Protests and Democracy in Japan: 
The Development of Movement Fields and the 1960 Anpo Protests

by

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To my family

and

In memory of Mayer N. Zald
This dissertation is the end of a long path that began when a student seeking to become a sociologist and an independent scholar first came to the United States. It is also very much a collaborative work, produced through scholarly encounters and critical conversations I have enjoyed throughout my graduate study both in the United States and Japan. As a work of sociology, the dissertation analyzes a historical event through the lens of theory, specifically Pierre Bourdieu’s field theory. This theory shapes the analysis, but is also informed throughout by my conversations with the people who actually participated in these events.

The dissertation focuses on the protests against the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in Japan in 1960, the so-called 1960 “Anpo protests,” named after the Japanese acronym of the treaty. As a student of historical sociology, my original plan was to conduct a comparative historical analysis of the groups constituting the protests. However, I soon realized that a rigid comparison of movement groups such as of students, intellectuals, workers, and citizens’ groups posed many problems. To begin with, the groups, as units of analysis, differed significantly not only in terms of size, but also in terms of structures and boundaries. Some were informal groups, others took the form of formal organizations, and still others constituted multi-level organizations. Second, the volume, details, and contents of historical records pertaining to these groups varied considerably. Intellectuals themselves wrote much about their thoughts, but little about what they actually did; students wrote about their own thoughts and actions equally, including critiques of rivals; but the histories of workers and labor unions were often written by others, and few historical records offered insight into what rank-and-file workers actually thought and did.
My fieldwork in Japan lasted for 18 months between 2008 and 2010. From the moment I began meeting and talking with those who participated in these events, I began realizing things that I had not predicted. Interviewees saw me as a student who was thirty or forty years younger than them, so they often began by telling me about the history of Japan, particularly the devastation and poverty that followed World War II, even before I began asking any questions. I asked the same questions of all my interviewees, but their reactions varied considerably. Some responded to the questions, others would not, and still others became frustrated, even upset. Meetings with former university faculty members generally went smoothly, whether I met them in their offices or at their homes. They offered their views and responses to the questions, and few, if any, awkward moments arose. In my interviews with former student activists, however, frustrations sometimes accumulated for both parties. For example, these participants did not understand why I asked them about topics such as “democracy” and even challenged my legitimacy as an interviewer when I continued to ask about it. I was perplexed at first, but eventually I realized that, from their perspective, I was not asking the “right” questions or focusing on the relevant aspects of history. For them, these included events such the 6th Conference of the Japanese Communist Party in 1955 and Khrushchev’s criticism of Stalin in 1956.

It soon became clear that, although I was asking all my interviewees about the same period of time (1945-1960) and the same event (the 1960 Anpo protests), beyond similar accounts of postwar devastation and poverty, their versions of history varied greatly. There was significant variation even in terms of which other individuals and groups they considered relevant and about whom they expressed opinions. Slowly, I began tracing out the boundaries of the events themselves and compiled a list of relevant players. Some people referred to specific events and names, while others did not refer to them at all. It became increasingly clear that learning the terminology of each of the groups themselves was crucial, for if I did not know the right names of individuals or incidents, it often created an awkward moment in the interview or elicited a non-response. One notable example was Kan’ichi Kuroda, a charismatic independent thinker of New Left groups who became influential in student New Left movements especially after 1960.
His original name was Hirokazu Kuroda, but following the convention of leftist groups, his first name was read as Kan’ichi, using a Chinese phonetic reading, not a Japanese one. Intellectuals at the time of the protests seemed to know of Hirokazu Kuroda and occasionally referred to him. Former student activists, both then and today, definitely knew who he was, but referred to him as “Kuro Kan,” a nickname derived from the first two syllables of his last and first names. But among former workers, I did not meet anyone who knew who he was, unless they had participated in student movements prior to their union activism. Understandings of who was an important figure, as well as what to call him or her, served to mark people’s group memberships, which had distinct boundaries of inclusion and exclusion, and demonstrated one’s proximity to that figure.

At an informal party organized by leftist and left-leaning former student movement groups that I participated in during my fieldwork, I asked people why Kuroda had been so important, but they only smirked, though they did reply, kindly, that he was indeed important. Subtly, their response indicated the inappropriateness of my question and confirmed that I was an outsider to their groups.

As I met with more and more current and former activists, I began to recognize that they were acting within a highly demarcated social space—one that did not just “house” their respective movements, but actively shaped their organizations and how they consciously and strategically mobilized resources and members. Activists knew within their group who had power, what kinds of power they had, and where their skills lay—for example, whether this was giving speeches, writing articles, writing flyers, directing people, or doing paperwork. They also knew who had power in rival groups, and what leaders and members in these others groups were doing. Importantly, it also became clear that groups in close proximity to one another within this movement space were more likely to view each as rivals. Indeed, it seemed that activists had little knowledge about or interest in people or groups outside the boundary of their own specific movement. For example, former university faculty members tended to know little about conflicts among student group factions and, likewise, student activists were indifferent to struggles among intellectuals and even to intellectuals themselves. Not surprisingly, my standardized set of questions thus worked for some groups and not
others, and I increasingly felt as if I was crossing the boundaries of different social spaces composed of the different movement groups. Once I realized this, I began to learn how to position myself better within these spaces, depending on who I was meeting with, in order to better interact with them. It was in this way that I discovered “field” as an empirical unit of analysis.

Despite the fact that the 1960 Anpo protests constituted the largest protests in post-WWII Japanese history and mobilized millions of people to take to the streets, theirs is a largely forgotten history. During my fieldwork, my informants sometimes wondered aloud why I was bothering to research these events that took place over fifty years ago. In 2010, I organized a conference panel discussion on the 1960 Anpo protests with another graduate student in Japan. During the discussion, a Japanese scholar asked us what the historical significance of the protests was, and related that they were rarely taught in schools—something I already knew from my own experience. I had at least heard about the protests, yet it was still only after I came to the United States that I, myself, really learned about these protests and their historical and theoretical importance.

My research also led to discoveries about my own family history. At a reception celebrating the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the Bund (a New Left group), a participant in his sixties asked me if I knew Yaosaku Saruya, a name I had not heard until then. When he learned where I was born, the man insisted that Yaosaku was my great-grandfather, whom he had known when he was small and from whom he had learned waka poetry. The man’s name was Itaru Yui; he had been a student and labor union activist, and his brother, Chikai Yui, was a well-known communist activist. The Yui brothers were from Kawakami, a neighboring village to Minami-Aiki, the village of my forefathers. Both villages are located in Nagano (a central part of mainland Japan) and surrounded by mountains. When I interviewed him, Itaru said that Yaosaku came to visit by passing a mountain that crosses over two villages. He also told his own story that he and his brother turned “red” when they were young, even though most of villagers were conservative. Despite this conservatism, Itaru explained that these villages in Nagano provided many of the radical farmers responsible for the Chichibu Incident, a peasant
revolt against the Meiji government in 1884 that was influenced by the Freedom and People’s Rights Movements, which sought people’s representation in government. Later, I learned that my forefathers, who served as village headmen and landlords, in addition to various other professions, had helped to hide peasants who were prosecuted after the revolt.

It has thus been an expected research journey: I had to come to the United States to embark on this research, which not only led me to rediscover the radical history of Japan, as represented by the 1960 Anpo protests, but also led me to histories of dissent in the very rural, remote, and peaceful area of my forefathers that I had not visited for almost two decades.

I am indebted to a number of people. My first gratitude goes to my committee members, who supported my long passage to the end. George Steinmetz has supervised me from the very early part of my graduate career at the University of Michigan. He read my early, often underdeveloped drafts a number of times, discussed various theoretical debates with me, and shared his vast knowledge in diverse areas not limited to sociology, while also helping me to re-focus my research when necessary. Jennifer Robertson, another supporter from early in my career, helped my intellectual and personal growth by asking compassionate, yet uncompromising questions as I developed my research. Her passion for research and teaching was always intellectually stimulating and inspired me to think about how to be both a scholar and an engaged educator. From Geneviève Zubrzycki, I learned not only how to construct a solid work of historical sociology, but also how to teach theory from a historical sociological perspective, when I worked as a graduate student instructor for her class. Kiyoteru Tsutsui provided the direction to make this historical work stand as a study of social movements, in addition to providing valuable advice on non-dissertation matters such as career plans during and after graduate school. I have known Michael Kennedy since before I began at Michigan, and throughout this time, he not only provided me with intellectual support, but he also demonstrated a firm trust in me. In the middle of my career, I encountered some difficult situations that
threatened my physical ability to continue my studies, but his unswerving trust gave me
ground to stand on, get through it, and reach this point.

I have also benefitted from the many scholars and colleagues who have inspired
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I was able to access rare sources at the Ōhara Institute for Social Research at Hōsei
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form institute, and Kayoko Taniai at the latter, I not only had access to written records, but I also learned about the rich history of labor movements and intellectuals’ political activism from these staff members. Finally, it goes without saying that it is my informants, who spared their time with me, who are the foundation of this dissertation. I am especially thankful to: Kazunari Kurata, who helped me reach out to various activists, including even members of rival groups; Yasumasa Koga, who warmly welcomed my visits to him, shared his history, and also introduced me to labor movement activists; and Takeshi Ishida, who shared his observations as a political scientist and as an informant.

Before I began my graduate program in the United States, I trained as a sociologist at Sophia University in Japan. Masahisa Sonobe taught me what research should strive to do, Akihiro Kiod provided intellectual encouragement while he was there, and Shin Watanabe offered me long-term support and guidance about graduate schools as well as about life to the present. I am grateful to conversations with other faculty members and my colleagues at seminars, classes, and informal meetings at the university. I also want to thank Chikako Kashiwazaki and Reiko Kage, who supported my study in the United States as a foreign student in important ways. I was able to consult both Chikanobu Michiba and Kenji Hasegawa whenever I needed clarification of the details of Japanese history. And librarian Mari Suzuki at the University of Michigan gave professional guidance and assistance in consulting diverse historical data.

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This work owes many debts and is not without shortcomings, but I hope to repay those by the ideas in my future work. However imperfect it may be, this dissertation lays the cornerstone upon which I shall build my career. I shall strive to learn and improve along the way and make valuable contributions to the discipline.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Words in italics are Japanese acronyms or Japanese abbreviated titles of books and organizations.

AFL  American Federation of Labor
Anpo  U.S.-Japan Security Treaty
Chūkaku-ha  Japan Revolutionary Communist League National Committee
CIE  Civil Information and Education Section
CIO  Congress of Industrial Organization
CPC  Communist Party of China
CPSU  Communist Party of the Soviet Union
GHQ  General Headquarters of the Allied Powers
GS  Government Section (of the GHQ)
JCP  Japanese Communist Party
JSP  Japan Socialist Party
Kakukyōdō  Revolutionary Communist League
KOS  *Kuno Osamu shū* (*Osamu Kuno Collection*)
LDP  Liberal Democratic Party
MSRUKI  *Monogatari Sengo Rōdō Undōshi Kankō Iinkai* (Publishing Association for Postwar Labor Movement History Stories)
NRKS  *Nihon Rōdō Kumiai Sōhyōgikai* (General Council of Trade Unions of Japan)
OCTEU  Osaka Central Telegraph Employees’ Union
Sanbetsu Federation  Japan Council of Industrial Labor Unions
SCAP  Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
SFE  Subcommittee for the Far East
Shinsanbetsu Federation  National Federation of Industrial Organizations
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<td><em>Shimizu Ikutarō chosakushū (Ikutarō Shimizu Collected Works)</em></td>
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<td><strong>Sōdōmei Federation</strong></td>
<td>Japan Federation of Labor</td>
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<td><strong>Sōhyō Federation</strong></td>
<td>General Council of Trade Unions of Japan</td>
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<td><strong>SSGU</strong></td>
<td><em>Shiryō sengo gakusei undō (Historical Materials on Postwar Student Movements)</em></td>
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<td><strong>SSKBK</strong></td>
<td><em>Shima Shigeo Kinen Bunshū Kankōkai (Publishing Association for the Memorial Collection for Shigeo Shima)</em></td>
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<td><strong>SWNCC</strong></td>
<td>State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee</td>
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<td>Tokyo Federation of Student Self-Government Association</td>
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<td><strong>Tojiren</strong></td>
<td>Tokyo Liaison Council of Student Self-Governing Associations</td>
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<td><strong>U.S.T.</strong></td>
<td>United States Treaties and Other International Agreements</td>
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<td><strong>Zenjiren</strong></td>
<td>National Liaison Council of Student Self-Governing Associations</td>
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<td><strong>Zenkyōtō</strong></td>
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ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the historical processes leading up to the 1960 Anpo protests, the historic social movements that coalesced to oppose the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty (Anpo in the Japanese acronym) in 1960. Specifically, the dissertation explores: How and why did movements developed as they did at the 1960 Anpo protests? How did democracy, the key watchword for rebuilding the Japanese nation-state in the post-World War II period, become the main slogan? And how did different movement groups put into practice various understandings of democracy during the protests?

Contrary to studies that contend that social movements emerge from a foundation of common resources and frames, I argue that movements can also develop through conflicts and antagonism within and across movement groups. Building upon Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of field, I argue that the groups involved in the 1960 Anpo protests developed movement fields and spaces of varying degrees of structuration, within which actors engaged in struggles and competition according to specific rules and practices. I examine three movement groups involved in the 1960 Anpo protests: intellectuals, students, and workers.

Drawing on 18 months of fieldwork conducted in Japan between 2008 and 2010, including in-depth interviews and archival research, I first show that the 1960 Anpo protests did not constitute a coherent movement; rather, they were an aggregation of discrete social movements, each internally comprised of different movement groups demarcated by impermeable boundaries. I then argue that these movements surged in 1960 due to competition and conflicts within groups. Movement groups attempted to
utilize the 1960 Anpo protests so as to achieve previously-developed goals, as well as to gain dominance within their respective fields and spaces. Lastly, I show that even as the understanding of the concept of democracy varied across groups, democratic practices—namely, discussion and voting—that were institutionalized under the U.S.-led occupation, provided a shared context to coordinate collective behaviors on the streets as movement groups fought over resources, goals, and power amongst themselves.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The streets of Japan are not often the site of major political protests, though there have been exceptions. Indeed, until the recent surge of protests against nuclear power plants following the earthquake and tsunami of March 2011, the numbers of demonstrators that have appeared on Japan’s streets in the last four decades have been modest. When anti-war demonstrations against the Iraq War surfaced in major cities around the world between 2002 and 2003, mobilizing several hundreds of thousands of people in New York, Washington, D.C., Rome, Paris, Athens, and Melbourne,1 the streets of Tokyo saw 11,000 people marching—a far smaller number than those in the other world cities.2 In 2005, prior to U.S. President Bush’s visit to Japan in October, Miyashita park, located in Shibuya—the capital of consumer culture in Tokyo—hosted protesters who were there to launch a “sound demonstration,” an eye-catching mode of protest that featured new styles of music and 3D videos projected onto buildings. With young artists providing music and visual imagery, approximately 700 protesters hit the streets of downtown Shibuya with anti-war and anti-neoliberal messages.3 Similar sound demonstrations were performed at May Day demonstrations that were, in turn, organized by independent unions unaffiliated with established union federations, and seeking to involve a younger generation. In 2008, May Day sound demonstrations, named “May Day for Freedom and Lives,” took to the streets in Shinjuku—a downtown business,

1 For more discussion of these numbers, see, for example, Ness (2004: 1106-07).
3 Miyashita park is run by Shibuya Ward and used to serve as a space for gatherings for youth, homeless people, and citizens’ organizations. The demonstrators in this particular instance were guarded by 500 riot police (Hayashi and McKnight 2005: 91). This style of demonstration was first staged in early 2003 in Japan (ibid.: 88). For more details, see Hayashi and McKnight (2005); also, see Mōri (2003) for the political culture on the streets performed by the youth in Japan.
shopping, and entertainment district of Tokyo—with a DJ performance and 550 protesters (Asahi Shinbun, May 4, 2008: 34).

So, protests have been staged in recent decades and participants have even expressed new styles of demonstration, but the numbers have been insignificant and the events have rarely received much attention from the media. What is most puzzling about this relative absence of protest is the fact that fifty years ago, the streets of Japan witnessed the largest and most lengthy demonstrations in the country’s history. Understanding this history and the dynamics of contentious politics and social movements in Japan is especially necessary today as the pendulum appears to swing back towards crowds protesting in the streets, this time as part of the newly (and tragically) reactivated anti-nuclear movement.4

1.1 Statement of the Problem, Research Goals, and Approaches

In response to the impending revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, massive protests were generated across Japan between 1959 and 1960. The security treaty was known in Japan as anpo jōyaku or simply Anpo, an acronym of the treaty’s name in Japanese (and hence, hereafter, the protests against the 1960 treaty revision will be referred to simply as the 1960 Anpo protests). The treaty was first concluded in 1951 when the San Francisco Peace Treaty determining the conditions of Japan’s independence was signed. Despite the fact that the treaty ostensibly related only to matters of security and foreign affairs, and even promised to establish more mutual responsibilities for the military alliance for Japan, protesters seized the occasion to call

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4 One month after the earthquake and tsunami of March 2011 and the nuclear power plant incidents, anti-nuclear power movements began to coalesce. Two months later, June 11th witnessed the peak of the anti-nuclear power movements of the year (http://datugeninfo.web.fc2.com/index.html, Retrieved January 24, 2012): 121 rallies, demonstrations, and events were held across the country, with the demonstration in Shinjuku attracting approximately 20,000 people (Asahi Shinbun, June 20, 2011: 20). The anti-nuclear movements on the streets surged in mid-2012, in response to the potential reopening of nuclear power plants, all of which had been shut down for inspections in May 2012. Since then, the number of protesters has grown, with demonstrations surrounding the Diet Building, the Prime Minister’s Office, the Tokyo Electric Power Corporation, and the nuclear plants that were going to resume operations. According to an organizer, one of the largest protests attracted 170,000 people at Yoyogi park—located in Shibuya Ward—on July 16, 2012 (the police reported 75,000 participants, Asahi Shinbun, July 17, 2012).
for democracy, mobilizing millions people onto the streets and tens of thousands of
demonstrators to the Diet Building from May to June 1960. At its peak, approximately
330,000 people surrounded the Diet Building on June 18, 1960, and several million
workers participated in the general strikes in June (Matsui 2001: 1; Minaguchi 1968: 232).
The 1960 Anpo protests constituted the largest social movements in postwar Japanese
history, and marked a watershed moment for movement dynamics in Japanese society
after World War II (Takabatake 1988: 70-1).6

This dissertation examines the following questions: How and why did movements
constituting these protests surge and culminate as they did in 1960? What underlying
historical processes shaped these events? And how and why did democracy—the key
watchword for reconstructing the Japanese nation-state—become not only the main
slogan of the 1960 Anpo protests, but also a concept hotly contested and variably put into
practice by the various groups involved in the protests?

On a broader level, the dissertation seeks to address the questions of why
movements upsurge—to the extent that they mobilize millions of people on the streets—at one historical moment but not others, and why particular claims (e.g., “protecting
democracy”) dominate over other claims (e.g., “stopping the treaty revision” or
“abolishing the treaty”). I seek to explain, in other words, why and how the 1960 Anpo
protests were staged at a specific time in the history, in specific ways.7

5 Chapter 2 provides concrete descriptions of the event and the postwar Japanese movement history.
6 During the prewar period before WWII, several large-scale political uprisings were generated, including
peasant uprisings in the Edo era (see Hashimoto 2005; Whyte 1995), the Freedom and People’s Rights
Movements during the Meiji era (see Bowen 1980), and agrarian disputes or the Rice Riots—a series of
uprisings against the economic hardships—during the Taishō era (see Nakazawa 1999). But, as the
subsequent chapters will elaborate, movement dynamics shifted in important ways after the events of the
1960 Anpo protests. Furthermore, after the 1960 Anpo protests, political parties—especially, the Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP, the ruling party)—shifted their policies. After the event, Prime Minister Ikeda,
who was affiliated with the LDP, enforced the policy of avoiding the confrontation with oppositional
parties. Also, the LDP launched a public campaign to create a favorable image of the U.S.-Japan security
treaty (see Packard 1966: 305-06).
7 The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was revised in 1970 as well, and protests against the 1970 revision were
organized yet again. The numbers of people mobilized per day for the 1970 Anpo protests sometimes
exceeded that of the 1960 Anpo protests (Kōan Chōsachō 1971: 199-200). However, when we take into
account the long period of time that the protests continued with a large scale of mobilization, the 1960
Anpo protests still constitute the largest social movements generated during the postwar period of Japan.
The dissertation has both theoretical and empirical goals. First, I seek to bridge the gap between the traditions of political sociology and social movement literature. Until the 1970s, political sociology developed a strong tradition of examining the transformation of societies, such as democratization, modernization, and revolutions, by exploring the relationship between social structure and people’s political behaviors (e.g., Bendix [1964] 1977; Moore 1966; Paige 1975; Skocpol 1979; Wallerstein 1974, 1989; Weber [1930] 1958). Then, as Walder (2009) points out, social movement studies—the scholarship of a later generation of political sociology—emerged, breaking away from the old tradition. These new studies, which were similarly interested in social change, proceeded instead by examining mobilization processes, rather than political processes at macro-levels.

Traditional, historically-grounded political sociology explores why movements adopted certain political goals and ideologies in given historical circumstances and were, thus, able to effect transformation (Walder 2009: 394). In contrast, social movement studies that have accumulated since the late 1960s, particularly in the United States, have primarily been interested in movement processes and how people became active, regardless of their political orientations (e.g., Gamson 1968; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tilly 1978; see Walder 2009: 394-95). As a consequence, the questions of why and what specific kind of political movements developed at certain historical moments have not occupied the center of the mainstream social movement studies developed especially in the United States. It is true that some social movement studies have incorporated the perspectives of historical sociology in exploring long-term historical changes (cf. McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly [2001] 2003; McAdam and Swell 2001; also see McAdam

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8 In contrast, the European tradition of social movement studies has been characterized by different theoretical takes. Over time, it has developed macro-sociological theories that account for the emergence of certain social movements, as represented in New Social Movement Theories (e.g., Castells 1997; Habermas 1981; Laraña, Johnston, and Gusfield 1994; Melucci 1980; Offe 1985; Touraine 1971). However, a problem with the European scholarship is that it rarely yields clear empirical implications for the emergence of social movements. Furthermore, the subsequent research with empirical data has shown the theories are not valid. This especially applies to the theories of New Social Movements. The scholarship argues that the class-based movements exhibited the features of new social movements, such as identity struggles, already in the nineteenth century (e.g., Barker and Dale 1998; Calhoun 1995; Pichard 1997; Tucker 1991).
However, compared to historical sociology that treats time, or the specificity of history, as a critical factor, social movement studies, particularly in the United States, have largely undertheorized historicity (see Walder 2009). At the same time, historical sociologists have been preoccupied with explaining macro-level historical transitions of entire societies and thus, for their part, have only examined collective actions relatively marginally (Gould 2005: 288). To bridge the disjuncture between historical sociology and social movement studies, this dissertation aims to offer an historically grounded account of the processes at play in the development of social movements, and to explore why specific protests unfolded at specific times and places.

The second goal of this dissertation is empirically grounded, concerning the postwar Japanese society. By looking into movement developments and how protesters raised their voices and behaved during the 1960 Anpo protests, the dissertation will show how the concept of democracy was constructed, practiced, and circumscribed in postwar Japan. It explores questions such as: How did people in Japan perceive and conceptualize democracy? What happened to democracy after “embracing the defeat” (Dower 1999) of WWII and the consequent occupation period in Japan? What kind of democracy did postwar Japan manage to attain at all? The 1960 Anpo protests provide a lens through which we can see the contested construction of democracy in postwar Japan, a concept that became a “great mantra” (Dower 1999: 30) dominating both the narrative of Japan’s reconstruction after WWII and people’s political imagination and practices at the time.

The research focuses on three constitutive groups within the 1960 Anpo protests—intellectuals, student movement groups, and labor unions—and examines each group’s tactics, networks, motivations, goals, and interrelations with other groups during the period leading up to and then including the 1960 Anpo protests. My main arguments are as follows: First, contrary to arguments in the extant literature on the 1960 Anpo protests (Takabatake 1979, 1988), the protests were not coherent movements in which the

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9 As I examine later, the political process model, or political opportunity approach, sometimes shares research interests with those of historical sociology.

10 To note, historical sociology is the discipline particularly developed in the United States (see Steinmetz 2010).
movement organizations routinely mobilized their members from the top-down; rather, the protests were staged by a constellation of different, pre-existing movement groups, each with its own political agenda. Whereas social movement studies often assume that actors in movements share resources and “framings” (Snow and Benford 1988, 1992), I highlight the ways in which actors and organizations competed for resources, power, and the very framing of the protests themselves.

Second, I argue that the 1960 Anpo protests constituted not only rational attempts and practices to bring about societal changes—such as the realization of democracy or the abolition of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty—but also processes constructing specific social spaces for political contentions, through which actors’ worldviews were both formed and expressed. One of the classic, pioneering theories of social movements defines social movements as “a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society” (McCarthy and Zald 1977: 1217-18, emphasis added). McCarthy and Zald (1977: 1218) further argue that social movements are nothing more than “preference structures,” or attitudes, directed toward social change. It is true that a social movement is expressed through participants’ actions, activities, and practices at various points in the course of its efforts, but I challenge the assumption that these efforts are shaped by pre-existing, already established ideas, as well as newly emerging ideas, that precede or go beyond actions, and are not modified, renegotiated and sometimes even transformed in the process of being put into action.

Making a similar point, Pierre Bourdieu sees political struggle as the struggle “for power to impose the legitimate vision of the social world…and the direction in which it is going and should go” (Bourdieu 2000a: 185). Bourdieu analyzes political struggles in different realms of society, such as the state, class, universities, the housing industry, and

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11 This definition of social movements is offered by McAdam (1982). It defines social movements not as irrational but as tactical attempts by excluded groups to mobilize sufficient political leverage to advance collective interests through non-institutionalized means (ibid.: 20).

12 McCarthy and Zald (1977) uses attitudes, not practices that later scholarship often uses, in defining social movements because the study of attitudes were more prominent back then than it is now (based on personal communication with Mayer Zald, June 28, 2012).
arts. Within each of these realms or fields, actors attempt to impose their own ideal views within and beyond its realm by mobilizing resources (or capital) and power. It has been conventional for social movement scholars to define social movements as collective actions and practices,\textsuperscript{13} while ideas, ideologies, or frames are given lesser roles, counted as resources or variables that promote the end goal, but that are not part of the goal itself. But from a Bourdieusian standpoint, ideas, views, visions, and values play a larger role in social movement theories. Jeffery Alexander makes a similar point using Durkheimian language; he argues that social movements present themselves as typifying “sacred values”—often as the bearers of social, national, or primordial myth—as cultural innovations that can create new norms and institutions that will allow resources to be channeled in different ways (Alexander 2006: 229). And social movements can serve as the means of redefining civil society with idealized values, visions, and ideas (see Alexander 2006: 228-29).\textsuperscript{14} I draw on both Bourdieu and Alexander to shift away from the conventional model of social movements, with its exclusive focus on materialism (Alexander 2006: 233); instead, I define social movements as political struggles over competing ideas and ideals of society, and as particular social spaces and processes in and through which actors make claims about the world through collective mobilization.

During the 1960 Anpo protests, protesters contested and competing over different ideas and ideals about society. The dissertation will demonstrate how different social actors who constituted the 1960 Anpo protests endorsed differently idealized visions of society in organizing the protests. Intellectuals attempted to make Japan a truly democratic society by mobilizing themselves and citizens for the protests. On the other hand, student movement groups aimed to turn the 1960 Anpo protests into a communist revolution for the realization of communism as a utopian ideal. And finally, union leaders

\textsuperscript{13} For example, another classical theory of social movements defines social movements as a collective acting with some continuity to promote or resist a change in the society (Turner and Killian [1958] 1987, quoted in Diani 1992: 4). The European tradition also defines social movements as collective behaviors (Touraine [1978] 1981: 77). Diani (1992) argues that while the existing definition of social movements has lacked specificity, theoretical clarity, and agreement, one of the common features of the definition is actions and behaviors.

\textsuperscript{14} Alexander defines collective actions more precisely as “a struggle for position vis-à-vis the categorical antipathies of civil life: a struggle to represent others in negative and polluted categories and to re-present oneself in terms of the sacred” (Alexander 2006: 231).
tried to utilize the 1960 Anpo protests as a chance to leverage their efforts to improve working conditions, workers’ rights, and the quality of workers’ lives.

Third, the dissertation frames the 1960 Anpo protests as the culmination of long-term historical processes that stemmed from the prior periods, particularly the U.S. occupation period that led to the expansion of various forms of political activism in Japan following democratic reformation. For many actors, wartime experiences during WWII were a critical factor motivating their engagement in political activism. The 1960 Anpo protests represent both an outgrowth of this history, and a rupture from it. In order to understand this concept of “rupture,” William Sewell’s concept of “event” is useful. With the storming of the Bastille in Paris in July 1789, Sewell argues that social protests can be conceptualized as “events”—significant happenings that affect, and eventually transform, social structures. According to Sewell, events are the culmination of historical processes that are at play both long before and throughout the duration of the event in question, and that do more than carry out a rearrangement of practices by gradual and cumulative social change (Sewell [1996] 2005: 226-27). According to Sewell, an event is constituted as such when it brings about the structural transformation of society through shifts of cultural schema, resources, and power relations.

Despite the revolutionary intent of some of the actors, however, the 1960 Anpo protests did not transform the existing structures of Japanese society. Indeed, they do not qualify as an event according to a strict application of Sewell’s definition. Nonetheless, I argue that the 1960 Anpo protests did constitute an eventful moment: first, the protests were the culmination of preceding historical processes; and second, they involved sequences of happenings that were durable over the time period of the event.

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15 Specifically, Sewell defines events as (1) a ramified sequence of occurrences that (2) is recognized as notable by contemporaries, and that (3) results in a durable transformation of structures (Sewell [1996] 2005: 228). Historical events are also not instantaneous happenings; some period of time elapses between the initial rupture and thesequent structural transformation (Sewell [1996] 2005: 227).
16 “Episode” (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly: [2001] 2003) is a similar theoretical concept with event.
17 Sewell defines social structure as entities composed of cultural schemas, distributions of resources, and modes of power (Sewell 1996: 842). To complete the transformation of the social structure, the last point—the transformation of pre-existing social relations—is critical. For more on the transformation of the structure, see also Sahlins (1981) and Sewell ([2000] 2005).
itself (see Sewell [1996] 2005: 227, emphasis added). Social movements such as the 1960 Anpo protests are not one-time happenings, but are the product of accumulated historical processes that precede and continue to unfold during the event (see also Slater and Simons 2010). Social movements can thus constitute an eventful moment, even if the outcome is that the event reproduces pre-existing cultural schema, resources, and power relations. More importantly, even if events (or social movements constituting events) do not transform the entire structure of society, they can still transform significant parts of the social sphere. I will argue that the 1960 Anpo protests were comprised of historically accumulated processes and durably constituted happenings that transformed the power relations, rules and resources of the spaces that generate and organize social movements.

1.2 Theoretical Discussions

Broadly conceived, this dissertation concerns the construction of social spaces for political contentions and the surge of social protests. In this section, I review and compare social movement literature and Bourdieu’s field theory, and recent efforts to integrate the two bodies of literature.

(1) Extant Literature on Social Movements

Social movement studies have significantly expanded in sociology since the late 1960s. The studies have developed three approaches that account for the successes and failures of movement mobilization by examining mobilizing structures, political opportunity structures, and cognitive and emotional factors, in turn. These paradigms are still dominant in theorizing about social movements and framing the interests and approaches of social movement scholars.

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18 In his earlier article, Sewell argues the structural patterns were durable and were reproduced despite the considerable historical transformation (Sewell [1988] 2005).

19 The problem of Sewell’s conceptualization of event is that the criteria of effecting a transformation is too vague, with what counts as a transformation ill-defined at the empirical level, thus making the adaptation of his theoretical concept difficult. Author’s thank to Kim Greenwell on this point.
The first approach investigates meso-level groups, organizations, and formal and informal networks. Pioneering works began with resource mobilization theory, as put forth by John McCarthy and Mayer Zald (1977), by examining the structures of social movement organizations. Breaking with grievance-based account of social movements, McCarthy and Zald argued that a movement organization is a critical resource for movement mobilization and that the organization’s efficacy of mobilizing necessary resources constitutes the key for the movements’ success (McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977). This approach centering around movement organizations has continued to expand to this day, with more recent trends investigating organizational structure, practices, and processes. The more recent research examines how social movement organizations contribute to the stability of mobilization (e.g., Whittier 1995), how resources affect organizational strategies (e.g., Edwards and McCarthy 2004a; Ganz 2000) or can facilitate or impede organizational mobilization (e.g., Cress and Snow 1996; Edwards and McCarthy 2004b; see Caniglia and Carmin 2005: 203). The approach also includes networks, including both informal and formal ones, as the critical mobilizing structures for movement organizations (e.g., Gould 1991, 1995; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; see also McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald ([1996] 2008: 4). The recent encounter between organizational scholars, who are interested in the emergence of organizations through social movements, and social movement scholars, who are interested in organizations, has further enriched the scope of this approach since the 2000s (cf. Campbell 2005; Greenwood, Roy, and Sahlin-Andersson 2008; Davis et al. 2005).

The second approach expands on the first, but has a stronger emphasis on the link between mobilizing structures such as organizations, meso-level institutions and networks, and political opportunities or the external factors available to the mobilizing structures. Pioneering American scholars of this approach have argued that a particular social movement emerges due to the institutional changes outside the movement, benefitting the protagonists of the movements (e.g., McAdam 1982; Tilly 1978; see also McAdam et al. ([1996] 2008: 3). This approach has had a strong influence on European scholars, who have undertaken comparative works, often arguing that the characteristics

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20 On this summary, see also McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald ([1996] 2008: 3-4).
of different nation-states’ political structures affect the growth of the movements therein (e.g., Kitschelt 1986; Ferree 1987; Kriesi et al. 1992; Rucht 1989, [1996] 2008; see McAdam et al. [1996] 2008: 3). While what is counted as political opportunity varies (see McAdam [1996] 2008a), the approach locates political opportunity structures as the key explanatory variable affecting both the timing of collective action and the outcomes of movement activity.

The political opportunity approach has further expanded into two directions, sometimes showing contradictory findings from the pioneering studies of this approach. One strand of literature focuses on the heterogeneous effects of political opportunities and/or emphasizes cognitive factors involved in utilizing or creating such political opportunities (e.g., de la Luz Inclán 2008; Einwohner 2003; Goodwin and Jasper 1999; Ramos 2008; Skrentny 2006; also see Gamson and Meyer [1996] 2008; Meyer 2004). The basic claims of these studies are that the effects of political opportunities, as well as what constitute political opportunities, differ, depending on cases. For example, the earlier pioneering works of this approach have argued that openness of political system promotes mobilization (e.g., Rucht 1989, [1996] 2008; Tarrow 1994; see also McAdam [1996] 2008a: 26-9). In contrast, more recent research has found that such openness can lessen political activity and that the degree to which a political system is closed can promote mobilization (e.g., Einwohner 2003; de la Luz Inclán 2008).21 The other group of studies within this approach have extended the scope of temporality and investigated the protest cycle. These studies have demonstrated the movement’s different developmental stages, which differ depending on changes of political opportunity structures, and also have examined other related factors that affect the developmental trajectory of the movements by often focusing on the declining and waning phase of the movements (e.g., Koopmans 1993; McAdam 1995; Minkoff 1997; Tarrow 1989, 1993; Zwerman, Steinhoff, and della Porta 2000).

21 The studies also suggest that the perception of both protagonists and elites create opportunity structures as opportunities for movement mobilization (e.g., Kurzman 1996; Lindsay 2008; Skrentny 2006).
The research on political opportunity structures, including the protest cycle, has expanded the scope of the first approach on mobilizing resources and structures by incorporating the exogenous factors. Importantly, it has done so by extending temporality as well. Indeed, as pioneering scholar in this area, Doug McAdam, explains, the root of the political opportunity approach lies in historical sociology that examines long-term social changes (McAdam and Sewell 2001: 91; also see McAdam [1982] 1999), and aims to explain why people participate in social protests at a particular time in history. However, as I argued earlier with regard to social movement studies in general, despite their original intention, this approach places too narrow a focus on how movements are mobilized. Consequently, most of the research, including studies on political opportunity structures, turns into a non-temporal theory-building attempt that identifies generalizable regularities (Gould 2005: 299). To note, the political opportunity approach does look into historically developed factors (such as political party alliances or the absence of state repression). However, the studies often treat these incidents as exogenous factors that affect the movements as seemingly timeless “opportunities.” Consequently, the above two approaches on mobilizing structures and political opportunity structures do not sufficiently address why people participate in particular social protests at a particular point in time.

The cognitive turn of social movement studies does not escape the problem of fully integrating historicity. The framing approach began in the 1980s, later than the other two approaches, and has explored “frame”—a cognitive schema that the participants of the movements utilize in interpreting the issues at stake and organizing the movements (Snow et al. 1986: 464; also see Benford and Snow 2000, McAdam [1996]2008b, Snow and Benford 1988). The approach emphasizes that actors’ perceptions play a role in movement participation and development—a role irreducible to the objective and structural factors that the other two approaches have examined. The framing approach does argue that the kind and functions of frames vary, and that frames are not fixed, but

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22 See for examples, Tarrow (1989: 13).
23 Three approaches have developed by influencing one another, and they are not incongruent (see McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald [1996] 2008).
However, the approach treats frames, or cognition, as simply another set of resources that determine the effectiveness of the movement development. In addition, like the other two approaches, the approach’s goal is still to theorize generalizable—that is to say, transhistorical—mobilization processes.

On the one hand, the framing approach successfully incorporates the issues of ideology, marginalized in other social movement studies, by arguing that meanings are not given or fixed, and that actors actively create meanings (see Snow and Benford 1988: 197-98; Snow 2004). Yet, it incorporates these meanings in a way that is “overtly micro-sociological” (Alexander 2006: 224). The approach treats actors’ interpretive strategies in “purely practical, situationally oriented, [and] there-and-now manner” (ibid.). The problem of incorporating historicity arises again. The framing approach does not fully explain why a certain frame is made available to actors in the first place, what social circumstances determine the receptivity or one frame over another, and what kinds of people respond to different interpretive representations (Walder 2009: 406). More importantly, the approach does not explore the preexisting meanings (Davis 2002: 9), which are critical in understanding why certain meanings are attributed to not others. In this way, the framing approach falls short of incorporating the larger settings that circumscribe certain interpretative schemata and the historicity that generates the repertoire of certain frames.

Thus far, I have outlined the limitations of the dominant approaches in social movement studies. Unlike historical sociology, which has developed various conceptual tools and theoretical arguments to examine time—e.g., through debates over how time intervenes in the sequences of causality— the three approaches developed in social

24 The examples include “frame extension” and “frame transformation.” See Snow et al. (1986: 472, 476).
25 To note, the cognitive dimension of the social movements has been highlighted across the approaches in the past two decades. As I discussed earlier, the recent studies on political opportunity structures argue about the subjective dimension. This trend applies to the mobilizing structure approach (cf. Clemens 1993, [1996] 2008, 1997). In addition, other subjective factors—such as collective identity, memory, and emotion—have also been highlighted (or re-highlighted) in the studies in the recent years (e.g., Armstrong and Crage 2006; Bernstein 1991; Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2001; Griffin and Bollen 2009; Jansen 2007).
26 For debates on how causal theory is possible or not with particular historical cases, the vast literature exists in historical sociology. For the summary, see Adams et al. (2005).
movement studies do not fully incorporate temporality and historicity in their theoretical arguments. Walder (2009: 397) collectively named these approaches “mobilization studies,” because the approaches have excessive interests in mobilization processes that would presumably recur in non-temporal settings and in generalizable laws that are applicable across time, as well as specific political context. This applies even to the political opportunity approach, which started with a shared interest by historical sociologists in investigating long-term social changes.

While I acknowledge the importance of existing social movement studies in providing useful tools in accounting for the emergence and development of social movements, I also argue that we need better theoretical tools to fully incorporate historicity, so that we are able to understand why certain political movements upsurge at a specific time of the history and what processes and mechanism are at work.

(2) Incorporating Historicity: Bourdieu’s Field Theory

In order to fully incorporate historicity into social movement studies, Bourdieu’s theory of field proves useful. According to Bourdieu, a field is a social space where agents and institutions constantly engage in struggle, following the regularities and the rules constitutive of the space (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 102). Field is inherently historical since struggles within it are made historically (see ibid.). Furthermore, habitus and capital (specifically, cultural and symbolic capital), which are indispensable components of the field, are also historical constructions (see Steinmetz 2011). Thus, Bourdieu’s work provides valuable tools to integrate historicity into the analysis (see also Benson and Neveu 2005; Martin 2003: 44). In the following, I will unpack the concept of field and examine how social movement studies can utilize the concept as an analytical tool.

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27 On this point, the recent studies on social movements are more susceptible to geographical differences—or differences in political culture. For those examples, see de la Luz Inclán (2008) and Liu (2006).
Bourdieu defines field as a “space of objective positions to which correspond a homologous space of stances” (Bourdieu 1997: 454). Actors, who occupy certain structural positions in the field, seek to take dominating positions in it, and thus engage in struggle. Bourdieu explains this struggle as follows:

[T]he field as a structure of objective relations between positions of force undergirds and guides the strategies whereby the occupants of these positions seek, individually or collectively, to safeguard or improve their position and to impose the principle of hierarchization most favorable to their own products. (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 101)

In this social space, actors engage in struggles for domination that are specific to that field. Bourdieu does not, in fact, provide a rigid, clear-cut, and handy definition of field; rather, the focus of his explanation of field has shifted over the time (Swartz 1997: 118; also see Martin 2003: 23). However, Bourdieu’s extensive works enable us to gain a comprehensive picture of fields, nonetheless.

*Fields are arenas of struggles for domination*: Fields are primarily characterized by competition, inequality, and conflicts among the constituencies (Crossley 2002a: 676). This is primarily because in each field, the different forms and volumes of capital, and the specific profits that are at stake are unequally distributed (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 101). This leads to competitions and struggles among the constituencies. Bourdieu describes this competition as follows:

[A] field of forces within which the agents occupy positions that statistically determine the positions they take with respect to the field, these position-takings

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28 Homology, for example, is oppositional lifestyles that correspond to structures of opposition in the class structure described in *Distinction* (Swartz 1997: 130).

29 Bourdieu first gave the analysis of field with a case of intellectuals in 1966 (Bourdieu [1966] 1969) and developed the concept more in the late 1970s especially though his major works *Distinction* ([1979] 2002) and *Logic of Practice* ([1980] 1990).

Scholars claim that Bourdieu’s field is an analytic concept (cf. Martin 2003: 24). At the same time, in Bourdieu’s entire theory, the theory of field also reflects the metatheoretical dimension that aims to transcend subjective and objective antinomy and promote relational thinking (Swartz 1997: 118, see also 52-64). The vagueness of Bourdieu’s theory results from his efforts to challenge the established methodologies of social science, while still aiming at constructing generalizable accounts in explaining social sphere.
being aimed either at conserving or transforming the structure of relations of forces that is constitutive of the field. (Bourdieu [1995] 2005: 30)

Based on the forms and volume of capital, actors occupy relational positions vis-à-vis one another—as manifested in dominating or in subordinated positions—within the field. However, they always try to overturn the ordering of their positions, thus constantly engaging in struggle with one another to gain the volume or the kind of capital at stake in the field.

A field has relative autonomy from other fields and other social spheres: Field demarcates a boundary of both membership and capital, which is effective only in the given field, by creating the autonomy of the field. The demarcation of the boundary, more precisely, results from the internal mechanisms of field’s own development. For example, the “history of art” has emerged as a distinct field by objectively defined references to each agent and his/her works in past or present and through these self-referential activities between agents and products (cf. Bourdieu 1985a: 22). Similarly, the field of intellectuals emerges through self-referential activities amongst themselves—who occupy objectively-defined locations within the field—as well as through referencing activities between themselves and the products of their activities.

In the field, capital has field-specific value, and functions in relation only to the given field (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 101). Due to this feature, capital in one field is not transferable to the other fields; and if it is, it will change the value in the other fields. Members in the field are those who participate in struggles over capital and struggle over the forms and the volume of capital. A field commissions something like an “admission fee”—or the specific form of capital—that defines eligibility for participation and can only be acknowledged by the members of the field (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 107-08). By doing so, the field includes certain actors but excludes others.30

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30 The boundary of membership and capital in the field is defined by both actors in question and researchers. Ultimately, it is the researcher’s task to determine the specific forms of capital that operate within it by knowing specific logic of the field (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 108).
Fields are arenas of struggles for legitimation: While actors engage in struggles for domination, they simultaneously engage in struggles for legitimation—the struggles over the very definition of the field. Bourdieu states that “every field is the site of a more or less overt struggle over the definition of the legitimate principles of division of the field” (Bourdieu 1985b: 734). This struggle is about imposing the legitimate visions about the field, and the symbolic capital that is at stake in this struggle. Symbolic capital ultimately brings about the power to make things seen in certain ways, to make things believed, or to produce the legitimate classification of the field (Bourdieu 1985b: 732). When those who monopolize symbolic capital hold this power and their domination is mystified and recognized as legitimate, what Bourdieu calls symbolic violence take place (Bourdieu [1982] 1990: 183).  

As the outcome of these struggles, once they are settled, the field crystallizes a value system of its own. Members of the field are caught in doxa—the dominant value in the field that is accepted by actors in an unthinking, taken-for-granted manner. Doxa builds a presupposition of actors’ thought and unconscious dispositions, which constitute larger, broader opinions (Bourdieu [1972] 1977: 168; Bourdieu 1990: 381). Working at the more conscious level of actors, another classificatory mechanism operates in the field—orthodoxy and heterodoxy. Orthodoxy is the certain way of talking and thinking the world, distinguishing ‘right’ opinions and ‘wrong’ opinions, legitimate certain views, and illegitimate other views (Bourdieu [1972] 1977: 169-70). While doxa doesn’t require an explicit account of its own values and is not questioned, orthodoxy does (see Steinmetz 2008: 596). Orthodox excludes heresy; the latter of which is comprised of other competing worldviews and explicit alternatives that suggest actors not choose the established orders (Bourdieu [1972] 1977: 169). The actors who monopolize the specific capital at stake tend to defend orthodoxy, and orthodoxy functions to defend an existing dominant form of specific capital in the field. Conversely, the actors who are least endowed with capital are inclined to heresy, challenging the orthodoxy and the capital at stake in the field (see Bourdieu 1993: 73). The members engage in struggles for legitimation of their world views.
engage in this struggle (orthodoxy-heresy) via struggles for accumulating or converting capital.

_A field enforces the specific form of struggles:_ While engaging in the struggles of domination and legitimation, the actors competing in a field share fundamental interests at stake in the field and are equally interested in illusio—the belief or acceptance of the worth of the game, as well as the commitment to the specific interest in the given field (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 98, 115). In other words, regardless of their objective positions within the field, actors are complicit in accepting the rules of the game in which they play and engage in the struggle (Swartz 1997: 125). Illusio is also the “game” or “feel for game” (sense of practice) that actors use without calculation to locate themselves and operate with the field (Bourdieu 1985a: 14; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 98). The actors learn the field specific illusio through habitus—i.e., the “prelogical logic of practice” (Wacquant 2004: 387) that gives the actors knowledge and recognition of the dominant laws of the fields and the stakes (Bourdieu 1993: 72). Thus, while the field is unequally structured in the material dimension, it results in a homogenously constructed social space where the actors agree upon the fundamental principles for engaging in the struggles in the field specific ways.

In sum, the field consists of three structural components, as shown in Figure 1.1 Doxa, orthodoxy, and heterodoxy compose the value system of the actors. Capital constitutes the material dimension of the field and is distributed unequally among the participants. Illusio, game, and habitus are inscribed in actors’ dispositions, which enables or confine actors to engage in the struggles in field specific ways. The actors engage in struggles over all of these components simultaneously.

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32 The term illusio is used more in Bourdieu’s later works in place of “interest” (Swartz 1997: 73; see Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 115).
33 Actors are endorsed with illusio to the extent that they concur in their belief (doxa) in the field (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 98).
34 Habitus is defined as a “system of dispositions acquired by implicit or explicit learning which functions as a system of generative schemas.” It generates strategies for each actor that can be objectively consistent with the objective interest of the actor in the field (Bourdieu 1993: 72, 76).
Figure 1.1 Three Components of Field

Note: Whereas doxa concerns a larger social sphere, illusio and game are field-specific.

Field transforms: Field is not fixed. The dominant power and the legitimate views in the field are always at risk of being overturned. As I have noted, field involves constant struggles even at the state of being settled where doxa is not questioned and orthodoxy is granted its legitimacy. But a field can also transform. In theory, the following scenarios are possible. First, because struggles in the field are about conserving or subverting the principles by which field-specific capital is distributed, actors may attempt to change the very definition of the field’s dominant form of capital, or the distributing principles that count on existing distinction. This was the case in German colonial states, for example, when officials created new forms of cultural capital (Steinmetz 2008). Second, the legitimacy of domination may be questioned due to the very possibility of questioning, and the doxa that directs the ordinary orders as given can be overturned (Bourdieu 1985b: 734; also see Bourdieu [1977] 1980: 285). This can be effected either by existing members of the field, or by new constituents of the field who entered with exogenous habitus to the given field. One example of this was feminist groups that emerged out of the male-dominated New Left student movement groups prevalent in the 1960s in Japan. According to Bourdieu, these moments may also arise at the time of “crises” of the field, when the existing order is in doubt, as was the case with students’ and workers’ uprisings.
in France in 1968 (see Bourdieu [1984] 1988). The third scenario is a partial one. The field may build a subfield, which is granted a certain degree of autonomy from the encompassing field, and the capital in the latter field is inverted or revised in the subfield. As Steinmetz (2010) argues, the establishment of historical sociology within the field of the American sociology presents an instance of this.

In the existing field, actors’ attempts to rebel and the possibility of field transformation are omnipresent because of the very characteristics of the field. That is, the field is inherently an arena of struggle, and every actor recognizes their own holdings of symbolic capital, their performances, perceptions, and practices in the field, thus constantly trying to overturn the existing ordering or dominate within it (see Steinmetz 2006: 596). Similar to a concept of Niklas Luhmann’s system theory (Luhmann [1984] 1995), field is a semi-autonomously functioning auto-referential social system that creates itself. However, its construction is incessantly challenged by the constituencies within, to mention one of the key differences between Bourdieu’s field and Luhmann’s system.

Struggles in the field discussed thus far all inevitably involve historicity; and they do so in two ways. The history of the field is about the history of the struggle over the monopolistic power, which is established as monopolistic as time goes by (see, for example, the histories of the state, science), while the struggle itself creates the ongoing and forthcoming history of the field (see Bourdieu [1977] 1980: 289). In this sense, history and field are mutually constitutive. In analyzing the issues at hand, the key is to examining field-specific struggles by identifying capital, habitus, and game, as well as the dynamics and mechanisms of inclusion, exclusion, and domination.

(3) Field Theory Approaches and Social Movement Studies

Field analysis has been expanding in the past decade. Bourdieu himself examined different kinds of fields, including literature, philosophy, science, the academy, photography, religion, jurisdiction, bureaucracy, and housing construction. Successive
scholars across the disciplines have applied Bourdieu’s field theory to a variety of topics,\textsuperscript{35} and social movement studies are among them. Unlike other applied studies, however, the field approaches of social movements have derived from two theoretical origins—organizational studies and Bourdieu’s theory—which actually generate distinct analytical foci and theorizations.

The field approach stemming from organizational studies has its roots in the neo-institutionalism pioneered by Meyer and Rowan (1977) and DiMaggio and Powell (1983).\textsuperscript{36} This work theorizes the cultural and political settings in which organizations are embedded, arguing that the interconnectedness of organizations as well as shared meanings among them enforce specific, similar organizational behaviors. Since the 2000s, an increasing number of scholars have adopted the neo-institutionalist approach in examining social movements and organizations (e.g., Armstrong 2002, 2005; Evans and Kay 2008; Fligstein 2001; Fligstein and McAdam 2011; Hensmans, 2003; Lounsbury, Ventresca, and Hirsch 2003; Schneiberg and Lounsbury 2008).

Among them, Armstrong (2002, 2005), Evans and Kay (2008), and Fligstein and McAdam (2011) deserve particular attention, as their research has changed conventional social movement studies in two ways. First, by examining the gay rights movements in the United States, Armstrong (2002, 2005) demonstrates that social movements, which consist of interconnected different movement organizations, act like a field, and that a movement gains efficacy when the field is “crystallized”—the state in which different movement organizations agree upon their strategies, rules, or goals. Armstrong (2002) emphasizes that the movement fields undergo the course of institutionalization and deinstitutionalization, independently from other factors such as political opportunities. Second, Evans and Kay (2008) and Fligstein and McAdam (2011) argue that the field, which consists of multiple (movement) organizations, affects behaviors and strategies of

\textsuperscript{35} Topics greatly vary, including fashion (e.g., Entwistle and Rocamora 2006), music (e.g., Moore 2007; Prior 2008), architecture (e.g., Lipstadt 2003; Molnár 2005), journalism (e.g., Benson and Nevenu 2005), European integration (e.g., Kauppi 2003), citizenship (e.g., Isin 2002), colonial studies (e.g., Steinmetz 2007, 2008), and sexuality (e.g., Martin and George 2006).

\textsuperscript{36} DiMaggio and Powell (1983) gained their insights from Bourdieu in the beginning (Emirbayer and Johnson 2008: 3, note 2; Martin 2003: 27). However, neo-institutionalism’s conceptualization of field has developed in ways significantly different from that of Bourdieu, as I will argue shortly.
movement participants by creating rules and consensuses that they create among themselves, thereby affecting the movement outcomes. Both groups of studies have revealed that the dynamics of the field serve as the critical factor for movement development, aside from organizational resources, political opportunity structures, or framings that the conventional social movement studies have often examined.

While neo-institutionalist field approaches focus primarily on the interconnectedness of organizations and exclusively on the field’s effects, a Bourdieusian field approach also looks at habitus and capital, the necessary components of Bourdieu’s field theory, and their effects on movements. British sociologist Nick Crossley, one of the leading scholars who adopts a Bourdieusian field approach, has extensively investigated the British mental health movements from the 1960s (e.g., Crossley 1999, 2002b, 2004, 2005a, 2005b, 2006) and anti-globalization movements developed since the 2000s (Crossley 2002a). Similar to the neo-institutionalist approach, Crossley argues that movements should be analyzed as fields that constitute the space of contention (see Crossley 2002a, 2003, 2005b). However, unlike neo-institutionalists, he pays special attention to habitus, a critical component of field that Bourdieu advocates, as a major drive for generating movements, and argues that actors’ radical habitus, which diverge from existing doxa or orthodoxy, especially serves as the key to the development of movement field.37 Haluza-DeLay (2008), another scholar influenced by Crossley’s works, demonstrates that specific habitus, such as “ecological habitus” commonly developed among actors in given societies, promoted the environmental movements as a specific field. In addition, in the Bourdieusian field analysis, scholars argue capital as field specific resources effective to the movement field. Cultural capital, such as media expertise or constituencies’ competence in new technologies, is considered to facilitate movements when it fit to the field specific strategies (Crossley 2002a). And symbolic capital is taken as a sort of asset of being able to claim one’s legitimacy, such as being “mental patients” in the psychiatric movement field, by giving the constituency better

37 To note, his later study on anti-globalization movements also argues that exogenous factors such as “structural strains” (Smelser 1962) and political opportunities help to create a field (Crossley 2002a).
location in the field (Crossley 2002b).\textsuperscript{38} This way, despite the claim that the theoretical perspectives of Bourdieu and neo-institutionalism can be combined (e.g., Evans and Kay 2008; Fligstein 2001; Fligstein and McAdam 2011), their analytical perspectives as well as theoretical standpoints differ significantly.

Indeed, unbridgeable theoretical gaps exist between the two approaches. First, as I have argued previously, in Bourdieu’s theory, habitus and capital are specific to the field and are not transferable to the other fields. Although some scholars, often neo-institutionalists, argue that \textit{resources} are equivalent to capital, and \textit{social skills} or \textit{schemas} that participants mobilize for interacting in the field are parts of habitus (see Fligstein 2001; Fligstein and McAdam 2011), these analogies will miss the nature of field that Bourdieu theorizes.\textsuperscript{39} Capital is not only non-transferable to other fields, but also is a structuring and constitutive force of the field. While resources are mobile within and across the field, capital is effective only in a specific field, defines the field, and is unequally distributed according to actors’ structural positions within that field. Similarly, social skills or schemes can be generalizable assets of actors; however, habitus is specific not only to the actors who engage the field but also to the field itself.\textsuperscript{40} These points will be discussed in more details using empirical examples in subsequent chapters.

Second, the theoretical presupposition of the two approaches concerning the status of the field is almost opposite. On the one hand, neo-institutional theories presume conformity within existing fields and pay little attention to the power struggles (Fligstein and McAdam 2011: 21). In contrast, in Bourdieu’s theory, a field is, first and foremost, a social space where actors engage in power struggles. In other words, while a Bourdieusian field approach focuses on domination, subordination, and subversion of among actors, neo-institutional field approaches treat actors in the field more or less

\textsuperscript{38} As a shortcoming of Bourdieu’s field analysis of social movements, scholars’ treatment of symbolic capital have been sometimes slippery in their analyses, taking it as capital that has symbolic value (such as status) and thus just merely treating it as cultural capital, not as the capital at stake in the field as Bourdieu originally argued. See, for example, Crossley (2002b: 65).

\textsuperscript{39} A growing number of neo-institutionalists in organizational studies at large incorporate Bourdieu’s field theory; however, the use of the concept of field in organizational studies of neo-institutionalist bent has been limited by the absence of capital and habitus (Emirbayer and Johnson 2008: 37).

\textsuperscript{40} Thus, in Bourdieu’s theory, actors who have the affinity of habitus can participate in the field.
equally, and simply regard the field as the state of conformation, competitions, or conflicts (e.g., Armstrong 2002, 2005; Fligstein and McAdam 2011). As Emirbayer and Johnson (2008: 9) point out, the field that Bourdieu theorizes is not reducible to interaction and interconnection, as neo-institutionalists theorize; rather, it is a structuring and constitutive force in itself.

I argue that the above differences between the two field approaches can point the way towards a useful theoretical refinement, by reframing them as different degrees of structuration of a social space. In fact, it is often debated whether social movements—or any other given social spaces—constitute a field or not. For example, Bourdieu-influenced French sociologist Lilian Mathieu argues against conceptualizing social movements as fields because social movements do not attain the sufficient degree of objectification and structuration necessary to Bourdieu’s definition (Mathieu 2007: 139). Instead, she proposes the concept of “social movement space,” whereby such a space equips itself with the “set of practices and meanings constituted by all protest mobilizations in a given society” (Mathieu 2009: 103), providing actors with resources as well as ideological, political, or religious inspirations for recruitment and mobilization (also see Mathieu 2007).

In her conceptualization, the social movement space is social universes in which social movements emerge, and these social universes interact with other universes, such as those of the political and economic spheres (Mathieu 2007: 133). She argues that this is similar to the concept of social movement sector conceptualized John McCarthy and Mayer Zald that “consists of the collection of social movements in a society” (McCarthy and Zald 1977: 1220); but it differs in that it captures the competitions over resources under the state of interdependence of organizations and movements (Mathieu 2007: 134-35). It is important to note that she does not argue about interconnectedness through the distribution of capital, or dominating or subordinating relations, while the social

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41 Mathieu also argues that while Bourdieu’s theory of field presumes the relative autonomy of fields, the actual autonomy of social movement spaces significantly varies, sometimes being connected to the political field, other times not. Besides, while Bourdieu focuses on domination and subordination, the movements prefer anti-authority (Mathieu 2007: 137-39).
movement space is an independent social universe where actors share meanings and practices. On this point, Mathieu’s Bourdieu-influenced concept is closer to the “strategic action field” (SAF) conceptualized by the neo-institutionalist field approach, denoting the space where the efforts of collective actors occur “to vie for strategic advantage in and through interaction with other groups” (Fligstein and McAdam 2011: 2). While the SAF is embedded in and affected by other broader fields, the constituents of the SAF, which include both incumbents and governance units, share understandings, frames, and social skills resulting in collective action (Fligstein and McAdam 2011: 4). In conceptualizing the SAF, Fligstein and McAdam (2011: 5) highlight the competitive and conflictive state of the field more than conventional neo-institutionalists do. In the end, Fligstein and McAdam’s version of neo-institutionalism has a distinctly Bourdieusian flavor with its attention to the conflictive state of field.42

Taking all these variations in conceptualization together, “field” is here defined as the social space exhibiting the highest degree of structuration, with “space” or SAF following distinctly, but close behind. Figure 1.2 illustrates this.

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42 On this point, Bourdieu himself argues that “social space” is a “structure of objective relations which determines the possible form of interactions and of the representations the interactors can have of them.” (Bourdieu [1979] 2002: 244).
Figure 1.2 The Structuration of Social Space, Theoretical Orientations, and the Features of Social Space Generating Collective Action

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structured</th>
<th>Unstructured</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Field</td>
<td>Multi-Institutional Domain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Space (or SAF)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Theorists**

- Bourdieu
- Mathieu or Fliedstein & McAdam
- Armstrong & Bernstein

**Features**

- **Structured**
  - Boundary (Autonomy)
  - Structuration of capital e.g., Symbolic capital; volume & composition of capital are determined
  - Habitus
  - Domination/subordination

- **Unstructured**
  - No distinctive boundary
  - Interconnected organizations and institutions
  - Different cultures
  - Actions

To note, the field conceptualized by Bourdieu denotes a sub-level social-universe in the given society. In accordance with that, all variations illustrated in Figure 1.2 show such sub-social universes that vary the degree of structuration. It is possible that collective action and social movements do not create a demarcated specific space for their activism and yet still make political claims and actions. To indicate such social universe, a multi-institutional politics approach proposed by Armstrong and Bernstein (2008) is useful. Mainly speaking to the existing social movement studies that have often divided the incumbents and one source of power that monopolizes domination such as the state, Armstrong and Bernstein (2008: 78-9, 82-4) argue that society is composed of multiple
and often contradictory institutions, and that collective action takes place against different sources of domination with different levels and sorts of “political-ness.”

Taking some of their points, I conceptualize the social universe for collective action that takes place in the least structured space as a “multi-institutional domain,” within which spaces for activism are not clearly demarcated, granted autonomy or generative of specific cultures or habitus.

As Figure 1.2 shows, the degree of structuration varies across the social space for collective action and social movements. When the social universe of social movements is less structured, it takes the form of social movement space, or social movements generated in the multi-institutional domain.

With the above conceptualized field approach, the dissertation shows that, with varying degrees of structuration, some movements constitute social moment spaces, while others constitute social movement fields. In the empirical chapters, I specifically examine when and how social movements take the form of fields versus spaces; how capital, habitus, and the games that are specific to a field are enacted when a social movement takes the form of a field; what the space specific meanings and practices are of social movements; and finally how social movement fields and spaces interact and merge at a certain historical moment, causing a movement surge driven not by conformation or crystallization (Armstrong 2002, 2005), but by struggles for domination.

