
by

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A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (History) in The University of Michigan in 2012

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For my sisters,

Jessica and Kate Woods,

for everything.
Acknowledgements

This dissertation is a product of the generous community of scholars in the Department of History at the University of Michigan. At the University of Michigan I had the good fortune to receive fellowship support from: The College of Literature Science and the Arts, Rackham Graduate School, The International Institute, The Eisenberg Institute for Historical Studies, The Center for International and Comparative Studies, The Southeast Asian Studies Center, the Grant Opportunities in Collaborative Spaces (GROCS) fellowship, and the Department of History. Two Foreign Language and Area Studies provided support for the study of Tagalog, including a summer at the Southeast Asian Summer Institute in Madison, Wisconsin. I was able to complete this project with support from a Dissertation Completion fellowship, which is part of the Andrew W. Mellon/American Council of Learned Societies Early Career Fellowship Program.

I owe a great deal to the librarians and archivists at the Truman Library, the National Archives at College Park, the Hoover Institute at Stanford University, the Bentley Historical Library at the University of Michigan, the Douglas MacArthur Library, the Gonzalez Library at the University of the Philippines, the Ramon Magsaysay Collection, the Ayala Library, and the University of Santo Tomas. I would especially like to thank Engracia Santos at the American Historical Collection at the Ateneo de Manila University and David Goodridge at the Holy Cross Family Ministries for their assistance.
I could not have imagined a better group of colleagues and mentors than the ones I have been surrounded by in the History Department. I was very fortunate to have taken my very first graduate course in history with Gina Morantz-Sanchez and Geoff Eley. Geoff and Gina model the collaborative spirit and commitment to critical scholarship that represent the kind of academic community I always imagined myself being a part of. Lorna Alstetter and Kathleen King are instrumental members of the History Department. Their incredible support of graduate students has made every step of this process easier. While an undergraduate at the University of Michigan, Michele Mitchell and Matthew Countryman encouraged me to pursue an advanced degree in history and I was fortunate to have been able to take Michele’s last graduate course in the department. I owe a special thank you to Kathleen Canning and Douglas Northrop for organizing a seminar in Global History. During the Global History seminar Alison Abra, Charlie Bright, and Nancy Hunt provided feedback on the earliest stages of this dissertation. For two years Paul Kramer, Brendan Goff, Matt Wittman kept our little American Empire Reading Group alive. Many thanks to: Matt Briones, Philip Deloria, Sue Juster, Ian Moyer, Marty Pernick, Leslie Pincus, and Rony Suny as well. I also want to thank Marilyn Young and Michael Nash for inviting me to present a paper at the Center for the United States and the Cold War at New York University.

Perhaps the greatest inspiration has come from my peers in the department: Elspeth Martini, Sara Lampert, Suzi Linsely, Kirsten Leng, Federico Hellgott, Jared Secord and Crystal Chung read early chapter drafts with generous eyes. Sara Crider has kept me laughing. Lani Teves pulled me through many long days of writing. Thanks also to: Matt Blanton, Mathieu Desan, Afia Ofori-Mensa, Kelly Fayard, Emma Amador, Kara
French, Gene and Sarah Cassidy, Trevor and Alison Kilgore, Patrick Parker, Atef Said, Sarah Hamilton, Ricky Punzalen, Paul Farber, Alice Gates, Francis Gealogo, Rolando Tolentino, Judy Taguiwalo, Joi Barrios, Nenita Domingo.

Many years ago, Christine Sermak taught me how to approach my goals with fearless ambition. I am incredibly thankful for her friendship and all the encouragement she has provided through the years. Bob Currie, Michele Martinez, and Zahra Patterson made my life in New York City one in which creativity, art, and writing were not simply careers or hobbies, but ways of living. I am grateful to: Kevin Jones, Ryan Vigil, Kate Siriani, Laura and Rebecca Walker, and Cindy, Art, Elizabeth Morley for filling my holidays with good food and even better company. I especially want to thank Terry Anne Vigil for her constant love and support. Urmila Venkatesh has been an interminable source of support. She has listened to me talk about every part of this journey with intellectual curiosity. For the past ten years Vincent Messana has been a brother to me; thank you, Vince. I am very grateful to have met my compassionate and caring friend, Monica Kim, during my time in Ann Arbor. At a critical moment in my writing, when I was paralyzed by having to describe and analyze a particularly violent episode in history, Monica gently pushed me in the right direction. Together, we’ve vented our frustrations over the moralizing discourses of the Cold War, discussed the importance of being a witness to history, and imagined our futures as critical scholars. I am very lucky to have spent the last year living with Annah MacKenzie. We’ve laughed our way through this past year even when we both were struggling to get words on the page. Each day was made easier knowing that it would end with Annah’s company. I owe a special thank you to my dear friend Karen Miller. Karen has been a collaborator on this project from the
beginning. She has read every chapter—and some more than once—and worked out ideas with me every step of the way.

My dissertation committee, Matt Lassiter, Damon Salesa, Deirdre de la Cruz, Howard Brick, and Penny von Eschen, have all, in one way or another, helped transform this project. I am grateful to have had such a brilliant team supporting me along the way. I owe a particularly large thank you to my adviser, Penny von Eschen. Thank you also to Penny’s family, Kevin Gaines and Maceo Gaines, for providing many evenings of good food, wine, and conversation. Penny is an astute scholar and caring mentor and she has supported my ambitious vision for this dissertation from the very beginning. Always willing to talk through ideas and formulations, this dissertation represents six-years worth of insightful conversations with Penny.

My parents, Bob Woods and Jan Shanahan, are models of individuality and intellectual commitment. My dad always reminds me that I come from a long line of storytellers, including my late grandfather, Morton Woods who sparked my interest in history with tales of his life growing up on a farm in central Oklahoma. My dad has always been creative, curious, and caring. I owe my love of writing to my father, who very early in life encouraged me to cut my own path and work against the odds. My mom, Jan Shanahan, is the strongest woman I know. Her work ethic, commitment to the care of others, and inherent sense of social justice have consistently inspired me. Both my parents have an enthusiasm for exploring the unknown that I have embraced in my own life and work. Their constant encouragement has made this dissertation possible.

Without Kiara Vigil this project never would have come to fruition. After meeting in my very first graduate course at Michigan, we became quickly inseparable through our
work at GEO. Kiara is the most committed and disciplined individual I know and her dedication has made me a better scholar and person. She traveled across the world with me and wrote a significant piece of her dissertation away from her own scholarly community in order to support my own academic work. Thank you Kiara; you’ve filled this journey with insightful wisdom, hours of careful editing, even more hours of careful listening, and most importantly, lots of laughter. We continue to have our adventures. Finally, this dissertation is dedicated to my older sisters, Jessica and Kate Woods. They have always been my best friends and greatest enthusiasts.
Table of Contents

Dedication.................................................................ii
Acknowledgements.....................................................iii
List of Figures..........................................................x
Abstract.........................................................................xi

Introduction:

The “Meaning of Manila” in a “Vanished World” ......................... 1

Chapter One:


Chapter Two:

Globalizing “Huklandia”: Transnational Counterinsurgency Networks........................................................................90

Chapter Three:

“A Dirty, Half-Hidden War”: The CIA, the Freedom Company, and the Politics of Intra-Asian Aid........................................150

Chapter Four:

“The Experiment in Oriental Democracy”....................................199

Chapter Five:

A Free World that Prays Together, Stays Together: The Rosary Crusade in the Philippines and Global Networks of Catholic Anti-Communism........247
Conclusion:

“A Friendship Written in Blood for all the World to See” ........................297

Bibliography........................................................................................................306
List of Figures

2.1 Tagalog Anti-Communist Propaganda..................................................141
3.1 Freedom Company Pamphlet, 1955...............................................151
4.1 International Cooperation Administration, University Contracts.........222
4.2 Foreign Operations Administration Library,
Laoag City, Philippines.................................................................233
4.3 Public Administration Week Pamphlet.............................................244
5. 1 Family Rosary Crusade Rally, 1959...............................................250
5.2 The Atom Bomb or the Rosary........................................................271
5.3 Family Rosary Crusade slogan as drawn by a Philippine
teenager during 1959 Crusade.......................................................279
5.4 Handbook for Popular Mission Volunteers.....................................292
ABSTRACT

Bombs, Bureaucrats, and Rosary Beads:

The United States, the Philippines, and the Making of Global Anti-Communism,

1945-1960

By Colleen P. Woods

Chair: Penny M. Von Eschen

This dissertation examines how the Philippines became the primary postwar site for the development and dissemination of a transnational anti-communist politics. I examine how Philippine elites and their U.S. allies managed local struggles over land reform, armed insurgency, democratic governance, and religion between 1945 and 1960. During the late 1940s and 1950s, U.S. policymakers and Filipino elites developed what they conceived of as exportable models for postcolonial development. They designed projects across a range of social arenas, including military bases, universities, and churches, which were to be implemented in the Philippines and throughout the developing world. These globally charged discourses were formed against such local political movements as the Huk rebellion, which sought to challenge the political, economic, and cultural status quo of the colonial world order. My dissertation considers how these local political struggles, characterized by Filipino leaders and U.S policymakers as early sites of tension in a global Cold War, were transformed into laboratories for the development of a globally oriented anti-communist movement. Engaging multilingual sources, this
dissertation draws from state, military, personal papers, and civic institutional records in the Philippines and the United States. I highlight the ways that Americans and their Filipino allies continually crossed the political borders of the world throughout this era and brought with them an accumulated knowledge of their experiences in the Philippines. My approach is not strictly bound by national boundaries but instead follows actors and events as they traveled widely throughout the postwar period. This methodology, informed by recent trends in transnational and global history, allows me to focus on the ways in which ideas or movements flow through networks of historical actors. It also highlights the ways that the politicized geographic scales of the Cold War resulted, at moments, in contradictory U.S. foreign policy missions. This dissertation thus not only reveals the collaborative constructions of a transnational anti-communist politics, it highlights the deep fissures in postwar U.S. global power.
Introduction:

“The Meaning of Manila” in a “Vanished World”

On Tuesday February 6th, 1945 the words “Manila Falls” captured the front-page headline of the New York Times. Only a few days earlier, after weeks of artillery shelling, U.S. ground forces had entered Manila and commenced what would be the largest and costliest urban battle in the Pacific war. General Walter Krueger, commander of the Sixth Army in the Pacific and a veteran of the turn-of-the-century Philippine-American War that purged Philippine resistance to American colonial rule, landed his troops on the shores of Lingayan Gulf on January 9th 1945, the same shores that General Masharu Homma had guided the Japanese 14th Army through a mere three years earlier. Over the course of the next month, U.S. troops marched south through the provinces of Luzon.¹ Filipino guerillas that had spent three years fighting behind Japanese lines clandestinely furnished intelligence assistance to U.S. troops as they made their way through the heart of Central Luzon.² Streaming down from the Gulf of Lingayan, U.S. troops first liberated the rural provinces north of Manila, home to the Philippines’ “Rice Bowl” and several large sugar centrals, before converging in Manila with units of the Eighth U.S. Army that

¹ Throughout this dissertation I use U.S. and American interchangeably though I recognize America also functions as a hemispheric designation.
had landed on the Visayan Islands of Mindoro, south of Luzon. Over the next two months Japanese and American forces openly battled in the capital’s streets, razing Manila’s landscape and taking more than 100,000 Filipino civilian lives.\footnote{Stanley Sandler, World War II in the Pacific: An Encyclopedia (New York: Garland Pub., 2001).} Carlos Romulo, future Philippine ambassador to the United Nations and later the United States, likened his experience in the immediate aftermath of the Battle of Manila to “a ghost hunting his way in a vanished world.”\footnote{Carlos P. Romulo, I See the Philippines Rise, First edition. ed. (Garden City, N. Y,: Doubleday & company, inc., 1946).}

According to U.S. military and journalistic sources, the destruction of Manila came largely at the hands of Japanese troops that had not retreated with General Yamashita to the northern city of Baguio.\footnote{General Tomoyuki Yamashita, known as the Tiger of Malaya for his defeat of British forces in Singapore and Malaya, was the first Japanese military official to face an Allied military tribunal. Yamashita’s trial was marked by intense criticism, including that from U.S. Supreme Court Justice and former Governor General in the Philippines, Frank Murphy. Murphy questioned the procedures and considerable use of hearsay evidence in Yamashita’s trial. Yamashita was executed at Los Baños, a former internment camp of the Japanese Army on February 23rd 1946. The main issue during the trial was whether Yamashita maintained command over his troops that committed war crimes or not. The ruling in the Yamashita case set a precedent, known as the Yamashita Standard, for assigning criminal responsibility to military officials who failed to prevent war crimes perpetrated by troops under their command. Timothy P. Maga, Judgment at Tokyo: The Japanese War Crimes Trials (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2001). John W. Dower, Cultures of War: Pearl Harbor, Hiroshima, 9-11, Iraq, 1st ed. (New York: W.W. Norton : New Press, 2010).} Stranded without food or supplies, due to the successful Allied interruption of Japanese shipping into the islands, the Japanese troops that remained in Manila were left to dig into their positions and continue fighting.\footnote{An estimated 80 percent of Japanese supplies were kept out of the Philippines beginning in the summer of 1944. John Whitney Hall, The Cambridge History of Japan (Cambridge [Cambridgeshire] ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988).} The desperation of starving, abandoned troops, constant Allied artillery firing, and the unquestionable brutality of the war years collided horrifically in Manila. A February 5th, 1945 American news report claimed that Japanese troops “began a systematic destruction of installations that might prove useful to swiftly advancing Americans and Filipinos.”\footnote{“Liberation of Manila,” Washington Post, February 5th 1945.}
Within a month, the “systematic destruction” had turned into an “orgy of madness” and, according to the American press, “Japanese brutality became more frenzied.” After the month-long siege ended, over 16,000 Japanese troops and 1,000 American troops lay dead. In part due to the Battle of Manila, the Philippines emerged from the war with damages second only to Poland among the allied nations. Carlos Romulo’s “city of the tortured and the dead” also lay in physical ruin. In a macabre scene, bodies piled up alongside Manila’s wide, tree-lined boulevards as death literally clogged the city. In the aftermath of occupation and war, the city widely recognized as the “Pearl of the Orient” was reduced to a barely recognizable skeletal landscape.

One day prior to the New York Times’ front-page coverage of Manila’s liberation, the paper’s editors buried a short article titled, “Natives near Manila Fight Their Own War.” The article revealed a darker side to the Philippine liberation occurring in the country’s rural provinces. The article also exposed one of the ways that colonial era conflicts lived on in the aftermath of war. The news report, sent in from an associated press correspondent, described “an encounter between Malolos guerillas and Socialist Huk Bahalap [sic] guerillas.” Although the article’s unnamed author described the event simply as a “crack of gunfire between two Filipino factions,” what transpired in the

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historic Central Luzon town that lay less than 30 miles north of Manila exposed the deep class conflicts of the prewar era and the postwar origins of a long and violent anti-communist crusade in the islands.

At the outset of the Japanese occupation, a group of peasant activists formed the Huks, or *Hukbo ng Bayan laban sa Hapon* (People’s Anti-Japanese Army). Trekking through the city of Malolos, reportedly on their way to homes in the province of Pampanga, USAFFE guerillas, a separate anti-Japanese resistance group, stopped and surrounded over one hundred Huks, holding the Huks at gunpoint. Adonis Maclang, the USAFFE leader in Malolos, forced the Huks to dig their own graves and then ordered his men to execute the captured Huk army. Officers of the American Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) looked on as USAFFE guerillas mowed down the Huks in a blunt strike of extrajudicial violence.\(^{10}\)

Unlike the Huks, who had remained an independent guerilla army throughout the war, Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the U.S. Army’s Southwest Pacific Command Area (SWPA), incorporated the USAFFE guerillas of Malolos into the U.S Army command structure prior to liberation.\(^{11}\) Though the Huks were not integrated into the U.S. Army command structure, Huks assisted U.S. troops in the campaign to liberate the Philippines from Japanese occupation. For instance, a group of Huks, under commander Silvestre Liwang, fought alongside of U.S. forces in the liberation of Bataan and Western Pampanga during the fall of 1944. However, numerous Philippine and American military intelligence officers questioned the political loyalties and ambitions of


the guerilla group and submitted reports that the Huks were a “communistic,” “subversive,” and “radical organization.”  

In another CIC report, filed during February 1945, a U.S. intelligence officer claimed that the Huks were hindering “the entire area from returning to a normal way of life.”

For U.S. policymakers the return to “a normal way of life” in the Philippines meant reestablishing the political order of the Colonial and Commonwealth periods or, in other words, returning political power to a small group of Philippine political elites that maintained control of the state through highly regionalized family patronage networks.

In 1902, after U.S. troops had suppressed a sustained Philippine insurrection against American rule, the U.S. Congress passed “the Organic Act.” The Organic Act established the contours of civilian government in the islands, including the formation of the Philippine Assembly. Elite Filipinos and American colonial officials served in the Philippine Assembly, legislative body of the American colonial state. In 1916, Congress transferred greater governing power to Filipinos with the passage of the Jones Act, stipulating that only Filipinos could serve in the Philippine Assembly. Moreover, Filipinos, since the passage of the Organic Act, increasingly served in administration roles, or the daily operating procedures of the colonial state.

By 1930, Americans comprised only one percent of civil servant jobs in the Philippines.

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The Filipinization of the American colonial state did not, however, translate into greater political, economic, or social equality for the majority of Filipinos. In fact, Benedict Anderson, a scholar of Southeast Asian politics, argues that the American colonial period strengthened the political power of the Philippine oligarchies. As the American colonial state grew, so too did the number of national, provincial, and local political positions. According to Anderson, family members of the Philippines’ most powerful families delivered these new positions in the colonial state to other family members in order to ensure continued power of their “political fiefdoms” in their home provinces.16 The Japanese occupation undoubtedly disrupted the power of elite families as many fled from the country’s provinces to Manila, leaving behind a political vacuum once U.S. forces, or Huks, liberated villages from Japanese control. Though the Huks aided in the liberation of the Philippines, they also linked their ideas regarding Philippine independence to a strong resistance against the return of the prewar colonial order. For this reason, the Huks effectively stood in the way of U.S. officials’ and Philippine elites’ collaborative efforts to restore elite control of Central Luzon as well as the Philippine State.

Luis Taruc, a prewar Socialist Party organizer and Commander-in-Chief of the Huks during the war, strongly disputed accusations that the Huks sought to undermine the reestablishment of the Philippine Commonwealth state. On February 13th 1945, after the massacre at Malolos, Taruc sent a letter to General Douglas MacArthur and Sergio Osmeña, Philippine President-in-Exile.17 In the letter, Taruc wrote that the Huks

17 Sergio Osmeña was elected vice president of the Philippine Commonwealth in 1935. After the Japanese invasion of the Philippines in 1941, Quezon, Osmeña, and MacArthur fled the Philippines. After the death
“recognized the Philippine Commonwealth Government as the legal government of the Philippines” and argued that the attacks against the Huks, by “reactionary redbaiters,” had “no basis in fact.”\(^\text{18}\) Despite acknowledgement from at least one CIC officer that the Huks’ “political aims” were to “assure Philippine independence” and “preserve democracy” and that “there was no evidence that a real grasp of communistic doctrines goes very far,” within the spring of 1945, U.S. forces captured and imprisoned fourteen leaders of the Huks, including Luis Taruc.\(^\text{19}\)

The imprisonment of the Huks illustrates how competing visions of independence and class conflicts stemming from the American colonial period were compounded by the war’s interregnum. The U.S. Congress and Filipino elites had set the Philippine path to independence in motion with passage of the 1934 Tydings-McDuffie Act and the formation of the Philippine Commonwealth.\(^\text{20}\) However, large questions, complicated by WWII, remained over the actual shape that independence would take in the postwar Philippines. Colonial legacies—political, economic, and social—remained ingrained in the transnational fabric of Philippine-American history. These legacies, many of which revealed deep fissures between American colonial ideology and its enactment in the

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\(^\text{18}\) In his letter to Osmeña and MacArthur cited above, Luis Taruc raises questions over the status of the individuals massacred a Malolos writing that “even civilians suspected of coming from or going to Huk territory are manhandled and murdered especially in Malolos.” Within one year U.S. forces would dispense 5,000 extra tommy-guns to capture Huks. Luis Taruc, “Memorandum to Gen. MacArthur and Pres. Osmeña,” Record Group 110, Box 2, Folder 2, “Office of the Special Assistant to the Hugh Commissioner, Frederic Worcester Papers, MacArthur Memorial Library.


Philippines, continued to animate debates and political struggles over the first fifteen years of the postcolonial relationship.\(^{21}\)

My dissertation examines the transition to independence in the Philippines; demonstrating that even as the global proliferation of decolonization struggles signaled the end of the international system of imperialism, Americans and colonial elites fought to keep the power relations of the colonial state intact; this history of the reformulation and reassertion of a transnational colonial class uncovers the global origins and the materiality of anti-communist politics—lending insights into the roots of the lingering and extreme inequality that exists between and within nations in the contemporary world. In this project, the Philippines is not simply a case study for understanding U.S. global power, but a specific site in which transnational actors first created anti-communist strategies and institutions to intervene in the complex politics of decolonization and Third World development. By reframing local struggles through the lens of an international crisis, actors in these varied projects successfully linked a global anti-communist movement to ideas about legitimate postcolonial state development.

The core arguments of this dissertation focus on three central factors: the transformation of colonial power in the Philippines, the assimilation of anti-communism into on-the-ground postcolonial politics and institutions, and, finally, the ways that this new political language of global anti-communism was mobilized through the networks of

\(^{21}\) I use the term “postcolonial” throughout this dissertation as a temporal designation that marks the end of formal western colonialism beginning in 1945. Importantly I use the word as both a concrete referent—such as postcolonial elites—but also as a description of the kind of future that policymakers and colonial elites imagined for the decolonizing world—or what Arif Dirlik has argued is a description for a “a global condition.” Though I do not use the term to refer to the body of scholarship known as postcolonial criticism, I acknowledge and accept the critique of euro-centrism that this group of scholars attaches to the word “postcolonial.” Arif Dirlik, "The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in Age Global Capitalism," *Critical Inquiry* 20, no. 2 (1994). On the euro-centrism of postcolonial histories see: Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*, Princeton Studies in Culture/Power/History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000).
American power. I examine how five distinct networks of Filipinos and Americans: diplomats, counterinsurgency experts, intelligence agents, university professors and administrators, and missionaries from the Rosary Crusade, a global oriented Catholic organization, intervened in local politics in the Philippines, produced a broad range of knowledge about the terms of the Cold War struggle, and then disseminated this language, born out of their experience in the Philippines, to locations around the globe.

Americans had argued throughout the 20th century that their mission in the Philippines was a benevolent one—intent on training Filipinos in the rigors of American styled democracy so that Filipinos could, one day, govern themselves.22 In an article titled “the Meaning of Manila,” one American journalist argued in a February, 1945 Washington Post article, that the liberation of Manila meant “the beginning of a new era as well as the end of a long night of enemy occupation—an era in which the Filipinos will have a great opportunity to demonstrate the fruits of democracy and freedom in the Far East.”23 Journalists and policymakers combined their celebrations of the liberation of the Philippines from the Japanese with a discourse that affirmed the ideological terms of benevolence and tutelage that characterized the American colonial project in the Philippines.

The American and Philippine colonial elite belief that the Philippines, as an independent nation, manifested the vision of a just and democratic postcolonial world order emerged triumphantly in the days after liberation. As the Washington Post

22 Julian Go argues that tutelary colonialism in the Philippines was derived from a combination of newer European models of colonialism that focused on “racial uplift,” the U.S. Progressive movement’s focus on social engineering, and the strive to create the conditions of local legitimacy in the islands. Julian Go, American Empire and the Politics of Meaning: Elite Political Cultures in the Philippines and Puerto Rico during U.S. Colonialism, Politics, History, and Culture (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008).

journalist expressed in the “Meaning of Manila” article, American colonization of the Philippines positioned Filipinos at the forefront of “democracy and freedom in the Far East.” Thus, the American journalist erased the violent history of American colonialism in the Philippines while simultaneously ignoring contemporaneous conflicts over the restoration of the colonial order. Once colonialism formally ended in 1946, American policymakers and Philippine elites sought to recast the colonial experience as a successful example of American intervention, while concurrently reframing the peasant uprising in Central Luzon as an early contest between the “Free World” and international Communism.

In fact, in the days following liberation, Americans and colonial elites produced a complex discourse of colonial nostalgia that, in an attempt to build consent for the return of the colonial order, suppressed progressive prewar political struggles and the anti-imperialist sentiments upon which these efforts drew. Indeed, an American and a Philippine elite’s vocal nostalgia for the past obscured the colonial lineages of postwar provincial violence in the Philippines. In this way, American and Philippine policymakers collaborative visions of the post-war Philippines combined this potent nostalgia for the American colonial past with the specter of global communism to distort the politics of the ongoing peasant rebellion. This act of memorializing the benevolent tutelage of the American colonial project in the Philippines both misrepresented the past and initiated a forward-looking discourse that repositioned the social and political struggles of prewar peasants into the field of global communism. Americans, both in the Philippines and in Washington, and colonial elites mobilized a discourse of colonial nostalgia to support a continued anti-communist project in the islands that sought to
further repress and contain leftist visions of democracy in a post-independence Philippines.

In the Philippines the promises of democracy, and the projection of the Philippines as a “showcase of democracy” was tested in nearly every arena of postwar, postcolonial society. Both policymakers and the U.S. press corps used similar language to describe postwar politics, and in so doing, they belied, rather than clarified the international dynamics that shaped postwar Philippine politics. Thus, the oft-repeated language of the “fruits of democracy” in the Philippines was a transnational projection of an idealized vision of politics rather than an assessment of the social-political atmosphere in the islands. In making such claims, American policymakers further projected an image of the U.S. as a benevolent force in the world, intent merely on supporting the will of the world’s peoples—yet willing to enforce this will through military force.

During the American colonial period, U.S. policymakers empowered political elite class in the Philippines to manage the quotidian responsibilities of the state. 24 Faced with the reorganization of the global political economy due to WWII, the rise of the Cold War, and the demise of European imperialism, U.S. policymakers reempowered the same class of Philippine elites in the postwar era. The Philippine political elite did not always work in concert with American policymakers; the five transnational networks studied in this dissertation reveal the fissures and contradictions in Cold War U.S. global power. However, this dissertation reveals how a group of Philippine elites, alongside their U.S. allies mobilized U.S. aid, as well an emerging global anti-communist language, against

24 Julian Go defines the Philippine political elite as “the wealthiest, most educated, and most politically powerful of local society.” In the Philippines there was great continuity between political elite controls from the Spanish colonial period through the American period. Go, American Empire and the Politics of Meaning: Elite Political Cultures in the Philippines and Puerto Rico during U.S. Colonialism.
the progressive politics of peasants, labor unions, and leftist intellectuals. In effect, U.S.
policymakers and Philippine elites worked collaboratively to restore the unequal political
and social order of the colonial era.

Throughout this dissertation, I demonstrate how, in order to retain power derived
from the colonial period, Filipino elites and their American allies transformed political
struggles in the post-independence Philippines into laboratories for the development of a
globally oriented anti-communist movement. I show that a varied range of policymakers,
from military officials to college professors and religious officials, managed local
struggles over state violence, land reform, armed insurgency, democratic governance, and
religion between 1945 and 1960. Through their engagements in on-the-ground politics,
U.S. foreign policy actors and Filipino elites constructed what they conceived of as
exportable models of post-colonial development. Though many of the postwar political
struggles in the Philippines stemmed from the colonial period, they were increasingly
characterized by Philippine elites and U.S. policymakers as early sites of tension in a
global Cold War.

This dissertation argues that the shift to a global framing was not merely an
ideological one. Indeed, reinterpreting local struggles as part of the Cold War led to an
increase of U.S. aid and military support. For example, the Philippine State and U.S.
military officials connected peasant activists in the Philippines to a theoretical global
communist movement in order to oversimplify and dilute the specificities of their local
grievances. Furthermore, by referencing the global scale, Philippine politicians were able
to make a case about the potential threats of Philippine peasants to the international order,
legitimating the disproportionate influence of U.S. foreign aid on politics in the newly independent nation.

Interrogating the production of Cold War geographic scales, or the process of constructing spatial difference in a postwar world, is fundamental to my study. I argue that the use of geographic scales, and particularly the global scale, represented a site of intense political struggle. For historians, the Cold War is most often understood as a temporal designation, an era that stemmed from 1947 to 1989. In addition to periodization, scholars have recently emphasized the global dimensions of the Cold War. I argue that by reframing local struggles through the lens of an international crisis, specifically the threat of a global communist movement, U.S. policymakers and their Filipino allies were able to frame national struggles as global struggles. Indeed, U.S. policymakers’ believed that U.S. policies in the Philippines were essential to global politics and colonial and decolonizing nations in particular. For instance, Michael J. Deutch, a member of a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and U.S. military team that traveled to the Philippines in 1951 and then onto Vietnam in the 1960s, argued in 1957 “we cannot fail in our assistance to the Philippines without endangering our entire effort in the Afro-Asian block.” For Deutch, and the American Council of Foreign Relations, an influential American foreign policy think-tank formed in 1921, U.S. foreign policy

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27 According to his obituary Michael J. Deutch “fled Lenin’s Russia and Hitler’s Europe” before becoming Deputy Director of the War Production board for the U.S. government during WWII. Deutch, who held degrees in electrical and mechanical engineering as well as a doctorate in Economics, is also credited with helping to develop a method to produce synthetic rubber from petroleum. Tim Weiner, “Michael Deutch, 88, Co-inventor of Method for Synthetic Rubber,” February 22, 1986, New York Times.
28 Michael J. Deutch, “Memorandum for George E. Taylor,” October 31st, 1957, Myron Cowen Papers, General Correspondence, Box 16, Truman Library.
towards the Philippines was never simply about the relationship between the nations.\textsuperscript{29} The connection to the Philippines was, in fact, projected into the global arena by both U.S. policymakers and Philippine elites as a testament to the potential of U.S. intervention in colonial and postcolonial societies. In other words, policymaker’s anxiety that the Philippines could be viewed as a failure of U.S. aid and foreign policies, suggested that the relationship to the Philippines could determine decolonizing nation’s receptivity to U.S. policies and interventions.

Throughout this dissertation, I show how U.S. policymakers’ and Philippine elites’ anticommmunist ideologies were deeply intertwined with a vision of global postcoloniality rooted in the need for sovereign states to provide the political and legal infrastructure for globally linked markets. Because American policymakers saw the postwar Philippines as a potential model for future engagements with decolonizing countries, they, alongside the U.S. military and U.S. diplomats in Southeast Asia, worked very hard to sustain elite control of the Philippines. In this way, the “global” Cold War was also a “local” war over domestic relations of power. In the Philippines, political actors referenced the global scale so that domestic inequalities of the colonial world could justifiably continue to exist in postcolonial spaces.

George E. Taylor, a scholar of Chinese Studies, wartime director of the Office of War Information in the State Department, and critic of Chinese Communism, wrote a 1958 study for the Council on Foreign Relations that emphasized the connection between

\textsuperscript{29} In his study of American geographer Isaiah Bowman, cofounder of the Council of Foreign Relations, Neil Smith argues that Bowman saw the post WWI years as ones in which territorial expansion could no longer support the economic growth needed by the American capitalist system. Bowman co-founded the CFR in order to push the U.S. government to incorporate an activist foreign policy in order to meet the demands of economic expansion. Neil Smith, \textit{American Empire: Roosevelt's Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization}, California Studies in Critical Human Geography (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); ibid.
postcolonial statehood, the Philippines, and anti-communism. Taylor wrote, “we should see the problem of U.S. relations with the Philippines first, as a new phase in the relations between Asian colonies and Western Powers [and] second as a test case in the achievement of our long range objectives towards Asian peoples and under-developed areas.”

According to Taylor, in 1958, communism in the Philippines posed less of a threat than it did in the immediate postwar period. However, U.S. policymakers continued to cultivate and encourage a brand of Philippine nationalism steeped in anti-communist politics.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the construction of the Cold War as a global conflict, and problem for the imagined international community known as “the Free World,” made possible the dissemination of anti-communist politics through old and new transnational networks of American power. As mentioned above, the global scale of local political struggles in the Philippines facilitated and legitimated the presence of a diverse group of American interests in the islands. This motley assemblage of American CIA, military, and religious officials along with college professors and writers, did not necessarily agree about their projects or even like each other. Yet, all interpreted their experiences in the Philippines largely through the lens of a global Cold War. This global framing, for example, led counterinsurgency experts, both Filipino and American, to believe that they could transfer their experience in training the Armed Forces of the Philippines in counterinsurgent strategies to other locations around the world. I show how the efforts of the transnational networks that I trace throughout this dissertation, encompassed sites across the globe including: Colombia, Guatemala, Venezuela, Laos,

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30 George E. Taylor “America and the Philippine: Asset or Liability?” Council on Foreign Relations, Myron Cowen Papers, Box 16, General Correspondence, Truman Library.
Indonesia, Pakistan, Vietnam, Taiwan, Japan, and Korea in order to impart the “lessons” learned in the Philippines.

Even after the Huk rebellion, which peaked in the early 1950s, dwindled under the brutal repression of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the islands continued to be a primary site for the construction of global anti-communist politics. Maintaining a hegemonic anti-communist politics from the mid-1940s through the 1960s in the Philippines was, in part, based upon a U.S. fear that Philippine politicians would “resent the loss of what they consider their right, a preferred position” in relation to U.S. foreign aid, while U.S. foreign policymakers turned greater attention, and foreign aid, to “enemies or ex-communist countries.”

By the early 1960s, fifteen years into independence, when the insolubility of the Philippine economy had eclipsed the promises of postwar prosperity, the Philippine political elite continued to face critiques of disproportionate U.S. influence in the islands. Perhaps nothing symbolized the crass utility of the Philippines in U.S. foreign policy schematics for the Philippine public better than the presence of the world’s two largest overseas U.S. military bases, Clark Air Force Base and the U.S. Naval Base at Subic Bay. Yet, despite pressure from a broader Philippine population, a political elite continued to claim, as President Carlos P. Garcia did in 1960 that, “our soil will always

be available to the free world’s forces.” Even more, Garcia advocated for a greater role for Filipinos in U.S. global ambitious, “we can prove to the millions of our fellow Asians that they, too, can have a good life as free men.”34 It was in part these kind of sentiments espoused by the Philippine political elite, that led men like George Taylor, to argue before the Council of Foreign Relations that “the Philippines is a very important testing ground for American policies in Asia.”35 Ultimately, this dissertation shows how global anti-communism developed through transnational networks of actors who were engaged in locally based struggles in colonial and postcolonial spaces. These understudied circuits U.S. foreign policy and networks of global anti-communist actors that emerged in and through postcolonial power struggles in the Philippines illustrate how a wide range of American and Filipino individuals and institutions organized their political ambitions and ideologies on a global scale.

**The Cold War, Anti-Communism, and Decolonization**

Accounting for the ways that the Cold War infiltrated and internationalized Philippine’ politics in the years following independence demands tracing the deep structures of violence and power that arose at the intersection of imperial histories, decolonization, and the rise of U.S. global power.36 For scholars of history, the study of the Cold War remains a rich, yet deeply contentious field of study, particularly amongst historians interested in the international, rather than domestic implications of the half-

35 George E. Taylor “America and the Philippine: Asset or Liability?” Council on Foreign Relations, Myron Cowen Papers, Box 16, General Correspondence, Truman Library.
36 Greg Grandin argues that in order to understand the “cataclysmic violence” that defined the Cold War in Latin America one must understand how everyday life was “politicized and internationalized.” G. M. Joseph and Daniela Spenser, *In From the Cold: Latin America’s New Encounter with the Cold War*, American Encounters/Global Interactions (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008).
century struggle.\textsuperscript{37} This project intervenes in literatures on the Cold War, decolonization, and post-WWII international history by illustrating how U.S. policymakers and a Philippine political elite developed an anti-communist politics and then circulated their interpretations of the contemporary world through global networks. I contend that global anti-communist politics, based upon a hegemonic definition of the Cold War as an ideological struggle between capitalism and communism, masked attempts by U.S. policymakers and postcolonial elites to restore the political and social order of the colonial world in the new international governance order of the postwar world.\textsuperscript{38} This is not to suggest that the Cold War was a fictive historical event or creation, nor does it imply that policymakers’ understanding of the post-1945 world was consistently coherent.\textsuperscript{39} Instead, I argue that paying attention to how American policymakers and colonial elites used an anti-communist discourse to transform local political struggles in recently decolonized nations into fronts in a global war against communism complicates the dominant narrative of early Cold War historiography.

Two distinct schools of thought, termed New Left and Post-Revisionism, greatly shape histories of U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War. New Left historians asserted that U.S. foreign policy was primarily defined by market expansion, or the search for new


\textsuperscript{39} Anders Stephanson argues that the Cold War was a political project of the United States established largely by 1941 and FDR’s political logic. Stephanson also argues that “there is no final and pristine Cold War in the archives” indicating that a decisive attempts to understand the Cold War will always expand “the picture.” Simon Dalby and Gerard Toal, \textit{Rethinking geopolitics} (London ; New York: Routledge, 1998).
markets. The highly influential post-revisionist scholarship, championed by John Gaddis, recast the New Left’s centering of economic policy through interpretations that relied upon the categories used primarily in international relations and international security studies. For example, post-revisionists interpret American postwar policies in Europe, such as the Marshall Plan, and the formative years of the Cold War, as the territory of geopolitics and balances of power, not market expansion. For example, in *America’s Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity*, a recent history of U.S. Cold War history, Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall periodize the early Cold War from 1945 to 1949-1950. Drawing from the post-revisionist treatments of the early Cold War period, Craig and Logevall argue that the conflict with the U.S.S.R resulted from an unavoidable confrontation over geopolitics, primarily over the struggles in postwar Europe.40 While the authors turn their focus on U.S. domestic politics for much of the book, their readings on the formative years of the Cold War represent a return to a post-revisionist, largely state-centered, understanding of the period. In similar ways, much of early Cold War historiography, including Melvyn’s Leffler’s influential *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* and even the newly released and mammoth, *Cambridge History of the Cold War* by Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, interprets the Cold War largely through the emergence of an ideological conflict

between the U.S. and U.S.S.R.\textsuperscript{41} Problematically, studies focused on United States’ international Cold War politics, such as those mentioned above, have often assumed the same analytical assumptions and categories, such as state power and grand strategy, held by the historical actors they study.

On the other hand, in response to the “triumphant realism” of post-revisionist scholarship, another set of scholars of the Cold War including: Christian Appy, Mark Philip Bradley, Jonathan Nashel, Penny von Eschen, and Christina Klein have drawn upon the methods of cultural studies to show how the Cold War was also a struggle over discourse, or “a struggle for the word.”\textsuperscript{42} Connecting domestic political culture and the foreign policy of the United States, these scholars, have shown that terms such as the “Cold War” and “containment” are creations of particular historical contexts and expressive of relations of power.\textsuperscript{43} No less attuned to the politics of power than more traditional diplomatic historians this set of scholars have demonstrated the transnational dynamics of Cold War politics and the ways that power flowed through discursive formations, such as language and everyday practices, in addition to state policies.\textsuperscript{44} For


\textsuperscript{42}Historians, such as Melvin Leffler have argued that studies influenced by cultural theory or discourse analysis have worked to distract scholars away from the hierarchy of “causal factors” in the study of history.


example, Christina Klein’s work on the production of cultural knowledge regarding Asia and its relation to Cold War American identity and collective security, illustrates how Americans imagined themselves as “protectors of Asia” in order to deny that United States’ global interventionist policies derived from imperialist ambitions. In fact, the policies and projects directed at countries, such as the Philippines, that were considered “secure allies” of the United States were often conducted through a language of mutuality, management, technical assistance, nurturing, and human welfare.

Scholars employing cultural studies methods have successfully utilized analytical categories of race and gender to illustrate the multiplicity of dynamics embodied in postwar U.S. foreign policies. Yet, at the same time these studies often fail to look closely enough to understand how U.S. policies were accepted, contested, and even reshaped in various locations around the world. In this way, culturally informed historical studies often miss the deep and material structures of violence, including the intersection of capitalist expansion and cold war militarization that characterized the cold war period for most of the globe, and particularly the decolonizing world.

Systematic treatments of the Cold War often consider the intersection of decolonization and the Cold War as a political movement that fueled and prolonged the bipolar Cold War conflict. The U.S., in this literature, is seen as intervening in

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decolonizing countries in order to grow market economies, ensure political stability, promote democracy, and weaken the appeal of leftist ideologies.48 A wealth of historical studies on international development, including works by Michael Latham, Nils Gilman, and David Engerman, consider the ideological race between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to “modernize” the world. With the exception of Bradley Simpson’s *Economist with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S-Indonesian Relations, 1960-1968*, these studies privilege the intellectual formations, culture, and practices of modernization theory at the expense of understanding the grounded enactments of development policy, including the friction between local development and a global anti-communism.49 Examining the groundwork of the multifaceted arms of U.S. global power in the newly independent and decolonizing world brings to light the complexity of postwar American hegemony.50 U.S. foreign policies in the early Cold War era were not simply about containing communism, either through force or through foreign aid. Rather, this dissertation seeks to highlight how transnational networks of political actors mobilized anti-communist discourses in

order to expand a U.S. driven liberal, capitalist international order in the decolonizing world.  

While the Cold War and decolonization are undoubtedly interrelated temporally and numerous studies of their intersection have complicated understandings of the Cold War and 20th century international history, many histories also take for granted the connection of the Cold War and decolonization.  

Assuming an inherent link between local struggles of decolonization and “global realities” of the Cold War, much of the scholarship on the U.S., the Cold War, and decolonization has either interpreted U.S. policies through the lens of national security or economic interests. In this vein, scholars have focused heavily on how global conflicts are reflected in local contexts. In both these schools of thought, anticommunism is either considered as an ideological weapon used to forward U.S. market expansion, through force or through development policies, or, as in the revisionist school, anti-communism is understood as a particular worldview that took seriously the threats posed by the U.S.S.R. However, interpreting U.S. intervention or polices towards colonial and postcolonial nations solely through the

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51 This point is not an argument that the political discourse of the Cold War was not highly motivated by ideas about containment. However, many Cold War scholars such as Thomas Borstelman don’t critically engaging in the language of containment as an ideology. This approach runs a risk of making the actual practices of ‘containment’ seem benign and that it renders the Cold War simply into struggle of competing ideologies. To critically engage the ideology of containment would involve investigating the ways in which the language of containment worked in conjunction with the expansion of US interests globally. In other words containment might have been in ideology about limiting the spread of communism, but in practice it also included actively undermining communist, leftists, or reformists independent movements in order to secure US political and economic gain. Thomas Borstelman, The Cold War and The Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001).

52 Prasenjit Duara argues that the Cold War was a period of “new imperialism” in which anti-imperialist ambitions of the post WWI years were contained through limited sovereignty of the nation-state system or as he states, “nationalism and national rights formed the common framework through which imperialist sought to exercise domination.” Understanding the relationship between the Cold War and decolonization requires tracing a longer history of the relationship between imperialism and nationalism. Prasenjit Duara, "The Cold War as a Historical Period: An Interpretive Essay," Journal of Global History 6(2011).

53 For an example see a collection of essays on this topic: Jeffrey A. Engel, Local Consequences of the Global Cold War, Cold War International History Project Series (Washington, D.C. Stanford, Calif.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press ; Stanford University Press, 2007).
lenses of political economy or strategic considerations overlooks a longer history of the collaborative construction of anti-communism in the Philippines and Southeast Asia.54

The intersection of the Cold War and decolonization is also often framed as a struggle between superpowers, in which newly independent states are seen as trapped in an ideological rivalry between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Forced to choose between capitalist and communist developmental models and differing visions of the global political economy, decolonizing or Third World states are cast as pawns of the superpowers, which seek only to collect nations in a race to secure continued access to the world’s most vital resources.55 In this way, anti-communism is often considered a Cold War ideological export of U.S. policymakers.56 While this literature rightly uncovers the ways in which the anti-communist rhetoric of the Cold War prolonged the conflicts of decolonization, it obscures the ways that anti-communist politics intersected with a transnational class of westerners and colonial elites that sought to restore colonial relations of power in a newly organized global political system represented by the United Nations.

54 Similar to the studies I’ve already cited above, scholars of the intersection of the Cold War and the Third World often treat the Cold War as if it is a living entity onto itself, like a natural phenomenon. For instance, historian Melvyn Leffler writes that the “Cold War engulfed the Third World” Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992).
56 This is not to suggest that U.S. policymakers did not export anti-communism, only that historians have failed to consider the transnational, pre-Cold War, construction of anti-communist politics. Margaret Power, "The Engendering of Anticommunism and Fear in Chile's 1964 Presidential Election," *Diplomatic History* 32, no. 5 (2008).
Some of the most fruitful explanations of the intersection between the Cold War and U.S. engagement in decolonization movements examine the period through the lens of global racial politics. These studies primarily highlight the central role of U.S. racial politics, both domestic and international, in U.S. foreign policies. Studies on global racial politics are particularly clear on the connections between colonial racial orders and a reorientation of the Cold War along a North-South axis, complicating the hegemonic narrative of the Cold War as an East-West ideological battle. At the same time, the racial politics of the American colonial project, and the comparative manner in which U.S. policymakers and Philippine political elites measure the politics of American colonialism against other forms of western colonialisms, remains understudied.

My transnational reading of the Cold War draws upon recent work by Prasenjit Duara, who argues that nation-states served as containers of anti-imperialist ambitions during the Cold War. As Frederic Cooper and Jane Burbank similarly argue, by the outset of the 1950s, nation-states represented the only accepted political form through which anti-colonialists could imagine terminating colonial rule. The fiction, sustained by the United Nations and undoubtedly promoted by the United States, of sovereignty and equivalence under international law factored largely in the intersection of the Cold War and decolonization. Challenging studies that focus solely on the geopolitical interactions


between nations, rather than the transnational collaborations between political actors from different nations, I argue these studies have obscured the ways that colonial elites formulated a politics of anti-communism in order to implement the projects of a global capitalist class with which they identified. Yet, while postcolonial elites and American policymakers argued that Philippine communism was a part of a global communist threat, I also show how this political construction of anti-communism was flexible enough to be deployed on different geographic scales, from the global and national, to the local.

Anti-communism was not simply a worldview of American policymakers. It was also a constructive political project designed to undermine a range of political positions across the globe. Here, my argument breaks from understandings that interpret American anti-communism abroad as a “misreading” of foreign cultures or an “overreaction” to foreign political movements. The complex relationship with emerging postcolonial states highlights how an American driven international order, based on expanding capitalist markets and liberalized trade, spread in the early Cold War period. Indeed, the U.S. postwar relationship to the Philippines is not solely explainable through a narrative of bipolar Cold War geopolitics, in which the United States and the Soviet Union are understood as “scrambling” for Third World allegiances. I argue this view, that privileges the ideological contests between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R, runs the risk of casting intervention in the Third World as a geopolitical necessity. When intervention in the Third World is cast as a geopolitical necessity the result is a furthering subsuming of the dynamics of local specificities under the broader frame of a global struggle against

59 In We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History, John Gaddis essentially excuses the violent enactment of the Cold War in the Third World by arguing that policymakers could not possibly have known that their anticommunist anxieties projected conflicts onto the third world, or as he simply states, “nightmares always seem real at the time.” Gaddis, We now Know: Rethinking Cold War History.
By tracing multiple networks of U.S. policymakers and colonial elites, I show how these various groups formulated a politics of global anti-communism in order to capture and contain the alternative forms of political, economic, and social organization imagined by a diverse range of non-elite political actors.

Chapter Outlines

In my opening chapter, “The American Arsenal of Freedom: State Violence, Security, and the International Order,” I uncover the ways that conceptions of global security emerged out of a civil war between the Philippine military and the Huks, a communist-inspired peasant movement. This chapter demonstrates how this new articulation of “global security,” formulated by Filipino elites and American policymakers, was deployed in an effort to assert that Philippine independence could effectively coincide with American political, economic, and military intervention. Furthermore, because American and Filipino policymakers promoted the Philippine state as a model for postcolonial transitions, I show how by the early 1950s, the acceptability of state violence became linked to a transnational vision for a liberal, capitalist system of postcolonial states.

The second chapter, “Globalizing Huklandia: Transnational Counterinsurgency Networks” explores a group of American and Filipino counterinsurgency experts that mobilized anti-communist politics with the aim of eradicating the political visions of the Huk movement in the Philippines. This mobilization resulted in an increased

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60 David Engerman and Corrine Unger argue in a recent historiographical article argue that critics of modernization theory, in particular, have argued that politics of development during the Cold War were, “at best plays for geopolitical loyalty” or attempts to secure “unfettered access to [the third world’s] natural resources.” Unger, “Introduction: Towards a Global History of Modernization."
militarization of Philippine society through the millions of dollars of U.S. military aid that flowed into the country, a multi-year counterinsurgency campaign, and the criminalization of the political philosophies of the Huk movement. This chapter demonstrates a distinct way that the Cold War, largely understood as a global conflict, is best understood through the intersections of myriad fragments of local histories and its undoubtedly global ambitions, reach, and ramifications. Following the network of CIA agent Edward Lansdale and his transnational counterinsurgency cohort demonstrates how global politics infiltrated local conflicts and then how anticommunist actors, motivated by global ambitions, re-translated local politics back into the global dimensions. The transformation of the Huks, from a local movement to a front in a global Cold War, and the extraction and packaging of “lessons” into a universally applicable case of successful anti-communist warfare illustrates how this dynamic functioned in the Philippines.

In the third chapter, “A Dirty, Half-Hidden War: The CIA, The Freedom Company and the Politics of Intra-Asian Aid,” I show how a CIA formed Philippine paramilitary organization moved through military circuits throughout Southeast Asia during the 1950s and 60s. The Freedom Company was established through an alliance of Filipino veterans and U.S. officials in 1954 in order to provide technical support and paramilitary services to anti-communist forces in in Vietnam, Laos, and Indonesia. I argue that the Freedom Company was utilized to distance contemporary U.S. interventions in Southeast Asia from a history of Western imperialism. This formulation was rooted in the belief, disseminated by a Philippine elite and American policymakers, that the American colonial project had been legitimate, while European imperial practices had failed to properly develop Asian societies. This articulation, in which American men and women
imparted “modern political knowledge” onto Philippine peoples, was part of the Freedom Company’s mission to promote anti-communist Filipinos as the most “politically modern” Asians, equipped to “export democracy” throughout the region.

In the final two chapters, I turn from the nexus of militaries, intelligence agencies, and diplomats, towards considerations of academic institutions, development politics, and religious movements. In the fourth chapter, “The Experiment in Oriental Democracy: American Universities in the Philippines and the Scales of Development,” I expose tensions between global anti-communism and local development politics by showing how technocratic solutions ran counter to imperatives of U.S. global power. I look at the University of Michigan’s role in the establishment of the School of Public Administration at the University of the Philippines, one of the first U.S. government sponsored university projects of the postwar era. By the mid-1950s thirty-two institutions of higher education in the United States had established international programs in governance and public policy located in recently independent or decolonizing nations in the global south. American professors built the anti-communist politics of local struggles in the Philippines into the School of Public Administration’ curriculum, which they shared with other American universities that were establishing their own governance schools in Brazil, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Taiwan. Yet, despite this successful global dissemination of their ideas, I also illustrate how American and Philippine technocrats’ proposed solutions often clashed with the policies of state and military officials. Specifically, I argue that the School of Public Administrations’ attempts to rectify corruption and elite control of the Philippine state eventually collapsed under the weight of global anti-communist imperatives that demanded that American policymakers continue to cultivate
relationships with the same elite class technocrats identified as the source of the
government’s problems.

The final chapter, “The Free-World that Prays Together Stays Together: The
Family Rosary Crusade and Global Networks of Anti-Communist Catholicism,” reveals
the understudied links between global Catholic networks, anti-communism, and U.S
foreign policy. When Father Patrick Peyton, founder of the American Family Rosary
Crusade visited the Philippines three times during the 1950s, he regularly attracted
crowds of over one million devotees. In this chapter, I examine how the 1959 Rosary
Crusade in the Philippines led to the creation of the organizations first international
office. A transnational group of Rosary Crusade employees and volunteers imagined that
the Philippine office would serve as hub of a transnational network in Asia and an
organizational model for other locales. Hoping to expand upon the dramatic success of
the Rosary Crusade internationally, the CIA funded Peyton’s religious missions across
Latin American during the early to mid 1960s. This chapter shows how the institutional
network, organizing capabilities, and anti-communist message of the Family Rosary
movement brought the organization into webs of U.S. state and economic power.

By examining the projects of five distinct, yet overlapping, networks of American
and Philippine foreign policy, my dissertation highlights the multifaceted attempts of a
transnational group of actors to construct a global anti-communist movement. Several
studies of Cold War U.S. engagement with decolonization are helpful in discerning the
larger structures of postwar U.S. political and economic power.61 However, like many

61 Mark Berger, "Decolonisation, Modernisation and Nation-Building: Political Development Theory and
the Appeal of Communism in Southeast Asia, 1945–1975," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 34, no. 3
(2003); Mark T. Berger, The Battle for Asia: From Decolonization to Globalization (New York ; London:
RoutledgeCurzon, 2004); Nick Cullather, Managing Nationalism: United States National Security Council
studies of postwar U.S. global power these studies render hegemony abstractly—as a force that flows relatively unobstructed from Washington to Manila or other points around the globe. Focusing on different networks, that at moments worked collaboratively and at other moments sought contradictory political ends, I am able to show the deep tensions and points of friction in the U.S. driven project of expanding, and legitimating, a liberal capitalist international order. Tracing global networks also foregrounds the dynamic political “work” it took for anti-communist actors to formulate and maintain a hegemonic bloc that legitimated the exclusion of communist or leftist political alternatives. Additionally, by following transnational groups of anti-communist actors, I center the global class politics—or as one scholar as termed it “the international civil war”—at the intersection between the Cold War, U.S. global power, and decolonization. Although anti-communism remains a defining feature of Cold War history, in revealing the grounded formation and enactment of an anti-communist global ideology, this dissertation strives to make clear the materiality, and in most cases, the penetrating and lasting violence of Cold War anti-communist politics.

Chapter One:

In late February of 1951, nearly five and a half years after Japan officially surrendered on the U.S. Battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay, the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA) of the Republic of the Philippines issued an ominous reminder that the Second World War had forever changed the economy of violence in the island nation. The sixteen-page document titled, “Smuggling in the Philippines,” detailed the regional network of arms and U.S. dollars smuggling that had parasitically ground alongside the seemingly chaotic demobilization and disbursement of WWII “surplus and excess property.”\(^1\) Yet, the document, like thousands of others, sanitized the material realities of armed conflict, distorting the magnitude of war materials and human labor that had accompanied each nation’s war machines. In the years after the war, weaponry simply referred to as “excess property” or “loose firearms” fueled countless conflicts in multiple nations.

Prior to the Japanese invasion, nearly 80,000 U.S troops, comprised of 20,000 troops from the U.S. along with 60,000 Filipino soldiers, constituted the U.S. Army in the Philippines Commonwealth. The Japanese invasion of the Philippines, a mere twelve hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor, plunged the islands into war. During the height of

\(^1\) “Smuggling in the Philippines,” Republic of the Philippines, Office of the President, National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, Quirino Presidential Papers, Ayala Museum.
the Japanese occupation, nearly 650,000 Japanese soldiers were stationed in the islands. By the autumn of 1945, 379,000 U.S military personnel and an additional 199,000 U.S. civilians were stationed on Philippine soil. The sheer scale of the fighting in the Philippines during the Second World War resulted in the destruction of the islands’ industries, infrastructure, and hundreds of thousands of human lives.

Yet, the war did not simply raze the physical structures and natural environment of the Philippines, it also brought millions of dollars of worth armaments and non-combat supplies to the islands. In effect, at war’s end, the guns, non-perishable rations, clothes, boots, tents, trucks, tanks, and countless other accouterments of war lingered in nearly every province of the nation. “Numerous loose arms,” NICA reported “were scattered all over the Islands in the possession of former guerillas and unauthorized persons as these were distributed even to civilians when American liberation forces came.” “Surplus property,” the phrase chosen by the U.S. military to describe the entirety of war supplies leftover in the Philippines fed a lucrative black-market network that sprung up around the more quotidian necessities of war. American dollars, canned food, tires. Cigarettes, and even Bibles were all part of a market that spread throughout East and Southeast Asia. In the words of NICA, “loose firearms” fueled a wider web of arms traffickers that supplied buyers in “Indo-China, Thailand, Borneo, Singapore, Batavia, Hong Kong, Argentina, and even Israel.”

In addition to attesting to the magnitude of violence experienced by countless populations of people, the circulation of WWII weapons indicated how porous the political boundaries of the immediate postwar years had become.

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The abundance of arms spread throughout the islands was not the only issue that
confronted the Philippine and U.S. governments, as two powers sought to recoup the
weaponry in order to police the emergence of black markets. Both aimed to curb the
numerous incidents of gun-related deaths and armed robberies that plagued the islands
during the immediate postwar years. The effort to reclaim weaponry required an account
documenting the extent of leftover supplies. Yet, a Philippines-Ryukus Command
(PHILRYCOM) report presented to the Inspector General of the U.S. Army in 1948,
estimated that the inventory of U.S. surplus property “in this theater after V-J-Day,” was
“almost 40% in error.”² In other words, it was difficult for both governments to
accurately assess how many weapons remained in the provinces and where they were
located. This confusion points to the deeper shift in the political economy of violence in
the Philippines.

In this chapter, I examine this shift through a focus on U.S. military aid and the
Philippine state’s use of force against peasant activists in the name of security.³ I argue
that this interplay between U.S. support and Philippine state violence reveals the principal
role that state violence came to play in a transnational vision for a liberal, capitalist

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² The status of Interim Tasks in the Philippines, PHILRYCOM, May 14th, 1948, Edward Lansdale Papers,
Hoover Institute.
³ In this chapter I draw on Max Weber’s theory of the state as principally based in law, but also that the
state cannot otherwise be defined then by its monopoly on legitimate violence within a given territory. This
does not mean that the state is the only institution with claims to legitimate violence and the ability to
degraded the use of violence to another entity. The question for Weber, and one of the ways that he
critiqued what he saw as the economic determinism of Marx, was how states, or modern regimes,
legitimated themselves or were held to be legitimate. For Weber, the “political” and political subjectivities
were formed through culture as well as class. In addition to Weber, I rely on contemporary socialist
readings of the states as never fully formed but ongoing process of state-formation. The state is not the only
means in which subjects construct identities, or the only source of power or domination. Yet, the state does
construct, what George Steinmetz calls, “hegemonic identifies.” The state may not be the only source of
social power but it is a central locus. Timothy J. Lomperis, From People's War to People's Rule:
Insurgency, Intervention, and the Lessons of Vietnam (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1996); Ngaire Woods, Explaining International Relations Since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1996); ibid.
system of postcolonial states. Beginning with the anti-communist drives during the colonial 1930s and concluding in 1950, I trace a shift in the discourse of global security, demonstrating that Filipino officials and their U.S. allies came to use the language of global security to justify and legitimate the Philippine state’s use of force against peasant activists. Furthermore, I show how violence and anti-communism became constitutive elements of an American and colonial elite construction of the American-led postwar international order.

