Shakespeare’s Whore: Language, Prostitution, and Knowledge in Early Modern England

by

Stephen Andrew Spiess

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Doctoral Committee:

Professor Valerie J. Traub, Chair
Professor Barbara C. Hodgdon
Associate Professor Steven G. Mullaney
Associate Professor Elizabeth R. Wingrove
To my many teachers and mentors –
above all first and forever, Paul and Susan Spiess –
with thanks and love.

Spiritus
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Introduction

Language, Prostitution, and Knowledge in Early Modern England

“Prostitutes allow drama to tell particular kinds of stories”

~Jean Howard, *Theater of a City*

“New kind[s] of relationships, but also new ways of seeing existing relationships, appear in language in a variety of ways”

~Raymond Williams, *Keywords*

“Even if we do not remember, our language remembers”

~Helene Cixous

On April 14th 1546, an unknown representative of the English crown walked the streets of London broadcasting the terms of Tudor Royal Proclamation 265, “Ordering London Brothels Closed.” The proclamation signaled a decisive shift in English social and sexual policy, yet the conditions surrounding its publication remain a mystery: this non-event appears inconsequential in historical studies of Henry VIII’s final years. We are left to imagine why the act came about, how Londoners received the proclamation, and how its meanings materialized in the practices of everyday life. Such lacunae prove especially significant given what scholars do know about English prostitution: first, that illicit sexual commerce persisted despite the royal prohibition; and second, that “prostitutes” and “whores” would come to saturate the stages and pages of Elizabethan and Jacobean England.

In *Shakespeare’s Whore: Language, Prostitution, and Knowledge in Early Modern England*, I argue that such concomitant presences and absences, traditionally perceived as problems that inhibit scholarly analysis, are instead crucial to understanding how prostitution functioned in that culture, including its staged representations. Far from limiting further study, this methodological impasse encourages scholars to consider how prostitution operates like a
language: informed by its seemingly incommensurable presences and absences, and conspicuously implicated in questions of signification, materiality, identity, memory, body, and knowledge. As historicist and feminist scholars have shown, the repertoire of representational figures associated with illicit sexual practices provided subjects with a potent vocabulary to explore and police matters of religion, gender, ethnicity, status, power, and sexual practice. Here, I demonstrate how shifting the critical lens from tropology to epistemology implicates discourses of prostitution and whoredom in larger problems of knowledge production in the early modern era.

To unpack these contentions, and situate my work in extant studies of English prostitution and whoredom, especially as represented on the early modern stage, this introduction proceeds in three sections. First, I will consider what is known about sexual commerce in the period and suggest how current understandings of the archive – and a related desire to remedy its supposed absences – can mask what was productively opaque in early modern London. Expanding this inquiry in a second section, I will then illustrate how notions of absence inspire particular hermeneutic practices that enable as well as foreclose a range of different knowledges. In so doing, I discuss how the situated nature of knowledge production informs my methodology – including my contention that language itself serves as an archive, and a site for epistemological contestation, especially for studies of London prostitution. In conclusion, I will outline my understanding of dialectical historical epistemology as the study of knowledge production, dissemination, and contestation in a given cultural context – giving particular attention to modes and media of distribution, as well as to the constitutive functions of opacity and absence - placed in conversation with my own scholarly practices and those of my peers. Whereas my approach here focuses less upon the underlying axioms, style of reasoning, or unifying foundations for knowledge than on the means through which knowledge was forged and contested in a given cultural context, I describe how this understanding informs my subsequent literary readings and cultural critiques. In particular, I suggest how “thinking language” attends to concerns of historical difference, cultural hegemony, gender relations, material practices, and political criticism.

Throughout, I ask how the study of English prostitution can illuminate questions of knowledge and knowledge production, both in the early modern era and our own: how do meanings and relations materialize – or fail to materialize – in the texts, practices, and bodies of a given culture? How were sexual meanings and identities informed by an emergent
lexicographic project – the writing of meanings in early modern dictionaries, lexicons, and related texts? How do sexual terms attach to material bodies – and can such attachments be resisted? How were problems of sexual knowledge explored in and across an array of early modern discourses and media? Which discourses or media enabled, or foreclosed, questions or articulations of sexual knowledge? How do cultures remember – and forget – their sexual histories?

Proclamation / Signification / Prostitution

Let me return to that anonymous representative of the English crown, walking London’s streets in the middle of the sixteenth-century. As noted, there is no record of these perambulations, of the timbre of his or her voice, of what responses this proclamation received from the varying Tudor subjects going about their daily lives on that April day in 1546. We might imagine a figure similar to Shakespeare’s Mistress Overdone, Measure for Measure’s bawd, who proclaims, in response to a Viennese proclamation intent on suppressing urban prostitution, “Why heere’s a change indeed in the Commonwealth” (TLN 193-194).

In other words, official repression might catalyze a stark change in the city’s sexual policies and politics. Yet this literary and historical trace appears over fifty years later, by which time Henry VIII had long since passed, and his second daughter was herself navigating the final stages of life. And, of course, Overdone’s line appears in a playtext written for performance, likely uttered by a boy actor onstage, and first published in the 1623 Folio of John Heminges and Henry Condell. Indeed, we do not know if there was a proclamation in its verbal sense, for the term’s early modern connotations included public speech and utterance as well as acts of printing, publishing, and declaring law (OED, n.1-4).

In his Survey of London (1603), John Stow offers an alternative vision of the event, arguing that the “kings commandment… was proclaimed by sounds of trumpet,” almost as if this sonic pall were language enough, its divine reverberations instantly perceived and its effects immediately felt across London’s sexual landscape.

Amidst these varying performances – speech act and music and play – we also have a document:
According to this manuscript, the

King’s most excellent majesty, considering how by toleration of such dissolute and miserable persons… have been suffered to dwell beside London and elsewhere in common, open places called the stews, and there without punishment or correction exercise their abominable and detestable sin, there hath of late increased and grown such enormities as not only provoke instantly the anger and wrath of Almighty God, but also engender such corruption among the people… [the King thus] hath by advice of his council thought requisite utterly to extinct such abominable license and clearly take away all occasion of the same. 9

Historians have debated what perceived “enormities” stimulated suppression, whether increased outbreaks of syphilis, 10 rising concerns about male lust, 11 fears of vagrancy and criminality, 12 or – as the document’s biblical rhetoric suggests – “shifts in morality” linked to the era’s contentious religious climate. 13

What is clear, however, is that the document outlines a definitive break from the “abominable license” of past sexual commerce: the “toleration” of public brothels – those “open places called the stews” – in and around the city for at least three centuries. 14 Yet while scholars agree that the sex trade was largely tolerated – in segregated sections of the
city, barring the occasional raid or abolition campaign – prior to the 1546 suppression, it is unclear exactly what happened after the proclamation was issued. Part of this uncertainty reflects the dubious legal status of royal proclamations as official acts of lawmaking: their jurisdictional authority and legality were both subject to considerable debate in sixteenth-century English legal circles. Scholars thus have disagreed whether the proclamation remained in force throughout the century or was nullified upon Henry VIII’s death, its issuing monarch. Roy Porter, for example, suggests that the stews reopened at Edward VI’s accession were suppressed once more by Mary Tudor, and then returned and “prospered” under Elizabethan rule (56). Gamini Salgado offers a similar account, differing only in the assertion that brothels persisted “more or less unmolested” under the Marian regime, as well as those of her half-siblings (52). Yet such present-day attempts to delineate the precise legal status of London prostitution mask what was conspicuously – and, I would argue, productively – opaque in the period: as Sir William Holdsworth notes, “the rule of the law” regarding royal proclamations “was ill-defined” and not always rigorously upheld throughout the sixteenth century (101-102). If TRP 265 documents an official (monarchical) position vis-à-vis prostitution by the middle of the sixteenth century, it neither seems to have abolished sexual commerce, nor even necessarily made its perpetrators vulnerable to prosecution.

Although references to prostitution disappear from Tudor and Stuart records following the Henrician attempt at suppression, sexual commerce, historians agree, clearly persisted well into the seventeenth-century. Yet it did so in altered forms: formally condemned by the monarchy, it was largely tolerated in practice and subject to only sporadic regulation by other social and legal authorities, predominantly the ecclesiastical and Bridewell courts. Such evidence implies that sexual commerce functioned as an “open secret” in early modern London – illegal yet tolerated, visible yet unrecognized, present yet absent. I thus suggest that TRP 265 memorializes not an end but an evolution, and not an erasure but an inauguration of official forgetting: a transition in the histories of London prostitution, informed especially by an emergent memory practice that enabled a practical toleration of sexual commerce.

The shifting semiotics of London sexual commerce further inflected this liminal status. As the 1546 proclamation itself suggests, the conspicuous visibility of the bankside stews – specifically those “houses white and painted with signs on the front for a token of the said houses” – enabled a sense of social and geographic containment, however illusory,
prior to suppression: illicit sexual practices could be restricted, conceptually at least, to the
“moral geographies” of the London bankside. Yet as Stow notes, Henry’s suppression altered the material and literal “signs” by which London prostitution had been and could be known: beforehand, “allowed stew-houses had signs on their fronts, towards the Thames, not hanged out, but painted on the walls, as a Boar’s Head, the Cross Keys, the Gun, the Castle, the Crane, the Cardinal’s Hat, the Bell, the Swan, &c.” What happened when these “signs” were painted over and “this row of stews in Southwark was put down by the king’s commandment”?23

According to contemporary accounts, this erasure had the paradoxical effect of making sexual commerce seem all the more visible to discerning eyes. In a well-known sermon to Edward VI, Hugh Latimer decried not simply the persistence but also the metamorphosis of London “whoredom,” just three years after its supposed suppression:

You have put down the stews: but I pray you what is the matter amended? 
What availeth that? Ye have but changed the place, and not taken the whoredom away… There is more open whoredom, more stewed whoredom, than ever was before. For God’s sake let it be looked upon; it is your office to see unto it.24

Latimer’s emphases on perception are especially significant here: Edward, the Bishop implies, is blind to the “open” proliferation of “stewed whoredom.” The king must shift his gaze and “see” clearly that which is obvious and easily perceptible to others. Yet as Latimer’s use of “whoredom” – a term that encompassed a range of sexual practices and desires in the period – suggests, perception partakes not only of “place” but also of one’s definitions and accepted significations. What does the Bishop “see”? What does the King not “see” – or choose not to “see”? As Laura Gowing argues, Henry’s proclamation, however unwittingly or paradoxically, amplified the conceptual parameters of London prostitution:

While before 1546 the regulation of London prostitution focused on restricting it to Southwark, by the late sixteenth century no single place could be identified with prostitution… in the intensely (though frequently unsuccessfully) regulated city streets of the 1580s-1640s, the shadow of illicit sex and prostitution could be seen or imagined everywhere (145).

No longer the province of bankside brothels, illicit sex pervaded the urban landscape: it could be “imagined” (and thereby perceived) anywhere – in streets, stores, taverns, alehouses, inns, churches, theaters, fields, alleys, and even ditches.25 Without the clear signs
and white walls of Southwark, all buildings were potential sites of sexual commerce — including Westminster Abbey, St. Paul’s Cathedral, and Whitehall. The question of course, was not only where illicit sex was located, but also who was doing it. In another widely cited anecdote, the poet John Taylor (1622) suggests how London’s shifting sexual semiotics extended to the interpretation of individual identities:

The Stews in England bore a beastly sway,
Till the eight Henry banish’d them away:
And since those common whores were quite put downe,
A damned crue of Priuate whores are growne…

Taylor’s distinction between “common” and “Priuate” encodes differences of perceived accessibility, official legitimacy, and visibility. While English sumptuary restrictions concerning prostitution were not as strict as in other European countries, the 1546 proclamation nonetheless would have made officially prescribed sartorial signifiers uncommon, if not altogether obsolete. The question, therefore, is what signifying practices emerged or evolved in absentia. Whereas shorn hair or striped hoods may have identified medieval prostitutes, such conspicuous signifiers were less likely following the Henrician suppression. Other forms and means of signification persisted into the seventeenth century, however, including social and symbolic exclusions such as those pertaining to church attendance and seating, access to communion, and even distinction in burial; Stow recalls, for example, a distinct “plot of ground called the Single Woman’s Churchyard, appointed for [prostitutes] far from the church.” Men and women accused of prostitution were also subject to public fines, stocks, whipping, carting, cucking, or other spectacles of shame. Yet while such public practices offered one means of making the sexual transgressor visible or known, even (and perhaps especially) the most violent signifying practices cannot ensure what knowledge gets produced through the expressions and inscriptions of power.

Obviously, gender was a crucial signifying category in its own right; yet it posed its own hermeneutic challenges. Although extant historical documents overwhelmingly refer to early modern sex workers as women, men are occasionally referred to in ways that might suggest their availability to interested clientele. Moreover, men are frequently mentioned as bawds and clients, and thus directly implicated in practices of sexual commerce. Whenever possible, I attend to the varying intersections, fusions, and dissociations of gendered and
sexual meanings for prostitution in early modern England.\textsuperscript{35} As I illustrate in Chapter 1, for example, inter- and intra-gendered associations pervade the early modern “terms of whoredom,” where references to whorse\textit{sons}, whom\textit{asters}, and whorem\textit{ongers} – not to mention bawds, buggers, paramours, and other such subjects – imply a range of social relations. Such intersections of gender, social status, and sexual practice reflect the complex field of cultural relations in which prostitution operated. In her study of London ecclesiastical court documents, for example, Laura Gowing reveals that women constituted the vast majority of plaintiffs and defendants in cases of sexual slander; the “terms of whoredom,” she suggests, were most commonly used by, and applied to, women in the period.\textsuperscript{36} At least in these venues (ecclesiastical courtrooms and city streets), and as revealed by her archive. Although male prostitutes do not appear in contemporary courtbooks,\textsuperscript{37} allusions to catamites, ingles, and Ganymedes surface in a variety of literary and lexicographic texts from the period, and thus suggest their cultural presence.\textsuperscript{38} Mary Bly’s reading of bawdy puns (including references to prostitution) – performed by male actors before the predominantly male audience of London’s Whitefriars Theater – moreover suggests one way through which homoerotic meanings and eroticsisms relating to prostitution were engaged and reproduced in the period.\textsuperscript{39} In a similar vein, scholars examining associations of prostitution with acting have suggested how references to sexual commerce policed relations of gender and status as well as sexual practice.\textsuperscript{40} Absences in juridical archives may therefore reflect contemporary expectations and ideologies about male prostitution as much as actual practices; indeed, gendered assumptions regarding male clients and female sex workers may have enabled “invisible” sexual relations, practices, and eroticsisms.\textsuperscript{41} While I do not, therefore, propose a rigid gender binary in the \textit{practices} of London prostitution, I do examine how \textit{perceptions} thereof informed the cultural fields wherein gender and sexual ideologies were reproduced and contested, including contemporary literary and dramatic productions. Although my source materials and feminist investments encourage attention to how discourses of prostitution, as sites for epistemological contestation, inform understandings of women and gender in early modern England, it is also important to foreground the absence in my study, of – in Thersites’s terms – “mafculine Whore[s]” (\textit{Troilus and Cressida}, TLN 2887); doing so identifies an important topic for future study, while also reminding scholars that absence itself can assume varying forms, effects, and possibilities.
Absences in one realm, moreover, can catalyze activities or practices in another. In what follows, I consider how archival and evidentiary absences have inspired modern and postmodern hermeneutic practices that both enable and foreclose certain forms of knowledge. While this approach focuses on effects, I nonetheless want to keep open the proposition that absence and opacity might be seen to represent, and produce, knowledge in their own right – not simply as causal factors, in the sense of lacks to be remedied, but as productive components of any epistemological field.

Evidence / Absence / Archives

A Tudor Royal Proclamation (1546), a Protestant sermon (1549), an urban chorography (1603), an early Jacobean play (ca. 1604), and a satirical poem (1622): my use of source materials thus far is not incidental, as these exact texts appear in almost every historical and/or literary critical study of English sexual commerce between the medieval and Victorian eras, and are discussed frequently in relation to sparse records from London’s Bridewell courts. Historians in particular have lamented the absent archive of early modern English prostitution: whereas Ruth Mazo Karras illuminates the structures of medieval prostitution by reference to the array of tax, ordinance, and legal documents produced to regulate a legal trade, and Judith Walkowitz draws on the range of medical, military, and judicial records produced by the Contagious Diseases Acts of the Victorian era, scholars working in medias res have stressed the dearth of official records and the inherent invisibility of “real” London prostitutes. Such absence regularly gets figured in contrast to the conspicuously present “prostitutes” and “whores” in the literary and dramatic works of late sixteenth-century England: as representations rather than “real women,” prostitutes pervade Protestant sermons and royal proclamations, bawdy poems and neo-classical tragedies, anti-poetical and anti-theatrical treatises, the drama of Shakespeare, the poetry of Spenser, the satires of Donne, and the dictionaries of Cawdrey, Bullokar, and Florio.

Such disjunctions raise important methodological concerns. In an influential study of Elizabeth prostitution, historian Paul Griffiths argues that, given a relatively meager archive – by which he means legal, royal, or medical documents – “we must conceptualize and contextualize, and read literary sources in the light of the archival record.” While this assertion usefully highlights differences among varying textual forms, his subsequent declaration that “the pamphlet, ballad or play must adopt a supporting role to the courtbook”
(1993: 53-4, emphasis added) infers an evidentiary privilege that elides certain forms of
knowledge in the very process of making other meanings or relations visible. As Karen
Newman argues contra Griffiths, court books can suggest the locations, numbers, costs, and
clientele of early modern prostitution, yet “rarely… consider questions of language, affect,
dress, motivation, desire, or performance” (136). Moreover, Griffiths’s claims that “we are
perhaps closer to the authentic voice of the bawd or prostitute” in Bridewell records
overlooks the ways in which archival voices are themselves mediated (41) – by the questions
asked, by contemporary confessional narratives, and even by a scribe’s recording practices.45
What Griffiths elides, therefore, is the manner in which his own hermeneutic practices
produce particularized understandings of “real” London prostitution. Neither his privileging
of “documents” nor Newman’s privileging of literary texts are correct or incorrect per se, but
it is important to note that both make certain forms of knowledge available, partly based
upon how they define – and approach – evidence and absence. Marginal historical subjects
pose a particular hermeneutic challenge to scholars, especially as absence or silence can
encourage victimization paradigms that efface agency (and thus further reinforce social
abjection)46 or invite an anachronistic application of postmodern identities and desires upon
past historical subjects.47 They can also lead to what I would call the “paternal archivism”
evident in Gustav Ungerer’s study of late Tudor prostitution:

In view of the vast territory still left unexplored and unmapped, I have
chosen to rescue from oblivion and anonymity a group of women who have
been denied their individual voices. I have ventured to unlock, empirically
and paradigmatically, the reality as experienced by the following bawds and
prostitutes… The recovery of Mary Newborough’s story… breaks new
ground in reclaiming what has been considered to be virtually irrecoverable:
the individual experience of a woman fallen to the level of prostitution; the
authentic voice of a supposedly voiceless miscreant (139-140).

A form of scholarly self-fashioning, “paternal archivism” positions the heroic archivist as an
agent of historical rescue who reclaims “lost” subjects “from oblivion and anonymity.”
Although supposedly motivated by a desire to grant subject status to those denied voice, this
victimization paradigm renders historical subjects as passive objects, while construing the
scholar as an “empirical” postmodern explorer capable of unlocking – indeed “reclaiming” –
the voices of the past.48
I raise this issue less to take aim at Ungerer than to highlight how absence, as a problem of knowledge, informs hermeneutic practices in studies of English prostitution that produce or enable certain knowledges. Literary scholars are by no means exempt from critique; early studies of prostitution in Shakespeare, for example, adhere to a type of old historicism that renders literary or dramatic representation as reflective rather than constitutive of social reality. Such an approach effaces the ways in which cultural performances can produce or mediate a subject’s experience of that very reality, while at the same time conflating the theatrical with the quotidian.49 Thus Normand Berlin, Gamini Salgado, and Wallace Shugg, reading Shakespeare’s plays as evidence of daily life, locate prostitutes as part of a distinct criminal subculture restricted to London’s Southwark liberty.50 Whereas these studies highlight the conspicuous presence of prostitutes and whores on the London stage, emphasizing the geographical proximity of the Globe Theater to probable bawdy houses, they also unwittingly reproduce the ideological work performed by the texts under analysis – lending a sense of organization, as well as social and geographic containment, that has since been exposed as largely illusory.51

Similar limitations encumber Anne Haselkorn’s *Prostitution in Elizabethan and Jacobean Comedy* (1983), an otherwise useful tropological analysis that locates an “extensive concern or interest or absorption with the plight of the prostitute” on the comedic stage, identifies a “range of attitudes poised somewhere between severity and liberality” in these texts, and argues that the prostitute, as a dramatic role, offered writers a potent site for examining the shifting status of women in an increasingly capitalist society.52 Drawing attention to how a specific genre enabled divergent explorations of “sensitive sexual issues” at the time (147), Haselkorn’s work nonetheless proves unpersuasive as an analysis of how cultural productions inform, and are informed by, the material conditions of everyday life; in particular, her claims regarding women’s status lack correlative evidence that might shed light upon the dramatic representations she analyzes.53

The theoretical turn of early modern scholarship that took place in the 1980s brought increased attention and methodological rigor to relations between the theatrical and the social in early modern England. Whereas Haselkorn suggests – yet does not pursue – potential links between misogynist representations and female economic mobility, as well as what might be termed dissident voices or narrative faultlines in the plays under analysis, Jyotsna Singh delves into the “problematic area for feminist criticism” that exists in the
“relationship between women’s experience and the construction of women in cultural representation” (9, emphasis added). Noting that “prostitution was a way of making a living for many women facing material needs” in the era, Singh observes that “economics [are] hardly mentioned in the discourses of sexuality that regulated – or desired to regulate – human sexual behavior” (32). Such disjunctions can suggest “how the category of the whore” functioned ideologically on the early modern stage, “deployed in male fantasies in ways that elide the reality of prostitution as a social and economic institution” (12).

Singh’s feminist-materialism offers one means of theorizing the cultural work of dramatic representation within a given historical context, with particular attention paid to absent voices, experiences, or subjectivities. Such an approach positions absence less in terms of scholarly limitation than as a constitutive element of cultural production and political hegemony. As a variety of scholars have shown, the London theater provided early modern subjects and writers an arena to think about, rehearse, feel, and work through their most profound conflicts and contradictions: in Fredric Jameson’s terms, the theater was a site wherein “real social contradictions, insurmountable in their own terms, [might] find a purely formal resolution in the aesthetic realm.” Yet as Jameson and others remind us, any such knowledge is always partial, and never achieved without struggle and contestation. By attending to how narrative resolution is achieved, as well as what must be silenced, elided, or ignored in order to enable coherence – whether social, dramatic, ideological, hegemonic, and so on – scholars can examine absence as something other than a lack: as a cultural byproduct, with substantive value and function in its own right, constitutive of the reproduction of power yet also subject to reproduction and therefore a means of political critique.

By attending to the contradictions and paradoxes, lacunae and aportia – what Alan Sinfield terms “faultlines” – that emerge at sites of repression, absence, and failure, scholars can make visible and interrogate that which is not obvious, unconscious of, or inexpressible within the original conditions of production.

Given these emphases on the inherently partial and political nature of knowledge production, dialectical materialism appears well suited for studies of historical epistemology. While this methodology cannot solve the issues of authenticity and voice raised above, its best practitioners illustrate how attention to historical specificity, scholarly positioning, and power relations – economic, gendered, discursive, interdisciplinary, among others – can at least situate a scholar’s own investments within a larger field of knowledge relations. Such
contextualization is crucial for studies of prostitution, especially as the common idiom “the world’s oldest profession” construes a transhistorical and transcultural phenomenon that effaces differences of practice, legality, meaning, terminology, economics, agency, and gender in England and elsewhere.\textsuperscript{58} Jean E. Howard (1994, 2007) offers a model for this type of analysis; excavating the intimate economic, geographic, and conceptual conjunctions of prostitution and theater in early modern London,\textsuperscript{59} she unpacks divergent understandings of gender relations in early modern England, considers how varying discourses and media produce these often contradictory meanings, and locates her own postmodern position and assumptions as implicated in her findings. In so doing, Howard implicitly advances an understanding of knowledge production as itself situated – that is, partial, fragmented, contestatory, and dependent upon a variety of cultural factors. Looking ahead, these suppositions (which I take to be axiomatic) might be further honed by placing the dialectical method in conversation with studies of feminist epistemology, where Donna Haraway and others have drawn attention to the ways in which gender, race, age, ethnicity, status, and other social forces shape access to, and perceptions of, knowledge within varying historical contexts.\textsuperscript{60} Whereas earlier works in this field focused on the authority of the hard sciences in a postmodern present, the application of feminist epistemological insights to the study of London prostitution encourages attention to competing modes and media for knowledge production in the early modern period, as well as our own. In each of my chapters, I demonstrate how this bifocal attention to the modes and means of knowledge production, both in the historical past and the postmodern present, illuminates crucial continuities and changes, whether historical, cultural, and/or epistemological.

The concept of situated knowledges can also inform our approaches to, and understandings of, the historical archive and postmodern scholarship. While Howard exerts a significant influence upon my approach here, questions – or more appropriately, definitions – of the archive remain. Is Howard’s method all that different from Griffiths? From Newman’s? Does she simply invert the relationship between literary and historical archives, using the latter to supplement the former? Literary critics have been criticized for as much, and it is easy to feel, as Anjali Arondekar put it, that “multidisciplinarity is [now] a methodological requirement rather than a hermeneutic choice” (17).\textsuperscript{61} The only answer, it would appear, is more evidence, more comparative analyses, an endless proliferation of discourses and documents.
Yet Arondekar encourages an alternative tactic. Instead of digging ever deeper, perhaps we should (re)consider what we already have: that is, shift our definitions of the archive itself, and consider how absence – rather than a lack that must be remedied or filled – might be approached as constitutive of knowledge itself. Reviewing recent debates regarding the colonial and sexual archives, she concludes that “implicit in this rethinking [remains] the assumption that the archive, in all its multiple articulations, is still the source of knowledge about the… past” (11). New approaches may have “fractured traditional definitions of the archive,” but “the telos of knowledge production is still deemed approachable through what one finds, if only one can think of more capacious ways to look” (11). Arondekar associates this epistemological imperative with what Jacques Derrida calls “archive fever” – a craving, fetishistic desire for the (material) archive as the location of origins, as the repository of transcendental signification that, if only ever filled, can secure meanings.

But as I suggested earlier, the very act of proclamation – at least in the contexts of early modern England – unsettles any such logic. It may have been heard but not read, ignored or acted upon, printed or trumpeted or uttered onstage. Most importantly, it could be in force – or enforced – even in absentia: that is, it could indicate a decisive shift in English sexual policy without the vast majority of subjects aware of its existence; or it could be enforced while lacking legal substance; or – as imagined in Measure for Measure – it could be forgotten, a “drowsy and neglected act” only brought to light when necessary to authorize a vice campaign (1.2.146-7). From this perspective, the Henrician proclamation appears less an “event” that names a singular temporal incident than a shift in relations operating at the “intersection of discourses that differed in origin, form, organization, and function.” I draw this definition of event from Foucault, whose work elsewhere reveals how notions of (sexual) repression or absence are instead emblematic of discursive shifts, altered relations that implicate the sexual in the archival and epistemological. Indeed, while the geographic, architectural, and conceptual spaces of London sexual commerce evolved post-proclamation, so too did its discursive locales: absence in the royal and secular court records, for example, contrasts with a proliferation of onstage representations. Yet as Gowing has shown, charges of whoredom pervaded the ecclesiastical court sessions of later Elizabethan England, where common subjects – particularly women – used slander as a means of policing the sexual behaviors of their peers. Exploring this alternative archive, Gowing
reveals the intimate relations between language, sexual commerce, gender ideologies, and material practices in the period. In so doing, she suggests how knowledge about such relations – and identities – emerged from and was contested within a specific social arena.

In the next section, I pose language itself as a situated archive for London prostitution, consider how this approach reflects my understandings of historical epistemology, and illustrate that attention to language need not deny historical specificity nor possibilities for agency and resistance. “Even if we do not remember,” Helene Cixous notes, “our language remembers.” While Cixous implies the archival possibilities of and in language, her work moreover suggests how language can be made to reveal varying relations, oppressions, and exclusions – as well as serve as a site for discovery, resistance, and play. With this in mind, I ask: what evidence exists in language, and what knowledge – about relations and meanings, about the past, present, and future – does language render possible? How can early modern understandings of, and debates about, language – about signification and materialization, evidence and utterance, bodies, practices, and meanings – inform postmodern studies of English prostitution? How do meanings about prostitution materialize – and fail to materialize – in the texts and contexts of early modern England, including Shakespeare’s stage?

Epistemology / Language / Play

In her forthcoming Making Sexual Knowledge: Thinking Sex with the Early Moderns (2014), Valerie Traub argues for the constitutive import of the “unknown,” the “invisible” and the “insignificant” to understandings of sexual knowledge in that period. Stressing “the importance of opacity in knowledge” production, Traub suggests that impasse, absence, gaps, blockages, and resistances be engaged as constitutive features of, and potential heuristics to, sexual knowledge rather than as methodological limits to access and understanding of the past. Thus far, I have suggested how a similar epistemological approach to absence implicates prostitution in questions of knowledge production, both in the early modern era and our own. In this final section, I consider how approaching prostitution as operating like a language encourages attention to the effects wrought by the known and unknown –especially to how subjects mediate what they can and cannot know, through what media, and to what ends. I begin by outlining my own approach to historical epistemology, particularly as related to – or more importantly, divergent from – the Foucaultian concept of
the episteme, and then connect this understanding to my alternative archive and literary
critical methodology. In so doing, I suggest how an adapted historical semantics informs my
epistemological inquiries, illuminates as yet unexplored relations of language and prostitution
in the era, and encourages particular attention to the material and textual practices that
shaped, enabled, or delimited meanings in early modern London. Throughout, I suggest how
presence and absence can be – and were – exploited as a means of envisioning alternative
practices, knowledges, and relations.

As noted, my understanding of historical epistemology focuses on varying modes
and media of knowledge production – particularly the discourses, genres, hermeneutic and
textual practices that disseminate, validate or contest what counts as knowledge within a
given historical context – with attention paid to the constitutive functions of, and
possibilities for, opacity and absence. In so doing, I focus less on underlying structures,
styless of reasoning, or unifying foundations for knowledge than on the means through which
knowledge was forged and contested in early modern England. Put another way, I subordinate
the “preconditions that make thinking this or that idea possible” to the study of the cultural
conditions, technologies, and practices through which subjects mediate – enable, foreclose, and play
with – the production of meanings, especially in manuscripts, printed texts, and plays written
for performance. This analytic helps me ask: what were the sites and modes of (sexual)
knowledge production and contestation in early modern England? How did early moderns
perceive the page, stage, street, pulpit, scaffold, classroom, or brothel as divergent venues for
knowledge production? How did contemporaries attempt to control knowledge production
in these venues? How did they attempt to augment or enable the play of meanings, and to
what extent did some meanings function in excess of their signification? How and where did
meanings materialize? What were the possibilities for resistance, mediation, or intervention
in these processes? Most importantly, how can scholars locate and theorize absence – that
which did not officially count, was forgotten, elided, or unarticulated – in early modern
knowledge production?

To approach these questions, I propose to scrutinize language as an alternative
archive that enables the analysis of epistemological contestation. While Cixous states that
language “remembers” the past, Raymond Williams’ notion of historical semantics offers an
applied methodology for unpacking culturally and historically specific configurations
encoded in the English language. In Keywords and elsewhere, Williams reveals how
attending to how words signify, fail to signify, and are made to signify in a given culture can illuminate contemporary relationships as well as envision alternative possibilities. If such an approach destabilizes essentialist or transcendent inferences ascribed to words, it does not evacuate the force or disciplinary functions of particular terms; by contrast, it focuses attention on how meanings are posited, reproduced, and/or contested. “Nightwalker,” a word that assumed a variety of differing connotations, depending upon locale and era, between the fourteenth and seventeenth centuries, provides one such example: predominantly associated with male thievery and vagrancy during the earlier period, it became increasingly feminized and sexualized by the end of the Elizabethan era. By attending to historically contingent meanings, diachronic shifts, and lexical relations, historical semantics renders language open to contestation and re-appropriation, while also attending to the social and disciplinary implications (or “performative effects”) of specific words within particular contexts.

To situate my approach to (relations of) sex and language in early modern England, it is important to detail what understandings have been made possible by previous studies of sex and language in the period. In Wanton Words: Rhetoric and Sexuality in Early Modern Drama (2004), Madhavi Menon notes that writers of the period display an “uncanny tendency to talk about sexuality in the same breath as they talk about language” (4). The same can be said for those working in the field of Shakespeare studies. From puns to rhetorical tropes, Lacanian psychoanalysis to queer philology, scholars as diverse as William Empson, Jacqueline Rose, Stanley Fish, Stephen Greenblatt, Mary Bly, Peter Stallybrass, and Jeffrey Masten have explored, in Menon’s terms, the “mutual imbrication of language and sexuality” across the literatures and cultures of early modern England (3). Menon offers a useful introduction to this expansive topic, in part as her text grapples with a variety of terms and concepts – dissemination and deferral, metaphor and metonymy, purity and corruption, copia, excess, order, and desire – that have dominated, to differing ends, previous studies. My work, moreover, bears similar investments to Menon, particularly in the application of postmodern linguistic theory to early modern texts. Yet given significant divergences in our approaches to historical specificity and alternative methodologies, it is worth reflecting briefly upon Menon’s scholarly practice in Wanton Words.

Re-reading canonical texts such as Romeo and Juliet, Othello, and Volpone in conjunction with contemporary rhetorical handbooks, Menon examines how “a specific rhetorical trope
brings into focus a mode of sexual desire which shares its outstanding features” (31). In so doing, she argues that early modern writers yoked the seemingly disparate categories of language and sexuality through notions of fluidity and excess; as tropes such as metaphor, metonymy, metalepsis, and catachresis get metonymically linked to specific forms of desire, linguistic processes provide the varying models through which early modern sexuality – “desire” for Menon – operates. Despite the historicist practice of reading rhetorical handbooks in relation to dramatic playtexts, Menon suggests that “historical specificity might not be the best basis from which to approach an analysis of sexuality. Rather, we should set our sights… on rhetorical agility, taking our cue from the handbooks on rhetoric in which sexuality is insistently displayed as a rhetorical effect” (6).

Positioning her work as a methodological polemic, Menon contrasts rhetorical analysis with historicist criticism, construing the two as incommensurate. Her reason for doing so, I believe, lies in a desire to destabilize early modern and modern understandings of sexuality – and thus, perhaps ironically, to draw explicit links between past and present: sexuality emerges as an effect shaped by similar modes of discursive production in both eras. In doing so, Menon locates conceptual homologies between early modern theories of rhetoric and postmodern works by Foucault and Lacan, Derrida and de Man. Such an approach is not incorrect per se. Lacan’s “return to Freud,” for example, yielded a theory of desire that operates linguistically, predicated upon processes such as metaphor, metonymy, displacement, and deferral, that has been applied by various critics to explore how such processes produce effects such as linguistic proliferation, sexual energy, displacement and abjection, and male anxiety. Other critics have demonstrated how Freudian and French feminist psychoanalytic theories of language can illuminate gendered configurations within an early modern symbolic order, sexual or developmental paradigms, erotic possibilities and putative impossibilities, while scholars adopting a more expansive definition of language have explored the homoerotics of textual and theatrical collaboration, examined conjunctions of speech, gender, and sexuality, revealed how specific cultural forms, narratives, scripts, and genres provided early modern writers with a means to (attempt to) order the terms of everyday life, and studied how writers attempted to enable or constrain linguistic play through varying practices.

These studies suggest some of the ways in which language makes certain forms of knowledge available to postmodern readers. Yet one need not abandon “historical
specificity” – much less metonymically link, as Menon does, historicism with “the homophobic discourse of essential difference”\(^{90}\) – to resist hegemonic meanings. This latter assertion is a problematic charge, in part because Menon’s work otherwise opens productive avenues for further research. In particular, by focusing on processes of sedimentation – how privileged terms accrue citational weight, and thus the appearance of stability – scholars can explore both synchronic and diachronic meanings without ascribing to essentialist paradigms. An attention to historical semantics is particularly important for studies of sexual language in Shakespeare, given that critics, at least since Samuel Johnson aligned Shakespeare’s puns with a “fatal Cleopatra,”\(^{91}\) have attempted to validate and/or suppress “improper” sexual significations in early modern texts. Such efforts have fueled what I would call an endlessly proliferating Shakespearean “sexicography” – a quest to identify the “bawdy” or “filthy” inferences of every enigmatic idiom.\(^{92}\) Scholars have also posited – and contested – a variety of sexual keywords in recent years, including homosexual, sodomy, tribade, Ganymede, virgin, chastity, Amazon, friend, courtier, and whore.\(^{93}\) As these practices appear increasingly de rigueur, it is important neither to condense that which remained productively opaque during the period, nor to infer absolute terminological equivalence. In Chapter 1, for example, I argue that while modern critics have associated hundreds of terms with “whore” in early modern England, the relations between – and material consequences of – varying sexual signifiers differed quite markedly in the period.

Given my sense that the meanings of early modern words both matter and change, I have chosen to preserve (whenever possible) original spellings and/or typographies for the early modern texts examined in the chapters that follow. Such a tactic resists modern editorial practices, which can constrain or delimit meanings that were opaque, plural, or contested in their original contexts. I also attempt to avoid an uncritical application of postmodern terms, identities, or significations to the study of early modern cultures. My intention is to excavate the potentially foreign, uncanny, and familiar resonances “remembered” in early modern words, and consider how they do and do not align with present-day modes of knowing. I thus approach language as a site for social contestation and ideological critique rather than a totalizing system of social oppression,\(^{94}\) a perspective that reveals my debt to poststructural theorists like Derrida and Cixous – who demonstrate how language is always already subject to absence and failure, and thus can be appropriated to identify cultural paradoxes and possibilities. As I illustrate in my first chapter, such theories
nonetheless can be placed in productive conversation with early modern understandings of language as, in Peter Stallybrass’s words, a “site of synchronic conflict” (604). \(^95\) My focus on the terms of whoredom therefore leads me to analyze how contemporaries managed the play of language, with particular attention drawn to textual and lexicographical practices (Chapter 1), acts of naming and proclaimed embodiment across genres (Chapter 2), and the use of theatrical dialogue that foregrounds the politics of silence and displacement (Chapter 3), and of memory and forgetting (Chapter 4). In so doing, I suggest how attending to homologies and differences between postmodern and early modern understandings of language can illuminate past relations as well as future possibilities. Moreover, by focusing on how meanings materialize, fail to materialize, or can be made to materialize in the texts and practices of early modern London, I advance Judith Butler’s perspective that discourses and ideologies assume meanings (“materialize”) through material (textual, corporeal, citational) practices, \(^96\) and that an attention to such processes can acknowledge hegemonic oppressions without foreclosing possibilities for contestation and change.

My first two chapters, conjoined under the section heading “The Queane’s Two Bodies,” specifically explore relations of language, matter, and knowledge in early modern England. In my allusion to canonical studies of the English body politic, \(^97\) I suggest how these chapters interrogate the cultural position of the English whore, raise crucial issues of gender and sexual reputation, and examine those processes through which individual bodies assume cultural meanings. “The Terms of Whoredom” identifies over 250 early modern words related – in varying degrees of similitude and difference – to illicit sexual commerce. Positioning these terms as an archive, I examine how lexicographers attempted to mediate the play of relations between signifiers, in part by experimenting with a range of organizational and typographic possibilities on the printed mise-en-page. Whereas scholars have focused predominantly upon “prostitute” and “whore” as the governing terms for illicit sexual commerce and/or identity – and often construed a hierarchical or “umbrella” relationship between the two \(^98\) – my archive reveals a broader field of sexual meanings and relations than previously acknowledged. Moreover, by attending to the introductory epistles to these texts, I disclose a crucial conceptual link between sexual and lexical thinking in the era – a shared rhetoric of purity and corruption that conjoins contemporary understandings of signification and sexual practices; when lexicographers discussed their projects, they frequently invoked a desire for “pure signification” posited in contrast to the “corrupt”
status of language in a post-Babel era. At the same time, they exhibited a clear sense that their work profited from such corruption – particularly as it enabled a range of meanings, relations, and textual practices that helped sustain a developing market.

When Stallybrass suggests the productive play of early modern language, he also reminds us that such “synchronic” conflicts can possess “diachronic consequences” (604). In my second chapter, “Puzzling Embodiment: Proclamation, Gender, and The First Part of Henry VI,” I attend to issues of diachronic change and equilibrium, while focusing in particular on relations of signification and embodiment. Examining three historically situated representations of Joan of Arc – at her trial and execution in medieval Rouen (France), on Shakespeare’s stage, and in scholarly accounts of the play – I consider how attempts to define her embodied substance reflect historically contingent modes of knowing women who exceed culturally prescribed roles. My argumentative triptych suggests how slanderous terms work to localize the culturally inexplicable within an excisable female body: in fifteenth-century Rouen, Jeanne la Pucelle had to embody the heretic; in Shakespeare’s play, “Joan” must prove a witch; and in scholarly criticism of this role, she has become a whore. In considering the epistemological work engendered by three signifiers in three historical contexts, I focus upon who is served by these acts of naming, what is and is not known through such names, and how such linguistic attachments might be resisted. To do so, I adapt Michel de Certeau’s sense of “strategies” and “tactics” to studies of embodiment, calling particular attention to what I designate “strategies of sedimentation”: how subjects engage and mediate instabilities of meaning within a given cultural order, especially through (reiterative) naming practices. By focusing on Jeanne’s tactical resistance at Rouen, as well as the possibilities for resistance in The First Part of Henry VI, I also suggest some of the ways in which oppressed subjects can expose and disrupt those governing contradictions – especially those related to the female body – that undergird a hegemonic social order. I close by exploring what is at stake in the “whoring” of Shakespeare’s Joan by present-day scholars, and consider what such tendencies might reveal about evidence, naming, and epistemology in the postmodern present.

My final chapters examine the broader cultural legacies of English prostitution as engaged by Shakespeare’s Pericles and Measure for Measure. Whereas “Puzzling Embodiment” introduces the stage as a crucial arena for rehearsing ideas of embodiment in the period – and suggests how extant playtexts can be read to reveal contemporary thinking about the
constitutive interrelations of language and body – these two chapters advance my understanding of the stage as a site for semiotic and epistemological inquiry as well as for ideological production and contestation. As with Part One, my section heading here – “Uncanny Prostitutions and the Shakespearean Stage” – indicates shared investments that conjoin the two chapters. In this case, my allusion to Freud’s uncanny suggests the simultaneously foreign and familiar aspects of London prostitution on Shakespeare’s stage, including its potentially illicit proximity to dominant social institutions and practices including the marital traffic in women, the gendered dynamics of sexual reputation, the unofficial tolerance of urban prostitution, and the sexual practices of governing authorities. My allusion to Freud also indicates some of the methodological tools applied in my analysis of early modern drama, including certain psychoanalytic concepts and paradigms. In so doing, my work here adopts the dialectical methodology described in the preceding section, particularly in its attention to moments of cultural, textual, or narrative contradiction. Excavating these faultlines, I suggest how the early modern stage served as a unique technology for English subjects to negotiate contradictions that manifest in representations of illicit sexual practices, identities, and histories.

In “The Melancholy of Prostitution in Pericles, Prince of Tyre,” I read the protagonist’s humoral disposition as a symptom of cognitive dissonance that emerges from his initial inability to detect – and then articulate – the incestuous status of Antiochus’s daughter, a potential spouse. Although scholars have traditionally disregarded Pericles’s melancholy or read it as a symptom of arrested sexual development, I reveal how his affective condition crystallizes issues of visibility and legibility, speech and sexual knowledge that permeate the play. From this perspective, the play’s notorious brothel scenes, by making one form of illicit sexual commerce visible, appear to salve the epistemological crisis of the first act and render palatable a marital exchange in the denouement. Yet the play’s call to melancholy, as a structure of unfinished mourning, disturbs any such resolution. The concluding marriage of Marina to Lysimachus, a man who purchases her in the Mytilene brothel, thus enacts a form of cultural mourning for prostitution as necessary to legitimate – precisely by rendering invisible – the marital traffic in women. Whereas an edition of the play in the Oxford Shakespeare (1986/2005) supplements Marina’s dialogue with an extended lamentation – one that decries her prostitution yet honors Lysimachus as her savior and preserves their subsequent marriage – I conclude by suggesting how this editorial tactic, however
unwittingly, reproduces the melancholic logic I have outlined. Like the critical engagements with Joan that construct her as a whore, contemporary scholars risk reproducing the very patriarchal ideologies that Shakespeare’s play opens to contestation and critique.

My final chapter, “The Measure of Sexual Memory,” examines similar absences, disturbances, and scholarly reproductions through an analysis of sexual memory and forgetting in Measure for Measure. Literary historians, seeking to date and localize the play, have foregrounded a brief reference, in the play’s second scene, to a state “proclamation” centered upon the suppression of prostitution in Shakespeare’s Vienna. Erroneously, scholars have associated this allusion with a 1603 Stuart Royal Proclamation related to the dissolution of plague-infested buildings in the city; by contrast, I argue that this scene, as well as the play’s larger engagement with urban prostitution, likely stimulated two memories that significantly alter scholarly understandings of the sexual commerce of Measure for Measure: first, the 1546 abolition of state-regulated prostitution discussed above, and second, its perceived persistence throughout the remainder of the century. In so doing, I revisit earlier scholarly debates concerning relations of history and memory, as well as of the memory arts in early modern England, in order to foreground previously overlooked sexual aspects of the ars memoria and illustrate how these concepts offer new purchase on Duke Vincentio’s attempts to suppress both Viennese prostitution and his own sexual histories. I also suggest how palimpsests and sexual mnemonics – forgotten laws, razed brothels, pregnant bodies, bawds and prostitutes themselves – provide conceptual tools to better understand the interrelations of memory and sexual practice in the period.

This project originated in absence: the relative or perceived lack of prostitutes and acts of prostitution in Shakespeare’s works, especially as compared to his contemporaries. In response to this perceived lack, this dissertation represents an extended engagement with “Shakespeare’s Whore[s].” In contrast to the London city comedies of Ben Jonson, Thomas Dekker, Thomas Middleton, John Marston and others, not to mention the satires of John Donne, the epigrams of John Davies, or the prose treatises of Robert Greene, Thomas Overbury, and Thomas Nashe, Shakespeare appeared, at first glance, to evince little interest in the lives, relations, and histories of English sexual commerce. Yet as I struggled to define analytic parameters that might stabilize early modern “prostitutes” and “acts of prostitution” – especially as related to or contrasted with “whoredom” – I began to notice homologies between my own epistemological practices and the roles or situations that I was
encountering in Shakespeare’s works. How does one know or identify another as a whore? The prostitute from the courtesan from the trull? What constitutes prostitution, and how does it compare to whoredom, marriage, friendship, and other sexual, erotic, or non-erotic relations in the period? Seeing my own questions and concerns reflected in early modern texts, I began to consider how discourses of prostitution and whoredom were implicated in larger problems of knowledge production, both in that era and our own. This epistemological standpoint began to illuminate my readings of Shakespeare, particularly the manner in which his plays continually query relations between language and body, sex and identity, individual, culture, and knowledge. Yet Shakespeare was surely not alone in such explorations. My work thus aims to encourage engagements, insights, and explorations with those texts, genres, and writers that lie beyond the frame of this project. Indeed, I hope that the presences and absences of “Shakespeare’s Whore[s]” will stimulate further conversation – not only concerning prostitution and early modern drama, but also their relations to knowledge production, cultural practices, and gender and sexual relations across a range of cultures and time periods.


4 Although the legal authority of royal proclamations were subject to contestation in the period, the 1546 proclamation appears to mark a decisive shift from official regulation and of prostitution to condemnation and, as I suggest later, informal tolerance (license). Whereas the last known ordinance prior to suppression – a 1524 subsidy return, examined by J.B. Post – includes issues a variety of ordinances aimed at regulating sexual commerce in Southwark, no such documents appear after the Henrician exchange. Moreover, as an noted below, writers such as John Stow (1603) clearly identify the 1546 proclamation as incurring a significant shift in London prostitution, not only in terms of legality and regulation, but also outward appearance, thus impacting the visibility of the London sex trade. Stow, for example, notes that while the prostitution was “permitted” and “allowed” prior to 1546, Henry VIII not only “had this row of stews… put down,” but more importantly, that they were “no more to be privileged”:

Notwithstanding, I find that ordinances for the same place and houses were again confirmed in the reign of Henry VI., to be continued as before. Also, Robert Fabian writeth, that in the year of 1506, the 21st of Henry VII., the said stew-houses in Southwark were for a season inhibited, and the doors closed up, but it was not long, saith he, ere the house there were set open again, so many as were permitted, for, as it was said, whereas eighteen houses, from henceforth were appointed to used twelve only. These allowed stew-houses had signs on their fronts, towards the Thames, not hanged out, but painted on the walls, as a Boar’s Head, the Cross Keys, the Gun, the Castle, the Crane, the Cardinal’s Hat, the Bell, the Swan, &c… In the year of Christ, 1546, the 37th of Henry VIII., this row of stews in Southwark was put down by the king’s commandment, which was proclaimed by sounds of trumpet, no more to be privileged, and used as a common brothel, but the inhabitants of the same to keep good and honest rule, as in other places of this realm, &c. (374).