1.3 Data and Main Arguments

The dissertation examines three major constitutive groups within the 1960 Anpo protests—students, intellectuals, and workers. I conducted a total of 18 months of fieldwork in Japan between 2008 and 2010. My first visit to Japan spanned from February 2008 to June 2009, during which time I was hosted as a visiting researcher at the Institute of Social Science at the University of Tokyo. I collected historical records—

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43 The varieties include identity politics, symbolic/cultural struggles, and the “real” politics of state-oriented activism.
including flyers, meeting minutes, magazines memoires, journals, booklets, and pictures—in libraries at the University of Tokyo, the Ōhara Institute for Social Research at Hōsei University, and the L-library in Ōsaka. The Ōhara Institute for Social Research was particularly important as it had flyers that were made and distributed during the protests themselves. Although this dissertation does not quote them directly, these flyers helped me to understand how and when demonstrations were organized (the flyers often gave directions with illustrated maps) across different movement groups. The L-library stored important documents that revealed important differences and similarities across the movements both in general and, specifically during the 1960 Anpo protests, between Tokyo (a major city in eastern Japan) and Ōsaka (a major city in western Japan). Although regional differences do not constitute the major focus of this dissertation, it is worth noting that students and workers in the western part of Japan considered their respective counterparts in the eastern part of Japan to be rivals, motivating the former at times to adopt even more radical forms of activism.

Interviews comprise the other critical source of my analyses. I conducted 98 interviews, lasting at least two hours each and sometimes over several hours, with former student activists, scholars, and union activists who participated in the 1960 Anpo protests, as well as politicians, academics, and writers of the history of political activism. With some informants, I met more than once. The interviews were semi-structured; two interviews were conducted as focus group interviews. The informants were acquired through snowball sampling. Kazunari Kurata, a key figure who organized an event in 2008 for the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the New Left group Bund, was particularly helpful in connecting me to key former student activists.44 Former student activist Yasumasa Koga and former union activist Itaru Yui, whom I met through Kurata and the Bund’s anniversary event, then helped me to meet with former labor movement activists. Of the 98 interviews, 50 percent of them were with former student activists of various factions; 22 percent of them were with former union activists; 11 percent of them were with former university faculty members; and the rest were with politicians, scholars,

44 Since Kurata was a former Bund member, my sample leans toward Bund members. However, Kurata and other former Bund activists helped me to interview former members of other student movement groups that competed with the Bund.
current activists, and others. This unequal distribution resulted partly from the nature of snowball sampling and also from generational differences—namely, that student participants were more likely to still be alive when I conducted my fieldwork. Accordingly, my analyses of intellectuals were based primarily on historical and contemporary written materials; my analyses of students were based largely on interviews, cross-checked with documents written by students at the time; and in the case of workers, my analyses used mostly data from interviews and literature on the history of labor movements in Japan.

In 2010, I revisited Japan for two months during the summer to attend events organized by various groups for the Anpo protests’ 50th anniversary, and conduct follow-up and new interviews. As a participant observer, I also joined ongoing political activism organized by former activists, such as the anti-U.S. base movements in Okinawa, protesting plans to relocate the base, and a movement demanding that the Japanese government disclose documents regarding the intervention of the United States and the Japanese government vis-à-vis the Japanese Supreme Court in 1959 over the issue of the constitutionality of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.45

My interviews required a great deal of travel. In addition to the Tokyo metropolitan area, I traveled to Shizuoka, Kyōto, Ōsaka, Nagasaki, and Nagano. In most cases, informants responded positively to my invitation and welcomed my visits. However, at the same time, they often expressed surprise that the 1960 Anpo protests would be considered important and wondered why a person like me, of the same age as many of their children or grand-children, would bother to study an event from 50 years

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45 In March 1959, the Tokyo District Court decided the case that the U.S. base in Japan was anti-constitutional, given Article 9 that prohibits Japan from holding armed forces for wars of aggression. In December, in the midst of the 1960 Anpo protests, the Japanese Supreme Court gave a decision that the U.S. base was not anti-constitutional and also decided to denounce the Supreme court’s ability to judge the constitutionality of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty itself, arguing that the issue was too political and went beyond the court’s jurisdiction.

In 2008, a Japanese journalist discovered diplomatic papers in the U.S. state archive that indicated that the Ministry of Justice and a Supreme Court justice were pressured by both the U.S. ambassador and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan to overturn the sentence of the Tokyo District Court. Since this discovery, a movement has emerged—organized primarily by former activists from the 1950s—demanding the disclosure of the related documents.
ago. Despite the fact that the 1960 Anpo protests were the largest, most groundbreaking social movements generated in postwar Japan, their history has been forgotten by even the participants themselves.

In interviews, the questions I asked included: how and why they began committing themselves to activism, what their school and family lives were, what kinds of political activism they participated in prior to the 1960 Anpo protests, when and how they learned leftist thoughts, how they participated in the 1960 Anpo protests, what their roles in the protests were, and how they understand the concept of democracy. To investigate movement organizations and inter- and intra- group dynamics in depth, I also asked my informants about their affiliated groups in terms of organizational structures, tactics, networks, goals, ideologies, and how their groups made alliances or competitions with other groups. In addition, to understand the processes of protest mobilization as well as participants’ practices and behaviors during the protests, I asked how exactly the informants participated in the protests—by asking how they learned of the protests (or how they recruited protesters, if they were leading activists), how they went to the protest sites, and what they did during rallies and demonstrations. I also asked for their observations about manners and behaviors and the protest repertoires of other participants and movement groups.

The central claim of this dissertation is that the 1960 Anpo protests were constituted by a fraught constellation of different pre-existing movement groups, each with its own political agenda, developing their movement fields and spaces. The 1960 Anpo protests served as a political opportunity for each of these groups to achieve previously determined political goals as well as to gain hegemony within their movement fields and spaces. I argue, the 1960 Anpo protests surged in such a significant way when they did largely (1) because movement fields and spaces, each of which developed relatively autonomously, created a juncture at a certain moment of the history, and (2) because competition and conflicts among movement groups within the fields and spaces led to the escalation of their members’ mobilization. Importantly, though I identify a moment of conjuncture, I do not claim that the movement spaces and fields merged at the
time of the 1960 Anpo protests. On the contrary, the participants and groups kept the boundary of fields and spaces, and capital, habitus, and games specific to the fields (or spaces) were not convertible to other fields (or spaces) even when some activists attempted to effect such conversions. However, it was still the case that, with a few exceptions, competing groups mobilized their members at the same location and time, coordinating with other movement groups. The collective behaviors of these groups across the fields and spaces were orchestrated through shared networks among leading activists who passed the information on dates and locations of the protests. In addition, practices of democracy that the actors acquired in the postwar education under the U.S.-led occupation and were represented by discussion and voting helped both surge and coordinate collective behaviors during the protests, while the concept of democracy was understood very differently across movement groups.

Extant social movement studies do focus on antagonism, but mostly on the antagonism between protagonists and power holders, and only a few studies have examined the effects of antagonism or competitions within and among movement organizations (see Soule and King 2008: 1597). Studies have revealed that such competition affects increases and decreases in the number of movement organizations (Minkoff 1997), that levels of competition affect the diversity of tactics and goals of movement organizations (Olzak and Ryo 2007), and that inter-organizational competition increases the level of specialization of movement groups (Soule and King 2008). These are all studies examining the effect of competitions over the movement organizations. When it comes to the effect of competition over the overall movement dynamics, however, far fewer studies have accumulated, only indicating that competition and conflicts elevate radicalism of the movements, resulting in more violent tactics (Koopmans 1993; Tarrow 1989). Indeed, this was the case for the student revolts in 1968-1969 in Japan. In the case of the 1960 Anpo protests, by contrast, I will demonstrate that the surge occurred not because of the radicalization of tactics, as the very features and dynamics of the movement fields and spaces actually enforced non-radical ways of protests, but because inter-organizational competitions as well as the conjunctures of the
fields and spaces created the conditions for a movement surge and a massive increase in mobilization.

1.4 Contributions

The dissertation will contribute to three areas of study—social movement studies in general, field-theory approaches to social movements, and Japanese studies. The Bourdieusian field approach is beneficial to social movement studies in the following ways. First, it disaggregates the levels and domains of social movements that are generated coherently at the surface. As this dissertation will examine, what we call the 1960 Anpo protests consisted of different kinds of movements, each with their own goals, actors, and dynamics. Furthermore, student movements, for example, themselves consisted of two kinds of movements—communist and democratic movements. Also, it is important to recognize that the same actors can engage in multiple movements simultaneously, as union leaders were involved in the movements at the workplace and of left-wing parties, while participating in the 1960 Anpo protests. The Bourdiesusian field approach allows us to demarcate the various boundaries of these movements, distinguish the elements that compose the movement fields and spaces, and examine the fundamental struggles that constitute them.

Second, a Bourdiesusian field approach goes beyond the binary analysis of power holders (such as the state or dominant groups and institutions) versus challengers (or protesters) that many conventional social movement studies seem to assume (e.g., Gamson [1975]1990; McAdam 1982; Steinberg 1999a, 1999b). As the dissertation will demonstrate, actors are equally—or even more greatly—involved in struggles with those who fight within the same fields or spaces of movements, than with dominating powers who neither play the same field-specific games nor share a space-specific culture. As the multi-institutional politics approach also claims, social movements would be better analyzed by a multi-institutional politics perspective that conceptualizes struggles for power as taking place in multiple, overlapping fields and arenas (see Armstrong and Bernstein 2008; Fantasia and Stepan-Norris 2004: 55-6). To this point, the dissertation
highlights that social movement groups fight one another and do not always target the centralized power, such as states or corporations, even when they may do so in their rhetoric.\textsuperscript{46} In examining inter-organizational or inter-institutional relations that are involved in social movements, a Bourdieusian field approach gives us theoretical tools for analyzing the underlying conditions that create the focal points of struggles within and across the related organizations and institutions.

Third, Bourdieu’s field theory, especially the concept of habitus, allows us to see the disjunction between the \textit{framing} of protesters mobilizing for their movements and the \textit{practices} that protesters actually carry out, and the ways in which these practices are shaped by their habitus. For example, as I will show in Chapter 4, student activists used violent language (such as the slogan of “violent revolution”), while they followed democratic practices (such as discussion and voting). The conventional social movement studies, including the neo-institutionalist field approach, cannot explain, or even consider, these discrepancies regarding the movements’ practices; however, Bourdieusian field theory approach gives us an account of why and how disjunction is possible, by demonstrating the persistence of habitus that can transcend framing and serves as the more fundamental organizing principle of the movements beyond actors’ individual choices.

Overall, the Bourdieusian field approach equips us with theoretical tools and perspectives that not only incorporate historicity, but also examine multi-institutional and multi-layered structures of social movements, wherein protagonists engage in different sorts of struggles in overlapping fields simultaneously. By employing Bourdieu, the dissertation aims to demonstrate that Bourdieu’s field approach is an integrative analytical tool for investigating social movements, labor movements, and intellectuals’ movements—movements that have generally been examined separately.

\textsuperscript{46} In this point, some other multi-institutional perspectives have a slightly different take from Armstrong and Bernstein (2008). For example, McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001: 5, 10-3) propose multi-institutional settings, but emphasize that social movements need to include the government as a claimant or the object of claims.
Furthermore, my work will not just apply, but also contribute to the refinement of the Bourdieusian field approach in three ways. It has been often the case that, despite advocating the theory as a whole, scholars’ analyses focus simply on field or one of the other concepts of habitus and capital (e.g., Crossley 2005a; Crossley 2005b; Evans and Kay 2008; Haluza-DeLay 2008; also see Emirbayer and Johnson 2008). However, this dissertation, especially Chapter 4 on student movements, fully integrates Bourdieu’s three core concepts for the analysis. Second, while field theory approaches have often focused only on one particular field (Evans and Kay 2008: 971), this dissertation examines different movement fields and spaces that compose one social movement, and examines how different movement fields and spaces make a conjuncture at a particular time in history. Most importantly, in doing so, the dissertation will offer a refinement of the field approach that distinguishes between social movement fields and spaces both theoretically and analytically.

Lastly, to the extant studies on the 1960 Anpo protests and the studies on social movements in Japan, the dissertation aims to make the following contributions. First, this research responds to the dearth and limitations of scholarly works on the 1960 Anpo protests. Despite the fact that many articles and books have been published on the events in the past half century,47 scholarly works that apply systematic theories and provide theoretical arguments have been surprisingly scarce. Most works either provide description of the course of events (e.g., Hidaka 1960; Shinobu 1961; Packard 1966) or examine the reactions of individual participants (e.g., Koschmann 1996; Kersten 1999; Igarashi 2000).48 This trend was still evident in the publications released at the time of the 50th anniversary of the events in 2010. Newly uncovered histories and records came out (e.g., Aoki 2008; Irokawa 2008; Kawakami and Ōkubo 2007; Nenpō Nihon Gendaishi Henshū Iinkai 2010) and existing publications were reprinted (e.g., Hosaka

47 To show the general interests on the event, the National Diet Library even published a book that listed the publications on the 1960 Anpo protests in 1960 (Kokuritsu Kokkai Toshokan Etsuranbu Shakaikagaku Sankōshitsu 1960).
48 On this point, Matsui (2001: 3-4) also points out that very few Japanese social scientists have analyzed the 1960 Anpo protests.
There have been two theory-based analyses of the 1960 Anpo protests that should be noted. Political scientist Michitoshi Takabatake has argued that the 1960 Anpo protests were consolidated, hierarchical movements in which existing organizations, such as unions and student associations, mobilized their members from the top-down (Takabatake 1979, 1988). He basically argues that the 1960 Anpo protests surged due to this top-down mobilization, which had been already common among existing movement groups before the 1960 Anpo protests. In contrast, building upon the new social movement literature, Sasaki-Uemura (2001) argues that the 1960 Anpo protests marked the emergence of horizontally organized new social movement groups organized from the ground up. He then analyzes citizens’ groups that, in theory, were voluntarily organized and that participated in the 1960 Anpo protests. In both of these studies, the scholars have assumed that the 1960 Anpo protests emerged as a consensus-driven movement, formed out from a set of more-or-less similar goals and shared organizational resources. In contrast, my dissertation will demonstrate that the 1960 Anpo protests were constituted by a fraught constellation of different pre-existing movement groups, each with its own political agendas, practices, and struggles.

My dissertation also speaks to discussions about competing civil spheres within civil society (cf. Sasaki-Uemura 2002). Often, scholars on social movements in Japan have focused on the divide between or cooperation of protagonists and authorities (e.g., Apter and Sawa 1984; Garon 1997). However, my work has an exclusive focus on the politics among the protagonists and examines the conflicts and competition among...

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49 Furthermore, while quite a few studies on social movements in the post-1960 Anpo protests exist, there have been few studies of the pre-1960 Anpo protests. In fact, studies of political activism during the occupational period and in the 1950s are only now beginning to accumulate (e.g., Igarashi 2010, 2011).
50 Despite the claim of Sasaki-Uemura (2001), theoretical and empirical divides between old and new social movements have been proved invalid. On this, see footnote 7.
51 There is one other theory-based analysis, Ōtake (2007), which examines the emergence of the New Left groups and citizens groups, arguing the Bund, the New Left group, was manifestation of post-modern phenomena. However, his focus is not the 1960 Anpo protests but on the Bund; besides, he uses the concept of post-modernism as a meta-narrative that signifies society’s transition, not as an analytical concept.
constituencies within civil society, which are not peculiar to Japanese society by any means. Recent studies on civil society—especially those examining non-Western societies—emphasize either the repression within civil society or the struggles of social movements against the civil society (e.g., Hellman 1995; Davis 1999; Kenny 2001). In line with these studies, this dissertation illuminates the competition and repressive strategies enacted by constituencies themselves within the civil sphere. The cases that this dissertation illuminates are specific to Japan, but they contribute to our understanding of why collective behaviors often fail to be, in fact, collective and to form a coherent force to achieve their goals.

1.5 Chapter Outlines

The next chapter of the dissertation outlines the expansion of the social movement sphere in postwar Japan. I argue that U.S-led occupational forces stationed in Japan between 1945 and 1952 not only provided new policies and institutions, but also promoted an idea of democracy that motivated people in Japan to seek to build a new society. Implementing this vision was far from linear, however. In the beginning of the occupation, a significant number of people, even socialists, interpreted democracy in older, traditional terms that continued to locate the emperor at the center of their political discourses. Furthermore, the government implemented the new institutions of democracy

52 To detail, the focuses of the studies on social movement and civil society in Japan shifted as follows. Arguing against the traditional view that Japan was a harmonious and consensual society (e.g., Nakane 1967; Vogel 1979), the subsequent generations of Japanese studies scholars have emphasize Japan as a conflictive society and examined various historical cases through pre-modern to contemporary periods (e.g., Apter and Sawa 1984; Duke 1973; Krauss, Rolen, and Steinhoff 1984; Najita and Koschmann 2005; Steinhoff 1989, [1991] 2003; White 1995). With detached interest in arguing about the uniqueness of Japanese political culture, other studies on Japanese political activism examine an autonomous sphere of democratic movements (Pincus 2002), the emergence of new social citizenship and democracy (George 2001), the development of grassroots movements (Sasaki-Uemura 2001, 2002), and the political participation of the marginalized social actors in the mainstream politics (LeBlanc 1999).

Other scholars focus on the supposed peculiarity of the construction of civil society in Japan. Garon (1997; 2003) emphasizes that constituencies have strong cooperative relations with the state, and Pekkanen (2006) points out that Japanese civil society, unlike that in the United States, lacks professionals that influence state politics. While both works illuminate a sort of ‘weakness’ of Japanese civil society (despite that authors aim to avoid dichotomous arguments about the weakness or the strength of civil society), Aldrich (2008) argues that civil society is not just responsive to, but actively forms the state’s response. 53 This viewpoint is not always congruent with utopian views of civil society theories, which have been largely based on the experiences of Western democratic countries.
by strategically invoking their connection to the prewar political system. Nonetheless, for those who approached democracy as a new idea, it became a most salient, motivating frame for social movements, promising the realization of a better society than before.

The rest of the dissertation examines each movement group in turn. Chapter 3 focuses on the emergence of the so-called progressive intellectuals by comparing them with nationalist intellectuals and liberal intellectuals of earlier generations. Postwar progressive intellectuals were the most active intellectuals during the 1960 Anpo protests and played a key role in generating the slogan of “protecting democracy.” I will show that their participation in the 1960 Anpo protests derived from their long-term collective efforts to implement democracy in Japan after defeat in WWII. Moreover, I argue, their collective activism during the early postwar period was largely helped by occupational policies that created a more protected space for these left-leaning progressive intellectuals than for their nationalist counterparts. In addition, I will show that progressive intellectuals did not compose a unified group. The chapter argues that progressive intellectuals manifested varied individual styles of political engagement and that divisions amongst intellectuals became salient in the course of the 1960 Anpo protests.

In Chapter 4, I argue that student movements that emerged after WWII developed into two movement spaces, the communist movement field and the democratic movement space, and that student activists maneuvered between the two. Shortly after the war, students engaged in democratic movements, pursuing democracy on their campuses as well as in society. They established a nation-wide organization, the Zengakuren (the All-Japan Federation of Student-Government Associations, hereafter the Zengakuren). However, because student activists became members of the Japanese Communist Party, they were simultaneously involved in the struggles fought in the communist movement field that was constructed both domestically and internationally. The chapter highlights the dynamics and structure of the two movement spaces by focusing on the emergence of the Bund, the Japan’s first New Left movement group, which took a leadership role in the 1960 Anpo protests. I argue that the Bund first emerged through the destabilization of the communist movement field, which had been dominated by established communist.
parties. Then, the Bund shifted the locus of their struggles to the democratic movement space: they took over the executive seats of the Zengakuren—a nation-wide student democratic organization—and consequently played a key role in the 1960 Anpo protests. The chapter will also highlight that although the Bund activists called for “violent revolution” and refuted “bourgeoisie democracy,” their behaviors were constrained by the practices of democracy whereby students decided their participation in the protests through discussion and voting.

Chapter 5 focuses on workers’ activism, its origins in multiple organizations and movement dynamics, and how unions and union federations engaged in “political battles” that made political claims not limited to economic issues. I argue that unions and union federations chose to engage in political battles such as the 1960 Anpo protests in order to leverage ongoing union activism or labor movements and gain more power in organizing their overall movements against rival unions, companies, or the government. My investigation will also demonstrate that despite union leaders’ intent, these political battles often became sites generating turbulence and conflicts among union members. The chapter examines three cases to illuminate this point; the unions at the Ōsakagawa Central Telegraph and the Mitsubishi Nagasaki Shipyard, and the Minato Ward of the Tokyo Regional Council of Trade Unions. These cases demonstrate how the frustration of union members over tactics for engaging in political battles—including and especially the 1960 Anpo protests—led to the emergence of radicalized factions, resulting in the formation of the New Left labor movement groups. The student New Left group, the Bund, critically intervened in this process. However, the chapter will highlight that a sharp boundary existed between student and worker groups nonetheless, mirroring a broader boundary between intellectuals’ political activism and workers’ movements in general. Just as some intellectuals were reluctant to join the lines of workers at the demonstrations, so did workers resist accepting intellectuals, as well as students, as true allies of the labor movement.
CHAPTER 2
BUILDING SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND DEMOCRACY: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

After Japan surrendered at the end of World War II, the occupational forces began to implement drastic political, economic, and social reform in Japan. New policies purged militarists and nationalists, dissolved economic monopolies, deprived the emperor of the sovereign power, legalized political activism, and established the new constitution. According to the Allied Powers’ Potsdam Declaration of July 1945, demanding Japan’s surrender, the principles guiding the occupation were to be the democratization and demilitarization of Japan. The Declaration was signed by the United States, Britain, and China, but ultimately, it was the United States that planned out the detailed policies and took the initiative in the reformation of Japan, while other Allied countries assumed a much lesser role.

This U.S.-dominated occupation was peculiar in the history of international relations. Understanding both this peculiarity and how it emerged requires looking at multiple contingent factors in the history of international relations. First, unlike preceding major wars, the Allied powers after WWII imposed unconditional surrender on the defeated countries, demanding that they be subjected to total occupation by the Allied powers (Iokibe 1985a: 110). Second, the Potsdam Declaration outlined only basic principles for the occupation of Japan, in contrast to the detailed occupational policies outlined for the defeated European countries (Toyoshita 1990: 252).¹ Third, the U.S. government wasted no time developing policies for the occupation of Japan—indeed, the U.S. began this work immediately after the two countries went to war in December 1941, so that documents detailing occupational policies in Japan were already completed by

¹ These European countries included Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Germany.
Fourth, the U.S.-led occupational forces began the occupation a half year before the formal establishment of the Far Eastern Commission, the Allied power’s committee established in February 1946 for settling occupational policies in Japan (Toyoshita 1990: 252-56). The United States was thus able to begin implementing occupational policies immediately upon their arrival in Japan in September 1945.

The democratic reformation of Japan was shaped by the international political ambition of the United States and the power politics within Japan itself. First and foremost, occupational reform aimed to ensure international security, as well as U.S. security. For the United States, demilitarizing and demoralizing Japan fulfilled the ultimate objective to “insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the United States or to the peace and security of the world” (Sakamoto 1987: 44). Second, the radical democratic reform was both envisioned and enacted by U.S. occupational reformers, who were largely inspired by the political ideals of the New Deal under the Roosevelt Administration. Because of the number of actors involved in the occupation of Japan, intricate power struggles existed among the occupational forces both in Japan and the United States. But most critical to the later emergence and development of various social movements in Japan was the early domination of New Deal-minded reformers in the General Headquarters of Allied Powers (GHQ). The radical-minded reformers planned and carried out policies for restructuring political, economic, and social institutions in order to implement a democracy in Japan that they perceived as ideal. To the Japanese society, the arrival of democratic-minded reformers was, in fact, a

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2 The occupational forces stationed in Japan were comprised of forces from the United States, New Zealand, Australia, and Britain. However, U.S. occupation forces greatly dominated over the Commonwealth forces, the majority of which retreated in the latter half of the occupation of Japan.

3 The occupation forces arrived in August 28, and Japan was formally under the occupation from September 2.

4 The major actors who held decision-making power for the occupational policies in Japan were mostly U.S. authorities, including Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP, i.e., General MacArthur), GHQ (General Headquarters of Allied Powers), the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), the Department of State, U.S. presidents, and the U.S. Congress. The Allied Council, which consisted of the Allied countries, did not have substantive decision-making power.

As the studies of the occupation of Japan have revealed, complex power struggles existed among U.S. authorities over the occupational policies for Japan (see e.g., Iokibe 1985a, 1985b; Takemae 1983, 1992). However, until U.S. President Truman dismissed MacArthur in 1950, it was SCAP that had significant power to make and perform occupational policies, and no other Allied nation could challenge MacArthur’s authority (cf. Sakamoto 1987; Dower 1999: 73).
contingent and exogenous factor. However, the consequences were substantial and enduring, creating an expansion of social movements during the occupational period between 1945 and 1952 and thereafter.

The goal of this chapter is to provide a historically-grounded overview of the various social movement fields and spaces that developed leading up to the 1960 Anpo protests. To this end, the chapter examines how this social universe of movement fields and spaces expanded during the U.S. occupational period, forging forms and rules of political activism prior to the events. It highlights the way in which U.S. forces constituted an exogenous factor that impacted Japan’s domestically constructed realm for social movements. Three factors were critical in this expansion of social movements: shifts in the regulatory frameworks of the state, new political opportunities that encouraged leftist movements, and the concept of democracy—a new motivating vocabulary that inspired people to engage in political activism. I argue that U.S. occupational forces, especially liberal-minded staff members, played a significant role in expanding the societal realm of social movements in Japan. Importantly, though, the course of this expansion was non-linear, even clumsy, often appropriating old rituals and practices to interpret newly implemented democratic institutions, and experiencing “reverse course” when U.S. occupational forces started repressing radical political activism.

To shed lights on the changes in the realm of social movements of the postwar Japan, I begin by discussing the prewar period. Then, I examine the institutional changes brought by the occupational forces, how these impacted on the development of social movements, and how democracy was understood and practiced in the early occupational period. Finally, the chapter offers brief sketches of postwar movement upsurges and the 1960 Anpo protests.
2.1 Pre-History: Social Movements in the Pre-WWII Era

As contemporary scholarship in Japanese studies emphasize, the pre-WWII era in Japan is filled with examples of social uprisings and political activism. Labor unions started being organized in the late 1890s, and labor disputes, which resorted to strikes and demonstrations as we see today, surged from the 1900s onwards. Democratic movements that demanded the universal (male) suffrage spread from the late 1890s until it was institutionalized in 1925. Socialism and communism as forms of knowledge and political movements became prevalent from the late 1890s (Hoston 1986: 19-20),\(^5\) resulting not only in radical labor movements, but also the establishment of the short-lived Social-Democratic Party and Japanese Communist Party (JCP), respectively in 1901 and 1922.\(^6\) Other major protests surfaced in cities and villages between the 1900s and 1920s. Examples include the Hibiya Incendiary Incident—a city-wide riot in Tokyo—in which protesters expressed frustration at the content of the Treaty of Portsmouth that ended the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, and the Rice Riots that took place across the country resulted from the high inflation of rice prices in 1918. The period between the 1900s and 1920s marked the time when social uprisings became increasingly prevalent, perhaps not surprisingly given the country’s experience of rapid industrialization, modernization, and the course of nationalism.\(^7\)

In response, the Meiji government, which was in the process of constructing a modern and imperial Japanese nation-state comparable to European ones, imposed laws and regulations for controlling political activism. The state aimed to regulate forms of political dissent and ideology that could challenge state goals and potentially threaten the national polity. To this end, the state steadily tightened laws, emperor’s rescripts, and regulations. In 1900, the government enacted the Public Order and Police Law, which aimed to repress organized labor movements and to restrict the freedom of assemblies.

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\(^5\) Among scholars, Marxism was introduced as Western philosophies, along with Neo-Kantianism, Historicism, and Pragmatism in the early 19th century (Akimoto 2004: 18).

\(^6\) Marx and Engels’s *Communist Manifesto* (1848) was translated in Japanese in 1904.

\(^7\) As Gordon (1991) demonstrates, radical movements were not necessarily counter-nationalist movements during this time. Labor movements, which were radical in the beginning, turned into a system of governing with nationalistic discourses.
and associations of anti-government political groups. The police could break up resolve the meetings and disband organizations, and joining secret political organizations was forbidden (Mitchell 1976: 23). Through this law, the Social-Democratic Party was outlawed just two days after its establishment in 1901. Similarly, the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) was dissolved as a result of government repression in 1924, two years after the Party’s establishment.

Most critically, in 1925, the government enacted the Peace Preservation Law that limited both the ideological and political activism of organizations and individuals. Fearing the spread of leftist ideologies and movements, the government law specifically aimed to repress socialism, communism, and anarchism at the establishment of the law. In carrying out the laws, the Special Higher Police (or “thought police”) established under the Home Ministry in 1911 served as the central agency for the surveillance of political activism and ideologies of groups and individuals. The Peace Preservation Law was amended and tightened first in 1928 and then in 1941, ultimately extending the government’s ability to impose the death penalty for those deemed as subversive. As the government tightened the laws, not only leftists, but also liberalists, students, religious groups, and other political groups were under surveillance and repression. Until 1945, over 70,000 people were prosecuted and several hundred thousand people were arrested under both the Public Order and Police Law in 1900 and the Peace Preservation Law from 1925 onwards (Masujima 2007: 15).

Thus two trajectories were set in motion. On the one hand, Japan in the early twentieth century was undergoing major transitions linked to modernization, industrialization, urbanization, wars, and the course of nationalism; political activism was also high and the stage was set for an expansion of social movements. At the same time, however, Japan’s government was in the process of establishing a modern nation-state—a process that involved regulating any political activism and ideologies seen as

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8 The Meiji Constitution (the Constitution of the Empire of Japan, 1890) granted freedom of meetings and associations. However, this freedom was restricted by various laws, such as Lèse majesté (1890), the Publication Law (1893), and the Newspaper Law (1909).

9 As the case of an intellectual, Osamu Kuno, in Chapter 3 will show, suspects could be jailed for a significant period of time and be subjected to torture without prosecution.
undermining state goals or threatening the national polity. Ideologies and attempts to
delegitimize the emperors were subject to especially strict penalties, as the very
legitimacy of the Japanese modern state was founded upon the notion of a national polity
(kokutai) that centered around emperors, considered the source of sovereignty since the
birth of Japan.\textsuperscript{10} For example, the article that introduced the anarchist communism of
Kropotkin that refuted state and absolute power was banned in 1920, and author Tasuo
Morito, a junior professor of economics at Tokyo Imperial University, was purged from
the university after the trials.

Recent historiography of Japan rejects dichotomous analysis of the state and civil
society by emphasizing mutual and collaborative efforts between the two entities for
generating movements (Garon 1997; Gordon 1996; see also Gluck 1985). However,
during the prewar period, a sharply antagonistic relationship did exist between the state—
which aimed to control potentially subversive activism against its national polity—and
movement groups—which aimed to manifest their political dissent against the state. To
be sure, conflicts and antagonism also existed among political groups, especially among
leftist groups,\textsuperscript{11} but it was the antagonism between the state and political groups that was
the most critical in shaping the realm of social movements during the pre-WWII period.
The state further tightened its control over political activism and ideologies even more
when it engaged in colonial expansion and imperial wars in WWII, mobilizing its
subjects, including those in the colonies, to achieve its goals.

\textsuperscript{10} For example, the Criminal Code, enacted in 1890 with the Meiji Constitution, penalized any conduct that
violated the honor of the emperor and the imperial family.
\textsuperscript{11} The most notable example was the debate between two strands of Marxism in Japan; Kōza-ha, and Rōnō-ha. Marxist scholars and intellectuals were divided in their interpretation of the history of Japan,
particularly whether the Japanese economy had reached the stage of capitalism or not. The Kōza position argued that the Meiji Restoration was not a bourgeois revolution and that the Meiji state continued to
enforce an absolute monarch and semi-feudalistic system. Thus, they argued for overturning the emperor
system first and then moving to a socialist revolution. The Rōnō position argued that the Meiji Restoration
was a bourgeois revolution leading to the capitalist stage, and thus they argued for attaining a socialist
revolution. Many of the former group members had some connection with the Japanese Communist Party
(JCP), whereas members of the latter group were associated with socialist parties and organizations. This
divide continued during the postwar period. For more details, see Hoston (1986).
2.2 The Expansion of the Space of Social Movements: Democratic Reform

(1) Changes to the Regulatory Framework

Beginning in September 1945, the space of social movements, as well as the structure of Japanese state, shifted drastically. The formal orders by the U.S.-led occupational forces became fully active by October. On October 11, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) Douglas MacArthur issued five instructions to Prime Minister Shidehara for the democratization of Japan: 1) abolish and reform the closed juridical system, 2) promote labor unionization, 3) grant universal suffrage to women, 4) open schools to more liberal education, and 5) democratize the economy. On that day, MacArthur also ordered the “liberation of the constitution,” which would grant freedom of speech, assembly, and political activism. The occupational policies for the democratization of Japan radically and suddenly shifted the regulatory frameworks of the state—laws, regulations, and the unwritten rules that affect civil society (Pekkanen 2006: 15), thereby expanding the chances for developing social movements.

As MacArthur’s five instructions directed, liberating political activism and promoting labor movements were two major areas for the democratic reform of Japan. The impact of the reform was significant, especially for leftist movements. On October 4, prior to the above-mentioned instructions, MacArthur directed the removal of restrictions on political, civil, and religious liberties (SCAPIN-93, the so-called Civil-Liberties Directive). This directive specifically requested the abolishment of the Special Higher

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12 As discussed in Chapter 1, the “space of social movements” is not to be confused with “social movement space.” The former refers to the societal arena in which different kinds of social movements develop; while the latter distinguishes between two different levels and types—social movement fields, and social movement spaces—that constitute the latter.

13 Since Japan was under the indirect rule of U.S.-led Allied powers, orders and instructions of the occupational policies were directed to the Japanese government. GHQ/SCAP issued orders at different levels of formality and coercion. The formal orders were issued under the title of “SCAPIN” (abbreviation of SCAP instructions) and were officially recorded, while other orders were issued as “instructions” or “suggestions” and were orally delivered. When the Japanese government was hesitant to follow instructions and suggestions, GHQ/SCAP sometimes threatened government officials that they would change their orders to “directives” or “orders,” which would be more coercive (Takemae 1983: 96).

14 An event providing significant impetus here was Marxist philosopher Kiyoshi Miki’s death due to poor hygiene while in prison in September 1945, prompting U.S. authorities to release political prisoners. The circumstances of political prisoners were uncovered by foreign journalists (Takemae 1978).
Police and the repressive judicial system, and the release of political prisoners—often left-wing critics of the government—from jail. Following MacArthur’s order, important personnel of the JCP and hundreds of other JCP members were released. The release of resilient communist members, who had resisted the wartime regime, was welcomed with enthusiasm of the supporters. Hundreds of people gathered at the gate of the detention center on the day when JCP leader Kyūichi Tokuda, who had been imprisoned for 18 years, and Yoshio Shiga, another leading member of the JCP who had been imprisoned for 17 years, were freed, along with 14 other communist members (Takemae 1978: 168).

Relieved from repression, leftist groups quickly began the establishment of political parties and organization. In December 1945, the JCP was reestablished for the first time legally, with party policies that advocated a two-stage revolution—overturning the emperor system and moving to a socialist revolution—and a “peaceful revolution” that would not resort to violence, to fit to Japan’s situation (Hoston 1986: 266-67). The JCP leading members’ backgrounds as long-term political prisoners motivated other leftists and activists to join the JCP. In the case of socialists, the move for the establishment of their party began right after the war’s end, slightly earlier than that of the JCP (Fukunaga 1995: 291-92). Then, by incorporating a wide range of factions, including left-wing socialists, right-wing socialists, and communists, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) was established in November 1945. Soon, both JCP and JSP became major forces in organizing labor movements, as I shall discuss shortly. But it was the GHQ/SCAP’s political reformation that encouraged leftist activism and the consequent establishment of political parties, which led to organizing further political activism.

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15 According to Takemae (1978: 168, 190), approximately 3,000 political prisoners were in prison, and 2,465 political prisoners were released.
16 In contrast, conservatives were purged and their movements were restricted under the occupation.
17 The JCP’s new party line was heavily influenced by the old one drafted in 1932, given the influence of leading JCP members who had been imprisoned for decades from the prewar era (Scalapino 1966: 52). However, two changes were made: the occupational forces were considered to be a liberating force, and a Bolshevik-style violent revolution was abandoned (Hoston 1986: 266-67).
18 Note that unlike communists, only a few socialist activists were imprisoned before the end of WWII.
U.S. occupational forces also radically promoted labor reform. They considered the reformation of labor relations to be an important means by which the occupational reform could promote democratization and prevent re-militarization. This broad goal had two major foci. The first was turning “feudalistic” labor relationships that were based on coercion—as seen in human trafficking at mines and textile factories—into “modern” labor relationships that were based on individual contract (Watanabe 1991: 33). The second was to abolish the nation-wide labor unions, such as the Industrial Patriotic Associations (Sagyō Hōkoku Kai) and Patriotic Labor Associations (Rōmu Hōkoku Kai), that the old regime utilized to mobilize members for the total-war effort during WWII, and to reorganize unions as a democratic force (cf. Takemae 1992: 319). Thus, labor reforms specifically aimed at establishing modern labor relations and a modern work force (Takemae 1973: 68; Takemae 1992: 329).

The labor reform was well planned by their various sections of the occupational forces, starting from 1944, and was swiftly implemented. Workers’ rights were granted by various laws much earlier than the rights that the postwar constitution granted for its nationals. The first reform, the Trade Union Law that defined the right to organize and the right of collective bargaining was passed in December 1945 by the Diet. It was the first time that workers in Japan had the right to organize. In September 1946, the Labor Relations Adjustment Law was enacted, inaugurating labor relations commissions at the national and local levels to intervene in labor disputes. In addition, GHQ prohibited, in principle, the police from intervening in labor disputes (Takemae 1982: 81).

19 To note, not only the occupational reformers, but also Japanese intellectuals thought that Japanese society should attain the transition from a premodern to modern one.
20 Those sections included the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Department of War, SWNCC, the Subcommittee for the Far East, and the Far Eastern Commission (Takemae 1992).
21 Discussion of drafting the Labor Union Law existed during the prewar period in Japan, but the draft was not placed before the parliament. The Labor Union Law of 1945 was drafted by Japanese bureaucrats who aimed to impose order on unionized workers who might otherwise attack the capitalist system, but it turned out to be a progressive measure that granted unprecedented rights and protection to organized workers (Gordon 1998: 55).
22 Since the nature of the law was to prevent strikes and lockouts by mediating labor disputes, the effect of the law on labor movements is controversial; it sometimes “cut the teeth of the dispute” (see Gordon 1998: 56).
23 The police were sometimes involved at the request of companies at massive labor disputes during the early postwar period. A notable example is the dispute at the Yomiuri Newspaper Company in 1946.
democratizing labor relations (Takemae 1992: 315), and thus GHQ/SCAP encouraged and endorsed workers’ unionization. As was directed in MacArthur’s directive of October 11, 1945, GHQ urged companies to form labor unions and actively promoted the establishment of the federation of labor unions by recruiting leading labor union members. Thus, the Japan Council of Industrial Labor Unions (the so-called Sanbetsu federation), which later turned into a rebellious force against GHQ and organized radical labor movements, was established in August 1946.\(^{24}\)

In this way, the regulatory frameworks of the state largely shifted because of the occupational reforms that encouraged and endorsed the expansion of various forms of political activism and social movements. Figure 2.1 illustrates the political institutions that affected the space of social movements during the occupational period between 1945 and 1952. Political opportunity structures that would affect the emergence and course of social movements were actually confined largely by the regulatory framework of the state where the occupational forces, the exogenous forces, had strong influence on during this time period in Japan.

\(^{24}\) For more details regarding the federation, see Chapter 5.
The degree of reform enacted by the occupational forces went beyond what the Japanese government had originally imagined. The Higashikuninomiya cabinet (August 1945 - October 1945) had planned to lift the restriction on freedom of speech. However, the national polity was to continue to center around the emperor, and thus the government planned to keep the penalty for offenses against the emperor and the imperial family. Moreover, to prevent possible uprisings of both communists and right-wing activists who were discontent with Japan’s defeat and surrender, the government had even planned to expand the powers of the Special Higher Police. Under the conditions of the occupation, however, it was not the Japanese government but SCAP/GHQ that took the role of commanding and planning reform. Thus, despite the assertion that the occupation was a form of “indirect” rule, the fact that SCAP’s orders for the democratic reformation were issued without any advance notification to or consultation with the Japanese government
only made the latter realize the domination of the occupational powers (Amakawa 1995: 240).  

Thanks to GHQ/SCAP and the liberal-minded reformers, the space of social movements largely expanded in postwar Japan. By the end of 1945, the number of unionized workers reached 6.2 million (Hōsei Daigaku Ōhara Shakai Mondai Kenkyūjo 1949, vol. 22: 104). These unionized workers organized themselves not only for economic issues, such as wage raises, but also for political issues, such as the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which determined the independence of Japan. It is important to note that GHQ/SCAP promoted political activism in Japan only to the extent that it would not counteract GHQ/SCAP’s occupation. Indeed, when activism went beyond the expectations of the occupational forces, GHQ/SCAP intervened. As I will discuss in a later section, GHQ/SCAP aborted the first nation-wide general strikes planned in February 1947. Moreover, the laws and regulations concerning labor relations became restrictive in the second stage of the occupation, as civil servants were deprived of their right to strike in 1948. Notwithstanding these efforts to safeguard the occupational goals above all else, the U.S. occupational forces substantially transformed the regulatory framework of the Japanese state, thus expanding the space for political activism and social movements in Japan.

(2) New Political Opportunities

The social movement space of postwar Japan also expanded via new political opportunities, factors that indirectly shaped the timing and efficacy of groups to organize (McAdam [1996] 2008: 29; Pekkanen 2006: 19-21). The formal establishment of the

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25 To offer a brief international comparison, while the Japanese occupation was nominally indirect rule, the German occupation was under direct rule and divide-and-rule, and there were no occupying forces on the ground in Italy. Other vanquished countries, including Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania, were indirectly ruled by the Soviet Union after WWII. Other areas, such as the Okinawan islands and South Korea, were under the direct rule of the U.S. military.

26 Chapter 5 explores the differences of economic and political struggles in detail.

27 Scholars in political science and sociology have defined political opportunities differently sometimes by including environmental factors (McAdam [1996] 2008: 27). However, existing literature on social movements by and large argues that political opportunities are the middle range of political structures that
JCP and the JSP, as well as the networks of the leftist political parties with movement groups, helped to organize radical movements. Furthermore, a rivalry between the JCP and the JSP created competition among labor unions under each camp, which resulted in the growth and radicalization of labor movements. One of the most significant developments that encouraged labor movements was the birth of the socialist cabinet that existed between May 1947 and March 1948.

The establishment of the Katayama cabinet—the first cabinet led by the JSP—was partly a product of GHQ/SCAP’s intervention. MacArthur, who halted the general strike in February 1947 and was concerned about the level of workers’ frustration, directed the Japanese government to call for a general election (Takemae 1982: 177). When the election returns showed the JSP to be the leading party, the results were just as MacArthur and GHQ both expected and hoped. MacArthur had earlier suggested that the Japanese government tackle the issue of economic improvement and the economic crisis, but the preceding cabinets, run by the Liberal Party, had not been successful (Fukunaga 1995: 291-92). GHQ—and particularly the Government Section (GS), the central section of GHQ that took charge of the reform of the Japanese government—was especially keen for the JSP to seize the government given the worsening economic conditions and the increasing frustration of workers (Fukunaga 1995: 291-92). The formation of the first socialist cabinet was thus something that U.S. occupational forces not only wanted, but also intervened to ensure by directing the election.

The formation of this first socialist cabinet served to create political opportunities for labor unions in two ways. In the beginning, the very fact of the creation of a socialist cabinet included: i) the presence and absence of elite allies, ii) the stability or instability of elite alignments, iii) the divisions within the elites, and iv) the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system (Brockett 1991; Tarrow 1994). For the rivalry relationship between the JCP and the JSP, see footnote 11 in this chapter.

There were attempts to form the people’s fronts that united the JCP and the JSP. However, except for a few examples in local areas, particularly the one in Kyōto, no successful united people’s front existed (see Matsuo 2002).

The cabinet was formed through party collision among the JSP, the Japan Democratic Party, and the National Cooperative Party.
The next section will unfold the detail of this general strike.
The intervention was relatively indirect, but at other times, MacArthur intervened more directly in the selection of prime ministers during the occupation.
cabinet encouraged workers. High expectations that the socialist cabinet would benefit the workers led to a surge in strikes from July 1947 onwards, and a rally to support the Kabayama cabinet attracted 30,000 laborers in July (Monogatari Sengo Rōdō Undōshi Kankō Inkai, hereafter, MSRUKI 1997, vol. 2: 52; Rōdōshō 1947: 1047). However, it did not take long for the socialist cabinet to incur workers’ frustration when it did not meet these expectations and the demands of left-minded activists and labor unions. Union activism was sparked when the government proposed an emergency economic plan in July 1947 to relieve the economic hardships of workers faced with rapidly inflated food prices. Specifically, a provision to raise the monthly wage to 1,800 yen across industries invited unions’ disputes because some unions proposed different calculations and the wage was not paid as it was proposed. The Japan Postal Workers’ Union and the National Railway Workers’ Union, the major unions in civil service, organized walkouts and rallies, and the disputes continued toward the end of the year (Ōkōchi and Matsuo 1969: 238-43).

The opposition to the emergency economic plan and the Katayama cabinet were eased through the mediation of GHQ; nonetheless, the cabinet resigned en masse in February 1948. This was partly due to the protests against the government’s economic emergency plan, but more importantly, due to an internal dispute that split the JSP into right-wing and left-wing factions over the budget plan (Ōkōchi and Matsuo 1969: 250-54). That the first socialist cabinet ended with an internal dispute created disillusionment with the JSP, especially among leftist intellectuals who had close ties with the JSP. During Katayama’s appointment, some of these intellectuals, particularly Marxist economists at the University of Tokyo, had attempted to influence the direction of the economy by advocating for policies that would benefit workers and laborers.

The extant literature on political opportunity structure argues that acquiring allies from political elites helps movement organizations for their mobilization (McAdam [1996] 2008, Tarrow 1998). However, in the case of the Katayama cabinet, it was the failed alliance between the political elites and movement groups that instigated the movements. In April 1947, the average monthly salary in the manufacturing industry was 1,068 yen (Rōdōshō 1947: 1049).

In addition to the formation of the first socialist cabinet, the Ministry of Labor, which took charge of promoting the welfare of laborers and implementing labor policies, established under the Katayama cabinet in September 1947, further encouraged labor unions and activists. This was partly because the important personnel of the ministry—the minister and the junior cabinet minister—were former active union leaders. The Ministry of Labor, in fact, sometimes developed policies through meetings with major union representatives (Rōdōshō 1947: 878-79).
government economic policies. But disappointed by the ideological disputes within the party, these Marxist intellectuals later dissociated themselves from the JSP (Hein 2004: 120).\textsuperscript{35}

Short-lived though it was, the first socialist cabinet illustrates the political opportunities that spurred the growth of movements, especially those of workers, during the occupational period. The evidence shows that these new political opportunities were created by the occupational forces. GHQ/SCAP were pivotal in not only legalizing left-wing political parties and activism, but also intentionally, albeit indirectly helping to form the first socialist cabinet.\textsuperscript{36}

(3) The Surge of the Movements

The democratic reforms of the occupational forces gave movement organizations and unions the license and space to organize and reorganize themselves. The minority groups reestablished their organizations at the national level to promote equal rights. The Ainu—an indigenous people, most of whom live in Hokkaidō, Japan’s northern island—built the Hokkaidō Ainu Association, the first such inclusive association in February 1946. In the same month, the Burakumin—a social minority group comprised of outcast communities from the feudal era—reorganized their organization into the National Committee for Buraku Liberation, which ultimately aimed for an inclusive movement organization that could also involve non-Burakumin. Once women were granted suffrage,

\textsuperscript{35} To the labor movements, the dissolution of the Katayama cabinet seemed to have little significant impact. The major unions, such as the Japan Postal Workers’ Union, protested against the new cabinet over the wage system. And the anti-JCP movements grew stronger among the labor unions, resulting later in the new federation against JCP’s hegemony. For more details, see Chapter 5.

\textsuperscript{36} The occupational forces were selective in promoting certain kinds of organizations, while discouraging or repressing others—especially nationalist organizations and groups (see Kage 2011: 19-43, 46). However, some conservative movements gained new political opportunities by associating themselves with allies in ruling parties or by connecting themselves directly to governmental projects. Such movements and movement organizations included the domestic product movement that encouraged consumers to buy domestically produced goods, the repatriates’ movements that demanded compensation for lost property, and the Japan Association of War-Bereaved Families that asked for commemoration of their deceased family members (Gordon 2005: 256-60; Seraphim 2006).
a group of female politicians was elected to the congress in April 1946. Housewives organized themselves for consumer movements in the early postwar period (see Itô 2011); and in the 1950s, groups and organizations of mothers largely organized themselves against nuclear war (see Mackie 2003). Encouraged and endorsed by the occupational forces, unions flourished as well. Farmers’ movements crystallized with the re-establishment of the Japan Farmers’ Union in February 1946, and “militant teachers” (Duke 1973) organized themselves in June 1947 into the Japan Teachers Union, one of the most radical unions that subsequently organized various other movements, such as peace movements and protests against the Teachers’ Merit Rating System, as I will discuss shortly.

Movements were organized not only by movement groups but also by a variety of voluntary groups. The so-called circles—associations for cultural activities where people gathered for reading books, hobbies, learning specific subjects, or discussing social issues—served as crucial locations for mobilization around social issues in which members were interested. Historically, the circles were organized by left-wing groups in the 1930s (Gordon 2005: 256). Later, during the war, they served for both political and non-political purposes, as some were organized by political parties and unions, but others were organized as non-partisan and political (Gordon 2005: 270). Throughout the postwar period, the circles, as voluntary associations, helped to forge various movements. The movements of intellectuals, students, and workers that the subsequent chapters will examine sometimes collaborated with these associations, and used them as a resource for mobilization.

37 In the general election, 39 females were elected, comprising 8.4 percent of the members of the Lower House (Mackie 2003: 123-24). This was the highest proportion of women in the House of Representatives until 2005.
Figure 2.2  The Ruins of the Buildings in Tokyo

Note: The picture is taken around Tokyo Station. Except for the large buildings that remain, all other buildings were burned down by the air-raids. Photo: Taiheiyō Sensō Kenyūkai (2007: 208).

When the ban on public protests was lifted in October 1945 with the abolishment of the Peace Preservation Law, protesters came out to the streets and parks. The “People’s Plaza” located outside the Imperial Palace was a main site for protests during the occupation era. A most notable contestation made on the streets immediately after the war concerned food shortages (Itō 2011: 217; Umeda 2007). The exhausting war, the deprivation of the agricultural labor force, the destruction wrought by air-raids, and a sudden increase in the population as a result of six million repatriates, caused severe

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38 The U.S. bombed 90 cities in Japan between 1944 and 1945 and two and a half million dwellings were wholly or partly destroyed (Tipton 2002: 143). Air raids particularly targeted Tokyo, bombing the city 130 times over 9 months until the war-end (Hiratsuka 1995: 98). The largest air-raid in Tokyo, on March 10, 1945, killed over 80,000 people and burned 268,000 dwellings (Hiratsuka 1995: 100-01).

39 At the time of the war’s end, approximately 6.74 million Japanese people were in Japanese colonies and combat areas (Fujiwara 1975: 31).
food shortages in cities and towns across the country. Roughly 9 million people in Japan are said to have been homeless at the end of the war (Dower 1999: 47-8). The rice ration—about two cups a day—was often delayed or canceled, and hunger and starvation became pressing social issues (Umeda 2007: 26). In addition, skyrocketing inflation added economic difficulties to people’s lives. Political parties, including both ruling and oppositional parties, campaigned on promises to solve the problems. Unions organized street protests. Workers, farmers, and citizens combined with union members at the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry organized a movement organization the Kantoh Democratic Association for Food (Kanto Shokuryō Minshu Kyōgikai), which asked solutions for food shortages and wage raise in January 1946 (Umeda 2007: 31-3).

The demands for food and wage increases intensified more than ever in 1946, resulting in three major waves of protest and the culmination of antagonism with both the government and GHQ/SCAP. In the first wave in April, approximately 70,000 protesters held a rally in Hibiya Park—a central park in downtown Tokyo, located by Kasumigaski government district, demanding food and the overturn of the Shidehara cabinet (October 1945 – May 1946) (Umeda 2007: 34). The second wave was on May 1, at a May Day Rally, the first time in eleven years that such a rally could be held as the state had previously banned a May Day rally in 1936. On that day, approximately 500,000 people rallied in the People’s Plaza outside the Imperial Palace and demanded relief from starvation, and the establishment of a people’s front (Umeda 2007: 34; MSRUKI 1997, vol.1: 132). A few weeks after, on May 19, the third wave, “Food May Day,” was organized. Approximately, 250,000 protesters gathered in the People’s Plaza in front of the Imperial Palace (Umeda 2007: 35). As the next section will discuss, importantly, the

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40 Food shortages were, however, a long-standing problem and had begun in some parts of the country before the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 (Dower 1999: 90).  
41 The newspaper, for example, reported that six homeless people starved to death in Tokyo in one day (Asahi Shinbun, November, 18, 1945).  
42 The cost of living index was 14.8 times higher in Tokyo and 22 times higher in Osaka in January 1946 than in 1937 (Oguma 2002: 60). The inflation did not stabilize until 1949. In the four years after the end of WWII, the price level had risen 150 times (quoted in Gordon 1998: 5), and people in Tokyo suffered from serious food shortage, inflation, and the arrears of pay during that time (Itō 2011: 217).  
43 Demonstrations were ended by police fire and the U.S. Army. Some were injured, but none died (MSRUKI 1997, vol.1: 128)  
44 The first May Day organized by labor unions was held in 1920 in Japan. May Day in 1946 also marked the 17th celebration after the interval.
emperor was the target to whom protesters addressed their demands. In fact, some protesters referred to him as the supreme sovereign, while other protesters visited the Imperial Household Agency, along with the office of the Prime Minister and the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department, for their appeal.  

Antagonistic mass protests climaxed at the aborted February 1 General Strikes of 1947. Throughout 1946, the establishment unions and union federations continued to proliferate, and unions especially at public offices largely organized themselves to demand wage increases and overturning the Yoshida cabinet (the 1st Yoshida cabinet, May 1946 – May 1947) toward the end of 1946. The government response only intensified the protests. Yoshida’s remark on New Year’s Day in 1947 that the protesters were “lawless people” (“futei no yakara”) sparked workers’ anger. With demands for wage increases, special allowances, the introduction of a minimum wage plan, and the overturn of the cabinet, 33 unions and 6 million union members—of which 2.6 million workers were civil servants—were ready to go on strike (Fukunaga 1995: 290; Yamada 2007: 95). The JCP and JCP-affiliated unions planned to build the people’s front, while the JSP and the JSP-affiliated unions demanded the overturn of the Yoshida cabinet. But it was at this point that GHQ/SCAP intervened. GHQ staff member William F. Murcutt—a chief of the Economic and Scientific Section—called on union representatives and “advised” them to cancel the strike. Furthermore, on the day before the general strike that was planned, MacArthur issued a final order to cancel the strike, and the union leaders complied.  

While antagonistic mass protests against the government lessened after the aborted 1 February General Strike in 1947, other nationwide political activism was on the

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45 The last wave of food protests elicited MacArthur’s repressive indictment on the following day, when he stated that “disorderly minorities” (a phrase rendered as bōmin demo in Japanese, which literally means “mob demonstration”) would not be permitted (Dower 1999: 265).
46 On New Year’s Day in 1947, Prime Minister Yoshida’s statement was broadcast over the radio, saying that labor disputes, strikes, and demonstrations were creating social disorder, but that those “lawless people” did not represent the majority of the nationals (quoted in Fujiwara 1975: 109).
47 The National Public Service Law enacted originally in October 1947 did not restrict the rights of civil servants. But, in July 1948, MacArthur issued an order depriving civil servants of the right to strike and the right to collective bargaining. It was enacted and enforced in December 1948.

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rise.\textsuperscript{48} Two major forms of activism could be seen in peace movements and democratic movements, which the following chapters will discuss in detail. During the occupational period, both peace and democratic movements were potentially antagonistic against the state and sometimes made controversial claims against the occupational forces. Some peace movements advocated peace claimed by the Soviet Union in the context of the Cold War,\textsuperscript{49} and the debate and activism concerning the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty revealed the opposition against the U.S.-dominated peace treaty conclusion.\textsuperscript{50} However, these movements were not overly antagonistic, unlike the cases that I have examined. The U.S. occupational forces, as well as U.S. forces after Japan’s independence in 1952, sometimes oversaw movement organizations and protests on the sites, but rarely intervened in them directly. Both peace and democratic movements in Japan continued to expand throughout the 1950s.\textsuperscript{51}

2.3 Democracy in Transition

The space of social movements also shifted along cultural dimensions. Democracy not only resulted in institutional changes, but also motivated people to organize various sorts of political activism. Similar to the “motivational framing” that scholars identify in social movement mobilization (Snow and Benford 1988),\textsuperscript{52} the concept of democracy served as “cultural idiom,” an anonymously developed signifier for a long period of time that motivated people’s actions and thoughts, and shaped society’s

\textsuperscript{48} The last and most radical protests during the occupational era occurred on May Day in 1952, when there were bloody clashes between protesters and the police in the People’s Plaza, leading to the application of the Mayhem Law.
\textsuperscript{49} Communist countries advocated peace against capitalist counties, which, according especially to Lenin, cause wars.
\textsuperscript{50} For the debates on the San Francisco Peace Treaty, see Section Four of this chapter and Chapter 3.
\textsuperscript{51} The details of these movements are beyond the focus of this dissertation; however, peace movements manifested as anti-U.S. base movements in the 1950s and caused concern amongst army officials in the U.S. government. For the United States, such anti-U.S. sentiments and movements in Japan fuelled fears that the latter could become involved in the Soviet Union block. These concerns animated, in part, the U.S. motivation to negotiate the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty (see Sakamoto 2000: 191-203).
\textsuperscript{52} Drawing on Erving Goffman, Snow et al. (1986: 464) argues that frame denotes “schemata of interpretation” that enable individuals to locate, perceive, identify, and label events. In social movement literature, framing is counted as a resource utilized for mobilization processes.
transition (Skocpol 1985: 91). Democracy—physically and symbolically associated with the actual Diet Building, served as a major political concept to motivate people for contentious politics in Japan until 1960. It constituted an ideal political concept, but one which allowed the competition of different ideals both in the pre-and post-WWII periods.

(1) Peace and Democracy as Ideals

In the attempt to rebuild their nation-state after the war, people discussed their new society together with the concepts of “culture,” “science,” and “bright and new life (akarui shin seikatu).” “New” and “bright” were frequently used adjectives in discussions of the ideal society (Gordon 2005: 256). Among those politically motivating concepts, “peace” and “democracy” constituted the most enduring concepts in the debates and activism regarding the construction of postwar Japanese society (Gordon 2005: 261). Broadly speaking, discussion and activism regarding these concepts emerged not so much from any pre-existing philosophical tradition rooted in Japan, but rather in relation to the regrets, devastation, and hardships of war (Michiba 2005: 251). Nonetheless, the concepts of peace and democracy were politically loaded, generating “symbolic struggles” (Bourdieu 1991: 241-42) over the legitimate definition of the concepts and struggles for domination. The section below describes the larger historical context of the meanings of peace and democracy.

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53 Arguing against the concept of ideology that scholars have used in accounting for social transformation, Skocpol (1985: 91) claims that rather than ideology, which is an intentionally developed system of ideas, anonymously developed cultural idioms serve as motivational political discourses.

54 The People’s Plaza served as the major site for protests between 1946 and 1950. In 1951, the U.S. forces prohibited protests at the People’s Plaza; and in the following year, there were severe clashes between the police and protesters who asked for permission to use the square for May Day. Since then, although it is not prohibited to hold rallies, the square has not been used much for protests. See http://www.jcp.or.jp/akahata/aik07/2008-05-01/ftp20080501faq12_01_0.html (Retrieved February 27, 2012).

As the next section will discuss, in the 1960 Anpo protests, the Diet Building constituted the major site for the protests.

55 Yamamoto (2006: 16-9) also argues that unlike the case in European countries and the United States, the pacifism of the peace movements in Japan was based not on religious beliefs or liberalism, but on the experience of war.

See Chapter 3 for the basis of intellectuals’ political activism.

56 To note, in Bourdieu’s definition, symbolic struggles primarily concern the definition of the field.
Peace did not simply mean anti-war during the prewar period in Japan. Although originally associated with anti-war and anti-armament, and influenced by European political philosophy and Christianity (Ishida 1989: 4-81), by the end of WWII, the concept of peace was largely mobilized in support of expanding Japan’s colonies and, paradoxically, engaging in wars in order to establish peace in Asia (or the East, Tōyō). In the postwar period, the concept of peace was used less to advocate war, but was linked with other political ideas such as democratization, economics, and human rights, resulting in nation-wide peace movements (Yamamoto 2006: 20).

It is also worth noting that in political discourse in Japan, the concept of peace divided the socialist and communist camp, which together opposed re-armament and constitutional reforms, from the conservative camp, which supported the re-armament and constitutional reforms. The socialist and communist camp advocated peace because, in line with the Soviet Union, they opposed the American imperialism that would invite Japan to engage in wars as a consequence of the development of capitalism (Michiba 2005: 245). In so doing, the communist-socialist camp also opposed the constitutional reform that would change Article 9, which states that Japan forever renounces the armament for wars of aggression. Leftist peace movement and grassroots peace movements converged into a long-standing nation-wide peace movement, which later comprised the anti-U.S. base movements and “ban-the-bomb” movements of the 1950s.

The concept of democracy was also based on western political philosophies and first debated during the early Meiji period (1868-1912). In the attempts to establish both the modern Japanese nation-state and the political culture to sustain the nation-state, the concept of democracy was modified to suit Japan’s political goals. Different translations of the very term developed: among others, minponshugi (民本主義) and minshushugi (民

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57 For example, the Sino-Japanese War in 1894-1895 was fought for peace, progress, and civilization in the East (Ishida 1989: 24-6).
58 The ideological divide in Japanese politics has been over whether they supported rearmament or oppose it, rather than over whether they were radical or conservative, as seen in the major division of European politics.

In the early 1950s, socialist and communist parties began calling themselves progressives (kakushin) rather than radicals (kūshin) (Miyazaki 1995: 226-27).
were the most lasting Japanese translations, which utilized Chinese characters, during the Taishō period (1912-1926) (Meyer and Hashimoto 2003). The translation *minponshugi*, strongly advocated by Sakuzō Yoshino (1878-1933), a political philosopher at Tokyo Imperial University, became the most popular early translation when the concept was first introduced in Japan. *Minponshugi* meant “government for the people,” in which the fundamental end of the exercise of the nation’s sovereignty was the people, and the emperor held the sovereign right (Meyer and Hashimoto 2003: 307). In contrast, the translation that later became the standard, *minshushugi*, added the notion of the “government of the people and by the people,” whereby the people held sovereign right (Meyer and Hashimoto 2003: 307). However, even *minshushugi* was interpreted as democracy that bestowed the supreme sovereign power on the emperor, the throne of Japan’s national polity, under the Meiji and Shōwa imperial periods. This conceptualization was manifested in the Meiji Constitution that lasted until the end of WWII. The debates on democracy in pre-WWII period in Japan rarely envisioned subjects as unconfined to the emperor’s sovereignty.60

The political system of Japan, which centered on the emperor, drastically changed after the occupational forces’ reform. During the postwar period, *minshushugi* and *demokurashi* (デモクラシー)—a phonetic expression of democracy written in *katakana* characters used for transliterating foreign words—became the standard translations for democracy. While Japanese scholars have emphasized that postwar democracy was built upon the preceding ideas and institutions that developed during the prewar period (cf. Amamiya 2008), even today, only nine percent of people in Japan perceive postwar democracy as the continuance of prewar democracy (Ikeda and Kohno 2008: 167).