Throughout the colonial and postwar eras, Philippine peasant activists sought a reform of the colonial social order, which was characterized by the rule of a landed elite and the poverty of sharecropping. During the 1920s and 30s, Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (Communist Party of the Philippines) organizing took hold and the emancipatory promises of communist ideology offered the peasants of Central Luzon a new vision for socioeconomic reform. Yet it was the organizational structure and relentless activism of the Philippine Communist Party (PKP), not necessarily a belief in communist principals that drew peasants from across provinces into a broader movement. In fact, the majority of peasant activists advocated for reform, not the abolition, of private property in the Philippines.

Pre and postwar Philippine political elites and U.S. policymakers agreed that communism posed a menacing threat to the social order for two distinct reasons. First,

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4 In asserting that the United States contributed to the acceptability of state violence in the Philippines I do not intend to preclude the possibility of subjective or individual motivations for enacting violence. In fact, emotions, and particularly revenge and pride have been used as explanations for understanding the internecine conflict between Filipino guerilla groups both during and following WWII. Much of this explanation has been gleaned from hundreds of interviews of peasants, Huk, and members of the Philippine Armed Froces conducted by scholars in the past 25 years. My argument that the U.S. armed and supported Philippine state violence in order to legitimize the newly independent state does not contradict individual accounts of postwar violence. Instead, by looking at a different set of archives, I assert that the U.S. role in the project of state building in the Philippines was not only conducted through violent means—it created a legacy in which state violence could be construed as a legitimate means of achieving political order. Mark Mazower, "Violence and the State in Twentieth Century," *The American Historical Review* 104, no. 4 (2002).
though in practice Philippine communist appeared vastly different than the Marxist-Leninist philosophy that the state drew upon to criminalize activists, in its most basic rhetoric communist theory proposed an alternative system for the international political economy. Instead of a system of nation-states, communist theory posited a utopian vision of global working-class solidarity, which opposed the liberal vision of a world governed by the protection of individual rights by market-based sovereign nations. Second, the ability of communist to unite and mobilize peasants to insist that the Philippine state, first the Commonwealth and then the independent Philippine Republic, was responsible for producing an equitable socioeconomic order meant that the landed elite would have to cede power and resources.

In both the Commonwealth and postwar periods the interests of the landed elite were over-represented in positions of governance and, in many ways, this group conflated their interests and livelihoods with national interests. Therefore, political demands that hinged on the ability of the state to impose its will on an elite class were easily translated into threats against the state. Even though many Filipino communists did not embrace particularly radical notions in their vision of social change, elite Filipinos saw any struggle to mobilize power from below as a threat to their ability to sustain control and maintain the stability of the social order. The idea of stability, particularly in the postwar period, became synonymous with definitions of global security because of the deep reach of capitalist markets in the Philippines. In effect, American policymakers and Philippine elites viewed an unstable social order in the Philippines as an impediment to capital investment, and thus a threat to the development of the Philippine economy.
Like many places around the globe, the ferocity of anti-communist violence in the Philippines was never simply about how closely communists adhered to doctrine. Instead, U.S. policymakers’ and Philippine elites’ anti-communist ideologies were deeply intertwined with their visions of a postcolonial world. This vision was rooted in the need for sovereign states to provide the political and legal infrastructure for globally linked markets. Because American policymakers saw the postwar Philippines as the model for future engagements with decolonizing countries, they alongside, U.S. military officials and diplomats in Southeast Asia, worked very hard to help Philippine elites sustain control over the state through both violent and juridical means.\(^5\)

This chapter explores the fundamental connections between state violence, anti-communism, and the construction of a postwar international order through a chronological reading of Philippine history from the 1930s to 1950. First, I show how the connections between state violence and anti-communism from the colonial period to 1950 were intertwined with an American vision of the Philippines as a model of postcolonial statehood. Second, I show how the shifts in a transnational language of security justified the Philippine states’ use of force against communist inspired Philippine peasants. In the third section, I begin the chronological narrative of the chapter by illustrating the ways that the colonial state used an anti-communist discourse of security to justify its juridical exclusion of leftist visions of independence. In the fourth section, I return to the theme of the shifting economy of violence to show how the excess cache of WWII weaponry fed an emerging civil war in Central Luzon between peasants, landlords, and the state. I argue that this struggle was fueled by surplus weaponry as well as the Philippines elites’ aim to return the social order to the unequal power relations of the

\(^5\) Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War.*
colonial period. Finally, I conclude the chapter by considering how the remobilization of U.S. military aid to the Philippines worked to legitimate and further the Philippine states use of violence against leftist dissent. For U.S. policymakers, the ongoing violence in Central Luzon and the Philippine state’s inability to end the uprising, threw doubt and global skepticism on the U.S. claim that the Philippines was a colonial success story and therefore, also, a postcolonial model. I argue that policymakers’ determination of the need to uphold the image of the Philippines as the “showcase of democracy” in Asia necessitated intervention from the United States in the form of military advisors and military aid.

State Violence and the Philippines as a Postcolonial Model

By the time that the PKP began organizing the peasants of Central Luzon, the United States had already transferred the quotidian responsibilities of state management, including law enforcement, to a Philippine political class. The Commonwealth state delegated this authority to surveil and police civilians in the colony to the Philippine Constabulary (PC). In the postcolonial era, the Philippine state continued to rely on the policing powers and claims to legitimate authority of the PC. In many ways the actions of the PC, renamed temporarily the Military Police (MP), in the postwar era defined the capabilities and limits of the newly independent state. Specifically, the PC maintained the integrity of the state, run by an elite population, to protect itself from non-violent or

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6 In 1901, the first American civil governor, William Howard Taft, constructed a three-tiered network of security that would “persist for nearly a century.” This included, “a lightly armed Filipino force for each of several hundred municipalities; a bi-national unit, the Manila Metropolitan Police, to contain radical nationalist and militant workers in the capital; and the Philippine Constabulary, a paramilitary police of Filipino soldiers and U.S. officers, to patrol the countryside. In Quezon’s Commonwealth state the PC became the national state police. Alfred W. McCoy, Policing America's Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009). 59-61 and 362-367.
violent dissent from within its own population. Even after the United States granted independence to the Philippines in 1946, the U.S. consistently supported the Philippine elites’ use of state force to discipline and contain dissent among Philippine citizens. The United States’ supported this violence, and worked to cast it as legitimate in the new, postwar international order. This was one part of the United States’ larger strategy to ensure that elite Filipinos maintained control of the state in order to guarantee continued access to and expansion of capitalist markets in the Philippines and Southeast Asia.

As the Philippines transitioned from colony to republic, and as the historical context shifted from the prewar to the Cold War era, a distinct shift occurred in the techniques used by the state to police communists. During the colonial period, Americans envisioned preparing Filipinos for the task of governing a modern nation state. Because U.S. colonial administrators and Filipino elites cast communist and other movements on the political left as threats to the state, despite the party’s popularity, Communist discourse was considered as outside of the realm of legitimate political debate. In a grave portent of future decades, Communists in the prewar era were consistently labeled as potentially violent because they employed “seditious speech” that functioned as verbal threats of rebellion.

Yet because the colonial government, and later the Commonwealth, succeeded in retaining its monopoly on lethal weaponry in the country, the state criminalized leftist opposition primarily through juridical means. Unlike the postwar era in which wartime

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7 McCoy argues that for most Filipinos their primary contact with the state was with law enforcement, linking ideas about state legitimacy to police efficiency. Ibid.
8 Although I argue that the colonial and Commonwealth state used primarily legal means to criminalize the prewar political left in the Philippines, historian Anne Foster shows that, in certain case, the U.S. and Philippine officials acted above the limits of the law in order to limit Communist influence. For example, a famous case of anti-communist law enforcement occurred after Tan Malaka, a member of the Partis Komunis Indonesia (PKI) travelled to Manila. In response to the arrival of a known Communist the U.S.,
weaponry fueled open gun battles in barrio streets, peasants in the 1920s and 1930s were less likely to own guns. Through the judiciary, the state asserted its dominance and legitimacy through an appeal to the naturalized rationality and authority of modern legal structures. This turn to legal structures fulfilled the shared vision of the American and Philippine elite—a vision in which colonialism had succeeded in bringing modernity to the peoples of the Philippine islands.

This partially shared vision of modernity was realized in the planned transition to Philippine independence, originally scheduled for 1944, but postponed by the war until 1946. The imperial clash between the Japanese and the U.S. during WWII brought a seemingly infinite number of weapons and ammunitions to the islands. The presence of

as Foster writes, “searched several months for a man suspected of no crime in the Philippines, arrested him without a warrant, held him for three days before charging him with a crime, deported him on the eve of his trial, and informed Dutch officials of all the ports of call of the ship on which he was deported.” Anne L. Foster, Projections of Power: The United States and Europe in Colonial Southeast Asia, 1919-1941 (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2010).34-37.

9 Joseph Hayden to Betty Hayden, September 7, 1926, Joseph R. Hayden Papers, B28, F26, Bentley Historical Library, Ann Arbor, MI.

10 In addition to defining the state as having a monopoly on legitimate violence, Weber also argues that because the state is based principally in law, and that this basis allows for a claim to rationality in which the state can sometimes claim or appear to be the ultimate source of value. The legal power of the state, for Weber, was key as he argued that regimes that rested merely on force could not survive for long if rulers did not attempt to attain some kind of legitimacy. Legitimacy, as an achievement of the state, meant that a level of validity was reached in the acceptance of the state’s rules of order. Duncan Kelly, The State of the Political: Conceptions of Politics and the State in the Thought of Max Weber, Carl Schmitt, and Franz Neumann (Oxford ; New York: Published for the British Academy by Oxford University Press, 2003).

11 This is not to imply that a Philippine elite uniformly accepted the terms of American tutelary colonialism. In fact, Julian Go reveals many ways that a Philippine political elite used their own cultural systems to reformulate or “domesticate” tutelage. Julian. Many monographs explore the relationship between colonialism and modernity. Some foundational texts include: Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History, 1 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005); Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: postcolonial thought and historical difference, Princeton studies in culture/power/history (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000).

two countries’ war machines dramatically altered the economy of violence in the Philippines such that countless civilians, including the primary target of the state’s anti-communist attacks, the Hukbalahaps, were armed or had access to weaponry. Because the war did not ameliorate, and in fact, deepened the prewar conflicts between peasants, landlords, and the Commonwealth state, the months and first few years following WWII were marked by continued armed combat.

The unending skirmishes in Central Luzon not only prolonged fighting in a country that had already suffered through intense cycles of conquest and occupation, it also highlighted the inability of the Philippine central state to intervene and end those conflicts. This lack of state power represented an on-the-ground rebuttal of U.S. and Philippine political elites’ picture of a peaceful and prosperous postcolonial state. Moreover, for the United States, the widespread dissent against the will of the Philippine state also held the potential to rebuke American claims to colonial superiority or the idea that Americans were benevolent imperialists who eschewed selfish interest and only sought to transfer the promises of modernity to their “little brown brothers” in the Pacific.  

For both groups, the Philippines was not only an independent country but also the “show window of Democracy,” or the imagined American outpost of freedom, in a region enflamed by postwar anti-colonial struggles. As the United States sought to

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14 Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper argue that the Second World War empowered previously disempowered groups to join political struggles and view the immediate postwar period as one of possibility and change. They also call the immediate postwar years Britain’s “second colonial conquest” in the region as the empire attempted to reassert control over Burma and Malaya. C. A. Bayly, T. N. Harper, and C. A. Bayly, *Forgotten Wars: Freedom and Revolution in Southeast Asia* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007). 517.
expand its political influence and economic markets further into the territories of the disbanding British and French empires, the Philippines held the potential to represent a successful model of U.S. political, military, and economic intervention.\textsuperscript{15} This is why, for the State Department, U.S. military, and other Foreign Policy agencies of the U.S. government, the Philippines represented a “unique and special case.”\textsuperscript{16} Drawing on a spatial metaphor to explain the strategic goals of U.S. foreign policy, the State Department and the U.S. military identified the Philippines’ 7,107 islands as a “vital link in the chain of American security in the Pacific.”\textsuperscript{17}

In addition to its geographic location, U.S. policymakers recognized the symbolic power of the Philippines as a global model for postcolonial transitions. Indeed, in 1951 Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Dean Rusk wrote, “the Philippines is generally regarded by Asia as evidence of American sincerity and capability, and if we fail there the rest of Asia will surely consider we have nothing to offer elsewhere. For these reasons it is vital that we hold the Philippines whatever the cost—unless we are prepared to write off Asia.”\textsuperscript{18} Rusk’s sweeping together of the diverse histories, cultures, and politics of “Asia” into a coherent bloc, revealing the simplified racial ideologies that informed that way in which American officials viewed the postwar world.\textsuperscript{19}

Rusk’s comment also underscores the significance of the Philippines as a material site where the U.S. could stage military bases and an imaginary site where the world

\textsuperscript{15} On prewar U.S. investment in the British, French, and Dutch empires in Southeast Asia see Chapter two of Foster, \textit{Projections of Power: The United States and Europe in Colonial Southeast Asia, 1919-1941}.

\textsuperscript{16} Dean Rusk to H. Freeman Matthews, 31 Jan 1951, FRUS, 1951, 6:24-25.

\textsuperscript{17} Dean Rusk to H. Freeman Matthews, 31 Jan 1951, FRUS, 1951, 6:24-25.

\textsuperscript{18} Dean Rusk to H. Freeman Matthews, 31 Jan 1951, FRUS, 1951, 6:24-25.

could judge the relative merits of American colonial and postcolonial policy. Finally, Rusk’s vision of the United States either “holding,” or its implied inverse, not being able to hold, Asian countries implies his clear understanding of the United States’ position of global dominance.\footnote{My argument is not that U.S. domination was unilateral or all encompassing. However, in terms of financial power the U.S. wielded great control as primary “world bank” for postwar reconstruction. Catherine R. Schenk, \textit{International Economic Relations Since 1945} (New York, NY: Routledge, 2011).} For policymakers like Rusk, U.S. control over the Philippines signified an ability to influence and gain access to the rest of Asia.

The public, widespread acknowledgement of both of these registers, the material and the imaginary, required the success of the Philippine state. U.S. policymakers measured the success of the Philippine State primarily in terms of economic indicators and the ability of the state to address the “continued and dangerous deterioration of the law and order situation.”\footnote{“The Military Assistance Program for the Fiscal Year 1951 for the Philippines,” from Manila to the Department of State, April 7\textsuperscript{th}, 1950, RG 59, Department of State, Director Mutual Defense Assistance, Decimal Files, 1950-1954, Box 4323.} Both of these markers demanded the ability of the central state to exert its policies over the population. This included the rehabilitation of major industries from the damages of war, the disarming of wartime weaponry, and the reassertion of prewar legal contracts, including land titles. The enactment of these policies would serve, according to countless Philippine politicians, the ability of the state to lure foreign capital into the nation in order to fuel economic growth and industrial development. Ultimately, an unstable state was seen as a risky investment.\footnote{The 25-year period from 1950-1975 is cited as the most exceptional period of sustained economic growth in the history of capitalism, in large part due to the increase in the liquidity of global capital derived from U.S. military expenditures and foreign aid. The period is also marked as one of intense inter-state competition in the world-economy for investment capital. Giovanni Arrighi, \textit{The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of our Times} (London ; New York: Verso, 1994). 303-308.} If the state were unable to exert decisive control over all its territories then investors and their capital...
would inevitably seek other global spaces, such as postwar Europe, that could offer more reliable returns.\textsuperscript{23}

The language of security, which I discuss in the subsequent section, offered an alternative linguistic and cognitive framing for the violence that accompanied U.S. market expansion, Philippine state building, and the construction of the postcolonial international order. Without an internationally recognized legitimate political state to provide the legal framework for global markets, the legibility of the Philippines as an independent state, rather than a client or satellite of the United States, as the U.S.S.R claimed, faltered.\textsuperscript{24} In the Philippines, the concept of security was used to frame the use of state violence as a politically and culturally valid way to expand the transnational project of capitalist penetration and development.

The language of security, utilized by both Americans and Filipino elites, offered a way for both countries’ leaders to assert that Philippine independence could coincide with American intervention. During the colonial era, a variety of U.S. policymakers produced a discourse of security that consistently framed Americans and the United States as educators to Philippine elites and the incipient Philippine nation. This role, as an imagined mentor-nation for the Philippines, allowed the U.S. to retain control of the political economy of the colony as well as the use of force against Filipinos resistant to U.S imperialism. Beginning with the First World War, most of this authority of the state

\textsuperscript{23} Weber and Arrighi assert that inter-state competition was one of the defining characteristics of modern “world-historical” capitalism. David Harvey seconds this idea while elucidated the ways that politics involved in the geographical scale of capitalism and the institutions that support the system, such as states, should not be considered as pre-ordained, or historically inevitable. David Harvey and Giovanni Arrighi, "The Winding Paths of Capital," \textit{New Left Review} 56, no. March-April (2009).

\textsuperscript{24} According to a State Department memo from 1950, the “U.S.S.R has never recognized the Republic of the Philippines” Memo From AMEMBASSY MANILA to Department of State,” September 11 1950, RG 59, Decimal File, 1950-54, Box 4323.
to was ceded Filipino elites.\textsuperscript{25} By the late 1940s and early 1950s the historical context shifted, and the inability of the independent Philippine state to retain its monopoly on violence threatened the United States’ vision of the Philippines as a embarkation point and source of raw materials for East and Southeast Asian markets. As the international press began to descend upon the civil war in Luzon and report their observations to a wider world, they highlighted the dire conditions of an economy trapped by centuries of colonial policy. Under the scrutiny of the international press, the fantasy of the Philippines as a paragon for American global policy threatened to collapse.

**The Language of Security**

During the postwar period the transnational vision of the Philippines as a stable, liberal-capitalist state belied the colonial history of a land and people marked by U.S. imperial conquest, war, occupation and resistance, racial and linguistic divisions and rampant class inequality. WWII, which was fought for nearly five years in the islands, collided with this prewar history in such a way that a volatile mix of arms, ammunitions, loyalties, and political ambitions defined the opening years of independence. In this way, violence in the provinces of Central Luzon represented not only a continuation of prewar struggles over land, equality, and livelihood but also a postwar story regarding the lingering materiality of wars and the role of global armed forces in the expansion of U.S. power. These instances of violence provide a case study for how the anti-communist language of “security” and “order” could be used to obscure the legacies of the colonial economic and political inequalities upon which they were based.

In the broadest sense, both Filipino and American policymakers used the language of security to claim that the state was the only institution that could adequately provide for the well-being of the entire nation of Filipinos.\textsuperscript{26} Philippine politicians and their American counterparts used security to mean both economic growth based on capitalist markets and political stability, wherein elites maintained control over the state and the state served as the authoritative voice of law and order.\textsuperscript{27} The Philippine state thus came to be aligned with the interests of the political elite, a group who saw the Philippines’ welfare as intimately tied to the maintenance of a positive relationship with the United States and to the expansion of capitalist development within the country.

For example, in his 1946 campaign for the Philippine presidency, Manuel Roxas used the language of security to defend his belief that the Philippines should sustain “an Open Door” for U.S. investors after independence. “We have no suspicions against American capital or American businessmen,” he explained, asserting that Filipinos should “extend to them every assurance of fair treatment and security.” By “security” Roxas meant “peace and order” as well as “fair taxes upon profit.”\textsuperscript{28} Implicit in these remarks was a reference to the continued fighting in Central Luzon, which Roxas believed the state needed to quash in order to convince global capital that the Philippines

\textsuperscript{26} Vicente Rafael argues that during the Filipinization of American colonial rule members of the Filipino elite regarded themselves as the “sole legitimate speakers of the nation.” Because they were able to “monopolize the symbolic resources for imagining nationhood” the elite, according to Rafael, found it easy to think of “their class interests as coterminous with the national interest” Vicente Rafael, "Anticipating Nationhood: Collaboration and Rumor in the Japanese Occupation of Manila," Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies 1, no. 1 (1991).68.

\textsuperscript{27} My analysis of the role of class in the Philippines is guided by Terry Eagleton’s recent work, \textit{Why Marx Was Right}, in which he argues that Marx’s assertion that class struggle was the motor of human history indicated how Marx viewed capitalist society as one comprised divisions or groups with mutually incompatible interests. Eagleton argues that this does not mean that everything in human history should be attributed to class struggles, rather class struggle should be understood as a fundamental aspect of human history. Terry Eagleton, \textit{Why Marx Was Right} (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011). 30-36.

\textsuperscript{28} “Roxas Advocates Open Door for US Investors When PI Gains Freedom,” \textit{Manila Times}, Tuesday February 5\textsuperscript{th}, 1946.
would participate in a world markets on “fair” terms. Moreover, Roxas used the concept of security to seamlessly merge the state's attack on peasant dissent with the need to present the Philippines as a “fair” competitor in global capitalist relations. This merger of state violence and capitalist expansion became two interlocking sides of an international political and economic engagement, compounding the already circumscribing effects of capitalism onto the possibilities for a more egalitarian brand of democracy in the Philippines.

In other words, domestic politics in the name of “peace and order,” also became code for the disciplinary power of global capitalism and the legitimate claim for the Philippine state to use violence in order to enact this discipline on its population. After he became president, Roxas continued to use the language of security in order to justify a diverse array of policies and practices designed to promote U.S. capitalist expansion into the Philippines and to repress political discourses directed at the reign of the elites. For instance, Roxas used the language of security to explain his removal of Huks from elected office, the re-writing of the Philippine Constitution to allow American citizens equal rights to develop Philippine natural resources, and the use of the Philippine Constabulary to violently and aggressively police the civilian population of Luzon in order to curb peasant and organized labor’s political influence.

Within a global framework, U.S. officials used the language of security to justify their vision of the U.S. as a self-appointed global police force, which, in rhetoric, worked to maintain justice and freedom throughout the world. Within this discourse the United States called on the Philippines, and eventually other states in a similar way, to police their own population as a first step toward guaranteeing the international security that the
U.S. claimed it could offer.\textsuperscript{29} The United States’ own interest therefore was to contribute to the global sense that the Philippines was indeed a stable and functioning democracy, supported by the people of the Philippines through “fair and honest” elections. Without this, the United States’ interventions in the region looked akin to an older form of Western imperialism. While American policymakers and the Philippine elites’ use of the state to police communists and promote anti-communist ideologies and institutions remained constant from the prewar to the postwar eras, the transnational emergence of the concept of security and the notion of international order became a new language both groups used to justify postwar attacks on Philippine leftists, and ultimately, the means through which the Philippine state claimed authority and legibility as a sovereign nation within a newly defined “liberal order” of international governance.\textsuperscript{30}

Postwar historians of international politics have asserted that American postwar security concerns were dominated by correlations of power, or, simply put, the ability of the United States to access resources so that nothing would “force the United States to alter its political and economic system.”\textsuperscript{31} This meant that the United States would have to cultivate allies that would agree to a world of reduced barriers to trade and a more unrestricted flow of capital. Security, in this formulation, was based on the implicit


\textsuperscript{30} In his writings on development Mark T. Berger emphasizes how development was naturalized as a national project because of the universalization of the nation-state and the “framework of an increasingly global nation-state system that rapidly incorporated former colonies” Berger, "Decolonisation, Modernisation and Nation-Building: Political Development Theory and the Appeal of Communism in Southeast Asia, 1945–1975." In a somewhat different vein Robert Latham argues that what was truly at stake during the Cold War was the United States’ and Western Europe’s desire to keep nations in “the liberal order” Latham argues that when necessary policymakers in the hegemon would impose “limits” on liberalism in order to secure stability. At the local level outcomes could be “nonliberal” if it meant that at the global level international liberalism, based on nation-states, was maintained, Robert Latham, \textit{The Liberal Moment: Modernity, Security, and the Making of Postwar International Order} (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).162-163.

\textsuperscript{31} Leffler, \textit{A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War}.12.
coherence of postwar nation-states, or the idea that the United Nations merely united states rather than demanded their creation. In demanding their creation I mean that in order for the Philippines, as a self-proclaimed “smaller state” of the world to have a voice in international politics, the people of the Philippines must be represented by a coherent state.32

This imperative for the peoples of the world to organize solely along the consciousness of nation-states was reinforced by the institutionalization of global governance structures that reached deep into the sovereignty of states. Historians of the postwar era have too often taken this international political organization as a given rather than unpack its historical origins through examinations of on-the-ground politics. This interpretation by historians lends an assumed rationality to the world in which nation-states are the only acceptable form of sovereignty, as if such states were a foregone conclusion. In putting forth this interpretation, historians have also ignored or overlooked the contingencies, alternate visions, and also the violence that accompanied the formation of state power in the postwar period.

Colonial Anti-Communism

In May of 1931 twenty-six men from the Katipunan ng mga Anak-pawis sa Pilipinas (Association of the Sons of Sweat of the Philippine Islands) met at the El

32 Prasenjit Duara writes against the way historians of imposed a false linearity to the history of the nation-state and that histories of nationalism, or the idea of coherent population of individuals that share a consciousness based in a “national identity,” have repressed or hidden alternative identities or narratives. What is new about modern nationalism, according to Duara, is that it is in relation to a world-system of nation-states that sanctions the nation-state as the only acceptable form of sovereignty. In his view nations functioned almost akin to empires in that states asserted the right to represent a population through a discourse that linked political enlightenment, or modernity, with the state-form. Prasenjit Duara, Rescuing History From the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).
Reteño building in Manila. Already under surveillance, Manila authorities arrested the men. Eventually the group was put on trial for their membership in the Communist Party. Since launching in 1930, the Philippine Communist Party contributed to debates about independence, the nature of the state, and the condition of the colonial Philippine economy. Speaking to the popularity of the 1930s party, Jose Lava, a leader and primary intellectual for the Party, wrote, “everywhere [the PKP] conducted mass meetings, with or without permits, large audiences flocked to hear the Communist leaders attack American imperialism, their native puppets, the feudal landlords, and the bourgeois and even god.”33 These ideas circulated by the Communist Party provided an explanation for a colonial society exemplified by deep class inequalities. However, because the Communists did not pose a direct threat to the state’s monopoly on violence, the state was able to use its juridical power to claim that communist politics had no place in Philippine society. The state’s use of its legal power exemplified both an assertion of its authority and a claim to the legitimacy of that authority.

In its decision to outlaw the party, the Supreme Court of the Philippines drew upon an 1884 ruling from the Spanish colonial courts that had been formulated to combat the anti-imperialist movement against Spain during the late nineteenth century.34 The Supreme Court of the Philippines concluded that the aims of the Communist Party were to “incite class struggle and to overthrow the present government by peaceful means or by armed revolution and therefore the purpose of such association is to alter the social

33 “20 years of struggle” Gregorio Santayana (a.k.a. Jose Lava), Papers of the PKP, Exhibit O, Box 3, University of the Philippines, Quezon City, Philippines.
34 There is a long history of anti-imperial protest in the Philippines. Many histories trace an origin to the Propaganda Movement, started by European educated Filipino, including Jose Rizal, to raise awareness regarding the Philippines in Spain. Ultimately the organization sought imperial reform. John Schumacher, The Propaganda Movement: The Creation of a Filipino Consciousness (Manila: Ateneo de Manila Press, 1997).
order and to commit the crimes of rebellion and sedition.” This decision, legitimized through the state’s appeal to legal precedent, outlawed the Communist Party in the Philippines.\textsuperscript{35} Despite legal attacks from the state, the organizing momentum in Manila corresponded with an upsurge in political organizing and protests among the peasant populations of Central Luzon.

During the American colonial period in the Philippines, the historic relationship between landlords and tenants shifted as Philippine agricultural products became integrated into a global marketplace. Although Americans had started out the century with a plan to redistribute land in order to quell peasant resistance to American rule, by the end of the first decade of the twentieth century it became clear that American colonialism would contribute to the consolidation of the power of the landed elite. Access to an American market allowed large landowners, particularly sugar planters, to broaden their ambitions and expand their production capacities.\textsuperscript{36} Sugar cane was principally an export commodity, with the United States as the largest consumer of Philippine sugar. As a U.S. colonial product, Philippine sugar had privileged access to the U.S. market. Moreover, beginning in the 1920s, sugar planters plowed this capital back into the industry in order to meet an increase in international demand. While the largest sugar producing areas of the country were located in the Visayas island groupings and principally on the island of Negros Occidental, the Central Luzon provinces of Tarlac and Pampanga also became prominent sites of sugar production. Sugar centrals, sites where sugar cane was processed for export, rose in prominence and further altered the dynamic

\textsuperscript{35} CUFA, “The illegality of the Communist Party of the Philippines” Congress of the Philippines, House of Representatives, Manila, Bureau of Printing, 1951, Ateneo De Manila University.
of the sugar industry as the wealthiest planter families constructed sugar centrals, and therefore, rose above the class status of the planters. Simultaneously, as Americans sought to transition elite Filipinos into government roles, political power in the Philippines shifted increasingly towards Manila. Additionally, as the colonial state sought to increase its reach over the countryside, more and more landlords moved to Manila, leaving their *Hacenderos* in hands of the *katiwala*, or overseers, whose primary job was to maintain a high production of sugar cane.

The attempt to centralize the colonial state in Manila also coincided with the colonial project to integrate all regions of the Philippines into a legally codified nation. This included the surveying and titling of lands that had no previous legal standing. Scholars have argued that this condition alongside an increasing population in the rice producing provinces and the penetration of global capitalism, contributed to the demise of the semi-feudal relationship between the *cacique* and tenant classes. This semi-feudal relationship, imperfectly rooted in a culture of mutuality, was replaced by tenancy and other forms of capitalist class relations, which were devoid of the promises and benefits of interdependence. In addition to the transformation of the political economy and social world of tenant farmers, the national economy during the colonial period was skewed heavily to benefit the interests of the landlord class. American consumer goods, able to enter the Philippines without tariff, overwhelmed the ability of Filipino capitalists to invest in commodity production outside of the realm of agricultural cash crops. Tenant farming, therefore, remained the most viable avenue for Filipino laborers.

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In response to the changing conditions of life and labor, tenant farmers of Central Luzon began to organize themselves into various activist organizations. Benedict Kerkvliet, a scholar of the Huk Rebellion, argued that, "by the latter half of the 1930s, scarcely a week would pass without a major incident of agrarian discontent." Demands for widespread reform of the system of landownership and tenancy united the numerous peasant organizations that dotted the plains of Central Luzon. The *Manila Tribune*, one of three major English language dailies based in the capital, printed tenants’ demands after a succession of major strikes in 1933, 1939, and 1940. In their demands, peasant organizations addressed the terms of harvest sharing, loans, and expenses paid by tenants for maintaining crops. Additionally, peasants argued that their landlords “shall not discriminate against tenants and laborers who belong to unions” or “hire strikebreakers.” Ultimately, the peasant movements in the Central Luzon prior to the war demanded a reformation of national and provincial land policies. While peasants had not yet called for a general redistribution of land, and many would never support this revolutionary tenet, it is quite possible that landlords and their networks viewed the demands of peasant activists as a call for a revolution against the historic political and social relationships that governed the social order of the countryside. Like the Communists in Manila, the peasants of Luzon identified land inequality as a primary grievance, and sought the power of the state to remedy the situation.

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39 Ibid. 36.
40 Ibid. 43.
The emergence of the Communist and Socialist Parties in Manila, and the interplay between the leadership of various activists organizations, likely contributed to a sense among the elite that politicized peasants represented a potential threat to their historic ways of living. For this reason, some landlords began to organize in order to present a united front against the demands of peasant activists. In his research on the topic, Kerkvliet cites the Samahan ng mga Proprietario (Association of Landowners) from Nueva Ecija as stating that their organization was created to “protect their interests.” In addition to landowners associations, the overlap between ruling politicians and landed elites ensured that the government would generally support the interests and rights of the propertied class over the grievances of the tenants and peasant farmers.

Therefore, perhaps unsurprisingly, the state continued to rule against the legality of the Communist Party and their attempts to contribute to the arena of political discourse in the colony. On September 28th, 1932, the Supreme Court of the Philippines upheld a previous ruling, which enabled the Manila chief of police to “prohibit all kinds of meetings held by the Communist Part throughout the city.”

Crisanto Evangelista, the plaintiff in the case and the head of the Philippine Communist Party, claimed that he had been deprived of his constitutional rights and demanded that Tomas Earnshaw, an engineer, industrialist and Quezon appointee to the mayoral office of Manila, issue a permit that would allow “the holding of meetings and parades by the Communist Party in Manila.” The Mayor had initially issued permits to the Communist Party, which had organized and held several public meetings in different parts of Manila in which,

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42 In its ruling the court cited, Gitlow v New York, a 1925 United States Supreme Court ruling that upheld the conviction of Gitlow, a socialist, based on the argument that the government may suppress free speech based if such speech directly advocates the overthrow of the government, the Philippine Supreme Court ruled against the PKP.
according to the brief, “seditious speeches were made urging the laboring class to unite by affiliating to the Communist Party of the Philippines in order to be able to overthrow the present government.”\textsuperscript{43} Citing the bylaws of the Communist Party, the court issued a brief that stressed the anti-imperialist underpinnings of Philippine Communism and claimed that the leftist movement went unrestricted the communists might resort to violent dissent. On this point, the court went beyond its ruling and even praised the mayor of Manila for his actions, claiming that “instead of being condemned or criticized, the respondent mayor should be praised and commended for having taken a prompt, courageous, and firm stand towards the said Communist Party of the Philippines before the latter could do more damage.”\textsuperscript{44} The court’s claim that Communist Party members, and those affiliated with the party, were potentially violent would continue to mark communists as illegitimate contributors to debates regarding Philippine politics.

The ability of the state to demarcate certain political visions as “potentially violent,” and therefore ban them from political participation, illuminates how the state’s claim as the source of legal value and authority worked to remove alternative visions, while shoring up the dominant class’ hold on state power.\textsuperscript{45} The ability to influence the laws that governed the terms of landownership provided one means by which the landed elite maintained their grip on the wealth of agricultural production. The unilateral control over the Philippine Constabulary (PC), the national police force of the colonial state, provided a second means of control. Acting essentially as a private police force for

\textsuperscript{43} “Official Gazette, Vol XXXI, Sept, 7the 1933” Joseph Hayden Papers, Box 25, Folder 17, Bentley Historical Library.
\textsuperscript{44} “Official Gazette, Vol XXXI, Sept, 7the 1933” Joseph Hayden Papers, Box 25, Folder 17, Bentley Historical Library.
\textsuperscript{45} The state, according to Weber, has no inherent substantive content and is a tool for “the realization of any political and an ideological end[s].” In other words, the state can serve the interest of anyone who gains control of it.
landowners, the PC guarded fields from potential sabotage or theft, broke up meetings of peasants unions, and imprisoned activists. In one month in 1939, *The Manila Tribune* reported that the PC had jailed four hundred activists in the province of Pampanga alone.\(^{46}\) Yet, for most of the colonial period, because the state retained its monopoly on violence in most regions of the nation, the state did not have to resort to violence in order to curb the “communist threat” because it could rely on the legal authority of the state for enforcement.\(^ {47}\)

Though the United States colonial mission was predicated and justified through the language of colonial benevolence, in which Americans would guide Filipinos on their path towards independence through democratic tutelage, the Communist Party viewed the democratic structures of the colonial state as primarily exploitative, “it is clear that the different political parties of the burgesses are no different from one another. They have but one aim; to rise into power and exploit with independence or not; to enrich themselves and strengthen the control of a government which is pro-capitalist and pro-imperialist.” Furthermore, the bylaws of the Communist Party aligned the organization with what they perceived as other anti-imperialist movements occurring in the islands:

> The reluctance of the Moros in paying taxes to the government, the disorders in the large haciendas, the farmers resisting the owners and the Constabulary, the strike of the high school students, the uprising of the Colorums, and the oppression of the imperialists and capitalist of the laborers, are symptoms of a movement, which if carried with unit, will


\(^{47}\) Although one of the primary tasks of the colonial state had been to unite the geographic area of the Philippines to the rule of law of the central state, countless areas functioned relatively autonomously from the central state. The relationship of the state to different provinces in the islands is linked to hierarchies of class, religion, language, and power in the Philippines. For instance, Mindanao, a southern island with the most highly concentrated proportion of Muslims in the Philippines, was imagined as a ‘distinct’ cultural space while also a territory of the Philippine nation. This tension was born out by repeated attempts by the central state to lure Christian Filipinos, including ex-Huks, to the “under populated” and “underdeveloped” island of Mindanao. P. N. Abinales, *Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the Formation of the Philippine Nation-State* (Quezon City: ADMU Press, 2000).
perforce bring about the downfall of American imperialism and the obtaining of Philippine Independence.⁴⁸

Yet, when it became clear that the Japanese might invade the Philippine Islands, peasant activists and the Socialist Party, which had merged with the Communist Party in 1938, declared a popular front against fascist regimes in Europe and Japanese militarism and declared allegiance to the United States. In response, on December 24th 1938, President of the Philippine Commonwealth, Manuel Quezon pardoned the convicted activists and released them from prison.⁴⁹ This move may have encouraged the Communist Party to seek influence through organizing and electing leadership to offices of the state. In fact, after the Philippine Constitution was written, ratified, and signed by American President, Franklin Roosevelt, the Communist Party argued that the Constitution “upholds the achievements of democracy, the right of “liberty, equality, and fraternity.” Land reform and general social and civil rights for the Filipino poor and landless all seemed possible within the lofty rhetoric of the Constitution, and thus these ideals became central elements to the Communist and Socialist election platform.⁵⁰ By 1940, organizers had grown the Communist party’s base enough to elect six mayors to office in the provinces of Luzon.

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⁴⁸ “Official Gazette, Vol XXXI, Sept, 7the 1933” Joseph Hayden Papers, Box 25, Folder 17, Bentley Historical Library.
⁴⁹ The emergence of Popular Front politics was a response to the rise of fascism in the 20s and 1930s. The particulars of the strategy, as they arose out of the cominterm, are complicated and contentious and the debates surrounding the utility of a popular front as a strategy in part reflect some of the internal debates and power struggles in the Soviet Communist Party. Michael Denning describes the American popular front as a “radical historical bloc uniting unionist, communists, independent socialists, community activists, and émigré anti-fascists around laborist social democracy, anti-fascism, and anti-lynching” In the Philippines the Popular Front was declared for similar anti-fascist reasons. And similar to the American version, the Philippine Popular Front importantly included a strong dose of patriotism, particularly because the US had already set the date for Philippine independence and it was assumed that the US would protect the Philippines from a potential Japanese invasion. Michael Denning, The Cultural Front: The Laboring of American Culture in the Twentieth-Century, Haymarket series (London: Verso, 1996).
⁵⁰ “Communist Convention,” 9/16/38, Hayden Papers, Bentley Historical Library.
The peasant agitation of the late 1920s and 1930s did not dramatically restructure the exploitative conditions of tenant life, however, the continued growth and visibility of the movement did eventually necessitate a response from politicians in Manila. The President of the Commonwealth, Manuel Quezon responded by asking for patience and non-violence. While peasants had made some progress in legal areas, through contracts and some improved harvest sharing agreements, arguably the most strident achievement of the decade was the organizational strength in numbers that peasant unions maintained.

An American, and last governor general of the Philippines, Frank Murphy envisioned independence in the Philippines as one in which global liberalism would maintain what Americans imagined to be a mutually beneficial relationship between the U.S. and the Philippines. Crisanto Evangelista, organization secretary of Congreso Obrero de Filipinas and leader of the Pacific Trade Union Secretariat, envisioned a different kind of relationship between Filipino people and the globe when he argued that Filipino laborers, "plunged into the world movement and became a part of the world class struggle that fights against capitalism and imperialism, against exploitation and oppression, that stands for political and economic freedom of all colonial and semi-colonial peoples." The difference between the ideology of Frank Murphy and Crisanto Evangelista was not merely a reflection of the hollow struggles for political power. Instead, their opposing viewpoints represent strikingly different visions of the direction that Philippine independence, and its political and economic relationship to the rest of the world, could take.

51 "Class Solidarity in the Philippines," Pan-Pacific Monthly No. 78, July 1929, Joseph Hayden Papers, Folder 18, Box 25.
52 I draw the idea that power struggles over political economy and the course or methods that national development can take from Rebecca Karl’s description of splits in the Chinese Communist Party Rebecca
The colonial and commonwealth state’s surveillance and criminalization of the Communist Party illustrates that the idea of a global movement against capitalism threatened the vision of the kind of independence that American policymakers imagined for a postcolonial world. While many of the groups and individuals associated with either the Socialist Party or the Communist Party in the Philippines spoke through a language of Marxist or Leninist assessments of capital and revolutionary politics, most members of these parties were brought into contact with the Party through their experiences with peasant strikes against landlord abuses. At the same time, the poor living conditions of tenant farmers, which worsened during the global depression of the 1930s, could also be mobilized to indicate the inherent failures of colonialism and capitalism in order to steer Philippine independence towards socialist reforms. Despite attempts in the postwar era to locate communism as a foreign ideology in order to undercut the movement’s nationalist appeals, Filipino Marxisms were in fact grounded in local activist traditions and movements.

The inclusion of this aspect of prewar history in the Philippines reveals a longer and more elaborate history of anti-communism in the colonial world. The political project of U.S. driven global anti-communism, often cited by historians as the justification for American interventions in decolonizing countries, did not develop simply out of the


53 Maria Cynthia Rose Banson Bautista, “Marxism and the Peasantry: The Philippine Case” in *Revisiting Marxism in the Philippines: Selected Essays*, (Manila: Anvil Publishing, Inc., 2010). In *Amazons of the Huk Rebellion*, Vina Lanzona argues that Manila was the center of industrial labor based leftist while the rural countryside as dominated by a peasant based activism. Eventually, during the pre-war years, these two traditions merge and push towards a national movement that seeks to reform the Philippine economic and social order. Vina A. Lanzona, *Amazons of the Huk Rebellion: Gender, Sex, and Revolution in the Philippines* (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009); ibid.

54 Francisco Nemenzo argues, “From its beginnings in the late 1920s, Filipino Marxism was wedged firmly into local revolutionary tradition. The Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) formally established in 1930, grew out of Congreso Obrero, which in turn emanated from the gremios or craft guilds of the nineteenth century” *Revisiting Marxism in the Philippines: Selected Essays*.4-5.
competing superpower politics of the Cold War. Colonial states considered communists and those with visions of alternative forms of political economy a threat to the relations of power. This pre-Cold War anti-communist illustrates how the simplified narrative of a United States support of anti-communist allies at any cost, and out of sheer necessity, actually works to conceal the longer histories, and ambitions, of the American vision for a postcolonial Southeast Asia.

**Independence Interrupted: WWII in the Philippines and the Rise of the Hukbalahaps**

The Japanese invasion of the Philippines, mere hours after the attack on the U.S military installations at Pearl Harbor, wedged the islands into a brutal collision between warring imperial powers. The undermanned and unsupported U.S. army was quickly overwhelmed as the Japanese took Manila by January 2 and eventually defeated the last hold out of American forces on the island of Corregidor by early May, 1942. The Japanese occupation lasted from 1942 to 1945, and marked a shift for the Communist Party and peasant activists in the Philippines. Refusing to submit to the authority of almost 650,000 Japanese soldiers stationed in the islands, the leftist peasants reorganized themselves as the *Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon* (Hukbalahaps or Huks) or, the People’s Army Against the Japanese. As with most political movements, there were multiple, and sometimes conflicting reasons for joining the wartime Huks. Indeed, many

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55 General Douglas MacArthur’s withdrawal in the Philippines, the battle at Corregidor, and the forced “Bataan Death March” of Filipino and American soldiers to Japanese prisoner of war camps or “hell-ships” are some of the most well-known popular histories of the Second World War in the Philippines, in part through Hollywood’s dramatization of the era. Less well known are the histories of the prewar U.S. military in the Philippines and Pacific and the debates over the “defensibility” of the Philippines and the likelihood of an attack by Imperial Japan. Brian McAllister Linn, *Guardians of Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific, 1902-1940* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997).
Filipinos joined the Huks simply as a strategy to survive the lean years of the war. During the Japanese occupation food was scarce and Japanese soldiers terrorized villages that were suspected of harboring guerillas. The conflict over varying factions of armed groups in the provinces of Central Luzon represented the vacuum of power that the chaos of war and occupation had left in its wake. During the war, most of the landlords of Central Luzon fled to Manila, leaving behind hired guards to protect their properties. The Japanese Military Administration (JMA) brought the elites of the colonial state into positions of leadership in the Philippine Republic, which functioned as a puppet state of imperial Japan.

In addition to seeking out Japanese soldiers and Philippine collaborators, Huks “rescued Allied aviators and prevented large amounts of harvested rice and cotton from falling to the Japanese.” Unlike the other guerilla groups operating in the region, many of whom took direction from the U.S. Army command, the Huks liberated villages of Central Luzon immediately and in such great numbers that “the Japanese found it necessary to send a large force to Central Luzon.” A harbinger of the conflicts that would blight the postwar years, The Philippine Constabulary (PC), supplemented the Japanese military’s attempts to hunt down and eradicate the Huks. Particularly troubling to the Japanese, American Army, and Philippine collaborators, was the Huks’ establishment of autonomous democratic governments in liberated villages. Indeed, by the end of the war, and much to the worry of both Americans and the Filipino landlord class, the Huks had established a “de facto government” that operated throughout parts of

56 Lanzona, Amazons of the Huk Rebellion: Gender, Sex, and Revolution in the Philippines.
58 Ibid.245-248.
Central and South Luzon.\textsuperscript{59} With liberation and independence in view, Huk leaders set their sights on joining the postwar democratic state in order to resist the reestablishment of an unequal social order that had defined Luzon during the prewar era. Confident that their wartime participation in the Japanese resistance movement would secure at least some recognition from the politicians that had run the Commonwealth State, the Huks approached the postwar era as one in which they would participate through trade unions and elections.

In addition to guerilla backpay (payment from the U.S. for combat services during the war), which, in 1946, many Huks were optimistic that they would receive, the Huks sought political recognition and representation in the New Republic. In addition to the three-year long guerilla war against the occupying Japanese army, the Huks attempted to establish a system of government based on their vision of a New Democratic Philippines. In fact, by July 1945, a loose coalition of peasant activists and urban laborers formed a new political party, the Democratic Alliance (DA). Luis Taruc, a Huk leader, argued that the DA was anything but revolutionary and in fact “believed in the ballot and peaceful petition” as means through which to end the “feudal agricultural colonial condition” that characterized the Philippine economy.\textsuperscript{60} Perhaps most of all, the Huks and the DA imagined that those who had collaborated with the Japanese, which included most landowners, would be excluded from the government, thus removing the greatest barriers to true land reform.\textsuperscript{61} Wartime collaborators, however, could not easily be displaced from power. As a 1945 report reveals, “almost all the known Filipino leaders cooperated with

\textsuperscript{59} Lanzona, Amazons of the Huk Rebellion: Gender, Sex, and Revolution in the Philippines. 85-120.


\textsuperscript{61} Entenberg, "Agrarian Reform and the Hukbalahap."247.
the Japanese…of the 300 outstanding Nacionalistas, barely 30 in number refused to server under the Japanese.”

In the highly contentious 1946 elections that elected the first president of the independent Philippine Republic, six activists on the Democratic Alliance (DA) ticket, including Huk leader Luis Taruc, were elected to office to represent Central Luzon. Meanwhile, Manuel Roxas, who the Huks had opposed for his record of collaboration with the Japanese, was elected as the first president of the Philippines. Prospero Sanidad, a Liberal Party senator from Ilocos Sur, a province in Northwest Luzon, brazenly stated that the recently elected Democratic Alliance representatives had, “no place in our scheme of government.” Sanidad’s statement, delivered shortly after elections, foreshadowed the impending conflict that quickly consumed the Roxas Administration.

The Surplus of War: The Shifting of Economy of Violence in Central Luzon

The excess of guns and ammunitions that were circulated and stored in the Philippines after WWII fundamentally altered the economy of violence in the Philippines and the surrounding regions. Enterprising individuals, such as George Murray, an American and veteran of the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) of the U.S. army, stepped into this environment with ambitions to capitalize on the apparent disorder of military property management. Murray, who was murdered in his upscale Manila home

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62 The Nacionalista party was the dominant political party in the Philippines and the party of the commonwealth President, Manuel Quezon. Manuel Roxas split from the Nacionalista Party to form the Liberal Party in order to run against, Manuel Osmena, the Nacionalista candidate that had spent the war years in exile. Abraham Chapman, "Note on the Philippine Election," Pacific Affairs 19, no. 2 (1946). Elite collaboration and/or resistance was a complex matter that shouldn’t be overly generalized. For instance, on the island of Panay, two opposing political families continued to feud during the Japanese occupation and sent representative family members to both the occupation government and local resistance groups. Alfred McCoy, “Politics by Other Means,” in Alfred W. McCoy, Southeast Asia Under Japanese Occupation (New Haven, Ct.: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1980).

63 Chapman, "Note on the Philippine Election."
in 1949, reportedly orchestrated a prominent ring of arms trafficking that included a sale of 10,000 Garand rifles and other firearms worth one million U.S. dollars. Murray’s personal life, which included a marriage to Ester del Rosario, a wealthy widow, and an affair with Carla Varga, a Philippine movie star, leant fodder to the press’ lengthy and tantalizing coverage of his death.64

Murray, however, was not the only gunrunner in town. In another case of arms trafficking, the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, NICA, reported that a representative of the Ministry of Defense of the Government of Israel, who was in the Philippines to pursue a legal sale of surplus weaponry, was approached by “certain individuals who offered to sell assorted arms including 4,500 Thompson sub-machine guns, 10,000 Carbines, 100 Flame Throwers, 2,000 Tommy guns, 250 Trench Mortars, 50 Tanks, 7,005,000 Cal .30 ammunitions and 10 barrels of fuel for flame throwers.”65 Even American GIs were, according to the local press, “carrying on a regular traffic in small arms, rifles and even mortars.”66 Surplus property circulated through new markets bringing wealth for untold numbers of people, and guns to others.

While the regional network of arms trafficking did receive press attention in both the Philippines and the United States, both governments were more concerned with the domestic security implications of policing a new nation of civilians armed with what came to be termed “loose firearms.” The Huks received the blunt of the U.S. and Philippine State’s drive to gather the scattered war supplies. In this way, the war did not

66 State Department Memo No. 125, August 24th, 1946. RG 469. National Archives
mark the end of prewar struggles that were based in access to land, wealth, and political power.

In the months and years following the end of the war, the violence that raged through the provinces of Central Luzon continued to plague the everyday lives of the majority peasant population. Peasants were often trapped as opposing Filipino guerilla groups and the Military Police turned the large numbers of “loose firearms” on each other. Many wartime reports indicated that the Huk groups came into conflict with guerilla organizations inducted into the U.S. military structure and the Makapili, a Japanese trained group of Filipino soldiers who fed intelligence to the Kempeitai (the Japanese military police) about guerilla locations and movements. Although they had fought to liberate the Philippine state from the Japanese in order to achieve an independence promised by the United States in 1934, the Huks now found themselves on the other end of a battle where they became the targets of the state’s police force, the Philippine Constabulary, and multiple armed civilian groups that had flooded into the countryside to protect the property of landed elites. This chaotically violent postwar milieu was continually fueled by the wartime supply of arms and ammunition.

Though the Second World War officially ended with the Japanese surrender in August 1945, the population of Central Luzon remained heavily armed. The war years had irrevocably laid bare the contentious class politics of the country. Many elites claimed that their service during the Japanese occupation was for reasons of “national survival” and that their role in the state had mitigated the severity of Japanese rule for

67 The Makapili was a shortened form of Makabayan Kaipunan ng mga Pilipino (Alliance of Filipino Nationalists/Patriots). Ikehata Setsuho and Ricardo Trota Jose, The Philippines Under Japan: Occupation Policy and Reaction (Quezon City1999).
Filipino civilians. Americans, acting again as an occupying force in the nearly independent nation, were anxious to restore the prewar social order. The alliance between American interests and Filipino elites became clearer still when, in 1947, Manuel Roxas declared a general amnesty for any wartime actions. Still, prewar class conflicts could not be overcome and these resumed as opposing factions sought to assert their interests in the short months leading up to independence.

The wartime conflicts between the Huks, Military Police, and the USAFFE Guerillas raged on in the months prior to the official transfer of independence scheduled for July 4th, 1946. Throughout the month of May, in 1946, the Manila Times printed daily articles on the worsening conditions in Central Luzon. The underlying reasons for the ongoing fight, which continued to trap a civilian population, was debated in the press as provincial mayors expressed their interpretations of the ongoing violence. While many understood the conflict as deeply rooted in agrarian inequality, the Times printed numerous interviews with individuals who cited postwar policy and the state’s inability to disarm civilian guards, control the actions of the Military Police, and the state’s pursuit of a decidedly militarized, “mailed fist,” strategy to disarm Huks, as the primary source of the continued bloodshed.

The “old grudges” of the Japanese occupation and the inter-guerilla clashes were also fueled by the U.S. armies’ participation in the arrest of Huk guerillas during the days immediately following liberation. As early as 1944, reports trickled into U.S. Army

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commanders that the Huks were, unlike the USAFFE guerillas, conducting extra-military, political units in the barrios of Central Luzon. Though the U.S. army had relied on their strong presence in Central Luzon, once the Japanese were removed from the region, the Hukbalahap suddenly found themselves the target of persecution. According to wartime reports of the American Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC), the Huks were considered disruptive to the imagined return of a prewar status quo in the provinces.

In the waning days of May in 1946, nearly a year after the Philippines was declared liberated from the Japanese occupation, the Manila Times began running a special four-part series titled “The Tangled Web in Luzon.” Based on on-the-ground reporting in the provinces immediately north of the nation’s capital, the first piece in the series pondered the reasons for why “blood still flows in Central Luzon.” It notes that: “in clashes between Huks and MPs, Huks and ex-USAFFEs, and Huks and members of the Iglesia ni Kristo….Huks mostly die.” In this account the article’s author, A. Arguilla, introduced the paper’s readers to the primary groups involved in the ongoing conflict. The Huks and the United States Armed Forces of the Far East (USAFFE) were anti-Japanese, guerilla resistance groups that, even during the war, had an antagonistic relationship; the MPs, or Military Police also known as the Philippine Constabulary (PC) had served as part of the Japanese state; non-Huk guerilla armies were inducted into the United States Armed Forces of the Far East command structure, along with the guerilla group that called themselves the USAFFE guerillas. According to Huk accounts, USAFFE guerillas were ordered to “hide out” and merely gather intelligence to feed to Douglas MacArthur while the Huks faced nearly daily battles with Japanese forces and the terroristic practices of the Kempeitai. USAFFE guerillas, on the other hand, charged
the Huks with overthrowing governments in order to set up their own in liberated villages. Finally, the *Iglesia ni Kristo*, or the “Church of Christ,” is a Christian sect in the Philippines founded by Felix Manalo in 1914. The underlying causes of the strife between the Huks and *Iglesia ni Kristo* members is less clear, though it is clear that *Iglesia ni Kristo* supported Roxas during the 1946 elections and because the Huks viewed Roxas as a collaborator with the Japanese, they vehemently opposed his election to the presidency.

In an attempt to understand the reason for violence, *Manila Times* reporter Arguilla pointed to prewar and postwar reasons for the unabated killing. One peasant she interviewed claimed “to really trace the trouble we have to go back to the pre-war days and view the course and history of a progressive movement that had its roots in desire for agrarian reforms.” However, the same peasant also pointed to the treatment of the Huks during the process of liberation as a possible contributing factor. When the American forces entered Central Luzon the Huks were “not welcomed or recognized like other guerillas who resisted the Japs during the occupation...beginning in June 1945 Huks were picked up with the help of American MPS and clapped in jail.”

Indeed in the chaotic days immediately following the liberation of the Philippines, U.S. armed forces, which now included members of the Philippine Armed Forces, were ordered to disarm or arrest Huks. A 1946 article, published by the Institute for Pacific Relations, claimed, “as early as July 1945 the U.S. Army used tank destroyers to break up Huk meetings.” In fact, the majority of the Huk leadership spent the first month of liberation behind bars on charges of “illegal possession of firearms.” Huks were confused

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71 Entenberg, 248.
when other guerilla outfits were left armed and yet they were being asked to surrender their weapons. Therefore, many Huks only clung tighter to their weapons after the MPs began a virtual reign of terror in the countryside, set on dismantling wartime Huk led governments.72 To both Philippine and American military officials it was clear that the greatest threat posed to the state was the armed population of “progressive groups” who had been able to govern locally and autonomously for nearly three years.

In addition to giving a national audience to the voices of a peasant population caught in the midst of ongoing warfare, the “Tangled Web of Luzon” series of articles also revealed the politically charged vocabulary that defined the conflict. In particular, the phrase “loose firearms” was used simultaneously to describe the presence of the leftovers of war and to designate what kind of civilian was allowed to retain their weapons in the war’s aftermath. In fact, “loose firearms,” as a descriptor of armaments left in civilian hands, justified the ongoing occupation of Central Luzon by the MPs, as well as repeated mass arrests of Huk or *Palawakin ang Kilusang Magbubukid* (Expand Peasant Movement or PKM) peasant activists. News reports from the spring and early summer of 1946, however, make clear that civilian guards, the hired security of landlords, were not receiving the same harassment from MPs who were charged with disarming civilians in possession of “loose firearms.” In fact, Judge Barrera, leader of the Democratic Alliance, claimed, “the authorities have failed to disarm and disband the civilian guards responsible for the killing of a number of Huks and PKM members.”73 This statement confirms the extent to which it was not the threat of “loose firearms” in

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the hands of any civilian that mattered as much as the politics those individuals expressed.

