Ruin, Restoration, and Return:
Aesthetic Unification in Post-Socialist East Berlin

by

Courtney Glore Crimmins

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Doctoral Committee:

Professor Andrei S. Markovits, Chair
Associate Professor Julia C. Hell
Associate Professor Andrew H. Herscher
Associate Professor Johannes von Moltke
To my family
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**Chapter Four: Defining the City Center**

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<td>ADN</td>
<td>Allgemeiner Deutscher Nachrichtendienst (General German News Service)</td>
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<td>BAK</td>
<td>Bundesarchitektenkammer (Federal Chamber of German Architects)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BAS</td>
<td>Befreiungsausschuss Südtirol (Liberation Committee of South Tyrol)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBR</td>
<td>Bundesamt für Bauwesen und Raumordnung (Federal Office for Building and Regional Planning)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMU</td>
<td>Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit (Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRD</td>
<td>Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Federal Republic of Germany)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BStU</td>
<td>Der Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (Federal Commissioner for the Documents of the State Security Service [Stasi] of the former German Democratic Republic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSV</td>
<td>Bund der Stalinistisch Verfolgten (Association of Persecutees of the Stalinist Regime)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BVV</td>
<td>Bezirksverordnetenversammlung (Berlin District Assembly)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (Christian Democratic Union of Germany)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSU</td>
<td>Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern (Christian-Social Union of Bavaria)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Deutsche Demokratische Republik (German Democratic Republic)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DVP</td>
<td>Deutsche Volkspolizei (German People’s Police)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDGB</td>
<td>Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (Free German Trade Union Federation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDJ</td>
<td>Freie Deutsche Jugend (Free German Youth)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPÖ</td>
<td>Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Freedom Party of Austria)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDR</td>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>KPÖ</td>
<td>Kommunistische Partei Österreichs (Communist Party of Austria)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MfS</td>
<td>Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (Ministry for State Security)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSI</td>
<td>Movimento Sociale Italiano (Italian Social Movement)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NPD</td>
<td>Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (National Democratic Party of Germany)</td>
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<td>ÖVP</td>
<td>Österreichische Volkspartei (Austrian People’s Party)</td>
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<td>PDS</td>
<td>Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (Party of Democratic Socialism)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RFB</td>
<td>Roter Frontkämpferbund (Red Front Fighters’ League)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SBZ</td>
<td>Sowjetische Besatzungszone (Soviet Occupation Zone)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SED</td>
<td>Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party of Germany)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMAD</td>
<td>Sowjetische Militäradministration in Deutschland (Soviet Military Administration in Germany)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPK</td>
<td>Stiftung Preußischer Kulturbesitz (Prussian Cultural Heritage Foundation)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPÖ</td>
<td>Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (Social Democratic Party of Austria)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TLA</td>
<td>Tallinna Linnaarhiiv (Tallinn City Archives)</td>
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<td>VP</td>
<td>Volkspolizei (People’s Police); see also DVP</td>
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This dissertation addresses the transformation of specific public spaces in eastern Berlin after 1990. The underlying question of this study is: Why do some GDR-era structures still stand in post-Wall Berlin, while others were demolished? Memory, politics, symbolism, and financial considerations all play a role in answering this question. In this dissertation, I examine the political decision-making processes involved in determining the fate of particular built spaces in the German capital. In so doing, I analyze how history, memory, and identity figure into the reappropriation of the sites across time. In addition, I address how the visual environment of these sites affects decisions about their future. That is, in addition to staking out the historical and political significance of the sites, I ask what role optic experience in the urban landscape plays in the moment of political upheaval and transition. I argue that ultimately the aesthetic unification of Berlin is a goal which parallels the political integration process during the post-Wall period.

I take as examples in this study two locations in eastern Berlin: the Soviet War Memorial in Treptower Park and the Schlossplatz in Berlin-Mitte. The city of Berlin and federal German government not only saved the former, but renovated it in the 2000s. Demolition of the Palace of the Republic, which was located on the latter, began in 2006 after years of standing vacant. In comparing these two public spaces, I argue that the Soviet War Memorial remains today, not least because of the constraints of a German-
Russian treaty, but rather because of the way the memorial grounds visually figure into its surroundings. Alternatively, the construction and later dismantling of the Palace of the Republic are part of a longer history of attempting to create an optically cohesive Berlin center. As I will show, these undertakings recuperate past German unifications while they reconstruct the fragments of 1989.
INTRODUCTION

As with any extensive political and social transformation, the changes in East Germany at the end of 1989 demanded reflection and re-assessment in the time which followed. On both sides of the Wall, writers, journalists, academics, and politicians tried to stake out the lessons of the autumn revolution and the collapse of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Along with individuals grappling with what the fall of the Berlin Wall meant for them and their families, on the collective level, the emerging politically unified Germany was charged with the task of constructing its future with respect to the defunct East German state. What of that nation’s past would remain, and what would be tossed away? Across Eastern Europe, in both the end of the Soviet Union and the GDR, the seismic shift from forty years of a particular political and social worldview to a new one produced years of such questioning. Yet, while the USSR disintegrated into independent new states, the GDR became part of a new Germany, joining East and West. This special situation of unification complicated matters of identity for East Germany after 1990, not only because it had to negotiate its own history and legacy, but did so vis-à-vis its West German counterpart, as it struggled to find its place in the new Bundesrepublik.
Much research and analysis has sorted through and tried to make sense of unification from a variety of interventions: from economic\(^1\) to political,\(^2\) from literature and film\(^3\) to education policy\(^4\) and foreign relations,\(^5\) from the borderland\(^6\) to the capital.\(^7\)

Historians and others have attempted to understand German unification in 1990 in terms

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of past German unifications, reconciling Germany’s many ghosts along the way. This particular study examines German unification in terms of the built space in Berlin. Specifically, I analyze the transition of East Berlin’s urban landscape in two case studies—the Soviet War Memorial in Treptower Park and the Palace of the Republic in Berlin-Mitte—and ask how history, memory, politics, national identity, and visual environment merge in the cityscape of each landmark to affect the way in which these iconic landmarks fared post-1990. The Treptow memorial and the Palace of the Republic acted as particularly meaningful symbols during the course of the GDR. Yet, the question here is not only about the significance of site, but rather sight as well. Ultimately, the topic of this dissertation is about aesthetic unification in the face of political and cultural integration.

In speaking of Berlin during the upheaval of 1989, the problem that lingers for many, is why some landmarks in East Berlin survived, while others were destroyed. The Berlin Wall and the Stasi Headquarters faced the immediate wrath of East Berliners, but other potentially contentious places, such as the Marx-Engels statue or the city’s several Soviet war memorials were left untouched. Instead of focusing on the immediate impulses of November 1989, this dissertation takes a longer view of the decisions and implications of the transformation of the urban landscape in East Berlin. I ask how, in the course of the twenty years following German unification, has East Berlin as a built environment been shaped and re-imagined as part of unified Berlin and the unified

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9 While in the post-1989 era the Palace of the Republic is the building standing in this particular location, it is one of several structures built on this plaza since the early fifteenth century. I will be examining each manifestation (and projected construction) on the Schlossplatz (palace square).
German capital? And how do these spaces figure into the emerging Berlin and German identities? I further question how these spaces figured into the GDR and Germany (and Prussia) before it, arguing that the post-1990 configurations of these locations are not only about negotiating the immediate past, but rather generations of history as well.

My goal in this dissertation is to frame these questions within the perspective of visual experience. While this study is not an examination of architectural history or an exploration of visual culture, I do consider how aesthetics figure into the quest for uniting Berlin. This is how I articulate the question of aesthetic unification: In the realm of the visual, what are the value judgments attributed to various GDR architectures and how are they then manipulated to become part of a visual whole in Berlin? That is, what is the role of the visual in the history and politics of these two built structures? Simply, this dissertation considers the political decisions involved in building and either maintaining or altering the Soviet War Memorial and the Schlossplatz across time. In so doing, I examine how national identity, history, memory, and the visual affect these decisions.

There are many ways in which this examination of the urban landscape of East Berlin could be organized and conducted. A fruitful study might look at the topographies of spectral and hidden spaces, such as Hitler’s Bunker, or the restructuring of the public transportation system. One could also look at the renovation process of Friedrichstrasse’s shopping district or Karl-Marx-Allee. Brian Ladd’s The Ghosts of Berlin, Karen Till’s The New Berlin, Elizabeth Strom’s Building the New Berlin, and Michael Z. Wise’s Capital Dilemma offer some examples of how such a study could be successfully accomplished. Looking further west, Deborah Ascher Barnstone’s The Transparent State examines the use of transparency as metaphor for emerging political openness in
moments of transition in the building of Bonn’s two *Bundeshäuser* in 1949 and 1992, as well as Norman Foster’s Reichstag dome addition in Berlin in 1999. But none of these works looks specifically at the transformation of Berlin post-1990 from the GDR perspective. That is, the starting point for these inquiries is not specific to the context of post-socialist re-appropriation and negotiation, as this work seeks to be. Further, with the exception of Barnstone, none of the above-mentioned analyses of post-Wall Berlin topographies considers aesthetics or the impact of visual perception as I will here.

To that end, this dissertation focuses on two sites, which act as examples of the process of aesthetic unification in post-1990 East Berlin. The first is the Soviet War Memorial in Treptower Park, which was renovated during the early 2000s. The second is the site of the Palast der Republik (Palace of the Republic), the former East German statehouse, which was razed in the mid-2000s to make way for a reconstructed rendering of the Prussian-era Berliner Stadtschloss (Berlin City Palace), which previously stood on this site. These sites act as counter-examples: the former, which has remained intact and has further been re-contextualized to fit into a new understanding of German history, and the latter, a GDR remnant, which was erased in favor of resurrecting a previous past.

A theoretical framework is necessary for analyzing the changes in the visual landscape of East Berlin across time. When reading the built space in terms of memory

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11 To be sure, the concept of “seeing” is inherent to Barnstone’s *Transparent State*, as she examines post-war West German governmental buildings and the relationship between politic regime change and architecture. She considers not only the visual transparency (i.e., the use of glass façades) of the Bundestag buildings in Bonn and Foster’s Reichstag cupola, but their didactic transparency for the general public as well. For example, in analyzing Hans Schwippert’s 1949 Bundeshaus design, Barnstone argues that he sought to limit the amount of ornamentation so as to make the building understandable to the everyday visitor, or in Barnstone’s words, so that “. . . it is readable without any special knowledge, accessible to everyone” (121). In the end, however, Barnstone’s specific interventions with architectural subject matters—West German political ideology and transparency—are different than mine.
and identification, as I in part will do here, scholars often use theorists such as Pierre Nora to provide a conceptual structure for their studies.\textsuperscript{12} Nora’s now canonical concept of \textit{lieux de mémoire} suggests that physical and figurative sites such as archives, anniversaries, and museums can serve as points of memory, creating meaningful connections between past and present. Rather than being a mere “representation of the past” as a \textit{lieux de histoire} would apparently be, \textit{lieux de mémoire} instead link the past to the present, since memory is, according to Nora, a “perpetually actual phenomenon, a bond tying us to the eternal present.”\textsuperscript{13} Instructive in Nora’s concept is the implication of meaning. That is, in contemplating such sites, simple existence is unimportant; rather, it is the derivation of significance for identification that is critical.

Nora writes in his landmark essay, “Between Memory and History: \textit{Les Lieux de Mémoire}”:

Then there are the monumental memory-sites, not to be confused with architectural sites alone. Statues or monuments to the dead, for instance, owe their meaning to their intrinsic existence; even though their location is far from arbitrary, one could justify relocating them without altering their meaning. Such is not the case with ensembles constructed over time, which draw their meaning from the complex relations between their elements: such are mirrors of a world or a period, like the cathedral of Chartres or the palace of Versailles.\textsuperscript{14}

While an excellent starting point for an examination of the subjects of this study, Nora’s concept of \textit{lieux de mémoire} is incomplete for understanding the significance of the

\textsuperscript{12} In terms of the specificities of German postwar memory, Markovits and Reich offer an instructive “memory map” of time periods and regimes, which they term “clusters,” in \textit{The German Predicament}. These clusters, such as the “Nazi cluster” and the “Bundesrepublik cluster,” serve as conditions for collective memory in which various themes and mythologies are accepted and contested. The stakes of such competing collective memories for post-Wall unified Germany could not be higher, as Markovits and Reich rightly suggest: “Collective memory thus becomes the foundation for a debate about the trajectory of future German engagement. Which historic incarnation is the new Germany most likely to resemble? Is it to be Germany’s dictatorial past or its democratic future?” Markovits and Reich, \textit{The German Predicament}, 42.


\textsuperscript{14} Nora, “Between Memory and History,” 22.
location of the Soviet War Memorial in Treptower Park and the Palace of the Republic. In the case of the former, as I will show, the location and environmental context of this massive monument to fallen Red Army soldiers (i.e., the “dead”) is of utmost importance, despite Nora’s insistence in the above passage that the location of such memorials could be modified without consequence. To be sure, as I will argue, the locational and visual context of the Treptow memorial is critical in deriving meaning from the space. Likewise, in the case of the grounds of the Palace of the Republic, the “complex relations between [its] elements” certainly matter, but again the visual context of the site matters as well. In sum, what I will argue is that it is not only location that is important here, but rather how one sees it as well. Nora’s model lacks this explicit concept.

Instead, I propose using the theories of historian Simon Schama and geographer Yi-Fu Tuan to initially frame the element of the visual at play in reading these city spaces. The sites/sights of memory are not only designated as important because of their intentions a priori, but rather because of how they are actually experienced. Where Nora focuses on the work of the site in creating meaning, here I will also consider the work of the observer.15

Simon Schama’s *Landscape and Memory* offers a model of such an interplay between the inherent work of objects and the work of the observer. While Schama is concerned with natural landscapes, as opposed to the human-made constructions I consider in this study, the notion of built space and mental interaction is shared in both

15 One could also consider the *flâneur* as urban experiential viewer, such as in the work of Walter Benjamin’s *Arcades Project* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), Franz Hessel’s *Ein Flaneur in Berlin* (1929; repr., Berlin: Das Arsenal, 1984), or more recently, Anke Gleber’s *The Art of Taking a Walk: Flanerie, Literature, and Film in Weimar Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998) and Susan Buck-Morss’s *The Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989). The notion of the *flâneur* is loaded with questions of modernity, class, and intention, however, which I do not wish to infuse the issue of “sight” with as I am taking it up here. To approach this topic from the perspective of the *flâneur* would be a different task entirely.
circumstances. Schama writes, “For although we are accustomed to separate nature and human perception into two realms, they are, in fact indivisible. Before it can ever be a repose for the senses, landscape is the work of the mind. Its scenery is built up as much from strata of memory as from layers of rock.”\(^\text{16}\)

It is precisely this interplay between the object and the viewer which is my concern. The architectural style of the Soviet War Memorial and the Palace of the Republic (or the Stadtschloss) as Socialist Realist or Baroque is of less concern to me than the effect such architectural styles and designs has on their observers. Specifically, it is the relationship between this interplay of experience of observation and image vis-à-vis memory and identity with which I am concerned. Schama writes of “…moments of recognition…, when a place suddenly exposes its connections to an ancient and peculiar vision of the forest, the mountain, the river. … He [“A curious excavator of traditions”] scratches away, discovering bits and pieces of a cultural design that seems to elude coherent reconstitution but which leads him deeper into the past.”\(^\text{17}\) So, too, will I show that the Palace and Memorial grounds expose links with the past, recuperating aesthetic and political unifications which precede that of 1990. As I hope to demonstrate, the optic transformations of these spaces act not in isolation, but rather in conjunction with their environs.


\(^{17}\) Schama, *Landscape and Memory*, 16.
In his *Space and Place*, Yi-Fu Tuan seeks to explain the importance of space and place in the human-made environment in terms of experience. Where Schama is chiefly interested in the natural environment, Tuan’s work focuses on the built world. Tuan writes:

> Completed, the building or architectural complex now stands as an environment capable of affecting the people who live in it. Manmade space can refine human feeling and perception. It is true that even without architectural form, people are able to sense the difference between interior and exterior, closed and open, darkness and light, private and public. But this kind of knowing is inchoate. Architectural space—even a simple hut surrounded by cleared ground—can define such sensations and render them vivid. … the built environment clarifies social roles and relations. … A planned city, a monument, or even a simple dwelling can be a symbol of the cosmos. … architecture is a key to comprehending reality.

Tuan’s architecture-as-organizing-principle is not vastly different from Schama’s natural world. But Tuan’s extensive exploration in his book of the comprehensive character of experience (i.e., sight, sound, taste) as it relates to environment helps to sort out how built space influences the individual and society. To take but one of these aspects of experience, sight, Tuan concludes thusly, “To see and to think are closely related processes. In English, ‘I see’ means ‘I understand.’ Seeing. . .is not the simple recording of light stimuli; it is a selective and creative process in which environmental stimuli are organized into flowing structures that provide signs meaningful to the purposive organism.” Determining what these meaningful signs are is at the heart of this dissertation. Of less importance is the question of what the purpose of a memorial or a building is; more critical is how either functions in relation to its surroundings, and how it

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18 Tuan defines experience as a “cover-all term for the various modes through with a person knows and constructs a reality.” Yi-Fu Tuan, *Space and Place. The Perspective of Experience* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 8.
19 Tuan, *Space and Place*, 102.
20 Tuan, *Space and Place*, 10.
is then ultimately read by the observer. That is, the obvious prescribed designation of the Palace of the Republic as a statehouse matters less in this discussion than how the building itself—embodied as statehouse—figures into its surroundings, and to what end. If the goal in post-1990 Berlin is total unification in the political, social, economic, cultural, and architectural realms, how particular memorials or buildings act in accordance with the existing landscape matters as much as their symbolism.

At this point, it is important to contextualize this discussion in terms of the actual architectural debates in Berlin following the fall of the Berlin Wall. The moment of 1989/90 was a purported new “Stunde Null” (zero hour), in which the move towards unification on all fronts offered officials and members of the community the opportunity to re-imagine the city. During the early years of the 1990s, Berlin became not only symbolic of the new Deutschland, but also the end of the Cold War. Thus, politically, and perhaps even psychologically, the city could not remain in any way divided. The task of figuring out how to conceive of what the “New Berlin” would entail would be fraught with disagreements. As Jane Jacobs famously stated, “Designing a dream city is easy; rebuilding a living one takes imagination.” To be sure, post-Wall Berlin required plenty of imagination.

In the early 1990s, a wide swath of architects began to deliberate how Berlin should be reconstructed in light of the new post-Wall reality. It was a popular and highly contested question, fraught not only with the legacy of the GDR, but more vocally with the National Socialist past. Already burdened by skeptics with uncertainties about the direction of unified German power, the architecture of the to-be-again capital raised questions as well. But not all were fatalistic. On the contrary, the Frankfurter Allgemeine

Zeitung and the German Architecture Museum, for example, collaborated with architecture critic Michael Mönninger and architect Vittorio Magnago Lampugnani in producing a design exploratory in the fall of 1990. Many entries swung to the utopian, providing idealistic impressions of what the city center could become. On the whole, the exposition spoke volumes to the vast variation in the way architects perceived the future of Berlin.

At the same time, a group of architects took on the problem in the so-called Berliner Architekturdebatte, which sought to determine if and how the city should achieve architectural unity. Central to the debate was the acknowledgment by some of the impossibility of unification in the built landscape because of the city’s past, as well as a rejection of future revisionism. The debate produced essentially two ways of thinking about Berlin’s architecture after 1990: one was the group which advocated “critical reconstruction.” This approach looked to recreate lost architectural coherence in the city, a goal which architects such as Daniel Libeskind dismissed as “reactionary.” His and

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22 The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung published the entries in January 1991. The Architectural Design issue “Berlin Tomorrow” catalogues the designs and essays from the architects. See original German publication, Michael Mönninger and Vittorio Magnago Lampugnani, eds. Berlin morgen: Ideen für das Herz einer Groszstadt. Exhibition Deutsches Architektur-Museum, Frankfurt am Main, January 26-March 24, 1991 (Stuttgart: Hatje, 1991). Notably absent from the exercise were GDR architects. The participants, from Norman Foster to Josef Paul Kleihues, were trained in the West.


Hubertus Siegert’s documentary Berlin Babylon offers an important introduction to some of the main areas of contention in Berlin during these initial years. Not only is the area of the Palace of the
others’ more modernist take on re-building advocated for a completely new way of designing the city. Instead of repurposing old Nazi buildings, which would be tantamount to stripping the horrific from the structures, instead architects and city planners, according to Libeskind, should embrace the contradictions of the city.

In a heated exchange begun in Der Spiegel in December 1993, Vittorio Magnago Lampugnani and Daniel Libeskind presented both sides of this argument. Lampugnani condemned postmodern architecture as punishment for the Nazi legacy, arguing that those who wished to design with traditional “geometric” lines and “uniform facades” were denounced as “fascist.” Libeskind responded with an article entitled “Die Banalität der Ordnung” (The Banality of Order), in which he criticized the prevailing Berlin architecture mentality as “primitive” and argued, “In reality, Berlin is a fascinating montage of contradictory history, contradictory standards, forms and spaces: a colorful mixture of imagination and material.”

As Gavriel Rosenfeld rightly points out, this dispute was the latest mutation of a longer architectural debate, which preceded the Historikerstreit (Historians’ Debate), but

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also fed into its larger concerns of reconciling a German present with the Nazi past. In its original forms, the architects’ debate of the 1970s and 1980s was concerned with the nature of architecture supporting political ideology. Just as in the Hansaviertel dispute of West Berlin during the early 1950s, or even the rejection of “Nazi” architecture as monumental in East Berlin, so too did the architects’ debate early on question the properties of architectural form. Lampugnani, proven to be one of the more outspoken architects of this time, already rejected the notion of political form in architecture in a controversial essay in the late 1970s. He wrote, “there is no such thing [as fascist architecture], just as there is not ‘communist art’ or ‘Catholic news’… [only possibly ever] architecture under fascism.”

What Philipp Oswalt coined the “Berliner Architekturdebatte” in the trade journal Archplus in 1994, was essentially a response to a debate about the fascist impulses in modernist and postmodernist architecture in Germany. In Berlin, architects such as Hans Stimmann, named Berlin’s Senatsbaudirektor (Secretary for Building and Housing, Berlin Senate) in 1991, sought to conserve the “traditional scale” of the city and work from existing street patterns and forms. As Rosenfeld characterizes this school of “critical reconstruction,” adherents hoped the plans would “help Berlin reestablish continuity with its historical patterns of urban development and help mend the damage to its urban fabric caused by wartime bombings and postwar modernism.”

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28 The Hansaviertel is an apartment block built in Berlin’s Tiergarten district in the late 1950s. Meant to satisfy the postwar fantasy of urban living within nature, it was criticized as promoting homogeneity and the “emergence of the detached individual.” Mathewson, “City Planning,” 36.
Stimmann, was a return to the “European urban tradition” of Milan or Paris.  

In this line of reasoning, the future of Berlin lies in its returns to a particular past, and the circumvention of the designs which did not fit into that image.

From one such interpretation of critical reconstruction, which architect Josef Kleihues and others support, came the articulation of the belief in 1993 that architecture in Berlin needs to address its own specific history. Beyond the “European” urban tradition other Western cities produced, adherents believed unity in Berlin should come out of a return to the city’s own “historic identity.”

For proponents of the “Berlin Architecture,” this specifically meant a return to “Prussian sensibility;” there was no room for GDR-style architecture in this vision.

Among the built spaces of East Berlin that would best fit this model of a return to the Prussian past would be the Stadtschloss. As I will address in a later chapter, supporters of the reconstruction of the former Prussian palace argue its image in central Berlin will complete the Gesamtkunstwerk (total work of art) of the area. In addition, Kleihues advocates the rebuilding of the Stadtschloss in a discussion with Stimmann during a scene in Hubertus Siegert’s documentary Berlin Babylon, stating “Der Ort ist einfach zu wichtig” (The location is simply too important). By linking geographic location to historical prominence, Kleihues stresses the significance of location on city planning decisions, a connection with which few would probably argue.

31 Deutschlandradio broadcast a radio commentary on Stimmann’s career as Senatsbaudirektor on the occasion of Stimmann’s retirement announcement at age sixty-five after fifteen years in the position. Broadcast March 8, 2006.
33 Rosenfeld discusses this in terms of Fritz Neumeyer and especially Jürgen Sawade. See Rosenfeld, “The Architects’ Debate,” 210.
34 Interesting political alliances have formed around this question, in that it is not only conservative Western politicians who have supported the rebuilding of the Stadtschloss and/or a return to the “ethischer Rationalismus” (ethical rationalism) of the Prussian landscape, but also left-leaning politicians as well,
Criticisms of this critical reconstruction school of thought seem inevitable, given the highly contentious return to Prussian references. While GDR architects were not especially vocal on a national level during this long debate about how to conceive of a new Berlin, Libeskind did reference the irony of following the rules in the capital of a democracy. In his rejoinder to Lampugnani, Libeskind describes a moment during a conference regarding building concerns in the former GDR:

The guidelines he [Lampugnani] suggested demanded a rigid and reactionary order—an order of seductive simplicity for overcoming complex problems. He demanded iron discipline during a time of transition. … As I sat there between the architects and planners of the former GDR and listened to him [Lampugnani] with growing unease, I felt, what surely others also felt on this day in Magdeburg—outrage over this plea for law and order: conduct yourself quietly; say goodbye to your dreams, visions, and individual creativity; follow the rules of the game, if you guys want to build something.36

In fact, this struggle between idealism and practicality in Berlin is not unique to the 1990s. As both sides of Berlin attempted to rebuild following World War II, the same tendencies emerged. To be sure, Christa Wolf’s criticisms of the Eleventh Plenary of the Central Committee of the SED in 1965 are eerily echoed in Libeskind’s words.37 In both

Gerhard Schröder among them while still in office. Thus, this issue does not necessarily fall along “conservative” and “liberal” lines. See Jürgen Sawade, “Das Berliner Büro- und Geschäftshaus,” in Neue Berlinische Architektur: Eine Debatte, ed. Annegret Burg (Berlin: Birkhäuser, 1994), 156, for the “ethical rationalism” citation.

35 Conspicuously missing from these debates are an East German take on the formulations.


37 Wolf criticized the break the decisions of the 11th Plenary made with advances gained earlier at the Bitterfeld Conference: “And as it became clear, that the relationship the artists had with the factories were headed in that direction, that they [SED officials] realistically saw what was going on, that they [artists] could establish friendships with workers with factory management, and with people of other occupations, that that they came to realize also about the economic realities in this country: there, exactly at this point, the Bitterfeld Conference and all the possibilities which it had opened for us, was rigorously cut. The upshot of the 11th plenary was, ‘we don’t want to hinder you any way, but you have to see things in the right way.’” (Und als klar wurde, daß die Verbindung der Künstler mit den Betrieben dazu führte, daß sie
cases, the parallels between the two moments of transition brought forth a match between order and originality. In the case of the 1990s, the tensions between these schools of thought played out for years following political unification throughout Berlin. Most prominent were the debates surrounding very public and visible spaces: Potsdamer Platz, the Reichstag, the American Embassy, the Holocaust Memorial, Alexanderplatz, and the Schlossplatz.

What follows in this dissertation is a specific examination of the treatment of two East Berlin landmarks after 1990, and the role their immediate visual environment played in their future. The dissertation is divided into two parts. I begin in Part One with the Soviet War Memorial in Berlin’s Treptower Park. Part Two analyzes the Schlossplatz.

Chapter One of Part One looks at the design and construction of the Soviet War Memorial in the late 1940s. I outline the intents of the designers as well as bureaucrats in building several Red Army memorials and cemeteries in Berlin. I also examine the role of the East German public in the task. In addition, I offer a close reading of the sculptural elements and images in the park, setting the stage for an analysis of how these symbols were co-opted by the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED) during the course of the GDR, the topic of the following chapter.

Chapter Two explores the reception of the Treptower Park memorial during the course of the GDR. I look at the SED’s use of ritualization and ceremonial practices to

control the tenor of the site and its ability to alter the perception of the memorial from that of a Soviet-specific construction to one which embodies the core of East German foundational mythology. To that end, I show how the memorial helped to support the GDR’s “myth of anti-fascism,” which argued that East Germans were not heirs to the Hitler legacy, but rather to the socialist revolutionaries of Karl Liebknecht and Clara Zetkin. Finally, I introduce the concept of Heimat, a German notion of home or homeland, and show how the memorial offered East Germans visual images indicative of Heimat. I argue that representations of the feminized nation, a return to the pre-modern, a doubling of nature in the memorial and its environs, and the possibility of redemption, rang authentic to East Germans, thus reinforcing the memorial’s apparent status as a legitimate GDR landmark. More critically, however, the visual recognition of Heimat, along with the history of socialist revolutionary activity at Treptower Park during the early 20th century, helped the Soviet War Memorial bridge the transition into post-Wall Berlin.

Chapter Three examines the Treptower memorial in its post-GDR life. It looks first at the initial use of the memorial in late 1989 and early 1990, and the significance of a German-Russian treaty requiring the new Germany to maintain the site. I argue that while correct to suggest that the treaty initially saved the memorial from demolition, it cannot fully explain the reason why the Soviet War Memorial has been met with relatively little attention or controversy. I believe the visual context of the site accounts for this, especially when one considers that Heimat is a concept well recognized in united Germany as well. The optic experience of the site for the post-Wall German population fits into a specific understanding of German history. Finally, I take two other Soviet War
Memorials—one in Tallinn, Estonia, and another in Vienna, Austria—as counterexamples to the memorial in Treptower Park to show differences and commonalities in how they fared after the collapse of the Soviet Union. I consider how their visual environments impacted their treatment post-1989, and how they figured into national narratives of identity and history.

Part Two explores the Schlossplatz in Berlin-Mitte, which has been home to the Berliner Stadtschloss and the Palast der Republik. The Stadtschloss, a Prussian castle built and altered over the course of hundreds of years, is the focus of Chapter Four. I analyze the decisions of eight monarchs in nearly five hundred years to change the face of the Stadtschloss to fit into various images of the center of Berlin. I look as well at the impact the famed eighteenth and nineteenth century Berlin architects Andreas Schlüter and Friedrich Schinkel had on the visual unity of the urban center of the capital. The chapter explores the intersection of politics and aesthetics in the urban landscape, and also provides a basis for considering the specter of the Stadtschloss after the SED demolished it following wartime damage.

Chapter Five begins by exploring the post-war status of the Stadtschloss as incompatible with the GDR worldview, and how this led to its ultimate destruction. I look at the voided space of the Schlossplatz over twenty years in the GDR as an instructive space (Lehre [teaching] in Leere [emptiness]), and use Simmel’s ruin theory to illustrate how meaning may be derived from urban decomposition. This will prove instructive in reading the construction and later deconstruction of the Palace of the Republic, which the SED built on the Schlossplatz as its statehouse. I analyze how the Palace figured visually into the context of the new East German capital center. In contrast to the Soviet War
Memorial of Part One, the Palace of the Republic was eventually torn down. Unlike the Berlin Wall, however, it was left to decay for some time before it was actively demolished. The question again remains, why was the Palace of the Republic not an object of immediate physical destruction in late 1989 if, as GDR statehouse, it was a symbol of oppressive power? Further, why was it ultimately destroyed years later? In looking at both of these sites, the question of visual perception comes to bear. In the conclusion to this chapter, I look at proposals for the reconstruction of the Stadtschloss on these grounds, and the implications this has for visual unification in Berlin.

In all, I examine the Soviet War Memorial in Treptower Park and the Schlossplatz of Berlin-Mitte in terms of historical returns and recuperations, along with how politicians, citizens, and planners used the spaces to reconstitute the fragments of 1989. In so doing, I argue that the politics involved in the decisions to either preserve or demolish these landmarks speak to the negotiations required in developing a new post-Wall unified German identity. As well, the visual experience of these sites informs these negotiations, as Berlin attempts to create an optic wholeness in the cityscape as it, and the country, attempts to unify itself politically, culturally, and socially.
PART ONE
THE SOVIET WAR MEMORIAL IN TREPTOWER PARK

INTRODUCTION

WHAT REMAINS

Treptower Park is a 220-acre expanse in the eponymous district of Treptow, a historically mixed residential and industrial area situated along the former southwest border of East Berlin. The park lies on the banks of the Spree River, and offers vast open space for public recreation. The Sowjetisches Ehrenmal in Treptower Park (Soviet War Memorial in Treptower Park) lies in a twenty-five-acre secluded section of the park, surrounded by a dense belt of trees. At the behest of Soviet occupying forces, German workers built the memorial following the end of World War II to honor Red Army soldiers. The site also serves as a cemetery for thousands of Soviet soldiers.

Over the course of its existence, this particular Soviet war memorial has stood as a symbol of various histories and legacies, not least because of its intended message, but, as I will argue, because of its aesthetic presentation as well. As such, the memorial is a study in the relationship between commemorative design and visual environment, as well as a study in the significance of politics in developing national identities.

The Soviet War Memorial in Treptower Park is one of many Soviet memorials and monuments built throughout Central and Eastern Europe following the end of the Second World War. Yet, where so many others were either torn down or vandalized after
the fall of the Iron Curtain, this Soviet war memorial not only remains, but has been through several stages of restoration since 1999. It perseveres as a curious remnant of a bygone culture and life. The question thus arises: Why would the Soviet War Memorial in Treptower Park survive the post-socialist transition of the 1990s, and further, why would the federal German government choose to restore it in the time since? What was the decision-making process during this period regarding the memorial’s future, and how is the memorial used and interpreted in its current form? As I will argue, the Soviet War Memorial, as East German cultural remnant, has been incorporated into a newly defined history of unified Germany.

I begin by establishing in Chapter One the origins of the Soviet War Memorial in Treptower Park. I describe the political and cultural conditions in which it was built, and to what ends the Soviet occupying forces and the monument’s designers created it. In addition, I analyze the design of the memorial grounds and the sculptural elements on the site.

I will then show in Chapter Two how the seemingly Soviet-specific memorial grounds became appropriated by the GDR as a testament to the country’s emerging master narrative of “anti-fascist resistance” and Socialist authenticity. I will not only examine the reception and exploitation of the memorial during the GDR, but will also look at the visual environment in which it resides. Because I will argue that the intervening factor in this Soviet war memorial’s post-war and post-Wall reception lies in

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38 See Katherine Verdery’s description of statues as symbols in the 1989/90 transitional period across Eastern Europe in The Political Lives of Dead Bodies (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 5-13. Consider as well Monument Park in Moscow and Statue Park in Budapest, where Communist Era statues are arranged in a cemetery-like setting.

its location—visually and literally—I will present a history of Treptower Park as it relates to the aesthetic significance of the memorial site as well as its layered history as a site of anti-fascist resistance. In addition, I will consider the German notion of Heimat and how it appears and is read by German visitors.

In Chapter Three, I will address the memorial’s re-appropriation after 1990 as an object of East German history, one to which citizens did not take a sledgehammer, nor the government a wrecking ball. Further, I will examine two other Soviet war memorials, one in Tallinn, Estonia, and another in Vienna, Austria, using them as counterexamples to the one in Treptower Park, Berlin.

In each step, I will pay particular attention to the role of the visual as well as the returns of history found in the memorial and its setting. In the end, the Soviet War Memorial in Treptower Park will stand in both contrast and complement to the case of the Schlossplatz, featured in Part Two of the dissertation.
CHAPTER ONE
THE ORIGINS AND DESIGN OF THE MEMORIAL

The Soviet War Memorial in Treptower Park was born of a desire, and of the necessity, of the Soviet Military Administration (SMAD) to bury Red Army soldiers who died in Berlin during the Second World War. Urban combat had left thousands of Russian troops dead in the streets of the city. The morose reality associated with the overwhelming number of decomposing bodies exacerbated the already pressing need for local burial. While the question of Russian interment was initially solved through provisional burial in various districts throughout Berlin, the SMAD made clear as late as the spring of 1946 that more permanent burial arrangements needed to be made for Russian soldiers fallen in the battle of Berlin.

First and foremost, the SMAD decreed, Russian military personnel and civilians were not to remain in German cemeteries; they should have their own separate burial grounds. Secondly, the SMAD did not want one centralized cemetery for all Russian soldiers. 

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40 To be sure, the bodies of Russian soldiers were not the only ones requiring burial. Correspondences in the Berlin city archives suggest the extent of all corpses unaccounted for, and left unburied. Residents wrote to authorities complaining of singular bodies still lying in backyards; the Berlin water authority cautioned the city that if bodies were not properly buried, the water supply of Berlin was certain to be compromised. See Landesarchiv Berlin, C Rep. 109, Nr. 1052. Further, as one group notes, among the Russians dead were not only Red Army soldiers and officers, but family members and civilians as well, some of whom died not only of the direct consequences of war, but of indirect ones as well, such as illness and accidents. See Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge, e.V., Sowjetische Kriegsgräberstätten in Deutschland, (Kassel 2003), 6. Quoted in Arbeitsgemeinschaft Sowjetische Gräber und Ehrenmale in Deutschland, ed. Sowjetische Gräberstätten und Ehrenmale in Ostdeutschland heute (Berlin: Wostok Verlag, 2005), 18n.
fallen, but rather insisted on several cemeteries serving particular districts. Thus, across the city of Berlin, the SMAD established a number of cemetery sites for the soldiers of the Red Army. Three of these burial locations have extensive memorial features as well.

The three main Soviet war memorials in Berlin are located in the districts of Tiergarten, Treptow, and Pankow. While each of the memorials share many substantive commonalities, the differences in their form and presentation are important for understanding their roles in the post-war and post-Wall landscape. As one might infer by the rather belated attempt of creating these official commemorative burial sites, the form of the cemeteries mattered to the SMAD as much as their function. That is, despite the fact that these Russian soldiers were already interred elsewhere in the city, the SMAD demanded their graves moved and marked in a manner suitable to honoring the deceased soldiers’ legacy. At each newly designed site, Russian leadership in East Berlin expected memorial cemetery designers to pay particular attention to the commemoration of the Red Army’s intentions, successes, and personnel losses. The SMAD thus conflated the process of burial and the practice of commemoration.

41 See, for example, correspondences from the Zentralnachweiseamt für Kriegsverluste und Kriegergräber to the Magistrat der Stadt Berlin, Hauptamt für Planung—Grünplanung on May 7, 1946 and May 13, 1946 regarding these questions. Herrn Oberstleutnant Kasakow of the SMAD-Karlshorst told the Zentralnachweiseamt that each of the Russian battalions was to be buried at various locations around the city, not in a centralized cemetery. This clarification came as a response to indications that Treptower Park was to be the site of a burial ground for the Russian soldiers already buried in Berlin. (See letter from the director of the Zentralnachweiseamt für Kriegsverluste und Kriegergräber to the Magistrat der Stadt Berlin, Hauptamt für Planung—Grünplanung on February 22, 1946). Landesarchiv Berlin, C Rep. 109, Nr. 1052.

42 Monica Black discusses the redemptive power of burial practices following the war in “Reburying and Rebuilding: Reflecting on Proper Burial in Berlin after ‘Zero Hour,’” in Between Mass Death and Individual Loss: The Place of the Dead in Twentieth-Century Germany, ed. Alon Confino, Paul Betts, and Dirk Schumann (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008), 69-90. In particular, she argues that it was a revelation for many Berliners that Russians, too, exercised a so-called Gräberkult (cult of graves), burying their dead with “flags and ‘flowers upon flowers’” (ibid., 74). Further, Black asserts that the Soviets often employed Berlin burials as a means of German atonement following the end of the war.
Tiergarten

The most prominent of the three memorials was also the first one the Russians built in Berlin. On November 11, 1945, mere months after the end of the war, Russian leaders dedicated the Soviet war memorial in Tiergarten. It contains more than 2,000 individual graves and features a six-point curved colonnade with a center column, atop which an eight-meter-high bronze Red Army soldier stands with a machine gun slung over his shoulder. Behind the colonnade lies the cemetery with two water fountains, which no longer function, but which were designed to suggest the “tears and grief of the people of the former USSR over their fallen.” Included on the pillars of the colonnade and on a sarcophagus-like structure at the front stairs of the memorial are phrases such as “Eternal glory to heroes who fell in the struggle against the German fascist invaders for the freedom and independence of the Soviet Union” as well as names of some of the dead, most notably commanding officers.

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45 The Tiergarten memorial is the only one to include English in its original form. (New signs on site which describe the building of the memorial have English translations.) The English here is due to the memorial’s location in the former British sector of Berlin.
The most distinctive feature, which sets the Tiergarten memorial apart from the Treptow and Pankow memorials, is its geo-political location. Physically located on the former Charlottenburger Chaussee (later Straße des 17. Juni), the Tiergarten memorial lies in what would become the British sector of Berlin. As a Russian monument in the Western half of Berlin, it could never develop the same political resonance with residents during divided Germany as the other two memorials; the relationship between West Berlin and the USSR was fundamentally too different from that of East Berlin and the USSR. Yet, symbolically, as architectural scholar Alan Balfour describes, the centrality of the monument’s physical location served also as a reminder of the Soviet sacrifice fighting National Socialist Germany:

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46 A better comparison here would be between the Soviet war memorial in Tiergarten and the Russian memorial in Vienna, which I will analyze in Chapter Three.
The symbolism was explicit. Within a hundred yards of the Reichstag, in a field still strewn with the detritus of war, a monolith of white marble was erected to support the figure of a Soviet soldier. It had the theatrical presence of a spike through the heart of an evil state.\(^47\)

Further, the Tiergarten memorial’s physical location on a busy thoroughfare means it lies in plain view to passers-by. Despite the fact Soviet soldiers later guarded the memorial, thus shrouding it in physical inapproachability, it was and still is visually quite apparent.\(^48\) In contrast, the Treptow and Pankow memorials are both set in wooded areas outside of the city center.\(^49\)

Linking the Tiergarten memorial’s location and political tenor is its function as a ceremonial site. Where, as I will show below, the Pankow and Treptow memorials focus heavily on the bereavement aspects of the Red Army sacrifices, the Tiergarten memorial highlights the militaristic view of sacrifice. For example, at the Pankow and Treptow memorials, statues of grieving mothers figure prominently in the site designs. Alternatively, Soviet tanks and artillery guns flank the sides of the Tiergarten memorial. The waterfalls, which as I mentioned above were meant to portray grief, are in the back of the memorial, not visible from the street. They are not focal aspects of the memorial. Where the Pankow and Treptow memorials exude grief, the Tiergarten site radiates military pride.

\textbf{Pankow}


\(^{48}\) Further, British soldiers protected the memorial as well, as when West Berlin protesters attacked the memorial after the Berlin Wall was erected, and again in 1971 when right-wing protesters shot at Soviet guards. See Dirk Verheyen, \textit{United City, Divided Memories? Cold War Legacies in Contemporary Berlin} (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2010), 82.

\(^{49}\) To be sure, the area around the Tiergarten memorial was initially a wasteland. However, its proximity to the Reichstag, Brandenburg Gate, and central Berlin in general, ensured it would be a highly visible memorial.
The Soviet war memorial located in Schönholzer Heide park in the Pankow district of northwest East Berlin was dedicated on November 7, 1949. Built after the Tiergarten and Treptow memorials, the Pankow site completed the Soviet war memorial trilogy in Berlin. Similar in topographic context to the Treptow memorial, Schönholzer Heide was once a destination for Berlin families in the nineteenth century to escape the city on day trips. Later, however, it functioned as a labor camp during the Second World War. By the end of the war, some 3,000 Russian soldiers were buried at the site. The SMAD declared the site appropriate for the re-burial of the majority of soldiers already laid to rest across the city. All told, officials moved over 10,000 bodies to the site. By the memorial’s dedication in late 1949, 13,200 officers, soldiers, and Russian women were laid to rest at the memorial in Pankow, making it the largest cemetery for Russian fallen in Berlin.

Not only is the landscape surrounding the Pankow memorial similar to the Treptow site, but the memorial design and imagery included at the site is comparable as well. A sculptural pietà of Mutter Erde (mother earth) overlooks the grounds, an emblematic departure from the armed soldier and tanks at the Tiergarten site. Further, the layout of the memorial grounds are similar to Treptow. As one enters through marble gates, the grounds open to a long corridor flanked by sixteen sarcophagi. The end point is an obelisk, in front of which Mutter Erde is located. The base atop which she stands is

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52 Knoop, “Schönholzer Heide,” 86.
etched with the words, “Not in vain was the death and the flowing blood of the Soviet soldiers. Not in vain the sorrow and tears of the grieving mothers, widows and orphans. They call to fight for the eternal peace among all people.”

![Soviet War Memorial in Berlin’s Schönholzer Heide, Pankow. Bundesarchiv, Photo 183-37912-0004. Photograph by Hans-Günter Quaschinsky, May 1956.](image)

While the somber and mournful tone of the Pankow site, along with its location within a park, is reminiscent of the Treptow memorial, significant differences are evident. First, the Pankow memorial includes Stalin quotations and sculptural images evocative of Treptow. But also included are names of thousands of soldiers and officers as well, something not on display at Treptow. This act underscores the specificity of those buried

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there. As I will argue below, the ambiguity of the Treptow memorial offers the opportunity for German viewers to see themselves as part of anti-fascist resistance story, something that is difficult to do when thousands of Russians are individually named as the fallen in Pankow.

Additionally, and more to the point, Treptower Park has a long history as an anti-fascist and pro-socialist protest site; Schönholzer Heide does not. This fact limits the nature of the Pankow memorial’s ability to recuperate this aspect of German history. The location is therefore positioned to speak differently to a German population than Treptow or Tiergarten. As I will show later, SMAD leaders chose the memorial in Treptower Park to use for official memorial ceremonies, mainly because of its legacy as a socialist gathering point. In contrast, the Pankow memorial acts simply as an urban sanctuary for commemorating Soviet war dead.

**Treptow**

Like its fellow Soviet memorials in Tiergarten and Pankow, Treptow’s memorial initially served primarily as a monument to the Soviet people, a burial ground for fallen Red Army soldiers, and as a site of ritualized memorial practices. Not only did it commemorate the Red Army’s fallen members, but the memorial sought to validate Stalin’s role in Eastern and Central Europe, not as victor, but rather as that of liberator.54

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54 The specifics of this argument will be discussed in a later section of this chapter. Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk and Stefan Wolle characterize Soviet influence in Central and Eastern Europe until the mid-1950s as being defined by an “aesthetic of victors.” *Roter Stern über Deutschland* (Berlin: Links, 2001), 231. While I wholly agree with this point, I think in the case of the Treptower memorial, its aesthetics goes beyond this sentiment.
The process of building the memorial in the early post-war period sheds light on the tensions and power negotiations between the SMAD and the nascent East Berlin and East German government. After all, the project was a Soviet one, but Germans physically built the memorials on their land. Though the SMAD, and to be sure, the SED, promoted this union of interment and commemoration in these early years of post-war Berlin, the jurisdiction and responsibility for such emerging Soviet burial and memorial grounds were not well defined. Despite the fact the SMAD developed initial project organization plans, the leadership’s roles and the project financing became increasingly muddied during the beginning design stages and later construction of the Treptower Park memorial.

Originally, Soviet Occupation Zone (SBZ) Military Governor Georgy Zhukov issued a decree in December 1945 requiring all documents and correspondences related to Berlin governance to be submitted to the SMAD. Thus, the SMAD controlled administrative leadership. Two months later, Oberstleutnant (Lieutenant colonel) Kasakov of the SMAD-Karlshorst notified East Berlin Mayor Ebert that the SMAD also expected German members of the Berlin government to submit proposals for Russian gravesite plans; that is, the SMAD expected them to participate in the planning of Soviet burial grounds.55 Only days later, and despite significant involvement by the Germans,56

55 See correspondence in Landesarchiv Berlin, C Rep. 109, Nr. 1052. A letter from Dr. Krause from the Zentralnachweiseamt für Kriegsverluste und Kriegergräber to the Oberbürgermeister der Stadt Berlin on February 6, 1946 describes requests from Kasakov including, among other things, the German side should propose plans for Russian cemeteries in Berlin. Krause suggests to the mayor that perhaps there are already some generic plans from 1922-24 available to give to Kasakov. Krause writes he is unsure, because the applicable files in his office burned down, further indicating the unstable situation in Berlin at this moment. This exchange also points to the extent that plans for the kind of memorial the SMAD had in mind were not a priority for German officials.
56 Paul Stangl suggests (according to sculptor Yevgeny Vuchetich in Horst Köpstein, Helga Köpstein, and the Arbeitsgemeinschaft “Junge Historiker” des Hauses der Jungen Pioniere Berlin-Treptow, *Das Treptower Ehrenmal. Geschichte und Gegenwart des Ehrenmals für die gefallenen sowjetischen Helden in*
the SMAD notified the director of the Baumschulenweg (Treptow district) crematorium in late February 1946 that Treptower Park would be the site for an *Ehrenfriedhof* (memorial cemetery), memorializing “russische Soldaten.” The SMAD had thus in fact not consulted with German bureaucrats during the final decision stages; the Russian leadership had simply made the decision. Further, *Oberst* (Colonel) Koschelev, the commander of Treptow, stated that soldiers currently buried in the districts of Treptow, Lichtenberg, and Köpenick would be re-buried on that site. Treptower Park had the space required to create the kind of grand-scale memorial and burial space the SMAD wanted.

At the time that the re-interment of Russian soldiers from the three districts into the site of the new burial grounds of Treptower Park began to take place in the fall of 1946, the SMAD began a two-fold approach to securing a design for the memorial at

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*Berlin* [Berlin: Staatsverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1987]) that Wilhelm Pieck had a hand in advocating for Treptower Park to be the site of the most significant war memorial in Berlin: “[he] convinced the SMAD to locate the main memorial there due to its revolutionary tradition. But the site and situation were more likely the decisive factors. . . .” Paul Stangl, “The Soviet War Memorial in Treptow, Berlin,” *Geographical Review* (April 2003): 217.


58 This aspect will be detailed below. Initially, and to be sure later as well, there seemed to be an apparent lack of specific coordination and clarity between the Russian and East Berlin leadership on the issue of soldier burial and commemoration. In fairness, these months after the capitulation of the Nazi regime were very disorganized and uncertain for all involved. But the sense of frustration and anxiety on the part of East Berlin leadership is palpable in correspondences which suggest that the SMAD is acting without consultation. Simultaneously, Ebert is clear that German leadership needs to respect Soviet control. See Landesarchiv Berlin, C Rep. 109, Nr. 1052 and Landesarchiv Berlin, C Rep. 127, Nr. 348, and Landesarchiv Berlin, C Rep. 145-09, Nr. 3. Additionally, see Norman M. Naimark, *The Russians in Germany. A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-1949* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1995) for further examples.

59 It should be noted at this point with regard to the budgetary obligations mentioned above, that the financial responsibility for the transfer of the Russian graves fell suddenly and without warning on the Berlin *Magistrat*. Initially, along with administrative control, the SMAD took control of financial obligations as well. In October 1946 the SMAD handed financial burdens for the re-burial to the city of Berlin. A letter from Magistrat Berlin, Abteilung für Arbeit, Hauptamt IV, Arbeitsrecht, Lohn- und Tarifstelle to the Magistrat Berlin, Abteilung Finanzen on October 18, 1946: “Die Bezirkskommandantur Treptow hat bisher die Lohnkosten für die deutschen Arbeitskräfte bezahlt, die die in Berlin gefallenen Rotarmisten umbetten und auf dem Ehrenfriedhof in Treptow beisetzen. (Up to this point, the district
the location. First, the SMAD held a competition, which called for a design for Treptower Park that would commemorate the Russian fallen of the Battle of Berlin. The announcement also explicitly required the proposals to address the reason behind the Red Army’s sacrifice. It read:

With the conception of this project, one should extract from the assignment the notion of developing a permanent, monumental memorial construction, which reflects the idea of a perpetually lit commemoration of the fallen Soviet soldiers and the enormity of the international liberation mission of the Soviet Army, for whose realization the soldiers gave their lives.  

