Ethics and Imperialism in Livy

by

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For my grandparents
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Introduction

Those who wish to establish empires obtain them through bravery and intelligence, make use of moderation and kindness in order to increase their size, and secure them through fear and terror. You may find proof of this by considering both empires established long ago and the later Roman hegemony.¹ (Diodorus Siculus 32.2)

This passage was once thought to derive from Polybius and reflect that historian’s Machiavellian sentiment. We now know that his views were very much the opposite.² Nor would any Roman, at least during the heyday of the Republic, say such a thing. Nevertheless, Diodorus could not only say this of Roman expansion a few centuries later, he could say it approvingly. While most scholarship has focused on crafting a synthetic explanation of Roman expansion, I use historiographical analysis to pinpoint the ethical terms used by Romans of the Republic and their contemporaries to justify or find fault with Roman expansion. I find that the Romans’ own ethics of imperialism were based around consistency and good faith, *fides*, in their dealings with other states. The demands of *fides*, a characteristically Roman virtue, determined what actions and wars the Romans felt the need to justify and the arguments they used to do so.

Sources and Structure

To find Republican attitudes towards imperialism we must turn to Livy, whose monumental history of Rome survives only in parts, but which remains our most complete

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¹ Diodorus 32.2: Ὡτι οἱ τὰς ἡγεμονίας περιποίησασθαί βουλόμενοι κτῶνται μὲν αὐτὰς ἀνδρείᾳ καὶ συνέσει, πρὸς αὐξήσιν δὲ μεγάλην ἄγουσιν ἐπιεικείᾳ καὶ φιλανθρωπίᾳ, ἀσφαλίζονται δὲ φόβῳ καὶ καταπλήξει· τούτων δὲ τὰς ἀποδείξεις λάβοις ἄν ταῖς πάλαι ποτὲ συσταθείσαις δυναστείαις ἐπιστήσας τὸν νοῦν καὶ τῇ μετὰ ταῦτα γενομένη Ῥωμαίων ἡγεμονίᾳ.
account of the Republic. It is possible to treat Livy’s history as broadly representative of republican attitudes because Livy used the so-called Sullan annalists as his primary sources to produce a refined exemplar of an already homogeneous tradition. While Livy testifies to differences in casualty figures (Valerius Antias was particularly fond of impossibly high enemy death tolls), only internal politics and class divisions seem to have generated any substantial controversy and variance in accounts. Greek authors who used Roman sources, Polybius, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Appian, and Cassius Dio, often provide their own interpretations of Roman foreign policy, but their narratives tend to match extant Roman accounts or, when these are lacking, are consonant with what one would expect. So far as concerns foreign policy during the Republic, the Roman historiographical tradition was characterized by consensus. Using Livy’s work as a representative of this tradition, I have written this study as a series of case-studies following the trajectory of his historical narrative.

Chapters 1 and 2 focus on Livy’s first ten books, for which Valerius Antias and Licinius Macer were the primary sources. The dubious historicity of this material is advantageous for discovering the core values and concerns with which the Romans went to war. The long timespan between these events and their historian reduces the need for exacting accuracy, increasing the degree to which the historical tradition may have been shaped by and altered to reflect Roman values. Such an idealized narrative may be less than trustworthy with respect to historical facts, but can be counted on to display contemporary ideals in stark relief. My first chapter shows that Livy used his initial pentad to establish the trans-historical essentials of

3 S.P. Oakley, *A Commentary on Livy Books IV-X*, 4 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1997-2005), vol. 1, 15-6: “that there are surprisingly few major variants in these books, and from this we may perhaps deduce that the tradition which he used was relatively uniform.” See also the list, pp. 13-15, of every passage in Books 6-10 that cites or acknowledges the existence of a source.

Roman character and behavior. *Fides* dominates Livy’s idealized depiction of relations with the Latins, for his Romans see themselves as offering protection and benevolent stewardship to conquered and subordinate peoples in exchange for loyalty. Through success against Veii and the disaster of the Gallic sack, we also see that the Romans regarded their success as dependent upon their upright behavior. This section also highlights ways in which the Roman tradition attempted to contain the blame for Roman improprieties and keep them from reflecting on the reputation of the state as a whole.

Chapter 2 examines the challenges to this idealized picture of foreign relations that emerge in Books 6-10 and in Livy’s account of Capua’s defection during the Second Punic War. Livy’s Romans understand the defection of the Latins after the Gallic sack and that of Capua after Cannae as indicative of these allies’ own moral failings; because their allies do not reciprocate *fides*, the Romans are obliged to find the appropriate admixture of *fides* and force to guarantee their loyalty. When the Romans acted in their national interest in contravention of their ethical obligations, the Roman historiographical tradition uses the debate as a palliative for seemingly unethical conduct. By focusing on senatorial anxieties over ethical issues rather than the actual result, Livy can reinforce the impression that the Romans were exceptionally concerned with ethics, even when this is contradicted by their actions. The main example of this is the decision to accept Capua’s surrender, a move which touched off the First Samnite War. This finds a strong parallel in Polybius’ account of the outbreak of the First Punic War in my third chapter.

Chapter 3 shows that these patterns of Roman self-presentation are not confined to Livy’s account of early Rome, but shaped traditional accounts of the outbreak of the First and Second Punic Wars, as well as the manner in which the Romans understood their interactions with the
Spanish. Livy’s second decade, which included his account of the First Punic War, is lost, yet the
Periochae, extremely brief and uneven epitomies, testify to his tone and we find the outlines of
the Roman narrative in Polybius. His work seeks to explain, to Romans and his own Greek
political class, how it was that Rome came to dominate the Mediterranean in such a brief space
of time, and also offers practical models for how rulers of lesser states could operate in this new
environment. We will see that, although Polybius used a variety of Greek sources and
superimposed his own high-level interpretations, his narrative was one the Romans found largely
agreeable and which Livy used in for the Second Punic War. The historical tradition for both
wars thus emphasizes the Romans’ own concern with upholding treaties and bringing aid to
beleaguered allies, contrasting this with the characteristically perfidious Carthaginians. In Spain
we see the Scipios attempting to establish bonds of fides with indigenous peoples in much the
same way that the Romans dealt with the Latins in Chapter 1.

In Chapter 4 we turn to Rome’s initial forays into the east, the First and Second Illyrian
Wars and the First Macedonian War. Although Appian and Polybius differ on the First Illyrian
War’s causes, both accounts fit into the moral framework outlined in previous chapters.
Polybius, however, makes these three wars lead to the συμπλοκή, the irreversible entanglement
of eastern and western Mediterranean that led to Rome’s decisive implication into Greek

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5 A leading politician in the Achaean League, Polybius turned to history after being taken to Rome as a hostage in
168 BCE and became tutor and companion to Scipio Aemilianus. Scipio would go on to conquer Carthage and, after
the Romans destroyed Corinth in 146 BCE, Polybius helped implement and soften the post-war settlement.
6 Polybius’ first pentad survives intact, along with most of the sixth, which outlines the Roman constitution and
military practices. For Books 7-40 we are dependent on quotations in other authors and two traditions of excerpts,
the so-called Excerpta Antiqua and those made at the behest of Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus. See J.M. Moore,
7 Livy was generally believed to have almost exclusively used Roman sources, especially Fabius Pictor, whom
Polybius also used heavily, for the Second Punic War. However, D.S. Levene, Livy on the Hannibalic War (Oxford:
Oxford University Press 2010), has recently shown that Livy used and responded to Polybius’ interpretation in a
sophisticated manner, making it necessary to consider the possibility that many Livian episodes are actually a unique
synthesis of multiple sources. It is likely that such synthesis was largely accomplished in the author’s memory.
There is no indication that Livy ever collated or systematically compared his sources. Hermann Tränkle, Livius und
Polybios (Basel: Schwabe & Co., 1977), 193-229, espoused the previous consensus, that Livy only occasionally
used Polybius before Book 31, where he began to consult Polybius for Greek affairs.
politics. Here I show that Livy used Polybius for the First Macedonian War, but consciously excluded his interpretive framework. Although these wars ushered in dramatic changes in foreign policy, it was vital for the Roman historian to see them as traditionally motivated and entirely separate occurrences, an interpretation that would be undercut by acknowledging any sort of process underlying Roman expansion. To do otherwise would call Roman ethics into question.

It is widely recognized that Livy made extensive use of Polybius for Books 31 through 45, mostly for his more detailed account of affairs in the east. Livian source criticism, therefore, has been largely focused on identifying the “Polybian” portions of Livy, some of which are direct translations. In many cases this has led the excessively confident to attempt to “reconstruct” lost sections of Polybius based on Livy, but this is no longer considered a sound methodology. I demonstrate in Chapter 5 that the outbreak of the Second Macedonian War, long seen as a radical reversal in Roman policy towards Greece, had no such reputation in the Roman tradition. Instead, Livy frames the war as an attempt to defend allies, especially Athens, against the depredations of Philip. Yet while he has left the fundamental rationale intact, Livy has altered the Roman tradition which, as evidenced by Polybius and Pompeius Trogus, saw this war as a Roman response to the Syro-Macedonian Pact, the secret agreement of Philip V and Antiochus III to conquer and divide the Ptolemaic Empire between themselves. Livy made this major change in order to avoid stressing a long Roman tradition of aiding the Ptolemies while writing under Augustus, who had presided over the dynasty’s elimination. Chapter 6 then

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8 The сυμπλοκή is a concept of Polybius’ own devising, with no analog in other historians’ work.
examines the war with Antiochus and the competing propagandistic claims these antagonists made to foster Greek liberty. Although this war is one of the clearest cases of hegemonic rivalry in Roman history, we shall see that Rome’s diplomatic strategy was largely dictated by need to force Antiochus into the position of breaking *fides* with Rome rather than vice-versa.

Chapter 7 examines the tumultuous politics of Greece after Rome’s victory over Antiochus firmly established Roman hegemony, focusing on the Third Macedonian War. I show that Livy adroitly adapted Polybius’ explanation of this war, in which the Greek historian claims that although Perseus carried out the war, his father Philip V’s anger with Rome was the war’s cause. In doing so Livy manages to depoliticize Rome’s attempted interference with the Macedonian succession and cast Philip and Perseus as inveterate enemies of Rome with whom there could be no peace. In the Epilogue, I argue that the Romans thought about the Third Punic War and Achaean War, in which they destroyed Carthage and Corinth respectively, as necessary and moderate responses to betrayals of *fides*. In the case of Carthage, the Roman tradition saw this war as a simple response to Carthaginian treachery and enmity. In Greece, the situation was more complicated. The opposition and resentment fostered by what the Romans perceived as benevolent stewardship led them to abandon the optimism of Flamininus’ Isthmian Proclamation and decide that they could only achieve security and impose order upon these irrational and quarrelsome states with a greater application of force.

**The Problem of Roman Expansion**

Much as the history of Rome is dominated by conquest, the history of scholarship on Rome has woven itself around the question of how that one city-state came to control the Mediterranean world in the third and second centuries BCE. Many, such as William Harris, and
with more sophistication, John Briscoe, have seen Rome as a state bent on conquest.\textsuperscript{11}

Alternatives to this are largely based on Maurice Holleaux’s influential thesis that, prior to the Second Macedonian War, Rome had no organized eastern policy, engaged in the first three of these wars under duress, and, upon their completion, attempted to withdraw from the Greek world.\textsuperscript{12} New support for this view has recently emerged from Arthur Eckstein’s application of neo-realist political theory to antiquity. Acknowledging Roman militarism yet emphasizing that it was not unique, he uses the theoretical framework of political realism to provide a compelling explanation of Rome’s entry into the Second Macedonian War as the result of a “power-transition crisis,” the destabilization of Greek politics caused by the effective collapse of the Ptolemaic Kingdom.\textsuperscript{13} Although this study is historiographical, many of Eckstein’s conclusions, especially the historicity of the “Syro-Macedonian Pact,” a secret agreement between Antiochus III of the Seleucid Kingdom and Philip V of Macedon to divide the Ptolemaic Kingdom, and thus the Greek world, between themselves, underlies my own understanding of Mediterranean history. For this reason, and because Eckstein has not followed up on the historiographical implications of his work, a brief discussion of his application of neo-realist political theory to the ancient world is necessary.

Outlining his use of neo-realist theory, Eckstein highlights the key concepts and


\textsuperscript{12} Holleaux, \textit{Rome}, 306-334. Most of the work deals with showing the extremely limited goals the Romans had in their interactions with Greece up to this point, and so the thesis of change is fully stated in this final chapter.

introduces much of the terminology he will use in a one-sentence summary upon which it would be difficult to improve:

The Realist approach in analyzing interstate behavior is founded on three fundamental concepts: the prevalence of anarchy in the world of states (i.e., the lack of international law); the resultant grim self-help regime imposed upon all states and its impact upon the constellation of state actions (including especially power-maximizing conduct); and the importance of the stability or instability of balances of power. (Eckstein, *Anarchy*, 12)

The ancient Mediterranean, as Eckstein presents it, was a multipolar anarchy. This model derives from the work of Kenneth Waltz, the political theorist responsible for neo-realism:  

The state among states conducts its affairs in the brooding shadow of violence. Because some states may at any time use force, all states must be prepared to do so—or live at the mercy of their neighbors. Among states, the state of natures is a state of war . . . not in the sense that war constantly occurs, but in the sense that with each state deciding for itself whether or not to use force, war may at any time break. (Waltz, *Theory*, 102)

From a practical perspective, therefore, we can say that a state's foremost concern is its continuing existence, inclusive of political independence, and its primary objective will be to acquire security. Security then comes to be defined by a state's capability, primarily military, in relation to other states. As there is no reliable authority to which a state can appeal, this is termed a self-help regime. Moreover, the lack of any effective policing of international conduct and the competition for this one resource, which is limited because one state's security is, by definition, a source of potential danger to other states, make for legitimate conflicts of interest and nearly limitless opportunity for war. Waltz later highlights this with greater force:

Whether or not by force, each state plots the course it thinks will best serve its interests. If force is used by one state or its use is expected, the recourse of other states is to use force or be prepared to use it singly or in combination. No appeal can be made to a higher entity clothed with the authority and equipped with the ability to act on its own initiative. Under such conditions the possibility that force will be used by one or another of the parties looms always as a threat in the

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background. In politics force is said to be the *ultima ratio*. In international politics force serves, not only as the *ultima ratio*, but indeed as the first and constant one. (Waltz, *Theory*, 113)

Such harsh realities are quite easy to think away, particularly since the presentation of conflicts, statesmen's speeches, and the reiterated grievances draw justification from, and reinforce the pretexts. Then, once a point of conflict has been established, systemic constraints largely limit or determine the actual outcomes.

In this environment, abiding by agreements may be an important consideration, but it is a consideration that is never more than secondary. Without the survival of the state, all other considerations become meaningless. Thus, survival is not something any state will leave to chance. Because the motivations of one state's decision makers are often opaque to those of their neighbors, states often find it safest to assume the worst. This was even more the case in the ancient world, where permanent diplomatic contact, as through embassies, was not maintained, and the time it took for an ambassador to travel from place to place could compass any number of critical developments.15 An anarchy therefore presents a decidedly hostile, or at best, ambiguous environment. With no more reliable option, states in an anarchy rely on their own arms, and therefore anarchies are, or tend quickly to become, militarized anarchies.

A significant point made by realist theorists, central to Eckstein’s treatment of Rome, is that the above tendencies are created not by the individual characteristics of a particular state, but by the competitive pressures of the larger inter-state ecosystem in which it is enmeshed. Moreover, while individuals' decisions and the culture that contributes to them are critically important, the need to maximize the chance of survival constrains perceived possible choices and

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15 Eckstein, *Anarchy*, 121: “Diplomacy was primitive. As in Classical and Hellenistic Greece, there were no permanent ambassadorial missions to foreign states to exchange information, lessen mutual opacity, and express early concerns about policies so as to head off possible crises. In the crises that thus inevitably developed, diplomacy consisted primarily of making demands on others in public: the *rerum repetitio* (rehearsal of grievances), made by special priests called *fetiales.*”
selects for cultures with particular characteristics. Where Harris and others have tried to explain Roman conquest as due to innate bellicosity or some other such characteristic, Waltz's system-level approach highlights the broader trends within which these characteristics have an effect as largely shaped by the systemic forces:

In a self-help system each of the units spends a portion of its effort, not in forwarding its own good, but in providing the means of protecting itself against others. . . When faced with the possibility of cooperating for mutual gain, states that feel insecure must ask how the gain will be divided. They are compelled to ask not "Will both of us gain?" but "Who will gain more?" If an expected gain is to be divided, say, in the ratio of two to one, one state may use its disproportionate gain to implement a policy intended to damage or destroy the other. Even the prospect of large absolute gains for both parties does not elicit their cooperation so long as each fears how the other will use its increased capabilities. Notice that the impediments to collaboration may not lie in the character and the immediate intention of either party. Instead, the condition of insecurity—at the least, the uncertainty of each about the other's future intentions and actions—works against their cooperation. (Waltz, Theory, 105)

This does not deny the importance of individuals or cultural factors in influencing the course of events. Ancient states made remarkable attempts at diplomacy, but with real or perceived strength being the main determining factor as to how a state was treated by others, this systemic arrangement provided a marked disincentive to any act that could be interpreted as a sign of weakness. Bravado thus trumps compromise and leads to what is called compellence diplomacy. Each state tends to intensify its claims until one admits that it is the weaker or war breaks out, a situation political scientists term a contest of resolve. Thus we will see that even though the Romans used the instruments of diplomacy and consistently held out for peace, often

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16 Waltz, Theory, 96-7: “States vary widely in size, wealth, power, and form. And yet variations in these and in other respects are variations among like units... States are alike in the tasks that they face, though not in their abilities to perform them. The differences are of capability, not of function. States perform or try to perform tasks, most of which are common to all of them; the ends they aspire to are similar... national politics consists of differentiated units performing specified functions. International politics consists of like units duplicating one another’s activities... The units of an anarchic system are functionally undifferentiated. The units of such an order are then distinguished primarily by their greater or lesser capabilities for performing similar tasks...”

17 Eckstein, Anarchy p. 60; Waltz, Theory, 188-9, draws the term from Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 70-1.

18 Eckstein, Anarchy, 61.
forcing the other party to take the decisive step towards war, this approach was often doomed to failure. While it may seem a cynical political move, as perhaps it often was, to merely repeat demands which the Romans surely knew their opponents would or could not accept, they were conditioned by their environment to see no other options.

The Waltzian formulation is only the beginning for a great deal of political scholarship, and, while Eckstein focuses on the distribution of power throughout the Mediterranean and how that shapes the broader systemic dynamics of the area as a whole, for an account oriented more at the Roman perspective and the rationale underlying its expansion, one of the authors he makes somewhat less use of bears mention here. Stephen Walt, in *The Origins of Alliances*, seeks to expand on and refine what he refers to as balance of power theory, of which he calls Waltz's study "the most elegant and rigorous presentation." What he sees as the core of this theory is the idea that, in order to protect their own security, states seek alliances to either balance against a greater power, that is ally with other states to compensate for their relative weakness as individual entities, or to bandwagon, joining with the most powerful state in the hopes of either avoiding destruction or profiting secondarily from its success. The fundamental change Walt makes to balance of power theory is to replace the vague and unquantifiable aggregate power with the much more nuanced concept of threat:

First, I demonstrate that balancing is far more common than bandwagoning. In contrast to traditional balance of power theorists, however, I suggest that states ally to balance against threats rather than against power alone. Although the distribution of power is an extremely important factor, the level of threat is also affected by geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions. Thus I propose balance of threat theory as a better alternative than balance of power theory. (Walt, *Origin of Alliances*, 5)

While the case study Walt uses is the Middle East between 1955 and 1979 and the practical questions he attempts to answer are framed in terms of the then-ongoing Cold War, he writes

with such clarity that it is easy to extract the concepts from their setting and apply them to the ancient world in so far as it was also an anarchic system. In particular, he concludes that regional powers balance against each other, compensating for increased threats from their neighbors and close competitors but remaining largely unresponsive to fluctuations in the global balance of power. He attributes this, however, largely to the stable opposition of two superpowers, the high deterrence value of nuclear weapons, and the reduced threat imposed by their great distance from the area under consideration.\textsuperscript{20} We will see a much weaker version of this behavior in later chapters when Rome moves into the Greek world, but many of these considerations are, for obvious reason, inapplicable to most ancient scenarios.

Another of Walt’s conclusions, however, is paramount: selecting an ally from amongst great powers and the decision to bandwagon hinge largely on that state’s perceived intentions. Applying this to balancing both against local rivals and larger powers which otherwise threaten to consume or destroy a small state, it provides a strikingly economical explanation for how Rome acquired and retained allies at varying distances. There will be little occasion to directly reference Walt in the course of this study, but it is worth noting here that his theory accords strikingly well with Livy’s account and validates Rome’s political strategy. For, by attempting to honor agreements with far more exactitude than its neighbors, cultivating the appearance of a state that goes to war only on just cause and as a last resort, and by offering local autonomy or relatively generous civic integration to the conquered, Livy’s Rome always appears the least threatening power. Therefore, although no state will freely compromise or give up its sovereignty, when faced with a host of bad choices, aligning with Rome will frequently be the

\textsuperscript{20} Walt, \textit{Origins of Alliances}, 147ff.
best bad choice. This has been often cast as a sort of sneakily predatory behavior on the part of Rome, acting rather like a pawn-broker of sovereignty, but Livy and the Roman account are clear in placing the initiative, either in seeking alliance or starting a war which ends in subjugation, on the other party. These actions are driven by Roman virtues, not cupidity. In fact, the involvement of distant powers need not be seen as meddling at all, for Walt concludes "balancing behavior predominates, but regional powers prefer the support of a distant superpower to cooperation with another regional actor. The reason is obvious: the superpowers can do more to help, and helping a neighbor may be dangerous if it becomes to strong as a result."22

On the whole, Walt is startlingly optimistic in tone, but this is largely a result of the modern world with which he is concerned. Many of the specifics reasons he gives for the rarity of bandwagoning are either weaker or not applicable to the ancient world. His great powers are largely concerned with each other, but the reader in Livy will see many larger states hungrily turn upon their neighbors, making it much more attractive to willingly join with a dangerous neighbor in order to preempt its attack. Similarly, as the aftermath of the Gallic Sack will show, defection was a much more real possibility. This shows that the Romans lived in a much harsher world, but makes the contrast Livy attempts to make between Rome and its neighbors all the more striking.

One other optimistic account bears mentioning, that of Paul Burton. As a student of Eckstein, he rebels against realism, instead advocating the institutional constructivism championed by Alexander Wendt.23 While Burton is quite correct to highlight the deep

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21 These factors, as Walt stresses, do not force a state to seek alliances or great-power patronage, or fix the time at which it will do so, but do influence the choices it will likely make.
22 Walt, Origins of Alliances, 266.
importance of social relations to the Romans (he sees the concept of *amicitia* as constitutive of Roman foreign policy), he fails to adequately distinguish between what the Romans said of their own actions and what they did. He brings well-deserved attention to the Romans’ own ethical concerns, but his historical analysis often cannot be accepted. It thus bears emphasis that my study is historiographical rather than historical. Neo-realism and Eckstein’s work are present throughout, but very much in the background. My goal is to examine how, within such a harsh political environment, the Romans conceived of and presented their actions. Instead of the precise reason why the Romans went to war on any given occasion, I seek to determine what ethical strictures the Romans claimed to impose upon their own actions and what motivations they believed were legitimate. Since the Romans, like all peoples, usually fell far short of their own standards, I focus upon the anxieties evident in their historiographical tradition and the distortions the Romans used to redeem the past and make it conform to their own lofty ethical pronouncements.

**The Roman Virtue of Fides**

Although Eckstein’s model is the most historically convincing, the hostile interpretation of a Harris is, in one critical way, much closer to how the Romans explained this period of their own history. Holleaux’s model, often referred to as “defensive imperialism,” is attractive to many because it corresponds with a prevalent modern ethic, according to which aggression is inherently illegitimate while defense needs little justification. While much of Holleaux’s historical analysis is extremely valuable, understanding these actions within an ethical framework that exclusively valorizes self-defense is anachronistic and obscures the Romans’ own understanding of their actions. For as we shall see, Livy and other representatives of the Roman historical tradition saw Rome’s entry into the Greek East as driven by the same ethical
principles and behavior which had always characterized Roman action. Accordingly, I argue that
Roman foreign policy should be understood primarily in terms of *fides*, and that defense was not
the primary criterion by which the Romans judged the justice of their wars.

Livy's history, especially his idealized first decade, presents Rome as more reliable and
less threatening than other states. More than any other characteristic, it is Rome’s exceptional
*fides*, as demonstrated towards friends and enemies alike, that creates this impression.²⁴ The term
itself has a broad and complicated array of meanings, which Timothy Moore catalogued in a
study of ethical terms used by Livy:

> Most often in Livy *fides* involves attention to the obligations which accompany a
> specific agreement, promise, or relationship. Very close to such manifestations of
> *fides* are the passages where *fides* is the conscientiousness of one in a particular
> position (e.g., a magistrate) in performing the duties which attend that position. *Fides* can also be more general, meaning concern for obligations which are
determined not by any explicit relationship or agreement, but by the unwritten law
which demands that one act honestly. (Moore, *Artistry*, 36)

*Fides* can be somewhat passive, as when maintaining *fides* involves not defecting, but it
frequently includes a sense of obligation, as in supporting allies, sometimes even of assistance
offered out of goodwill when not strictly required. It can refer to the moral quality of good faith,
the sense of allegiance between parties loyal to each other, as well as the actions and states that
are motivated by and arise from such bonds. One aspect of *fides* that has received insufficient
comment is its implied reciprocity, but in this study we shall see that the Romans believed that
their own upright behavior and generous treatment, whether through *clementia*, *moderatio*, or
*beneficia*, could instill *fides* in other peoples.²⁵ This sense of obligation is stronger than the
English “good faith” would imply, for *fides* only began to indicate a mental activity with Cicero.

²⁴ Timothy Moore, *Artistry and Ideology: Livy’s Vocabulary of Virtue* (Frankfurt: Athenäum Monografien, 1989),
35: “Except for *virtus*, no virtue plays as important a role in Livy’s work as does *fides*.”
²⁵ Particularly in the case of *beneficia*, such loyalty can be referred to by, or come in parallel with, *gratia* and the
like. Moore, *Artistry*, 83-5 notes that *clementia* is rarer than one would expect, occurring only 33 times in the extant
portions of Livy.
Even if Livy’s usage had begun to change, for his Latin sources, *fides* was more akin to a guarantee or a characteristic.\textsuperscript{26} Loyalty, however, could also be secured by fear, and Moore notes the frequency of the opposition between *fides* and *metus* in Livy.\textsuperscript{27} We shall see that this opposition, or perhaps the proper balance between the two, appears as one of the central questions of statecraft in Livy, for his Romans often give what they regard as generous terms to allies and defeated enemies only to have them rebel. Stung by such displays of infidelity and ingratitude, the Romans then tend to respond with greater force against these peoples whom they regard as morally compromised.

The use of *fides* in phrases such as *deditio in fidem*, the act by which a city or people formally surrendered all their rights to the Romans, has also been a point of controversy, especially in relation to the Aetolian misinterpretation of their surrender’s significance in 191 BCE.\textsuperscript{28} As Dmitriev argues in an exhaustive discussion, Roman *fides* did not correspond to Greek πίστις in conveying an obligation of the superior party to be merciful, but only acquired this meaning through continued interaction with the Greeks, beginning perhaps as early as the end of the 3rd century BCE.\textsuperscript{29} This also requires revisionism in the Roman historical tradition by which the Romans began to reinterpret their past in terms of a *fides* which included elements of

\textsuperscript{27} Moore, *Artistry*, 37.
\textsuperscript{28} Eugen Täubler, *Imperium Romanum: Studien zur Entwicklungsgeschichte des Römischen Reichs*, (Berlin: Teubner, 1913) begins with an attempt to parse the Deditiovertrag into clean categories, yet the consensus has emerged that the language of authors such as Livy is too variable to generate exhaustive and unproblematic legal categories on such points. Another approach has been to look for correspondence and interaction with Greek concepts, as in Erich Gruen, “Greek Πίστις and Roman *Fides*” in *Athenaeum* 60 (1982): 50-69, which finds significant parallels and an attempt to bridge a cultural divide.
\textsuperscript{29} Sviatoslav Dmitriev, *The Greek Slogan of Freedom and Early Roman Politics in Greece*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 237-82. Dmitriev makes a strong case for the unqualified *deditio* being, contrary to common opinion, a more desirable state, indicating a prearranged surrender, than *deditio in fidem*. However, I suggest that the difficulties in explaining cases of surrender should not add so far-removed a definition as “discretion” to the word *fides*. Instead, the perspective of the phrase should be reversed. Since the *dediticii* abrogate their rights and legal identity, it is their own *fides*, or trust, in the Romans that is referenced, since that is all that they would have left to rely upon.
However, as the basic definition of *fides* was abiding by agreements, Dmitriev goes too far in denying it all ethical force in foreign policy and assigning all of its sense of reciprocity to its development under Greek influence. Towards allies, Roman *fides* did require consultation of their interests, including defense, and the Romans expected loyalty in return, hence the phrase *manere in fide*.

We shall see that the Romans were resistant to framing their foreign policy primarily in terms of profit and advantage, although these were valid secondary considerations. Rather, what we find in Livy is a moral justification centered around the exceptional quality of Roman *fides*. This consisted, first and foremost, of honoring all implicit and explicit obligations. If a group showed *fides* to Rome, the Romans attempted to reciprocate in order to strengthen the bond. If not, war was a legitimate option, with clemency in its prosecution favored when this was thought to increase the chance of future goodwill, or at least untroubled acquiescence. Clemency was preferred, although not a moral requirement. In practical terms, it could also serve to demonstrate power and confidence. If a state broke its bonds of *fides* with Rome, it lost all guaranties of protection. The decision of whether or not to go to war, and, once that was won, to show the enemy mercy lay with the Romans and their calculation of advantage, hence the harsh behavior Dmitriev highlights in cases of *deditio in fidem*.

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30 Dmitriev, *Greek Slogan*, 272-3: “Such prearranged surrenders were on the mind of Cicero when he said that the Romans had concluded treaties with their former enemies based on *fides*. These later reinterpretations of *fides* might have emerged as part of the general effort by the Romans, displayed in the second century, to present Roman foreign policy as always having been selfless and based on moral principles. But reinterpreting instances of prearranged surrender, which guaranteed certain rights and privileges to the *dediticii*, as instances of having surrendered to Roman *fides* was only possible because of the later understanding of *fides* as having a meaning close to that of *pistis*, that is, as providing all those who had surrendered with merciful treatment. The guarantees that accompanied prearranged surrenders, on the one hand, and the later retrospective vision of *deditio in fidem* as always offering merciful treatment to the *dediticii*, on the other, have created a distorted vision of the relationship between *deditio* and *deditio in fidem*.

31 Only 6 times out of 33 references to *clementia* in Livy refer to non-Romans. *Moderatio* is used only 8 times in an international context. See Moore, *Artistry*, 72, 83-5.
To moderns this may seem a very weak ethical standard, but the Romans did not always receive the *fides* they expected, and often prosecuted the ensuing wars with righteous indignation. War was not, as often thought today, to be avoided at all costs. On the contrary, *virtus* was a martial characteristic and, while profit-seeking was considered a base motivation, taking advantage of the opportunity for profit in war was not. The higher standard of conduct to which Livy's Romans lay claim actually provides more opportunities for war while allowing the Romans to place the blame for conflicts at the feet of their opponents who had not lived up to the standard of conduct the Romans expected. Moreover, to accept an insult or wrong is often seen as a sign of weakness that then invites further offenses. Therefore, Roman accounts tend to portray the Romans, or, more often, their allies, as victims of aggression. The Romans were thus compelled to wage war by the heavy-handed and threatening acts of their neighbors. This manifests itself imperfectly in the omission of many *casus belli*, narrative focalization on unjust acts against the Romans, and the suppression of Roman offenses. Many times in Livy's first decade cities just happen to be taken by the Romans or the first mention of a Roman army already in the field appears after mentioning the enemy's action against the Romans.

This tendency towards reactivity and the importance of honoring obligations also frequently brings Livy's Romans into conflicts on their neighbors' behalf. Rome's expanding network of alliances, particularly at those moments when it provided the impetus for involvement in a new region, is often seen as nothing but a tool of conquest disingenuously wrapped in pretensions of honor and loyalty. In some circumstances this may indeed have been the case, but the account given by Livy and other ancient historians so stresses the Roman preoccupation with honor that it would be a mistake to look for manifest hypocrisy. This sort of cynical interpretation, when applied broadly, stems from an anachronistic judgment that
conquest is somehow wrong. As others have often pointed out, such a view also implies far more
capacity for and consistency in long-term planning than such an ancient state was capable of.32

We will also see, towards the end of this study, that Greek writers lauded Roman piety and
honour, and that these traits are accordingly not subverted by the acquisition of empire. Moreover,
the notion that the Romans planned out their expansion, a claim most bound up with the
interpretation of Polybius, is largely anachronism and would have been unlikely to occur to
that Greek historian at all. Thus, throughout the Romans’ own account of their history, we see
wars that are fundamentally reactive, with the Romans responding to perceived threats and
offences against themselves and their allies. In doing so, the Romans fulfilled the reciprocal
obligations of fides to their allies, and, although it was often doomed to failure, attempted to
maintain relationships with their potential enemies as long as possible. Although their actual
behavior often contradicted their values, moments we can recognize because their historians
spilled much ink to try to redeem these episodes, the Romans’ own historical tradition presents
their rise to Mediterranean hegemony as the result of following a higher standard of behavior
than their neighbors, a standard based on fides.

32 Eckstein, Anarchy, 14: ancient states lacked the ability to plan far into the future, citing Kenneth Waltz, “The
Origins of War in Neorealist Theory” in Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18 (1988); Arthur Eckstein, Senate and
General: Individual Decision-Making and Roman Foreign Relations, 264-194 B.C. (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1987). For the unpredictability of outcomes, see Waltz, Theory, 108.
Chapter 1

Livy's First Pentad and the Formation of Roman Character

In the preface to his monumental work, Livy fixes the outline of his narrative to Rome's path from tiny village surrounded by enemies to undisputed ruler of the known world, perhaps even to its decline.¹ He takes pride in relating the history of the princeps terrarum populus, a history spanning the centuries between the city's humble beginnings and a time when it had grown so great that it labored under its own bulk.² Nevertheless, he appears ambivalent towards Rome's imperial success, in part because of the complicated imbrication of moral, economic, and political ideas that made him believe in Rome’s inexorable decline.³ Rome’s power may have been the result of upright behavior and deeds of daring, yet the end result was not the unqualified good of a teleological narrative. When Livy remarks that the contemporary events his readers so relish are those in which “the strength of this people, supreme not long ago, turns upon itself,” iam pridem praevalentis populi vires se ipsae conficiunt, a phrase that refers both to the magnitude of Rome’s dominion and the destruction of civil war, he obliquely devalorizes

¹ There is room for much debate over the extent and sincerity of Livy's pessimism, yet partisans of both sides would surely agree that the idea of decline and specter of collapse in his preface energize the narrative with suspense for his readers who, after all, live on its final page.
² Livy Praefatio 4: Res est praeterea et immensi operis, ut quae supra septigentesimum annum repetatur et quae ab exiguis profecta inithi eo creverit ut iam magnitudine laboret sua.
³ This is a rich topic in Roman literature. The historians’ linkage of empire, luxury, and moral decline is well known, but this strain of thought is visible in many other genres and is not unique to the Romans. Juvenal's Satires lampoon the rich. Horace, although somewhat epicurean in his tastes, shies away from wealth and the competition of elites and aspirants. For a survey of Roman reference to corruption and decline, see A. W. Lintott, “Imperial Expansion and Moral Decline in the Roman Republic” in Historia 21 n.4 (1972): 626-38. Herodotus, Aristotle, Aristophanes, and many others all associate virtue with moderate means.
Rome’s imperial success. Although both statements express dissatisfaction with the result of Rome's dominance, they are complementary, not identical. The first raises the possibility that the empire was so large as to be intractable, and the second that, with a lack of a suitable outlet for aggression, civil wars replaced foreign.⁴ Perhaps Livy's Roman history is indeed a teleology, but one that has overshot its proper mark? If so, it is not because empire was illegitimate. Doubts about the desirability of empire do crop up throughout Livy's history and were a part of the Republican discourse on conquest, but did not dominate it. These doubts and insecurities worked around the edges, evidenced more by the defensive way authors treat some episodes than by their stated opinions. To the extent that Livy believed in it, Rome’s ethical backsliding was neither the cause or nor the necessary reflex of military success, for this success was based upon ethically unimpeachable behavior. Its rewards were but secondary a secondary effect.

Some conquests and their ramifications gave Livy pause, but he was no pacifist; martial glory forms the basis for Rome's greatness in a manner that only began to turn problematic in modern times. Livy extols Roman valor at the high point of the preface in what almost seems like a claim that might makes right:

I do not intend to affirm or refute what is handed down from before the city was founded, more suitable for poetic stories than an unvarnished history of events. Antiquity is given license to make our city’s origins more august by mixing the human and divine. Moreover, if it is fitting to allow any people to consecrate its origins and treat the gods as its founders, the Roman people has such military glory that, since it claims most powerful Mars as its founder’s parent, let the human race submit to this with the same equanimity with which it submits to Roman rule.⁵ (Livy Praefatio 7)

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⁴ This is, however, not quite an analog to the idea of metus hostilis famously advocated by Sallust.
⁵ Livy Praefatio 7: Quae ante conditam condendamve urbem poeticis magis decora fabulis quam incorruptis rerum gestarum monumentis traduntur, ea nec adfirmare nec refellere in animo est. Datur haec venia antiquitati ut miscendo humana divinis primordia urbium augustiora faciat; et si cui populato licere oportet consecrare origines suas et ad deos referre auctores, ea belli gloria est populo Romano ut cum suum conditorisque sui parentem Martem potissimum ferat, tam et hoc gentes humanae patiuntur aequo animo quam imperium patiuntur.
A strong assertion of Romulus’ divine parentage could motivate an ideology of force, but for Livy it is a symbol which is shorthand for Roman success rather than its explanation. The second sentence’s purpose clause closely associates foundation myths with contemporary policy in the form of an explanatory analogy for the conquered, an external audience that could contest neither Rome's might nor its conduct. Livy even implies that they might not wish to contest Roman power and, as we shall see, he considered a limited degree of consent integral to legitimating Roman rule. It will become apparent that Livy did not believe that Roman success stemmed from any particular military or diplomatic strategy, but instead was the natural result of the Romans’ national character and ethical behavior. Here Livy obliquely brings in the notion that this success was evidence of the gods’ favor, and thus that the Romans had indeed acted properly. This will be discussed in more detail at the end of the chapter in relation to the siege of Veii.

Livy’s prefatory commentary on Roman hegemony is inextricably intertwined with moralizing and his subscription to the traditional role of history, furnishing moral *exempla* to imitate or avoid. He even explicitly makes the connection between the admirable traits and the acquisition and enlargement of Rome’s *imperium*:

> Let each reader attentively turn his mind to this: what was the lifestyle, what character, by what men, and with what practices at home and on campaign was our empire acquired and expanded. Then let him follow how, with discipline slipping away like a crumbling facade, morals sunk ever lower and then began to crash down, until he reaches our own time, in which we can bear neither our vices nor their cure.⁶ (Livy *Praefatio* 9)

The unmediated downward trajectory of public morals is directly contrasted with the good character that brought empire, which itself is regarded as a good. A necessary implication of Livy’s moralizing language and the unqualified applicability of his historical *exempla* for his

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⁶ Livy Praefatio 9: *Ad illa mihi pro se quisque acriter intendat animum, quae vita, qui mores fuerint, per quos viros quibusque artibus domi militiaeque et partum et auctum imperium sit;labante deinde paulatin discipline velut dissidentes primo mores sequatur animo, deinde ut magis magisque lapsi sint, tum ire coeperint praecipites, donec ad haec tempora quibus nec vitia nostra nec remedia pati possimus perventum est.*
own readers is that there is an ethical standard, achieved at some point in the past, which is equally valid for past, present, and, presumably, future actions.\(^7\) At least in broad strokes, the ethical standards Livy uses throughout his history are constant. This unitary and transhistorical ethical system that Livy applies to the entirety of Roman history rules out looking for a gradual development of Roman character and ethics over the course of his work. Even if some forms and customs had changed slightly, our historian assumes that his values are fundamentally in accord with those about whom he writes. Nor was he alone in this belief, as the immense power vested in the idea of the *mos maiorum*, monolithic and unimpeachable, indicates. While later Romans may behave increasingly poorly, such that this seems to become a new social norm, it is not that their principles are different so much as that they fail to live up to them.\(^8\) Livy’s preface authorizes his readers to seek out a transhistorical set of Roman ethics that can be applied just as easily to the first book of his history as the fortieth.

For most of the history, Roman character appears a largely indivisible unity, yet Livy is not so unsophisticated as to imagine it had sprung fully formed and togate from the head of Romulus. Livy has the essential Roman *mores* in place by the end of Book 1 and highlights the development of the Roman state over the course of the first pentad.\(^9\) Later changes and

\(^7\) This is especially true in light of the argument of Jane Chaplin, *Livy’s Exemplary History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), that Livy’s entire history was deeply concerned with and full of *exempla*, not simply famous episodes such as the rape of Lucretia, but in past events more generally and the many occasions on which characters within the history then model their use, correct and incorrect.

\(^8\) For a general discussion of Livy’s schema for Roman decline see Luce, *Livy*, 250ff. From 270 onward he discusses the contrast between Livy, who sees this decline as a slow process and Sallust, who frames the removal of Carthage, the last conceivable threat to Roman dominion, as the inflexion point in Roman character.

\(^9\) See Gary Miles, *Livy: Reconstructing Early Rome* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), 4-5 for how Luce. *Livy*, synthesized the scholarship on this point and elaborated on R.G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946), which argued that Livy allowed for no development in Roman *mores*, noting that Livy took care to specify the founders of various practices and in some ways shows significant Greek influence in attributing these innovations to kings and lawgiver figures. He shows, in fact, that it was even more historical than many Greek counterparts, quoting Cicero on the Romans having not just a single lawgiver, but many, (238-40). That development did not stop with the inception of the Republic, however, but was part of a more general view of Rome’s past-one that was common in the later Republic and went back at least to Cato. In the second book of Cicero’s *De Re Publica*, Scipio Aemilianus is represented as saying: “Cato used to declare that our constitution
refinements in forms and customs would continue to occur, but they were not such as to alter the Romans’ nature. \(^{10}\) If Livy thought his contemporaries worse than their ancestors it was because they fell short of a common mark. It has long been recognized that individual books in the first pentad highlight the development of particular virtues and vices, yet these are all present at least embryonically after the first book. \(^{11}\) In the opening of the second, directly after the expulsion of the kings, Livy asserts that the regal period was necessary to allow the state to mature:

Nor is there any doubt that the same Brutus who earned so much glory from driving out that arrogant king would have set the worst public example if, with desire for a liberty yet immature, he had wrested control from any of the earlier kings. Indeed, what would have happened if that plebs, made up of shepherds and immigrants, deserters from their own peoples, had, under the guardianship of an inviolate sanctuary, obtained either liberty or, certainly, impunity? What if, freed from the fear of a king, it had begun to be driven by the storms of tribunician agitation and, in a city not yet its own, to sow quarrels with the patricians before the pacts of marriage, the dearness of children, and the very soil, with which one bonds would have been torn apart by discord. Yet the peaceful moderation of monarchy fostered them, and by nourishing them brought it about that the state could bear the noble fruit of liberty with its adult strength. \(^{12}\) (Livy 2.1.3-6)

surpasses all others because in most of them individuals established laws and institutions, as Minos did in Crete, Lycurgus in Sparta. . . . Our nation, on the other hand, was established not by the genius of one many but of many, not in one lifetime but over many centuries and ages.” The contrast with the usual Greek manner of accounting for \textit{origines} is explicit. More important, the process is viewed in an historical perspective: that is, it was one of accretion, its stages interconnected and fixed in time, its causes explicable in terms of human character.”

\(^{10}\) Luce, \textit{Livy}, 241-249 allows for nuance in Livy’s idea of Roman development, listing a number of passages illustrative of change: 1.53.4; 2.12.9; 4.37.7; 5.28.3; 5.36.1; 5.38.4-5. He then brings in Livy 2.1.3-6, an authorial digression on how the monarchy was necessary to allow the Roman people to mature to such a point that they could make responsible use of their liberty. Arguing that this indicates that Livy took a similarly developmental view of the national character, he still must admit that whenever Livy compares his contemporary Romans with their ancestors, the historian uses a single transhistorical ethical standard. Luce then slips from ethics to education, leaving the issue unresolved.

\(^{11}\) Luce, \textit{Livy}, 231: “Hence, too, the preoccupation with telling a vivid, dramatic story that speaks for itself. To a large extent this approach caused him to treat history as a panorama—a series of episodes embodying moral values. The pantheon of virtues such as \textit{fides, pudicitia, disciplina}, and so forth, are consistently put on display for the edification and enjoyment of Roman readers. Sometimes whole books or sections of books, particularly in the first pentad, have been designed around such themes: e.g. \textit{libertas} in Book 2, \textit{moderatio-modestia} in 3, \textit{moderatio} again in 4, \textit{pietas} in 5. Nor have the vices been slighted. \textit{Temeritas, libido, ferocia}, and the like appear and reappear in stories of often remarkably similar shape and construction; sometimes particular vices characterize whole clans down through the centuries.”

\(^{12}\) Livy 2.1.3-6: \textit{neque ambiguitur quin Brutus idem qui tantum gloriae superbo exacto rege meruit pessimo publico id facturus fuerit, si libertatis immutatiae cupidine priorum regum alicui regnum extorsisset. Quid enim futurum fuit, si illa pastorum convenarumque plebs, transfuga ex suis populis, sub tutela inviolati templi aut libertatem aut certe impunitate adepta, soluta regio metu agitari coepta esset tribunicis procellis, et in aliena urbe cum patribus serere certamina, priusquam pignera coniugum ac liberorum caritasque ipsius soli, cui longo tempore adsuescitur, animos}
This *libertas*, acquired in Book 1, and the Romans’ learning to exercise it responsibly to protect themselves from external threats is Book 2’s theme. The sense of community, which transcends individual interest, barely manages to hold the quarreling senators and plebs together when faced with hostile neighbors throughout Book 2, and it is easy to imagine that the more recently integrated peoples and the earliest Romans would have been less able to put aside their differences for the common good. Livy’s focus on civic identity is relevant to external affairs because, looking back from a period in which Octavian could speak of *tota Italia* as a unity, the conquest and assimilation of Italy appears both foreign and domestic.

The ideals and ethics in terms of which the Romans understood their foreign relations must therefore be found in their accounts of their own legendary history. Once the kings were driven out the Roman state began to take on its familiar form. However, because Livy and his annalistic sources had an essentializing view of Roman character, they were not obliged to show that every diplomatic and religious form was followed in every single war. Instead, a few major dramatic episodes do not merely serve as *exempla*, but form the readers’ idea of how the Romans behaved in those events Livy does not treat at length. If they were careful and honorable when dealing with Porsenna and Veii when the stakes were high, why would Livy’s Romans compromise their dearest values in some skirmish with the Volsci?

In the following discussion of Livy’s first pentad we will see the historian depict *fides* as an innately Roman characteristic and use this, in combination with a knack for clemency and

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eorum consociasset? *Dissipatae res nondum adultae discordia forent, quas fovit tranquilla moderatio imperii eoque nutriendo perdixit ut bonam frugem libertatis maturis iam viribus ferre posset.*

13 Ogilvie, *Commentary*, 233.

14 Augustus, *Res Gestae* 25. T.J. Luce, “The Dating of Livy’s First Decade” in *TAPA* 96 (1965): 209-40 concludes that the first pentad was complete by 27 BCE and perhaps as much as the first three were finished by 23. No precise dating is necessary here, only that the idea of a common Italian identity was current.

15 Certain institutions and actions of the more reputable kings will figure here, particularly the *ius fetiale*, which Livy attributes to Ancus Martius, but generally speaking, these reflect more on the individual characters of the kings than the community.
integration, to adumbrate an ideal for of Roman foreign policy that will persist throughout his history. This virtue accounts for and encompasses the Romans’ exacting use of foedera, as well as their diligent maintenance of relationships of amicitia and societas. Even when the word fides is not expressed directly, this was the network of moral concepts, particularly benefaction and reciprocity, operative when Romans dealt with or wrote of other states and their relationships with Rome. In this chapter I will demonstrate the foundational importance of fides to Livy’s account of the regal period and then discuss the institution charged with maintaining Roman fides, the ius fetiale. Turning to Roman relations with the Latins, we shall find what Livy depicts as an ideal fides relationship, with the Romans offering protection and the Latins gratefully submitting to Roman authority. Finally, with the capture of Veii and the disaster of the Gallic sack, we shall see how Roman historians understood victory and defeat as a divinely implemented reflex of their own integrity, or lack thereof.

