2	0.324	New York District 23	-0.138
New Jersey District 1	-0.345	New York District 24	0.207
New Jersey District 2	0.000	New York District 25	0.069
New Jersey District 3	0.138	New York District 26	-0.034
New Jersey District 4	0.345	New York District 27	0.000
New Jersey District 5	0.379	New York District 28	-0.379
New Jersey District 6	-0.241	New York District 29	-0.034
New Jersey District 7	0.172	North Carolina District 1	-0.357
New Jersey District 8	-0.276	North Carolina District 2	-0.179
New Jersey District 9	-0.276	North Carolina District 3	0.036
New Jersey District 10	-0.379	North Carolina District 4	-0.071
New Jersey District 11	0.276	North Carolina District 5	0.143
New Jersey District 12	0.207	North Carolina District 6	0.321
New Jersey District 13	-0.069	North Carolina District 7	-0.214
New Mexico District 1	0.300	North Carolina District 8	0.000
New Mexico District 2	0.267	North Carolina District 9	0.321
New Mexico District 3	-0.233	North Carolina District 10	0.393
New York District 1	-0.138	North Carolina District 11	0.071
New York District 2	-0.207	North Carolina District 12	-0.174
New York District 3	-0.103	North Carolina District 13	0.056
New York District 4	-0.034	North Dakota District 1	-0.250
New York District 5	-0.172	Ohio District 1	-0.069
New York District 6	-0.552	Ohio District 2	0.379
New York District 7	-0.517	Ohio District 3	-0.276
New York District 8	-0.552	Ohio District 4	0.379
New York District 9	-0.517	Ohio District 5	0.345
New York District 10	-0.552	Ohio District 6	0.138
New York District 11	-0.552	Ohio District 7	0.345
New York District 12	-0.552	Ohio District 8	0.379
New York District 13	-0.172	Ohio District 9	-0.310
New York District 14	-0.207	Ohio District 10	0.069
New York District 15	-0.310	Ohio District 11	-0.379
New York District 16	-0.552	Ohio District 12	0.310

<u>NAES District</u>	<u>Big Loser %</u>	<u>NAES District</u>	<u>Big Loser %</u>
Ohio District 13	-0.345	South Carolina District 3	0.172
Ohio District 14	-0.172	South Carolina District 4	0.276
Ohio District 15	0.310	South Carolina District 5	-0.138
Ohio District 16	0.345	South Carolina District 6	-0.241
Ohio District 17	-0.310	South Dakota District 1	0.069
Ohio District 18	-0.103	Tennessee District 1	0.300
Oklahoma District 1	0.207	Tennessee District 2	0.267
Oklahoma District 2	-0.138	Tennessee District 3	0.000
Oklahoma District 3	-0.069	Tennessee District 4	-0.233
Oklahoma District 4	-0.069	Tennessee District 5	-0.400
Oklahoma District 5	0.414	Tennessee District 6	-0.333
Oregon District 1	-0.138	Tennessee District 7	0.267
Oregon District 2	0.310	Tennessee District 8	-0.433
Oregon District 3	-0.345	Tennessee District 9	-0.400
Oregon District 4	-0.241	Texas District 1	0.000
Oregon District 5	0.034	Texas District 2	0.067
Pennsylvania District 1	-0.276	Texas District 3	0.567
Pennsylvania District 2	-0.276	Texas District 4	-0.033
Pennsylvania District 3	-0.138	Texas District 5	0.067
Pennsylvania District 4	-0.103	Texas District 6	0.433
Pennsylvania District 5	0.448	Texas District 7	0.567
Pennsylvania District 6	-0.103	Texas District 8	0.533
Pennsylvania District 7	0.414	Texas District 9	0.067
Pennsylvania District 8	0.276	Texas District 10	-0.100
Pennsylvania District 9	0.483	Texas District 11	0.000
Pennsylvania District 10	0.414	Texas District 12	0.067
Pennsylvania District 11	-0.172	Texas District 13	0.300
Pennsylvania District 12	-0.276	Texas District 14	0.167
Pennsylvania District 13	0.207	Texas District 15	-0.100
Pennsylvania District 14	-0.276	Texas District 16	-0.033
Pennsylvania District 15	0.138	Texas District 17	-0.033
Pennsylvania District 16	0.483	Texas District 18	-0.167
Pennsylvania District 17	0.414	Texas District 19	0.500
Pennsylvania District 18	0.000	Texas District 20	-0.167
Pennsylvania District 19	0.448	Texas District 21	0.567
Rhode Island District 1	-0.364	Texas District 22	0.567
Rhode Island District 2	-0.303	Texas District 23	0.267
South Carolina District 1	0.414	Texas District 24	-0.033
South Carolina District 2	0.310	Texas District 25	0.000

<u>NAES District</u>	<u>Big Loser %</u>	<u>NAES District</u>	<u>Big Loser %</u>
Texas District 26	0.500	Wisconsin District 7	-0.310
Texas District 27	-0.100	Wisconsin District 8	0.241
Texas District 28	0.000	Wyoming District 1	0.367
Texas District 29	0.000		
Texas District 30	0.000		
Texas District 31	0.350		
Texas District 32	0.350		
Utah District 1	0.714		
Utah District 2	0.429		
Utah District 3	0.607		
Vermont District 1	0.176		
Virginia District 1	0.345		
Virginia District 2	0.103		
Virginia District 3	0.069		
Virginia District 4	-0.138		
Virginia District 5	-0.103		
Virginia District 6	0.241		
Virginia District 7	0.448		
Virginia District 8	0.034		
Virginia District 9	-0.138		
Virginia District 10	0.483		
Virginia District 11	0.333		
Washington District 1	-0.036		
Washington District 2	-0.179		
Washington District 3	-0.214		
Washington District 4	0.214		
Washington District 5	-0.214		
Washington District 6	-0.429		
Washington District 7	-0.464		
Washington District 8	0.214		
Washington District 9	-0.217		
West Virginia District 1	-0.586		
West Virginia District 2	-0.483		
West Virginia District 3	-0.621		
Wisconsin District 1	-0.069		
Wisconsin District 2	-0.034		
Wisconsin District 3	0.034		
Wisconsin District 4	-0.276		
Wisconsin District 5	-0.310		
Wisconsin District 6	0.345		

<u>NAES District</u>	<u>Simple Loser %</u>	<u>NAES District</u>	<u>Simple Loser %</u>
Alabama District 1	0.586	California District 21	0.310
Alabama District 2	0.586	California District 22	0.103
Alabama District 3	0.103	California District 23	-0.103
Alabama District 4	0.103	California District 24	-0.379
Alabama District 5	-0.172	California District 25	-0.034
Alabama District 6	0.241	California District 26	-0.379
Alabama District 7	-0.172	California District 27	-0.172
Arizona District 1	0.600	California District 28	-0.103
Arizona District 2	0.000	California District 29	-0.448
Arizona District 3	0.667	California District 30	-0.448
Arizona District 4	0.600	California District 31	-0.448
Arizona District 5	0.600	California District 32	-0.448
Arizona District 6	0.520	California District 33	-0.103
Arizona District 7	0.400	California District 34	-0.448
Arizona District 8	0.500	California District 35	-0.103
Arkansas District 1	-0.600	California District 36	-0.379
Arkansas District 2	-0.533	California District 37	-0.103
Arkansas District 3	0.133	California District 38	0.172
Arkansas District 4	-0.333	California District 39	0.241
California District 1	-0.241	California District 40	0.310
California District 2	0.310	California District 41	0.310
California District 3	-0.241	California District 42	-0.034
California District 4	-0.034	California District 43	0.172
California District 5	-0.448	California District 44	0.034
California District 6	-0.448	California District 45	0.310
California District 7	-0.448	California District 46	-0.083
California District 8	-0.448	California District 47	0.083
California District 9	-0.448	California District 48	0.167
California District 10	-0.310	California District 49	0.000
California District 11	-0.034	California District 50	-0.250
California District 12	-0.103	California District 51	0.083
California District 13	-0.448	California District 52	0.167
California District 14	-0.103	California District 53	-0.158
California District 15	-0.310	Colorado District 1	-0.241
California District 16	-0.448	Colorado District 2	-0.241
California District 17	-0.172	Colorado District 3	0.241
California District 18	-0.448	Colorado District 4	0.517
California District 19	0.241	Colorado District 5	0.517
California District 20	-0.103	Colorado District 6	0.517

<u>NAES District</u>	<u>Simple Loser %</u>	<u>NAES District</u>	<u>Simple Loser %</u>
Colorado District 7	0.263	Georgia District 8	-0.133
Connecticut District 1	-0.517	Georgia District 9	-0.200
Connecticut District 2	-0.379	Georgia District 10	-0.133
Connecticut District 3	-0.517	Georgia District 11	-0.040
Connecticut District 4	0.241	Georgia District 12	-0.100
Connecticut District 5	-0.034	Georgia District 13	-0.200
Deleware District 1	-0.133	Idaho District 1	0.655
Florida District 1	-0.036	Idaho District 2	0.517
Florida District 2	-0.393	Illinois District 1	-0.448
Florida District 3	-0.370	Illinois District 2	-0.448
Florida District 4	0.179	Illinois District 3	-0.448
Florida District 5	0.036	Illinois District 4	-0.241
Florida District 6	0.179	Illinois District 5	-0.379
Florida District 7	0.036	Illinois District 6	0.310
Florida District 8	0.393	Illinois District 7	-0.448
Florida District 9	0.393	Illinois District 8	-0.034
Florida District 10	0.321	Illinois District 9	-0.448
Florida District 11	-0.393	Illinois District 10	0.310
Florida District 12	0.370	Illinois District 11	-0.103
Florida District 13	0.393	Illinois District 12	-0.103
Florida District 14	0.036	Illinois District 13	0.310
Florida District 15	0.321	Illinois District 14	0.310
Florida District 16	0.074	Illinois District 15	0.310
Florida District 17	-0.393	Illinois District 16	0.241
Florida District 18	0.107	Illinois District 17	-0.448
Florida District 19	-0.393	Illinois District 18	0.310
Florida District 20	-0.261	Illinois District 19	-0.310
Florida District 21	0.261	Indiana District 1	-0.143
Florida District 22	0.261	Indiana District 2	0.214
Florida District 23	-0.261	Indiana District 3	0.214
Florida District 24	0.056	Indiana District 4	0.500
Florida District 25	0.056	Indiana District 5	0.429
Georgia District 1	-0.067	Indiana District 6	0.643
Georgia District 2	-0.467	Indiana District 7	0.571
Georgia District 3	-0.133	Indiana District 8	0.259
Georgia District 4	-0.200	Indiana District 9	-0.143
Georgia District 5	-0.467	Iowa District 1	0.310
Georgia District 6	0.267	Iowa District 2	0.310
Georgia District 7	-0.133	Iowa District 3	-0.172