As one scholarly team who studied the Soviet War Memorial has asserted, the memorial site was to be the artistic expression of the concept of Soviet liberation.

Second, while the SMAD publicly called upon Russian and German architects and sculptors to propose design ideas for Treptower Park, the SMAD was also, at least nominally, attempting to garner the opinion of perhaps the most influential architect and commandant’s office of Treptow has paid the wages for the German labor force, who are re-burying the fallen Red Army at the memorial cemetery in Treptow.)

“Die Bezirkskommandantur hat nunmehr den Leiter des Bezirksarbeitsamtes Treptow wissen lassen, dass diese Lohnkosten nicht mehr von der Roten Armee getragen werden. General Kotikow habe bereits ein Schreiben an den Oberbürgermeister der Stadt Berlin gerichtet, in dem die mit dieser Umbettung und der Unterhaltung des Friedhofes in Zusammenhang stehenden Kosten nicht über Besatzungskosten oder durch die Rote Armee getragen werden. (The district commandant’s office has notified the district employment office of Treptow, that these wages will no longer be furnished by the Red Army. General Kotikov has conveyed already to the mayor of Berlin in writing, that neither the costs of the re-burial nor the maintenance of the cemetery will no longer be covered by occupation costs nor by the Red Army.)

“Die Übernahme dieser Kosten sei eine unmittelbare Aufgabe der Stadt Berlin.” (The city of Berlin is responsible for the adoption of these costs.) Landesarchiv, C Rep 145-09, Nr. 3.

I mention this at this juncture because it became increasingly difficult for the city to pay their own employees for this work. This is significant, because coupled with other considerable burdens placed on the city with regard to the building of the Treptower Park memorial, it would seem as though the resentment and frustration with the process may embitter the later German city and state government against this memorial. Instead, as I will show, it became part of the myth of the GDR, a particularly ironic outcome given its inception.

Bei der Ausarbeitung des Projekts ist von der Aufgabe auszugehen, eine bleibende monumentale Gedenkanlage zu schaffen, die die Idee des immerwährenden lichten Gedenkens an die gefallenen sowjetischen Soldaten und die Größe der internationalen Befreiungsmission der Sowjetarmee widerspiegelt, für deren Verwirklichung die Soldaten ihr Leben hingegeben haben.” Quoted in Köpstein et al., Das Treptower Ehrenmal, 15.

Köpstein et al. write, “Es galt, den künstlerisch vollkommensten Ausdruck für diesen tiefen Inhalt zu finden” (It was necessary to find the most artistically perfect expression for this profound subject matter.) Das Treptower Ehrenmal, 15.
city planner of post-war Berlin: Hans Scharoun. The SMAD did not publicize the fact it called upon Scharoun to consult on the matter of the design of the memorial grounds, and especially the gravestones, as much as it heralded the competition (for obvious reasons, as it was the Russian winners of the competition who eventually designed the space).62 During organized site visits, members of the Russian Kommandantur (commandant’s office), who were supposed to meet Scharoun and other members of the consulting committee from the Hauptamt für Planung-Grünplanung (Department of City Landscape Planning and Design), routinely failed to appear. Scharoun and his group, in good faith, nonetheless completed plan proposals for the memorial site in October of 1946.

While in the end, one might argue that the meetings were irrelevant given the fact that the SMAD ultimately disregarded Scharoun, that he was involved at all points, I believe, to an attempt at least to engage the German expert authorities on the building of the Soviet War Memorial. The actions of East Berlin’s Kommandantur were at best haphazard in this matter, but Scharoun’s initial meeting with Major Yakovlev in early October 1946 to discuss the memorial suggests that the SMAD was in fact looking to bring a German perspective into this construction. Had the Russians simply built the memorial without any hint of collaboration with Berliners, it would have been that much harder for the SMAD to argue that the memorial had any relevance whatsoever to East Germans. That is, with the inclusion of German consultation (and later builders), it could be argued that the Germans in fact did have a stake in the memorial and in the overarching story it tells of German liberation by the Red Army.

Be this as it may, it was the design of the Russian team of architect Yakov Borissovich Belopolski and sculptor Yevgeny Viktorovich Vuchetich which was eventually selected from the forty entries to the SMAD competition. The decision was announced in May of 1947, and within months construction was underway.

Design and Intent of the Soviet War Memorial in Treptower Park: Constructing a New Post-War Narrative

The intent described in the original design competition announcement called for a memorial and monument design which would cast a “perpetually lit commemoration” on the fallen Soviet soldiers and on the “enormity of the international liberation mission” of the Red Army, for which, as the committee argued, the soldiers gave their lives. The sculptor Yevgeny Vuchetich—perhaps best known in the United States for his later “Swords into Plowshares” statue at the United Nations Plaza in New York—and the architect Yakov Belopolski both conveyed this intent in separate remarks describing their design plans. Belopolski, for example, wrote:

The Soviet soldiers, steeped in holy Soviet patriotism, gave, while contemptuous of death, the most dear thing they could for the fortune of humanity: their lives. … But as the bright spring light of victory poured over the earth on the 9th of May 1945, mothers and women, brides and children dried their tears. A sigh of relief released itself from the breast of hundreds of millions of ordinary people and

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63 The full team of designers for the Soviet War Memorial in Treptower Park, dubbed the Schöpferkollektiv (creator team), included Belopolski and Vuchetich, along with engineer Sarra Samuilovna Valerius and painter Alexander Andrejewitsch Gorpenko. Vuchetich was responsible for the sculptural elements for the sarcophagi, on which I mainly concentrate. Gorpenko’s work included the mosaic images inside the kurgan.

Regarding the transliteration of the artists’ names from the Russian, the accepted German spellings are Jakow Borissowitsch Belopolski, Jewgeni Wiktorowitsch Wutschetitsch, Sarra Samuilowna Valerius, and Alexander Andrejewitsch Gorpenko.

64 See footnote above for full original quote.
spread throughout the entire planet. Hearts were filled with enormous pride for those who won back fortune for humanity.65

It is precisely this narrative—that of liberation and hope—combined with the reverence afforded the soldier’s ultimate sacrifice, which Vuchetich and Belopolski planned to visually communicate in their design of the Soviet War Memorial of Treptower Park.

![Map of Treptower Park Soviet War Memorial grounds. Rendering by author.](image)

Before proceeding to how the East German public perceived the Soviet War Memorial in Treptower Park over the course of nearly forty years, I will first analyze the actual memorial design as it was first built. Since its dedication in 1949, there have been virtually no changes made to the memorial, with the exception of renovations necessary for maintenance and the addition of signage in the 2000s. Thus, prior to outlining the receptive changes to the memorial during this time period, I will present the key elements of the memorial design.

Unlike the Soviet War Memorial in the then British sector of Tiergarten, which is located on the busy thoroughfare of Straße des 17. Juni, the memorial in Treptow is not visible from the street. One must enter on a pedestrian walk-way from either Puschkinallee or Am Treptower Park under so-called triumphal arches, which mark the northern and southern openings of the western edges of site.

![Triumphal Arch: Entrance to Soviet War Memorial from Puschkinallee.](image)

**Fig. 4. Triumphal Arch: Entrance to Soviet War Memorial from Puschkinallee.**
*Photograph by author, August 2004.*
These punctuated points of entrance indicate the beginning of a narrative journey: into the top of each arch is carved, in Russian and German, the quotation “1945: Eternal glory for the heroes who fell for the freedom and independence of the socialist Heimat.”

Fig. 5. Text on top of triumphal arch. Photograph by author, August 2004.

There are three things about this initial framing that are germane. First, is the issue of language. Russian is printed on the left side of the arch; therefore, it is presumably the first language which one would read upon approach. Russian thus functions as the initial point of departure for the reading of the entire memorial grounds. Yet, the inclusion of the German translation on the right side of the arch indicates a clear outreach to the German visitor. This point of explicit linguistic inclusiveness speaks to a

66 “1945: Ewiger Ruhm den Helden, die für die Freiheit und Unabhängigkeit der sozialistischen Heimat gefallen sind.”
larger project of incorporating East Germans into the folds of Soviet-ness, as seen in the choice of location as one layered with a socialist revolutionary past.  

Second, is the vague usage of the term *Helden* (heroes). As I will show later in my analysis of the sarcophagi lining the main area of the memorial, the “heroes” referenced in the park are clearly Soviet; yet, in this initial contact with the memorial, there is no explicit mention of the heroes to which this monument is dedicated as being exclusively Soviet. Though one might infer this detail by the repetition of the phrase in Russian, the lack of a clear reference to the Red Army here is important.

Third, is the use of the word *Heimat*. There is no direct reference here (or elsewhere on the memorial grounds) to Germany. “Heimat” is used instead in the inclusive sense that there is a certain socialist “home” and “country,” a geographical as well as ideological space or territory for which the “heroes” fought. As well, this aspect of the memorial narrative will become increasingly important for the German visitor, as I will show in the next chapter.

The visual environment which meets the visitor is not only that of the literal narrative inscribed in text of the triumphal arch, but also that of the experiential storyline of the park itself. Crossing underneath the gateway of the arch, one is transported into a very different Berlin. One enters a history carved from nature. Vuchetich wrote of this design:

. . . Surrounded by mighty sycamores, the monument is sheltered from nearby neighborhoods. When one enters the park, one leaves the big city life behind and stands completely under the effect of the memorial.

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67 This point of inclusion will further be taken up below in terms of the narrative structure of the sarcophagi, and in the visual cues of the site.
The arches, I argue, act not only as a literal point of access to the park, where visitors leave the city to be immersed in the “effect of the memorial;” they are the markers of visual and experiential gateways to a space of myth-building. The arches are thus a framing device. The impression of the monument is that of the narrative drawn and told amongst the trees. Its encapsulation within the park reinforces its significance. Robert Musil once declared there is nothing as invisible as a monument. His reasoning was that like pictures on the wall or books on a shelf, one becomes immune to a monument’s existence as it blends with one’s own familiar landscape and the “mise-en-scene of [his] consciousness.”\textsuperscript{69} But in this case of the Soviet War Memorial, the act of entrance into the park separates the visitor from his or her familiar landscape of the city and thus distinguishes its contents as something spectacular. It is as if one is walking into a museum, or more aptly here, a cemetery and secular space of worship.

To emphasize this latter point, as one passes through the entrance corridor of the park, one initially approaches a solitary figure.

\textsuperscript{69} See Robert Musil, “Denkmale,” in Nachlass zu Lebzeiten (Zurich: Humanitas Verlag, 1936), 87-89: “... das Auffallendste an Denkmälern ist nämlich, dass man sie nicht bemerkt. Es gibt nichts auf der Welt, was so unsichtbar wäre wie Denkmäler. ... Alles Beständige büsst seine Eindruckskraft ein. Alles, was die Wände unseres Lebens bildet, sozusagen die Kulisse unseres Bewusstseins, verliert die Fähigkeit, in diesem Bewusstsein eine Rolle zu spielen. Ein lästiges dauerndes Geräusch hören wir nach einigen Stunden nicht mehr. Bilder, die wir an die Wand hängen, werden binnen wenigen Tagen von der Wand aufgesogen; es kommt äusserst selten vor, dass man sich vor sie hinstellt und sie betrachtet.” (The most conspicuous thing about monuments is that one doesn’t notice them. There is nothing in the world that would be more invisible than monuments. ... Everything constant loses its power in making an impression. Everything that creates the walls of our lives, that is the mise-en-scene of our consciousness, loses the capability to play a role in this consciousness. We no longer hear a bothersome and lasting noise after a few hours. Pictures, which we hang on the wall, become absorbed by the wall within a few days; rarely does one walk up to a picture he has hung to look at it.)
Fig. 6. Mutter Heimat at end of entrance corridor. Photograph by author, July 2008.
Seen initially in profile, the hunched outline of grief is the visitor’s first encounter with human sculptural form in the park. Upon approach, one sees more clearly “Mutter Heimat,” who clutches a burial shawl in her fist and mourns the apparent loss of a son.
The statue thus frames the central grounds in a shroud of quiet reverence. If the figure were a woman standing upright with a rifle in hand (as is an image on one of the sarcophagi, or as exists on other Soviet war memorials in Europe), one might interpret the mood of the entire memorial differently, and the site may create a more belligerently defiant sentiment than the statue of the bereaved mother allows. To be sure, though, the clearly defined bones of her fisted hand unmistakably indicate the intense emotions behind her grief. Vuchetich summarized his intent with the sculpture:

This statute should, we believe, convey the deep grief of the Soviet people in losing its best sons. At the same time, it should be a symbol of the noble goal and justification of their fight against the powers of imperialism and for the freedom of the people. . . . We were convinced, that the genuineness of the feelings this figure portrays to everyone who visits here to honor the fallen soldiers comes across especially well.  

If one then follows Mutter Heimat’s bowed head, one turns ninety degrees to enter from the northwest end of the main grounds of the memorial. One again walks through a corridor of trees to approach this central area. The main entrance is flanked by two enormous marble flags, made of materials taken from Hitler’s chancellery. Beyond the angled flags, one observes in the distance the centerpiece of the memorial: a kurgan (an eastern European burial mound) and, atop it, an imposing and unmistakable statue of a soldier.

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Fig. 9. Approach to main memorial site. Rising flags frame Soviet Soldier on kurgan in distance. Photograph by author, July 2008.

As a visitor first approaches the framing flags, he or she sees two kneeling Russian soldiers, facing each other, heads bowed.
Fig. 10. Kneeling soldier at left flag. His mirror image is a soldier at right. Photograph by author, July 2008.
Fig. 11. Bowed soldier on inside of pylon. Photograph by author, August 2004.
The somber tone of Mutter Heimat is repeated here: each soldier crouches on a bent knee, weapon at his side, and helmet on his knee. The dangers of battle are over and all that appears to remain is quiet reflection and deference. The feeling is articulated in words etched on the pylon behind each soldier in a phrase similar to the one which marked the entrance to the park. Written in Russian on the left pylon and in German on the right is carved: “Eternal glory for the fighters of the Soviet Army, who gave their lives in battle for the liberation of humanity from fascist slavery.” Here for the first time on the central memorial grounds the Red Army’s name appears explicitly. The soldier looming on top of the kurgan at the end of the memorial now becomes immediately recognizable as a Soviet soldier.

It is at this point, I would argue, that the literal narrative of the memorial grounds also begins to come into focus. It is with this quote on the pylons that one can now formatively link the “Helden” of the triumphal arch to the Red Army. As well, the mythology of the Soviet army as liberators of all “enslaved” by fascism begins to take shape within the grounds. This narrative of anti-fascist resistance, which so many have argued was a cornerstone of East German national identity, does not at this point in the memorial grounds include the East German people as a part of the resistance. Clearly, if only through the location of the memorial in Soviet occupied Germany, East Germans are assumed to be included here among the group of those freed by the Red Army, but have not yet been expressly said to be part of the anti-fascist movement. Yet, as I will show, in the narrative depicted on sixteen sarcophagi lining the central grounds, along with the

72 “Ewiger Ruhm den Kämpfern der Sowjetarmee, die ihr Leben hingegben haben im Kampf für die Befreiung der Menschheit von faschistischer Knechtschaft.”
73 See, for example, Jeffery Herf, Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997) for a comprehensive discussion on the anti-fascist mythos of the GDR.
GDR rituals performed at the site in the years following its building and the collective memories of past acts of resistance in Treptower Park, East Germans most assuredly become folded into the narrative of anti-fascist fighters.

Past the kneeling soldiers, the grounds open up to the central square of the Soviet War Memorial. As I described above, at the far end of the grounds stands the monument of the Soviet soldier atop a kurgan. The soldier, nearly forty feet tall, stands atop a nearly sixty-five and a half foot-high burial mound, making it the crowning visual—and narrative—point of the Soviet War Memorial.

Fig. 12. Soviet Soldier in distance of main memorial grounds. Photograph by author, July 2008.
Fig. 13. Soviet soldier with child. Photograph by author, July 2008.
The imagery and sheer size of the statue makes its presence inescapable throughout the main memorial site. The soldier holds a child in his left arm, who clutches his protector’s chest. The soldier’s sword—nearly half as large as he is—breaks a bronze swastika under his boot in half. The symbolism of these two additions to the soldier is significant. For example, Rudy Koshar argues in *Monuments to Traces* that the anachronistic use of the sword is a “premodern” nod to the anti-fascist resistance, placing the fight against Nazi Germany as a time-honored battle against threatening foreign occupying forces, of which the Soviet Union apparently was not to be considered one. Instead, the statue of the Soviet soldier unmistakably conjures the Red Army as protector of the vulnerable child of the socialist Heimat. As an article in the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* suggested in 1995, “both—soldier and child—[are] innocence in human form.” It is this constant reminder of benevolence and protection hovering over the visitor of the main grounds, which further frames the narrative told along the sarcophagi below the soldier’s gaze.

Below the soldier and child, sixteen sarcophagi line the open central square of the main Soviet Memorial site: eight on the north side and eight on the south. On each long side of the sarcophagi, bas-relief depictions visually narrate the Soviet liberation story. The history is told through the series of these sixteen artistic sculptures as well as through written text etched on the narrow end of each sarcophagus. The eight sarcophagi on the north side of the plaza are identical to those on the south except for the text language,

which is Russian in the case of the former and in German in the case of the latter. The text, which is actually a collection of quotes from Stalin, frames the visual narrative, the surrounding grounds, and the Soviet-German/Eastern European relationship. 

The initial images of the first sarcophagus begin the narrative by depicting an embattled, distraught, and frustrated people under attack. Everyday life is in ruin as a woman weeps amongst the rubble of her home; a man waves an angry fist to the bomber planes above.

Fig. 14. Bas-relief, sarcophagus 1. Photograph by author, August 2004.

Standing side-by-side, the German and Russian sarcophagi are identical, not mirror images of another. This means that when placed facing each other, as they are on the memorial grounds, the bas-relief images on the long sides of the sarcophagi are inverted as one moves from the start of each row on the west end of the memorial plaza to the far east end by the soldier statue. Visitors should thus approach each individual sarcophagus and read it from the left side to right side, as per Vuchetich. Therefore, in describing each bas-relief image, I use the following order: sarcophagus one is closest to the marble pylons on the west end. Bas-relief one is on the left side of the sarcophagus as the visitor is standing reading the Stalin quote; bas-relief two is on the right side.

The quotes and sources (i.e., the dates of Stalin’s speeches and order, from which these quotes were taken) are included in the Appendix.
Portrayed as non-cosmopolitan people requiring aid, the victims of fascism in this image are in apparent need of rescue by an impenetrable socialist army.\(^{77}\) As one walks around the sarcophagus to view the image on its opposite side, one is meant to pause and read the first quote on the interior end of the small monument:

> For two decades the Red Army protected the peaceful building efforts and progress of the Soviet people. Yet, in June of 1941, Hitler’s Germany broke its word and invaded our country, brutally violating the non-aggression pact. The Red Army was thus forced to move to the field in order to defend its home [Heimat].\(^{78}\)

The Soviet people are depicted visually as well as textually as being brutally and unjustifiably attacked by the Nazis, who forced the Red Army [sah sich gezwungen] to bear arms in defense of its “Heimat” and its peoples. Vuchetich and Belopolski intended the combination of visual and written text to function, in Vuchetich’s words, as “stone pages of a book” narrating the “unconquerable moral strength of the soldiers of the Soviet Army, and the entire Soviet peoples.”\(^{79}\)

The images on the next sarcophagi continue to depict scenes of bomber planes attacking women dressed as laboring peasants. The accompanying text underscores the gravity of the visual cues: “Hitler’s thugs . . . set themselves the goal of enslaving or eradicating the people of the Ukraine, Byelorussia, the Balkans, Moldova, Crimea and the

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\(^{77}\) The dress of the women in particular evoke this interpretation of the figures as “non-cosmopolitan”: their heads are covered in kerchiefs tied under the chin and each wears billowy peasant tops and ankle-length skirts. Further, one relief shows a woman carrying a sack of what appears to be potatoes over her shoulder. Industry seems to loom in the background of the second relief, but this is then superseded by later relief which depicts Soviets taking up arms in a forest.

\(^{78}\) “Zwei Jahrzehnte schützte die Rote Armee die friedliche Aufbauarbeit des Sowjetvolkes. Doch im Juni 1941 überfiel Hitlerdeutschland wortbrüchig unser Land, in dem es brutaler und niederträchtiger Weise den Nichtangriffspakt verletzte, und die Rote Armee sah sich gezwungen, ins Feld zu ziehen, um ihre Heimat zu verteidigen.”

Caucasus.” “Our goal is clear and noble. We want to liberate our Soviet soil.” Thus, not only is the mission of the Red Army to protect all its citizens, it is to liberate them as well. The intent is “noble.”

But also striking here in the list of countries and geographic areas is the omission of the (East) Germans as victims to be liberated by the Red Army. While GDR history suggests that this notion of Soviet liberation indeed became part of the East German foundational mythos, the argument of East Germans as victims and co-anti-fascist fighters is not yet developed at this moment, nor is it included here in this monument.

However, as I hope to show, the universalism of the images included in the bas-reliefs of these sarcophagi afforded later leaders the opportunity to co-opt and appropriate the visuals to support the argument that the East German populace had in fact been part of the Soviet resistance effort, and thus its version of Heimat. That is, despite the explicit absence of the word “Germany” in the Stalin quote here, the images will in later years be interpreted as nonspecific, which thus may include citizens of the GDR as well.

This idea of generality emerges in the fourth relief of the series. The first three depict urban—or at least residential—scenes of devastation, loss, and ruin. The fourth moves the narrative to the forest, where Partisanen (partisans) take up arms. Whereas the first three scenes muster mental images of urban warfare, the fourth produces a visual repetitive effect for the viewer: the trees of the image mimic those of the Treptow memorial grounds. Even as the words quoted above suggest that the explicit omission of East German soil from its Soviet counterpart (“Sowjetboden”), the visual evokes the

80 “Die Hitlerschen Schürken . . . haben es sich zum Ziel gesetzt, die Bevölkerung der Ukraine, Bjeloruslands, des Baltikums, der Moldau, der Krim und des Kaukasus zu versklaven oder auszurotten.” “Unser Ziel ist klar und edel. Wir wollen unseren Sowjetboden befreien.” The two separate quotes are included on one sarcophagus. See Appendix for dates of each.
immediate surroundings, and thus begins to draw the viewer into the narrative through mental imagery and live experience. Visual repetition here serves to further draw the viewer in through sympathetic means. Further, the narrative begins to shift after this relief from telling the story of victimization, to that of collaboration and mutual respect. Following a quotation suggesting that the success of the Red Army would have been unthinkable without the support of Soviet people, the fifth relief shows the exchange of arms between symbols of the Soviet people (worker, engineer, farmer) and the army. Vuchetich writes, “We wanted this relief to remind people of the unforgettable heroics of millions of workers, engineers, and farmers, who worked the fields and evacuated factories day and night with extraordinary enthusiasm; whose efforts inched the victory over the foe ever closer.” The sixth relief shows others giving material goods to the military cause.

This claim of ever-closer victory through civilian support is then depicted in the next five reliefs. The narrative which follows shows the efforts and actions of the Red Army. They are reverent but strong. Neither civilians nor enemies are depicted in these images; only Soviet soldiers, their weapons, and the effects of their efforts are portrayed. The mini-series opens with a row of Red Army members standing shoulder to shoulder as a soldier kneels to kiss a flag. The accompanying text implores the heroes to look to their

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81 “Die Erfolge der Roten Armee wären unmöglich gewesen ohne die Unterstützung des Volkes, ohne die aufopfernde Arbeit der Sowjetmenschen in den Betrieben, in den Bergwerken und Kohlengruben, im Verkehrswesen und in der Landwirtschaft.” (The successes of the Red Army would have been impossible without the support of the nation, without the self-sacrificing work of the Soviet people in factories, in collieries and coal mines, in transportation and in agriculture.) Here both the urban and the rural population are joined.

predecessors of revolution and draw strength from Lenin’s victories. The next image shows a defiant and seemingly endless front of a united and cohesive Red Army, rifles charged. Above the soldiers, an image of Lenin adorns a flag, as the Kremlin emerges in the foreground. In the background left, a smaller structure bookends the Kremlin. It suggests the lines of the Brandenburg Gate, a possible subliminal nod to the military line driven between Berlin and Moscow.

The images which follow depict soldiers firing missile launchers, tossing hand grenades, and crossing city bridges with rifles in tow. The rubble mourned previously by a helpless woman is now vehemently protected and further fought for by Soviet troops. The relief on the opposite side of the sixth sarcophagus shows, however, the risk of the action: a soldier glides to the ground, arms stretched like an angel in flight.

The final two sarcophagi narrate the end of war: as adamant defenders of a powerless and defenseless people, the Red Army eventually liberates the now grateful and thankful homeland. A tearfully appreciative woman first falls into the arms of a Soviet liberator. A bearded man next shakes a soldier’s hand in gratitude. Finally, the heroic war dead must be laid to rest.
These closing images—which depict the fallen soldiers covered in drapes evoking the shawl around grieving Mutter Heimat’s shoulders—justify the entire project of Soviet war memorials in Central and Eastern Europe. Given these final scenes, the viewer is reminded that such massive memorials, as the one in Treptower Park, are not oppressive mementos of Soviet occupation, but should rather be understood as a reasonable expression of gratitude to the heroes who liberated them from fascist slavery.

To be sure, such claims are reinforced by the narrative text which is etched into the ends of each of the sarcophagi. In particular, the final two quotations create the space for the inclusion of the East German people which I suggested above was missing from
the opening sequences. The first of these final quotes is directed towards commonality: “The ideology anchored in our land of equality for all races and nations, as well as the ideology of (global) friendship, led to the victory over Hitler’s fascist ideology of bestial nationalism and racial hatred.” Lastly, the memorial narrative is summed up in an ambiguous reference to homeland and a return to the arches at the entrance to the park: “Eternal fame to the heroes, who fell in the fight for freedom and independence for our homeland [unseres Heimatlandes].”

Fig. 16. Final Stalin quote, sarcophagus 8, German. Photograph by author, August 2004.

83 „Die in unserem Lande verankerte Ideologie der Gleichberechtigung aller Rassen und Nationen, die Ideologie der Völkerfreundschaft hat den vollen Sieg über die hitlerfaschistische Ideologie des bestialischen Nationalismus und Rassenhasses errungen.”
84 „Ewiger Ruhm den Helden, die in den Kämpfen für die Freiheit und Unabhängigkeit unseres Heimatlandes gefallen sind.”
What happens in the course of this visual and textual narrative is the development of a space for East Germany in the story of Soviet anti-fascist resistance and personal sacrifice. If one enters the main site of the memorial grounds and approaches the sarcophagi as if reading a book, one begins on the left-hand side of the grounds. This first sarcophagus is the beginning of the Russian text. As one then walks towards the central soldier statue on the kurgan and crosses over to the next side, the story repeats in German, starting again by the pylons. It would seem that, as a German visitor, having already familiarized oneself with the images so seemingly Soviet-centered, the introduction of the German language, accompanied by the repetition of the bas-relief images, would serve as a point of commonality and shared experience. That is, had the Stalin quotations solely been presented in the Russian language, it would be difficult to argue even in forethought that the memorial could have ever been intended to “speak” to a German audience. Thus, the inclusion of the German translations as distinct from their Russian counterparts—yet joined by shared visual experience—leaves open the opportunity for East German appropriation of the memorial.

Clearly, the location of the memorial in SMAD-administered East Berlin may suggest an inherent connection between the narrative of the memorial and the residents of this half of the city, but the fact of its existence should not, I believe, presume or even require ipso facto the later appropriation of the site by East Berliners or the East Berlin or German government. Yet, as Paul Stangl also argues in his article analyzing the Treptow

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85 Despite Russian language requirements in East German schools during the post-war period, German was clearly the national language of the GDR.
Monument, the Soviet War Memorial did in actuality become assumed by these groups as something “German.” How, and in what ways, did this occur?

There are several aspects of everyday and political life that, taken in combination, help to explain how, and to what ends, the Soviet War Memorial in Treptower Park became woven into an East German master narrative of redemption and resistance in meaningful and real ways. To be sure, the Soviet War Memorial at its inception was “Russian.” Yet, over time, the memorial began to speak to East German identity through its own narrative text, through ritualization practices, through a deliberate repetition of local history, and through its visual composition. It is these four aspects: ritual practices, narrative strategy, historical repetition, and aesthetic environment, which I will consider in the next chapter.

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86 Stangl attributes, I believe correctly, the ritualization of May 8 ceremonies in Treptower Park, along with the narrative emphasis on “humanism and liberation, rather than socialism and victory” in the memorial site, as an explanation for the possibility for East German acceptance of the site as legitimate. See Stangl, “The Soviet War Memorial,” 222, 227-8. I think, however, the case should be made for Socialism as a connective thread between the project at hand and a worldview accepted, if at least only officially, in the GDR.
CHAPTER TWO
RECEPTION IN THE GDR

Four years after the end of the war, officials dedicated the completed Soviet War Memorial in Treptower Park. On May 8, 1949, both Soviet and German leaders participated in the ceremony, viewed by a seemingly endless sea of Russian soldiers and East Berliners. General Alexander Kotikov, commandant of Berlin, reiterated the narrative of the sarcophagi text in his speech, suggesting the Red Army not only saved “our Soviet fatherland” ("unser sowjetisches Vaterland") from Hitler-Germany, but in fighting, saved the future of mankind. In further remarks, Kotikov pointed directly to the potential legacy of the memorial:

This memorial—dedicated today in Europe’s center of Berlin—will be a constant reminder to the people of the world, when, by whom, and at what cost the victory was won, to save the Socialist fatherland as well as the life of the now and future generations of humanity. This memorial in the center of Europe is a witness to the enormity and the invincible strength of the Soviet power, and of her massive liberation mission. It is a symbol of the fight of the people of the world, with the Soviet Union at the helm, for the sovereign rights of the people, for socialism and democracy, for the fight against slavery and arbitrariness and against the dark powers of the imperialist reaction and the incendiaries of a new war."

87 Alexander Kotikov: “Der treubrüchige Überfall des faschistischen Deutschlands auf unser sowjetisches Vaterland, den ersten sozialistischen Staat der Welt, stellte nicht nur für das Leben unseres Volkes, sondern auch für das der gesamten fortschrittlichen Menschheit eine tödliche Bedrohung dar.” (The disloyal attack of fascist Germany on our Soviet fatherland, the first socialist country in the world, represented, not only for the life of our people, but for all progressive humankind, a deadly threat.) Cited in Köpstein et al., Das Treptower Ehrenmal, 132. See also: Neues Deutschland, May 10, 1949, pg. 2; Berliner Zeitung, May 10, 1949, pg. 6; Tägliche Rundschau, May 10, 1949, pg. 2 for accounts of the ceremony.

88 German translation from Tägliche Rundschau, May 10, 1949, pg. 2. Cited in Köpstein et al., Das Treptower Ehrenmal, 133: “Das soeben im Zentrum Europas in Berlin eingeweihte Denkmal wird die Völker der Welt ständig daran erinnern, wann, durch wen und um welchen Preis der Sieg errungen, das sozialistische Vaterland sowie das Leben der jetzigen und der kommenden Generationen der Menschheit
How could this memorial, which according to Kotikov is testament to the “invincible strength of Soviet power,” become in any way “German” over the course of the GDR? This chapter will explore the reception of the memorial by East Germans, particularly the way in which the SED co-opted the memorial as part of its national narrative of anti-fascist resistance, through ritualized ceremonies, the history of the park, the images evocative of Heimat included on the grounds, and the overall visual context of the site.

While Kotikov clearly situates the memorial in the above passage as one specifically praising the Red Army’s accomplishments, he also leaves room, as the memorial text itself does, to bring East Germans into this story. To be sure, Kotikov defines the past Soviet initiative as an anti-fascist “liberation mission,” and suggests the struggle of the future is protecting fellow citizens from slavery and imperialist forces. In this latter goal, Kotikov implies that his East German audience is a participant in this effort, as the memorial, which is a “symbol of the fight of the people of the world. . . for

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89 Kotikov states previously in his speech, “Heute ehren wir an den uns teuren Gräbern das Andenken der ruhmreichen Söhne des großen Sowjetvolkes, das Andenken der Helden, die im Kampf für die Freiheit und Unabhängigkeit unseres Vaterlandes, für das Leben und das Glück der Werktätigen der ganzen Welt gefallen sind. . . . Wenn Hitlerdeutschland zerschlagen, die Gefahr der deutschfaschistischen Versklavung friedliebender Völker beseitigt und der Sieg errungen wurde, so nur deshalb, weil das sowjetische Volk für den Sieg Blut und Leben, Freunde und Glück seiner besten Söhne und Töchter hingegangen hat.” (Today we honor through the graves, which are dear to us, the memory of the splendid sons of the great Soviet people, the memory of the heroes, who—in battle for the freedom and independence of our fatherland, for the life and the happiness of the working people of the whole world—gave their lives. . . . If Hitler’s Germany was smashed, the danger of the enslavement of freedom-loving people by German fascists was abolished, and victory was rung, it was only because the Soviet people gave blood and life, friends and the happiness of their best sons and daughters for the victory.) In Neues Deutschland, May 10, 1949, pg. 2. Using the rather vague Helden (heroes) as partners in the fight leaves open room to later include GDR citizens in this equation.
socialism and democracy,” is located on German soil. With the Soviet Union leading the cause, this anti-fascist/anti-imperial/pro-socialism/pro-democracy resistance movement is thus to include the East Germans as well.

Following several other Russian speakers, Otto Grotewohl, then head of the SED, offered remarks. In his speech, Grotewohl accepts the monument as Kotikov and others have presented it, and further promises that Germany will adopt responsibility for its legacy, thereby providing German legitimacy for the memorial as it is dedicated.

We bow in awe at the great sacrifices that the people of the Soviet Union have made in the liberation from fascism. Even when the last Soviet soldier has left Germany, will we promise you, that we, the German anti-fascists, will not rest in the fight for democracy and peace. We will then take this memorial in our protection and will tell the next generations that they must live in peace and friendship with the people of the Soviet Union, so that the peace of the world is secure. Never would we alone have been able to restore the freedom of the German people. For that we thank the people of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Army, who, under Stalin’s leadership, freed us from fascism. The pledge of a million proletariats at this hour is: to fight for democracy, peace, and socialism.

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90 italics mine.
91 I will continue more with this theme of the anti-fascist mythology of the GDR in the next section.
92 Grotewohl was joined in attendance by representatives of other fields of East German political and cultural life, including Mayor Ebert, a member of the FDJ, the Berlin Volkspolizei, and German economic commission. See Köpstein et al., *Das Treptower Ehrenmal*, 134-36 for an account.

*Neues Deutschland* presses this point about the importance of the memorial. Following Grotewohl’s remarks, the editors write, “Damit hatte Grotewohl alles gesagt, was dieses Denkmal im Treptower Park, von sowjetischen Künstlern zu Ehren sowjetischer Soldaten errichtet, für uns Deutsche bedeutet. Es wurde nicht in einem vernichteten, zerstückelten Deutschland errichtet, sondern in einem befreiten Land, das lebt und aufbaut, das sowjetische Traktoren erhält und dessen Einheit von der siegreichen Sowjetunion anerkannt und tatkräftig gefördert wird. Es ist ein Mahnmal und kein Bomberflugplatz, eine Kulturstätte und kein strategischer Stützpunkt.” (With that, Grotewohl had said everything about what this memorial in Treptower Park, built by the Soviet artists to the honor of Soviet
Grotewohl here clearly situates himself and his fellow citizens as the “German anti-fascists” on the side of the Soviets. As I will discuss later, this assertion plays greatly into the mythos-building of the GDR as a state of dedicated anti-fascist resisters, thus exculpating East Germans of any complicity with Nazism and any need for post-war contrition. But also telling here is Grotewohl’s pledge to protect the memorial as a lasting symbol of German-Russian cooperation in the name of freedom and democracy. It suggests a governmental imperative to eventually take on the preservation of the memorial as Germany’s own.

Just a month after the initial dedication of the memorial, the mayor of East Berlin, Friedrich Ebert, wrote a letter to the city’s construction and housing authority complaining about the condition of the site. In particular, Ebert was concerned with the general upkeep and protection of the memorial grounds. Beyond the actual maintenance issue, Ebert further charged that visitors to the site were not acting with appropriate deference; some were visiting with pet dogs, others yet were riding around on bicycles. Benches, Ebert proposed, should be added to the grounds, presumably for quiet reflection. And workers should be brought in to ensure that the grounds were properly maintained and that visitors were acting respectfully.95

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“Es erscheint mir notwendig, für diese Anlage einen besonderen Gärtner und einige Frauen einzustellen, die für die Sauberkeit über darauf acht zu geben, daß die Spaziergänger nicht, wie es jetzt geschieht, mit Hunden, Fahrrädern usw. die Gedenkstätte betreten. Außerdem erscheint es mir zweckmäßig, Sitzgelegenheiten für die Besucher anzubringen.”
This letter, and the ensuing correspondences within the East Berlin government, suggests an eagerness on the part of the East Berlin leadership to control the reception and use of the space by its residents in a particular way. As well, however, it shows how some Berliners were, at least initially, using the memorial grounds: perhaps more as a park than as a cemetery or hallowed place of reflection. Treptower Park had, in fact, been a favorite place for Berliners to enjoy in leisure for years prior.\textsuperscript{96} The behavior Ebert is criticizing here is probably nothing more than what had already been established as everyday practice. It indicates that the memorial at this point had not yet become something “reverent” to East Berliners. Yet, as I will show, this perception shifted as the site became increasingly integrated into a series of official annual ceremonies over the course of the GDR period, thus demanding a different code of behavior from ordinary visitors to the memorial.

Mere months after the dedication of the Soviet War Memorial, the Soviet military commander of Treptow transferred full responsibility of the memorial grounds to the Berlin district of Treptow on September 2, 1949.\textsuperscript{97} This act of transfer was a subtle turning point in the dynamics of the memorial’s oversight. Where previously the SMAD arguably swayed German use of the grounds in both overt and more discreet ways, once

\textsuperscript{96}See, for example, Regina Richter, Frauke Rother, and Anke Scharnhorst, \textit{Hier können Familien Kaffee kochen! Treptow im Wandel der Geschichte}. (Berlin: be.bra Verlag, 1996).

\textsuperscript{97}The reality is that the city was responsible for much of the building costs and coordination of the Soviet War Memorial, even though it was officially a SMAD project. The confusion and financial scrambling to pay German workers, for example, during the building is documented in the \textit{Landesarchiv Berlin}. See specifically C Rep 145-09, Nr. 3 \textit{Stadtbezirksversammlung und Rat des Stadtbezirks Treptow: Bauwesen "Ehrenmal Treptow: 1946-1949."}
the East Berlin city government was in total control of the space, a fine, but important shift in its appropriation becomes evident.98

Although German leadership—along with German workers and artists—was involved in the building and planning of the memorial site, the orders and final decisions regarding the space clearly came from the SMAD. While the Magistrat of Gross-Berlin was perhaps eager to assist in the memorial’s creation, it realistically had little choice but to do so. Once the full administrative and financial responsibility for the site was officially transferred to the Magistrat of Gross-Berlin, East Germans also assumed the task of determining how to use and approach the space as something “German.”99

One way in which this was accomplished was through the ritualization of the space over the course of the GDR. The dedication ceremony of the memorial in May 1949 was a clear overture to Soviet moral ascendancy. But as Ebert’s concerns indicate, the dedication ceremony and the memorial itself perhaps did not resonate with East Berlin residents as planners had intended. Furthermore, the German Democratic Republic state was founded as an independent state in the fall of that year. It would perhaps logically follow, that with this formal political separation from the Soviet Union, the war memorial would have even less resonance with East German leadership and visitors. Yet, as history shows, the GDR’s founding did not sever the country’s ties with the USSR, nor did it preclude the GDR from beginning to use the Soviet War Memorial for its own purposes. In fact, on the anniversary of the founding of the GDR each October 7, East

99 This idea will be more fully explored below in the sections on narrative mythologies and historical repetition.
German officials held wreath-laying ceremonies at the Soviet War Memorial in Treptower Park. This tradition, I believe, was not an act to placate the Russians, but rather a means of establishing a national narrative of origin.100

To take the GDR’s own constitution as an example of this transformation in the relationship between the state and the USSR, in the original constitution the GDR adopted in 1949, there is no mention of the Soviet Union or of socialist tradition. The opening article of the constitution reads: “Germany is an indivisible democratic republic; it is based upon the German states.”101 Yet, subsequent rewritings of the document in 1968 and 1974 modified this and other articles to more accurately represent the political situation of the time. This opening statement, for example, became “The German Democratic Republic is a socialist state of the German nation. It is the political organization of the urban and rural workers, who together under the leadership of the working class and its Marxist-Leninist Party brings socialism to fruition.”102 This emphasis on the political view of the GDR as a Marxist-Leninist state of industrial and agricultural workers is followed in the later two versions of the constitution with the declaration that the country looks to the East for its friendships.

The 1968 version of the GDR constitution states in article six, paragraph two: “The [GDR] nurtures and develops the principles of socialist internationalism as

100 See also Alan L. Nothnagle’s descriptions of various exhibits of “pageantry” at the Treptow Memorial, which supported GDR foundational mythologies of East Germany as a co-victor in the war. Nothnagle, *Building the East Germany Myth: Historical Mythology and Youth Propaganda in the German Democratic Republic, 1945-1989* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 166-167.
101 (Deutschland ist eine unteilbare demokratische Republik; sie baut sich auf den deutschen Ländern auf.) *Die Verfassung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik* (Berlin: Kongreß-Verlag, 1951), 7.
appropriate for the comprehensive cooperation and friendship with the [USSR] and other socialist states.”\textsuperscript{103} This explicit mention of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries shows the clear alignment the GDR state claimed by the late 1960s. By 1974, the relationship was even more resolute. The last version of the constitution altered this paragraph to state: “The [GDR] is forever and irrevocably tied to the [USSR]. The close and brotherly relationship with it guarantees the people of the [GDR] the further advancement on the path of socialism and freedom. The [GDR] is an indivisible constituent of the socialist state community. . .”\textsuperscript{104}

In the following sections, I will show how the GDR and East Berlin co-opted the Treptow memorial as an object not only compatible with the emerging SED world view seen in the twice-modified GDR constitution, but also supportive of the country’s claims of an anti-fascist tradition. First, I will examine how the act of ritualization at the memorial legitimized the notion of East Germans as Hitler resisters. Second, I will show how the recuperation of Treptower Park’s past further buttressed the “myth of resistance.” Finally, I will examine the visual context and effect of the memorial, arguing that optic components of the site educe notions of Heimat, eliciting a sense of familiarity across the threshold of 1990.

Ritualizing the Memorial Space

\textsuperscript{103} (Die [DDR] pflegt und entwickelt entsprechend den Prinzipien des sozialistischen Internationalismus die allseitige Zusammenarbeit und Freundschaft mit der [UdSSR] und den anderen sozialistischen Staaten.) Ibid.

No memorial may claim meaningful significance in a society which does not know of its existence. The designers of the Soviet War Memorial in Treptower Park certainly had visitors in mind, but unless East Germans utilized the space, it would have no resonance in the national consciousness. To be sure, images from the memorial seeped into GDR society. From postage stamps featuring the soldier on the kurgan or Mutter Heimat issued in 1955 and 1970, respectively, to the ten Mark commemorative coin of the Treptow solider minted in 1985 on the “Fortieth anniversary of the victory over Hitler-Fascism and the liberation of the German people from fascism,” the Treptow memorial did indeed become part of the GDR consciousness.

I will discuss below the visual and artistic conditions which allowed the memorial to speak to the East German and East Berlin population, but I will first reconcile the question of how German visitors came to the location at all. The promotion of the space as a site for political and social ceremonies explains this participation. My argument here is that the process of active participation and commemoration ceremonies (i.e., not just passive observance), allowed for East Berliners to use the space as their own. National anniversary celebrations and youth organization ceremonies were in fact ritualized events on the memorial grounds.

Often, the concept of ritualization is laced with religious undertones, a concept which I find unhelpful in this discussion. Instead, I propose to approach ritual here as “secular,” a method Sally Falk Moore and Barbara Myerhoff use in their edited volume aptly titled, Secular Ritual. After all, as Moore and Myerhoff write in their introduction

105 (40. Jahrestag des Sieges über den Hitlerfaschismus und der Befreiung des deutschen Volkes vom Faschismus.)
106 See for example, Catherine M. Bell’s Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). To consider military anniversary ceremonies as “religious” practice is not an exercise I wish to pursue here.
to the book, “Unquestionable tenets exist in secular political ideologies which are as sacred in that sense as the tenets of any religion. Secular ceremonies can present unquestionable doctrines and can dramatize social/moral imperatives without invoking the spirits at all.” Moore and Myerhoff further argue, “Ritual may do much more than mirror existing social arrangements and existing modes of thought. It can act to reorganize them or even help to create them.”

Without question, the initial dedication ceremony at the Treptow memorial sought to control the reception of the memorial, privileging Soviet socialism as a means to freedom in a way that the GDR constitution emerging at that moment did not. The formality of Kotikov and Grotewohl’s speeches (among others), contextualized visually by presence of uniformed soldiers and officers, and the laying of wreaths and flowers at the site, “mirrored” the burgeoning GDR-USSR relationship, as it also confirmed East Germany’s stance vis-à-vis socialism, anti-fascism, and the Soviet liberation story. Subsequent ceremonies over the years mimicked the highly formalized dedication service, seeking to discredit the use of the park for leisure activities (as Ebert had also sought to do), and instead promote the space as a legitimate site of GDR national tradition.

Initially, the East German events at the memorial were strictly political and militaristic in nature. GDR officials hosted politicized liberation ceremonies on May 8 and Soviet Army Day commemorations on February 23 each year, and operated them with reverent fanfare. The programs often included wreath-laying services, and were

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almost always accompanied by soldiers ceremonially toting weapons. But with progressive years, the ceremony participants became more diverse, as the GDR began to develop more social organizations and foreign relations as a sovereign nation. In August of 1951, for example, in celebration of the Third (Annual) World Festival of Youth and Students in Berlin, young members of the Freie Deutsche Jugend (FDJ) gathered to participate in a wreath-laying ceremony with international guests. Furthermore, delegations and dignitaries from foreign countries often honored the site during official visits to the GDR.

Over the course of a few short years, the Soviet War Memorial in Treptower Park transformed from a specifically Soviet-branded landmark into one with international appeal, which became part of a GDR and East Berlin identity. Certainly, its use during the World Festival of Youth and Students and Soviet-themed anniversary ceremonies may be explained by the Soviet-centric political realities of the “Ostblock.” But political pressures do not fully account for how or why the Treptow memorial became part of personal milestones in the GDR either, as when young couples visited the memorial site after getting married. Nor do political pressures completely provide a reason for the use of the memorial grounds as a GDR protest site, as I will show below.

Further, the fact that the Soviet War Memorial became part of East Berlin and GDR identities does not

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109 The USSR granted the GDR official sovereignty in March 1954.
110 When the World Festival (Weltfestspiele) were held in East Berlin again in 1973, the program once more included an elaborate ceremony at Soviet War Memorial.
111 See, for example, July 12, 1957 when delegations from Czechoslovakia, China, North Korea and Vietnam gathered at the memorial.
112 In terms of East German political ceremonies held at the Soviet War Memorial, annual May 1 and anti-fascist protests were often held at the Memorial. Also, newlyweds would often visit the site to lay flowers on the kurgan (as pictured in Köpstein et al., Das Treptower Ehrenmal, 154). Anecdotally, Ukrainian scholar Oleksandr Bilous, shared with me that he and his wife laid flowers at Treptower Park on their wedding day. Carol-Anne Costabile-Heming described to me a visit as an American student being brought to the Soviet War Memorial as part of an official Western student tour.
explain why it would then not become a target of the post-1989 wrecking ball, as other GDR landmarks, such as the Palace of the Republic and the Berlin Wall did. Surely, nostalgia is not a factor in the equation of post-socialist political calculation, as even the pleas to save the Palace of the Republic as a remnant of the past and opportunity for the future went unheeded.113

In the case of the Soviet War Memorial during the course of the GDR, it was the confluence of repeated ceremonies and historical references, the adoption of an East German “myth of resistance,” as well as the visual characteristics of the site changed the tenor of the site from a Soviet-specific memorial in the early post-war years to one which included a longer historical referent to a particular official East German identity schema. Further, as I will show below, these factors differentiate this Soviet War Memorial from other “East German” sites such as the Palace of the Republic as well as from other Soviet war memorials, such as the Pankow memorial or the Heldendenkmal der Roten Armee (Red Army Monument) on Schwarzenbergplatz in Vienna.

Memorial as Text: Writing a National Master Narrative

If the ritualization practices and ceremonious activities indeed provided an increasingly active and participatory aspect to the Soviet War Memorial in Treptower Park during the course of the GDR, one wonders in what ways the site resonated as something “authentic” to the citizens of East Germany and the residents of East Berlin.

113 To be sure, one factor here in terms of ritualization, which cannot be overlooked is the fact that the Soviet War Memorial is a burial ground. This adds a further dimension to its attributes. See the collection Alon Confino, Paul Betts, and Dirk Schumann, eds. Between Mass Death and Individual Loss: The Place of the Dead in Twentieth-Century Germany (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008) for an analysis of post-war burial practices in Berlin.
To be sure, Treptower Park was not the only location in the capital city which afforded space for rallies and ceremonies. Marx-Engels Platz, Stalinallee, and Alexanderplatz, but to name a few, were other sites of significant mass gatherings and ritualized practice.

Certainly, as discussed above, the fact that the Soviet War Memorial was a burial site lent itself to a tone of reverence and respect. But what I would argue led these Soviet deaths to resonate in the everyday life of East German people in part was the narrative structure of the site and its link to German history. That is, the narrative properties of the site itself—through the entrance arches, Mutter Heimat, and the storyline of the sarcophagi—created a point of reference for East German visitors. I will focus here on the monument itself as text, as opposed to its visual environment, which I will discuss below.

