The Politics of Enlistment, Empire, and the “U.S.-Philippine Nation”: Enlisted and Civilian Filipino Workers in and beyond the United States Navy, 1941-1965

by

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PREFACE

This dissertation is the first historically balanced and comparative study on civilian and enlisted Filipinos in the U.S. Navy (USN), and in other branches of the U.S. military. Filipino civilians were native-born Philippine locals recruited by U.S. military officials to work under indefinite civilian contract within U.S. military bases in the Philippines, Okinawa, Guam, and elsewhere in Asia and the Pacific. These civilians often worked in positions of manual and technical labor within these bases. In turn, Filipino enlistees were native-born locals in the Philippine archipelago who U.S. military officials recruited in its enlisted force. The terms of their enlistment normally lasted between four to six years, with probable chances for re-enlistment.

Drawing upon the oral historical records of such Filipino American historians as Fred Cordova and Riz Oades, I examine how the experiences of Filipinos shaped—and were facilitated by—the United States Navy since the end of the nineteenth century. In addition, I build on their works methodologically by investigating more than 1,500 pages of written correspondences, letters, and memorandums within—and between—U.S. and Philippine military officials, political officials, military personnel, and civilian citizens regarding Filipino enlistment policies. Historiographically, this dissertation departs from the previous work of a plethora of scholars—including Yen Le Espiritu, Paul A. Kramer, and Gary Gerstle—by assessing and theorizing the conflations of race, gender, and nationalism in the imperial politics of Filipino enlistment and the bi-national imaginaries.
of U.S.-Philippine relations. I coin this bi-national condition as the “U.S.-Philippine nation.”

Nevertheless, while previous scholars have assumed a linear imperial history of U.S. empire in the Philippines from formal (1898-1945) to informal (1946-present), I make an underlying argument that the U.S. Empire behaved formally in certain ways, and informally in other contexts that were contingent upon the degrees of U.S. officials’ anxiety and immediacy in securing their imperial project within the same region and time period: including and beyond the colonial Philippines. Subsequently, the simultaneous formal—and informal—practices of the U.S.-Philippine nation state further shaped the restrictive politics of Filipino enlistment, including the recruitment and marginalization of Filipino enlistees and civilians in the U.S. forces. Although Filipino enlistees were more geographically and upwardly mobile than their civilian counterparts within the global U.S. nation-state, their initial assignments in menial forms of labor (as cooks or stewards) often made the conditions of their enlistment parallel to the Filipino civilian workers.

By closely investigating the unique historical distinctions and comparisons between enlisted and civilian Filipinos within (and beyond) the U.S. Navy, I explore the following questions within the contexts of empire, militarism, and bi-national recognition. When and why did U.S. military officials enlist Filipinos in the first place? Second, what political implications did Filipino recruitment serve in expanding U.S. practices of war, occupation, and colonial governance in the Philippines—and elsewhere in Asia and the Trans-Pacific? And third, to what extent did these recruited Filipinos shape their own terms of enlistment, upward mobility, and subjectivity beyond their
parametrical restrictions by the U.S. military and the nation-state? Based from these underlying questions and frameworks within this dissertation, I argue that the inclusive and restrictive politics of Filipino enlistment, coupled with the intricate bi-nationalities of U.S.-Philippine relations vitally contributed to the Cold War imperial politics and multiethnic alliances within the U.S. Empire nation-state. These seemingly contradictory politics of enlisting Filipinos played a key role in shaping militarized formations of the U.S.-Philippine nation state during and following the Second World War.
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INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER

If it weren’t for the Navy, I’d be dead.¹

The words above were spoken by a retired U.S. Navy enlistee as he was reflecting in hindsight on his thirty-year service in the U.S. Navy (1945 to 1975). This enlistee of Philippine descent was a civilian worker in one of the military bases in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation in World War II. After the U.S. atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki that promptly led to the end of the Second World War, this Filipino civilian worker decided to apply for the U.S. Navy at Sangley Point in Cavite City, Philippines. By September 22, 1945, this Filipino civilian worker became an enlistee as he was one of the very few ‘good men’ who were accepted in to the U.S. Navy during that time. U.S. Navy officials’ acceptance of this enlistee marked the beginning of a thirty-year tenure that included promotion to chief petty officer in 1959, access to citizenship and the benefits of the G.I. Bill, and geographic mobility and settlement in the following military stations of enlistment: San Diego and Lemoore, California; Pusan, Korea; Newport, Rhode Island; Groton, Connecticut; Seattle, Washington; and Naples, Italy.

The name of this Filipino enlistee is my grandfather, or lolo: Bonifacio Luna. Mr. Luna was one of the 22,000+ Filipinos who joined the U.S. Navy between 1944 and 1973. As an appointed enlistee throughout his naval career, Mr. Luna received access to

¹ Bonifacio Lukban Luna, interview by author, 22 November 2003, Fresno, tape recording.
U.S. citizenship and veterans’ benefits which was part and parcel of the U.S.’s politics of Filipino inclusion in its nation-state. The U.S.’s politics of enlistment, for Navy Filipinos, entailed empowering degrees of upward mobility within the ranks and files of the U.S. military in particular, and the U.S. nation-state in general. For U.S. officials, the politics of Filipino enlistment meant the continuing ideological facilitations and practical manifestations of the U.S.-Philippine nation-state in a time of postwar economic rehabilitation, strategic hegemony as a leader of the ‘free world’ against the ideological perils of communism, and the continuum of the colonial relationship between the U.S. and the Philippines. These politics of enlistment were exercised and enforced as much by the upward mobility and inclusion of Filipinos in the nation-state as the restricted and exclusive positioning of Filipino enlistees as stewards in the U.S. Navy and other branches of the military. Such restrictive and exclusive positions of enlistment also applied to Mr. Luna. Though promoted as chief petty officer during the middle and latter half of his naval career, U.S. naval officials often designated him strictly to duties of stewardship throughout most of his naval career.

But what about some of the other 22,000 Filipino enlistees, along with the dozens of thousands of Filipino civilians, who worked in the U.S. Navy and other branches of the military? To what extent were they included and positioned by U.S. military officials in the U.S. nation-state in the same way that Mr. Luna was during his naval tenure? How did Filipinos respond to the politics of their civilian and enlisted work in the U.S. military? And last but not least, in what ways did the continuities and changes in the politics of Filipino enlistment facilitate U.S. global (and domestic) militarisms during the early Cold War period?
This dissertation examines the trans-local sites of Filipino enlistment, experience, and subjectivity in the United States Navy and other branches of the military within the broader global context of the U.S. Empire and Cold War politics. I argue that these trans-local experiences and histories must be examined in relation to what I call the Cold War’s “politics of recognition”, which I explain further in this chapter. In particular, this project delineates the comparative histories of two types of Filipino workers within and beyond the U.S. Navy: civilians and enlistees. Filipino civilian workers were native-born Philippine locals recruited by U.S. military officials to work under indefinite civilian contract on U.S. military bases in the Philippines, Okinawa, Guam, and elsewhere in Asia and the Pacific. These civilians often worked in positions of manual and technical labor within these bases. In turn, Filipino enlistees were native-born locals in the Philippine archipelago who U.S. military officials recruited into its enlisted force. The terms of their enlistment normally lasted between four to six years, with the possibility of re-enlistment. On the one hand, these enlistees’ physical inclusion and upward mobility within the U.S. nation-state, and its imperial bases across the globe, differentiated their conditions of enlistment from that of their civilian counterparts. On the other hand, their initial assignments in menial forms of labor (as stewards) often made their experiences parallel to Filipino civilian workers. In other words, the divergent experiences between enlisted and civilian Filipino laborers actually resulted in their convergence.

By investigating the historical similarities and distinctions between Filipino civilian and enlisted workers in U.S. forces, this dissertation addresses the following questions. When and why did U.S. military officials enlist Filipinos in the first place? Second, what political and historical implications did Filipino enlistment have for the
shaping of U.S. practices of colonial governance, war, and militarism in the Philippines and elsewhere in Asia and the Trans-Pacific? And third, to what extent were these recruited Filipinos able to forge and negotiate their own terms of enlistment, upward mobility and subjectivity within—and despite—the restrictive politics of their inclusion within the U.S. military and its nation-state?

Over the course of this dissertation, I make three overarching arguments. One, the origins of United States Navy (USN) Filipino enlistment lay in the immediate aftermath of the Spanish-American War of 1898. Within this context, U.S. officials enlisted as many as 500 Filipinos in the U.S. naval force. These Navy Filipinos, in turn, aided the U.S. against Philippine nationals in the Philippine-American War (1899-1913). This politics of enlistment endured unevenly throughout the twentieth century, and geographically across global bases of the U.S. military, over the course of its exponential escalations (including World War I and especially World War II). Two, during and after the Second World War, the continuation of policies that enlisted Filipinos played a vital role in creating a powerful bi-national feeling of partnership between United States and Philippine officials and personnel. The formation of this “imagined community,” as Benedict Anderson might put it, was underwritten by the formalization of official policies and treaties, and I call this phenomenon the emergence of the “U.S.-Philippine nation.” And third, coupled with the bi-national emergence of the “U.S.-Philippine nation”, the overlapping and competing politics of enlistment contributed to the Cold War imperial politics and the rising dominance of the U.S. Empire nation-state. On the one hand, the competing politics of Filipino enlistment existed in vertical and horizontal modes within numerous U.S. militarized spaces. On the other hand, the uneven degrees of negotiation
and exclusion of Filipinos within these bases foreground affiliations among Filipino enlistees with United States imperial politics in the early Cold War period.²

The remaining sections in this introductory chapter trace the underlying conceptual frameworks, research methodology, historiographical interventions, and structural outline shaping the overarching arguments and scope of this dissertation.

**The Politics of Enlistment**

I coined the phrase “politics of enlistment” in order to capture the multiple meanings and repercussions of U.S. officials’ enlistment of foreign nationals and racial minorities, specifically Filipino laborers. What did the enlistment of foreign nationals and racial minorities mean to U.S. diplomatic, political, and military officials who anxiously sought to sustain, enforce, and popularize their ideologies of democracy, capitalism, and strategic military presence on a global scale? For Filipinos, particularly the civilian workers and enlisted personnel at the heart of this study, what did enlistment mean to them in their struggles for survival, basic sustenance, and upward mobility, especially in relation to middle-class standards in the United States during the early Cold War period? And for other racial and ethnic minorities, including African Americans, Arab/Arab Americans, Asian Americans, Latina/o Americans, Native Americans, and Pacific Americans, *Suspended Apocalypse: White Supremacy, Genocide, and the Filipino Condition* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010).

² It was primarily among the intergenerational civilian descendants of these militarized workers where Filipino Americanist visions of what Sarita See would coin as “the decolonized eye” became most evident, promising, and worthy of infinite dialectical revision. I recall the term “Filipino Americanist” as a descriptive and adjective form of what Dylan Rodríguez articulates as “Filipino Americanism.” According to Rodríguez, Filipino Americanism, “as a discursive communal possibility and instigation of identity is unthink(ably) absent [in] its sturdy allegiance to the American civil society form, and as such must articulate through a generalized (if only sometimes ‘critical’) allegiance to the political integrity and essentialized moral legitimacy of the United States of America in its localized institutionalizations… and as a putative ‘national’ hegemony writ global” (Rodríguez 2010, 26-27). See Dylan Rodríguez, *Suspended Apocalypse: White Supremacy, Genocide, and the Filipino Condition* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010).
Islanders, what did enlistment mean to them in historical and political comparison with Filipino Americans? This dissertation, in varying degrees, addresses these contingently comparative historical paradigms within the scope and methods shaping the overarching arguments.

Historiographically, the politics of enlistment derives and departs from a similar conceptual term associated with liberal multiculturalism: the politics of recognition. According to historian Paul A. Kramer, the politics of recognition are the parametrical meanings of U.S. racial inclusion in civil society and discourse. So when it comes to the study of enlistees versus civilians, a theoretical framework that emphasizes a politics of recognition would conflate minority enlistees with civilians and include them in the same political category of scholarly analysis. Important distinctions between the two groups would not be acknowledged. In contrast, my conceptualization of the “politics of enlistment” makes and assumes clear-cut distinction between the political recognition of marginalized enlistees and civilians in the U.S. nation-state.

“The U.S.-Philippine Nation”: A Wartime and Postwar Ideological Partnership


4 On the one hand, I recognize and honor the necessity of politically conflating agents of civilian and military society in order to avoid commonsensical trappings of neo-liberal simplicities. For example, Keith Camacho and Setsu Shigematsu argue that neo-liberal frameworks emphasize the distinction between civil and military society while overlooking the common politics of knowledge production overlapping them. Or, for a more necessarily elaborative explanation, please see Keith Camacho and Setsu Shigematsu eds., *Militarized Currents: toward a Decolonized Future in Asia and the Pacific* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), xxvi-xxvii. On the other hand, I believe it is also important to overlook the disparate conditions of inclusion and exclusion that shape the politics of enlistment. The conditions of enlistment, as will be further elaborated and articulated in this dissertation, also defined and facilitated the formal policies and informal methods of U.S. militarism, and the bi-national constructs of the “U.S.-Philippine nation.”
The phenomenon of Filipino enlistment is connected to the emergence and imperial hegemony of what I call the “U.S.-Philippine nation.” Instead of treating the relationship between the United States and the Philippines as one that evolves bilaterally between two separate or distinct entities, I propose the concept of the “U.S.-Philippine nation” because it more accurately describes the development of an ideological and bi-national partnership between the U.S. and the Philippines, particularly amongst politicians, diplomats, scholars, military officials, and military personnel. In other words, I am distinguishing the “bi-national” from the “bilateral” by emphasizing the unilateral nature of this bi-national relationship between the United States and the Philippines. Earliest discursive and political manifestations of this bi-national entity can be traced back to the Spanish-American War of 1898, the official end of the Philippine-American War in 1902, and during the First World War from 1917 to 1918. As the forthcoming chapters of this dissertation illustrate, the peak of this ideological and bi-national alliance emerged in the trans-pacific theatre of World War II from 1944 to 1945 and during the early stages of Cold War politics, militarisms, and orientalisms in the late 1940s, 1950s, and early 1960s. Also, in varying degrees, the celebratory imaginary of bi-national alliance informed and shaped U.S. and Philippine officials’ dominant interpretations of the “U.S.-Philippine nation.” Nevertheless, U.S. officials, in particular, interpreted this alliance with relevant levels of anxiety towards, and surveillance of, Filipino nationals—particularly Filipino nationals enlisted by U.S. officials themselves. By studying the

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everyday and institutional encounters between Filipino laborers and their U.S. military officials in this dissertation, I assess how the complexities and contradictions of celebratory alliance structured and potentially destabilized the ideological foundations and hegemonic practices of the “U.S.-Philippine nation.”

My historical and conceptual account of the “U.S.-Philippine nation” stems from previous studies of U.S.-Philippine history, knowledge politics, and the political contradictions shaping the celebratory discourse of this bi-national alliance. The 1947 Military Bases Agreement, which I will further explain later in this dissertation, clearly contravenes the presumption of the sovereign status of these two nations. In reality, this agreement only confirmed the neo-colonial status of the Philippines in relation to the United States. While scholars from all political, disciplinary, and interdisciplinary spectrums agree that there is direct contradiction between the sovereign and neo-colonial status of the Philippines, there are fissures and divergences when it comes to the political meanings and logics of this contradiction. Conservative and moderate military historians have justified this contradiction by emphasizing the “necessity” of strategically enforcing U.S. imperial and ideological dominance against actual and potential global threats of communist, or anti-colonial, dominance. Meanwhile, liberal and radically leftist scholars have largely critiqued, if not collectively protested, this basic contradiction often by calling our attention to the gendered and nationalist grounds of social justice, equality, and opportunity. In this dissertation, I address the history and transpirations of this

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6 Comparative literary critic Neferti Tadiar, for example, articulates the notion of U.S.-Philippine bi-national alliance and friendship as a “fantasy production” within lens of gender, sexuality, and nationalism. See Neferti Tadiar, *Fantasy Production: Sexual Economies and other Philippine Consequences for the New World Order* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong UP, 2004).

contradiction by assessing the emergent, competing and dominant ideological formations of the “U.S.-Philippine nation,” along with its imperial implications across lines of gender, race, nationalism, and citizenship.

My coinage of this term derives and differentiates from previous historical actors’ definitions of and challenges toward this bi-national concept during the early-mid Cold War period, as well as from previous definitions and delineations of particular variations of this term by recent scholars in Filipino studies. Claro Recto and Lorenzo Tanada, for instance, were historical actors who both assessed and critiqued the ideological foundation of U.S.-Philippine bi-national relations. In turn, Recto and Tanada were in strong support of an actual Philippine independence that stood apart from United States neo-colonial rule. Claro Recto, as a Philippine Senator, led the nationalist movement in the Philippines during the time of his political tenure in the 1950s. Subsequently, his views on Philippine-U.S. relations were immensely influential on official and grassroots activists for many years to come.

Specifically, Recto was one of the most notable Philippine officials to openly criticize the militaristic foundations and dehumanizing implications of the U.S.-Philippine bi-national “friendship.” In his public speeches, Recto frequently critiqued the presence of U.S. bases in the Philippines on the grounds that the militaristic conditions of extraterritoriality, as applicable to U.S. bases, contradicted (and hence violated) the terms of Philippine sovereignty. In addition, Recto was not afraid to express his fear that the continual U.S. base presence in the Philippines would invite open attack by foreigners, even to the point of nuclear warfare.⁸

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Lorenzo Tanada was another Philippine senator who critiqued the neo-colonial politics of U.S.-Philippine relations on an official level. In particular, Senator Tanada often spoke about the “myths” that the Philippines has lived by as a developing nation, particularly in relation to the United States and other foreign powers. These “myths” that Tanada alluded to included the following: first, that the Philippines needed to depend on U.S. and/or other foreign powers in order to sustain itself economically, politically, and diplomatically; second, that the Philippines needed to rely on western models predicated by the U.S. and other western foreign powers in order to achieve similar results as a newly sovereign nation; and third, that the nature of the U.S.-Philippine relationship lay in American “benevolence” and its “special relations” with the Philippines, rather than the actual and conditioned Philippine neo-colonial mentality and its erased public memory of the immensely violent Philippine-American War since the American colonial period. Hence, in order for the Philippines to elevate itself as a developing nation, it must first admit its “real” status as such, and then take appropriate measures—as a truly sovereign nation—in order to advance and empower itself politically and economically apart from the westernized and capitalist standards of the U.S. and other foreign powers.9

In the historiographical sense, this concept of the “U.S.-Philippine nation” derives from recent scholars’ analyses of the bi-national imaginaries and neo-colonial realities shaping U.S.-Philippine relations. In particular, it stems partly from Neferti Tadiar’s notion of bi-national U.S.-Philippine relations as a “fantasy production” that has served U.S. interests, instead of bilateral interests or Philippine sovereignty. Consequently, to Tadiar, the Philippines have carried the burden of the discursive erasure of the

contradiction between the bi-national and mutual friendship of U.S.-Philippine relations on the one hand, and the contingent status of the Philippines as subservient to U.S. interests on the other. In addition, this concept of the U.S.-Philippine nation derives from Dylan Rodríguez’s notion of “Filipino Americanism.” Rodríguez defines Filipino Americanism as the everyday civil and cultural allegiances, particularly among Filipino Americans, to the U.S. nation-state.\(^\text{10}\) While my definition of the “U.S.-Philippine nation” takes cue from both of these scholars, what distinguishes my conceptualization of this bi-national imaginary from these previous delineations is twofold (especially in the methodological sense). First, I utilize specific case studies of Filipino laborers in the U.S. military to illustrate how this bi-national entity was exercised and challenged on the ground. Second, I complement these case studies with military correspondences that revealed the ways in which the “U.S.-Philippine nation” was enforced, particularly on the official level.

The United States Empire as a Formal and Informal Operation of Global Governance

By underscoring the discursive formation and the imperial manifestation and enforcement of the “U.S.-Philippine nation”, I argue that the United States, in matters relating specifically to the Philippines, behaved as both a formal and informal empire since the official inception of this diplomatic relationship in 1898. Previously, scholars of United States and Philippine history have delineated the history of U.S. Empire in linear or binary terms. Historians who have narrated a linear history of U.S. Empire emphasized that the U.S. transitioned from a formal empire in the Philippines, from 1898 to 1946, to

an informal one from 1947 to the present.\textsuperscript{11} Scholars who have theorized the history of U.S. Empire in binary terms often noted that the U.S. was either formally implemented in certain regions (like Puerto Rico) or informally in others (including the Philippines).\textsuperscript{12} While these scholars should be acknowledged for groundbreaking work that furthered social and cultural studies on U.S. Empire, I emphasize a more complex and multilayered historical analysis that deconstructs the teleological and binaristic framework shaping previous works on empire, particularly in a region as complex as the Philippine archipelago. I show that the United States Empire behaved formally in certain ways and informally in others, depending upon the degree of necessity and secrecy in securing its imperial project—within the same particular region and time period.

I define formal and informal U.S. Empire as divergent and convergent characteristics of imperial hegemony. By “formal” empire, I mean the actual and carefully planned implementation of policies enforcing U.S. hegemony toward a specific territory—or group of territories. In turn, I use the phrase “informal” empire to describe the sudden, spontaneous, and hidden acts of building and reinforcing American hegemony in subjugated territories around the globe. Throughout United States history, the lines between formal and informal U.S. Empire have blurred to the point where they have become almost indistinguishable and unrecognizable. Some formal policies of U.S. Empire have been planned and executed with the most informal and spontaneous methods (e.g., the Military Bases Agreement and its shifting policies of enlistment), and with some of the most informal and covert acts of imperial domination that have been

\textsuperscript{11} See, for example, Matthew Frye Jacobsen, \textit{Barbarian Virtues: the United States Encounters Foreign Peoples at Home and Abroad, 1876-1913} (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000).

committed through formal and pre-meditated methods—e.g., U.S. officials’ use of now-banned waterboard torture to squelch guerilla resistance in the Philippine-American War, the CIA’s suppression of the Huk Rebellion in the early Cold War Period, and the Central Intelligence Agency’s similar implementation of covert operations to overthrow socialist governments in Guatemala (1950s) and Chile (1970s). In this dissertation, I argue that the lines between formal and informal U.S. Empire were not only blurred, but were mutually constitutive of each other. In other words, I define formal and informal U.S. Empire in mutually and inclusively constitutive ways.

Methodological, Historiographical, and Temporal Contributions of this Dissertation Study

This dissertation project draws upon both written and oral historical records to shape its explicit and implicit historical arguments. By written historical records, I mean correspondences, letters, and memorandums composed by U.S. and Philippine military officials, political officials, military personnel, and civilian citizens. In turn, interviews of mostly Filipino naval enlistees, from various published oral history collections and manuscripts, comprise the oral historical records cited in this dissertation. While the written historical files largely informed my findings regarding enlisted stewards during World War II and civilian workers during the early Cold War period, the oral histories primarily guided and shaped my historical analysis of Filipino enlistees following the Second World War. My extensive, balanced, and methodical use of written records and

oral histories is what distinguishes this dissertation project from the work of previous scholars on this subject, particularly within Philippine/Filipino American history, Asian American studies, and American military history.

Since the interdisciplinary and groundbreaking merging of these scholarships (and activisms) in the massively influential 1976 anthology Counterpoint, there has been a plethora of published works that have documented the oral histories of enlisted Filipino stewards, primarily in the U.S. Navy. ¹⁴ Examples of such community- and academic-oriented works include Dorothy and Fred Cordova’s Filipinos: Forgotten Asian Americans (1983), Yen Le Espiritu’s Filipino American Lives (1995) and Homebound (2003), Riz Oades’s Beyond the Mask: Untold Stories of Navy Filipinos (2004), Filipino American National Historical Society’s In Our Uncles’ Words: ‘We Fought for Freedom’ (2006), Ray L. Burdeos’s Filipinos in the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard during the Vietnam War (2008), and Teresa Cenidoza Suarez’s article “Militarized Filipino Masculinity and the Language of Citizenship in San Diego” from the published anthology Militarized Currents (2010). With the exception of Dr. Suarez’s astute study which emphasizes a feminist cultural studies and critical race studies lens, these works largely are more interested in recovering histories of Navy Filipinos as part of nationally discursive and community building projects that seek to move such histories from the margins to the center of American history. While these veteran recovery projects are, to a large degree, necessary for increasing social awareness about ethnic diversity in American culture, they are in large part either celebrated or briefly assessed in various national conferences and class curricula. In other words, the primary oral histories contained in these previous

works have been under-utilized or ignored. This dissertation addresses this
methodological and historiographical gap by assembling this rich but scattered archive of
Navy Filipino testimonials published over the past forty years and by treating and
studying them with the sustained historical and theoretical attention that they deserve.

In addition, this dissertation calls attention to the politics of knowledge production
about minority enlistees. The scholarship to date by American military and public
historians tends to draw upon the records regarding minority enlistees in the National
Archives and Records Administration (NARA). Record No. 24 in the NARA file archive
is an example of what Asian American and American Studies scholar Jodi Kim calls
“regulatory knowledge production.”15 Arguably the most widely researched archive
concerning minority enlistees, this record group includes a well-organized collection of
files that the NARA archivists promote for public and scholarly viewing. One the one
hand, this particular collection of files provides a plentitude of illuminating and useful
correspondences between mostly U.S. military and political officials regarding minority
enlistment. On the other hand, the content and form of this collection largely imply a
teleological narrative of minority advancement within the narrowed periodization of U.S.
involvement in the Second World War (e.g., 1941-1945). Moreover, military historians
who have referenced this record group have done so briefly as evidentiary historical
backdrops for the larger centerpieces shaping their particular studies: e.g., naval oral
histories of minority enlistees and ensigned officers. This dissertation addresses this
methodological and historiographical gap in American military scholarship by providing
a fuller account of these written record files concerning minority enlistment and by

15 Jodi Kim, Ends of Empire: Asian American Critique and the Cold War (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 2010), 40, 150, as quoted in Camacho, Militarized Currents, xxxii.
complementing the NARA files with an analysis of USN Filipino testimonials, which are absent from these official military records.

Although this project takes the late nineteenth and entire twentieth centuries into account, it focuses on World War II and the early Cold War period up to 1965. The reasons for this are twofold. First, the overwhelming majority of researched written and oral historical records focus on this particular time period. Second, this project complements the majority of previous works in Asian American historical scholarship that focus on the post-1965 period of Asian migration and settlement in the United States. While many works rightly recognize the quantitative importance of the 1965 Immigration Act as a port of entry for hundreds of thousands of Asian professionals and families to the U.S., there were also critical masses of Asian immigrants, including Filipinos, who came to the U.S. well before 1965.\footnote{In conversation with the historians Mae Ngai (2003) and Dorothy Fujita-Rony (2003), this dissertation decenters our temporal understanding of Asian immigration as a post-1965 phenomenon, and re-centers on a significant segment of Third Wave Filipino migration to the U.S. and elsewhere in the transpacific: enlisted civilians and stewards in the U.S. military (1945-1965).\footnote{The “Third Wave” of Filipino immigration to the U.S., according to Fred Cordova, was Filipinos who came to the U.S. between 1945 and 1965. This wave primarily consisted of navy men, women nurses, professionals, business technicians, and engineers. (Cordova 1983, 20) The Second Wave of Filipino immigrants came during the U.S. colonial period between 1906 and 1934. This wave first comprised of “pensionados”, who were students subsidized by the Philippine colonial government. Those who came later in this second wave were single male laborers who worked in the farms and canneries—primarily in the American West, Midwest, and the East Coast. (Cordova 1983, 14-19) The very first wave of Filipino immigration came between 1763 and 1906. This wave included more sporadic patterns of migration among seafarers, laborers, domestic workers, and “stowaways” escaping Spanish colonial captivity in the Philippine archipelago and the galleon trade ships. On these galleon ships in particular, many of them were stationed as crew members and slave laborers. While most of them migrated to Alaska and Hawai’i, a few of them landed in Acapulco, Baja California, Peru, Guam, and New Orleans, among other places in the trans-pacific and trans-Atlantic. (Cordova 1983, 9-10) See Fred Cordova, Filipinos: Forgotten Asian}}
Like the early Cold War period, the overwhelming impact of global circumstances and catastrophes in World War II cannot be overestimated or over-studied—especially the politics of minority enlistment, inclusion, and experience in the U.S. Navy and other branches of the U.S. military. My prioritization of World War II, therefore, seeks to redress previous works by scholars of this period who have not yet addressed the most crucial events in world history—and all of its related and regional historical scholarships. My emphasis on the Second World War fills this under-theorized area of historical scholarship in Asian American studies.

Furthermore, the comparative historical lens on civilian and enlisted Filipino workers in the U.S. military utilizes a trans-local, transpacific, and transnational approach. This approach has grown exponentially in numerous fields of study especially in Southeast Asian Studies, a field that has remained an area-studies program over the past forty years. However, this dissertation hopes to exert productive pressure on the field of Southeast Asian Studies in order to prioritize Philippine/Filipino American studies and to decenter the overall area studies approach that has established and enforced Southeast Asian Studies as a globally dominant and state-funded field of scholarship since its inception as a surveillance-oriented political project for U.S. Cold War officials in the 1960s. Its disciplinary area-studies approach remains, to this day, a direct and problematic obstacle to its enriching intellectual dialogues with Asian/Pacific Islander American Studies, American Studies, Globalization Studies, and Empire Studies. Nevertheless, Southeast Asian Studies has since become much more mindful of its own political history, and has showcased well-intended efforts to transform and align itself

with other related scholarly fields. With the method and scope of this dissertation, therefore, I strive to catalyze a new scholarly movement and trajectory in Southeast Asian Studies toward a more transpacific and transnational approach that would expose and advance its interconnection with research subjects and scholars related to Philippine/Filipino American Studies, A/PIA Studies, and U.S. Empire History.

Chapter Outline

The main chapters are divided into two parts. Part I, “The Origins of Filipino Enlistment and the Making of a ‘U.S.-Philippine nation’”, delineates the converging, diverging, and synergistic trajectories of the U.S.-Philippine relationship within the context of Filipino enlistment in the U.S. Navy and other branches of the military from 1898 to 1945. This historical overview and analysis, based largely on secondary and primary sources, sets the stage for Part II of this dissertation, “The Politics of Filipino Enlistment and the Enforcement of the ‘U.S.-Philippine Nation.’” Grounded in primary sources both written and oral historical, Part II assesses the converging and diverging politics of integrating Filipino civilians and enlisted stewards within the U.S.’s armed forces and militarized spaces around the globe during the early and mid Cold War period.

Largely drawing upon the secondary works of established and groundbreaking scholars in U.S. history, empire studies, and Philippine/Filipino American studies,

18 These critical progressions in Southeast Asian Studies scholarship were evidenced in the Center of Southeast Asian Studies’ 50th anniversary conference in the University of Michigan on October 2010. This crucial progression of scholarship, foreshadowed by the groundbreaking works of Patricio Abinales, Resil Mojares, and Reynaldo Ileto—and more recently evident in the interventions of Vernadette V. Gonzalez, Kale Fajardo, and Vina A. Lanzona—articulate and reframe the crucial intersections of race, class, nation, gender, sexuality, and geography in their respective and future works of Filipino postcolonial subjectivity and resistance. Once again, this dissertation project supports and contributes to this growing body of scholarship within and across intersecting fields of Southeast Asian Studies—from the region(s) of Southeast Asia itself as well.
Chapter one traces the connections between U.S. officials’ policies of Filipino enlistment, the emergence of the U.S. as a global empire, and the making of the “U.S.-Philippine nation”: from the Philippine-American War in 1899 to the Philippine Liberation Campaign in 1945, and during the early Cold War Period. This chapter then examines case studies of Filipino civilian workers and enlistees who were recruited by U.S. military officials during this period. By synthesizing these specific case studies with the shifting and uneven grounds of U.S.-Philippine relations during this time period, I argue that the celebratory, contradictory, and reconciliatory foundations of the “U.S.-Philippine nation” were forged through early recruitments— and restrictions—of Filipinos in the U.S. military during the Philippine-American War, the implementation (and evacuation) of the American colonial state in the Philippines, and the two World Wars. It was not until World War II when the “U.S.-Philippine nation” arrived at its peak, and proved strategically and ideologically vital to the global emergence of the U.S. as an empire state by the end of the Philippine Liberation Campaign in 1945 and throughout the early Cold War period.

Chapter two is a historical analysis of Filipino and other minoritized enlisted stewards of the U.S. Navy during the wartime period. Drawing upon written correspondence between U.S. military officials and civilian citizens, this chapter discusses the politics of U.S. naval officials’ enlistment of Filipinos primarily as stewards, messmen, and cooks. It is true that the U.S. Navy stopped the recruitment of Filipinos during much of the Philippine Commonwealth period in the late 1930s and early 1940s. However, as the Second World War dragged on and the United States prepared for its return to the Pacific Theatre, the U.S. Bureau of Naval Personnel
officially reversed its policy and began enlisting more Filipinos into the armed force by 1943. While many Filipinos embraced this opportunity to enlist in the U.S. Navy during this period, their limited inclusion in manual work positions placed them alongside other racial, ethnic, and foreign minorities hired for similar lines of work. Despite written efforts by concerned civilians to enhance their upward mobility within the naval ranks, the anxious responses and methods among U.S. officials proved not only similar to these officials’ handling of civilian personnel matters in the Philippines, but they also illustrated the extremely limited sense of political mobility amongst Filipino and other minority enlistees within (and beyond) the U.S. militarized space especially during the Second World War.

Chapter three details the contingent and intimate connections between the enrollment of Filipino civilians and enlistees in the U.S. military; and, the enforcements, anxious continuities, and destabilizations of the “U.S.-Philippine nation” following the Second World War. As the bi-national alliance of the “U.S.-Philippine nation” peaked by the end of World War II, anxieties among U.S. officials regarding the destabilization of this bi-national entity—or even worse to some, its decolonization—escalated when Philippine Independence was officially enacted vis-à-vis plenary power in 1946. Drawing upon secondary and primary research, this chapter gives an overview of how the continual recruitment and experience of civilian and enlisted Filipino laborers both enforced and unsettled American militarist presence in the Philippines, elsewhere in the transpacific, and around the globe.

Chapter four assesses case studies about Filipino civilian workers in the U.S Navy and other branches in the military during the early Cold War period, with a special focus
on the Bartolome Roldan case. Roldan was a former civilian worker on Clark Air Force Base who organized a labor union inside the base in order to agitate for overtime pay, actions that prompted his termination by U.S. Air Force authorities. His immediate termination led to increased horizontal mobilization amongst his fellow co-workers on-base, vertical-based alliances with Philippine local and national politicians, and national press coverage regarding his case. This case proved politically influential at the national and international levels, as evidenced by simultaneous mobilizations among Filipino civilian laborers around the transpacific, as well as the subsequent persistence by Philippine labor officials to establish a U.S.-Philippine labor committee to investigate U.S. officials’ treatment of Filipino laborers on its bases in the Philippines. While this and other related cases illustrated the great political maneuverability of Filipino civilian workers on U.S. bases in the transpacific, they also illuminated the anxieties of U.S. officials and the methods that these officials had at their disposal to declare and enforce unilateral practices shaping the “U.S.-Philippine nation” during the early postwar period.

Chapters five and six focus our attention toward Filipino enlistees during the early-mid Cold War period. While my earlier chapters rely upon the analysis of written records to articulate and assess the historical politics of Filipino enlistment, this chapter draws largely from available oral historical records to provide an in-depth analysis of the “upward mobility” of Filipino enlistees and their varying degrees of inclusion within the U.S. nation-state. These varying degrees of inclusion, as determined by U.S. officials, also facilitated the politics of Filipino enlistment. Unlike their civilian counterparts, Filipino enlistees in the U.S. Navy and in other branches of the U.S. military were offered U.S. citizenship, G.I. benefits, global mobility, and global settlement for themselves and
their families within U.S. militarized spaces all over the globe. It is true that their increased inclusion in the U.S. nation-state facilitated celebratory terms and conditions of their enlistment, and I address these terms of inclusion in chapter five. However, their limited mobility within the navy rank and file, coupled with their restricted political mobilization within these militarized spaces (in the collective sense), illuminated and reinforced the uneven, contradictory, and reconciliatory conditions shaping the “U.S.-Philippine nation” in particular, and the U.S. as a global empire state in general. In chapter six, I delineate and deconstruct these politics of postwar enlistment and restricted inclusion affecting Filipinos in the U.S. Navy and other branches of the military.

This dissertation contains topical, temporal, and methodological “blind spots” that I will correct in future revisions and distributions. One blind spot is the comparative empire studies analysis of Filipino enlistment in transpacific U.S. bases to those stationed in bases of the Trans-Atlantic. Another is a more central gendered analysis of Filipino enlistment, which is more emergent in the fifth chapter than in the rest of the dissertation. My primary reason for these “blind spots” is this: there was not enough evidence in the recovered written historical records to extrapolate gender-centered or further comparative regional analysis of this subject of empire and postcolonial history.

Additionally, as a side note one cannot underestimate the relationship between my own personal and local history, as a “Navy brat”, and the politics of enlistment shaping Filipino recruitment and experience in and beyond the U.S. Navy: particularly, as the son of a Navy Filipino seaman, the nephew of a Navy Filipino midshipman, and the grandson of a Navy Filipino steward. Having been born and raised in the Cavite Province, my grandfather/lolo was recruited from the Sangley Point U.S. Naval Base in Cavite City.
Also, having been born in Cavite City and growing up all over the world as a “Navy brat”, my uncle became a U.S. naval officer via the U.S. Naval Academy (USNA) in Annapolis, Maryland in 1979: the same year that I was born. Moreover, as the daughter of a Navy Filipino steward, my mother joined the U.S. Navy in 1978 vis-à-vis Lemoore Naval Air Station in Lemoore, California, USA. Indeed, my personal and familial relationship with Navy Filipinos can certainly be further emphasized and studied in relation to my archival findings, especially as they pertain to the local histories of these aforementioned places of Cavite, Olongapo, Annapolis, and Lemoore respectively. However, I have not yet had the chance explore my personal connections with the politics of Filipino enlistment as thoroughly in this dissertation, especially given the disciplinary method and scope of the written historical archive. Nevertheless, my historical theorizations of these archival case studies have undoubtedly—if not implicitly—been significantly shaped by my own personal and local histories as a “Navy brat.” It is in the manuscript version of this dissertation that I look forward to explicitly emphasizing and evaluating my own personal historical relationship with the politics of enlistment and empire in shaping the bi-national formations of the “U.S.-Philippine nation” on the one hand, and the “tense and tender ties”¹⁹ of U.S. Empire on the other. These connections between the personal, local, and historical need not only be explored within the history discipline²⁰, but even beyond its confines in the creative and interdisciplinary outlets of

¹⁹ I borrow this term from the theoretical framework of Ann Laura Stoler’s and Frederick Cooper’s anthology Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997). Stoler and Cooper, along with other selected articles in that anthology, argue that empire is a dominant, fluid, yet always tense and tender entity that is constantly in danger of being ruptured and restructured through close and distant interactions between the metropole and its colonial subjects.

²⁰ Reynaldo Ileto and Alfred McCoy are examples of scholars whose military or military family backgrounds arguably shape the epistemology, diverging youth politics, topical scope, and historical discipline of their respective works. Please see Reynaldo Ileto, Pasyon and Revolution: Popular
poetry, art, and spoken word. While I promise to correct these shortcomings by conducting more oral histories of wartime enlistees and postwar civilian workers in the manuscript stage of this project, I realize that the process of revision is, as poet Emmanuel Lacaba would note, like peeling a billion layers of coconut husks. In other words this process, or journey, of dialectical revision: infinite.

Movements in the Philippines, 1840-1910 (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila UP, 1979); and Alfred McCoy, Closer than Brothers: Manhood at the Philippine Military Academy (New Haven: Yale UP, 1999).

PART I

The Origins of Filipino Enlistment and the Making of a “U.S.-Philippine Nation”: A Historical Overview of Filipino Civilian and Enlisted Workers in the U.S. Military

CHAPTER ONE

Historicizing the Politics of Filipino Enlistment: Philippine-American War to the Early Cold War Period

Introduction

On January 31, 1946, a Subic Bay U.S. Navy commandant corresponded with Charles J. Bodnar, a U.S. Naval Reserve commander. This letter confirmed the establishment of a board of review consisting of three high-ranked naval officers. According to this Commandant, the board of review of U.S.N. officers aimed “to screen active, reserve, and retired naval personnel suspected of alleged collaboration with the enemy.” After the selection and screening of suspected naval personnel, the board of review met to determine the fate of those suspects: whether or not to bring them to trial for further investigation. The board then gave their final recommendations to the commander of the Philippine Sea Frontier for further investigation of these suspects in the U.S. Navy.22

22 Mark L. Hersey, Commandant, U.S. Naval Operating Base Manila-Subic to Charles J. Bodnar, Commander, US Naval Reserve, “Board to Review to Screen Active, Reserve, and Retired Naval Personnel Suspected of Alleged Collaboration with the Enemy,” Memorandum, Manila-Subic Bay, Philippines; 31 January 1946, p. 1; BAUTISTA, Jesus, MM1c, USN (Ret.), Case File, 1945-1946; Box 6 or 11, File 313-08-006 (181-72-0144); National Archives and Records Administration (Pacific Region), San Francisco.
The name of this U.S. Navy commandant was Mark L. Hersey, Jr.; and the targeted USN suspects described in Hersey’s letter were Filipinos who directly—or indirectly—collaborated with the Japanese military during World War II. Hersey’s letter, which confirmed the creation of this board of review, revealed two oft-concealed historical developments in U.S.-Philippine relations following the Second World War. First, it highlighted the anxieties of U.S. military officials about the possible prevalence of Filipinos whom they considered “subversive.” In this early postwar period of the allied “U.S.-Philippine nation”, U.S. officials defined Filipino “subversives” as those who directly—or indirectly—cooperated with the Japanese military during World War II. U.S. and Philippine allied forces demarcated these subversives as the “enemy” not only in wartime, but also in this early postwar period.

Secondly, in this early postwar context, Commandant Hersey’s letter paved the way for a broader historical definition of who U.S. officials considered “subversive” in the Philippines. In other words, former collaborationists with the Japanese imperial military were not only considered as subversives by the U.S. government, but also worthy of close scrutiny by U.S. officials. Wartime collaborators with the U.S. government, the Hukbalahaps (e.g. the Huks), shifted their political allegiances from agents of the wartime “U.S.-Philippine nation” to anti-colonial nationalists who sought Philippine sovereignty, autonomous of U.S. influence, during the early postwar period. Like the wartime collaborationists of the Japanese government, the postwar Huks were seen as “subversives” in the eyes of U.S. government officials. The continuing presence of the collaborationists, coupled with the shifting politics of the Hukbalahaps, shaped U.S. officials’ anxieties about their neo-colonial rule in the Philippines, even as the date of
Philippine formal independence approached on July 4, 1946. Postwar public celebrations of alliance and friendship between the U.S. and the Philippines often concealed U.S. officials’ private suspicions about Filipino political “subversives.” During the early postwar period, their usual Filipino suspects consisted primarily of two categories: one, the postwar Huks; and two, wartime collaborators with the Japanese government.

Why did U.S. officials see the threat that these groups posed as great enough to merit the creation of a board of review and the invention of other methods to locate, investigate, and classify these Filipinos as “subversive”? To what extent did these investigative practices disturb but also reinforce the politics of enlisting Filipinos into the U.S. naval force? And third, what political and historical implications did Filipino enlistment have for the informing and shaping of U.S. colonial practices of war, militarism and governance in the Philippines, which dated from the late nineteenth century?

By addressing these questions of Filipino political enlistment, I make the following arguments in this chapter. First, U.S. national conceptualizations and practices of race, nationhood, and citizenship informed U.S. involvement in, and evacuation from, the Philippines—from the Philippine-American War (1899-1913); to the institutionalizations of the American colonial state (1901-1934); and through the commonwealth period in the Philippines (1934-1946). During and following the Second World War, the U.S. reemerged as an occupying force in the Philippines, and U.S. notions of race, nation, and citizenship collapsed, in a bi-national context, to the point that by the early Cold War period the presence of the U.S. colonial state in the Philippines had become unnoticed by the populace. Second, promises of the U.S.
benevolence and bi-national friendship with the Philippines—among U.S. and Philippine officials—further shaped the unrecognizable presence of the U.S. as an empire, and reinforced the realities and continuums of colonial governance, political compliance, and economic inequality that shaped the foundations of U.S.-Philippine relations. And thirdly, I argue that these promises and realities of U.S.-Philippine relations foreground a bi-national formation that I call the “U.S.-Philippine nation.” These promises and realities of the “U.S.-Philippine nation” facilitated not only the emergence and repression of anti-colonial nationalists but also the policies of Filipino enlistment and the politics of Filipino marginalization in the U.S. militarized space. I foreground and broadly assess these policies and politics of Filipino enlistment through my case study of former U.S.N. civilian and enlisted laborer Jesus Bautista.

**HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE COLONIAL U.S.-PHILIPPINE RELATIONSHIP**

Throughout the Philippine-American War and the U.S. colonial period in the Philippines (1899-1934), U.S. officials justified their imperial ambitions by articulating racially subjugating conceptualizations of Filipinos. These conceptualizations echoed invidious and concurring rationalizations of Indian removal, occupation of Mexico, and enslavement of Blacks. Concurrent pro-imperialist discourse represented Filipino citizens as “children” and “savages” in need of Christianity, education and overall “uplift” within the American national standard.23

These images circulated through newspaper publications, congressional hearings, and especially exhibitions at worlds’ fairs. Anti-imperialist groups such as the Trade Union delegate voiced their protests against the U.S. occupation of the Philippines under the rubrics of racial paternalism and xenophobia. For instance, some anti-imperialists claimed that Filipinos needed to be “saved” from the savagery and atrocity of U.S. imperialism and militarism. Others, like Senator William Jennings Bryan, claimed Filipinos were the “savages.” These “savages,” therefore, were not deserving of incorporation into the U.S. nation and citizenry. In addition, to Bryan and other anti-imperialists, the integration of Filipinos into U.S. society would only enhance and complicate the U.S. domestic race issue. Meanwhile, anti-imperialist artists like George Ade and Mark Twain satirized the Christian-based ideologies that justified U.S. conquest of the Philippines. On one hand, these public figures highlighted their anti-imperial politics by critiquing the ways in which lust and greed shaped the real motives of U.S. imperialism in the Philippines and elsewhere. On the other hand, their politics of recognition simultaneously subscribed to racialist conceptions that assumed Filipinos were unfit for self-government.

Meanwhile, the U.S.’s policies and justifications of imperial occupation directly contradicted with elite Philippine nationalist claims to sovereignty during the Spanish-American War. Philippine military leader Emilio Aguinaldo, for instance, pleaded to U.S. naval commodore Dewey to grant the Philippines independence during their alliance

24 See, for instance, Enrique de la Cruz et al., The Forbidden Book (San Francisco: T’Boli, 2004); and Benito Vergara, Displaying Filipinos: Photography and Colonialism in Early 20th Century Philippines (University of Philippines Press: Quezon City, 1995).

25 Please see Mark Twain, “Darkness that Enters the Home,” in Luis Francisca and Angel Velasco Shaw, Vestiges of War: the Aftermath of an Imperial Dream (New York: NYU Press, 2002); and Victor Román Mendoza, Fantasy Islands (upcoming).
against Spanish forces. When Dewey and U.S. officials refused to acknowledge Philippine independence, Aguinaldo defiantly declared himself president of the Philippine republic on July 2, 1898. Nonetheless, critical masses of Philippine nationalist forces, led by Aguinaldo, grew prominence while Commodore Dewey kept his men stationed in Cavite and enhanced preparations for battle against the Philippines.\(^\text{26}\) Alas, with the opposing agendas of the U.S. and the Philippines coming to a head, the first shots were fired between U.S. and Philippine forces on February 4, 1899 in Manila. Thus the Philippine-American War had begun, with the occupation, colonization, and informal emergence of the American colonial state in the Philippines happening simultaneously.

During the Philippine-American War, U.S. army field commanders openly recruited local Philippine scouts. Previously having served Philippine nationalists, these members of the Philippine scouts switched allegiances to the U.S. field commanders. These field commanders assigned the Philippine Scouts to duties similar to those assigned to Indian scouts during the early-mid nineteenth century in the following ways. First, these Philippine Scouts were designated navigators who would serve as guides through the terrain and tropics of the Philippine archipelago. Second, they served as interpreters to help commanders communicate, negotiate with, and pacify local Philippine natives. Moreover, President William McKinley passed an executive order to recruit 500 Filipinos into the naval insular force on April 1, 1901 to assist the U.S. war, annexation, and colonization of the Philippines. Also, U.S. navy officials hired the first Filipinos in

the regular naval force as cooks, who later would be known as mess attendants.\textsuperscript{27} While naval officials assigned these Filipinos to menial positions and hence consigned them to the margins of the navy, the purpose of Filipino naval enlistment remained the same as that of recruiting Philippine scouts: the implementation and enforcement of the American colonial state in the Philippines.

As the emergence and enforcement of the U.S. colonial state in the Philippines became imminent, U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt declared the formal end of the Philippine-American War on July 4, 1902. The formal end of the war, in turn, meant the return of the majority of American troops to the United States. Four months later, the U.S. Philippine Commission passed the Brigandage Act, which declared that future armed subversion to foreign U.S. rule would be considered “banditry.” These two formal announcements served three functions that further shaped the informal implementations of the U.S. Empire and the “U.S.-Philippine nation.” First, they allowed subsequent and scattered sites of the imperial war to be downplayed, forgotten, and unknown within American political discourse. Second, they shifted public attention toward the multifaceted colonial project and building of the “U.S.-Philippine nation.” And third, these acts added another political dimension to the U.S. racial classification of Filipinos: those who continued to resist U.S. foreign rule would be vilified and deemed inassimilable to the American colonial state project. These announcements, in turn, set the historical—and historiographical—tone for the almost complete denial of the U.S. Empire in the Philippines. Concurrently and subsequently, the racial distinctions between the “good”—e.g. “assimilable”—and “bad”—e.g. “inassimilable” Filipinos further

\textsuperscript{27} Alfred McCoy, \textit{Closer than Brothers: Manhood at the Philippine Military Academy} (New Haven: Yale UP, 1999), 18; William McKinley, Executive Order, April 1, 1901; Yen Le Espiritu, \textit{Homebound} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).
shaped the fantasy productions of the “U.S.-Philippine nation” and actual continuities of war shaping the informal U.S. Empire in the Philippines.

According to historian Reynaldo Ileto, the informal continuation of war between the U.S. and the Philippines became known as “amigo warfare.”28 Under amigo warfare, armed Philippine nationalists relied on guerilla forces and tactics to overthrow the U.S. occupation within different local regions and provinces throughout the archipelago, including Ilocos, Samar, and Mindinao. In the northern region, the last standoffs between U.S. and Philippine forces took place in 1907 before the establishment of the Philippine Assembly later that year. In the southern island of Mindinao, U.S. forces initiated a second front of war despite the negotiation and execution of the Bates Agreement which promised Muslim Filipinos peace and autonomy in this area of the archipelago. During these informal stages of the war, at least 4,000 U.S. troops and one million Filipino citizens died.29 After one last massacre within this southern province in 1913, the U.S. military government in Mindinao formally declared the area as “pacified.”

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29 I use the term “Filipino citizens” to recognize and pay homage to the one million Filipinos of the Philippine military and civilian citizenry who either may have fought for or imagined, within varying degrees, an autonomous Philippines: including those whose lives may have been lost at the hands of U.S. forces or Filipino collaborators of the U.S. government. Philippine studies scholars such as Reynaldo Ileto have analyzed specific religious sects of the Philippine populace who have imagined and struggled for communal forms of kalayaan, or freedom in Filipino/Tagalog, particularly during the formal and informal stages of the Philippine-American War. On the one hand, more specific and broader sects of the Philippine populace have yet to be further studied in general—especially during the formal and informal stages of the U.S. war against the Philippines. On the other hand, by coining these specific and broader segments of the Philippine population as Filipino citizens (of kalayaan), I recognize and pay homage to these deceased locals and nationals whom I recall as citizens.
declaration of pacification, the military government lifted its rule on the entire province. This 1913 massacre and pacification marked the end of the Philippine-American War.\(^{30}\)

Additionally, U.S. military forces informally pacified the Philippine insurgents in the southern province through methods of torture, including the practice of what had become known as the “water cure.” This form of torture, alongside others acknowledged by previous scholars, would later be duplicated and modified in subsequent U.S. military actions: the declared Korean and Vietnam Wars during the early Cold War; the covert Latin American Wars during the 1980s; and the imprisonment of political detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba in the twenty-first century. Nonetheless, during the Philippine-American War of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, U.S. military officials like Colonel Frederick Funston initially utilized this and other methods of torture to pacify and subjugate those they viewed as “illiterate, savage people” who subverted “Anglo-Saxon order and decency.”\(^{31}\)

With the formal and informal stages of the Philippine-American War ending in 1913, U.S. officials implemented at least three technologies of colonial governance. First, U.S. officials constructed military base installations that included Sangley Point in Cavite City, Subic Bay in Olongapo City, and Clark Air Force Base in the Pampanga Province.\(^{32}\)


\(^{32}\) Sangley Point was immediately occupied by U.S. forces following the Battle of Manila Bay in May 1898. Subsequently, in 1901, Theodore Roosevelt issued an executive order which designated Subic Bay,
Second, they organized the infrastructural institutionalization of American colonial schools within intimate proximities toward these bases. And third, they implemented American political governance in the Philippines by former University of Michigan faculty Dean Worcester, future Detroit Mayor, Michigan Governor, and U.S. Supreme Court Judge Frank Murphy, and future U.S. President William Howard Taft. In turn, these three formal—and informal—technologies of colonial governance required the enlistment of Filipinos within the U.S. military for reinforcement and imperial expansion across the Pacific and Latin America during these first two decades of the twentieth century.

Nevertheless, while these first two decades oversaw the formations of the American colonial state in the Philippine archipelago, Philippine subjects continually contested U.S. hegemony in varying degrees. Whether in the form of armed guerilla resistance in the 1910s, or in the form of politically seditious writings like that of Isabelo de los Reyes in the 1920s, anti-colonial Philippine resistance persisted despite the implementation of the American colonial state and its politics of Filipino enlistment. By 1930, the Sakdalistas had emerged as a collective organization of Philippine resistance.