<u>NAES District</u>	<u>Simple Loser %</u>	<u>NAES District</u>	<u>Simple Loser %</u>
Iowa District 4	-0.103	Michigan District 1	-0.600
Iowa District 5	0.241	Michigan District 2	0.133
Kansas District 1	0.793	Michigan District 3	-0.200
Kansas District 2	0.379	Michigan District 4	0.133
Kansas District 3	0.586	Michigan District 5	-0.267
Kansas District 4	0.379	Michigan District 6	-0.200
Kentucky District 1	-0.034	Michigan District 7	-0.200
Kentucky District 2	-0.034	Michigan District 8	-0.400
Kentucky District 3	-0.103	Michigan District 9	-0.200
Kentucky District 4	0.172	Michigan District 10	-0.267
Kentucky District 5	0.379	Michigan District 11	0.133
Kentucky District 6	0.172	Michigan District 12	-0.600
Louisiana District 1	0.071	Michigan District 13	-0.600
Louisiana District 2	-0.643	Michigan District 14	-0.600
Louisiana District 3	-0.429	Michigan District 15	-0.600
Louisiana District 4	-0.286	Minnesota District 1	-0.143
Louisiana District 5	-0.286	Minnesota District 2	0.000
Louisiana District 6	0.071	Minnesota District 3	0.286
Louisiana District 7	-0.586	Minnesota District 4	-0.500
Maine District 1	-0.067	Minnesota District 5	-0.500
Maine District 2	0.133	Minnesota District 6	-0.357
Maryland District 1	-0.310	Minnesota District 7	-0.214
Maryland District 2	-0.172	Minnesota District 8	-0.500
Maryland District 3	-0.793	Mississippi District 1	0.333
Maryland District 4	-0.655	Mississippi District 2	0.133
Maryland District 5	-0.793	Mississippi District 3	0.267
Maryland District 6	-0.379	Mississippi District 4	0.067
Maryland District 7	-0.793	Mississippi District 5	0.310
Maryland District 8	-0.241	Missouri District 1	-0.214
Massachusetts District 1	-0.333	Missouri District 2	0.357
Massachusetts District 2	-0.667	Missouri District 3	-0.214
Massachusetts District 3	-0.533	Missouri District 4	-0.214
Massachusetts District 4	-0.667	Missouri District 5	-0.214
Massachusetts District 5	-0.667	Missouri District 6	0.286
Massachusetts District 6	-0.533	Missouri District 7	0.571
Massachusetts District 7	-0.667	Missouri District 8	0.500
Massachusetts District 8	-0.667	Missouri District 9	0.071
Massachusetts District 9	-0.667	Montana District 1	0.000
Massachusetts District 10	-0.667	Nebraska District 1	0.400

<u>NAES District</u>	<u>Simple Loser %</u>	<u>NAES District</u>	<u>Simple Loser %</u>
Nebraska District 2	0.200	New York District 17	-0.586
Nebraska District 3	0.400	New York District 18	-0.586
Nevada District 1	-0.379	New York District 19	-0.172
Nevada District 2	0.241	New York District 20	-0.034
Nevada District 3	-0.158	New York District 21	-0.241
New Hampshire District 1	0.647	New York District 22	0.103
New Hampshire District 2	0.588	New York District 23	-0.172
New Jersey District 1	-0.655	New York District 24	0.172
New Jersey District 2	-0.310	New York District 25	0.172
New Jersey District 3	-0.241	New York District 26	-0.172
New Jersey District 4	0.103	New York District 27	0.172
New Jersey District 5	0.103	New York District 28	-0.586
New Jersey District 6	-0.655	New York District 29	-0.172
New Jersey District 7	0.103	North Carolina District 1	-0.143
New Jersey District 8	-0.586	North Carolina District 2	-0.071
New Jersey District 9	-0.655	North Carolina District 3	0.214
New Jersey District 10	-0.655	North Carolina District 4	0.000
New Jersey District 11	0.034	North Carolina District 5	0.214
New Jersey District 12	-0.103	North Carolina District 6	0.571
New Jersey District 13	-0.310	North Carolina District 7	-0.143
New Mexico District 1	0.333	North Carolina District 8	0.071
New Mexico District 2	0.333	North Carolina District 9	0.643
New Mexico District 3	-0.400	North Carolina District 10	0.643
New York District 1	-0.172	North Carolina District 11	0.429
New York District 2	-0.310	North Carolina District 12	0.043
New York District 3	-0.172	North Carolina District 13	0.333
New York District 4	-0.103	North Dakota District 1	-0.429
New York District 5	-0.241	Ohio District 1	0.034
New York District 6	-0.586	Ohio District 2	0.448
New York District 7	-0.586	Ohio District 3	-0.241
New York District 8	-0.586	Ohio District 4	0.448
New York District 9	-0.586	Ohio District 5	0.448
New York District 10	-0.586	Ohio District 6	0.103
New York District 11	-0.586	Ohio District 7	0.448
New York District 12	-0.586	Ohio District 8	0.448
New York District 13	-0.172	Ohio District 9	-0.310
New York District 14	-0.241	Ohio District 10	0.172
New York District 15	-0.241	Ohio District 11	-0.310
New York District 16	-0.586	Ohio District 12	0.448

<u>NAES District</u>	<u>Simple Loser %</u>	<u>NAES District</u>	<u>Simple Loser %</u>
Ohio District 13	-0.310	South Carolina District 3	0.241
Ohio District 14	-0.241	South Carolina District 4	0.448
Ohio District 15	0.448	South Carolina District 5	-0.103
Ohio District 16	0.448	South Carolina District 6	-0.103
Ohio District 17	-0.241	South Dakota District 1	0.172
Ohio District 18	0.034	Tennessee District 1	0.400
Oklahoma District 1	0.517	Tennessee District 2	0.400
Oklahoma District 2	0.103	Tennessee District 3	0.000
Oklahoma District 3	0.172	Tennessee District 4	-0.067
Oklahoma District 4	0.241	Tennessee District 5	-0.333
Oklahoma District 5	0.655	Tennessee District 6	-0.333
Oregon District 1	-0.448	Tennessee District 7	0.400
Oregon District 2	0.310	Tennessee District 8	-0.333
Oregon District 3	-0.448	Tennessee District 9	-0.333
Oregon District 4	-0.448	Texas District 1	0.000
Oregon District 5	-0.103	Texas District 2	0.000
Pennsylvania District 1	-0.172	Texas District 3	0.733
Pennsylvania District 2	-0.172	Texas District 4	0.000
Pennsylvania District 3	-0.103	Texas District 5	0.267
Pennsylvania District 4	-0.034	Texas District 6	0.667
Pennsylvania District 5	0.586	Texas District 7	0.733
Pennsylvania District 6	-0.103	Texas District 8	0.733
Pennsylvania District 7	0.448	Texas District 9	0.067
Pennsylvania District 8	0.241	Texas District 10	0.000
Pennsylvania District 9	0.586	Texas District 11	0.000
Pennsylvania District 10	0.586	Texas District 12	0.267
Pennsylvania District 11	-0.172	Texas District 13	0.467
Pennsylvania District 12	-0.172	Texas District 14	0.400
Pennsylvania District 13	0.310	Texas District 15	0.000
Pennsylvania District 14	-0.172	Texas District 16	0.000
Pennsylvania District 15	0.379	Texas District 17	0.000
Pennsylvania District 16	0.586	Texas District 18	0.000
Pennsylvania District 17	0.517	Texas District 19	0.667
Pennsylvania District 18	0.034	Texas District 20	0.000
Pennsylvania District 19	0.586	Texas District 21	0.733
Rhode Island District 1	-0.152	Texas District 22	0.733
Rhode Island District 2	-0.091	Texas District 23	0.400
South Carolina District 1	0.655	Texas District 24	0.000
South Carolina District 2	0.655	Texas District 25	0.000

<u>NAES District</u>	<u>Simple Loser %</u>	<u>NAES District</u>	<u>Simple Loser %</u>
Texas District 26	0.667	Wisconsin District 7	-0.586
Texas District 27	0.000	Wisconsin District 8	0.103
Texas District 28	0.200	Wyoming District 1	0.733
Texas District 29	0.200		
Texas District 30	0.200		
Texas District 31	0.600		
Texas District 32	0.600		
Utah District 1	1.000		
Utah District 2	0.571		
Utah District 3	0.786		
Vermont District 1	0.176		
Virginia District 1	0.655		
Virginia District 2	0.172		
Virginia District 3	0.241		
Virginia District 4	-0.034		
Virginia District 5	-0.034		
Virginia District 6	0.310		
Virginia District 7	0.655		
Virginia District 8	0.172		
Virginia District 9	-0.103		
Virginia District 10	0.655		
Virginia District 11	0.500		
Washington District 1	-0.214		
Washington District 2	-0.500		
Washington District 3	-0.571		
Washington District 4	0.000		
Washington District 5	-0.357		
Washington District 6	-0.714		
Washington District 7	-0.714		
Washington District 8	0.071		
Washington District 9	-0.565		
West Virginia District 1	-0.724		
West Virginia District 2	-0.586		
West Virginia District 3	-0.724		
Wisconsin District 1	-0.241		
Wisconsin District 2	-0.310		
Wisconsin District 3	-0.103		
Wisconsin District 4	-0.586		
Wisconsin District 5	-0.517		
Wisconsin District 6	0.172		