As many scholars have argued, official GDR history became dominated in its foundational years with the “myth of resistance.” In essence, the myth eradicated German culpability for Hitler’s crimes by insisting the true socialist cause was incompatible with his politics and actions. Instead, the Soviet Socialists of the GDR were

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114 See Silke Satjukow, *Besatzer: “Die Russen” in Deutschland 1945-1994* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck / Ruprecht, 2008) for such an overview, especially pages 64-67. David Bathrick takes up the question of anti-fascist myth-building vis-à-vis East German literary intellectuals in *The Powers of Speech: The Politics of Culture in the GDR* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995). In the introduction to his book, Bathrick argues, for example, that especially during the early years of East Germany, “...the GDR state [was coupled] with ‘objective’ antifascism as a way of guaranteeing a collective moral atonement. ... [O]fficial antifascism, defined in Marxist terms socioeconomically and associated politically with the victims of communist resistance, became an important social imaginary for the absolution of guilt—the separation from the ‘bad fathers’—for many living in the GDR” (Bathrick, *Powers of Speech*, 12). See also the New German Critique’s special issue on antifascism, particularly Anson Rabinbach’s introduction on the “Legacies of Antifascism,” *New German Critique*, Winter, No. 67 (1996): 3-17 and Dan Diner’s article, “On the Ideology of Antifascism,” *New German Critique*, no. 67 (Winter 1996): 123-32. In the latter, Diner argues that “[t]he GDR’s official antifascism . . . linked together two central elements: first, a steadfast loyalty sworn to the Soviet Union that continued to feed upon the postwar bonus of the Soviet victory over fascism; secondly, the material preconditions, anchored in social politics, to prevent all that was deemed to be a prerequisite of fascist rule, notably ‘imperialism,’ ‘militarism,’ and ‘revanchism’ (Diner, “Ideology of Antifascism,” 127). Further, Antonia Grunenberg, *Antifaschismus—ein deutscher Mythos* (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1993) is also particularly instructive here in contextualizing the development of East German anti-fascism.
the heirs apparent to the legacies of Liebknecht and Luxemburg, not Goebbels and Himmler. It allowed for a counter-point to West Germany, which was argued to be the continuation of the latter. Rudy Koshar argues this point thusly in *From Monuments to Traces:*

Rooted in the experiences of German Communist leaders in the Weimar Republic and in exile during the war, anti-fascism was an ethical category resting on two premises. First, it was based on the acceptance of the Soviet Union’s historical role as the victor over imperialism, capitalism, and fascism and as the model of a new society inspired by the goal of universal freedom. Second, it depended on the building and maintenance of an antifascist political coalition derived from the struggle against Nazism but guaranteed in the daily policies of the GDR. . . . Anti-Hitler resistance was carried over into the postwar era as a fundament of the new state’s political culture.\(^{115}\)

The first of Koshar’s two points is delineated in the Stalin quotations and in the bas-relief images on the sarcophagi. As I described in the previous chapter, the images and text of the site’s sarcophagi detail the Soviets’ role in modern history as provoked combatant, humanitarian defender, and eventual liberator.

The Stalin quotations contextualize the bas-relief images, and while they explicitly name areas of the Soviet territory—such as, the Ukraine, Moldova, and the Caucasus—as areas liberated by the Red Army from Hitler, Germany is not explicitly included. However, the monument’s location on German land suggests this inclusion. In addition, the quotation “We want to liberate our Soviet soil” on the second sarcophagus, links the GDR to the Soviet tradition. The fact that the Stalin quotations were translated into German allowed the German public access to the storyline unfolding.

Further, the images of the sarcophagi allowed space for the inclusion of the liberated as supporters in attaining this Soviet goal of victory over fascism and

capitalism. The story line produced on the sarcophagi depicts certain Soviet and Russian symbols, like Lenin, which indeed were co-opted by the GDR. Additionally, the images of laborers working in the fields, for example, resonated with emerging mythologies associated with the Marxist socialist state. All Soviet peoples—including the population in the SBZ and the eventual citizens of the GDR, I argue—were included in this “myth of resistance.”

This notion of East Germans as heirs to the anti-fascist resistance legacy of the Soviets leads into Koshar’s second premise: that such a “myth of resistance” must be relevant in an everyday political sense in the GDR in order for it to succeed. Taking a broad sweep look across the political spectrum of the GDR—from official speeches to classroom textbooks—it is clear that the notion of state policy perpetuating the belief of East Germans as anti-fascist resisters became ingrained in the collective consciousness of the country.116 As part of this agenda, German officials utilized the Soviet War Memorial in laying claim to the foundational story of the GDR by broadening the scope of memorial’s prescribed meaning. That is, the memorial was not only used for Soviet-specific commemorations, but later, as I showed above, for German ones as well.

1911, 1918...1947: Treptow as Socialist Gathering Point

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If, as Koshar argues above, the East German “myth of resistance” found its origins in the German Communists of Weimar, then it would appear that Treptow served as an incipient site for pro-communist and socialist activity in Berlin. Years before the first post-war stone commemorating the Soviet Red Army was laid at its current location in Treptow, the site served as a massive gathering point for Berlin Socialists. In the early years of the twentieth century, Berliners gathered in Treptow to demonstrate for work, food, and justice. Further, Treptower Park became a locus of anti-war protests, led by the SPD and the *Spartakusbund* (Spartacus League). In September 1911, for example, Karl Liebknecht famously spoke to 200,000 Berliners in Treptower Park, calling for peace in Europe and the unity of international workers. In following years, massive anti-war demonstrations by the Communist Party’s paramilitary arm, the *Roter Frontkämpferbund* (RFB) as well as international Solidarity Day demonstrations, among others, occurred in the park. From the turn of the century to 1930, Treptower Park was synonymous with influential Leftist politics.

This tradition was not lost on builders of the Soviet War Memorial. Vuchetich recalled years later choosing Treptow as the location for the main memorial site:

Treptower Park is a beloved place for Berliner to get away. The workers of the city associate the park with great memories of May Day celebrations, the fiery revolutionary speeches of Karl Liebknecht, Clara Zetkin and Ernst Thälmann. As we drove through the city with General Kotikov, the then Soviet City Commander of Berlin, searching for the right location for our memorial, Wilhelm Pieck described to us the revolutionary history of Treptower Park. He encouraged us to build the memorial on this site.

118 See Köpstein et al., *Das Treptower Ehrenmal*, 22-27.
To be sure, Belopolski and Vuchetich were not the first to mark Treptower Park with the narrative of Soviet liberation and sacrifice. In May 1946, on the occasion of the first post-war international worker’s day, the German trade union federation, Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (FDGB) of Gross-Berlin held a small ceremony, where it dedicated a memorial stone inscribed with words of appreciation for the Russian army. Set under the trees of Treptower Park, yards from where Belopolski and Vuchetich’s monumental grounds would be laid, the small cube tombstone states on one side:

Immortal victims, brought for us, that freed us, from the fascist night. Victims who taught us all an admonishing lesson—eternal fame to you and eternal honor!  

It is signed on another side: “From the productive people of Berlin to the immortal heroes of the Red Army. May 1, 1946.”

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Erinnerungen an Feiern des 1. Mai, an die flammenden revolutionären Reden Karl Liebknechts, Clara Zetkins und Ernst Thälmanns.

120 “Unsterbliche Opfer, die für uns gebracht, die uns befreit, aus faschistischer Nacht. Opfer uns allen zur mahnenden Lehre—ewiger Ruhm euch und ewige Ehre!”

121 “Das schaffende Volk Berlins den unsterblichen Helden der Roten Armee am 1. Mai 1946.”
Fig. 17. Front view of FDGB memorial stone. The sarcophagi of the main memorial site are seen behind trees. Photograph by author, July 2008.

Fig. 18 Side view of FDGB memorial stone. Photograph by author, July 2008.
The significance of this stone, I would argue, is its political and moral alignment with the Russians months after the war had ended. This was not a simple pacifying statement uttered in the immediate aftermath, but rather a statement carved in stone by a particular group (namely union workers) to align themselves with the newly developing narrative of Russian liberation and anti-fascism within the context of a class-symbolic occasion (i.e., May Day). This latter emphasis, namely the legacy of class-based revolutionary activity and leftist protest history of Treptower Park, is a significant record. The explicit connection between the intent of the memorial and the history of its location is of critical importance for understanding how this Soviet War Memorial could become personally relevant for East Germans. The return of a past tradition of Socialist-Communist pursuits and ideals dovetailed on this site with the emerging “myth of (anti-fascist) resistance.” To this end, the memorial site could be thus justified as something “German.”

As I argued above, the vague visual and textual references to anti-fascist resisters on the sarcophagi of the memorial site left open the possibility that East Germans could become part of the liberation story depicted in the bas-reliefs. With the adoption of cultural and political currency of “East Germans as anti-fascist resisters” following the founding of the GDR, as well as the relatively recent collective memory of Treptow as

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\[122\] To be sure, the SMAD employed more forceful tactics as well to make this point, but if any argument of cultural resonance and acceptance was to be successful, the Russians would have to convince the East Germans of their commonalities. The SMAD had to override memories of the brutal attacks by the Red Army during its march into Berlin in order to gain legitimacy as a “friendly” occupier among the East German public. See Naimark, *Russians in Germany*, 129-30 and 132-140 for attempts at such re-framing by the SMAD and SED, as well and the journal account Anonymous, *A Woman in Berlin: Eight Weeks in the Conquered City* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2005) for particularly blunt accounts of mass rapes and pillaging during the spring and summer of 1945. See also Naimark *Russians in Germany* and Pike, *Politics of Culture*, for an examination of the problem of moral legitimacy in SBZ governance. In terms of contextualizing this issue within the question of post-Wall memorialization of the victims of dictatorship in the SBZ and DDR: Jörg Morre, “Sowjetische Speziallager in Deutschland,” in *Orte des Erinnerns: Gedenkzeichen, Gedenkstätten und Museen zur Diktatur in SBZ und DDR*, ed. Anne Kaminsky (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2007), 512-516.
location for Socialist/Communist protest, the idea of East Germans as having been part of the visual narrative of Mutter Heimat and the sarcophagi seems entirely plausible. Thus, the return of grand-scale revolutionary assemblies and (now Soviet-) Socialist/Communist practices at the site drew a line of continuity between the positive intentions of Weimar and the possibility of success for the future of East Germany.\(^{123}\)

With its tradition of socialist grass-roots protest, the Soviet War Memorial of Treptow distinguished itself from other Soviet war memorials in Berlin. In much the same way that the architecture of the Stadtschloss, as I will later show, evoked a continuity of German development, and its open square allowed for political expression, so too did the Soviet War Memorial’s location in Treptow draw upon a particular history as repetition and return, an action which helped secure its place in an East German collective consciousness as something “German.” The Soviet war memorials in Tiergarten and in the Pankow district’s Schönholzer Heide park lack this historical tradition.\(^{124}\) Therefore, the argument for contemporary relevance is hard to make at these sites.\(^{125}\)

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\(^{123}\) Jeffrey Herf argues this point in speaking generally about the allusions to Weimar (and specifically the failures of the Social Democrats) made by Ulbricht in the mid-1940s to the 1950s. See Herf, *Divided Memory*, 33-35.

\(^{124}\) Schönholzer Heide in fact was the site of a *Zwangsarbeiterlager* (forced labor camp) during WWII, quite the tradition from which the new SED leadership would shy away.

\(^{125}\) In the same ways, contentious Red Army Monument in Vienna and the Bronze Army monument in Tallinn, Estonia, lack any historical—or otherwise relevant—link between Austrian or Estonians traditions and their World War II experience. As I hope to show in the following chapter, this deficiency, along with their visual contextualization within the cities of Vienna and Tallinn, helps to explain why they have each required police protection, whereas the Soviet War Memorial in Treptow was afforded an extensive renovation in recent years with relatively little controversy. To be sure, the *Heldendenkmal der Roten Armee* at Schwarzenbergplatz in Vienna could arguably also cite historical importance linked to its location, or at least its namesake. The Russian politician (and later foreign minister) Dmitri Shepilov apparently chose the site for the monument because of Austrian General Karl Philipp Fürst zu Schwarzenberg’s support of Russia during its war against Napoleon. But while the historical connection of the site and its forbearer may indeed have provided a pretense for resonance with Austrians and Viennese, the context of the relationship between the two countries hardly had the same bond that the GDR and USSR had throughout the latter part of the 20th century.
Visualizing *Heimat*

While the contextual and textual conditions of the Soviet War Memorial certainly help to explain how the GDR appropriated it to represent an authentic socialist legacy and anti-fascist narrative in East Germany, it does not fully account for how the memorial could make the transition into the post-1990 political landscape with minimal controversy. Unified Germany makes no claims to universal resistance to fascism under Hitler in the ways the GDR did, nor does it herald itself as the champion of Marxist-Leninist socialism. What thread could then connect the GDR to unified Germany in this case?

In the last chapter and above sections, I have argued that the Soviet War Memorial in Treptower Park consists of several factors which elucidate how it was received and utilized during the GDR period: first, the intent of the memorial’s designers was to construct a burial site which commemorated not only the Red Army’s war dead in the anti-fascist fight, but also the historical tradition of the Soviets’ efforts in support of its people’s liberation from fascism. This suggestion of ideological martyrdom, coupled with its function as a burial site, promises a particular level of reverence for the memorial grounds; it is thus not simply a Soviet war monument, but is rather understood as a Soviet memorial.

Second, this impression of ideological reverence was underscored by highly ritualized memorial and political ceremonies through the course of many years. What

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126 Although the Spartakusbund legacy of Treptower Park is certainly relevant for leftist politics in unified Germany.
began as specifically Soviet ceremonies developed into more general occasions to celebrate the Socialist cause. These events—from official state visits to Weltfestspiele parades—framed the memorial site within an inclusive context of Socialist brother- and sisterhood. Consequently, the site began to resonate with the East German population as something connected to both their own political autonomy and alliances.

Third, this connection between the Socialist anti-fascist cause and East Germany was further reinforced by the location’s past as a Socialist protest site. The park’s legacy as host to Karl Liebknecht and mass Berlin protesters provided an organic legitimacy of sorts for the political ventures of the site. It also helps reconcile the narrative texts of the monument as fitting into a broader case for the East German myth of “anti-fascist resistance.” But a further, fourth aspect must be considered at this point in an effort to explain how the memorial further not only resonated with East Berliners, but managed to speak to a later unified population as well. It is the memorial’s visual context, which added to claims East German officials made regarding its legitimacy as a memorial relevant to the GDR. Its visual environment may also help to explain how the Treptow memorial has been re-appropriated in the post-1990 landscape as a GDR-era landmark worth preserving, while others in Berlin, such as the Palace of the Republic, have been torn down.

If, as I will argue in Part Two, the Palace of the Republic failed to fit into a visual Gesamtkunstwerk of the urban center, the Soviet Memorial in Treptower Park is afforded the distinction of being the Palace’s visual opposite. That is, where the Schlossplatz

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127 Not only did the memorial “survive” the political transformations of 1990 unscathed, but it received a thorough renovation without large-scale protest. As I will discuss later, the determining factor for renovation is the German-Russian treaty binding each country to maintain the other’s war burial grounds. This does not, however, in itself explain the extent to which the Treptower Memorial was renovated in the early 2000s, nor the fact that the renovations met little controversy.
occupies the urban center, the Soviet Memorial lies in a distinctive nature setting, framed by an entry footpath which creates a threshold of differentiation. My argument regarding the visual experience of Treptower Park is thus two-fold: first, the park setting of the memorial envelops its visitor in a sense of “naturalness.” That is, visitors may perceive the memorial grounds as something other than distinctly manmade or contrived. It suggests a link to a German Heimat, reinforcing the images of home and pedigree carved into the memorial’s sarcophagi. Second, the memorial design layout provides a break with the “outside.” That is, the separation from the city of Berlin creates an aura of distinction from reality, which is particularly germane in the post-1990 era.

The concept of Heimat is a critical one to German notions of identity and history, with a particular focus on locality and geography. A one-word English translation for Heimat is nearly impossible, but it is closely tied to “home” and “homeland.” Most often associated with romanticized nostalgia for home in small-town Southern Germany, or at least in the post-war era in West Germany, Heimat has been largely overlooked as a cultural phenomenon in the GDR. It has been generally accepted that the regionalism and localism associated with Heimat was incompatible with the increased centralized

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nature of the GDR state. Jan Palmowski has argued to the contrary that, in fact, the idea of Heimat showed itself to be well-matched in East Germany, especially after 1955, with a defense of the GDR Socialist fatherland. As one example of such a manifestation, Palmowski points to May Day and October 7 celebrations:

By 1959, Walter Ulbricht defined the central cultural aim for the next seven years as the formation of the “socialist person” in town and countryside. . . . The creation of a socialist Heimat, therefore, was inevitably linked to its realization and reflection in new types of Heimat festivals that were truly socialist. Perhaps the purest representation of the socialist Heimat occurred at public holidays, notably 1 May and 7 October (the republic’s “birthday”). Throughout the country, on these days the wider Heimat, the GDR, was celebrated in the mornings through political demonstrations, while in the afternoon the population was rewarded by celebrations of the narrow Heimat, through folklore, local foods, and beer.

While officials and the members of the Berlin community certainly commemorated public holidays at the Treptow memorial, local folk music and beer drinking were not activities one normally experienced at the memorial. However, I would argue that the aesthetic and optic experience of the memorial did offer a space for Palmowski’s “wider” Heimat to emerge, along with reinforcing the “narrow” version. On the one hand, GDR leaders used the Soviet War Memorial to portray a particular state identity through various ceremonial observances; on the other hand, the imagery of the memorial and its visual context offered a means of reaffirming an identity for the nation, the broader understanding of home. In addition, the overlapping optic cues of the memorial and its setting justified the memorial’s place in Treptow’s history by suggesting the local Heimat.

129 See Palmowski, “East German Nation,” 368. Palmowski takes this assumption as the basis for his counter-argument that in fact this did not preclude Heimat traditions from maintaining root in the GDR.
130 Palmowski, “East German Nation,” 380.
131 Palmowski, “East German Nation,” 388.
In this following section, I will look at four recognizable features of Heimat which appear at the Soviet War Memorial: the feminized nation, nature, the pre-modern, and the possibility of redemption. Each are acutely present and understandable to a German audience as such. As I will show, these optic imprints not only figured into East German narratives of Heimat, but carry on after the end of the GDR.

**Feminized Heimat / Feminized Nation**

One of the problems the GDR faced in developing a sense of national identity was distinguishing itself from the BRD in cultural terms. Politically speaking, the countries diverged fundamentally along ideological lines, but the actual lines of geographic divisions were artificial, a creation of Allied and Soviet negotiations. That is, the GDR easily defined its status as a “state,” but had more difficulty creating a “nation.” Even though the GDR as a state faced legitimacy issues, such as the non-recognition of the country by West Germany, the greater task was in arguing that there was culturally, linguistically, and historically something which distinguished East Germany as separate from West Germany. As Benedict Anderson argued in *Imagined Communities*, “... nationalism has to be understood by aligning it, not with self-consciously held political ideologies, but with the large cultural systems that preceded it, out of which—as well as against which—it came into being.”

Thus, if the ideological notion of the GDR as a “socialist nation” appeared too contrived or “self-conscious,” in Anderson’s terms, culturally linking socialism and anti-fascism to Heimat to serve as proof of an Ur-East

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132 Palmowski’s *Inventing a Socialist Nation* explores this notion most fully in terms of Heimat.

German nation managed to circumvent this problem. That is, developing a “myth of resistance” helped the GDR to differentiate itself from West Germany, but it too was largely a political construction. The myth required something more to establish itself as a legitimate cultural value, separating East Germany from the West. The concept of Heimat helped to fill in that space.\textsuperscript{134}

Jan Palmowski argues persuasively in his book, *Inventing a Socialist Nation: Heimat and the Politics of Everyday Life in the GDR, 1945-90*, that exploiting an East German brand of Heimat helped the GDR to define itself as a nation. He argues in the introduction to his book, “. . . [Heimat] did not just help reinforce the legitimacy of the second German state: it allowed the party to go further and lay claim to a distinctive nationhood for the GDR.”\textsuperscript{135} To be clear, Belopolski and Vuchetich aimed in their design of the Treptow memorial to create a commemorative space which honored the Red Army. But the visual narrative of the sarcophagi, sculptures, and setting of the site were also compatible with German understandings of Heimat. The ambiguity of the sculptural images on the Treptow memorial grounds allowed the GDR the opportunity to seize them as its own.

One of the characteristics embedded in Heimat is that of the feminine. It is the nurturing, subtly sexualized, and gestationally productive aspects of home. Peter Blickle, who examines the trope of the feminine in *Heimat: A Critical Theory of the German Idea*

\textsuperscript{134} Irma Hanke associates Heimat attachments with a “seelische Verortung” (spiritual or emotional localizing), suggesting the manifestations of Heimat in the GDR in festivals, museums, and the like were a response to industrialization and lack of free travel. She suggests provocatively that those who can’t travel abroad turn more intensively to their immediate surroundings (“Wer nicht nach außen reisen kann, wendet sich um so intensiver dem engeren Lebensumfeld zu.”). See Irma Hanke, “Heimat DDR: Heimat und Beheimatungsstrategien im anderen Teil Deutschlands,” in *Politische Kultur in der DDR*, ed. Hans-Georg Wehling (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1989), 185-186. 

\textsuperscript{135} Palmowski, *Inventing a Socialist Nation*, 7.
of Heimat, suggests that this quality of Heimat is part of a binary of oppositional concepts:

. . . the self, the individual, absolutism, adulthood, culture, and the city are encoded masculine; the Other, democracy, childhood, nature, the country are encoded feminine. Heimat is associated with the feminine, with staying home, Fremde [the foreign, the unknown] with the masculine, with going out into the world. Usually the longed-for aspect—the one that was missing or not immediately present, at least from the male perspective—became the idealized, feminine one.¹³⁶

If, as I argued above, the Tiergarten memorial exudes the masculine traits of militarism and urbanism, then Treptow suggests the converse, emphasizing the feminine Heimat, countryside, adolescence, and specters of loss and grief.

The first encounters one has with the Treptower memorial site is with one of two archways leading into the grounds. The mention of Heimat in the statements along the top of the arches first leads the visitor to frame the grounds within that context; the natural setting implies it as well. But as one enters the grounds, one’s first encounter with a sculptural element is the statue of grieving Mutter Heimat. While I do not wish to take this moniker as literal proof of her conformity with the elements of Heimat on the site, her presence nonetheless is critical in establishing a feminized account of home and nation engendered in Heimat. If, as Elizabeth Boa and Rachel Palfreyman argue, the maternal Heimat is the “threshold” between nature and culture, it is also the stand-in here for the mourning nation, and acts further as confirmation of a German Heimat on these grounds.¹³⁷

Grieving Mutter Heimat as a component of the Soviet War Memorial clearly laments the loss of Soviet lives during the war, but her ambiguity also could lead the

¹³⁶ Blickle, Heimat, 85-86.
German visitor to imagine that she weeps for the loss of German life as well. If, as the GDR wished its citizens to believe, East Germans were on the anti-fascist side of the war, then the losses incurred by Mutter Heimat were German as well.

A further instance of the feminized Heimat appears in the sculpture of the soldier on top of the kurgan at the pinnacle of the central memorial grounds. Again, while the soldier should be considered part of the Red Army due to the context of the memorial grounds and the fact he is slashing a swastika with his sword, his dress is ambiguous. He is not wearing a Russian uniform, but rather a cape. And while the soldier is a masculine figure, the protection of the child in his left arm is a paternal as well as maternal gesture, a return to the doubling of the “Mother Germany and Germany the Fatherland” Blickle sees in eighteenth century German literature. But further, the child itself is suggestive of youthful Heimat. Recognized as that which was defended, the child is a symbol of all Soviet lands, including East Germany. This layered effect of both protector and child as symbolic of the GDR is not unlike its citizens’ assumed role in Hitler Germany: as saved and liberated (child) as well as resister (soldier).

The doubling of Mother Germany and Fatherland Germany seen in the symbolic soldier-child interaction on the kurgan is delineated on the sarcophagi as simply the mother-child relationship. The initial bas-reliefs depict women as mourning the destruction of the homeland and protecting children. These images thus evoke the feminized Heimat. The women weep, drawing sympathy from the German visitor for the wrecked towns and villages, who recognize these women as their own local Heimat.

Blickle, *Heimat*, 87. Blickle is careful to argue, however, that this doubling is also usually an overlap between nation and state: “. . . Heimat is usually presented in contrast to the state, which is a political, public, *vaterländisch* [fatherland-like] construct. In other words, there is usually a fatherland and a Heimat, even if they both occupy the same geographical space.” Ibid, 3.
suffering. These figures define Heimat as the feminine, the one in need of aid. Yet, on the second sarcophagus, the child from the kurgan is in the arms of a woman. She offers a different protection than the soldier could; she is feminine and non-violent, Heimat proving its quiet resilience.

In two subsequent bas-reliefs, women take up arms, apparently contradicting Heimat as non-violent. Yet, although they are carrying rifles in the two scenes, the women do not fire the weapons. In fact, only men are depicted in the next six images, in various manifestations of warriors. In the final images, women appear again. One embraces a soldier on the seventh sarcophagus. On the concluding image, Mutter Heimat, the sculpture at the entrance to the memorial site, returns. Clothed similarly in an ankle-length dress, clutching a shawl as the statue does, gazing down at the fallen soldier only suggested in the sculpture, the repetition of this image bring the notion of the feminized, grieving Mutter Heimat full circle.

*Return to the Premodern*

The encoded feminine homeland emerges with a second cue to Heimat in the memorial’s images: the premodern. Longing for the pre-modern is a characteristic of Heimat. It is a way of unifying the disaffected “I” of the modern world with its spirit. To yearn for the past is to break with modern discontents, while simultaneously encouraging the recuperation of one’s own history. That is, it is not an absolute disavowal of one’s current homeland, but rather a desire to search for origins. To recognize and appreciate the ideal, is to hope for it in the present.
As I discussed in the previous chapter, the soldier on the kurgan is the most obvious symbol of the pre-modern on the grounds. His sword, an anachronism of the modern fighting of World War II, slices the swastika at his feet. The sword acts as a juxtaposition to the machine gun the central soldier of the Tiergarten memorial has slung over his shoulder. It at once universalizes the experience of the war as a longer story of the triumph over evil, as it also strips away the modern war to a mythologized, almost quaint experience. The erasure of the marker of modernity allows the visitor to comprehend the liberation of Germany by the Red Army not as an event bound by time, but rather as a socialist ideal, which has always protected the German Heimat.

Further, many of the images on the bas-reliefs reiterate this anachronistic narrative with the inclusion of peasants working the fields. While modern weaponry and industry is also depicted, it is utilized on behalf of the peasant workers, and thus serves as a method of return. The fighter planes bombing thatched roofed homes and hand-pushed farming equipment are thus clearly an attack on the long-standing homeland, not just the actual homes and industrial fields of the late 1930s and 1940s.

A particularly telling image appears on the third sarcophagus. The image follows the Stalin quotation, which suggests that the successes of the Red Army would have been unthinkable without the support of the people. It specifically mentions their sacrifices in factories, coal mines, and transportation, all modern fields. Yet the image associated with the sentiment is of decidedly un-modern people laying apparently expensive personal belongings—china, silver—in front of a monument of two soldiers, dressed in a quasi-ancient Roman style. Both dressed in belted tunics, the standing man passes a sword to another, seated with a round shield. In actuality, the reference is to a monument in
Moscow, commemorating Dmitry Pozharsky and Kuzma Minin, who fought successfully against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth with an all-volunteer Russian army in 1612. Vuchetich suggested that this bas-relief should conjure memories of the “millions of Soviet citizens, patriots of the Heimat,” who also made sacrifices during the time of the Red Army, of this earlier history.\textsuperscript{139} While the monument to Pozharsky and Minin may appear specifically Russian, it is also a universal appeal to the triumph of apparently common people over foreign invaders. It is a return to a previous example of the defense of homeland, but it is also a return to the pre-modern. The dress of the soldiers are not necessarily evocative of seventeenth century Russia, but rather are of a seemingly generic pre-modern time, which could be understood again as the anti-modernity. This combined image allows for Heimat to emerge from the bas-relief.

\textit{Nature}

The visual cues to the feminized and pre-modern Heimat are part of the memorial construction. To be sure, they are purposefully articulated symbols and images which could be construed by East German officials and visitors alike to support the notion that the Soviet War Memorial in Treptower Park was in any way “German” and belonged to the East German Heimat. One factor which helped to justify this impression as authentic is the memorial’s setting within the wooded park.

The natural landscape is a key component to ideals of Heimat. From the Pfälzerwald Verein’s (Palatinate Forest Group) nature-oriented activities Celia Applegate

\textsuperscript{139} (Millionen Sowjetbürger, Patrioten der Heimat). Quoted in Köpstein et al., \textit{Das Treptower Ehrenmal}, 63.
describes in turn-of-the-century Germany\textsuperscript{140} to the variety of natural topographies represented in the German *Heimatfilm*,\textsuperscript{141} the role of nature in German notions of Heimat is well established across time. In East Germany, too, mountains and forests proved frequent images for political posters attempting to align people’s topographic associations of homeland with electing particular candidates. Jan Palmowski argues that owing to a dearth of “sites of memory” in the GDR, country-wide images were often generic landscapes, whereas district-level posters offered specific examples, such as the *Drei Gleichen* (Three Same), a set of three castles on three hills in Thuringia.\textsuperscript{142}

But Treptower Park offered a place where the natural landscape was indeed a “site of memory,” at both a local and national level. East Berliners drew on their own or imparted recollections of Treptow as a place for weekend leisure, but also on the history of the park as location for socialist activism. These two memories allowed the park to vacillate between a local and national site, which was compatible with the SED worldview. As such, since designers left the trees surrounding the memorial standing, the historical integrity of the site remained.

Further, the visual images of the bas-reliefs mimic the surrounding landscape. On the second sarcophagus an image depicts partisans bearing arms in the forest. The trees surrounding the men, woman, and child appear to be stone likenesses of the trees surrounding the memorial. Standing in front of the bas-relief, the tops of adjacent trees

\textsuperscript{140} Applegate, *Nation of Provincials*, 76.
\textsuperscript{141} See especially discussions of the *Bergfilm* (mountain film) as dialectic intermediary between nature and modernity in von Moltke, *No Place Like Home*, 45-49, particularly as counterpoint to the use of nature in the *Heimatfilm*.
\textsuperscript{142} Palmowski, *Inventing a Socialist Nation*, 47.
The trees on the sarcophagus do appear to be oaks, while the surrounding trees of the park are sycamores. Despite the fact the bas-relief image is intended to depict partisan fighting further in Eastern Europe, I maintain the consequence of the effect remains.

“mythification of nature,” which he attributes to modern notions of *Heimat*.145 His argument, based on Schelling’s notion of *Entzweiung* (separation146), suggests that split into history and nature (or *Bewußtsein* [consciousness] and *Wesen* [being]147) creates struggle for the return of wholeness. Heimat creates a space for this possibility:

. . .the modern idea of Heimat . . . is a ground whereon *Entzweiung* is reconciled, a mental place in which landscape and identity, nature and self, reason and space becomes fused. Heimat . . . offers a sense of originary unity to the divided, suffering subject. Heimat is a subjectivized aestheticization of nature inside of which the subject is capable of reaching a larger, communal self.148

I would argue that if we look at the Soviet War Memorial’s topography from the perspective of Heimat, the action of entrance under the triumphal arch into the wooded shelter of the Treptower Park allows for this unification of spirit. The visible break with the city and, thus, the alienating effects of modernity, allow for this transformation and reconciliation.

**Redemption**

Finally, as Blickle suggests through Walter Benjamin’s theory of history, the ultimate power of linking the Soviet War Memorial to Heimat is that of its powers to redeem the past in the present.149 If the memorial’s location in the park (i.e., nature), on hollowed German-Socialist ground, with nods to both the feminine and pre-modern aspects of history and nation, speaks to a people’s future—as Soviet socialist, GDR, or in

146 Blickle’s translation. See Blickle, *Heimat*, 27. He later translates *Entzweiung* as “the split, the becoming two.” See ibid, 114.
147 Both translations are Blickle’s. See *Heimat*, 114.
149 Blickle, *Heimat*, 43-44.
fact, Deutschland—it harnesses the redemptive power of the past, thus justifying its existence and rendering it relevant to the present. In the case of the GDR, the memorial ultimately served to link East Germany to a longer tradition of socialist activism, and to exculpate the nation from the guilt and blame of the Holocaust. By linking the memorial to an East German Heimat, it became more than a site strictly commemorating the Soviet soldiers of the Red Army. Instead, it became a testament to the GDR myth of resistance.

Yet, if the memorial were only able to speak to an East German audience’s idea of Heimat, it would not explain how the memorial managed to survive the transition to unified Germany in 1989 and 1990. I would thus argue, that the fluidity involved in Heimat to bridge the idea of home in the GDR to the Bundesrepublik explains in part how the memorial could still be standing today, as it transfers the Soviet War Memorial from one world-view to a seemingly incompatible other. The aspects of nature, mother, pre-modern were recognizable to West Germans as well, and thus to “Deutschland” as Heimat today. Although the Heimat of the GDR focused on the socialist ideal, the fundamental cues of the concept were able to be re-appropriated in unified Berlin as something authentic German. It is exactly this re-appropriation which I will consider in the next chapter, as I examine how the memorial space functioned in the post-Wall context.
CHAPTER THREE
AFTER THE WALL

By the late 1980s, the Soviet War Memorial occupied a quiet, if not somewhat distinguished, space in East Berlin. May 8 commemorations, wreath-laying ceremonies by foreign dignitaries, and young Pioniere excursions were the typical ways in which residents and local and national government used the park. It had become a location of official commemoration and earnest ritual appropriated by East Berlin and East German organizations, politicians, and citizens alike.

As groups protesting against the SED began to gain strength in the GDR in 1989, the sites of their gatherings took on particular meaning, even if their locations were determined by practicality and circumstance rather than overt symbolic gestures. The Nikolaikirche in Leipzig, locus of prayers for peace, for instance, became synonymous with the Montagsdemonstrationen (Monday demonstrations) which spread across Eastern Germany. Similar services and protests were held at the Gethsemanekirche in Berlin’s Prenzlauer Berg, and marches against alleged election fraud had begun earlier at the Sophienkirche in Berlin-Mitte following the May vote. But it was the mammoth demonstration begun at Alexanderplatz in central East Berlin, along with the ultimate march in downtown Leipzig in November 1989, which proved the additional turning points in the GDR revolution.
The locations of mass demonstrations in East Germany were as much about visibility as they were about protest. Protest marches and gatherings were generally non-violent and peaceful; they were not particularly provocative, as those in China and Eastern Europe had been, although many protesters were nonetheless mistreated and arrested by the police. However, because of their apparent peaceful intentions, it should thus not be surprising that protest marches in Berlin and Leipzig did not convene directly at symbols of repression, such as the Berlin Wall; they instead found resonance in the large urban spaces previously co-opted by the SED for official parades.

The Soviet War Memorial in Treptower Park was no exception in this regard. As a hidden space, it did not see mass protest during the fall of 1989, despite its potentially contentious presence as a symbol of Russian, and by now East German, political repression. But in the short weeks following the fall of the Berlin Wall, the site enjoyed a renaissance of sorts as it returned to its previous life as site of pro-Socialist protest.

In late December 1989, vandals smeared the Soviet War Memorial with anti-Soviet and otherwise national socialist graffiti. The East German government

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150 The final protests at Alexanderplatz and in Leipzig were auspiciously, and resolutely, non-violent. The police in Leipzig were explicitly implored not to harm crowds. See Konrad H. Jarausch, The Rush to German Unity (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 34 and Ulrich Schwarz, “Schließt euch an!” Spiegel-Redakteur Ulrich Schwarz über die Massendemonstration in Leipzig.” Der Spiegel, October 16, 1989, 24-25 for depictions of the tenuous line between violence and peace during the Leipzig march. However, earlier, during the fortieth anniversary celebrations in Berlin (as elsewhere across East Germany), many protesters coming from the Gethsemane Church were arrested and otherwise beaten and harmed by police. See Charles S. Maier Dissolution. The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 148 and Richard A. Leiby, The Unification of Germany, 1989-1990 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999), 13-14 for witness accounts.

151 See, for example, Charles S. Maier’s characterization of the “Autumn Upheaval” as being part of a overall German sense of revolution steeped in “wise restraint or collective gentleness” (114) in his Dissolution, especially Chapter Three. In suggesting repetition of previous German revolutions, but also in contrast to more violent revolutions elsewhere around the globe, Maier argues, “The year 1989 was thus an upheaval far less doctrinaire, less polarized, more tolerant and civil than the 1918 revolution. At last Germans might apparently claim a revolution that did not degenerate into civil war or succumb to armed reaction.” (Maier, Dissolution, 118).

152 Since 1990 the Soviet War Memorial in Treptow has, as other memorial sites in Berlin have, been victim to graffiti vandalism. Generally, swastikas and Stars of David have been found on the sites. Yet, in
determined that West German members of a neo-Nazi youth group perpetrated the crime. Days later, in early January 1990, an estimated 250,000 people, organized by the SED-PDS, gathered below the kurgan in Treptower Park to protest the affront to both humanity and socialist principles of civility. The SED insisted that such offensive actions by neo-Nazi youth were indicative of an alarming insurgence of anti-Semitic and fascist ideology from the West, a direct attack on the East German constitution. Though couched in the context of a state-sponsored self-preservation act, the massive gathering at the Soviet War Memorial demonstrated the apparent lingering appeal of the socialist legacy in Treptower Park; it signaled a return to the Spartakus protest marches of the last turn of the century held on this very site. While a highly contrived and ritualized

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Some discrepancy exists in the estimate of protesters at the Treptow Memorial that day. One Bundesarchiv photograph caption put the number of protesters at a quarter million (Photographer: Ralph Hirschberger, Bundesarchiv photograph number 183-1990-0105-300, dated January 5, 1990.) Michael Richter also cites the 250,000 number based on the Allgemeiner Deutscher Nachrichtendienst (ADN, General [East] German News Service), but remarks in a footnote that the Volkspolizei (VP, [East German] People’s Police) estimated 120,000 were in attendance. See Michael Richter, Die friedliche Revolution: Aufbruch zur Demokratie in Sachsen 1989-90, vol. 2 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2010), 1120, footnote 71.

A more cynical interpretation of the January 3rd demonstration, such as that offered by Walter Süß in Staatssicherheit am Ende: Warum es den Mächtigen nicht gelang, 1989 eine Revolution zu verhindern. (Berlin: Ch. Links, 1999), suggests that the accusation that the defacement at Treptower Park came from West German neo-Nazis (spray paint cans produced in the FRG were later allegedly found nearby) served as an opportunity for SED-PDS officials to claim that the GDR was under attack by Western fascists. Süß suggests that the SED exploited the opportunity to link the attack to the protective measures of the anti-fascist GDR to a public who were willing to at least hear, if not accept, this argument. Süß characterized the scene as an “eerie event” (“. . . [es] geriet zu einer etwas gespenstischen Veranstaltung,” 689). See Süß, Staatssicherheit am Ende, 686-90. A Reuters report from January 4th, 1990 echoes this sentiment of opportunism. It quotes a participant of the rally leaving in “disgust.” The unnamed woman states, “I recognized a lot of Stasi ([GDR state security service]) types there and I did not want to be misused.” See “Berliners Rally against Fascism,” Toronto Star, January 4, 1990. See also Richter, Die friedliche Revolution, 2:1118-1121.
demonstration (demonstrators were apparently bused in), the sheer volume of participants
found in a moment of revolution against the GDR’s existence speaks to an unusual
political convergence: the Treptow memorial seemed to have captured a space between
the ideals of a German socialist republic and the realities of a crumbling nation.\footnote{156}{The organized and apparently non-organic nature of the rally disheartened many opposition groups, who sensed that the exercise was a façade. Stefan Finger, International Secretary of the SPD-DDR, stated to a reporter at the demonstration, “The old ways are still there, the old faces are still there.” Ralph Boulton, “Nazi Past Haunts Politics of E Berlin,” \textit{The Independent} (London), January 6, 1990.} Where
the Berlin Wall fell victim to the citizen chisel and city crane, the grounds of the Soviet
War Memorial remained relatively unchallenged by the opposition.\footnote{157}{Brian Ladd argues in \textit{The Ghosts of Berlin} that East Germans were more apt to wait for political processes to decide the fate of GDR icons than rush to tear them down themselves. He writes: The revolutionary enthusiasm that swept Eastern Europe at the end of the 1980s was directed against many a monument that symbolized the Bolshevik regime. But celebratory fervor in the divided city of Berlin took a different form. East German activists, less interested in symbols, seized the sprawling headquarters of the Ministry of State Security (Stasi), with its tons of secret records; they have since turned its main building into a museum. It was mainly West Berliners who engaged in acts of ritual destruction, and their target was the Wall, the GDR monument known best to them. Other monuments mostly escaped unscathed, leaving their fate to be decided by official deliberation (Ladd, \textit{Ghosts of Berlin}, 192).}

As I argued in the previous chapter, the Soviet War Memorial in Berlin was seen
during the GDR in, at best, ambivalent terms. Whereas the Berlin Wall, the Stasi
headquarters, and, perhaps, the Palace of the Republic, were symbols of oppressive
politics, the Soviet War Memorial had been co-opted during the GDR as a more positive
stand-in for liberation and hope. It partook in the overriding master narrative of Soviets
as liberators and East Germans as co-anti-fascist resisters. Even if East Berliners did not
themselves fully subscribe to this reading of history as it related to the memorial, its
presence was perhaps less threatening than that of other sites in the city. Where guards’
guns along the Berlin Wall were trained against defectors, the War Memorial guards’
rifles were instead carried in ceremonial ways, as the ritualized objects of pacifists and saviors.\(^{158}\)

Yet, across Eastern and Central Europe many Soviet war memorials were purposely damaged, destroyed, and contested during the revolutions of 1989 and beyond. To suggest that the image of Soviet war memorials as legitimate symbols of Russian liberation found wide-spread acceptance in the post-socialist era is naïve, if not impossible. Further, to imply that the Soviet war memorials in Berlin transitioned from one dominant political ideology to another without contention is misleading, if not entirely incorrect. However, stark differences emerge in the way in which those memorials in Berlin crossed the threshold of 1989. In this section, I will examine the re-appropriation of the Soviet War Memorial in Treptower Park in post-Wall Berlin as a process not without controversy, but one which stands as a counter-example to the fate of the Palace of the Republic, Berlin Wall, and many of the Soviet war memorials across Central and Eastern Europe.

1990: Good Neighbors, Partnership, and Cooperation

In the initial years following the fall of the Berlin Wall and subsequent unification of the two Germanys, the Soviet War Memorial in Treptower Park—like its fellow Soviet memorials elsewhere in the city—was largely ignored and treated essentially with political indifference. In the context of the Two Plus Four Agreements, a newly unified

\(^{158}\) Of course, it could be argued that the Wall, portrayed as an anti-fascist protective measure (*antifaschistischer Schutzwall*), indeed fed into the East German master-narrative or “myth of resistance” in that it functioned as a bulwark against foreign fascists attempting to breach the Heimat. However, as Ladd and others argue elsewhere, this interpretation of the Wall lost any credence it had shortly, if not immediately, after it was built. See Ladd, *Ghosts of Berlin*, 18-29.
Germany signed a “good neighbor” treaty with the Soviet Union on November 9, 1990, committing to, among other things, maintaining each other’s war memorial and burial sites. The eighteenth article of the treaty reads:

The government of the Federal Republic of Germany declares that the memorials erected on German soil, which are dedicated to the Soviet victims of war and dictatorship, will be respected and cared for and placed under the protection of German law. The same is true of Soviet war cemeteries, which will be preserved and maintained. . .

Yet despite this agreement, the memorial site began to show signs of falling into disrepair. Not only were there more pressing matters related to unification straining German coffers, but the issue of financial responsibility itself appeared to be unclear. The federal government, then in Bonn, argued that since memorials are considered to be under the jurisdiction of each Bundesland, Berlin would be responsible for its Soviet war memorials’ upkeep and necessary repairs. Berlin, in turn, stressed that because it was the federal government who signed the “good neighbor” treaty with the USSR, coupled with the fact that the memorial was the result of a world war involving Germany and not merely the state of Berlin, the memorial must be maintained by the federal government. While the city nevertheless continued to appropriate 1.3 million DM per


160 Heinz Wiegand of the Berlin Senate Administration for Urban Development (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung) argued in 1998 that the Soviet Memorials were objects of “German history, which are in no way Berlin-specific.” (As cited in Rolf Lautenschläger, “Der grosse Russe wackelt schon,” taz, die tageszeitung, May 9, 1998: “In der Frage der Friedhöfe und Ehrenmaeler spiegelte sich ‘deutsche Geschichte, die keineswegs berlinspezifisch’ sei.”). Interestingly, this is a continuation of argument
year for the care of the three Soviet war memorials in Berlin, the political and financial impasse between the federal and state governments regarding the hefty costs for complete renovation continued for years: estimates suggested the full necessary restoration of the three Soviet memorials could cost between 30 and 50 million DM.\(^{161}\)

What further complicated the contention was that not only are the Soviet war memorials in Berlin memorial sites, but they are also the burial grounds of victims of war. In a letter to the foreign ministers of the Four Powers signing the Two Plus Four Treaty on September 12, 1990, West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and East German Foreign Minister Lothar de Maizière declared that in addition to war memorials built on German soil, war graves would also be protected and maintained, an assertion also later included in the final “good neighbor” treaty.\(^{162}\) But the statement did not specify which level of German government would be responsible for their care.

The West German “Gräbergesetz” (Graves Act) of 1965 holds individual state governments accountable for the maintenance of burial plots and cemeteries where those advanced under the GDR: that the Soviet War Memorials are pieces of East German history. In the case of Wiegand, he made this assertion as part of the city’s contention that the federal government should be solely responsible for the memorials’ renovations.


Point two of the brief states, “Die auf deutschem Boden errichteten Denkmäler, die den Opfern des Krieges und der Gewaltherrschaft gewidmet sind, werden geachtet und stehen unter dem Schutz deutscher Gesetze. Das Gleiche gilt für die Kriegsgräber, sie werden erhalten und gepflegt.” (Those memorials, erected on German soil, which are dedicated to the victims of the war and dictatorship, will be respected and remain under the protection of German law.

The same applies to soldier gravesites; they will be preserved and maintained.) From the “Gemeinsamer Brief des Bundesministers des Auswärtigen und des amtierenden Außenminister der DDR an die Außenminister der Vier Mächte anläßlich der Vertragsunterzeichnung am 12. September 1990 in Moskau.” (Joint Letter of the Federal Secretary of State and the Acting Foreign Minister of the GDR to the Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers with Regard to the Treaty Signing on 12 September 1990 in Moscow.) Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung, Bulletin Nr. 109. September 14, 1990.
who died in war and particular instances of oppression (such as the Vertreibung) are laid to rest.\footnote{Ultimately, however, the funds do come from the federal government, as each state compiles a list of applicable sites, for which states are then reimbursed with a yearly payment. See §10 Art. 4 of the Gräbergesetz. A 1998 statement from the Bundestag indicates that between 1993 and 1998 the Federal government provided the “Neue Bundesländern” (New States; i.e., the former GDR states) between 11 and 14 million DM a year for the maintenance of cemeteries qualified under the Gräbergesetz. Of those, the Berlin Senate Department for Urban Development, Environmental Protection and Technology was given 3.9 million DM between 1991-1993 specifically for the Soviet Memorials in Treptow, Tiergarten, and Pankow. The statement argues the money was given because of the “special political significance of the three Soviet memorial sites . . .” (besonderen politischen Bedeutung der drei sowjetischen Gedenkstätten . . .) Deutscher Bundestag, “Erhalt und Pflege sowjetischer Denkmäler und Kriegsgräber auf dem Territorium der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Maritta Böttcher, Dr. Ludwig Elm, Dr. Uwe-Jens Heuer, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Gruppe der PDS,” Publication No. 13/10232, March 26, 1998.} However, the law did not pertain to former East German territories until 1993.\footnote{The official title of the law is: “Gesetz über die Erhaltung der Gräber der Opfer von Krieg und Gewaltherrschaft (Gräbergesetz).” (Act Regarding the Preservation of Graves of the Victims of War and Dictatorship [Graves Act]) The law has seen several variations since 1965, including the one passed in 1993. More recently, the law was amended again in 1997, 2005 and 2007. Although the 1993 version included the former GDR, the language did not officially become law until 1995. The 1993 version is printed in the Bundesgesetzblatt Part 1, no. 5, 179-182. Bonn: February 11, 1993. The announcement for this new version begins on page 178 as “Bekanntmachung der Neufassung des Gräbergesetzes” from January 29, 1993.} Therefore, the financial obligations specific to the Soviet war memorials of East Berlin—first, because of the conflicting commitments of the Federal government’s 1990 “good neighbor” treaty and the Bundesland responsibility to memorials, and second, because the memorials were not initially included in the Gräbergesetz—fell into a sort of jurisdictional limbo not easily resolved.

Aside from the financial aspect of necessary maintenance and restoration projects, the political implications of the memorial became increasingly apparent. While the Soviet War Memorial in Treptower Park had been co-opted during the GDR as a site flush with symbols compatible with an SED world-view, the Socialist philosophy rendered in stone proved contrary to the center-right view of the dominant West German political party of the time: the CDU.
Though still bound by the protective tenets of the “good neighbor” treaty, certain CDU politicians voiced their preferences regarding the memorial. In June 1996, the General Secretary of the CDU-Berlin proposed undertaking new negotiations with the Russians to remove the “worst excesses” of the memorials in Berlin. In particular, Secretary Gerhard Lawrentz wanted the Stalin quotations eliminated from the sites. “To remove them would be an act of de-Stalinization, just as was already done with similar memorials in other Eastern European countries,” he justified.\textsuperscript{165}

Three years earlier, the CDU Bundestag representative from Berlin-Spandau (West), Heinrich Lummer, dismissed such memorials outright, stating, “We don’t need the Soviet Army junk at all.”\textsuperscript{166} In February 1998, Lummer argued that the Soviet War Memorial in Treptower Park should in fact be torn down.\textsuperscript{167} Given the state of the memorial, such action seemed increasingly unnecessary; the structures were falling apart on their own. The memorial in Treptower Park continued to deteriorate from water damage and ensuing rust. As the soldier on the kurgan threatened to collapse in 1998, the immediacy of the situation was inescapable.\textsuperscript{168}

Two months after Lummer argued that the memorial should be demolished, the Duma released an appeal to the German government reminding its leaders of the country’s commitment to uphold the 1990 “good neighbor” treaty. It read, in part, that the maintenance of the memorials was a “prerequisite for the further development of friendly

\textsuperscript{168} Orde, “Der Rotarmist.”
relations between our two peoples and states.” While not necessarily a direct response to Lummer’s suggestion, the Duma’s call does indicate a push to come to a definitive conclusion in determining which authority would be obliged to pay for the memorials’ upkeep. Although the city of Berlin had been spending funds to care for the memorial, the necessity to begin the required full renovations had reached a breaking point.

The watershed moment in the future of the Soviet War Memorial in Treptower Park came as the ruling government in Bonn changed party hands. In the fall of 1998, the SPD won the Bundestag elections. With the leadership change from Helmut Kohl to Gerhard Schröder came as well a change in the approach to the Soviet war memorials in Berlin. Prior to the elections, members of the SPD—particularly at the Berlin-local level—expressed a more forgiving attitude towards Soviet legacies in East Berlin. During that time, calls for restoration generally only came from the SPD members of the CDU-SPD coalition Berlin Senate, not from the CDU-led federal government, where members of the leading party most vocally expressed opposition to the projects.