In an article from May 4th 1946, Vivencio Cuyugan of San Fernando, a self-proclaimed Huk sympathizer, explained why Huks were reticent to turn in their weaponry: “the Huks will not now lay down their arms because they are afraid they will have no protection—either from the MPs or from the USAFFE.” Yet, despite this reasoning, Cuyugan added, “I can’t understand why Filipinos are fighting Filipinos…but the Huks feel they are being persecuted by the Military Police.” It was clear to other politicians in the region that the continued fighting, while regretful, was partially the result of wartime inter-guerilla skirmishes. In the same article, Governor Santa Romana of the province of Nueva Ecija claimed that, “the fighting is a result of two guerilla outfits which fought each other for local control even during the Japanese occupation and they’re still at it, the USAFFE guerillas and the Hukbalahap.” Yet, Romana also acknowledged that “much economic unrest” existed in the region, and that the Huks, “want recognition as a minority party with some legal rights.” The notion of “recognition” here had a dual meaning. Because many of the guerilla resistance groups during WWII had been incorporated into the U.S. Army structure, Filipino guerillas could claim payment for their wartime services in the form of “guerilla backpay.” However, the Huks were never drafted into the U.S. Army establishment, and therefore, they could be denied payment for their contribution to the resistance movement.74

Once in office, the DA representatives used the political platform to raise awareness to what they called, “MP terrorism.” In a letter to Commonwealth President

74 “Quick Action Urged to Nip ‘War’ in Luzon,” Manila Times, Saturday May 4th, 1946, Ateneo de Manila University.
Sergio Osmeña, Congressmen-elect Luis Taruc, Amado Yuzon, Jesus Lava, and Alejandro Simpauco cited instances in three separate provinces (Pampanga, Tarlac, Nueva Ecija) of MP abuse. In one case, in Concepcion Tarlac, the Democratic Alliance congressman claimed, “on April 25th, MPs assisted by the municipal police took three PKM (national peasants union) members who have now disappeared.”75 In response, Alfredo Montelibano, an industrialist and Secretary of National Defense and the Interior under Osmeña, claimed that “old grudges and rivalries with the Huks” were to blame for the ongoing violence. “Most MPs in these areas,” Montelibano claimed, “are ex-USAFFE guerillas with grudges against the Huks dating back to the Japanese occupation.” Luis Taruc, “supremo of the Huks,” claimed that in addition to the MPs wealthy landowners in the provinces of Central Luzon were “subsidizing certain elements and maintaining private armies to clash with members of the Huks and PKM.”76

Not only were MPs not removing the means of violence that the landlords used to threaten peasants, regain control over their hacenderos, and restore the social and political order of Central Luzon, MPs were also subjecting the peasant population, Huk and non-Huk, to “raids, illegal searches, kidnappings, killings, and zonings” in order to unearth “loose firearms.” The strategy of zoning, used by the Japanese during the occupation period and by the Americans during the Philippine-American War, was a policy in which the Philippine Constabulary would surround a village and demand that civilians identify Hukas, who would then be removed for interrogation, torture, or execution.

75 “D-A Solons Tell Osmena of MP Abuses,” Friday May 3rd 1946, Manila Times, Ateneo De Manila University.
In order to publicize what peasants experienced as terroristic tactics, reports of MP terrorism were culled together and sent to Democratic Alliance field offices in the Central Luzon. The press reported that, “the [DA] reports tell of many peasants languishing in the torture cells of Magalang, Lubao, Bacolor, San Fernando, and Porac.” The specific tactic of targeting Huk and peasant activist through zoning also meant that all kinds of civilians, even relatives of activists, were subject to arrest and intimidation. For instance, in late June of 1946, University of the Philippines professor Angel Baking, reported that Bernardo Cuyugan, brother of the socialist mayor of San Fernando, was “missing after he was picked up in zona [zone] made in San Fernando last Friday.” The nephew of Luis Taruc, seventeen-year old Felix Yonzon, was also reported murdered during a MP raid on the barrio of San Luis.

Embedded within these news reports, the language of “loose firearms” justified state forces to arrest and interrogate civilian populations en masse. At the same time, this rhetoric was also flexible enough to ensure that MPs and Civilian Guards, despite their role in the fighting, were able to keep their weapons, because they were considered part of the established “order” that was tasked with disarming civilians. The presence of private militias continued to plague the state in the upcoming years, primarily through electoral violence, which attracted the attention of the international press. In 1946 private militias represented the interest of the ruling elite. Therefore, even though civilian guards did represent the inability of the state to retain a monopoly on violence, the retention of

77 In her ethnography of women involved in the Huk movement, Vina Lanzona argues that there are many continuities and discontinuities between the prewar and postwar movement. The cultural and social relations between Huks and the community were central reasons for sustaining participation. Lanzona argues that in the postwar era, as the political ideology of the movement shifted from a national liberation struggle against the Japanese to a “class war” against “fellow Filipinos” the organization called for a “much greater radical commitment.” Lanzona, Amazons of the Huk Rebellion: Gender, Sex, and Revolution in the Philippines.

weapons by civilian guards was not framed, like the Huks, as a threat to the state. These incidents of violence and the language used to legitimate certain forms of repression illustrate how constructed and flexible discursive structures of “law and order” were in the postwar Philippines. Indeed, the state mobilized the discourse of “loose firearms” to claim they were restoring “order” and constructing domestic security.

State anti-communist violence was utilized in order to ensure a kind of political economy of violence that did not necessarily preclude the presence of personal militias. In other words, the “order” that the Philippine state sought, was in fact dramatically disordered because it failed to address armed elements of society, like landlord militias. Indeed, the continued existence of landlord militias created a tension between a public commitment to “law and order” and another commitment to upholding a political economy that had for decades rested on the power of elites who needed hired guns to protect their property. For the state, the solution became one in which it became increasingly militarized so that it could restore and sustain legitimacy through a monopoly on violence. Furthermore, looking closely at the economy of violence during this period uncovers the global ambitions, repressive tactics, and constructed nature of the U.S. driven anti-communist alliance.

“Food Not Bullets”: The Battle over Parity and Competing Visions of Independence

In June of 1946, as the guerilla fighting from WWII continued, the PKM, a peasant activist organization formed during the colonial period, sent a letter to president Roxas with their proposal for peace in Central Luzon. Essentially repeating their
demands of the prewar era, PKM members asked for “the abolition of the present tenancy system, the purchase of big landed estates and their subdivision into small lots to be resold for the peasant occupants, the establishment of small crop loan banks, the promotion of cooperatives, and the disarming of civilian guards.” Roxas responded to peasant demands with a promise of land reform, though there was much doubt about the state’s ability to impress its will on reticent landlords. Even the U.S. State Department believed that Roxas’ promised reforms lacked substance. The State Department, reporting on the president’s proclamation to institute land reform, argued that it was merely a strategic political tactic, “designed to advise the people that President Roxas’ program of social and agrarian reform is equivalent to the demands of the dissident organizations.” Roxas’ unwillingness, or inability, to disarm the private armies organized and financed by powerful landlords was highlighted by DA representative and Huk leader, Luis Taruc who stated, “my people expect sympathy and understanding. Food not bullets. Housing not prison. Democratic justice not fascistic treatment. We all want peace, but peace of free men.” It was clear to the Huks that land reform was an impossibility as long as the state continued to allow landlord armies and the MPs continued to target and arrest peasant activists.

Despite Taruc’s call for “food not bullets,” there was a larger problem the DA posed to the Roxas administration, which was their opposition to the “Parity Amendment.” In this case, “parity,” or as it was sometimes called by the Philippine Press, “the Equal Rights Amendment,” meant that American citizens would have the same rights to the development of Philippine natural resources as Philippine citizens. This call

79 “Peasants appeal to Roxas” June 6th 1946, Manila Times.
80 “Taruc Scores Truce Break, Says Terrorism Continues” Manila Times, June 27th, 1946.
for “parity” required an amendment to the 1934 Philippine Constitution, which stated that Filipinos must own 60 percent of any enterprise. For critics of parity, the bill was seen as one that would further entrench the development of principal Philippine export products, which heavily favored American business interests. American businessmen were also able to import products into the Philippines free of duty, quotas, and price ceilings, preventing the development of a diversified industrial economy.\textsuperscript{81} At the same time, Filipino businessmen were forbidden to export their major products to countries other than the United States, even though these countries may have offered higher prices. Thus, American businesspeople were given the same privileges in the Philippines with regard to property, business, and industry as those enjoyed by Filipinos.\textsuperscript{82} Also included in the Trade Act were terms that “provided that free trade will exist for a period of eight years, followed by a twenty year period of gradual imposition of tariffs until, by 1974, the full duty will be paid. Maximum duty-free quotas are provided for coconut oil, copra, sugar, and hemp.”\textsuperscript{83} The four products identified in the Trade Act were the primary products of the colonial economy, thus ensuring that, despite the promises of the bill’s promoters in Washington, the Philippine economy would remain “a four-product economy.”\textsuperscript{84}

In an example of the unequal political economic terms that defined the relationship between the U.S. and the Philippines, U.S. policymakers tied the Trade Act

\textsuperscript{81} The Bell Trade Act of 1946, which largely set the terms of Philippine Independence, and the Bell Mission, also called the Bell Report, should not be confused. The Bell Mission was an economic survey of the Philippines conducted by a team of Americans. A report, with detailed policy recommendations, was published in 1950.
\textsuperscript{83} Bernard Seeman and Laurence Salisbury, “Cross-Currents in the Philippines,” Institute of Pacific Relations, Laurence E. Salisbury Papers, Box 3, Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
\textsuperscript{84} Bernard and Salisbury, 57.
to its Bill to provide funds for war rehabilitation. Thus, if the Philippine legislature failed to pass the Bell Trade Act, then the United States reserved the right to withhold promised payments for war rehabilitation projects in the Philippines. Roxas, speaking on the supposed benefits of the Trade Act, argued that the United States pushed for the bill, “because America realizes that her obligation was to liberate our country and help ensure the security of our freedom.” In order to pass the constitutional amendment, Roxas first had to eliminate the votes and influence of the DA representatives, and therefore, he refused to allow the representatives their seats in the Philippine legislature on charges of fraud and electoral violence.

While Taruc spoke of access to food and democratic justices as the characteristics that define “free men,” Roxas, through his defense of the Bell Trade Act, aligned economic development and continued ties to the United States with the “security of freedom.” The two “freedoms” articulated by Roxas and Taruc, indicate what the stakes were for the Philippine Republic. Roxas, speaking on behalf of elites who sought foreign investment as a means in which to spur growth for the Philippine economy saw parity as a form of security, but this particular security demand the financial power of American capitalist. “Capital is shy,” Roxas spoke, “capital will not go to any country unless it is sure that it is welcome. That is why we propose to give certain concessions to American investors.” American investment, for Roxas, ensured that the Philippines would grow economically, and thus enjoy freedom. Taruc, acting as a spokesman for the peasants, equated freedom with democratic representation, civil rights, and the necessary

redistribution of land, the state’s primary resource. In September of 1946, the Parity Amendment passed and Roxas continued to refuse the DA candidates their seats, in effect denying representation to thousands of peasants across the provincial countryside of Central Luzon.

The First Cold War Casualty: Remobilizing U.S. Military Aid to the Philippines and the International Order

On April 15th 1948 Manuel Acuña Roxas stepped in front of the microphone and gave the last speech of his life, only five weeks after declaring the Huks an illegal organization. Standing on the tarmac of the United States’ largest military base outside of the U.S., Roxas spoke to the Thirteenth Air-Force division about the implications of a quickly developing Cold War. During his speech Roxas argued that if another war were to engulf the Philippines, he was certain that “Americans and Filipinos will again fight side by side.” After the speech, Roxas retired to the residence of Major General Eugene L. Eubank, who had been stationed as commander of the 13th Air Force since July of 1946. By the next morning, Roxas was dead at the age of 56. Speaking a few days later to a graduating class in Mindanao, Maximo Kalaw, a Philippine political scientist with a PhD from the University of Michigan and delegate to the organizational meeting of the UN, claimed, “President Roxas was the first casualty in the cold war between Democracy and Communism.” Kalaw argued that “democracies do not want war” but that they are

88 This construction of Philippine communism as an element of, what was being discursively manufactured as a global communist movement, worked to justify the U.S. intervention in Philippine military politics that included the continued presence and expansion of the twenty-three U.S. military installations in the islands. The alliance with the United States, and particularly the financial aid, military prowess, and projected power of the U.S., helped Philippine elites consolidate the hierarchal power relations that defined the Philippine social and political order since the colonial period. In the next chapter I delve into how the
“prepared for it” and that Roxas’ policies had committed the Philippines to “the side of all freedom-loving countries.” Although Roxas had died from an apparent heart attack, Kalaw asserted that because the President’s death “was a great loss to the democracies,” Roxas should be remembered as a casualty in the great “ideological conflict” between “countries espousing the Communist cause and democratic governments.”

The death of Roxas on a U.S. military base carries important symbolic significance. Roxas, a leader who aligned his policies closely to those sought by U.S. diplomats, spent his career positioning Philippine interests as congruent with American military and business interests. U.S. military bases on Philippine soil represented these ideological and political commitments. At the same time, however, they exposed deep tensions in the transition from colonial outpost to independent nation, since the United States insisted on retaining a strong and permanent military presence in its former colony, to which it was supposedly granting full sovereignty. US military commanders used the Cold War to justify the retention of U.S. bases in a foreign sovereign country as good for both the United States and for the Philippines. The final section of this chapter explores how the United States remobilized military aid so that the Philippine state could eradicate the armed Huk insurgency and reclaim a monopoly on violence. For U.S. military planners, the mobilization of aid to the Philippines served the dual purpose of aiding the Philippine state and providing the U.S. a “forward base” in the Pacific.

Nearly two years after official independence was declared on July 4, 1946, the U.S. maintained twenty-three military bases in the islands as well as dozens of other

remobilization of U.S. military aid to the Philippines was also the result of Filipino politicians who argued that the Huk insurgency was not simply a problem of local politics but an indication of a growing international communist threat.

89 “Roxas Cold War Casualty—Kalaw,” April 19 1948, Manila Times.
“military installations.” In fact, throughout most of the Cold War years the two largest U.S. overseas military bases were located within a short distance of the Philippine capital. Clark Air Force base was the largest, and was a site for the U.S military since 1903 when it was first named Fort Stotsenburg after a Philippine-American War casualty, John M. Stotsenburg. Subic Bay, the largest U.S. Navy installation in the Pacific, second only to Clark Air Force base in overall size, was expanded during the 1950s due to a 100 million dollar improvement project to construct a naval air station. Upwards of 15,000 Filipino day laborers worked on each base, making these two U.S. military bases some of the largest sources of employment for Filipinos during the postwar years.

A 1946 State Department telegram, sent from Moscow, reveals that the Soviet Union had also taken notice of both the United States support of the Roxas administrations “mailed fist” policy against the Huks as well as the continued military presence of the United States in the Philippines. The telegram reported that a recent editorial in the Soviet Navy’s newspaper, called The Red Fleet, argued that “in somewhat more than three months in which Roxas govt has been in power it has set up suppressing national democratic movement on instructions of and with aid of reactionary American leaders” and that “Roxas troops are generally eliminating all opposition with anti-democratic laws.” By calling attention to the colonial relationship between the United States and the Philippines, the editorial argued that the continued presence of the U.S. military in the islands “established an occupational regime” that in turn forced Roxas to defend “American colonial interests” instead of those of the Philippine people.90

The “occupational regime” that the Soviet Navy foresaw in 1946 was solidified by the 1947 Military Assistance Bill, which U.S. policymakers tied to a bill for War

90 Department of State, Incoming Telegram, October 10th, 1946, RG 896.00/10-2146, National Archives.
Rehabilitation dollars to secure its passage in the Philippines. The bill allowed for the United States to retain complete sovereignty over base territory. While allowing the United States to retain bases might seem to indicate that Filipino politicians had simply traded complete sovereignty of their territories for much needed war rehabilitation funds, the bases offered more to the nation than just a bargaining chip for the oligarchy of elites that dominated Filipino politics. The bases also offered a psychological reminder to the Philippine population that the United States military would remain in the islands; U.S. troops ready to defend the Philippine state from external attack. Although the United States guaranteed to offer military protection only in the event of attack from an external force, the establishment of the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) in the Philippines signified that the U.S. military would be more involved in Philippine politics through its involvement in the internal military affairs of the Philippine Armed Forces. In addition to pushing for a reorganization of the Philippine military, JUSMAG also worked to “advise” the Philippine military in the tactics of counterinsurgency.  

During the late 1940s, this type of training was directed at the internecine warfare in the provinces of Central Luzon and the “common banditry” and “lawlessness” in the Muslim dominated provinces of Mindanao. In this way, the bases, JUSMAG, and the flood of military aid that poured into the Philippines in the late 1940s and early 1950s represented a further affirmation of the state’s violent campaign against the Huks. In May 1948, two years after the *Manila Times* ran their series on violence in the provinces of Central Luzon, the U.S. Army Philrycom Headquarters issued a report that raised concern over the

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91 The second chapter of this dissertation has a full discussion of JUSMAG and counterinsurgency.
92 Throughout the first 5 years of independence in the Philippines the *Manila Times* regularly ran stories of gun related crimes, usually armed robbery. The *Times* also ran extended stories on Moro “rebels” and “bandits” in Mindanao. On loose firearms in Mindanao see: Abinales, *Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the Formation of the Philippine Nation-State*.125.
continuation of “lawlessness” and the inability of the Philippine state to mediate the situation. “Despite an apparent lull in lawless activity,” which the Army identified as a result of a presidential order that outlawed the Huks and the Partido ng Kommunista, “dissident elements will continue to constitute a potential threat to the restoration of peace and order in the islands, and will continue to imperil American lives and property.”

The chaotic fighting in the Philippines slowly began to receive international attention as the violence in the country, which the U.S. upheld as a model for colonial management and postcolonial transition, began to look more like that of neighboring territories—particularly the French colony of Vietnam and the British colony of Malaya. For the United States and Filipino political elite, this comparison was unacceptable, because it revealed the ways that the Philippines struggled with the structural legacies of colonialism, an image that ran contrary to what the U.S. and Filipino political elites aimed to project internationally. Perhaps the two deepest legacies, both contributing elements to the Huk rebellion, were the political economy of land and agriculture and the empowerment of the PC to act as a national police force charged with maintaining the colonial and postcolonial order.

Yet, given that the Philippines was being upheld and used as the example of postcolonial democracy, an explanation that took the Huks’ analysis of land and excesses of state policing seriously would threaten to delegitimize a colonial project that had been

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93 “The Status of Major Interim Tasks in the Philippines as Presented to the Inspector General, Department of the Army,” Edward Lansdale Papers, Hoover Institute, Stanford University.
94 In a March 6th 1952 memo titled “Principal U.S. objectives and Problems in Malaya summarized for the Information of Ambassador Myron Cowen,” the insurgency in Malaya is attributed to an “alien Communist movement, 95% Chinese, and not a ‘grass-roots’ nationalist movement.” While the memo recognizes the British and does “not question her role as tutor in Malayan political, social, and economic development” it also signals that “the signs of basic differences of opinion between the United States and Britain in the Far East” pertain to “the recognition of Communist China.” Myron Cowen Papers, Truman Library.
set into motion by the U.S. over the past fifty years. In this context, the state’s failure to retain a monopoly on violence demanded a solution. The United States’ intervened by providing military advisors and military aid in order to uphold the image of the Philippines as the “showcase of democracy” in Asia. Despite the fact that numerous Filipino politicians had a “feeling that the aid extended by the United States has been less than desired,” and that U.S. embassies in Manila were quite aware of “public apprehension” that “in the case of another major war the Philippines might again go through the painful cycle of invasion, occupation, and liberation,” American military involvement in Philippine politics only increased. Simply put, the embassy was cognizant that a U.S. military presence could spark public fears that the Philippines would, again, be caught between warring nations like it had during World War II.

The United States’ engagement with the postwar violence in the Philippines is not an isolated incident, but one deeply entwined in the contingent politics of the region and the globe. Indeed, U.S. military support of the Philippine state aimed to end violence in the islands and to legitimate the state for a world audience—which demanded that the Philippine government be the sole source of law and order. Ensuring that the Philippine state controlled the economy of violence in the country, even if it meant suppressing its own population, was critical to confirming that the state would be legible in the newly defined system of interlocking sovereign nations. For U.S. administrators this was a critical piece of global politics because it would explicitly prove to the world that the Philippines had benefited and learned from U.S. colonialism and by extension prove that contemporary U.S. interventions were not in the vein of colonial ambitions but rather represented a new, altruistic vision of global peace and stability. U.S. military aid,
requested by Filipino politicians and military leaders, coupled with claims that the Philippines was a postcolonial model state in Asia and the Pacific, worked to legitimize state violence as an acceptable means of managing dissent or protest.

The U.S. obsession with the construction of a liberal order, both in the Philippines and internationally, paired with the view that the Philippine state had failed to tame a populist unrest amongst the islands densest population of peasants in Luzon, reveals a seeming paradox of U.S. strategy in the islands. That is, if there was doubt amongst U.S. policymakers about the abilities of the Roxas administration to contain the elements of disorder and violence in the countryside, identified as peasant radicalism, Philippine Constabulary terror, and the excesses of extrajudicial violence at the hands of landlord militias, then why did the U.S. state proceed to give the state millions of dollars of military aid? Would not this type of aid, increase the likelihood of additional violence? Looking to the scale of U.S. global power easily unravels this paradox of military aid and state violence.

Liberalism, with a capitalist market economy, might have been the rhetorical position of the United States and its hegemonic allies, but this often meant that non-liberal politics on the local level could be sacrificed in the name of maintaining a global level of liberalism. Ultimately, this chapter has demonstrated that the on-the-ground violence in the Philippines was the result of the resistance of those with alternative visions of independence to the liberal perspective that was posited by U.S. policymakers and Philippine elites. Local resistance struggles made it an imperative for military force to discipline national populations into accepting a liberal order that was based on the power relations defined by the United States and their transnational allies. Although

Americans, such as former Philippine Commissioner Paul McNutt, framed American policy in the Philippines as “mutually beneficial,” he also argued in 1948 that “the expansion of the economic horizons of the entire Orient is the surest way I know not only to expand our own trade and promote our business and commercial interests, but also to serve the more transcendental cause of world democracy.” Like many American policymakers and Filipino elites, McNutt’s view that open economic markets were inherently linked to a definition of “world democracy” reveals one way in which global liberalism was defined. Because a market economy and the U.S. policy to “promote democracy” were discursively linked, the willingness of the Philippine state to the use of military force and U.S. policymaker’s willingness to disburse aid in support of the state’s use of force meant that militaries also served the purpose of postwar market expansion. While market expansion might not be a legitimate reason for the use of military force, the protection or promotion of democracy, in the face of global communism, was a justifiable use of force.

The problem of communism, as perceived by U.S. policymakers was that in its most basic rhetoric it proposed (or imagined) an alternative system for international organization. Indeed, instead of a system of nation-states, communism referenced a utopian global vision of international working class solidarity—not on individual rights based in the sovereignty of separate, but ostensibly equal, liberal nations. However, on the ground, communism looked vastly different than in theory. Not unlike many of the communist inspired activists of the postwar era, the Huks and the PKP were undoubtedly Philippine nationalists and therefore supportive of the international organization of

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nation-states rather. Still, for the U.S. policymakers and their Philippine allies these nuances of Philippine communism mattered little—what mattered was that communism seemed to provide a language of creating an alternative social movement that could and would threaten the elites who dominated Philippine politics, and by extension the ability of the United States to maintain its’ influence in the region.

The PKP and the Huks ultimately sought a reconfiguration of a colonial social and economic order for the majority population of Filipinos. Elites, on the other hand, argued that capitalism was the only method for organizing economic relations within a democratic society. The threats of the postwar Philippine left—which had in the prewar era been organized around peasant living conditions and was, based in popular anti-imperialist language—shifted towards linking independence to modern, particularly U.S. driven, capitalism. Although it is clear that peasant activists had many reasons for joining the Huks, in the leadership’s rhetoric, capitalism was seen as the problem because it subjected peasants in the Philippines to the capitalist world market and therefore infringed on their ability to obtain full-independence.

The momentum to build an anti-communist movement—in which alternative visions of independence and statehood flourished—began in the late 1920s and 1930s when colonial elites and U.S. allies sought to eradicate non-capitalist vision through juridical means. While this was coupled with a movement, led by landlords and their militias, to terrorize activists in the provinces—an area in which the colonial state had failed to fully penetrate and govern—it was not until the postwar era that the Philippine state, with the help of U.S. military aid, could sustain and justify to its population an extended campaign of violence and repression. While the ruling elite in the Philippines
sought military aid from the United States in order to solidify their control over the political avenues of power, U.S. administrators viewed the rampant violence in the Philippines as an indication that the state was failing to discipline its population, and therefore, more military aid was disbursed in order to project U.S. power in Asia, to discipline the Philippine state into more efficient and legitimate means of violence, and to signify to the world that Philippine democracy functioned as well as Americans and Philippine politicians claimed that it did.

**Conclusion: America’s Arsenal of Freedom**

On November 9, 1950, Philippine Secretary of Defense Ramon Magsaysay stood on the parade grounds of Camp Murphy, the headquarters of the Philippine Army, to introduce the American Ambassador, Myron Cowen, to a crowd of Philippine Armed Forces Officers and enlisted men. In addition to a set of speeches, the occasion was accompanied by a parade of celebration for Cowen, who had recently been offered a new position as American ambassador to Belgium. Camp Murphy, named after Frank Murphy, the last American Governor-General of the Philippines, harkened to the period of colonial rule that had defined the relationship between the two nations for over half a century. Camp Murphy’s colonial appellation was a stark reminder of a lasting American presence in Philippine military politics. Yet, in Magsaysay’s speech there was no indication that the fifty-year period of American colonial occupation had resulted in any animosity or disdain for the Philippines’ former colonizer. By 1950, four years after the U.S. granted Philippine independence, a language of friendship, harmony, and gratitude peppered Magsaysay’s characteristically short speech. Speaking of Cowen, Magsaysay
stated, “within the little time at his disposal [Cowen] was able to do much and what he did was what he wanted most. This was his warm testimonial of friendship to us.” Magsaysay’s cordiality was not directed only at Cowen but also to the “harmonious relations that have always been typical of Filipino-American amity.”

Speaking from a military base, which was the headquarters for an ongoing counter-insurgency campaign bankrolled by U.S. foreign aid, Magsaysay’s choice of the word “amity,” or a peaceful accord, strikes a strange chord. In fact, in the years since independence, a staggering amount of gun violence, fraudulent elections, and a remobilized U.S military presence marred Philippine politics. Indeed, through Cowen’s efforts, according to Magsaysay, “the Republic of the Philippines was brought into alliance with the vast military power of the United States.” The fight against Philippine Communism, according to Magsaysay and the U.S. military, State Department, and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was rooted in “the serious agrarian reform problem of the Central Luzon plain” but the “leadership, however, has been taken over by Communists.”

Linking the U.S. military’s support to the current political conflicts in the Philippines, Magsaysay argued, “the American arsenal of freedom has equipped our eager fighting men for the task of helping us out within our borders against the scourge of communism.” While U.S. policymakers intended to retain bases in the Philippines after independence, it is clear that without the appeal to domestic communism and the shifting

97 “Speech delivered by Secretary Magsaysay at the Camp Murphy Parade Ground,” November 9th, 1950. Ramon Magsaysay Papers, Magsaysay Center, Manila.
100 “Speech delivered by Secretary Magsaysay at the Camp Murphy Parade Ground,” November 9th, 1950. Ramon Magsaysay Papers, Magsaysay Center, Manila.
political context in Asia, U.S. foreign aid, including military aid, would not have been as generous.

Despite a pervasive discourse of a “mutual feeling of genuine friendship,” the Philippines, unlike like Western Europe and Japan, did not receive a large disbursement of U.S. aid in the immediate postwar years.\(^{101}\) Although the U.S. in public rhetoric had committed resources to the rehabilitation of the badly war damaged nation, and in theory, it had sought to develop the country in order to lure foreign capital, in practice the reconstruction of the Philippines did not rank high on the list of postwar priorities for the globally active US state—in part because the Philippines comprised such a small piece of U.S. foreign investment dollars in comparison to Western Europe. From the perspective of U.S. policymaker’s, without a resurgent Europe and Japan—the political economy underwriting the U.S. vision of universal democracy and statehood would collapse. It was not until the Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War, the rise in Philippine elites complaints about the threat of domestic communism, and the continued failure of the Philippine state to control violence in the Philippines, that the United States brought attention back to its former colony.

Magsaysay’s thankfulness to the “American arsenal of freedom” for their “amity” in “helping us out” illustrates how a local political issue of land inequality could be discursively displaced by an interpretation of the Huks as representatives of an arm of the global, “Moscow-directed,” communist movement. The label of “communist” was mobilized for political reasons and this worked to oversimplify and dilute the specificity

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of local grievances. In the Philippines, U.S. policymakers and Philippine politicians
framed the violent repression of locally rooted organizations within global terms, and by
extension, this framing legitimated the use of violent force as it was hidden under an
abstract banner of national and global security. Although the struggle between the
Philippine state and the allegedly communistic Huks had violent beginnings in the
immediate aftermath of the Second World War, the influx of U.S. military aid and the
support that Washington lent to the Roxas and subsequently Quirino administrations
reveals how state violence continued to be central way to the ways that the Philippines
was constructed and reconstructed as an internationally recognized modern state.
Chapter Two:
Globalizing “Huklandia”: Transnational Counterinsurgency Networks

On June 15th 1961, at the Fort Bragg U.S. Military installation in North Carolina, three Filipinos, all veterans of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and two Americans conducted a daylong seminar on counterinsurgent warfare for a class of international military officers. The seminar, titled “Counter-Guerilla Operations in the Philippines, 1946-1953” featured Edward Lansdale. At the time, Lansdale was serving as a “special operations” advisor for the U.S. Department of Defense, after having spent the first half of the 1950s working for the U.S. Air Force and the CIA in both the Philippines and Vietnam and eventually, in 1957, Robert McNamara’s Pentagon.

Lansdale opened the seminar with words that linked the local campaign in the Philippines with its “classic,” or in other words global and universalized mission: “We have met here today to talk about a counter-guerilla campaign which has become a classic in our time—the Huk campaign in the Philippines.” Lansdale had organized the conference and invited four additional speakers; men whom he referred to as his “fellow gremlins,” a mythical creature whose World War II origins were specifically associated

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with the mechanical sabotage of aircraft. All had been his collaborators as he orchestrated the Philippine-led and U.S. assisted counterinsurgency effort. The lecturers, Lansdale emphasized, were “from different services and from different nations” and included: Medardo T. Justiniano, a Filipino intelligence operator; Napoleon Valeriano, a combat commander; Ismael Lapus, head of G-2, the intelligence division of the Philippine Armed Forces; and Major Charles Bohannan, a U.S. veteran and American adviser to the Philippine Armed Forces. Throughout the duration of the seminar this cross-national cohort argued that the campaign in the Philippines deserved attention because it was “classic in its lesson of the strategy and tactics that win” and its demonstration of “economy of force.” For Lansdale, economy of force did not mean that the use of concentrated military might was restrained in the mountains and plains of Central Luzon. And despite his implication that force was employed parsimoniously, it did not mean that Philippine civilians escaped the violence. In fact civilians were regularly subject to zoning and napalm, as well aerial strafe bombing.

The economy of force, for Lansdale and his cohort, simply meant that the strategic policy goals of the U.S. and the Philippine state were met by an indigenous police force, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), with limited financial and

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1 At Fort Bragg, Lansdale claimed that, “rather than bring you these lessons in the usual way—through lectures and books—we are going to try something a little different.” Instead of a single lecturer, Lansdale chose to include four additional speakers who he “shared many experiences” with during the eight-year campaign against the Huk.


3 Napalm, a blend of aluminum naphthenic, aluminum palmitate, and gasoline was first used by allied troops during the Second World War. During the liberation of the Philippines, U.S. forces used one million gallons of the gelatinous weapon. The use of napalm as a weapon of war came under criticism during the Korean War, in which the U.S. Air Force dropped 30,000 tons. American forces in Vietnam reportedly used 400,000 tons of Napalm-B, an updated chemical formula. James Ledbetter, *Unwarranted Influence: Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Military-Industrial Complex* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011); Sahr Conway-Lanz, *Collateral Damage: Americans, Noncombatant Immunity, and Atrocity after World War II* (New York: Routledge, 2006).
advisory support from the United States. The United States, through the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) stationed in the Philippines, served as “combat advisors” and, perhaps most importantly, provided the military supplies and finances necessary to meet the oversized budget of the AFP.⁴ Even before the Philippines gained independence on July 4th, 1946, the United States had already furnished nearly 100 million dollars in military aid. However, a bulk of this aid arrived in the form of “surplus munitions,” weaponry and supplies left in islands at the conclusion of WWII.⁵

A Philippine political elite that had long dominated the economic and political avenues of power in the islands lobbied heavily for increased U.S. military aid in 1949 and 1950. In order to receive the aid however, the Joint Intelligence Committee of the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) required the Philippine state to reform the AFP, charging the army with “widespread abuses of police authority by all law-enforcing groups.”⁶ With Military Police (MP) abuse regularly cited as one source of the ongoing conflict in Luzon, U.S. policymakers envisioned a reformed AFP that would eventually lead to a decisive victory against the Huks. The Philippine political elite, though fractured along regional and kinship lines, largely benefited from U.S. intervention as the Huks represented the greatest threat to their relatively unified vision of political economy in an independent Philippines.

As in many counterinsurgent wars in the twentieth century, U.S military advisors cited communist violence, not debates over the local and global contours of political

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⁵ Pach, Arming the Free World: The Origins of the United States Military Assistance Program, 1945-1950. See chapter one of this dissertation for a fuller discussion of surplus weaponry.
economy, as the cause of war. Moreover, military officials assessed the Philippines campaign on a binary scale of “success” or “failure,” with success marked only by the reduction in the number of Huks cited in military intelligence reports. Undeniably, by narrow military standards, the American advisory role in the Philippines was a success. Unlike the Korean War, which overlapped with the dates of the Huk campaign and cost 50,000 American lives, not a single U.S. soldier was killed in the counterinsurgent war against the Huks. Although the international press regularly cited land inequality and abusive MP tactics as the primary points tension between peasants and the state, American military advisors used an entirely different set of criteria to judge the success of the military operation. For both the American and Philippine militaries, success did not mean the resolution of these terms of the struggle. Instead, success was simply judged by the ability of the Philippine Army to eradicate the “communist threat” with limited U.S. advisory and financial support, and with no U.S. troops on the ground.

Yet even more than the on-the-ground victory for what policymakers in Washington considered “a secure ally,” the Huk defeat represented an enticing new strategy for U.S. intervention in the recently termed Third World. In fact, the U.S. role in the Huk campaign was markedly different than the contemporaneous conflict on the

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8 Bruce Cummings estimates that there were 4 million casualties during the Korean War, 2 million of which were civilian. 36,940 Americans lost their lives while another 92,134 were wounded in action. The South Korean forces suffered over a million casualties, while North Korea suffered two million and Chinese forces suffered 900,000. Bruce Cumings, *The Korean War: A History*, 1st ed., Modern Library Chronicles (New York: Modern Library, 2010). 35.

9 Douglas J. Macdonald, *Adventures in Chaos: American Intervention for Reform in the Third World* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992). The term “Third World” was used to describe countries that were neither part of the capitalist or communist blocs and is often attributed to Alfred Sauvy, French demographer use of the term in a 1952 publication. Arturo Escobar explores the discursive origins of the geographic demarcation of the Third World in Escobar, *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World*. 

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Korean peninsula. Officially classified as a “police action,” American President, Harry Truman, and the Pentagon conveyed to a war weary American public the necessity of sending American troops to Korea. What made the intervention in the Philippines unique and for many policymakers ideal, is that it offered a model that allowed military analysts and policymakers to believe that instead of envisioning the U.S. military serving as the boots on the ground of a global police force, the U.S. military could instead provide aid and advisement in order to achieve U.S. policy goals. This prototype for future warfare necessitated that U.S. advisors guide strong national leaders in the creation of internal security apparatuses, including national armies and police forces as well as intelligence organizations and customs bureaus, designed to sustain the American driven postwar liberal-capitalist order.

Indeed, the development of national armed forces was paramount to the vision of postcolonial statehood that Lansdale and his anti-communist cohort of counterinsurgency experts advocated. Speaking before another class of military officers at the U.S. Army Civil Affairs School at Ford Gordon, Georgia in 1960, Lansdale argued that “in many countries today, the national armed forces have a role which is quite different from the classical one of defending borders or undertaking conquest.” The U.S. role, therefore, needed to be “concerned that these armed forces are used effectively to build a security in

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11 Andrew Wyatt-Walter argues that “the main legacy of post-war power and purpose of the United States was the Bretton Woods international monetary system and the GATT-based multilateral trade regime” According to Catherine R. Shenk, Trade liberalization and currency convertibility were, for U.S policymakers, linked as crucial elements to postwar global prosperity. The International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop did not hasten economic recovery in Western Europe as hoped. The Marshall Plan, announced in June 1947, was implemented in order to counteract a perceived threat of communist revolution and to quicken the pace of economic recovery in growth in Europe and strengthen the European market for American goods. Shenk, *International Economic Relations Since 1945*. Andrew Wyatt-Walter, “The United States and Western Europe” in Woods, *Explaining International Relations Since 1945*.
which the nation can grow strong, independent” and become “our life-long friend.”

Lansdale’s vision of the U.S. cultivation of national armies likely appealed to American policymakers concerned over the increasing fiscal commitments of U.S. foreign policies. The development of a national army was also central to Lansdale’s interpretation of the U.S. role in the Philippine campaign and, therefore, also central to his presentations on winning future counterinsurgent wars.

The job of Americans, according to Lansdale, was ideally not to fight wars against communists but instead to guide the underdeveloped armies of foreign nations. Ultimately he sought to create a vast conglomerate of the world’s armed forces “in a struggle against international Communism.” Yet, while Lansdale drew upon a universalizing and abstract definition of the Cold War as a struggle “between man’s liberty as a free individual and man’s slavery as a possession of the state,” he also acknowledged that the Cold War was not simply an ideological battle. Instead, he taught his military students that, “the real battleground in today’s conflict is down at the grassroots, among the people of a nation.”

Drawing directly from the Huk campaign, Lansdale claimed that independent national armies were essential to counterinsurgent wars because it was the Army that “must win over the population” and become “politically identified with the people.” The role for U.S. GIs was clear; Lansdale repeatedly instructed U.S. soldiers that their behavior in foreign countries must convince foreign populations and armies that

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Americans were present in these countries only to assist in the “true security of the nation against the half-hidden attacks of the Communists.” In this regard, Lansdale consistently advocated for U.S. military personnel to “behave with true military courtesy.” “Do not,” he insisted, “discredit the authority of those you are trying to help.”

With both the U.S. and Philippine states framing the Huk Rebellion as a struggle between democracy and communism, Americans continually portrayed their role in the campaign as a further step towards global democratization and the preservation of the “Free World.” This aspect of the counterinsurgency theories put forth by Lansdale roundly appealed to U.S. military advisors because it nurtured a U.S. fantasy that contemporary interventions, or postcolonial military engagements, were markedly different from colonial ones.

This chapter explores a transnational group of Americans and Filipinos that mobilized anti-communist politics with the aim of eradicating the political visions of the Huk movement in the Philippines. This mobilization resulted in an increased militarization of Philippine society through the millions of dollars of U.S. military aid that flowed into the country, a multi-year counterinsurgency campaign that targeted all peasants in Central Luzon, and the criminalization of a range of leftist political philosophies. Importantly, unlike in previous years, the rise in anti-communist violence in the Philippines did not hinge simply on the local or national political frame in which the Huks were positioned as threats to the Philippine social and political order. The Huks had always been recognized as either socialist or communist inspired. But the Huks only became firmly framed within the international context of a global Cold War through the

U.S. response to a rise in multiple, communist inspired, anti-colonial movements throughout Asia.

This latest anti-communist formulation, which gained traction and momentum from its global referent, intensified as the Huk movement expanded in popularity during the late 1940s. By 1950, an anti-communist discourse that drew its potency from a naturalized understanding of international geopolitics depicted Huk leaders as nothing less than agents of a Stalinist master plan. In this transnationally constructed vision, the peasants of Central Luzon, who constituted the political base of the Huks, were presented as brainwashed, duped, and even enslaved by the slick propaganda of Communist agents. In effect, the mass base of the Huk movement was emptied of political consciousness, history, and agency.16

Importantly, it was the networks of anti-communism and U.S. global power—utilized by Lansdale and his cohort—that allowed for the spread of their counterinsurgency doctrine gleaned from the “Philippine Experience.” The prophetic claim of Philippine and American Military officials that “Americans should study the Communist campaign which was waged in the Philippines because it may be a harbinger of a type of warfare to come” was put in motion through transnational circuits of power, many of which grew out of the increasing militarization of the Cold War.17 These international paths of U.S. power ran through the CIA, the State Department, the Department of Defense, as well as their counterpart agencies in foreign nations—many of

which received direct training from U.S. advisors. This global spread of
counterinsurgency doctrine, alongside the disproportionally influential political
economies of U.S. military aid, shaped the contours of the Cold War as well as the on-
the-ground politics in countless locales.

The first section of this chapter explores how the 1949 presidential elections in
the Philippines reoriented American policy. Since WWII, U.S. officials stationed in
Manila had noted the potentially destabilizing effects of the Huk movement; yet it was
not until the aftermath of the 1949 elections that U.S. Defense Department officials and
the Philippine politicians came together to claim that the Philippines was yet another site
in an emerging conflict against global communism. This assessment hinged on the
international context of 1950 as well as the inability of the Roxas and Quirino
administrations to quell the peasant uprising in the Philippines. This section also
uncovers the activities of anti-communist agents in the Philippines who, with funding
from the U.S. government, disbursed Tagalog language propaganda throughout Luzon in
order to convince the population that communist promises of land reform functioned as
smoke screens for a Soviet takeover of the Philippine state. In these materials communist
ideology is, in Lansdalian fashion, equated with slavery to the state while American
democracy is posited as the liberation of the individual. The final section demonstrates
the transnational promotion of Ramon Magsaysay, Philippine Secretary of Defense,
future Philippine president, and renowned “Huk-killer.” Philippine and American
policymakers’ portrayal of Magsaysay’s decisive defeat of the Huks as the “first victory”
for the Free World against Asian communism facilitated the spread of counterinsurgency
theories developed during the Huk Rebellion.
Alongside the history of the weakening of the Huk movement, this chapter also reveals the origins of a global network of influential anti-communist counterinsurgency experts. This point should not be understated. Indeed, Lansdale’s alignment with a group of corrupt, violent, and controlling military officials in the Philippines, their propensity to “experiment” in psychological warfare, and their ultimate success in eradicating the political voice and vision of mid-century communist-inspired peasant activist movements undoubtedly shaped the course of twentieth century global history.\(^{18}\) Finally, this chapter demonstrates a distinct way that the Cold War, largely understood as a global conflict, is best understood through the intersections of myriad fragments of local histories. Following the network of Lansdale and his counterinsurgency cohort, I demonstrate how global politics infiltrated local conflicts and then how anticommunist actors, motivated by global ambitions, re-translated local politics back into global dimensions. Lansdale’s cohort translated the Philippine states’ conflict with the Huks from a local movement to a front in a global war. By mobilizing a spatial politics that reoriented the relationship between local and global geographic scales, Lansdale’s counterinsurgency experts were continuously able to extract and package the “lessons” from the Philippines into a universally applicable case of successful anti-communist warfare.

“True Brother Officers”: A Transnational Anti-Communist Cohort

\(^{18}\) Though outside of the scope of this chapter, it is important to note that Lansdale and his cohort also promoted a domestic role for national militaries termed “civilian action” or “civil action.” In a counterinsurgent war, troops assigned to civilian action detail worked to provide economic and social services to local populations. In 1965, President Ferdinand Marcos sent the Philippine Civil Action Group (PHILCAG), comprised of 2,300 Philippine troops, to serve alongside U.S. civilian action teams in Vietnam. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*; Robert M. Blackburn, *Mercenaries and Lyndon Johnson's "More Flags": The hiring of Korean, Filipino, and Thai Soldiers in the Vietnam War* (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 1994).
“You may be killed by a guerilla.” These simple, provocative words opened Napoleon Valeriano and Charles Bohannan’s counterinsurgency textbook published in 1962 and titled, *Counter-Guerilla Operations: The Philippine Experience*. Bohannan and Valeriano’s introductory phrase laid bare the severe tone that Valeriano and Bohannan attributed to the topic of guerilla warfare and their experiences in the Philippines. The textbook’s opening line also spoke to the authors’ extensive experience in the development of strategies and practices of counterinsurgent warfare. Indeed, by 1962 both Valeriano and Bohannan had spent long periods of their lives in combat. The American, Charles Bohannan, trained as an anthropologist and geologist, survived the Bataan Death March and spent the length of WWII as part of the Philippine resistance movement against the Japanese occupation. According to his biography, Bohannan “returned to the newly independent Philippine Republic in 1946 and, for the next three years, participated in the anti-Huk campaign as a counterintelligence officer.” This period was followed by a stint at the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) in the Philippines where he worked with Lansdale as an “unconventional operations” advisor to the AFP.19 In addition to his engagements in the Philippines, Bohannan traveled with Lansdale to Saigon in 1954 as part of the Saigon Military Mission (SMM) and later served as counterinsurgency advisor for the U.S. Colombia Survey Team in 1959. After his trip to Colombia, Bohannan “teamed with Valeriano to train anti-Castro forces in the Florida swamps.”20

Valeriano, also a veteran of the anti-Japanese resistance in the Philippines during WWII, graduated from both the Philippine Military Academy and the U.S. Calvary

19 *Counterinsurgency: A Symposium, April 16-20 1962* (Santa Monica, CA: the RAND Corporation)
School. Valeriano also “served as a military assistant to President Magsaysay; commander of the Presidential Guards Battalion; Secretary to the Philippine National Security Council; and National Security coordinator for the Philippines.” Like Bohannan, Valeriano also traveled to Vietnam with Lansdale in 1954 before becoming the Philippine Military Attaché to Thailand and the Philippines’ representative to the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO). Whereas Valeriano resigned from his position with the Philippine state in 1957, his career as an expert in counterinsurgent warfare took him, along with Bohannan, first to Colombia and then to a position as a trainer for anti-Castro forces preparing for the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion.

At the outset of the 1950s, however, Valeriano’s career as a Major in the Philippine Military Police looked grim. In 1949, Valeriano controversially filed controversial sedition charges against two democratically elected mayors in the Philippine province of Pampanga. After the controversy played out dramatically in the press, a presidential order removed Valeriano from his post as Provincial Commander. Both of the mayors that Valeriano attacked sympathized with local left-wing political movements. The mayors had already filed complaints against Valeriano for forcibly disarming their municipal police forces and for performing unsanctioned late-night house raids. Additionally, a Lieutenant under Valeriano’s command was charged with administering a form of torture, known as the “water cure,” to three members of the San

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Fernando Police force. Because of these charges, Valeriano was removed from his command post and temporarily jailed at Camp Crame—the headquarters of the Philippine Military Police. Yet by 1951, Valeriano’s career outlook improved when Ramon Magsaysay, Philippine Secretary of Defense, brought Valeriano into a position as a special combat advisor. Shortly after, Valeriano began receiving praise from U.S. military advisors and policymakers for his innovative approach to counterinsurgent warfare.

Ismael Lapus and Medardo Justiniano, the other two speakers at Lansdale’s Fort Bragg counterinsurgency seminar, were also veterans of the AFP. Lapus, who spoke at the Fort Bragg Seminar on “The Communist Huk Enemy,” served in the G-2 division of the AFP as the head of military intelligence during the Huk Campaign. Although he served as head of military intelligence, Lapus also took an active role in military interrogations. In his memoir on his years as political prisoner in the Philippines, William Pomeroy, an American who joined the Huks after WWII, claimed to have been personally interrogated by Lapus. Though Lapus’ career is more difficult to trace than Valeriano’s, it is clear that after the 1961 seminar at Fort Bragg he remained in networks of the U.S. military. In a 1964 conversation with American Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, and Philippine President, Diosdado Macapagal, Lapus suggested sending a

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24 A February 2nd 1949 Manila Times article reported that Col. Napoleon Valeriano was removed from “his command as provincial commander of the PC” in San Fernando, Pampanga. Complaints were also filed against Lt. Cuadrato Palma, of the PC, for “maltreating, torturing, and applying the water cure to Epifano Canilao, Domingo Sunga, and Teodoro Evangelista.” Canilao, Domingo, and Evangelista were all members of the San Fernando Police Center. “Colonel Valeriano is relieved,” Manila Times, February, 2nd 1949.

Philippine Battalion Combat Team to, as McNamara stated, “deal with [Communist] infiltration from the South.”

Medardo Justiniano also cultivated and maintained ties with U.S. military officials throughout the second half of the twentieth century. Immediately following WWII, Justiniano served under Valeriano as part of the notorious “Nenita Unit” of the Philippine Armed Force. Valeriano, commander of the group, claimed the Nenita Unit originated in 1946 and quickly developed a notorious reputation. Although U.S. military advisors, and Valeriano himself, claimed that the Nenita Unit employed “unconventional” tactics, others argued that the Unit terrorized villages in order to, in Valeriano’s words, “destroy top leaders of the Huk.” One army officer, interviewed by scholar of the Huk Rebellion, Benedict Kerkvliet, claimed that when he was “stationed in the Candaba area [in Pampanga where] almost daily you could find bodies floating in the river, many of them victims of Valeriano’s Nenita Unit.” It is difficult to ascertain from the existing historical record the actual severity of the Nenita Unit’s tactics. Lansdale’s cohort, however, promoted the Nenita Unit, known colloquially as the “skull squadron” for its skull and crossbones insignia, as an example of innovative and effective counterinsurgent warfare.

In both the 31st division of the USAFFE, his WWII guerilla company, and the Nenita Unit, Justiniano served as an intelligence officer. During the Fort Bragg seminar he gave a speech, titled “Combat Intelligence,” that detailed the psychological warfare

27 Valeriano stated that the Nenita Unit “was organized as a small semi-independent hunter-killer detachment.” Valeriano maintained that the unit was formed in 1946 to “find and finish the Supreme Commander, Luis Taruc,” Valeriano and Bohannan, Counter-Guerilla Operations. 79, 94.
28 Napoleon D. Valeriano and Charles T. R. Bohannan, ibid.79.
applied during the Huk campaign. Although it is unclear where Justiniano traveled after his participation in the Fort Bragg seminar, historian Jonathan Nashel revealed Justiniano’s participation in a 1986 meeting that included: Lansdale, Justiniano, Executive Director of the National Defense Council, Andy Messig Jr., John Singlaub and Oliver North, both of whom became involved in the Iran-Contra scandal. The group, described by Nashel as, “individuals intent on waging the Cold War in Latin America,” indicated that, similar to his colleagues, Justiniano maintained ties with U.S. military networks.

Lansdale, perhaps the least experienced combat soldier of the group, was undoubtedly the master promoter who opened the circuits and routes through which this cross-national cohort traveled over the next several decades. Having served as a major in the Armed Forces Western Pacific (AFWESPAC) and as a public information officer in the Philippines-Ryukus Command (PHILRYCOM) office until 1948, Lansdale already had direct experience with the Philippine Armed Forces when he was transferred to the Joint U.S. Military Advisor Group (JUSMAG), stationed at Clark Air Force Base in 1950. Through JUSMAG, Lansdale earned a place as a special advisor to recently promoted Secretary of Defense, Ramon Magsaysay. The intimate friendship between the two men has captured the attention of numerous historical accounts, though there is no clear consensus on the true nature of their relationship. While interpretations of

31 See Chapter Three for a discussion of the historical debates over Lansdale’s career in the CIA.
friendship between Magsaysay and Lansdale range from portraying Magsaysay as a puppet of U.S. power to seeing him as skilled politician and “man of the people,” much less has been written regarding the larger effect their collaboration had on ideas regarding postwar guerilla warfare and anti-communist politics. Certainly, it was the success, and Lansdale’s avid promotion of the counterinsurgency effort in the Philippines, that facilitated Magsaysay’s dynamic rise in career status.\footnote{After securing Ramon Magsaysay’s election to the Philippine presidency in 1953, rumors spread that an Indian diplomat coined the nickname, “Colonel Landslide” for Lansdale. H. W. Brands, Bound to empire: the United States and the Philippines (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992)., 254. Hugh Wilford, The Mighty Wurlitzer: How the CIA Played America (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008). 170.}

In addition to disseminating their methodology for fighting guerilla wars, this cohort of men also spread the interpretation that the Huks were “faithful to death to the creed of the Kremlin” and that Ramon Magsaysay had “saved the Philippines from Red Conquest.”\footnote{William O. Douglas, “Asia 1952: A Report on Today’s Momentous Developments in the World’s Largest, Most Turbulent Continent,” Look Magazine, Volume 16, Number 22, November 4th, 1952, Myron Cowen Papers, Truman Library.} Beginning in the late 1940s, American policymakers and Philippine politicians reoriented their understanding of the Huks based, in part, on the dynamics of global politics. Once considered disgruntled tenants that refused to resubmit to landlord rule, American policymakers and a Philippine political elite transformed the Huks peasant movement into “the vanguard of the soviet-union” and the “U.S.S.R border patrol on Filipino shores.”\footnote{Troop Information Pamphlet, Civil Affairs Division, Department of National Defense, 1951, Quirino Papers, Ayala Museum, 5.}

More importantly, this rendering of the Huks as conduits of Kremlin policy facilitated the deployment of anti-communist discourses regarding the nature of peasant activism, guerilla warfare, and the righteousness of American interventions in foreign
countries. With a political elite arguing that “the long-range aim of the communist party of the Philippines is to get control of the existing government and to set up in its place a dictatorship of the communist party, with the avowed ultimate aim of making the Philippines part of a federation of Soviet republics dominated by the Soviet Union,” the U.S. was able to frame its intervention in the Huk rebellion as a piece in a broader strategy of communist containment.36

These interpretations of the Huk rebellion as an arm of a global communist movement obscured a longer history of activism in the Philippines as well as the cultural, economic, and social roots of peasant politicization. This erasure also omitted the political and economic effects of imperialism in the islands, in which the United States and the Philippine political elite maintained power at the expense of a broader population. Furthermore, Lansdale’s network of counterinsurgency experts benefited from the linkage of the Huks to global communism. Anti-communist actors associated local political movements to global communism by asserting that Soviet Communism functioned as a new form of imperialism. This claim accelerated the spread of Lansdale’s counterinsurgency network because it implied that anti-communist tactics could be employed in different locales with only a modicum of adjustments to local languages and cultures.

36 Troop Information Pamphlet, Civil Affairs Division, Department of National Defense, 1951, Quirino Papers, Ayala Museum, 5. George F. Kennan’s “Long Telegram,” written from Moscow in 1946, is often credited as the intellectual source for containment. In the telegram Kennan argues that the Soviet Union was an inherently expansionist regime. Historian, and Kennan biographer, John Lewis Gaddis argued in Strategies of Containment that the policy grew out of discussions over what shape the U.S. relationship to the U.S.S.R. would take in the post-WWII era. NSC-68, authored by the National Security Council Study Group, including Kennan, laid out plans to increase American military spending—which Gaddis sees as modification of Kennan’s original containment strategy. John Lewis Gaddis, George F. Kennan: An American life (New York: Penguin Press, 2011); Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy.
In addition to the teachings of counterinsurgent warfare experts, the reading of Soviet communism as a new brand of imperialism emerged in varied foreign policy institutions. For instance, U.S. State Department memos reveal discursive attempts to break ongoing U.S. policies from the historical continuum of western imperialism in the region. U.S. State Department policymakers argued that contemporaneous U.S. interventions were conducted on behalf of anti-imperial liberation movements against a common enemy, international communism. At the same time, anti-imperialist movements in Southeast Asia drew on Marxist and Leninist theories, using the language of capitalist exploitation of colonial commodities, to interpret the poor material conditions of peasant life across the region.37

To counteract the linkage between communism and independence movements, U.S. policymakers strategically equated communism with imperialism; “we must expose Communism as in fact an agency of the most dangerous imperialists…conversely we must show that the U.S., which has fought two world wars in the past generation in which the basic issue has been the right of self-determination, is a loyal [guard] and proponent of the nationalist ideology.”38

John Foster Dulles, speaking in 1955 in Manila at the signing of the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), a collective security arrangement between The Philippines, Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, Great Britain, Thailand, and the United States, and prompted by the Geneva Conference regarding the partition of

37 For example: in his “Appeal Made on the Occasion of the Founding of the Indochinese Communist Party” Ho Chi Minh described the world as “divided into two camps: one is the revolutionary camp which includes oppressed colonial peoples and the exploited working class….the other [camp] is the counter-revolutionary camp of international capitalism and imperialism” Chí Minh Hồ and Walden F. Bello, Down with Colonialism!, Revolutions (London Verso, 2007).
38 “Visit of General Romulo to discuss Southeast Asia Association,” John Melby Papers, China File, Box 5, Truman Library.
Vietnam, reiterated this theme of communist imperialism.39 Dulles argued, “we are united by a common danger, the danger stems from International Communism and its insatiable ambition.” Dulles also affirmed the claim that the U.S. acted as an instigator for “the independence of new nations” and would always seek “to promote the processes whereby others become capable of winning and sustaining the independence they desire.”40 Dulles’ analysis concluded with a statement that aligned neatly with the vision that Lansdale and his cohort imparted on their martial trainees, “Americanism must be considered the greatest revolutionary force the world has known.”41 Like Lansdale, Dulles considered American democracy the only political form that universally liberated individuals from the bonds of imperialism. Therefore, intervention on behalf of democracy could only, in the minds of its advocates, be rendered in a positive light.