<u>MTurk District</u>	<u>Big Loser %</u>	<u>MTurk District</u>	<u>Big Loser %</u>
Alabama District 1	0.405	California District 20	-0.108
Alabama District 2	0.351	California District 21	0.270
Alabama District 3	-0.027	California District 22	0.162
Alabama District 4	0.027	California District 23	-0.243
Alabama District 5	-0.216	California District 24	-0.189
Alabama District 6	0.216	California District 25	-0.027
Alabama District 7	-0.270	California District 26	-0.297
Alaska District 1	0.486	California District 27	-0.324
Arizona District 1	0.368	California District 28	-0.270
Arizona District 2	0.000	California District 29	-0.486
Arizona District 3	0.474	California District 30	-0.432
Arizona District 4	0.316	California District 31	-0.459
Arizona District 5	0.395	California District 32	-0.459
Arizona District 6	0.333	California District 33	-0.162
Arizona District 7	0.071	California District 34	-0.432
Arizona District 8	0.286	California District 35	-0.216
Arkansas District 1	-0.395	California District 36	-0.216
Arkansas District 2	-0.263	California District 37	-0.243
Arkansas District 3	0.237	California District 38	-0.162
Arkansas District 4	-0.263	California District 39	0.054
California District 1	-0.351	California District 40	0.270
California District 2	0.189	California District 41	0.216
California District 3	-0.162	California District 42	0.108
California District 4	-0.054	California District 43	-0.081
California District 5	-0.459	California District 44	-0.081
California District 6	-0.459	California District 45	0.216
California District 7	-0.486	California District 46	-0.031
California District 8	-0.459	California District 47	-0.094
California District 9	-0.459	California District 48	0.125
California District 10	-0.324	California District 49	0.000
California District 11	-0.054	California District 50	-0.219
California District 12	-0.243	California District 51	-0.063
California District 13	-0.486	California District 52	0.094
California District 14	-0.216	California District 53	-0.296
California District 15	-0.324	Colorado District 1	-0.306
California District 16	-0.486	Colorado District 2	-0.167
California District 17	-0.243	Colorado District 3	0.083
California District 18	-0.459	Colorado District 4	0.222
California District 19	0.162	Colorado District 5	0.389

<u>MTurk District</u>	<u>Big Loser %</u>	<u>MTurk District</u>	<u>Big Loser %</u>
Colorado District 6	0.361	Georgia District 6	0.179
Colorado District 7	0.038	Georgia District 7	-0.026
Connecticut District 1	-0.486	Georgia District 8	-0.154
Connecticut District 2	-0.243	Georgia District 9	0.051
Connecticut District 3	-0.432	Georgia District 10	0.026
Connecticut District 4	0.081	Georgia District 11	0.059
Connecticut District 5	-0.081	Georgia District 12	-0.069
Connecticut District 6	0.061	Georgia District 13	-0.138
Deleware District 1	-0.103	Hawaii District 1	-0.568
Florida District 1	0.083	Hawaii District 2	-0.676
Florida District 2	-0.361	Idaho District 1	0.459
Florida District 3	-0.257	Idaho District 2	0.486
Florida District 4	0.111	Illinois District 1	-0.486
Florida District 5	0.028	Illinois District 2	-0.486
Florida District 6	0.111	Illinois District 3	-0.459
Florida District 7	0.028	Illinois District 4	-0.324
Florida District 8	0.278	Illinois District 5	-0.432
Florida District 9	0.250	Illinois District 6	0.162
Florida District 10	0.278	Illinois District 7	-0.486
Florida District 11	-0.306	Illinois District 8	-0.162
Florida District 12	0.229	Illinois District 9	-0.486
Florida District 13	0.222	Illinois District 10	0.162
Florida District 14	0.139	Illinois District 11	-0.189
Florida District 15	0.167	Illinois District 12	-0.216
Florida District 16	0.086	Illinois District 13	0.189
Florida District 17	-0.417	Illinois District 14	0.189
Florida District 18	0.111	Illinois District 15	0.162
Florida District 19	-0.361	Illinois District 16	0.162
Florida District 20	-0.290	Illinois District 17	-0.270
Florida District 21	0.194	Illinois District 18	0.162
Florida District 22	0.129	Illinois District 19	-0.189
Florida District 23	-0.290	Illinois District 20	-0.182
Florida District 24	0.000	Indiana District 1	-0.162
Florida District 25	0.000	Indiana District 2	0.135
Georgia District 1	0.051	Indiana District 3	0.216
Georgia District 2	-0.308	Indiana District 4	0.351
Georgia District 3	-0.026	Indiana District 5	0.432
Georgia District 4	-0.231	Indiana District 6	0.541
Georgia District 5	-0.385	Indiana District 7	0.351

<u>MTurk District</u>	<u>Big Loser %</u>	<u>MTurk District</u>	<u>Big Loser %</u>
Indiana District 8	0.083	Massachusetts District 5	-0.632
Indiana District 9	-0.027	Massachusetts District 6	-0.579
Indiana District 10	0.061	Massachusetts District 7	-0.711
Iowa District 1	0.270	Massachusetts District 8	-0.711
Iowa District 2	0.189	Massachusetts District 9	-0.711
Iowa District 3	0.054	Massachusetts District 10	-0.632
Iowa District 4	0.054	Michigan District 1	-0.316
Iowa District 5	0.405	Michigan District 2	0.263
Kansas District 1	0.784	Michigan District 3	0.158
Kansas District 2	0.405	Michigan District 4	0.289
Kansas District 3	0.514	Michigan District 5	-0.184
Kansas District 4	0.405	Michigan District 6	0.158
Kentucky District 1	-0.162	Michigan District 7	-0.053
Kentucky District 2	-0.135	Michigan District 8	-0.132
Kentucky District 3	-0.189	Michigan District 9	0.000
Kentucky District 4	0.081	Michigan District 10	0.026
Kentucky District 5	0.270	Michigan District 11	0.105
Kentucky District 6	0.000	Michigan District 12	-0.263
Louisiana District 1	0.243	Michigan District 13	-0.316
Louisiana District 2	-0.421	Michigan District 14	-0.395
Louisiana District 3	-0.243	Michigan District 15	-0.395
Louisiana District 4	-0.081	Michigan District 16	-0.324
Louisiana District 5	-0.053	Minnesota District 1	-0.056
Louisiana District 6	0.162	Minnesota District 2	0.083
Louisiana District 7	-0.263	Minnesota District 3	0.389
Maine District 1	-0.053	Minnesota District 4	-0.306
Maine District 2	0.079	Minnesota District 5	-0.361
Maryland District 1	-0.135	Minnesota District 6	-0.056
Maryland District 2	-0.162	Minnesota District 7	-0.167
Maryland District 3	-0.594	Minnesota District 8	-0.361
Maryland District 4	-0.486	Mississippi District 1	0.256
Maryland District 5	-0.595	Mississippi District 2	0.000
Maryland District 6	-0.243	Mississippi District 3	0.205
Maryland District 7	-0.649	Mississippi District 4	0.026
Maryland District 8	-0.243	Mississippi District 5	0.171
Massachusetts District 1	-0.395	Missouri District 1	-0.270
Massachusetts District 2	-0.711	Missouri District 2	0.324
Massachusetts District 3	-0.605	Missouri District 3	-0.135
Massachusetts District 4	-0.684	Missouri District 4	-0.243

<u>MTurk District</u>	<u>Big Loser %</u>	<u>MTurk District</u>	<u>Big Loser %</u>
Missouri District 5	-0.189	New York District 10	-0.622
Missouri District 6	0.162	New York District 11	-0.622
Missouri District 7	0.378	New York District 12	-0.622
Missouri District 8	0.324	New York District 13	-0.270
Missouri District 9	0.189	New York District 14	-0.351
Montana District 1	-0.054	New York District 15	-0.432
Nebraska District 1	0.462	New York District 16	-0.622
Nebraska District 2	0.308	New York District 17	-0.622
Nebraska District 3	0.487	New York District 18	-0.568
Nevada District 1	-0.162	New York District 19	-0.243
Nevada District 2	0.216	New York District 20	-0.135
Nevada District 3	0.037	New York District 21	-0.351
New Hampshire District 1	0.295	New York District 22	-0.135
New Hampshire District 2	0.250	New York District 23	-0.135
New Jersey District 1	-0.351	New York District 24	0.081
New Jersey District 2	0.081	New York District 25	-0.027
New Jersey District 3	0.135	New York District 26	-0.135
New Jersey District 4	0.351	New York District 27	-0.162
New Jersey District 5	0.297	New York District 28	-0.486
New Jersey District 6	-0.270	New York District 29	-0.135
New Jersey District 7	0.135	New York District 30	-0.152
New Jersey District 8	-0.297	New York District 31	-0.061
New Jersey District 9	-0.297	North Carolina District 1	-0.351
New Jersey District 10	-0.378	North Carolina District 2	-0.216
New Jersey District 11	0.297	North Carolina District 3	0.108
New Jersey District 12	0.108	North Carolina District 4	-0.135
New Jersey District 13	-0.135	North Carolina District 5	0.108
New Mexico District 1	0.158	North Carolina District 6	0.324
New Mexico District 2	0.158	North Carolina District 7	-0.243
New Mexico District 3	-0.342	North Carolina District 8	0.000
New York District 1	-0.243	North Carolina District 9	0.324
New York District 2	-0.351	North Carolina District 10	0.351
New York District 3	-0.135	North Carolina District 11	0.027
New York District 4	-0.216	North Carolina District 12	-0.219
New York District 5	-0.324	North Carolina District 13	-0.037
New York District 6	-0.622	North Dakota District 1	-0.216
New York District 7	-0.595	Ohio District 1	-0.054
New York District 8	-0.622	Ohio District 2	0.324
New York District 9	-0.595	Ohio District 3	-0.162