169 Quoted in Nadja Caspar and Martin Hatzius, “Angemessener Ehrenkult?” Freitag 32, August 4, 2000: “Unterpfland für die weitere Entwicklung freundschaftlicher Beziehungen zwischen unseren beiden Völkern und Staaten.” A representative of the Russian ambassador to Germany declared prior to the Duma’s statement, that Russia wished that Germany would uphold its duties: “Wir wünschen, dass die deutsche Seite ihre Verpflichtungen voll einhält.” (We hope that the German side will fully embrace its obligations.) Quoted in “Berliner Telegramm; Böger fordert Sanierung sowjetischer Ehrenmale,” taz, die tageszeitung, February 24, 1998. These statements from the Duma and the Russian Embassy come during an extended effort on the part of the Duma and other Russian officials, such as Boris Yeltsin, to fulfill the so-called restitution of cultural values. As one official stated during a press conference regarding the return of German and Russian artifacts taken from each other during WWII, Russia felt it would be the “laughing stock” if it satisfied its end of the bargain, but Germany did not. State Duma Speaker Gennady Seleznyov declared, “The Soviet state has preserved and restored everything, and we would be a laughing stock if we returned everything today and heard in response: ‘Well, we would have returned everything to you as well, but we have very different laws and we cannot take a piece of the Amber Room from a private collector.’ Please, let them resolve this problem, and then we will take our decisions and hold negotiations.” Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, April 27, 1998.

170 Berlin continued to maintain a shared CDU-SPD government during this time under the leadership of Mayor Eberhard Diepgen (CDU).

171 See, for example, City Development Senator Peter Strieder’s (SPD) report regarding the necessary renovations in October 1997 (“Bund soll sowjetische Ehrenmale finanzieren.” taz, die tageszeitung, October 23, 1997), and SPD-Faction Leader Klaus Böger’s insistence in February of 1998, that the
Following the 1998 national elections, however, the pleas for memorial restoration found resonance in the upper-levels of government. Federal Government Commissioner for Culture and Media Michael Naumann (SPD) announced that the federal government would provide 6 million DM necessary for the memorial restoration projects in Berlin. He reasoned that the renovations not only served as a fulfillment of the “good neighbor” treaty, but rather also that of “intrinsic decency.”

Although the question of restoration seemed to be cleared at this point, the specifics of the project were not. Particularly on the right, and in German veterans groups, the issue of the memorial’s message remained contentious. Many strongly disputed Naumann’s assertion, particularly as it related to the Stalin quotations against which General Secretary Lawrentz had railed, that there was anything “decent” about maintaining the Soviet War Memorial. The Association of Persecutees of the Stalinist Regime (BSV) in Germany demanded that the Stalin quotations be removed from the site. “It is indisputable,” the director of the group stated in 2004, “that with Stalin we are speaking of one of the greatest mass murderers the world has ever seen.” This is the argument local CDU politicians made in their call for the quotations’ erasure as well.

memorials were in a “catastrophic state.” (“Berliner Telegramm; Böger fordert Sanierung sowjetischer Ehrenmale,” taz, die tageszeitung, February 24, 1998).

172 “Die Bereitstellung der Mittel sei nicht nur eine Frage der Vertragstreue, sondern auch eine Frage des ‘inneren Anstands,’ sagte Naumann . . .” (The allocation of funding is not only a question of upholding the treaty, but also a question of ‘intrinsic decency,’ Naumann stated.) “Innerer Anstand,” taz, die tageszeitung, October 7, 1999. As Federal Government Commissioner for Culture and Media Naumann also holds the less cumbersome title of Federal Cultural Minister.

CDU-Vice Parliamentary Delegation Leader for Berlin-Köpenick argued, “They are the quotes of a dictator and a mass murderer, which come out of a time of Stalin-worship.”

This characterization of Stalin as dictator and mass murderer was not in dispute among any serious party members or the public; however, as the cultural policy speaker for the local Berlin PDS then reasoned, the way in which one contextualizes and interprets such historical artifacts is debatable. The CDU, the PDS argued, was unable to distinguish between support for Stalin and historical authenticity, and should allow visitors the due trust to be able to understand the difference.

This sentiment of moral neutrality vis-à-vis the Soviet War Memorial resonated among the left and many preservationists, who argued that while perhaps not a statement which follows current understanding of historical reality, the memorials constituted legitimate objects of their moment. The PDS Treptow-Köpenick faction further argued in its “Blättchen” (short newsletter), following the logic of a Russian Embassy official, “you wouldn’t build [the memorial] like this today, but it’s an important testimonial of our time.”

Klaus von Krosigk, the Berlin State Conservator agreed, stating in response to CDU Secretary General Lawrentz’s suggestion to remove the Stalin quotations at the

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176 “Die von der CDU geforderte Auseinandersetzung wird damit beim Betrachter nicht bewirkt. Unserer Meinung nach ist Authentizität dafür unerlässlich. Das Vertrauen, solche Denkmäler auch kritisch zu betrachten, sollten wir auch in die Betrachter haben.” (The argument being advanced by the CDU will not hold water with spectators [of the monument]. Our opinion is authenticity is essential here. We should have faith in beholder that such memorials can also be viewed critically.) Weise, “Der Solat kehrt zurück,” 2004, 5.

Soviet War Memorial, “It is not the duty of memorial preservation to sort out the positive and negative aspects of history.” Instead, he suggested, it would be more constructive to discuss and debate Stalinism verbally, than to simply take a chisel to the quotations.

At the time the federal government was moving from Bonn to Berlin, movements in the restoration of the Soviet War Memorial were occurring as well. Federal Cultural Minister Naumann declared a “politischen Paradigmenwechsel” (political paradigm change) in a Bundestag meeting in September 1998, assuring that the federal government would secure the necessary funding for the memorials’ restoration. Naumann’s agency guaranteed 29 million DM in 1999 for the three Berlin memorials; in 2000 the federal and Berlin governments added an additional 3.2 million DM for the restoration of the granite flags on the Treptow site. Neumann noted that Berlin needed to understand the importance of the project’s process in terms of the city’s own responsibilities vis-à-vis the international community. At this point, the restoration took on a moral imperative, as well as a reformulation of Berlin as a center of a changing European geography. The question of Soviet memorial restoration in the three parks in Berlin were situated as the re-definition of Berlin’s role in post-Cold War world politics. Berlin was forced to respect its neighbors’ history as it preserved half of its own.

In October 2003, the Red Army soldier left his perch at the top of the kurgan and was shipped to the island of Rügen for full restoration. After 1.35 million Euros and a

178 “Es ist nicht die Aufgabe der Denkmalpflege, nach positiven und negativen Aspekten der Geschichte zu sortieren.” Quoted in Weiland, “CDU-General.”
179 Ibid. In effect, this former course of action is what Berlin ultimately decided to do: over ten years later, in 2007, informational boards were added to the site to explain the construction and later restoration of the site.
180 Caspar and Hatzius, “Angemessener Ehrenkult?”
half year, the soldier returned.¹⁸² In time for May 8 celebrations, tourists, journalists, neighbors, and camera teams alike came to see his return. One journalist likened it to the return of a king.¹⁸³ Two birch trees were planted in anticipation of the completion of the mausoleum under the soldier, which was completed in time, then Berlin City Development Senator Ingeborg Junge-Reyer (SPD) stated, for the May 8, Day of Liberation celebrations.¹⁸⁴ This was an interesting acknowledgement of the holiday, considering Senator Junge-Reyer was raised in West Germany.

Not all were pleased by the developments. The BSV organization, which had voiced its displeasure of the site’s Stalin quotations, bristled at the political implications of the costs. During the Treptow memorial’s restoration, Theo Mittrup, Director of the BSV said of the financing, “It is for those who were transported to the USSR for forced labor in 1945—who never received restitution—especially frustrating, that so much money is being spent on the conservation [of the memorial in Treptower Park].”¹⁸⁵

**Public Use of the Memorial in United Berlin**

How did others feel about the developments in Treptower Park? In contrast to the vocal public debate surrounding the Palace of the Republic, the question of restoration at the Soviet war memorials garnered little attention. In fact, the memorial’s heavily

¹⁸³ Ibid.
Ceremonies, protests, and public gatherings did still occur from time to time in the memorial site after the unification of Germany. In September of 1994, Chancellor Kohl participated in a ceremony with Boris Yeltsin at Treptower Park in honor of the Russian soldiers leaving Germany after nearly fifty years of apparent protective presence. While Kohl made a point at the ceremony to express to the Russian soldiers that their fallen compatriots would not be forgotten, much of the occasion’s rhetoric emphasized a new relationship with Russia and the end of post-war politics. German President Roman Herzog stated at a lunch for Yeltsin at Bellevue that afternoon, that Germany and Russia together would “overcome the remainders of the post-war period with their ideological and political confrontation.” At the Treptow ceremony, both Yeltsin and Kohl took time to assure the public that while the past would not be forgotten, the countries must move on in partnership and cooperation in a new Europe.

While the German federal government at the time of the Russian troop departure showed little motivation to restore the Soviet War Memorial, the context of the site seemed to be shifting. In his participation and statements at the ceremony, Kohl claimed

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the site as a remnant of German failings, while not explicitly addressing the “liberation” of the East Germans by the Red Army. In this sense, the memorial site could be seen as a further reminder of the devastating consequences of Hitler Germany, instead of as a literal memorial of gratitude to the Red Army and Stalin.

In fact, as May 8 ceremonies continue to be held each year, fewer and fewer Germans participate in the observances. Russian veterans and ex-patriots seem to be the only ones laying wreaths. One such Russian veteran was quoted during a May 8 wreath-laying ceremony in 2000 lamenting, “Aber wo sind die Deutschen?” (But where are the Germans?). Indeed, the ceremonies and the site as necessitating such remembrances seem to resonate little to Germans in the post-socialist landscape.

As the country celebrated the sixtieth anniversary of the end of World War II in 2005, public and private observances of the occasion spanned across Berlin. At the Soviet War Memorial in Treptower Park, Egon Krenz was seen in the hour before an official ceremony placing a wreath at the entrance to the memorial. According to one published report, approximately 1,000 “older” people came to remember the Red Army’s achievement at ten o’clock that Sunday morning. Some carried old East German flags. Without dismissing the significant crowd assembled to pay respects to the Soviet liberation, the composition of the group—namely older, GDR-sympathetic constituents—contrasted with the idea that the Soviet War Memorial finds resonance with younger

190 “ältere,” ibid.
generations as a legitimate, meaningful historical site, which serves as a testament to Soviet altruism.

On the other hand, the site does resonate with some as an heir to the true Socialist and anti-fascist legacy. On the same weekend of the sixtieth anniversary celebrations, the NPD neo-Nazi party announced it would be holding a march through Berlin. Several citizen groups voiced their intention to hold counter marches. One was to leave from the Bertolt-Brecht-Platz (site of the Berliner Ensemble, north of the Friedrichstrasse station), another from Berlin Representative House, and yet another from Treptower Park; they were to converge on the Brandenburg Gate.\textsuperscript{191} The NPD gathered the morning of the march, but eventually declined to follow through with the protest as police pressure mounted.\textsuperscript{192} The opposition march from Treptower Park, coordinated under the umbrella group “Bündnis 8. Mai” (May 8 Alliance), comprised of anti-fascist, leftist peace groups, and “friends of the Russian people” groups, continued nonetheless. It began its march from the Mutter Heimat statue at Treptower Park. Symbolically starting at this location, instead of in the main grounds of the memorial, speaks to the group’s intentions.

This difference in participation between the Red Army memorial service and the anti-fascist rally illustrates quite clearly the way in which the Soviet War Memorial—and more broadly, the re-assessed German-Soviet relationship and GDR master-history—functions in the post-1990 political landscape. The story of Soviets as liberators perhaps does not resonate as “truth” as such to be commemorated today; yet, the overarching ideological premise of the site does. That is, to commemorate the Red Army as emancipators does not make sense in today’s post-Wall terms in the formalized or

\textsuperscript{192} “Die NPD sagt Aufmarsch ab; Gegendemonstration und ‘Tag für Demokratie’ in Berlin,” \textit{Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung}, May 9, 2005.
ritualized way found during the GDR. However, the resistance aspects of the GDR foundational mythology finds continuity in the form of anti-fascist and leftist ideals. Thus, I argue, the symbolic resonance of Treptower Park as a traditional site of demonstrations and activism persists.193

**Framing History**

During the time that the extensive restoration of the Soviet War Memorial was taking place, elected officials and the BSV continued to debate the contextualization of the site in a new united Germany. While many wished to at least see the Stalin quotations removed from the site without deference to the “good neighbor” treaty, SPD-State Development Senator Peter Strieder announced in March 2003 that a compromise would be reached: informational boards would be erected at the memorial to explain the historical context of the memorial.194

The PDS agreed with this arrangement as a sensible step in the process of coming to terms with the GDR history: “With the informational boards, the foundational history of the Soviet Memorial can be presented. Viewers—young and old—will have the

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193 This is not to suggest that there is no generalized sense of respect for the Russian soldiers buried at Treptower Park. During a “popKick” festival, held in conjunction with the World Cup soccer tournament held in Germany in 2006, organizers were initially admonished by neighbors for potentially disturbing their peace, as well as that of the soldiers laid in rest at the memorial. PopKick organizer Björn Döring announced measures—including erecting a fence between the park and memorial, and bringing in police security—to help mitigate any disturbance. In addition, the festival’s website issued a statement, along with concert details, encouraging concertgoers to respect the nature, tradition, and memorial of Treptower Park. See Kays Al-Khanak, “Kontrolliert feiern im Treptower Park; Nach massiven Protesten von Anwohnern muss sich das einmonatige ‘popKick’-Festival an strenge Auflagen halten: Konzerte dauern höchstens 75 Minuten, um 23 Uhr ist Schluss, Forscher überprüfen regelmäßig die Brutplätze der Vögel.” *taz, die tageszeitung*, May 31, 2006 and “Was ist popKick.06?,” popKick.06, accessed August 13. 2009, [http://www.popkick.de/wasist.htm](http://www.popkick.de/wasist.htm).

194 Informational boards were already in place at the Tiergarten memorial at this point. Strieder referenced them as an example of the boards that would be placed at the Treptower memorial. See “Ehrenmal kriegt Schautafel,” *taz, die tageszeitung*, March 13, 2003.
opportunity to contextualize the memorial in history.”\textsuperscript{195} The CDU ultimately agreed to this arrangement to leave the Stalin quotations, as long as informational signs were included at the Soviet War Memorial. However, the CDU voiced its skepticism regarding their content. In a “Kleine Anfrage” (minor interpellation or inquiry to the federal government) released to the Bundestag in June of 2004, the CDU posed the question, “How will it be ensured that with the creation of the extra boards . . . the victim groups or the victim memorials will be included?”\textsuperscript{196}

In the spring of 2005 the Berlin Senate Administration for City Development commissioned the German-Russian Museum in Berlin-Karlshorst to create a narrative to accompany archival photographs of the construction and use of the Treptow memorial during the twentieth century. The Russian embassy and the Berlin Senate Chancellery were given the opportunity to approve the text before the signs were installed in the summer of the same year.\textsuperscript{197} Ultimately, the signage appeared with photographs of the site with German explanatory text. After their installation, the SPD of Treptow-Köpenick district took issue with the lack of English and Russian translations for foreign tourists and visitors. While the signage appeared for several years in German only, in 2010 the


\textsuperscript{197} See “Sowjetisches Ehrenmal soll Infotafeln erhalten,” Berliner Morgenpost, May 20, 2005.
City Development Administration installed new signs, identical in content to the original, in the three languages.\textsuperscript{198}

Eight signs are now included at the Soviet War Memorial: four on the Puschkinallee side and four identical signs as one enters from Am Treptower Park. One encounters the first sign as one enters under the triumphal arch from the street.

\textbf{Fig. 19.} Informational Sign, at right, just inside triumphal arch. Photograph by author, July 2008.

On the sign is a large aerial photograph of the site, showing the memorial grounds as carved out of the park’s thick trees. One gains the perspective of how large and hidden the site is before even fully entering the site.

A text accompanying the photograph begins to frame the location. Its first sentence situates the site as a location of sacrifice: “Cemetery for more than 7,000 Soviet soldiers.” The next sentence places their deaths on Germany history: “Soviet Army memorial commemorating the defeat of National Socialism.” The paragraph then describes the original intent of the memorial, within the context of the other cemeteries in

199 “Friedhof für über 7.000 sowjetische Soldaten.” (English translation from updated sign.)
200 “Ehrenmal der sowjetischen Armee für die Zerschlagung des Nationalsozialismus.” (English translation from updated sign.)
Berlin, to bury and pay respect to the Soviet soldiers who gave their lives in connection with the overthrow of the city. It again reiterates the relevance of the memorial for German history today: “The cemetery and the memorial create a central place of commemoration for those Soviet soldiers who fell in the battle of Berlin, whose achievements resonate over Berlin and Germany. The memorial, and above all, the image of the Soviet soldier with sinking sword over a destroyed swastika and a rescued child on his arm, is a symbol known around the world of the effort of the Soviet Union in defeating National Socialism.”

While not directly commenting on the contentious quotations from Stalin on the sarcophagi, the text here draws the visitor’s attention to the most visible point of the grounds, contextualizing it within a context of sacrifice and humanity. In addition, it places the efforts of the Soviet Army against the sins of the Germans.

The initial informational board concludes with a reference to the 1990 “good neighbor” treaty and the Gräbergesetz, which obligate the federal government and the City of Berlin to preserving the site as it stands. Lest there be any confusion about the stance that the city and the national government take, the text assures visitors that the governments are bound by law and treaty to preserve the site.

What this first informational sign does not include is any reference to either East Germany, or to the memorial’s long history under the GDR. Nor is any reference made here to the atrocities committed by the Red Army against the residents of Berlin during

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201 “Der Friedhof und das Ehrenmal bilden eine zentrale Gedenkstätte für die in den Kämpfen um Berlin gefallenen sowjetischen Soldaten, die mit ihrer Wirkung über Berlin und Deutschland hinausgeht. Das Ehrenmal und vor allem das Standbild des Sowjetsoldaten mit gesenktem Schwert über dem zerschlagenen Hakenkreuz und einem geretteten Kind auf dem Arm ist ein weltweit bekanntes Symbol des Beitrages des Sowjetunion zur Zerschlagung des Nationalsozialismus.” German text from original sign (no official English translation). The updated narrative varies slightly. In general, the photographs have been rearranged to accommodate the English and Russian translations on the new signs, and the texts themselves have been slightly modified for the space.
the battle of Berlin. Instead, it is solely appropriated as a specific testament to the Soviet Army’s sacrifice in overthrowing National Socialism.

As one enters the anteroom of the main memorial site—that is, the location where Mutter Heimat is situated—one must look to the side before continuing down the main path to the kurgan and sarcophagi to see the other three connected informational signs.²⁰²

These three signs tell the history of the memorial from the end of the war to present day. Included here are images and texts relating the construction of the memorial, the use of it

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²⁰² Three signs appear to the left of the Mutter Heimat sculpture and three identical signs are found to the right. The signs line the outside of the opening, meaning visitors must purposefully walk from the main pathway over to see them. They are not especially apparent if one follows the original walking trajectory set forth by the designers of the memorial grounds.
during the GDR as a ceremonial site for East German politicians and young Russian Lenin Pioneers and East German FDJ members, and images of the restoration of the memorial in the early 2000s. Of particular note is the address of the Stalin quotations. A singular image shows a close-up of one of the German translations at the end of one of the sarcophagi. Its corresponding text reads:

_Inscription on the End Side of a Sarcophagus; May 6, 1949._ The texts of Joseph W. Stalin are excerpts from daily orders to the Red Army. After the end of the Second World War, Stalin was celebrated by Soviet propaganda as the great strategizer and commander as well as the ‘inspiration of all victories,’ under whose leadership the ‘mother Heimat’ was defended.

The eight texts, each in German in the left row and in Russian in the right row of sarcophagi, illuminate the reliefs on the sides. They are touted as the ‘account written in stone’ of the Soviet Union’s battle of survival following the German attack in June 1941.203

Here the contentious Stalin quotes are situated not as historical fact, but rather as the statements of a product of a particular propaganda. However, the last statement offers a moment of German apology. The new brand of German history in Treptower Park establishes the German people not as part of the attack on National Socialism and fascism, as the GDR had done, but rather squarely situates Stalin’s actions as a response to German aggression. There is no further comment as to the legitimacy of the Soviet Union’s line of logic in so far as Stalin’s quotations are concerned; instead, the text offers a context for their emergence and inclusion at the site.

In total, what these signs accomplish is to contextualize and establish the Soviet War Memorial in concrete terms appropriate for a new post-Wall German master

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"Die acht Texte, jeweils in deutscher Sprache auf der linken Reihe und in russischer Sprache auf der rechten Reihe der Sarkophage, erläutern die Reliefs auf den Seitenflächen. Sie sind als ‘Steinerne Chronik’ des Überlebenskampfes der Sowjetunion nach dem deutschen Überfall im Juni 1941 angelegt." The second paragraph was omitted in the revised signage.
narrative. Even as the grounds were de-ritualized organically after 1990 in becoming a pedestrian’s retreat from the city as opposed to a constant and highly ceremonial site during the GDR, the informational signs solidify a certain way of thinking about the memorial. In the early years of the Soviet War Memorial, Russian and East German politicians used the power of the speech and the symbolism of the uniform to convey a particular reading of the memorial. After the last SED-PDS protest in January 1990, the continual rhetoric and ritualization of the memorial was stripped away; what was left were annual commemorations on May 8, which became increasingly irrelevant for a newly unifying population. Yet, as questions about the extent of required restoration became more critical in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the conflicted meaning of the memorial seemed to become less contested once the restoration was settled and the signs were in place. Further, the re-appropriation of the location as a return to “authentic” German socialist demonstrations by “Antifa” (anti-fascist) and community groups seemed to cut away at the legitimacy of the Soviet version of socialism depicted in the images and statements in stone.

An additional aspect of the memorial grounds, which leads, I argue, to the compartmentalization of the memorial as specific remnant of history is its location and visual environment: the hidden quality of the memorial grounds in nature once again allows the memorial and its contentions to become separate from the day-to-day realities of urban Berlin and the post-Wall German master narrative.

204 Other controversial sites around Berlin received informational signs around this time, including a former Stasi detention center in Hohenschönhausen and the Hitlerbunker in Mitte. The Berlin group Berliner Unterwelten e.V. pushed for the latter to be in place for the 2006 World Cup games, so as to clarify the site to tourists.
As I described above within the context of the GDR, the triumphal arches lead the visitor through a portal of reality. The visual and experiential break with the busy roadways of Puschkinallee and Am Treptower Park allow the visitor to enter a parallel world of history. In passing through each gateway (past Mutter Heimat, past the granite flags, etc.), one distinguishes the past from the present. Even if the informational signs contextualize the memorial grounds as part of the German experience, and as product of the National Socialist legacy, its location is distinct from the everyday life of the city and country. It can, in a sense, be locked away from the visual landscape of the capital, until one wishes to breach its entrance gate.

Two counter-examples of the effect of “hiddenness” vis-à-vis contested Soviet war memorials are the so-called Bronze Soldier in Tallinn, Estonia and the Russian Monument in Vienna, Austria. Both of these monuments were built for the Russians in the direct aftermath of WWII with similar intent to memorialize the Red Army sacrifices in battles in the two cities. In contrast to the East Berlin memorials, however, those in Tallinn and Vienna were built in their respective city centers. Thus, the memorials offer an interesting comparison in the post-Soviet era to those in Berlin.

**Center and Periphery in Tallinn and Vienna**

**Tallinn: Moving the Bronze Soldier**

The focal point of the “Monument to the Liberators” in Tallinn, Estonia, is a statue of a soldier, reminiscent of the kneeling soldiers on the pylons at the Soviet War
Memorial in Treptower Park. In Tallinn’s monument, a singular soldier stands, head bowed, with his helmet in hand. Prior to 2006, the so-called Bronze Soldier stood in the center of Tallinn, enveloped in a stone wall, evoking an opened, vertical casket. The circular emblem of the Red Army—sliced by a sword and rifle, centered with a hammer and sickle—hovered above the soldier’s head like a halo.

Fig. 22. Bronze Soldier, Tallinn. Photograph by Petri Krohn, May 2006.

The Executive Committee of Tallinn’s Council of Working People’s Deputies held a competition in 1945 to “express and perpetuate the memory of the courageous sons of our fatherland who have fallen in battle against the enemy while liberating Tallinn.”

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205 The competition is outlined in the activities report of the Tallinn Department of Architecture for the period from 11 June to 20 June 1945. ERAF Archives depot 5, ref. 5, depository unit 62. L. 4. The details of the design expectations are given in the Minutes of the meeting of Tallinn CWPD EC No. 23.
The Central Committee of the Estonian Communist Party chose the design of Estonian architect, Arnold Alas, and sculptor, Enn Roos. After gaining approval from other state and local agencies, Estonia dedicated the Bronze Solider memorial in 1947 on the occasion of the third anniversary of Tallinn’s liberation. The memorial was to be located in connection with the remains of several war dead that were buried at the site, already named “Liberators’ Square.” Additionally, the design was to take its surroundings into consideration: the size of the monument was not to exceed five meters, and was to be in “harmony” with Liberators’ Square. Additionally, the designers were to use local stone materials. While the Bronze Soldier monument was to conform to its immediate surroundings and available local natural resources, its location was undeniably central. Unlike the Soviet war memorials in Treptow and Pankow, Berlin, the Liberator of Tallinn stood on Tõnismägi (St. Anthony’s Hill), a square in central Tallinn.

A plaque inscribed on the stone wall listed the names of the dead buried at the site, along with recognition of two unknown bodies. In the 1960s, an eternal flame was installed in front of the soldier. Fifteen years later, the names of the unknown were added after research confirmed their identities. During the post-war Soviet era in Estonia, the Bronze Soldier and the eternal flame became a “ritualized place to commemorate. . . (the) Soviet victory over fascism. . .” The memorial thus not only ostensibly fit into the

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208 Ibid, 16.
landscape of Soviet Tallinn, it fell in line with the official master narrative of Soviet liberation of Estonia from fascism.

Not surprisingly, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union came a breakdown of the Soviet master narrative in Estonia of Russian liberation. As Siobhan Kattago has written in the context of the Tallinn memorial, the fracture in the union further broke Estonia along the fault line of Estonians—who increasingly saw the Russians as occupiers—and the large contingency of ethnic Russians—who regarded their compatriots abroad as liberators. But while the memorial continued to stand on Tõnismägi with little regard in 1991, by 2007 it became a flash point of violent reaction.

In 1993, as Estonia began to make its political transition into full independent statehood, the city of Tallinn removed the eternal flame from the memorial and changed the text of the inscriptions from “Eternal Honor to the Fallen Heroes, who have Fallen for the Liberation and Sovereignty of our Land” to the more inclusive “To those killed in the Second World War,” written in both Estonian and Russian. These changes fell in line with the emerging Estonian re-reading of World War II. There was little vocal opposition to these changes.

However, with the changing geo-politics of the post-Yeltsin era, Estonia began to move ever closer to the West, as Putin fueled nationalist fires in Russia. As Kattago emphasizes in her analysis, Estonia’s admittance into the European Union and NATO in 2004, along with swelling nationalism under Putin, brought the issue of competing historical interpretations to a head in Estonia. The issue was further spotlighted by the

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210 Estonia declared independence in August 1991; the last Russian troops left three years later.
211 I defer to Kattago, “War Memorials,” 158 and Kaasik’s translations of the text. See Kaasik, “Common Grave,” 16. Above I use Kattago’s translation. Kaasik’s version is similar: “May the fallen heroes who have fallen for the liberation of our country and for independence be honoured forever” and “For those who were killed in World War II.”
contentious sixtieth anniversary of May 8 celebrations in 2005: the two protest contingencies erupted at the Bronze Soldier memorial. The city banned Russian Army veterans from relighting the Eternal Flame, citing safety concerns and the “feelings” of others which might be “hurt” by the action, but it did allow the veterans to organize a two and a half hour public gathering.212 In the hours before the day began, vandals poured red paint on the Bronze Soldier. The mayor called for understanding.213 Estonia’s national police chief later reprimanded two senior Tallinn police officials for not having fully protected the memorial from desecration.214 Clearly, tensions abounded, but officials attempted to contain the hostilities between the two groups.

One year later, in connection with the May 9 commemorations, Russian veteran groups again received permission to hold a ceremony at the Bronze Soldier.215 In protest, however, the right-leaning Pro Patria Union party demanded the memorial be removed from Tõnismägi. Juri Bohm, a member of the party, stated, “A monument to Red Army soldiers who occupied Estonia must not be located in the heart of Tallinn.”216 The party argued that the monument, as a symbol of occupation, had no place in the center of the Estonian capital. The party’s faction in Tallinn filed a resolution with the city to move the memorial to another location. The Constitutional Party, supported mainly by ethnic Russians, filed a counter to Pro Patria, arguing that the removal of the memorial would be

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212 See “Tallinn City Govt Bans Red Army Vets from Relighting Eternal Flame at WWII Monument May 9,” Baltic News Service, May 4, 2005, which quotes Mayor Tõnis Palts: “Firstly, lighting of the flame may hurt the feelings of many people and secondly, lighting of the gas flame in the way proposed (by the veterans) involves a heightened safety risk.”
215 The Soviets established May 9 as “Victory Day” in 1945 in recognition of Nazi Germany’s capitulation in WWII. Commemorative celebrations began across the USSR and several Eastern Bloc countries the following year.
the ultimate in poor cultural taste and accused the party of “political maliciousness” and being overly ideological.\textsuperscript{217}

As the tensions again began to mount between those who saw the memorial as an oppressive symbol of occupation and those who understood the memorial as a mark of liberation, the city brought in extra police and security protection for the days surrounding May 9.\textsuperscript{218} On the day of the commemoration, Bohm, who came in protest of the memorial, and several Russians there to lay wreaths, were removed by police after they began to argue. Others smeared paint on the memorial; an older Estonian woman was hit in the face.\textsuperscript{219} Mayor Juri Ratas, a member of the Center Party, stated in response that the decision regarding how to move forward with the memorial would be up to the City Council. He hoped, however, the community would come to a consensus regarding the memorial first so the Council could act according to the will of the people.\textsuperscript{220}

In an effort to calm tensions, Estonian Minister of Internal Affairs banned any further gatherings at the memorial, including picnics and laying flowers.\textsuperscript{221} The President of Estonia, Arnold Ruutel, proposed roundtable discussions to draw a consensus on the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{217} “Estonia’s Constitutional Party against Removal of Red Army Monument,” \textit{Baltic News Service}, May 5, 2006. The statement further concluded (inaccurately), “There are in Europe numerous monuments symbolizing the victory over Nazism, erected in honor of those who liberated European nations from the ‘brown plague.’ In Austria, Germany, Poland, the Czech Republic, France, Hungary, and many other countries such memorials are under the protection of the state and nowhere are they regarded as symbols of occupation.”
\item \textsuperscript{218} See ibid.
\end{itemize}
fate of the memorial. Other organizations followed suit. The decision-making process became increasingly taken over by the federal government.

In January of 2007, the Estonian Parliament passed the “War Graves Protection Act,” which allowed, under the language of the Geneva Convention, to move war graves if they were found to be located in unsuitable areas, either because of geographic or political reasons. This act allowed the government to proceed with the relocation of the Bronze Soldier. Russian officials reacted strongly to the decision, calling the move of the Soviet War Memorial “steriliz[ing] history.” Russia argued that the move would harm the memory of the 70,000 Russian soldiers who died in Estonia. One official stated, “I am generally against the touching of monuments. Times change but monuments bear our history. Besides, monuments pertaining to World War II are not connected with Estonian history alone.”

Over the weeks which followed the Parliament’s decision, conflict became more heated within Estonia as well as in the country’s relationship with Russia. Estonian-Russian activists went so far as to picket the European Union in Strasbourg. Despite Tallinn’s municipal government’s pleas to delay the action, the Ministry of Defense began excavation work at the Memorial on April 26, 2007, days before the next May 9

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222 “Estonian PM Opposes President’s Proposal to Form Special Commission on Red Army Monument,” Baltic News Service, May 25, 2006. The Prime Minister, Andrus Ansip, originally opposed the idea, fearing too much credence would be given to extremists if they were to be included in the discussion.


224 “Estonian Parl Passes War Graves Protection Act,” Baltic News Service, January 10, 2007. German and Finnish graves would be exempt from this bill, as they have separate treaties governing their war graves.

225 “Estonian War Graves Act Draws Russian Criticism,” Baltic News Service, January 10, 2007. Original context: “[Russian Ombudsman Vladimir] Lukin said that he could very well understand some people’s bitterness vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. ‘But I do not like if this is expressed on some kind of pagan level: see, we will take down the monument and the problem is solved. There is no need to sterilize history,’ he said.”

226 Ibid. Lukin quoted here.

observances. Riot police were brought in to the location in the middle of the night to prevent unrest. Workers posted seven signs: “Archeological excavations and identification work of Tõnismägi war graves are taking place here. Please maintain calm and dignity in the area of works.” The notices went unheeded: by the next day, more than 300 rioters were arrested, and one person was stabbed to death.

While the police took control over the area around the Bronze Soldier, government-level protest continued. Some accused Russia of jamming internet service in Estonia in a cyber-attack. Estonia looked to the European Union for support, who called on Russia to protect foreign diplomats. Russia cut off oil lines to Estonia.

In the end, Russia and Russian-Estonians conceded and the Bronze Soldier, the stone backing wall, and the remains of the dead from Tõnismägi were moved to the Defense Forces Cemetery outside of the center of Tallinn. The former grounds on Tõnismägi were planted with flowers the color of the European Union flag, removing any doubt about the official Estonian conclusion to the controversy and its vision for the future. As the Prime Minister months later asked rhetorically regarding the relocation of the monument, “whose word matters in Estonia, [...] the Estonian government’s or the Kremlin’s?”

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229 “Tallinn Violence over Statue,” Evening Standard (London), April 27, 2007. Estonia blamed youth looters for taking advantage of the situation. See also “Estonian Envoy in Russia Says Riots in Tallinn Caused by Looters.” Text of report by Russian news agency Interfax. BBC Worldwide Reporting, April 27, 2007 and Stephen Lee Myers, “After Violent Night, Estonia removes a Soviet-Era Memorial,” New York Times, April 27, 2007. “‘All this had nothing to do with the inviolability of graves or keeping alive the memory of men fallen in World War II,’ the Estonian president, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, said in a statement on Friday. ‘The common denominator of last night’s criminals was not their nationality, but their desire to riot, vandalize and plunder.’”
While the relations between Estonia and Russia continued to be contentious after the move, the following May 9 commemorations were peaceful. The Estonian Prime Minister declined to participate in ceremonies observing the anniversary; however, ethnic Russians commemorated the day both on Tõnismägi and at the new site in the Defense Cemetery. The police did not report any incidents.  

By May of 2009, Red Army veterans in Tallinn decided to forgo a wreath-laying ceremony at the former site of the Bronze Soldier altogether, and instead held May 9 ceremonies at the Defense Cemetery and a second cemetery in Tallinn.

The political situation in Estonia vis-à-vis Russia cannot fully be compared to that of Germany and Russia following 1990. The relationship between the respective countries in the years following the Second World War were varied, as are the ethnic composition of the countries’ populations (i.e., nearly one third of Estonia is populated by ethnic Russians). Nonetheless, the controversy in Tallinn over the Bronze Soldier is instructive in understanding Berlin’s Soviet War Memorial in Treptower Park.

At issue for Estonian’s protesting the Bronze Soldier while it stood on Tõnismägi was that first, it was symbolic of oppressive politics that were no longer relevant in an independent Estonia. Second, while the language on the stone wall behind the Bronze Soldier was changed in 1993 to recontextualize the monument from one of Soviet

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liberation to one honoring all who died in the war, the visual context remained the same: 
the statue was located in the city center. The monument could be seen from cars passing 
by or from the National Library of Estonia. Standing at the monument, visitors’ sightline 
included trees in the square, but also buildings of Tallinn. It stood within the visual 
circumference of the capital, thus capturing the Russian experience within the optic 
context of Tallinn.

Once the Bronze Soldier was relocated to the Defense Cemetery, it was removed 
from the urban topography of Tallinn. Those wishing to visit the monument would be 
required to intentionally seek it out in the other-world of the burial grounds. It was no 
longer explicitly part of the city landscape. As such, the rate of violence and vandalism 
against the monument has decreased dramatically since the monument was moved.

**Vienna: De-luminating the Red Army Monument**

Austria’s experience with the Soviet Union after World War II was assuredly 
different from both Estonia and the GDR. Specifically, the occupation of Vienna by 
Soviet (and allied) forces only lasted until 1955, when Austria declared its independence. 
Austria did not have as close a relationship with the Soviet Union as the GDR and 
certainly Estonia had in the years following. Nor does 1989/1990 have the same cultural 
and political resonance as break for Austria as it does in the other two countries. As such, 
the Soviet War Memorial in Vienna—which I will call here the Red Army
Monument\textsuperscript{235}—must be observed over the years of the post-1955 era in a way similar to the others after 1990.

Months before the Red Army approached Vienna, plans were already in the works for the creation of a Soviet monument in the capital. Soviet artists and engineers began in February of 1945 to design the monument. Vienna fell in April of 1945, and the monument was completed and dedicated in August.\textsuperscript{236}

The monument sits at the apex of two distinct urban spaces. It is the end point as one approaches Schwarzenbergplatz. The street then splits around the monument as it begins to circle Palais Schwarzenberg and the Belvedere castle gardens. Directly behind the Red Army Monument begins the lush landscape of the palace grounds. Yet, in terms of a visual trajectory from the street, the Red Army Monument is an optic fulcrum joining these two distinct spaces. Before the Red Army Monument was constructed, the line of sight from the wide streets of Schwarzenbergplatz ran from the large nineteenth century monument to Karl Philipp Schwarzenberg (the General who led Austria to victory in the Battle of Leipzig [\textit{Volkerschlacht}]) to a large Hochstrahlbrunnen fountain at the end of the street, culminating visually in Palais Schwarzenberg, a seventeenth century palace recently turned five-star restaurant and hotel. When the monument was built in 1945, the

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{235} The “Heldendenkmal der Roten Armee” has many names in Austria, some more pejorative than others, such as “Erbsendenkmal” (pea memorial), after the Russian rationing of the legume to hungry Viennese in the immediate post-war period (See Marcello La Speranza, “Der Russenpanzer und die Rote Armee im Kampf um die Freiheit,” in \textit{Das Wiener Russendenkmal: Architektur, Geschichte, Konflikte}, ed. Matthias Marschik and Georg Spitaler [Vienna: Turia + Kant, 2005], 57) or the more disparaging “Denkmal des unbekannten Plünderers” (memorial of the unknown plunderers). The most oft-used name for the monument is “Russendenkmal,” but considering the composition of the Red Army as inclusive of Soviet territories, this name is most assuredly incorrect. Hence, I will use “Red Army Monument” to suggest the distinction in German between \textit{Denkmal} used here and \textit{Ehrenmal} used in Berlin.

\textsuperscript{236} See Erich Klein’s “Drei Monate statt ein Jahr: Die Autoren des Russendenkmals” in \textit{Das Wiener Russendenkmal: Architektur, Geschichte, Konflikte}, ed. Matthias Marschik and Georg Spitaler (Vienna: Turia + Kant, 2005), 21-33 for a more detailed description of the monument’s conception. He argues that the rush to complete Europe’s first Soviet victory monument was to be proof to the Allies of the Soviet Union’s great organizational capabilities. Klein, “Drei Monate,” 27.
\end{footnotesize}
singular Red Army soldier rose behind the fountain as a visual repetition to the water rising from below. It also partially obscured the view of the Palais Schwarzenberg from the street. The Red Army Monument replaced it as the end point as one approaches from Schwarzenbergplatz.

The Red Army Monument is situated directly behind the Hochstrahlbrunnen fountain. A colonnade wraps the monument by repeating the curve of the fountain on its southern side.

Fig. 23. Red Army Monument, Vienna. Photograph by Andreas Pöschek, July 2005.
In between, a Red Army Soldier rises on a singular obelisk, arm raised with a flag, machine gun hanging from his neck. In his left hand, the soldier holds a large bronze shield depicting symbolic images of the Soviet Union, including a hammer and sickle. Below the soldier, the base of the obelisk widens to provide a space for text. A carved wreath and flags adorn the base. The text on the base includes the first verse of the Soviet hymn as well as a poem “From the walls of Stalingrad you all came to Vienna.” On the colonnade behind the obelisk runs along the top, “Eternal Honor to the soldiers of the Soviet army, who fell in battle against the German-fascist occupiers, for the freedom and

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independence of the people of Europe.”²³⁸ The texts on the colonnade and the obelisk were only written in Russian. Atop the colonnade two crouching soldiers, with weapons pointed out to the side streets, flank both ends of the structure. In addition, a tank was also positioned at the site.

In contrast to the tone of the Soviet War Memorial in Treptower Park and the Bronze Soldier of Tallinn, the monument at Schwarzenbergplatz has a decidedly defiant quality. Where the Treptow memorial in Berlin creates a mournful narrative of the struggle of the socialist fight against fascism and the sacrifices made by both soldier and family, and the Bronze Soldier’s simple statue and background suggest the hardships of war, the Red Army Monument in Vienna strikes a very different chord textually and visually.

First, as Erich Klein argues, the monument emphasizes the specificity of Soviet army victory, rather than exploiting the ideologies of Stalinism and socialism. It is less, as the texts described above show, about moral victory than it is about brute strength in conquering a fascist enemy.²³⁹ With the symbols of the tank and the positioned soldiers with weapons ready to fire on top of the colonnade, the visual impact of the monument reiterates this.

Second, the visual context of the monument shows a desire on the part of the designers to obscure a particular history of Vienna (i.e., the Palais Schwarzenberg) with the monument. Its repetition of line with the Hochstrahlbrunnen fountain, however, brings the monument in focus with the city landscape, changing the meaning of the

²³⁸ Klein’s German translation from the Russian: “Ewigen Ruhm den Soldaten der Sowjetarmee, die im Kampf gegen die deutsch-faschistischen Okkupanten für die Freiheit und die Unabhängigkeit der Völker Europas gefallen sind.” Ibid.
²³⁹ See Klein, “Drei Monate,” 23.
fountain from simple aesthetic beauty to a duplication of the lines of the obelisk. The rounded colonnade mimics the curve of the fountain’s base and the rising obelisk repeats the height of the singular water stream from the center of the fountain. This, in turn, suggests an incorporation of something Russian in Vienna. It is a visual trick only, though, as the texts of the monument were only written in Russian.

When the Red Army Monument was dedicated in August of 1945, Austrian politicians came to speak at the ceremony, not unlike their German counterparts in Berlin in 1949. Yet, unlike those who spoke in Treptower Park, the politicians in Vienna would not become forefathers of a socialist republic. Instead, they would, a decade later, be leaders of an independent and democratic nation. Their words spoke to this prospect, as they couched their language in praise of the actions of the Red Army liberating Vienna, but not of the ideology behind it. Chancellor Karl Renner, State Secretaries Leopold Figl and Ernst Fischer, and Vienna Mayor Theodor Körner each thanked the Russians for their deeds, but did not align themselves or Austria as co-anti-fascist resisters in the same way East Germans later did. Instead, several of the speakers contextualized the Russian liberation within the actions of other liberators, specifically the Allied forces. Renner, for example, further distanced the Russians by stating that their liberation of Austria

240 Leopold Figl: “An diesem Festtag soll unser Dank allen jenen gelten, die an unserer Befreiung mitgewirkt haben. In erster Linie den alliierten Nationen und vor allem den tapferen Soldaten der Roten Armee” (On this celebration day, we should thank all those who made our liberation possible. First and foremost, the allied nations, and especially the brave soldiers of the Red Army.) Quoted in Georg Spitaler, “Dank für dieses Befreiungswerk!” Die Reden österreichischer Politiker zur Eröffnung des Heldendenkmals am 19.8.1945,” in Das Wiener Russendenkmal: Architektur, Geschichte, Konflikte, ed. Matthias Marschik and Georg Spitaler (Vienna: Turia + Kant, 2005), 42. Fischer: “... so danken wir diesen Vereinten Nationen und vor allem dem Heldenvolk der Russen, der heldenhaften Roten Armee.” (... and so we thank the United Nations for this and especially the heroes of the Russian people, the courageous Red Army.) Quoted in ibid, 43.
allowed for the “rebirth” of the country as a “free, independent republic,” but did not mention any further indebtedness, except to state, as Mayor Körner did, that Vienna would protect the monument in the same way Stalin had ultimately protected the city.

This distinction—that Austria was thankfully liberated by the Russians, but not necessarily beholden to their politics—is followed by a final point germane to the prevailing post-war Austrian master narrative of victimhood. Beyond situating the monument as one within the context of Russian and Allied liberation, Figl also locates it as one inclusive of all suffering during the war. He states,

We stand today at a memorial, not a monument to war dedicated to a battle, but rather at a monument to an unyielding justice, which never let human dignity perish. For seven years the Austrian people languished under Hitler’s barbarianism, for seven years the Austrian people were enslaved and oppressed. No possibility for the freedom of stating one’s opinion, no free confession was possible.

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241 “Uns haben diese Taten und Opfer nicht nur erlöst von den Fesseln des Faschismus [der Unfreiheit], die haben die Wiedergeburt unseres eigenen Staates, der freien, unabhängigen Republik, und damit die Wiedergewinnung des Selbstbestimmungsrechtes unseres Volkes ermöglicht.” (These actions and these martyrs not only freed us from the chains of fascism, but they have made the rebirth of our own nation, of a free, independent republic and therefore the recovery of our right of self-determination of our people possible.) Quoted in ibid, 39.

242 Körner stated the following in reference to the fact that with the dedication, Austria would be transferred liability of the monument from the Russians: “Die Stadt wird das Denkmal ebenso heilig in Ehren halten wie die Erinnerung an den der Wiener Bevölkerung so freundlich gesinnten Generalissimus der Roten Armee Joseph Stalin.” (The city will hold the monument as sacredly in honor as the memory the Viennese people have of the friendly chief commander of the Red Army, Joseph Stalin.) “Reden zur Eröffnung des Heldendenkmals für die gefallenen Kämpfer der Roten Armee, 19 August 1945.” In Spitaler, “‘Dank für dieses Befreiungswerk!’,” 45. See Spitaler’s compilation of Karl Renner, Leopold Figl, Ernst Fischer, and Theodor Körner’s speeches in ibid, 34-45.

243 Figl: “Wir stehen heute an einem Ehrenmal, nicht an einem Kriegermal, das einer Schlacht geweiht ist, sondern am Mahnmal einer unerbittlichen Gerechtigkeit, die niemals die Menschenwürde untergehen läßt. Sieben Jahre schmachte das österreichische Volk unter dem Hitlerbarbarismus, sieben Jahre wurde das österreichische Volk unterjocht und unterdrückt. Kein Wort der freien Meinungsäußerung, kein freies Bekenntnis war möglich.” Spitaler, “‘Dank für dieses Befreiungswerk!’,” 42. Spitaler argues, “... Hatte Renner das Denkmal in erster Linie als Monument für die Taten der Roten Armee bezeichnet, so wollte sein Regierungskollege von der Regierungspartei [Figl] lieber von einem allgemeinen Denkmal für die Befreiung Österreichs sprechen, wobei auf diese Weise auch die anderen Alliierten sowie der österreichische Beitrag zu dieser Befreiung ins Spiel kamen.” (If Renner had called the memorial principally a monument for the actions of the Red Army, his colleague from the ruling party [Figl] would have preferred to speak of a general memorial for the liberation of Austria, so that the other Allies as well as the Austrian contribution to this liberation could come into play.) Spitaler, “‘Dank für dieses Befreiungswerk!’,” 36). See Spitaler, “‘Dank für dieses Befreiungswerk!’,” 34-38 for his analysis of the four speeches.
Heidemarie Uhl points to this statement from Figl as one of the defining moments of the “first victim” myth in Austria’s Second Republic. Because of this developing official narrative of Austria being the first—and therefore longest—victim of Hitler’s aggression, the Red Army Monument could thus stand as testament to liberation (by Russians and perhaps the Allies, as suggested by the Austrian dedication speakers). It did not, as in the case of East Germany, necessarily have to correspond to a particular and accepted worldview of Soviet Socialism as a legitimate brand of politics for the country; Austria, while officially neutral, was considered a true Western European, i.e., democratic, state in the post-war era.

This fact did not, however, curb controversy regarding the Red Army Monument in Vienna. Two high-profile attacks attempted in the early years of its existence highlight the most violent responses to the monument.

By 1947 three suspects in an attempted bombing of the Red Army Memorial were before a judge. Two suspects—a woman and a man in their late teens and early 20s—drew attention at a night club by making known their desire to find an underground neo-Nazi “Werewolf” group. Vienna police approached the two suspects with an infiltrator, “Herbert,” who was later accused of provoking the suspects into placing a bomb at the

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244 Heidemarie Uhl: “Leopold Figl’s Rede kann als exemplarisches Beispiel für die Selbstdarstellung Österreichs im Rahmen der Opfertheorie gesehen werden. Grundgelegt wurde dieses Geschichtsbild in der Unabhängigkeitserklärung vom 27. April 1945, als die von Vertretern der Sozialistischen Partei (SPÖ), der Volkspartei (ÖVP) und der Kommunistischen Partei (KPÖ) gebildete provisorische Regierung die Wiederherstellung der demokratischen Republik Österreich proklamierte.” (Leopold Figl’s speech can be seen as an ideal example of Austria’s self-portrayal in context of the victim theory. This historical picture was founded in the Independence Declaration of April 27, 1945, when the provisional government, which was comprised of representatives of the Socialist Party of Austria [SPÖ], the People’s Party of Austria [ÖVP] and the Communist Party of Austria [KPÖ], proclaimed the reestablishment of the democratic republic of Austria.) Heidemarie Uhl, “Das ‘erste Opfer.’ Der österreichische Opfermythos und seine Transformationen in der Zweiten Republik,” Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft 30, no. 1 (2001): 20. Uhl traces the changes and variation in this official “myth” across the post-war Austrian political landscape.
foot of the obelisk. “Herbert” was put on trial, too. But of particular interest here is the expressed reasoning behind the attack. “KK,” the male suspect, was said to have complained that the Red Army Monument, like so many other memorials, did not “fit.” Further investigation exposed an alleged plot hatched by the communist Vienna Chief of Police, Heinrich Dürmayer, to use “Herbert” and the two neo-Nazis to drum up sympathy in support of the Russians through an attack on the memorial. Dürmayer was relieved of his post in September 1947.246

Fifteen years later, a second large-scale neo-fascist attack on the Red Army Monument was foiled by police. A time bomb was found five meters up on the back of the obelisk, set to detonate hours after it was discovered. Investigators were led to Italy, where a member of a student group associated with the neo-fascist Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) party placed the bomb at the site.247 This attempted attack took place during a moment of increased violence by South Tirol separatist groups, who sought to destroy symbolic monuments across the region.248 Police in Vienna took extra measure to protect the monument from further attack.

245 “K.K. soll geäußert haben, ‘es gebe so viele Denkmäler und andere Sachen, die nicht hereinpassen, wobei er auch auf das Befreiungsdenkmal am Stalinplatz zu sprechen kam.’” (K.K. allegedly stated, ‘there are so many monuments and other things that don’t fit in, at which point he also started to talk about the liberation monument on Stalin Square.) Quoted in Rudolf Jeřábek, “Russendenkmal—Eine kleine Kriminalgeschichte,” in Das Wiener Russendenkmal: Architektur, Geschichte, Konflikte, ed. Matthias Marschik and Georg Spitaler (Vienna: Turia + Kant, 2005), 81, from the Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Archiv der Republik. Jeřábek’s essay was also reprinted with photographs in Öffentliche Sicherheit, the official magazine of the Austrian Department of the Interior in 2006 under the title “Mädchenmord und Attentate: Das ‘Russendenkmal’ auf dem Schwarzenbergplatz in Wien hat auch eine interessante Kriminalgeschichte.”