**Fides and Integration in Livy’s Regal Period**

At its extreme, Roman history begins with Aeneas’ flight from Troy and arrival in Latium. Even at this early point, Livy, beginning with Aeneas and Antenor, takes pains to contrast Rome’s ancestors with other peoples and their mythic founders. These two Trojans had attempted to broker the return of Helen out of respect for the law of hospitality and a desire for peace; thus they gained the Greeks’ goodwill and were allowed to depart with some of their people. Antenor and his group of refugees sailed up the Adriatic and seized a new homeland by force. Livy registers no disapproval of this other exile, for such actions are typical of

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16 Livy 1.1.1.
17 Livy 1.1.2-3: “After various trials Antenor, along with a mass of Eneti who had been driven out of Paphlagonia by sedition and sought a home and a king after losing theirs, Pylamenes, at Troy, came to the northernmost part of the Adriatic and took control of the land after driving out the Euganei, who lived between the sea and the Alps.” Casibus deinde variis Antenorem cum multitudine Enetum, qui seditione ex Paphlagonia pulsi et sedes et ducem
foundation legends, and Antenor’s conduct during the Trojan war grants him some degree of moral authority. The historian then mentions an alternate version in which Aeneas conquered the Latins and then integrated them with his own people, but Livy quickly moves to a longer account in which the two peoples peacefully integrate, clearly his preferred version. Livy’s description of the meeting between Aeneas and Latinus provides the conceptual framework, complete with a significant amount of the terminology, that the Romans will use to describe their own policies and actions throughout the history:

[The story is that Latinus] admired the nobility of the man and his lineage as well as his spirit, prepared either for peace or war, and with his right hand consecrated his pledge (fidem) of future friendship. Thus a treaty was struck between the two kings and the armies introduced to one another. Aeneas was Latinus’ guest and there, before his penates, the king added private treaty to public by giving his daughter to Aeneas in marriage. This at last confirmed the Trojans’ hopes for a secure home and an end to their wandering. (Livy 1.1.8-10)

Already a proponent of good faith and just dealing with the Greeks, Aeneas arrives in Italy prepared for peace or for war. This illustrates an ideal prevalent in Livy’s history, that Romans neither sought nor shrank from war. While the arrival of a large group of armed men and refugees in an already inhabited land is an occasion ready-made for violence, the Trojans and Latins avoid conflict, instead combining their peoples in what Livy presents as perfect harmony. By prefacing this positive outcome with two stories of conquest, Livy draws attention to the contrast, but does not dole out praise and blame. There is no condemnation of the two forceful

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rege Pylaemene ad Troiam amisso quaerebant, venisse in intimum maris Hadriatici sinum, Euganeisque qui inter mare Alpesque incoebant pulsis Enetos Troianosque eas tenuisse terras.
18 Ogilvie, Commentary, 38 notes that “the second version, which spares the Latins the humiliation of defeat and the Romans the infamy of aggression, doubtless gained currency from the late fourth century when the foundation legend was invoked to improve relations with the Latins” and cites its rough equivalence to Cato, Virgil 7.170ff., and Varro via Dionysius 1.57-64. See also Miles, Early Rome, 20-31 for Livy’s preference for the second version and subtle disavowal of authoritatively factual history.
19 Livy 1.1.8-10: et nobilitatem admiratum gentis virique et animum vel bello vel paci paratum, dextra data fidem futurae amicitiae sanxisse. Inde foedus ictum inter duces, inter exercitus salutationem factam. Aenean apud Latinum fuisse in hospitio; ibi Latinum apud penates deos domesticum publico adiunxisse foedus filia Aeneae in matrimoniunm data. Ea res utique Trojanis spem adfirmat tandem stabili certaque sed finiendi erroris.
colonizations; the existence and inclusion of this Roman tradition reveals that it was not embarrassing, but they remain far from ideal. Within a range of acceptable possibilities, Livy primes his readers to expect that Romans follow a higher standard.

In addition to and in support of this theme of Rome’s ethical exceptionalism, this passage is shot-through with key terms significant for Roman ideals of external relations. Latinus and Aeneas first form a bond of *fides*, the necessary basis for civil interactions and agreements. Its reciprocally binding nature guarantees and makes possible friendly relations, *amicitia*, and this is then followed by the most binding tool in Roman diplomacy, the *foedus*. Livy further emphasizes this by placing the personal relations between the two rulers on a parallel track, with *hospitium* corresponding to *fides*, and then referring to Aeneas’ marriage to Lavinia as a *domesticum foedus*. Livy highlights the concord in this union, commenting on Aeneas renaming his own people Latins after the loss of king Latinus. Thus *fides*, both as a virtue and as a relationship, forms the basis for concord and leads to the eventual integration of disparate communities. This picture of the Latins as a single people formed by the harmonious unification of communities can be read as a justification of Roman claims to control Latium as well as a model for the eventual unification of Italy.

Livy uses Romulus’ career to prove the necessity of military strength while offering a striking example of how upright behavior can turn a foe into a friend. This the rape of the Sabine women, where the Romans, rebuffed by their neighbors, are forced to take brides by force to ensure their city’s survival. Although these women are taken against their will, the good treatment Romulus ensures for them eventually brings them around, and they in turn persuade their kinsmen to consent to their marriages. In order to mitigate the ethical problems attendant on

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20 Livy 1.2.4-5.
21 Livy 1.9-14.3.
this episode, Livy focuses on the danger of Roman extinction as well as the grievous insult
effecting by the neighbors who refused intermarriage. *Fides* and related words only occur in
negative contexts, emphasizing that Roman concerns were over the deceit rather than the hostile
action itself, implying that the Sabine rebuff to forming a relationship at least partially freed the
Romulus’ hand. This political union also brings about what seems a reasonably successful dual
kingship with Titus Tatius, and in the end this extremely problematic episode is turned into a
source of positive *exempla*. The virtue *clementia* does not appear because the Romans were the
offending party, but this episode still shows the Romans placing a high value on reconciliation.
Thus, although a paradigmatic warrior, Livy’s Romulus was not defined by violence: the
strength he instilled in Rome was what allowed the city to enjoy peace.

If Romulus established Roman *virtus*, his successor, Numa, was responsible for *pietas*
and laws, which Livy, by framing him as Rome’s second founder, clearly marks as the other half
of Roman character. After demonstrating Numa’s piety and establishing legitimacy equal to
Romulus’ by the elaborate augury confirming the kingship, Livy turns to the new king’s
reformation of Roman *leges, mores*, and the *artes pacis*. Both Livy and Cicero have Numa
conceive of his project in terms of the opposition between peace and war, making the people, as
yet accustomed only to war, less fierce. This is in no way a rejection of Romulean values, but
an act of balancing; the arch of Janus, which was closed when Rome was at peace, served to set

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for the Sabine women, in which some injustice is shown to be acceptable when necessary for the state’s survival, yet
this is overshadowed by the Romans’ solicitous behavior and the resulting happy union of Sabines and Romans.
23 Livy 1.15.6-7.
24 Livy 1.19.1: *Quī regno ita potitus urbem novam conditam vi et armis, iure eam legibusque ac moribus de integro
condere parat.*
25 Livy 1.21.6: *Ita duo deinceps reges, alius alia via, ille bello, hic pace, civitatem auxerunt. Romulus septem et
triginta regnavit annos, Numa tres et quadraginta. Cum valida tum temperata et belli et pacis artibus erat civitas.*
26 Cicero *De Re Publica* 2.25-6.
boundaries and conditions for warlike behavior. Livy presents the peace signified by its closure as a goal, but he defines the condition is that of *pacatos circa omnes populos*, the passive implying that pacification was often necessary. Numa’s reign also serves as a key *exemplum* for the Roman idea that peace could also be secured by virtuous behavior and the goodwill it engendered. The tradition Livy worked within saw much of Roman history as an attempt to balance the approaches of Romulus and Numa and find the appropriate combination of strength and goodwill to secure peace. Thus, Livy’s comment that the gate of Janus had only been closed twice afterward was not meant to indicate hawkishness so much as the hostility the Romans perceived in their world.

Another key moment in early Roman expansion is the dismantling of Alba Longa and forced integration of its people into the Roman state after their leader, Mettius Fufetius, betrayed the Roman king Tullus Hostilius. Much like the alternative version of Aeneas’ landing, the action itself is not censured, for it was a response to Mettius’ *proditio ac perfidia*. The breach of *fides* enabled the Romans to take what action they would, but Livy focuses on the Albans’ grief. Just as Livy disapproves of, but does not condemn, Hostilius’ savage execution of Mettius, the destruction of Alba is not wrong so much as unbecoming; Hostilius, reputed to have been killed by Jupiter’s thunderbolt, was certainly not a source of good *exempla*. Hostilius’ successor, Ancus Martius formalized a higher standard of conduct in international relations with the *ius fetiale*, discussed in the following section, which would forbid stirring up wars in the

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27 Livy 1.19.
28 Livy 1.19.2. Numa’s appointment also shows the gradual integration of the Titus Tatius’ Sabines into the Roman population. This relative inclusiveness was one of Rome’s great strengths in securing empire. See also Livy 1.17-18.
29 Livy 1.21.2.
30 Livy 1.28.4, Livy 1.27.5: *Albano non plus animi erat quam fidei*. J.D. Noonan “Mettius Fufetius in Livy” in *Classical Antiquity* 25 n.2 (2006): 327-49 makes the case that Livy used this story as a sort of early illustration or *aition* within his own narrative of the *fraus* endemic to Osco-Sabellian peoples, and the connection with the perfidious Fidenae is notable. This perceived hostility and untrustworthiness of foreigners legitimates the Romans own harsh actions throughout Livy’s history.
31 For his death, which is not the result of an wrongdoing so much as incompetence and inadequacy see Livy 1.31.8.
manner of Hostilius. Taken together, these first four kings establish what it means to be Roman, in contrast to the tyrannical behavior of the Tarquins, as displayed in Superbus’ vicious treatment of his Latin allies and the deceitful capture of Gabii.\(^{32}\) This misrule forges Rome’s appreciation for liberty and forces the assertion of Roman character. It is only with the Republic that emerges from the expulsion of the Tarquins that these national values begin to truly be put into practice.

Livy’s first book, covering the Regal Period, displays embryonic and nascent forms of a number of values and characteristics that the historian regarded as key to Roman identity. It is possible to speak of their development, particularly in terms of institutions and their putative founders, but the fundamental Roman character seems to exist independently. As necessitated by this essentializing view of Roman character, the Republic comes into its own and acts with remarkable consistency abroad from the beginning of Book 2. What variation in practice one finds is moderated by the consistency of the early Romans’ core values. Most important for issues of war and diplomacy, instead of following the principle of might makes right, which the preface hinted at, Livy's narrative displays the Romans acting with what he regards as exceptional honor while exerting a marked civilizing influence on those around them.

Establishing a scrupulous concern for propriety in matters religious and mundane as a fundamental characteristic of the Romans’ national identity is one of Livy's first preoccupations. In contrast, Livy and his Roman characters often make mention of other peoples' movable loyalties and principles. We now turn to considering these principles and the Roman practices and institutions that supported them.

\(^{32}\) Livy 1.53-5.
International Law and the *Ius Gentium*

Livy’s Romans are more beholden to high principle than their neighbors, but a concrete or comprehensive statement of these principles is lacking. The closest thing to a comprehensive term for principles of international relations is the ambiguous phrase *ius gentium*. Although it can carry a broad range of specific meanings, in international politics, and in Livy, it almost always refers to the internationally recognized inviolability of ambassadors.33 This specificity renders it unsuitable as an umbrella term for the rules of foreign policy, except in so far as one admits that there was but one rule. That it was often broken underscores that there was little in the ancient world that we could term functional international law. Despite this indication that ancient states had little to no guarantee of each other’s behavior, their attempts at diplomacy were legion. They were also largely doomed to failure, as the anarchic interstate system rendered not just implicit and explicit norms, but agreements and treaties between states fundamentally unreliable. In this environment, individual nations and states, although subject to the intense pressures of the anarchic system, were free to define their own standards of conduct, standards which then could easily be associated with a sense of national identity. Rome’s higher standard of behavior took the form of strict adherence to agreements, scrupulousness in declaring war through the Latin custom of the *ius fetiale, clementia* in treatment of those who surrendered, and extensive use of treaties of alliance that, while they placed allies in a distinctly subordinate position, did so on terms more generous than could be hoped for from any competing power. In return for acting in this way, the Romans expected their *fides* to be reciprocated.

Violating *fides* would not merely undercut the Romans’ integrity on the international stage. The Romans believed that the gods, invoked in agreements such as *foedera*, and concerned

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33 The phrase appears in this connection in 1.14, 2.4, 4.17, 4.19, 4.32, 5.36, 5.37, 5.51, 6.1, 7.7, 8.5, 8.6, 9.10, Other uses are in 4.1, 4.4, 7.6, where the *iura gentium* are the respective rights of patricians and plebeians.
with enforcing the most basic norms of human behavior, could and did punish wrongdoing.\textsuperscript{34} In no way was this idea unique to the Romans, but the seriousness with which they regarded divine matters was exceptional.\textsuperscript{35} Livy's Romans are consequently quite conscientious in punishing wrongdoers and attempting to keep their community as a whole free from blame. Paradoxically, this allows a pro-Roman historian to turn some misdeeds into the firmest proof of Roman ethics. At this point a cynical argument can intrude, that the Romans only acted thus because they believed the gods rewarded and punished them for just and unjust behavior.\textsuperscript{36} However, the irony of this view is that the more cynical one is about Roman foreign policy, the less cynical one has to be about their religiosity, a trait often treated with scorn by modern historians, particularly in reference to the decision-making elite.\textsuperscript{37} Yet not even the purest motives entirely lack calculation, and this is an anachronistic and unfair standard to apply. The germane point is that a number of Greek and Roman sources laud Roman piety and saw empire as the reward for upright behavior.\textsuperscript{38} The Romans often explicitly acknowledged not just the moral but the practical benefits of such behavior in gaining the loyalty of allies and acquiring a reputation for reliability. We will, therefore, examine the areas in which Livy places special emphasis on Roman behavior:

\textsuperscript{34} The primary examples are the defeat at the Allia and the Gallic Sack, discussed at the end of this chapter, and the larger war narrative built around the surrender at the Caudine Forks, discussed in Chapter 2.

\textsuperscript{35} For the Roman ideology of victory and the extreme importance placed on maintenance of the \textit{pax deorum}, see Nathan Rosenstein, \textit{Imperatores Victi: Military Defeat and Aristocratic Competition in the Middle and Late Republic} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 54-91. Although Rosenstein focuses on the role of defeated generals and the manner in which the Romans apportioned blame to spare their commanders opprobrium attaching to defeat, Dionysius and Polybius explicitly connect the Romans’ exceptional piety and morality to their success. Note also that, even if analyzed in terms of ritual correctness, the fetials’ formula, called upon the gods to judge the righteousness of the Roman cause, see below and Alan Watson, \textit{International Law in Archaic Rome: War and Religion} (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 1-30.

\textsuperscript{36} That this is an unrealistically stringent application of ethics appears when we consider that although we tell children to “be good for goodness’ sake” their main incentive is often recompense from Santa Claus.

\textsuperscript{37} Frank Tenney, “The Import of the Fetial Institution” in \textit{CPh} 7 n.3 (1912): 335-42. Some earnest anachronism seems rather near the mark here: “It would be a work of supererogation to discuss whether the infraction of the oath, either among the early Romans or any other primitive people, could be devoid of moral significance and whether it could be atoned for by simple performance of correct rites that would satisfy the gods. That is entirely out of the question, for we are dealing with the very institutions that brought ethical considerations into religious beliefs and made the supermundane spirits guardians of relationships for which states had as yet failed to provide,” 339.

\textsuperscript{38} This sentiment's broad appeal argues against there being a major qualitative difference in piety across cultures.
the *ius fetiale*, striking and abiding by *foedera, deditiones*, Roman *fides*, and the eventual integration of communities and peoples into the Roman state.

A procedure built around the inviolability of envoys, the *ius fetiale* is the most clearly codified and characteristically Roman means of diplomacy. It is consistently dated to the early Regal Period, although authors differ as to its inventor. Both our sources for this procedure are Augustan, or at least post-Actian, for in addition to Livy, we have a detailed discussion in the work of Dionysius of Halicarnassus in 2.72. Livy himself is sometimes thought to have followed two contradictory sources, since he attributes the *ius fetiale* to Ancus (1.32), yet a fetial had already appeared in Tullus’ reign (1.24), officiating over the combat of the triplets. Dionysius, however, tells us that the duties of the fetial were many, so it seems that this priesthood was not limited to this one ritual. According to Livy, Ancus Martius founded the college because wars needed to be officially declared, implying that this had not consistently been the case. In outline, the procedure was to seek reparations by sending an envoy to declare Rome’s demands before men and gods; if these were not met, war would be declared:

> When the priest, head covered with a woolen fillet, comes to the border of those people from whom restitution is sought, he says “Listen, Jupiter, listen boundaries,” and he names those of whatever people are at issue; “let justice hear. I am a public messenger of the Roman people; I have come justly and piously as a

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39 Scholarship on the fetials is abundant and varied, much of it concerning aspects of ritual that are of little import here. T. Wiedemann, “The Fetials: A Reconsideration” in *CQ* 36 (1986):478-90, for example, argues that the spear-throwing ceremony was an Augustan invention, but maintains that concerns related to the *foedus* were the province of the fetials.


41 Dionysius 2.72.3. T.R.S. Broughton "Mistreatment of Foreign Legates and the Fetial Priests: Three Roman Cases" in *Phoenix* 41 (1987): 50-62, argues that, beyond the delivery of ultimatums and the declaration of war, they served to judge whether Roman citizens had violated the *ius gentium*, that is, whether they had done violence to ambassadors. Since he deals with three later cases and makes a convincing argument for the continuing relevance of the college of fetials, there is no problem attributing multiple related roles to them even for Rome's legendary past. It seems safe to say that, to whatever extent it was codified, the fetials were the priests charged with ensuring Roman adherence to the *ius gentium*.

42 Livy 1.32.4.
legate, and credence be given to my words.” Then he goes through the demands. After this he makes Jupiter his arbiter: “If I unjustly or impiously demand that those men and things be given to me, then never allow me to live in my homeland.” He recites this with just a few words of the imprecation and, legal formula changed when he crosses the border, to whatever man he first meets, when he enters the gate, and finally in the forum. If what he demands is not given within thirty three days—for these many are required by religion—he thus declares war: “Hear, Jupiter, and you Janus Quirinus, and all gods heavenly and infernal; I call you to witness that this people”—he names whichever one it is—“is unjust and does not render what is just; the elders in of my land will consult on these matters and how we might obtain justice.” 43 (Livy 1.32.6-10)

These proceedings were then followed by consultation with the king or senate, a vote of war, and finally a dramatic ritual throwing of a spear into enemy territory, but these non-diplomatic elements are of less interest here. Ending this section, Livy also specifies that although an old custom, later generations continued to use it, a frustratingly vague statement.44 The problem of when this ritual, predicated on the enemy’s proximity, became impracticable and fell out of use is its own debate. The establishment of token hostile territory near the temple of Bellona ca. 270 BCE indicates that when ritual details became inconvenient they were revised, but it is enough for our purposes to note that the requirements of the *ius fetiale* still merited consideration in 201 BCE, suggesting that ritual elements and the principles behind them might have had different

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43 Livy 1.32.6-7: *Legatus ubi ad fines eorum venit unde res repetuntur, capite velato filo-lanae velamen est—‘Audi, Iuppiter,’ inquit; ‘audite fines’ cuilscumque gentis sunt, nominat—; ‘audiat fas. Ego sum publicus nuntius populi Romani; iuste pieque legatus venio, verbisque meis fides sit.’ Peragit deinde postulata. Inde lovem testem facit: ‘Si ego iniuste impieque illos homines illasque res dedier mihi exposco, tum patriae compotem me nunquam siris esse.’* 

*Haec, cum fines suprascandit, haec, quicumque ei primus vir obvius fuerit, haec portam ingrediens. haec forum ingressus, paucis verbis carminis concipiendique iuris iurandi mutatis, peragrit. Si non deduntur quos exposcit diebus tribus et triginta-tot enim sollemnes sunt-peractis bellum ita indicit: ‘Audi, Iuppiter, et tu, Iane Quirine, dique omnes caelestes, vosque terrestres vosque inferni, audite; ego vos testor populum illum—quicumque est, nominat—‘iniustum esse neque ius persolvere; sede istis rebus in patria maiores natu consulemus, quo facto ius nostrum adipiscamur.’ *

44 An exaggerated emphasis on continuity may have been agreeable to Livy, not to mention Octavian, who revived the procedure as part of his program of allegedly restoring antique practices. See also Dio 50.4.4-5.
histories. At any rate, Livy’s statement implies enough continuity that the principles underlying the rite are to be applied throughout his history.

The first and, perhaps, most important point to bear in mind is that the fetials’ pronouncements and the entire procedure were predicated on the notion that war was an exception to a default state of peace. Going to war required an ethical justification before men and gods, and this justification had to be founded on the other party’s unjust actions. The three repetitions of the rerum repetitio over thirty three days did provide a period in which negotiations might occur, but the formula itself made no provision for discussion or debate. Especially later on, negotiations would likely occur during the prescribed period, but ritual itself makes no provisions for how the disputes were to be mediated. Without any other authority to invoke, the Romans invoked the gods as judges and, since it was extremely unlikely that anything resembling divine wrath would fall on the fetial, and this surely offered the Romans comfortable confirmation. And, should he fail to return from enemy territory, this would be interpreted as a perfidious violation of the ius gentium, guaranteeing war. That this ritual could assure the Romans of the justice of their cause without recourse to any of the particulars should not be seen as a cynical manipulation of religious belief and procedure such as would demonstrate clear bad faith. Instead, we must remember that most diplomacy in the ancient world was compellence diplomacy; backing down was seen as the sort of weakness that would only invite attack and the fixed period before war could be declared provided room for maneuver that might otherwise be lacking. Moreover, had this ritual been an attempt to preempt diplomacy and secure a favorable pretext for war, it would not have been held up for such praise by Livy

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45 See Ogilvie, Commentary, 127-9. The declaration of war in 201 BCE and whether this interest in the fetials constituted a revival is itself a point of controversy and is discussed in detail in Chapter 4.
46 Tenney, “Import of the Fetial Institution,” 335. Tenney also combats the notion that words such as iustum, and hence the whole Roman procedure, were purely mechanical and devoid of ethical content.
and Dionysius. With logical consistency, the Romans judged the justice of their wars in the same way as their claims, by the outcome.

Two features of fetial procedure deserve further comment. The first is that Livy does not frame Ancus’ concoction of this rite as an attempt to make sure that the Romans only embarked upon just wars; so much is merely assumed. Rather, his purpose in founding the institution was to ensure “that war was not just waged, but declared by means of a ritual.”47 The fetial’s journey and repeated pronouncements appear designed primarily to make clear to the potential enemy that there was a serious dispute that could lead to war, making sneak attacks impossible. Just as the Romans found trickery in battle morally suspect and avoided using ambushes, all their wars were to be conducted openly.48 The process does not, however, initiate actual warfare, but severs the ties that forbid it, for the rerum repetitio is the only time-sensitive element. The Romans are thereafter free to attack or not attack the offending party as any other with which they had not come to some sort of arrangement.

The gods’ role in legitimating Rome’s wars was also not entirely perfunctory nor was their approval unconditional.49 The Roman tendency to consult the gods at every turn indicates that all their actions mattered and they did not believe they were invested with a broad divine mandate or extraordinary right to conquest.50 The Romans also believed that disasters stemmed

47 Livy 1.32.5: *Ut tamen, quoniam Numa in pace religiones instituisset, a se bellica caerimoniae proderentur, nec gererentur solum sed etiam indicerentur bella aliquo ritu...*

48 Polybius 13.3.7-8: *βραχὺ δὲ τι λείπεται παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις ἵνα ἐτι τῆς ἀρχαίας αἱρέσεως περί τὰ πολεμικά· καί γάρ προλέγουσι τοὺς πολέμους καὶ τὰς ἐνέδρας σπανίως χρῆται καὶ τὴν μάχην ἐκ χειρὸς ποιοῦνται καὶ (συ)στάδην. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν εἰρήσθω πρὸς τὸν ἐπιπολάζοντα νῦν ἐν τῇ κακοπραγμοσύνῃ ζῆλον περὶ τοὺς ἠγουμένους ἐν τὲς πολιτικαῖς καὶ πολεμικαῖς οἰκονομίαις. See also Livy, 1.53.4, who describes the trickery Tarquinius Superbus used to take Gabii as *minime arte Romana.*

49 The Romans did practice *perlitatio*, repeating sacrifices until the desired outcome was obtained, but this is not the place for a discussion of this custom. It suffices here that negative responses were obtained.

50 Watson, *International Law* has argued that the fetiales, when they invoked the gods as *testes*, meant not witnesses as commonly translated, be that as witness to the claim or its validity, but judges. If this is the case, Roman conquest is sanctioned by the gods and becomes the concrete proof of their support: “The gods, as judges, cannot be (and were not) asked to play favorites. The Romans must, precisely, accurately, and formulaically, perform all the rituals and complete all the observances to ensure a just war. For Roman religion, personal piety in leaders was, of course,
from divine displeasure with Roman actions, as we shall see in the case the Gallic Sack at the end of this chapter. 51 Dionysius of Halicarnassus uses his explanation of the *ius fetiale* to his Greek audience as the occasion to not only explain Roman belief in this principle, but to vouch for it himself:

> But I think that, since this college of fetials is not known to the Greeks, I must go over how many and what sort of responsibilities it has so that it will be clear and unsurprising to those unacquainted with the piety that Romans then cultivated that these Romans had the greatest success in their wars. For, they will be seen to have made their *casus belli* and the initiation of their wars most righteous, and for this reason had the gods as their steadfast supporters in moments of crisis. 52

(Dionysius 2.72.3-4)

This is a remarkable statement, particularly for a non-Roman. 53 While the sentiment’s origin is clearly Roman, it is also somewhat congenial to the conquered for at least ruling out the possibility of their inherent inferiority. It is unclear just how far Dionysius was willing to take such an explanation, as his work is entirely antiquarian and he clearly qualifies this Roman piety as something practiced in the past, τότε. His exposure to this ideal may speak to its presence in Augustus’ attempted revival of traditional values and currency at the end of the 1st century BCE, but clearly does not amount to a blanket endorsement of Roman actions.

In the *ius fetiale*, therefore, we have a Roman attempt to institutionalize an ethical standard regarded as superior to common practice, and a claim that Roman success depended on upholding this standard. The simple implication of Livy’s description implies that the *ius fetiale*

not a requirement. But every Roman victory in war confirmed the belief that their religious approach was correct and advantageous. Thus, as long as the Romans wished to dominate in war, so long had they to be the most religious of peoples, at least until cynicism overwhelmed the state religion. They, themselves, were not slow to put together their religiosity and their worldly success* 69.

51 Another notable example is the case of Pleminius’ sacrilege towards Proserpina during the Second Punic War and its impact on Scipio Africanus. See Livy 28.7-9, 18-20.

52 Dionysius 2.72.3-4: οἴομαι γ’ ἐπειδήπερ οὐκ ἐστιν ἐπιχώριον ἔλθησι τὸ περὶ τοὺς εἰρηνοδίκας ἀρχαῖον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναί μοι πόσων καὶ πηλίκων πραγμάτων κύριον διελθεῖν, ἵνα τοῖς ἀγνοοῦσι τὴν Ῥωμαίων εὐσέβειαν, ἣν οἱ τότε ἀνδρείς ἐπετήδευον, μὴ παράδοξον εἶναι φανὴ τὸ πάντας αὐτοῖς τὸ κάλλιστον λαβεῖν τοὺς πολέμους τέλος. ἀπάντων γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς ὑποθέσεις εὐσεβεστάτας φανήσονται ποιησάμενοι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μᾶλιτα τοὺς θεοὺς ἐσχήκοντες ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις εὔμενες.

53 Dionysius is, however, far from hostile, as one of his primary goals, articulated at length in 1.5, is to prove to his Greek readership that the Romans themselves are Greek, removing the shame of subjection to a barbarian.
was used continuously and without interruption. This is difficult to credit given the paucity of references in later Roman history, but Dionysius adds a further specification: the *ius fetiale* was specific to cities with which Rome had a treaty, what Dionysius refers to as a *πόλις ἐνσπόνδος*.  

Although Livy says nothing of this detail, it is not incompatible with his account, since this practice is envisioned as between neighboring communities, which would have some sort of formal relationship. Attempting to determine particular classes of allies to which this did or did not apply would be to quixotically read a great deal more technicality than is warranted into Dionysius' language, as consideration of the imprecise use of *amicitia* and *φιλία* show. Instead we can expect this procedure to be used whenever there is any sort of relationship other than outright war, or perhaps a truce, between Rome and its new enemy.

If we follow Dionysius strictly, the Romans were not obligated to use this procedure in a first-contact scenario. The fetials’ task was to ensure that the Romans did not violate their agreements and obligations, in other words, that they maintained their *fides*. If accepted, this also has a clear implication for Livy’s definition of *iustum* and *iniustum*, for although the passages discussing the practice imagine reparations for raiding parties, it put no constraint on the type of demands the Romans might make. The outcome, that is to say, the gods’ will, would be the

54 Dionysius 2.72.4-5: “Listing all the duties of the fetials is difficult, but these can be summarized as below. They are to guard that the Romans undertake no unjust war against any city bound to them by treaty and, if others break treaties with them, to first demand justice but, if they are not heeded, then to see to [declaring] war. Likewise if any of Rome’s allies say they are wronged, the fetials make the demands,”

55 It is unclear whether Dionysius’ *ἐνσπόνδος* is meant to correspond directly to a specific classification, such as *socii foederati*, a class which probably did not exist as such in early Roman history.

56 However, in its pure form, the *ius fetiale* requires the accused state to recognized and use the institution as well, and therefore it is only directly applicable to Latins and a few other of the nearest central Italian peoples. On these grounds Watson has made it appear quite likely that the custom was originally an attempt to prevent the escalation of disputes within the Latin League. Watson, *International Law*, 8, 62.
ultimate judge of whether the Romans’ cause was just, and just as they sacrificed until they obtained a favorable result, the Romans did not give up when beaten. History, therefore, provided a powerful *post-eventum* justification. The *ius fetiale* did not, then, impose a universal standard equally applicable to all actions, but one that judged the Romans relative to their agreements and obligations, something rather akin to the Greek idea that proper behavior consists of helping one’s friends and harming one’s enemies. The *ius fetiale* required the Romans to make their intent known, but it neither limited them to defensive wars nor required that they make demands their enemies would be reasonably expected to accept. Thus, while Livy does not show the Romans breaking their agreements, most agreements they made were decidedly in their own interests.\(^{57}\)

*Fides Romana* in Practice: Latins and Volsci

Abiding strictly by agreements and not launching sneak attacks were not the only ways in which the Romans thought their conduct exceptional. Rather than a set of rules, ideal Roman conduct was based around demonstration of the moral qualities attached to *fides*, being trustworthy, which included openly stating intentions and engaging in diplomacy, such as it was, and honoring obligations to friends and allies. Livy presents the early alliance of Rome with the Latins, made possible by the Latins’ defeat at Lake Regillus, as an ideal form of such a relationship. Moreover, Livy’s account of the turmoil that led to this battle illustrate how the

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\(^{57}\) It is not my goal to make an accounting and classification of Roman treaties. Although it now appears that Livy’s language obscures many technicalities, if the Romans even had such precise legal categories, Täubler, *Imperium Romanum* remains necessary reading. It seems best to assume that *foedera* were almost all *iniqua*, so far as the Romans did not make agreements not in their favor. Additionally, Claudine Auliard, *La diplomatie romaine: L'autre instrument de la conquête* (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2006) offers a comprehensive survey of diplomacy in Livy’s first decade, counting 2,133 *actes diplomatiques* in Livy’s first decade, forty seven of which appear to result in either truce or treaty. Unfortunately, her insightful reading of Livy is marred by the apparent belief that much of this material was historical.
Roman tradition assimilated complicated conflicts into simple wars of self-defense and the suppression of rebellions, framing them in terms of reciprocation or betrayal of Roman fides.\(^58\)

The battle itself is portrayed as a decisive stroke against a sudden and unprovoked threat from a coalition of thirty Latin cities, yet the conflict may have itself been merely an escalation of an ongoing war prompted by Roman successes.\(^59\) No reason or rationale is given and it seems an entirely aggressive move by the Latins; any Roman reaction would merely be self-defense. Yet this attack from thirty cities out of the blue is quite implausible, and Livy may have actually inferred some agreement between the Latin communities in light of an ongoing conflict with Rome. Two chapters previous to the conspiracy, two Latin colonies, Pometia and Cora, defected to the Aurunci and embroiled them in a war with Rome. Pometia, a member of a Latin League at Aricia, and likely affiliated with these 30 communities, had previously been recaptured from the Volsci by Tarquinius Superbus and the Romans may have thought of it as a dependable and subordinate ally in virtue of this.\(^60\) Pometia's defection to a hostile power may have prompted Rome to assert its unsteady dominance over the Latins and control of their foreign policy, thereby leading to hostility with the heretofore friendly, yet autonomous, cities of Latium.\(^61\)

\(^{58}\) Ogilvie, *Commentary*, begins discussion of 2.16-18 with "It is as difficult for the modern reader, as it clearly was for L., to see any coherent pattern in the events of the years leading up to the Battle of Lake Regillus. The Fasti were available and a few events may have been documented (the triumphs, the first dictatorship, an the wars with the Sabines; cf. 18. 2 n.) but even here there was wide scope for doubt and distortion... D.H. follows a separate tradition from L. In addition to giving a different chronology for Lake Regillus (19.2 n.; D.H. expressly says that the chronology adopted by L. was that given by Licinius Macer), he knows nothing of the revolt of Cora and Pometia and the two wars against the Aurunci. Instead he has four wars against the Sabines and places Cora and Pometia in 495. Now it has long been realized that L. duplicates the history of Cora ad Pometia, for under 495 (22.2) he again speaks of their revolt and suppression, and this later section is unquestionably derived from Valerius Antias. (271-272)"

\(^{59}\) The conspiracy is mentioned an additional threat arising when Rome was already anxious about a possible Sabine rebellion, implying that these Latin cities had simply been treacherously waiting to take advantage of Roman weakness, Livy 2.18.3-4: *Supra belli Latini metus quoque accesserat, quod triginta iam coniurasse populos concitante Octavio Mamilio satis constabat. In hac tantarum expectatione rerum sollicita civitate, dictatoris primum creandi mento orta*

\(^{60}\) Pometia was captured in Livy 1.53.2. See also Ogilvie, *Commentary*, 205, 280-81.

\(^{61}\) Ogilvie, *Commentary*, 279-281, makes the further claim that with the expulsion of Tarquin, Rome ceased to be a member of the operative Latin league and therefore drifted into enmity.
An incident one year before the conspiracy may have contributed to anxiety and resentment towards the Romans. They had received a *deditio* from Pometia yet spared neither the town nor the citizens:

And a *deditio* was made even though, with the sheds rebuilt and momentum restored, the state of the war was such that the soldiers were already mounting the walls. But the Aurunci suffered no less terribly in surrendering their city than if it had been taken by force: the leading men were executed, the other colonists were sold as slaves, the town was torn down, and the land went up for sale. The consuls celebrated a triumph more because they had satisfied a deeply held anger than because of the importance of the war.62 (Livy 2.17.5-7)

Livy’s description leaves no doubt that he finds the treatment accorded Pometia unacceptable. He will not sweep it under the rug, but does lessen its impact with the indirect justification that the soldiers had all but ascended the walls and that the town was, in effect, captured. Livy minimizes the triumph and quickly moves on, chalking the actions of the consuls up to anger and vengeance, again reminding the reader that the Romans saw themselves as the injured party.

Treating the sack of Pometia as an aberration is one of numerous cases in which Livy, by interpreting events in terms of a later standard of conduct, misses their significance. To him, the Latin conspiracy against Rome seems an inexplicable act of aggression rather than a chaotic series of acts of violence, and the connection between Pometia and the next outbreak is weakened.63 It did not occur to later Roman historians that their standards of conduct did not apply to either side and that the sack might have simply been part of a normal pattern of escalation. From a perspective in which the Romans sometimes acted badly, but were more often than not just, Livy had to understand the Lake Regillus campaign and the eventual subjugation of

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62 Livy 2.17.5-7: *Et cum vineis refectis aliaque mole belli iam in eo res esset ut in muros evaderet miles, deditio est facta. Ceterum nihil minus foeda, dedita urbe, quam si capta foret, Aurunci passi; principes secuti percussi, sub corona venierunt coloni alii, oppidum dirutum, ager veniit. Consules magis ob iras graviter ultas quam ob magnitudinem perfecti belli triumpharunt.*

63 Were he to acknowledge that they may have been reacting to the destruction of a Latin city at the hands of Rome in contravention of the terms of surrender he would make his own nation ultimately responsible for the war. However, such an evaluation would be unfair to the Romans, holding them to a higher standard than the Sabines.
Latium as a response to the antagonism of neighboring peoples. He was not primed to see it as escalation prompted by a regular conflict between a number of states with plenty of blame to go around. Livy was not attempting to whitewash Roman history and was willing to acknowledge misdeeds, yet he isolated them from the broader narrative and accordingly denied their historical significance, likely because these events made sense to him in no other way.

Since the Romans were the targets of their neighbors’ perfidy, there was no problem with taking the initiative in the war with the Latins. Livy's cursory statements that Fidenae was besieged and Crustumerium was captured, prompting Praeneste to defect from the Latins to the Romans, indicate that they did so. Yet a year’s worth of campaigning prior to Regillus receives only this one sentence, leading to the conclusion that "the Latin war, already on the horizon for so many years, was delayed no further." Livy stresses only the conspiracy of thirty cities and the Battle of Lake Regillus. The result of this battle was the so-called foedus Cassianum, the treaty that subordinated Latin foreign policy to Rome and obliged the supply of auxiliaries. For the casual reader, this climactic battle is prompted by an external and unprovoked threat to Rome. It does not appear as the culmination of a bloody five-year attempt to assert Roman dominance over the Latins. In fact, the participation of the Tarquins on the Latin side, although unexplained, implies that the conflict with the Latins was somehow bound up with an attempt to restore Superbus to the throne, making the issue not simply self-defense, but preserving the very sovereignty of Rome. The actual battle narrative is also symbolic, with Tarquins and magistrates

64 It is suggestive that in this chapter, Livy moves from the sparse statement of the conspiracy to the idea of a pro-Tarquin faction gaining ascendancy in Rome, which colors the Latin actions, although Livy dismisses it, to a longer dispute over the identity of the dictator. The historian returns to the narrative by means of a generic description of popular fear and tentative diplomacy on the Sabine front. Nothing happens with the Latins until the next year.

65 Livy 2.19.2.

66 The treaty is struck in 2.33, but since it was preserved on a well-known monument, Livy apparently did not feel compelled to give details. The result of this this treaty was, of course, much more ambiguous than Livy lets on. For the treaty as a foedus aequum, as Edward Togo Salmon “Rome and the Latins I” in Phoenix 7 n.3 (1953), 93-104, and “Rome and the Latins II” in Phoenix 7 n.4 (1953), 123-35 repeatedly stress, see Dionysius 6.95 and Livy 8.2.13. If Rome did dominate in this arrangement, it was on the basis of auctoritas rather than strict legal power.
locked in fierce combat. After the Latins are defeated, Tarquin flees to Cumae where, to the Romans' great relief, he dies. More so than Livy, Dionysus of Halicarnassus highlights the Tarquinian element of this war, and this emphasis indicates that it was an integral part of the annalistic tradition. Moreover, it is clear that no account is prepared to authorize conquest as the Roman motive.

Emphasizing Tarquinius Superbus’ role was also useful from a later Roman perspective, since it mitigated some of the blame attached to the Latins. Livy takes pains to show that after the battle the Latins remained faithful and respected allies rather than a resentful subject people. The seeds of this loyalty may take many lifetimes to bear fruit, but Livy sees them planted early. After the crushing victory of the Romans at Regillus he only says "For three years there was neither war nor a secure peace." This ambiguity, however, has nothing to do with the Latins, for just three years after Regillus, the Volsci attempt to solicit Latin aid in what is portrayed as an attack on Rome. The Latins, moved by the keen remembrance of their losses rather than deeply felt loyalty, seize the Volscian legates and send them to Rome. The senate responds to the Latins' demonstration of fearful submission by releasing six thousand prisoners. In addition, the senate adds unspecified reconsideration of the presumably punitive treaty concluded with the Latins to the next year's docket. This reciprocal show of trust is received with almost unbounded joy and Livy concludes the chapter with the comment "never before had the Latin name been so closely joined in any way, either publicly or privately, with Roman rule." He then gives an extended description of dedications, political concord, and thanksgivings public and private, and

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67 Dionysius 6.4-13, especially 6.6.2, where the consul interprets the war primarily as an attempt to restore the Tarquins to power.
68 Livy 2.21.1: *Triennio deinde nec certa pax nec bellum fuit.*
69 Livy 2.22.4-5: *Legatos quoque ad sollicitandum Latium passim dimittunt; sed recens ad Regillum lacum accepta clades Latinos ira odioque eius, quicumque arma suaderet, ne ab legatis quidem violandis abstinuit; comprehensos Volscos Romam duxere.*
70 Livy 2.22.7: *Nunquam alias ante publice privatimque Latinum nomen Romano imperioconiunctius fuit.*
strengthened ties of guest friendship. However grudgingly, the Latins here begin to have a stake in the Roman state, yet they remain subordinate. The reciprocal relationship that begins to grow is not egalitarian, but it is clearly presented as mutually beneficial. We must also remember that although this remarkable degree of harmony is presented as the result of Roman generosity, it was generosity that could only emerge from the Latins’ catastrophic defeat and subjugation.

This nascent Latin \textit{fides} towards Rome is, nevertheless, problematic, for it begins with a violation of the \textit{ius gentium} when the Latins hand over to Rome the Volscian envoys attempting to persuade then to defect. By focusing attention on Latin loyalty good behavior, even if stems more from cognizance of their own weakness, Livy puts the Volsci into the role of would-be corruptors and allows the Romans to frame this next war as a response to Volscian wrongdoing.\footnote{The powerful retrospective tendency to see the Latins as Roman 'allies' is manifest even in Ogilvie, \textit{Commentary}, 295, in which he labels dealings with the Volsci as "external affairs" and with the Latins as "internal." Doubtless Livy would have approved.} The narrative's focus on the Latins’ refusal obscures the sequence of events and makes the Volsci seem perfidious plotters, but a difference of perspective might be just as powerful here as narrative compression.\footnote{The portrayal of this people in particular is constantly negative, to the point that the reader is encouraged to think them characteristically warlike and perfidious. For example, the rallying cry of a Volscian from Livy 4.28.4: \textit{"Quid igitur arma habetis aut quid ulter bellum intulisistis, in otio tumultuos, in bello segnes?"}} When, after an initial defeat, the Volsci give three hundred hostages and then immediately resume the war, the Romans see them as both devious and senseless in much the same way that Greeks regarded barbarians as fickle.\footnote{Livy 2.22.2-3. The Volscian towns of Cora and Pometia figure prominently in these first thirty chapters as bones of contention. Although Latin colonies, the Romans appear to see them as part of their sphere of influence despite their consistent opposition to Rome. The brutal treatment of Pometia in 2.17 indicates that feelings ran high, and the last heard of this city is it's capture by the Romans in 2.27. The position of these two towns near the Latin-Volscian border implies further that Roman policy was, even before Regillus, attempting to assert control over entirety of Latium.} Those who consider temporizing or, unlike the Romans do not succeed at masking it, appear characteristically untrustworthy in the Roman tradition. This makes harsh actions against them

\footnote{Livy 2.22.2-3. The Volscian towns of Cora and Pometia figure prominently in these first thirty chapters as bones of contention. Although Latin colonies, the Romans appear to see them as part of their sphere of influence despite their consistent opposition to Rome. The brutal treatment of Pometia in 2.17 indicates that feelings ran high, and the last heard of this city is it's capture by the Romans in 2.27. The position of these two towns near the Latin-Volscian border implies further that Roman policy was, even before Regillus, attempting to assert control over entirety of Latium.}
easier to justify.\textsuperscript{74} We will see that the Roman practice dealing with peoples they regarded as somehow having a diminished moral capacity, the Gauls and Spanish for example, was less exacting, perhaps because less could be expected.

Livy admits that the Latins' violation of the \textit{ius gentium} was motivated by fear.\textsuperscript{75} However, that it can be cast in retrospect as good \textit{fides} towards Rome demonstrates that this ethical quality, conceived in terms of relations between groups, is itself relative rather than absolute. Since the seizure of the legates is constitutes good faith towards the Romans and bad faith towards the Volscians, the \textit{ius gentium} begins to appear more like a lowest common denominator for interstate relations than an ethical mandate. From such a perspective, the Latins were faced with more of a tactical than a moral choice. This interpretation does not remove ethics from foreign policy but allows them to be slightly repositioned. The Latins' choice of Rome over the Volsci, however forced, begins to foster peaceable relations between the two peoples, a self-reinforcing reciprocity that fosters moral obligations. The Romans become honor-bound to treat the Latins fairly and protect them, which then ought to earn the Latins' loyalty, although this takes much longer than the Romans expect.

Livy’s characterization of the Volsci also helps excuse the Latins’ crime and provides the distorted view of events necessary to redeem the episode. The Volsci first appeared as enemies, attacked by Tarquinius Priscus in 1.53.1-2. Livy does not offer a rationale for this, but is content to treat it as the foreign policy analog to the king’s domestic injustice, merely noting that he took

\textsuperscript{74} A clear example of this comes from Livy 3.1-2, in which the Aequi sue for a peace which they immediately break. The Roman commander then offers them the chance to repent of their crime: \textit{si paeniteat, tutum receptum ad expertam clementiam fore}. The Romans often extend, but never receive, such offers, possibly due to their historiographical tradition downplaying their defeats.

\textsuperscript{75} Livy 2.22.4: \textit{ne legatis quidem violandis abstinuit}. 46
Suessa Pometia, making this the start of two centuries of war.\textsuperscript{76} Any wrong committed can be blamed on Tarquin rather than the Roman people. From this point on, the Volsci are defined merely by their unremitting hostility towards Rome; they are, as Livy says in 3.16.2, \emph{aeterni hostes}. Yet one detail raises the possibility that things were not quite so simple, for in 2.9.6 the fledgling Republic seems to consider it a possibility (we are not told the outcome), that the Volsci would supply food. If something happened to cause them to send help to the Latins and then attempt to stir them to revolt in 2.22, Livy bears no trace of it. Another possible explanation for the less-hostile Volsci of 2.9.6 is that the political unity implied by Livy’s simple use of the ethnic term is inaccurate. Similarly, many Volsci could be admitted into Rome for a festival in 2.37. Perhaps multiple conflicts, some of them localized and discrete, have been amalgamated into this supposed 200-year war. Although Rome would wage many campaigns against the Volsci, often separated by long periods of inactivity, Livy makes no mention of fetials, declarations of war, or war votes.\textsuperscript{77} The Volsci are shown as aggressors, particularly predatory in attacking whenever the Romans seem immobilized by civil strife, but their attacks are almost always raids rather than attempts to take cities or gain territories. While the Romans do often meet the Volsci on the march, there are frequent campaigns that begin as reprisal raids. These are exactly the situations to which the \textit{ius fetiale} would seem to apply, and religious constraints would render this procedure obligatory, even if futile. Roman interactions with the Volsci thus sit

\textsuperscript{76} Livy 1.53.1-2: \textit{Nec ut iniustus in pace rex, ita dux belli pravus fuit; quin ea arte aequasset superiores reges ni degeneratum in alis huic quoque decori offecisset. Is primus Volscis bellum in ducentos amplius post suam aetatem annos movit, Suessamque Pometiam ex iis vi cepit.}

\textsuperscript{77} Of the 264 occurrences of \textit{Volsc-} in Livy, 11 refer to Romans named Volscus. In the rest, we see almost no diplomacy whatsoever. The exceptions are 2.25.6, where ambassadors from the town of Ecetra perform a \textit{deditio} after seeing neighboring Pometia captured, 2.26.4, where the Aurunci, also at war with Rome, demand that the Romans leave Volscian territory. The connection between the Volsci and the Aurunci is unclear. The Aurunci had been implicated in war with Rome in Livy 2.16, when Pometia and Cora had defected to them, although these were apparently Volscian towns. Although the Auruncian demand follows a Volscian defeat, Livy does not indicate that they were co-belligerents. In 2.39.11 Coriolanus demands the return of Volscian land in exchange for peace, but as a Roman it seems he is using Roman methods, and this does not appear to be a purely Volscian initiative.
in stark relief to their interactions with other peoples, finding their best parallel with the barbaric Gauls in Livy’s second pentad.

The Latins’ defeat at Lake Regillus began a gradual revision of Rome's relations with other states in they struck *foedera* with defeated or suppliant peoples, limiting their autonomy, obligating them to furnish troops, and making them dependent on Roman protection. Although such alliances emerge from Roman victories and thus appear more like subjugation, the Roman tradition casts them as a means of preventing violence and refers to these peoples with dignified terms such as *socii* and *foederati*. Rome’s competitors, once humbled, were placed in a position that would hopefully keep them from future antagonism, while lesser subjects and Romans profited from the deterrence and stability offered by this clear relationship. Yet Livy also mentions that many treaties imposed punishments such as confiscations of land, abolition of local civic identity, or the wholesale destruction of a settlement. In Livy 2.40-41, the Hernici, who joined the Volscians in predatory operations against Rome, were conquered and a *foedus* was struck, depriving them of much of their land. Even so, these Hernici, along with the Latins, prove to be loyal and stalwart allies throughout the first pentad, exemplifying the ideal result of Roman foreign policy.

Since, as Livy presents them, the Latins and the Hernici were extremely limited in their capacity for independent foreign policy, the greatest service the Romans could do them was to promptly and staunchly defend their lands against their neighbors' incursions. Indeed, the wars in Book 3 are mostly in support of the Latins and Hernici. Although their limited foreign policy and apparent inability to protect their own lands is a result of their defeat at Roman hands and the interdiction of their fielding a force under their own command, Livy does not seem to see these peoples as a possession to be protected but, perhaps because of the Romans' good-faith defense
of them, active allies. The recurrent pattern is that they inform the Romans of hostile incursions, often taking the field as part of the Roman contingent, and only twice do they take independent action. In Livy 2.53 they mount their defense against the Volsci and Aequi, which Livy believes the Romans found an unwelcome precedent. The second case occurs in Livy 3.6 when the Romans, beset by plague, were unable to come to their aid. These allies were even so moved by Rome’s plight that that they came to the city's aid when the enemy approached its walls and, as soon as they were able, the Romans gladly repaid this kindness. As already seen with Roman treatment of the Latins, it was not just the legal relationship between the communities, but Rome's respectful and solicitous treatment of these allies that made the foedus a relatively admirable institution. Since the Romans were required to come to the aid of their allies, each new ally enlarged the probable theater of Roman wars. We will see, when we come to the Samnite wars, the possibility for cynical manipulation of Roman fides by those seeking help and by the Romans themselves. For now, it is sufficient that Livy sees reciprocal obligations as making faithful allies out of enemies, with Roman good faith eventually bringing the Latins and Hernici to the point of not hesitating to help Rome in difficult circumstances. The ideological content of these relationships is important because this state of dependence and total subordination that characterizes the Latins throughout Livy’s first pentad is a major exaggeration. That the Roman

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78 Livy 2.53.4: *Dum haec ad Veios geruntur, Volsci Aequique in Latino agro posuerant castra populatique fines erant. Eos per se ipsi Latini adsuuntis Hernicis sine Romano aut duce aut auxilio castris exuerunt; ingenti praeda praeter suas recuperatas res potiti sunt. Missus tamen ab Roma consul in Volscos C. Nautius; mos, credo, non placebat sine Romano duce exercituque socios propriis viribus consiliisque bella gerere.* Historically, it seems these peoples might have worked on a more equal footing, although the idea that command of joint forces alternated between Rome and Latins is unlikely. See Oakley, *Commentary* vol. 1, 339-41, citing Festus 276-7.