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59 The Japanese language used to borrow Chinese characters, often with compound words consisting of a pair of Chinese characters for translating foreign words that did not exist in the vocabulary of the Japanese language. This was the case for translations of democracy. But note that since 1920, many foreign words were phonetically adopted and written in *katakana* characters, the simplest Japanese script (Meyer and Hashimoto 2003: 304).

For a discussion of semiology in translating western political concepts in Japan, see Howland (2002).

60 Gordon (1991, 1996) emphasizes that political movements, especially labor movements, laid the foundations of democratic popular movements that could potentially go beyond the limitations of what he names imperial democracy that existed before 1931-2.

61 The issue of whether the democracy promoted by the occupational forces in Japan was “new” or not constitutes one of the most contentious debates among Japanese scholars (Gluck 1983).
Indeed, it was the U.S.-led occupational forces that promoted the idea of democracy by separating it from the political ideology of imperial Japan and promulgating the new idea that sovereignty resides with the people. As a cultural idiom and a motivational framing, democracy promoted various movements in Japan, as the following chapters will seek to examine. I turn next to what ideals of democracy the U.S. occupational reformers attempted to implement in Japan.

(2) Democracy, An American Ideal

In democratizing Japan, the occupational forces enforced decentralizing policies to reform political, economic, and social institutions. The elite school system, which was modeled partly after that of Germany, was reformed into an egalitarian school system. The Ministry of Education was stripped of its decision-making power; instead, boards of education, to which members were elected by local residents, were established and given policy-making power. The status system, as represented by the nobility system and the House of Lords, was abolished. Farming land was redistributed to tenant farmers from the hands of their landlords; and the zaibatsu, Japanese industrial and financial business conglomerates, were dissolved. In addition, although it was short-lived, the occupational forces also reestablished a decentralized police system in which the municipal police (jichitai keisatsu) had a certain degree of autonomy, were independent of the National Police Agency, and were controlled by municipal public safety commissions (Takemae 1992: 275-304). The long-standing ideals of America’s democracy were, first, the principles of decentralization and local government, and second, the construction of a society where individuals and non-governmental associations undertook initiatives for politics outside the state (Garon 1997: 150). The occupational reformers attempted to implement those principles of decentralized and grassroots-based civil society onto Japanese soil.

62 Extensive research exists that shows how the Japanese government failed to draft a new constitution that guaranteed the principle of popular sovereignty when GHQ/SCAP ordered it for the first time (Bix 2000: 567-79; Dower 1999: 346-404; McNelly 1987; Mikuriya 1995). The next section will further explore the history of drafting Japan’s new constitution.
63 For the school system, see Chapter 4.
The democracy that the U.S. occupational forces promoted in Japan, however, was an idealized one, some aspects of which were not realized even in their home country. The separation of state and religion, and the separation of state and private organizations, for example, were more rigorously implemented in Japan. In the United States, the separation between the two was sometimes blurry—for example, the state subsidized religious and charitable organizations for providing welfare services. However, in Japan, the occupational forces ordered the Japanese government to stop mobilizing private groups—notably neighborhood associations—to carry out governmental functions (Garon 1997: 150-51).64 Another example concerns the implementation of universal suffrage. Largely owing to the efforts of twenty-two year old GHQ staff member Beate Sirota, who drafted a bill of civil liberties with another GHQ staff member,65 universal suffrage was granted to women in Japan at a time when obstructionist voting practices were still disenfranchising many African-Americans in the United States. The Constitution’s Article 14, which Sirota drafted for Japan, states that “[a]ll people are equal under the law and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin” (quoted in Pharr 1987: 224).66

Democratization was implemented not only through institutional reform, but also by mobilizing symbols of democracy. The occupation staff introduced cultural symbols to Japan that would demonstrate and teach the ideals of democracy. American cultural and commercial goods—such as jeeps, chewing gum, chocolate, jazz, baseball, refrigerators, and nylon stockings—signified a bright, new, and advanced life, not just a lifestyle (see Yasuda 2005: 132). Furthermore, American films and cartoons served as a medium through which Japanese people could learn of the idealized version of American

64 The order was also inserted in the Constitution. Article 89 prohibits public money and property from being spent for any religious institutions or for any charitable organizations (quoted in Garon 1997: 151).
65 Born in Vienna 1923, Sirota lived in Japan for about ten years, starting as a young child, after her father took a position at the Imperial Academy of Music teaching piano. Sirota went to the United States for her undergraduate education and worked in broadcasting and journalism thereafter. As soon as the war ended, she went to Japan to look for her parents left in Japan, and quickly got a job with SCAP. As one of the few people who was completely bilingual in Japanese and English, and who had experience living in Japan, she was appointed to an important post in GHQ, despite her youth (Pharr 1987: 230; also see Dower 1999: 365-66).
66 I will discuss the history of the drafting the constitution in the next subsection.
While the occupation forces imposed censorship on films, music, theatrical performances, books, paintings, and other cultural products within Japan (Hirano 1998; Yamamoto 1996), they enthusiastically imported films, cartoons, and magazines that portrayed the positive sides of democracy idealized in the United States. As examples, American films, such as *Madame Curie* (1943), *His Butler’s Sister* (1943), and *Abe Lincoln in Illinois* (1940), were imported and screened in 1946 (Tanikawa 2002: 281-96). The popular cartoon *Blondie*, which was reprinted in Japanese magazines and newspapers between 1946 and 1951, depicted the lives of an affluent and egalitarian American middle-class nuclear family.67 A monthly American magazine, *Reader’s Digest*, which was translated into Japanese and sold 1,400,000 copies in 1949, played a similar role in narrating ideals of American democracy (Yasuda 2005: 134-35).

The notable point is that the cultural medium imported in Japan portrayed the positive aspects of American democracy exclusively. The occupational reformers did not import American films that touched on poverty, racism, corruption, or war. Popular films in the United States during the same period, such as *The Grapes of Wrath* (1940, on poverty), *Gone with the Wind* (1939, on racism), *Citizen Kane* (1941, on corruption), and *The Great Dictator* (1940, on war), were screened in Japan only after 1960 (quoted in Yasuda 2005: 132). Similarly, the cartoon *Blondie* did not illustrate social problems, politics, societal competition, war, or unhappy family relationships—elements that would have existed in a realistic depiction (Yasuda: 2005: 132).

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67 Originally, the series *Blondie* began in 1930 in the United States.
As discussed above, the occupational reformers selectively introduced the ideals of democracy to Japan. In addition, as Figure 2.3 illustrates, the occupational policies were carried out to affirm the legitimacy of the U.S.-led indirect rule in Japan. Thus, as I discussed previously, the occupational forces permitted political activism in Japan only to the extent that it did not conflict with occupational policies. In addition, they enforced strict and extensive censorship, prohibiting, for example, criticisms of the U.S. occupation, and of the U.S. and British capitalism (Yamamoto 1996: 595-601). However, it is still true that MacArthur and “New Dealers” in GHQ were highly inspired to be the
reformers of Japan that were going to reconstruct the nation. MacArthur, as he portrayed himself as a messiah figure, later stated that Japan made social transformations that were comparable to the French Revolution and the American Revolutionary War in terms of their significance and magnitude (Ishii 2000: 223). Staff members at GHQ were also heavily inspired by New Deal policies, such as labor reformism and Bill of Rights idealism in the 1930s in the United States, and were passionate about implementing this idealized version of democracy overseas (Dower 1999: 26; Gotō, Uchida, and Ishikawa 1982: 42). This reformist idealism was also shared among the GHQ staff members who wrote a new constitution for Japan. As Sirota recalled, they believed that they were helping to create a less oppressive society that Japanese people desired, and idealistic and “humanistic” spirit filled staff members across different political orientations (Dower 1999: 366).

This implementation of the ideals of democracy in Japan is rather unique. The ideals were hardly introduced to other American-occupied areas in Asia, including South Korea and Okinawa and the Ryūkyū Islands, where the U.S. military occupied with direct rule (Dower 1999: 26). Indeed, the staff members at the General Section, the central section of GHQ that was in charge of democratic reformation especially in the beginning of the occupation of Japan, placed particular emphasis on popular participation in the formation of self-governance (Dower 1999: 612, note 51). In addition, the GHQ staff members, whose numbers reached approximately 6,000 at their peak in 1948, were, overall, highly educated and skilled in their specific areas of knowledge (Takemae 1983: 95, 206). The political influence of (socialist) democracy-oriented New Dealers of GHQ

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68 MacArthur believed that the United States was the realization of the most ideal democracy and that if the Japanese accepted that spirit, Japan could attain prosperity like that of the United States. Also, as an enthusiastic Episcopalian, MacArthur regarded himself an important Christian, along with the Pope (Ishii 2000: 223).

69 The constitution of Japan, which is still in effect today, was drafted by the occupation forces in 1946. Translated into Japanese, it was enacted in 1947. For more history, see the next section.

70 The United States is also a peculiar country where both domestic and international politics are largely founded upon the ideal of democracy. In the politics of the United States, the concept of democracy constitutes a universal ideal and America’s identity (Ōtsuru-Kitagawa 2000b: 320), to this day. Under the Clinton administration, democracy was for the first time coined as a principle that should be spread through the international affairs of the United States (Ōtsuru-Kitagawa 2000a: 2).

For the studies of America’s attempts at nation-building around the world, see Dobbins et al. (2003), Ōtsuru-Kitagawa (2000a, 2000b), and Smith (1994).
in general waned as the focus of occupational policies shifted from political and social reform to economic reform and growth.\textsuperscript{71} Besides, the intensification of the Cold War in the latter occupational period changed power relations within the occupational forces, weakening the power of New Deal liberals and MacArthur. Such shifts, however, did not lessen the impact of the democratic reform and the American idealism that animated the early occupational period.

An idealized version of American democracy was also channeled through Japanese people, notably cultural figures and intellectuals, who had direct experience of American democracy through traveling and staying in the United States. Tadaichi Hirakawa, host of a popular English conversation radio program at NHK (the Japan Broadcasting Cooperation),\textsuperscript{72} for example, lived in the United States from 1918, when he was 16-years-old, until the end of WWII. Hirakawa observed American democracy and liberalism in the 1920s and 1930s, and his talks often cited his own experiences of democracy in the United States (Takemae 1992: 357-82). This program attracted an audience of one million listeners, 500,000 copies of textbooks of the program were sold, and 1,000 groups that listened to the program existed across the country (Takemae 1992: 360). Furthermore, as will be discussed in Chapter 3, Japanese intellectuals—who lived and studied in the United States before WWII and who learned American pragmatism—comprised an influential group for promoting grassroots democracy in Japan. To a large extent, the ideal of democracy was provided by occupational reformers. However, people in Japan who idealized American democracy and American political philosophy through their personal experiences also played roles in making these ideals available to the movements.

\textsuperscript{71} In the later period of the occupation, from 1949 onwards, economic specialists, another group of idealists who aspired to reform Japan but who were anti-New Dealers, were sent by the federal government to conduct economic reform, such as tax reform and new policies for curbing hyper-inflation in Japan. They gained power over the General Section of GHQ in conducting the reforms (Gotō, Uchida, and Ishikawa 1982: 55).

\textsuperscript{72} The radio program, called “Come Come English” (\textit{Kamu kamu Eigo}), was broadcast between 1946 and 1951.
A concept of democracy wherein the sovereign right resides not with an emperor, but with the people was newly implemented in postwar Japanese society. Enacting this vision of democracy in practice, however, did not keep pace with institutional transformations in the beginning of the occupation. Democracy in Japan was understood differently than the idealized American image, and incorporated symbols and practices that pre-dated the wartime years. This disjuncture manifested itself most keenly in the matter of coping with the emperor and the imperial system.

A serious debate on the imperial system began when SCAP and MacArthur requested that the Japanese government renew the constitution. In October 1945, MacArthur directed the government to draft a new, liberal constitution. However, the Shidehara cabinet (October 1945 – May 1946) and the cabinet-established Constitutional Problem Investigation Committee failed to meet SCAP’s expectation and maintained fundamental elements of the Meiji Constitution, especially the provisions on the emperor’s sovereign right and the restriction of civil liberties (Dower 1999: 353). Finding the Japanese draft to be too conservative, MacArthur ordered GHQ staff members at the General Section to write the new constitution for Japan. The new draft contained radical changes, stating that the emperor was a symbol of the state and the people, defining the Diet as “the highest organ of state power,” and granting basic civil liberties that would ban all discrimination, and guarantee economic and social rights, even including social security (McNelly 1987: 81-2). The GHQ’s draft, which was completed in February 1946 in six days following MacArthur’s order, was shortly translated into Japanese, approved in both Houses in October 1946, and enacted in May 1947.

Political parties showed paradoxical reactions to the new constitution, according to their political convictions. Two major conservative parties—the Liberal Party and the Democratic Party—supported maintaining a national polity that centered on the emperor.

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73 The call for Emperor Hirohito’s indictment was strong among the Allied powers and in the United States (Dower 1999: 279; also see Takeda 1978: 235-326). However, MacArthur kept the emperor in order to support the occupation (Dower 1999: 280-86).
However, the parties announced that the GHQ-drafted new constitution, which defined the emperor as a symbol, fit their party lines (Fukunaga 1995: 282). The opposition party, the JSP, supported the new constitution as well. They showed a positive reaction to the declaration that sovereignty rests with the people and that the status of the emperor was that of a symbol. But the JSP did not oppose either the imperial system or democracy established under the imperial system. To the JSP, socialism and the imperial system were compatible. In fact, in a draft constitution, in which the JSP wrote to demonstrate their party policies in February 1946, they envisioned democracy and socialism established under the emperor system—though the emperor’s prerogative was limited more than the Meiji Constitution granted (Fukunaga 1995: 275). It was only the JCP that opposed the GHQ-drafted new constitution. The JCP claimed the abolishment of the emperor system and opposed the new constitution because, to them, it disguised the fact that sovereignty resided with the emperor, not with the people. Importantly, however, different views on the emperor system existed within the JCP. A charismatic sub-leader of the JCP, Sanzō Noasaka, did not entirely oppose the emperor system. He claimed that, although it was necessary to abolish the emperor as leader of a “feudalistic autocracy,” the issue of the emperor as a religious leader could be left to a popular vote (Dower 1999: 256; Fukunaga 1995: 272). This indicates the wide support for the emperor system, even among some communists. Although the political parties had different reasoning, this evidence suggests that the majority of people, including those in political power, accepted with little argument the new constitution that granted symbolic power to the emperor and was written by the U.S. occupational forces.77

74 The JSP incorporated various factions of socialist groups, and experienced serious and long-term power struggles. At the beginning of the JSP, the right faction led the party (Fukunaga 1995: 271). Later on, the left faction of the JSP gained more power, and created intensifying conflicts within the party until 1960 when the right-faction established its own party in the midst of the 1960 Anpo protests.
75 However, the JCP maintained the party line that claimed the abolishment of the emperor system until 2004.
76 As for the emperor system, it was widely supported among the Japanese public. An opinion poll conducted by the Mainichi newspaper in 1946 showed that 13 percent of people supported its abolishment, while 85 percent of people supported the emperor system (the sample size was 2,000; quoted in Ashibe 2008: 100). Support for the emperor system increased to 90.3 percent in 1948 in a different opinion poll by the Yomiuri newspaper (sample size was 3,080; Yomiuri Shinbun August 15, 1948).
77 As far as my investigation goes, no opinion polls were published that asked about support of the new constitution in general during the occupational period, though such polls existed for major clauses of the constitution.
The implementation of the new constitution, as well as the new democracy that the constitution defined, was carried out in an elaborate manner. The new democracy was installed through a ritualistic ceremony by Emperor Hirohito, a divine figure until the arrival of the occupational forces. On New Year’s Day of 1946, Hirohito announced to his people that the new democracy of postwar society actually had its roots in the democracy that the Meiji emperor, his grandfather, had sworn to the sun goddess, the divine ancestor of the emperors.

The primary purpose of this New Year’s rescript (or imperial mandate), the so-called emperor’s Humanity Declaration, was to announce to the people that the emperor was stripping off his divinity—before the promulgation of the new constitution in November 1946. The rescript was requested by MacArthur, and GHQ wrote the first draft. Hirohito was willing to deny that he had ever been a “god” either in the Western sense or in the Japanese sense (Dower 1999: 315). However, tactful political gestures were inscribed in the New Year’s rescript, when GHQ’s draft was amended by the Imperial Palace and the Shidehara cabinet.

First, in the rescript, Hirohito did not deny that he was a descendant of the gods, although he denied that he was an akitsumikami, a rarely used and obscure term that people did not understand well—except that they would guess the suffix, as—kami or mikami means gods. The vagueness manifested in the rescript rose from a power game such that Hirohito, and the Imperial Palace in particular, were reluctant to deny Emperor Hirohito’s legitimate lineage as that of a descendent of the sun goddess, while the emperor himself was willing to deny his manifest divinity (see Dower 1999: 315-16). Therefore, his rescript did strip off Hirohito’s divinity to a significant extent but not entirely, keeping him to symbolically reign in postwar Japanese democracy. Another notable tactic of the emperor’s court was that Emperor Hirohito began his rescript of

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78 See Dower (1999: 316). Akistumikami (現つ御神) means a reigning “manifest deity.” The New Year’s Rescript was not broadcast but appeared only in the press (ibid.).
1946 with the Charter Oath. The Meiji Emperor, Hirohito’s grandfather, swore the Charter Oath when the Meiji government began. The Meiji Emperor’s oath proclaimed to the sun goddess, the ancestor of the emperors, that the principles of modern democracy were being adopted at the beginning of the Meiji government. Emperor Hirohito followed his grandfather, and inserted the Charter Oath that announced the beginning of democracy to be the time of the Meiji government’s establishment; by doing so, Hirohito legitimized the implementation of postwar democracy for rebuilding Japan. This way, by replicating the ceremonial practice of the Meiji Emperor for New Year’s Day 1946, Emperor Hirohito linked postwar democracy under the U.S. occupation with the Meiji past by declaring the Meiji government as the originator of the democratic state of Japan (Bix 2005: 183). Not only that, Hirohito emphasized his monarchy’s harmonious relationship with democracy that, in his proclamation, started from the Meiji period (Bix 2000: 561-62).

Only gradually did people accept the idea of new democratic nation with the emperor as largely symbolic figure. The episodes of the JSP exemplify this well. At the time when the JSP hosted the inaugural meeting for the party’s establishment in November 1945, a chairperson began the convention with a greeting to the Imperial Palace, called kyūjōyōhai or kōkyoyōhai—a collective ritual of lowering one’s head toward the Imperial Palace to show respect to the emperor. In addition, the convention ended with a call to hail the emperor by a founder of the party, Toyohiko Kagawa (Fukunaga 1995: 272; Takemae 1987: 261). Though the JSP’s convention ended with uproar by its left-faction which was discontent with the practices, these rituals for hailing the emperor were common practices in the public spaces, including the parliament or at conventions of political parties during the prewar and wartime periods (Takemae 1987: 261).80

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79 Inserting the Charter Oath was Hirohito’s request to GHQ/SCAP. Hirohito later recalled that he “adopted democracy” not because people were sovereign but because democracy was the will of the Meiji Emperor (Bix 2000: 562).

The New Year’s rescript of 1946 was published in the front page of newspapers, along with the comments of Prime Minister Shidehara, who expressed his support for the rescript.

80 At schools, as another example, students had to bow the picture of Emperor Hirohito whenever schools hosted events. Since the emperor was considered to be sacred, photographing him was prohibited; thus, the picture distributed at schools was actually a picture of his portrait.
The transition to democracy, from the one that the Imperial Japan incubated to the one the U.S. occupational reformers promoted, was gradual in the realm of practices. Historical sociologist William Sewell argues, during society’s transitional moments, ritualized practices in an old regime can create a new articulation of a new regime by creating new meanings for the rituals (Sewell 2005: 252-54). However, what the case of Japan reveals is that old rituals and practices were persistent, when the new regime was enforced. But, utilizing these old rituals and practices, which manifested covert resistance to the new regime, the transitions from the old regime to new regime was brought smoothly since it avoided creating cultural disjunction in the society. Old rituals and practices, which were practiced with old meanings, were replicated in order to understand and accept a new regime.

With the enforcement of new institutions and regulations, as the occupation proceeded, rituals and practice gradually changed also. This could be seen in the literal spaces of protest. During the occupational period, a major site for protests in Tokyo was the People’s Plaza in front of the Imperial Palace, where protesters demanded food and to mark May Days. In this square, protesters not only hold protests, but also submitted petitions to the emperor.\(^81\) From 1946, approximately 40 protests were hosted until the U.S. forces prohibited protests in the square in 1951.\(^82\) In the following year, the last year of the U.S. occupation, there were severe clashes between the police and the protesters who had asked permission to use the square for May Day.

Since then, although holding rallies and demonstrations there are not prohibited, the square in front of the Imperial Palace has not been used much for protests. Toward the end of the 1950s, the Diet Building became the major site for demonstrating and protests instead. During the 1960 Anpo protests, the Diet Building, as the symbol of

\(^{81}\) Communists especially used to call this space “People’s Plaza” (jinmin hiroba), in opposition to the name the “Imperial Palace.” Currently, people call it the “plaza in front of Imperial Palace” (kōyomae hiroba).

\(^{82}\) Retrieved February 27, 2012 (http://www.jcp.or.jp/akahata/aik07/2008-05-01/ftp20080501faq12_01_0.html).
democracy, became the site where millions of citizens across the country came to show their demands.\textsuperscript{83} I turn now to the description of these protests.

2.4 The Course of the 1960 Anpo Protests

Organizing for the 1960 Anpo protests began when the negotiations for the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty began between two countries. The treaty concerned foreign affairs between the two governments, but the protesters’ demands covered a wide range of issues, from anti-revision of the treaty and abolition of the treaty, to broader questions of anti-imperialism and democracy. This section will provide a brief sketch on the general course of this event before I turn to the details of each movement group in the following chapters.

(1) The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty

The original U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was concluded at the time when the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which determined the condition of Japan’s independence, was concluded in September 1951. The security treaty outlined provisions concerning the U.S. bases stationed in Japan, and was signed six hours after the San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed (Yoshida 1962: 256). Essentially, the security treaty was \textit{not} a mutual defense act because neither the United States nor Japan had responsibility to defend the other country. Instead, the treaty aimed primarily to maintain the U.S. military pact with Japan (Hara 1991: 19-20). The provisions were simple, stating that Japan would permit the U.S. Army, Air Force, and Navy to be stationed in Japan, and that the U.S. Army would be utilized to maintain peace in the Far East, to guard Japan against armed attack, and also to repress riots and disturbances within Japan. The Article 1 follows:

\begin{quote}
Such forces [United States land, air and sea forces] may be utilized to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East and to the
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{83} For a discussion of symbolic meanings of space and social movements, see Sewell (2001). For the role of space in social movement mobilization, see Zhao (1998, 2009) and Chapter 4.
security of Japan against armed attack from without, including assistance given at the express request of Japanese Government to put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through instigation or intervention by an outside power or powers. (*United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*, hereafter U.S.T. 1952: 3331)

Debates emerged among the Japanese officials not concerning the repression of insurgency in Japan, but regarding the definition of “the Far East” and the vagueness of the U.S. responsibility for protecting Japan in the state of war (Sakamoto 2000: 56-60; also see Hara 1991: 21). The security treaty was an unequal but interim one, and was expected to expire when Japan would become able to provide “individual or collective security dispositions as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance…peace and security in the Japan Area” either by its force or by the United Nations (U.S.T. 1952: 3332).

Negotiations for revising the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty began in August 1955 under the Hatoyama cabinet (December 1954 – December 1956). To begin the discussion, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu visited Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in the United States; however, Dulles turned down Shigemitsu’s requests for discussion, reasoning that Japan did not have sufficient preparation to meet the expectations of the United States.84 In February 1957, Nobusuke Kishi assumed the office of prime minister. Under the Kishi cabinet, Foreign Minister Fujiyama and U.S. Ambassador MacArthur,85 as the official representatives, began meetings for the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, starting from October 1958. The meetings were recessed between December 1958 and April 1959, but the draft of the revised treaty was mostly completed by June 1959 (Sakamoto 2000: 210-11). In January 1960, the representatives of the two governments signed the revised U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in Washington.86 The new security treaty emphasized political and economic cooperation between the two countries, set the

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84 Prime Minister-to-be-Kishi attended this meeting. He later recounted that Dulles flatly refused to discuss the treaty at the meeting (Kishi 1983: 205); also see Sakamoto (2000: 152-55).
85 U.S. Ambassador MacArthur was the nephew of General MacArthur who served as SCAP during the occupational period.
86 Treaties concerning foreign affairs are signed first among the related countries and then delivered to each country’s legislature. If the legislative bodies approve the treaties, the instruments of ratification are exchanged, and the treaties become effective.
expiration date, outlined clearly what responsibility the U.S. would assume for defending Japan, and erased the clause on civil wars that concerned utilizing the U.S. army to repress them.87

The signed treaty then was to be discussed in the national legislatures of the two countries, and to be ratified and enacted. But the nationwide protests against the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty started being organized in the midst of the Diet session where the revised treaty was delivered and approved.

(2) Organizing the 1960 Anpo Protests

In March 1959, the national organization the People’s Council to Stop the Revised Security Treaty (hereafter, the People’s Council) was organized under the leadership of the JSP and Sōhyō (the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan; hereafter, the Sōhyō federation). One hundred and thirty-four existing movement organizations joined the People’s Council at the time of its foundation (Saitō 1962: 77). The People’s Council was actually a small organization in which a few staff members coordinated meetings for the executive board, consisting of about 15 or 16 representatives of existing major movement organizations, including the JSP, the JCP, the Sōhyō federation, the Japan Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (which coordinated national ban-the-bomb movements), and the Tokyo Regional Council of Trade Unions (which coordinated unions in the Tokyo region).88 The People’s Council coordinated 22 times for so-called united joint actions that called for direct actions—such as rallies, demonstrations, strikes and petitions—between April 1959 and July 1960. The first united action was a rally in Hibiya Park, located by the Kasumigaseki government district, mobilizing approximately 5,000 protesters (Kōan Chōsachō 1960: 105-06).

87 Another important change was that the revised treaty limited the effective period to ten years, and stated that it was to be abandoned after ten years if the one of the countries—either the United States or Japan—declared so. The original treaty consisted of 5 articles and the revised treaty in 1960 consisted of 10 articles. The details on the conditions of the U.S. forces stationed in Japan were outlined in U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement. After the revision of the U.S-Japan Security Treaty in 1970, the treaty continues to be effective to this day.

88 Interview with Takehiko Matsuda, July 10, 2010. Matsuda worked for the People’s Council as a staff member. The number of the founding organizations for the People’s Council was 13 (Saitō 1962: 76).
The contents of the treaty revision negotiated between the two countries were not completely disclosed. However, in June 1959, expecting the revisions to be completed and responding to the People’s Council’s call for the third united action, approximately 9,000 protesters gathered at Hibiya Park and approximately 100,000 people rallied across the country (Kōan Chōsachō 1960: 107-08). During the summer and fall of 1959, intellectuals, student movement activists, and labor union organizers attempted to mobilize members in their organization and institutions at rallies, gatherings, and seminars.

In November 1959, the nationwide protests marked the first turning point when the protesters, who were mainly composed of student movement groups and workers at the Tokyo Regional Council of Trade Unions, entered the grounds of the Diet Building. The storming of the Diet was an accidental event; the protesters who gathered in front of the Diet Building were pushed to the gate and forced inside when the gate was somehow opened (see, for example, Aoki 2008: 50). Twenty thousand protesters entered the gate of the Diet Building (Shinobu 1961: 70). This incident generated a dispute not only by the ruling party but within movement organizations over the validity of occupying the grounds of the Diet Building—a “sacred” symbol of democracy (e.g., Asahi Shinbun, November 28, 1959). The media, the People’s Council, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the JSP, and the JCP criticized the incident (Saitō 1969: 144-46). However, the overall movements against the revision of the security treaty largely expanded after this incident, albeit with increased cleavages and competition among movement organizations within the movement field and space, as Chapters 4 and 5 will disclose.

The second turning point in the course of the 1960 Anpo protests was on May 19, 1960 when the LDP made forcible passage of the bill of the treaty revision in the House of Representatives without the attendance of opposition parties. Railroading had not been

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89 The draft of the treaty ratification was submitted to the Diet in February 1960 (Michiba 2010: 110).
90 This accident constituted a significant and symbolic event for the entire Anpo protests, and different accounts exist regarding who arrived at the gate first and who opened the gate. A former student leader at Hōsei University says that students were the first group to arrive at the gate (Interview with Eichi Onaya, March 3, 2009). Fifty years later, other activists came forward and said that they opened the gate (correspondence with Kazunari Kurata, October 21, 2011).
uncommon in the Diet, in which one ruling party had dominated both Houses for most of the postwar period. However, the LDP railroaded the bill by bringing 500 of policemen and burly male secretaries into the Diet Building to clear away JSP members who were blocking the LDP members’ entrance into the Chamber (Gotō, Uchida, and Ishikawa 1982: 179-81). The bill was passed amid scuffles and roars. The event was widely reported on in the media, provoking anger and concerns amongst people who were worried about becoming involved in potential war again due to the demands of the security treaty.91

On the following day, the main slogan of the protests shifted from “stop the security treaty” to “protect democracy.” As Chapter 3 will argue, this was largely due to the efforts of intellectuals who had long been engaged in the establishment of democracy in postwar Japan, and were concerned about the “crisis of democracy.”92 Until June 19, 1960, when the bill was automatically approved in the House of Councilors, demonstrations and rallies surged across the country. On June 4, 1960, the general strike was held by the leadership of the Sōhyō federation, and approximately 5.6 million people participated in the strikes (Minaguchi 1968: 172).93 The episodes continued. On June 10, the arrival of President Eisenhower’s secretarial assistant James Hagerty, who was visiting Japan prior to the president’s expected visit, was surrounded by student protesters on his way from Haneda Airport, resulting in his rapid return to the United States. On June 15, at the last joint action prior to the automatic ratification of the bill revising the treaty on June 19, approximately 5.8 million protesters participated in strikes (Minaguchi 1968: 217),94 approximately 100,000 people surrounded the Diet Building (Saitō 1969: 248), and about 5,000 students occupied the ground of the Diet Building (Shinobu 1961:

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91 Railroading at the Diet session was not an uncommon practice in the Diet, but it was only the second time that the police entered the Chamber during the postwar period (Packard 1966: 241),
92 The People’s Council also changed their slogan (Packard 1966: 242).
93 This number is based on sōhyō’s announcement. According to the police, the number was approximately 904,000 (Kōan Chōsachō 1960: 121).
94 As for the number of participants, Matsui (2001: 7, 18-20) argues that the numbers announced sometimes significantly varied among the Metropolitan Police Department, the Public Security Intelligence Agency, the Ministry of Labor, and the People’s Council, but the basic trend over the course of the protests stayed the similar.
94 The number is based on the Sōhyō federation’s announcement. According to the police, the number was approximately 719,000 (Kōan Chōsachō 1960: 124).
On this day, University of Tokyo student activist Michiko Kanba was crushed to death when students entered the gates of the Diet Building.

The death of the female student changed the tactics of both the government and of movement organizations. On June 16, Prime Minister Kishi called off U.S. President Eisenhower’s visit, and the People’s Council cancelled the demonstrations that they had planned at Haneda Airport on June 19. At the University of Tokyo, students, professors, university union members—separately—held rallies for protesting for Kanba’s death on the following day (Tokyo Daiaku Syokuin Kumiai 1960: 93-103). On June 17, seven major newspapers issued a joint statement, expressing their opposition to the violence of the protesters and their support for democracy. On June 18, the demonstration and the rally to memorialize Kanba were held, including different movement groups as well as the university president. On June 18, the bill revising the treaty was automatically ratified in the House of Councilors when 330,000 protesters—the largest number yet present during the course of the protests—surrounded the Diet Building (Shinobu 1961: 443). Prime Minister Kishi announced his resignation on June 23 when the instrument of ratification was exchanged between the two governments, and he resigned his office on July 15. Although the People’s Council had planned joint actions through July 1960, the overall movements against the treaty revision swiftly waned following the ratification.

2.5 Conclusion

The space of social movements developed in postwar Japanese society was largely conditioned by the U.S.-led occupational forces, especially in the early stages of the occupation. The U.S. forces pushed new institutional frameworks that granted—and later regulated—civil liberties and political activism, helping to forge political opportunities that the movements would utilize. Moreover, civil-minded U.S. occupational staff members promoted a new ideal of democracy and were motivated to implement radical democratic reforms for Japan. They were the advocates of a version of democracy that even their home country had not fully realized.
For people in Japan, democracy, among other available vocabularies, became the most salient cultural idiom for the transition and transformation of their society. In one way, the new American ideal of democracy was meshed with old rituals and practices and implemented with tactful gestures towards the past. Emperor Hirohito, the former sovereign power who had supposedly stripped off his divinity and political power, declared that postwar democracy had originated in democracy that the Meiji Emperor had implemented when his reign began in 1868. The political parties, except for communists, also welcomed a new democratic polity by hailing the emperor, the head of the old regime, at ritual ceremonies. Thus, on the one hand, the new ideal of democracy was implemented with old rituals and practices exactly because it was perceived to be exogenous—and it was, indeed, novel because the new constitution granted the sovereign the right reside with the people for the first time in Japanese history. The transition, or accommodation, to the new political system, was carried out relatively smoothly because a new political system was translated by a prior cultural system as represented by rituals manifested relating the emperor.95

On the other hand, people perceived U.S.-promoted democracy as a new ideal for reconstructing their nation-state after its defeat in war, and in the midst of exhaustion, starvation, and ruin. Democracy was taken as new, and evoked as an ideal for the new nation. It functioned as a reinvigorated cultural idiom, inspiring actors to engage in political activism. Thus, even when the occupational forces reversed course and switched to explicitly repressive policies against communists and labor movements, the movements did not wane, thanks to the institutions and resources granted in the early reformation period. Democratic movements, peace movements, and other grassroots movements were mobilized nationwide in the 1950s, leading up to the 1960 Anpo protests, which lasted—at first glance—over one and half years from March 1959. However, the national mobilization movements, as represented by the 1960 Anpo protests, actually consisted of amalgamations of different sorts of movements. As the diversely constituted rallies at the University of Tokyo following Kanba’s death

95 For a discussion on how societies adopt a new exogenous political system by maintaining or modifying existing cultural meaning systems, see the comparative works on the Philippines and Puerto Rico by Go (2008).
exemplified, demonstrations and rallies were organized differently even at the same protest sites.

As occasionally observed in the splits among demonstrators on the streets, the protest groups composed different movements within the 1960 Anpo protests. Each movement field and space had accumulated their own historical dynamics that was distinct from the overall course of the 1960 Anpo protests. In subsequent chapters, I will disaggregate the movements that led to the 1960 Anpo protests by the examining social movement fields and spaces of intellectuals, student movement groups, and labor union members. In so doing, I will explore the historically constructed logics, strategies, and motivations that shaped actors participation in the momentous protests.
CHAPTER 3
POSTWAR INTELLECTUALS’ PUBLIC ACTIVISM: MAKING DEMOCRACY ROOTED IN JAPAN

Figure 3.1 University faculty form lines during a demonstration. Placards say: “Immediate Dissolution of the Diet,” “Protect Democracy,” and “Kishi [the Prime Minister], Resign!” The smaller print shows the university affiliation. Photo: Sekai (1960, vol. 1976: 2).

On May 19, 1960, a bill revising the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which provided the legal basis for the U.S. stations in Japan and determined security and economic relations between the United States and Japan, was steamrolled through the House of Representatives. Shortly thereafter, the predominant framing of the 1960 Anpo protests shifted from “stop the treaty revision” to “protect democracy.” It was intellectuals—most notably the so-called progressive intellectuals—who played the key role in this shift. The 1960 Anpo protests not only marked the moment when intellectuals took their protests to the streets, but also epitomized the culmination of intellectuals’ long-standing commitment to public activism, dating back to the end of World War II.
Japanese intellectuals—who, in some ways, regretted their commitment to the wartime regime—were motivated to rebuild Japan as a modern, peaceful, cultural, scientific, and democratic nation-state. In their efforts to help democracy take root in Japan, intellectuals committed themselves to various activities and forms of activism both within and outside universities. Some, for example, offered a range of university colloquiums designed for students who felt confused and wanted to understand how and why Japan had been drawn into the war.1 One informant who returned to the University of Tokyo after the war and who was involved in organizing the 1960 Anpo protests related that students’ enthusiasm filled up the classrooms. He said that he literally had the sense of “scales falling from their eyes bit by bit” (ichimai ichimai mekara urokoga ochiru toiu kankaku) when he attended lectures of two political scientists at the University of Tokyo; Masao Maruyama (1914-1996), a scholar of Japanese political thought, and Hisao Ōtsuka (1907-1996), a scholar of Max Weber. He described the levels of hunger and starvation that existed among people at the time, and related that he was often too hungry himself to walk the 20-30 minutes from the train station to university. Not only within their universities but even outside, intellectuals established informal schools and research institutes for the purpose of promoting democratic and scientific thinking among Japanese. Notably, intellectuals in these efforts collaborated across disciplines and beyond political ideologies and generational differences.

Progressive intellectuals—mainly young, liberal-minded, and survivors of wartime hardship—were particularly active in promoting democracy and democratic movements in Japan. U.S. occupational policies, particularly the purge of nationalist scholars and partial purge of leftist scholars from universities, created political opportunities for progressive intellectuals to take a more active role in organizing movements in the 1950s—a trend that reached its peak with the Anpo protests in 1960. Indeed, the very category of progressive intellectuals (shinpoteki bunkajin, literally translated “progressive men of culture”)2 emerged from debates between progressive

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1 Interview with Y, October 22, 2008.  
For more about the atmosphere in these classrooms, see also Ishida (2006: 72).  
2 The term “men of culture” was used interchangeably with intellectuals.
intellectuals and their critics, in which the term was coined by the latter. The category of progressive intellectuals referred to intellectuals who committed themselves to democratic thinking and activism during the early postwar period up until the 1970s.

The period between 1945 and 1960 marks the pinnacle of Japanese intellectuals’ efforts to intervene in political debates and engage in public activism as “public intellectuals,” who would add intellectual substance to the public sphere (Bamyeh 2012: 2-3). The leading group of progressive intellectuals comprised scholars from a variety of backgrounds. As I will argue in detail later, except for Maruyama, a political scientist of the Law School at the University of Tokyo, many of them—namely, Ikutarō Shimizu, Shunsuke Tsurumi, Osamu Kuno, Yoshimi Takeuchi—came from relatively dominated positions in the field of intellectuals. This raises crucial questions: how and why did a group of scholars in dominated positions—i.e., non-mainstream and non-orthodox scholars—in the field play such active roles in the nationwide movements of 1960? The goals of this chapter are the following: first, to investigate the historical conditions that enabled the emergence of progressive intellectuals as a distinct group; second, to examine the types of activism that this group engaged in, as well as the structures of the fields that circumscribed activism; and finally, to examine the trajectory of two progressive intellectuals—Kuno and Shimizu—in order to compare their paths toward activism, and

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3 A major critic of progressive intellectuals was the translator and playwright, Tsuneari Fukuda (1912-1994). His critique coincided with the period when progressive intellectuals were active in the 1950s. His main criticisms included: progressive intellectuals were deceptive, and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty that progressive intellectuals rejected was not necessarily bad (Fukuda 1954, 1960).

As for the concept of “progressive intellectuals,” Maruyama, a progressive intellectual himself, admitted that the group’s name came from external critics (Maruyama [1977] 1996: 259).

4 Bamyeh (2012: 2-3) categorizes public intellectuals as those who: (1) popularize existing, complex intellectual systems for the benefit of the public; (2) create original systems of thought in a language that captures a broad public audience; or (3) express existing public sentiments, feelings, and attitudes in intellectual and systematic but accessible formats.

5 These five intellectuals played active roles during the 1960 Anpo protests (see Koschmann 1993).

At the time of the 1960 Anpo protests, Shimizu was a professor of sociology at Gakushuin University, Tsurumi was an assistant professor at Tokyo Institute of Technology, Kuno was a lecturer of philosophy at Gakushuin University, and Takeuchi taught Chinese literature as a professor at Tokyo Metropolitan University. The chapter will examine their positions later in more detail.

It should be noted that although most progressive intellectuals were politically left-leaning, a few were members of the JCP. The role of communist intellectuals is an important topic of intellectual history in postwar Japan, but is outside the scope of this chapter.
to explore the dynamics of inclusion in and exclusion from the field that shaped their trajectories.

The extant literature is awash with discussions over the definition, categorization, and functions of intellectuals. Yet, what deserves more serious investigation is the role that intellectuals play at a particular moment in society. Their roles and functions are not fixed, but are rather contingent upon the conditions of society, as well as their relationships with other groups of people at any particular historical moment. At various times, other actors such as physicians and doctors have also played a key part in the making and/or unmaking of civil society (Kennedy 1990; Lo 2002); at other times, businessmen have taken on an important role in articulating new voices in the public sphere (Kennedy 1999). Defining intellectuals depends neither on specific ideological commitment nor personal qualities, but rather on a distinctive location within the larger social structure (Karabel 1996: 207).

Recently, studies of intellectuals have shifted from the traditional focus on intellectuals as a special category, to new studies that delegitimize the category of intellectuals and their knowledge while claiming to examine non-intellectuals’ thoughts (cf. Camic and Gross 2001). Since the late 1990s, sociologists have started calling for intellectuals to become more politically engaged in public debates. Michael Burawoy advocates “public sociologists” who bring their knowledge to bear on politics and activism (Burawoy 2005), and Bourdieu argues for “collective intellectuals” who collectively intervene in ongoing political debates with their specific knowledge

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6 Many classical theories have debated intellectuals’ class origins (e.g., Mannheim [1929] 1985, Gramsci [1929-35] 1971) or their roles and functions in society (e.g., Konrád and Szelényi 1979, Said [1994] 1996). Other theories have discussed types and categories of intellectuals (e.g., Shils 1972, Gouldner 1975-1976, 1979; Lipset [1959] 1981). In these classical theories, intellectuals were considered “special custodians of abstract ideas” (Camic and Gross 2001: 248).

Diverging from these conventional approaches, new approaches in the sociology of knowledge emerged in the 1970s. Sociologists who investigated the scientific field revealed that intellectuals’ legitimate power of speaking the “truth” was socially constructed through their activities in laboratories and specific networks among them (Latour and Woolger [1979] 1986; Latour 1987). Other sociologists have argued that intellectuals engage in struggles and make truth claims so as to gain hegemony in specific fields (e.g., Bourdieu, 1975, [1988] 1991, [1992] 1996; Whitley 1984). In this way, scholars have begun rethinking the authenticity of intellectuals as a category and the legitimacy of their knowledge in the past decades.

7 For empirical analyses that demonstrate this point, see Coser ([1965] 1997).
(Bourdieu 1998). While many of these claims tend to be normative (e.g., Jeffries 2009), a few empirical studies in this line of research have also found that: (i) intellectuals need relative autonomy from other fields in order to be politically, culturally, and socially influential (Büyükokutan 2010a, 2010b); (ii) intellectuals gain symbolic benefits by engaging in political activism (Büyükokutan 2010b); and (iii) one’s position in the field determines one’s form of engagement in the political sphere (Sapiro 2003).

Informed by these developments in the study of public intellectuals, this chapter examines the ways in which public intellectuals emerged as a group in Japan and became actively involved in the nation’s democratic movements. My examination of postwar Japanese intellectuals will explore what kind of intellectuals engage in political activism, how they do so, and what conditions motivate them. I will also explore the trajectories leading up not only to the 1960 Anpo protests, but also certain divergent aftermaths. Following 1960, some progressive intellectuals retreated from activism, while others quitted being public intellectuals and shifted to becoming promoters of citizens’ movements.

3.1 Social Conditions for Postwar Japanese Intellectuals’ Activism

(1) Beginning with Remorse: Collective Emotion

Political scientist Maruyama describes the sentiments that were widely shared among intellectuals immediately after the end of WWII:

8 Existing studies of Japanese intellectuals are problematic in the following ways. First, with few exceptions (e.g., Kersten 1996), they have focused exclusively on intellectuals’ thoughts, and examined the configuration of discourses without fully examining their practice and activism (e.g., Barshay 1992, 1998; Tsuzuki 1995). This is so even when scholars acknowledge the importance of intellectuals’ non-discursive contributions (e.g., Koschmann 1996). Second, many representative works of Japanese intellectuals are based on the naïve assumption that intellectuals’ thoughts are shared by, or resonate with, those of ordinary people (e.g., Oguma 2002: 20-1). Third, the studies tend to concentrate on an analysis of mentalités, seeing discourses as the expression of mentalités, which are collectively shared and reflect transitions in society (e.g., Oguma 2003).

In contrast, my research pays as much attention to intellectuals’ activism as to their discourses, taking into account that politics and struggles exist between intellectuals and ordinary people, and rejecting the simple reductionism that sees shared mind and sentiment as the single cause for generating certain intellectual discourses. In this regard, my approach departs from the conventional approach to the intellectual history of Japanese intellectuals.
Intellectuals were remorseful because all felt in one way or another that they had failed to resist the war, and many were regretful over various degrees of collaboration with fascism. After the war’s end, intellectuals engaged in self-criticism as intellectuals and explored how they could make a fresh start with renewed efforts from the ashes of the war (Maruyama [1977] 1996: 254-55).

Maruyama famously framed this shared sentiment among intellectuals as the “community of remorse.” The experiences of individual intellectuals during the war differed, and thus it could hardly be considered a collective experience. What was widely shared among postwar Japanese intellectuals, however, was a sense of remorse. Some regretted their commitment to the war regime, while others were self-critical of the fact that they may not have played a fully responsible role as intellectuals during wartime (Yoshino 1995: 227). Like philosopher Tsurumi, even when they were pacifistic philosophically, they regretted that they had not fully resisted the war based on their belief (Tsurumi, Ueno, and Oguma 2004: 50).

This community of remorse manifested itself not only in intellectuals’ sense of regret, but also in their determination to rebuild a new Japan. As Maruyama noted above, intellectuals were filled with hope for a brand new start for their nation-state and society (see Yoshino 1995: 227). They were determined to take responsibility as intellectuals to create this new start and make collaborative efforts across disciplinary boundaries (Maruyama [1977] 1996: 256). And they did so by immersing themselves directly in political activism and activities.

To give but a few examples, some established institutions conducted surveys of public opinion because they thought statistics and surveys were means of promoting democracy, as they enable people to learn more about their own society, and that such

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9 With the exception of Marxists, who branded civil society as bourgeois, scholars did not use the concept of “civil society” much until 1960. As I will examine later in this section, some scholars like Kuno articulated the state and society separately, but did not use the term civil society extensively before 1960. It was during the 1960 Anpo protests that scholars began using the concept of civil society with positive meanings, as represented in the attempt by Kuno, as this chapter will examine. Also, see Oguma (2002: 16).
information could, in turn, be used as weapons by the people against the government (Hein 2003; Hein 2004: 100). Many intellectuals were often reluctant to become cabinet members, even when requested by GHQ (General Headquarters of the Allied Powers) and Japanese government officials, although other intellectuals accepted to work as specialists for the Japanese government in terms of implementing economic and welfare policies (see Hein 2003, 2004).

In other cases, intellectuals took part in activities to promote grassroots democracy. Maruyama, for example, served as an active lecturer at the informal school called the commoners’ university of Mishima (Shomin Daigaku Mishima Kyōshitsu), which was founded in a village near Mishima-city in Shizuoka. The school was organized by young scholars of law and graduates from the Tokyo Imperial University, who had been evacuated from air-raids during the war. After the school opened in December 1945, it attracted hundreds of attendees at its peak—including university students, citizens, union workers, and farmers—until it closed down in June 1948. Lecturers came from major universities in either Tokyo or Kyōto, and included Shimizu (sociologist and journalist), Sumio Takatani (Marxist and scientist), and Shō Ishimoda (Marxist historian), to name but a few. The scholars not only gave lectures at the school, but also stayed with host families in nearby villages and talked about a wide range of topics overnight. Intellectuals’ efforts to organize informal schools or study groups proliferated for a few years since 1945, an example of which is the individual case of Kuno that will be examined more closely in this chapter.

When the war ended with Japan’s defeat, it created a crisis in the field of intellectuals (see Bourdieu [1984] 1988); orthodoxy was questioned, intellectuals became more self-critical, and the configuration of knowledge and power was under the processes of restructuring itself. Political activism and public engagement became two of the most important traits necessary to be acknowledged as a responsible and legitimate intellectual.

10 The description of the People’s School in Mishima was obtained from http://tosyokan.city.mishima.shizuoka.jp/MM/MM9_20080715.docx, and http://giin.i-ra.jp/e165734.htm (Retrieved March 13, 2011).
11 Interview with former scholar Y, October 30, 2008.
12 For the details of other cases, see also Yoshida (2011).
Mobilizing for Peace: The Convergence of the Fields of Intellectuals and Journalism

Intellectuals’ collective activism after WWII first culminated in a group called the Peace Problem Symposium. The Symposium was formed in 1948 and issued three statements on peace. Progressive intellectuals rose to prominence via this political activism, but it also widened the cleavage between progressive intellectuals and the “old-liberal intellectuals”—an older, liberal-minded generation of intellectuals from the pre-WWII and wartime period. The peace movements of (progressive) intellectuals were largely supported by a magazine called Sekai (World), first issued in 1946 by Iwanami, a major publishing company that I will discuss in more detail shortly.13

The intellectuals’ activism for peace was initiated by Genzaburō Yoshino, a chief editor of the magazine Sekai, after he encountered a UNESCO statement in an office at GHQ.14 The UNESCO statement, entitled “A Statement by Eight Distinguished Social Scientists on the Causes of Tensions which Make for War,” was issued by social scientists around the world and argued for peace and against war.15 Impressed by UNESCO’s manifesto, through which social scientists from both Western and Eastern blocks together advocated peace in the midst of the Cold War, Yoshino planned for a similar manifesto on peace so as to set it as the new direction for rebuilding Japan. Shortly thereafter, discussion groups of intellectuals were formed in Tokyo and Kyōto. After a sequence of discussions, the intellectuals issued their manifesto, “A Statement by Japanese Scientists on Peace and War” in the March 1949 volume of Sekai.16

The discussion groups that produced the manifesto comprised over fifty notable intellectuals from a variety of disciplines, political ideologies, and generations. The

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13 For the history of the Iwanami publishing company and Sekai, see Hanawa (1990).
14 Because of the censorship, the GHQ’s sections that enforced the censorship—i.e., CCD (Civil Censorship Detachment) and CIE (Civil Information and Education Section)—and Japanese publishers had close ties, so much so that the latter had access to documents related to democratic movements outside the country.
15 These social scientists included Gordon Allport, George Gurvitch, Max Horkheimer, and Alexander Szalai.
16 For details, see Yoshino (1995: 221-24).
statement critiqued past and future potential wars and called for peace (see Sekai 1949, vol. 39: 2-9). At the same time that the group issued the statement in Sekai, they also named themselves the “Peace Problem Symposium” (Heiwa Mondai Danwakai).17

The Peace Problem Symposium subsequently evolved into an organization of intellectuals who actively mobilized themselves around various issues. The next in line was their opposition toward the conditions for concluding the San Francisco Peace Treaty. The San Francisco Peace Treaty determined the official termination of WWII and the conditions for Japan’s independence. Given the increasing tensions of the Cold War, it became likely early on that the communist countries would not sign any peace treaty that tied Japan closely to U.S. policies (Dower 1999: 552). Therefore, it was presumed that both the U.S. and Japanese government would agree to conclude a peace treaty that excluded countries of the Soviet bloc from the beginning—thus, this concluded peace treaty was called a “separate peace” treaty.18 The issue of the peace treaty for the settlement of WWII came to light around November 1949 (Gotô, Uchida, and Ishikawa 1982: 59).

Seeing the move for a separate peace treaty, Japanese intellectuals demanded an “overall peace” treaty that would not exclude communist countries for the conclusion of the treaty. The intellectuals advocated an overall peace treaty because they supported the disarmed neutrality that the Constitution of 1947 granted, and wanted to avoid a potential Japanese involvement in future world wars by remaining neutral. For this purpose, intellectuals once again mobilized themselves as the Peace Problem Symposium and issued two statements in Sekai. Their first statement on the peace treaty conclusion was published in the March 1950 volume, and advocated an overall peace treaty, economic

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17 The discussion groups were tentatively called the “Society of UNESCO (Yunesuko no Kai)” (Shimizu Ikutarō chosakushū, hereafter SIC 1993, vol. 14: 319-20) or the “Peace Problem Discussion Group (Heiwa Mondai Tōgikai)” (Oguma 2003: 35).

18 The Japanese government was actually given the choice of a “separate peace” or no treaty at all (Dower 1999: 552).

The San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed by representatives from 48 countries in September 1951. In addition to communist countries such as the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, India and Burma did not sign the treaty. For details on the ratification of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and its relation to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, see Chapter 2.
independence, and military neutrality, and opposed military bases in Japan. The second statement, published in the December 1950 volume, argued for peace that is granted in the Constitution, denouncing wars of aggression in the midst of the Korean War. On the one hand, the issue of concluding the peace treaty generated the intellectuals’ most active and collaborative intervention in ongoing political matters for the first time since the war. On the other hand, the debates created a chasm between progressive intellectuals, who ideally supported peace, democracy, and an overall peace treaty, and old-liberal intellectuals, some of whom supported the exclusive separate treaty with the Western block. The differences between the two groups lay not only in their political stances but also in their *habitus*—whether they favored activism or not, or if they had critical views or not of the state. As I will argue shortly, the cleavage widened as activism of the Peace Problem Symposium intensified.

The Peace Problem Symposium’s interventions at the conclusion of the peace treaty were squarely against U.S. policies, let alone being incongruent with U.S. occupational policies. Their manifesto in the December 1950 volume of *Sekai* was issued as a protest against the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. As the Cold War intensified, GHQ began adopting repressive policies against leftist movements. In addition, GHQ censored the media throughout the occupation and sternly suspended the publication of articles related to communist movements in China and revolutions around the world. Yet, despite the fact that the Peace Problem Symposium’s manifestos could potentially claim incorporation with the Eastern bloc, GHQ—more specifically, the Civil Information and Education Section (CIE) and the Civil Censorship Department (CCD)—permitted the publication of these statements. To be precise, a moment of friction did

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19 Thus, the manifesto of the Peace Problem Symposium in the December 1950 volume of *Sekai* was published in the form of a report rather than a manifesto, which would require all members’ agreement (*Kuno Osamu shu*, hereafter, *KOS* 1998, vol. 5: 162).

20 The GHQ’s censorship of the press in Japan began in October 1945 and continued until October 1949 when the Civil Censorship Department (CCD) was abolished. However, until the end of the occupation, the “press code” that restricted media contents was enforced, and the media had to face military tribunals when they violated the code; furthermore, MacArthur issued extralegal orders restricting the media (Yamamoto 1996: 330).

Yoshino, a chief editor of *Sekai*, later recounted how GHQ prohibited *Sekai* from publishing almost all articles related to China (Yoshino 1995: 274). Also, articles on revolutions in the world were strictly censored, especially after the aborted 1 February General Strike of 1947 (Ōi 2004: 164). See also Chapter 2 for more discussion on this aborted strike.
occur, but it was only after the first manifesto on the peace settlement was published in the January 1950 volume. Staff members from GHQ, Japanese governmental officials, and the police visited the publisher, Iwanami, and questioned the editors at length. However, none of the authorities enforced punitive action against the publisher or the Peace Problem Symposium.21

The Peace Problem Symposium’s statements on peace and the conclusion of the peace treaty that were published in Sekai made a significant impact on readers, as well as on union activism. Until 1960, Sekai was the most widely read “comprehensive magazine” (sōgō zasshi), which contained semi-academic articles, reports, interviews, roundtable discussions, and translations of foreign articles (Oku 2007: 84).22 Readers of Sekai were by and large the educated population, which included university students, teachers, and officials;23 and according to a poll at one university, half of the students read the magazine.24 Having such educated readers, intellectuals wrote their articles for and expressed their political views in these comprehensive magazines, even at the expense of specialized journals in their disciplines.

It is also worth noting that Sekai constituted a locus where intellectuals—especially progressive intellectuals—not only expressed their political views, but also organized forms of political activism not limited to publishing manifestos. While the extant studies on intellectuals and field emphasize the relative autonomy of intellectual field from other fields as the key for generating intellectuals’ political influence, Japan’s intellectual field operated in tandem with the field of journalism. Starting with Sakuzō Yoshino, the prominent scholar who advocated democracy during the pre-WWII

21 The details of this conflict are obtained from Yoshino (1995: 262-63).
22 For this definition of comprehensive magazine, see Seki (1963: 2). Other major comprehensive magazines between 1945 and 1960 included Chūō Kōron (Central Review, originally published as Hanseikai Zasshi in 1887, 1899-present), Kaizō (Reconstruct, 1919-1955), and Bungei Shunjū (Spring and Autumn Literary Annals, 1923-present). To illustrate Sekai’s popularity, 15,000 copies were sold when Sekai featured the San Francisco Peace Treaty in its October 1951 issue, although it was largely due to union activists who purchased it in large numbers for their union members (Midorikawa and Yasue 1985: 63; Oku 2007: 113-14).
23 According to the publisher’s survey in 1952, readers of Sekai were predominantly company employees (24%), students (23.2%), teachers and scholars (20%), and officials (19.7%) (Oku 2007: 121).
24 The survey was conducted at the present Hitotsubashi University (Oku 2007: 85).
Japanese intellectuals and scholars to this day have sometimes valued publishing in comprehensive magazines, such as *Shisō* (Thought, 1921-present) and *Gendai Shisō* (Contemporary Thought, 1973-present), more than specialized academic journals in their own fields. The interdependence between the fields of intellectuals and journalism was a critical setting for those intellectuals who turned to political activism. *Sekai*, as an initiator of intellectuals’ peace and democracy movements, was especially pivotal in providing cultural and social capital for intellectuals to mobilize themselves for political engagement. Until the 1960 Anpo protests, this was true in the case of progressive intellectuals, more than the older generation of liberal intellectuals who were dissociated from progressive intellectuals and departed from *Sekai*—as the chapter will later unveil.

### (3) Permissible Policies: Political Opportunities for Progressive Intellectuals

Intellectual political activism during the postwar period was made possible by the broader social and political circumstances. The U.S. occupational forces generally enforced policies that made political activism and activities hindering the occupation impermissible; they therefore intervened and repressed activism at critical moments during the occupation. The Japanese government, which also sought to put down any radical activism, collaborated with GHQ in doing so. But, importantly, intellectuals were not included in this repression by GHQ or the Japanese government. Further, university authorities did not intervene in their faculty members’ activism, even as the same authorities acted to repress student movements on campus.

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26 Which general magazines to become the sites for intellectuals’ intellectual and political investment changes would seem to depend on the construction of both the field of intellectuals and that of journalism.

27 Some Japanese studies argue that a social space for journalism in Japan called *rondan*—comprised of comprehensive magazines and newspapers through which intellectuals express their views on ongoing political issues and trends (cf. Oku 2007: 10-1)—constituted a “field” in Bourdieu’s sense. For example, Yō Takeuchi points out the case of a specific intellectual who accumulated symbolic capital by engaging in journalism (Takeuchi 2005: 184-85). However, as this chapter will argue, it is critical to distinguish the field of intellectuals from that of journalism. The field of journalism is a social space for publishers who struggled; and intellectuals were selected by editors for the publishers’ survival, not vice versa. For the editor’s struggle, see Ōi (2004).

28 See Chapter 2.
There were also two critical occupational policies that inadvertently facilitated progressive intellectuals’ activism: the purge and resignation of nationalist scholars, and the aborted Red Purge at universities. In the earliest stage of the occupation, GHQ/SCAP, with its twin aims of democratizing Japan and eliminating any possibility of future Japanese militarism, ordered the “removal and exclusion of undesirable personnel from public office” (Masuda 1996a: 1). The order was issued in January 1946, followed by a second purge of militarists and nationalists a year later. Based on the request of GHQ/SCAP, the Japanese government further issued a decree to permit the Prime Minister to expel potential purge candidates before filing the case (Masuda 1996a: 4-5).\footnote{Potentially purged candidates who received provisional designations, however, were able to ask for grievance with their documentation within 30 days after they received notification (Masuda 1996a: 4-5).}

As a consequence of this purge against “undesirable personnel,” approximately 202,000 people were expelled from their workplaces across the country (Masuda 1996a: 5). At schools and universities, the backgrounds of all educators were reviewed (approximately 560,000 people), while 5,000 teachers and professors were purged (Yamamoto 1994: 2). Importantly, prior to the official purge against nationalists and militarists, more than 110,000 teachers and scholars had already voluntarily resigned from their positions, having had foreknowledge that the regime was about to change (see Yamamoto 1994: 3).\footnote{Purged personnel began to return to work starting in 1950 (Yamamoto 1994: 319); however, it was after the fall of 1951 that the de-purge took place at educational institutions (Yamamoto 1994: 323). The de-purge was largely pushed at the breakout of the Korean War in June 1950, which changed MacArthur’s policies. Also, the GHQ’s purge was criticized by journalists and politicians in the United States. By the end of 1951, over 250,000 people were de-purged, and the rest of the de-purge was completed when the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into effect in April 1952. For details, see Masuda (1996a: 5-7; 1998: 282-326).}

At universities as well, notable nationalist scholars were either purged or encouraged to resign voluntarily after the war. For example, philosophers at Kyōto Imperial University, who found theoretical grounds for the Greater East Asian Co-Periphery Sphere (daitōa kyōeiken) and who had close connection with the Imperial Navy, were purged from the university.\footnote{Philosophers who were purged included Masaaki Kōsaka (1900-1969), Keiji Nishitani (1900-1990), Shigetaka Suzuki (1907-1988), and Iwao Kōyama (1905-1993). After the de-purge, both Kōsaka and Nishitani returned to the University of Kyōto. Suzuki taught at Waseda University and Kōyama taught at Kanagawa University and elsewhere.} In the case of Tokyo Imperial University,
historian Kiyoshi Hiraizumi, who was “most likely to be purged” (Hayashi [1992] 2002: 186) because of his ultra-nationalistic view of history, resigned at the war’s end.

