The role that parties play in incorporating immigrants varies across these cities. Often, parties think of immigrants as being just like other voters. When this is the case, as it seems to be in many of these cities, no special outreach regarding naturalization or voting develops. Where parties are competitive, greater outreach is more likely. Overall, whether regarding naturalization, registration, or voter turn-out, ethnic/immigrant organizations are the activists.

Because of its multi-city focus and thoughtful analysis, this is a valuable addition to the study of immigrant political incorporation. In effect, it is a generator of hypotheses that should drive much future research. Its numerous tables are especially informative and helpful. Together, they suggest that there may be no model that will efficiently explain immigrant incorporation across the nation, because the key variables are too numerous and multi-layered to be accommodated in that way.

The book leaves one major issue untouched, however. How does dual citizenship affect incorporation? Relatedly, what impact do home country conditions and ease of return have on motivating immigrants to engage the polity? While the study could not have answered these questions, it should have engaged them.

Overall, this volume will be of interest and very valuable to researchers on political incorporation and urban politics.

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You have to give Samuel Huntington credit. Borrowing the term from Bernard Lewis, he made “Clash of Civilizations” a popular and convenient way for Americans and others in the West to think about why our relations with the Muslim world are so troubled.

Except that Huntington was mostly wrong, as are the anti-Islam perceptions, and indeed the Islamophobia, of many in the West. There are undoubtedly some Muslims who dislike the West (read “hate the West”) because of our freedoms and other aspects of our social order. But numerous empirical studies, some undertaken in response to the echo that Huntington’s thesis has found in various political quarters, make clear that this is not the view held by most people in the Muslim world—that it is no more than a minor and peripheral aspect of Muslim anger at America and the West.

My own thinking on the subject is perhaps best communicated by repeating something I have been told by taxi drivers and other ordinary people on more than one occasion when visiting the Middle East over the years: “When you go back to the U.S., give my love to the American people and tell the President to go to Hell.”
Now comes Steven Kull’s valuable study, with a wealth of additional evidence to deepen and refine our understanding of what most ordinary citizens in the Muslim world really think. Kull draws on public opinion surveys conducted in more than a dozen Muslim-majority countries, mostly in the Middle East, but also in South and Southeast Asia. Many were sponsored by WorldPublicOpinion.org, which is affiliated with the University of Maryland and which Kull directs.

Until a decade ago, or even less, there was very little systematic political attitude research in the Muslim Middle East. I have discussed the reasons for this elsewhere; but the situation has changed in the last few years, even if there are still too many countries where survey research on potentially sensitive issues is not possible. Accordingly, Kull also draws on other recent surveys, including those of the Arab Barometer, the World Values Survey, the Pew Research Center, the Gallup World Poll, and Zogby International. He also uses insights from focus groups to explicate some of the survey findings.

There is a great deal of detail about Muslim attitudes and perceptions in this informative volume, more than can be summarized in a short review. Kull’s main points, illustrated by numerous charts showing responses to the questions asked in various surveys, include the following:

- Muslims reject the thesis that conflict with the West inevitably arises from cultural factors, even as they are troubled by the anti-Muslim sentiments that exist in America;
- Muslims want democracy, which they believe is compatible with Islam, and denounce the United States for disregarding its own professed liberal principles and working instead to support an anti-democratic status quo;
- Muslims denounce America’s one-sided support for Israel, which they believe not only enables Israel to reject territorial compromise but also makes the United States complicit in the expansion of Israel’s borders;
- Muslims believe that in pursuit of its own interests, as the United States understands them, America seeks to dominate the Muslim world—it “abuses its greater power to make us do what the United States wants” (p. 43);
- Muslims do not support terrorist acts against the West, but many do have sympathy for the goals terrorist groups profess: changing U.S. behavior in the Muslim world in order that Muslims can more fully control their own destiny.

Although there are some unanswered questions about the lessons to be learned from the data Kull presents, evidence that Muslim anger toward America and the West is rooted in political and economic concerns, and has at best only a limited civilizational component, is an important contribution, and one which it is in American’s strategic interest to understand.

There are a few things that Kull might have done with the data to make the book even more valuable. In particular, some analysis and discussion focused on variance would have been helpful. Despite the importance of the broad
tendencies Kull identifies, there are cross-national differences that it would be instructive to interrogate. Even more, it would be valuable to know something about the demographic distribution and determinants of key attitudes. Are there important generational differences, for example, or does education make people more or less likely to hold particular attitudes toward the United States.

Kull’s final chapter takes up the question of how Americans should think about and respond to Muslim anger. His thoughts are constructive and in the right direction, including the suggestions that America “look for subtle opportunities to differentiate U.S. national interests from those of Israel” (p. 213), and that American leaders “lace diplomatic communications with references to the rights of Muslim people to democracy and self-determination” (p. 215) and make statements “affirming that Middle Eastern nations have a sovereign right to the oil on their territory” (p. 216).

Perhaps more cannot be asked of Kull, but these are timid prescriptions that are unlikely to make much difference. Americans need to ask themselves whether the complaints fueling Muslim anger are real or imagined; and to the extent that they are indeed real, even if exaggerated in the imagination of some Muslims, the debate that Kull’s study calls us to have is not only about how best to communicate with Muslims but also, and much more, about the nature and implications of our policies in the Muslim world.

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Book deals, speaking events, and television appearances are increasingly common for U.S. Supreme Court justices. More so than ever before, the justices appear to be part of the mainstream media environment. Why do justices “go public”? Has the relationship between justices and the media changed over time? If so, what are the implications of these changes for the Supreme Court? These are among the questions that Richard Davis tackles. The result is an in-depth account of the evolving relationship between the Supreme Court justices and the media.

Davis’s central argument is that justices engage in strategic external relations to retain institutional and individual influence. An extensive historical analysis offers evidence of such strategic relations throughout the Court’s history. Beginning with the first session of the U.S. Supreme Court, Davis offers an overview of justices’ awareness of press coverage and their attempts to influence this coverage and public opinion. In addition to providing general evidence of strategic behavior, the historical analysis offers insight into how this behavior has varied across justices. For example, Davis focuses on justices’ professional backgrounds prior to joining the Court to help understand variation in their relations with the media.