The definition is my own, yet I draw from Lorraine Daston’s sense of “historical epistemology” as the study of those “categories that structure our thought, pattern our arguments and proofs, and certify our standards for explanation” (282), as well as Valerie Traub’s work on absence and opacity as constitutive features of, and potential heuristics to, sexual knowledge. See Lorraine Daston, “Historical Epistemology,” in Questions of Evidence: Proof, Practice, and Persuasion across the Disciplines, eds. James Chandler, Arnold I. Davidson, and Harry Harootunian (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 282-289; and Valerie Traub, Making Sexual Knowledge: Thinking Sex with the Early Moderns (2014).

Citations for all plays are taken from MR. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARES COMEDIES, HISTORIES, & TRAGEDIES (1632), reprinted in The Norton Facsimile, ed. Charlton Hinman (New York: Norton, 1996), and refer to that edition’s through-line numbering (e.g. TLN 222). As noted below, I use the Folio rather than modern editions to foreground how Shakespearean playtexts themselves draw attention to, benefit from, and wrestle with the play of language – possibilities often circumscribed or contained by modern editors.


By reference to “speech act,” I suggest how early moderns may have understood and/or explored what we might now call language’s performative properties: the capacity for specific words or utterances to produce tangible social, material, and ideological effects. Rather than presupposing early modern understandings that might align with postmodern theory, however, I raise the potential for such homologies, and explore their possibilities, in the chapters to follow. See especially Chapters 1 and 2, where I consider: what words “mattered” in early modern England, how (and where) were such effects produced, and to what extent could they be contested? On speech act theory, see especially J.L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962). My interest in performative success, failure, and contestations reflects the influences of Austin’s many interlocutors, most notably Jacques Derrida and Judith Butler. See especially Jacques Derrida, “Signature Event Context,” in Deconstruction: Critical Concepts in Literary and Cultural Studies, ed. Jonathan Culler (New York: Routledge, 1977), 222-244; and Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex (New York: Routledge, 1993). See also the introduction and essays collected in Performativity and Performance, eds. Andrew Parker and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick (New York: Routledge, 1995).


11 Archer (1991), 211.


17 Hughes and Larkin (1964-1969, 1973). For references to commercial sexuality before 1546, see TRP 13 (6 June 1487), “protecting women of all kinds from ravishment,” including “common women not allowed to follow king’s garrison”; TRP 73 (15 May 1513), which includes a section on keeping brothels, and TRP 250 (26 May 1545), which associates vagabonds with sexual licentiousness on the London bankside and “such like naughty places where they much haunt and in manner lie nightly for the accomplishment and satisfying of their vile, wretched, and filthy purposes.”


20 I draw the notion of the “open secret,” as a form of unofficial license dependent upon an adopted authoritarian “blindness,” from Steven Mullaney, Angela Vanhaelen, and Joseph Ward, “Religion Inside Out: Dutch House Churches and the Makings of Publics in the Dutch Republic,” in *Making Publics in Early Modern Europe: People, Things, Forms of Knowledge*, eds. Bronwen Wilson and Paul Yachnin (New York: Routledge, 2010), 25-36. In this study, Mullaney et al examine how private houses of worship (*huiskerk*) were allowed to remain and “privately” practice non-conformist religions in Reformation Dutch Republic, so long as they *outwardly* conformed to contemporary social and religious codes.

21 I am indebted to Anupam Basu for this crucial insight.

22 The term “moral geographies” comes from Griffiths (1996). See also Mullaney (1988), who argues that the “license” provided by the London “liberties” encompassed a “moral, ideological, and topological... a freedom to experiment with a wide range of available ideological perspectives and to realize, in dramatic form, the cultural contradictions of its age” (ix). On urban sexual zoning, especially as related to notions of visibility, in the present-day United States, see Michael Warner, “Zoning Out Sex,” in *The Trouble with Normal: Sex, Politics, and the Ethics of Queer Life* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 149-194.

23 Stow (1598/1603), 371.


See Karras (1996), who argues that “common women” were defined in terms of sexual accessibility – they were perceived as open and “common” to all men – rather than monetary exchange. On categories of English prostitution, see especially Dabhoiwala (2000) and, for rural communities, Quaife (1979).

As Roper (1996) notes, sumptuary regulations made legible not only the prostitute but also, by way of difference, their “honest” counterparts. See also Bullough and Brundage (1982). On clothing as a means of constituting the early modern subject, see especially Ann Rosalind Jones and Peter Stallybrass, *Renaissance Clothing and the Materials of Memory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

Karris (1989); Carlin (1996). Although Philip Stubbes expresses a desire that prostitutes be “cauterized” with a signifying mark on their forehead – and similar sentiments appear in *Comedy of Errors, Hamlet, and Measure for Measure* - there is no extant evidence that this particular practice occurred in early modern England. On such marking practices, see especially the first chapter of James Grantham Turner’s *Libertines and Radicals in Early Modern England* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002). See also Standish Henning, “Branding Harlots on the Brow,” *Shakespeare Quarterly* 51 (2000), 86-89.

Stow’s account does suggest the possibility for penance and, therefore, restoration to the church community – practices that might further complicate contemporary understandings of sexual status or identity: “these single women were forbidden the rites of the church so
long as they continued that sinful life, and were excluded from Christian burial if they were not reconciled before their death” (371). On the repentant prostitute as a privileged figure in contemporary religious narratives, see especially Lorraine Helms, “The Saint in the Brothel: Or, Eloquence Rewarded,” Shakespeare Quarterly 41.3 (Autumn, 1990), 319-332; and Suzanne Gossett, “To Foster is not Always to Preserve: Feminist Inflections in Editing Pericles,” in In Arden: Editing Shakespeare, eds. Ann Thompson and Gordon McMullen (London: Thompson Learning, 2003), 65-80. See also Storey (2008), 84-85.

On shaming in early modern England, especially as related to women’s bodies, see Gail Kern Paster, The Body Embarrassed: Drama and the Disciplines of Shame in Early Modern England (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993). It is important to note that sexual shame was not limited to female subjects, as is evident by the pervasive cultural emphasis on cuckolded husbands. Nonetheless, and as Carol Cook argues, male “honor” in this regard remains predicated upon (perceived) women’s sexual reputation and activities. See “The Sign and Semblance of Her Honor: Reading Gender Difference in Much Ado About Nothing,” PMLA 101.2 (March, 1986), 186-202.

Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish (New York: Pantheon, 1977). This is not to deny the violence – physical as well as symbolic – of sexual signification. On physical and symbolic violence directed towards transgressive women in the period, see for instance Lynda E. Boose, “Scolding Brides and Bridling Scolds: Taming the Woman’s ‘Unruly Member,’” Shakespeare Quarterly 42.2 (Summer, 1991), 179-213. However, even the most controlled and authoritarian of signifying practices provide sites for dissonant interpretations. See for example Stephen Orgel, “Making Greatness Familiar,” in Pageantry in the Shakespearean Theater, ed. David Bevington (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1985), 19-25; and Louis Montrose, “The Elizabethan Subject and the Spenserian Text,” in Literary Theory/Renaissance Texts, eds. Patricia Parker and David Quint (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 303-340.

See, for example, the 15th century customary regulating London prostitution examined by Post (1977). As Howard argues, women were also frequently identified as bawds in the period (Theater, esp. 114-161). On male prostitution, see Bray, Homosexuality in Renaissance England (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); Ruth Mazo Karras and David Lorenzo Boyd, “Ut Cum Muliere’: A Male Transvestite Prostitute in Fourteenth-Century London,” in Sexualities in History: A Reader, eds. Kim M. Phillips and Barry Reay (New York: Routledge, 2001), 90-104; and Valerie Traub, The Renaissance of Lesbianism in Early Modern England Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).


On “invisibility,” see especially Traub (2002). On the rise of “Molly Houses” as sites for male homoeroticism in the later sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, see Bray (1982) and Goldberg (1992).

By “historians,” I refer to scholars who situate themselves and their work within the discipline of history.


While the Bridewell court records serves as Griffiths’ archive, his assertions of “absence” even here have been challenged by Ungerer (2002), who notes that both Griffiths and
Archer (1991) limit their searches to the 1570s. By expanding his chronological parameters into the seventeenth century, Ungerer locates further materials for scholarly analysis.


48 Ungerer claims a postmodern perspective as crucial to Mary Newborough’s “rescue”: “for her contemporaries Mary Newborough was a paragon of sinfulness; from our postmodern perspective she was an extraordinary woman” (140). Such a position presupposes a universal point-of-view in both eras, including an approach to prostitutes as “fallen,” and prostitution as emblematic of “disordered sexual orientations,” that elides the wide range of perspectives on sex work in contemporary scholarship, especially within feminist discourses. Thus while Ungerer usefully introduces new archival materials, his problematic axioms encourage particularized understandings of archival research and London prostitution under the proclaimed valence of historical and empirical objectivity. He goes on, moreover, to deny literary analysis any legitimate role in advancing postmodern understandings of an historical past. On feminist approaches to sex work, see Walkowitz (1982); Ellen Carol Dubois and Linda Gordon, “Seeking Ecstasy on the Battlefield: Danger and Purity in Nineteenth-Century Feminist Thought,” *Feminist Studies* 9.1 (Spring, 1983), 7-25; Rubin (1993); and the essays collected in *Prostitution and Pornography: Philosophical Debates About the Sex Industry*, ed. Jessica Spector (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006).
For a potent critique of this type of literary criticism, as well as a thoughtful engagement with the possibilities and limitations of the “new historicism,” see Jean E. Howard, “The New Historicism in Renaissance Studies,” *English Literary Renaissance* 16.1 (1986), 13-43.

50 Berlin (1968); Salgado (1977); and Shugg (1977).


53 Haselkorn’s work depends largely upon the “historical” evidence provided by E.J. Burford, whose work has since been called into question by Karras (1996).


56 Jameson’s dialectical materialism moreover attends to the problems of “voice” and “representation” raised above: only through juxtaposition – of text and context, past and present, present and absent – can the “logical scandal or double bind, the unthinkable and the conceptually paradoxical, that which cannot be unknotted by the operation of pure thought, and which must therefore generate a whole more properly narrative apparatus… to square its circles and to dispel, through narrative movement, its intolerable closure” (83) – be made visible and subject to critical analysis. A scholar’s own political and historical positions play an important role in these excavations: knowledge is produced partly by how we look, what questions we ask, what is valued as evidence, etc. Reflexivity does not solve problems
of archival “voice,” but it does foreground such concerns and conspicuously avoids presumptions of scholarly objectivity.

My examples and terminology here draws from three scholars – Jameson, Sinfield, and Jean E. Howard – whose works overlap at times yet diverge at others. While necessary distinctions will be drawn as I proceed, I find it useful at this time to consider homologies, especially emphases on ideological struggle, contradiction, and political criticism. Jameson provides a salient example of how Freudian analysis, unmoored from individual psychodynamics, can provide a potent tool for cultural and literary analysis. Sinfield stresses the necessary failures inherent to ideological production, and locates “faultlines” as problematic areas for literary criticism that emerge precisely at the site of “the awkward, unresolved issues” of the time. Similar to Jameson, he notes that the “task for political criticism, then, is to observe how stories negotiate the faultiness that distress the prevailing conditions of plausibility” (47). Howard illustrates how a similar methodology can be used to highlight relations of class and gender, yet favors the term lacunae: “rather than as signs of aesthetic failure, these incompatibilities can be read as traces of ideological struggle, of differences within the sense-making machinery of culture” (1994: 7). Whether it is crucial to distinguish among Jameson’s “contradictions,” Sinfield’s “faultlines,” Howard’s lacunae – or Derrida’s apora and Zizek’s “short circuits” – for the purposes of this study remain an open question, as does the extent to which one or the other approach may offer the most analytic traction for the epistemological questions at stake. Zizek’s idiom – and the related “parallax view” – bears further examination, particularly as his emphases on knowledge and articulation are particularly useful: “short circuits” emerge at sites of cultural contradiction and contestation that defy ready synthesis within historical modes of knowing. In so doing, they incur what Zizek calls the “parallax view”: an unfamiliar vantage point that not only reconfigures what can be known about an object of analysis, but also foregrounds what cannot be articulated. Although Zizek deploys this metaphor within the parameters of his own Lacanian-dialectical materialism, he nonetheless encourages its application, and stresses it functionality, within other theoretical paradigms. See The Parallax View (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006).

Only by attending to historical continuity and diachronic change can forms of hegemonic stasis be theorized and contested. Judith Bennett’s notion of “patriarchal equilibrium” provides one conceptual tool for analyzing continuities of hegemonic oppression without reifying such regimes as natural or totalizing. See History Matters: Patriarchy and the Challenge of Feminism (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006). For diachronic understanding of English prostitution, scholars are encouraged to compare the symbolic dimensions of early modern English prostitution not only to those of the medieval (Karras) and Victorian (Walkowitz) periods, but even of the later seventeenth and early eighteenth century. See J.G. Turner (2002); and Melissa M. Mowry, The Bawdy Politic in Stuart England, 1660-1714: Radical Pornography and Prostitution (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004). In other countries, see especially Alain Corbin, “Commercial Sexuality in Nineteenth-Century France: A System of Images and Regulations,” Representations 14 (Spring, 1986), 209-219; Philippa Levine, “Venereal Disease, Prostitution, and the Politics of Empire: The Case of British India,” Journal of the History of Sexuality 4.4 (April, 1994), 579-602; Roper (1996); and Gail Hershatter,
Howard’s work offers a useful comparison to Haselkorn’s earlier study, particularly for the manner in which she contextualizes “the theater’s role in imagining London and the new forms of social life and social identity flourishing within it” (*Theater*, 28). By foregrounding the material and economic conditions that made an early modern theater possible, Howard can then examine *how* representations of prostitution engage, imagine, mediate, and suppress contemporary social relations:

In their many incarnations, the bawdy houses and whores of London comedy nearly always exceed their predictable function as the site and emblems of urban vice and abjection. Rather, they are key to the genre’s innovative examination of the effects on social relations of the city’s expanding market economy, of the special pressures put on gender relations in the metropolis, and of the necessary, if sometimes fear-provoking, cosmopolitanism of urban life. Collectively, whose plays negotiate the changing place of women and strangers in the city. If they sometimes denigrate prostitutes, they also use them to pressure outmoded or inadequate conceptions of normative femininity and to acknowledge the increasingly hybridized life in an international commercial center (*Theater*, 161).

Whereas such conclusions partly align with Haselkorn's earlier claims, they are supplemented by a dialectical methodology that situates these dramatic representations within a particular cultural and economic moment. On conjunctions of theater and prostitution in early modern England, see also Mullaney (1988); Valerie Traub, *Desire and Anxiety: Circulations of Sexuality in Shakespearean Drama* (London: Routledge, 1992); and Lenz (1993). On the longstanding philosophical critique of theater as a type of prostitution, especially in terms of counterfeit and mimesis, see Barish (1981).

Given that Howard, Jameson, and Sinfield draw from a materialist lineage, references to their work might suggest that this dissertation will have a significant focus on economic relations. However, and given that the strongest contributions to studies of women and prostitution – most notably Howard and Singh – have focused predominantly upon relations of sex and labor, representations and material exchange, my dialectical approach examines historical epistemologies rather than materialisms. While I acknowledge the constitutive interrelations of historical modes of production to contemporary epistemologies, I reduce neither one to the other. On feminist epistemology, see especially Donna Haraway, “Situated Knowledge: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective,” *Feminist Studies* 14 (Fall, 1988), 575-599; Sandra Harding, *Whose Science? Whose Knowledge?: Thinking from Women’s Lives* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); and the entry on “Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science,” in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (http://plato.stanford.edu).

Anjali Arondekar, “Without a Trace: Sexuality and the Colonial Archive,” *Journal of the History of Sexuality* 14.1/2 (January, 2005), 10-27. As Arondekar is well aware, “multidisciplinarity” is itself an opaque signifier that can be taken to include (or exclude)
questions of evidence, methodology, disciplinary training, subjects/objects of study, questions posed, authorship, publishing venues, etc.


63 Foucault’s notion of an “event” is neither singular nor limited to a specific time or moment: “in their totality and their variety they form neither a composite work nor an exemplary text, but rather a strange contest, a confrontation, a power relation, a battle among discourses and through discourses. And yet, it cannot simply be described as a single battle: for several separate combats were being fought at the same time and intersected each other.” Although Foucault develops this concept throughout his various works, this description comes from *I, Pierre Riviere…* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982), x. See also Charles C. Lemert and Garth Gillian, who agree, in their analysis of Foucault’s work, that an event “is not a decision, a treaty, a reign, or a battle, but the reversal of a relationship of forces, the usurpation of power, the appropriation of a vocabulary turned against those who had once used it, a feeble domination that poisons itself as it grows lax, the entry of a master ‘other’” (41). See *Michel Foucault: Social Theory and Transgression* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982).


65 Whereas the proliferation of slander cases implicates the juridical-ecclesiastical in contemporary sexual politics, it not only testifies to the complex – and often competing – legal and jurisdictional structures of early modern London, but also reminds us of the difficulty of drawing clear distinctions between discourses in the era. See Gowing (1996).


68 Given what I see as a scholarly tendency to conflate epistemology with Foucault’s notion of the episteme – or to avoid discussing Foucault’s profound influence upon historical
epistemology – my move here bears commentary. For my purposes, attention to the modes and media of knowledge production and contestation offers greater analytic traction than the search to identify an episteme as, in Arnold Davidson’s words, “a set of relations that unites” seemingly disparate “discursive practices” [The Emergence of Sexuality (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 201]. Such a definition implies a structural approach that seems at odds with the Foucault’s sense of an episteme as a site of dispersal and displacement:

The episteme of a period, [is] not the sum of its knowledge, nor the general style of its research, but the divergence, the distances, the oppositions, the differences, the relations of its various scientific discourses: the episteme is not a sort of grand underlying theory, it is a space of dispersion, it is an open and doubtless indefinitely describable field of relationships… the episteme is not a general developmental stage of reason, it is a complex relationship of successive displacements (“Politics,” 55).

In this articulation, the Foucaultian episteme emerges as a site of “relations” that is also a “space of dispersion.” As such, it is a chameleonic register, an anti-foundation, a chimeric site of exchange and effects. As a self-consuming concept that defies the very stability proposed by its identification or application, its utility for analysis has proven to be somewhat slippery.

Although beyond the frame of my current argument, Foucault’s early epistemic thinking bears resonance for studies of the early modern era, especially given his contention, in The Order of Things (New York: Random House, 1970) that the period witnessed an epistemic shift from relations governed by similitude and resemblance to those of identity and difference. Crucially, this shift conflates language with epistemology; whereas the previous episteme was marked by notions of an original, natural, or non-arbitrary kinship between signifiers and signifieds – that is, the search for, and belief in, pre-Babel signifying relations – the seventeenth-century witnessed emergent theories of representation predicated upon the notion that “things and words were to be separated from one another” (47). This new configuration, Foucault argues, incurred a rise in modes of distinction and difference, classification and taxonomy – a perception that language no longer reflected the larger world, but could be used to order it. Historical linguistics thus provides, however ironically, a structural basis for understanding what types of “knowledge and theory became possible; within what space of order knowledge was constituted” (xxiii); This shift in contemporary theories of signification – how early modern perceived relations between “words and things” – structures the Renaissance and classical epistemes, revealing their respective governing conditions. The concept of the episteme is also explored in The Archaeology of Knowledge (New York: Vintage, 1972), esp. 215-238; and “Politics and the Study of Discourse,” in The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, eds. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), 53-72.

69 Daston (1991), 283. In this quotation, Daston summarizes an approach best reflected (for her) by Arnold Davidson and Ian Hacking.

70 Indeed – and as Foucault, Derrida, and Arondekar remind us – all claims of behalf of any archive are implicated in political and epistemological power relations.
Raymond Williams, *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society*, revised ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983).


In an endnote, for example, Menon notes that even “the overwhelmingly ‘historicism’ Stephen Greenblatt is now writing that ‘language is the slipperiest of human creations; like its speakers, it does not respect borders, and, like the imagination, it cannot ultimately be predicated or controlled’” (176) – as if historicist critics have never acknowledged linguistic play. Yet one of Greenblatt’s most influential essays, “Fiction and Friction” – appearing in a text Menon cites in two other footnotes – is predicated upon notions of wanton or excessive signification. See Stephen Greenblatt, *Shakespearean Negotiations: The Circulation of Social Energy in Renaissance England* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 66-93. This hostility to historicism precipitates a trend that Menon and Jonathan Goldberg have termed “homohistory” in early modern studies. See Jonathan Goldberg and Madhavi Menon, “Queering History,” *PMLA* 120:5 (Oct. 2005): 1608–17. For a review, and trenchant critique, of this movement, see Valerie Traub, “The New Unhistoricism in Queer Studies,” *PLMA* (January, 2013).

As formulated by Menon, “sexuality” emerges as a trans-historically consistent entity – always an effect, always “no-thing.” Such an approach, however, fundamentally elides differences of meaning, interpretation, and reception in varying contexts. Acknowledging such differences need not assume essentialist notions of sexuality, as Menon infers.

Menon does not, however, discuss how these modern critics discussed and/or analyzed early modern theories of language – an omission most notable in the case of Foucault, whose argument in *The Order of Things* would appear critical to, and in some cases even support, such an analysis; Menon presumably avoids this text because her project is predicated upon a critique of the Foucaultian epistemic model. See Foucault (1970).


Greenblatt (1998), 66-93. Greenblatt offers an interesting corollary to Menon, as his paradigmatic historicist work often draws implicitly upon Lacanian models of language and desire, despite his infamous contention that psychoanalysis “functions as if the psychological categories it invokes were not only simultaneous with but even prior to and themselves causes of the very phenomena of which in actual fact they were the results” (221). See
“Psychoanalysis and Renaissance Culture,” in *Literary Theory/Renaissance Texts*, eds. Patricia Parker and David Quint (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 210-224. Juliana Schiesari offers an insightful critique of methodological Greenblatt’s paradoxes in *The Gendering of Melancholia: Feminism, Psychoanalysis, and the Symbolics of Loss in Renaissance Literature* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992). In addition to revealing Greenblatt’s own debts to Lacanian psychoanalytic theory – an approach to subjectivity that often uncritically substitutes a trans-historical “shattered” self for an equally essentialist “modern” mode of consciousness – Schiesari illustrates how works by Marsilio Ficino reveal an early modern conception of melancholia, rooted in an ethos of lack and loss that, bears resemblance to, and may as a precursor of, modern psychoanalytic categories. In so doing, she illustrates how psychoanalytic criticism – when used as a method or “practice of interpretation that lends an ear to what is not said, to what is ‘repressed,’” rather than a universalizing theory of selfhood – provides a powerful analytical tool, especially for interrogating those ruptures and silences that hegemonic cultures cannot fully address, or resolve as ideology, in a given historical moment (25). On psychoanalysis and historicism, see also *Historicism, Psychoanalysis, and Early Modern Culture*, eds. Carla Mazzio and Douglas Trevor (London: Routledge, 2000).


85 Traub (2002).


Singh (1994) and Madelon Gohlke, for example, illustrate how attention to cultural narratives centered on the female reproductive body and/or female sexuality reveals the prejudices, desires, and anxieties fueling a patriarchal society, while Bruce Smith, Mario DiGangi, and Judith Haber have, by focusing on literary traditions, explored how varying “sexual scripts,” genres, and dramatic forms enable and/or constrain polymorphous expressions of desire and eroticism. See Madelon Gohlke, “‘I Wooed Thee with My Sword’: Shakespeare’s Tragic Paradigms,” in The Woman’s Part: Feminist Criticism of Shakespeare, Eds. Carolyn Ruth Swift Lenz, Gayl e Green, and Carol Thomas Neely (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1980), 150-170; Bruce Smith, Homosexual Desire in Shakespeare’s England: A Cultural Poetics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Mario DiGangi, The Homoerotics of Early Modern Drama (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); and Judith Haber, Desire and Dramatic Form in Early Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).


Menon delineates this argument predominantly in the endnotes of Wanton Words: “sexuality… emerges in the Renaissance as a specific effect of discourse about discourse, of language about language. Whether or not that language describes sexuality in terms of homo- or heterosexuality is of less interest to me than the more important discussion of how this rhetorical understanding of sexuality modifies ‘our’ understanding of sexual desire. In other words, both Renaissance and current ideas of sexuality are, in my understanding, terms that are in flux. By presuming on the fixity of the latter, we might find ourselves implicated in the homophobic discourse of essential difference that most work on Renaissance sexuality seeks to avoid. The ‘difference’ between acts and identities, then, I argue, is less helpful than an analysis of the rhetorically similar modes of sexual production” (176).

On Johnson’s comment, see Cook (1996), passim.


94 For an overview of feminist approaches to phallogocentrism and the place of “woman” within language, see Teril Moi, *Sexual/Textual Politics: Feminist Literary Theory* (London: Routledge, 1985).


98 See Karras (1996), who identifies prostitutes as a “subset” of whores in medieval England (30): “What marked these women for their contemporaries was not the fact that they took money for sex but rather that they were generally available to men for sexual purposes. This behavior was considered both socially necessary and individually depraved. Thus, while it is possible to talk about medieval prostitution, it is the broader concept of whoredom that is more relevant to an understanding of medieval sexuality” (131). In her study of sexual slander in the early modern period, Gowing (1996) argues, by contrast, that “whore… rarely meant prostitute” (59).

99 While the phrase is my own, my thinking here draws explicitly upon the work of Judith Butler (esp. 1993 and 1997).

Chapter 1

The Terms of Whoredom in Early Modern England

“Whoever is ignorant of words shall never judge well of things”

~Thomas Blount, *Glossographia* (London, 1656)

I

In an introductory epistle to 1589’s *Bibliotheca Scholastica* (the *Scholar’s Library*), the first dictionary that “hath the English before the Latine,” John Rider offers a traditional if relatively concise *apologia*, locating his text within an extended lexicographic genealogy while defending its status as a unique contribution to this “learned” project. Confessing “I may feeme to fome over bold in fetting forth a newe treaure of wordes vnto the world, when the works of fo honorable and learned men, who have labored in this kinde, are fo learnedly penned, and highly efteemed,” he nonetheless positions his edition as a new type of “Dictionarie,” one that serves as both an aggregation and condensation of previous works. Whereas contemporary volumes had proven increasingly expansive and expensive, he “thought it good … to epitomize and contract the learned works of all the learnedft and beft Dictionaries in England, with us now extant, into a portable Enchiridion.” Pitched as leaner, cheaper, and more accessible than its peers, the *Bibliotheca*, Rider alleges, offers a storehouse of “treasurers” to “students” too “poore” to “furnifh themfelves with [other] fuch Dictionaries.” As individual units of knowledge, the terms deposited within these texts represent – within Rider’s metaphorical construction – tangible forms of social, intellectual, and material currency in an evolving print culture.

This aggregate value derives, in part, from the *Bibliotheca’s* status as one of many print texts produced in late-medieval and early modern England seeking to explain, define, codify, stabilize, and/or order the terms of everyday life. Such manuscript productions precede the advent of the printing press in England, originating in the codification of marginalia glosses
in medieval monasteries. When negotiating difficult words or passages in antique texts, monastics inscribed personal definitions between lines or along the margins of original manuscripts. To locate meanings in such texts, therefore, subsequent readers often had to navigate an interactive mise-en-page – conjoining imprinted terms and inscribed notations, or juxtaposing entries proper with their neighboring marginalia. As such methods proved increasingly de rigueur, scribes began collating these glosses in separate manuscripts, creating reference texts to be studied in their own right. The emergence of print further catalyzed such practices, yet the project remained, by the late sixteenth-century, less a codified field of study, possessing specific rules or guidelines, than a site – and sight – for textual and lexical experimentation. I refer to the production of these texts as lexicography, using the term to indicate the writing of “meaning or meanings.” Such a definition reflects the inchoate state and “experimental spirit” of the lexicographic project, but also its fundamentally creative character: organizing words and definitions in print, writers inscribed as they transcribed, added where they assembled, constructed when they codified. English lexicography thus provided a “powerful instrument” through which contemporary writers could explore – and produce – English heritage, cultural history, and ethnic identity. It also, however, provided lexicographers a textual site to examine, experiment, and play with processes of signification and the production of meanings in an evolving print culture.

Engaging terms possessing multiple connotations, lexicographers molded meanings through a variety of complimentary – and competing – textual forms and organizational systems. For present-day scholars, such an experimental dynamic encourages attention to the interactions among and between the signifying components of the lexicographic text, especially its visual, textual, and linguistic characteristics. What interests me is how these explorations – rooted in tensions between conceptual codification and textual experimentation, between terminological condensation and definitional accretion – impacted contemporary sexual significations. In what follows, I explore how efforts to organize and define English terms of whoredom impacted perceived relations of sex, language, and meaning in the period. In so doing, I approach these terms as an archive, and a site for epistemological contestation, especially for studies of London prostitution. What were the terms of whoredom in early modern England, and how did they assume meanings in contemporary lexicography? How were they defined, organized, related, and delimited in these texts?
Examining the terms of English whoredom – by which I indicate the vast array of words bearing, implying, or indicating illicit sexual meanings, as well as the processes and parameters through which specific words assume such meanings in the period – my analysis shares similar investments to recent scholarly debates concerning the presence of “social persons,” “characters,” or “types” in medieval and early modern England. Nonetheless, my focus on how early moderns delineated such terms – including those suggesting persons, types, or characters – sheds new light on the productions of, and possibilities for, social meanings in the period, including and perhaps especially sexual meanings. “Delineate” in this sense indicates modes of textual and linguistic organization but also of relation and representation. I deliberately draw upon the term’s early modern connotations – to delineate as “to draw the proportion of any thing,” “to draw, to paint,” and “to forme, shape, fashion; imagine, conceive” – to foreground the critically visual and visionary aspects of lexicographic definition. From this perspective, lexicographic attempts to “signify & shew” sexual meanings foreground the crucial interrelations of language, textuality, and visuality in the production of early modern English meanings, sexual and otherwise.

As discussed in my Introduction, my approach to language and understanding of terms also derives, in part, from the work of Raymond Williams (1983). Here, I adapt his “keywords” project as a way to situate my work in relation to studies of characters and social types by Elizabeth Fowler, Bruce Boehrer, and Mario DiGangi. In his notion of “historical semantics,” Williams stresses the historical and contextual contingency of lexical meanings, urging attention to definitional “continuity and discontinuity,” as well as the potential for “deep conflicts of value and belief” within “particular and relational meanings” (23). A keyword, therefore, participates not only in a field of relations but also a “field of meanings” (25). Although he gestures towards the notion of terminological “clusters,” Williams largely eschews analyzing (potential) hierarchical relations among terms and focuses predominantly upon diachronic trends at level of the selected keyword. By contrast, I synchronically draw upon terms’ double resonances to examine how early modern lexicographers sought to enable or constrain linguistic relations and meanings, including potential terminological clusters.

Conceptual clusters or constellations occupy central positions in the literary and cultural analyses of Fowler, Boehrer, and DiGangi. In Literary Character: The Human Figure in Early English Writing (2003), Fowler argues that fictional characters of the era were “largely cobbled together out of allusions to a number of social persons.” Defined as “abstract
figurations of the human” and/or “models of the person, familiar concepts of social being that attain currency through common use,” these personae function, she argues, like a literary genre – a constellation, clustered around a privileged term, from which writers and readers draw as they construct individual characters. According to Fowler, readers cognitively “produce” characters by comparing entities, described within a given text, to figures circulating in the social imaginary, adding their own cultural experiences, biases, and fantasies to the projected “type.” This “relational nature” – between text and context, character and personae, term and type – “makes personification instrumental in the process of building social structure and distributing capacities and faculties across the culture” (26).

Drawing on Fowler’s work, Bruce Boehrer argues that the notion of a “character” offered pre-Cartesian English writers a means to negotiate crises of distinction between human and animal. Noting that literary critics predominantly associate character with the eighteenth-century novel, Boehrer instead traces its origins – as an indicator of disposition, temperament, or inclination – back to Aristotle and Theophrastus, arguing on behalf of its reappearance, bearing these meanings, in early modern English works such as Joseph Hall’s Characters (1608) and Thomas Overbury’s Characters, or Wittie descriptions of the properties of fundry Perfons (1616). Acknowledging early modern associations of “character” with a discursive mark or act of inscription, Boehrer nonetheless asserts its status as “from the outset a hybrid of subject and object: a catalog of observable qualities fabricated by the observer’s stylus” (13). This move accords with Boehrer’s interest in non/human distinction, but elides the manner in which the dispositional and discursive merged – or collided – in the terms of early modern “character.”

In Sexual Types: Embodiment, Agency, and Dramatic Character from Shakespeare to Shirley (2011), Mario DiGangi adopts a different organizational heuristic to consider how “definitive traits of a particular sexual type… are embodied in dramatic characters whose sexual transgressions are linked to transgression against gender, social, economic, or political order” (6). Emphasizing the ideological effects of such representations, he examines how figures such as the sodomite, tribade, narcissistic courtier, whore, bawd, and favorite provided “sites for both the assertion and the demystification of disciplinary ideologies.” As with Fowler, DiGangi argues that conceptual constellations – “types” for him, “social persons” for her – provided writers a means to explore and contest “configurations of established social structures” (22).
Fowler, Boehrer, and DiGangi each highlight the complexity and instability of these social constructions – tracing their production across a multitude of contemporary discourses and ideologies, including those relating to race, class, and gender – but tend to look past their terms to focus upon the “deeper” cultural issues behind the representation. Persons, characters, and types become ciphers or, in DiGangi’s case, “symptom[s]”: sites “through which skirmishes over the boundaries of social legitimacy and illegitimacy are fought” (6). Such analyses testify to the complex cultural work performed by contemporary terms, but I want to forestall, if momentarily, these moves from term to body, body to ideology, and focus instead on the relations between terms in the lexicographic texts of the period. Doing so queries how certain terms like “whore” assume definitional or organizational privilege, both in that era and our own.

Although frequently deployed as a transcendental sexual signifier in modern editions of early modern texts – used to define and delimit a range of contemporary terms, both familiar and opaque – the term “whore” possesses its own textual histories and terminological relations. Moreover, the introductory epistles to these texts also disclose crucial conceptual links between sexual and lexical thinking in the era: a shared rhetoric of purity and corruption that conjoints contemporary understandings of signification and sexual practices. While subordinate to my larger argument, such sexual-lexical thinking invites further analysis: when lexicographers discuss their projects, they frequently invoke a desire for “pure signification” posited in contrast to the “corrupt” status of language in a post-Babel era. At the same time, they exhibit a clear sense that their works profit from such corruption – particularly as such corruption enables a range of meanings, relations, and textual practices that sustains their developing market. Whereas this dialectic fueled contrasting impulses towards codification and experimentation that manifest in the lexicographic mise-en-page, such textual practices complicate Foucault’s diachronic argument regarding the development of a modern regime of sexuality: while suggesting inchoate and experimental understandings of early modern sexual meanings and relations, these practices also rehearse nascent taxonomic impulses that characterize the incitement of sexual discourse.

Such implications remain largely implicit and inchoate in the pages that follow. Here, I focus specifically on the structures and meanings of “whoredome” in Rider’s Bibliotheca, a text that proves representative in its unique textual qualities and characteristics. In line with
the experimental nature outlined above, no two lexicographic texts are alike – including varying editions and alternative manuscript copies of the Bibliotheca. Whereas this text first appears in 1589, it is chronologically akin to both Shakespeare’s emergence in London and the apex of the English lexicographic movement. 20 Although I pursue a largely synchronic analysis here, by comparing Rider’s entries to other lexicographic texts spanning the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, I nonetheless also consider how terms, definitions, and relations changed – or failed to change – over time.

II

To Signifie & fhew
1 Significo, confignifico, adfignifico, praefignico, portendo, intimo, 2 Enunio, renuncio
To signifie, betoken, and foretell.
1 Praefignifico
Signified. 1 Significatus, confignificatus, p.
A signification, or meaning of a thing. 1 Significatio, confignificatio, f. confignificatus, fenfus, m.
An expreff signification of that which is entended.
1 Emphafis, f.
Signifying, 1 Significans, p. significativus, ed.
Signifying but one thing.
1 Univocus. ad.
Signifying many things.
1 AEquivocus, ad.
That signifieth a thing to be at hand. 1 Praenuncius, ad.
With the fame signification.
1 Univoce, adu.
With many significations
1 AEquivoce.


Now such are thought apt words, that properly agree vnto that thing, which they signifie, and plainly expresse the nature of the same.

~Robert Cawdrey, A Table Alphabeticall (London, 1604).
Positioning his text as a linguistic repository, a “treasure of wordes,” Rider both stresses the value of the Bibliotheca’s contents and alleges their inherent stability: valuable words – each configured as autonomous material assets – reside within his text, waiting to be procured by the “Covrteovs Reader.” Noting the addition of “fome fmal mites of mine owne, which amount to 4000. Wordes,” Rider amplifies this sense of material accretion, implicitly associating terminological acquisition with personal development – procurement as a means of enhancing intellectual wealth.

If this path to erudition appears tangible, the lexicographic promise implicitly depends upon the writer’s ability to “Signifie & fhew.” Does the lexicographer, like Rider, provide a comprehensive list of possible significations? Does he, like Robert Cawdrey, seek definitional precision – “apt words, that properly agree vnto that thing, which they signifie, and plainly expresse the nature of the same?” In most cases, lexicographers pursued a combination of the two, as these tensions between precision and breadth drove the lexicographic market by encouraging experimentation and imitation, production and reproduction. Fueled by these frictions, lexicography also provided a textual site to explore the making of sexual meanings and relations in print.

Given the intimate associations of signifying and “fhew(ing)” in these texts, I begin with a look at Rider’s entry for “To commit Whoredome”: 
To locate meanings, readers must first negotiate the visual order imposed by Rider’s *mise-en-page*. The tripartite pagination departs from the most common approach – usually bipartite or without columns – structuring contemporary dictionaries, a divergence that enhances claims to textual distinction, but also confers a sense of geometric order upon the *Bibliotheca*. Lines and numbers divide each page into ordered compartments, while integers progress horizontally across the top of the page, marking individual columns. A second numeric scale then descends the vertical axes of each margin, indicating line numbers. This spatial geometry produces a terminological cartography: a coordinate system wherein latitude (columns) and longitude (lines) appear to secure precise locations for each entry. Suggesting
order and extreme precision – attributes readers may extend to terms and definitions listed within – the *mise-en-page* implies that meanings are located with pinpoint accuracy in the *Bibliotheca.* From a purely visual perspective, English “Whoredome” resides at the intersections of column 1649, lines 49-50. Or so it seems.

Upon closer examination, Rider’s coordinate system corresponds solely to Latin terms – the *Bibliotheca’s* “second” language. Indeed, this Latin cartographic precision contrasts with English terminological breadth: whereas Latin entries seem fixed, exact, and condensed, English terms appear expansive and meaning-full. Before turning to these English entries, however, it is important to note that such divergences emerge from differing systems of organization, as the text adopts different structuring axioms for each language.

The terminological, geometric, and cartographic qualities ascribed to Latin are especially visible in the *mise-en-page* of the *Bibliotheca’s* Index (Figure 3). In this textual order, intimate conjunctions of words and coordinates suggest not only the careful positioning of all Latin terms, but imply a type of lexical stability: all meanings appear accounted for, and can be precisely located within the preceding text. Compared to the main text (Figure 2), where a range of subcategories divide English headwords, indexical entries are situated in close proximity to one another and occupy less space on the page – visual characteristics that suggest concision and approximation. In brief, meanings seem more exact, definitions more definite. By substituting coordinates for meanings, the indexical *mise-en-page* also suppresses, if not outright elides, shades of distinction between potential significations. Readers do not see, for example, that while “Luftor” (the first entry in Figure 3) signifies *specific* geographic sites at the coordinates 711,43, where it is defined as “to haunt stews” (“stews” referring to bathhouses or hothouses), the term indicates a *general* locale at 1649,56, where it is defined as “to haunt whorifh places”.

In contrast to Latinate reduction in the Index, the *Bibliotheca’s* English entries prove capacious and polymorphous. The entry “To Commit Whoredome” illustrates such abundance as well as the experimental “principles of arrangement” undergirding this section of the text. It also demonstrates the breadth of meanings associated with early
modern whoredom: as opposed to cartographic approximation, whoredom emerges amidst a vast definitional field of associated terms, meanings, values, and interrelations.

Whereas the index proceeds in a strictly alphabetical order, Rider “observ[e]s usually this order” in the text proper: “Firft I put the verbe (if it haue any) then the participle, after the Nownes subftantives, and adjectiues, and laftly the Adverbs.” Adopting this unique system of organization for his primary entries, the first of its kind in English lexicography, Rider alters relations of terms and meanings. When listed alphabetically – as in the index – words assume no distinct value *in their own right*: textual positions are not ordered according to grammatical function, part of speech, or precision in signification. To return to Figure 3, for example, terms signifying the haunting of “whorish places” (Luftror 1649,56), a “cave for wild beasts in the wood” (Lufstrum 230,7), and the act of being “deceived” (Lufus 403,15) appear equivalent *as terms*: the text confers no distinctions between an activity bearing sexual connotations, a locale, and a passive action – they are simply listed in alphabetical order.

Terminological equivalences such as these are inferred by several contemporary lexicographic texts. A quick glance at Cawdrey’s *A Table Alphabeticall* (1604, Figure 4), for example, equally implies terminological equity, not only between entries and definitions, but also among headwords (“baptift” and “baud”) and meanings (“a baptifer” and “whore”). Such a structure also – especially as compared to Rider’s *Bibliotheca* – accords greater prestige to meanings than headwords. In Cawdrey’s text, “whore” appears solely as the definition of “baud,” assuming further prominence in bold print. Given Cawdrey’s interest in defining “hard words” – terms considered difficult to grasp at that time – the *mise-en-page* also situates the “whore” as a familiar term, common enough to stabilize the more evasive “baud.”

“Whore” assumes quite different meanings in the *Bibliotheca*. To return to Rider’s unique organizational principles, this text suggests a range of values and relations according to terminological function (e.g. part of speech), derivational relationship, and subject-field orientation. In this grammatical order, the act of committing “whoredome” precedes the
“whore”: visually and grammatically subordinate, the nouns of “whoredome” derive from an action, implying that one becomes a whore – or whoremonger – through one’s deeds. This derivational relationship proves especially significant given that many English nouns lack associative verbs, thus functioning as headwords in their own right. Entries such as “an Abbot” (Figure 5), for example, suggest an identity prior to, or regardless of, one’s actions or activities. Solidified by differences of font and typography, the social and hierarchical implications of this entry prove particularly apparent in the subordination of “An Abbeffe, or Abbateffe”: the masculine abbot, quite literally, precedes – gives birth to – the feminine Abbess. I will return to these gendered inferences momentarily, but first emphasize the manner in which terminological relations, in Rider’s text, always begin with, and correspond to, privileged headwords: whereas the Abbot appears outside the province of a given verb, acts of “committing whoredom” conspicuously govern (the meanings of) whores and whoremongers alike.

Such relations prove especially intricate as readers navigate the various subdivisions of each English entry (Figures 6-7). Subtending all headwords, and subordinate entries, in the English portion of the text, Latin terms are again associated with specific numerals. In this case, however, integers do not relate to textual coordinates, but instead indicate literal, figurative, and archaic meanings. The first English dictionary to use subsections ordering figures of speech, the Bibliotheca thus confers, in these subentries, values according to precision in signification. The number 1, for example, denotes “literal” translations – what Rider refers to as “proper Latine word[s]” – for the English headwords. The numeral 2 then signifies “figurative” meanings, subordinating representation to supposedly direct signification. Some entries include a third numeral, listing definitions “that be old and out of use.” Within each subclass, Latin terms deviate from an alphabetical order. In each instance, therefore, sequence suggests proximity of translation, even amongst supposedly “literal” renderings: “Meretricor,”
generally signifying the sale of sex, appears closer to “whoredome” than “adulteror.” If intimately related, definitions possess varying degrees of kinship, both to their terminological peers and to the organizing headword.

Two verbal subcategories, indicating actions – “to haunt wvhores company” and “to haunt wborish places” – follow this headword, yet precede the “Nownes subfuntatives” of “Whoredome.” Critically, both entries indicate relational activities: unspecified subjects commit whoredom by coming in contact with, or proximity to, spaces or persons seen as “whorifh.” In Bibliotheca, therefore, the terms of whoredom transcend sexual activity: one can be whored by means of interpersonal associations or even their geographic location. Moreover, these actions bear interpersonal connotations and lack gendered subjects, appearing applicable to all persons and positions: imprecision here suggests a range of erotic pairings and practices.

While present-day work has emphasized the gendered connotations of early modern whoredom – especially its predominant association with women and female sexuality – Rider’s Bibliotheca poses a variety of potential gendered and sexual configurations.

Such relations prove especially intricate in light of the multiple substantives – as well as adjectival and adverbial constructions – that follow the three verbal entries. The first substantive entry, “A vwhoremonger” (Figure 6), again identifies individuals associated with, or related to, the figure of the whore, yet also – as the first substantive – possesses a tighter visual, textual, and conceptual bond to acts of “whoredome” than the varying “whores” that follow. Whoredom thus appears, first and foremost, as an activity committed by individuals adjacent to the “whore.”

Figure 7: Rider (1589): “To commit Whoredome”
The whore-as-subject appears as a fourth subcategory under “To Commit Whoredome.” Yet rather than a solitary term that configures the “whore” as an singular or coherent entity – such as is suggested by Cawdrey’s Table (Figure 4) – Rider identifies ten types of whoredom, indicating a range of associated terms and meanings (Figures 6-7): not only those “common” or “young,” but also “disdainful,” “steved or arrans,” “foaking and wafting” whores, “wedded mans” and “whores in fleves, or whores kept instead of wives,” as well as “halfene of wbores, vvhore that will bee hired for a farthen,” and those “which at nine of the clocke, open their houfes to let men come in.” These entries indicate distinctions of cost, age, attitude, clothing and behavior: although the “[Whore, or harlot]” appear[s] akin to the “common,” “young,” or “wedded mans” whore, they clearly are not equivalents. Degrees of relation surface even within subcategories, including this initial “a Whore, or harlot” – where it is unclear whether the conjoined terms constitute a singular or dual entry. “[Whore]” precedes the “harlot” in this internal hierarchy, yet this shared conjunction – this “or” – establishes an intimate kinship between the two terms, a bond closer than that shared with phonetically related entries, such as the “halfene whores.”

These polymorphous and polysemous whores reflect a different sense of definitional precision than that implied by the Index’s Latin cartography. As opposed to numeric localization, these English terms conjoin definitional breadth with minute distinction. Minor discrepancies of cost (farthing versus halfene) and availability (the common whore versus common whores who “open their houfes to men” at “nine of the clock”) suggest fields of relation and distinction configured by a range of variables. Paradoxically, attempts to codify meaning amplify meanings: precision becomes a means of production. Readers are left to wonder: what, then – or who – is a whore?

Just as Rider expands the referential possibilities of whore and whoredome, he suppresses distinctions between differing (sexual) signifiers – terms composed of entirely different phonemes. In contrast to other lexicographers, that is, he largely eschews aggregating English synonyms, such as trull, strumpet, or jade. For example, readers find many whores, but only one harlot, in this entry. This type of synonymic reduction transcends the number of signifiers: whereas other lexicographers deployed a range of “verbal discriminators” to indicate degrees of relation between terms – including “properly,” “also,” “moreover,” and “sometimes” – Rider’s “or” intimates substitution as opposed to distinction. “Harlot” appears less as a simile, metaphor, or metonymy than as an apparent
equivalent. Similar intra-entry relations permeate this particular *mise-en-page*, including couplings of whores “ftevved” or “arrans,” “in ftevves” or “kept instead of vvifes,” and “foaking” or “vvafting.”

Lacking verbal discriminators, the *Bibliotheca* uses other visual and textual elements to indicate shades of distinction between entries. In addition to its sequential privilege – it appears before the “harlot” – the “whore” also appears with greater breadth and frequency than its counterpart. That is, although “harlot” appears as a singular headword – lacking an associative verb – early in this text, this entry simply refers readers to see *(vid)* “whore” (Figure 8). Lacking other definitions and subcategories, the “harlot” appears insignificant in contrast to the plentiful “whore”: the latter term appearing twelve times as compared to the text’s two “harlots.”

The abbreviation linking these two terms – “*vid,*” shorthand for the Latin *vide* – concretizes a critically visual component of signification in this text. To define the harlot, readers must look to the whore. Meaning, in the *Bibliotheca*, incorporates multiple relations and *systems* of relation: linguistic, visual, numerical, and sequential. Yet plenitude also produces its own absences: in the referential circle constituted between “whore” and “harlot,” something drops out – readers are encouraged, always, to look elsewhere for the meanings of whoredom.

Such deferral may appear familiar to present-day readers, yet it is crucial to remember that early modern lexicographers pointedly stress a desire to locate “true” or “proper” significations – even as they confess, indeed economically benefit from, the Sisyphean nature of their quest. Such tensions encourage attention to the manner in which specific discourses possess – or were seen to possess – differing relations to, and possibilities for, signification. These differences, I argue, should encourage scholars to focus less to definitions than on the means through which lexicographic texts – and other print genres – organize, enable, and constrain meanings.

**II**

Should readers compare Rider’s work to contemporary lexicographic texts, the terms of English whoredom increase dramatically. As noted, the *Bibliotheca’s* organizational
structure neither reflects nor encapsulates English lexicography; the text proves emblematic in its unique and experimental, rather than orthodox or programmatic, qualities. The meanings – and relations – of English whoredom thus emerge not only within a given text such as the *Bibliotheca*, but also by way of comparison to and in conjunction with other texts, including those seeking single or “proper” definitions. While Rider links “whore” with “harlot” in the *Bibliotheca*, Cawdrey (1604) associates the former term with “baud,” and Thomas Thomas (*Dictionaryum*, London, 1587) conjoins “common whore, harlot, or strumpet” when defining “Prostitula.” Moreover, when John Bullokar publishes *An English Expositor* in 1616, the “whore” disappears entirely, while “harlot” defines, to varying degrees, the “Curtezane” and “Pander.”