The decline of nationalist scholars was paired, in some cases, with the rising predominance of Marxist scholars at universities. The reshuffling of the Department of Economics at Tokyo Imperial University illuminates this. In 1939, both nationalist economists (such as Seibi Hijikata, 1890-1975) and liberal economists (such as Eijirō Kawai, 1891-1944) were expelled from the department.\(^\text{32}\) This internal issue began with a criticism of the department by the ultranationalist, Muneki Minoda (1894-1946), resulting in the intervention of the Ministry of Education, concerned that scholars were “going red” (sekika) at their imperial universities (Takeuchi 2001: 188-218). Prior to this, Marxist economists (such as Hyōe Ōuchi, 1888-1980; Hiromi Arisawa, 1896-1988; and Yoshitarō Wakimura, 1900-1997) had been jailed on suspicion of involvement in the “people’s front” under the Peace Preservation Law of 1925.\(^\text{33}\) Thus, during the war, notable Marxist economists were not found in dominant positions at Tokyo Imperial University. However, when WWII ended in 1945, liberal and Marxist economists returned to their positions. On the other hand, nationalist economists who had resigned after the internal dispute of 1939 did not return, seeing that the political climate had changed with the end of the wartime regime.\(^\text{34}\) Consequently, Marxist economists actually enjoyed something of a heyday in the Department of Economics at the University of Tokyo until the 1960 Anpo protests.\(^\text{35}\)

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\(^\text{32}\) The incident is called Hiraga Shukugaku (平賀粛学), combining the name of the university president and where it took place. For details, see Hayashi ([1992] 2002:132-35) and Takeuchi (2001). Takeuchi (2001) also emphasizes that the factional struggles over hegemony were the cause of the incident.

\(^\text{33}\) They were jailed in 1938. Unlike Kuno, who was in jail as a non-faculty member and later became a progressive intellectual, these Marxist scholars were treated better due to their social status as professors at Tokyo Imperial University.

\(^\text{34}\) In addition, Akio Hashizume (1899-unknown), the director and nationalist economist at the department, also resigned from his position after the war (Hayashi [1992] 2002: 187-88).

\(^\text{35}\) Former New Left student activist, Masahiko Aoki, recounts this (Aoki 2008: 94). He decided to study modern economics, not Marxist economy, after the 1960 Anpo protests. See Chapter 4 on Aoki and the student movements.
As the cases of the universities of Tokyo and Kyōto demonstrate, the waning of nationalist scholars coincided with the waxing of left-leaning scholars after WWII.\textsuperscript{36} Thus, the prevalence of left-leaning progressive intellectuals was made possible by the relative absence of nationalist intellectuals, who later emerged as the most serious critics of progressive intellectuals after 1960.\textsuperscript{37} The other factor creating a political opportunity for left-leaning politicized intellectuals was the aborted “Red Purge” against JCP members and their sympathizers at university campuses. Ultimately, the attempted Red Purge failed, due largely to the anti-Red Purge movements among students. The purge and its failure merit a brief history, to which I turn next.

As discussed in Chapter 2, GHQ/SCAP policies shifted from encouragement of democratic movements in the second half of the occupational period to focus more on the repression of radical political activism. Since March 1949, communists and their sympathizers had been steadily excluded from governmental sectors, schools, and companies (Takemae 1992: 201). After the outbreak of the Korean War, GHQ/SCAP officially began the Red Purge in Japan. In June 1950, GHQ/SCAP purged leading members of the JCP from their workplaces and suspended the JCP’s organ journal, Akahata (Red Flag).\textsuperscript{38} In July, based on MacArthur’s letter to Prime Minister Yoshida, purges were carried out at companies and governmental offices;\textsuperscript{39} approximately 12,000 employees in private companies and 1,200 government officials were fired (Miyake 1994: 8). The Red Purge in schools had been underway since September 1949, and approximately 1,200 teachers had been expelled (Myōjin 1988: 36; Miyake 1994: 38).

\textsuperscript{36} Studies of the purge against “undesirable personnel” have concentrated on the purge of politicians (e.g., Masuda 1996b), even though studies on the purge of intellectuals have accumulated. Thus, I have used the personnel’s affairs at the universities of Tokyo and Kyōto as examples.

\textsuperscript{37} Fukuda was one of the few intellectuals who criticized progressive intellectuals when they were active (see footnote 3 of this chapter). After the 1960 Anpo protests, more critics of progressive intellectuals emerged. Most notable were poet and critic, Takaaki Yoshimoto (1924-2012), and professor of literature and critic, Jun Etō (1932-1999).

\textsuperscript{38} It is worth noting that GHQ/SCAP did not make the JCP illegal, but only expelled its leaders from their workplaces.

\textsuperscript{39} GHQ/SCAP purged communists indirectly by issuing orders to upper organizations of Japanese institutions (Takemae 1992: 206-10).
The Red Purge encroached on university campuses as well.⁴⁰ In July 1949, Walter C. Eells, a former professor at Stanford University and a special advisor to the CIE,⁴¹ visited Niigata University, a national university in the northern part of Japan, to give a speech. He made anti-communist remarks, asserting that communist professors should be dismissed from universities because communists were not free to think (Krämer 2005: 5). While Eells visited other university campuses with the same message—advocating the purge of communist university faculty—anti-Red Purge movements steadily grew among university students in response. In particular, at Tōhoku University, a national university in the northeastern part of Japan, students heckled Eells’s speech, forcing him off the stage in protest, instigating anti-Red Purge movements on other campuses (Takei 2005: 46). Students resorted to boycotting exams and going on strikes, sometimes created clashes with the police on campuses. The protests surged to a level that students across campuses were able to organize a general strike in June 1950.⁴² The Minister of Education, Teiyū Amano, a distinguished Kantian scholar at the University of Tokyo who joined the cabinet in May 1950, stood firm on implementing the Red Purge at universities. However, Amano’s decision only spurred further student protests, until he announced a suspension of the Red Purge at universities in October that year (Ōno 1967: 105).

In response to the students’ anti-Red Purge movements, university authorities took punitive action. Although the severity of the punitive actions varied across universities, the university authority at Waseda University—a top private university in Tokyo where students were politically active—for example, expelled or suspended 86 students from school (Takei 2005: 14).⁴³ It was students, not faculty members, who

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⁴⁰ Actually, controversies did exist among staff members in the CIE of GHQ over the validity of the Red Purge at universities and schools (Krämer 2005: 4-5).
⁴¹ Eells specialized in higher education. After teaching at universities, he worked for the War Department in the United States before he came to Japan. For his biography, see the Northwest Digital Archives at http://nwda-db.wsulibs.wsu.edu/findaid/ark:/80444/xv73545 (Retrieved May 12, 2012).
⁴² For a broader discussion of the student movements, see Chapter 4.
⁴³ In this general strike, 27 universities participated. Approximately 50 universities organized some sort of protests (Ōno 1967: 84-8). Other general strikes were carried out, as the movements gained momentum. In contrast to Waseda University, the authority at the Hongō campus of the University of Tokyo—the top national university where students were also active—was more lenient. The university authority expelled ten students and suspended three (Ōno 1967: 105). However, most of the expelled were allowed to return to
organized the protests against the purge of university faculty members, and it was the students who were expelled from school as a consequence of their activism.\textsuperscript{44}

Partly owing to the students’ anti-Red Purge movements, the Red Purge at universities was not as extensive as it might have been.\textsuperscript{45} As Krämer (2005: 8-9) shows, only 35 faculty members were dismissed from their positions across the country (see Table 3.1).\textsuperscript{46} This contrasts sharply with the extent of the purge in other sectors. As mentioned earlier, approximately 1,200 teachers were discharged from schools between 1949 and 1950. In other intellectual fields, such as publishing companies and broadcasting stations, approximately 700 people were expelled in 1950 (Miyake 1994: 9).

Table 3.1 The Number of Faculty Members Expelled by the Red Purge

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Faculty</th>
<th>Purge Suggested</th>
<th>Purge Attempted</th>
<th>Actually Dismissed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literature and Science</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanities</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicine</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Science</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>116</strong></td>
<td><strong>51</strong></td>
<td><strong>31</strong>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{44} As Chapter 4 will flesh out in greater detail, students were actively engaged in democratic movements, and the anti-Red Purge movements were organized as democratic movements—protecting the self-governance of universities. Ironically, the JCP attempted to repress the student anti-Red Purge movements and expelled some student members from the party for their activism (Ōno 1967: 82, 91).

\textsuperscript{45} With regard to the aborted nature of the Red Purge at universities, extant studies have pointed out the students’ protests and faculty objections (e.g., Takemae 1982: 348; Takei 2005: 34-5; Myōjin 1989). Krämer (2005) also suggests that neither GHQ nor the Japanese government made any final decisions over universities as to whether anyone should be purged, by whom, and when.

\textsuperscript{46} Myōjin (1989) also indicates that between 30 and 40 faculty members were purged.
Table 3.1 shows the relative insignificance of the purge: there were only 51 attempted purges among more than 11,000 faculty members across the country. Consequently, compared to other sectors, universities became the exception where the Red Purge was enforced only partially.

As I have argued, waxing of left-leaning intellectuals in the early years of the occupation was linked to the scarcity of nationalist intellectuals, following the purge of nationalist intellectuals and their voluntary resignation. In addition, the aborted Red Purge at universities constituted another political opportunity for left-leaning intellectuals and their political activism. The lack of intervention from GHQ, the government, and university authorities also helped the intellectuals’ political activism. However, the prevalence of progressive intellectuals did not begin immediately after the war. They became dominant by eventually separating themselves from the old-liberal intellectuals—specifically, an older generation of intellectuals who were liberal-minded, but who still believed in an imperial Japan—with whom they once collaborated. The next section explores this transition.

### 3.2 Old-Liberal Intellectuals during the Transition

The transition from prewar/wartime democracy to postwar democracy happened gradually during the time of the occupation following the war. In the social space of intellectuals, a shift in dominant discourses on the nation-state and democracy came with the shift from the salience of old-liberal and socialist intellectuals to that of progressive intellectuals. This section focuses on the discourses of the former, the old-liberal intellectuals. Unlike many nationalists in the prewar and wartime period, the old-liberal

Note: The total number is lower than that indicated in the text because information on each individual was not always available.  
Source: Krämer (2005: 9).

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47 In 1950, the total number of university faculty in the country, excluding faculties at junior colleges and lecturers, was 11,534 (Kaigo and Shimizu 1966: 250).
intellectuals were advocates of democracy, but they still represented and articulated “imperial democracy” (Gordon 1991), an older political-symbolic system that held the emperor at the center of society.

During the initial U.S. occupational period between mid-August and December 1945, people’s views of their society and nation-state were muddled, having been the transitional point from a wartime regime to democracy. In their discussions of democracy, major newspapers during this period still featured intellectuals and politicians who overtly supported the national polity presided over by the emperor in their discussions of democracy (see Ōi 2004; Oku 2007). For example, Tamon Maeda (1884-1962), the Minister of Education, at one roundtable discussion organized by a newspaper company, outlined the following:

Democracy in Japan was founded upon ikkun banmin [= a political ideology that a sovereign lord is granted all rights and governs all the people]. The relationship of lord and subject was a close one and was similar to that of father and son. However, it digressed because of feudalism, exclusivist militarism and nationalism. But, if we strip off this digression, we will return to the Imperial Rescript on Education and further to the Charter Oath of Five Articles [of the Meiji period]. Since the Imperial Rescript on Education [educational policies and ethics that centered on the emperor] shows the essence of democracy, we have to re-evaluate that earnestly and carry that out. (Summary translation, Asahi Shinbun, October 4, 1945: 2)

Maeda argued that the national polity in the Meiji era embodied a Japanese version of democracy with the emperor at the center, but that the military created the divergence. To Maeda, the Charter Oath of Five Articles of 1868—which declared Meiji Japan’s new governance—and the Imperial Rescript on Education of 1890—which articulated the educational ethnics of Meiji Japan—constituted the foundations of Japanese democracy. As Chapter 2 has examined, this view paralleled the New Year’s Rescript of Emperor Hirohito, in which he undraped his divine dignity and declared that postwar democracy had its roots in the beginning of the Meiji period.48 The New Year’s Rescript was published in newspapers in 1946 and was accompanied by Prime Minister Shidehara’s

48 See Chapter 2.
commentary. Shidehara extolled the majesty of the emperors and echoed that democracy in Japan began with the Meiji Emperor’s Charter Oath of 1868 (Asahi Shinbun, January 1, 1946: 1). Not only political elites, but also old-liberals and socialist intellectuals aligned themselves in support of a vision of postwar democracy that would uphold the emperor at the center of Japan’s postwar political system.

Other intellectuals even argued that democracy could be traced back to the beginning of the imperial system. Sōkichi Tsuda (1873-1961), a notable liberalist during the prewar and war period, proclaimed that the imperial family had been the spiritual center in uniting nationals for two thousand years and that democracy in Japan ought to be founded upon nationals’ love for the emperor.\(^{49}\) Put more clearly, Tsuda argued that although the imperial system was distorted by the military during wartime, the emperor originated from the Japanese people (Nihon minzoku), being equal to them, and did not reign over them as an antagonistic power. He thus argued that a democracy of people governing themselves was congruent with the continued rule of the imperial family, who resided amidst the Japanese people (Tsuda 1946: 53-4). Tsuda’s article was published in Sekai, stirring intensive controversies before and after its publication.\(^{50}\)

Love and support for the imperial system and the American vision of democracy were not compatible, however. Toyohiko Kagawa (1888-1960), a well-known socialist activist from the prewar period, often featured in major newspapers between mid-August and December 1945 (Ōi 2004: 18-9). As an ardent supporter of the constitutional monarchy, he was skeptical of democracy, particularly the American version of it. In one newspaper, he was quoted from the above mentioned roundtable discussion on American democracy as saying:

\(^{49}\) Tsuda had been known as a liberal historian because his research had criticized the validity of historical facts as narrated in Kojiki and Nihonshoki, the oldest classical Japanese books on the ancient history of Japan and its emperors. Due to potential criticism against the imperial system, he was repressed by the government in 1940. Tsuda’s books were banned, and he was forced to resign his professorship at Waseda University.

\(^{50}\) Before the publication of Tsuda’s article in 1946, Yoshino, the chief editor of Sekai, added his commentary to the volume because he got objections from other editorial members against Tsuda’s article before its publication (Hanawa 1990: 27-8; Mainichi Shinbunsha 1996: 28).
[If we had a presidential government and] if we elected a president wrongly, [our society] would become more and more chaotic, and we would not have ended in [chaos]. Because we are not armed, it is to the best benefit of nationals to hold on to the imperial family that has been everlasting. (Asahi Shinbun, October 4, 1945: 2)

For Kagawa, democracy was dangerous because it would bring chaos to society. Thus, he advocated the monarchy as a moral guardian of society. He continued:

If we adopted bad democracy, I mean, a democracy in which the sovereignty changes all the time whenever we have elections, autocracy might appear, and Japan will fall into chaos. To avoid that, it is best to hold on to the monarchy. In addition, [the monarchy] is ideal for democracy because [the Emperor] has acquired a sense of justice and is sworn to protect [the nationals] from evils. (ibid.)

Kagawa argued that whereas American democracy could corrupt society, a constitutional monarchy would prevent such corruption. Some participants at the discussion where Kagawa made these comments valued the positive aspects of American democracy, such as the educational system and local autonomy. However, they all agreed that Japan had a democracy and should pursue its own form of democracy, which held the monarchy as a governing power (Asahi Shinbun, October 2-5, 1945).51

Furthermore, during the transitional period, some intellectuals were even reluctant to grant freedom, equal rights, and democracy for all, although only a few sources can verify this. Of these, an editorial staff of Sekai recorded the story in his diary that Kikuo Kojima (1887-1950), a well-known art historian at the University of Tokyo, talked to a young stranger on the train in Tokyo as follows:

People are born with a predetermined talent and an ascribed position in society. It is wrong to ignore that [fact] and claim equality for all. These days, everyone and his dog (neko mo shakushi mo) cry out for democracy, and even workers make

51 The GHQ’s censorship began in September 1945. This was a direct censorship and became full-fledged in October. Kagawa’s remarks may or may not appear before the censorship tribunal. However, even after the censorship had been fully implemented, Kagawa was sometimes quoted in major newspapers as a representative of intellectuals (Ôi 2004: 41).
The diary entry was made on a day in 1948. It was on the same year that intellectuals were organizing the Peace Problem Symposium and mobilizing themselves as activists for peace. Prior to that, other intellectuals experiencing remorse after the war were also engaged in grassroots democracy by establishing informal schools and research institutes, as discussed earlier. But as these examples demonstrate, not all intellectuals were in favor of postwar democracy. Old-liberal intellectuals and sometimes socialist intellectuals supported the constitutional monarchy that granted the emperor power and did not always value democracy where everyone would have equal rights.\textsuperscript{52} The differences between the worldviews and respective habitus of old-liberal intellectuals and progressive intellectuals became even more apparent when the two groups collaborated in the Peace Problem Symposium at \textit{Sekai}.

\subsection*{3.3 Rooting Democracy for All: \textit{Sekai} and the Primacy of Progressive Intellectuals}

The magazine \textit{Sekai}, which later initiated and subsequently became the locus of progressive intellectuals’ political activism, at first expressed similar views as the older generation of liberal intellectuals. The first issue, which was published in January 1946, included a prefatory note appealing to the ideals of postwar democracy that the U.S. occupational forces were advocating, and referring to respect for individuality, freedom of speech and religion, and world peace as universal ideals. At the same time, the issue also emphasized that the Charter of Oath of 1868 had already embodied the same ideals (\textit{Sekai} 1946, vol. 1: 5). At first, \textit{Sekai} was close to the older group of liberal

\footnote{The editor of \textit{Sekai}, who had met with numerous intellectuals in his job, noted his impression that some intellectuals, especially some old liberal intellectuals, seemed to think of themselves as noble and cultural people, different from the majority of people who were dirty and uncultivated (Hanawa 1990: 8-9). During the 1960 Anpo protests, faculty members tried to dissociate themselves from workers as well. Not all university faculties were comfortable with joining protests organized by university unions where university staff members were the majority; thus, faculty members often formed their own rallies and demonstrations (Interview with R, August 14, 2008).}
In addition to publishing Tsuda, as noted above, the magazine also published articles by old-liberal intellectuals such as law scholar Tatsukichi Minobe (1873-1948, taught at Tokyo Imperial University), philosopher Tetsuzō Watsuji (1889-1960, taught at Kyōto Imperial University), philosopher Yoshishige Abe (1883-1966, taught at Keijō Imperial University in Korea), and economist Shinzō Koizumi (1888-1966, taught at Keiō University). As outlined above, these were the old-liberals who advocated a constitutional monarchy in which the emperor would retain governing power.

The worldviews of the newer group of progressive intellectuals differed sharply from those of the old-liberal. First and foremost, these progressive intellectuals did not support the constitutional monarchy and criticized the wartime regime, including the ideology of the imperial (i.e. emperor) system.54 Maruyama, the political scientist quoted earlier who coined the phrase “community of remorse,” criticized the ideology of ultranationalism with the emperor at the center, arguing that it governed people’s minds and behaviors which had ultimately led to the war (Maruyama [1946] 1964). Maruyama’s article, entitled “Logic and Psychology of Ultranationalism” and published in Sekai in May 1946, was written when he was a 32-year-old assistant professor at the University of Tokyo. The article made a significant impact on readers and made Maruyama widely known (Oku 2007: 72-7).55 Maruyama argued that the imperial system under fascism prevented people from becoming autonomous subjects (Maruyama [1946] 1964: 26-8). To Maruyama and progressive intellectuals, democracy meant the establishment of the autonomy of self vis-à-vis the political system, and they argued about the obstacles to, and possibilities for, the realization of democracy in Japan.56 Especially for Maruyama,

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53 The group was called Dōshin Kai, made up of intellectuals and artists, including scholars, journalists, novelists, and painters. It was established right before the end of the war. See Oku (2007: 46-8).
54 However, it is worth noting that progressive intellectuals, including Maruyama, did not call for the abolishment of the imperial system.
55 Editorial board members of Sekai invited Maruyama to submit his manuscript (quoted in Oku 2007: 73). Maruyama later related that after the article was published, more than 10 editors visited his home in a week seeking more manuscripts from him (Matsuzawa and Uete 2006b: 145).
56 The topic of subjectivity or the autonomy of self (shutaisei) generated intensive debates among Marxist literary figures, involving social scientists such as Maruyama between 1946 and 1949. See Koschmann (1993, 1996).
such democracy had a universal value, which Japan had not attained yet. Maruyama wrote:

> At present, there is no democracy worth defending in Japan. For when it comes to the autonomy of intellectuals and the expansion of political and economic rights of the nationals, the issue we currently face is not the protection of democracy that we had attained but the development of democracy that we started in order for it to take root. I say this not in the sense of “Soviet-type democracy” but in the sense of the western civic democracy. (Maruyama [1950] 1964: 146)

Maruyama was not alone in this view. Other progressive intellectuals also had a universalistic view of democracy, and often found democracy in Japan to be lacking or insufficient, which then motivated them to engage in and organize democratic movements.  

Importantly, progressive intellectuals advocated two other forms of autonomy: for Japan in the international arena, and for themselves as intellectuals. The peace movements at the Peace Problem Symposium were democratic movements pushing for Japan to attain political autonomy in its international relations. As a notable movement, progressive intellectuals advocated an overall peace treaty concerning the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. This was because, in their view, military alliance would make Japan’s independence conditional in the context of the Cold War and thus undermine its democracy (Kersten 1996: 164). Furthermore, activism for peace was an opportunity for the progressive intellectuals themselves to realize their responsibility as intellectuals who should have had autonomy but failed to achieve it during the war (Kersten 1996: 179). This autonomy for intellectuals was also claimed as a universal value (Kersten 1996: 101-05).

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57 To note, Maruyama, along with other progressive intellectuals, emphasized activism and participatory democracy of the masses, rather than the autonomy of individuals, during the 1960 Anpo protests (Kersten 1996: 200, 214). Many progressive intellectuals who criticized the lack of democracy in the late 1940s changed their views during the 1960 Anpo protests.

58 In contrast, some old liberal intellectuals advocated a separate peace.

59 To be precise, most progressive intellectuals were still students or were too young to be intellectuals during wartime. Thus, as I will argue shortly, the criticism against intellectuals was directed more at the old liberals who failed to stop the war.
The experiences of progressive intellectuals before and during the war differed substantially from those of their old-liberal counterparts. The latter, most of whom were born in the late nineteenth century, had had the opportunity to enjoy a certain degree of liberalism and freedom in the 1910s and the early 1920s. In addition, they did not join the battlefront during WWII since they had attained established social statuses as faculty members at imperial universities or were not young enough to be sent to the battlefront. In contrast, many progressive intellectuals, who were born in the early twentieth century, by and large struggled with the repression of freedom of speech in their youth and served in the military during the war.60

Many of the progressive intellectuals who emerged as ardent advocates of democracy after the war had experienced repression of freedom of speech in their youth prior to the war. The existing literature attributes their beliefs to a broad generational shift (e.g., Oguma 2002; Tsuzuki 1995; Yoshida 2001); but I would argue that it was these experiences of repression, followed by hardships on the battlefields, that turned them into zealous promoters of democracy in the postwar era.61 As I will examine later, Shimizu, a prominent progressive intellectual who did not experience either event in any serious manner, opposed the slogan of democracy during the 1960 Anpo protests. However, many progressive intellectuals were passionate and persistent advocates of democracy and often referenced the hardships they had indeed experienced during “fascism” and on the battlefields. Maruyama, for example, was caught by the police when he attended a lecture organized by the Society of Materialism in his time as a student at the First Higher School.62 The Special Higher Police investigated Maruyama, read his diary, and kept him in jail for a few days. After Maruyama entered Tokyo Imperial University, the police also visited his home because he was blacklisted (Matsuzawa and Uete 2006a: 50-2, 74). Maruyama later recalled that he had spent his teen years in a “very awful era,” in which

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60 The extant Japanese scholarship argued that generation was the key factor that differentiated the two groups (e.g., Oguma 2002; Tsuzuki 1995; Yoshida 2011). However, as will be argued shortly, I would focus more on the differences between their experiences before the end of the war and their structural location.

61 As I have explained however, the dynamics and structure of the fields shaped the form their actual activism eventually took.

62 Higher schools are equivalent to present-day colleges.
the Special Higher Police usually kept close surveillance over what people talked about (Yoshino 1995: 240).

In the case of pragmatist philosopher, Osamu Kuno (1910-1999), his experience in jail was critical enough to make him determined to begin activism when the war was over. Kuno was jailed for two years from 1937-1939, charged for his connection with the communist parties and his leftist “consciousness” (ishiki) (Kuno Osamu shū, hereafter KOS 1998, vol. 5: 63). Kuno later explained his determination to be an activist as follows:

When I got cuffed when I was around 27 years old, I knew I was innocent. So I was firmly determined [at that time] that I would never cooperate with the state authority who had done that to me. I mean, I thought I would never let my wisdom cooperate for their control. (Kuno quoted in Gotō 2001: 101)

I keenly felt [in jail] that if I were to have my life back and were able to be back on the street, I would seriously begin a peace movement and an anti-war movement well in advance and before war breaks out, even if I had to neglect half of my academic responsibility.63 (Kuno 1988: 26)

While waiting for the sentence, Kuno was sent from one jail to another and suffered from an infestation of flea and lice in jail. He thought there was nothing he could do to help himself while he was there. While in jail, Kuno made his decision to become an intellectual and activist once the war would end (ibid.).

Their experiences on the battlefield also pushed some progressive intellectuals to commit to activism, in the hope of preventing any potential rise of fascism while forging grassroots democracy. A notable example is Tsurumi, a philosopher who was born in 1922. Tsurumi came to the United States in 1937 and studied at Harvard University between 1938 and 1942. After returning to Japan at the outbreak of the war between the United States and Japan, Tsurumi served with the navy in Jakarta in 1943. He was only

63 In the 1930s, those who were arrested due to their thoughts and activism were tortured and sometimes killed by the police. As a well-known example, proletariat novelist Takiji Kobayashi (1903-1933) was lynched and put to death.
twenty years old at the time. Tsurumi had anti-war ideas; and, he recalled that it was a serious horror to be the only person who thought that Japan would lose the war, when all the other Japanese soldiers believed in Japan’s victory (Tsurumi, Ueno, and Oguma 2004: 48). Tsurumi later noted that despite his anti-war beliefs, the fact that he did not make any effort to realize his pacifist ideal while in the navy remained a source of remorse (Tsurumi, Ueno, and Oguma 2004: 50).64

Other postwar progressive intellectuals were also conscribed to the battlefields. Leading progressive intellectuals at the 1960 Anpo protests, such as Maruyama, Tsurumi, and Takeuchi, a scholar on Chinese literature (1910-1977), all served in battlefields where they observed the outrageousness of the army and Japanese society.65 Progressive intellectuals’ experiences of repression and conscription made them anti-fascists, critics of the state, determined to step away from the “ivory tower,” and engage in democratic movements as intellectual activists once the war was over.

In contrast, the old-liberal intellectuals experienced less repression both before and during the war. As noted earlier, many old-liberal intellectuals were spared any suppression of freedom of speech during their youth and had the opportunity to enjoy a relatively liberal society during the early part of the twentieth century. Like Tsuda, even when their books were banned, or they were forced to resign from universities, the old-liberal intellectuals were rarely actually imprisoned—unlike Kuno. Then, the wartime experiences of the two groups were also different. While most progressive intellectuals were sent to the battlefields, few old-liberal intellectuals were of an age to be recruited as

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64 In the case of Tsurumi, in addition to the war experience, his experience in the United States would significantly shape his motivation to engage in democratic movements. In 1942, Tsurumi was jailed on suspicion of being an anarchist in the United States. Nonetheless, Harvard University still granted his degree. Tsurumi tells of how he was impressed by the university’s tolerant treatment, despite the fact that the United States and Japan were at war, and admits that he found democracy in the United States. After returning to Japan, Tsurumi thought that it was Japan, not the United States, that was the enemy, after seeing people being arrested when they criticized the war in Japan (Tsurumi, Ueno, and Oguma 2004: 40-1).

65 Maruyama served as a private 1st rank (ittōhei) in the army troop in Pyongyang in 1944, where he always had to watch out for his boss (Oguma 2002: 55). Takeuchi served as a private 2nd rank (nitōhei) in Hubein in China from 1943. In the case of Shimizu, another leading progressive intellectual, he served in Burma in a propaganda campaign along with other writers. As I will argue later, for Shimizu, the Great Kanto Earthquake that struck in 1923 impacted him more than did WWII.
soldiers for the war. Tsurumi, who was sent to Jakarta after coming back from the United States, for example, expressed his antagonism, stating that the lack of draft experiences would have made old-liberal intellectuals’ fundamental mental structure different from his (Kuno, Tsurumi, and Fujita [1959] 2010: 135). In addition, the social backgrounds of the two groups of intellectuals differed as well. Many old-liberal intellectuals came from the upper or upper-middle classes, and sometimes had close connections with state officials (Oguma 2002: 191; Kuno, Tsurumi, and Fujita [1959] 2010: 133-34). Some progressive intellectuals also came from affluent family backgrounds, but in most cases, their time in the military exposed them to an environment in which their social status was overturned, allowing them the chance to interact with “ordinary people.”

Both the old-liberal intellectuals and progressive intellectuals shared feelings of remorse following the war, and collaborated in peace movements through the Peace Problem Symposium. However, as their activism continued, the gap between the two groups widened. The experiences of progressive intellectuals before and during the war had made them more suspicious of the nation-state, and of intellectualism and idealism that were not followed by actions (see Kuno, Tsurumi, and Fujita [1959] 2010: 135). Eventually, this began to manifest itself in progressive intellectuals’ distrust in and discomfort around old-liberal intellectuals. For example, one group of progressive intellectuals criticized the intellectual discourses of old-liberal intellectuals for being based on elitism, conservatism, and cultivation (kyōyōshugi) (Kuno, Tsurumi, and Fujita [1959] 2010: 109). Many progressive intellectuals viewed the liberalism of the pre-WWII period through critical eyes. One progressive intellectual, Takenobu Kawashia (1909-1992), for example, wrote that old-liberalists did not stop the war and fascism, which, in turn, angered some old-liberal intellectuals (Matsuzawa and Uete 2006b: 26). For their part, the old-liberal intellectuals also separated themselves from their progressive

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66 Even when the old liberal intellectuals were recruited, they could serve as generals, unlike progressive intellectuals who served in much lower rank like 1st private. See footnote 64.
67 In fact, some old liberal intellectuals were recruited to ministries.
68 Sometimes, these experiences of interacting with ordinary people led progressive intellectuals to dissociate themselves from elite social groups, which they grew to detest (Oguma 2002: 96-7).
69 Other notable activism in which they were involved was that of the Japan Teachers’ Union.
counterparts. Reacting against the surge of leftist movements and discourses—though not exactly against progressive intellectuals, the old-liberal intellectuals began a new magazine, *Kokoro* (Heart) in 1948 (Kuno, Tsurumi, and Fujita [1959] 2010: 106). The publication created an opportunity to distance themselves from the progressive intellectuals who were active at *Sekai*.

Although *Sekai* had close connection with the old-liberal intellectuals at the beginning, it started featuring young, progressive intellectuals more and more after the enormous response to Maruyama’s article in 1946. Indeed, *Sekai*, the magazine that began with the purpose of preventing war by reaching out to ordinary people (Oku 2007: 44), and progressive intellectuals started sharing more affinity by organizing the peace movements through the Peace Problem Symposium. It was especially so after progressive intellectuals and old-liberal intellectuals began to dissociate from each other until finally the old-liberal intellectuals left the symposium. Japan’s defeat in the war had brought the field of intellectuals to a crisis, in which legitimacy of existing knowledge was questioned, and political activism became a significant value for intellectuals. In this way, *Sekai* provided cultural and social capital to progressive intellectuals when many of them were in dominated positions in the field. To elaborate this further, I now turn to the field of intellectuals.

3.4 The Politicization and Structural Location of Progressive Intellectuals

After the war, a substantial number of intellectuals were engaged in some sort of political activism and activities, shifting the field of intellectuals clearly in favor of activism. Journalism, especially as represented by magazines such as *Sekai*, promoted intellectuals’ public activism and the preeminence of these politicized intellectuals until 1960. Progressive intellectuals became more salient in the field of intellectuals between the late 1940s and 1960 due to their public engagement and political activism. Their increasingly occupying a central position in the field was supported by the resources provided by *Sekai*, which valued the progressive intellectuals’ views and styles of activism, and found them useful. In fact, *Sekai* began with the purpose of a company
president who wanted to publish a popular magazine that could connect the masses and culture so that the masses could cultivate their knowledge to prevent future outrages by the military and politicians, although the audience turned out to be educated readers (see Oku 2007: 44).

Postwar intellectuals experiencing remorse after the war attempted to reach out to ordinary people, in order to allow democracy to be more firmly rooted among ordinary Japanese. As Avenell (2008) argues, it was a time when all Japanese intellectuals sought to connect themselves with the “common” people through their activism and activities. Still, it was progressive intellectuals who were the most enthusiastic in this effort. In addition to the Peace Problem Symposium, progressive intellectuals initiated other organizations, institutions, and groups that grew in the early postwar years during the occupation. In 1946, Shimizu established the Twentieth Century Research Institute (20-setki Kenkyūjo), which aimed to conduct research and disseminate social science and philosophy. It soon shifted its goal exclusively to the dissemination of knowledge, and offered open lectures and published a series of books (Shimizu Ikutarō chosakushū, hereafter SIC 1993, vol. 14: 305-07). With other notable progressive intellectuals such as Maruyama and Kuno, Tsurumi began the Science of Thought Study Group (Shisō no Kagaku Kankyū Kai) in 1946. The group initially started with the purpose of introducing “Anglo-American thoughts” to the Japanese people (cf. Yoshida 2011: 199). However, it evolved into a group where intellectuals and non-intellectuals—non-higher-education degree holders—participated in regular discussions and published writings for their journal.

These organizations, as well as the networks they generated, were reformulated when new political issues emerged. For example, some members of the Twentieth Century Research Institute—notably, Shimizu and Maruyama—became the core members of the Peace Problem Symposium (cf. SIC 1993, vol. 14: 331). Intellectuals affiliated with the Twentieth Century Research Institute also served as lecturers at the Academy of Humanistic Studies (Jinbun Gakuen), an informal school established by Kuno and others in Kyōto in 1946. Furthermore, not a few networks and organizations of
intellectuals created during the occupational period turned themselves into active movement groups for the 1960 Anpo protests. This was the case, for example, for the Voices of the Voiceless Association (Koenaki Koe no Kaï) that members of the Science of Thought Study Group began and that was later acclaimed as one of the first citizen movement groups.

(1) Types of Groups for Intellectuals’ Public Intervention

While politicized intellectuals were motivated to reach out to ordinary people through their activism after WWII, the ways in which they reached out and built connections with such people varied, depending on the inclusiveness of their intellectual groups, as well as on how the members identified themselves as intellectuals. This shifted as time went by and as they increasingly found themselves engaged in actual activism. Furthermore, in keeping with Gramsci’s classic argument, how intellectuals situate themselves vis-à-vis the mass and how these intellectuals could create mass movements constituted a central question and debate for Japanese intellectuals during the early postwar years (see Kinoshita, Noma, and Hidaka 1964). This subsection looks at the various ways in which intellectuals, both university faculty members and non-university faculty members, incorporated non-intellectual members in their activism.

Generally speaking, the old-liberal intellectuals formed closed groups and did not involve non-intellectuals, such as non-higher degree holders, in their activities—even when they intended to reach out to the ordinary people. In contrast, some groups of the progressive intellectuals were inclusive, involving non-intellectuals in their regular activism. Table 3.2 below shows intellectuals’ affiliation and their networks and activities with non-intellectuals. Compared to the occupational period between 1945 and 1952, the late 1950s saw more groups being organized by non-university faculty members and more attempts on the part of intellectuals to incorporate ordinary people in their groups and activities. In short, as time went by, the salience of intellectuals’ activism shifted

70 Except for a few studies (e.g., Zald and McCarthy [1973] 2003), the social movement scholarship has not offered extensive theoretical arguments on the relationship between intellectuals and social movements. In
from activism amongst themselves to activism with non-intellectuals. At the same time, non-university faculty members took up a more prominent role at the forefront of political activism. This shift was parallel to shifts in the value of political engagement in the field of intellectuals, as the chapter will examine shortly.

Table 3.2 Types of Groups Organized by Intellectuals for Public Engagement (1945-1960) \(^7\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Institutional Position of Organizing Intellectual(s)</th>
<th>Intellectual Involvement with Non-Intellectuals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>University Faculty</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>University Faculty</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Non-Faculty</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Non-Faculty</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Shaded cells indicate the types of groups organized by progressive intellectuals. They committed Type II more than Type I or III. These are ideal types, but in general, the prominent type shifted from I to IV from 1945 through the 1960s.

Intellectuals’ attempts to engage in public and political activism began with Type I groups after WWII. The Peace Problem Symposium and the research institutes set up by intellectuals were examples of this type. This type of group was prevalent during the occupational period, and was also generated in the late 1950s. For example, in 1958, a group of law scholars at the University of Tokyo organized the Constitution Study Association (*Kenpō Mondai Kenkyūkai*), as a reaction against the constitutional reforms proposed by the government. Scholars also organized this type of group during the 1960 Anpo protests.

\(^7\) Historian Midori Kurokawa has identified three types of intellectuals in the organization of peace movements in Japan. Kurokawa classifies intellectuals in terms of their identity as intellectuals and their attitudes towards the ordinary people (Kurokawa 2002: 138).
The attempts by many progressive intellectuals to forge grassroots democracy were often carried out with Type II groups. As discussed earlier, examples are the commoners’ university in Mishima in which Maruyama was involved, other newly formed informal schools, and the Science of Thought Study Group to which Tsurumi invited a significant number of non-academics. The democratic movements organized by this type of group reached their peak right after the 1960 Anpo protests. University students and a group of faculty members organized the Homecoming Movements (kikyō undō), where they visited students’ hometowns and villages to inform people of the event of the 1960 Anpo protests and the essence of democracy. These were short-lived movements organized in the summer of 1960, but they developed into nationwide democratic movements in which university students and faculty members collaborated during that period.

Groups of intellectuals led by non-faculty members became more salient in intellectuals’ political activism of the late 1950s. The most illustrative example of a Type III group emerged for the protests against the Police Duties Bill in 1958. While intellectuals’ movement groups during the early postwar years incorporated both scholars and cultural figures, Type III groups comprised non-faculty members, cultural figures and artists, including novelists, critics, composers, poets, theater performers, and playwrights, all of whom organized themselves against the bill in 1958. Other groups, most notably the Society for Young Japan (Wakai Nihon no Kai) that was organized by young artists mostly in their twenties, were reorganized to confront the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1960.

The prominence of progressive intellectuals, as well as the form of activism represented by Type II was largely criticized, so that increasing value and visibility shifted towards Type IV groups around the time of the 1960 Anpo protests. A notable case was that of the poet Gan Tanigawa (1923-1995), who organized the Taishō Action

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72 To be precise, informal schools were sometimes organized by academic figures who were non-faculty members as well.
73 For more detail, see articles published in Shisō no Kagaku, such as Nishimura (1960). Also, a group of students and professors published the newspaper called Mingakken Nyūsu (The News of Mingakken), using their organization’s name between 1960 and 1961.
Group (Taishō Kōdōtai) to support a workers’ dispute at the Taishō mines in Kyūshū in the southern part of Japan in 1960. Tanigawa organized his movement by critiquing existing intellectuals and their activism. Poet and critic, Takaaki Yoshimoto (1924-2012), also harshly criticized progressive intellectuals and their version of democracy advocated during the 1960 Anpo protests, calling it fictitious (Yoshimoto [1960] 1966). Yoshimoto then became the leading critic against progressive intellectuals after the 1960 Anpo protests, while also becoming an influential intellectual for New Left student movement groups. In the 1960s, this fourth type of group, which had non-university intellectuals as representatives and collaborated with non-intellectuals, generated the highest level of mobilization. The most prominent group was the Citizen’s Federation for Peace in Vietnam, organized against the Vietnam War, which had a novelist, Makoto Oda, as a representative. The organization was founded by former progressive intellectuals—namely, Tsurumi, Kuno, and political scientist Michitoshi Takabatake (1933-2004)—aimed at fostering citizen movements led by the citizens themselves.

As I will argue shortly, political activism was an important means through which intellectuals were able to situate themselves within the field of intellectuals. In the postwar period, many prominent intellectuals regarded public engagement as a central part of their societal role and responsibility. However, as I have shown above, the ways in which intellectuals connected with the public were not uniform. Intellectuals debated among themselves about their role and the appropriate form for their public engagement. While old-liberal intellectuals often formed Type I groups and rarely allowed themselves to be connected with non-intellectuals, progressive intellectuals, being critical of old-liberal intellectuals, were enthusiastic about acting with non-intellectuals. But after the

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74 His article, “Gisei no shūen (The End of a Fictitious System)” (Yoshimoto [1960] 1966), was written in September soon after the end of the 1960 Anpo protests. Yoshimoto argued that the ideal of “democracy” advocated by progressive intellectuals was factious and without substances (ibid.: 67-74). Yoshimoto’s thought is complicated; but in contrast to progressive intellectuals who advocated “public sphere” and “citizens,” he advocated individuals who acted for their own individual interests, not for those of the public (ibid.: 71-4).

75 More precisely, Yoshimoto and Tanikawa differed on how to situate themselves vis-à-vis the masses. While Yoshimoto regarded himself as a commoner, Tanikawa found Yoshimoto deceptive in positing himself as an intellectual and a commoner. Tanikawa thought of his own ambivalent location among intellectuals by situating himself not as an intellectual to the masses, but as a commoner to the intellectuals in general. The author is grateful to Chikanobu Michiba for this clarification.
1960 Anpo protests, the field shifted yet again and the political activism of progressive intellectuals was criticized. But they themselves were self-critical of their own arrogance and assumption that they could or should spread ideas from the top down, thereby “enlightening” the masses (e.g., Ishida 2006: 8). Thus, after the 1960 Anpo protests, the role of intellectuals, particularly faculty at universities, declined, and more non-intellectuals served as representatives of these organizations. 76

(2) The Structural Location of Progressive Intellectuals

Progressive intellectuals’ political activism and their location within the field of intellectuals are not unrelated. Progressive intellectuals between the late 1940s and 1960 occupied a peculiar position in academia, which gave them autonomy and advantage for engaging in public activism. Figure 3.2 below shows the structural positions of the majority of old-liberal intellectuals and their progressive intellectual counterparts within the field of intellectuals.

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76 Further examination is needed of this point, but Type IV might have prevailed during the late 1940s when many artists who joined the JCP were engaged in cultural activities and activism directed by the JCP. However, the role of the JCP-affiliated intellectuals is beyond the scope of this chapter.
In Figure 3.2, progressive intellectuals often occupied the space of the second and third quadrants, where autonomy from universities was relatively high. As represented by Maruyama and other law school graduates at the University of Tokyo, a few progressive intellectuals occupied the first quadrant where both dependency on universities and the symbolic and cultural capital were high. At the time of the 1960 Anpo protests, Maruyama, a political scientist, was a professor of the Law School at the University of Tokyo. Takeuchi, a scholar on Chinese literature, taught at Tokyo Metropolitan University as a professor. Tsurumi, a philosopher, was teaching at the Tokyo Institute of Technology as an assistant professor. Upon seeing the forceful passage

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77 These included Murayama’s students, such as Yoshikazu Sakamoto (a political scientist, 1927-) and Takeshi Ishida (a political scientist, 1923-).
of the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty bill in May 1960, Takeuchi quitted his university position in protest, and Tsurumi soon followed. This episode shows the relative autonomy of progressive intellectuals from universities.

Shimizu, one of the cases to be further examined in the next section, worked as a journalist after he graduated from Tokyo Imperial University, majoring in sociology. After the war, at the time when he was involved in activism, he was recruited as a professor at Gakushūin University because of his popularity among the general public. Shimizu wrote close to a hundred books in his lifetime (Oguma 2003: 80) and over 50 articles for Sekai between 1946 and 1960. However, Shimizu distanced himself from the circle of professors, especially the one at the University of Tokyo, who also distanced themselves from him as long as he continued to engage in activism. Kuno, the other individual I had focused on, was a philosopher and a lecturer at Gakushūn University. Prior to this, he graduated from Kyōto Imperial University and had been imprisoned, as discussed above—something that had a profound impact on him. After WWII, Kuno became one of the leading organizers of informal schools, the Peace Problem Symposium, and later the citizens’ movements.

With the exception of Maruyama and a few other law school graduates at the University of Tokyo, the most active progressive intellectuals occupied the dominated positions in the field of intellectuals. This begs the question: how and why were these dominated intellectuals able to become so involved in activism and, ultimately, became influential within their field? One key to answering this lies in the proximity and interdependence between the fields of intellectuals and journalism. Figure 3.3 illustrates the interconnectedness between the two fields.

78 Shimizu was the third scholar who wrote for Sekai most frequently between 1946 and 1960 (quoted in Takeuchi 2005: 187).
79 Despite the volume of publications he made during his lifetime, until now only a few scholars have written on Shimizu such as Oguma (2003) and Kersten (2006).
Figure 3.3 The Field of Intellectuals and the Field of Journalism (late 1940s-1960): Progressive Intellectuals, *Sekai*, and the Transactions between the Two Fields

Note: CSs stand for cultural and symbolic capital specific to the field. Autonomy in the field of intellectuals concerns autonomy from universities, whereas autonomy in the field of journalism means the autonomy from the state or dominant powers.

Although the most prominent progressive intellectuals often occupied the dominated positions in the field of intellectuals, they acquired social, cultural as well as symbolic capital that was effective in the field of intellectuals through the investment of constituencies in the field of journalism. *Sekai* and other magazines were able to invest in these less-powerful progressive intellectuals because of their (the magazines’) own relatively autonomous position in the field of journalism, and because they were

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80 For studies on the interconnectedness between the fields of intellectuals and journalism, see Boyer (2005).

81 Takeuchi (2005: 196-97) discusses the “proliferative effects” of the symbolic capital exchanged in the fields of university and journalism. Takeuchi, for example, argues that Maruyama gained an increased effect of symbolic capital in the field of intellectuals by investing in the field of journalism. In contrast, I would argue that it was not Maruyama but *Sekai* and the marginalized intellectuals who acquired the effect of symbolic capital from Maruyama.
essentially reinvesting the capital they had received from scholars in dominant positions (such as Maruyama), as well as from scholars in dominated positions (such as Shimizu).\textsuperscript{82}

While the extant studies on intellectuals and intellectuals’ activism have emphasized that the autonomy of the field of intellectuals is necessary for intellectuals’ political activism, the case of Japanese progressive intellectuals suggests that interconnectedness with other fields is the key for intellectuals’ activism, especially when intellectuals occupy the dominated positions in their field. Progressive intellectuals became prevalent through these interdependent fields, fields of intellectuals and journalism which facilitated intellectuals’ political activism. The 1960 Anpo protests served as political opportunities for progressive intellectuals, not only to achieve their long-lasting political goal of rooting democracy in Japan, but also to gain more power in the field of intellectuals, supported by actors and resources in the field of journalism.\textsuperscript{83}

3.5 Progressive Intellectuals: Individual Cases

To illustrate more clearly how these intra- and inter-field dynamics worked, let us turn now to two individual progressive intellectuals who were involved in political activism. This section focuses on Osamu Kuno and Ikutarō Shimizu, two progressive intellectuals active between the late 1940s and 1960. I examine their experiences during the war, their thoughts about the end of the war, democracy, political activism, and their actual engagement with activism until 1960. Through this analysis, I aim to show how

\textsuperscript{82} The three authors who wrote most frequently for Sekai between 1946 and 1960 were Shigeto Tsuru (68 times, an economist, progressive intellectual, 1912-2006), Hyōe Ōuchi (68 times, an economist, old liberal intellectual, 1888-1980), and Shimizu (54 times) (quoted in Takeuchi 2005: 187). Maruyama actively wrote for Sekai in the late 1940s and during the 1960 Anpo protests. In the 1950s, he was hospitalized on and off due to illnesses.

\textsuperscript{83} Takeuchi (2005: 164-215) argues that Maruyama was the mediator of the two fields and utilized the field of journalism’s capital because he did not need to sacrifice his own legitimacy in order to invest in the field of journalism. In contrast, I would argue that according to Bourdieu’s theory, Maruyama did not need to invest in the field of journalism since he already had symbolic capital in the field of intellectuals, and thus, it was Sekai that used Maruyama and his cultural capital, not the other way around. And in fact, it was not Maruyama, but Shimizu, who wrote more often for Sekai. Thus, contrary to Takeuchi’s argument, progressive intellectuals in dominated positions (the majority) were those who benefitted most from the interconnectedness between the two fields.
progressive intellectuals formed multiple and overlapping networks, negotiated the conflicts and differences within and across these networks, and gained a standing in the field of intellectuals through such activism.

(1) Osamu Kuno

Kuno was born in Sakai City, Osaka, a rural area in the western part of Japan, in 1910. His family background is not well-known; however, it is said that his family was not wealthy enough to send all of their children to university (Sataka 2006: 152). Kuno was a child who was more interested in playing baseball than reading books; not that he had access to many books in his middle school years anyway (KOS 1998, vol. 5: 4-5, 340). Notwithstanding such an environment, in 1928 he entered the Fifth Higher School in Kumamoto (currently Kumamoto University), an elite school that prepared students to enter imperial universities. Kuno then went on to Kyōto Imperial University in 1931 and studied philosophy under Hajime Tanabe, a student of Kitarō Nishida, a well-known Japanese philosopher in the study of Zen.

Table 3.3 Kuno’s Career History (1910-1960)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>Born in Sakai in Osaka.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928 (18 years old)</td>
<td>Entered the Fifth Higher School in Kumamoto.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931 (21 years old)</td>
<td>Entered Kyōto Imperial University (philosophy major).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933 (23 years old)</td>
<td>Participated in protests during the Takigawa Incident.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934 (24 years old)</td>
<td>Graduated from Kyōto Imperial University.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Did not succeed in getting a job at companies (due to the Great Depression) and entered the graduate school of Kyōto Imperial University.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935 (25 years old)</td>
<td>Published monthly journal Sekai Bunka (World Culture).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Became a lecturer at the Showa Commercial High School (currently Osaka University of Economics).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936 (26 years old)</td>
<td>Published weekly magazine Doyōbi (Saturday).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

84 Comparable to the upper-level Gymnasium in Germany and public schools in England, Japanese higher schools were national academies that prepared students for imperial universities under the Meiji government (Roden 1980: 6). For more details, see Roden (1980).

Although Kuno entered the Fifth Higher School, he was the second last person to pass the entrance exam, followed by a student who was admitted to fill up a vacancy (KOS 1998, vol. 5: 7-8).
Became a professor at Showa Commercial High School.

1937 (27 years old)  Arrested and jailed on suspicion of leftist activism.

1939 (29 years old)  Released from jail, obtained a job at Osaka Girls College of Economics (former Showa Commercial High School and currently Osaka University of Economics). Worked until 1947 (* Elsewhere, he said he worked until 1945).

1945 (35 years old)  End of WWII.

1946 (36 years old)  Established the Academy of Humanistic Studies (Jinbun Gakugen) in Kyōto.

1949 (39 years old)  Became a lecturer at Gakushūin University and then moved to Tokyo. Coordinated the Peace Problem Symposium.

1951 (41 years old)  Organized the first Educational Research Meeting of the Japanese Teachers’ Union.

1958 (48 years old)  Coordinated movements of cultural figures at the protests against the Police Duties Law.


Kuno’s Prewar Activism

Kuno began his activism while still a student at university. During his junior year at Kyōto Imperial University in 1933, the “Takigawa Incident” took place. The Ministry of Education overrode the university’s authority to suspend Yukitoki Takigawa, a liberal scholar at the Faculty of Law, from his position due to his “anarchist idea.” Faculty members at the Faculty of Law, as well as approximately 2,000 students, organized protests against Takigawa’s dismissal (KOS 1998, vol. 5: 20). It was the first time Kuno engaged himself in political activism, protesting in order to protect academic freedom (KOS 1998, vol. 5: 26). Through these protests, Kuno and his friends established ties

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85 Takigawa argued that crimes occur when the state does not function properly. This was considered a “dangerous thought” and was accused of being a potential Marxist by rightists and politicians. The Minister of Education suspended Takigawa, prompting Takigawa and other professors at the Faculty of Law who supported him to resign (KOS 1998, vol. 5: 19, 33).

After WWII, Takigawa returned to the University of Kyōto as the university president. He enforced repressive policies against student movements on his campus, resulting in conflicts with the students. Kuno was emotionally motivated at the beginning. He decided to join the protests when he saw a professor whom he much respected was filled with tears about the incident (KOS 1998, vol. 5: 21).
with other student activists, setting the foundation for broader movements in later periods.

Kuno then joined anti-fascist cultural movements. He became a collaborator for journals that Masakazu Nakai (1900-1952), a graduate student at Kyōto Imperial University, started in order to create cultural movements against fascism in Japan. Their attempts were influenced by the movement Front Populaire (Popular Front) in France, in which journalists and artists mobilized themselves against fascism, particularly in Germany after the Nazi Party rose to power in 1933 (KOS 1998, vol. 5: 45, 47; Tsurumi 1998: 3). To prevent the growing threat of fascism in Japan, Nakai, Kuno, and others began the journal Sekai Bunka (World Culture) in 1935. Prior to this, Nakai and his friends had already published a journal on aesthetics, but reformed it after seeing the French Popular Front movement’s efforts to propagate theories and information on anti-fascist movements (KOS 1998, vol. 5: 44-7). In the following year, taking their cue from the French journal Vendredi (Friday), which aimed to establish an anti-fascist cultural front in France, they began the weekly magazine Doyōbi (Saturday) which covered political news, culture, entertainment, and fashion, in an effort to enlighten a larger audience (KOS 1998, vol. 5: 76-7). The goal of these magazines for Nakai, a chief editor of the journals, was to prevent the expansion of the war that Japan was waging in

87 The popular front which Nakai and Kuno organized was not part of the Comintern that directed, under Joseph Stalin, communist parties throughout the world to resist the growing threat of fascism in 1935 (Tsurumi 1998: 3).
88 The journal was called Bi Hihyō (Beauty: Critique).
89 Vendredi was published by Alan (Émile Chartier), André Gide, Jacques Maritain, and others. It aimed to open up the dialogue between intellectuals and citizens in France and to organize anti-fascism movements broadly. The weekly magazine Doyōbi sold well in Kyōto and in the western part of Japan (KOS 1998, vol. 1: 260). Doyōbi sold 3,000 copies at its peak, whereas Sekai Bunka only published 1,000 copies (KOS 1998, vol. 5: 55, 77-9). Both Sakai Bunka and Dōyōbi continued until 1937, when Kuno, Nakai, and others involved with the magazines were arrested. Attempts to create a popular front were not lacking in other parts of Japan. The efforts of Nakai and Kuno were criticized as “bourgeois intellectual movements” by Marxist popular fronts (cf. Tsurumi 1998: 2). Radical Marxists discerned only “3s” in the magazine’s content: screen, sports, and sex (cf. KOS 1998, vol. 5: 56).
China. For Kuno’s part, he intended to promote “populist enlightenment movements” via these magazines (KOS 1998, vol. 5: 89). Kuno continued his anti-fascist movements—more precisely, resistance movements against authorities—through the use of culture or the media during the postwar period (cf. Tsurumi 1998: 3).

Kuno’s activism, however, was halted by his arrest in 1937. Kuno and his friends were jailed on suspicion of leftist mind and their possible connection to the Comintern (the Third Communist International) under the Peace Preservation Law (KOS 1998, vol. 5: 62-3). During two years in jail, he suffered from fleas, lice, and bedbugs. No bathing or haircuts were allowed, and sometimes prisoners were kept standing all night because of overcrowding (KOS 1998, vol. 5: 66). The investigators tortured Kuno and repeatedly told him that if he admitted his mistakes and converted—to embracing national polity by renouncing the left—he would be released (KOS 1998, vol. 5: 65; Sataka 2006: 195). One day, he suddenly felt that all things were absurd and then decided to convert (Sataka 2006: 195). In 1939, Kuno was released.

By the time of Kuno’s release, Imperial Japan had undertaken the war with China, expanding its battlefronts across Asia and then the Pacific Islands. At the Osaka Girls College of Economics where Kuno found a temporary job, he took care of students who were evacuated to avoid possible air raids, and who worked at factories for war

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90 Nakai thought that intellectuals’ ignorance caused the second Sino-Japanese war in 1937, and he aimed to prevent any further expansion of the war by creating a “breakwater” (bōhatei) of cultural enlightenment (KOS 1998, vol. 5: 91-2).
91 Tsurumi’s Science of Thought Study Group was influenced by Sekai Bunka (cf. Tsurumi, Oguma, and Ueno 2004: 158-59). Some key members, such as Kuno and the physicist Mitsuo Taketani of Sekai Bunka, joined the Science of Thought Study Group.
92 In 1935, the Comintern and Joseph Stalin also directed that communist parties around the world resist fascism. From the end of 1937, the Japanese government began arresting a large number of socialist scholars and intellectuals, such as Ōuchi, under suspicion of forming a Japanese popular front under the Comintern. The popular front that Nakai and Kuno organized was not part of it (Tsurumi 1998: 3). Whether the Japanese state did adopt fascism is debatable (see Tansman 2009). However, Japanese intellectuals—especially progressive intellectuals, including Kuno, Maruyama, and Tsurumi—believed so; thus, they engaged themselves in political activism to oppose fascism after the war.
93 Kuno was in jail as a prisoner awaiting trial. Until the end of WWII, Kuno was under parole, and the Special Higher Police occasionally visited Kuno’s house for domiciliary search (KOS 1998, vol. 5: 74: 107).
94 The college was renamed from Showa Commercial High School after a sharp decrease in the number of male students due to conscription.
mobilization (KOS 1998, vol. 5: 95-100). It was during his years at this college that Kuno read extensively about American pragmatism, especially the works of John Dewey. Pragmatism helped deepen his ideas about individualism, and along with his own experiences of oppression and imprisonment, Kuno developed critical ideas about the Japanese state and people (cf. KOS 1998, vol.5: 114-15).95 When Japan surrendered after many years of war, Kuno was overwhelmed by feelings of self-criticism:

I was very exhausted mentally and physically. But I couldn’t resist feeling a sense of relief that the war was finally over. However, soon after, I suffered from an aching heart that came from my endless remorse, why didn’t I resist the war more strongly? My remorse at having “Japanese conformity” in me, who couldn’t resist enough, was deep and persisted a long time. (KOS 1998, vol. 5: 132)

While still being imprisoned, Kuno reflected on the importance of organizing resistance movements before it is too late. As this section has examined, his experience in jail, his reflections on this period, and his feelings of remorse, drove Kuno to be politically active when the war ended.

Kuno’s Postwar Activism

Kuno’s postwar political activism had multiple goals, aiming to organize resistance movements against the potentials of war and fascism and for the development of democracy. He was involved in three distinct forms of activism between 1945 and 1960. First, he attempted to enlighten and help organize workers and citizens during the early postwar period. He played a key role in organizing intellectuals’ collective movements at the Peace Problem Symposium and the protests against the Police Duties Bill between the late 1940s and 1950s. And during the 1960 Anpo protests, Kuno helped organize the citizens’ movements.96

95 In contrast, Kuno’s senior students, prominent philosophers at Kyōto Imperial University, were engaged in philosophical debates in support of Japan’s war effort.
96 As he shifted the styles and targets of his activism, he also shifted in the way in which he connected himself to the people. To use the typology of Table 3.2, Kuno organized Types I and II groups at the beginning but moved to Type III groups for the protests against the Police Duties Bill (which I will come to shortly), and Type IV groups during and after the 1960 Anpo protests.
One of Kuno’s first public engagements was to establish an open-college for citizens. Collaborating with other scholars in Kyōto where he based himself, Kuno took part in establishing the Academy of Humanistic Studies in 1946. Kuno’s goal was to build a college “by the citizens, for the citizens, and of the citizens,” and he worked there with almost no salary (KOS 1998, vol. 5: 122-23). Similar attempts to establish informal schools began in other regions shortly after the war. However, Kuno and his collaborators were peculiar in that, unlike the other cases, they aimed to make their college a regular college that would be accredited by the Ministry of Education (KOS 1998, vol. 5: 123). Though their attempt did not succeed, the Academy of Humanistic Studies eventually merged with the Labor College, where workers who were paid by their companies studied (KOS 1998, vol. 5: 125). Many progressive intellectuals came to visit and/or lecture at these informal colleges. Importantly for the intellectuals’ activism, the institutes served as a hub for intellectuals in forming networks for future activism.

Kuno’s second major form of activism was to organize intellectuals’ movements and organizations. He did so primarily by creating networks among intellectuals. He was one of the key persons who maintained a connection between the Academy of Humanistic Studies in Kyōto and the 20th Century Research Institute that Shimizu and others established in Tokyo, as well as with scholars in Kyōto and Tokyo who gathered at the Peace Problem Symposium. The joint activities between the Human Academy and the 20th Century Research Institute were made possible partly through an encounter between Shimizu and Kuno, when Shimizu visited Kuno in the fall of 1945. Invited by

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97 The Human Academy was established by scholars in Kyōto and the members of Sekai Buna (Matsuo 2002: 222-26).
98 The Labor School had been run by scholars at the University of Kyōto (KOS 1998, vol. 5: 124). The Labor College, partly modeled after labor colleges in Britain, was supported by GHQ as well (KOS 1998, vol. 5: 125). It was dissolved in 1950, then resumed itself as the Kyōto Laborers’ Academy in 1957.
99 For Kuno’s other political activism in the early 1950s, the Japanese Teacher’s Union was one of his key interests. Intellectuals were closely involved in establishing the union and holding annual research meetings where many intellectuals were invited for lectures and discussions. The close tie between the union and intellectuals lasted throughout the 1950s and thereafter. For more on the Japanese Teachers’ Union, see Duke (1973).
100 According to Kuno’s account, their encounter goes back earlier than this. Kuno had known Shimizu during the war since Kuno visited the Institute of Pacific Relations in Tokyo, where liberal intellectuals who more or less had critical views of the war worked (KOS 1998, vol. 5: 116).
Shimizu, Kuno also became a member of the Twentieth Century Research Institute that Shimizu organized in Tokyo in 1946. Through his close connection with Shimizu, Kuno obtained a position of lecturer at Gakushūin University in 1949. Kuno played an active role as an organizer of the Peace Problem Symposium—the first and largest organization of intellectuals for political engagement, introduced at the beginning of the chapter. Kuno mainly served as a coordinator who mediated the sometimes antagonistic relations between scholars in Kyōto and Tokyo, physically going back and forth between the two places (see KOS 1998, vol. 5: 141). Kuno explained that he was motivated to participate because Max Horkheimer, whom Kuno respected greatly, was one of the contributors behind the UNESCO’s manifesto, upon which the Japanese manifesto was later modeled (KOS 1998, vol. 5: 141).

As examined in earlier sections, progressive intellectuals and their old-liberal counterparts diverged as they tried to develop their activism at the Peace Problem Symposium. Kuno later expressed his distrust in old-liberal intellectuals, asserting that they were fundamentally conservative, focused only on cultural aspects of the nation-state, did not accept liberal views of the state, and avoided politics (seijishugi) (Kuno, Tsurumi, and Fujita [1959] 2010: 101-104, 111-13). In addition to this divergence, after the Peace Problem Symposium issued the last manifesto—or report—during the Korean War in 1950, progressive intellectuals split internally as well. While most intellectuals in the group returned to universities, Kuno and Shimizu continued their activism in the 1950s (KOS 1998, vol. 5: 163, 165, 172). Kuno recalls, “I didn’t have a choice not to be an activist. Before and after it [= the engagement in the Peace Problem Symposium], I had long been engaged in citizens’ movements, so it was natural [to do so]” (KOS 1998, vol. 5: 164).