Lansdale and Dulles’ connection of communism to imperialism held particular resonance in a region colonized by Spain, France, the Netherlands, Great Britain, Germany, and the United States. The anti-communist politics of Lansdale’s counterinsurgency cohort facilitated a distance between U.S. policies and imperialism through the insistence that democracy, and especially the democratic system “taught” to Filipinos during the American colonial period, exemplified a liberating form of government. Prone to abstracting American styled democracy with rhetorical flourishes, Lansdale argued that the primary struggle of the Cold War was “the issue between man’s liberty as a free individual and man’s slavery as a possession of the state.”42 Because of

41 “Visit of General Romulo to discuss Southeast Asia Association,” John Melby Papers, China File, Box 5, Truman Library.
42 The Free Citizen in Uniform, Lansdale, Readings in Counter-Guerilla Operations (Fort Bragg: US Army
this insistence that individuality was at stake, Lansdale’s cohort promulgated the idea that military officials first had to know the culture of guerillas in order to conduct a successful counterinsurgent campaign. This knowledge, in Lansdale’s mind, would be turned towards cultivating peasant cultures that aligned with the demands of the liberal-capitalist “Free World.” Lansdale idealized this practice as a form of liberation—and particularly a liberation of individuals that he and his cohort imagined were culturally stuck in the confining lineages of European imperialism.

This duality—that a universalized counterinsurgency strategy began with anthropological excavation of peasant cultures—cut to the heart of Lansdalian strategy. At the same time as he advocated “knowing” local cultures, Lansdale’s lessons on counterinsurgency also embraced the universalization of peasant political movements in such a way that the defeat of guerilla forces in the Philippines could easily be transported to Vietnam, Laos, Indonesia, or Colombia. For Lansdale’s cohort of anti-communist counterinsurgency experts, American style democracy resolved the paradox of recognizing the uniqueness of peasant cultures while promoting the universality of counterinsurgency techniques targeted at peasant cultures. Lansdale’s cohort idealized American democracy and believed that it was a form of global political organization that accommodated and respected native cultures. In short, Lansdale’s counterinsurgency strategies relied upon the creation of easily knowable and transferable understandings of leftist, or oppositional, political movements. This universalization of complex histories, peoples, and places alongside policymakers’ assertions that the U.S. sought to protect the rights of individuals in Asian nations represented a fracture in the U.S. driven anti-communist project, both within and beyond the Philippines.

Special Warfare School, 1961).
Economic Crisis and the 1949 Elections

By 1949, monumental political changes were afoot in the Philippines’ neighboring territories: by September, 1949 the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) declared the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, opposing forces in Korea clashed along the border of the 38th parallel, multiple insurgent groups threatened the stability of the Burmese state, a guerrilla war erupted in Malaya, and Vietnamese and Indonesian anti-colonial movements continued to push through episodic violence and political instability towards independence.43 Already three years removed from independence, 1949 and 1950 were years of change in the Philippines as well. One of the first critical junctures of the postcolonial years was the election of the incumbent, Elpidio Quirino, to the office of the Philippine presidency in 1949.44 Quirino, who ascended to the presidency after Manuel Roxas’ sudden death in 1948, steered away from Roxas’ “mailed fist” approach towards the ongoing conflict in Central Luzon. Instead, Quirino approached Huk leaders in an attempt to seek diplomatic solutions to the perpetual violence and by June 1948, Quirino declared an amnesty period. The declaration of Amnesty required that Huk guerrillas register their weapons with the Military Police (MP) stationed in their respective areas, and many, including high-ranking Huk officials chose to trust Quirino’s intentions and register their arms. Luis Taruc, who was stripped of his elected seat in congress by the Roxas administration, traveled to Malacañang, the Presidential residence, for a heavily publicized meeting with Quirino, expecting a reappointment of his elected position.

44 Although Quirino was the incumbent this was his first election for the presidency after Manuel Roxas’ death in 1948.
The Quirino administration’s progress in constructing a workable peace between the state and the protesting peasants of Luzon was impeded again by the failure of the central state to exert its will over the private militias of provincial landlords as well as its own MPs operating in the provinces. Negotiations centered on long-standing issues regarding land reform and the end of impunity for, what Huks identified as, the terroristic tactics of the MP. Huk leaders also demanded that the government reverse its policy of economic parity for Americans citizens conducting business in the Philippines. However, once again, negotiations broke down and seemingly without options or political recourse, Taruc left Manila for the provinces of Central Luzon.45

In addition to the ongoing hostilities in Luzon, American technocrats, working for the United Nations (UN), beset the Quirino administration with dire predictions for the economic future of the nation. The economic assessments of the Philippine economy intersected with the complaints of the peasant uprising in Luzon, leaving the Quirino administration with little room to maneuver politically. The President Action Committee on Social Amelioration in conjunction with a UN consultant in Social affairs and chief of the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) Mission in the Philippines issued a 1949 study on the state of Philippine society. The 1949 Philippine trade balance, revealed in the UN study, underlined what analysts saw as the economic and social woes of the nation—the country imported over twice as much as it exported, meaning that much-needed dollars continued to flow out of the country rather than into industrialization or development projects. The study also indicated that although nearly ninety percent of Filipinos were engaged in agricultural labor, the Philippines imported

food staples, such as rice, into the islands in increasing numbers.\textsuperscript{46} Unless rice cultivation expanded by at least 250,000 hectares the “cultivation deficit,” or the figure by which the population increased faster than land cultivation, would also continue to grow, resulting in even higher levels of rice importation and dollar outflow from the Philippines.\textsuperscript{47}

In addition to facing economic burdens, the Quirino administration headed into the 1949 elections with substantial challenges from within a locally fractured political elite. Months before the election, Quirino attempted to oust Jose Avelino, his political rival within the Liberal Party, from his position as President of the Philippine Senate. The Liberal Party held the presidency since independence.\textsuperscript{48} The row made front-page news during February 1949 and brought to light the splinters within the political elite as well as the levels to which politicians, from both Liberal and Nacionalista Parties, used their political positions to enrich themselves and their families.\textsuperscript{49}

In the 1949 election, Jose Laurel, former justice of the Supreme Court during the Commonwealth period and president of the Philippines during the Japanese Occupation, opposed Quirino on the Nacionalista party ticket. The \textit{New York Times} reported that ballot fraud marred an election already considered, “the most violent of national elections.” The \textit{Chicago Tribune}, in a flippant manner, claimed, in an article titled “More

\textsuperscript{46} “Philippine Social Trends: Basic Documents Pertinent to Long-Range Social Welfare Planning in the Philippines,” President’s Action Committee on Social Amelioration, Manila, Philippines, 1950, Irene Murphy Papers, Bentley Historical Library.
\textsuperscript{47} “Philippine Social Trends: Basic Documents Pertinent to Long-Range Social Welfare Planning in the Philippines,” President’s Action Committee on Social Amelioration, Manila, Philippines, 1950, Irene Murphy Papers, Bentley Historical Library. 4.
\textsuperscript{48} “Whose Senate?” Silent Fight for LP leadership explodes into open war, splits Senate,” \textit{Manila Times}, February 2, 1949.
\textsuperscript{49} Alfred McCoy argues that “Filipino political families [used] their offices to extract a share of government services and projects destined for their territories, using the extralegal take to build patronage networks of political followers” McCoy, \textit{An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines}. 
Voters Than People in the Philippines,” that “Douglas Fairbanks and many other
American films stars, many of them dead, are expected to vote in Tuesday’s Philippine
Presidential Election.” 50 In a report by Ford Wilkins, who served as editor of the Manila
Bulletin, one of the longest standing English newspapers in the country and the self-
proclaimed second oldest English language newspaper in the “Far East,” confirmed the
reports of endemic electoral violence. Wilkins’ account also noted, “twenty-four persons,
some prominent politically, were killed by gunfire and thirty-two others wounded” in an
election in which “in many localities, armed groups roamed the streets.” Leading up to
the elections, the Philippine Communist Party (PKP) advocated “critical support” for the
opposition Nacionalista Party. However, following the inability of the Nacionalista Party
to challenge the “wholesale terrorism and fraud” of the elections the PKP pulled its
support for the party. 51 Furthermore, the leadership of the PKP argued that the failure of
the Nacionalista leadership to challenge the elections only “served to alienate the NP
masses from their leaders, and [draw] them closer to the HMB and the CPP [PKP].” 52

The fiasco of the 1949 elections contributed to a policy shift in the transnational
political forces that shaped and influenced the political direction of the Philippine State.
While foreign policy emanating from Washington continued to focus largely on Europe,
Japan, and Korea, American policymakers in the Philippines raised alarms over the near
bankruptcy of Philippine state coffers, a stagnating economy, and finally, the failure of

50 The paper named “reports on election frauds from Negros, Occidental province” as its source of
information. Walter Simmons, “More Voters than People in the Philippines” Chicago Daily Tribune,
November 5th 1949.
51 Gregorio Santayana [Jose Lava], “Twenty Years of Struggle of the CPP,” PKP Papers, Exhibit O, Box 3,
Gonzalez Library, University of the Philippines.
52 Gregorio Santayana [Jose Lava], “Twenty Years of Struggle of the CPP,” PKP Papers, Exhibit O, Box 3,
Gonzalez Library, University of the Philippines.
popular elections.\textsuperscript{53} For the PKP, the elections also represented a turning point in their struggle. After the elections, the PKP leadership declared, “the existence of a revolutionary situation” in the Philippines. The revolutionary situation resulted, according to the PKP, from “our imperialist-feudal dominated economy and the crisis of bourgeois parliamentarianism.” \textsuperscript{54} Importantly, 1948 marked the year the politburo of the PKP decided to officially support the peasant uprising in Central Luzon. However, the PKP, and particularly the politburo, never acted as the primary voice of the Huk movement. Indeed deep tensions emerged between the leadership of the Huks, predominantly Luis Taruc, and the leadership of the PKP. \textsuperscript{55} As the 1940s gave way to the 1950s the progressive politics of both groups, the PKP and the Huks, raised steadily in popularity. With leftist energies on the move, the electoral violence between supporters of opposing political parties patently underscored the political fissures that had long characterized the Philippine political elite.

With few exceptions, however, the political elite aligned behind anti-communist politics. For example, in February 1950, Lorenzo Tañada, a member of the senate, wrote a telling letter to his long-term friend, Edward Lansdale.\textsuperscript{56} “The Philippines today is not the same country that you left more than a year ago,” Tañada wrote, “it is beset with so

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{54} Gregorio Santayana [Jose Lava], “Twenty Years of Struggle of the CPP,” PKP Papers, Exhibit O, Box 3, Gonzalez Library, University of the Philippines, 39.
\item \textsuperscript{55} William Chapman, \textit{Inside the Philippine Revolution}, 1st ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1987). The communist party would continue to endure splits and fissures amongst the leadership throughout the second half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. In 1968, communist activist, Jose Marie Sison, criticized the political philosophies of the Lava brothers, who had long served as the intellectual force of the PKP. Sison, writing under the name Amado Guerrero, sought to reorient the party to include a greater emphasis on Maoist philosophies. Amado Guerrero, \textit{Philippine Society and Revolution} (Hong Kong: Ta Kung Pao, 1971); P. N. Abinales, \textit{The Revolution Falters: The Left in Philippine Politics after 1986}, Southeast Asia Program Series (Ithaca, N.Y.: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1996).
\item \textsuperscript{56} In later years, Lorenzo Tañada openly opposed U.S. policy in the Philippines and in 1991 was an outspoken critic of the US Naval Base at Subic Bay.
\end{itemize}
many problems, many of them serious that frankly I do not know how we can manage without wrecking the dwindling faith of the people in our government unless of course we get the much needed aid from your government." 57 Indicating that the letter was both a personal and political one, Tañada joked to Lansdale “I’ve given up badminton… I’m old and besides you are no longer here to play with or to beat." 58 Tañada’s gloomy account of contemporary politics in the Philippines underscored the one aspect the political elite consistently agreed upon—the long-term success of the Philippine state relied on continued infusions of U.S. foreign aid dollars. The themes that emerged from the 1949 elections—the Huk and PKP turn away from electoral politics, the ongoing and seemingly uncontrollable violence in the provinces, and the political elites demand for increased U.S. aid—would come together over the next four years to dramatically alter the direction of Philippine politics, U.S. aid to the country, and the careers of Lansdale’s counterinsurgency cohort.

From “poverty-stricken tenant farmers” to Reds

Although American and Filipino Counter-intelligence officers raised concerns over the political ideologies of the Huks during WWII, the dominant interpretation of the Huk movement largely transformed in the late 1940s. The U.S. State Department, American Embassy, and U.S. Military trusted the Roxas Administration’s allegation that the leadership of the Huk movement was “communist.” The Commonwealth state and Roxas administration had always recognized the influence of communist thought on

57 Lorenzo Tañada to Edward Lansdale, February 11th, 1950, Edward Lansdale Papers, Hoover Institute, Stanford.
58 Lorenzo Tañada to Edward Lansdale, February 11th, 1950, Edward Lansdale Papers, Hoover Institute, Stanford.
prewar peasant activism and the wartime Hukbalahaps. However, the PKP was grounded largely in Manila’s intellectual class and labor movement leaders and remained a separate organization from the Huks, though some leaders of the Huk movement were also enrolled as members of the PKP. U.S. policymakers and Philippine politicians claim that prewar peasant activists, that had organized themselves into the Hukbalahap guerillas during the war, were taking directives from the PKP was a hard one for the state to make in the 1930s and into the late 1940s. As detailed in the previous chapter, a political elite mobilized anti-communist discourses in the previous two decades in the Philippines to discredit the political activism of progressive movements—and in many ways the anti-communist politics of the late 1940s and early 1950s continued this tradition. The anti-communist politics of the postwar period, however, gathered greater strength than its prewar antecedents through the linkage to the global scale of communist imperialism.

Despite the Huks repeated denials of foreign influence, U.S. intelligence officers and Philippine politicians, in 1950, argued that there existed “ample evidence that Soviet-directed communist leadership” sought “to utilize agrarian unrest to create internal turmoil” in the Philippines.\(^5^9\) Invoking the threat of future subordination to the U.S.S.R., one U.S. State Department analyst claimed that communists sought to “wrest national power from our sovereign people.”\(^6^0\) Neither the State Department nor the Philippine state had concrete evidence that the Soviet Union, or its supposed Communist proxies in the Philippines, utilized agrarian dissent as strategy to destabilize the Philippine Republic. In fact Huk attempts, in 1946, to participate in the state through electoral politics seemed

\(5^9\) J.H Burns to Dean Rusk, 13 June 1950, “Intelligence Estimate of the Internal Situation in the Philippines,” NARA, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 4323, page 1.

\(6^0\) J.H Burns to Dean Rusk, 13 June 1950, “Intelligence Estimate of the Internal Situation in the Philippines,” NARA, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 4323, page 1.
to provide enough evidence that the Huks and their supporters were interested in gaining legislative representation. Nevertheless, the Roxas administration successfully marshaled an argument that the Huks gained their electoral seats through the communist tactics of terror and voter intimidation. As the decade progressed, the Huks became increasingly framed not as a threat to local political stability, as they had in the prewar era. Instead, and more potently, U.S. policymakers and Philippine politicians argued that the Huks were a dangerous wing in a global communist movement.

The reports of Counter-intelligence officers during WWII undoubtedly shaped the way that American and Philippine forces engaged and interpreted the political ambitions of the Huks during the earliest days of liberation. A few American Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) reports in the waning days of WWII argued that the Huks were “subversive” and even pointed to the similarities between the Huks and the “communistic organizations in China.”\(^6^1\) However, these reports also reflected the political milieu that had developed between guerilla groups during the war, particularly the well-known feud between Huk guerillas and USAFFE guerillas.\(^6^2\) In fact, in some cases the information that CIC officers based their reports upon stemmed from information submitted by USAFFE guerillas—making it likely that CIC reports were tainted by resentment many USAFFE guerillas had for the Huks.

One report, written by Lt. Commander Frederic Worcester to the Commanding Officer of the 7th Fleet Intelligence Center contradicted other counter-intelligence reports filed in the Office of the Chief of Counter-Intelligence following liberation in 1945. In


\(^{6^2}\) The poor relations between USAFFE and Huk Guerillas stems from the Huks refusal to submit to the military authority of the commander of the USAFFE guerillas, Lt. Col. Thorpe. The USAFFE Guerillas, both American and Filipino, also reportedly resented the political work of the Huks during the war, ibid., 14-115.
his report Worcester, who had grown up in the Philippines, described the “rank and file” of the Hukbalahap as “poverty-stricken tenant farmers who, ever since the Tangulan uprising in 1931, have been showing increasing evidence of discontent with their lot in life.”63 Worcester further declared that it was “because of lack of knowledge on the part of our forces as to the background of the Hukbalajap [sic] movement” that there “was in the first instance a disposition to class the members of this group as Communists.”64 Throughout his reports, which extend through the spring of 1946, Worcester identifies land inequality, wartime feuds with the USAFFE guerillas, and the abundance of wartime firearms as the primary source of conflict in Luzon.

It is likely that Frederic Worcester had a more thorough understanding of, or at least exposure to, the history of peasant movements in the Philippines than his peers in the CIC. Frederic Worcester was the son of Dean Worcester, American anthropologist, member of the first Philippine Commission in 1899, and Secretary of the Interior for the Philippine Insular Government until 1913. Frederic Worcester lived in the Philippines from the age of two until he enrolled at the University of Michigan, where his father served as a professor of zoology. After graduating Worcester left Ann Arbor to return to

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63 The Tangulang uprising is a complicated event mixed with peasant political protest, secret societies, Japanese assistance, and sensationalistic news reportage. The Kapatiran Tangulang Malayang Mamamayan (Association for an Offensive for Our Future Freedom) was reportedly, originally, a secret society claiming 97,000 members intent on achieving Philippine independence. After splits in the leadership, and a botched attempt at fomenting a revolutionary, a moderate Tangulang leader, Patricio Dionisio, along with former communist party member and peasant leader, Jacinto Manahan, were brought into the Commonwealth state by Manuel Quezon in an attempt to “guide restless Tagalog workers into legitimate protest channels.” See: David Reeves Sturtevant, Popular Uprisings in the Philippines, 1840-1940 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1976). Authorities in the Philippines also claimed that prewar uprisings resulted from foreign influence as well as religious fanaticism. Though Joseph Hayden, an American imperialist and author of The Philippines: A Study in National Development, argued that the Sakdal uprising was a stark example of class conflict. Dante C. Simbulan, The Modern Principalia: The Historical Evolution of the Philippine Ruling Oligarchy (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 2005). 158-160.

the Philippines. Until he was drafted into the U.S. Army for the Pacific War, Worcester lived as a private citizen in Manila. During the war, Worcester served as an intelligence officer on the southern Philippine island of Mindanao, where he was stricken with malaria and evacuated to Australia, only to return again to the Philippines in 1944 as a member of the 7th Fleet. In January of 1945, Worcester was among the first surge of U.S. forces to return to Manila where he reunited with his sister, Alice, who spent the previous three years held by the Japanese in the Santo Tomas internment camp.

Following the liberation of Manila, Worcester procured another position with the U.S. government in the Philippines and served until independence with Paul McNutt in the Office of the High Commissioner.65 His service under the Higher Commissioner included conducting research on Filipinos suspected of collaboration with the Japanese. Imaginably it was while conducting research on collaboration when Worcester alleged that the Huk leadership “at the present time is in the hands of intellectuals with some knowledge of communist doctrines.” Worcester also argued, perhaps in response to contradictory reports, that to advance “communism” as the driving explanation for the Huk movement or to “brand” Huk “followers as ‘reds’ [was] incorrect.”66 Worcester’s assessment of the Huks was corroborated by a May 26th 1945 report prepared by Lt. Dale Pontius. The memo, addressed to the United States Army Forces in the Far East, Office of the Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2, or the division for intelligence, stated that “there is no

65 As High Commissioner under Manuel Quezon during the Commonwealth period, McNutt is known for securing the passage of over a thousand European Jews, threatened by the rise of Nazism, to the Philippines. Frank Ephraim, Escape to Manila: From Nazi Tyranny to Japanese Terror (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2003).
66 F.L. Worcester to Commanding Officer, Seventh Fleet Intelligence Center, July 17th, 1945, Frederick Worcester Papers, RG-110, Box One, folder 6 “Office of the Chief of Counter Intelligence,” MacArthur Memorial Library.
evidence that a real grasp of communism goes very far” for the “mass of tenant farmers” that comprised the Huk organization.67

Despite Worcester’s claim that the Huks were simply impoverished peasants, a definition of the Huk movement as a wing of global communism coalesced around the national political struggles between elite factions, coupled with a compounding pressure to secure War Rehabilitation funds from the United States. The project to define the Huks as part of a global Cold War was hegemonic project in that it was always an unstable and contested and required active construction and constant positive maintenance. In other words, the historic bloc of Philippine and American anti-communists could not simply maintain control through one front, such as the economic or political, but also had to coordinate their ideologies in a diverse series of arenas, including knowledge production regarding the Huks connection to global communism.68

While high-ranking Philippine politicians and Presidents, from Roxas through Magsaysay, asserted their own political interests in the face of American pressure, the sheer level of destruction to the industries and infrastructures of the islands meant

67 Lt. Dale Pontius to Headquarters, United States Army Forces in the Far East, Office of the Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2, Philippine Research and Information Section, May 26th, 1945, Frederick Worcester Papers, RG-110, Box One, folder 6 “Office of the Chief of Counter Intelligence,” MacArthur Memorial Library
68 On the connection of knowledge and power Foucault writes: “Knowledge linked to power, not only assumes the authority of 'the truth' but has the power to make itself true. All knowledge, once applied in the real world, has effects, and in that sense at least, 'becomes true'…There is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time, power relations.” In this chapter I use Foucault’s conception of knowledge and power alongside of Stuart Hall’s reading of Gramscian hegemony. Hall argues that Gramsci, like Foucault, conceived of power as a not only the oppressor versus the oppressed or from a single origin such as the state, but as an impermanent constructed across several arenas of society. For all three theorists, Foucault, Hall, and Gramsci, historical context is central to understanding how power functions in a society. See: Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, 1st American ed. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977).Antonio Gramsci, ed. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, Antonio Gramsci and David Forgacs, The Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings, 1916-1935 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1999). Stuart Hall, Stuart Hall and Open University., Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices (London Sage, 1997).
American officials could continually use U.S. foreign aid as political leverage. As discussed in the previous chapter, U.S. officials tied postwar aid to the ability of the Roxas administration to pass the Bell Bill, a piece of “American imperial” legislation strongly opposed by the Huks. By 1949, the inability of local politicians to restore order to Central Luzon, the growing awareness of U.S. policymakers to the politics of decolonization, and the success of communist movements elsewhere in Southeast and East Asia, collided in the Philippines to alter the way U.S. foreign policymakers comprehended the significance of the Huk threat.

Though Chinese immigrants migrated to the Philippines over the course of several centuries and established communities in retail trading, the Communist victory in China provoked fears over the Chinese communities presence in Philippine society. Indeed by May of 1950, both the U.S. State Department and Philippine intelligence officials believed Chinese Communist influence was on the rise in the islands. The Chinese Civil War, which received daily front-page coverage in Manila’s leading English language newspapers, raised concerns over the size of the Chinese population in the Philippines and the proximity of the Philippine islands to mainland China, as well as the Communist held island of Hainan. One 1950 Philippine newspaper report, indelicately titled “Our Alien Problem,” claimed “obviously there are Chinese communists in the Philippines.”

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70 The U.S. further tied the release of War Rehabilitation funds to the passage of the Philippine Constitutional amendment that allowed for the “parity” for American citizens, meaning that American citizens had the same rights to develop Philippine natural resources as Filipinos. In order to pass the amendment a majority of the Philippine congress would have to vote to send it to a popular vote, the six elected officials on the Democratic Alliance ticket, an affiliation of progressive politicians that included Huk leaders, opposed the amendment. In effect, Roxas had to find a way to remove the six officials, and did so through charges of electoral fraud and terrorism, in order to pass the amendment through congress. The Truman administration also pushed Philippine politicians to restore “order” to Philippines by pacifying the ongoing violence in the provinces of Central Luzon.
The news report, drawing more from opinion than investigative journalism, did acknowledge one possible effect of the Chinese Civil War on Chinese Filipinos, the severing of family ties. Between the chaos of civil war and the unpopularity of the Communist victory in China amongst stridently anti-communist countries, including the Philippines, the Communist victory potentially meant that “most of them could not or would not return” to China.\textsuperscript{72}

NICA, the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency of the Philippine Republic, contributed to assumptions that Chinese communists were organizing in the Philippines. A May 1950 NICA report stated that, “6000 Chinese, who compose the first batch of Graduates from a Red intelligence school in China” were traveling to the Philippines and NICA “expected [them] to engage in underground activities here.”\textsuperscript{73} The source of NICA’s warnings was not revealed. However, it is clear the Chinese community leaders in the Philippines recognized a growing public suspicion and the potential that they could be labeled undesirable subjects due their ethnicity. Against a wave of detentions of Chinese Filipinos, “the leaders of the Chinese community” issued a statement requesting that five leaders from the Chinese community in Manila be “named to assist in screening the suspects and detainees.” Though the letter’s authors made clear their “support of [the] anti-communist movement” they worried that Philippine intelligence officials were falsely identifying remittances sent to family members in China as “giving contributions to the Communist cause.”\textsuperscript{74}

\textsuperscript{73} “Weekly Intelligence Summary No.4, May22-28, 1950, National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, Republic of the Philippines, Office of the President, Quirino Papers, Ayala Library.
\textsuperscript{74} Undated document, Quirino Papers, Ayala Library.
While business leaders in the Chinese community in Manila grappled with threats to their safety and political rights in the country, as well as their abilities to financially support families in China, the victory of the Communist Party in China also fueled claims that the Chinese communist party provided, or intended to provide, material support to the Huks. Luis Taruc, wartime commander-in-chief of the Huks and unofficial spokesman to the Philippine and American press during the late 40s and early 1950s, deemed the accusation that the Huks received, via Chinese submarines, shipments of military supplies, “wholesale lies.” Without evidence, NICA’s accusations of Chinese Communist assistance gained traction through an anti-communist conjuncture brought on by the increasing political momentum of Huk popularity and the regional successes of Communist parties.

Luis Taruc acknowledged the role of Spanish imperialism in the formation of the political economy in the islands, however, American colonialism, and particularly the “boasts of about having brought democracy to the Philippines” led him to believe that an economic system promoted by Americans and a colonial elite did not square with the American promises of democracy and self-rule. Taruc grew up as a peasant in San Luis in the Central Luzon province of Pampanga and received two years of education in law at the University of the Philippines. Unable to afford his tuition after he lost his job at the Metropolitan Water District, Taruc returned to his home in Pampanga. In his memoir

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75 There many divisions and factions within the PKP and the Huks including a feud between Luis Taruc and the intellectual and theoretical leaders of the party, particularly the Lava Brothers (Vicente, Jose, and Jesus) Alfredo B. Saulo, *Communism in the Philippines: An Introduction* (Manila: Ateneo Publications Office, 1969); Renze L. Hoeksema, *Communism in the Philippines: A Historical and Analytical Study of Communism and the Communist Party in the Philippines and its Relations to Communist Movements Abroad*, ([S.I.]: [s.n.], 1956), microform, 507 _.; cm.

76 “Taruc Not getting Aid from USSR, China, Impliedly attacks NAP,” *Manila Times*, April 10th, 1949, Ateneo de Manila University.
titled, *Born of the People*, Taruc described his political “awakening.” Centering his political economic analysis on the unequal distribution of land and labor, Taruc wrote:

> The waters ran deep in Central Luzon. The Problems were ages old. The people were land hungry. The land was there but it did not belong to them. Sometime in the past there had been land for everybody. Now it was in the hands of the few. The few were incredibly rich; the many were incredibly poor.\(^77\)

Whereas Taruc maintained that he had always “been aware of exploitation and, in a vague way, class relationships” it was only once he saw the rise of mass labor and peasant activism during the 1930s that he began to connect “his exploitation” to the historic and exploitative practices of colonialism and global capitalism.

Taruc connected NICA’s accusations of Chinese or Soviet intervention in the Philippines to his analysis of the relationship between capital and imperialism, claiming that the charges further served American and elite interests by discrediting the “national struggle of the Filipino people for their own liberation and freedom.”\(^78\) The supposed “liberation and freedom” of American democracy was contradicted, according to Taruc, by “the guns and military used to shoot down our peasants, to destroy their homes.” Taruc argued the weaponry “supplied to the Quirino administration by the one foreign power (the US) that has taken upon itself to force its will upon nations” revealed the true intentions of American foreign policies.\(^79\) Taruc’s strident observations emphasized the strong connection between communism, anti-communism, and U.S. military aid. For Taruc, U.S. intervention in the Philippines clearly benefited the colonial elite, who remained enabled by U.S. aid, at the expense of Philippine peasants. Recognizing the

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\(^77\) Taruc, *Born of the People*, 26.

\(^78\) “Taruc Not getting Aid from USSR, China, Impliedly attacks NAP,” *Manila Times*, April 10\(^{th}\), 1949, Ateneo de Manila University.

\(^79\) “Taruc Not getting Aid from USSR, China, Impliedly attacks NAP,” *Manila Times*, April 10\(^{th}\), 1949, Ateneo de Manila University.
Quirino administration’s usage of the threat of communism to both “explain away the utter failure of its mailed fist policy” and to secure continued aid from the United States, Taruc’s contentions revealed the cognizance the Huk leadership had of the persuasive and dangerous authority of anti-communist discourses.

As Filipino politicians’ anti-communist appraisals of the Huks intensified, U.S. policymakers, in the State Department and Military, concerns centered on a perceived lack of “law and order” on Luzon. In June 1950, General J.H. Burns of the U.S. Department of Defense sent a detailed report, prepared by the Joint Intelligence Committee, to Assistant Secretary of State, Dean Rusk. The document titled, “Intelligence Estimate of the Internal Security Situation in the Philippines” offered the most current U.S. military assessment of the civil war in Luzon, “the Huks have carried out coordinated and widespread raids so successfully that the Philippine government has not been unable to maintain law and order, or to cope effectively with them.”

Despite the allocation of millions of dollars of military and economic aid since the conclusion of WWII, U.S military analysts conveyed that the “strength of the Philippine government had declined seriously in recent months” and that they expected the deterioration to “continue at an accelerating rate.” Though intelligence officials claimed that “it is not believed that communist-led dissident elements will be able to unseat the government in the immediate future” they did believe that the Huks “have the capability of continuing to

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80 J.H Burns to Dean Rusk, 13 June 1950, “Intelligence Estimate of the Internal Situation in the Philippines,” NARA, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 4323.
81 J.H Burns to Dean Rusk, 13 June 1950, “Intelligence Estimate of the Internal Situation in the Philippines,” NARA, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 4323.
conduct widespread guerilla operations and attacks” and that it was the “increasing capability” of Huk raids that posed “the most serious problem.”

The State Department intelligence assessment author’s also connected the “increasing capability” of the Huks to the chaotic 1949 elections and the waning popularity of the Quirino administration. The “decline in the stability of the Quirino government,” the report stated, was due in part to a “widespread loss of confidence in the Government and President Quirino in particular.” From the perspective of the U.S. military, “incompetency,” “abuses of power,” and “the weak and irresponsible Philippine party system,” contributed to the Quirino administration’s “spectacular failure to maintain essential conditions of law and order.” As described in the previous chapter, U.S. policymakers had long viewed the Huks as a threat to Philippine stability. However, U.S. policymakers also expected the Philippine political elite to manage local conditions on the budget provided by U.S. military and foreign aid. Yet, as this intelligence report details, U.S. military officials were quickly losing faith in the ability of the Quirino administration to maintain a status quo that was acceptable to U.S standards.

In addition to its critique of the Quirino administration and the Philippine party system, the intelligence assessment produced by the U.S. military for the State Department linked the Huks, and the uprisings in the Philippines, to an international communist movement directed by the Soviet Union. Moving away from evaluations derived from understandings of local political struggles, U.S. military intelligence officers derisively cast the peasants of Central Luzon as “Soviet-guided communists.”

Listed under a section enumerating the causes of disturbances in internal security in the

82 J.H Burns to Dean Rusk, 13 June 1950, “Intelligence Estimate of the Internal Situation in the Philippines,” NARA, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 4323.
Philippines, the report cited “the increasing pressure of dissident elements led by Soviet-guided communist” as a primary source. Furthermore military officials argued that in order to accomplish their communist objectives in the Philippines, “the Soviets” operated “through dissident Philippine elements” that were “encouraging guerilla warfare, peasant agitation, labor unrest, corruption, and subversion.” In addition, the report claimed that Soviet communists were, “utilizing [the] Chinese to promote communist activities” in the Philippines.\(^8^3\)

Though the intelligence assessment acknowledged the domestic economic and political situation as contributing sources of the popular disaffection with the Philippine government and a principle origin of the “dissident problem” in the Philippines, it is clear that by at least June of 1950 U.S military officials believed that the Huks were no longer solely a domestic issue but a front in an expanding global conflict.

The scalar repositioning of the Huk rebellion reveals how transnational anti-communist actors, including U.S. policymakers and Philippine political elites, mobilized geographic scales to fit their ideological views, highlighting the social construction of Cold War geography.\(^8^4\) As the Huk conflict jumped scales, from the local to the national, and then global, the meanings attached to the conflict also underwent a transformation. By reconstructing the Huks on the global scale, transnational networks of American and Filipino elites sought to contain a social struggle occurring on a lower geographic scale.\(^8^5\)

U.S. policymakers and colonial elites sought to ensure that domestic inequalities of

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83 J.H Burns to Dean Rusk, 13 June 1950, “Intelligence Estimate of the Internal Situation in the Philippines,” NARA, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 4323, page 1
colonial order continue to exist in postcolonial spaces through the “globalization” of the civil war in Central Luzon.

**The Moral Geography of Anti-communism**

Though the global reorientation of the Huk rebellion supported the ideological positions of anti-communist actors, the jumping of scales was not simply a bald manipulation of the meanings attached to geographic spaces by U.S. policymakers and Philippine postcolonial elites. Rather, the political upheavals in neighboring territories produced a spatial and temporal context that reshaped how policymakers viewed the successes of communists in the region, revealing how entangled the U.S. had become in the internal politics of the world’s nations. Undeniably, the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines compounded American policymakers’ anxiety over communist popularity in East and Southeast Asia.

Philippine officials, military and civilian, also contributed their own anxieties and discourses on the threats posed by Asian communism. Philippine politicians, quite vocally and voraciously, declared that without U.S. aid the Philippines risked “falling” to communist forces. For instance, a pamphlet titled “Communism and the Serviceman,” collated by the Civil Affairs Office of the Philippine Department of National Defense, echoed the 1950 U.S. Defense Department’s globalization of the Huks. In a section titled, “Basic Differences Between Democracy and Communism” the pamphlet’s authors contended, “two opposite ideologies are battling for supremacy” in the world. “One that believes that world peace can be achieved by means of world revolution,” and “the other maintains that universal peace can be attained by means of peaceful changes and
international understanding and good will.”

Derivative of anti-communist discourses that equated communist politics with violence and anti-communist interventions with peace, the pamphlets authors’ emphatically claimed that the “present full-dress war in Korea is only one of the many clashes between communism and democracy.”

For Filipinos, and particularly servicemen, the reference to Korea took on added meaning as a battalion of the AFP was serving in the Korean War with United Nations forces.

Mariano Jesus Cuenco, President of the Philippine Senate in 1950, underscored the meaningfulness of Philippine participation in the Korean War in an address before the Philippine Senate in 1950. Cuenco argued, “the free nations of the world face a new aggressor, Communist imperialism” in Korea. “Soviet Russia,” Cuenco reminded his audience, already had Communist regimes in “the vast expanse of China, Manchuria, and Mongolia” and that “she maintains armed forces of subversion in Indochina, Burma, and our own Philippines.”

Cuenco’s framing of the Korean War as a part of a global conflict, rather than a civil war, allowed him to assert that the Philippines, as “Free-Nation” had no choice but to participate.

Cuenco’s speech underlined the numerous issues at stake in the articulation of the Philippines’ role in the global anti-communist struggle. “There is also the basic principle,” he argued, “that small nations like the Philippines cannot defend themselves unaided and that their security and survival depend on their united efforts to maintain world peace and

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86 “Communism and the Serviceman,” Civil Affairs Office, Philippine Department of National Defense, American Heritage Collection, Ateneo de Manila University.
87 “Communism and the Serviceman,” Civil Affairs Office, Philippine Department of National Defense, American Heritage Collection, Ateneo de Manila University.
88 The Second Congress of the Republic of the Philippines passed Concurrent Resolution No. 16 on August 10th 1950 stating, “The Republic of the Philippines should render every possible assistance to the United Nations effort in the Korean Conflict, including the participation of Filipino troops.” American Heritage Collection, Ateneo de Manila University.
89 Mariano Jesus Cuenco, “Why We Must Help in Korea: The Communist Plot for World Conquest,” American Historical Collection, Ateneo de Manila University.
This reference to the supposed "basic principles" of international law echoed a United States Information Service (USIS) pamphlet that argued "the Communist forces of Northern Korea suddenly without warning or provocation invaded the Republic of Korea to the South in a ruthless act of aggression." The USIS pamphlet and Cuenco’s speech before the Philippine Senate, two contemporaneous articulations of the Philippine’s role in a global Cold War, contended that Korea would be the site of “the most bitter test” for Free-Nations, supported by the authority of international law, “to preserve the peace of the world.”

Cuenco’s opinion that Communists in Korea were “aggressors” in the realm of international law referenced a long-standing belief that the Huks, PKP, and other peasant activists’ organizations stood outside the rule of law in the Philippines. American and Philippine policymaker’s assertions that Korean Communists violated international law worked to further justify the Philippine state’s use of violence against its own “communist movement.” As the mounting causalities in Korea made front-page news in Manila, Cuenco’s speech also deepened the link between the Huks and the Korean War by asserting a Soviet communists presence in the Philippines. This threat implied that if left unchallenged communism could also lead to devastation in the Philippines, as it did in Korea. Additionally, Cuenco’s speech served to conceptually link a pan-Asia peasantry in such a way that the contemporary situation in Korea, Indochina, or Malaya was conceived as interchangeable with the crisis in the Philippines.

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90 Mariano Jesus Cuenco, “Why We Must Help in Korea: The Communist Plot for World Conquest,” American Historical Collection, Ateneo de Manila University.
91 “Korea: The United Nations Defends a Free Nation from Aggression,” United States Information Service, Manila, American Historical Collection, Ateneo de Manila University.
Speaking before a crowd at the 21st National Business Conference at Harvard University in 1951, Cornelio Balmaceda, Philippine Secretary of Commerce and Industry, also warned that, “Communism has spread in Asia” and “constitutes a grave threat to the existence of democracy in that part of the world.” Balmaceda, a graduate of Harvard, referenced specific examples such as “the Korean front where hordes of Communist aggressors from Red-dominated China are now engaged in mortal combat against the defenders of democracy” as well as Indo-china where “Communist elements led by Ho Chih Miseh [sic] are waging a civil war.” Yet even more than his reliance on specific contemporary conflicts, Balmaceda drew upon the idea that “Communism is seeking to engulf the entire Eastern continent and the countries of Southeast Asia.” Underscoring the insidious spread of communist ideology, Balmaceda maintained that the “susceptibility of the Asian masses to new, revolutionary doctrines” was due to their “age-old state of poverty and misery.”

Ignoring disparate histories and cultures, Balmaceda’s promotion of “Asian peasants” as a coherent group contributed to a discourse that assumed a universality of communist ideology, and the transnational similarities between peasant cultures based upon an imagined geography of a unified Asian continent.

U.S. military officials also drew a connection between the Philippines, Asian geography, and the threat of communism. However, U.S military officials largely connected geography, people, and ideas in terms of martial strategy and U.S. military

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92 Cornelio Balmaceda, “Communism in Asia,” American Heritage Collection, Ateneo de Manila University.
93 In her study on American culture and the Middle East, Melanie McAlister utilizes Michael Shapiro’s concept of “moral geographies” or “cultural and political practices that work together to mark not only states, but also regions, cultural groupings, and ethnic or racial territories” to describe how humans “ethically and politically as well as cognitively” understand ideas and spaces. McAlister, Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East, 1945-2000.
bases. Military analysts claimed that the top three “intentions of the USSR in the Philippines” were “to install a communist-dominated regime, to eliminate U.S. influence as soon as possible, and to deny military bases to the United States.” For U.S. military officials Philippine security transcended the promotion of the Philippines as the U.S. “showcase of democracy” in Asia; U.S. military bases in the Philippines connected a U.S. global agenda to local struggles in the Philippines. Moreover, U.S. Department of Defense policymakers concerns over U.S. bases in the region points to an explanation for how a “law and order” issue in the Philippines was transposed into a site of global communist expansion.

While the conflation of communist movements across Asia underscored the vitality of anti-communist agendas in the Philippines, it also drew attention to the lesser size of the communist threat in the Philippines. Because communist forces were dramatically smaller than their counterparts in Indochina and Korea, arming the Philippine state appeared, at times, a secondary concern for some U.S. military officials not stationed in the Philippines. In material terms this meant, to the frustration of military officials stationed in the Philippines, that the JUSMAG office in the Philippines was less of a priority to U.S. military officials stationed in Washington. In a letter sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff in the U.S. Department of Defense, dated December 21st 1950, Leland Hobbs, Major General of the U.S. Army and head of the JUSMAG office in the Philippines, complained about the chronic delay in Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) shipments to the Philippines. Hobbs wrote, “only 54% of the Army phase of the FY 1950 program has been delivered to date” and the “United States cannot afford to be placed in a position where it can be stated here that operations
cannot be aggressively pursue because the United States has not furnished vitally needed supplies.”94 In addition to revealing the slow and uneven processing of MDAP supply disbursements, Hobbs’ letter also highlighted how reliant the Philippine Army was on U.S. military aid.

JUSMAG officers, stationed at Clark Air Force Base, north of Manila, identified the importance of the Philippines as—“a key position in the off-shore chain of islands considered essential to our strategic position in the Western Pacific.”95 The U.S. military officials also saw the Philippine as a potential source of manpower “on the side of the United States and free nations.” Citing statistical estimates a 1953 annual JUSMAG report written by Robert M. Cannon stated that, “about one and one-half million men between the ages of 18 and 30 meet qualifications for military service and could be used without impairing the productive capacity of the country seriously.”96 While population and geographic location spoke to the global concerns of the U.S. military, the American military staff at JUSMAG emphasized the current struggle within the Philippines.

Hobbs cited, for example, the American failure to deliver “much needed motor transportation” for the Philippine Army’s Battalion Combat Teams (BCTs), the units charged with confronting Huks in the countryside. Hobbs argued, “such supplies are needed now—not eighteen months hence.” In a separate letter, dated one day after Hobbs’ longer memo to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Philippine Embassy in Manila reported to the State Department that “it has come to our attention that the Philippine Armed Forces

94 Leland Hobbs to Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff, Department of Defense, “Military Assistance to the Republic of the Philippines,” NARA, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-1954, Box 4323.
95 “Annual report, 1 January-31 December 1953” JUSMAG Philippines, RG 334, General Correspondence, 1941-1961, Box 11.
96 “Annual report, 1 January-31 December 1953” JUSMAG Philippines, RG 334, General Correspondence, 1941-1961, Box 11.
have been handicapped by lack of motor transport” and that in the struggle “against elusive guerillas the mobility of the government forces is obviously of the utmost importance.”

The embassy memo presented a damning portrait of the inefficiency of the MDAP program, “less than 10% of trucks called for by the FY 1951 program have even been scheduled, and those trucks are not scheduled to be delivered before the fall of 1952.” Hobbs concluded his letter with the sentiment that “these people here are trying to fulfill their number one mission—restore peace and order in the Philippines. They cannot do it with mere increased manpower alone. They must have—and deserve to have—the help of our prompt fulfillment of our 1950, 1951, and supplemental 1951 MDA program.”

Although U.S. officials in the Philippines drew attention to the “expansion of Communist forces” and the “unprecedentedly effective operations” led by the “energetic and aggressive new Secretary of Defense,” Ramon Magsaysay, the JUSMAG office also had to compete with other countries receiving MDAP supplies and in this regard, the Philippines ranked rather low on U.S. military priorities. A February 7th, 1951 letter, sent from the office of the Secretary of State to the “officer in charge of the American Mission in Manila,” reviewed where the Philippines fit in U.S. global priorities. The letter stated that the Secretary of State’s office “noted that Major General Hobbes requests that programmed items be delivered immediately.” The Secretary of State argued, however, “it must be brought in mind that the priority of the Philippines in the furnishing of

98 Leland Hobbs to Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff, Department of Defense, “Military Assistance to the Republic of the Philippines,” NARA, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-1954, Box 4323.
Despite continued warnings from Philippine politicians and JUSMAG officials regarding the immediate threat of communism in the Philippines, disaster struck the Philippine Communist Party in October 1950. Magsaysay led AFP forces in raids on twenty-two homes in Manila, capturing high-ranking members of the PKP’s Politburo, over one hundred activists, and hundreds of PKP internal documents. This strike against the leadership of the leftist movement was a major coup for the Philippine government and especially the newly appointed Secretary of Defense, Ramon Magsaysay. The capture of PKP documents, which detailed the organization’s ambitions to expand organizing into the Visayas islands in the central section of the Philippines Archipelago only served to intensify the state’s drive against the Huks. For the Huks in the provinces, the arrest of the PKP leadership and their supporters in Manila meant that the already strained communication lines would become increasingly distant. Perhaps most importantly, the arrests also represented the state’s final strike against Huk and PKP attempts to legitimately participate in national political conversations. Although none of the captured documents proved that the PKP or Huks received aid or even strategic advice from foreign communist parties, the arrest and eventual trial and jailing of the PKP leadership meant that, once and for all, all the access to the legal political power of the state was cut off.

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“Every Man, Woman and Child is a Potential Communist”: Anti-Communist Propaganda and Peasant Culture

Newspaper reports, speeches of Philippine politicians, and reports by the U.S. military in the Philippines that connected the Huks to global communism were printed in English. Anti-communist propaganda directed at the peasants of Central Luzon was, however, printed in Tagalog, Kapampangan, or one of the many dialects spoken in region. Anti-communist propagandist used local languages, comics, photographs, and illustrations rife with politically charged symbols to contend that communism would inevitably result in death, terror, and slavery for the people of the Philippines. Although this propaganda was likely produced in the Philippines, it was also likely funded by U.S. foreign aid. For instance, one Tagalog language pamphlet, adorned with an image of Joseph Stalin looming over a seated Filipino schoolboy, identified its source as the United States Information and Educational Exchange Program (USIE).  

Similar to the main themes of the “lessons in counterinsurgency” that Lansdale and his cohort proselytized over the next decades, the Tagalog language propaganda aimed at the Philippine peasantry of Luzon hinged upon two ideas. First, the propaganda asserted that communism was a particularly pernicious ideology because it exploited the social conditions of poverty and the presumed cultural simplicity of the Filipino peasant. Throughout Lansdale’s counterinsurgency seminars and Valeriano and Bohannan’s counterinsurgency textbook, the Huk leaders are depicted as using the political, economic,  

100 The pamphlet is undated; however, the fact that it was produced in conjunction with the USIE gives us a sense of its publication date as the United States Information Service (USIS) replaced the organization in 1953. Takeshi Matsuda, Soft Power and Its Perils: U.S. Cultural Policy in Early Postwar Japan and Permanent dependency (Washington, D.C. Stanford, Calif.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press ; Stanford University Press, 2007). Laura A. Belmonte, Selling the American way: U.S. propaganda and the Cold War (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008).
and social conditions of the peasantry as “an excuse” to attract recruits. Addressing the issue of why communism appealed to the peasants of Central and Southern Luzon, Bohannon and Valeriano wrote that “for more than a century, demagogues and well-intention persons of understanding have been telling the people in these provinces that they are abused…needless to say, many were inclined to believe that they were abused, that they had no salvation except through revolution.” Therefore, the peasants, according to Valeriano and Bohannan, “found the Huk slogans of land reform, equal justice, and good government easy to accept.”

The author’s drove the point further stating “agrarian reformers” could be “a label applied to Communist insurgents by their own propagandists, and adopted by well-meaning but uncritical individuals.” For Bohannan and Valeriano, believing “agrarian reformers” were anything other less than international Communists in disguise represented “a classic illustration of the refusal to know an enemy.”

Undeniably, Valeriano and Bohannan’s inability to interpret the demands of peasant leaders as anything less than ideological brainwashing was tied up in class and racial biases as well as strategic goals of both the U.S. and the Philippine State. Throughout their careers, Lansdale’s cohort overlooked how peasants understood their world and throughout their textbook, Valeriano and Bohannan draw distinct lines between “guerillas” and “the people” so that the demands of the guerilla could be construed as an imposition of foreign political values on a population.

Indeed, a universalized communism provided a way that military advisors could essentially ignore or marginalize the political consciousness of peasants that disagreed.

101 Valeriano and Bohannan, Counter-Guerrilla Operations. 34.
102 Ibid. 44.
with the status quo. Bohannan and Valeriano consistently argue that an attention to the “political sphere,” in order to “win the people” over to the side of the government, was as crucial to campaign success as military strategy. They also derisively claimed that “for thirty years the communist have been painting this canvas: the ‘agrarian reformers’ nobly fighting for the ‘people’s rights’ against corrupt officials supported by evil property owners.” While Valeriano and Bohannan understood the most basic terms of the struggle, their treatment of the matter was to insist that it was a communist leadership, not the grass-roots organization of peasants that implanted ideas of political corruption and land rights based on class position into the minds of Filipino peasants. For example, Valeriano and Bohannan’s interpretation of the “land issue” in the Philippines highlights the ways that counterinsurgency experts came to see communist infiltration as the primary explanation for peasant activism.

The author’s biases to not take the structural elements of social life seriously and to assume that peasants could not arrive at their own political conclusions, was also buttressed by a deep underlying belief in the nature of communism. To take seriously communist analysis of the structural elements of the peasant class would also mean that U.S. military advisors had to recognize that grievances came out of human concerns, and indeed human concerns rooted in a long history of U.S. imperialism and the domination of the state by an elite class, rather than Communist plans for world domination. This did not mean that the counterinsurgency experts ignored land inequality as a primary root of the Huk insurgency, they did, and even Bohannan and Valeriano claimed that, “there were many in the Philippines who echoed the Huk cry for land reform, for equal justice, for an end to inefficiency and corruption in government.” Yet, “many who echoed the

103 Ibid. 89.
Huk line were far from being Communists.” While the authors do not offer a clear explication of this point, they clearly objected to the communist analysis of land inequality.

For Valeriano and Bohannon the injustices of the tenant farming system were not caused or intensified by the subjection of Philippine agricultural to imperialism or global capitalist markets. Culture, and specifically the culture of Filipino peasants, accounted for both the continued impoverishment of the peasants as well as their susceptibility to communist doctrine. On this point, Valeriano and Bohannon wrote that an alteration of the political economy of land in the Philippines would also require a shift in “cultural patterns” and that this change “would be most fiercely opposed by the small farmer.” In fact the authors contended that the peasants “don’t realize [their] own contribution to [their troubles]” and that “he tends to attribute exclusively to the malice of the ricos, or the bias of the government the fact that often he does not have enough rice left to feed his family.”\footnote{Ibid.48.}  In particular, Valeriano and Bohannan argued that this kind of peasant was “easy prey to guerilla propagandists.” This specific interpretation of the peasants, as mired in a culture that was outdated in a modern world, was ultimately part of strategy that sought to neutralize cultural beliefs that were oppositional to liberal capitalist forms of social organization.

Lansdale is immortalized through fiction and film, in part, for his insistence that Americans operating in foreign countries needed to experience and even celebrate local cultures. Lansdale and his cohort of counterinsurgency experts enacted policies that hinged on their belief that the “promise in our own Declaration of Independence” was inherent to all cultures and that soldiers simply needed to “learn to recognize these
Lansdale’s statement, given before a mixed crowd of American and Vietnamese military officials, highlighted how counterinsurgency experts diluted conflicts into a choice between freedom, embodied by American political values and cultures, or communistic slavery. In this vein, American military advisors and thinkers claimed that communism was a particularly pernicious enemy because it eradicated local cultures and customs and replaced them with a singular, oppressive foreign culture. This belief, that American values were somehow inherent among all men, allowed the military to justify their presence in foreign countries because it was built around the idea that American democracy liberated native cultures while communism replaced native traditions. The construction of the singularity of communist thought and organizations is a theme continually emphasized in Tagalog language anti-communist propaganda.

Tagalog language anti-communist propaganda focused heavily on Soviet influences in the Philippines and contended that the Soviets, and Stalin in particular, looked to take over the Philippine government. One pamphlet titled “Banta ng Komunismong Sobyet sa Pagtuturo,” or “The Threat of Soviet Communism to Teaching/Education,” utilized images to signify what Soviet domination of the Philippines looked like. The cover of the pamphlet featured a young Filipino schoolboy attempting to read a small textbook titled, “Katotohan” or truth. The boy is unable to read his book because a figure, obviously rendered to evoke Joseph Stalin, stands behind the boy, holding a larger book titled “Kasinungalingang Komunista,” or “Communist lies,” in front of the boy’s book. The representation of the Philippines, through the image of a small boy, aligned with the discourse that communism infiltrated and exploited the

105 Ibid. 75.
minds of the weak, uninformed, or child-like. The image also conveyed multiple meanings and touched upon the same themes that Lansdale’s cohort of counterinsurgency experts emphasized—the exploitability of Philippine peasant culture and the universal singularity of communist politics and culture.

2.1: Tagalog Anti-Communist Propaganda
From: “Banta ng Komunismong Sobyet sa Pagtuturo,” undated, American Historical Collection, Ateneo de Manila University.
A second pamphlet titled “Ikaw! Ano Ang Magiginigkahulugan sa iyo ng Komunismo?” or “What will be the meaning/significance of Communism to you” also used text and images, to portray how Soviet Communism malignantly spread the Philippines through the Huk movement. For instance, an opening page of the pamphlet warned, below an image of two Filipino women holding infants a message reads, “the bad fruit of communism is already here.” Underneath the photograph is an image and text that conveyed a second, alarming message for the reader. At the top of the image a hammer and sickle lays above an oversized image of Stalin. Below Stalin several figures, that we are encouraged to think are Huks enforcing the rule of Stalin, loom over the image of a large group of people, saddled with their children and belongings, fleeing a burning Christian Church. The text reads: “Huks have one country—Russia! And one leader—Stalin!” This image—intended to portray the consequences of communism—also posed a challenge the nationalist claims of the Huks. The pamphlet warned that, despite what the Huks might claim in regards to Filipino nationalism, their ultimate goal, according to this brand of propaganda, was to subject the Philippines to the ruthless authority of Joseph Stalin.106 The result of this subjugation is, again, the eradication of an important facet of Filipino culture, which in this case is represented by religion.

Connecting Philippine Communism to the Soviet Union was not simply about proving the “foreignness” of communist culture and politics. Anti-communist propagandist strategic connection to the Cold War, which by 1950 was quite “hot” in Asia, also utilized the scale of “the global” as leverage. While the broadly held goals of the communist inspired peasant movement were deeply grounded in land reform, political

106 In tagalog the text reads, “Ang masamang bunga ng komunismo ay narito na. ito ay mga takas sa mga huk, mga tagasunod ng komunista” and “ang mga huk ay may isang bayan—ang rusya! May isang lider—si Stalin!” American Historical Collection, Ateneo de Manila University.
recognition, and equal justice under the Philippine law, the reference to a global phenomenon, international communism, allowed anti-communist actors to alter possible results of peasant activism. In other words, by linking local activism to the Cold War, anti-communist propaganda worked to erase the on-the-ground demands of land reform and replace them with the abstract goal of world domination. Even if Philippine peasants, stuck in-between the warring Huks and Philippine state forces, did not believe that the Soviets were involved in the conflict, the threat of a future world war in the Philippines, a land that had been occupied by two different foreign powers in fifty years, functioned as a psychological threat to a war weary peasantry.107

By 1950, U.S. officials had successfully framed the Cold War as a multinational struggle of the “Free World” against Communism. This linkage to a global struggle elided the political valences of U.S. military aid to the Philippines. In other words, while Luis Taruc connected a history of U.S. imperialism in the islands to the current supply of “guns and military” that the U.S. fed the Philippines, the global framing of the Cold War situated U.S. military aid in a different historical continuum entirely—one that positioned the U.S. as the global protector of freedom and self-determination. As with many of the political projects constructed by Philippine elites and their American allies, the anti-communist propaganda of the Huk campaign subtlety erased the national liberation and anti-imperialist aspirations of the Huk movement and the PKP. This erasure not only cloaked the history of American imperialism in the islands but also the connection political progressives were making to this history and the contemporary state of national politics.

107 Lanzona, Amazons of the Huk Rebellion: Gender, Sex, and Revolution in the Philippines.
The “International Solidarity” of Anti-Communist Nations

At the Fort Bragg Seminar on Counter-Guerilla operations Medardo T. Justiniano spoke on the topic of “Combat Intelligence.” Coupled with psychological warfare, combat intelligence was considered a primary tactic of Lansdale’s counter-guerilla warfare strategies and Justiniano’s speech was peppered with anecdotes of the tactics Lansdale’s counterinsurgency cohort employed. Justiniano offered a caveat before he revealed specific details, “I suppose I will be criticized about some of the things I will discuss with you.” He did not, however, appear to spare the crowd the details of the gruesome tactics that were employed, and apparently, celebrated in the Huk campaign. For instance, in one telling scenario, which clearly meted results successful enough to be included in Justiniano’s speech, the Colonel reports that he and his men had “killed a large number of Huks” and then “piled these dead Huks into a truck with the hands and feet dangling outside.” Justiniano then described how they took “a whole truck load of dead bodies” and “drove this truck clear around town.” Cited as an example of how the AFP attempted to “instill greater fear” towards joining the Huks, the ultimate message of Justiniano’s speech is that there was no limit to the kinds of intelligence, counter-intelligence, and psychological warfare that could be utilized when the stakes were to “survive Communist bondage and oppression.” By defeating the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines, Justiniano claimed to “have contributed a humble share to our brother nations in the free world.” Justiniano’s message was one in which he envisioned the whole world working together to defeat communism—regardless of national boundaries.

108 Medardo T. Justiniano “Combat Intelligence,” 49.
He noted, “Let us all act in concert to fortify the framework of international solidarity” and “with freedom as our battle flag lets us stand united as one race and one nation.”

Justiniano claimed that anti-communist counterinsurgent wars required untraditional, and perhaps even morally questionable, military strategies and that anti-communist warfare was, because of the global aspirations inherent in communist doctrine, already an international war. Justiniano’s speech highlighted how the spatial categories the “national” and “global” were alternately prioritized as the primary organizers of political affairs in order to serve the interests of the U.S. and its allies. In simple terms, the idea that nations of the “free world” willingly joined together to represent “one race” and “one nation” in a global struggle facilitated the militarization through U.S. military bases. At the same time, the primacy of the national frame was clearly articulated by the rise of the United Nations—an organization that guaranteed the primacy of national sovereignty as a global governing principle. The national framework could also be mobilized to serve the ends of the global ambitions of the U.S. and its allies.