79 Livy 3.6.4-5: *Vix instantes sustinentibus clades repente legati Hernici nuntiant in agro suo Aequos Volcosque coniunctis copiis castra posuisse, inde exercitu ingenti fines suos depopulari. Praeterquam quod infrequens senatus indicio erat sociis adflictam civitatem pestilentia esse, maestum etiam responsum tulere, ut per se ipsi Hernici cum Latinis res suas tutarentur; urbem Romanam subita deum ira morbo populari; si qua eius mali quies veniat, ut anno ante, ut semper alias, sociis opem latus.*

80 Livy 3.7-8.

81 A.N. Sherwin-White, *The Roman Citizenship* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 23: “It is not to be denied that Livy in writing his history has succeeded in disguising the equal alliance as a Roman suzerainty, nor that under the
tradition makes such a point of the protection of the Latins thus demonstrates this model’s centrality to the Romans’ conception of their own foreign policy and dramatically highlights the disaster of the Latins’ rebellion after the Gallic sack, discussed in the following chapter.  

A Different Kind of Enemy: Veii as a Model of Perfidy

If the Latins are Livy’s model allies, then Etruscans prove quite the opposite. In particular, Livy’s first pentad focuses on Veii and Fidenae. The latter was originally an Etruscan settlement, but the Romans claimed it after establishing a colony and took its frequent rebellions especially bitterly. An exhortation Livy puts in the mouth of the dictator Mamercus Aemilius as he rallies his troops against an unexpected attack by Fidenates brandishing torches indicates how the Romans regarded these peoples:

“Come, mindful of the Roman name and your and your fathers’ virtue, turn this blaze upon your enemies’ city and destroy Fidenae with its own flames, that city which you were never able to win over with kindness. The blood of your legates, of your colonists, and your fields laid waste urges you to this!”  

(Livy 4.33.5)

Although they engage in diplomacy, Livy’s Etruscans invariably break their word and commit atrocious crimes. In light of early Etruscan influence on it might seem odd to regard this people with such hostility, yet the ignominious end of the monarchy colors Roman reactions to the people as a whole, painting them as a hostile and fundamentally alien neighbor. Veii’s proximity makes it a natural enemy for Rome from the start, and rivalry erupts during the regal period, yet cover of this treaty the Romans established a de facto supremacy, from which the Latins in the fourth century made continuous attempts to break away. But under the surface clear traces of the foedus aequum can be detected down to the time of the Latin revolt.”

See Salmon “Rome and the Latins I” and “Rome and the Latins II,” which work towards an understanding of the Latin League’s makeup and the identity of the prisci Latini, arguing against the traditional tendency to acquiesce to the Roman version. The first article concludes that Latin colonies were planted under the authority of the Latin League, not, as Livy would have it, Rome, thus indicating something approximating an equal alliance against the threat of the Volsci and Aequi.

Livy 4.33.5: *Agite, nominis Romani ac virtutis patrum vestraeque memores vertite incendium hoc in hostium urbem, et suis flamnis delete Fidenas, quas vestris beneficiis placare non potuistis. Legatorum hoc vos vestrorum colonorumque sanguis vastatique fines moment.*
Livy’s Romans assume that the hostility found in Veii is assumed to be characteristic of other Etruscans. Even while the Romans besiege Veii in Book 5, their constant fear is of a united Etruria rolling over their armies and descending upon Rome. Throughout the entire first decade, Etruscans are characterized by an unremitting hostility that can be found from the people’s first entrance in Livy’s history.

The first Etruscan in Livy’s history is Aeneas’ opponent, Mezentius. After the city was founded and Romulus made peace with the Sabines, Fidenae launched an unprovoked attack, fearing Rome’s growing power. Livy does not offer moralizing commentary here, but the contrast that will emerge with Roman behavior speaks for itself. It is worth mentioning that Livy’s matter-of-fact statement of the Fidenate bespeaks a certain familiarity with the behaviors predicted by political realism. When the Romans took Fidenae, Veii was forced to take notice, and Livy’s tone becomes more pointed as he explains Veii’s attack in terms of contagio, a word often used of irrational or morally blameworthy influences. Only after this does Livy mention Veii’s fear of Rome’s proximity and, what Livy presents as a false conception, the idea that Rome would prove hostile to all its neighbors. Veii’s war ends up a glorified plundering raid, which Livy contrasts with a iustum bellum, and which Romulus defeats, establishing a truce of one hundred years. It is significant that Livy would have this peace with Veii was consecrated not by treaty, but by truce, for this signals a break in fighting rather than the sort of normalized relationship that can give rise to fides. That Mettius Fufetius could later stir Fidenae, which Livy

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84 In Livy 1.2.3 Mezentius, king of Caere, joins with Turnus against Aeneas and Latinus. The peace struck in 1.3.5 then sets the Tiber as the boundary between Latins and Etruscans.
85 Livy 1.14.4: Et cum his quidem insperata pax erat: aliud multo propius atque in ipsis prope portis bellum ortum. Fidenates nimis vicinas prope se convalescere opes rati, priusquam tantum roboris esset quantum futurum apparebat, occupat bellum facere.
86 Livy 1.15.1: Belli Fidenatis contagione irritati Veientium animi et consanguinitate-nam Fidenates quoque Etrusci fuerunt-et quod ipsa propinquitas loci, si Romana arma omnibus infesta finitimis essent, stimulabat. In fines Romanos execurrerunt popularundi magis quam iusti more belli.
87 Note that in 1.4.5 Romulus, when he finds Veii too fortified to take, lays waste to their land, but does so ulciscendi magis quam praedae studio.
then describes as a *colonia Romana*, to revolt, indicates continued hostility.\textsuperscript{88} Fidenae in turn brought Veii in as an ally, and Livy later finds it almost incredible that Veii had honored the agreement with Romulus up to that point.\textsuperscript{89}

Etruscans were the first threat to the nascent Republic as well, for after his expulsion, Tarquin had made the rounds in Etruria begging to be restored to his throne by force. He based his appeals primarily on his being Etruscan and, at Tarquinii, at the similarity of his name: \textsuperscript{90}

Tarquin, when he saw that a path of intrigue was closed off to his hopes [of recovering his kingdom], motivated not only by grief over such a descent into disgrace, but also by anger and hatred, decided he had to openly stir up war and visited the Etruscan cities as a suppliant. Most of all begged the people of Veii and Tarquinia that they not allow him, an Etruscan born of the same blood, to perish as a needy exile, along with his young children, before their very eyes.... He complained that even though he was enlarging Roman rule in war, he, a king, had been exiled and driven out by his closest companions in a wicked conspiracy... They should bring aid and help, and would thereby avenge their own injuries, their legions slaughtered so many times, their land taken away by the Romans. These considerations moved the people of Veii, and everyone thought that at least with a Roman leader his own disgrace could be wiped away and were menacingly complaining that their losses in war should be regained. Tarquin’s name and blood-relation moved Tarquinia, for it seemed desirable that their own kin rule at Rome.\textsuperscript{91} (Livy 2.6.1-4)

\textsuperscript{88} Livy 1.27.
\textsuperscript{89} Livy 1.30.7. This *fides* was shown in public policy, Etruscan land continued to be a fertile recruiting ground for campaigns against Rome.
\textsuperscript{90} Livy first attributes a subversion of diplomatic procedure to the former king, for his agents, here referred to with perhaps excessive formality as *legati*, claim to be on a mission to recover his property, but actually are out to foment civil strife: Livy 2.3.6: *Interim legati alia moliri; aperte bona repetentes clam recuperandi regni consilia struere; et tamquam ad id quod audi videbatur ambientes, nobilium adulescentium animos pertemptant.* Livy also emphasizes the Romans’ just dealing with these legates in 2.4.7: *Proditoribus extemplo in vincla coniectis, de legatis paululum addubitatum est; et quamquam visi sunt commisisse ut hostium loco essent, ius tamen gentium valuit.*
\textsuperscript{91} Livy 2.6.1-4: *incipiens Tarquinius non dolore solum tantae ad inritum cadentis spei sed etiam odio iraque, postquam dolo viam obsaepiam vidit, bellum aperte molliendum ratus circumire supplex Etruriae urbes orare maxime Veientes Tarquiniensesque, ne se ortum ex Etruscis, eiusdem sanguinis, extorrem, egentem ex tanto modo regno cum liberis adulescentibus ante oculos suas perire sinerent... se regem, augentem bello Romanum imperium, a proximis scelerata consiratione pulsum... suas quoque veteres inuirias utum iarent, totiens caesas legiones, agrum ademptum. Haec moverunt Veientes, ac pro se quisque Romano saltem duce ignominias demendas belloque amissa repertenda minaciter fremunt. Tarquinienses nomen ac cognatio movet: pulchrum videbatur suas Romaine regnare.*
After this coalition failed, Tarquin turned to Porsenna, who made the king’s restoration the main object of his assault on Rome. Livy's description of Tarquin’s various embassies and rhetoric gives the exile a remarkably foreign identity, and his and his kin's hostility is only confirmed by the leading role they took in the later Latin campaign leading to Regillus. The same is true of the Veientines’, for the description of their anger at Rome, *minaciter fremunt*, is almost bestial.

Incidentally, it is notable that the proper role of a king here is to enlarge his kingdom by war, and what makes Tarquin’s appeal suspect is his willingness to undo these very gains. Livy also takes pains to show that good relations were established between Rome and Porsenna, summing this up with *utrimque constitit fides*, highlighting the return of Cloelia, a hostage who had made a daring escape from the king, and declaring false and hateful the religious tradition of selling Porsenna’s goods. The result of upright Roman behavior and *fides* is a mutually beneficial relationship that goes beyond the demands of legality, for the Romans further reciprocate by caring for the wounded when Porsenna’s expedition against Aricia fails.

These good relations with Porsenna are largely personal, and, within Livy’s narrative, although the Romans were receptive to peaceable relations, the Etruscans as a whole appear innately hostile to Rome. This is evident from Livy’s naming conventions, for, apart from Porsenna, he either refers to Veii and Fidenae or Etruscans as a group. This broadly inclusive use of this ethnic term is critically important to the Romans' conceptualization of wars. The shorthand of describing enemies in ethnic terms implies hostility and open warfare with entire peoples and obviates the need for detailed *casus belli* for what may have been more numerous

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92 In the negotiation for Porsenna’s withdrawal that Livy presents in 2.13, the Romans agree to everything but the king’s restoration, which was apparently a difficult point.
93 Livy 2.13.9-14.4. Porsenna’s city, Clusium, is far enough north beyond Rome’s immediate Etruscan contacts that good relations with him do not impinge upon hostility with Veii.
94 Livy 2.14.5-9.
smaller-scale conflicts with a variety of differentiated polities.\(^{95}\) While this imprecision is most likely the result of antiquity and compression rather than deliberate obfuscation, the constant use of broad ethnic identifiers shapes how subsequent generations understand their history, and, in this way, separate campaigns and wars against different cities or groups of cities can blend into a single conflict by virtue of a common ethnic term, exaggerating the enmity and obliterating the traces of normalized relations with other communities in the same group. When more specificity is given it is because there is one city either preeminent in the \textit{gens} or proximate to Rome.\(^{96}\)

This, of course, operates in parallel with a natural, if often dangerous, tendency to regard peoples as the fundamental operative political unit. Therefore, this method of conceptualizing the entities which Rome fought and eventually conquered is by no means unique to, but finds its strongest expression in, Livy's first decade.

The conflicts with Veii that follow amply demonstrate that the Romans saw Etruscans as a people as inherently hostile, violent, and perfidious. When strife threatens to immobilize Rome, Etruscans stream to Veii and their war effort:

\begin{quote}
From there they set off for war with Veii, where reinforcements had arrived from all over Etruria, not so much because they were concerned with Veii as because the civil strife had reached the point that the Roman state might be undone. At their assemblies the leading men of all the Etruscan peoples were muttering that Romans’ resources were endless unless they turned on themselves in sedition; only this one poison, this one disease, had been discovered in flourishing states to make even great empires prove mortal.\(^{97}\) (Livy 2.44.7-9)
\end{quote}

\(^{95}\) The imprecision in general ethnic terms cannot, paradoxically, be precisely defined. The peace with Porsenna, for example, is considered \textit{fida} although only a few sentences later there are suspicions of a war \textit{ab Tusculo}. 2.15-16. The political realities are clearly far more complicated than such terms can show, yet their continued use is illustrative of Livy's conceptual framework. Moreover, as seen with the case of Veii and Tarquinii, the historian is not so naive as to invariably use general terms to obscure relevant details.

\(^{96}\) This is even more true of the Volsci and Aequi, who are unremittingly hostile throughout the first decade.

\(^{97}\) Livy 2.44.7-9: \textit{Inde ad Veiens bellum profecti, quo undique ex Etruria auxilia convenerant, non tam Veientium gratia concitata quam quod in spem uentum erat discordia intestina dissolui rem Romanam posse. Principesque in omnium Etruriae populorum conciliiis fremebam aeternas opes esse Romanas nisi inter semet ipsi seditionibus saeuiant; id unum uenenum, eam labem ciuitatibus opulentis repertam ut magna imperia mortalia essent.}
As Livy frames it, the threat is not just from Veii, but all the peoples of Etruria, with the Romans fearing *Etruscae legiones* in 2.46.1 and *omnis Etruria* in 2.48.6. Livy has nothing more specific on this point and these fears do not come to fruition, but repetition fixes the idea of Etruscan hostility in the reader’s mind. No Etruscan disturbances are to be found in Book 3, although Book 4 begins with an unexplained Veientine raid on Roman land. Significant hostilities commence in 4.17 with Veii’s king, Lars Tolumnius, inciting the defection of Fidenae and murdering four Roman envoys.  

When the Romans capture Fidenae, the Etruscans as a whole finally take an interest in Rome:

> Fidenae’s capture terrified Etruria, with not just the people of Veii fearing a similar destruction, but even the Falisci, mindful of having stood with them in the war’s beginning although they had not aided their rebellion. Therefore, since these two states sent legates around to the twelve Etruscan peoples seeking that a council meeting be set at the sanctuary of Voltumna, the Roman senate, as if a great tumult was impending, ordered Mamilus Aemilius again appointed dictator. Postumius Tubertus was chosen by him as his master of horse. The preparation for war was greater than the previous war to the degree that the danger posed from all Etruria was greater than what had been posed by only two peoples.  

(Livy 4.23.4-6)

In spite of Roman fears, the Etruscans decided that Veii was responsible for its own wars; the next year the Etruscan council votes to suspend all discussion of any joint action for a further year, much to the frustration of Veii.  

When Veii, after significant victories against Rome, sends legates around to the other Etruscan cities asking them to join in, only Fidenae accepts. Fidenae began this rebellion with an atrocity, the massacre of the new Roman settlers.

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98 Since Fidenae was considered a Roman colony, these may have been fetials.
99 Livy 4.23.4-6: *Trepidatum in Etruria est post Fidenas captas, non Veientibus solum exterritis metu similis excidii, sed etiam Faliscis memoria initi primo cum iis belli, quamquam rebellantibus non adfuerant. Igitur cum duae civitates legatis circa duodecim populos missis impetrassent ut ad voltumnae fanum indiceretur omni Etruriae concilium, velit magno inde tumultu imminente, senatus Mam. Aemilium dictatorem iterum dici iussit. Ab eo A. Postumius Tubertus magister equitum est dictus; bellumque tanto maiore quam proximo conatu apparatum est quanto plus erat ab omni Etruria periculi quam ab duobus populis fuerat.*
100 Livy 4.25.
101 Livy 4.31.
The exhortation Livy has the dictator Aemilius' exhortation to his troops briefly sums up Rome’s deeply felt grievances against Veii: “upon the enemy was the crime of the murder of legates, in violation of the *ius gentium*, the slaughter of Fidenate colonists in peacetime, breaking the truce, and a seventh unsuccessful defection.”\(^{102}\) Livy contrasts this with the Romans’ own generous behavior towards Veii when the senate orders the decision about terms and reparations demanded from Veii to be delayed because that city was then weakened by internal strife, a direct contrast to Etruscan behavior in Livy 2.44.\(^{103}\) Nevertheless when fetials are sent the next year to seek reparations they are threatened with being killed just as the Fidenates had previously slaughtered Roman legates on Lars Tolumnius' order.\(^{104}\) Tellingly, the people, already engaged in a serious war with the Volsci, fear Veii because it seems likely to bring all Etruria into the war. Veii adds another crime: the legates sent to protest are threatened with murder by Veii’s senate.\(^{105}\) Then, in 4.61, there is debate but no decision at the Etruscan meeting whether or not to aid Veii. As the Veientine war enters its final phase help from the rest of Etruria, which still seems quite possible to Livy is forestalled by their choice of an unpopular king, but the Romans do not cease to guard against the possibility. When the Falisci and Capenates, fearing for themselves, come to aid Veii, the Romans believe even then that all of Etruria is on the march. The only aid the Etruscan league offers is that volunteers be allowed to go to aid Veii although Livy implies that more would assistance would be offered were it not for the Gauls.\(^{106}\)

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\(^{102}\) Livy 4.32.5: *cum hostibus scelus legatorum contra ius gentium interfectorum, caedem in pace Fidenatium colonorum, indutas ruptas, septimam infelicem defectionem*...

\(^{103}\) Livy 4.58.1-3: “so averse were they from seeking their own advantage from another’s distress,” *tantum afuit ut ex incommodo alieno sua occasio peteretur*.

\(^{104}\) Livy 4.17.

\(^{105}\) Livy 5.17.7-10.

\(^{106}\) Livy 5.1, 5.8, 5.17.
At the beginning of Book 5, as the Romans consider undertaking a year-long siege, Appius Claudius rehearses the complaints against Veii in even stronger language.\textsuperscript{107} Little is left to say against Veii yet Livy further over-determines the justice of this war by means of the gods. Violations of the \textit{ius gentium} and slaughtering Roman colonists are not just criminal, but impious, and it is perhaps because of such wickedness the gods take an interest in seeing Rome capture Veii. In Livy’s account, the battle for the city becomes a war not just of arms but of prophecies, in which the gods take a decisive role. When an unusual number of prodigies appear the Romans become alarmed and, lacking the Etruscan \textit{haruspices} who might help them puzzle out their meaning, send to Delphi.\textsuperscript{108} Before an answer is received from Delphi a citizen of Veii utters a prophetic remark soon confirmed by the Pythia: the Romans would sooner capture Veii than they would drain the Alban Lake. Rather than be discouraged, the Romans interpret this response as a clear formula for victory, for if they drain the Alban Lake in the prescribed way they will conquer with the help of the god.

Divine involvement in the capture of Veii does not end with the Alban Lake. Prior to the assault on the city, Camillus vows a tenth of the spoils to Apollo and performs an \textit{evocatio}, attempting to persuade the tutelary deity of Veii, Juno Regina, to abandon Veii for Rome:\textsuperscript{109}

\textsuperscript{107} Livy 5.4.12-14: “But we find it inconvenient to carry on a year-long siege less than twenty miles away, almost within sight of the city, as if it were some trivial reason for war lacking a sufficient injury to goad us into continuing the effort. Seven times they have rebelled, and they have never been faithful in peace. They have plundered our lands a thousand times and compelled Fidenae to defect. There they murdered our colonists and were the authors of the impious murder of our ambassadors. They wanted to raise all Etruria against us, and now they are working to that end. Even our legates sent to seek reparations barely avoided being attacked.” \textit{Nos intra uicesimum lapidem, in conspectu prope urbis nostrae, annuam oppugnationem perferre piget. Scilicet quia leuis causa belli est nec satis quicquam iusti doloris est quod nos ad perseuerandum stimulet. Septiens rebellarunt; in pace nunquam fida fuerunt; agros nostros miliens depopulati sunt; Fidenates deficere a nobis coegerunt; colonos nostros ibi interecerunt; auctores fuere contra ius caedis impiae legatorum nostrorum; Etruriam omnem aduersus nos concitare uoluerunt, hodieque id molintur; res repetentes legatos nostros haud procul auit quin uiolarent.}

\textsuperscript{108} For later Romans, this anecdote also emphasizes Rome's reliance upon Etruscan divination and this people's eventual close integration into a state that seems helpless without them.

\textsuperscript{109} Ogilvie, \textit{Commentary}, 673-5 on the \textit{evocatio}, which is not clearly represented as a separate ritual by the Livian passage. While the prayer does not correspond to the detailed description of the actual ceremony in Macrobius 3.9, the context and the setting imply that this is what was envisioned. There may indeed not have been an exact formula.
“With you as our leader, Pythian Apollo, inspired by your power, I go forward to destroy the city of Veii, and to you I vow a tenth part of the spoils. You too, Juno Regina, who now inhabit Veii, I pray that you follow us as victors to our city, which will soon be yours as well, where a temple worthy of your greatness shall receive you.”

Two additional miraculous stories contribute to the rhetoric of divine approval. In the first, Romans tunneling into Veii overhear a *haruspex* announce to the king that whoever sacrifices the animal at hand will gain victory; the Romans opportunely break out of their tunnel and steal the animal. Livy cares much more for the other story: as the Romans begin to transfer captured cult items with care, one of the picked youths asks the statue of Juno Regina whether she wants to go to Rome, and she nods in assent. Although some statements indicate manifest destiny, the gods' support need not imply a long-term program of Roman conquest. The occasional sign points the way but the scope of Roman dominion does not seem to be anticipated by any of the actors in Livy's first decade. It is, instead, authorial hindsight. In any particular narrative it seems that the Romans believe that righteous behavior gives them more claim on the gods' support in that instant and it is consistent piety rather than any guarantee of the gods, that makes for their long-term support.

Livy’s narrative throughout his first five books clearly establishes that Roman morality is the foundation for Roman success and hegemony, and the events of Book 5 render this in a schematic way. After the conquest of Veii and just before the crime that would bring the Gauls down upon Rome, Livy gives Camillus, arguably the most heroic figure in the first decade, a paradigmatic expression of Roman values, setting the difference between Rome and its

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111 For these stories, see Livy 5.21-22.
neighbors in stark relief. For, when besieging Falerii, the dictator replied thus to a schoolmaster who delivered the children of the city’s leading men to the Romans:

“Villain bearing your villainous gift, you have not come to a leader or people at all like yourself. While there is no bond of human contriving between us and Falerii, there is and will be that which nature established for each. There are laws in war as well as in peace, and we have learned to justly uphold these no less than we bravely follow those. We do not take up arms against children, who are spared even in a captured city, but against armed men and those who, neither harmed nor harried by us besieged the Roman camp at Veii. As you seized these children by your own unheard of wickedness, thus will I seize Falerii by Roman means, with virtue and the work of arms, just as I seized Veii.”

(Livy 5.27.5-8)

When Camillus sent the children back along with the traitor, the people of Falerii were so amazed at Roman fides that they gladly surrendered to Rome. Such actions, along with Camillus’ celebrated iustitia fideque hostibus victis, are not only ethical in their own right, they establish Rome as uniquely trustworthy partner. Such is the Roman ideal and, as the Roman tradition would have it, legitimates Roman hegemony. However, just as proper behavior leads to stunning success, so too does the Romans’ own improper behavior nearly destroy them.

Roman Misdeeds and the Redirection of Guilt

Not all crimes and misdeeds can be easily covered up and omitted, particularly before a Roman readership that was likely aware of past controversies and the variety of traditions surrounding them. Such minor issues as the sack of Pometia pass by quickly, if even mentioned,

112 Livy 5.27.5-8: “Non ad similem” inquit “tui nec populum nec imperatorem scelestus ipse cum scelesto munere venisti. Nobis cum Falisci quae pacto fit humano societas non est: quam ingeneravit natura utrisque et eritque. Sunt et belli, sicut paxis, iura, iusteque ea non minus quam fortiter didicimus gerere. Arma habemus non adversus eam aetatem cui etiam captis umbribus parcitur, sed adversus armatos et ipsos qui, nec laesi nec lacessiti a nobis, castra Romana ad Veios oppugnarunt. Eos tu quantum in te fuit novo sceleire vicisti: ego Romanis artibus, virtute opere armis, sicut Veiros vincam.”

113 Livy 5.27.9-15. Particularly 11: Fides Romana, iustitia imperatoris in foro et curia celebrantur.

114 Livy 5.28.1.

115 Miles, Early Rome, 75-109, emphasizes Camillus’ restoration of Roman values as part of a cyclical pattern of Roman history, which happens to neatly divide Roman history from the founding to Actium into two equal parts, implying that Octavian had the opportunity to fulfill such a role. For the current point, the intense exemplarity of Camillus as conditor is most germane.
but those that cannot be easily effaced or rendered inert by some simple palliative received significant comment, swelling almost like scar tissue in the annalistic tradition. However, their inclusion and prominence do not fundamentally undermine Roman claims to justice, for a few simple and familiar techniques contain and deflect blame away from the Roman people as a whole. As with Pometia, an individual or an easily disparaged group that does not represent the Roman decision-making elite, can be blamed, or the community can pay some penalty and atone for its improper act. Deftly handled, both of these possibilities do not simply fail to discredit Roman policy in its broad application but, paradoxically, make such a contrast with the high standard of behavior seen elsewhere (and in part manufactured by the process of retransmission), that they actually reinforce the idea that the Romans almost always acted rightly. Livy uses both methods, often in combination, in relating Roman misdeeds, and succeeds in turning them to the state's advantage, as, for example, with the Roman theft of Ardeate land in Book 3.

In 3.70-72, when Ardea and Aricia submit a territorial dispute to Rome, the Roman people vote to take the disputed land as their own, an act which Livy finds utterly shameful. His account insulates the Roman state as a whole from the opprobrium attaching to this theft, first by prefacing the affair with his own disapproval, which forces the reader to see this as something apart from the inspiring exempla they have come to expect. Secondly, he attributes the proposal to a rabble-rousing soldier named Scaptius and even has him make his case in direct speech. Beyond Scaptius being a plebeian and making a standard conflict-of-the-orders argument, the language Livy himself uses is extremely judgmental, tying this affair directly to

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116 Livy 3.71.1: Victoriam honestam ex hostibus partam turpe domi de finibus sociorum iudicum populi deformavit.
117 Scaptius’ speech draws heavily upon the sort of populist rhetoric which Livy consistently portrays as self-serving and suspect.
the moral faults of the plebs and the tribunes. Therefore, even though the theft comes to fruition, it appears a plebeian excess rather than a state act; it speaks more to the need for patrician oversight than the character of Roman conquest. Livy emphasizes that the senate was grieved by this action, which they were constitutionally powerless to prevent. This dramatic treatment is enough to characterize this as a setback for the better party at Rome rather than an indication of Roman injustice towards allies, but Livy goes further.

Highlighting the senatorial response and their eventual restitution, Livy portrays the crime as a disgraceful relic of the conflict of orders and a symbol of the wickedness inherent in civil strife rather than the community itself. Livy focuses attention on the episode, using it to end the third book, but the matter does not end there. Ardea quickly revolts, yet far from receiving swift Roman retribution, the senate assures its envoys that although the internal politics of Rome do not immediately permit them to overturn the people's decision, they will make it up to the Ardeates in full. This they do by speedily rendering assistance to the town and saving it from the Volscians, and then reinforcing the then depopulated town with Roman colonists. This last act might seem far from charitable, but is actually part of a clever scheme to return as much of the stolen land as possible to the people of Ardea and their kinsmen. By giving so much play to the lofty senatorial sentiments that end Book 3 and their enduring determination to do right by the Ardeates, Livy transforms this Roman breach of faith into a compelling narrative that, in the end, serves to show just how faithful an ally Rome was.

118 Livy 3.71.5: Tribuni, ut fere semper reguntur a multitudine magis quam regunt, dedere cupidae audiendi plebi ut quae vellet Scaptius dicet.
119 Livy 3.72.6-7: Haec consules, hace patres vociferantur; sed plus cupiditas et auctor cupiditatis Scaptius valet. Vocatae tribus iudicaverunt agrum publicum populi Romani esse. Nec abnuitur ita fuisset, si ad iudices alios itum foret; nunc haud sane quicquam bona causa levatur dedecus iudicii; idque non Aricinis Ardeatibusque quam patribus Romanis foedius atque acerbius visum.
120 Livy 4.7.
121 Livy 4.11.
In Book 5, just after the capture of Veii, Livy uses the Gallic Sack, a mirror image of that Roman success, to illustrate that violating *fides* could have far greater repercussions. The Romans had already imprudently exiled Camillus, the one man who could have saved Rome, and ignored a prophetic voice. Then they sent three Fabii to attempt to mediate between Gauls and the Etruscans of Clusium who had requested Roman help. Instead, the legates would take up arms against the Gauls, causing the Gauls to march on Rome. Livy begins the episode with an ironic comment: “It would have been a peaceful mission had it not had hot-headed legates, more like Gauls than Romans.” The rhetorical irony and our historian's broader appraisal of Gallic and Roman conduct are clear, marking this as an exceptional moment of role-reversal, but not everything the Fabii have to say should be discounted. After they attempt to dissuade the Gauls from attacking Clusium to no avail, receiving the answer that the newcomers demand land or war, the legates make a rhetorical flourish which Livy appears to endorse. Only after this do they do wrong by joining battle, and Livy once again invokes fate:

> To the Romans, asking what right they had to demand land from its owners or threaten war, and what business the Gauls had in Etruria, the Gauls responded that they carried their right in their arms and that all things belonged to the stronger. With spirits thus stirred for war on both sides they parted and joined battle, and there, as if the fates were already assailing the city of Rome, the legates also took up arms, in contravention of the *ius gentium*. (Livy 5.36.5)

The direct implication of the legate's complaint is that taking land by right of force is not lawful and most assuredly not a justification Romans would ever accept or use; in fact this *ius* is no law at all. When the Romans act like Gauls, ignoring the neutrality of ambassadors and engaging in

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122 Livy 5.32-33. Camillus’ exile, it must be noted, largely results from greed for the plunder of Veii. As often in Livy, the desire for gain is a legitimate motive, but only when it is secondary; as a driving motivation it is a vice.
123 Livy 5.36.1: *Mitis legatio, ni praefroces legatos Gallisque magis quam Romanis similes habuisset.*
124 Livy 5.36.5: *Quodnam id ius esset agrum a possessoribus petere aut minari arma Romanis quaerentibus et quid in Etruria rei Gallis esset, cum illi se in armis ius ferre et omnia fortium uiorum esse ferociter dicerent, accensis utrimque animis ad arma discurritur et proelium consenitur. Ibi iam urgentibus Romanam urbem fatis legati contra ius gentium arma capiunt.*
battle, the Gauls act like Romans and seek satisfaction from the senate.\textsuperscript{125} Acting in such a characteristically un-Gallic way also prompts readers to remember normal Gallic behavior, paradoxically furthering Livy’s positive depiction of the Romans.

Livy’s brief account of the Gallic embassy is also of great significance. Unspecified yet authoritative senators realize that they were in the wrong yet refuse to hand over the Fabii. Most telling is the senate's recourse to demagoguery in order to absolve themselves of blame, which Livy attributes to fortune blinding their wits.\textsuperscript{126} Not surrendering the envoys, or their not surrendering themselves, runs counter to many positive Roman exempla, especially the sacrifice of this same Fabian clan at the river Cremera. Camillus' prayer in 5.21 that the gods' jealousy fall on him rather than Rome, a prayer which costs him his children, is still in the reader’s mind. The senate acknowledges the justice of the complaints yet yields to the legates’ prestige. In attempting to absolve themselves of the responsibility for the crime they refer the question to the people, of whose bad judgment they are fully aware. Improprieties mount as the people honor the criminal legates with military tribuneships; these tribunes not only conduct a slothful levy but ignore the gods while on campaign.\textsuperscript{127} When the Gauls hear of the honors given to the legates they abandon their Etruscan campaign and march on Rome, “burning with rage, against which their race is powerless.”\textsuperscript{128} In all else Livy continues the reversal, for in the field “to such a degree not only fortune, but even good sense was on the barbarian side. In the other army there was nothing Roman, neither among the soldiers nor the generals.”\textsuperscript{129} After the defeat at the Allia

\textsuperscript{125} Livy 5.36.6-11.
\textsuperscript{126} At least in internal politics, means are far more important than ends. The historian invariably condemns actions that stink of popularis methods even when he agrees with the goal.
\textsuperscript{127} The religious aspect of Livy 5.38.1 is particularly striking: \textit{Ibi tribuni militum non loco castris ante capto, non praemunito vallo quo receptus esset, non deorum saltem si non hominum memores, nec auspicato nec litato, instruunt aciem...}
\textsuperscript{128} Livy 5.37.4.
\textsuperscript{129} Livy 5.38.45: \textit{adeo non fortuna modo sed ratio etiam cum barbaris stabat. In altera acie nihil simile Romanis, non apud duces, non apud milites erat.}
the Romans begin to reassert their usual character. The senate, previously unwilling to give up
two of their number, now leaves its elders, useless in the defense of the Capitol, to a dignified
death in the Curia. Roman piety also gets unique expression when a young Fabius sneaks
through the enemy lines in order to not neglect a family rite. The role of the gods and fate,
punishing the Romans with defeat and then restoring the city after they return to their usual pious
character, is paramount, demonstrating the Romans’ own belief that success or failure was
dependent on, and could serve as an indication of, their proper behavior and piety.

It is during this crisis that Camillus, as he attempts to stir the Ardeates who received him
in his exile to fight of the Gauls, provides a brief yet critical summary of the relationship Roman
policy attempts to build between the city and its allies, men, he has just reminded them, who
have newly been granted citizenship:

> An opportunity has been delivered you, men of Ardea, to show your gratitude for such
great services the Roman people has done you in times past (for you yourselves
remember how great they are, and they should not be brought up to shame those who are
mindful), and to bring great martial glory to this city in a war born from a common
enemy which approaches in disorder. (Livy 5.44.3)

Rome provides its allies, whether they became allies through peaceful means or by war, with
beneficia which then incline the receiver to reciprocate, ideally out of gratitude more than
obligation. Camillus' ideal is, however, difficult to achieve, and the decision to help against the
Gauls is made out of self-interest by both friends and opponents of Rome: the Gauls could
continue to be a threat to Ardea and the rest of Italy and the Ardeates had a famous general at

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130 Even in Rome's darkest moment, Roman care for the law and procedure is on full display when a dangerous
mission to reach the besieged senate is necessary so that Camillus can officially be appointed dictator, as in 5.46.
131 Rosenstein, Imperatores (1989), 158-9, actually sees the battle of the Allia as a critical moment in the formation
of this view: “... this disaster gave rise to the first authentic determination by the senate on record that religious
errors had been responsible for a defeat. ... This trauma appears to have brought about a consensus at Rome for the
first time that the gods and the legionaries were principally to blame for a military defeat.”
132 Livy 5.44.3: Vobis autem, Ardeates, fortuna obleta est et pro tantis populi Romani pristinis beneficiis quanta ipsi
meministis-nec enim exprobranda ea apud memoris sunt-gratiae referendaes et huic urbi decus ingens belli ex hoste
communi pariendo, qui effuso agmine adventat.
their disposal. Rome gained an unusual amount of support from its subordinate allies, but it is not unconditional and the Latin revolt of Book 6 proves a bitter lesson to the Romans that force and fides must be used together to obtain security and loyalty.

The end of the Gallic occupation has its own thematic significance and resonates much more closely than one might think with the legal maneuvering we will see later around the Caudine Forks. When the Romans on the Capitol have been brought so low as to bribe the Gauls to leave, Camillus arrives with his army and declares the agreement void because it was made by an inferior without his authority as dictator, justifying the lengths gone through to make his appointment legal. While such niceties have absolutely no bearing on the military situation, they mean everything to the justice of the Roman cause, particularly in contrast to Gallic behavior.

Then the exchange was made in a meeting between the military tribune Q. Sulpicius and the Gallic chieftain Brennus and a thousand-pound ransom of gold was then paid for the people that would soon rule over nations. A further indignity was added to this most shameful transaction: false weights were used by the Gauls and, when the tribune balked, an insolent Gaul added his sword to the scale, and an utterance, intolerable to the Romans, was heard: “Woe to the conquered.”¹³³ (Livy 5.48.8-9)

For all their previous use of the ius gentium, the Gauls assert that might makes right and, by their own conniving, seem to invalidate the agreement. Roman scrupulousness and exemplary legality in declaring the agreement invalid reinforce the point. Since Livy attributes Camillus' arrival to the will of the gods and their plans for Rome, this means of rejecting an agreement not ratified by the appropriate official or body becomes a meaningful precedent.¹³⁴ The actual battle against the occupiers is fairly perfunctory, but Livy hammers home the exceptional nature of Roman piety and propriety by detailing how the Romans did not, upon recovery of their city, look to

¹³³ Livy 5.48.8-9: Inde inter Q. Sulpicium tribunum militum et Brennum regulum Gallorum conloquio transacta res est, et mille pondo auri pretium populi gentibus mox imperaturi factum. Rei foedissimae per se adiecta indignitas est: pondera ab Gallis allata iniqua et tribuno recusante additus ab insolente Gallo ponderi gladius, auditaque intoleranda Romanis uox, uae uictis.
¹³⁴ We shall see it used to great effect in the next chapter at the Caudine Forks.
their own personal or collective material advantage, but before all else purified captured temples and worked to give the gods their due. All of this, from the disaster at the Allia to Camillus' defeat of the Gauls, calls attention to the Romans' uniquely upright behavior and its validation through divine approval. What might seem to undermine such a broad assertion of Roman justice, the criminal violation of the *ius gentium* at Clusium, is actually the exception that proves the rule. The narrative's heavy-handed focus on causation and divine agency demonstrates the Romans' belief that righteous behavior leads to success while improper behavior leads to disaster. The reader is tacitly invited to compare the Roman transgression to those of other peoples, and they could surely remember many Roman legates who gave up their heads to a Gallic spike and neighboring communities that broke faith with Rome. Roman *imperium* thus seems just recompense in hindsight, especially considering that the Romans themselves believed that they did not stoop to such tactics, while the lack of further Roman disasters on this scale stands as a strong piece of evidence for the strength of Roman justice and *fides*. 
Chapter 2

Roman Ideals and the Limits of Fides

The previous chapter showed that Livy’s first pentad establishes an idealized foundation for Roman character and that *fides*, the quality of scrupulously honoring agreements and obligations, as well as acting in straightforward good faith, was central to this identity as manifested in foreign policy. In this chapter I show, using the case of the Latins after the Gallic Sack and Capua during the Second Punic War, that the Roman tradition interpreted defection and rebellion not as failures of Roman policy, but as the result of the moral failings of their allies, who did not appropriately reciprocate Roman *fides*. The lesson Livy’s Romans take from such events is that *fides* needed to be supplemented by *metus* to keep subordinate allies in line, and they reorganize their system of alliances accordingly after the Latin War.¹ The second half of the chapter considers two questionable Roman decisions and the ways the Roman tradition attempted to justify them. In the outbreak of the First Samnite War, when the Romans choose to accept the *deditio* of Capua and thus enter into war with their Samnite allies, Livy focuses on the senate’s reluctance to violate its principles rather than their ultimate decision to do so. Then, with the affair at the Caudine Forks, I argue that some Roman ethical sensibilities were derived from a legalistic mindset rather than vice-versa, indicating that a number of incidents in which Roman maneuvers may appear to have been undertaken in bad faith, the Romans themselves would not

¹ *Fides* here is used to mean the ethical quality of loyalty, as opposed to the non-ethical use in which it merely means loyalty or allegiance. A city could be manifestly lacking in *fides* in an ethical sense, but be compelled by fear to remain *in fide*. See Moore, *Artistry*, 36-40.
have seen as a significant ethical problem. Yet while the traces of controversy do surround the episodes in which the Romans appear to have acted in bad faith, these passages do not go so far as to cast these as wholly negative exempla. The Romans appear to have had a greater tolerance for what we might call legal chicanery.

**The Immediate Aftermath and the Latin Defection**

As the Roman tradition has it, the Latins and Hernici had been stalwart and ideal allies since the foedus Cassianum of 493 BCE, regularly supplying troops in return for Roman protection against the marauding Volsci and Aequi. The Romans thought they should be, and believed they were, grateful, but the Latins shocking defection left a greatly weakened Rome to fend off threats more dire than ever before. The betrayal was all the greater for their combining with the Volsci, the very enemy the Romans had spent over a century defending them against, and attacking Rome itself when the Romans attempted to reassert their dominance. Because Livy’s Romans were convinced that the arrangement with the Latins was favorable, the lesson they took from the revolt was stark, yet also a commonplace in political thought both ancient and modern: even the most precarious sovereignty is far preferable to the most generous and safe subordination. Thus allies had to be held in line not just by fides and goodwill, but by managed subjugation. Livy’s narrative therefore draws attention to the Romans’ naive reliance on Latin goodwill and assumption that they felt a sort of kinship and common interest with Rome. Livy’s Romans frequently refer to the Latins’ former fides and base their response to disloyalty on the actions of individual communities before the sack.

The Latin defection and rebellion were not the work of a moment, nor did they simply coincide. According to Livy, the first few years after the Gallic sack were a period of extreme uncertainty. Livy thus folds his discussion of the defection, that is the refusal to supply troops in
accord with the foedus Cassianum, into his appraisal of the grim situation that led to Camillus’ appointment as dictator for 389 BCE:

But [the Romans] were not left long in peace to busy themselves with plans for restoring the state after so terrible a calamity. For on one side the Volsci, long their enemy, had taken up arms to extinguish the very name of Rome, while on the other merchants were reporting that a war council of the leading men from every Etruscan people had been called at Voltumnae. A novel terror had also emerged with the defection of the Latins and Hernici, who, after the battle at lake Regillus had kept friendship with Rome with impeccable faith for around a century. Thus, since such threats menaced from every side and it seemed that the Roman name was foundering, not only hated by enemies but held in contempt by allies, they decided that the state had to be defended by the auspices of the man who had saved it and appointed M. Furius Camillus dictator. 2 (Livy 6.2.1-5)

Camillus deals handily with the Volsci, forcing a deditio which lasts only three years, but to the north Livy reports that “almost all Etruria was in arms and besieging Sutrium, Roman allies.”3 Exaggerating the Etruscan threat valorizes the Romans after their disgrace but, more importantly, we see that the Romans still had allies, allies who sought and received their protection. In the following year, Livy reports that Rome made war on the Aequi as a preemptive measure and because of their own resentment.4 Immediately after the Gallic Sack, Rome was still strong enough to undertake aggressive action.

Although Rome was not so vulnerable as Livy suggests, since the Latin defection began as a passive refusal to supply troops rather than overt aggression, Rome’s international position remained unclear. Due to a multitude of threats, real or perceived, Rome was unprepared to press this ambiguity. Although the senate considered attacking the Latins and Hernici, fear of the

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3 Livy 6.3.2: Etruria prope omnis armata Sutrium, socios populi Romani, obsidebat.

4 Livy 6.4.8: Exercitum alterum in Aequos, non ad bellum-victos namque se fatebantur-sed ab odio ad pervastandos fines, ne quid ad nova consilia relinqueretur virium, duxerect
Etruscans obviated the attempt, a fear quickly superseded by an actual army of Volsci from Antium. A large force of Latins was present in this army, large enough to cause serious problems for the Volsci when they fled after an initial defeat. The Latin communities themselves claimed this was not public policy but that individuals had joined the Volsci on their own initiative, so the Romans deferred action. Since the Romans did not believe the Latins’ excuses for their men turning up in enemy armies, the senate attempted to deal with the problem diplomatically by using the fetials. The Latins gave an elaborately disingenuous response:

In that same year reparations were sought from the Latins and Hernici, along with an answer to why throughout recent years they had not supplied troops as stipulated by treaty. In crowded assemblies of each nation the response was given that it was by no fault of the people nor any public policy that some of their youths fought alongside the Volsci; they themselves paid the price of their wicked designs and not one of them had made it back home. The reason for the lack of a levy, however, was the constant fear of the Volsci, an enemy that clung fast to their side and could not be exhausted even by so many wars upon wars.

(Livy 6.10.6-8)

The senate decides that it only lacked the opportunity for war, not sufficient reason. Although there certainly was a degree of calculation due to the other wars, it does not follow that the Romans necessarily desired war and the abasement of the Latins. The fetials were, after all, an institution conceived of in terms of maintaining the peace, however ineffectual they proved at it. Further, if one believes that the incorporation of Veii boosted Roman power so much that even after the Gallic setback they could undertake a war of expansion in the Pompitine district, their reticence to go to war with the Latins becomes all the more striking. The Roman tradition may have exaggerated the city’s peril during this period in service of both dramatic sensibilities and

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5 Livy 6.6.2.
6 Livy 6.10.6-9.
7 Livy 6.10.6-8: *Eodem anno ab Latinis Hernicisque res repetitae quaesitumque cur per eos annos militem ex instituto non dedissent. Responsum frequenti utriusque gentis concilio est nec culpam in eo publicam nec consilium fuisse quod suae iuventutis aliqui apud Volscos militaverint; eos tamen ipsos pravi consilio poenam habere, nec quemquam ex his reducem esse; militis autem non datur causam terrorem assiduum a Volsciis fuisse, quam pestem adhaerentem lateri suo tot super alia alis bellis exhaeriri nequisse.*
8 As does Oakley, *Commentary* vol. 1, 345-7.
in order to make a starker point about the need to back *fides* with force, but the sense of disillusionment and betrayal felt by the Romans was surely very real.

The next Volscian defeat yields conclusive proof of a betrayal in the form of many high-ranking Latin prisoners.9 Their involvement in the Volscian war effort could not have run counter to their states' policy and demonstrates that their withholding troops was not because they were hard-pressed by those very people with whom their youth was serving. Shockingly, these prisoners include Roman colonists from Velitrae and Circeii, communities which in 6.17.7-8 even had the audacity to protest innocence while seeking the restitution of the captives. Because the ambassadors from these communities are fellow Roman citizens, not foreigners, and the senate is not in a position to take action, they attempt to make a harsh point, threatening these ambassadors on the grounds that the protections of the *ius gentium* does not apply. Even then the Romans are prevented from campaigning against these fair-weather friends, this time by the seditious actions of Marcus Manlius Capitolinus.

Of all the Latins, only the Tusculans, who had before shown such loyalty to the Romans, were repentant. When, in 381 BCE, even Tusculans were found amidst the routed Volscian foe, Camillus marchest against their city. Surprisingly, the Tusculans open their gates to the Romans and take no defensive action, actually going about their business normally. Camillus then succumbs to the sententious impulse, "So far only you Tusculans have found the true weapons and strength by which you might shield yourself from Roman anger" and sent their representatives along to the senate.10 The Romans accept their humble apology and grant them citizenship, making an example of concord out of potential violence. This is an exceptional act of enfranchisement, particularly at such a moment when bitter resentment could have been well

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9 Livy 6.13.6-8.
10 Livy 6.26.1: 'Soli adhuc ' inquit, 'Tusculani, vera arma verasque vires quibus ab ira Romanorum vestra tutaremini invenitis.'
justified, and it demonstrates perhaps more clearly than any other example the inclusiveness that contributed most substantially to the success of the Roman state.\textsuperscript{11} It was, of course, also a calculated attempt to conciliate the Latins and provide them a safe means of backing down, a preview of the policy Camillus would later advocate in dealing with the Latins as a group. This episode also shows another characteristic Roman virtue which, since it has more to do with wars’ ends than their beginnings, is less evident in this study: \textit{clementia}. For, although Tusculan behavior indicates that they did not aim to make war upon Rome, they remain implicated in the refusal to supply troops and thus are not entirely absolved of guilt. Yet Roman mercy provides the opportunity for enemies to establish or re-establish bonds of \textit{fides} with Rome. Livy lays further stress on the reciprocity of this arrangement when the Latins, resentful of Tusculan accommodations with Rome, march on the city; Roman support is sent “no slower than befits the \textit{fides} of the Roman people.”\textsuperscript{12} Thus, the final words given to the Tusculan ambassadors exemplify the Romans’ own belief in their ethical exceptionalism: “Let men continue to wrong you, so long as you, whom this repentance thus satisfies, remain worthy.”\textsuperscript{13} And, in Livy’s view, men would continue to wrong the Romans, for, many years later, Tusculans appear in the Latin War of 338 BCE, proving yet again that Roman \textit{fides} must be backed by force.\textsuperscript{14}

Examples of Latin disloyalty that Livy finds appalling continue to mount. In 380 BCE the people of Praeneste march up to the gates of Rome and give battle at the Allia, marking out their enmity by attempting to use the Romans’ memory of the disaster to their own advantage.\textsuperscript{15}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{11} Eckstein, \textit{Anarchy}, 244-257, gives a remarkably clear and comprehensive account of just how unique this willingness to extend citizen rights was in the ancient world, particularly in contrast to Greek poleis.
\item \textsuperscript{12} Livy 6.33.8: \textit{Haud segnius quam fide populi Romani dignum fuit exercitus Tusculum ductus}. A particular sense of obligation to Tusculum emerges from the Roman response to their appeals in 6.36 as well.
\item \textsuperscript{13} Livy 6.26.8: \textit{Pecetetur in vos, dum digni sitis quibus ita satisfiat}.
\item \textsuperscript{14} Livy 8.7.2. Upon the war’s conclusion, Tusculum received the same mercy as Nepete, including the preservation of the perceived benefit of citizenship. Livy 8.14.4: \textit{Tusculanis servata civitas quam habebant, crimenque rebellionis a publica fraude in paucos auctores versum}.
\item \textsuperscript{15} Livy 6.28.
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Although they are compelled to surrender, the next year sees them revolt and even unite with their long-time enemies, from whom the Romans had repeatedly protected them, the Volsci.\textsuperscript{16}

When their Volscian allies in Antium are forced to surrender to the Romans, the Praenestini are too indignant to join them in making terms; Livy thus describes the Latins as subject to \textit{ira et rabies} in following campaigns.\textsuperscript{17} In 368 BCE, Velitrae, one of the chief movers in the Latin revolt, appears under siege by the Romans.\textsuperscript{18} As shown by the Latin offer aid against a Gallic rising in Livy 7.12 (Dionysius informs us that they were already hard pressed by this enemy), it takes a grave external threat and cognizance of their own weakness to convince the Latins to agree to any degree of political subordination.\textsuperscript{19} This is not a once-off occurrence, but betokens a transitory Latin realignment.\textsuperscript{20} Judging from the exhortation given in fighting against Gauls in 7.24.4-5, Livy’s Romans seem to think that their relationship with the Latins has been repaired: “Why are you standing still? This is no battle with Latins or Sabines who, conquered, you may convert from ally to enemy. We’ve drawn our swords against beasts.”\textsuperscript{21} Playing off of the diminished moral capacity and alterity of the Gauls, this also calls attention to how temporary the Latins’ return to the fold was, for in the next chapter the Latins unite in refusing to supply troops, setting the Latin League in direct opposition to Roman dominion, their own \textit{libertas} to Rome’s \textit{alienum imperium}.\textsuperscript{22} Livy stresses the terror this occasioned amongst Romans who find that themselves abandoned yet again by allies amidst a Gallic tumult, and it also highlights the

\textsuperscript{16} Livy 6.30.8: \textit{id modo extremo anno tumultuatatem quod Praenestini concitatis Latinorum populis rebellarunt.}
\textsuperscript{17} Livy 6.38.4.
\textsuperscript{18} Livy 6.42.4.
\textsuperscript{19} See Oakley, \textit{Commentary}, vol. 1, 716 citing Dionysius 14.8.1-10 as well as Plutarch \textit{Camillus} 40-41, Appian \textit{Celtica} fragments 7-8, and Zonarus 8.24. He attributes the brevity of Livy’s account to an unwillingness to distract his readers from the class warfare dominating Book 6, yet the convenience of this for making the Latin realignment appear less forced is also quite noteworthy.
\textsuperscript{20} In Livy 7.19, 353 BCE, Latin envoys warn of a hostile Volscian incursion directed both against them and Rome.
\textsuperscript{21} Livy 7.24.4-5.
\textsuperscript{22} Livy 7.25.5-7: \textit{Inter hos longe maximus exstitit terror concilia populum Latinorum ad lucum Ferentinae habita responsunque haud ambiguum imperantibus milites Romanis datum, absisterent imperare iis quorum auxilio egerent: Latinos pro sua libertate potius quam pro alieno imperio laturos arma.}
extremely mercenary and deceptive use the Latins had made of Roman *fides* in obtaining such aid when the Gauls were ravaging their lands. The Hernici at least, who had also defected, were beaten in two significant battles in 362 BCE, the capture of Ferentinum in 361, another battle in 360, and were again *devicti subactique* by 358.23

**The Latin War of 340-338 BCE**

In Book 6 and the beginning of 7, the Latins are not Rome’s primary antagonists, but sit on the sidelines like a carrion bird, waiting for Rome to falter. Since they had regained enough of their independence to no longer rely on Rome for their defense and only enter Livy’s narrative at moments of conflict, they become emblematic of betrayal and broken *fides*. It was Rome’s involvement with the Samnites that provided the impetus for the Latin War of 340-338 BCE and the eventual resolute of Rome’s Latin problem. The First Samnite War was sparked by Capua, which, under attack by the Samnites, gave itself over into Roman custody, causing the Romans to go to war with their Samnite allies. The Sidicini, also under attack by the Samnites, attempted to surrender to Rome as well. When the Romans refused to accept this *deditio*, the Sidicini turned to the Latins, who seized upon the opportunity for aggrandizement. The Samnites then appealed to the Romans with the utmost humility; the senate issued an ambiguous response, fearing to further alienate the Latins or admit that they could not control them. Livy highlights that the Romans did claim the right to control Capuan policy because they were not *foederati*, but *dediticii*, indicating that he saw this as proof of Roman moderation towards allies in not abridging their sovereignty. The Roman desire to manage their allies is clear, but Livy seems to imagine it operating informally through their *auctoritas* rather than any legal sanction. Moreover,

23 Livy 7.8, 7.15.9.
in Livy’s presentation, sovereignty is not something the Latins had wrested from Rome during their period of weakness, as the Latins imply in 8.4.3, but which they had always possessed.\(^2\)

Their authority flouted, the Romans summoned the chief Latin agitators to Rome, and what follows is a diplomatic narrative that owes much less to history than the Social War’s influence on the annalistic tradition. During the Latins’ own deliberations, Annius, one of the Latin League’s praetors, gives a fiery speech that convinces the Latins to send him to Rome to demand an equal share in the senate and the consulship for the Latins.\(^3\) Annius’ speech harps upon the inequality of the Latins’ relationship with Rome and its contradiction of the terms used, claiming that they “bear servitude under the name of an equal (\textit{aequum}), treaty.” \textit{Aequum}, however, can mean both equal and fair, and that the \textit{foedus Cassianum} followed from the Roman victory at Lake Regillus renders it fair to Roman sensibilities.\(^4\) The demand that Latins furnish one of the consuls and half the senate thus cannot but seem the hubristic demand of a conquered people that has betrayed the faith generously placed in it. Likely a result of the awkward fit of Social War rhetoric to the Latin War, these demands also appear manifestly disingenuous in Livy’s narrative. Annius begins his speech by professing that what matters is not what the Latins are to say to Rome, but what they are to do, for “it will be easy to fit words to actions once our

\(^2\) Livy’s comment in 2.53.5, that he suspects the Latins and Hernici defending themselves was a precedent unpleasant to Romans, who then launched an uneventful campaign for show, indicates that the allies likely did have this power, but the Romans counted on \textit{fides} and their own \textit{auctoritas} maintaining order.