Founded by former Senate Clerk Benigno Ramos in 1930, the Sakdalistas consisted primarily of poor and working-class laborers and peasants who consistently spoke out against the establishment, the American colonial educational system, colonial governance, and militarism in the Philippines. They argued that mass poverty in the

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along with 70,000 acres of land adjacent to Olongapo City, as a U.S. military installation; three years later, in 1904, two years after the formal end of the Philippine-American War, Subic Bay was officially declared as a U.S. naval reservation. (Simbulan 1983, 118) Additionally, Fort Stotsenburg was first declared as a military reservation for the U.S. Fifth Cavalry in 1903, and was expanded as an airfield after the Second World War (which at this time and thereafter became known as Clark Air Force Base). (Simbulan 1983, 131-32)
region resulted less from the global impact of the Great Depression and more from the “American stranglehold” on the Philippine economy. Hence, the Sakdalistas urged complete sovereignty for the Philippines, autonomous from the institutional and cultural hegemony of the United States. By the end of 1935, the Sakdalistas had demanded the following conditions for Philippine independence: tax abolishment; state control of natural resources; and national and equitable distribution of land and agriculture to the landless peasantry. 33

The massive circulation of the Sakdalistas’ newsletter Sakdal spurred the emergence and increased the influence of the communal-based organization. Accompanied by its masthead “Independent with no master but the people,” the Sakdal newsletter included and politicized phrases that shaped the Sakdalistas’ politics of recognition against the U.S. colonial state. Eventually, other radical groups such as the Tangulan would subscribe to similar views and practices that were also highlighted in the Sakdal newsletter. The common ground for these radical organizations stemmed from their oppositional relationship to the U.S. and Philippine ruling elite during that time.

According to the historian Renato Constantino:

The tabloid [newsletter] accused both Quezon and Osmena of being servants of the Americans and charged independence missioners with insincerity. It adopted the position that independence is not given but must be taken through the united action of the people. The paper ranged itself against the political and economic oligarchy and proved with statistics the widening gap between the rich and poor. It soon became immensely popular with all sectors that disapproved of or had grievances against the status quo. These readers became the nucleus of the Sakdalistas organization. 34

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34 Ibid., 373.
In reaction to the growing influence of the Sakdalistas on the peasantry and working class, the U.S.-Philippine colonial government made sincere efforts to squash the Sakdal movement. The colonial government harassed the Sakdalistas during their regular meetings. Also, in order to prevent the Sakdalistas from holding rallies in public spaces, the government refused permits to Sakdals who wished to protest publicly.\(^{35}\)

Nevertheless, the peasantry continued to attend, support, and shape the meetings organized by the Sakdalistas. These meetings were often held in private houses, stores (tiendas), barbershops, and even on water while pretending to be fishermen. In addition, the Sakdalistas became involved in electoral politics. In 1934, the first year of the Philippines as a Commonwealth, the Sakdalistas elected a plethora of candidates as representatives in local elections during that year. Subsequently, all three of their candidates were elected: two from the Laguna Province, one from Tayabas. Another Sakdal Party candidate was elected governor in Mardinduque, and others eventually won municipal posts in Laguna, Bulucan, Ecija, Rizal, and Cavite.\(^{36}\)

In response to the electoral success of the Sakdalistas’ efforts, founder and leader Benigno Ramos gradually shifted the Sakdalistas’ politics from grassroots independence to reformist collaboration with the Japanese imperial government. Evidence of this ideological shift included the following: one, Ramos’s downplaying of the “Anti-Americanism” expressed by his followers; two, prioritizing his political party’s agenda towards national ownership of the military, resource control, and corruption prevention;

\(^{35}\) *Ibid.*

\(^{36}\) *Ibid.*
and three, the renaming and reconfiguring of their organization so as to form the Ganap Party, which took a pro-Japanese collaborationist political stance.\footnote{Ibid.}

The shifting politics of the Sakdalistas led to the alienation of local peasantry by 1935. Eventually, these local peasantry reclaimed and retained themselves as communal-based agents against the American colonial state and its local elites. The Sakdal leadership’s alienation from the peasantry transpired in a massive protest by the peasantry on May 2 of that year. Held at midnight, this protest ultimately became an uprising, and it is interpreted by historian Renato Constantino as a politically conscious act against the U.S.-Philippine colonial relationship. The political lineage of such acts rooted in the formal and guerilla stages of the Philippine-American War, as emphasized earlier in this chapter.

Consequently, the Sakdal leadership’s departure from the peasantry demonstrated how fearful and cautious their organization was of the reactionary forms of terror displayed and perpetuated by militarized agents of the Philippine-American colonial state and commonwealth. Given Ramos’s previous political affiliations as a senate clerk, it was likely that Ramos was more fearful and respectful of the U.S.-Philippine colonial state than the peasantry. While Ramos’s middle-class background shaped his collaborationist politics with the elite, the peasantry’s full knowledge of the U.S.-Philippine colonial state was rooted in the hardships they faced on a daily and nightly basis: lack of work, lack of land, lack of agricultural resources.

These class-based divergences between the Sakdalista leadership and peasantry ultimately led to the political fissures within the party overall. The leadership, as represented by Benigno Ramos, collaborated with the Japanese imperial government to
form the pre-war Ganap Party. Over time, the local peasants, over time, collectively organized in different reconfigurations like the Hukbalahaps (Huks), Partido ng Komunista (PKP), and the Communist Party of the Philippines/National People’s Army (CPP/NPA) during the post-World War II period. These trans-local countryside peasants, alongside the urban working class poor, chose to take matters into their own hands and continued to oppose those whom they considered as the primary source of their lack of material and political sustainability: the U.S.-Philippine colonial state. The contradictions between the visual fantasies of U.S.-Philippine friendship and the everyday realities of socioeconomic inequality proved to be vital sources for the radical politicization of the poor and working class since the Philippine-American War.

In turn, the radical politicization of the poor and working class facilitated the anxieties of the U.S.-Philippine colonial state. Henceforth, during the 1930s, as the Philippines underwent a massive transition from colonial state to commonwealth, Philippine officials were as anxious as ever in enforcing their political authority despite—and because of—this period of increasingly informal colonial rule in the Philippines. The U.S. congressional passage of the Tydings-McDuffie and Repatriation Acts of 1934 and 1935, respectively, marked this transition from formal to informal colonial rule and the exclusion of Filipino immigrants from the continental US. Additionally, everyday acts of violence committed by W.A.S.P. laborers toward Filipino migrant laborers in California further reinforced the politics of exclusion of Filipinos during this period.38

38 Events impacting the everyday lives of trans-pacific Filipinos between the Philippine-American War and the Great Depression have been highlighted, articulated, and theorized in post-World War II writings by analysts and activists. See Carey McWilliams’ works; Carlos Bulosan’s America is in the Heart: A Personal History; the Asian American studies-based anthology Counterpoint; Chris Friday, Organizing Asian American Labor: the Pacific Coast Canned-Salmon Industry, 1870-1942 (1994); Dorothy Fujita-Rony’s American Workers, Colonial Power: Philippine Seattle and the Transpacific West, 1919-1941 (2003); and Paul A. Kramer’s Blood and Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines
THE CASE OF JESUS BAUTISTA

One individual who fit this category of trans-local/trans-pacific Filipinos was Jesus Bautista. Bautista worked both as an enlistee and as a civilian for the U.S. Navy from the late 1920s to the early 1940s. Until the writing of this dissertation, this person’s name and case file has never been mentioned or studied before in any field of historical scholarship. However, this name and person sparked the anxious hearts and minds of U.S. military officials following the Second World War. Bautista, along with thousands of others, was closely scrutinized during a time when the politics of recognition of the “U.S.-Philippine nation” were peaking in the Philippine Liberation Campaign of 1944 and 1945. Bautista’s previous interactions with the “radical” Sakdalistas informed close and concealed surveillance.

During the late 1920s and 1930s, Jesus Bautista was an enlistee in the United States Navy, and he rated as high as a first class machinist mate. In the mid-to-late 1930s, Bautista was known to become a member of the Sakdalistas. From 1942 to 1943,

(2006). Writings on U.S. Filipinos have also been the focal point of textual analysis in a plethora of literary critiques; please see Victor Bascara’s Model Minority Imperialism (2006), Susan Koshy’s Sexual Naturalization (2006), and Allen Isaac’s American Tropics: Articulating Filipino America (2006).

Nevertheless, these works have covered briefly or sporadically the living experience of Filipinos in the U.S. military, and how their daily interactions with military personnel shaped labor policies of Filipino enlistment since the emergence of the “U.S.-Philippine nation” in World War II. Jesse Quinsaat’s article on U.S. Navy Filipinos from the Counterpoint Anthology (1976) and Fred Cordova’s Filipinos: Forgotten Asian Americans (1983) arguably spurred a plethora of oral history collections of these veterans. Examples include Yen Le Espiritu’s Filipino American Lives (1995); Riz Oades’s Beyond the Mask: Untold Stories of U.S. Navy Filipinos (2004); Filipino American National Historical Society’s In Our Uncles’ Words: ‘We Fought for Freedom’ (2006); and Ramon Burdeos’s U.S. Navy Filipinos in Vietnam (2008). However, with the exception of Yen Le Espiritu’s Homebound: Filipino American Lives Across Cultures, Communities, and Countries (2003), not enough scholarly works of U.S. military Filipino experience have critically examined the relationship between USN Filipinos and the emergence of the model minority myth. Only E. San Juan Jr.’s After Postcolonialism: Remapping Philippines-United States Confrontations (2000) has critiqued potential perpetuations of the model minority myth in mainstream academic, community, and political discourse.
Bautista worked as a civilian worker at the Navy Yard in Cavite during the Japanese military occupation.

Several months after the end of the Second World War, on February 22, 1946, the United States military gave Bautista a recommendation for general court martial. The premise of this recommendation was Bautista’s possible treason against the U.S. government because of his association with the Sakdalistas as a navy enlistee and because of his potential collaboration with the Japanese military as a civilian worker in World War II.

As part of their investigation of Bautista’s previous associations with the Sakdalistas, U.S. military officials interviewed a handful of Bautista’s friends and former co-workers in Cavite. Each interviewed person offered considerably varying testimonies regarding Bautista’s degree of involvement with the Sakdalistas. While some claimed that Bautista interacted with Sakdal leaders in passing and with lack of interest, others proclaimed the exact opposite: that Bautista was a full-fledged member of the Sakdalistas during the late 1930s and early 1940s.

One such accusatory testimony came from Mariano Angel. Angel was an intelligence officer for the U.S.-allied South Central Luzon Saboteur Unit of the Guerilla Forces during the wartime and early postwar period. In Cavite City, Philippines, U.S. military officials brought Angel as a witness to address the extent of his association with Bautista, along with his knowledge of Bautista’s associations with the Sakdalistas. In his testimony, Angel proclaimed: “I have known Jesus Bautista of M. Gregorio Street, San
Antonio, Cavite City to have worked for the Japanese Navy inside the Cavite Navy Yard as a Coppersmith. This man is a well known Sakdalista or Ganap.”39

Nevertheless, testimonies that contradicted Angel’s led U.S. military officials to discontinue any further recommendation of Mr. Bautista for general court martial and treason owing to lack of sufficient evidence. In fact, one U.S. military official went so far as to clear any negative commentary regarding this case from Bautista’s military record. For instance, this official discounted Bautista’s family members’ previous involvements with the Japanese military and the “hearsay” testimonies of Bautista’s colleagues.

According to a correspondence letter by H.H. Good, Commander of the U.S. Naval Forces of the Philippines, to the Naval Board of Review:

1. From a careful and detailed study of this record accompanied by further investigation it has been determined that there is insufficient proof available to support a charge of treason: holding intercourse with the enemy. The charges that subject’s wife and daughters spread Japanese propaganda cannot be considered against subject. The mere fact that subject was employed as a machinist is insufficient to justify a charge of treason. None of the statements indicating adherence to the enemy allegedly made by the accused are accompanied by any overt act. Consequently they cannot be made basis of a charge of treason. Further these statements are not susceptible of proof because they are too indefinite as to time and place and are, in many cases, supported by only hearsay evidence. Accordingly, for the above reasons the subject man cannot be brought to trial without any possibilities of conviction. Inasmuch as trial would be futile it is deemed advisable to disapprove recommendation for same.

2. In the Japanese boatyard Recommendation for trial by general court martial… is hereby disapproved. You will take necessary steps to remove all disabilities accruing to as a result of this charge and will clear subject man’s record insofar as this charge is concerned.40

39 Mariano Angel, Intelligence Officer, South Central Luzon Saboteur Unit of the Guerilla Forces to G.R. McLean, Lieutenant, U.S. Naval Reserve, Testimonial STATEMENT, Cavite City, Philippines, 25 November 1945, p. 1; BAUTISTA, Jesus, MM1c, USN (Ret.), Case File, 1945-1946; Box 6 of 11 File 313-08-006 (181-72-0144); National Archives and Records Administration (Pacific Region), San Francisco.
40 H.H. Good, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Philippines to Board of Review, Naval Forces Philippines, “BAUTISTA, Jesus, MM1c, U.S. Navy (Retired), Memorandum, Manila, Philippines; 20 August 1946, p. 1; BAUTISTA, Jesus, MM1c, USN (Ret.), Case File, 1945-1946; Box 6 of 11, File 313-08-006 (181-72-0144); National Archives and Records Administration (Pacific Region), San Francisco.
Significantly, Bautista became one of many local Filipinos who fell under close investigation by the Truman administration for past or living acts of treason against the U.S. government between September 1945 and June 1946. While the exact number of Filipinos who were under investigation for possible subversive collaborations is not listed in the recovered historical record, the amount of interest and investment that the Truman administration took to suppress the communist and other “subversive” forces during this period were aplenty. On May 25, 1946, the Truman administration proposed Congress to implement an act that would provide military assistance to the Philippines, especially in response to the emerging communist movement and other possible political oppositions from the Philippines. Such military assistance included the training of Filipino personnel, as well as equipment, weaponry, and other provisions that would better equip these cooperatives for suppressing political resistance to the dominant paradigms of the “U.S.-Philippine nation” (at least for a five-year period). This act, known as H.R. 6572 (e.g. the Military Foreign Assistance Act), was formally introduced by a vice admiral to the Committee of Foreign Affairs on June 7, 1946, and later was passed unanimously by Congress on June 3 of the same year.

It could also be suggested that such military assistance, provided by this Military Foreign Assistance Act, included the informal investigations of Jesus Bautista and other local Filipinos who sparked U.S. officials’ suspicions of being possibly “subversive” to their emerging “U.S.-Philippine nation.” Financial and official assistance in such investigations might have been left “off the record” within the Committee of Foreign Affairs hearings that led to the passage of the act. This was implied by the following statement during the Committee Hearing regarding this act, as stated by House Chairman
Bloom to Vice Admiral Sherman: “if there is anything that you think should be out of the record at that point please say so, and then the reporter will make a note of that…”

Given that these investigations were never discussed during these hearings, it is likely that they were implemented informally and within the extraterritorial jurisdiction of American military officials in the Philippines during the Truman presidency.

Nevertheless, with the passage of the Military Assistance Act of 1946, along with US officials’ informal investigations of their Filipino civilian workers, officials felt more comfortable in securing their ideological partnership with the Philippines, an emerging sovereign nation that Vice Admiral Forrest Sherman noted as a “‘keystone in the foundation of a base system essential to the security of the United States, its possessions, the Western Hemisphere, and the Philippines.’”

While the general conditions of global Cold War politics shaped the context behind these massive investigations in the Philippine archipelago, the question of Philippine independence provided another factor informing such inquiries. Nonetheless, despite these abundant and, in some cases, inconclusive investigations, the Philippine Independence Act was finally passed by U.S. Congress in 1946. This act thereby declared the Philippines “independent” from the United States, hence defining the Philippines as a “sovereign” nation. The resolution of the Bautista case occurred amidst the broader declaration of Philippine Independence, and so it appeared that there was an increasing mutual sense of security and postwar bi-national friendship between these two independent nations during the Cold War. However, I argue that the “resolution” of this

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42 Ibid., 8.
case signified the emergence of the Philippines as a newly sovereign nation under the auspices of a neo-colonial politics of a joint “U.S.-Philippine nation.”

After clearance from further recommendation for general court martial trial, Jesus Bautista requested back pay in 1947. This proposed back pay consisted of unpaid labor and benefits during his tenure in the navy. While the U.S. Navy took care of any missing income or benefits due to Bautista as an enlistee in the 1930s, the USN never granted benefits due to Bautista during his tenure as a civilian worker in the early 1940s. The following letter by Bautista himself reported these details and concerns for his civilian benefits, along with the USN Board of Review’s previous interrogations regarding his loyalty to the U.S.:

... I have filed my application for arrears in pay sometime on May, 1945 and up to the present I have not received any information thereof as to what action has been taken.

In view of the fact that two years had elapsed since I filed mine, I presumed this has been held for some reasons unknown to me.

I was investigated several times at the Garita School accusing me that I belong to the Sakdalista Party, which charges were without foundation.

I was also investigated by the Naval Intelligence Office and as a result thereof, I was cleared of the charges preferred against me and because such charges were without foundation, I was paid all monies due me as an enlisted man in the Naval Reserve.

As a civilian employee of the US Navy Yard Cavite payment for my backpay was not paid, so I respectfully request that I be investigated in order that all wages due me as a civilian employee be given to me…”

43 Jesus Bautista, Check No. 31294 to Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Shore Establishments and Civilian Personnel Division), via: Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Philippines, Letter, Cavite City, Philippines; Undated (circa October 1947), p. 1; BAUTISTA, Jesus, MM1c, USN (Ret.), Case File, 1945-1946; Box 6 of 11, File 313-08-006 (181-72-0144); National Archives and Records Administration (Pacific Region), San Francisco.
Shortly after his request, however, U.S. military officials denied Bautista’s request for the same reasons behind their initial recommendation of Bautista for court martial trial. Their first reason was Bautista’s previous possible associations with the Sakdalistas and the Japanese military. Their second reason was the slight possibility of Bautista’s treasonous activities against the U.S. government. On October 16, 1947, in a memorandum to the assistant secretary of the U.S. Navy, Commander James C. Bigler reported the following:

… Records of Commander US Naval Forces Philippines disclose that the Board of Review to screen active, reserve, and retired naval personnel suspected of alleged collaboration, recommended the subject-named man for trial by general court martial. The convening authority disapproved the recommendation because of the insufficiency of proof available to support the charge of treason. However, records obviously reveal that:

a. Bautista voluntarily worked for the Japanese in the Cavite Navy Yard in September 1942;

b. That he left his employment in May 1943 because he heard that the Japanese were rounding all ex-servicemen;

c. Before the war he attended three public meetings of the Sakdalista Party, but said ‘he never joined the party’;

d. Two of his daughters worked in a Japanese bar, and

e. One of his daughters married a Japanese by the name of Okamina.

… Bautista’s activities during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines are considered derogatory to the established policy of the Navy Department. It is, therefore, recommended that his claim be disapproved…

In other words, the USN Board of Review’s grounds for releasing Bautista from recommendation for trial were the same as those that USN Commander Bigler cited when he recommended and enforced the denial of benefits to Bautista. Therefore, like the

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44 James C. Bigler, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Philippines to Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Shore Establishments and Civilian Personnel Division), “Jesus Bautista, #31294, U.S. Navy Yard, Cavite – Request for reconsideration claim of claim for back pay”, Memorandum, Manila-Subic Bay, Philippines; 16 October 1947, pp. 1-2; BAUTISTA, Jesus, MM1c, Case File, 1945-1946; Box 6 of 11, File 313-08-006 (181-72-0144); National Archives and Records Administration (Pacific Region), San Francisco.
250,000 Filipino war veterans who fought for the “U.S.-Philippine nation” after FDR’s 1941 recruitment decree, Bautista was denied benefits and back pay for the services he performed during the Second World War under the auspices of the 1946 Rescission Act. While Philippine sovereignty and wartime dissociation from the U.S. were the rhetorical logics for U.S. congressional disapproval of Filipino veteran benefits, possible treasons against the U.S. government provided the rhetorical basis for the denial of Bautista—and other Filipino civilian workers—from receiving back pay and benefits from the U.S. government.

During this stage of emerging Philippine independence, fears of Filipino treason shaped U.S. policymakers’ conceptualization of the Philippines as less ready for self-government and national self-defense, and hence more likely to be swept up by prevalent “enemy” nations of the U.S. neo-imperial metropolis. These strategic conceptualizations, commonly reminiscent of racialist perceptions of Filipinos in the colonial period, facilitated U.S. officials’ decisions to pass and enforce policies that only added more exceptions to the ideologically sovereign foundations of the Philippine Independence Act and the Philippine National Constitution. For instance, the Bell Trade Act, passed in 1946, continued the uneven trade dependencies of the Philippines toward the U.S. for national and economic stability. The Military Bases Agreement, passed in 1947, enforced the retention of U.S. military bases in the Philippines for another ninety-nine years. In addition, the numerous revisions of the Military Bases Agreement throughout the 1950s reinforced the quantitative terms and conditions of Filipino enlistment into the U.S. Navy. While the enlistment of Filipinos in the U.S. Navy largely shifted from exclusion to limited inclusion after 1941, enlisted USN Filipino nationals were largely restricted to
work as domestic servants for naval officers, as in the colonial period. These continuums of coloniality confirmed the postwar status of U.S.-Philippine relations as neo-colonial.45

LABOR MOVEMENTS, LAWS, AND POLICIES IN THE EARLY COLD WAR PERIOD OF THE “U.S.-PHILIPPINE NATION”

Through militaristic, political, and economic measures, the U.S. was able to exert military control over Filipino laborers, particularly over those working within the military bases within and beyond the Philippines. Claiming responsibility for the creation and stability of the Philippine nation-state, U.S. officials felt it was necessary to maintain military presence—if not hegemony—in the Philippines. The mutual agreement of this contradiction between the ideality of Philippine sovereignty and the reality of U.S. military hegemony in the archipelago was no more evident than in the Military Bases Agreement between U.S. and Philippine officials on March 14, 1947. The Military Bases Agreement (MBA) allowed for the continuing U.S. military base presence in the Philippines for another ninety-nine years—free of rent. For U.S. officials, the Military Bases Agreement was instrumental in maintaining U.S. national security interests during the early stages of the Cold War—not just in the Philippines, but throughout the Asia-Pacific as well.46 Simultaneously, the MBA allowed for the conditions of Philippine

45 Revisionist historians and critical scholars have continually articulated the status of postwar U.S.-Philippine relations as neo-colonial. Please see William Pomeroy, An American Made Tragedy; E. San Juan, Jr., After Postcolonialism; Theodore Gonzalves, The Day the Dancers Stayed; Dylan E. Rodríguez, Suspended Apocalypse.

sovereignty to exist under the political, diplomatic, and military watch of the U.S. nation-state.\(^\text{47}\)

During the course of the 1950s and 1960s, Filipino officials, civilians and laborers would contest the contradictory foundations in which the Military Bases Agreement was implemented, especially in matters of sovereignty and jurisdiction. More specifically, they would contest U.S. officials “rights” to conduct trials on their personnel who committed assault crimes against Filipinos within or beyond the bases. In my brief field research of such cases, these assault crimes by U.S. military personnel were normally brought under or transferred to U.S. jurisdiction, despite pleas by the local plaintiffs and their regional supporters to bring the accused to justice under the Philippine courts of law. Under U.S. jurisdiction, the “defendants” of these crimes were often deported or transferred to the U.S., where they continued their enlistments in detention centers, awaited further trial in U.S. courts, or were merely discharged from the U.S. military without further trial under U.S. civil courts. This lenient politics of enlistment applied to

\(^{47}\) Politically conservative, moderate, liberal, and radical leftist scholars alike have convincingly highlighted that the Military Bases Agreement was a direct contradiction, if not violation, of Philippine Independence and the Philippine Constitution which promised sovereignty apart from U.S. colonial rule. Moreover, Article XVII reinforced the celebration and contradictions of bi-national U.S.-Philippine relations. On the one hand, this agreement was a formal celebration of the bi-national alliance and friendship that was forging between the United States and the Philippines since the Second World War. In other words, the Military Bases Agreement signified a bi-national friendship that apparently was made between the U.S. and the Philippines as two separate, sovereign, and democratic allied nations. On the other hand, the Military Bases Agreement reinforced the tense contradiction between the bi-national imaginary of what I call the U.S.-Philippine nation and the continuing colonial framework and overall unequal relationship between the United States and the Philippines. More specifically, the bases agreement restored the very denial of Philippine independence that was initially prevalent during the American colonial period. U.S. officials' denial of Philippine sovereignty also defined the contradictions shaping the ideological partnership between the U.S. and the Philippines during and following the Second World War. In addition, to local Filipinos living in close proximity to these U.S. bases, this article and agreement meant immediate yet severely limited opportunity for material, social, and upward mobility amidst widespread poverty and economic strife throughout the Philippine archipelago following the Second World War.
U.S. enlistees and officers who committed recorded crimes of assault and were tried under U.S. rather than Philippine jurisdiction.  

Despite the fact that these crimes were committed on Philippine sovereign territory, U.S. jurisdiction over these cases was enforced under the 1947 Military Bases Agreement which directly contradicted with the Philippine Independence Act in 1946. Though periodical revisions were made to the agreement that apparently allowed more involvement by Philippine legal officials in these cases, U.S. military officials usually

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48 Cited cases from NARA, San Francisco with similar notable outcomes of dishonorable discharge, limited years of imprisonment/detention, or enlistment transfer:


The People of the Philippines, Complainant -versus- Pablo Custodio, Esperidion Federi, Victorino Federi, Florencio Custodio, Cayetano Carino, Juan Acheta, Manuel Linda, Defendants in Criminal Case 834 for: Theft, Subic Bay General Correspondence, 1947-48, NARA, San Francisco.

Clarenden E. Coonley, boatswain's mate first (BM1, USN), U.S. Navy, Summary Court Martial held 7 October 1948, Subic Bay General Correspondence, 1947-48, NARA, San Francisco.

Howard Irwin Trammel, Jr., Service Number 386 76 67; rate BM3; class USN—“Offense: Under the influence of intoxicating liquor while as a member of the U.S. Navy Shore Patrol.” 29 September 1948, Subic Bay General Correspondence, 1947-48, NARA, San Francisco.

―Charges and specifications on the GCM trial of Charles Bernard Baldwin, Jr. USMC‖, 19 August 1948, based on “Charge III Fornication… of a woman, named Milagros Buenaventura… a civilian prisoner… while on active duty,” Subic Bay General Correspondence, 1947-48, NARA, San Francisco.

Catalina de la Cruz and Prudencio Quintana, Case of Foreign Claims, Folder A17, Law and Justices from Box 4, Accession # 313-58-3345, General Correspondences, Subic Bay, 1947-1948, NARA, San Francisco.

Santiago de la Cruz, Statement of Claim, Folder A17, Law and Justices from Box 4, Accession # 313-58-3345, General Correspondences, Subic Bay, 1947-1948, NARA, San Francisco.

H.H. Good, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, Commander Task Force Ninety Three, “Task Force Ninety Three Court Martial Order No. 11-48 [Mack William Prescott, 625023, Private First Class, U.S. Marine Corps]”, “Assault and strike one Isabelo de los Reyes, a civilian, and as a result of which the said Reyes sustained bruises and lacerations about his, the said Reyes’, body,” 14 April 1948, Folder A2-11, General Court Martial Order, General Correspondences, Sangle Point, 1947-1948, NARA, San Francisco.

H.H. Good, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, “Task Force Ninety Three Court Martial Order No. 9-48” [Thomas Joseph Mulvihill 856 37 52, seaman first class, U.S. Navy], “Assault and strike one Demetrio R. Escote, a civilian, and as the said Escote was lying prostrate on the floor, therein and thereby, then and there, he, the said accused, did kick the said Escote on the face, and as a result of which, the said Escote sustained lacerations and contusions on the face,” 10 March 1948, Folder A2-11, General Court Martial Order, General Correspondences, Sangle Point, 1947-1948, NARA, San Francisco.

overruled their interventions and transferred these cases to U.S. jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{49} Thus, the enforcement of U.S. jurisdiction, over Philippine oversight, of such assault cases further illuminated the uneven and contradictory conditions of the U.S. and Philippine bi-national relationship between the mid-1940s and mid-1960s. On one hand, the Garcia-Bendesten talks in 1956 and other formal revisions of the MBA rhetorically enforced Philippine jurisdiction over crimes committed by Americans on Philippine soil. On the other, these written assurances would later be overturned, further reinforcing U.S. military control over Filipino workers and other locals on these bases in the Philippines.\textsuperscript{50}

U.S. military hegemony in the Philippines was exercised not only by U.S. officials, but especially in collaboration with Philippine military officials and personnel. Such collaborations were reinforced by the interventions of the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG). JUSMAG was a collaborative effort among branches of the U.S. military service to train the Armed Forces of the Philippines in combating political subversives of the U.S.-Philippine nation state. Thus, JUSMAG assisted the Philippine

\textsuperscript{49} Continual assault cases by U.S. military servicemen, with related outcomes of limited imprisonment, discharge, or enlistment transfer during, the mid-late 50s to 60s, are chronicled and neutrally assessed in War College historian William Berry, Jr.’s \textit{U.S. Bases in the Philippines: The Evolution the Special Relationship} (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 92-112: Airman Curtis Willis’s “frustrated homicide” of Philippine citizen Rufino Cambura on 19 December 1954 (Berry 1989, 92-93); Airman Robert Cottee’s “grave coercion, grave threats, illegal discharge of firearms, and malicious mischief” on 13 November 1956 (Berry 1989, 94); U.S. Navy enlistee George Roe’s “causing physical injuries through reckless driving” on New Year’s Day of 1956 (Berry 1989, 95); USN enlistee Walter Higgins’ “allegedly stabbed to death a Philippine citizen on the base” on April 1958 (Berry 1989, 96); Airman Larry Cole, on 25 November 1964 at Clark Air Force Base, “shot and killed a Filipino on the base while Cole was performing sentry duty” (Berry 1989, 103); Two U.S. Marine guards, “also on sentry duty, shot and killed a Filipino in a boat as he allegedly approached a restricted area where ammunition was stored” (Berry 1989, 103-104); U.S. Marine Corporal Kenneth Smith, on 26 July 1968, “while on guard duty at the Sangley Point Naval Station, shot and killed Regilio Gonzalez who allegedly was in the process of stealing a bicycle and removing it from the base” (Berry 1989, 110); Airman Bernard Williams, on September 1968, “… abducted and attempted to rape a Filipino woman in Angeles City outside of Clark Air Base” in September 1968 (Berry 1989, 111); Gunners Mate Third Classmen Michael Mooney, and another sailor, on 10 June 1969 “shot and killed Eliserio Amor, a Filipino contract worker whom they “believed were… a wild boil” (Berry 1989, 112).

Armed Forces in serving the interests of U.S. national security in the Philippines, and they played a prevalent role in subduing political subversions among Filipino locals within and beyond the U.S. bases in the Philippines, especially during the late 1940s and early 1950s.

Other treaties made between the U.S. and other Southeast Asian nations further solidified U.S. military control over the Philippines and the local workers in the bases. For example, in 1954, U.S. officials met with other Southeast Asian countries in Manila to implement more stringent and broader measures to secure U.S. national interests in Southeast Asia. What transpired from this series of meetings was the Manila Pact. This pact spurred the establishment of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Comprising of officials from Australia, France, New Zealand, Thailand, England, and the Philippines, the U.S. founded SEATO in behalf of their “‘regional defense of Asia.’” In other words, the Manila Pact and the subsequent creation of SEATO enforced the U.S.’s “right” to draw the Philippines into any war in Southeast Asia on behalf of U.S. national interests. These developments also permitted the U.S. to collaborate with other Southeast Asian governments to suppress emergent politically subversive formations in the Philippine archipelago as well. Five years later, in 1959, Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Felixberto Serrano corresponded with U.S. Ambassador Charles Bohlen in a two-year series of conferences that culminated in 1961. In this series of conferences, Bohlen and Serrano discussed the conditions of mutuality regarding U.S. military base

53 Ibid.
presence in the Philippines, as well as the degree of continuing American military assistance to the Philippines against foreign and domestic political subversives within the U.S.-Philippine nation state.

What transpired from this two-year series of conferences was the Bohlen-Serrano Agreement. This agreement, in written form, reduced the lease of U.S. military presence in the Philippines from ninety-nine to twenty-five years, while simultaneously surrendering 118,000 hectares of land to the Philippine nation-state. Nevertheless, over time, these and other related agreements never came to material fruition, as the U.S. military maintained its hegemonic control over Filipino locals, including their workers in and beyond these bases in the Philippines. As stated by Philippine policy analyst Roland Simbulan, “[i]n their daily encounters with the Americans in the bases, Filipino base employees have reported discriminatory treatment as in the inequality of salary scales between Filipino employees and their American counter-parts, security of tenure arbitrary dismissals, and the boorish behavior of American supervisors toward Filipino employees.”

In addition, the immediate aftermaths of World War II, coupled with the prevailing need for U.S. economic and military assistance to rehabilitate the Philippines, fostered the structural conditions for U.S. military exertion of control over the Philippine archipelago. The overwhelming sense of indebtedness felt by elite and non-elite Filipinos for U.S. “liberation” and assistance, during and following the Second World War, further facilitated this structure of feeling among Filipinos for general assistance from U.S. officials in the economic and military rehabilitation of the Philippines. In 1946, U.S.

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54 Ibid., 93.
Congress passed the Rehabilitation Act, e.g. the Bell Bill, which aimed to provide economic aid to the Philippines, along with war and military reparations for the next twenty years. Additionally, the Military Assistance Act was passed by U.S. Congress to enforce the economic rehabilitation of the Philippines from the infrastructural aftermaths of the Second World War, and to provide more stringent measures to prevent the occupation of the Philippines by domestic and foreign “subversives” to the U.S.-Philippine nation state.

Additionally, to further understand the applicable labor laws, policies, and movements that occurred in the early postwar period, one has to consider the 1947 Military Bases Agreement (MBA), coupled with the MBA’s amended revisions to the 1946 Philippine Independence Act. The MBA allowed for the continuance of strategic U.S. military jurisdiction and base operations in the Philippines, as well as the limited inclusion of Filipino civilians and enlistees. However, the MBA ceased to address the applicability of Philippine labor laws to U.S. bases on Philippine national territory.

This evident gap in the MBA left Philippine labor law more open to bilateral, if not unilateral, debate among elite and non-elite agents of both national governments. U.S. military officers and employers often argued for U.S. jurisdiction over Philippine labor laws on the bases. According to these U.S. officials, the U.S. already adhered to Philippine labor laws and policies. Hence, they considered the question of Philippine sovereignty on U.S. bases as irrelevant in the first place. Meanwhile, Philippine military, labor, and political officials often argued one or both of the following: one, the legal conditions of Philippine national sovereignty required its own interpretation of its labor

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55 Department of State, Committee on International Relations, Selected Executive Session Hearings of the Committee, 1943-50 Volume VIII (Washington, D.C.;, 1976), 11, 12, 33.
laws and policies to be practiced on U.S. bases in the Philippines; and two, given the fact that Philippine labor laws and policies were inherently “copied from their American counterparts,” U.S. officials should unconditionally accept the applicability of local labor laws and policies on ‘their’ military bases. These diverging interpretations of Philippine labor law on U.S. bases are further explored in the proceeding sections in this chapter as they transpired from the Bartolome Roldan case, as well as from other cases and subsequent proposals that contested the dominant paradigms of the “U.S.-Philippine nation.”

Philippine political officials such as Sergio Osmeña, the Philippine Commonwealth president following Manuel Quezon, did not have as much support from U.S. Washington officials as did succeeding presidents in the post-Independence period. Such backing by U.S. Washington officials was confirmed with Philippine presidential candidate Manuel Roxas’s affirmation that he would continue “friendly relations” with the U.S.—in terms of trade and aid—if Roxas was elected as president of the emerging sovereign nation. Subsequently, U.S. support almost certainly determined the election of Roxas, as with succeeding presidential candidates. This conditional backing by U.S. officials involved the active role of these Philippine presidents, and their political officials, in suppressing “subversive” elements that stood against the political, economic, and social criteria of the U.S.-Philippine nation. For these elected political officials, they felt it crucial, if not necessary, that they publicly demonstrate absolute loyalty to the U.S. without any hint of denying U.S. claims to Philippine sovereignty. This was especially evident, arguably, in the outcome of the first Philippine national election in 1946, with Manuel Roxas becoming the Philippine national president. Such public claims of loyalty

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to the U.S. were evident in Roxas’s inauguration speech on July 4, 1946, when he urged the Filipinos to have “‘absolute faith in the goodness of America.’” According to Roxas, “‘to do otherwise… would be to foreswear all faith in democracy, in our future, and in ourselves… Our safest course, and I believe it is true for the rest of the world as well, is in the glistening wake of America whose sure advance with mighty prow breaks for smaller craft the waves of fear.’”

These threads of bi-national continuity and political suppression (especially toward the poor and laboring class) were prevalent in varying degrees with succeeding Philippine presidents and political officials in barrio, provincial, and national levels of the “sovereign” government. For instance, President Quirino, according to Dante G. Guevarra, initiated the passage of the Magna Carta of Labor in 1949. This provision was meant to promote productive and harmonious relations between employers and their employees under the revised rubric “labor-management relations.” Nevertheless, provision and revision of labor-management relations never came to material fruition during Quirino’s presidency. In fact, the opposite became true as President Quirino most explicitly exerted control over the Philippine labor masses with what came to be known as the “Quirino-Figueras strategy”. This strategy of curtailing mass labor movement involved what Guevera noted as “the outright busting of the union and the abduction and murder of labor leaders.” Nonetheless, arguably no Philippine president in the pre-Marcos era was as vigilant in bi-national collaboration with the U.S. and


58 Dante C. Guevarra, *History of the Philippine Labor Movement* (Manila: Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations), 95.

59 Ibid., 101.
structural coercion of subversive masses as Ramon Magsaysay (1949-1953). President Magsaysay’s public and covert politico-military collaborations with the Eisenhower administration led to the diffusion and dissemination of one of the most profound wartime collaborators-turned-postwar antagonists of the “U.S.-Philippine nation”: the Hukbalahaps. While this insight is discussed in further analysis in chapter three, it is important to briefly note, in this overview, the bi-national measures of militarism employed by the Magsaysay administration in securing the U.S.-Philippine nation-state at the cost of the mass existence of the Hukbalahaps and other organizations that were seen as political opponents to this bi-national and neo-colonial enterprise.

Philippine political officials during the presidency of Carlos Garcia (1957-1961) took similar acts to suppress any hints at intellectual subversion. Such measures were evident in the 1957 Anti-Subversion Act which succeeded, in many levels, in achieving this very outcome of compliance among the masses. According to Bienvenido Lumbera in “From Colonizer to Liberator: How U.S. Colonialism Succeeded in Reinventing Itself after the Pacific War”, a conference held by the University of the Philippines in Diliman proved how much impact this act and other measures by Philippine political officials had in securing the “U.S.-Philippine nation-state” at the cost of silencing the masses to a significant degree. During this conference, for instance, the potential influence of such visiting journalists as radicals Renato Constantino, I.P. Soliongco, and Hernando Abaya, coupled with the request for the passage of a resolution/petition that protested against “military interference in intellectual affairs”, was profoundly limited (to a certain degree) by the actual military surveillance of these conference speakers. Such military surveillance likely intimidated and limited the political mobility of the youth organizers
and fellow participants of the conference during that year (1957)—and in the following years to come.\(^\text{60}\)

However, sovereign-based alliances between Philippine political officials and mass labor interests were more evident in the late 1950s. Undersecretary of Justice Jesus Barrera’s alliance with one of the key labor cases, Bartolome Roldan et al, was just one example of these alliances between Philippine political officials and laborers during this period. This was evident in Barrera’s open political stance that “the Philippine Government has jurisdiction over the American Bases in the country,” including the jurisdiction to investigate labor conditions in Clark Air Force Base.\(^\text{61}\) The political positioning of this politico-legal official was notably referenced earlier in the November 21, 1957 issue of the *Manila Chronicle* regarding the labor case of Bartolome Roldan. Shortly thereafter, Barrera’s comments were referenced by U.S. military officials who became widely concerned about their approach to the Roldan case and the press coverage surrounding it. (More details on this case, including the emerging political shifts among labor officials, were evident in these correspondences concerning this particular case. Such details will be further assessed in chapter four.)

More grounds of commonality between the laboring Filipino masses and Philippine political officials were most evident during the Macapagal presidency (1961-1965). His presidency allowed more relative room for organizing, mobilizing, and building among the Philippine labor masses. According to labor policy analyst Dante G.

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\(^\text{61}\) “Clark Guards form Union, Pick Lawyer,” *The Manila Times*, 7 April 1958, p. 6; Labor Policies in the Philippines, Case File, 1958-1961/3; File 313; National Archives and Records Administration (Pacific Region), San Francisco.
Guevarra, “it was only during the tenure of President Macapagal that the working class and peasantry somehow enjoyed a comparatively fair treatment and consideration.”

This was evident through his policies of land reform, implementation of tenement housings, and other governmental projects that “relieved the tension between the government and labor.” Nevertheless, as with other Philippine presidents, Macapagal’s ability to open more space for labor organization, mobility, and overall massive building was structurally limited by continual conditions of U.S. hegemony.

Philippine military officials, especially during the postwar period, were instrumental in enforcing the policies of the Philippine-U.S. nation-state—policies that were carried out by Philippine political officials. Nevertheless, there were exceptions, particularly during the late 1950s. The Philippine military liaison officer of Subic Bay, for example, was one official who pleaded to U.S. counterparts for more equitable retirement benefits to a more inclusive populace of Filipino laborers. More specifically, in an October 17, 1958 letter of correspondence to the Philippine-United States Mutual Defense Board, the Philippine military liaison officer of Subic Bay reported “that only a small portion of Filipino workers at the US Naval Base, Subic Bay are covered by the U.S. Federal Civil Service Retirement System.” Conclusively, the Philippine military liaison officer held American officials more accountable for the uneven distribution of retirement benefits to Filipino civilian workers during this period. Aside from this and (likely) other exceptions, most of the Philippine military officials during the postwar

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62 Guevara, 99.
63 Ibid.
64 Philippine Military Liaison Officer, Subic Bay to Philippine-United States Mutual Defense Board, Memorandum; p. 1; Labor Policies in the Philippines, Case File, 1958-1961/3; File 313; National Archives and Records Administration (Pacific Region), San Francisco.
period were much more eager to cooperate with the U.S.-Philippine nation-state: at the cost of subjecting Filipino masses to economic exploitation and inequality. Such cooperation and subjection were just as prevalent within JUSMAG during the postwar period as within the Philippine constabulary during the colonial prewar period—particularly in suppressing such “subversives” to the “U.S.-Philippine nation” as Amado Hernandez and others.

Moreover, Philippine labor officials, especially during the early Cold War period (1945-1961), were often as instrumental in carrying out the ideological and material duties of the “U.S.-Philippine nation” as their military counterparts. These labor officials were not union members or leaders. Rather, they were an integral part of the Philippine national government. In addition, these officials mostly acted in direct collaboration with military, political, and diplomatic officials of the U.S. nation-state. For example, Pedro Magsalin, Assistant Secretary of Labor during the late 1940s, appeared to be in absolute cooperation with U.S. military officials in labor matters related to Filipino civilian workers in Guam. This was evidenced in his probable willingness to distribute false information to the press which would provide “news” of positive labor conditions among civilian Filipino workers in Guam—instead of the material realities of exploitation shaping the everyday experience of these laborers on-base. This probable willingness was cited in a written memorandum by Lieutenant T.K. Cencebaugh, a civilian personnel officer, to the commanding officer at Sangley Point on February 26, 1948. In this memorandum, Cencebaugh recalled a conference held by Philippine Secretary of Labor Magsalin. During this conference, Magsalin met with U.S. naval officials and corporate contractors who were recruiting Filipino civilians to work in Guam. By conducting this
meeting with U.S. military and corporate officials, Magsalin provided space for these officials to voice their concerns and dissatisfactions with the local Filipino press. This privileged space was further evident by the lack of Philippine labor union leaders in the meeting.  

Nevertheless, by the early 1960s, some labor officials were deemed as “less pro-American” than they were in the previous decade. More specifically, some of these labor officials diverted from absolute loyalty to the U.S.-Philippine nation-state by being more responsive to the concerns of the civilian Filipino laborers. One labor official, in particular, was Bernadino Abes who by 1963 was the new labor secretary of the Philippines. Abes, according to U.S. labor attaché Norman Johnson, provided “professionally competent” but “less pro-American leadership” than this U.S. official had expected. The direct reasons for Johnson’s declaration of Abes’s leadership as “less pro-American” were not stated in the written historical record. Nevertheless, evidence of Abes’s increased budget for “manpower counseling services” illustrated that Abes was more responsive to the needs of the Filipino laborers than to the statecraft of the U.S.-Philippine nation-state. This alone arguably spurred this U.S. labor attaché to characterize Abes’s leadership as “less pro-American” than initially desired. In addition, according to Norman Johnson’s report, Secretary of Labor Abes’s active concerns, in regards to the welfare of Filipino civilian workers in Guam, were clearly demonstrated in Abes’s instruction to the manager of the Manila Employment Office of the Philippines (at the


66 Ibid., 4.

67 Ibid.
time), Emeraldo de Leon. Supposedly, Abes’s order was for de Leon to visit Guam and report on such labor conditions in this U.S. militarized region of the Pacific.\textsuperscript{68}

By contrast, since the end of World War II, radically grassroots organizations like the Hukbalahaps argued not just for actual Philippine sovereignty of its U.S. bases, but especially for Philippine national sovereignty and the sweeping obliteration of U.S. hegemony in its entirety. Besides the key role that U.S. and Philippine officials and labor groups played in the imperial shaping of the “U.S.-Philippine nation”, it is imperative to consider the critical impact that the Huks had on Philippine worker movements, labor policies, and labor laws—as well as the measures that U.S. and Philippine labor, military, and political officials took to enforce their hegemony with all their privileged political might. Like the Sakdalistas who came before them, the Huks were a direct response to the post-Depression economic strife plaguing the Philippine archipelago. In addition, like the ideological framework of the Sakdals, the United Front platform guiding the grassroots ideology of the Huks was grounded in a sense of solidarity between themselves, the workers, and the peasantry for a classless, democratic, and sovereign Philippine nation. Their solidarity, in turn, stood in opposition to the hegemonic continuities of U.S. rule, along with the labor laws, policies, and negotiations that enforced the continuities of U.S. imperial hegemony in the Philippines. These historical developments transpired, in profound ways, at the cost of the socioeconomic welfare and broader political mobility of the workers and peasants.

In 1945, after the U.S. Liberation Campaign and Japanese evacuation in the Philippines, a clear and sudden shift occurred in the Huks’ “United Front” policy. In World War II, the Huks’ sense of this “United Front” entailed not just uniting with

\textsuperscript{68} Ibid., 2.
workers and peasants in the classless sense, but also with U.S. and Philippine nationalism in the bi-national sense. Nonetheless, after the “Good War,” the Huks continued to witness the following entangled triangulation. First, they encountered the ongoing economic strife in the Philippines from the devastations of World War II. For example, in the Cavite Province, one of the most exemplary sites of U.S.-Philippine military elite collaboration, the war had left the region “with destroyed buildings, roads, bridges, and farms leaving the people in dismal poverty.”69 Second, they observed the class distinctions and marginalization by elite agents of the “U.S.-Philippine nation.” And third, the Huks experienced the ongoing national economic strife and class exclusions under the neo-imperial hegemony of the U.S. as an informal empire in the Philippines. In subsequence, the Huks shifted their politics of U.S. recognition from post-colonial collaboration to anti-colonial opposition. Witnessing this political shift among the Huks, U.S. officials took great lengths to keep a pro-U.S. sense of the “U.S.-Philippine nation” intact among Philippine elite officials through active bi-national collaboration against the Huks. Collaborative efforts between U.S. and Philippine officials sought the obliteration of the then-communist organization, along with the Huks’ actual and potential allies in and beyond the Philippine archipelago.

Informal and formal steps to dispose the Huks were threefold. First, during the Philippine presidency of Ramon Magsaysay, U.S. and Philippine officials, led by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), distributed and propagated leaflets, pamphlets, and other propaganda to the non-elite workers and peasantry in Luzon and other provinces in

the Philippine archipelago—particularly in localities that were likely to be influenced by the Huks. Second, these officials formally collaborated, in the militaristic sense, through the formation and practices of the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG). And thirdly, the mutual insurance of confidentiality in conducting these propagandistic and militaristic exercises was enforced in order to prevent further subversive acts of protest and revolution from taking place during this time of Cold War politics.

By the mid-1950s, the Hukbalahaps were dissipated by the consensual and coercive modes of governance of the “U.S.-Philippine nation.” The Huks’ influence on workers and the peasantry greatly decreased over time as their radical politics—like the Sakdalistas before them—shifted toward a more moderate, liberal, and collaborative platform. This radical shift in Huk politics was none more evidenced than in the political neutralization of founder and leader Luis Taruc during the Magasaysay presidency in 1953. Hence, the history of the Huks provided key lessons for the elite creators and enforcers of Philippine labor law, as well as for the non-elite laborers and peasantry.

For the elite enforcers of Philippine labor law and policy, the rise and fall of the Huks meant that the U.S.-Philippine nation state’s methods of consensual and coercive politics were effective and necessary in the suppression of what it perceived as savage acts of subversion and threat against its Cold War politics. Hence, to U.S. officials and their elite Philippine collaborationists, structural stability, security, and sustenance of the U.S.’s empire statecraft remained intact: especially during a time when U.S. officials felt that the stability of the U.S.-Philippine nation state also meant the strategic protection of
U.S. military outposts within and across the Asia-Pacific in the midst of the early Cold War.\footnote{Please see Daniel Schirmer and Stephen Rosskamm Shalom, eds., \textit{The Philippines Reader: A History of Colonialism, Neocolonialism, Dictatorship, and Resistance} (Boston: South End Press, 1987), for a more historically comprehensive account of the historical relationship between the Hukbalahaps and the U.S.- Philippine bi-national political elite.}

For the workers and peasantry impacted on the ground, the Huks’ dissipation and the U.S.-Philippine nation-state’s implementations meant clear limitations on how broad and “anti-colonial” grassroots labor politics could be without the apparent cost of their social upbringing and cultural well-being. Thus, after the apparent demise of the Huks: moderate reformism, business trade unionism, and active participation in electoral politics became further prioritized over the anti-colonial lineage of the Sakdals and Huks since the 1930s.

These political and radical shifts toward moderate reformism and electoral politics could be seen in the diffused leaderships of the Sakdals and Huks themselves. Nevertheless, these reformist politics were more than prevalent in the postwar period through the collaborationist activities of emerging labor and trade unions since 1950. These unions included the National Confederation of Trade Unions (NCTU), the Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and Offices (CUGCO), among others.\footnote{For a more descriptive historical account of these and other collaborationist Philippine labor unions, please see Dante G. Guevarra, \textit{History of the Philippine Labor Movement} (Manila: Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations, Polytechnic University of the Philippines, 1991).}

However politically prevalent and business-oriented these labor unions were during the early Cold War, there were sporadic but critically significant individuals and groups who continued to contest the dominant and structural paradigms of the “U.S.- Philippine nation” and the U.S. informal empire. These ongoing contestations occurred
despite the fact that, according to cultural critic Theodore Gonzalves, they were expressed from “an incredibly isolated and unpopular position” during that time.\(^7^2\) These politically charged—and inspiring—individuals who continued at all costs to resist the hegemonic foundations of the “U.S.-Philippine nation” and its informal empire included Senator Claro Recto, Justice Secretary Jose Diokno, Congress of Labor Chair Amado V. Hernandez, and a plenitude of others. Grassroots-based groups who provided parallel contributions at similar costs included the Partido Komunista ng Pilipino (PKP), the Philippine Workers Union, and Katipunang-Manggagawang Pilipino (KMP).

While there were periodic signs of resistance toward the elite and collaborationist paradigms of the “U.S.-Philippine nation”, the dominant presence of the latter manifested in the establishment of Philippine labor departments, laws, and policies which one Philippine labor official coined as “copies of their American counterparts.”\(^7^3\) These departments and policies included the Philippine Department of Labor, the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, the Minimum Wage Act, Eight Hour Law, among countless other examples. It might be argued by such historians as Stanley Karnow that Philippine officials implemented these labor laws and policies to showcase two things: one, the modernization and westernization of the Philippines; and two, further political recognition of the Philippines as a sovereign nation under the modernist and westernized standards of the U.S. nation-state. These labor laws and policies, to a significant degree, further displayed the Philippines as a model “former” colony, a newly sovereign nation, and (besides Japan) one of the staunchest U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific.


\(^7^3\) “Introduction,” History of the Bartolome P. Roldan Claim, Undated, pp. 1-14; Bartolome P. Roldan et al., Case File, 1958-1961/3; Box 6 of 11, File 313-08-006 (181-72-0144); National Archives and Records Administration (Pacific Region), San Francisco.
The historical impact that these Philippine labor laws, policies, and departments had on demonstrating Philippine sovereignty cannot be overstated. Nevertheless, these same exact labor laws, policies, and departments could clearly and suddenly be considered as obsolete—if not invalid—by U.S. military officials at any given time. This was especially the case if the applicability of Philippine labor law on the bases meant the potential criminalization of and further contestation against the elite and hegemonic practices of the imperial “U.S.-Philippine nation” in the neo-colonial period. The lacking applicability of Philippine military and labor laws on these bases consequently impacted the subjectivity of Filipino laborers in these militarized areas of the Philippines. The extent of such impact, from documented subjectivities of Luzon-based Filipinos within and near these militarized areas, will be examined in chapter three.