Although the Cold War is often historicized as a period when the nation-state reached its ascendency—it was also a period of intense mobility for actors and ideas across national borders. Indeed, the anti-communist counterinsurgency network this chapter traces illustrates how the development of national armies was not simply a national project, but a global project in which a set of actors, with access to avenues of power and resources, were able to crisscross the globe in order to “advise” the development of new military techniques. For example, intelligence training, of the sort Justiniano spoke was conducted in both the Philippines and at U.S military academies.

109 Medardo T. Justiniano “Combat Intelligence,” 49.
In the 1953 JUSMAG annual report, Robert M. Cannnon, head of JUSMAG in the Philippines, reported that, “thirty officers were graduated from 9 week Intelligence Specialist Course on 22 September 1953, conducted by a U.S. team sent to the Philippines for this purpose.” Cannon also reported that “thirty seven officers graduate from second 10-week intelligence specialist course in December 1953.” The second course was “presented by Filipino officers” that the U.S. military had identified as “ten outstanding graduates” of the intelligence course conducted by the team of U.S. intelligence specialist. Cannon described this strategy as one that gave “wide dissemination to the original material presented.” Two years later, Wayne C. Smith, a veteran of both WWII and the Korean War, advocated for the continuance of programs in which U.S. military advisors train foreign military officials. Smith wrote, “I believe strongly in the training of Asiatics by Asiatics and feel that there is a big potential here in the Philippines to carry out that policy.” For the type of programs that Smith described the U.S. would have to continue to fund the Armed Forces of the Philippines, which included funding Filipino officers to attend U.S. military academies, “we must continue to send as many Filipinos students to the US.” Smith emphasized that the training of Filipino soldiers buttressed the capability of the AFP. Smith also wrote of an additional benefit to developing the Philippine army, “already there has been some training by the AFP of Indonesian and Vietnam students here in Manila, the latter students on Psy War.” In fact, once trained, it appeared that Filipino soldiers also provided instruction to American soldiers en route to Vietnam, “we have been asked to give a weeks

111 “Annual report, 1 January-31 December 1953” JUSMAG Philippines, RG 334, General Correspondence, 1941-1961, Box 11. ANNEX D.
112 “Annual report, 1 January-31 December 1953” JUSMAG Philippines, RG 334, General Correspondence, 1941-1961, Box 11. ANNEX D.
indoctrination to the US Psy War team going to Vietnam,” Smith wrote, “the AFP will assist us in this indoctrination”113 Smith, like Lansdale’s cohort, imagined that once schooled in U.S. military tactics and strategic aims, Filipinos could then serve as “tutors” for the region.

Conclusion: “Our Best Friend in Asia”

In February 1953, the *U.S. News and World Report* published an interview with newly elected Philippine president, Ramon Magsaysay, titled “We Smashed the Communist” and subtitled, “Philippine leader tells how guns and food won war on Huks.” The article claimed that, “Magsaysay found out what made Communists tick.” Through Magsaysay’s retelling of the events in the Philippines, *U.S. News and World Report* promised to show an American readership, “why the communist thrive in Asia and how they’ve been defeated after getting a foothold.” The defeat of the Huks, which the article conflated entirely with Philippine Communism, urged that the topic was a “matter of major importance at this time.”114

In the article, Magsaysay claimed that the leadership of the Huks was Communistic, but the “people” that supported the Huks were simply supportive because “people were more afraid of the Philippine Army and police than they were of the Huks.” Magsaysay’s response drove to the heart of the ideology that underpinned his understanding of the Huk movement as well as the source for his strategy of counterinsurgent warfare. For Magsaysay, communists should be and, indeed, were killed

113 Wayne C. Smith to A.G. Trudeau, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, 20 August 1955, RG 334, JUSMAG Adjutant General Files, Box Two, 1954.
by the Philippine Army. In fact, once taking over the position of Secretary of Defense in 1950, Magsaysay offered extra payment to soldiers that killed Huks. He stated, “I established awards for kill Huks. A man gets $2,500 for a Huk commander, less for other Huks.” Magsaysay never explicitly stated how he separated “the people” from the “Huks” in his payouts, but he underscored that in addition to killing Huks the primary task of any counterinsurgent army was to offer the peasant of Central Luzon, “more hope than Communism can offer him.” Magsaysay pushed this point further “you do not kill Communism with the sword and gun alone. Communism is an idea.” Magsaysay claimed his efforts to rid the Philippines of Communism were derived from United States and that the AFP had “[copied] American methods.” Magsaysay maintained that the AFP treated “the people as you did when [Americans] came here to fight us in 1901. You fed hungry people. You gave the children candy. Your soldiers made friends, that’s how American conquered the Philippines.” Not only does Magsaysay evoke a strange nostalgia for colonial conquest, his interview concluded with what is perhaps the most revealing statement of the article. “We can also show Asians,” he stated, “that this business of being an ally of the United States is something far different from the colonialism they knew…we are not just the show window of democracy in Southeast Asia. We should be exporting democracy.”

The news of a Communist defeat in Asia offered a reprieve for U.S. policymakers beleaguered by American policies toward Asia. When the *U.S. News & World Report* article on Magsaysay was printed, U.S. and U.N troops continued a stalemated and

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bloody battle in Korea. Lansdale believed that success in the Philippines could convince Americans that the millions being spent overseas were worth the investment. Finally, the promotion of Magsaysay as a “new Asian nationalist” highlighted how American policymakers and the press promoted the idea that U.S. intervention and military aid could coincide with independence. In addition to the psychological impact of “beating the communists” the Philippines experience also offered a policy recipe for how to further engage in Asian countries, with Lansdale and his Filipino allies situated as potential tutors. In this way, it is important to see how the counterinsurgency campaigns against the Huk Rebellion made possible the mobility and careers of Lansdale’s cohort of counterinsurgency experts. Most importantly, their assertion that the Huks were a Philippine wing of a global Communist movement allowed them to transport their experience, through the martial language of “lessons in counterinsurgency,” to other areas of conflict around the globe.
In September 1956, a Filipino non-profit organization called The Freedom Company published a thirty-page booklet titled, “This is Free Vietnam.” Adorned with a colorful cover and containing sections on food, dress, geography, and climate, the pamphlet seems at first like little more than a travel booklet. The booklet’s introduction, however, makes clear that this is not an ordinary guidebook. Intended as a field manual for Filipinos traveling to Vietnam to “assist the South Vietnamese Army in logistical problems” the booklet argues that Vietnam, like the other “border lands…lying on the circumference of the Communist world” is a nation where “all the facets of the world struggle come into sharpest focus, for it is here that the situation remains most fluid…where, in short, the greatest confusion exists.”¹ Saturated in the entrenched Cold War discourse of the “titanic struggle” for freedom over Communism, the Freedom Company booklet describes Vietnam as a young, innocent nation “rising out of the paralysis of colonial domination” only to be challenged again by a new imperial foe, international Communism. The pamphlet argues that Filipinos were best positioned to offer assistance to “their traditional friend,” the Vietnamese, because they had also gone

¹ The Freedom Company, “This is a Free Vietnam”, Charles T.R. Bohannan Papers, The Hoover Institute, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA.
through two periods of colonization and had emerged a “freedom-loving nation.”

Figure 3.1: Freedom Company Pamphlet, 1955
From: Edward Lansdale Papers, Hoover Institute

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1 The Freedom Company, “Freedom in Asia,” January 1955, Box 33, Edward Lansdale Papers, The Hoover Institute, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA
The pamphlet’s authors link Filipinos to the Vietnamese through their mutual histories of encounters with white colonials and their assumed racial similarities derived from a the geographic location of the two territories in a newly emerging geographic space known as Southeast Asia. The language of freedom and democratic principles, used by the pamphlet’s authors throughout the document, cloaked the connection of the two nations and peoples to the United States, the Philippines’ former colonizer, and the financial and military supporter of the contemporary crisis in Vietnam. This booklet and other material published by The Freedom Company defined a “freedom-loving nation” as one that aligned itself with the worldview of the United States’ anti-communist agenda. However the booklet did not explain how and why a group of former Philippine Armed Forces officers ended up in Saigon in 1955, at the beginning of what would be a nearly twenty year American intervention in Vietnam.¹

Part of the reason that military officers from the Philippines ended up, “training, indoctrinating, inspiring and reinforcing indigenous forces,” in Vietnam can be unearthed by following the trail of U.S. foreign aid and U.S. military interventions in Southeast

Asia. The Freedom Company was intended to be a model for a string of similar non-profit organizations in countries across the world connected to Freedom Incorporated, a U.S. based firm that would, “sponsor and advise the foreign affiliates.” It is not clear in the historical records if Freedom Incorporated ever existed in the capacity described by this booklet. What is clear is that during the mid 1950s into the 1960s the Freedom Company, with covert support of the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Defense Department funding, conducted operations in at least three different Southeast Asian nations. Though framed as a humanitarian project of “Asians helping Asians,” intra-Asian aid, in the case of the Freedom Company, was far from humanitarian and contributed to the intense militarization of Southeast Asia.

Investigating the CIA’s clandestine projects in Asia also reveals the understudied links between race, decolonization, and covert operations. The CIA worked to circumvent the link between whiteness and American power by recruiting Filipinos to contribute to American expansion in Southeast Asia. They did this by attempting to sever the connection between contemporary U.S. practices and the history of American colonial conquest in the Philippines. In this way, the project of expanding U.S. power and influence was complicated by the rise in anti-colonial and nationalist movements, the discrediting of colonial practices, and the anxieties liberation movements provoked amongst imperial nations.

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2 The Freedom Company, Appendix A to Freedom Inc. Goes to Laos, Box 33, Edward Lansdale Papers
3 Matthew Connelly argues that the worldview of the Cold War was shaped by people who came of age when anti-colonial nationalism was on the rise and worried about demographic trends, particularly in regards to non-predominantly white countries. Matthew Connelly, "Taking Off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North-South Conflict during the Algerian War for Independence," American History Review 25, no. 2 (2000).
With the Freedom Company the CIA intervened in the racial politics of decolonization by promoting Filipinos as exemplary Asian political subjects not in spite of colonization but because of U.S. colonization. This formulation, in which white American men and women were imagined as having successfully imparted “modern political knowledge” on Philippine peoples served the CIA’s purpose of changing the conception of white foreigners in Southeast Asia. In other words, if the Vietnamese, for instance, could see Filipinos as politically modern subjects because of U.S. colonial practices then they might also reconsider the influence of white American advisors in their nation. This attempt to sever the link between whiteness, U.S. intervention, and U.S. colonial history was central to the Freedom Company. The racial politics of the Freedom Company link the histories of colonialism, decolonization and transnational anti-communist politics.

CIA efforts to produce new understandings of anti-communist Filipinos as politically modern Asians were part of American policymaker’s’ attempts to exert U.S. power and influence in decolonizing nations. Significantly, this formulation was rooted in a belief that the American colonial project had been legitimate, even though, according to U.S. policymakers, all other colonists’ practices unjustly failed to develop Asian societies. In other words, Americans continued to cast themselves as the right kind of white liberators: tutors of democracy and freedom rather than white colonists like the British, Dutch, or especially, the French.5

The CIA and its agents in the field represented their actions for two separate audiences. Its American audience needed to be convinced that without American intervention and aid, the Philippines and its nascent democratic people might not withstand the threat of communism. To its Filipino audience, conversely, the CIA communicated that, in relation to the rest of Southeast Asia, the Philippines stood at the forefront of political modernity in the region and by extension, the colonial world.⁶ In addition to the interventionist logic that underpinned the practices of the CIA, the Freedom Company also wielded power in its ability to create knowledge about the lands, peoples, and politics they encountered in Southeast Asia. Read in this way, the Freedom Company not only uncovers a hidden narrative of an on-the-ground enactment of international Cold War politics, it also revels the ways that the Philippines operated both as a discursive and material nexus of the deep structures of American Cold War power.⁷

Filipinos allied with the policies of the United States and the CIA saw their own interests and the interests of the Philippine nation as falling in line with United States aims in the region. They did not see themselves as puppets of American power. Philippine postwar politicians, many of whom were educated in the United States and had cut their political teeth during the American colonial period through a “Filipinization” of American colonial rule, factored into U.S. intervention in the islands and regional politics

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⁷ Mrinalini Sinha has conceptualized a way to highlight power, practices, and material effects of imperialism without reducing it to the only organizing factor in society while also considering the power of discourse without making an “omnipotent” force that weighs heavy on historical subjectivities. This blending of the two considerations—discursive and material—takes seriously the material effects and discursive power of American empire while not closing down the ways in which empires are hegemonies, or sites of conflict, that require constant work to maintain. This is in part a political choice as well because as Sinha writes “we can’t get outside of constructions of discourse, but we also can’t construct our way outside the materiality of living.” Mrinalini Sinha, *Specters of Mother India: The Global Restructuring of an Empire* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006).
in complicated ways. Some politicians were quite savvy at negotiating with American emissaries and manipulating different American agencies active in the islands to further their personal political power. Though continually attempting to exert autonomy in their rule of the Philippine state through “non-confrontational resistance,” many members of the Philippine political elite also simultaneously expressed the benevolence of U.S. colonialism, affirming a long-standing U.S. colonial ideology. Importantly, similar to their American counterparts, Filipino politicians also utilized the polarized and moralizing language of the Cold War in order to strategically secure further financial support from the United States.

Projects like the Freedom Company demonstrate that CIA agents and their supporters in Washington and Manila were cognizant of colonial era racial divisions and of Southeast Asians’ potential animosity toward Western intervention. Although, the CIA was only one of many American agencies that attempted to maintain American power in the Philippines, the Freedom Company displays how U.S. foreign policy agencies searched for unique ways to manage racial anxieties in colonial or decolonizing territories. In contrast to its deliberate efforts to cast members of the anti-communist Philippine elite as modernized Asians, the CIA also consistently framed “the Asian masses” as being “prey” for communist infiltration. In fact, the Agency refused to consider the historical development of indigenous political movements or the possibility that Philippine peasants could embark on alternative models of development than those embraced by the United States or the U.S.S.R. This racialized imagination of politics,

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10 See chapters one and two for further discussions of elite representations of Filipino communism.
stemming from the U.S. colonial experience in the Philippines, framed Asian peasants as victims incapable of independent political consciousness. And although agencies of the United States worked very hard to publicly distinguish their policies as distinctively postcolonial, historical racial hierarchies continued to influence a range of CIA operations, from covert warfare to humanitarian intervention.

The Freedom Company was a unique “special operation” in that it was not simply a CIA “front” organization.¹¹ In fact, the Freedom Company was established through an alliance between members of the Philippine Armed Forces and U.S. officials in 1954. From the scarce and fragmentary archival records that remain, it is clear that organization was not simply a “cover” for covert American agents. The transnational group of individuals that formed the Freedom Company intended the organization to provide technical support and paramilitary services to anti-communist forces in Southeast Asia, specifically in Vietnam, Laos, and Indonesia. While its start-up money came from “private donors,” a euphemism that indicates that it received funding from the CIA, and it was incorporated as a non-profit organization under Philippine law, the Freedom Company actually did perform the work it openly professed to in its founding statements.¹² Throughout its existence, the Freedom Company engaged in both very local struggles between opposing political forces and nation-wide civil wars.

Beginning in 1954, the Freedom Company sent Philippine advisors into conflict zones after U.S. military aid began to flow to anti-communist forces in those areas. After

¹¹ For a recent study on primarily domestic front organizations of the CIA see: Wilford, The Mighty Wurlitzer: How the CIA Played America.
¹² This is in striking contrast to Air America, a well-known CIA front organization in Southeast Asia that was purportedly a civilian air charter service used for delivering humanitarian aid. In reality, the airline was owned and operated by the CIA and flew combat supply missions throughout the region. William Blum, Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Interventions since World War II (Monroe, Me.: Common Courage Press, 1995).
it was established, the Freedom Company signed contracts with the governments of Vietnam, Laos, and Indonesia and was paid by those governments for its consulting work with their military or police forces. The funds that the governments of Southeast Asia used to pay the Freedom Company were drawn from U.S. aid payments that came out of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP). MDAP was a program set up by the US Congress in 1949 through which it funneled money for foreign military assistance aimed at containing Communism. In certain cases U.S. foreign aid agencies, such as the U.S. Operations Mission of the International Cooperation Administration (ICA), facilitated the hiring of the Freedom Company by foreign governments. However, the U.S. affiliation to the Freedom Company eventually proved detrimental to its success. In 1960, the Freedom Company organizers, who had been coming under attack in Vietnam for supporting U.S. policy, shed the company’s non-profit status and renamed their entity the Eastern Construction Company, a move that helped to further ensconce U.S. influence.

This chapter demonstrates how the CIA inserted itself into Philippine politics in order to influence postcolonial power relations in the new republic in a way that would continue to benefit the globally defined security interests of the United States. The CIA, through the Freedom Company, argued that the power upheavals of decolonization and the threat of global communism demanded new ways of managing the security of the Free World. As colonialism became delegitimized as a form of global political organization in the wake of an increasing number of nationalist uprisings, the CIA was able to intervene in Philippine and Southeast Asian politics by positioning itself as the defender of democracy and global equality. In this way, the CIA could help sustain
asymmetrical relations of power between the Philippines and the United States while avoiding charges of imperialism from the U.S.S.R. or from Philippine anti-imperial nationalists.\textsuperscript{13} Additionally, I argue that this history of the Freedom Company, one of the CIA’s many covert avenues into Southeast Asian politics, reveals a way in which the CIA was created in part to extend existing U.S. power relations. By attempting to manage the processes and outcomes of global decolonization, the CIA exerted influence over the Philippines in a way that stunted complete Filipino independence from the American empire. This historicization runs counter to the official and popular histories of the agency that are rooted in a distinctly Cold War framework of bipolar politics. The erasure of colonial history, the racial politics of decolonization, and a growing transnational anti-communist movement come together to reveal the “dirty, half-hidden” history of the Freedom Company.

\textbf{From Local Politics to Global Communism: A Critical History of the CIA}

The historical analysis of the CIA is strikingly similar to the popular portrayal of one of the agency’s most recognizable Cold War agents, CIA operative in the Philippines, and co-founder of the Freedom Company, Edward Lansdale. Cultural historian Jonathan Nashel depicts Lansdale as a historical figure stuck between two polarizing interpretations. In one version, Lansdale is a patriotic cold warrior, almost clairvoyant in his knowledge of communism. In the second version, Lansdale is the nefarious agent that arrogantly disregards the hypocrisy of his role as a proselytizer of democracy while employing black propaganda, “dirty tricks,” and sometimes murder. Though Nashel concludes that as complicated a figure as Lansdale might have been, the

\textsuperscript{13} Westad, \textit{The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of our Times}. 
seemingly paradoxical versions of his actions are less important than the need to read Lansdale through the history of American Cold War political culture. More central to Nashel’s argument is the way that he envisions Lansdale as an embodiment of and agent in a particular juncture in American history. Within the context of American culture, Nashel rightly argues that Lansdale’s beliefs and actions reflected a particular Cold War consensus about the imminent threat of communism and the use and purpose of the National Security State.14 Nashel also rightly argues that Lansdale’s career and the mythology that grew around him is representative of a more general popular conception of the CIA, the agencies actions during the Cold War, and American Cold War culture at large.15

However, the American racial, class, and national anxieties of the Cold War that Nashel uses the biography of Edward Lansdale to illustrate emerged out of a longer history of U.S. colonialism in Southeast Asia. While he was in the Philippines, Lansdale described CIA projects, like the Freedom Company in the Philippines, as “teaching the Filipino to stand up for themselves as free men.” Lansdale further elucidated that this strategy “was in keeping with our consistent operating philosophy of helping the people learn to help themselves.”16 As this quote underscores, American policy recreated a colonial hierarchy in which Americans were positioned as the mentors or tutors to their unenlightened Philippine “brothers.” This framing allowed the United States to justify its continued intervention in the region on benevolent grounds. The righteousness of the

14 Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War.
15 As historian Jonathan Nashel described in a recent cultural biography, Lansdale is perhaps simultaneously the most recognized and notorious CIA figure of the postwar era, despite his own accounts that downplay his affiliation with the agency. The complexity of the Freedom Company funding source is only depended by its connection with Colonel Edward Lansdale.

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American position was further buttressed by the belief, which Lansdale often espoused, that Asians could be “saved” if Americans committed to “winning over” Asian populations. While policymakers in the postcolonial period used different articulations to justify American intervention in different historical contexts, the underlining racial ideology that justified the Indian Wars of the 19th century and Spanish-American-Philippine War of the early twentieth century continued to live on as core American cultural beliefs in the post-independence Philippines.

Reading the history of the CIA through the lens of U.S. colonial history does not imply that the Cold War context is irrelevant or even secondary. Undoubtedly the deteriorating diplomatic relationship with the U.S.S.R., the Communist revolution in China, the onset of the Korean War, and the generalized fear of communism precipitated the creation, structure, and American state support of the CIA. However, a close consideration of the CIA in the Philippines reveals how the fear of global communism slowly moved to center of U.S. explanations for its global interventionist politics. A 1949 CIA intelligence estimate, for instance, exposes how local politics, not the threat of communism, were indicated as the primary problems plaguing the Philippines. In this estimate, one of the first conducted by the agency in the country, chronic land inequality, elite control of the government, and uncontrolled surplus firearms are cited as the primary contributors to internal instability in the Philippines. Although, in 1949 the CIA identified

17 Edward Lansdale, Lecture on Southeast Asia, Army War College, December 3, 1958, Myron Cowen Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO.
18 There is an extensive historiography on early 20th century imperialism. For this claim I rely heavily on Mary Renda’s interpretation of the Haitian occupation. According to Renda, early 20th century paternalist discourses were a prime cultural mechanism by which the Haitian occupation was made acceptable. As an expression of superiority and control expressed in parent-child terms, paternalism was ultimately a form of domination masked as benevolence, while encouraging citizens back home to view Haiti as being within the proper scope of U.S. concern. Mary A. Renda, Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism, 1915-1940 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001).
the Huks as the “most serious” dissident group in the Philippine Republic, the 1949 report also makes clear that the Huks were simply one of many dissident groups operating in the nation. The CIA identified the actions of “common outlaws,” “disaffected peasantry” and “the Moros” as having emerged from “genuine social and economic grievances.” Indeed, uncontrolled firearms, which were literally left behind from the intense fighting of WWII, were seen as one of the primary factors that fed the multiple fires of postwar social unrest.

Communism, and a perceived communist “exploitation” of Philippine peasants, which dominated Lansdale’s reports on the Huks in the early to mid 1950s, appeared in the 1949 CIA document secondary to longstanding, and deeply local, tensions in the Philippines. Most strikingly, the 1949 intelligence report stated, “no clear-cut evidence, aside from Marxist literature, has been presented which would indicate that Russians or Chinese in the Philippines are aiding the Huks.” Furthermore, the report argues that the Huks:

Have legitimate grievances: the land system has been historically inequitable and the masses of the peasants live in poverty. Partly because

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20 “The Current Situation in the Philippines,” Truman Library, 10. The term “Moro” (Moors) was term used by the Spanish to classify Muslim Filipinos. Abinales, *Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the Formation of the Philippine Nation-State*.

21 Due to the extraordinarily high numbers of surplus weaponry left in the Philippines after the fighting of World War Two ended, weapon theft and smuggling were rampant. According to the Philippine NICA (National Intelligence Coordinating Agency) intelligence reports, over 84,000 machine guns were left in the Philippines following the war, along with countless other firearms and munitions. U.S. GIs were involved in the attempted theft of one million rounds of ammunition in late 1946. “Subject: Arms Smuggling in the Philippines,” Elpidio Quirino Papers, Ayala Museum, Manila.
the landlord class dominates the government, policies designed to aid the peasants’ lot are ineffective both in formulation and in execution.\textsuperscript{22}

Although the document’s author points to the deeper historical roots of Huk grievances, there is conspicuously no mention of the U.S. role in the islands, which had empowered the landed oligarchy and deepened rural inequality during the 50 year U.S. colonial rule. This assertion, that the Huks were primarily a peasant organization, changed dramatically in later CIA reports on the Huks. While the 1949 report very clearly illustrates that it is the tensions between elite and peasant Filipinos, or local dimensions of power, that animate Huk dissent, within a few short months, global communism became the CIA’s primary explanation of Philippine civil unrest.

For instance, Charles Bohannan, Lansdale’s comrade in combat in the Philippines, wrote in 1950 that the Huks were “seen as part of the tide of Communist conquest which has just engulfed China, and was seeking to roll over Indo-China and Korea.” Similarly, reflecting on the Huks in a 1958 speech to the Army War College Lansdale identified the Huks as one of the “hard-core Communist” movements operating Southeast Asia. Although the Huk movement was largely eradicated in a brutal campaign of political and military repression by the mid 1950s, the rebellion lived on as an example of operational success by Lansdale and his CIA and military colleagues as a example of the “dirty, half-hidden war that is going on now” in Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{23}

Certainly many policymakers like Lansdale acted in response to the events of what they perceived to be the evolution of communism and the Cold War. At the same time, historical interpretations of the Cold War that hinge upon the ideological battle

\textsuperscript{22} “The Current Situation in the Philippines,” Truman Library, 9.
\textsuperscript{23} “Lecture to Army War College,” Lansdale Papers
between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R fail to comprehend how agencies, such as the CIA, used the language of global communism to legitimize the spread of the U.S. power.\(^{24}\) Lansdale and his fellow CIA agents undoubtedly exemplified a quintessential American worldview about the dangers and realities of communism and thus, interpreted world events myopically. However, this chapter shows how historical accounts that continually frame the CIA as a distinctive Cold War project overlook the continuities between the CIA and histories of American imperialism.\(^{25}\)

In the postwar era, policymakers drew upon the supposed exceptionalism of American colonialism in order to extend the boundaries of U.S. national security to encompass nearly every space on the globe. Policymakers and diplomats regularly asserted right of the U.S. to intervene anywhere and at anytime and this exceptionalist principle also served as a core operational practice for the CIA.\(^{26}\) In other words, interpretations that hinge explanations of the CIA on the events that defined how U.S. policymakers experienced the Cold War overlook the longstanding American intervention in the Philippines. In the case of the Huks, the American state, in concert

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\(^{25}\) Additionally, a general problem with the historiography of the CIA it is largely grounded in an American chronology of the 20th century. This chronology is largely focused on the wars in Europe and presents the end of World War II as a sharp break from the past. From the viewpoint of the Philippines and other parts of colonial Southeast Asia the end of World War II, while certainly recognized as momentous event, did not signal the end of Western intervention and in fact only worked to re-entrench colonial struggles in the region.

with a Philippine political elite, exerted power against political challenges partially through a process of knowledge production. The power to authoritatively define leftist movements, as Lansdale did by claiming that they were “taking directives from Stalin,” is an example of a new articulation of old imperial strategies by the U.S. state. Tracking this shift in the CIA, from viewing the Huks as a local issue to seeing the Huks as part of a global communist movement illustrates how the CIA attempted to expunge U.S. imperialism from the history of the Philippines in an effort to transform the United States from an imperial nation to a postcolonial global power.

The Freedom Company emerged at the intersection of postwar Philippine and American military and political relations. It evolved out of the connections between WWII guerilla groups and the U.S. military and it was a product of the expanding American international intelligence apparatus, especially the quickly evolving CIA and its Philippine counterpart the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA). Therefore, despite the image of inter-Asian goodwill promoted by its pamphlets, the Freedom Company did not emerge out of Philippine democratic movements or even from the halls of Malacañang, the presidential palace. In fact, the Freedom Company was explicitly designed to carry out the interests of U.S. foreign policy.\footnote{The idea of ‘national interests’ is a fixture in international relations theory and the ‘realist’ school global politics as it is primarily associated with explanations of the action of states. States are not problematized in terms of coherency or instability of nations as politically constructed entities. My approach is informed by transnational and global history. The definitions and methodologies for ‘transnational’ are varied. I derive my working definition from two recent articles on transnational history, historiography, and methods. The “core of transnational history” as challenges to the hermeneutic of the nation-state. My understanding of the term does not elide the power of nation-states but instead recognizes nations as constructed entities. Micol Siegel writes, “Transnational history examines units that spill over and seep through national borders, units both greater and smaller than the nation-state. Micol Siegal, "Beyond Compare: Comaparative Method after the Transnational Turn," Radical History Review Winter 2055, no. 91 (2005). Gladys McCormick Laura Briggs, J.T. Way, "Transnationalism: A Category of Analysis," American Quarterly 60, no. 3 (2008). De-centering the nation is similar to projects of the new imperial historians. See: Cooper and Stoler, Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World; Antoinette M. Burton, After the Imperial Turn: Thinking with and Through the Nation}
designed to promote the Freedom Company to U.S. officials in the State Department, Freedom Company advocates described the organization as a vehicle that, “gives the U.S. unofficial means for accomplishing necessary and approved missions.” The memo explained that the Freedom Company could extend the reach of U.S. military operations when “the proposed operations exceeded the capability of CIA.”28 Simply, the Freedom Company was explicitly created as a tool that the U.S. military and intelligence institutions could use to undertake missions they, themselves, could not legally prosecute because they did not have the mandate to do so. While the United States government would provide financial support for approved missions, the Freedom Company would develop a plan for the “country of combat” and coordinate with foreign governments. The U.S. government, in effect, would maintain no official or overt relationship to either the Freedom Company or the country receiving military assistance.29

The CIA’s activities in Southeast Asia and the support of the Freedom Company was the result of a key development in American foreign policy. In the midst of a downward trend in defense spending, spurred on by a Republican congress, the CIA evolved from an executive branch creation called the Central Intelligence Group (CIG). And, although conservatives in congress opposed the establishment of a centralized intelligence agency by likening it to an “American Gestapo,” in January of 1946, the CIG became the first civilian, rather than military, source of international intelligence for the President.30 Eventually pushed to create a legal basis for the organization, the CIG

28 Questions and Answers, Freedom Incorporated, Edward Lansdale Papers.
29 Questions and Answers, Freedom Incorporated, Edward Lansdale Papers.
30 Even before the conclusion of World War two, X-2 or the counterintelligence branch of the OSS had already conducted campaigns against Italian Marxist, whom agents claimed were Soviet Agents. James Callanan, Covert Action in the Cold War: US policy, Intelligence and CIA Operations, International Library of Twentieth Century History (London ; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2010).
became the CIA in 1947 and reported directly to the newly formed National Security Council (NSC). Congress, under the 1947 National Security Act, signed the creation of a permanent civilian intelligence agency into law. Congress debated the 1947 National Security Act and charged the CIA with the tasks of: advising the NSC on intelligence, providing recommendations based on collected intelligence, producing intelligence estimates and reports, and performing “such other functions” and duties related to intelligence. Regardless of the original congressional discussions, the structure of the CIA and its relationship to the National Security council meant that CIA directives were largely removed from the arena of ongoing congressional debate.\(^{31}\) As historian John Prados has argued, covert operations, special operations, or any of the numerous terms that served as euphemisms for CIA secret warfare do not exist within the 1947 law.\(^ {32}\) However, the elasticity of the phrase “such other functions” is what enabled the CIA to conduct, what came to be known as, covert operations.\(^ {33}\) In fact, covert operations predated the National Security Act of 1947 when CIG operatives recruited anti-Soviet organizers in Romania. Although, this particular operation failed badly, responsibility for covert actions was removed from the State Department’s purview and placed in the organizational scope of the CIA. The first CIA led covert operation occurred in Italy leading up to the 1948 general election. The mechanisms for how the CIA, the NSC, and the President would provide funding for covert operations also developed through the


\(^{33}\) Historian James Callahan distinguishes between three different types of covert action. These include: defensive covert action defined as countering communist efforts to undermine U.S. allied states, offensive covert action or attempts to destabilize or remove communist regimes and preventative covert action or attempts to intervene in neutral countries so as to prevent the spread of U.S.S.R influence. Callanan, *Covert Action in the Cold War: US policy, Intelligence and CIA Operations*. 3-7.
course of State Department, Defense Department, and White House handlings of the events of 1947.\textsuperscript{34}

In the fall of 1947, at the request of Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, the CIA received its first inquiries for conducting secret paramilitary and political action campaigns. Anxious about the legality of the proposed projects, the CIA director Rear Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter sought advice from the CIA general council, Lawrence R. Houston. Houston expressed the opinion that there was only a tenuous connection between covert operations and “intelligence matters” permitted by law, but that if the president gave the agency instructions and congress allocated the funds then the agency would have the legal footing to carry out covert actions.\textsuperscript{35} In June of 1948, the National Security Council issued NSC 10/2 creating a panel, which later became known as the “Special Group,” comprised of representatives from the State Department, the Defense Department, and the CIA. This panel could dictate the direction of CIA policy and received an allocation from the CIA annual budget to funnel towards covert operations.\textsuperscript{36} In other words, the concern that the CIA skirted authorization from congress to influence the outcome of foreign politics was pushed aside in order to begin a series of operations against leftist groups seeking electoral victories in the political contests of post-war Europe.\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid. 23.
\textsuperscript{35} Prados, Safe for Democracy: The CIA and the American Democratic Enterprise. 39.
\textsuperscript{36} NSC 10/2 stated that covert actions were “conducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and executed that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them.” NSC 10/2, June 18, 1948, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRIS), 1945-1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, document 292.
\textsuperscript{37} Alessandro Brogi, A Question of Self-Esteem: The United States and the Cold War Choices in France and Italy, 1944-1958, International History (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002).
Widening the Dirty War: Lansdale, Bohannon, and the Genealogies of Intra-Asian Aid

In November of 1954 a group of male Filipino citizens, with the aid of United States’ Air Force officers Edward Lansdale and Charles T.R. Bohannon, helped establish the Freedom Company in the Philippines. Both Lansdale and Bohannon had served in the Philippines prior to their return to the islands in 1950. Lansdale was trained in advertising at the University of California Los Angeles, served first as an OSS officer and was stationed in San Francisco during the Second World War. He then transferred to the G-2, an intelligence division of the Armed Forces/Western Pacific (AFWESPAC) in the Philippines. Lansdale remained a public information officer in the Philippines until 1948 when he returned to the United States and took a teaching position at the Strategic Intelligence School at Lowry Air Force Base in Colorado.38

From the beginning of his career in the military, Lansdale recognized the importance of the United States’ image abroad. In his role as a public relations officer in the army intelligence division, Lansdale urged his colleagues to “keep the journalists (particularly the Americans) so busy with favorable news that any bad breaks for the U.S. Army will be merely incidental.”39 “Bad breaks” for the Army in the postwar Philippines included at least two “accidental” shooting deaths of young Filipino boys by American soldiers, an open gunfight between African American and white American soldiers after the murder of a black solider, multiple car crashes involving U.S. military vehicles, and a

39 Memo from Edward Lansdale, July 10th 1947, Edward Lansdale Papers
growing black market for U.S. surplus products. Most dramatically, 10,000 U.S. soldiers stationed in the Philippines staged a march through the streets of downtown Manila protesting the “slowed down” demobilization plan of the American military in January of 1946.40 Amidst this news, Lansdale worked to promote the idea that the U.S. was well suited to the task of protecting Filipino interests and promoting freedom in the newly independent country. He was particularly cognizant of the problems that might arise if Americans lost their popular appeal. While Lansdale was often aware of the fragility of American claims, he also believed fiercely in the benevolence of the U.S. global mission.

Lansdale blended his wartime intelligence work with his skills as an advertiser in his role as Public Relations officer. During his time as a public relations officer, Lansdale was also acutely aware of the delicate position of the U.S. Army, which was, as he put it, “stationed on independent, foreign soil.” Thus he sought to produce news stories that would create “a favorable, constructive publicity in the press, both locally and in the United States.” He believed that the U.S. would “enjoy a marked improvement in our relations with many people” because of good publicity. A consummate salesman, seemingly always aware of his audience, Lansdale further stated that good publicity was directed at “not only at Filipinos and the American public generally, but even the War Department and our congress.”41 As Nashel writes, Lansdale was essentially “selling images and ideas” in order to improve the view non-Americans had of the United States and its position in the world. Yet, Lansdale was doing more than just selling overly

41 Memo from Edward Lansdale, July 10th 1947, Edward Lansdale Papers,
positive news reports. Gathering news meant creating intelligence and producing knowledge about the nature of Filipinos, as news reports were a primary text in which both Americans and Filipinos could interpret the evolving relationship between the nations.42

Similar to his later work writing intelligence reports and conducting covert operations, Lansdale’s manipulation of the news during his first tenure in the Philippines situated him amongst the few actors in the Philippines that had the power to describe the “reality” of the islands to a wider world. Additionally, Lansdale’s position allowed him to make contacts and cultivate a network of Filipinos and Americans with access to the avenues of power in the islands. Lansdale’s network, revealed through a list of his “bon voyage fete” in 1948, included influential individuals from the press, military, government, and the presidential palace. Lansdale’s guest list included top military and Philippine Constabulary officials: Jalandoni, Calixto Duque, Agustin Gabriel, Napoleon Valeriano, Manuel Lapus, and Manuel Castendada; from the press: Ford Wilkins (editor of the Manila Bulletin), Go Puan Seng (editor of the leading Chinese daily, the Fookian Times), Manny Manahan (editor of the leading Tagalog daily, Bagong Buhay), and Eugenio Lopez (owner of the Manila Chronicle) and from politics: Juan Orendain (public relations secretary for the republic’s first postwar president, Manuel Roxas), Lorenzo Tañada (Philippine Senator), and Aresenio “Arsenic” Lacson (journalist and Mayor of Manila from 1952 to 1962).43

42 In his cultural biography on Edward Lansdale Jonathan Nashel analogizes Lansdale’s work as a PR officer to that of confidence man selling the “magic” of American capitalism to Southeast Asia. While, I do not disagree with Nashel’s assertion that Lansdale’s embrace of market economies and democracy was something akin to a 19th century religious missionary, I do think in linking Lansdale’s work to “larger forces of consumer culture operating in this period” overlooks the power to create knowledge that Lansdale management of the press embraced.
43 “Guest List,” Lansdale Papers.
While one can retrace Lansdale’s paths in the Philippines through the fragments of his archive, unraveling a complete picture of the history of the Freedom Company is hindered by the lack of historical documentation on the company, particularly in relation to its American supporters. Perhaps most important to the creation of the Freedom Company, and an indication of its source of CIA funding, was, in fact, the connection to Edward Lansdale. Lansdale lauded his participation in the suppression of the Hukbalahap and promoted the war in Washington circles as a successful case of counter-insurgent warfare. Indeed, his role in the 1953 Philippine presidential election earned him the lifelong nickname of “Colonel Landslide” and the favor of the CIA’s director, Allen Dulles.\footnote{Nashel, Edward Lansdale's Cold War.21.}

Unlike Lansdale, who eventually became a figure widely recognized for his role in formulating counterinsurgency practices and policies in Vietnam, Charles T.R. Bohannan’s long career in Southeast Asia occurred largely outside the spotlight of the American media. In this way, Charles Bohannan does not hold the place that Lansdale does in American memory or even written history. However, Bohannan was, in fact, more representative of his numerous colleagues that worked in the purposively grey spaces between the U.S. military and the CIA.\footnote{Valeriano and Bohannan, Counter-Guerilla Operations; Dennis M. Rempe, "Guerillas, Bandits, and Independent Republics: U.S. Counter-inrgency Efforts in Colombia, 1959-1965," Small Wars and Insurgencies 6, no. 3 (1995).}

In the articles of incorporation, filed in the Philippines and adhering to Philippine law regarding non-profit organizations, the founders of the Freedom Company wrote that the purpose of the company was, “to promote, assist, train, and employ Filipino citizens and citizens of legitimate freedom-loving countries in the techniques of preserving their
freedom.”46 The original board of directors included: Agustin G. Gabriel (future head of NICA, the Philippine intelligence organization), Jose E. Razon, Juan C. Orendain, Bernard L. Anderson (USAFFE), Ricardo Galang (AFP), Frisco San Juan (WWII Guerilla leader), and John Wachtel (former Lt. Colonel in U.S. Armed Forces); listed as associate members were Lou Conein and Rufus Philips who were both CIA agents and later were also part of Lansdale’s Saigon Military Mission.47 Charles Bohannan, Edward Lansdale, Ramon Magsaysay, Ngo Dinh Diem (President of the Republic of Vietnam from 1955-1963), Napoleon Valeriano, and Nguyen Ngoc Le (head of the Vietnamese National Police) were all listed as honorary lifetime members.48 This list of Freedom Company members represented the connections the anti-Japanese resistance movement facilitated as nearly all of the men were from the military and at least two members had been part of the “Hunters,” another resistance group that fought fiercely with both the Huks and the Japanese in central Luzon. Members of the Freedom Company recruited WWII guerillas, former soldiers of the Philippine Army and Philippine Scouts and members of USAFFE (U.S. Army Forces of Far East) to serve as “combat advisors in military and paramilitary matters” to anti-communist forces in Vietnam, Laos, and Indonesia.49 In addition to military connections, the membership of Magsaysay, Diem, Lansdale, Gabriel, Orendain, and Le indicated the in roads that the organization made

47 Ahern, Thomas, Vietnam Declassified: The CIA and Counterinsurgency (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2010). Ahern argues that from 1954 to 63 there were two autonomous CIA stations in Saigon, one led by Lansdale that reported directly to Allen Dulles, called the Saigon Military Mission (SMM) and another managed by two career officers of the Far East Division. Lansdale’s station dissolved in late 1956.
48 “Report of the Secretary to the Membership,” Lansdale Papers. Additional honorary members included: Manuel Manahan (Taglog Daily, Bagong Buhay, publisher and Magsaysay Administration official) Jaime Ferrer, Macario Peralta, Guillermo B. Francisco, La Thai Buu, Duong Van Duc, Cao Thai Bao
into sources of state power in the Philippines, the United States, and Vietnam.\textsuperscript{50}

Another intra-Asian aid organization, Operation Brotherhood, was also sponsored by the CIA and has a similarly difficult genealogy to trace. Operation Brotherhood, like the Freedom Company, intervened in Southeast Asia throughout the 1950s in order to foment the spread of anti-Communist, U.S. friendly political regimes. However, Operation Brotherhood also sent Filipino nurses and doctors into other Southeast Asian countries as public health workers in conflict zones. According to Miguel A. Bernad, a Jesuit priest and Yale educated literary scholar, Operation Brotherhood sprang forth in the mind of Oscar Arrellano, president of the Manila chapter of the Jaycees, during a visit, as a member of the Philippine presidential trip, to Bali, Indonesia. Academic accounts and memoirs written by former CIA agents, on the other hand, claim that Operation Brotherhood was a Lansdale creation and thus a CIA progeny from the outset.\textsuperscript{51} In \textit{Adventure in Viet-Nam: The Story of Operation Brotherhood, 1954-57}, a hagiographic account of Arellano and Operation Brotherhood, published in 1974 by Operation Brotherhood International, Lansdale appears as a kind of serendipitous figure, who Arellano stumbled upon while browsing in a Saigon bookshop.\textsuperscript{52} Edward Lansdale writes in his memoir, \textit{In the Midst of Wars}, that he “was present when Operation Brotherhood was born” at a dinner party in Saigon 1954 that evening. According to

\textsuperscript{50} The freedom company conducted “operation show how” in Vietnam from 1956-1958. Described in a euphemistic language of “support services” the Freedom Company trained Vietnamese military and civilian personal. “Historical Background,” Lansdale Papers.

\textsuperscript{51} Numerous texts touch on Operation Brotherhood and the CIA, though, typical of research on CIA front organizations, no single text provides direct proof of their connection. This points to one of the difficulties of researching the CIA: front organizations were provided with a “cover” in order to prevent revelations linking private or non-profit organizations with the American state. For a short discussion of Operation Brotherhood’s links to the CIA see: Eric Thomas Chester, \textit{Covert Network: Progressives, the International Rescue Committee, and the CIA} (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1995).153-156.

Arellano and Bernad, the International Jaycees and wealthy Philippine donors provided funding for Operation Brotherhood’s projects in Vietnam and Laos. Air America, a well-known CIA owned airline, provided the transport for Operation Brotherhood volunteers to and within Laos and Vietnam.\(^{53}\)

Partially funded by the CIA, yet staffed entirely by Filipinos and registered as a private corporation, it was perhaps as difficult for contemporaries in the 1950s as it is for historians sixty years later to exactly determine how the Freedom Company originated or how many projects they embarked upon. CIA agents were instructed to conceal “paper trails” in order to distance the organization from covert operations. Therefore the lack of documentation detailing exactly what “technical services” Freedom Company operatives conducted while in the field should not be read as an indication of the company’s historical impact. Likewise, the contested genealogies of the Freedom Company and Operation Brotherhood and the sparse documentation that remains should not be a deterrent to piecing together their intertwined histories. A core tenet of covert operations demanded that the CIA deliberately create a sense of uncertainty regarding the origins of its policies. Therefore, like many of the CIA’s international organizations during the Cold War era, the Freedom Company existed in the ambiguous spaces of American and Philippines foreign policy and the striking appearance and absence of the company in archival sources is itself revealing of the kind of work that these organizations conducted.

**The Huk Rebellion, JUSMAG, and the Freedom Company**

In 1956, as the Huk rebellion fizzled under intense pressure from the Armed Forces

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\(^{53}\) Though denying any connection with the CIA, OB volunteers in Laos described the airline as their transportation in: Penelope Villarica Flores’, *Good-Bye Vientiane: Untold Stories of Filipinos* (San Francisco: Philippine American Writers and Artists, Inc, 2005).
of the Philippines (AFP), the Freedom Company set up its Philippine headquarters on Natib Road in the Cubao section of Quezon City, the seat of the Philippine Republic. Named after Manuel Quezon, the first president of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, Quezon City was formed from the incorporation of small villages and a large land holding of the Tuason family.\(^{54}\) Situated north and east of downtown Manila, which served as the capital under the Japanese occupation, the Cubao section of Quezon City in the 1950s was developing into a commercial district for the capital region.\(^{55}\) For example, after purchasing a large land holding from the Radio Corporation of America (RCA), Don J. Amado Araneta, an heir to the powerful Araneta family, began the construction of the Araneta Coliseum, which by 1960 was deemed the largest domed coliseum in the world.\(^{56}\) In addition to its location near a growing commercial and leisure district, the Freedom Company’s Natib Rd. location was also within walking distance from Camp Aguinaldo and Camp Crame, the headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police.\(^{57}\) Perhaps merely by coincidence, the location on Natib Road positioned the Freedom Company between two central elements of power in the Philippines: landed elites who were expanding their commercial empires and the Philippine military establishment.\(^{58}\)

\(^{54}\) Luis Francia, _A History of the Philippines: From Indio Bravos to Filipinos_, 1st ed. (New York: Overlook Press, 2010); ibid.

\(^{55}\) Republic Act No. 333 relocated the capital to Quezon City in 1948.

\(^{56}\) The Araneta Family has been influential in politics in the Philippines since the 19th century. In the postwar era, J. Amado Araneta, concentrated the families power and wealth through a concentration of sugar milling in Negros Occidental as well as alliances with Philippine politicians. On this point see: Alfred McCoy “Rent-Seeking Families and the State” McCoy, _An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines_. For a highly critical view of Manila’s elite see: Teodoro A. Agoncillo, _Malolos: The Crisis of the Republic_ (Quezon City,: University of the Philippines, 1960).

\(^{57}\) The Philippine National Police was originally called the Philippine Constabulary. For more on the PC see: McCoy, _Policing America's Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State_.

\(^{58}\) Despite widespread inequality and civil unrest the 1950s was seen as the highpoint in Philippines industrialization Paul D. Hutchcroft, _Booty Capitalism: The Politics of Banking in the Philippines_ (Ithaca,
From the founding statements, the Freedom Company’s promotion of services in Southeast Asia hinged on the promotion of Philippine democracy as an Asian variant of American styled “free-world” democracy. This paradigm not only erased the violence of American colonization but also elided the tumultuous nature of post-independence politics in the Philippines, in which Americans and the American state were unremittingly involved. The postwar era was laden with conflict and debate over the political direction of the newly independent nation. In fact, the late 1940s and early 1950s in the Philippines were years marked by deep internal strife. In addition to contentious political debates, the country also faced the challenge of reconstructing basic infrastructure after the devastating effects of the Second World War and the Japanese Occupation, in which a staggering number of Filipinos lost their lives.\(^59\)

After the conclusion of WWII, the Philippine military and state, with the assistance of American advisors and weaponry, was faced with domestic conflicts that were extensions of colonial-era struggles over rampant inequality.\(^60\) The civil war in Central Luzon contributed to limited the postwar demobilization of the Philippine Armed Forces and justified the continued existence of an American military presence in the islands. Not only were Huk guerillas denied recognition for their role in the Japanese resistance, their viewpoints were considered outside of the margins of acceptable political discourse. Indeed, after the war the Huks were categorized as subversives and essentially framed as


the anti-citizens of the newly independent Philippine Republic.\textsuperscript{61} After the war, as a Philippine elite and their U.S. allies attempted to construct a stable republic that would continue to serve their political and economic interests, the political discourse of peasant dissent became quickly marginalized as dangerous to the peace of the newly independent Philippine nation.\textsuperscript{62} In a blatant example of the political power of U.S. foreign aid in the immediate post-war years, the Truman administration threatened to pull much-needed funding for war rehabilitation if Filipino elites failed to ease the growth in uprisings among rural leftists. If the Philippine government could not find a way to “put their house in order,” as Truman said, by bringing peasants at least nominally into the polity and away from the agrarian rebellion, then the political and financial power that underwrote the Philippine political elite threatened to dissolve.

The Armed Forces of the Philippines were so heavily subsidized by post WWII American aid that by mid-1948 alone, prior to the height of the Huk Rebellion, U.S. aid amounted to 76 million dollars. Additionally, because of their co-operative fighting with the American military during the WWII, many members of the post-war Armed Forces of the Philippines maintained relationships with Americans in the U.S. military. The Freedom Company drew upon this long-standing military relationship, as well as the experience, or “lessons learned” from the Huk campaign, for its source of funding,

\textsuperscript{61} Nikhil Pal Singh uses the concept of anti-citizen to describe a racial regime that went beyond simple exclusion of emancipated African Americans from political power in the United States. He argues that anti-citizens are not viewed simply as a political opposition but as enemies of the state. Similarly the Hucks are cast not simply as a political opposition to the Philippine Republic but as individuals that stood outside of an abstract “social contract” and sought to undermine the tenets of Philippine citizenship. Nikhil Pal Singh, Black is a Country: Race and the Unfinished Struggle for Democracy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004).23.

\textsuperscript{62} For more on the history of the Hukbalahap and prewar peasant movements in the Philippines see chapters one and two. See also: Larkin, Sugar and the Origins of Modern Philippine Society. the memoirs by peasant leader, Luis Taruc: Taruc, Born of the People; Luis Taruc, He Who Rides the Tiger: The Story of an Asian Guerrilla Leader (New York: Praeger, 1967).
recruitment, and the production of knowledge about Southeast Asian peasants and guerilla warfare.

The 1947 military base agreement between the U.S. and the Philippines, which secured ninety-nine year leases for the nearly two-dozen U.S. military installations in the islands, meant that American military presence in the Philippines would remain substantial during the postwar years. Although the bases certainly impacted daily life in the surrounding communities, Americans intervened in Philippine military culture primarily through their role as advisors to the Armed Forces of the Philippines through the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG). Though the number of Americans employed by the Philippine JUSMAG office was small, the institution helped Philippine military leaders and politicians secure increased military aid from the United States and therefore, played a disproportionately influential role in postwar Philippine politics. Additionally, in the Philippines the advisory role of JUSMAG entailed an entire reorganization of the structure of the Philippine Army codified in law in 1950.

Edward Lansdale was originally stationed at the Philippines JUSMAG office as a cover for his CIA duties and used the JUSMAG offices during the Huk Rebellion and the 1953 Ramon Magsaysay presidential election campaign. The JUSMAG office also consulted officers of the Philippine Armed Forces about their military needs. As detailed in weekly reports and briefings, this included everything from helping to construct Napalm bombs from U.S. supplies to inspecting the standards of Philippine military hospitals.\(^63\) However, despite the large influx of militarized aid and the formation of relationships between American and Philippine military officers, the Freedom Company

\(^63\) “Weekly summary of activities,” JUSMAG Philippines, Record Group 334, National Archives, College Park, MD.
Philippines remained outside of the JUSMAG structure, and therefore, was not subject to official oversight by either the U.S. military establishment or the Philippine government.

JUSMAG did provide a site to in which the U.S. could legally transfer massive amounts of military aid, which could potentially be funneled to CIA operations. In its earliest European campaigns, the CIA relied on a unique source of funding borne out of the fighting and plundering of the Second World War. A Truman confidante, Secretary of Treasury John W. Snyder, managed the Economic Stabilization Fund, composed of confiscated Axis power dollars. Now empowered to spend funds without reporting to congress, the CIA was able to transfer funds through private channels, particularly businessmen that had interests in influencing the Italian election, into foreign front organizations, such as anti-communist labor unions or right-wing religious organizations. In the Philippines, Edward Lansdale wrote Washington to secure funding for the 1952-53 fiscal year. In this memo Lansdale argues that the Mutual Security Agency (MSA) “or any other agencies” should provide a check for a half-million dollars “drawn in favor of Secretary Magsaysay, not P.I. [Philippine Islands] government” for “black propaganda.” Revealing the Mutual Security Agency as a source through which the CIA could funnel funds for covert operations, Lansdale’s memo portrays a specific example of how the CIA’s practice of money laundering funded numerous front organizations around the world without implicating the CIA or the U.S. government.

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64 Callanan, Covert Action in the Cold War: US policy, Intelligence and CIA Operations.38; Prados, Safe for Democracy: The CIA and the American Democratic Enterprise.39.
65 Black propaganda, as distinguished from grey and white propaganda, is propaganda “wherein authorship was wrongly attributed to enemy sources” while grey simply concealed authorship and white where the source is revealed. Michael McClinton, Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counter-Terrorism, 1940-1990, 1st ed. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1992).25, 125-127.
66 “Funds for Psychological Warfare,” Box 34, Lansdale Papers.
For these reasons, the possibility of finding the exact source that indicates that the Freedom Company Philippines ever received funding directly from U.S. government sources or especially the CIA remains remote. It is clear, however, how non-U.S. governments contracted with the Freedom Company. In 1949, the U.S. congress created a foreign aid program called the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP). MDAP was funded by congress and distributed aid to U.S. allies for military assistance. In Southeast Asia, anti-communist forces were directly funded by MDAP and countries such as Vietnam were encouraged to use MDAP funds to hire Freedom Company members as consultants and military advisors. Though the MDAP funding seemed to link the Freedom Company directly to the U.S. state, this form of funding was actually quite circuitous and insulated from the U.S. government. The United States government would only provide financial support for the approved missions through MDAP, and there were countless countries during the immediate postwar era that received MDAP support. In fact the spread of U.S. military assistance was so colossal that in 40 years, from 1949-1989, the U.S. provided 90 billion dollars worth of military aid to 120 different countries.67 It was from this wealth of MDAP funds that foreign governments, such as South Vietnam, drew upon in order to pay the Freedom Company. Other than providing the original fund for military assistance, the U.S. government, in effect, maintained no official overt policy relationship to either the Freedom Company or the country receiving technical assistance.68 Furthermore, this allowed the U.S. government to fund operations

68 “Questions and Answers, Freedom Incorporated,” Edward Lansdale Papers, The Hoover Institute, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA.
without committing its own military or getting directly involved in either foreign military or political conflicts.

There were certain Freedom Company missions, however, that were sourced directly through the U.S. government’s International Cooperation Administration (ICA). A letter from Harry Brenn, director of the ICA, to John Wachtel, General Manager of the Freedom Company, indicates that the ICA authorized the Freedom Company to “act as the agent of the United States Operations Mission to the Philippines-ICA” while making arrangements with the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other Philippine Government agencies “for one month’s worth of training for five Indonesian police officials.” The training was intended to allow the Indonesian police officials to confer with the Freedom Company on “matters relative to police administration as it applies in the Far East, to observe the practical application of police theory to problems common to all Far Eastern police entities.”

For the training, the Freedom Company arranged sessions with the Manila Police Department, the National Bureau of Investigation, the Philippine Constabulary, and a week with an AFP Battalion Combat Team in order to observe “measures for the control of dissidents” and the use of “psychological warfare at field troop level.” While the travel and training for Indonesian Police Officials to the Philippines appeared within the realm of acceptable ICA policy, other Freedom Company activities demanded a more clandestine relationship to the U.S. government.

Yet, despite the distance the CIA provided the Freedom Company from the U.S. government, documents show that policymakers in Washington were aware that the

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69 Harry Brenn to John Wachtel, October 24th, 1955, Record Group 469, U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies, Central Files, 1951-59, Box 88.
organization existed and served the needs of U.S. policy. In 1955, a telegram sent from JUSMAG in the Philippines to the MAAG (Military Assistance Advisory Group) in Vietnam stated that Colonel Bernard B.L. Anderson, member of the Freedom Company, WWII Veteran, and Manager of the Philippine Airlines, had contacted the JUSMAG offices to gain “unofficial support and technical advice” for a mission in Vietnam. The telegram went on to state, “according to Anderson CMA Freedom Company recently received request from Vietnam Govt to recruit and employ sixteen twin engine crews to fly troop carrier and cargo missions in Charlie dash four sevens to be provided by Vietnam.” Anderson, according to the memo, was “presently recruiting these crews principally from Phil Air Lines and Phil [Air Force officers] who would be placed on indefinite leave status.” Donald MacGrain, executive officer of JUSMAG Philippines, and author of the telegram, assured the chief of MAAG Vietnam that, “although JUSMAG is interested in aims of the project it cannot participate or be connected with it in any way without specific directive from higher military authority.” This sentiment is echoed in a memo received by the U.S. Asst. Secretary of Defense in 1958, four years after the founding of The Freedom Company in the Philippines. The memo, written by Lansdale, states that the purpose of the organization was to serve as vehicle that gave “the U.S. unofficial means for accomplishing necessary and approved missions…Freedom Inc. is designed to step in only when the proposed operations exceeds the capability of CIA.” Indeed Filipinos, rather than U.S. military advisors, were the individuals who served as the primary on-the-ground force for the Freedom Company’s projects in Southeast Asia in the mid 1950s. A report detailing the group’s activities in 1955 reveals

71 Record Group 334, JUSMAG, Adjutant, General Correspondence, Box 2, 1954, NARA.
that the Company conducted five different military classes in Vietnam and sent advisors to both Vietnam and Indonesia. The Freedom Company also located the Philippines as a site in which to construct a “complete base training camp” within the vicinity of the American Clark Air Force Base.