<u>MTurk District</u>	<u>Big Loser %</u>	<u>MTurk District</u>	<u>Big Loser %</u>
Ohio District 4	0.324	Pennsylvania District 13	0.081
Ohio District 5	0.324	Pennsylvania District 14	-0.324
Ohio District 6	0.027	Pennsylvania District 15	0.081
Ohio District 7	0.324	Pennsylvania District 16	0.378
Ohio District 8	0.378	Pennsylvania District 17	0.216
Ohio District 9	-0.324	Pennsylvania District 18	0.027
Ohio District 10	0.000	Pennsylvania District 19	0.405
Ohio District 11	-0.378	Pennsylvania District 20	-0.152
Ohio District 12	0.270	Pennsylvania District 21	0.273
Ohio District 13	-0.351	Rhode Island District 1	-0.439
Ohio District 14	-0.081	Rhode Island District 2	-0.390
Ohio District 15	0.270	South Carolina District 1	0.378
Ohio District 16	0.297	South Carolina District 2	0.297
Ohio District 17	-0.324	South Carolina District 3	0.216
Ohio District 18	-0.081	South Carolina District 4	0.297
Ohio District 19	-0.030	South Carolina District 5	-0.162
Oklahoma District 1	0.270	South Carolina District 6	-0.270
Oklahoma District 2	-0.162	South Dakota District 1	0.027
Oklahoma District 3	0.054	Tennessee District 1	0.316
Oklahoma District 4	0.054	Tennessee District 2	0.289
Oklahoma District 5	0.432	Tennessee District 3	0.079
Oklahoma District 6	0.061	Tennessee District 4	-0.237
Oregon District 1	-0.216	Tennessee District 5	-0.395
Oregon District 2	0.297	Tennessee District 6	-0.342
Oregon District 3	-0.378	Tennessee District 7	0.289
Oregon District 4	-0.297	Tennessee District 8	-0.421
Oregon District 5	0.000	Tennessee District 9	-0.395
Pennsylvania District 1	-0.324	Texas District 1	0.132
Pennsylvania District 2	-0.324	Texas District 2	0.158
Pennsylvania District 3	-0.108	Texas District 3	0.579
Pennsylvania District 4	-0.081	Texas District 4	0.105
Pennsylvania District 5	0.378	Texas District 5	0.184
Pennsylvania District 6	-0.108	Texas District 6	0.474
Pennsylvania District 7	0.297	Texas District 7	0.553
Pennsylvania District 8	0.189	Texas District 8	0.553
Pennsylvania District 9	0.432	Texas District 9	0.026
Pennsylvania District 10	0.324	Texas District 10	0.000
Pennsylvania District 11	-0.216	Texas District 11	0.132
Pennsylvania District 12	-0.297	Texas District 12	0.184

<u>MTurk District</u>	<u>Big Loser %</u>	<u>MTurk District</u>	<u>Big Loser %</u>
Texas District 13	0.368	Washington District 6	-0.405
Texas District 14	0.263	Washington District 7	-0.432
Texas District 15	-0.079	Washington District 8	0.162
Texas District 16	-0.053	Washington District 9	-0.250
Texas District 17	0.026	West Virginia District 1	-0.632
Texas District 18	-0.158	West Virginia District 2	-0.474
Texas District 19	0.500	West Virginia District 3	-0.658
Texas District 20	-0.158	Wisconsin District 1	0.000
Texas District 21	0.579	Wisconsin District 2	-0.135
Texas District 22	0.500	Wisconsin District 3	-0.054
Texas District 23	0.289	Wisconsin District 4	-0.324
Texas District 24	0.079	Wisconsin District 5	-0.189
Texas District 25	-0.026	Wisconsin District 6	0.324
Texas District 26	0.526	Wisconsin District 7	-0.351
Texas District 27	-0.079	Wisconsin District 8	0.189
Texas District 28	-0.030	Wisconsin District 9	0.273
Texas District 29	-0.030	Wyoming District 1	0.395
Texas District 30	-0.030		
Texas District 31	0.429		
Texas District 32	0.321		
Utah District 1	0.757		
Utah District 2	0.405		
Utah District 3	0.676		
Vermont District 1	0.136		
Virginia District 1	0.297		
Virginia District 2	0.054		
Virginia District 3	-0.054		
Virginia District 4	-0.081		
Virginia District 5	-0.081		
Virginia District 6	0.243		
Virginia District 7	0.405		
Virginia District 8	-0.081		
Virginia District 9	-0.216		
Virginia District 10	0.405		
Virginia District 11	0.250		
Washington District 1	-0.108		
Washington District 2	-0.216		
Washington District 3	-0.243		
Washington District 4	0.216		
Washington District 5	-0.135		

<u>MTurk District</u>	<u>Simple Loser %</u>	<u>MTurk District</u>	<u>Simple Loser %</u>
Alabama District 1	0.676	California District 20	-0.243
Alabama District 2	0.676	California District 21	0.243
Alabama District 3	0.297	California District 22	0.081
Alabama District 4	0.297	California District 23	-0.243
Alabama District 5	-0.081	California District 24	-0.297
Alabama District 6	0.405	California District 25	-0.027
Alabama District 7	-0.081	California District 26	-0.297
Alaska District 1	0.676	California District 27	-0.297
Arizona District 1	0.579	California District 28	-0.243
Arizona District 2	0.158	California District 29	-0.514
Arizona District 3	0.684	California District 30	-0.514
Arizona District 4	0.474	California District 31	-0.514
Arizona District 5	0.526	California District 32	-0.514
Arizona District 6	0.576	California District 33	-0.189
Arizona District 7	0.286	California District 34	-0.514
Arizona District 8	0.429	California District 35	-0.243
Arkansas District 1	-0.579	California District 36	-0.459
Arkansas District 2	-0.526	California District 37	-0.243
Arkansas District 3	0.158	California District 38	-0.027
Arkansas District 4	-0.351	California District 39	0.027
California District 1	-0.351	California District 40	0.243
California District 2	0.243	California District 41	0.243
California District 3	-0.189	California District 42	-0.027
California District 4	-0.027	California District 43	-0.027
California District 5	-0.514	California District 44	0.027
California District 6	-0.514	California District 45	0.243
California District 7	-0.514	California District 46	-0.063
California District 8	-0.514	California District 47	-0.125
California District 9	-0.514	California District 48	0.125
California District 10	-0.405	California District 49	0.000
California District 11	-0.135	California District 50	-0.188
California District 12	-0.243	California District 51	-0.125
California District 13	-0.514	California District 52	0.125
California District 14	-0.243	California District 53	-0.333
California District 15	-0.405	Colorado District 1	-0.333
California District 16	-0.514	Colorado District 2	-0.333
California District 17	-0.297	Colorado District 3	0.056
California District 18	-0.514	Colorado District 4	0.389
California District 19	0.189	Colorado District 5	0.444

<u>MTurk District</u>	<u>Simple Loser %</u>	<u>MTurk District</u>	<u>Simple Loser %</u>
Colorado District 6	0.444	Georgia District 6	0.447
Colorado District 7	0.077	Georgia District 7	0.132
Connecticut District 1	-0.568	Georgia District 8	0.026
Connecticut District 2	-0.405	Georgia District 9	0.079
Connecticut District 3	-0.568	Georgia District 10	0.132
Connecticut District 4	0.135	Georgia District 11	0.242
Connecticut District 5	-0.135	Georgia District 12	0.036
Connecticut District 6	0.091	Georgia District 13	-0.036
Deleware District 1	-0.179	Hawaii District 1	-0.730
Florida District 1	0.083	Hawaii District 2	-0.838
Florida District 2	-0.361	Idaho District 1	0.676
Florida District 3	-0.343	Idaho District 2	0.622
Florida District 4	0.250	Illinois District 1	-0.568
Florida District 5	0.139	Illinois District 2	-0.568
Florida District 6	0.250	Illinois District 3	-0.568
Florida District 7	0.114	Illinois District 4	-0.405
Florida District 8	0.361	Illinois District 5	-0.514
Florida District 9	0.417	Illinois District 6	0.189
Florida District 10	0.361	Illinois District 7	-0.568
Florida District 11	-0.361	Illinois District 8	-0.243
Florida District 12	0.400	Illinois District 9	-0.568
Florida District 13	0.417	Illinois District 10	0.189
Florida District 14	0.139	Illinois District 11	-0.189
Florida District 15	0.361	Illinois District 12	-0.297
Florida District 16	0.114	Illinois District 13	0.189
Florida District 17	-0.361	Illinois District 14	0.135
Florida District 18	0.194	Illinois District 15	0.189
Florida District 19	-0.343	Illinois District 16	0.135
Florida District 20	-0.258	Illinois District 17	-0.568
Florida District 21	0.323	Illinois District 18	0.189
Florida District 22	0.194	Illinois District 19	-0.297
Florida District 23	-0.233	Illinois District 20	-0.294
Florida District 24	0.080	Indiana District 1	-0.135
Florida District 25	0.160	Indiana District 2	0.189
Georgia District 1	0.184	Indiana District 3	0.297
Georgia District 2	-0.289	Indiana District 4	0.514
Georgia District 3	0.079	Indiana District 5	0.459
Georgia District 4	-0.079	Indiana District 6	0.622
Georgia District 5	-0.289	Indiana District 7	0.405

<u>MTurk District</u>	<u>Simple Loser %</u>	<u>MTurk District</u>	<u>Simple Loser %</u>
Indiana District 8	0.222	Massachusetts District 5	-0.737
Indiana District 9	-0.081	Massachusetts District 6	-0.632
Indiana District 10	-0.030	Massachusetts District 7	-0.737
Iowa District 1	0.189	Massachusetts District 8	-0.737
Iowa District 2	0.189	Massachusetts District 9	-0.737
Iowa District 3	-0.243	Massachusetts District 10	-0.737
Iowa District 4	-0.027	Michigan District 1	-0.684
Iowa District 5	0.243	Michigan District 2	0.053
Kansas District 1	0.784	Michigan District 3	-0.211
Kansas District 2	0.405	Michigan District 4	0.053
Kansas District 3	0.459	Michigan District 5	-0.421
Kansas District 4	0.459	Michigan District 6	-0.211
Kentucky District 1	0.135	Michigan District 7	-0.263
Kentucky District 2	0.135	Michigan District 8	-0.368
Kentucky District 3	-0.027	Michigan District 9	-0.263
Kentucky District 4	0.297	Michigan District 10	-0.263
Kentucky District 5	0.459	Michigan District 11	0.053
Kentucky District 6	0.135	Michigan District 12	-0.684
Louisiana District 1	0.222	Michigan District 13	-0.684
Louisiana District 2	-0.432	Michigan District 14	-0.684
Louisiana District 3	-0.333	Michigan District 15	-0.684
Louisiana District 4	-0.056	Michigan District 16	-0.647
Louisiana District 5	-0.056	Minnesota District 1	-0.222
Louisiana District 6	0.222	Minnesota District 2	0.000
Louisiana District 7	-0.297	Minnesota District 3	0.222
Maine District 1	-0.158	Minnesota District 4	-0.556
Maine District 2	0.000	Minnesota District 5	-0.556
Maryland District 1	-0.351	Minnesota District 6	-0.278
Maryland District 2	-0.351	Minnesota District 7	-0.333
Maryland District 3	-0.838	Minnesota District 8	-0.556
Maryland District 4	-0.730	Mississippi District 1	0.447
Maryland District 5	-0.838	Mississippi District 2	0.184
Maryland District 6	-0.351	Mississippi District 3	0.447
Maryland District 7	-0.838	Mississippi District 4	0.132
Maryland District 8	-0.405	Mississippi District 5	0.441
Massachusetts District 1	-0.474	Missouri District 1	-0.189
Massachusetts District 2	-0.737	Missouri District 2	0.405
Massachusetts District 3	-0.632	Missouri District 3	-0.189
Massachusetts District 4	-0.737	Missouri District 4	-0.189