Kuno recounts that it was also because Kuno’s friends were also members (KOS 1998, vol. 5: 167). Gakushūin University was formerly a school for Japanese nobility, but was reestablished as a university in 1949. Kuno asked for Shimizu’s assistance in getting a job there as Shimizu knew the university president, Yoshishige Abe (SIC 1993, vol. 14: 326-27). See footnote 19 in this chapter.

During this time, Kuno also committed himself to the left-wing faction of the JSP and Sōhyō (the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan; hereafter, the Sōhyō federation) (Hidaka 1998: 2). For Kuno,
In the 1950s, Kuno again organized intellectuals for protests against the Police Duties Bill submitted to the Diet in 1958. The bill aimed to strengthen the authority and power of the police for the prevention of crimes, granting greater emphasis to maintaining public order. It proposed, for example, that the police be allowed to search personal belongings before arrest, and be given the power to dissolve meetings and gatherings if any danger of disarray was detected. Collaborating with others, Kuno organized a group of cultural figures. Probably for the first time in the postwar period, cultural figures such as novelists, critics, theater people, film directors, actors, and cartoonists, organized themselves and protested on the main street of Ginza—a classy shopping district in downtown Tokyo. Their style of demonstration, in which protesters filled up the street, peacefully marched, held hands, and distributed flyers, was called a “French demonstration” (furansu demo). This demonstration style signified citizens’ movements—as opposed to zigzag (snake dance) demonstrations that signified radicalism and that student movements often adopted—and were frequently performed during the 1960 Anpo protests (Figure 3.4).

labor unions were organizations for commoners (taishū soshiki) (Kuno, Rōyama, and Takabatake 1972a: 8).

105 Kuno’s other major activism during the 1950s included organizing anti-U.S. base movements in Sunagawa in the suburbs of Tokyo, the Science of Thought Study Group, and protests against discontinuity of the lefty magazine Kaizo (Reconstruction).

106 Prime Minister Kishi proposed the bill by envisioning protests against the upcoming revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty (see Avenell 2010: 66-8).

107 Kuno called it “demonstration in silence” (chinmoku no demo) (Kuno and Hidaka 1960: 44). Both Kuno and another organizer, Jun Takami (a novelist and poet, 1907-1965), knew about this demonstration style from seeing it in resistance movements in Paris, and then planned a similar style in Tokyo.

108 See Chapter 4 for zigzag demonstrations.
Kuno also mobilized the media. Collaborating with publishers, Kuno helped create the slogan “the Bill that will interrogate even dating” (deito mo jamasuru keishokuhō), which became the dominant framework for organizing the protests beyond cultural figures (KOS 1998, vol. 5: 182-84). Kuno’s collaboration with cultural figures and the media was a repeat of the anti-fascist cultural movements that he had organized during the wartime years.

Shortly after the protests against the Police Duties Bill ended, the 1960 Anpo protests began. During the 1960 Anpo protests, Kuno did not join the groups of intellectuals in a serious manner. Instead, he committed himself more to organizing his neighborhood and a citizens’ group. In part, Kuno said that he preferred bottom-up movements rather than the top-down ones that intellectuals organized (KOS 1998, vol. 5: 187-88). On the other hand, it was also because he was not called upon by groups of intellectuals and scholars (ibid.: 191). Thus, he took part in organizing residents in his neighborhood.
district—specifically, in Nerima City, Tokyo—by recruiting various residents, including lawyers, scholars, housewives, businessmen, and university students who lived in the area.\textsuperscript{109} Moreover, by collaborating with Tsurumi and other members of the Science of Thought Study Group, Kuno actively supported the citizens’ movement group, the Voices of the Voiceless Association, which was organized in the course of the 1960 Anpo protests. It is important to note that unlike demonstrations that occurred elsewhere in the world or even in contemporary Japan, demonstrations during that time in Japan were often organized by already existing groups, whose members wore headbands and held placards identifying them as such. If one did not already belong to one of those organizations, there was little space to join these demonstrations. Responding to this, the Voices of the Voiceless Association emerged as a new type of organization that solicited the participation of any citizens who did not belong to unions or schools.\textsuperscript{110} The group eventually turned into the Citizens’ Federation for Peace in Vietnam—an anti-Vietnam War movement group and the most successful citizens’ movement group in Japan. With other intellectuals at the Voices of the Voiceless Association, Kuno promoted this transition.\textsuperscript{111} With a few other progressive intellectuals, but for the most part separating himself from intellectual circles, Kuno was committed to the grassroots movements of citizens during the 1960 Anpo protests and thereafter.

Kuno’s Thoughts

While Kuno was involved with different forms of activism, the goal of his activism was persistent throughout the prewar and postwar years, aimed at forming resistance movements and furthering democracy in Japan. He viewed his participation in the Peace Problem Symposium as contributing to resistance movements (Kuno, Rōyama, and Takabatake 1972a: 14; 1972b: 22). Especially given his personal experiences before and during WWII, Kuno viewed the state as the potential cause of wars and fascism; thus, peace movements for him were a form of resistance against the state.

\textsuperscript{109} The group was named Musashino Railroad Citizen’s Congress (\textit{Musashino Ensen Shimin Kaigi}). Kuno organized a similar citizens’ movement group called Toshima/Nerima Citizen’s Congress (\textit{Toshima/Nerima Sihim Kaigi}) (\textit{KOS} 1998, vol. 5: 191-2).
\textsuperscript{110} For further discussion of the Voices of the Voiceless Association, see Sasaki-Uemura (2001).
\textsuperscript{111} The role of Kuno in all this has not been well-known, but for a discussion of the evidence, see Takatabake (1998: 1-3).
In terms of democracy, Kuno’s view shifted from favoring parliamentary democracy to advocating a form of participatory democracy that put the emphasis on actions. Until 1950, Kuno valued parliamentary democracy and argued that parliament was the institution that should protect people’s civil and political liberty, or what he called “individual liberty” (shiken)—the most basic right in his view (Kuno 1950: 78; Kuno and Tsurumi [1966] 1975: 12). But he became disappointed with parliamentary democracy and shifted in 1950 to calling for more action and democratic practices.

Kuno’s views on democracy in Japan shifted as well. Around the time when the Peace Problem Symposium issued their third manifesto, Kuno had a westernized and universalistic view of democracy. He argued that eastern society, including Japan, did not hold the roots of democracy, unlike western society where the urban life constituted the foundation of democracy (Kuno 1950: 76). But, after seeing parliament ignore protesters outside the Diet Building and witnessing the emergence of a massive number of autonomous protesters during the 1960 Anpo protests, Kuno appealed to what he called “democracy in action” (kōdōsuru minshushugi) (Kuno 1975: 28-57). Kuno asked people to take action so as to make their voices heard and not to relegate democracy to politicians. Importantly, in this call, Kuno argued that people should collaborate in the workplace, neighborhoods, and streets, rather than acting as individuals. This was largely based on his view that a movement built on the self or individualism would not flourish in Japan because it lacked the middle class that had proven so vital to harnessing individualism in wealthy European countries (Kuno and Katō [1960] 2000: 190-91). Thus, unlike Maruyama and other intellectuals who argued for the autonomy of the self during the early postwar period, Kuno’s advocacy of democracy was peculiar in that it was not based on individualism but on how people or citizens in Japan could establish the ethos of voluntary or contractual associations that would make democracy work.

In his arguments about democracy outlined above, Kuno emphasized the importance of alliance with commoners and workers. However, until the 1960 Anpo protests, he also believed in the autonomous roles of intellectuals in organizing
democratic movements. Similar to other progressive intellectuals who started their political engagement with (self-) criticism of intellectuals, Kuno used to think that intellectuals as well as anti-state groups such as the JCP lacked autonomy from the state during the prewar and wartime years. Thus, one of his major goals when he engaged in peace movements in the late 1940s and 1950s (Kuno, Rōyama, and Takabatake 1972a: 12).

The 1960 Anpo protests changed Kuno’s view, however. Seeing tens of thousands of housewives and non-activist students surrounding the Diet Building, Kuno proposed the concept of a “citizen’s ethos” (shiminshugi) for promoting voluntary activism among ordinary people. For Kuno, theoretically, professions (shokugyō) were the key to conceptualizing citizens. For him, “citizens” meant independent individuals who had (modern, non-agricultural) occupations, distinct from their livelihood (or private life, seikatu) (Kuno [1960] 1975: 10). In his view, without this separation of professions from their livelihood, no citizens would be born and would only yield the status system built on their livelihood (ibid.). In his article, “The Formation of a Citizen’s Ethos” (Shiminshugi no seiritsu, 1960), Kuno argued that it was voluntary associations and contractual groups, not individuals, that were the force that could change the state. For Kuno, such voluntary associations needed to be autonomous from the state and based on people’s professions and their residential community (Kuno [1960] 1975). He also emphasized the importance of extra-parliamentary actions taken in public in order to make their voices heard (KOS 1998, vol. 5: 195; also see Kuno [1962] 1975). Kuno’s new argument on democracy followed his reflexive observation of the 1960 Anpo protests. A similar shift also happened for other progressive intellectuals involved in democratic movements: after seeing their wish for a democratic Japan fulfilled in the

112 Thus, Kuno did not agree with Shimizu who, to Kuno’s eyes, abandoned the responsibility of intellectuals and committed to movements of commoners (Kuno, Rōyama, and Takabatake 1972a: 13).
113 Tsurumi recalls that other notable progressives, including himself, did not imagine that tens and thousands of people would voluntarily take to the streets, and were both surprised and satisfied when they witnessed it (Tsurumi, Ueno, and Oguma: 2004: 277-78).
114 Note that Jürgen Habermas’s book, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, was first published in 1962. To give but a brief historical context to theories of civil society, the idea of civil society was first resurrected among intellectuals and political activists in Central Eastern Europe in the 1970s, before it was taken up by Western scholars in the 1980s, and became a mainstream of Western academe after 1989 (Seligman 1993: 139).
1960 Anpo protests, they were not only satisfied but also began developing new arguments for democracy—often with a new focus on voluntary participation, discussion, and everyday efforts (cf. Maruyama 1960).

In Kuno’s case, he abandoned the movements led by intellectuals and committed himself fully to promoting citizens’ movements after the 1960 Anpo protests. He did so, however, as a marginalized intellectual. Despite the fact that he graduated from Kyōto Imperial University, he only managed to get a lectureship at Gakushūin University until the very end of his career. He himself acknowledged his marginality in two ways. He thought of himself as both a minority and a heretic in society, alienated from the state and mainstream Japanese thought, especially during his imprisonment in wartime (KOS 1998, vol. 1: 112, 200). Moreover, Kuno recognized that he was not comparable to other progressive intellectuals such as Maruyama, who was teaching at the University of Tokyo, and Shimizu, who used to be an editorial writer at the Yomiuri Shimbun, a major newspaper company (cf. KOS 1998, vol. 1: 112, 200). Because the field of intellectuals was largely politicized and because he had close connections with Shimizu and other important progressive intellectuals, he was able to play a significant role in the realm of intellectual political activism, as well as in the field of intellectuals between 1945 and 1960—but he did so always from a marginalized position. He was one of the few progressive intellectuals since 1945 who remained committed to public engagement throughout his intellectual life.115

(2) Shimizu Ikutarō

Unlike Kuno, who was persistent in his intellectual and political activism, Shimizu’s thoughts and forms of political engagement changed throughout his life. Further, unlike Kuno, democracy was not the most central element in Shimizu’s writings and thoughts. Nonetheless, between 1945 and 1960, Shimizu was certainly one of the

115 It was after the 1960 Anpo protests and indeed the 1960s that Kuno drew upon the debates of French intellectuals and their “commitment” (engagement) to politics by quoting, for example, Sartre (cf. Kuno, Rōyama, and Takabatake 1972b: 21-2). Sartre visited Japan in 1966.
most active intellectuals involved in democratic movements through organizing intellectuals’ activism, writing in general magazines, and participating in the anti-U.S. base movements. Despite the fact that he did not occupy a dominant position in the field of intellectuals—indeed, he was distanced or dissociated from intellectual circles—Shimizu was acclaimed as a “champion” of postwar intellectuals, whose ideas and actions were a major influence on readers of the magazines and on movement participants between the late 1940s and 1950s. Shimizu is a good case for examining how an intellectual in a dominated position became a predominant intellectual through political activism, and even became one of the leading figures in the 1960 Anpo protests. In this section, I shall examine Shimizu’s early life, his commitment to public activism in relation to other intellectuals, and his thoughts on democracy.

Table 3.4  Shimizu’s Career History (1907-1960)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>Born in Tokyo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920 (13 years old)</td>
<td>Entered Doitsugaku Kyōkai Gakkō (German Study Association School, currently the Dokkyō Group of Academic Institutions) for his junior high school.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923 (16 years old)</td>
<td>Experienced the Great Kantō Earthquake, during which his house collapsed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925 (18 years old)</td>
<td>Entered Tokyo Higher School (currently Tokyo High School).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928 (21 years old)</td>
<td>Entered Tokyo Imperial University (sociology major).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931 (24 years old)</td>
<td>Graduated from the university. Became an assistant for the office of sociology at the university.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932 (25 years old)</td>
<td>Became a member of the Materialist Study Group (until 1937).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933 (26 years old)</td>
<td>Resigned from the assistant position at the university.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938 (31 years old)</td>
<td>Hired as a non-regular staff by the Tokyo Asahi Newspaper.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joined the Shōwa Research Association (Shōwa Kenkyūkai).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941 (34 years old)</td>
<td>Became an editorialist at the Yomiuri Newspaper.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942 (35 years old)</td>
<td>Recruited by the army as a reporter and served in Burma (for half a year).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943 (36 years old)</td>
<td>Joined the Association for Pacific and American Studies (Taiheiyō Kyōkai Amerika Kenkyūshitsu)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

116 Even today, only a few studies on Shimizu have been made (e.g., Ōkubo 1999; Oguma 2003; Ōtake 2007). To show his marginality in academia, Oguma (2003) wrote about Shimizu in only a thin volume that was published separately from his other major books analyzing postwar intellectuals (e.g., Oguma 2002).

117 For example, see Amano (1979: 6) and Kuno (KOS 1998, vol. 5: 151).
Shimizu was born in Nihonbashi, a downtown neighborhood of Tokyo, in 1907. He moved to Honjo, a slum area in Tokyo, and spent his early adolescent years there after his family had changed their business. While living in a “poor, dirty, and stinky” district, Shimizu nonetheless felt free because he was able to separate himself from his family origin—his grandfather was declassed during the Edo era after serving the Tokugawa clan (SIC 1993, vol. 14: 133-34, 146). However, the Great Kantō Earthquake of 1923, which hit Tokyo with a magnitude of 7.9 in 1923, impacted Shimizu’s view of reality. Due to the large fire that came in the aftermath of the earthquake, most houses in his district were burned down, with countless dead bodies left behind. Shimizu had to live in a barrack built amidst the ruins (SIC 1993, vol. 14: 183), while his teacher and many of his classmates from school who lived in uptown Tokyo were safe and unaffected (SIC 1993, vol. 14: 181). Most of his classmates at Tokyo Higher School were sons of doctors, lawyers, executives, and nobility, while Shimizu needed to work after school to support his family members who were in absolute poverty, especially after the earthquake (SIC 1993, vol. 14: 199-200).

From his early years, Shimizu aspired to “move up” by obtaining a higher education, as he perceived that only education could take him out from his family’s
sunken status (*SIC* 1993, vol.14: 142). At one point in his youth, he decided to become a doctor (*SIC* 1993, vol. 14: 147). However, after experiencing the earthquake, he decided to major in sociology—partly because his junior high school teacher suggested it and partly because the subject suited both his experiences in a slum and his desire to free himself from the downward spiral of his family (*SIC* 1993, vol. 14: 185-87). He also developed a strong desire to become an intellectual, as the earthquake made him believe that “intellect” was for people in uptown Tokyo where Shimizu did not belong (*SIC* 1992, vol. 10: 309). This ambivalent feeling—of both longing to be an intellectual, and of being rejected by intellectuals—continued until he later became an intellectual and took part in the 1960 Anpo protests with other intellectuals.

Shimizu entered Tokyo Imperial University in 1928 and majored in sociology. However, while he was at the university, he had to earn a living for his family by doing other work, such as tutoring, writing articles and books, and translation works (*SIC* 1993, vol. 14: 239-46). After graduating from university, he was appointed as a junior assistant (*fukushu*). His senior thesis on Auguste Comte was published in the general magazine *Shiso* (Thought) and received good reviews. However, after two years of working as a junior assistant, Shimizu was fired by his advisor (*SIC* 1993, vol. 14: 270).

After resigning from university, Shimizu worked as a freelance writer for eight years, writing for magazines and newspapers. Because his published thesis was well

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118 The short-lived decision was based on the advice a fortune-teller had given him (*SIC* 1993, vol. 14: 146). But he did go to the German Study Association School (*Doitsu* *Dokkyō Group of Academic Institutions*) in order to become a doctor. Generally, the former junior high school required five years of education.

119 Shimizu lived in poverty while he was at university. When Shimizu could not pay his tuition, senior students who graduated earlier donated money for him (*SIC* 1993, vol. 14: 246-47).

120 To be a professor at any university, a graduate from the university needed to work first as a junior assistant (*fukushu*) or an assistant (*joshu*) at the office (laboratory) of the department.

121 Shimizu’s advisor did not provide any explanation (*SIC* 1993, vol. 14: 270), but Shimizu felt hat he did not fit in well with other faculty members who worked there (Ōtake 2007: 158; Oguma 2003: 20-1). In addition, Shimizu could not find a research topic to continue his scholarship (Oguma 2003: 21).

122 In the 1910s and 1920s, scholars began writing for magazines intended for the educated part of the population (Takeuchi 2001: 83). Scholarly journals and these magazines were not strictly separated in the 1920s and 1930s. In sociology, it was in the 1910s and 1920s that professional associations and journals were established (see Kawai 2003).
received, he was often invited to write pieces for magazines and newspapers. While Shimizu constantly wrote media articles in the 1930s and 1940s, he was also involved in different kinds of intellectual activism; joining a Marxist scholar group, studying American pragmatism on his own, and serving in governmental organizations such as the Shōwa Research Association (Shōwa Kenkyūkai), a governmental think tank under the cabinet, and the American Annex of the Pacific Association (Taiheiyō Kyōkai) founded by Yūsuke Tsurumi—Shunsuke Tsurumi’s father. As the political climate shifted toward supporting the wartime regime, Shimizu, who continued as a writer, wrote to support the war regime and the imperial system, even though he was not its most ardent and fanatical supporter (Amano 1979: 159).

Unlike Kuno and other progressive intellectuals, the war experience and the end of the war did not have much impact on Shimizu. There were three reasons for this. For Shimizu, the Kantō earthquake that he experienced at the age of 16 had a much greater impact (Shimizu and Tsurumi [1968] 1975: 369). It was also because, unlike Kuno, Shimizu did not suffer from repression under the wartime regime. Furthermore, unlike Tsurumi and Maruyama, Shimizu did not have any disturbing observations or unbearable experience from the battlefront. Shimizu was dispatched to Burma, but only as a reporter

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124 Shimizu was invited and joined the group between 1932 and 1937. Although he was exposed to Marxism, he did not become a Marxist (SIC 1993, vol. 14: 192).
125 Shimizu first discovered pragmatism when he was asked to write about the issue of children (SIC 1993, vol. 14: 285-89). He then sought to study it on his own (SIC 1993, vol. 14: 104-105).
126 The Shōwa Research Association was established under the Konoe Cabinet in 1933. Its original purposes were to further political reform and anti-fascist policies, and to incorporate Marxist and leftist intellectuals. But instead, it turned into promoting the idea of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and the association was replaced with the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (Taisei Yokusankai), a reformist single political party that supported the war regime.
127 With the support from the Navy, the American Annex of the Pacific Association was founded in 1938 to look into the enemy countries. The members were Japanese students who came back from the United States, including Yūsuke’s daughter, Kazuko Tsurumi, who contributed to networking with members of the Science of Thought Study Group (see Tsurumi, Ueno, and Oguma 2004: 163).
128 Shimizu worked as a full-time editorialist at the Yomiuri Newspaper from 1941. A witness who also worked at the same newspaper company said that Shimizu avoided writing articles that would support the war and instead wrote about life, culture, and entertainment (Yoshida 2009: 67). Also, see Kuno (KOS 1998, vol. 5: 165-66) for the account that Shimizu was no ardent advocate of the war.
and only for half a year.\textsuperscript{129} When Japan surrendered, Shimizu cried (Shimizu and Tsurumi [1968] 1975: 371). Later, when he wrote about the end of the war, he said: “As the war ended, we can say that one era ended and another era began, that the old power disappeared and the new power emerged, or that a sort of revolution had begun. However, (...) what I find in my daily life is a subtle change in my personal relationships” \textit{(SIC} 1993, vol. 14: 297).

Though he had some articles that criticized intellectuals’ lack of responsibility during the wartime period (see Yoshida 2011: 193), he did not exhibit the same strong personal remorse as other progressive intellectuals did. Clearly, the remorse was not the basis or starting point for Shimizu’s political activism after the war.\textsuperscript{130} How then did he end up with such activism after WWII?

\textit{Shimizu’s Postwar Political Activism}

Soon after the war, Shimizu became a central figure in organizing intellectuals’ movements and writing for democratic movements. He occupied a uniquely intermediate position, spanning the fields of both intellectuals and journalism. He worked as a journalist at the Yomiuri Newspaper Company full-time from 1941 until he quit in 1945. He made his living writing for magazines, notably for \textit{Sekai}.\textsuperscript{131} It was through this activity that he established social networks with other intellectuals and became popular with the public, which, in turn, led to him being granted a full professor position at university.

\textsuperscript{129} Shimizu also recounted that he did not do much in terms of an actual job while in Burma; rather, what he did was to read a lot, and take a lot of runs and walks \textit{(SIC} 1993, vol. 14: 63).

\textsuperscript{130} To add one more point, unlike Kuno or Maruyama, Shimizu did not have any noteworthy instances of engaging in political activism before and during WWII. He was only involved in a few unimportant incidents. In his junior high school days, Shimizu supported cotton mill-girls who were exploited at a factory in a speech contest \textit{(SIC} 1992, vol. 10: 309-10). Then, at university, he participated in protests against the purge of a Marxist economist at his university and against a tuition raise. He also sometimes lectured at a labor college as part of the settlement movements of university students \textit{(SIC} 1992, vol. 10: 368-76).

The settlement movements began in England and the United States as reformist social movements in the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century. In Japan, university students, including both activists and non-activists, were involved in order to help poor families in their districts. In Japan, the movements continued through the 1960s.

\textsuperscript{131} Maruyama recalled that the financial remuneration for the article he wrote for \textit{Sekai} in 1946 was equivalent to a monthly salary for a faculty member at university (Matsuzawa and Uete 2006b: 141).
Shimizu’s main activism right after the war included founding the Twentieth Century Research Institute and organizing the Peace Problem Symposium. In 1946, Shimizu established the Twentieth Century Research Institute by collaborating with Kazuo Ōkōchi (an economist at the University of Tokyo, 1905-1984) and Tōtarō Hosoiri (a scholar on American literature and history at Rikkyō University, 1911-1993). Shimizu served as the director of the institute until it was dissolved in 1948. Between 1948 and 1950, Shimizu served as a key figure in the Peace Problem Symposium. Asked by Yoshino, a chief editor of Sekai who sponsored the symposium, Shimizu wrote a draft of the symposium’s manifesto. After intensive discussion on the draft, involving a large number of intellectuals at the end of 1948, the Peace Problem Symposium, with over fifty intellectuals, issued their manifesto in Sekai in 1949. The Peace Problem Symposium issued two more manifestos, and Shimizu again played a key role in drafting them both.

While Shimizu committed himself to the Peace Problem Symposium and writing manifestos, he dissociated himself from other intellectuals, having become increasingly frustrated with them. Later, he related that it felt absurd to discuss what was obvious at meetings (SIC 1993, vol. 14: 341). However, it was also around this time that Shimizu also gained public recognition and prominence due to his public activism, especially through his writings. As a result, many universities invited him to join as a faculty member, sometimes even as university president. Shimizu turned all of them down (SIC 1993, vol. 14: 327), until he finally joined Gakushūin University as a faculty member in 1949, though only in order to help Kuno gain a position there. But in terms of his political engagement, Shimizu separated himself from other intellectuals and became involved in movements of non-intellectuals, most notably in the activism of the Sōhyō

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132 Rikkyō University, where Hosonori worked, received a huge donation, and Hosonori used a part of it to establish the institute (Yoshida 2011: 193).
133 While Kuno was a central figure in coordinating the symposium, Shimizu was involved in both organizing the members and writing manifestos.
134 Another key intellectual who was involved in drafting the manifestos was Maruyama, especially in the case of the third manifesto.
135 Kuno also recalls that Shimizu’s fame was growing during this time (KOS 1998, vol. 5: 151).
136 Because Kuno did not have a regular job, he wanted to get a job at Gakushūin University. Shimizu knew Yoshishige Abe, the president of the university, so Shimizu helped negotiate a job for Kuno. Abe accepted Kuno on the condition that Shimizu would also join as a faculty member (SIC 1993, vol. 14: 326-27).
federation and of anti-U.S. base movements in the 1950s. Thus, along with Kuno, Shimizu was one of the few intellectuals who remained political engaged among members of the Peace Problem Symposium after the group ended their activism.\textsuperscript{137}

Shimizu was involved in two major anti-U.S. base movements in Japan—one in Uchinada, a small fishing village on Japan’s sea coast, and one in Sunagawa, a village in suburban Tokyo.\textsuperscript{138} At the same time, in the 1950s, he was also exposed to socialism and was involved in activism by the JSP. However, as time went on, he began to feel disillusioned with movement groups, socialism, and the movements themselves. In the movements in Uchinada, Shimizu played a pivotal role, writing about the village and encouraging participants on site (cf. Kersten 2006). However, when he visited Uchinada, Shimizu found that the JSP politicians—especially the left-wing faction that he supported and was also taking part in the movements\textsuperscript{139}—only cared about vote-gathering for the coming elections and did not seriously fight for the rights of the villagers (\textit{SIC} 1993, vol. 14: 369). In addition, in the late 1950s, he started feeling that his intellectual activities had reached a roadblock. Though Shimizu believed in socialism, he became increasingly suspicious of it given that Japan and other countries in the world had not been transformed from capitalism to socialism (\textit{SIC} 1993, vol. 14: 434-38).\textsuperscript{140} Similarly, pragmatism, which Shimizu had relied upon and looked to for flexible tools, no longer

\textsuperscript{137} However, according to Kuno, the differences between him and Shimizu were as follows. At that time, Kuno, like Maruyama, believed that intellectuals should organize the activism of intellectuals as intellectuals. In contrast, through his participation in the Peace Problem Symposium, Shimizu discerned that the role of intellectuals in political activism had ended; thus, Shimizu chose to stand in front of political movements by the “common people” (Kuno, Rōyama, and Takabatake 1972a: 13).

\textsuperscript{138} Shimizu’s commitment to the anti-U.S. base movements in Uchinada was accidental. It was triggered by a question of a journalist who asked Shimizu’s opinion about the plan of constructing the site for a test-firing in the village. This was when he visited for a lecture in a city nearby. Shimizu did not know about the plan and the movements but became interested in them because he was already committed to other anti-U.S. base movements (\textit{SIC} 1993, vol. 14: 355-58).

At the time of Japan’s independence in 1952, more than six hundred U.S. military bases remained in Japan and generated tension in communities around the bases (cf. Kersten 2006: 308). For Shimizu’s commitment to Uchinada protests, see also Kersten (2006).

\textsuperscript{139} Shimizu served as a chef editor for \textit{Shakai Taimusu} (Society Times), an organ newspaper of the left-leaning faction of the JSP.

seemed useful for his intellectual activism (see *SIC* 1993, vol. 14: 434). Finally, he was filled with a feeling of emptiness by the fact that he was left with nothing after engaging for ten years in the movements, through the Peace Problem Symposium and the anti-U.S. base movements since the late 1940s (*SIC* 1993, vol. 14: 430).

When Shimizu was emotionally and intellectually at an impasse, the issue of the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty loomed. Rather than his intellectual activities, already established networks and past experiences of being involved in the movements created an opportunity, almost an imperative for him, to engage in the 1960 Anpo protests. Shimizu recounted later that not being involved in the protests was for him not an option.141 He began meeting with other intellectuals in February 1959, a month before intellectuals officially organized groups and issued statement against the treaty revision (*SIC* 1993, vol. 14: 438). The next section will recount how Shimizu was involved in the 1960 Anpo protests and how his structural location in the fields of journalism and intellectuals facilitated his participation.

*Shimizu’s Activism and Location during the 1960 Anpo Protests*

As Shimizu himself recalled a year later, the 1960 Anpo protests turned out to be the largest show of intellectuals’ political activism ever (*SIC* 1992, vol. 10: 195). Progressive intellectuals took leadership of intellectuals’ movements during the 1960 Anpo protests, as was the case with the Peace Problem Symposium. Shimizu again took part as a key figure, even though many other intellectuals were also actively engaged in the protests in one way or another. It was at this time that the field of intellectuals in Japan became largely politicized; thus, not only their intellectual achievement, but also their public activism now gained new value vis-à-vis the conventional symbolic capital that used to define the field, that is, publishing and holding positions within academic contexts (cf. Bourdieu [1984] 1988). As one of the leading figures who benefited from this, Shimizu protested on sites, wrote manifestos and articles, and participated in intellectuals’ movement organizations. Once again, however, he began to accumulate his

141 Shimizu recounted that he was totally torn to shreds because of his long-term engagement to various movements, but he geared up to tackle, via the protests, the treaty revision (*SIC* 1993, vol. 14: 439).
wonder about his own suitability as an intellectual and dissociated himself again from the circle of intellectuals, as well as from his own political activism when the 1960 Anpo protests ended.

Prior to May 19 when the discourse of the protests shifted to protecting democracy, Shimizu wrote two influential manifestos that mobilized the 1960 Anpo protests, but which also created a conflict among movement organizations. One manifesto criticized the movement organizations—notably the JCP—for condemning student movement groups as being “radical” even more harshly than the government. Shimizu claimed that the movement organizations should mobilize protesters for actions rather than discouraging them. Another manifesto was published in the April 1960 issue of Sekai. In the article entitled, “Now, Go to the Diet (Imakoso kokkai e),” Shimizu called for using the right to petition (seigankan)—a right, Shimizu argued, which had been granted since the Meiji Period. Shimizu encouraged the protesters to bring their own petition to the Diet Building and pass it directly to the presidents of the congresses (Shimizu 1960). Movement organizations, especially the People’s Council to Stop the Revised Security Treaty, the umbrella organization for the overall protests, adopted Shimizu’s proposal and mobilized tens of thousands of people to the Diet Building in April (see Figure 3.5). On April 27, on the day of the united action, 75,000 people made a line to the Diet Building for demonstrations and petitioning (Minaguchi 1968: 108). Petitioning, along with signing and pleading, was a commonly used repertoire of contention in Japan. However, Shimizu’s suggestion was unique in that he claimed it as the individual’s right and asked protesters to bring their own petition, not to delegate it to their representatives. Shimizu saw this as a form of direct action; however, radical student groups criticized this style as docile, causing them to take more radical actions—as the next chapter will discuss. What is important to note for the point being made in this chapter is that Shimizu wrote this article at the request of Yoshino, a chief editor of

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142 The document was entitled, “The Demands for Other Organizations (Shososhiki eno yōsei)” and dated February 1960. Having acquired other intellectuals’ signatures and endorsements, Shimizu distributed the manifesto to movement organizations.

143 Petition requires the intervention of lawmakers to file the claim, while pleading does not.

144 However, Shimizu wrote “Now, Go to the Diet” in order to back up student movement groups who took direct action (Oguma 2003: 62). Shimizu believed that his writing could support them (SIC 1993, vol. 14: 454).
Sekai. The article, which instigated the movement’s largest protests but also generated conflict within the movement, was thus the production of Shimizu’s structural position as an interlocutor between the fields of intellectuals and journalism.

Figure 3.5 Protesters’ Petition

Note: Protesters psyche themselves up by holding their hands up at the side of the Diet Building. This group of protesters came from Niigata (the northern part of Japan). Photo: Mainichi Shinbun (http://showa.mainichi.jp/news/1960/05/17-ef0b.html, Retrieved June 10, 2012).

Even as Shimizu wrote for magazines and made speeches at lectures and rallies, he also committed himself to various intellectuals’ organizations. For the 1960 Anpo protests, intellectuals largely formed organizations, groups, and networks for the movements, and Shimizu participated in those, sometimes as coordinator. The groups of intellectuals with whom Shimizu engaged were, for example, the Anpo Problematizing Association (Anpo Hihan no Kai), where cultural figures gathered and Shimizu served as a key coordinator, and the Constitution Problem Study Group (Kepō Mondai Kenkyūkai),

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145 Yoshino initially intended to ask Maruyama to write the petition (Oguma 2003: 61).
146 The intellectuals’ first collaborative action regarding the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty went back to 1957 at the earliest. In February 1957, after the Kishi cabinet was set up with over 500 names, the intellectuals posted their manifesto asking for the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty (Asahi Shinbun, March 1, 1957). During this time, the intellectuals did not oppose the revision.
organized by scholars who advocated the Constitution in the Law School at the University of Tokyo.

Although Shimizu wrote for the right to petition, his frustration with other progressive intellectuals who shifted the movement discourse to protecting democracy began to grow after May 19, 1960. His discontent grew as he continued to engage with intellectuals’ activism. It became fairly obvious when progressive intellectuals took direct actions. After May 19, as the picture at the opening of this chapter portrays (Figure 3.1), university faculty members went out onto the streets. They organized lines of demonstrations for themselves, displaying the names of their universities and sometimes holding placards that read “group of university faculties (daigaku kyōjudan).” While on the streets, intellectuals began engaging in more direct action. On May 24, after they ended the demonstration on the street, about 50 of the faculty members decided to visit the office of the prime minister to demand a meeting with him, and Shimizu was one of them. But Shimizu found that intellectuals were docile and were not serious enough about standing up to the government. No one agreed with Shimizu’s suggestion that they pushed on more aggressively and held sit-ins until their demands were met. Hugely frustrated, Shimizu thought, “They are just democratic party assholes” (minshushugi yarō janaika) (SIC 1993, vol. 14: 465-67). This was not the first time he felt distanced from other intellectuals during the protests. At the meeting of the Constitution Problem Study where he presented his talk, he found a smaller and less engaged audience, and felt the members, who were mostly dominated by the Law School professors at the University of Tokyo, treated him as if he was a construction worker or cargo worker on the protest sites (SIC 1993, vol. 14: 441).

While other progressive intellectuals started calling for democracy after the forceful passage of the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty bill at the House of Representatives on May 19, Shimizu refused any association with the slogan of “democracy” and felt that the democratic movements that other intellectuals had begun would not achieve any victory because their goal was too vague (SIC 1993, vol. 14: 465, 469-70). Until May 19, Shimizu was a leading progressive intellectual; but even as he
collaborated with some intellectuals, he isolated himself from other intellectuals more and more. While other progressive intellectuals viewed the 1960 Anpo protests as the most successful pinnacle of the democratic movements led by citizens, Shimizu saw them as a defeat because their goal—stopping the bill—was not achieved. Thus, after the protests, he organized a study group to examine the causes behind the failure of the 1960 Anpo protests, and began to explore new intellectual foundations by collaborating with former student activists.  

Similar to Kuno, Shimizu occupied a marginal position in the field of intellectuals. Even today, it is still the case that Shimizu is not regarded as a “legitimate” intellectual deserving serious scholarly inquiry over his scholarly history—especially in Japanese academia. Shimizu was uniquely located in both the fields of journalism and intellectuals. His early work as a journalist, writing for magazines, did much to promote progressive intellectuals. Then, as he engaged in political activism, he gained intellectual connections and public popularity among the general public, which led him to a position at Gakushūin University, a relatively prestigious private university. Although he engaged himself in political activism with other intellectuals until 1960, he found himself dissociated from their circles—especially the one that centered on scholars at the University of Tokyo and its Law School. This dissociation became most salient when he participated in the 1960 Anpo protests and collaborated with other intellectuals. Ironically, it was during this time that Shimizu was perceived as a more influential intellectual among the public than Maruyama, especially when it came to intellectuals’ political activism (Andō et al. 1997: 9). However, unlike Kuno, Shimizu did not castigate himself as merely marginalized. Instead, he called himself a journalist, or “baibun gyōsha”—a business man who sells his writings professionally (e.g., SIC 1993, vol. 14: 421). Shimizu attempted to locate himself in a different space within the field of

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147 The group was called the Contemporary Thought Study Group (Gendai shisō kenkyūkai), founded in September 1960. Initially, it incorporated progressive intellectuals—Kuno and Tsurumi, but not Murayama. However, it soon turned into a group wherein former student activists dominated.

148 Exceptions are Ōkubo (1999), Oguma (2003), and Otake (2007). Oguma (2003: 79) explains that Shimizu was less examined because he did not have originality and consistency as a thinker. However, as I would argue, the lack of authenticity mattered more as Kuno has also failed to receive scholarly attention, despite his consistent intellectual path.

149 Norisuke Andō, the author cited here, was a former student activist who entered university in 1960.
intellectuals and to play a different game. This was, in a way, an attempt to create a sub-field by redefining the form of capital—revaluing writing for the public as more important than pure academism—within the field of intellectuals.\textsuperscript{150}

Indeed, Shimizu was successful to the extent that a number of his books and articles in magazines were well received, and his active political engagement was acknowledged by the public. However, similar to Kuno, the lack of legitimacy and credentials required in the field of intellectuals prevented Shimizu from occupying a dominant position in the field.\textsuperscript{151} Unlike Kuno, Shimizu was able to utilize resources in the field of journalism and was able to invest them in the politicized field of intellectuals, though ultimately, they were still insufficient to move him into the circles of dominating intellectuals. When he became a nationalist in the 1980s, Shimizu was further castigated in the field of intellectuals.

3.6 Conclusion

At the end of the war in 1945, four major groups of intellectuals survived—nationalists, old-liberal intellectuals, progressive intellectuals, and Marxist intellectuals.\textsuperscript{152} It was predominantly this last group that rose to prominence in the field of intellectuals by 1960 through their engagement in democratic movements.

At the war’s end, with Japan in ruins and facing occupation, the field of intellectuals was in a crisis: agents in the field were exposed to very different conditions of existence, and there was a moment when a different or divergent set of dispositions (\textit{habitus}) could emerge and seize the critical break (Bourdieu [1984] 1988: 175). The intellectuals were left with remorse, and the configuration of knowledge, practice, and

\textsuperscript{150} Steinmetz (2010: 6) argues that a sub-field has autonomy from the external forces and inverts or revises the values placed on different activities within a broader field.

\textsuperscript{151} Unlike Kuno and Shimizu, Tsurumi was well-perceived in the field of intellectuals. It was largely because of his social networks with other intellectuals, which were forged by his family origin, being born into a family of political elites. Tsurumi’s grandfather was Shinpei Gotô, the Governor General of Taiwan. For the analysis of Tsurumi’s social capital, see Harada (2001).

\textsuperscript{152} The examination of Marxist scholars is beyond the scope of this dissertation chapter, but they were also the major group who mobilized themselves for the democratic movements after WWII.
power relations in the field of intellectuals was being reformulated. Many sought to address what they saw as the political and cultural deficiencies of Japanese society, in order to make the Japanese state, people, and themselves more modern and autonomous. They did this by publicly organizing and engaging themselves in democratic and peace movements. The field of intellectuals after the war was thus largely politicized after a significant number of intellectuals fully committed themselves to, or at the very least, explored ideas and practices related to public engagement.

Three kinds of political opportunities had forged intellectuals’ political activism, as well as the waxing of left-leaning intellectuals in general, especially during the occupational period. These were the decline of nationalist intellectuals, the partial implementation of the Red Purge on university campuses, and the fact that neither the occupational forces nor the Japanese government directly intervened in intellectuals’ political activism, in sharp contrast to the authorities’ response to the labor movements. The peace movements of the Peace Problem Symposium, which organized postwar intellectuals for the first time after the war, emerged from these political settings. As notable intellectuals—who were already interconnected through their own networks and through the magazine Sekai—continued their activism at the Peace Problem Symposium, the cleavage between progressive intellectuals and their old-liberal counterparts widened. As the old-liberal intellectuals separated themselves from progressives, and vice versa, the predominance of the latter—strengthened by capital from the field of journalism—grew within the field of intellectuals.

Although many members of the Peace Problem Symposium ceased their active political engagement and went back to universities, the interdependence between the fields of intellectuals and journalism continued throughout the 1950s. This interconnectedness of the two fields began in the prewar period. Partly because of the underdevelopment and scarcity of specific academic journals, the two fields had

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153 The chapter did not examine this closely but members reorganized their networks and groups when the 1960 Anpo protests began. The International Problem Symposium was where progressive intellectuals at the Peace Problem Symposium recruited younger scholars and the Constitution Study Association was where law scholars at the University of Tokyo collaborated (see Oku 2007: 141). Maruyama joined both.
interdependently existed since the 1910s. During the postwar period, the two fields became even more closely connected; both fields—more precisely, the politicized field of intellectuals and part of the field of journalism—valued political activism and debate. Not only *Sekai* but also other magazines such as *Shisō no Kagaku* (The Science of Thought, edited by the Science of Thought Study Group) and *Chūō kōron* (Central Review) posted articles that sought to intervene directly in the social and political movements that surfaced in the 1950s. Those intellectuals who were engaged in political activism, though importantly did not occupy dominant positions in the field of intellectuals (that is, progressive intellectuals), gained prevalence in the field of intellectuals through this interdependence between the fields. Among others, Kuno and Shimizu in particular benefited from this interdependence as they simultaneously served as the go-betweens in the two fields by networking the constituencies in each field and investing in their cultural capital (i.e., writing).

The political engagement of progressive intellectuals peaked during the 1960 Anpo protests. For most of them, the 1960 Anpo protests served as the most significant political opportunity to mobilize themselves, enabling them to fulfill (at least, in their own opinion) their long-term political ambition of making Japan and its people democratic. After the forceful passage of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty revision bill in May 19, 1960, newspapers and journals were vocal in their calls for democracy. Faculty members and intellectuals came out onto the streets, and did so explicitly as public intellectuals. They were also often found to be relatively autonomous from universities; indeed, Takeuchi and Tsurumi quit their positions as a form of protest. However, as I have also indicated, progressive intellectuals were not a coherent group. Shimizu became increasingly frustrated with other progressive intellectuals, whom he found lacking in *habitus* by resorting to direct actions that were incongruent to his own. To Shimizu, his fellow intellectuals had a docile *habitus*—the system of dispositions, according to Bourdieu, acquired by implicit or explicit learning which functions as a system of

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154 The intellectuals wrote for the general magazines, partly because Japanese intellectuals identified themselves as general rather than specific intellectuals. It was also the case, as I have argued earlier, that the manuscript fees were well paid by publishing companies.
155 Note that *Sekai* began in 1946. Immediately after the war, new magazines flourished one after another but soon disappeared (Ōi 2004).
generative schemes and strategies that are in accordance with actors’ objective positions (Bourdieu 1993: 76). In the case of Kuno, it worked similarly: during the 1960 Anpo protests, he was excluded from the dominant circles of progressive intellectuals at the beginning, except the one at the Science Thought Study Group.

After the 1960 Anpo protests, most intellectuals went back to their workplaces while progressive intellectuals who remained in the movements ceased being public intellectuals and attempted instead to become backseat players of citizens’ movements. When Sartre’s acclaimed notion of engagement gained support in Japan in the late 1960s, most Japanese intellectuals had already ceased being the public intellectuals they once were. Ultimately, it was university students rather than the intellectuals themselves who debated most intensively intellectuals’ political engagements.156 Progressive intellectuals enjoyed their moment as “champions” in the field of intellectuals in 1960, but by the end of the decade they had become the target of severe criticism by the radicalized students who had taken over the leadership of the democratic and peace movements, as fleshed out in the following chapter.157

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156 Thus, between 1945 and 1960, Japanese intellectuals developed amongst themselves arguments about their political responsibility as intellectuals (e.g., Takeuchi 1952; Kinoshita, Noma, and Hidaka 1964). Kuno began using French discourse in argument on this topic in the 1970s (see Kuno, Rōyama, and Takabatake 1972a).

157 The most notable representative of progressive intellectuals was Maruyama. He quit his position due to conflicts and criticisms from radicalized students which seem to have also triggered his illnesses at the University of Tokyo. On this topic, see, for example, Kersten (2009) for English sources.
Students at universities and high schools embarked on democratic movements shortly after the end of World War II. The primary goal of the movements at the beginning was the democratization of campuses and schools, and the efforts resulted in the establishment of the Zengakuren (the All-Japan Federation of Student-Government Associations, hereafter the Zengakuren), the nation-wide student organization, in 1948. The leading student activists were members of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP).
These student activists were, thus, simultaneously committed to the communist movements under the JCP, at the same time that they organized democratic movements both on and beyond their campuses. This chapter examines the development of these student movements and, in particular, the emergence of the student communist movement group, the Bund, and its role in the 1960 Anpo protests. The Bund, which was also called the Communist League, was the first New Left group established in Japan in 1958. It broke away from the JCP, formed an independent organization, and took a leadership role in the 1960 Anpo protests. This leadership was noteworthy, as there was significant competition among student movement groups, and the Bund had a much smaller membership than its major rival student group, the so-called Anti-Mainstream faction.

The primary goal of the chapter will be to explain how and why the Bund was successful in dominating in the student movement space and taking a prominent leadership role in the historic social protests in Japan.

I argue that the key to the Bund’s success was its decision to disassociate itself from the communist movement field governed by the JCP, and to take over instead the Zengakuren that dominated the student democratic movement space. I demonstrate that this latter social space was less structured than the communist movement field, affording the Bund a crucial opportunity. The Bund’s emergence demonstrates three important points. First, the 1960 Anpo protests were the foci for competing student movement groups competing to gain a hegemonic position in the student movement space. Second, the success of the Bund hinged on its seizure of the Zengakuren, a democratic movement organization that enforced democratic practices among its members. And third, Bund members were particularly successful at developing radical language as heir slogans and party organs manifested, while their practices were based on democratic principles that organized the student democratic movement space, and incorporated these into their organizations and students’ behaviors on the streets.

1 The founders of the organization named it after the Communist League, which existed as an amalgam of exiled Germans, including Karl Marx, in the mid-nineteenth century in Britain (Aoki 2008: 21).

2 Because the Bund occupied the seats of the Zengakuren’s executive committee during the 1960 Anpo protests, the Bund was called the “mainstream” faction, while the JCP-affiliated students were named the “Anti-Mainstream” faction.

The Bund had a few hundred members when it was established (Shima 1999: 47) and had about 1,000 members during the Anpo protests in 1960 (Asahi Jānaru 1971: 105).
This chapter begins with an examination of student movement space in Japan after WWII. I argue that the student movement space developed along two paths, producing two different kinds of movement spaces: a communist movement field governed by the JCP as well as by the Communist Party of Soviet Union (CPSU); and a less structured student democratic movement space that included and organized various student movements and was dominated by the Zengakuren. Next, I examine the field of communist movements, focusing on the JCP, and outline the field dynamics that led to the rise of the Bund. Finally, I provide an ethnographic account of students’ habitus and practices within the student democratic movement space, and how competition among groups in this space led to the escalation of “radical actions,” incorporating democratic practices, in the 1960 Anpo protests.

4.1 The Establishment of the Zengakuren: Student Democratic Movements, 1945-1950

(1) Pre-Zengakuren History

Soon after the end of World War II in August 1945, university students and students at higher schools3 sporadically generated movements for the democratization of campuses, schools, and dormitories.4 Accusation and frustration against the war experiences that they had to endure, the serious shortage of food and goods, the injustices that they observed on campuses and at schools, and the militaristic education that still existed before the educational reform, were often manifested in their statements. In September 1945, students at Mito Higher School (currently Ibaraki University) went on strike, demanding the expulsion of their school principal and militaristic teachers, and asking for the return of liberal teachers suspended during the war. Their protests were successful. Students at Ueno Women’s School (currently Ueno Gakuen University), the

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3 Higher schools are equivalent of high schools in the current school system.
4 The movements were framed, for example, as the “democratization of the campus (gakuen minshuka),” the “struggles for democratizing the campuses (gakuen minshuka tōsō),” the “democratization movements (minshuka undō)” (see Shiryō senso gakusei undō, hereafter SSGU 1968, vol.1: 3-12).
Tokyo College of Science (currently Tokyo University of Science), and other schools also went on strike. Students at Ueno Women’s School, for example, expressed their anger as follows:

[During the war] we worked at a mint for the state and gave up our studies. We were longing to return to our school while we were suffering from the defeat. However, what we find in our school is injustice, which we, youths filled with a sense of justice, cannot bear. Our school almost never offers classes but demands that we farm the school grounds and do other services. (Asahi Shinbun, October 9, 1945: 2)

The dominant framings of these student protests used the language of “justice” and “fairness.” Students at Ueno Women’s School also demanded the purge of their school principal, vice-principal, and all school staff, the fair distribution of the foods that they cultivated, and the return of ‘correct’ (tadashii) teachers who were expelled (ibid.). Student protests also continued to grow across other campuses, with demands such as the suspension of enrollment for students who had served in the military (Kyōto University) and reconstruction of the air-raid-damaged campus (Waseda University).5 Students’ anger was also directed at teachers who had told them, “Go die on the battlefield,” during wartime.6

The democratization movements on campuses expanded, incorporating collaborative efforts to establish student body associations.7 The student body association founded in May 1946 at Waseda University (a top private university in Tokyo) was the first successful case in which students established an association with detailed

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5 See SSGU (1968, vol. 1: 17, 136-37). Though not the main focus of the chapter, it is important to note that high school students were also active in political and democratic movements, including the 1960 Anpo protests. For a personal account, for example, see Seki (1995), who recounts that high school students influenced the reformation of the school system in their prefecture.

6 This was the case of former student activist Akio Ōno (1930-, University of Tokyo) (Ōno 1967: 22).

7 Before WWII, some autonomous associations aimed at activism, such as the New Man Society (Shinjinkai) at Tokyo Imperial University and People’s League (Minjin Dōmeikai) at Waseda University, had existed (see Hasegawa 2007; Smith 1972). Also, efforts were made to establish student body associations, but were not totally realized (see e.g., Smith 1972: 161). However, during wartime, few student self-government associations existed. Student bodies such as the patriotic school body (Gakkō Hōkokudan), the patriotic body (Hōkokutai), and the royal association (Shiseikai) at schools and universities were mobilized for the total-war efforts. After WWII, converting these bodies into self-governing ones was a major goal in the early stage of student movements (Takei 2005: 101).
propositions and received endorsement from the university authority. Students at many other universities followed this model and founded their own student body associations. After several attempts to form regional and nationwide student organizations, the Zengakuren was established in September 1948. The Zengakuren, which became the center of organizing student democratic movements, developed out of the student democratic movements during this time.

Students’ collective action, beginning with the democratization of the campuses, grew further, instigated by the policies of GHQ (General Headquarters of the Allied Powers) and the Japanese government. In fact, it was the GHQ’s policies that triggered the establishment of the Zengakuren (Takei 2005: 23, 57-8). Around the time when the student body association at the University of Tokyo was established in November 1947, GHQ drafted a bill for the Ministry of Education that proposed that, using the U.S. state university system as a model, all public universities—except for seven former imperial universities—were to be reformed as prefectural universities run by the prefectures’ budgets and regulations. Reacting against this proposal, student body associations at public universities formed the Federation of Student Self-Government Associations for National Universities (Zenkoku Kokuritsu Daigaku Gakusei Jichikai Renmei) in November 1947. Similar kinds of regional or national federations were founded around the same time. In 1948, soon after hearing that bills proposing a threefold increase of tuition at public universities, an increase in train fare, and the establishment of a Board of Trustees for public universities were going to be submitted to the Diet, the federations of student body associations organized mass protests, mobilizing 200,000 students at 114

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8 One of the first attempts was the National Federation of Student Self-Government Association (Zenkoku Gakusei Jichikai Rengō), which covered universities in the eastern region and was founded in October 1946 (Takei 2005: 9).

9 The scholarship has emerged recently that examines how movements generate organizations, focusing especially on corporations (cf. Schneiberg and Lounsbury 2008; Schneiberg, King, and Smith 2008).

10 The school system in Japan was partly similar to the educational system in Germany but was reformed into a de-centralized and egalitarian system by GHQ, starting from 1947. The new draft proposed a further reform that modeled the Japanese higher education system after U.S. state universities. The seven imperial universities consisted of the University of Tokyo, Kyōto University, Tōhoku University, Kyūshū University, Hokkaidō University, Ōsaka University, and Nagoya University. These are considered to be the top schools.

11 These attempts included the Preparatory Meeting for the Federation of Private Universities (Shigakuren Junbikai, formed in July 1948), and the National Federation of Student Self-Government Association for Public Universities and Technical Colleges (Zenkoku Kankōritsu Daigaku Kōsen Gakusei Jichikai Renmei, founded in June 1948) (Takei 2005: 9).
universities to go on strike in June (Takagi 1985: 17). The success of these collaborative efforts resulted in the establishment of the Zengakuren in September 1948.

(2) The Structure of the Zengakuren

The Zengakuren was an umbrella organization that incorporated the student body associations at all national universities and 70 percent of private universities (Takei 2005: 9). At the time of its establishment, the Zengakuren had 300,000 members (Takei 2005: 9). The large membership was made possible by universities’ enrollment system. When freshmen enrolled at universities, they automatically became members of the student body associations there (and their membership fee was deducted from the enrollment fee, which provided the resources for the Zengakuren’s movements); and if their student body associations were affiliated with the Zengakuren, students automatically became members of the Zengakuren.

The Zengakuren was structured hierarchically from the bottom-up. Students at each class at a university elected one or two class representatives through voting. Once class representatives were chosen, the class representatives formed the student council, elected executive committee members, and nominated chairmen and vice-chairmen for the university’s student body association. Sometimes, one university had more than one student body association. In the case of the University of Tokyo, which produced a significant number of key student activists in the years leading up to 1960, there was one student body association on the Komaba Campus where freshmen and sophomores and students who majored liberal arts studied. And on the Hongō Campus, where juniors and seniors studied, most departments had their own student body associations. The representatives of student body associations on each campus were sent to the Zengakuren.

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12 Takei (2005: 15-6, note 1) argues that these numbers were actually even higher—that 300,000 students and 116 universities joined the strikes.

13 According to the statistics of the Ministry of Education, the total number of university students was approximately 450,000 (Takei 2005: 9).

14 Classes at universities were sorted as follows: classes of freshmen and sophomores were divided according to the foreign language courses that they were required to take, or their major, depending on university; for juniors and seniors, classes usually meant a practicum offered by specific professors for their thesis.
formed the council for the Zengakuren, and elected Zengakuren’s chairman, vice-chairman, and central executive committee members.\textsuperscript{15} Importantly, each step for electing representatives proceeded democratically—through discussion and voting. However, the Zengakuren formed a rigid central executive committee where both the chairman and secretary-general held certain decision-making powers once they were nominated, elected, and approved.\textsuperscript{16}

The organizational structure of the Zengakuren yielded two outcomes, resulting in subsequent struggles within the Zengakuren. First, it granted top-down leadership of the central executive committee of the Zengakuren over students and student movements. The goals and strategies of student movements were decided by the central executive committee of the Zengakuren and sent to each university’s student body association and then to each class. While the guidelines of the Zengakuren’s central executive committee were not forceful, students at each level of student body associations were urged to discuss and vote on them.\textsuperscript{17} In most cases prior to 1960, students at classes and universities followed their own decisions that they made collectively for their participation in the movements after they discussed the Zengakuren’s plans. Second, because of its extensive influence, the central executive committee of the Zengakuren became the site for factional struggles in which student movement groups, as well as the JCP, fought for seats. However, since the Zengakuren was a bottom-up organization, student activists—particularly in the later period as factional struggles increased—had to wage struggles from the lower to the upper organizational levels in order to elect their

\textsuperscript{15} Acknowledging male dominance in student movements and the fact that all chairpersons of the Zengakuren were male, I use the term ‘chairman.’

\textsuperscript{16} The positions such as secretary-general in the executive committees of the Zengakuren were chosen by mutual voting among university representatives, while, in most cases, chairman and vice-chairman needed approval at an all-student meeting.

Plenary meetings of the Zengakuren were supposed to be held annually. However, when leading activists found the state of the society pressing or when factional conflicts intensified, interim meetings were held, and the central executive committee members were re-elected.

\textsuperscript{17} The repertoire of protests during this time included strikes, boycotting of classes and exams, rallies, and demonstrations. The styles of demonstration, such as zigzag (snake dance) demonstrations, often became the focus of debates. I discuss this demonstration style more later in this chapter.
candidates for the central executive committee and, ultimately, mobilize students for their protests.\footnote{18}

(3) The Zengakuren’s Movements

After its establishment, the Zengakuren served as the central organization for mobilizing students for democratic movements, along with anti-war movements, across the country. During the U.S. occupation period until 1952, the main targets of the Zengakuren were the occupation forces, the Japanese government, and the Ministry of Education, which Zengakuren members argued sought to undermine the democratization of Japanese universities and society at large (see Takei 2005: 28). For example, student activists regarded the Board of Trustee Bill as a plan to deprive their student body associations of autonomy. In the summer of 1949, the Zengakuren mobilized the most students yet in opposition to the U.S. occupation and the GHQ-led Red Purge of their campuses. With the Red Purge, GHQ aimed to purge communist faculty members from universities, but to students, the purge symbolized the denial of academic autonomy and increased control by “imperialism” and “bureaucrats and the police” (SSGU 1969, vol. 2: 188-89). In the end, universities themselves and their faculty members were not significantly affected by the planned purge, but student activists who had protested against the plans were penalized by the university authorities.\footnote{19}

The official goals adopted by the Zengakuren at the time of its establishment included fighting against fascism within and colonization of the educational system, defending academic freedom—including students’ freedom to participate in political activism, and protecting democracy (Takagi 1985: 18; also see SSGU 1968, vol. 1: 285-302). Among these goals, the protection of democratic movements was foremost. The

\footnote{18} Unlike labor movements organized through unions at companies, students were able to attend discussions at classes and all-student meetings at other universities; thus, student activists often visited other universities for their factional struggles. For example, Eiichi Onaya (1939-, Department of Sociology), the Anti-Mainstream chairman of the student body association at Hōsei University, recounts that Bund activists at the University of Tokyo often visited his university, stayed at the office of the student body association, and sometimes had discussions with him (Interview with Onaya, March 3, 2009).

\footnote{19} The Red Purge was largely enforced in companies, governmental sectors, and schools in Japan. Universities were the exception, with the Red Purge having little impact. For more details, see Chapter 3.
first Zengakuren chairman, Teruo Takei (1927-2010, Faculty of Literature, University of Tokyo), who served between 1948 and 1952, argued for an understanding of student movements as “layered movements” (sō to shite no gakusei undō) among student activists. According to Takei, university students came from different class origins and yet commonly shared the characteristics of pursuing truths and being endowed with a sense of justice and the energy for activism. Takei believed that those students should be mobilized to fight for the establishment of a democratic and peaceful nation-state (Takei 2005: 30). The very ways in which the Zengakuren organized its constituent movements—such as, having students at the lower organizations discuss the policies and proposals of the central executive committee, rather than simply imposing decisions from the top—were designed to strengthen democracy within the organization through its practices (see Ōno 1967: 68).

During the U.S. occupational period, while movements within the Zengakuren’s were successful in mobilizing students and forging a set of organizational practices, their development was not linear but waxed and waned. Both GHQ and the Japanese government welcomed neither university students’ political activism nor the expansion of their autonomy on campuses. Thus, for example, the Ministry of Education attempted, as they had done during the prewar and wartime, to prohibit students from engaging in political activism by issuing official notices that students should not make political speeches or commit to activism on campuses in the early postwar period in January 1946 (SSGU 1968, vol. 1: 32-3). Furthermore, while the intensity of repression differed depending on the universities, university authorities expelled or suspended leading student activists from their universities when movements intensified and students resorted to rallies and strikes. However, the Zengakuren and their movements, which evolved, reacting to the policies of GHQ and the Japanese government, continued to grow and

20 Also, in 1947, the Civil Information and Education Section of GHQ directed that “students should not go beyond the experimental laboratory of self-governing and be involved in legislative matters” (CIE memorandum, February 7, 1947, quoted in Takagi 1985: 15).
21 For example, the first Zengakuren chairman Takei was expelled from the University of Tokyo because he “instigated an ‘illegal strike’ at other universities” during the anti-Red Purge movements in 1950 (Takei 2005: 14, 16).
become further embroiled in factional struggles and communist movements that the student activists engaged in.

4.2 Communist Movement Field, 1945-1958

The Zengakuren developed out of student democratic movements and eventually became the central organization for student democratic movements after its establishment in 1948. However, because leading activists of the Zengakuren became JCP members, the Zengakuren’s movements, especially the Zengakuren’s central executive committee, were also mobilized for the purpose of promoting communist movements. This section examines the development of communist movement field and how student activists were involved in the struggles within it. As Figure 4.2 illustrates, between 1945 and 1950, while student democratic movements grew with the Zengakuren as the central organization,22 the student activists also were involved in the struggles in the field of communist movements.

Figure 4.2 Student Movement Space (1945-1950)

22 The democratic and anti-war movements by students that did not involve the Zengakuren broadly existed during this time. Such movements included anti-US base movements, anti-bomb movements, helping workers’ strike at Ōmi Silks, or joining rural survey, which were sometimes organized at university dormitories (see Ise et al. 2005). Although there was an influence of the JCP, the Student Settlement Movements that aimed to help out the poor were also one of them.
The JCP was established as the Japanese branch of the Comintern (the Communist International) in 1922, but was soon outlawed by the Japanese government. Leftist activism in general, including socialism, was severely repressed, especially after the enforcement of the Peace Preservation Law in 1929. After WWII, with the purpose of democratizing Japan, GHQ and SCAP (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers) legalized the JCP, and important prewar JCP leaders were released from jails or returned from abroad. For the first time, in December 1945, the JCP was legally established. Since then, although some internal disputes existed, the field of Japanese communist movements was “settled” (Steinmetz 2008) under the JCP’s domination and with the strong leadership of the party chairman Kyūichi Tokuda until 1949. The JCP adopted a party line of “peaceful revolution,” which meant pursuing their goals by taking over parliaments under the occupation. Interestingly, because it was GHQ that legalized the JCP, the party regarded the occupational forces as its ally and found as much, if not more similarities with the United States than with the Soviet Union, in the respect that both countries aimed to establish a nation for the people without emperors. In 1947, JCP membership reached 100,000, and by 1949, the JCP membership numbered 200,000, and they held 35 seats in the election of the House of Representatives in January (Koyama [1958] 2008: 70).

In 1950, however, the field of Japanese communist movements was destabilized by international intervention through the CPSU, which monopolized symbolic capital within the international field of communist movements. In January, the Cominform (the Communist Information Bureau) refuted JCP’s “peaceful revolution” policy, claiming that it diverged from legitimate Marxism-Leninism and the JCP was serving the “imperialist occupation.” Due to the symbolic power of the CPSU, their criticism dealt...
a serious blow to JCP members, resulting in internal disputes (Koyama [1958] 2008: 81). A split emerged between those who accepted the CPSU’s criticism (the International faction or the Sokusai-ha led by Kenji Miyamoto\(^{28}\)), and those who rejected it (the Mainstream or the Shokan-ha led by Tokuda).