\(^3\) Oakley, \textit{Commentary} vol. 2, 407-11, esp. 409: “Two factors show that this powerful account of the preliminaries to the Latin War is for the most part unhistorical: firstly, it consists largely of speeches . . . secondly, it reflects to a remarkable degree events on the eve of the Social War in 90 BC. A general indication of this is provided by the arguments which L. gives his Latins, who demand a share in the government of Rome: \textit{unum populum, unam rem publicam} (5.5). Such a position takes Roman rule as an established fact, but in 340 the Latins were desperately trying to break free from the shackles of Rome and to halt the increasingly rapid advance of her domain; and it seems that arguments appropriate to 90 BC have been retrojected with insufficient thought as to their applicability.”

\(^4\) Oakley then brings in Appian \textit{Civ.} 1.176, recounting Torquatus’ embassy to the senate making such demands, as well as Velleius 2.15.2, as examples of the Social War models for the Latin War narrative.
plans our laid.”27 The exact demands and complaints in his speech, which contains nothing resembling a plan, are beside the point. What matters is that he stirs up resentment and forces the Latins down the path of open war, for the terms themselves are, seemingly by design, so extravagant as to have no chance of being accepted.

When Annius then addresses the Roman senate in the temple of Capitoline Jupiter, Livy frames Annius as impious to vitiate his second speech and the Latin cause. Moreover, since Annius opposed the consul Manlius, Livy even evokes the memory of the Gallic Sack, for the Latin “spoke as like a victor who had seized the Capitol by arms rather than a legate protected by the ius gentium.”28 By challenging that the Romans “held Latium as if by the gods’ will” Livy’s Annius raises the stakes, prompting Manlius to invoke Capitoline Jupiter:

> And turning to the statue of Jupiter he proclaimed “Hear this wickedness Jupiter! Hear, O Justice and Righteousness! Will you, Jupiter, a prisoner held captive in your own sanctified temple, countenance foreign consuls and a foreign senate? Are these the treaties which Tullus, the Roman king, made with your Alban ancestors, Latins? Or those that Tarquinius made later? Are we to ignore entirely that battle at Lake Regillus? Can you truly be so forgetful of your own old misfortunes and our generosity towards you?”29 (Livy 8.5.8-10)

When Annius then insults Jupiter and slipped leaving the temple, either killed or stunned by the blow to the head taken in his fall it is judged an omen. Livy nonetheless is careful to stress that despite the outrage felt, the Romans took care to follow the ius gentium and see him safely out of the city. This omen, as well as the devotio of Publius Decius Mus that secures the Roman victory, establishes divine consent for Rome’s dominance of Latium. The contrast between Roman and Latin behavior and the dependence of the outcome on the consul’s self-sacrifice

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27 Livy 8.4.1: *Facile erit explicatis consiliis accommodare rebus verba.*
28 Oakley, *Commentary* vol., 2, 409. Livy 8.5.2: *Annius, tamquam victor armis Capitolium cepisset, non legatus iure gentium tutus loqueretur...*
provide another proof that this is not some blanket dispensation to a chosen people, but that the
gods’ favor is contingent on Roman actions.

Livy thus over-determines the justice of Rome’s position regarding the combatants. The
Latins, enabled by Roman moderation in granting them sovereignty, display every kind of
perfidy in contrast to Roman attempts to do right by the Samnites. This excess justification
makes the reader less likely to question the Romans’ imposing far stronger controls on allied
action and confiscating a great deal of territory, all the while framing it as clemency. He
accomplishes this by placing a speech in the mouth of the younger Camillus during senatorial
deliberations on what to do with the Latins which forces the discussion into a binary choice
between exterminating the Latins and the harsh policy actually implemented, which accordingly
appears merciful in comparison:

What remains is to deliberate on how, since they so often wear us down by
rebellion, we might maintain [the Latins and Antium] in a perpetual state of
peace. The immortal gods have given you such power in this matter that it is in
your hands whether Latium should continue to exist or not. Thus are you able, so
far as it concerns the Latins, to gain perpetual peace either by cruelty or clemency.
Do you wish to treat those who have surrendered or been conquered cruelly? You
may destroy all Latium and make a vast wasteland out of the place from which
you have often gathered an allied army throughout so many great wars. Do you
wish to increase the Roman state by our ancestors’ example by accepting the
conquered as citizens? Material for such growth to the height of glory is at the
ready. Certainly that power (imperium) is by far the strongest which pleases those
who obey.30 (Livy 8.13.13-16)

Camillus assumes Roman hegemony and that this is a just and desirable and the reference to
frequent rebellions indicate that this is not a unique to the situation following recent victories, but
applies to the Romans’ long history with the Latins. The goal of a lasting peace skews the

30 Livy 8.13.13-16: Reliqua consultatio est, quoniam rebellando saepius nos sollicitant, quonam modo perpetua
pace quietos obtineamus. Di immortales ita vos potentes huius consilii fecerunt ut, sit Latium deinde an non sit, in
vestra manu posuerint; itaque pacem vobis, quod ad Latinos attinet, parare in perpetuo vel saeviendo vel
ignoscendo potestis. Voltis crudeliter consulere in deditos victosque ? Licet delere omne Latium, vastas inde
solitudines facere, unde sociali egregio exercitu per multa bella magnaque saepe usi estis. Voltis exemplo maiorum
augere rem Romanam victos in civitatem accipiendo? Materia crescendi per summam gloriam suppeditat. Certe id
firmissimum longe imperium est quo oboedientes gaudent.
options Camillus admits into his speech and prepares the ground for his rhetorical strategy of presenting the senate’s options in dealing with the defeated Latins as limited to either extreme. By raising the possibility of utterly eradicating the Latins (and heightening the pathos of such an act by recalling their long history as allies), Livy can cast the Romans’ eventual actions as merciful and generous. The positive outcome envisioned by Camillus is also entirely in line with the ideals seen in the Latin alliance before the Gallic Sack, namely that subordinates willingly accept Roman *imperium*, their loyalty earned through Roman clemency and solicitude.

Livy’s readers are thus primed to interpret the Latin settlement of 338 BCE, which included Campanians and Volsicans as well, in terms of the opposition between total destruction and benevolent integration, regarding all conditions short of annihilation as a Roman kindness. When the senate decides that the Latin states are too many and varied in their histories with Rome to admit being treated as a unit, it then appears that they are merely taking well-warranted care for a complicated situation and due process. This impression effectively disguises the true purpose of dealing with these cities separately, breaking up the Latin League, confirmed by the final sentence dealing with the Latins. This specifies that the rest of the Latin communities were to be denied the right to intermarry or undertake any sort of joint action.³¹ Similarly, Livy does list the territory confiscated by the Romans, but fails to mention that this land, along with the territory of those cities given the dubious privilege of *civitas sine suffragio*, formed a coherent and continuous expansion of the *ager Romanus*.³² Livy thus fosters the perception that these measures were taken simply with regards to justice towards each state and underplays Roman concerns for territorial expansion. The Roman settlement, generous in granting the continuance

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³¹ Livy 8.14.10.
³² For an account of the Latin settlement, see Salmon, *Roman Italy* ch. 2. For a list of references to territorial confiscations see Oakley, *Commentary* vol. 2, 396. This would have been split between viritane allotments and *ager publicus*, adding greatly to Rome’s territorial control without leaving a large footprint in historical sources because of a lack of large settlements and the continued “independence” of the pre-existing states.
of local autonomy and identity, yet harsh in removing the possibility of inter-state relations except with Rome and thus making these “allies” mere puppets in the foreign-policy sphere, would turn out to be Rome’s standard response to peoples who failed to show sufficient loyalty and gratitude.

**The Defection of Capua in the Second Punic War**

We briefly skip ahead to Second Punic War, 218-201 BCE, and another major defection, that of Capua after Cannae in 216 BCE. While some cities put up a valiant resistance to Hannibal, and the Roman tradition acknowledges the necessity of defection in other cases, Livy treats Capua’s defection as an indication and result of that city’s own moral failings. This is the Romans’ default explanation for defection and resistance to their rule, in Italy and abroad. This sort of interpretation underplays discontent with particular aspects of Roman rule, often framing resistance as the result of popular demagoguery and the lower class’ desire for revolution and plunder. Typically Livy and Polybius also admit a small pro-Roman faction made up of the better sort, allowing conflict with Rome to be seen as the manifestation of civil strife rather than something precipitated by the Romans themselves. However, when viewed as unitary actors, these states are seen as deficient in their *fides* towards Rome, not responding with suitable goodwill and loyalty for the benefits conferred by Rome.

Hannibal had to induce Rome’s allies to defect, for he could not have hoped to topple Rome with just the troops he brought over the Alps. He attempted to stir the Gauls to fight against Rome and to undermine Rome’s Italian alliances by releasing Italian prisoners and declaring that he would liberate Italy from the Romans. Hannibal’s plan began to bear fruit after Trasimene in 217 BCE, when three Campanian *equites* promised to hand over Capua, but the
attempt proved abortive. Livy ends Book 22 dramatically with the post-Cannae defection of most of southern Italy, prompted by no grievance, but only “because they despaired of Roman rule.” The list of defectors that follows collapses a large time span into a single sentence, drawing examples from cities and peoples that would go over to Hannibal over course of the next few books and ignoring the significant resistance he will face from a number of towns. As with the post-390 Latin defection, a great deal of this is passive; the Capuans, Bruttii, and to some extent, the Samnites are the only peoples who offer Hannibal significant military support. Livy thus exaggerates the immediate impact of Cannae in order to end the book not with a note of despair, but instead to highlight Roman resolve, for he concludes with the famous decision not the ransom the soldiers captured at Cannae.

Because a number of fortified towns held out against Hannibal, the defection of such a strong city as Capua required explanation. To this end, the historical tradition blames the defection on the city's character rather than any specific issues with Rome, encouraging the reader to see a correlation between this lack of *fides* and the city's wealthy decadence, a decadence Livy describes in markedly Sallustian terms. That the impetus for defection came

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33 This episode allows Livy to highlight Hannibal’s vicious execution of the guide who accidentally led him in the wrong direction in 22.13. This also anticipates future defections, but Livy balances it with admiration for the *fides* most of Rome’s allies showed, 22.13.10-11, a sentiment mirrored by Polybius in 3.90.12-14. While the Polybius attributes allied constancy to fear and respect, Livy echoes in his own voice the sentiment he had Sempronius articulate in relation to the Gauls in 21.52.9, explaining obedience and loyalty to Rome as the result of bonds of *fides* (both statements use the word *vinculum*), earned by justice and moderation.

34 Livy 22.61.10-12: *Quanto autem maior ea clades superioribus cladibus fuerit vel ea res indicio est quo fides sociorum, quae ad eam diem firma steterat, tum labare coepit nulla profecto alia de re quam desperaverant de imperio. Defecere autem ad Poenos hi populi: Atellani, Calatini, Hirpini, Apulorum pars, Samnites praeter Pentros, Bruttii omnes, Lucani, prater hos Uzentini, et Graecorum omnis ferme ora, Tarentini, Metapontini, Crotonienses Locrique, et Cisalpini omnes Galli.*


36 Judging from Polybius, who uses it as a culminating example of Rome’s good government and courage in 6.52, both physical and moral, this could be seen as inspiring rather than grim. See also Cicero *De Officiis* 3.113-4. The sentiment with which he concludes could equally well be applied to Livy’s treatment of *fides* in this book: *sic honestatis comparatione ea, quae videntur utilia, vincuntur,* “Thus those things that seem most useful are surpassed in comparison with upright behavior.”
from the lower classes only made it easier for Livy to discredit by equating it with greed and revolutionary aims. A further push came from the relatively unscrupulous Capuan senator Pacuvius, who took advantage of the situation to gain personal power while saving the senate, which he feared would be killed by the masses in the event they defected on their own.\(^{37}\) The close ties between Capua and Rome made this defection particularly galling: they had enjoyed the right of *conubium*, a group of elite Capuans served in the Roman cavalry, and Pacuvius himself had family ties to Rome.\(^{38}\)

From the Roman perspective, Capua was privileged, so its failure to reciprocate *fides* was a moral failing. The city itself was “luxuriating in its long good fortune and indulgence, yet all was corrupted by the license of the plebs exercising its liberty without restraint.”\(^{39}\) Laws had been held in contempt long before Cannae had allowed Capua to look down on Roman power; even *conubium* and the three hundred cavalry in Roman service provided only a temporary check on defection.\(^{40}\) Livy dramatizes the critical moment after Cannae, when Capuan delegates met the surviving consul, Varro, in a way that highlights their moral defects. Varro delivers a pitiable speech quite complimentary to Capua and its *fides*, casting the dire circumstance as a chance for the city to earn glory and return Roman benefactions, but the Capuans have the wrong reaction.\(^{41}\) This speech, perfectly suited to a faithful ally, turns the Capuans towards open contempt and defection; they remember only the alleged *iniuria* committed by Rome in seizing some of their

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\(^{37}\) This character is an odd mix of good and bad (Livy 22.2.2: *nobilis idem ac popularis homo, ceterum malis artibus nancetur opes*), and perhaps the moral hybridity he shares with Sallust’s Catiline is significant. Levene, *Hannibalic War*, 254-65 gives an extended discussion of this character and the degree to which is was or was not responsible for the defection.

\(^{38}\) See Levene *Hannibalic War* 224-7 for detailed discussion of the ambiguities in Capuan identity vis-a-vis Rome.

\(^{39}\) Livy 23.2.1: *Inde Capuam [Hannibal] flectit iter, luxuriantem longa felicitate atque indulgentia fortunae, maxime tamen inter corrupta omnia licentia plebis sine modo libertatem exerceretur.* Livy follows this with a more detailed description of Capuan decadence during Pacuvius’ ascendancy in 23.4.1-4 which nevertheless implies that such behavior had long been the norm.

\(^{40}\) Livy 23.2.5-8.

\(^{41}\) Livy 23.5; For traditional emphasis on Capuan faithlessness and an analysis of the breakdown of *amicitia* with Rome see Burton, *Friendship*, 250-6 who focuses as much on *fides* here as the *amicitia* which he attempts show as defining Roman policy.
land after their participation in the Latin defection of the fourth century.\textsuperscript{42} Capua's betrayal is accompanied by a massacre of whatever Romans are to be found, and Livy focuses on two instances of conspicuous loyalty to Rome in order to highlight their rarity. In the first, Pacuvius' son plots Hannibal's assassination in order to maintain faith with Rome, but his father restrains him from violating the oath of friendship he had just taken.\textsuperscript{43} In the second, Decius Magius, another Capuan notable, quickly becomes proof of Hannibal's disregard for his allies and \textit{Punica fides}: the treaty just signed had guaranteed the protection of Capuan citizens, but Hannibal has him arrested on the grounds that he is not a true Capuan because he opposed breaking with Rome.\textsuperscript{44} Hannibal's fine sentiments are thereby immediately shown to be nothing but pretense.

Livy sets up other Campanian towns as counterpoints to Capua, demonstrating that its defection was not necessary. Hannibal, quite willing to wage a campaign of terror should this fail, holds out hopes of profit to Naples and Nola, Livy notes that Nola’s political situation was much the same as Capua’s. Confronted with the same fear that motivated Pacuvius, the Nolan senate played for time and obtained a Roman garrison.\textsuperscript{45} Meanwhile, Hannibal starved Nuceria into submission, even then failing to bribe the citizens into remaining, and demolished the town.\textsuperscript{46} His reputation for cruelty comes out here in a different source, for Cassius Dio reports

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{42} Livy 23.6.1: \textit{... Vibius Virrius tempus venisse ait, quo Campani non agrum solum ab Romanis quondam per iniuriam ademptum recipere sed imperio etiam Italiae potiri possint;} Livy 22.6.6-8 also mentions, but does not believe, the tradition that they sent a delegation to Rome demanding a Campanian consul as the price of their loyalty. While not historical, this is good evidence for the Roman perception of their attitude.
\item \textsuperscript{43} Livy 23.9.
\item \textsuperscript{44} Livy 23.10.
\item \textsuperscript{45} Livy 23.14.5-13.
\item \textsuperscript{46} Livy 23.15.3-6: \textit{Eam cum aliquamdiu circumsedisset, saepe ui, saepe sollicitandis nequiquam nunc plebe, nunc principibus, fame demum in deditionem accepit, pactus ut inermes cum singulis abirent uestimentis. Deinde ut qui a principio mitis omnibus Italicis praeter Romanos uideri uellet, praemia atque honores qui remanerint ac militare secum uoluissent proposuit. Nec ea spe quumquam tenui; dilapsi omnes, quocumque hospitia aut fortuitus animi impetus tulit, per Campaniae urbes, maxime Nolam Neapolimque. Cum ferme triginta senatoribus, ac forte primus quisque, Capuam petissent, exclusi inde, quod portas Hannibali claussissent, Cumas se contulerunt. Nucerina praeda militi data est, urbs direpta atque incensa.}
\end{itemize}
that Hannibal sealed up and asphyxiated a number of Nucerian senators in a bath.\textsuperscript{47} That even Livy does not credit such extremes is a serious mark against their historicity, but the perseverance of the tradition demonstrates the failure of Hannibal's public relations. Not much later, when Hannibal besieges Accerae, its people slip away and he demolishes that empty city.\textsuperscript{48}

Thus, despite the critical military situation, Livy finds many examples of \textit{fides} throughout Italy and casts those who betrayed Rome as opportunists and demagogues.

Livy makes the contest for Nola the turning point of this pentad and the war. In spite of the Roman garrison its senators had brought in, holding Nola proves difficult in face of significant popular support for Hannibal.\textsuperscript{49} In 23.19, the entreaties of the Nolans and Acerrani compel Marcellus to remain at Nola with his legion instead of coming to the aid of Casilinum, likely indicative of further revolutionary activity, and in 23.39 another plot to kill the leading men and hand the city over is uncovered. Yet this little city continues to be an embarrassment to Hannibal, for, when he attempts to intimidate it into surrendering Marcellus and his garrison and points out \textit{quam grave Romanum imperium sociis}, he receives a strongly worded reply that the people of Nola had never been given any cause to regret their \textit{amicitia} with Rome.\textsuperscript{50} Hannibal also fails to take the city by force and heaps abuse on his soldiers, enervated by their Capuan

\textsuperscript{47} Dio 57.30; Appian \textit{Punica} 63; Zonaras 9.2; Valerius Maximus 9.6 ext.2 ; See Arthur Pomeroy, “Hannibal at Nuceria” in \textit{Historia} 38 (1989): 162-76 for this incident interpreted as an attack on \textit{fides}.

\textsuperscript{48} Livy 23.17.5-6.

\textsuperscript{49} In Livy 23.16 the plebs again stirs to betray the city. We also get a more personal anecdote on how the Romans maintained loyalty, for a Nolan, Bantius, had been found by Hannibal almost dead on the battlefield at Cannae and treated kindly, in light of which loyalty encouraged him to bring Nola over to his new benefactor. The Roman commander, however, by showing due appreciation for his merits makes him remarkably loyal. Livy 23.16.1: \textit{Hac comitate Marcelli ferocis iuuenis animus adeo est mollitus ut nemo inde sociorum rem Romanam fortius ac fidelius iuuerit.}

\textsuperscript{50} Livy 23.44.1-3: \textit{Ad ea Herennius Bassus respondit multos annos iam inter Romanum Nolanumque populum amicitiam esse, cuius neutros ad eam diem paenitere et sibi, si cum fortuna mutanda fides fuerit, sero iam esse mutare. An dedituris se Hannibali fuisse accersendum Romanorum praesidium? Cum iis qui ad sese tuendos uenissent omnia sibi et esse consociata et ad ultimum fore. Hoc conloquium abstulit spem Hannibali per proditionem recipientiis Nolae.}

83
excesses, for being unable to overcome a single legion.\textsuperscript{51} In fact, the Nolani themselves begin to lend a hand in the fight and when Marcellus returns from battle the plebs, once Hannibal’s supporters, greet him with joy. Even some Numidians and Spaniards defect to the Roman side and thereafter serve with exceptional \textit{fides} in 23.46. However, this new concord is slow to take hold, for in 24.13 the city's plebs again court Hannibal. In 24.17 hopes of treachery finally come to naught and the city never again figures in the war.

Nola and Capua function are paradigmatic examples of disaffection and defection during the Hannibalic War. In both cities, support for Hannibal stems from the lower classes and the younger, more ambitious members of the upper class who court their favor, two groups which are seen as morally suspect and whose views are automatically marginalized. Livy makes this class bias explicit in a later discussion of Croton’s defection:

\begin{quote}
  It was as if a single disease had infected all the states of Italy, causing the plebs to break with their betters; the senate favored the Romans, and the plebs was pulling the state towards the Carthaginians.\textsuperscript{52} (Livy 24.2.8)
\end{quote}

This same explanation for anti-Roman sympathies will recur throughout Livy and Polybius’ accounts of the Romans involvement in Greece. In part, this is illustrative of Rome’s strategy for controlling subordinates by winning over elites. Yet both authors apply this explanation far too readily, quickly labeling any politician they disagree with a demagogue.\textsuperscript{53} Much as with the secession of the Roman plebs, popular discontent during the Second Punic War surely found expression in or made use of Hannibal's invasion, but the simple equation of Carthaginian sympathies with revolutionary intent is a drastic oversimplification either leading to, or arising

\textsuperscript{51} Livy 23.45.
\textsuperscript{52} Livy 24.2.8: \textit{Unus velut morbus inaseras omnes Italiae civitates ut plebes ab optimatibus dissentirent, senatus Romanis faveret, plebs ad Poenos rem traheret.}
\textsuperscript{53} The aristocratic faction in Capua, seeking to establish the city’s own hegemony, was instrumental in the revolt. See Michael P. Fronda, "Hegemony and Rivalry: The Revolt of Capua Revisited" in \textit{Phoenix} 61 (2007): 83-108.
from, an unwillingness to legitimate dissatisfaction with Roman rule. We shall see that Capuan elites crop up throughout Livy’s narrative as impassioned opponents of Rome.

Capua continues to play an important role in Livy’s account, mostly as a shining example of moral turpitude. In 24.12.1 the Capuans lose their nerve as soon as the Romans undertake serious operations against them, but when they again beg for help, their remarkable indolence ruins Hannibal’s attempt to resupply the city and the commander on the spot calls them worse than beasts. Livy follows this incident with two examples of the debased fides of those who defected to Hannibal. In the first, Flavus, a Lucanian uses the murder of his Roman guest-friend to bind his people to Hannibal in quasi-sacral language; he lures the Roman commander to his death by promising to return Lucania to Rome, prefacing the murder with a speech that calls upon Roman clemency. Thereafter, the Capuans demonstrate signal audacia when a certain Badius, who had been nursed back to health by the Roman Crispinus, takes up a position before the Roman camp and calls to his friend, who expects a friendly meeting. Instead Badius heaps insults upon Crispinus and renounces his friendship lest “with public treaties broken, (Crispinus) not realize that all personal connections have been severed.” The Roman, of course, handily defeats Badius in single combat.

The Capuan repudiation of loyalty is somewhat ironic, for the city comes under increasing Roman pressure, and in 25.15 they have to beg Hannibal, who is far more concerned with taking Tarentum, for relief against two consular armies. The city thus becomes an example to the rest of Italy of Hannibal’s inability, or unwillingness, to defend his allies:

54 25.13.7: Ob id castigatis ab Hannone quod ne fames quidem, quae mutas accenderet bestias, curam eorum stimulare posset alia predicta dies ad frumentum maiore apparatu petendum.
55 Livy 25.16.6: Is mutata repente voluntate locum gratiae apud Poenum quaerens, neque transire ipse neque trahere ad defectionem Lucanos satis habuit, nisi imperatoris et eiusdem hospitis proditi capite ac sanguine foedus cum hostibus sanxisset.
56 Livy 25.18.8.
Since this was the situation at Capua, concern over holding the city and a desire to capture the Tarentine citadel were pulling Hannibal in opposite directions. Concern for Capua won out, for he saw the attention of all his allies and enemies turned toward this city, which would be an example of how defection from the Romans would turn out.57 (Livy 26.5.1)

Hannibal is, however, too late to break the siege. Just as Capua's defection signals the apparent collapse of Roman power and prompted other allies to consider changing allegiance, the city's recapture by the Romans provides a dramatic demonstration that Hannibal is either unable or insufficiently committed to the defense of his allies. The Romans, judging that Capua's defection was largely responsible for the suspect loyalty of other states and that its recapture would bring many peoples back into the fold, show a greater appreciation for the importance of allies than Hannibal. In this context, Livy is quite explicit that these traitors owed little loyalty to Hannibal but held out because of their fear of Roman punishment.

This fear retribution proves to be Hannibal's most dependable ally and, in spite of Roman attempts to mitigate it, was not unwarranted. The most explicit discussion comes not with regard to Capua, but earlier in Book 24, when a certain Altinius, one of the ringleaders of Arpi's defection, offers to betray the city back to the Romans. When younger members of the general's staff wish to punish Altinius as a traitor, Fabius agrees that they are right not to trust him, but convinces them that punishing him would be a mistake:

The elder Fabius spoke against the consul’s opinion, saying they were forgetful of their circumstances, laying down judgments as if they were at peace instead of amidst the flames of war. The result was that, although they should be taking care lest any allies desert the Roman people, they paid this no heed but were instead declaring that if anyone should come to his senses and return to his old alliance, he should be made an example of. But, if it were allowed to desert the Romans but not return to the fold, who could doubt that the Roman state would be

57 Livy 26.5.1: Cum in hoc statu ad Capuam res essent, Hannibalem diuersum Tarentinae arcis potiundae Capuaeque retinendae trahebant curae. Vicit tamen respectus Capuae in quam omnium sociorum hostiumque conuersos uidebat animos, documento futurae quaemcunque eventum defectio ab Romanis habuisset.
abandoned by all its allies and see all Italy joined by treaty to the Carthaginians?58
(Livy 24.45.4-6)

The elder statesman may make a practical point, but it is one that corresponds with the Roman virtue *clementia*. We also see here, in inverted form, the attempt to strike the right balance of force and *fides* to ensure loyalty that played itself out in Roman policy since the city first came to dominate the Latins. No reward Rome can offer will be as desirable as sovereignty and what the Romans perceived as good treatment was insufficient to ensure loyalty. Yet, while a disincentive to revolt was needed, so was presenting Rome as the least threatening possible ally.59

Livy makes the Roman treatment of Capua a model of what Burton calls “hard but fair” punishment.60 When Capua's fall is imminent and a brutal punishment has been visited upon spies in the Roman camp, Livy places a recapitulation of Capuan misdeeds in the mouth of Vibius Virrius, one of the pro-Carthaginian leaders.61 This reprobate and twenty-seven of his fellows then preempt the tortures they expect to face with suicide, but most of the Capuan senate believes that the Rome will once again be merciful.62 Upon surrendering the city they are brought *en masse* to the Roman camp as prisoners and fifty-two believed most responsible for the defection were taken to Cales and Teanum. When the two Roman commanders, Appius Claudius and Fulvius Flaccus, disagree over their treatment, Flaccus proceeds to execute the prisoners before a countermanding order from the senate can arrive. Livy stops short of

58 Livy 24.45.4-6: *Contra ea consulis pater Fabius temporum oblitos homines in medio ardore belli tamquam in pace libera de quoque arbitria agere aiebat; qui, cum illud potius agendum atque cogitandum sit si quo modo fieri possit ne qui socii a populo Romano desciscant, id non cogitent, documentum autem dicant statui oportere si quis resipiscat et antiquam societatem respiciat. Quod si abire ab Romanis liceat, redire ad eos non liceat, cui dubium esse quin breui deserta ab sociis Romana res foederibus Punicis omnia in Italia juncta uisura sit?*

59 The fate of Atinius family also casts the Romans in a more favorable light, for Hannibal seizes upon the chance to confiscate the man's property and then burns the family alive so as to seem to have acted more from anger than greed, in Livy 24.45.12-14.


61 This bit of indirect historiography is a mirror of what Livy does with Hanno at the beginning of the Second Punic War, discussed in Chapter 3, 122.

62 Livy 26.14: *Hanc orationem Virri plures cum adsensu audierunt quam forti animo id quod probabant exsequi potuerunt. maior pars senatus, multis saepe belli expertam populi Romani clementiam haud diffidentes sibi quoque placabilem fore, legatos ad dedendum Romanis Capuam decreuerunt miseruntque.*
condemnation, but does emphasize that Flaccus’ personal responsibility with two anecdotes, the first that he was given yet refused to open a letter from the senate, and the other that a Capuan at Cales, Taurea, claimed to have killed his family to keep them from being outraged and, objecting to Flaccus’ actions, was himself brutally killed.63 The deed appears distasteful and Livy clearly makes Taurea a sympathetic character, but the senate offers no recriminations. In fact, Atella and Calatia also surrender and seventy senators from these two cities are executed as ringleaders. Livy makes no further comment except to note that around 300 nobles were imprisoned at Rome and more, distributed throughout the neighboring towns, died in various ways.64 Evidently it was not the nature of the punishment that made Capua exceptional, but the city's fame; demonstrating that Roman anxiety over this case was more about presentation than practice.65

Livy’s final verdict on the punishment of Capua is one most readers would find quite surprising, for he calls it an example of Roman moderation.

Thus the matter of Capua was settled in an entirely laudable way. Harsh and swift punishment was visited upon those most guilty; most citizens were dispersed with no prospect of return; no rage was vented in fire and destruction on harmless buildings and walls; along with profit, by leaving this most noble and wealthy city unharmed, which all the neighboring peoples would have bitterly mourned if destroyed, a show of leniency was made to the allies; and a confession was wrung from the enemy of how much strength the Romans had to punish faithless allies, and how Hannibal was useless in protecting those dependent on his faith.66

(Livy 26.16.11-13)

63 Livy 26.15-16.
64 Livy 26.16.5-6: *Capuam a Calibus reditum est, Atellaque et Calatia in deditionem acceptae; ibi quoque in eos qui capita rerum erant animadversum. Ita ad septuaginta principes senatus interfeci. Trecenti ferme nobiles Campani in carcerem Romae conditi, ali per sociorum Latini nominis urbes in custodias dati, variis casibus interierunt; multitudo alia civium Campanorum venum data.*
65 For example, cf. Agrigentum in 26.40. In this case, the example prompts the rest of Sicily to come to heel.
66 Livy 26.16.11-13: *Ita ad Capuam res compositae consilio ab omni parte laudabili. Severe et celeriter in maxime noxios animadversum; multitudo civium dissipata in nullam spem reeditum; non saevitum incendiis ruinisque in tecta inoxia murosque, et cum emolumento quaesita etiam apud socios lenitatis species incolumitate urbis nobilissimae opulentissimaeque, cuius ruinis omnis Campania, omnes qui Campaniam circa accolunt populi ingemuesent; confessio expressa hosti quanta vis in Romanis ad expetendas poenas ab infidelibus sociis, et quam nihil in Hannibale auxilii ad receptos in fidem tuendos esset.*
Although Flaccus’ actions were drastic, Livy admits no doubt that those executed were only the guiltiest senators of Capua and neighboring towns. In the years that followed, Rome’s enemies would cast the treatment of Capua as a case study in Roman cruelty, yet for Livy it was another case in which the Romans are merciful to those who surrender and take great pains to punish only those who are manifestly guilty. Neither Livy nor modern readers may be comfortable with Flaccus’ brutality, yet the historian’s assessment of the Capuan settlement cannot be explained away as careless historiography.

A report in Athenaeus shows that Polybius came to a slightly different conclusion about Capua's punishment but, on the whole, corroborates the interpretation Livy reproduces of the Capuan narrative and thereby shows that this was the contemporary Roman explanation. Polybius claims that Capuan decadence surpassed Sybaris and Croton and uses this moral defect to explain their allegiance to Hannibal. Athenaeus' summary, however, has the Capuans suffering terribly at the hands of the Romans but contrasts this with the case of Petelia, where the people steadfastly held out against the Carthaginian siege until, on the brink of starvation, the Romans encouraged them to surrender and save themselves. If Athenaeus was a trustworthy reader of

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67 In 27.3 Fulvius takes care in settling various Italians and in 27.15 the Lucanians, Hirpini, and Vulceii capitulate to Fabius, receiving only verbal chastisement, and this encourages similar behavior from the Brutti. 68 Behind all of these accounts lies a Roman debate on how to treat the conquered and how best to preserve the loyalty of allies. See Levene, Hannibalic War, 214. The Capuan settlement was intended to demonstrate Roman moderation, and Livy 26.15.1-4 even frames Fulvius’ severity as an attempt to hold onto allies, for he feared giving the Capuans the opportunity to implicate others and undermine the trust they shared with Rome. Livy’s narrative does not just admit discomfort with the summary justice meted out; the two versions of the Taurea story demand it. Yet Livy can still judge Capua an example of moderation by distinguishing between individual and collective responsibility, and just as we have seen in other ethically fraught cases, emphasized senatorial debate to show that the Romans had a unique regard for propriety. This debate stems from an unprecedented event at the beginning of the next year: two conquered peoples, the Syracusans and the Capuans, came to Rome to protest their treatment. There was no legal case to be made, for as victors the Romans were within the bounds of ancient practice. Instead, these were appeals based upon moral propriety. The appellants made their cases largely because they felt they had nothing left to lose, as was true for many of the Capuans, and because of some belief that the senate had care to see that justice was done. Although the Capuan appeal was unsuccessful, the mere act of giving such a hearing and the attention to legal niceties displayed when Regulus notes that, as Roman citizens, the people have the ultimate authority on the Capuans' fate, demonstrates an above-average concern, as do the numerous individual exceptions to the punishment in the ultimate decision in 26.34.2. At least as Livy would have it, the Campanians "no longer complained of Fulvius’ cruelty, but the enmity of the gods and their own harsh fortune.” 69 The fragment is Athenaeus 12.528a, Polybius 7.1.
Polybius, then there is no contradiction between the historians, simply a slightly different perspective. In both, however, we find that the Roman tradition saw such cases in terms of a moral fault and the failure to reciprocate fides.

**Roman Apologetics in the First Samnite War: The Capuan Deditio**

Returning to Livy’s first decade and the point at which Capua entered Roman history, we find a demonstration of how the Roman historical tradition dealt cases in which the Romans broke those very agreements they claimed to hold sacred. The cause of the First Samnite War was Rome’s acceptance of Capua’s surrender, snatching it from the clutches of their current ally, the Samnites. In the case of Capua, Livy prejudices his readers by introducing the Samnites as a future enemy and focusing on the injustice of their war against Capua. Livy focuses on the senate’s reluctance to break with the Samnites and accept the Capuan *deditio*. When the senate does in fact do so it is not out of greed, but pity. Thus by focusing on the debate, Livy can present the Roman senate as uniquely attuned to demands of *fides* even when they act in bad faith. In Chapter 3 we will see that this is remarkably similar to the presentation Polybius gives to the outbreak of the First Punic War, indicating that he was following a Roman script.

Livy begins the Samnite Wars with a miniature preface in 7.29, extolling the greater mobilizations and increased threat to Rome in much the same way as he begins Books 21 and 31, the beginnings of the Second Punic and Macedonian Wars. More surprising than a preface in the middle of the book, these *maiora bella* with which Livy is concerned are not limited to the

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70 The Samnites do not enter Livy’s history on an auspicious note. He mentions the people only twice before the conflict over Capua. Their first appearance in 423 BCE is merely a chronological note that entails no contact with Rome, marking the year in which they captured Capua from the Etruscans. The second, in 411 BCE, sees them haughtily dismiss a Roman embassy seeking to buy grain: see Livy 4.37.1-2; 4.52.6; Ogilvie *Commentary*, 591-2. Having made brief but unfavorable appearance, they do not crop up again until 7.19.4 when they took notice of Roman success against Tarquinii. According to Livy 7.19.4, the Samnites sought *amicitia* but were granted a treaty, *foedere in societatem accepti*, and the formality sanctioned by a treaty, whether or not it was historical, is of great significance for the narrative, since puts significant obligations on both sides.

71 See Oakley, *Commentary* vol. 1, 382-6 for the preface to Book 6 and their use throughout Livy.
three Samnite wars, lasting from 343 to 341, 327/6 to 304, and 298-290 BCE. Livy sketches an historical trajectory that projects all at least into his forth pentad:

From this point on wars greater in terms of enemy forces, geographical extent, and duration will be told. For, in that year, arms were raised against the Sabines, a people formidable in battle and resources. The Samnite War, waged with varying fortunes, was followed by the enemy Pyrrhus, and he by the Carthaginians. What a mass of events! How many times were the greatest dangers faced so that Roman imperium was raised so high as can scarcely be maintained! The Romans’ cause for war with the Samnites, however, since they were joined in friendship and alliance, came from outside and did not arise between the nations themselves.72 (Livy 7.29.1-3)

These greater wars, and the fact that Capua saw Rome as a source of protection, indicate that by this time Rome had regained its footing.73 As in the preface to the entire work, Livy here too evinces that Roman hegemony is an achievement of which it is right to be proud. The passage underlined above, an ut clause, might be taken as a purpose clause indicating Rome’s intent to conquer, the number of words emphasizing magnitude and quantity signal a clause of logical result. Thus Livy’s meaning is that the dangers and enemies faced by Rome were so great that such imperium was the only possible result.74 Either way, since this passage also bases the progression of Roman power upon a series of enemies, this passage is difficult to assimilate to an active process of conquest.75 Much like the prefaces of Books 21 and 31, Livy’s emphasis is on

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72 Livy 7.29.1-3: Maiora iam hinc bella et viribus hostium et longinquitate vel regionum vel temporum [spatio] quibus bellatum est dicentur. Namque eo anno adversus Samnites, gentem opibus armisque validam, mota arma; Samnitium bellum ancipiti Marte gestum Pyrrhus hostis, Pyrrhum Poeni secuti. Quanta rerum moles! Quotiens in extrema periculorum ventum, ut in hanc magnitudinem quae vix sustinetur erigi imperium posset! Belli autem causa cum Samnitibus Romanis, cum societate amicitiaeque iuncti essent, extrinsecus venit, non orta inter ipsos est.
73 Auliard, Diplomatie, 324-35. In fact, Rome’s position in regard to her traditional enemies, the Volsci, was changing dramatically with the acquisition of the Pomptine district and then Capua. Once a major threat to Rome’s existence, the Volsci found themselves increasingly hemmed in by Rome and her allies, (see Oakley, Commentary vol. 2, 93), yet Livy’s narrative does not acknowledge the change. Without maps to show the continued march of Roman power the further-flung names of Roman settlements and allies do not fully illustrate the changing geopolitical situation. Thus, when the Volsci are continually shown on the offensive, the sense of danger to Rome persists, obscuring the degree to which Roman power had advanced and become a threat instead to the Volsci. 74 If the ut clause is read as denoting purpose, it appears to damingly signal Roman intent to conquer, yet this is not borne out by his actual historical narrative, as first indicated by the external source of the conflict.
75 Whatever Roman relations were to the Tarentines who called upon him for aid, Pyrrhus was remembered as a foreign invader of Italy.
the challenges faced by the Republic and the glory won by meeting them, of which Roman 
imperium is a result and manifestation.

The external origin of this war with the Samnites is of extreme importance to Livy for 
softening the charge that the Romans broke fides. Thus Livy provides a chapter-long summary of 
the events leading up to the Capuan embassy to Rome, first specifying that the Samnites had 
begun an unjust war, iniusta arma (7.29.4), against the Sidicini merely because they were in a 
position to do so and then that the Samnites transferred hostilities to Capua once they realized 
that this city would make far better prey. Reduced to desperation, the Capuans then send envoys 
begging assistance to Rome. Denying that the Samnites have any true grievance with Capua, 
they dwell on their enemy’s cupidity, twice using the phrase cupiditas explenda for Samnite 
motivations.76 This, however, falls towards the end of their speech, and the Capuans fail to fully 
understand and assimilate their case to Roman ethics. First, after anticipating the objection that 
the Samnites were already Rome’s associates and fully outlining their misfortune in 7.29.1-4, 
they launch into a long description of their city’s wealth, and the advantages, both material and 
political, that Rome would gain from the alliance. This initial appeal comes off as a bribe, 
implying that the Romans share the same motivations as the manifestly unjust Samnites.77 The 
Capuans also blunder in saying that they only nominally fought on behalf of their allies, the 
Sidicini, and were actually looking out for their own interests and preservation. This famously 
luxurious city is, therefore, morally suspect from the very beginning.

The ultimate significance of the initial Capuan appeal, particularly its missteps, is that it 
did not succeed. Beyond simply characterizing the Capuans and explaining their later perfidy, it

76 Livy 7.30.14, 16.
77 For the similarity of this speech to the Corcyreans’ in Thucydides 1.24, see Oakley, Commentary vol. 2, 294. This 
comparison, however, sheds little light on the Roman situation, except in that the Romans appear to place a greater 
stock in their principles than the Athenians, and Livy seems to be making a literary allusion rather than equating the 
two situations.
allows Livy to establish the Samnites as unjust and sidesteps the issue of the Romans’ breach of their *foedus* and *amicitia* with the Samnites by paradoxically demonstrating that at this moment *fides* was the senate’s foremost concern:

> Then with the ambassadors led out the senate deliberated. Even though many recognized that Capua, the greatest and wealthiest city in Italy, in possession of the most fertile farmland and opportunely situated on the sea, would be great storehouse for the Romans to use against the vagaries of the harvest, so ingrained was their consideration of *fides* before utility that the consul, on the senate’s authority, responded “Campanians, the senate judges you worthy of aid, but it is only just to join in friendship with you in such a way as to not violate any older association or alliance. The Samnites are allied to us by a treaty; thus we refuse to wage a war against the Samnites which would offend the gods more than men. We will, as is right and just, send legates to our friends and allies asking that no harm come to you.” 78 (Livy 7.31.1-2)

Prepared for this eventuality, the Capuans gave themselves over to the Romans, forfeiting their very sovereignty. Rather than continue to stress the ethical inconsistency, Livy focuses on the Capuan ambassadors’ calculation and the senators’ emotional reaction: pity. By describing the supplication and the senators’ thoughts on the mutability of fortune (their pity is actually enhanced by Capua’s negative qualities, *luxuria* and *superbia*), Livy places Roman motivations on the opposite end of the moral spectrum from those of the Samnites. Our historian also takes great pains to show the rectitude with which the Romans followed up on this event, apologetically sending the ambassadors to the Samnites to inform them of the Capuan *deditio* and receiving an insulting response. After this, the senate sent fetials and went to war.79 The Livian account of how this conflict with the Samnites began, therefore, goes to great lengths to redeem an extremely problematic episode which can easily be interpreted as manifest proof of

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78 Livy 7.31.1-2: *Semmotis deinde legatis, cum consultus senatus esset, etsi magnae parti urbs maxima opulentissimaque Italiae, uberrimus ager marique propinquus ad varietates annonae horreum populi Romani fore videbatur, tamen tanta utilitate fides antiquior fuit responditque ita ex auctoritate senatus consul. ‘Auxilio uos, Campani, dignos censet senatus; sed ita uobiscum amicitiam institui par est, ne qua uetustior amicitia ac societas uioletur. Samnites nobiscum foedere iuncti sunt; itaque arma, deos prius quam homines uiolatura, aduersus Samnites uobis negamus; legatos, sicut fas iusque est, ad socios atque amicos precatum mittemus, ne qua uobis uis fiat.’*

79 Livy 7.31-32.
Roman hypocrisy. Livy makes the case that even then the Romans took pains to act in accordance with justice and did not seek out empire, but were put into that position by Samnite injustice and their own *misericordia*, a positive moral characteristic. In light of Capua’s later betrayals of Rome, Livy’s treatment of this episode could even be taken to imply that the Romans were deceived concerning the nature of this new ally.

Livy also palliates what could be seen as a betrayal of the Samnites by characterizing them in terms similar to the inherently hostile Volsci. And, in some ways, this is a natural comparison. Both peoples stemmed from mountainous areas and were, to some extent, less urbanized than those inhabiting valleys and coasts, exception being made for the Volscian “capital,” Antium. They are, therefore, susceptible to being stereotyped as unsophisticated yet hardy and fierce in their rural way. To this end, Livy associates the Samnites with *ferocia*, usually a quality characterized by excess, and shows them repeatedly squandering their strength in impulsive and irrational acts. Twice in two chapters the Samnites act *ferociter*, first in their response to the Roman envoys and then when they first spy the Roman camp: “each fiercely demanded that his leaders give him their standard and affirmed that in bringing aid to the Campanian the Roman would hit upon the same fortune that the Campanians had in aiding the Sidicini.” This finds an immediate contrast in M. Valerius Corvus’ exhortation to his men that, since the Campanians were themselves *imbelles*, the Samnite victories count for little and his

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80 Strangely, Moore, *Artistry* has no discussion of *misericordia*, yet it occurs five times in Book 7 alone, both of Rome and her enemies.
81 In fact, characterization of the Samnites as barbarous has a significant history in Roman thought, even as late as the Social War. See Emma Dench, *From Barbarians to New Men: Greek, Roman, and Modern Perceptions of Peoples of the Central Apennines* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 98-103, particularly for claims to morality through austerity and the possibility of theirs being perceived at times as an “opulent barbarism.” For such peoples, this separate identity had multiple moral valences, invoked here in its hostile sense, but equally capable of hearkening back to rustic austerity and virtue. See also Edward Togo Salmon, *Samnium and the Samnites* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967) and *The Making of Roman Italy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982) ch. 1.
82 Livy 7.31.11; 7.32.4: *Ut vero castra Romana viderunt, ferociter pro se quisque signum duces poscere, adfirmare eadem fortuna Romanum Campano iaturum opem qua Campanus Sidicino tulerit.*
men should not be terrified by the new enemy. The consul is described as “as fierce in words as skilled in military matters;” every Roman would also remember that Corvus had sought his commander’s permission before answering the challenge to single combat with a Gaul that earned him his cognomen. His speech, recounting Roman exploits, and followed by Livy’s account of his good generalship, contrasts Roman discipline and good order with an almost barbarian impetuosity on the part of the Samnites. As the battle begins, Livy reiterates that the Samnites’ confidence in their recent exploits caused them to act with ferocia, whereas the Romans were emboldened by their long history. While the Samnites give the Romans the most difficult fight they have yet encountered, the Roman victory is attributed to their redoubling their efforts at the critical moment. The Samnites later ascribe their flight to terror at the Romans’ determined countenances, exactly the sort of behavior expected of impetuous and less civilized peoples, who lack discipline and staying power.