247 The main suspect, Giorgio Massara, was closely linked to Movimento Sociale Italiano, a neo-fascist party in Italy. See Jeřábek, “Russendenkmal,” 87-90 for details.

248 It was around this time—1962/1964—that the group “Befreiungsausschuss Südtirol” (Liberation Committee South Tyrol, or BAS) became especially violent. They have been accused of murdering over 20 people in various attacks.
In both cases, right-wing extremists were closely linked to the attempted harm to the Red Army Monument. Smaller-scale acts of vandalism and desecration have, in fact, persisted through present. But massive demonstrations or calls for the monument’s removal from the site have not come from mainstream Austrians, as they did in Estonia after 1990. Generally, as with the Soviet War Memorial in Treptower Park, these attacks have been linked to small-scale hooligans. These distinctions point to the overall collective understanding of the memorials in terms of their place in German, Estonian, and Austrian society and history, but they also point to the ways in which the monuments are literally seen.

In Tallinn, the relocation of the Bronze Soldier to a national cemetery was endorsed broadly across the native Estonian political spectrum. In Berlin, calls for the demolition of the Soviet War Memorial or, at minimum, the erasure of Stalin quotations on the site, were introduced by conservative CDU party members. In Vienna, while the debate of late has not been as acute as in Berlin, one conservative FPÖ party member did make rumblings about the legitimacy of the Red Army Monument, but in all, controversy surrounding the monument has been rather minimal since the 1960s.


By which, I mean, its removal was not supported by ethnic Russians in Estonia.

Within the context of an inquiry to the Austrian Federal Minister for Education, Art, and Culture, Representative Martin Graf (FPÖ) argues regarding artist installations at war memorials in Vienna, “Dabei wird nebenbei auch auf den kunsthistorischen Charakter dieser Denkmäler völlig vergessen und der Denkmalschutz außer Acht gelassen. Hier wirft sich auch die Frage auf, warum dahingehend das Denkmal der Sowjetarmee am Wiener Schwarzenbergplatz, wo auf einer 20 Meter hohen Säule ein 12 Meter großer martialischer Sowjetkrieger steht, unangetastet bleibt, zumal die Übersetzung eines Teiles der Inschrift lautet: ‘Ewiges Heil den Helden der Roten Armee.’ ” (Through that the historically artistic character of these monuments are completely forgotten and the memorial protection is disregarded. Here the question also arises, why in contrast does the Memorial of the Soviet Army on Vienna’s Schwarzenbergplatz, where on a 20 meter high column a 12 meter large menacing Soviet warrior stands, remain untouched, and above all the translation of part of the dedication which reads, ‘Eternal salvation for the heroes of the Red Army.’)
One critic has called the Red Army Monument a “masterpiece of ambivalence,” which has nothing to do with the city of Vienna.\textsuperscript{252} Jan Tabor writes:

The phrase ‘Russian Monument’ is correct in so far as the monument only wants to speak to the Soviet people, the Red Army members. It doesn’t at all look to Austrians. Doesn’t mourn them, doesn’t accuse them of anything, doesn’t settle any scores with them. The fallen, who are mentioned here, were in battle in Hungary. It ignores the people of the country in which it was erected, [or rather,] had to be erected. It honors the Soviet fallen, that is it.\textsuperscript{253}

Of course, Tabor himself doesn’t fully believe that there is no consequence for the Red Army Monument in Vienna, only that it shouldn’t resonate with the city’s residents. But he points, rightly, I believe, to the visual context of the monument as furthering this “ambivalence.” Its location between the fountain and the Palais Schwarzenberg, at the end of a thoroughfare, folds the monument into its surroundings. Despite being in the city center, it becomes invisible. As Tabor states, “It stands in the middle of the optic axis, but it doesn’t push forward, doesn’t impose itself.”\textsuperscript{254} In many ways, it repeats and follows the lines of its surroundings, completing a Gesamtkunstwerk of Schwarzenbergplatz. The Red Army Monument becomes unseen in Robert Musil’s sense of the word.

At the same time, the monument became further pushed from the visual focus of the urban landscape with a redesign of the square by Spanish architect Alfredo Arribas. Finished in 2004, Arribas widened the traffic lanes of the two stretches of Wien XV und anderer Denkmäler.” 2947/J XXIII. GP. December 12, 2007, http://www.parlament.gv.at/PG/DE/XXIII/J/J_02947/fname_096104.pdf.
\textsuperscript{253} Der Ausdruck ‘Russendenkmal’ stimmt allerdings dahingehend, dass das Denkmal nur die Sowjetmenschen, die Rotarmisten, ansprechen will. An die Österreicher wendet sich das Denkmal überhaupt nicht. Mahnt sie nicht, macht ihnen keine Vorwürfe, rechnet nicht ab oder etwas vor. Die Gefallenen, die hier erwähnt werden, beziehen sich auf die Kämpfe in Ungarn. Es ignoriert die Menschen jenes Landes, in dem es aufgestellt wurde, aufgestellt werden musste. Es ehrt die sowjetischen Gefallenen, das ist alles. (Tabor, “Entblößt das Haupt!,” 117.)
\textsuperscript{254} Tabor, “Entblößt das Haupt!,” 114.
Schwarzenbergplatz, added new lighting to emphasize the patterns, and added new monuments, among other things.\textsuperscript{255} But it is his specific use of lighting as visual delimitation that is of importance here.

In the 1998 competition for the redesign of Schwarzenbergplatz, the question of the Red Army Monument’s role in the new formulation of the square was apparent in Arribas’s plan as well as in the proposal of the architecture team PAULHOF and collaborating artist Hans Kupelwieser.\textsuperscript{256} The latter group proposed moving the Red Army Monument and the Karl Philipp Schwarzenberg “Reiterstandbild” monument to a more prominent location in the middle of Schwarzenbergplatz, so that their juxtaposition could play off one another. The provocative proposal stirred much discussion, but in the end, both monuments would receive much less attention. Arribas’s lighting design effectively erased the Red Army Monument from Schwarzenbergplatz.\textsuperscript{257}

\textsuperscript{255} See http://www.wien.gv.at/stadtentwicklung/schwarzenbergplatz/index.htm for a complete project description.


\textsuperscript{257} Arribas also included a two-foot (60cm) high “wall” around the circumference of the fountain and Red Army monument to create an “optic and constructed separation” ([e]ine optische und bauliche Trennung) between the fountain area and the traffic of Schwarzenbergplatz. While this certainly creates a formal distinction between the two spaces (especially while seated in a car or bench near the fountain), I am not convinced that its overall effect can break the gaze. To be sure, the intent behind the wall certainly creates delineation, but it is more of a barricade effect than a true impediment to the optic wholeness of the area. See “1., 3. und 4., Schwarzenbergplatz—Details zum Projekt—realisiertes Bauvorhaben” at http://www.wien.gv.at/verkehr/strassen/bauen/grossprojekte/schwarzenbergplatz-details.html.
Fig. 25. Red Army Monument at night behind Hochstrahlbrunnen; Arribas’s lighting design. Vienna. Photograph by Georg Tschannett.

Arribas’s design called for forty-five-foot street lights to be installed along the corridor of Schwarzenbergplatz, illuminating and highlighting the breadth and activity of the streets. Further, lighting tubes along the far end draw attention to the fountain and a dividing wall between it and the street. The Red Army Monument behind the fountain has no light, and falls into darkness at night. “But,” as Christian Kühn rhetorically asks, “can we really snap [it] out of the public consciousness so easily?”

The short answer is, of course, “no”; however, the combined effect of actively receding the monument into the night shadows, as well as the way in which the monument is veiled during the day through its visual agreement with the surroundings,

258 Full quote: “Denn weder das Reiterstandbild noch das ‘Russendenkmal’ sind beleuchtet, da sie sonst den Lichterketten Konkurrenz machen würden. Aber können wir sie wirklich so einfach aus dem öffentlichen Bewusstsein wegknipsen?” (Then neither the monument [of Carl Philipp of Schwarzenberg] nor the ‘Russian Memorial’ is lit, because they would otherwise be in competition with the chain of lights. But can we really snap them out of the public consciousness so easily?) Kühn, “Wem das reicht,” 2004.
cumulatively pushes the Red Army Monument from focus. The decreased immediacy of the monument to the rawness of Russian occupation after the war aids this disappearing act. So while the Red Army Monument in Vienna remains a contentious monument, its aesthetic composition vis-à-vis Schwarzenbergplatz continues to diminish its prominence.

The two counter-examples of the Bronze Soldier in Tallinn and the Red Army Monument in Vienna speak to two variations in which the visual aspects of their locations vis-à-vis their surroundings speak to how the monuments are then received and understood by the public. In the case of the former, the incongruence of the Bronze Soldier’s political and locational standing led to its removal from central Tallinn. Estonia’s increased disassociation with Russia transferred onto a conflict of symbolics and ethnic tensions in the Estonian capital. Not only was the Bronze Soldier argued to be symbolic of Russian oppression, its actual form was argued not to be befitting of the location. In this case, the juxtaposition of the monument with the city buildings of Tallinn surrounding it proved too much; the monument was moved to a cemetery, where it was contextualized within the confines of mortality.

Alternatively, the Red Army Monument continues to stand in the midst of Austria’s capital city. However, unlike the Bronze Soldier, it was not the Red Army

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259 Matthias Marschik takes up this issue of displacement, following Kühn’s assessment. Marschik argues, “Das Denkmal rückt aus dem Zentrum der Darstellung immer weiter an die Peripherie, indem es zunächst ins Ensemble des Platzes eingefügt, dann an den Rand gedrängt und schließlich hinter dem Hochstrahlbrunnen versteckt wird.” (More and more the memorial moves from the center of the design out to the periphery, in that it first is fit into the ensemble of the square, and then is pushed to the side, and finally is hidden behind the Hochstrahlbrunnen fountain.) Matthias Marschik, “Russenbilder. Die Visualisierung des Heldendenkmals am Schwarzenbergplatz,” in *Das Wiener Russendenkmal: Architektur, Geschichte, Konflikte*, ed. Matthias Marschik and Georg Spitaler (Vienna: Turia + Kant, 2005), 133.

260 In this regard, it is interesting to note that ÖVP-Wien criticisms of Arribas’s design, in particular criticizing the lighting design, did not make mention of the lack of light surrounding the Red Army Monument. See then ÖVP-Wien leader Matthias Tschirf’s statement on the Schwarzenbergplatz (Tschirf, “Schwarzenbergplatz,” http://www.matthias-tschirf.at /6028); his criticisms were published elsewhere as well in 2005.
Monument in Vienna which was moved, but the context of it, which shifted over the years. While two considerable neo-fascist attacks were attempted on the Red Army Monument after its construction, its presence became less noticeable over the years, not more. This is because, I argue, the monument visually aligned itself with its immediate environment, thereby reducing its prominence, despite its large scale. The curves of the colonnade mimic the fountain base in front of the monument; the water from the fountain itself follows the line upwards of the pedestal and soldier atop it. Further, with the newly redesigned Schwarzenbergplatz, Alfredo Arribas illuminates the Hochstrahlbrunnen fountain, but not the Red Army Monument behind it. The monument thus recedes into the darkness at night, removing it from the viewer’s sight.

Taken together, the three Soviet war memorials of Treptower Park in Berlin, Tallinn, and Vienna highlight the varied relationships each country (and city) has to their memorials. Not only is it a question of reinterpreting the legacy of the Red Army and the countries’ histories with Russia, but the monuments point to the impact of the visual context of the constructions as well. The Soviet Memorial in Treptower Park has found a new life after 1990 as a de-ritualized space of both leisure and reverence for the dead. Unlike the memorial in Tallinn, it no longer resonates as a specifically “Russian” memorial; instead, it has folded into the longer-running narrative of German socialism. This is in part, I argue, because of the visual surroundings of the memorial. The break one must make from “Berlin” upon entering the park separates the memorial from the everyday, and does not attempt to fit into the built space of the city. Instead, the memorial’s nature setting evokes the spirit of German Heimat, thus further integrating itself in the longue durée of German history.
Conclusion

The questions originally posed in Part One were, Why did the Soviet War Memorial in Treptower Park not only survive the political and cultural transitions of 1989/1990, but enjoy a full-scale renovation in the 2000s? And, how, with all of the possibilities for an outright rejection of a seemingly obsolete, incompatible, and potentially offensive Soviet remnant of the GDR in post-Wall Berlin, has the memorial been afforded the benefit of federal and local financial support as well as a concession of its place in unified Berlin? The easiest answer to these questions is that Germany is bound by the Good Neighbor Treaty to maintain the site. However, even this fact does not fully clarify the persistence of the memorial as a rather uncontroversial display of East German and Soviet history, especially in comparison to the blood shed over a similar memorial in Estonia. As I have hoped to show in the course of the past three chapters, the Soviet War Memorial in Treptower Park has proved a malleable display and construct within eastern Berlin over the course of its existence, able to transform its meaning, in part, by drawing on its surroundings.

In the immediate transitional moment of 1989/90, the Treptower Park memorial represented a particular optimistic world view that the GDR had developed as a trustee of the long-standing German tradition of anti-fascist resistance. Drawing on the history of the park itself as a place where Marxist socialist and communist activists gathered to promote the rights of German workers and a general anti-fascist and anti-capitalist agenda, the SED was able to capitalize on the ambiguous narrative presented in the bas-
reliefs and imagery of the memorial. In particular, the presence of recognizable images of Heimat, in the literal Mutter Heimat sculpture, or the pre-modern fashioning of the soldier on the kurgan, allowed for East Germans to identify with the visual cues of the memorial site as something relevant to themselves. As well, the visual experience of linking the memorial images to the surrounding environs—the repetition of nature and the lack of urban architectural interference—both situated the memorial as optically authentic and confirmed the mythological status of the site.

It is exactly these visual and narrative conditions of the Soviet war memorial which allowed it to cross the threshold of 1990 without significant objection. The allusions to Heimat, equally recognizable to a western German audience, supported a universal understanding of the memorial’s message. Similarly, the SED’s presentation of the memorial as a testament to East German anti-fascist resistance was re-appropriated after 1990 in some measure through the installation of signage contextualizing the site as an artifact of a particular time. As important, the signs also promote a return to the Spartakusbund-era activity in the park, thereby legitimatizing the GDR reading of the memorial as proof of a German anti-fascist tradition. Taken in combination, these factors explain the treatment of the Soviet war memorial in Treptower Park after 1990.
PART TWO

THE SCHLOSSPLATZ

INTRODUCTION

DEMOLITIONS AND RECUPERATIONS

The central boulevard of eastern Berlin begins at the base of the Brandenburg Gate, carving an axial line across the middle of the city, before turning towards the northwest as it passes by the Berliner Dom (Berlin Cathedral), Lustgarten, and the Schlossplatz (Palace Square), and finally proceeds towards the main square of Alexanderplatz. Unter den Linden, as the most central section of the avenue is known today, is a main thoroughfare of eastern Berlin-Mitte, which for centuries has showcased landmarks representative of German culture and history, in their various manifestations.

Situated on the southern side of Unter den Linden across from Lustgarten, Altes Museum, and Berliner Dom, the Schlossplatz occupies visually valuable real estate in the center of eastern Berlin. The Berliner Stadtschloss (Berlin City Palace) was the first

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261 To the west of the Brandenburg Gate, the thoroughfare is Straße des 17. Juni in the Berlin-Mitte district. Unlike its eastern counterpart, Straße des 17. Juni carves through Tiergarten park as it passes by the Siegessäule (Victory Column). The landscape surrounding the street is very different on either side of the Brandenburg Gate.

262 As but one example, the Zeughaus was first an eighteenth/nineteenth-century-era arsenal, which, since 1831, has housed several history museums.
structure to be built on the square, and it stood and was expanded and altered over the course of centuries to the preferences of Prussian royalty before ultimately succumbing to the SED. Years after the GDR destroyed the Stadtschloss, it built the Palast der Republik (Palace of the Republic) to serve as a government statehouse and public gathering point. The Palace of the Republic too was razed by the unified German government beginning in 2006. Today, plans are underway to reconstruct the Stadtschloss on the land, to house a museum complex.

The case of the Schlossplatz and the three structures that have occupied—and will occupy—its space along Unter den Linden has exposed the political and social rancor architecture can elicit. In debating the construction, destruction, meaning, and purpose of each of these structures, the visual coherence of the location has been as critical as any other aspect in deciding what should stand on the Schlossplatz. In analyzing the post-1990 discussions of the future of the Palace of the Republic and the Schlossplatz, the ghosts of past decisions and hopes for the future emerge. As with the Soviet War Memorial in Treptower Park, notions of German identity, history, memory, and authenticity are all integrated into the question of the Schlossplatz, as are the visual aspects of “seeing” the site. Yet, unlike the Treptow memorial, the question here is, Why was the Palace of the Republic torn down after Germany unified? Further, why would Germany decide to resurrect the Stadtschloss in its place? In Part Two, I will address these questions by considering previous reconfigurations of the Schlossplatz, which have, as I will argue, each sought to ensure the aesthetic unification of Unter den Linden.

In Chapter Four, I will analyze the precursor to the Palace of the Republic, the Berliner Stadtschloss. I trace the beginnings, usage, and expansion of the Stadtschloss
across time, and show how the construction was meant to satisfy the hopes of a city center in burgeoning Berlin as a cultural and political seat in Prussia. In so doing, I pay close attention to the architectural decisions of planners to develop a visually coherent space. In addition, I will examine the changes in readings of the Stadtschloss with the emergence of new political contexts, such as Weimar and the National Socialist periods.

Chapter Five begins with the post-war period and analyzes shifts in defining a new city center vis-à-vis the Schlossplatz with the founding of the GDR and its own world view. I look at the demolition of the Stadtschloss and the construction of the Palace of the Republic as aiding the in the definition of East German identity, and its approach to the notion of Gesamtkunstwerk in the city center. With the collapse of the GDR, the Palace of the Republic began to fall apart as well. I use Friedrich Simmel’s ruin theory to read the Palace of the Republic at this moment as a structure imbued with meaning in its state of disrepair. Finally, I examine plans by the Bundestag and Berlin Senate to reconstruct the Stadtschloss on the site as problematic in their attempts to recuperate the past.

In total, Part Two is a study of the Schlossplatz as the Soviet War Memorial’s visual counterpart. The Schlossplatz is an open space, squarely situated in a visually, politically, culturally, and historically central location in eastern Berlin. Its physical centrality presses it into the forefront of debates about German unification, but it is its optic interaction with its surroundings, which I argue makes the issue of the Schlossplatz all the more critical for the image of Berlin.
CHAPTER FOUR
DEFINING THE CITY CENTER

“This rubble heap covered with rot is what is left of Troy. Its historical topography is irrecoverable, no matter what the labels of the local tourist industry may give to individual spots of the landscape in order to turn them into attractions.”

One month after the opening of the Berlin Wall, the Akademie der Künste der DDR (GDR Academy of Arts) held the conference “Gegen den Untergang unserer Städte—für eine neue Baupolitik” (Against the Downfall of our Cities—A Call for a New Building Policy) at the Palace of the Republic. Initially conceived to address the decay of buildings in East Germany, but perhaps also fortuitously presupposing a pessimistic future for the urban aesthetics of the GDR, the conference was followed less than two weeks later by a similar symposium in Leipzig calling for both an “Abrissstop” (demolition moratorium) and the prohibition of “Plattenbauweise” (pre-fabricated type) construction in the old city center. Clearly, by the very immediate aftermath of the fall

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265 Ibid. The Akademie der Künste der DDR held its conference in Berlin on December 11, 1989; the first “Volksbaukonferenz” (Public building conference) was held in Leipzig on January 6, 1990.
of the Berlin Wall, a fear had emerged amongst the art and building community that the architecture and structure of East Germany was to collapse as well.\textsuperscript{266}

What of the concern for buildings in East Germany and East Berlin? Was there an urgent threat to the cities of the GDR either directly through political change or indirectly through years of neglect? Where monuments of Lenin might be clear symbolic stand-ins for the politics of the Ostblock (Eastern bloc),\textsuperscript{267} in what way would buildings? Surely, the storming of the Stasi headquarters in January of 1990 was more than a simple symbolic action; the secret police were evidently shredding personal files. But what of strictly symbolic buildings?

As the East German statehouse, the Palast der Republik was surely such a confluence of political statement and architectural structure. With the crowning hammer and compass fastened to the front façade, the parliamentary workings inside its doors, and the mythic bringing together of politician and citizen in the Milchbar, the Palace of the Republic seemed to be a political building. But as the former mayor of Hamburg countered nearly ten years later, just because Eric Honecker made speeches there doesn’t make the building necessarily important.\textsuperscript{268} So what has made the fate of the Palast der Republik

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{266} To be fair: the context of these conferences though was the concerns of the further dilapidation and disrepair stemming from the architectural and infrastructure neglect of the GDR period, not due to assumed future unification.
\textsuperscript{268} “Es soll ja Leute geben, die möchten den [Palast der Republik] bewahren. Ich finde ihn häßlich. Wir sind doch nicht verpflichtet, in Berlin oder in Deutschland eine solche Stätte nur deswegen aufrecht zu erhalten, weil manche Leute nostalgisch berührt sind. . . . Ich halte gar nichts von der Arroganz der Westdeutschen, wenn sie nun glauben, sie seien die besseren Menschen, nur weil sie das Glück hatten, dass die Russen an der Elbe stehen geblieben sind. Man muss natürlich sehen, dass auch in Ostdeutschland Erfahrungen gemacht wurden, die für uns alle wichtig und bedeutsam sind. Aber man muss darum nicht Gebäude stehen lassen, wenn sie im Weg sind—nur weil Honecker seine mechanisch applaudierten Reden in ihnen gehalten hat.” (There are supposedly people who want to preserve it (the Palace of the Republic). I think [the building] is ugly. We’re not required—in Berlin or in Germany—to hold on to such a site only because some people are moved by nostalgia. . . . I don’t buy into the arrogance of West Germans either when they think they’re the better ones, only because they were lucky that the Russians stopped at the Elbe.)
\end{footnotesize}
Republik such a touchstone in post-Wall Berlin debates about urban planning, aesthetics, and politics? It is indeed its past as East German statehouse and its subsequent political resonance that seems to justify its place on the roll-call of “important” sites. Yet, further, it is also the Palace’s visual location—its geographic and optic environment—in a newly-aligned center of the city, as well as the aesthetics of the building itself, I will argue, as they relate to visual and experiential wholeness that matter as well.²⁶⁹ These issues of centrality and aesthetic unification are of particular consequence in a scholastic and cultural fascination with the architecture and urban landscape of the “New Berlin.”²⁷⁰ The debate over the Palace of the Republic and the Schlossplatz is indeed one of a larger and...
longer exchange about the urban planning and political and cultural representation, but it also a polemical debate about a re-emerging and re-negotiated “center” of Berlin.\textsuperscript{271}

The story of the Palace of the Republic is intrinsically linked to the fate of its forbearer, the Stadtschloss, and its location on the so-called Schlossplatz. It is in its destruction that the Palace of the Republic proves to repeat the demolition and possible rebuilding of its predecessor—a return to a particular past—, while it simultaneously points to the future. While much has already been written and debated about the area,\textsuperscript{272} it is a critical point of interest for thinking about the urban landscape, about politics, history, and aesthetics: first, the long-term post-1990 debate and decisions about the fate of the Palace of the Republic and its proposed replacement, the Humboldt-Forum (anticipated to be constructed as a reincarnated Stadtschloss), speak volumes to the process of post-Wall architectural negotiation. Second, as a counter-example to the Soviet War Memorial, the site is one of the most visible in the former East Berlin, situated as it is in the center of the city. It therefore becomes an especially interesting case of a site, which is difficult to literally overlook. Third, in its former life as East German statehouse, the Palace of the Republic makes for a particularly symbolic example

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{271} While perhaps incongruous to refer to the area south of the now Karl-Liebknecht-Straße islanded between the split Spree river as “Schlossplatz” across time, I will do so only to simplify the reference to this area. The question of the politics of urban planning in Berlin is a central question of Siegert’s \textit{Berlin Babylon}, but also well documented and explored in Elizabeth Strom’s \textit{Building the New Berlin: The Politics of Urban Development in Germany’s Capital City} (Landham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001) and Michael Mönninger’s collection \textit{Berlin morgen: Ideen für das Herz einer Großstadt}. Exhibition Deutsches Architektur-Museum, Frankfurt am Main, January 26-March 24, 1991. (Frankfurt: Insel. 1991). The aesthetic-architectural debate about reconstruction in post-unification Berlin (especially the moralistic undertones of the so-called “Architect’s Debate”) is well captured in Annegret Burg, ed., \textit{Neue Berlinerische Architektur: eine Debatte} (Berlin: Birkhäuser, 1994), Bruno Flierl, \textit{Berlin baut um. Wessen Stadt wird die Stadt?} (Berlin: Verlag Bauwesen, 2001), and Gerd Kähler, \textit{Einfach schwierig: eine deutsche Architekturdebatte. Ausgewählte Beiträge, 1993-1995}. (Braunschweig: Vieweg, 1995).

\end{footnotesize}
of political and cultural transition in East Berlin. It is this tri-fold logic of the act of architectural negotiation, primacy of location, and political (and social) resonance that the area of the Schlossplatz becomes an important illustration of the stakes of aesthetic change and re-appropriation in East Berlin after 1990.

The form of the physical constructions at this location in Berlin is of additional consequence in the context of this study. Form speaks as well to the above points regarding the optic and political resonance of the site. The ideological constructions barely masked in the façades of both the Stadtschloss and the Palace of the Republic (and likely what is to come) are of importance insofar as the narrative properties of the structures serve as allegories for the political proclamations their residents, architects, and governing leadership respectively wished to make. But the underlying form of the buildings as such (as opposed to the hidden monument of the Soviet War Memorial in Treptower Park), and the specific role of architecture as allegory is of particular concern here as well.

Thus, the three points outlined above are intrinsically interwoven with one another. One cannot speak about transition in this context without considering the ways in which the construction on the Schlossplatz speaks to political and social identity through its own architecture and the way it informs and is informed by its surroundings. At the core, as with the Soviet War Memorial, is the role of repetition and return in this context of architectural change as a strategy for moving forward. That is, in its visual form in the Berlin urban landscape, the negotiations for the built space of the Schlossplatz again and again have looked backwards towards previous instances of attempts at unification—political and aesthetic—as a means for building a future. While
the built environment and memorial landscape of Berlin has, as many have recently argued, conjured the “ghosts” and memories of the past in various locations’ roles as palimpsests and lieux de mémoire, the repeated attempts towards visual wholeness in the ever re-aligned city center of the Schlossplatz, additionally seek to synthesize a new narrative thread of the unified history of a New Berlin and a New Germany. In short, the main question of Part Two is, Why was the Palace of the Republic torn down in favor of rebuilding the Stadtschloss in post-Wall Berlin? In sum, however, the question posed here is, In what ways do the architectural constructions of the Schlossplatz’s buildings (i.e., the Stadtschloss, the Palace of the Republic, and the future Humboldt-Forum) reconcile continual movements towards unification with the apparent need to bear the symbolic returns to the past? That is, how, in this new city center, does the story of unification become repeated in various tones?

Defining the City Center

To begin with perhaps one of the more theoretical concerns of primacy of location and figurative/literal centrality, the intersection of a plethora of issues is at stake in the Schlossplatz discussion. In what ways and to what end does the location of the site in question play a role in the debate about its future? To answer bluntly: in every way. To be sure, the area of the Palace of the Republic and Schlossplatz has been repeatedly reborn as city center in Berlin’s various stages of development and history.\(^{273}\) Shifts in the urban

\(^{273}\) In fact, this area of “Mitte” (Berlin-Center district) is but one of several city centers. Where other metropolitan areas may be able to identify a “downtown” or “city center,” one could argue that even in various forms of unification, Berlin has had, and continues to have, many city “centers.” Now, for example, the political center of Berlin is arguably the Regierungsviertel (government quarters) of the Reichstag area,
and political landscape have alternatively changed this space as visual and cultural axis to the city. From essentially the establishment of Berlin as a city, I would argue the site has acted as a particular thermometer or gauge of the political and cultural temperature in the city. Again and again alternatively reinvented as political and symbolic seat and wasteland, the site has been noted as both axis and void. Indeed, this repetition of realignment and the traces of past lives left affords the space a stronger resonance precisely because of the negotiation and appropriation of the space such repetition demands.

I believe there are three beliefs and philosophies that have effectively captured the stakes and meanings of the location, and describe the cyclical concerns and leitmotifs of the figurative and literal centrality of the Schlossplatz. First, is the matter of conservatism. As I will argue, this is a concern both with conservation, as in preservation—preservation of physical artifacts of the past—and with political conservatism, the preservation of historical tradition. Second, is the German preoccupation with the notion of a Gesamtkunstwerk. Beyond Richard Wagner’s well-known definition of the total work of art, architectural and political aspects of the concept manifest themselves vis-à-vis the city center of the Schlossplatz as well. Finally, the debate over the Schlossplatz brings to the forefront the paradox I will call Leere/Lehre (void/teachings). In the apparent ruin of Leere at this site, the affirmative process of Lehre seems to repeatedly emerge. Where in other locations of Berlin void has perhaps meant nothingness, the Schlossplatz has, I will suggest, offered a space of unanticipated redemption.

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or the commercial center of Potsdamer Platz or the Ku’Damm/Zoo area, or as I will suggest here, the cultural and symbolic center the Schlossplatz / Lustgarten area.
To summarize, I will argue that the area of the Schlossplatz offers an example of concerns about the centrality of historical and traditional reference (visual, political, and cultural totality) and the apparent contradiction of Leere and Lehre. These three concerns, at once interdependent and singular, are of particular importance to the question of city center—its location and its symbolic or allegorical resonance—in the face of unification. While the most recent debate on the area has focused on the question of the Palace of the Republic and the proposed reconstruction of the Stadtschloss, in fact, the debate is but a return to, and repetition of, previous moments of transition in this space.

Creating the Center; Defining Unification

Kurfürst Friedrich der II. “Der Eisenzahn” (Elector Frederick the Second, “The Iron Tooth,” 1440–1470)

It is perhaps not surprising that the modern Schlossplatz should be considered a principal player to the transformation contestations following 1989/90; indeed, since Brandenburg Kurfürst (Elector) Friedrich the Second’s inception of a symbolic stronghold in the mid-fifteenth century, the area has been continually re-invented as central space to Berlin. While the contexts and ideologies have changed and shifted throughout the centuries, the structures and emptinesses which have occupied this space 274

274 Brian Ladd, especially in his article, “Center and Periphery in the New Berlin: Architecture, Public Art, and the Search for Identity,” PAJ: A Journal of Performance and Art 22, no. 2. (May 2000): 7-21, takes a more liberal and inclusive approach to the idea of center. While here I am employing the notion of “center” as more of a visual fulcrum point than a larger geographic space, of say, the entire district of “Mitte,” I concede that despite my insistence above and throughout that the area of the Schlossplatz is in and of itself a “center” space, the interplay it has with the entire area of “central (/East) Berlin” must be noted.
have long-since been considered key in some way to creating and/or embodying a
governing political ideology. In this section, I will trace the initial developments of the
Schlossplatz years after the unification of Berlin-Coelln in the beginning of the fifteenth
century, to show how the confluence of location and intention on the part of planners and
the political elite have vested this particular site as visual and cultural fulcrum of the city
of Berlin.

In its first recorded instance of structural and symbolic (re)alignment, the
buildings centrally islanded by the river Spree were destroyed and redeveloped in the
mid-fifteenth century as the Schlossplatz by Brandenburg Kurfürst and Hohenzollern heir
Friedrich the Second, der Eisenzahn (the Iron Tooth). Prior to the Eisenzahn’s massive
and ultimately seminal construction, the location was home to a century-old established
church and convent, the Dominikaner Kloster.\textsuperscript{275} The complex of the Dominican Closter
sat on the Berlin side of the Cöllner city wall, cities which were unified in 1307 into the
Doppelstadt (double city) of Berlin-Cölln. This new center functioned as mere
geographic center until approximately 150 years later, when the Eisenzahn forced the
sale of the land, demolished the Dominican Closter and built a palace on the property.\textsuperscript{276}

Laying the first ceremonial stone to his new residence on July 31, 1443, some six
years after assuming power, Elector Friedrich the Second sought to create a Zwingburg,
or stronghold, in the center of his Berlin. Moving from the traditional “Hohes Haus” on
nearby Klosterstrasse, Friedrich the Second’s intention was to create a visual focal point
to his power, one which was a conspicuous statement in a central location. To use

Nachträgen zur Baugeschichte des Schlosses seit 1442} (Munich; Berlin: Deutscher Kunstverlag, 1992), 17.
\textsuperscript{276} See Heinz Graffunder and Martin Beerbaum, \textit{Der Palast der Republik} (Leipzig: WEB E.A. Seemann
Verlag, 1977) and Ladd, \textit{Ghosts of Berlin}, 48 for two perspectives on this account.
Eberhard Cyran’s phrase, the site to build the *Schloss* (castle, palace) was chosen to be the “genius loci” of not only Berlin, but the *Mark Brandenburg* (Margraviate of Brandenburg), and, further, the increasingly important East as well.\(^{277}\) The location was to maintain this privilege for centuries.

Fig. 26. Plan from Berlin-Cölln from Johann Gregor Memhardt, 1652. (Color reproduction from 1888.)

Architecturally, much is speculated about the construction of the Eisenzahn’s Zwingburg. The final Berliner “Schlossbaumeister” (palace architect), Albert Geyer, attempted in 1936 to reconstruct on paper the fifteenth century castle, famous for its “Grüner Hut,” a tower said to resemble a green hat. What is known is that construction for the castle not only required demolishing part of the Dominican convent, but the city wall separating Berlin from Cölln as well. The wall was completely demolished where the Schlosshof (palace courtyard) wrapped the Spree banks. But where the Schloss met the Spree, the city was incorporated into the side of the building. Thus, symbolically and actually, the boundaries of the two halves of the city were at once destroyed and

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integrated into the new government and city of Berlin-Cölln. As such, the location of the Stadtschloss provided the locus of political integration in Berlin, but also concentrated the regional power in a specific visual icon. The “Grüner Hut,” used as a jail with the ironic moniker *vadem in pacem* inscribed on its walls, fed into a new myth of Berlin as city representative of the tension between autonomy and authority.

Perhaps foreshadowing the contentions of future building on this site, the residents of Berlin-Cölln did not welcome the new construction of Kurfürst Friedrich the Second’s castle. Before the Schloss could be completed, Berliners stormed the construction site, the “Hohes Haus” (the Kurfürst’s residence), and the chancellery to protest and impede the construction of the Zwingburg. The so-called *Berliner Unwille* (Berlin Indignation), which succeeded in delaying the progress of the Schloss’s construction by flooding the area and severely damaging the construction already completed, was met by Friedrich the Second with swift punishment. In an apparent test of his power, he fought protests to claim this area as his residence by charging objectors with unruliness before the court.

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279 Wiesinger, *Das Berliner Schloss*, 8-9, describes the uses of the location through Geyer’s speculations. Cyran further suggests the symbolic nature of the location as well on the edge of the two city halves: *Schloß an der Spree*, 11.

280 Go in peace.

281 See Cyran, *Schloß an der Spree*, 16.

282 Most sources suggest that protesters were able to flood the area by opening the Spree dam. See, for example, Cyran, *Schloß an der Spree*, 12. Hans Mielke argues that the Schloss was actually destroyed. See Hans Mielke, *Der Schlossvogt und die fünf Jahrhunderte: Eine Nacht im Grünen Hut* (Berlin: Kulturbuch-Verlag, 1955), 233. Other sources suggest (but do not state outright) that the damage was inevitable, given the swampy conditions of the area. Peschken calls the original configuration of the Schloss a “Wasserburg” (castle on water). See Peschken *Das königliche Schloß*, 17 and Goerd Peschken “Schloss und Stadt,” in *Das Schloss? Eine Ausstellung über die Mitte Berlins*, ed. Förderverein Berliner Stadtschloss (Berlin: Ernst und Sohn Verlag für Architektur, 1993), 24.

283 Hans-Werner Klünner gives less credence to this story, and suggests that the so-called *Berliner Unwille* (Berlin Indignation) revolt is indeed a more complicated story that the one typically depicted. See Hans-Werner Klünner, “Vom Hohen Haus zur ‘Burg’ Kurfürst Friedrichs II,” in *Das Berliner Schloss: das klassische Berlin*, by Goerd Peschken and Hans-Werner Klünner (Frankfurt am Main: Propyläen Verlag, 1991), 15.
With the move of Kurfürst Friedrich the Second from the Hohes Haus on Klosterstrasse to the new residence of the Stadtschloss in 1451, a new era in the self-understanding of Berlin began as well. Following the heavy-handedness of the Eisenzahn, Berliners lost a sense of Selbstständigkeit, or independence. As Cyran suggests: “This was the beginning of truly new times. New times, which begin for most as rather joyless.”

It is with this particular sense of melancholic lament that the rest of the story of the Schlossplatz begins. But it is from this beginning that the Stadtschloss becomes the realized representation of Hohenzollern power. With no room for public appropriation, it at once separates the powerful from the powerless, and unites the political and geographic regions of Berlin and Coelln. The integration of the city wall into its construction consumes and merges the area, acting as a visual declaration of the new use of this space.

Joachim I “Nestor” (1499-1535); Joachim II “Hektor” (1535-1571)

Over the course of the following centuries, as Berlin grew with each annex, no less than twenty successive Hohenzollern electors and Prussian kings adapted the Stadtschloss to fit their needs and conform to emerging architectural trends. As such, the Stadtschloss became an increasingly principal anchor of the Berlin visual and political axis and exercised its role as symbolic center with each successive Kurfürst. Coinciding with Joachim I’s reign at the turn of the sixteenth century, the Renaissance of European cultural life also began to take shape in the Mark of Brandenburg. As Joachim I

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284 “Jetzt leitete dieser Beginn wahrhaft neue Zeiten ein. Neue Zeiten indessen beginnen meist für die Betroffenen ziemlich freudlos.” Cyran, Schloß an der Spree, 11. Cyran’s assessment of the death of Berlin’s “Selbstständigkeit” (independence), with which I agree, is found on page 13.
(“Nestor”) began to use the Schloss as his residence, the structure became emblematic of the Mark’s political and cultural significance, and also of the calm after the storms of the Black Plague and violence marring the end of the fifteenth century. As Cyran characterizes the Schloss’s existence: “The presence of the House in the Schloss of Coelln, the frequent visits of foreign royals, and the duty of representation and cultured conduct that went with this, awoke as well in the citizens of the city the aspiration to emulate the Lord [i.e., Nestor].” It is at this moment that a turning point in the image of the Schloss occurs. No longer is it seen as a structure and politic imposed on an unwilling population, but it becomes accepted as representative of a new tone. Nestor, named for his “besonnenes Wesen” (sensible being), is perceived by Berliners as a more well-intentioned leader and as bringing more order and peace to the region. By extension, and through the use of his residence, the structure takes on a new meaning.

But it is with Nestor’s successor, Joachim II, “Hektor,” that the Schloss takes on a further transformation in style and meaning. During the period of the Reformation, Hektor, a self-professed supporter of the arts, looked to reconstruct the Schloss to give it more “Gewicht” (weight). With the help of Saxon architect Kaspar Theyß, Hektor reinterpreted the area by turning against the notion of the “Zwing-Coelln,” negating the need of towers and walls. Indeed, Hektor looked south, to Dresden and Torgau, for inspiration, indicative of a move to cosmopolitainize Berlin and Brandenburg. Cyran writes:

286 Cyran, Schloß an der Spree, 21.
287 Cyran, Schloß an der Spree, 36.
288 Cyran, Schloß an der Spree, 38.
The new Schloss was to be comprised of two buildings: one on the Spree, primarily comprised of the remainder of the old Burg; the other on the south side, the later Schlossplatz. The main piece was on the south side, proposals of which were nods to the Saxon master Konrad Krebs. It was from him that the model of the new Berlin Palace, ‘Schloss Hartenfels bei Torgau’ came. Shortly after Joachim the Second’s accession to power, Krebs developed the prototype in Berlin, which Kaspar Theyss would eventually build. . . Here the ‘Residence’ emerges, from which the idea of the new city consciousness would develop.  

Increasingly, as opposed to Joachim II’s father and grandfather, who spend much time hunting in the outlying rural regions in the Mark Brandenburg, Joachim II spent more time in Berlin. With increased financial and political power in the region, Joachim II set out to expand and renovate the Schloss, affording it even more clout as a representation of familial wealth and power.

In what ways was Berlin developing at this point? And how did the Schloss function in this new image? In Hektor’s burgeoning artistic city, the Schloss was becoming a center of that activity. Cyran writes, “Year to year the Hektor Schloss developed more and more to sanguine center of all artistic and refined ways of life. Poets, painters, actors, writers found themselves gathering here.” In essence, the Schloss was on its way to becoming—just as the Palace of the Republic had, in principle, functioned—a central site of the confluence of artistic and political power.


Further, in a visual aspect, the Schloss was becoming an optic center to the city. As little else changed around it, the palace, with Hektor’s improvements, became the most visually ornate construction in the area. The Schloss had essentially become the cultural and visual representation of the transformations of the Reformation. As Goerd Peschken further notes, the idea of the “feste Burg” (secure castle, or “mighty fortress” per Martin Luther’s hymn) at this point also becomes unnecessary because of the protection the city of Berlin was able to provide. As such, the focus of the planning for the Schloss could thus be placed on aesthetic, instead of merely practical or functional, architectural principles. He argues regarding a specific example of a corner tower, “[t]his tower was thus dismantled and Joachim didn’t rebuild it on the new end of the wing. It would then seem that the palace was no longer a secure castle, but could and should rather be a magnificent residence. Meanwhile, the Elector sat protected in the city. . . With the two towers, the Spree wings presented themselves to the city of Berlin as remaining fortress-like enough.”

Thus, at this moment, the Schloss takes on a meaning, to which subsequent generations will return: it is not only the private locus of Hohenzollern power, but also the visual encapsulation of the developing regional center’s aesthetic and cultural authority. The security in strength, which Berlin apparently felt at this moment, was carved into the decorative, and thus less practical, touches of the detail work on the Schloss’s façade. As a result, the Schloss becomes indicative not only of the city center, but also the regional fulcrum.

Friedrich Wilhelm, der Grosse (1640-1688); Friedrich III (crowned in 1701
Friedrich I König in Preußen) (1688-1713): “Schlüter and Preußen”

But these significant changes in the presentation and reappropriation of the Stadtschloss were relatively short lived. After Hektor’s death, nearly a century of resumed violence and pessimism swept the area. Politically, by the mid-seventeenth century, Berlin-Brandenburg had become an isolated non-entity. Sick and inefficient leadership had effectively drained the area of its relevance in Europe.292 As Friedrich Wilhelm took power as an energetic twenty-year-old in 1640, the Schloss was in ruin. Of the nearly 900 residences in the structure, only three fourths were occupied, and many of the remaining properties were in complete disrepair.293 Again, Friedrich Wilhelm relied on art, along with science, to breathe life into the city. Hiring workers from the Netherlands, Friedrich Wilhelm set about repairing the Schloss to a point where it was again livable. As he and his wife moved in, it became a symbolic triumph for the city.294

By the time Friedrich Wilhelm passed power on to his son, Friedrich III, in 1688, he had grown Berlin from 800,000 to 1.5 million residents. Friedrich III, in turn, sought to continue the strides his father had realized, by continuing on with the further

292 This is not to suggest that no changes were made to the Stadtschloss by interceding leaders. To be sure, Joachim II’s successor, Kurfürst Johann Georg, for example, added the well-recognizable “Hofapotheke” (court pharmacy) section to the Schloss in 1585. Prior to that, interior renovations for his recently-widowed sister, Elisabeth Magdalena, were completed. But none of these changes, I would argue, constitute a significant turning-point in the history of the Stadtschloss and therefore are secondary to the scope of the study here. See among others, Peschken, “Kurfürstlichen Residenz,” 29 for specific changes during this time, or Albert Geyer’s 1936 work, Geschichte des Schlosses zu Berlin Erster Band: Die kurfürstliche Zeit bis zum Jahre 1698. Vol 1: Der Text. Vol 2: Die Bilder (Berlin: Deutscher Kunstverlag, 1936) for a more complete history of the Stadtschloss.
293 Cyran, Schloß an der Spree, 81.
294 Cyran, Schloß an der Spree, 87.
transformation and construction of the Schloss. His intentions were to significantly expand the Schloss for his needs as a residence and a governing axis.295 But his transformations also became some of the most controversial in the history of the Stadtschloss, not because of the aesthetic and visual changes themselves, but rather because of the architect who may or may not have been responsible for the changes. Andreas Schlüter, Hofbaumeister (Imperial court architect), remains one of the most contested Schloss architects to date because of the possibility that the designs credited to him, may not in fact have been his.296 Further, his technical abilities, especially after the disastrous near-collapse of the Münzturm (Mint Tower) under his direction, were largely questioned by his contemporaries and historians alike.297

What is of significance to this reading at this stage in the history of the Schlossplatz is Schlüter’s calculated intention of creating a visual unity in the latest renovation of the Schloss. The introduction of Schlüter in November of 1699 as chief architect into the history of the Schloss thus brings with it a new style, whose imprint was to remain on the façade of the city palace until its demolition in the 1950s, namely the “preußisches Stil” (Prussian style).298 Schlüter’s goal, ultimately, was the systemization and visual unification of the outside appearance of the palace, along with the evocation of

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295 Although original plans by Schlüter have not been located, Cyran estimates the addition to the Schloss to have doubled the size of the palace. See Cyran, Schloß an der Spree, 131.
296 See Guido Hinterkeuser, Das Berliner Schloss: der Umbau durch Andreas Schlüter (Berlin: Siedler, 2003), 102 for a complete description of the accusations and debates to follow.
297 Heinz Ladendorf is less critical of Schlüter suggesting that it wasn’t for lack of concern or attention to construction details that Schlüter’s designs failed, but rather simply a shortfall of technical know-how on his part. See Heinz Ladendorf, Andreas Schlüter (Berlin: Rembrandt-Verlag, 1937), 46.
298 Cyran, Schloß an der Spree, 126. “In Schlüter war für Berlin, wo er sich durch seine Schöpfungen bereits Heimatrecht erworben hatte, der erste führende Künstler einer neuen Richtung entstanden: des ‘preußischen Stils’, der von nun an all den großen oder geringen Bauten der Hauptstadt über Jahrhunderte hinaus das eigene, unverwechselbare Gesicht geben sollte.” (With Schlüter, Berlin—where he had acquired native status through his creations—discovered its founder of a new direction: the “Prussian style,” which from that moment on gave all the large and small buildings of the capital over the centuries its own unmistakable appearance.)
new political centrality and power. In so doing, Schlüter drew further on the Roman and otherwise southern architectural traditions, as a link, I would argue, to longer-standing European political elites. As Guido Hinterkeuser characterizes this objective, “Dormers, bays, little towers, and spires had to yield to a single, Roman-inspired flat roof, that further compounded the effect of the construction as angular cube. An encompassing balustrade, crowned with vases and architectural sculptures of various figures, connected all of the wings and sections.” 299 Thus, the optic strength of the precisely cubed form, with its allusions of Roman architectural lines, along with the sculptural narratives of the figures lining the top of the avant-corps or pavilion and roof lines of the Schloss, became a visual cue to the increased power Berlin and Friedrich III was to enjoy. Then it was within two years that Friedrich III was to become the first King in Prussia, Friedrich I. 300

It is at this point, I would argue, that the relationship between the visual and dimensions of the political were certainly coming to the forefront in Schlüter’s re-design of the Schloss. Largely known for his talent as a sculptor in his work on the near-by Zeughaus (armory) and Reiterstandbild Denkmal (equestrian statue monument) of

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299 (Lukarne, Erker, Türmchen und Türme mußten einem einheitlichen, römisch inspirierten Flachdach weichen, das die Wirkung des Baus als kantiger Kubus noch verstärkte. Eine umlaufende Balustrade, bekrönt von Vasen und figuraler Bauplastik, band schließlich alle Flügel und Trakte zusammen). Hinterkeuser, Berliner Schloss, 118. Schlüter originally proposed his model for the Schloss a year and a half earlier, but won the role of Schlossbaumeister, after a series of resignations of the post. Generally, while Schlüter had been working as the project director across the way at the Zeughaus. His first position as an architect at all was as he accepted the formal position at the Schloss. His competency was questioned by other architects on the grounds of a lack of experience. While his renderings were impressive, experts questioned their feasibility. See Hinterkeuser, Berliner Schloss, 114 for a more detailed description. Further, Schlüter’s actual design plans have never been uncovered. The plans Peschken attributes to Schlüter are speculative, although they are based on archeological research. See Hinterkeuser, Berliner Schloss, 109.

300 I do not intend to contend that mimicking Roman architecture or sculptural filigree is tantamount to a particular brand of political power; instead, I am suggesting that the intention of Schlüter as architect was to bring about a visual representation of historical nods to specific powers. In a vein similar to Deborah Ascher Barnstone’s argument in The Transparent State that the transparent glass found often in West German governmental architecture of the post-war period was to invoke the metaphor of political transparency, so too could Schlüter here be attempting to link this emerging Prussia to a long-standing tradition of political governing; i.e., to the Roman tradition.
Friedrich Wilhelm (which now stands in Potsdam’s Schloss Charlottenburg), after first arriving in Berlin in the mid-1690s, Schlüter’s work was already beginning to fit into a larger emergence of an aesthetics of political consciousness. That is, as Heinz Ladendorf has characterized the Zeughaus architecture: “The Zeughaus is not only an important architectural monument of the northern German Baroque style, but it is even more the monumental epitome of state self-confidence, a usable construction first and foremost, to which art imparts stature and dignity.”\(^{301}\) It is then, perhaps without surprise, that Schlüter—made *Bauleiter* (project manager) of the Zeughaus in March of 1698, and especially after submitting design proposals for the Schloss in the same year\(^{302}\)—should be chosen to lead the large-scale renovations to the Schloss a year later.

It would seem, given the skepticism surrounding Schlüter’s technical abilities as an architect, that his successful lobbying for the position, while perhaps serendipitous, should also indicate a great attention on Friedrich III’s part to put forth a particular visual statement regarding the Prussia to come. While not to overstate the point, I would argue that it is not by coincidence or chance that the Schloss, as it was conceived under Schlüter and Friedrich III, would stand later, in conflicted measure across generations, for “Prussia.”\(^{303}\) As Hinterkeuser, I suspect rightly, argues, regardless of the outcome of the “crown negotiations” in Vienna, the palace would have been built as first started in the fall of 1698, which is why the connection between the emergence of Prussia and the

\(^{301}\) (Das Zeughaus ist nicht bloß ein wichtiges Architekturdenkmal des norddeutschen Barock, sondern vielmehr die monumentale Versinnbildlichung staatlichen Selbstbewusstseins, ein Nutzbau vor allem, dem die Kunst Haltung und Würde verlieh.) Ladendorf, *Andreas Schlüter*, 13.

\(^{302}\) Hinterkeuser, *Berliner Schloss*, 111.