Meanwhile, the next chapter shifts our attention to the Filipino enlisted workers in the U.S. Navy, particularly the degrees of inclusion and marginalization within militarized spaces in particular, and within the US nation-state in general. To what extent did Navy policies—and politics—of enlistment shape the recruitment and experience of enlisted Filipinos in the U.S. Navy, particularly during the World War II period? This question will be addressed extensively in the next chapter.
CHAPTER TWO

Prologue

It was late morning of August 6, 1945. Lunching aboard the U.S.S. Augusta on the way back to D.C. from the Potsdam Conference, President Harry Truman and Secretary of State Henry Stimson received illuminating news from the ship’s captain and the U.S. Navy Department. The announcement was as follows: “The Japanese port of Hiroshima had been bombed a few hours before, under perfect weather conditions and with no opposition.”\(^\text{74}\) Soon after hearing the message, Truman relayed the news to the officers and crewmembers of the ship, including the mess officer who set the menu for his lunch and the enlisted Filipino stewards who had cooked and served the lunch to President Truman. In response to hearing the news, everyone cheered and clapped in patriotic celebration, including the white officers, the African American head steward, and the Filipino stewards aboard the ship.\(^\text{75}\)

For the U.S. President and white officers aboard this presidential yacht, this moment signified a victorious celebration of U.S. nationhood and values of liberty, democracy and freedom at home and abroad. For Japanese forces and citizens in their homeland during this wartime period, the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima, and Nagasaki


\(^{75}\) Ibid.
just two days later, marked one of the most devastating forms of dehumanization in Japanese, United States and global history in general. Meanwhile, for hundreds of thousands of American citizens of Japanese descent who were displaced as camp internees during World War II, this moment of U.S. national victory would eventually lead to less anti-Japanese sentiment within the U.S.

For the Filipino nationals and other U.S. ethnic and racial minorities enlisted on the ship, this moment signified more of a celebratory resolution of a contradiction regarding their status and position in the navy, rather than a moment of consummate victory. These minoritized navy workers experienced and embodied the contradiction between their enlistment in the defense of “freedom” and “democracy”, and their everyday experience of ethnic and racial exclusion, discrimination, and internment. Celebratory moments, like the multiracial celebration aboard Truman’s presidential yacht, illustrated the resolution of their conflicting emotions stemmed from the nature of their work experience. Their ambivalences were further resolved by their inclusion in the U.S. nation-state, as signified by their very enlistment, citizenship, and promised access to veterans’ benefits vis-à-vis the G.I. Bill. Ironically, however, this commonsensical and fraternal sense of resolution concealed and reinforced the structural realities of race, class, and gender discrimination within the civilian and military spaces of U.S. American popular culture.

By examining the policies of enlisted Filipinos, and comparing their treatment to that afforded to other U.S. ethnic and racial minorities, this chapter assesses the origins of these contradictions between freedom and internment, between democracy and discrimination, and between liberation and racism. These contradictions, subsequently,
shaped the wartime and postwar articulations of the “U.S.-Philippine nation”, and the U.S. as an empire. In what ways did the policies and politics of U.S. Navy enlistment facilitate the agency of Filipino nationals and other U.S. racial and ethnic minorities within and despite the bi-national politics of the “U.S.-Philippine nation”? Drawing upon the perspectives and experiences of enlisted stewards and civilians concerned about their plight, this chapter examines the politics of the Navy’s policies and the role of Navy Filipino enlistees in reinforcing the “U.S.-Philippine nation” and the U.S. as a global empire.

Three sections shape this chapter’s structure and inquiries. The first section offers an additional overview of the primary concept that guides the historical and theoretical framework of this chapter: the politics of enlistment. The second section provides a historiographical and historical overview of the recruitment and enlistment of Filipinos in the U.S. Navy from the Philippine-American War in 1899 to World War II. The third section assesses the correspondences among and between the military and civilian spheres, and how these discourses shaped the conditions of enlistment among Filipinos and other U.S. racial and ethnic minorities—from 1941 to 1945.

In this chapter, I make three overarching arguments. Firstly, the U.S. Navy (USN) informally continued to enlist Filipinos from the Philippines during the early 1940s, despite the fact that the status of the Philippines as an independent commonwealth officially prevented the Navy from doing so. Moreover, congressional revisions of the Nationality Act in 1940 officially permitted the naturalization of Filipinos after three years of wartime service in the Navy, Coast Guard, and Marine Corps. This act also
promised citizenship for Filipinos after five years of service in the U.S. military. This condition of naval enlistment illuminated an additional contradiction in U.S.-Philippine relations between Philippine “sovereignty” and U.S. military hegemony in the Philippines. Eventually, the official enlistment of Filipinos resumed in 1944 when the naval insular force was abolished and the USN began enlisting Filipinos this time as foreign nationals, along with enlistees from other countries (plus Guam).

Secondly, the U.S. Navy exclusively placed minoritized enlistees as cooks, messmen, and stewards under restricted allowances and, oft times, degrading treatment. Whereas some naval officers preferred Filipino enlistees serving such needs, others preferred African Americans, Mexican Americans, and/or Chinese Americans as cooks, messmen, and stewards. Factors determining such preferences often were contingent upon regional dominance or dominant conceptualizations of at least one of these minority groups within the U.S. bases. While local bases and transnational military bureaus had conflicting racial and ethnic preferences for “their” mess attendants, the continual politics and contradictions of enlistment among people of color in the U.S. Navy, coupled with the increasing U.S. wartime interventions abroad, materially transpired in the escalating recruitment of people of color into the U.S. Navy during World War II.

And thirdly, the grievances and protests against these politics of minority enlistment were often voiced by civilian relatives of these enlistees, rather than the

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76 Nationality Act of 1940, Statutes at Large 54, Sec. 324, 1149 (1940). See “Chapter III—Nationality Through Naturalization, Substantive Provisions, “Persons Serving in Armed Forces or on Vessels”:

A person, including a native-born Filipino, who has served honorably at any time in the United States Army, Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard for a period or periods aggregating three years and who, if separated from such service, was separated under honorable conditions, may be naturalized without having resided, continuously immediately preceding the date of filing such petition, in the United States for at least five years and in the State in which the petition for naturalization is filed for at least six months, if such petition is filed while the petitioner is still in the service within six months after the termination of such service. (1149)
enlistees themselves. These grievances were expressed in the form of written letters to naval officials. Nevertheless, the strategic responses by naval officials circumscribed the parameters of these grievances and thus facilitated the failure of these inquiries or, at the least, limited their scope. Examples of strategic responses ranged from naval officials’ denials of such grievances to renaming the position of these enlistees’ line of work to further conceal the practice of these grievances to the civilian public.

The Politics of Enlistment

As previously stated, I refer to the politics of enlistment as a continuation and departure from Paul Kramer’s conceptualization of the politics of recognition in shaping the racial politics and politics of race in the history of colonial Philippines and U.S. empire-building in general. Kramer argues that U.S. politicians, military officials, and other agents recognized Filipinos as both a part of and apart from the U.S. nation-state and its imperial project during the course of the American colonial period (circa 1901-1934). On the one hand, the politics of recognizing Filipinos as part of the U.S. nation and empire building project lay in U.S. racializing conceptions of Filipinos as “childlike” and “brown savages.” Through liberal colonial education and multicultural inclusion in the U.S. domestic nation-state, U.S. officials felt that Filipinos were potentially capable of being “reared” and “modernized” under the American colonial project in the Philippines. On the other hand, the politics of recognizing Filipinos as apart from the U.S. nation-state and empire building project stemmed in the competing racial conception of Filipinos as also “childlike” and “brown savages”, and hence incapable of inclusion into the American colonial project and the domestic nation-state.
These common and competing politics of recognition shaped the U.S. discourses and policies on U.S.-Philippine relations during the American colonial period. Such policies included U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt’s official declaration of the American colonial state in 1902, the timetable given for Philippine Independence in the 1916 Jones Act, the declaration of the independent Philippine Commonwealth in the 1934 Tydings-McDuffie Act, and the willing deportation of Filipinos in the U.S. through the 1935 Repatriation Act.

Nevertheless, Kramer conflates recognition of civilian Filipinos with recognition of enlisted Filipinos. My study, however, focuses less on the desire of Filipino elites to prove their maturity and capacity for self-governance and more on the educated desire of Filipino enlistees to become American subjects and citizens. This shift in topical scope provides further insights into the liberal politics of recognition within the context of U.S. naval minority enlistment, especially Filipino enlistment. These politics of enlistment, I argue, applied more to the case of Filipino and other minority enlistees than to Filipino elites desiring to become national officials. More specifically, these politics of enlistment spoke more to two tensions adhering to the specific historical contexts of U.S. military Filipino enlistment. First tension was Filipinos seeing enlistment as a path toward an idealized vision of American freedom and democracy, but simultaneously facing discrimination.77 Second tension, which I will analyze, was Filipinos viewing enlistment as a source of their quest for American inclusion, but at the same time implicating involvement in the broader project of U.S. militarism and empire. Enlisted Filipinos would only be included in the U.S. imperial project if they pledged and demonstrated allegiance to the U.S. nation-state. If otherwise, their inclusion into the U.S. nation-state

77 Carlos Bulosan’s “Freedom from Want”, Saturday Evening Post Magazine (6 March 1943).
would be more limited, if not prohibited. Therefore, the conditions for their inclusion were also conditions for their marginalization within the U.S. nation-state. In other words, the individual inclusion or citizenship aims of Filipinos in the Navy entailed supporting the broader imperial project of the U.S. that denied true national independence for the Philippines. This chapter, and overall dissertation, enhances our historical understanding of these politics of enlistment as they relate to Filipinos within the twentieth century military.

**Historiographical and Historical Overview of Filipino Enlistment in the U.S. Navy: From the Early to Mid-Twentieth Century**

The purpose of this historiographical and historical overview of Filipino enlistees in the U.S. military, and the navy in particular, is twofold. First is to provide a historical overview regarding Filipino enlistees settling in the U.S. Navy and civilian communities. And second is to effectively historicize the conditions of inclusion and marginalization of Filipino nationals as enlistees in the U.S. since the Philippine-American War in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.

With the exception of some sources about Filipino midshipmen in the Nimitz Library in Annapolis, Maryland, most of the research for this chapter comes from the materials I uncovered regarding enlisted Filipino naval workers at the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland. These archives primarily contained correspondences by the Bureau of Naval Personnel between 1941 and 1945. These have been the most referenced archives by previous scholars who have researched

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78 Specifically, I came across Record Group No. 24, Stack Area 470; Box Number 901; Row 53; Compartment No. 05, and Shelf No. 2.
Navy Filipinos and other marginalized subjects in the U.S. Navy. Naval archivists have made these records most immediately available to the public, leading many previous scholars to conduct brief research on this group of archives. Nevertheless, these scholars have tended to minimize citations of these and other printed archives. Rather, they have favored maximal recognition of oral histories and testimonials.

As Jesse Quinsaat, Fred Cordova, Kale Fajardo, and numerous other Philippine and Filipino American studies scholars have noted, the recruitment and enlistment of Navy Filipinos preceded the U.S. arrival on Philippine soil to fight ‘alongside’ the Philippines in the Spanish-American War. During the Spanish colonial period in the Philippines, Filipinos were recruited from the Philippines as seamen in the Manila Galleon trade beginning in the eighteenth century. In the early 1900s, during and after the Philippine-American War, the U.S. Merchant Marine and U.S. Navy started to recruit

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79 Examples of such previous works include Filipino American National Historical Society (FANHS), Hampton Roads Chapter’s In Our Uncle’s Words: ‘We Fought for Freedom’ (2006); Yen Le Espiritu, Homebound (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); Robert J. Schneller, Breaking the Color Barrier (New York: NYU Press, 2005); Richard E. Miller, Messman Chronicles (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2004). With exception to Schneller and Miller, these scholars have provided enriching, humanistic, and original accounts of these oral histories of U.S. Navy Filipinos—one of the most populated and relatively class-privileged Filipino communities in U.S. history. Some of the authors of these works, like Ray L. Burdeos and some members of FANHS, have been naval officers or direct beneficiaries of the G.I. Bill and other veterans’ benefits that have trickled down to navy descendants and relatives. Nevertheless, their minimal references to written historical records in national and bi-national archive depositories have limited these scholars’ understanding of the structural origins behind the emergence and prevalence of one of the most central Filipino communities in the U.S.—Navy Filipinos.

80 By prioritizing the written records in the U.S. National Archives, this chapter compliments and complements previous scholars’ oral history scholarships on Navy Filipinos in the U.S. In addition, this project serves to broaden our understanding of how military interests and political concerns combined with the subjective desires of Filipinos to foster the emergence and prevalence of Navy Filipinos, their families and communities on a national and global scale.

and enlist Filipinos from the Philippines.\textsuperscript{82} On April 1, 1901, U.S. President William McKinley ordered the enlistment of 500 Filipinos from the Philippines in what came to be known as the United States Navy Insular Force. The politics of recognition, in this context, served twofold. The first involved the recognition of these enlistees as servants of the U.S. Navy and of the U.S. body politic. The second purpose revolved around the state’s recognition of these enlistees as soldiers of the U.S. Navy who would even fight against their own to implement and enforce the militarist formations and bases of the American colonial state in the Philippines during the Philippine-American War (1899-1913). These bases included Sangley Point, Clark Air Force Base, Subic Bay, Samar in Baguio, among many others.\textsuperscript{83}

Similar presidential wartime policy facilitated Filipino national enlistment into the U.S. Navy and other branches of the U.S. military. In 1917, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson requested the enlistment and inclusion of 800 Filipino nationals into the U.S. Naval Insular Force to serve and fight for the U.S. abroad. Wilson announced his request soon after his official retreat from isolationism toward the war and foreign relations. Consequently, these enlisted Filipinos fought in behalf of the U.S. during the First World War.\textsuperscript{84} During the Second World War, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt issued an executive order that not only mandated the enlistment of at least 120,000 Filipino nationals into the U.S. Armed Forces, but also implemented the broader creation of an U.S.-Asian military alliance known as the United States Armed Forces of the Far East—

\textsuperscript{82} Quinsaat, 102.


\textsuperscript{84} Quinsaat, 102. Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy, to Woodrow Wilson, Memorandum, Washington, DC; 15 October 1917, MB, RG 24, NARA College Park.
otherwise known as USAFFE. President Roosevelt enacted this policy on July 26, 1941, while the U.S. Navy continued to recruit and enlist Filipino nationals into its insular force.85

Even during the pre- and post-war periods of the early twentieth century, the U.S.N. continued to enlist Filipino nationals in varying degrees. By 1917, there were 2,000 enlisted Filipinos in the U.S. Navy serving alongside African American enlistees as cooks or messmen. During the course of U.S. involvement in the First World War, the number of Filipino enlistees increased significantly, reaching 6,000 by 1919. Shortly after the war, U.S.N. officials prioritized Filipino recruitment while preventing enlistment of African Americans.86

Also during this period, Filipinos were recruited—if not transferred—from USN stations and ships to work as cooks for the U.S. president in the White House. As early as 1928, enlisted Filipinos such as Sotero Abiva and Mariano Floresca were hired by U.S. navy officials to work for the U.S. president. Following the Second World War, there were more than thirty Filipinos serving U.S. President Truman in the White House, in his presidential trips abroad, and during his national electoral campaigns.87

Besides enlisted cooks and soldier recruits, there were several Filipinos from the Philippines who migrated to the U.S. as students, or midshipmen, in the U.S. Naval Academy (USNA). As midshipmen, these enlistees were promising USNA students

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87 Public Papers, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Independence, MO.
training to become military officers. On August 29, 1916, United States Congress approved an act allowing a maximum of four Filipinos, specifically one per class, to receive instruction in the Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland. In 1925, the number of recruits increased by sixteen per year, thereby facilitating the official recruitment of one Filipino midshipman per year between 1919 and 1940.

Because U.S. Congress prohibited these Filipino midshipmen graduates from entrance into the U.S. Navy, most of these graduates eventually became officers in the Philippine military. For instance, after graduating from the USNA on June 2, 1938, Marcelo Sulit Castillo, Jr. became colonel of the 16th Battalion Combat Team in the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces in the Philippines (AFP). Moreover, in 1939, the Philippine Navy recruited Carlos Jesus Albert, from Lucena City, Luzon, as a captain shortly after Albert graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in June of that year. In the years following, Colonel Albert served as a detachment commander and training officer of the Offshore Patrol Base during WWII before becoming an armed forces attaché and military adviser to President Ramon Magsaysay during the anti-Huk campaigns from 1949 to 1953.

Nevertheless, a few Filipino midshipmen graduates eventually settled in the U.S. during the early postwar period, working as corporate engineers or (in rare cases) as officers, or ensignees, of the U.S. military. Henry Harold Hemenway, who graduated on June 4, 1936, worked as a marine generator designer/engineer for the Foster Wheeler Corporation in Livingston, New Jersey from 1936 to 1939. From 1959 to 1964,

88 Jose Olivares, Case File, Nimitz Library; Naval Academy, Annapolis. United States Public Congressional Hearing, 29 August 1916.

89 Jesus Albert and Marcelo Sulit Castillo, Jr., Lucky Bag Alumni Case Files; Nimitz Library, Naval Academy: Annapolis, MD.
Hemenway became Vice President of Research and Engineering of the Graver Tank
Division in the Transunion Corporation in Chicago. Also, in 1945, the U.S. Air Force
enlisted Sergio Castro Molano as a colonel. Molano’s stations of ensignment included
Westover, England Air Force Base, the MacGuire, Japan Air Force Base, and the
Washington, DC Air Force Base during the latter stages of World War II and the Korean-
American War.90

While Filipino nationals were continually serving the U.S. Navy as enlistees since
the Philippine-American War, their inclusion was generally shaped by a form of racial
paternalism. This form of racial paternalism involved enlisting both African Americans
and Filipino nationals as cooks, messmen, and stewards. The enlistment of these subjects
in such menial forms of labor was enforced in both public and private households of U.S.
naval officers, or what one author has referred to as “floating plantations.”91 These
practices of labor placement in the U.S. Navy also defined U.S. political discourses of
race and citizenship. These political discourses, in turn, shaped varying and sporadic
degrees of inclusion and marginalization of Filipino nationals within the U.S. national
body politic. Examples included the recruitment of Philippine nationals as foreign aliens
in the Philippine-American War (as stated in chapter one), as well as the placement of
Filipino enlistees within the U.S. citizenry vis-à-vis the 1940 revisions of the Nationality
Act.

The congressional hearings and reports surrounding the 1940 Nationality Act, in
particular, established similar terms and conditions of Filipino inclusion in the U.S.

90 Henry Harold Hemenway and Sergio Castro Molano, Lucky Bag Alumni Case Files; Nimitz Library,
Naval Academy: Annapolis, MD.

91 I borrow the term “floating plantation” from Timothy Ingram, “The Floating Plantation,” Washington
Monthly 2, no. 8 (October 1970), 17-20.
nation-state: specifically among those who were enlisted in most branches of the US military (with exception to the US Army) during that period. As previously stated, Filipino enlistees who provided at least three years of wartime service were offered naturalization and citizenship in the U.S. nation-state. Additionally, Filipinos who enlisted in U.S. vessels would be granted U.S. legal residence, and would be eligible for naturalization and citizenship after at least five years of military service. Nevertheless, these congressmen assumed that these Filipinos, along with other Asians, would be placed as messmen/stewards/cooks in the U.S. military, particularly those enlisted in the navy. As Congressman Butler articulated during the House of Representatives Subcommittee hearings regarding the 1940 Nationality Act: “… a good many of these vessels at Asiatic stations take on Chinese, Filipinos, and so forth, as mess boys and employees of that character… They enlist them, and then later on the vessel they may come to the United States.”

Moreover, the 1940 revisions of the Nationality Act added another layer to the politics of enlistment during this period: the enhancement of diplomatic and strategic alliance with Latin American regions, African American communities, and the Philippine Commonwealth. By granting naturalization and offering citizenship to enlisted persons from these specific origins and affiliations, U.S. officials felt more confident in their

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92 Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee of the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Revise and Codify Nationality Laws, 76th Cong., 3rd sess., 20 February 1940, 70. It should be noted that during this period, “aliens” of Asian descent, including Chinese and Japanese nationals, were prohibited from naturalization and citizenship, as based from the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act and the 1924 Immigration Act. The 1940 revisions of the Nationality Act, thus, did nothing to repeal these terms and conditions of ethnoracial exclusion. In addition, Pacific Islanders, along with other persons “indigenous” to the Eastern Hemisphere, were not included in this act (with exception to persons of African and Philippine descent). It was not until 1943 when the Chinese Exclusion Act was repealed, and not till 1965 when a mass quota of Asian immigration and naturalization was permitted (100,000 yearly) by U.S. officials.
diplomatic alliances with these indigenous regions and ethnic communities, especially as the U.S. played a more active role in the Second World War from 1941 onward.93

The Politics of U.S.N. Minority Enlistment: 1941-1945

Before the formal U.S. naval recruitment of Filipino enlistees proceeded in 1944, U.S. naval official correspondence concerning potential Filipino enlistment started as early as 1941. Such concerns were based from local and national demands for mess attendants. In a memorandum written to the chief of the Bureau of Navigation in Washington, DC, Commander H.W. Osterhaus requested that twelve additional mess attendants be stationed under his command in the Treasure Island military base in San Francisco. However, all surnames of the requested mess attendants were non-Filipino (based on the probable genealogy of their pronounced names): Bunting; Hornbill; Waxbill; Chatterer; Aloe; Catalpa; Ebony; Chinquapin; Grosbeak; Killdeer; Merit; and Rocket.94

Nonetheless, during that same year in 1941, in a memorandum written by the Director of Enlisted Personnel to the Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, USN Captain H.A. Badt reported that the required quantity of messmen during that time was 9,985. However, the actual amount of reported enlisted messmen, as of September 30, 1941, was 9,208. In addition, by that time, “only” 176 mess attendants were recruited. By June 30, 1942, Badt estimated that 12,700 total enlisted mess attendants would be requested and required. Subsequently, a total of 4,000 first mess attendants were requested between the end of September, 1941, and June 30, 1942 (i.e., approximately

93 Ibid., 63-75.

94 H.W. Osterhaus, Commander Patrol Force, Local Defense Forces, Twelve Naval District, San Francisco, CA (in Treasure Island) to Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, “Subject: Request for Increase in Allowance of Mess Attendants,” Memorandum, Washington, DC; 16 October 1941, p. 1; Record Group No. 24, Stack Area 470; Box Number 901; Row 53; Compartment No. 05, Shelf No. 2; NARA, College Park.
444 monthly). Overall, during the wartime period, more and more enlistees were being deployed in the infantry and armed forces. This left more and more vacancies in the mess branch. To fill this increasing vacancy, U.S. naval officials turned primarily to African Americans, and secondarily to Filipinos, Chamorros, and other minorities in the mess branch during this period.

In order to address the increasing demand for mess attendants, the Director of Enlisted Personnel (H.A. Badt) made the recommendation to recruit a “limited quota” of Filipino mess attendants from the Philippines into ‘Class V-6’ of the US Naval Reserve. Nevertheless, Badt immediately followed up on his recommendation by confirming his preference for “sufficient Negroes” over Filipinos if African Americans were able to fulfill his “limited quota.”

In addition, the third and last request in his memorandum emphasized the following:

3. If such enlistments are authorized it is recommended that these mess attendants pass through 3 weeks detentions in Cavite and then be transferred to ships of the Asiatic Fleet for training. It will be necessary to find out what facilities obtain in the Sixteenth Naval District for such detention.

Whether he was referring to specifically Filipinos or African Americans in this last item was unclear. What might be clearer was Badt’s association of Filipinos with

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95 H.A. Badt, Director of Enlisted Personnel, USN Captain to Assistant Chief of Bureau of Navigation, “Subject: Recruitment of Filipinos for Dubies [?] as Mess Attendants,” Memorandum, Washington, DC; 1941, p. 1; Record Group No. 24, Stack Area 470; Box Number 901; Row 53; Compartment No. 5, Shelf No. 2; NARA, College Park.

96 Enlistees who are classified by the U.S. Naval Reserve as “Class V6” specialize in “general service.” This includes specialties in generally any field in the naval service (mess stewardship included). This categorization is inclusive to any naval enlistment rank, whether third class, second class, first class, or chief petty officer.

97 Ibid., 1.

98 Ibid., 1.
African Americans in his reference to messmen and messmen recruitment. Secondly, American recruits, possibly including African Americans, were shipped all the way to the Philippines, and elsewhere in Asia and the Pacific, for extensive “detention” and training before official employment in their categorized term of duty.

Overall, the general use for these boot camp detention centers was for newly recruited enlistees to be as physically and mentally fit as possible for veteran service. This included intensive full-time regiments that tested the disciplinary capabilities and endurance of the newly recruited enlistees. While the parallels between these military detention centers and the immigration detention centers, as that in Angel Island, are quite comparable and illuminating in the historical sense, the nature of these two types of detention centers were quite distinct. While the military detention center emphasized U.S. military service and preparation, the immigration detention center reinforced U.S. acculturation within the civilian nation-state. Despite the distinctive natures of the U.S. military and immigrant detention centers, the common intent and outcome of including minorities under conditions of subjugation (if not subservience) made these two types of detention centers quite parallel. Therefore, these specific and broader politics of enlistment applied to the experience of enlistment among African Americans—even during their time in the detention centers.

In this period, the U.S. Navy’s preference for African American enlistment rather than Filipino enlistment was also evident in different geographical and temporal contexts where demands for mess enlistees were increasing. For instance, in a September, 24, 1941 memorandum to the chief of the Bureau of Navigation, Commandant A.C. Read of the U.S. Naval Air Station in Pensacola (FL) announced several related matters. First,
the commandant pronounced training preparations of 70 newly enlisted mess attendants on a four-week basis. Second, he requested for more mess attendants to work in the mess branch of the Pensacola Naval Station. His third request adhered more to the racial politics of enlistment prevalent in this period: “the Bureau is requested, when filling existing vacancies in the mess attendant complement of this station, to send Negroes, rather than Filipinos, especially in the cooks and stewards ratings.”

While it may have been cheaper for U.S. naval officials to hire massively available African American citizens within the U.S. rather than Filipino foreign nationals from the Philippine archipelago, the bottom line was that naval officials were formally restricted from enlisting Filipinos during the Philippine Commonwealth period. Based on that restriction alone, African Americans were more readily and legally available.

Despite the fact that Filipinos in the Philippines were not yet allowed to be officially recruited in the U.S.N. during this time, those who were previously enlisted legally during the Philippine-American colonial period (1901-1934) were continually transferred within the circuits, or registers, of the U.S. naval stations and ships within both coasts of the continental United States. In some cases, messmen of other ethnicities were included in such policies of transfer as well. In a 1941 telegram to the Bureau of Naval Personnel (they had just changed their name from “the Bureau of Navigation”), the Immigration of Naturalization Services (INS) requested and likely received confirmation that the ‘present policy’ of transferring messmen during that time was to “transfer

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99 A.C. Read, Commandant, US Naval Air Station, Pensacola, FL to Chief of Bureau of Navigation, “Subject: Mess Attendant Training,” Memorandum, Pensacola, FL; 24 September 1941, p. 1; Record Group No. 24, Stack Area 470; Box Number 901; Row 53; Compartment No. 5, Shelf No. 2; NARA, College Park.
Chinese and Filipino MATs [e.g. Mess Attendants] [in] San Francisco and other Matts in Norfolk[.]

The U.S. Navy’s racial preference of mess attendant recruits was contingent upon the demographics surrounding the local base. For instance, in early 1942, an officer from the Naval Air Station in Corpus Christi, TX sent a brief telegram to the Bureau of Naval Personnel. In this telegram, the officer (whose name was not mentioned in the document) requested for more information on the “races which can be enlisted [in the] messman branch.” In addition, this naval official directly articulated his “desire [for] enlist[ed] white officers[,] stewards[,] and cooks[,] and men of Mexican extraction for messmen if applicable.” On the one hand, this document revealed the navy official’s racial and ethnic preference for officer (white) and messmen recruits (white and or Mexican). On the other hand, it did not state as directly the logics behind its preference for white officers and white/Mexican messmen in this particular temporal and local geographical context. Nevertheless, given the historically high population of whites and Mexicans within Corpus Christi, one can suggest that the officers within this base historically had a conceptual preference and positive relationship with white officers and white/Mexican messmen on this particular base.

On May 21 of that same year, the Bureau of Naval Personnel sent a telegram to the Naval Air Station in Corpus Christi, TX. In this telegram, the Bureau confirmed two things. One confirmation was that the “enlistment [of] men of Mexican extraction […] [was] not approved. Secondly, the Bureau stated that the current instructions for

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100 Immigration Naturalization Services (INS), San Francisco, CA to Bureau of Naval Personnel, “Assume Present Policy to Transfer Chinese and Filipino MATs San Francisco and other Matts Norfolk Request confirmation,” Telegram, Washington, DC; 1941, p. 1; Record Group No. 24, Stack Area 470; Box Number 901; Row 53; Compartment No. 5, Shelf No. 2; NARA, College Park.
recruitment, during that time, permitted “enlistment of negro […], filipino and chinese extraction only as messmen.”

While this 1942 military document officially confirmed the naval bureau’s lack of preference or approval for Mexican enlistments, it also suggested at least two patterns pertinent to the inclusionary and exclusionary politics of minority enlistment. First was the national inclusive enlistment (or preference) of Filipinos as messmen recruits before 1944, alongside African American and Chinese men as well. Secondly was the concrete written evidence of the continual restriction of Filipino enlistees as “only messmen,” along with African Americans and Chinese in this particular item of military correspondence. From a historiographical standpoint, this historical evidence countered Jesse Quinsaat’s insight that Filipinos were not recruited as enlisted messmen during the Second World War until the watershed year in 1944, when the USN recruited more massive amounts of enlistees as messmen (Filipino and African American) from the Philippines. This historical complication and revision will be addressed in the next section of this chapter.

In addition, the brief memo, from the Naval Bureau to the Corpus Christi base, illustrated the likely fact that local bases and transnational military bureaus had conflicting racial and ethnic preferences for “their” mess attendants. The trans-local Naval Air Station in Corpus Christi desired Mexican enlistees from the civilian spaces immediately surrounding the base. However, the transnational-based Naval Bureau preferred the enlistment of Filipinos and Chinese enlistees to this particular base, as well.

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101 Webb C. Haynes, Bureau of Naval Personnel to Naval Air Station Corpus Christi, “Enlistment of Men of Mexican Extraction not approved’… ‘Current Recruiting Instructions Permit Men of Negro Filipino and Chinese Extraction only as Messmen,” Telegram, Washington, DC; 21 May 1942, p. 1; Record Group No. 24, Stack Area 470; Box Number 901; Row 53; Compartment No. 05, Shelf No. 2; NARA, College Park.
as to other militarized stations across the globe. Given the structural nature of superiority of the Bureau of Naval Personnel in matters of mess enlistments, it was more than likely that this and other naval stations enlisted more Filipino and Chinese as mess attendants, regardless of the civilian racial and ethnic demographic immediately surrounding the local militarized zone.

Moreover, from a historical perspective, this item of evidence illuminated two points related to my overarching arguments. Firstly, local prejudices toward the messmen force varied from location to location so there was no clear, universal racial hierarchy of preference for messmen. And secondly, there appeared to be no direct reasons or logics as to why the Naval Bureau preferred particular racial or ethnic minorities as enlisted messmen in specific temporal and geographic contexts over others. Even one of the naval officials stationed in Corpus Christi asked the following question to the Bureau of Naval Personnel during that year in 1942: “is there any reason why we can’t enlist Mexican U.S. citizen[s] Mess Attendants?”\(^{102}\) The Naval Bureau appeared to illustrate no clear and “logical” response to this Corpus Christi naval official’s inquiry. Nevertheless, what is just as important to uncover was that during World War II, there began to be increasing pressure for the U.S. to develop more national standards for recruitment and enlistment of messmen personnel. These standards, as confirmed by the Bureau of Naval Personnel, would be determined in reaction to civilian responses to the working conditions and racial criteria of the mess men. These civilian responses are discussed in the section that follows.

\(^{102}\) NAS Corpus Christi to Bureau of Naval Personnel, “… Is there any reason why we can’t enlist Mexican US citizens [as] mess attendants?” Telegram, Corpus Christi, TX; 13 May 1942, p. 1; Record Group No. 24, Stack Area 470; Box Number 901; Row 53; Compartment No. 05, Shelf No. 2; NARA, College Park.
“Inflammatory Matter”: Civilians and the Shifting Politics of Naval Minority Enlistment

Civilian responses to the living and working conditions of enlisted messmen were prevalent as early as 1941. This was evident in a January 24, 1941 memo that the Bureau of Navigation in the Navy Department (later named the Bureau of Naval Personnel) received from the commander-in-chief of the United States Fleet of the USS New Mexico Flagship. In this memo, the commander expressed sincere concern about public press statements regarding the working and living conditions in the mess branch. Subsequently, rather than aim to solve the root of the problem itself (i.e., race and class discrimination), this commander proposed solutions so that there would be no press complaints about their treatment of the mess men.103

Similar concerns by civilians were evident in a letter prepared by Rear Admiral and Assistant Chief of the Bureau L.E. Denfield. This letter, which was sent on October 11, 1943 to U.S. Senator Arthur H. Vandenburg, was responding to the Senator’s concerns about the forced placement of those enlisted as stewards.104 The next month in November, the Secretary of the Navy received a letter from Navy wife D.M. Salgado. In this letter, Salgado represented a “collective body” of enlistees protesting against their placement and treatment as the “Chief Officer’s Steward” and “Chief Officer’s Cook.” Ms. Salgado’s first complaint was that Filipinos and African Americans were the only assigned enlistees in that largely racially segregated position. Her second grievance was

103 Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, U.S.S. New Mexico Flagship to FLEET [?], “Mess Attendants, Examination of Living and Messing Conditions,” Memorandum, Washington, DC; 24 January 1941, p. 1-2; Record Group No. 24, Stack Area 470; Box Number 901; Row 53; Compartment No. 05, Shelf No. 2; NARA, College Park.

104 L.E. Denfield, Assistant Chief of Bureau to ‘The Honorable Arthur H. Vandenburg, United States Senate, Letter, Washington, DC; 11 October 1943, p. 1-2; Record Group No. 24, Stack Area 470; Box Number 901; Row 53; Compartment No. 5; Shelf No. 2; NARA, College Park.
the lack of respect given to these stewards by those ranked below them, as well as the ones ranked above them. Her third complaint was that these “officer’s chief stewards” lacked decent uniforms, unlike ranked chiefs from other branches of the USN. Lastly, her fourth grievance was that the officers were overworking these enlisted stewards, especially during the busy holiday celebrations.105

More complaints about the general placement and treatment of stewards of color continued in January 1944, as conveyed by a civilian named Mrs. Gurley from Chula Vista, CA. In particular, she was concerned about the lack of uniform allowances for those named as “Chief Cooks,” “Chief Stewards” or “Steward’s Mates,” especially in comparison to “Chief Petty Officers.”106 In a reply letter to this particular civilian, U.S.N. Lieutenant Commander W.F. Calkins assured the U.S. Navy’s positive—if not dignified—placement and treatment of enlistees of color as chief cooks and stewards.107 By being named as chief cooks or stewards, the U.S.N. established and recognized these servicemen’s duties in the branch that was then named the “Steward’s Mate Branch.”108 However, this lieutenant also emphasized the structural integrity of those placed in this branch of duty by proclaiming that “it was not intended that cooks and stewards would exert military authority [italics mine] or assume the responsibility of petty officers, and,
therefore, they have not been classified as such.” He also pointed out, nonetheless, that “all grades of cooks and stewards receive the same uniform allowances as chief petty officers, in view of similarity in type and hence cost of uniform.”

Calkin’s final political response in this letter to Ms. Salgado’s concerns was highlighted in the following statement:

It is the considered opinion of this Bureau [of Naval Personnel] that the best interests of the service are served by the present policy, and you may be advised that no change is contemplated. The Bureau, however, appreciates the thought which prompted your inquiry.

While the recognition—and structural politics—of enlistment were eminent in the lieutenant’s response letter, more specific details shaping these structural recognitions and politics were highlighted in a letter written by another civilian woman named “Miss Mildred I. Yemmans.” In her February 7, 1945 letter addressed to the Office of Dependency Benefits in New Jersey, Yemmans recalled a conversation she had with “a group of colored sailors (enlisted men) who are rated as Steward’s Mates.” In this conversation, the Steward’s Mates claimed to her that “they had to pay for their clothing and meals out of their regular pay.”

Additionally, in her letter of inquiry, Ms. Yemmans relayed the following questions that directly confronted the politics of enlistment in regards to these stewards’ mates, as previously highlighted in this chapter:

(1) Do Steward’s Mates pay for their clothing and meals out of their allotment?

109 Ibid., 1.

110 Ibid., 1.

111 Ibid., 1.

112 Mildred I. Yemmans to Office of Dependency Benefits, Letter, Newark, NJ; 7 February 1945, p. 1; Record Group No. 24, Stack Area 470; Box Number 901; Row 53; Compartment No. 05, Shelf No. 2; NARA, College Park.
(2) If so, why do Navy men have to pay for such things while the men in the Army do not?

(3) Is it true that Negro […] Steward’s Mates are replacing Philippino […] mess boys […], who have returned to their own land to fight?

(4) Who pays these Steward’s Mates? Is it the U.S. Government or the Officers of the ships on which they work?

(5) Is it true that said Steward’s Mates are not members of the regular U.S. Navy, but employees of the officers?113

After receiving this civilian woman’s letter, U.S.N. Captain W.B. McHugh of the Plans and Operations Division attempted to address, if not clarify, Ms. Yemmans’s questions. First, the U.S. captain proclaimed that steward’s mates had to pay for uniform replacements, not for their initial uniforms. Second, he clarified that “Negro […] steward’s mates are not enlisted to replace Filipino Steward’s mates.” Third, “the United States Government pays Stewards’ Mates.” And fourth, “Steward’s Mates are members of the United States Navy the same as all sailors are and receive the same benefits and privileges of any service man.”114

The USN Captain’s response letter to Ms. Yemmans revealed some keen continuities and changes in this time period—particularly by comparison to the 1941-42 period of enlistment. First, the 1944 and 1945 enlistments of African American and Filipino stewards increased dramatically, especially as demands for them to work overseas in U.S. global ship and base installations increased exponentially. Nevertheless, what the USN Captain’s letter concealed to this concerned U.S. civilian citizen was the

113 Ibid., 1.

114 W.B. McHugh, Plans and Operations Division. USN Captain to Mildred I. Yemmans, Letter, Washington, DC; 21 February 1945, p. 1; Record Group No. 24, Stack Area 470; Box Number 901; Row 53; Compartment No. 5, Shelf No. 2; NARA, College Park.
private preferences and enlistments of Filipino males as domestic stewards in the homes of U.S. naval officials, in addition to U.S. naval officials’ preference and enlistments of African American male stewards in different geographic and temporal contexts of the USN militarized space. It was clear to this naval official that the revelation of this information to Yemmen and other concerned civilians would not serve the overall interests of militarized stabilities in the USN space. Nevertheless, the limitations of Yemmans’ and others’ inquiries and protests in challenging these racial, gendered, and class-based injustices in the naval branch were just as evident. To echo the words of Lieutenant Commander Calkin the year(s) before: “no change is contemplated.”

From “Cooks” to “Steward’s Mates”: Reinforcing the Politics of USN Minority Enlistment

Despite the limitations of civilian grievances, it was in the context of what navy officials perceived as the mess attendants’ “lack of efficiency,” coupled with civilian concerns for the welfare of the mess attendants that prompted the Bureau of Naval Personnel to ponder the mess conditions and to create suggestions for insuring stability and mess attendant efficiency on base. These suggestions were also intended to ameliorate civilians’ concerns for the enlistees. In a January 20, 1943 memorandum to the Director of Mess Training, W.E. Moore, a military official in the Bureau of Naval Personnel, attributed the problem of mess attendant efficiency to several factors, largely regarding the issue of race. The Bureau’s immediate concern was the circulation of newspaper publications read by African American mess attendants, particularly the Chicago Defender and “several other Negro publications.” In the memorandum, Officer Moore claimed that the Chicago Defender, specifically, publicized civilian issues of

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115 Calkins, 1.
black employment that generated unrest among African American mess attendants who were dissatisfied with their labor conditions on base. According to this naval officer, their levels of unrest were attributed to their readings of such materials containing “inflammatory matter.” The naval official further stated that if not for the availability of these knowledge productions to the African American mess attendants, such situations of unrest and instability “would not otherwise have occurred.”

It is not clear, in these written historical records, the extent to which these ethnic news reports exposed the maltreatment of these African American enlistees, or the degree to which U.S. naval officers were successful in censoring these news reports in the militarized space. What is clearer from these records, nonetheless, is how anxious these naval officials were about the increased enlistment and visibility of African Americans as cooks/messmen/stewards, and the potential manifestations of their unrest through their access to these news reports. These anxieties, arguably, spurred not only further consideration for the placement of African Americans in other enlisted positions, but also the increasing preference for Filipinos and other minorities to fill these positions as cooks/messmen/stewards.

In addition, one should not underestimate the impact that W.E. Moore had on influencing navy policy in matters of minority enlistment and the like. From reinforcing the racialist terms of minority enlistment during World War II to determining the neocolonial terms of health sanitation policy in U.S. bases in the Philippines during the postwar period, W.E. Moore arguably had just as much of a major impact on navy enlistment politics as he had on the politics of health sanitation in U.S. bases within the

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116 W.E. Moore, Bureau of Naval Personnel to Director of Training, “Comments Letter Re Mess Attendants,” Memorandum, Washington, DC; 30 January 1943, pp. 1-2; Record Group No. 24, Stack Area 470; Box Number 901; Row 53; Compartment No. 05; Shelf No. 2; NARA, College Park.
Philippine archipelago (I will further discuss the related politics of health sanitation in the next chapter).

Moreover, racial legacies and essentialist traces of 19th century Social Darwinism permeated the logics of this naval officer who wrote this letter regarding African American and Filipino mess attendants. Besides the circulation of African American publications in their militarized spaces, W.E. Moore suggested the mess attendants’ “low intelligence” as a source of both their conflicts with officers and their “lack of efficiency” in their work performance. Subsequently this naval official stated, “if it were possible to raise the average intelligence of Negro recruit mess attendants above those that were brought in a year ago, and now being brought in, the mess attendant problem aboard ship would be made easier.”

Nevertheless, in his attempt to look at “all interrelated factors” on this issue, Officer Moore also held some naval officers accountable for their conflicts with the mess men in this time period:

A small percentage of officers have a poor attitude toward, and lack of consideration for, members of the messmen branch, be the Filipinos or Negroes. By and large, these officers are equally inconsiderate of other enlisted men outside the messman branch. In other words, most officers who can handle enlisted men can handle messmen well, and vice versa. It is true that a very limited number of officers, due to previous environment prior to entering the service, have had no experience whatever with servants of any sort, and do not treat them fairly. These few officers are found among newly graduated regulars as well as among newly commissioned reserves.

Nevertheless, officers like Moore were not looking at the “environments” informing and shaping the lives of the largely African American and Filipino mess attendants as they were when they were pondering the reasons for the lack of efficiency and intelligence among the white naval officers. This evident dichotomy between racialist

117 Ibid., 1.

118 Ibid., 1.
essentialism toward enlisted mess attendants and the sense of historical understanding towards their “few” fellow officers shaped not only their politics of enlistment among mess attendants. This dichotomy also determined the actual proposals, practices, and policies of enlistment among racial and ethnic minorities at the time. In sum, the messmen of color, rather than the broader structures of racial hierarchy and prejudice, were viewed as the problem that needed correction. Officer Moore’s recommendations for resolution included the extended education and institutional training of the USN captain assisting the president of the mess branch, as well as the officers whom the messmen served during this period. According to Moore, “it is believed that the required reading and explanation of the Navy Training Course for Messman Branch at the Naval Academy and at the Indoctrination Schools would reduce the number of officers who are totally unfamiliar with the servant problem in general.”  

Another suggestion that Officer Moore proposed, which actually came to fruition later in this period, was changing the name of the ratings, which at the time were “cooks” or “messmen.” The purpose of the name change, to this naval official, was to improve the aforementioned working relationships between officers and messmen on base, and to secure the structural stability of the domestic confines of the navy space. In the memorandum, this naval officer (Moore) first suggested changing their name to “Officers’ Mates.” However, he immediately discounted this recommendation because he believed that it was a misleading term for two reasons. Firstly, he thought that it did not “appropriately” define the mess attendants’ working relationship with their superior officers. Second, he interpreted the name as not indicative in “raising the question of

\footnote{Ibid., 2.}
In other words, Officer Moore did not believe that this term define clearly enough the racial, gendered, and class-based boundaries between the officers and “their” servants within this militarized and domestic space of the mess rooms and officers’ headquarters.

Subsequently, Moore offered that “if any change of the rating is eventually made, the terms ‘Stewards’ Mates’ or ‘Stewards’ Assistants are suggested.” In order to support this claim, Moore—if not patronizingly—recalled his own experience and observations about the pride and collective sense of responsibility felt by the people designated to such positions, as well as the domestic and additional work required from it. Because U.S. naval officials largely restricted Filipino enlistees within these mess positions, they were in turn lumped together with African Americans when issues of politics, unrest, or policy regarding mess men were raised: especially during and following the Second World War.

Officer Moore’s documented naval correspondence was historically vital because it spurred further discourse on the strategy of position name changing: particularly as a way of stabilizing and securing already-existent race and ethnic hierarchy in the U.S. Navy. Taking direct cue from Moore’s suggestions, in February and March of that year (1943), officials within and beyond the naval branch of the U.S. military further corresponded and eventually approved the name changes among and regarding assigned mess men. On February 15, 1943, the Chief of Naval Personnel submitted the name changes.

\(^{120}\) Ibid., 2.

\(^{121}\) Ibid., 2.

\(^{122}\) Ibid., 2.

\(^{123}\) Ibid., 1.
changes to Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox for approval. Subsequently, the “Messman’s Branch” became the “Steward’s Branch”. The “Officer’s chief steward” became known as “Chief Steward”. The “Officer’s chief cook” became the “Chief Cook”. The “Officer’s steward, first class” became “Steward’s Mate, first class.” In addition, the same name changes applied to the second and third classes of the enlisted ranks in the U.S. Navy, and so on. However, collectively known as the 1943 Naval Appropriation Act, these policies created mostly changes in terminology, and not in the actual pay or the “rating insignia, duties, and qualifications”—that would remain unchanged.

The name change reflected a desire for a boost in image and morale. Naval officials believed “that assignment to this rating branch would be more desirable and would attract a better class of personnel…” By making the mess branch more “desirable” to enlistees and new recruits, naval officials thought that the name change would enhance the image of the mess branch for those working within the branch, those recruited into the branch, and for concerned civilian citizens. Eleven days later, on February 26, 1943, the Secretary of the Navy transmitted an updated version of the approved memorandum to the Planning and Control Division of the Bureau of Naval Personnel. While this version confirmed the official name changes from the previous memorandum, this version also emphasized the conditions in which the name changes

124 Chief of Naval Personnel to Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy, Memorandum, Washington, DC; 15 February 1943, pp. 1-2; Record Group No. 24, Stack Area 470; Box Number 901; Row 53; Compartment No. 5, Shelf No. 2; NARA, College Park.

125 Ibid., 2.

126 Chief of Naval Personnel to BurPers Planning, Memorandum, Washington, DC; February 1943, pp. 1-2; Record Group No. 24, Stack Area 470; Box Number 901; Row 53; Compartment No. 05, Shelf No. 2; NARA, College Park.
did not apply. As previously stated, such conditions in which these name changes did not apply included these enlistees’ previous terms of duty in their service records, health records, and pay accounts—up until the official date of the name change itself (February 26, 1943). After the date of the name change, all official references to them would be made according to their newly named rank in file(s).  

Another condition of the name changes was temporal-based. Naval officials considered the time period for the universal applicability of these name changes as “indefinite.” Because of this, they allowed (and in turn practiced) the interchangeability of the old and new names of these enlisted ranks. The purpose of this interchangeability, according to naval officials, was for “establishing identity of men in the Steward’s branch.” Therefore, while naval officials rhetorically formalized the name changes in behalf of the enlistees and their concerned civilians, these same naval officials informally—if not contradictorily—permitted the discursive space (e.g. servicemen records, officers’ correspondence) and material space (i.e. naval ships and stations) for the interchangeability between the old terms (mess attendants, officers’ cooks, and so on) and new terms (e.g. steward’s mates) of these minority enlistees.

While the purpose behind this interchangeability, on paper, was to establish “the identity of men in the steward’s branch,” one can argue that such interchangeability was used more by the naval officials themselves to determine the stewards’ identity and to enforce their own power as “superiors.” Simultaneously and subsequently, the condition of interchangeability reinforced the class and race based boundaries between the subjects.

127 Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy to Planning and Control Division of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, Memorandum, Washington, DC; 26 February 1943, pp. 1-2; Record Group No. 24, Stack Area 470; Box Number 901; Row 53; Compartment No. 05, Shelf No. 2; NARA, College Park.

128 Ibid., 2, Chief of Naval Personnel, et al., 2.
of the mess steward’s branch on the one hand, and the ensigned officers approving these “name changes” on the other, to continue in “indefinite” time. These hierarchical boundaries, as evident from the written historical records, continued to racialize, feminize, and spatially segregate the people of color who were still restricted within the mess steward’s branch.

Wartime Demands for USN Minority Enlistment and the Politics of Diplomacy

On June 25, 1941, Franklin Delano Roosevelt implemented Executive Order 8802. As a compromise between President Roosevelt and activists of the March on Washington, E.O. 8802 promised equal opportunity for employment within the U.S. defense industry in general: on the condition that the March on Washington drop its demand that the military be desegregated.\textsuperscript{129} While the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps integrated more African Americans during this period, the Army was not as accepting of integration. As for the Navy in particular, though it reopened African American enlistment for the first time since 1922, officials continued to place African Americans primarily in menial positions of labor as cooks and janitors—or, as messmen.\textsuperscript{130} Nevertheless, with the combined activisms of newspaper publications, grassroots organizing, and public policy implementation vis-à-vis the Double Victory Movement, more African Americans in particular became enlisted—however unevenly—in various branches of the U.S. military during this period. Thus, racial integration in the U.S. military became relatively more


\textsuperscript{130} Yen Le Espiritu, \textit{Homebound} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 29, 62.
prominent during World War II, primarily from the grassroots efforts of the Double Victory Movement.\textsuperscript{131}

It was within this dual context of African American enlistment in defense of U.S. and global “democracy”, countered with the conditions of minority discrimination that African Americans faced in the institutional and everyday workplace of the U.S. military, that prompted a united front of African American enlistees, civilians, and militant activists of the NAACP, the \textit{Pittsburgh Courier}, and other allied groups and collectives in February 1942. On the one hand, this particular united front sought to defend ideas of American democracy abroad by promoting African American enlistment and honoring African American enlistees in the U.S. military, just like how the enlistment of other ethnic minorities (such as Irish and Japanese enlistees) were received within their respective communities during this period. On the other hand, this movement fought to enforce American democracy and social justice within a national domestic sphere that continued to reap the seeds of racial discrimination, segregation, and violence. These grassroots and national based mobilizations became known as the Double Victory Movement, which lasted over the duration of World War II.\textsuperscript{132} As a result of the Double Victory Movement, African American enlistments increased from 2,069 in 1940 to 370,000 in 1942, to over 500,000 deployed overseas later in the war.\textsuperscript{133} Additionally, the

\textsuperscript{131} The extent to which EO 8802 applied to civilian jobs within the military can be a topic for further research. Nevertheless, it should be noted that even after E.O. 8802 in 1941, it was still legal for the military to provide non-combat jobs on a “separate but equal” basis. It would not be until President Truman’s Executive Order 9981 in 1948 when the racial integration of the U.S. military would finally be officially enforced from the presidential level. Please see chapter five of this dissertation.


third African American midshipman ever to join the U.S. Naval Academy in 1944 became the first to graduate from that institution in 1948. Moreover, this movement propelled more vigilant measures to enforce racial integration in the military and civilian spheres during the postwar period.

Thus, these continual politics and tensions of enlistment regarding people of color in the U.S. Navy, coupled with the increasing U.S. wartime interventions abroad, materially transpired in the escalating recruitment of people of color into the U.S. Navy as early as in 1943. For example, on March 16, 1943, U.S. naval lieutenant Randall Jacobs ordered the Recruiting Division of the Bureau of Naval Personnel to “assign 1775 Negro Inductees for Steward Mates during the month of April.”

In addition, Lieutenant Jacobs requested for the recruitment of these African American “inductees” on “a percentage basis.” This meant that certain percentages of newly enlisted African Americans would be assigned to various commandants and chiefs of designated Naval Districts, Naval Commands, and Naval Operating Training Commands in proportions ranging from .8% to 34%. The conditions behind the percentage-based method of recruitment were as follows:


135 Kelley and Lewis, 166.

136 Randall Jacobs, Lieutenant, USN to Office of Planning and Control, “Subject: Assignment of Steward Mates for the Month of April, 1943,” Memorandum, Referenced in Randall Jacobs, Lieutenant, USN to Recruiting Division of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, “Subject: Assignment of Enlisted Men of the Stewards’ Branch Ashore,” Memorandum, Washington, DC; 5 August 1943, pp. 1-2; Record Group No. 24, Stack Area 470; Box Number 901; Row 53; Compartment No. 05, Shelf No. 2; NARA, College Park.


Fig. 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assignment of Enlistment</th>
<th>Percentage of 1,175 African American Recruits</th>
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<tr>
<td>Commandant of the First Naval District</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commandant in the Third Naval District</td>
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<td>Commandant in the Fourth Naval District</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commandant in the Fifth Naval District</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commandant in the Sixth Naval District</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commandant in the Seventh Naval District</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commandant in the Eighth Naval District</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commandant in the Ninth Naval District</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commandant in the Eleventh Naval District</td>
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<td>Commandant in the Thirteenth Naval District</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief of the Naval Operational Technical Training Command</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
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The historical evidence above illustrated the U.S. Bureau of Naval Personnel’s racial and ethnic preference for African Americans as navy stewards in quantitatively varying yet significant levels. With the increasing demand for steward enlistment, coupled with the increasing pressure for African American integration in the U.S. military, U.S. officials likely mediated both demands by officially enlisting African Americans as stewards in varying degrees within these listed militarized sites.
Nevertheless, the liberal inclusion and recognition of African Americans primarily as messmen, cooks, and stewards only further solidified the marginalized status of this ethnic group in the U.S. military. This tension between the increasing demand for inclusion of African American enlistees and the expecting placement of African American enlistees as primarily cooks/messmen/stewards reinforced the racial inequalities cemented in the U.S. military since the birth of the American republic. While the massive racial integration of African Americans and other minorities was not made as official until Truman’s executive order in 1948, imminent signs of racial integration were happening earlier that decade, but under limiting conditions.