Despite attempts to insulate the organization from official U.S. policy, the Freedom Company founders did not deny the connection between their mercenary army and U.S. funds. In fact, Lansdale indicated that one of the primary purposes of the organization was to aid in the administration and “efficient use” of American foreign aid. Envisioned as a panacea to what was perceived as the mismanagement of U.S. foreign aid dollars, the Freedom Company in the Philippines was designed to be a model for a string of similar non-profit organizations connected to Freedom Incorporated, a U.S. based firm that would, “sponsor and advise the foreign affiliates.” The CIA, the Freedom Company and its network of actors navigated the increasingly complex realm of international governmental and non-governmental organizations to attain funding for its clandestine mission.

The relationship between the CIA and the Freedom Company was, however, not as distant as to completely conceal the ties to the U.S. state. In a 1961 memo written by Lansdale to General Maxwell Taylor titled “Unconventional Warfare, SE. Asia,” Lansdale reported, “when U.S. personnel instrumental in the organization and operational

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use of the Freedom Company departed from the Asia area, direct U.S. support of the organization (on a clandestine basis) was largely terminated.” Presumably the “U.S.” personnel that Lansdale refers to is his infamous Saigon Military Mission (SMM), one of two CIA missions stationed in Vietnam beginning in June of 1954. In other words, Lansdale indicated that during the 1954-55 period the U.S. government was knowingly supporting the work of the Freedom Company. Importantly the Geneva accords, signed in 1954 to end the conflict between Vietnam and the French forbade interference in their internal affairs of members of the Geneva conference. The U.S. notably did not sign the Geneva Accords despite participating in the conference, but did agree to abide by the rulings set forth by the Accords. However, the information of this document was not revealed to a wider public until the release of the Pentagon Papers in 1971.

Colonial Exceptionalism: Race, Power, and Freedom

In its mission statement, The Freedom Company proclaimed that it aimed to turn Filipinos and the Philippines from Asia’s Show-Window of Democracy” to a “down-to-earth, workaday exponent of Asiatic freedom.” The Freedom Company proponents argued that because of their colonial past and recent independence Filipinos were in the “best position to acquaint other Asians with democratic principles.” Interestingly, this formulation situated Filipinos and the Philippines as racially, geographically, and culturally a part of Asia but not a part of the Asia that, American policymakers identified

as imbued with anti-modern, colonial paralysis. In other words, according to the Freedom Company, one of the reasons that the Freedom Company personnel were positioned so well to help their “Asian brothers” was because they had experienced the rigors of American colonialism based in the training of democratic governance; unlike, for instance, the Vietnamese people who they perceived had been negatively influenced by the practices of the indulgent French Empire.

Carlos Romulo, a Filipino leader closely aligned with the U.S., self-consciously contributed to the project of disassociating contemporary forms of U.S. intervention with colonization. Romulo, a Columbia University graduate and diplomat to the United States made a typical proclamation in 1945 that “the world [should] copy the successful American policy toward the Philippines in [order to prevent] a possible war between the white and yellow races.” Romulo suggested that the British Empire should grant independence to its colony, the Federated Malay States, like the US had done for the Philippines. Or, he suggested, a global race war might ensue.77 Yet at the same time, Romulo believed that Malayans were “not yet ready for the complexities of self-government.” He saw this as the fault of the British rather than a problem rooted in the nature of Malay people and intended this statement as a critique of the “warped and selfish” colonization practices of the British. Romulo thus inverted the American imperial language of “capacity,” used for decades to deny Philippine independence. Americans cited the inability, or “incapacity” of Filipinos to govern themselves as grounds for denying nationalist claims for independence. The British, he suggested, had not been good enough colonial tutors in that they had failed to develop similar capacities among the Malay. Though a consistent supporter of Asian anti-colonial movements including

those in the Malay States, Romulo’s attempts to support the anti-colonial movements of Southeast Asia through a critique of colonial nations also worked to re-write the history of colonialism in the Philippines through a lens of American colonial exceptionalism.78

From: Edward Lansdale Papers

Apart from the positive associations with American democracy, the Freedom Company largely overlooked American colonialism. Instead, company organizers drew upon the colonial legacy of the Philippines’ first imperial power, the Spanish. Interestingly, the Freedom Company primarily identified Filipinos and their conception of the development of a liberation ideology with the historic Spanish colonization of the Philippines and its most famous independence movement, the Katipunan. In fact, the emblem adopted by the Freedom Company was a white kalabaw, a Philippine work animal, superimposed on a red sun; an image that evoked a direct reference to the flag of the Katipunan, which depicted a white sun on a red background.

Like his Freedom Company colleagues, Edward Lansdale also fancied himself a descendent of a revolutionary freedom movement. In the brief one and a half page preface to his 1972 memoir titled, *In the Midst of Wars: An American’s Mission to Southeast Asia*, Lansdale cites Tom Paine and Thomas Jefferson as his ideological kin. Lansdale writes, “you should know one thing at the beginning: I took my American beliefs with me into these Asian struggles, as Tom Paine would have done.” Lansdale’s embrace of Paine’s libertarian impulses reveals his deeply held belief in a Cold War variant of American exceptionalism in which freedom was rendered interchangeable with American democracy and the effort to universalize an American political ideology was considered nearly a messianic global mission. Lansdale’s adoption of Paine as a predecessor also indicates another important aspect of Lansdale’s actions in Southeast Asia and one that applies directly to his connection with the Freedom Company: his propensity to operate outside of the structures of democratic procedures. Despite this

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79 Lansdale, *In the Midst of Wars: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia*.
incongruity, democracy, and the inherent freedom located in Lansdale’s version of American democracy, was continually used as the selling point of hiring Filipinos. With the Freedom Company Lansdale aided in the construction of what was essentially a foreign policy actor or institution that, in its designation as a private corporation, could operate free from the constraints of congressional debate.

In claiming that the work of the Freedom Company was in the spirit of the Katipuneros, the company’s members, and employees, were positioned as the inheritors of the Philippine freedom movement as well as the contemporary protectors of Philippine democracy. Again, unlike the neighbors of the Philippines who were considered as mired in the stagnant past of French, British, or Dutch colonial policy, the Freedom Company claimed the mantle of the Katipuneros in order to engage in a discursive war over the definitions of freedom. In claiming themselves as part of a genealogy of anti-Spanish colonization, rather than generically anti-colonial, which would include the American period, the Freedom Company contributed to the powerful discourse that the United States did not intervene in Southeast Asian politics for selfish or imperial reasons but for the good of humanity as a whole. In looking backwards to the liberation movements of the-late-nineteenth-century, the Freedom Company rewrote history so that the true “liberation” of the country occurred in 1898 whereby the subsequent 50 years of American rule were framed as a laborious course in democratic governance. In this context, Filipinos were situated in the emerging postcolonial Southeast Asia as at the forefront of Asian political modernity while, at the same time, their American allies could continue their role as their “benevolent tutors” to the newly independent nation.

The situating of the Philippines within Asia was based, according to the Freedom
Company, on both geographical and racial terms. The geographical designation of “Southeast Asia” and the locating of the Philippines within the region, rather than as a Pacific Islander nation was, as political geographer Jim Glassman argues, a Cold War project.\textsuperscript{81} Created in part to imagine a region distinct from China and Chinese influence, the geographically imagined space of Southeast Asia, Glassman argues, worked to subsume internal differences within nations (for example, differences based upon class, ethnicity or religion) and external difference amongst nations (linguistic, cultural, or again, religious) in order to create an “imaginative geography” of a coherent and unitary region.\textsuperscript{82} The power of this geographic division is represented in the Freedom Company’s call to Filipinos to assist their Vietnamese and Laotian “brothers.”

Yet, at the same time as the Freedom Company positioned Philippine volunteers as racially Southeast Asian, and therefore suited to “bridge the gap of doubt and/or distrust which people of newly developing nations have for whites” they also promoted the political culture of the Philippines as distinctly exceptional to the other nations of Asia.\textsuperscript{83} Although, the Freedom Company connected Philippine democracy to American rule in the islands, the dual positioning of the Philippines and the Filipino volunteers of the Freedom Company actually served to erase the violence of the American colonial past and the bloody wars that had established American dominance and the 47-year occupation of the islands.

Elite Filipinos, who had expanded their power under the American colonial regime, also tended to downplay the negative effects of American colonialism and portray the

\textsuperscript{81} Jim Glassman, "On the Borders of Southeast Asia: Cold War Geography and the Construction of the Other," Political Geography 24, no. 7 (2005).
\textsuperscript{83} “Offer of services,” prospectus of Eastern Construction Company Incorporated, Bohannon Papers.
period in a favorable light.\textsuperscript{84} Of course, American foreign aid, which the Philippine State direly required following the war, was tied to the continued use of the Philippines as a site for the American military, and therefore, collaboration with American policies was linked to the financial solubility of the Philippines and its most elite citizens. Yet, as historian Nick Cullather has argued, the positions of Philippine leaders should be understood as a mix of collaboration and resistance in which leaders constructed their own vision of what they thought were U.S. policy goals.\textsuperscript{85}

Though generally compelled to cultivate ties with U.S. interests because of the chronically weak state of the Philippine economy, Philippine politicians, and particularly presidents, resisted U.S. influence to an extent, particularly when U.S. policy intersected contentious party politics and political factions.\textsuperscript{86} Yet, even though Philippine politicians might have exerted, as Cullather claims, passive resistance in order to steer U.S. policies favorably towards their interests, many of these same leaders spoke openly about the merits of American colonialism.\textsuperscript{87}

Elipido Quirino, Philippine president from April 1948 to December 1953, stated on July 4\textsuperscript{th} 1951 in front of a large audience in downtown Manila’s Luneta Park celebrating the 5\textsuperscript{th} year of Philippines that “destiny has thrown us into a special relation with the United States.” What destiny, or a belief in an inevitable or natural order of historical events, meant to Quirino was that “there can be no false pride about this fact, nor feeling of subservience to a friend who unselfishly recognized our right to be free and stay free.”

\textsuperscript{84} There are, of course, exceptions to this statement particularly in relation to the Parity Agreement of the Bell Trade Act in which the Philippine congress had to revise their Constitution in order to allow for equal access to the development of Philippine natural resources.
\textsuperscript{86} McCoy, \textit{An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines}.
\textsuperscript{87} Cullather, \textit{Illusions of Influence: The Political Economy of the United States-Philippine Relations}.
Presumably defending his administrations reliance on U.S. foreign aid, Quirino further argued, “people have to get used to the fact, not so much of independence absolute and complete, as inter-dependence and mutual assistance.”88 The notion that the Philippines could only access independence and freedom through reliance on other countries underscored a political and economic reality. The remnants of a colonial economy precipitated a highly unequal trade balance reflecting the lack in national economic capabilities, particularity for consumer goods, in the islands.89 Yet, Quirino’s definition of interdependence was framed as inevitable rather than a reflection of colonial past or postcolonial power relations. Following this logic, interdependence, for Quirino and his supporters, meant freedom, which was diametrically opposed to colonial dependence.

Quirino’s speech, which he delivered in the midst of the Korean War after the Spring Offensives of the Chinese Army, reveals also heightened discourse of a global fight against communism.90 Anti-communism had been a part of Philippine politics prior to the outbreak of WWII. However, the anti-communism of Quirino’s speech, aligned with the apocalyptic rhetoric and the purpose of intra-Asian aid as argued by the Freedom Company. Indeed, communism provided a core factor for the claims of postcolonial interdependence.

In addition to the absolution of the violence of American colonialism, Philippine politicians also linked Philippine independence to their continued relationship with the United States and the politics of decolonization. Speaking to the United Nations in

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89 Philippine Social Trends: Basic Documents Pertinent to Long-Range Welfare Planning in the Philippines (Manila: Presidents Action Committee on Social Amelioration 1950) Irene Murphy Papers, Bentley Historical Library, Ann Arbor, MI.
December of 1950, Carlos Romulo proclaimed that, “by setting the Philippines free, the United States inaugurated a series of acts of colonial emancipation in Asia that has included the independence of India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, and Indonesia. We are convinced that this process will continue until the last colony is free.” In positioning the United States on the side of anti-colonial movements, Romulo’s message also has racial implications in that he severs the link between the United States from the racial hierarchies of European Imperialism.

In Romulo’s framing Americans, unlike European colonial powers, were not white imperialist but instead white liberators, intent on bestowing the knowledge and freedom of the west in a supposedly mutually beneficial process. Interestingly, Romulo’s promotion of the United States as a “colonial emancipator” intersected with debates about development and thus highlighted the core elements of what came to be known as modernization theory. Modernization theorists argued that development, both political and economic, was a linear historical process that could be tracked on a spectrum of “traditional” to “modern” states. Industrialized, capitalist democracies were considered the models of “modern” states while decolonizing nations, or “emerging states,” were considered the primary underdeveloped and “traditional” nations of the world. Advocates of modernization theory believed that traditional states could be transformed into modern states through the influx of development policies, capital, and especially the benefits of modern technology. Additionally, contact with developed or modern nations, and their technologies, could accelerate an underdeveloped nation’s progress towards modernity. In attaching the political valence of “progress” to modernity and

91 “Statement by General Carlos P. Romulo, Foreign Secretary of the Philippines, on the Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea, December 7th 1950, Quirino Papers.”
“backwardness” or “regression” to non-Western modes of political, economic, or social practices, modernization theorists necessitated legitimated U.S. intervention in recently decolonized nations.92

Selling the U.S. as friends or potential liberators of former colonial nations did not, however, always work to sever the link between the United States, imperialism, and whiteness. In fact by the late 1950s and early 1960s the Freedom Company had come under suspicion for “clandestine activities on behalf of the government” and “its close relationship and identification with Americans operating in Vietnam.” In order to, as the members stated, “obviate unfounded criticism and accusations of intervention and meddling,” the Freedom Company was dissolved and reorganized into a commercial entity under the new name: the Eastern Construction Company.93 Though the governance and cultural expectations of a non-profit organization versus a commercial company differed, the company retained offices in Vientiane, Saigon, and Manila, and the “prospectus” of the company issued in 1962 reaffirmed their role in projects that were “mutually advantageous to both the United States and the Philippines and beneficial to the cause of the security of the Free World.” Furthermore, the Eastern Construction Company identified its customers as “primarily US agencies engaged in the American foreign military and economic aid programs.” Although it appears that the company ceased the practice of contracting through foreign governments and instead contracted directly with U.S. agencies, the Eastern Construction Company continued to promote the Cold War causes of the United States in Southeast Asia.

93 “Memorandum for the Record,” Box 33 Lansdale Papers
The Freedom Company, and later the Eastern Construction Company, vouched for the sincerity of U.S. intentions. Written in 1962, eight years after the first Freedom Company mission in Vietnam, an Eastern Construction Company memo, written by Frisco F. San Juan, an original Freedom Company member, reflects upon this fact when stating that the “personal composition” of the company demonstrated “to the indigenous people with whom the ECCOI [Eastern Construction Company Incorporated] personnel work that people of a newly developing nation have acquired technical knowledge, experience and skills through their own effort and with U.S. assistance, which enabled them to develop their own country.” The document goes on further to argue that the Freedom Company bridged the “gap of distrust” that newly independent nations “have for whites” because Filipino volunteers did not provoke the same cognitive link between whiteness and imperialism that plagued American advisors. The Filipinos of the Freedom Company and Eastern Construction Company represented the potential of the United States’ developmental promises, or the idea that technical knowledge could be transferred from the U.S. in order to modernize the Philippines, and potentially, all of Southeast Asia.

Communism, on the other hand, only worked to exploit race-based conflict according to the ideology promoted by the CIA and their Filipino allies. Because Lansdale, the CIA, and the members of the Freedom Company tended to associate racial conflict with imperial legacies, and ones in which the U.S. was explicitly not involved, they could continue to argue that communism was the new imperialism and continued American intervention in the form of military political advisement and aid was seen as strengthening the foundations of Philippine sovereignty. Although the Freedom Company
provided only one example in a cacophony of anti-communist rhetoric in the Philippines, the connection to the CIA and their travels to Laos and Vietnam connected Freedom Company members to a larger audience and network of political actors. In this way, the Freedom Company, along with global reach of the CIA, acted as a network of empire, spreading a powerful discourse that linked communism to imperialism and freedom to American styled market democracies. The incorporation of a rigid anti-communist rhetoric into their definitions of what freedom and independence meant in the Philippines, worked to delegitimize leftist politics not only in the Philippines but also in the larger Southeast Asian region. Therefore, with the financial and advisory support of the CIA, the Freedom Company contributed to the restrictive narrowing of political debate particularly in the Philippines, but also Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Indonesia.

In other words, even though members of the Freedom Company imagined themselves as assistants to the independence efforts of their “Asian brothers” in Vietnam and Laos in the fight against Communism, because of the power structure of politics in the region, fighting communism often also meant spreading American power. Crucially, proponents of U.S. influence, both American and Filipino, had the power to define the range of legitimate political discourse and removed those who countered their interests through either the enactment or threat of physical violence. At the same time that the CIA attempted to manage western racial anxieties it also contributed to a racialized sense of knowledge about the region and the intersection between imperialism, race, and the Cold War. This particular formation meant that the United States and its allies in the region could define Communism in a way that ignored the nuance of local politics or
histories as well as the ways that people identified or located themselves within that history.

“Hellsfire, we’re just getting started”: The Legacies of CIA Intervention in the Philippines

In November of 1953 Edward Lansdale, writing under his pseudonym, Gregory Villiers, sent a report to the office of the director of the CIA, Allen Dulles, with the subject line “The Philippine Elections, 1953.” In this multi-paged, detailed memo Lansdale described the CIA involvement in the landslide presidential victory of Ramon Magsaysay. Writing that the election “became a social revolution which would have delighted Thomas Jefferson,” Lansdale described what he envisioned as a three-phase intervention in Philippine and broader Southeast Asian politics. Lansdale wrote candidly about the long-term and deeply interventionist policies of the CIA in the Philippines:

For years now, it has been clear that Kugown’s [CIA] operations in the Philippines were divided into three phases. The first phase was to meet and destroy the Communist attempt at armed revolution. The second phase was to bring about the social conditions wherein Communism cannot live. The third phase was to keep the Philippines secure as a base and to use the Philippine assets for establishing freedom elsewhere in Asia, (Asiatics working with Asiatics). We have nearly completed phase one. Phase two, which included the 1953 election, is more than half complete. We have commenced phase three.94

The CIA, according to Lansdale’s account of events, did not act without coordination of other U.S. agencies in the Philippines, including the American embassy

94 In the same document Lansdale claims that the U.S. intervened in the 1953 election because “we saw no other ready solution to the defeat of Communism in the country. We had taken part in the military campaign, which had suppressed the Communist armed forces, the Hiks. Seeds of social discontent still remained, read for Communist exploitation, nurtured by government corruption and lethargy. Under these conditions Communism had the capability of expanding again” “The Philippine Elections,” Lansdale Papers.

197
in Manila. “At critical moments” Lansdale claims the CIA’s “political-psychological team” consulted with the U.S. ambassador Raymond Spruance and his counsel, William Lacy, as well as JUSMAG chief Major General Robert Cannon. The CIA, in effect, had operational support from the most powerful and visible U.S. agencies operating in the Philippines. Lansdale ends the memo with a telling statement about the direction of CIA and broader U.S. policy in Southeast Asia, “It was a privilege to work with my fellow Kugowners” he states, “and to give the lie to the adage that the white man is through in Asia. Hellsfire, we’re just getting started.”

As Filipinos and Americans in the Freedom Company crossed the borders of Asia bringing with them: cultural practices and assumptions, military strategies and weaponry, and perhaps most importantly, resolute definitions of what: imperialism, military assistance, decolonization, and freedom meant in the Philippines and the emerging postcolonial Southeast Asia. The Freedom Company illustrates how the United States disavowed its own racist logics at strategic moments by empowering Filipinos rather than westerners to come to the aid of other Asian nations. At the same time, by reformulating the colonial history of the Philippines, the CIA and its Philippine allies reinforced and reshaped colonial narratives regarding the capacity and political modernity of Asian peoples.

95 Kugowners meant others CIA agents, most likely in the field of propaganda, as KUGOWN was used in operation PBSSUCCESS and PBHISTORY, elements of the coup d’état of Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954. The prefix “KU” was used to refer to the CIA. For instance Lansdale’s memo is addressed to “KUBark” which meant CIA headquarters. For CIA role in the Guatemala Coup see: Nick Cullather, Piero Gleijeses, and Nick Cullather, *Secret history: The CIA’s Classified Account of its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999).
Chapter Four:
“The Experiment in Oriental Democracy”

“We voluntarily hauled down the U.S. colors in the Philippines, turned the ‘show window of democracy’ over to independent management. But now, says this post correspondent in Manila, the wares in the window look shoddy. Can Filipinos ‘throw the rascals out’ in their 1953 election or is democracy dying in the Philippines?”

Robert Sherrod, Saturday Evening Post, October 3rd 1953.

In 1953 veteran combat reporter, Robert Sherrod, posed a rhetorical question to readers of the American Saturday Evening Post. Sherrod wrote, “why should the United States concern itself with the shenanigans of the local politicians in the Western Pacific?” After a few paragraphs of popular history lessons on the United States’ “gift of independence,” the horrors of Bataan, and the defeat of the Japanese Army, epitomized by Douglas MacArthur’s camera-ready landing on the beaches of Leyte, Sherrod concluded that Americans should care about Philippine politics because, “if democracy can’t work here, what kind of chance has it got in the less favored among the new nations like Indonesia or Viet Nam?”\(^1\) The article and Sherrod’s assessment of the political conditions in the Philippines came out of his research on the 1953 presidential election in the Philippines that pitted incumbent Elpidio Quirino against former Secretary of Defense, Ramon Magsaysay. Sherrod thus suggested that the health of the Philippine state was vital to the American project in Southeast Asia and throughout the world. According to Sherrod, Filipinos had benefited from U.S. colonial occupation. They had

\(^1\) Robert Sherrod, “Is Democracy Dying in the Philippines?”, Saturday Evening Post, October, 1953, American Historical Collection, Ateneo de Manila University.
learned about and implemented American democratic practices, but with independence, they had corrupted and soiled Philippine democracy and tarnished their ability to stand as a model for the rest of Southeast Asia. This failure, Sherrod claims, was a product of political corruption. “The missing ingredients in the Philippines today are honesty and conscience,” Sherrod concluded.¹

According to Sherrod, past U.S. colonial commitments were not the only reason that Americans should take an interest in the presidential election in the Philippines. Economic interests should also drive American concerns. According to Sherrod, Americans had “poured” 2 billion dollars into the islands since the conclusion of the Second World War.² The reference to the financial support of the Philippines indicates an unspoken current throughout Sherrod’s piece; if American dollars could not create the conditions for an American-style democracy in the Philippines, what would happen to other decolonizing nations in Asia that had not been “tutored” in American democratic practices for fifty years? The answer, Sherrod claimed, should alert Americans to the severity of the current “world crisis.” Citing the “eminently sane” comment of an American official in the foreign policy establishment, Sherrod reminded his readers that without support the Philippines could be lost to the “communist bloc in Asia.”³

Although both Quirino and Magsaysay voiced anti-communist sentiments, Magsaysay consistently espoused anti-communist rhetoric and was well known as the

² Sherrod’s figure that the United States ‘poured’ two billion dollars into the Philippines following the Second World War likely includes estimates for the value of ‘surplus property’ left by the military in the Philippines. The ‘value’ of the property, which included everything from tanks, guns, and ammunition to clothing, food rations, and barracks was a deeply contested issue. Filipino politicians, lobbying for more financial support from the United States, claimed that the value of the property was greatly inflated and did not take into account the degradation of supplies in a tropic environment.
“Huk Killer” in the press. Magsaysay’s participation in the suppression of the Huk rebellion fomented a relationship with notorious American military officer and CIA agent, Edward Lansdale. This relationship brought Magsaysay in closer contact with U.S. policymakers and particularly the U.S military establishment and won him American support for his 1953 presidential bid. Indeed, American dollars covertly supported the “Magsaysay for President Movement,” which successfully landed Magsaysay in the Philippine executive office in 1953.⁴

Sherrod’s short piece on the twin dangers of corruption and communism demonstrates the tensions and contradictions between the overt political discourse regarding U.S. intervention in Filipino affairs and the simultaneous, globally oriented, U.S. political, economic, and military projects during the early Cold War. The U.S. political and economic project of expanding the reach and depth of global capitalism and the global spread of U.S. military influence worked in tandem to promote and define U.S. power during the Cold War. In the Philippines, however, discourses regarding political corruption increasingly collided with U.S. political and economic imperatives so that the technocratic projects often failed to meet their stated goals because they came into conflict with an U.S. global hegemonic project that relied upon the extension of U.S. military might. In the case I explore in this chapter, the establishment of a School of Public Administration at the University of the Philippines, the local goals of University of Michigan professors to update and equip the University based on U.S. standards collapsed under a broader project to establish and arm U.S. military installations in Southeast Asia.

⁴Numerous historians, political scientists, and biographers have speculated on the nature and significance of the relationship between Edward Lansdale, the CIA, and Ramon Magsaysay; see chapter two for my interpretation.
In this chapter, I show how the on-the-ground implementation of technical projects collided with a broader anti-communist global agenda of the United States. I illustrate how one group of U.S. policymakers talked about and attempted to solve the problem of corruption at the same time that an overlapping group of U.S. policymakers worked to expand the reach of U.S. capital, ensure the stability of a Philippine political economic system that would remain friendly to U.S. interests, and guarantee the regional hegemony of the U.S. military.

American technocrats proposed to address political corruption through increased U.S. aid and American technocratic led development projects. Technocrats sought public and private funds to support projects in the Philippines aimed at cultivating a bureaucratic middle-class workforce. In this vision, American technocrats, or experts primarily from American universities, travelled to the Philippines in order to train Filipino civil servants in the “proper ways” to manage modern democratic states. Additionally, most technocratic projects included aid dollars that would offset building costs needed for repairing an infrastructural system destroyed during the Second World War. While these projects brought much needed capital and aid into the Philippines, they also, as I argue in this chapter, undermined the space for debate on how democracy would function in the independent Republic. American technocrats were empowered by both the Philippine and American states to define the terms of democratic governance in the Philippines. In their vision, a capitalist marketplace and the teleology of capitalist development is an assumed condition. Or in other words, the state envisioned by technocrats is one that fulfills the

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judicial and bureaucratic necessities of a capitalist economy. This rendering of democracy and the claims to power on behalf of the American experts worked to further exclude a leftist vision of Philippine democracy that did not always assume the centrality of capitalism development to democratic governance.

Despite the power claimed by American experts, in this chapter I argue that the technocratic project to train government workers collided with a broader global anti-communist project of the United States. In the first section of this chapter I show how technocratic policymakers believed, in part because of U.S. colonization, that the Philippines proved to be the ideal location for the development of technical schools that would provide training to individuals throughout Southeast Asia. In the second section, I consider the broader context of American university contracts in foreign countries and the technocratic report, the Bell Mission, which contributed to the assessment that the Philippines was nearing a state of crisis. In the chapter’s third section I show how American technocrats and the Philippine elite used a language of geographic scales in order to serve their political ambitions. This section includes a close examination of the

6 A few aspects about historical development of capitalism are key here: at the end of World War Two a new economic order was established by newly founded international organizations. These organizations interpreted the cause of the WWII as centered in inter-state competitions and state protectionist policies. Therefore, a new system was developed, led by US hegemony that would attempt to keep the world open for the movement of capital and the absorption of an over accumulation of US surplus capital. While US manufacturers certainly sought more markets for US produced goods, they also sought sites that could absorb capital in order to avoid devaluation. Large infrastructural projects, domestically in the form of suburbanization and internationally in the form of development, were ideal sites for investment. David Harvey, *The Enigma of Capital and the Crises of Capitalism* (London: Profile, 2010).

7 In her book, the *Will to Improve*, anthropologist Tanya Murray Li argues that "rendering technical’ is confirmation of expertise and constitutes the power relations between those “who are positioned as 'trustees' with the power to diagnose problems and those that are subject to the solution.” Additionally, she argues that issues that are rendered technical are also rendered non-political and are often absent of a political economic analysis. Tania Li, *The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of Politics* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007). See also: James Ferguson, *The Anti-Politics Machine: "Development," Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Timothy Mitchell, *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).
University of Michigan’s School of Public Administration program in the Philippines and the promotion of the idea that democracy was a skill-set to be learned through guided tutelage from American experts. However, the University of Michigan’s involvement in the University of the Philippines School of Public Administration received only three years of U.S. foreign aid support. In the final section of this chapter, I show how the University of Michigan program floundered due to the unreal expectations of its professors, the political context of the Philippines, and the contradictory effects of different U.S. foreign policy agencies.

**Scales of Development and Modernization Theory**

The themes of corruption and communism that Sherrod threaded through his article capture the political scales that American policymakers and elite Filipinos manipulated during the early to mid 1950s. Imaginations of what constituted “the global” and “the national” and the connection between the two scales deeply informed political thought during the 1950s. For instance, the Cold War was interpreted as a “global war” and many decolonization movements imagined the scale of the “national” to stake their claims of independence. In the Philippines, different political actors framed issues as either “global” or “national” rhetorically in order to achieve specific political ends. For instance, American policymakers and technical advisors argued that political corruption was a national problem rooted in the unequal distribution of land and wealth and the capture of the state by an oligarchy of powerful elite families.

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9 After losing U.S. state funding the Rockefeller foundation began to financially support the School of Public Administration in the Philippines.
American professors from the University of Michigan established the School of Public Administration at the University of the Philippines in order to train civil servants in the “science” of governance. Technocrats made two kinds of arguments about their interventions. One was that their projects were useful to local populations – they were educating Filipinos to be better bureaucrats so that the daily workings of government would run more smoothly and benefit more people. At the same time, their justifications of their actions were grounded in a global civilizationist discourse that situated the United States and the west at the advanced end of modernity, with recently independent and decolonizing countries relegated to the politically charged categories of “underdeveloped” or “traditional.”

Modernization theory as practiced by American academics, was a powerful ideological framework built upon assumptions about the exceptionality of American cultural and political systems. Modernization theorists argued that development, both political and economic, was a linear historical process that could be tracked on a spectrum of “traditional” to “modern” states. They cast industrialized western capitalist democracies as the model for effective “modern” states and decolonizing nations, or “emerging states,” as ineffective, underdeveloped, and “traditional.” Modernization theorists believed that traditional states could be transformed into modern states through the influx of development policies, capital, and especially through the benefits of modern technology. Additionally, contact with developed or modern nations, and their technologies, could accelerate an underdeveloped nation’s progress towards modernity.

In attaching a political valence of “progress” to modernity and “backwardness” or “regression” to non-Western modes of political, economic, or social practices, modernization theorists necessitated and simultaneously legitimated U.S. intervention in recently decolonized nations. According to the ideology of modernization theory, development was historically inevitable, thus American policymakers could deny accusations of unwarranted intrusion or imperialism.\(^\text{12}\)

Historians have demonstrated that modernization theorists from American universities helped shape U.S. foreign policy and ideas about international aid during the Cold War, beginning in the mid 1950s. The conceptual framework of modernization theory – especially the way it cast American intervention in newly decolonized nations under the seemingly benign umbrella of development – aligned perfectly with United States foreign aid projects during this period. Ultimately, modernization theory worked to turn United States overseas intervention and expansion into a celebration of American morality and altruism. As one of the American professors at the Public Administration Institute at the University of the Philippines wrote, American foreign policy and projects were about helping “people who are still in the early developmental stages of many aspects of their culture.”\(^\text{13}\) Advocates of modernization theory believed that intervention through foreign aid and development programs helped move “less advanced peoples” to modernity. This language of modernization, which aided in cloaking American


\(^{13}\) Post Report, Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan/Philippine Annex, 1 December 1954, University of Michigan School of Public Administration Collection, Bentley Historical Library, Ann Arbor, MI.
ambitions, suffused the attitudes of the University of Michigan professors in the Philippines.  

American academics in the Philippines applied the practices of modernization theory to the local and national level, however, the ideology also helped justify U.S. intervention on a global scale. Contemporary scholars’ exclusive focus on modernization theory as a way to explain US-sponsored international projects misses the local dynamics that shaped these interventions. Instead of focusing exclusively on geopolitical explanations for US intervention, I show that multiple scales were utilized to marginalize or eradicate certain political visions in the Philippines. In claiming expertise in democratic management, or the skills required to manage the bureaucracy of large nation-states, the professors at the University of Michigan School of Public Administration cast democracy as outside of the realm of politics or debate. Furthermore, I argue that American experts’ technical rendering of the Philippine state, concealed what was an ongoing indigenous conversation regarding the kind of democracy that would take shape in the new republic.

Investigating the long-term anti-communist politics in the Philippines alongside the shift towards technocratic intervention through University driven development programs offers a glimpse into how the dichotomous and globalizing language of the

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15 A historiographical point is that narratives about American experts in the third world rely on modernization theory to explain their actions—which draws upon a shift in American social sciences. These studies have been good at showing how debates about modernity—or what modernity looked like—were subject to intense debate. Also good at showing how the evolution of liberal projects of empire were transformed into objectivity, data obsessed culture. But, modernization theory as a lens for understanding the Cold War has it limits in that it obscures the competing discourses that competed during the Cold War that did not originate in Western social sciences. Overall, the majority of modernization theory studies assume that the ascendancy of bi-polar politics—leaving little room to imagine political visions that were not simply derivative of either US or USSR definitions of modernity and development.
Cold War facilitated the consolidation of free market capitalism with the ideology of democracy. Importantly, American technocrats’ ideas about democracy were underwritten by newly created international organizations, in which the United States and the countries of Western Europe exerted disproportionate power. A democratic state, in the eyes of the “international community,” was reified into one that accepted the mandates on postwar economics developed in the United Nations, GATT agreements, and Breton Woods conference. Through direct intervention, with consent from international organizations, the United States enacted the strategies and technologies for managing foreign populations and politics.

In fact, the policies and projects directed countries, such as the Philippines, that were considered “secure allies” of the United States were often conducted through a language of mutuality, management, technical assistance, nurturing, and human welfare. Many of the policies, such as the University of Michigan’s School of Public Administration in the Philippines, contributed to this effort to solidify this particular formulation of democracy. While proponents of American led democratic projects argued that free markets and trade, limited government welfare programs, and periodic elections had come to define the modern democracy, those on the political left argued that American democracy was limited at best to representing the interests of a bourgeois class. Communists, socialists, and leftist activists argued that American democracy was a continued imposition of western imperialist policies on the world’s majority. While

17 Theorized as a bourgeois democracy by Leninist who saw contemporary liberal democracy as a democracy for the minority, or rich. Lenin argued that capitalism and democracy were incompatible because the exploitations of capitalism would always limit the poor’s ability to participate on the same terms as the bourgeois class. Also called the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. Vladimir Il ich Lenin, *State and Revolution* (New York: International Publishers, 1932).
proponents of American-inspired democracy claimed that WWII proved that peace and prosperity was on the side of victors, leftists in the Philippines claimed that the war was an example of “when one imperialist group out competes another imperialist group in the search for sources of raw materials and markets for manufactured goods.”\(^{18}\) For Filipino leftists, who supported what the Huks called a “New Democracy,” American democracy was irreducibly linked to imperialism. Examining how American experts and their allies in the Philippines sought to implement their brand of democracy through discourses about aid and assistance brings to light the complexity of postwar American hegemony.\(^ {19}\)

**Corruption, Crises, and the Bell Report**

Immediately following independence, under President Manuel Roxas, both American and Filipino popular media depicted the Philippines as a phoenix rising out of a nation destroyed by war and the brutality of the three year Japanese occupation. News outlets on both sides of the Pacific cast the immediate postwar years as a period when colonial tutelage, valiant fighting, and undying loyalty to American colonizers would pay off and the Philippines would be reborn with the highest standard of living amongst its Asian neighbors. Yet by 1950, four short years after independence was declared, the meanings attached to this vision of the devastated country had shifted entirely. Now, under the “morbid psychology” of the second president of the republic, Elpidio Quirino, Americans saw the Philippines as a densely populated, starving nation run by the “gangsterism” of a few elite families. In this narrative, the foreign aid dollars that

\(^{18}\) “Soviet Russia Will not Start Aggressive War,” Mariano Balgos, Speech Delivered on March 13th, 1949, University of the Philippines, Partido ng Komunista sa Pilipinas (PKP), Box One, Exhibit G.

Americans had so selflessly poured into their former colony had been squandered on needless luxury items like Cadillacs and “a lifetime supply of hair gel.”

Corruption in all realms of Philippine society dominated press coverage in both countries. In many of these press tracts, journalist portrayed the Philippines as a nation that was once on the verge of a rapid capitalist development of the islands immensely rich natural resources. Yet, elites selfish mismanagement of the state had, in a brief span of time, corrupted Philippine democracy and plunged the Philippines into another period of national crisis.

A solution to the perceived crises, recommended by the Bell Mission and facilitated through private contracts with the U.S. government, was to institute technical assistance, or U.S. advisors, into the Philippine state. The Bell Report, a 53,000-word document, was issued after a two-month research trip headed by Daniel Bell, former Undersecretary of the U.S. Treasury. Unsparing in its detail, the Bell Report assessed that the Philippine economy and government was in a state of crises and that, in a worse case scenario, the U.S. “might have another China in the Philippines.” Charges of corruption and graft were, as the U.S. economic survey mission reported, “all we had read in American press before we came here.” Members of the team were “admonished to ignore” press comments as their assignment was not “to look for graft and corruption”

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20 Robert Sherrod, “Is Democracy Dying in the Philippines?”, Saturday Evening Post, October, 1953, American Historical Collection, Ateneo de Manila University.
21 The Bell Trade Act of 1946, which largely set the terms of Philippine Independence, and the Bell Mission, also called the Bell Report, should not be confused. The Bell Mission was an economic survey of the Philippines conducted by a team of Americans. A report, with detailed policy recommendations, was published in 1950.
22 I think there are a various ways in which the reference to China can be read here. I argue that the rhetorical use of “China,” particularly in 1950 was a political strategy to force fiscal conservatives into committing more dollars for US foreign aid projects. Even though the US had strongly supported the Kuomintang, or Jiang Jieshi’s (Chiang Kai-Shek) Nationalist Army, the Chinese Civil War reached a point where the Truman administration determined that no amount of US aid dollars could “save China.” Once Chairman Mao declared victory and the founding of the People’s Republic of China, congress Republicans charged the Democratic Truman with “losing China.” “Cuaderno Questions Predictions,” Manila Times, October 20th 1950.
but instead to “look for the causes of the present dilemma of the Philippines government and to prescribe some remedies.”

It turns out, avoiding corruption was a tall order, “we could not very well ignore the question of graft and corruption” as members reported “we met it on every front.” The report, which also claimed that “securing honest and efficient administration” was “unbelievably difficult,” blamed a large portion of the Philippine political and economic condition on the Philippine political elite.

The elites in office at the time, under president Elpidio Quirino were quick to argue that corruption was not simply a Philippine phenomena and that perhaps they had learned the practices from “their more accomplished and eminently successful mentors,” the Americans. Pointing out the vast disparities in wealth between the U.S. and its former colony the private secretary of Quirino argued, “Filipinos are now getting it in the neck, because they are not rich enough to cover up their own stink and to be lofty and moral about it before a devastated and hungry world...when you are wealthy, such as America is, you can afford to step on anybody.”

Although the elite in power partially resisted the findings of the Bell Report, and particularly those that suggested that they had mismanaged Philippine independence, U.S. foreign aid dollars became tied to the projects suggested in the Bell Report and thus the elite, while willing to openly criticize the U.S., were compelled to acquiesce to the reports suggestion in order to keep the flow of American capital streaming into the islands.

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23 U.S. Economic Survey Mission to the Philippines, Breakfast Conference with President Quirino and Secretary Romulo, August 21st, 1950, Record Group 59, Bell Mission, Subject File: February to October 1950, Box One.
24 U.S. Economic Survey Mission to the Philippines, Breakfast Conference with President Quirino and Secretary Romulo, August 21st, 1950, Record Group 59, Bell Mission, Subject File: February to October 1950, Box One.
25 Telegram to Secretary of State Dean Acheson from Daniel Bell, NARA, Record Group 59, Bell Mission, Subject File: February to October 1950, Box One.
American administrators used the discourse of corruption—or the idea that elites had “mismanaged” the state and economy—to explain why the Philippines had failed to be reborn as a functioning capitalist state with a high standard of living in the years after independence. Filipino leaders claimed they had followed American advice and reorganized their economy along the lines dictated to them. These Filipinos continued to believe in the promise of development that had been proffered by U.S. administrators throughout the Commonwealth period, the same promise that continued to justify American intervention in Philippine politics. Americans, however, blamed Filipino politicians for the failure of capitalist development. They argued that the current Philippine state apparatus needed to be replaced and run by an ostensibly non-political group of middle-class bureaucrats.

In March of 1950, William Lacy, Minister Counsel in the U.S. embassy in Manila, argued that Elpidio Quirino had a “childlike faith, as do all Filipinos, in the ability of Americans to get them out of trouble.”27 The trouble identified here refers to the growing deficit between imports and exports and, according to American policymakers, the Philippine political elite belief that the unfavorable trade balance would be “taken care of by U.S. disbursements.” Without a foreseeable solution to the balance of payments problem, capitalist development, the long-term vision of both American policymakers and Filipino elites, could potentially stagnate, or worse, regress. In other words, if the contemporary Philippine economy went unchanged then the Philippine government could not afford to operate without continued U.S. assistance. The “widespread pessimism” and “lack of confidence” that Lacy relates to Rusk is linked to

27 “Current problems in the Philippines” William Lacy to Dean Rusk, March 30th 1950, Record Group 59, General Records of the State Department, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Office of the Officer in Charge, Philippine Affairs, Office Files, 1948-1957, Box 1.
the “political ineptitude” rather than seen as the continuation of deeply unequal and unsustainable economic structures.\textsuperscript{28}

The U.S. economic mission considered the issue of attracting foreign capital, which a Philippine elite greatly desired in order to help “develop various industries,” as nothing more than elite “lip service,” primarily because American technocrats believed the Quirino administration applied “nationalistic policies” in their management of the Philippine economy. Although it is unclear the specific policies that the mission referenced as “nationalistic,” what is clear is that the mission was suggesting, “the attitude towards foreigners and their investments in this country would have to change” if the political elite expected “to attract foreign capital.”\textsuperscript{29} Foreign capital, according to the survey mission, also needed to be convinced of the “establishment of law and order.” This meant that the Philippine state needed to establish its authority in the countryside, once and for all, and end the peasant rebellion that U.S. investors argued continued to scare off foreign investors.\textsuperscript{30}

Discourses about corruption and anti-communism, at times, served the same political ends. Philippine elites needed U.S. financial support and therefore claimed that Philippine communists and the corruption of the state were two sides of the same world problem. Quelling the political tensions in the countryside and undermining the anti-imperialism upon which these movements were based was of utmost importance to the postwar Philippine administration. Indeed, President Truman threatened to pull much-

\textsuperscript{28} “Current problems in the Philippines” William Lacy to Dean Rusk, March 30\textsuperscript{th} 1950, Record Group 59, General Records of the State Department, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Office of the Officer in Charge, Philippine Affairs, Office Files, 1948-1957, Box 1.
\textsuperscript{29} U.S. Economic Survey Mission to the Philippines, Breakfast Conference with President Quirino and Secretary Romulo, August 21\textsuperscript{st}, 1950, Record Group 59, Bell Mission, Subject File: February to October 1950, Box One.
\textsuperscript{30} “Capital Investment in the Philippines,” Congressional Record, July 12\textsuperscript{th}, 1950, Myron Cowen Papers, Truman Library
needed funding for war rehabilitation if Filipino elites failed to ease growing unrest.\textsuperscript{31} In other words, if the Philippine government could not find a way to “put their house in order” by bringing peasants at least nominally into the polity and away from the agrarian rebellion, then the political and financial power that underwrote the Philippine political elite threatened to dissolve.\textsuperscript{32} Yet, much like the language of anti-communism that dominated reportage on the Huk rebellion, the narratives of corruption swirled around and through the government of the Philippines in the late 1940s and early 1950s.

Furthermore, a multiplicity of historical actors relied and drew upon the ideas about the relationship between the national and the global to meet their political ends. Concerns about corruption provided a local justification for U.S.-aided interventions into Philippine politics and economics. “In view of the grave developments in the world situation today, it is indeed imperative for the Phil government to take all necessary precautions.” Concerns about communism played a similar role, although they—promoted most vociferously by the Philippine and American press—were often framed in local terms, anti-communist rhetoric—most powerful amongst Philippine elites and the U.S. military and intelligence establishment—relied on claims that communism was a global threat to humanity. Filipino elites merged the discourses on communism and corruption and blame corruption on communists “communism encourages graft and

\textsuperscript{31} One of the main arguments in \textit{Limits of Empire}, Robert J. McMahon’s study of postwar Southeast Asia, is that after the geopolitical events of 1949 the United States had a “growing obsession” with South East Asian economic, political, and social unrest. McMahon argues that by the 1950s nearly all senior U.S. policymakers viewed South East Asia as a region of vital importance. South East Asia, as a region, was important to the reconstruction of a health Japanese economy because it was seen as both a market for Japanese produced commodities but also as a source of raw materials. Also, maintaining a US-friendly government in the Philippines secured access to the military bases in the Philippines that were crucial to Middle Eastern transport route. McMahon, \textit{The Limits of Empire: The United States and Southeast Asia since World War II}. On the reconstruction of postwar Japan see: Michael Schaller, \textit{The American occupation of Japan : the origins of the Cold War in Asia} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).

corruption to prove the basic Marxian conception of the rottenness of the capitalistic system” stated by congressman Tito Tizon.33

The differing scales in which Americans and Filipino elites framed their political claims reveals the tensions and contradictions that defined the various agencies and actors that participated in U.S. Cold War Policy. American military officials and Filipino elites often conjured the specter of a global communist movement and in most cases the American state financially underwrote and politically supported these appeals. However, anti-communist politics should not only be seen as a response to the perceived war between the U.S. and the “Communist world.” Rather the American state supported anti-communism because anti-communist ideology helped Filipino elites and U.S. administrators push back against a vision of democracy and economic equality promoted by working and poor Filipinos over the course of the American colonial project in the Philippines. American technocrats, steeped in the merits of capitalist development, identified corruption as a barrier to capitalist development. In their logic, foreign capital would not flow into the Philippines until business was assured that the state could maintain the legal structures necessary for capital accumulation. If the population of the Philippines resisted the authority and legitimacy of the state, then business reassessed the risk of investment and diverted capital to markets less susceptible to volatility. In this way, press reports of rampant corruption, fraudulent elections, and the misuse of U.S. aid dollars all seemed like indications that the Philippines was a risky site for capitalist investment.

While creating “stability” in the Philippines was the goal of both the technocrats, the U.S. military, and State Department, they operated on different scales and therefore came to different conclusions regarding the direction of U.S. intervention. For instance, while technocrats argued that efficiency and the modernizing the bureaucratic structure of the state would bring stability to the islands this meant taking on an elite class that controlled the Philippine state and economy. The U.S. military and state department, on the other hand, framed the Philippines in terms of global aspirations, and in this way, the Philippines was most valuable because of the multiple installations in the islands and the strategic location of the Philippines in Southeast Asia.

To solidify the U.S. military presence in the islands, which was unpopular for a multiplicity of reasons, the American state had to rely on the support of the very elites that technocrats identified as corrupting democracy. Because of the decades long threat to their power through strikes, sabotage, theft, and other technologies of protest, these Filipino elites harbored deep animosity towards communism, socialism, or any ideology that they felt undermined their positions as national oligarchs. In this way, the rhetoric of the Cold War and the global communist threat should be seen as a political tactic by the bourgeois democratic state to mobilize a contemporary discourse on the global nature of the Cold War in order to continually repress a decades long movement by the political left.

Yet, unlike the discourse of anti-communism, which elite Filipinos used to maintain control of the state and economy, American technocrats assessment of the “crises” in the Philippine state worked to set the definition of what was considered corrupt in a democracy. In this way, technocrats focused and drew upon discourses
regarding local or national politics. Importantly, this is based on western notions of universal democratic governance and excludes considerations of historic cultural practices in the Philippines. For instance, from the outset, the Institute of Public Administration at the University of the Philippines focused on “raising the performance and efficiency of present governmental employees.”\(^\text{34}\)

United States officials and Philippine politicians alike recognized that the best way to address anti-imperialist critiques, and especially the communist rebellion, was through Philippine channels of power, rather than direct U.S. intervention.\(^\text{35}\) The context of global decolonization, in which Philippine politicians positioned themselves as potential leaders of the decolonizing world, required masking the influence and origins of American power. American professors sought to transform the relationship between Philippine citizens and the state through the transfer of knowledge regarding bureaucratic state management. This strategy meant that policy changes would appear to have been extended from national and local governments, rather than the United States. For instance, the U.S. Economic Survey Mission considered technical assistance projects, such as training programs on efficient tax collection, to be “on ticklish ground” because they involved “the sovereignty of the Philippine government.”\(^\text{36}\)

\(^\text{34}\) John W. Lederle and Ferrel Heady, “Institute of Public Administration, University of the Philippines,” reprinted from the \textit{Public Administration Review} Vol. XV, No. 1, Winter 1955, University of Michigan School of Public Administration Collection, Bentley Historical Library, Ann Arbor, MI.

\(^\text{35}\) A National Security Council Statement on Policy U.S. policy toward the Philippines states, “It is important that the Filipinos act to the maximum extent possible on their own initiative and that other countries particularly in Asia, recognize that the Philippines are truly independent” quoted in: Cullather, \textit{Managing Nationalism: United States National Security Council Documents on the Philippines, 1953-1960}, 13-14. However, it is important to note that State Department and Military officials retained the option for military intervention.

\(^\text{36}\) U.S. Economic Survey Mission to the Philippines, Breakfast Conference with President Quirino and Secretary Romulo, August 21\(^\text{st}\), 1950, Record Group 59, Bell Mission, Subject File: February to October 1950, Box One.
This, Filipino and American leaders colluded together to mask the distinctly postcolonial power relationships they sustained between the Philippines and the United States through the sanitized language of public administration. The Filipino elite, arguing against the anti-imperialist rhetoric of the Huks and the Partido ng Komunista (PKP), recognized that it was important that Filipinos were seen as the primary creators and disseminators of governmental power. Though Philippine politicians played the primary role in directing post-independence politics, the reliance on the financial backing of the American state meant that Filipino politicians were aware of the need to manage the image of the Philippines for world consumption. Because the United States was framing its policies as ones that contributed to and supported the liberation of former colonies, the Philippines, as a former American colony, functioned as a place in which the U.S. could demonstrate its supposedly benevolent foreign policies. For the same reasons, American policies towards its former colony also served as a point of critique for nations and movements that opposed American intervention or questioned the validity of American benevolence. This was particularly acute during the years of rapid decolonizing and the first years of the United Nations in which the independence of the Philippines was questioned by the U.S.S.R.

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37 In addition to the University of Michigan’s School of Public Administration program, Cornell University began a to revamp the School of Agriculture at the University of the Philippines Los Banos Campus in the mid 1950s.
38 I acknowledged that my use of the term elite to represent the oligarchy runs the risk of homogenizing their identities, political orientations and ethnicities’ and/or linguistic backgrounds. This is not my intention nor to I believe that the elite were or are a static category in the Philippines. What is identified as the Philippines is an extremely diverse group of 7100 islands with at least 100 different linguistic dialects. While colonialism, both Spanish and American, worked to codify a national oligarchy, intense “family conflicts” often defined Philippine politics. Alfred Mc Coy has termed this particular style of Philippine politics “Anarchy of Families.” For the purposes of this dissertation I do argue that there was an identifiable oligarchic class that could, but sometimes did not, work in collusion with one another to serve their own political and economic interests.
In the context of technocratic projects, the relationship between American emissaries and the Filipino elite, shifted after independence. Though the actual demographics of the Filipino elite population underwent few changes in the shift from colony to nation, in the postwar era political elites found themselves endowed with power in a different kind of way then when they were colonial elites. During the American colonial period, elites functioned primarily as administrators of the United States’ colonial government. In the post-independence era, elites came to be administrators for the Filipino population rather than the American colonizers. Thus, even as the role of the postcolonial and colonial elite classes did not radically change, the ideological meaning of their relationship to the state changed dramatically. Via direct contact between American and Philippine universities, the United States actively cultivated the emergence of a technocratic middle class that was charged with “raising the level of performance and efficiency of present governmental employees.”

Through engagement with a range of American cultural and political emissaries, the United States sought to reconfigure the relationship with its former colony into a form that would fit the shifting terrain of the post-colonial world.

A Strategic Center: The Establishment of the Institute of Public Administration

Intended as a prescriptive guide for the U.S. congress and policymakers, the conclusions drawn by the Bell Mission led to technocratic projects like the University of Michigan’s School of Public Administration at the University of the Philippines. Yet, the idea that the Philippine state needed additional technical assistance predated the Bell

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39 Ferrel Heady to Professor Robert C. Angell, July 15, 1952, University of Michigan School of Public Administration Papers, Bentley Historical Library, Ann Arbor.
An October 1949 memo to Dean Rusk, Deputy Undersecretary of State and Philipp Jessup, an American diplomat that had worked with the United Nations, stated that establishment of “technical schools in the Far East are paramount.” The six-page memo, written by Raymond B. Fosdick, former president of the Rockefeller Foundation, argued that the need for technical schools in Asia hinged on the need to “create an indigenous leadership, in close touch with the problems to be faced.” Fosdick claimed that the effect of developing schools would only serve to benefit the United States, “if America could take the lead,” he wrote, “the psychological effect would be far-reaching.” For Fosdick an American role in establishing technical schools would serve a political purpose that would go beyond the immediate benefits of technical training, “it would underscore the fact that we are concerned with the development of native leadership, and that the repressive days of colonialism…are gone forever.”

Even though public schools represented one of the primary sites of the American colonial project during the early 20th century, Fosdick colored this history in a positive light, claiming that, “there is a tradition in the Philippines of sincere and disinterested effort by Western power on behalf of native education.” The benevolent influence of American colonialism in the Philippines that Fosdick imagined was only part of the reasons for identifying the Philippines as a potential site for American technical programs. Fosdick also wrote, “Manila immediately suggests itself because it stands at the crossroads of Eastern Asia and is a key spot.” Fosdick, like his contemporaries in

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40 Raymond B. Fosdick to Dean Rusk and Phillip Jessup, October 3rd, 1949, RG 59, General Records of State Department, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Office of Southwest Pacific, Office of the Officer in Charge of Philippine Affairs, Office Files 1948-1957, Box One.

41 Raymond B. Fosdick to Dean Rusk and Phillip Jessup, October 3rd, 1949, RG 59, General Records of State Department, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Office of Southwest Pacific, Office of the Officer in Charge of Philippine Affairs, Office Files 1948-1957, Box One.

42 Raymond B. Fosdick to Dean Rusk and Phillip Jessup, October 3rd, 1949, RG 59, General Records of
the State Department and Military, believed that the Philippines represented a “strategic center” for U.S. policy in the region.

The U.S.-sponsored technocratic project began the Philippines in June of 1952 when the University of Michigan established an “Institute of Public Administration” at the University of the Philippines. Under contract with the Mutual Security Agency (MSA), a newly formed governmental division whose director served on the National Security Council, the University of Michigan’s Institute of Public Administration was one of the many academic programs created overseas following the Second World War. In fact, by 1953 thirty-two institutions of higher education in the United States had established international programs in governance and public policy located in recently independent or decolonizing nations in the global south. The University of Michigan’s project in the Philippines was one of the first foreign academic programs established by the Mutual Security Agency. The Philippines’ status as a former American colony, the United States’ continued engagement with the Philippine political and economic system, and the continuing ties that private American citizens maintained in the islands since the turn of the 20th century aided in the quick establishment of the Institute.

The University of Michigan Philippine contract was, from the outset, envisioned as one of a few “pilot programs” occurring in other locations around the world. In July of 1953, the director of the Mutual Security, Howard Stassen, sent a circular air-gram to “certain diplomatic officers” in American embassies in Jakarta, Kabul, Karachi, New Delhi, and Rangoon informing diplomats that the “principle device”
of the Philippine Institute was the private contract.\textsuperscript{44} Underscoring the imperial rationale behind the private contract idea, Stassen wrote, “this approach minimized the direct participation of the two governments and thus tends to reduce opposition on the part of certain persons who feel that public administration is a particularly sensitive field.” This air-gram indicates that American offices used private contracts, at least in part, to mask American intervention and that officials, such as Stassen, understood that such intervention, particularly in foreign governments was controversial and worth concealing.\textsuperscript{45}

4.1: International Cooperation Administration, University Contracts
From: University of Michigan School of Public Administration Papers

American officials in the MSA understood the diplomatic benefit of private contracts. Indeed, they promoted private contracts as a way to “secure the advantages of

\textsuperscript{44} I am choosing to use the contemporary spelling of Jakarta rather than the mid-century spelling Djakarta as appears in the original document.

\textsuperscript{45} Howard Stassen, Circular Air-gram “Philippine Institute of Public Administration,” 31 July 1953, University of Michigan School of Public Administration Collection, Bentley Historical Library, Ann Arbor, MI.
flexibility and ‘freedom from government red tape’ as well as to avoid the appearance of American governmental interventions. In practice, the contracts never functioned as exclusively private arrangements. The Institute contract, in fact, had four signatories: The University of Michigan, The University of the Philippines, the MSA, and The Philippine Council on United States Foreign Aid (PHILCUSA), a department of the Philippine government. MSA projects required partial funding from host nations, necessitating the presence of the Philippine government on the contract. The contribution from the Philippine government was small, yet the joint monetary requirement provided another tie from the Philippine state to the American state. Although the project was originally conceived as a private effort between foreign universities, both national governments were financially invested in its success and therefore committed, at least in their public pronouncements, to the discourses and ideologies of the technocratic American advisors. The pervasive discourses of “technical assistance” and “mutual cooperation,” required endowing elites with power in the form of governmental legitimacy, but not opening up that power to democratic comment, critique, or participation in how it would function. Represented by the private contract, Americans continued a longstanding cultivation of a Philippine elite and middle class that could continue to direct the state towards supporting American interests.