\(^{303}\) Take here, for example, not least the perception of the *Schloss* from National Socialists (both during the war—such as with Alfons von Czibulka’s 1936 *Der Münzturm; Roman eines Künstlerlebens* [Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1954] or Herbert Maish’s 1942 film adaptation of the novel [re-named “Andreas Schlüter” (Chicago: International Historic Films, 1942)]—and after the war as it stood in ruin), the East German Socialists (who demolished the palace in 1950), or in post-Wall disputes of its reconstruction.

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architectural form of the Schloss should not be overstated. That is to say, its architecture was perhaps “inevitable” given the political climate and architectural style of the time. However, the seemingly mutual emergence of these facts is not without significant consideration; not least, because the Schloss has since been identified with the Prussia that materialized. While the particular brand of “center,” which I will argue emerges with Schinkel’s designs in the time to follow, has not been fully or explicitly explored at this point, the locating of the Schloss as symbolic of a particular visual focal point of political and cultural power takes particular material shape at this moment. While the location, as I presented, had repeatedly enjoyed the honor of emerging as symbolic center of the political nexus (of Berlin-Coelln, of Mark Brandenburg, and now of Prussia), the legacy of this latest symbolic incarnation has been perhaps the most lasting and contentious, as I will describe below.

Fig. 28. View of the Schlossplatz around 1750. (“Ansicht von dem Schlossplatz in Berlin, Kupferstich, um 1750”), Jean Baptiste Broebe. Plans from Schlüter. SLUB Dresden/Deutsche Fotothek+Kartensammlung df_dk_0010854
Of particular visual significance at this emerging juncture, I would suggest, was the repetition of line between Schlüter’s Schloss and that of the Zeughaus, located across from the palace. While also indicative of a Baroque-era architectural aesthetic, the optic link between the two buildings at this moment is striking. The arsenal, also built during this time and by the same designers as the major renovations at the nearby palace, followed the same heavily cubical form as its neighbor (see illustrations above). The bold, imposing lines of the facades impart a notion of permanence and grandeur. Beyond the stylistic fashionable-ness of the form, the reiteration of architectural style in these two structures visually linked, I would argue, the political and cultural power of the Schloss with the military power connotations of the Zeughaus.

As Friedrich III, now Friedrich I, King in Prussia, entered his new home with pomp and circumstance in 1701, the symbolic nature of the architecture imposed by the

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304 After Johann Arnold Nering’s death in 1695, first Martin Grünberg took over as the construction manager for the Zeughaus, but was replaced three years later by Schlüter, who was appointed by Friedrich III to the position. This appointment contributed to Schlüter’s ultimate rise on the Schloss project.
Schloss was not lost. As Hinterkeuser writes, “The facade of the Lustgarten was detracted from the city and thereby also from the eyes of the world; the front of the Schlossplatz in contrast created, with its triumphal-gate pavilion from portal one, the backdrop for the thoughtful and visual highpoint of the procession.”

In retrospect, I would maintain, from the vantage point of other turning points in German and Berlin history—1949 and 1990, to name but two—this moment also captures a particular image of the way in which the Stadtschloss has been perceived. This is the moment when the visuality and actuality of the city palace becomes “Prussian” for generations to come. Further, the visual cues of Schlüter’s architectural details of repetition and artistic fancy begin to shape a philosophy of organic wholeness in the area of the Stadtschloss.

While it will be some time before the emergence of Schinkel’s practice of architectural design, Richard Wagner’s treatise on the “art-work of the future” or in the Vienna Secessionist movement, the further integration of the Stadtschloss into its immediate urban landscape calls to attention a sense of interplay between architecture, politics, and aesthetic totality. By totality, I mean a wholeness of sensory, cultural, historical, and political experience. Although not yet completed at this point to its final form as it stood before demolition in the 1950s, the idea of the Stadtschloss and of the state, as well as the Schloss’s physical appearance under Schlüter’s tenure, is the moment

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305 (Die Fassade zum Lustgarten war der Stadt und damit auch den Augen der Welt entzogen, die Schlossplatzfront dagegen bildete mit ihrem triumphantartigen Risalit von Portal I die Kulisse für den gedanklichen und visuellen Höhepunkt des Festzuges.) Hinterkeuser, Berliner Schloss, 130.

306 Rather than following Wagner’s interest in the total work of art in terms of the “inner” senses of hearing, of significance here would be his discussion of history and future vis-à-vis the image or “outer” man. See Richard Wagner, “The Art-Work of the Future,” in The Art-Work of the Future and other Works, trans. William Ashton Ellis (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1993), 82-90 and 91-94. In particular, in the discussion of “architectural art,” Wagner argues that in order for architecture to be real (as in non-false), it must be conceived as an integration of various pieces of influence: art, history, beauty, etc. But to copy is to falsify, he argues. See Wagner, “Art-Work of the Future,” 156-162.

307 Vienna Secessionists of the Viennese Art Nouveau argue that exhibition space (i.e., architecture, lighting effects, etc.) creates the Gesamtkunstwerk in which exhibition objects (i.e., art) affects the ways in which art is read and interpreted.
to which those who long for its reproduction in the post-Berlin Wall period of 2000s seem to harken back.  

It is the moment that the unification of a political power (Prussia) becomes linked to the culmination of an artistic and architectural form (the Stadtschloss).

In the interceding years between Schlüter’s Zeughaus and Stadtschloss designs and Schinkel’s mid-nineteenth century work on other buildings in this area, it is of interest to examine the Romantic notion of aesthetics which begins to develop during this in-between period. I believe that this is of significance because it not only informed the

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308 It should also be noted at this point that a cessation to significant alterations to the exterior of the Stadtschloss takes place with Schlüter’s end of tenure. A reprise from major architectural changes further solidifies, I would argue, the impact the Stadtschloss makes as lasting symbol of the newly formed—and moreover historically legitimized—Prussia. Despite interior changes and exterior finishes made by Friedrich I’s son and successor, Friedrich Wilhelm II in the mid-eighteenth century, as Goerd Peschken argues, little else changed in its outside appearance: “Nach dem Soldatenkönig [Friedrich Wilhelm I], sind über hundert Jahre lang keine wesentlichen Änderungen am Außenbau erfolgt. Für die Wirkung des Schlosses bedeutete es aber viel, daß Friedrich der Große 1747 den Dom, die einstige Dominikaner-Kirche, abbrechen und im Lustgarten am Platz des heutigen Domes einen neuen bauen ließ. Damit war der Schlossplatz auf die Länge des Schlosses vergrößert, verdoppelt, so wie das Schloß verdoppelt worden war. Diese Vorstellung hatte schon Eosander in seinem ersten Vorschlag zeichnerisch formuliert und auch Böhme in seiner Planung vorausgesetzt” (After the Soldier King [Frederick William I], no substantial changes were made to the façade for over a hundred years. In terms of the effect of the castle, it mattered greatly that Frederick the Great tore down the cathedral—the only Dominican church—in 1747 and allowed for a new one to be built in the Lustgarten on the site of the current cathedral. With that, the Schlossplatz was made as large as the length of the castle, doubled in fact, just as the castle was doubled in size. Eosander already had this in mind when he drew up his first proposal, as did Böhme in his plans.) Peschken, “Kurfürstlichen Residenz,” 69. This latter point regarding the contextual changes made to the Schlossplatz during Frederick the Great’s tenure underscore the point I will be making below regarding the specific development of the Stadtschloss area as city center and Gesamtkunstwerk.

309 During this intervening period (i.e., after the death of Friedrich I in 1713, and his son’s completion of the castle a few years later, until Schinkel’s emergence on the scene in the early nineteenth century) two facts regarding the interim leaders’ use of the Stadtschloss are of significance. First, Friedrich Wilhelm I’s successor, Friedrich der Grosse, in fact favored Potsdam’s Sanssouci and Berlin’s Schloss Charlottenburg to the downtown Stadtschloss. As indicated above, and thus understandably given his preference to spend time elsewhere, very little changes were made to the Stadtschloss during Friedrich der Grosse’s reign. Second, however, as Fritz-Eugen Keller has suggested, with the re-introduction of the Stadtschloss by the “erste(r) Romantiker auf Preussens Thron” (first romantic on Prussia’s throne, as Hans Mackowsky has called him)—i.e., Friedrich Wilhelm II—the area once again becomes a relevant city center. Keller writes, “Die Thronbesteigung Friedrich Wilhelms II. (1744-97) am 17. August 1786 markierte auch für das Berliner Schloß den Beginn eines neuen Abschnitts. Hatte der alte König, der ‘Einsiedler von Sanssouci,’ alljährlich nur zwischen Weihnachten und Karneval darin gewohnt und sonst in Potsdam residiert, so beabsichtigte der neue König, Berlin und sein Schloß wieder zum Zentrum der Residenz zu machen und dort seine wichtigste Wohnung zu nehmen.” (The accession to the throne of Frederick William II (1744-97) on August 17, 1786 marked for the Berlin Castle the beginning of a new chapter as well. If the old king, the “hermit of Sanssouci” had only stayed in the castle on Christmas and during Carnival season each year and otherwise lived in Potsdam, the new king consciously made Berlin and his castle the central residence again, thus turning it into his most important home.) Fritz-Eugen Keller, “Die Königskammern Friedrich
work of Schinkel to come, but also parallels the ways in which conservative supporters of
the Stadtschloss restoration in the twenty-first century approach the subject of rebuilding
the castle.310

However, it is at this juncture that Schlüter’s designs for the Stadtschloss begin to
return focus to architecture as art. As a sculptor, Schlüter adorned the castle with the
filigree of adornments to the parapet walls, creating a symmetrical yet definite
adornment, drawing from the Italian Palazzo Madama by Paolo Marucelli.311 It is in this
conscientious movement to the realm of architecture as art—especially to Italian art—
that the notion of beauty and aesthetics in the context of total unity in particular, I argue,
begins to emerge. While beauty from Plato to Hegel has been a constant concern in the
question of art, the specific intersection at this historical moment of visuality, unity, and
political turbulence is of particular significance, an idea which will be more fully
explored in the next chapter.

With Schlüter’s attention to the artistic and non-utilitarian additions to the
Schloss, a connection between the perception and intention of the Schloss’s architectural
form and that of the shifts in the assessment of the state (i.e., of Prussian leadership) in its
new unified form, and its movement toward 1871, seems to emerge. It is not without
chance, I would argue, that such changes correspond over time to the developments in the
philosophical world. While not to overstate such parallels as fact, the similarities help to

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310 The argument for the rebuilding of the Stadtschloss is in part justified with the holistic notion of visual
unity in the new city center. In essence, the process is the attempt of the return and production of an
aesthetic unity, which parallels that of a political unification. Further, it is also an attempt to return to the
optic memory of another period of political unification and transition.
understand the ways in which the Schlossplatz is interpreted and presented at this moment of transition.

Completing the Visual Context: Schinkel and King Friedrich Wilhelm III

After a short break from Prussian residents, during which time Napoleon Bonaparte slept in the palace as victor of the Franco-Prussian War, Friedrich Wilhelm III and his wife returned to the Stadtschloss in 1809 to take up residence as the King and Queen in Prussia. In Friedrich Schinkel’s initial charge as royal architect, he began, under Friedrich Wilhelm III’s instruction, to renovate the residential palace. But the objectives of the King and his architect Schinkel differed vis-à-vis the Stadtschloss. Where the King, known to be a more modest and reserved personality than his title might suggest, merely wanted practical renovations necessary to maintain the condition of the palace, Schinkel advocated for greater attention to the maintenance of the artistic details of the complex. An example of this was the consideration Schinkel paid to the sculptural flourishes added previously by Schlüter. Friedrich Wilhelm III saw their repair as too expensive and unnecessary. Schinkel, however, produced a five-point opinion on the subject for King Friedrich Wilhelm III entitled, “Gutachten über die Erhaltung der

313 Peschken writes: “[Schinkel] führte in ästhetischen Fragen die oberste Bauaufsicht in Preußen und wurde daher damit befaßt, daß der König die Erneuerung der Balustradenfiguren zu teuer und überflüssig fand.” ([Schinkel] led as a top builder in Prussia in questions of aesthetics and therefore became concerned with the fact the King found the renovation of the baluster figures too expensive and unnecessary.) Peschken, “Königsschloß,” 101.
Statuen auf dem Königlichen Schloß zu Berlin” (Assessment regarding the preservation of the statues on the royal palace to Berlin). 314

In the Gutachten, Schinkel defends the full repair of the statues within an aesthetic, historical, and artistic framework. He first argues that the Stadtschloss is a “Denkmal der Gründer des Königlichen Hauses” (Monument to the founders of the royal house). As such, it is the architectural symbolization of Prussian power and heritage and must be maintained to uphold such a status. Second, Schinkel historicizes the architecture within the specific story of Schlüter as artist and countryman. He writes, “In terms of architecture, we must humbly recognize and endorse the talent of our great artist and countryman Schlüter. . .”315 Schinkel goes on to argue that Schlüter’s conscious intention to place statues on the facade of the Stadtschloss legitimized the structure as noble. These artistic merits of the “Meister” Schlüter alone, Schinkel argues, should be enough reason to renovate the sculptures.

Beyond the artistic and historical justifications Schinkel determines above, he further argues that the utility of the Stadtschloss is not to be overlooked either. This argument parallels the conservationist (i.e., preservationist) arguments on behalf of the Palace of the Republic, which will be discussed below. Schinkel writes, “And at the same time, the duty from this side will become that much more pressing, to maintain the inherited treasures in all their glory, and even in the most inopportune times not to look at such methods as a unnecessary waste, because the indirect usage, which grows out of this

315 (In architektonischer Hinsicht muß unsere Zeit demütig das Talent unseres großen Künstlers und Landsmannes Schlüter anerkennen und gutheißen…) Ibid.

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is simply too encompassing and large."

Following this chastising commentary about restoration never being a "Verschwendung" (waste), Schinkel explicitly admonishes the King for basing decisions about architectural and artistic upkeep on economics: "What an unfavorable impression this would make in the country and abroad, when after so many magnificent events in the history of the royal palace in Berlin a central jewel would be robbed out of economic reasons." Instead, as Schinkel concludes, the costs of maintaining the artistic integrity of such important structures must be calculated into the operating costs of the buildings.

Interestingly, Schinkel’s closing statement underscores the theme of unity on a smaller scale (i.e., in relation to the statues of the Stadtschloss façade), which will become a hallmark of this work for this moment in the history of the development of this area as city center, a topic which will be discussed below. Specifically, Schinkel writes, “It is the most proper, to take these four statues as the crown of one of the portals, of which each requires four, right away this year as a first start in the continued filling-in of the now currently empty squares.” This concern situates Schinkel in conformity with the notion of Gesamtkunstwerk. While perhaps only pointing to apparent incompleteness in the intended artistic design of his predecessor, Schlüter, I would argue that this notion of unity and wholeness with regard to artistic and aesthetic production was a concern which generally dictated Schinkel’s work in the area of the Schlossplatz and Lustgarten.

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316 (Und zugleich wird von dieser Seite die Pflicht um so dringender, die geerbten Schätze in ihrer ganzen Herrlichkeit zu erhalten, und in den ungünstigsten Zeiten sind die hierauf zu verwendenden Mittel nie als eine überflüssige Verschwendung anzusehen, weil der zwar indirekte Nutzen, der daraus erwächst, zu allgemein und groß ist.) Ibid.
317 (Welch einen widrigen Eindruck würde es im Landes und im Auslande machen, wenn nach so glänzenden Ereignissen in der Geschichte das Königliche Schloß in Berlin eines Hauptschmuckes beraubt würde aus einem ökonomischen Grunde.) Ibid.
318 (Es ist am zweckmäßigsten, diese vier Statuen als Krönung eines der Portale, von denen jedes vier bedarf, gleich in diesem Jahre zusammenzustellen als ein erster Anfang zu der fortgesetzten Ausfüllung der jetzt leer gewordenen Plätze) Ibid.
In his tenure as royal architect, Schinkel contextualized the Stadtschloss within a cultural-historical visual frame. As Brian Ladd rightly suggests in *Ghosts of Berlin*, Schinkel created a 360-degree visual and experiential perspective of Prussian society in this area by situating around the Lustgarten the seat and living quarters of government to the South (the “crown,” as he argues), a Protestant cathedral to the East (the “church”), the Zeughaus to the West (the “army”), and the Altes Museum to the North (“culture”). Indeed, a visual sweep from the north side of the Stadtschloss at this moment in the early nineteenth century encapsulated a particular wholeness of Prussian culture. But it was not without pragmatic negotiation on Schinkel’s part. As suggested by the discussion of the statues above, Schinkel had to make his case before Friedrich Wilhelm III in both aesthetic and economic terms.

![Model display of Stadtschloss, Lustgarten, Berliner Dom, Schlossbrücke, and Zeughaus from south. Model by Horst Dühring. On display at HumboldtBox Berlin. Photograph by author, March 2012.](image)

*Fig. 30. Model display of Stadtschloss, Lustgarten, Berliner Dom, Schlossbrücke, and Zeughaus from south. Model by Horst Dühring. On display at HumboldtBox Berlin. Photograph by author, March 2012.*

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319 Ladd, *Ghosts of Berlin*, 54. Ladd argues that the Lustgarten is in fact the fulcrum point. Indeed, this is also correct; yet, I suggest here that one could also interpret the Stadtschloss as a beginning vantage point.
Schinkel’s vision, which he was able to realize, was that of a cohesive and unified surrounding in the city center. Following recommendations made by his mentors, David and Friedrich Gilly as well as Heinrich Gentz, Schinkel linked the buildings of the Schlossplatz, Lustgarten, Berliner Dom, Neue Wache, Zeughaus, and the beginnings of a museum island through a Kupfergraben bridge. As Hermann Pundt argues, “[Proposed initially were] statues along either side of the avenue (Unter den Linden) and atop balustrades of a new bridge across the Kupfergraben were to effect visual unity and environmental comprehensiveness between hitherto isolated segments of Berlin’s civic center. … Schinkel’s interest in the area of the Lustgarten and its function and aesthetic improvement gained renewed impetus in 1819 when he was finally commissioned to construct a bridge at the eastern terminus of Unter den Linden.”\(^{320}\) This final contextualization situated the Schlossplatz within an optic and cultural panorama of city palace, religion, art, and military might.\(^{321}\)


\(^{321}\) See Pundt’s *Schinkel’s Berlin*, a particularly germane reading of the contextualization Schinkel achieved in transforming the Berlin city center.
Fig. 31. Model display of Unter den Linden facing west around 1900. Stadtschloss (left) and Berliner Dom (right). Model by Horst Dühring. On display at HumboldtBox Berlin. Photograph by author, March 2012.

1848: König Friedrich Wilhelm IV and Revolution

Increasingly, it would seem after Schinkel’s tenure, little would be done, or little attention would be paid, to the architecture or environmental context of the Stadtschloss. While a new King—Friedrich Wilhelm IV—would be interested, as he took power in 1840, in a particular kind of nostalgia for Schinkel and apparently for the middle ages as well, the movement west towards a different rule became apparent. As pressures from the people presented themselves in the form of the Revolution marches through Berlin in

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322 Construction on the Reichstag originally began in 1867 in the Leipziger Strasse area, but commenced in its current location in 1884 after the Leipziger Strasse accommodations were deemed too small. David Clay Large notes that such modest quarters for the Bundestag would have satisfied Bismarck, but not other politicians: “This was the new Reichstag, started in 1884 and dedicated a decade later. Bismarck had originally proposed that the lower assembly be housed in a simple structure on the Wilhelmstrasse, but a group of Berlin politicians and architects complained that this would hardly be adequate for the parliament of the ‘newly unified, victorious German nation, on the verge of taking over the leadership of Europe.’” David Clay Large, Berlin (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 59.
1848, the finishing details of Schinkel’s original design on the Stadtschloss were completed under Friedrich Wilhelm IV’s direction.\(^{323}\) Begun even before he took power as King, Friedrich Wilhelm IV sought to build out the Lustgarten area across from the Stadtschloss to include a new museum.\(^{324}\) But the emphasis appeared to be on the privatization of the city center. Peschken describes Friedrich Wilhelm IV’s relationship to the new modifications in the area as “seinen eigenen” (his own).\(^{325}\) To be sure, the automatic dynastic inheritance of the Stadtschloss, and apparently its surroundings as well, further exacerbated the mounting tensions between the Hohenzollern family and the residents of Berlin. Despite the new King’s reported moving and convincing oratory skills, the underlying antagonism remained.

With the Revolution of 1848 a few years after Friedrich Wilhelm IV’s assent to the throne, the Stadtschloss once again became the symbolic stand-in for the disappointments of the ruling monarchy. In an account commemorating its one hundredth anniversary of the uprising in Berlin, Ernst Kaeber describes one particular scene during the confrontations on the Schlossplatz: “[The declamations] laid the next morning in whole packages on the squares and in the gutters. The three men working for the king, who carried a large piece of canvas between the two poles on the Schlossplatz, were met

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\(^{324}\) In fact, Friedrich Wilhelm IV established the location in 1823. Peschken, “Königsschloß,” 103.

\(^{325}\) Peschken, “Königsschloß,” 103. Indeed, the Stadtschloss at this moment was still, among other things, a residence.
with jeers and taunts. On the canvas, as was often later recalled with bitter irony, the words were painted, ‘A misunderstanding! The king only wants the best!’”326 Clearly, not only did the Schloss and Schlossplatz act as one of many locations across the city stormed and barricaded by revolutionaries against the military, but here was the location to “speak” for the leading monarch.327 A humiliating defeat for Friedrich Wilhelm IV, his apparent compassions for the “Untertanen” (subjects) were left unanswered, as he and his wife were made to bow to the caskets of dead revolutionaries paraded through the Stadtschloss courtyard on a day following the Revolution.328 Friedrich Wilhelm IV left the Stadtschloss to take up residence in the Schloss in Potsdam within two years.329

Demolition and Modernity: Wilhelm II (Last King in Prussia, 1888–1918)

As the third Kaiser of Prussia, Wilhelm II took power in 1888. Following plans created by his father, Kaiser Friedrich III, who died during his first year in power, Wilhelm II’s intervention in creating a culminating effect of the Stadtschloss came in the form of a consequence of modernity.

327 A map included between pages 192 and 193 in Kaeber’s Berlin 1848 indicates the locations of the barricades across Berlin. Nearly every intersection was barricaded on the days of the 18 and 19 of March 1848.
329 Peschken, “Königsschloß,” 106.
While Kaiser Wilhelm II sought to maintain the artistic and historical integrity of Schlüter’s work on the façade of the palace, the setting of the Stadtschloss was significantly altered by demolition projects surrounding the Schlossplatz. First, the houses lining the Schlossfreiheit, which had occupied the space on the canal in front of the third portal since its initial construction, were razed.\footnote{See Peschken, “Königsschloß,” 111. \em Schlossfreiheit is the name of the citizen residential area attached to the palace.} This clearing in front of the Stadtschloss arguably allowed for more space for mass gatherings and demonstrations. But further, as Goerd Peschken also notes, the empty space actually created room for the allowance of the Stadtschloss in some ways to stand on its own. Peschken writes, “With that, the palace stood, as the city construction of the previous century has preferred, as singular monument on the presentation plate; the same was done at the time to many large cathedrals and churches of the middle ages around Europe.”\footnote{(Damit stand das Schloß, wie der Städtebau des vorigen Jahrhunderts es liebte, als einzelnes Monument auf dem Präsentierteller; das gleiche ist damals vielen großen Kathedralen und Kirchen des Mittelalters in ganz Europa angetan worden) Peschken, “Königsschloß,” 111.}

What I would be careful to emphasize here is that not only did the Schloss thus stand apart as the “only monument on the presentation plate,” but it also stood apart from the previous visual engagement of the Bürgerhäuser (public houses) along the Spree. The Schloss was still engaged in the optic environmental plane of the Lustgarten, Berliner Dom, Zeughaus, etc., yet it was more clearly defined in cultural boundaries from the (Klein)bürger (petty bourgeois) of Berlin.\footnote{Peschken introduces an interesting component of this transition into modernity; that is, the emergence of industrial and capital elitism. He argues in conclusion to his commentary on Kaiser Wilhelm II’s aesthetic changes to the Stadtschloss during his time in power, that while Wilhelm II was indeed careful to maintain the “Sinn des Schlüterschen Vorbildes” (sense of the Schlüter model) in the palace, the elitism of such an effort was not unattainable by newly wealthy. That is to say, the boundaries which had been for centuries established in the economic sphere, and thus the relevance of the Kaiser as particular elite, were eroding. Peschken explains this phenomenon thusly: “Bei aller Anlehnung an den alten Stil oder—mit einer Formulierung von damals—den Sinn des Schlüterschen Vorbildes hatten diese Bauarbeiten unter Wilhelm II. doch nicht mehr das Einmalige des alten Königbaues. In den Villen und Stadtwohnungen der großen}
elitist unified area of the Schlossplatz and the non-elites became tangible in the realignment of the Berlin city center. Further, Kaiser Wilhelm II took up residence in the Stadtschloss when taking office in 1888,\textsuperscript{333} a move, I would argue, which was a return to the familial and inherited status of the structure, a status rejected by the revolutionaries of 1848, and of the first two Kaisers of a unified Germany.\textsuperscript{334} This coupling of economic, political, and cultural elitism would prove fatal for the Schloss in the short time to come.

9. November 1918—14:00: Wiederkehrsmoment. Place of Return.


Of perhaps further indication of this transition into modernity was the fact that part of the Stadtschloss was demolished to make way for the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Strasse, a means of connecting Unter den Linden directly to the eastern side of the city. A sort of West-East connective tissue was thus created in the construction of this thoroughfare, not unlike the one created by the Schinkel bridge.\textsuperscript{333} Noted in Peschken, “Königsschloß,” 112.

\textsuperscript{334} Hela Zettler and Horst Mauter also note this transformation in the contextual visual landscape of the Stadtschloss during Wilhelm II’s authority. They write, “Einen rigorosen Eingriff in die gewachsene Architektur bedeutete die Beseitigung der Häuser zwischen dem Eosanderflügel und der Spree. . . . Wilhelm II. ließ diese ‘Schloßfreiheit’ 1890 niederlegen und auf ihrem südlichen Teil nach Plänen von Gustav Halmhuber (Architekt) und Reinhold Begas (Bildhauerarbeiten) das pompöse Nationaldenkmal für Wilhelm I. aufbauen.


“Als die Hohenzollernherrschaft im Zuge der revolutionären Ereignisse des Oktober und November 1918 gestürzt wurde, zeigte sich der Sitz des Fürstengeschlechtes als ein historisch gewachsenes, beeindruckendes, ästhetisch wirksames Bauwerk, das in seinem Maßstab, in der Kraft seiner Architektur sowie im Glanz seiner Gestaltung alles, was es in Deutschland Vergleichbares gab, übertraf. Es paßte sich harmonisch in ein wohlgeordnetes, architektonisches Umfeld ein.” Hela Zettler and Horst Mauter, Das Berliner Schloss: Eine Fotodokumentation der verlorenen Stadtmitte (Berlin: Argon Verlag and Märkisches Museum, 1991), 20.

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If the Stadtschloss and its environs had begun to solidify as the optic and real convergence of political and cultural elitism, fixed with a particular branding of Schlüter, Schinkel, and Prussianism, a moment of return was approaching. November 9, 1918 would prove to be a reversion to a failed revolution on the balcony of a Stadtschloss portal, but also a moment to which a future occasion of unification would return.

It was at two o’clock on November 9, 1918 that Philipp Scheidemann called from the Reichstag for the resignation of the Kaiser and proclaimed a new Republic. Shortly thereafter, from the balcony of Portal IV on the Stadtschloss, Schlesinger waved a red flag as Karl Liebknecht famously approached the palace at three thirty in the afternoon. Pointing to the portal, Liebknecht reportedly stated: “Through this door the new Socialist freedom will move in; on the location where the Kaiser’s pennant waved, we want the red flag of the free republic of Germany to fly.” Making a clear linguistic distinction between the outside and the inside (“Durch dieses Tor…” [Through this door]), Liebknecht locates a freedom within, specifically on the balcony of the portal. The importance of this gesture is the visual and topographic distinction Liebknecht makes in demarcating the outside from the inside, is that it is a matter of physically breaching that entryway, which makes the political distinction from Prussian tyranny to socialist freedom corporal and geographic. It should not be overlooked regarding this geographic

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336 “Durch dieses Tor wird die neue sozialistische Freiheit der Arbeiter und Soldaten einziehen; an der Stelle, wo die Kaiserstandarte wehte, wollen wir die rote Fahne der freien Republik Deutschland hissen.” Quoted in Klünner, “Novemberrevolution,” 114.
337 Tyranny is my word, not Liebknecht’s.
significance, that it was indeed the Berliner Stadtschloss, and not one of the Kaiser’s seventy-two other palaces and properties, that was stormed by Liebknecht.338

More specifically, the importance of the balcony is a point to which the SED of East Germany will later return and appropriate as it destroys the entire Stadtschloss with the exception of that portal. Because it is on this balcony that Liebknecht further notably called out moments later: “The day of freedom has dawned. Never again will a Hohenzoller enter this place. . . Today there stand a mass of excited proletarians, who cannot be overlooked. They stand together at this location to pay homage to this new freedom. Party comrades, I proclaim the free socialist republic of Germany, which shall embrace all tribes, and reject servitude, and offer every honest worker honest pay for his work . . .”339 It would be with these words, and the image retained from Liebknecht’s balcony gesture—a visual repetition linked to Scheidemann’s Reichstag announcement—that would locate this site as a moment of return in 1950. Yet the appropriation of the Stadtschloss as a locus for shifting political doctrine and transition would prove not only a mimesis for a future ruling party, but would also point to the past failures of the site to attain this goal.

Bogdan Krieger, royal librarian of the Schloss, wrote a first-person account of the proceedings of the November 9, 1918 Revolution on the grounds of the Stadtschloss. He

338 See Kurt Heinig, Hohenzollern. Wilhelm II und sein Haus. Der Kampf um den Kronbesitz (Berlin: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaft, 1921) for an extensive listing of the Hohenzollern properties as well an examination of their finances throughout the ages. An inventory of such properties is given on pages 45-47 in the book.

339 “Der Tag der Freiheit ist angebrochen. Nie wieder wird ein Hohenzoller diesen Platz betreten... Heute steht eine unübersehbare Menge begeisterter Proletarier an demselben Ort, um der neuen Freiheit zu huldigen. Parteigenossen, ich verkünde die freie sozialistische Republik Deutschland, die alle Stämme umfassen soll, in der es keine Knechte mehr geben wird, in der jeder ehrliche Arbeiter den ehrlichen Lohn seiner Arbeit finden wird. . . .” Klünner, “Novemberrevolution.” 113. See also Rudolf Rotheit, Das Berliner Schloß im Zeichen der Novemberrevolution (Berlin: Verlag August Scherl, 1923) for an extended portrayal of this event.
expressed repeatedly in an account of the day how the conditions evoked memories of other occasions for him. Krieger writes:

At two thirty I left the library and exited through the fourth portal, which was still opened for traffic, to the Lustgarten. The area was still partially cordoned off. The outside picture reminded me of so many events during which the area was barricaded due to celebrations, such as the Kaiser birthday parties, court balls, troop swearing-in events, when everyone was dressed so festively and in such good spirits. The juxtaposition moved me.

After a few minutes the picture changed completely, and I was in the harshest reality that I had ever been faced with in my life. . .

In this moment of chaos, Krieger creates a layering of images on the site: memories of tradition and experience are superseded by a new picture and context.

But Krieger’s vague recollections of balls and parties are quickly focused onto a return to the revolution of 1848. Even as he is reminded of a speech given by Kaiser Wilhelm II in the spring of 1901, in which the Kaiser declared the Schloss must always be protected at all costs, as dutiful and self-sacrificing troops had done in 1848, he relates the current actions of Liebknecht finding his way to the balcony of Portal IV to call for the new Socialist Republic. As such, Krieger makes a clear connection between 1848

340 Um ½ 3 Uhr verließ ich die Bibliothek und ging durch das für den Verkehr ausschließlich noch geöffnete Portal IV zum Lustgarten hinaus. Er war in weitem Umkreis durch leichte Postenketten abgesperrt. Das äußere Bild weckte in mir die Erinnerung an so vielen Gelegenheiten, bei denen aus Anlaß festlicher Veranstaltungen solche Absperrungen vorgenommen wurden, an die Kaisergeburtstagsfeiern, Hofbälle, Truppenvereidigungen, wie mal sie so oft, festlich gekleidet und freudig gestimmt, hatte miterleben dürchen. Das Gegensätzliche berührte mich.


and 1918, a return cloaked in a new politics. Noting that Liebknecht uses the same balcony as Kaiser Wilhelm II had also used two months prior to ironically relate his satisfaction with the Kaiserreich to a mass of people below, Krieger writes, “. . .to be able to speak to enthusiastic proletarians from this location, and in which he gave, after the proclamation of the free socialist republic, the assurance that the rule of the Hohenzollern, who had lived in these castles for hundreds of years, was over; never again would a Hohenzoller step foot on this square. . . . It was no longer to be a beloved privately-owned building, but rather one owned by the people.” This is the moment in which the Stadtschloss both loses, and solidifies, its cache as a Prussian artifact. The breaking of the space between interior and exterior disrupts the effect of the palace as Gesamtkunstwerk, in that it is dissolved into multiple visual and thus political spaces: the balcony of the fourth portal becomes a distinct entity in the eyes of the Socialists as well as apparently Hohenzollern employees. The rest of the Schloss, that is, the structure aside from this balcony, is thereby rendered insignificant and utilitarian: it is an architectural structure, I would argue, which is simply a building with no artistic value, since its value as such has been stripped by the revolution of November 9.

The competing narrative to this, of course, is that the Stadtschloss becomes frozen as it had been prior to 1918 as a true work of Prussian culture. As such, when conservativists following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 act to have the Stadtschloss

alle Unbotmäßigkeit und Ungehörigkeit wider seinen königlichen Herrn nachdrücklich in die Schranken zurückversen den” (Krieger 1922: 8).

rebuilt in its original form, they are doing so to resurrect the palace known just prior to two o’clock on November 9, 1918. As essentially little else in the direct visual plane from the Schlossplatz had been altered in the 1990s and early 2000s, a return to this prior configuration of Lustgarten, Berliner Dom, Zeughaus, and Stadtschloss seemed possible.

To return, however, to the question of the breaching of interior and exterior spaces by a new political culture, two further passages help illustrate the visual status of the Schloss from Krieger’s perspective. First, one passage depicting the interior conditions of the palace:

On Monday, November 18, I interrupted my work in the New Palace in order to try to get to the castle so that I could see how things were. In particular, it was up to me to determine if the libraries had suffered from pillaging and general havoc. I was concerned about the book collections which were stored in the living quarters of the majesties and also the royal library, which was located on the Spree side of the building. Only portal II was open to the castle from the Schlossplatz. Five or six sailors, in poor appearance and clothes, stood guard. Asked about my business here, I described my wish to be taken to the commander or anyone, who would give me the opportunity to go through the Kaiser living quarters. A sentry ushered me into the archival rooms on the main floor to the left of the portal. It appeared to be a kind of commanding office for the soldiers. I was assigned a soldier, who took me over the marble steps to the former apartment of the castle constable, Countess Brockdorff. The stairs, which were usually covered in heavy carpets, and whose walls were adorned with portraits of the Hohenzollern and pictures of Prussian history, were indescribably dirty and terribly damaged from the cleats on the soldiers’ boots; chunks of marble were knocked out of the stairs.

Second, a depiction of the exterior of the Schloss:

Aside from the damage to the outside portals IV and V, which had already been done, there were also the columns of the entryways in the interior, which were heavily damaged by bullets. In the second courtyard, the columns of the portals opposite the portals leading to the Kaiser’s living quarters were (damaged) as well. In the first courtyard a grenade had uncovered the roof of the entrance to the wine cellar. . . . The last day of the year brought with it finally the liberation from the rule of the sailors. They vacated the castle. . . . The entrance to the castle was relocated to the portal leading to the Eishof courtyard next to the pharmacy wing.\textsuperscript{344}

Krieger’s description of both the interior and exterior of the Schloss points to an intentional degradation of the structure and aesthetics of the palace. Dirt and bullet holes, along with chipped marble and lethargic soldiers, point here to an explicit indifference to the Residenzpalast. If, in the immediate moments of November 9, the Stadtschloss had not lost its weight as relevant object of the Socialist movement, in the weeks after, it sealed that fate. It is because of this lack of total appropriated significance (i.e., the portal IV is the only part of the Schloss which enjoyed future recognition), that I argue the Stadtschloss here begins to straddle a line between allegoric rubble and ruin.

\textbf{Post-1918: The Schloss in the Landscape of the Weimar Republic}

\begin{flushright}
In fact, much was plundered from the Stadtschloss during this time. Klünner argues that the placement of military personnel did little to prevent theft in, for example the wine cellar or silver cellar; although, he also claims that the degree or rate of pilfering was less than originally claimed. See Klünner, “Novemberrevolution,” 116.\textsuperscript{344} “Abgesehen von den bereits angeführten schweren Beschädigungen der Außenportale IV und V waren auch die Säulen dieser Durchfahrten im Inneren stark zerschossen, im zweiten Hofe auch die Säulen des gegenüberliegenden Portals vor dem Aufgang zur Wohnung des Kaisers. Im ersten Hofe hatte eine Granate das Dach zum Eingang des Weinkellers abgedeckt. . . . Der letzte Tag des Jahres brachte dann endlich die Befreiung von der Herrschaft der Matrosen. Sie räumten das Schloß. . . . Der Eingang zum Schloß wurde nach dem auf den Eishof führenden Portal neben dem Apothekenflügel verlegt.” Krieger, \textit{Berliner Schloss}, 32-33.
\end{flushright}
With the exile of Kaiser Wilhelm II to the Netherlands, the Schloss faced the dilemma of the right of property ownership of the Weimar government and that of Hohenzollern inheritance.\(^345\) In the years following the Kaiser’s abdication, the question was settled as the former residential palace became a location of public accessibility and historical and artistic expression. Along with the public use of the space as a museum, the Stadtschloss remained a residence—albeit to public officials, who rented upper-floor rooms for their private use. Twenty-seven such renters, mainly high-ranking employees from the Culture Ministry, were counted as residents as of 1924.\(^346\) Further rooms were occupied by various public groups as office space. In effect, the space created in the Schloss was multi-function and a mix of private and public occupants and consumers.

How the Stadtschloss, however, became more widely known in the context of Weimar, was as a museum of decorative arts. As described by Zettler and Mauter:

After the Berlin Palace lost its function as the Hohenzollern residence, areas of the castle were rented to interested parties. In 1932, there were fifteen private renters and twenty-five public facilities. People sought, however, to use the space as best suited to honor its historical, artistic, and architectural meaning: that is, as a museum. The ‘Palace Museum,’ as it was named, was an applied arts museum moved from the Gropius building, and opened in 1921. It expanded to almost ninety exhibition rooms by the beginning of the First World War. In addition, the wings of the Schlossplatz, with their historical living quarters from the Kaiser period, were opened to the public; other rooms displayed the important collection of the State Theater Museum, which was founded in 1929.\(^347\)

\(^{345}\) See Klünner, “Novemberrevolution,” 115 for a description of the negotiations for ownership of the Schloss between the Hohenzollern family and the new Weimar government.

\(^{346}\) Klünner, “Novemberrevolution,” 117.

Yet the museum was not without controversy. The curator of the *Kunstgewerbemuseum* (Museum of Applied Arts) felt that presentation diverted attention to the integrity of the building itself as historical object. In one printed interview, Hermann Schmitz, former director of the *Staatliche Kunstsbibliothek* (State Art Library) and then director of the public facilities declared that it was a hard-enough battle won to hinder the hammering of nails into the “*Schlüterschen Stukkaturen*” (Schlüter-style stucco work) to hang portraits in order to protect the structural integrity of the building and its architectural history.348

Where previously it had been an architect who had fought to preserve the Stadtschloss’s architectural history, it was now a caretaker who argued for the actual building’s preservation. Rather than making the claim as Schinkel had previously that the Schloss must be maintained for aesthetic and architectural history’s sake against the hand of nature, now Schmitz was attempting to save it from the hand of man.

Further, the Stadtschloss was actively shunned for official political or symbolically political use. Too closely associated with the Prussian past, the Stadtschloss instead physically languished without proper maintenance, and externally became a visual allegory of the ruin of a political and cultural dynasty, as it became reappropriated

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as an arguably politically-neutral museum space. Internally, however, the museum offered a historical retrospective in the form of exhibitions housed within the context of a Prussian elite’s residence.\textsuperscript{349} As such, distance was created between the current political status and that of the Prussian past which had previously inhabited the space. The Schloss was not appropriated as a Weimar-defining object, but rather left as a remnant of a past life.

Some continuance in the distance the ruling party held towards the Stadtschloss was seen with the takeover of the National Socialist party in 1933. In fact, the Kunstgewerbemuseum continued to operate into the beginning of the next War. The last exhibit to be showcased in the Kunstgewerbemuseum of the Stadtschloss was on costumes and art of the eighteenth century. It opened in the fall of 1940, despite much of the museum’s contents having already been shipped off or packed up for safety at the outbreak of the war a year earlier.\textsuperscript{350}

**Air raids and Palace Bombings: The Stadtschloss during World War II and the Nazi Period**

\textsuperscript{349} Bernd Maether argues that while the Stadtschloss and Schlossplatz were discredited as a space of protest, the Lustgarten opposite was a preferred venue for the Weimar political protesters: “Die Weimarer Republik verzichtete völlig auf die Nutzung des Schlosses für ihre repräsentative politische Selbstdarstellung. Zwischen den Weltkriegen fand keine einzige politische Veranstaltung im Schloss statt, während der Lustgarten sich zum Demonstrationsplatz der sich heftig bekämpfenden links- und rechtsradikalen Parteien entwickelte.” (The Weimar Republic abstained completely from using the castle as representative of the country’s politics. Between the World Wars, not one political activity or event took place in the castle, whereas the Lustgarten developed into a demonstration space for heavily contentious left and right radical parties.) Maether, *Vernichtung des Berliner Stadtschlosses*, 23. Regarding the reception of the museum space in the Stadtschloss, he writes, “. . . Nun war das Schloss für alle offen. Das Interesse der Berliner richtete sich nicht nur auf die neue Ausstellung, sondern vor allem auch auf die prachtvollen Räume des Schlosses. Die historischen Paradekammern mit ihrer reichen dekorativen Ausstattung waren nun ständig für die Bevölkerung zugänglich.” (. . . At that point the castle was open for everyone. The Berliners’ interest was not only in the new exhibit, but also especially in the grand rooms of the castle. The historical show chambers with their rich decorative furnishings were now accessible to people.) Ibid.

\textsuperscript{350} Klünner, “Novemberrevolution,” 121-2.
Before settling into offices in the Tiergarten, the director of the newly-formed *Reichskammer der bildenden Künste* (Reich chamber of visual arts), Eugen Höning, former professor of architecture in Munich, worked from its head office in the Stadtschloss. It was from here in the Stadtschloss that the National Socialist determinations of “entartete Kunst” (degenerate art) were initially to be conceived.\(^{351}\) While “acceptable” installations continued to maintain the Stadtschloss’s status as a museal space, the building itself stood in disrepair. Following the physical damage to the structure the Revolution of 1918 caused, the Stadtschloss had neither been renovated nor properly maintained. The illusion of ruin, which the Stadtschloss had perpetuated during the Weimar era, was to be reinterpreted by the National Socialist government in Berlin.

Perhaps the intervention may simply be attributed to the academic interests of the last Schlossbaudirektor, Albert Geyer, whose particular curiosity and study of the Stadtschloss led to his seminal work on the building, published in 1936. Comprised not only of a volume of detailed text of the palace, Geyer published an accompanying book of images, in which he rendered drawings of the Stadtschloss, speculating on its design, beginning with its initial conception, plans of which had long since not been available.\(^{352}\) In any event, Geyer set about reconstructing on paper interior spaces which had been damaged in the previous two decades. As well, he pushed for the conservation and renovation of the building’s exterior façade. Among the work done in the beginning of the 1930s, portals and roofs were repaired, and the sandstone façade cleaned. But as economic and supply conditions worsened, so too was the amount of work that the

\(^{351}\) Klünner, “Novemberrevolution,” 124.

building department was able to conduct more limited. The Schloss could not be made a priority. So while one academic’s interest in the Stadtschloss helped to preserve it in the meantime, it functioned mainly as a means to promote not history, but a new political aesthetic.

As with the majority of the infrastructure and buildings of Berlin during the Second World War, the Stadtschloss also suffered under the massive bombings. While the complex was bombed three times during the War, suffered a massive fire, and was damaged by general artillery attacks, the fate of the Stadtschloss appeared relatively insignificant in relation to the vast ruin of personal property across the city. As Bernd Maether rather candidly states, “For people after that, it was all about satisfying the elementary question of survival. The entire center of Berlin lay in rubble. Who would be interested in the palace and other famous buildings in the city?”

Moving into the post-war period, the transformation of the palace from a damaged building into destroyed one dovetails with the transition to socialist East Germany. In the next chapter, I will take up the demolition of the Stadtschloss by the SED and the construction of the Palace of the Republic in its place. Further, I will trace the re-appropriation of both buildings after 1990, and to what end the Schlossplatz is currently undergoing changes to once again satisfy the pursuit of creating a Gesamtkunstwerk in the center of Berlin.

353 See Klünner, “Novemberrevolution,” 126. Some exceptions were made fortuitously, including a room decorated by Andreas Schlüter. Academic attention to the room made finding funding for its upkeep possible.
354 (Für die Bevölkerung ging es danach nur noch um die Befriedigung elementarer Fragen der Lebenserhaltung. Die gesamte Innenstadt Berlins lag in Trümmern, wer interessierte sich da noch für das Schloss und die anderen berühmten Bauten der Stadt.) Maether in fact makes the claim that Hitler never even once step foot in the Schloss, suggesting its unimportance and lack of political utility for the leader. See Maether, Vernichtung des Berliner Stadtschlosses, 23.
355 Maether, Vernichtung des Berliner Stadtschlosses, 36.
CHAPTER FIVE
REALIGNMENTS AND RECONSTRUCTION

Post-War Realignments

It would be some years following the official end to the Second World War that any decision regarding the fate of the Stadtschloss would be made. Initially, however, in the late summer of 1945, Hans Scharoun, as “Stadtbaurat für Bau und Wohnungswesen beim Magistrat von Groß-Berlin” (Director of City Council for Building and Housing for the Municipal Authority of Great-Berlin), made his commitment to the preservation of the palace known to the Soviet Magistrat (municipal authority), who had apparently already made known their intention to demolish the Schloss. Scharoun made the case that the historical significance of the Schlüter architecture and adornments were reason enough to preserve the structure. This view was met with an unequivocal opinion that the architectural aesthetic was “kitsch.” Arthur Pieck, then member of the Magistrat, retorted to Scharoun’s dedication to the Schloss, “Only truly artistic works earn salvage and safekeeping. The castles in no way hold only objects of worth, but rather a lot of kitschy art as well. No one has interest today in sorry pieces that are only expressions of Hohenzollern imperialism.”356 This assessment was party line: the Stadtschloss was the

legacy of Prussia and the Hohenzollern family tradition, one which stood in direct opposition to the new national political narrative being written in the SBZ.

Scharoun, however, continued to press for the preservation of the Schlüter and further Baroque pieces, arguing that if not protected from the elements over the course of the winter, they would be forever lost. The Magistrat relinquished in the fall of 1945 and set aside 45,000 Reichsmark for necessary repairs to the Schloss in order to provide protection to the artifacts stored still in the palace.\textsuperscript{357} I would argue that this was not necessarily, however, an admission that the Schloss or the objects within it were of cultural importance to the SBZ or emerging New Berlin. Rather, I would suggest, the move was a means of protecting possibly monetarily valuable artifacts.\textsuperscript{358}

Secondarily (or perhaps even primarily), the preservation of the Schloss afforded the presentation of an exhibition of city planning designs in the Stadtschloss nearly a year later. In August of 1946, Scharoun opened the exhibition “Berlin plant–Erster Bericht” (Berlin plans–first report), a presentation of the vision for the future of Berlin’s urban landscape post-war. Hauntingly arguing Christa Wolf’s post-GDR question, Scharoun’s exhibition also asks about the fate of what is left: “What remained, after bombings and

\textsuperscript{357} The intention apparently was as well to bring artifacts from all other Berlin palaces to the Stadtschloss for their inclusion in the preservation process. See Maether, \textit{Vernichtung des Berliner Stadtschlosses}, 38ff.

\textsuperscript{358} I have not seen this argument put forth previously, but would suggest from the tone of the statement issued by the Magistrat in October 1945, that while it acknowledged that the architectural remnants and pieces are “wertvoll,” it is not implied nor actually stated that they are of importance to the cultural or historical heritage of the new emerging city or policy. Neither was the decision without internal conflict. Some on the committee saw the work as “kontraproduktiv.” (See Maether, \textit{Vernichtung des Berliner Stadtschlosses}, 40ff.)
final attacks executed a mechanical aeration [of the land] and ripped open the cityscape? That, what was left, gives us the opportunity to create a new ‘urban landscape.’”

As the planners, politicians, and residents of Berlin focused forward on the rebuilding process, the fourth and final exhibit to be showcased in the Schloss (after wildly successful exhibits of French Impressionism and objects of the Museum Island), was a return to 1848. Opened in March of 1948, the exhibition “Berlin 1848” celebrated the one hundredth anniversary of the socialist revolution in the city. In a perhaps ironic twist of fate, the final exhibit in the Stadtschloss, a return to the original socialist revolution, propelled the Schloss not towards a resolution or reconciliation of the structure most noted for its Prussian past, but rather towards demolition. With little fanfare, in the fall of 1949, Friedrich Ebert, son of the former Reichspräsident and head of the East Berlin Magistrate, announced the joint decision of the GDR and East Berlin government to raze the Stadtschloss. Walter Ulbricht ultimately declared at the Third Parteitag of the SED on July 22, 1950, “The center of our capital city, the Lustgarten and the area of the now castle ruins, must become a large square for demonstrations, where our people’s desire to fight [Kampfwille] and will to rebuild [Aufbauwille] can find

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359 “Was blieb, nachdem Bombenangriffe und Endkampf eine mechanische Auflockerung vollzogen, das Stadtbild aufrissen? Das, was blieb, gibt uns die Möglichkeit, eine ‘Stadtlandschaft’ daraus zu gestalten” (Quoted in Maether, *Vernichtung des Berliner Stadtschlosses*, 41. Originally documented as “Vortrag vom 5. September 1946 zur Ausstellung ‘Berlin plant—erster Bericht,’” in *Schriftenreihe der Akademie der Künste* 10 [1974]:158.)

360 Klünert describes the latter exhibit (“Wiedersehen mit Museumsgut” [Reunion with museum goods]) as a conflicted presentation of the old and the lost: “Von Ludwig Justi aus den Restbeständen der Kunstsammlungen auf der Museumsinsel zusammengestellt, ließ die Freude und Trauer zugleich aufkommen: Freude über das Gerettete und Trauer über das, was verloren schien, denn in der Öffentlichkeit war damals unbekannt, daß sich große Teile der Sammlungen im Gewahrsam der Besatzungsmächte befanden” (The exhibit, put together by Ludwig Justi from the remainders of the art collections on Museum Island, brought forth joy and grief simultaneously: joy over that which was saved, and grief over that which appeared to be lost. At that point the public did not know that large parts of the collections were in the custody of the occupying forces.) Klünert, “Novemberrevolution,” 129-130.
At this moment, the visual landscape of the Schlossplatz, and ultimately, the center of a New Berlin, was reconceptualized. As a demonstration area, the cleared Schlossplatz would bring Kaiser Wilhelm II’s initial attempt in razing the buildings of the Schlossfreiheit to full fruition. A return, as well, to the Lustgarten demonstrations of the Weimar Republic were, however, more intentionally evoked.