Continual demands for steward enlistments persisted in August of 1943. For instance, in August 5th of that year, the chief of the Bureau of Naval Personnel sent a memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy requesting the assignment of more enlisted stewards to the naval station in Manchester, Washington. 139 Three weeks later, on August 27, the bureau made another request for more steward assignments in the Naval Receiving Station and Naval Barracks in Washington, DC, the Naval Section Bases in Corpus Christi, TX and Panama City, FL, and the Advance Naval Base Personnel Depot in Camp Allen within the Naval Operating Base in Norfolk, VA. 140

Based on the military correspondences cited earlier, one can claim that the Bureau of Naval Personnel’s continuing enlistment of racial and ethnic minorities, as mess

139 Chief of Naval Personnel to Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy, “Subject: Assignment of Enlisted Men of the Stewards’ Branch Ashore,” Memorandum, Washington, DC; 5 August 1943, pp. 1-2; Record Group No. 24, Stack Area 470; Box Number 901; Row 53; Compartment No. 5, Shelf No. 2; NARA, College Park.

140 L.E. Denfield, Chief of Naval Personnel to Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy, “Subject: Assignment of Enlisted Men of the Stewards’ Branch Ashore,” Memorandum, Washington, DC; 27 August 1943, p. 1; Record Group No. 24, Stack Area 470; Box Number 901; Row 53; Compartment No. 05, Shelf No. 2; NARA, College Park.
attendants/stewards, between 1941 and 1943 still included Filipinos. Nevertheless, despite the potentially countering evidence, the general historical consensus was that between 1934 and 1944, the USN officially prohibited the enlistment of Filipino nationals into its general branch. However, there were some very interesting exceptions. For instance, naval officers who preferred the mess services of Filipino nationals sought private and informal alternatives to recruit Filipino nationals. Such requests, during this period, meant that these Filipino “recruits” had to be retired, on fleet reserve, or on inactive duty after at least twenty years of USN service.

Rear Admiral McIntyre, chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, made one such request to the Bureau of Naval Personnel for a Filipino steward in early September 1943. Shortly thereafter, on September 21, 1943, the Bureau of Naval Personnel sent a memorandum to the Third and Fifth Naval Districts, which requested “that a list of names, ratings, and home address[es] of all Filipino retired or fleet reserve cooks and stewards who are on inactive duty… be reported to the Bureau, in order that such a list be turned over to Admiral McIntyre.”

Ten days later, the Bureau sent a memo to Rear Admiral McIntyre that provided four names (“Maurecio,” “Jose and Garcia,” “Florentinn”) along with a list of “filipino cooks and stewards who are not on active duty and who reside in the Third and Fifth Naval Districts.” While this actual list (or copy of) was not included in this written historical record, this brief series of correspondences illustrated the fact that Filipinos

141 Chief of Naval Personnel to Commandants of the Third and Fifth Naval Districts, “Subject: Retired or Fleet Reserve Cook or Steward, Availability for Private Employment,” Memorandum, Washington, DC; 21 September 1943, p. 1; Record Group No. 24, Stack Area 470; Box Number 901; Row 53; Compartment No. 05, Shelf No. 2; NARA, College Park.

142 Military Bureau [of Naval Personnel] to RT McIntire, USN Rear Admiral, “Pursuant to your request…” Memorandum, Washington, DC; 1 October 1943, p. 1; Record Group No. 24, Stack Area 470; Box Number 901; Row 53; Compartment No. 05, Shelf No. 2; NARA, College Park.
continued to be in the mental and circular registers of U.S. naval officers during this period, despite the prohibition of enlistment of Filipinos from the Philippines.

Naval officials’ continuing enlistment of Filipinos, through private means, illustrated the continual politics of enlistment in a period when official recruitment of Filipinos in the Navy was formally restricted. By U.S. officials continuing Filipino enlistment by informal and private means during the Philippine Commonwealth period, the U.S. was continuing to operate as an informal empire in the Philippines. Despite U.S. national self-conceptions as a democracy and shining deacon seeking to “overthrow the tyrants”, U.S. officials’ informal preference and private recruitment of Filipino enlistees illustrated intimate threads of the continuing colonial relationship between the U.S. and the Philippines. Not only does this historical evidence counter J. Quinsaat’s and other previous scholars’ chronology of Filipino enlistment, but more importantly, it alludes to ongoing colonial sentiments that these U.S. officials had for Filipinos “serving” them in the intimate space of the mess branch. These colonial sentiments, in turn, manifested in the continuing enlistment of Filipino mess men by informal and private means.

This continual preference for Filipino enlistment not only applied to U.S. naval officers, but even to the U.S. president. While the history of White House recruitment of Filipino enlistees can be traced to the American colonial period in the Philippines, the physical and celebratory presence of Filipinos in the White House became more prevalent during Harry S. Truman’s presidency (1945-1953). In 1945, between twenty-five and thirty Filipino stewards, much of whom were previously on inactive duty as retirees or on fleet reserve, served the U.S. president.143

143 Summary Service Files, Sotero Abiva Mariano Floresca, and Cesar Lomibao.
Filipino White House stewards even became embroiled in diplomatic relations as allied leaders from other nations specifically requested their domestic services during the twilight year of World War II. In his memorandum for the naval aide to the U.S. president, U.S. Naval Reserve Rear Admiral A.F. Carter reported on a meeting that occurred between President FDR and Arab leader King Ibn Saud following the Yalta Conference. In this meeting, King Saud pronounced his pleasure with the luncheon prepared for him by FDR’s Filipino White House Stewards. In particular, King Saud stressed that it was the first meal he had eaten in a long time which did not aggravate a stomach ailment that had plagued him for several years.\textsuperscript{144}

Subsequently, in preparation for a meeting with local representatives of the Arab American Oil Company during that same month, King Saud requested that the same meal he had in his meeting with FDR (rice and curry) be prepared for him in this meeting with the Arab American Oil Company, particularly by the same cook who prepared that luncheon (i.e. one of FDR’s Filipino stewards). However, when the “improbability of securing the same cook who prepared the luncheon” was brought to King Saud’s attention, the USN rear admiral observed and reported on the Arab American officials’ suggestion that the White House staff or USN “recruit a good cook, either Filipino or Chinese, and dispatch him to Arabia after a possible short indoctrination period at the hands of the Navy cooks on the Potomac [FDR’s Presidential yacht].”\textsuperscript{145} Thus, given the diplomatic implications of this Arab leader’s preference for meals prepared by FDR’s

\textsuperscript{144} A.F. Carter, Rear Admiral, USNR, Executive Officer to Naval Aide to the President, Memorandum, Washington, DC; 18 June 1945, p. 1-2; Papers of William M. Rigdon Subject File, 1945-1960; Box Number 1; Chronological—April 12, 1945- June 1945; Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Independence, MO.

\textsuperscript{145} \textit{Ibid.}, 2.
Filipino stewards, the rear admiral offered the following suggestion: “In view of the desirability of further promoting and cementing our relations with Saudi Arabia, it is proposed, if appropriate, that permission be granted to accomplish the indoctrination mentioned.”

Shortly after receiving the correspondence letter, the Naval Aide to the President, James K. Vardaman, Jr., wrote back to Rear Admiral A.F. Carter expressing his affirmation of Carter’s and King Saud’s request:

The Naval Aide will be glad to have the cooks on the Potomac show any cook you designate how to prepare rice and currie which, as you know, has been a fairly standard Navy meal.

This instruction will, of course, be done when it does not interfere with the President’s schedule…”

Whether these Filipino “cooks on the Potomac” made this a standard meal by suggesting to their mess officer that this meal be served (or vice versa), or whether they just learned how to cook something that was already standard, such possibilities were not concretely evident in the written historical record—however likely they may have been.

What I think is important to point out, nonetheless, is the following. First, these officers had immense trust in these Filipino stewards to make this dish for this Arab leader. And second, these officials would rather have these Filipino stewards make the dish than any other cooks for the King’s associates. These indications suggest the intimate relationship between the white naval officers and the White House Filipino stewards during this time in World War II. Despite formal classification as foreign nationals, Filipinos came to be

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146 Ibid., 2.
147 James K. Vardaman, Jr., Captain, USNR, Naval Aide to the President, Memorandum, Washington, DC; 21 June 1945, p. 1; Papers of William M. Rigdon, Subject File, 1945-1960; Box Number 1; Chronological—April 12, 1945; Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Independence, MO.
known by U.S. officials as the most trusted “allies” of the U.S. during the war. In no other space was this relationship status more intimately evident than in the White House.

Also, whether this request was actually fulfilled was not lucidly evident in the U.S. national historical records. Nonetheless, what were more evident were two things. One, this Arab leader respectively preferred the hiring of a cook of Philippine descent in his meeting with Arab American officials. And two, this Arab leader’s request displayed the emergent politics of Filipino steward enlistment in furthering U.S. diplomatic relations during the Second World War. This emergent politics was not only prevalent in this request and served meal, but also through these stewards’ continuing services to the U.S. presidential staff during the Potsdam Conference and in other events relating to U.S. war and foreign policy. However, what cannot be stressed enough were the tensions shaping these politics of enlistment, especially considering the racial and gendered conditions shaping this essentially unequal bi-national relationship between the U.S. and the Philippines.

Nonetheless, in the bi-national sense, 1944 and 1945 were watershed years in U.S.-Philippine relations. This emergent bi-national relationship transpired from a common disdain for the daily atrocities committed by Japanese military forces in the Philippines, coupled with the increasing fervor among barely surviving Filipinos—in their local provinces—for the return of General MacArthur’s allied forces to aid in the evacuation of Japanese forces from the archipelago. Conscious of the increasing political national fervor in the Philippines for the U.S. ’s return, U.S.-based Filipino regiments who were training in Australia, along with General MacArthur’s soldiers of the U.S. Armed Forces of the Far East, “returned” to the Philippines to execute their Philippine Liberation
Campaign. It was within this historical context of allied U.S.-Philippine bi-national patriotism, vis-à-vis the Philippine Liberation Campaign, that the U.S. Navy resumed official enlistment of Filipino stewards in 1944.

Thus, in terms of ethnic minority enlistments, 1944 and 1945 were watershed years as well. This was not only true for Filipino enlistees, but also for Chamorro enlistees. In a September 21, 1944 memorandum, C.C. Hartman, U.S.N. Captain and Assistant Director of Enlisted Personnel, acknowledged the Bureau of Naval Personnel’s authorization of the Commander in Chief of the Pacific to recruit Filipinos [from the Philippines] and Chamorros [from Guam]. This U.S.N. Captain followed up on his point of acknowledgement by emphasizing two arguments for the continual enlistment of Filipinos and Chamorros.148

Hartman’s first argument was that Filipino and Chamorro enlistees would fulfill the drastically increasing demand for U.S.N. steward’s mates between October 1944 and January 1945 (4,982 specifically) within and across U.S. military bases in the Asia-Pacific, Trans-Atlantic, and elsewhere in a U.S. naval global scale. During that time, the quantitative demands for stewards consistently exceeded the number of stewards outputted from the Bainbridge Naval Training Center in Maryland by sixty-one. To fill the gap between the demand and supply of stewards, Captain Hartman requested the hiring of Filipino and Chamorro enlistees.149

148 C.C. Hartman, Assistant Director of Enlisted Personnel to Bureau of Naval Personnel, “Subject: Lack of Steward’s Mates,” Memorandum, Washington, DC; 21 September 1944, p. 1-2; Record Group No. 24, Stack Area 470; Box Number 901; Row 53; Compartment No. 05, Shelf No. 2; NARA, College Park.

149 Ibid., 1.
Also, Hartman felt that it would be more immediately convenient for U.S. Naval Bases in the Pacific Ocean to recruit “native labor” to fulfill the increasing demand for stewards within these militarized areas.\textsuperscript{150} Subsequently, various U.S. naval fleets within and across the transpacific enlisted Filipinos for six-year assignments within the general U.S. naval force over the last several months of the Second World War.\textsuperscript{151}

Thus, 1944 and 1945 were indeed “watershed” years in the transoceanic theatres of U.S. military enlistment during World War II. In addition, the same was true for other U.S. racial and ethnic minorities enlisted in the U.S. Armed Forces. This inclusive—if not celebratory—politics of enlistment culminated in the congressional passage of the G.I. Bill in 1944. The G.I. Bill was a main source of what George Lipsitz recalled as the “possessive investment in whiteness.”\textsuperscript{152} While I discuss some of the postwar and contemporary legacies of the G.I. Bill in chapter five, it cannot be overstated how much impact the G.I. Bill, coupled with the 1940 Nationality Act that promised U.S. citizenship after three years of military service, had on informing and shaping the wartime enlistment of U.S. racial/ethnic minorities and foreign nationals in general. Promised benefits of the 1944 G.I. Bill, for these wartime veterans, included subsidized navy housing and residence within these bases, retirement pensions, free or paid college education grants,

\textsuperscript{150} Ibid., 2.

\textsuperscript{151} H.M. Rubio, Commanding Officer, U.S. Naval Advance Base Unit Number Six, San Francisco to Commander Service Force, Seventh Fleet, “Enlistment of Filipino Stewards in the U.S. Navy – Report for Week of 19-25 March 1945,” Memorandum, San Francisco, CA; 25 March 1945, p. 1; Record Group No. 24, Stack Area 470; Box Number 901; Row 53; Compartment No. 05, Shelf No. 2; NARA, College Park. H.M. Rubio, Commanding Officer, U.S. Naval Advanced Base Unit Number Six, San Francisco to Chief of Naval Personnel, “First Enlistments—Forwarding Papers,” Memorandum, San Francisco, CA; 22 April 1945, p. 1; Record Group No. 24, Stack Area 470; Box Number 901; Row 53; Compartment No. 5, Shelf No. 2; NARA, College Park. Commanding Officer, San Francisco U.S. Naval Station to Chief of Naval Personnel, “Filipino Stewards—Enlistment Papers; Forwarding of,” Memorandum, San Francisco, CA 29 April 1945, p. 1; Record Group No. 24, Stack Area 470; Box Number 901; Row 53; Compartment No. 5, Shelf No. 2; NARA, College Park.

public college tuition fee waivers for their familial descendents under the age of twenty-four, postwar civilian employment services and training, mortgage loan guarantees for home purchases, and cash payments for the honorably discharged and unemployed. For these enlisted U.S. racial/ethnic groups and foreign nationals, therefore, the G.I. Bill provided material means for U.S. citizenship and/or upward financial mobility. While the 1946 Rescission Act barred allied Philippine national soldiers from obtaining similar benefits, for others enlisted as foreign nationals: the promises of the G.I. Bill were more likely to be realized.

For many Japanese Americans, 1944 and 1945 marked watershed years to a certain degree as well. By 1944, the U.S. government had begun to release Japanese American communities from wartime concentration camps (along with German Americans). In addition, the U.S. Armed Forces started to recruit individuals of this ethnicity into the 442nd Regimental Combat Team. The 442nd played a vital role in the U.S. liberation campaigns in the European theater. These enlistees fought for a country that displaced them from their homes to prison-like internment camps. Nonetheless, their veteran services, like that of Filipinos and other U.S. racial and ethnic minorities, illustrated their reconciliation of this tension between displacement and enlistment during the Second World War.

1944 and 1945 also marked watershed years for segments of the Chinese American, Native American and African American communities. For Chinese Americans, their relatives in China were finally able to migrate to the U.S. after the U.S. government finally repealed the Exclusion Act in 1943. It was also in 1944 that the U.S.N. continued to enlist Chinese Americans as stewards. In addition, the U.S. Armed
Forces enlisted a number of Native Americans as “code talkers.” Even amongst large segments of the African American community, the 1942 Double Victory Movement, coupled with momentums gained from the 1943 March in Washington, led to the escalation of African American enlistment into different branches of the U.S. military to fight in the war.153

And last but not least, Filipino stewards benefited from these watershed years in two ways. First, the U.S. Navy again started to enlist stewards from its bases in the Philippine archipelago, as they did from 1901 to 1934. Nevertheless, what distinguished the politics of previous wartime and prewar enlistments from that of World War II was this: rather than the U.S. enlisting these Filipino nationals into a segregated naval insular force, the U.S. was now enlisting them into the general U.S. naval force. It was during these watershed years, starting in 1944, that the U.S. Navy abolished the insular force altogether. Secondly, this revised politics of enlistment, for newly recruited Filipino stewards, meant that they gained greater geopolitical access to the U.S. nation-state and in the emerging bi-national polities of the “U.S.-Philippine nation.” Like other U.S. racial/ethnic minorities and foreign nationals (but unlike their civilian worker counterparts in Asia and the Pacific, whose cases I will further assess in chapter three), these revised politics of enlistment, for Navy Filipinos, meant that access to U.S. citizenship and upward financial mobility within the U.S. nation-state was more likely within reach.

153 Kelley and Lewis, 161-166.
CHAPTER THREE

Postcolonial USN Filipino Subjecivities and the Reinforcement of U.S. Militarization in the Philippines: 1942-1953

On January 31, 1946, Cenon Trias, intelligence personnel for a naval commander in Manila, provided three key details to U.S. intelligence officer Eng. McCullough regarding a potential Sakdalista and Japanese “collaborator” named Jesus Bautista. First detail: that Bautista “had been a member of the Sakdalista Party since 1939.” Second: that according to Bautista’s military ID, Bautista “participated actively with pro-Japanese elements whose activities were greatly against the United States government.” And third detail: within Bautista’s ID, there were specific references which spurred his empirical observations that his ID “was printed during the Japanese occupation” and that “Japanese ‘character’ [was] also printed on his identification card.”

Like the board of review memo acknowledged in the first chapter, Personnel Trias’s correspondence letter was transmitted on January 31, 1946: less than six months before U.S. formal declaration of Philippine Independence, and less than eight months before the board of review official stopped further investigation of Jesus Bautista.

Nonetheless, whereas the board memo was written from the ruling and privileged

154 Cenon Trias, USNFR First Class Steward’s Mate to Eng. McCullough, Intelligence Officer, Sworn Testimonial, Manila, Philippines; 31 January 1946, p. 1; Bautista, Jesus MM1c, USN (Ret.) Case File, 1945-1946; Box 6 of 11, File 313-08-006 (181-72-0144); NARA, San Francisco.
position of the U.S. white male officer, the personnel correspondence letter was written from the subjugated and collaborative position of a U.S. Navy intelligence personnel of Philippine descent: Cenon Trias.

Reflecting on and departing from Trias’s memorandum, this chapter takes on a deeper inquiry into what it meant to be “Filipino” within and despite the institutional reinforcement of U.S. militarization in the Philippines following the Second World War. In particular, I examine two distinct and overlapping groups of written historical records: first, a group of testimonies from 1945 to 1946 by Navy Filipinos who spoke out against Jesus Bautista or remained neutral; second, a series of correspondence letters between navy civilian employee Leonicio F. Arceo and U.S. naval officers in November of 1953. Drawing upon these two primary archival files, I address the following questions that shape the historical and textual analysis of this chapter. One: how did wartime and postcolonial Navy Filipinos formulate and articulate their subjectivities during the Philippines’ transition toward and beyond formal independence? Two, to what extent did these civilian Navy Filipinos exercise agency within and despite the structural hegemonies of the Japanese and U.S. imperial nation-states? And three, how can these evidentiary revelations of wartime and postcolonial subjectivity be understood in the larger transpacific statecraft of the “U.S.-Philippine nation” and globalized Cold War politics?

This chapter also assesses the ways in which Filipino subjectivities—and interpretations of such by U.S. officials—shaped the militarized areas bordering the “U.S.-Philippine Nation”, particularly during the early postwar period. While the U.S. Navy immediately stopped official recruitment of Filipinos from 1947 to 1952, U.S.
officials also implemented restrictions of what I call trans-local permeability among its own personnel and officers in civilian or “native” Philippine territories. Despite the fact that Filipino civilian workers were being integrated into a relatively more diverse plethora of positions in the U.S. military during this period (including, in part, handling classified correspondences), evidentiary conceptualizations of Filipinos in U.S. military officials’ health sanitation reports further enforced trans-local restrictions of mobility among Filipinos and American personnel during this period. Besides the cases of civilian workers Jesus Bautista and Leonicio Arceo, primary sources that I cover for this section range from military official correspondences regarding health and infrastructural sanitation policies, to a series of letters regarding a military personnel deserte, to memorandums concerning the hiring of Filipino civilians to handle classified correspondence matter.

By investigating these uncovered cases and record groups, I argue that during and following the Second World War, dominant formations of Filipino subjectivity shifted from an intense form of racialized anti-Japanese xenophobia to an emphasis on Philippine sovereignty and jurisdiction. This particular transition occurred both in the national and individual level. Despite this shift from latter wartime (1942-1945) to early postcolonial (1946-1953) Filipino subject formations, common threads binding these distinctive subjectivities were threefold: one, an intense and commonsensical allegiance to the U.S.-Philippine nation-state; two, a rhetorical and exaggerated sense of opposition toward anyone or anything potentially representing ideological opposition to the U.S. global nation-state; and three, a structural sense of anxiety among U.S. officials that reinforced the bureaucratic hegemonies, inequalities, and politics of marginalization shaping U.S.-
Philippine relations. Such militaristic reinforcements were exercised by policing and disciplining political “subversives”; through public and infrastructural sanitation policies; by imposing particular limitations on the range of duties of Filipino civilian labor; and by prompting terms/conditions of disposability regarding hired Filipino civilian workers, despite the relative increase in the plethora of positions of work in which these workers were being included during this period.

“Alleged Collaborator”: Revisiting Wartime and Postcolonial Exercises of Filipino Subjectivity in the Jesus Bautista Case Testimonials

During the prewar period, U.S. and Philippine colonial officials largely defined “political subversives” in the Philippines as local and trans-local based Filipinos with perceived or real political commitments with groups who fought for Philippine independence apart from U.S. governance. As mentioned, these groups included the Sakdalistas, Ganaps, and other radical groups in the trans-pacific. Even Filipinos with perceived political allegiances to the Japanese government fell under the “subversive category” during the pre-war period, but not nearly to the extent that they did during the Second World War.

Jesus Bautista was one such person who, in the eyes of the political and military agents of the “U.S.-Philippine nation,” dangerously fell under both characteristics of the “political subversive.” Well before the formal implementation of the board of review, U.S. military officials had their eyes on Bautista. Between May 17 and November 25, 1945, naval lieutenants H.H. Cofield and G.R. McLean, along with Lt. Commander J.J. Reynolds, conducted a series of interviews of largely retired enlisted and civilian navy mates of Jesus Bautista. These navy mates included Miguel Samson, first class enlistee;
Casiano Ablola, former first class officer’s steward; Juan Artana, former first class enlistee; Luis Pagtacan, retired second class engineman; Sixto Franco, active first class machinist mate; and Cenon Trias, active first class steward mate.

Some historically compelling logics and themes transpired from this series of interviews conducted by the U.S. military—particularly the “severity” of Bautista’s family’s involvement with the Sakdalistas and their collaboration with the Japanese government. While these logics of inquiry revealed and shaped the early postwar peak of the “U.S.-Philippine nation,” they also articulated—if not aligned with—the intimate continuities between the wartime and postwar conditions of Filipino subjectivity in and beyond the U.S. Navy.

One prevalent theme in these testimonies, as mentioned in the last chapter, was the extent of Bautista’s involvement with the Sakdalistas. In addition, the degree of Bautista’s success in recruiting other men into the Sakdalistas was another theme. Some, including first class enlistee Miguel Samson, testified that Bautista, along with another navy enlistee, Juan de los Reyes, “tried to get [him] to join the Sakdalista Party about 1939 and many time[s] since.” He also voiced that Bautista, along with first class officer’s steward I. Ablola, were “the only Sakdalista in San Roque, [Cavite Province].”

Former first class enlistee Juan Artana went so far as to identify Bautista as “a well-known Sakdalista.” Luis Pagtacan, a former shipmate of Jesus Bautista after

155 Miguel Samson, First Class Machinist’s Mate to H.S. Cofield, Lieutenant, USNR, Sworn Testimonial, Manila, Philippines; 17 May 1945, p. 1; Bautista, Jesus MM1c, USN (Ret.) Case File, 1945-1946; Box 6 of 11, File 313-08-006 (181-72-0144); NARA, San Francisco.

156 Juan Artana, Cavite City Guerillas, to G.R. McLean, Lieutenant, USNR, Sworn Testimonial, Manila, Philippines; 18 August 1945, p. 1; Bautista, Jesus MM1c, USN (Ret.) Case File, 1945-1946; Box 6 of 11, File 313-08-006 (181-72-0144); NARA, San Francisco.
World War I, proclaimed that “Bautista was a member of the Sakdalista Party and he even tried to get [him] to join the party in 1940.”

Sixto Franco, who claimed to be navy shipmates with Bautista from 1917 onwards, stated that he “knew that Bautista was a Sakdalista at least as far as 1938.” His testimony also offered a peculiar, if not odd, “evidentiary” statement: “I never talked with Bautista about [his involvement with the Sakdalistas] but he associated with Feliciano Tormis who had talked pro-Japanese to me.” Nevertheless, what exactly defined “pro-Japanese” talk, in this period of U.S.-Philippine relations, was not as evident in that noted conversation as it was in his memory of a dialogue he had with another navy mate regarding the subject of Bautista:

Panegeton F1/c (a retired Navy man whose first name I do not recall) told me he heard Bautista tell the Japanese that all the US Navy men and those Filipinos who refused to work for the Japs should all be killed. This conversation occurred in Bautista’s home and was overheard by Panegeton who was just outside the house. Panegeton has since been killed by the Japs.

Other testimonies by former navy mates of Bautista also illuminated the degree to which their rhetorical allegiance or opposition to the U.S. shaped the contours of the “U.S.-Philippine nation” during the wartime and early postwar period. Some, including Miguel Samson, revealed that in some conversations, Bautista told them that “the

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157 Luis Pagtacan, Second Class Engineman USN (Ret.), to J.J. Reynolds, Lt. Cmdr., USNR, Sworn Testimonial, Manila, Philippines; 9 July 1945, p. 1; Bautista, Jesus MM1c, USN (Ret.) Case File, 1945-1946; Box 6 of 11, File 313-08-006 (181-72-0144); NARA, San Francisco.

158 Sixto Franco, USNFR First Class Machinist’s Mate, to H.S. Cofield, Lieutenant, USNR, Sworn Testimonial, Manila, Philippines; 9 June 1945, pp. 1-2; Bautista, Jesus MM1c, USN (Ret.) Case File, 1945-1946; Box 6 of 11, File 313-08-006 (181-72-0144); NARA, San Francisco.

159 Ibid., 1.

160 Ibid., 1-2.
Americans would never come back. Japan controls all around.”  

Juan Artana stressed that “every time that this man have seen people gathered in the streets or barber shops, he always asked them what they were talking about. Then he would proceed telling them not to wait for the Americans as ‘they are defeated.’”

Moreover, the extent of Bautista’s wartime “collaboration” with the Japanese government was another prevalent theme shaping these testimonies. One measure of such “collaboration” was the time and duration of Bautista’s employment in the Cavite Navy Yard, which shifted from U.S. to Japanese control in 1942. According to Luis Pagtacan’s July 9, 1945 testimony, “Bautista worked in the Japanese Navy Yard from the time of the Japanese occupation up to the last minute when the Japanese evacuated Cavite.” And on June 4, 1945, Cenon Trias, who proclaimed to be one of Bautista’s navy shipmates in the 1930s, noted that Bautista “preferred the Japs to the Americans” and that he “heard Bautista say he liked to work for the Japs than the Americans.”

161 Miguel Samson, First Class Machinist’s Mate to H.S. Cofield, Lieutenant, USNR, Sworn Testimonial, Manila, Philippines; 18 August 1945, p. 1; Bautista, Jesus MM1c, USN (Ret.) Case File, 1945-1946; Box 6 of 11, File 313-08-006 (181-72-0144); NARA, San Francisco.

162 Juan Artana, Cavite City Guerrillas, to G.R. McLean, Lieutenant, USNR, Sworn Testimonial, Manila, Philippines; 18 August 1945, p. 1; Bautista, Jesus MM1c, USN (Ret.) Case File, 1945-1946; Box 6 of 11, File 313-08-006 (181-72-0144); NARA, San Francisco.

163 Between 1942 and 1945, the Japanese military controlled not only the Cavite Navy Yard, but Clark Air Base and Subic Bay as well. See Frank Hindman Golay, Face of Empire: United States-Philippine Relations, 1898-1946 (Madison: Center of Southeast Asian Studies), 407.

164 Luis Pagtacan, Second Class Engineman USN (Ret.), to J.J. Reynolds, Lt. Cmdr., USNR, Sworn Testimonial, Manila, Philippines; 9 July 1945, p. 1; Bautista, Jesus MM1c, USN (Ret.) Case File, 1945-1946; Box 6 of 11, File 313-08-006 (181-72-0144); NARA, San Francisco.

165 The word “Japs” was used intentionally as racist terminology in reference to Japanese and Japanese Americans who were considered as the wartime “enemy” during the Second World War. It has also been used as a racist term in selected (if not private) written and oral discourses by wartime and postwar veterans, officials, and descendants alike. Repetition of this term within this and other quoted passages is not in any way, shape or form, intended for similar usage or politics as in the context in which this term was said. Rather, it is referenced solely in the historical context of this quote during the early postwar
Trias, in an undated memo, went so far as to note that Bautista, as a member of the Ganap Party, “was obliged to work as a spy for which this party was recognized for. [Bautista] worked in the Navy Yard all during the Jap occupation. I saw him going to and from work daily. I lived less than a block from him at this time.”

Meanwhile, the testimony by Juan Artana, discharged first class enlistee, provided more specific—if not dramatic—details on the extent of Bautista’s “collaboration” with the Japanese government. While assisting the intelligence division of the U.S. sanctioned Cavite City Guerillas, Artana articulated Bautista’s active—if not “forceful”—efforts to recruit locals to join the Japanese government:

This man [Bautista] has been known and going around the City of Cavite telling and intimidating the people that they must help and collaborate… Every time that this man have seen people gathered in the streets or barber shops, he always asked them what they were talking about.

Intricately integrated with these logics of Bautista’s “political subversions” was the theme of family, particularly in the racial, interethnic, and heteronormative sense. Most, if not all of these testimonies noted Bautista’s daughters openly interacting with Japanese males: one through marriage with a Japanese man, another through employment in a Japanese bar. At least one of these testimonials extended this family theme in the

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166 Cenon Trias, USNFR First Class Steward’s Mate to Eng. McCullough, Intelligence Officer, Sworn Testimonial, Manila, Philippines; 31 January 1946, p. 1; Bautista, Jesus MM1c, USN (Ret.) Case File, 1945-1946; Box 6 of 11, File 313-08-006 (181-72-0144); NARA, San Francisco.

167 Ibid., 1.

168 Juan Artana, Cavite City Guerillas, to G.R. McLean, Lieutenant, USNR, Sworn Testimonial, Manila, Philippines; 18 August 1945, p. 1; Bautista, Jesus MM1c, USN (Ret.) Case File, 1945-1946; Box 6 of 11, File 313-08-006 (181-72-0144); NARA, San Francisco.
political sense. Miguel Samson, on May 14, 1945, testified that Bautista’s wife and
daughter “also spread Japanese propaganda.”

One exception to the extremely accusatory nature of these testimonies was that
from Casiano Ablola. Ablola was working in the civilian force as a security guard at
Sangley Point in the time of his testimony on June 4, 1945. In his testimony, Ablola
stated that “Bautista had the reputation in the [military] community of being a member of
the Sakdalista Party.” However, Ablola also noted that he “never heard him make any
speeches for them.”

In addition, Ablola provided a relatively deeper context behind Bautista’s
“collaboration” with the Japanese military. Ablola’s emphasis on Bautista’s obligations
to support his family, and to insure his family’s survival, perhaps resonated in the hearts
and minds of the Board of Review:

He [Bautista] worked as a machinist for the Japs during the latter part of 1942,
during 1943, and 1944 until the Americans came back. He told me that he had to
work there because he had a family to support. He has about 8 children—6 of
them young and at home.

And finally, the last part of Ablola’s testimony provided arguably the most important
evidence for U.S. military officials: “[Bautista] never talked much and I never heard him
make any statements against the Americans or the Philippine Government.”

169 Miguel Samson, First Class Machinist’s Mate to H.S. Cofield, Lieutenant, USNR, Sworn Testimonial,
Manila, Philippines; 17 May 1945, p. 1; Bautista, Jesus MM1c, USN (Ret.) Case File, 1945-1946; Box 6 of
11, File 313-08-006 (181-72-0144); NARA, San Francisco.

170 Casiano Ablola, USNFR First Class Steward’s Mate to H.S. Cofield, Lieutenant, USNR, Sworn
Testimonial, Manila, Philippines; 4 June 1945, p. 1; Bautista, Jesus MM1c USN (Ret.) Case File, 1945-
1946; Box 6 of 11, File 313-08-006 (181-72-0144); NARA, San Francisco.

171 Ibid., 1.

172 Ibid., 1.
While Ablola’s testimony provided a more nuanced and supportive interpretation of Bautista’s “collaborations,” perhaps the most convincing testimony came from Jesus Bautista himself. On June 9, 1945, Bautista wrote a letter to U.S. military investigative officials. This letter reported his own personal background in the U.S. Navy, along with his plea of “innocence” from any accusations of political subversion. The content and form of this letter is provided below in its entirety, followed by a close, nuanced, and historical reading of his testimony.

**Jesus Bautista Revisited**

I am Jesus BAUTISTA, MM1c, USN (Ret.) I was placed on inactive duty 29 Aug. 1933 and retired for physical disability 30 Sept. 1940. I was working in the Cavite Navy Yard as a civilian machinist when the war broke out in 1941. I am 52 years old and live in #19 Juan Luna St., San Roque, Cavite. I am not employed at the present.

I was not interned by the Japs. I was held for 5 hours, questioned and released. This was in Jan. 1942. I was not employed from them until Sept. 1942. At that time I heard from some of the people who were working in the Navy Yard for the Japs that the Japs needed workers there and I went there and applied for a job. The Japs did not tell me that I had to go to work or threaten me if I did not work. I went to work because I needed the money and the ration of rice each day which they gave the workers in the Yard. Once a month they gave me soap, children’s clothes and firewood. I worked for the Japs as a laborer, sweeping the buildings. I did not tell them I was a Machinist. I had no glasses then and so would have been unable to do that sort of work as my hindsight is bad.

I continued to work there from Sept. 1942 till May 1943. At this time I heard that the Japs were trying to locate all the Navy men. They did not know that I was a retired Navy man. I became afraid and ran away and hid at Imus, Cavite. I had no regular employment after that time. I fished some and raised a little garden.

In October 1943 I sold my house at #1 Inoscientio St., San Roque, Cavite for 4000 pesos (Jap money) and December 1943 I bought a smaller house at #19 Juan Luna St., San Roque, Cavite for 2000 pesos.

My daughter PATRIA (now age 18) worked in a Jap bar on Salamaca St. from May 1943 to May 1944. About March 1944 she married a Japanese civilian by the name of Okamina, who was a clerk in the Jap shipyard in Canacao. He lived with
my daughter and the rest of my family in San Roque for about 3 months. Then he and my daughter lived by themselves until Okamina fled with the other Japs. While living in my home Okamina contributed his rice ration and sometimes other food to the family food supply. I did not live in my house while Okimana was there.

My daughter FEDARICA (now age 19) worked in the same Jap bar for about 6 months prior to the time the Japs left.

Before the war I went to some of the public meetings of the Sakdalista Party but I never joined the party. I went to 3 different such meetings. I never talked politics or made any pro-Japanese or Anti-American statements. I never gave the Japs any information of any sort.

I have read this statement in 3 pages and it is true.173

Many details in Bautista’s testimony overlapped with the others mentioned. For instance, Jesus Bautista did work in the Cavite Navy Yard as a civilian Navy worker during the Japanese occupation between September 1942 and May 1943. Bautista’s daughters did work in a Japanese bar, with one of them marrying a male of Japanese descent. And Bautista did associate with the Sakdalistas. Nevertheless, the divergences within these testimonies illustrated various interpretations of how politically intimate Bautista and his family members were with the Japanese imperial government during wartime. Responses ranged widely from forcefully collaborative—at the expense of his people—to having been forced to work for the Japanese government to support his struggling family.

One can spend an entire career sifting through written and oral archive collections to assess the “truthfulness” or “accuracy” of these testimonies. Nevertheless, what I am most interested in, for the analytical purposes and methodological scope of this chapter, are the politics of these divergences in these testimonies. In fact, one might even make

173 Jesus Bautista, Sworn Testimonial, Manila, Philippines; Bautista, Jesus MM1c USN (Ret.) Case File, 1945-1946; Box 6 of 11, File 313-08-006 (181-72-0144); NARA, San Francisco.
the bold assessment that military officials were not as concerned with the accuracies of these details as they were with the politics, or implications, of their testimonies. More specifically, I am interested in inquiring and assessing the details of these testimonies, and how these details conveyed politics of recognition that shaped the bi-national imaginaries and continuing inequalities of the “U.S.-Philippine nation”: vis-à-vis war, conquest, and neo-colonialism. Inquiring these divergences, via the politics of recognition and enlistment, can enable us to further extrapolate the ways in which these Filipinos articulated their wartime and postcolonial subjectivities in a largely oppositional sense, as well as the ways in which the performative nature of these testimonials fueled or amplified their subjectivist articulations.

Consequently, in the eyes of these U.S. military officials, these Filipinos’ testimonials—face to face—measured their political, military, and familial allegiance to the “U.S.-Philippine nation.” Meanwhile, in the eyes of these Filipino personnel, the reception of their testimonies determined what might transpire if their politics were, in any way, shape, or form, contradictory to what these U.S. military officials expected as “patriotic.” In fact, it can be argued that there was no better articulation of wartime and postcolonial subjectivity than in the performance and politics of the formal testimonial. Therefore, for the purposes of this chapter, I am more interested in the politics of recognition exercised in these militarized subjects’ testimonials than in the “verity” of these testimonials.

Nonetheless, from a public historical perspective, Jesus Bautista’s personal history is a relatively unique and exceptional one, especially in comparison to narratives that resonate more deeply within the historical memory of the postwar “U.S.-Philippine
nation.” On the one hand, Bautista was not interned in Bataan or in any of the other Japanese concentration camps during that time. On the other hand, if Bautista had told Japanese officials that he had worked as an enlistee for the U.S. Navy, he probably would have been interned—or even put to death—given that at certain points these Japanese officials were rounding up former U.S. Navy veterans from their local barrios. While one can only speculate in hindsight, U.S. officials from the Board of Review likely found truth—if not sympathy—with Jesus Bautista’s wartime condition, and with his testimony overall. Perhaps because of the content and context shaping Bautista’s testimony, U.S. officials found the grounds of his shipmates’ testimonials as “insufficient” to put Bautista to trial for treason.


Despite such nuanced cases as Bautista’s, the emergence of radical political “subversives”, coupled with the prevalence of anti-colonial Philippine nationalisms, only increased anxieties among U.S. military and political officials and their Philippine elite collaborators. In turn, coincidentally or consequently, the U.S. Navy immediately stopped official recruitment of Filipinos from 1947 to 1952. During this period, U.S. officials implemented restrictions of what I call trans-local permeability among its own personnel and officers in civilian or “native” Philippine territories. In turn, these officials prohibited points of enlisted entry among civilian Filipinos into its militarized bases in the archipelago. While USN stoppage of Filipino enlistment, during this five-year period, illustrated one method of restricted Filipino mobility, evidenced conceptions of

174 I say “official” here because it was possible that U.S. navy officials in the Philippines continued to recruit Filipinos as tago ng tago (e.g., undocumented workers) in their living quarters on or off base. I discuss such historical possibilities in chapter two.
Philippine lands—and Filipino peoples—in U.S. military officials’ health sanitation reports further facilitated and legally enforced such trans-local restrictions of mobility among Filipinos during the early neo-colonial period.

On May 1, 1947, W.E. Moore, USN Commander of Naval Operating Base (NOB) Subic Bay, approved revisions in two sections of an instructional manual for a Pacific Fleet in Subic Bay. These two sections concerned “port health regulations” and “out-of-bounds areas” in the militarized region. One revision in this document was his point of “caution” toward U.S. military personnel of “Helminthiasis” and other diseases within the “native” surroundings of Olongapo City. According to W.E. Moore:

The natives have numerous types of parasites. Transference of these worm infestations may be made by:

(a) Close contact with natives.
(b) Eating food contaminated by natives, especially in native eating establishments.
(c) Drinking water that has not been properly and adequately treated.

Diphtheria:

There has been occasional case of diphtheria among natives. Avoid the disease by avoiding close contact with them.

Tuberculosis:

This disease is fairly prevalent among natives and close contact with them is the usual method of transference.175

Such warnings as these were also accompanied with the “dangers” of “native” Filipinos’ foods and beverages:

(a) Native foods and drinks are dangerous. Those foods and vegetables grown in, or near the ground are especially dangerous because of the presence of human

excreta. All fruits and vegetables handled by natives are dangerous for the same reasons. Their hands are contaminated—their sanitation in general is extremely poor.

(b) Water, milk, and other beverages are dangerous because a large number of restaurants [misspelled in this document] and native homes do not treat liquids and they are usually contaminated by human excreta.

(c) Native alcoholic beverages are extremely dangerous because some of them contain poison. Men have died and some have been blinded by these poisonous liquors.176

While the verity of these “insights” likely ranged from somewhat inaccurate to downright erroneous, the official author of these findings cited similar observations regarding the local gendered presence of venereal disease: “Venereal Disease rate among prostitutes in this area is about 85%. These women have little or no knowledge of female hygiene and make no effort to avoid venereal disease.”177

After noting the “dangers” of the local lands, peoples, and places surrounding the U.S. naval base, the U.S.N. captain suddenly—if not strategically—followed his revisions on the “Port Health Regulations” with corrections he approved in the section on “out-of-bounds areas”: “these areas are changed from time to time; the Security Office should be contacted for current out-of-bounds areas…”178

Similar neo-colonial and orientalist conceptions of Philippine local lands, ingestible materials, and peoples were evident in an August 1948 disciplinary sub-board report by U.S.N. Commanding Officer (C.O.) F.C. Dickey on the local area surrounding Sangley Point. In his memorandum, C.O. Dickey reported the water in Cavite as “still unfavorable.” Even the boiled water in the area was “often contaminated” and the “water

176 Ibid., IIa.
177 Ibid., IIa.
178 Ibid., III.
used at the ice plant [was] polluted.” Nevertheless, what differentiated—if not contrasted—this Sangley Point memorandum from the Subic Bay correspondences was the observed extent to which local political officials near Sangley Point were “cooperative” with U.S. military officials regarding health and sex regulation. Whereas USN Commander Moore lamented the “lack of cooperation on the part of the political authorities in Subic City”180, Commander Dickey acknowledged the significant degree of “cooperation” by Cavite City local officials in efficiently regulating water contamination near Sangley Point. Dickey emphasized that the water “contaminations” in Cavite were capable of being resolved or “purified” with the conditional cooperation between local officials and military officers of the Sangley Point Naval Station:

As a result the City Officials of Cavite are taking steps to chlorinate the water of the ice plant and to enforce the boiling regulation for public establishments. Pending receipt of a sufficient supply ashore, this station loaned a limited quantity of calcium hypochlorite to the City of Cavite. Water at the ice plant and that served in public establishments will be checked periodically.181

This exceptional theme of collaboration between Philippine local and U.S. military officials was also evident in a previous April 1948 memorandum by officials of the Sangley Point Disciplinary Sub-board. These officials included C.O. Dickey, Lieutenant


H.M. Gray, Lieutenant G.E. Wineinger, and Lt. T.B. Uber. In this memorandum, Dickey reported the numerically “prevalent” rate of venereal disease among temporary and permanent personnel in and around Sangley Point: “107.51… per thousand per annum.” Nevertheless, the members of the disciplinary sub-board were quick to note that “an intensified Venereal Disease control and educational program [was] being set up by a hospital corps officer who [had] recently reported abroad after completing special training in this field.” They also reported on the evident functioning and efficiency of this hospital’s establishment in reducing the VD infection rate based on the condition of “keeping infected girls of Cavite out of circulation.”

In addition to and in support of the sub-board’s report on local VD rates were U.S. officials’ updates on the “prevalence and control of prostitution.” In these updates, the disciplinary sub-board largely “credited” the local Shore Patrol for effectively “regulating”: “Organized houses of prostitution are prevalent but they are under control and observation by Shore Patrol that large scale prostitution does not occur from this source.” Appositionally, the report cautioned—if not with a degree of anxiety for the nighttime regulation of their transient and permanent naval personnel—that “a common source of prostitution exists among waitresses and hostesses who work at bars and night clubs and whose actions are hard to control after working hours.”

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182 Disciplinary Sub-Board, Sangley Point to Commanding Officer, Naval Air Station Sangley Point, “[Meeting] Proceedings – Report of,” Memorandum, Sangley Point; April 1948, p. 3; Sangley Point Correspondences, 1947-1948; File 313 (181); NARA, San Francisco.

183 Ibid., 3.

184 Ibid., 3.

185 Ibid., 3.

186 Ibid., 3.
Why were U.S. military officials still concerned about health sanitation in the Philippine archipelago, especially after the U.S.—under its standards of modernity and sovereignty—formally embraced Philippine independence by 1946? As numerous scholars in empire studies have pointed out, the U.S. was relatively successful in its endeavors of furthering health sanitation within its colonies on a global scale, particularly in the Philippines and other areas of the “American tropics”, during the early twentieth century. However, with the Philippines in economic and infrastructural ruins during World War II, by the postwar period of U.S.-Philippine relations, health sanitation again became a subject of relatively major concern among U.S. military officials in particular, especially considering the fact that they were reintegrating their personnel in the Philippine archipelago. For these officials, they were just as concerned about the health and survival of their personnel in an archipelago that they still considered, conceptualized, and stereotyped as “filthy” and “diseased”—just as they did in the early American colonial period in the Philippines. But while “civilizing the natives” under the project of American modernity was a primary logic behind both public health and military officials’ concerns about health sanitation during the colonial period, for U.S. military officials post-1945, their concerns about health sanitation were more exclusively

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188 It is also important to note that by the early 1950s, U.S. military officials sought to expand their strategic military presence in the Philippine archipelago. Such endeavors included the construction of Cubi Point Naval Station near Subic Bay, as well as expanding the barracks, “rest and recreation” facilities, and other supporting units of Subic Bay itself. (Simbulan 1983, 118) Their ambitions of expanding militaristic presence, coupled with increasing their personnel within these expanding areas, also likely enhanced their concerns about the health and well-being of their personnel, especially in a place that they still deemed as “dirty” and “filthy” (in some respects) as the Philippines.
based on insuring the health, survival, and militarized production of their personnel, and much less at this time about civilizing their Filipino counterparts under the auspices of what Warwick Anderson noted as “biomedical citizenship.” By maximizing the health, survival, and militarized production of their personnel, U.S. military officials felt more secure in enforcing their base installations in the Philippines—especially in political opposition against the ideological formations and imperialist expansions of global communisms during this stage of the Cold War. Therefore, officials’ concerns about health sanitation for their personnel intertwined intricately with their anxious enforcement of military base presence in this sovereign and neo-colonial area of the Asia-Pacific.

The extent to which the revisions in these health sanitation reports facilitated and reshaped the “out-of-bounds areas” cannot be determined by these archival evidences alone. Nevertheless, when closely and broadly juxtaposed with the materially intertwined legacies of war, militarism, and colonialism shaping neo-colonial U.S.-Philippine relations, then one can see the ways in which these health reports, along with these reported “out-of-bounds areas” (otherwise known as the “dead line” during the Philippine-American War), were key in regulating the interracial intercourse and permeability between U.S. military personnel and the surrounding local communities. These “out-of-bounds” areas, for instance, surrounding these U.S. militarized sites included the following places in Olongapo province cornering Subic Bay:

a. Banicain  
b. Santa Rita  
c. Binictican  
d. Boton  
e. Tiliin  
f. Kalalake
g. Maquinaya (Civilian Hill)

h. West end of Manga Point (West of Coconut Grove)

i. The portion of Manila Avenue between Simpson and Gil Streets, including the Diamond Horse Shoe Bar, but excluding the International Restaurant and the Silver Dollar.\(^{189}\)

The orientalist logics shaping the Subic Bay health/sanitation reports and out-of-bounds areas, during the late 1940s, also informed the sanitation reports and off-base housing policy within areas surrounding Sangley Point, particularly in the early 1950s. Such logics further demarcated the boundaries between the local and military sphere in and around Sangley Point as well. For instance, in early 1952, U.S. officials also complained about the sanitary conditions near Sangley Point, which they felt stemmed from the “dirty” living conditions in Cavite City. Such complaints were evident in Medical Officer Robert Pennington Jr.’s correspondence to the Sangley Point commanding officer regarding “inspection of off-station housing” early that year. In his correspondence, Pennington, Jr. specifically noted the area of 34-A Radio Road, Cavite City, as “unsatisfactory to this department because of the low sanitary level it presents.”\(^{190}\) Pennington’s complaints also included the following:

- ‘a. Open surface ditch used in back yard for disposal of kitchen wastes.
- ‘b. Inadequate protection against flying and crawling insects.
- ‘c. Inadequate protection from rodents.
- ‘d. Inadequate fencing around premises; the house is surrounded by native squalor.\(^{191}\)


\(^{190}\) Robert Pennington Jr., Medical Officer, Sangley Point to Commanding Officer, Sangley Point, “Inspection of Off-Station Housing.” Memorandum, Sangley Point, Philippines; March 1952, p. 1; “Meetings, Conferences, and Conventions” File, Sangley Point Correspondences, 1952-1953; File 181; NARA, San Francisco.

\(^{191}\) Ibid, 1.

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Pennington also took note of the “notoriously-bad water service facilities in Cavite City” and the potential dangers that they posed to the officers and their dependents, given the waterline connection that links the water supply of Cavite City to that of Sangley Point.”\textsuperscript{192} Subsequently, this medical officer recommended two things. First, he suggested further official inspection by the medical officer and public works officer of this housing facility in particular. Second, he requested an investigation and transformation of the overall health and sanitary conditions of all Navy housings in Cavite City generally. In response to the medical officer’s complaint, J.C. Day, Jr.—Public Works Officer, U.S. Naval Station, Sangley Point, immediately ordered the closing of that navy housing facility.\textsuperscript{193} However, Day, Jr. ceased to acknowledge or respond to Pennington’s recommendation to inspect all the off-station navy housing facilities in Cavite City. While Day Jr.’s apparent rejection of Pennington’s second recommendation—whether for budgetary reasons, or for prevention of further public inquiry into personnel living conditions of off-base housing—was not evident in these written historical records, it is more important to note how these Subic Bay and Sangley Point sanitation reports were shaped over time by military officers, and how these reports demarcated boundaries between the military and the local spheres for these officers and personnel.

\textsuperscript{192} Ibid, 1.

\textsuperscript{193} J.C. Day, Jr., Public Works Officer, Sangley Point to Commanding Officer, Sangley Point, “Inspection of off-station housing,” Memorandum, Sangley Point, Philippines; March 1952, p. 1; “Meetings, Conferences, and Conventions” File, Sangley Point Correspondences, 1952-1953; File 181; NARA, San Francisco.
Additionally, it is important to note how these boundaries further established the “out-of-bounds” areas where military officers were largely disabled from trying local suspects accused of crimes against military personnel. Because of their inability to court martial local suspects within these “out-of-bounds” areas, these officers strictly enforced these boundaries for themselves and their personnel during this stage of the Cold War. In other words, by enforcing these boundaries to protect their servicemen in a land (still) as “foreign” to them as the Philippines, these officials were just as concerned with regulating the physical mobility of their American personnel as they were with maintaining their view of Filipinos as their most loyal foreign allies.

Nonetheless, U.S. officials’ views of Filipinos as their staunchest allies, coupled with the continuing U.S. military presence in the Philippines, fostered the conditions of (relatively) increasing Filipino civilian inclusion into the U.S. militarized space during the late 1940s and early 1950s, particularly into positions that involved managing classified documents. In a June 28, 1949 memorandum, Sangley Point Commanding Officer J.H. Kuhl confirmed the integration of several Filipino civilians into lines of work that enabled them to handle classified materials regarding U.S. national security: Enrique Fernandez, Ricardo A. Fernandez, and Restituto Pugeda.194 Also, according to my findings from the written historical record, five more Filipinos were hired to work in similar positions to handle classified matter that pertained to U.S. national security: Raymond E. Lucio; Manuel Naycalo; Asterio ‘R’ Viray on June 6, 1952; Ciriace R.

Reyes on July 11, 1952; and Abel J. Pelayo on July 11, 1952. More specifically, the duties of these workers involved “handling classified matter” within divisions related to the United States National Defense, including the Special Operations Division, the Communications Department, the Photographic Laboratory, and the Administration Department.

The responsibilities of these workers entailed the following. Firstly, it required responsibility “for the security protection of any document or thing containing information affecting the National Defense or other classified matter to which [they] may obtain access in any manner whatsoever.” Additionally, their duties of “security protection” required that they “shall not in any manner reveal or divulge to any person any classified information of which [they] may gain knowledge except as may be specifically authorized by cognizant authority.” And lastly, they “shall not copy, photograph, sketch or otherwise duplicate any classified document, instrument, plan, writing or material to which [they] may gain access except as specifically ordered by competent authority in connection with [their] duties nor shall [they] willfully retain the same or fail to deliver it on demand to the responsible authority.”

These individual recruitments signified a degree of emerging trust that these U.S. officials had with their Filipino workers during this period, especially in contrast to the

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196 Ibid., 1.

197 Ibid., 1.

198 Ibid., 1.

199 Ibid., 1.
earlier stages of the postwar period. However, Philippine local citizens—particularly those residing close to the U.S. bases—continued to be perceived as “security threats.” This was evident by the severe limitations placed on Filipino civilians who were hired to handle classified documents of the U.S. National Defense. Moreover, the plethora of other historical evidence in this chapter attests to this fact, particularly from the establishment and enforcement of the U.S. military’s “out-of-bounds” areas in relation to the surrounding localities. Factors shaping the U.S. military’s “out-of-bounds” areas rooted not only from its perceived “prevalence” of STDs and “infected” locals, but perhaps too in the physical prevalence of political “subversives.” Additionally, the fundamental participation of their personnel’s “savage behavior,” especially while off-duty, further spurred the evident anxieties of maintaining military hegemony in the Philippines. Such fundamental “savage behavior” among military personnel included desertion, drug possession, drunkenness, consensual fornication, murder, rape, and other crimes that would have jeopardized these officers’ chances of trying their personnel under American jurisdiction.