<u>MTurk District</u>	<u>Simple Loser %</u>	<u>MTurk District</u>	<u>Simple Loser %</u>
Missouri District 5	-0.189	New York District 10	-0.676
Missouri District 6	0.351	New York District 11	-0.676
Missouri District 7	0.568	New York District 12	-0.676
Missouri District 8	0.514	New York District 13	-0.243
Missouri District 9	0.189	New York District 14	-0.405
Montana District 1	0.027	New York District 15	-0.405
Nebraska District 1	0.474	New York District 16	-0.676
Nebraska District 2	0.316	New York District 17	-0.676
Nebraska District 3	0.474	New York District 18	-0.676
Nevada District 1	-0.351	New York District 19	-0.297
Nevada District 2	0.297	New York District 20	-0.189
Nevada District 3	-0.037	New York District 21	-0.405
New Hampshire District 1	0.364	New York District 22	-0.135
New Hampshire District 2	0.318	New York District 23	-0.189
New Jersey District 1	-0.730	New York District 24	-0.027
New Jersey District 2	-0.297	New York District 25	0.027
New Jersey District 3	-0.297	New York District 26	-0.189
New Jersey District 4	0.027	New York District 27	-0.081
New Jersey District 5	0.027	New York District 28	-0.676
New Jersey District 6	-0.730	New York District 29	-0.243
New Jersey District 7	0.027	New York District 30	-0.212
New Jersey District 8	-0.676	New York District 31	-0.030
New Jersey District 9	-0.730	North Carolina District 1	-0.243
New Jersey District 10	-0.730	North Carolina District 2	-0.189
New Jersey District 11	-0.027	North Carolina District 3	0.189
New Jersey District 12	-0.297	North Carolina District 4	-0.135
New Jersey District 13	-0.459	North Carolina District 5	0.189
New Mexico District 1	0.211	North Carolina District 6	0.459
New Mexico District 2	0.211	North Carolina District 7	-0.243
New Mexico District 3	-0.474	North Carolina District 8	0.027
New York District 1	-0.351	North Carolina District 9	0.514
New York District 2	-0.459	North Carolina District 10	0.514
New York District 3	-0.189	North Carolina District 11	0.243
New York District 4	-0.297	North Carolina District 12	-0.125
New York District 5	-0.405	North Carolina District 13	0.037
New York District 6	-0.676	North Dakota District 1	-0.351
New York District 7	-0.676	Ohio District 1	0.027
New York District 8	-0.676	Ohio District 2	0.405
New York District 9	-0.676	Ohio District 3	-0.135

<u>MTurk District</u>	<u>Simple Loser %</u>	<u>MTurk District</u>	<u>Simple Loser %</u>
Ohio District 4	0.405	Pennsylvania District 13	0.081
Ohio District 5	0.405	Pennsylvania District 14	-0.297
Ohio District 6	-0.027	Pennsylvania District 15	0.297
Ohio District 7	0.405	Pennsylvania District 16	0.459
Ohio District 8	0.405	Pennsylvania District 17	0.243
Ohio District 9	-0.351	Pennsylvania District 18	0.027
Ohio District 10	0.027	Pennsylvania District 19	0.459
Ohio District 11	-0.351	Pennsylvania District 20	-0.212
Ohio District 12	0.405	Pennsylvania District 21	0.394
Ohio District 13	-0.351	Rhode Island District 1	-0.268
Ohio District 14	-0.135	Rhode Island District 2	-0.220
Ohio District 15	0.351	South Carolina District 1	0.730
Ohio District 16	0.351	South Carolina District 2	0.730
Ohio District 17	-0.297	South Carolina District 3	0.405
Ohio District 18	-0.027	South Carolina District 4	0.568
Ohio District 19	-0.030	South Carolina District 5	-0.027
Oklahoma District 1	0.568	South Carolina District 6	-0.027
Oklahoma District 2	0.081	South Dakota District 1	0.135
Oklahoma District 3	0.297	Tennessee District 1	0.474
Oklahoma District 4	0.351	Tennessee District 2	0.474
Oklahoma District 5	0.676	Tennessee District 3	0.158
Oklahoma District 6	0.273	Tennessee District 4	-0.053
Oregon District 1	-0.568	Tennessee District 5	-0.263
Oregon District 2	0.189	Tennessee District 6	-0.263
Oregon District 3	-0.568	Tennessee District 7	0.474
Oregon District 4	-0.568	Tennessee District 8	-0.263
Oregon District 5	-0.297	Tennessee District 9	-0.263
Pennsylvania District 1	-0.297	Texas District 1	0.211
Pennsylvania District 2	-0.297	Texas District 2	0.211
Pennsylvania District 3	-0.135	Texas District 3	0.789
Pennsylvania District 4	-0.135	Texas District 4	0.211
Pennsylvania District 5	0.459	Texas District 5	0.421
Pennsylvania District 6	-0.081	Texas District 6	0.737
Pennsylvania District 7	0.243	Texas District 7	0.789
Pennsylvania District 8	0.081	Texas District 8	0.789
Pennsylvania District 9	0.459	Texas District 9	0.105
Pennsylvania District 10	0.351	Texas District 10	0.211
Pennsylvania District 11	-0.297	Texas District 11	0.211
Pennsylvania District 12	-0.297	Texas District 12	0.421

<u>MTurk District</u>	<u>Simple Loser %</u>	<u>MTurk District</u>	<u>Simple Loser %</u>
Texas District 13	0.579	Washington District 6	-0.778
Texas District 14	0.526	Washington District 7	-0.778
Texas District 15	0.053	Washington District 8	0.000
Texas District 16	0.053	Washington District 9	-0.677
Texas District 17	0.053	West Virginia District 1	-0.684
Texas District 18	0.053	West Virginia District 2	-0.421
Texas District 19	0.737	West Virginia District 3	-0.684
Texas District 20	0.053	Wisconsin District 1	-0.243
Texas District 21	0.789	Wisconsin District 2	-0.459
Texas District 22	0.737	Wisconsin District 3	-0.297
Texas District 23	0.421	Wisconsin District 4	-0.676
Texas District 24	0.211	Wisconsin District 5	-0.459
Texas District 25	0.053	Wisconsin District 6	0.081
Texas District 26	0.737	Wisconsin District 7	-0.676
Texas District 27	0.053	Wisconsin District 8	-0.081
Texas District 28	0.212	Wisconsin District 9	-0.030
Texas District 29	0.212	Wyoming District 1	0.763
Texas District 30	0.212		
Texas District 31	0.714		
Texas District 32	0.714		
Utah District 1	1.000		
Utah District 2	0.514		
Utah District 3	0.838		
Vermont District 1	0.136		
Virginia District 1	0.514		
Virginia District 2	0.081		
Virginia District 3	0.027		
Virginia District 4	-0.027		
Virginia District 5	-0.081		
Virginia District 6	0.243		
Virginia District 7	0.514		
Virginia District 8	-0.027		
Virginia District 9	-0.243		
Virginia District 10	0.514		
Virginia District 11	0.313		
Washington District 1	-0.389		
Washington District 2	-0.611		
Washington District 3	-0.667		
Washington District 4	-0.056		
Washington District 5	-0.333		

<u>Group</u>	<u>NAES Simple Loser % Range</u>	<u>Percent of Respondents</u>
1	-0.7931034 through -.03571429	19.99%
2	-0.3333333 through -0.1333333	18.98%
3	-0.1034483 through 0.1071429	21.33%
4	0.1333333 through 0.3793103	19.62%
5	0.3928571 through 1.0000000	20.08%

<u>Group</u>	<u>NAES Big Loser % Range</u>	<u>Percent of Respondents</u>
1	-0.6551724 through -0.2666667	20.63%
2	-0.2608696 though -0.1034483	18.00%
3	-0.1000000 through 0.1000000	22.21%
4	0.1034483 through 0.3000000	18.68%
5	0.3103448 through 0.7931034	20.48%

<u>Group</u>	<u>MTurk Simple Loser % Range</u>	<u>Percent of Respondents</u>
1	-0.8378378 through -0.2580645	33.65%
2	-0.2432432 through 0.1842105	30.78%
3	0.1891892 through 1.0000000	35.57%

<u>Group</u>	<u>MTurk Big Loser % Range</u>	<u>Percent of Respondents</u>
1	-0.7105263 through -0.166667	32.38%
2	-0.0.1621622 through 0.1578947	33.65%
3	0.1621622 through 0.7837838	33.97%

Appendix B

<u>Variable</u>	<u>NAES Variable</u>	<u>Range</u>	<u>Description</u>
Register	cra01x	0-1	Registered to Vote
IntendorVotedPrimary	crb0311x	0-1	Intend to or Actually Voted in Primary
IntendGeneral	crc0128x	0-1	Intend to vote in general election
ChanceGeneral	crc0228x	0-1	Chance of voting in general election
ChancePrimary	crb0304x	0-1	Chance of Voting among those who have not already
VotedGeneral	crc28xx	0-1	Actual turnout in general election
FeelCandidates	caaab01x	0-1	Strong feelings about candidates
Ideology	cma06x	0-4	Ideology (Very Liberal)
Partisanship	cma123x	0-6	Partisanship (Strong Democrat)
StrengthPartisanship	cma123xx	0-1	Strength of Partisanship
IdeologicalExtremity	cma06xx	0-1	Ideological Extremity
ImportantVote	cre0204x	0-1	Importance attached to voting
EnjoyVote	cre05x	0-1	Enjoy Voting
StateImportant	ckb0204xs	0-1	Motivated by State Politics
LocalImportant	ckb0204xl	0-1	Motivated by Local Politics
DiscussedPolitics	ckb135x	0-1	Discussed Politics With Family, Friends, at Work, or Online in Past Week
AttentionPolitics	cea56713212223x	0-1	Attention to Politics
FollowPolitics	cka01x	0-1	Follow Politics
PoliticalKnowledge	cmc1357x	0-1	Political Knowledge
PoliticalTrust	cmb0102x	0-1	Trust in Government
PoliticsComplicated	cmb10x	0-1	Politics Too Complicated
NoSayInGovt	cmb11x	0-1	People Like Me Have No Say in Government
PercentLifeAtResidence	cwc07x	0-1	Years at Present Address
Age	cwa02x	0-1	Age
Sex	cwa01x	0-1	Sex (Female)