The other consul’s campaign further heightens the contrast between the Romans’ rational valor and the Samnites’ unthinking ferocity. When, unfamiliar with the terrain, the consul leads his army into an ambush, the tribune Publius Decius notes that the Samnites have neglected to occupy a hill overlooking their own camp and leads a daring mission to hold that position and cover the greater part of the army’s escape. In his proposal to the consul he calls the Samnites blind and then once he occupies the hill, they remain uncertain, which of the two enemies to attack until night compels them to return to camp. In a further failure of foresight, they then...
miss the opportunity to blockade Decius’ smaller force. Decius notes this blunder in his
exhortation to his men:

“What is this ignorance of warfare and sluggishness of theirs, or how did they
ever defeat the Sidicini and Campanians? You see how their standards are sped
hither and thither and how one moment they all collect together only to disperse,
but not one of them set to work even though we might have been barricaded by
now!”87 (Livy 7.34.13)

The harangue and Livy’s narrative of their escape further stresses Samnite laziness. A Roman
shout causes *trepidationem tumultumque* and similarly, when the reunited army catches the
Samnites scattered and unable to bring their army into order the next day, their own *clamor* and
*pavor* puts many to flight.88 The third and final battle of the year, Livy 7.37, also results in a
Roman victory because the Samnites incautiously disperse and fail to hold to military discipline.
Through these battle narratives, Livy characterizes the Samnites as a semi-barbaric people,
naturally fierce, yet unable to moderate their passions and put their military strength to good use.
Being warlike and lacking good judgment, their moral faculties are underdeveloped and their
enmity to Rome appears unavoidable. Just as with the Volsci and Gauls, Livy uses the
characterization of a people to obviate the need to fully justify making war upon them.

**Livy’s Second Samnite War and the Caudine Forks**

The Roman surrender at the Caudine Forks and subsequent repudiation of the agreed
peace, which had saved the Roman army from annihilation, during the Second Samnite War
posed a serious problem for ancient Roman historians. Roman *fides* was gravely compromised
by Rome’s decision to renege on the terms agreed to by the consul Spurius Postumius. The
Roman tradition’s attempt to redeem this action generated a controversy over whether

87 Livy 7.34.13: *Quaenam illa inscitia belli ac pigritia est? Aut quonam modo isti ex Sidicinis Campanisque victoriam pepererunt? Huc atque illuc signa moveri ac modo in unum conferri modo educi videtis; opus quidem incipit nemo, cum iam circumdati vallo potuerimus esse.*
Postumius’ agreement was a *foedus*, thus binding the Roman people, or a *sponsio*, which only implicated him and his staff. Livy attempts to save Rome’s *fides* by weighing in on this strain of legalistic justification and by building the episode into a larger narrative in which Livy deploys the Roman theology of victory. By admitting to a limited degree of wrongdoing in rejecting Samnite attempts at reparations (he does not judge that the repudiation was wrong), Livy can frame the Samnite debacle as divine retribution; the Romans’ eventual success thereby becomes divine legitimation of their eventual hegemony.

Livy stresses that the Second Samnite War arose from a Samnite breach of the treaty which compelled the Romans to defend their allies. He also relies heavily on his signature technique of highlighting the occasional conspicuous case of Roman wrongdoing, explaining it as the result of special circumstances, and introducing an authoritative Roman judgment against such behavior within the narrative. This use of what Sacks calls “indirect historiography,” authorial commentary by means of characters within the narrative, isolates the event from the reader’s general perception of Roman character.89 Despite the Romans taking their side, the Samnites remained hostile after the Latin War and in 332 BCE a dictator had to be appointed on the rumor that the Samnites were arming for war; Livy soon mentions that they had been suspect for two years but were distracted from a Roman war by Alexander of Epirus.90 Then in 330 BCE Fabrateria and Luca, Volscian settlements, appealed for Roman aid against the Samnites, who demurred because they were unprepared for war, not because they wanted peace.91 The Romans were lenient to Privernum after its defeat precisely because this city’s proximity to Samnium

90 Livy 8.11.2, 8.18-19. The reason for the Samnite hostility is not given. It may be the natural friction between two powerful neighbors, or because the Romans had been prosecuting successful wars against the Sidicini in Livy 8.15-17 (337-333 BCE), who the Samnites had themselves coveted, and thus extending into their sphere of interest.
91 Livy 8.19.3: *Missi tum ab senatu legati denuntiatumque Samnitibus ut eorum populorum finibus vim abstinerent; valuitque ea legatio, non tam quia pacem volebant Samnites quam quia nondum parati erant ad bellum.*
would be of use. Much like the First Samnite War, actual hostilities appear precipitated by external actors, in this case the Greek cities of Neapolis and Palaepolis, encouraged to act against Roman interests by the example of Samnite faithlessness towards Rome.

The trigger for the war was Palaepolis’ predatory action against Romans in the area, rejection of the fetial’s demands, and admission of a Samnite garrison “more by the compulsion of the Nolani than by Greek goodwill.” When the Romans sent ambassadors to the Samnites and attempted to discuss their grievances, an unnamed Samnite replied that arms, not words, would decide “whether Samnite or Roman shall rule over Italy.” Refusing diplomacy and anticipating the Romans in framing their dispute as a competition for empire besmirches the Samnites, in spite of the fact that tensions were on the rise because of the rapid extension of Roman power. It is important that the Samnites are the ones to sever their relationship with Rome; the Romans themselves had, according to Livy, attempted to turn their conversation to their common allies. The Samnites had not yet acted directly against Rome, but in involving themselves in the Palaeopolitan affair and then refusing negotiation had broken the fides that bound the nations. Rome’s advancing power may have been the threat that drove Samnite hostility, but the Roman tradition emphasizes that the Samnites broke off negotiations.

The contrast between Roman and Samnite character is furthered by the outrageous behavior of the Samnite garrison towards Palaepolis, because of which “surrender to the Romans

92 Livy 8.20.11-21.10, also endorsing the sentiment that peace is best obtained through mercy and gratitude.
93 Note the wordplay with fido Livy 8.22.7: Haec civitas cum suis viribus tum Samnitium infidae adversus Romanos societati freta, sive pestilentiae quae Romanam urbem adorta nuntiabatur fiden, multa hostilia adversus Romanos agrum Campanum Falernumque incolentes fecit. See also Oakley Commentary vol. 2, 638-40 for the background to the war.
94 Livy 8.23.1.Dionysius’ expanded annalistic account of proceedings at Neapolis shows a pattern class bias prevalent in Roman historiography. In 15.6.1 the better men tend to favor Rome, while popular politics tend the other way.
95 Livy 8.23.9: Samnis Romanus imperio Italiam regat decernamus.
96 Note the strategic foundation of Fregellae in 328 BCE, Livy 8.22.1-2, conveniently situated to watch over Privernum and the other Volsci in the area. Livy 8.23.6 shows that this town was as much a guard against, and irritation to, the Samnites.
97 Livy 8.23.8: Cum Romanus legatus ad discceptandum eos ad communes socios atque amicos vocaret...
seemed the least of possible evils.” While Livy does include the anti-Roman position, voiced by the Tarentines, their actions immediately contradict their complaints. They frame the Roman occupation of Palaepolis as part of an aggressive program of conquest and cast the Samnites as the last resistance to total Roman domination of Italy, yet they had initially offered aid to Palaepolis and failed fulfill their promise. If there were extenuating circumstances, Livy thoroughly occludes them, showing only their apparently hypocritical indignation at Palaepolis’ surrender, “as if the Palaepolitans had abandoned them rather than the other way around.” As often, Livy appears content with discrediting Rome’s enemies and does not directly dispute their hostile claims, perhaps because they were often true. Rome was engaged in hegemonic rivalry with Samnium, the only possible opposition to the south, and this position was a source of pride, not an embarrassment. Although most Roman actions are seen as the result of enemy intransigence and can be understood defensively, cases such as that of Palaepolis demonstrate that this was not the Romans’ own understanding.

The issue of justice and the gods’ favor emerges prior to the disaster, when Livy reports that the Samnites judged their losses divine punishment for an “impious war undertaken in violation of a treaty” and that their fault had to be expiated. They arrested those they judged responsible for their policy and handed over them, the body of their leader, who had committed suicide, and their accumulated booty. The Romans rejected this as a sham deditio, although the Samnite decision to use fetials, adopting the custom of the state they hoped to appease, appears a striking act of contrition. Despite the Romans’ mistake in rejecting the surrender, every detail in

98 Livy 8.25.8: Postremo levissimum malorum deditio ad Romanos visa.
99 Livy 8.27.2: Namque Tarentini, cum rem Palaepolitanam vana spe auxilii aliquandii sustinuissent, postquam Romanos urbe potitos accepere, velut destituti ac non qui ipsi destituisissent, increpare Palaepolitanos, ira atque invidia in Romanos furere...
100 Livy 8.39.10: Hoc demum proelium Samnitium res ita infregit, ut omnibus conciliis fremerent minime id quidem mirum esse, si impio bello et contra foedus suscepero, infestoribus merito des quam hominibus nihil prospere agerent; expiandum id bellum magno mercede luendumque esse.
this narrative seems tailor-made to reinforce the Roman schema for understanding such conflicts: not only do they use Roman forms, but the enemy admit their guilt and use it to explain their defeats by espousing a Roman principle, that victory follows from the gods as a reward for justice.\textsuperscript{101} It is a principle that Livy expected his readers to recognize just as with the defeat at the Allia; and, just like Livy’s account of the Gallic sack, the Caudine Forks episode hosts a temporary swap of Roman and Samnite character.

Book 9 begins with the Samnite commander, Gaius Pontius, authoritatively pronouncing that the Romans’ rejection of their attempted restitution was unjust and had alienated the gods.\textsuperscript{102} His speech uses the Romans’ own weapons against them by once again acknowledging Samnite wrongdoing in violating the previous treaty, reiterating the opinion that this impiety had turned the gods against them and caused their defeat. Insisting that this sin had been expiated by their attempt to offer redress, Pontius excoriates the Romans for their hypocrisy and impiety, claiming that the gods are now on the Samnite side. This is no empty boast, and Livy describes his words as both true and prophetic, for the Romans quickly suffer defeat.\textsuperscript{103} The consul Postumius hastily leads his army into the Samnite trap in the Caudine Forks and is forced to surrender and pass under the yoke, but Livy avoids playing up the consul’s incompetence. Instead he implies that Postumius’ recklessness stemmed from a desire to quickly aid allies and characterizes the victorious Samnites as deceitful, not brave.\textsuperscript{104} The Samnites are almost as surprised by their success as the Romans and Pontius needs to consult his father, Herennius, on what action to take;

\textsuperscript{101} Livy 8.39.13: De eo coacti referre praetores decretum fecerunt ut Brutulus Papius Romanis dederetur et cum eo praeda omnis Romana captivique ut Romam mitterentur quaeque res per fetiales ex foedere repetitae essent secundum ius fasque restituerentur. Strangely, Oakley, Commentary vol. 2, 760-70, despite the length of the entry on this section, makes no mention of the fetials or the formal language of the Samnite action.

\textsuperscript{102} Livy 9.1.3-11.

\textsuperscript{103} Livy 9.2.1: Haec non laeta magis quam vera vaticinatus...

\textsuperscript{104} Oakley, Commentary vol. 3, 15, 48-9, attributing this, at least in part, to the historian’s plan to redeem Postumius through his heroic self-sacrifice. For the Samnites and fraus hostilis see p.61. This attempt to exculpate rashness also figures in Livy’s account of Lake Trasimene, 22.3.7.
this emphasizes that the victors were ill-prepared for a success that will prove all too fleeting.

The old man’s sage advice was to either completely destroy the army or reconcile with the Romans, whose persistence he flatteringly describes. Yet perhaps what is most striking is that, just as Samnite reparations took on a Roman form, Herrenius’ recommendations closely resemble Rome’s own foreign policy in that he sees no options except total victory or establishing peace and *amicitia* by means of *beneficia*.106

Instead, Pontius compels Postumius to agree to peace on humiliating terms, sending the Romans under the yoke and requiring that they make major territorial concessions. Significantly, some of the Samnites slay a few individual Romans as they submit to their public degradation, a parallel to the Gauls adding weight to the scales while measuring out Rome’s ransom. Although these incidents elicit no comment from Livy or any of his characters, they accomplish a great deal by implying that these agreements had already been broken by the enemy. What actually became an issue was whether Postumius’ agreement was a *foedus*, which had binding force upon the Roman people, or a *sponsio*, which only bound its guarantors. Postumius took the latter interpretation and advocated that the state refuse to acknowledge the agreement, since it was not ratified by the people, and hand him and his officers over to the Samnites.107 This was a vexed historical question, and Livy explicitly states that the agreement at Caudium was a *sponsio*, while informing us that Claudius Quadrigarius took the other view. In his version of the narrative, Livy goes so far as to have Postumius make Pontius aware that he did not have the authority to make a *foedus* on the spot, which places some degree of responsibility on the Samnite for his poor

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105 For Herennius Pontius’ advocacy of extreme positions as part of an independent philosophical or wisdom tradition, see Philip Horkey, “Herennius Pontius: The Construction of a Samnite Philosopher” in *CA* 30 (2011): 119-47.

106 Livy 9.3.10: *priore se consilio, quod optimum duceret, cum potentissimo populo per ingens beneficium perpetuam firmare pacem amicitiamque; altero consilio in multas aetates, quibus amissis duobus exercitibus had facile receptura vires Romana res esset, bellum differre; tertium nullum consilium esse.*

107 The heroic *exemplum* of Postumius’ willingness to sacrifice himself for the state thus begins to overshadow both the shameful defeat and the issue of the justice of the course of action he advocates.
judgment. It is, however, almost universally accepted that the sponsio tradition was a later annalistic fiction, somehow intertwined with the surrender at Numantia in 137 BCE. When Postumius rose to speak in the senate and proposed his own surrender to void the agreement, he put his case as simply as possible:

“This declaration will stand as witness for whether I spared myself or your legions when I bound myself by an agreement that was either shameful or necessary. The Roman people, however, since it was made without the people’s consent, cannot be bound by this, nor is anything owed to the Samnites besides our bodies.” (Livy 9.8.4-5)

With another stroke of indirect historiography, Livy lingers on the senate’s admiration for the man and embeds the argument that only a total return to pre-agreement conditions could be fair within a cowardly ploy by the tribunes to save themselves. By first focusing the debate on the tribune’s sacrosanct status and contrasting their characters with Postumius’ spirit of self-sacrifice, Livy manages to assimilate dissent to tribunician demagoguery and use his readers’ class bias to avoid the thornier legal and ethical issues inherent in the episode.

The actual surrender scene Livy presents, however, is deeply troubling and comes close to undermining the claim of upright Roman behavior made by the larger narrative of loss and re-acquisition of divine favor. Livy clearly intends to make Postumius into a shining exemplum, relating his insistence that he be bound tight in 9.10.7, yet when Postumius attempts to manufacture a diplomatic incident by declaring that he is now a Samnite and striking the Roman

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108 Livy 9.5.1. See Oakley, Commentary vol. 3, 84-5. The theme of poor Samnite judgment also permeates their tactical choices throughout the war, as in 9.14.6,

109 For the various correspondences see Oakley, Commentary vol. 3, 27-34. Note that it is not just the foedus/sponsio question, but the possible invention of the entire tale of a repudiated agreement that is at issue. See 30 in particular for the idea that the annalists invented victories to compensate for a defeat and then found themselves in need of a reason for the Romans to resume the war after concluding a peace with the Samnites.

110 Livy 9.8.4-5: quae sententia testis erit mihine an legionibus vestris pepercerim, cum me seu turpi seu necessaria sponsione obstrinxi; qua tamen, quando iniussu populi facta est, non tenetur populus Romanus, nec quicquam ex ea praeterquam corpora nostra debentur Samnitibus.
ambassador, he reduces the proceedings to absurdity. Gaius Pontius then launches into a speech that begins and ends with Postumius’ creative use of his knee, asserting that the Roman would only make such a mockery of their agreements if he didn’t believe in the gods at all. Repeatedly calling invoking the gods and mentioning fides three times, Pontius makes a persuasive case, interpreting the deditio which he refuses as an attempt to deceive the gods. Within the context of Livy’s work, Pontius’ speech undermines its own argument with its use of exempla from Roman history to demonstrate a pattern of deceit. Pontius makes special mention of the hostages given to Porsenna and the Roman attempt to ransom the city from the Gauls:

When beaten will you never lack for an excuse to break your word? You gave hostages to Porsenna; you deceitfully stole them away; you ransomed your state from the Gauls with gold; they were slaughtered while receiving it; you pledged peace with us that we might return your captured legions; now you treat this peace as false. And you always clothe your fraud with a specious legality. (Livy 9.11.6-7)

The amount of discussion Livy provided for these episodes shows that they were potentially embarrassing parts of the tradition that Roman authors felt compelled to justify, yet Livy has already done so and his readers presumably know that Postumius’ interpretation is wrong. Readers are likely to remember that the Romans did return the escaped hostage, Cloelia, to king Porsenna. Unlike Pontius, the king accepted the gesture and laid the foundations of fides. The example of the Gauls also works against Pontius, for both Samnites and Gauls immediately violate the terms of these agreements. The use of Roman exempla by an enemy to discredit the

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111 Livy 9.10.10: Haec dicenti fetiali Postumius genu femur quanta maxime poterat vi perculit et clara voce ait se Samnitem civem esse, illum legatum [fetiale] a se contra ius gentium violatum: eo iustius bellum gesturos. Strangely, Oakley has no comment on this.  
112 I read his comment in 9.11.3, “Sed quid ego te appello, qui te captum victori cum qua potes fide restituis?, “ as ironic rather than an admission of some degree of correct behavior on Postumius’ part or as slippage from Livy’s authorial view.  
113 Livy 9.11.6-7: Nunquamne causa defiet cur victi pacto non stetis? Obsides Porsinnae dedisti; furto eos subduxistis. Auro civitatem a Gallis redemistis; inter accipiendum aurum caesi sunt. Pacem nobiscum pepigistis ut legiones vobis captas restitueremus; eam pacem inritam facitis. Et semper aliquam fraudi speciem iuris imponitis.  
114 Livy 9.5.2 and 5.48.9 respectively.
Romans is a favored device of Livy. The rhetorical strategy Livy gives to these enemies consistently backfires, because they offer hostile interpretations at odds readers’ own understanding of Roman history, which Livy has already shaped.

Nevertheless, Livy does not remove all ambiguity, but follows the speech with the comment “and they (the guarantors of the sponsio) returned unharmed from Caudium to the Roman camp, certainly having fulfilled their private obligation (fides), and perhaps that of Rome.”\textsuperscript{115} The Romans did meet with success afterward, indicating that the gods’ favor had been reclaimed, and the Samnites quickly realized their foolishness in not following Herrenius Pontius’ advice. The source of the return of divine favor must be that Samnites were placed in the position of refusing recompense, just as the Romans had earlier.\textsuperscript{116} If Livy’s readers were not too troubled by this episode, part of the reason has to be ethnic characterization and the overwhelming weight of the previous eight books’ accounts of Roman righteousness.\textsuperscript{117} Livy's Romans need not be perfect, but if they adhere to a higher standard, or follow the same standard more closely, then they are at least as justified in their actions as their neighbors. In this difficult episode we can, therefore, see just how important ethnic characterization is to Livy’s history and the Roman discourse it synthesized. The Romans believed that acting rightly did not guarantee

\textsuperscript{115} Livy 9.11.13: \textit{Et illi quidem, forsitan et publica, sua certe liberata fide ab Caudio in castra Romana inviolati redierunt.} Livy shows himself willing to acknowledge Roman faults and it would be perverse to think he wished to fully paper-over the ethical issues. Never taking the side of Rome’s opponents, he provides enough justification to spare the state opprobrium while leaving room for a discussion amongst Romans of the justice of Roman actions.

\textsuperscript{116} Oakley, \textit{Commentary} vol. 3, 17-9: “As elsewhere in L., divine favour returns to the Romans when divine law and ritual have been respected. After Sp. Postumius in his first speech has stressed the importance of religion (8.6) and prayed to the gods (9.8-10) and in his second has emphasized the sanctity of treaties (9.4), after the tribunes (the latter albeit after some forceful persuasion has compelled them to abdicate from their sacrosanct office) have voluntarily agreed to hand themselves over to the enemy (19.1) and after the ceremony of the handing over of the sponsores has been scrupulously performed (10.6-10), the gods are soon shown to be on the Roman side (14.4): ‘auspicia secunda esse, Tarentini, pullarius nuntiat; litatum praeterea est egregie: auctoribus dis, ut videtis, ad rem gerendam proficiscimur’. This state of affairs contrasts sharply with the earlier claim of Pontius in 1.11, then justified, that the gods were leading the Samnites.” Note also that, as usual, success itself is proof of the gods' favor.

\textsuperscript{117} W. Liebeschuetz “The Religious Position of Livy’s History.” in \textit{JRS} 57 (1967): 44-55, 46, “The Romans are felt to be humanly if not morally justified,” because the reader has been brought to recognize that they could never live with such a disgrace, while Livy himself recognizes that history is too complicated to allow for a simple moral judgment.
that the gods would grant success, but it was at least a prerequisite. Combined with a record of
success, this naturally leads to the idea that the Romans were characteristically just, and their
opponents were not. The Caudine Forks episode demonstrates that if events themselves did not
make the strongest claim for the Romans being in the right, ethnic characterization could pick up
some of the slack.

This issue of characterization, however, only comes fully into play to the extent that
Livy’s reader doubts that surrendering Postumius actually freed Rome for war with the Samnites.
Since the versions given in Roman histories almost always support Roman actions, the effect of
national characters is to provide an explanation for the Romans’ enemies’ bad behavior rather
than over-determine the justification of any given casus belli. To be sure, Livy’s forsitān
indicates that there was room for such doubt, but the reaction of the senate in the similar situation
at Numantia in 137/6 BCE indicates that this doubt was rather less than that which modern
readers might entertain. In the Numantine debacle, the Roman Mancinus, who had surrendered
and made a similarly unacceptable peace treaty, was surrendered to the enemy in order to expiate
the senate’s rejection of the treaty. The points of contention preserved in our sources for
Numantia and Caudium concern whether or not the agreement bound the Roman people, with
little concern as to the spirit of the agreement or whether such a repudiation was deceptive.
Where there is anxiety, it is expressed at the level of Livy’s own narrative, while the historical
controversy on whether the agreement was a foedus or sponsio implies that, if the latter, Roman
actions were simply and evidently justified. This leads to the conclusion that this legalistic
approach to ethics was, at least up to Livy’s time, relatively unproblematic. Thus, such legalism
was actually the wellspring of Roman ethics rather than an artful dodge.
Chapter 3
Case Studies in the First and Second Punic Wars

Livy and Polybius on the First Punic War

Livy’s second decade, covering the final victory over the Samnites and Etruscans as well Pyrrhus of Epirus’ invasion of Italy, an event which seems to have convinced the Romans that they could ignore developments beyond the shores of Italy only at their own peril, and the First Punic War, which established Rome as more than a regional power and spurred the development of provincial organization in Sicily, has been lost to history. Nevertheless, the Roman understanding of the First Punic War can still be glimpsed in the Periochae, brief book-by-book epitomies of Livy, and, most importantly, in Polybius. Except for the censure he lays upon the Roman seizure of Sardinia, Polybius' history of this period is also largely consonant with what we might expect from Livy, had his account survived. Polybius made extensive use of Roman sources, yet we find him ranging over the breadth of the Greek historiographical tradition for material, often including outside interpretations of Roman actions and exercising independent judgment. This license is remarkable, for Polybius was a political prisoner at Rome and dependent for the privileges he enjoyed upon Scipio Aemilianus, the conqueror of Carthage. Scipio’s patronage implies that Polybius, despite his position, was not a hostile witness to Roman

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1 For Rome’s dealings with Pyrrhus and the Italiote Greek city of Tarentum, see Eckstein, Anarchy, 147-58.
For this reason, and because Livy found Polybius’ history agreeable enough to use heavily from Book 21 on, if not earlier, it is likely that the Greek’s account of the First Punic War was not at significant factual variance with the preferred Roman version and likely reproduced the Roman *casus belli*.

For the First Punic War, Polybius made use of both Fabius Pictor and the pro-Carthaginian historian Philinus of Agrigentum; he may even have reproduced some of the latter’s hostile judgments. This would not have been too objectionable since Polybius’ criticism of Rome is largely confined to single events and he succeeded admirably in synthesizing his sources, producing a narrative that shows both powers at their acme. Moreover, while Polybius did present the Carthaginian side, his narrative focalization is on the Romans, and their own justifications for the war are on full display. Judging from the *Periochae*, Livy seems to have left out the Carthaginian position and taken a moralistic tone. Polybius may focus more on practical considerations, but in both versions the Romans felt the need to justify their hegemony not just by power, but by principle. Instead of invoking some near-absolute right, their program was based on defending allies and responding to perceived Punic perfidy.

Polybius’ version of the outbreak of the First Punic War justifies Roman intervention in Sicily with the same rhetorical strategy Livy used to make the Roman acceptance of Capua’s *deditio* of 343 BCE palatable. In both episodes, the Romans are confronted with a choice

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4 F.W. Walbank, “Polybius, Philinus, and the First Punic War” in *CQ* 39 (1945): 1-18, for Polybius’ use of Philinus, and the likelihood that the indictment of Regulus’ hubris and the Roman attempts to use brute force in all things, as exemplified by their heedlessness of stormy waters, come from Philinus. For Polybius’ discussion of the respective and extreme biases of Fabius and Philinus see Pol. 1.14-15, and a further explicit citation of Fabius in 1.58.5.
between principle and expediency and choose the later, yet the narratives stress their pained deliberations in order to make them appear exceptional in their concern for propriety. According to Polybius, the Mamertines, Italian mercenaries who had treacherously seized the Sicilian city of Messene, sent to Rome seeking support against Carthage and Syracuse in 264 BCE. The Romans had good reasons not to aid the Mamertines, for they had just severely punished the Campanian allies, whom they had sent to garrison Rhegium at the city’s own request, for brutally seizing the city in much the same way that the Mamertines took Messene. Polybius twice uses πίστις, which seems here to function as a translation of fides, in describing the affair at Rhegium, and states clearly that aiding the Mamertines would be difficult to justify.6

[The Romans], in no way ignorant of [the ethical inconsistency of aiding the Mamertines], yet perceiving that the Carthaginians had subjugated not only Libya but much of Spain, and were even then in control of all the islands around the Sardinian and Tyrrhenian seas, were concerned that if the Carthaginians took control of Sicily they would be oppressive and fearful neighbors, since they would encircle them and loom over every part of Italy. It was clear that, if the Mamertines received no aid, the Carthaginians would quickly subdue Sicily. For, having prevailed and taken possession of Messene, they would in a short time take Syracuse because they would already be the masters of almost all Sicily. Foreseeing this and deeming it necessary to not abandon Messene or allow the Carthaginians to build a bridge, so to speak, into Italy, they debated for a long time but, for the reasons above, came to no decision. For the moral inconsistency of aiding the Mamertines seemed of equal consequence to the advantages of giving aid.7 (Polybius 1.10.5-11.2)

5 Pol. 1.10.5-8.
6 In the first case it refers to their obligations, and in the second, Rome’s reputation for fulfilling those obligations. See Pol. 1.7.7: “So long as the garrison at Rhegium acted properly, it maintained faith,” ο ò εἰσελθόντες χρόνον μὲν τινὰ διετήρουν τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὴν ἐαυτῶν πίστιν. When the Romans move against their rebellious garrison they act as follows primarily to restore their good name with their allies in Pol. 1.7.12-13: ὃν ἀναπεμφθέντον εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην, οἱ στρατηγοὶ προαγαγόντες εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν καὶ μαστιγώσαντες ἅπαντας κατὰ τὸ παρ’ αὐτοῖς ἐθος ἐπελέκισαν, βουλόμενοι διὰ τῆς εἰς ἑκείνους τιμωρίας, καθ’ ὅσον οοὶ τ’ ἦσαν, διορθοῦσαν παρὰ τοῖς συμμάχοις τὴν αὐτῶν πίστιν. τὴν δὲ χώραν καὶ τὴν πόλιν παραχρῆμα τοῖς Ρῃγίνοις ἀπέδοσαν.
7 Polybius 1.10.5-11.1: οὐ μὴν ἀγνοοῦντες γε τούτων οὐδὲν, θεωροῦντες δὲ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους οὐ μόνον τὰ κατὰ τὴν Λιβύην, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴς Ἑπτάριας ύπῆκοι πολλά μέρη πεποιημένους, ἔτι δὲ τῶν νήσων ἄπτασον ἐγκρατεῖς ὑπάρχοντας τῶν κατὰ τὸ Σαρδόνιον καὶ Ῥυθηνικὸν πέλαγος, ἤγουνοι, ἡ Σικελίας ἐτί κυριεύσεαι, (μή) λιαν βαρεῖς καὶ φοβεροὶ γείτονες αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχουν, κύκλῳ σφᾶς περικύκλους καὶ πάσι τοῖς τῆς Ἰταλίας μέρεσιν ἐπεκείμενοι, διὸτι δὲ χαρέος ὧν’ αὐτοῖς ποιοῦσιν τὴν Σικελίαν, μὴ τυγχόνει καὶ ἐπικυρία τῶν Μαμερτίνων, προφανὲς ὃν’ κρατήσαντες γὰρ ἐγκρατεῖσθαι τὴν Μεσσήνην, οὐδ’ ἐκάτ Καρχηδονίους οἰονεὶ γεφυρῶσαι τὴν.
The Romans’ geopolitical interest lay in maintaining the status quo of a divided Sicily, and Polybius has the senate recognize in their deliberations what he regarded as a fact: should Messene fall, Carthage would quickly gain the entire island and then pose a grave threat to Italy.\(^8\) Pyrrhus' Italian adventures had posed a significant threat to Rome and laid out the bitter lesson that events beyond the shores of Italy could not be ignored. Sicily, not far off, had been one of Pyrrhus' targets and the Mamertine's involvement there was further evidence that this island could have frequent and complicated interactions with mainland Italy, threatening the security of Rome's allies. The rhetorical strategy the Roman tradition used to justify the decision to aid the Mamertines is much the same as in the case of Capua: the senate rejected the appeal, or at least did not assent, thus demonstrating the Roman preference for principle over advantage. In both cases, the decision was reversed by an external factor, pity for the abasement of the Capuans, and here, a vote of the people.\(^9\) In addition, both narratives stress the bad faith of the enemy as a further palliative, raising an implicit contrast with Rome. This negative characterization of the enemy distracts from the thorny ethical issue at hand and neatly obviates potential complaints about the Romans’ own unjust behavior. Polybius thus interprets the war as having a geopolitical origin, but nevertheless includes a strong strain of Roman moralizing in his account.

\(^8\) The assumption that states naturally expand, which in Thucydides either prefigured or inspired political realism, deftly sidestepping overtly guilt-based explanations of war, is key to Polybius' understanding of international politics. See Matthias Gelzer, Review of Die Kriegsschuldfrage von 218 v. Chr. by W. Kolbe in Gnomon 11 (1935): 152-7. Tim Rood, “Polybius, Thucydides, and the First Punic War,” in Imperialism, Cultural Politics, & Polybius, eds. Christopher Smith and Liv Yarrow, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012): 50-67, 53-7 rightly identifies a parallel between this and Thucydides’ account of the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, but I believe exaggerates the critique inherent in the intertext. Polybius’ own language legitimates the fear of Carthaginian expansion and the episode highlights Roman reluctance, a contrast to Athenian πλεονεξία.

This idea that Rome’s intervention was to counter an existential threat in the growing power of Carthage is likely a Roman piece of revisionist history. A fragment of a hostile account survives in Diodorus Siculus 23.1, in which Hiero and the Carthaginians begin by working together against Messene (Polybius has opposing factions within the city appeal to Carthage and Rome for help against, Syracuse, which only joins with Carthage after the Romans gain control of the Messene). Hiero upbraids the Romans for intervening on the pretense of πίστις, surely a Greek translation of fides, when in fact they were merely making their own bid for possession of Sicily. As Eckstein points out, the Roman siege of Syracuse indicates that Carthage was not initially thought of as the main antagonist.\(^{10}\) The Romans’ relationship with the Mamertines is unclear, but it may have been closer than the Roman tradition is willing to admit. Italian mercenaries had long been active in Sicily, both integrating into and disrupting the communities they served. The seizure of Messene an isolated phenomenon and the communities formed or dominated by such mercenaries maintained Italian connections.\(^{11}\) Rome may have a much closer relationship with the Mamertines than it was expedient to admit. At any rate, the Mamertines seem to have claimed that Rome was obliged to come to their aid. When war flared up with Carthage, it was then reinterpreted as a Punic war from the beginning. The senate’s reticence to aid such wicked men as the Mamertines, much like their initial refusal of the Capuan deditio, thus became critical to Rome’s claim to righteousness.

Although Livy’s account of the First Punic War is lost, the Periochae and backwards-looking remarks in his narrative of the Second Punic War preserve some clues.\(^{12}\) The Periochae

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\(^{12}\) P.A. Brunt, “On Historial Fragments and Epitomes” in *CQ* 30 (1980): 477-94 provides a number serious problems with the Periochae and clearly shows that they are useless for significant factual questions except so far as they give
have the Carthaginians renew their treaty with Rome for the fourth time in Book 13, yet violate it in Book 14 by bringing naval aid to Tarentum.\textsuperscript{13} Although of little military consequence, this transgression sets the Romans as the first of the two states wronged by the other, and Livy makes much of it at the beginning of the second war, meaning that it was not just the epitomator’s fancy including it in the \textit{Periochae}.\textsuperscript{14} Notably, neither this incident nor any violation of treaties before the First Punic War receives any mention in Polybius.\textsuperscript{15} Such violations were not strictly germane to the \textit{casus belli}, and so this is of little import for Polybius’ reliability on Roman politics. However, the Roman tradition made a cottage industry of highlighting \textit{Punica fides}, especially Cato, who so famously advocated the city’s destruction.\textsuperscript{16} As with inveterate enemies in the previous decade, this could dramatically lower the burden of justification. Carthaginian involvement with Tarentum surely seemed to indicate Italian ambitions, and even Polybius admits that Rhegium was just as afraid of Carthage as of Pyrrhus.\textsuperscript{17} Thus in Livy’s history, Carthage was presented unfavorably before receiving the formal introduction in Book 16 that accompanied the senatorial debate on whether to aid the Mamertines and the origins of the First Punic War. The \textit{Periochae} indicate that he, like Polybius, paid much attention to this ethically

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\textsuperscript{13} Periochae 14: \textit{Carthaginiensium classis auxilio Tarentinis uenit, quo facto ab his foedus uiolatum est}. The epitomator calls this the fourth treaty, Periochae 13: \textit{Cum Carthaginiensibus quarto foedus renouatum est}, and although Livy has mentioned only two others up to this point, in 7.27 and 9.43, he refers to the latter as the third. Livy 7.38 would have us believe that the Carthaginians dedicated two golden wreaths to Jupiter in commemoration of a Roman victory.

\textsuperscript{14} Livy 21.10.8, discussed in detail below, in which Hanno the Great, opposing Hannibal, argues against going to war with Rome.

\textsuperscript{15} Polybius gives different details on the treaties predating the First Punic War. The first, dating to 509 BCE, is a clear annalistic fiction, 3.22-23 and a second in 3.24. Polybius' third treaty, 3.25, is evidently the epitomator's fourth, since it provides that neither make an alliance with Pyrrhus against the other. The next in the series is the peace concluded with Lutatius, 3.27.


\textsuperscript{17} Polybius 1.7.6.
charged debate, yet attributes the initiative to the senate, perhaps a result of compression.\footnote{18} Moreover, the epitome of Book 16 indicates that Livy emphasized Carthaginian duplicity in the war’s prosecution, claiming that Scipio Asina was captured \textit{per fraudem}, a circumstance which does not figure in Polybius.\footnote{19}

Polybius appears to differ from the Roman tradition not in his narrative, but in isolated pockets of interpretation. He treats Regulus as an example of hubris, an interpretation possibly taken over from Philinus, rather than the exemplar of self-sacrifice seen in later Roman sources.\footnote{20} He also famously comments on Roman stubbornness after a disastrous shipwreck, but most important is his condemnation of the seizure of Sardinia after the end of the First Punic War.\footnote{21} This act, following directly upon the Carthage’s brutal mercenary war in Libya, in which the Romans actually supported their defeated foe, was undertaken on the appeal of mercenaries left over in Sardinia. Polybius also views Carthaginian control of Sardinia as a clear threat to Roman security, yet interprets Roman involvement here quite differently. Circumspection and reluctance marked the Roman entrance to Sicily, but Polybius treats Roman interest in Sardinia during the course of the war as aspirational; Carthaginian ships were using it as a base to raid the Italian coast, but the Romans only began to dream of taking it after their initial success at sea.\footnote{22}

After the war, however, the Romans complained of the mistreatment of Italian traders and

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\item Periochae 16: \textit{Origo Carthaginiensium et primordia urbis eorum referuntur. Contra quos et Hieronem, regem Syracusanorum, auxillium Mamertinis ferendum senatus censuit, cum de ea re inter suadentes ut id fieret, dissuadentesque contentio fuisset; transgressisque tunc primum mare exercitibus Romanis aduersus Hieronem saepius bene pugnatum. Petenti pax data est.}
\item Per. 16: \textit{Cn. Cornelius consul a classe Punica circumuentus et per fraudem, veluti in conloquium evocatus, captus est. cf. Polybius 1.21.}
\item The Regulus narrative plays out over Pol. 1.25-35, ending with an injunction to mistrust fortune. For discussion on Polybius’ source, see Walbank, \textit{Commentary, ad loc.} The \textit{Periocha} for Livy 18 suggests that this book largely focused on Regulus, invoking portents rather than Fortune giving him his comeuppance, then dwelling at length on his honorable return to Carthage. However, a commander ignoring portents could also allow a negative appraisal of Regulus’ conduct in Africa, which could then fit comfortably within Livy’s own moralizing framework, placing blame on the individual rather than the state, while leaving room for a heroic \textit{exemplum} of self sacrifice along the lines of Postumius in the Caudine Forks narrative.
\item See Pol. 1.37 for the Roman reliance on \textit{βία} in their shipwreck.
\item Pol. 1.20.7, 1.24.7.
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threatened war on the grounds that the Carthaginians were preparing a fresh war against Rome when they prepared to put down rebellions on the island, thus forcing them to cede control to Rome and pay a further indemnity. While Polybius narrates the event in a matter-of-fact way in 1.88.8-12, he goes further when including it as one of the chief causes of the Second Punic War, making clear that the Carthaginians believed they had been gravely wronged. In explaining its true cause, Hamilcar’s resentment of Rome and this rage’s transmission to Hannibal, Polybius makes clear that the Carthaginians thought Roman threats of war when they attempted to recover the island patently unjust. He even laments that Hannibal made a pretense of basing his war on Saguntum rather than the true cause, the Roman theft of Sardinia and aggravated tribute, and later explicitly states that this was unjust and undertaken under false pretenses:

Just as we see that that the Romans’ crossing into Sicily was not contrary to their treaty obligations, so in the case of second war (the war threatened by Rome should Carthage contest Sardinia), that in which they made the treaty concerning Sardinia, no one would be able to find any pretext or reasonable cause, but would agree that the Carthaginians were compelled, contrary to ever demand of justice, to evacuate Sardinia and pay the specified indemnity. (Polybius 3.28.1-4)

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23 Polybius 1.88.8-12.
24 Polybius 3.10.1-6: υπολαμβάνοντες αὑτοὺς νικήσειν τοῖς δικαίοις, Pol. 3.13.1, and 3.27.8 for the terms of the additional tribute imposed. See Eckstein, Moral Vision, 100-2. William Carrey, “Nullus Videtur Dolo Facere: The Roman Seizure of Sardinia in 237 B.C.” in CPh 93 n.3 (1996): 203-222 has argued that, in analogy with private law, the Romans saw Carthage’s claim to Sardinia as forfeit since they could not impose their control on the island. As attractive as this idea is, there is little in the historical sources to justify this as an actual Roman pretext for the seizure.
25 Polybius 3.15.10-12.
26 Polybius 3.28.1-4: Ὦσπερ οὖν τὴν εἰς Σικελίαν διάβασιν Ῥωμαίων οὐ παρὰ τοὺς ὅρκους εὑρίσκομεν γεγενημένην, οὕτως ὑπὲρ τοῦ δευτέρου πολέμου, καθ’ ὃν ἐποίησαν τὰς περὶ Σαρδόνος συνθήκας, οὔτε πρόφασιν οὔτ’ αἰτίαν εὑρὸν τις ἄν εὐλογον, ἀλλ’ ὁμολογούμενος τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ἡγακασμένον παρὰ πάντα τὰ δίκαια διὰ τὸν καιρὸν ἐκχωρῆσαι μὲν Σαρδόνος, ἐξενεγκεῖν δὲ τὸ προειρημένον πλῆθος τὸν χρημάτων. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων περὶ τούτον λεγόμενον ἐγκλήμα, διότι τοὺς παρὰ σφῶν πλοῖοι κατὰ τὸν Αἰθιόπην πολέμοιν, ἐλύθη καθ’ οὕς καιροὺς κομισάμενοι παρὰ Καρχηδονίων ἀπαντάς τοὺς κατηγμένους ἀντεδωρήσαντο χωρὶς λόπτην ἐν χάριτι τοὺς παρὰ σφῶν ὑπάρχοντας αἰχμαλώτους.
Despite rejecting Philinus and taking the Roman side in the First Punic War, Polybius then specifies that the Roman pretext, mistreatment of Roman sailors during the Mercenary War was a sham, clearly authorizing the Carthaginian viewpoint.27

As should be expected, Livy’s view of Sardinia is quite different. The Periochae show the consul fighting “against the Sardi, Corsi, and the Punic general Hanno” in Book 17, and the epitome of Book 20 simply says “When the Sardinians and Corsicans rebelled, they were pacified.”28 Judging from the admittedly scanty testimony of the Periochae, Livy treated Corsica and Sardinia as captured territory and likely framed the Carthaginian attempt to regain control of these islands as a breach of the treaty. Nevertheless, the Roman does acknowledge the Carthaginian viewpoint, although it is located firmly in Hamilcar’s mind when he imbues his son Hannibal with his obsessive hatred for Rome.29 Most telling is that when Sardinia appears in Book 21, Livy always joins it with Sicily, implying that both islands were justly taken in war.30

Thus we find that Polybius’ narrative of the First Punic War tends to support the Romans, particularly in the war’s outbreak. Diodorus’ testimony indicates that a tradition hostile to Rome had survived well into the late Republic, yet Polybius uses a version that highlighted Roman scruples in much the same way annalists dealt with ethically problematic episodes. Polybius does retain an outside perspective and criticizes the Romans, but these passages are distinct and isolated from his narrative. Combining this with the testimony of the Periochae and the evidence that Cato’s Origines catalogued Carthaginian treaty violations, it is clear that Roman historians saw this war, and the seizure of Sardinia, as the result of Carthaginian treachery and aggression.

27 Pol. 3.22-30 provides a detailed discussion of the treaties between Rome and Carthage.
28 Per 17: contra Sardos et Corsos et Hannonem, Poenorum ducem; Per. 20: Sardi et Corsi cum rebellassent, subacti sunt.
29 Livy 21.1.4-5. Discussed further below.
30 In Livy 21.40.5, 21.41.14, 21.53.4, and 22.54.11 the consul refers to them as prizes of war. Livy then, in 21.43.6, has Hannibal himself link them in an address to his troops, and then in speaking to a Roman in 21.44.7. In 22.1.8, 22.25.8, 23.21.1, 23.30.18, and 23.32.2 Sicily and Sardinia are grouped together in the sortition of provinces.
The Roman tradition for the First Punic War thus manifests the same ethical concerns with *fides* seen in Livy’s first decade, contrasting Roman good faith with Carthaginian deceit and neutralizing impropriety of aiding the Mamertines by highlighting the senate’s concerns over the ethical inconsistency involved, foisting the responsibility for the decision on the masses.

**Saguntum and the Causes of the Second Punic War**

Livy’s account of the Second Punic War confirms my model of *fides*-based foreign policy with a detailed narrative of the diplomacy surrounding its outbreak and the most vivid characterization extant in his work. Borrowing and expanding upon Polybius’ story of Hannibal’s oath of hatred for Rome, Livy casts the war as that general’s personal vendetta, almost to the exclusion of Carthaginian grievances with Rome. Both Livy and Polybius emphatically reject Fabius Pictor’s version, in which the violation of the Ebro treaty is the main justification for war, and instead focus on Saguntum and its relationship to Rome. Both also reject the Fabian tradition that Hannibal had exceeded his mandate, although Livy uses internal Carthaginian politics to place two dramatic speeches in the mouth of Hannibal’s opponent, Hanno the Great, which indict Carthage and affirm the Roman case for war. This use of indirect historiography directly parallels Livy 8.39.10-15, where the historian makes the Samnites a

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31 The twenty first book opens with its own preface, in which he claims, perhaps with some justification, that the scale and importance of his topic for this section rivals that of the entire works of other authors: Rome and Carthage were both at their peak during the Second Punic War and that the following ten books are the high point of Roman history. Nevertheless, the reader finds a certain wistful discontent lurking below Livy’s triumphalism. For, in taking over the judgment that Polybius applied to the First Punic War, that the two powers were then at their height, Livy hints at a schema of decline in 21.1.2: *Nam neque validiores opibus ullae inter se civitates gentesque contulerunt arma neque his ipsis tantum unquam virium aut roboris fuit.* The exact temporal force of *unquam* is ambiguous, yet it seems to mean “ever” rather than “ever before.” The statement that both were then at their most powerful cannot stand in reference to materiel and influence; it is too general to be argued into some prosaic claim about the number of men mobilized at one time. Instead, the strength Livy refers to should be seen as, at least in part, moral, for the questions he is most interested in and the terms in which he understands history are ethical. While moral decline is not something Livy is inclined to stress, particularly at the point of Rome’s moment of triumph, this judgment subtly pervades his history.” Cf. Polybius 1.13.11-13, which unambiguously indicates decline. Walbank, *Commentary* ad loc. interprets this as a reference to the Carthaginian constitution, not Rome.
witness to their own crimes. Finally, to compensate for the disgrace of not bringing timely aid to Saguntum, Livy highlights Roman exactitude in diplomacy and declaring war against Carthage.

In his introduction to Book 21 and the causes of the war, Livy states that the Romans and Carthaginians’ anger was as important as their arms, yet only indirectly discusses the Carthaginians’ grievances. The Romans were indignant that Carthage did not stay beaten, while the Carthaginians claimed that the Romans acted with greedy hubris, an allegation which the Roman motivation seems to support. Specific word choices undercut this conclusion: the Romans react to a fact, the Carthaginians, merely a belief. Much as with the Samnites’ grievances at the Caudine Forks, Livy preemptively raises the case against Rome only to quickly undermine it. Whether the reader takes a generous or cynical view of the historian or his explanation, its presentation is consistent with the ideology of the first ten books in that fides is at its core. For the Romans, this war was the result of Punic perfidy, a conniving sneak-attack led by a general who seemed to embody bad faith on behalf of a society with a total disregard for treaties and laws. Yet the Romans also failed to meet their own standard, for fides demanded that the Roman act decisively. Aiding Saguntum was their responsibility, and the shame of failing to relieve their beleaguered ally would rankle for all time.

Polybius recognized that Hannibal was the prime-mover in the war, but Livy draws even greater attention to this and uses it to subvert the Carthaginian case. Livy places the story that the young Hannibal was made to swear eternal enmity to Rome by his embittered father, Hamilcar, directly after the introductory sentences of Book 21:

The story goes that Hannibal, when he was around nine years old and the African war had just been finished, begged his father Hamilcar to take him along to Spain

33 Livy has not suppressed the allegation; he simply does not believe it, likely through a combination of partiality and the belief that Rome's continued success proved, by means of divine support, that Romans acted honorably.
while he was offering sacrifice before crossing over with his army. Hamilcar brought him to the altar and made him solemnly swear to be an enemy to Rome as soon as possible. The loss of Sicily and Sardinia weighed heavily on that prideful man, for he thought that even Sicily was given up in a fit of premature desperation and that, while Africa was in turmoil, the Romans stole Sardinia through their duplicity and even had the gall to add an indemnity. Plagued by these concerns, he spent five years in the African war following the recent peace with Rome and nine years in Spain increasing Carthaginian power in such a way that it was clear he had in mind a greater war than the one he was waging. Had he lived longer, the Carthaginians who brought war to Italy with Hannibal as leader would have done so under Hamilcar’s command.³⁴ (Livy 21.1.4-21.2.2)

This is one of the two strongest statements of Roman cupidity and bad faith which Livy admits into this decade, yet it is not set in any official context, nor does it figure in the reply to the Romans' later embassy. The argument is only indirectly stated, situated in the obsessive mind of Hamilcar, and overshadowed by the dramatic frame, a young boy infected by the bitterness of his father. Whereas Livy makes Hannibal’s oath the centerpiece of the Carthaginian casus belli, Polybius uses it to illustrate Hamilcar’s resentment of Rome, shared with the Carthaginians at large, which was only one of three causes of the war.³⁵ Moreover, since it comes alongside justifiable Carthaginian grievances, it loses the sense of irrational hatred and megalomania with which Livy infuses the episode. Significantly, Livy removed the frame narrative, in which an exiled and beleaguered Hannibal has to prove his anti-Roman credentials while under threat in Antiochus’ court. Polybius’ Hannibal is very human and vulnerable, depicted at once in the two extremes of helplessness: childhood and exile; Livy’s readers find almost an avatar of rage with no thought but their destruction. Nevertheless, Polybius does not end on a note of pathos but,

³⁴ Livy 21.1.4-21.2.2: Fama est etiam Hannibalem annorum ferme novem, pueriliter blandientem patri Hamilcari ut duceretur in Hispaniam, cum perfecto Africo bello exercitum eo traiecturus sacrificaret, altaribus admotum tactis sacris iure iurando adactum se cum primum posset hostem fore populo Romano. Angebant ingentis spiritus virum Sicilia Sardiniaque amissae: nam et Siciliam nimis celeri desperatione rerum concessam et Sardiniam inter motum Africæ fraudem Romanorum, stipendio etiam insuper imposito, interceptam. His anxius curis ita se Africo bello quod fuit sub recentem Romanam pacem per quinque annos, ita deinde novem annis in Hispania augendo Punico imperio gessit ut apparat maius eum quam quod gereret agitare in animo bellum et, si diutius vixisset, Hamilcare duce Poenos arma Italæ inlaturos fuisse qui Hannibalis ductu intulerunt.