The fragmentation of the Japanese communist movement field further intensified in 1950 through the intervention of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and U.S. occupational forces, which began repressing leftist and communist movements. On January 17, 1950, the CPC’s organ newspaper, the People’s Daily, criticized the Mainstream; at this point, the Mainstream accepted CPC’s suggestion to change their policies. However, GHQ policies that aimed at the democratization of Japan had already shifted since 1947 and steadily repressed leftist activism. A bloody clash of the GHQ army and demonstrators occurred in the “People’s Plaza” located outside the Imperial Palace on May Day 1950, and led GHQ to purge leading communist members and editors of the JCP’s organ newspaper Akahata (Red Flag). In the months leading up to the Korean War in June 1950, GHQ purged JCP members and activists from companies and government offices and banned Akahata.\(^{29}\) Due to these repressions, the JCP’s internal conflict between the Mainstream and the International faction intensified. Seeing the JCP’s split, the People’s Daily this time urged the International faction to merge with the Mainstream in September 1950. Although the International faction agreed with this and dissolved, the Mainstream this time refused the unification. Thus, the International faction again formed their own group. Consequently, each of the JCP’s factions claimed to be the only legitimate communist party of Japan, and JCP members, including student JCP members, of the two factions engaged in intense internal struggles over legitimacy in the Japanese communist movement field.

In the years between 1951 and 1955, however, the field of communist movements dominated by the JCP was stabilized, involving radical shifts in the field. First, reacting to the GHQ’s purge in June 1950, the Mainstream’s activism went underground, and the

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\(^{28}\) Miyamoto later become the third party chairman in 1958.

\(^{29}\) See Chapter 2 on GHQ/SCAP’s Red Purge.
faction announced suddenly in October 1950 that they would begin armed fights for revolution—a drastic shift from the previous party line. Excluding members of the International faction, in February 1951, the Mainstream faction held the Fourth Party Conference, set the goal of armed fighting as the official party line, and built a new organization for it.\(^{30}\) Second, the split between the Mainstream and the International faction where each faction created their own organization ended with the intervention of the Cominform in 1951. The Cominform sent its order through a broadcast of Moscow Radio in August 1951, declaring that the Mainstream was the only legitimate party and directing the International faction to end “factional activity.” Shocked by the Cominform’s announcement,\(^{31}\) the International faction dissolved itself and the communist movement field, which had been destabilized by the Cominform in 1950, was thus re-stabilized with the Cominform’s intervention.\(^{32}\) However, the communist movement field enforced ‘illegal’ activism that involved violence under the domination of the former Mainstream until around 1954.\(^{33}\) The JCP promoted guerrilla warfare in cities and villages in Japan, involving devoted young communist workers and students. Figure 4.3 illustrates that the space of student democratic movements and the field of student communist movements overlapped through student activists and the Zengakuren. The Japanese communist movement field was under the symbolic domination of the CPSU, and was sometimes affected by the Cominform and the CPC, which were under the CPUS.

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\(^{30}\) The armed fight was modeled after the guerrilla warfare in villages in China and armed uprisings in cities in Russia (Koyama [1958] 2008: 128). The Japanese version aimed at fighting for repressed farmers and workers, and against the U.S. army and the Japanese police. The forces behind this shift was unknown for a long time, however, until it was revealed that Stalin called Tokuda, Sanzō Nosaka, and Ryūji (Takaji) Nishizawa, who all had been in Beijing since 1950, to Moscow, and urged the JCP to engage in armed fighting (Tsuda 2008: 313). Prior to this, since 1949, the CPC had suggested guerrilla warfare, and Stalin approved this as the official model of revolution (ibid.: 305-07).

\(^{31}\) Creating a faction or committing factional activism was considered to be one of the most serious offenses against the Party. Besides, the Cominform did not allow communists to build more than one party in one country.

\(^{32}\) To stabilize the field and maintain its orthodoxy, the JCP also began so-called “overhaul movements” and purged factional activism between 1953 and 1954.

\(^{33}\) Examples of armed fights included the shooting of a policeman in January 1952 and the bombing of public places with Molotov cocktails in May-June in 1952. However, in July 1952, Tokuda announced the importance of non-violent popular movements, not limiting the group to armed fighting; then, the party began both violent and non-violent activisms.
The shift to violent tactics\textsuperscript{34} ended with the drastic loss of the JCP’s seats in the congresses. The party did not gain a single seat in the House of Representatives election of October 1952, and gained only one seat in April 1953. These results inevitably made the JCP change their policies. In January 1954, Akahata announced self-criticism about their “sectionalism.” At the Sixth Party Conference in July 1955, finally, the party officially denounced their armed activities and embraced a “peaceful policy” for revolution.\textsuperscript{35} This time, the Party Conference was organized by the former International faction, which had been marginalized since 1950, but gradually seized hegemony after the death of Tokuda in October 1953.\textsuperscript{36} The former International faction called for the unification of the party, and with the leadership of Miyamoto, the communist movement field settled down as a “legal” one, which stopped resorting to underground activities, after 1955.

\textsuperscript{34} In addition to guerrilla warfare, JCP members, including student members, conducted inquests of their fellow members that sometimes were accompanied by lynching between 1950 and 1955.

\textsuperscript{35} More specifically, the party denounced armed fighting as a tactic, but they kept violent revolution as their political ideology. This ambivalence resulted from the CPSU’s intervention, in which they suggested that the JCP keep violent revolution as a policy goal (Tsuda 2008: 319).

\textsuperscript{36} Tokuda’s death was officially announced for the first time at the conference in 1955, two years after his death.
4.3 The Fluctuation of the Communist Movement Field and the Rise of the Bund

(1) The Fluctuation of the Communist Movement Field

Just when the field of Japanese communist movements governed by the JCP had settled down, the field of student communist movements, which had been congruent with the Japanese communist movement field, began fluctuating. Three incidents generated in the national and international communist movement fields shook the symbolic power of the CPSU and the JCP, carving out space for the student communist movement field to restructure. This process resulted in the establishment of the Bund, Japan’s first New Left organization.

The most critical incident that caused the fluctuation of the student communist movement field was the JCP’s Sixth Party Conference in July 1955. On the one hand, the Conference, including the renunciation of armed fighting, helped to secure the field of Japanese communist movements. On the other hand, the drastic shift of the JCP’s party line—from violent to peaceful revolution—led devoted young communists to despair. “The leaders of the Zengakuren all caved to pressure and confessed their policies were wrong. Some students cried ridiculously, other students yelled out that they wanted their youth (seishun) back,” a former leading activist Gentarō Tsuchiya (1934-, Faculty of Law, Meiji University), recalled.37 Becoming a member of the JCP required full devotion of one’s personal life to the party missions, which sometimes meant separation from their family. In the case of Tsuchiya, he recollected, “I joined the JCP with a perfectly prepared mind. My parents would repudiate me, I thought. I felt this pessimism for joining the JCP back then.”38 Some students were even asked for a higher level of devotion to party activism than to their own families. Later Bund activist Yasumasa Koga (1931-, Faculty of Agriculture, University of Tokyo) could not see his mother, his only parent, when she was hospitalized with terminal cancer because the leader of his cell told

37 Interview with Tsuchiya, April 27, 2009.
38 In terms of procedure, to be a JCP member, applicants were asked to write statements and have two recommenders from the JCP, and their applications had to be approved by cells, regional committees, and the central executive committee of the JCP (Interview with Tsuchiya, April 27, 2009).
him to commit to activism instead. After asking so much of its members, the JCP’s new policies rejecting past activism created deep doubt among devoted student activists about the legitimacy of the JCP, as well as about the symbolic order in the Japanese communist movement field in which the JCP was dominant.

Two other incidents generated in the international communist movement field created further fluctuations among student activists. These incidents were, first, Khrushchev’s criticism of Stalin, previously the symbol of ultimate legitimacy in communist movement fields in the world, in February 1956. This incident was followed by the Soviet Union’s repression of the Hungarian Revolution in October 1956, a move that generated serious debates among student activists. Along with the JCP’s Six Party Conference in 1955 that overturned the JCP’s previous policy, these international incidents deepened students’ doubt over the legitimacy of the CPSU and the JCP, making the students question what the “true” party stood for, and what the legitimate form of revolution was.

It is important to note that, in stark contrast to the impact of these events among student activists, these events did not unsettle the larger field of the Japanese communist movement. Unlike communist students, the JCP leaders did not take the incidents of the Soviet Union seriously (Koyama [1958] 2008: 242). In the eyes of the JCP student activists, however, the events were drastic enough for them to doubt the symbolic order and doxa that organized the Japanese communist movement field. These incidents, followed by student activists’ confusion and doubts, thus created a distinct space for student communist movements to constitute their own field, increasingly independent of that of the JCP’s. The year 1957 witnessed the flourishing of reading groups in which young communists discussed Marxist literature and the history of Russian revolutions. Such groups included the Society for the Analysis of the Present State (Genjō Bunseki Kenyūkai) and the Society for Dialectic (Benshōhō Kenyūkai). Trotskyism, previously

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39 Koga’s mother passed away shortly hereafter (Shima Shigeo Kinen Bunshū Kankōkai, hereafter SSKBK 2002b: 264).
40 For more detail, see Koyama ([1958] 2008: 264-65).
41 For more detail, see Koyama ([1958] 2008: 264-65).
strictly prohibited by the JCP, became popular as part of this trend, and many JCP students secretly read books written by Trotsky.\footnote{A later leading figure of one of the Trotskyist groups, Yoshinobu Shiokawa (1935-, Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo) recalls, “It was, in a way, a betrayal of the communist party even to buy a book of Trotsky and read it. So we read it secretly” (Interview, March 21, 2009).} There were at least five Trotskyite groups during this time (Shiokawa 2007: 145-49). These embryonic groups soon developed into New Left groups after the JCP purged the students from their field, as I discuss in further detail in the following section. Figure 4.4 illustrates how these events changed the configuration of the groups in the student communist movement field between 1948 and 1960.

Figure 4.4 Shifts of the Constituencies in the Field of Student Communist Movement Field (1948-1960)

(2) The Revitalization of Student Movements through Democratic Movements

The disruption and fluctuation within the student communist movement field led to a decline in overall student activism between 1955 and 1956. The incidents in 1955
and 1956 in the communist movement field created functional disturbance within the Zengakuren and its central executive committee. And at the regional level, the incidents led to the resignation of all the executive committee members of the Tokyo Federation of Student Self-Government Associations (Togakuren, a regional umbrella organization for student body associations).43 Far from simply fading away, however, student activism was actually revitalized as it shifted instead to student democratic movements, a development that led, in turn, to the restructuring of the student communist movement field.

Student activism found new energy, in particular, through the anti-U.S. base movements in Sunagawa (a suburb of Tokyo) in 1956 and 1957.44 The success of the Sunagawa anti-U.S. base movements—along with other kinds of students’ “popular movements (taishū undō),” non-communist mass-based democratic movements45—gave communist student activists renewed enthusiasm for their activism. Protests against the expansion of the U.S. base in Sunagawa started in 1955, led by local residents who were asked to leave the land by the Japanese government. The residents did not plan the Zengakuren’s involvement for the first year because of their rejection of communism;46 and in any case, Zengakuren leaders were in the midst of turmoil and did not know about the protests in Sunagawa.47 However, in 1956, responding to the request of the residents who thought that their former allied groups—the JSP and Sōhyō (General Council of Trade Unions of Japan; hereafter, the Sōhyō federation)—had betrayed them, the residents asked the Zengakuren to join their protests on the site (see Morita 1980: 127-28). The protests in 1956 resulted in bloody clashes between the protesters and the police, but were successful in preventing the land survey planned for the expansion of the U.S. base in 1957. The success of the anti-U.S. base movements, together with other students’

43 Interview with Tsuchiya, April 27, 2009.
44 In the context of the Cold War, the United States aimed to expand U.S. bases in Japan, considering Japan to be the key to preventing communism in Asia. Protests against the expansion of the U.S. base in Sunagawa started in 1955.
45 Student activists often use the term “popular movements” in referring to mass democratic movements and to distinguish them from communist movements. Similarly, labor movement activists use this term when describing mass movements of workers to distinguish their own political activism.
47 Interview with Tsuchiya, April 27, 2009.
popular movements, such as protests against tuition increases at public universities and against the introduction of a single-seat constituency system in national elections, helped student activists to regain their confidence.

At the same time, however, the Sunagawa protests created a new dispute within the field of student communist movements. JCP-affiliated Zengakuren leaders argued over conflicts between student activists who participated in on-site protests, and student activists who stayed in Tokyo to coordinate resources. Seeing the latter group—which adhered more tightly to JCP party policies—being kept in the background, the JCP called for a convention of JCP’s student activists on June 1, 1958. But the convention, which was held with JCP executive members in attendance, ended with students voting for the dismissal of the JCP’s executive members from the JCP.

(3) Symbolic Conflicts in the Communist Movement Field and the 1st June Incident

Symbolic conflicts in the communist movement came to a head during one key incident, referred to as the “1st June Incident” in the history of the Japanese New Left. The event was partly accidental and largely symbolic, yet it generated a significant consequence—namely, it created a more autonomous student communist movement field, no longer under the JCP’s dominance. Former leading student activist Tsuchiya, who supervised the Sunagawa protests as a chairman of the Togakuren on the site, talks about the incident. Groups of students who were frustrated with the JCP secretly held a meeting the day before June 1st. The participants agreed that they would take the chairmanship of the convention and demand the reformation of JCP policies, which, to these students’ minds, were not radical enough.

48 The Togakuren was a sub-organization of the Zengakuren that student body associations at universities in Tokyo joined.
49 The following account is based on the interview with Tsuchiya, April 27, 2009.
The June 1st convention began in tumult.\textsuperscript{50} After the JCP made an opening speech, the party announced the JCP would take the chairmanship. No sooner did the JCP turn down the students’ demand for the chairmanship of Tsuchiya and Masaomi Onodera (1933-, Faculty of Letters at University of Tokyo, the secretary-general of the Zengakuren) than a fist fight began between students who had attended the secret meeting the day before, on one side, and JCP executive members as well as students who were more closely in line with the JCP. After the fighting ceased, Tsuchiya and Onodera took the chairmanships and demanded the self-criticism of the executive members of the JCP. JCP executive member Yojiro Konno, to the surprise of the rebellious students, admitted his fault, and apologized. Tsuchiya recalls it as follows:

Tsuchiya: In the end, Yojiro Konno, who was the Party’s permanent representative, appeared. We demanded he apologize. He was a fool, because when we did, he apologized. “The policies of the party were wrong,” he told us.

Author: Who was he, more exactly?

Tsuchiya: He was the permanent representative of the Party, one of the senior executives of the central executive committee, which was like the Politburo in Russia. He was old, in his fifties back then, wasn’t he? And attacked by us, he apologized.

Author: How did you persuade him?

Tsuchiya: It wasn’t persuasion. “Apologize, your instruction was wrong,” we ranted and screamed. Then he, in the end, gave self-criticism, saying he was wrong. He was helpless, Konno was a fool. And then we were empowered into voting to recall the JCP’s central executive members.

That was nothing legitimate, of course. There was no binding authority, at the conference like that. But we did, as the majority. It was at their convention.\textsuperscript{51}

The students’ voting was, thus, largely symbolic and had no binding authority. Nonetheless, it constituted a turning point for the emergence of the Bund. Responding to

\textsuperscript{50} Interview with Tsuchiya, April 27, 2009. Approximately, 140 student activists attended the convention (Kurata 2008: 52).

\textsuperscript{51} Interview with Tsuchiya, April 27, 2009. The attendants of the JCP executive committee included Yojiro Konno (a permanent representative), Ichizou Suzuki (the chief of youth division), and Kaoru Tsushima (pen name of Susumu Iijima, the chief of student division) (Morikawa 2005: 93). Konno was the JCP’s number three leader (Morikawa 2005: 276).
the students’ rebellion, the JCP expelled and deprived the student activists who were involved of their partial membership rights.52 This effort to exclude the rebellious faction from the field of the communist movements of the JCP led the frustrated student activists to create their own parties in pursuit of revolution.53

Shigeo Shima (1931-2000, Medical School, University of Tokyo), a long-term student activist, seized this opportunity and played a key role in the establishment of the Bund.54 As I argued earlier, due to the fluctuation in the student communist movement field beginning in 1955, the number of study groups was on the rise, and young communists, including Trotskyite groups, sought an alternative to the existing communist parties. It was Shima’s group that made the first successful move. Prior to the 1st June Incident, in December 1957, Shima and his two fellow activists at the University of Tokyo—Kōji Ikuta (1933-1966, Faculty of Economics) and Hidemitsu Saeki (1933-, Faculty of Science)—had decided to collectively reform the JCP (Shima 1999: 44). At that time, devoted communist activist Shima’s intention was to reform the JCP from within. Shima was cautious and disinclined to build an independent party. It was because, as Shima himself said, he was caught in the “myth,” believing in the JCP was the only legitimate revolutionary party for communist movements (ibid.: 49). However, the 1st June Incident in 1958 and the JCP’s subsequent reaction, freed Shima from the doxa. With his fellow student activists, Shima made swift and steady progress towards establishing a new party, the Bund.

52 The JCP penalized 16 students in June and nine students in July, 1958 (Kurata 2008: 52). The deprivation of the rights of membership (tōinken teishi) meant that members served in the party but did not have the right to make their opinions and voting known at meetings. For JCP members, expulsion from the party (jomei) was the most serious punishment. For devoted JCP activists, expulsion could mean the end of one’s life. Psychological struggles involved in deprivation of membership are well depicted in the autobiography of Tōru Kawakami, who became a JCP member in his twenties in 1960 (see Kawakami [1997] 2001).

53 Self-criticism confessed in the public had a significant symbolic meaning to the JCP and other new left activist groups, signifying not only one’s confession of a mistake but also one’s obedience to the power who demanded it.

54 Shima entered the University of Tokyo in 1950 but was suspended from the school indefinitely because of his activism during the anti-Red Purge movements in 1950. Shima re-entered the Medical School in 1954.
(4) The Rise of the Bund

In 1958, students successfully mobilized for nation-wide protests against the Police Duties Bill\textsuperscript{55}, and shortly after, the Bund held their inaugural meeting in December 1958.\textsuperscript{56} The draft of the declaration statement for the Bund’s establishment claimed that party lines were nothing without actions, and that students should fight like workers and, indeed, serve as leaders for them (quoted in Kurata 2008: 35). The theory of the movement theory was that since the students could travel light, they could serve as an ignition point for revolutionary movements that would enlighten workers, and that workers would follow (see Senki, January 1, 1960; also see Shima 1999: 83).\textsuperscript{57}

The Bund’s claims were radical, particularly in contrast to those of the JCP, which defined students as petit-bourgeois and, hence, failing to constitute a true revolutionary force. The Bund also constituted a minority group, outsized by its major rival, the Anti-Mainstream faction, which adhered to the JCP policies. How, then, was this relatively small group of students able to form an organization that would ultimately, emerge as hegemonic over other, larger student groups, and play a leading role in subsequent nationwide protest movements?

The explanation begins with the fact that the Bund, as a small networked group of people, was separated from the JCP via the 1\textsuperscript{st} June incident in 1958. With this separation, the Bund shifted from being a still dominated student group critical of the JCP, to becoming an independent group in a more autonomous field where they could begin a new game. The Bund formally established its organization in December 1958 with a formal convention, outlining their own formal structures. Indeed, the Anti-Mainstream faction, a student group that was said to be pro-JCP, was actually critical of the JCP and

\textsuperscript{55} On these protests, see Chapter 4.
\textsuperscript{56} Bund means “party” in German; see also footnote 1.
\textsuperscript{57} This is also based on the interview with Kazunari Kurata, a former Bund activist, December 30, 2008. The Bund’s movement theory is called the Pioneer Spirit Theory (senkusei riron) among student leftist groups. One of the major differences in the theories between the Bund and other Kakukyōdō factions was that while the Bund considered the party as the basis for the movements, some of latter groups argued that every member was a party serving for revolution (Interview with Kurata, February 7, 2009).
had been loosely forming a structural reformist group under the influence of Italian communist Palmiro Togliatti since 1957.\textsuperscript{58} Thus, they, like the Bund, were also beginning to rebel somewhat against the JCP. However, unlike the Bund, the Anti-Mainstream faction remained in the Japanese communist movement field under the JCP’s hegemony and did not form a separate organization.\textsuperscript{59}

Furthermore, the Kakukyōdō groups, other New Left fractions, were excluded from the formation of the Bund, the first successful New Left group. While five Trotskyite groups existed in 1957, only two of them were actually involved in activism and the others were no more than study groups.\textsuperscript{60} Bund leader Shima initially tried to incorporate the active factions of the Kakukyōdō into the Bund (Shima 1999: 56), but, in the end, these factions separated themselves from the Bund and formed independent organizations.\textsuperscript{61} By excluding the pro-JCP students and the Kakukyōdō factions and with the leadership of Shima, the Bund members were elected to the executive committee of the Zengakuren and took all of its important seats at the 14\textsuperscript{th} Plenary Meeting in June 1959. And so, the Bund Zengakuren was launched.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[58] Interview with A, a former Anti-Mainstream student activist, March 16, 2009 and the focus group interview with former students activists at Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, March 17, 2009.
\item[59] Forming a faction was considered to be a serious offense against the party. Thus, if groups decided to remain in the field that the JCP governed, they would not, and could not, form new organizations.
\item[60] Interview with Shiokawa, March 21, 2009.
\item[61] Two factions of the Kakukyōdō were the Kansai Kakukyōdō (Kakukyōdō Kansai-ha) that formed around Kyōji Nishi (pen name of Shirō Ōya), and the group Shiokawa joined and where students gathered around Eiichi Yamanishi, a translator of Trotsky’s books.
\end{footnotes}
As Figure 4.5 illustrates, the second factor that explains the rise of the Bund was that the Bund took over the executive committee of the Zengakuren. The student communist movement field and the student democratic space overlapped significantly, and the Zengakuren, specifically its central executive committee, served as the key organization that connected the two spaces. Thus, taking over the Zengakuren’s central executive committee meant domination in the student democratic movement space, and this, in turn gave the Bund the ability to mobilize potentially tens of thousands of students in support of communist—or, indeed, any kind of—goals. When the Bund Zengakuren was formed in June 1960, the 1960 Anpo protests had already begun. The Bund, which continued to hold executive committee meetings of the Zengakuren for the duration of the 1960 Anpo protests, decided to put all its efforts into these protests (Shima 1999: 92-4).

This strategy of the Bund differed from that of the Kakukyōdō factions, the other New Left groups formed around 1957, which did not seek the seizure of the Zengakuren until 1960. The Kakukyōdō factions were unsuccessful in gaining dominance in either the student democratic space or the student communist movement field until 1960.62 While the strategy was successful for the Bund, I will argue shortly that their seizure of the

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62 Later, they began seeking to take over the Zengakuren and did so in 1961. This game, organizing student communist movements through the Zengakuren, the democratic organization, became dominant in the subsequent student movement space, including the time of the student revolts in 1968-1969 in Japan.
Zengakuren actually involved the manipulation of democratic institutional practice. But first, the following section will examine three structural factors that characterized the student movement space, and that enabled the Bund’s capture of the Zengakuren.

4.4 The Dynamics and Structure of the Student Movement Space

The Bund emerged at the intersection at the student democratic movement space and the field of communist student movements. Its rise to dominance hinged on this space of overlap, and the Bund’s successful utilization of the democratic organization that existed at the intersection.

(1) Autonomous Organization and Autonomous Movement Space

The Bund not only separated itself from the JCP, but also was considerably independent from the influence of other intellectuals in Japan. This autonomy made it possible for the Bund to dominate in the communist student movement field, in which they could impose and invest significant symbolic capital. The student movement space between 1945 and 1960 was considerably independent from the political and intellectual activism of intellectuals, or other kinds of movement spaces.63 This was critical for the dominance of the Bund because the degree of the autonomy of the field affects the definition and strategies for the accumulation of capital that is at stake within the field (see Büyükokutan 2010b: 38).64

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63 Though the JCP had a certain amount of power in deciding the members for the Zengakuren’s central executive committee, the Zengakuren was largely able to resist JCP’s policies while organizing movements. The anti-Red Purge movements organized by the Zengakuren were a notable example, despite the fact that the JCP critiqued the Zengakuren and penalized important JCP members for engaging in the movements (see Öno 1967: 82, 90).

64 In comparison to New Left movements in England where intellectuals had considerable influence on New Left movements, the autonomy from Japanese intellectuals, especially from university faculty members, constitutes the important characteristic of the Japanese New Left movements in general.
It was true that some intellectuals passionately supported the Bund (or the Bund Zengakuren), but the majority of intellectuals did not. Indeed, Bund members neither had close ties with intellectuals nor were interested in collaborating with the intellectuals who supported them. For example, Masahiko Aoki, one of the most important theorists of the Bund (1938-, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo) recalls that he only once met poet and critic Takaaki Yoshimoto, who earnestly and openly supported the Bund, and it was after the 1960 Anpo protests (Aoki 2008: 42). Aoki describes the Bund as waging a one-man battle, despite the fact that an article published by Yoshimoto during the Bund’s activism was an important statement of support and alliance (ibid.: 40-1). Former Bund activist Hiroshi Nagasaki (1937-, Faculty of Science, University of Tokyo) describes student activists’ views of intellectuals as follows:

There was little incentive among the Zengakuren to involve or collaborate with intellectuals. It was the influence of the Bund. Students in general interacted with professors, but the Bund had amazingly few intellectuals. [pause] I don’t know why. Maybe it was because we were too young. The students were arrogant and smirked at the professors. The students thought them to be nutty professors, if they came to make speeches, as they pleased, to support us.

Intellectuals did not attempt to intervene in student movements, but the autonomy of the movements result more from students’ indifference and even distrust of intellectuals. Bund leader Shima, in particular, distrusted intellectuals in Japan. He later recounted that he had no trust in intellectuals and university faculty members because of his personal

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65 A political scientist, who actively participated in the 1960 Anpo protest as a junior faculty at the University of Tokyo, explains that the majority of intellectuals were not in favor of the Bund and the Zengakuren (Interview with Y, October 22, 2008).

66 Intellectuals who supported the Bund held relatively marginalized positions. Another intellectual who supported the Bund Zengakuren was Ikutarō Shimizu, the progressive intellectual discussed in Chapter 3. Yoshimoto also tells that he did not give any advice to the students about their activism (Yoshimoto 2008: 17).

67 Yoshimoto’s article was “Sengo sedai no seiji shisō (Political Thoughts of the Postwar Generation)” (Chūō Kōron, 1960: 26-38). The article was published right after November 27, 1959 when students and workers occupied the ground of the Diet Building for the first time (see Aoki 2008: 41).

68 Interview with Nagasaki, January 12, 2009.

69 It is also important to note that university students constituted the high strata of the society. University advancement rate was 8.2 percent in 1960 (http://www.e-stat.go.jp/SG1/estat/List.do?bid=000001015843&ccycode=0, Retrieved, June 16, 2012). They were sometimes called as “Mr. Students (gakusei-san)” with some respect. Onaya recalls that ordinary people, such as an unknown taxi driver and a hotel clerk, treated him better when they found out he was a student and had joined the 1960 Anpo protest (Interview with Onaya, March 3, 2009).
experience of seeing his teachers quickly turn from militarists into democrats or from imperialists into communists in his earlier school years (Shima 1999: 24). It was only after the 1960 Anpo protests and the Bund’s breakup that student activists established strong ties with intellectuals.70

In order to understand further the autonomy of the student movement space from intellectuals, it is necessary to understand the characteristics of the symbolic capital that was effective in the space, specifically in the field of student communist movement. It was not the thoughts and philosophies of Japanese intellectuals, including the ones of progressive intellectuals, but competence in understanding and articulating Marxist thoughts that were critical in seizing the field of student communist movements.

Onaya, who was the leader of the Anti-Mainstream faction at Hōsei University, described how leading student activists armed themselves with leftist discourses to fight against one another:

By borrowing money [from someone], I bought Lenin’s book.71 I searched for the words “peace” and “democracy” and looked up those sections. And I skimmed them—otherwise, I couldn’t be ready [for upcoming debates and speeches]. I put all my efforts into it. In doing so, I found Lenin’s imperial theory was marvelous, especially in terms of his analysis and prediction of the war. […] I was young, around twenty years old. So, if I copied for two or three hours [when I wrote flyers], I became able to remember exact words and phrases and to make a speech the following day.72

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70 Scholars sometimes point out Japanese intellectuals’ influence on student activists (e.g., Ōtake 2007). It was true that Bund members read Japanese Marxist economist Kōzō Uno. However, except for Uno, any substantial influence of Japanese intellectuals on student activists emerged only after 1960. For example, Osamu Mikami (pen name of Osamu Ajioka, 1941-, Law School, Chūō University), a former Bund activist, visited Yoshimoto after the 1960 Anpo protests and formed the Hanki faction (Kyōsanshugisha Dōmei Hanki-ha) under his strong intellectual influence (Interview with Mikami, January 6, 2009). It was also after the breakup of the Bund that one faction of the Kakukyōdō, which was strongly influenced by a charismatic independent leftist intellectual Hirokazu (Kan’ichi) Kuroda, expanded the membership among student leftist movements.

71 In this interview, Onaya sometimes told how people and students in Japan were poor.

72 Interview with Onaya, March 3, 2009.
Onaya’s story indicates that knowledge and articulation of Marxist thoughts were necessary cultural and symbolic capital in the field of student communist movements to dispute with other factions of student movements.\(^73\)

Importantly for organizing student movements, student activists, as well as non-activist students, were capable of accumulating what I call “Marxist capital.” This is a specific form of symbolic capital at stake in the student communist movement field. In addition to Karl Marx, Lenin and Trotsky were widely ready by Bund members; Togliatti and Gramsci attracted leaders of the Anti-Mainstream faction; and Trotsky was the central figure for the Kakukyōdō factions. As I will demonstrate shortly, organ journals of the Bund, and of the Kakukyōdō as well, heavily deployed Marxist and leftist discourses. Thus, many student activists read Marxists from the Soviet Union, China, or Italy, and were rarely influenced by Japanese intellectuals. There were some activists who rarely read any books by Marx, Lenin, or Mao Zedong, as former Bund activist Susumu Nishibe (1939-, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo) bluntly confessed later (Nishibe [1986] 2007: 33); but even if a student activist had never read such texts, they had to be able to make speeches or write articles referencing or citing them if they aspired to be leading activists.\(^74\)

Furthermore, this was a time period when non-activist students, sometimes even including high school students, read and discussed leftist theories extensively.\(^75\) Therefore, the relatively independent field of student communist movements, which heavily deployed Marxist discourse, was possible because students in general were

\(^73\) The next subsection will outline how cultural capital turns into symbolic capital.

\(^74\) To clarify one point; student activists did not use heavily loaded Marxian terms such as “revolution,” when they made speeches in front of non-activist students (Interview with Koga, March 19, 2009); these were terms for activist audiences. Nonetheless, activists still needed to be able to give persuasive discussion about the society and social conditions that students faced and Marxist discourse was a crucial resource in this respect.

\(^75\) With the focus on student movements in 1960, Kazuko Tsurumi conducted a survey of 100 students at universities in Tokyo (e.g., University of Tokyo, Chūō University, and Keiō University) in 1962. The survey asked students, including both activists and non-activists, to list books and authors that influenced them. Students listed many books by Marx, Lenin, Mao, Engels, Trotsky, Stalin, and Lukács; only a few books by Japanese intellectuals were listed (Tsurumi 1970: 356-57). Similarly, more students named Marx, Lenin, and Schweitzer as intellectuals that influenced them than Japanese intellectuals such as Yoshimoto, Masao Maruyama, and Kōzō Uno (ibid.: 358).
Competent in understanding leftist theories by themselves. Activists’ speeches and writings were put under scrutiny even by non-activist students. Masaru Kaneko (Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo), who was an active member of the Anti-Mainstream faction, described the setting of the Komaba Campus at the University of Tokyo by referring to his friend:

Masayuki Iwata

 didn’t join the Bund or the Zenjiren [the Anti Mainstream faction]. He often walked around the campus and closely read flyers and listened to speeches. Iwata read the flyers that Kaneko and others had written through the night. Then, he would point out “You’re wrong. Lenin didn’t say that,” or “From where did you cite this? You can’t plagiarize without citation.” Iwata said that here and there.

Kaneko noted that there were others like Iwata and that Bund members were more critical, saying Trotsky didn’t say anything like that.

Relative independence from Japanese intellectuals did not mean that student activists did not have any incentive to establish ties with intellectuals. When the Bund activists were short of resources to fund their activism, they went to ask for money from intellectuals, even though such efforts were rarely successful (e.g., Kojima 1997: 179-80). Still, overall, the field of student activism was relatively autonomous not only because the type of capital necessary provided leverage specific to student movement fields, but also because student activists were capable of acquiring such capital, independently from others.

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76 Iwata was born in 1939 and studied at the Faculty of Letters at the University of Tokyo.
77 Interview with Kaneko, March 12, 2009.
78 Shima recalls that the most serious challenge to the Bund’s activism was collecting money and that he made the largest effort at it. As the movement grew, more money was needed—for example, for telephone bills, printing flyers, newsletters, and newspapers, manpower for traveling to find or contact with allies, and rent for their office and sound trucks. Further expense was incurred in defending arrested students (Shima 1999: 105). According to Yoshinobu Tōbara (1938-, Faculty of Letters, Waseda University), who was in charge of finance, the Bund Zengakuren spent 9 million yen (= 9 thousand dollars) in 1960, which was triple the Zengakuren’s revenue (Kojima 1997: 176-79).
79 To add one more factor regarding the accumulation of capital: the subjects in which students majored also shaped their ability to be effective activists. Students who majored in the humanities and social sciences, for example, often had the advantage of more time for activism than students in the natural sciences, who were required to put in substantial laboratory hours. Nagasaki, who majored in science at the University of Tokyo, said that he sometimes chatted with his friends in his department and concluded that
(2) Socializing into Marxism and the Accumulation of Capital

With relatively few exceptions, most student activists were already familiar with Marxist literature or had experience in participating in communist or democracy movements before they entered university. Bund leader Shima, for example, had radical teachers when he was in high school, and he made the decision to become a member of the JCP when he was a senior (Shima 1999: 23; SSKBK 2002a: 22-4, 96-7). Similarly, Ikuta, another key Bund leader, had already joined the JCP and energetically engaged in activism during his high school years (Ikuta Fusai Tsuitō Kinen Bunshū Kankōkai 1967).80 Even if students did not have prior experiences, universities—as a physical and ecological space that impacts on social movement mobilization (Zhao 1998)81—provided opportunities for students to socialize themselves into leftist thought and activism. Study groups and dormitories provided key social spaces, constituting one locus where activists attempted to recruit their own new members. Bund members excelled at accumulating the forms of cultural and symbolic capital necessary to wage factional struggles in this university-based student movement space.

At many universities in the 1950s, students organized study groups, such as the Social Science Study Association (Shakaikagaku Kenkyūkai), the Historical Study Association (Rekishigaku Kenkyūkai), and the Soviet Study Association (Sobiet Kenkyūkai), where they read and discussed Marxist literature, independent of university professors. Many leading student activists joined at least one of these study groups, particularly the first two. Furthermore, these groups also offered opportunities for turning non-activist students into activists. Shiokawa, a later leading figure of one of the Kakukyōdō factions, is a good example. He first joined the Mountain Club. While climbing mountains throughout the year, he began wondering about the meaning of his

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80 Some of my informants also related their prior experiences of being exposed to political activism and leftist thoughts (Interviews with Masayuki Iwata, January 5, 2009 and Kurata, February 7, 2009).

81 Zhao (1998: 1945, note 5) conceptualizes these spaces as “ecologies” that affect movement constituencies, the reactions of which are an independent variable for movement mobilization.
daily life and joined the Historical Study Association where he learned of Chinese
revolutions and the histories of movements, thus becoming a leading leftist.82

Another critical space in which students were exposed to Marxism and activism
was campus dormitories. The ecology of a campus dormitory on the Komaba campus at
the University of Tokyo—the central location for student movement mobilization—was
as follows: approximately 900 students, which consisted of almost half of the students,
lived in dormitories on the campus.83 The Komaba Dormitory was comprised of three
floors and 150 rooms, and because between 6 and 10 people shared one room, tightly-knit
communities were created (Ise et al. 2005: 122). The dormitory was run by residents, and
students were assigned their rooms based on sākuru—study and hobby groups that they
joined.84 In this dense environment, students discussed not only their studies, but also
political issues, society, and life and developed mutual and friendly competition (Takei
2005: 80). Then, when movements did organize, roommates and residents of the
dormitory were often mobilized extensively.85

Due to the magnitude of its mobilization and its impact over other university
campuses, the Komaba Dormitory was considered to be the locus of student activism. As
revealed in the saying “those who seize the Komaba Campus will seize the Zengakuren”
(Nishibe [1986] 2007: 39), factions of student movement groups engaged in constant
struggles to seize hegemony in the student body association on the Komaba Campus. A
former activist of the Anti-Mainstream faction at Waseda University, Takashi Ikumi
(1940-, Faculty of Letters), recalls that activists across factions and universities watched
the trends of the Komaba Campus closely, paying special attention to decisions of the
student body association there.86 The dormitories, where close to half of the students

82 Interview with Shiokawa, March 21, 2009.
83 Approximately 2,000 students studied on the Komaba campus (see Ise et al. 2005: 122).
84 Sākuru describes voluntary extra-curricular clubs at universities where students engage in activities such as
study, sport, music, literature, and debating.
In the case of the Komaba Dormitory, rooms were assigned based on sākuru that students join. Thus, it
turned out that some rooms accommodated more activists than others (see Ise et al. 2005).
85 Importantly, though, activists did not force other students to participate in these actions, and residents felt
free to decide whether to join or not (Ise et al. 2005: 322). The atmosphere of the dormitory in general was
liberal and egalitarian. For more the details on the Komaba Dormitory, see Ise et al. (2005).
86 Interview with Ikumi on January 17, 2009.
lived, were the focal point of these struggles. Thus, student movement factions, as well as the JCP, sent their most competent activists to the campus to recruit new members. It was, thus, pivotal when the Bund successfully seized the student body association on the Komaba Campus at a critical moment of the 1960 Anpo protests, as I will argue shortly.

The Bund gained dominance in the field of student communist movements, as well as in the student movement space, through their combination of Marxist and economic capital. Bund members’ holdings of Marxist capital gave them advantages in debates among students and student activists. For example, Bund members boasted numerous Marxist publications, which were enabled via cultural and economic capital, and which promoted their successful rise. From the Bund’s establishment, core members acknowledged the importance of having their own organ journals to make their own voice and legitimate their claims to be a party (e.g., Shima 1999: 73, 88). The Bund produced a significant number of publications: these included *Proretaria tsūshin* (*Proletariat Correspondence*), *Kyōsanshugi* (*Communism*), *Senki* (*War Flags*), *Rōdōsensen* (*Laborer’s Front*), and *Seinen Rōdōsha* (*The Young Workers*). The publications, first, were possible due to the inexhaustible number of members contributing their articles, owing to the fact that significant contributors were at top universities. Among others, Aoki and Saeki, both were at the University of Tokyo, were acclaimed theorists, and Aoki in particular wrote a number of influential articles among Bund members. Second, these publications were made possible by the members’ economic capital. When mimeography was common for printing among student activists, Bund member Masao Kōmura (1935-, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo) borrowed money from his father and purchased a letterpress printing machine so they

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could have their own printing machine and publications.\textsuperscript{88} These organ journals served as the media that exhibited their Marxist capital, functioning as effective resources for recruiting new members as well.\textsuperscript{89}

In contrast to the Bund, the Anti-Mainstream faction did not have their own publications. To publish their opinions, activists of the faction wrote for university newspapers and flyers. It was true that the Anti-Mainstream faction had an acclaimed public speaker, Takehiko Noguchi (1937-, Faculty of Letters, Waseda University), but they had neither ‘theorists,’ such as Bund activists Aoki and Saeki, nor the print media to present their voices as a group and utilize their capital in an effective way. In fact, one of the key figures of the Anti-Mainstream faction expressed his regret that they did not have their own publication, which may have partly contributed to their “unsuccess.”\textsuperscript{90}

Figure 4.6 illustrates the location of student movement organizations in terms of their volume of Marxist capital, and their autonomy vis-à-vis the JCP. The Bund manifested the larger volume of Marxist capital and was independent from the JCP, whereas the Anti-Mainstream faction revealed a smaller volume of Marxist capital and was dependent on the JCP. The Kakukyōdō factions gained a larger volume of Marxist capital and acquired an even higher level of autonomy from the JCP than did the Bund. However, the Kakukyōdō lacked hegemony in the student communist movement because they did not seize the democratic student movement field, as I outlined earlier.

\textsuperscript{88} Kōmura invested 200,000 yen (= $2,225) when the monthly salary for a university graduate was about 11,000 yen (= $122) (SSKBK 2002b: 82).

\textsuperscript{89} Kyōsanshūgi, the main organ journal printed in letterpress printing, was used for recruiting new members (Shima1999: 73) and was widely read among advocators of the Bund.

\textsuperscript{90} Interview with S, April 20, 2009.

However, it is important to note that even if students of the Anti-Mainstream faction had been capable of having their own journals, whether the JCP would have allowed them was a different matter. In fact, publications by JCP’s structural reformists were banned by the JCP in 1958.
Figure 4.6 Organizations in Students Communist Movement Field: The Volume of Marxist Capital and Autonomy from the JCP (1958-1960)

Note: Autonomy refers to autonomy from the JCP.

Finally, cultural capital, which was endorsed by the hierarchical order of universities, was critical for the Bund’s dominance in the student movement space. The structure of the student movement space, the Zengakuren, and the Bund all reflected the hierarchically ordered university credentials. In choosing the Zengakuren’s central executive committee, although its members were chosen by discussion and voting, in most cases, a student from the top-ranked University of Tokyo was elected as chairman, while a student from the similarly prestigious Waseda University was appointed to either vice-chairman or secretary-general. But, generally speaking, students from the University of Tokyo dominated the top positions of the Zengakuren’s organization until

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91 As Bourdieu himself noted, academic qualifications are a form of cultural capital (Bourdieu [1972] 1977: 186).
92 Similar to the structure within communist parties, the secretary-general of the Zengakuren’s central executive committee had more power than the vice-chairmen (the Zengakuren elected two vice-chairmen from 1949); and sometimes had more power than a chairman.
After one of the Kakukyōdō factions occupied the important seats of the Zengakuren’s central executive committee in 1961, students at non-elites universities began occupying the seats of the Zengakuren’s central executive committee, and Marxist capital—the capital at stake—began to change by adding the intensity of physical violence, symbolizing radicalism.

The hierarchical credentials of universities were even more sharply reflected in the personnel of the Bund, another factor contributing to the success of the Bund. Most core members, especially at the time of its foundation, were from the University of Tokyo, and some were from Waseda University. Thus, the Bund, as an organization, already had significant holdings of cultural capital at the moment of its establishment. This also enabled the Bund to claim its own legitimacy and to advance its own activism without the endorsement of the established authorities, such as the CPSU, which used to give legitimacy to communist parties in the world. In short, the Bund arose from the top of the hierarchical order of the Japanese university system. The Bund’s cultural capital brought further gains to them: first, it made it easier for the Bund to access the economic capital that was needed to fund their activism, and second, it facilitated the creation of alliances across different universities. Third, and most importantly, endorsed by this cultural capital, Marxist capital was converted into symbolic capital that defined and organized the student communist movement field. The Bund, in this way, monopolized the defining form of capital of the student communist movement field, and was thus uniquely...

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93 Bund Zengakuren officially ended at the 17th Plenary Meeting of Zengakuren in July 1961, when the meeting approved new personnel. In terms of the mobilization, non-elite universities—such as Chūō University and Hōsei University—were also important because of the large number of enrolled students. However, except for one occasion, they did not take any of the top three positions of the Zengakuren until 1960.

94 Former Bund members claim that, unlike the JCP, the Bund was not bureaucratic and hierarchical (Aoki 2008: 84-5), but the fact remains that its leading figures were all at top universities.

95 A member who was in charge of Bund finances asked for donations from anyone who made favorable comments about the Bund, including the ruling party members, bankers, intellectuals, hospital owners, gangs, and retailers (SSKBK 2002b: 23). Without the credentials of university affiliation, it would have been difficult for students to access these people at all, and the possibility of collecting donations would have been low.

96 In the JCP, direct contact with other cells was prohibited. But the Bund members who were JCP members broke the rule and made allies at major universities throughout the country right before their official establishment.
positioned to utilize university system itself, as well as the social spaces at universities in which the democratic student movements were embedded.

As I mentioned earlier, as the student communist movements shifted after 1961, the forms of cultural and symbolic capital at stake changed. For manifesting Marxist capital, showing the radicalism of violence became important, and university credential no longer served as the most critical cultural capital. However, until 1961, and under the Bund, what was at stake at the field of communist student movements as well as the student movement space was Marxist capital legitimatized by the cultural capital of university credentials. Importantly, the student activists competing over this capital were equipped with democratic habitus that they acquired under postwar educational system, and their struggles for hegemony were thus structured by the rules of democracy.

(3) Democratic Habitus and Fighting the Game of Democracy

As I have argued, the language of student activists was that of Marxism. But it was the idea of democracy that organized their practices, as student activists exhibited previously acquired democratic habitus in carrying out their aktivisms and organizing movements. Abiding by this, the Bund played “games of democracy.” It was through this game that the Bund was able to seize the Zengakuren and, thus, the field of communist student movements. It helps, at this point, to review the ways in which the practice of democracy was historically formed in the student democratic movement space, which intersected with the field of student communist movements.

The principles and practices of discussion and voting were adopted by student activists consciously and unconsciously. It was conscious when the first chairman of the Zengakuren promoted this style as a way of making the Zengakuren and the society democratic (Takei 2005; also see Ōno 1967: 66-8). As I discussed earlier, this way of organizing movements was a strategy on the part of students to make their voices and movements stronger by involving a larger number of students, including non-activists. Takei, the first Zengakuren’s chairman as well as a JCP student member, urged activists
to put the proposal on the table and let the other students discuss the Zengakuren’s decision, even if they were to vote for nay (Ōno 1967: 68). This way of organizing movements, which was sometimes called the “Zengakuren style,” was so firmly established in the student movement space encompassing both the student democratic space and the field of student communist movements via the Zengakuren that the Bund was unable to change it, or even, I argue, to conceive of changing it.

At a deeper level, the practices of discussion and voting had already been inculcated as part of students’ habitus prior to their university years. With the purpose of reforming the Japanese educational system into a democratic one, the U.S. occupational forces had introduced homeroom practices that classmates could discuss and vote on to make decisions in schools. University students unconsciously continued this practice in their movements after entering universities. Former Bund activist Nagasaki recalls that theirs was the first generation to learn that discussion and voting were the best way to make collective decisions. As a communist movement activist, Nagasaki further explains that the Zengakuren was widely understood as promoting and operating according to democratic principles.

It was not the case, however, that the Bund simply followed the principles of discussion and voting naively, only unconsciously putting their habitus into practice. Rather, the Bund sometimes strategically manipulated the practices of democracy to facilitate their rise to hegemony. There were two critical instances of this. The first was the election of the student body association on the Komaba Campus at the University of Tokyo, the central location for student movements, in November 1959. On the Komaba Campus, the Bund was weak, and looked like it might be voted out of office. However, Bund activist Nishibe, candidate for the chairman position, collaborated with other Bund activists to rig the election by switching the ballots after voting, and ensure his

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97 During the prewar and wartime period, teachers and class presidents, who were designated by teachers, led classroom activities.
98 Interview with Nagasaki, January 12, 2009. Generally speaking, if students were at university between 1950 and 1955, they previously attended elementary school between 1939 and 1944—during wartime; if students were enrolled at university between 1955 and 1960, they attended elementary school between 1944 and 1949—mostly during the U.S. occupation period. To reiterate, the Bund was established in 1958.
declaration as the winner (Nishibe [1986] 2007: 41). This incident was just around the time that protesters stormed the grounds of the Diet Building on November 27th, 1959, led by student activists. As a consequent of the election on the Komaba Campus, Nishibe hold his position until the end of the 1960 Anpo protests (ibid.: 43-5).

The second moment took place at the Plenary Meetings of the Zengakuren. At the 14th Plenary Meeting in June 1959, the Bund Zengakuren was established when Bund members were elected to make up the central executive committee of the Zengakuren. The following 15th Plenary Meeting of the Zengakuren in March 1960 was convened by Bund members who then prevented the attendance of the Anti-Mainstream and Kakukyōdō factions. With the help of students who practiced karate, the Bund physically shut out other factions by claiming that they were delinquent in paying Zengakuren membership fees. Then, the Bund elected their members to fill the new appointments again for the executive committee of the Zengakuren. And, indeed, they continued this strategy for the 16th Plenary Meeting of the Zengakuren also, thus retaining their control of the Zengakuren’s central executive committee until 1961.101

The rise of the Bund, in this way, was a consequence of utilizing the practices and organizational structures and procedures of democracy. The Bund followed the principles of democracy by, for example, holding elections and conventions, but they did so strategically, in ways that enabled them to establish and retain legitimacy in the student democratic movement field. Bund members’ practices were thus uniquely framed using Marxist discourses, but also enacted according to a democratic habitus acquired in their earlier school years.

99 Nishibe recalls the vote for the Anti-Mainstream faction candidate was about 60 percent, for the Kakukyōdō candidate was about 30 percent, and for the Bund candidate (himself) was between 10 to 20 percent (Nishibe [1986] 2007: 41-2).
100 Those students were recruited from Nihon University and Aichi University (SSKBK 2002b: 33).
101 The central organization of the Bund collapsed, however, with the dispute over their “failure” at the 1960 Anpo protests after the protests ended in July.
The student activists carried out the practices of democracy—discussion and voting—even when they went out into the streets, day after day, in the midst of the heated Anpo protests in 1960. The habitus that I discussed earlier contributed to these behaviors. However, it was also the result of the shifting composition and dynamics of the student movement space. Previously, under the JCP’s domination, student activists were confined to organizing their activism according to a different set of rules. Under the JCP, when the communist student activists set out to recruit new members, they needed to ask for permission from the JCP first. For example, if an activist at the University of Tokyo wanted to visit Hiroshima University (a national university in the western part of Japan), he first needed to receive permission from the JCP. Then, the JCP would send a message to the JCP committee in Hiroshima Prefecture, which would, in turn, send a message to the cell at Hiroshima University, and finally, the student could visit the campus and meet other JCP student activists. In addition, under the JCP’s rule, communist activists were strictly prohibited to make direct contact with other cells, and were expected simply to follow the directions sent from the party’s central committee. But the Bund ignored this procedure by sending their activists to major universities throughout Japan to forge alliances. They did this through persuasion and voting at student body associations. The Bund, thus, utilized institutions and practices of the student democratic movement space to dissociate itself from the communist movement field in which the JCP enforced the rules.

Democracy shaped not only the practices within the student democratic movement space, but was firmly installed in students’ habitus as well. Over and over again, student activists, including Bund activists, working within and through democratic practices and procedures. A leading Bund activist at Kyōto University (a top school in the western part of Japan) recounts that the activists at Kyōto University did not attempt, or even think of, a “Bolshevik election” that manipulated the ballot in order to gain the

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102 The accounts are based on the interview with Shiokawa, March 21, 2009.
103 Persuading the leading student activists in other universities was the first step, and having them to convert the other students at the universities and student body associations to their allies was the second step.
majority, although the Bund was in rival with the Anti-Mainstream factions there. He explains that this was because the leaders were “naïve adherents of democracy” who believed that the leaders had to follow the final decisions of “ordinary students (gakusei taishū).”\(^{104}\) Both cases at the University of Tokyo and at Kyōto University manifest that students were compelled to work within the democratic election process, rather than dispensing it entirely with other procedures. Indeed, the Bund’s hegemony in the Zengakuren was an outcome of the manipulation of democratic practices as they did at Zengakuren’s 15\(^{th}\) Plenary Meeting. However, the manipulation took place within the realm of the game of democracy; it was, paradoxically, an undemocratic way of performing an institutionalized democratic practice.

While student activists adhered firmly to performing the practices of democracy, they seized upon the 1960 Anpo protests as a competitive site in their struggle for hegemony. Their activism on campuses and on the streets during the 1960 Anpo protests heated up especially with an escalation of the rivalry between the Bund and the Anti-Mainstream faction. Responding to the Bund, which, as discussed earlier, excluded opposing factions from the 15\(^{th}\) Plenary Meeting of the Zengakuren in March 1960, students in the Anti-Mainstream faction held a separate meeting on that day,\(^{105}\) formed the Tojiren (Tokyo Liaison Council of Student Self-Governing Associations), and started mobilizing the student body associations under their leadership, separately from the Bund Zengakuren, to participate in the 1960 Anpo protests.\(^{106}\) After this, competition between the two factions intensified, resulting in the Anti-Mainstream faction organizing the protests against the visit of U.S. President Eisenhower’s press secretary, James Hagerty, after arriving at Haneda Airport on June 10, 1960\(^{107}\) and the Bund’s activists organizing the radicalized entry to the gate of the Diet Building on June 15.\(^{108}\) But still, even as the

\(^{104}\) Noboru Ogawa (SSKBK 2002b: 184).

\(^{105}\) One witness says there were 260 in attendance at the meeting of the Bund (the 15\(^{th}\) Plenary Meeting of the Zengakuren) and 234 in attendance for the meeting of the Anti-Mainstream faction in March 1960 (Ōno 1967: 199).

\(^{106}\) Recall that Figure 4.1, presented at the opening of the chapter, was of Bund activists. This was the first time that the Bund and the Anti-Mainstream faction participated in united actions separately.

\(^{107}\) After this incident, Eisenhower called off his plan to visit in Japan.

\(^{108}\) On June 10, the Bund leaders decided to storm the ground of the Diet Building and sit in indefinitely, using whatever means necessary (Shima 1999: 122). This resulted in a clash with the police and the death of one of their members, as I will examine shortly.
rivalry between the two groups increased, they continued to operate according to
democratic manners and behaviors.

The Bund’s radicalism did not go beyond what parliamentary democracy
symbolized, even though, in their slogan, Bund activists called for “violent revolution.”
In addition, their radicalism did not explicitly break with the principle of non-violence,
for this had become practically synonymous with democracy in Japan after WWII,\(^{109}\) and
associated with organized, orderly, mannered behaviors. The Bund’s valorous slogan
“storm the Diet Building” did not actually mean occupying the inside of the building.
Besides, the Bund chose to attempt to reach the grounds through the “south gate,” where
riot police were waiting to attack them, when it would have been far easier to scale
fences around the building that were low enough to climb over.\(^{110}\) Thus, the “violence” of
the protests and their radicalism were symbolically and ritually created, but they did have
real consequences in terms of generating conflicts with other student factions and
movement organizations.

The zigzag (snake dance) demonstration was another ritualistic and coordinated
performance that expressed students’ radicalism. As Figure 4.7 shows, the participants
who joined the lines moved right and left of the road so that the demonstration shaped
like snake. In contrast to a “petitioning demonstration,” whereby each protester would
bring their petition to the politicians at the Diet Building,\(^{111}\) students were advocates of a
zigzag demonstration since the style symbolized radicalism and actually required
participants’ physical energy to perform it.

\(^{109}\) Among student activists during this time, democracy and non-violence were sometimes used as
synonyms, or the relationship between the two was at the very least quite slippery. But, this depended on
who used the words. For more of the use of the concepts peace and democracy for domestic and
international politic in general, see Dower (1993).

\(^{110}\) Nishibe’s account (Asahi Shinbun, August 5, 2008: 8, evening edition).

\(^{111}\) In addition, unlike today, the Diet Building was not tightly guarded.

For this protest repertoire, see Chapter 3. The Bund activists critiqued petitioning demonstrations by
calling them “oshōkō demo.” Oshōkō is burning incense for dead people at funerals.
The Bund activist who supervised demonstrations during the 1960 Anpo protests, Kazunari Kurata (1934-, Evening Division of the School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University) describes the demonstrations below:

The goal of demonstration is to stop traffic. Stopping traffic by demonstration is the same with workers who go on strike. It’s same with production strikes, distribution system strikes, and labor strikes. All are struggles for seizing the site of production. Zigzag demonstration is an escalated style of demonstration. It gives us more satisfaction and excitement than ordinary demonstration.

He also added that zigzag demonstrations had two functions meanings—the expression of the protestation, and a way of expending participants’ energy.\textsuperscript{112} As a writer of the

\textsuperscript{112} Interview with Kurata, December 21, 2008.
history of the New Left, Kurata’s words may seem biased, but student activists did see zigzag demonstration as the most militant way to express their radicalism. Thus, many students, including students of the Anti-Mainstream factions, adopted this style because they found it more exciting.\(^{113}\) Other movement organizations, however, such as the People’s Congress to Stop the Revised Security Treaty, and the JCP in particular, criticized students’ zigzag demonstrations (see Shinobu 1961: 274-77).

Despite its seeming radicalism and spontaneity, a zigzag demonstration requires coordination, order, and discipline when participants march. The way demonstrators are typically organized is as follows. Five or six people join their arms together in a row, and the front row of protestors hold a rolled flag (usually for one of the participating organizations) as a bar. This front row of protestors leads and the rest of the protesters follow with joined arms. A supervisor, who normally wears a sash, directs participants on how to move, using a whistle.\(^{114}\) Participants often move quickly, so it is difficult for older people to join or keep up with the demonstration, especially if they are placed in the end of a row. Done correctly, a zigzag demonstration is a coordinated and orderly collective behavior that, paradoxically, expresses radicalism, abruptness, and spontaneity.\(^{115}\)

Though students were purposeful in deploying radical framings for their actions, their democratic habitus could be seen shaping in their practices even at the climax of the Anpo protests. On June 15, 1960, the People’s Council to Stop the Revised Security Treaty and other movement organizations, including student ones, planned the last protests before the automatic ratification of the bill revising the treaty in the House of Councilors. Bund leaders had already decided to storm the grounds of the Diet Building and sit in indefinitely (Shima 1999: 122). On the day, Bund activists broke the gate open with clippers, saws, and a battering ram, and 5,000 other students and young labor

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\(^{113}\) Interview with Onaya, March 3, 2009. Also, this is based on the interview with Masaharu Sakogashira (1942-, Law School at Chūō University), March 27, 2009.

\(^{114}\) Sometimes, a zigzag demonstration turned into a so-called “circling march” \((uzumaki kōshin)\) in which the participants circled around on a large crossroad.

\(^{115}\) The origin of zigzag demonstrations is unclear, but it goes back at least to workers’ protests in the 1920s.

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activists stormed onto the grounds.\textsuperscript{116} This is when Bund member Michiko Kanba (1937-1960, Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo) was crushed to death. The news of the student’s death quickly reached the other students, including the Anti-Mainstream faction, the Bund’s rival group, which was also present around the Diet Building.

The \textit{Tojiren}, a group of the Anti-Mainstream faction in Tokyo, initially decided to finish their demonstrations after going around the Diet Building. When they were about to leave, they received news of a student having been killed. When their discussion of whether or not to return to the Diet Building did not reach a conclusion, the representatives of the student body association of the faction took a vote. Each school was given one ballot; eleven voted for going back to the Diet Building, and twenty or twenty-one voted for not going back.\textsuperscript{117} The vote did not prevent individuals from returning to the Diet Building regardless, but the episode is important as it manifests the depth of the students’ democratic habitus, which functioned as an organizing principle in the midst of the heated protests. June 15 marked one of the largest protests, in which approximately 5.8 million workers went on strike—either limited or full strikes—in Japan, and about 100,000 people rallied around the Diet Building.\textsuperscript{118}

This democratic habitus, as manifested as the collective practices of discussion and voting that organized the student movement field, characterized both the democratic student movement space and the field of communist student movements. Japan’s first New Left group, the Bund, rose out of the intersection of these two social spaces. University students, including student activists and Bund members, were constrained by the principles of democracy and practiced them industriously, despite their radical posturing of leading an entire communist revolution during the Anpo protests (see Shima 1999: 92). This democratic habitus, forged in students’ early education and further fostered in the Japanese student movement space, transcended individuals’ strategic

\textsuperscript{116} This number is from Shinobu (1961: 399-401).
\textsuperscript{117} Interview with A on March 16, 2009 and a focus group interview with the Anti-Mainstream faction activists at the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies on March 17, 2009; whether the exact number of votes against was 20 or 21 was unclear.
\textsuperscript{118} Numbers are from Saitō (1969: 247-48). On this day, in the clashes at the Diet Building, one person died, 741 protesters were wounded (Kojima 1977: 211), and 167 people were arrested (Shima 1999: 126).
framing and was enacted through the collective practices of the movement field, even as struggles were waged within it.

4.5 Conclusion

The constituencies of student movements—the Bund, the Anti-Mainstream faction, the Kakukyōdō factions, and the JCP—emerged and competed for position within the student movement space, which was comprised of the student democratic movement space and the field of student communist movements, prior to the 1960 Anpo protests. The 1960 Anpo protests served as a political opportunity for these groups to compete for hegemony—a competition in which rivals were bound by, but also sometimes able to appropriate the resources, practices, and habitus of democracy.

When it was first established, the Bund had a few hundred members, significantly less than the Anti-Mainstream faction. Nonetheless, the Bund ultimately succeeded in seizing the leadership of the student movements and of student participation in the 1960 Anpo protests for the following reasons. Responding to fluctuation of the student communist movement field, the Bund separated itself from the communist movement field governed by the JCP. This enabled the Bund to escape JCP intervention in their activism, claiming an important space of autonomy for their organization and activities. Not only that, their success lay in the very fact that, unlike the Kakukyōdō factions, the Bund also found a space for gaining power and resources in the previously developed student democratic movement space by taking over the Zengakuren, the central organization for mobilizing student democratic movements.

For the rise of the Bund, members’ ability to understand and articulate Marxist thoughts, and their structural positions within the hierarchically ordered university system enabled them to access additional resources and allies. But, ultimately, it was their manipulation of democratic rules in electing members for the Zengakuren’s central executive committee that was the key to their success. Bund members maneuvered within institutionalized practices of democracy such as discussion, debates, and voting,
notwithstanding the fact that they did so in ways that were, ironically, “undemocratic.” In other words, a sphere of “rational debates” (Habermas [1962] 1989) was upheld even in the often chaotic midst of historic social movements. Quoting Hannah Arendt, former Bund activist Nagasaki reflects that students were “political men” who fought with debate without appealing to violence as a last resort.119

Indeed, the years between 1955 and 1960 constituted an exceptional moment in which students and other leftist activists did not resort to violence in pursuing their political goals. Instead, they sought their political goals through democratic organizations and practices, even if they sometimes resorted to manipulation of these methods. This was an entirely different mode of mobilizing than when they were under the JCP and student communist activists’ actions were dictated from the top-down and always required the permission of the JCP. Furthermore, competition and factional conflicts among student groups were fought out according to implicitly agreed upon democratic rules. Participants sometimes bent the rules of democracy, but the 1960 Anpo protests were a historic moment in which protesters ardently pursued democratic practices.