Desertion, in particular, was relatively more common among U.S. military personnel than officials preferred. These cases of desertion were briefly recorded in station logs during this time, and researched by me in my field research. For the most part, records of these desertions were merely listed and not documented in extended detail. However, one case that I uncovered in my field research proved to be a considerable exception. This case regarded American U.S.N. enlistee Paul Lee Ridgeway. While records of this case consisted of brief correspondences among U.S. military officials, they also included a concerned and lengthy letter by Ridgeway’s
grandmother. This letter expressed deep concern about her grandson’s whereabouts. For instance, Ridgeway’s grandmother emphasized how “scared” she was “when he was out on his liberty.” Also, she stressed the possibilities of what could have happened to him during his leave of absence: “[There] are so many dangers and bad people… They might have got him and made way with him or has him somewhere and has him in a camp suffering and needing help.” Moreover, she articulated her grandson’s disciplined and religious nature in order to eliminate any possibility of Ridgeway’s conscious desertion or tardiness from his duties as U.S. military personnel: “Paul was such a good boy and never late in the things he was to do… he always went to Church with me and had been a member since quite young and he worked for his Lord…”

All in all, Ms. Bland’s letter illuminated some strategic logics and themes that she utilized to convince the U.S. military officials to retrieve Ridgeway back within her actual gaze. For instance, religion appeared to be a theme that Ms. Bland used to convince the officers of her grandson’s purity, disciplined nature, and overall morale. By utilizing this religious rhetoric to the officers, Ms. Bland sought to denounce any possibility that Ridgeway may have deserted from the navy base: “he was good and always went to Church with me and had been a member since quite young and he worked for his Lord.”

200 Luanna Bland, 7215 Ira Ave., Bell Gardens, CA to Commanding Officer Sangley Point, “Regarding the Welfare, in the Case of Paul Lee Ridgeway, USN,” Letter, Sangley Point, Philippines; 14 January 1952, pp. 1-2; Sangley Point Correspondences, 1952-1953; File 313 (181); NARA, San Francisco.

201 Ibid., 1.

202 Ibid., 1.

203 Ibid., 1.
This letter also demonstrated an emerging historical pattern that I have witnessed in these written historical records on navy enlistees. Civilian relatives of these navy enlistees often spoke out on behalf of the enlistees themselves, particularly people of color (as evidenced in chapter two). These navy enlistees largely suffered severe structural limitations on political mobilization and unionization. Therefore, it was the civilian relatives, guardians or associates of these enlistees who exerted more pressure on navy and other military officials to affirm fairness for these enlistees: monetarily, hierarchically, and morally. In more specific cases, concerns of these enlistees’ relatives ranged from the working and living conditions of these enlistees, to ongoing requests for child support from these enlistees, and even to the whereabouts of these enlistees (as in the case of Ms. Luanna Bland).

Moreover, in the case of Luanna Bland, what most distinguished her letter from some of the others that I uncovered in my field research was that it was written in behalf of a non-Filipino U.S. Navy enlistee. Evidence of this exception can be found not just in the probable genealogies of Luanna’s and Paul’s surnames (e.g., Bland and Ridgeway, respectively), but especially in Bland’s concerns about her grandson’s encounters with the “other” (e.g., the “native” local Filipino—classified largely in the following passage as “they”).\(^\text{204}\)

In addition, the third and last logic that I uncovered in this document was the exact same logic employed by U.S. military officials to enforce the “out-of-bounds” areas among their personnel—the politics of sickness and health: “He is all the one I have to stay with me. I am a widower have been a long time. I am here sick. I’ve had rheumatic

\(^{204}\) Ibid., 1.
fever and another operation depending I need him so bad.”

Whereas U.S.N. officials utilized knowledge productions of health and illness to regulate the physical mobility of their personnel, Ms. Bland personalized the politics of sickness and health to bring her enlisted grandson back into the physical realm of her social life.

In comparison to the contents of Ms. Bland’s letter, the details of military officials’ correspondences provided a contrasting description of Paul Ridgeway’s character and morale. Some of these correspondences pertained to Bland’s letter itself. After receiving Ms. Bland’s letter on January 14, 1952, the commanding officer of the Sangley Point Naval Air Station wrote to the C.O. of the Long Beach Naval Receiving Station regarding the letter from Paul Ridgeway’s Grandmother. The contents of this CO’s letter included the CO’s file on Ridgeway’s brief tour of duty, a copy of the letter from Ridgeway’s grandmother, and a few points of resolution for U.S. officials regarding the case of Ridgeway. More specifically, the C.O. provided interpretive details about how Ridgeway’s “character had changed” since “he left his grandmother’s home,” and based on hearsay “he followed the pattern of a number of men out there of taking unto themselves a native girl as a constant companion.” As for Ridgeway’s deep religious faith and devotion, the C.O. of Sangley Point responded, “You will not [tell] by the tone of his grandmother’s letter that he was very religious and quite without a touch of sin. I don’t remember him being a regular attendant at religious services.”

205 Ibid., 2.

206 W.G. Irwin, USN Commander and Staff Chaplain to Chaplain Brewster, NAS Long Beach, CA, “Regarding Letter from Paul Lee Ridgeway’s Commander,” Memorandum, Sangley Point, Philippines; 30 January 1952, p. 1; Sangley Point Correspondences 1952-1953; File 313 (181); NARA, San Francisco.
While the enlistee’s grandmother illuminated gendered politics of religion, “otherness,” health, and familial matriarchy, the U.S.N. commander’s response offered a different, if not oppositional, knowledge politics regarding the whereabouts and “character” of this individual enlistee. Also, this document spoke exactly to what this and other navy officials were “afraid” of during that time in the early post-independence and Cold War period of U.S.-Philippine relations: the “character change” among their personnel over time in their inevitable interactions with the “other”, which in this case happened to be “native” Filipinos. The more interactions their personnel had with the “natives”—particularly “native” women—while off-duty and in “out-of-bounds” areas, the more fearful officials felt that their militarized personnel might “change.” Such “changes” that these officials feared were their personnel’s social and sexual intimacies with the “native other”; and, subsequently, in their desertion from the U.S. military altogether.

Such fears regarding their personnel arguably translated to their logics and politics of recognizing their “changed” personnel as part of the “other”; and, hence to be of no further concern in the eyes of the U.S. military officials. This politics of fear, recognition, and exclusion were likely illuminated in the U.S.N. commander’s contrasting—if not oppositional—remembrances of Enlistee Ridgeway’s character: “You will not [tell] by the tone of his grandmother’s letter that he was very religious and quite without a touch of sin. I don’t remember him being a regular attendant at religious services.”

The binary logics of this and arguably other deserters facilitated the structural bordering and “stability” of the trans-local military bases, along with the physical and

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207 Ibid., 1.
political mobility of their personnel. In addition, these logics provided key points of departure from the wartime politics of recognition of the “U.S.-Philippine nation.” The political targets among agents of the “U.S.-Philippine nation” largely shifted from “foreign occupier” in the wartime period (e.g., Japanese and other axis military forces) back to “domestic personnel” (including Filipinos) considered as possible or “definite” political subversives. Also, in a broader scale, U.S. nationalist conceptions of the wartime “foreigner” (e.g., Japanese and Japanese Americans) shifted from the racialized “yellow peril” to the racialized “model minority” within the U.S. national body politic. Like the Philippines, Japan was exceptionalized and essentialized as America’s “staunchest ally,” especially during a time when the U.S. sought to expand its alliances with other Asian nations against China, Korea, and other communist imperial forces. While the 1950 Mutual Defense Treaty, for example, aimed to continue mutual-based military alliances between the U.S. and the Philippines, U.S. officials also hoped that this treaty would imply Philippine acceptance of U.S. ties with Japan as well. This remarkable conceptual shift in U.S. diplomacy transpired from two overlapping historical developments. First was the U.S.’s military occupation and cultural colonialism of Japan between 1945 and 1953. And second, the hemispheric emergence and expansion of U.S. hegemony in the trans-local Asia Pacific.


These two historical developments in U.S.-Japanese relations significantly impacted the political militarized formations of Navy Filipino subjectivity in the postwar and postcolonial period of the U.S. and Philippine relationship. On the one hand, wartime anti-Japanese sentiments remained ingrained in the memories of U.S.-Philippine nationalist subjectivities in varying degrees in the 1950s. On the other hand, these essentialist sentiments no longer had the same political leverage and believability as they did in the wartime period. Rather, during the early postwar period, militarized formations of postcolonial Filipino subjectivity were recognized by their evident obedience to their military “superiors”, their discursive allegiance to the U.S. nation-state, and the degrees of their marginalization within the militarized space by their superiors, particularly within their own homeland in the Philippines.

Inclusion of Filipino civilian workers, vis-à-vis marginalization, was especially evident in the minutes of a Board of Governor’s meeting for the Commissioned Officers’ Mess. This meeting, held on October 6, 1952, confirmed their recommendation to hire a (Filipino) chief steward, or first class commissary steward, as a full-time manager of the Officers’ Club. The assigned steward would be paid $75 per month, in addition to fulfilling their initial duties, for the managerial position. To the steward hired for the position, this additional assignment likely meant means of further financial sustenance for himself and his family who may have lived nearby the Sangley Point Naval Base, however low the additional salary may have been at the cost of working in another full-time position. Nevertheless, for the officers in this meeting, the hiring and meager pay of
this new manager ($75/month) meant reduced costs for successfully maintaining this Officers’ Mess Branch.211

These officials also considered other alternatives for lessening the budgetary costs of managing this officers’ club. One alternative was the deduction of each of the present managers’ salaries to twenty-five pesos per month, and reducing the waiters’ pay to ten pesos per month. Another alternative that these officials discussed, especially if the new hired manager did not meet their expectations, was the replacement of the present waiters and managers with five Filipina waitresses. This option, according to these officials, would entail paying forty pesos per month to each of these waitresses and would “save about $75.00 per month.”212

The direct reasons why these officials hired a new manager, rather than choose any of the other alternatives that they discussed, are not immediately evidenced in the written historical record. Nonetheless, it is important to note the evident budgetary logics for the terms and conditions of this additional hire, along with the other managerial alternatives that they discussed during their board meeting. To these officials, what was more important was hiring who they perceived to be as cheap and docile labor in order to successfully manage their officers’ mess space—in this case, a full-time (Filipino) steward. According to J.R. Siefert, the chairman of the Commissioned Officers’ Mess Board of Governors, the cost of hiring of a full-time (Filipino) civilian steward would “be

211 J.R. Siefert, Chairman, Board of Governors, Commissioned Officers’ Mess (Open), to President, Commissioned Officers’ Mess (Open), “Board Governor’s Meeting Held 6 October 1952,” Memorandum, Sangley Point, Philippines, 6 October 1952, p. 1; “Meetings, Conferences, and Conventions” File, Sangley Point Correspondences, 1952-1953; File 181-588-3380; NARA, San Francisco.

212 Ibid., 1.
about $70.00 less than would be necessary to hire a retired stewards mate" who likely would have more time and availability to commit to the position on a full-time basis.

Such budgetary logics also informed a brand of nationalism that would shape limited quotas and other restrictions on Asian immigration and migrant labor policy (as Mae Ngai, Gary Gerstle, and others have noted), and especially military Filipino labor policies and cases, between the late 1940s and early 1960s. On one level, budgetary logics facilitated specific policies as broad as the 1946 Rescission Act (which prohibited veterans’ benefits to 250,000 Filipino soldiers who served for the U.S. in World War II). On another level, these logics seemingly determined the outcome of particular labor cases filed by Filipino workers who have complained about their treatment in the U.S. Navy.

One related case, in particular, pertained to a series of events that occurred between October 13 and October 20, 1952. During this period, three Filipino civilian workers, Alex P. Pagkaliwangan, from 1st St, San Antonio, Cavite City; Pedro C. Moya, P. Pio St., from Caridad, Cavite City; and Papaya G. Gandia, from Kawit, Cavite, all of whom were cement workers in the Public Works Department at Sangley Point, set up huts by using eight carpentry jacks to secure the beams of the hut—as ordered by their supervisor, Mariano Montefalcon. On October 17, 1952, the jacks that they used to set up the hut were stolen, and three days later these three employees were given discharge papers, while their other co-workers were retained or reenlisted. Based from this series of events, these three workers organized to write a formal complaint letter on October 29 in that same year. In this letter, they stressed that they “became victims of unfounded and groundless suspicion without giving [them] a fair and due investigation.” In turn, they gave the following rendition of their complaint: “We regret to reiterate that we became

\[\text{Ibid.}, 1.\]
victims of unfounded and groundless suspicion so much so that we were given discharge papers." In response to their complaint letter, Sangley Point Commanding Officer S.P. Weller notably evaded the issue of the stolen jacks and instead emphasized two things: the need to lay off Filipino workers during this time because of budgetary constraints; and the possibility of their reenlistment. In his November 1952 correspondence to these workers, Weller emphasized that Pakgaliwangan, Moya, and Gandia were discharged “as reduction in force” and that “[their] rights to re-employment at this activity are not in any way prejudiced.” Weller also stated that “in the event a need exists for personnel with your qualifications, you will be considered for employment…”

As the Weller correspondence illustrates, budgetary logics, or budgetary nationalism, were utilized by officials (consciously or not) to marginalize Filipino civilian workers in stewardship positions, as well as to terminate their employment under actual or possible grounds of discrimination. Despite the communal efforts by these workers to deliver a formal letter of complaint, officials usually dismissed such claims made by Filipino civilian workers, sometimes under grounds or logics of “budgetary constraints.” In the following section, I narrate and assess the case of an individual

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214 Alex P. Pagkaliwangan, 1st St, San Antonio, Cavite City; Pedro C. Moya, P. Pio St., Caridad, Cavite City; and Papaya G. Gandia, Kawit, Cavite, to Lt. Liverman, Public Works Officer, Public Works Department, Sangley Point, Letter, Memorandum, Sangley Point, Philippines, 6 November 1952, p. 1; “Investigations” File, Sangley Point Correspondences, 1952-1953; File 181-588-3380; NARA, San Francisco.

215 S.P. Weller, U.S. Captain and Commanding Officer, Sangley Point, to Alex P. Pagkaliwangan, 1st St, San Antonio, Cavite City; Pedro C. Moya, P. Pio St., Caridad, Cavite City; and Papaya G. Gandia, Kawit, Cavite, “Messrs[?]: Alex P. Pagkaliwangan, 1st St, San Antonio, Cavite City; Pedro C. Moya, P. Pio St., Caridad, Cavite City; and Papaya G. Gandia, Kawit, Cavite,” Memorandum, Sangley Point, Philippines, November 1952, p. 1; “Investigations” File, Sangley Point Correspondences, 1952-1953; File 181-588-3380; NARA, San Francisco.

216 Ibid., 1.
Filipino civilian worker who arguably was hired as the new manager of the same officers’ mess branch that was Headlined in the Sangley Point board of governor’s October 1952 meeting (although this connection is only speculative at the moment). The particular case of this civilian worker, Leonicio Arceo, demonstrates the ways in which the ideological foundations and uneven realities of the “U.S.-Philippine nation” operated on the ground level, especially in frequent everyday encounters between U.S. officers and their Filipino civilian workers.

**Politics of Recognition and Enlistment: the Case of Leonicio F. Arceo**

On October 14, 1953, two upper level superiors, Mess Manager Mr. Pineda and Lieutenant Commander D.R. Nixon, gave Leonico Arceo an order. They ordered Arceo to replace one of his co-workers as full-time manager of the Food Services Department of the Officers’ Mess. This full-time position was also meant to be an addition to, rather than replacement of, his existing full-time work as storeroom keeper. As storeroom keeper, Arceo was already involved in the handling and organizing of paper work related to the stock employee branch, the packaged liquor store, the bar, and other relative divisions of the Officers’ Mess. In response to these demanding requests by his manager and lieutenant commander, Arceo stressed that he would not be able to fulfill the double duties as food service manager and as storeroom keeper of the Officers’ Mess with equal attention and efficiency. Nevertheless, over the next four weeks, Arceo resolved this double bind by working full-time in his duties as mess storeroom keeper while fulfilling his assignments as food service manager.

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217 Leonicio F. Arceo, USN civilian to F.F. Gill, USN Captain, Letter, Batangas, Philippines; 11 November 1953, pp. 1-4; Sangley Point Correspondences 1952-1953; File 313 (181); NARA, San Francisco.
Arceo’s sense and practice of prioritization towards his storeroom keeping duties eventually caught up with him. This was evidenced by the looming threats by Lt. Cmdr. Dixon to Leo Arceo. These threats begged for Arceo’s dismissal if Arceo did not consistently meet the duties of his additional full-time work as food service manager.218 Thus, Arceo’s sense and act of resolve conflicted with the inevitably unmet demands of Lt. Cmdr. Dixon and his orders. This conflict between Arceo and Dixon came to a sudden head on the morning of November 11, 1953. During that morning, LCDR Dixon asked Arceo if his assigned tasks, as food service manager, were “up-to-date” in accordance to the LCDR’s own standards. Arceo’s response, according to his written testimony, was that he was still handling the required paperwork of his initially fulltime interdisciplinary work as storekeeper. Therefore, Arceo was understandably unable to complete those tasks commanded by Lt. Cmdr. Dixon.

According to Arceo’s testimony, after hearing Arceo’s plea for a downscaled workload, Dixon called Arceo a certain word. This word was the exact synonym of one used repeatedly and degradingly to describe and conceptualize “native” Filipinos, the “native” food, and the “native” land that they defined as “out-of-bounds” for U.S. military officials and enlisted personnel to spend off-duty hours. This word that Dixon called Mr. Arceo was “shit.”219

As noted earlier in this chapter, such name calling by this U.S. military official was reminiscent, if not reflective, of the echoing conceptualizations of Filipino “natives” by U.S. health sanitation officials during this neocolonial period of U.S.-Philippine relations, as well as the colonial period of U.S. hegemony in the Philippines. Such

218 Ibid., 1-4.
219 Ibid., 1-4.
orientalist conceptualizations and applications by these officials, according to colonial historian Warwick Anderson, was prevalent in U.S. health sanitation officials’ stereotypical depictions of Filipinos as “dirty”, “filthy”, “contaminated”, or “diseased” in order to facilitate and enforce projects of sanitation and subsequent displacement of Filipino bodies from their communal homes.

These conceptualizations and practices likely transpired in the language used by such leading U.S. military officials as Lt. Cmdr. Dixon to reinforce the intimate conditions of inequality that shaped the Officers’ Mess Room. These inherent conditions of inequality privileged the power of the U.S. military officials and enforced the subjugation of the local civilian personnel. Despite the fact that these local civilian laborers were included within the spatial boundaries of the U.S. military base, the boundaries and conditions of Filipino exclusion were articulated, imposed, and concealed at any time under the terms of the U.S. American military officials. In the meantime, according to empire historian Nayan Shah, similar projects and policies were enacted by health officials in the U.S. in order to displace, segregate, and marginalize trans-pacific Chinese immigrants in San Francisco during the first half of the twentieth century.

Enactments of these conditions were evidenced in Dixon’s reaction to Arceo’s acts of postcolonial “insubordination”: he fired him immediately from both positions as storekeeper and food service manager of the Officers’ Mess. Shortly after hearing news of his forced resignation, Arceo packed up all his belongings inside the Mess and left them in a local store just outside the Main Gate of Sangley Point. Arceo then traveled to Batangas, just across town from Sangley Point. As for whom he stayed with, who his local family was, or even if he had any local family in Batangas, these details were not
evident thus far in the written historical record. What was clear was at some point between his forced deportation from the base and his subsequent arrival in Batangas, Arceo wrote a series of compelling letters to F.F. Gill, the commanding officer at Sangley Point. This series of letters emphasized his case and “appeal for justice, gentleman dealings and fairness.” This quoted phrase provided the title for Arceo’s first letter to military officials on November 11, 1953.

In this letter that Arceo proclaimed as his “modest proposal for justice,” Arceo pleaded the case of his unjust firing to this military official. As having been “wantonly humiliated, insulted, and oppressed” upon his firing, Arceo stressed that he was a “humble Filipino ever desirous… to serve the American Government and the American people.” Subsequently, Arceo requested for assistance by Commanding Officer Gill, whom he complimented as “veritable” and willfully assumed “would mercifully grant justice to any human being irrespective of race and color”. Moreover, in this letter, Arceo described his specific case in full detail to C.O. Gill: from his initial duties as full-time storekeeper, to his additional assignment as full-time service manager, to the disrespect bestowed upon him by his official superiors during the course of his two full-time labor duties as storekeeper and service manager.\(^{220}\)

One can argue that the contents of Arceo’s letter, along with the act of Arceo writing the letter himself, were an exercise and politics of self-recognition. In addition, one can assess these contents and form of action as articulations of his own postcolonial subject position as a subjugated and excluded “native” Filipino civilian within the borders of a U.S. militarized space situated on his homeland: the Philippines. As evidenced in

\(^{220}\) Leonicio F. Arceo, USN Civilian to F.F. Gill, USN Captain, Letter, Batangas, Philippines; 11 November 1953, pp. 1-4; Sangley Point Correspondences 1952-1953; File 313 (181); NARA, San Francisco.
Arceo’s case, these spatial borders were especially enforced within the intimate confines of the Officers’ Mess, despite the fact that Arceo likely knew not what his subjugation and exclusion meant in terms of the U.S.-Philippine neo-colonial relationship.\(^{221}\) Take, for instance, the first statement in Arceo’s letter:

> I seek shelter within the folds of your good office, I, having been wantonly humiliated, insulted, and oppressed. I still entertain the serious belief that your respectable self as a veritable American would mercifully grant justice to any human being irrespective of race and color. I am a humble Filipino ever desirous as I am to serve the American Government and the American people.”\(^{222}\)

“This phrase signified a particular contradiction in Arceo’s postcolonial subjectivity. This contradiction was evidenced by Arceo’s “modest” request for “shelter” or protection from the very same office and institution that excluded him from such “shelter” and “protection” in the first place: the officers’ mess and the U.S. Navy. The officers’ mess and the U.S. Navy were the institutional targets of Arceo’s inquiry, resolve, and possible resistance that shaped this momentary shift in his own postcolonial subjectivity. The potential awareness of the co-dependence between his own subject condition and the existing hegemony of the U.S. militarized space also pointed toward what Sarita Echavez See alludes to as the “improbability” of postcoloniality. More specifically, within the contents of his letter, the rising “improbability” of Arceo’s postcolonial subjectivity almost surfaced: from the historical depths of his personal experience to the written page of the letter. This written


\(^{222}\) Leonicio F. Arceo, 1.
articulation of his experience was evidenced in the second half of the first sentence: “… I, having been wantonly humiliated, insulted and oppressed…”223

Another note of relevance from this letter was the mutually constitutive formations of Arceo’s politics of enlistment. These mutually constitutive formations consisted of two things. First, the racially inclusive ideal of justice that represented Arceo’s colonized epistemology of U.S. American modernity and nationalism. And second, the racially exclusive and exploitative practices that largely shaped Arceo’s experience and writings as a civilian laborer and migrant in his own homeland: the Philippines. Without the blanketing ideology of racial inclusion, this politics of restriction would likely have been less imminent, if not existent.

In addition, the letter displayed textual evidence of Arceo’s cultural self-identification with *hiya*, a Tagalog- and Filipino-based practice of shame, or humility. This cultural practice was evident in the way that Arceo referred to himself as a “humble” Filipino or his “humble self.” These self-references were not only notable in the statement above, but also in all three of the letters he sent to the U.S.N. captain in his “modest proposal for justice.”224

Besides this gesture of *hiya* vis-à-vis humility, there was a second dimension of this cultural term and practice: the act of shaming others. This latter meaning of *hiya* implied a more anti-postcolonial form of resistance by shaming his superiors. This exercise of shame was evident in these letters through Arceo’s written recollection of each and every recorded incident in which he felt unfairly treated during his U.S.N. civilian tenure. Consider, for example, Arceo’s description of his firing:


[C.O.] Mr. Dixon entered the office and ask me if I had made the work of the Food Service activity up-to-date. I told him that I was still busy entering in the Stock Cards of the Packaged Liquor and Bar, their respective sales and consumption respectively (which he found me exercising that official function befitting my actual work). I was reasoning to him in a very respectfully and gentlemanly way as an inferior employee as my humble self would do to a Superior Officer, but I was powerless to move his human instinct. Instead, however, I received the severest blow and insult from him, calling me ‘shit,’ besides, driving my humble self like a hungry dog. He told me that I was fired and immediately told me to get all my personal belongings outside the Storeroom.”

This latter practice of hiya was further exemplified by Arceo’s references of himself as “powerless”, the recollection of his superior officer’s treatment of him as “a hungry dog”, and of his officer’s “harsh” and “beastly” treatment of him, leading to what Arceo recalled as his “forced severance from the service.”

The following day, on November 12, 1953, enough temporal, geographical, and emotional distance provided Arceo the chance to compose two things. First and foremost, he composed himself. Secondly, a follow-up letter to address any corrections that he felt needed to be articulated after the first one. These “corrections” might have especially been made after encountering his former co-worker and his Catholic God. These details were confirmed in the second letter he sent to U.S. military officials. Considerably briefer than his first letter, the second one is as follows:

Everything has no come to light with me. When previously all was dark and gloomy, now God has enable[d] me to comprehend and see the light.

I wish to apologize for everything that transpired formerly, seeing and comprehending now as I do that all were the fruits of Mr. P.M. Pineda’s (Manager) Mismanagement, both activities of the Club and men altogether, and partly misunderstanding my humble self.

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225 Ibid., 3.

226 Ibid., 3.
Mr. Villamiel whom I have the lucky privilege of meeting and conferring this morning has enable me to see the light in a wider and clearer perspective, and for which I reiterate my apology to you for my seemingly fabricated insubordination which convinced as I am now were all caused by the Manager’s faultless personal and official shortcomings.

I take this opportunity of thanking you for whatever assistance you have extended my humble behalf, which I would have the optimistic privilege of reciprocating you in the future with something in my power possibly good also.

Very respectfully, (SGD) Leonicio F. Arceo

Whether because of proclaimed divine intervention or increased temporal distance from the time of his termination, the content of Arceo’s second letter re-presented a shift back to a postcolonial practice of *hiya* that emphasized a more honorable form of shame: humility. While considerably evident in the first letter, this honorable act of *hiya* was even more amplified in the second one, particularly through Arceo’s reverb of the following noun and verbal conjugation that illuminated the religious and re-visionary tone of this second letter: “apology.” This prevalent form of *hiya* did not detract, nonetheless, from the latter form of *hiya*: passing shame. While Arceo’s passing of shame was still evident in his second letter, it was displayed in a more forgiving, tactful, and diplomatic tone than in the first: “… I reiterate my apology… for my seemingly fabricated insubordination which convinced as I am now were all caused by the Manager’s [Lt. Cmdr. Dixon’s] faultless personal and official shortcomings.”

Besides the “divine” intervention and redemptive direction toward a more humbled postcolonial sense of *hiya*, the last paragraph in this second letter articulated a postcolonial display of *utang na loob*. This other Tagalog-based linguistic and cultural term essentially means “inner debt.” The conditions of this sense of “inner debt” were—

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227 Leonicio F. Arceo, USN Civilian to F.F. Gill, USN Captain, Letter, Batangas, Philippines; 12 November 1953, pp. 1-4; Sangley Point Correspondences 1952-1953; File 313 (181); NARA, San Francisco.
and are—defined by the mutual sense of agreement between two parties. As these two letters illustrated, Arceo offered his interpretation and imposition of *utang na loob* by establishing the terms of mutual reciprocity between himself as a “humble Filipino” and the U.S. military officials who will have extended “whatever assistance” to his “humble behalf.” By doing so, Arceo was practicing the improbability of Filipino postcoloniality. The improbable conditions of postcoloniality were set by Arceo’s—not the U.S. officials’—attempt to establish a mutually equal relationship between him—a “native” Filipino national—and his military officials of the U.S. empire nation-statecraft.

However, such conditions of improbable postcoloniality also defined its probability. This was evident by the means in which the informal conditions of improbability were established. These conditions involved the unawareness, if not postcolonial amnesia—of the colonial legacies of inequality shaping the postcolonial U.S.-Philippine relationship. In the context of Arceo’s case, these terms were shaped by two factors. First, they illuminated the disposability of Arceo himself as a human being in the imperial eyes of the U.S. military officers and agents. And secondly, the degrees of probability of U.S. military officers and agents in enforcing the structural integrity of their own superior subject positions in relation to the Filipino “foreign” nationals, in and beyond the U.S. militaristic bases of empire.

Similar attempts by military officials to secure their structural integrity were evident in Arceo’s case in the name of bureaucracy. After Arceo sent his two letters to the U.S.N. captain at Sangley Point, the letters were sent back to Arceo due to “bureaucratic changes” in the mail department of the officers’ mess. The direct root of such “bureaucratic changes”—whether they were merely coincidental or made in
conscious confirmation of Arceo’s termination—was not as clear in the written historical record. What was relatively clearer, nonetheless, was Arceo’s subtle suspicion that the latter possibility might have been the case. This probable suspicion transpired in his likely recognition of the impossibility of mutual negotiation between himself and U.S. military officials to resolve what he felt was his unfair workload, treatment, and termination from the U.S. naval civilian force. In turn, Arceo’s recognition of impossibility reignited Arceo’s feelings of being unjustly subjugated by his fellow employees and employers in the officers’ mess. Such re-ignitions remained in Arceo’s third letter, which I phrase below in its entirety:

Permit me to forward you copies of my letters surrounding my forced, oppressive, and dictatorial severance from the service in my humble capacity as an employee of the Officers’ Mess (Open) and of which you have all supervision and control. I am submitting to you all the issues involved for your impartial consideration and perusal and with it goes my optimistic anticipation that justice and fair deal should take its rightful course. Copy of my first letter addressed to your honorable sir which I requested an intermediary was not delivered to you at my own personal request accounted for the charge of development as hinted to me by the Chief Accountant and of which I would be privileged to present to you my second letter [along with the first—both of which were attached to this sent memo].

From Batangas, Arceo sent all three letters to the corrected mailing address on November 22, 1953. During this time, Arceo realized the impossibility of mutual negotiations between himself and agents of the U.S. military. Additionally, the agential, bureaucratic, and structural conditions of impossibility were even more evident in the subsequent written correspondence between U.S.N. Captain Gill and Lieutenant Commander Dixon regarding Leonicio Arceo. As a result of this correspondence, Lt. Cmdr. Dixon wrote his letter of resolution to Capt. Gill on December 2, 1953. I have displayed this letter below in its entirety:

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228 Leonicio F. Arceo, USN Civilian to F.F. Gill, USN Captain, Letter, Batangas, Philippines; 22 November 1953, pp. 1-4; Sangley Point Correspondences 1952-1953; File 313 (181); NARA, San Francisco.
As Treasurer of the Officer’s Club, US Naval Station, Sangley Point, I don’t believe it necessary to answer the letter of Mr. Arcia [Arceo’s name is misspelled in this document]. As he stated he was insubordinate, which I believe is sufficient enough, but in order to clarify his dismissal, the following was used as a basis of his discharge from the Officer’s Club:

1. Insubordinate
2. Wouldn’t take orders
3. Used the Club as his home
4. Wouldn’t take any work, wherein the storeroom job he had only required approximately four hours a day.
5. When he was confronted for not working during regular working hours, he used to say ‘All work and no play makes Jack a dull boy’
6. He was fired 3 times but wouldn’t leave, which necessitated calling the Marines to have him escorted to the gate.

D.R. Dixon
LCDR, USN

Dixon likely felt a strong degree of sincerity about his accusations toward Arceo’s insubordination and his subsequent termination of Arceo’s civilian employment in the U.S. Navy. After all, to Dixon, the politics of employing Filipinos like Arceo, as civilian workers, was largely defined by these workers’ abilities to successfully fulfill their duties, regardless of how menial, taxing, or marginal they may have been in the naval work space. With Arceo failing to meet these duties, Dixon likely felt obligated, as a superior military official, to take disciplinary measures—not only in taking his own actions into accountability, but in maintaining and enforcing the structural integrity of his naval service branch. By not doing so, Dixon probably felt that he would be failing in his own duties as a (white) military official. Additionally, it is likely that Dixon felt Arceo was already well-aware of the work that was in store for him before “choosing” to take upon the dual position as storeroom keeper and food service manager. Given his subject

229 D.R. Dixon, Lieutenant Commander, USN to F.F. Gill, Captain, USN, Letter, Sangley Point, Philippines; 2 December 1953, p. 1; Sangley Point General Correspondences, 1953; File 313 (181); NARA, San Francisco.
position as a U.S. official, what mattered more to Dixon was Arceo’s ability to fulfill his duties, rather than consider seriously the structural obstacles that may have prevented Arceo from successfully handling two jobs as storeroom keeper and food service manager. Therefore, any slight or major deviation from fulfilling his required duties or scheduled attendance would likely be considered as “insubordinate”: regardless of the degrees of impossibility of fulfilling each and every task of this dual position. Along these lines of thought, any sign of resistance by Arceo would be even further considered by Dixon as “not taking orders” and would provide more grounds for Arceo’s termination.

However, as evidenced in the contents of this letter, Lt. Cmdr. Dixon’s primary preference was not to reply at all to Arceo’s lettered grievances. That way, Arceo’s case would abruptly be dropped from further correspondence in the written historical record. These preferences were especially evident given two likely possibilities. First possibility being that Arceo was actually unfairly subjugated, vilified, and disposed from the U.S.N. civilian force. Second possibility: that Lt. Cmdr. Dixon himself fabricated the conditions of Arceo’s termination. Examples of such likely fabrication were illuminated in particular examples from the letter text. One citation was Dixon’s miscalculation of Arceo’s recorded daily work hours (four rather than eight). The next citation was Dixon’s likely misconstruing, if not fabrication, of Arceo’s statement “All work and no play makes Jack a dull boy.” This statement alone was a completely unlikely remark that Arceo would make, especially given Arceo’s letter writing style, along with the likelihood that the phrase would be something that Dixon himself would say. Such likelihood was imminent in the similarities between the structural and cultural syntax of that phrase, along with the
overall content and form of Dixon’s brief response letter. Therefore, with no further evidence of this case in the written historical record, there would be much less likelihood that this case would be circulated in any sort of public context, nor would there be likelihood that these officials would hold any accountability for the immense workloads and maltreatment that may have been bestowed upon Arceo as a U.S.N. civilian worker.

Moreover, the strategic framings and suppressions of Arceo’s “voice” in Dixon’s letter spoke to what Paul A. Kramer and Stuart MacIntyre referred to as the “politics of recognition.” As stated earlier, in Blood and Government, Kramer defined the politics of recognition as the parametrical meanings in which U.S. policymakers included Filipinos in the U.S. national body politic, particularly through the pacification and subjugation of Filipinos during the Philippine-American War and the U.S. colonial period. In the case of Lt. Cmdr. Dixon’s response letter, there was a politics of recognition and enlistment of such Filipinos as Leonicio Arceo. Such politics of recognition and enlistment manifested in the uneven degrees of inclusion—and exclusion—of Filipinos as civilian workers in the U.S. military bases.

Nevertheless, I would also argue that the politics of recognition and enlistment were defined by their very contradiction within the context of the neo-colonial U.S.-Philippine relationship. In other words, the recognition of Philippine sovereignty and nationhood, in the eyes and epistemologies of U.S. military policymakers, relied heavily upon the very lack of recognition of independence from Philippine local and nationalist perspectives. Therefore, to U.S. military officials, the politics of enlisting such Filipinos as Arceo meant the very subjugation and restriction of these laborers. While more organized and collaborative forms of resistance among Filipino laborers did not happen
in significant levels until the latter 1950s, for Arceo and other Filipino laborers in the earlier half of this decade, individual or communal based letter writing to U.S. officials was seen as a more appropriate outlet to express their grievances.

Thus, in the “individual” case of Arceo, the politics of enlistment placed upon Arceo informed and shaped this Filipino worker’s subversive act by writing his trilogy of letters to these U.S. military officials. In addition, the subversive nature of his response was amplified by proclaiming power upon his American superiors. Arceo expressed this form of proclamation by his articulation of utang na loob. Therefore, while the hiring, exploitation, and firing of Arceo exemplified exercise of military officials’ politics of recognition and enlistment, Arceo exercised his own politics of enlistment through his intrepid defiance of his military superiors. By these acts of defiance, Arceo further exemplified the improbability of his postcolonial condition, and the probable paradigm shift toward an anti-colonial frame of mind.

Arceo’s intrepid acts of resistance were not lost upon Lt. Cmdr. Dixon. Dixon, in turn, exercised his own power and structured privilege by providing the following response to his colleague Captain F.F. Gill: “I don’t believe it is necessary to answer to the letter of Mr. Arcia….” By denying the content and form of Arceo’s letters, including the correct spelling of Arceo’s last name, Dixon therefore discounted any relevance of not just Arceo’s letters, but Arceo as a person as well. While further inquiries and theories on the relationship between knowledge, power, privilege, and subjugation can be examined as a separate project on the Arceo case, the following questions may now be asked within the structure, method and scope of this chapter: What was it about Arceo’s allegations that a privileged person like C.O. Gill would interpret and implicate as
“without merit”? Was it the actual details that Arceo highlighted that led to Arceo’s forced resignation? Or was it the mere fact that a person like Arceo was already considered by U.S. military officials as an “inferior” (by race and class) who was outside the U.S. national, political, and—even more ironically—military body politic?

If all the above were the case during this period—and much likely so—then in the eyes of the U.S. American military officials, Arceo (along with the rest of the 9,985 Filipino civilian workers230) had absolutely no political leverage in matters regarding their own local working conditions and livelihood inside the U.S. bases within their homeland. Additionally, for these Filipino civilian workers, the only way they would be able to be included within the domestic U.S. nation-state—and U.S. citizenship for that matter—was through actual enlistment in the U.S. Navy. And even through actual naval enlistment, neither U.S. citizenship nor equal opportunity would be guaranteed.

Nevertheless, while such distinguished and related enlistment cases have been extensively discussed in the second chapter, for this chapter in particular it is important for us to understand the uneven and unequal politics of recognition: both for U.S. military officials employing Filipino civilians, as well as for “their” Filipino civilian workers hired by these officials.

CONCLUSION

On November 10, 1953, F.F. Gill, the Commanding Officer (C.O.) in Sangley Point, wrote a letter to the C.O. in the U.S. Naval Forces of the Philippines, located in Manila. The primary subject of this correspondence was Sangley Point, particularly the degree of strategic importance of Sangley Point to U.S. global military

230 Sangley Point General Correspondences, 1952-1953; File 313 (181); NARA, San Francisco.
operations, and the “problems” that continued to plague the base in relation to the surrounding local community. In this letter, Gill first emphasized that Sangley Point was “the most important US Naval installation in the world,” and the base was a “‘Major Outpost’ in the ‘Frontiers of American Diplomacy’ in South East Asia.” Secondly, Gill intricately tied or anchored Sangley Point—as a military outpost—with all Southeast Asian nations, including the “Australians, Indonesians, the British in Malaya and Hong Kong, the Burmese, the Thailanders, the French in Indo-China, the Free Chinese of Formosa and the Filipinos.” Thirdly, C.O. Gill pointed out how vital Sangley Point would be for the U.S. if their war in Vietnam were to escalate to “hotter” proportions (which it eventually did). Fourth, this U.S. official’s correspondence letter emphasized that the mission of Sangley Point, as a naval base, was to “provide facilities to support, fleet reconnaissance, anti-submarine, transport and utility aircraft operations and to provide essential support for ComNavPhil, Fleet Units, Military Assistance Groups and Naval Attaches in Southeast Asia.” Fifth, Gill stressed the role of the base in managing affairs in Cavite City, especially to “detect and control ‘Black Market’ violations” that he felt was evident given the “nature” of the locals who were living within close proximity to the American naval base. In addition to what he considered as the “health and sanitation problems” that were prevalent in Cavite City and hence affected the base

231 F.F. Gill, Commanding Officer, to Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Philippines, Sangley Point, Philippines, 26 November 1953, p. 1; “Meetings, Conferences, and Conventions” File, Sangley Point Correspondence, 1952-1953, File 181; NARA, San Francisco.

232 Ibid., 1.

233 Ibid., 1.

234 Ibid., 1.
in Sangley Point, Gill stressed—in perhaps metaphorical terms—that if officials want “to exterminate insects on the Point [they] have to ‘swat flies’ in Cavite City.”

There are several pertinent things to point out in this letter, especially in regards to the chapter’s scope and method, and particularly in regards to the politics of what was not recognized in this correspondence. First, C.O. Gill wrote this letter during a time that Arceo and other Filipino civilian workers continued to be subjugated and marginalized in Sangley Point and other U.S. military bases within their own homeland in the Philippines. On the one hand, these Filipino civilian workers continued to be included in these militarized spaces in the Philippines between the late 1940s and early 1950s, despite the fact that U.S. officials banned Filipino enlistment in the US Navy during most of this period. On the other hand, Gill’s correspondence ceased to acknowledge the visible presence of these Filipino civilian workers within these spaces, and especially the pertinent role that they played in making the Sangley Point Naval Base “the most important US Naval installation in the world”, as stated by this navy official. Second, the content of this letter revealed the ways in which the U.S. military continued to demarcate its boundaries in relation to the surrounding local communities, specifically within the realm of health and sanitation policy. Third, this letter exemplified, especially to U.S. officials, how the raving importance of Sangley Point—and likely other U.S. military bases in the Philippines—often relied upon their politics of non-recognition of these Filipino civilian workers and the contributions that these Filipinos have made to the U.S. militarized landscape in the Philippines.

Nonetheless, such case studies as those of Jesus Bautista, Leonicio Arceo, and others allow us to gain a better sense of the ways in which the shifting politics of

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235 Ibid., 2.
enlistment reinforced and destabilized the bi-nationalities of the “U.S.-Philippine nation”,
as exercised in the U.S. militarized space within the Philippines during the Second World
War and the early postwar period. These case studies, and others assessed in this chapter,
exemplified how Filipinos responded individually to the structural limitations shaped by
the mass atrocities of World War II, coupled with U.S. officials’ anxieties concerning the
eventuality of Philippine independence. In varying degrees, these structural limitations
facilitated the wartime and postwar subjectivities among Filipinos in the Philippines,
especially for those like Jesus Bautista and Leonicio Arceo who worked and lived within
closest proximities to and from the U.S. militarized base. Because they lived and worked
within the borders of these bases in the Philippines, their physical and political
movements were severely limited and subject to close scrutiny under U.S. American
jurisdiction. While the conditions of U.S. American jurisdiction directly contradicted
with nationalist terms of Philippine sovereignty, such conditions were largely
uncontested—in the national sense—until the latter 1950s. Contestations of these terms
and conditions of American hegemony existed more collectively and publicly in the case
of Filipino civilian worker Bartolome P. Roldan and others within the Philippines—and
elsewhere in Asia and the Pacific. This and other cases are further explored in the next
chapter.

All in all, despite their exclusion from the American colonial subject to national
citizen narrative, these U.S.N. Filipino civilian workers were part of the militarized

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labor industrial complex that have been oft overlooked by previous scholars. Such individual cases as Jesus Bautista and Leonicio Arceo, among others, provide us brief ports of entry into further understanding the logics that military officials used to employ and restrict Filipino civilians and servicemen in the U.S. militarized space. And just as importantly, these cases give us a deeper and broader overview of how these Filipino civilian workers responded to military officials’ policies and politics of enlistment in ways that expressed varying degrees of postcolonial subjectivity. While infinitely similar cases are yet to be found in the written and oral historical records, this project is just the beginning or starting point for future study of such cases stored in the archived files and boxes of the U.S. and Philippine national archives.
CHAPTER FOUR

Politics of Recognition and Jurisdiction in the Postwar “U.S.-Philippine Nation”: the Case of Bartolome P. Roldan and other “Troublesome Matters” in Neo-Colonial U.S.-Philippine Relations

Introduction

On May 11, 1960 in Manila, U.S. Embassy Representative J. Graham Parsons sent a letter and series of dispatches to John N. Irwin, Assistant Secretary of International Security Affairs. In the letter, Parsons expressed sincere concern for further clarification and resolution of “Bartolome Roldan et al”, a labor case in Clark Air Force Base that had been “hanging fire for years” since 1956. The U.S. Embassy representative warned that this labor case was part and parcel of the increasing emergence of Filipino labor unions on U.S. military bases in the Philippines and the unions’ increasing support from Philippine national officials. Based from the evident and broader concerns of this labor case, Parsons strongly recommended that it would be “of the United States interest for the Air Force to agree on an early disposition of this long-standing case.” To conclude his letter, Parsons urgently underlined this military labor case as a “troublesome matter.”

What was it about this specific labor case that concerned this U.S. Embassy official enough to write this letter and series of dispatches to the International Security Affairs division of the U.S. Department of Defense, calling for “early disposition” of the

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237 Graham J. Parsons, Assistant Secretary, Department of State to John N. Irwin, Assistant Secretary, Department of Defense, “Revival of Roldan Case,” Memorandum, Washington, DC; 16 December 1960, pp. 1-14; Bartolome P. Roldan et al., Case File, 1958-1961/3; Box 6 of 11, File 313-08-006 (181-72-0144); NARA, San Francisco.
labor case itself? More specifically, what was it about this labor case that made it part and parcel of the increasing emergence and prevalence of Filipino labor unions on U.S. military bases in the Philippines? And in subsequence, how did U.S. officials respond to the developments and potentialities of this and other related cases in ways that reinforced the imperial bi-nationalities of the “U.S.-Philippine nation”?

This chapter will address these questions in the following three sections. First, I provide a narrative and analytical introduction to the labor case of Bartolome P. Roldan on Clark Air Base in the Pampangas Province. Who was Bartolome P. Roldan? In what line of work was he positioned with in relation to the civilian and enlisted Filipino laborers studied in previous chapters? When and how long did he work on Clark Air Force Base before getting fired by his U.S. military superiors? Why was he fired in the first place, and how did his forced resignation lead to the actual and possible transpirations of a greater labor union movement against U.S. military jurisdiction and governance?

The second section of this chapter historicizes and theorizes the surfacing anxieties among U.S. military officials regarding this emerging “troublesome” case of Bartolome Roldan. Why were U.S. officials so concerned about this case in the first place? To what extent did their concerns reflect a deeper and broader history of U.S. militarism as a dominant, preceding, and concurrent extension of colonialism in the Philippines—and elsewhere in Asia and the Pacific— since the late nineteenth century? And how did these concerns among officials rearticulate in ways that further cemented the trans-pacific and trans-local seas of the U.S. empire statecraft?
The third section of this chapter assesses the cases and policies related to the Roldan case, and to the marginal and broader issues regarding militarized Filipino civilian workers elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific. These related cases occurred primarily in Hawaii and California. Meanwhile, the policy I focus most in this section is a proposal by Philippine officials for a U.S.-Philippine Labor Committee. In what ways did such cases and policies relate to, and depart from, the emergence and trajectories of the Roldan case? To what extent did these Philippine proponents, American opponents and civilian benefactors of these labor issues—within such militarized terrains in the trans-pacific—operate within and despite of the bi-national politics of the “U.S.-Philippine nation”?

With this three-section format shaping and structuring this chapter, I make three primary arguments that provide continuing threads from previous chapters. First, like Jesus Bautista and Leonicio Arceo, the case of Bartolome P. Roldan and others illustrated how postcolonial articulations of Filipino subjectivity and resistance often operated within and despite the continuing hegemonic presence of U.S. militarism and politics of the “U.S.-Philippine nation.” Second, despite their largely legal, reformist, and cooperative pivots within U.S. military jurisdiction on Philippine soil, the anxieties evidenced in J. Graham Parsons’ and other military officials’ correspondences illuminated the prevalent degrees in which the informal contradictions and militarized formations of the “U.S.-Philippine nation” were in danger of being destabilized and possibly overcome. And thirdly, the possible dangers of destabilization, unraveling, and Philippine transformation of the militarized “U.S.-Philippine nation” structured the feelings of anxiety, rearticulated logics of hegemonic stability, and secured the gradual and sudden death of further mobilizations surrounding the Bartolome P. Roldan case.
Simultaneously and subsequently, nonetheless, such reactions by U.S. military, diplomatic, and political officials urgently spawned, broadened, and reinforced U.S. officials’ concerns of political mobilizations by Filipino civilian workers within (and despite) the hegemonic presence of the militarized “U.S.-Philippine nation.”

**Section One: Case of Bartolome Roldan et al**

Like most—if not all—Filipino civilian workers uncovered in these written historical records, little is known about Bartolome Roldan other than the tenure and aftermath of his forced resignation at Clark Air Force Base. Such chronicled details regarding this individual and his affiliates were written by and recorded from the viewpoint of U.S. and Philippine officials. In other words, the epistemological voice and subject position of Bartolome Roldan himself have remained largely absent—if not erased—from these military, political, labor, and diplomatic correspondences that shape the written historical records of this case file.

Nevertheless, while the origins and aftermaths of these recorded gaps appear beyond the scope of this chapter, what were clearer from these labor case files were twofold. First, the immediate aftermaths of Roldan’s tenure and termination as a Clark Base civilian worker were evident in these written historical records. And second, Roldan’s organized labor protests against the U.S. government endured the course of the latter 1950s and early 1960s. By historical and textual based readings of these developments, we can better assess the ways in which Roldan and his affiliates navigated through the neo-colonial conditions of the “U.S.-Philippine nation” and the continual militaristic operations of the U.S. Empire in the early Cold War period.
During the mid-1950s, Bartolome Roldan worked as a civilian security guard. Working eight-hour days at minimum, Roldan also was required to work overtime and holidays. Despite being mandated to work overtime and holidays, Roldan was not paid for this extra menial and daunting labor. In addition, he and the other security guards were required to pay for their own uniform allowances. In 1956, shortly after Roldan voiced his grievances to Clark Air Base officials, Roldan was forced to resign with unpaid separation allowances, owing to what Clark Air Base officials claimed were “defamatory comments” made to his military superiors, and for “soliciting bribes.”

Whether or not these accusations of verbal profanity, bribery, and insubordination were actually true remain unknown in the written historical record. Worth pointing out, nonetheless, were the parallel framed logics behind the firing of Roldan to that of Arceo three years earlier in 1953. Like Arceo, Roldan was accused of being insubordinate to his military superiors. However, what distinguished Roldan’s response from Arceo’s was that soon after being forced to resign, Roldan took his initial case—and revised complaint of his “unfair dismissal”—to the Presidential Complaints and Action Committee (P.C.A.C.). Shortly thereafter, either upon recommendation of—or lack of response from—the P.C.A.C., Roldan brought his case to the Philippine Department of Labor. Subsequently, Roldan’s complaint reached the office of Ruben F. Santos, chief of the wage administration in the Department of Labor.

While Santos’s initial reaction to Roldan’s file was not as evident in the written historical record, what was clear was Santos’s desire to further investigate the details and trends relating to Roldan’s termination on Clark Air Force Base. On May 21, 1956,

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238 “Introduction,” “History of the Bartolome P. Roldan Claim,” Undated, pp. 1-14; Bartolome P. Roldan et al., Case File, 1958-1961/3; Box 6 of 11, File 313-08-006 (181-72-0144); NARA, San Francisco.
Santos wrote a correspondence letter to the commanding general of Clark AFB. In this letter, Santos requested permission to investigate “within the area the complaint lodged by Bartolome P. Roldan against the base.”\textsuperscript{239} Several days after the letter reached the Clark AFB commanding general, base agents forwarded the request to the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs. Soon afterwards, the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs forwarded Santos’s letter to the American Embassy.\textsuperscript{240} Such evident transnational transmission and correspondence of this case proved the national and international attention to this case in the postwar period of U.S.-Philippine relations. The transnational registers of this case stood in contrast to the Bautista and Arceo cases. Unlike the Roldan case, the Bautista and Arceo cases never circulated outside the private transnational circuits of U.S. military correspondence. This evidentiary distinction displayed the ways in which the politics of military labor organizing largely shifted from individual- to collective-based during the course of the 1950s. Many on-base Filipino laborers, in this period, learned that they needed to voice their grievances not only to American military officials, but especially to Philippine national officials as well. By sending their labor complaints to Philippine national officials, American officials were more likely to take their grievances into relative consideration.

Section Two: “If the claim were processed that far”: Structural Responses and Reinforcements by the U.S. Government on the Roldan Case

Subsequently, several Clark Air Force officials took the forwarded requests from Philippine officials into closer consideration and conducted their own brief investigations on the on-base living wage—and living conditions—of the local civilian workers. After

\textsuperscript{239} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{240} \textit{Ibid.}
their brief investigations, the U.S. Chief of Civilian Personnel at Clark Air Force Base concluded that Bartolome Roldan “probably has sufficient basis for this claim to gain favorable consideration by the [U.S.] General Accounting Office if the claim were processed that far.” Nevertheless, in his lettered response, the U.S. Chief of Civilian Personnel at Clark A.F.B. also noted that “such action would result in 660 similar claims by fellow guards involving ‘a tremendous amount of money,’ and would ‘affect future manpower requirements’ as well as ‘public relations at this time.’” While the Philippine Department of Labor showed general national support for his case, by the time it reached Clark A.F.B. and the U.S. Embassy, the potential bi-national support for this case gave way to exclusionary logics and practices of budgetary nationalism. This was the exact same logic that informed and shaped the 1946 Rescission Act. This Rescission Act, in particular, prohibited due benefits to the 250,000+ Filipino veterans who served in World War II because of two factors. First, the U.S. did not have the economic resources to pay livable benefits to each of these 250,000+ Filipino nationals. Secondly, U.S. Congress, by the early postwar period, no longer viewed these Filipino veterans as part of the U.S. military, or even part of the U.S. national body politic. Hence, they did not want, in any degree, to prioritize this item in its national budget.

Besides noted budgetary nationalism shaping the U.S. chief’s politics of exclusion, the chief’s letter cited references from the U.S. Air Force Manual to advise officers that all duties performed by Roldan and the 660 other workers were “part of the job requirements within the established tour of duty,” and that “[Roldan et al] will be

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241 Ibid.
considered in a pay status until they check out at the expiration of the shift.”

This was also evident in his second memorandum to U.S. officials that followed on July 20, 1956.