In late January of 1952, on a trip to Manila sponsored by the MSA University of Michigan professors, James K. Pollock and John W. Lederle met with officials of the

46 John W. Lederle and Ferrel Heady, “Institute of Public Administration, University of the Philippines,” reprinted from the Public Administration Review Vol. XV, No. 1, Winter 1955, University of Michigan School of Public Administration Collection, Bentley Historical Library, Ann Arbor, MI.
47 John W. Lederle and Ferrel Heady, “Institute of Public Administration, University of the Philippines,” reprinted from the Public Administration Review Vol. XV, No. 1, Winter 1955, University of Michigan School of Public Administration Collection, Bentley Historical Library, Ann Arbor, MI.
 Philippine Government and of the University of the Philippines to discuss the feasibility of bringing American professors to teach governance to Philippine public servants. The American professors believed that the idea for this project came from public officials in the Philippines. Yet, when they met with the President Elpidio Quirino he seemed to know little of the program. Quirino, the professors reported, was finally convinced when he realized that “Vice Governor Hayden, with whom he was on the friendliest of terms” was a former colleague of theirs at the University of Michigan. By the end of the meeting, Pollock and Lederle proudly announced that Quirino had stated, “we not only have the desire but we have the determination to support the program.” In less than six months, the University of Michigan professors returned to Manila and to their new jobs as professors at the newly established Institute of Public Administration.

From the outset, University professors sought to turn the Institute into a regional hub and training center. One of the centerpieces of this vision was the construction of a library that, according to the Institute’s catalogue for 1953-1954, would “eventually be the finest special public administration library in the Far East, and one of the finest in the world.” University professors proposed that the collection would contain ten to twelve thousand volumes of foreign and domestic publications on publication administration and “twenty to thirty filing cases of vertical file materials.” In numerous letters written by

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48 John W. Lederle and Ferrel Heady, “Institute of Public Administration, University of the Philippines,” reprinted from the Public Administration Review Vol. XV, No. 1, Winter 1955, University of Michigan School of Public Administration Collection, Bentley Historical Library, Ann Arbor, MI.
49 J.K. Pollock to R.R. Renne, 30 January 1952, University of Michigan School of Public Administration Collection, Ann Arbor, MI.
50 The University of the Philippines, Institute of Public Administration, Catalogue and Announcements, 1953-1954, University of Michigan School of Public Administration Collection, Bentley Historical Library, Ann Arbor, MI.
51 James K. Pollock and John W. Lederle to R.R. Renne, 29 January 1952, University of Michigan School of Public Administration Collection, Bentley Historical Library, Ann Arbor, MI.
University of Michigan faculty, the library is cited as one of the preeminent aspects of the Institute and an “American gift” to the Filipinos.

Considering the destruction WWII wrought on the urban infrastructure of Manila, which included the national library and many government departmental libraries, the creation of the library and the arrival of twelve thousand new books to the University of the Philippines benefited Filipino scholars and students. Yet, the functioning and the organization of the library, which University of Michigan professors demanded follow an American system rather than the current Philippine system, reflected the subtle ways that technocratic ideas infiltrated and transformed past Philippine practices. The customary method for library management in the Philippines was known as the “closed-shelf system.” Essentially it meant that books were only accessible to the librarian and retrieved upon patron request. Part of the explanation for this system was that, according to reports by a Michigan professor, Philippine law held librarians legally responsible for the loss of library materials. How well the closed-shelf system functioned or if the law placing the liability of the collections on Filipino librarians was even enforced was not discussed. What is clear is that the American professors wanted their organizational system in place at the Institute’s new library even though it was “scoffed at by many Filipino librarians.” Furthermore, Professor Lederle justified the transition to the American system through the rhetoric of “democratic practices” and “free access” and characterized the possibility of Filipinos reverting to their former system as “retrogression” in policy. In a review, published in an American journal on public administration, Lederle wrote, “We were teaching ‘democratic administration in our
courses; we were practicing it in our library operation."52 The library provided a space for professors and students at the University of the Philippines to utilize its new resources during their training. Yet at the same time the forced shift in library management techniques and the language the professors used to rationalize the change reflected their underlying ideologies. Connecting the American organization system to “modern” libraries, as opposed to the “retrograde” or “traditional” Philippine system, American professors used the discursive power of local practices in “democracy” to legitimize their policies. While there was certainly a slippage between the rhetoric of national and global, technocrats were primarily concerned with the “evolution” of the Philippine state, the production of a “stable” society, and cultivating the terrain necessary for capitalist development.

The Truth About Democracy and Communism: The Institute of Public Administration’s Democratic Mission

In 1950, Tito V. Tizon, chairman of the newly formed Committee on Un-Filipino Activities (CUFA) asked Emilio Abello, minister of the Philippine Embassy in Washington D.C. to send him a report about the “organizational setup of the Committee on Un-American Activities.” In his request Tizon was particularly interested in “copies of existing statutes or laws, either state or federal, curbing communism or the activities of the Communist party.” Drawing inspiration and juridical guidance from the American State’s House Un-American Committee (HUAC), CUFA claimed that communism was a threat to democracy in the Philippines and the “nature” of Philippine politics. Like its

52 John W. Lederle and Ferrel Heady, “Institute of Public Administration, University of the Philippines,” reprinted from the Public Administration Review Vol. XV, No. 1, Winter 1955, University of Michigan School of Public Administration Collection, Bentley Historical Library, Ann Arbor, MI.
American counterpart, CUFA did not represent the beginning of an attack against “communist forces” in the Philippines but instead represented the culmination of three decades worth of anti-left political activism.

CUFA consistently disregarded Philippine leftists’ claims about the unjust nature of national and international political economies. Despite a long struggle between Filipino elites and the political left, CUFA built its case on the writings of Lenin, Stalin, and Marx. Even after the Philippine government successfully raided the Manila based politburo, the urban leadership of the PKO, and captured several hundred documents, CUFA’s 1951 report continued to rely on readings of non-Filipino Marxists as a politically expedient way to mask popular criticisms of domestic and international relations of power. In other words, CUFA did not actually engage in the specific terms and local critiques of the Huks and the PKP. Instead, CUFA relied a prevalent transnational discourse that assumed that communism was an undifferentiated monolithic ideology that was, in the Philippines, deemed fundamentally incompatible with “true nature of Filipinos.”

CUFA, on the other hand, argued that capitalism was the only method for organizing economic relations in a democratic society. Using a rhetoric that linked a capitalist system to democracy, Tizon argued “our nations’ safety requires that we make every day a day of profit, not only for our legitimate businesses and professionals but especially for the happiness of our people. When we close our books at the end of each working day, let us see that the accounts always show a clear gain for democracy.”

53 “The Illegality of the Communist Party of the Philippines,” Special Committee on Un-Filipino Activities, Gonzalez Library, University of the Philippines.
54 “The Illegality of the Communist Party of the Philippines,” Special Committee on Un-Filipino Activities, Gonzalez Library, University of the Philippines.
American-styled democracy and market capitalism, he suggested, were not only the best and most modern methods of social and political organization; they were also the morally superior choices that, he claimed, would bring “happiness for our people.”

Although the Committee on Un-Filipino Activities’ proclamations aligned with the global message of U.S. anti-communists, American technocrats in the Philippines continued to argue that Filipino politicians could not manage their own economy without continued American tutelage. E.D Hester, who served as economic advisor to Paul McNutt, the American High Commissioner in the Philippines prior to independence, argued as such in a November 1949 letter written to Richard Ely, Chief of the Division of Philippine Affairs in the U.S. State Department. Hester strongly supported the idea of establishing American universities in the Philippines in order to remedy the perceived educational gap between the west and the east, “The establishment in the Philippines of a high grade secular college under an American foundation would have a profoundly beneficial cultural effect not only in the Philippines but also in the Far East.” His enthusiasm, however, was coupled with a strong dose of skepticism over the role that Filipino universities might play in such projects. “The college,” he wrote “should be controlled by the board of trustees resident in the United States, represented in the Philippines only by a president, an executive secretary and a treasurer.”55 Believing that any contribution from the Philippine government would “heavily weight toward frustration and failure,” Hester advocated for only minimal involvement from, what he viewed as “the woefully low cultural and scientific standards of the Philippines.”56

55 E.D. Hester to Richard Ely, November 9th 1949, RG 59, General Records of State Department, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Office of Southwest Pacific, Office of the Officer in Charge of Philippine Affairs, Office Files 1948-1957, Box One.
56 E.D. Hester to Richard Ely, November 9th 1949, RG 59, General Records of State Department, Bureau of
Beliefs about modernity and the superiority of American methods of social and political organization also dominated the Institute of Public Administration’s stated mission to create undergraduate and graduate degree programs in public administration. Courses in the undergraduate degree began in the fall of 1953 and included two years of study in the University of the Philippines’ College of Liberal Arts. These first two years students were required to take economics, accounting, sociology, psychology, political science, English, and Spanish courses. Beginning in year three, undergraduates moved into the School of Public Administration and onto more advanced topics including: taxation and government finance, municipal government and administration, governmental accounting, and an introduction to public administration course. Additionally, students were required to take “specially emphasized electives” which included courses such as: problems and techniques in urban planning, international administration, comparative public administration, industrial management, and transportation economics. In the final year, students took only upper level public administration courses that focused on administrative organization, governmental planning, and ethics in public service, administrative law, and fiscal administration. In 1953-1954 there were 200 students registered in one of the Institute’s academic courses, and over half were government employees.

Far Eastern Affairs, Office of Southwest Pacific, Office of the Officer in Charge of Philippine Affairs, Office Files 1948-1957, Box One.
57 Proposed Curriculum: Appendix C, “The Undergraduate Curriculum in Public Administration, University of Michigan School of Public Administration Collection, Bentley Historical Library, Ann Arbor, MI.
58 The University of the Philippines, Institute of Public Administration, Catalogue and Announcements, 1953-1954, University of Michigan School of Public Administration Collection, Bentley Historical Library, Ann Arbor, MI.
59 Ferrel Heady, “Programs and Problems of the Institute of Public Administration, University of the Philippines,” University of Michigan School of Public Administration Collection, Bentley Historical Library, Ann Arbor, MI.
undergraduate program, the masters program in public administration at the Institute was “designed to suit [each student’s] needs, taking into account his earlier preparation, his particular field of interest, and the requirements of government employment.” To accommodate the high number of governmental employees enrolled as students, most courses at the Institute were offered in the late afternoon or evenings in Manila, within walking distance of governmental buildings, rather than at the main campus of the University of the Philippines that resides outside the city center of Manila in the suburb of Diliman.

The development and enactment of the in-service training program and the resulting frustrations, on the part of the University professors reveal what can only be called idealistic beliefs about their mission in the Philippines and the relationship the institution would have with broader U.S. foreign policies currents in the region. Out of the stated missions of University of Michigan professors at the Institute, the objective of “in-service training,” or the direct training of governmental employees, was the approach that aligned most neatly with the goal of cultivating a bureaucratic class that would police the corruption of elites. For the University of Michigan professors “in the field,” in-service training was undoubtedly the most problematic and difficult aspect of the Institute’s mission. Similar to the frustrations expressed over what they perceived to be the “red-tape” and “politicking” of Americans employed by the U.S. government and working in the Philippines, the professors struggled to maintain positive opinions when faced with the reality of transforming a deeply entrenched political, economic, and social system. Additionally, the American professors confront the pressures of providing

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60 Ferrel Heady, “Programs and Problems of the Institute of Public Administration, University of the Philippines,” University of Michigan School of Public Administration Collection, Bentley Historical Library, Ann Arbor, MI.
“results” to government officials in Washington who dictated the length and financial terms of their contracts. John Lederle and Ferrell Heady wrote about this tension in a journal article published in 1954, in which the professors stated that, “we wished to avoid any reaction that we were a purely academic, impractical operation.”  

Surely, the institute’s professors were aware that their academic methods ran against the need to produce results that met the larger goals of the Foreign Operations Administration, the National Security Council, and the State Department.

The in-service training program was slower in getting started compared to the degree programs and much of the first year was spent bringing in managerial specialists from the United States, such as famous industrial management expert, Lillian Gilbreth. Despite the delays in getting the program off the ground, by 1955 over 2,500 governmental officers and employees had participated in one of the Institute’s training course. The training of public servants by the Institute was from the outset directed at reaching officials in executive or supervisory roles. A memo written in 1953 by Institute researcher Clyde Holmes cited the Bell Report of 1950, which tied ‘efficient’ public service to successful economic development, as the guide for the Institute’s approach to in-service training. Writing that supervisors “can be ‘made’ by proper indoctrination and training,” Holmes described the early training programs at the Institute as one in which “an important aspect of this training” was the “injection of the training concept into the supervisor...[the supervisor] calls the play but the team steps into action...mutual respect, loyalty are all part and parcel of such a program.”  

The Institute’s emphasis on

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61 John W. Lederle and Ferrel Heady, “Institute of Public Administration, University of the Philippines,” reprinted from the Public Administration Review Vol. XV, No. 1, Winter 1955, University of Michigan School of Public Administration Collection, Bentley Historical Library, Ann Arbor, MI.  

62 Clyde Holmes, “In Service Public Administration Training Program for the Philippine Government,”
characteristics of leadership, teamwork, and mutual respect was reflective of the discourses of mutual security and cooperation that framed the entire technocratic project in the Philippines.

Along with the idea of mutuality, the American professors and their diplomatic supporters believed that in-service training would eventually result in Filipinos taking over the leadership role of the Americans in the training process. Ideally, they saw the American role as one of “stimulation and facilitation,” which pointed to the underlining of modernization in which modern countries were able to transform underdeveloped nations through tutelage and the transference of technological knowledge. The American educational projects were intended to function in two-phases. First, American experts educated Filipinos to promote the development of a technocratic middle-class. After this technically skilled group was thoroughly inculcated they would then turn to educating the broader Filipino electorate. This two-phased project was ultimately an attempt to produce a stable electorate that would support the U.S.’ economic, political, and military interests. Unlike other contemporary imperial projects, such as the CIA inspired Coup d'états, the American project in the Philippines could be conducted through quasi-private institutions with minimal visible intervention by the American state. This two-phased process was implicit in the ideas about modernization that the University of Michigan professors brought with them to the Philippines. Focused on what they called the “management process in a democracy,” the American professors enthusiastically sought to transform Philippine political culture. Yet, the idea of “managing a democracy” presents contradictions, which reveal the imperial underpinnings of the entire project.
4.2: Foreign Operations Administration Library, Laoag City, Philippines
From: RG 469.6 Records of the Foreign Operations Administration
Democracy, in theory and in the Cold War rhetoric of the United States, was a form of government ruled through the will of “free people.” The foreign policy of “managing a democracy” implied, however, that Filipinos simply did not know how to rule themselves and therefore needed to be guided and “technocratically trained” in the proper ways to participate in a democratic system. Indeed, this is not an unfamiliar line of argument in the Philippines. In fact, Filipino independence from the American colonial state was continually denied on these exact terms. In fact, images from a Foreign Operations Administration funded library in Philippines indicate the extent to which American technocrats believed that the United States, and American advisors, monopolized the “truth about democracy and communism” and how democracy should be enacted on the ground.

Yet, postwar conditions and the language of modernization theory embraced by the technocrats allowed for a different linguistic and cognitive framing of this old colonial claim. Modernization theory cast American democratic government as the most advanced and therefore the best form of governance. The implication of this claim is that as citizens of a “modern state” the American populace was able to self-manage their participation in a democratic system while the Filipino population simply was not. The idea that practices of “management in a democracy” could be transferred through “technical exchanges” and “built into the cultural structures” of foreign countries

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63 In *The Blood of Government* Paul Kramer argues that the idea of ‘capacity’ was a crucial element of imperial politics in that “America retained the power to recognize Filipino capacities and exchanged colonial power for Filipino recognition of, and fulfillment of, their standards” In this way, “capacity found its power in being protean; it could mean—and often meant all at once—capacity for self-discipline, for loyalty, for rationality, and for communication, each of which pointed toward capacity for self-government and nationality.” Kramer, *The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines*. 310-322.
explicitly highlights one of the ways in which technocrats imagined shaping a broader postwar world. However, though strikingly different in tone, the work of CUFA was not entirely unlike the assessments of technocrats that interpreted the ‘success’ of the state in terms through ‘bottom lines,’ finances, and the state’s ability to provide the legal and bureaucratic means necessary to support capitalist development. Although, because the professors most often understood their projects in terms of local issues—such as the basics of tax collection and documentation—they did not engage in Philippine communism in the same ways, as did the members of CUFA. However, because the American technocrats had the power to assert themselves as experts in democracy, they also contributed to the marginalization of democratic debate in the postwar Philippines.

“Politicking and Red-Tape”: The Frustrating Experiment at Rizal Hall

In February of 1954, the Institute relocated to Rizal Hall, in a more centrally located district of Manila. Harold Stassen, director of the Foreign Operations Administration, gave the opening address to commemorate the Institute’s new location. Built in 1908 on the original site of University of the Philippines, Rizal Hall was badly destroyed during the Second World War. Rizal Hall made an ideal location for the Institute. Despite its location in the central city, in the early 1950s Rizal Hall was surrounded by large areas of grass and trees, which some professors noted was similar to the open spaces of United States land grant universities. The architecture of the building also bore striking resemblance to American collegiate designs.

64 MacDonald Salter to Dean Russell A. Stevenson, 27 December 1955, University of Michigan School of Public Administration Collection, Bentley Historical Library, Ann Arbor, MI.
The three-story building, with a Spanish-tiled roof, and long line of elegant columns framing the front, Rizal Hall projected an aura of authority through its decorum. It is evident that to those passing by, whether they knew what went on inside or not, Rizal Hall was a building of importance. Indeed, the newly rebuilt inside of Rizal Hall matched the elegant outdoor design. In addition to the Institute’s classrooms, library, and specialized training halls equipped with oversized chalkboards and large flow charts describing the Philippine governmental system, Rizal Hall was also used as a site for conferences and meetings of public officials. Certain conference rooms in Rizal Hall, in fact, resembled palace or presidential spaces rather than a university building. These rooms included heavily upholstered furniture, long glass-topped bamboo tables, ornate curtains, and gold plated light fixtures and doorknobs. The library and classrooms at Rizal Hall were also, according to a pamphlet promoting the Institute, equipped with “modern facilities.” The regal reconstruction of this old Manila building also worked to lend legitimacy to the Institute. Within walking distance of many governmental offices, the location of Rizal Hall, as well as its stately presence, aided in recruiting public services workers into the Institute’s academic and training programs.

The academic degree programs conducted at the Institute provided opportunities for both undergraduate and graduate study and aided in the American goal of cultivating a technically skilled middle class that would manage the bureaucratic structures of the Philippine government. At a 1956 State Department meeting in which the university contract program was discussed, Paul R. Hanna, an education professor at Stanford University and coordinator for Stanford’s University contracts in the Philippines, voiced the need to cultivate a technocratic middle class, “there exists in the most of the
technologically less advanced countries a vacuum in the training of a ‘middle’ group of technical and professional workers.’” Hanna explicitly linked this educational project to the Cold War political climate of bilateral competition, “As the result of the absence of adequate training...as many as 20,000 of these ‘middle’ group young people annually accept the offer of Russia or China to study in Moscow or Peiping on communist scholarships.” How representative Hanna’s data was of reality is unclear. Yet, what is important about Hanna’s rhetoric is his claim that the transference of young people from decolonized nations to communist Russian or China was a real danger and threat to American security. If the United failed to implement academic and technical opportunities to ‘less developed countries,’ Hanna argued, “the net result is...the flow of students from the free world toward the communist world.”

While, Hanna might have strategically linked the language of economic development and technical modernization to American Cold War security concerns in order to secure funding from the U.S. congress.

Unlike Stanford’s Paul Hanna, University of Michigan professors rarely mentioned the Cold War or communism in their academic work or personal letters. Though the professors might not have explicitly promoted or explained their work in the framework of the Cold War, the education programs such as the one at the Institute were understood in Washington as part of the in the “longer-term struggle” against communism. In the same conference in which Hanna presented his paper on foreign training opportunities, Assistant Secretary of State, Francis Wilcox explained the diplomatic benefits of foreign education programs in the struggle against communism, “I

66 Paul R. Hanna, “A World Grid of Regional Training Centers,” Office on Institutional Projects Abroad of the American Council on Education, 27 June 1956, University of Michigan School of Public Administration Collection, Bentley Historical Library, Ann Arbor, MI.
think the role of the colleges and the universities of the United States will be even more basic than it was in the past. As I see it, this struggle has now definitely taken on aspects of a longer-range struggle, and whether it be 10, 20, 30, or 40 years it seems to me we have to be prepared to meet it.” The representatives of the State Department also echoed some of the University of Michigan professors in their use of the language of modernization and the project of aiding in the ‘modernization’ of recently independent nations. Akin to the language of modernization theory, in which change is plotted in evolutionary terms as a historical progression from “traditional” to “modern,” Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles linked foreign academic projects to the American contribution to the “evolution of the world.” Dulles also commended what he called the “missionary zeal” of participating professors in “[making] people realize the great values which exist in our form of society.”67 The language of modernization theory, which scholars have argued became the pervasive Cold War liberal discourse by the Kennedy Era and the Vietnam War, was in the early to mid-1950s deployed strategically by State Department officials.68 It is clear that State Department officials who spoke at the conference viewed the groundwork of modernization, conducted by Professors ‘in the field,’ was important, yet separate to Cold War political relations. Unlike Hanna, who underscored the importance of projects that cultivated foreign populations to the broader rhetoric of Cold War geopolitics to, Assistant Secretary of State, George V. Allen understood the relationship in slightly different terms:

It is educational contact between nations, which keeps the basic relationships steady. As on the ocean, waves may buffet political relations on the surface, but the depth of relations between two nations depends on how the people feel toward each other and what direct impact one people make on another. That, gentlemen, you are handling. I have to worry about the waves on top. 69

From Dulles, Wilcox, and Allen it is evident that by mid 1956 the language of modernization and particularly ideas about economic development had already greatly influenced the foreign policy thinking of some of the United States’ most powerful policymakers. Yet, it is also evident that Academics were at the forefront of linking the language of development with explanations of technocratic progress and therefore, the justification of U.S. global ambitions and interventions.

The idealistic belief that the Institute could transform the political culture of the Philippines eventually dissipated as the University of Michigan professors ran up against realities of the postcolonial Philippine political system and its complicated and problematic relationship to the United States. In 1953 the enthusiastic group of University of Michigan professors felt that “prospects [looked] encouraging for a ‘New Deal’ in the Philippine Government.”70 Yet by 1956, three short years later, the institute’s training coordinator, Theodore Drews summed up the feeling of many professors when we wrote, “too often we are tempted to discuss foreign political

69 “Department of State Conference: Education and Foreign Operations,” Office on Institutional Projects Abroad of the American Council on Education, 27 June 1956, University of Michigan School of Public Administration Collection, Bentley Historical Library, Ann Arbor, MI.
70 Ferrel Heady to Dr. James Pollock, 8 December 1953, University of Michigan School of Public Administration Collection, Bentley Historical Library, Ann Arbor, MI.
institutions in American terms…and to delude ourselves into thinking that American solutions will apply.”

Over time, the Michigan professors saw the involvement of the American government in the form of the MSA, which was renamed the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) in the 1953 Reorganization Act, as hindrance to the Institute’s success. Reflecting on his tenure as the director of the Institute, John Lederle wrote, “it was discovered that there were those in the United States government service who were so politically ‘sensitive’ as to be unable to clear even the seemingly uncontroversial matters…and reconciliation of differences was not a matter of weeks but months.” For a group of professors who understood their mission to the Philippines as, at times, a “moral obligation,” the ‘attitude’ of non-Institute affiliated FOA employees surprised, irritated, and disappointed the Michigan professors.

In a letter addressed to MacDonald Salter, advisor on public administration in the ‘Far East’ division of the FOA, a research assistant, Theodore Drews, expressed his exasperation “I am really at a loss as to how to make Washington see how frustrating the Mission-Michigan relationship is.” By the summer of 1954, the end of the first full academic year at the Institute, the idealistic pursuits of academics grated against the complex politics involved in managing United States foreign aid projects. The animosity and frustration between the academics and the non-Institute FOA employees went both

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71 Theodore Drews to Ed Shor, 20 October 1955, University of Michigan School of Public Administration Collection, Bentley Historical Library, Ann Arbor, MI.
72 John W. Lederle and Ferrel Heady, “Institute of Public Administration, University of the Philippines,” reprinted from the Public Administration Review Vol. XV, No. 1, Winter 1955, University of Michigan School of Public Administration Collection, Bentley Historical Library, Ann Arbor, MI.
73 Ferrel Heady to Wilbur K. Pierpont, 1 October 1954, University of Michigan School of Public Administration Collection, Bentley Historical Library, Ann Arbor, MI.
74 Theodore Drews to MacDonald Salter, 27 July 1954, University of Michigan School of Public Administration Collection, Bentley Historical Library, Ann Arbor, MI.
ways. In fact, it appears that some FOA employees either disapproved of the American financial investment in projects like the Institute or, as Heady wrote, did not believe that the University partnerships were “a worthy enterprise.” In a similar expression of tension between the FOA and university professors, Ferrel Heady, in letter addressed to Wilbur K. Pierpont, Vice President of the University of Michigan, the Institute’s director, wrote that “both in Washington and in the field the universities and their staffs are regarded as mendicant recipients of governmental largesse.” From the available historical record it is difficult to surmise how widespread these tensions were or how deeply they interfered with the actual functioning of the Institute. It is clear that the University of Michigan faculty felt that the U.S. military in the islands received preferential treatment and argued that the prioritization of military aid over civilian aid consistently delayed the professors’ projects. The University of Michigan professors felt that their “altruistic reasons” for engaging with the University of the Philippines and the Philippine state were undermined by the politics and power relations that came with government contracts.

The modernization and technocratic ideas that underwrote the professors’ early zeal quickly unraveled in the face of, what they perceived as a chaotic Philippine political system. Also, as the decade progressed and the Philippines approached its ten-year celebration of independence the tolerance for a heavy presence of American officials began to wear thin. What one professor off-handedly described in mid April of 1956 as a Filipino “vogue of criticizing American experts” had in fact become a broader nationalist-inspired, anti-imperialist critique of American intervention.

75 Ferrel Heady to Wilbur K. Pierpont, 1 October 1954, University of Michigan School of Public Administration Collection, Bentley Historical Library, Ann Arbor, MI.
States government also lost their enthusiasm for the project and ended its contract with the University of Michigan in June of 1956. As the contract ran out, the direction of Institute was transferred to a Filipino staff and the University of Michigan professors returned to Ann Arbor. Despite the U.S. government withdrawal of funds the Institute did continue to receive American dollars through the Rockefeller foundation; however, it is not clear if Americans continued to influence or participate in the Institute in any substantial way. I can only speculate as to the reasons why the U.S. government shifted away from the Institute’s educational mission. It is possible that the divestment of funds was connected to a strategic shift in foreign policy; this conclusion is, however, beyond the scope of this chapter. What it is evident is that that throughout the duration of the project American officials, to the frustration of the American professors, always considered the efforts to transform Philippine society in larger global context.

Conclusion

In November 1956, three years after the publication of Sherrod’s article, government offices bustled with activity as the first ever “Public Administration Week” came to state agencies in Manila. Two years before, as part of the Governmental Reorganization Act of 1954, Philippine President, Ramon Magsaysay declared the second week of November of every year “Public Administration Week.”77 Decorated with the seal of the Republic of the Philippines, participants opened the week’s printed program to an artistically rendered image of the president watching over a group of industrious

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77 Philippine President Ramon Magsaysay issued the Reorganization Act in 1954. The act directed the president of the Philippines to submit, by March of 1955, a plan of governmental reorganization to the Philippine congress. Charged with following the broad goals of: “expeditious administration of public business and increased efficiency of the operations of the government to the fullest extent possible.”
workers. Depicted in a *barong tagalog*, an embroidered dress shirt for Filipino men, with closely cropped hair, dark skin, and a stern gaze, President Magsaysay hovered over a public administrator wearing a tie and eyeglasses, writing busily behind a neatly ordered desk. To his left was an image of two construction workers digging and drilling in front of a sharp line of modern buildings. One sported a hardhat and manned a jackhammer; the other wore a traditional Filipino hat and used a shovel. On the right of the desk-bound bureaucrat, a nurse administered shots to a child sitting on its mother’s lap, as two other children anxiously looked on. Unlike the detailed likeness of Magsaysay, no other face in the image was shaded. Framing the images a bold text pronounced, “good public administration means efficient, honest, and democratic public services.”

Though the celebration of public service enjoined “all offices in the national, provincial, city and municipal governments” to participate, Manila served as the hub of activity. The week’s ceremonies, religious services, “business machines” and office equipment exhibits, radio and press forums, and conferences contributed to an ongoing discourse on the roles, functions, and efficacy of Philippine governance.

The imagery adorning the printed program of National Public Administration Week reflects the colliding discourses of communism and corruption that Sherrod wrote about in 1953. Magsaysay, described as a “sincere friend of the United States” and a “new Asian leader” in 1953 by the *New York Times*, was heralded as an “example for working democracy through the Far East” by the American media and the United States government. Ramon Magsaysay first received attention for his role as a guerilla fighter

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78 National Public Administration Week, November 1956, folder “International Cooperation Administration,” University of Michigan School of Public Administration, Bentley Historical Library, Ann Arbor, MI.
against Japanese forces during the Second War World, winning the praise of U.S. General, Douglas Mac Arthur. Charged with the role of ‘cleaning house’ in late 1940s and early 50s, Magsaysay worked closely with American military advisors in an extended campaign against a peasant insurgency.

4.3: Public Administration Week Pamphlet
From: University of Michigan School of Public Administration Papers
Magsaysay was not from one of the families that historically ruled politics in the Philippines that Sherrod identified as the primary perpetrators of corruption. In fact, Magsaysay self-consciously portrayed himself as a “break away from tradition.” In the National Administration Week program, for example, Magsaysay’s designers positioned him as a common man turned politician, “with his warm, magnetic personality, his simple man-to-man approach and sympathy for the common people,” in contrast to the “entrenched, unscrupulous, political machine,” known as the cacique system. In the American and Philippine press as well as the printed publications generated by Philippine government programs, Magsaysay was repeatedly linked with symbols of Filipino traditionalism, peasantry, and the countryside. The multiple references to Magsaysay as a common indicated how pervasive the discourses about elite corruption were during the years preceding his election.

Praised in the United States as a, “symbol of a new hope for Philippine democracy, stability, and progress” American political leaders supported and celebrated Magsaysay’s rise to power. Indeed, Magsaysay exemplified the United States’ ideal political leader in Southeast Asia at the time. He was deeply anti-communist, he supported the global military project of the United States, and he believed in US efforts to integrate newly independent nations into a capitalist world economy. Magsaysay’s presentation of himself as a ‘common man’ provided a powerful discursive link between the two major political movements that the U.S. supported in the Philippines: the eradication of communist-inspired activism and the naturalization of the link between Philippine democracy, bureaucratic state management, and capitalist development.
In this chapter I have argued that the on-the-ground implementation of modernization projects co-existed with and, at moments, conflicted with the global, American driven anti-communist project. While scholars of modernization theory have shown how the claim to expertise by western technocrats continued an imperial ideology that positioned the moral superiority of the modern west against the stagnant “traditional” politics of the Third World. Assessed by technocrats who were empowered by foreign aid policymakers, these newly independent states or decolonizing states were often viewed as ineffective, anti-modern, and increasingly anachronistic in an interlocked world of sovereign nation-states. In the Philippines, where Americans were keen on promoting their “experiment in Oriental democracy,” corruption and inefficiency were the key vectors of technocratic intervention. However, as this chapter has shown the local politics in the Philippines and the technocrats that sought to address these projects often collided with and created friction with an American driven anti-communist global project.

In short, the anti-communist project in the Philippines demanded that American policymakers continue to cultivate relationships with the same elite class that technocrats identified as the source of instability in the islands. Unlike the American military and anti-communist Filipino elites, technocrats did not argue for a criminalization of leftists in the Philippines. Yet, I argue that we need to look beyond the traditional periodization of the Cold War in order to understand show on the on-the-ground enactment of modernization policies and technocratic actors contributed to the eradication of a 20th century indigenous, leftist vision of Philippine democracy.
Chapter Five:

“A Free-World That Prays Together Stays Together”: The Rosary Crusade in the Philippines and Global Networks of Catholic Anti-Communism

On December 6th 1959, at 3pm, upwards of a quarter of a million individuals, primarily, Manileños, assembled around the Singalong Catholic Church in Manila. The month-long Battle of Manila razed the centuries old historic churches of Intramuros, the 17th century seat of the Spanish Empire. The Singalong Church, South of the Pasig River, stood as a refuge for civilians seeking shelter during the Pacific War’s most severe episode of urban combat. On the steamy December 6th afternoon, crowds circled Singalong, waiting to proceed to Luneta Park. Ominous rain clouds hovered overhead, threatening organizer’s plans for what they imagined was a significant day in Philippine and Catholic history.

Luneta Park was the destination for Singalong’s masses, a recognizable landmark in the landscape of a city transformed by WWII and postwar reconstruction projects. The centuries old park lay adjacent to Manila’s other famous site, Intramuros, a walled city-within-a-city and architectural remnant of the Spanish empire. Luneta Park was boarded by stretches of broad pavement, named in honor of American colonial officials; Taft Avenue, home to many of the country’s government buildings, bound the northern edge of the park while Dewey Boulevard, a seaside stretch dotted with restaurants and hotels, cut the southern edge in two, with only a small slice of the park left to touch the
broad blue expanses of Manila bay. Luneta Park, formerly known as Bagumbayan, or new town, was notoriously known as a site for executions. In 1872, Spanish colonial authorities executed three Filipino priests, Mariano Gomez, Jose Burgos, and Jacinto Zamora, charged with inciting a mutiny in Cavite.¹ The martyrdom of the priests, known collectively by the acronym Gomburza, represented an incidence of colonial repression and a spark in a burgeoning anti-colonial movement in the Philippines. Twenty-four years later, Spanish officials again used the park as a site for colonial repression, this time murdering Jose Rizal, a medical doctor trained in Spain and co-founder of La Liga Filipina, a movement aimed at reforming Spanish colonialism. The park, which would be renamed Rizal Park after its famed national hero, eventually shed its status as an execution site to become the popular home for Manila’s most lavish celebrations, including the 1946 independence celebration and successive presidential inaugurations.

Prior to Sunday, the week’s weather was marked by rain coupled with the steamy heat of the tropical Philippine climate. As the crowds swelled and the dark clouds that had gathered throughout the afternoon grew denser, a torrential rainstorm broke through, drenching the devotees but offering at least a break from heat. One and a half million people flooded the grassy, green fields of Luneta, turning them to mud. Father Patrick Peyton, the man the crowd waited to see, remembered the scene as “a sea of people pressed together and out beyond the horizon.”² The million and a half followers watched and prayed as a sequence of religious and political figures led the crowd in praying the

Rosary. The Archbishop of Manila, Rufino J. Santos, led the Rally in reciting the first decade of the Rosary in Tagalog. Associate Justice of the Philippine Supreme Court, Pastor Endecia, also spoke the native Filipino language for the second decade while Speaker of the House, Daniel Romualdez, and Vice-President, Diosdado Macapagal, recited the third and fourth in English. The Apostolic Nuncio, or envoy to the Holy See, Monsignor Salvatore Siino, recited the fifth and final decade, in Spanish. Signifying the blend of religious and political power that supported the Rosary Crusade mission in the islands, the five leaders in prayer were joined on-stage by the first Lady of the Philippines, and the wives of the Speaker of the House and Vice-President, as well as twenty-eight members of the Catholic hierarchy.

By the time Peyton finally took the stage at 4:30 in the afternoon, the sky cleared and the Irish born and American trained Holy Cross priest looked out upon the crowd that extended all the way to shore of Manila Bay. From his privileged viewpoint on stage, Peyton observed that “Bataan and the island of Corregidor,” two sites that evoked memories of a merciless Japanese Occupation and WWII, formed an “emotion-laden backdrop” to the occasion. The December 6th rally at Luneta Park and Father Patrick Peyton’s appearance was the culminating event of a multi-month religious expedition by the Family Rosary Crusade, a transnational Catholic organization organized to promote Marian devotion through Rosary prayer. Moved by enthusiastic turnout, Peyton proclaimed that the Family Rosary crusade reached “the highest peak” in Manila where over a million gathered to “let their bodies and souls cry out to heaven and earth their

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response to our Blessed Mother’s holy will regarding all that is implied in the sentence:

‘the family that prays together, stays together.’”

5. 1: Family Rosary Crusade Rally, 1959
From: Holy Cross Family Ministries, North Easton, MA

\[\text{Ibid.}\]
The 1959 Manila Rally was not the first Peyton conducted internationally. In fact, Peyton traveled extensively through Chile in the months prior to the Philippine campaign, after missions in Canada, England, Australia, India, Pakistan, Burma, Malaysia, and Thailand. Nor did the 1959 rally mark his first visit to the Philippines. Peyton had traveled to the Philippines in 1951 to conduct a radio broadcast of the “Rosary Hour” and in 1953, a crowd of one million had gathered to hear Peyton lead a Rosary Rally in Manila. Yet, according to Peyton and his team of employees and volunteers, the 1959 Manila Rosary Rally set the standard for all future rallies. “I must repeat,” Peyton wrote reflectively, “I never expect to see an equal in any other place in the entire world even if the Crusade goes on for another hundred years.” Indeed, the 1959 Rosary Crusade in the Philippines proved to be a monumental moment in the growth of the organization’s global networks. The rally, which Crusade organizers cited as the largest postwar gathering in the Philippines, “way beyond the Marian Congress in 1954, more than the Eucharistic Congress in 1957 and more than the crowd that attended the inauguration of the most popular President of the Philippines, Ramon Magsaysay” marked a culmination, but also a beginning.

The 1959 Rosary Crusade in the Philippines resulted in the creation of the first international office of the Family Rosary Crusade, explicitly imagined by its founders as a hub of a transnational network, and an organizational model for other locales. The office, based in Manila functioned as a “subsidiary of the worldwide Family Crusade

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office in Albany, New York.” Father Bienvenido Lopez, an organizer of the 1959 Crusade, served as the first director of the Manila office. Lopez, a priest with a Doctorate in Canon Law from the Gregorian University in Rome, became an auxiliary bishop in the Archdiocese of Manila in 1966. Peyton and the Archbishop of Manila defined the purpose of the subsidiary office, as to “grasp and harness the opportunities the future may give the Crusade not only in the Philippines but throughout the Far East and Southeast Asia.” The transnational network of Rosary Crusaders that formed through the international circuits of the Catholic Church, U.S. government, and American business, saw the Philippines office as the ideal location to open an international office. Although in practice the ideological leanings of the organization, including Catholic anti-communism, did not translate neatly across time and space. In fact, it is likely that locals translated, transformed, or perhaps even ignored certain aspects of the Family Rosary Crusades universalizing doctrines. Yet, epitomized by the Rosary Crusade’s internationalist slogan, “a world at prayer is a world at peace,” the Philippines office also represented a model on which the Crusade could begin to enact its ambitious global agenda.

**Religion, U.S. Foreign Policy, and The Cold War**

In spite of the vast body of literature on the Cold War, the role of religion in the global conflict has only recently received the systematic attention of historians, due in

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part to a tendency to assume the separation of church and state. One group of scholars complicated this view by hewing closer to interpretations that focused on the ideological impact of religion on the worldviews of U.S. foreign policymakers. More recently, the presumptions of the separation church and state has been challenged in studies on the relationship between U.S. foreign policy and religion by scholars employing methodologies of cultural history. Writing against the post-revisionist historian, John Gaddis, who argued that balances of power and geopolitics explain U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War, such studies have eschewed explicit links of causation as a staple element of historical interpretation, opening the door to considerations of the intersection of religious and political thought, as well as the possible organizational power of religion.

Historians writing on religious ideologies and the Cold War have considered how U.S. policymakers perceived the Cold War as a spiritual crises that threatened to unravel the moral building blocks of humanity. For example, John Foster Dulles, a foremost

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14 Ibid.
16 Jonathan P. Herzog, The Spiritual-Industrial Complex: America's Religious Battle Against Communism in the Early Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Axel Schafer, "The Cold War State...
policymaker of the early Cold War period, understood the Cold War in these baldly sacred terms.\textsuperscript{17} Scholars of international relations often posit Dulles, the “moralist,” and George Kennan, the “realist,” as the opposing poles of early Cold War U.S. foreign policy. However, Kennan initially framed the US Containment policy as akin to a moral and spiritual duty, bestowed distinctly upon the United States. In addition to accounting for the worldview of Cold War policymakers, some historians argue that American policymakers were not simply influenced by the ideological underpinnings of a predominantly Protestant brand of Christianity; but policymakers also utilized religion as a tool to strengthen anticommunist beliefs as well as to undermine foreign communist movements.\textsuperscript{18} For example, in his account on the American support of the Diem regime in Vietnam, Seth Jacobs shows how Diem’s Catholic faith and American policymakers racist beliefs regarding the capacities of Vietnamese people combined to make Diem an appealing candidate to American policymakers.\textsuperscript{19} This chapter contributes to a historical narrative that sees the early Cold War Period as a “Third Great Awakening” of American religious fervor, where presidential administrations mobilized religious faiths in order to drum up public support for Cold War military spending.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{17} Inboden, \textit{Religion and American Foreign Policy, 1945-1960: The Soul of Containment}.  
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{19} There is debate about how much Seth Jacobs’ analysis of race and religion over determines the argument that Diem was a puppet of American power. In a roundtable on Jacobs ‘book, Edward Miller claims that scholars such as Philipp Catton and Jessica Chapman have shown how Diem exercised greater independence from American. Jessica M. Chapman, "The Sect Crisis of 1955 and the American Commitment to Ngô Đình Diệm," \textit{Journal of Vietnamese Studies} 5, no. 1 (2010).  
My analysis of Father Patrick Peyton’s Rosary Crusades draws on studies on the intersections between the ideology of American religions, religious practices and US Cold War foreign policy, while also highlighting how one religious institution intersected with global networks of power. I show how individuals endowed with great political and economic power populated these networks, which were created above, below, and through nation-states. Therefore, while I focus on the political influences of anti-communist thought within a sect of global Catholicism, this chapter also highlights the organization structures, global networks, and the proximity between an international religious institution, the Family Rosary Crusade, and individuals with disproportionate access to American avenues of power.

For example, throughout Peyton’s long career at the helm of the Family Rosary organization, he cultivated relationships with millionaire industrialists, Hollywood stars and producers, heads of states, the American Central Intelligence Agency, and men at the highest echelons of the Catholic hierarchy. At times this support appeared strictly financial, such as the multiple donations from financial executive and commissioner of the Empire State Building, John J. Raskob. Other times, as in Peyton’s consistent support from shipping magnate, J. Peter Grace, connections to wealthy, prominent individuals went beyond simply financial backing. The Rosary Crusade’s support from Grace, in particular, brought Peyton’s movement into contact with individuals operating within the innermost circles of the American state including: Eisenhower’s Vice President, Richard Nixon, Director of the CIA, Allen Dulles, and Senator and future President John F. Kennedy.21

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Finally, like most American Catholics during the period, Peyton was a dedicated anti-communist. For example, in 1946 Peyton advocated that the “rosary is the offensive weapon that will destroy Communism—the great evil that seeks to destroy the faith.”

Yet, while the overt ideology of Peyton’s Rosary Crusade hinged upon the notion that communism, and specifically the U.S.S.R. were in part to blame for turmoil of the postwar world, by in large Peyton’s Crusade targeted individuals, and primarily Catholics, to seek the solution. Unlike contemporaneous military or development projects involved in the global anti-communist movement that targeted individuals or groups either through force or the promise of material improvements, Peyton claimed that his Crusade operated “strictly on the spiritual level” through the idea that “by prayer and prayer alone” will mankind “bring peace to [a] troubled world.” This is not to suggest that Peyton’s crusade eschewed the attractions of the material world. Undoubtedly, Peyton’s use of newer technologies in communication, including film and television, to distribute spiritual content, as well as the employment of colossal publicity blitzes for his international crusades, contributed to the widespread success of the Rosary Family organization.

The multiple networks of power that the Rosary Crusade traveled through were not opened simply through religious affinities, but through elaborate networks of power and communications established over centuries. The Rosary Crusade worked with and through already established networks of the Catholic Church in locations around the globe. This meant that wherever Peyton traveled, whether it was the Philippines, Latin America, or India, Crusade organizers empowered local Catholic populations to organize

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22 Ibid.
23 “For Peace Among Nations God’s Blessing on Homes,” The Time for Family Prayer, Holy Cross Family Ministries, Father Patrick Peyton Papers, North Easton, MA.
themselves around the specific tenants of the Rosary Crusade as well as the broader Catholic Church. In fact, without the cooperation of local Catholic hierarchies, parish priests, and lay volunteers, the Rosary Crusade could not have functioned as it did. This meant that Peyton’s message of prayer, family, and religious anti-communism spread through local as well as global networks. The Rosary Crusade spun new webs through these networks, facilitated by the institutional and organizational strengths of the Crusade, in conjunction with an ardent anti-communist message, that stretched deep into the centers of U.S state power.

“What shall it be, the Atom Bomb or the Rosary?”

In his self-consciously unassuming autobiography, *All for Her*, published in 1967, Father Patrick Peyton narrates his history that led him from a “straggly little village of thatched one-story cabins” in Carracastle, Ireland to his life as a global religious icon, popular enough to receive personalized telegrams from President John Kennedy.24 In a chapter titled, “I call and Mary hears,” Peyton describes the long illness and awakening prayer that led him to devote “all the merit of my priesthood until death” to propagating Rosary Prayer and the veneration of the Virgin Mary.25 Patrick Peyton declared that his belief in the power of the Virgin Mary stemmed from a long and serious bout of tuberculosis. His illness lasted over a year and interrupted his studies for the priesthood at the Holy Cross College at the Catholic University of America in Washington D.C. Peyton’s illness required months of bed rest in various sanitariums. His treatments for the illness, and his resolution to forgo further medical treatment and

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25 Ibid.
pray exclusively to Mary, resulted from a September 1939 medical appointment. After assessing the course of his treatment, Peyton’s doctor informed him that his pneumothorax treatments, a process that involved injecting air into the thoracic cavity to promote the collapse and eventual rest of an infected lung, continued to elicit poor results. Exhausting all other treatments, doctors at the Notre Dame infirmary recommend a radical solution that prompted Peyton to cease medical treatments, and focus solely on the potential healing powers of prayer.

Peyton’s doctors argued that a thoracoplasty constituted the “only alternative” left for the future Rosary priest. The radical procedure entailed the “removal of several ribs” along with the breakage of several others. Involving “three major operations” that allowed the shoulder blade to collapse inward, it aimed to allow space for the lung to collapse and eventually rest.  

26 Pondering the “desperate mutilation” of his body, Peyton sought the council of his superiors including Father Cornelius Hagerty. Convinced by his conversations with Father Hagerty, Peyton resolved that “Mary is omnipotent in the power of her prayer…Mary can do anything God can do…the difference is in the way they do it. God wills something and it happens. Mary prays to Him for something and He does it. He will never say no to her.”  

27 This message resolved Peyton to forgo the operation, put his trust in God, and “approach him through His Mother and mine.” By January 1940 Peyton’s tuberculosis had significantly cleared. For the remainder of his life, Peyton believed that his prayers to Mary cured him of his persistent case of tuberculosis. In addition to his training, Peyton’s serious illness and miraculous recovery committed him to the idea that he would spend the rest of his life “repaying the gifts to

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26 Ibid. 72.
27 Ibid. 76.
Peyton’s personal narrative to Marian devotion cannot, however, account for the significant rise in Marian devotion amongst American Catholics or the connections to anti-communism and the Cold War. Nor should his account be read as the sole explanation for the widespread international success of the Family Rosary Crusade.

A publication of Peyton’s organization, however, offers great insight into the linkages between anticommunism and Rosary prayer. In one edition of *The Time for Family Prayer*, a publication of the Family Rosary organization, the travails of Cardinal Mindzenty, a Roman Catholic priest sentenced to life imprisonment by the Communist regime in Hungary, are described in text under four large pictures of Rosary Rallies held in the United States. The imprisonment of the Hungarian priest is also connected in the article to the catastrophes of WWII and the threat of third world war or “an atomic war which President Truman says could wipe out civilization and turn mankind back to barbarism.” War, religious oppression, and atomic bombs are all, according to the editorialist, “terrifying persecutions” that the world has “seen come true” as “predicted by the Lady of the Rosary.” The Rosary Rallies, depicted on the same page as the editorial, represented the answer to the Virgin Mary’s repeated warning to “pray, pray—pray for the World which is in such trouble—you MUST say the Rosary.” The connection between the predictions of the Lady of the Rosary and anti-communism stemmed from the 1917 religious experience of three Portuguese children. While the story would not become a part of American Catholic tradition until after 1945, it eventually became a central element of Cold War Catholic anti-communism.

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28 Ibid. 86
30 Una Cadegan, “The Queen of Peace in the Shadow of War: Fatima and U.S. Catholic Anticommunism,”
In May of 1917, three children reported seeing apparitions of the Virgin Mary near the village of Fatima, Portugal. While letting their sheep pasture, the three children, ten-year old Lucia de Jesus dos Santos, the eldest, and her two cousins, eight-year old Francisco and seven-year Jacinta reported seeing a woman, “brighter than the sun.” According to the memoirs of Lucia, the children were playing on a hillside, while their sheep grazed, when they saw a flash of lightning. As the children attempted to herd the sheep towards the road a second lightning flashed and a woman dressed in all white appeared to the children. The woman, who the children recognized as the Virgin Mary, informed them that she would return on the 13th of each month. As promised, the Virgin Mary, who first appeared on the 13th of May, reappeared to the children on the 13th of each month for six consecutive months. As the months passed and rumors of the apparition spread, crowds began to gather and by July over 50,000 onlookers witnessed what they described as a “sun dance” or what came to be known as the “Miracle of the Sun.”

Despite the growing multitudes and publicity, the Virgin Mary reportedly entrusted her message, and purpose for appearing at Fatima, to the three children alone. Delivered as “three secrets,” Lucia waited until 1941 to reveal Mary’s Message. By then, Francisco and Jacinta had fallen victim to the Spanish Flu epidemic of 1918-1919 and only Lucia remained to convey Mary’s message. Compelled by Bishop of Leiria, Dom Jose Correia da Silva, to share the Virgin Mary’s communications, Lucia wrote a short

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letter relating the first two secrets. Lucia, who was again compelled to share by her Catholic superiors, despite feeling that it went against her instructions from God, wrote the third secret down in 1943. The Vatican did not make the third secret public until 2000. The first secret focused on a vision of hell that Mary reportedly revealed to the children. The Virgin Mary’s second secret centered on geopolitics and the apparent “errors” of Russia, Lucia wrote:

The war is going to end: but if people do not cease offending God, a worse one will break out during the Pontificate of Pius XI. When you see a night illumined by an unknown light, know that this is the great sign given you by God that he is about to punish the world for its crimes, by means of war, famine, and persecutions of the Church and of the Holy Father. To prevent this, I shall come to ask the Communion of reparation on the First Saturdays. If my requests are heeded, Russia will be converted, and there will be peace; if not, she will spread her errors throughout the world, causing wars and persecutions of the Church. The good will be martyred; the Holy Father will have much to suffer; various nations will be annihilated. In the end, my Immaculate Heart will triumph. The Holy Father will consecrate Russia to me, and she shall be converted, and a period of peace will be granted to the world.33

The timing of Mary’s appearances at Fatima coincided with the both WWI and the Russian Revolution that culminated in the October Revolution against the Russian Provisional Government and the rise of Lenin’s Bolshevik revolutionaries.34 Prior to the 1940s publication of the Secrets of Fatima in English, Americans knew little of the Fatima apparitions outside of a few descriptions offered by journalists on Marian

pilgrimage trips. However, the contemporaneous timing of the 1917 apparitions with
the Revolution in Russia led the Catholic Church to argue that the purpose of the Marian
intercession at Fatima was to warn the world about the dangers of Communism. This
geopolitical interpretation did not emerge until the 25th anniversary of the Fatima
apparitions in 1942, where praying the Rosary was enlisted as a spiritual weapon against
Soviet Communism.

Specifically, the Virgin Mary told that children that they should “pray the Rosary
every day, in order to obtain peace for the world, and the end of the war.” In addition
to ending the contemporary war, the Virgin Mary conveyed to the three children that by
praying the rosary humanity could prevent the onset of another global conflict.
Communism is not directly referenced in Lucia’s account of the Fatima Secrets, only the
need to consecrate Russia. Though it is clear that post-1941 interpretations of Fatima
emphasize the contemporaneous timing of the Russian Revolution and the supposed
anti-communist message from Mary. The apparitions at Fatima represented only one of
the many reported incidents of visions of the Virgin Mary during the 19th and 20th
century. However, the geopolitical message revealed in the Fatima Secrets contributed
to postwar flourishing in meanings the Catholic Church and its faithful derived from the
story.

35 Cadegan, "The Queen of Peace in the Shadow of War: Fatima and U.S. Catholic Anticommunism."
36 In the late 12th and early 13th centuries St. Dominic, founder of the Dominican order, led a preaching
crusade against the Albigensians, an esoteric religious community deemed as heretics. St. Dominic
reportedly received a rosary from the Blessed Virgin Mary as well as 15 promises for those who regularly
prayed the rosary. Simon Tugwell, Early Dominicans: Selected Writings (New York: Paulist Press, 1982).
Ralph Francis Bennett, The Early Dominicans (Cambridge [Eng.]: The University Press, 1937).
38 Deirdre De La Cruz offers an analysis of mass media as not simply a technological means through which
incidents of Marian apparitions are disbursed globally, but a factor that could “mirror, restructure, and
possibly produce, religious phenomena and experience.” Deirdre De La Cruz, "Coincidence and
Consequence: Marianism and the Mass Media in the Global Philippines," Cultural Anthropology 24, no. 3
Journalists in the American Catholic press, in particular, connected the anti-communist implications of the Fatima Secrets to the Cold War.\textsuperscript{39} This confluence of Fatima, the Cold War, and Rosary prayer also resonated in the Philippine Catholic press. For instance, in the Philippine periodical, \textit{Santo Rosario}, the “Rosary magazine of the Philippines,” Rev. Fr. Francisco Muñoz applied the lessons drawn from the visions of Fatima directly to the Cold War and the role of the Philippines in the conflict.\textsuperscript{40} In an article titled “The Road to Peace,” printed on an anniversary of the First Fatima Apparition, Muñoz wrote:

> The Story of Fatima is a story of three children and the Mother of God. It is the story of an angel of heaven who was assigned to earth to accomplish the mission of preparing three children of men to become fervent and loyal children of Mary, in order that they, one day, may be called, in reality, children of God. But Fatima is more than that…it is the story that concerns all of us and the whole world at large.\textsuperscript{41}

Characteristic of postwar writings on the Secrets of Fatima, Muñoz, in the “Road to Peace” equates Russia entirely with undifferentiated “communism.”\textsuperscript{42} This slippage perhaps seemed inconsequential to the magazine’s contemporary readers; the equivalence of Marxist and Leninist political philosophies with the U.S.S.R was not unique to the Catholic press.

\textsuperscript{39} Cadegan cites the rise of articles on Fatima during the Cold War in: \textit{Ave Maria, The Catholic Mirror}, \textit{the Catholic Mind, Catholic World, America}, and the \textit{Catholic School Journal} as examples from the American Catholic Press.
\textsuperscript{40} “A Rosary Crusader Comes to the Philippines,” \textit{Santo Rosario}, Vol. VI-II, November 1951, No. 70. Holy Cross Family Ministries, Father Patrick Peyton Papers, North Easton, MA
\textsuperscript{41} Rev. Fr. Francisco Munoz, “The Road to Peace,” \textit{Santo Rosario}, Santo Tomas University
\textsuperscript{42} Melanie McAlister shows how biblical films, particularly the \textit{Ten Commandments}, connected contemporary geopolitics and the supposed “benevolence” and inevitability of U.S. global power to the retelling of the exodus narrative. McAlister, \textit{Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East, 1945-2000}. 
Editorialists writing for *Santo Rosario* displayed a profoundly anticommunist worldview prior to Peyton’s multiple visits to the islands. Indeed, Catholic anticommunist discourse appeared in *Santo Rosario* beginning in 1948. In an article, reflecting on the year, titled, “1948, The Year of Watchful Waiting,” an unnamed editorialist argued the that world was waiting on “peace that elusive dove which in 1948 led the diplomats, or those who pass for such, a merry chase.” In this author’s view the “panegyrics of Peace” of the previous three years gave way to a struggle for survival that “as intense as ever.” In the article, 1948 is marked as “the inauguration of the Cold War—that epitome and masterpiece of watchful waiting.”43 The sentiment of *Santo Rosario*’s editorialist aligns neatly with that expressed by American President, Harry Truman, in an April 1948 speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors. A lifelong, devout Baptist, Truman’s faith unquestionably influenced his interpretation of the world as well as his view on the purposes of U.S. foreign policy.44 For example, in his speech to the news editors, Truman expressed the need for Americans, chosen by “Almighty God” to assume the leadership of the “free peoples of the world” so that “our children” do not have to “go through the same situation that we had to go through” during the “last five or six years.”45 Truman’s speech, and the op-ed in *Santo Rosario*, suggested continuity between WWII and the contemporary period, claiming, “there has only been a change of villains.”46 Indeed, similar to their peers in the U.S., Catholic journalist in the

43 *Santo Rosario*, “A Year of Watchful Waiting” Santo Tomas University
44 Inboden argues that unlike Eisenhower, who developed his religious beliefs during his terms in office, Truman drew upon Baptist traditions throughout his career in public office.” Inboden, *Religion and American Foreign Policy, 1945-1960: The Soul of Containment*.
46 *Santo Rosario*, “A Year of Watchful Waiting” Santo Tomas University
Philippines argued that Christianity and communism were “antagonistic by nature” and therefore could never coexist peacefully in the world.