³⁵ Polybius outlines these in 3.9.6-10.6. The second cause was anger over the seizure of Sardinia, and the third was the success of Hamilcar’s imperial project in Spain. See below, 120.
while giving a more balanced picture of Hannibal, reaffirms his pro-Roman viewpoint. The Roman tradition preserved in Livy may have lifted much of its analysis from Polybius, but the ease of adaptation to Roman works implies that this tale was perhaps Roman in origin.

Livy also highlights Hamilcar’s baleful influence with his description of Hannibal’s assumption of command, stressing that the soldiers marveled at his uncanny similarity to his father. Hannibal’s character sketch is exactly what one would expect for a Roman bogeyman, combining incredible virtues such as bravery and exceptional industriousness, almost superhuman faculties such as his resistance to cold and exhaustion, and equally prodigious vices, most notably perfidy and cruelty. Much of this could have been drawn directly from Sallust’s Catiline and Jugurtha. There is a marked parallel to Sallust’s Catiline, but where that man combined prodigious ability with self-destructive profligacy, Hannibal lacks no self control. His baseness is entirely moral and expresses itself as the exact opposite of Roman values; with treachery that is "more than Punic," Hannibal is the ultimate anti-Roman. Comparison with Polybius reveals the extremity of the Roman characterization of Hannibal.

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36 See Pol. 3.10, especially 3.10.7 for Hamilcar’s importance as the bridge to the story of Hannibal’s oath, which occupies 3.11-12. As P.G. Walsh, Livy: Book XXI. (London: Bristol Classical Press, 1985), 41, 121, points out, Livy also changes Polybius’ version in making Hannibal swear to never be reconciled to Rome, rather than to oppose Rome as soon as possible, yet this may go back to Valerius Antias. Nepos Hannibal 2.4 is similar: numquam ... in amicitia cum Romanis fore. Much later, Appian Iberica 9 follows the same Roman tradition: ἀσπετος εὐθρός ἐσέσθαι Ῥωμαίος ὅτε ἐς πολιτείαν παρέλθῃ.

37 See Pol. 3.8-9.5 for a critique of Fabius’ analysis of the war’s causes. In fact, Fabius’ not mentioning Hamilcar implies that this story was a later invention, perhaps invented by Cato. See Walbank Commentary, ad loc. for discussion of the attribution made in Eugen Täubler Die Vorgeschichte des zweiten punischen Kriegs (Berlin, C. A. Schwetschke & sohn 1921), 90.

38 Livy 21.4.2: Missus Hannibal in Hispamian primo statim adventu omnem exercitum in se convertit; Hamilcarem iuvenem redditum sibi veteres milites credere; eundem vigorem in voltu vimque in oculis, habitum oris lineamentaque intueri.


40 Nepos, in contrast, presents a highly complimentary portrait of the general, while admitting that he never ceased to plot Rome’s downfall. Appian also follows Roman explanations for the war and provides evidence for Hannibal’s
Polybius begins the Second Punic War with Hannibal’s oath, clearly the inspiration for Livy’s own placement of this episode, but puts his own character study much later. There he does credit Hannibal with almost single-handedly beginning and managing the course of the entire war, but this does not negate from the legitimacy of Carthaginian grievances. Refreshingly, Polybius asserts that it is difficult to come to a true judgment of prominent men because the demands of circumstance mask rather than draw out men’s characters. He is, however, careful to still allow for moral judgment, carefully eschewing the word ἀναγκή for variants of περιστάσις, which allows for events to exert a strong influence without eliminating personal choice. Where the Roman tradition makes Hannibal out to be cruel, Polybius suggests that, if and when he was cruel, Hannibal was pressured by friends and circumstance. Polybius nevertheless admits that Hannibal committed injustices and impieties in abandoning allies, breaking treaties, and executing people whom he only suspected might cause trouble later. Perhaps most important, Polybius softens the blame Hannibal received for abandoning allies towards the end of the war, explaining that, after Capua defected from Rome and other cities began to join his cause, Hannibal’s forces were stretched to thin to protect all these allies and make war upon Rome. Considering these circumstances, the historian decides that he cannot

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41 See Pol. 9.22, 11.19; Walbank *Commentary* vol. 2, 150-5, 294-5; Eckstein, *Moral Vision*, 73n; 254-6: “As for Hannibal, his effort against Rome, brilliant as it is, is undermined from the beginning by the fact that his own destructive hatred of the Romans leads him (in Polybius’s judgment) to go to war prematurely without sufficient resources (11.19.6-7; cf. 3.15.5-11).”

42 Pol. 9.22.1: Ὅτι τῶν ἑκατέροις, Ῥωμαίοις φημὶ καὶ Καρχηδονίοις, προσπιπτόντων καὶ συμβαινόντων εἷς ἦν ἀνὴρ αἴτιος καὶ μία ψυχή, λέγω δὲ τὴν Ἀννίβου. It must be remembered that in the introduction Polybius allowed for every cause to have its own cause. High-handed Roman behavior sets the stage for a legitimate conflict between the two powers, including the situation's influence on Hannibal. He is then at liberty to exercise his own influence for good or ill without compromising the legitimacy of the broader conflict. It should also be noted that Polybius objected to Hannibal's empty pretexts for stirring up the war, believing it would have been far better to give the true cause: Roman injustice, 3.15.10.

43 Famously, his friend Hannibal Monomachus, who had even advocated cannibalism as a means of feeding the army while crossing the Alps: Pol. 9.24.
come to an accurate assessment of Hannibal's character, but merely remarks that the Romans remembered him for cruelty and the Carthaginians for avarice.⁴⁴

Returning to the outbreak of the war, Livy emphasizes Hannibal’s enmity and the attack on Saguntum, adopting a simpler and more partisan view of the war’s beginning than his source. Polybius, distinguishing Saguntum, which he calls the beginning of the war, from the causes, lists three.⁴⁵ First was Hamilcar's anger, transmitted to his son Hannibal. The second cause, the Roman seizure of Sardinia and imposition of further tribute, justifies and explains the first and pushed many Carthaginians towards Hamilcar's way of thinking. The third cause was Carthaginian success in Spain, which stemmed from the redoubled efforts from the indignant Hamilcar and his countrymen to reestablish their power, making this cause an extension of the first two. From this point, Polybius moves on to how Hannibal consolidated his Spanish dominion while carefully keeping away from Saguntum so as to avoid giving the Romans a pretext for war.⁴⁶ Polybius then compresses Saguntum's repeated warnings and skips ahead to the point at which Hannibal is already besieging the city on the pretext that the Romans had unjustly tampered with its internal politics. In his authorial voice Polybius then claims it would have been better had he not resorted to empty pretense but laid bare the real reasons for the war, demanding back Sardinia and the extra tribute they had unjustly been forced to give in 3.15.9, and he reaffirms this verdict in 3.32. Thus, Polybius’ is a nuanced explanation of the war’s causes that

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⁴⁴ Pol. 9.26.11: κρατεῖ γε μὴν ἡ φήμη παρὰ μὲν Καρχηδονίοις ὡς φιλαργύρου, παρὰ δὲ Ῥωμαίοις ὡς όμοιον γενομένου [αὐτοῦ].
⁴⁵ Pol. 3.6-7 also makes a distinction between a cause, αἰτία, beginning, αἰρή, and pretext, πρόφασις.
⁴⁶ P. describes the attack on Saguntum as the act beginning the war in 3.6.1, see Walbank, *Commentary* vol. 1, 305-6. Polybius 3.10.5 has Hamilcar envision Carthage’s Spanish project as a weapon directed against Rome. Carthage already had a presence in Spain as early as the 6th century, but Hamilcar was responsible for greatly expanding it to compensate for the loss of Sicily. See H.H. Scullard, “The Carthaginians in Spain” in *CAHF* 17-43; J.S. Richardson, *Hispaniae: Spain and the Development of Roman Imperialism, 218-82 BC* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986), 18-30.
transmits the Carthaginian point of view, yet ultimately is a pro-Roman version in which the Carthaginians are responsible for breaking the peace.\textsuperscript{47}

Polybius also devotes 3.8-9 to refuting Fabius, who alleged that Hannibal was acting as a rogue agent in his attack on Saguntum. For, according to Fabius, Hamilcar’s successor, Hasdrubal, had come near making Spain his own kingdom and passed this authority on to Hannibal. Walbank has rightly suggested that the Fabian explanation dates to the period after the Second Macedonian War, during which Hannibal’s opponents came to power and Carthage was subject to Roman scrutiny.\textsuperscript{48} While Polybius explicitly refutes Fabius, Livy, never referring to the annalist, attaches so much responsibility to the Carthaginian senate that his account must be read as a forceful reply to Fabius’ claims. Upon reaching Spain, Hannibal began to regard Italy as, evocatively, his \textit{provincia}, moving immediately against Saguntum solely to secure a pretext for war with Rome.\textsuperscript{49} Livy would not have this behavior be unforeseen by the Carthaginian elite: the decision of whether to send the orphan Hannibal to Hasdrubal had been an issue of state policy. Much as Livy validated the Roman viewpoint during the Samnite Wars within the text by putting it in the mouth of the Samnites, he sets up a figure within the Carthaginian senate to serve as his own mouthpiece: Hanno the Great. This statesman ominously forecasts the course the young man will follow and casts him as a tyrant who cares not for Carthage, only his very own \textit{regnum}, entirely free from the rule of law.\textsuperscript{50} The domestic political competition that likely played a very strong part in this episode is trivialized, and the debate over the Spanish command

\textsuperscript{47} Polybius consulted pro-Carthaginian sources for this war as well, rejecting the accounts of a Roman debate on war after the fall of Saguntum given by Chaereas and Sosylus of Sparta in 3.20.1-5. Nepos \textit{Hannibal} 13.3 indicates that Sosylus and Silenus of Caleacte accompanied Hannibal for at least part of the war. For Polybius’ characterization of the Carthaginians, see Champion, \textit{Cultural Politics}, 118-21.
\textsuperscript{49} Livy 21.5.1.
\textsuperscript{50} Livy 21.3.5: \textit{An hoc timemus ne Hamilcaris filius nimis sero imperia immodica et regni paterni speciem videat et, cuius regis genero hereditarii sint reliicti exercitus nostri, eius filio parum mature serviamus?}
is transformed into an early referendum on policy towards Rome.\footnote{Pol. 10.10.9 does seem to hint at Hasdrubal's monarchical intent and mentions a building he had intended to be his palace in New Carthage.} Hanno, the wise counselor, is of course ignored, and Livy, by including this scene of debate, is able to reconcile his attribution of the war to Hannibal’s own resentment and initiative while making the Carthaginian state equally culpable for the war.

When the Romans come to demand the surrender of Hannibal, Livy gives Hanno another speech, which, ironically, is the strongest statement of the Roman cause. In this speech he advises offering Hannibal up to the Romans as a criminal because he attacked Saguntum and refused to even meet with Roman envoys. In holding this opinion, which Livy, of course, endorses, Hanno is entirely alone and only provokes the Carthaginians to further bellicosity. His speech hits every point that could possibly help the Roman case, and the idea that a leading Carthaginian would utter such remarks is laughable. Just as in his Caudine Forks narrative, Livy assimilates the enemy to his own perspective in order to have them confess their guilt. Livy also has Hanno contrast the measured pace of Roman negotiation with how they will prosecute the war in a passage reminiscent of a comment Livy gave to a Capuan, Calavius, upon seeing the Romans slink home after their release.\footnote{Livy 8.39.10-15, 9.7.1-5.} Hanno’s speech deserves to be quoted in full:

“...You have sent your armies a young man burning with lust for tyranny who understands that the only way to acquire this is, girded with your weapons and legions, to live by stringing war after war as if fueling a fire. You, therefore, fed the fire which now consumes you. Your armies are besieging Saguntum, from which they are barred by a treaty; soon Roman legions will besiege Carthage with, for their leaders, those same gods by whom the Romans gained their revenge in the previous war for broken treaties. Or are you truly ignorant of your enemy or either people’s fortune? Your noble general refused to admit legates coming from allies on behalf of allies to his camp; he did away with international law; these men, however, have come to you, driven off from where even hostile legates are not turned away. They seek the reparations guaranteed by our treaty. Let there be no public deceit: they demand the man who is the perpetrator of the insult and defendant charged with the crime. Yet, however lightly they tread,
however sluggishly they respond, I fear lest once they have begun they rage all
the more implacably. Just recall the Aegeates Islands and Eryx, what trials you
endured on land and sea for twenty four years! This boy was not our leader then,
but his father, Hamilcar himself, another Mars as those men would have you
believe. But we had not upheld the treaty and kept our hands off Tarentum, just as
now we now do not keep our hands off Saguntum; therefore gods prevailed over
men and, concerning the question of which nation had broken the treaty, the
outcome of the war gave victory to the side of right just like an impartial judge.

Now it is Carthage against which Hannibal moves his sheds and siege towers; he
shakes the walls of Carthage with his battering ram. The ruins of Saguntum—
would that I were a false prophet—will fall on our heads, and the war begun with
the Saguntines will have to be waged with the Romans. ‘Should we, therefore,
surrender Hannibal?’ one might ask. I know that my authority counts for little
because of my ancestral hostility, but I am glad that Hamilcar perished when he
did, for had he lived, we would already be at war with Rome, and this youth, I
loath him as the madness and firebrand lighting this war. He should not just be
surrendered, but if no one demands him as atonement for the violation of the
treaty, he should be cast off to the furthest recesses of land and sea, banished to
where his name and reputation could not disturb our peace, so I say. Legates must
be sent to Rome immediately to satisfy the senate, and others to command
Hannibal to lead his army back from Saguntum and, as demanded by the treaty,
surrender him to the Romans, and a third legation must be sent to offer
reparations to the Saguntines.’53 (Livy 21.10.4-11)

Hanno’s speech leaves nothing for the legates in Livy’s account to say, a clever device that
makes Carthaginian guilt seem more manifest. Hanno’s language is characteristically Roman: he

53 Livy 21.10.4-13: ‘Iuvenem flagrantem cupidine regni viamque unam ad id cernentem si ex bellis bella serendo
succinctus armis legionibusque vivat, velut materiam igni praebentes, ad exercitus misistis. Aluistis ergo hoc
incendium quo nunc ardetis. Saguntum vestri circumsedent exercitus unde arcentur foedere; mox Carthaginem
circumsedebunt Romanae legiones ducibus isdem dis per quos priore bello rupta foedera sunt ulti. Utrum hostem
an vos an fortunam utriusque populi ignoratis? Legatos ab sociis et pro sociis venientes bonus imperator vester in
castra non admisit; ius gentium sustulit; hi tamen, unde ne hostium quidem legati arcentur, pulsi, ad vos venerunt.
Res ex foedere repetuntur; publica fraus absit: auctorem culpae et reum criminis deposcunt. Quo lenius agunt,
segnius incipiunt, eo cum coeperint vereor ne perseverantius saeviant. Aegates insulas Erycemque ante oculos
proponite, quae terra marique per quattuor et viginti annos passi sitis. Nec puere hic etiam sed pater ispe
Hamilcar, Mars alter, ut isti volunt. Sed Tarento, id est Italia, non abstinueramus ex foedere, sicut nunc Sagunto
non abstinemus; vicerunt ergo di homines[que] et, id de quo verbis ambigebatur uter populus foedus rupisset,
eventus bellorum velut aequus iudex, unde ius stabat, ei victoriam dedit. Carthagini nunc Hannibalem vineas turresque
admovet: Carthaginis moenia quattuor ariete. Sagunti ruinae-falsus utinam vates sim-nostris capitibus incident,
susceptunque cum Saguntinis bellum habendum cum Romanis est. Dedemus ergo Hannibalem? dicet aliquis. Scio
meam lesem esse in eo auctoritatem propter paternas inimicitias; sed et Hamilcarem eo perisse laetatus sum quod,
si ille viveret, bellum iam haberemus cum Romanis, et hunc iuvenem tamquam furiarum facemque huilus belli odi ac
detester; nec dedendum solum id piaculum rupti foederis, sed si nemo deposcist, devehendum in ultimas maris
terrarumque oras, ablegandum eo unde nec ad nos nomen famaque eius accedere neque ille sollicitare quietae
civitatis statum possit, ego ita censeo. Legatos ex tempore Romam mittendos qui senatu satisfaciant, alios qui
Hannibali mutinent ut exercitum ab Sagunto abducant ipsumque Hannibalem ex foedere Romanis dedant, tertiam
legationem ad res Saguntinis reddendas decerno.
emphasizes religion, claiming that the very gods are on Rome's side since, as he repeatedly asserts, the Carthaginians are in flagrant violation of their treaty. He even uses the word foedus seven times. Referring to himself as a prophet, Hanno predicts defeat for Carthage as a direct result of these impieties and advises offering up Hannibal as a piaculum, a markedly Roman gesture. Livy's Hanno espouses the same Roman theology of victory seen in Livy's account of the Gallic Sack and the Samnite Wars, demonstrating the continuity and internal coherence of Livy's ideology.54

Livy’s account also compresses the events leading up to Saguntum’s destruction and the outbreak of the war in order soften Rome’s disgrace in having failed its ally. For, according to Livy, these Roman envoys thus reached Rome, returning from their fruitless mission, at the same time as news of Saguntum's destruction. Polybius, however, reports that the Saguntines sent repeated warnings to Rome, that Roman legates met Hannibal in Spain before he had even attacked Saguntum, and that Rome undertook the Second Illyrian War as a preliminary to their anticipated war in Spain.55 This reveals that the Livian chronology, in the Roman legates meet Hannibal in the act of besieging Saguntum, was distorted.56 Obfuscating the chronology to make it appear that Hannibal’s violence had merely outpaced the Romans’ proper response was the annalistic solution. Once again, therefore, we find that where the Romans’ own historical tradition has been distorted, it is in the service of fides.57

No positive spin could be put on Saguntum's destruction, so Livy gives an extended dramatic treatment emphasizing Saguntum’s fides socialis, its tragic consequences, and the

54 Rosenstein, Imperatores Victi, 54-91.
55 Pol. 3.15-16.
56 Gelzer, “Romische Politik,” 156-8 deals with this issue and concludes that the embassy mentioned by Polybius proceeded to Carthage and obtained a conciliatory reply from the Carthaginian senate, then in the hands of the anti-Barcid faction, and that this convinced Rome that it had time to prepare for a war that was not yet assured.
57 Walsh, Commentary, 138, 152.
moral imperative for the Romans to respond with war.\(^{58}\) In Livy’s narrative, even Hannibal’s representative to the Saguntines frames their decision to surrender or resist in terms of *fides*, arguing that their good faith towards Rome would bring them no help.\(^{59}\) In spite of its futility, Saguntine *fides* is exceptional, showing almost every act of daring desperation that is to be seen in a besieged city and driving the enemy back from a breach in the walls. Holding fast to their commitments, they throw all of their gold and silver into a bonfire to which they then add themselves.\(^{60}\) The pro-Roman version, unable to cite any concrete aid to Saguntum, emphasized the Romans' shock at this event, giving vibrant play to every possible emotion. They first are moved by *misericordia* for their *socii* and then “shame for the aid not given,” *pudor non lati auxilii*, which builds into “anger against the Carthaginians and fear over the end result,” *ira in Carthaginienses metusque de summa rerum*, almost as if the enemy were already at the gates. This fear over the outcome of the war is natural, but the extended description of the Senators fretting about fighting off the whole world from the gates of Rome is overblown and steers the reader away from dwelling too long on the Saguntine's misfortune, instead emphasizing the Roman sense of responsibility. That Hannibal's campaign in Italy focused astutely making Rome appear an unreliable ally illustrates that this was not just an embarrassment but a blow to the Romans' primary ethic and justification for their actions abroad. When they sought support in Spain, the Romans learned that the ghosts of the Saguntines were not easily exorcised, and Roman credibility required a great deal of reconstruction.\(^{61}\) This *pudor non lati auxilii* suffuses

\(^{58}\) Livy 21.7.1-3: *Dum ea Romani parant consultantque, iam Saguntum summa ui oppugnabatur. Ciuitas ea longe opulentissima ultra Hiberum fuit, sita passus mille ferme a mari. Oriundi a Zacyntho insula dicuntur mixtique etiam ab Ardea Rutulorum quidam generis; ceterum in tantas breui creuerant opes seu maritimis seu terrestribus fructibus seu multitudinis incremento seu disciplinae sanctitate qua fidem socialem usque ad perniciem suam coluerunt.*

\(^{59}\) Livy 21.13.

\(^{60}\) Livy 21.14.

\(^{61}\) Livy 21.19.6-10.
their view of the whole war, alternately propping up their dogged resistance and driving impulsive commanders, indignant at seeing allied lands laid waste, to rush to their destruction.\textsuperscript{62}  

Since Saguntum is already lost, Livy has the Romans make sure to follow every form, sending a second delegation to Carthage in order to formally establish that their ally’s destruction had been sanctioned by the Carthaginian state and declare war.\textsuperscript{63} The Carthaginian response was to reject the question as an implicit abridgment of their sovereignty, instead angrily asserting parity with Rome and that the only legitimate demand that Rome could make would be in regards to treaty obligations. On this point the Carthaginian speaker rejects the treaty made by Hasdrubal as not ratified by the government, using the Roman practice of referring these back to the people for approval as precedent. Thus he claims that only the terms of the treaty of Lutatius, which ended the First Punic War, can be discussed, and raises the valid question of the Saguntines’ true status vis-a-vis Rome in the absurd context of whether they were \textit{socii} at that time.\textsuperscript{64} This appears as a bald-faced mockery of Roman procedure, and government and Livy feels the need to specify that even that old treaty, as presented by Lutatius, included an explicit rider concerning ratification while pointing out that Hasdrubal's had nothing of the sort. It is striking that Livy is so committed to demonstrating the Romans' exactingly correct behavior that

\textsuperscript{62} So at Trebia in Livy 21.40-41, Trasimene in 22.3, and in Minucius' complaints against Fabius in 22.14.  
\textsuperscript{63} Livy 21.18.2-4: \textit{His ita comparatis, ut omnia iusta ante bellum fierent, legatos maiores natu, Q. Fabium M Livium L. Aemilium C. Licinium Q. Baebium in Africam mittunt ad percontandos Carthaginienses publicone consilio Hannibal Saguntum oppugnasset, et si id quod facturi videbantur faterentur ac defenderent publico consilio factum, ut indicerent populo Carthaginiensi bellum.}  
\textsuperscript{64} With the slippage between \textit{socii et amici} in Livy, the Saguntines not being formal allies matters little. \textit{Fides}, moreover, is not confined to formal treaty relationships.
he cannot let the Punic sarcasm speak for itself. Perhaps this is a recognition that the Carthaginian argument was remarkably Roman in its selective legalism.

Polybius uses the Carthaginian repudiation of the treaty with Hasdrubal, the so-called Ebro Treaty, which he had mentioned in 2.13, as a jumping-off point to discuss all the treaties made between Rome and Carthage before the First Punic War in 3.22-25. While Livy and Polybius make clear that Saguntum was the main motivation for the war, both persistently mention the Ebro Treaty in the context of the Roman *casus belli*. This is especially problematic, because Livy explicitly states, and Polybius implies, that Saguntum was on the other side of the river, making Hannibal’s attack on the city a treaty violation. Polybius’ passages bear the hallmark of compression, not error, and since Livy later has Hannibal make an ironic comment about Saguntum not lying beyond the Ebro, Livy’s mistake was likely the result of carelessness, not total ignorance. As Gelzer has shown, Fabius Pictor’s account is the reason the tradition runs aground on the Ebro Treaty, for Fabius’ account gave the Romans, investigating Saguntine warnings before Hannibal attacked the city, enough time to receive a conciliatory reply from the Carthaginian senate. These complaints necessarily would have been about Carthaginian expansion in Spain, thus raising the specter of Hannibal eventually crossing

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65 Livy 21.19.2-3: *Nam si verborum disceptationis res esset, quid foedus Hasdrubalis cum Lutati priore foedere, quod mutatum est, comparandum erat, cum in Lutati foedere diserte additum esset ita id ratum fore si populus censuisset, in Hasdrubalis foedere nec exceptum tale quicquam fuerit et tot annorum silentio ita vivo eo comprobatum sit foedus ut ne mortuo quidem auctore quicquam mutaretur?*

66 Pol. 3.21 confirms that this was the Carthaginian argument.

67 The first dates to the first year of the Republic, traditionally 509 BCE, the second is not dated, and third was a response to Pyrrhus’ Italian campaign of 280-76 BCE. Scholarly attempts to correlate these with notices in other historians are too many and fraught for a full discussion here.

68 While the Carthaginians in Pol. 3.21.5 take issue with Saguntum’s formal status, *fides* could be engaged even by informal *amicitia*, so the likelihood that Saguntum did not enjoy a *foedus* does not invalidate the Roman case.

69 Livy 21.7.2; Pol. 3.21.1, 3.29.1 only imply that attacking Saguntum constituted a breach of the treaty, although it is possible that there was a provision for Saguntum separate from the Ebro boundary in the treaty.

70 Livy 21.44.6, see below. See Gelzer, Review of *Die Kriegsschuldfrage* for the likelihood that Polybius knew Saguntum’s position, and that these passages are merely the unfortunate result of compression. Walbank, *Commentary* vol. 1, 358, believes that Polybius was confused.
the Ebro frontier, but this was separate from the *casus belli*. Gelzer accounts for Fabian emphasis on the treaty with the point that Fabius would have been concerned with treaties and making Rome’s case, at least in part, to a Greek audience. In his analysis, the confusion of the two complaints likely dated to the period directly before the Third Punic War, when cataloging Carthaginian treaty violations was of great interest at Rome. The confusion was further cemented by Polybius’ compression of these two different strands of complaint in Fabius.

After the dramatic confrontation in which Roman ambassadors offer the Carthaginians a choice between peace and war, that city’s senate fades into the background, only dimly mirroring Hannibal's *Punica fides*. At the point when Hannibal is about to cross into Italy and take up the war in earnest, Livy provides him with a showy speech which once again reminds the readers of his suspect character. More importantly, this speech contains the last and most direct statement of the Carthaginian case and the last direct reference to the theft of Sardinia. Livy uses the setting, a bloody gladiatorial entertainment staged between prisoners, the situational irony of claiming a defensive rationale at the beginning of so audacious a campaign, and the general's overly sarcastic tone to neutralize the argument. Hannibal praises his men in what seems a parody of Roman values, using *virtus* four times, conceptualizing his army in terms of

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71 Gelzer, “Romische Politik” 159ff.
72 Ibid., 130.
73 Ibid., 160-1: “Erst als man genau nachweisen wollte, worin der Vertragsbruch des zweiten punischen Kriegs bestand, geriet man auf die letzte römisch-karthagische Vereinbarung, den Ebrovertrag Hasdrubals. Dabei mußte, wie bemerkt, die Chronologie etwas verwischt werden. ... Es verdient alle Anerkennung, daß Polybios diese Geschichtsfalschung nicht übernahm. Aber er beging den Fehler, auf das Gerede vom Bruch des Hasdrubalvertrags einzugehen und mußte dann, weil er darüber in der guten Überlieferung nichts fand, erklären, warum er in den Verhandlungen von 218 nicht herangezogen wurde: Die Karthager sollen ihn nicht für genügend rechts-gültig gehalten haben, weil er nicht vom karthagischen Volk bestätigt war.” For Carthaginian treaty violations, see Hoyos, “Cato’s Punic Perfidies.”
74 Uniting against Hanno’s conciliatory advice they claim in 21.11 that Saguntum began the war and that the *vetustissima societas* with Carthage should take priority for the Romans. For the confrontation with the Carthaginian senate, see Livy 21.18.
75 Rawlings, “Soldiers’ War,” raises the point that Hannibal’s gladiatorial combat may have been an attempt to demonstrate sympathy to Gallic warrior culture, pointing to the eager response to Scipio’s games at New Carthage in Livy 28.21.
Carthaginians fighting for their *patria*, and referring to the other contingents as “the most brave and faithful allies,” *socios fidelissimos fortissimosque.*⁷⁶ However, when speaking of rewards, Hannibal emphasizes that there were overabundant riches in Spain and shows that his mission was purely one of revenge. According to Hannibal, his men are moved by the “grief, injury, and indignity,” *dolor, iniuria, and indignitas,* inflicted by Rome:

This most cruel and arrogant people makes the world subject to its whim and thinks it fair to dictate to us with whom we can make war or peace! This people boxes us in with mountains and rivers which we must not cross, but does not observe those boundaries itself, saying “Do not cross the Ebro! Have nothing to do with the Saguntines!” But is Saguntum on the Ebro? “Don’t move a step,” they say. Is it not enough that you Romans stole our oldest provinces, Sicily and Sardinia? Will you take Spain, and then, if we withdraw from there, will you cross into Africa? You will cross? I say you have. The Romans have just this year already sent out two consuls, one to Africa, the other to Spain⁷⁷ (Livy 21.44.5-7)

It is difficult to imagine what other points an angry Carthaginian would have made against Rome and this tirade might appear to be a genuine justification for the war were it supported by other elements of the narrative. The Polybian version of this speech, in contrast, does not touch upon these seeming justifications; the gladiatorial combat and the harsh object lesson that Hannibal drew from it are the same, but where Livy's Hannibal launches into invective, Polybius has him only bid his soldiers be brave and ready at daybreak.⁷⁸ As it stands, Livy's readers have seen the war actively fomented by Hannibal and neither he nor the Carthaginian leadership had bothered to state these grievances sooner. Polybius was puzzled by this, saying that it would have been better had Hannibal stated his actual reasons instead of stirring up trouble in Saguntum, but does

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⁷⁶ Livy 21.43-44. ⁷⁷ Livy 21.44.5-7: *Crudelissima ac superbissima gens sua omnia suaque arbitrii facit; cum quibus bellum, cum quibus pacem habeamus, se modum imponere aequum censet. Circumscribit includitque nos terminis montium fluminumque, quos non excedamus, neque eos, quos statuit, terminos obseruat: "Ne transieris Hiberum; ne quid rei tibi sit cum Saguntinis." Ad Hiberum est Saguntum? "Nusquam te uestigio moueris." Parum est quod ueterrimas provincias meas, Siciliam ac Sardiniam, [ademisti?] Adimis etiam Hispanias et, si inde cesseris, in Africam transcendes. <Transcendes> autem? Transcendisse dico. Duos consules huius anni, unum in Africam, alterum in Hispaniam miserunt.* ⁷⁸ Pol. 3.62-3.
not doubt that Sicily and Sardinia were major motivators. In Livy, this speech is the only indication that anger over Sardinia contributed to the war. Then, recognizing the historiographical confusion, or misrepresentation, of the Ebro treaty, Livy turns it into a throwaway joke. This is perhaps the clearest indication that the Roman position that once Saguntum had fallen there could be no more discussion of treaties was not just bluster, but reflected their actual way of thinking: *fides*-obligations to *amici* superseded all else.

**Syracusan *Fides* in the Second Punic War**

Three unique elements of the Roman tradition concerning the campaign against Syracuse during the Second Punic War also require discussion. First, after Syracuse’s defection, Livy’s Romans claim to make war on the city because of their *fides*, taking the side of exiles and judging its current government illegitimate. Second, the qualms Livy expresses about the city’s treatment are directed more at the effect of luxury on the Romans rather than their severity towards the city. Third, after the city’s capture, the Romans gave Syracusan complaints a hearing, an episode which Livy draws attention to in order to portray the Romans as responsive

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79 So far as the war comes to the island, it appears that the Carthaginians are stirring up an otherwise peaceful province. Livy 22.1 has the first mention of events on the island, dire omens, perhaps indicating some anxiety about the place. In 22.25 the plebs allege that Fabius was keeping a praetor stationed there unnecessarily to keep him out of the way. In 22.31 the consul receives hostages from both Corsica and Sardinia, and in 23.21 the island’s praetor requests supplies, but when Rome cannot spare any resources the cities on the island kindly, *benigne*, support the Romans. Sardinia continues to be assigned as a praetorian *provincia* in 23.30, but in 23.32 we find the first actual mention of unrest, with the islanders tired by the *diuturnitate imperii Romani*. While this makes clear that 23.30’s *benigne* was a euphemism, *diuturnitate* indicates that the Sardinians rankled at far more than this particular exaction, 23.48 specifying that the island had previously been a significant source of income. In 23.34 the outgoing prefect reports that *bellum ac defecctionem omnes spectare*. Two battles occur in 23.40, the second prompted by a second set of Carthaginian reinforcements, amongst which three Carthaginian notables are captured, including a Hanno, whom Livy describes as *auctor rebellionis Sardis bellique eius haud dubie concitor*. The Sardinian leader Hampiscora and his son Hostus also come to a bad end and it is announced to the senate that Sardinia has been completely subdued. Sardinia only appears as a supply base and in the sortition of provinces until 27.6 when a Punic fleet makes a desultory raid, and an increase in forces in 27.22 after a rumor of significant naval mobilization, but nothing comes of this. 28.46 sees Carthaginian supply vessels captured near the island and in 30.19 Carthaginians evacuating Italy barely make it as far as the island, indicating its tactical utility for the Italian campaign. As the rebellion was so quickly and decisively subdued, the Roman version of events passes over it quickly and attempts rather half-heartedly to focus blame on a Carthaginian.
hegemons. In the senate’s deliberations, Livy makes the commemoration of the city’s prior fides towards Rome, both by Syracusans and Romans, the foundation of a renewed relationship between the cities. The Roman historiographical tradition on Syracuse thus demonstrates the flexibility of fides-based foreign policy, which here justifies a war for regime-change.

The details of Syracuse’s defection and the Roman campaign in Sicily during the Second Punic War are too complicated to analyze in detail here. In summary, since striking his alliance with Rome during the First Punic War, Hiero, king of Syracuse, had been a model ally, even offering substantial material assistance at the beginning of the Second Punic War.\(^80\) When Hiero died in 215 BCE, his young grandson Hieronymous ascended to the throne.\(^81\) Arrogant, immature, and beholden to his advisers, Hieronymous rejected what Livy claims was Hiero’s deathbed wish, that he maintain his fides erga populum Romanum, and instead began to negotiate with Carthage and mocked Roman ambassadors with the result of Cannae.\(^82\) Hieronymous was quickly assassinated and, through various turns of fortune, two Carthaginian agents of Syracusan extraction, Hippocrates and Epicydes, came to power in the city through demagoguery that bears the same mark of class bias already seen in Livy.\(^83\) Since civil strife and bloodshed gripped the city, Hippocrates and Epicydes stir hatred of Rome by spreading false rumors of a massacre at Leontini, and numerous exiles sought refuge with the Romans, Livy is able to have Marcellus frame the ensuing war as on behalf of Syracuse, rather than against it.\(^84\)

\(^80\) Hiero provides aid in Livy 21.49-51, 22.37, and 23.21.5, where Livy refers to him as the unicum subsidium populi Romani. Hiero requests aid against Carthaginian reprisals in 22.56.

\(^81\) Livy 24.4.1.

\(^82\) For the wish, see Livy 24.4.5. The insult comes in 24.6. Throughout Livy casts his rule as illegitimate governance with words such as regnum and dominatio.

\(^83\) The assassination occurs in Livy 24.7, and the Sicilian narrative resumes in 24.21. After much chaos, Hippocrates and Epicydes are elected to office in 24.27 as Marcellus arrives on the scene and attempts to make peace with Syracuse.

\(^84\) An actual massacre was committed by the Romans later at Henna, Livy 24.37-9, after a number of Sicilian cities began defecting to the Carthaginians. Livy ambivalently justifies the Roman act by theatrically displaying the fear of the prefect in charge of the town’s garrison, who believed he and his men had to preempt Hennan treachery with
The Roman speaker said that they were not bringing war to the Syracusans but aid, both to those who fled to them from amidst the slaughter, and to those who, oppressed by terror, were suffering a servitude worse not just than exile, but death. The Romans would not allow the wicked slaughter of allies to go unavenged. Thus, if the Syracusans would allow the safe return of those who had fled, give up the perpetrators of the crime, and Syracuse’s liberty and laws were restored, there would be no need for arms.\(^8\) (Livy 24.33.5-6)

In this way the Romans deny the legitimacy of the government at Syracuse and position themselves as the city’s protectors, their right to intervene stemming from their obligations to allied citizens.

Much later, as Syracuse falls in stages, Livy puts heavy emphasis on Marcellus’ misericordia, showing him in tears as he contemplates the greatness of the city, Hiero's great service to Rome, and how it would soon be destroyed, a scene which prefigures Scipio Aemilianus at the destruction of Carthage.\(^8\) While Marcellus then holds his troops back in less populated areas of the city lest they turn to uncontrolled plunder, this seems to have been more from fear of enemy reinforcements, for he declared that no free citizen was to be harmed, but all else would be booty.\(^7\) Livy is explicit that there was much looting, but no bloodshed as the outer section of the city was taken. When the Carthaginian reinforcements are destroyed, Epicydes has fled, and Hippocrates is murdered, Marcellus works out conditions the exiles in his camp that prove acceptable to the besieged as well: Rome would take control of the territory that had been their own. Livy comments in 24.39.7 that ita Henna aut malo aut necessario facinore retenta, but then admits that the act was highly detrimental to the Roman cause throughout Sicily in 24.39.9: et quia caede infanda rebantur non hominum tantum sed etiam deorum sedem violatam esse, tum vero etiam qui ante dubii fuerant defecere ad Poenos.

\(^8\) Livy 24.33.5-7: Romanus orator non bellum se Syracusanis sed opem auxiliumque adferre ait, et eis qui ex media caede elapsi perfugierint ad se, et eis qui metu oppressi foediorem non exsilio solum sed etiam morte servitutem patiantur; nec caedem nefandam sociorum inultam Romanos passuros. Itaque si eis qui ad se perfugerint tutus in patriam reditus pateat et caedis auctores dedantur et libertas legesque suae Syracusanis restituantur, nihil armis opus esse. Although much less is preserved, Pol. 8.3 indicates that he too placed the lion's share of responsibility for the war on advisors and demagogues.

\(^8\) Livy 25.24.11-13. For Scipio, see Pol. 38.21.

\(^7\) Livy 25.25.5-7.
the kings’ possession, but the Sicilians would be granted liberty and their own laws.\textsuperscript{88}

Representatives sent to the main part of the city, Achradina, convince the Syracusans that the Romans made war because of affection, \textit{caritas}, for them, since they had fallen under tyranny.\textsuperscript{89}

The Roman position absolves the Syracusans themselves of most guilt, blaming Hieronymus and his lackeys, Hippocrates and Epicydes, for the breach with Rome, and claiming that the only danger the besieged need fear is that of their own choosing. The besieged follow Marcellus’ script, sending back envoys who begged forgiveness in exactly these terms. The siege, however, continues because deserters and mercenaries murder some of the Syracusans, fearing that they will be betrayed to the Romans, and Marcellus finally takes the city by detaching the mercenaries from the deserters and seizing the island Ortygia by treachery, allowing the Syracusans themselves to finally admit him.

After Marcellus finally takes the city, Livy has him proclaim to a select group of Syracusans that he had besieged the city not in order to subjugate but to free it, echoing the language used at the start of the war. His rhetoric, while not terribly unique, deserves some attention as an early example of Roman attempts to deal with Greek cities under their control.

Marcellus summoned his council and the Syracusans who had sought refuge with the Romans after being driven out during the civil disturbance. He responded [to the envoys surrendering the city], saying that Hiero’s benefactions towards Rome over fifty years did not outnumber the wrongs done by those now in control of Syracuse. Yet most of those wrongs had fallen where they should and their doers had brought greater punishments for the violated treaties upon themselves than the Roman people would have wished. He himself had besieged the city for three years not in order that the Roman people have a servile city, but that a band of deserters not hold it captured.\textsuperscript{90} (Livy 25.31.3-5)

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{88} Livy 25.28.3.
\bibitem{89} Livy 25.28.7: \textit{Romanis causam oppugnandi Syracusas fuisse caritatem Syracusanorum, non odium.}
\bibitem{90} Livy 25.31.3-5: \textit{Marcellus consilio advocato et adhibitis etiam Syracusanis qui per seditiones pulsi ab domo intra praesidia Romana fuerant, respondit non plura per annos quinquaginta benefacta Hieronis quam paucis hisannis maleficia eorum qui Syracusas tenuerint erga populum Romanum esse; sed pleraque eorum quo debuerint reccidisse foederumque ruptorum ipsos ab se graviores multo quam populus Romanus voluerit poenas exegisse. Se quidem tertium annum circumsedere Syracusas, non ut populus Romanus servam civitatem haberet sed ne transfugarum duces captam et oppressam tenerent.}
\end{thebibliography}
While Marcellus publicly accepts the fiction that the Syracusans defected unwillingly and works to define its status as that of an ally, not a slave, he nevertheless upbraids them for not surrendering the city sooner. He then seizes the royal treasury and gives the city over to his soldiers to loot (protecting the homes of those who had served with the Romans), and, after the death of Archimedes, takes care to give him a proper funeral.\footnote{Livy 25.31.} Livy thus seems to stress Marcellus’ moderation in taking the city, yet allowing it to be looted goes against the expectations raised in his negotiations. Because of the \textit{deditio}, Syracuse was completely at Marcellus’ mercy, yet Roman practice favored mercy. The agreed-upon terms only cover territory, yet it is reasonable to assume that the Syracusans thought their city would be left reasonably intact. Marcellus acted legally, but his actions are at odds with his rhetoric and plundering the city appears morally suspect.\footnote{For discussion of the ethics and characterization of Marcellus, see Levene, \textit{Hannibalic War}, 209-14.} In general, however, Livy approves of Marcellus’ conduct, stating that “he managed other affairs in Sicily with such \textit{fides} and integrity that he built up not just his own glory, but increased the majesty of the state.”\footnote{Livy 25.40.1: \textit{Dum haec in Hispania geruntur, Marcellus captis Syracusis, cum cetera in Sicilia tanta fide atque integritate compositisset ut non modo suam gloriam set etiam maiestatem populi Romani augeret...} Although the \textit{cum} clause is concessive, Livy’s reservations are not with how the plunder was acquired, but the end result. Note also that Marcellus used it for public display rather than private gain.}

Later developments make clear that Marcellus' treatment of Syracuse was not ideal.\footnote{The Syracusan complaint occurs in parallel with that of the Capuans, who contest the punishment they received at Roman hands for their defection. This city is found much more culpable and serves as a contrast to the relatively generous treatment of the Syracusans. For these deliberations, see Livy 26.33-4.} A Sicilian delegation comes to find fault with his \textit{acta} and complains bitterly when Marcellus is again allotted Sicily even threatening to abandon the city.\footnote{They were first mentioned in 26.26, awaiting the return of Marcellus' colleague before making their accusations.} The Syracusans exaggerate their loyalty, invoking Hiero's \textit{fides}, claiming that Hieronymous was assassinated because of his break with Rome, and even that it was only through fear of Hippocrates and Epicydes that tolerated
siding with Carthage. Moreover, they blame Marcellus for the death of seventy youths who relied on his aid to assassinate the Carthaginian agents but were disappointed, an anecdote nowhere mentioned in Livy’s narrative. After mentioning a massacre Livy had already refuted and alleging that the consul ignored legitimate attempts at making peace so as to have a pretext for sacking the city, the Syracusans conclude with a complaint about Marcellus stripping the city of its artworks.\textsuperscript{96} Marcellus replies with a speech that conforms exactly to Livy’s narrative, repudiating most Syracusan complaints. The artworks, he insists, were taken \textit{belli iure}.\textsuperscript{97}

After much debate in the senate, it is decided to ratify Marcellus' settlement, although with significant reservations:

The other consul raised the issue of the Sicilians’ requests. When there was a long debate on the matter, a great part of the senate followed T. Manlius Torquatus’ view that the war had been waged against the tyrants, common enemies of both the Roman and Syracusan people, and that it would have been better for the city to have been received in surrender rather than taken by force, and, when it had been received, to have been set aright with its ancestral laws and liberty rather than, tired with war, to be afflicted with wretched servitude. A most beautiful and noble city had been placed in the middle of the contest between tyrants and a Roman leader, and perished as a result, a city which once was the granary and treasury of the Roman people, and which had aided and embellished the Roman state with its generosity and gifts at many times, even in this Punic war. If king Hiero should return to life, that most faithful (\textit{fidissimus}) supporter of Roman rule, with what expression could either Syracuse or Rome be shown to him, since when he would see his own land half-destroyed and burnt down he would then see all its spoils upon entering Rome, almost at its very gate? These and other such sentiments were expressed with ill-will for the consul and in sympathy with the Syracusans, but the senate’s decree was more gentle.\textsuperscript{98} (Livy 26.32.1-6)

\textsuperscript{96} Livy 26.30.6: \textit{scilicet iustiore de causa vetustissimos socios populi Romani trucidaret ac diripet.}

\textsuperscript{97} Livy 26.31.9.

\textsuperscript{98} Livy 26.32.1-6: \textit{Consul alter de postulatis Siculorum ad patres retulit. Ibi cum diu [de] sententiis certatum esset et magna pars senatus, princeps eius dententiae T. Manlio Torquato, cum tyrannis bellum gerendumuisse censerent hostibus et Syracusanorum et populi Romani; et urbem recipi, non capi, et receptam legibus antiquis et libertate stabiliri, non fessam miserandam servitute bello adfligi; inter tyrannorum et ducis Romani certamina praemium victoris in medio positum urbem pulcherrimam ac nobilissimam perisse, horreum atque aerarium quondam populi Romani, cuius munificentia ac donis multis tempestatibus, hoc denique ipso Punico bello, adiuta ornataque res publica esset; si ab inferis exsistat rex Hiero fidissimus imperii Romani cultor, quo ore aut Syracusas aut Romam et ostendi posse cum, ubi semiratam ac spoliatam patriam resperexerit, ingrediens Romam in vestibulo urbis, prope in...}
The senators express a preference for how the war should have gone; they do not claim that Marcellus had this option. Acrimony is instead reserved for the plunder and glorying in the downfall of a once loyal ally, the powerful image of senators trying to explain the ruin of his city to Hiero’s ghost making clear the source and depth of their discomfort. This is framed not as a criticism of Marcellus’ behavior, but as proof of their own fine sentiments: the senate feels shame before the memory of Hiero, the adornments of whose city were now displayed as booty in Rome, and laments the great city’s fall. Livy thus justifies Marcellus’ conduct while, through the senate’s reaction, making a case that the Romans generally follow a higher standard. The senate approves Marcellus’ *acta* but declares setting the city right a matter of state importance. Livy ends the episode with a reconciliation scene, the Sicilians apologizing to Marcellus, proof of their abasement, and him taking them into his *fidem et clientelam*. Livy thus wraps up his Syracuse narrative by admitting that Roman behavior was not what it should have been, yet showing the state’s effort both to act correctly and uphold even the memory of *fides*. Much like the theft of Ardeate land in 3.70-2, Livy turns the plundering of Syracuse into an event that eventually redounds to Rome’s credit.

As one would expect, Polybius' interpretation was somewhat different, finding fault with the Romans for robbing Syracuse of its artworks but not for their severity. Far worse fates, of which Polybius seems to approve, are to be found in his history. Instead, his concern seems to be

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99 Burton, *Friendship*, 335-9 stresses how slow the Romans were to enter into hostilities and their willingness to continue negotiations in face of bad faith, although his account flattens the various factions in this turbulent period into a more cohesive vision of Syracuse than is actually to be found in Livy.

100 Livy 26.32.6: *Acta M. Marcelli quae is gerens bellum victorque egisset rata habenda esse; in reliquum curae senatui fore rem Syracusanam, mandaturosque consuli Laevinorum ut quod sine iactura rei publicae fieri posset fortunis eius civitatis consuleret.*


102 Pol. 9.10.
for Roman morality and international reputation. He judges that they would be justified in taking gold and silver, thus depriving the conquered of a potential war-chest. Exchanging Roman austerity for Syracusan luxury, however, would be a change for the worse. Polybius is not alone in this judgment. Livy also sees the spoils of Syracuse as forming a stepping stone on the way to Rome’s much lamented decadence, hinting at Marcellus’ arrogance with his private triumph on the Alban Mount, for the senate granted him only an ovation, and cataloging the extreme wealth on display. In 25.40.2 Livy affirms that these works were taken *jure belli*, but links the ensuing appreciation for Greek art with the *licentia* that would lead to Romans (Verres is, of course, implied), plundering even sacred sites. But Polybius has a further consideration, φθόνος. Appropriated works of art, he says, remind viewers of the vanquished and incline them to pity, stirring envy of the victors’ excessive good fortune. Instead, Polybius recommends seeking the reputation for magnanimity gained by leaving as much as possible intact, a sentiment seemingly shared by Livy’s senate. Both historians tap into the same discourse on conquest which, if not Roman, was at least shared. Stripped of the narrative of Rome’s moral decline, such considerations of propriety in dealing with the conquered are based upon contemporary Roman discourse. Thus, for later historians, the question was not what Syracuse deserved, but how best to make it a useful example. Roman anxieties over Syracuse were not over the justice of Marcellus’ actions, for Livy deftly crafts a narrative of *fides* broken and then restored, but over luxury and its detrimental influence on the Romans.

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103 Livy 25.40.2: *ceterum inde primum initium mirandi Graecarum artium opera licentiaque hinc sacra profanaque omnia volgo spoliandi factum est, quae postremo in Romanos deos, templum id ipsum primum quod a Marcello eximie ornatum est, vertit.*

104 Polybius 9.10.
The Romans in Spain

We conclude discussion of the Second Punic War with Roman activity in Spain and the way in which Livy and Polybius see the Romans offering the Spanish a sort of moral education. With what almost appears to be a nascent ancient version of the “civilizing mission,” these accounts show how the Romans could imagine themselves enjoying both the material and moral benefits of empire while practicing policies they saw as uniquely ethical. Rome’s Spanish campaigns needed no elaborate *casus belli* or prefatory diplomacy, since Carthage’s hostility made the area a natural theater of war, but Livy endeavors to show that the Romans behaved better than the Carthaginians, thus earning Spanish loyalty. That this loyalty was temporary was due to the Spaniards’ character, for “the Spaniards’ nature is turbulent and keen for revolution,” much like the Gauls.\(^{105}\) Accordingly, when Gnaeus Scipio arrives in 217 BCE he finds the Spaniards dissatisfied with Carthaginian rule. His initial successes prompt one hundred twenty communities to send ambassadors to the general, give hostages, and place themselves under Roman jurisdiction.\(^{106}\) It is doubtful that they had any idea what would be the extent or duration of the Roman presence or that, by submitting to Roman authority, *dicio*, they had agreed to a binding and quasi-legal subordination. Although the destruction of Saguntum had utterly devalued Roman promises, the arrival of a sizeable force drastically changed the situation.