After the end of 1960 Anpo protests, there were drastic shifts within the student movement space. The Bund collapsed due to disputes over the “failure” of the protests to spark a revolution. At the Bund’s Fifth Plenary Meeting held in July 1960, members harshly criticized their executive committee members for the failures and “fence-sitting (hiyorimi).”120 The portion of the Bund that was concentrated in the Tokyo metropolitan area broke up into three factions, and then two of these factions merged into the Kakukyōdō faction, in which charismatic leftist intellectual Kuroda had strong influence, and which gradually gained dominance in the student movement space in the 1960s.121

119 Nagasaki also recalls that although activists met daily, they knew little about each others’ personal lives, and were connected to each other only through political issues (Interview with Nagasaki, January 12, 2009).
120 “Fence-sitting (hiyorimi)” and “petite bourgeois” (puchi buru) were commonly used words among leftists critiquing conservatism.
121 To note, this was the trend in the Tokyo metropolitan area where the Bund’s central committee existed. The Bund continued to exist in a coherent form in the western part of Japan, centered around Kyōto University, and eventually led to the formation of the United Red Army and the Japanese Red Army in the 1970s.
On the other hand, the most important members of the Bund, including Shima, Ikuta, and Aoki, quit their activism shortly after the Anpo protests.122

Student movements continued to grow after the 1960 Anpo protests,123 and activists within these movements continued to struggle for power and hegemony. Still centered on the Zengakuren, the student movement space became multilayered as the number of student movement factions increased and as each of these established their own Zengakurens. After seeing the success of the Bund in organizing their political activism through the Zengakuren, other student leftist factions similarly struggled to seize the Zengakuren, or to establish their own Zengakurens—i.e., a national federation of student body associations. In 1961, the Zengakuren split into three Zengakurens (Takagi 1985: 69), and, at the time of the student revolts in 1968 and 1969, five different organizations that claimed the name “Zengakuren” existed (Dowsey 1970: 97).124 The JCP, the former (single) hegemon of the communist movement field, tried to stabilize the field and to reestablish its position within it by purging rebellious factions.125 However, this only resulted in creating more factions opposing the JCP, while the student faction of the JCP retained a certain amount of dominance in the student movement space.

Furthermore, as the number of constituencies within the field increased and power struggles intensified, violence became the more prevalent means of waging factional struggles, whether through street protests, in actions on campuses against authorities, or even in conflicts between student groups. During the 1960 Anpo protests, there were a few moments when student activists in heated debates ended up fighting each other with

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122 Shima envisioned building a new party (SSKBK 2002a: 70-9), but instead, he went back to medical school and became a psychiatrist. Both Ikuta and Aoki went to graduate school at the University of Tokyo, and further pursued graduate education in the United States. Ikuta passed away following an accident, and Aoki became a professor of economics.
123 Those movements included anti-U.S. base movements in Nijima (an island in the southern part of Tokyo) in 1961, protests against Constitutional Reform in 1962, protests against the bill concerning university management in 1962-1963, and protests against a visit of the U.S. atomic submarine in 1964. The late 1960s witnessed further intensified and militant struggles opposing, for example, Prime Minister Satō’s visit to South Vietnam, the port visit of the U.S. enterprise to Japan, and the construction of an international airport in Narita.
124 According to Kutara, 5 major factions and 18 sub-factions existed during that time (Interview with Kurata, December 30, 2008).
125 Not a few leading activists of the Anti-Mainstream faction were purged by or quit the party in 1961.
their fists, and a few moments when students threw stones during their protests. But, for
the most part, the principles of non-violence and rational debate reigned during the Anpo
protests. It was only in 1961 that violence truly began to escalate. The 17\textsuperscript{th} Plenary
Meeting of the Zengakuren in July 1961 was dominated by the National Committee of
the Japan Revolutionary Communist League and the Kuroda-influenced \textit{Kakykyōdō}
faction. Students began fighting with timber staves (\textit{geba-bō}, pieces of wood) soon after
the convention began (Takagi 1985: 68-9). When student activists took to the streets in
the late 1960s, they came fully armed with helmets, rods, iron pipes, stones, and Molotov
cocktails in their fights against the police, the state, and “imperialism.”\textsuperscript{126}

In this sense, the communist student activist’ discourse, habitus, and practice in
the 1960s become more compatible—e.g., espousing violent revolution and violent
protests—unlike the student radicals during the 1960 Anpo protests in which the student
radicals used only violent discourse, not violent practices. The activism of the radicalized
students culminated in the student revolts in 1968 and 1969, spreading to over 165
universities—over 80 percent of the universities in the country (Takagi 1985: 113).
Furthermore, in the early 1970s, left-wing student violence reach a peak of radicalism,
with international terrorism and the lynching of some their own members, as represented
by the incidents involving the United Red Army and the Japanese Red Army.\textsuperscript{127}

\textsuperscript{126} According to Takagi (Takagi 1985: 87), protests against Prime Minister Satō’s visit to Vietnam in 1967
were the first at which students used weapons on the streets.
\textsuperscript{127} Numerous rich studies have accumulated on the Japanese student movements, focusing on 1968-1969
and hereafter (e.g., Krauss 1974; Marotti 2009; Oguma 2009a, 2009b, Steinhoff 1989, [1991] 2003;
Zwerman, Steinhoff, and della Porta 2000). However, as this chapter has demonstrated, student movements
were constructed very differently before and after 1960, and there has been much less attention given to
this important moment.

To tell the most recent history of student movements, as of June 14, 2012, the student body association
on the Komaba Campus at the University of Tokyo, which used to be the central locus of student
movements, voted to withdraw from the Zengakuren. The reason was that the Zengakuren had been
intervening in the activities of the student body association on the campus.
CHAPTER 5
MOBILIZING WORKERS FOR “POLITICAL BATTLES”

Figure 5.1  Strike at Higashi-Jūjō Station in Tokyo on June 4, 1950. Workers are holding a meeting in front of freight cars during the strike in the early morning. Photo: Mainichi Shinbunsha (1960: 36).

Figure 5.2  The Zoomed image of Strike at Higashi-Jūjō Station. Photo: Mainichi Shinbunsha (1960: 36).
In the aftermath of the 1945 defeat and the consequent U.S.-led occupation, labor movements surged across Japan. The number of union members jumped from about 4,000 in October 1945 to about 6.2 million in December 1947, over 48.6 percent of the entire employed workforce (Hōsei Daigaku Ōhara Shakai Mondai Kenkyūjo 1949: 104). Union membership continued to rise until ever-increasing inflation became moderately contained in 1949 and occupational forces imposed restrictive regulations on labor unions and union activism in 1948 and 1949 (see Gordon 1998: 5, 10). Although labor unions and movements had existed since the late nineteenth-century, they were only legalized in Japan through occupational reform post-1945. The rapid growth of both union membership and labor movements after World War II largely resulted from the expansion of the institutional framework that regulated civil liberties and labor issues, the encouragement and endorsement of unionization by the General Headquarters of the Allied Powers (GHQ) and the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), as well as the food shortage, sharp inflation, and unemployment that plunged Japan’s population in hunger and starvation after the war.

Both newly organized and re-organized unions actively engaged in labor disputes over issues such as the dismissal of employees, wage raises, necessary improvements of their work places, and personnel policies. In 1946, unionized workers became militant enough to enact “production control,” in which the workers locked out their managers and ran companies, factories, railroads, mines, or farms by themselves in an effort to win their demands in labor disputes (Moore 1983: 156-60). In 1946, 400 instances of production control were recorded (see Moore 1983: 104). At the same time, workers also organized themselves for “political battles” (seiji tōsō) over issues that were not limited to economic concerns. Unions and workers engaged in domestic and international political movements, such as peace movements and protests against the conditions of the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in the early 1950s. Union leaders continued such political engagement even when Sōhyō (the General Council of Trade

1 Also see, Jōkyō (1974, vol. 74), the special issue on production control. The major difference between strikes and production control is that the former refers to work stoppage by workers, while the latter refers to workers continuing to work when companies elect to produce below market demand in an effort to maximize profits (see Takashima 1991: 137).
2 For the debates on the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, see Chapters 2 and 3.
Unions of Japan; hereafter, the Sōhyō federation), the largest and most radical union federation, decided to limit its activism to economic concerns after its leadership changed in 1955.

Indeed, the 1950s saw continuous engagement of unions and workers in political activism. These included anti-military base movements in the early and mid-1950s, protests against the introduction of a Teachers’ Merit Rating System between 1956 and 1959, and protests against the Police Duties Bill in 1959. But notable mobilization of workers occurred at the 1960 Anpo protests, when general strikes were organized, with over 7 million workers striking in June 1960.³ Why and how did unions and workers engage in political battles that were not directly related to their economic lives?

To review, the literature on labor movements has constituted a separate area of research from that of social movements. Largely driven by Marxist or post-Marxist theories, the focus of the former studies has been whether and how workers have organized themselves as a coherent force—i.e., as a class—against the dominating power, economic systems, and political institutions. Many have found that workers have been deprived of the capacity to organize themselves (Burawoy 1979; Form 1985; Gramsci [1929-35] 1971; Offe and Wiesenthal 1980; Parkin 1979). Others have focused on various factors shaping class formation: workers’ collective experiences, practices, sentiments, or narratives (Przeworski 1985; Thompson 1963; Sewell 1976, 1980; Steinmetz 1992); classificatory processes or dialogical interactions across the boundaries of classes (Goldberg 2005; Speier [1977] 1986; Steinberg 1999a, 1999b; also see Somers ([1992] 1997); and direct and symbolic actions such as strikes and demonstrations (Fantasia 2001; Sorel [1908] 1941). Other scholars have further examined the intersection of micro, middle, and macro levels of organizations, institutions, and systems that affect working-class formation (Boltanski [1982] 1987; Katzenelz and Zolberg 1985; Kimeldorf 1988, 1999; Marks 1989; Valenzuela: 1992).

³ Three general strikes were performed in June 1960 during the 1960 Anpo protests. On June 4th, about 770,000 workers were mobilized, and about 720,000 workers were mobilized on June 15th (Rōdōshō 1960: 243-44).
When it comes to workers’ movements, which go beyond the mere class formation, scholars have pointed out various historical variables. In addition to the above accounts, studies have noted the significance of the timing of the social-class formation and industrialization, the ways in which economic or political elites respond to demands of workers, or unions’ alliances with certain political parties (Gallie 1983; Lipset 1983; Marks, Mbaye, and Kim 2009; Valenzuela: 1992). In one classic study, Lipset (1983) found that the absence of feudalism and a history of political democracy before industrialization reduced class-conscious politics in the United States and Canada. Subsequent historical studies have found other variations of such factors that generate working-class movements. One strand of literature indicates that when unions are under leftist leadership, they are more likely to engage in politics (cf. Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin, 2002). Conversely, another strand finds that labor movements engage in politics when their political allies (socialists and communists) are not in power, but when they are, labor leaders shy away from political struggles. Indeed, the history of Japanese labor movements conforms with this last strand of research. Between 1945 and 1960, radicalized labor unions in Japan tended to be under leaders who were affiliated with leftist political parties. Thus, for communists and socialists, labor movements represented the central means of organizing for their political visions.

In examining unions and workers’ participation in the 1960 Anpo protests, however, more specific questions need to be asked: why and how did labor unions and activists engage in political struggles other than economic struggles? To answer these questions, the existing studies on class and labor movements have offered the following discussions. The first group of literature focuses on state restrictions by, for example, arguing that when the state represses labor movements but they still remain influential in society, unions will resort to political struggles (Marks 1989). Similarly, other scholars have found that restrictive political and economic conditions such as developmental dictatorship and neo-liberalism, both of which seek to repress union activism, push unions resort to political activism (Moody 1997: 23; Seidman 1994: 263; Turner 2004: 4;

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4 Suggested by Howard Kimeldorf, and the citation is to be found.
5 In contrast, when unions are well-suited to the economic market, unions tend to engage in economic struggles (Marks 1989).
The second group of studies examines the structure of economic conditions that invite political activism rather than economic struggles. Scholars have argued that when workers do not have the power that results from their location in the economic system, they are more likely to aim at strengthening organizations’ “associational power,” the power that results from the formation of collective organization, including political parties, trade unions, and other collective organizations (Wright 2000: 962; also see Silver 2003). Subsequent studies have further found that workers who occupy weaker locations in the existing economic system resort to political and symbolic struggles, such as claiming rights and justice through organizing themselves (Chun 2009).

The important point in the history of Japanese labor movements, however, is that workers were not necessarily located at structurally weak positions, and unions and workers engaged in economic and political struggles simultaneously. After legalizing unions and labor disputes in 1945, GHQ/SCAP encouraged unionization, and companies followed. And it was during this time that both the political and economic struggles of labor movements surged. The existing literature would suggest that unions and workers in Japan’s early postwar period engaged in political struggles as well as economic struggles because labor disputes were not fully formalized or institutionalized, and union leaders were strongly influenced by leftist political parties. As this chapter will reveal,

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6 This has been argued in the topic under “social movement unionism,” a new trend in which unions commit to social movements. The literature on the topic has argued that unions engage in political activism, especially grassroots movements, when a union needs union members’ voluntary commitment to union activism (e.g., Moody 1997; Robinson 2002; Schenk 2003; Clawson 2003; also see Suzuki 2005: 7).

7 Wright names the former power “structural power” (Wright 2000: 962).

8 In addition, a similar study argues about two forms of workers’ collective actions: one is based on economic logic triggered by the disruption of capital accumulation, and takes instrumental form; the other is based on political logic triggered by the disruption of political legitimacy and takes expressive form (Meyer 2008: 16, 193-94).

9 The data of the chapter is not sufficient enough to examine this hypothesis; however, the conditions for generating political struggles and economic struggles can be hypothesized as below.

Table 5.1 Typology of Struggles in which Unions and Workers Engage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutionalization of Labor Disputes</th>
<th>Union Leaders’ Affiliation to Political Parties</th>
<th>Economic Struggles</th>
<th>Political Struggles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
union leaders and activists deliberately chose political demands in order to strengthen their associational power by motivating workers around broader issues than narrowly defined economic demands. However, since political demands were more likely to invoke notions of social justice and evoke conflicting political and symbolic meanings, such demands also created conflicts among union activists and those who were affiliated with leftist political parties. As Pierre Bourdieu puts it, “What is at stake in symbolic struggle is the imposition of the legitimate vision of the social world and of its divisions, that is to say, symbolic power as worldmaking power” (Bourdieu 1987: 13). Thus, workers and union activists who had different visions of the world were not only antagonistic against capitalists, but also engaged in struggles amongst themselves to impose their own “legitimate” views of society—especially over political issues that they chose to mobilize around in order to strengthen their collective power.10

This chapter argues that unlike the movements of students and intellectuals, labor movements did not construct movement fields, the structured social universes composed of objective positions, field specific capital, and field specific games for maximizing capital and thus gaining domination within the field (e.g., Bourdieu 1985a; 1985b; 1993; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992).11 Labor movements took place in and as a form of a movement space, which is less structured but is characterized by a set of practices and meanings, providing actors with resources as well as ideological or political inspirations for mobilizing movements (Mathieu 2007, 2009). Importantly, though less structured, labor movement space also sees actors in constant and intensive competition with one another for power and domination in organizing movements by forming different levels of organizations.12

The table shows that when the institutionalization of labor disputes is low but union leaders are affiliated with political parties, unions tend to engage in political struggles. In contrast, when labor disputes are institutionalized and when union leaders are not affiliated with political parties, unions tend to engage only in economic struggles. This was the case after the 1960s in Japan (see e.g., Gordon 1993). The other boxes are left blank as they are not directly relevant to the point.

10 In contrast to social movement studies, labor movement studies have accumulated fewer application studies of Bourdieu’s theory (cf. Boltanski [1982] 1987; Chun 2009; Fantasia 2001; Fantasia and Stepan-Norris 2004).
11 For detailed theoretical argument of fields, see Chapter 1.
12 For more discussions of field and movement space, see Chapter 1.
In the following, I offer a brief history of the establishment of unions and union federations in Japan. Next, I discuss how major union federations engaged in political as well as economic battles. I then move on to examine the emergence of New Left labor unions, which formed through struggles with the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) during the midst of the 1960 Anpo protests. I also draw upon interviews to link these broader struggles with union leaders’ life courses and what was at stake in organizing labor movements at the micro level. Finally, the last section addresses the incommensurability of different movement field/space, and how capital, games, and habitus are differently constructed in each. I draw on interviews once again to illustrate this point and show why members of the Bund, the student New Left group discussed in Chapter 4, were unsuccessful in intervening in the labor movement space.13

5.1 Unionization in Growth and Union Federations

(1) The Growth of Unions and the Rise and Fall of the Sanbetsu Federation

As U.S.-led occupational forces introduced labor reform, the unionization of workers grew at a dramatic pace. Democratization of workers in Japan was one of the major goals of occupational reform. In October 1945, General MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP), ordered the Japanese government to promote unionization as a part of his five major orders for democratization. The occupational forces’ General Headquarters of the Allied Powers (GHQ) also invited leaders of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) to serve as advisors for the unionization of Japanese workers. In December 1945, the Trade Union Law to allow first-time workers to organize, strike, and bargain collectively

13 Few scholarly works exist that analyze first-person accounts of those who were directly involved New Left labor unions when they were first established in the late 1940s.

Since labor movements were vast and had a diverse organizational structure, the empirical cases discussed in the second half of this chapter are not necessarily the cases most representative of the labor unions. However, the cases will serve as good exemplars in demonstrating how the 1960 Anpo protests—the main topic of this dissertation—were conflict-ridden and served as political opportunities for workers and unions to engage in their own struggles in the labor movement space.
was passed by the Diet and enacted in March of the following year.\(^{14}\) After this, the numbers of unions and union members grew dramatically.\(^ {15}\)

As Table 5.2 shows, the increase was, indeed, dramatic, starting officially at zero at the time of surrender, spiking up to over 370,000 at the end of 1945, and reaching over 3.7 million by June 1946. Union membership then peaked between 1948 and 1949 with 6.7 million workers. Labor unions in Japan were differently organized from those in the United States. Unions in Japan typically formed “enterprise unions” (kigyōbetsu rōdōkumiai)—the labor unions organized by full-time workers within and run by companies. Unlike in the United States, individual employees in Japan were affiliated not with independent trade unions organized for certain occupations but with unions in their companies, and enterprise unions consisted of 88 percent of the total number of unions in 1947 (Ōkōchi and Matsuo 1969: 150). Unions established after WWII sometimes grew out of the unions mobilized for the wartime regime and retained authoritarian organizational practices (Masumi 1983: 317). However, rapidly growing unions exceeded the capacity of prewar activists to incorporate the unions into their organizations (Carlile 2005: 66); therefore, most unions were newly established after WWII. As a part of their efforts to make their companies democratic, employers were willing to promote unions at their companies sometimes even by letting their managers join (Masumi 1983: 317). These factors contributed to the rapid increase of the number of labor unions.

\(^{14}\) As Chapter 1 discussed, during the prewar period, labor unions existed but did not have legal standing, and their activism was severely restricted by laws. During the wartime period, labor unions were dissolved into state sponsored associations, such as the Industrial Patriotic Association (Sangyō Hökokukai), for the mobilization for the war.

\(^{15}\) During the prewar period, the numbers of unions and union members were largest in 1933, with 942 unions and about 380,000 union members that consisted of 7.5 percent of the entire workforce (Hōsei Daigaku Ōhara Shakai Mondai Kenkyūjo 1949: 104).
Table 5.2  Labor Union Numbers and Membership (1945-1952)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month. Year</th>
<th>Number of Unions</th>
<th>Number of Union Membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8. 1945</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. 1945</td>
<td>707</td>
<td>378,481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. 1946</td>
<td>11,579</td>
<td>3,748,952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. 1946</td>
<td>17,265</td>
<td>4,849,329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. 1947</td>
<td>23,323</td>
<td>5,692,179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. 1947</td>
<td>28,014</td>
<td>6,268,432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>33,926</td>
<td>6,677,427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>34,688</td>
<td>6,655,483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>29,144</td>
<td>5,773,908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>27,644</td>
<td>5,686,774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>27,851</td>
<td>5,719,560</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As the number of unions surged, the struggles among unions and union organizations at different levels intensified. Although labor unions in Japan were not based on craft unionism that organized workers across companies, enterprise unions were often affiliated with the upper level of union organization—union federations organized nationally. In the case of Japan, the enterprise union system was supported by nationwide federations that encompassed several industries and served to enhance bargaining power against both specific companies and the government. The support of union federations could be central in helping a political party to gain votes.  

Most importantly, the establishment of union federations proceeded through different processes than those of unions established within companies. Union federations were formed and influenced by political parties and GHQ/SCAP as well as internal factional struggles. Therefore, unlike intellectuals’ and student movements, competition among union federations were intervened and intensified directly through external political powers, including political parties, the occupational forces, and the Japanese government, as they developed.

Leftist political parties, namely the JCP and the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), both of whose activism were banned during the wartime, planned to establish union

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16 Another factor that led to the creation of union federations was the need to join international labor movements, which required national organizations as the entry unit. Author thanks to Akira Suzuki on this point.
federations around the same time. The JSP-leaning federation was established first. In early 1946, the leaders of the former Sōdōmei federation (Nihon Rōdō Sōdōmei or Japan Federation of Labor) that had existed since 1919 established a preparatory committee to reestablish the federation, which was accomplished by the beginning of August 1946. To compete against the JSP-leaning federation, in early 1946 the JCP also established an office devoted to the creation of national industrial unions, which soon turned into the Sanbetsu federation (Zen Nihon Sangyōbetsu Rōdō Kumiai Kaigi or Japan Council of Industrial Labor Unions), strongly supported by GHQ.

During the occupational period between 1945 and 1952, the most intense competition among federations was between the JCP-led Sanbetsu and the JSP-leaning Sōdōmei federations. However, after the establishment of the Sōhyō federation (Nihon Rōdō Kumiai Sōhyōgikai or General Council of Trade Unions of Japan) in 1950, the Sōhyō federation gained hegemony.\(^\text{17}\) Figure 5.3 shows the development of union federations during the early postwar period.\(^\text{18}\) Names that appear in bold are union federations examined in this chapter.

\(^{17}\) This is about the competition at the federation level. Unions at companies were continuously involved in competition with the JCP-affiliated and JSP-affiliated unions and apolitical unions, as I will examine shortly.

\(^{18}\) During the prewar period, a few union federations other than the Sōdōmei federation existed on a smaller scale.
In terms of the differences between the JSP-leaning Sōdōmei federation and the JCP-led Sanbetsu federation, the political views of the Sōdōmei federation were not particularly radical in terms of leftist ideals. They accepted the basic framework of a capitalist society, and their leaders emphasized the common interests and cooperation between capitalists and workers. However, they did see their role as the defense of workers, and they sometimes engaged in militant tactics to pursue their demands (Gordon 1998: 9). At the time of its reestablishment in 1946, the Sōdōmei federation gained about
2,600 unions and about 860,000 union members (Masumi 1983: 317). Although the Sōdōmei federation was established slightly earlier than the Sanbetsu federation and had more experienced labor movement activists, it was the JCP-led Sanbetsu federation that first gained hegemony, thanks in part to its endorsement by GHQ.

The Sanbetsu federation was also established in August 1946, led by communist leaders who were freed from jails in October 1945 by MacArthur’s order. Attracting radical-minded workers, the Sanbetsu federation gained unions from 21 major industries (such as steel, mining, schools, and postal workers) and about 1.63 million of union members, which comprised 43 percent of the total union members of the country at the time (Ōkōchi and Matsuo 1969: 151; also see Masumi 1983: 319). GHQ endorsed the JCP-led Sanbetsu federation and not the JSP-leaning Sōdōmei federation, viewing the latter as a legacy from the old regime but the former as a democratic force (cf. Masumi 1983: 317; Monogatari Sengo Rōdō Undōshi Kankō Iinkai, hereafter MSRUKI 1997, vol. 1: 112). This endorsement sometime took the form of GHQ staff members advising JCP members to model the federation after the CIO (Masumi 1983: 319).

The relationship between the Sanbetsu federation and GHQ was mutually constituted. Since most of JCP’s important activists were jailed or had their activism repressed during the prewar and wartime years, the Sanbetsu’s organizers, unlike those of the Sōdōmei federation, had little experience in organizing a nationwide federation. JCP union activists thus sought out the GHQ’s advice and support (MSRUKI 1997, vol.1: 111-12). Following GHQ advice, the Sanbetsu federation adopted the CIO’s organizational constitution almost entirely (Masumi 1983: 319). Still, the Sanbetsu federation’s ultimate goal was socialist and communist revolution and thus their party line continued to express antagonistic views against capitalists, militarism, and fascism by emphasizing the struggles against those powers (see Ōkōchi 1966: 15-6). The

19 To add about the establishment of the Sōdōmei federation, its establishment was initiated not by the JSP but by former labor movement activists during the prewar period, although it incorporated the JSP members and supported the JSP.

20 In their party line, the Sanbetsu federation did grant freedom to decide political support for their union members as the CIO did, but their political orientation was communism, and tingly closely related to the JCP, thus creating dispute and struggles within the federation, as I argue shortly.
strategy of production control, whereby workers ran companies themselves and excluded employers, became particularly prevalent in 1946 and were organized by the JCP members’ leadership at production sites (Moore 1983: 103-07). Collaborating with other leftist organizations and unions, the Sanbetsu federation gained sufficient strength to organize waves of rallies that demanded a solution to the food shortage, the establishment of a people’s front in May 1946, as well as the first general strike that was to mobilize millions of workers in February 1947 but that was cancelled by MacArthur.  

The Sanbetsu federation’s hegemony, however, began declining due to both internal and external factors of the organization. Responding to radical elements of the labor movements that called for overturning the cabinet and the establishment of a people’s front, GHQ/SCAP began to institute overtly repressive labor policies. This was manifested first and most sharply with the cancellation of the first general strike, which was planned for February 1, 1947. The general strike was jointly planned by the Sanbetsu and Sōdōmei federations and accused the government of economic collapse and demanded the overturn of the cabinet; it was called off by GHQ following MacArthur’s direct orders. In July 1948, MacArthur then advised the Japanese government to revise the labor laws, and the Yoshida cabinet willingly enacted a new law in December that denied the right to strike of public sector unions, which constituted the major radical force of labor movements. Furthermore, the Red Purge against communists at workplaces and offices significantly affected the decline of the JCP-led Sanbetsu federation.

The cancellation of the general strike in 1947 exacerbated tensions between workers and the JCP that had already been accumulating within the Sanbetsu federation. Labor union activists and workers criticized the JCP of engaging in political battles and of using unions for their political purposes. A large segment of anti-JCP factions separated themselves from the Sanbetsu federation and established a new federation, the Shinsanbetsu federation (new Sanbetsu or National Federation of Industrial

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21 For these events, see also Chapter 2.
Organizations) in 1949 (see Figure 5.2). The primary goal of establishing this new federation, which brought together anti-JCP factions, was to fight the hegemony of the Sanbetsu federation and the JCP. This was clearly stated in their party line, declaring that they sought for “democratization movements” (minshuka undō) that aimed at gaining autonomy from the JCP and the government (MSRUKI 1998, vol. 2: 103-08,131-34). Members of the Shinsanbetsu federation demanded the democratization at their workplaces, including the abolishment of internal hierarchies that divided such as blue-collar and white-collar workers, as well as the democratization of unions themselves (see Ōkōchi and Matsuo 1969: 257; Masumi 1983: 320-22). These anti-JCP factions and the anti-Sanbetsu federation contributed to the decline of the Sanbetsu federation’s hegemony.

The JCP-led Sanbetsu federation that was endorsed by GHQ did gain momentary hegemony over the JSP-leaned Sōdōmei federation, but this hegemony was subsequently thwarted by GHQ/SCAP repression and the rise of anti-JCP faction within the federation. Most importantly, GHQ decided next to strongly promote the establishment of the Sōhyō federation in order to repress JCP-affiliated union members (Masumi 1983: 324). I turn now to the Sōhyō federation, the leading federation during the 1960 Anpo protests.

(2) Establishment of the Sōhyō Federation

The Sōhyō federation was established in 1950, initiated by the anti-JCP leader of the Sanbetsu federation, the leftist faction of Sōdōmei federation, and an amalgamation of other independent unions. At the time of its establishment, it gained about 2.9 million union members, which greatly exceeded the membership of its major rival, the Sōdōmei federation with 310,000 members (Masumi 1983: 325-27). Its inaugural meeting held in

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22 The faction against the JCP emerged in unions at companies. The first case was at the National Railway Workers’ Union in 1947 (Masumi 1983: 321).
23 It was sometimes also referred to as “union democratization movements” (kumiai minshuka undō).
24 For the establishment of the Shinsanbetsu federation, also see Carlile (2005: 162-63).
25 GHQ planned to decrease the JCP affiliate union members less than 5 percent of total union members and have 84 percent of union members join the new federation that they promote (Takemae 1970: 262).
26 For the detail, see for example, Carlile (2005: 160-71) and Suzuki (2008: 236-37).
July 1950 stated that the federation would aim at democratic revolution and the establishment of socialism, and it also refuted the JCP’s domination and the “ultra leftist” labor movements of the JCP (Ōkōchi 1966: 158-59). The Sōhyō federation was overtly anti-JCP, declaring its independence from political parties, while at the same time declaring resistance against the Yoshida cabinet and support for a political party that would promote socialism (Ōkōchi 1966: 158-59; Ōkōchi and Matsuo 1969: 407). For the most part, however, their basic party line was modest in the beginning and largely matched with U.S. policies. The Sōhyō federation’s establishment was promoted through the strong support of GHQ and the United States, which faced the intensifying Cold War and found that Japan needed to establish a labor federation in order to join an anti-communist international labor federation.27 The intervention of GHQ and the United States in the Sōhyō federation was direct. For example, GHQ staff members, MacArthur himself, and members of the U.S. Department of State sometimes met with Sōhyō federation union leaders (Masumi 1983: 323-25), other times advisors from the U.S. Department of State or GHQ attended union meetings (Ōkōchi and Matsuo 1969: 384).

However, the Sōhyō federation, which GHQ both favored and expected to essentially serve the government, the occupational forces, and companies, soon became a most radical and politicized federation. Furthermore, as it engaged in the movements against the conditions for the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951,28 the federation also became increasingly anti-American (Masumi 1983: 327). From that time on, the Sōhyō federation constituted the most active and radical federation that mobilized its affiliated unions and members for political as well as economic demands.

Unlike student movements in which activists formed a unified nationwide organization Zengakuren (the All-Japan Federation of Student-Government Associations, hereafter the Zengakuren) and fought to control it until 1960, labor movements were involved in more complex struggles at the national level, affected by the policies of the

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27 This was the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, established in 1949 in following a split within the World Federation of Trade Unions. The confederation consisted mostly of non-communist counties.

28 For the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the movements, see Chapters 2 and 3.
United States and U.S.-led occupational forces, Japanese leftist political parties, and internal struggles within the federations. During the occupational period between 1945 and 1952, in the competition among national labor union federations, hegemony of union federation shifted from the JCP-led Sanbetsu federation, which was initially endorsed by GHQ/SCAP, to the later-JSP-leaning Sōhyō federation, which was also initially promoted by the occupational forces.

5.2 The Sōhyō Federation and “Political Battles”

Existing studies have pointed out following factors that contributed to the politicization of the Sōhyō federation. First, Sōhyō leaders were connected with progressive intellectuals who actively mobilized themselves for the movements against a “separate” peace, which excluded major communist countries in ratifying the San Francisco Peace in 1951. Second, the Subversive Activities Prevention Law of 1952, which restricts subversive activism and organizations against the government, instigated counter-movements of unions and workers against the law and actually provoked them into becoming involved in political battles against the bill. Furthermore, Minoru Takano, the Sōhyō federation’s secretary general between 1951 and 1955, actually favored political battles over economic battles, as I will discuss further (see Yamada 2006: 69-78). And finally, as one former union activist indicated, young, passionate workers became more prominent after many communist activists were expelled during the purge and took an active role in organizing radical union activism, leading to the radicalization of the Sōhyō federation.

Both the JCP-led Sanbetsu and the JSP-leaning Sōdōmei federations, which gained hegemony one after the other before the Sōhyō federation gained domination,

29 For the San Francisco Treaty and the intellectuals’ movements, see Chapters 2 and 3.
30 Interview with Ken’ichi Wakita (December 8, 2008). The next section will examine his activism in detail, but Wakita used to be a communist and union organizer at a steel company, and then became the Sōhyō federation’s organizer.

Other informants at a different union also mentioned that radical activism of the union stagnated after communist workers were fired by the company (Focus group interview with former union activists at the Osaka Central Telegraph Employees’ Union, July 19, 2010).
engaged in economic battles and political battles simultaneously. In terms of political battles, the federations engaged in food strikes, overturned cabinet, and supported democratization movements. Economic and political demands were seen as relatively inseparable because the union leaders were closely aligned with leftist political parties that held socialist and communist revolutions as goals. By contrast, the newly established Sōhyō federation that gained hegemony in 1951 chose strategically to engage in political battles separately from economic battles, with the specific aim of strengthening the associational power of unions.

(1) Takano’s Political Battles

Prewar union activist Minoru Takano (1901-1974) was the key figure for the increasing politicization of the Sōhyō federation. Prior to his chairmanship, Takano was a leading figure of the left faction of the JSP-leaning Sōdōmei federation and had served as its secretary general since October 1948. Takano was elected as the secretary general of the Sōhyō federation in March 1951, by which point labor movements had already radicalized and shifted towards political strategies, while also encountering the repressive policies of GHQ. As noted earlier, MacArthur had ordered the Japanese government to restrict public servants’ right to strike in 1948. In addition, in 1949, thousands of workers were dismissed governmental sectors and companies in accordance with American industrialist Josef Dodge’s economic plan of austere fiscal and monetary policy to rescue the Japanese economy.32

The Korean War (1950-1953) was also influential, with workers protesting both the war and the use of their workplaces to manufacture weapons, as one former JCP member and labor union activist recalled. Tokuzō Higuchi, who worked in mainly in Kanagawa—an industrial area in the suburb of Tokyo as a JCP member and union

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31 See also Chapter 2.
32 The so-called Dodge plan was the SCAP-endorsed, austere fiscal and monetary policy for rescuing the Japanese economy. It suggested, among other things, efficient tax collection, balancing the national budget, and fixing the exchange rate between the U.S. dollars and the Japanese yen. Followed by the Dodge plan, 160,000 people were fired in governmental sectors, and an additional one million people lost their jobs due to the acute monetary plan (Ōkōchi and Matsuo 1969: 298).
organizer—in the 1950s, explained that the Sōhyō federation’s “four principles of peace” actually demanded that members be anti-war and motivated workers at his workplace to engage in anti-war activism. It was because, he said, the Korean War began so soon after WWII and its devastation. Anti-war and peace were thus central political demands of the Sōhyō federation. Shortly after the outbreak of the Korean War, the Sōhyō federation held a rally, calling for an end to the war and for Japan’s independence, along with a call for the minimum wage (Ōkōchi and Matsuo 1973: 10). The following year, the Sōhyō federation mobilized for another political battle, this time calling for the so-called peace treaty that would not exclude major communist countries at the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951. The movements for the overall peace treaty turned to be the first major political battle that they engaged in.

As examined in Chapter 3, postwar intellectuals, especially the progressive intellectuals who were active in peace and democratic movements and in public engagement, largely collaborated in organizing the movements for the overall peace for the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Similarly with the progressive intellectuals at the Peace Problem Symposium, the Sōhyō federation endorsed the overall peace treaty. At their second annual meeting in March 1951, the federation adopted union policies that would pursue: i) protests against rearmament, ii) disarmed neutrality, iii) protests against the bases, and iv) an overall peace treaty (quoted in Ōkōchi and Matsuo 1973: 48). These policies were called the four principles of peace.

These four principles of peace were enacted through the federation’s close ties with progressive intellectuals and their movements. First, some progressive intellectuals, such as Osamu Kuno, a philosopher and organizer of the Peace Problem Symposium,

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33 Interview with Higuchi, May 2, 2009.
34 Since both the treaty conclusion and the debates on it took place in the context of the Cold War, GHQ opposed Sōhyō’s political stance and warned that the four principles of peace would indicate support of the Soviet Union (Masumi 1983: 327). At a meeting, the leaders of the Sōhyō federation replied that their principles were to protect the Japanese nation and workers in Asia as well as to resist communism and fascism (thus conforming with occupational policies) (Masumi 1983: 327-28). This demonstrates how tactical political movements were in their framing of issues under the U.S. occupation.
were actively involved in the Sōhyō federation’s political activism. Furthermore, to promote their movements, the Sōhyō-affiliated union activists utilized resources produced by progressive intellectuals; for example, making mimeographed leaflets from the three volumes of Sekai (World, a general magazine) in which progressive intellectuals at the Peace Problem Symposium had written their manifesto for peace and an overall peace treaty. The organizers of the Sōhyō federation distributed these leaflets at workplaces (see Kuno Osamu shū 1998, vol. 5: 161). But while they connected their movements to those of progressive intellectuals, the Sōhyō federation’s calls for peace went slightly more radical than those of the intellectuals, demanding not just disarmed neutrality, no bases, and an overall peace treaty, but also opposition to the remilitarization of Japan.

The radicalization and politicization of the Sōhyō federation resulted from Takano’s policy, as well as the dissatisfaction of affiliated members with the cadre of the federation who was, in their eyes, submissive to the U.S. occupational forces (Kuno Osamu shū 1998, vol. 5: 161; also see Yamada 2006: 72). For Takano, political battles constituted the critical element of the labor movements. He framed political battles in universal and non-Marxist term, but situated them in the larger economic and political context that Japan faced. In Takano’s view, first, political demands were the main demands of workers, who were the people (or the nation, kokumin) before they were workers and who pursued independence under the occupation (Ōkōchi et al. 1955: 81). Second, for Takano, labor unions consisted of the forces that would challenge not simply the capitalists who run companies, but capitalists at large who were seen as the cause of many problems (Ōkōchi et al. 1955: 79).

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35 Not limited to Kuno, under Takano’s leadership, the Sōhyō federation and progressive intellectuals maintained close ties. The progressive intellectuals, for example, often attended annual meetings of the Sōhyō federation (Shimizu 1978: 42-3).
36 Progressive intellectuals’ second collaborative manifesto, published in Sekai in the volume of March 1950, advocated an overall peace treaty, called for disarmed neutralism, and opposed bases. See Chapter 3 for the detail.

The JSP, which was dominated by its left faction and the Sōhyō federation supported also adopted the same principles as their party line in January 1951. To note about the JSP, the four principles of peace also created a cleavage within the JSP since the JSP, especially its leftist faction that was closely aligned with Takano’s Sōhyō federation. The JSP split into two independent party-like factions between the left-wing and the right-wing in October 1951. The former supported an overall peace treaty for the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and the latter opposed it.
With this broad view, Takano aimed at mobilizing people at large, including but not limited to workers. He promoted the movements called “community and household struggle” (machigurumi and kazoku gurumi tōsō) in which unions would collaborate with communities and households where unions and companies were located (Carlile 1994: 148). Takano emphasized that this mobilization style useful to cover up the weaknesses of the enterprise union system, in which unions would otherwise exist separately (Ōkōchi and Matsuo 1973: 149). Other political battles promoted by Takano included the anti-base movements in Uchinada—a small fishing village on the coast—from 1952, the protests against the U.S. Japan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement in 1953, and the movement for the restoring diplomatic relations with China and the Soviet Union.

But while the federation radicalized through its own political activism, this activism in turn created a cleavage within the federation between its rightist and leftist factions—a cleavage that intensified as the time went by (Yamada 2006: 72). In addition, despite its success in mobilizing affiliated workers for political battles, the Takano-led Sōhyō federation kept losing at the bargaining table for their economic demands (Carlile 1994: 148). In 1955, the leadership of the Sōhyō federation shifted from Takano to Kaoru Ōta and Akira Iwai, who formed the factions against Takano.

(2) Sōhyō’s New Leadership and Economic/Political Battles

In the conventional narrative of labor movement history, the new leadership of Ōta and Iwai marked the turning point of Sōhyō’s union activism—shifting from political battles to economic battles (cf. Ōkōchi and Matsuo 1973: 241). It is true that Ōta and Iwai criticized Takano’s policies of making the federation’s activism turn too “far left” (e.g., Murakami 1961: 130-51). However, Ōta and Iwai did not abandon political demands, they pursued both economic and political concerns simultaneously (Carlile 1994: 151). Not only that, under the leadership of Ōta and Iwai, the Sōhyō federation actually engaged more frequently in nationwide political battles, including the 1960 Anpo

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37 Takano announced this inclusive movement style in 1953, and this was later called the community and household struggle (Ōno 2006: 246).
protests. Ōta and Iwai did initiate a new form of collective union activism called the “spring labor offensive” (shuntō), whereby company unions under the Sōhyō federation collectively bargained for their economic demands every spring. The spring labor offensive did focus primarily on economic demands, but it did so in order to strengthen the associational power of unions, and second, it was also combined with political demands to further mobilize workers.

Before being elected as the chairman of the Sōhyō federation in 1955, Ōta (1912-1998) was a union organizer at a synthetic chemistry workers’ union in the western part of Japan. Coming from a relatively small union and company, Ōta was a critical opponent of Takano (see Masumi 1985: 57). Though Ōta lost the election for the secretary general to Takano in 1954, Iwai (1922-1997), a former union organizer at the particularly radical and active National Railroad Workers’ Union who was aligned with Ōta, became the secretary general of the Sōhyō federation in 1955. In 1958, Ōta then took a turn as the secretary general, and Iwai became a chairman. Between 1955 and 1970, Ōta and Iwai shared leadership in the Sōhyō federation.

Ōta and Iwai criticized Takano’s labor strategy in two ways. To them, and to anti-Takano factions in the Sōhyō federation, Takano went too far left when he announced his views that the United States was a “war force” and the Soviet Union was a “peace force” at the Sōhyō federation’s annual meeting (Masumi 1985: 575-76). Furthermore, they criticized Takano’s movement strategies as represented in the community and household struggle, and his emphasis on political battles while suffering significant losses in economic battles in 1954 (Masumi 1985: 577).

38 Note, not a few notable labor union leaders during this period graduated from elite universities. For example, Takano entered Waseda University (but was expelled from due to his activism), and Ōta graduated from Osaka Imperial University.

39 The secretary general has more power than the chairman. The secretary of general was analogous to the president of the organization, while the chairman was to the vice-president.


41 These labor disputes included the one at the Amagasaki Steelmaking Plant in Hyōgo (a prefecture located western part of Japan) that began with the company’s announcement of wage cuts and ended with the bankruptcy of the company, and the one at the Japan Steel Works Company Muroran Plant in Hokkaidō (the northern island of Japan) that unions split and fought one another but encountered mass job cuts.
After Takano’s leadership ended, the spring labor offensive began under Ōta and Iwai in 1955, mobilizing 700,000 union workers in 1955. Because the offensive was organized to involve union members affiliated with other federations as well, it mobilized 2.4 million workers in the spring of 1959 (Masumi 1985: 590), at which point the Anpo protests were already being staged nationwide. The spring labor offensive was organized as follows: enterprise unions in an industry discussed their bargaining plans with one another ahead of time and established a common wage-increase demand or other economic demands, such as reduction of working hours, and agreed on timelines for reaching settlements. It was often the case that as the enterprise unions in an industry proposed similar plans and timelines, the companies in the industry would propose more or less similar proposals and resolutions. It was the collective bargaining system between workers and companies that pushed the economic demands in front. However, as I mentioned briefly, political purposes and political demands were enmeshed within these economic negotiations.

For Ōta and Iwai, economic battles did not just concern material issues but were about empowering workers as political subjects whose democratic rights and liberation had to be promoted and protected. As they put it, “if we hope to realize our economic demands we are faced with the need to establish our democratic rights and cannot achieve them unless we break through political barriers” (quoted in Carlile 1994: 150). To Ōta, the “labour movement is something in which the improvement of working conditions is irrevocably linked to the liberation of workers” (quoted in Carlile 1994: 150). While, against Takano, Ōta and Iwai emphasized the importance of economic demands, but they still saw the main task of labor movements as mobilizing workers to gain the power to bring down the regime of conservatives and monopoly capital (Carlile 1994: 150).

Indeed, the movement policies of Ōta and Iwai were not that far from those of Takano in that both leaderships endorsed political battles for the Sōhyō federations’ movements. And they did so to strengthen the mobilization of workers. In promoting the spring labor offensive system, Ōta and Iwai shared Takano’s view that the ultimate purpose of the labor movements was to promote a larger political agenda (Carlile 2005: 218).
Importantly, political agendas were strategically added to spring bargaining every year in order to motivate and harness passions of workers (Carlile 1994: 151). In addition, the spring labor offensive system was a device to circumvent the weakness of the union structure that was often manifested when unions had a tendency to settle for moderate wage gains out of fear of being fired when they resorted to striking for bigger gains (Carlile 1994: 151). In short, the spring labor offensive, combining both economic and political demands, was devised as the means to strengthen associational power of unions.

In sum, political battles constituted the key element for organizing the Sōhyō’s labor movements not only for Takano, but also for Ōta and Iwata. As the previous section indicated in discussing Takano’s views, political battles directly manifested themselves as symbolic battles—struggles over the imposition of worldviews. In the case of Ōta and Iwata, while both emphasized economic demands, the spring labor offensive system that they institutionalized always incorporated political concerns to motivate workers. As I examined above, Ōta and Iwata framed their goals of movements in Marxist terms, taking labor movements as the locus for symbolic struggles of workers against capitalists and power. So political values were still important, but what kinds of political battles were the federation engaged in? The next section examines the major nationwide political battles in which the Sōhyō federation participated in the 1950s.

(3) Sōhyō’s Primacy for Engaging in Nationwide Political Battles

During the era of Ōta and Iwai, the Sōhyō federation reached the peak of its engagement in political battles between 1955 and 1960. The issues included the anti-U.S. base movements in Sunagawa—currently Tachikawa, a suburb of Toyo—between 1956 and 1957, protests against the Teachers’ Merit Rating System between 1956 and 1959, the protests against the Police Duties Bill in 1958, and the 1960 Anpo protests, which began in 1959.

Similar to, but preceding the student organization Zengakuren, the Sōhyō federation joined the anti-U.S. base movements in Sunagawa following a request from
the local residents.\textsuperscript{42} The residents, consisting mostly of farmers, organized the protests to oppose the confiscation of their lands for the expansion of the U.S. bases. Initially, the local protesters did not seek allies for their protests. However, as they found the government taking the upper hand, they asked for allies from labor unions, political parties, and student movement groups. The Sōhyō federation then sent thousands of workers to support the residents’ protests in 1956 and 1957 (Hoshi 2005: 28). The protests escalated to bloody clashes with the police and the confiscation of land was halted. The Sōhyō federation framed their engagement in the Sunagawa protests as a part of the peace movements that they had promoted along with the movements to ban the bomb (Nihon Rōdō Kumiai Sōhyōgikai, hereafter NRKS 1964: 501, 503).

Next, the Sōhyō federation participated in nationwide protests against the Teachers’ Merit-Rating System. In 1956, the Teachers’ Merit-Rating System was introduced by the educational board in each prefecture. As increasing numbers of prefectures decided to adopt the system, teachers’ protests against the system spread steadily. The Japan Teachers’ Union declared a state of emergency in education (Takashima 2008: 158), and allied unions, Zengakuren members, and intellectuals joined in support of the teachers between 1956 and 1959. The Sōhyō federation, as the organization overseeing the Japan Teachers’ Union, fully endorsed the protests and described them as “battles for protecting democracy and peace of workers” (NRKS 1964: 627). The federation planned to invest 400 million yen (about 11,000 dollars) to support the protests (Takashima 2008: 158).\textsuperscript{43}

Shortly before the Anpo protests began in early 1959, the largest national protests to date were staged against the Police Duties Bill toward the end of 1958. On October 8, \textsuperscript{42} The anti-U.S. movements in Sunagawa created conflicts among student movement activists, triggering the formation of the New Left group, the Bund, as discussed in the previous chapter. \textsuperscript{43} Under the Bretton Woods Agreements between 1949 and 1971, 1 dollar was 360 yen, the fixed exchange rate. It is worth noting that although Takano stepped down from the position of secretary general, he remained influential in coordinating activists. In the protests against the Teachers’ Merit-Rating System, Takano took a leadership role (cf. Takashima 2008: 158-59). He also seems to be a key person in coordinating the Sōhyō federation’s participation in the Sunagawa struggle. The Zengakuren activist Minoru Morita met Takano through the introduction of progressive intellectual Ikutarō Shimizu, after which Morita decided to mobilize Zengakuren for the Sunagawa struggle (Morita 1980: 127-28).
the government planned to submit the bill of Police Duties Law.\textsuperscript{44} Measures introduced by the bill reminded people of the Special Higher Police during both prewar and wartime. In addition, Prime Minister Kishi’s comments to an American newscaster, stating that he wanted to change Article 9 of the Constitution—in which Japan formally renounced war as a sovereign right, banned the use of force to settle international disputes, and prohibited the maintenance of any armed forces with the capability of waging war—escalated people’s concern. Large protests were swiftly organized. The Sōhyō federation announced that they would fight against the revival of the “dark politics” of the prewar period (NRKS 1964: 650). The federation then established a People’ Council against the Police Duties Bill (\textit{Keishoku Hō Kaiaku Hantai Kokumin Kaigi}) to mobilize unions and workers. Ultimately, Sōhyō organized about six million workers for a nationwide strike on November 5, 1958 (NRKS 1964: 655).

The Sōhyō federation’s participation in the 1960 Anpo protests, starting from 1959, began a few months after the end of the protests against the Police Duties Bill, and built upon the existing momentum. It continued to play a key role coordinating and organizing workers’ strikes and rallies; during the 1960 Anpo protests, the federation organized actions through the People’s Council to Stop the Revised Security Treaty, the umbrella organization that it endorsed.\textsuperscript{45} The Sōhyō federation’s active engagement in political battles continued until the 1970s (see Suzuki 2008: 246-51).

5.3 The Emergence of New Left Labor Movement Groups

The Sōhyō federations’ movements were closely aligned with the JSP. The federation supported the JSP and served as the vote-gathering machine. Thus, as the Sōhyō federation gained hegemony in the labor movement space, the JCP-affiliated unions as well as the JCP’s dominance in labor movements waned. Furthermore, the JCP

\textsuperscript{44} The bill was drafted partly in preparation for future protests that were anticipated against the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which was supposed to be revised in 1960 (Michiba 2010: 90). For more details of the protests against the Police Duties Bill, see Chapter 3 on Osamu Kuno.

\textsuperscript{45} For the 1960 Anpo protests, see Chapter 2.
own activism, including labor movement activism, had been modest after the Red Purge that purged communists at workplaces in the late 1940s and after the party lost their legislative seats due to their guerrilla warfare in the early 1950s.\footnote{For the JCP’s guerrilla warfare, see Chapter 4.} Consequently, at the national level, while the JSP-leaning Sōhyō federation gained hegemony and organized movements actively, the JCP became less prominent in organizing union activism and labor movements. This constituted an opening for further radical groups in the labor movement field, namely New Left labor movement groups.

By examining personal narratives of former labor union activists, this section explores the micro level of struggles that brought about the emergence of the New Left labor movement groups. The new left labor movement groups emerged through the struggles with the JCP, especially through the disputes over political battles in the late 1950s and during the course of the 1960 Anpo protests. Before moving to this point, I will examine how labor movements and unions were organized at workplaces and what was at stake in organizing them.

(1) Organizing Macro-Level of Struggles at Workplaces: Gaining Trust

Similar to student movement activists who fought for hegemony in classrooms and universities, as well as at the national level, union activists engaged in the struggles for power and domination in each company’s union(s), and in the nationwide federations. While student activists engaged in struggles for hegemony over the Zengakuren, a unified national organization until 1960, union activists developed different national federations that were affected by ideologies and regulations of the U.S. occupational forces, the government, and political parties, as I have examined. In addition, the ways in which workers engaged in struggles also differed from those of students at the micro-level. While for student activists persuasion using what I called Marxist capital was critical to gaining allies and mobilizing people for struggles, at the workplaces, gaining trust constituted the first and foremost key for organizing. The former union activists whom I interviewed similarly emphasized the importance of establishing trust and reciprocal
relationships with other workers in order to expand their allies when different groups were competing within the union.

As I discussed earlier, because the majority of unions in Japan formed enterprise unions formed within companies, three kinds of groups competed with one another in the union. Typically, an enterprise union consisted of three groups, and each group fought for hegemony by attempting to gain more allies or take over the executive positions of the union. These three groups were: i) a group of activists devoted to the labor movements, ii) a group whose concern was to succeed in the company by accommodating management, and iii) a neutral and inactive group that constituted the majority of the rank and file (Carlile 1994: 149).

Figure 5.4  Factions in an Enterprise Union

![Diagram of factions in an enterprise union]

The union members affiliated with political parties—either the JSP or the JCP—often constituted the first group (Group X in Figure 5.4). When competition and struggles among the groups intensified, it was often the case that the second group formed the “second union” (or yellow union, daini kumiai, Group Y in Figure 5.4) that was

47 Both struggles are not always congruent. For example, the Japan Teachers’ Union, one of the most radical unions in the 1950s, demonstrates the disparity well. At their peak in 1958, less than 1 percent of the total union membership was JCP members, but JCP members held more than 80 percent of the union’s executive committee positions (Duke 1973: 200-01).
cooperative with companies and opposed to the union organized by the first group. Thus, the goal of union activists, the first group (Group X), was to make the other two groups (Groups Y and Z) their allies in order to win the struggle to impose their worldview within and, ultimately, beyond the labor movement space. However, union activists did not pursue this end through persuasion or indoctrination to their political views, as student activists did when they were recruiting allies. Instead, in Bourdieusian terms, the principles of the game in this space centered around gaining trust, often by offering problem-solving assistance in the workplace and sometimes even in people’s homes.

Yūgo Maeda (1934- ), who later became a leading figure in forming a new left labor movement group, began his activism at his workplace at the Ōsaka Central Telegraph. In the company, union members affiliated with the JCP used to be active in labor union activism. However, as the Red Purge expelled most of the JCP members from the workplace, the JSP-affiliated union members gained hegemony in the union. In 1950, at the age of sixteen, Maeda finished his training earlier than usual and started working at the telegraph office to help fill the shortage following the Purge.

Maeda’s activism was provoked by practices at his workplace. The senior workers treated junior workers unfairly, and newly hired workers were asked, for example, to run errands during lunch time or give massages to senior workers, and were punched if they were perceived as being insolent. Maeda’s personal experiences of postwar democratic education in which he saw pre-existing values and worldviews being overturned made him cautious about what to believe in. Besides, the early postwar period was a time when the values were not fully fixed; although democracy was the most

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48 Focus interview with former union activists at the Ōsaka Central Telegraph, July 19, 2010.
50 To provide the demography of the Ōsaka Central Telegraph, the number of employed was between 1,200 and 1,600, and about 80 people were newly hired when Maeda began working (Interviews with Maeda, December 22, 2008, June 26, 2010, and a focus group interview with former workers at the Ōsaka Central Telegraph, July 19, 2010).

The following account of Maeda is based on the interviews with Maeda, December 22, 2008 and June 26, 2010.
dominant value, leftist thoughts, teachers, and students were repressed at schools and called “red” (aka). Through his school experiences, Maeda decided he would not follow conventional practices and orders that he did not believe in. After he began work, Maeda began fighting against the senior workers by refusing their “unfair” requests and collaborating with young workers around his age. At the time when Maeda started the resistance, few JCP members remained in his workplace. However, several JCP members, who were expelled from the workplace, stayed in the dormitory where Maeda lived. Influenced by them, Maeda organized young workers and established the JCP’s cell in 1952 at his workplace.51

As a JCP member who joined the party after 1951, Maeda had a few occasions where he participated in guerrilla warfare.52 In the early 1950s, he was mostly devoted to democratization movements that he organized at his workplace, sometimes following the advice of senior JCP members. These members, for example, suggested pouring sand and breaking down clock card machines that surveilled workers’ working time. Maeda himself also organized his colleagues and was successful in lobbying for the introduction of regular break time during working hours to prevent workers from getting tenosynovitis, a job related disease.53 Through his activism, Maeda ultimately aimed at taking over the decision-making power for workers at the workplace.

As a worker who also went to college and a graduate school, and as the next section will examine this shortly on the emergence of new left labor movement groups, Maeda committed himself to theoretical and intellectual debates with other activists. However, Maeda emphasized that it was crucially important for labor movement activists to build “relationships of trust” with their fellow workers at their workplaces. According to Maeda, the task of activists was to offer consultation on private issues so that the

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51 Similarly to student movement activism, dormitories constituted an important social space for organizing workers’ movements, especially among young workers.
52 The JCP began guerrilla warfare in 1951. For more details, see Chapter 4.
53 After this, the workers were able to have 30 minutes of break after 30 minutes of work.
activists would build trust relationship with other workers, and make them their allies in their movements at the workplaces.54

Similarly, another union activist, Ken’ichi Wakita (1935- ) emphasized the importance of gaining trust among fellow workers in organizing labor movements and union activism. Wakita worked at a steel manufacturing factory in Ōsaka in his twenties and was determined to build the JCP’s cell and labor movements.55 Prior to this job, he already had experiences of engaging in communist movements, including guerrilla warfare, since he was seventeen. Wakita chose the steel industry as the site for his work and activism. This was because, according to him, iron and steel constituted a key industry since no tall buildings could sustain themselves without reinforced steel.56 To be a union organizer and activist at his workplace, Wakita, first of all, had to work hard and become as skilled as other workers. This was another significant difference in organizing student movements: while student activists could devote most of their time to their activism;57 labor movement activists had to work, unless they were full-time union officials. In Wakita’s case, he worked harder than other workers to acquire trust for his activism. In his view, workers did not have a revolutionary attitude, and most of them wanted happy, less constrained workplaces, homes, and lives. Thus, to build labor movements, Wakita’s strategy was to offer consultations and help to solve the problems of his fellow workers by sometimes sharing food or lending money.

In organizing labor movements, union activists often highlighted the importance of offering practical solutions. Going back to Maeda’s story, when Maeda reestablished
the JCP’s cell at his workplace, it was around the same time that the JCP shifted their
dline from guerrilla warfare to peace and democracy—a drastic ideological shift that
created the fluctuation in the field of student communist movements and the consequent
emergence of new left groups examined in Chapter 4. But as Maeda, a devoted JCP
member recounted:

For the people like us on the job site, the important thing was whether we filled
our stomach. Theoretical disputes did not matter. [Besides,] we were not informed
of them.58

Maeda was a highly educated worker who went to college and was in a master’s program.
But even as one of the more theoretically oriented activists, Maeda recognized that the
principles of the game in the labor movement space differed from those for student
movements, and valued the ability to offer practical solutions. While the latter valued theoretical arguments and powers of persuasion, labor movement space rewarded those
who could understand “feelings at the workplace”59 and provide solutions. This
difference constituted a barrier that prevented student movement activists from
effectively intervening in and organizing labor movements, as the last section of this
chapter will examine.

As I have examined, in an enterprise union, at the micro-level of labor movements,
three kinds of groups—the groups of activists, conformists, and non-actives—competed
for power (see Figure 5.4). In the struggle to gain rank-and-file workers as allies in the
workplace, members of these groups focused on the practical, reciprocal exchange of
giving help and receiving trust—neither of which required any overt manifestation of
political or world views. In this way, struggles for position in workplaces differed from
the national-level struggles in which union federations were engaged. However, the
activists at workplaces did engage in political and symbolic struggles over different
worldviews in overt ways at a time when they engaged in political battles. This was

58 Interview with Maeda, December 22, 2008.
The JCP members were informed about the party and their policies from the upper levels of cells. For the
structure of the JCP and the Sixth Party Conference, at which the JCP made the shift of party policy in
1955, see Chapter 4.
59 Interview with Hiroyuki Satō, a Bund activist who served as a recruiter of workers, July 9, 2010.
sharply reflected in the emergence of New Left groups in the labor movements, following conflicts over the political battles in which unions engaged. The next section turns to this emergence of New Left labor movement groups and focuses on JCP-affiliated labor movement activists.

(2) Political Battles and New Left Labor Movement Groups: Ōsaka Central Telegraph

Similar to developments within student movements, yet effected through different processes, New Left labor movement groups emerged out from the conflicts developed between young, devoted JCP union activists and the JCP itself. In this process, two factors were critical: the conflicts accumulated through political battles, and the intervention of New Left student activists. In the following sections, I examine three cases at the Ōsaka Central Telegraph, the Mitsubishi Nagasaki Shipyard, and the Minato Ward of the Tokyo Regional Council of Trade Unions. I focus particularly focuses on the Ōsaka Central Telegraph Employees’ Union, which developed a New Left labor movement group through a sequence of political battles led by the aforementioned Maeda.

The Ōsaka Central Telegraph Employees’ Union (hereafter, OCTEU) was established in February 1946. Not unlike other unions in Japan, it was under two upper levels of union organizations, each of which affected power struggles within the union. First, it was under the Japan Postal Workers’ Union, one of the most active unions, but for the most part, OCTEU activism was organized independently from that of the Japan Postal Workers’ Union. At the most upper level, the OCTEU was also aligned with the Sinsanbetsu federation, the anti-JCP federation, and by the late 1940s, the anti-JCP faction had gained hegemony within the OCTEU even though the union used to have a

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60 In the case of students, the Bund in particular developed the organizational form. However, New Left labor movement groups did not develop their organizations until the 1960s.
61 As I examine shortly, JCP’s cells were organized within these corporations as well. The decisions of upper level of cells on union activism affected the lower level of cells. It is important to note that the union and the JCP’s cells in unions were different organizations; although each of which was established in one corporation and membership often overlapped.
62 To give more precise history, after the government reformed its ministries in 1949, the Central Telegraph—the upper bureau of the Osaka Central Telegraph—was incorporated under the Ministry of Telecommunication. At the same time, the existing unions in the Central Telegraphs were also integrated
significant number of JCP members as activists. However, after the Red Purge, most JCP members were expelled from the workplace and once the union was taken over by the anti-JCP faction, it became more conservative in terms of union activism. This constituted the background of the emergence of more radical movements, such as those Maeda organized, according to Maeda himself.

As discussed earlier, Maeda organized his own labor movements but soon committed himself to JCP activism. Ultimately, disputes between Maeda and the JCP over the strategies for political battles led to his departure from the JCP, and the consequent establishment of a New Left labor movement group. Three political battles determined Maeda’s decision. The first was the incident called the Chiyodamaru Incident in 1956-1957. This was the labor dispute started with the international incident when the U.S. submarine cable between Japan and South Korea that the United States used for their military purpose broke down. Based on the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty of 1951, the U.S. forces asked the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation (so-called Denden Kōsha), the upper corporation of the Ōsaka Central Telegraphy, to fix the cable by sending a ship—named the Chiyodamaru, hence the name of the incident.

The ship had to cross the sea boundary of the Syngman Rhee Line and the president of South Korea had declared that any Japanese ship that crossed the line would into a new union, the Electronic Communication Employers’ Union (Zenkoku Denki Tsūshin Rōdō Kumiai) in 1950. In the Ōsaka Central Telegraph, the Democratic League faction, the anti-JCP faction—which in the end incorporated various ideological factions and used to have hegemony—was absorbed into the newly formed Electronic Communication Employers’ Union (Interview with Maeda, June 26, 2010 and Maeda’s interview by Etō, February 2, 2009).

The history of the Ōsaka Central Telegraph can be also obtained from Ōsaka Chūden Nenpyō Hensan Inkkai (2003).

63 During the peak of JCP representation, the OCTEU had about 120 JCP members, consisting of 10 percent of the total employees (Focus group interview with former workers at the Ōsaka Central Telegraph, July 19, 2010).

64 Though it was shortly merged with the original union, the anti-JCP faction was strong enough to elect their own union executive office of their union in 1948.