Such relations appear concise when compared to Timothy Bright’s *Characterie* (London, 1588), a rather paradoxical situation given this lexicographer’s desire to locate, whenever possible, singular relationship between terms and meanings. While successful in reducing most entries to a single signifier-as-definition, Bright then reuses these privileged meanings throughout his text. The “whore,” for example, defines “Adulterer, Baude, Brothel, Buggerie, Chaste, Concubine, Defloure, Gille, Harlot, Lemman, Rauish, Ribaude, Stewes, Strumpet,” and “Vnchaste.” Within such a configuration, the term signifies, among other things: spouses (ungendered) who violate the sacrament of marriage, buildings, acts of sodomy, defloration, and, paradoxically, states of unchastity and chastity (Figure 9).

As with the *Bibliotheca*, Bright’s *mise-en-page* helps configure meanings, in this case by conjoining terms along a horizontal, as opposed to vertical, register. In contrast to other texts – such as Rider, Cawdrey (Figure 10), and Edmund Coote’s *The English Scholemaster* (London, 1597, Figure 11) – a single bar separates headword and meaning, simultaneously suturing and fracturing relations between the two. The use of bold and italics further distinguish the two words, the latter of which assumes a prominent position in all three texts – *Characterie*, *A Table Alphabetical*, and *The English Scholemaster* – especially as compared to typography of the *Bibliotheca*.

Despite such similarities, these alternative texts fail
to conform in other ways: Coote’s *Scholemaster*, for example, does not include “whore,” “harlot,” or other related terms, listing only “proftitute” as a sexual term. Indeed, this entry—again signaling actions as opposed to subjects—fails to mention “whoredom” altogether, focusing instead on openness to uncleanness. Such absence suggests the presence of conceptual distinctions between prostitution and whoredom in the period.\(^45\) John Florio appears to bridge prostitution and whoredom in *Queen Anna’s New World of Words* (London, 1611), associating “to profhitute or abandon to every mans abufing for money” with “to play the whore or bawde… Alfo to præctife wheredome or bawderie.” This conceptual and lexical association, however, disappears entirely in later texts by Bullokar (1616) and Henry Cockeram [*English Dictionary* (London, 1623)], where prostitution—without reference to whoredom—indicates the sale of one’s body.\(^46\)

The terms of whoredom prove even more capacious in multilingual dictionaries. Editions by Florio\(^47\) and Randle Cotgrave [*A Dictionary of the French and English Tongues* (London, 1611)] offer multiple English definitions for each Latin headword, and thereby suggest an array of intra-English relations. In *A Dictionary*, for example, Cotgrave produces a field of synonymic relations, suggesting varying hierarchies based upon textual proximity to the French headwords:

- **Gaultiere**: a whore, punke, drab, quaene, gill, flirt, strumpet, cockatrice, mad wench, common hackney, good one
- **Paillerde**: a whore, punke, drab, strumpet, harlot, quaene, courtesan, callet
- **Pimbeshbe**: a wilie quaene, subtile wench, cunning drab; one that can finely execute her Mistresses knauish deuises
- **Putain**: a whore, quaene, punke, drab, flurt, strumpet, harlot, cockatrice, naughtie pack, light huswife, common hackney
- **Rebut (“Madame de rebut”)**: A loathsome queane, rascallie drab, ouerworne punke, pockie whore

Within this order, the “whore,” “quaene,” “punk” and “drab” assume privilege according to headword proximity and frequency of citation: the three appear in almost every entry. By contrast, “callet,” “cockatrice,” and “common hackney” seem rare and unusual, located at a distance from headwords and other privileged terms. Ironically perhaps, such relegation may
signal greater precision in meaning: uncommon words may suggest rarefied – and thus quite specific – connotations.

Such paradoxes permeate the lexicographic project. Although word order and citationality confer distinctions among Cotgrave’s English terms, his definitional surpluses increase meanings and complicate relations between terms concurrently conjoined and divorced: whereas “whore,” “punk” and “quaene” subtend Limax, Paillarde, and Putain, only the latter appears as a definition for Pimbesche. This association imbues “quaene” with a sense of cunning or subtlety – a link supplemented, and complicated, by the loathsome, rascally, aged, and diseased inferences connoted by Rebut. Whereas Rebut reunites the “whore,” “quaene,” “punk” and “drab,” these terms nonetheless appear in a different sequence, and bear far more descriptive modifiers, than in alternative entries.

Larger lexicographic texts predominantly accrue more expansive meanings: Cotgrave’s extensive Dictionary, for example, associates 44 different headwords with “whore.” In Florio’s World of Words (London, 1598), the “whore” appears 48 times, and is associated with, among other meanings: foolish priests, secret lovers, women that commit fornication, witches, sluts, prostitutes, taverns, perceptions of filth, and the Catholic Church (“Whore of Babylon”). Appearing in 1611, these texts signal, in part, the expansion of the lexicographic project as a whole. In doing so, they suggest a proliferation of sexual meanings in conjunction with the development of this textual field. Indeed, from a diachronic perspective, the early modern “whore” not only proliferates lexicographically, but also increasingly relates terminologically and conceptually to other facets of social life over the course of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.

III

An Archive

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Adultress</th>
<th>Amazonian Trull</th>
<th>Ambulantries</th>
<th>Ammunition Whore</th>
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<td>Angels</td>
<td>Ape</td>
<td>Apple-John</td>
<td>Apple-Squire</td>
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<td>Apron Mountant</td>
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<td>Antem-Mort</td>
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<td>Bird o’the Game</td>
<td>Bitch</td>
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<td>Bogs</td>
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Developments in modern-day technology provide another vantage point from which to review potential relations – synchronic, diachronic, and discursive – between early modern terms. *Lexicons of Early Modern English (LEME)*, a website based out of the University of Toronto, incorporates 176 searchable lexicons, featuring over 588,000 word entries and 60,000 English headwords. In terms of the “whore,” *LEME* maps a far more intricate field of relations than scholars have previously acknowledged. Chart 1 (Appendix) illustrates the most common terms of whoredom appearing in 133 English lexicographic texts from 1500-1650. Given the inchoate state of English orthography, numbers are suggestive as opposed to approximate. Nonetheless, the graph indicates that lexicographers favored certain terms, including whore (281 citations), harlot (149), and strumpet (92) and quean (75). Moreover, the relative popularity of bawd (83), cuckold (35), and pander (17) supports my contention that the terms of whoredom encompass a wide range of social and sexual relations, including figures in proximity to, but not necessarily performing, sexual practices. Conferring notions of adjacency or contiguity to whoredom, these relational terms appear more frequently, for example, than punke (15), prostitute (13), minx (13), and doxy (6). Homoerotic terms – including bugger (33), ingle (17), and sodomite (13) – also outweigh...
the punk and doxy and, in combination with minion (39), favorite (19), paramour (12), Ganymede (4), and catamite (3), signal a conspicuous homoerotic presence in English lexicography. As terms often overlap, conceptual and terminological boundaries – even among the seemingly licit and illicit – prove increasingly opaque. “Wanton” reflects such diverse signifying potential: appearing 412 times in total, the term assumes sexual connotations – that is, is associated with other terms of whoredom or relates specifically to sexual practices – in just under half its entries (171). Its varying relations include “minion boys” and “ingles,” as well as “wenches,” “goddesses,” and “unchaste” women. As with Florio’s “whore,” the lexicographic “wanton” assumes a range of meanings, connoting, to varying degrees, effeminacy, boyishness, delicacy, prodigality, lasciviousness, immodesty, love, gentleness, and playfulness.

While some terms predominate, others prove significant in their relative absence or seemingly unorthodox connotations. Courtesan, a privileged term in continental Europe at the time, appears only eight times in these texts, while Doll – a popular eponym on the early modern stage generally glossed as a prostitute’s name – appears just twice. Tribade and fricatrice, often linked to female homoeroticism, do not appear in any of the LEME’s 133 texts. Terms also accrue curious or surprising significations: succubae (7), often associated with female maleficence in texts such as the popular *Malleus Maleficarum*, appears largely dissociated from witchcraft in these early modern texts, where it signifies women that “lyeth with, or under, another man’s wife,” as well as harlots and whores. The Winchester Goose, often glossed by present-day editors as referring to the regulation of prostitution by the Bishops of Winchester, consistently defines venereal sickness, rather than sexual traffic, in lexicographic texts: in the latter, it is “a disease about the privie members,” a “cunt-botch,” or a “pokie sore.” Even seemingly licit terms such as darling (22), girle (17) and lasse (17) – not to mention maiden (48) and virgin (108) – appear in relation to sexual terms or inferences. Such citations transcend the antonymic: maiden – repeatedly conjoined with girle, lasse, and wench – appears just one term removed from those bearing “filthy” connotations. Notions of proximity or substitution prove especially appropriate with homonymic terms such as quaene and “huswife” (13), the latter of which assumed increasingly negative and sexual connotations heading into the seventeenth-century: whereas earlier lexicographers define the term as a female head of house or “goodwife,” Florio and
Cotgrave, for example, associate it with gossiping, prattling, whoredom, sluttishness, and harlotry.

As noted in the Introduction, the meanings of “nightwalker” also evolve over time yet in a different manner. As Paul Griffiths has shown, the term assumed a variety of differing connotations – depending upon locale and era – between the fourteenth and seventeenth centuries: predominantly associated with male thievery and vagrancy during the earlier period, it became increasingly feminized and sexualized by the end of the sixteenth-century. Given that Griffiths’s analysis depends almost exclusively upon legal documents, this example underscores potential differences according to textual formats, medium, genre, chronology, and even the tendencies of specific writers involved in the production of early modern meanings: the term appears neither in the lexicographic texts assembled in the *Lexicon of Early Modern English* nor in the works of Shakespeare. This is not to argue that lexicographic texts bear correct or true meanings as opposed to poems, dramatic play-texts, or works in other discourses, or vice versa; instead, scholars must attend to similarities and differences among varying mediums, as well as the potential epistemological privilege accorded to specific mediums: their value as acceptable sources of knowledge by contemporary subjects.

As the most common illicit sexual signifier in lexicographic texts, the “whore” accrues differing values and relations both over time and in the works of various lexicographers. As Chart 2 (appendix) demonstrates, individual lexicographers often favored specific terms: while Bright uses “whore” almost exclusively in *Characterie* (1588), Elyot prefers “wanton” and “harlot” in his *Dictionarie* (1538), and Cotgrave (1611) deploys “queane” far more frequently than his peers. Moreover, usages wax and wane over time: absent in Elyot, the “whore” appears only seven times in Richard Huloet’s *Abecedarium anglicum latinum* (London, 1552) and six in Cooper’s *Thesaursus* (1584) – figures in stark contrast to the numbers listed for Florio and Cotgrave, mentioned above, as well as Florio’s second edition, *Queen Anna’s New World of Words* (1611), which includes a stunning 69 citations. By way of contrast, “harlot” – one of the more popular terms in the early and mid-sixteenth-century – appears to decline slightly in lexicographic texts over time: Florio reduces its presence from 25 to 18 in his second edition, while Cotgrave uses the term only nine times in *A Dictionary* (1611). Huloet’s *Abecedarium* perhaps best exemplifies this inverted chronological relationship. As opposed to Rider’s “To Commit Whoredome,” Huloet’s
respective entries clearly prioritize the harlot, implying its privileged status earlier in the sixteenth century (Figure 12). Indeed, and in direct contrast to Rider, Huloet locates plenitude, and degrees of distinction, at the site of the harlot rather than the whore (Figure 13).

The terms and meanings of English whoredom also diverge and amplify across varying texts, mediums, writers, and discourses. A lexical survey of Shakespeare’s complete works, available through the digitized Riverside editions, as well as of the King James Bible (1611) reveal differing fields of terminological relation (Charts 3-4, appendix). Although citations clearly depend upon edition and editor, these charts suggest significant terminological differences between texts and genres. Whereas the “harlot” chronologically declines while the “whore” increases in lexicographic usage, the former retains its dominant status in the King James Bible. Moreover, in Shakespeare’s works, “bawd” and “wench” far outweigh the “whore,” while this latter term appears comparable, from a citational standpoint, to “cuckold” and “whoreson.” As in contemporary lexicography, Shakespeare’s “whoremasters” and “whoresons” emerge as relational and inter-gendered, even as meanings retain an emphasis upon female sexual status or reputation.

In contrast to lexicographic texts, however, Shakespeare’s works rarely, if ever, feature terms such as “bugger” (0), “ingle” (0), “sodomite” (0), “Ganymede” (1), “fricatrice” (0) or “tribade” (0) – absences that may reflect a desire to avoid such labels or, given the relatively common use of “minion” (23) and “favorite” (10), reflect a desire for suggestive, figurative, or imprecise language at sites of polymorphous eroticisms. Given the extensive work on early modern eroticisms, such absences suggest that desire – whether licit, illicit, or without name – partakes of multiple fields of signification in the drama of the period; that which is imprecise or invisible on the page, moreover, may accrue meanings in bodies and onstage.
These examples suggest some of the ways in which the terms of whoredom reconfigure sexual-textual and sexual-lexical meanings in early modern England. Although the instability of the lexicographic project is well known, these texts testify less to terminological relativity or absence of stable meanings than to the ways in which lexicographers produced meanings on (and beyond) their pages. If it is the “constant conflation of signifiers that characterizes Renaissance texts,” early modern writers clearly navigated such relations through different means and to different ends. In his textual order, John Rider privileges acts over actors, whoremongers over whores, literal renderings over figurative connotations. When Timothy Bright suggests precision by reduction – positing direct, singular relations between headwords and meanings – he paradoxically amplifies the signifying capacities of his privileged definitions. Providing a seemingly stable foundation for other hard words, Bright’s “whore,” for example, annexes a range of meanings that permeate multiple facets of social life. When Florio and Cotgrave, by contrast, seek precision in amplitude – attempting to render all possible significations for a given headword – they configure differing fields of terminological relation, suggesting degrees of both proximity and connotation. Amidst such plenitude, the terms of whoredom specialize and generalize: at times applicable to any-body, they appear, at others, restricted and particularized. In the words of Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, as an aggregate, they both universalize and minoritize the whore.

While these terms and texts illustrate the vast signifying potential of English whoredom, they also suggests some of the ways in which potential meanings were engaged, ordered, limited, or produced within an evolving print form. Exploring different orders of signification – linguistic, visual, mathematical, cartographic, interpersonal, and discursive – lexicographers grapple with relations not only textual and terminological but also human and social. In doing so, their texts emerged as sites for social reflection and creation. Codifying certain terms, many of which are used to stabilize or define others, lexicographers balance precision with possibility. They seem aware that meanings are never final, that judgment lies with readers and interlocutors. Concluding his introductory epistle, Rider comforts himself with the knowledge – indeed the hope – that readers “wilt my faultes efcaped, either with thy pen correct, or in courtieff conceale” any “blemifhes” in his text. A conventional caveat, this digression situates lexicographic texts as “open works” – fields of exploration, relation, and
interaction, of possibility as well as re-production. In terms of whoredom, these texts also encourage the attentive reader to consider early modern sexual meanings in a similar manner.

V

As with the absences that surface amidst the referential relationship of Rider’s “whore” and “harlot,” the “open work” of sexual signification encourages readers to look at (vide) sites of absence – and to consider how such gaps are mediated. The play of Rider’s “whore,” as well as its terminological relationship to “whoredome,” is perhaps best exemplified – and visualized – in a contemporary text, published within a year of his Bibliotheca. Timothy Bright’s Characterie, as noted, deploys “whore” as a privileged definition for an array of terms. Yet when readers seek definitions for this term, they find only absences: whoredome, not whore, appears in the table, and this entry itself lacks a definition (Figure 14, copy 1).

![Figure 14: Two print copies of Timothy Bright’s Characterie (London: 1588)](image)

While nothing stands behind Bright’s “whoredome” in copy 1, the marks and marginalia of copy 2 suggests other forms inscription in the places of definitional absence: who writes – inscribes – meanings within the open spaces and texts of early modern sex? What signifying practices appear where language or definitional precision fail? Recalling the origins of lexicography, readers and scholars must consider how the terms of the margins relate to, define, or replace the central terms of the printed text.

In his own, unique contribution to English lexicography, Bright encourages readers to adopt an alternative sign system, subordinating his English lexicon to a system of “characters” or ideograms, exceeding 7000 in number. In this section, a discursive mark – as
opposed to an alternative term – signifies the “whore” (Figure 15). Bright’s text failed to achieve widespread acclaim, yet such an entry suggests other, multiple, and conflicting means through which writers might inscribe, define, textualize, visualize, or imagine the terms of whoredom in early modern England. Although Bright’s whore remains opaque, such sites assure readers that the marks of whoredom can be written – perhaps by the person who holds the text at that very moment. The question, of course, is what marks or meanings one chooses to provide.

When Stallybrass highlights the productive play of early modern language, he also reminds us that such “synchronic” conflicts can possess “diachronic consequences” (604). In the next chapter, “Puzzling Embodiment: Proclamation, Gender, and The first Part of Henry VI,” I attend to issues of diachronic change and equilibrium, focusing in particular on relations of signification and embodiment. In so doing, I turn toward the newly institutional London Theater as an alternative arena for examining the production of sexual meanings, as well as relations of language and body, in early modern England.

As Gabriele Stein and John Considine have argued, these textual practices precede – and later coincide with – the development of English philology, etymology, and orthography, among other fields. As such, these texts defy boundaries that serve to separate modern textual genres, including dictionaries, encyclopedias, lexicons, thesauruses, and glossaries. A single lexicographic text from the period may include any number of the following characteristics: word lists, etymological clusters, field-specific vocabularies, singular or multiple definitions, extensive glosses, encyclopedia-length definitions, famous quotations, biblical parables, English and polyglot synonyms, antonyms, rhymes, mnemonic verses, rhetorical forms, pictures, drawings, proper names, social types, and/or parts of the human anatomy. Although writers often copied definitions verbatim from other texts, adopted nearly identical typographies, and/or reproduced previous organizational axioms, their products also diverged widely along these very same axes. See Gabriele Stein, *The English Dictionary Before Cawdrey* (Tubingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1985); and John Considine *Dictionaries in Early Modern Europe: Lexicography and the Making of Heritage* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). Scholars generally date the birth of the “modern dictionary” – predicated upon the establishment of consistent “lexical laws” (150) – with Samuel Johnson’s *Dictionary of the English Language* (1755). See Margreta de Grazia, “Homonyms before and after Lexical Standardization,” in *Deutsche Shakespeare-Gesellschaft West: Jahrbuch* (1990), 143-156.

I adopt this definition from the *Oxford English Dictionary* (“Dictionary” 1a), as opposed to the more limited sense of lexicography as “the writing or compilation of a lexicon or dictionaries (“Lexicography” 1a). See the preceding footnote for this rationale. I acknowledge the potentially anachronistic status of this latter term; according to the *OED*, the first known use of “lexicography” to indicate a distinct practice or profession does not appear until 1680, when George Dalgarno notes in *Didascalocophus* (Oxford) that he “shall therefore only make some few reflexions upon Etymology and Syntax, supposing Orthography to belong to Lexicography.” Nonetheless, Dalgarno’s entry indicates the intimate relations between these varying fields. Such terminological imprecision poses a taxonomic quandary for modern scholars. Robert Cawdrey’s *A Table Alphabetical* (London, 1604), for example, has been cited as the “first English Dictionary,” yet this assertion derives from its status as a monolingual text, thus differentiating Cawdrey’s effort from earlier bilingual (e.g. Rider) and polyglot compendiums, as well as word-lists and grammar books.
In a telling move, Cawdrey himself never uses the term “dictionary,” referring to his text solely as a “true Orthography.”

5 Stein (1985), 59.


7 Rider construes a direct, metonymic relationship between “signification, or meaning of a thing” (1334: 7-10). For the purposes of conceptual clarity, I use the terms lexicography and lexicographers to indicate, respectively, the writing and writers of early modern reference books. These terms incorporate rhetoric handbooks, which deal specifically with the production of meaning in language, and illustrate the fluid categorical boundaries between what may now appear as distinct if related textual fields—such as etymology, philology, lexicography, and orthography. See Stein (1985); Considine (2008); and Rubright (2007: 25), from whom I draw the quotation.


9 John Florio, “Delineare” Queen Anna’s New World of Word (London, 1611).


12 Elizabeth Fowler, Literary Character: The Human Figure in Early English Writing (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003).

13 For Fowler, such personae emerge from, and are informed by, representations across a multiplicity of contemporary discourses—literature, economics, jurisprudence, and moral philosophical, among others—as well as by means of comparison to other types.


15 That is, Boehrner’s notion of hybridization, central to the argument at hand, depends upon a rather strained tautology: “Let us begin with terminology. As is well know, the English noun “character,” which by the seventeenth century refers to the artificial human beings created by writers in writing, originally refers to the act of writing. Theophrastus’s charactaeres is a plural substantive formed from the Attic charassein, “to engrave, carve,” “inscribe,” or “simply, write” (Liddell and Scott “charasso” v. III.1) and in its Theophrastan application the noun thus refers simultaneously to the “distinctive mark, characteristic, character” that has been “impressed (as it were) on a person” (Liddell and Scott “character” sb. II.4) and to the
act of impression or inscription. In this respect, the noun character is similar to the historia of Aristotle’s Historia Animalium, which refers to “information obtained through investigation” (Peck I:V). In both cases we encounter from the outset a hybrid of object and subject: a catalog of observable qualities fabricated by the observer’s stylus. However, in the English Nachleben the two terms part company. English ‘history’ emphasizes the objective nature of reportage so relentlessly that Hayden White’s rediscovery of the narrative element in historical writing could become a major twentieth-century intellectual event. Literary ‘character,’ on the other hand, comes to denote invention rather than reportage, fiction rather than fact. Thus both words are subjected to a sort of spurious purification, consistent with their original reference to nonhuman and human subject matter, respectively” (13).

Boehrer goes on to note “the model of literary character explored in the following chapters derives expressly from Aristotle’s notion of the interspecies continuum, as this is manifested in his zoological treatises and remains implicit in the ethical work of his successor Theophrastus. This latter work helps convey the term “character” into English as a word for the fictional persons created by writers, but even before the term becomes thus established, the sense of character that underwrites it is available for literary exploration” (17). Thus, according to Boehrer, Aristotle’s “character,” as indicative of fictional persons – a conceptual leap from disposition – arrives in England via Theophrastus via Hall. This latter work, however, focuses predominantly on traits, virtues and vices, as opposed to fictional to persons or the “types” that would later appear in Overbury. The conceptual leap to hybrid status is perhaps best indicated by Boehrer’s turn to “history,” a parallelism upon which the conjunction appears to depend: simply put, his argument asks readers to assume, first, that “a catalog of observable qualities fabricated by an observer’s stylus” effectively conjoins inscription, disposition, and personae, and second, that this Theophrastan position was widely assumed and accepted – even before “the term becomes thus established” – by writers in the early modern period.


17 Such a practice may signal a reduction in our modern sexual vocabularies – an inability to grasp a richly diverse early modern (sexual) lexicon. It is a condition, paradoxically, that permeates a contemporary cultural moment featuring an endlessly proliferating Shakespearean sexitography – a quest to identify (know) the “bawdy” or “filthy” inferences of every enigmatic idiom. This process hearkens back to the middle of the twentieth-century, when Eric Partridge first published Shakespeare’s Bawdy (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1948). Nonetheless, a variety of “Shakespeare Dictionaries” – some specifically focused on sexual puns or inferences – have been published over the course of the past forty years, including Pauline Kiernan, Filthy Shakespeare: Shakespeare’s Most Outrageous Sexual Puns (New York: Gotham Books, 2006); David Crystal and Ben Crystal, Shakespeare’s Words: A Glossary & Language Companion (London: Penguin Books, 2002); Shakespeare: The Bard’s Guide to Abuses and Affronts (Philadelphia: Running Press, 2001); Michael Macrone, Naughty Shakespeare: The Lascivious Lines, Offensive Oaths, and Politically Incorrect Notions from the Baddest Bard of All (Gramercy, 2000); Gordon Williams, A Glossary of Shakespeare’s Sexual Language (London: Athlone, 1997); Walter F. Hill and Cynthia J. Ottchen, Shakespeare’s Insults: Educating Your Wit (New York: Three Rivers Press, 1991); Frankie Rubinstein, A Dictionary of Shakespeare’s Sexual
In an analysis of the term across the Shakespearean canon, Kay Stanton illustrates its expansive semantic possibilities yet nevertheless fixes the term within a strict terminological hierarchy. Compared to strumpet, harlot, and minion, she argues that “whore... is the term with the most abusive punch, the ‘dirtiest’ word” of the period (81). Stanton includes multiple variations of “whore,” including whoremonger, whoremaster, bewhored, etc., but does not discuss or address other sexual signifiers aside from noting that “whereas ‘strumpet,’ ‘harlot,’ and ‘minion’ are still recognized, they are considered old-fashioned, and terms like ‘callet,’ ‘drab,’ and ‘stale,’ are unknown among the general populace – a contention challenged by my findings in this analysis. See further emphasizes the importance of this singular term through the use of bold-font, an analytic move that further distinguishes the “whore” from its lexical peers. See Kay Stanton, “‘Made to write ‘whore’ upon?’: Male and Female Use of the Word ‘Whore’ in Shakespeare’s Canon,” in A Feminist Companion to Shakespeare, Ed. Dympna Callaghan (Malden: Blackwell Press, 1990), 80-102.


According to Jurgen Schafer, the production of monolingual dictionaries peaked during the two decades from 1590-1610. See Early Modern English Lexicography: A Survey of Monolingual Printed Glossaries and Dictionaries, 1475-1640 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 9-10. While his analysis, and subsequently thesis, restricts the parameters adopted in my definition of lexicography, the vast majority of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century English lexicographic texts were printed within, or proximate to, this time-frame: cf. Thomas Thomas, Dictionarium Linguae Latinae et Anglicae (London, 1587), Rider (1589), Florio The Worlde of Wordes (London, 1598) and (1611), Cawdrey (1604), and Randle Cotgrave, A Dictionarie of the French and English Tongues (London, 1611), as well as multiple reprints including Noel van Barlement, Colloquia et Dictionarium; Ambrogio Calepino, Dictionarium Decem Linguarum; Thomas Cooper, Thesaurus Linguae Romanae; Claudius Hollyband, A Dictionarie of French and English; Simon Pelegromius, Synonymorum Sylva; Robert Percyvall, Bibliotheca Hispanica; and John Withals, A Shorte Dictionarie for Yonge Begynners. See Stein (1985) and Considine (2009), passim.

Richard Mulcaster draws a similar analogy in The First Part of the Elementary (London, 1582), a rhetorical handbook including a table of 8000 “hard words.” In that text Mulcaster, an English schoolmaster and later head of London’s St. Paul’s School, argues that words provide the element-al “fundation” necessary to advance “frudents to the attainme[n]t of learning” and help “the learned to aduaunement of liuing.”

This belief, permeating lexicographic texts in the period, also assumes nationalist connotations. See Mulcaster (1582).
As illustrated in the epigraph, Rider not only critically conjoins the two verbs (1589: 1333-4), but also acknowledges that words may signify “one thing” or “many things,” that they may possess “a signification, or meaning of a thing,” as well as “many significations.”

See also John Cowell’s The Interpreter, or Booke Containing the Signification of Words: Wherein is set forth the true meaning all, or the most part of such Words and Termes… (Cambridge, 1607). Arguing on behalf of “proper” punning in the early modern period, de Grazia’s (1990) argues that “the linguistic ideal of one linguistic sign per epistemological signified” postdated Shakespeare’s era. This argument rightly acknowledges the inchoate state of English lexicography – especially the lack of fixed guidelines or practices – yet overlooks the conspicuous tensions between lexical experimentation and a desire for “proper” signification in these texts; that is, where de Grazia collapses distinctions between early modern lexicography, poetry, and drama, scholars might now attend to how “linguistic ideal[s]” varied across texts and discourses of the period. In a study of amphibology on the early modern stage, for example, Steven Mullaney argues that anxieties around, and desires for, stable signification indeed appear and inform dramatic representations in the era. See “Lying Like Truth: Riddle, Representation, and Treason in Renaissance England,” in Shakespeare’s Late Tragedies: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Susanne L. Wofford (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 1996), 61-73. For an early modern reflection regarding the moral connotations of “proper” and “improper” signification, see Sir Philip Sidney’s An Apologie for Poetrie (1595). See also Madhavi Menon, Wanton Words: Rhetoric and Sexuality in English Renaissance Drama (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004); and Howard Felperin, “Tongue-Tied our Queen?: The Deconstruction of Presence in The Winter’s Tale,” in Shakespeare & the Question of Theory, eds. Patricia Parker and Geoffrey Hartman (New York: Routledge, 1985), 3-18.

By altering content and organizational axioms, lexicographers marketed their products simultaneously as new editions – reproducing popular and/or essential components from preceding texts – and innovative productions in their own right. To attract readers (and buyers), for example, Rider stresses the Bibliotheca’s proximity to its forebears, as well as its unique and experimental attributes. These latter characteristics include not only differences of size, price, and accessibility, but also the imposition of an innovative organizational structure and indexical system. Such diversity promulgated calls for standardization and even, by the mid-seventeenth-century, attempts to establish a new, “perfect” language [cf. Francis Lodowyck, The Ground-work for a New Perfect Language (London, 1652)]. Focusing on English grammar school education, Mulcaster (1582) argues that lexicographers must codify a terminological “fundation” for the English tongue. The “grammar master,” he laments, “hath no Elementarie principle” – neither a codified set of rules, nor definitional consensus – from which to draw. Lexicography, Mulcaster argues, needs to identify stable “ellemets or principles, which children ar to deal with,” without which national-linguistic “vnity” proves impossible.

On the mise-en-page’s constitutive role in the production of lexicographic meanings, see Rubright (2007), 25.

A valuable reminder that such texts, regardless of their social “utilitie,” were produced as commodities for distribution within a developing English print economy (Rider). Assertions
of textual kinship and distinction depend, perhaps unsurprisingly, on a reader's definitional parameters (see footnote 3). Identifying the Bibliotheca as a "Dictionarie," Rider invites comparison to earlier compendiums such as Thomas Elyot's Dictionary (London, 1538) and William Salesbury's A Dictionary of English and Welsh (London, 1547), both dedicated to Henry VIII, or perhaps a later chronology such as Thomas (1587). However – and in contrast to chronological contemporaries such as John Baret [Alvearie or Triple Dictionary in Englyshe, Latin, and French (London, 1573)] and Florio (1598) – Rider declines to identify specific influences, referring simply to the "learned men" and "works" that have preceded his text. Such imprecision enables subsequent claims to economic value and textual concision: it is difficult to judge veracity when one does not know the field of comparison.

28 The Bibliotheca is therefore – at least in relation to its Index – organized by column as opposed to page. Thus image 1 reprints columns 1648-1650, yet appears on the 550th printed page of the text. The main body of the text includes approximately 1800 columns, or 600 printed pages. However this number fails to incorporate introductions, dedications, and directions for the reader, as well an extensive Index that nearly doubles the size of the print manuscript.

29 This conspicuous geometric structure and numerical coordinate system reflects the intimate interrelations of science and the humanities in Early Modern England. Among the scholars exploring such relations, including cartography, geometry, mathematics, and the visual arts, see in particular Richard Helgerson, "The Land Speaks: Cartography, Chorography, and Subversion in Renaissance England," in Representing the English Renaissance, ed. Stephen Greenblatt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988); Henry S. Turner, The English Renaissance Stage: Geometry, Poetics, and the Practical Spatial Arts, 1580–1630 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); and the essays collected in Shakespeare and Science, special edition of South Central Review, 25: 1 & 2, ed. Carla Mazzio (Spring and Summer, 2009);

30 As noted, Rider pointedly stress the Bibliotheca's status as the first "Dictionarie, as yet, extant, that hath the Englifh before the Latine."

31 Peter Stallybrass notes just such a distinction between Latin and English in the period, arguing that the "Latinate fantasy of fixed meaning is forced to submit to the orthographic play of the [English] vernacular" (601). See "Shakespeare, the Individual, and the Text," in Cultural Studies, eds. Lawrence Grossberg, Cary Nelson, and Paula A. Treichler (New York: Routledge, 1992), 593-612.

32 Of course, the use of figurative language complicates such specificity: stews were often metaphorically and metonymically, and, potentially, literally associated with brothels. Such imprecision highlights, as in these entries, tensions between specificity and generalization inherent within the terms of whoredom.

33 Stein (1985), 42.

34 Ibid, passim.
Indexical entries do identify a term’s word-class (e.g. parts of speech), but these categories do not impact the organizational structure of this section – as is the case in the English portion of Rider’s text.

Although the frontispiece entitles this “A Table Alphabetical,” the interior pages (as indicated by Figure 3) refer to “An Alphabetical Table.” Scholars adopt the former when referring to Rider’s text.


I adopt these categories from Stein (1985). Subject-field orientation refers to sections organized by category (names of birds, herbs, numbers, etc.). I will discuss these entries later in the chapter.

Stein (1985), 332-352.

Whoredom can also refer to those who “hunt for” the whore. See for example Cotgrave (1611): “Putier”: a whoremonger, whore-hunter; and Thomas Blount, [Glosagogia (London, 16560]: “Scortator”: a whoremonger, a hunter of harlots.

On “verbal discriminators,” see Stein (1985: 322): terms “used to distinguish proper senses from derived ones, [or] indicate different senses of a word or homograph.”

Similar to Rider, Thomas (1587) indicates an array of subtle distinctions among his entries, including differences of age (Scortillium: “a little whore, a young whore”) and location (Virosus: “a stewed or arrant whore.”

The full entries read as follows: “Curtezane”: a Harlot. “Pander”: A bafe fellow that keepeth or attendeth upon Harlots.” This latter entry supports my contention that the terms of whoredom conspicuously incorporated men (“fellow”) as well as women.

This horizontal configuration encourages a reevaluation of Sausaurean and Lacanian theories of the sign. Locating two signifiers side-by-side, the entry appears to reflect a chain of citation. However, if Lacan’s configuration of the sign inverted the (vertical) relationship between signifier and signified – e.g. the elevation of the former over the latter – this early modern configuration encourages scholar to consider, in an era predating modern linguistics, a potential reciprocity, if not equivalence, between contemporary notions of words and meanings. Or, given my point regarding Bright’s surplus “whore,” some of the linguistic and conceptual paradoxes with which these lexicographers were grappling.

Coote’s Scholemaster represents one of the first, if not the first, English lexicographic text listing “prostitute” as either a headword or definition; the term does not appear, for example, in Rider or Bright.
See Bullokar (1616): “Prostitute: To set to open sale: to offer to every man for money.” Cockeram (1623) replicates this first entry word-for-word, but also lists the term as a definition for “to Set out ones body for money,” as well as for “Baldraca: a poore Maid that could not be brought to prostitute her body to the Emperor Otho, albe he proffered her great rewards.” See also Blount (1656): “she that for money suffers herself to be abused by all that come, a common harlot”); and Elisha Coles [An English Dictionary (London, 1676)]: “to let out the use of her body,” both of whom pointedly gender the prostitute as female.

A World of Wordes (London: 1598) and Queen Anna’s New World of Words (1611)

The following terms have been either glossed as, or associated with, “whore” in present-day monographs or editions of early modern texts. These include works listed in footnote 18; Arden, Norton, Oxford, Pelican, and Riverside editions of Shakespeare; and anthologies of other early modern texts.

Figures as of April, 2012. See http://leme.library.utoronto.ca.

My search parameters have been defined by the texts available in the LEME as of April 2012. The timeframe was restricted to approximately 150 years. Citations were selected when associated with illicit sexual practices or states (e.g. defloration, unchaste, etc.), or associated with other illicit terms; in particular, repeated overlaps configured – as opposed to a signifying chain – a cross-referential field of citation. Given the focus of this chapter, I have excluded foreign (Latin, French, etc.) terms from this graph, as well as those predominantly associated with “licit” sexual categories, such as maiden (48) and virgin (108). Nonetheless, it is important to note that licit terms were quite often explicitly linked to those appearing in my graph, whether as antonyms or – as with Bright’s “whore/chaste” – in a seemingly paradoxical combinations. Given the inchoate state of English orthography, terms also appear under a variety of different spellings (Cf. Stallybrass, 1992); As noted in the main text, I have done my best to account for all entries, but my findings nonetheless are suggestive as opposed to exact. For example, “whore” (281) includes “woor, whore,” and hoore,” while “ingle” incorporates “enge,” etc. The most common foreign terms were, in order: meretrix (31), leno (13), putain (10), succuba (7), pucelle (6), lupus (7), and lena (5). As Williams (1983) has shown, consistent orthography may confer the appearance of terminological stability upon a given term, yet consistency in one realm can mask conflict and contradiction in another.


See Tessa Storey, Carnal Commerce in Counter-Reformation Rome (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). In line with my analysis, however, Storey notes that the term’s “use and meaning… shifted noticeably” over the course of the sixteenth century (122).

In addition to Doll Tearsheet (1 + 2 Henry 4), see also Anthony Munday (et al), Sir Thomas More; Thomas Dekker and John Webster, Northward Hoe; Ben Jonson, The Alchemist.

55 Elyot (1583), Baret (1574), Cooper (1584), Thomas (1587), and Florio (1611). See also the entry in Richard Huloet, *Abecedarium anglico latinum* (London, 1552).


57 Cooper (1584), Thomas (1587), Florio (1598, 1611), and Cotgrave (1611).

58 Salebsury (1547), Huloet (1552), Baret (1574), and Cooper (1584) – although the latter adds a sense of “shrewdness” to his description, potentially signaling a shift towards more negative connotations.


60 All citations from *The Riverside Shakespeare*, online edition.

61 In direct contrast to Rider, Huloet (1552) includes several different entries clustered around harlot, including “Harlot,” “Harlot or concubyne,” “Harlot to a wedded man,” “Harlot, whore, or f trumpet mofte commune, and famous aboue other,” “Harlotte whyche medleth wyth a man for a farthpage,” “harlot whom we call a drivelynge.”

62 While such findings suggests differences of genre and discourse, it is worth noting that large portions of the *King James Bible* likely derived from both the *Geneva Bible* (1560) and William Tyndale’s *New Testament* (1525), which supports my general chronological argument.

63 This example demonstrates the manner in which terminological use varies according to the editor and edition. The numbers reflect only the Riverside edition, which removes a suggestively imprecise print term from the Folio edition of *1 Henry VI* – “she and the Dolphin haue bin iugling” – as “juggling,” suppressing the potential trace of the “English” ingle. For a closer analysis of this particular passage, see Chapter 2.


65 Stallybrass (1992: 601). I also suggest that relations depend not only upon textual organization, but also differences genre, medium, speech, etc. That is, early modern lexicography, print drama, and theatre performance may each constitute divergent relations between signifiers.

66 Eve Sedgwick, *Epistemology of the Closet* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). In this influential work, Sedgwick encourages scholarly attention not only to the gaps between, *but also* to the overlaps among, “long-coexisting minoritizing and universalizing, or gender-transitive and gender-intransitive, understandings of same-sex relations” (47).

Chapter 2

Proclamation, Gender, and The first Part of Henry VI

It is not mere chance that St. Joan became, in Shakespeare’s first tetralogy, and in popular British imagination, not only a witch but a whore.

Marilyn French, *Shakespeare’s Division of Experience*

It is in [words] that what we imagine becomes what we know, and, on the other hand, that what we know becomes what we represent to ourselves everyday.

Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things*

I

I begin with the voices of Jeanne la Pucelle. Not those divine tongues heard by the young, fourteenth-century woman from Domrémy, but the cacophonous choruses that surround her, speak for her, and precede her many representations, including those on Shakespeare’s stage. These voices span epochs and cultures, interpretations and ideologies, genres and genders. Some precede the historical figure herself; others speak to, within, and beyond our historical moment. A legend within her lifetime, Jeanne was mythically prophesied by Merlin, the Sybil, and the Venerable Bede; the narratives surrounding her multiplied as she traversed the battlefields of medieval France and Burgundy, witnessed the coronation of Charles VII in Rheims Cathedral, and burned at the stake in Rouen on May 30, 1431. Since, she has been condemned and canonized by the likes of Christine de Pizan, Francoise-Marie Voltaire, David Hume, Friedrich Schiller, Jules Michelet, Pyotr Tchaikovsky, Mark Twain, George Bernard Shaw, Helene Cixous, and Alain Badiou. There is, one might say, something uncanny about Jeanne. She is an epistemological puzzle who produces language: she generates a desire to proclaim who she is, and what her body means.

This will-to-proclaim has produced a seemingly endless list of words and monikers by which Jeanne might be known and categorized. Edward Hall, in his famed English
Chronicle (1542), catalogues Jeanne in a manner symptomatic of this larger cultural impetus to name her through profusion. She is mayd; monster; Ione the puzell; oracle; soothsaier; deuilishe wytche; sathanicall enchaunteres; sorceresse Ione (called the mayde, sent from GOD); wytch or manly woman; blotte…to the Frenche nacion; shephereds daughter; a chamberlain in an hostrie; beggers brat; an enchateresse; an orgayne of the deyill, sent from Sathan, to blind the people and bring them in vnbelife; supersticious sorceresse, and a diabolical blashemeresse of God; a persone scismatike and erroneous, in the lawe of Iesu Christe; pevishe painted Puzel; Image or an Idole; false prophetisse, and seducer of the people (148-159).

Maid and monster. Oracle and witch. Blasphemer and blot and image and error, Jeanne is all things and none – a potent non-persona. In Hall’s account, she appears as a “persone scismatike” – a divisive figure who incorporates terms of division into her physical substance. Or does she? Is there is a body in this text? Hall implies that Jeanne’s meanings partake of her body: of her speech and actions and appearance, of her questionable femininity yet (seemingly) irrefutable womanhood. Yet like other writers, Hall describes this body in its material absence, one hundred years after Jeanne was consigned to ash; he never saw or spoke with Jeanne la Pucelle; he never witnessed her embody, or fail to embody, his manifold terms. Hall’s account thus demonstrates his definitional privilege – a power he claims and uses to proclaim Jeanne’s bodily significance. It also – in its verbal excess, in its mixtures of the material and abstract, the supernatural and everyday – belies the tight conceptual links between derogatory language and lived human embodiment that his catalogue attempts to forge.

In what follows, I query the nature of these relations: how words relate to, permeate, or materialize in human bodies. As a noun, “embodiment” has come to indicate, in early modern studies, the varying ways in which the body was understood and experienced “as embedded in a larger world with which it transacts” in early modern England. In what follows, I want to shift our analytic lens to explore the concept as a verb, a transitive and transformative action that brings the seemingly immaterial – a principle, word, idea, or discourse – into the corporeal. Recent studies of spells, slander, scolding, and even the aural components of stage and sermon attendance highlight this transitive aspect, and have begun to reveal some of the ways in which early moderns perceived words as affective, penetrative, material, and dangerous. I am particularly interested in how early moderns explored what we
might now call language’s performative properties: the capacity for specific words or utterances to produce tangible social, material, and ideological effects. What words mattered in early modern England, how (and where) were such effects produced, and to what extent could they be contested? What, for example, are scholars to make of Robert Burton’s assertion, in *The Anatomy of Melancholy* (1621), that unsettling words might “so suddenly alter the whole temperature of the body, move the soul & spirits, [and] strike such a deep impression, that the parties can never be recovered”? What did early modern playgoers hear in Hamlet’s avowal to “speak Daggers… but vfe none” (TLN 2267)?

As action and process, embodiment raises questions of discursive manifestation and individual contestation—the ways in which individuals can and cannot negotiate socially circumscribed meanings. Instead of resolving the paradoxes engendered by Jeanne’s lexical excess and material embodiment, I examine where they emerge, how they take shape in varying media, and the strategies or tactics employed to manage their dissonance. While stressing material effects—how meanings might manifest in print and utterance, texts and bodies—I also consider possibilities for agency, however limited. Can Jeanne proclaim her own meanings? How might her self-proclaimed meanings assume resonance alongside those voiced by her inquisitors, by Hall, by roles in Shakespeare’s play, and by modern literary critics? To attend to these power dynamics, I adapt Michel de Certeau’s notion of “strategies” and “tactics” to the study of embodiment. By the former, I suggest how empowered institutions and individuals attempt to manage (or mark) Jeanne’s dissonant body. Strategies often transcend singular experiences or embodiments in order to address the inexplicable or unintelligible to a given culture. As Keith Thomas famously argued, singular terms can perform cultural and conceptual work with material effects—not only as a means of explaining the unfathomable, but also by localizing it within a single, excisable body. Here I suggest how different terms—heretic, witch, whore—perform this work in different cultural settings. These terms bear gendered connotations central but irreducible to Jeanne’s unique legacy; all give material form to paradoxes of female authority in patriarchal cultures. While attending to the force of external proclamations, particularly efforts to get Jeanne to make herself intelligible by embodying the terms of her opposition, I also emphasize how she resisted or unsettled these strategic imperatives. As de Certeau reminds us, strategies produce faultlines in a given cultural logic that create space, however limited, for dissident actions or “tactics”: practices through which the disempowered can exploit the
enabling contradictions of an imposed cultural system.\textsuperscript{12} de Certeau’s understandings help illuminate how Jeanne’s embodied meanings were proclaimed and resisted, as well as the cultural work performed by this corporeal reckoning. They also reveal a broader range of meanings and narratives for Jeanne than critics have considered, including her representations in \textit{The first Part of Henry VI}.

In this play and her other historical manifestations, Jeanne’s figure becomes a site for querying how (female) bodies assume meanings in language. Her adopted moniker “pucelle” – and its English homonym “puzel” – encapsulates these enigmatic relations of language and body, implying antithetical states of virginity and sexual accessibility, femininity and phallic authority.\textsuperscript{13} Although it functions like Plato’s chiastic \textit{pharmakon},\textsuperscript{14} the “pucelle” also bears inflections that suggest diverse implications for women – and the female body – in the “texts of Western thought.”\textsuperscript{15} Jeanne may prove both sorcerer (“pharmakeus”) and scapegoat (“pharmakos”), but also limns virgin (“pucelle”) and slut (“puzel”). Moreover, Jeanne \textit{proclaimed herself} a “pucelle,” but \textit{was proclaimed} a “puzel” by her interlocutors. As a term whose early modern connotations included public speech and utterance as well as acts of printing, publishing, and declaring law \textit{(OED)}, “proclaim” demands attention to how Jeanne’s meanings materialize in the texts, utterances, bodies, and practices of a given era. The texts reviewed here illustrate varying needs for such materialization, as well as differing perceptions of success, failure, and resistance. We cannot see the bodies discussed here, but can examine how writers demanded or imagined Jeanne’s material substance. My sense of “proclamation” further clarifies the strategies and tactics I will explore throughout this chapter: \textit{who} proclaims Jeanne’s meanings, and \textit{to what effect}, are the questions we must ask if we are to “puzel” out the logic of her real and imagined, lexical and somatic embodiments.

The London stage emerged as a crucial arena for rehearsing ideas of embodiment – to explore how bodies assumed meanings and how meanings were embodied – in early modern England, and it is thus no coincidence that such processes prove central to the action of \textit{The first Part of Henry VI}. Indeed, Jeanne’s “pucelle” figures in language what the boy actor who played Joan embodied onstage: a split sign that incorporates contradictions of sex, gender, and language.\textsuperscript{16} I address the play in section III, but begin with a short reading of Jeanne’s inquisition and execution in 1431, where I examine efforts to get Jeanne to materialize her \textit{fama publica} (ill reputation): to provide evidence against herself in her own body, statements, and actions. Even when she speaks at the Rouen trial, Jeanne’s comments
are always already mediated by other writers.\textsuperscript{17} To the extent possible, my approach here honors the interrogative and subjunctive moods adopted by Jeanne at Rouen: she asks questions instead of providing answers, exposes contradictions, parodies faultlines in laws and logic, plays with language, and suggests forms of tactical resistance. At times I adopt these unruly tactics, especially in my analysis of Shakespeare’s playtext, where I stress disruptions inherent to \textit{The first Part of Henry VI}; this is not to prescribe theatrical effects, but to acknowledge – indeed encourage – alternative possibilities for Joan’s onstage representations. In marking this excess, I want to suggest that such effects are crucial to her legacy, and that as we walk the faultlines of language and embodiment, we discover new problems and possibilities for imagining (another’s) embodiment in language. In so doing, we probe the limits for our language to give voice to bodies past.

\textbf{II}

It was of paramount importance to Joan’s accusers that her body be corrupted and unholy… the body that for one side was impermeable and unbroken, became vulnerable, broken, permeable, impure to the other.

Marina Warner, \textit{Joan of Arc: The Image of Female Heroism}\textsuperscript{18}

The voices of Jeanne’s execution preserved in historical archives describe a spectacle so rich in its iconography, so stunning in its developments, and so unsettling in its affects as to beggar description. Yet like Hall’s \textit{Chronicle}, these accounts nonetheless \textit{overflow} with words and bodies, as if attempting to bury the indescribable amidst a mass of language. Such effects illustrate Jeanne’s exceptional status in the political unconscious.\textsuperscript{19} They also speak to the problems and possibilities of proclaiming another’s embodied meanings. In their efforts to interrogate her body, publish her meanings, and orchestrate her spectacular condemnation at Rouen, inquisitors used multiple strategies to interpellate Jeanne, or get her to proclaim herself, as the heretic embodied. In so doing, they exposed contradictions in the cultural and legal codes governing their actions. By exploiting these faultlines, Jeanne located sites, however ephemeral, to proclaim her own meanings and counter-narratives. Her dissident tactics drew attention to legal irregularities at her trial, which not only undermined the inquisitional authority that condemned her, but also laid the foundation for the nullification of her sentence in 1456.
On May 30, 1431, Jeanne la Pucelle was led, for the second time in three days, from Rouen Castle to a plaster scaffold erected before the gathered public. As she progressed through the crowd, this seventeen-year old peasant girl, anonymous only three years prior, literally bore the signs of her own condemnation. With her hair shorn to suggest penance, Jeanne wore a mitre – a bishop’s headdress that traditionally signified male office and ecclesiastical authority. Her headdress was of course a mockery, a derisive nod to Jeanne’s claims of divine revelation. So that none might misperceive its symbolic intent, four Latin words – *Heretica, Relapsa, Apostata, Idolater* – were embroidered upon the mitre as inscriptions for the body beneath. As Jeanne passed through their midst, those close to the condemned may also have glimpsed three demonic figures on the cap – Belial, Satan, and Behemoth – intended to re-present Jeanne’s guiding voices: the Archangel Michael, Saint Catherine and Saint Margaret. The cap thus served two essential functions: it disclaimed Jeanne’s voice – evacuating her claims by marking them as counterfeit – and proclaimed her status as an error embodied. It did so by distorting traditional signs of authority.