Next Livy adapts an episode from Polybius rife with demeaning stereotypes of Spanish and Carthaginian alike. When Gnaeus’ brother Publius arrives at what used to be Saguntum he is approached by a certain Abelux, whom Livy describes as “a noble Spaniard of Saguntum, once faithful to the Carthaginians, but at that point (such is the character of barbarians!), fortune had

\(^{105}\) Livy 22.21.2: *Hispanorum inquieta avidaque in novas res sunt ingenia…*  
\(^{106}\) Livy 22.20.10-12.
changed his allegiance (*fides*).”107 Both Polybius and Livy take a clear paternalistic view of Abelux, and his dubious character presages future problems in Spain in such a way as to style them the result of an ingrained fault of the locals.108 In order to gain the Romans' favor Abelux decides to hand over to them the hostages Hannibal had taken so that the Romans could in turn gain the Spaniards' gratitude. In fact, Abelux had convinced the Carthaginian in charge of the hostages that by releasing them he would earn their peoples' *fides*, his argument invoking the same dichotomy between ruling by means of *beneficia* rather than *metus* seen in the Roman management of Italy. The mildly disapproving tone taken towards Abelux's faithlessness is heightened by his awareness of the utility of *fides*, if not its true meaning. Abelux tricks Bostar the Carthaginian, whom Livy describes as “not clever in accord with Punic character.”109 That the Romans received much more credit for releasing the hostages than the Carthaginians would have is weakly justified by the Spaniards having already come to regard them as heavy-handed.

It is notable that Livy's version is almost a direct translation of Polybius. The main difference is, as elsewhere, that Livy places greater emphasis on the Romans' wish to rule by benefaction rather than fear.110

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107 Livy 22.22.6: *Abelux erat Sagunti nobilis Hispanus, fidus ante Poenis; tum, qualia plerumque sunt barbarorum ingenia, cum fortuna mutaverat fidem.* See also Polybius’ parallel account, 3.98-9.

108 As his comments on the differing credit received by Romans and Carthaginians shows, Livy is not unaware that this dim view of their moral capacities weakens the argument that the Romans treated them so much better that they consented to Roman rule. For this author, the Romans' own moral superiority to both the Carthaginians and the Spaniards seems sufficient, a hint of a “civilizing mission”-like idea which may have appeared in the Livain vision of post-Carthaginian Spain.

109 Livy 22.22.15: *Homini non ad cetera Punica ingenia callido...*

110 Pol 3.99.6-9: οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Πόπλιον ἐτίμησάν τε διαφερόντως τὸν Βώστωρ δὲ παιδικώτερον (ἢ) κατὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν δόξας ἐγκεχειρικέναι τοῖς ὁμήρους τοῖς παῖδας πρὸς τὰς ἐπικειμένας ἐπιβολάς.
The two Scipios' campaigns of 212 BCE then demonstrate the unreliability of these allies, for the Romans’ Celtiberian allies are bribed to withdraw and the two consuls are killed. Livy himself states that such bad faith from allies will always be a concern for Roman commanders and later the younger Publius Scipio, when he embarks upon the war, takes special care to not give an opportunity for treachery even when there are no grounds for suspicion.\textsuperscript{111} Dismissive as the Roman attitude to the Spanish may be, it is not fatalistic. Much as the unification of Italy had its share of setbacks, so to did establishing stability in the provinces, but Livy knew that these efforts had come to fruition. Habituating non-Romans to Roman \textit{fides} and norms of behavior takes time, but Livy believes that this is something for which they will eventually become grateful and he ends his account of the two Scipios with such an intimation:

The grief over their death was no greater at Rome than throughout all of Spain; amongst citizens the public disaster brought a share of grief for the lost army and province, while in Spain they mourned and missed the leaders themselves, Gnaeus more so. Because he had been with them longer, he had earned their favor and provided their first example of Roman justice and moderation.\textsuperscript{112}

\textbf{(Livy 25.36.14-6)}

Livy gives the impression that the Roman virtues the Scipios displayed in Spain were not just a good character reference for Rome, but a new and improving influence. This imagined grief legitimates the Roman presence in the region on the grounds that they were doing its inhabitants a service. Making the Spanish appear to acknowledge Rome’s moral superiority implies some measure of consent to Roman authority. The idea that the Romans' influence was a gift will have a distinguished history in Roman literature but, for those of Republican sensibilities at least, it appears to have remained a happy side effect. Once Rome had, for other reasons, established a

\textsuperscript{111} Livy 25.33.5-6. See also Livy 28.13.

\textsuperscript{112} Livy 25.36.14-6: \textit{Luctus ex morte eorum non Romae maior quam per totam Hispaniam fuit; quin apud cives partem doloris et exercitus amissi et alienata provincia et publica trahebat clades; Hispaniae ipsos lugebant desiderabantque duces, Gnaeum magis, quod diutius praefuerat iis priorque et favorem occupaverat et specimen iustitiae temperantiaque Romanae primus dederat.}
presence, this sort of belief could help justify its continuance.

Rebuilding this Roman presence after the disaster of the Celtiberian betrayal was the challenge that launched the younger Scipio’s career and prompted him to successfully implement the alliance-building strategy which Hannibal had tried to use in Italy.\textsuperscript{113} When Scipio takes New Carthage he releases the citizens and tradesmen while using slaves and resident aliens as rowers in his fleet.\textsuperscript{114} His kindly treatment of the Spanish hostages found in the city proves exemplary, particularly in his attention to the women's modesty. With an implicit contrast between Rome and Carthage he briefly lays out the principles of Roman foreign policy:

\begin{quote}
As for the rest, he first bade the assembled hostages to take heart, for they had come under the power of the Roman people, which preferred to bind men by beneficence rather than fear and to have foreign peoples joined in fides and alliance rather than crushed by grim servitude.\textsuperscript{115} (Livy 26.49.7-8)
\end{quote}

This is as notable for what Scipio does not say as for what he does. He makes no mention of Spanish sovereignty but explicitly states that they are in Rome's power as a recognized fact. Furthermore, it is easy to take too rosy a view of the Roman people preferring to bind foreign nations to them by bonds of fides, alliance, and beneficence; Rome's aim is still control and the formulation holds the implicit threat that should kind treatment fail to leave them obligated to Rome, force would indeed be used. It also shows that, in the Romans' rhetoric, servitium and societas do not entail fundamentally different rights or levels of autonomy, but that the former is to societas what tyranny is to monarchy: a debased form of the same political structure. Although the environment is far removed from archaic Latium, we find the Romans again confronting the ethical problem of how to ensure their subordinates’ loyalty and coming to the same answer:

\textsuperscript{113} Livy acknowledges Spanish reticence to return to a Roman alliance in 26.17.
\textsuperscript{114} Livy 26.47.
\textsuperscript{115} Livy 26.49.7-10: Ceterum vocatis obsidibus primum universos bonum animum habere iussit: venisse enim eos in populi Romani potestatem, qui beneficio quam metu obligare homines malit, exterasque gentes fide ac societate iunctas habere quam tristi subiectas servitio.
they attempt to privilege *fides* over *metus*.\textsuperscript{116} The benefits of this approach quickly become clear when Scipio takes particular care to reunite a certain Allucius with his betrothed and then adds the gift given to him to her dowry. This is not just a personal favor, for the young man returns a few days later with 1,400 cavalry.\textsuperscript{117} The choice of how a people would experience Roman power ultimately depended on their own actions, and Allucius chooses correctly.

Roman alliance-building in Spain accelerated further in 209 BCE, when Scipio received the loyalty of Edesco, whose family were in Roman hands; it seems that the Romans kept hold of the families of those still allied with the Carthaginians until they came to the right decision. However, since Livy wants to differentiate Roman and Carthaginian rule, he minimizes the Roman's use of hostages and instead has this chieftain motivated as much or more by sudden surge in Roman popularity: “but besides that cause, an almost spontaneous inclination which had shifted Spain’s favor almost entirely from Carthaginian to Roman rule, moved him.”\textsuperscript{118} The language here seems unremarkable at first, but is quite important for the Roman perspective, for it demonstrates that the Spaniards are not fighting against a common enemy but choosing a better master. This is the power relationship implicit in Scipio's speech to the hostages, but which is rarely stated so bluntly to foreign audiences. The Romans regard it as both a palliative and legimation of their rule that, although the Spaniards’ choices are limited, either Romans or Carthaginians for masters, they are still presented with a choice. In this same chapter, two other chieftains, Indibilis and Mandonius, also distance themselves from the Carthaginians, abandoning Hasdrubal just as the Celtiberians had abandoned the prior Scipios. They assure Scipio Africanus that they feel shame for their defection, yet allege Carthaginian abuses and

\textsuperscript{116} Moore, *Artistry*, 36-40.
\textsuperscript{117} Livy 26.50.
\textsuperscript{118} Livy 27.17.2: *sed praeter eam causam etiam velut fortuita inclinatio animorum quae Hispaniam omnem avererat ad Romanum a Punico imperio traxit eum.*
hope to prove themselves loyal to Rome by their subsequent actions.\textsuperscript{119} Thus they follow the script perfectly, accepting the Romans as new and kindlier masters of their choosing, and receive their families back from Scipio. While to modern eyes the Romans may seem almost as cynical and manipulative as the Carthaginians in this, the Romans present themselves as a marked improvement.

Such is also the message of Polybius' account of the Spanish campaigns, for while we lack a continuous narrative, as with Sicily, there are enough excerpts to assure us of the history's general tenor. For example, after the defeat of the two Scipios, Polybius states that the Carthaginians' innate πλεονεξία did their cause great harm, citing as an example Hasdrubal's extortion from a certain Andobales, a prince who had supported the Carthaginians even when it temporarily cost him his throne. When he resisted giving the sum, relying on the πίστις he had already shown, he was accused of treachery and forced to give his daughters as hostages.\textsuperscript{120} Polybius is quite insistent that Carthage cuts a sorry figure beside Rome, crediting the Romans' success to their good treatment of allies.\textsuperscript{121} However, one discordant element arises in Polybius' portrayal of the Romans which cannot be ignored: their brutality in taking cities.

Publius, when he thought enough had entered, let his soldiers loose in the city, as is their custom, bidding them to kill whomever they met, spare no one, and not to start pillaging before he gave the signal. I believe the Romans do this to cause terror, and for this reason one can see, when the Romans seize cities, not just men slaughtered, but even dogs cut in half and the limbs of other animals hacked off. Quite a lot of this happened then because of the multitude caught in that city.\textsuperscript{122}

\textsuperscript{119} Livy 27.17.10: “Indibilis spoke for each, not at all crudely and incautiously like a barbarian, but rather with modesty and dignity, more like one excusing his change of allegiance as necessary than glorying in it as if he had taken the first opportunity: he said he knew that the label of defector was hated by old allies and suspect to new...”

\textsuperscript{120} Polybius 9.11.

\textsuperscript{121} Polybius makes an explicit contrast in 10.36 as Hasdrubal's allies quickly melt away.

\textsuperscript{122} Pol. 10.15.4-6: ὁ δὲ Πόπλιος ἐπεὶ τοὺς εἰσεληλυθότας ἀξιόχρεως ὑπελάμβανεν εἶναι, τοὺς μὲν πλείστους ἔφηκε κατὰ τὸ παρ’ αὐτοῖς ἐθος ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει, παραγγείλας κτείνειν τὸν παρατυχόντα καὶ μηδὲνος φείδεσθαι, μηδὲ
This seems a case of understatement where the historian did not feel at liberty to express his disapproval. Still, this presentation focuses attention not on their bloodlust so much as their discipline, perhaps responding to more critical accounts from other authors. Polybius' word choice is also noteworthy, for the Romans' success in bringing Spanish tribes around to their side is achieved by means of terror, καταπλήξις. Actions of this sort quickly backfired in Greece, giving the Romans a reputation for barbarity which Flamininus would have to work to erase.

Whether because Polybius mentioned it or since it was a notable example, Livy also mentions the slaughter, but says that it only lasted until the citadel was taken, and then describes the large number of hostages, countering the impression Polybius gives that this was to terrify other communities rather than a strategic part of that specific conflict.123

Although there remained fighting to be done, and at this point Carthaginian hopes in Spain had collapsed, the province was not yet secure. Not having truly assimilated the ethic of fides, Indibilis and Mandonius revolted when they heard the rumor of Scipio's death. Their motive was that they had anticipated taking control of Spain once the Carthaginians had been driven out, evidently misinterpreting Roman intentions.124 The Spaniards considered abandoning the attempt upon learning that Scipio yet lived but, despairing of mercy after learning how Scipio had punished a mutiny, fought on.125 When they finally surrendered, Scipio chose to interpret their actions as the result of a misunderstanding, explaining the concept of deditio and making

\[ πρὸς τὰς ὑφελείας ὀρμᾶν, μέχρις ἂν ἀποδοθῇ τὸ σύνθημα. \]
\[ ποιεῖν δὲ μοι δοκοῦσι τούτῳ καταπλήξεως χάριν· διὸ καὶ πολλάκις ἰδεῖτο ἐν ταῖς τῶν Ῥωμαίων καταλήψεις τῶν πόλεων οὐ μόνον τοὺς ἀνθρώπους πεφονευμένους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς κύνας δεδιχοτομημένους καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων μέλη παρακεκομμένα. \]
\[ τότε δὲ καὶ τελέως πολύ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἥν διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν κατειλημμένων. \]

123 Livy 27.46.10: Quoad dedita arx est, caedes tota urbe passim factae, nec ulli puberum qui obvius fuit parebatur; tum signo dato caedibus finis factus. Ad praedam victores versi quae ingens omnis generis fuit.
124 Livy 28.24.2-4: Non socii in fide, non exercitus in officio mansit. Mandonius et Indibilis, quibus, quia regnum sibi Hispaniae, pulsis inde Carthaginiensibus, destinabant animis, nihil pro spe contigerat, concitatis popularibus—Lacetani autem erant—et iuventute Celtiberorum excita agrum Suessetanum Sedetanumque sociorum populi Romani hostiliter depopulati sunt.
125 Livy 28.24, 28.32.
clear that they were completely in the Romans' power while sparing them the indignation of its actual performance. Scipio's formulation deserves quotation here, for it shows clearly just how limited the Roman toolbox was: “The Romans had an ancient custom not to treat a people, with which the bond of amicitia had not been made with treaty or equal terms, as pacified and in their power until they had surrendered everything, mortal and divine, hostages were received, weapons confiscated, and garrisons had been placed in their cities.” In this way Livy shows that the Romans were not unwilling to recognize their hegemony for the forceful domination it was, but prided themselves on cultivating ethical relationships where possible. Scipio also makes clear that any further problems would meet with the harshest punishment and, once again presents these barbarians with a simple binary choice in how they want to interact with Rome. Once Scipio leaves the province, they make the wrong choice.

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126 Livy 28.34.7: Mos vetustus erat Romanis, cum quo nec foedere nec aequis legibus iungeretur amicitia, non prius imperio in eum tamquam pacatum uti quam omnia divina humanaque dedisset, obsides accepti, arma adempta, praesidia uribus imposita forent.

127 Livy 28.34.

128 Livy 29.1.
Chapter 4

The Illyrian and First Macedonian Wars

This chapter surveys accounts of the First and Second Illyrian and First Macedonian Wars, focusing on the relationship Polybius’ relationship to Livy and the broader Roman tradition. Much like in the First Punic War, Polybius appears to have reproduced the Roman narrative and added a further layer of interpretation, in this case his programmatic explanation for Rome’s entrance into and eventual domination of Greek politics. Yet, despite the fact that Livy used Polybius as a source, this is thoroughly lacking in his history, indicating that the Roman tradition saw these wars as isolated events with the same traditional ethical justifications as those that came before. We shall see that Livy, and presumably other Roman historians, were resistant to any mode of explanation that cast Roman expansion as a process and thereby implied an intent to conquer.

Livy, Polybius, and the Illyrian Wars

Rome’s first armed excursion across the Adriatic, the First Illyrian War of 229 BCE, was not motivated by desire for expansion or gain, but a plea for help and a violation of the *ius gentium*. This is striking because the surviving accounts of the war, all more or less pro-Roman, follow this traditional pattern to the exclusion of a sound rationale based on economics and security which would give little room for apology: securing the straits of Otronto and Greek trading partners against a growing threat posed by the Ardiaean monarchy in Illyria. Polybius
tells us that an increase in Illyrian piracy prompted complaints to Rome, which at last sent a
group of senators to investigate. When the youngest Roman envoy spoke too frankly, the
recently widowed Illyrian queen, Teuta, had him killed, and war resulted from this grave offense
against the *ius gentium*. Scholars have rightly resisted attaching much historical weight to
Polybius’ dismissive and stereotyped attribution of the war to a woman’s caprice. Why Polybius
would prefer this version when more plausible accounts were available is a thorny question.
There may have been a certain attraction in seeing this war, followed by the Second Illyrian and
First Macedonian Wars, as the first in a sort of *tricolon crescens* of wars caused by poor
decision-making.¹ This culminates in the *συμπλοκή*, the irrevocable entanglement of east and
west which Polybius saw as the turning point in Mediterranean history and used as the climax of
his first pentad.² Polybius’ account of the war itself is built around sentiments and
characterization that sound Roman, making it difficult to doubt that the mainline Roman tradition
was quite similar, yet the interpretive framework Polybius uses to connect this war to the Second
Illyrian and First Macedonian Wars is entirely absent from Livy.

Appian presents what seems a somewhat more realistic tale, with the citizens of Issa
begging for aid and the Roman ambassador sent to investigate being killed in a random act of
Illyrian piracy along with the Issaean Kleemporos.³ Among moderns, Appian’s foremost
champion has been Derow, who, with the use of admittedly slight epigraphic evidence, showed
that the name Kleemporos is quite likely to be a genuine detail and that much of scholars’

¹ Pol. 2.2-7, concerned entirely with events in Greece and a negative characterization of both Illyrians and Aetolians,
is clearly based off a Greek source, while the consensus is that 2.8-12, detailing Roman involvement, comes from a
Roman source. See Walbank, *Commentary* vol. 1, 153, although P.S. Derow, “Kleemporos” in *Phoenix* 27 (1973),
118-134, makes a strong case for Appian’s version being the more annalistic of the two.
² This is, of course highly suggestive, yet Derow, “Kleemporos,” 132, seems to point in this direction: “In yet
another way, I suspect that Fabius’ portrayal of Teuta was very much to Polybius’ taste. It was as a result of her
unthinking conduct that the Romans entered the war and ‘these parts of Europe:’ the responsibility for what is
described as an insane provocation lay entirely with her.”
tendency to hold to some pruned version of Polybius’ narrative stems more from *a priori* assumptions about the two authors’ worth rather than an evaluation of the specifics.\(^4\) However, acknowledging this bias should not automatically reverse the judgment, for accepting Appian’s version requires explanations both of why the Issaeans would make such an unprecedented appeal for help to the Romans and, considering the Romans’ apparent disinterest in Illyria after the war, why they would have put their weight behind Issa.\(^5\) As Hammond recognized, Romans rushing to protect Greeks from the barbarian menace is an extremely convenient pretext, and Eckstein is surely right to take Gruen’s suggestion that the Issaean appeal entered the historical tradition because the Roman envoys happened to meet Teuta as she was besieging this city.\(^6\) Such a version explains the presence of Kleemporos and would have been useful propaganda during or after the Second Macedonian War.\(^7\)

The version in Dio appears to be a later amalgam of the two traditions, with internal politics driving Issa to defect from the Ardiaean monarchy and appeal to the otherwise unknown Romans for aid. Roman ambassadors meet not with Teuta, but her husband Agron; when he dies, Dio offers a much embellished version of Teuta’s womanly recklessness and a remarkably direct rationale for the Roman alliance:

> The island of Issa freely surrendered itself to the Romans, for when the Romans were first about to make an attempt on the island the Issaeans judged that they were the most agreeable and trustworthy of those powers they feared.\(^8\)

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\(^4\) See Derow, “Kleemporos,” 119-120, esp. n.10 for the exceptions to this trend.

\(^5\) The latest proponent, Danijel Dzino, *Illyricum in Roman Politics, 229 BC–68 AD* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 47-50 skips this step entirely in his narration. Moreover, the two recent studies he cites for Polybius’ literary reworking of the episode do not actually force a rejection of Polybius. Champion, *Cultural Politics*, 111-114 does not consider Appian at all, he then cites Eckstein, *Moral Vision* 150-7’s description of Polybius’ stereotypical treatment of Teuta is cited in favor of Appian, just below a citation of Eckstein, *Greek East*, 36, which nevertheless dismisses Appian’s account.


\(^7\) In fact, such rhetoric was remarkably absent from wars before this period: see Gruen, *Hellenistic World*, 143-5.

\(^8\) Dio 12.49 (= Zonaras 8.19): ὅτι Ἴσσα ἡ νῆσος ἑκουσία ἑαυτὴν Ῥωμαίοις παρέδωκεν. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ τότε πρῶτον πειρᾶσθαι σφόν ἐμπέλλον, καὶ προσφυλεστέρους αὐτοὺς καὶ πιστοτέρους τῶν ἣδη φοβερὸν ἐνόμιζον εἶναι
Considering the Issaeans’ lack of previous experience with Rome, that the Roman campaign ended rather than began with Issa, and that such minimal contacts were maintained afterward, this version is difficult to credit historically. Such was the reasoning that, according to the opening decade of Livy, motivated so many Italian communities to give themselves willingly over to the Romans when faced with some external threat. This degree, not just of consent, but initiative, adds a layer of legitimacy that would be lacking had hegemony been acquired solely by force. As the earliest extra-Italian intervention justified in this way, Appian and Dio’s versions of the First Illyrian War show that the Roman historical tradition saw expansion into the east as a continuation of traditional Roman policy. Although we do not know which version Livy used, but the Periochae make it clear that the death of a Roman ambassador was the deciding factor in going to war. Either tradition would support the claim that Roman character and actions were essentially the same in 229 as in 509 BCE.

For our own understanding of this war and what the primary Roman tradition may have left out, we are not presented with a simple choice between Polybius and Appian. For, if Appian is correct, with a suppliant state forcing Roman involvement and the actual mobilization motivated by a violation of the ius gentium, what need would there be for another version, particularly one that ignores Issa entirely? The solution comes via Hammond’s observation that

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9 Periochae 20: Bellum Illyriis propter unum ex legatis, qui ad eos missi erant, occisum indirectum est, subactique in deditionem uenerunt. War was declared on the Illyrians because one of the legates who had been sent to them was killed, and they were subdued and surrendered.

10 It might be argued, (as indeed Ernst Badian, Studies in Greek and Roman History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964) does of Polybius’ version), that Teuta’s reply is, on the whole, conciliatory and that Rome’s reaction was disproportionate and hawkish. This is much easier to say of Appian’s Teuta who actually does not bear any personal responsibility for the killing. For a demonstration that much of Badian’s reconstruction is based on surmise rather than evidence, see Karl-Ernst Petzold, “Rom und Illyrien: Ein Beitrag zur römischen Außenpolitik im 3. Jahrhundert” in Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte 20 (1971): 199-223. It is also unlikely that, after the apparent murder of one ambassador the Senate would send another, and Appian, in his admittedly compressed account, only placed contact with the queen at the end of the war.
the actual Roman campaign, which worked its way north from Corcyra, appears to have little bearing on either pretext. Punitive measures against Teuta ought to have had more impact on her homeland, over a hundred kilometers of coastline to the north.\(^{11}\) If the relief of Issa was the primary objective, that is over three hundred kilometers away and was, as Polybius tells us, the last point the Romans reached.\(^{12}\) The probability that there was an Issaean named Kleemporos involved indicates that the island’s appeals played a contributory role, but focusing on these would make Rome seem a poor protector indeed. Neither version yields a discreditable war, but focusing on the queen provides the best Roman talking point, for it would be rather strange for a war mounted in defense of Issa to have that city as the very last place relieved by the Romans allegedly sent to help.

Despite being exaggerated, perhaps even ahistorical, the emphasis on Teuta in Polybius and Dio can still tell us a great deal about this preferred Roman version by virtue of the historical explanations and details not included. Modern accounts stress the rapid growth of Ardiaean power, particularly after the capture of Phoenice.\(^{13}\) While this must have been quite alarming to those coastal cities so crucial to trade between Italy and Greece, our ancient sources do not explicitly link piracy and geopolitics. As a *casus belli*, protecting trade routes against a possible threat is distinctly unglamorous, and Issa, being so far north of where the Roman campaign began, could provide only a flimsy pretext on its own. Roman intervention might actually be seen as motivated by a base desire for gain. Both Polybius and Appian get around this by making the Romans’ first move diplomatic and then focusing on the violation of the *ius gentium*, which

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\(^{11}\) Harris, 196-7 n.4 rightly objects to Hammond’s claim that a punitive action against Teuta would start in her territory, for leaving Demetrius with a free hand at Corcyra would be quite dangerous. On the war itself, Harris says surprisingly little.

\(^{12}\) Polybius only mentions Issa in 2.11.11. See Hammond, “Illyris,”.20 for Teuta’s actual power-center. His explanation of this conflict relies on Roman greed and the idea of an Illyrian protectorate oriented against Macedonia. For the arguments against the latter, see below. However, Teuta’s kingdom may not have been so well defined: Dzino, *Illyria*, 45-7.

\(^{13}\) So Eckstein, *Greek East*, 36.
requires a response. All these other motivations may reside in the background, but did not trigger
the outbreak of war. Polybius goes even further in characterizing the Romans: they request
orderly and civilized behavior but Teuta offers an angry rebuff, claiming unfettered piracy as
every Illyrian's birthright. Polybius judges that the youngest of the Romans, Coruncanius, spoke
rightly, but undiplomatically:

He said, “There’s a most admirable custom we Romans have, Teuta, to punish
private misdeeds collectively and to go to the aid of those wronged: now we shall
try, with the god willing, vehemently and quickly, to force you to correct your
customary management of the Illyrians as queen.”¹⁴ (Polybius 2.8.10-11)

While the young man's retort did raise the prospect of war, this sort of bluster is expected in a
contest of resolve. It was only after this outrage that the Romans mobilized, and Polybius
foregrounds the significance of this event for later Roman involvement in the east.¹⁵ For
Polybius’ Greek readers, this episode did double-duty, since the undeniably Roman sentiment of
the younger Coruncanius opportunely lays out a major piece of Roman self-definition:
exceptional concern for justice on the part of the state, not merely individuals, was not just the
Romans’ νόμος but their ἔθος. Coruncanius’ complaint also shows that the Romans thought
justice and its enforcement was sanctioned by the gods as its ultimate guarantors. Such an ethic
was nothing new to Greek thought, but the Roman insistence on this point, particularly their
appeal to the gods even from a position of power, was. Finally, just as Polybius remarked that
Romans doggedly pursue enterprises upon which they have embarked with their full strength, the
Romans, once wronged, would not yield until they obtained satisfaction.¹⁶ The adjective
βασιλικά may even point to Rome's perceived hostility towards monarchies and a tendency to

¹⁴ Pol.2.8.10-11: εἶπεν γὰρ ὅτι Ῥωμαίοις μὲν, ὦ Τεύτα, κάλλιστον ἠθος ἐστὶ τὰ κατ’ ἰδίαι ἁδικήματα κοινῆ
μεταπορεύεσθαι καὶ βοηθεῖν τοὺς ἁδικομένους· παρασώμεθα δὴ θεοῦ βουλομένου σφόδρα καὶ ταχεοὶς ἀναγκάσαται
σε τὰ βασιλικά νόμιμα διορθώσασθαι πρὸς Ἰλλυρίους.
¹⁵ Pol. 2.8.12
¹⁶ See Pol. 1.37.7 for Roman conduct leading to the loss of a fleet to a storm in 255 BCE.
see any offense on the part of a monarch as especially hubristic. Nevertheless, these could only be contributing factors: here, as elsewhere, Roman rhetoric makes use of a claim to ethical superiority and blurs the line between law and an external sense of justice. Yet for all its importance, this sense of justice is always limited to supporting the actual *casus belli*.

In both origin and prosecution, Polybius explicitly sets up this war as a model of Roman methods and goals. The two consuls, Gnaeus Fulvius with the fleet and Aulus Postumius with the army, cross the Adriatic and find Corcyra already captured, but the wily Demetrius of Pharos quickly betrays the city to the consuls. Just as important, the Corcyreans themselves willingly accept Roman πίστις and φιλία, seeing Rome as their only protection from Illyrian violence, παρανομία. In terms of legal particulars, πίστις easily corresponds to a *deditio in fidem* for the purpose of taking over the hostile city. After this the consul returns Corcyrean autonomy while affirming Rome's commitment to the island’s protection and establishing a relationship of informal *amicitia*. The Romans also took Epidamnus under their protection, presumably in the same way, but Polybius offers fewer details and focuses on the campaign. As the Romans advanced, locals gave themselves up and were received into φιλία. The Romans are not presented as aiming at conquest but offering security and some, likely ill-defined, degree of autonomy. This could also be interpreted as delivering these communities into servitude under Demetrius, but there is no hint of that in the text and the dynast appears to merely be a participant in a consensual act of liberation.

The result of this campaign was that Demetrius ended up in charge of a large portion of Illyria and it was in his interest to maintain a settled situation. Rome then left a small force to help protect those states that had surrendered and, with many local troops, this could not be

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17 Pol. 2.11.
19 Despite having initially captured the city in Teuta’s service.
called a garrison. In sum, the apparent strategy was to find communities eager for their aid against the Illyrian scourge and establish a balance of power favorable to these new friends in the hope that it would both prove stable and spare them further annoyance. Thereby, Rome undertook a degree of responsibility for the stability of the region as a whole through ties of amicitia with a number of cities and created an ethical obligation to come to their defense.

Unlike in Appian, Polybius’ version does not see the Romans’ reliability and position as the least threatening power pulling them into wars, yet it still figure prominently in their negotiations. The generalization of this ethic and pattern of behavior to describe the entirety of the war, as seen in Appian and Dio, is a natural simplification.

That Rome sent an explanatory embassy to the Aetolian and Achaean leagues and seems to have succeeded in framing the war as a service to Greece makes it probable that the tradition preserved in Polybius was close to what Rome put out for external consumption.\textsuperscript{20} Much as one would expect of a Livian account, these Romans engaged in wars reluctantly, were concerned more with obtaining justice than territory, and the lasting engagements they made in foreign lands were aimed at maintenance of their fides rather than material and territorial gains.\textsuperscript{21} From the Greek perspective, the precise demands made by the Romans were unclear. Since the Romans do not evidence any territorial ambitions and make a point of declaring their allies’ autonomy, the deditio must have seemed a legal fiction to the Greeks, an impression that would persist for some time.\textsuperscript{22} The Romans understood this autonomy as subject to a continuing bond

\textsuperscript{20} Pol. 2.12. See Dzino, Illyria, 51. That such a flattering discourse towards the Greeks was emerging in no way means that it substantially contributed to the decision to go to war.
\textsuperscript{21} The Romans also send envoys to Athens and Corinth. That they participate in the Isthmian games seems to indicate that the Greeks were well-disposed towards them.
\textsuperscript{22} Jean-Louis Ferrary, Philhellénism et Impérialism (Palais Farnèse: École Française de Rome, 1988), 117-31 convincingly establishes that the patron-client relationship was not so foreign to Greek ways of thinking, but different assumptions about the strength of obligations still provide a large field for misunderstanding.
of fides which obliged their new allies to maintain policies acceptable to Rome. Since their interests do not seem to have dramatically diverged, we cannot test the strength of this bond.

The significance of these varied Roman accounts also depends on their relationship to historical reality. Holleaux, with his defensive idea of Roman expansion, saw the Romans reacting to outside stimuli and then, with too much hindsight, fortifying themselves against Macedon after this war. Hammond himself takes a hard line in explaining Roman aims in this war and frequently uses the term “Illyrian protectorate” while repeating his view that it is entirely euphemistic. Here we should note that Hammond’s conception of Roman policy is structured around the presupposition of continued projection of force reminiscent of the United States’ policy after World War II, as evinced by his frequent reference to Roman “bases,” although he admits “to use a modern phrase, she intended to maintain ‘not a military presence but a military capability—a capability to get troops there if they were needed.’”

A protectorate, or a powerful interest in projecting force, implies a major opponent. The only such threat would be Macedon, yet Dell, pointing out the weakness of Demetrius II at the time, has shown that the idea of protecting this hodgepodge of Greeks and beaten Illyrians from Macedonia is an anachronism, stemming from knowledge of later wars. Rome’s geopolitical

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23 Holleaux, Rome, 112-29. See 113: “Ansi donc, en 228, qu’il s’agiss des Illyriens ou de la Macédoine, le gouvernement romain se comporte avec une prudence avisée et hardie, sans que rien dans so conduite témoigne-du moins nécessairement-de pensées ambitieuses.”

24 Hammond “Illyris,” 20: “This imperialistic quality in Rome is obvious from the first act in Illyris. . . What Rome took was not revenge on Teuta but command of a strategic area in Illyris, strategic not only in a military and naval sense, but also in an economic sense; and to this command she clung consistently until in 200 her other major commitments were so much reduced that she could exploit her strategic position against Macedonia. If it is claimed that Rome took command of this strategic area in Illyris in order to stop Illyrian piracy, the facts are that neither earlier nor now nor later did the independence of this sector of Illyris prevent or even hinder substantially the practice of piracy by the Illyrians, nor did Rome ever use her bases in her sector of Illyris to try to stop Illyrian piratical expeditions.”

25 Ibid., 9
horizon was indeed as limited as our texts suggest and claims of long-term planning again fail.\textsuperscript{26} The idea of a competition between Rome and Macedon at this period, let alone such a strategic bridgehead against a threat that would only begin to emerge, much to Rome’s surprise, a decade later is a shaky proposition.\textsuperscript{27} The lack of territorial gains or tribute exacted from allies shows that the benefit derived by the Romans was nothing other than security. While the relationship may have been decidedly unequal, it was far from subjugation or a façade hastily built to cover conquest. Roman concerns in Illyria are best seen as an attempt to maintain stability in the region, stability predicated on no one group gaining ascendance. To this end, what was protected against was actually the raiding of more northerly Illyrians and the unification of Illyria under a single warlord.

Based on the absence of Illyrian cities and peoples from two treaties, that with the Aetolians in 212/11 BCE, and the list of \textit{adscripti} for the Peace of Phoenice contained in Livy 29.12.14, Ferrary has raised significant doubts about the status accorded to the communities of Illyria.\textsuperscript{28} In the first, where Apollonia, Corcyra, and Epidamnus are missing, Ferrary argued that they were included under the phrase \textit{socii quique eorum dicionis essent} on the grounds that their absence from the list would confirm that they were subject to Rome and could not act in the own name.\textsuperscript{29} The \textit{que} here is critical, for an inscription from Pharos shows that the Romans applied their usual practice to Illyria, striking treaties without formally abridging sovereignty.\textsuperscript{30} Thus, these cities could be \textit{socii} but not \textit{eorum dicionis}. Although Philip and Hannibal seems to state that the Romans are masters of Corcyra, Apollonia, Epidamnus, Pharus, Dimale, the Parthini,

\textsuperscript{26} Harry Dell “Antigonus III and Rome” in \textit{CPhil} 62 (1967): 94-103; Badian, \textit{Studies}, believes that this war arose because of Italian blockade-runners disrupting Teuta’s legitimate war efforts, her response to the Corucanii being essentially conciliatory, and the Romans answering this with a declaration of war is difficult to accept.
\textsuperscript{27} Some of this stems from the idea that the Ardiaean monarchy and Antigonus of Macedon were allies around 230. Hammond, “Illyris, Rome and Macedon” p.4,
\textsuperscript{29} Ferrary, \textit{Philhellénism et Impérialism}, 32.
and the Atintani, this appears to be more of a practical way of expressing their likely allegiance, or perhaps perceived subordination, rather than a juridical nicety.\textsuperscript{31}

The lack of clear political organization in Illyria combines with the relatively scattered nature of the communities to explain the absence.\textsuperscript{32} It is also possible that these cities were in some way associated with Pleuratus, the Illyrian dynast Scerdilaidas, or the Epirote Republic which took the lead in mediating the peace treaty. That Rome later ceded Atintania is certainly much more problematic, but Gruen seems right to see this as Roman recognition of territory Philip had already gained.\textsuperscript{33} While the foreign policy of many Illyrian communities was, at this point, dependent on that of Rome at least in practice, Ferrary’s claim that they held the same legal standing as Greek cities in Sicily exceeds the mandate of our evidence, for we have no evidence of magisterial involvement, and, as he admits, makes the absence of Illyria from anti-Roman rhetoric awkward.\textsuperscript{34}

The idea of a legally constituted Illyrian protectorate has recently been countered by Eckstein who, while he in no way denies Rome’s stark assertion of influence in the region, shows the fundamental incoherence of any such entity.\textsuperscript{35} Rather than forcing the loose aggregate

\textsuperscript{31} Derow, “Rome and Pharos,” rightly concludes that such statements reflected outside perception rather than legal status. See Ferrary \textit{Philhellénism et Impérialism}, 27-8, particularly n. 91 for Polybian vocabulary, referencing Derow, “Polybius, Rome, and the East,” the relevant section of which appears to be p. 5 n. 16, an exhaustive list of words used by Polybius for Roman commands. At this point Derow has just pointed shown, quite rightly, that Polybius does attribute imperial aims to the Romans and that these are described primarily in terms of other states obeying Roman commands. This cannot be directly translated into a discussion of legal status and sovereignty. A smaller state might choose to obey a larger neighbor either because of intimidation or prestige; both certainly entail practical constraints on freedom of action. They do not automatically render the smaller state a subject.

\textsuperscript{32} See also Dzino, \textit{Illyria}, 39, 48-51.

\textsuperscript{33} Gruen, \textit{Hellenistic World}, 79.

\textsuperscript{34} In concluding, Ferrary appears to give ground slightly and provide a reading of Greek usage that would allow Rome decisive informal control while keeping legal independence for the Illyrians. Ferrary, \textit{Philhellénism et Impérialism}, 43: “Le pacte entre Philippe V et Hannibal, le traité romano-étolien de 212/1, les exigences formulées en 209 par les Étoliens eux-mêmes pour conclure la paix avec Philippe, la façon enfin dont Polybe parle de cités “sujettes des Romains”, tout cela montre que les Grecs, en réalité, avaient fort bien compris ce que les Romains entendaient par \textit{amicitia}. D’ailleurs, pas plus que l’\textit{autonomia} (qui correspondait à la formule latine \textit{suis legibus uti}), le statut de φίλος καὶ σύμμαχος n’était, dans le monde hellénistique contemporain, incompatible avec un état de dépendance et de sujétion vis-à-vis d’un souverain, d’une confédération ou d’un cité.”

\textsuperscript{35} Eckstein, \textit{Greek East}, 50-54.
of relatively independent states established in 228 BCE into a protectorate aimed at extending Roman power, this arrangement would, ideally, minimize Roman commitments and, absent the threat of Ardiaean domination, allow cities such as Apollonia to manage their own affairs. Even this outcome most assuredly contributed to Rome’s eventual hegemony over the Mediterranean, but this is presented as an ethically regulated imperialism, based on a degree of consent from those communities which appealed to, or eventually sided with, Rome. Driven by goals other than exploitation, hegemony is seen purely as a byproduct of proper behavior. Rome did use Corcyra and Apollonia as staging areas for the Second Illyrian as well as the Macedonian wars, but the relationship was somewhat different. An inscription from Pharos records that the Romans did form alliances with individual Illyrian cities after the First Illyrian War, seemingly treating them much as they treated Italian cities. While the Romans may have been blind to the possibility that this would be seen as a threat, as Polybius 3.16.3 indicates, it was, and thus may have contributed to the hostility towards Romans manifest at the conference of Naupactus and the outbreak of the First Macedonian War.37

Although more legitimate than territorial aspirations, ancient historical accounts do not treat suppressing piracy as a sufficient cause for war. Illyrian piracy had been an irritant to Italian traders and the Roman senate paid little heed to appeals for intervention until the Illyrian capture of Phoenice established Illyria as an ascendant regional power.38 In addition to disrupting trade on a greater scale, the Illyrians could be seen as a potential threat to coastal cities all over the Adriatic.39 According to Dell, who makes a convincing argument that prior to 231 BCE, Illyrian

36 Derow, “Rome and Pharos.”
37 Pol. 3.16.3: τὰς κατὰ τὴν Ἰλλυρίδα πόλεις τὰς ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίους ταττομένας.
38 See Gruen, Hellenistic World, 359-398 for his chapter on the Illyrian and First Macedonian Wars, offering both insightful historical analysis and exhaustive bibliography; Eckstein, Greek East: 38-41.
39 As shown by the appeals made not to Rome, but to the Aetolian and Achaean Leagues. See Eckstein, Greek East, 37 citing Pol. 2.6.1 and 2.9.1.
piracy was largely limited to raids for food, the change was a credible reason for Roman involvement.\textsuperscript{40} This would pose a serious problem for Rome’s southern allies and transform the piratical nuisance into a state-level threat no longer beneath the senate’s notice; the eventual settlement’s emphatic interdiction of Illyrian warships passing further south than the river Lissus shows that the security of trade between Greece (particularly the major cities of Epidamnus and Apollonia), and Magna Graecia was a significant consideration.\textsuperscript{41} The rapid growth of Illyrian power and the destabilizing effect it promised for the Adriatic could have provided a compelling reason for Roman intervention, particularly since the interests of their southern Italian allies were directly threatened, but the region’s geopolitics only figure into the settlement insofar as they directly affect piracy. The historical tradition itself focuses on the wrongs done to Roman ambassadors and, to a lesser extent an appeal for help from Issa, making plain that the Romans did not regard economic concerns as sufficient justification for the war even if they had spurred Roman involvement. The example of the First Illyrian War, therefore, shows that calculations of interest did motivate policy, but the legitimacy of war and the actual \textit{casus belli} had to be sought on moral terms.

In spite of the fact that Polybius and Appian both transmit the same version (there might have not even been another option), the Second Illyrian War is just as obscure in its origin as the

\textsuperscript{40} Harry Dell, “The Origin and Nature of Illyrian Piracy” in \textit{Historia} 16 (1967): 344-358, 358: “The organization given to this raiding by the Ardiaean monarchy and the collapse of effective opposition by the civilized states bordering on the eastern coasts of the Adriatic and Ionian seas suddenly and dramatically allowed the Illyrians to become a serious threat. With the collapse of effective opposition also comes the transformation of Illyrian piracy from disorganized sorties aimed at procuring foodstuffs to something like large scale raids for booty and incipient imperialism. At this point Illyrian expansion collided with Roman interests. Although the Roman decision to intervene and halt Illyrian aggression came about for a variety of reasons, the sudden transformation of Illyria from an area traditionally practicing small scale piracy for food into a serious maritime power makes the Roman reaction all the more understandable.”

\textsuperscript{41} Gruen, \textit{Hellenistic World}, 366-7; Polybius 2.12.3; Appian \textit{Ill.} 17-21.
first. Both historians blame Demetrius of Pharos. Foreseeing the Second Punic War and holding Roman power in contempt after the Gallic invasion in Italy, he allied with Macedonia, which was at this point positioned as a rival to Rome, violated the peace of 228 BCE by sailing south of the Lissus, sacked cities subject to Rome, and raided the Cyclades. Appian adds that the Romans were already suspicious of the man’s ἀπιστία and found fault with him for his ingratitude towards Rome. Badian and others have cast doubt upon this explanation on the grounds that the Romans were free of their Gallic entanglements by the time Demetrius made his move, the Second Punic War’s outcome was by no means certain, Demetrius’ Macedonian ‘ally,’ Antigonus Doson, had just died and been replaced by a young Philip V, and Demetrius actually seems to have carefully avoided attacking Rome’s dependents. The claim that the Lissus frontier did not apply to Demetrius is more problematic and has generally fallen into disfavor. The lack of an initial response to his and even Scerdilaidas’ raids would seem to imply that this was the case, yet we must also remember that Demetrius had married Triteuta and assumed effective control of most of what Teuta held. Badian’s conclusion, that the war represents a relatively arbitrary attempt to check the growing independence of the various kingdoms along the Adriatic coast, is followed rather more forgivingly by Gruen, who adds that, in light of Demetrius’ general behavior, “the Second Illyrian War was a logical corollary of the Istrian campaigns.”

42 The Periochae merely record: Iterum Illyrii cum rebellassent, domiti in deditionem uenerunt, “Since the Illyrians had again rebelled, they were pacified and brought to surrender.” The language of total subjugation seems an anachronism.
43 Pol. 3.16.
44 Appian Ill. 22-24.
45 Badian, Studies, 10-18.
46 See Dzino, Illyria, 51, who summarily dismisses it, as well as Eckstein, Hellenistic World, 61, countering the arguments of Badian, Gruen, and Coppola.
47 Note that Badian’s interpretation assumes that Rome had already taken on a hegemonic role in the area. In contrast, Eckstein, Hellenistic World, 60-71 provides a detailed discussion of all the arguments, siding with Dell and R.M. Errington, “The Chronology of Polybius’ Histories, Books I and II” in JRS 57 (1967): 96-108, in seeing the
What we can say is that, as in the first war, economic concerns did not seem a sufficient justification. This war’s pretext was built with same ethical tool-kit we have seen throughout: Demetrius violated Roman fides and attacked Roman allies in what is presented as clear contravention of the treaty of 228 BCE. Hindsight has reshaped this conflict in the image of the First Macedonian War, prefiguring this kingdom’s later hostility and Philip’s attempt to treacherously catch Rome while bogged down in other wars. Since Polybius so directly ascribes Philip’s instigation of the identically motivated First Macedonian War to the influence of Demetrius, this cannot be a coincidence. In fact, this parallelism between the Second Illyrian and First Macedonian Wars based around Demetrius’ involvement forms the lynch-pin in Polybius’ outline of the συμπλοκή, the permanent intertwining of eastern and western Mediterranean geopolitics. Recognition of Polybius’ literary touch immediately calls the historicity of his account into question. In the following discussion it will become clear that his authorial contribution lies mostly in one significant synchronism and an added layer of interpretation and speculation on Demetrius and Philip’s motives. Polybius did this in service of linking the Second Illyrian and First Macedonian Wars through Demetrius. Livy, who proves capable of following Polybius without reproducing the Greek’s author’s programmatic material, has no hint of such a connection. Livy’s autonomy on this point is clear from his lack of interest in the συμπλοκή and the Syro-Macedonian Pact, indicating that even when he used Polybius he was following a broader Roman interpretive framework. In fact, Livy could completely write Demetrius out of war as the result of a long history of actions Rome regarded as provocative.

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48 Dio 12. 53 (= Zonaras 8.20) hinges on a perfidious attack by Demetrius and the refusal of a Roman rerum repetitio. See Eckstein, Hellenistic World, 69.
49 Matthias Gelzer, “Römische Politik bei Fabius Pictor” in Hermes 68 (1933): 129-166 reserves judgment on the source of Polybius’ narrative, while Holleaux, Rome, 138, believes it Fabian. Gelzer also highlights that this account has been worked over by Polybius, who constructed a synchronism between the beginning of this war and troubles at Saguntum.
Philip’s decision to attack Rome without undermining the narrative, decoupling the war with Macedon from Greek politics without fundamentally altering Philip’s motive: a predatory attack on Rome. This suggests that Polybius matched the Second Illyrian war to the First Macedonian rather than vice versa.

Livy’s Rejection of Polybius’ συμπλοκή in the First Macedonian War

Caught up in the drama of the Second Punic War, which extends across ten books of his history, Livy offers rather sparse coverage of the concurrent First Macedonian War. This fact only further privileges what remains of the more detailed version recorded by Polybius, whom scholars generally regard as a more reliable historian. In addition, since Livy made heavy use of Polybius, when they differ it is often correct to suppose that the Roman author has inserted something annalistic or suppressed an unflattering detail in an otherwise accurate Polybian account. Polybius’ version of the First Macedonian War, however, is so programmatic as to prove an exception to this rule, for it arose from what the historian saw as a world-changing event. This was what he called the συμπλοκή, the unification of the Mediterranean into a single political system which prepared the way for Roman hegemony.

Because Polybius made significant use of Roman sources and regarded Philip as clearly responsible for the war, Livy found his version generally acceptable. However, although it was clearly the τέλος of Polybius’ first pentad, Livy did not include even the slightest hint of the συμπλοκή. This suggests that, despite common assumptions to the contrary, Livy’s use of

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50 See, for example, the extended discussion of Livy with reference to Polybian standards in Walsh, Livy, 141-168.
51 Livy explicitly refers to his use of Polybius in 30.5.5 for the spoils acquired from Syphax and, given Livy’s tendency to use authors for their areas of geographic competence and his rather Polybian characterization of Philip, it has long been accepted that Polybius was consulted for the campaign in Greece as well. See Walsh, Livy, 125.
52 For Polybius’ teleological bent, see 1.4.1: τὸ γὰρ τῆς ἡμετέρας πραγματείας ἴδιον καὶ τὸ θαυμάσιον τῶν καθ’ ἡμᾶς καθότι τούτ’ ἔστιν ὅτι, καθάπερ ἡ τύχη σχεδὸν ἄπαντα τὰ τῆς οἰκουμένης πράγματα πρὸς ἓν ἐκλίνει μέρος καὶ πάντα νεὼν ἴματος πρὸς ἓν καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν σκοπόν, οὕτως καὶ (δεῖ) διὰ τῆς ἱστορίας ὑπὸ μίαν σύνοψιν ἀγαγεῖν τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσι τὸν χειρισμὸν τῆς τύχης, ὃ κέχρηται πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἄλλων πραγμάτων συντέλειαν.
Polybius was not unsophisticated, for he clearly recognized and avoided the Greek writer’s own programmatic elements and agenda.\(^{53}\) That he did so even when that program judged Roman actions as entirely justifiable suggests that he was not simply concerned with presenting Rome favorably, but also with maintaining the continuity of traditional Roman foreign policy throughout his history. In this case he presented the war as an isolated event and resisted the idea that Roman expansion was a process managed by Fortune, interpreting Roman dominance instead as the byproduct of consistently just and ethical policy and a situation for which the dominated also had some share of responsibility.\(^{54}\)

Polybius had emphasized the extreme importance of the fusion of the eastern and western Mediterranean into a single political system as a prerequisite and preliminary for Rome’s rise to dominance from the very beginning of his work.\(^{55}\) It was, moreover, an event rather than a process, and it occurred at the conference of Naupactus in 217.\(^{56}\) At this meeting Philip, embroiled in the Greek Social War, convinced his enemies and allies alike to end the conflict in order to prepare for what he framed as the inevitable intrusion into Greek affairs by whichever

\(^{53}\) Walsh, *Livy*, 144: “A clear and somewhat damning picture emerges of a mind rapidly and mechanically transposing the Greek, and coming to full consciousness only when grappling with the more congenial problems of literary presentation.” Levene, *Hannibalic War*, has now refuted this view, showing that that Livy responded to Polybius’ narrative in a sophisticated way.