65 Interview with Maeda, June 26, 2010.

As the JCP’s cell reestablished, unions activism as well as the struggles among factions within the union became active, with politically oriented activists from both the left and right factions of the JSP, the JCP, neutral, and anti-war groups (Ōsaka Chūden Nenpyō Hensan Inkkai 2003: 1). Overall, the OCTEU was one of the most active unions especially in the western part of Japan (Focus group interview with former workers at the Ōsaka Central Telegraph, July 19, 2010).

66 For details of the incident, see Zenkoku Denki Tsūshin Rōdō Kumiai (1979, vol. 3: 267-98).
be captured or fired. The crew of Chiyodamaru thus asked for safeguard and special allowance for the corporation, and the union was involved in the negotiation. However, in the middle of the negotiation between the union and the corporation, the latter ordered the ship to set sail and dismissed three executive officers of the union who objected. Since the dismissed executive union officers were JCP members, JCP members, as well as labor union activists, demanded the repeal of their dismissal. While the JCP’s executive office in the eastern part of Japan repealed, the JCP’s executive office in the western part of Japan, which governed JCP’ cells in the region, including the one at the Ōsaka Central Telegraph, decided not to repeal.67

To overturn the JCP’s decision not to repeal the dismissal of the union members, Maeda and his fellow workers at the Ōsaka Central Telegraph mobilized the union, which included non-JCP members, at his workplace and took a vote.68 Their voting had no effect on the decisions of either the JCP or the corporation; nonetheless, the event demonstrated, first, the potential for political battles to create conflicts among unions and union party members. And second, the labor union and its activism, which included various factions in this case, were utilized for struggles both within and outside the JCP. The union thus created a symbolically meaningful challenge to the JCP, which should have held power over its members, according to the JCP’s stated purpose of representing an unified revolutionary party. After this event, Maeda faced the first inquest by the JCP, charged with anti-factional activities. The incident itself and subsequent events sparked Maeda’s suspicions of the JCP for the first time.

Two other political battles followed, increasing Maeda’s suspicion and leading, ultimately, to his departure: the protests against the Teachers’ Merit-Rating System and the 1960 Anpo protests.69 For the protests against the Teachers’ Merit-Rating System, the OCTEU secretary general, a JCP member, proposed the cancellation of the previously planned strike in 1958. This only caused Maeda to become more frustrated with the JCP

67 The reason why the JCP’s executive office in the western part of Japan decided not to repeal was that they were seeking to establish the united front with the JSP (Interview with Maeda, December 22, 2008).
68 The account in this paragraph is based on interviews with Maeda, December 22, 2008 and January 30, 2009.
69 Maeda’s accounts in this paragraph are based on the interview with Maeda, December 22, 2008.
because he did not consider the party’s strategy to be radical enough. The next incidents followed during the 1960 Anpo protests, when Maeda and his fellow activist workers joined the protest in Haneda Airport on January 16, 1960. The protest was organized by the student organization the Zengakuren. Protesters rallied at the lobby of the airport to oppose Prime Minster Kishi’s visit to the United States. The JCP had criticized students’ radical protests, especially those of the Bund, which separated itself from the JCP and dominated the Zengakuren, the national federation of university student body associations.70 For any JCP members, joining this protest effectively declared one’s rebellion against the party. Thus, when Maeda and his fellow workers returned to Osaka after joining the protest at Haneda Airport, the JCP held an inquest again, charging them with suspicion of offence of party rules and expelling them from the party.71

During the time when Maeda engaged in the Teachers’ Merit-Rating System and the 1960 Anpo protests, two other factors were critical in leading to Maeda and his fellow workers to establish a New Left Labor movement group. A novel about a young JCP member, caught in doubt and anguish over the legitimacy of the JCP, deepened Maeda’s suspicion about the party. Furthermore, the Bund members’ solicitation of Maeda to join the Bund—the New Left student movement group that had distanced itself from the JCP—affect ed Maeda’s decision to establish a New Left labor movement group via aligning with the Bund.72

In student communist movements, it was ideological debates conjoined with the endogenous and exogenous events that generated the fluctuation of the movement field and the consequent establishment of New Left movement groups. In labor movements, it was political battles and debates over what tactics should be used in them that created the conflicts between the JCP and its members, leading to the establishment of the New Left labor movement groups. Unlike students, debates on authentic Marxist thoughts were not critical for JCP’s union activists—or leftist workers—at workplaces. Conflicts over

70 On this conflict, see Chapter 4.
71 The inquest by the JCP was symbolically serious for committed party members. After the inquest, Maeda’s fellow activist committed suicide due to the despair of being dispelled from the party that he believed in (Interview with Maeda, December 22, 2008).
72 The next section examines the intersection between the two groups.
political battles and tactics constituted symbolic struggles, causing doubts over the authenticity of the JCP and its role in labor movements.\(^{73}\)

Importantly, in the case of Maeda, a democratic habitus, which he acquired through postwar democratic educational system,\(^{74}\) played an important role in enabling him to split off and initiate democratic labor movements of his own and establish a New Left movement group. Maeda’s relatively high educational attainment as a worker and his network with student activists also played important roles as well, as I will discuss further later.\(^{75}\)

(3) The Mitsubishi Nagasaki Shipyard, the Minato Ward of the Tokyo Regional Council of Trade Unions, and the 1960 Anpo Protests

Through more or less similar processes as the Maeda-led group at, two other union factions also established New Left labor movement groups: the faction of the union at the Mitsubishi Nagasaki Shipyard (hereafter, the Shipyard) and the JCP’s cell at the Minato Ward of the Tokyo Regional Council of Trade Unions (hereafter, the Minato Ward). The Shipyard was a major shipbuilding company of Mitsubishi, a former zaibatsu;\(^{76}\) and the Minato Ward was the JCP’s regional cell active in the Tokyo area.\(^{77}\) Both factions in the two unions separated themselves from the party in the course of their political battles, and formed the New Left groups in the middle of the 1960 Anpo protests.

The formation of the New Left faction at the Shipyard union began with conflicts over the political battle concerning the guided missiles, which the Japanese government

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\(^{73}\) In the case of student movements, tactics and their symbolic meanings did created conflicts between the JCP and its members, and among student movement factions; however, the debates did not create the actual split. However, in labor movements, as Sorel ([1908] 1941) argues, the tactics of direct actions constitute a most important essence of demonstrating radicalism and rebellions.

\(^{74}\) On this, see previous sections.

\(^{75}\) To note about the factions at the Ōsaka Central Telegraph, another New Left labor movement faction existed there around the same time when Maeda organized the Bund faction. But, it was smaller than Maeda’s faction (Interview with Masanobu Etō, June 25, 2010), thus, I focus only on Maeda’s group.

\(^{76}\) The shipyard was located in the Kyūshū region, the southern part of Japan. The number of workers at the Mitsubishi Nagasaki Shipyard was 12,000 in the 1960s (Funahashi 1966: 72).

\(^{77}\) The JCP had different regional cells in Tokyo, governing JCP union members in the region.
imported from the United States in 1958. For Japan, it was the first time to carry the guided missiles; therefore, workers, which mostly consisted of dock laborers across the country, organized the protests by boycotting landing and transporting the missiles. The workers at the Shipyard were especially concerned about the fact that they had to send their engineers to fix failures detected in the guided missiles. The workers also debated over whether they should engage in manufacturing guided missiles that could potentially carry nuclear warheads, to begin with. While no direct actions were performed, a faction within the JCP emphasized class antagonism more sharply, criticized the party, and argued not for communist but for socialist revolution. The JCP’s prefectural cell in Nagasaki—the upper division of the cell at the Shipyard—first supported this faction’s vision but later criticized it, and conducted an inquest against a leading member in the fall of 1959. These successive incidents triggered the separation of the faction at the Shipyard union from the JCP.

The second incident followed, creating further conflicts between the faction at the Shipyard and the JCP, during the 1960 Anpo protests. Similarly with the faction at the OCTEU, the faction in the Shipyard sent their members to Haneda Airport to protest Prime Minister Kishi’s visit to the United States on January 16. The JCP’s prefectural cell in Nagasaki agreeably sent them off with cheers at first. But when the members returned to Nagasaki, the party’s cell condemned them and conducted a second inquest for yet another leading member. The consequent JCP’s criticisms against the faction made its members think that the JCP betrayed the masses and did not act for revolution, thus resulting in the faction’s decision to depart from the party. In the following month, the JCP also announced the expulsion of the faction members. The faction members’

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78 The struggles were called the Elikon protests, after the missiles’ name.
79 The details are obtained from “Mitsubishi mōhitotsu no sugao” Shuppan linkai (2009: 83-5) and Mitsubishi Nagasaki Shaken and Fujita (1970).
80 Another significant labor dispute at the Shipyard union generated during this time was over demands to make temporary workers into full-time workers. These protests were successful (Interview with Takuji Nishimura, July 14, 2010). The reason that the faction preferred socialist revolution is unclear.
81 It is worth noting that one of the leaders of the faction was a former student activist in the mid-1950s who witnessed the breakdown of the orthodoxy of the communist movement field in the mid-1950s and supposedly had been already independent from the JCP before this separation.
82 The accounts in this paragraph are based on Mitsubishi Nagasaki Shaken and Fujita (1970: 9-15).
doubt over both the party and the party’s decision to expel them pushed faction members to establish a New Left group.

In this process, two factors were critical. Like Maeda at the Ōsaka Central Telegraph, the leaders of the faction at the Shipyard were relatively highly educated in comparison to the other manual laborers. Takuji Nishimura, finished two years of education at the University of Tokyo, and Kuboyama,\(^{83}\) graduated from the University of Tokyo (Faculty of Economics). In addition, Nishimura knew one of the founders of the Bund, Hidemitsu Saeki, from junior high school; thus, these union activists at the Shipyard union were familiar with the formation of the Bund, the New Left student group and had learned its organizational repertoire (Clemens 1993) when they decided to form a New Left labor movement group as the Bund.\(^{84}\)

The last case, the New Left labor movement group in the JCP’s cell of the Minato Ward also emerged in the middle of the 1960 Anpo protests. In this case, another event during the 1960 Anpo protests marked their departure and their decision to establish a New Left labor movement group. On November 27, the protesters, who mostly consisted of students and partly of workers, stormed the grounds of the Diet Building. Entering through the gate and occupying the ground were accidental actions, but because it was the first time that protesters occupied the ground of the Diet Building and because the building, to some groups, stood for the “sacred” symbol of democracy, the event caused contention among movement organizations.\(^{85}\) The JCP criticized the protesters.

Responding to this, a faction in the JCP’s cell of Minato Ward, whose workers also participated in this protest, condemned the party as “betrayers” (Minatoku tōhō 1960, vol. 51: 8), expressing their disappointment that the party could not organize the power of the

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83 Kuboyama is a pseudonym since he wants to remain anonymous.
84 The backgrounds of the individual activists were from the interviews with Nishimura on July 14, 2010 and with Kuboyama on July 15, 2010.
The faction at the Mitsubishi Nagasaki Shipyard continued their activism after as a New Left group, after the dissolution of the Bund in July 1960. To note, although the New Left labor movement groups that this chapter examines announced to affiliate with the Bund, their organization and activism were autonomously organized from the student group Bund.
85 For this episode, see Chapter 2.
mass exhibited at the protests. In the faction members’ view, workers must participate not only in struggles on the production site, but also in the protests at the Diet Building. To them, the demonstrations at the Diet Building represented the fight with power; thus, abandoning the demonstrations there meant avoiding the encounter with the power and withdrawing from the fight (Minatoku tōhō 1960, vol. 51: 9).

In the following month, the faction of the JCP’s cell of Minato Ward held a press conference, which demonstrated anti-JCP sentiments and attitudes (see Takahashi 1988: 79-85). Three days later, the JCP’s cell of Tokyo, the upper division of the JCP’s cell of Minato Ward, asked the JCP’s head office to expel two faction leaders of the cell of Minato Ward (see Takahashi 1988: 85-92), and the JCP’s head office discharged the entire cell in February 1960. Following the faction at the Mitsubishi Nagasaki Shipyard, which had already separated from the JCP and declared their plan to join the Bund, the JCP’s former cell of Minato Ward also issued a manifesto declaring their joining of the Bund in April 1960 to be a part of a “true” vanguard party (Takahashi 1988: 95; also see Minatoku tōhō 1960, vol. 51).

As all of three cases illustrate, conflicts between union activists and the JCP triggered the emergence of the New Left labor movement groups. All three cases also show that it was political battles, rather than economic battles, that constituted the causes of the conflicts. In the first two cases, the factions in the Ōsaka Central Telegraph and the Mitsubishi Nagasaki Shipyard had already developed disputes with the JCP prior to the 1960 Anpo protests, and they formed New Left movement groups when the conflicts culminated during the 1960 Anpo protests. In the last case of the Minato Ward, the dispute emerged during the Anpo protests and then led to the formation of the New Left labor movement group. In all cases, the members of the factions regarded the JCP’s engagement in the political battles to be insufficiently radical and thus problematic, and they sought to establish the “true vanguard party” that could pursue their worldviews.

86 From the flyer by the JCPs cell of the Minato Ward of the Tokyo Regional Council (Nihon Kyōsantō Minato-ku Chiku inkai, March 5, 1960).
It is worth repeating, however, that the formation of student New Left groups resulted from ideological debates stemming from fluctuation in the broader communist movement field. Rebellious student factions attempted to overturn the established orthodoxy by accumulating field-specific capital, and then gaining dominance in a new movement field they created for themselves. In contrast, the emergence of New Left labor movement groups was triggered by their suspicion of the JCP, notably the JCP’s strategies for direct actions. The rebellious factions began to doubt the very authenticity of the party, their movements, and the movement space, but they did not attempt to overturn it. This was because while the movements of students were structured enough to rebel against and attempt to overturn the existing order, the movements of workers were not (see Figure 1.2).87 Put another way, the rebellion of students was facilitated precisely because there was an established criteria for one’s standing, a form of orthodoxy in the field; whereas, the labor movement space did not constitute a field and thus lacked such a clear form of doxa, resulting in more diffuse and, ultimately, less successful forms of contestation. In short, while a movement field constitutes a social universe structured by a specific form of capital that coordinates relations of domination and subordination—that can subsequently be the target of resistance, a movement space is a less structured space in which power struggles are not organized according to one single form of capital and thus less likely to congeal in the form of organized rebellion that would grant the “success” of rebellion.

Though not quite a fully formed field in the Bourdieusian sense, the labor movement space was, nonetheless, still organized according to field-specific forms of capital and habitus that regulated actors’ standings in organizing activism. This was most visible in the case of student movement activists from the Bund who attempted to intervene in the labor movement space, but were unsuccessful. Conversely, flows in the opposite direction were more fruitful: knowledge of and familiarity with the Bund did help to provide an organizational repertoire for the rebellious workers to form their own

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87 For theoretical discussion on the difference between field and space, see Chapter 1.
In the following section, I will discuss how the student communist movement field and the labor movement space did and did not intersect.

5.4 Incompatibility of Fields/Spaces: Incommensurability of Capital, Habitus, and Rules of the Game

The formation of New Left labor movement groups was made possible partly as a result of intervention of the Bund, a student New Left movement group. Soon after its establishment in December 1958, Bund members began seeking allies among workers, theorizing that a true revolutionary party needed workers as the subjects of revolution. The role of the Bund, as a student movement group, was considered to find the “traps of enemies” and set the direction for revolution. See also Chapter 4 on their theories.

This section examines the intersection as well as compatibility and incompatibility of the student communist movement field and the labor movement space. It focuses on the Bund and their efforts to recruit labor movement activists. The three cases discussed above of the OCTEU, the Shipyard union, and the Minato Ward union were successful cases, in which factions of JCP-affiliated union members turned to the Bund. In other cases, however, Bund members were not successful in recruiting activists from the labor movements, largely due to the differences in the two social universes that the movements composed.

(1) Intersection: The Bund and the Labor Movement Activists

To establish the Bund as a true revolutionary party, Bund activists considered recruiting workers as members to be a critical task. In their second party conference on June 9, 1960, when Bund members planned to draft the party platform, they formally

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88 To be precise, the last case, the JCP’s cell of the Minato Ward, followed the group at the Mitsubishi Nagasaki Shipyard, rather than the Bund.
89 Interview with Yasumasa Koga, March 19, 2009.
90 Though the dissertation does not focus on the Kakukyōdō groups, the other major New Left student movement groups, they also attempted to intervene in the labor movement field. Their main strategy back then was so-called entryism (kanyū sen jutsu), whereby members of New Left groups joined existing political parties and factions by covering up their true affiliations and then took over the existing parties and factions through their activism.
decided to recruit workers as allies (cf. Tozuka 1976: 22-3). The Bund selected specific members to intervene in the labor movements to recruit their allies. The members were strategic in that they often targeted educated groups of workers. More specifically, they focused on the following groups: first, those who had graduated from universities with which major Bund members were associated, and second, those who were studying at night schools while working during the day (Shima Shigeo Kinen Bunshū Kankōkai, hereafter SSKBK 2002b: 111). The Bund appointed several members this specific task of worker recruitment and sent them to designated regions across Tokyo (SSKBK 2002b: 110).91 When they found other promising union activists across the country, the members would travel to recruit them. Former Bund member Yasumasa Koga (1931-, Agricultural Department, University of Tokyo) was a key person who traveled around the country to recruit union activists. He later became an influential figure in forming the New Left labor movement groups at the Ōsaka Central Telegraph, as well as at the Mitsubishi Nagasaki Shipyard. Two factors were crucial in connecting the Bund members and labor movement activists who turned to the Bund: the affinity of cultural capital, and networks.

Encounters between Bund members and union activists were made possible by cultural capital acquired through educational attainment and cultivated by both groups prior to interacting. As examined in Chapter 4, the most prominent Bund members were at top universities and were knowledgeable about and well-versed in Marxist theory, the critical symbolic capital for gaining hegemony in the student communist movement field. Similarly, as noted earlier, key members of the New Left labor movement groups also had high educational attainment. While working at the Ōsaka Central Telegraph, Maeda went to Dōshisha University, a top private school in Kyōto for his college and continued his graduate education for a master’s degree at Ritsumeikan University, another top private university in Kyōto. Two leaders at the Mitsubishi Nagasaki Shipyard also studied at the University of Tokyo. In the case of the JCP’s cell of the Minato Ward, there were relatively highly educated workers in this district because the bureaus of the

91 Similar to the JCP that divided the regions of Tokyo to coordinate their activism, the Bund divided the regions of Tokyo and assigned their members to the task of the recruitment. About 10 Bund members were committed to this task (Interview with H, July 13, 2010).

In furtherance of their goal of recruiting workers, the Bund issued a journal Rōdō Sensen (Labor Front) and a newspaper Seinen Rōdōsha (Young Workers).
Japan Postal Workers’ Union and the Japan National Railway Workers’ Union, as well as Keiō University, a top private school, were located there. Thus, in this district, union workers who were sympathetic to the Bund were able to read the Bund’s journal *Kyōsanshugi (Communism)*, which debated abstract ideological discussions (see SSKBK 2002b: 112). The homology of the locations of the Bund and three of the New Left labor movements groups is illustrated in Figure 5.5. It shows the similarity of the structural locations occupied by the Bund and the New Left labor movement groups in their respective movement field and space.

Figure 5.5 The Affinity of the Structural Locations of the Bund and the New Left Labor Movement Groups

![Figure 5.5](image)

*Note:* Autonomy refers to autonomy from the JCP for both circles. SS in the student communist movement field means symbolic capital, whereas CS in the labor movement space stands for cultural capital. Cultural capital turns into symbolic capital when cultural capital constitutes the capital that defines the field, thus forming a field, not a space. The labor movement space is loosely structured by the distribution of cultural capital.

As Figure 5.5 shows, the New Left labor groups and the Bund were located in a similar structural position in their respective movement field and space—autonomous
from the JCP and endowed with high cultural or symbolic capital. In the case of the 
Bund, members acquired high volumes of symbolic capital (knowledge and articulation 
of Marxist thought) that helped them to seize the field of student communist movements. 
In the case of New Left labor movement groups, they had high volumes of cultural 
capital (through educational attainment), although not enough to seize the labor 
movement space entirely. Furthermore, this space was not sufficiently structured to 
develop the features of a field. However, the similarity of their structural locations and 
the affinity of the forms of capital that both groups acquired helped them to relate to one 
another, enough for the Bund to approach the groups of workers.

In addition to these affinities, personal networks between the Bund and a faction 
of the JCP provided a channel to spread the organizational form of the New Left 
movement group. In the case of Maeda at the Ōsaka Central Telegraph, Maeda learned 
about newly emerging groups against the JCP through the network of activists at his 
schools, just as his own suspicions about the JCP were deepening. Maeda had been 
recruited by one of the student organized Kakukyōdō factions, the New Left movement 
groups influenced by Trotsky, but he did not favor their theories and recruitment 
strategies.92 However, when Maeda met Koga, a Bund recruiter who visited Kyōto, they 
got along well and Maeda and his fellow activists decided to join the Bund.93

Similarly, Koga visited the faction at the Mitsubishi Nagasaki Shipyard for the 
purpose of recruitment. In this case, two leading members had directly and indirectly 
connected with Bund members already, as I mentioned earlier. Kuboyama was a former 
student JCP activist who committed himself to student movements in the 1950s and knew 
some later-to-be Bund activists when he was at university.94 Nishimura, another key 
member of the faction, was close in junior high school to Saeki, later a key figure in the 
founding of the Bund.95 In the case of the Shipyard. In the case of the Minato Ward, as

92 Interview with Maeda by Etō, February 2, 2009. 
93 Unless otherwise noted, Maeda’s story is based on interviews with Maeda, December 22, 2008 and 
94 Interview with Kuboyama, July 15, 2010. 
95 Interview with Nishimura, July 14, 2010. But Nishimura and Saeki rarely met each other after Nishimura 
came to Nagasaki, although Saeki kept sending journals and writings after he established the Bund (ibid.).

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mentioned earlier, its JCP cell had highly educated members, and some of the workers who studying at night colleges were already Bund sympathizers. Thus, the Bund activists had better access for recruitment from this faction (see SSKBK 2002b: 112).

In forming networks and promoting recruitment, Koga was also important in actually constructing new connections and building the influence of the Bund on workers. Even when students and workers had affinity in terms of capital and their structural locations, their habitus were still sufficiently different to make meaningful connections difficult. Union leaders did not trust student activists easily in general. In addition, as Maeda and Wakita emphasized, workers were more concerned with practical matters than abstract discussion in their movements. Koga was able to create links between the two groups because of his habitus of being a student and worker. Although Koga was a student at the University of Tokyo, he was not a traditional one as he did not come from a wealthy family, like many other students there. Before entering college, Koga had quit junior high school because he needed to support his family as a breadwinner. Koga decided to come to the University of Tokyo only because he was told that he could receive a good fellowship there that would allow him to stop working. While there, he continued to work in order to sustain his family. When Maeda met Koga in Kyōto, Maeda was surprised that Koga did not look like a typical student from the University of Tokyo. Koga wore shabby clothes and toned shoes and had rough hands like workers. Eschewing the extensive discussion about theories that student activists often engaged in, Maeda and his fellow activists accepted the simple invitation from Koga to “fight together.” Nisimura at the Mitsubishi Nagasaki Shipyard also expressed his favorable impression of Koga.

In sum, the encounter of the Bund and the anti-JCP labor movement factions, and the formation the New Left labor movement groups were possible through previously

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96 For example, Wakita manifested such distrust (Interview with Wakita, December 8, 2008). The next section will detail this point more.
97 The typical cases were Bund activists Masahiko Aoki and Masao Kōyama, who were discussed in Chapter 4.
98 Koga’s story is based on interview with Koga, March 19, 2009. Also see Ise (2005: 85-118).
99 Interview with Maeda by Etō, February 2, 2009.
100 Interview with Nishimura, July 14 and July 16, 2010.
formed personal networks, the affinity of capital between the two groups, and Koga, a go-between who was endowed with two kinds of habitus. However, these three New Left labor movement groups were exceptional cases in which the Bund intervened successful in the labor movements space. When there was no shared capital, habitus, and sense of game with workers, as was the case more often, Bund members were not successful in gaining workers as allies.

(2) Incommensurability of Capital and Incompatibility of Fields/Spaces

The Bund sent selected members to the designated regions for the recruitment of workers. Sites were chosen strategically. They targeted the unions that were involved in labor disputes and tried to offer their support to workers. As noted earlier, in organizing labor movements, offering practical solutions, rather than presenting authentic leftist ideologies and thoughts, were key even for labor movement activists themselves in their workplaces. Bund members knew this and, as a first step in recruitment, they tried to build trust with union activists by offering practical assistance for workers in trouble.

Koga, the Bund’s main recruiter, visited a number of unions actively involved in disputes. He described that unions normally had closed membership, so “when you visit and say hello to the union that you don’t know, they think you’re just an outsider (uma no hone) and you’ll end up with being chucked out.” He described the strategies of trying to get in touch with workers:

If there was a labor dispute, we just visited the union without making an appointment. [And for example] with a big paint, we drew [slogans] on the wall [for them]. We bought the paint. We helped them to make a red flag [to show their resistance]. Also, we helped to write and distribute flyers. Then, we became closer to them, and began talking many things.101

Seminars and study groups that unions or union federations organized were other opportunities through which Bund recruiters found potential allies. When the Bund

101 Interview with Koga, March 19, 2009.
recruiters found active participants who asked good questions, they approached them, asked them to go out for drinks, and engaged in casual conversation. If the workers started talking about union issues, the Bund members listened and offered help when it was needed. If this went well, the next time, the Bund members would ask the workers to invite their colleagues from the unions to join them for further conversation. In this way, Bund members built networks with workers and attempted to recruit allies.

When the student activists recruited other students, making speeches in front of classrooms or in public spaces on campus was an important strategy; but this was not the case when trying to recruit among the labor movements, especially when the organizers were not workers. Koga explains that he needed to recruit workers one by one as described above.\textsuperscript{102} His story illuminates that understandings of who belonged and how to “play the game” were specific to the movement fields and spaces. Any non-member attempting to cross the boundary had to know the game constructed within that field or space and follow its rules. On this point, Takehiko Matsuda (1934-, Faculty of Education, Tokyo University of Education), a student activist in college who engaged in labor movements after graduation and become a secretary of the People’s Council to Stop the Revised Security Treaty, pointed out clear differences in organizing student movements and labor movements. According to Matsuda, while students could grow an organization “without watering,” labor movements needed to build an organization from scratch. Organizers had to listen to workers’ frustrations such as low wages, offer solutions, and encourage them to form an association (as the foundation for the union). These processes were closed ones in which an organizer from the outside could not normally intervene, Matsuda explained.\textsuperscript{103} Therefore, even when student activists crossed the boundary of the movement space and got in touch with workers or union activists, the students were, at most, able to offer tips and suggestions to workers but were unable to organize them directly.\textsuperscript{104}

\textsuperscript{102} Interview with Koga, March 19, 2009.
\textsuperscript{103} Matsuda’s account was based on interview with Matsuda, July 10, 2010.
\textsuperscript{104} Also based on the interview with Koga, March 19, 2009.
Indeed, many labor movement activists overtly expressed their distrust in student activists. Wakita, a union activist at a steel manufacturing factory in Ōsaka, said that students only knew about the “superstructure” but not “base,” and that students rarely had the experience of engaging in economic activism in real workplaces and actual movements. He expressed his thoughts about student activists during the 1960 Anpo protests as follows:

[Students] to go the Diet Building and meet politicians. Many do many things, but they pretend to be connoisseur or professional activists. But in that sense I don’t trust student movements at all.105

Wakita did not trust student movements, although he did not deny the efforts of students who later came to the workplaces and became involved in labor movements by experiencing hardships there.106 Indeed, labor movement activists not only distrusted student activists, there was also a sense of rivalry with them. Sakata, the JCP-affiliated union activist at a steel company in Kawasaki, shared:

It’s nothing that students go to the Diet Building, whine (wāwā), and occupy the ground. The most threatening thing [to the state] is workers’ strike. Because it stops the production, the transportation. And the function of the society.107

During the interviews, it was rare that former student activists expressed any sense of rivalry with labor movement activists. In contrast, union activists were more likely to say that labor movements were more radical by comparing them to student movements.108

A sharp boundary also manifested between workers and intellectuals during the 1960 Anpo protests. As I discussed in Chapter 3, for the purpose of making democracy take root in Japan, intellectuals had made long-standing efforts to reach out to ordinary people after WWII. Similarly, the union federations, notably the Takano-led Sōhyō

105 Interview with Wakita, December 8, 2008.
106 Interview with Wakita, December 8, 2008. Wakita had little trust in movements of intellectuals also. He said that scholars and cultural critiques were superficial and that though they could, they did not need engage in activism (Interview with Wakita, December 8, 2008).
107 Interview with Sakata, April 6, 2009.
108 This may be partly because the author was a student.
federation, was active in involving intellectuals in their annual and organizational meetings. However, in organizing the movements, it was rare that either intellectuals or workers attempted to fully incorporate members from the other movement field or space. This was even true when the intellectuals and workers came from the same institution. The example of the University of Tokyo during the 1960 Anpo protests highlights this point. When faculty members at the university organized themselves, they rarely recruited their students or university staff members for their rallies and protests (see, for example, Figure 3.1). University staff members led by the union likewise organized their own demonstrations exclusively, although the union did sometimes invite faculty members for speeches at rallies. Thus, although various groups of protesters demonstrated on the same site during the 1960 Anpo protests, each group formed their protests separately and rarely mingled, even when they occupied the same sites. Indeed, as all the chapters of this dissertation attempt to demonstrate, the protesters who participated in the 1960 Anpo protests did so according to very different logics and rules specific to their respective movement fields and spaces.

To add one more episode from the 1960 Anpo protests, it was true that protesters in different fields collaborated in the same action for some occasions. For example, when workers staged the general strike on June 4, 1960, students and intellectuals also joined strike (see Figure 5.1). However, this did not mean that the three groups planned the protests together; rather, intellectuals and students were under the instruction of workers and joined the strike as collaborators. Still, interesting forms of collaboration sometimes developed. Because national railway workers were civil servants and were prohibited by law from going on strike, university students and workers in different industries helped the railway workers’ strike. Student activists at the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, for example, on behalf of the National Railway Workers’ Union members, climbed up

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109 University professors sometimes had the placard, saying “the group of university professors” (daigaku kyōjudan). A scholar who organized the group of scholars during the 1960 Anpo protests stated that there was a sentiment among university professors that they did not want to act with university staff members (Interview with R, August 29, 2008).

110 For details, see Tokyo Daigaku Shokuin Kumiai (1960).

111 This constituted the background behind the formation of the citizens’ group the Voices of Voiceless Association, which aimed at incorporating people who did not belong to any associations or groups during the 1960 Anpo protests, as discussed in Chapter 3.
the stairs of the interlocking tower that controlled railway signals for trains and tore down the barricade built in front of the door that had been designed to intercept the striking workers.¹¹²

Figure 5.6 General Strike at a Railway Station


Scholars have argued that the mobilization of workers during the 1960 Anpo protests were top-down, directed by the Sōhyō federation and unions (e.g., Takabatake 1979, 1988). This is only partially true. Workers and union activists sometimes had to go through the same process of discussion and voting to go on strikes and for demonstrations as student activists did, because unions were supposed to be democratic organizations that followed democratic practices. In the case of a union at a steel manufacturing factory

¹¹² Focus group interview with former student activists at Tokyo University Foreign Studies, March 17, 2009.

On other occasions, workers in other industries helped the strike of the National Railway workers. Collaborating with other union activists, Sakata, at a steel company in Kawasaki, for example, investigated the train schedule the day before and had drivers from the company go to one of the train stations and stop the train. They collaborated in this plan with union activists at the National Railway Workers’ Union (Interview with Sakata April 6, 2009). The workers at the steel company could do this because they were not civil servants and were from other companies.
in Ōsaka, Wakita said that the union had to win the vote to go on strike at union meetings and then establish the strike committee. He recalled that it was exciting the moments to foresee that they could go on strikes (because it was not always easy to go on strikes), and that it felt like a day before the revolution. However, Wakita also expressed that such moments were scary at the same time because the strikes were not for economic demands, but for political demands and this showed radicalism of the union.113

This constituted part of the game and common practice in the movement space; but most of the labor movements in Japan during this time were based on unions and built on union activism. And union activism needed to follow formal procedures and was a closed organizational process, as Wakita described above. This prohibited the intervention of students and other groups in labor movements. Besides, as this section has examined, workers and union activists did not easily trust student activists—except in rare cases such as the Bund activist Koga, who shared the worker habitus. More often, the student activists lacked both the habitus and the capital necessary to intervene effectively in the labor movement space. Overall, though the student New Left group the Bund made some headway in making allies in the labor movement space, their success was limited scale until 1960.114 Consequently, at the moment in history when the Anpo protests, the largest social movements generated in Japan occurred, spanning over a year and mobilizing millions of people on the streets day after day, the movements represented there arrived from separate movement fields and spaces and, with few exceptions, manifested different kinds of dynamics, conflict, and competitions.

113 Interview with Wakita, December 8, 2008.
114 Other than three anti-JCP factions that turned to the Bund, the Bund gained only a few workers as allies at each district. For example, Satō, who took in charge of recruiting workers at the eastern part of Tokyo, gained two or three people at a few unions in his district (Interview with Satō, July 21, 2010).

As Tozuka (1976) examines in detail, the New Labor movement groups developed more in the 1960, as the New Left movements in general expanded. The three New Left Labor movement groups that turned to the Bund continued to develop in the 1960s, while the original, student organization Bund broke up in the Tokyo area where its central committee was located.
5.5 Conclusion

In the early postwar period, unions and union federations, which were often under union leaders affiliated with leftist political parties, engaged in both political and economic battles simultaneously. The union federations, especially the Sōhyō federation, tactically chose to engage in political battles in order to strengthen the associational power of the unions, by motivating members for the overall labor movements. This was effective when labor disputes were not completely formalized or institutionalized. However, unions’ and workers’ engagement in the political battles, rather than economic battles eventually created fragmentation among union members, as political demands were more likely to carry diverse symbolic meanings and thus engender disputes among union members over tactics. Engagement in political battles and the subsequent conflicts constituted catalysts for the emergence of the New Left labor movement groups during the 1960 Anpo protests.

Labor movements constituted a distinct social space from the field of student movements. The two spaces were not completely impenetrable, and the barrier was breached when student activists attempted to intervene in the labor movements. Yet, while the Bund members made some success in recruiting anti-JCP union factions as allies, most other cases were not successful. This was because the movement field and space were differently constructed and rarely compatible in terms of membership, practices, capital, habitus, and the rules of game that constituted each. Notably, when there was some penetration, as in the limited success of student activists in the labor movement space, it was made possible by previously formed networks, the structural homology of groups, and intermediary figures such as Koga, the Bund member whose habitus manifested as that of a worker through his clothes, body, and ways of speaking. This (manifested and recognizable habitus) allowed Koga to interact with workers more directly and gain union leaders’ trust. Koga’s role was similar to that of the sociologist Shimizu, discussed in Chapter 3, who connected the fields of intellectuals and journalism through the investment of capital and his location in the field of journalism. In Shimizu’s
case, however, he was marginalized in the field of intellectuals because of his dual habitus and his paucity of the symbolic capital that dominant intellectuals should acquire.

While some penetrability existed, however, student movement groups and labor unions constituted distinct social universes in other respects as well. Because workers’ legal status was constrained by the state and the companies that employed them, the labor movements had to deal with more legally restrictive conditions, had more closed memberships, and, ultimately, had to choose from a more limited range of strategies. In addition, labor movements were also subject to more variety of external forces with direct influence over them, such as the state, companies, and political parties, when compared to social movements in general. Besides, as this chapter has examined, in the case of unions in Japan during that time, both unions and labor movements were constructed through multi-layered organizations, including factional groups within unions and union federations at the national level, each of which had their own internal power struggles. And finally, the degree of the institutionalization of labor movements was often greater than that of other social movement groups because unions are formal, bureaucratic organizations and they take institutionalized actions vis-à-vis companies and state (cf. Fantasia and Stephan-Norris 2004: 557).

As I noted at the beginning of this chapter, theories of labor movements and social movements have largely developed separately. Part of the reason for this is that when theories of social movements began to emerge in the United States in the 1960s, labor movements there were waning, and as new social movement theories developed mainly in France and Germany around the same time, they excluded labor movements from their focus as they were seen as outdated. It is possible to analyze both labor and social movements with the same theoretical concepts developed in conventional social movement studies, such as mobilizing structure (resource, organizations, and networks), political opportunity structures, and framings, or, indeed, using field theory approach, as

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115 This is the difference between the case of the interconnection between the fields of intellectuals and journalism where two fields affected one another through the go-betweens and the movement of capital.  
116 Social movements in general would interact with the state, companies, and political parties, but influences and control over the movements could be more indirect.
this chapter has attempted. However, as I have shown, the processes and mechanisms of
social movements and labor movements differ because the actors and organizations are
embedded in different social spaces, in which their practices and competitions are
structured by distinct sets of resources, habitus, practices, meanings and rules.

With diverse political ambitions and worldviews, union activists and workers fought not
only with authorities, but also amongst themselves for power and domination. The 1960
Anpo protests constituted an important occasion for both unions and student movement
groups, each for their respective political purposes. Whereas the Bund saw the event as a
chance to make violent revolution, the Sōhyō federation and union activists used it to
strengthen their associational power. After the 1960 Anpo protests, the student movement
group the Bund regarded the 1960 Anpo protests as a failure and fell apart. However,
unions and workers continued their activism. Interviewees explained that workers did not
feel defeated and simply moved on to the next issues and demands. In fact, by the
1960s, union leaders had begun increasingly to cooperate with companies and had
become more conservative (cf. Gordon 1993). However, some unions remained militant
and continued to engage in battles both political and economic with corporate and
government leaders. The Sōhyō federation’s protests reached their peak in 1975 to the
extent that the National Railway Workers’ Union went on strike for eight days to gain the
right to strike, a right that they had been deprived of because of their status as civil
servants.

117 Based on the interviews with Wakita, December 8, 2008 and Maeda, January 30, 2009.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

These movement groups of intellectuals, students, and workers involved in the 1960 Anpo protests were not simply a reaction against the planned revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, but were also the manifestation of struggles within the movement fields and spaces that developed prior to the event. Intellectuals organized themselves for the 1960 Anpo protests in order to achieve their long-term goal of further entrenching democracy in Japan; student movement groups, especially the New Left group, the Bund, aspired to turn the protests into a communist revolution; and union leaders hoped to utilize the event to strengthen their own organizing power and to better motivate workers within the labor movement. I have shown that in terms of mobilization the 1960 Anpo protests achieved a historic level due to the nature and dynamics of Japan’s movement fields and spaces. The 1960 Anpo protests surged, first of all, because each movement field and space underwent escalated competition and conflicts among the constitutive groups. As an increasing number of constituencies in each field and space found engaging in the 1960 Anpo protests to be beneficial toward waging their respective struggles, the overall magnitude of the protests grew, shaping, in turn, the dynamics of future struggles within each movement. Second, the 1960 Anpo protests signaled a significant social and historical conjuncture for these movement fields and spaces. The conjuncture was not that different movement fields and spaces merged or integrated. Rather, the dominant actors and groups within them discovered new benefits from participating in such shared protests, as it strengthens their positions in their own respective fields, helping them achieve previously determined political goals.
6.1 Summary Discussion

The dissertation has highlighted that the 1960 Anpo protests—the major street protests that lasted from April 1959 to July 1960—were actually a set of movements far lengthier in duration, in addition to the fact that they were not coherent movements. In fact, the 1960 Anpo protests were far from even being “collective” in many respects. Movement groups were involved in competitions and conflicts prior to and during the protests, and, indeed, saw increasing divergence among them as the event unfolded. The struggles among student movement groups demonstrate this most saliently. After Bund members forcibly excluded their rival groups from the plenary meeting of the Zengakuren in March 1960, the Anti-Mainstream faction, the Bund’s major rival, started organizing their own protests separately. When the Anti-Mainstream faction staged a “successful” protest at Haneda Airport on June 10, 1960—by encircling the U.S. President secretary’s car, thereby forcing the secretary to flee by helicopter—this, in turn, stirred up Bund activists and fueled their radical act of “storming” the Diet Building on June 15. Conflicts intensified within the labor movement space during the 1960 Anpo protests as well. The New Left labor movement groups emerged precisely during the course of the 1960 Anpo protests, as the Japanese Communist Party (JCP)-affiliated union members became increasingly frustrated with the JCP’s tactics and harbored doubts about its status as the “truly” revolutionary party. As for the field of intellectuals, on the one hand, progressive intellectuals became dominant in the field because it has long been developed since World War II and valued political activism. Progressive intellectuals thus invested in political activism and were especially active during the 1960 Anpo protests. But, ultimately, progressive intellectuals split sharply among themselves during the protests, as evidenced by the conflicts between Ikutarō Shimizu, a leading progressive intellectual, and the other progressive intellectuals over how to organize their direct actions, such as whether or not to demand a meeting with the prime minister.

The various groups and actors in these movements were thus involved in competition and conflicts within their own fields and spaces; at the same time, however, they were largely disinterested in or distrustful of actors and groups in other movements.
This can clearly be seen during the 1960 Anpo protests: despite the fact that diverse groups of protesters occupied the same place and time, the different movement fields and spaces that constituted the protests did not merge. As I have argued, except for a few intellectuals such as Osamu Kuno, Shimizu, and Takaaki Yoshimoto, most intellectuals, including progressive intellectuals, did not support the Bund-led Zengakuren’s style of protests. For their part, leading student activists generally preferred to read “authentic” leftist thinkers such as Marx, Lenin, Trotsky, and Togliatti—not Japanese intellectuals. Conversely, Bund activists attempted to recruit workers as allies because, in the student activists’ view, the “true” communist party must include workers as its main revolutionary force. For their part, however, union leaders often distrusted student activists and thus only a few cases existed in which workers allied with them.

The boundaries of movement fields and spaces were reflected sharply by the relationship between intellectuals and workers as well. On the one hand, following Japan’s defeat in WWII, intellectuals actively sought to reach out beyond their “ivory towers” to “ordinary people” by establishing informal schools for workers, aiding in the establishment of unions (notably, the Japan Teachers’ Union), and offering lectures and seminars at union meetings. However, as I have examined above, university faculty members were often reluctant to organize rallies and demonstrations with workers or even with non-faculty staff members at their own universities. A number of pictures from the 1960 Anpo protests vividly show these boundaries among movement groups. University faculty members, students, and unions formed separate lines at demonstrations, and then protesters were usually even further divided by specific organizations or institutions. When they took to the streets, faculty members at the same university lined themselves up, students from the same university gathered as a group, and workers formed their demonstrations under the placards of their union names. The Voices of the Voiceless Association was formed precisely for people who wanted to join the demonstrations but could not claim membership in any of these other relatively firmly bounded groups. Importantly, such literal, physical divisions at demonstrations were not haphazard or premeditated; rather, these were the physically manifested outcome of
“collective decision making”—i.e., practices of democracy—whereby protesters held discussions as a group about precisely how they would participate.

Notwithstanding these divisions, other forms of collective behavior were still possible: first, shared practices among movement groups and actors endorsed by their habitus; and second, loosely-formed extant networks among leading activists. It was not just students who faithfully followed the practice of “discussion and voting.” University faculty members also discussed the issue of the U.S.-Japan Security Revision and participated in the protests by holding faculty meetings and collectively making decisions. Led by union leaders, workers held shop-floor meetings (shokuba taikai) during lunchtime and work-breaks or after working hours, talking about the issues and how they would participate in the protests. Some provincial towns and villages across Japan have kept records documenting their residents’ activism during the 1960 Anpo protests. The history of Nagano (located in the central region of mainland Japan), for example, recounts that union workers in pre-existing movement organizations and residential organizations also held meetings and discussions (see Niitsu 2010).¹ Residents in towns and villages not only protested on streets in their towns, but also sent representatives to the protests in Tokyo and around the Diet Building. Figure 6.1 shows protesters from Nagano sitting in front of the Diet Building.

¹ These residential or local organizations included the Nagano Prefectural Council of Trade Unions (which was under the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan, the Sōhyō federation, while retaining some autonomy), the Mothers’ Congress (hahaoya taikai, a movement organization aimed primarily at anti-war and anti-nuclear movements), and members of the youth groups (seinendan).
Of course, in order to inform millions of protesters about the place and time for the protests, networks were needed to ensure such information would be transmitted in time. The People’s Council to Stop the Revised Security Treaty (hereafter, the People’s Council), the umbrella organization for the 1960 Anpo protests that was endorsed by the Sōhyō federation (the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan; hereafter, the Sōhyō federation), consisted only of a small number of people—approximately 15 or 16 individuals from major movement organizations and unions, including the Zengakuren (the All-Japan Federation of Student-Government Associations), leftist political parties, the Sōhyō federation itself, and peace and anti-nuclear movement groups. Members of the People’s Council discussed plans for the protests and the preparations for them. Their decisions were not binding over the affiliated groups and organizations, but leaders of those groups and organizations usually did follow the protest dates and locations decided by the council. In this way, a loosely-formed network did exist, centered around the People’s Council, which helped coordinate demonstrators, even if only in terms of

Note: The protesters wore headbands indicating the name of their prefecture. The exact day or month is unknown. Photo: Niitsu (2010: 186).

2 Interview with Takehiko Matsuda, a former secretary of the People’s Council to Stop the Revised Security Treaty (July 10, 2010).
logistics. It is important to emphasize, however, that unlike existing studies arguing that the 1960 Anpo protests were a coercive and top-down movement, my research suggests otherwise.

Prior to the 1960 Anpo protests, the movement fields and spaces of intellectuals, students and workers had already gone through moments of crisis (Bourdieu [1984] 1988), even as power relations in these spaces were in the process of being restructured. Indeed, the 1960 Anpo protests emerged precisely because the fields and spaces were undergoing restructuring. This was especially the case for intellectuals and students. The field of intellectuals in Japan was drastically transformed after 1945, when the nation-state shifted its political ideologies from war and imperialism to peace and democracy. After Japan’s defeat, the 1960 Anpo protests provided an opportunity for intellectuals to consolidate this renewed political ideology and further overturn previously dominant political ideologies. In the communist movement field, the destabilization wrought during the mid-1950s meant that orthodoxy and doxa within the field were unsettled, leading communist student activists to form a New Left group. For these students, especially those in the newly established Bund, the Anpo protests represented an opportunity to prove themselves as the “legitimate” revolutionary party. And finally, in the case of workers, their labor movements had benefited from U.S. occupational reforms that provided both the legal grounds and formal endorsement from occupational forces and companies. Unions and union leaders seized upon the 1960 Anpo protests as a “political battle” (seiji tōsō) that could indeed help revitalize the labor movements. As each of these separate trajectories demonstrates, the 1960 Anpo protests emerged within and through the historically accumulated processes of existing movement fields and spaces, and the struggles within each of them.

The distinct characteristic of the movement fields and spaces that typified the 1960 Anpo protests is that it was relatively marginalized groups that constituted the most prominent groups at the protests. Progressive intellectuals did not hold a dominant position within their field, especially compared to old-liberal intellectuals who were senior to them and often at the University of Tokyo or other elite schools. Likewise,
among student groups, the Bund actually had far fewer members than its rival, the Anti-
Mainstream faction. However, progressive intellectuals and Bund members were able to
exert dominance at the time of the 1960 Anpo protests because of dynamics within their
fields which they were able to use to their advantage. In the case of workers, the Sōhyō
federation, the major union federation, organized unions and union workers for the
protests, but the protests themselves provided a turning point for the emergence of New
Left labor movement groups, which became more prevalent throughout the 1960s. In
summary, the 1960 Anpo protests provided an opportunity in each case for non-dominant
groups to make a bid for power, or at least try to turn the internal struggles and conflicts
within their respective movements and fields in their favor.

When no tangible routes for any participating group in the protests to gain power
or dominance within its respective field or space, or when the field or space did not value
political activism, actors were less likely to participate in the movements. The
comparison with the 1970 Anpo protests—the protests generated in response to the
second round of revisions to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty\(^3\)—will make this point
clearer. Student activists, radicalized in the struggles throughout the 1960s, actively
participated in the 1970 Anpo protests. Unions and union federations, which also
remained in political battles throughout the 1960s, similarly mobilized their members for
the 1970 Anpo protests. But this was not the case for intellectuals; university faculty
members, in particular, did not join the 1970 Anpo protests.\(^4\) As I have argued, Sartre—
an iconic figure of political engagement for intellectuals during this period—was claimed
more in the 1960s by radicalized students than university faculty members. The field of
intellectuals, especially that of university faculty members, was settled by 1970, and
since then political engagement steadily lost its value within the field.\(^5\)

\(^3\) The revised U.S.-Japan Security Treaty signed in 1960 was to be effective for 10 years. Though either
country could abandon it with proper notification after 10 years, the treaty has remained unchanged and in
effect since 1960.

\(^4\) A more thorough examination would be necessary to explore this issue fully, but generally, the field of
intellectuals was much affected by the student revolts of 1968-1969 and also by the specialization of
knowledge and professionalization of disciplines.

\(^5\) The field became unsettled in 1980, especially over the issue of whether universities should hire scholars
who have produced non-academic works. One notable example was Shin’ichi Nakazawa, an anthropologist
with expertise on Tibetan Buddhism. The faculty members at the University of Tokyo disputed the issue,
with some even resigning as a result (see Koschmann 1993: 418-23)
The conflicts and lack of coherence within movement fields and spaces were similarly reflected in how seemingly shared slogans such as “protecting democracy” were understood. The very concept of democracy varied across actors, groups, movement spaces and fields. To intellectuals, democracy after WWII constituted an ideal along with peace or modernization. However, for student activists who upheld leftist thoughts, democracy meant bourgeois democracy, which they had to refute, even as they pursued the practices of democracy within their specific movement space and according to their habitus. And workers certainly had democratic habitus and practiced it, as exemplified by the union activist Yūgo Maeda at the Ōsaka Central Telegraph who drew upon his postwar education in democracy and workers’ rights to organize others at his workplace. Still, as a slogan for the movement, union leaders often considered “democracy” too abstract and found practical goals more effective for mobilizing workers.

In this way, the seemingly coherent slogan of the 1960 Anpo protests actually belies the diverse views among groups and actors involved. I argue that the concept of democracy was not only understood differently by different actors but also that each field and space developed different meanings for it, informed actors in the field and space with a certain way of understanding, interpreting, and using it. For example, the communist movement field had developed particular ways of understanding democracy, based on Marxist theories; therefore, the Bund members’ understanding of “democracy as bourgeois democracy that needed to be denounced” was not their own choice of interpretation but was rather imposed by the field. The field imposes doxa and orthodoxy. Thus, when the constituents in the field attempted to advance different understandings, it invited struggles over the legitimacy of their membership within the field and raised the specter of heresy. The meanings and practices of democracy were thus field-specific and exercised coercive force, sometimes even going beyond the intentions of specific actors.

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6 On this point, it is important not to generalize as not a few Anti-Mainstream factions, who were members of the JCP but later turned out to be structural reformists, leaned more toward socialist ideas that embrace the ideals of democracy (e.g., Interview with Takashi Ikumi, May 18, 2009). Many structural reformists of the JCP in the late 1950s were purged from the JCP ranks in 1961.

7 See footnote 6.
As I have argued, the 1960 Anpo protests were conflict-ridden, comprised of different movement fields and spaces, each with its own historically accumulated trajectories and dynamics. My analysis of the protests illuminates the ongoing struggles among the protagonists themselves, and the fact that the movements themselves continuously created new struggles. At the same time, however, all these struggles followed the particular logics of fields and spaces with long historical roots already in place before any of the specific events I examine transpired. Thus, contrary to what previous studies have argued, I argue that the 1960 Anpo protests were neither the product of routinized movements nor a turning point whereby one kind of movement was replaced with another. Rather, the event was essentially conflict-ridden and the culmination of already developed processes and ongoing struggles. Before and during the 1960 Anpo protests, progressive intellectuals were promoted through the field of journalism that supported them and afforded them opportunities to become more dominant in the field of intellectuals; the communist group Bund emerged by utilizing the student democratic movement space; and the labor movement space was already in the process of structuring through engaging in political battles. In this way, each movement field and space that made up the 1960 Anpo protests had different dynamics and mechanisms, while protesters’ participation in the protests was shaped by their field-specific rules, habitus, and practices. Thus, the only seemingly coherent and collective action of the protests was a hybrid product of different movement fields and spaces, and the conflicts and competitions within them.

6.2 Limitations of the Research

Of necessity, the primary limitation of this research has to do with its scope. Because the 1960 Anpo protests amounted to such an expansive event, there were numerous groups that participated or simply identified with the protests that could not be discussed in this project. Nonetheless, those included for discussion had to do with the fact that they clearly illustrate the dynamics of movement fields and spaces that this dissertation sought to examine. I will note below those instances where further research could help supplement my findings.
First, I did not examine citizens’ groups, which arguably are more grassroots and bottom-up type of organizations, as represented by the Voices of the Voiceless Association. Citizens’ groups were excluded partly to delimit the dissertation’s focus, but also because, as argued in Chapter 3, until 1960 such groups were largely supported and promoted by intellectuals, including the Voices of Voiceless Association. Further research is needed to examine the extent to which citizens’ grassroots organizations developed more autonomously from the field and political activism of intellectuals after 1960.

Second, while the dissertation examined student communist movements and the JCP, it did not explore communist intellectuals, who were influential in intellectuals’ political activism especially during the early postwar period. In this case, it was simply too difficult to identify JCP-affiliated intellectuals, especially those who were university faculty members. Except for a very few cases, such as Shōzō Fujita (political scientist and a student of Masao Maruyama), it was and remains rare for intellectuals themselves to reveal whether they are or were JCP members. One of my informants, a former faculty member, related how he had been a member of the JCP, but he also noted that it was quite extraordinary to share it with someone.8 Indeed, in an interview with another former scholar, whom others often suspected of being an active member of the JCP, he always changed the topic whenever I asked about his views on Marxism or the JCP.9

Furthermore, although I examined only the leading groups in the case of intellectuals’ activism and student movements, I took a different approach to the examination of labor movements. I did examine the major labor union federation, the Sōhyō federation; however, for the middle-range analysis, I also examined smaller groups that had interaction with student movement activists.10 This analysis on the nexus

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8 Interview with K (August 13, 2008, and November 7, 2008).
9 Interview with R (August 14, 2008).
10 For my initial attempt, I had a plan to examine the National Railway Workers’ Union, one of the largest and most active unions. In collecting data, I soon discovered that the union’s formal documents did not record the details that were essential for the field analysis—for example, details regarding the key members of the field, and what internal conflicts existed among groups. I also approached the former leaders of the union; however, many of the important personnel of the union who could have supplemented the unwritten records are already deceased. One person I managed to meet was a secretary of the union, but he seemed to
of the student movement field and the labor movement space was successful insofar as it illuminated the compatibility and incompatibility of different movement fields and spaces. However, how labor movements created the movement field, and how specifically the student (or social) movement field and a labor movement field may be different are important questions yet to be investigated.

6.3 Implications and Future Research

The field analysis of Bourdieu demonstrates the importance of disaggregating the levels and domains of social movements that present themselves as coherent on the surface. My work has suggested that movements rise or decline not only due to shifts in political opportunities—exogenous factors that conventional social movement studies examine—but also due to dynamics of movement fields that are endogenous and, indeed, constitutive of the movements themselves. Furthermore, this research has highlighted that protagonists who share a field or space often struggle amongst themselves even more than against monopolizing powers such as the state, police or corporations, which do not always take part in the struggle for capital and power in the same field.

Broadly speaking, the dissertation contributes to three areas of research: social movement studies, Bourdieusian theory and research, and Japanese studies. For conventional social movement literature, as discussed above, Bourdieusian field analysis brings a new perspective to the mechanisms and processes that produce the coherence and discoherence, surge and decline of movements rather than simply suggesting the cycles of those movements. Moreover, my research has shown that the “resources,” “frames,” and “opportunities” that are the focus of conventional social movement studies and framed therein as empowering variables can become the focal points of struggles among the protagonists who actually discourage or impede the organization of collective behaviors. However, as I have also shown, by using the conceptual tools of habitus,

be unfamiliar with the politics of the union and did not recall any details (Interview with F, April 21, 2009), while another person was suffering from hearing loss too significant for a successful interview (Interview with N, May 16, 2009).
practice, and capital provided by Bourdieu, social movement scholars may yet be able to analyze new organizing principles for collective behaviors that have not been explored.

On Bourdieu’s theory, my work contributes in the following ways. First of all, it shows that social movements can, indeed, be analyzed as fields, or rather, as the aggregation of fields. But my dissertation has also suggested ways to surmount some of Bourdieu’s theoretical difficulties. First, while Bourdieu’s theory primarily assumes struggles of individuals and does not generally address collective actions (see Fligstein and McAdam 2011: 19-20), my dissertation has shown that shared habitus and practices generate collectivity, thus allowing actors to organize and mobilize themselves for collective actions. Second, although scholars have often debated whether or not a certain social space constitutes a field, I have suggested that we should think more of a continuum of social space that varies according to its degree of structuration. By suggesting three levels of structuration (field, space, and multi-institutional domain), my research contributes to a refinement of Bourdieu’s theory. Indeed, Bourdieu himself hinted towards this idea of social space that does not structure itself as a field (e.g., Bourdie [1979] 2002, [1992] 1996), even though it remains for us to further refine a field theory that includes such variations.

Finally, as to Japanese studies, Bourdieu’s field theory offers an important perspective in examining society. First, the analysis moves beyond dichotomous debates over whether social movements in society were organized top-down and forcibly so, or bottom-up and voluntarily so. The studies of Japanese social movements, as well as theories of civil society, often analyze movements through such binaries. But, as I have shown, movements are better understood as neither top-down nor bottom-up, neither forceful nor voluntary; rather, they are the outcomes and processes of incessant power struggles. Second, as my work has sought to highlight, Bourdieu’s field theory avoids any sort of “cultural essentialism” in explaining the mechanisms and processes within fields; there is no attribution of cause to cultural factors that are supposedly “unique to Japan.” As argued in Chapter 1, Japanese studies have shifted from emphasizing homogeneity to examining the more conflictive and heterogeneous aspects of society. Whether focusing
on unity or conflict, however, scholars on both sides continue to essentialize Japan and explicitly declare its unique differences from other societies. Counter to this trend, my dissertation has highlighted that processes and mechanisms, as well as how people behave and act, are specific to field or space rather than to Japanese society or what is called “culture.” Japan’s specific history remains important but only insofar as it reveals the accumulation of mechanisms, processes, and struggles within and across social spaces, from a Bourdieusian perspective.

It was, in fact, tempting to argue that certain ways of coordinating protests were or are somehow unique to Japan—particularly when we observe peaceful and orderly protests of millions of people, whether during the 1960 Anpo protests or in today’s anti-nuclear power protests. It is often the case that similar-size protests elsewhere in the world involve violence and bloody clashes. But here too, I would argue that the presence or absence of bloodshed and violence in such instances can be explained by the dynamics of fields and spaces. When protests grew and the police mobilized significant forces of physical repression, there has been violence and turmoil in Japan as well. Indeed, this was the case during the Mayday demonstration that took place in front of the Imperial Palace in 1952, when the U.S. army and protesters clashed violently. The Shinjuku riot at Shinjuku Station as part of the anti-Vietnam war movements ended with the enforcement of the mayhem law in 1968; and the student revolts in 1968 and 1969 invited the introduction of the riot police on campuses to break through barricades that students had set up in campus buildings. Although beyond the scope of this project, I would suggest that these incidents, like those during the Anpo protests, were the product of ongoing-processes within and among the relevant groups and movements.

Unlike such incidents of violence, the 1960 Anpo protests, for the most part, did not include or result in violent conflict. But there were some moments that came close—with the key difference being that the state did not respond in a way that would have pushed the situation towards violence. There were some rare exceptions, such as the incident on June 15, 1960, when a female student at the University of Tokyo was crushed to death. The memoirs and records of the participants show that the police dealt harshly
with protesters using fists and bats, and about 700 were injured on that day (Shima 1999: 126; see Kojima [1968] 1997; Minaguchi 1968; Tokyo Daigaku Shokuin Kumiai 1960). But in another instance, the authorities responded in a way that actually prevented the situation from escalat
ging. Faced with an increasing number of protesters in June 1960, Prime Minister Kishi, along with other members of the Liberal Democratic Party (then the ruling party), asked the defense agency chief to send the Self Defense Force troops (SDF, the equivalent of a military force). The reason cited was the need to protect U.S. President Eisenhower, who was expected to visit Japan on June 19. Remarkably, the defense agency chief refused the request, explaining that it could result in SDF troops firing at protesters and sparking further chaos (Akagi 1973: 101-06). The defense agency chief, Akagi, recalls that his decision reflected his cadre’s opinion (ibid.: 104). Thus, the overall peaceful and orderly protests during the 1960 Anpo protests were a result of the ways in which each field and space—including various protesters, the state, and the police—reacted to one another.

Future research could expand the findings and approaches of this dissertation in different ways. One important angle would be to investigate the ongoing contemporary protests against nuclear power plants in Japan, which have mobilized tens of thousands of people in front of the office of the Prime Minister since April 2012. Anti-nuclear movements are not new; in fact, they have a long history in Japan. They developed especially in the mid-1950s after Japanese fishers on a fishing boat were exposed to nuclear fallout from a nuclear test that the United States conducted on Bikini Atoll in 1954. Led by different organizations and actors such as a-bomb survivors, political parties, and religious groups, anti-nuclear-bomb movements have continued to this day. In addition, anti-nuclear power plant movements have been organized by residents and activists since the 1970s, when nuclear power plants were being built across the country.

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11 The police record, Kōan Chōsachō (1960: 204), counts a few hundred injured.
12 Eisenhower’s visit was planned for five days from June 19. It was supposed to be the first time ever for a U.S. president to visit Japan, but it was cancelled due to the tension surrounding the 1960 Anpo protests. However, defense chief Akagi ordered the SDF to stand ready in case of any emergency (Akagi 1973: 104).
13 To note, Akagi was more concerned about the chaos that would only benefit communists who wanted a revolution (Akagi 1973: 103). The police records published in the 1950s and 1960s spent considerable number of pages analyzing communist movements in Japan.

For the dialectic development of protesters and power holders, see Steinberg (1999a; 1999b).
(see Aldrich 2008; Yoshioka [1999] 2011). However, conflicts leading to further escalations were observed in these movements as well. For example, the Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs, which was established by all party groups in 1955, ended up organizing separate movement organizations as conflicts between the JCP and the Japan Socialist Party intensified in the 1960s. Both organizations continue to engage in activism today. In this way, the ongoing anti-nuclear movements in Japan could well be similarly characterized by internal divisions, separate fields and spaces, and the prominence of conflicts between non-dominant groups and dominating groups competing for power, all of which had their own history of development.

Other recent protests around the world, such as the Arab Spring movements, anti-globalization movements, and the Occupy movements, could similarly be analyzed more effectively by looking into their historical development and the dynamics of specific fields and spaces from which they emerged. These are all movements that have emerged, in the eyes of some, as if out of nowhere, mobilizing unprecedented numbers; however, none of the extant literature on social movements or the studies of historical sociology would suggest that protesters in these movements were mobilized in such huge numbers spontaneously. It all points to one thing. Sociologists need to draw productively on insights from various theoretical fields in their attempt to develop analytical tools for understanding historic surges in both past and present, an attempt that this dissertation has contributed to and demonstrated.
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