Should viewers miss the significance of such corporeal, sumptuary, and embroidered markers, Jeanne’s execution included additional visual and oral signs. Recording the scene in his diary, Clément de Fauquembergue notes

> And on a placard in front of the fire in which she was placed were written these words: ‘Joan who had named herself the Pucelle, liar, pernicious person, abuser of people, soothsayer, superstitious woman, blasphemer of God, presumptuous, unbeliever in the faith of Jesus Christ, boaster, idolater, cruel, dissolute, invoker of devils, apostate, schismatic, and heretic.’

In all likelihood, Pierre Cauchon, Bishop of Beauvais and lead inquisitor, also proclaimed these terms, as sentences were traditionally read aloud prior to execution. Inquisitors apparently sought to execute Jeanne both in body and words, to surround her with myriad signs of condemnation in order to char her name before they charred her body. Perched above and below Jeanne, proclaimed for all to hear, such signs were invested with the authority of the medieval church and mobilized to legitimate her execution.

Such excessive signifying practices imply anxiety on the inquisitors’ behalf but also underscore a concerted effort to divest Jeanne’s speech of its remarkable power. The placard illustrates such concerns, especially in the acknowledgment that she “*named herself the Pucelle.*” At the most basic level, self-nomination implies self-assertion – an act that, in Jeanne’s case, supplants the customary role of the family patriarch. But the phrase also, along
with other inferences of fraudulent speech, attacks the foundation of Jeanne’s rhetorical agency. As codified by Church fathers like Gregory of Nyssa, Ambrose, and Augustine, holy virginal women could, through the public renunciation of sexual relations, lay claim to a “state of wholeness and perfection” that transcended even masculine church authority. By claiming this status, Jeanne surpassed the strictures that traditionally “delimit[ed] and define[d] her sex,” including the right to public speech. As François Meltzer has demonstrated, she was an extraordinary and dangerous exception to the dominant orders of her era. I am less interested, however, in the nature of Jeanne’s authority than in how inquisitors negotiated her state of exception – the strategies through which they reestablished, or sought to reestablish, the right to proclaim meanings in her material body.

Following the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215, legal procedure demanded, as the basis for an inquisition, what was known as *fama publica* – a collective, public sense of the accused’s “ill reputation.” On the basis of rumor, inquisitors could arrest and charge individuals without evidence, but were required to establish – retrospectively – infamy to legitimate the trial. This stipulation demanded creative, sometimes coercive, legal maneuvering as prosecutors hauled defendants into court to investigate *fama*, hoping that the accused would then make statements validating the charge. Trials thus depended upon a rhetorical paradox: in order to silence the accused, inquisitors had to let them speak. In Jeanne’s case, Cauchon “explained that public fame had reported many of her deeds to be harmful to orthodox faith and that therefore it was incumbent upon him to hold a trial concerning the faith.” In a telling move, however, the search for evidence at Rouen began not in a dialogue with Jeanne but an examination of her hymeneal integrity; the material body was the first witness in the inquisition of Jeanne la Pucelle. This was the second such occurrence, as Jeanne also submitted to a virginity exam before meeting the Dauphin at Chinon. Valuating female (hymeneal) integrity over female speech, this repetition suggests that Jeanne’s material body was the privileged site for the construction and interpretation of her potential meanings. In both cases, when the hymen spoke – as translated by female examiners – Jeanne was “found to be woman and virgin and *pucelle.*”

When the body failed to provide (the desired) evidence, inquisitors sought proof by means of self-proclamation. Turning to Jeanne’s speech, Cauchon attempted to secure statements that would provide, in trial transcripts, tangible evidence of heresy. To achieve this goal, he conducted six public and nine private interrogations, with as many as sixty-two
male clerics at each session. As Jeanne’s statements accumulated in writing, inquisitors began to repeat questions in an attempt to make her contravene earlier statements. This particular strategy sought evidence of perjury as well as heresy; if Jeanne contradicted her sworn testimony, she was a heretic for lying under oath. The most frequent line of re-questioning focused upon the materiality of Jeanne’s divine voices – the literal matter of Gabriel, Margaret, and Catherine. Inquisitors wanted to know whether these voices had hair, bodies, eyes, clothing, crowns, or arms. As Marina Warner notes, any suggestion that Jeanne’s voices possessed “substance” would be taken as proof that “they belonged to the lower, demonic class where the trammels of the flesh still lived” (128-9). Material substance – hymeneal, scribal, even ethereal – was sought and privileged in her inquisition.

Fatigued and almost impossibly circumscribed by language, Jeanne managed to repeatedly escape Cauchon’s rhetorical traps. Despite scribal mediation, the extant trial records, translated by Craig Taylor, reveal a series of brilliantly evasive tactics by which Jeanne exposed or parodied fractures in her inquisitors’ governing logic. Asked, for example, “if she saw St Michael and the angels corporeally and really,” Jeanne replied “I saw them with the eyes of my body, just as well as I see you” (153). By shifting the corporeal object of Cauchon’s interrogative – from the saints to herself – Jeanne syntactically evaded heretical inferences. She chose a different tactic when asked “in what form, size, appearance and clothing St Michael came to her,” adopting a vague rhetoric as she responded “that he was in the form of a very true and upright man, and that she would not say anything more about his clothing or other things” (197). In so doing, Jeanne forced inquisitors to draw upon their own definitions or imaginative frameworks to evaluate her response. Jeanne also turned interrogatives back on her inquisitors. When Cauchon probed potential divisions between “our lord the pope” and “whom she believed to be the true pope,” Jeanne neither denied nor affirmed papal legitimacy, responding instead “by asking if there were two of them” (159). How Cauchon received this counter-question is unknown. According to the extant record, he simply moved on to the next question.

Clearly, Jeanne deciphered Cauchon’s rhetorical strategies and responded with a series of sharp, tactical rejoinders. During the sixth public examination, for example, Cauchon discussed Jeanne’s public reception at Rheims, implying her excessive pride and/or status as an idol among the people. Yet when he reviewed a specific episode wherein local women touched Jeanne’s ring, she countered that “many women touched my hands and my
rings, but I do not know their thought or intention” (171). On other occasions, she would simply defer direct response, claiming that “she did not remember” (188), “will answer that another time” (181), or will not speak “without the permission of her voice” (152).

Despite such maneuvers, Jeanne’s tactical options proved limited. This condition is perhaps best exemplified by a line of questioning that centered upon her willingness to submit to the Church militant (the church as manifest on earth) as the representative of the Church triumphant (God’s divine hierarchy). Although this inquiry broached a deeply contested theological issue,28 inquisitors elided points of doctrinal disagreement to focus solely on submission to authority – whether Jeanne would submit to church patriarchs or to her divine voices. With characteristic savvy, Jeanne again subverted the question: “I submit myself to God who sent me, to the Blessed Mary and to all the saints of heaven. And it seems to me that God and the church are one, and no difficulty should be made about this. Why do you make difficulties about this?” When inquisitors briefly distinguished the two, once more demanding a selection, Jeanne replied that she “would not answer anything more for now” (197-8).

Unable to secure irrefutable proof of heresy, Cauchon shifted strategies. On May 23, 1431, inquisitors declared Jeanne a heretic, schismatic, apostate, and witch and sentenced her to death by fire. Her only option, it appeared, was to recant her claims of divine mandate before the gathered public, an action that would confirm *fama publica* by proving her a liar. Cauchon had crafted an ingenious double bind: Jeanne would either burn as an obstinate heretic unwilling to submit to church authority, or proclaim herself as such and submit to that same authority. In both cases, however, evidence of heresy depended upon Jeanne – whether by her confession or silence. Given her recalcitrance during the inquisition, prosecutors likely expected Jeanne to remain defiant and perform heresy to the crowd.29 If so, they clearly misread her rhetorical tactics at trial, thus underestimating her ability to slip through even the most deliberately constructed of double binds.

In place of confession or sacrilegious silence, Jeanne selected a third route, requesting direct appeal to the Pope. It was a brilliant move, one that eluded Cauchon’s coercive binary and publicly undermined one of the charges – a refusal to submit to church authority. Moreover, Jeanne displayed her knowledge of, and adherence to, ecclesiastical law – which inquisitors subsequently violated by denying her petition. Jeanne’s dissident tactics continued. When presented with a writ of abjuration moments later, she again stunned
witnesses by signing the document. This signature bore significant legal and ideological weight. By marking the abjuration, Jeanne agreed in writing to stipulations – including the rejection of male attire – whose breach authorized her execution. Yet even this discursive mark proves a complex sign of Jeanne’s self-inscription. When presented with the document, Joan did not pen her proper name but instead “in a mocking guise… made a kind of circle.” As Larissa Juliet Taylor notes, “even though [she] could not read or write, she could sign her name. That she did not do so is revealing.” The notation, Taylor argues, may have represented another mark – “the cross in a circle” – that Jeanne used to “tell her followers not to believe what she wrote” (159). This was not a signature, therefore, but an anti-signature, a signifier disclaiming its own value. Although Jeanne was ultimately circumscribed by the terms of the abjuration, these events – and the tactics she used to circumvent them – illustrate the labor entailed in (her) abjection. They also reveal her resistance even in apparent submission, even in the marks of self-condemnation.

What occurred between the time of Jeanne’s abjuration and execution remains unclear, but existing accounts raise further questions regarding her proclaimed embodiment, especially in terms of gender, agency, and authority. According to court records, Jeanne returned to her cell after the abjuration, assumed female attire as ordered, and had her head shaved in penance. Three days later, Cauchon reported that she had resumed wearing masculine attire and was thus condemned by virtue of her signature. If Jeanne knew that the armor she donned would signify relapse and life-threatening disobedience, why did she change clothing? Taylor interprets the episode as the reclamation of knightly identity, but notes another disturbing possibility: according to Martin Ladvenu, a Dominican friar, Jeanne claimed “she was attacked violently by a great English lord who tried to rape her… this was why she was forced to resume wearing men’s clothes” (160). Another priest, Jean Massieu, offered a related account:

She asked the English guards to undo her chains. Then one of the guards tore off the women’s clothing she was wearing and… threw the male attire to her, ordering her to get up. She responded, ‘You know that is forbidden to me. I will not put them on.’ But they would not return the other clothes. This went on for about an hour until finally, out of necessity, she was constrained to get out of bed and put on the clothing (160).

Within this space of female confinement, one point appears indisputable: the means for Jeanne’s self-incrimination had been placed at her disposal. As Taylor notes, “if those around
Jeanne wanted her to keep the promises she made on May 24, all male clothing would have been taken from her cell” (160-1). Whether proclaiming or protecting herself, Jeanne – by putting on those clothes – “embodied” the heretic. Her actions, no matter how forced, brought her body into accordance with the signs of heresy.

Jeanne’s persecutors carefully orchestrated her execution yet still failed to silence her. Even as she burned, Jeanne contested the material and discursive means by which others had proclaimed her meanings. Boldly proclaiming her faithful service to God, Christ, the Holy Spirit, and the Virgin Mary, she reiterated her divine narrative and cast herself as a Christian martyr. These appeals, along with her spectacular suffering, moved witnesses to tears and impelled many to reconsider her sanctity. Even Jean Tressart, secretary to the English King Henry VI, admitted, “we are all lost, because a saint has been burned.”

The semiotic surplus of the Rouen episodes reveals a desire to make Jeanne provide the material evidence – by hymeneal lack, self-proclamation or perjury, signature, attire, or silence – of her own heresy. Yet by focusing on Jeanne’s rhetorical and corporeal tactics, we discover that Jeanne drew authority from the languages and laws of medieval patriarchy and used these discourses to proclaim her agency and identity. First, she forced inquisitors to violate their own canons, exposing the cultural and legal contradictions that enabled her execution. Second, when convicted without evidence of fama publica, she appealed to papal authority and thus undermined the charges against her. Third, and perhaps in light of her successful resistance, she was judged only in ecclesiastical court, despite the fact that canon law required ecclesiastical and secular pronouncements prior to sentencing. These aggregate violations – brought to light and even produced by Jeanne’s tactical maneuvers – ultimately facilitated the 1456 nullification of her sentence.

To authorize Jeanne’s execution, inquisitors had to empower the very body they sought to destroy – one that continued to speak amidst ashes and even in absentia. Moments after Jeanne fell silent upon the stake – when it appeared that she had expired – the executioner stepped forward and temporarily put out the fire:

Then the fire was raked back, and her naked body was shown to all the people, with all the secrets that could or should belong to a woman, to remove any doubt from the people. When they had looked upon her as long as they wanted, her dead body bound to the stake, the executioner got a large fire going again under her poor carcass, which was promptly engulfed, and her bones and her flesh were reduced to ashes.
It is an incredible image: a body subject to interrogation and violation even in death. According to the writer, this “naked body” demystifies Jeanne and exposes “all the secrets that could or should belong to a woman.” It is stripped to remove “any doubt[s].” Yet another male spectator argues precisely the opposite, describing a spectacle more enigmatic than explanatory: “there were many people there, and elsewhere, who said that she had been martyred for her true lord. Others said that she was not, and that the one who looked after her for so long had acted evilly.”

Between these voices one imagines a female body, forever diminishing from view, its material substance slowly “reduced to ashes.” Readers are left only with images and voices, with “secrets” and “doubt[s].”

Nearly one hundred and fifty years later, English playgoers would encounter a new incarnation of “Joan de Puzel,” restored from the ashes on the London stage. How does The first Part of Henry VI think through this overdetermined body? How might her representation speak to past histories – and raise yet new questions for language and embodiment in Elizabeth England? A potential surrogate for Elizabeth, “Joan” may have offered English playgoers a dead figure through which the paradoxes of a living queen might be explored. Alien and uncanny, Jeanne was an ideal figure for dramatic representation. Carole Levin aptly summarized the stakes: “perhaps the best queen of all is a dead one; one who can be made to stand for whatever one wishes” (5-6). In the last decade of the sixteenth-century, with the English queen still very much alive, perhaps it was another woman, “Aftrea’s Daughter” (TLN 644), who best served that cultural function.

III

Thus Ioane de Puzel hath perform’d her word.

The first Part of Henry VI (TLN 643).

In a famed spectator’s account of The first Part of Henry VI, Thomas Nashe recalls the wonder with which audiences experienced the renaissance – the “new birth” – of John Talbot on the London stage:

How would it have joyed brave Talbot, the terror of the French, to think that after he had lain two hundred years in his tomb, he should triumph again on the stage, and have his bones new embalmed with the tears of ten thousand spectators at least (at several times) who in the tragedian that represents his person imagine they behold him fresh bleeding.
For Nashe, the spectacle suggests the imaginative and affective possibilities of late sixteenth-century English dramaturgy: players and companies can, he implies, re-incarnate the heroic dead for contemporary audiences. Such embodied *exempla*, he alleges, inspire English masculine virtue: Talbot’s triumphant “bleeding” bodies offer sharp “reproof to these degenerate effeminate days of ours.” Yet just as Nashe commends Talbot’s virile resurrection, he elides the simultaneous reincarnation of Joan de Puzel, Talbot’s stage nemesis. How audiences felt upon seeing the female “Englifh Scourge” returned to human form goes unremarked (TLN 335).

Nashe’s silence proves more significant as it is Joan, not Talbot, who triumphs onstage – and whose body proves the central subject of inquiry in *The firft Part*. Frenchmen and Englishmen alike praise Talbot’s heroism, yet the play’s action foregrounds his defeats, if not outright dissolution, whether at Joan’s hand or her rhetorical puissance. Talbot may triumph in the play’s masculine discourses, but he spends most of his time onstage confused and “fresh bleeding.” These disjunctions assume theoretical form in Talbot’s famed distinction between “shadow” and “substance.” Arguing that his (masculine) self transcends the body – that he exists in name, language, fraternity, and paternity – Talbot proclaims himself an idea or essence irreducible to the body: “what you see,” he tells the Countess, “if but the smalllest part, / And least proportion of Humanitie” (TLN 892-894).

This logic seems inapplicable to Joan, who appears, in *The firft Part*, solely intelligible in the terms of her body. How she confirms and corrodes this gendered logic – how she does and does not embody the terms by which she is proclaimed – provides the foundation for the play’s dramatic action. It is Joan, not Talbot, in whom relations of shadow and substance achieve their fullest expression in the play.

Burgundy gives voice to the central mystery of *The firft Part* early in the second act: “But what’s that Puzell whom they tearme fo pure?” (TLN 698). The interrogative addresses Joan’s early victories onstage, if not also a seemingly unimaginable chapter of English history, wherein this puzzle or pucelle or puzel led French forces to repeated military victories over the English. Yet Burgundy also suggests a power to “tearme” her substance: “they” proclaim her “pure.” He speaks, presumably, of the French, whom playgoers and readers have already encountered; indeed while Burgundy and his English peers retrospectively debate Joan’s substance, members of the French court have already proleptically configured
her meanings – which are then reiterated, and interrogated, throughout the play. The Bastard of Orleans is the first of many – all men – to “tearme” Joan:

*Bast*: A holy Maid hither with me I bring,
Which by a Vifion fent to her from Heauen
Ordayned is to rayfe this tedious Siege,
And driue the Englifh forth the bounds of France:
The fpirt of deepe Prophecie fhe hath,
Exceeding the nine *Sibyls* of old Rome:
What’s paft, and what’s to come, fhe can defcry (TLN 251-257).

However laudatory, the Bastard’s thick description serves less to codify than to confound; a “holy Maid” who exceeds the “nine *Sibyls* of Rome,” Joan is an “ordained,” martial, vocal, and prophetic woman in a period of hegemonic patriarchy. Her contradictions and allusions only proliferate as the scene continues: the Dauphin alone reads her in relation to the Amazons, Deborah, Helen of Constantine, Mohammed, Venus, and Saint Philip’s daughters (TLN 307-352). Male and female, mythical and biblical, maid and mother, daughter and wife – Joan emerges amidst a patchwork of references to absent bodies, names that point away from her material substance.

Joan is of course a fictional character, a role conceived by English writers and represented by a boy actor on the London stage. Despite such circumscription, she is nonetheless imagined to resist, parody, and use the languages of the play to her own ends. If her tactics are hard to distinguish from the strategies used by her male counterparts, this overlap proves crucial to our understanding of her paradoxical puissance: she is both empowered and constrained in (the) terms of her body. While Joan does not, in contrast to the Bastard and Charles’s metaphorical projections, compare herself to other women, she does define her exceptional status by reference to the female body: “whereas I was black and fwart before, / with thofe cleare Rayes, which fhee infus’d on me, / That beautie am I bleft with, which you may fee” (TLN 286-288). Beautiful, martial, and chaste, she is and is not a woman. “Thou fhalt finde that I exceed my Sex,” she tells Charles, but then notes that “Christs Mother helps me, elfe I were to weake” (TLN 291-310). Such lines reveal the narrow space Joan occupies in the languages of the play; even as she demarcates a sex of her own, Joan draws upon recognizable narratives of sanctified femininity – annunciation and holy virginity – as if she were solely intelligible in these terms. Unlike Talbot, Joan does not divorce her corporeal and discursive selves. If she can only be imagined in the terms of her mortal coil, then Joan inhabits this logic. Construing a femininity that is metaphysical *and*
meta-physical, she unsettles the boundaries of material and ethereal to proclaim an embodiment of her own.

This early scene depicts multiple utterances but also meaningful actions. Joan proclaims her substance but also displays this exceptional status, proving her prophetic “skill” (TLN 263) by identifying the Dauphin and demonstrating her “Courage” by defeating him in “fingle Combat” (TLN 297). In so doing, she links self-proclamation and corporeal action, illustrating what I will characterize as an “embodied proclamation”: an act of (self)-nomination that emerges through an array of signifying practices. Crucially, varying signs need not align: Joan’s embodiment emerges through conjunction and disjunction, alignment and contestation.

The battle to define Joan’s embodied substance assumes many forms, including a concurrent discourse that emerges in this first scene to reframe her martial and rhetorical successes. Just as she achieves tangible victories at court and in battle, Joan’s male counterparts – French and English alike – read and reconfigure these feats in misogynist terms. When she proclaims holy virginity, the Dauphin reads her as an erotic object: “Impatiently I burne with thy desire” (TLN 312). When she negotiates with Charles, Alençon warns “Thefe women are fhrewd tempters with their tongues” (TLN 329). When she routs English troops in battle, Talbot disparages her as a “Strumpet” and “Witch” (TLN 591-598). This compulsive commentary produces a semantic net that encircles Joan’s staged body, drawing tighter until she appears bound by the terms of her persecution.

However slanderous, this discourse amplifies Joan’s substance in these early scenes; as the terms and voices surrounding her accrue, she appears less linguistically diminished than existentially expansive – an eerie successor to Henry V as one whose “Deeds exceed all fpeech” (TLN 23). Indeed, it is Talbot’s substance that appears at risk when he faces this female potentate: “where,” he vexes, “is my strength, my valour, my force?” (TLN 591). When Talbot struggles to imagine her, however, Joan dismisses these projections as the ramblings of an imaginative child. “Come, come,” she chides, “‘tis only I that muft disgrace / thee” (TLN 599-600, emphasis added). Scorning his famed “ftrength” and displaying her own, Joan leaves this bewildered adversary in her wake. “My thoughts are whirled like a Potters Wheele,” Talbot says, “I know not where I am, nor what I doe” (TLN 614-615):

A Witch by feare, not force, like Hannibal,
Drives back our troupes, and conquers as she lifts:
So Bees with fmoake, and Doues with noyfome ftench,
Are from the Hyues and Houfes drieuen away.
   They call’d vs, for our fierceness, Englifh Dogges,
   Now like to Whelpes, we crying runne away. (TLN 616-621).

As if inhabited by Joan, Talbot spews metaphors that approach catachresis: a “Witch… like Hannibal” has achieved tangible victories. Conquering with apparent ease, Joan exposes Talbot’s “Englifh Dogges,” as “Whelpes,” “Bees,” and “Doues.” From this angle, she appears less like “Circe” – as York later proclaims her (TLN 2467) – than something ineffable, beyond form, as impossible to encapsulate as “fmoake” itself. She also appears uncannily similar to Talbot, albeit more successful. As if extracting his virility, Joan scythes the English imagination and secures material results; she “conquers,” while he teeters on the brink of dissolution (TLN 617).

It is no coincidence that the next scene – one that links Talbot’s dismal cry to Burgundy’s pivotal interrogative – approaches the dangerous apex of allusive language in late Elizabethan England. Having “perform’d her word” in battle, Joan is recognized by the Dauphin as a female head of state: she is “Aftreas Daughte” – as the emblem of a (new) golden age and, as the substitute for “Saint Dennis [sic],” the heir apparent to church and state (TLN 643-669). As unsettling inferences intimate the unspeakable paradoxes of Elizabeth’s body politic, the Englishmen retake their “places” onstage and pledge to “be vigilant” (676). Indeed, Talbot appears before and after Charles’s uncanny allusions to bookend disquieting resonances. And despite his confusion, he does “doe” something by reiterating terms and paradigms that seek to contract Joan’s apparently inconceivable existence. He draws the net tighter. This strategy achieves sharper focus in the following scene, when Burgundy utters his pivotal inquiry:

Bur: But what’s that Puzell whom they tearme fo pure?
Tal: A Maid, they say.
Bed: A Maid? And be fo martill?
Bur: Pray God shee prise not maeculine ere long:
   If vnderneath the Standard of the French
   She carry Armour, as she hath begun.
Tal. Well, let them practife and conuerfe with fpirits.
    God is our Fortreffe, in whose conquering name
    Let vs refolue to feale their flinty bulwarkes (TLN 698-706)

As before, Joan disturbs English syntax, her dissonance assuming poetic form in Bedford’s caesura: “A Maid? / And be fo martill?” This time, however, the men locate resolution,
albeit ephemeral, in the terms of witchcraft – a discourse that located the unfathomable within a single, excisable body. These rhetorical and conceptual moves appear to work; the men are quickly “Agreed” and return to battle (TLN 705-718).

Yet if such “tearmes” console the men, they do so in the absence of Joan’s unsettling body. As such, they appear less as corporeal weapons or transcendental signifiers that define her embodied substance than as cultural tools that she must continually navigate – and that demand tremendous tactical effort. It is a laborious strategy, for both sides. Despite these nominative attacks, Joan proves more Teflon than “Trull” (TLN 799). Whereas the “Cry of Talbot” serves Englishmen like a “sword” that hews Frenchmen on the fields of battle (TLN 768-770), no singular term lacerates Joan’s substance; instead, Englishmen hurl numerous slurs in her direction, as if attempting to bury her beneath slanderous sediment. She is a deceitfull Dame, Witch, damned Sorceresse, vile Fiend, fhaveleffe Curtizan, Foule Fiend of France, Hag of all delight, luftfull, Damfell, rayling Hecate, Pucel, Giglot Wench, Damfell of France, vgly Witch, fell banning Hagge, Inchantreffe, Mifcreant, Sorceresse, Graceliffe, Wicked and vile, curfed Drab, Gyrle, Strumpet, fowle accurfed minifter of Hell.41

The question, of course, is why these uncanny echoes of Edward Hall, Clement de Fauquembergue, and others? As a stage for embodiment, the notorious final scenes of Joan de Puzel in the play offer important clues – and raise new questions.

Prior to the summoning and condemnation, the semantic field encircling Joan accrues in marked tension with her expansive puissance. Indeed, after she cognitively castrates Talbot, Joan oversees victories at Rouen and Bordeaux, the deaths of Talbot and his son, and the defection of Burgundy – a rhetorical victory that highlights her command of affective language. Submitting to Joan’s entreaty, Burgundy confesses “Thefe haughtie wordes of hers / Haue batt’red me like roaring Cannon-fhot” (TLN 1670-1672). Such verbal authority contrasts with an English linguistic impotence; when Lucy eulogizes Talbot, Joan juxtaposes his “filly fately flile” with the body that “Stinking and fly-blowne lyes here at our feete” (TLN 2308-2310). If the claim suggests that Joan, like the Countess, cannot grasp English masculine “substance,” her raw corporeal imagery, and more importantly the material body that lies “at [their] feete,” unsettles this implicit critique. Talbot may transcend the corporeal, playgoers like Nashe may remember or reiterate Lucy’s proclaimed meanings, but above his “stinking and fly_blowne” corpse Shakespeare places Joan. And she is laughing.
Joan’s dissidence underscores Lucy’s absurd blindness – his inability to see the messy, lived, human body that lies before him. But her laughter can also be heard in a more threatening tenor – one that mocks the cultural illogic of a play that celebrates insubstantial Talbot yet depends upon Joan’s (self-)proclaimed embodiment to achieve dramatic closure. Just as Lucy transforms Talbot’s male corpse into sheer discourse, Joan begins to embody the roles prescribed for her: woman and witch. These processes begin perhaps with her dissident laughter, but they are further manifested – and materialized – by the appearance of her “Fiends” onstage. If so, this strategy provides closure through contradiction and paradox. The summoning and condemnation give dramatic form to Marina Warner’s canny insight regarding the historic Jeanne la Pucelle: “the English side believed in Joan the Maid more than the French” (110, emphasis added).

Joan’s extended denouement stages these paradoxical beliefs and other enabling contradictions – and thus provides further space for tactical dissidence. According to the Folio stage directions, when Joan summons her “Familiar Spirits,” they do materialize onstage (TLN 2431), even if they fail to do her bidding. As such, while these specters “argue [material] proof” of Joan’s maleficence (TLN 2434), they secure dramatic closure by violating a central tenant of Protestant reform. They also affirm Joan’s vocal authority in order to evacuate it; in a surreal twist on the Rouen episode, her voices do materialize yet fail to speak. Such paradoxes illuminate her subsequent denigration at the hands of the English court. Already “condemn’d to burne” as a “Sorcereffe” (TLN 2561), Joan is subjected to further condemnation. Why? Without precedent in the source materials, these exchanges provide further evidence of Joan’s demonic status by staging her disregard for, and condemnation by, patriarchal authority – practices that appear to substantiate the charges against her, and thus produce the body to be excised. Her censure begins at the hand of an unknown French shepherd working in apparent collusion with the English nobility. This pater-ex-machina requests that Joan “Kneele downe and take my bleffing” (TLN 2665), an action that would perform her submission, and restoration, to the religious and patriarchal orders. When she denies both entreaty and authority (“Thou are no Father, nor no Friend of mine,” TLN 2647-2649), the shepherd not only links social dissidence to sexual incontinence but demands the annihilation of her body: “Doeft thou deny thy Father, curfed Drab? / O burne her, burne her, hanging is too good” (TLN 2672-2673).
Joan’s response, as well as her final exchanges with York and Warwick, poses further questions regarding her proclaimed embodiment. After reasserting her rights to self-proclamation – “Firft let me tell you whom you haue condemn’d” – Joan castigates an English imaginary that insistently sexualizes her body, without evidence, yet cannot envisage her presence “but by helpe of diuels”:

But you that are polluted with your luftes

Corrupt and tainted with a thousand vices:

Becaufe you want the grace that others haue,

You iudge it fraft a thing impofsible

To compaffe Wonders, but by helpe of diuels.

No mifconceyued, Ione of Aire hath beene

A Virgin from her tender infancie,

Chafte, and immaculate in very thought,

Whofe Maiden-blood thus rigoroufly effus’d

Will cry for Vengeance, at the Gates of Heauen (TLN 2683-2693).

“Misfconceyued” – Joan seems to reflect back upon her own reception throughout the play, acknowledging the discourses that have followed her but crucially hurling the terms of feminine transgression back upon her accusers. It is they who are polluted, lustful, and graceless. They too are enmeshed in the semantic net that circumscribes her. It is a “polluted” imaginary that reads her as impossible, permeable, feminine, and demonic. Whereas signs of witchcraft have materialized, Joan’s tactics nonetheless query interpretive practices and notions of evidence. What have playgoers seen? What are the links between proclamation and proof? Action and inference? Witchery and whoredom?

Joan further amplifies social and ideological contradictions in the pregnancy dialogues that follow. Although scholars have long taken these claims as evidence of Joan’s whoredom, they make sense from a tactical perspective – and foreground the crucial issue of evidence in the languages of (female) embodiment. When York demands her “execution” (TLN 2694), Joan shifts tactics to redefine herself in his terms; recognizing her entrapment, she draws upon the terms encircling her to plead for life. She begins by stressing her feminine “infirmity” as an appeal for mercy. When this fails, she requests the “priuiledge” of pregnancy recusal as “warranteth by Law,” and then claims the status of an elite mistress (TLN 2699-2721). Even as she interpellates herself in their terms, Joan traps her oppressors in a series of double binds. If playgoers believe female infirmity, her claims support the accusation that her persecutors have “vnrelenting hearts.” If they assume her
promiscuity, her claims to pregnancy bear some validity – and thus her execution represents a violation of religious and secular “Law” (TLN 2699); if they suppose her virginity, then this dialogic exchange exposes a strategic interpretive practice that can only read, fantasize, and abject Joan in sexualized terms. As York himself declares, “She and the Dolphin haue bin iugling, / I did imagine that would be her refuge” (TLN 2708-9, emphasis added).

As a metonym for anal sex, York’s “iugling” juggles multiple resonances – ingling the English sexual imaginary – but it also suggests that Joan’s imagined embodiment, if always already circumscribed, likewise proves always already disruptive, demanding other meanings and possibilities. Early in the play, Joan proclaims “Glory is like a Circle in the Water, / Which neuer ceafeth to enlarge it felfe, / Till by broad fpreading, it difperfe naught.” A metonym for reputation or substance or language or puissance, “Glory,” in The first Part, refers as much to Joan as to the “English Circle” she identifies (TLN 339-341). It is a fitting image for Joan’s ephemeral authority, but also for an embodied self that, in its shadow and substance, suggests what cannot be fully codified, contained, or excised in either language or body. Talbot claims that his substance transcends the corporeal, yet is forgotten as the tetralogy proceeds. It is Joan who persists beyond the frame of the play, not only as a phoenix reborn in Margaret,45 but as a figure for tactical maneuver, self-proclamation, and resistance within a constrictive political unconscious.

Joan also voices the paradoxes of that woman who was “naught” onstage; who also refused to “Kneele down” before any man; who also exceeded her sex – yet could not be, literally, entangled in a net and hauled offstage, as “Joan” was in a 1990 English Shakespeare Company production of the play;46 who was also a phoenix, Gloriana, Astraea, Judith, Deborah, Belphoebe, Sweet Cynthia, Elizabeth I, and the Virgin Queen – as well as Jezebel, Arrant Whore, Little Whore, and the daughter of the Great Whore.47 Preceded and surrounded by language, Joan’s representation in The first Part suggests the (visceral) cultural labor necessary to grapple with, if not fully circumscribe, an exceptional virginal female body in Elizabethan England. In doing so, she opens breaches in even the most restrictive of social fabrics – and encourages attention not only to those tears, but how they might be hemmed, stitched, or torn asunder.

**Coda**
Students are often surprised to encounter Joan de Puzel in *The First Part*, unaware that Shakespeare participated in shaping her extended historical legacy. Far less familiar than Juliet or Cleopatra, less notorious than Lady Macbeth, Joan is a puzzling figure. Students wonder, why haven’t they heard of Shakespeare’s Joan? This conundrum may reflect her reception within the scholarly and performance traditions: neither one of “Shakespeare’s Heroines” nor his “Unruly Women,” her representations has been read as a “virtual parody”; an obscene archetype; the “caricatured” foil for the English Talbot; the sign of threatening “female sexuality” and Renaissance “antifeminism”; a “composite portrait of the ways women are dangerous to men”; a “mythological system”; and a “smudgy cartoon.” Where terminological plentitude signals characterological lack, Joan proves too full of words and too empty of substance to embody a coherent identity.

Yet just as many Shakespeareans critique Joan as at once too excessive and too empty, they almost universally imagine and proclaim her illicit sexual status. Echoing her assertion – voiced as she begs for life – that she bears the child of Charles, Alençon, or Reinher, scholars declare that Joan “sleeps with the Dauphin”; that the “reiterated innuendo of sexual misconduct is made utterly explicit in her confession”; and that her “sexuality is not only demonic but obsessive in its promiscuity and seeming insatiability.”

She is “a vixen of monstrous pretensions and ingratitude”; a “polluted… and self-proclaimed harlot”; and a “diabolic whore.” Although “an outwardly immaculate virgin,” she “turns out to be a slut underneath.” Such imagined sexual plenitude – one scholar cites her “many lovers” – permeates the critical tradition. When it comes to Joan, the sexual subjunctive almost invariably turns declarative – if not imperative.

*The First Part* offers clues to how this happens. It demonstrates what I call, following Judith Butler, “strategies of sedimentation:” the reiteration – and reapplication – of slanderous terms until they assume the appearance of stability. While this strategy enables dissident tactics, it also suggests the weight of empowered proclamations – and the difficulty of navigating one’s own embodied meanings, especially when occupying a culturally marginal position. Indeed, the three “bodies” discussed here encourage attention to the ways and means of cultural proclamation, whether by utterance, legal transcript, dramatic playtext, or literary criticism. They also suggest how three particular terms (heretic, witch, whore) perform related cultural work in differing periods and contexts: overlapping yet irreducible to one another, each reveal some of the ways that female substance has been imagined or
made intelligible. Given these effects, my triptych stresses the need to consider voice – to discern who speaks Jeanne’s meanings, and how they proclaim her body-in-language. My thinking here encourages further attention to what I have called “proclaimed embodiment” in early modern England, especially as a site for interrogating how cultural discourses are and are not resisted in the terms of the body. But more importantly, I call attention to problems of epistemology – to what can and cannot be known, to how knowledge is perceived, attained, or challenged – and how such problems are navigated in specific cultural contexts.

Such an approach might challenge our own languages and imaginaries. We might begin by interrogating the terms of embodiment circulating in our own critical lexicons. In his Arden edition of the play, Edward Burns reads Shakespeare’s Joan as a “kind of optical paradox as well as an embodied word-play, as a trick of point of view, like the anamorphic figure that can be read one way as a young woman, the other as a hag” (27). This claim encourages scholars to approach Joan from oblique or alternative perspectives, yet remains grounded in the binary thinking that Burns critiques: describing Joan as “a summation of binary categories normally seen as discrete – saint/whore, peasant/gentry, villain/hero, man/woman, virgin/whore,” he simply alters the terms of the lexicon, seeing her as an aggregation of binaries as opposed to a figure who disrupts binary thinking altogether. These continued paradoxes suggest an ongoing need to resolve or codify Joan in familiar terms: “the critical controversies surrounding the depiction of Jeanne as Joan Puzel,” Burns claims, “can perhaps be contained if we see the figure” as by parts “young woman” and “hag” (26-27, emphasis added). Perhaps in light of these “controversies,” Burns also argues that she “cannot be read as a substantive realist character, a unified subject with a coherent single identity” (26). Such desires for substance, unity, and coherence replicate the typological thinking – the search to identify the distinct social types, characters, or personae of early modern England – critiqued in my preceding chapter.

By contrast, I wonder if we might listen to Jeanne – as best we can – and alter the tenor of our discussions and the aims of our analysis. Instead of the indicative or imperative, perhaps it is time to adopt a subjunctive and interrogative analytic mood. Rather than a “substantive” failure, might Joan be understood to best exemplify the epistemological problems of proclaiming any self – if not especially the female self, produced and performed within hegemonic patriarchy? From such a perspective, scholars might re-view Joan’s representation in The firft Part for how she dramatizes the forces within and against which the
women of English history must contend, especially when attempting to proclaim their own embodied substance, if not also the terms of their “humanitie.”


also the introduction and essays collected in *Performativity and Performance*, eds. Andrew Parker and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick (New York: Routledge, 1995).


10 Citations for all plays are taken from *MR. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARES COMEDIES, HISTORIES, & TRAGEDIES* (1632), reprinted in *The Norton Facsimile*, ed. Charlton Hinman (New York: Norton, 1996), and refer to that edition’s through-line numbering (e.g. TLN 222).


15 Although the pharmakon/pucelle analogy is my own, my thinking here has been significantly influenced by François Meltzer, *For Fear of the Fire: Joan of Arc and the Limits of Subjectivity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), from whom the concluding phrase
is drawn (1). I also draw on Marjorie Garber’s astute claim that “Joan is a pucelle (virgin) who is also a puzel (slut).” See *Shakespeare After All* (New York: Anchor Books, 2004), 96.


17 On “voice” and mediation in court depositions, see Carolyn Steedman, *Dust: The Archive and Cultural History* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2002).


22 Extant accounts of the execution do not record Cauchon’s words upon the scaffold, but it is likely, following inquisition procedure, that he read aloud the formal sentences, as decreed and printed by the court of inquisition. Jeanne was actually tried twice over the course of seven-days, with an opinion issued on May 19, as well as verdicts on the 24th and 30th. Terms
from the placard are drawn from a combination of these three accounts. See C. Taylor (2006), 213-224.

23 Meltzer (2001), 83.


25 Ibid, 1012.

26 Meltzer (2001), 93. The comment comes from the testimony of Jean Pasquerel, Jeanne’s confessor.

27 Unless otherwise noted, page citations refer to the trial documents (Procès de condamnation) reprinted and translated in C. Taylor (2006).


31 L. Taylor (2009), 165.


33 Ibid, 234.


36 Thomas Nashe, Pierce Penniless, His Supplication to the Devil (London, 1592).

Tantalizingly mutable, “pucelle” clearly confused early modern scribes, who used ten different forms in the 1623 First Folio: Puzel, Puzel., Puzell, Pucell, Pucell., Pucel, Pucel., Puc., Pue., and Pu. In addition to Burns, see Gary Taylor, “Shakespeare and Others: The Authorship of Henry the Sixth, Part One,” in Medieval and Renaissance Drama 7 (1995), 145-205.154-155. Taylor argues that, as opposed to scribal or compositional error, these variations reveal the playtext’s collaborative authorship.

Significantly, Joan and the Countess are the only figures to challenge Talbot’s legacy in the play. On women in this tetralogy as “anti-historians” who challenge the production of patriarchal history, see Rackin (1990).

For a reading of Talbot’s “shadow” and “substance,” see Mullaney (forthcoming), esp. “The Wreckage of History.”

TLN 735, 1466, 1477, 1487-1491, 1567, 2274, 2462-2477, 2461-2734.


As Kay Stanton notes, Joan’s potential sexual partners occupy successively higher positions in the social hierarchy (113) – a progression that, in the terms of my argument, suggests tactical alterations throughout Joan’s final moments. See Kay Stanton, “A Presentist Analysis of Joan, La Pucelle: ‘What’s Past and What’s to Come She Can Descry,’” in Presentism, Gender, and Sexuality in Shakespeare, ed. Evelyn Gajowski (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), 103-121.

Hodgdon (1991), 56.


On Elizabeth I as a “whore,” see especially Levin (1994).

Joan is conspicuously absent from both Anna Brownell Jameson’s mid-nineteenth-century Shakespeare’s Heroines (New York: E.P. Dutton, originally published in 1832) and a late twentieth-century exhibition entitled “Shakespeare’s Unruly Women” at the Folger.

49 Riggs (1971), 22.


52 French (1981), esp. 37-44.


55 Schwarz (2000), 87.


58 Riggs (1971), 107.

59 Bevington, ed. (1992), 496.

60 Sacco (1977), 110.

61 Tricomi (2001), 22.


63 Marcus (1988), 70; see also Gutierrez (1990), who argues that “Joan’s construction as whore… a construction *ever obvious* to the viewing audience,” is solidified by the end of the playtext: “what had heretofore been artifice *becomes reality*” (185, emphasis added).

64 Fiedler (1972), 64.

65 Jackson (2002) proves a notable exception to this trend.
Chapter 3

The Melancholy of Prostitution in *Pericles, Prince of Tyre*

Every man, saith Seneca, thinks his own burthen the heaviest, and a melancholy man above all others complains most; weariness of life, abhoring all company and light, fear, sorrow, suspicion, anguish of mind, bashfulness, and those other dread symptoms of body and mind, must needs aggravate this misery... yet it [is] no whit offensive to others, not loathsome to the spectators, ghastly, fulsome, terrible, as plagues, apoplexies, leprosies, wounds, sores, tetters, pox, pestilent agues are, which either admit of no company, terrify or offend those that are present.

~“Against Melancholy Itself,” *The Anatomy of Melancholy* (1621)

Thus Robert Burton, Oxford scholar and vicar, describes the melancholic condition in his famed medical treatise. Here, as throughout Burton’s extensive catalogue, this human “misery” becomes manifest through an array of signs and symptoms. In contrast to “terrible” diseases such as the pox and plague, which materialize in “ghastly” external marks–blackened buboes or festering sores “loathsome to the spectators”–melancholy proves more opaque than “offensive.” It is, therefore, also harder to detect. Unable to see those unbalanced humours, circulating beneath the body’s surface, which were believed to constitute the melancholic condition, diagnosticians had to expand their interpretive field, reading not only a patient’s body and *habitus*, but the surrounding cultural system: one’s statements and relations, affects and affectations, ethnicity, eating habits, favored environs, and more. Such an interpretive riddle likely existed for most humoral disorders, whether one was sanguine or choleric or lovesick. Yet as scholars have aptly demonstrated, melancholy was a privileged and a particularly complex disease in early modern England, as much a cultural condition as a corporeal state or cognitive disorder. Here, I shift the focus from the ailment to its interpretations and epistemology: what is and is not visible in early modern melancholy? What can be known through melancholy, to whom, and through what hermeneutic practices? To early modern *sufferers*, melancholy may have signaled one’s
scholarly identity, masculine privilege, or shared human condition. To its interpreters, it was also—and remains—a hermeneutic challenge.

Just as Burton assures readers that the “symptoms” of melancholy are “plain, obvious, and familiar,” he also stresses that “some signs are secret, some manifest, some in the body, some in the mind; and diversely very [sic], according to the inward or outward causes” (325). Such diversity helped melancholy emerge as a productive topic for literary exploration in the period, yet also made it difficult to know just what constituted the melancholic condition: “there is not one cause of this melancholy, nor one humour which begets it,” Burton notes, “but divers diversely [sic] intermixt, from whence proceeds this variety of symptoms” (339). Writers like Burton, Jacques Ferrand, and Marsilio Ficino, not to mention Shakespeare, Spenser, Petrarch, Tasso, Donne, and Milton, registered hundreds of signs, symptoms, and case studies, and in so doing configured a disease as protean as it was pervasive. Each case derived from its own etiological and symptomatic matrix—and each therefore presented its own hermeneutic challenges: “one must employ all the faculties, including at times pure conjecture,” Ferrand writes in Of Lovesickness or Erotic Melancholy (1610), to perceive the condition. In contrast to those “ghastly” diseases noted by Burton, which so offend in their horrific visibility, the melancholic, Ferrand contends, cannot be known by a single symptom: “one must not make conclusive judgments based on the disposition or temperature of one part only, but must consult many signs at once” (294, emphasis added). To adopt Burton’s term, “spectators” must look differently—directly, obliquely, and contextually—to perceive the melancholic condition. In other words, the act of deciphering melancholy conjoins hermeneutics with epistemology: how one looks configures what can be known.

In what follows, I attempt to think with and look through the politics of melancholy by means of Pericles, Prince of Tyre. Doing so provides a unique vantage point—a parallax view—from which to re-view the play’s notorious prostitution narratives. As I will argue, the play itself encourages multiple hermeneutic perspectives, including shifts that foster multiple understandings of the play’s representations of melancholy and prostitution. Although Burton works to dissociate melancholy from syphilis, a disease commonly associated with prostitution in the era, the Anatomy and Pericles construct intimate and complex relations between melancholic symptoms, sexual commerce, and bodily health (personal and politic) in early modern England. Yet while Pericles is repeatedly described as
suffering from that “fad companion dull eyde melancholie” (1.2.2), studies of this condition in Shakespeare have overwhelmingly neglected this character in favor of Hamlet, or to a lesser extent, Jaques (As You Like It). Such oversights may reflect, as with The first Part of Henry VI, the play’s reputation in present-day scholarship as an aesthetic problem or failure. Yet whereas the contradictions wrought by Joan of Arc, in her varying historical incarnations, incurred violent naming practices that sought to circumscribe her problematic and opaque bodies, the problems of Pericles have been largely attributed to authorial or compositional errors: scholars have long lamented the play’s fragmentary narrative, textual corruptions, questionable authorship, and “obscene” content. My epistemological approach encourages alternative understandings; whereas one critic describes the 1609 quarto edition of play as a “distorted,” “damaged,” “insipid,” or “imperfect” memorial reconstruction of an absent Shakespearean ur-text, I illustrate how perceived textual corruptions, compositional errors, or aesthetic failures can be read as symptomatic of a larger cultural condition that I call the “melancholy of prostitution,” understood as an ambivalent desire for lost prostitutions, a longing for conspicuous sexual commerce that could legitimate—precisely by rendering invisible—the marital traffic in women. This yearning likewise reflects an epistemological desire for legible sexual identities that resolve—by clearly defining the illicit or abject—the interpretive problems fostered by female beauty, especially concerns regarding interior virtue and exterior appearance. In both cases, the melancholy of prostitution makes certain forms of knowledge and social relations possible through the elision or silencing of contradictions constitutive of those very formations.

Initially, I illustrate how Pericles’ melancholy emerges as a byproduct of such marital traffic in the court of Antioch, particularly through his inability to perceive and articulate the illicit sexual status of Antiochus and his Daughter. As a framing mechanism for these scenes, Gower’s prologue further encourages playgoers to view this emergent condition as a problem of sexual knowledge—rather than sexuality—described predominantly in terms of interpretation and dissemination. Whereas these early scenes implicate Pericles in the silent sexual commerce of Antioch, they also prefigure his ongoing sufferings as well as the play’s representations of prostitution and marriage in the denouement.

Before turning to the brothel scenes, I clarify my understanding of the “melancholy of prostitution” by means of a brief historical and methodological overview in the chapter’s second section. Here, I return to Burton and his contemporaries to suggest how their
discussions of melancholy and prostitution – particularly relations between the two – reflect and enact this cultural condition in three ways: first, in their ambivalence towards sexual commerce; second, in the manner in which they wrestle with historical theories of prostitution as a “necessary evil”; and third, in the adoption of moralizing (and profoundly misogynist) rhetoric that coincides with what I pose as the internalization of English prostitution – the movement of necessary fornication from prostitution into marriage – aided by official acts and policies, such as the attempted suppression of London brothels in 1546, that encouraged the decreased visibility of illicit sexual commerce against which marriage might be defined. As Burton suggests, conspicuous prostitution, however “offensive,” offered a certain conceptual comfort and stability: it is shocking and ugly yet visible and, unlike melancholy, knowable. Freud’s theory of melancholy, understood here as a cultural structure of unfinished mourning rather than an individual psychological process, illuminates a contradictory mourning for prostitution as necessary to structure licit sexual practices, social institutions, and individual identities. This adaptation of melancholy seeks not to elide historical difference but rather to examine how a specific historical culture navigated its own social and sexual contradictions – and sought symbolic closure not only through articulation and representation, but also through suppression and silence.17 As I argue throughout, London drama provided a popular and potent media through which English subjects negotiated those contradictions that defied ready synthesis within contemporary thought. Such representations offered a means through which playwrights, players, and audiences could explore and work through topics that didn’t make sense, ideas or issues that couldn’t be resolved within other, existing frameworks of analysis.18

I then return to Pericles, where I explore how the conspicuous sexual commerce in Mytilene appears to salve the epistemological crises of the first act and render palatable the marital exchange of the denouement. Because that resolution depends upon the marriage of Marina to Lysimachus, a man who purchased her in the brothel, the play rehearses the melancholy of prostitution even as it moves beyond the brothel. Given that two Oxford editions of the play (1986/2003) supplement Marina’s dialogue with an extended lamentation that decries her prostitution yet honors Lysimachus as her savior and preserves their subsequent marriage, I conclude by suggesting how this editorial tactic, however unwittingly, reproduces the melancholic logic I have outlined. Like the critical engagements with Joan
that construct her as a whore, present-day editors risk reproducing the very patriarchal ideologies that *Pericles* opens to contestation and critique.