Education	cwa03x	0-1	Education
Income	cwa04x	0-1	Household Income
Income_mr		0-1	Houshold Income (with mean)
Unemployed	cwb01xu	0-1	Employment Status (Unemployed)
Retired	cwb01xr	0-1	Employment Status (Retired)
Student	cwb01xs	0-1	Employment Status (Student)
Worklife	cwb01xw	0-1	Employment Status (Worklife)
ReligiousAttendance	cwd01x	0-1	Attend Religious Services
Married	cwf07x	0-1	Marital Status
Black	cwc03xb	0-1	Race (Black)
Minority	cwc03xom	0-1	Race (Other Minority)
Hispanic	cwc01x	0-1	Race (Hispanic)
Citizenship	cwc0405x	0-1	Citizenship
bigloser	bigloser	0-1	Big Loser
bigwinner	bigwinner	0-1	Big Winner
bigcompete	bigcompete	0-1	Big Competitive
simloser	simloser	0-1	Simple Loser
simwinner	simwinner	0-1	Simple Winner
simcompete	simcompete	0-1	Simple Competitive

Appendix C

Health Sciences and Behavioral Sciences Institutional Review Board • 540 East Liberty Street,
Suite 202, Ann Arbor, MI 48104-2210 • phone (734) 936-0933 • fax (734) 998-9171 •
irbhsbs@umich.edu

To: Patrick Cherry

From:

Richard
Cc:

Redman

Patrick
Ted

Cherry
Brader

Subject: Notice of Exemption for [HUM00061627]

SUBMISSION INFORMATION: Title: A Study in Futility Full Study Title (if applicable):
A Study in Futility: Perpetually Losing Voters in American Elections Study eResearch ID:
[HUM00061627](#) Date of this Notification from IRB: 2/28/2012 Date of IRB Exempt
Determination: 2/28/2012 UM Federalwide Assurance: FWA00004969 expiring on
6/13/2014 OHRP IRB Registration Number(s): IRB00000246

IRB EXEMPTION STATUS: The IRB HSBS has reviewed the study referenced above and
determined that, as currently described, it is exempt from ongoing IRB review, per the following
federal exemption category:

EXEMPTION #2 of the 45 CFR 46.101.(b): Research involving the use of educational tests

(cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude, achievement), survey procedures, interview procedures or observation of public behavior, unless: (i) information obtained is recorded in such a manner that human subjects can be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects; and (ii) any disclosure of the human subjects' responses outside the research could reasonably place the subjects at risk of criminal or civil liability or be damaging to the subjects' financial standing, employability, or reputation.

Note that the study is considered exempt as long as any changes to the use of human subjects (including their data) remain within the scope of the exemption category above. Any proposed changes that may exceed the scope of this category, or the approval conditions of any other non-IRB reviewing committees, must be submitted as an amendment through eResearch.

Although an exemption determination eliminates the need for ongoing IRB review and approval, you still have an obligation to understand and abide by generally accepted principles of responsible and ethical conduct of research. Examples of these principles can be found in the Belmont Report as well as in guidance from professional societies and scientific organizations.

SUBMITTING AMENDMENTS VIA eRESEARCH: You can access the online forms for amendments in the eResearch workspace for this exempt study, referenced above.

ACCESSING EXEMPT STUDIES IN eRESEARCH: Click the "Exempt and Not Regulated" tab in your eResearch home workspace to access this exempt study.



Richard Redman
Chair, IRB HSBS


Introduction

Thank you for agreeing to participate in this survey. We will ask you questions about current issues in politics and are especially interested in your thoughts and experiences related to elections and voting. The survey takes roughly 12 minutes, on average, to complete. Please note that you cannot go back to a previous page once you have left it, so please make sure you provide your final answer before advancing the page. If you wish to participate in this survey, please proceed now to the first page.

Trigger 1

Taking into consideration all of the elections that occur in your area, from the presidential to local school board elections (and everything in between), how often do the candidates you prefer win? You may not know the exact percentage, but what's your best guess from 0 to 100 percent?

(Move the slider below to indicate any number between 0 and 100, for example 0 means your candidates never win, 25 means they win about one time in four, 50 means they win about half of the time, and so on, up to 100, which means they win every time.)



Timing

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First Click: 0 seconds.

Last Click: 0 seconds.

Page Submit: 0 seconds.

Click Count: 0 clicks.

Question Block

These days, many people are so busy they cannot find time to register to vote, or they move around so often they do not get a chance to re-register. Are you currently registered to vote in your precinct or election district, or haven't you been able to register so far?


- Registered
- Not Registered
- Don't know

Do you intend to vote in the November election later this year?

- Yes
- No

What is the percent chance that you will vote in the elections this coming November? The percent chance can be thought of as the number of chances out of 100. You can use any number between 0 and 100. For example, numbers like 2 and 5 percent may be "almost no chance," 20 percent or so may mean "not much chance," a 45- or 55-percent chance may be a "pretty even chance," 80 percent or so may mean a "very good chance," and a 95- or 98-percent chance may be "almost certain."

Please move the slider to indicate the percent chance you will vote in November.



In 2008, you may remember that Barack Obama ran for President on the Democratic ticket against John McCain for the Republicans. Do you remember for sure whether or not you voted in that election?

- Yes, I voted
- No, I did not vote
- No, I was not eligible to vote in that election
- Don't remember

In talking to people about elections, we often find that a lot of people were not able to vote because they weren't registered, they were sick, or they just didn't have time. Which of the following statements best describes you:

- I did not vote in the 2010 Election
- I thought about voting in the 2010 Election-but didn't
- I usually vote, but didn't in the 2010 Election
- I am sure I voted in the 2010 Election
- I was not eligible to vote in that election
- I don't remember

In most places around the United States, elections of one sort or another take place nearly every year, sometimes more than once per year. Thinking about all of the elections (including primaries, caucuses, special and recall elections, as well as regular elections) that have been held where you live in **the last five years (and in which you were eligible to vote)**, in about how many of these elections did you vote?

- I did not vote in any election
- I voted in less than half of the elections
- I voted in about half of the elections
- I voted in more than half of the elections
- I voted in every election

How often do you personally follow what is happening in government and politics at each of these three levels?

	Never	Sometimes	About half of the time	Most of the time	Always
Local elections	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
State elections	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
National elections	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Some people believe that who wins an election has a big impact on policies and conditions in the country. Other people believe that, in the end, it doesn't matter much who wins the election, because very little of importance changes. In your opinion, how much do election outcomes usually affect what actually happens on the issues you care the most about?

- Not at all

- A little
- A moderate amount
- A lot
- A great deal

How often have you thought your own vote would make the difference in who wins or loses an election?

- Never
- Sometimes
- About half of the time
- Most of the time
- Always

Typically, how difficult is it for you to find the time and transportation to get to your polling locations to vote?

- Not at all difficult
- Slightly difficult
- Moderately difficult
- Very difficult
- Extremely difficult

Thinking back to the 2010 elections, did anyone from one of the political parties or the candidates' campaigns get in touch with you and encourage you to vote?

- Yes
- No

Did anyone besides the parties or candidates encourage you to vote in 2010?

- Yes
- No

Now how about this year, has anyone from one of the political parties or the candidates' campaigns been in touch with you and encouraged you to vote in this year's elections?

- Yes
- No

Has anyone besides the parties or candidates encouraged you to vote in this year's elections?

- Yes
- No

How likely are you to participate in this year's election campaigns, by working to help one of the candidate's campaigns, by donating money to a campaign, or by attending a campaign event of some kind?

For each type of political campaign below, please indicate your likelihood of participating in one or more of these ways.

(If you believe there is no such election where you live this year, or are unsure, just leave the line blank.)

| Definitely Might or Probably will Definitely will

	Will	Probably will	might not	not	not
President	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
U.S. Senate	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
U.S. House of Representatives	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Governor	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
State Legislature	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
State Judge	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
County Commissioner or Executive	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Mayor or Town Council	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Local School Board	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Ballot Initiative/Referendum	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Do you think there are any important differences in what the Republicans and Democrats stand for?

- Yes, many important differences
- Yes, a couple of important differences
- No, no important differences at all

How many days in the past week did you discuss politics with

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Family	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Friends	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Co-Workers	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Neighbors	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Do you spend most of your time during the day in activities with other adults or do you pretty much work on your own most of the time?

- Mostly spend time in activities with other adults
- Pretty much work on my own most of the time

How often do you attend religious services, apart from special events like weddings and funerals?

- More than once a week
- Once a week
- Once or twice a month
- A few times a year
- Never

In past elections, has information about candidates, parties, or political issues been made available in your place of worship before the election?

- Yes
- No

Do you like or dislike the process of going to the polls and filling out a ballot?

- Like
- Neither Like Nor Dislike

Dislike

How strongly do you like the process of going to the polls and filling out a ballot?

- Very strongly
- Moderately strongly
- A little strongly

How strongly do you dislike the process of going to the polls and filling out a ballot?

- Very strongly
- Moderately strongly
- A little strongly

Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the statements below.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what is going on.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
When someone I know asks me to vote, I don't feel any added pressure to do so.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The process of going to the polls and filling out a ballot is so familiar to me, I feel like I could do it in my sleep.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If I happen to miss an election, I don't care if other people know I didn't vote.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If I know my side will lose the election, I see voting as pointless and prefer to find better ways to achieve my goals.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
There are times when I turn out to vote mainly to please someone I care about.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

People differ in their feelings about voting. For some, voting is a **duty** – they feel they should vote in every election no matter how they feel about the candidates and parties. For others voting is a **choice** – they feel free to vote or not to vote, depending on how they feel about the candidates and parties.

For you personally, is voting mainly a duty, mainly a choice, or neither a duty nor a choice ?

- Mainly a duty
- Mainly a choice
- Neither a choice nor a duty

How strongly do you feel that voting is a choice?

- Very strongly
- Moderately Strongly
- A little strongly

How strongly do you feel that voting is a duty?

- Very strongly

- Moderately Strongly
- A little strongly

Sometimes, people care a lot about what happens in elections, even getting very excited when their candidates win or very depressed when their candidates lose. Other times, people don't care much who wins or loses in the elections.

Thinking of the different types of elections we have in this country, do you usually care the most about elections at the local level (e.g., town/city officials, school board, country officials), the state level (e.g., governor, state legislature), or the national level (e.g., president, Congress).

