posits that cosmopolitan communications—reflected in “the channels that increasingly bind people living in diverse communities and nation-states together” (p. 8)—have individual-level effects that are moderated by several factors. Macro-level factors (or firewalls) include the level of media freedom that exists in a particular nation-state, the external barriers to trade integration, levels of poverty, and access to communication technologies. Coupled with individual-level firewalls, such as how much citizens learn from the media, these factors condition the extent to which cultural exports (primarily from the global North) can undermine cultural diversity.

Particularly impressive about Cosmopolitan Communications is the authors’ array of criterion variables. Recognizing how other scholars have conceptualized and operationalized media impact, Norris and Inglehart focus on several key consequences of such media content—the extent to which citizens hold nationalistic identities and trust outsiders; their attitudes regarding individual success as well as conservative economic attitudes; social and moral values related to sexuality, religion, gender, and family; and citizens’ level of civic engagement. Research on each of these criterion values can fill volumes, and Norris and Inglehart adroitly distill the work of key players to present an easily digestible account of the extant literature. Naturally, their focus is driven by their working with secondary data from the World Values Surveys. The authors link these data to indices constructed from a plethora of other sources, including the Freedom House, the World Bank, and the United Nations Development Programme.

As with any undertaking that involves extensive comparisons over space and time, Cosmopolitan Communications does not allow for detailed contrasts to be made—nor should readers expect them. The book’s argument simply is not designed with any particular country in mind, although the authors have included numerous rich examples that serve to illustrate a particular point. Readers, however, should anticipate skillful theoretical and analytical meshing of levels of analysis. Norris and Inglehart easily succeed on this front. Despite the spate of data on which their argument rests, the authors provide sufficient caveats to their research that allow future researchers to follow up in specific research areas. Norris and Inglehart are to be commended not only for integrating arguments from a number of disciplines, but also for returning to the very serious normative concerns and practical implications related to cultural diversity around the globe.

PATRICIA MOY
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Alan Ware turns the focus on two often-overlooked factors in prevailing models of party systems: the agency of the party leaders and the structure
of party organization. Those factors can best be seen on the boundaries of two-party politics. Ware focuses first on the cases in which one of two major parties is on the brink of collapse, and second, on the cases in which a minor party is on the brink of joining with one of the two major parties.

Major parties do not fail as often as one might think. Ware attributes much of this to their position as a major party, and thus as the primary focal point for any opposition to the party in power. But when parties do suffer major defeats, they may not always be able to fight their way back, especially if they are sandwiched between two foes. This attention to the prospect of failure is critical to understanding a two-party system, because the ability for even a critically wounded party to rebound is part of what maintains a two-party equilibrium.

Minor parties do not merge as often as one might think, either. And attention to this is equally critical to our understanding. The logic of coalition building that drives a party system to have two parties should mean that small parties would be absorbed easily. Here, much of the action is with the bargaining incentives between a major party and a minor party—more nimble perhaps, but with fewer voters. The book thus sharpens another frontier in the maintenance of the two-party equilibrium. Indeed, still more focus in this area might highlight the forces that keep small parties in check even when they do not fuse with the major parties, and so maintain the existence of the two-party system.

But that is not this book’s purpose. The book instead seeks to understand how party leaders work within a two-party system as much as how they create it. A more serious omission is at this level. Like much of party scholarship, this book reduces the actors to party actors and voters. All the relevant dynamics then, are within parties, between parties, or between parties and voters. There is little room for outside agents, be they interest groups, intellectuals, journalists, or activists. This last omission is especially notable. A growing literature has highlighted the role of activists in pulling parties away from their constituents’ preferences. Where activists are present in Ware’s account, they are either a wing of the party or a faction among voters, and sometimes it is not clear which.

It may be that activists have the same role whether one thinks of them as part of the party or outside it. But identifying them could highlight key elements of Ware’s thesis. For instance, the structure of the organization might be more or less open to outside influence or more or less capable of co-opting activist demands. And of course, the agency of official party leaders take place alongside the agency of extra-party activists. When parties suffer catastrophic defeats, their survival surely also depends on whether other minor parties successfully seize the opportunity, or whether activists choose to continue to work with the former major party or switch to a new one.

This is hardly a fatal flaw. Indeed, there is good reason to conceptualize activists as members of the party with which they are aligned. The focus of
the book is elsewhere. That there are so many questions remaining after reading it highlights the fruitfulness of the approach taken.

HANS NOEL

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Jennifer Merolla and Elizabeth Zechmeister contend that citizens cope with a terrorist crisis in three ways—increased authoritarian attitudes, assigning leadership qualities to those in power (as opposed to bringing strong leaders to power), and preferring foreign policies that engage threats abroad—and these responses potentially put democracies at risk. The authors devote a chapter to each coping mechanism, which provide survey and experimental data to illustrate that people do respond to terrorist crises as the authors suggest.

The book is well written and interesting, but suffers from three significant weaknesses. The first is that the scope condition of terrorist crises appears somehow both too broad and too narrow. Although the authors emphasize terrorism, many of their findings should be applicable to other types of crises (for example, surprise attacks by foreign states, military stand-offs short of war, the assassination of a leader). Some of their experiments do distinguish between terrorist and economic crises, but certain national security crises can pose a greater threat to the existence of the state and the lives of its people. At the same time, it is unclear that their argument is even applicable to most terrorist events. Their evidence relies heavily on surveys and experiments conducted after September 11, but that event is so unique in the history of terrorism that relying on it so heavily weakens the generalizability of the authors’ arguments. One is left wondering how the coping mechanisms differ between a single, destructive incident like September 11 compared to a sustained terrorist campaign, as experienced by the British, Israelis, or Colombians.

Second, not only should the nature of the attack matter, but I would expect very different public responses, depending on the perpetrators. September 11 was carried out by foreign citizens in the name of a religious organization that declared war on the West. Should we expect the same coping mechanisms in response to attacks by, for example, the Animal Liberation Front, a single-issue group made up of American citizens, which seeks to avoid injuries? Logically, at least one mechanism—focusing on foreign engagements—should be more prevalent if the perpetrators are citizens of a foreign state. But what if they are citizens of the state, as with Timothy McVeigh’s attack in Oklahoma City? Likewise, what if the government engineers the crisis, such as during a campaign of state terror (for example, Argentina’s Dirty War)? Should we