As a new tool for cultural analysis, the melancholy of prostitution encourages attention to questions of interpretation, articulation, gender, and sexual knowledge crucial to understandings of the play: how does one read sexual status on the body? How does one interpret, recognize, and articulate sexual commerce in *Pericles*? What is made visible – and invisible – through the conjunctions of melancholy and prostitution? As an applied case study exploring these questions, this chapter also advances gendered, hermeneutic, and epistemological concerns central to my larger project. In *The Gendering of Melancholia*, Juliana Schiesari describes “a medical/clinical condition” that is also “a discursive practice” (15), one that has produced – and negated – particular subjectivities across a range of cultures and time-periods, including early modern England. Melancholia, Schiesari argues, is not only “a type of disease but also a form of cultural empowerment… a cultural category for the exceptional man” that proves “concomitant with the denial of women’s own claims to represent their losses within culture” (95). As a structure for accentuating differences, including but not limited to gender, melancholy fosters silences and absences in the very processes of making knowledges and subjectivities available. In so doing, Schiesari reveals how melancholy – long associated, even in early modern England, with knowledge possession or attainment19 – also serves as a site for situated knowledge production and contestation.20 Her work in this regard provides a methodological foundation for my historicist and feminist adaptation of psychoanalytic concepts.21 I am particularly interested in how the melancholic condition – as dissonance, differentiation, and mourning – can make legible various relations, not only those between female and male, but between health and disease, bodies and knowledge, marriage and sexual commerce, in *Pericles* and its cultural contexts.

I went to Antioch,  
Whereas thou knowft againft the face of death,  
I fought the purchafe of a glorious beautie... .

~*Pericles, Prince of Tyre*, 1.2.68-70
“Let none disturb us,” says Pericles, for “melancholic, / be me [sic] fo vfed a gueft, as not an houre / In the dayes glorious walke or peacefull night, / The tombe where grief fould [sic] sleepe can breed me quiet” (1.2.1-5). Having returned from Antioch, where he sought the “purchafe” of a courtly spouse – only to find this “glorious beautie” stained by incest, Pericles begins at Tyre by diagnosing his own melancholic condition. Among a variety of familiar symptoms – self-enforced isolation, lack of sleep, loss of pleasure, inability to reason, and self-recrimination – he draws particular attention to his disturbed mental state, a type of festering, cognitive dissonance. Unsettled at Antioch, the “passions of [his] mind” are now nourished by a growing fear that the incestuous king, seeking to stifle report of his illicit union, will “with hostile forces… ore-fread the land” (1.2.11-24). In so doing, Pericles situates his melancholic condition less in terms of inappropriate “lust” or arrested sexual development than as a problem of knowledge and its dissemination: the “great Antiochus,” he fears, “will thinke me fpaking” and attack Tyre to prevent knowledge of his “dishonour” from spreading (1.2.16.20). It is a perspective that encourages scholars to re-view melancholy in Pericles as a product of relations rather than an individual ailment, and, more particularly, as a condition of knowledge about sexual status rather than a problem of sexuality. Since scholars have aptly demonstrated the tight social and conceptual links between melancholy and knowledge in the period, my rhetorical move here indicates a shift from the dominant scholarly approach to Pericles’s melancholy as a problem of sexuality. Instead, I approach it as a symptom of unknowing – that is, manifesting his inability to detect, and then articulate, what happens at Antioch – rather than a condition that signals his status as a genius or privileged intellect.

To read melancholy in this manner, I begin not with corporeal symptoms but with interpretive frameworks, for how and why Pericles initially misreads the mise-en-scène at Antioch prefigures his melancholic suffering and situates this condition in terms of (sexual) knowledge production and dissemination. Gower’s prologue is crucial in this regard, as it encourages playgoers to perceive Antioch in terms of discordance and corruption – not only the illicit status of the royal couple but also the distortion of all signs and signifying systems at the court. Corruption at Antioch therefore transcends bodies natural and politic to encompass – indeed establish – the epistemological conditions upon which knowledge is based. This framework contrasts with that used by Pericles, who interprets the sights at Antioch primarily according to Neoplatonic conventions of beauty, concordance, and
harmony – and therefore fails to detect what may appear “obvious” to others. A gap therefore emerges between Pericles and playgoers, one that produces dramatic irony but also suggests how epistemology – understood here as the “categories that structure our thought, pattern our arguments and proof, and certify our standards of explanation” – informs symptomology: what can be seen, read, or understood in Antioch’s signs and bodies. At the court of incest, playgoers watch Pericles fail to detect what appears manifest. Dramatic irony thus links his melancholic condition, which emerges as soon as he learns the “truth,” to processes of knowledge production. It also, I will argue, renders him complicit in the play’s unspoken sexual politics.

As is well known, *Pericles* begins with the seemingly impossible vision of the dead reborn. Assuming “man’s infirmities,” Gower returns from “ashes ancient” to “glad your ear and please your eyes” by translating his famous tale from the *Confessio Amantis* (1393) into a staged drama. The ensuing stage traffic, he promises, will provide pleasure and instruction alike, serving as a type of medicine that might embolden the soul and “make men glorious” (I.7-9). Authorizing his claims by reference to history and traditional authority, Gower positions himself as a credible source of knowledge capable of guiding audience interpretation. It is an intimate connection further encouraged when, moments later, he reveals the pivotal secrets of Antiochus’s court: the King and Daughter have engaged in an incestuous relationship, protected by law and encoded in riddle, that has precipitated the deaths of numerous male suitors. Such a revelation, argues Amy Rodgers, helps “fashion” the ways in which spectators perceive the play’s subsequent action, providing privileged insights that reconfigure the “acts of observation and interpretation” to follow. It also constitutes an epistemological imbalance – a difference not only in terms of what is known but how it is known – between Pericles and everyone else at Antioch.

To all except the protagonist, the Daughter arrives onstage as a polluted sign, her physical beauty contravened by the terms of “Inceft,” “euill,” and “finne” that frame her entrance (1.0.26-30). The issue is not, therefore, that Pericles “portrays a remarked lack of insight” when he misreads at Antioch, but that he encounters a contemporary interpretive crux – how to read female beauty – lacking knowledge crucial “to the judgement” of the scene (1.0.41). Such a disparity produces a devastating power imbalance at court, for incest reconfigures the semiotics of Antioch writ large: everything means differently in light of the prologue. The contest is a lark, but a deadly one. Whereas *discordance* marks Gower’s analytic
paradigm, Pericles, drawn to Antioch by “glory of her praise,” assumes a rhetoric, and analytic, of concordance, stressing correspondences between the Daughter’s physical appearance, oral report, and internal worth:

See where she comes, appareled like the Spring,
Graces her subiects, and her thoughts the King,
Of every Vertue gives renowne to men:
Her face the booke of prayfes, where is read,
Nothing but curious pleafures, as from thence,
Sorrows were euer race and theftie wrath
Could neuer be her milde companion (1.1.55-61).

This description draws upon an interpretive framework fostered by Antiochus only moments before, when the father associates his daughter’s beauty with celestial harmony and divine sanction:

Muficke bring in our daughter, clothed like a bride,
For embracements euen of Jove himelfe;
At whose conception, till Lucina rained,
Nature this dowry gaue; to glad her prefence:
The Seanate houfe of Planets all did fit,
To knit in her, their beft perfections (49-54).

Serving, like Gower, as an interpretive guide, Antiochus encourages Pericles to read the scene according to familiar conventions of Neoplatonic love. The prince responds as expected: assessing the Daughter’s visage as a “booke of prayfes,” he detects “nothing but curious pleafures” – an appraisal that accords with, and appears confirmed by, various external reports of her “face like Heauen” (1.1.31). Moreover, this interpretation derives from what the prince sees and hears, favored senses within contemporary love discourses. Young, naïve, perhaps hopeful, Pericles draws upon what he knows and reads the Daughter as she appears.

The point, of course, is that Pericles misreads this Daughter “So buckfome, blith, and full of face / As heauen had lent her all his grace” (1.1.23-24), while confronting an acknowledged interpretive conundrum centered upon the beautiful female body. In Castiglione’s The Courtier (1528), the most popular Neoplatonic text in early modern England, Pietro Bembo stresses that young men are particularly susceptible to confusing physical splendor with “true supernatural beauty” (325). Such distinctions, he argues, are difficult to ascertain regardless of one’s age or circumstance:
One cannot have beauty without goodness. In consequence, only rarely does an evil soul dwell in a beautiful body, and so outward beauty is a true sign of inner goodness. This loveliness, indeed, is impressed upon the body in varying degrees as a token by which the soul can be recognized for what it is, just as with trees the beauty of the blossom testifies to the goodness of the fruit (330).

“One cannot have beauty without goodness,” yet “rarely... an evil soul dwell[s] in a beautiful body” – these paradoxical assertions of impossibility and infrequency evoke the double-bind of female beauty as a split sign: both the guarantor of Neoplatonic virtue and the epitome of feminine deception. To perceive a women’s interior state, male observers depend upon outer appearances as the “true sign” of inner worth – with some awareness that they might prove deceptive. Antiochus plays upon this paradox when he refers to his daughter as “this faire Hefperides, / with golden fruite, but dangerous to be toucht”(1.1.71-2). If one’s “sight,” as Bembo laments, “can be deceived,” how then does one distinguish the virtuous from the polluted? How can one detect, in Castiglione’s terms, “meretricious impudence” – the insolent performance or prostitution of beauty – in the face of beauty (333)? The Courtier provides no answers: Bembo falls silent at the moment the crux emerges.

Pericles, by contrast, cannot remain silent in the face of deceptive beauty: he must “expound” upon Antiochus’s riddle (1.1.133) or forfeit his life. Therein lies the rub, for it is precisely in terms of speech – what he cannot say, especially in public – that Pericles describes his subsequent humoral suffering. His symptoms emerge at the moment in which Pericles deciphers – by virtue of the rather transparent riddle – the Daughter’s incestuous state. The effect is immediate: learning that “this glorious Casket [is] ftor’d with ill,” Pericles turns “pale,” his “thoughts reuolt,” and he dismisses the Daughter-as-love-object: “Good footh, I care not for you” (1.1.73-87). Such a response suggests a calamitous mental “perturbation” – an immediate and traumatic influx of emotion that, according to Burton, causes “such violence and speedy alterations in this our Microcosm,” that it “subverts the good estate and temperature of it” (217). Yet however shocked he may be – his passions “have their first conception by mifdread” (1.2.12) – Pericles is neither lovesick nor ashamed nor confused: he has little trouble comprehending the state of incest upon deciphering the riddle, immediately dismisses the Daughter, and effortlessly shifts to an analytic of corruption. Indeed, his first words upon reciting the riddle – “Sharpe Phyficke is the laff” (1.1.115, emphasis added) – respond not to this text’s sexual content, but to the relations of
interpretation and mortality suggested in its final line: “as you will liue refolue it you.” His melancholy, Pericles stresses, manifests problems of speech and suppression rather than sexuality: he fears that Antiochus will “fmother” him to prevent the king’s incest from “being more knowne” (1.1.72-107).

In his formal response to the king, Pericles construes tyranny as the suppression of public knowledge about vice, rather than vice itself. Given his emphases on dissemination and silence, the passage is worth citing in full:

Great king,
Few loue to heare the finnes they loue to act,
T’would brayed yourfelfe too neare for me to tell it:
Who has a booke of all that Monarches doe,
Hee’s more secure to keepe it flut than fhowne.
For Vice repeated, is like the wandring Wind,
Blowes duft in others eyes to fpread itfelfe;
And yet the end of all is bought thus deare,
The breath is gone, and the fore eyes fee cleare:
To stop the Ayre would hurt them, the blind Mole caftes
Copt hilles towards heauen, to tell the earth is throng’d
By mans opprefsion, and the poore Worme doth die for’t:
Kinges are earth’s Gods; in vice, their law’s their will:
For if love fray, who dares fay, love doth ill:
It is enough you know, and it is fit;
What being more knowne, grows worfe, to fmother it.
All loue the Wombe that their firft beeing bred,
Then giue my tongue like leaue, to loue my head (1.1.92-109).

To Pericles, monarchical crimes prove especially malignant in the reactions they inspire. Original vices, he implies, are “repeated” by attempts to stifle their report. Corruption breeds further corruption: “one Finne (I know) another doth prouoke; Murther’s as neere to Luft, as Flame to Fmoake” (1.1.138-139).

This riddling response reflects Pericles’s newfound rhetoric of corruption yet also frames Antiochus’s expected retribution in terms of suppression rather than simple vengeance. In this, he intuits correctly. “We meane to haue his head,” Antioch declares when the prince departs:

he muft not liue to trumpet foorth my infamie,
Nor tell the world Antiochus doth finne
In such a loathed manner:
And therefore infantly this Prince muft die,
For by his fall, my honour muft keepe hie (1.1.145-150).
It is not what Pericles knows, but what he might say, that inspires Antiochus’s death sentence: the prince “infantly… must die” so that he will not “trumpet forth” the king’s “infamie.”

The key, of course, is the riddle. This text first makes the mise-en-scène legible for Pericles, allowing him to re-view Antioch, and especially the daughter, in terms of horrific corruption: “fhe an eater of her Mothers flefh, / By the defiling of Her parents bed, / and both like Serpents are; who though they feed / On sweeteft Flowers, yet the Poyfon breed” (1.1.131-134). Yet the prince’s own riddling responses provide a means of acknowledging the unspeakable without speaking it in public. Indeed, Pericles insists, both at that court and upon returning home, that he will not disseminate the “knowledge found” at Antioch (1.2.75). While at Antioch, this pledge can be seen as an unfortunate accord of sorts: an agreement, between men, that exchanges Pericles’s life for the preservation of Antiochus’s secret. Yet Pericles reiterates his fidelity to suppression even at Tyre – and even while acknowledging that the king will not honor his end of any such bargain. Antiochus, he laments, “Will thinke me fpeaking, though I fweare to filence” (1.2.18, emphasis added). Pericles even goes so far as to suggest that he would lie on Antiochus’s behalf, should specious claims protect Tyre: “nor bootes it me, to fay, I honour [him], / If he fufpect I may dishonour him. / And what may make him blufh in being knowne, / Heele ftop the courfe by which it might be knowne” (1.2.19-22).

The prince does, ultimately, disclose this “dishonour” to Helicanus, his most trusted advisor, yet as promised, does not publicly circulate this knowledge. Indeed, this information only passes to another individual, the courtier Escanes, upon the “divine execution” of Antiochus and his Daughter midway through the play – and only then by Helicanus, not Pericles. The prince, by contrast, repeatedly indicates his desire to suppress what was learned at Antioch: “it is enough you know,” he tells the king, “what being more knowne, grows worfe” (1.1.107). Why such reticence? Why this fidelity – even after Antiochus sends an assassin, Thaliard, to kill him?

Drawing upon Freudian models of sexual development, scholars have argued that Pericles internalizes the “great Antiochus” as a castrating father, and adopts the king’s “guilty desire” as his own. Such readings usefully illuminate an intimate relation between the two men, as well as in their relations to the Daughter, yet one need not ascribe modern psychological categories to realize such connections. Instead, I want to suggest that the prince’s fear of – and fidelity to – Antiochus bespeaks a type of systemic, rather than
psychological, corruption: a breakdown in male “honour” that destabilizes a system of exchange, the traffic in women, upon which social order appears to depend. Indeed, when Pericles recites his tale to Helicanus, he speaks not in terms of desire but deception:

I fought the purchase of a glorious beauty,  
From whence an issue I might propagote,  
Are armes to princes and brings ioies to subjects,  
Her face was to mine eye beyond all wonder,  
The reft harke in thine care, as blacke as infest,  
Which by my knowledge found, the sinful father  
Seemde not to ftrike, but fmonothe, but thou knowft this,  
Tis time to feare when tyrants feeme to kiffe (1.2.70-76).

In language that should by now appear familiar, Pericles describes the contest in terms of “knowledge found” and appearances feigned. In rather pragmatic terms, he states that his objective was to “purchase… a glorious beauty,” a formulation that construes the desired object as a commodity and, having been corrupted, henceforth a counterfeit currency: neither she nor her father is what they “seeme.” He then distinguishes between the Daughter’s external beauty and her internal corruption, but focuses the majority of his attention upon that “sinful father” who “seemde not to ftrike, but fmonothe” – who lies, flatters, and corrodes that which should appear straightforward (1.2.74-89). As before, Pericles situates fear – both his own and Antiochus’s – in terms of dissemination and silence: “that I shoule open to the lightning ayre, / How many worthie Princes blouds were shed, / To kepe his bed of blackneffe vnlayde ope” (1.2.85-7). Indeed, Pericles here suggests that the problem transcends incest to strike at a larger corruption of male relations: the king’s crime has predicated the deaths of “many worthie Princes.” The king has not simply kept his daughter for himself, but offered her as a legitimate object of exchange within an exogamous marital economy, one wherein men depend upon one another’s “honour” to preserve the integrity – the glorious beauty – of those objects they seek to “purchase.” If this system is polluted, how then will female beauty truly signify? Where women are perceived as inherently deceptive, men must depend on men for their knowledge of women’s inner “truth.” How will one know true beauty from its “meretricious” impersonation?

Such questions inform much of the play’s action, yet also render Pericles inarticulate or mute. Although he capably describes his own melancholic symptoms – the loss of sleep, a pale visage, a mind perturbed by a “thoufand doubts” (1.2.94-95) – Pericles refuses to
publicly acknowledge what he learned at Antioch. In such reticence, he assumes – symbolically at least – a position similar to those deceased suitors whose “fpeachlefe tongues, and feffemblance pale” manifest the corruptions of that court (1.1.37).\(^{52}\) Melancholic and mute in the public arena, his condition encourages further attention to the problems – most particularly the silences – that manifest at the intersections of sex, knowledge, and marital exchange in *Pericles*. As I argue later, such “faultlines” emerge most notably in the commodification of female beauty\(^{53}\) – a *leitmotif*, begun at Antioch, that recurs in the court of Simonides at Pentapolis, the brothels of Mytilene, and aboard Pericles’s ship at Tyre. Before turning to these passages, however, I turn to contemporary humoral texts to situate melancholy within a larger cultural frame. The ambivalent position of prostitution in these texts – particularly as related to female beauty, male health, and legitimate marriage – suggests that a type of cultural melancholy for visible sexual commerce is necessary to legitimate, precisely by rendering invisible, the marital traffic in women.

II

Say they are evils, yet they are necessary evils, and for our own ends we must make use of them to have issue, and give pleasure and restore the race, and to propagate the church.

~Robert Burton, “For and Against Marriage,” *The Anatomy of Melancholy*

In melancholia the relation to the object is no simple one; it is complicated by the conflict due to ambivalence… just as mourning impels the ego to give up the object by declaring it dead… so does each single struggle of ambivalence loosen the fixation of the libido to the object by disparaging it, denigrating it, and even as it were killing it.

~Sigmund Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia”

As is well known, prostitution was long regarded by Catholic theologians as a “necessary evil” for the maintenance of individual and social health. Derived primarily from the writing of St. Augustine, reiterated by St. Thomas Aquinas, and debated well into the seventeenth-century,\(^{54}\) this medieval sexual theology simultaneously condemned and legitimated prostitution as a necessary outlet for corrosive male lust – conceived at least partly as an imbalance of the material passions – that would otherwise pollute licit sex, honest women, and the institution of marriage.\(^{55}\) In positing a medieval sexual theology, I draw an intentional parallel to Ernst Kantorowicz’s *The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval*
Political Theology,56 for the manner in which this theory of sexual contagion and evacuation was both produced and encoded, as with the “king’s two bodies,” in medieval religious and juridical discourses. In a famous metaphorical formulation, Aquinas stressed prostitution’s social utility by comparing it to the city cesspool: “Take away the sewer, and you will fill the palace with pollution.”57 This bipartite constitution – legitimation within the context of condemnation – reveals conceptual fissures that persist well into Reformation England, where the institution was declared illegal by royal proclamation in 1546 yet notably persisted; this informal tolerance, combining senses of legitimation and condemnation, perhaps best reflects that culture’s melancholic relation to prostitution by the turn of the seventeenth century.58

Notions of individual and social pollution help explain the ambivalent moralizing that informs English discourses of prostitution, in part as such rhetoric derived from humoral as well as moral discourses. That is, debates concerning “healthy” sexual practices – especially prominent in treatises on anatomy, as well as those on erotic or love-melancholy – often associated immoderate sexual activity, especially celibacy, as inhibitive to one’s physical well-being.59 These medical perspectives, however, coincided with Reformation sexual ideologies that varied depending upon cultural context; thus while the English Protestant Burton and French Roman Catholic Ferrand acknowledge, to varying degrees, a need to purge unhealthy humours, their texts betray deep ambivalences towards – and differing articulations of – “healthy sex,” necessary prostitution, and marriage. In what follows, I review Burton and Ferrand as representative writers participating in a larger discursive field that encompassed contemporary ideologies of melancholy and prostitution – in part because they each explicitly address both topics in their respective texts.60 Ferrand, for example, adopts Galen’s argument that the “retention of seed causes erotic melancholy” (248):

The immediate cause of this disease is sperm… sperm is nothing other than blood bleached by natural heat, an excrement of the third digestion. Depending on its quantity and quality, it can irritate the body, thereby provoking a natural expulsion. Otherwise it would remain in its reservoirs, turn corrupt, and from there… send a thousand noxious vapors to the brain, troubling the faculties and principle virtues (327).

While ejaculation would appear the obvious remedy, Ferrand first recommends phlebotomy,61 an invasive “surgical” cure, followed by “pharmaceutical” options. When he
addresses intercourse (masturbation merits no attention), Ferrand defers discussing specific
sexual practices, focusing instead on what one should not do.

What Ferrand does, however, is pointedly critique the necessary evil thesis: “I must make a clear distinction between licit and illicit lovemaking… if for any reason a marriage cannot be contracted [to cure the condition], it is totally absurd and immoral to prescribe, as Avicenna and Haly Abbas do, that our lover ‘purchase young girls and sleep with them frequently.’” Despite this seemingly unequivocal assertion, Ferrand soon vacillates, stating “I will leave it to the theologians to prove that fornication is never permitted to a Christian, and that he is not allowed to commit an ill deed to avoid another ill.” He then reiterates his earlier position: “I can prove to you out of Aristotle that such persons, rather than finding a cure in fornication, will only find themselves more inclined to lust and wantonness” (334-5). Such equivocations reflect the constricted and conflicted conceptual space that sex inhabits in the treatise, especially as the moral and humoral intersect. While Ferrand appears to authorize intercourse within the context of marriage, he defers explicit discussion to focus on marital “friendship” and the curative powers of “children” (338-339). Indeed, it can be argued that the entire treatise serves as a critique of “the erroneous opinions of certain philosophers or physicians… who, though for the most part Christians, recommend lechery and fornication for the curing of this disease” (221-2). By way of contrast, Ferrand stresses phlebotomy, diet, and even clitorectomy as preferred treatments. This final recommendation encapsulates a pervasive misogyny that courses through Ferrand’s treatise. It also, moreover, suggests how such misogyny helps “resolve” those contradictions rendered in terms of men’s sexual health. I will return to this “cure” momentarily, but first compare Ferrand’s rendering of marriage – and marital intercourse – to that of the English Burton.

Published in France in 1610, Ferrand’s Treatise can only prove suggestive for my study of English cultural practices (although it was widely read in England), yet his treatment of prostitution and marriage illuminates Burton’s more complex and contradictory proposals in The Anatomy. In contrast to Ferrand, who largely avoids discussing marital sex, Burton offers an extensive, and strikingly ambivalent, engagement with this topic. Like his French predecessor, Burton, drawing upon classical sources, stresses the dangers of celibacy: “some, that if they do not use carnal copulation, are continually troubled with heaviness and headache; and in some in the same case by intermissions of it… because it sends up poisoned vapours to the brain and heart… if this natural seed be over-long kept (in some
parties) it turns to poison” (204). At varying points throughout *The Anatomy*, he alleges that one can turn melancholic – if not devolve into outright madness69 – without the “frequent use of Venus” (768). Such discussions delineate the sole form of female melancholy, known as “uterine fury” or “greensickness,”70 whose etiology is associated either with a lack of paternal control or lack of sexual activity; in both cases, the cure resides in the restoration of patriarchal authority. These and similar acknowledgements lead Burton to proclaim, in one especially hyperbolic passage, marriage as the “best and surest remedy” to alleviate melancholic suffering (355). Yet upon closer examination, this claim suggests a far more contradictory vision of marriage as social and sexual resolution:

How odious and abominable are those superstitious and rash vows of Popish Monasteries, so to bind and enforce men and women to vow virginity, to lead a single life against the laws of nature, opposite to religion, policy, and humanity, so to starve, to offer violence to, to suppress the vigour of youth! by rigorous statutes, severe laws, vain persuasions, to debar them of that which by their innate temperature they are so furiously inclined, urgently carried, and sometimes precipitated, even irresistibly led, to the prejudice of their souls' health, and good estate of body and mind!... For let them but consider what fearful maladies, feral diseases, gross inconveniences, come to both sexes by this enforced temperance. It troubles me more to think of, much more to relate, those frequent aborts & murdering of infants in their Nunneries... their notorious fornications, those male-prostitutes, masturbators, strumpets, &c., those rapes, incests, adulteries,mastuprations, sodomies, buggeries, of Monks and Friars” (357).

Like Ferrand, Burton appraises marital intercourse in largely negative terms, in this case promoting an English Protestantism defined partly in contrast to perceived Catholic sexual “abominations.” Yet Burton’s position is hardly a ringing endorsement for the Lutheran reconceptualization of marriage as the site for sanctioned sexual activity; indeed, his position is perhaps best summarized by his terse declaration, in the same passage, that it is “Better [to] marry than burn” (357). Indeed, Burton suggests that even “union in marriage” will prove impotent in the face of “boundless” lust:

But this love of ours is immoderate, inordinate, and not to be comprehended in any bounds. It will not contain itself within the union of marriage, or apply to one object, but is a wandering, extravagant, a domineering, a boundless, an irrefrangible, a destructive passion: sometimes this burning lust rageth after marriage... it is confined in no terms of blood, years, sex, or whatever else (655).
What are (melancholic) men to do? In a telling passage, Burton positions the brothel house as the “last and final refuge” for such sufferers (716) – a pharmakon that provides “final” relief yet fully signifies one’s melancholic corruption. Such paradoxes inform his ongoing vacillations; he later critiques those “carnal men” who “had rather go to the stews” than “have wives of their own” (791).

In proposing marriage as an imperfect salve for melancholic sufferers, this Oxford vicar suggests a conceptual relation between marriage and prostitution that is less antithetical than uncanny. The tensions articulated here reflect in part the unstable cultural status of each institution in the wake of the extended social and religious upheavals that marked the English Reformation. In an insightful study of prostitution in Reformation Augsburg, Lyndal Roper illustrates how Protestant sexual reforms facilitated the criminalization of sexual commerce in 1532: when heterosexual marriage emerged as a newly sanctioned site for acceptable coition, the “necessary evil” was no longer “necessary.” Similar shifts may explain the King’s proclamation to suppress brothels in 1546, yet one must recall that official English religious doctrine proved especially mutable in the mid-sixteenth century. As Steven Mullaney writes, “In the space of a single generation, from 1530 to 1560, there were no fewer than five official state religions, five different and competing monotheisms, incompatible versions of the one god, the one faith, the one truth, the one absolute. What one monarch declared to be sacred and timeless, the next declared to be heresy or worse, in a reformation and counter-reformation by state decree that was also a family feud, with one Tudor half-sibling divided against another in the name of God.”

Sexual commerce emerged as a fraught site for articulating religious difference, and English writers would associate prostitution with Catholic licentiousness and idolatry well into the seventeenth-century. Yet Roper’s work reminds us that such momentous reformulations of social and sexual policy were by no means smooth ideological operations. In Augsburg, she argues, the suppression of visible prostitutions brought the economic aspects of contemporary marital exchange into greater relief. It also, Roper suggests, removed those visible entities – prostitutes and brothels – against which the honest house and citizen might be defined. It thus incurred new anxieties: how might one distinguish wife from whore?

Although written nearly a hundred years later and in the context of Jacobean England, Burton’s Anatomy suggests similar problems of knowledge and definition. Indeed,
his rhetoric betrays a conceptual proximity between prostitution and reformed marriage, even as he commends the latter:

Some trouble there is in marriage, I deny not. And if matrimony be a burden, saith Erasmus, yet there be many things to sweeten it, a pleasant wife, pretty children, the chief delight of the sons of men. And howsoever, though it were all troubles, it must willingly be undergone for publicke good’s sake… Say they are evils, yet they are necessary evils, and for our own ends, we must make use of them to have issue, to give pleasure and restore the race, and to propagate the church (816, emphasis added).

In this rendering, Burton recasts women and matrimony as the “necessary evils” that preserve “publicke good.” These, of course, are the terms used to define prostitution in works from Augustine’s *De Ordine* (386) to Thomas Fuller’s *Church History of Britain* (1655). I do not argue that Burton equates marriage and prostitution: his emphasis on marital procreation construes women less as necessary receptacles for humoral discharge than as necessary vehicles for humoral dissemination. But in addition to ambivalence towards marriage, his rhetoric also signals the complex cultural position of English prostitution, even seventy years after Henry VIII attempted to suppress it.

While Burton and Ferrand both castigate prostitution as a social practice, the former suggests its rhetorical and conceptual value as a means of curing – by way of a vicious misogyny – problems both humoral and epistemological. Struggling to articulate a proper site for legitimate and healthy sex, Burton betrays a desire for “ugly” prostitution as necessary to sanctify female beauty and licit marriage. As noted, however, Ferrand encourages a misogynistic imaginative practice to cure male erotic melancholy: “if the beauty of the lady cannot be denied, she must at least be brought down as much as possible by comparison with the most beautiful women he knows” (314). Should such mental degradation fail, this man might look at “a cloth stained with her menstrual blood,” which will “cool his ardor and preserve him from falling into love melancholy” (318). However shocking, these recommendations pale in comparison to Burton’s proposed remedies. He begins by construing one’s love object within a binary framework: “if he love at all, she is either an honest woman or a whore” (778). To avoid falling for either, Burton recommends reconfiguring female beauty by imagining women’s internal corruption: “within, God knows, [she is] a puddle of inequity, a sink of sin, a pocky quean” (779). Whereas these appalling descriptions recall Ferrand, they are also rendered explicitly in the languages of English
whoredom; here and throughout, Burton directly links “sin,” disease (“pocky” as a synonym for syphilitic), pollution (“sink” and “puddle” as metaphors for sewage), gender and prostitution (“quean”). His “remedy of love” is described over twenty-six pages, comprising two of the longest subsections in the entire *Anatomy* (III.5.2-3). Such descriptive detail testifies in part to the seductive force of female beauty, which reaches its apex in a stunning description that seeks to destroy physical beauty by reference to human mortality:

> When thou seest a fair and beautiful person, (a brave *Bonaroba*, or well-dress’d woman, a beautiful Donna who’d make your mouth water, a merry girl and one not hard to love)… bethink with thyself that it is but earth thou lovest, a mere excrement… take her skin from her face, and thou shalt see [saith Chrysostom] all loathsomeness under it, that beauty is a superficial skin and bones, nerves, sinews: suppose her sick, no riveld, hoary-headed, hollow-cheeked, old: within she is full of filthy fleam, stinking, putrid, excremental stuff: snot and snivel in her nostrils, spittle in her mouth, water in her eyes, what filth in her brains… she is rich, but deformed; hath a sweet face, but a bad carriage, no bringing up, a rude and wanton flirt; a neat body she hath, but it is a nasty *quean* otherwise, a very *slut*, of a bad kind (785, emphasis added).

As before, terms of whoredom – “*Bonaroba,*” “*quean,*” and “*slut*” – encapsulate the “excremental stuff” that is, for Burton, the feminine. Yet such practices, he paradoxically stresses, also *preserve* beauty and proper marriage: “mistake me not,” he notes, “I say nothing against any good woman, I honor the sex, as with all good men” (787). The statement comes only moments after Burton, citing the tyranny of female beauty, encourages men to remember the “filthiness of women… the menstrual dirtiness… that which would make thee loathe and hate her, yea, peradventure, all women” (786-7).

Such ambivalence bespeaks the axiomatic misogyny that pervades Elizabethan and Jacobean formulations of health, marriage, beauty, melancholy, and prostitution. More specifically, it also reflects the melancholy of prostitution: a complicated desire for “polluted” prostitution as a means of rendering knowable “honest” beauty and legitimate marriage in Reformation England. Not only did English prostitution persist following the Henrician suppression of 1546, but such persistence likely heightened anxieties related to social and sexual knowledge. When the “stews” took down their signs, and when prostitutes were no longer imaginatively confined to the liberties, they could be envisaged anywhere – even within one’s own house, marriage, or sexual relations. What was new, however, is that they *were* “imagined” on the stages and pages of Elizabethan and Jacobean England, where
brothels, prostitutes, and whores would assume a profound visibility. In their similitude and
difference, diverse texts such as Burton’s treatise and Shakespeare’s *Pericles* encourage
scholars to consider how cultural representations of prostitution in Jacobean England helped
early moderns to navigate such epistemological concerns.

Freud’s theory of melancholy illuminates the effects rendered by such ambivalent
representations. As a structure of unfinished mourning informed by processes of
identification and aggressive moralizing, melancholy suggests how abjection – understood as
the violent repudiation and forceful expulsion of what is perceived as internal”8 – salves
contradiction: it enacts psychic and rhetorical violence as a proposed resolution or cure. In
distinguishing pathological melancholia from mourning, Freud stresses that the former need
not depend upon a *lost* object; indeed, it is often stimulated by the ongoing presence of that
which has been perceived as lost. What is lost, moreover, need not be – often is *not* – an
individual, but instead something inexplicable, an “unknown loss” that the patient struggles
evén to articulate. This further complicates the analyst’s task: “the melancholic seems
puzzling to us because we cannot see what it is that is absorbing him so entirely” (245-6). It
is the unknown nature of this loss that prefigures narcissistic cathexis with the object: “an
identification of the ego with the abandoned object” that explains, to Freud, those
sadomasochistic tendencies associated with melancholia (249). Here Freud proves especially
opaque. On the one hand, this “unknown loss” directly implicates the subject: the loss is
ultimately *theirs*, not that of some external object. Yet restoration therefore depends upon
breaking this identificatory bond, by denying one’s attachment to that which is lost. Freud
describes this tension in terms of “ambivalence,” a conflicted internal state that produces
profound aggression.”9 The cure, such as it is, depends upon dissociation: to let go – to
mourn properly – one must destroy the bond that has been rendered internal. As Freud
argues, “everything derogatory that they say about themselves is at bottom said about
someone else” (248). To resolve such suffering, this “else” must be made visible. Only when
it is restored to the external, only when the complicit bond is broken, can the melancholic
return to health. It is a dissociation achieved only by way of incredible – and ongoing –
violecialc: “each single struggle of ambivalence loosen(s) the fixation of the libido to the
object by disparaging it, denigrating it, and even as it were killing it” (257). Freud, of course,
worries about the subject’s health rather than the object’s extermination. Yet what the
psychoanalyst largely overlooks the Shakespeare stage brings into partial solution, at least in
terms of how melancholic restoration depends upon a displaced violence – a shift from the self, and denial of complicity, that moves outward, towards an external object. Where does such aggression go?

What has been “lost” in the melancholy of prostitution, I want to suggest, is not the legal practice of commercial sexuality, but the type of social and epistemological clarity it made possible, partly by rendering other conflicts invisible. It is, as outlined above, a “loss” imbued with powerful social, moral, and even medical resonances. The stage provided one means of negotiating these contradictions, and Shakespeare’s plays offer a series of complex attempts to resolve them. Notably, the prostitutions tracing through Pericles, Measure for Measure, and Troilus and Cressida, however “ugly” and abhorrent, persist beyond the frame of the play: in the famous epilogue to Troilus and Cressida, for example, Pandarus suggests that London playgoers themselves participate in, and perpetuate, this illicit trade in the very act of playgoing. Such presence and persistence is, however, inflected by a rhetoric of corruption that reflects the violent moralizing – and acts of displacement – implicit in Freud’s structural vision. Someone always pays the price for melancholic restoration.

III

Marina: Are you a woman?
Bawd: What would you haue mee be, and bee I not a woman?
Marina: An honeft woman, or not a woman.

~Pericles, Prince of Tyre, 4.2.75-77.

Among the hermeneutic worlds of Pericles, it is a brothel that appears, early in the fourth act, as the play’s most transparent site of representation. Following the deceptions of Antioch, sycophancy in Tyre, and a play of appearances at Pentapolis, the prostitutions of Mytilene appear strikingly “honeft” in their corruption: its various denizens repeatedly articulate their own corruption, figure their commerce in violent terms, and dissociate themselves from “honeft” citizens and relations. The brothel is not, however, a hermeneutic site for Pericles; the prince neither appears in the brothel nor is told what happens at Mytilene. Like Gower’s prologue, the brothel scenes provide an interpretive frame for subsequent actions: in this case, Pericles’s reunion with his daughter Marina, the alleviation of his melancholy, the restoration of Neoplatonic order, and the socially legitimate exchange of women. It is, as Fredric Jameson might suggest, a magical ending: it includes, quite
literally, Diana as a \textit{deus-ex-machina}. In so doing however, \textit{Pericles} doesn’t so much resolve the epistemological problems raised at Antioch as bypass them entirely.

Or, perhaps, it attempts to \textit{prostitute} them: salve them by way of “obvious” corruptions. For to examine closure in \textit{Pericles} – not only the alleviation of the prince’s humoral suffering, but also the dramatic art of familial and marital restoration – entails partaking of prostitutions never acknowledged by the protagonist. By identifying specific individuals and relations as illicit, the visible, grotesque, and violent sexual space of the Mytilene brothel appears to function as an epistemological key or antidote in \textit{Pericles} – a means of curing the problems engendered by female beauty, as well as of denuding the economic and incestuous inflections inherent to the marital traffic in women. Yet resolutions and restorations produce remainders: what is left behind, lingering, forgotten, or silenced in the melancholy of \textit{Pericles}’s prostitutions?

To address these, we must shift attention from Pericles to Marina, an analytic move that mirrors the play’s action; the latter half of \textit{Pericles}, especially its extended fourth act, focuses predominantly upon the “painful adventures” of Marina rather than those of her father. Scholars have not discussed her potential melancholy – perhaps because the play never configures Marina’s suffering in such terms. Yet Schiesari reminds us that male melancholy, among its many significations, appropriates female mourning: it displaces and denigrates female suffering in the process of valorizing male grief. As such, Marina’s travails – her prostitution and marriage, her speech and silence – encourage renewed attention and analysis. The conspicuous corruptions of Mytilene produce her as an “honest” woman, yet likewise disclose – in the frank depiction of female beauty and virginity as profitable commodities – an unspeakable proximity between prostitution and marriage. As feminist critics have noted, these relations are rendered particularly unstable in Marina’s concluding union with Lysimachus. Yet whereas editors have attempted to correct this problematic union by providing Marina with a dialogue that highlights her victimization, such efforts, however unintentionally, reproduce the very logic of the melancholy that seems to inhere in early modern prostitution.

Following his departure from Antioch, and fearing retribution from Antiochus, Pericles flees from Tyre yet continues to suffer “the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune.” Surviving two tempests at sea, he marries the virtuous Thaisa only to lose her, seemingly, as she gives birth to the child Marina. Recalled to Tyre, he then entrusts this
daughter’s care to the duplicitous governor Cleon and his wife Dionyza, who will repay his earlier generosity – he saved their country from starvation – by arranging Marina’s assassination. The extent of these troubles leaves him melancholic, and “in forrowe all deuour’d” he returns to sea in “fack-cloth,” unshorn and silent (4.4.25-29). The action then shifts to Marina, who escapes execution only to be sold into prostitution.

Even before she enters the Mytilene brothel, Marina serves as a figure of social, sexual, and economic distinction whose Neoplatonic beauty renders legible the worth of those in her surrounding environments. In an important subplot, Marina overshadows Cleon and Dionyza’s own daughter, Philoten: a “full grown wenche; / Euen ripe for marriage fight.” The comparison, Gower suggests, “darkes” Philoten’s own attributes (4.2.16-35). More specifically, as Dionyza informs Cleon, this comparison devalues Philoten as a sexual and economic commodity:

[Marina] did difdaine my childe, and froode betweene her and her fortunes: none would look on her, but cafte their gazes on Marianas [sic] face, whileft our was blur-ted at, and helde a Mawkin not worth the time of day (4.3.32-34).

Given her exceptional virtue, Marina – at least from Dionyza’s perspective – corrupts Philoten, transforming this governor’s daughter into a mere “Mawkin,” a “lower-class, untidy, or sluttish woman, esp. a servant or country girl” (OED 1a). Marina brings things, including people, into contrast: her beauty pollutes – “difdaine[s]” – Philoten, cheapening the latter’s value and virtue. “Helde a Mawkin” by others, Philoten appears “sluttish” – sexually impure, filthy, foul – in light of Marina. Beauty, in the worlds of Pericles, is both a prize and a problem.

Beauty is also a commodity. Although Marina survives, she is stolen by pirates and sold into prostitution. A “prize” to “rogueing theeves” (4.1.89-92), she is also a “peece” to be sold (4.2.40): an object of value explicitly construed, at Mytilene, in terms of her beauty, virginity, speech, age, and apparel. Purchased for “a thoufand peeces” by Bawd and Pander, Marina has her beauty “cride… through the Market” of Mytilene. Transformed into discourse – Boult draws “her picture with [his] voice” – this beauty literally stimulates the sexual affects of the city; the people, Boult claims, “liftened to mee, as they would haue harkened to their fathers teftament,” including a Spaniard whose “mouth watred, and he went to bed to her verie defcription” (4.2.1-93). Throughout these encounters, Marina – and
her chastity – are figured in explicitly sexual and economic terms: she both inspires desire and is perceived as a valuable commodity.

The corrupted state of Mytilene thus appears not only legible but conspicuous when compared to the riddled signs and symptoms of Antioch; intimate conjunctions of economics and disease, not to mention the violent rhetoric that permeates these scenes, foreground the legibility of the brothel as a site of social corruption. Whereas riddles encode sexual crime in Antioch, the sexual exchanges of Mytilene are rendered explicit in the dialogue; while allusions and double-entendres persist, the brothel discourse is pointedly economic. In the course of a single scene (4.2), Bawd and her compatriots refer to their “trade” in terms of a “market” (four citations), “money” (two), “commodity” (two), “profit” (two), “pay,” “credite,” “wages,” “eftate,” “profession,” “price,” “cheape,” “Fortunes,” “gaine,” “bargaind” and “fpend.”

Even proper names are subsumed to this rhetoric of exchange. The eponymous monikers Bawd and Pander reflect socio-economic positions, while their “Creatures” (4.2.6) – the women they traffic – are reduced to mere chattel: commodities dehumanized to the point of near invisibility. Significantly, none appear in the play’s dialogue. Such symbolic reduction recalls the play’s opening scene, where the Daughter, although speaking a few brief lines, also lacks a proper name. It appears a likely fate for Marina, at least when Bawd and Boul begin the process of blazoning her – fracturing her into marketable pieces or “qualities” for sale (4.2.42). In the language of the brothel, Marina can only be perceived as a commodity.

Or so it would seem. Amidst the many sexual, economic, and rhetorical exchanges of the brothel, the scene reiterates questions, hearkening back to Antioch, of sexual identity: who is implicated in the corruptions of Mytilene? How is an individual identified and (sexually) known in such a market? In this setting, all are presumed polluted until found pure. It is, moreover, a site where diseases, as well as commodities, circulate widely. As Bawd and Pander repeatedly note, their sexual commerce conjoins men of diverse statuses and ethnicities in a global traffic in sex: “if we had of euery Nation a traveller,” Bawd notes, “wee fhould lodge them with this figne” (4.2.105-6). In addition to the salivating Spaniard, this sexual exchange includes, and implicitly associates, a dead Transylvanian, a Frenchman, and the city’s governor Lysimachus. Rich and poor, foreign and domestic, “honorable” and base: men of all kinds circulate through the Mytilene brothel, yoked by women they share and “crowns” – both coins and diseases – they disperse. Such circulation incorporates even
the children – eleven, by Bawd's count – born unto the brothel's syphilitic “baggage” (4.2.9-21).94

Marina appears, of course, the outlier in this environment. One who “blufhes,” “ftops [her] cares,” and cannot “vnderftand” the languages of illicit sexual commerce (4.2.70-113),95 she remains an “enclosed territory” in this space of sexual violation.96 The scene’s humor derives largely from the manner in which Marina paradoxically corrupts the polluted brothel by her virtue:

_Pander_: Well, I had rather then twice the worth of her fhee had nere come heere.
_Bawd_: Fye, fye, vpon her, fhee's able to freze the god Priapus, and vn doe a whole generation, we muft either get her rauifhed, or be rid of her… (4.5.10-14).

To the brothel proprietors, Marina is an economic liability; she begins converting customers to “vertuous” activities, threatening their livelihood (4.5.8).97 In the terms of sexual commerce, she is an inhibitive force who constrains necessary circulations. While Pander stresses commercial concerns, Bawd construes Marina’s virginity – and its effect on these converted customers – as an unnatural humoral state that threatens the social order: Marina would “freeze” Priapic flow and prevent “generation.” Boult makes a similar humoral allusion later in the scene, as he informs Bawd that Marina has “fent [a nobleman] away as colde as a Snowe-ball” (4.5.144).98 However comic, such allusions suggest the socio-sexual tensions outlined in the preceding section. They also illuminate Marina’s precarious virginity: a valuable commodity desired by men and constantly under threat – but also, given the humoral discourses of the period, a condition construed as both virtuous and dangerous to her health.

Marina’s supposed greensickness best illustrates the cultural contradictions wrought by her position within the brothel, where she is both implicated in the social, sexual, and economic logic of institutional prostitution, and functions to critique this illicit trade. Bawd and Boult’s responses to this threatening presence are especially significant: they will “execute” her “maydenhead,” “crack the glaffe of her virginitie,” and declare “fhe fhall be plowed” (4.5.132-149). As the lines between corporeal and symbolic violence in the brothel begin to collapse into suggestions of rape, the two go on to propose a type of prostitution as
a cure for melancholy: they advocate sexual – and syphilitic – exchange as a cure for Marina’s female melancholy (“greene ficknes”):

_Pander:_ Now the pox vpon her greene ficknes for mee.
_Bawd:_ Faith ther’s no way to be ridde on’t but by the way to the pox (4.5.21-22).

Such a suggestion reflects Marina’s circumscription within the logic of the brothel: as a virgin, she is healthy and unhealthy, inhibitive and stimulating, honest, dangerous, and valuable. Indeed, Marina appears to sustain Mytilene’s sex trade even while defending her virginity: her beauty not only stimulates male desire _in absentia_ – and presumably incurs further business for the Bawd and Pander – but she continues to accrue profits, however licit, for her owners even when she escapes to an “Honest-house”: “her gaine / she giues the curfed Bawd” (5.0.3-11).

Thus if the brothel scenes produce Marina as a legible “honeft” woman, especially by way of contrast to the unnamed brothel denizens and the socio-sexual logic their work sustains, they simultaneously disclose paradoxes and remainders that further the melancholy of prostitution enacted in these scenes. That is, just as the brothel appears to signify its occupants in socially legible terms – Marina informs the Bawd, for example, that one is either an “honeft woman, or not a woman” at all – and thereby attend to the epistemological concerns raised at Antioch, any such knowledge appears more problematic in light of Marina’s commodity status (ironically amplified by these scenes) and her subsequent interactions with Lysimachus. Indeed, whereas this governor declares the transparent semiotics of the brothel upon meeting Marina – “the houfe you dwell in proclaimes you to be a Creature of fale” (4.5.70-83) – his statement holds within it a question that undermines the literalism of this implied logic: Marina is precisely _not_ what the brothel “proclaimes” her to be. Just like Pericles at Antioch, Lysimachus assumes transparency in an act of sexual interpretation, and does so incorrectly.

Lysimachus himself proves a crucial exception – or, more specifically, a crucial challenge – to the scene’s binary logic: he is an “honorable” man who not only appears to condone, but participates in, Mytilene’s sexual commerce. While it is unclear whether or not he actually purchases Marina, Lysimachus is recognized by the brothel’s operators, conversant in the languages of the brothel, perceived as a potential client by the Bawd, and
expresses an erotic desire for Marina. He is also the agent of familial reunion and, for Pericles, of melancholic recovery in the denouement. As such, it is important to acknowledge how Lysimachus and an “honest” Marina enable the play’s resolution.

Harbored in Mytilene, the protagonist, now a king, has lapsed into a state of “diftemperature” marked especially by the loss of speech: “a man, who for this three moneths hath not spoken to anie one” (5.1.20-23). Upon hearing this description from Helicanus, Lysimachus proposes Marina as a potential cure: her “sweet harmonie, and other choisen attractions” might “win some words of him” (5.2.35-38). For the third time – after Antioch, Pericles competed for the hand of Thaisa at Pentapolis – Pericles finds himself gazing at (an unknown) female beauty. And once again, playgoers watch him interpret, lacking knowledge crucial “to the judgement” of the scene. As before, dramatic irony – again laden with hints of incest – encourages attention to how Pericles navigates this hermeneutic impasse. His solution depends upon reanimating echoes of Antioch, particularly in the terms of kinship and, paradoxically, through a type of restored Neoplatonism.