- Local elections
- State elections
- National elections
- Don't care about elections at any of these levels

Now, how much do you usually care about what happens in each of these three types of elections?

	Don't care at all	Care a little	Care a medium amount	Care a lot	Care a great deal
Local elections	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
State elections	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
National elections	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the statements below.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
Every time a new election comes around, it feels like I have to figure out where to go and what to do, almost like it's my first time.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I would be embarrassed if my friends, neighbors, and co-workers found out I didn't vote.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I want to cast my vote and make sure my views are counted, even if I know I am on the losing side.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I never feel pressured to vote just to make other people happy.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Going to vote with friends or family members is usually more fun.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I feel I have a pretty good understanding of the important issues facing our country.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Please indicate whether you have done any of the following activities.

	Yes	No
Donated money to a candidate because of the position he/she took on an issue that matters to you	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Done volunteer work for a candidate because of the position he/she took on an issue that matters to you	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Donated money to a group that was supporting a political cause you believe in	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Officially joined an organization that advocated your views on a political issue	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Attended a meeting to support a political candidate	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Attended a protest in support of a specific political cause

As far as you are concerned personally, how important is it to **always** vote in elections?

- Not important at all
- Slightly important
- Moderately important
- Very important
- Extremely important

If you were selected to serve on a jury, would you be happy to do it or would you rather not serve?

- Happy to do it
- Rather not serve
- Don't know

Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, or an Independent?

- Republican
- Democrat
- independent
- something else

Do you consider yourself a strong or not a very strong Republican?

- Strong Republican
- Not very strong Republican

Do you consider yourself a strong or not a very strong Democrat?

- Strong Democrat
- Not very strong Democrat

Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or to the Democratic Party?

- Closer to the Republican Party
- Closer to the Democratic Party
- Neither

When it comes to politics, would you describe yourself as liberal, conservative, or moderate?

- Extremely conservative
- Conservative
- Slightly conservative
- Moderate
- Slightly liberal
- Liberal
- Extremely Liberal

Battery

When you consider whether or not you will turn out to vote, which of the following factors are most important to you personally and which are least important?

Please take a moment to rank them in order of importance, so that the most important factor is on top, the next most important factor is second, and so on, with the least important factor on the bottom.

You can use your mouse to drag each option up or down the list.

- When candidates or groups encourage you to vote

- Making a friend or family member happy by going to vote

- Desire to express your support for a candidate or cause you strongly believe in

- Ease (convenience) of getting to the polls

- How much you are likely to be affected by the outcome of the election

- The likelihood that the election is so close that your vote will determine who wins

- Showing loyalty to your political party

- Desire to fulfill your civic duty

- Pleasure you get from standing in line and filling out a ballot

Timing


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Last Click: 0 seconds.
Page Submit: 0 seconds.
Click Count: 0 clicks.

Trigger 2

Taking into consideration all of the elections that occur in your area, from the presidential to local school board elections (and everything in between), how often do the candidates you prefer win? You may not know the exact percentage, but what's your best guess from 0 to 100 percent?

(Move the slider below to indicate any number between 0 and 100, for example 0 means your candidates never win, 25 means they win about one time in four, 50 means they win about half of the time, and so on, up to 100, which means they win every time.)



Timing

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First Click: 0 seconds.
Last Click: 0 seconds.
Page Submit: 0 seconds.
Click Count: 0 clicks.

Controls

What is your age?

- 18-24
- 25-30
- 31-35
- 36-40
- 41-45
- 46-50
- 51-55
- 56-60
- 61-65
- 65+

How many years have you lived at your present address?

- Less than six months
- Six months to one year
- Number of years

What is your sex?

- Male
- Female

Are you a citizen of the United States?

- Yes
- No

Which choice best describes the highest level of education you've completed?

- Less than high school
- Some high school
- High school (or equivalent)
- Some college
- Associate degree (2 year program)
- Bachelors degree (4 year program)
- Graduate degree (e.g. JD, MD, Masters, PhD)

Last year, what was the total income before taxes of all the people living in your household?

- Less than \$10,000
- \$10,000-\$15,000
- \$15,000-\$25,000
- \$25,000-\$35,000
- \$35,000-\$50,000
- \$50,000-\$75,000
- \$75,000-\$100,000

- ▼ \$0,000 \$100,000
- \$100,000-\$150,000
- More than \$150,000

Are you of Hispanic ethnicity?

- Yes
- No

What is your race? (choose all that apply)

- White
- Black
- Asian
- American Indian
- Other

How would you describe your current employment status?

- Working full time
- Working part time
- Temporarily laid off
- Unemployed
- Retired
- Permanently disabled
- Homemaker
- Student
- Other

In what state do you currently reside?

Please enter your zip code where you are registered to vote, or, if you are not registered to vote, where your current mailing address is. We would like this information to learn more about where in the country people who take our survey live. This information cannot and will not be used to contact you.

It would be most helpful to us if you provided the full nine digit zip code.

If you don't have it memorized, nine digit zip codes can often be located on utility bills or other mail you may have sitting nearby. You can also look it up at:

<https://tools.usps.com/go/ZipLookupAction!input.action>

If you are unable to locate your nine digit zip code, please just enter your five digit zip code.

Conclusion

This is the end of the study. Thank you for participating in this research! Your responses are extremely valuable and your time is greatly appreciated.

The main goals of this research are to learn more about why people vote sometimes and other times do not and to understand better why people get involved in elections.

Your code to be paid through Amazon Mechanical Turk is $\$(e://Field/mTurkCode)$

When you are ready, please click the arrow below to secure your responses.

If you have any comments, please leave them in the box below (optional). Any questions about this research can be directed to pacherry@umich.edu.

<u>Variable Name</u>	<u>Scale</u>	<u>Based On</u>
Registered	0-1	Q1: These days, many people are so busy they cannot find time to register to vote, or they move around so often they do not get a chance to re-register. Are you currently registered to vote in your precinct or election district, or haven't you been able to register so far?
Intend	0-1	Q2: Do you intend to vote in the November election later this year?
Chance	0-1	0 if Q2==2; Q2_1: What is the percent chance you will vote this coming November?
Vote_2008	0-1	Q3: In 2008, you may remember that Barack Obama ran for President on the Democratic ticket against John McCain for the Republicans. Do you remember for sure whether or not you voted in that election?
Vote_2010	0-1	Q4: In talking to people about elections, we often find that a lot of people were not able to vote because they weren't registered, they were sick, or they just didn't have time. Which of the following statements best describes you:
Vote_five_year	(Q5-1)/4	Q5: In most places around the United States, elections of one sort or another take place nearly every year, sometimes more than once per year. Thinking about all of the elections (including primaries, caucuses, special and recall elections, as well as regular elections) that have been held where you live in the last five years (and in which you were eligible to vote), in about how many of these elections did you vote?
Past_turnout_scale	0-1	Vote_2008 Vote_2010 Vote_five_year
Personally_follow_local	(Q6_1-1)/4	Q6_1: How often do you personally follow what is happening in government and politics at each of these

Personally_follow_state	(Q6_2-1)/4	three levels? Local Q6_2 ^ State
Personally_follow_national	(Q6_3-1)/4	Q6_3 ^ National
Election_affect_issues	(Q7-1)/4	Q7: Some people believe that who wins an election has a big impact on policies and conditions in the country. Other people believe that, in the end, it doesn't matter much who wins the election, because very little of importance changes. In your opinion, how much do election outcomes usually affect what actually happens on the issues you care the most about?
Vote_makes_difference	(Q8-1)/4	Q8: How often have you thought your own vote would make the difference in who wins or loses an election?
Transportation_difficult	(Q9-1)/4	Q9: Typically, how difficult is it for you to find the time and transportation to get to your polling locations to vote?
Party_contact_2010	0-1	Q10: Thinking back to the 2010 elections, did anyone from one of the political parties or the candidates' campaigns get in touch with you and encourage you to vote?
Other_contact_2010	0-1	Q11: Did anyone besides the parties or candidates encourage you to vote in 2010?
Party_contact_2012	0-1	Q12: Now how about this year, has anyone from one of the political parties or the candidates' campaigns been in touch with you and encouraged you to vote in this year's elections?
Other_contact_2012	0-1	Q13: Has anyone besides the parties or candidates encouraged you to vote in this year's elections?
Participate_president	(5-B1_1)/4	B1_1: How likely are you to participate in this year's election campaigns, by working to help one of the candidate's campaigns, by donating money to a campaign, or by attending a campaign event of some kind? President
Participate_senate	(5-B1_2)/4	B1_2 ^ U.S. Senate

Participate_house	(5-B1_3)/4	B1_3 ^ U.S. House of Representatives
Participate_governor	(5-B1_4)/4	B1_4 ^ Governor
Participate_legislature	(5-B1_5)/4	B1_5 ^ State Legislature
Participate_judge	(5-B1_6)/4	B1_6 ^ State Judge
Participate_commissioner	(5-B1_7)/4	B1_7 ^ County Commissioner or Executive
Participate_mayor	(5-B1_8)/4	B1_8 ^ Mayor or Town Council
Participate_school	(5-B1_9)/4	B1_9 ^ Local School Board
Participate_ballot	(5-B1_10)/4	B1_10 ^ Ballot Initiative/Referendum
Discuss_family	B2_1/8	B2_1: How many days in the past week did you discuss politics with: Family
Discuss_friends	B2_2/8	B2_2 ^ Friends
Discuss_work	B2_3/8	B2_3 ^ Co-Workers
Discuss_neighbor	B2_4/8	B2_4 ^ Neighbors
Differences_between_parties	(3-Q14)/2	Q14: Do you think there are any important differences in what the Republicans and Democrats stand for?
Time_alone	0-1	Q15: Do you spend most of your time during the day in activities with other adults or do you pretty much work on your own most of the time?
Attend_church	(5-Q16)/4	Q16: How often do you attend religious services, apart from special events like weddings and funerals? 0 if Q16==5; Q16_1: In past elections, has information about candidates, parties, or political issues been made available in your place of worship before the election?
Church_information	0-1	Q17: Do you like or dislike the process of going to the polls and filling out a ballot? 4 if Q17==2; 4 if Q17==3; Q17_1: How strongly do you like the process of going to the polls and filling out a ballot? 4 if Q17==1; 4 if Q17==2; Q17_2: How strongly do you dislike the process of going to the polls and filling out a ballot?
Like_process	(4-Like_process)/3	B3_1: Sometimes politics and government seem so
Dislike_process	(4-Dislike_process)/3	
Government_complicated	(B3_1-1)/4	