However, such pay status, according to U.S. military and diplomatic officials, apparently did not include overtime pay, holiday allowances, uniform allowances, or even severance pay. On July 26, 1956, representatives of the U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, and U.S. Embassy met in part to discuss what transpired and became “evident” in the Roldan case. From the meeting, they reached a consensus that “the Roldan claims were without merit and that it should be pointed out in the reply to the Philippine government that U.S. policies were consistent with local labor customs and practice.”

What is important to note, in this note of correspondence between U.S. military and political representatives, is that they reached such a consensus without the consent of or collaborative dialogue with Philippine Government official representatives. Although it is true that much of local labor customs and practice were consistent if not “copies of their American counterparts,” the mere fact was that eight-hour workdays, overtime pay, paid holidays, and uniform allowances were part of American labor law and established by the radical U.S. American labor movements in the 1930s. The Eight Hour and Minimum Wage Laws were parallel to the labor laws enacted by the Philippine national government after the official declaration of Philippine independence on July 4,

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242 Ibid.

243 Ibid., Phil W. Roth, Representative, U.S. Navy Philippines, Meeting Minutes between USN, Air Force, And Embassy Representatives, pp. 1-3; Bartolome P. Roldan et al., Case File, 1958-1961/3, Box 6 of 11; File 313-08-006 (181-72-0144); NARA, San Francisco.

244 Ibid.

1946. Nevertheless, the mere fact that such claims made by Bartolome Roldan were being rejected by American military and political officials proved the very inconsistency between U.S. labor policy and Philippine ‘local’ labor law on U.S. bases in the Philippines.

This point of inconsistency, or even contradiction, between American labor law and “copies of their American counterparts” was not lost upon this anonymous U.S. Embassy representative who met with U.S. Navy and Air Force officials. After their July 26 meeting, the embassy official recommended that “any reply to the question of permitting an investigation of the base by the Philippine Department of Labor—and the general question of applicability of Philippine labor law—should be avoided in the Embassy note because of the imminence of base negotiations [from the 1947 Military Bases Agreement].”

To add further slight to the agency of Philippine officials and the applicability of Philippine law, this U.S. Embassy official proclaimed that Washington gave Clark Air Base the authority to waive Air Force instructions regarding the Philippine Department of Labor and Philippine labor law on the grounds that “U.S. Air Force practice [in the case of Roldan] was [already in] conformity with local labor custom and practice.” In other words, Washington officials gave Clark A.F.B. officers the liberty and privilege to discard instructive information on how to handle, if not accommodate to, Philippine local labor law and practice. These Washington and Clark base officials held a mutual sense of conformity to the commonsensical and hegemonic understanding that U.S. Air Force application of labor law, custom, and practice was inherently consistent with Philippine

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246 “Introduction,” “History of the Bartolome P. Roldan Claim,” Undated, pp. 1-14; Bartolome P. Roldan et al., Case File, 1958-1961/3; Box 6 of 11, File 313-08-006 (181-72-0144); NARA, San Francisco.
sovereign law—even if the opposite may have been the case, or if Philippine officials might have interpreted otherwise. Thus, whether the Philippine locals or nationals interpreted such A.F.B. practices as “in conformity” with the laws of their “sovereign” territory appeared to be out of the question. The consensuses from the July 26, 1956 meeting between U.S. officials only reinforced the unequal bi-national relationship between the U.S. and the Philippines. This unequal bi-national dynamic also solidified the hegemonic presence of U.S. Empire in the postcolonial Philippines. This unevenness was prevalent not only in the continuity of U.S. military base installations in the archipelago, but in the very continuing recruitment and mistreatment of Filipino civilian workers in the U.S. military. Hence, what was evident and enforced in the U.S. Embassy representative’s recommendation was that such conditions of U.S.-Philippine relations would be enforced and stabilized under the commonsensical understanding that “AF practice was in conformity with local labor custom and practice.”

After the U.S. official’s letter of recommendation received consent and confirmation from the rest of the U.S. Embassy, the letter was forwarded to the U.S. Air Force Headquarters on August 13, 1956, and then to the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs on August 26, 1956. A representative from the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs wrote a response to the U.S. Embassy’s confirmation on November 16, 1956. In this response letter, this Philippine representative emphasized that the U.S. Embassy never answered the Philippine Department of Labor’s previous request for “permission to make an investigation of the Roldan case on the base itself.”

247 Ibid.

248 Ibid.
The Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs’ citation of the U.S. Embassy not only revealed the U.S. Embassy’s lack of response and consideration to diplomatic requests by the Philippine Labor Department, but in a broader spectrum it illuminated the unilateral condition of bi-nationality shaping the “U.S.-Philippine nation”, and in turn, “Philippine sovereignty.” This unilateral sense of bi-nationality determined such labor cases as Roldan’s, and simultaneously reinforced the structural foundations of the U.S. as an informal empire during the neo-colonial period of U.S.-Philippine relations. While it was true that the avoidance of the Philippine perspective in the Roldan case stood consistent with the confidential consensus of unilateralism among U.S. officials, U.S. officials’ approach of avoidance was just one of several strategies utilized by U.S. officials in numerous correspondences with Philippine officials who provided greater support for Bartolome Roldan, along with the other 300+ security guards who eventually joined him in 1958 in a petition and lawsuit against the U.S. government. The petition and lawsuit led by Bartolome P. Roldan are further discussed and assessed in the next section that follows.

Section Three: Historical Manifestations and Legacies of “Bartolome P. Roldan et al”

Designed by Bartolome P. Roldan, the case petition and lawsuit were signed by ninety-two other petitioners who pleaded for overtime pay, severance pay, and clothing allowances that were never given to them during their tenure as civilian workers in the U.S. military force. Unlike the “closed” individual case of Leonicio F. Arceo five years before.
earlier, this petition by Roldan and his associates was supported by, and stood in alliance with, the following institutions and organizations: the [Philippine] Court of Industrial Organizations; the Philippine National Government; and delegates of the Clark Labor Base Organization, which included Roldan and the petitioners themselves. The petition was then sent to the U.S. Embassy and other U.S. government agencies in the Philippines. Signers of the petition requested the permission of these U.S. representatives for the case to be tried under Philippine law and jurisprudence. Previously dismissed in the mid-1950s, this plea further illuminated the unequal legal, militarist, and political conditions of the “U.S.-Philippine nation” and U.S.-Philippine nation-state building during the late 1950s.

By the early 1960s, support for the petitioning efforts of Roldan’s labor-based collective grew to public national and transnational proportions. This was evidenced by the acts of such Philippine government officials as then Philippine Justice Secretary Jose W. Diokno. These officials provided their own vocalized petitions to the U.S. Embassy for the welfare of these former Air Force Base civilian workers. These vocal pronouncements of support transpired in almost a dozen U.S.-based newspaper articles collected in the Roldan case file, including one from the February 10, 1961 issue of the *Manila Times*:

Justice Secretary Jose W. Diokno has referred to U.S. embassy officials complaints arising from the dismissal of 7,000 Filipino employees and laborers from Clark Air Base, it was learned yesterday.

The charges were forwarded to Diokno by provincial Fiscal Union C. Kayanan recently.

The dismissed base personnel asked Kayanan to intervene on their behalf for the payment of their salary differentials for the past years prior to their lay-off.

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They also claimed that they were dismissed without any previous investigation or cause.

Fiscal Kayanan said he has documents to prove that the dismissed Clark employees had not been paid the salary differentials due to them.

It was also learned that the employees and laborers had earlier complained with the U.S. department of labor office in Hawaii, the US Air Force Pacific Commander, the legal department of the Philippine foreign office and the US embassy.

Up to the present, however, no action was taken on their complaints by any of these offices, they charged.

Base officials, meanwhile, declined to give any official statement on the case.250

This newspaper article revealed some illuminating details that demonstrated the growing impact of the Roldan case by the early 1960s. Firstly, Roldan and his supporting cast sent their case to the local fiscal union official of the Pampanga province, the location of Clark Air Force Base. By this time, the case plaintiffs calculated a total of 7,000 Filipino civilian workers who were forced to resign under similar circumstances of maltreatment.

Secondly, the provincial fiscal union official, C. Kayanan, forwarded the case to Jose Diokno, a prominent and legendary Philippine nationalist and human rights advocate who was national Justice Secretary during the time he heard about the Roldan case. After receiving word about Roldan et al, Diokno requested more explanation about the case from U.S. embassy officials. Diokno’s request to embassy officials, coupled with the national press coverage and previous pleas to the U.S. Labor Department in Hawai’i, demonstrated the trans-local, trans-pacific, and transnational circuits of this particular case, along with the parallel impact of this labor case on elite Philippine officials.

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250 “Pampanga: Clark employe[e]s case to embassy,” Manila Times, 10 February 1961, p. 1, Bartolome P. Roldan et al., Case File, 1958-1961/3; Box 6 of 11, File 313-08-006 (181-72-0144); NARA, San Francisco.
While Air Force base officials declined to give any official response to the growing (Philippine) national support of this case, Roldan et al remained a focal point of confidential scrutiny between—and among—U.S. and Philippine elite officials. Such private yet transnational concerns were made evident by previously noted correspondences between U.S. and Philippine political, labor, and military officials. Additionally, simultaneous and subsequent efforts were made by U.S. officials to contain—if not prevent—such cases from shifting over to Philippine labor and legal jurisprudence. These concerns among U.S. officials primarily stemmed out of fear of the potential loss of their hegemonic jurisprudence over the conceptual possibilities, concrete policies, and everyday practices of Philippine nationalism and sovereignty. Based from the underlying narrative of the 110 pages that comprise the Roldan case file, it appeared that U.S. officials’ efforts for containment, prevention, and avoidance of Philippine legal military jurisprudence proved successful—to a large degree—by the increasingly sporadic, decreasing visibility, and archival death of the Roldan case from national, military, and legal discourse since 1961.

Nevertheless, what were just as eminent from the Roldan case were the arising collective subjectivities of these Filipino civilian workers. This was evident in the greater degree of political leverage and international mobilization that Filipino civilian workers had during the latter 1950s—particularly within the context of the Roldan case. Subsequently, these Filipino civilian workers played a more crucial role in reshaping the conditions of U.S. jurisdiction in the Military Bases Agreement (1947), and Philippine “Sovereignty” on U.S. bases since 1946. In brief contrast, their enlisted counterparts had

251 Such confidential concerns among U.S. officials to remove what they considered as “petty irritants to Philippine-American relations” were expressed in 1957 and 1960 memorandums and foreign dispatches by U.S. Labor Attaché Jorma L. Kaukonen.
relatively least political leverage and mobility—despite the fact that these navy enlistees were privileged with global mobility and opportunities for U.S. citizenship and veterans’ benefits. Nonetheless, while Filipino civilian workers did not have similar opportunities for upward mobility as their enlisted counterparts, they did have greater access to local, national, and transpacific political mobility. These civilian workers’ heightened political mobility were not only illuminated in the case of Bartolome Roldan, but also in other civilian labor cases in the Philippines, Okinawa, Guam, Hawai’i, and California\textsuperscript{252}, as well as in a proposal by Philippine officials for a U.S.-Philippine Labor Committee to oversee Roldan’s and other related military labor cases.\textsuperscript{253}

These cases and issues, in addition, were part and parcel of the growing urban and military labor movements in the mid-late 1950s after the business unionization of labor organizations, and individual modes of grievance, in the first half of the decade. During the early 1950s, the lack of Philippine response to the Bandung Conference, on a national level, was part and parcel of the Philippine trajectory toward trade and business unionization. In his written correspondence to the U.S. Embassy in Manila, labor attaché Norman Johnson reported on the extent of Philippine involvement and collaboration with the planning and execution of the Bandung Conference in 1955: which was none. According to Norman Johnson, the Philippine Trade Unions Council (PTUC), an affiliate of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), ignored notifications and requests by Indonesian labor officials regarding the Bandung Conference. This Afro-

\textsuperscript{252} Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Philippines, General Correspondences and Reports, Labor Policies in the Philippines, 1958-1961/3; Box 9 of 11, File 313-08-006 (181-72-0144); NARA, San Francisco.

\textsuperscript{253} Commander in Chief Pacific to Chief of Industrial Relations, “Joint U.S.-Philippine Labor Coordination Committee,” Memorandum; 13 September 1963, pp. 1-2; General Correspondence and Reports, Labor Policies in the Philippines, 1958-1961/3; Box 9 of 11, File 313-08-006 (181-72-0144); NARA, San Francisco.
Asian labor conference just as openly denounced global colonialism, neo-colonialism, and neo-imperialism as they wholly embraced the emerging and prominent Third World decolonization movements in the early postwar period.\(^{254}\) The Philippine (national) lack of response, coupled with this U.S. official’s relative satisfaction thereof, exemplified the national shift among Philippine unions from anti-colonial and communist-based formations to a collaborationist and compliant politics with the bi-national elite formations of the “U.S.-Philippine nation.”

The arrests, sentencing, and life imprisonments of Amado V. Hernandez from the Congress of Labor (CLO), Jose Nava from the Philippine Workers’ Federation, and other prominent radical labor activists and groups extremely limited the radical socio-spatial formations and political mobility of Filipino laborers in the early 1950s. In direct consequence and subsequence, business trade unionist organizations held more prominence and support from the U.S.-Philippine nation-state during this period, including the National Confederation of Trade Unions (N.A.C.T.U.)\(^{255}\). Led by Philippine Secretary of Labor Jose Figueras, the N.A.C.T.U. played a key role in influencing the anti-Communist and business unionist politics of many labor unions at the time, while simultaneously further limiting the political mobility of such Filipino civilian workers and enlistees as Leonicio Arceo and Jesus Bautista, respectively.

Nevertheless, while the collaborationist Philippine labor unions gained more momentum and prominence at the cost of political neutralization, that did not mean, in

\(^{254}\) Norman F. Johnson, Labor Attaché of the U.S. Embassy in Manila, Correspondence, p. 10; General Correspondence and Reports, Labor Policies in the Philippines, 1958-1961/3; Box 9 of 11, File 313-08-006 (181-72-0144); NARA, San Francisco.

any way, shape or form, that radical labor unions were militaristically exterminated or nonexistent in the Philippines during this period. In fact, the opposite was true, and U.S. officials knew it too. For example, the Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) was one of a plethora of anti-colonial and nationalist labor organizations that remained prevalent and within direct surveillance of U.S. labor and diplomatic officials during this period. In the same report written by U.S. labor attaché Norman Johnson, the PAFLU, led by leftist labor activist Cipriano Cid, organized a labor strike against an American-owned company in Baguio called the Benguet Consolidated Incorporated Gold Mine. An estimated 6,000 employees were involved in the strike and followed the lead of the PAFLU. According to this U.S. diplomatic representative, this strike was “an important example of bitter labor-management strife” that spread “Anti-American propaganda directed at American Management by [the] PAFLU.” 256

In the latter 1950s and early 1960s, the political landscapes shaping the presidential administrations of Carlos P. Garcia and Diosdado Macapagal evidenced more sympathetic attitudes towards the plights of Filipino military and civilian laborers. Such Philippine national politicians as Pampanga Congresswoman Juanita Nepucemento, Vice President and Secretary of Foreign Affairs Emmanuel Pelaez, and others showed greater support for concerns pertaining to Filipino civilian laborers. 257 This national shift in labor politics was evident in the prevalence of mobilizations as collective-based as the

256 Ibid.

257 Johnson, 10.
(mentioned) Roldan case, and in events as historically symbolic as the release of Amado Hernandez from imprisonment in 1956.258

Such local, national, and transpacific political mobility was also evident between 1957 and 1963 in the emerging discourses concerning Filipino naval civilians working on U.S. bases in the Philippines, Okinawa, and Guam. Within these places, tangible discussions emerged regarding a transpacific labor movement among Filipino farm workers in Hawai‘i and California for fairer wages, benefits, and overall treatment by ensigned U.S. military and civilian “superiors.” In Guam and Okinawa, for instance, retirement benefits and forced deportation were primary issues concerning Filipino civilian workers stationed on U.S. military bases in these areas of the trans-pacific. Other points of union organization and mobility for these civilian workers included two things. Abuse of these workers by employers and recruiters provided one point of organized mobility. Another point of collective mobility, among these civilian workers, was the potential termination of their employment, given consistent complaints by local Chamorros about the U.S. military’s persistent preference of hiring Filipino workers. This second concern was rooted in the multi-layered legacies of competing colonialisms in the Asia-Pacific, and hence what one empire studies historian might articulate as “an analogous... manifestation of an international frontier.”259

258 Guevara, 92.

259 See Damon I. Salesa, “Samoa’s Half-Castes and Some Frontiers of Comparison,” in Ann Laura Stoler, ed., Haunted by Empire: Geographies of Intimacies in North American History (Duke UP: Durham, 2006). In this article, Salesa rightfully articulates this phrase within a relatively different yet comparable temporal, geographical, and subjective context: last-quarter nineteenth century Samoa, specifically in the racial ambiguities of class categorization among local half-castes. In addition, I would emphasize that this astute insight can be extrapolated for seemingly different—but considerably parallel—historical contexts in Asia and the Pacific “frontier”, particularly in the case of Filipino civilian workers as postcolonial settlers in U.S. military bases on Okinawa and Guam during this early Cold War period.
Another issue that raised concern among privileged agents of the “U.S.-Philippine nation” was the conditions of immigration, labor, and settlement among Filipino farm workers in California. In a memo dispatched to military officials on November 15, 1957, U.S. labor attaché Jorma L. Kaukonen reported on a simple request made by Apolonio V. Castillo, who at the time was chief of manpower services in the Philippine Department of Labor. Castillo’s request was to meet with Kaukonen to discuss the degree of Philippine labor law enforcement in U.S. bases as it applied to such cases as Bartolome Roldan’s and the recruitment of Filipino farm workers to California. The memo stated that Castillo himself desired to postpone the Roldan case and the discussion of Philippine labor law on U.S. bases until after the next Philippine national elections in June of the following year in 1958. Such evidence of postponement from open discussion of the Roldan case only confirmed the approach of avoidance that was not only confidentially implemented by U.S. officials, but also by cooperative Philippine officials as well. While concerns about electoral politics seemed to have been a primary motive behind Castillo’s brief recognition of this issue, it was this brand of Philippine national electoral politics that further confirmed the mutually inclusive conditions shaping the duality of Philippine sovereignty and U.S. Empire in this early postwar period.

For Castillo, therefore, the prioritization of the farm worker recruitment cases served to provide a diplomatic smokescreen as a point of the bi-national continuum of the “U.S.-Philippine nation.” In addition, the relative privileging of this particular case illustrated the immediate relevance of this issue to the contingency of Filipino farm worker recruits whose corporate-based recruiter, Sanborn and the California Growers Association, permanently left the Philippines at the cost of failing to meet the contracted
agreements made with the farm worker recruits. After hearing about this predicament, a group of still-employed Filipino farm workers took interest in recruiting these Filipinos themselves. For further assistance with their own recruitment of these Filipinos, this group appointed a lawyer named Richard L. Tracy and collaborated with two California-based recruitment organizations. These organizations were the San Jose Growers Association and the Valley of Gardens Farm Labor Association of Fresno and Santa Maria respectively. These recruited farm workers were now being screened with the help of other Filipino workers in California and by recruitment organizations apparently not yet sanctioned by the U.S. Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization (INS).

Nevertheless, it was the INS itself that pulled the plug on this operation, ordering Castillo and the Philippine Department of Labor to “drop the project.” According to Castillo, the reason given to him by the Bureau for the stoppage of this alternative recruitment agency was this: “the objection of the U.S. government to the involvement of a third interest in the negotiations between the California growers and the Philippine government.”

Whether or not the requested meeting between Castillo and Kaukonen ever took place, or if anything directly manifested from the meeting itself, was not evidenced in the written historical record. However, what were evident from reading between the lines of these correspondences were the profound concerns among U.S. officials in discussing and handling the Roldan case. In addition, the proposed organization of a Filipino-based intermediary between Filipino labor recruits and U.S. corporate farm worker recruits brought upon a negative response by the INS: “drop the project.” This commonplace

260 Ibid., 1-4.

261 Ibid., 1-4.
phrase, “drop the project”, was also a point of supplemental confirmation to the stance and approaches taken by U.S. military, labor, and political officials on similar proposals made by Philippine officials who might have been more sympathetic—or even empathetic—to cases of Filipino civilian workers on U.S. military bases in the Philippines and elsewhere in Asia and the Pacific. This particular phrase, “drop the project”, also applied to proposals introduced by Philippine officials, including the recommendation for a Philippine-U.S. Labor Committee that would be chosen by an actual mutual collaboration between Philippine and U.S. officials.

U.S. officials’ handling of the Roldan case (and related cases as well) was also indicative of the increased involvement of the U.S. National Security Council and International Security Affairs in stabilizing, enforcing, and expanding the U.S.-Philippine nation state. While the Truman administration used these U.S. departments more sparingly—most notably during the Korean War—the Eisenhower administration utilized them as central and expansive components in conducting matters of U.S. diplomatic, foreign, and militaristic policy. Starting in 1953, U.S. President Eisenhower expanded the U.S. National Security Council to include more direct involvement from a wider array of governmental agencies, including the Department of State and Department of Defense. These departments produced draft policy recommendations that were sent to the Planning Board division of the NSC. The Planning Board Division consisted of officials at the Assistant Secretary level, along with advisors from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Central Intelligence Agency. The purpose of the Planning Board was to screen and revise the draft policy papers for the NSC. One of the assistant secretaries of this Planning Board division of the NSC and International Security Affairs was John N. Irwin, who
received the urgent recommendation by U.S. Embassy Representative J. Graham Parsons for “an early disposition of this long-standing case” of Roldan et al. Once again, the extent to which the Roldan case was discussed and resolved beyond the Planning Board of the N.S.C. and International Security Affairs is beyond the written historical record. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that the Roldan case was a “troublesome matter” that, like other related cases and issues to be discussed in the next section, profoundly troubled U.S. nation-state officials and their Philippine national cooperatives.

“Cognizance of Claims… ”: Proposal for a Joint U.S.-Philippine Labor Coordination Committee

In 1960, Philippine Secretary of Labor Angel N. Castano—an avid supporter of the Roldan case—introduced and proposed the intermediary-based U.S.-Philippine Labor Coordination Committee. This proposal was a concrete manifestation of Castano’s and the Philippine Department of Labor’s proclaimed “cognizance of claims against the U.S. government from employees of American military bases here [on Clark Air Force Base]”262 three years earlier. One of these claims included the labor case of Bartolome P. Roldan.

Like the Roldan case, however, little or no details have been uncovered thus far in the written historical record relating to the actual point of view of Castano and the Department of Labor for their proposal of this committee other than how U.S. military officials interpreted the intent and support of these Philippine officials, as well as the broader implications of the possible creation of such an actual bi-national labor committee. Nevertheless, what was evident thus far in the written historical record was

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262 “Philippine Pay Claims on Clark Air Base,” Despatch No. 516, 22 November 1957, p. 1; General Correspondence and Reports, Labor Policies in the Philippines, 1958-1961/3; Box 9 of 11, File 313-08-006 (181-72-0144); NARA, San Francisco.
this: after a series of briefs between Philippine and U.S. officials, the U.S. Commander-in-Chief (CINC) Pacific gave at least two recommendations to the U.S. Chief of Industrial Relations in a September 13, 1963 correspondence letter. First, “no further efforts [shall] be made toward the establishment of a joint U.S.-Philippine Labor Coordination Committee”. And second, “current provisions for the stationing of the Philippine Military Liaison Officers at U.S. bases in the Philippines provides an effective two-way communication between management and the local national work force.”

These two recommendations demonstrated the U.S. Pacific Commander-in-Chief’s relative trust in the existing dominant avenues of negotiations between U.S.-based labor management and the Philippine national labor force, likely given that the interests of the Philippine military liaison officers and the appointed “Civilian Advisory Councils” were much more in compliance with U.S. nation-state officials than with Philippine national officials’ vision of the joint U.S.-Philippine labor committee. Such a committee provided an alternative conception of the “U.S.-Philippine nation” based on an actual mutual partnership of coordination, investigation, and decision-making between U.S. and Philippine officials, which of course lay in contradiction with the existent relationship already set in place since the Philippine-American War. To U.S. officials, the potential unraveling, cancellation, and dissipation of this relationship would have profoundly disrupted the existing stability of U.S.-Philippine relations. Such stability existed upon the terms and conditions of the U.S. as an empire in the Philippines.

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263 Commander in Chief Pacific to Chief of Industrial Relations, “Joint U.S.-Philippine Labor Coordination Committee,” Memorandum; 13 September 1963, pp. 1-2; General Correspondence and Reports, Labor Policies in the Philippines, 1958-1961/3; Box 9 of 11, File 313-08-006 (181-72-0144); NARA, San Francisco.
What the U.S. Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific emphasized and supported in his recommendation, therefore, were two things. First, the Commander emphasized the pro-U.S. leanings of the intermediaries between U.S. labor management and the Philippine work force on U.S. bases in the Philippines. Second, he declared his own opposition against the Philippine nationalist politics of recognition, particularly nationalist politics that were critical or antagonistic to U.S. presence in the Philippines. To this U.S. commander, these Philippine nationalist politics of recognition were exercised not only among Philippine officials proposing the joint labor committee, but especially in these Philippine officials’ selection process of the joint labor committee itself. Such U.S.-based advisory precautions were prevalent in the following details from the Pacific Commander-in-Chief’s 1963 recommendation:

… If the proposed committee is established, the selection of Filipino representatives would be extremely difficult. Experience with representative of the [Philippine] Department of Foreign Affairs and the [Philippine] Department of Labor indicates that a selection of committee members from either or both departments could result in differences which would make ineffective any efforts by the committee to effect Philippine-U.S. coordination…

… *Extreme concern* [italics mine] would be generated at U.S. bases if certain representatives of the Department of Labor, whose pro-communist leanings have been indicated by investigative reports, were nominated to serve the committee…

… If Filipino representatives were to accept pro-American recommendations, such recommendations would probably undergo extensive discussions before acceptance by the Department of Foreign Affairs or other Departments. If the Filipino representatives were anti-American, indiscriminate disclosure or committee selection and issuance of biased statements to the press and other sources would cause difficulty to management representatives of the U.S. Military bases would have no effective means of controlling such disclosures or of having statements corrected or retracted…

… In conclusion, it is recommended that no further efforts be made to establish a Joint U.S.-Philippine Labor Committee…

The U.S.-Pacific Commander in Chief’s recommendation illuminated the ways in which Filipino military civilian labor were part and parcel of local, national, and transpacific attentions given to the issue of Philippine sovereignty on U.S. military bases. This issue arguably came under closer scrutiny among U.S. officials in the early Cold War period than during the colonial period, especially as Filipino labor movements became more in the public forefront of local, national and transpacific attention. The U.S.-Philippine nation-state’s dissipation of groups with “pro-communist leanings”, such as the Hukbalahaps (Huks) by 1953, gave way to closer scrutiny among other Philippine leftist, radical, and “subversive” groups and leaders. Such individuals included radical union leaders Cipriano Cid, Ignacio Lacsina, and other leftist labor unions from the urban areas of the Philippines, particularly in Manila. U.S. officials’ concerns regarding such individuals and groups stemmed in the degree of their involvement in the Bandung Conference and other related anti-colonial conferences and movements around the globe, as well as the extent of their relationship with Bartolome P. Roldan’s case and other prominent Philippine labor, political, and military officials who provided their support for the joint U.S.-Philippine Labor Coordination Committee. While the demise of the countryside Huks gave way to the emergence of their successor ng Partido Komunista ng Pilipino (P.K.P.), U.S. officials were more anxious about the influence of urban-based groups with potential or actual communist leanings on emerging military labor movements than the ones that resided in the countryside. The means and manifestations of U.S. officials’ structural reinforcements of the “U.S.-Philippine nation”, as implicated in these cases, are further examined and assessed in the next section.

Reinforcing the U.S.-Philippine Nation-State
Based on my findings from the correspondences among U.S. officials, at least five recommended strategies were implemented to prevent these transpacific labor alliances from coming to fruition. First, U.S. labor officials implemented and institutionalized postcolonial education programs in such educational institutions as the University of the Philippines-Diliman to teach “native” civilian workers the “spirit” of capitalism and the practice of investing in behalf of their labor and monetary productivity. Second, these U.S. officials exercised political recognition of potential and tangible bureaucratic—and consciously deliberate—responses toward Philippine labor activists and their diplomatic allies in order to shut down the momentum of such sociopolitical activity. Third, these U.S. labor officials recommended shutting down Philippine-based bi-national labor committees that sought to investigate the Filipino condition of civilian labor on U.S. military bases in the Philippines and elsewhere in the transpacific. Fourth, they supported the minimization of Philippine jurisdiction on U.S. military bases and their stationed personnel in the Philippines. And fifth, U.S. military, political, and diplomatic officials sought to prevent Filipino military civilian workers from seeing their own cases in ways that would challenge neocolonial discourses of “Philippine sovereignty”, “labor activism”, and “Philippine nationalism” reinforced by U.S. nation-state officials and their cooperative Philippine elite.266

265 One of these programs was the Asian Labor Education Center. Founded by Dean Jose Valmonte of UP-Diliman in 1953 and originally called the Labor Education Center, the initial goal of this center was to utilize professional education and research in the name of labor and social empowerment. By the latter 1950s, it became a direct cooperative of U.S. Cold War politics. By 1958, the Center became renamed as the Asian Labor Education Center, and one of the most established training centers for Asian trade union leaders.

266 Ibid. See also Norman F. Johnson, Labor Attaché of the U.S. Embassy in Manila, Correspondence; General Correspondence and Reports, Labor Policies in the Philippines, 1958-1961/3; Box 9 of 11, File 313-08-006 (181-72-0144); NARA, San Francisco.
These five distinct and overlapping methods were, to a large degree, successfully implemented by political and military officials of the U.S. empire nation-state to maintain their hegemonic sense of structural integrity. These methodical implementations thus shaped and enforced the terms and collaborative conditions of post-1946 “Philippine sovereignty” and “Philippine nationalism”—including the original and revised initiations of the Military Bases Agreement in 1947. In addition, these hegemonic practices played a major role in the relative dissipation of transpacific and transnational possibilities of Philippine military civilian labor mobilization. This was imminent in the dismissal of the Arceo, Roldan, and Bautista cases from confidential and public correspondence: the Arceo case in 1953; the Roldan case in 1963; and the Bautista case in 1964, as evidenced in the archival deaths of their respective cases in the written historical record. While the 1964 emergence of Jose Maria Sison’s youth-based Kabataang Makabayan (KM) organization would reignite the sparks of Philippine nationalist radicalism within urban, labor, and military sites, the dominant fantasy productions and implementations of the “U.S.-Philippine nation” were still intact within these exact same imperial sites.

Epilogue

On October 10, 1962, Modesto M. Lumarque, President of the Filipino Employment Association, Okinawa (F.E.A.O.), wrote a memorandum to the Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Emmanuel Pelaez. In this letter, Lumarque expressed sincere concern about the implications of the U.S. military’s “phase out” policy of Filipino civilian personnel. First implemented in 1955, the goal of this policy was “reducing Filipino personnel to a zero balance come 1965” in order to increase available employment to local Okinawans. From 1955 to October of 1962, the number of Filipino civilian
personnel dropped from 2,000 to “scarcely 600.” Nevertheless, what was important to point out in Lumarque’s letter was threefold. First, Lumarque was less concerned, if not all, with the loss of employment retention and opportunities among Filipino civilians. Rather, he was more concerned with the fact that, like Roldan, Bautista, and Arceo, the Filipino laborers in Okinawa were not receiving any form of severance pay for their services, which often spanned fourteen years. Second, the letter displayed Lumarque’s political recognition of support for the Filipino workers for their subsequent alleged allegiance to the U.S. for their civilian veteran services. And three, this memorandum evidenced Lumarque’s elaborate point of comparison to “other co-employees” privileged with U.S. citizenship. According to Lumarque:

… [These] other co-employees… by reason of their American citizenship… could take it easy and avail the benefits of the U.S. Civil Service Pension System—get the deposit they made plus interest or wait till they reach retirement age and enjoy their monthly pensions—we, the Filipinos, whose services are terminated, can fall back on nothing.  

The specific “co-employees with American citizenship” whom Lumarque was referring to are still largely unknown in the written historical record. Nevertheless, it is more than likely that Lumarque was alluding to one or both of the following. One, Lumarque might have been alluding to white American civilian management who had militarized authority over stationed Filipino civilian personnel, including Lumarque himself. Or two, he was referencing all American enlisted personnel with U.S. citizenship, including those of Philippine descent, stationed in the U.S. military base of Okinawa. While the outcome of the FEAO’s labor case are yet to be seen in the written historical records, what can likely be determined, when reading between the lines of this

267 Modesto M. Lumarque, President FEAO, to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Republic of the Philippines, Letter of Correspondence, 10 October 1962, pp. 1-2; General Correspondence and Reports. Labor Policies in the Philippines, 1958-1961/3; Box 9 of 11, File 313-08-006 (181-72-0144); NARA, San Francisco.
correspondence, were the methods in which such cases as this dissipated from the eyes of U.S. and Philippine state officials, especially in light of the alternative visions of contestation that this case might have brought against the imperial U.S.-Philippine nation-state, as previously assessed with other mentioned cases.

In the meantime, what follows in the next chapter is a more elaborate and analytic version of the historical comparison that FEAO President Lumarque alluded to in his letter to the Foreign Affairs Department. This historical comparison is between Filipino civilian personnel and enlisted navy personnel of Philippine descent. What did it mean, in historical and political terms, that these different categorized groups of Filipino workers labored for the U.S. military under the bi-national politics of the “U.S.-Philippine nation”? What were the mutual degrees of their inclusion and marginalization in the U.S. Navy and other branches of the military following the Second World War? These questions are addressed in the last two chapters of this dissertation.
CHAPTER FIVE

The Inclusive Politics of Filipino Steward Enlistment: Degrees of Inclusion, Upward Mobility, and Citizenship in the U.S. Nation-State

Between 1944 and 1973, over 22,000 Filipinos joined the U.S. Navy as enlistees. While these Filipinos had educational experience in different fields of local professions, they opted for the U.S. Navy instead. Yearning to escape impoverished wartime conditions and “see the world” while feeling obligated to financially support their trans-local families, these Filipinos enlisted in the U.S. Navy to fulfill these dreams of imperial geographic and upward mobility. Unlike their Filipino civilian and soldier counterparts, these navy enlistees had greater access to global geographic mobility, postcolonial settlement, U.S. citizenship, and veterans’ benefits for themselves and their transnational families by joining the U.S. Navy.

The domestic and global presence of Filipino enlistees in the U.S. Navy, coupled with the upward and geographic mobility of these enlistees as postcolonial settlers in the U.S. nation-state, only enhanced and enforced the imaginary bi-national allied status between the U.S. and the Philippine nation-states, as well as the actual subordinate politico-military position of the sovereign Philippines in relation to the U.S. imperial nation-state. This duality between the imagined and propagated bi-national status of the U.S.-Philippine relationship, and the actual unequal and paternalistic foundations shaping and enforcing this diplomatic relationship, defined what I have been noting as the “U.S.-Philippine nation.” The root of this bi-national duality lay in the emergence of the
American colonial state following the Spanish-American War in 1898, and the Philippine-American War from 1899-1902. The peak of this bi-national sense of alliance manifested in the Second World War and onwards in the post-1946 period of U.S.-Philippine relations. These profound idealities and concrete realities of U.S.-Philippine relations existed in everyday and institutional contexts of political, military, and civil life. In addition, various degrees of this bi-national duality were commonly and especially prevalent in shaping the politics of Filipino enlistment in the U.S. military, and the U.S. navy in particular.

This chapter looks at the divergent meanings of these politics of enlistment for Filipino enlistees on the one hand, and their U.S. commanding officers and officials on the other. For Filipino enlistees, the promising politics of enlistment entailed sustainable and successful means of attaining social and class mobility for themselves, their families, and communities of (often) suburban settlement within bi-national and trans-pacific circuits of the U.S.-Philippine nation-state. By enlisting in the U.S. Navy these Filipino enlistees were promised citizenship and G.I. benefits within the U.S. nation-state. With probable access to citizenship and G.I. benefits, these enlistees would be better able to assure their survival and mobility within the U.S. nation-state—not only for themselves, but for their families, communities, and their collective subjectivities as Filipino males.

For U.S. political and military officials, these liberal and inclusive politics of Filipino enlistment meant several things. First, as previously stated, these politics of enlistment indicated the continual enlistment of a group of foreign nationals whom they conceptualized as loyal, hardworking, and perhaps staunchest Asian allies of the U.S. during the Cold War. Second, the politics of enlistment, for these officials, meant the
multiracial inclusion of “their” Filipino enlistees, particularly those in the White House, within the U.S. nation-state and for the global public to see. Public displays of Filipino stewards in the White House, in particular, further showcased the image of U.S. leadership in diplomacy, democracy, and minority inclusion. And thirdly, the politics of enlisting Filipinos meant the frequent clustering of these enlisted Filipinos with Japanese Americans as emerging “model minorities” in U.S. national discourse. As part of the third wave of Filipino migration, which lasted from 1945 to 1965, more and more Filipinos were enlisted by U.S. officials under the historical and prevailing conceptualization of these foreign nationals as extremely loyal, hardworking, and subservient.

Such conceptualizations largely informed the rehiring of Filipino enlistees during the Second World War. This is not only evidenced in the military correspondences cited in the last chapter, but it is especially reinforced in the newsreel coverage of the Bataan Death March. In January 1944, a series of newsreel footage documented Filipinos and U.S. Americans, dying of malnourishment and mistreatment by Japanese military personnel, marching sixty miles to the prison camp in Bataan. One of these newsreel pieces, titled “America Shocked by Jap Brutality to War Prisoners,” showcased montages of that brutality to the homes of millions of U.S. Americans. On one level, these discursive images spurred massive American support for the “liberation” of the Philippines during the last two years of the Second World War. On another level, these images of struggle and alliance between Filipinos and U.S. Americans, coupled with U.S.

\[268\] “America Shocked by Jap Brutality to War Prisoners”, Universal Newsreel Footage, prepared by Jack Haney, distributed by Lowell Thomas and Movietone News, 1944. As mentioned in chapter two, this racist term “Jap” does not intend to in any way, shape or form, to be used in the present context.
military officials’ preconceived notions of their “hardworking” and “loyal” Filipino laborers, catalyzed the model minority politics of enlisting Filipinos in the U.S. Navy—during and beyond the Second World War.

Newsreels also documented U.S. military officials’ celebratory support for Japanese Americans who fought for the U.S. during the Second World War. However, unlike Bataan, national public and press coverage of such support for Japanese Americans, or Nisei, soldiers did not come to fruition until the end of the war. One of these national newsreels, “Pres. Truman Honors Nisei Combat Group”, recorded and broadcasted the July 1946 parade that commemorated the return of the 442nd Regiment Combat Team, an all-Japanese force that fought in behalf of the U.S. In this parade, 500 members of the 442nd marched down Constitutional Avenue in Washington, DC. Their honorable march was followed by President Truman’s tribute to these veterans: “‘you fought not only the enemy but you fought prejudice. And you’ve won. Keep up that fight and we’ll continue to win. The next great republic stands just for what its constitution stands for: the welfare of all the people all the time.’” The newsreel then ended with the narrator’s definitive note: “‘these soldiers: true Americans.’”

While this and other newsreels ceased to reveal the forced displacement and internment of Japanese Americans, its celebratory recognition of the Nisei greatly influenced public opinion and ideology towards seeing these Japanese Americans, like Filipinos, as model minorities following the Second World War. While Naoko Shibusawa and John Dower might rightly argue that Japanese were becoming America’s staunchest

allies after the Second World War, I would also argue that Filipinos were undergoing a similar trajectory during the Second World War and onwards toward the postwar period. While U.S. officials’ ethnoracial formations of Filipinos and Japanese could not be any more different during World War II, the trajectories between these two ethnoracial formations converged over time, and especially during the early postwar period. As U.S. political officials celebrated Japanese Americans as model minorities in the civilian sphere, military officials—in many cases—conceptualized Filipinos as model minority enlistees within the military sphere.

These model minority politics continued to facilitate Filipino enlistment during and beyond the early postwar period. Over time, these model minority politics of Filipino enlistment not only structured the hiring of postwar Filipino enlistees, but even previous scholars’ studies regarding Filipino enlistees during the past thirty years. The historical model minority politics shaping these studies (including this chapter) have been scathingly critiqued by pioneering critical ethnic studies scholar E. San Juan, Jr. In *After Postcolonialism: Remapping Philippine-U.S. Confrontations*, San Juan comments on Yen Le Espiritu’s book *Filipino American Lives* as one example of a scholarly text that practices the conflation of model minority and bi-national politics that San Juan coins as a “new conceptual model of transnationalism”:

> When post-1965 second- and third- generation Filipinos (mostly professionals) devise strategies to construct multiple and overlapping identities, thus presumably altering their rank in U.S. society, they succeed (for Espiritu) in resisting the dominant ideology of subordination by race, class, gender nationality, and so on. While the self-interpretation of Espiritu’s informants does contain indices of flux rather than continuity, multilinear narratives, rather than one monologic strand, I think that it is not due to their overall success in elevating their country and culture of origin to equal status with the United States and its hegemonic

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prerogatives. This is the fatal mistake of the transnational model despite its gesture of acknowledging it: it assumes the parity of colonized/dominated peoples and the U.S. nation-state in contemporary global capitalism.271

While my study focuses more on pre-1965 Filipino enlistees rather than the post-1965 enlistees that shape Espiritu’s findings and San Juan’s critiques, there is at least one point of continuity that I think can be applied from E. San Juan’s historiography of post-1965 Navy Filipinos onto my own study on pre-1965 Filipino enlistees. This chapter, in particular, does trace the historical origins and outcomes of such bi-national formations. This is indicative in my analysis of the interactions between U.S. military officials and “their” enlisted Filipino laborers. Rather than assume the Philippines as having “equal status” with the United States, I see the “equal status” of the U.S.-Philippine relationship more as an imaginary than a reality. This imaginary, as I have argued throughout this dissertation, structured, reinforced, and concealed the inequalities between the U.S. and the Philippines: from the top level between U.S. and Philippine officials to the top-down level between U.S. officials and Filipino laborers.

Given the inclusive historical and historiographical politics of U.S.N. Filipino enlistment, I emphasize the following arguments in this chapter. Firstly, the ideological and bi-national alliances forged between the U.S. and Philippines facilitated the continual inclusive politics of enlistment, upward mobility, and U.S. citizenship among postwar Filipino enlistees. Nevertheless, beneath these success narratives lay daily experiences and realities of discrimination, spatial restrictions, and limited upward mobility within the militarized spaces of the U.S. Navy. While many of these Navy Filipinos endured relatively successful navy careers, their line of work was often strictly limited to cooking,

271 E. San Juan Jr., After Postcolonialism: Remapping Philippine-U.S. Confrontations (Rowman: Lanham, 2000), 54.
cleaning, and other menial forms of labor. And secondly, accounting for these cases of inclusive enlistment and upward mobility was the varying paternalistic bonds forged between Filipino enlistees and their “superior” U.S. officers, however unequal the relationship really was. If the officers, informally or formally, gained further knowledge of the (relatively) high degree of education already attained by his “assigned” enlistee before joining the service, uneven possibilities existed for the enlistees to be reassigned to different lines of work that more closely aligned with their knowledge and skills, as well as to the relative desirability of the assigned stewards to those work positions. Thus, while these Navy Filipinos endured by becoming geographically mobile, attaining citizenship in the U.S. nation-state, and providing material sustenance for their trans-local and intergenerational families, racial paternalism in the U.S. Navy shaped and reinforced the everyday and institutional politics of Filipino enlistment.

**Degrees of Inclusion**

When U.S. Congress passed the Immigration Act in 1965, the immigration quota for Asians increased dramatically to 100,000 yearly—which also included middle- and upper-class Filipinos. While previous scholars have marked 1965 as the watershed year for Filipino and Asian immigration to the U.S. 272, working-class and university-educated Filipinos already started to migrate to the U.S. and elsewhere around the world through the U.S. Navy well before then. In addition, the watershed years of U.S.-Philippine relations in World War II continued in parallel and uneven ways during the Cold War period. With the exception of a five-year period between 1947 and 1952, Filipino enlistment continued in the U.S. Navy. While concrete reasons for this five-year gap of

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Filipino enlistment have not yet been found in the written or oral historical records, I further explore this historical question with the most relatively tangible evidence in this and the following chapter. As previously stated, nonetheless, between 1944 and 1973 the U.S. enlisted more than 22,000 Filipinos in the U.S. Navy, and the Philippines (other than Japan) maintained its status as one of America’s staunchest allies during this period.\(^\text{273}\)

**Fig. 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Years</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1944-1946</td>
<td>2,289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947-1952</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953-1958</td>
<td>5,525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>980</td>
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<td>1960</td>
<td>1,169</td>
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<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>1,675</td>
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<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>644</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1965</td>
<td>1,964</td>
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<td>1966</td>
<td>1,716</td>
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<td>1968</td>
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<td>1969</td>
<td>1,284</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>633</td>
</tr>
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<td>1971</td>
<td>422</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


While numbers seem to increase drastically during the Vietnam War, one of the important things to note—from this chart—is that Navy Filipino enlistment decreased drastically during the latter peak of the Vietnam War between 1970 and 1972. One interpretation of this data is that before 1973, when Admiral Zumwalt officially decreased Filipino enlistment to 400 per year, Navy Filipino enlistment was already on the decline.

As for the reasons or logics behind the decrease in Filipino enlistment during this three-year period, they have not yet been directly uncovered in the written historical record—neither by previous researchers (myself included), or arguably even the archivists themselves who, coincidentally, might have such data buried in the National Archives or other official archive collections. To uncover such relevant archival materials would likely entail another research trip to various branches in the U.S. National Archives—and even that would involve a massive investigation through files that have not been appropriately organized, classified, and declassified yet.

Nonetheless, this institutional practice of enlistment exclusion was likely part and parcel of several overarching historical developments. First, with the official declaration of the Philippines as an independent nation-state on July 4, 1946, U.S. military and political officials implemented their own terms and conditions of what constituted “Philippine Independence” in relation to the U.S. (and in practically full compliance from
elite agents of the Philippine nation-state). These particular terms and conditions also coincided with logics of budget nationalism, which foreground policies of exclusion toward certain racial and ethnic groups based on the emergent premises of national patriotism in cutting the federal budget and in restoring the U.S. national economy. The earliest post-1946 institutional policy of exclusion toward Filipinos arguably was the Rescission Act. This act restricted veterans’ benefits to locals in the Philippines who served under the U.S. Armed Forces during World War II. Alas, it was under these historical conditions of post-1946 exclusion which set the political stage for barring Filipino naval enlistment between 1947 and 1952. In turn, it can be argued in this historical sense that these conditions of exclusion toward Filipinos also set the stage for further and broader restrictions toward foreigners and immigrants during the early postwar period, culminating in the plenary congressional passage of the 1952 Immigration Act.

Moreover, when juxtaposing this data with overarching historical evidence, one can argue that the overall decrease in U.S. Navy Filipino enlistment, between (and relatively since) 1970 and 1972, coincided with the general decrease and withdrawal of troops in Vietnam during the war in this Southeast Asian region. As early as 1970, the Nixon administration implemented the foreign policy of “Vietnamization” which, coupled with secret diplomacies and sporadic bombings in North Vietnam and Cambodia, entailed gradual American troop withdrawal from Vietnam in exchange for American training of South Vietnamese forces in continual defense against “enemy” forces. This policy of troop withdrawal likely complemented with decreases in minority enlistments, which also worked to gain more electoral support from U.S. anti-war activists and
government officials who demanded withdrawal of troops and a peaceful and honorable end to what Daniel Ellsberg referenced as an “illegitimate” war.275

Another likely factor relevant to the decrease in Filipino enlistment was the massive increase of grassroots unrest and organizing among racialized and ethnic minorities. These mobilizations, which transpired under various forms of cultural and internationalist nationalisms among African Americans, Latina/o Americans, Native Americans, and Asian Americans, led to the necessary emergence of ethnic studies and interrelated interdisciplinary programs in universities and secondary schools throughout the United States. Consequently, these grassroots-based movements spurred exponential anxieties among U.S. political and military officials, most notably the Nixon administration and the Federal Bureau of Investigation who were concerned about the actual and possible instabilities within the civilian and military spheres that can stem from these collective efforts.276 Based from evidences of instabilities in both spheres of the U.S. body politic, U.S. military officials were likely less than willing to enlist racialized and ethnic minorities into the branches of the U.S. military during this period—including Filipinos in the U.S. Navy. Although Navy Admiral Zumwalt formally expanded the horizontal and vertical mobility among Filipino stewards through renaming and broadening their line of work as “seamen,” the simultaneous massive decrease in Filipino enlistments illuminated the fact that U.S. Navy officials were more comfortable with expanding the placement of already enlisted Filipinos to other duties and ratings


276 Norton et al., 859, 867-68.
besides those affiliated with the steward branch upon the precondition that less and less Filipinos would be enlisted in the U.S. Navy in the first place. By 1992, when horizontal and vertical mobility—within the naval ranks and duties—was arguably at its peak among active Filipino enlistees, the U.S. government banned Filipino enlistment from the Philippines altogether. I further delineate and assess the implications of this dual relationship between U.S.N. Filipino upward mobility on the one hand, and downward trajectories of U.S.N. Filipino enlistment on the other, in the dissertation epilogue that covers Filipino enlistment and veterans’ movements—from the Vietnam War to the post-9/11 period.

Nevertheless, it was since the 1950s that many of these Filipinos were transferred—if not promoted—by U.S. officials to different ranks, positions, and branches upon initial enlistment as stewards. For instance, one individual, Pedrito Sap-ay Aquintey, initially applied to the U.S. Navy in 1954 only to be suddenly reassigned to the U.S. Coast Guard shortly thereafter. Here was his testimony, as recorded in *Our Uncles’ Words*: “so the Navy just pointed to some of us and said, ‘Alright, 1-2-3… okay, you’re in the Guard.’”

Ramon Burdeos and David C. Orolfo were two other naval enlistees who were transferred to the Coast Guard. On October 30, 1955, after initial enlistment in the U.S.N. from Sangley Point, these two, along with one-hundred other newly enlisted Filipinos

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were taken aboard the U.S.S. Barrett to San Francisco, CA. From San Francisco they transferred to Alameda, CA where they reported for Coast Guard boot camp.\textsuperscript{278}

After brief stints as stewards, some naval enlistees were able to transfer to other positions within the U.S. naval branch. One such case was Mario G. Gamboa. In late 1959, Mr. Gamboa first enlisted in the U.S. naval force as a steward.\textsuperscript{279} A few years later, he requested for a change in his rating from “mess management specialist” to “storekeeper specialist.” Thanks to a strongly supportive recommendation from his supervisor, his division and commanding officers approved his request. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Gamboa headed to storekeeper school where he received best possible preparation for his desired rating as storekeeper specialist. After successfully completing his training, Gamboa’s commanding officers transferred him to the destroyer ship Shelton, where he worked as a storekeeper specialist.\textsuperscript{280}

Another person who made a successful request for a ratings change was David C. Orolfo. On January 29, 1963, enlisted as a stewardman (TN), Mr. Orolfo requested for a promotion in his enlistment to a “seaman” (SN). His commanding officer (CO) at the time, chief training officer Felix X. Riley, approved Orolfo’s request for the enlistment shift.\textsuperscript{281} Subsequently, the Coast Guard Personnel Division promoted Orolfo to second class yeoman by the mid-60s.\textsuperscript{282} Factors leading to his promotion included his sustained

\textsuperscript{278} Ray L. Burdeos, \textit{Filipinos in the U.S. Navy & Coast Guard during the Vietnam War} (Bloomington: AuthorHouse, 2008), 3.

\textsuperscript{279} \textit{Ibid.}, 61.

\textsuperscript{280} \textit{Ibid.}, 63.

\textsuperscript{281} \textit{Ibid.}, 86.

\textsuperscript{282} \textit{Ibid.}, 86.
connection with his superior officer, along with his consistently hard work and disciplinary accommodations.

The varying inclusions and recognitions of Filipino enlistees were prevalent in the White House as well. The White House was widely known to be the most powerful household in the entire globe where military, civilian, and political life converged for the whole world to see. In the White House, as many as twenty-five to thirty Filipino stewards assisted the Commander-in-Chief in the White House, and between ten and fifteen during his domestic and international presidential trips. During the Truman presidency, in particular, U.S. officials and journalists recognized and at times celebrated the inclusion and presence of these stewards in the White House. These historic sites of inclusion, recognition, and celebratory presence were evident in U.S. officials’ deck logs of Truman’s presidential trips, pictures taken by White House photographers of the stewards with U.S. officials, and the very duties of the Filipino stewards themselves.²⁸³

²⁸³ Such present and celebrated instances were most noted in hindsight in the public papers of various U.S. officials and staff in the Harry S. Truman Library in Independence, Missouri, including the Mariano Floresca Papers, the William Janssen Papers, the William Rigdon Papers, and the Leo Roberts Papers. These National Archives in the Harry S. Truman Library have highlighted time and time again the presence of Filipino enlistees assisting the U.S. president in the White House, from his daily chores to the meals that the president consumed on a daily basis.

Appendices A and B from this chapter contain photos of Filipino stewards who served in the White House during the Truman Presidency. Mess Officer Leo Roberts, along with twenty-five of the thirty-four Filipino stewards, are featured in the photograph featured in Appendix A. As for the nine other stewards, according to Roberts:

5 stewards [were] at Camp Shanghai [now known as Camp David] and the other 4 apparently were on liberty (or leave) when photo was taken. These stewards were US citizens as the date was prior to the United States granting the Philippines their independence. My stewards were outstanding in every respect. Two of the stewards served President Roosevelt, Pres. Truman and later Pres. Eisenhower before he put the yacht out of commission.

The photograph in Appendix B features Leo Roberts and two White House Chief Stewards at Camp Shangri-La (again, now know as Camp David): Chief Rangasa and Chief Pascual. According to Roberts, “Chief Rangasa [was] in charge of the Wardroom Officers Mess aboard the Williamsburg”; and, Chief Pascual was someone whom Roberts “always assigned to the First Lady when she was present.” The individuals photographed on page three of the appendix are some of the White House commanding officers...
As previously noted, it is no coincidence that the hiring of Filipino veteran stewards in the White House began during the early American colonial period in the Philippines. The historical enlistment, recognition, and inclusion of Filipinos as stewards in the White House has been both a commonplace and exceptional practice of facilitating and enforcing the social, economic, and political inequalities of the “U.S.-Philippine nation. Nevertheless, for many of the Filipino enlistees, especially those hired in the White House since World War II, this chance provided once-in-a-lifetime opportunities for them to work with the president of the United States.