As Pericles evaluates Marina, his first comprehensible utterance queries her “parentage, good parentage” (5.1.88). It is a significant comment, particularly as the specter of incest looms in their subsequent exchanges, where Pericles stresses Marina’s resemblance to Thaisa: “my dearest wife was like this maid, and such one my daughter might have beene. My Queenes square browes, her stature to an inch, as wandlike-straight, as filuer voyft, her eyes as Iewell-like, and cafte as richly, in pace another Iuno” (5.1.98-102). Such a blazon reiterates the unstable boundary of licit and illicit beauty interrogated throughout the play; while the reference to “my daughter” recalls the incests of Antioch – and thus registers a warning – Pericles’s description uncannily echoes the Bawd’s commercial rhetoric. He is, quite literally, estimating Marina’s value. Yet just as his discourse limns the boundary of inappropriate appetite – he declares “who starues the eares shee feedes, and makes them hungrie, the more shee giues them speeche” – Pericles reiterates questions of kinship: “Where were you bred?” Even while confessing “I perceiu’d… that thou camft from good descendings,” he demands that she “Report thy parentage” (5.1.98-120). The only answer, the only way to know Marina, the scene suggests, is by proclaiming kinship.

These declarations prove especially significant as Pericles describes his daughter, like the Daughter, in terms of Neoplatonic beauty. In a second echo of the scene at Antioch, he declares that “Falfneffe cannot come from thee, for thou lookeft modeft as justice, & thou
feemest as *Pallas* for the crownd truth to dwell in.” As if he replaying his earlier naivete, Pericles goes onto to assert “I will believe thee & make fenfes credit thy relation, to points that feeme impoffible, for thou lookeft like one I loued indeede” (5.1.111-116). In this vein, the restoration of kinship enables a restored Neoplatonism: beauty again signifies correctly in the worlds of *Pericles*.

At least for Pericles. Indeed, he is the only onstage figure to register the “Muficke of the *Spheres*” as the scene draws to a close (5.1.216). Yet even as the goddess Diana, that virginal *deus-ex-machina*, descends to authorize the play’s familial restorations, Pericles’s subsequent actions render any such resolution problematic. Moments after proclaiming allegiance to Diana, he pledges his daughter to Lysimachus, that frequenter of brothels. This pledge depends, crucially, on a lack of knowledge: Pericles does not appear aware of their former association in the brothel. His ignorance suggests the constitutive silence, and silent persistence, of prostitution in *Pericles* – and best reflects the cultural melancholy that underlies this play. When Marina relates her woes to Pericles in the Mytilene harbor, she occludes any mention of the brothel, as well as her previous association with Lysimachus:

> The King my father did in *Tharsus* leaue me,  
> Till cruel *Cleon* with his wicked wife,  
> Did feeke to murther me: and hauing wooed a villaine,  
> To attempt it, who hauing drawne to doo’t,  
> A crew of Pirats came and refcued me,  
> Brought me to *Metaline*,  
> But good fir, whither wil you haue me? why doe you weep? (5.1.161-167).

At the very moment Marina seems about to mention prostitution in “*Metaline,*” she breaks off her discourse, turning the questions back upon Pericles’s desires and emotions. Neither prostitution nor Marina’s individual trials receive further discussion. Whereas Pericles’s silence at Antioch is explicitly linked to his melancholic condition, Marina’s silence appears curative – at least for her father. When Lysimachus indicates his interest in marrying Marina, Pericles declares: “you fhall preuaile… for it feemes you haue beene noble towards her” (5.1.247, emphasis added).

What then to make of this resolution, which brings to a head the contradictions among prostitution, melancholy, and marriage in *Pericles*? Whereas the protagonist appears cured, Marina’s fate passes in silence: she is excluded from discussing the arrangement with Lysimachus and, like *Measure for Measure*’s Isabella, is conspicuously silent when her
“Nuptials” are publicly announced (5.3.81). Such an absence is particularly significant given Marina’s rhetorical authority throughout the play, including an extended appeal to the assassin Leonine (4.1.48-86), her success in persuading multiple brothel patrons to disavow their activities (4.5.52-60), and her fierce critiques of Boult’s bawdry (4.5.164-197). One solution, advanced by the editors of two Oxford editions, is to supplement Marina’s quarto dialogue – most notably her exchanges with Lysimachus – with excerpts from George Wilkins’ *The Painful Adventures of Pericles Prince of Tyre* (1608), a supposed memorial reconstruction of an original theatrical production of Shakespeare’s play. Such an editorial move both increases Marina’s dialogue, as well as accords with previous comments regarding women’s value within the logic of the play; in the quarto, Marina contrasts her own worth, especially by reference to traditional feminine skills, with that of the prostitute: “I can fing, weaue, fow, and dance, with other vertues, which Ile keep from boaft” (4.5.186-187). If she fails to perform in these avenues, Boult can “take mee home again, And [sic] profhitute mee to the bafeft groome that doeth frequent your houfe” (4.5.192-194). In so doing, she reiterates a conceptual binary between honest femininity and prostitution, suggesting that she deserves to be trafficked to the “basest” of brothel patrons should she fail to prove honest. Indeed, because she succeeds in these activities, Marina is literally dis-located from the brothel – moved into an “Honeft-houfe,” before reuniting with her father – yet remains materially connected to Mytilene’s sex trade.

Nonetheless, as suggested by Pericles’s claim that Lysimachus “feemes [to] haue beene noble” to Marina, dramatic and ideological resolution depends heavily upon playgoers’ perceptions of the governor’s honor. Given that his preliminary comments in the brothel prove suggestive, if not outright licentious, his exchange with Marina assumes particular resonance. Significantly, this dialogue has garnered a great deal of scholarly attention – especially as one of the play’s most conspicuous aesthetic failures. In varying editorial arguments and practices, Philip Edwards (1952), Roger Warren (1998, 2003), Stanley Wells and Gary Taylor (1986/2005), have sought to resolve the problem of Lysimachus’s conversion by supplementing the dialogue. According to Warren, the “crucial” conversion exchange exists “only in an obviously mutilated form in the Quarto text”:

> Marina: If you were born to honour, show it now;  
> If put upon you, make the judgment good  
> That thought you worthy of it.
Lysimachus: How's this? How's this? Some more; be sage.

Marina: For me,
That am a maid, though most ungentle fortune
Have placed me in this sty, where since I came,
Diseases have been sold dearer than physic –
O, that the gods
Would set me free from this unhallowed place,
Though they did change me to the meanest bird
That flies i’th’ purer air!
Lysimachus: I did not think
Thou couldst have spoke so well...

In an early commentary on this scene, Edwards notes, “after a mere sentence appealing to his honour, Lysimachus is marveling at her wisdom, and after what is really only a passionate and inarticulate cry, he is marveling at her eloquence” (44). Warren, in his edition, argues that “two brief speeches hardly seem enough to arouse such amazement and admiration in the sexual predator that we have seen in the early part of the scene” (2003: 49). The answer, they believe, lies in Wilkins’ text – an episode which provides a “genuine conversion” featuring “the struggle of unarmed innocence that, having withstood the horrible and corrupting atmosphere of the brothel, is able to overcome the evil intentions of a temporal ruler and bring home a sense of sin to a thoughtless rake” (Edwards, 43). Such comments are not insignificant: they partake of the logic of the melancholy of prostitution by reiterating a binary between innocence and corruption that emerges by way of visible (“horrible and corrupting”) prostitution.¹¹⁰

Whereas the Oxford editors claim to provide a more “potent” scene in the reconstructed text, one that refigures the “lame” language of the Quarto edition,¹¹¹ my argument encourages a more critical approach to what is gained and lost in filling absence. Whereas Gary Taylor – one of the Oxford editors (1986/2005) – argues that “editorial decisions directly impinge upon the representation of gender in Shakespeare’s plays,” for the “minds with which we edit can harbor dubious assumptions about gender, dubious assumptions which influence the editorial choices we make,”¹¹² the melancholy of prostitution provides an analytic tool that might help illuminate such assumptions, as well as their subsequent implications. At the same time, it reminds us that muteness, silence, or failed articulation – rather than additional speech – may best encapsulate the cultural melancholy at play in Pericles.
Following Lysimachus’s, “How’s this? how’s this? Some more; be sage,” Marina – in Oxford’s reconstructed editions – offers an elaborate appeal on behalf of her chastity, claiming:

*Marina:* My life is yet unspotted,
My chastity unstained even in thought.
Then if your violence deface this building,
The workmanship of heaven, made up for good,
And not for exercise of sin’s intemperance,
Will kill your honour, abuse your justice,
And impoverish me.

When Lysimachus responds by claiming that her integrity has already been compromised, or re-signified, by her presence in the brothel, Marina expands the chaste model not only to reinforce Lysimachus’ social, political, and gendered authority, but also to reference the long-standing tradition of honor-suicide – a model set forth by the Lucrece narrative:

*Marina:*...O my good lord, kill me but not deflower me,
Punish me how you please but spare my chastity,
And since ‘tis all the dowry that the gods have given
And men have left me, do not take it from me.
Make me your servant, I willingly obey you,
Make me your bondmaid, I’ll account it freedom.
Let me be the worst that is called vile;
So I may still live honest, I am content.
Or if you think’t too blest a happiness
To have me stay so, let me even now,
[She kneels]
Now in this minute die, and I’ll account
My death more happy far than was my birth.
*Lysimachus:* [Lifting her up]
Now surely this is virtue’s image, nay,
Virtue herself sent down from heaven a while
To reign on earth and teach us what we should be!–
I did not think thou couldst have spoken so well…

In this supplementary exchange, Marina’s chastity is presented as more valuable than life; to protect it, she subjugates herself to Lysimachus, noting that she will “account” her bondage as “freedom.” It is *this* Marina – kneeling, servile, emphatically chaste, self-sacrificial – that the governor identifies as “virtue’s image”; it is these lines, moreover, upon which the Oxford editors predicate Lysimachus’s conversion. Warren, for example, alleges that this supplement “completely solves the problem of the inconsistency and contraditoriness of *Lysimachus’s* character in the Quarto, as well as providing a much more dramatic
confrontation between Lysimachus and Marina, which becomes a conversion scene” (2003: 50). But that depends on what the problem is. What of Marina?

By addressing a potential theatrical crux, this extended lamentation – that decries Marina’s prostitution, validates her chastity, honors Lysimachus as her savior, and preserves their subsequent marriage – reproduces the melancholic logic I have outlined. It denigrates prostitution as an illicit form of sexual commerce, reproduces chaste femininity as a marital ideal, and preserves the marital traffic in women. By contrast, I argue that the lacunae of the quarto edition – however problematic as a theatrical playtext – combined with Marina’s conspicuous silence upon hearing of her marriage to Lysimachus, best articulate the gendered consequences wrought by this cultural condition.

Indeed, silence also signals the persistence of prostitution in Pericles. Although Antiochus and his Daughter are conspicuously punished for their “monstrous luft” (5.4.2), and Cleon and Dionyza are burned by their own citizens, Gower makes no mention of the brothel and its operators. For all its illicitness, for all its violence, prostitution performs necessary work in the world of Pericles. It enables a type of social and epistemological resolution through its conspicuous presence, which renders invisible problems of sexual knowledge related to the politics of female beauty, marriage, and family. Yet if the play itself enacts the melancholy of prostitution, it also rehearses the enabling contradictions and enforced silences necessary for its own reproduction. From this perspective, the melancholic who matters in Pericles is one who is conclusively muted, and who is married into prostitution. In so doing, Pericles suggests a condition that finds best expression not in a prince’s lamentation, but in a daughter’s silence.
Robert Burton, *The Anatomy of Melancholy* (1621), eds. Floyd Dell and Paul Jordan-Smith (New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1972), 556/429. Published in folio and quarto form, the *Anatomy* appeared in six editions between 1621 and 1651. In their edition, Dell and Jordan-Smith draw primarily from the sixth folio (1651), but “correct this text in certain passages by comparison with that of the earlier folios and the first edition, the quarto of 1621” (vi). Although I use this edition due its scholarly accessibility, all citations from Burton, including this epigraph, also appear in the first quarto of 1621. The send page citation of each footnote thus refers to the first edition, accessible at EEBO.


3 Trevor (2004).


5 Michael O’Connell, “Burton cannot keep to the medical sense of melancholy, and in fact the whole of the *Anatomy* oscillates between melancholy as a disease and melancholy as a metaphor or, more properly, melancholy as a metonym of human misery.” Cited in Trevor (2004), 117.

6 In what follows, I draw on Burton’s distinction between “plain, obvious, and familiar” symptoms and “secret” signs. Although somewhat arbitrary, this dissociation allows us to view symptoms in terms of visibility and corporeality – what can be seen or detected on the human body. Such a perspective sheds light on Pericles’s interpretive failures at Antioch and also, as I argue in the chapter’s third section, illuminates the obvious prostitutions at Mytilene. Although symptoms are also signs, this latter category extends beyond the visible and corporeal to incorporate a broader hermeneutic field: not only that which is obvious, but also what might inferred, intuited, detected, or even – in Ferrand’s terms – conjectured. The
signs of melancholy thus bespeak larger concerns about what cannot be known, acknowledged, and/or made visible in the world of Pericles.


8 Burton pledges a type of cross-discursive analysis on the title-page to the 1628 edition of *The Anatomy*, noting that the disease will be “Philosophically, Medicinally, Historically opened & cut-up” in the pages that follow.

9 For Slavoj Zizek, the “parallax view” emerges in relation to, and as a means of engaging with, conceptual “short circuits”: sites of cultural contradiction and contestation that defy ready synthesis within historical modes of knowing. As noted in my introduction, these analytic tools encourage greater attention to knowledge production and articulation than the more materialist (Jameson’s “contradictions”; Sinfield’s “faultlines”; Howard’s “lacunae”) or linguistic (Derrida’s “aporia”) inflections of related conceptual frameworks. As “faulty connection(s) in the network” of contemporary thinking, short circuits also offers a potent framework for critical analysis: a “procedure” that can lead “to insights which completely shatter and undermine our common perceptions” (ix). These shifts in observational perspectives enable a “parallax view”: an unfamiliar vantage point that not only reconfigures what can be known about an object of analysis, but also foregrounds what cannot be articulated – the irreducible gap between two points, wherein no synthesis or mediation is possible. In the scholarly tradition, the “symptoms” plaguing *Pericles* – its many ellipses, moments of fragmentation or failure – have been critically associated with such “faulty connections.” Although Zizek deploys this metaphor within the parameters of his own Lacanian-dialectical materialism, he nonetheless encourages its application, and stresses it functionality, within other theoretical paradigms. See *The Parallax View* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006).


11 Although *Pericles* (ca. 1609) precedes the first edition of Burton’s *Anatomy* (1621) by over a decade, such a chronology should not dissuade us from placing the two in conversation; in what follows, I consider neither text as a source or authority for the other, but instead approach the two as differing mediums – what Steven Mullaney calls “affective technologies” – through which contemporaries explored, communicated, and felt, to varying degrees and ends, those issues and relations that defied ready synthesis in contemporary thought. See *The Reformation of Emotions in the Age of Shakespeare* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, forthcoming).
12 All citations are taken from the 1609 quarto. Since available online editions lack through-line numbers, I have included act, scene, and line entries taken from the Suzanne Gossett’s Arden Shakespeare edition of the play. See William Shakespeare, Pericles (London: Thomson Learning, 2004). The quarto is available at: internetshakespeare.uvic.ca/Library/facsimile/book/BL_Q1_Per/.


18 On the London stage as an “affective technology,” see especially Mullaney (forthcoming).

19 Schiesari (1992); Radden (2002); Trevor (2004).

20 On “situated knowledge” and feminist epistemologies, see the introduction. Although Schiesari does not use these terms, her work testifies to the ways in which gender, race, age, ethnicity, status, and other social forces shape access to, and perceptions of, knowledge within varying historical contexts.

21 Schiesari also provides a powerful response to critiques of psychoanalytic literary criticism in early modern studies, most famously advanced in Stephen Greenblatt’s “Psychoanalysis and Renaissance Culture,” in Literary Theory/Renaissance Texts, eds. Patricia Parker and David
Quint (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 210-224. In addition to revealing Greenblatt’s own debts to Lacanian psychoanalytic theory – an approach to subjectivity that often uncritically substitutes a trans-historical “shattered” self for an equally essentialist “modern” mode of consciousness – Schiesari illustrates how works by Marsilio Ficino reveal an early modern conception of melancholia, rooted in an ethos of lack and loss that, bears resemblance to, and may as a precursor of, modern psychoanalytic categories. When approached as a method or “practice of interpretation that lends an ear to what is not said, to what is ‘repressed,’” rather than a universalizing theory of selfhood, psychoanalytic criticism remains a fruitful analytical tool, especially interrogating ruptures and silences that hegemonic cultures cannot fully address, or resolve as ideology, in a given historical moment (25). On psychoanalysis and historicism, see Historicism, Psychoanalysis, and Early Modern Culture, eds. Carla Mazzio and Douglas Trevor (London: Routledge, 2000). Schiesari has been criticized for her own silences, especially grief or sadness as modes of expression accessible to men and women alike in English Protestant texts. Such critiques illuminate the epistemological issues raised by this dissertation as a whole, including the ways in which postmodern literary critical methodologies open and foreclose varying forms of knowledge. That is to say, Schiesari has predominantly been criticized by historicists critics for overlooking 1) the ways in which men and women were both seen to suffer from sadness, 2) the fact not all men could access the latter, 3) that certain women, like Margaret Cavendish, were able to articulate a type of melancholic identity, and 4) for conflating public rites of mourning with melancholy. Yet such critiques misread Schiesari’s analytic aims and elide one of her central contentions: that melancholia provides a privileged structure through which male subjects appropriate “feminine” mourning, thereby enacting a double-exclusion on gendered grounds. Given such appropriations, Schiesari notes, feminist scholars must adopt alternative viewpoints, methods, and even notions of evidence to illuminate less “visible” relations and subjects, especially women. The turn to traditional historical archives and evidence to critique her scholarship therefore largely supports, rather than negates, her governing argument.

22 By “cognitive dissonance,” I refer, first and foremost, to what Burton describes as a mental “perturbation” – a traumatic unsettling of one’s mental state or cognitive disposition: “this thunder and lightning of perturbation… causeth such violence and speedy alternations in this our Microcosm, and many times subverts the good estate and temperature of it” (218). As Burton suggests, while such perturbations may affect the patient at a singular moment (“thunder and lightning”), their effects can linger, and indeed multiple, over time. Thus while “distemperatures, alteration and confusion” mark the patient’s humoral-cognitive imbalance, this cognitive imbalance affects their ability to reason – that is, to interpret, comprehend, understand, articulate, etc. In a second sense, therefore, my use suggests a sense of internal conflict or discord that impacts a patient’s ability to reason, or make sense of their immediate condition. Finally, I draw on Alan Bray’s use of the phrase, in Homosexuality in Renaissance England (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), to suggest how this seemingly internal and individual condition also reflects, and partakes of, contemporary cultural contradictions between prescribed cultural mores and lived social practices.

23 It is important to distinguish between analyses of the play centered upon inappropriate lust, generally construed along Neoplatonic or religious paradigms, and those that apply...

24 I do not intend to deny melancholy’s status as a medical condition in early modern England, but simply seek to acknowledge that it is, in Trevor’s (2004: 7) words, “both a condition and a [discursive] practice.”


26 The use of a chorus or choral figure in this manner proves relatively unique in Shakespeare, closer to the prescient witches of Macbeth or wily Rumor of The Fecund Part of King Henry the Fourth than to the more traditional choruses of Romeo and Juliet, Henry V, Troilus and Cressida, or Henry VIII. Yet whereas the witches and Rumour are clearly questionable sources of authority, associated with the either the demonic or defamatory, Gower pointedly associates his license with historical and literary tradition.


Of course, Gower’s *Confessio Amantis* (1393) was likely only one of many source materials for *Pericles, Prince of Tyre*. On these debates, see the recent Arden Edition of the play, edited by Suzanne Gossett (London: Thomson Learning, 2004), 70-76. See also Kenneth Muir, *Shakespeare’s Sources: Comedies and Tragedies* (London: Routledge, 1957), 225-230.


Skeele (2000: 22), here summarizing a critique offered by William Watkiss Lloyd in 1858.

In her study of aurality in the play, Gina Bloom argues that it is “Pericles’ failure to engage his hearing faculties [that render] him incapable of recognizing the truth about Antiochus’s incestuous relationship with his daughter. Captivated by the silent daughter’s beauty, Pericles is dumbstruck with love” (122). I agree that Pericles misses a variety of verbal cues, but would stress that these double-entendres and allusions all depend upon Gower’s

34 I refer here to the time and context of performance – early modern London – as opposed to the internal time of the play. Although familiar to modern critics, Neoplatonic theories – and I emphasize the plural – arrived in England over time and in fragmented form: far from an ordered collection of texts and ideas, Neoplatonisms were disseminated through an array of texts and perspectives, influencing – at times merging with – conceptions of truth and knowledge across other philosophic, medical, literary, secular, and religious discourses. This conceptual instability matters for audiences and Pericles alike: as if often the case, readers retain (or attain) only part of a given discourse or theory, leading to potential misinterpretation or misapplication. It is, nonetheless, important to acknowledge Ficino and Castiglione as powerful influences, particularly as both privilege sight and sound in the acquisition, and sensation, of love. See the essays collected in *Platonism and the English Imagination*, eds. Anna Baldwin and Sarah Hutton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). See also Nesca A. Robb, *Neoplatonism of the Italian Renaissance* (New York: Octagon Books, 1968) and Walter Pagel, *Religion and Neoplatonism in Renaissance Medicine* (London: Variorum Reprints, 1985).

35 In addition to Gower (I.23-24, 31), Antiochus stresses that “report” of the Daughter’s “face like Heauen,” has drawn numerous “Princes… aduentrous by defire” (1.1.73-78).

36 As Rodgers’s (2009) notes, sight and hearing are conspicuously emphasized in the early stages of the play: variations of “eye” appear six times, “see” four times, and “ear” thrice in the prologue and first scene alone. On sight and hearing in Neoplatonic theory, see Baldwin and Hutton (1994).

37 Warned by Antiochus prior to accepting the riddle, Pericles replies that he will proceed “Like a bold Champion” (1.1.62), a proclamation that suggests he also interprets the scene at Antioch according to conventions of chivalric romance. On the play as it relates to, and departs from, conventions of Greek and medieval romance, see Jordan (1997), esp. 35-67.


39 Indeed, Burton and Ferrand repeatedly construe such deception as the sign of femininity par excellence. For male writers, this perceptual problem was a perpetual problem. Burton, writing nearly 100 years after Castiglione, stresses the same interpretive crux: noting the “power and sovereignty” of physical splendor – associated here with “symmetry,” “proportion,” and “correspondence” – Burton laments that even nature itself, the “seas and waters… the air and winds,” proves subject to and “enamoured of beauty.” (As with the elliptical nature of Burton’s text, the subject of beauty is addressed in several disparate sections; quotations are from pages 674, 619, 676-677, and 670). The guarantor of goodness and “common object of all Love,” beauty also proves an unrelenting tyrant, a master

40 Meretricious derives from the Latin meretrix, meaning “a prostitute” (OED 1a).

41 In a fascinating development, Bembo ceases to speak upon this concluding comment, a narrative fracture that emblematizes the fraught conceptual relations of prostitution, female beauty, and sexual knowledge examined in this chapter: Bembo cannot continue this line of thought, as it undermines the entire system upon which his (Neoplatonic) philosophy depends. Falling “silent,” Bembo only returns to speech when “urged to say more about this kind of love and about the true way in which beauty should be enjoyed” (333). Such an impasse reflects the contradictions – of presence and absence, speech and suppression – that I locate as constitutive of the melancholy of prostitution.

42 The riddle describes sexual corruption precisely in terms of symbolic corruption, as incest reflects the corrosion of social and familial roles – “Hee’s Father, Sonne and Hufbande milde / I Mother, Wife, and Yet his Child” (1.1.69-70).

43 From a humoral perspective, that is, Pericles appears traumatized by the “apprehension of some terrible objects heard or seen” – a “most pernicious and violent” affright that
suddenly alter[es] the whole temperature of the body, move the soul & spirits, strike such a deep impression, that the parties can never be recovered” (Burton, 286).

41 A tantalizing orthography that might indicate “misread” (the “shocking apprehension of dread,” OED), but also what was “missed read” – that is, “read incorrectly.” In her gloss, Gossett notes that this OED definition derives solely from the quarto (195).

45 Pericles’s ability to grasp incest – he has no trouble understanding what it is – suggests that (royal) incest was far more uncanny than otherworldly in Tudor and Stuart England. See Mullaney (1988: 137), who notes, “where the actions of Pericles and [Antiochus’s] daughter are concerned, the play reveals a sense of taboo that is both far from universal and quite foreign to the Greek romance upon which the play is based: a sense of taboo that reveals significant cultural tensions and contradictions.” Whereas for Mullaney such taboo resides at, and points towards, the “intersection of drama, dramatic forum, and historical moment that we customarily call Shakespearean romance” (137), I stress the far more basic tensions and contradictions of incest in a society governed by subsequent royal families and genealogies – both Tudor and Stuart – conspicuously associated with its practices. Indeed, it was a question of incest – Henry VIII’s marriage to Catherine of Aragon, the wife of his brother Arthur – that helped catalyze the English Reformation. See Maureen Quilligan, Incest and Authority in Elizabeth’s England (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), and Susan Frye, “Incest and Authority in Pericles, Prince of Tyre,” in Incest and the Literary Imagination, ed. Elizabeth Barnes (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2002), 40-58.

46 The riddle thus functions as an epistemological key of sorts: Pericles immediately shifts his interpretive paradigm, and registers Antiochus’s dissimulation: “How courtefie would feeme to couer finne, / When what is done, is like an hipocrite, / The which is good in nothing but in fight” (1.1.122-4). His references to “Joue” also suggest a retrospective rendering of Antiochus’s earlier allusion to the Daughter as “clothed like a bride, / For embracements euen of Joue himzelfe.”

47 These claims assume special resonance given the scene’s repeated emphasis on honest disclosure at court: while Helicanus upbraids sycophants and flatters (1.2.36-42), Pericles praises his advisor’s candor (1.2.58-62).

48 It appears clear, moreover, that Escanes did not know about the state of Antioch prior to Helicanus’s declaration. The latter begins, in medias res, as if denying a contrary assertion by his counterpart: “No, Efcanes, know this of mee, / Antiochus from infest liued not free…” (2.4.1-16).


50 These actions have also, significantly, cost the lives of other princes. In her pioneering study of the “traffic in women,” Gayle Rubin argues that it is the homosocial dynamic between men – as opposed to a heterosexual contract between spouses – that organizes kinship relations and predicates, in part, the subordination of women: “If it is women who
are being transacted, then it is the men who give and take them who are linked, the woman being the conduit of a relationship rather than a partner to it... it does imply a distinction between gift and giver... and it is the partners, not the presents, upon whom reciprocal exchange confers its quasi-mystical power of social linkage” (174). See “The Traffic in Women: Notes of the ‘Political Economy’ of Sex,” in Toward an Anthropology of Women, ed. Rayna R. Reiter (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975), 157-210. See also Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Between Men: English Literature and Male Homosocial Desire (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), esp. 1-57.

51 In her study of incest in early modern England, Quilligan (2005) suggests how this illicit sexual economy might also mark women as agentic subjects whose transgressive endogamous desires challenge the patriarchal traffic of women in that culture. However, Quilligan’s hypothesis proves hard to apply in this particular case. Although implicated in – or, as some scholars argue, blamed for – the incestuous relationship at Antioch, the Daughter lacks the “transgressive polysyllabic garrulousness” that Quilligan associates with such women (11). Moreover, Quilligan’s hypothesis positions the garrulous, incestuous woman as a surplus sign that disrupts the symbolic functioning of the patriarchal traffic: “a woman’s value-endowed ability to speak, that is, to manipulate signs, may come into conflict with her function as a sign in the system of the traffic in women, it is clear that female semiotic agency is potentially very problematic to this system” (11). Whereas the Daughter’s combined beauty and corruption construes her as a seemingly contradictory or split-sign, this position, in my reading, reflects less her individual agency than an epistemological problem centered upon the beautiful female body: one must recall that she barely speaks, and when doing so, wishes Pericles prosperity and “happiness” – enigmatic comments at best. By contrast, the most effective speaker, male or female, in the play proves to be Marina, an individual who pointedly conforms to patriarchal imperatives regarding chastity, obedience, and exogamy, if not silence. See also Frye (2002), who argues that the quest for family stability in the play inherently depends upon, rather than flees from, a possibility of incest intimately associated with royal and political authority in the period.

52 Pericles also abandons his own body politic – leaving it “headless” – at the end of the following scene. See Jordan (1997).

53 Although he cites Jameson only in passing, Sinfield’s (1994) work bears much in common with this earlier methodological manifesto, in part due to the shared influence of Raymond Williams. For Sinfield, faultlines are the “breaking points” in a text’s governing narrative – sites wherein contradictions manifest in a text and can be detected by the dissident reader (9). Whereas ideology is produced precisely to render such contradictions obsolete (or invisible), Sinfield stresses that any such resolution necessarily bypasses the faultline itself – that is, displaces these tensions elsewhere. Faultlines are, therefore, “by definition resistant to the fantasies that would erase them” (41).

54 On Augustinian and Thomistic approaches to prostitution as a “necessary evil,” see especially Derrick Bailey, Sexual Relation in Christian Thought (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959); Vern L. Bullough and James Brundage, Sexual Practices & the Medieval Church (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1982); Vincent M. Dever, “Aquinas and the Practice of Prostitution,” in
While the necessary evil thesis was often articulated as a means of protecting marriage and “honest womanhood,” Jacques Rossiaud reminds us that lust was predominantly viewed as a female vice, and that the cultural blame for prostitution was posed in terms of female, as opposed to male, desire. See *Medieval Prostitution* (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1984), 81. In her analysis of Italian prostitution, Storey (2008) offers an important reminder that “Prostitution was not just the necessary evil portrayed by city regulations… it was also a convenient source of revenue” (63). On the persistence of the necessary evil thesis well into the seventeenth-century, see Thomas Fuller, *Church History of Britain* (1655), vol. II, sec. V.39-42.

55 On the material and symbolic dimensions of pollution, see Mary Douglas, *Purity and Danger* (London: Routledge Classics, 1966). Douglas stresses a need to frame understandings of pollution within specific cultural contexts, while also underscoring the constitutive functions served by the profane – the polluted, abject, dirty, or taboo – in the formation of social systems.


57 Bailey, 162.

58 Although little work has been done examining the impact of Reformation thinking upon English prostitution, Lyndal Roper and Tessa Storey have examined these relations in early modern Germany and Italy, respectively. See Lyndal Roper, “Discipline and Respectability: Prostitution and the Reformation in Augsburg,” in *Feminism and History*, ed. Joan Wallace Scott (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), and Tessa Storey, *Carnal Commerce in Counter-Reformation Rome* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).


60 To a large degree, Burton and Ferrand are also synthesizing previous anatomical, midwifery, humoral, religious, and philosophic texts. On contemporary anatomy texts, see Traub (2002), esp. 77-124; and Eve Keller, *Generating Bodies and Gendered Selves: The Rhetoric of*

Ferrand’s position accords with contemporary understandings of sperm as heated or “frothy” blood. Yet if phlebotomy makes sense as a “logical” treatment in this regard, it also an invasive procedure – what Ferrand terms a “surgical remedy” – that appears in place of masturbation or sexual excitation. Onanism is, significantly, never mentioned in this extended treatise. As noted, intercourse appears after these “surgical” and “pharmaceutical” options have been reviewed, and then only by inference.

Ferrand’s extended argument reveals an attempt at social, cultural, and religious definition construed in terms of sexual practice: he associates the “necessary evil” thesis not only with classical writers such as Galen, Lucretius, and Ovid, but the Persians Avicenna and Haly Abbas, noting “I am not surprised if Mohammedans and infidels hold such an accursed view, since the Koran allows them as many wives or concubines as they can feed.” He does not, however, limit these critiques to his perceived cultural opposition: “this opinion is completely sacrilegious and misguided in the mouths of Arnald of Villanova, Magnimus, Valescus de Taranta, Pereda, Marsilio Ficino, and other Christian writers” (334).

It is important to note that Ferrand frequently conflates fornication with prostitution in this text.

These caveats did little good: the treatise was immediately declared “sacriligious and pernicious in the extreme” by local Catholic officials. Beecher and Ciavolella frame this condemnation predominantly in terms of Ferrand’s discussions of astrology, but note that his second, revised edition noticeably suppresses discussions of sexual practices so as to conform to “public decency” (26-34).

This section, “Melancholy in Married Persons,” perhaps best encapsulates Ferrand’s inability to discuss marital sex in any direct manner. While the passage incessantly defers conversation of intercourse, he concludes by noting, crudely, that “one should make certain, too, that the woman is not ‘unperforated’ and ‘incapacitated’ such as was Cornelia, the mother of the Gracchi. In such cases, the passage is opened with a razor.” Such invasive procedures ensured, to Ferrand, that the “two diseases” – male and female erotic melancholy – could be cured (340).

“If the clitoris, by its excessive length, is the cause of this furious desire and raging disease, as is often the case, it should be cut in the manner taught by the Greek Moschian and the Arab Albucasis” (357).

Burton first alludes to Ferrand’s work in the 4th edition (1632) of The Anatomy, and does so only in passing.
The one exception appears in case of “uterine fury,” in which case Ferrand cites Hippocrates: “for an appropriate cure he recommends marriage” (264). Significantly, Ferrand does not claim this position as his own. Moreover, and whereas he associates this condition with women outside of patriarchal authority – “they are found only in young girls, widows, or women of a warm temperature who delight in dishonest pastimes and pleasures,” his sense of “curative marriage” can be read in terms of patriarchal, rather than humoral, restoration. Schiesari (1992) does not address Ferrand’s work in her otherwise illuminating study – an unfortunate oversight given that this work might amplify, rather than contradict, her central theses.

In a significant gendered distinction, Burton and Ferrand both associate female “retention” – general referred to either as “uterine fury” or “greensickness” – with a state of “raging or madness” (Ferrand, 264), while construing its male counterpart as the more favorable terms of melancholic imbalance.

On greensickness, see Schiesari (1992) and Paster (2004).


Roper focuses her analysis, and frames her conclusions, predominantly in terms of gender and surveillance, arguing that this “(sexual) Reformation, which seemed at first to offer a sexual ethic identical for men and women, and appeared to bestow a new dignity on the married wife,” instead fostered increased suspicions of female sexual incontinence, and thereby new forms of social and sexual surveillance (356-7).

To illuminate the point at hand, I have italicized “necessary evils” but removed italics from the phrase “the chief delight of the sons of men.” This latter emphasis is significant in its own right, and reveals Burton’s approach to marriage as a vehicle for (male) reproduction.

On misogyny as a means of mediating ambivalences engendered by Elizabethan rule, see especially Mullaney (2001).

This rendering does not reflect Julia Kristeva’s theory of the abject as a primary state of being that precedes narcissistic construction [Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982)]. Instead, I suggest those transitive processes of violent exclusion, possible in the lived and symbolic dimensions, upon which recognized “order” depends.

As Schiesari notes, Freud’s essay is especially notable as a preliminary introduction of this self-critical, moralizing figure later known as the super-ego (236).

On romance as a genre particularly well-suited to negotiating the tensions and transitions between competing modes of production within a specific historical context, see Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981). Jameson’s insights inspired a reading of Pericles by Steven Mullaney (1988), who argued that this particular Shakespearean romance represented “a radical effort to dissociate the popular stage from its cultural contexts and theatrical grounds of possibility – an effort to imagine, in fact, that popular drama could be a purely aesthetic phenomenon, free from history and from historical determination” (147). For Mullaney, it is Gower – who stands ‘i’ th’ gaps” of history as a proleptic incarnation of the modern author – who serves as an ideological salve for the commercial and sexual anxieties associated with London theatrical production. Here I seek less to critique Mullaney’s contentions than to extend a suggestive line of argumentation subordinated to his essay’s larger claims, arguing that the play’s melancholic relation to prostitution helps efface socio-economic concerns related to marriage and female beauty in Reformation England. Other influential studies of Pericles as romance include Barber (1969); Howard Felperin, Shakespearean Romance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972); Kahn (1981); and Adelman (1992). On romance as a genre “characterized primarily as a form which simultaneously quests for and postpones a particular end, objective, or object,” see Patricia Parker, Inescapable Romance: Studies in the Poetics of a Mode (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979).

On persistence in Measure for Measure, see Chapter 4, as well as Leah Marcus, Puzzling Shakespeare: Local Reading and Its Discontents (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), esp. 160-212. On prostitution, disease, and Troilus and Cressida, see Traub (1992), esp. 71-87; and Joseph Lenz, “Base Trade: Theater as Prostitution,” ELH 60.4 (Spring, 1993), 833-855.
In their reunion, Marina notes only “she hath endured a grief [that] might equall yours… wayward fortune did maligne my f fate” (5.1.78-80).

On Diana as an unsettling figure in the play, see Caroline Bicks, “Backsliding at Ephesus: Shakespeare’s Diana and the Churching of Women,” in Sheele (2000), 205-227.


Hamlet, 3.1.60

By this point, the causes of his melancholy – at least as articulated by others – have migrated: aboard a ship in Mytilene harbor, Helicanus claims that Pericles’s “mayne griefe fprings fro[m] the loffe of a beloued daughter & a wife” (5.1.24-25). His unn\nature silence – his muteness – nonetheless remains a crucial symptom: Pericles, Helicanus notes, “hath not spoken to anie one” for over three months (5.1.20-1).

“Mawkin” appears as an alternative spelling for “Malkin” in the OED, under which term corresponding definitions are listed.

Cf. “distain” (OED 2): “to defile, to bring a blot or stain upon, to sully, dishonour.”

Cf. Thomas Thomas, Dictionarium Linguae Latinae et Anglicaenae (1587).


The use of eponymous names such as Pander and Bawd – one thinks also of Measure for Measure’s Mistress Overdone and Troilus and Cressida’s Pandarur – reinforce the presumed legibility of these scenes.

Among the many gendered analyses of the blazon tradition, see especially Nancy J. Vickers, “‘The Blazon of Sweet Beauty’s Best’: Shakespeare’s Lucrece,” in Shakespeare and the Question of Theory, eds. Patricia Parker and Geoffrey Hartman (New York: Routledge, 1985), 95-112.
The French knight – “who cowers i’the hams” – appears far more familiar to the trio, as the Bawd both identifies him by name (“Monsieur Veroles”) and notes that “here he does but repair” his syphilitic condition (90-98). The governor Lysimachus is also clearly familiar with Bawd and Boult, the latter of whom states that he is “glad to see your honour in good health” (19.28), and presumably pays the former for access to Marina: “Faith, she would serve after a long voyage at sea. Well, there’s for you. Leave us” (19.45-6).

In a double-entendre, Bawd notes that the syphilitic French knight “will come in our shadow, to fattering his crowne in the Sunne” (4.2.103-5), inferring both that he will spend French coins and, by inference, shed not only the hairs on his head – a common symptom of syphilis in the period – but also, presumably, his disease. Like melancholy, syphilis received extensive coverage in the era. The humanist Girolamo Fracastorius composed two famous treatises discussing the disease, *Syphilis Sive de Morbo Gallico* (1530) and *De Contagione* (1546), the first of which appeared in almost 100 editions – a staggering number, especially in the early years of English print culture. Yet syphilis was also, as Burton alleges in this chapter’s opening epigraph, perceived to be more visible than melancholy: construed predominantly as an “exterior” contagion whose symptoms – oozing pustules, swollen glands, putrid-smelling abscesses, crooked joints and scarred bodies – were visible to the naked eye. See Quetel (1990), esp. 50-105. See also *Hieronymus Fracastorius and his Poetical and Prose Works on Syphilis*, ed. and trans. William Renwick Riddell (Toronto: Canadian Social Hygiene Council, 1928); Spencer Pearce, “Fracastoro on Syphilis: Science and Poetry in Theory and Practice,” in *Science and Literature in Italian Culture from Dante to Calvino*, eds. Pierpaolo Antonello and Simon A. Gilson (Oxford: European Humanities Research Centre, 2004), 115-135; See also Healy (2004).

This comment serves as a reminder that bastardy was a crucial financial component of prostitution, especially as local parishes were financially responsible for the wellbeing of all children born within their precincts. See G.R. Quaife, *Wanton Wenches and Wayward Wives: Peasants and Illicit Sex in Early Seventeenth-Century England* (London: Croom Helm, 1979).

On female purity produced within the brothel, see Helms (1990).


On the “economic realities” of early modern sex work, particularly as represented in Shakespeare, see Singh (1994).

Indeed, Bawd explicitly compares Marina to that favored figured of dramatic ridicule, the “Puritane” (4.5.18). On perceptions of “Puritanical” celibacy as unhealthy, one thinks also of *Measure for Measure’s* Angelo, a “man whose blood is very snow-broth” (1.4.57-58), and who is described in the play as “unregenerative” (3.1.356). For further discussion, see Chapter 4.
Although Gossett implies that Lysimachus purchases Marina (SD, 351), his lines can only prove suggestive, not conclusive, on the point: “Faith fhee would ferue after a long voyage at Sea, / Well thers for you, leaue vs” (4.5.49-50).

_Boult_: I am glad to fee your Honour in good health (4.5.30).

_Bawd_: He will lyne your apron with gold (4.5.62).

_Bawd_: if fhee not a faire creature?

_Lys_: Faith fhee would ferue after a long voyage at Sea… (4.5.48-49).

On repetition, interpretation, and incest, especially the resemblance between Marina and Thaisa, see Barber (1969) and Frye (2002).

This type of public suppression recalls Marina’s defensive tactics in her brothel exchanges with Lysimachus. When the governor seeks a “private place” to engage her, Marina foregrounds his “honour” as a means of appeal, raising the specter of public disgrace (4.5.95-6). A notorious textual crux, this rhetorical appeal – reminiscent of Antony’s “praise” for Brutus – nonetheless works: Lysimachus leaves, and Marina secures space “amongst honest women” (4.5.196).

_Gower_ notes that “fhee fings like one immortall, and fhee daunces / As goddeffe-like to her admired layes. / Deepe clearks fhe dumb’s, and with her neele compofes / Natures owne shape…” (5.0.3-6)

_Warren_ (2003), 49.

Edwards goes onto assert that what the passage really needs is “amplification of these ejaculations into really persuasive arguments” (44).

_Warren_ (2003), 50.

In the dizzying, chaotic finale of *Meaure for Meaure* – moments before Lucio unwittingly discovers the Duke, catalyzing a famously unsettling resolution – the play’s dramatic energy intensifies during a sharp repartee between Vienna’s most prominent male figures. Fueled by the disguised Duke’s presence-in-absence, the dialogue draws its horror and hilarity from the tensions inherent within competing memory narratives: those of Lucio and the Duke, but also of Escalus, Angelo, their fellow citizens, and even the playgoing audience. Dramatic irony reaches its apogee, however, neither in Escalus’s torturous threats nor the Duke-as-Friar’s critique of Viennese corruption, but rather a basic question of memorial inquiry:

Lucio: …come hither goodman bald-pate, do you know me?
Duke: I remember you Sir, by the found of your voice, I met you at the Prifon, in the absence of the Duke.
Lucio: Oh, did you fo? and do you remember what you said of the Duke?
Duke: Moft notedly Sir.
Lucio: Do you fo Sir: And was the Duke a flefh-monger, a foole, and a coward, as you then reported him to be?
Duke: You muft (Sir) change perfons with me, ere you make that my report: you indeede fpoke fo of him, and much more, much worfe (TLN 2707-2719).

Punning upon absence and substitution, understood by critics to be dominant motifs throughout the play,² the dialogue pulls *Meaure for Meaure*’s dramatic past into its immediate present: as the two characters debate previous roles, they replay the humorous inequality of their situational awareness – Lucio knows not to whom he speaks. Yet irony lies not only in Lucio’s ignorance, nor solely his
memorial reconstructions, but also in the memory work of the playgoing audience. As witnesses, playgoers presumably recall that Lucio “f PCIe fo” of the Duke’s supposed sexual histories and desires: the identity of the true speaker lies within the bounds of their recollection. However, even if early modern playgoers were aware of the friar’s true identity, the characters within the play remain, at this moment, oblivious to the immense power imbalance between the two interlocutors. Before the Duke returns with the social and political power to enforce his memory narrative, the citizens of Vienna hear competing recollections, either of which could prove valid. Escalus and Angelo, the Duke’s acolytes, take neither side on this particular aspect of the debate, responding instead to the “Friar’s” preceding comments – his “Slander to th’ State” (TLN 2703). In doing so, they concentrate upon the attribution of slanderous claims only as applied to the “State” as abstract entity, not to the person who occupies its chief office: the central contention of Lucio and the Duke’s exchange – the latter’s status as a fleshmonger, fool, and coward – falls into silence.

Lucio’s charges of sexual immorality, intellectual impotence, and masculine incapacity disappear, at least rhetorically, as the play concludes. The Duke’s alleged sexual practice – the central point of contention in his prolonged repartee with Lucio – thus not only falls into absence, but is revealed as a type of absence, that which lies beyond the epistemological parameters of the play. In place of proof, audiences witness the operations of power. Imbued with social and political authority, the Duke goes on to identify subjects, order social and sexual relations, and organize the play’s dramatic narrative in relation to his personal recollections: he remembers Lucio’s slanders, Marina’s virtuous confessions, Escalus’s “goodneffe” and the Provost’s “care, and fecrecie” (TLN 2927-2929). The Duke’s memory, quite literally, matters: his chosen recollections not only provide the content and structure for Vienna’s official narrative, but also – most notably in this concluding scene – are inscribed upon the very bodies of the Viennese citizenry. Yet as scholars have increasingly argued, memory production simultaneously depends upon processes of forgetting, whether natural or enforced. Indeed, as the Duke orders the official narrative, he simultaneously encourages his interlocutors to forget: to “throw away [the] thought” of his alleged sexual past (TLN 290). In these and other attempts throughout the play, the Duke – the state embodied – repeatedly attempts to dissociate his bodies natural and politic from the “thought” of sexual practice or desire. The only character who explicitly challenges this official memory narrative – Lucio, who remembers the Duke as “One of all Luxurie, an affe, a mad man” – finds himself subjected to public discipline and forcibly married to a “Punke” (TLN 2900-2922).
If these practices enable *Meafure for Meafure’s* ordered resolution, the call to memory nonetheless bespeaks an excess supplement, the traces of that which has been sacrificed (or violently suppressed) to achieve narrative coherence – whether social, sexual, or dramatic. Indeed, just as the denouement stages the processes of memorial production, work that includes the playgoing audience, it construes memory not only as an individual and cognitive phenomenon, but also as an ongoing, collective, and contestatory process. As the disguised Duke and Lucio provide competing accounts, characters and playgoers alike are drawn into processes of memorial valuation – at least until the Duke’s discovery augments his recollections with the weight of his social and political power. As such, the play dramatizes the labor of memorial production, the violence of memorial suppression, and the innate (and unstable) relations between the two. Thus while Lucio’s counter-memories fade into dramatic silence at the end of the play, his recollections nonetheless remain in play throughout and beyond the denouement: as Lina Perkins Wilder argues, even the absence of that which was formerly present, perceived, felt, heard, or experienced continued to perform memorial work on the early modern stage. Here, I want to consider what happens to Lucio’s claims that the Duke had “fome feeling of the fport” and that “his vfe was, to put a ducket in her Clack-difh,” that he would “eate Mutton on Fridaies” and “mouth with a beggar” (TLN 1607-1669). How do these claims of sexual immorality align with other allusions and ellipses centered upon sexual pasts and practices in Shakespeare’s Vienna?

To forget or devalue Lucio’s claims is to align oneself with the Duke’s official narrative, while to remember with Lucio can illuminate the state’s investment in sexual memory. This analytic move does not seek to know the Duke’s sexual practices or desires; instead, I argue that *Meafure for Meafure* renders these practices significant precisely in their epistemological opacity. Moreover, by staging the processes of memorial production, I want to suggest that this play constitutes a space – and draws upon a theatrical technology – through which the cultures of early modern London could negotiate those practices and histories, sexual and otherwise, which the state seeks to forget. In doing so, *Meafure for Meafure* invites two questions that invite further analysis: how do cultures remember sex? What were the sites and technologies of sexual memory in early modern England?

Pursuing memorial absences and omissions – not only within the created worlds of Shakespeare’s *Meafure for Meafure*, but also in recent scholarly treatments of memory in early modern England – this chapter advances my epistemological investments by attending to conjunctions between memory and sexual practice, while also attending to memories of sexual practice. Such an approach bears larger political questions and implications: I examine these mutually constitutive
entities—in their many forms and meanings, their potency yet imprecision—as central sites for the expression of, and resistance to, state power. Positing memory as a social construction that performs cultural work, I therefore consider sexual memory as inextricably individual and cultural. In the memory work of the play, narratives of sexuality depend as much upon the absent and elided as the present and reproduced; just as the Duke depends upon practices of sexual forgetting to produce his own authority, the play registers traces of counter-memories that foreground the state’s investment in practices of sexual commerce. The play’s many voices thus bespeak alternative narratives and mnemonics through which the sexual practices of early modern England might be remembered. In what follows, I focus in particular on acts of cultural forgetting as they span four distinct, if interrelated, registers—in modern memory studies, within the play, in modern editorial practices, and in the cultures of early modern England.