The editors of Santo Rosario, in fact, offered extended meditations on WWII and the Cold War. Specifically, writers from the Catholic paper argued that, Nazism, or more broadly fascism, represented a lesser threat to humanity than those posed by postwar Soviet Communism. “Where before there was a neurotic gentlemen who laughed at the world behind a Chaplinesque mustachio,” one journalist descriptively wrote, “today the hirsute adornment has become bushier and the goose-stepping has given way to a heavy Caucasian gait. But the portents are the same.” Although the author ends with the claim that the threats of fascism and communism “are the same,” his characterization of the two indicates otherwise. The villainy of a “laughing” Hitler is made to look almost juvenile, or perhaps criminally insane, next to looming and omnipresent, “heavy gait” of Josef Stalin.

The editorialist’s juxtaposition of descriptions attested to his conviction regarding the seriousness and magnitude of contemporary world’s problems, but also clearly assigned blame for the deferred postwar peace. Employing another rhetorical theme of early Cold War anti-communism, the editorialist claimed communism presented a greater threat than Nazism because communism “offers a utopia to the class of society who by instinct is the most gullible.” The belief that communist organizers preyed on the unknowing or naivety of peasants, serfs, or various other iterations of the working class was a common theme voiced by a range of anti-communist actors throughout the Cold War. The author makes clear that this belief is grounded in “waiting that some of our

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48 See chapter two, “Globalizing Huklandia,” for an extended discussion on communism and anti-
“brothers” in the Philippines “might finally see the light of reason.” The author is plainly referring to the domestic conflict with the Huks, whose name, the reader is unsubtly reminded “rhymes with crooks.” According to this Santo Rosario editorialist, the Huks, like communists everywhere, were responsible for delaying the onset of peace in the Philippines. Yet, at the same time, he asserts they are also victims of utopic communist propaganda. This is an important distinction because it linked communists in the Philippines to an imagined global, homogenous, communist movement. Therefore, the author makes clear that the “peace” described in the “The Year of Watchful Waiting” is thus contingent on a global, rather than simply national, victory of the “free-world” over Soviet Communism.

In another edition of Santo Rosario, Manuel V. Moran, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in the Philippines, wrote a similarly ardent piece on the connection between communism and fascism. In his article titled, “The Cross or the Sickle, Communism and Spiritual Reconstruction” Moran claimed that, “a Communist government as we know it today is one which flies the attractive banner of the rule of the proletariat, but is in fact a dictatorship, pure and simple, not different from that of Hitler and Mussolini.” Moran’s claim regarding the relationship between fascism and communism staked out a variation of the argument that communism would inevitably lead the world to a third world war. Yet, much like the tone Muñoz employed for his piece on the deferred peace of 1948, Moran treated the geopolitics of the Cold War as common sense knowledge.

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49 Manuel V. Moran “Communism and Spiritual Reconstruction” Santo Rosario, 12.
Moran’s drawing of rhetorical continuities to WWII, alongside his argument that communist co-existence could only lead to a third world war intensified the gravity of his message. In its most basic terms, communism, according to Moran corrupted the human soul such that individuals became “deaf to the voice of conscience.” For Moran, communism was not simply an “enemy of the Church;” it was antithetical to humanity. It literally made men “sick with hate.” Echoing the secrets of Fatima, Moran concluded that communism’s spread could only lead to a “bleak and terrible fate” for humankind. Moran mixed his spiritual belief that communist politics created a depraved version of humanity with what he offered as clear-cut historic evidence; the “eventual and proven outcome of communism,” Moran wrote, was the “enslavement of the masses and the destruction of all that is good and delicate and noble in them.” Though he does not reference what specific historical example he drew this conclusion from, for Moran, it is quite clear that communists not only threatened to take-over the nations of the world, it also threatened to colonize the human soul. Again, blending the secular and the sacred, Moran argued communists were not “content with ruling one nation” but instead sought to “dominate the whole world.” Moran described the spread of communist politics as “like a forest fire” that started “from a spark” and grew “fanned by the gusts of hate and fed with the underbrush of envy and greed.” Along with many Catholic anti-communists, Moran emphasized the role of the individual. Just as individual prayer could ignite a spiritual bulwark against communist infiltration, one communist “infected soul” could spread into “a mammoth conflagration.”

50 Manuel V. Moran “Communism and Spiritual Reconstruction” Santo Rosario, 13.
51 Manuel V. Moran “Communism and Spiritual Reconstruction” Santo Rosario, 13.
52 Manuel V. Moran “Communism and Spiritual Reconstruction” Santo Rosario, 13.
53 Manuel V. Moran “Communism and Spiritual Reconstruction” Santo Rosario, 14.
Even as Moran deliberated upon what he believed were the proven effects of communism on the human soul, he also claimed that the human spirit afforded the Free World its most effective weapon. On this point, Moran indicated the importance of Catholic organizations that relied upon the activism of lay volunteers, citing the work of “a representative group of Catholic laymen” that received the blessing and approval of the Philippine hierarchy to take “upon their shoulders the responsibility of launching, on a nation-wide scale, a Prayer Crusade.”

A 1951 edition of *Santo Rosario* featured the organization, led by a priest, but relying largely upon lay volunteers, that Moran referenced in his earlier piece. Addressed to “ardent Rosarians—of which the Philippines abounds,” the “name of Father Peyton has become known as that of a modern crusader in a world that is torn with indifference and strife.” The author described Peyton’s visit to the Philippines as “The Rosary Father in the Rosary Land.” Peyton immediately asserted an affinity between the Philippines, a place where, according to *Santo Rosario*, “the threat of Communism [lurked] along the length and breadth of the land.”

Undeniably, Peyton’s reputation preceded his visit to the islands and Filipino Catholics, or at least that wrote for *Santo Rosario*, intended to impress upon Peyton the “Rosarian love of our people.”

Indeed, Moran argued that “spiritual regimentation, and the collectivity of our individual moral strength” in the Philippines provided an “impregnable bulwark against Communism.”

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57 Manuel V. Moran “Communism and Spiritual Reconstruction” *Santo Rosario*, 14
comply with our Mother’s requests, Russia will be converted and universal peace will reign.” Consequently, this also meant that if individuals *did not* pray the rosary, communism would prevail and “men [would] be enslaved” everywhere. In effect, for Moran, Christian prayer offered the only reliable “weapon” in the war against communism.\(^{58}\) Similar to the secrets of the Fatima that emphasized the consecration of Russia and the anti-communist message of the Rosary Crusade, the sentiment expressed in *Santo Rosario* endorsed the idea that peace would forever be postponed unless individuals committed to eradicating global communism.

Peyton’s Rosary Crusade also conveyed the unequivocal principle that prayer, and prayer alone, could save humanity from certain ruin. Characteristic of the slick propaganda of the Family Rosary organization, the Crusade adopted an apocalyptic slogan that emphasized the idea that individuals, not simply nations, had a role to play in the Cold War. According to Peyton, individuals, and collectively the world, had only two options: the “atom bomb or the rosary.” In this formulation, utilized repeatedly in the Rosary Crusade materials, civilization was positioned on the brink of destruction. Peyton’s ambitious mission, therefore, was to convince the world that individual prayer offered humanity its only avenue to world peace.

In an edition of *The Time for Family Prayer*, the Rosary Crusade uses the “atom bomb or rosary” slogan to forward its family prayer agenda. In this particular edition, a Family Rosary editorial team exploited public anxieties regarding nuclear weapons and nuclear annihilation in order to draw a stark connection between prayer and the purpose of individuals in the Cold War.\(^{59}\) Although the publication is undated, the edition also

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\(^{58}\) Manuel V. Moran “Communism and Spiritual Reconstruction” *Santo Rosario*, 15

\(^{59}\) Paul S. Boyer, *By the Bomb’s Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age*
highlighted the 1951 Rosary rallies in Baltimore, Washington D.C. and South Bend. The Rosary rallies, however, receive brief coverage, while the primary topic of the magazine was displayed in bold letters across the magazine’s front cover, “WAR DRUMS ARE ROLLING! You’re the Doctor—it’s one or the other.” Beneath this headline, an instantly recognizable photograph of a nuclear explosion in the Pacific spreads across the page. The photograph was taken during a nuclear test in 1946 and featured in the *New York Times*. Beneath the photograph, in small text, read “god alone can extricate [sic] world from its troubles.” Overlying the image of the bomb blown beachfront and expanding mushroom cloud, in large letters and bold font, the simple, yet profound phrase, “Atom Bomb or the Rosary” definitively laid bare the stakes referenced in the magazine’s headline.  

The “atom bomb or rosary” slogan also unveiled the geopolitics of the Rosary Crusade’s cause. Indeed the slogan appeared to extend far beyond Peyton’s humble, seemingly apolitical, sickbed pledge to devote his religious career to promoting the veneration of the Virgin Mary. The Rosary Crusade was, in fact, a religious movement directed at effecting political change on a global scale. Indeed, a 1946 radio broadcast highlighted the ways that Peyton, very early in his career, understood the political edge of his movement. “The rosary,” Peyton argued, was the “offensive weapon that will destroy Communism—the great evil that seeks to destroy the faith”  

Though Peyton acknowledged the inherent politics of his movement, he did so largely in spiritual terms. Rosary Crusaders and other Catholic anticommunism saw the Cold War as a conflict over

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60 *The Time for Family Prayer*, The Family Rosary, Albany NY and Hollywood Holy Cross Family Ministries, Father Patrick Peyton Papers, North Easton, MA.

the fate of humanity—allowing believers, as well as the Rosary Crusade, to claim that their passions were moral ones, not political.

5.2: The Atom Bomb or the Rosary
From: Holy Cross Family Ministries, North Easton, MA
The foundations of Peyton’s Marian missions lay in his belief that “enemies of Christ and His Church are attacking Christian civilization at its root, the family.”

Though Peyton referenced Fatima in *The Rosary Crusade Handbook*, a booklet for Rosary Crusade volunteers, Peyton did not frequently reference Mary’s “secret message” at Fatima in his campaign to pray the Rosary. It was the strength of Peyton’s organization however, not simply the viewpoints of Peyton as the organization’s public figure, that contributed to the global mobility of the Family Rosary Crusade’s anti-communist message. Yet, undoubtedly, Fatima’s secrets provided postwar Catholics with an ecclesiastical explanation for their contemporary anticommunism.

Catholic journalists in both the U.S. and the Philippines drew upon the story and contributed to the growth of Rosary Prayer in the Twentieth Century Catholicism. What made Peyton’s promotion of the Rosary particularly unique and arguably successful was his emphasis on family prayer, the dynamic employment of new technologies of communication, and the Crusade’s ability to traverse existing religious and political networks while also creating new ones.

**The “Rosary Father in the Rosary Land”**

By the time Peyton returned to the Philippines in 1959, six years after his one million-person rally in 1953, the Rosary Crusade had already blossomed into an international phenomenon. As early as 1947, Peyton transformed his local 15-minute

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radio show into *Family Theater of the Air*, a program broadcasted by three hundred stations across the United States as well as the Armed Forces Radio that reached across the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The growing popularity of television lured Peyton to the medium and by 1949 the Family Theater added the *Road to Peace*, a twenty-minute program starring Bing Crosby and Ann Blyth to its growing catalogue of media productions. Numerous Hollywood stars, including James Stewart, Raymond Burr and Joan Crawford acted in Peyton’s made-for-television films. *Hill Number One*, cited as Peyton’s most popular production, debuted the future star, James Dean.\(^{64}\) Internationally, the Crusade made stops in almost every continent, including an unprecedented tour through seventy-four-archdioceses in six East African nations.\(^{65}\) Peyton’s 1959 visit marked his third trip to the Philippines and the return of “The Rosary Father” to the “Rosary Land.”

Domestic and international Rosary Rallies grew in popularity over the course of 1958, with one held in Minneapolis that was, according to Peyton, “the biggest gathering of people in the entire history of the Upper Midwest”\(^{66}\). On the heels of the Minneapolis rally, at the end of October in 1958, Patrick Peyton mailed a letter to the Archbishop of Manila, Rufino J. Santos. In the letter, Peyton expressed his desire to bring the Rosary Crusade back to the Philippines. Santos, the 29\(^{th}\) Archbishop of Manila, replaced the first Filipino archbishop in the islands, Gabriel Reyes, in February 1953. Though Santos’ career was already marked by controversy, he eventually became the first Filipino


\(^{65}\) The Six East African nation crusade (Kenya, Tangantika, Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Uganda and Sundan) followed a crusade in South Africa in 1955. Ibid.

Cardinal in the Catholic Church. The Archdiocese in Manila, elevated from diocese in 1595 by Pope Clemente VIII, once stretched over 18,000 square miles of territory and included the provinces of: Rizal, Bulacan, Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Batangas, Laguna, Cavite, Bataan, Zambales, and Mindoro. By 1948, the territory covered by the Archdiocese shrunk as the Diocese of Mindoro and San Fernando were carved out to form additional Archdiocese in the Philippines.

Based on their epistolary exchanges, it appeared that tensions existed between Peyton and Santos prior to the 1959 Crusade. Though, Peyton’s third trip to the Philippines came at the invitation of Archbishop Santos, it is evident that Peyton pressured Santos’ into extending an official invitation. Peyton’s October 1958 letter was not the first communication between the two men nor was it the first time that Peyton proposed bringing the Crusade back to the Philippines. “Your warm reaction to the Crusade the Archdiocese and perhaps throughout the Philippines next year has been a great joy for me ever since,” Peyton wrote. The Archbishop of Manila appeared responsive to the idea of the Crusade, though Peyton begins the letter with an apology for not [being] in touch with your excellency sooner,” indicating the increasing busyness of Peyton’s schedule. Even if Santos responded positively to the idea of the Crusade, it is also clear that Peyton felt compelled to secure an official invitation from Santos to visit the Philippines, and thus wrote, “I will await your Excellency’s answer.”

67 The hierarchy in the Philippines faced several challenges in the Postwar era. In 1943, during the war, a the Auxiliary Bishop of Manila, Cesar Maria Guerrero, attempted to oust the Archbishop, O’Doherty from his position. The “Rebel priests,” Fr. Ambrosio Manaligod and Hilario Lim argued for a Filipinization of the hierarchy. See: Reynaldo C. Ileto, “Transient and Enduring Legacies in the Philippines” in David W. H. Koh and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies., Legacies of World War II in South and East Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007). 88-89.
69 Father Patrick Peyton to Reverend Rufino J. Santos, October 28th, 1958, Holy Cross Family Ministries,
As Peyton expected, Santos approved of the Crusade and agreed to let Peyton “carry on his Family Rosary Crusade throughout [the] Archdiocese of Manila.”\(^{70}\) The issue of leadership, or of the role of local religious leaders nonetheless, appeared as a source of tension in the Philippines crusade. In previous communications, Peyton indicated that the Archbishop of Manila expressed a desire to impose limits on Peyton’s ambitions in the Philippines. A discussion between Father Lawyer, Peyton’s, “companion and associate in the Madrid office,” and an unnamed assistant to the Archbishop of Manila, revealed the Archbishop’s preference to limit both the geographical scope and the timeline of Peyton’s proposed 1959 Crusade. Peyton acknowledged that he knew it was a preference of the Archbishop that Peyton “not [attempt] the whole Philippines but only [the Archbishop’s] province first and then perhaps other.” In addition to the territorial range of the Crusade, Peyton also accepted, or at least acknowledged, that Santos’ preference was to not have the crusade begin “earlier than September” 1959.\(^{71}\) Given the scale and density of the Catholic population within the Archdiocese of Manila, Santos’ wishes likely did not greatly impose upon the ambitions of the 1959 Philippine Rosary Crusade.

From the fragmentary historical record it is not entirely clear how Santos truly felt about Peyton’s Crusades in the Philippines. In 1954, Pope Pius XII declared the year a “Marian Year” and Santos presided over the international Marian Congress held in Manila. Therefore, it is clear that Santos supported Marian prayer. However, it is also

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\(^{70}\) Revered Joseph M. Quinn to Revered Rufino J. Santos, August 7\(^{th}\), 1959, Holy Cross Family Ministries, Father Patrick Peyton Papers, North Easton, MA.

\(^{71}\) Father Patrick Peyton to Reverend Rufino J. Santos, October 28\(^{th}\), 1958, Holy Cross Family Ministries, Father Patrick Peyton Papers, North Easton, MA.
possible that Santos’ loyalty to the Holy See led him to be less receptive to Peyton, a charismatic celebrity priest with limited financial resources to back his ambitious visions. Yet, because the organizational style of Peyton’s missions depended heavily on local Catholic structures, at least in his letters, Peyton acknowledged the authority of Santos’ office.  

In August 1959, a team of Family Rosary Crusade employees—led by Father Quinn—arrived in Manila to prepare for the second Rosary rally in the capital city in six years. Joseph Quinn, a fellow Holy Cross Priest, began working for Peyton in 1950. Quinn served as the leader of the “front team,” or the group of typically three individuals that arrived at crusade locations several weeks ahead of the official start of the crusade. On August 22nd Father Quinn flew from the U.S. to Manila to commence organizing for the six-week Crusade in the Philippines. Following his arrival, Quinn “set up his headquarters at the Archbishop’s guesthouse at 375 Arzobispo St. in the Intramuros district of Manila. Father Quinn also spent the length of the crusade living in the Archbishops guesthouse. Two Spanish “Misoneres,” Tere Aguinaco and Margarita de Lecea, and Terry Fellowes an “Irish girl” that Peyton described as having “worked with us for several years,” accompanied Father Quinn in August. Beginning with his arrival in late August, Father Quinn cultivated relationships with members of the radio, television, and newspapers and set an ambitious publicity agenda for the rally. While Quinn worked tirelessly to prepare for the upcoming crusade, Father Peyton finished another international crusade in Santiago, Chile before flying to Manila on October 11th. The

72 Cruz, "Of Crusaders and Crowds: The Family Rosary in the Philippines (1951-1985)."
following day, October 12th 1959, the Family Rosary Crusade officially kicked of its third
mission in the Philippines with a press gathering at the New Selecta Restaurant in
Manila. Whatever Santos’ reservations regarding the Crusade prior to the fall of 1959, by
the time of Crusade’s official kick-off on the 12th, he appeared fully in line with Peyton’s
mission. Interestingly, Quinn marked the beginning of the campaign as Peyton’s arrival
in Manila in October, though a pastoral letter written by Archbishop Santos cites
November 1st as the official start date. The Archbishop’s letter, distributed and read at
masses throughout the Archdiocese of Manila, claimed “this letter will official[ly] open
the Archdiocesan Crusade for Family Prayer.”

The Archbishop’s pastoral letter in November 1959 began with an ominous tone,
“our times are most difficult ones,” Santos wrote. Echoing the Rosary Priest, Santos
argued that “disintegration [reigned] supreme” and the Philippines suffered from the loss
of “our former spiritual and moral wealth that made of our beloved fatherland the Pearl of
the Orient.” Santos likewise claimed that “time-tested” and “rock-bottom principles”
were exchanged for “modernistic, pharisaical, and superficial notions” leading the
Philippines to potentially “catastrophic” results.

The “disintegration” of morals portrayed in Santos’ pastoral letter supported the
underlying ideology of the Rosary Crusade and the spiritual worldview that Peyton built
his organization upon. For Peyton, the “family unit” faced unprecedented challenges
from the conditions of modern life and a perceived increase in atheism. Peyton’s belief

75 “Archbishop Santos Writes on Crusade,” Holy Cross Family Ministries, Father Patrick Peyton Papers,
North Easton, MA.
76 “Archbishop Santos Writes on Crusade,” Holy Cross Family Ministries, Father Patrick Peyton Papers,
North Easton, MA. The phrase that the Philippines represented the “Pearl of the Orient” was common in
the pre and postwar eras. In “Mi Ultimo Adios,” a poem written on the eve of his execution, Jose Rizal
referred to the Philippines as the “Perla del Mar de Oriente” or the “pearl of the orient seas.” José Rizal and
Alfredo S. Veloso, Where Slaves There Are None: The Complete Poems of José Rizal in Spanish (Manila:;
Far Eastern University, 1961).
regarding the “crisis” in family life was far from unique in American religious and Global Catholic thought. In fact, religious and secular leaders across a wide spectrum continually raised the issue of family disunity and the supposed decline in American morals throughout the 20th century.77 During WWII, Peyton promoted family prayer as a way to express familial solidarity in the face of the pervasive uncertainty of wartime. After the war, Peyton reformulated the focus on family prayer to an emphasis on a return to morality, which for Peyton was analogous to a return to Christian ideals.

Though Family Rosary Crusade’s discourse on the “family” was multivalent, the Rosary Crusade did link anti-communist politics to family prayer and Christianity to political stability amongst the world’s nations through the slogan, “A World at Prayer is a World at Peace.” Alternatively termed the “Peace Plan of Our Lady,” Peyton’s organization simultaneously advocated that family prayer would result in “God’s blessing on our homes” as well as “peace among nations.”78 This argument was buffeted by the claim that individual prayer would “save freedom” and “set up road blocks to communism.”79 For advocates of Rosary prayer the Cold War was, at its core, a religious struggle or, as one Santo Rosario editorialist argued, “a great fight” between “Christ and the anti-Christ, the Church and enemies of the Church.”80 Indeed, as the Fatima Story reveals, the Holy See, under Pope Pius XI, interpreted the rise of communism after the Russian Revolution as equivalent to the spread of militant atheism.

80 Rev. Fr. Francisco Munoz, “The Road to Peace,” Santo Rosario, Santo Tomas University
In 1949, under the leadership of Pope Pius XII, the Church proclaimed a policy of excommunication for any Catholic who joined, supported, or “even read the newspapers of communist and their allies.”81 According to the Church, it was communists that first assaulted the church, not vice versa. While the Russian Revolution and the subsequent rise of Stalinist U.S.S.R. presented an obvious challenge to papal authority in Eastern Bloc nations, the Holy See also reacted to the changes in political and social orders proffered by communist theory. The Rosary Crusade represented an on-the-ground mobilization of the Holy See’s position that communism not only threatened the world’s

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81 Peter Kent, “The Lonely Cold War of Pius XII” in Kirby, Religion and the Cold War.
political order, it threatened families, individuals, and morals that constituted the world’s social order.

Whereas Peyton noted the particular resonance that Marianism carried in the islands claiming “the rosary is a precious heritage of the Philippines,” he also largely appealed to simplistic understanding of Philippine Catholicism—or rather assumptions based on a belief that that Catholicism represented a set of “universal truths” that translated neatly across time, space, and cultures. 82 Peyton also argued that praying the Rosary represented “a defense of Filipino womanhood, a guarantee of Filipino manhood” and “a protection against the inroads of communism, materialism, secularism.” In the United States, the Catholic Press drew on lessons on the “protection of innocence” and the Virgin Mary’s motherhood in order to reassert conservative Catholic beliefs regarding appropriate gender norms. 83

Finally, like his peers in the Philippine Catholic Press, as well as American foreign policy actors operating contemporaneous in secular fields, Peyton argued that the Philippines and Filipinos occupied a particularly unique and important position in the world. In part this was due to the religious geography of the region and the belief that, as a predominantly Christian nation, Philippines signified a “bulwark of democracy in the East.” While military leaders from both the Philippines and the U.S. idealized the islands as a “strategic site” for U.S. military bases, Peyton claimed that the Philippines “may

even be an instrument of peace throughout the world.” He also imparted his devotees with the message, “in your hand lies the destiny of the Philippines and the world.”84

The Rosary Crusade tied the themes of family and anti-communism together in the Philippines and promoted the Crusade’s mission through a pervasive publicity campaign. In his summary of the 1959 Crusade in the Philippines titled, “Diary of the Great Blessings of God and Our Lady on the Family Rosary Crusade in the Archdiocese of Manila,” Father Peyton asserted that Father Quinn’s publicity campaign was “a mobilization of the entire city of Manila.” In Peyton’s enumeration of the individuals and organizations offering contributions to the campaign he specifically cites the assistances from the Army and Manila Police Force. The Manila Rosary Rally, in particular, relied upon, “12,000 uniformed ROTC cadets,” culled from Manila’s universities, to “act as ushers.” Peyton and Quinn also secured the use of the Philippine Army’s sound equipment for the Rally. Finally, the Crusade arranged for 2,000 Manila policemen to “keep order” and direct traffic during the Manila rally.

While, Peyton’s “front team” marshaled support from the police, ROTC, and Army for the December 6th event, the most significant contributions to the campaign’s publicity blitz came from media organizations in the islands. In fact, Peyton identified “co-operation on the part of the press, radio, television, motion picture cinemas and the schools and churches” as keys to the Crusade’s pervasive popularity. Movie theaters, “first and second class,” showed trailers advertising the December 6th rally at the conclusion of each film showing and announcements “to the degree of 300 in a day” were

“shouted from the radio stations to the homes of Manila.” The Crusade went as far as to hire an airplane “with neon lights under its wings” and “letters so large they are plainly visible in the streets of Manila” to fly over Manila during the week leading up to the rally. Although the Crusade spent 1000 pesos to charter the neon banner-flying airplane, Quinn recruited support from a local pilot who used his own airplane to drop “leaflets over the Suburb of Manila” advertising the December 6th rally. Finally, during daytime hours the Crusade also strategically placed a “trailer of extraordinary size and length” with “loud speakers” that could “carry a sound for a mile distance.” Whereas Peyton claimed that this saturating promotion was “broadcast from the hearts and homes of Manila from the very heavens,” the publicity actually came together through the persistent networking of Father Quinn, the associate director of the Crusade.

Prior to Peyton’s arrival in Manila, Quinn worked with two members of the United States Information Service (USIS) to arrange a “formal reception” for Peyton. David Roberts, a USIS officer stationed at the United States Embassy in Manila, arranged for a local television station to air Peyton’s arrival. Father Quinn convinced producers of the station to have Peyton’s reception air at 5:55pm on October 12th with replays airing at 10 and 10:15pm. In addition to the popular media, Quinn worked tirelessly to solicit donations from industrial leaders and corporations in Manila. A letter, on Archdiocese of...
Manila letterhead, dated September 28th 1959 reveals that Quinn secured 350 yards of “first class white cocoa cloth” for streamers from the Universal Textile Company in Marikina, a suburb of Manila famed for its shoe production. Another Quinn contact, identified only as “the General Manager of Advertising Associates” agreed to paint and hang posters and streamers throughout the city free-of-charge.90

Father Quinn did not rely solely on Manila’s business class for donations. In addition to the local sources of financial support that Father Quinn collected, American corporations with business interests in the Philippines also contributed to the publicity campaign. Pepsi Cola, which provided funding for numerous international Rosary Crusade missions, including trips to South America, paid for three-page ads in the Manila Times, the nation’s most widespread English-newspaper. Not to be outdone by it’s cola competitor, Coca-Cola funded the screening of Rosary Films at local parishes throughout the archipelago, including every night of the campaign in Cebu.91 The Rosary Films, filmed in Spain in 1956, aired in outdoor locations for several nights during Crusade, with each night pulling in thousands of viewers. Ernesto Rufino, owner of a chain of movie theaters in Manila and a distributor of films throughout the Philippines, helped coordinate the distribution of Peyton’s Rosary Films.92 Father Quinn’s utilization of multiple media sources undoubtedly contributed to the large numbers that turned out for the December 6th rally.

90 Joseph Quinn to Mr Ang, September 28th, 1959 Holy Cross Family Ministries, Father Patrick Peyton Papers, North Easton, MA.
91 Family Rosary Crusade, Archdiocese of Manila, October 21st, 1959.
However, the door-to-door organizing of lay Catholic volunteers, termed by Peyton, “spiritual salesmen,” aimed to collect two million Rosary pledge cards in Manila alone.\textsuperscript{93} Beginning October 13\textsuperscript{th} members of the Crusade’s “front team” began meeting with Parish Priests and two laymen from each Parish in the Archdiocese of Manila. Father Peyton claimed that “practically 100%” of Parish Priests attended the organizational meetings. The Crusade presented local priests with a characteristically ambitious goal of building, “an army of 100,000 men who would go out from door to door through the entire Archdiocese.” The purpose of these visits was to “bring back 2 million Family Rosary Pledges” from the 2.5 million “potentials” living within the Archdiocese.\textsuperscript{94} Reflecting the gendered hierarchy of the Catholic Church, Father Peyton explicitly stated the two laymen volunteers and all their future recruits was open only male volunteers.

In a highly organized division of the city’s districts, Rosary volunteers traveled door-to-door, expounding upon the virtues of the Rosary Crusade to their neighbors or fellow Manileños. They recruited participants for the December 6\textsuperscript{th} Rally in Luneta Park, collected Family Prayer pledge cards, and distributed instructional pamphlets on “How to Say the Family Rosary.” Before heading out into the city, Peyton’s spiritual salesmen received training in “their product.”

Analogous to commercial door-to-door salesmen, Peyton emphasized that “a salesmen must know his product thoroughly and plan in advance methods of effective approach.” “Remember,” Peyton wrote in the Rosary Crusade Handbook, “your product

\textsuperscript{93} Father Patrick Peyton, “A Personal Message to Crusade Leaders,” Rosary Crusade Handbook, Holy Cross Family Ministries, Father Patrick Peyton Papers, North Easton, MA.

is the Family Rosary. You must know *what it is, where it came from, what it can do, and why it is necessary today.*” Ultimately Peyton charged his volunteers with convincing families to sign the “Family Rosary Pledge.” The pledges, which were marked down and sent via telegram to the Archbishop of Manila’s office, were also published in “souvenir editions” of religious and secular newspapers. Signing a pledge meant that families agreed to say the Rosary each night.

In his instructions to volunteers, Peyton instructed volunteers to convey that the Rosary Pledge did not “bind” families “under pain of sin.” Perhaps drawing upon the bipolar rhetoric of American Cold War politics that eschewed “neutrality,” the Rosary Crusade pushed its volunteers to communicate to families that signing a prayer card indicated “whose side we are on, whose principles we follow.” Rosary Crusade volunteers further sold the idea of “choosing sides” by distributing window stickers, with the suggestion to frame or place “the sticker on a door or window,” for neighbors to view.

In conjunction with door-to-door visits, Rosary Crusade volunteers also directed their organizational attention to the secondary schools and Universities in Manila. Indeed, targeting local schools received the attention of Peyton’s team from the outset of their efforts in the islands. On October 18th the Archbishop of Manila requested that all the Catholic teachers in the metropolitan area attend a lecture by Father Peyton, held at St. Paul’s College. During the lecture Peyton instructed the teachers that they represented the “second line of defense,” behind the parish priests and the laymen “army of 100,000.”

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95 Rosary Crusade Handbook, , Holy Cross Family Ministries, Father Patrick Peyton Papers, North Easton, MA.
96 Rosary Crusade Handbook, Holy Cross Family Ministries, Father Patrick Peyton Papers, North Easton, MA.
In addition to the lecture, teachers left the meeting with a Family Rosary Crusade teacher’s manual that encouraged and guided the teacher’s on how to “indoctrinate the students with the riches of the Family Rosary.”97 Innovatively, the Crusade also employed teachers as sources of information regarding the effectiveness of the door-to-door campaign, “getting the students to report on the progress of the house to house visitations.”98 During the week leading up to the December 6th Rally, the Crusade instructed teachers to question students to see if volunteers visited their family homes or not. In effect, students were pressured to implore their parents to join the crusade as well as report to school authorities on their parent’s choice to do so. It is easy to imagine that this pressure as well as the authority of the principals, teachers, and religious figures contributed to student participation. A Mother Prioress of one Catholic high school told students that the fate of the nation, and world, depended upon their willingness to commit to Family Prayer. In an oft repeated phrase, the Mother Prioress urged students that, “in your hands lies the destiny of the Philippines and of the world.”99 Undoubtedly some students believed in the tenants of the campaign, as self-identifying Catholics comprised a large portion of Manila’s religious demographics. However, the educational campaign of the Crusade also imparted Peyton’s stark, if not apocalyptic, view of the world to the young Catholics of the Philippines.

With estimates reaching upwards of one and a half million devotees, the December 6th Rosary Rally in Manila unquestionably demonstrated the widespread

97 Family Rosary Crusade, Archdiocese of Manila, October 21st, 1959, Father Patrick Peyton Papers, North Easton, MA.
98 Family Rosary Crusade, Archdiocese of Manila, October 21st, 1959 Father Patrick Peyton Papers, North Easton, MA.
99 “Message from Mother Prioress,” undated, Holy Cross Family Ministries, Father Patrick Peyton Papers, North Easton, MA.
esteem for Peyton’s Crusade and his global message. Indeed, after the rally Father Santos agreed to establish a permanent office of the Family Rosary Crusade in Manila that would “promote the movement throughout the whole of the Far East.”100 The Crusade also prompted the inauguration of the Family Theater, a Philippine television program modeled after productions of the Family Theater in Hollywood. The program, first aired on a television station owned by President Elpidio Quirino’s brother, Antonio Quirino, and an American engineer and retired veteran, James Lindenberg.101 Throughout the 1960s, the Family Theater aired during primetime hours on one of the islands most popular television networks, ABS-CBN.

The enormous popularity of the Rosary Crusade in the Philippines in 1959 was reaffirmed during Peyton’s return trip to the islands in 1962. At a rally in Cebu, upwards of 1.8 million devotees attended to hear Peyton recite the Rosary. The Cebu rally was a particularly moving experience for Peyton as he recognized it as the “cradle of Catholicism in the Far East” because it was the site where “the first Mass in the Orient was offered 500 years ago.”102 Peyton’s triumphant return in 1962 inspired futures plans to lead a “popular mission,” or a crusade organized around screenings of the Rosary Films, in the islands. The early 1960s brought new challenges, destinations, and supporters, to Peyton’s organization. Though Peyton declared that his Family Rosary was “not a campaign for politics, commerce, or money,” the anti-communist underpinnings of

100 Peyton, All For Her: The Autobiography of Father Patrick Peyton.216.
102 The Popular Mission in the Far East, Holy Cross Family Ministries, Father Patrick Peyton Papers, North Easton, MA.
his message eventually brought the organization into the vast networks of the American foreign policy establishment and one particularly notorious source of funding.\textsuperscript{103}

**Latin America, the CIA and the Launching of a “Popular Mission” in the Far East**

Peyton bookended his 1959 and 1962 Crusades in the Philippines with a series of trips to South America, including stops in Bogotá, Caracas, Rio, Recife, and multiple sites throughout Chile. The popularity of Peyton’s global crusade, and particularly the enormous crowds that flocked to Peyton’s rallies in the Philippines, as well as the strident anti-communism of the Catholic Church eventually drew the attention of the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).\textsuperscript{104} J. Peter Grace, a shipping magnet and devote Catholic, financially supported Peyton’s Family Rosary beginning in the late 1940s and is suspected to be the link between the CIA and the Rosary Crusade. Intent on shoring up anti-communist forces in the region, the CIA opted to fund Peyton’s crusade as a front agency for US anti-communist interests in the region. Yet to fund what Peyton termed “The Popular Mission of the Family Rosary in the Far East” the Crusade looked to private sources.

In an undated letter to the Raskob Foundation for Catholic Activities the Rosary Crusade described the organization’s ambitious plans for the next mission in the Philippines. The letter was likely written sometime during 1963, after the last crusade in the Philippines and prior to organizing for what Peyton called, “The Popular Mission in the Far East” progressed in 1964. John J. Raskob, a financial executive for the Dupont


Company and General Motors, founded the Raskob Foundation for Catholic Activities in 1945. Raskob served as chairman of the Democratic National Committee from 1928 to 1932, resigning after Franklin Roosevelt won the party’s nomination. His dissatisfaction with Roosevelt contributed to his founding membership in the American Liberty League, an anti-New Deal political organization. After removing himself from party politics, Raskob plunged his stock in the Empire State Building, a project he commissioned, to fund the core of the Raskob Foundations charitable projects.105

The appeal to the Raskob Foundation did not arrive out of the blue as the organization funded several Rosary Crusade projects, beginning in the late 1940s. In fact, in 1960 and 1961 the Raskob Foundation offered financial support for two separate construction projects, a new building for the Family Theater Productions, the Family Rosary’s television and film outlet and a new office in New York City. Peyton imagined that the New York City office would “harness the power of Madison Avenue and complement and supplement the Hollywood office in facing the tremendous challenge ahead of us in regard to a weekly TV program of high caliber.”106 The NYC office never came to fruition however; the Diocesan Board of Consulters claimed that the original Albany already serviced the needs of the Family Rosary organization on the east coast. Though the plans for the Manhattan office collapsed, television programming and films central to the proposed plan for the Popular Mission in the Far East.

Peyton traveled to locations throughout South and Latin American throughout his career, yet the crusade in Latin America, falling between Peyton’s 1959 and 1962

Crusades in the Philippines, served as a guide for the kind of work that Rosary Crusade workers imagined for the Popular Mission in the Philippines. Building upon the “fantastic results” of the Popular Mission in Latin America, the Rosary Crusade proposed bringing “the beautiful story of the Mysteries of the Rosary to the poor and depressed areas” of the Philippines. Indeed Father Jose Borces, from the Archdiocese of Cebu, traveled to South America “with Father Peyton for an intense course in the actual operation of this film apostolate.” In South America, Father Borces served as a member of the mobile “Crusade Team,” learning the day-to-day and organizational tasks of the popular mission model before returning to the Philippines to organize the Popular Mission in the Far East with Father Bienvenido Lopez.

During Rosary Crusades in Latin America, which began in 1959 and lasted through 1966, Peyton explicitly positioned his movement against communism in the region. Indeed, the Catholic Church in Latin and South America provided the Rosary Crusade with a strong, transnational network that was already mobilizing against the influence of communism. Although a Catholic network did exist in Southeast and East Asia during this period, running through Hong Kong, the Philippines, and Vietnam, the density of the Catholic population in Latin and South America was unrivaled. Yet, while Latin and South American comprised high densities of individuals that identified as Catholic, the idea for the Popular Mission model actually grew out of Peyton’s belief that many of this population remained “religiously illiterate.” It is clear that “religiously

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107 The Popular Mission in the Far East, Holy Cross Family Ministries, Father Patrick Peyton Papers, North Easton, MA.
illiterate” was a judgment based upon the high standards of Patrick Peyton and the other officers of the Rosary Crusade. The Rosary Crusade films provided Peyton and the Rosary Crusade a unique tool to reach staggering numbers of individuals. In effect, Peyton’s message of family prayer and Marian devotion buttressed the political power of the Catholic Church, particularly in areas where the church was organizationally weak.

Indeed, organizers of the Popular Mission model framed the targeting of “slums” as a solution to the shortage of local priests or churches. For instance, in their plan for the Philippines, Rosary Crusade organizers argued that “in Manila alone, there are more than one-half million people living in areas which are economically depressed and where often there is no church to serve them.” In other words, the Crusade saw itself as a mobile church that provided a spark for a religious renewal in underserved areas.110 The financial supporters of the Popular Mission in Latin America and the Philippines, however, pointed to communism, not religious illiteracy, as the primary explanation for the sites chosen by the Rosary Crusade.111 Citing inter-religious competition in the country, Peyton’s Catholic supporters in the Philippines also argued that “all serious thinking people are worried about conditions in the remote barrios where the Protestant Missionaries are making great progress.” In addition to worrying about the inroads of Protestant Missionaries, Mother Benedict, of the Archdiocese of Cebu, also expressed the idea that the Philippines could serve as the Catholic missionary hub of East and Southeast Asia. “The Philippines will be called upon,” she wrote;“ God’s name to the rest of the Pagan

110 The Popular Mission in the Far East, Holy Cross Family Ministries, Father Patrick Peyton Papers, North Easton, MA.
111 Gribble argues that there is not evidence to illuminate the rationale behind the Crusade’s South American destinations. However, Peyton said that the organization traveled to Caracas, Venezuela because “it was another Havana, ready for revolution.” Quoted in: Gribble, American Apostle of the Family Rosary: The Life of Patrick J. Peyton.
Orient, we feel sure of that.”112 Mother Benedict’s concern over Protestant Missionaries suggests that local actors could interpret the purpose, or even the success or failure, of the Crusade’s through local dynamics, such as inter-Christian rivalries. However, like secular and religious anti-communists who imagined the Philippines could serve as a nucleus for circuits of anticommunist actors in the region, Mother Benedict imagined that, with the aid of the Rosary Crusade, her nation could function as the religious inspiration or model for nation’s in the region.

5.4: Handbook for Popular Mission Volunteers

From: Holy Cross Family Ministries, North Easton, MA

112 Father Patrick Peyton to Reverend Joseph Quinn, March 3rd, 1962, Holy Cross Family Ministries, Father Patrick Peyton Papers, North Easton, MA.
Beginning with the Crusade in South America, Peyton organized the Crusade’s “popular missions” around multiple screenings of the fifteen half-hour films that comprised the “Mysteries of the Rosary” collection. Rosary Crusade volunteers screened two episodes of the Mysteries series per night for seven consecutive nights, with one final episode on the concluding eighth night. Prior to the films screenings, which attracted thousands of local viewers, the Crusade team spent multiple weeks in each site, scouting outdoor locations for screenings, meeting with Parish Priests, and training local volunteers. The local volunteers, recruited by the Parish Priests, served as film operators, door-to-door organizers, and instructors. The Crusade expected instructors, many of whom were women, to give educational sermons on the lessons on the films after screenings. In Latin America, volunteers took three-week courses on how to “give impromptu talks on an Mystery of the Rosary” after film showings.\footnote{The Popular Mission in the Far East, Holy Cross Family Ministries, Father Patrick Peyton Papers, North Easton, MA.}

According Peyton’s biographer, Richard Gribble, J. Peter Grace organized the funding for the Latin American Popular Mission. Grace, CEO of W.R. Grace, a chemicals company with investments in the shipping industry in South America, was a longtime supporter of Peyton. Peyton cultivated his relationship with Grace, even spending the Christmas Holiday of 1961 with Grace in South Carolina because, as Peyton explained to Father Quinn, “to be away from Peter for many months it o be away from the very source that enables us to continue financially.”\footnote{Father Patrick Peyton to Revered Joseph Quinn, December 13\textsuperscript{th}, 1961, Holy Cross Family Ministries, Father Patrick Peyton Papers, North Easton, MA.}

Although Grace identified as a devout Catholic, he saw the “slums” of the world that Peyton targeted for his Popular Mission not through the lens of “religious illiteracy”
but as potential breeding grounds for communism. In fact, according to Gribble, Grace mobilized the threat of South American communism to gain further support from American industrialists as well as policymakers in Washington D.C. For instance, Gribble identifies a 1958 meeting, organized by Grace, in which Vice President Richard Nixon, Chase Manhattan Bank executive, David Rockefeller, South American Operations director for U.S. Steel, Walter Donnelly, president of Pan American World Airways, Juan Tripp, and W.E. Know, president of Westinghouse, discussed the potential threat communism posed to their mutual business interests and the idea that Peyton’s Rosary Crusade provided the perfect antidote to leftist political influence in the region. Finally, after winning support of some of America’s most prominent and influential industrialists, Grace orchestrated a meeting between Allen Dulles, who was serving as director of the CIA, and again, Richard Nixon. In the end, Grace’s political networking yielded six years of funding from the CIA for the Latin American mission.

Conclusion

Beginning in 1967, American journalists started exposing the relationship between the CIA and American religious organizations, particularly the National Council of Churches. Revelations that Peyton received financial support from the CIA called into question the altruistic intentions of the Rosary Crusade. It remains unclear whether the Rosary Crusade ever received CIA funding for its missions in the Philippines or elsewhere in Asia. Certainly Crusade organizers used the threat of communism to secure

115 Gribble, 168-168-175
financial backing for Crusades in other parts of the world, including in the application to the Raskob Foundation for the Popular Mission in the Far East. At the very least, funding from the CIA allowed the Rosary Crusade to funnel contributions from private donors and institutions, like the Raskob foundation, to fund additional Crusades in locations around the globe. Including in the United States where Peyton applied his lessons learned overseas to domestic issues. The short-lived and poorly received “Ghetto Crusade,” targeted at inner-city African Americans in Milwaukee, was in fact modeled after the Popular Mission crusade model from South American and the Philippines.\(^{117}\)

According to Peyton’s biographer, Peyton reluctantly relinquished his outlet to seemingly limitless state funds. The *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* reports on the dubious connections between churches and the American state did not mention Family Rosary. Furthermore, the Congregation of the Holy Cross, Peyton’s priestly order, did not fall under the purview of the National Council of Churches. However, once the Superior General of the Congregation of the Holy Cross, Germain Lalande, learned of the extent of the CIA’s influence on the Crusade, he threatened to inform the Pope about the relationship. The Rosary Priest, ceding to the rules of global Catholicism, obeyed his superiors and ended his ties with the CIA.

Despite the loss of steady government funding, Peyton and his team continued to crisscross the globe, conducting rosary rallies and holding mass screenings of the Rosary Films. The Family Rosary movement in the Philippines also continued to grow. On a trip to Manila in 1977, Peyton met with several top Philippine businessmen including: Jose Soriano, Jaime Zobel de Ayala, and Ernesto Rufino, owner of a chain of Manila movie

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theaters who helped publicize Peyton’s trips in the Philippines throughout the years. Peyton’s purpose of the meeting was to reestablish a “New Family Rosary Crusade” in the Philippines, with Jose Soriano serving as the chairman of the foundation. The group committed to the longest Rosary Crusade in history, seven years. Beginning in 1978 and culminating in the Marian Year, 1985, Peyton once again hoped that his efforts in the Philippines, combined with the enthusiastic support of the Philippine hierarchy, would lead to a greater blossoming of Peyton’s message throughout Asia.

The Crusade’s concluding rally, held December 8th 1985 in Luneta Park, the same location as Peyton’s 1959 event, attracted two million followers. Similar to his other experiences in the Philippines, Peyton celebrated the “spiritual power” of Filipinos in a time of great uncertainty. Within a few months, in February 1986, Cardinal and Archbishop of Manila, Jaime Sin, called upon the millions protesting, along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) and encircle Camp Crame and Camp Aguinaldo, the headquarters of the Philippine Military Police and the Philippine Armed Force. The Rosary, once a symbol of anticommunist spiritual warfare was now wielded against Ferdinand Marcos, a staunchly anti-communist U.S. ally in the region.

Conclusion:
“A Friendship Written in Blood for all the World to See”

In July 1961 the Philippine Information Agency compiled three editorials written in American newspapers into a pamphlet titled “Success Story: Given their choice 28 Million Filipinos Chose Freedom.” The editorials, which appeared in the Washington D.C. based *Sunday Star*, the *New York Herald-Tribune*, and the *New York World-Telegram* were culled together to mark the fifteenth anniversary of Philippine independence on July 4th, 1961. The Philippine Information Agency in the U.S., based out of the National Press Building in Washington D.C., functioned as a public relations office for the Philippines and the Philippine government. The agency sought to place stories in the American press that would “justify continued American concern for and interest in the Philippines.”1 While the U.S. government continued to dedicate foreign aid to the Philippines, the amount of aid that the U.S. annually committed to the islands had, since the conclusion of WWII, been a point of contention between diplomatic officers from the two nations. Yet, by 1961 it was clear that U.S. policymakers were delivering the bulk of aid to areas where they perceived U.S. interests were more directly threatened. In addition to celebrating the 15th anniversary of Philippine independence, and related to Philippine politicians concerns over U.S. aid, the “Success Story,” also to reassert a discourse on the “special relationship” between the two nations.

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1 Vicente Albano Pacis, Memorandum for the President, March 30th, 1949, Republic of the Philippines, Department of Foreign Affair, Elpidio Quirino Papers, Ayala Library
Since the end of WWII, both Filipino and American political actors cast the “friendship” between the two nations as a product of a shared history of struggle—in the overthrow of Spanish colonialism, the rigors of American democratic tutelage, and most importantly, in the triumphant and collaborative defeat of Japanese imperialism. Though the priorities of historic and contemporary geopolitics fundamentally shaped the ubiquitous description that the Philippines functioned as “America’s showcase of democracy in Asia,” the nature of the bond between the two nations was supposedly derived from a shared, seemingly inherent, love of democracy.

Mobilizing nearly all of the rhetorical tropes that policymakers used to characterize the colonial and post-independence relationship, A.L. Valencia, the “Success Story’s” author and seasoned Philippine journalist, rosily reflected on his assignment to cover the first Philippine independence celebration on July 4th, 1946. In line with the discourse of friendship, that disavowed the bloodstained history of American imperialism in the islands, Valencia wrote “after nearly four centuries of Spanish rule, more than 40 years of American tutelage, and three years of Japanese occupation, the Philippines was a nation at last.” Valencia’s labeling of U.S. colonialism in the islands, as “tutelage” reinforced the longstanding claim that the U.S. functioned as an imperial nation only for the benefit of the colonized. Even more, in 1961, Valencia’s claim that the Philippines served as “a living monument to the American ideal of total freedom against total tyranny” connected this exonerating history of American imperialism to the contemporary Cold War politics.

Yet, at the same time, Valencia’s narrative of the Philippines’s “Success Story” concealed two primary themes of the immediate post-independence years. First,
Valencia’s teleological retelling of Philippine history, from Spanish colonialism to the “showcase of democracy” ignored a history of Philippine anti-colonialism, and particularly anti-American imperial discourses. This elision represents more than a journalists subjective interpretation of the past—Valencia’s article buried multiple debates and struggles, from the colonial period well into the post-independence years, regarding the nature of the relationship between the Philippines and the U.S. Valencia’s effacing of anti-imperial activism also buttressed claims that Filipinos welcomed American imperialism and in the postcolonial years, supported continued American influence in the islands. The disavowal of anti-imperial activism, directed at the United States, in the Philippines also facilitated the ability of U.S. policymakers and Philippine elites to claim that the Huks, and other postwar progressive movements, were simply operating under the corrupting influence of global communism. In this way, the recasting of American colonial history, and submerging of Philippine elite support of the American colonial project, contributed to the success of an anti-communist project in the Philippines.

The “Success Story” of the Philippines, according to Valencia, also spoke to the benevolent intentions of U.S. global power. At the end of the month, on July 31st, 1961 Minnesota Senator Hubert H. Humphrey moved to have Valencia’s article included in the Congressional Record. “We can indeed point with pride to this great bastion of freedom and democracy in a troubled and strategic Southeast Asia,” Humphrey argued, “for it truly symbolized our ideal of the dignity of man and his right to self-determination, as opposed to the tyranny of totalitarianism.”

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2 A.L. Valencia, “Success Story,” Myron Cowen Papers, Box 16, General Correspondence, Truman Library
3 Congressional Record, Monday, July 31st, 1961 Myron Cowen Papers, Box 16, General Correspondence,
policy and a sustaining anti-American sentiment in the Philippines, Valencia wrote his reflections on Philippine independence in order to, “honor a friendship with the people of the United States—written in blood for all the world to see and remember.”

Ultimately, the “Success Story,” was not only an idealized representation of the past 15 years of Philippine-American relations but also a timely exposure of the cracks in the American driven global anti-communist project in that the language of “special relationship” and “friendship” concealed the mounting tension regarding U.S. foreign aid disbursements to the islands. By 1956, even Ramon Magsaysay, long considered the strongest U.S. ally amongst Philippine politicians, complained to U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles that U.S. aid to the Philippines was insufficient. Invoking the language of a “special relationship” between the U.S. and the Philippines Magsaysay wrote, “I wish to call to your attention to the fact that the aid we are receiving from the ICA is not in my opinion, proportionate to the special relationship that exists between your country and mine.” Magsaysay also argued that, “the aid we get is quite unimpressive when compared with the aid you have given other countries.” Throughout the 1950s, Philippine politicians sought increased levels of U.S. foreign in order to address chronic budget shortfalls. However, by the late 1950s U.S. aid to the Philippines began to dip as the U.S. funding to the region increasingly tilted towards Laos, Indonesia, and Vietnam. Increased U.S. intervention in Southeast Asia, however, meant that U.S. military bases in the Philippines would remain a top priority of U.S. military officials.

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4 A.L. Valencia, “Success Story,” Myron Cowen Papers, Box 16, General Correspondence, Truman Library
5 President Ramon Magsaysay to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, March 15th, 1956 in FRUS, 1955-1957 (Southeast Asia), 22: 640-642.
and, despite mounting tensions, American policymakers continued to reference the Philippines as a model of postcolonial statehood.

Indeed in the “Success Story” Valencia claimed, and Senator Humphrey reaffirmed, the long-standing belief that the Philippines offered the postcolonial world an example of the promises of U.S. interventionist policies. His editorial also called attention to the role the Philippines had played throughout the postwar years as one of the strongest anti-communist states in Southeast Asia. In fact, in less than three years U.S. policymakers would again compel the Philippine state to support U.S. interests in the region. American President Lyndon Johnson, seeking to increase international support for the war in Vietnam through his “many flags” policy initiative, called upon the Philippines, South Korea, and the Republic of China (Taiwan), three states where U.S. policymakers had cultivated anti-communist sentiment over the past two decades, to contribute to the American war effort. In 1965, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos agreed to send a 2,300 man Civic Action Group, comprised primarily of Philippine military engineers, to South Vietnam to assist the American Army, although the funding for the Philippines troops was provided through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

Finally, Valencia’s article, and its striking absences, highlighted a long-spanning transnational anti-communist project that sought to distance American colonial history from contemporary interventions in the decolonizing, or Third World. This dynamic connection between histories of colonialism and the cold war demonstrates grounded examples of how the United States sought to recreate the global power relations of the

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7 Blackburn, Mercenaries and Lyndon Johnson's "more flags": the hiring of Korean, Filipino, and Thai soldiers in the Vietnam War.
colonial order in a postcolonial world. For example, U.S. policymakers tied the payment of war rehabilitation funds to the Philippines to the Philippine Congress’ passage of the Philippine Trade Act of 1946, better known as the Bell Bill. The Bill was widely opposed by the Democratic Alliance, the postwar fusion party of the Huks, labor unionists, and other progressive elements. Bell Bill established:

The disposition, exploitation, development, and utilization of all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces and sources of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines, and the operation of public utilities, shall, if open to any person, be open to citizens of the United States.⁸

In effect, the postcolonial economic relationship detailed by the Bell Bill meant that U.S. business could maintain privileged access to Philippine natural resources, while U.S. policymakers could avoid the racial politics of colonialism that included the threat of Filipinos attempting to claim rights as Americans.⁹ As shown in this dissertation, it took the Philippine state nearly a decade of intense civil violence to eradicate the strongest opposition to U.S. intervention in the Philippines. In its broadest terms then, this dissertation has demonstrated that extractive economies, increased global militarization, and postwar American abundance can all be tied together through the global production of anti-communist discourses that policymakers and colonial elites formed against the often very locally driven political movements that sought to challenge the political, economic, and cultural status quo.

⁹ Paul Kramer argues that policymakers sought to grant the Philippines independence, in part, to secure American racial insularity in the face of Filipino migration to the United States. Kramer, The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines.
The five intertwining networks uncovered in this dissertation highlight key insights regarding the construction and enactment of U.S. foreign policies. Tensions, fissures, and transnational allegiances, in fact, characterized U.S. and Philippine foreign policies in the immediate postwar years. The migrating, martial careers of Charles Bohannan and Napoleon Valeriano, members of Lansdale’s counterinsurgency cohort, detail how the scale of the global facilitated historical actors’ ability to transport their anti-communist ideologies and policies around the world. Uncovering how five networks of Filipino elites and American policymakers transformed local struggles in the Philippines into a globally oriented anti-communist mission, highlighted the ways that the politicized, geographic scales of the Cold War resulted, at moments, in contradictory missions. This dissertation thus has not only revealed the collaborative and transnational construction of a global anti-communist politics, but has emphasized the deep fissures that existed in a transnational, hegemonic project to construct a definitive Cold War.

U.S. intervention in a post-independence Philippines assisted in precipitating a somewhat hollow form of democracy in which debate has been typically limited to the machinations of elites and radical dissent has been criminalized and, at times, grounds for murder. In this way, the legacies of Cold War anti-communist politics in the contemporary Philippines are far from buried. In more recent years, an insurgent brand of Maoist influenced communism in the form of the New People’s Army, a descendent of the unresolved Huk struggles of the 1950s, and an ongoing separatist struggle on the southern island of Mindanao and neighboring Sulu archipelago, continue to plague the authority of the Philippine state. Furthermore, in strikingly similar ways to the 1950s, Philippine progressives continually face the reality of state sanctioned political terrorism.
Indeed, within the first 100 days of the presidency of Benigno “Noynoy” Aquino III in 2010 extrajudicial forces murdered sixteen political activists. One victim, Fernando Baldomero from the Aklan province in the Visayas, was gunned down after receiving threats from the 3rd division of the Philippine infantry, which labeled the *Bayan Muna* political activist as a leader in the “communist-terrorist movement” in Aklan.\(^\text{10}\)

Regional and local politics and histories factor largely in the relations of power in the contemporary Philippines, meaning that contemporary anti-communist discourses are not simply derivative of Cold War era anti-communism. Yet, at the same time, the legacies of anti-communist state violence remain deeply ingrained in state institutions and political cultures, not only in the Philippines. Historian Gilbert Joseph has argued that Latin American countries long subject to American intervention continually experience the historical outgrowths of Cold War era politics through the “bubbling up of extrajudicial violence.” While the end Cold War is often marked in 1989, the relations of power produced during the Cold War through the globalization of anti-communism continue to live on. In this way, Cold War anti-communist mobilizations successfully, though not wholly or uniformly, silenced the ability for movements with alternative ideological and political formulations to legitimately participate in political debate. In some cases, as in Latin America, this eradication of political ideologies and movements resulted in an intense polarization of the political field, bringing forth intense violence and political terror from both the political right and left.

Anti-communist actors during the Cold War mobilized politicized spatial scales of

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global, absorbing local conflicts into a universal narrative of communism versus democracy or the Soviet Union versus the Free World. When reduced to its barest claims, this is an argument about language, and the power ideas and discourses have in shaping struggle and conflict. This should not, however, obscure the fact that the limiting discursive formation of the Cold War brought great violence, political repression, and racialized interpretations of freedom to Southeast Asia.\footnote{In his book on Guatemala during the Cold War, historian Greg Grandin argues that cold war terror—exercised, patronized, or excused by the United States—fortified illiberal forces, militarized societies, and broke the link between freedom and collective equality. In this sense, he argues, American empire worked to weaken democracy in the region. Grandin, \textit{The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War}.} Importantly, despite the end of the Cold War, the rise of neoliberalism, and declarations of the “end of history” the political struggles of the immediate postwar years are far from over in the Philippines.\footnote{In his book on Guatemala during the Cold War, historian Greg Grandin argues that cold war terror—exercised, patronized, or excused by the United States—fortified illiberal forces, militarized societies, and broke the link between freedom and collective equality. In this sense, he argues, American empire worked to weaken democracy in the region. Grandin, \textit{The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War}.}
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