But for whatever public empowerment the SED government was suggesting in Ulbricht’s proposition that by destroying the Stadtschloss, the emptiness left was to exemplify the “Kampfwille” and “Aufbauwille” of the GDR, some remained skeptical. As one advisor to the building commission of Berlin made clear, the decision to demolish the Stadtschloss came not from the city of Berlin, but rather from its new national government, the owner of the building. While not explicitly stating so, the implication is that the demolition of the Stadtschloss was a function of a new national political agenda, not that of a local city planning board.

Further, as many have since argued, the structure, although damaged, was not beyond repair. In fact, Schloss Charlottenburg was said to have received more substantial damage during the war, but was later restored. The symbolism of destroying the

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361 “Das Zentrum unserer Hauptstadt, der Lustgarten und das Gebiet der jetzigen Schloßruine, müssen zu dem großen Demonstrationsplatz werden, auf dem der Kampfwille und Aufbauwille unseres Volkes Ausdruck finden können.” Quoted in Klinner, “Novemberrevolution,” 130. See also Bundesarchiv DH 1/38615 (Ministerium für Bauwesen, 1952-54) for discussions regarding the usage and preservation of surrounding buildings, such as Staatsoper and the Zeughaus, the vis-a-vis the GDR’s five-year building plan. In the file is also a note from September 4, 1950 describing a conversation with Ulbricht, who confirming that the Stadtschloss will in fact be demolished (the following day).

362 One such account: “Aber in seiner Substanz stand es fest, es war weniger zerstört als das Charlottenburger Schloss, dem man heute seine Kriegsschäden nicht mehr ansieht.” (But the structure remained standing. It was destroyed less than the Charlottenburger Castle, whose damage suffered in the war is no longer visible.) Statement from the Förderverein Berliner Schloss, e.V., proponents of its rebuilding post-unification. “Die Baugeschichte.” Available at: http://berliner-schloss.de/das-historische-schloss/baugeschichte. August 31, 2011.
ultimate icon of the country’s Prussian royal past through the razing of a historic building in the name of a fresh start was not lost on public servants of the new German Democratic Republic. Nor was it lost on many in the academic community.

To be sure, the intent to demolish the Stadtschloss met with particular resistance from, among others in Berlin, art historian Professor Richard Hamann of the Humboldt Universität. He argues in a letter to Ebert dated two days after the initial demolition of the Schloss:

Politics demands that the voice of the people, i.e., in this case of the long-time Berlin residents, finds a listener. For as long as I have been able to hear from simple people, this voice has called for the preservation of the old Berlin, which only with the linden trees (on Unter den Linden) and with the castle, which is architecturally inseparable from Berlin, can be preserved as a cultural center, a cultural center which reveals the respect the new era has for the accomplishments of the great past now and in the future.

Politics demands that the damage done to the castle, which was perpetrated by the representatives of a dying culture, which they boast so much about, will not be completed by the advocates of new ideas.

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363 Portal IV, from which Liebknecht called for the new socialist republic during the 1918 revolution, was salvaged and symbolically placed as the new entrance to the Staatsrat-Gebäude across from the Schlossplatz.

364 Baustadtrat (City Council Member for Construction) Arnold Munter, who received the contract to demolish the Stadtschloss related later: “Die Sprenggruppe unterstand meiner Fachabteilung, so daß ich unmittelbar dafür zuständig war, den Beschluß umzusetzen. Das Schloss war zwar teilweise Ruine, aber teilweise auch in durchaus erhaltungsfähigem Zustand. Gerüchte über seinen Abriß hatte es schon vorher gegeben, ich hatte aber nie so recht daran glauben können, auch nicht wollen. Nun bat ich den Oberbürgermeister, noch einmal mit den zuständigen Leuten zu sprechen. Ich habe im Besonderen auf den Schlüterhof hingewiesen, der noch verhältnismäßig gut erhalten war und notdürftig als Museum genutzt wurde. Kurze Zeit später kam Friedrich Ebert auf mich zu und sagte: „Herr Stadtrat, es ist endgültig beschlossen und abgesprochen‘, er sagte mir nicht mit wem „das Schloss muß abgerissen werden.“ Übrigens war das Schloss damals im Besitz des Staates, nicht im Besitz Berlins.” (The demolition group understood my specialty, so that I was completely responsible for implementing the decision. The castle was perhaps partly in ruin, but partly also in an absolutely repairable condition. Rumors about its demolition had circulated before, but I never really believed them, didn’t want to either. So I asked the mayor once more to speak to the people in charge. I had pointed to the Schlüterhof in particular, which was still standing pretty well and being used as a museum. A short time later Friedrich Ebert came to me and said, “It’s been decided and arranged,” he didn’t tell me with whom, “the castle must be torn down.” Incidentally, the castle was the property of the state at the time, not the city of Berlin.) Cited in Maether, Vernichtung des Berliner Stadtschlosses, 88. I would argue that this statement accuses the participants in question of closed-door politicking, but also suggests the complexities of the general question of Berlin planning between the local and national levels, an issue which existed previously, and certainly continues to persist.
For the purpose of an area for military marches there are other possibilities and perhaps better ones, which would go together better with the needs of the day, rather than with the district of old Berlin which has become historical through the current association of linden trees and the Schlossplatz, which through its wholeness, its total character as a piece of art, its usage today as a place of intellectual life with the library, university, theater and museums, which suggests a continuation and expansion in this regard. These historical points have already been made known in a variety of ways and it has already been suggested to move the place for military marches further east directly into the pulsing life of the worker city. Then Berlin would save a center, that could stand dignified next to the big historical places of memory and representative monuments of other places, like the Zwinger Palace in Dresden, the Louvre in Paris, the Doge’s Palace and St. Mark’s Square in Venice, the Hradčany in Prague and the Kremlin in Moscow.

The argument Hamann makes—that Stadtschloss should be protected as it is indistinguishable from its surroundings in architectural and historical sense, and further exposes the past to the present and future—was likely precisely that which Ebert et al.


“Die Politik verlangt, dass die Zerstörungen am Schloss, die von den Vertretern einer abgelebten Kultur, deren sie sich so rühmen, begonnen ist, nicht von den Verfechtern neuer Gedanken vollendet wird. . . .

“Für den Zweck eines Geländes für Aufmärsche gibt es andere Möglichkeiten und vielleicht bessere, die mit den Forderungen des Tages besser zusammenstimmen würden, als mit einem durch die heutige Verbindung von Linden und Schlossplatz historisch gewordenen Bezirk des alten Berlin, der durch seine Geschlossenheit, seinen Gesamcharakter als Kunstwerk, seine heute schon gegebene Verwendung als für Stätten des geistigen Lebens wie Bibliothek, Universität, Theater und Museen auf eine Erhaltung und Erweiterung in diesem Sinne hinweist. Auf diese Geschichtspunkte ist schon vielfach aufmerksam gemacht worden und es liegen auch Anregungen vor, den Aufmarschplatz weiter östlich unmittelbar in das pulsierende Leben der Arbeiterstadt hineinzuvorlegen. Dadurch würde Berlin ein Zentrum bewahren, das neben den grossen historischen Erinnerungsstätten und repräsentativen Monumenten anderen Ortes wie dem Zwinger in Dresden, dem Louvre in Paris, dem Dogenpalast und Markusplatz in Venedig, dem Hradschin in Prag und dem Kreml in Moskau würdig bestehen könnte. . . .” Original document (“Letter from Prof. Hamann to Friedrich Ebert, 8. September 1950”) reproduced in Maether, Vernichtung des Berliner Stadtschlosses, 259-261. It should be clarified here, as Hamann does in his letter, that he writes from the perspective of a then sudden “Westerner.” He writes, “Solang man mir nicht den Mund gewaltsam verschliesst, werde ich nicht aufhören, gegen den Beschluss zu protestieren und zwar nicht als (ein) Angehöriger des Westens, sondern als ein Sohn des Ostens, der durch Herkunft und Erziehung (1898 an der Berliner Universität immatrikuliert, 1911 habilitiert) aufs innigste mit Berlin und seiner Kultur verknüpft ist und der bemüht ist, in kulturellen Fragen dem Osten das Gewicht zu erhalten, auf das er durch die grossen Hinterlassenschaften der Kunst (Dresden, Naumburg, Magdeburg—dessen Dom ich eine Monographie gewidmet habe—Erfurt, die norddeutschen Backsteindome, das Berliner Schloss) Anspruch hat” (Page 3 of Hamann letter, in Maether, Vernichtung des Berliner Stadtschlosses, 261). This is not to suggest that Hamann’s opinion was not given credence given his apparent Western ties, but rather to underscore the dynamic of the moment in drawing political lines along architectural and structural ones.
wished to destroy. In response to the letter above (as well as more Hamann and others published elsewhere), some elite protesters received a curt response from Walter Ulbricht suggesting the dissenters look elsewhere for blame. “Now, if you have the desire,” Ulbricht wrote to one, “to organize a protest movement, then please protest against those who destroyed the castle with their bombing terror.”

While Ulbricht was undoubtedly eager to set the debate within the tones of “Socialists as martyrs”—whereby the government would not be able financially to repair the damages caused by ruthless American bombers, thus requiring the Stadtschloss’s destruction—classified documents of the time support the suggestion that in reality it was a conscious decision by government officials to raze the building for its own symbolic resonance. Where Hamann and others argued that in fact the visual and historical link of the Stadtschloss to its surroundings was critical for the preservation

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366 “Also wenn Sie den Wusch haben, eine Protestbewegung zu organisieren, dann bitte gegen jene, die das Schloss durch ihren Bombenterror zerstört haben.” See “Schreiben von Walter Ulbricht an Helmut Räther, 18. September 1950,” published in Maether, Vernichtung des Berliner Stadtschlosses, 279. In it, Ulbricht specifically holds the “amerikanische Bombenangriffe” (American bombing raids) accountable for the destruction of the Stadtschloss, and suggests broadcast journalist Helmut Räther protest the US. Further, Ulbricht reasoned, the GDR further lacks the funds necessary to repair the destruction the “amerikanischen Bombenterror” (American bombing terror) caused. Clearly, the West-East divide was palpable in Ulbricht’s letter.

367 This is a narrative I explore further in the chapter about the Soviet Monument in Treptower Park.

368 One such document from the Beauftragter Denkmalpfleger des Ministeriums für Aufbau am Schloß Berlin noted as “Streng vertraulich!!” (Strictly confidential!!) states: “Im Verlauf der vergangenen Woche hat sich deutlich erwiesen, daß die Propaganda gegen den Abbruch des Stadtschlosses trotz vorliegendem Ministerratsbeschlusses und dessen Bestätigung durch die Volkskammer als systematisch betrieben und organisiert gelenkt betrachtet werden muß. Das subjektiv ehrliche Bemühen einzelner Wissenschaftler um die Erhaltung der ruinösen Substanz wird hierdurch zusammengefaßt und politisch wirksam gemacht. Damit verbunden sind ständige diffamierende Angriffe gegen die Mitarbeiter des wissenschaftlichen Aktivs, denen korrupte Motive untergeschoben bezw. jegliche fachliche Qualifikation abgesprochen wird. . . .” (“In the course of the past week it has become clear that the propaganda against the demolition of the City Palace, despite the Council of Ministers’ decision and the confirmation in the People’s Chamber, must be seen as systematically carried out and managed in an organized fashion. The subjectively truthful efforts of particular scientists to preserve the ruinous building will be summarized here and made politically active. Associated with this are the constant defaming attacks against colleagues of the Science Team, who are accused of having corrupt motives and whose qualifications are discredited.”) From the brief “Aktennotiz zum Abbruch des Stadtschlosses Berlin, ‘Gegenpropaganda von G. Strauss’ (Streng vertraulich!!), 12. September 1950.” Reproduced in Maether, Vernichtung des Berliner Stadtschlosses, 262-3.
of a continuity of the past into the future, the new government was quick to discredit the past by destroying traces of its existence in the new city center. Where Hamann suggests in the passage above that the area of the Stadtschloss could continue to function as a cultural center, a location of artistic “Gesamtcharakter,” he also suggests that the political lives of workers (i.e., demonstrations) could be held elsewhere than in this cultural space. This notion clearly contradicts the intent of the new GDR: to create in (East) Berlin’s city center a space of cultural, political, and worker expression.

Beginning on September 5, 1950, workers began to systematically detonate the explosions necessary to demolish the Stadtschloss. By the end of the year, the structure was but a pile of rubble. By March of 1951, the remains of the Stadtschloss had been cleared, and on the May 1, 1951, the former Schlossplatz was officially renamed, in the presence of over one million demonstrators, “Marx-Engels-Platz.”

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369 Not only this, but as Mayor Ebert was quoted as saying, it would be ill advised to allow the space to harken back to a distant past, “since the new Berlin must not become a city of ruins like Rome.” Quoted in Ladd, *Ghosts of Berlin*, 57. Originally quoted in Gerd-H. Zuchold, “Der Abriss des Berliner Schlosses,” *Deutschland Archiv*, 18 (2985), 192.

370 Klünner, “Novemberrevolution,” 130.
Rubble and Ruin; Leere and Lehre: Defining a New City Center

If the era of the central Gesamtkunstwerk was over, a different moral from the past was to make a return, namely that of city center as allegory of regional/national status. Just as for centuries, the various incarnations of the Stadtschloss acted as symbol of the political and cultural relevance of the Mark Brandenburg in the sixteenth century, symbol of the city’s reemergence after struggle in the mid-seventeenth century, symbol of Prussian independence later in that century, and symbol of unification nearly a hundred years later, in the area’s latest reappropriation, it was to become the “Schaufenster des sozialistischen Lagers” (display window of the socialist condition).371

Certainly, it cannot be but curiously noted that this “Schaufenster” was indeed a blank space in the middle of the new East German capital. Where in the past, a built space in the urban landscape (i.e., the Stadtschloss) was rendered symbolic of political and cultural imaginings, the newly donned Marx-Engels-Platz seemed to be the antithesis of architectural composition.³⁷²

Yet what I would argue here is that despite, or even because of, the Leere—emptiness—in the city center, the space afforded a kind of political visualization, which in fact created an optic argument for the Auferstanden aus Ruinen (Risen from the Ruins), upon which the GDR built its political mythos. As the architectural rendering of the political legacy of Prussia was summarily swept away, it was replaced with the open space of red banners and stadium seating for protests: a Lehre—a specifically political and cultural teaching of the elite—in the Leere.

To be sure, the emptiness of the vacant “parking lot” as Brian Ladd has described it,³⁷³ could be interpreted as well as the product of the failed attempt to actually build. As another scholar has cynically depicted the area of the former Stadtschloss during this period:

The history of the Palace [of the Republic] begins not with the demolition of the wartime-destroyed Schloss. For more than twenty years the location was simply empty. First people pursued different concepts of state representation buildings. A

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³⁷² In the epilogue to his book on “cultural and intellectual life in Berlin” during the postwar period of 45-48, Wolfgang Schivelbusch characterizes the area of Berlin-Mitte in the decades following as a “dead crater.” He writes: “The center of Berlin, we remember, was the most thoroughly destroyed part of the city. It was the dead ‘crater’ around which the urban ‘circle’ of the two postwar Berlins reconstituted itself. This center remained a wasteland well into the 1960s” (Wolfgang Schivelbusch, In a Cold Crater: Cultural and Intellectual Life in Berlin, 1945-1948 [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998], 185). While I fully agree with this characterization of the center in general at this time as “wasteland,” I also seek to find some sense of the push for a redemptive quality of the void left in the wake of the Stadtschloss’s destruction.

³⁷³ Ladd, Ghosts of Berlin, 57.
central government building in pseudo-classical style was, however, probably due to a lack of money, never realized. Instead, the location was a military marching and demonstration square, as well as a Christmas market. Otherwise, it distinguished itself mainly through non-use [Nichtnutzung].

Rather than agree outright, though I do concur, with the reality of this space as a zone of supreme “Nichtnutzung,” during this period, I believe it is of benefit to look for a different explanation, as I suggested above. This centrally located space (geographically and politically speaking) was couched in a political rhetoric that it was a place of public demonstration. In what ways could this have been successful? Or, to ask the question differently, in what way was this vacant space bound to fail as such (i.e., that a structure would eventually be built on its foundation)?

I alluded in earlier sections to the idea that the Stadtschloss, in its post-1918 form, straddled a line between rubble and ruin. To explore this argument further, I will draw briefly upon Georg Simmel’s notion of the ruin, a concept which will prove critical to understanding the Palace of the Republic in its post-Wall form. In his essay, “The Ruin,” Georg Simmel argues that architecture holds a special distinction in the realm of the arts in that it, unlike “poetry, painting, and music,” allows for “the great struggle between the will of the spirit and the necessity of nature issues into real peace.”

This possible reconciliation between spirit and nature is made significant through the struggle between the two. Where the ruin is the effect of nature prevailing over man, its meaning is derived

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from the specific unadulterated process of nature pushing against the material of the building. In instances where man actively pursues its demise, the “fascination of the ruin” is no longer, and the building is instead a “mere heap of stones.”

As I argued previously, the Stadtschloss, during the revolution of 1918, again in Weimar’s Berlin, further during the Nazi period, to its final demolition at the hands of the SED, failed to capture either the re-appropriated life as a relevant piece of the Gesamtkunstwerk of central Berlin or the return of a Prussian past. Instead, it was shot at by Revolutionaries, bombed by the Allies, and razed by the East Germans. In each of these instances the wounds at the hand of man were not successfully healed, nor were they caused by the impact of the nature. As such, I would argue, the Stadtschloss failed to become an architectural form symbolic of renewal in the face of transformation. Where in fact the break in the unity of the structure and the area could have, as Simmel would contend, afforded a moment of redemption, none occurred and the building instead was rendered irrelevant.

Simmel writes regarding the breakdown of unity:

The moment [the building’s] decay destroys the unity of the form, nature and spirit separate again and reveal their world-pervading original enmity—as if the artistic formation had only been an act of violence committed by the spirit to which the stone unwillingly submitted; as if it now gradually shook off this yoke and returned once more into the independent, lawful order of its own forces.

But this makes the ruin a more meaningful, more significant phenomenon than are the fragments of other destroyed works of art.

So while it is not necessarily the breakdown of unity which is the Stadtschloss’s demise as relevant or “meaningful,” instead, it is the fact a new unity was not allowed to grow. Simmel argues, “The ruin of a building, however, means that where the work of art is

dying, other forces and forms, those of nature, have grown; and that out of what of art
still lives in the ruin and what of nature already lives in it, there has emerged a new
whole, a characteristic unity."

But because the active physical destruction of the Stadtschloss by man, coupled, I would argue, with the cultural destruction of its past through the rejection of the building as relevant, the Schloss at this moment cannot be deemed a significant ruin in Simmel’s estimation, as it was not nature which caused its decay. Simmel writes:

To be sure, from the standpoint of that purpose which the spirit has embodied in palace and church, castle and hall, aqueduct and memorial column, the form in which they appear when decayed is a meaningless incident. Yet a new meaning seizes on this incident, comprehending it and its spiritual form in a unity which is no longer grounded in human purposiveness but in that depth where human purposiveness and the working of non-conscious natural forces grow from their common root. For this reason, a good many Roman ruins, however interesting they may be otherwise, lack the specific fascination of the ruin—to the extent, that is, to which one notices in them the destruction by man; for this contradicts the contrast between human work and the effect of nature on which rests the significance of the ruin as such.

Thus, because the hand of man destroyed the Stadtschloss, the appeal of the structure as ruin cannot exist. The significance of this is that as a thus insignificant pile of stones, the Stadtschloss is not able to attain the new unity promised in a meaningfully decayed building. To take this argument one step further, the lack of unity in the structure of the Stadtschloss disrupts the unity found in the area in the form of a Gesamtkunstwerk. This is to say, not only is the area of this center of Berlin thus disrupted not only by the Schloss’s physical absence after 1950, but also in its insignificant presence in the years preceding.

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378 Ibid.
379 Ibid.
If the building itself was doomed to the status of rubble rather than ruin, the blank space of *Leere* left in its absence would likely perpetuate this unredeemed notion of rubble. Indeed, while the *Lehre* in the *Leere* appears to have the saving property of meaning in nothingness, in fact it is a forced appropriation which finds little resonance in an organic use of the space. While parking lots and Christmas markets are clear functions of utility, the aesthetic finds no space in the void. Thus, the *Leere* of the pre-Palace of the Republic seems to justify the assertion that the space was merely one of “Nichtnutzung.”

**Building a Palace of the Republic:**

Already in the early years of the GDR, the reconstruction of war-damaged buildings was framed within the larger paradigm of State construction. In 1950, a delegation of architects and city planners from East Berlin were sent by party functionaries to the Soviet Union to tour its major landmark cities in an effort to develop a plan for architectural coherence along party lines in the new German republic. In the course of their several-week-long journey observing the architecture of the USSR, planners developed a “blueprint,” to use Michael Z. Wise’s word, for East German structural redevelopment called, “The Sixteen Principles of Urban Planning.”

The sixteen *Grundsätze des Städtebaus* served as a manifesto to urban planning in relation to State identity development. The introduction explicitly links the two: “Urban city planning and the architectural formation of our cities must express the social order of

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380 I will refer to the Palace of the Republic in shortened form as the “Palast” so as not to confuse it with the former Prussian palace (“Schloss”).
381 Wise, *Capital Dilemma*, 41.
382 Ibid.
the German Democratic Republic, the ever-continuing traditions of our German peoples, as well as the considerable goals imparted in the reconstruction of all of Germany.”

Further, under principle number one: “The city is, in its structure and architectural form, an expression of the political life and the national consciousness of our people.”

City planners of East Berlin would have many years to put this mantra into practice before coming to the site of the former Stadtschloss. Stalinallee and Frankfurter Tor, for example, built over the course of the early 1950s, exuded the “architectural form-giving” of the political ideology of Socialist Realism. By the time builders were set to unveil the Palast der Republik in central East Berlin, the State was ready for its arrival:

The Palace of the Republic will be a house of the people, a place of lively political and intellectual-cultural life. This house stands on historical ground. Here Karl Liebknecht announced the socialist republic in November 1918. Here the sailors of the people’s naval division fought against the reaction. Here the revolutionary Berlin workers revealed their allegiance to the young Soviet power. Here Ernst Thälmann spoke to the Berlin proletariat, from here he called for the creation of a large anti-fascist action.

This place, that today carries the names of Marx and Engels, has—in the three decades since the liberation of our people by the honorable Soviet Army and enthusiastic demonstrations in the name of socialist patriotism and proletariat internationalism—experienced the steadfast friendship of our people to the Soviet Union. The Palace of the Republic will forever be indebted to these revolutionary traditions. As good hosts, we will welcome to this house friends and our comrades.

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385 For a fascinating read of the politics of East Berlin urban planning development in the 1950s, see Wise’s Capital Dilemma, 43-46.

in fight from all over the world. Far over the borders of our land the Palace of the Republic will announce the industriousness and creative power of our people.\textsuperscript{387}

Tellingly, in calling on the past ghosts of the site, Honecker omits references to the most conspicuous tenant of the space, the Stadtschloss. Instead, Honecker contextualizes the new palace with markers of its new Socialist history.

Chief architect of the Palace of the Republic, Heinz Graffunder, framed the construction as a new beginning and freedom from the past. In a book he wrote on the subject in 1977, Graffunder writes:

The Palace of the Republic as house of the people in place of the old castle as house of the Prussian kings and Kaisers is a symbol of the changed ownership in favor of the workers of our land, who were liberated from exploitation.

When the castle, which was heavily damaged by the Anglo-American bombing raids of February 1945, was razed in 1950, the square, which was exposed through those same bombings, received along with the former Schlossfreiheit and the Lustgarten . . . the name ‘Marx-Engels-Square.’\textsuperscript{388}

Aside from being a symbol of freedom from the Prussian (and National Socialist) past, the architecture of the Palace of the Republic was also considered a break from the


\textsuperscript{388} “Der Palast der Republik als Haus des Volkes anstelle des alten Schlosses als Haus der preußischen Könige und Kaiser ist Symbol der veränderten Besitzverhältnisse zugunsten der von Ausbeutung befreiten Werkätigen unseres Landes.

“Als das durch anglo-amerikanische Bombenangriffe im Februar 1945 schwer beschädigte Schloss 1950 abgetragen worden war, erhielt der dadurch freigewordene Platz mitsamt der ehemaligen Schloßfreiheit und dem Lustgarten . . . den Namen ‘Marx-Engels-Platz’” (Graffunder and Beerbaum, \textit{Palast der Republik}, 9). Note the language evocative of Walter Ulbricht’s “amerikanische Bombenangriffe.”
“dull urban environment”\textsuperscript{389} seen elsewhere in Berlin, and indeed Eastern Europe. Specifically, the “glitzy” orange-mirrored façade of the Palace was a rejoinder to the critique of Modernism’s apparent monotony. Wise writes, “. . .there was a creeping recognition by East German authorities that industrialized building production and standardized design fostered by the state-planned economy [as evidenced in the construction of \textit{Plattenbauten} (pre-fabricated buildings)] was creating a ubiquitously dull urban environment. East Germans began to share the same doubts that arose in the West about the anonymous city centers left in modernism’s wake.”\textsuperscript{390}

Graffunder’s counter was to build a palace which was both optically pleasing and fit into both the surrounding of the Berliner Dom and Staatsratsgebäude, but also with nature’s effects: “The sun-reflecting bronze colored Thermoglass installed from the third floor up mutes the sunlight indoors, creating . . . a certain intimacy in the rooms near the façade.”\textsuperscript{391} In April 1976, the Palace of the Republic opened its doors to the public. Its function was multifaceted; it served as statehouse and bowling alley, art gallery and coffee shop, conference center and post office.

Throughout the GDR era, the Palace of the Republic served as both everyday and special. That is, it was a meeting place for East Germans in the Volkskammer as well as the Bierstube and Theater. Then, in November 1989, the Berlin Wall fell. On August 23, 1990, the Volkskammer convened to officially join the BRD. Almost a month later, in an ironic twist of fate, the first freely elected Volkskammer voted to close the Palace of the Republic due to asbestos contamination. It seemed as though one man’s creation—

\textsuperscript{389} Wise, \textit{Capital Dilemma}, 51.
\textsuperscript{390} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{391} “Die sonnenlichtreflektierenden bronzefarbenen Thermoglasflächen vom zweiten Geschoß an, schaffen innen durch leichte Dämpfung des Lichteinfalles . . . eine gewisse Intimität in den fassdennahen Räumen” (Graffunder and Beerbaum, \textit{Palast der Republik}, 23).
asbestos—officially and symbolically sealed the fate of other men’s invention—the GDR.

Why didn’t the Palace of the Republic face the same attacks as the Berlin Wall in the fall of 1989? It was, after all, the fulcrum of political life in Berlin. In October of 1989, for example, the Palast was the final destination for the large celebration of the fortieth anniversary of the founding of the GDR. I would argue that precisely because the Palace of the Republic was symbolic of the entire GDR, and not just the punitive actions of the Wall or the Stasi, the Palace of the Republic did not have the same resonance with Berliners as the Wall or, in January 1990, as did the Stasi headquarters on Normannenstrasse. To be sure, protesters gathered at the Palace of the Republic in the thousands in January of 1990 as relatively newly elected GDR Prime Minister Modrow defended controversial policies, but these demonstrations were against his government, not this building itself.392

By the mid-2000s, the Palace of the Republic was a ruin. Its orange-bronze Thermoglass had fallen off piece by piece; the GDR State emblem had been removed from above the building’s front entranceway. A chain link fence surrounded the structure and graffiti adorned its outside walls. Overgrown weeds littered the parking lot. The ruinous state of the Palast in the years following 1989 is intrinsically linked to the story of state and local politics in the years following the closure of the building to asbestos and to the moment and aftermath of Unification. Here I will explore the Palace of the Republic specifically as a “meaningful” ruin, in Simmel’s terms, in opposition to that of the Stadtschloss in the years between 1918 and its demolition. In so doing, I argue that

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392 See Moritz Holfelder, *Palast der Republik: Aufstieg und Fall eines symbolischen Gebäudes* (Berlin: Christoph Links Verlag, 2008), 74.
the Palast following 1990 until its intentional dismantling, beginning in February 2006, can be understood as a palimpsest and ruin of inbetween.

As I argued above in regard to the Stadtschloss after 1918 failing to realize the full potential as a ruin in Simmel’s language, architecture is the art of peace, the reconciliation between man and nature which holds the two in balance. Once that structure begins to crumble, Simmel argues, the balance swings towards nature’s advantage, whereby its dominance over man is exemplified in the structure’s ruin-remainder. This is “nature’s revenge.” And it is this, I argue, which was the condition of the Palace of the Republic as ruin in the intervening years before the dismantling process began:

This unique balance—between mechanical, inert matter which passively resists pressure, and informing spirituality which pushes upward—breaks, however, the instant a building crumbles. For this means nothing else than that merely natural forces begin to become master over the work of man: the balance between nature and spirit, which the building manifested, shifts in the favor of nature. This shift becomes a cosmic tragedy which, so we feel, makes every ruin an object infused with our nostalgia; for now the decay appears as nature’s revenge for the spirit’s having violated it by making a form in its own image.

There is a sense of loss, which Simmel describes above; first, a loss of the building to a ruinous state of non-functionality, a loss to nature, but, second, also a loss of past. That is, once the building is deemed a ruin through the moment of crumbling and loss to nature, a line is drawn between the present and past, infused with a nostalgic sense of defeat and mourning. And who is to blame for this loss? Man, for (s)he made the ultimate mistake of attempting to power over nature in building the structure in the first place. Perhaps we can read in this way of Graffunder’s apparent folly in believing he could manipulate the light of the sun to cast an impression of intimacy onto the inner rooms of the Palast.

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In any event, the moment of breakdown marks the moment of loss and the shift towards nature for Simmel. However, in this process of fragmentation and decay, there is a positive outcome. The ruin derives meaning and significance from the process. Nature and spirit divide from another, only to return to a new wholeness, where nature and what is left of the spirit rejoin to create a new unity. But as I argued previously, this meaning may only be derived from that where nature proved more diligent than man, not through man’s intended destruction.

Thus, there is something specific about this urban ruin, to which Simmel points. There is an innate difference in meaning and significance derived from those ruins created at the sole hand of man versus those made by nature alone. Where did the Palast fit in this construction? It occupied the territory created when ruins are created through man’s neglect, where he becomes an “accomplice of nature.” Simmel writes, “In these cases [of many urban ruins], what strikes us is not, to be sure, that human beings destroy the work of man—this indeed is achieved by nature—but that men let it decay. From the standpoint of the idea of man, such indifference is, so to speak, a positive passivity, whereby man makes himself the accomplice to nature and of that one of its inherent tendencies which is dramatically opposed to his own essential interests.”

Since the moment asbestos was discovered in the building, the Palast’s fate has been debated. Although the building was cleared of its asbestos over the course of several years, it otherwise sat in neglect after 1990, victim to strapped finances and politics. It is precisely in this way, I argue, that men have become the “accomplice of nature” in Simmel’s terms vis-à-vis the Palast. Bronze glass exterior pieces fell off the building and

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were never replaced; the white marble corners disappeared as well; the inside framework slowly rusted away. Nature took its course on the building because “man” did not step in to intervene. Instead, the structure continued to crumble, fall into disrepair, and persist as an urban ruin.

And what of the effect of the urban ruin? In the struggle for meaning and wholeness between the spirit and nature, ambiguity and discomfort prevail in the end. Simmel writes, “Here the inhabited ruin loses for us that sensuous-suprasensuous balance of the conflicting tendencies of existence which we see in the abandoned one. This balance, indeed, gives it its problematical, unsettling, often unbearable character. Such places, sinking from life, still strike us as settings of a life.”397 In this case, I would argue that the Palast is a stand-in for Simmel’s inhabited ruin (such as those, he suggests, make their homes on the Italian roadside). Although abandoned by its former function as everyday gathering place, the Palast was still functional in some sense until 2006. It was appropriated as the “Volkspalast” (people’s palace) in which rock concerts, light shows, and film showings took place. The point, however, is this: the Palace of the Republic, although physically damaged and undoubtedly a ruin, was still capable of functioning and being inhabited in certain ways. If not only inhabited by such events as rock concerts, the site was also inhabited by collective memory and identity.

Simmel conceptualizes this notion thus, “…[S]o long as we can speak of a ruin at all and not of a mere heap of stones, this power [of nature] does not sink the work of man into the formlessness of mere matter. There rises a new form which, from the standpoint of nature, is entirely meaningful, comprehensible, differentiated. Nature has transformed the work of art into material for her own expression, as she had previously served as

397 Ibid.
Nature’s work was able to bring a specific kind of meaning to the ruin of the Palast than would have arguably been exhibited had the structure not been abandoned. The decay of the palace into ruin, where shards of bronze glass coexisted with the sprouting of nature’s weeds, created difference between the palace as it functioned in “Ostzeiten” (East times, or the time of the GDR) and how it might have been understood post-1990 had it been maintained. The hand of nature draws a greater line between the present and the past in this context. The ruins of the Palace of the Republic in 2004, for example, did not resemble the gleaming monument to Socialist Realism found on Unter den Linden in the late 1980s. Instead, the Palast derived new meaning through its ruinous condition as a monument and reflection to the GDR.

How exactly this monument or palimpsest is interpreted is a difficult question to answer. On the one hand, as some have suggested, its state is an allegory to a fallen State and time. Asbestos, analogous to a cancer which destroyed the socialist State of East Germany, destroyed the Palast as a symbolic manifestation of its political counterpart. On the other hand, it is the site of memories of everyday life before “die Wende” (the turn, or the period of unification). As Svetlana Boym recounts in *The Future of Nostalgia*, the Palast is cloaked in memories of clear telephone calls to the West, chilled orange juice, and a feeling of pride in the construction of the building as being on par with architecture in the West. In short, it was a site of nostalgia, possibly for the loss of things that were good. It is the mark of differentiation when one saw the building in the early 2000s and remembered that one could be thrilled for chilled orange juice in a place that has literally crumbled, and a time that that has figuratively crumbled.

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Simmel marks this nostalgia or longing for the “good” in a reference to Goethe. Simmel writes, “This is a fascination of the ruin, too [to find aesthetic pleasure in the worn patina of a ruin]; but the ruin has an additional fascination which is of the same order: the destruction of the spiritual form by the effect of natural forces, that reversal of the typical order, is felt as a return to the ‘good mother,’ as Goethe calls nature.” In a gesture to the Biblical sentiment of “dust-to-dust,” Simmel accounts for nostalgia as a return home to nature. In essence, to let nature do her work on the building, man is allowing the Palast—and what it stands for—to return “home.” Perhaps, to maintain the Palace of the Republic would only to perpetuate something—as in the GDR—which no longer exists except in memory and history.

Another aspect of returning home, which Simmel points to, is that of a ruin becoming one with its environment. That is, the ruin, “orders itself into the surrounding landscape without a break, growing together with it like tree and stone—whereas a palace, a villa, or a peasant house, even where they fit perfectly into the mood of the landscape, always stem from another order of things and blend with that of nature only as if in afterthought.” It would be unlikely that one would argue that the Palace of the Republic prior to 1990 “fit perfectly into the mood” of its immediately surrounding landscape. To its north lies Schinkel’s Berliner Dom and Lustgarten, arguably “graceful” architecture, to use Ladd’s words, words not generally used to describe the Palace of the Republic.

To the south lies the former Staatsratsgebäude, whose entrance is the original façade from the Stadtschloss. As argued earlier, the façade was appropriated by

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400 Simmel, “The Ruin,” 262.
401 Simmel, “The Ruin,” 263.
Honecker, as well as others, as a specifically socialist object as it is the location where Karl Liebknecht called for a Socialist Republic. In this way, the façade is interpreted not in a strictly architectural way, but rather in a manner delineated and understood by its references to time. It is possible in this sense to argue that as the Palast “returns home,” it not so much attains physical attributes similar to its surroundings, but rather that it regresses in time to something before the GDR, before the era of National Socialism, before Prussia, before buildings occupied the space at all. To employ Goethe again from a different context, the Palast’s perpetual collapse into ruin returns it home to a place where “it’s as good as if it never happened.”

That said, however, as the bronze-colored mirrors fell from the outside walls of the Palast, its color mimicked the buildings around it. The gray of the concrete previously hidden beneath the white marble edges of the building complemented the gray tones of the Berliner Dom. In its former polished “glitzy” days before 1990, the Palast sat in stark contrast to Schinkel’s somber cathedral. As Simmel writes, “the influences of rain and sunshine, the incursion of vegetation, heat, and cold, must have assimilated the building abandoned to them into the color tone of the ground which has been abandoned to the same destinies.” Dust to dust, the Palast left untouched became one with its surroundings.

A final way in which Simmel is instructive in reading the ruin of the Palace of the Republic is in the construction of the “ruin as past.” Simmel writes:

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It is the site of life from which life has departed—but this is nothing merely negative, added to it only by thought, as it is for the countless things which, once immersed in life and accidentally cast on its bank, are by their very nature capable of being easily caught again by its current. In the case of the ruin, the fact that life with its wealth and its changes once dwelled here constitutes an immediately perceived presence. The ruin creates the present form of a past life, not according to the contents or remnants of that life, but according to its past as such.\(^{404}\)

This construction places the ruin in a contradictory situation of inbetweenness. It is at once both past and present, at once only one or the other. Looking at the Palast in ruin evoked memories of its past for those who have experienced it in any way. As well, its site evoked memories of that which stood before it. Encapsulating both the present state of ruin, as well as the history of what it was in a former life, the Palast exemplified Simmel’s ruin.

This tension between the past(s) and the present laid on the Palast is indicative of Andreas Huyssen’s reading of Berlin as palimpsest. In the introduction to his book, *Present Pasts,* Huyssen explores the problematic of the past-present bound in the object: “Memory as re-presentation, as making present, is always in danger of collapsing the constitutive tension between past and present, especially when the imagined past is sucked into the timeless present of the all-pervasive virtual space of consumer culture.”\(^{405}\)

Additionally, as Huyssen adds elsewhere, and I would stress, nostalgia and forgetting/mis-remembering are particular dangers to “collapsing” the past and present. Although, as Simmel argues, the site of the ruin becomes layered with both past and present, he is right to suggest that the distinction between the two are not always easily discernible. The past is interpreted through the gaze of the present.

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\(^{404}\) Simmel, “The Ruin,” 265.
When the Palace of the Republic shut its doors to the public in 1990 due to asbestos contamination, the question arose quite imperatively, what should be done about the empty building now occupying space on one of the most prominent locations in central Berlin? Although more pressing logistical concerns regarding the unification of the two Germanies and two Berlins took precedence, the issue was nonetheless important, especially given the symbolic and real meaning attached to the palace. At stake was identity: identity for a generation of East Berliners who came to know the Palace of the Republic as Volkshaus, and for a new generation of Berliners, comprised of people from both sides of the Wall.

By 1992 one person, in particular, was certain of how the issue of the Palast could best be resolved. Wilhelm von Boddien, a businessperson from Reinbek bei Hamburg, founded the Förderverein Berliner Stadtschloss e.V. ([Association of the Berlin City Palace], since renamed Förderverein Berliner Schloss e.V.) and became its first chairperson. Von Boddien and the Förderverein continue to argue that the Berlin Stadtschloss should be rebuilt in its original form where it once stood prior to its demolition in 1950. The group contends, “This was the crystallization point of the center of Berlin. The famous buildings of the center, which still stand today, created with [the Berlin Stadtschloss] an incomparable ensemble of Berlin identity, that has been described in the history of art in the world ‘Gesamtkunstwerk Berlin.’ The Berliners called it lovingly ‘Athens on the Spree’ [Spreeathen].”

Whether or not Berliners actually understand the holistic picture the Förderverein puts forth in its preamble as “Spreeathen” is not clear; however, the argument the group makes is unambiguous. The image the Förderverein presents is one of an incomplete and fragmented center of Berlin. The object which would complete this picture is the Berlin Stadtschloss. A second contention the Förderverein maintains is that of the problem of the Modern: “The development association [Förderverein] has made it its central goal to restore this ensemble through the reintroduction of the castle. In this way, it seeks to create a counterweight to the large modern quarters located around historic central Berlin.”\textsuperscript{407} The preamble suggests that the fragmentation felt in the city center is also due to a splicing of history with the Modern. There is “too much” Modern, and, hence, the response is to recreate history.

A year after its founding, the Förderverein simulated the recreation of the Stadtschloss by partially wrapping the Palace of the Republic and the Schlossplatz with a life-sized linen mural of the Schloss. The drape not only simulated what a rebuilt Schloss would look like, but it also created a simultaneous time-space with the Palast, collapsing the two structures and histories into one space. As Elke Heckner suggests, the stage (and the renaming of the Marx-Engels-Platz just previously to Schlossplatz), “helped restore the Schlossplatz to its absent referent.”\textsuperscript{408}

Although visually, artistically, and aesthetically interesting and provocative, the danger in the Schlosssimulation of 1993 is the danger in collapsing the past with the present. As Simmel might argue, the masking of the ruin behind a screen precludes the

\textsuperscript{407} “Dieses Ensemble durch die Wiedereinführung des Schlosses zu rehabilitieren und damit ein spannendes Gegengewicht zu den riesigen modernen Quartieren rund um die historische Mitte zu schaffen, hat sich der Förderverein zur zentralen Aufgabe gemacht” (Ibid).

viewer from seeing the true past projected in the present. From the viewer’s standpoint in the present, he or she is unable to see the ruin behind the curtain; the true past is unattainable.

Further, the project to rebuild the Berlin Stadtschloss would deny and erase the physical traces and ruins of a particular past, that is, of the GDR. Although again perhaps aesthetically pleasing to do so—as politicians and citizens alike argue on the Förderverein’s website—it is, as Heckner astutely argues, “predicated on a mythological notion of wholeness that serves as the imaginary point of departure for construction a postreunification Berlin identity. Such an argument [as in rebuilding the Stadtschloss] ignores the symbolic significance of the site to GDR memory as well as the discontinuous urban history of Berlin itself. . .”

One can perhaps argue that in a newly unified Berlin in the 1990s and beyond, it is necessary to develop a new sense of collective “Berlin Identity” which embodies experiences from both sides of the wall. Just as the SED cleared the Schloss in 1950 in order to make way for a new function (and arguably a new identity apart from that of Prussia and National Socialism) one might argue that in clearing the Palace of the Republic, room is made for a new inclusive Berlin identity. The difference in the two situations, however, is striking. Only about half of Berliners in the unified city have memories of the Palast as it functioned in the GDR. The other, debatably, has no collective attachment to it, and therefore would not experience the same kind of loss of identity or personal history if it were destroyed. Heckner questions rhetorically on this subject, “Were the Stadtschloss to be rebuilt as a symbol of postreunification order, what would remain for former East Berliners to recognize their identity in? The image of a

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409 Ibid.
stripped down Palast der Republik or in the future a recreated Stadtschloss?” She expounds to spell out what is at stake in the Stadtschloss debate: “Von Boddien’s selective recuperation of an unmarked Western identity not only denies the complexity of historical claims to the site, but also seeks to erase the specificity of its geographical location. The tendency to pretend that after reunification the topographies of East and West have become irrelevant and to superimpose on the city a West-defined notion of visual cohesion amounts to a deliberate ‘forgetting’ of GDR urban history.”

This is what is at stake: memory and forgetting, identity and history.

To be sure, collective memory and identity are slippery concepts. Despite Maurice Halbwachs’s and others’ attempts to mark the lines of each, especially vis-à-vis history, it is difficult to put a finger on what exactly collective memory is and how it functions in situations such as the Schlossdebatte. Nevertheless, it is clear that the project proposed by the Förderverein Berliner Schloss has significant and real repercussions and implications for collective memory and identity of East Berliners. Collective memory is, as Halbwachs argues, a social construction, and as such is contingent upon the both the present and the past. In this case, Nora’s notion of lieux de mémoire is particularly helpful in thinking about collective memory and identity, as it situates the rather ethereal concepts on real objects: monuments, archives, buildings. As such, when Nora writes that the lieux de mémoire is “where memory crystallizes and secretes itself … at a particular historical moment, a turning point where consciousness of a break with the past is bound

up the with the sense that memory has been torn,” one can understand how the space of the Palace of the Republic and the Stadtschloss fit into the theory of collective memory. Both sides of this story seek to find what is lost and ruptured in this city block.

The International Expert Commission “Historical Center of Berlin”

In the fall of 2000, the Berlin Senate and the German federal government established a commission of international architecture and history experts called Historische Mitte Berlin (Historical Center of Berlin). The task of the commission was to provide recommendations for the redevelopment of the Schlossplatz and the surrounding area. Under the direction of chairman Hannes Swoboda, an Austrian Social Democratic member of the European Union Parliament, the group devised specific requirements for the Schlossplatz and the Humboldt-Forum.413

The commission presented a report to the mayor of Berlin Klaus Wowereit and Federal Minister of Transport, Building and Urban Development Kurt Bodewig in April 2002, which justified the changes to the area as a reconciliation for the apparent wrongs the SED made in city planning after the destruction of Berlin during World War II. The specter of the missing Stadtschloss created a void in the area, the commission argued, which the existence of Palace of the Republic never managed to rectify: “The urban architectural structure of the nearby spaces and buildings drew and draws itself primarily

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413 Other notable participants in the “Historical Center of Berlin” commission were GDR architecture expert Bruno Flierl; Schinkel, Schlüter, and Stadtschloss expert Goerd Peschken; Humboldt University professor of Nazi-era Berlin Laurenz Demps; architects Josef Paul Kleihues and Vittorio Magnago Lampugnani; and Helmut Engel of the Stiftung Denkmalschutz Berlin (Foundation for Memorial Preservation in Berlin).
from the figure of the former castle. The Palace of the Republic was never able to replace its function in the urban fabric.” The commission clearly took the view from the outset that the Palace of the Republic was deficient in creating a wholeness to the area. And as the moniker of the group suggests, only a “historical” building would remedy this concern. The notion that the long-since destroyed Schloss would achieve the architectural unity sought seems curious, since a recreation cannot be authentically historical, but rather only a representation of that historical moment.

Kurt Bodewig himself seemed to sense this incongruity in a speech to the commission in January 2001. In it, he suggested that instead of focusing primarily on the architectural form of the reconstructed Schloss, one should instead also concentrate on the function of the building as an educational center. Too often, he stated, the discussion regarding the Schlossplatz area has been reduced to “keep the Palace of the Republic” versus “rebuild the Stadtschloss.” A balance, seen in the private development of Potsdamer Platz, could be instructive in this discussion, he added. Now, however, it was the public’s turn to make such decisions about the direction the new Berlin should take. In total, he argued, the building does not stand by itself; one must take the surroundings into consideration.415


In the end, the commission recommended that the Schlossplatz integrate socially important usage in the building, integrating cultural and scientific exhibits into the space. The Humboldt-Forum should be a “place of dialogue” (Ort des Dialogs) drawing on the resources of the Stiftung Preußischer Kulturbesitz (SPK, Prussian Cultural Heritage Foundation), the neighboring Humboldt University to Berlin, and the Central and Regional Library Berlin.\(^{416}\) In terms of the architectural components of the area, the commission specifically addressed the Schlossplatz, Schlossfreiheit, Staatsratsgebäude, Breite Strasse, Marx-Engels-Forum, and the Bauakademie. Regarding the Palace of the Republic, the commission rejected the idea of reconstruction of the building outright, but did leave open the possibility of keeping parts of the structure, writing, “The reconstruction of specific parts of the Palace of the Republic (e.g., the Volkskammer hall) should—subject to architectural-artistic integration, technical feasibility, and usage possibilities—be considered. In this way, the existing connection between contrasting pieces from various eras could mean an appropriate demonstration of the examples of change during German as well as Berlin history.”\(^{417}\) That said, the commission voted in favor of rebuilding along the original castle footprint on the north, west, and south sides, as well as the reconstruction of the original façades.\(^{418}\) Hardly did this seem to leave room to integrate the Palace of the Republic into the external designs of the new

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\(^{417}\) “Die Rekonstruktion einzelner Teile des Palastes der Republik (z.B. des Volkskammersaals) soll—vorbereitlich der architektonisch-gestalterischen Einbindung, der technischen Machbarkeit und der Nutzungsmöglichkeiten—überprüft werden. Die auf diese Weise entstehende Verbindung kontrastierender Teile aus verschiedenen Epochen könnte eine angemessene Veranschaulichung der Wechselfälle deutscher wie Berliner Geschichte bedeuten.” International Expert Commission “Historical Center of Berlin,” *Abschlussbericht*, 19. Later in the report, the commission backtracked on this statement, suggesting that the reality of costs and structural problems would likely exclude the inclusion of any parts of the Palace of the Republic. See ibid, 32.