Someone_asks_pressure	(B3_2-1)/4	complicated that a person like me can't really understand what is going on. B3_2: When someone I know asks me to vote, I don't feel any added pressure to do so.
Process_familiar	(B3_3-1)/4	B3_3: The process of going to the polls and filling out a ballot is so familiar to me, I feel like I could do it in my sleep.
Miss_dont_care	(B3_4-1)/4	B3_4: If I happen to miss an election, I don't care if other people know I didn't vote.
Voting_pointless	(B3_5-1)/4	B3_5: If I know my side will lose the election, I see voting as pointless and prefer to find better ways to achieve my goals.
Vote_to_please	(B3_6-1)/4	B3_6: There are times when I turn out to vote mainly to please someone I care about.
Mainly_choice	(4-Mainly_choice)/3	Q18: For you personally, is voting mainly a duty, mainly a choice, or neither a duty nor a choice ? 4 if Q18== 1; 4 if Q18==3; Q18_1: How strongly do you feel that voting is a choice?
Mainly_duty	(4-Mainly_duty)/3	4 if Q18==2; 4 if Q18==3 Q18_2: How strongly do you feel that voting is a duty? 0 if Q19==2; 0 if Q19==3; 0 if Q19==4; Q19: Thinking of the different types of elections we have in this country, do you usually care the most about elections at the local level (e.g., town/city officials, school board, country officials), the state level (e.g., governor, state legislature), or the national level (e.g., president, Congress). Local
Usually_care_local	0-1	0 if Q19==1; 0 if Q19==3; 0 if Q19==4; Q19 ^ State
Usually_care_state	0-1	0 if Q19==1; 0 if Q19==2; 0 if Q19==4; Q19 ^ National
Usually_care_national	0-1	1 if Q19==4; Q19_1_1: Now, how much do you usually care about what happens in each of these three types of elections? Local
Care_local	(Care_local-1)/4	1 if Q19==4; Q19_1_2 ^ State
Care_state	(Care_state-1)/4	1 if Q19==4; Q19_1_3 ^ National
Care_national	(Care_national-1)/4	

Feels_first_time	(B4_1-1)/4	B4_1: Every time a new election comes around, it feels like I have to figure out where to go and what to do, almost like it's my first time.
Embarrassed_no_vote	(B4_2-1)/4	B4_2: I would be embarrassed if my friends, neighbors, and co-workers found out I didn't vote.
Cast_even_losing	(B4_3-1)/4	B4_3: I want to cast my vote and make sure my views are counted, even if I know I am on the losing side.
Never_pressured_people_happy	(B4_4-1)/4	B4_4: I never feel pressured to vote just to make other people happy.
Vote_family_fun	(B4_5-1)/4	B4_5: Going to vote with friends or family members is usually more fun.
Understand_issues	(B4_6-1)/4	B4_6: I feel I have a pretty good understanding of the important issues facing our country.
Donated_money_candidate	0-1	B5_1: Donated money to a candidate because of the position he/she took on an issue that matters to you
Volunteer_candidate	0-1	B5_2: Done volunteer work for a candidate because of the position he/she took on an issue that matters to you
Donated_money_group	0-1	B5_3: Donated money to a group that was supporting a political cause you believe in
Joined_group	0-1	B5_4: Officially joined an organization that advocated your views on a political issue
Attend_protest	0-1	B5_5: Attended a protest in support of a specific political cause
Always_vote_important	(Q20-1)/4	Q20: As far as you are concerned personally, how important is it to always vote in elections?
Serve_on_jury	0-1	Q21: If you were selected to serve on a jury, would you be happy to do it or would you rather not serve?
PartyID	0-6	Q22: Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, or an Independent? Q22_1: Do you consider yourself a strong or not a very strong Republican? Q22_2: Do you consider yourself a strong or not a very

Ideological_extremity	((Folded 1-4)-1)/3
Battery_ease	(9-B6_1)/8
Battery_affected_outcome	(9-B6_2)/8
Battery_fulfill_duty	(9-B6_3)/8
Battery_pleasure_line	(9-B6_4)/8
Battery_vote_determines	(9-B6_5)/8
Battery_express_support	(9-B6_6)/8
Battery_family_happy	(9-B6_7)/8
Battery_loyalty	(9-B6_8)/8
Battery_encouraged	(9-B6_9)/8
Age	Q24
Years_at_address	0-53
Sex	0-1
Citizen	0-1
Education	(Q28-1)/6
Income	(Q29-1)/8
Hispanic	0-1
White	0-1
Black	0-1

strong Democrat?

Q22_3: Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or to the Democratic Party?

Q23: When it comes to politics, would you describe yourself as liberal, conservative, or moderate?

B6_1: Ease (convenience) of getting to the polls

B6_2: How much you are likely to be affected by the outcome of the election

B6_3: Desire to fulfill your civic duty

B6_4: Pleasure you get from standing in line and filling out a ballot

B6_5: The likelihood that the election is so close that your vote will determine who wins

B6_6: Desire to express your support for a candidate or cause you strongly believe in

B6_7: Making a friend or family member happy by going to vote

B6_8: Showing loyalty to your political party

B6_9: When candidates or groups encourage you to vote

Q24: What is your age?

Q25: How many years have you lived at your present address?

Q25_TEXT

Q26: What is your sex?

Q27: Are you a citizen of the United States?

Q28: Which choice best describes the highest level of education you've completed?

Q29: Last year, what was the total income before taxes of all the people living in your household?

Q30: Are you of Hispanic ethnicity?

Q31_1: What is your race? (choose all that apply) White

Q31_2 ^ Black

Asian	0-1	Q31_3 ^ Asian
American_Indian	0-1	Q31_4 ^ American Indian
Other_race	0-1	Q31_5 ^ Other race
Minority	0-1	Hispanic Black Asian American_Indian Other_race
Unemployed	0-1	Q32: How would you describe your current employment status? Unemployed dummy
Retired	0-1	Q32: How would you describe your current employment status? Retired dummy
Student	0-1	Q32: How would you describe your current employment status? Student dummy
Working	0-1	Q32: How would you describe your current employment status? Working full/part time dummy
Trigger	Trigger/100	Trigger_1, Trigger_2, condition
Partisanship	(Partisanship-1)/3	PartyID
Percent_life_at_address	Percent_life_at_address/23	Years_at_address/Age
Impact_civic_duty	Impact_civic_duty/6	Q18: For you personally, is voting mainly a duty, mainly a choice, or neither a duty nor a choice ? Q18_1: How strongly do you feel that voting is a choice? Q18_2: How strongly do you feel that voting is a duty?
Impact_liking_process	0-6/6	Q17: Do you like or dislike the process of going to the polls and filling out a ballot? Q17_1: How strongly do you like the process of going to the polls and filling out a ballot? Q17_2: How strongly do you dislike the process of going to the polls and filling out a ballot?
Expressive_activity_index	Expressive_activity_index/5	Donated_money_candidate Volunteer_candidate

		Donated_money_group
		Joined_group
		Attend_protest
Average_national_participation	Average_national_participation/3	Participate_president
		Participate_senate
		Participate_house
Average_state_participation	Average_state_participation/4	Participate_governor
		Participate_legislature
		Participate_judge
		Participate_ballot
Average_local_participation	Average_local_participation/3	Participate_commissioner
		Participate_mayor
		Participate_school
Index_of_mobilization	0-5	Party_contact_2010
		Party_contact_2012
		Other_contact_2010
		Other_contact_2012
		Church_information
	Personally_follow_state-	
Follow_state_relative	Personally_follow_national	
	Personally_follow_local-	
Follow_local_relative	Personally_follow_national	
		Average_state_participation,
State_relative_index	-0.8333334 - 0.75	Average_national_participation
		Average_local_participation,
Local_relative_index	-0.8333334 - 1	Average_national_participation
BLDiv	1-3	Based on Congressional District information from merge
SLDiv	1-3	Based on Congressional District information from merge
bigloser	0-1	0 if Partisanship~=. 1 if BLDiv==1 & Partisanship<2.9 1 if BLDiv==3 & Partisanship>3.1

bigwinner	0-1	0 if Partisanship~=. 1 if BLDiv==3 & Partisanship<2.9 1 if BLDiv==1 & Partisanship>3.1
bigcompete	0-1	0 if bigloser==1 0 if bigwinner==1 1 if bigloser==0 & bigwinner==0
simloser	0-1	0 if Partisanship~=. 1 if SLDiv==1 & Partisanship<2.9 1 if SLDiv==3 & Partisanship>3.1
simwinner	0-1	0 if Partisanship~=. 1 if SLDiv==3 & Partisanship<2.9 1 if SLDiv==1 & Partisanship>3.1
simcompete	0-1	0 if simloser==1 0 if simwinner==1 1 if simloser==0 & simwinner==0
Feels_first_time_rev	(5-B4_1)/4	B4_1
Never_pressured_people_happy_rev	(5-B4_4)/4	B4_4
Someone_asks_pressure_rev	(5-B3_2)/4	B3_2
Voting_pointless_rev	(5-B3_5)/4	B3_5
Government_complicated_rev	(5-B3_1)/4	B3_1
Elections_matter	Elections_matter/3	Differences_between_parties Election_affect_issues Vote_makes_difference
Cost_scale	Cost_scale/2	Transportation_difficult Battery_ease
Local_elections_scale	Local_elections_scale/6	Care_local Care_state State_relative_index Local_relative_index Follow_state_relative Follow_local_relative
Political_discussion	Political_discussion/4	Discuss_friends Discuss_family

Civic_duty_scale	Civic_duty_scale/3	Discuss_work Discuss_neighbor Impact_civic_duty Always_vote_important Mainly_duty
Social_norms_scale	Social_norms_scale/2	Embarrassed_no_vote Miss_dont_care
Social_pressures_scale	Social_pressures_scale/3	Never_pressured_people_happy_rev Someone_asks_pressure Vote_to_please
Habitual_voting_scale	Habitual_voting_scale/2	Feels_first_time_rev Process_familiar
Efficacy_scale	Efficacy_scale/2	Understand_issues Government_complicated_rev
Voice_counted_scale	Voice_counted_scale/2	Cast_even_losing Voting_pointless_rev
Partisan_commitment_scale	Partisan_commitment_scale/3	Battery_loyalty Ideological_extremity Partisanship

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