The following section explicates key terms and situates my analysis within existing discourses of memory in late medieval and early modern England. In Section II, I examine the power and politics of memory in Measure for Measure, particularly as implicated in the Duke’s famed status as a social authority. I then explore, in Section III, the polymorphous traces of illicit sex in the play’s second scene, considering how the various geographies, architectures, records, bodies, objects, and languages of the scene remember and forget sexual practices on an individual and cultural scale. Hailing its audiences, this memory work draws upon a multiplicity of memories relating to English sexual practices, including state control of London sexual commerce prior to the suppression of legalized prostitution in 1546. In a fourth and concluding section, I recall the voice of Lucio to suggest how his memories might re-member or dis-member multiple sexual narratives, both within and beyond the world of the play.

I

In her famed analysis of the classical, medieval, and early modern arts of memory, Frances Yates describes a remarkable, if strikingly grotesque, mnemonic promoted by the Franciscan priest John Ridevall. To recall the sin of Idolatry during their sermons, preachers should, Ridevall argues, construct a deformed prostitute in their minds—her face painted and disfigured, her ears mutilated, and her body conspicuously diseased. Such an image epitomizes, for Yates, a distinctly medieval art of memory, descended from the Aristotelian tradition and reconfigured by Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, among others. Ridevall’s prostitute exemplifies a Scholastic strain of this classical
art, one predicated upon associations of affects and ethics: practitioners are encouraged to construct exceptional images – in this case bodies, or what Aquinas refers to as “corporeal similitudes”\textsuperscript{13} – within their mind. Such beauty or ghastliness, according to this line of thought, strengthens the impression of the memory image, thereby ensuring its preservation and facilitating effortless recollection. More importantly, such affective intensity inspires socially sanctioned behavior on behalf of the memory artist – stirring him to virtuous conduct or, at the very least, away from lascivious comportment. For Ridevall, Aquinas, Magnus, and their contemporaries, even the horrific mnemonic serves a pedagogic function – the recollection of vices and virtues induces a “moral habit… used to remember past things with a view to prudent conduct in the present, and prudent looking forward in the future.”\textsuperscript{14} The imagined harlot – a general persona as opposed to a specific individual – thus functions as a moral mnemonic, derived from the social and characterized by the sexual. It also sustains and reproduces contemporary gendered and sexual ideologies: Ridevall’s harlot is conspicuously female, a “common woman” who metonymically embodies specific sins.\textsuperscript{15}

Little evidence suggests that Ridevall’s minor thirteenth-century treatise was well-known or circulating in late Elizabethan and early Jacobean England. A relatively obscure text, the treatise proves interesting predominantly for its interpretation of the Thomistic art, specifically the emphasis on personification as a mnemonic practice. Indeed, the use of personae – especially those marked by their sexual practices or reputations – as mnemonics has been overlooked in modern scholarly accounts regarding the classical arts of memory, which have tended to emphasize spaces, material objects, rituals and iconography.\textsuperscript{16} Although scholars have rightly noted the centrality of memory to medieval and early modern European cultures, relations of memory and sexual practice – especially at the cultural as opposed to individual level – remain underexplored.\textsuperscript{17} However, traces of Ridevall’s practice – in which individual types serve as embodied mnemonics imbued with social, sexual, and religious meaning – persists into the sixteenth-century, ranging across a variety of cultural forms, most notably medieval morality and mystery plays (where audiences were encouraged to remember cardinal virtues and deadly sins by ritualistically observing eponymous characters who personified a given trait). Whereas this theatrical tradition wanes over the course of the long Protestant Reformation, elements of the practice continue to circulate in print works devoted to the arts of memory, including Magnus’s commentary on Isaias, from which Ridevall may have drawn inspiration.\textsuperscript{18} In that text, the author encourages readers to deploy the goddess Venus as a sexual mnemonic, construing an image of the deity as a harlot: “her skirt raised, showing her leg, to incite men to desire.”\textsuperscript{19} Peter of Ravenna’s The Art of Memory, that Otherwyse is called the Phenix (London,
1548) testifies to the persistence of the sexually personified mnemonic well into the early modern period. In this extraordinarily popular text, Ravenna not only argued on behalf of “maydens and vyrgyns” as especially powerful moral and sexual mnemonics, but also encouraged practitioners to model these constructions after individuals known personally to the memory artist. If not a dominant trope in the medieval and early modern arts of memory, the Ridevall harlot – and its virginal/chaste correlative in Magnus and Ravenna – suggests that the memorial can partake of, and draw energy, from the sexual. Does the sexual partake of the memorial as well?

Among the most striking aspects of the Ridevall harlot is this sexual mnemonic’s combined social and individual characteristics. Lacking a proper name and body, she functions as an abstraction, the personification of a general vice. Produced in the mind of the memory artist, this figure assumes form as an aggregation of cultural, institutional, and personal narratives: the practitioner draws from the Ridevall text, but completes and personalizes the mnemonic by calling upon his own cultural experiences, biases, and fantasies. Produced at the intersection of the internal and external, the individual and the collective, this mnemonic organizes and augments the preacher’s memory in the social activity of preaching – the dissemination of an institutionally authorized narrative to a local congregation. It is unclear if Ridevall’s preachers directly transmitted the image to their parishioners – that is, encouraged them to deploy this mnemonic as well – or simply used it as a device to organize their sermon. Regardless, the mnemonic draws upon a shared social framework in the pursuit of an explicitly communal objective. This is not solely an isolated and individual memory art, but part of an extended social conversation drawing upon multiple technologies of memory – discursive, rhetorical, and poetic – and augmented by the authority of a distinct social institution.

Ridevall’s imagined harlot thus draws upon cultural narratives to construct and disseminate shared meanings and values. Transmitted from the pulpit, this mnemonic draws from, reproduces, and circulates the harlot as a privileged figure through which an institution expresses – and impresses – its authority. In doing so, this absent figure also suggests a series of critical absences in studies of early modern sexuality and memory – most notably the centrality of cultural memory to early modern conceptions of sex and sexual practice, as well as the place of sex in the memory cultures of early modern England. From this alternative perspective, the sexual practices of Meafure for Meafure appear polymorphous – concomitantly present and absent, political and personal, public and private, corporeal and discursive, remembered and forgotten, suppressed and persistent. As a site for illuminating these apparent paradoxes, the play’s depiction of prostitution encourages
particular attention to state investment in controlling the practices, memories, and meanings of sexual exchange. In doing so, the memories of *Meafure for Meafure* remember that which has been generally absent in literary critical readings of the play: the centrality of sexual commerce to the social and political cultures of Tudor and Stuart England.

Before turning to the play, I want to clarify my understanding of collective memory, especially as derived from an array of critical studies that emerged in the wake of Maurice Halbwachs’s groundbreaking *On Collective Memory*. In that work, Halbwachs challenges constructions of memory as a predominantly individual and neuropsychological phenomenon, arguing instead that “any memories capable of being formed, retained, or articulated by an individual are always a function of socially constituted forms, narratives, and relations.”25 As a social formation, collective memory both precedes and depends upon individual subjects: one’s unique neurology, experiences, perspectives, and affective capacities interact with, and are framed in relation to, surrounding narratives. It is then through individual subjects and groups that memory narratives are validated, repeated, challenged, and/or produced. Through repetition and sedimentation, select narratives achieve the appearance of stability or truth.26

My emphasis on narrative indicates a particular subfield within memory studies. Applying the tools of narratology, this approach posits collective memory as an aggregation of varying events and perspectives forced into legibility. Related to (but distinct from) traumatic memory, these memories emerge from – and make sense within – a particular milieu, a “context in which, precisely, the past makes sense in the present, to others who can understand it, sympathize with it, or respond with astonishment, surprise, even horror; narrative memory offers some form of feedback that ratifies the memory.”27 In this incisive definition, Mieke Bal underlines the critically affective, historical, and epistemological implications of memory theory. Attuned to the specific conditions of possibility within which a chosen text assumes meaning, collective memory construes past and present as equally unstable and mutually constitutive entities, continually reproduced in relation to one another. Through the ongoing processes of validation, repetition, and sedimentation, privileged memories can assume an authoritarian weight or stability, yet as an unstable aggregation continually reproduced, cultural memories nonetheless bear the traces of alternative possibilities and thus remain susceptible to resistance and revision. Cultural memory thus provides postmodern scholars yet another conceptual framework for theorizing and analyzing the situated aspects of knowledge production.28
To account for these traces or counter-memories – while simultaneously attending the powerful imperatives of authorized narratives – I use the phrase “cultural memory” as opposed to “collective memory.” The latter idiom, posed by Halbwachs, infers a false sense of unity or totality that ironically belies the complexity of that author’s original formulation: “We can remember only on the condition of retrieving the position of past events that interest us from the frameworks of collective memory. A recollection is the richer when it reappears at the junction of a greater number of the frameworks, which in effect intersect with each other and overlap in part” (172). For Halbwachs, each society necessarily features multiple memory frameworks, constituted by various social groups or institutions such as the family, guild, or, as in Ridevall’s account, congregation. A given “recollection,” Halbwachs argues, assumes greater potency when it “reappears at the junction of a greater number of the frameworks,” thereby acquiring the appearance of universality.

“Forgetting, or the deformation of certain recollections” he goes on to note, “is explained by the disappearance of these frameworks or part of them” as well as the fact that “frameworks change from one period to another” (172). While this position suggests the multiplicity and mutability of memory frameworks, Halbwachs implicitly naturalizes the “disappearance” and “deformation” of alternative positions rather than examining the power dynamics inherent to the production of cultural memory. Put another way, all narratives and frameworks are not equal. Cultural remembering thus does not signify the simple or complete retrieval of past events, but instead reflects an inherently contestatory process wherein certain recollections are preferred at the expense of others.

Let me return to Lucio and the Duke. In their heated public exchange, each offers an individual account of their earlier interactions. They agree on some points: both acknowledge that the Duke was referred to as “a fleh-monger, a foole, and a coward” and, in doing so, may draw upon a shared conceptual framework – a catalogue of social “types” circulating in early modern England. In his monastic disguise, however, the Duke augments his narrative with the institutional authority of the Catholic Church (a position that may have worked to his detriment for Protestant playgoers). The Duke also positions himself as a foreigner to his Viennese audience: “be not fo hot: the Duke dare no more fretch this finger of mine, then he dare racke his own. His Subiect am I not, nor here Provinciall” (emphasis added, TLN 2693-2696). Lucio, by contrast, speaks as both a gentleman and a Viennese citizen familiar to his various social interlocutors: Claudio, Mistress Overdone, Isabella, and even the Duke, before whose court he once appeared. A conspicuous libertine implicated in the city’s sexual practices, Lucio can appear to playgoers and his onstage
counterparts as a figure of sexual knowledge — his calibrated orchestration of the initial Angelo-Isabella exchange attests to a certain experience in erotic matters — and/or as a depraved and untrustworthy rake, among other possibilities. In this momentary equality, the two characters and their audiences reach a memorial impasse: whose account should one accept?

Limited to an individual model of cognition, wherein memory resides solely within the cerebral processes of the Duke and Lucio, the exchange’s memory work concludes at the moment of revelation; the figure with the power to enforce his account authors an official narrative that assumes the status of truth, while his opponent’s counter-memory slides into silence. Yet as audiences, both within and beyond the world of the play, participate in the construction of meanings — and, in this context, memories — by placing this event in relation to other signs presented throughout the play, the question centers not so much on truth as validation and enforcement: how are specific memories privileged and other suppressed? How do competing memories relate to official narratives or histories? Finally, how might the early modern stage itself function as a technology of cultural — and sexual — memory? As Measure for Measure performs memory and forgetting, it also enacts and interrogates their production. Exploring an array of mnemonics and technologies, the play thus encourages playgoers to consider how, where, and to what extent cultures retain their memories, including and perhaps especially those related to sexual practices.

II

Traces of illicit sex permeate the social, urban, and corporeal landscapes of Shakespeare’s Vienna. Writ across the bodies of its citizenry, inscribed in the laws of the land, enshrined within buildings razed or repurposed, present and absent in the bawdy languages of its subjects, sexual memory saturates the contours of Viennese life. Although criminality, transgression, and authority in Measure for Measure have received ample scholarly attention, their relations to cultural memory have gone unnoticed. The play, however, both begins and concludes at sites of remembrance, constructing the Duke’s memory practices as the manifestation of his authority. He opens by praising his deputy Escalus, noting that “The nature of our People, / Our Cities Institutions, and the Termes / For Common Iustice, y’are as pregnant in / As Art, and practife, hath intriched any / that we remember” (emphasis added, TLN 12-16). Locating in his counterpart those “qualities essential to the office of ruling,” the Duke nonetheless qualifies his praise by noting that Escalus’s commission
remains predicated upon a higher license: his authority not only depends upon, but emerges from, the parameters of official memory, the boundaries of the Duke’s recollection.

This caveat sheds light upon the passage’s otherwise enigmatic concluding sentiment: “There is our Comission,” the Duke goes on to note, “From which, we would not haue you warpe (TLN 16-17). What, exactly, is this commission, and how does it relate to the “no more… but that” which Escalus has been entrusted to perform? The question turns upon an obscure editorial crux, one that centers precisely upon the acknowledgement – or elision – of memory as a central category in Measure for Measure. Here is the passage in full, with the 1623 Folio alongside a present-day Norton edition:\footnote{34}

\begin{tabular}{ll}
\textit{Norton (2008)} & \textit{Folio (1623)} \\
Of government the properties to unfold & Of Gouvemment, the properties to vnfold,  \\
Would seem in me t'affect speech and discourse; & Would feeme in me t'afect speech & discouerfe  \\
Since I am put to know that your owne science & Since I am put to know, that your Science  \\
Exceeds in that the lists of all advice & Exceeded (in that) the liftis of all aduice  \\
My strength can give you. Then no more remains, & My strengh can giue you: Then no more remains  \\
But \textbf{this}: to your sufficiency, as your worth is able, & But \textbf{that}, to your sufficiency, as your worth is able  \\
And let them work. The nature of our people, & And let them worke: The nature of our People,  \\
Our city’s institutions and the terms & Our Cities Institiutions, and the Termes  \\
For common justice, you’re as pregnant in & For Common Iustice, y'are as pregnant in  \\
As art and practice hath enriched any & As Art, and practife, that enrichted any  \\
That we remember. There is our commission, & That we remember: There is our Commiffion  \\
From which we would not have you warp. & From which, we would not haue you warpe;  \\
\end{tabular}

In both versions, the stated “Comission” appears to delineate Escalus’s cognitive authority – his advanced understanding of the nature, institutions, and terms of Viennese life.\footnote{35} It also hearkens back to the Duke’s earlier, seemingly inscrutable assertion that “no more remains but \textbf{this}: to your sufficiency, as your worth is able, and let them work” (Norton, 1.1.5-7). This lineation emends the Folio’s “then no more remains but \textbf{that}, to your sufficiency, as your worth is able, and let them work” (emphasis added).\footnote{36} The pronoun shift proves critical. In the Norton construction, the clause looks forward, functioning as instruction: Escalus must “go to” or “rely on” his sufficiency, letting “them work.” His commission, as it were, is to use this knowledge to the best of his abilities – an obtuse charge at best. The emendation generates further problems: not only do object (sufficiency) and pronoun (them) fail to agree, but the command also disrupts the balance of the speech: the Duke’s subsequent lines prove unnecessary (quite literally, no more “remains,” only a retrospective inventory of Escalus’s “science”) and the passage loses a critical verbal echo.\footnote{37}

Editions drawn from the Folio retain this easily overlooked rhetorical device and produce – by way of the pronoun “that” – a commission directly connected to Escalus’s memory practices. In
the Folio rendering, the pronoun refers not forwards but backwards – it remembers the Lord’s “owne Science,” a knowledge base which “exceedes (in that), the lifts of all advice my strength can give you.” The term’s second citation, positioned parenthetically in the Folio, moves even further back, remembering the “properties” identified in the speech’s first line. In the restored Folio construction, therefore, the Duke offers an entirely different commission, summarized thus: “it would appear vain of me to expound upon the properties of Viennese governance, as I am aware that your knowledge (in this particular realm) exceeds mine own; nothing more do you possess, so use these faculties to the best of your ability. This knowledge – regarding the nature of our people, our institutions, and the codes of our legal system – is as deep and thorough as that possessed by any person in my (official) memory. That is your commission – to understand how the state functions – from which you must not deviate.” Escalus thus possesses no official powers beyond a unique capacity to know, acknowledge, and remember how power operates in the Duke’s Vienna. “Pregnant” in this capacity, he functions as a repository of state memory, embodying the critical interrelations of memory, authority, and power in Vienna. Such an understanding proves invaluable in its own right, a lesson which others in Vienna will learn to their benefit or detriment: one’s status and livelihood, the savvy Escalus knows, depends upon “that” which “we” – the state – “remembers.” In forgetting the Folio, the Oxford and Norton editions elide memory itself.

The election of Angelo only reiterates the potent and capricious functions of official memory in Vienna. Turning to this alternative deputy, the Duke declares “There is a kinde of Character in thy life, / That to th’obferuer, doth thy hiftory / Fully vnfold (TLN 33-35). The statement appears benign, coming only moments after Escalus affirms Angelo’s honorable reputation. Yet the Duke’s assertion registers a discordant note: based upon conspicuously vague evidence – a “kinde of Character” observed – he declares his counterpart as a capable and qualified ruler. Angelo himself immediately challenges this memorial construction; noting his own lack of experience, he responds “Let there be fome more tef, made of my mettle, / Before fo noble, and fo great a figure / Be ftamp’d vpon it” (TLN 54-57). The Duke pithily discards this self-history: “No more euafion: / We haue with a leauen’d, and prepared choice / Proceeded to you” (TLN 58-60). While the stately proclamation, with its emphases upon prudence and circumspection, appears to settle the case, the Duke’s immediate assertions of haste unsettle such declared discretion. Two scenes later, the entire conceptual framework for Angelo’s election – that he possesses the proper character to oversee Vienna – crumbles when the Duke acknowledges, to Friar Thomas, that he does not know whether Angelo will govern responsibly (“hence we fhall fee / if power change
purpofe, what our Seemers be,” TLN 345-346).\(^{42}\) Angelo’s “hiftory fully vnfold” thus unfolds not the deputy’s histories – his past, present, or future – but those of the Duke and Vienna: a history wherein the state produces and enforces certain memory narratives, to pointedly material consequences.\(^{43}\)

Such coercive memory practices continue throughout the play’s conclusion; the Duke’s brief exchange with Angelo foreshadows his later contest with Lucio, reminding audiences that the past has many voices, including dissident ones.\(^{44}\) Yet while counter-memories can be suppressed and elided by social authority, attending to the acts and processes of enforced forgetting exposes the labor necessary to reproduce dominant social narratives. Indeed, just as *Meafor Meafor* measures the material and affective force of official memory, it simultaneously registers those alternative memory narratives, frameworks, and technologies that complicate, or outright contest, the Duke’s ordered narrative. In doing so, it asks audiences to consider what exactly the Duke wants to forget – and why.

The memory work of *Meafor Meafor* begins not only with chosen recollections but also conspicuous ellipses. Amidst the haste and clamor of the play’s first scene, the Duke offers a deeply significant, if easily overlooked, aside to his newly appointed deputy. “Our hafte from hence,” he declares, “is of fo quicke condition, / That it prefers itfelfe, and leaues vnquefion’d / Matters of needfull value” (TLN 61-63). A seemingly casual digression, the comment barely registers in light of the scene’s momentous actions: just prior, the Duke announced his intentions to abscond from the state and transfer full authority (“Mortallitie and Mercie in Vienna”) to an untested deputy, bypassing the more experienced Escalus (TLN 50). Plunged into chaos, the Duke’s audiences – Escalus, Angelo, readers, and playgoers alike – struggle to synthesize an abruptly disordered state of affairs, to locate a thread of stability in a world suddenly gone awry. In such a situation, “vnquefion’d matters” may appear trivial; as a ruler rushes away, the scene produces a powerful impetus to focus upon what remains visible, that which materializes onstage as opposed to offhand occlusions. Nonetheless, the aside offers a haunting reminder that matters of “needfull value” have been pointedly omitted.

Far from trivial, the comment identifies a central narrative omission. If, at first glance, the Duke appears to indicate the parameters of Angelo’s commission or the “fcope” of his authority as a substitute ruler, he addresses these issues moments later by ordering the deputy “to inforce, or qualifie the Lawes / As to your foule feemes good” (TLN 73-75). A troubling assertion – granting Angelo powers *carte blanche* in his absence – the claim nonetheless broadly defines the deputy’s
mandate. The Duke’s aside thus suggests another omission, some other casualty to the imperatives of haste. Amidst harried departures and substitutions, what the Duke “leaves unquestion’d” are the very grounds for his withdrawal.

The Duke addresses these motives in the play’s third scene, acknowledging to Friar Thomas that he has forgotten – or failed\(^45\) – to enforce the “strict Statutes, and most biting Laws… Which for this fourene yeares, we haue let slip” (TLN 309-311). These claims echo those of Claudio who, in the preceding scene, suffers under a “drowfie and neglected Act” and cites his persecution as an expression of “Tirrany” (TLN 256-263), thereby associating capricious or selective enforcement with despotism.\(^46\) The Duke, in part, agrees: “twas my fault” he confesses to the Friar, “‘T [sic] would be my tirrany to ftrike and gall them, / For what I bid them doe” (TLN 328-329). The elected Angelo stands in his place. By this act of substitution, the Duke displaces his forgetting – and recollecting – onto his deputy. The ruse works: the Viennese subjects never question “what [the Duke] bid them doe,” and instead focus upon the actions of Angelo, who “for a name” (TLN 264), they believe, resurrects the forgotten law.

Placing Angelo in his stead, the Duke also elides his relations to the sexual politics of contemporary Vienna. The dramatic narrative reflects and enacts these displacements; given that the Duke defers the grounds for his remove until his discussion with the Friar (Act 1, scene 3 in modern editions), it is the citizens who first articulate the sexual practices of Vienna (Act 1, scene 2).\(^47\) By the time the Duke – disguised and thus still symbolically dissociated from his official position – finally admits that he repeatedly has “feene corruption boyle and bubble, / Till it ore-run the Stew,” these corruptions have been associated with the citizenry (TLN 2698-2699). What the Duke wants to forget – or, more precisely, wants to dissociates from himself and the official narrative – is sexual “corruption”: that which “ore-runs” socially sanctioned boundaries, desires, or practices.

Such efforts to dissociate himself (as the state embodied), from Viennese vice and bawdry are metaphorically expressed in the Duke’s own denial of an alleged sexual past. In addition to his fiery exchanges with Lucio, the Duke begins an earlier conversation with Friar Thomas by denying an (absent) assertion that implicitly articulate his own (present) desires:

\begin{verbatim}
No: holy Father, throw away that thought,  
Believe not that the dribling dart of love  
Can pierce a compleat bofome: why, I defire thee  
To giue me secret harbor, hath a purpofe  
More graue, and wrinkled, then the aimes, and ends  
Of burning youth (TLN 290-6).
\end{verbatim}
In the Duke’s memory practices, sex does not simply fall out: it is actively forgotten. These practices mirror those of the Viennese state; as Leah Marcus aptly notes, “at the end of the play, despite all the initial talk about the rigid enforcement of law, the Viennese statute punishing fornication with death is forgotten” (178). Yet just as the Duke’s own desires return with sudden force at the denouement – where he shockingly expresses his intention to wed Isabella – the play throughout associates memorial absence not with oblivion, but persistence and the possibility of return. Indeed, while the Duke attempts to contain the sexual and social memories of Vienna, his actions simultaneously reveal and encounter sites of (sexual) memory beyond his authoritarian grasp, including mnemonics that shift, transfer, reside elsewhere and even – much like the Duke himself – assume a certain disguise in other names, bodies, and spaces.

III

Literary historians seeking to date and localize Measure for Measure often turn to the play’s second scene, especially the “Clowne” Pompey’s famed reference to a state “proclamation” demanding the razing of “All howfes in the Suburbs of Vienna” (TLN 182-185). Scholars have long read this citation – in conjunction with Mistress Overdone’s references to the “war,” “fweat,” “gallowes,” and “pouerty” (TLN 172-3) – as an allusion to events contemporary to the play’s first known performance before the court of King James I on December 26, 1604. For example, argues that “Overdone’s complaint links a number of factors operative in the winter of 1603-4: the continuance of the war with Spain; the plague in London; the treason trials and executions at Winchester in connection with the plots of Raleigh and others; the slackness of trade in the deserted capital.” In a gloss that has become essentially de rigueur, Lever goes on to link Pompey’s “proclamation” to a contemporary Stuart Royal Proclamation that calls for the “pulling down of houses and rooms in the suburbs of London as a precaution against the spread of plague by ‘dissolute and idle persons’” (xxxii). I will return to these proclamations, but first I want to address the geographies of sexual memory, particularly the presence and absence of prostitution in the suburbs of Shakespeare’s Vienna and early modern London.

As discussed in the Introduction, while various studies have challenged the strict segregation of prostitution to the early modern London suburbs or “liberties,” it is clear that these locations – particularly a London bankside that also housed the Globe, Rose, and Swan Theaters – were among those conceptually associated with the practices of commercial sex work in early modern London.
stress conceptually to suggest in particular how legal prostitution remained present in memory, even after the state formally ceased to regulate the London sex trade.\textsuperscript{53} To situate the conceptual in relation to the cultural memories of sexual practice, I turn to John Stow’s \textit{Survey of London}.

Published in 1598, with a second edition distributed in 1603, Stow’s famous account of early modern London constructs a city in and of memory, one wherein present buildings, geographies, and edifices “stand as monumental signposts to a community, a culture, a history defined and embodied by the traces it has left behind.”\textsuperscript{54} Stow’s text also produces, as in the Ridevall account, commercial sex \textit{in its absence and as a memory}, an approach signified, in part, by the writer’s peculiar shift from the present to past tense as he perambulates through the present spaces of past prostitutions.\textsuperscript{55} To illuminate these memorial implications, I reprint a significant portion Stow’s text, with emphasis added:

Having treated of wards in London on the north side of the Thames, in number twenty-five, I \textit{am} now to cross over the said river into the borough of Southwark…

St. Margaret on the Hill being put down \textit{is} now a court for justice; St. Thomas in the hospital serveth for a parish church \textit{as afore}; St. George a parish church \textit{as before} it did; so doth St. Olave and St. Mary Magdalen, by the abbey of Bermondsey.

There \textit{be} also these five prison or gaols:—

- The Clink on the Banke.
- The Compter, in the late parish church of St. Margaret.
- The Marshalsea.
- The King’s Bench.
- And the White Lion, all in Long Southwark.

Houses most notable \textit{be} these:—

- The Bishop of Winchester’s house.
- The Bishop of Rochester’s house.
- The Duke of Suffolk’s house, or Southwark place.
- The Tabard, an hostelry or inn.
- The Abbot of Hyde, his house.
- The Prior of Lewes, his house.
- The Bridge House.
- The Abbot of Battaile, his house.
- Bataille Bridge.
- The Stewes on the bank of the Thames.
- And the Bear-Gardens there.

Now, to return to the west bank, there \textit{be} two bear-gardens, the old and new places, wherein \textit{be kept} bears, bulls, and other beasts, to be baited; as also mastiffs in several kennels, nourished to bait them. These bears and other beasts \textit{are baited} in plot of ground, scaffolded about for the beholders to stand Safe.

Next on this bank \textit{was sometime} the Bordello, or Stewes, a place so called of certain stew-houses privileged there, for the repair of incontinent men to the like women… these and many more orders \textit{were to be} observed upon great pain and
punishment. I have also seen divers patents of confirmation, namely, one dated 1345, the 19th of Edward III. Also I find, that in the 4th of Richard II., these stew-houses belonging to William Walworth, then Mayor of London, were farmed by Froes of Flanders, and spoiler by Walter [Wat] Tyler and the other rebels of Kent. Notwithstanding, I find that ordinances for the same place and houses were again confirmed in the reign of Henry VI., to be continued as before. Also, Robert Fabian writeth, that in the year of 1506, the 21st of Henry VII., the said stew-houses in Southwark were for a season inhibited, and the doors closed up, but it was not long, saith he, ere the house there were set open again, so many as were permitted, for, as it was said, whereas eighteen houses, from henceforth were appointed to used twelve only. These allowed stew-houses had signs on their fronts, towards the Thames, not hanged out, but painted on the walls, as a Boar’s Head, the Cross Keys, the Gun, the Castle, the Crane, the Cardinal’s Hat, the Bell, the Swan, &c. I have heard of ancient men, of good credit, report that these single women were forbidden the rites of the church so long as they continued that sinful life, and were excluded from Christian burial if they were not reconciled before their death. And therefore there was a plot of ground called the Single Woman’s Churchyard, appointed for them far from the church.

In the year of Christ, 1546, the 37th of Henry VIII., this row of stews in Southwark was put down by the king’s commandment, which was proclaimed by sounds of trumpet, no more to be privileged, and used as a common brothel, but the inhabitants of the same to keep good and honest rule, as in other places of this realm, &c.

As Stow moves to the next location, he casually returns to the present tense: “next is the Clink, a jail or prison for the trespassers in those parts.” Yet even these present tense constructions incorporate the traces of past prostitutions: Stow notes that the existing jail had served “in old time” to house the rabble who might “break the peace” in the streets or “brothel-houses” and “were straightly imprisoned.” Moving forward, he again returns to the present tense: “Next is the Bishop of Winchester’s house” (374).

Within Stow’s peripatetic memory narrative – the author quite literally walks his readers through the present spaces of London’s sexual past – these brothels assume an absent materiality. Whereas other buildings are present, this section of the bankside exists as a type of cartographic lacuna, a gap filled solely with memory narratives centered upon the suppression and persistence of commercial sex in early modern London. Stow takes the reader from St. Thomas hospital, through the (absent) brothels, to a present Clink and House of the Bishop of Winchester. If the material spaces of prostitution have been razed from the face of London, these buildings remain a ghostly presence, urban palimpsests that occupy the gap between hospital and jail. Indeed, even as they are absent in Stow’s narrative account, the “Stewes on the bank of the Thames” remain present in his earlier inventory of houses that “be” in Southwark. Whereas Steven Mullaney has argued that the
city featured the “traces of a past whose outlines were daily growing more tenuous,” Stow’s London brothels appear as a curious exception—a durable, even interminable, urban memory.58

Other English chronicles, like William Camden’s Britannia (London, 1586) and Thomas Fuller’s Church History of Britain (London, 1655), mirror Stow’s account.59 Camden proves an exemplary comparison as he adopts a similar temporal and memorial register:

The things that have been remarkable, are, a noble Abbey for Monks of the Benedictine Order… there still remains as Hospital of S. Thomas, repaired or father founded by the City of London, for the lame and inform… as also the house of the Bishop of Winchester, built by William Gifford Bishop, about the year 1107. for the use of his successors. From this along the Thames-side, there runs westward a continued line of houses, in which compass, within the memory of our fathers, there were Publicke Stews, called by the Latins Lupanaria (wherein Whores prostituted and set to sale their modesty), because they, like rapacious She-wolves, have miserably filthy people in their dens. But these were prohibited by King Henry 8 at a time when England was at the height of Lust and Luxury; tho’ in foreign nations they are still continued for gain, under the specious pretense of making allowance to humane infirmity.60

Turning to Southwark, Camden notes a “continued line of houses” that “were Publicke Stews.” Yet while condemning those “miserable filthy people… prohibited by King Henry 8,” he acknowledge that they remain present “within the memory of our fathers” (322).

I rehearse these memorial journeys not to ascribe a causal link between text and context, but rather to illustrate four points: first, to emphasize that material records—such as these chronicles—function as a crucial collective form of memory that can be reproduced and disseminated on a grand scale; second, to highlight Stow’s and Camden’s shared reference to the suppression of prostitution under Henry VIII; third, to note their joint emphasis on visibility and erasure; and fourth, to draw attention to the manner in which both configure London prostitution as a present-absence haunting the early modern city.61 While Measure for Measure, especially the play’s “seedy” second scene,62 does not reflect these memories, it does participate in the memorial cultures of English sexual practices. The play also construes sexual memory as contested and opaque, a persistent if evasive cultural form that continually disrupts the dominant memory narratives of state authority.

As noted, the proclamation of Act 1, scene 2 arguably invited playgoers to recall a Stuart Royal Proclamation, issued September 16, 1603, that calls for the dissolution of plague-ridden buildings in the city and suburbs of London. Upon closer historical examination, however, the alleged reference proves a surprisingly imprecise match, testifying less to prostitution than to plague, less to topicality than to persistence—an extended royal campaign, spanning the entirety of the
Tudor monarchy, focused upon the unsuccessful suppression of undesirable diseases, spaces, and persons:

Whereas it falleth out by wofull experience, that the great confluence and access of excessive numbers of idle, indigent, dissolute, and dangerous persons, And the pestering of many of them in small and strait roomes and habitations in the Citie of London, and in about the Suburbes of the same, have bene one of the chiefest occasions of the greate Plague and mortality… His Majestie … to avoide the continuance or renewing of such mortalitie, doth by the advice of his Privie Councell, doth straightly prohibite and forbid, That no new Tenant or Inmate, or other person or persons, be admitted to inhabite or reside in any such house or place in the saide Citie, Suburbes, or within foure miles of the same, which have been so infected.63

In contrast to *Measure for Measure*’s proclamation, the Stuart document unites rather than separates city and suburb. Attempting to limit the spread of “greate Plague and mortality,” it adopts a diseased rhetoric similar to that of the play, yet explicitly emphasizes mortality over sexuality; neither brothels nor sexual practices are mentioned. When this privileged proclamation finally refers to the razing of houses in its conclusion, moreover, it cites this practice not as an intervention but as an extension of previous edicts:

Wherein his Majestie straightely doeth charge and require… that none of the foresaid Roomes, Houses, or places be hereafter pestered with multitudes of dwellers, or with any Inmates. And that such of the said Roomes, Houses, or places as by any Proclamation heretofore published, are ordered or appointed to be rased or pulled down, shall forthwith, the same bein now voide, or as the same shall hereafter become voide, be rased and pulled down accordingly. And being once pulled down, that they or any of them at any time afterwards, suffer not any of the same to be newly erected, as they will answere the contrary at their utmost perill.

These predecessors, “any Proclamation heretofore published,” include not only the contemporary – Elizabeth I issued a similar edict on June 22, 1602 – but also the historical: nearly forty Royal Proclamations attending to these and related issues published between 1487 and 1603.64 Even if early modern playgoers associated Pompey’s claim with the Stuart proclamation, such a reference likely stimulated memories of suppression and persistence: an authoritarian failure to extirpate that which was seen as dissolute and diseased.

Pompey’s allusion likely stimulated two further memories, both of which significantly alter the play’s representation of prostitution: first, the 1546 abolition of state-sanctioned prostitution by royal proclamation under Henry VIII, and second, its perceived persistence throughout the remainder of the sixteenth century. As in the Stow (1598/1603) and Camden (1695) accounts
excerpted above, when writers of the period remembered the official suppression of vice, they spoke not of 1603, but 1546. These memories not only allude to another crucial proclamation – TRP 265, “Ordering London Brothels Closed,” issued 14 April 1546 – that resonates more precisely with the world of Shakespeare’s Vienna, but one that also situates itself within an extended legacy of authoritarian failures to suppress the London sex trade. The document remains, to this day, an extant, material mnemonic of English sexual practice in the sixteenth-century (full text reprinted in Appendix):

Figure 16: Manuscript Copy of TRP 265, ca. late 16th-century (Credit: by permission of the Society of Antiquaries of London)

The King’s most excellent majesty, considering how by toleration of such dissolute and miserable persons… have been suffered to dwell beside London and elsewhere in common, open places called the stews, and there without punishment or correction exercise their abominable and detestable sin, there hath of late increased and grown such enormities as not only provoke instantly the anger and wrath of Almighty God, but also engender such corruption among the people… hath by advice of his council thought requisite utterly to extinct such abominable license and clearly take away all occasion of the same… Furthermore, his majesty straightly chargeth and commandeth that all such householders as under the name of bawds have kept the notable and marked houses and known hostelries for the said evil-disposed persons; that is to say, such householders as do inhabit the houses white and painted with signs on the front for a token of the said houses, shall avoid with
bag and baggage before the Feast of Easter next coming upon pain of like punishment at the King's Majesty’s will and pleasure…

Although it may be unlikely that playwrights, actors, or playgoers of 1603-4 had direct access to this text, proclamations were traditionally read aloud in the public (“proclaimed”) and thus generally accessible; regardless, one is struck by the manner in which TRP 265 and Meafure for Meafure remember state prostitution in strikingly similar language. Closer akin to one another than to the favored Stuart proclamation, the two in tandem – as well as in combination with other textual traces spanning the century – reveal an array of complex cultural, sexual, and political memories swirling at the site of sexual commerce. Focused specifically on the London suburbs, the Tudor proclamation decries the “abominable and detestable sin” of “persons as have accustomed most abominably to abuse their bodies contrary to God’s law and honesty” – sentiments quite similar to those of a Duke who castigates the “abominable and beaftly touches” of those who “beleeu thy living is a life, / So ftinkingly depending” (TLN 1513-16). It also infers the trade’s “abominable license” by state authority. This brief reference, easily overlooked amidst an invective-filled opening paragraph, could indicate general licentiousness. However, given the long-standing practice of officially sanctioned prostitution in medieval and early modern London, dating at least as far back as 1276, the allusion possesses further resonances: as in Shakespeare’s play, an official proclamation suppressing prostitution simultaneously encodes – and memorializes – state involvement (“license”) in sexual commerce. Indeed, Meafure for Meafure’s proclamation itself stimulates memories of past Viennese sexual practices: “Why,” Mistress Overdone notes, “heere’s a change indeed in the Commonwealth” (TLN 193-194).

The Henrician suppression appears to have succeeded, at least on one level: following the 1546 proclamation, prostitution disappears entirely from monarchical records. The document thus memorializes a pivotal moment, or transition, in the histories of London prostitution: the date upon which the Tudor state formally revoked its “abominable license” of London sex work. Yet the cultural memories associated with this suppression – including those potentially stimulated and produced in and by Meafure for Meafure – offer an alternative narrative, one that posits the proclamation not as an end but a beginning, not as erasure but as the inauguration of official forgetting, an ongoing memory practice which actively enabled the unofficial toleration of sexual commerce.

Silenced within one site of cultural memory (state records), the proclamation took on a new life in other discursive fields. In these arenas, TRP 265 was memorialized not as a successful
suppression, but an authoritarian failure. Speaking only three years after the Henrician proclamation, Hugh Latimer, in a sermon before young King Edward VI, decried the persistence – indeed the metamorphosis – of “whoredom” in the city of London:

You have put down the stews: but I pray you what is the matter amended? What availeth that? Ye have but changed the place, and not taken the whoredom away…

There is more open whoredom, more stewed whoredom, than ever was before. For God’s sake let it be looked upon; it is your office to see unto it.\textsuperscript{69}

Nearly seventy years later, and roughly two decades after \textit{MeASURE for MeASURE}'s first performance, the poet John Taylor echoed these sentiments to an entirely different audience in an alternative discursive form.

\begin{quote}
The Stews in \textit{England} bore a beastly sway,
Till the eight \textit{Henry} banish’d them away:
And since those common \textit{whores} were quite put downe,
A damned crue of Priuate \textit{whores} are growne…\textsuperscript{70}
\end{quote}

That which was blasphemous to Latimer provides the humorous bite to Taylor’s social satire. Even in their divergence, however, Latimer and Taylor attest to the proclamation’s complex memorial legacy: to the power and limitations of royal authority; to state involvement in and persecution of sexual commerce; to the suppression of a segregated geographic practice and community, as well as its subsequent dispersal in and throughout London; to relations of sexual bodies and spaces; to repercussions not only individual and cultural but architectural, topographic, and economic; and to relations of specific historical moments and extended cultural memories. The many proclamations of early modern London thus serve as uniquely pregnant sexual mnemonics, possessing an array of significations transcending individual or institutional authority. Accessing this memorial legacy, \textit{MeASURE for MeASURE}'s proclamation incorporates not only the sexual memories of Shakespeare’s Vienna, but a series of narratives predicated upon the persistent present-absence of commercial sex in early modern London.

These memories not only enrich \textit{MeASURE for MeASURE}'s second scene, but also raise important conceptual and epistemological concerns. Slotted between the Duke’s narrative deferral (1.1) and the acknowledgement of his complicity (1.3), this scene provides the essential content of Viennese sexual memory, touching upon fornication, prostitution, venereal disease, sexual geographies, bawdy language, marriage, lechery, desire, religion, and authority. Centered upon Juliet’s pregnant body, it actively interrogates whether or how sexual practices signify – and if so, where and how they might be remembered.
The scene begins by interrogating the materiality of memory. In a humorous if seemingly trivial exchange, Lucio opens by discussing a prospective war with Hungary, arguing that his hawkish counterparts — like “Sanctimonious” pirates who head out “to fea with the ten Commandments” — conveniently ignore injunctions that counter their material or martial desires. In doing so, pirate and soldier alike symbolically “raze” the letter of Divine Law, scraping undesirable prohibitions from the surface “of the table” (TLN 103-107). The intense materiality of this image — an audacious sinner chiseling commandments from Moses’s tablet — emphasizes the labor necessary to banish unwanted edicts into absentia. Adopting the languages of the *ars memoria*, the exchange speaks to a central legal, ethical, and memorial concern raised in several Shakespearean works: can one effectively raze or erase that which exists in memory? Macbeth hopes to “Plucke” the “rooted Sorrow” from his wife’s “Memory,” yet can find no “Amidtote” to “Raze out the written troubles” plaguing her conscience (*Macbeth*, TLN 2263-2265). Upon his father’s death, Prince Hal declares his intention to “race” the memory of his former “Vanity” in *The fecund Part of King Henry the Fourth* (TLN 3012-3015), yet the Dauphin attests to its clear persistence in *Henry V*, proclaiming “as matching to his Youth and Vanitie, / I did prefent him with the Paris-Balls” (TLN 1025-1026). Gloucester, shocked to hear of the king’s marriage to Margaret in *The fecund Part of Henry the Sixt*, argues that this marital alliance will blot their “names from Bookes of memory, / Racing the characters of [their] Renowne” — only to find himself razed from their presence (TLN 107-108).