\(^{418}\) Ibid, 19.
Humboldt-Forum. But the commission decided to leave this up to architects in a design competition, the details of which the commission could not decide upon. 419

In July of 2002, the recommendations of the International Expert Commission “Historical Center of Berlin” were put to a vote in the German Bundestag. The resolution offered representatives two alternatives. Choice “A” mandated that the new building reconstruct the three sides of the original Stadtschloss, including the façades. Choice “B” left the design up to an open competition, allowing architects the freedom to design a building which accommodated plans for the Humboldt-Forum. This second option required the design to follow the footprint of the Stadtschloss, but permitted modern interpretations as well. 420 The resolution passed 378 in favor of choice “A,” 133 voting for “B,” and sixty-two voting “no” to either. 421

To some extent, the vote ran across party lines, although slightly differently than had been the case with the Soviet War Memorial. 422 In general, both the conservative CDU/CSU and a significant number of the liberal SPD stood behind choice “A.” Social Democrats Chancellor Schröder and Bundestag president Wolfgang Thierse were both steadfast in their support of rebuilding the Stadtschloss. Thierse argued that the reconstruction of the Stadtschloss would provide a “Brückenschlag” (bridge) from the

Schlossplatz to Museum Island. And that opening up a competition to consider other designs would be a “Blamage für die Politik” (disgrace for politics). 423

Vice president of the Bundestag, Green representative Antje Vollmer concurred with Thierse, setting herself apart from other Green members, stating that the limitations of modern architecture were already obvious in areas such as Potsdamer Platz. What this project needed to accomplish, according to her, was to give Mitte back its “heart.” She denied that the reconstruction would be an “ästhetische Lüge” (aesthetic lie), criticizing those who support the “Kult der offenen städtebaulichen Wunde“ (cult of public urban planning wounds), arguing that democracy in fact can be found in any construction, and that the reconstruction was not tantamount to resurrecting Wilhelmine politics. 424

Most opposition to choice “A” came in the form of financial concerns. Mayor Klaus Wowereit (SPD), a proponent of a more modern façade, argued that if the federal government was adamant that the Schlossplatz be rebuilt, it should be responsible for financing the project. 425 Thomas Flierl, then PDS Berlin Senator for Science, Research, and Culture, argued politicians were working backwards. That to insist that the Stadtschloss must be rebuilt, without first securing the financial backing, endangered the entire project. “More than anywhere else,” Flierl insisted, “we need democracy as the foreman at this location.” 426

Former SPD Bundestag member, Peter Conradi, who by 2002 was president of the Bundesarchitektenkammer (BAK, Federal Chamber of German Architects), was the most vocal opponent of the reconstruction of the Stadtschloss and choice “A.” In a statement issued by the BAK in March 2002, Conradi detailed the problems and inconsistencies associated with reconstruction. While Conradi supported the idea of the Humboldt-Forum, he was critical of the architectural problems associated with reconstructing the Stadtschloss. Among the criticisms were the technical limitations of the original façade vis-à-vis the function of the Humboldt-Forum. The corresponding room dimensions and height, Conradi argued, were more conducive to a traditional gallery than the exhibits planned for the Forum. Further, Conradi was concerned with the fact that reconstruction would be based on a limited number of fragments from the original façade along with photographs of the Stadtschloss. Thus, the reconstruction process would lead to “inevitable haphazard, even arbitrary concessions and compromises.” Instead, Conradi’s ultimate suggestion was to promote the opportunity for a plethora of ideas for the design of the Humboldt-Forum to emerge through competition, not to simply limit it to a Stadtschloss reconstruction. In Conradi’s judgment, this would be tantamount to historical fraud:

The reconstruction of the former Prussian castle would be a fraudulent political and historical message. Certainly, Prussia was part of German history, but Prussia fell and the Berlin Prussian Castle doesn’t constitute an identity for Germany. It is not necessary for either “historical self-understanding,” nor for “national affirmation.” If Berlin needs a reconstruction of the Prussian Castle for its identity, then it is not a matter for the federal government. A reconstruction of the

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http://www.bak.de/site/ItemID=315/mid=836/844/default.aspx
castle would falsely suggest it is a memorial, a testament of its time, but a reconstruction is neither of these things.\footnote{Der Nachbau des ehemaligen preußischen Schlosses wäre eine politisch und geschichtlich falsche Botschaft. Gewiss war Preußen ein Teil deutscher Geschichte, aber Preußen ist untergegangen, und das Berliner Preußenschloss begründet keine Identität für Deutschland und ist weder zur “historischen Selbstverständigung” noch zur “nationalen Vergewisserung” notwendig. Wenn Berlin eine Rekonstruktion des preußischen Schlosses für seine Identität braucht, dann ist das keine Angelegenheit des Bundes. Ein Nachbau des Schlosses würde vortäuschen, es handle sich um ein Denkmal, ein Zeugnis, doch ein Nachbau ist weder ein Denkmal noch ein Zeugnis.” Conradi, “Empfehlungen,” March 3, 2002.}

Instead, in Conradi’s opinion, contemporary architecture should be given a chance, since the area requires a courageous form [mutige Gestalt], which points to Berlin’s future [weisende (Gestalt)].

Of course, this is not how the Bundestag ultimately voted, but the political affiliations of the various representatives to weigh in on the July vote expose to some extent the political posturing of the debate. Conservative members of the CDU and FDP (Free Democratic Party) tended to vote overwhelmingly for choice “A,” followed by about one third of the SPD. The liberal Greens and the post-SED PDS parties were generally against the plans to reconstruct the Stadtschloss.\footnote{Martin Lutz, “Schröder und Thierse für Barock-Fassade; Der Bundestag entscheidet heute ohne Fraktionszwang über Wiederherstellung des Berliner Stadtschlosses,” Welt, July 4, 2002.} This provides an interesting counterpoint to the political groupings surrounding the Soviet War Memorial renovation and signage debate. With the question of the Stadtschloss reconstruction, conservative representatives were more supportive of a particular return to a Prussian past, no matter the implications for historical revisionism or authenticity. The more liberal parties tended to support a new approach to the space.

This is not to say that the Palace of the Republic remained an empty and unused space during this period of debate. To be sure, artists and activities continues to use the building to produce exhibits and events in and around the Palast. One such exhibit shown at the Palace of the Republic during 2004 began as a concept called “Volkspalast”
(people’s palace) initiated by the organization Zwischen Palast Nutzung e.V (Between Palace Use). The idea behind the Zwischennutzung (use in-between) of the Palast was to transform the building into a functional object of history. In the project description, the organizers state, “The Palace of the Republic waits for use as a gift of history. Stripped right down to its skeleton, it presents a vacuum—a unique space. A place, where the tension between past and future is addressed. A transitory place of change.” Amongst the weeds and rusted interior support beams, the Volkspalast transformed the ruin of the Palace of the Republic into something functional and meaningful, in Simmel’s terms. As quoted previously, Simmel writes, “There rises a new form which, from the standpoint of nature, is entirely meaningful, comprehensible, differentiated.” Life returns to the ruin in the present; yet the history of the object is not lost in its new function.

In fact, the project was highly ideological. A companion website, www.grussmarcella.de, offered a “Leserbriefe” (reader letters, letters to the editor) section in response to the Zwischennutzung concept. Many responses decry the perceived inevitable loss of identity if the Palast is destroyed, and the Volkspalast functioned as a way to bridge the past to an inclusive present. Not confined to activities relating to the GDR, the events during the Volkspalast were meant to be non-political on some level. The Volkspalast installation, which ran from August 20 to November 11, 2004, was a successful “multifunktionelles Stadion,” which offered rock concerts, discussions, lectures, theater, and sports. One event was the “Supernova” light show which illumined the Palast in lights and sound. Its success I measure in the fact that the Süddeutsche

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Zeitung wrote that the Palast, “...is certainly at least a new place: a very vital and very communicative place.”

From the viewpoint of the present, the Volkspalast managed to retain the past palimpsest-like history located within the space, yet it branched out to serve the entertainment and identity needs of a new Berlin.

The Hand of Man: Dismantling the Palace of the Republic and Preparing for its Predecessor

On January 19, 2006 the German Bundestag voted to end years of delays, debates, and protests and begin demolishing the Palace of the Republic the following month. One year later, Federal Minister of Urban Development Wolfgang Tiefensee opened the architectural competition to plan the construction of the Stadtschloss. The purpose of the new structure remained as originally conceived: as a museum space and cultural center, with a specific focus on the international; that is, on cultures and sciences of the world. The so-called Humboldt Forum is to “complement the museums honoring classic Europe on the northern half of the Spreeinsel through the ‘foreign view’ upon the world beyond Europe.”

But before the conceptual complement to the institutions of the Museum Island could be realized, the space for it had to be cleared.

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The moment the cranes began to actively “un-build” the Palace of the Republic in February of 2006, Simmel’s ruin ceased to exist. While clearly memories and debates about the Palast persisted, its existence as a meaningful ruin ended when man began to force the hand of nature in its demise. The aesthetic “patina” of the ruin, accomplished through the active indifference man afforded during the fifteen-odd years following the fall of the Wall, was replaced by the lifeless skeleton of steel I-beams and rubble at its feet.

Fig. 33. Palace of the Republic demolition process, January 2007. Photo courtesy of Silke Atmaca.

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435 Structural concerns due to the sandy soil on which the Palace of the Republic is situated precluded engineers from simply razing the Palace with dynamite, as had been done with the Stadtschloss. Instead, teams must literally build the Palace in reverse.

436 Simmel writes in this regard, “The ruin reverses this order: what was raised by the spirit becomes the object of the same forces which form the contour of the mountain and the bank of the river. If in this way there emerges an aesthetic significance, it ramifies into a metaphysical one in the manner revealed by patina on metal and wood, ivory and marble. In the formation of a patina, too, a natural process takes place on the surface of a human product and produces a growth of skin which completely covers up the original one. That the product becomes more beautiful by chemical means; that what has been willed becomes, without intention or force, something obviously new, often more beautiful, and once more self-consistent—this is the mysterious harmony which is the fantastic fascination of patina; and it cannot be wholly accounted for by analyzing our perception of it” (Simmel, “The Ruin,” 262).
As the Palast was dismantled, the tenets of the location as Gesamtkunstwerk had been altered by changes made (and proposed) to the surrounding architecture. A new entrance to the former Zeughaus, and now *Deutsches Historisches Museum*, was added to the museum in 2004. A clear departure from the Schlüter architecture of the Zeughaus, the entrance adds a visual interjection of modern architecture into the landscape of this center of Berlin.⁴³⁷

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⁴³⁷ The entrance to the German Historical Museum is off of Unter den Linden on at the back of the building. In this way, one must leave the main visual corridor of this area of Mitte to see the new Pei structure. However, if one considers this area of Berlin as a complete city center, the argument holds that the entrance speaks to the entirety of the area.
As well, the *Staatliche Museen zu Berlin* has developed, along with architects such as David Chipperfield, a concept for the future of Museum Island. Included in the plans is a new structure, the James Simon-Galerie, which is to provide an aesthetic synthesis between the lines of the existing architecture of the Museum Island and the architecture of today.⁴³⁸

Given these architectural changes to the area around the Schlossplatz, it would seem that much more incongruous to construct a replica of the Stadtschloss. It would be a

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⁴³⁸ I had the opportunity to hear David Chipperfield speak as part of the “Berlin Architecture Panel Discussion” during the “Berlin in Lights” festival at Carnegie Hall in November 2007. In his lecture on the restoration process he has lead on the Museum Island (and in the *Neues Museum* in particular), he discussed this method of synthesis of trying to both recoup the past as past while preserving the architecture as authentically as possible for the future. In this speech, he noted that the new James Simon-Galerie was to be a physical link to the museums of the island, as well as a modern interpretation of the existing structural elements, thus connecting past to future.
false return to a Prussian past, and would not allow for the structure to fit into a new image of the neighborhood, which includes modern interventions with the past. An important development to this end has been the appointment of Hermann Parzinger as President of the SPK on March 1, 2008.

Parzinger, a lauded archaeologist and former director of the Deutsches Archäologisches Institut, brings with him a new approach to the question of the Schlossplatz redevelopment. In an interview in the Zeit prior to assuming his new position at the foundation, Parzinger argued that a strict reconstruction of the Stadtschloss was not ideal. When asked about his feeling of the “Ehrlichkeit beim Schloss” (honesty regarding the palace) when three Baroque facades are to be reconstructed, he responded: “I must admit to you, I don’t like speaking about the Schloss. We’re not building a palace, but rather the Humboldt-Forum. Some facades of the original building will be put up new for the Forum, but not much more than that. . . . One could also of course imagine it a different way; a completely new, modern building there would be plausible in my opinion. We don’t want to weaken these decisions. At the same time, we made clear in the first jury meeting for the architect competition, that we need latitude in certain areas.”

Although a design for the Humboldt-Forum was unanimously chosen in November 2008, the controversy has yet to be quelled. The jury chose Francesco Stella,
an Italian architect, as the winner of the competition.\textsuperscript{440} His design includes a recreation of three sides of the original Stadtschloss, along with a modern fourth side along the Spree. The \textit{Bundesamt für Bauwesen und Raumordnung} (BBR, Federal Office for Building and Regional Planning) praises Stella’s design as one which returns a true center to Berlin, and re-orientates the surrounding area: “[Stella’s] design … will give the true geographic heart back to the growing center of Berlin. The Berlin Cathedral, the Altes Museum, the Schlossplatz, and the street of Unter den Linden will get their orientation back.”\textsuperscript{441}

Thus, the oppositional notions of how the new Humboldt-Forum should look are reduced to how each believes it should speak to its surroundings. On the one side, stances such as Parzinger’s are sympathetic to the idea that reconstructions are not the same as the original. Praising Chipperfield’s work on the New Museum, Parzinger stated his design wasn’t a simple imitation, but rather a highly intellectual appropriation, which “clearly marks the dividing lines between the old and the new.”\textsuperscript{442} From this perspective, the old may be evoked even when creating something new. The “dividing lines” can also create cohesion in that the entire environment speaks to an entirety of historical experience.

On the other side is the BBR’s position, which allows for the reconstruction of the old as exact copy because it fits with the historic elements of the surrounding area. The

\textsuperscript{440} Aside from aesthetic concerns, some controversy persisted regarding Stella’s eligibility for winning the prize.


\textsuperscript{442} “…deutlich er die Trennlinie zwischen Altem und Neuem markiert.” Parzinger, “Hochdruck,” 49.
reconstruction of the three sides of the Stadtschloss in this argument create cohesion through supplying the area within view with the missing piece to the “heart” of the city center. The position does not, however, seem concerned with the fourth, more modern side, overlooking the Spree. It is not visible from that “center” of Berlin, which includes the Cathedral and the Altes Museum. This lack of concern for the fourth side is evident in the conditions of the BBR’s original competition requirements. It sought for the new construction to respect the special form of the former Schloss, and more specifically, it required the three sides in question to be “reconstructions” of the baroque façades.\footnote{“Der Neubau soll sich an der Stereometrie des ehemaligen Schlosses orientieren. Die Wiedererrichtung der barocken Fassaden des ehemaligen Schlosses ist an je drei Seiten außen und im Schlüterhof vorzusehen.” (The new construction shall orient itself on the stereometry of the former castle. The reconstruction of the baroque façades of the former castle should be included on each of the three sides outside and in the Schlüter courtyard.) Bundesamt für Bauwesen und Raumordnung, “Wiedererrichtung des Berliner Schlosses / Bau des Humboldt-Forums Berlin: Wettbewerbsbekanntmachung” (Reconstruction of the Berlin Castle / Construction of the Humboldt-Forum Berlin: Competition Announcement), accessed December 9, 2011, http://www.bbr.bund.de/cln_032/nn_21462/DE/WettbewerbeAusschreibungen/PlanungsWettbewerbe/Ablage_AbgeschlWettbewerbe/Archiv_08/Humboldtforum_Bekanntmachungstext.html.} Clearly, the visual link between the reconstruction of the original façades and the surrounding landscape of the same era was the BBR’s main concern.

Stella voiced his compliance with this design prerogative in a 2008 article, in which he stated, “I didn’t want to create a counterpoint to the city architecture, but provide continuity, not replacement.”\footnote{Tristana Moore, “Berlin Split over Palace Design,” BBC News, November 28, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7755245.stm.} But in this formulation, how can continuity be achieved when part of the visual landscape is an asynchronous addition to the sum? That is, true chronological continuity would be a progression from one architectural construction to the next, allowing for changes in design over time. The visual continuity of which Stella apparently speaks—in which the eye is tricked to believe that the lines of
the Deutsches Museum are the same as those of the reconstructed Stadtschloss—is a false unity. Stella’s reconstruction merely simulates reality, it is not an authentic present.

Despite the fact the fourth side receives relatively little attention, it does indeed create a visual link between past, present, and future. Situated on the Spree, the final side will be best visible from the opposite bank, as one stands with the Marx-Engels statue facing west. Stripped of the baroque adornments, the fourth side mimics the window openings of the other sides in simple lines.

![Model](image)

**Fig. 36. East side of Stella’s proposal for the Stadtschloss reconstruction. Model on display at HumboldtBox Berlin. Photograph by author, March 2012.**

The lines provide a visual counterpoint to the surrounding architecture, thus staking out a contemporary interpretation of the original structure. In addition, the lines as well as the proposed building materials (architectural grade concrete) suggest the same in the Regierungsviertel (government quarters) to the west, which used the same materials and
similar designs.\footnote{The juxtaposition of the Reichstag next to modern Paul-Löbe-Haus offer a similar contrast between old and new.} Thus, the scale of the window lines evoke the original façade, the rectangular white shape of the face suggests the Palace of the Republic, while the modern materials and lack of adornment points to present and future Berlin. But this possible synthesis in Berlin architectural and political history cannot save the rest of the three sides. They remain a false representation of the past, thus undercutting the effectiveness of the final fourth side.

By December 31, 2010, the plans to begin building the reconstructed Stadtschloss were delayed until 2013.\footnote{“Kulturminister Neumann fordert Kuppel für Stadtschloss,” \textit{Der Tagesspiegel}, December 31, 2010. Among other continued alterations, the dome of the Stadtschloss is threatened because of lack of finances.} A year later, the BBR continues to anticipate groundbreaking in 2013 and completion in 2019. In the meantime, artisans are at work in a “Schlossbauhütte” (palace construction workshop) in the western Berlin district of Spandau creating reconstructions for the new façade. In December 2011, the first example was hoisted on a “Musterfassade” (sample façade) erected on site at the Schlossplatz to test the work.

\textbf{Conclusion}

The starting point for Chapters Four and Five was the question, Why was the Palace of the Republic torn down after 1990? Concerned with the tropes of identity and history, memory and returns, ruins and rubble, and the pursuit of aesthetic unification in the city center, I have argued that across time, the Schlossplatz has exemplified particular changes and consistencies in the thinking about urban landscape in the center of eastern
Berlin. Since its initial construction, unifying the cities of Berlin and Coelln in the fifteenth century, the original Stadtschloss has been made the symbolic icon of a Prussian power, praised by some and damned by others. During its physical existence, the Schloss maneuvered in its meaning, but ultimately visually linked the city center, becoming a figurative and literal “crown” to the area. With the re-appropriation of the Schloss by Liebknecht in 1918, as a revolutionary moment to which the SED would return, the palace began falling into a state of apparent irrelevance, as its political cache and visual appeal proved irreconcilable with the both the National Socialist and GDR worldviews.

As the empty Schlossplatz attempted to gain meaning in the *Lehre in the Leere*, it failed to impart real significance. The human-made destruction of the Schloss and the barren parking lot left in its place did nothing to create a visual unity in the landscape, nor could it be considered a significant ruin worthy of meaning.

In building the Palace of the Republic, the SED sought to remedy this void by creating a structure that created visual coherence in the immediate area. While it arguably succeeded in this task with the bronze-reflecting windows and modern nods to the former lines of the past, the specificity of the architecture as “East German” doomed it after 1990; the Palast simply did not “fit” in the new Berlin. In answer to the original question, the Palace of the Republic was torn down because it failed to speak to its surroundings in a way that was acceptable to unified Germany’s majority of constituents. In much the same way the war wounds of Allied air raids provided the SED grounds to demolish the Schloss, so too did the blight of asbestos afford the Bundestag with a means to dismantle the Palast. While the cultural and political history of the building was perhaps not
palatable in post-Wall Berlin, it was ultimately its lack of optic integration into the preferred history of the city center which mattered most.

The efforts of new Bundestag to recreate the original Stadtschloss is an effort to recuperate an acceptable past life, one which supposedly could be relevant to all Germans. The argument, however, centers around the visual appeal of the Schloss—that it will reunite the optic fragments of this central section of Berlin. In its continual repetition and recall of past lives, as well as in the effort to contextualize the space as one of a unified aesthetic field of the Gesamtkunstwerk, the Schlossplatz has functioned as an important site of identity and redemption, of loss and emptiness.

In summary, the process of the transformation of the city center in the case of the Schlossplatz has been one of building and reappropriation, of return and synthesis, of meaning and insignificance. Moving forward, the next architecture to inhabit this space should in some way speak to the project of the Gesamtkunstwerk as a stand-in and allegory for political unification.
CONCLUSION

In the twenty plus years since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the political unification of the two Germanys, the political, economic, social, and cultural landscape of the once-again capital city has changed in dramatic ways. The “Siamese city” has tried to re-conceive itself as a coherent whole. Gone is the Wall, which divided the two halves of the city. Resurrected are Potsdamer Platz and the government district, anchoring the unified city’s center around the Brandenburg Gate. Strasse des 17. Juni and Unter den Linden pulse as the main traffic artery, stretching out beyond to the West and East. The re-linked public transportation system makes no distinction between the two sides of the city; instead, S-Bahn and tram maps clearly show the city as a series of veins bulging outwards from and crossing through Mitte.

Yet, in this process of reinvention, Berlin has faced the task over the past twenty years of deciding how and if it should reconcile its former selves with its new identity. If, as Karl Scheffler determined at the turn of the last century, that Berlin is never to “be,” but rather always “becoming,” his prediction would ring true again, as the city continued to transform itself into the united capital.\(^\text{447}\) To be sure, and what I have hoped here to emphasize, the changes in making the “New Berlin” after 1990 are but part of a long string of reinventions the city has undertaken in the course of its history. The returns to

\(^{447}\) Karl Scheffler in declared the city: “verdammt, immerfort zu werden, aber niemals zu sein” (damned to continually become, but never to be) Karl Scheffler, *Berlin—ein Stadtschicksal* (Berlin-Westend: Erich Reiss Verlag, 1910), 267.
such moments of change—the recuperations and remembrances of the past—instill in the city’s landscape a particular and unique identity. The image of the city’s built topography and the interaction between it and its viewers shapes how the city is experienced, and how it is understood, especially with respect to German history and the country’s future. The Schlossplatz and the Soviet War Memorial in Treptower Park are but two examples of such exchange in post-unification East Berlin. Several other examples must be explored to fully understand the dynamics of such change.

The Berlin Wall

Perhaps the most recognizable and symbolic, as well as actual, manifestation of German division is of course the Berlin Wall. Nearly twenty years after it was successfully breached and collapsed, negotiations over its future are still ongoing. As the first and most famous target of the literal and metaphoric sledgehammer, the Berlin Wall nonetheless persists as one of the key associations of the city. In its erection, the Wall helped define the political divisions in the city, making concrete the diverging societies and cultural mythos of the two Berlins and indeed two Germanys. A construction with which to orientate oneself vis-à-vis the new frontier, the Wall of the 1960s thus confirmed the shift of a former singular center of the city to two new centers.448

448 Already in the 1950s the “centers” of East and West Berlin began to take shape. In the East, I would argue the center ran across an East-West axis, from Unter den Linden to the Stalinallee, rather than centering itself in a concentric circle of Alexanderplatz only, for example. Dorothea Tscheschner describes Alexanderplatz as a hinge in the axial arms of Unter den Linden and Stalinallee: “Dem Alexanderplatz war innerhalb des Zentrumsbandes eine ganz neue Aufgabe zugewachsen. Er hatte (bildlich gesprochen) die „Zusammengehörigkeit” der von Westen und Südosten in seinem Platzraum aufeinandertreffenden Achsbeziehungen verständlich zu machen, die beiden „Magistralen” gelenkartig miteinander zu verbinden” (Alexanderplatz accrued a completely new task within the central rings [of Berlin]. It had (usually speaking) to make the ‘cohesiveness’ in the meeting of the west and southeast axes at its square make
But as the years progressed, the Berlin Wall played on Musil’s declaration that there is nothing as invisible as a monument; the Wall became as equally obvious as it was overlooked. At once one of the most loaded symbols and constructions of the Cold War, the Berlin Wall over the course of years became an orienting feature of the city. But in its turns barricading in and locking out, the Wall also disappeared in the consciousness and visual landscape of the city. From the Western literary perspective, the narrator of Peter Schneider’s *Wall Jumper* summed it up thusly, “In response to the question of what it is like to live in a city surrounded by concrete and barbed wire, I’ve long since come to answer like most Berliners: living here is no different from living in any other city. I really don’t see the Wall anymore, even if it is the only structure on earth, apart from the Great Wall of China, that can be seen from the moon with the naked eye.”

Yet, even in the ordinariness of 1980s West Berlin, the Wall still was inescapable in its representations. Marion, the circus performer in Wim Wenders’s *Der Himmel über Berlin* (*Wings of Desire*) laments, in thinking about how the city can be both familiar and foreign, “No way can you ever get lost [in Berlin]. You always eventually come across the Wall again.” This orientating principle diverges from the more complicated relationship those living in the GDR had to the Wall. Even if writers and filmmakers in the GDR were to use the Wall as a spatial organizer in their representations of Berlin, sense, and to link the two ‘main streets’ with one another) Dorothea Tscheschner, “Der Alexanderplatz—Seine Entwicklung nach 1945,” in *Alexanderplatz. Städtebaulicher Ideenwettbewerb*, ed. Verein “Entwicklungsgemeinschaft Alexanderplatz” in Zusammenarbeit mit der Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung und Umweltschutz, Berlin (Berlin: Ernst und Sohn, 1994), 38.

In the West, as Elizabeth Strom has argued, the city sought not to “double” Berlin, which would acknowledge the division as legitimate (see Elizabeth A. Strom, *Building the New Berlin. The Politics of Urban Development in Germany’s Capital City* [Landham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001], 44). As such, the center of West Berlin became, I would argue, the later commercial area of Zoo and the Ku’Damm, the goal of many East Berliners in fact when the Wall fell.

450 “Auf jeden Fall kann man sich nicht verlaufen. Man kommt immer wieder an der Mauer an.”
their use would be limited by political concerns. As early as Christa Wolf’s *Der geteilte Himmel* (Divided Heaven), for example, which uses the building on August 13, 1961 as its leitmotiv, the Wall itself does not feature in the novel. Its construction clearly is the central allegory of the narrative, yet the Wall as ekphrastic subject does not appear.

As Berliners attempted to render the Wall officially obsolete by destroying it as a border in November 1989 and immediately re-creating it as a commodity in tiny plastic boxes on the tourist circuit, the Wall’s end was not in sight. Its afterlife has come in different forms since that time. Large segments were installed abroad, fragmenting the structure and isolating it within a specific time. The largest stretch of Wall, across from the Ostbahnhof train station, was rendered into an outdoor art exhibit, the East Side Gallery. While the East Side Gallery has been continually renovated and restored over the course of the last twenty years, it remains, like its counterparts abroad, fragmentary. The section of the Wall sits as an artistic anomaly along the Spree, not visually integrated into the rest of the city’s history. While the Cultural Minister, Andre Schmitz, has declared that the East Side Gallery is part of the memory culture of the Wall,451 I would argue that in and of itself, the East Side Gallery lacks the contextualization present even in the Museum at Checkpoint Charlie. A proposed museum at the East Side Gallery may perhaps help this problem of fragmentation and contextualization; in the meantime, the 2006 relocation of a thirty-four segment stretch of the East Side Gallery to make way for visitors of the newly-built O2-World Arena to have a view and access to the Spree river.

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certainly does not help to make the argument that the East Side Gallery is impervious to the march of time away from 1989.\textsuperscript{452}

In a similar situation, a year after the East Side Gallery segments were moved, a section of the Wall on Erna-Berger-Straße in Berlin-Mitte across from Potsdamer Platz was to be relocated due to the construction of the Federal Environmental Ministry building. Some argued that plans to move the section inside the building and preserve it behind glass would actually improve its visibility. Taking it out of its original context would thus ostensibly treat it as a historical document in an archive, safeguarding it for generations to come.\textsuperscript{453} Detractors argued that to remove the section from its original context “fictionalizes” the piece, and was wholly unnecessary since architects provided plans to build around the segment anyway.\textsuperscript{454}

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\textsuperscript{452} See for example, Karin Schmidl, “Die Mauer muss weg,” \textit{Berliner Zeitung}, June 23, 2006, 27.\textsuperscript{453} Rainer Klemke, Head of the Memorial Department stated: “Entscheidend ist, dass dieses Mauerstück in dem Neubau später vor aller Witterung geschützt und hinter Glas für alle sichtbar sowie öffentlich zugänglich ist. Der Aufmerksamkeitswert steigt dadurch ja sogar noch. Die Mauer ist ja nicht in dem Sinne ein historisches Denkmal wie ein Kunstwerk, sondern sie diente einem Zweck, denn [sic] man dokumentieren sollte.” (It is crucial, that this piece of the [Berlin] Wall in the new construction be protected later from weather elements and be visible to all while behind glass. It should also be accessible to the public. It will receive greater attention that way. The Wall is not a historical monument in the sense of art work, but rather it served a purpose which one should document.) Quoted in Sabine Grundlach, “Historiker: Mauerabbau ist skandalös,” \textit{Berliner Morgenpost}, April 11, 2007, 12.\textsuperscript{454} Johannes Cramer, Historian at the Free University of Berlin, stated, “Einen der letzten Mauerteile in der Mitte Berlins erst abzubauen, um ihn dann später wieder hinter Glas aufzubauen und zu fiktionalisieren, ist ein ebenso albernes wie unnötiges Vorgehen.” (To first disassemble one of the last pieces of the Wall in

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{452} See for example, Karin Schmidl, “Die Mauer muss weg,” \textit{Berliner Zeitung}, June 23, 2006, 27.\textsuperscript{453} Rainer Klemke, Head of the Memorial Department stated: “Entscheidend ist, dass dieses Mauerstück in dem Neubau später vor aller Witterung geschützt und hinter Glas für alle sichtbar sowie öffentlich zugänglich ist. Der Aufmerksamkeitswert steigt dadurch ja sogar noch. Die Mauer ist ja nicht in dem Sinne ein historisches Denkmal wie ein Kunstwerk, sondern sie diente einem Zweck, denn [sic] man dokumentieren sollte.” (It is crucial, that this piece of the [Berlin] Wall in the new construction be protected later from weather elements and be visible to all while behind glass. It should also be accessible to the public. It will receive greater attention that way. The Wall is not a historical monument in the sense of art work, but rather it served a purpose which one should document.) Quoted in Sabine Grundlach, “Historiker: Mauerabbau ist skandalös,” \textit{Berliner Morgenpost}, April 11, 2007, 12.\textsuperscript{454} Johannes Cramer, Historian at the Free University of Berlin, stated, “Einen der letzten Mauerteile in der Mitte Berlins erst abzubauen, um ihn dann später wieder hinter Glas aufzubauen und zu fiktionalisieren, ist ein ebenso albernes wie unnötiges Vorgehen.” (To first disassemble one of the last pieces of the Wall in
Yet, while standing sections of the Wall were altered and at times moved, spectral forms of the Wall persist in more cohesive ways. An installation of pavers partially mark the former trail of the Wall in the streets of the new central Berlin. Carved into the ground, the bricks provide a trace of the Wall integrated into the geography of the city. A project initially promoted by the Western left alliance of Bündnis 90 and Die Grünen (and rejected by the SPD and CDU), the line figures into a reworking of the Wall in unified Berlin. Instead of leaving the Wall intact—an impossibility in a myriad of ways—the trail provides a topographic orientation of where the Wall stood, thus preserving a trace of its former self. Its interruption by post-1990 constructed buildings integrates history with the present, thereby neither rendering the Wall as fragmentary anomaly, nor as impediment to aesthetic or mental unification.

The inverse to this is the criticism that the traces of the Wall are not complete; that is, that the markings become “lost.” One such account in Die Welt in 2009 summarized the situation thusly: “Only a forty kilometer long strip made of pavers laid through downtown Berlin indicates today the course of the Wall—from [the districts of] Tiergarten to Friedrichshain, from Neukölln to Prenzlauer Berg. And it’s not even complete. It disappears under the sides of newly built houses, in parks, or for no recognizable reason at all.” But in this case, I would argue, the fragments are part of a whole. They are an attempt to allow the Wall to persist as allegory in the city, where memory is swallowed up by progress, and interrupted by forgetting. The remnants,

Berlin Mitte, only to then later build it again behind glass and fictionalize it, is a silly as well as an unnecessary action.) Quoted in Sabine Grundlach, “Mauerabbau,” 12.
however, seek to create a whole, something that the East Side Gallery and the section at Erna-Berger-Strasse fail to do. While perhaps counterintuitive, the incomplete brickwork of the Wall’s trail in the streets of Berlin allow for the mental work of recuperation, as one actively struggles to piece together the former structure of the Wall vis-à-vis this born-again cityscape.

Another way in which the path of the Berlin Wall has been reclaimed is in the installation of a foot and bike trail along with signs. The signs along the route explain the history of the Wall in the three languages of the occupying forces and German. The Berlin *Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung* (Berlin Senate Administration for Urban Development) began the project “Berliner Mauerweg” (Berlin Wall Path) in 2001, which guides bicyclists and pedestrians along the entire seventy-mile length of the Wall, with signs showing development of the Wall and its everyday implications along the way. The signs, guiding bicyclists along the route, are posted at the height of the original Wall, the reverse of the pavers in the ground. Instead of only marking the physical location of the Wall, the signs provide partial dimensionality to the absent structure.

In its description of the Berliner Mauerweg, the Urban Development Administration further integrates the trail into the past and present in similar ways to the pavers. First, in terms of linking multiple pasts to the Wall and to the present, the route description of the Berliner Mauerweg provided to cyclists points out landmarks along the way. Not only are GDR or Berlin Wall-specific landmarks included, such as Checkpoint Charlie or a memorial to a twenty-year-old shot and killed in February of 1989 attempting to breach the Wall, but also are included are Berlin-Schönefeld airport (which stands to become the main international airport for Berlin) and nineteenth-century
churches. The mix of attractions listed in the official route description suggest the Berliner Mauerweg is not just about the Wall as it was, but is rather about its place in past and future.

Second, in terms of the visual context of the Berliner Mauerweg, Ingeborg Junge-Reyer, the Berlin City Senator for Urban Development suggests the tour unifies not only East and West in the city, but also the city with the surrounding countryside, from which Berlin was also divided. She writes, “People can experience the 160 kilometer long walk of the Berlin Wall Path, but it should not simply be a contribution to the memory of the time of division or a tourist destination for guests from around the world. Instead, it should bind Berlin with its green surrounding area as well as serve as a meeting place between east and west.” This kind of visual linking, which would not be possible in the same way if the Wall were still standing, is an important means of unifying the cityscape and breaking the legacy of East Berlin as island.

**Hitler’s Bunker**

The re-marking of the absent Berlin Wall exemplifies the reworking of its meaning after 1990. The construction once facing the ire of most of the world, is now recuperated in its referent form. In a different way, Hitler’s bunker, situated not far from the Erna-Berger-Strasse watchtower and Wall fragment, in its post-1990 life is about the

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retrieval of a spectral space. The “Führerbunker” (Hitler Bunker), where Hitler allegedly took his life in April 1945, was bulldozed by the Soviets in the immediate aftermath of the War. Twice more during the GDR, the structure was bombed in an attempt to eradicate its existence. Unable to completely destroy the bunker because of its massively solid construction, the GDR sealed it over, erasing it from the landscape. Further, the bunker became part of the so-called no man’s land between the Berlin Wall and the city streets of East Berlin.

Not only did the Führerbunker literally disappear from the urban landscape, but it disappeared figuratively as well. As discussed in Chapter Two, the mythos of the GDR denied a space for the legacy of Nazi Germany in East German history. During the late 1980s, the bunker became a parking lot for a neighboring apartment complex. Despite the obvious access to the site, the exact location of the bunker remained officially unidentified.

The site remained unmarked following 1990. Concerns that the location might become a pilgrimage destination for Nazi sympathizers curbed discussions about formally identifying the bunker’s location. The site is in fact indicative of the still delicate and complicated task Germany continues to face in dealing with its National Socialist past. Where the Soviet War Memorial in Treptower Park could be de-mythologized through the re-appropriation of the space as a place for Sunday strollers, or further passed off as a Russian construction or a nod to Germany’s socialist activist legacy, the sheer proximity of Hitler’s Bunker to the optic and historical centrality of the city proves it to be an even more challenging site to negotiate in terms of how, or whether, to identify its location. The Soviet War Memorial is tucked away in the trees of
the park, thus shaping its reading as something perhaps distinct from everyday life. The controversy surrounding the rebuilding of the Stadtschloss speaks to the importance of negotiating what history becomes visually and geographically, and thereby metaphorically, central. How, then, Berlin should acknowledge Hitler in the center of the city clearly becomes problematic. Particularly because the bunker is in such close proximity to other central figures of the “New Germany”—it is one city block away from the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe, steps from the commercial and entertainment hub of Potsdamer Platz, and minutes from the newly developed federal government quarter—it is critical that if the Hitler Bunker was to be marked, it was done in such a way that it fit appropriately into the emerging national master-narrative. Neither Berlin, nor Germany, seemed to be particularly eager to take on the issue, and the site remained unmarked for over a decade and a half after the Wall fell. But another group was interested in revealing its location.

The group Berliner Unterwelten e.V. (Berlin Underworlds), a collection of academics, journalists, architects, engineers, and interested citizens, was founded in 1997 to promote the exploration of the underground bunkers, tunnels, and subway systems of Berlin. The group has published extensively on the underground topography of the city, and also gives tours of the subterranean world of Berlin. Based on continued interest from tourists (especially, apparently, from foreign tourists), on the location and description of the Hitler Bunker, founder Dietmar Arnold petitioned the Berlin Administration for Urban Development to place an informational board regarding the architectural floor plan, contents, and history of the bunker at its site, in an effort to strip

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458 Dietmar Arnold, the founder of Berliner Unterwelten, has published several guides to underground Berlin, including Neue Reichskanzlei und “Führerbunker”: Legenden und Wirklichkeit (Berlin: Links Verlag, 2005), a history of the Regierungsviertel and the Hitler Bunker from 1734-2005.
the location and the bunker of its mythologizing properties. Arnold argues, “[b]y making the area of the former ‘Hitler Bunker’ visible, the myth building and nostalgic glorification can be countered.”

The Urban Development Administration ultimately agreed to the plans, as did the Förderkreis Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas (Association for the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe). The fact that the informational board was erected on the site days before the start of Germany’s hosting of the 2006 World Cup seemed to suggest an unmasking of hidden Nazi architecture, and further intended to demonstrate claims that Germany faces its past. Where Jewish victim memorialization has rightly taken precedence, at least as it has in the case of West German architecture and collective memory, some have argued this is perhaps a clearer road to take than to figure out how, or whether, to acknowledge sites of Nazi history. Goebbels’s bunker, for example, still remains unidentified under the Holocaust Memorial nearby. But in a counter-example, the Topography of Terror exhibit lays bare Nazi government mechanics in the half-dug-out terrain only a few blocks away. Clearly, as many have documented, there are a variety of ways in which architectural relics from National Socialist Germany have been used, destroyed, and re-appropriated.

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460 Steffen Pletl and Linda Pacykowski, “Breite Zustimmung zu Info-Tafel; Berliner und Touristen reagieren positiv auf neuen Schaukasten zum ‘Führerbunker,’” Welt, June 12, 2006.

461 Goebbels’s bunker, for example, found in 1997 while preparing the site of the Memorial for the Murdered Jews of Europe, was simply built upon to hold the steles of the memorial.

462 Gavriel Rosenfeld’s Munich and Memory: Architecture, Monuments, and the Legacy of the Third Reich (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2000) is one such example.
What is significant about the Hitler Bunker for this study is the way, and conditions under which, the bunker was made visible, despite its subterranean inaccessibility. Where the physical end of Hitler was buried, a location which was ultimately eclipsed by the Berlin Wall both literally through the building of the Wall and figuratively through GDR politics, the final connection between visual-imaginings and location in the form of an informational placard was made through a push of tourists and a citizens’ initiative. The visual turn at this location is an acknowledgement of the past in an effort to de-mythologize the space instead of ignoring it.

**New Topographies**

Beyond the spectral recuperations of the Berlin Wall and Hitler’s Bunker, other topographies in East Berlin have changed as well over the past twenty years. The re-imagining of the ritzy shopping boulevard along Friedrichstrasse points back to its pre-GRD life in Weimar. The formerly imposing Stalinallee has been reappropriated by hipsters as Karl-Marx-Allee and Frankfurter Allee. Former icons of the GDR—Checkpoint Charlie and the compound of the *Untersuchungsanstalt des Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit* (Stasi prison)—have remained in some senses intact, an anomaly of the changing landscape. The control point at Checkpoint Charlie remains in the middle of Friedrichstrasse, altered with giant photos of American and Russian soldiers, but nonetheless left as an memento of the intersection’s past life. As well, the Stasi prison in Berlin-Hohenschönhausen was placed under historic preservation protection in 1992, and

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463 Even beginning in the early 1980s as construction in the area started to commence, and especially once apartment buildings went up around the site, the GDR still failed to officially acknowledge the bunker, except to try to destroy it again in 1988. See Arnold’s *Neue Reichskanzlei und ‘Führerbunker.’*
has, with the exception of restoration measures in the 2000s, been left unchanged. Its prison walls and guard towers an interruption in the topography of its surroundings. Both the Checkpoint Charlie guard booth and the Stasi prison grounds, in their form make a visual break with the present and re-inform the viewer of their past lives.

How the past lives occupying East Berlin’s space will continue to change in the future of course remains to be seen. As Germany and Berlin continue to solidify their new identities and negotiate the integration of their former fractured selves as well as their distinct histories and mythologies, the urban landscape will keep changing and adapting. How the landmarks of past lives will factor into the visual totality of the city will continue to be a complex process. However, as I hope to have shown, it is the sum of these negotiations in the struggle for aesthetic unification, which enrich the total understanding of the significance of the “New Berlin” for a politically unified Germany.

The decision to restore some GDR-era landmarks in the post-Wall Berlin landscape, while demolishing others, is a complex negotiation with the past and future. I have argued over the course of this dissertation that the visual environment of these sites is as important as their symbolic and historic meanings. In all, the push towards an aesthetic unification of the city is a goal which at times is left explicitly unarticulated, even as its political and social counterpoints are pursued.

Over the course of its existence, the GDR co-opted the Soviet War Memorial in Treptower Park as a testament to its own anti-fascist legacy. Drawing on the history of the park itself as a haven of anti-fascist, anti-capitalist, and pro-socialist activity, the ambiguous imagery of the memorial grounds fed into the SED worldview of the same. No longer a specific “Soviet” structure, the memorial found its way into the GDR
collective consciousness through ritualized ceremonies and political contextualization. Yet, it is the visual unity between the memorial images and the surrounding natural environment, which helped to authenticate the space as a true example of German Heimat history. The repetitions of natural, feminized, pre-modern, and redemptive images fed into the mythology of the GDR, but also into collective understandings of Heimat. The history of the park, along with its marked differentiation from the urban landscape, framed the memorial as both genuine and fairy tale-like. Taken in concert, these attributes secured the Treptow memorial’s ability to cross the threshold of 1990 into an acceptable narrative germane to the new master narrative of unified Germany.

The Schlossplatz has a centuries-longer legacy to consider, yet the story is similar. The alterations and modifications of the square—through the original Schloss to the Palace of the Republic to the proposed Humboldt-Forum—tell of the recuperations and returns the site has experienced as planners, politicians, and citizen activists alike attempt to create a satisfactory visual cohesiveness to the city center. Whether this was originally through the aligning of the filigree with the architectural adornments across Unter den Linden, or the reflection of the Berliner Dom in the bronze Thermoglass of the Palast, the goal across time has been to seek aesthetic unification in this urban axis to represent both political and historical consistency.

**Beyond Berlin**

The underlying topic studied in this dissertation has been that of the aesthetic unification in times of political transition and ultimately unification. While I have
specifically focused on the cases of two sites in Eastern Berlin in the post-Wall landscape, the dynamic of the visual in the built environment vis-à-vis political, historical, and cultural factors is hardly limited to this city or even to Germany. To be sure, the negotiation and appropriation of architectural constructions in moments of regime change and shifts in local and national narratives are instances from which scholars, political leaders, and citizens alike may glean insight into a society’s process of transformation. The specificity of “unification” need not in general be one of two previously separated countries joining together, as in the case here of East and West Germany, but may be that of unifying disparate threads of collective identities during the bridging of seemingly incongruous collective narratives.

In modern Iraq, for example, the process of reconciling the national identity under Saddam Hussein with the emerging democratic tendencies in the post-Iraq War era have been fraught with the shifting dynamics of political leadership and Iraq’s own place in the region. Beginning in 2003, during the Iraq War, coalition forces destroyed and defaced many monuments Hussein had built in Baghdad in his apparent effort to create national unity. One scholar has described the coalition efforts as operating with “marauding efficiency,” seeking to topple “[a]n entire epoch of state-produced symbols, monuments, and motifs . . .”464 Yet, outside forces did not destroy all such monuments in the city, and the Iraqis charged in the post-war task of transitioning the country from Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship to a democratically-minded nation have sought to reconcile the two.

In February 2007, an Iraqi committee, which was given the authority to determine which Saddam Hussein-era monuments were to be further destroyed, began the process of dismantling the “Swords of Qādisīyah” or the so-called Victory Arches in central Baghdad. The arches—a mirrored set of crossed swords evocative of the seventh-century battle of Qādisīyah, held by exaggerated replicas of Hussein’s hands rising from the earth—were erected by the leader in the mid-1980s as a gesture of purported victory in the Iran-Iraq War, a conflict which most outside experts deemed a stalemate. The day after the demolition of the Victory Arches began, the government halted the work amid protests.

Four years later, at the start of 2011, the Iraqi government began restoring the arches as part of a nearly $200 million project to revamp the city in anticipation of an Arab League meeting in Baghdad in March of that year. A spokesperson for Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki justified the decision, stating, “We don’t want to be like Afghanistan and the Taliban and remove things like that or to be like the Germans and remove the Berlin Wall. We are a civilized people and this monument is a part of the memories of this country.”

Not everyone agreed with al-Maliki’s assessment, of course. Some suggested that the swords, Arab symbols, should remain, while Hussein’s hands be removed. Others yet felt the monument was simply a source of painful reminders of the past. Kanan Makiya, who wrote a book about the monument in 1991 under the pen name Samir a-

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466 The meeting was ultimately postponed until March 2012.
468 Hakim al-Zamili, paraphrased by Meyers, “Iraq Restores Monument.”
469 Samira al-Mousawi, quoted in Meyers, “Iraq Restores Monument.”
Khalil, argued that the monument was worth preserving because it was the “perfect symbol of the Baathist experience.” The controversy over the Victory Arches’ renovation is reminiscent of the discussions regarding the Soviet War Memorial in Treptower Park in post-Wall Berlin. A similar reminder of a bygone—and at times painful—past, the conditions surrounding the Baghdad monument are also different. The Iraqis are not tied by a treaty to preserve the monument, nor are the arches tucked away in a sheltered park or relocated to memorial grounds, as in Tallinn, Estonia. Instead, the swords are centrally located in the “Green Zone,” framing opposing entrances to the city’s parade grounds near the former Presidential Palace and several embassies.

Yet, beyond the symbols associated with the swords and hands, and the monument’s physical location in central Baghdad, is the question of how this structure speaks to, and is informed by, its visual form and optic environment. How does the repetition of the crossed swords on either entrance to the pathway of the parade grounds figure into one’s understanding of the monument? How does the fact that the swords frame the sky, partitioning off a section of otherwise uninterrupted openness relate to the observer and how he or she perceives and makes sense of this structure? How does the experience of viewing and mentally comprehending this monument correspond to notions of Iraqi history and current identity? In general, do Iraqis today understand the monument differently now than they did in the era of Saddam Hussein’s rule? These are the kinds of questions with which I have approached the structures of the Schlossplatz and Treptow memorial.

What this example of the Swords of Qādisīyah, as well as others across time and the world, brings to light is the significance the built environment can have in evoking

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470 Quoted in Meyers, “Iraq Restores Monument.”
collective and individual memories, of creating national identities, and informing local and foreign observers of consequential cultural experiences. Whether they be during the post-Saddam Hussein era in Iraq, the Chinese administrative reclamation of Hong Kong, or the end of the Confederacy in the United States, the decisions to destroy or maintain architectural and artistic remnants of the past, or to forge new ones for the future matter for collective understandings of nationhood and community—past, present, and future. Nonetheless, it is not strictly about symbols or sites of memory, but rather sights as well.

To be sure, individual architectural and artistic structures may promote symbolic meaning simply because that was the intention of the designer. A memorial to a fallen hero or a state building may matter purely because of their designations as such. What I have hoped to impart here, however, is the notion that the optic experience brings an additional aspect to the built form when considering its role in collective identity formation. In moments of political and social change, this is particularly important, as observers try to make sense of the transformation and stake out claims to collective identity, memory, and historical master narratives. It is through this exercise of “site seeing” that such landmarks may thus allow for authentic redemption and return, as well

471 William H. Jordy has argued that I.M. Pei’s Bank of China Tower in Hong Kong, for example, is “the most visible monument in the Crown Colony to the momentous transfer of power,” which could either be read as “draconian” or “liberating” depending on how the observer stood vis-à-vis the “Handover” to China in 1997. See William H. Jordy, “Bank of China Tower,” in “Symbolic Essence” and Other Writings on Modern Architecture and American Culture, ed. Mardges Bacon (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005), 277.

Monument Avenue in Richmond, Virginia, serves as an example of modern aesthetic interventions with Confederate history in the United States. The addition of Richmond native and African-American tennis player Arthur Ashe to the string of monuments to Confederate officers, such as Robert E. Lee, on the avenue caused controversy when added in the mid-1990s, not least because of his lack of direct involvement with the Civil War, but also because of the actual composition of his statue. See Jonathan Leib, “The Witting Autobiography of Richmond, Virginia: Arthur Ashe, the Civil War, and Monument Avenue’s Racialized Landscape,” in Landscape and Race in the United States, ed. Richard H. Schein (New York: Routledge, 2006), 187-211.
as a connection between past, present, and future, therefore promoting total unification in moments of transition.
APPENDIX

Sarcophagi Text and Original Citations (German)\textsuperscript{472}

Text 1: “Zwei Jahrzehnte schützte die Rote Armee die friedliche Aufbauarbeit des Sowjetvolkes. Doch im Juni 1941 überfiel Hitlerdeutschland wortbrüchig unser Land, in dem es brutaler und niederträchtiger Weise den Nichtangriffsakt verletzte, und die Rote Armee sah sich gezwungen, ins Feld zu ziehen, um ihre Heimat zu verteidigen.”\textsuperscript{473}

Text 2: “Die Hitlerschen Schurken . . . haben es sich zum Ziel gesetzt, die Bevölkerung der Ukraine, Bjelorusslands, des Baltikums, der Moldau, der Krim und des Kaukasus zu versklaven oder auszurotten.”\textsuperscript{474} “Unser Ziel ist klar und edel. Wir wollen unseren Sowjetboden befreien.”\textsuperscript{475}

Text 3: “Die Erfolge der Roten Armee wären unmöglich gewesen ohne die Unterstützung des Volkes, ohne die aufopfernde Arbeit der Sowjetmenschen in den Betrieben, in den Bergwerken und Kohlengruben, im Verkehrswesen und in der Landwirtschaft.”\textsuperscript{476}


\textsuperscript{472} All quotes are from Stalin speeches made during the period of 1941 to 1944. The original German translations (as also transcribed on the ends of the sarcophagi in Treptower Park) were published in the collection \textit{Über den grossen Vaterländischen Krieg der Sowjetunion} (Moscow: Verlag für fremdsprachige Literatur, 1946). The same were also published in English by International Publishers, New York in 1945 under the title \textit{The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union}.

\textsuperscript{473} Stalin, “Befehl des obersten Befehlshabers, Nr. 95,” Moscow, February 23, 1943.


\textsuperscript{475} Stalin, “Befehl des Volkskommissars für Verteidigung, Nr. 130,” Moscow, May 1, 1942.

Michael Kutsows! Möge euch das siegreiche Banner des grossen Lenin Kraft verleihen!"477


Text 6: “Die Rote Armee hat ihr edles und erhabenes Kriegsziel, das sie zu Heldentaten begeistert. Dadurch ist eigentlich auch zu erklären, dass der vaterländische Krieg bei uns Tausende von Helden und Heldinnen hervorbringt, die bereit sind, für die Freiheit ihrer Heimat in den Tod zu gehen.”479

Text 7: “Die in unserem Lande verankerte Ideologie der Gleichberechtigung aller Rassen und Nationen, die Ideologie der Völkerfreundschaft hat den vollen Sieg über die hitlerfaschistische Ideologie des bestialischen Nationalismus und Rassenhasses errungen.”480

Text 8: “Ewiger Ruhm den Helden, die in den Kämpfen für die Freiheit und Unabhängigkeit unseres Heimatlandes gefallen sind.”481

478 Stalin, “Befehl des Volkskommissars für Verteidigung, Nr. 345,” Moscow, November 7, 1942.
481 Stalin, “Befehl des obersten Befehlshabers, Nr. 220,” Moscow, November 7, 1944.
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