These Filipinos stewards not only worked for the U.S. president in the White House, but they also traveled with him all over the world. They assisted President Truman during his two-week vacations in Key West. Additionally, these Filipinos traveled with Truman during his national election campaigns and diplomatic trips abroad. For instance, during his 1948 re-election campaign President Truman brought four Filipino stewards with him on his train trips to and across Washington, DC; Ohio; Illinois; Nebraska; Montana; Wyoming; Idaho; Seattle, WA; Oregon; Berkeley, Davis, Sacramento, Santa Barbara, and Los Angeles, CA; Albuquerque, NM, Emporia, KS; Jefferson City, MO; and the Democratic National Convention in Philadelphia, PA in the months of June and July, 1948.\(^2^{84}\) The national and local publics of these major U.S.

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\(^{284}\) William Rigdon Papers, NARA Truman Library, Independence, MO.
cities were able to witness his policies of multiracial liberal inclusion on visible and invisible display. Other than Truman’s Executive Order 9981 that implemented formal racial integration in the U.S. military, or his support for the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, or even in the extraterritorial re-acquisition of Guam and Samoa in 1947, such policies of liberal inclusion were no more evident than by the visible hiring and invisible status of Filipino stewards in the White House, and throughout Truman’s two-term presidency.

During his diplomatic trips abroad, President Truman brought even more Filipino stewards with him for additional assistance in everyday affairs. Three years earlier, in July 1945, President Truman and his associates embarked on a multi-week journey aboard the U.S.S. Augusta to actively participate in one of the most crucial meetings in the history of U.S. foreign policy: the Potsdam Conference. In preparation for the trip, Truman brought not only his cabinet members, military officials, and media publicists, but ten Filipino enlistees as well to assist in the everyday affairs of these associates. Each of these ten Filipino enlistees was assigned to at least one U.S. official. Mr. Sotero Abiva, whose oral history is now celebrated by his genealogical descendents in the Filipino American national community, was specifically designated to assist the President during this 1945 trip. In addition, Mr. Estrada was assigned to the Secretary of State; Mr. Benjamin Licodo to General Vaughn and Captain Vardaman; Armando Custodio to Secretary Ross and Captain McMahon; Mr. Mariano Floresca to a “Mr. Matthews” and “Mr. Bohlen”; and Mr. Olivares to a “Mr. Canfil”, Lieutenant William Rigdon, and Ensignee Fleener. Meanwhile, four Filipino enlistees were appointed to work solely and strictly in the galley of the U.S.S. Augusta during this trip. These stewards included

“headboy” Mr. Orig, Mr. Ordonia, Mr. Bautista (no apparent resemblance or relation to civilian worker Jesus Bautista in chapter three), and Mr. Palomaria.  

Once again, well before Admiral Zumwalt’s 1973 shift towards broader inclusion of stewards as seamen, U.S. military officials enlisted and transferred Filipinos into different ranks and positions since the 1950s. For instance, in 1956, Navy steward Frank Cariaga Gonzalez, interviewed by the Hampton Roads division of the Filipino American National Historical Society in 2006, was able to convince naval personnel to switch his rating to storekeeper third class. Another Navy Filipino steward, Alberto Romen Asercion, was transferred to music navy school in the early 1960s soon after his commanding officer heard of his prodigal musical talents and knowledge gained in the Philippines. Confirming his decision to send Asercion to music navy school, the commanding officer said, “We’re not going to waste you.”

Some commanding U.S. officers unofficially reassigned Filipinos to different positions before their official promotions. One case in particular was Len Monzon. After World War II, Mr. Monzon enlisted in Sangley Point and was assigned as a steward in the Naval Air Station in Barber’s Point, Hawai‘i and later in San Diego, California. By the Korean War in the early 1950s, Mr. Monzon was working in the personnel office of the naval ship as a yeoman striker, or yeoman trainee, while still officially positioned as a navy steward. Eventually, by July 1951, Mr. Monzon’s commanding officer formally

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287 In Our Uncles’ Words, 36.
switched his rating from steward to yeoman, or seaman. By 1962, Mr. Monzon was promoted to chief yeoman.\textsuperscript{289}

At other times, U.S. officers took it upon themselves to insure the enlistment promotion of Filipino stewards toward positions that aligned more closely to the skilled knowledge and learned expertise of these Filipinos, as attained during their colonial education in the Philippines. For instance, after learning of navy steward Jeff Colet’s successful completion of high school, Colet’s captain told him: “You don’t belong in this [steward] department, why don’t you change your rating to corpsman?” After Mr. Colet replied affirmatively but thought it was too late to reply, the commanding personnel promptly replied: “it’s never too late.”\textsuperscript{290}

After a brief interview and accidental mix up of Mr. Colet’s records, Jeff Colet’s request was officially approved and he entered hospital corpsman school in Bainbridge, Maryland. After successfully completing hospital corpsman school, Mr. Colet officially became ranked on file as a hospital corpsman in 1956.\textsuperscript{291} In addition, when Mr. Alabado joined the U.S. Navy in 1959, commanding personnel initially enlisted him as a steward. Just several weeks later, after graduating from boot camp and successfully completing his steward training, Mr. Alabado’s rating changed to first class engineman after commanding officers heard of his initial professional and educational background in engineering.\textsuperscript{292}

\textsuperscript{289} Ibid., 42.

\textsuperscript{290} Burdeos, 97.

\textsuperscript{291} Ibid., 97-98.

\textsuperscript{292} Ibid., 75.
Nestor Enriquez was another successful example of vertical enlistment promotion from stewardship. When he joined the U.S. Navy in 1958, navy commanders first enlisted him as a steward. Just two years later, after considering his promotion request and witnessing his daily diligence, navy personnel approved Mr. Enriquez’s enlistment change from steward in the mess hall to storekeeper in the supply department. Mr. Enriquez eventually entered submarine school in New London, Connecticut, where he became officially promoted as global submariner.

Some of these Filipino enlistees were also guerilla members or soldiers of the Philippine Armed Forces during the Second World War. One of these 250,000+ soldiers, Francisco Frias, who was interviewed by Fred and Dorothy Cordova in FANHS Seattle in the early 1980s, was a Philippine guerilla member at age fifteen during World War II before joining the U.S. Navy in 1946. Carlos Balmaceda, another Navy Filipino enlistee, was ranked as a second lieutenant in the Philippine Army before joining the U.S. Navy in 1960. Two years after his initial enlistment, Mr. Balmaceda appealed to the Bureau of Naval Personnel for a rating change to navy recruiting counselor. Afterwards, the Bureau of Naval Personnel accepted his request and his rating and position shifted from steward to recruiting counselor in 1962.

Several institutional factors also played into the unlikely and gradual enlistment of Filipinos into other positions in the U.S. Navy since the 1950s. In 1948, U.S. President Truman implemented Executive Order 9981 for the racial desegregation of the U.S.

293 Ibid., 113.
294 Ibid., 118-120.
295 Cordova, 35.
military, which “‘hereby declared to be the policy of the President that there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion, or national origin.’” Executive Order 9981 exerted more presidential pressure to promote well-qualified, hardworking, and strongly competitive African Americans and other nonwhite minorities into different and higher positions of rank and file in the United States military. Officially, U.S. commanding officers were no longer able to categorize and subjugate minorities as stewards, especially if the expertise of certain enlisted minorities evidenced qualifications well beyond manual duties.

Truman’s 1948 executive order was also quite timely, especially considering that the implementation of the United Nation’s Declaration of Human Rights, in that same year, increased the degree of global political and media attention to the U.S. nation-state’s treatment of racial minorities, particularly African Americans. For the Harry Truman presidency and the U.S. nation-state, the official public declaration of Executive Order 9981 in 1948 was instrumental in enforcing, if not re-establishing, the image of the U.S. as a leading global model of democracy and human rights. As Mary Dudziak and others have argued, this image and hopeful practice of U.S. political ideology was especially important in positioning the U.S., militarily and strategically, as a direct and dominant ideological force against communism during the pre-McCarthy era of the Cold War.

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The ideological and strategic timing of Truman’s executive order proved no exception to the U.S. nation-state’s diligent efforts in promoting itself internationally as a global leader of freedom, liberty, and democracy.

Following Truman’s executive order of racial integration in the U.S. military, more and more African Americans requested and were granted positions different from and higher than stewardships, especially from the 1950s onward. This relative trend of upward mobility among African Americans within the U.S. military also applied, in some ways, to Filipinos. As evidenced in the numerous testimonies conducted by previous scholars (and further assessed in this chapter), many Filipinos were positioned within and beyond the ranks of stewardship in the U.S. Navy after Truman’s executive order in 1948. Some, like Nestor Enriquez, adopted and adapted to such different positions as that of naval storekeepers, corpsmen, enginemen, and gunners, while some became enlisted in similar and higher ranks in the U.S. Coast Guard, as in the case of Ray Burdeos and others. The relative enlistment of these Filipinos within and beyond the ranks of naval stewardship during this period also reflected and furthered their inclusion and presence in the Cold War U.S. nation-state. Executive Order 9981, therefore, allowed racialized minority enlistment in different horizontal and vertical positions in the U.S. Navy. In addition, the U.S. government revised the 1947 Military Bases Agreement in 1952 to allow up to 1,000 Filipinos into the U.S. Navy on a yearly basis, specifically to aid the U.S. in its war against Korea. In 1953, just one year later, the U.S. government increased the quantity of Navy Filipino enlistment to 2,000 yearly. Massive enlistment of Filipinos continued onwards during the early stages of the Vietnam War as well.
These Filipinos’ decisions to enlist and participate in the U.S. imperial project were guided by the need to advance the socioeconomic status of themselves and their respective families. Many of these Filipinos became well-educated during their childhood, adolescence, and formative years in the Philippines. Nonetheless, their increasing knowledge and skills, attained through much of their secondary higher education, arguably lessened their tolerance in experiencing a particular daily contradiction. This contradiction was defined by the daily reality of living through and witnessing the socioeconomic local poverties shaping their daily lives since World War II, coupled with the idealities/fantasies of socioeconomic mobility, American middle class values, and imperialist masculinities witnessed often (if not daily) in printed and visual outlets of American militarism and popular culture.

Examples of discourse that expressed and popularized these idealities/fantasies can be found in films, literary works, and other publications popularized during the late 1940s, 1950s, and early 1960s. According to cultural studies historian Christina Klein, these knowledge productions were especially prevalent within middlebrow public discourse and were part and parcel of U.S. America’s imperialist “fascination” and sentiments with Asia and the Pacific in order to promote ideologies of “U.S. civil rights” and “democracy” abroad, particularly in regular publications like Reader’s Digest and the Saturday Review magazines, numerous novels, travel essays, and American musicals about the “Orient”, such as South Pacific (1949), The King and I (1951), and Flower Drum Song (1958).²⁹⁹

American films circulated and propagated conceptions of imperial masculinity, particularly in the form of global exploration and heteronormative romantic love—whether intra-racially between a white male and a white woman, or interracially between a white male and an Asian woman (but never an Asian male or other male of color with a white woman). Such films, as studied by film scholars within the framework of race, gender, and sexuality, included *China Gate* (1955), *Love is a Splendored Thing* (1955) and *The World of Suzie Wong* (1960).\(^{300}\) On one hand, these popular films, largely produced in the 1950s and 1960s, represented redemptive narratives of victory for the American empire in the post-Korean War period—narratives that were later reconfigured to some degree in the post-Vietnam War period during the 1980s (particularly through the *Rambo* series, which I discuss a bit further in the dissertation epilogue). On the other hand, these American romance war films of the 1950s and 1960s also inspired many Filipino males in particular to live out the imperial fantasies of the white male protagonists in these films through the U.S. Navy.

One of these U.S. Navy Filipino enlistees who were significantly influenced by the visually powerful displays of white imperialist American culture, particularly in the decision to apply for U.S. Navy enlistment, was Aladino Alfaro Simbulan. In his interview with the Hampton Roads contingency of the Filipino American National Historical Society (FANHS), Mr. Simbulan recalled the scene(s) in the 1960 film *Where the Boys Are* where the navy sailors, wearing white uniforms, were chased by white women within and across different countries. After watching this movie and recalling this scene to his interviewer, Simbulan proclaimed, “That’s the life I want. So I said, ‘Oh,

\(^{300}\) For a more comprehensive study of these films in terms of race, gender, and sexuality please see Gina Marchetti, *Romance and the “Yellow Peril”: Race, Sex, and Discursive Strategies in Hollywood Fiction* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
Where the Boys Are, I like it.’ So that’s the reason I joined… to be able to see the world.”

By joining the U.S. Navy, many of these Filipinos thought they would be upwardly mobile enough to gain access to the material benefits of American consumer culture. That way, they would be able to provide monetarily for their families in the Philippines. To echo the words of enlistee Mr. Simbulan, “‘I also want to be able to provide for my parents. That’s the main thing… To provide for my parents really ‘cause most Filipinos are thinking when they have money, they will provide for their parents.’”

Media technology, in the form of advertisements and popular film, also played a persuasive role in engaging Filipinos to apply for the U.S. Navy to become enlistees in the early postwar period. Advertisements for navy enlistment circulated vis-à-vis American-sponsored newspapers in the Philippines—not just in the early postwar period, but throughout the twentieth century. One of these American-sponsored newspapers was the Manila Chronicle. According to retired navy enlistee Roberto Gatdula Facun, the advertisements were often seen in small print in the back pages of the newspaper. Nevertheless, while the advertisement was too small to notice “unless you take a closer look”, its size was visible enough to inform local Filipinos of the ongoing availability of naval enlistment, and to motivate such local Filipinos as Mr. Facun to apply for and join the U.S. Navy in order to provide socioeconomic support for themselves and for their

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301 In Our Uncles’ Words, 46.

302 In Our Uncles’ Words, 46.
families.\textsuperscript{303} In addition, these advertisements in national and local Philippine newspapers announced the U.S. Navy’s desire for enlistment of Filipinos. Such advertisements also prompted local Filipino Ramon Burdeos to apply for and join the Navy from Sangley Point after encountering the announcement in the local newspaper in Cavite City.\textsuperscript{304}

Hence, the “little” ads in American-sponsored newspapers were instrumental in facilitating Filipino interest to apply for enlistment in the U.S. Navy and relative inclusion in the U.S. nation-state\textsuperscript{305} because they gave local readers hope that joining the navy was possible, if not more tangible. And by joining the navy, they would be able to live the “fantasy life” of citizens in the imperial metropole, thus becoming more geographically and upwardly mobile. These local ads have been cited by numerous Navy Filipinos who have generously provided testimonials of their experience leading up to and within the U.S. Navy. While these local ads were often featured in small print and often in the back pages of these local Philippine newspapers, it was the mere visibility of these advertisements that caught the colonized eye of these Filipinos, and hence presented the rare chance for these Filipinos to join the U.S. Navy, especially amidst the infrastructural and economic aftermaths of mass destructions from the Second World War.\textsuperscript{306}

\textsuperscript{303} Ibid., 47.
\textsuperscript{304} Oades, 51.
\textsuperscript{305} In Our Uncles’ Words, 45.
\textsuperscript{306} These local ads still have not been uncovered by previous and present scholars specializing on this topic (myself included). To do so would require revisiting the Manila Chronicle archives—both in the Philippine National Library in Manila on the one hand, and in the Smithsonian Archives in Washington, DC on the other—and would entail an additional research project on the impact of Philippine local newspapers on the engagement and recruitment of Filipinos in the U.S. Navy. Nonetheless, for the purposes of this particular project, it is important to note that evidence of the mere presence of these ads in these local newspapers, as testified by these Filipino veterans, was just enough to excite the minds and hearts of these locals Filipinos who were yearning to escape the poverty in the Philippines and provide material support for their trans-
Commercially successful American films that were widely distributed in the Philippines further propelled Filipinos to apply for U.S. Navy enlistment. From *Anchors Aweigh* in 1945 to *Where the Boys Are* in 1960, these American movies spurred local Filipinos’ embrace of the U.S. Navy and the U.S. nation-state as places of work and residence. *Anchor’s Aweigh* provided a coming-of-age narrative of a white young male protagonist in Los Angeles who encountered two U.S. navy sailors on liberty. Aspiring to join the U.S. Navy when he was old enough to do so, the protagonist saw the two Navy sailors (one of them Frank Sinatra) as living ideals of heteronormative masculinity. On one hand, the plot of the latter film (*Where the Boys Are*) was not as directly related to the U.S. Navy as implied in Mr. Simbulan’s testimony. On the other hand, the film’s engaging portrayal of four white college women becoming romantically linked with white civilian males—while on spring vacation—glorified unconventional yet still heteronormative ideals of white masculinity during the 1960s. While such films played contingent roles in increasing U.S. national support for its imperial endeavors in the Asia-Pacific during the early Cold War, they also played a key role in influencing locals in such areas of the Asia-Pacific (in this case, the Philippines) to enlist and join in such globalist endeavors.

The prevailing influence of American movies in U.S.N. Filipino enlistment illustrated the confluence of U.S. popular culture and American military hegemony during that period. Veteran Ramon Burdeos, whom I mentioned earlier, decided to join the U.S. Navy after seeing the white heteronormative male bravado and popularity of an

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local families. Hence, for these local Filipinos, these “little” ads had a significant impact on their decision to actually apply and enlist in the U.S. Navy. Without these “little” ads, these Filipinos would not have known that such opportunities would have existed for them in the first place.
onscreen Frank Sinatra portraying a navy man in *Anchors Aweigh*. Produced and globally distributed in 1945, the film still weighed heavily in the hearts and minds of such local Filipinos as Mr. Burdeos ten years after its initial production, prompting him to apply and join the U.S. Navy by October 1955.  

Many of these cases are evidenced in the oral histories of Navy Filipinos documented by scholars Yen Le Espiritu, Riz Oades, and Ray Burdeos, along with other community-based scholars and students from the Filipino American National Historical Society (FANHS) in Hampton Roads. These community scholars and students conducted interviews of Navy Filipinos within major Filipino communities in San Diego County and Hampton Roads respectively. Many of these enlistees had already spent a considerable amount of years in college in the Philippines to pursue careers in various established local professions before cementing their fates by joining U.S. Navy instead. One of these Navy Filipinos, Mr. Sicat, was college-educated and trained as a chemical engineer before joining the U.S. Navy in order to provide more material sustenance for his family. Moreover, many of them came from well-educated backgrounds. One of their subjects and interviewees, Rufino “Pie” Roque from Guaga Pampanga, attained a Bachelor of Science degree in agricultural engineering from the University of the Philippines before enlisting in the U.S. Navy instead in 1959. Gene V. Medina, interviewed by Riz Oades, enrolled in the University of the Far East in Manila for five years, where he majored in Business Administration. After this five-year period of

307 Burdeos, 129.


309 In Our Uncles’ Words, 17.
training to become a business professional, Mr. Medina opted instead to enlist in the U.S. Navy from Sangley Point on February 26, 1965.310

Subsequently, the tens of thousands of working-class and well-educated Filipinos who migrated to the U.S. through naval enlistment since 1944 already marked the early stages of the “brain drain”—well before the congressional passage of the 1965 Immigration Act. This added politics of enlistment signified another point of distinction between the history of Filipino immigration to the U.S. and that of other racialized and ethnic groups falling under the sociopolitical label “Asian American.” This massive influx of late war and postwar Filipino migration was what Filipino American historian Fred Cordova called the “Third Wave” of Filipino migration. For example, most—if not all—of the dozens of Filipino enlistees interviewed by former enlistee Ramon Burdeos were trained to become educated professionals before joining the U.S. Navy between 1945 and 1965. One of Mr. Burdeos’s interviewees, Gregory P. Alabado, attended the University of the Philippines as an electrical engineering major. During his senior year, Mr. Alabado joined the U.S. Navy from Sangley Point, Philippines, and sworn in on December 14, 1954.311 Moreover, retired Navy enlistee Mario G. Gamboa was in his third year in law school to become a lawyer when he succumbed to the enlistment temptation and joined the Navy vis-à-vis Sangley Point in late 1959.312 Additionally, Mariano Montilla, another enlistee, spent at least two years at the University of the East in the Philippines before joining the U.S. Navy on October 8, 1964.313

310 Oades, 140.
311 Burdeos, 71.
312 Ibid., 61.
313 Ibid., 53.
Another one of Burdeos’s interviewees, Corpsman Jeff Colet, also attended the colonial-rooted University of the East in Manila—in 1953. There, he took liberal arts classes in general, and primarily European and U.S. history courses in particular. While it appeared that he was desiring and training to become a historian, the exotic visual landscapes that these courses emphasized, such as the Leaning Tower of Pisa juxtaposed with the knowledge of his grandfather’s tenure in the U.S. Navy, prompted his desire to visit such touristy places in Europe and the U.S. through the navy instead. Subsequently, Colet applied to and joined the U.S. Navy later that year in 1953.\textsuperscript{314}

**Degrees of Upward Mobility**

In addition, the increasing inclusion and presence of Filipinos in the U.S. nation-state was evident in their global geographic mobility throughout their tenures of enlistment, especially in contrast to the limited physical movement of their civilian counterparts in the Asia-Pacific (as evidenced in chapter four). Starting from their initial enlistment, whether in Sangley Point, Subic Bay, Clark Air Force Base, Baguio, Samar Province, or in any of the other U.S. military bases in the Philippine archipelago, an overwhelming number of Filipino enlistees fulfilled their learned dreams of “seeing the world” by applying to and enlisting in the U.S. Navy. In turn, their physical ability to “see the world” further evidenced their visibility and inclusion as nonwhite minorities in the U.S. military and the nation-state.

Similar and dominant trends of geographic mobility were prevalent in most if not all of the published oral history accounts of Filipino enlistees. After their initial enlistment in the U.S. Navy, these Filipinos underwent extremely intensive and often

\textsuperscript{314} *Ibid.*, 95.
degrading experiences of boot camp in one of the U.S. military bases in the Philippine archipelago or elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific (Hawai‘i and San Diego included). While these enlistees had the chance to see these particular parts of the world, the range of their actual daily activities were severely limited, especially during boot camp. Francisco Cariaga Gonzalez, for instance, provided the following testimony of his boot camp experience while stationed in 1953 in San Diego: “During the twelve weeks of boot camp at the Naval Training Center in San Diego, one of my duties was to wash uniforms by hand.” Their menial duties were also complemented by their intensive studies of “stewardship”, as well as their restricted physical mobility during this introductory stage of their navy tenures. In Our Uncles’ Words, Conrado Organo Calpito provides the following testimony: “… the first four week[s] you are not allowed to go out [on liberty]. All you do is study seamanship, the structure of the ship, all the surface craft like the destroyer and all the seaman terminology. Tying knots, square knots, all these knots, granny knots—that was a shock to me because I didn’t even know what a granny knot or square knot was. But because of my interest, I learned fast.” And lastly, extensive physical training was demanded of these newly enlisted Filipinos. According to enlistee Gregorio Bergado Ellazar: “Boot camp was… hard for other people, but me, I’m used to work[ing] hard. I don’t mind hard work. We wake up 5 o’clock in the morning everyday, march to the grinder or march to the church, or breakfast and then march all over the place.”

315 In Our Uncles’ Words, 60.
316 Ibid., 60-61.
317 Ibid., 62.
After boot camp, U.S. naval ships transported them to the Naval Training Center in San Diego, California; Bainbridge, Maryland; or, Great Lakes, Illinois for steward training. After about three weeks of training, naval personnel transferred “their” Filipino enlistees to U.S. military installations at wherever commanding officers requested them to perform as stewards or within other lines of duty. Some of the most common stations of Filipino enlistment within the domestic U.S. nation-state included places that best prepared these enlistees for their assigned work positions. These places included Brooklyn and New York City, NY; Providence and Newport, Rhode Island; Camp May, NJ; Groton and New London, CT; Philadelphia, PA; Saint Mary’s County and Annapolis, Maryland; Norfolk, Little Creek, and Newport News, VA; Charleston, SC; Jacksonville, Mayport, Key West, and Pensacola, FL; New Orleans, LA; Mobile, AL; Corpus Christi, Galveston, and Freeport, TX; San Diego, San Francisco, Long Beach, and Kings County, CA; Honolulu, HI; Seattle, WA; and many other bases within the U.S. nation-state.

Besides menial labor, stewardship training, and physical training, these enlistees’ encounters with the racialized civilian world shifted their scope of what it meant to “see the world”—particularly in some of these aforementioned places of enlistment. Jovencio Meru Sison, for example, provided the following testimony of his experience arriving to his first duty station in Mayport, Florida:

Riding the bus we see the sign up front as soon as you board the bus, ‘Colored people start from the rear white people start from the front.’ So what does the Filipino do? He’s not black. But he’s colored and it’s questionable. So what we Filipinos did was start from the middle. We start from the middle that way there will be no police coming in and or no commotion on the bus and the driver is not gonna say anything. Then when there were more Filipinos in the area, we were welcomed and could sit anywhere. We could sit in the front, nobody would

question you or sit in the back. Sometimes we would scatter intentionally, some would sit in the front, some would sit in [the] middle, and some would sit in the back… just to find out if there is any reaction from the community. There was none.”

J. Sison’s account illustrated the fact that these enlisted Filipinos got a chance to “see the world” in a way that they likely did not expect upon arriving in the U.S., particularly in terms of race. Filipinos, like other Asians, blurred the black-white race dichotomy in American society, especially within the militarized space of the U.S. Navy. Alas, Filipinos often responded to and negotiated being “in the middle” of the race question in the U.S. nation-state by “sticking together” or disbursing in groups, especially when realizing their relative strength in numbers.

Nevertheless, despite the structural limitations in military and civilian society that may have inhibited their ability to “see the world” as they previously envisioned it, they were able to fulfill some of the dreams that they had prior to joining the navy by achieving them through the navy. Whether exploring foreign imperial sights during their travels, courting women (or even men) in civilian society, and/or fulfilling their filial obligations as sons, fathers, and brothers through remittances, these enlistees were able to fulfill their sense of male responsibility through the Navy. Ray L. Burdeos’s testimony arguably provides valid historical evidence of his fulfillment of such responsibilities as a Filipino male. Take, for instance, his account of being stationed in Gloucester, NJ, near Philadelphia, during the early 1960s. According to Burdeos, his experience being near Philadelphia was reminiscent of his high school colonial education in the Philippines where he learned about the landmark constitutional achievements of the U.S. American city:

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319 In Our Uncles’ Words, 114.
To be stationed near Philadelphia was a blessing for me. In my high school history class, I had been fascinated by tales of that city. I could still remember many things about Philadelphia, the city of brotherly love and the capital of Pennsylvania, which William Penn settled. It was the birthplace of America, where the U.S. Constitution was drafted and signed during a federal convention that met in Independence Hall. It was also home of the Liberty Bell.

According to Burdeos, his visits to Philadelphia were a chance for him to openly participate in mainstream American popular culture and simultaneously fulfill his sense of heteronormative manhood. This sort of fulfillment was illustrated in his interactions with one of the Filipina American dancer(s) in American Bandstand:

In those years, Philadelphia was home to a very popular daytime TV show, American Bandstand, with Dick Clark as the host. I happened to meet a beautiful Filipino-American girl named Barbara Magallanes, who attended the dance sessions quite frequently. She was the only ethnic Filipino who regularly attended the dance. I heard that she became a good friend of the attractive aspiring singer Fabian from South Philly, along with Frankie Avalon and Bobby Rydell.

Additionally, Burdeos recounted being “fairly successful in dating white girls” during his tenure in Gloucester, as well as in New York City—the place where he was stationed after Gloucester in 1964. There, he had a brief romantic affair with the white Captain’s daughter, Kimberly Bullard. While the outcome of that romance severely limited his stay at this military base (I will explain this in greater detail and analysis in the next chapter), this narrative of “seeing the world” was intricately connected with his intra- and inter-racial heteronormative relationships while stationed in these places of “the world.”

Burdeos’s heteronormative dreams of “seeing the world” were finally consummated through his experience of meeting another woman while stationed in New

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320 Ray L. Burdeos, Filipinos in the U.S. Navy & Coast Guard during the Vietnam War (Bloomington: AuthorHouse, 2008), 124.

321 Ibid., 124.

322 Ibid., 125.
York City (this woman being of Philippine descent). What transpired from this courtship was their matrimony on April 4, 1964 in Toronto, Canada. After later being stationed in Great Lakes Naval Training Center in Great Lakes, Illinois, Honolulu, Hawaii, San Diego, California, New London, Connecticut, and Base Ketchikan, Alaska, Burdeos retired in Galveston, Texas in 1979—still married with children to this day. In his memoir Burdeos testified—through this courtship and eventual marriage, starting and raising an upwardly mobile family, and further participating in the U.S. nation-state through his contemporary contributions to American civil society—his immense gratitude for the support of the U.S. military during and beyond his Navy and Coast Guard tenure.

Further historical evidence of the U.S. nation-state’s inclusion of these Navy Filipino enlistees—along with their families—meant access to U.S. naturalization, citizenship, and veterans’ benefits under the G.I. Bill for these enlistees. Ever since the congressional passage of the 1940 and 1942 Nationality Acts, the U.S. nation-state included enlisted Filipino veterans who served at least three years for the U.S. during its imperial wars abroad: World War II, Korean War, and or the Vietnam War. Their naturalization, citizenship, and access to the G.I. Bill enabled these Filipino enlistees’ inclusion in the U.S. national body politic—especially after their retirement if they decided to settle more permanently in the United States.

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323 Ibid., 166-168.

324 Their U.S. citizenship has also been celebrated by U.S. military officials to portray Filipinos in the public discourse as one of the staunchest U.S. allies during the Cold War. See Leo Roberts Papers, NARA, Truman Library, Independence, MO.
After undergoing intensive and extensive boot camp and steward training, Filipino enlistees’ stations of enlistment often not only included the domestic U.S., but also other U.S. militarized installations across the globe, particularly those in the Trans-Atlantic, Mediterranean, and the Asia-Pacific. Overwhelming evidence in the oral historical record pointed to the enlistment of Filipinos in such areas where global wars were most eminent, particularly in Japan in the aftermaths of World War II, in Korea during the early 1950s, and in Europe and Vietnam during the 1960s. While most U.S. troops, in general, were stationed in these areas around the globe, Filipino enlistees in particular celebrated their geographic mobility while on liberty from their duties on-base or on-ship. During their time on liberty, Filipino enlistees happily socialized with the locals. Nestor Enriquez was one enlistee who celebrated his geographic mobility and relative inclusion in imperial civility while on liberty. For instance, while stationed in Spain after his promotion to submarine patrolman, Enriquez recalled his delight from interacting with the local Spaniards, as well as from his observations of his fellow enlistees’ interactions with the locals. According to Enriquez, the local Spaniards treated him and other Filipinos like ‘brothers and sisters’, allowing him to reconcile—to a degree—Spanish cruelties and punishments towards Filipinos during Spain’s 300-year colonial history in the Philippines.\footnote{Burdeos, 120.} Enriquez’s testimony, therefore, illustrated multiple layers of his appreciation for geographical and upward social mobility through his open interactions with local Spaniards during his time on liberty. On one level, these social interactions with the locals provided a sense of delight for him and likely for the other Filipino enlistees stationed in Spain during that time. Also, on a deeper level, such moments gave Enriquez a profound sense of reconciliation, in the historical sense, of his
previous conceptions towards Spanish citizens of the former colonial power in the Philippines.

**Citizenship in the U.S. Nation-State**

For Navy Filipinos, the nuances in obtaining U.S. citizenship were evidenced institutionally by the 1940 Nationality Act, the 1947 Military Brides Act, and the 1952 Immigration Act, coupled with the everyday experiences of the Filipino Navy enlistees themselves. Their ability to gain citizenship was contingent upon several factors. First, if the Filipino enlistee served in a U.S. war for more than three years, then citizenship was more immediately attainable from the U.S. government. However, if the enlistee served in a U.S. war for less than three years over the course of their enlistment, then the process of obtaining citizenship was considerably longer, if not more tedious. The candidacy for citizenship among enlistees who served less than three years in war depended rather on the extremely limited U.S. national naturalization and citizenship quota. This was enforced institutionally by the 1940 Race and Nationality Acts.\(^\text{326}\)

One enlistee who fell under this latter ambiguous category was David C. Orolfo of the U.S. Coast Guard. During the Kennedy presidency, the INS denied Mr. Orolfo of U.S. citizenship because he fell slightly below the citizenship requirements for foreign national U.S. wartime veterans. According to the oral historical record, Mr. Orolfo, a veteran in the Korean War, missed the cut off date for citizenship by just three months. In order to appeal for U.S. citizenship, Mr. Orolfo wrote a letter to President Kennedy shortly after he and his Coast Guard unit welcomed the president’s visit in New

\(^{326}\) *In Our Uncles’ Words*, 90-91.
Orleans. In this letter, Mr. Orolfo confirmed his status as a wartime veteran and requested the U.S. president’s “assistance to legal status.” Mr. Orolfo’s persuasive case sparked a response from the Attorney General himself, Robert F. Kennedy. In his response, Robert Kennedy affirmed Mr. Orolfo’s request by commanding Mr. Orolfo to go to the U.S. Embassy in Mexico, where he would complete his legal paperwork and hence his legal status in the U.S. After obtaining a passport from the New Orleans consulate (by showing his birth certificate to the embassy) and filling out the necessary paperwork, Mr. Orolfo’s U.S. legal status was confirmed. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Orolfo successfully applied for and obtained U.S. citizenship based from his revised veteran status—as granted by Robert F. Kennedy’s initiative.

In one sense, for Filipino enlistees, gaining citizenship meant further horizontal and vertical mobility within the ranks of the U.S. military, including the Merchant Marines. After the Second World War, opportunities for Filipinos in Seattle to enlist in the Merchant Marines were available as long as they were U.S. citizens. In addition, for others, obtaining citizenship meant opportunities for upward mobility to officer ranks. For example, in 1965, U.S. commanding officers offered Filipino enlistee Mr. Finones Manglicmot enrollment in Officer Candidate School after obtaining U.S. citizenship. After applying for citizenship during that year, the INS officially approved Mr. Manglicmot for citizenship, and swore him in as a U.S. citizen.

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327 Mr. Orolfo was one of the honorary members of the Coast Guard who welcomed Pres. Kennedy to New Orleans. See Burdeos, 85.

328 Burdeos, 86.


330 In Our Uncles’ Words, 75.
With access to naturalization, citizenship, and the G.I. Bill, the U.S. government allowed enlisted Navy Filipinos further possible access to the white middle-class American Dream socially, and the U.S. nation-state politically. Since the initial congressional implementation of the G.I. Bill in 1944, like many marginalized U.S. military veterans of Asian, African, Pacific, and (at times) American Indian descent, Filipinos who served at least three years under the U.S. military were also allowed the following G.I. Bill of Rights: one, access to housing loans and homeownership; two, free or paid college education; and three, free guidance toward employment in civilian life following (conditional) honorable discharge.\(^{331}\)

Moreover, the privilege of living in subsidized navy housings further facilitated the model minority politics of enlistment for Filipinos in the U.S. Navy since (at least) 1944. One example of Navy Filipino housing residence, privilege, and community building was in the navy housing communities in Hampton Roads, Virginia. Located two miles from the Virginia Beach Oceanfront, this Navy housing complex (otherwise known as Wadsworth Homes) resembled a relatively upscale condominium neighborhood in Norfolk, a suburban area of the Virginian state.\(^{332}\) It was in such subsidized neighborhoods as these where postwar Navy Filipino enlistees and their families often resided, settled, built, and enforced their own respective communities, fiestas, and other social and family gatherings.\(^{333}\)

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\(^{333}\) Formations of Navy Filipino neighborhood communities exist(ed) not only in Norfolk/Hampton Roads, but in San Diego, Seattle, and many other suburban areas nearby U.S. bases. Please see Fred Cordova,
Access to citizenship, G.I. benefits, and U.S. nation-state settlement brought more and more opportunities for heteronormative family building among U.S. Filipino enlistees, particularly after the congressional passage of the 1947 Military Brides Act. The first two waves of Filipino migration consisted primarily of single, civilian, working class, and professional Filipino males during the first half of the twentieth century. However, the third wave (1945-1965) consisted not only of enlisted Navy Filipinos, but eventually their families since the passage of the 1947 Military Brides Act. Thus, for Navy Filipino enlistees, the politics of their enlistment meant being able to bring over their respective families in civic and political participation within the U.S. nation-state—often from working-class, well-educated, and professional backgrounds. Increasing opportunities for such family building and settlement in the U.S. became available not just to these Filipino enlistees, but for their partners and descendents as well. One of these enlistees taking full advantage of these opportunities was Pedro Antolin. Mr. Antolin, a veteran steward during World War II and the Korean War, met his wife in July 1950 while stationed overseas in Pusan, Korea. After completing his enlistment in Korea, he and his wife returned to the United States, eventually settling in Tacoma, WA.

Mr. Antolin was one of a wide plethora of Filipino male enlistees who were able to build and sustain families thanks to the Military Brides Act. On one hand, such previous scholars as Ji-Yeon Yuh and others have astutely pointed out the extent to which

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Filipinos: Forgotten Asian Americans, a Pictorial Essay/1763-circa 1963; Yen Le Espiritu, Homebound; Filipino American National Historical Society, Hampton Roads, In Our Uncles’ Words, and others not yet mentioned or publicly circulated in the oral and written historical record.


335 Cordova, 224.
white and nonwhite U.S. Americans benefited from this act while serving in the Korean War and other imperial wars abroad. On the other hand, it is also important, within the scope and framework of this chapter, to emphasize Filipino enlistees such as Mr. Antolin and many, many others who were able to marry overseas locals, bring them to the U.S., and create sustaining and upwardly mobile navy families and communities within the U.S. nation-state.

Marrying overseas was not the only way that Filipino enlistees created upwardly mobile families in the U.S. nation-state, especially during the Third Wave of Filipino migration from 1945 to 1965. In the latter half of this period, particularly in the early 1960s, more and more Filipino women, whom interested Filipino male enlistees considered a “good catch,” migrated to the U.S. as nurses under the Exchange Visitor Program. While their settlement in the U.S. was intended to be temporary, many cases of them dating and marrying Filipino enlistees proved otherwise. Under such circumstances, their residence became permanent, and their veteran male counterparts hence were able to build, sustain, and expand their military families within the U.S. nation-state.

**Conclusion**

As evidenced throughout this chapter, there is a large kernel of truth to the conceptual and actual emergence of these “model minority” politics of enlistment following the Second World War. To a large degree, access to naturalization, citizenship, and G.I. benefits shaped the politics of enlistment for Filipinos within the U.S. Navy. Greater access to such privileges and benefits not only differentiated them from their civilian counterparts, but also gave them the material tools to fulfill their male responsibilities of

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336 Oades, 21.
providing for their families in the Philippines, the U.S. and possibly elsewhere around the
globe. Their ability to travel all over the world during the course of their enlistments not
only further distinguished them from their civilian counterparts. This additional privilege
enabled them to fulfill their heteronormative sense of masculinity while abroad and at
home.

Simultaneously, for U.S. military officials, enlisting Filipinos enabled them to
fulfill increasing demands for stewards, especially within branches that were becoming
more vacant following racial integration in the U.S. military during the late 1940s. With
racial integration allowing more upward mobility for African Americans within and
beyond the steward branch, there was increasing demand for Filipino enlistees to fill
these vacant spots. Supplied with preconceptions of Filipinos as “hardworking,” “loyal,”
and “submissive,” U.S. military officials—in many cases—viewed them largely as a
“model minority” within the U.S. Navy, particularly in the steward branch. Further
knowledge of the educational experience and skills among many of these enlistees
informed officers to promote them within different branches, positions, and higher ranks
in the U.S. Navy. Nevertheless, for the military officials, there was a strong and common
sense of neo-colonial sentiment that spurred their decision to enlist Filipinos primarily as
stewards—from the U.S. bases in the Philippines to the White House metropole in
Washington, DC. The official declaration of ethnic inclusion into different branches,
positions, and ranks within and beyond the U.S. Navy did not occur for Filipinos until
1973, when Admiral Zumwalt formally changed the terms of their enlistment from
“stewards” to “seamen.” As seamen, Filipinos were allowed access to more skilled lines
of work that did not necessarily require the menial labor of stewards. In addition, the term
change allowed more official and immediate integration of Filipinos into higher ranks and positions in and beyond the U.S. Navy.

Nevertheless, while many of these Filipinos enjoyed much of the privileges, benefits, and upward mobility that were eminent from the politics of their enlistment, their relative success stories do not necessarily represent the deeper and broader meanings of what these politics of enlistment entailed for them during the course of their naval tenure—and beyond. In addition, these relative success stories of minority enlistment and experience do not yet represent the larger majority of the 22,000-plus Filipino enlistees who have served between 1944 and 1973. The oral and written records of this “silent majority” of Navy Filipino enlistees have yet to be documented and historically assessed. As the next and final chapter more closely illustrates, significant and structural dualities inherently shaping the politics of Filipino enlistment persisted during the third wave of Filipino migration between 1945 and 1965. These dualities were especially evident in the institutional restrictions and discriminations shaping the conditions of Filipino steward enlistment. These particular dualities both highlighted and concealed the degrees of Filipino marginalization from political, military, and social spaces of the U.S. nation-state, and the degrees of discrimination and patronization against Filipinos within these exact same spaces. These dualities shaping Filipino enlistment provided more grounds of commonality with their civilian counterparts than previously conceived.
CHAPTER SIX


Continual and increasing Filipino recruitment during the postwar period did not exist without U.S. officials’ precautions and prejudices towards Filipinos and their enlistments in the U.S. Navy. Such prejudices predicated upon historical and social conceptions of race, gender, class and sexuality regarding “native” Filipinos ever since the U.S. entangled itself as a nation in “troublesome matters” in the Asia-Pacific during the late nineteenth century. Preconceptions of Filipinos as too “childlike” to self-govern or too “savage” to participate in U.S. imperial projects of modernity justified and facilitated U.S. war, militarism, imperialism and colonialism in the Philippines from 1899 to 1945.337

Nevertheless, from 1945 onwards, with the bi-national anticipation and acceptance of Philippine independence in 1946 and the powerful impacts of the World War II era-Double-Victory Movement in the U.S. civilian and military spheres, white U.S. political and military officials found it more and more difficult to justify, facilitate,

337 See The Forbidden Book: the Philippine-American War in Political Cartoons, Enrique de la Cruz et al (T’Boli: San Francisco, 2004); Servando Halili, Iconography of the New Empire: Race and Gender Images and the American Colonization of the Philippines (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 2006); Paul A. Kramer, The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006); Benito Vergara, Displaying Filipinos: Photography and Colonialism in Early Twentieth Century Philippines (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1995); and numerous works by Jody Blanco and other scholars who have presented or published works on racial politics of U.S. war and colonization in the Philippines during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
and regulate the politics of recognition and exclusion based explicitly on racial misconceptions of minorities that were more commonly accepted before World War II.

That is not to say, of course, that race- and class-based ceilings no longer existed in the US. Far from it. On the one hand, there were considerable and groundbreaking strides in the overall working and living postwar conditions of veterans from different racial and ethnic backgrounds. On the other hand, U.S. officials and officers still enlisted these veterans largely in the mess-steward positions in the U.S. Navy—particularly Filipinos. Scholars of various interdisciplinary formations have illustrated the restriction of enlisted Filipinos primarily as stewards in the U.S. Navy—even in the postwar era. Regardless of the depth and breadth of knowledge, skills, and expertise among newly enlisted Filipinos, U.S. officials recruited locals from the Philippine archipelago strictly as stewards upon initial enlistment. Even the ones who were able to transfer to different and higher positions in the branches of the U.S. military started initially as stewards. As stewards, these Filipinos worked solely and subserviently in the mess hall, cooking for and attending to navy personnel.338

In this chapter, I examine the continual and varying degrees of discrimination against Filipinos in the navy and other branches of the U.S. military. Although these enlisted stewards had more opportunities for upward mobility within and across the ranks of the U.S. military, U.S. officials could at any time terminate their enlistment in preference for individuals they considered more “American” in the domestic sense. These cases more likely occurred in the years directly following the Philippine Independence Act, as passed by Congress in 1946. With the Philippines officially declared as a

sovereign nation-state, U.S. officials again considered Filipinos as “aliens”, rather than foreign nationals. As foreign nationals during the U.S. colonial period, Filipinos were allowed entrance into the U.S., whether as civilians or enlistees. However, as “aliens”, U.S. officials no longer were able to legally enlist Filipinos into its military during this period. In addition, U.S. Congress passed a 1947 law requiring ninety percent of all ship crews aboard U.S. commercial ships to be U.S. American citizens, thus further limiting Filipinos from access to citizenship in the early postwar period.

This chapter is divided into three parts. First, it briefly overviews the immediate aftermaths of the five-year period of Filipino exclusion from the U.S. Navy from 1947 to 1952, as enforced in the 1947 Military Bases Agreement (MBA). Second, this chapter explores the continuing conditions of institutional, spatial, and everyday forms of marginalization that shaped the inclusion of Filipino enlistees in the U.S. Navy and other branches of the military during this period, as well as after the 1952 MBA revisions which allowed between 1,000 and 2,000 Filipinos per year in the U.S. Navy. And three, this chapter briefly assesses the politics of Filipino enlistment during the 1970s when civilian journalists and scholars started to expose and critique the continuing enlistment and discrimination of Filipino stewards, particularly those in the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard.

By looking at these postwar patterns of and responses to Filipino enlistment, I provide the following arguments. First, though racial integration in the U.S. military was officially enforced in 1948, discrimination was still part and parcel of how enlistment policies were implemented in the U.S. military, particularly in the navy and the coast guard. This was evidenced in the continual placement of racial and ethnic minorities,
particularly Filipinos, in the steward branch during the postwar period. Second, despite some evidence of upward mobility within the militarized space among Filipino stewards, racial paternalism shaped the overarching politics of Filipino steward enlistment. Racial paternalism—whether in the White House, or other militarized spaces in general—shaped the relationship between the stewards and their superiors on the one hand, and the overall conditions of inclusion facilitating Filipino enlistment on the other. Hence, racial paternalism was an act of inclusion, just as it was an act of exclusion. This means of exclusion was happening not just through the practice of exclusion itself, but through the conditions in which Filipinos were included in the militarized space. This was evidenced with Filipinos being enlisted primarily—if not only—within the steward branch through their placement as stewards, and in their restrictions from speaking Filipino within these designated working spaces as well. Additionally, these terms of inclusion and exclusion were evident in interracial romance in this postwar period. In this respect, I look specifically at the experience of Filipino enlistee Ray L. Burdeos, and how the cautions and outcomes of interracial romance formed the conditions of power and subordination within the U.S. militarized space. And thirdly, I argue that by the mid 1970s, public discourse had much more of an impact on the shaping of USN enlistment policy toward Filipinos than in the pre-1965 period. I demonstrate this case through a close textual and historical reading of Timothy Ingram’s widely referenced journalistic article called “The Floating Plantation” and Jesse Quinsaat’s influential essay “An Exercise on How to Join the Navy… and Still Not See the World.”

Filipino Exclusion in the Aftermath of the 1947 MBA and 1948 Racial Integration in the U.S. Military

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The conditional reconfigurations of Filipino exclusion lasted from 1947 and continued throughout the 1950s, despite individual cases of upward mobility. These sweeping conditions of exclusion most immediately impacted 4,000 Filipinos who initially were enlisted in 1947 by U.S. officials to serve as stewards in the Merchant Marines. However, soon after congressional passage of the 1947 federal law mandating U.S. citizenship for employment in this branch, U.S. officials laid off these 4,000 Filipinos immediately.\textsuperscript{339}

These revised conditions also greatly affected the working livelihoods of Filipino enlistees in the U.S. Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS). Previously known as the Second World War Army Transportation Service, the Seattle-based MSTS transported troops to and from Korea during the Korean War. After the war, the MSTS suffered from severe economic setbacks transpired in the midst of a national recession. To resolve this matter, the MSTS laid off all of its Filipino stewards in 1956. Soon afterwards, nonetheless, the MSTS replaced these Filipinos in preference for American national citizens, specifically veterans who returned from the Korean War and were apparently not Filipino.\textsuperscript{340} In addition, these postwar reconfigurations of Filipino national exclusion directly impacted U.S. officials’ policies of Filipino recruitment and enlistment in the U.S. Navy. Between 1947 and 1952, the Bureau of Naval Personnel stopped recruitment and enlistment of Filipinos altogether, as stated earlier.

Also, post-1948 upward mobility among African Americans within the naval ranks, coupled with the subsequent increase in demand for stewardships further facilitated and restricted the enlistment of Filipinos as stewards by the 1950s onward.

\textsuperscript{339} Cordova, 100.

\textsuperscript{340} Ibid., 99-100.
President Truman’s declaration and implementation of racial integration in the U.S. military propelled the enlistment and promotion of many African Americans in different and higher ranks than the stewardships to which they were previously appointed by U.S. military officials. Subsequently, African American vacancies and officers’ demands for Filipino stewards converged as U.S. officers facilitated the “migration” and promotion of African Americans to different and higher positions in the U.S. Navy in particular, and the U.S. military in general.341 Meanwhile, the re-emergence of Filipino steward enlistment in the 1950s also facilitated the continual restriction of Filipinos to the ranks of stewards, especially considering the relative lack of collective political and civil activism among Filipino enlistees during this period. This was especially true in comparison to African Americans, whose activist leaders and massive protests pressured and prompted further political and social change for racial minorities in both the civil and military spheres of the U.S. body politic. For the third wave of Filipino immigrants, their commonsensical naval status, in the eyes of (still mostly white) U.S. officials and officers, continued to be that of stewards servicing their official U.S. “superiors.”

These continual restrictions remained prevalent not just in their placement of enlistment, but also in the working and living space in which they worked. As stewards, their work and presence were largely restricted to the racialized space of the mess room. The mess room was an enclosed space, often located in the basement of the ship or in other marginalized spaces on-base, where the stewards, previously known as “mess attendants”, cooked meals for their “superior” officers. It was also a designated space where they cooked and ate their own provisions. One of the most evident examples of

341 Many of the Filipino stewards in the oral historical records, between 1945 and 1965, worked under the watchful command of higher-ranked African American personnel. See Ray Burdeos (2008); Riz A. Oades (2004); William Rigdon Papers and Deck Logs, RG 24, NARA, Independence, MO.
this racialized spacing was detailed in my archival findings of the mess hall in the White House during and beyond the Truman presidency.\(^\text{342}\)

During the Truman and Eisenhower presidencies, White House officials hired as many as twenty-five to thirty Navy Filipino stewards to assist these respective presidential administrations. Officials directly hired them into the White House because of the high demand for stewards of Philippine descent. There is not enough evidence in the written historical record to assert why the White House was employing navy stewards directly. What was more evident, from my findings, was that the presidential preference for Navy Filipino stewards, whether they were classified as active, on fleet reserve, or even retired in some cases, was consistently high during these U.S. presidential periods and beyond as well. As stated in the correspondences assessed in chapter two, during the early-mid 1940s, many U.S. Navy officials preferred Filipino enlistees because they were perceived to be hard working and more subservient to the authority of the officials. Such perceptions likely transcended to U.S. White House officials as well. Although the U.S. Navy banned further enlistment of Filipinos between 1947 and 1952, White House officials continued to send requests to the U.S. Navy to transfer enlisted USN Filipino stewards directly to the White House to assist the U.S. president. On one hand, more historical research needs to be done on the specific logics and reasons for the hiring of Filipino stewards in the White House. On the other hand, what is necessary to clarify is that White House Filipino stewards were primarily hired by direct transfer from the U.S. Navy.

Nevertheless, these stewards’ spatial movements and place of work were largely restricted to designated and enclosed areas. Spatial boundaries were demarcated between

\(^{342}\) Leo Roberts Papers, RG 24, NARA, Independence, MO.
the stewards and other White House personnel, particularly in terms of where their meals would be eaten. In a June 13, 1951 memorandum, White House Aide Robert Dennison confirmed that “no one other than regularly assigned stewards will be permitted to eat in the kitchen.” In the same memo, even budget nationalism, as I explained briefly in chapter five, was being potentially exercised in determining the working and living space of Filipino stewards in the White House. For instance, Dennison hinted at the potential reduction of stewards if “the facilities of the mess become overtaxed.”

In 1951, then-U.S. President Harry Truman was making major renovations in the White House, despite the fact that the U.S. was going through a national recession. While logics of budgetary nationalism shaped the rhetorical contours of downsizing employment of stewards, these logics remained largely absent in funding projects as extravagant and immensely expensive as rebuilding the White House during that year. Included in this project was the stewards’ mess hall, which was scheduled for renovation between May 29 and June 11, 1951. More specifically, it was contemplated that such renovations would involve the direct downsizing of the mess hall in order to “provide adequate service with the facilities available.”

The White House mess hall was located underground in the basement of the West Wing. Before 1951, the mess hall was severely cramped and undersupplied for the marginalized stewards working within the mess hall, despite the fact that it was located in one of the most extravagant housing stations in the world. For instance, there was only

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343 Robert Dennison, Rear Admiral and Naval Aide to the U.S. President, Memorandum, 13 June 1951, Leo Roberts Papers, RG 24, NARA., Independence, MO.

344 Robert Dennison, Rear Admiral and Naval Aide to President Truman, “Subject: Establishment of New Mess at the White House,” Memorandum, 29 May 1951, p. 1; RG 24, NARA, Independence, MO.

345 Robert Dennison, Rear Admiral and Naval Aide to President Truman, “Subject: Establishment of New Mess at the White House,” Memorandum, 29 May 1951, p. 1; RG 24, NARA, Independence, MO.
one table that was twelve feet in width and twenty-four feet in length. According to the mess officer during that time, Leo Roberts, because of the immense length and width of the only table in the mess hall, “one could readily understand the difficulty in conducting a conversation over lunch.”