And, perhaps most famously, the speaker of *Sonnet 122* argues that one’s internal memory far outlasts the external mnemonic:

```
Thy guift, thy tables, are within my braine
Full characterd with lasting memory,
Which fhall aboue that idle ranke remaine
Beyond all date euuen to eternity;
Or at the leaft, fo long as braine and heart
Haue facultie by nature to fubfift,
Till each to raz’d obliuion yeeld his part
Of thee, thy record neuer can be mift:
That poor retention could not fo much hold,
Nor need I tallies thy deare love to skore;
Therefore to give them from me was I bold,
To truft thofe tables that receiue thee more,
Fo keepe an adiunctk to remember thee
Were to import forgetfulneffe in mee.73
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Across the Shakespearean corpus, memory persists “Beyond all date euuen to eternity,” even in the face of external forces seeking “raz’d obliuion.” Only death, the Sonnet speaker implies, defeats
memory: “fo long as braine and heart / Haue facultie by nature to fubfift… thy record neuer can be mift.” Lucio’s comments concerning the absence or presence of Divine Law thus can be seen to suggest remembrance and return – not only of Viennese sexual law, whose “inrolled penalties” have “like vn-feowr’d Armor.. hung by th’ wall / So long, that nineteene Zodiacs haue gone round” (TLN 269-261), but also, and paradoxically, those practices of prostitution that demanded such penalties in the first place. His exchange also suggest how practices of forgetting depend upon, and can indeed solidify, the very memories they seek to suppress. To forget divine law, Lucio argues, the sinner must scrape the table itself; analogously, when Angelo attempts to erase the places and practices of prostitution from the face of the city, he inherently recognizes their presence. Indeed, the very authority upon which he attempts to suppress prostitution emerges from two mnemonics that testify to its presence and thus ensure its memorial persistence: the original edict outlawing fornication and the subsequent proclamation suppressing prostitution.

Focused upon official statutes, whether material or ethereal, this humorous exchange emphasizes relations of the individual and the collective: what happens when the pirate simply ignores or reconfigures a mandate from above? Given the play’s religious allusions, especially conceptions of justice rooted in the biblical phrase “measure for measure,” the Gentlemen’s philosophy appears foolish. At the same time however, the episode pointedly distinguishes between human and divine law: just as Lucio opens the scene by defending the authority of divine law, he closes it by decrying the application of a pointedly human law – absent from the Ten Commandments – that erroneously equates human “life” with a “game of ticke-tacke” (TLN 282-284). The double-entendre, one of many that saturate this particular scene, proves especially significant: in their semiotic imprecision, these metaphors posit the scene’s central dramatic, political, and epistemological questions: to what, exactly, does Lucio refer? In what ways is “ticke-tacke” sex? How do these exchanges remember and forget Viennese sexual practice? How, ultimately, does one know the sexual practices of another?

Beyond official edicts, whether divine commandment or state proclamation, this early scene also poses a series of sexual mnemonics that enclose their own polymorphous narratives. Centered upon the conspicuous visibility of Juliet and Claudio’s sexual relations – their “moft mutuall entertainment / With Character too groffe, is writ” upon her swelling womb – the scene locates the body itself as one memorial register (1.2.131-2). This exemplary case foregrounds gender as a critically operative category, yet exactly what Juliet’s pregnant body signifies remains in question. Indeed, where “pregnant” in the play indicates both a parturient condition and the possession of
knowledge – as noted, the Duke opens by praising Escalus’s “pregnant... Art, and practife” – Juliet’s mnemonic body proves both symbolically rich and polyvalent: whereas Angelo reads it as the sign of abhorrent fornication (2.2.23), Claudio cites it as a mnemonic of their mutual enjoyment. Speaking to Isabella soon thereafter, Lucio remembers Juliet’s womb as the expression of natural growth and fecundity – a construction the pious Isabella immediately associates with marriage. 

Acknowledging the unique if polyvalent memorial function of the female body, the scene nonetheless interrogates whether one can effectively read sex upon the body of another. Following their opening comments regarding the significance of written law, Lucio and the gentlemen debate just how and if bodies bear the traces of past sexual practices – whether they “art tainted, or free” (TLN 136-137). While the first Gentleman claims he can read syphilis in Lucio’s absent hair – or, more specifically, in the velvet used to cover his bald spots – his counterpart responds by reading the signs of disease in their symptomatic absence: the Gentleman is “found, as things that are hollow; thy bones are hollow; Impiety has made a feast of thee” (TLN 148-150). This repartee soon expands beyond the men to address Mistress Overdone as well, whose sciatic hips they attempt to read as symptoms and signifiers of venereal disease (TLN 151-152). In so doing, the dialogue further expands the memorial parameters of sexual practice beyond the pregnant female body.

The scene’s constant punning and double-entendres foreground the play’s epistemological and memorial politics; just as the gentlemen appear to speak of and about sex, sexuality, fornication, prostitution, whoredom, syphilis, brothels, and desire, these terms are conspicuously absent from their dialogue – they are, quite literally, never spoken in this exchange. Instead, sexual memories assume alternative shapes and forms, appearing opaquely in bodies, bawdy allusions, clothing, proclamations, taverns, and even names themselves: Mistress Overdone bears the traces of her marital and sexual past in her appellation, further supplemented by the moniker “Madam Mitigation” (TLN 138). In these polymorphous traces and polyvalent mnemonics, Viennese sexual practices surface everywhere and nowhere at once. Like Lucio’s Ten Commandments, the state may scrape commercial sexuality from the face of the city table, yet its practices and languages persist in this scene, as ethereal as they are material. When Pompey introduces the proclamation, he famously notes that the brothels inside the city “shall stand for feed,” but also suggests that those of the suburbs might survive by adopting new forms, names, or locales: “Come: feare not you: good counfellors lacke no Clients: though you change your place, you neede not change your Trade” (TLN 195-197). By suppressing the visible sites and standard mnemonics of illicit sexuality, Pompey argues, state authorities merely catalyze the evolution and adaptation of sexual commerce in the early
modern city. “Ile bee your Tapfter still” (TLN 197), he claims, inferring that Viennese prostitution will be re-membered—quite literally, put back together—under the guise of tavern keeping.76

This suggestion, neither contested nor negated by the citizens of Vienna, explicates a curious side-note in TRP 265: bawds must “leave off their victualing and forbear to retain any guest or stranger into their house either to eat and drink or lodge.” In a pointed effort to divorce food and housing from sites of sexual commerce, the proclamation reveals an anxiety that, once the “houses white and painted with signs on the front for a token” are removed, all houses will prove sexually suspect. From this perspective, Pompey’s comments can be seen to participate in the vast conceptual distribution of urban prostitution in late Elizabethan and early Jacobean literature: even if working brothels were generally restricted to a few select areas in early modern London, often along or outside the city walls (Southwark, Aldgate, Cock Lane, Ram Alley, Smithfield, Clerkenwell, Whitefriars), they could be imagined anywhere. Thus one finds, in the literary records of the time, dozens of city spaces associated with sexual commerce, including such prominent locations as Bishopsgate, Cheapside, Fleet Street, Guildhall, Holborn, Tabard Street, Lambeth Marsh, Paris Garden, the Royal Exchange, Shoreditch, Spitalfields, St. Thomas Hospital, Westminster, and even the vaunted St. Paul’s Cathedral.77 Meafure for Meafure’s proclamation participates in this memorial tradition: far from restricting or razing sexual spaces, the Viennese proclamation catalyzes their literal and conceptual distribution throughout the city.78 In the attempt to elide its own explicit relations to sexual commerce, the play suggests, the state further relinquishes its capacity to identify, control, and/or contain practices of illicit sexuality.

Pompey’s citation thus bears traces of multiple memories that, especially in the aggregate, emphasize persistence over dissolution. In conjunction with the various sexual mnemonics of Meafure for Meafure’s second scene, it also poses cultural and sexual memory as sites of contestation. Just as these mnemonics signify differently for various Viennese citizens—imprisonment for Claudio, permissiveness for the Duke, a threat to Overdone’s livelihood, an ideal puritanical state for Angelo, and a futile gesture for Pompey and the Provost—Meafure for Meafure’s proclamation speaks to, and encodes, multiple sexual memories in and beyond the world of the play. Arguing that prostitution will not only persist but permeate, the scene and play ask readers and playgoers to consider just how sex will be remembered—not only recollected, but assume new shapes and relations. Foregrounding the state’s inherent investment in such processes, Meafure for Meafure remembers sexual practices that the Duke-as-State wants to forget. Speaking memories beyond official control, the play’s sexual mnemonics permeate and disrupt the play’s carefully authored
narrative. In doing so, they encourage audiences to remember the memories of the play – even those which have been forgotten.

IV

Like Pericles and Troilus and Cressida, discourses of prostitution in Meafure for Meafure conspicuously associate sexual commerce with death and disease. Yet even as Lucio claims that he has “purchaf’d” multiple “difeaes” from Mistress Overdone (TLN 139), he and his fellow citizens do not seem particularly concerned about their physical health; it is the interventions of the state, not their own sexual practices, that threaten their well-being. The men conspicuously joke about syphilis and mock one another’s potential contagion; while these sexual discourses partake in a rhetoric of disease, not a single character articulates pain or suffering associated with venereal infections, even as the play explicitly recognizes that illicit sexual activities have occurred – not only between Juliet and Claudio, but also Angelo and Mariana as well as Lucio and Kate Keepdown. Instead, the gravity of this pivotal scene comes not from, in Angelo’s words, a “ftaind” body, but rather a condemned one (TLN 1059). As Claudio is paraded through the streets, his shackled body functions precisely as an “inscribed surface of [Viennese] events” that which embodies the state's investment in the sexual practices of its citizens. Rather than reiterating the condemnatory rhetoric centered upon Claudio’s sexual body, Lucio stresses the state’s efforts to inscribe the sexual practices of select Viennese citizens – they seek to execute Claudio – while simultaneously eliding those of its officials, Angelo and the Duke.

While Lucio playfully debates his own potentially diseased status, he later constructs Angelo’s body as the unhealthy exception; the latter is a “man, whose blood / Is very fnow-broth: one, who never feeles / The wanton ftings, and motions of the fence” (TLN 409-411). Speaking to the disguised Duke later in the play, Lucio draws on contemporary humoral discourses to construct the deputy as an unhealthy, inhuman figure: “They fay this Angelo vvas not made by Man and Woman… Some report, a Sea-maid fpawn’d him. Some, that he vvas begot betweene two Stock-fifthes. But it is certaine, that when he makes water, his Vrine is congeal’d ice, that I know to be true: and he is a motion generatiue; that’s infallible” (TLN 1591-1600). This opinion is ratified by the Duke and, implicitly, by Angelo himself: “Lord Angelo is prcife,” the Duke informs the Friar, he “Stands at a guard with Enuiue: fscarce confeffes / That his blood flowes, or that his appetite / Is more to bread than ftone” (TLN 342-245). In contrast to the porous body of early medical discourses, one whose health depends upon the flow or movement of bodily humours, Angelo is
stopped, frozen, and inhuman. If coldness could, in some instances, indicate the healthy moderation of unruly desires, Angelo represents not moderation but extremism. Once stirred by desires, Angelo’s erotic subjectivity shifts dramatically from an almost inhuman abstemiousness (“his appetite / is more bread than stone”) to an uncontrolled and rapacious gluttony: “And now I give my fenfual race, the reine,” he tells Isabella, “Fit thy content to my fharpe appetite” (TLN 1174-1175).

In his immoderate rejection of sexual desire and practice, Angelo serves as a substitute for the Viennese Duke: both fashion themselves as possessors of a “complete bosom” impermeable to desire. Even as they attempt to do so, however, a variety of subjects remind them (and the playgoing audiences) that to measure the sexual practices or desires of another, one must remember their own – that is, one must contextualize the relationships and practices, as well as consider how they themselves might act. Whereas the Duke and Angelo actively attempt to forget sex, Isabella and the Provost frame Claudio’s punishment in direct relation to Viennese sexual memory: “All Sects, all Ages fmaack of this vice,” the Provost decries to Angelo’s servant, yet Claudio will “die fort?” (TLN 738-739) Isabella echoes this sentiment, imploring Angelo to remember “Who is it that hath di’d for this offence? / There’s many that haue committed it” (TLN 842-843). Such recollections foreground notions of justice and equity – as Lucio notes, “for the rebellion of a Cod-peece, to take away the life of a man?” (TLN 1602-1604) – but also of empathy, an ability to see oneself in the actions of another. Even Escalus, who invariably supports the Duke’s positions and policies, encourages Angelo to remember his own temptations as he judges of Claudio – to envision himself in the place of the man he condemns:

Let but your honour know
(Whom I believe to be most ftrat in vertue)
That in the working of your owne affections,
Had time coheard with Place, or place with wifhing,
Or that the refolute acting of your blood
Could haue attain’d th’effect of your owne purpofe,
Whether you had not sometime in your life
Er’d in this point, which now you cenfure him,
And pul’d the Law vpon you (TLN 459-467).

When Angelo disregards the comment, he sets the stage for his fall from grace and power.

To remember sex in *Meafure for Meafure* is not to celebrate or recuperate prostitution as a cultural institution, but to forcefully examine the manner in which cultures and institutions – including the state – recall, identify, enable, suppress, forget, and/or overlook sexual commerce. To
position Lucio as a figure of memory is not to valorize his actions – including his notorious
denigration and abandonment of Kate Keepdown – but to adopt an alternative framework through
which audiences might perceive the sexual politics of Shakespeare’s Vienna. From this perspective,
Lucio functions as a type of licentious Antigone: a figure of counter-memory who conspicuously
challenges the state’s proclaimed disinterest in sexual desire and commerce, an incessant voice –
“not bid to fpeak” – who speaks precisely that which state authority seeks to silence and suppress.84
A peripatetic figure, Lucio traverses the many sexual spaces of Vienna, interacts with characters
across the social spectrum, and lays claim to an alternative understanding of the “the nature of our
people, / our city’s institutions, and the terms / for common justice.”

Arguing on behalf of sexual practice as a natural human condition, as common as “eating
and drinking” (TLN 1591), Lucio repeatedly remembers the sex that the state seeks to forget.
Crossing the many sites of sexual memory, debating the sexually mnemonic body, and playing with
bawdily imprecise yet evocative language, his presence embodies the desires, practices, and
memories that the Duke seeks to “extirpe” (TLN 1590). Proclaiming that the state itself possesses
desire, he repeatedly links sex and state – a union concretized in the Duke’s abrupt and stunning
proposal to Isabella in the denouement. Disregarding inferences of syphilis, he challenges the
constructions of sex as corrupt or diseased. Hailing Mistress Overdone as Madam Mitigation, he
infers that prostitution may serve a healthy body politic.85 Surmising that the Duke himself has
patronized prostitutes, he locates Viennese authority in the very center of the city’s sex trade,
foreshadowing the play’s final acts of bawdry (3.1.413).

To restore order in the play’s final scene, the Duke must reveal himself: he has to return
from absence to author his narrative. Threatened with torture for articulating (as the Friar) the
corruptions of his state, faced with inferences of his own licentiousness, responsible for the sexual
liaison of Angelo and Mariana, he depends upon the authority of his office to enforce his memories
– and, significantly, to silence Lucio. As is well known, the Duke concludes the play by ordering the
monetary and marital relations of Vienna: he aligns Claudio with Juliet, Angelo with Mariana, and
himself with Isabella. Yet while marriage serves as his privileged mechanism of social reconciliation,
it simultaneously enfolds sexual practices – Juliet’s pregnancy, Mariana’s bed-trick – under his
institutional authority. Moreover, Lucio’s forced marriage to Kate Keepdown metonymically aligns
these unions with the absent prostitutions of the Viennese state: the prostitute becomes the wife, the
client a husband. Gesturing towards a “Pallace” offstage, the Duke promises that the narrative will
continue: “we’ll fhow / What’s yet behind, that meete you all fhould know” (TLN 2977-2978). As
memory work persists beyond the world of the play, playgoers are left to wonder just how the prostitutions of past and present might be remembered – and forgotten – in the future.
Unless otherwise noted, all citations are from MR. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARES COMEDIES, HISTORIES, & TRAGEDIES (1632), reprinted in The Norton Facsimile, ed. Charlton Hinman (New York: Norton, 1996), and refer to that edition’s through-line numbering (e.g. TLN 222).

For a Lacanian-inspired reading of substitution and deferral in the play, see Meredith Skura, “Interpretation for Interpretation in Measure for Measure,” Boundary 2 7.2 (Winter, 1980), 39-60.

Through repeated references to physical torture (Escalus threatens to “towzee” the Duke-as-Friar “joint by joint” on the “racke” (TLN 2690); the Duke proposes that Lucio be “Whipt firft… and hang’d after” (TLN 2906) and state-sanctioned execution (the proposed sentences of Claudio, Angelo, Barnardine, and Lucio), the play’s final scene explicitly foregrounds the manner in which state authority can be, quite literally, writ across the bodies of its citizens. Even as none of these threats come to fruition – with the critical exception of Ragozine, who died while imprisoned by the state, and whose decapitated body serves a central role in the play’s narrative resolution – several of these bodies are restrained under state authority, most notably those of Claudio and Barnardine. These corporeal processes continue as the Duke attempts to order the concluding narrative; he releases bodies from imprisonment, but also commands a series of physical and marital unions in the pairings of Mariana and Angelo, Claudio and Juliet, Lucio and Kate Keepdown. The associations of execution and marriage are most explicit in the Duke’s own coupling with Isabella: moving immediately from Claudio’s pardon to his own marriage proposal, the Duke replays, if subtly, Angelo’s early proposition wherein state access to Isabella’s body substitutes for – and remits – the state’s demand for Claudio’s life: “If he be like your brother, for his fake / Is he pardon’d, and for your louelie fake / Giue me your hand, and fay you will be mine” (TLN 2889-2890). The Duke’s authority is also inscribed in a variety of corporeal practices described, if not prescribed, by the scene’s stage directions, including multiple instances of kneeling before his authority.


Ernst Kantorowicz’s seminal study of the king’s two bodies posits uninterrupted succession as a central tenet of this conceptual framework. While this paradigm implicitly depends upon sexual reproduction, it simultaneously provides a means of eliding sexual practice through an emphasis on the eternal “presence” of the body politic. In doing so, the framework itself provides a means of dissociating sex and state. See Ernst Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957). On the threatening sexuality of the monarch’s two bodies, see Louis Montrose, “The Elizabethan Subject and the Spenserian Text,” in Literary Theory/Renaissance Texts, eds. Patricia Parker and David Quint (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins

6 For these counter-narratives, Lucio is sentenced to marry Kate Keepdown and then, the “nuptiall finisht, [to] be whipt and hang’d” (TLN 2910-2911). Significantly, Lucio decries only the first punishment, inferring that “Marrying a punke” is far worse than “preffing to death, / Whipping and hanging” (TLN 2921-2922). As several scholars have argued, these disciplinary practices enact a series of displacements, wherein the socially privileged transfer stigmas from themselves onto the lower or marginal classes: accused of lechery, the Duke displaces these charges onto his accuser Lucio by symbolically marrying him to prostitution. Lucio then repeats these processes, abjecting the absent Kate. However, these processes of displacement and slander conspicuously align the empowered and the abject, drawing the former into an intimate relation with the latter. On the constitutive interrelations of slandered and slanderer, see M. Lindsay Kaplan, \textit{The Culture of Slander in Early Modern England} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). On displacement, especially as related to sexually subordinate subjects, see Jonathan Dollimore, “Transgression and Surveillance in \textit{Measure for Measure},” in \textit{Political Shakespeare: Essays in Cultural Materialism}, eds. Jonathan Dollimore and Alan Sinfield, 2\textsuperscript{nd} ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994a), 129-153; and Janet Adelman, \textit{Suffocating Mothers: Fantasies of Maternal Origin in Shakespeare’s Plays, Hamlet to The Tempest} (New York: Routledge, 1992). On displaced abjection, see Peter Stallybrass and Allon White, \textit{The Politics and Poetics of Transgression} (Methuen: Methuen & Co., 1986).

7 Scholars have long noted, within the play, an inherent meta-theatrical reflection upon, and critique of, associations of theatricality and sovereign power. Jonathan Goldberg, for example, argues “in the Duke, Shakespeare has written a role that represents his powers as playwright as coincident with the powers of the sovereign” (232), while Steven Mullaney sees the play as a “critical reflection” upon the “power and cultural effects of Shakespearean dramaturgy” (113). See Jonathan Goldberg, \textit{James I and the Politics of Literature: Jonson, Shakespeare, Donne and Their Contemporaries} (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), and Steven Mullaney, \textit{The Place of the Stage: License, Play, and Power in Renaissance England} (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1988).

8 Ricoeur (2004: 7) opens his monumental study of memory by arguing that the “present representation of an absent thing” functioned as the foundational philosophical conundrum posed by memory to Socratic philosophy. In a provocative new monograph, Lina Perkins Wilder develops recent studies of memory and forgetting on the early modern stage to foreground the constitutive work of absent properties – persons, bodies, objects, spaces, actions, and narratives – as stage mnemonics. When characters refer to that which is absent from the stage, Wilder argues, audiences are incorporated into the memory work of the play itself. Readers and playgoers must construct – make present – that which is absent by drawing upon their own memories – a practice which may include recollections of previous performances, actors, and objects – as well also the events and histories of the surrounding cultural milieu. See Lina Perkins Wilder, \textit{Shakespeare’s Memory Theatre: Recollection, Properties, and Character} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). See also Sullivan (2005) and the essays collected in \textit{Shakespeare, Memory and Performance}, ed. Peter Holland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). By mnemonic, I refer to any object, technique, or practice that aids the construction or development of one’s memory, including practices of recollection.
Thus when Carolyn E. Brown reads the Duke’s enigmatic exchange with Friar Thomas (1.3.1-17) as evidence of the former’s “latent sexuality,” a suppressed desire centered predominantly upon the deputy Angelo, she not only imports a distinctly modern and Neo-Freudian conceptualization of erotic subjectivity, but overlooks the play’s critical investment in the very opacity and imprecision of sexual memories, both individual and social. See Carolyn E. Brown, “The Homoeroticism of Duke Vincentio: ‘Some Feeling of the Sport,’” Studies in Philology 94 (1997), 187-220.

For the purposes of this chapter, I adopt a capacious definition of each term – culture, memory, and sex. By cultures, I refer to the social forms, values, symbols, and cosmologies that mediate the experience of individuals within a specific locale and period of time. Cultures always precede the subject, providing in advance the categories and meanings that structure social experience, but are neither static nor monolithic. What we often take as “culture” is instead composed of multiple cultures, in tension with one another and informed by hierarchies of social power. By sex, I do not refer to anatomical or biological distinctions, but instead the array of sexual practices and possibilities within a given culture – including, but not limited to, transitive and non-transitive acts, desires, fantasies and, as I will argue, memories. I address memory in the following section. It is important to acknowledge, at this early stage, my preference for “cultural memory” as opposed to the more familiar, “collective memory.” The reasoning for this definitional shift will be discussed shortly and, to a certain extent, represents one of the central projects of this chapter.

Scholars have long noted the association of authority with authorship (author-ity) in Measure for Measure. All subsequent references to authority in this chapter acknowledge this longstanding tradition, yet do so in part to emphasize the manner in which memory offers a means of disrupting an intrinsic link between the two. The dash thus becomes critical; as the Duke attempts to author the play’s narrative and resolution, his totalizing power is disrupted precisely in the bridge from author-to-authority by the presence (absence) of cultural memories. I remove the dash from the body of the argument for the benefit of my readers, but intend for its trace to remain. On the Duke as social author-ity, see especially Dollimore (1994a) and Goldberg (1983). The term counter-memory derives, in part, from the genealogical project of Michel Foucault, and is deployed to indicate that which destabilizes the metaphysical imperatives of dominant social discourses, revealing instead the multiplicity, polyvocality, and contestation within the production of these narratives and ideologies. See especially “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, ed. Donald F. Bouchard (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977): 139-164.


Yates (1966), 75.

Ibid, 62. Mary Carruthers notes a similar practice in the works of John Bradwardine, ca. 1335: “because the memory retains only what is extraordinary, wonderful and intensely charged with emotion, [Bradwardine argues that] the images should be of extremes – of ugliness or beauty, ridicule or nobility, of laughter or weeping, of worthiness or salaciousness.” Given such parameters, these memory practices naturally gravitated towards depictions of extreme violence and sexuality: “these are shocking images, but their shock value is useful,” for this affective intensity ensured

15 Predominantly the harlot is described as embodying the sins of Lust and Pride. While Yates (1966) identifies Ridevall’s image as a “prostitute,” her source material – Beryl Smalley’s *English Friars and Antiquity in the Early Fourteenth Century* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1960), 114 – cites it as a harlot. On labels and terminology, see Introduction and Chapter 1 of this dissertation.

16 The extensive array of works on memory in medieval and early modern Europe has revealed an incredibly intricate and evolving philosophical system, one embracing a multiplicity of concepts and metaphors. Nonetheless, the first wave of critical scholarship – especially in early modern literary studies – focused predominantly upon classical conceptions of natural and artificial memory, the memory theatres of Fludd and Willis, and neo-Aristotelian conceptions of memory as a wax tablet or *tabula rasa*. Recent works have challenged and/or developed what Sullivan (2005: 5) calls a “critical over-emphasis on artificial memory since at least the groundbreaking work of Frances Yates.” In addition to Sullivan, Holland (2006), and Wilder (2010), see Katherine Rowe, “‘Remember Me’: Technologies of Memory in Michael Almereyda’s *Hamlet*, in *Shakespeare the Movie II: Popularizing the Plays on Film, TV, and Video*, eds. Lynda E. Boose and Richard Burt (New York: Routledge, 2003), 37-55; John Sutton, “Spongy Brains and Material Memories,” in *Environment and Embodiment in Early Modern England*, eds. Mary Floyd-Wilson and Garret A. Sullivan, Jr. (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 14-34; and Evelyn B. Tribble, “Distributing Cognition in the Globe,” *Shakespeare Quarterly* 56:2 (Summer, 2005), 135-155.


18 Smalley suggests that Ridevall was familiar with Magnus’s work, and that it was the latter who may have “invented her as a personification of harlotry” (114-5). See also Carruthers (1990), 142-3.

19 Carruthers (1990), 143.


21 In contrast to Albertus and Ridevall, Ravenna focuses on chaste figures (“maydens and vyrgyns”), yet this construction is nonetheless explicitly linked to the recollection of sexual virtues and vices. William Perkins (1584) and John Willis (1666) draw this link in their critiques of the Ravenna model, noting that such images serve to incite desire despite - or precisely because of - their virginal status. All citations from Wilder (2010), 35-41. On chastity and virginity as forms of sexuality and/or identities produced in relation to (absent) sexual practices, see Montrose (1986, 2002) and Karma

22 In accordance with the scholastic memory tradition, the text lacks a visual depiction of the woman; instead, the memory artist draws from a rhetorical description to produce a woman in his mind, around whom he would then cluster various attributes and meanings associated with the sin of idolatry. As Smalley notes, this sin assumed a specifically sexual character, based upon the notion that “idolators [sic] leave the true God to fornicate with idols” (114).

23 By technologies of memory, I refer to the various social media (e.g. circulated texts, plays, sermons) through which specific memories were retained and disseminated to a broader audience. As David Middleton and Derek Edwards note, drawing upon the work of David Thelen, “the constructive nature of remembering ‘is not made in isolation but in conversation with others that occur in the contexts of community, broader politics, and social dynamics’” (3). See *Collective Remembering*, eds. David Middleton and Derek Edwards, (London: Sage Publications, 1990).

24 Sullivan (2005) takes it as axiomatic that “memory and forgetting are inevitably social; that they are less purely cerebral processes than modes of behavior and kinds of bodily deportment; that each manifests a relationship not only with the past but with the present and the future (indeed, each aims to prescribe a future); and that each charts multiple interfaces between the subject and society: memory and forgetting are the terms through which the subject is located in relation to various social institutions and practices” (21), he nonetheless, approaches memory and forgetting “from the perspective of the individual, and not the collective, subject” (6). Yet where Sullivan posits an early modern subjectivity produced through acts of “erotic self-forgetting,” this very conception of the self emerges precisely in relation to, and divergence from, a prescribed social identity (6). As such, this subject’s liberation through self-alienation, as well as the desires produced through these processes, depends upon the collective memories – both individual and interpersonal – of their “former” social identity. Sullivan contrasts the individual with the “collective,” a term which implicitly constitutes cultural memory as a fully shared or unified perspective. Sullivan presents the term to sidestep it, theorizing instead an individual subjectivity, but this chapter contests the generalizing implications of the term “collective memory,” as well as the privileging of individual memory over, and at the expense of, social memory. I explicitly address my use of “cultural memory” on page 11. Sullivan’s work is one of a variety of critical studies, especially in the fields of humoral and cognitive theory, which have challenged prevailing conceptions of the bound early modern subject, locating instead an inherently permeable or “passable” self wherein the subject’s cognitive and emotional processes reside not within a contained body, but in the relations between this internal physiology and the external environment. Where these studies forcefully articulate a pre-Cartesian conception of mind-body relations, they identify the critically somatic components of early modern memory. On the humoral body, see Thomas Laqueur, *Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990); Gail Kern Paster, *The Body Embarrassed: Drama and the Disciplines of Shame in Early Modern England* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); Michael C. Schoenfeldt, *Bodies and Selves in Early Modern England: Physiology and Inwardness in Spenser, Shakespeare, Herbert, and Milton* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Gail Kern Paster, *Humoring the Body: Emotions and the Shakespearean Stage* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004); Douglas Trevor, *The Poetics of Melancholy in Early Modern England* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). On cognition in early modern England, see Tribble (2005) and Sutton (2007).


For a discussion of standpoint epistemology and situated knowledges, see the Introduction.


Recent studies of memory in modern England offer provocative new ways of thinking about the construction of meaning(s) in the early modern theater. The early modern stage featured not only the “performance of memory” – scenes or exchanges in which characters, such as Lucio and the Duke, actively “remember” onstage (Wilder) – but also, as an evolving institution in its own right, participated in ongoing production and reproduction of English cultural memory. As Steven Mullaney has so cogently argued, “theater can provide a culture with a means of thinking about itself, especially about its more painful conflicts and contradictions.” In doing so, the London stage not only negotiated but produced the past, functioning as one of the many early modern technologies of memory: arenas in which memory narratives, including those “at odds with official history,” were ordered, contained, or contested. The quotation comes from Crewe (1999: 76), who argues, “insofar as communal fictionalizing, idealizing, and monumentalizing impulses significantly determine cultural memory, efforts to maintain a strict separation between literature and cultural memory will surely be unproductive as well as ineffectual.” Carruthers (1990: 12) makes a similar claim, noting, “where literature is valued for its social functions, [it also can] provide the sources of a group’s memory.” While Crewe’s analysis focuses upon the “white Anglo-South African ‘memory’ of Europe” as constituted and mediated by the early modern Portuguese epic poem *Os Lusiadas* (1572) by Luis Vas de Camoes, scholars such as Anthony Dawson, Stephen Greenblatt, Barbara Hodgdon, Steven Mullaney, Joseph Roach, and Lina Perkins Wilder have articulated the manner in which theater, including the early modern English stage, provided an arena through which subjects mediated individual and shared relations to the past. See Greenblatt (2001); Mullaney (1988); Wilder (2010); Anthony B. Dawson, “The Arithmetic of Memory: Shakespeare’s Theatre and the National Past,” *Shakespeare Survey* 52 (1999), 54-67; Barbara Hodgdon, ”The RSC’s Long Sonata of the Dead: Shakespeare-History and Imagined Community,” in *Re-Vision of Shakespeare: Essays in Honor of Robert Ornstein*, ed. Evelyn Gajowski (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2004), 131-46; Steven Mullaney, “Affective Technologies: Towards an Emotional Logic of the Early Modern Stage,” in...


35 This concession of conceptual authority includes, according to Leah Marcus (1988: 176), Escalus’s superior understanding of common law – a body of cultural knowledge predicated upon the memory of past practices and precedent.

36 The Norton lineation draws from an earlier (1986) Oxford edition by Stanley Wells and Gary Taylor. The Arden (ed. J.W. Lever) and Pelican (ed. Jonathan Crewe) reproduce the original Folio “that.” Lever (1965: n8) offers an extended grammatical analysis, arguing the “interpretation depends on whether ‘that’ is a pronoun or conjunction,” claiming that, if a pronoun, the term must refer back to the Duke’s “strength.” If my lineation aligns with that of Lever, my reading clearly departs from his exegesis.


38 When the Oxford and Norton editions remove this clause’s status as a parenthetical aside, they elide the significance of “that” – Escalus’s conceptual grasp of the Viennese state – in this opening speech.

39 As Goldberg (1983: 233) notes, “the play opens in a manner that characterizes its proceedings throughout. The Duke starts with a dissertation on the nature of rule… but gets no further than the
opening clause. Instead of words, the Duke points to Escalus, to whom he speaks, as the embodiment of the words about government he would have spoken... as exemplar, Escalus doubles and embodies the Duke’s learning and knowledge of government, and the Duke has ‘unfolded’ himself in Escalus. Since Escalus embodies the words, an audience might presume that the Duke is resigning his powers to him... This supposition proves false immediately. Instead the reigns of power are handed to Angelo.” I agree with Goldberg’s insightful analysis, but attenuate his claim to cite Escalus not only as the embodiment of words, but the embodiment of submission and acquiescence to them – official narratives and memory – even and especially as he is overlooked.


When the Duke asks his opinion regarding the proposed deputation of Angelo, Escalus notes, “If any in Vienna be of worth / To vndergoe such ample grace, and honour, it is Lord Angelo” (TLN 25-27). He later reiterates this perspective to the deputy himself, telling Angelo that “I believe [thee] to be most strait in vertue” (TLN 460). Where such claims perform memory by accessing narratives beyond the world of the play, they nonetheless tell us as much about the savvy and sycophantic Escalus as Angelo. In a similar vein, Lucio’s initial, if less laudatory, comments regarding Angelo’s reputation, tell us as much of the speaker as the object of his discourse.

Speaking to the Friar, Vincentio constructs the deputation as a test of human nature. Even if the Duke possesses a strong premonition, this acknowledgment of uncertainty (“hence we shall see”) contradicts his previous assertion that Angelo’s observed character “doth thy history fully unfold.”

The material effects of this memory narrative are both immediate and tangible. Even if Claudio and Juliet, for example, are spared from execution by the end of the play, both are imprisoned under Angelo’s authority. Pompey and Froth are also detained and brought before the court. In addition, and as will be explored in detail, the state issues a formal proclamation razing specific buildings within the city, an action which not only implies architectural and topographic alterations, but directly impacts the economic well-being of Mistress Overdone and Pompey, among others.

Wilder (2010), 172.

In this sense, the dialogue suggests the ways in which forgetting can be posed, retrospectively, as a device for eliding known or cognizant omissions.
The Duke and Claudio famously disagree on the lapse in prosecution, a divergence that supports my argument concerning the relations of official and cultural memory in the play; the audience has no evidence to verify either account, and thus must consider each claim in relation to what they know of the speaker. John Draper attempts to connect these dates with contemporary campaigns against bawdry in Shakespeare’s London, but does so upon particularly scant evidence. See John W. Draper, “Measure for Measure and the London Stews,” Philological Papers 23 (1977): 5-17. For a more sophisticated analysis on topicality and localization in the play, see Marcus (1988).

For a similar analysis of narrative bypass, see Chapter 3.


As Halbwachs (1992: 133) notes, “it is never certain that… disappearance is definitive.”

It is important to note that Pompey is identified as “Clowne” in the Folio’s dramatis personae. I use the former name for ease of argumentation, given it predominant usage in Shakespeare studies.

A play listed as ‘Mesur for Mesur,’ written by ‘Shaxberd,’ was apparently performed at Whitehall, presumably before the court of King James I, on December 26, 1604 (Lever, 1965: xxxi).


As noted in the Introduction, although the legal authority of royal proclamations were subject to contestation in the period, the 1546 proclamation appears to mark a decisive shift from official regulation of prostitution to condemnation and informal tolerance.
Mullaney (1988: 6). Phyllis Rackin explicitly connects a rising early modern interest in monuments and physical artifacts to evolving practices of historiography, rooted in an increasing awareness of human causality, historical anachronism, and a questioning of textual authority – all of which led to an “increased reliance on physical remains to correct or corroborate the written accounts of the past, which were no longer accepted as authentic simply because they existed” (13). See Phyllis Rackin, *Stages of History: Shakespeare’s English Chronicles* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990).


The diocese of Winchester was also conceptually associated with practices of prostitution, bawdry, and venereal disease. Pandarus draws this connection in the closing epilogue of *Troilus and Cressida* (“my fear is this: / Some galled goose of Winchester would hiss,” 5.11.31.22-23, as does Gloucester in *1 Henry 6*, claiming that the Bishop of Winchester “giv’st whores indulgences to sin,” 1.4.35). On the contested involvement of the Bishopric in practices of London prostitution, see Martha Carlin, *Medieval Southwark* (London: Hambledon Press, 1996) and Henry Ansgar Kelly, “Bishop, Prioress, and Bawd in the Stews of Southwark,” *Speculum* 75:2 (2000), 342-388.


Camden’s account, first published in 1586, proved enormously popular and was reprinted seven times by 1610. It is unclear if Stow read the Camden account or modeled his description upon it; the author never refers to Camden in his exhaustive survey of prominent London citizens.

William Camden, *Britannia* (London, 1695), 322. I have altered the italics in the original document to draw attention to the passage’s temporal register. See also Thomas Fuller, *Church-History of Britain* (London, 1655), Vol. II, section V: 39-41:

At this time (1546) also, by the king's command, were the stews suppressed…there stood a place on the south bank over against London, called " the Stews”… after-wards the place was converted to a worse use, but still retaining its own name… brothel-houses being built there, and publicly permitted by the state… and it is to be feared, that too many of the clergy (then forbidden marriage) were too constant customers to it. Such who lived in these colleges of lust were called "single women;" and pity it was so good a name should be put upon so lewd persons.

On material records as collective memory, see Yrjo Engestrom, Katherine Brown, Ritva Engestrom, and Kirsi Koisininen, “Organizational Forgetting: an Activity-Theoretical Perspective,” in *Collective Remembering*, eds. David Middleton and Derek Edwards (London: Sage Publications, 1990): 139-168. One cannot discern what individual playgoers perceived, felt, expressed, or assumed. In her nuanced analysis of localization in Shakespeare, Leah Marcus (1988) explores the contextual possibilities afforded by *Measure for Measure’s* potential contemporary references to cogently argue that the play thrives off the very tensions inherent within the combined presences, and absences, of
London and Vienna upon the stage. Providing compelling cases for both sides of this contextual argument, she constructs the play as a type of Möbius strip, one “relentlessly oscillating” between the two cities, at once the same and other. Where the play is “double-written in a way that allows for other meanings, opens the play out to a range of audience reaction and potential signification,” Measure for Measure necessarily calls upon audience memory in the production of meaning (164): the play, she argues, “is clearly topical, but can be understood in diametrically opposite ways, depending on the degree to which an audience conceptualizes cultural distance and enter imaginatively into an alien locale” (186).

62 In a telling editorial move, Taylor and Wells isolate Act 1.2 to suggest that “someone – perhaps Thomas Middleton, to judge by the style – seem to have supplied a new, seedy opening” to the scene (843). Such a practice replicates the very displacements enacted by the “playwright”-Duke of Vienna, shifting responsibility for sexual content from the privileged figure of Shakespeare to an alternative writer.


64 Hughes and Larkin (1964-9, 1973).

65 These include not only the accounts of chroniclers such as Camden, Stow, and Fuller, but also priests (Hugh Latimer, 1549) and poets (John Taylor, 1622). I do not imply that these writers actively compared the two proclamations, selecting one over the other – indeed several of the texts were written and circulated long before the Stuart proclamation. Instead, I emphasize the memorial potency and durability of the Henrician suppression, an event acknowledged across a variety of discursive forms spanning nearly a century. Jyotsna Singh (1994) and Wallace Shugg (1977) also note potential links between the play’s proclamation and TRP 265, but only in passing.


67 Hughes and Larkin (1964-1969, 1973). References to commercial sexuality appear on a few occasions before 1546. See, for example, TRP 13 (6 June 1487), “protecting women of all kinds from ravishment,” including “common women not allowed to follow king’s garrison”; TRP 73 (15 May 1513), which includes a section on keeping brothels, and TRP 250 (26 May 1545), which associates vagabonds with sexual licentiousness on the London bankside and “such like naughty places where they much haunt and in manner lie nightly for the accomplishment and satisfying of their vile, wretched, and filthy purposes.” Prostitution and whoredom disappear from the royal records following 1546, but remains an active presence in other jurisdictional and authoritarian venues, including ecclesiastical and Bridewell court records. In addition to Archer (1991), Griffith (1993), and Ungerer (2002), see Martin Ingram, Church Courts, Sex, and Marriage in England, 1570-1640.
It is important to note that both the jurisdictional authority and, at times, the legality of royal proclamations represented areas of considerable debate in sixteenth-century English law. Modern scholars have tended to assume either 1) that the proclamation remained intact throughout the century, or 2) that the proclamation was nullified upon the death of Henry VIII, the issuing monarch. Following this second interpretation, some scholars have argued that the brothels legally reopened upon the accession of Edward VI. However, this search for clarity masks what was, at the time, conspicuously – indeed legally – opaque. As Sir William Holdsworth contends, “the rule of the law on this subject was ill-defined” during the sixteenth-century. See *A History of English Law*, Vol. IV (London: Methuen & Co., 1966), esp. 53-104, 294-307. In this sense, London prostitution may have functioned as a type of “open secret” following the Henrician suppression, representing a form of unofficial license, or tolerance, dependent upon an adopted authoritarian “blindness.” Such a practice aligns with Steven Mullaney, Angela Vanhaelen, and Joseph Ward’s recent argument concerning practices of tolerance in Reformation Europe. In “Religion Inside Out: Dutch House Churches and the Makings of Publics in the Dutch Republic,” these scholars argue that, by outwardly conforming to contemporary social and religious codes, private houses of worship (*huiskerk*) were allowed to remain and “privately” practice non-conformist religions in Reformation Dutch Republic. The possible “rebirth” of unofficial prostitution in London after 1546 would add another element to this arguments; where the authors speak of an “uncodified policy” that “allowed communities to keep the peace and maintain the appearance of an ordered and unified orthodoxy while avoiding the need to police the private beliefs of its residents,” the “tolerance” of prostitution would speak not only to sexual orthodoxies, but also, and perhaps more importantly, the desire to avoid “policing” private sexual “practices.” Nonetheless, while prostitution may have been unofficially tolerated, this status was clearly tenuous – as evinced by the series of sporadic campaigns to suppress vice which occurred, if infrequently, throughout the remainder of the sixteenth-century. See Mullaney, Vanhaelen, and Ward, “Religion Inside Out: Dutch House Churches and the Makings of Publics in the Dutch Republic,” in *Making Publics in Early Modern Europe: People, Things, Forms of Knowledge*, eds. Bronwen Wilson and Paul Yachnin (New York: Routledge, 2010), 25-36. On suppression campaigns post-1546, see Archer (1991).

While Latimer’s comments on whoredom do not explicitly signify the persistence of commercial prostitution, his repeated emphasis on the “stews” infers such an association. Stow, for example, draws precisely this link in the selected excerpt. Hugh Latimer, “The Third Sermon of M. Hugh Latimer, Preached before King Edward (1549),” in *Sermons by Hugh Latimer Sometime Bishop of Worcester* (London: J.M. Dent & Co., 1906).

John Taylor, *A Whore* (1622). The distinction between “common” and “private” whores attests to the perception that commercial sexuality evolved – indeed was reconstituted and re-membered – following the Henrician suppression. For more on the relations of common and private, see Introduction and Ch. 1.

On the wax-tablet as a dominant trope of early modern memory, particularly as related to forgetting and erasure, see Carruthers (1990). See also Rowe (2003) and Peter Stallybrass, Roger J.

72 See also TLN 2068-2071: “and therefore will hee wipe his Tables clean, / and keepe no Tell-tale to his Memorie, / that may repeat, and Hiftorie his loffe, / to new remembrance”

73 *Shakespeare's Sonnet* (1609 Quarto). Available online at http://internetshakespeare.uvic.ca/Library/facsimile/bookplay/UC_Q1_Son/Son/


75 “Your brother and his lover have embraced. / As those that feed grows full, as blossoming time / That from the seedness the bare fallow brings / To teeming foison, even so her plenteous womb / Expresseth his full tilth and husbandry” (1.4.39-43). While Lucio clearly derives some enjoyment out of the bawdy implications of his recollection, he nonetheless construes Juliet’s body as bearing an alternative mnemonic function to that of Angelo, who intends to use the bodies of Claudio and Juliet not only as mnemonics of sin and transgressions, but the site upon which Viennese law can be re-membered and re-inscribed.


The quotation comes, significantly, from Angelo in a subsequent scene. As will be argued in this final section, the play cites Angelo’s – not Lucio’s – perspectives as extreme.


Angelo’s supposedly “cold” blood and urine also construct him as a gendered anomaly: while there were some exceptions, most notably older or melancholic men, male bodies were generally consider hotter and drier than their cold, spongy, and passive female counterparts. Female bodies were also considered more inconstant, subject to shifts in temperature; Angelo’s rigid temperance would appear inherently “masculine,” yet his dramatic narrative centers upon an extreme affective shift, one that finds him entirely subject to unruly passions, thus complicating his gender alignment. Lucio’s comments also play upon these gendered paradigms, inferring that Angelo cannot “produce” the heat necessary to procreate. On the place of gender in early modern humoral discourses, see Paster (1993 and 2004) and Schoenfeldt (1999).

In his reading of Sonnet 94, Michael C. Schoenfeldt (1999) argues that “coldness” in the period, far from signifying an unhealthy state, could represent the careful control of potentially unruly desires. However, while Schoenfeldt locates an agentic, early modern self that emerges through the careful regulation of desires, Angelo’s humoral self-fashioning rejects fluidity altogether – and, critically, is directly construed as irregular by his peers and explicitly tied to his harassment of Isabella.

My reading of the Antigone paradigm has been influenced by the recent work of Donald E. Pease. See “Antigone’s Kin: From Abu Graib to Barack Obama,” in *The New American Exceptionalism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), 180-214.

The construction of prostitution as a necessary evil serving a healthy body politic is supplemented by Elbow’s famous malapropism, wherein he cites Pompey and Froth as “notorious Benefactors” (TLN 505). Both the malapropism and sobriquet allude to a long-standing construction, derived from Augustine and remembered by St. Thomas Aquinas, arguing that prostitution, while sinful, must be condoned as a means of tempering insatiable male lust. This perspective was clearly well known during the early modern period; Fuller (1655), for example, explicitly addresses the “necessary evil” thesis in Section 42, “Argument Pro and Con About Stews,” of *The Church History of Britain*. See especially Argument I: “Man’s infirmity herein, since his natural corruption, is grown so general, it is needful to connive at such houses, as a kind of remedy to prevent worse incontinency with married women; the whole land being the cleaner for the public sinks or sewer of the stews.” See also Ruth Mazo Karras (1996a) and "Prostitution in Medieval Europe," in *Handbook of Medieval Sexuality*, eds. Vern L. Bullough and James A. Brundage (New York: Garland Publishing, 1996b), 243-60; Derrick Sherwin Bailey, *Sexual Relation in Christian Thought* (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1959); Vern L. Bullough and James Brundage, *Sexual Practices & The Medieval Church* (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1982); Vincent M. Dever, “Aquinas on the Practice of Prostitution.” *Essays in Medieval Studies: Proceedings of the Illinois Medieval Association* 13 (1996), 39-50.
Coda

Impasses and Effects

If prostitution operates like a language, who speaks it, who listens, and how do we engage its dialogue? What can Shakespeare's Whore teach us about how disparate cultural systems manage their most potent and enabling contradictions – particularly those that circulate around, through, and by means of prostitution and whoredom?

Like others before me, I began this project with a desire to speak with the dead. Drawing to a close, I now suggest the constitutive functions of impasse rather than dialogue, contradiction rather than cohesion, as best articulating the language of prostitution in early modern England – and encouraging attention to the cultural effects wrought when certain knowledges, understandings, or meanings prove opaque, if not impossible, in historical contexts. Attempting to solve the evidentiary problems of London prostitution, I first scoured the historical and scholarly archives, seeking a type of conceptual stability in the traces of the past. Encountering methodological impasses that had frustrated my predecessors – silence, absence, and mediation – led me to examine how alternative methodologies and analytic paradigms might better illuminate the structures of the London sex trade: its locales, practices, identities, and meanings. Historicism and cultural materialism, feminism and psychoanalysis, structural linguistics and deconstruction all proved revelatory – their respective lenses exposing differing insights, aspects, relations, and meanings. Such literary critical methodologies emerged as powerful tools that could bring to light differing aspects of complex social and cultural phenomena, yet for all their insights inevitably led me, like a type of Möbius strip, back to the same cruxes – to those core issues of archive, definition and, ultimately, epistemology. The questions remained the same: how does one, whether early modern writer or postmodern scholar, know – that is, attain and accept knowledge about – the sexual status, bodies, identities, or practices of another? Where does such knowledge reside, and how is it created, managed, or contested? How do cultures navigate their own epistemological impasses, ideological contradictions,
and problems of signification? And finally, how might “whoredom” participate in, and enable insights unto, such problems of knowledge?

My pursuit of these questions catalyzed the development of what I have termed “dialectical historical epistemology,” defined as the study of knowledge production, dissemination, and contestation in cultural contexts. As pursued here, this methodology encourages attention to the modes and media of knowing in early modern England, to the constitutive functions of opacity and absence in the production of meanings, and to how scholars working in a postmodern present produce knowledge about past cultures. Crucially, the dialectic nature of this approach operates not only at the level of history, but among and between the analytic categories adopted in this study. Thus while Shakespeare’s Whore attends to past and present modes of knowing, I concurrently examine relations between words, names, and bodies (especially in Part I), and to the cultural practices and representational media of early modern prostitution (predominantly in Part II). My sections separate such categories to gain analytic purchase on the questions that motivate my work, enabling examination of how seemingly distinct cultural structures and practices – textual production, proclamation, melancholy, and memory, among others – emerge to negotiate problems of knowledge and knowledge production. Nonetheless, my findings throughout demonstrate their crucial interrelations in constituting larger fields of knowledge production and contestation.

By embracing the silences and absences that emerge amidst the names, bodies, and cultures of London prostitution, Shakespeare’s Whore also illustrates how perceived evidentiary problems – rather than lacks to remedied or voices to be reclaimed – serve as forms of evidence in their own right, pointing to cultural impasses that constitute meanings and incur potent cultural effects. In Chapter 1, for example, I examine how the writers of early modern dictionaries, lexicons, and word lists experimented with the shaping of meanings enabled by an evolving lexicographic mise-en-page, while at the same time revealing how present-day attempts to establish early modern sexual-lexical hierarchies mask a far broader field of meanings and relations operating in that era. In my second chapter, I highlight a persistent, cross-cultural impulse to constrain Joan’s social and gendered excess through acts of naming. My attention to modern editorial practices, as well as my divergence from accepted scholarly understandings of Pericles and Measure and Measure, continue this bipartite literary critical practice in the concluding chapters, to varying ends: while the “melancholy of prostitution” in Pericles pervades a twentieth-century edition of that play, recent studies of cultural memory have largely forgotten the conspicuously sexual aspects of the medieval and early modern ars memoria, and missed their resonance in Measure of Measure.
By encouraging attention to the partial and contingent nature of all knowledge production – not only to what we know, but to how we know it – my use of dialectical historical epistemology proposes one means of negotiating the “tyranny” of historicism in contemporary early modern studies. While Shakespeare’s Whore demonstrates my deep historicist investments, and the on-going importance of historicist methodologies, it simultaneously reveals the analytic limitations of an inflexible historicism that proclaims the archive as the privileged repository for – and arbiter of – knowledge of the past. As Foucault’s work presages, the discourse of London prostitution and whoredom examined here constitutes “so complex a reality that we not only can, but should, approach it at different levels and with different methods.” Engaging this discourse as a field of relations rather than a collection of representations, as a space for epistemological inquiry rather than a repertoire of assorted identities associated with illicit sexual practices, I offer a new means of approaching such complex fields of cultural relations – and grappling with how they produce not only meanings and absences, but meanings and effects in absence.

As scholars continue to examine structures of knowledge and power, including how they change over time, we must also consider how they do not: what problems of knowledge persist across cultural and historical divides? How are such problems of knowledge navigated, through what means and media, and to what effects in varying contexts? In proposing that prostitution operates like a language, my work in Shakespeare’s Whore does not suggest that such a language can be adopted or discarded, spoken or silenced, by agentic subjects. Rather, my readings of Shakespeare, alongside other early modern texts and in relation to present-day works, suggest the far more radical notion that this language is produced and constrained by the epistemological elasticity of cultures at work.

If, as I have argued, prostitution emerges as a space to think concomitantly about representation and signification, evidence and knowledge practices, relations of body, gender, sex, and power, then we must continue to tease out its grammars, syntaxes, moods, and imperatives, to linger in the productive apora it engenders, and, of course, to explore the play it produces in culture – both in Shakespeare’s era and our own.
APPENDIX

CHART 1: Sexual terms in English lexicographic texts, 1500-1650 (LEME)
CHART 2: Select illicit terms in English lexicographic texts, 1500-1650 (LEME)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Count</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<tr>
<td>Whore</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whoreson</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whoremaster</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wench</td>
<td>107</td>
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<td>Wanton</td>
<td>36</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trull</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strumpet</td>
<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sodomite</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>Slut</td>
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<td>Quaene</td>
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<td>Pander</td>
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<td>Minion</td>
<td>23</td>
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<td>Harlot</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lasse</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slurp</td>
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<td>Filth</td>
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<tr>
<td>Drab</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>Filth</td>
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<td>Gixie</td>
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<tr>
<td>Whore</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHART 4: Sexual terms in *King James Bible* (1611)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bawd</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bugger</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concupine</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuckold</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darling</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drab</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favorite</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filth</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Flurt</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Girle</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gixie</td>
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<tr>
<td>Harlot</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ingle</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lasse</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maiden</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minion</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pander</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quaene</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slut</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sodomite/s</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strumpet</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trull</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wanton</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wench</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whoremaster</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whoreson</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whore</td>
<td>19</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Tudor Royal Proclamation 265: “Ordering the London Brothels Closed”
(Reprinted from Larkin & Hughes, 1973).

The King’s most excellent majesty, considering how by toleration of such dissolute and miserable persons as, putting away the fear of Almighty God and shame of the world, have been suffered to dwell beside London and elsewhere in common, open places called the stews, and there without punishment or correction exercise their abominable and detestable sin, there hath of late increased and grown such enormities as not only provoke instantly the anger and wrath of Almighty God, but also engender such corruption among the people as tendeth to the intolerable annoyance of the commonwealth, and where not only the youth is provoked, enticed, and allowed to execute the fleshly lusts, but also, by such assemblies of evil-disposed persons haunted and accustomed, is daily devised and conspired how to spoil and rob the true laboring and well-disposed men, for these considerations hath by advice of his council thought requisite utterly to extinct such abominable license and clearly take away all occasion of the same: wherefore his majesty straightly chargeth and commandeth that all such persons as have accustomed most abominably to abuse their bodies contrary to God’s law and honesty, and in any such place called the stews now about the city of London, do, before the Feast of Easter next coming, depart from those common places and resort incontinently to their natural countries with their bags and baggages, upon pain of imprisonment and further to be punished at the King’s majesty’s will and pleasure.

Furthermore, his majesty straightly chargeth and commandeth that all such householders as under the name of bawds have kept the notable and marked houses and known hostelries for the said evil-disposed persons; that is to say, such householders as do inhabit the houses white and painted with signs on the front for a token of the said houses, shall avoid with bag and baggage before the Feast of Easter next coming upon pain of like punishment at the King's Majesty’s will and pleasure.

Furthermore, the King’s majesty straightly chargeth and commandeth that all such as dwell upon the banks called the stews near London, and have at any time before this proclamation sold any manner victuals to such as have resorted to their houses, do before the said Feast of Easter cease and leave off their victualing and forbear to retain any guest or stranger into their house either to eat and drink or lodge, after the Feast of Easter next coming, until they have presented themselves before the King’s majesty’s council and there bound themselves with surety in recognizance not to suffer any such disorder in their house, or lodge any serving man, prentice, or woman unmarried, other than their hired servants, upon the pain before specified.

The King’s most excellent majesty also chargeth and commandeth that no owner or mean tenant of any such whitened house or houses, where the said lewd persons have had resort and used their most detestable life, do from the said Feast of Easter presume to let any of the houses, heretofore abused with said mischiefs in the streets called the stews aforesaid, to any person or persons before the same owner or mean tenant intending to make lease as aforeso do present the names or names of such as
should hire the same to the King’s majesty’s council, and that before them the lessee hath put in bond and surety not to suffer any of the said house to be abused as hath been in times past with the same abomination, upon like pain as before is mentioned.

Finally, to the intent all resort should be eschewed to the said place, the King’s majesty straightly chargeth and commandeth that from the Feast of Easter next ensuing there shall no bear-bating be used in that row or in any place on that side the bridge called London Bridge, whereby the accustomed assemblies may be in that place thoroughly abolished and extinct, upon like pain as well to them that keep the bears and dogs which have been used in that purpose as all such as resort to see the same.
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