This prompted the stewards to eat their meals elsewhere besides the mess hall, while still being mandated to pay a monthly mess bill for using the mess hall facilities. The taxing monthly bill, coupled with the cramped space of the mess hall informed the mess officers’ assessment of the mess kitchen as “a most unsatisfactory operation in every aspect.” Before Mess Officer Roberts’ tenure, the White House mess hall was operated by Army General Harry Vaughn who, before Robert Dennison, was the military aide to presidents Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman. By 1950, Rear Naval Admiral Robert Dennison replaced Army General Harry Vaughn as military aide to the U.S. president. Therefore, the transition of White House mess hall operations reflected a shift from an army- to navy -led entity. (The navy has had a much longer and sustained history of managing the mess hall and its attendants than the army or any other branch of the U.S. military.) In one sense, this formal naval occupation of the White House mess hall, from 1950 onwards, enhanced the efficiency and eminent domain of the mess hall’s existence and function for the U.S. president, his staff, and the White House as a whole. In another sense, the formal shift of mess hall operations in the White House enforced the continual spatial, racial, and class based restrictions of (Filipino) stewards within the White House.

After replacing Harry Vaughn as Military Aide to the President, Rear Admiral Dennison asked Leo Roberts to assist in the renovation of the White House Mess, in

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346 Leo Roberts Papers; RG 24, NARA, Independence.
347 Ibid.
accordance with navy standards. This led Roberts to replace the existent mess hall with a
renovated one. Subsequently, the three-week renovation of the mess hall began and was
completed by June 1951. General items of its renovation included the replacement of the
immensely long table in the kitchen room (which was used by President Roosevelt’s
administration to read maps) with six smaller tables, each one fitting between four and
six mess attendants; the addition of at least twenty-eight chairs to accompany the new
tables; the replacement of its map-reading lamps with “soft ceiling lights”; the white and
blue navy colors painted on the ceiling; the displays of poster-size visuals of the
presidential yacht (USS Williamsburg), e.g., the “Little White House,” the President’s
vacation home (Camp “Shangri-La”/Camp David), and the presidential plane (then
known as “Independent One”); the exchange of existing kitchen equipment for new ones
made of stainless steel; and the imports of “Navy-approved” utensils, linen, and menus in
the mess hall as well.  

While some of these mess hall revisions may have appeared beneficial for the
global image of the White House presidential staff and U.S. national public, the revisions
also revealed interesting implications for more efficient and eminent utility that came at
the cost of further enabling and enforcing spatial restrictions for the stewards. For
instance, the visual installations of the stewards’ other working spaces, e.g., the
President’s yacht, vacation spot, and airplane, only further confirmed and enforced where
they were permitted to be physically present as enlisted stewards in the White House,
regardless of how ‘eminent’ these working spaces may have been. Moreover, while the
installation of smaller tables and dimmed lights enhanced the function of the mess hall as
a designated space for these stewards to eat and gather for breakfast, lunch, and dinner,

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348 Ibid.
these particular renovations also further limited chances for central organizing or mobilization among the stewards if they chose to intellectualize and act upon such possible grievances as their mandated monthly mess bills, and the existence and enforcement of their spatial restrictions as stewards in the wardroom messes within these eminent domains of the U.S. commander-in-chief.

Like the White House military officials who served before him, Mess Officer and Captain Leo Roberts had a preference for Filipinos as “his” stewards. His preference was likely informed and shaped by the fact that he received a Philippine Liberation Ribbon for his commendable services as a naval officer in the Philippines during the Second World War. The paternalistic and fraternal bonds that he forged with local officials and personnel in the Philippines perhaps informed his preference for as many as thirty-four Filipino enlistees to work under his assistance for the U.S. president during his brief tenure as the White House officer from 1950 to 1952.

Limited spaces of physical and social mobility illustrated instances of racial marginalization within the presidential White House, as well as in local U.S. militarized spaces and the U.S. nation-state in general. While Filipinos were being included in the White House as stewards, they were still conceptualized as inferior or marginal within these spaces. Between 1945 and 1965, San Diego remained as such a domain where spatial restrictions of Filipino enlistees remained eminent. For Filipino recruits nineteen years or younger, their scarce physical presence in dances held by the YMCA, for example, was enforced by design. According to Gregory P. Alabado, a newly enlisted navy recruit in San Diego by 1954, he was one of only a few Filipinos, and Asians in general, allowed on the dance floor at the YMCA public facility. Additionally, Mr.
Alabado, in his oral historical record, acknowledged how Filipinos were most exclusively well- and widely- received in the “skid row” enclaves of San Diego. With a plethoric presence of Filipino restaurants, the “skid row” enclaves were the only spaces, he noted, where they could socially and culturally unite without being intrudingely surveillanced or reprimanded for speaking Filipino, or even eating Filipino food in the steward branch.  

These continual restrictions, based largely on legacies of race, ethnic, and national relations, also facilitated and enforced individual and patterned relationships between Filipino stewards and their (mostly white) officers based on racial paternalism. By racial paternalism in this context, I mean specifically the unequal relationship between the white “superior” officer and the Filipino “subordinate” serving that officer. This concept shaped and guided previous scholars’ works on U.S. militarism in different historical contexts, specifically Mary Renda’s study on the relationship between U.S. military personnel and the Haitians whose land they occupied between 1915 and 1940. Nevertheless, in my own historical study, I have extended and reconfigured this concept in the historically contextual relationship between U.S. white officers and Filipino stewards. Just as racial paternalism justified and enforced U.S. occupation in the Philippines during the first half of the twentieth century, by the bi-national manifestations of U.S.-Philippine relations during the second half of that century, explicit and subtle forms of racial paternalism continued to exist in the structural relationship between Filipino stewards and white U.S. military officers.

349 Burdeos, 74.

For example, in another Navy town, Groton, Connecticut, taxi cabs were known to send enlisted Filipinos to the backdoor of the Chief Petty Officers’ Club where the kitchen was located, rather than to the front main entrance. During this period, even civilian taxi cab drivers outside the navy base presumed Filipinos as merely “mess boys” who went to the officers club for kitchen employment rather than social enjoyment. This was the case for Nestor P. Enriquez, who was stationed in Groton by the mid-1960s. Mr. Enriquez was one of the very few Filipino enlistees who became ranked as a chief petty officer during this period, rather than as a mess boy during his early years of enlistment in the late 1950s. Nevertheless, one day when he received a taxi cab ride to the Chief Petty Officers’ Club, the driver sent him to the backdoor of the vicinity, again presuming that he was a mess boy and not one of the invited chief petty officers to the club.\textsuperscript{351}

Strict—and scrutinized—spatial restrictions especially applied to newly enlisted Filipinos, as illustrated in Mr. Alabado’s and others’ oral historical records. The limited agency in spatial mobility, during the first few years of their enlistment, were further evidenced and enforced by their ambiguous legal status in the United States. Despite legal entry into the U.S. through military enlistment, the INS did not consider them to be legal residents, or as naturalized citizens yet. Thus, as “aliens” within the U.S. military, their initial entry into the U.S. was widely welcomed, yet with extreme exception to their physical movement within U.S. military and civilian society. Although their veteran status, over time, allowed them further inclusion into these spaces of the U.S. nation-state, the politics of their enlistment lay in the fact that their subsequent social and

\textsuperscript{351} Burdeos, 120.
upward mobility never reached what Teresa Suarez astutely coined as “white male privileges in all areas of life and property despite liberal claims and inclusion for all.”

Therefore, the general restrictions of Filipino enlistment were also evident in the spatial sense within the U.S. militarized space. Their work was largely restricted within the mess hall, or the steward branch. These employment restrictions, coupled with the continual hiring of almost exclusively nonwhites as stewards, were evident in the words of a commanding officer in a 1947 memo addressed to a navy journalist: “‘there are no white personnel in the Steward Branch.’” While navy officials denied such details to civilians during the Second World War (as evidenced in chapter two), by the early postwar period, the naturalized segregation of the steward branch was one restriction that officers were not as hesitant to admit, especially to this “insider” navy press journalist who did not record or write on this issue in navy press publication for probable reason of securing stability within the naval social order.

**Restricted Inclusion**

In 1952, U.S. officials lifted its ban on Filipino enlistment. With the Korean War in peak escalation, and the increasing mobility of African Americans to different and higher positions of enlistment, U.S. commanding officers again became co-dependent on one of its staunchest allies to fill escalating gaps within the steward ranks: Filipinos. In the 1952 revision, the Bureau of Naval Personnel permitted the enlistment of 1,000 Filipinos on a yearly basis. Although Filipino enlistment in the U.S. Navy was banned again in (and since) 1992, it was between 1947 and 1952 that one can gain a better

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352 Cenidoza-Suarez, 195.

353 Filipino American National Historical Society—Hampton Roads, 23.
historical sense of the exclusive politics of Filipino enlistment, especially as they pertained to the terms and conditions of bi-national U.S. Philippine relations, Cold War politics, immigration restriction, and national economic restoration. In addition, previously interviewed Navy Filipino enlistees acknowledged their relative lack of upward mobility within the ranks and files of the U.S. Navy.

Moreover, despite the changes and uneven continuities of Filipino exclusion in the U.S. military, there were particular conditions of exclusion that remained constant throughout this period between 1945 and 1965. Besides the initial and restrictive enlistment of Filipinos as stewards, U.S. officials barred everyday practices of Filipino culture—especially in terms of language. While U.S. and Philippine colonial teachers enforced English as the primary language spoken in Philippine schools, the prohibition of Filipino language dialects in formally militarized spaces of the U.S. was an extension of that exclusion in the postcolonial period. Even from the moment of possible—not actual—recruitment from the Philippines, U.S. officials strictly enforced communication in the English language for further consideration of enlistment candidacy. According to navy steward Jay Ruiz all the recruit exam rooms displayed the following sign: “ONLY ENGLISH IS SPOKEN HERE.”³⁵⁴ If one of the U.S. officials noticed a possible enlistee speaking his own or another person’s local dialect, then that enlistment candidate would immediately be sent back to his home province or barrio.³⁵⁵ Despite the fact that U.S. officials, in a few cases, permitted the cooking and serving of Filipino food³⁵⁶, their strict prohibition of Filipino language dialects within U.S. militarized spaces remained

³⁵⁴ Oades, 54.
³⁵⁵ Ibid., 55.
³⁵⁶ Burdeos, 74.
dominant throughout and beyond this period (until 1973)—even from the moment of possible enlistment in the U.S. Navy.

The limited upward mobility among Filipino enlistees not only existed within their steward positions in the U.S. Navy and other branches in the U.S. military, but they even extended beyond the duration of their military service into civilian life. In her brief study on honorably discharged and Los Angeles-based Filipino enlistees in the federal government civil service sector after 1946, Linda España-Maram calculated that out of 513 discharged Filipino veterans eighty percent landed in federal government civil service jobs directly related to their steward work in the U.S. military. These jobs included those of busboys, domestic servants, and janitors. While only 7.4% of these wartime veterans obtained skilled positions of welders and mechanics, only 3.7% of these 513 veterans were able to transfer to a professional or managerial position in the civil sector.357 While their line of work within the service sector was quite distinct from that of their civilian counterparts in the cannery industry, the levels of marginalization by their employers were likely similar in both the service and industry sectors within the civilian sphere of the U.S. nation-state.358

Lengthy and bureaucratic obstacles toward citizenship provided additional limits of inclusion for enlisted Filipinos in the U.S. nation-state. For Filipinos who did not enlist at all during wartime, their chances for attaining citizenship were even lower. Rufino

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“Pie” Roque, for example, enlisted in the U.S. Navy in 1959, well after the end of the Korean War. Over the duration of his naval service, Mr. Roque applied for U.S. citizenship twice to no avail. There were two reasons for this. First of all, he, like all newly recruited Filipino enlistees, was not considered as a legal immigrant by the INS. And second, according to Mr. Roque, “it took a special act of Congress to make all Filipinos become U.S. citizens.” While it was definitely true that newly recruited Filipinos were not all considered U.S. citizens or even legal, Mr. Roque, for some reason or another, chose not to specify the “special act” that permitted Filipinos U.S. citizenship. This “special act,” when aligning the contents of Mr. Roque’s testimony with the historically prevailing developments during that time, was most likely the Nationality Act of 1952. This act extended immediate U.S. citizenship to foreigners who served for the U.S. armed forces during the Korean War. Likely because of the timing of his enlistment as apart from wartime service, Mr. Roque was denied U.S. citizenship twice during his naval career. Hence, his path toward citizenship was much longer and tedious than those who enlisted during wartime. Subsequently, Mr. Roque’s path toward U.S. citizenship illustrated another point of nuance and restriction for enlisted Filipinos within the U.S. nation-state. Additionally, upon initial enlistment, Filipinos were considered neither legal nor illegal residents of the United States. As enlistees in the U.S. military, the INS insured their overall legal status in the U.S. as informally legal aliens, despite the fact that they were not yet classified as legal residents.

Another point of restriction shaping the politics of Filipino enlistment was interracial romance. However well-documented this topic of interracial romance has been

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359 Oades, 17.
360 Burdeos, 123-169.
in the works of previous scholars, none have discussed the restrictions, evidences, or ramifications of interracial relationships between Filipino enlistees and the relatives of their commanding officers. Generally speaking, interracial relationships during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries have been and continue to be researched by Filipino, Asian American and U.S. studies historians—specifically, within the following contexts: U.S. white male enlistses and local women of occupied territories in the Asia-Pacific; single Filipino males and white females in the U.S. civilian sphere; and even Navy Filipinos and (non)white civilians within U.S. militarized spaces. Meanwhile, there has only been one recorded case of “forbidden” racial miscegenation between a Filipino male enlistee and the white relative of his commanding officer. This one particular case has come to be relatively well known within navy communities of Filipino America. This case has been briefly documented in 2004 by Riz Oades in his study of Navy Filipinos, and by the Filipino male enlistee himself who underwent this highly unique and telling life story of racial miscegenation and restriction in the U.S. military. The name of this Filipino enlistee was Ray Burdeos, and his particular story related to him and “the Captain’s Daughter.” Regardless of the level of entertainment and gossip that this story might bring as it did when it first happened, it does give us a better understanding of the institutional and everyday restrictions and discriminations against Filipinos enlisted between 1945 and 1965 within the U.S. militarized space—especially in terms of race.

This brief interracial affair happened within the Coast Guard Base in New York City in 1963, while Mr. Burdeos was working for a U.S. captain as a steward. One day, while serving dinner for the white captain and his family, he met the captain’s daughter for the first time, and was “mesmerized by her.”\footnote{Burdeos, 130.} Despite direct and persistent warnings by his fellow Filipino colleagues and African American mess officer, Mr. Burdeos remained just as persistently defiant to their commands and continued to pursue the daughter of his white commanding officer. His feelings for the captain’s daughter turned out to be reciprocal, and they went out on a date one night while Mr. Burdeos was on liberty.\footnote{Ibid., 156.}

While the date went pleasantly well for both of them, Mr. Burdeos (the captain’s steward) and Ms. Bullard (the captain’s daughter) felt just as cautious as Mr. Burdeos’s shipmates were about them as an interracial couple, especially during a time when advancements in U.S. race relations were emerging but not yet nearly fulfilled. During the early 1960s, interracial romance was, in some ways, just as forbidden in many public spaces as in the 1930s. Even in the early 1960s, U.S. public officials and military officers found interracial romance as a “transgression of the social order,”\footnote{Burdeos, 125.} and therefore forbidden. While interracial romance could have been grounds for deportation for Filipino civilian males in the 1930s, by the 1960s repatriation to the Philippines was also a possible repercussion for such Filipino enlistees as Mr. Burdeos.

As Michel Foucault, Ann Laura Stoler, and other scholars have argued, state and society’s regulations on sexuality have historically been utilized as disciplinary and

\footnote{Burdeos, 130.}
\footnote{Ibid., 156.}
\footnote{Burdeos, 125.}
coercive means of domestic and colonial governance. During the intensely brief affair between Mr. Burdeos and the captain’s daughter, no one knew the potential social and cultural consequences of this interracial romance more than Mr. Burdeos and the captain’s daughter themselves. Throughout the course of their date, their mutual sense of delight for each other’s company was constantly met with an uncanny fear that any one of Mr. Burdeos’ colleagues, or even the captain himself, would spot them together.\textsuperscript{365} And if anyone of the U.S. military spotted them together in this romantic sense, then disciplinary measures were likely to follow swiftly and harshly. Possible manifestations from such disciplinary measures would not only jeopardize the future of their relationship, but even the social, cultural, and professional aspects of their future livelihoods within a U.S. nation-state still largely defined and demarked by race.

By the end of their night out, one of their worst fears came true. As Burdeos escorted Bullard (the captain’s daughter) back to her house and kissed her good night, he saw the captain himself waiting for his daughter to come to the house safe and sound. The captain, meanwhile, chose to save his pronounced measures of discipline and punishment towards Mr. Burdeos for the following morning.\textsuperscript{366}

During that morning, the captain ordered Mr. Burdeos into his office. There, within the space of the captain’s military authority, the captain himself was not as hesitant as the night before to express his personal and professional distaste for Mr. Burdeos’ romantic pursuit of his daughter. The captain also conveyed his wife’s intense feelings of “hate” toward Mr. Burdeos for even harboring the thought of pursuing their only daughter, let alone having an actual romantic relationship with her. Despite

\textsuperscript{365} Ibid., 157.

\textsuperscript{366} Ibid., 160-61.
Burdeos’ response of regretful yet respectful persistence for the captain’s blessing, from that moment on, the captain expressively perceived Mr. Burdeos as “sexually deviant” and a threat to the social order of the military base in New York City.  

Surprisingly, however, the captain did not view Mr. Burdeos as a possible threat to the sweeping social order of the entire U.S. military. Rather, the captain ended their brief and intense meeting by announcing Mr. Burdeos’ immediate transfer to a base that the captain considered distant enough to secure not just the social stability of the NYC base, but especially his own privileged upward mobility as a white captain soon to be evaluated for admiral. The captain’s choice for Burdeos’ transfer was a place more than 1,300 miles south of New York City: New Orleans.

After multiple transfers to other bases within the Trans-Atlantic, Mr. Burdeos settled in Galveston, Texas in 1964. It was during this time that Mr. Burdeos spotted his former captain Bullard, who was now an admiral, during an officers’ party at the Bachelor Officers’ Quarters (BOQ). Despite Mr. Burdeos’ anticipated misgivings about reuniting with Admiral Bullard, the admiral himself took the initiative to meet and briefly socialize with Mr. Burdeos. In this brief and relatively less intense encounter, Admiral Bullard sincerely asked Mr. Burdeos about his current state of professional affairs and endeavors during that time. In turn, Mr. Burdeos respectfully responded by acknowledging his full-time work status at the base in Galveston and his part-time coursework at the local community college.

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367 Ibid., 163.
368 Ibid., 164.
369 Ibid., 165.
After hearing Mr. Burdeos’ update, Admiral Bullard congratulated Mr. Burdeos on his continuing hard work and dedications, and wished him good luck in the future. Over the course of their conversation, both of them dared not mention the brief and “forbidden” interracial romance between Mr. Burdeos and the admiral’s daughter, which likely would have caused serious repercussions and transgressions of the social order during and after the officers’ party.\(^ {370}\)

It was within that moment in 1964, far away from the New York City Coast Guard Base, that the Admiral felt socially comfortable enough with Mr. Burdeos to briefly chat with him again, and to congratulate him for all his service and hard work during his enlistment. Though a certain amount of tension still existed between them in this particular encounter, it was during that moment that the admiral’s conception of Mr. Burdeos as a loyal and committed worker overshadowed his preconception of Mr. Burdeos as a possible “sexual deviant” one year earlier. This prevailing piece of knowledge about Mr. Burdeos, in the American eyes of Admiral Bullard, lay parallel to this admiral’s conceptions of Filipino stewards who serviced him in the years before Mr. Burdeos in 1963.

In this brief series of encounters between Mr. Burdeos and Mr. Bullard, we can see how race and sexuality shaped the grounds of restriction and marginalization for Filipino enlistees within the U.S. militarized space. During the early 1960s, enlisted Filipino stewards like Mr. Burdeos were strictly prohibited from having interracial romantic relationships with anyone related to their commanding officers. Such race-based social and sexual prohibitions were enforced and naturalized by the authority of white commanding officers, personnel, and their willing subordinates—including and

\(^ {370}\) Ibid., 166.
especially Mr. Burdeos’ colleagues.\textsuperscript{371} This mode and site of what Susan Koshy would coin as “sexual naturalization” not only facilitated the social and sexual parameters of white supremacy within the U.S. militarized space, but also informed and shaped the inclusive spaces of racial paternalism that structured the relationships between white commanding officers and nonwhite Filipinos, as evidenced in such encounters as that between Mr. Bullard and Mr. Burdeos. These spatial parameters in the U.S. militarized space facilitated, regulated, and limited the social and spatial mobility of Filipino enlistees—both within military and civil society.

**Post-1965 Politics of Filipino Enlistment**

To a significant degree, the policies and politics of Filipino enlistment helped shape the historical conditions for the 1965 Immigration Act and post-1965 Asian immigration to the United States. The Double Victory Movement’s influence on minority enlistment and upward mobility were evidenced institutionally by Truman’s Executive Order No. 9981 in 1948. This order racially desegregated the U.S. military and allowed nonwhites, especially African Americans, further upward mobility within its ranks and files. Although racial segregations and restrictions still remained prevalent in many ways, for Filipino stewards the formal implementation of the 1948 executive order permitted upward mobility on some levels as well. Such cases were evident—and celebrated—in the oral historical records cited in the fifth chapter, and commemorated in previous works by community scholars and historians over the past thirty years.

However, public critique and revision of the continuing enlistments and restrictions of Filipino stewards became as imminent as ever during the 1970s. Arguably,

\textsuperscript{371} *Ibid.*, 134.
the most important public critique emerging in this period came from author and PBS television journalist Timothy H. Ingram.\textsuperscript{372} In October 1970, Ingram contributed an article to \textit{Washington Monthly}, a bi-partisan journal that covered national politics from the U.S. metropole in Washington, DC. This article, titled “The Floating Plantation”, was an exposé on the hiring and discriminatory practices of Filipinos as stewards in the U.S. military, particularly those in the Navy and the Coast Guard.

Ingram’s four-page article revealed findings and insights from his interviews with U.S. naval officials and Filipino stewards stationed in three institutional spaces within the metropole: the Department of Transportation, the White House, and the Naval Academy in DC and Maryland. Officials of the Department of Transportation and the Naval Academy, in particular, were relatively cooperative and willing to be interviewed by Ingram. Subsequently, these officials presented Ingram with convincing quantitative figures that illustrated how many Filipinos in the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard were enlisted as stewards during that time (13,884 out of 16,669 and 800 out of 900, respectively). Also, within the Naval Academy, 258 of the 365 enlisted stewards were Filipino.\textsuperscript{373} However, White House officials were not nearly as cooperative in sharing details of the hiring practices of Filipinos during that time. Despite the unmistakable presence of Filipino stewards serving the U.S. president and his staff, White House officials were “reluctant to talk about this.”\textsuperscript{374} Additionally, Ingram compiled empirical evidence of how this continuing hiring practice served to enhance and enforce white male

\textsuperscript{372} Timothy Ingram was an associate for the investigative PBS news series \textit{The Advocates} at the time of his written contribution to the October 1970 issue of \textit{Washington Monthly}.

\textsuperscript{373} In terms of where Ingram got his quantitative data, that also is unknown, but they likely came from Naval Academy officials.

class privilege amongst existing U.S. officers aboard naval ships and stations. According to Ingram, the rank of the U.S. officer could be detected by the number of stewards that he had at his disposal. For an admiral, it was three; and for a captain, one.375

Moreover, Ingram exposed the problem of communication between Filipino stewards and their ensigned officers, based on language. According to one rear admiral interviewed by Ingram, “their” stewards spoke English in a way that was relatively limiting and difficult for the officials and other native English speakers to understand. In addition, the tendency of the Filipino stewards to “stick together” and socialize collectively, in Filipino, enhanced these officials’ difficulty and likely anxiety in communicating with Filipino stewards.376

From his interviews and observations, Ingram coined the policies and politics of U.S. naval Filipino enlistment as a “colonial arrangement”377, and the navy itself (along with the Coast Guard) as a “floating plantation” for continuing to enforce its discriminatory hiring and enlistment practices of Filipinos as stewards. This American journalist paralleled the enlistment of Filipino stewards to the hiring of Mexicans vis-à-vis the Bracero Program, along with the history of slavery of African Americans. Ingram emphasized running parallels in U.S. official justifications for these comparative racialized practices. In all three cases, U.S. officials claimed that they were helping these recruits of color “escape from poverty.” Also, officials have argued that these recruits of color were thankful for supporting themselves through the work that they were doing, and hence “liked” their assigned labor—regardless of how menial their labor may have been.

375 Ibid., 18.
376 Ibid., 18.
377 Ibid., 17.
Such logics and justifications, Ingram emphasized, were especially unacceptable during a time of major progress in terms of civil rights, equality, and “liberation” up to that point in U.S. history. Ingram even noted relative progressions within other branches in the military sphere in this regard, as evidenced in the hiring of civilians, not enstilees, in the Army, Air Force, and Marines. In “contrast”, the Navy and Coast Guard were the “floating” branches of the military that continued to enlist and restrict Filipinos in the steward branch. Because of their continuing hiring practices, coupled with the perceived parallels of their practices with those running slave plantations, Ingram coined the U.S. Navy—along with the Coast Guard—as the “floating plantation.”

The article likely raised the anxieties that officials already had in enlisting Filipinos as naval stewards, particularly in regards to anticipated reactions by these stewards and civilians if such information was known to the national public. Given that such information was therefore accessible to the U.S. national public through Ingram’s article, U.S. military officials were suddenly held more accountable for following through with implementing fundamental changes toward social justice that aligned more with relative changes made in the civilian sphere. In 1968, the U.S. Army, Air Force, and Marines apparently changed its steward enlistment policy from hiring enlisted Filipinos, and other enstilees of color, to hiring civilians in general—regardless of race. Nonetheless, up to the date of the article’s publication (1970), this change did not apply to the U.S. Navy.

Hence, the national publication and distribution of Ingram’s article likely caused—if not reignited—more public concerns about this continuing enlistment practice, perhaps exerting more pressure on U.S. Navy officials to implement similar...

378 Ibid., 20.
changes that other military branches had made up to that point in time. About three years later, in 1973, Admiral Zumwalt officially changed the name of the steward rank to one more racially inclusive and dignified in theory and working practice: *seamanship*. In addition, Admiral Zumwalt’s Z-gram policy, implemented in 1974 and 1975, set the stage for English-language courses for foreign nationals to improve their communication and accommodation skills with their fellow enlistees and superiors, and to lessen their likelihood of being recipients/victims of ethnic intimidation or harassment by military personnel and officers.

Moreover, the national publication and circulation of Ingram’s influential article reached working-class and activist agents of the Asian American Movement by the mid-1970s. One of these activists, in particular, was a Filipino American named Jesse Quinsaat. In his 1976 article “…How to Join the Navy… and Still Not See the World”, Quinsaat acknowledged Ingram’s historical references to the continual policies of Filipino steward enlistment, along with the bases that enforced colonial policies of racialized servitude and white male privilege in the U.S. military. Subsequently, Quinsaat complemented such secondary evidence with interviews of fifteen Navy Filipinos, as conducted by him and eight other students identifying themselves—in the anti-colonial sense—as *Pilipino* (walá ng Spanish letter “F”).

While the content and form of these interviews illustrated the continuing obstacles, limitations, and restrictions that these enlistees faced in the U.S. Navy and other branches of the military, these interviews also presented a diverse plethora of perspectives that Ingram did not uncover in his respective article: the perspectives of the

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Navy Filipinos themselves. In addition, while Ingram gestured toward the legacy of colonialism (generally) in shaping the continuing enlistment policies of servitude within the U.S. Navy, Quinsaat astutely historicized and specified this practice—as they pertained to Filipinos—to the beginnings of the Philippine-American War in 1899, and the emergences (and legacies) of American militarism and colonialism that followed after that war was declared in the Philippines.  

Published in the 1976 anthology *Counterpoint: Perspectives on Asian America*, Quinsaat’s article—along with a plethora of other essays in that anthology—has spoken directly to a strong contingency of Filipino, Asian American, and other minority scholars and activists since the time of its publication. Such scholars and activists included those in the post-Vietnam War era who catalyzed the veterans’ movement, particularly in behalf of Vietnam War veterans who returned to the U.S. and were mistreated by the same exact citizens for whom they fought while stationed in Vietnam. In addition, these activists, while aiming to recover the histories of these veterans, also sought to critique—if not erase—the very conditions and legacies shaping veteran enlistment: militarism, colonialism, and genocide. I engage the politics and contributions of these future generations shaping the post-Vietnam War era—among them veterans, scholars, and activists of various marginalized descents—in the concluding epilogue of this dissertation.

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EPILOGUE

“Is it the end of enlistment as we know it?” The Uneven Politics of the “U.S.-Philippine Nation” and Demilitarization in the Post-Vietnam War Era, Late Twentieth to Early Twenty-First Century

Throughout the course of the twentieth century, the U.S. nation-state’s politics of Filipino enlistment served to expand the U.S. as an empire in the general sense, and to reconfigure its hegemony in the Philippines in the particular. From its colonial implementation in the early half of that century to the emergence of the “U.S.-Philippine nation” imaginary since World War II, the U.S. nation-state continually considered the Philippines as a strategic military site for expanding and policing its socioeconomic interests overseas, especially in Asia and the Pacific. Additionally, various branches of the U.S. military, specifically the navy, consistently saw the recruitment of Filipino civilians and enlistees as integral to the U.S. imperial project, despite their evident anxieties of Filipinos shifting political alliances with U.S. interests. On the one hand, their policies of inclusion shaped the enlistment of Filipinos within and beyond the naval branch of the U.S. military. On the other hand, their politics of enlistment facilitated the marginalization of Filipinos primarily within the steward branch to work as cooks and messmen, as well as the periodic exclusion of Filipino enlistment altogether when U.S. officials considered Philippine sovereign interests as opposite with theirs. While these policies of inclusion, marginalization, and exclusion shaped the limited upward mobility of these Filipino recruits, these politics of enlistment simultaneously signified the historically unequal bi-
national relationship between the U.S. and the Philippines: specifically since World War II.

Nevertheless, between 1990 and 1992, three momentous events occurred that marked key breakthroughs and ruptures within U.S.-Philippine relations. Firstly, in 1990, the U.S. granted national citizenship to Filipino veterans who fought in behalf of the Philippines and U.S. during World War II.\textsuperscript{381} Secondly, in 1991, the Philippines suffered one of the worst disasters the world has ever seen: the volcano eruption in Mt. Pinatubo, which severely damaged Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay Naval Base. And thirdly, in 1992, the U.S.—with elite cooperation by the Philippine Congress—formally ended its lease on the military bases in the Philippines.

On the one hand, the naturalization of World War II Filipino soldiers—in the Philippine armed forces—as U.S. citizens signified a victory for the “U.S.-Philippine nation” on three counts. First, it represented a victory for these veterans and their allies who sought forms of compensation that were equitable to those received by their Filipino steward counterparts, along with the Filipino soldiers from the First and Second Infantry Regiments in the U.S. Armed Forces. Secondly, this victory marked one step toward the redemptive recovery of these veterans’ untold histories of sacrifice, valor, and pain previously lost since the 1946 Rescission Act barred World War II Filipino veterans from receiving benefits for their allied services with the United States. And thirdly, in the general sense, this congressional act was part and parcel of the U.S. national public’s

redemptive recognition of their veterans—recognition which was lost since the 1970s following the Vietnam War. Political restoration of veteran recognition was especially important for U.S. officials seeking national public approval for militarist escalations in Iraq in order to protect the U.S. nation-state’s economic and political interests in that region.\(^{382}\)

On the other hand, if the congressional passage of the 1990 Naturalization Act marked victory for the Filipino veteran movement in particular—and the U.S. veteran movement in general—the events that followed also reinforced, in varying degrees, the fragility and uneven status of Philippine-U.S. relations that has been evident through the case studies of Jesus Bautista, Leonicio Arceo, Bartolome Roldan, and many others presented in this dissertation. The immediate and mass devastations of Mt. Pinatubo led to the forced evacuations of hundreds of thousands of Filipinos from their homes, especially for those who lived closest to the fatal volcanic site. Meanwhile, many elite Philippine officials\(^{383}\), seeking immediate assistance to this national disaster, urged

\(^{382}\) Melani McAllister and Lynda Boose, for instance, provide relatively comprehensive and balanced explanations on the restorative knowledge productions of U.S. veterans in national public discourse during the post-Vietnam War era and the Gulf War, particularly in terms of gender, sexuality, and orientalism. See Melani McAllister, *Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East, 1945-2000*; and Lynda Boose, “Technomuscularity and the ‘Boy Eternal’” in Amy Kaplan and Donald Pease, eds., *Cultures of United States Imperialism* (Durham: Duke UP, 1993), 581-616. Both of these authors articulate the ways in which the shifting ideologies of mainstream media productions, during the post-Vietnam War era, have reinvigorated and shaped public celebrations of U.S. veterans on the one hand, and how these productions have reinforced national patriotic support for U.S. war, militarism, and empire on the other.

\(^{383}\) Some Philippine officials strongly advocated for the retention—if not return—of U.S. bases in the Philippines, especially in light of the Mt. Pinatubo disaster. To some of these officials, U.S. base retention and military assistance was needed in order to rehabilitate specific sites and resources that were seriously damaged from the volcanic explosion. One of these pro-base advocates was Richard “Dick” Gordon. During the early 1990s, Gordon was mayor of one of the cities that had been most historically dependent on the U.S. military for economic sustenance, and had been within closest physical proximity to the Subic Bay U.S. naval base: Olongapo City. According to policy analyst Roland G. Simbulan, Mayor Gordon “used to be one of the fiercest pro-bases advocates in the country, mobilizing the city’s base-dependent communities in Manila to rally for the retention of the bases” (Simbulan 2009, 2).

In the meantime, other officials, particularly Philippine national labor and political leaders, supported U.S.-Philippine negotiations that would lead to the formal end to the 1947 U.S.-Philippine bases
international support—particularly from the U.S.—as they did during and following World War II. However, for U.S. officials, the event sparked intense debate: should they provide much needed emergency and military assistance to their staunchest ally? Or should they finally cut their lease on the military bases in the Philippines without long-term budgetary commitments and personnel assistance, especially in behalf of rehabilitating the Philippine archipelago from this monumental volcanic disaster?

U.S. officials decided on the latter, with formal approval by the Philippine Congress. In 1992, the U.S. military evacuated all of its personnel, officers, and material property from the bases in the Philippines, which left Olongapo City, Subic Bay, and other areas near Mt. Pinatubo in environmental and infrastructural disarray. With the formal end of the U.S. military’s lease intact, so was the official policy regarding Filipino enlistment in the U.S. military. In that same year, U.S. military officials banned enlistment of Filipinos in all branches of the U.S. military, including the stewardship/seaman branch of the U.S. Navy. Therefore, for Filipinos hoping to join the U.S. Navy as a means to provide material support for their families—especially in the aftermaths of the Mt. Pinatubo disaster—the bi-national decision for U.S. base evacuation marked the end of enlistment as they knew it.

agreement and would hence facilitate U.S. base evacuation from the Philippines for good (Simbulan 2009, 1). These competing perspectives on U.S. base retention vs. evacuation sparked debates within the Philippine Senate in 1991, and especially following the Mt. Pinatubo disaster during that same year. What transpired from these two key events were the following. First, on September 16, 1991, the majority of the Philippine Senate voted in favor of rejecting a new base treaty that would permit U.S. base retention for another ten years. Second, in 1992, Philippine Congress passed the Base Conversion Development Act (BCDA), which provided assistance for converting the former U.S. bases to commercially driven areas within infrastructural frameworks provided by the Philippine national government and its corresponding local governments that were closest to these former bases. And third, once the BCDA was formally established and successfully approved by U.S. standards, U.S. military forces completed their formal evacuation from the Philippines on November 24, 1992. (Simbulan 2009, 9) Therefore, from these debates and congressional implementations, the successful conversion of these bases, from U.S. military to Philippine controlled entities, become prioritized over retaining U.S. bases in the Philippines for an allotted period of time.
Nevertheless, the formal ends of this enlistment policy—as we, the readers know it—have also meant the informal bi-national continuities of alliance between U.S. and Philippine officials, most often in behalf of the U.S. nation-state interests as a global empire in today’s post-9/11 era. As long as the U.S. continues to impose and enforce its imperial/ambitious interests as an empire, the most powerful agents of the Philippine nation-state will likely continue—as “Asia’s staunchest ally”—to supply the U.S. with civilian labor and even military enforcement. This has already been evident with the continuing implementation of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)\(^\text{384}\), Philippine President Arroyo’s enlistment of Filipino soldiers in post-9/11 U.S. wars, the contract employment of Filipino civilian workers in the militarized Middle East, and the U.S. military’s “training exercises” in Mindanao and other regions of the Trans-Pacific.

The current state of U.S.-Philippine relations, like previous events and cases uncovered and assessed in this dissertation, attests to the continuing and departing formations of the “U.S.-Philippine nation”—hopefully for the betterment of the peoples of diverse races, ethnicities, classes, genders, and sexualities shaping this bi-national formality. The current presidents of both nations, Barack Obama and Benigno “Nonoy” Aquino III respectively, arguably exemplify the most promising bi-national presidential partnership in the history of U.S.-Philippine relations. One is a former law professor, community organizer, and the first black president in U.S. history; and the other is the heir of perhaps the most prominent human rights activist and martyr in twentieth-century

\(^{384}\) According to Philippine national policy analyst and activist Roland G. Simbulan, “for most Filipinos, the VFA has only highlighted the inequalities in present-day Philippine-U.S. relations, the surrender of Philippine sovereignty to U.S. secret operations and activities as part of combat operations, and the blatant circumvention of the Philippine constitutional policy against foreign military bases, facilities and foreign troops.” (Simbulan 2009, 153) For more information about the legal implementations, uneven implications, and varying oppositions to the Visiting Forces Agreement, please see Roland G. Simbulan, *Forging a Nationalist Foreign Policy: Essays on U.S. Military Presence and the Challenges to Philippine Foreign Policy* (Ibon: Quezon City, 2009).
Philippine history. Both are arguably the most intellectually and socially educated presidents ever to take executive lead in the national politics of their respective countries—particularly in issues and ideologies of social justice.

While the highest achievements within this bi-national partnership have yet to be seen, a series of questions remains as poignant as ever within the currents of this trans-pacific bi-national formation. To what extent will their respective histories of civil rights, community building, and socially diligent epistemologies shape their concerns, actions, and politics on matters pertinent to U.S. and Philippine relations? Will the structural legacies of militarism, colonialism, and imperialism that have shaped U.S.-Philippine relations since 1899 become minimal—if not obsolete? Or will these presidents’ past politics and epistemologies of social justice shift (if not already) toward a more pragmatic, electoral, and “real” bi-national politik that will not only entail the continual enforcement of the neo-colonial U.S.-Philippine relationship, but the continuing enlistment of Filipinos and other people of color (still) marginalized by ethnicity, race, gender, sexuality, class, disability, geography—at minimum—to enforce the continuums shaping globalization and the most privileged global nations within it today? Or, will in fact their respective genealogies and backgrounds in social justice and human rights translate in promoting harmony, diplomacy, and mutual cooperation—rather than war and militarism—on a bi-national, global, and multilayered scale that has never been seen before in the history of U.S.-Philippine relations?

Nonoy Aquino and Barack Obama have officially met at least one time over the course of their respective presidential careers. This meeting was held on September 26,
2010 during Aquino’s brief U.S. tour.\footnote{Ging Reyes, ABS-CBN Northern American Bureau, “Noy, Obama meeting short but sweet,” \textit{abs-cbn.NEWS.com} (26 September 2010), \url{http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/09/26/10/noy-obama-meeting-short-sweet}.} During this seven-minute meeting, two matters were discussed: first, cleaning up ammunition remains in Corregidor; and second, “competing territorial claims” for islands in the South China Sea, otherwise known as the Spratlys controversy. But how much actual follow-up was there from this meeting, regarding these and related matters? This remains to be seen in the contemporary record.

There was intended to be a follow-up meeting between Aquino and Obama on September 20, 2011 during Aquino’s subsequent visit to the U.S. for the launching of the Open Governance Partnership (OGP).\footnote{Jill Beltran, “No Meeting with Obama during Aquino’s Visit,” \textit{sunstar.com} (14 September 2011), \url{http://www.sunstar.com.ph/manila/local-news/2011/09/14/no-meeting-obama-during-aquinos-us-visit-179361}.} While no meeting actually transpired between the two, this visit only assured the continual bi-national partnership/friendship between these two presidents and nations, as it was Obama who invited Aquino to this “new multilateral initiative to promote transparency, empower citizens, fight corruption, and harness new technologies to strengthen governance.”\footnote{Ibid.} According to the November 16, 2011 issue of \textit{Sun Star}, a Philippine online news publication, the next official meeting between President Obama and President Aquino is scheduled to be “early next year” which, as of the time of this dissertation completion, would be at anytime—if not already. The primary goal of this meeting is twofold: one, to commemorate the sixtieth anniversary of the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty (implemented in 1951); and two, to update
and improve the status of the “military relationship” between the U.S. and Philippine

Because of the immensely hectic schedules of both presidents—to put it most
mildly—this second meeting has yet to happen and perhaps is unlikely to occur this year.
Nevertheless, a floodgate of possible topics and events might be discussed during and
after this future meeting: to what extent might leftist scholars and activists see this
meeting as an opportunity to highlight their discontents with the ongoing role of
militarism in shaping U.S. and Philippine relations? How might this resilient contingency
articulate the promising—and contradictory—imaginaries that continue to facilitate this
bi-national formation? To what degree might this politically diverse contingency bring
back to light historical truths, realities, and legacies of the Philippine-American War that
remain just as prevalent in many hearts and minds of this contingency as they did during
the war’s peak from 1899 to 1902?

In this day and age, it might be as (relatively) safe as ever to discuss the
Philippine-American War within public and academic discourse, likely because it is seen
Philippine-American War still needs to be seen just as that: a fictitious, rather than actual,
ruptured site of U.S. empire and foreign policy. The Philippine-American War has played as much of a role in establishing the bi-national U.S.-Philippine relationship—through militarism, mass coercion, and major enlistment—as has the global public in forgetting this war throughout the twentieth century and early twenty-first, and most recently, in current recollections of this war as a “distant past” or “story of fiction.” Returning to the history of Filipino enlistment in the U.S. military, I recognize the need to recover the stories of these Filipino veterans, just as I see the urgency to critique—if not obliterate—the conditions of war, militarism, and orientalism that facilitated their enlistments, subjugations, and other related aftermaths of such historical and contemporary facilitations (including the wars in the Middle East since the 1990s). As stated in my introduction, my simultaneous recovery of Filipino civilian and enlisted labor history, folded with my continuing critique of colonial militarisms, is what differentiates this

390 In his recent article “The Impact of the Philippine Wars (1898-1913) on the U.S. Army” (2009), Brian MacAllister Linn describes the Philippine-American War as one of “the imperial wars of the distant past” that U.S. military historians and officials have further studied during the twenty-first century in order to find “answers to the questions of a new and challenging future” (Linn 2009, 472). These particular “questions” of the present and future revolve around the concurrent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as other likely imperial wars of the post-9/11 era. While the U.S. war in the Philippines has received scant attention in military studies, along with most other fields of historical scholarship, throughout most of the twentieth century, the Philippine-American War is “attracting more attention within the U.S. armed forces than they ever have” (Linn 2009, 471). This is primarily due to the remarkably parallel guerilla tactics that these officials are seeing among Iraqi “insurgents” in the early 2000s to the tactics used by Filipinos during the “pacification” stage of the Philippine-American War in the early 1900s. While historians and officials in military studies have been studying the Philippine-American War more fervently than ever, the reasons for their surging interest on this topic lie more in the applicability and revisions of military guerilla tactics used during that time to the concurrent wars that they had been fighting in the Middle East, rather than in the actual recovery and revisionist critique of the U.S. empire within U.S. historical analysis and U.S. historiographical scholarship. While critical studies of imperial wars are becoming more emergent within empire studies and its related scholarships, the same is becoming more true within military studies as well—but with considerably different academic, political, and strategic agendas.

dissertation from groundbreaking works in migration studies, military studies, and
diplomatic history since the 1990s.

Understandably, military families of different political backgrounds have
embraced their soldier-citizen relatives or descendants who have joined the U.S. military
in behalf of the nation-state, particularly military families from racially and ethnically
minoritized backgrounds. Even within Filipino American communities, this conception
of the soldier-citizen has been just as—if not more so—embraced as well. On the one
hand, many of these enlisted Filipino veterans in the U.S. military served within the
steward branch of floating and stationary bases, including Sotero Abiva, Mariano
Floresca, Jeff Colet, and many others acknowledged in this dissertation. Over time, by
the 1990s, Filipino stewards in the White House started to receive more public notoriety
within and beyond Filipino America for their services to the U.S. president at the time
(Bill Clinton), as well as for reporting what they might have known surrounding the
Lewinsky case. Additionally, since the 1990s, a considerable plethora of works have been
published regarding Filipino stewards in the U.S. military, specifically within intersecting
realms of community and academic scholarships. These works have emphasized the
recovery of these veterans’ oral histories and testimonials. As acknowledged earlier in
this dissertation, such works include Yen Le Espiritu’s *Filipino American Lives* (1995)
and *Homebound* (2003), Riz Oades’s *Beyond the Mask* (2004), and the Filipino American
National Historical Society’s *In Our Uncles’ Words* (2006). Subsequently, a number of
Filipino veterans have taken it upon themselves to write their own memoirs of U.S.
military enlistment and comparative upward mobility in the U.S. nation-state. Armed
with a deep need to represent himself and his shipmates in the U.S. military, one of these
retired veterans, Ray L. Burdeos, researched the history of his own service in the Navy and Coast Guard, along with the histories of about a dozen of his fellow shipmates who served with him at various stages in his enlistment. What transpired from his seven-year self-reflection and extensive research was his book *Filipinos in the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard during the Vietnam War* (2008), which has been one of the many primary sources shaping the research in this dissertation.

Besides the general recovery and celebration of retired Filipino veterans, a large segment of the Filipino American community has highlighted and honored active Filipino veterans since the end of the Cold War. These particular veterans have elevated beyond politics of enlistment which have restricted their respective elders to the steward branch. One of these well-known veterans is a Filipina American woman: Dr. Connie Mariano. Like some of her male steward counterparts (including her own father), Mariano was enlisted in the U.S. Navy. However, unlike many of these first generation Filipino stewards, Mariano was raised primarily in the U.S., received a college degree, and graduated from medical school at U.C. San Diego. Shortly after graduating from medical school, Connie Mariano enlisted in the U.S. Navy as an officer before being transferred to the White House. There, Dr. Mariano served as primary practitioner of President George H.W. Bush by the early 1990s. Following Bush’s presidency, Mariano stayed onboard as the “White House Doctor” throughout Clinton’s two-term presidency from 1993 to 2001. Following the Clinton presidency, Mariano started her own practice in Scottsdale, Arizona and openly shared her story about being the “president’s doctor” to folks within and beyond the Filipino American national community. By 2010, like Ray Burdeos, Connie Mariano took it upon herself to write, publish, and circulate her own
story to the U.S. and global public. What transpired from her own recollections was a book titled *The President’s Doctor*, which gained notoriety not just within Filipino American communities, but in U.S. national discourse—as evidenced by her appearance in Jon Stewart’s *The Daily Show* during 2010, along with the national circulation and sales of her memoir.392

While the careers and relative upward mobility of these Filipino veterans continue to be recovered and celebrated within and beyond Filipino America, the current presence of Filipino stewards in the U.S. military—particularly those in the White House—illustrates the continuing sentiment that U.S. military officials have for hiring Filipinos as stewards. This ongoing sentiment, as illustrated throughout this dissertation, can be traced within and beyond the scope of U.S. colonialism in the Philippines. Up to this day, U.S. military officials continue to enlist retired or active Filipino Americans as stewards in the White House, as there are several who remain there during the current presidency. On the one hand, the ongoing prevalence of Filipino steward enlistment in the U.S. military reminds us of the historical legacies of war, militarism and colonialism shaping U.S.-Philippine relations. On the other hand, the historical and current presence of these stewards provide concrete points of departure to assess how much sacrifice, commitment and honor these veterans put forth in their works, settlements, and mobility—within, beyond, and perhaps despite the hierarchical structures of the U.S. military. As what is commonly stated, and can perhaps be applied to this ongoing history between Filipino enlistees and their U.S. officers: “one hand cannot exist without the other.” To put it more broadly: the historical implementations and continual legacies of slavery, war, militarism,

392 See Connie Mariano, *The White House Doctor: My Patients were Presidents* (New York: St. Martin’s, 2010), as well as Dr. Mariano’s website (http://www.whitehousedoctor.com/).
and colonialism in facilitating the U.S. as empire cannot be more likely—if not possible—without the military enlistment and political marginalization of its racial and ethnic minorities, including Filipinos.

Subsequently, to the tens of thousands of Filipino veterans who have enlisted in the U.S. Navy since 1944, their relative successes, settlements, and global mobility could not have been fulfilled without the U.S. Navy—and for that, many forever exemplify their gratitude to the military for granting those opportunities to them. To the U.S. officials who hired these Filipinos, they are formally thankful for the hard labor and unwavering loyalty that these veterans provided for the U.S. military. And lastly, to the descendants of these veterans—like myself—seeking to recover their respective histories while simultaneously critiquing and transforming the structural conditions shaping their enlistments, the phrase “one hand cannot exist without the other” takes on a notably different meaning. This mutual recognition and militarized condition of co-dependency, indebtedness, and gratitude deserves further research and investigation, especially in light of the politics of enlistment that reinforce this unequal but co-dependent relationship.

While I may have conducted such research and investigations within this dissertation project, it is through this project that I hope to take more active steps in order to erase the historical silences that have reinforced these militarized relationships on one hand, and the global presence of the U.S. as an empire on the other. This engagement with erasing these silences involves historical transformations from master-slave hierarchies to proactive forms of indebtedness—if not gratitude—towards decolonizing and anti-colonial projects within particular “native” and global contexts:

sa utang na loob
ng mga kalayaan.

To ancestral and living practitioners of Filipino culture, in addition to historical scholars of Filipino cultural studies, *utang na loob* literally means a sense of inner debt. As stated in the third chapter of this dissertation, *loob* means “inner,” *utang* means “debt,” and *na* is the linker that apparently makes this sense of indebtedness ingrained within the heart and psyche of the Filipino in a way that establishes co-dependency between the Filipino subject on the one hand, and the (often) privileged recipient of that indebtedness on the other. While Vicente Rafael and others\(^3\) have widely contextualized this cultural practice within the Filipino local and Spanish friar relationship, other cultural critics have studied the ways in which Filipino mass movements have rearticulated this cultural practice within varying degrees of decolonization and anti-coloniality. Take Reynaldo Ileto, for instance. In his historically groundbreaking text *Pasyon and Revolution* (1979), Ileto delineates Philippine nationalism among religious-based independence movements that interpreted *utang na loob* in the horizontal and collective sense among the Filipino masses.

This horizontal based interpretation of *utang na loob*, to Ileto, fostered intense bonds of collectivity stemmed from a common sense of freedom that stood apart from the Spanish colonial state in the latter 1800s, later against the U.S. occupation during the Philippine-American War of the early 1900s, and even during the Sakdalista movement during the 1930s. These anti-colonial articulations of freedom were otherwise known as *kalayaan*, which literally means freedom in the largely Tagalog-based Filipino language.

While different contingencies of Philippine nationalists had divergent definitions and understandings of this term throughout the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries (e.g. class-based vs. classlessness, reformist vs. radical independence, local vs. internationalist, among other criteria), what these different contingencies and movements had in common was that they imagined this sense and practice of the word as steadfastly in opposition to the U.S. colonial state and its later variations of imperial hegemony in the Philippines. This was arguably—if not especially—true for the Hukbalahaps, whose wartime bi-nationalist political allegiances to the U.S. nation-state shifted towards an oppositional sense of kalayaan and utang toward a classless Philippine national society during the late 1940s and early 1950s. Similar sentiments existed within more explicitly communist national movements in the Philippines since the mid-1950s, including Partido ng Komunista (PKP) and the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), along with the CPP’s military enforcements through the National People’s Army (NPA). Meanwhile, in post-1980 United States history, contingencies of artists and scholars within Filipino America have insisted on transforming what core Filipino values of utang na loob and kalayaan might mean in the decolonial sense, especially as these artistic statements stand in scholarly alliance with critical ethnic studies, queer studies, and other interrelated scholarships of historical undisciplinariness.394

Because of the privileged and competing politics of the “U.S.-Philippine nation” that remain to this day, I still do not know how the contents of this dissertation project will be received—especially in events as public as conferences and gatherings, or in moments as private as dinners and phone calls with navy parents and relatives. To me,

nonetheless, one thing might remain as clear and present as ever: such necessary—if not inevitable—spaces of interaction will certainly manifest “learning moments”, as one of my colleagues relayed, in “wiping away the billion layers of coconut husks,” as martyred poet Emmanuel Lacaba would note. As someone closely related to the global landscape of Filipino America, I notice that an overwhelming majority of scholars, artists, and community advocates within this bi-national entity have traced their personal and intellectual genealogies to Filipino relatives in the U.S. Navy and the comparative history of U.S. militarism—along with its associated components of hegemony—in the Philippines. How can we further decipher these infinite connections between enlistment in and beyond the U.S. Navy on the one hand, and the enforcement and ruptures of U.S. militarisms on the other, especially in relation to the Philippines, other places in Asia and the Pacific, and elsewhere around the globe? Perhaps more specifically, how can I—personally, intellectually, poetically—offer my gratitude to the U.S. military and its veterans (including my tatay, nanay, tiyo, and lolo) for monetary support and practical guidance to such “navy brats” as myself who achieved degrees of higher education vis-à-vis the G.I. Bill? At the same time, how can I deliver critiques and transformative points that are historically comprehensive and engaging enough to further erase conditions, silences, and class privileges that stem from the history of militarism itself—along with its relative and comparative components of war, colonialism, and genocide?


396 Tatay means father in Filipino/Tagalog; nanay means mother; tiyo means uncle; and lolo means grandfather.
… this dissertation is just a start.
Appendix A: Mess Leo Roberts and Filipino Stewards during Truman Presidency
(courtesy of the Leo Roberts Papers, Harry S. Truman Library)
Appendix B: Mess Leo Roberts with Chief Rangasa and Chief Pascual at Camp David—formerly Camp Shangri-La (also courtesy of the Leo Roberts Papers)
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