\(^{54}\) This is worked out fully in earlier chapters dealing with Rome’s network of *socii* and *amici* in Italy and the pressure Hannibal placed on this system. A great deal of the system’s legitimacy comes from the admittedly limited consent of the subordinate and the conquered, given in view of the just treatment and favorable, at least compared to other potential conquerors, terms afforded by the Romans. The vanquished can, of course, also be responsible for their lot because of having provoked Rome through unjust acts.

\(^{55}\) Polybius 1.3.3-5: ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς πρὸ τούτων χρόνοις ὡσανεὶ σποράδας εἶναι συνέβαινε τὰς τῆς οἰκουμένης πράξεις (ὅτι) τῷ καὶ [κατὰ] τὰς ἐπιβολὰς. ἦτε δὲ [καὶ τὰς] συντελείας αὐτῶν ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ τοὺς τόπους διαφέρειν ἕκαστα τῶν πεπραγμένων. ἀπὸ δὲ τούτων τῶν καιρῶν οίονει συμπλεκέσθαι συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι τὴν ἱστορίαν, συμπλέκεσθαι τε τὰς Ἰταλικὰς καὶ Λιβυκὰς πράξεις ταῖς τε κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν καὶ τὰς Ἑλληνικὰς καὶ πρὸς ἐν γίνεσθαι τέλος τὴν ἀναφορὰν ἅπαντων. διὸ καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς αὐτῶν πραγματείας ἀπὸ τούτων πεποιήμεθα τῶν καιρῶν.

\(^{56}\) Of the 85 occurrences of *συμπλοκή* and *συμπλεκέσθαι* in Polybius, 78, refer to the contact and muddle of battle lines and only the remaining 7 deal with the interdependency of world events. None of these seven fall outside the first pentad and, although the fragmentary nature of the text that follows makes certainty impossible, it is likely that once this event had occurred there was little reason to discuss it further. The military use of the word, which is used either for the meeting and mixing of the battle lines or the skirmish that results from it, also illustrates how, despite its derivation from the root for weaving, *plek-*, *συμπλοκή* can refer to an event or result, but not a gradual process.
power should win the Second Punic War. In this scenario, Philip’s actual goal was to free himself to subdue Illyria in preparation for his planned Italian campaign against Rome. Instead, this scheme brought the Romans across the Adriatic in force and convinced them that their own security depended on the balance of power in the Greek world.  

It was this occasion and this conference that first intertwined Greek, Italian, and even African affairs: for neither Philip nor the leaders of the Greeks any longer made their plans with reference just to affairs in Greece, nor did they make wars or treaties with one another, but all then looked to the spectacular developments in Italy.  

Polybius found that linking the end of the Social War to the First Macedonian War and all its consequences made for a tidy and highly schematic explanation of what he believed was a revolutionary change in the political landscape; such an interpretive nexus is exactly where an ancient historian is likely to have made simplifications or adjustments. In fact, this placement of the συμπλοκή creates a critical synchronism, for Philip’s decision to make peace (he was in a position of strength relative to Aetolia), and ally with Hannibal against Rome becomes a response to the Battle of Lake Trasimene. Polybius also stresses that Philip took secret council with Demetrius of Pharos, the Illyrian dynast who had fallen foul of Rome and, after his defeat in the Second Illyrian War, fled to the Macedonian court.  

Because Demetrius was the closest senior statesman to have direct experience with Rome, both as friend and enemy, he would have been the natural “expert” for Philip to consult.

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58 Pol. 5.105.4-5: Τὰς μὲν οὖν Ἑλληνικὰς καὶ τὰς Ἰταλικὰς, ἔτι δὲ τὰς Λιβυκὰς πράξεις, οὕτως ὁ καρός καὶ τοῦτο τὸ διαβούλιον συνέπλεξε πρῶτον· οὐ γὰρ ἐτί Φίλιππος οὐδ’ ὁ τῶν Ἑλλήνων προεστῶτες ἄρχοντες πρὸς τὰς κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα πράξεις ποιούμενοι τὰς ἀναφορὰς οὕτε τοὺς πολέμους οὔτε τὰς διαλύσεις ἐποιοῦντο πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἀλλ’ ἢ δὴ πάντες πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ σκοποῦς ἀπέβλεπον.  
60 Pol. 5.101.3-102.2. That Polybius makes Demetrius the only adviser for Philip both before and after Naupactus also indicates that the historian had some interest in the man beyond giving him due credit for his disastrous scheme. Walbank, Commentary, is curiously silent on this passage.
But, while Demetrius was a likely adviser, Polybius had no need to reach any further than Philip himself for a credible source for such an ambitious plan.\textsuperscript{61} His inclusion was not strictly necessary and one wonders how Polybius knew the details of such a secret meeting, yet from a literary perspective this use of Demetrius does yield a substantial return. It activates the literary topos of the bad-adviser and advances Polybius’ program of portraying young rulers as rash and self-destructive.\textsuperscript{62} Yet Polybius also found him a peculiarly effective means of explaining Philip’s enmity toward Rome, for, unlike in Livy, this Philip never appears to consider siding with Rome against Carthage. Since Demetrius was clearly hostile to Rome, Polybius may have seen Philip’s refusal in 217 BCE to hand him over to the Romans as an indication that the king was as well.\textsuperscript{63} Polybius also explicitly states that Demetrius was far more concerned with his own hatred for Rome and the possibility of recovering his former kingdom than Philip’s prospects.\textsuperscript{64} Demetrius’ influence also contributes to an explanation for Philip’s complex character and what Polybius saw as a clear case of degeneracy over the course of his life.\textsuperscript{65} Most importantly, Demetrius functions as a structural pivot-point in the schematic explanation of history, for the Romans had already crossed the Adriatic twice without deeply implicating themselves in Greek affairs.\textsuperscript{66} Although less significant on their own, these moments of contact

\textsuperscript{61} Pol. 5.102.1 makes clear that this sort of daring move was characteristic of Philip, and if he could have carried it off, it would have been a great accomplishment. See Eckstein, \textit{Moral Vision}, 214.

\textsuperscript{62} On Philip’s youth and the deleterious effect of Demetrius, see Eckstein, \textit{Moral Vision}, 146-7, 211-3, 226-8; Craighe Champion, “The Nature of Authoritative Evidence in Polybius and Agelaus' Speech at Naupactus” in \textit{TAPA} 127 (1997): 111-128, 112: “the historian's authority in Polybius' methodological conception allows for the application of universal categories to inform particular cases. Here Polybius' general ideas on the malleability of youth, the Macedonian state, and monarchies may have provided templates for his representation of Philip's motivations at Naupactus.” Although this argument is specific to Polybius, the principle is in no way unique to him and should be taken as a criticism of ancient historiography in general. Polybius, like Thucydides, by appearing in some ways to reflect a more modern historical sensibility, is at times taken too readily to record objective reality.

\textsuperscript{63} Livy 22.33.3-4.

\textsuperscript{64} Pol. 5.108.5-7.

\textsuperscript{65} See Eckstein, \textit{Moral Vision}, 226-7 for Polybius’ general approval of Philip’s early actions; Pol. 7.11-14.

\textsuperscript{66} Much of the scholarship that credits Polybius’ account and assumes Philip had a natural hostility to Rome draws its support from the once popular notion that the Illyrian Wars led to Rome’s establishment of the so-called “Illyrian protectorate,” a block of territory variously described as annexed, occupied, or made a puppet state by Rome.
form a background narrative in which Demetrius of Pharos allied with the Romans only to cross
them, as the strange account of the Second Illyrian War would have it. Then, yielding to
resentment, he senselessly provoked Rome and brought about his own destruction, just as
Philip’s unrealistic ambitions led to the abasement and ultimate dissolution of Macedon in his
son Perseus’ Third Macedonian War of 171-168 BCE. This parallelism highlights Demetrius’
role linking the two wars and renders him all the more significant for the συμπλοκή narrative.
Thus Polybius’ version of Philip’s decision and the conference brings his universal history
together into a single thread which, thanks to this synchronism and Demetrius’ dramatic role, can
weave together Hannibal’s campaign in Italy, Philip’s choice to ally with Hannibal against
Rome, and the close of the Greek Social War.67

Once Philip’s desire for universal rule, τῆς τῶν ὅλων ἐλπίδος, was kindled he arrang
ed the conference at Naupactus to bring an end to the current war.68 The highlight, and the only
speech Polybius records, was that of the Aetolian politician Agelaus, famous for its metaphor
likening Rome’s growing power to “clouds in the west:”

He called upon Philip to shelve his disputes and wars with the Greeks and instead
pay most eager attention to this issue so that he would still have the power of
making war and peace as he chose. For he said “As soon as we wait for these
clouds looming now in the west to fall upon Greece while we struggle senselessly
in these truces and wars we now play at, it will happen that they are all cut short
such that we will pray to the gods to give us the power merely to go to war when
we wish and make peace with one another, essentially to be sovereign in our own
quarrels.”69 (Pol. 5.104.9-11)

Philip’s Illyrian campaigns that followed the Peace of Naupactus then appear to be decidedly anti-Roman. However,
as discussed at length in the previous section, the Romans appear to have made no such arrangements in Illyria. See
the most recent and thorough discussion in Arthur Eckstein, Greek East, 42-58.
61 For Polybius’ likely having adjusted the date see P.S. Derow, “The Roman Calendar, 218-191 B.C.” in Phoenix
30 (1976): 265-281, especially 276-7 n.36; Walbank, Commentary vol. 1, 629-30; F.W. Walbank, Polybius.
68 For universal rule, see Eckstein, Greek East, 81-2.
69 Pol. 5.104.9-11: τὰς δὲ πρὸς τοὺς Ἑλλήνας διαφορὰς καὶ τοὺς πολέμους εἰς τὰς ἀναπαύσεις αὐτὸν ἑπερίθεσθαι
παρεκάλει, καὶ μάλιστα σπουδάζειν περὶ τούτου τοῦ μέρους, ἵν’ ἔχῃ τὴν ἐξουσίαν, ὅταν βουλήτης, καὶ διαλύσεται
καὶ πολεμεῖν πρὸς αὐτούς· ὡς ἐὰν ἂν τὰ προφαινόμενα νῦν ἀπὸ τῆς ἑσπέρας νόηση προσδέξηται τοῖς κατὰ τὴν
Ἐλλάδα τόποις ἐπιστῆται, καὶ λίαν ἄγονιν ἔρη μὴ τὰς ἀνοχὰς καὶ τοὺς πολέμους καὶ καθὸλος τὰς παιδιὰς, ὡς νῦν
While this speech does give a stark and foreboding description of the danger to Greece that would follow the end of the Second Punic War, neither Agelaus nor the historian engage with or criticize either possible threat, Rome and Carthage, and the speech has no preference:

For it is now clear to anyone even remotely interested in public affairs that if the Carthaginians defeat the Romans or vice versa, it is in no way likely that the victors will remain content with dominion over the Italians and Sicilians, but will come here and extend their aims and power beyond their right.  

(Polybius 5.104.3)

The argument Polybius ascribes to Agelaus is built around a shared sense of Greek ethnic identity that enables at least limited cooperation, acknowledging Philip’s preeminence and attempting to oblige him to defend all of Greece as if it were already in his possession. Within the narrative, this speech not only encourages Philip to do what he had already decided upon, but Agelaus also persuades his fellow Aetolians to make peace with the king, at least temporarily, on the grounds that Macedon was the least threatening great power. Polybius earnestly valued Greek cooperation and sovereignty, foundational goals of his beloved Achaean League, and was not averse to cooperating with powers such as Macedonia to achieve them even to a limited extent. Philip was not trustworthy, but, were Antigonus on the throne, Polybius might have agreed with Aristaenus in more than principle. Whatever degree of ambivalence Polybius held towards Rome, this episode most assuredly does not imply a condemnation of the Roman παίζομεν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἐκκοπῆναι συμβῇ πάντων ἡμῶν ὡς ἐάν τε Καρχηδόνιοι Ῥωμαίων ἐάν τε Ῥωμαίοι Καρχηδονίων περιγένωνται τῷ πολέμῳ, διότι κατ’ οὐδένα τρόπον εἰκός ἐστι τοὺς κρατήσαντας ἐπὶ τᾶς Ἱταλικῆς καὶ Σικελικῆς μεῖναι δυναστείαις, ἥξειν δὲ καὶ διατείνειν τᾶς ἐπιβολὰς καὶ δυνάμεις αὐτῶν πέρα τοῦ δέοντος.

70 Pol. 5.104.3: δῆλον γὰρ εἶναι παντὶ τῷ καὶ μετρίως περὶ τὰ κοινὰ σπουδάζοντι καὶ νῦν, ὡς εἶναι τοὺς Καρχηδόνιους Ῥωμαίους ἔαν τοὺς Ῥωμαίους Καρχηδονίους περιγένωσιν τῷ πολέμῳ, διότι κατ’ οὐδένα τρόπον εἰκός ἐστι τοὺς κρατήσαντας ἐπὶ τῇ Ἱταλικῇ καὶ Σικελικῇ μεῖναι δυναστείαις, ἥξειν δὲ καὶ διατείνειν τὰς ἐπιβολὰς καὶ δυνάμεις αὐτῶν πέρα τοῦ δέοντος.

71 For Greek perceptions of the Romans as barbarians see Champion, Cultural Politics, 54-6, 193-203.

72 Since Polybius 5.105.1 states that Agelaus actually confirmed Philip on this course of action, Philip’s acceptance of Demetrius’ plan in 5.101-102 appears more tentative than that episode would seem to indicate.

73 See Eckstein, Moral Vision, 198-9 on Polybius’ treatment of Aratus, and, for the dispute over Roman policy between Philopoemen and Aristaenus, 202-3.
position in this war. The reader, cognizant of the fact that Philip acted on predatory instinct rather than a desire to defend Hellas, soon learns that it was his action that drew these dark clouds across the Adriatic. The idea that Rome represented a significant danger to Greek independence might have resonated throughout Greece after the Illyrian wars, yet Agelaus’ speech does frame Rome as exceptional in this regard. Rather, Rome’s impact on the Greek world would be to add one more threatening power to be played against the others.

The proceedings at Naupactus did not commit Philip to any specific action. If there actually was discussion of the Roman threat, it may have been exaggerated through hindsight and we have no way of knowing when the king reached cognitive closure. Regardless of whether Philip had actually committed to a course of action, convincing enemies and rightfully suspicious allies to make peace required that he fashion his proposal as a response to a common threat rather than a bid to further increase his own power. Discussion of the Hanniballic War at Naupactus could also have been a rhetorical smokescreen hiding the king’s need of breathing room to deal with Scerdilaidas. That Polybius’ interpretation forces events into an overly schematic causal explanation is revealed by his description of the political scene in 5.105.4-10, in which various Greek states send embassies to Carthage or Rome, their choice determined by their relations with Philip. The actual course of the war unmasks the exaggeration, for the Aetolians were slow to join with Rome. This passage also assumes that Philip’s Carthaginian alignment was already known to the Greeks, yet Agelaus’ neutrality makes this difficult to credit. In fact, what follows in 5.106 makes clear that Philip’s allies were motivated by a desire for peace, while his adversaries were relieved to end the war without having lost their liberty; neither of these was concerned with Rome. Thus it seems that Polybius has compressed a

74 Gruen, Hellenistic World, 374-5; Pol. 5.108ff.
75 See below, 13-14.
significant length of time and made it appear that, merely being alerted to developments across
the Adriatic, Philip and the Greeks derived their actual policy from their own Greek concerns. 77
Even after the war with Rome broke out, Philip and most Greeks thought of it as primarily a war
between Macedon and Aetolia. Efforts at mediation accordingly focused on these two and took
little account of Rome. 78 Certainly the Peace of Naupactus did free Philip for war with Rome,
but the idea that such was his purpose in calling the conference and ending the Social War is
Polybius’ own.

Livy’s account of this war and its origins makes no mention of Naupactus and places
Philip’s decision to ally with Hannibal not after Trasimene, but Cannae. Even though Livy
lacked all interest in the Greek Social War and elsewhere apologized for dwelling too much on
Greek events, if he had credited Polybius’ interpretation, its importance for Rome would have
been clear. Polybius’ version of the conference at Naupactus is, after all, so focused on Rome
and crucial for its history that it being a Greek event cannot explain its absence. 79 It would have
taken a terminal case of myopia for Livy to ignore the conference and its significance. Instead,
the logical explanation is that Livy recognized and omitted the programmatic elements in
Polybius, or passed him over in favor of other sources entirely. Indeed, this would have been
sound historical practice. For, while Trasimene was a harsh blow, Rome’s hopes and
international prestige were only truly undermined at Cannae, Philip’s judgment that the Romans
were about to lose the war makes much better sense here. In addition, hostilities on other fronts
gave Philip more pressing reasons for ending the Social War. 80 Since Polybius’ narrative at least

77 In fact, the implied flurry of diplomatic activity appears largely illusory. See Walbank “Symplēkē”: 201;
Champion, “Authoritative Evidence,” 117; Eckstein, Greek East, 81-82.
78 Arthur Eckstein, “Greek Mediation in the First Macedonian War, 209-205 B.C.” in Historia 51 no. 3 (2002): 268-
297, esp. 272-3.
79 See Livy’s for an apology for dwelling too much on Greek history, 35.40.1.
80 Gruen, Hellenistic World, 373-5; Eckstein, Greek East, 80-2 argues for Polybius’ schema, since the raids launched
by Scerdilaidas in Pol. 5.95 only became known to Philip after the conference in 5.108.1. However, in addition to
shows that the other belligerents also did not immediately concern themselves with Rome, Polybius’ explanation of the συμπλοκή makes the Peace of Naupactus suspiciously overdetermined. From this we see that Livy himself was a perceptive reader of Polybius and, when he chose to depart from this venerable source, he did so with care and for specific reasons. In Roman eyes, Philip, like many kings, was treacherous and power-hungry: his actions would have made intuitive sense. Livy’s readers are encouraged to see the king as opportunistic, but in no way as an inveterate or inevitable enemy.

Instead, Philip arrives late and remains on the sidelines of Livy’s narrative. The Roman’s first extant mention of Philip is in 217 BCE, but only consists of the brief notice that legates were sent to the king demanding the surrender of Demetrius as part of a broadly based mission tidying up a number of low-priority issues.81 The king reappears only after Cannae as an interested spectator:

Many kings and nations had fixed their attention upon this struggle between the two most powerful peoples in the world, particularly Philip, king of Macedon, because he was closer to Italy, only separated by the Ionian Sea. When he first heard that Hannibal had crossed the Alps he was as delighted that war had broken out between Rome and Carthage as much as he was uncertain which he desired to win. After the third battle and third victory for the Carthaginians, he fell in with fortune and sent legates to Hannibal.82 (Livy 23.33.1-4)

It is critical to note that, up to this point, Livy’s Philip has had only minimal interactions with either party and comes to the spectacle of the Hannibalic War with no preconceived desire for the outcome. His immediate joy on hearing about the war and Hannibal’s invasion of Italy is

\[\text{\textsuperscript{81}}\text{Livy 22.33.3-4.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{82}}\text{Livy 23.33.1-4: In hanc dimicationem duorum opulentissimorum in terris populorum omnes reges gentesque animos intenderant, inter quos Philippus Macedonum rex eo magis quod propior Italiae ac mari tantum Ionio discretus erat. Is ubi primum fama accepit Hannibalem Alpes transgressum, ut bello inter Romanum Poenumque orto laetatus erat, ita utris populi mallet victoriam esse incertis adhuc viribus fluctuatus animo fuerat. Postquam tertia iam pugna, tertia victoria cum Poenis erat, ad fortunam inclinavit legatosque ad Hannibalem misit.}\]
often read as a sign of innate hostility towards Rome, yet to take this view one must overlook the second half of the sentence, which describes a lengthy state of ambivalence. Philip’s participation in the war and his choice of alignment were entirely unanticipated and alarming for the Romans, as proven by the fact that the emissaries to Hannibal could credibly claim to be on a mission to offer support to Rome in Livy 23.33. For the Romans, this new threat was not just surprising, but serious. While hindsight labels the prospect of a Macedonian invasion of Italy entirely fanciful, the Romans, then at their most vulnerable, had already been taught both by Pyrrhus and Hannibal that the greatest danger could come without warning. The severity of the Hannibalic War and the fearsome reputation of the Hellenistic kings allowed this otherwise laughable idea to take on a life of its own in Roman discourse; it even made a strong impression on Polybius.83 The Roman perspective as reflected in Livy is simple: Philip leapt at the chance to profit from Cannae by allying himself with Hannibal and simply containing and preventing him crossing to Italy with an army as a sort of second Pyrrhus was a major challenge.

From the realist perspective, in which international politics is a zero-sum game, Philip’s elation is entirely comprehensible even without experience of, or enmity toward, either power, for the war diminished the capabilities of his neighbors and rendered him relatively more powerful.84 As would any major powers, Rome and Macedon must have been wary of one another and the demand for Demetrius would have been interpreted as a signal that Rome intended to play a role in the region that could interfere with Philip’s objectives. In spite of the fact that Rome was a greater threat than Carthage by virtue of proximity, Philip did not yet

83 Polybius implies that universal rule is out of Philip’s reach, yet he is quite willing to believe that the king himself thought it possible. See Polybius 5.101-102. Eckstein, *Anarchy*, 178; Eckstein, *Greek East*, 84-5 claims that Polybius did believe a Macedonian invasion of Italy possible, although this is difficult to accept in light of Polybius’ thematic emphasis on his poor decision-making. Furthermore, even if Polybius did doubt Philip’s ability to carry out such a plan, those abilities would not have been common knowledge at the time and he does emphasize the effect of the king’s stated intention.

84 Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, encapsulates the theoretical framework used by Eckstein. For this particular application, see 102-107.
regard Rome as an enemy and remained indecisive for some time; his embassy to Hannibal must be interpreted as an attempt to secure a favorable position in whatever Mediterranean system would emerge from Rome’s eventual defeat. Thus Livy’s Philip actually holds back until he believes the issue has been decided: the king’s behavior is that of a scavenger rather than an implacable enemy. This is the clear implication of the terms Livy gives for the agreement negotiated with Hannibal:

Xenophanes proceeded past the Roman guards into Campania and then took the quickest path to Hannibal’s camp, established friendly relations, and struck a treaty with him on the following terms: Philip would cross over to Italy with the largest possible fleet—it seemed, however, that he would do so with merely twenty ships—lay waste to the coast, and wage war in Italy on land and sea in his own name; when the war there had been concluded, all the booty, Rome herself, and Italy would belong to Hannibal and the Carthaginians. With Italy subdued they would sail to Greece and wage war with whomever the king wished, and whatever states, whether on the mainland or islands, which were near Macedonia would be Philip’s.85 (Livy 23.33.9-12)

Philip demonstrably had no interest in Italy save establishing it as a secure frontier for his planned east-Adriatic expansion, while the remote and unspecified aid Hannibal was to give raises a number of questions about just how actionable any such agreement was.86 Even though Livy’s hindsight seems to make him question how much of a threat Philip might have posed, he clearly believed that the war was sufficiently justified by Philip’s alliance with Hannibal. We should also note that Polybius’ reproduction of the treaty is placed in 7.9 in his post-Cannae

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85 Livy 23.33.9-12: Xenophanes per praesidia Romana in Campaniam, inde qua proximum fuit in castra Hannibalis pervenit foedusque cum eo atque amicitiam iungit legibus his: ut Philippus rex quam maxima classe-ducentas autem naves videatur effecturus in Italiam trairceret et vastaret maritimam oram, bellum pro parte sua terra marique gereret; ubi debellatum esset, Italia omnis cum ipsa urbe Roma Carthaginensium atque Hannibalis esset raedaque omnis Hannibali cederet; perd herself Italia navigarent in Graeciam bellumque cum quibus regi placeret gererent; quae civitates continentis quaeque insulae ad Macedoniam vergunt, eae Philippi regnique eius essent.

86 Livy’s summary of this treaty is far inferior to but compatible with that which Polybius carefully reproduced in 7.9. That Polybius’ version was authentic is definitely established by the coherence of the detailed list of gods invoked as guarantors as well as its structure, analogous to those seen in the Near East. This was specialized knowledge that would have been unknown to a Roman annalist or forger. M.J. Barré, The God-List in the Treaty between Hannibal and Philip V of Macedonia: A Study in the Light of the ancient Near Eastern Treaty Tradition. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983). See particularly 10-18 for the difficulty matching the treaty to Greek forms and in interpreting the Greek names used by Polybius as simply indicating Greek deities.
narrative. If this mission had actually been dispatched shortly after Naupactus, there should be some direct mention in the diplomatic material of 5.105 or elsewhere in the end of that book, which brings Polybius’ res Graeciae up to where he left off his Italian narrative at Cannae. It therefore seems quite probable that Polybius moved Philip’s decision back in time in order to set it as the cause for the end of the Social War but left Philip’s actual actions untouched.

 Unlike Philip’s schemes and the shape of world history, the outline of the campaign that followed provides little room for factual disagreement between Polybius and Livy. In fact, the manner in which events unfolded made this easy to justify under many conceptions of just war, although one feature important to the Romans, a formal declaration of war, is lacking. This is most easily accounted for if one sees fides as the main obstacle to making war. That Philip’s ambassadors accidentally fell in with a force of Romans and fooled them, claiming that they were headed to Rome to forge an alliance with the senate reinforces the sense that there was no operative relationship between Rome and Macedon at this time. When the senate learned of Philip’s plans there was none of the usual ceremonial, no vote of war, mobilization of the fetials, or mention even of a formal declaration. Although it is possible that the formalities have simply dropped out of the tradition, it is more economical to suppose that they simply were not considered necessary, for Philip had manifestly and willfully begun the war. The Romans could justify action against the king as defensive as well as on the grounds that there were no existing ties of fides to break. Instead of measured diplomacy, a strategy that had cost the Romans dearly while Hannibal prepared his invasion, a small fleet was sent to investigate and found that Philip

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87 Büttner-Wobst follows Hut sch’s placement of the fragment, which comes from manuscript F, a selection of diplomatic encounters from Polybius. Since Book 7 is the point at which the narrative resumes and the first 5 books have no substantial lacunae, it cannot have come any earlier. See Moore, Manuscript Tradition, 53-73.

88 The extensive debate the Romans held over the proper means of declaring war on Philip in the Second Macedonian War and the footprint it has left in Livy 31.8 suggest that this issue would not have been taken lightly in the previous war. See also A.H. McDonald and Walbank, F.W., “The Origins of the Second Macedonian War.” in JRS 27 (1937): 180-207.
did appear to be making preparations. This made it acceptable to take the offensive and contain him in Greece since his actions created a *de facto* state of war. Nevertheless, then as now, preemptive warfare and the lack of a legal obstacle to attack do not seem to carry sufficient weight: Laevinus and his fleet waited at Brundisium until Rome received an appeal for aid from Oricum. The legates’ explanation of Philip’s actions may or may not have been selective, but, as presented, Rome was honor-bound to come to their defense; hostilities commenced without any diplomatic preamble.

When the war actually began in 214 BCE, Laevinus’ operations were fairly limited; receiving appeals for aid, he crossed the Adriatic and rescued Oricum and Apollonia. His small relief force terrified the Macedonians in a night attack and blockaded Philip’s fleet, causing the king to burn his boats and flee overland. The next recorded development is in 212 BCE, when Laevinus attempted to gain an Aetolian alliance. Yet no progress in Laevinus’ attempt to draw in the Aetolians is noted until 211, when he attended a meeting of the Aetolian league, briefly explained Roman foreign policy, and struck an agreement. In Livy’s simplification, the Romans either absorbed peoples into citizenship or maintained them as *socii* and provided for their security. This appears to be the typical explanation given to foreigners. In this case Laevinus also promised them Acarnania. Either way, the Romans eventually saw themselves as doing a favor, in return for which the Aetolians, supported by the Roman fleet, were supposed to immediately

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89 Livy 23.38. In 24.10-11 we find Laevinus guarding the coast near Brundisium and troops being enrolled.
90 Livy 24.40.1-4.
91 All this happens in Livy 24.40, and 41 turns immediately to events in Spain.
92 Livy 26.24. For the broadest outline, see 26.24.2-3, but note that the Romans already had some explaining to do: “Where, when he had explained how Capua in Italy and Syracuse in Sicily had been captured and brought under the protection of Roman *fides*, he added that he followed the Romans’ revered ancestral practice in cultivating alliances in such a way that some they made citizens and gave equal rights, while others they maintained in such a favorable circumstance that they preferred to remain allies rather than citizens.” *Ubi cum Syracusas Capuamque captas in fidel in Sicilia* *Italique rerum secondarum ostentasset, adiecit se sequi iam inde a maioribus traditum morem Romanis colendi socios, ex quibus alios in civitatem atque aequum secum ius accepissent, alios in ea fortuna haberent ut socii esse quam cives mallent.*
make war upon Philip. The division of spoils was important: the Romans only seized booty and handed captured territory over to the Aetolians. Attalus, Pleuratus, Scerdilaidas, the Eleans, and the Spartans were also to be included, should they choose to accept. Neither was to make a separate peace with Philip, and it was the violation of this provision that created the friction that would grow through the Second Macedonian War and eventually drive the Aetolians to Antiochus III.93

The Romans’ aims, not entirely compatible with the Aetolians’, are perfectly summed up by the last sentence in this section, 26.24.16: “Thinking that Philip was already sufficiently embroiled in war with his neighbors that he could not even consider Italy, the Carthaginians, or his agreement with Hannibal, Laevinus left for Corcyra.”94 In 26.26, before his successor, Servius Sulpicius Galba arrived, Laevinus helped the Aetolians take Naupactus, but Roman interest continued to be weak. Aside from a minor naval skirmish in 27.32 we barely receive any significant update until 209 BCE, when the Aetolians and Philip almost made peace lest the Romans and Attalus gain a foothold in Greece.95 Notably, this episode is one of the few in which Greek suspicions about Rome make it into Livy, but the inclusion of Attalus here weakens the implication that Rome was seen as a foreign invader. In any event, when both of these allies appeared on the scene the Aetolians insolently broke off the negotiations and resumed hostilities.

One might question just how deep Greek concern over Rome ran. While the historical tradition

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93 Livy 26.24.9-13: *additumque ut, si placeret vellentque, eodem iure amicitiae Elei Lacedaemoniique et Attalus et Pleuratus et Scerdilaues essent, Asiae Attalus, hi Thracum et Illyriorum reges; bellum ut extempo Aetoli cum Philippo terra gererent; navibus ne minus viginti quinque quinqueremibus adiuvarat Romanus; urbinam Corcyra tenus ab Aetolia incipienti solum tecte et muri cum agris Aetolorum, alia omnis praeda populi Romani esset, darentique operam Romani ut Acarnaniam Aetoli haberent, Si Aetoli pacem cum Philippo facerent, foederi absberent ita ratam fovere eorum pacem si Philippus arma ab Romanis sociisque quique eorum dicionis essent abstinuisset; item si populus Romanus foedere langueretur regi, ut cavereret ne ius et bellum inferendi Aetolis sociisque eorum esset.

94 Livy 26.24.16: *Philippum quoque satis implicatum bello finitimo ratus ne Italiam Poenosque et pacta cum Hannibale posset respicerre, Corcyram ipse se recepit.*

on the First Macedonian War confidently and consistently interprets this war as Philip’s predatory and unprovoked attack on the Romans, the Greek perspective was that this was primarily a war between Aetolia and Philip. Because of this focus on Aetolia, Philip could even claim not to have started the war.  

While Polybius testifies to a Greek recognition that Philip was the aggressor towards Rome, the Romans did not take a particularly active role in any of the campaigning. A speaker from one of the Greek states attempting to mediate the conflict likened the Romans to heavy infantry, waiting on the results of the skirmishers before either engaging and taking credit for the victory (also taking the opportunity to subjugate the Greeks), or withdrawing without any loss. In any event, the Dardani soon invaded Macedon and Philip could no longer concentrate on operations against Aetolia and Sparta. Laevinus and Attalus retired as well, leaving their Aetolian allies to be defeated by the Achaeans.

The cause of the war and what the Romans most feared, Carthaginian and Macedonian cooperation, never materialized, although a near miss occurred in 207 when Philip arrived at Aegium just after the Punic fleet sent to rendezvous with him had left. Even then, this would have been exactly the inverse of the coordinated campaign the Romans feared. Aside from the questionable report of a Macedonian detachment at Zama, the only interaction mentioned between these two enemies of Rome comes in the form of a vain Carthaginian appeal for Philip to invade Sicily in 205. For the Romans, whose sole objective was to keep Philip from gaining ascendancy over any part of the Adriatic and thus threatening Roman interests, this war was a stunning success since the king found his projects frustrated at every turn. Nor was Rome’s

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97 Pol.10.25.1-5.
98 Livy 27.33.
99 Livy 27.8-8.
100 Livy 29.4.
abandonment of Aetolia unique; Attalus was similar in his ambitions and variable engagement in the war, for it was likely that keeping Philip from Asia Minor and the Aegean drove his actions more than any close relationship with Aetolia or any other states on the Greek mainland. Roman diplomats had, however, promised the Aetolians a much more decisive war. Because the prolonged conflict in and near their own territory was disadvantageous, it could have come as no surprise when the Aetolians made peace with Philip at Phoenice, a peace which even Livy finds embarrassing for Rome.\textsuperscript{102} The Romans themselves, seeing Philip otherwise occupied, had no reason to continue the war much longer; their anger stemmed from the Aetolians’ independent action, in violation of the treaty of alliance and of Rome’s implicit assumptions about the subordinate role of allies.\textsuperscript{103} There is a serious charge of misrepresentation to be made against the Romans. They clearly had little interest in helping their allies achieve the promised goals, merely in occupying Philip. That the Romans belatedly sent help somewhat mitigates their fault if true, but it is noteworthy that Livy admits that they did share some of the blame.

This was not the only charge that could be leveled at the Romans. Ferrary has advanced a powerful argument that Rome’s treaty with the Aetolians and its harsh treatment of captured cities had made it quite easy for the broader Greek world to think of Rome as a savage barbarian power primarily concerned with pillage. Certainly the Romans did not do their reputation any

\textsuperscript{102} Admitting that the Romans had offered insufficient support, he nevertheless makes the dubious claim that help was on the way. Livy’s use of \textit{fido} is extremely significant in acknowledging a degree of Roman culpability. See Livy 29.12.1-4: \textit{Neglectae eo biennio res in Graeciae erant. itaque Philippus Aetolos desertos ab Romanis, cui uni \textit{fidebant} auxilio, quibus voluit condicionibus ad petendam et paciscendam subiecit pacem...}

\textsuperscript{103} Aetolian anger was quite justified. See Eckstein, “Greek Mediation,” for the traces of a very different view, in which Philip may have been the aggressor in regards to Rome, but Rome stirred Aetolia to break its peace with Macedon and then abandoned her. In this war, which Greeks called Aetolian rather than Roman, the lack of consideration for Roman interests shows that the Greek states involved might have assumed that Rome had already gotten what she wanted out of her cynical manipulation of Aetolia and anticipated no objections.
service: they failed to support their allies and, in accordance with this Aetolian alliance, plundered captured cities. Handing them over to the Aetolians, who already had their own reputation for rapacity, could only make things worse. Rome’s non-annexation of Illyrian territory was, in fact, far too little to persuade Greeks of Rome’s good intentions. When, however, the Syro-Macedonian Pact forced many Greek states to look to Rome for protection, this interpretation became counterproductive. As Flamininus’ platform of Rome as guarantor of Greek liberty began to take shape, it became at once expedient and easy, thanks to Aetolian recalcitrance, to pin opprobrium on them despite Galba’s apparent resumption of First Macedonian War policy. In fact, as would be the case in the war with Antiochus, the Aetolians themselves attempted to take the credit for “liberating” Greece. Ferrary uses Flamininus’ letter of 195/4 BCE to the Chyretians to prove just how critical this piece of pro-Roman propaganda was even after the Isthmian proclamation, with the proconsul still working to discredit the

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104 Ferrary Philhellénism et Impérialism, 44-45 “Au moment où commença la deuxième guerre de Macédoine, les Grecs avaient tout lieu, en vérité, de redouter les conséquences possibles d’une nouvelle intervention romaine au-delà de l’Adriatique. On pouvait suspecter les Romains, déjà « maîtres » des cités grecques d’Italie, de Sicile et d’Illyrie, de vouloir étendre leur domination sur une partie ou la totalité de la Grèce, et la propagande macédonienne, bien entendu, ne manqua pas de le faire. Lors de leur précédent conflit avec Philippe, il est vrai, les Romains n’avaient manifesté aucune intention de ce genre ; mais la politique qu’ils avaient alors adoptée n’était pas davantage destinée à rassurer les Grecs. . . . S’étant ainsi mis au service des intérêts étoliens, les Romains combattirent moins Philippe lui-même que ses sujets alliés grecs, et ils le firent avec une dureté qui indigna l’opinion hellénique et ranima le vieux thème d’une irréductible opposition entre Grecs et Barbares, sans pour cela d’ailleurs satisfaire les Étoliens . . .”

105 Ferrary, Philhellénism et Impérialism, 49-58,62-3, 72, 86.: “On voit bien quels sont les buts visés par Flamininus dans ce beau texte de propagande qu’est la lettre à Chyrétiae. Il s’agissait en premier lieu de montrer à quel point la politique romaine différait de ce qu’elle avait paru être lors de la première guerre contre Philippe : celle d’un peuple barbare n’ayant d’autre souci que de faire du butin. La générosité romaine étant implicitement opposée à la cupidité bien connue des Étoliens, ces derniers devaient apparaître comme les uniques inspirateurs de l’ancien traité de sinistre mémoire dont ils avaient continué de se réclamer en 197.”

106 Ferrary, Philhellénism et Impérialism, 115-116: “On voit bien quels sont les buts visés par Flamininus dans ce beau texte de propagande qu’est la lettre à Chyrétiae. Il s’agissait en premier lieu de montrer à quel point la politique romaine différait de ce qu’elle avait paru être lors de la première guerre contre Philippe : celle d’un peuple barbare n’ayant d’autre souci que de faire du butin. La générosité romaine étant implicitement opposée à la cupidité bien connue des Étoliens, ces derniers devaient apparaître comme les uniques inspirateurs de l’ancien traité de sinistre mémoire dont ils avaient continué de se réclamer en 197.” See also 69-72, 82.
Aetolians and undo the damage done to Greek opinion in the first war. This anti-Aetolian interpretation was clearly contemporary with the Second Macedonian War and of great use in defining Roman foreign policy abroad. However, as the war with Antiochus loomed, it took on even greater importance not simply in selling Roman intervention to the Greeks, but in framing the narrative both Greeks and Romans would use to understand Aetolia’s opposition to Rome. Thus it may be that even Romans, who would not find anything objectionable in Rome’s arrangement with Aetolia, would have had reason to prefer Flamininus’ version and blur the line between domestic understanding and what was presented abroad.

To conclude, Polybius’ version of the First Macedonian War appears forced, yet still places the responsibility for the First Macedonian War squarely on the eastern side of the Adriatic, a result of the poor choices and disunity of the Greeks. The historian sometimes took a dim view of Roman actions and none of his Greeks were as eager for Roman intervention as Livy would like us to believe, but little in this version was particularly objectionable to a Roman audience. In Polybius’ account, those in attendance at Naupactus did readily accept the assumption that whichever western combatant should emerge victorious would pose a dire threat to Greece. But, this was not a claim that either Rome or Carthage was exceptionally violent or imperialistic, let alone an indictment of any particular action: it is, rather, a reflex of the Polybian assumption that states naturally expand. Or, in modern terms, that any increase in a state’s power is regarded as a threat by its neighbors and increases the likelihood of conflict. If Rome figured more heavily than Carthage in these calculations, it is the natural result both of hindsight and Rome being the more threatening of the pair merely because of its proximity. In addition, the

107 Syll3 593, especially lines 9-14: ὅσαι γὰρ ποτε ἀπολείπονται κτήσεις ἔγγειοι καὶ οἰκίαι τῶν καθηκουσῶν εἰς τὸ δημόσιον τὸ Ῥωμαίων, πάσας δίδομεν τῇ ὑμετέρᾳ πόλει, ὡς καὶ ἐν τούτοις μάθητε τὴν καλοκαγαθίαν ἦμων παῖ ὅτι τελέος ἐν οὕθεν φιλαργυρήσας[α] βεβουλήμεθα, | περὶ πλείστου ποιούμενοι χάριτα καὶ φιλοδοξίαν.
108 For this theme in Polybius, see Eckstein, Moral Vision, 195-236.
109 Eckstein, Anarchy, 12-36; Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 102-128.

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fact that Livy omitted the complicated Greek politics actually validates one of the key elements in Polybius’ vision of the συμπλοκή: until Philip altered the situation, eastern and western developments were independent.

In terms of causation, Polybius offers two distinct Greek perspectives on Rome’s entry to the east: Rome was either a willful conqueror, senselessly provoked, or simply another major power to deal with in the same way as the Hellenistic kingdoms. For Greeks, Roman ascendancy was an unexpected phenomenon which required a comprehensive explanation, as we see from Polybius’ oft repeated rhetorical question “For who is there so worthless and lazy as to not want to learn how and by means of what sort of constitution almost the whole inhabited world was conquered and came to be under the Romans’ sole rule in less than fifty-three years?”110 Notably, Polybius’ explanation repeatedly locates the cause not in Rome, but in the rash and provocative actions of Teuta, Demetrius, and Philip, even implicitly following Flamininus’ line that some of Rome’s early missteps were the Aetolians’ fault.111 While Polybius’ broader narrative remains more useful so long as its over-drawn characterizations are recognized, we should not make too much of his superiority to Livy either in understanding or veracity. Polybius’ Greek perspectives offer compelling outsider’s views of Rome, but these are layered over a narrative that relies just as much on Roman sources, whether they be annalists or contemporary justifications which the Romans presented abroad and with which Polybius sometimes sympathized.

Livy, should he have felt the need to justify Rome’s eastern empire as a whole, could easily have taken Polybius’ version and made Philip a more determined enemy by connecting him more closely with Demetrius and the Illyrian Wars. Such a narrative, which would transform Roman actions into measures of strategic defense and link Roman the ‘conquests’ into a neat and

110 Polybius 1.1.5.
111 The Illyrian Wars are discussed earlier in the chapter. The attempt to pin some of Galba’s behavior on Aetolia is discussed with other propaganda of the Second Macedonian War.
justifiable progression might have been a propagandistic windfall for Rome; that it is only to be seen in our main Greek source implies that the Romans themselves did not see this as a period of increased imperialism and indirectly validates Holleaux’s thesis that the Romans had no eastern policy prior to the Second Macedonian War, ruling out hypothesized plans of conquest. From the Roman perspective the Illyrian and Macedonian wars could be credibly explained and justified as individual events, but that in itself is not a sufficient motivation for Livy’s presentation. What gives Livy’s Roman history a sense of unity and coherence is his trans-historical formulation of Roman identity and ethics, and it is this rather than a detailed accounting of each and every casus belli that justifies the Romans’ action and their place in the world. Admitting the συμπλοκή could only alienate the Romans’ success from their ethics.
Outbreak of the Second Macedonian War


- September (Aug. 2, 201)
- October (Aug. 31, 201)
- November (Oct. 1, 201)
- December (Oct. 30, 201)
- Januarius (Nov. 28, 201)
- Februarius (Dec. 27, 201)
- Martius (Jan. 24, 200)
- Aprilis (Feb 24, 200)
- Maius (Mar. 25, 20)
- Iunius (Apr. 25, 200)
- Quinctilis (May 24, 200)
- Sextilis (June 24, 200)
- September (July 23, 200)
- October (Aug. 21, 200)
- November (Sept. 21, 200)
- December (Oct. 20, 200)

Eleusinian Mysteries
Acarnanian Raid: Livy 31.14.9
First Athenian Embassy to Rome: Livy 31.1.10; Athenian mission to Ptolemy (Kephisodorus #1): Livy 31.9.1; Paus.1.36

Attalus, and Rhodes send to Rome; Rome sends Lepidus to Ptolemy: Livy 31.2, App. Mac. 4;

Laevinus sent to Greece Livy 31.3.3-6

Athens to Rome (Kephisodorus #2) L31.5; P1.36; App. Mac. 4

Ides of March (Feb 7) Consuls take office, 1st war vote fails: Livy 31.5-6

Aetolian embassy: App. Mac. 4; referenced later in Livy 31.29.4

Speech of Sulpicius and 2nd war vote: Livy 31.7-8

Legates from Ptolemy in reference to Athenian request for aid: Livy 31.9; Just.30.3; Lepidus returns from Egypt

Roman Delegation sent to Greece, Philip, and Antiochus Livy 31.18; Pol. 16.27, 16.34; Just. 30.3, 31.1 (Lepidus as tutor to Ptolemy); App. Mac. 4; Val. Max: 6.6

Attalus and Romans at Athens; Athens votes for war against Philip. Romans deliver ultimatum to Nicanor: Pol. 16-25-7

Philocles’ attack on Athens: Livy 31.16.2

Romans, at Rhodes, hear of Philip’s campaign; Lepidus confronts Philip at Abydos: Livy 31.18.1-4; Pol. 16.34

Sulpicius arrives in Greece with army: Livy 31.14, met by Athenian ambassadors
Chapter 5

The Second Macedonian War

The Second Macedonian War is the point at which it is no longer possible to see Rome’s expansion beyond Italy as merely a response to foreign threats. With Carthage defeated, Rome was catapulted to a position of undisputed dominance in the west. If ever there was a moment to pay debts, rebuild a devastated homeland, and consolidate power, this was it. Yet, almost without pause, we find Romans crossing the Adriatic in force for reasons that fail to convince: Philip was preparing to invade Italy (if even possible this would have been a disaster), and Roman allies were under attack. Roman actions here require a great deal of explanation, and it is with reason that Holleaux identified this as the turning point in Roman foreign policy after which Rome could no longer extricate herself from Greek affairs, the beginning of the path towards empire. This puts the point too schematically and with a touch of hellenocentrism, for Rome already possessed foreign dominions, but the import of this moment is not overstated. For Holleaux, the drive to protect Greece from Philip was the result of a sort of philhellenism and a defensive rationale.¹ Holleaux stresses Roman fears regarding a novel development in the east, that he regarded as more rumor than fact. This was the Syro-Macedonian Pact, the secret agreement between Philip V of Macedon and Antiochus III of the Seleucid Empire to divide the Ptolemaic Kingdom, weakened by a native rebellion and the accession of the boy Ptolemy V, up amongst

¹ Holleaux, Rome, 315: “et, d’autre part, qu’il était indispensable à la sécurité, peut-être au salut de la République, que la Grèce redevint libre sous la protection du Peuple romain.”
themselves. In his view, this rumor made abasing Philip an urgent priority for Rome. In the perceived, if not real, crisis, it was much easier to present their involvement, which was actually aimed at their own security, as an act of altruism towards the Greeks.\(^2\) Despite broad acceptance, a core of opposition to Holleaux has remained; for some, such as Briscoe, Derow, Harris, this war is an example Rome’s unvarnished and pathological aggression.\(^3\) However, recent work by Eckstein has fundamentally altered our understanding of the historical situation in which Rome turned eastward by proving that the Syro-Macedonian Pact was no mere rumor and that the two kings acted upon it.\(^4\) This change calls not just for renewed historical discussion, but reconsideration of the historiographical tradition as well. My own points necessitate a detailed summary of this argument, which Eckstein made in two lengthy studies and a number of articles.

The generative question for Eckstein’s work was why in 201 BCE a number of significant Greek states, which appear to have been quite suspicious of Rome, suddenly reversed

\(^2\) Holleaux, *Rome*, 306-7: “Et, cette fois, son parti est pris de la pousser à fond: s’il ne pretend pas anéantir la monarchie antigonide - tâche laborieuse et qui prendrait du temps – il entend du moin l’ «abaisser grandement», la «mettre à l’étroit», la frapper d’un-coup qu’il juge irreparable. Resserrer la Macédoine dans ses primitives limites, la refouler derrière l’Olympe, partant, la rejeter hors de Grèce, lui interdire la Grèce, voilà l’objet que, d’emblée, se proposent les Romains et la fin qu’ils assignent à la guerre. Et, poursuivant ce dessein, ils se trouvent naturellement adopter à l’égard de tous les peuples grecs – sans distinguer désormais entre les «Symmachoi» et leurs adversaires – la conduit qui en facilitera et qu’en implique l’exécution. Comme ils veulent, la guerre terminée, séparer à jamais ces peuples de la Macédoine ; comme ils souhaitent, Durant la lute, les avoir contre elle pour auxiliaires, ils font tout de suite effort pour se les rallier et les lui oppose. A cet effect, dès le premier moment, prenant occasion des violences récentes commises par Philippe à Kios, à Thasos, en Attique, ils s’offrent aux Hellènes comme leurs défenseurs, leurs vengeurs et leurs libérateurs : c’est dans la seule intention de les server, si l’on en croit le Sénat et les généraux romains; c’est pour les ouver dans le présen et les protéger dans l’avenir ; c’est a fin de les preserver de toute aggression et d’éarter d’eux toute menace ; c’est pour les render et les maintenir indépendants, que Rome s’est armée de nouveau contre le Macédonien naguère épargné.”

\(^3\) Briscoe, *Commentary* vol. 1, 39-41, claims that Athens played only a minimal part in motivating Roman action and that in Livy there is no “consistent attempt to mislead the reader and hide the facts of Roman aggressive imperialism.” To this end he cites only J.P.V.D. Baldson, “Rome and Macedon, 205-200 B.C.” in *JRS* 44 (1954): 30-42, yet while that author too argues for Roman aggression, the article does not support the specific point but makes clear that the Athenians had apprised Rome of Philip’s aggression in 201, drawing particular strength from Pausanias’ description of the tomb of a certain Cephisodorus and its inscription recording his mission to Rome (Paus. 1.36.6). See also Harris, *War and Imperialism*, 217-8.

\(^4\) The thesis of Eckstein, *Greek East*, chapters 4, 5, and 6, discussed in detail below.
their positions and appealed to Rome for aid against Philip and Antiochus. Chief among these was Rhodes, which had taken a leading role in attempting to arbitrate an end to the First Macedonian War contrary to Roman interests. This “diplomatic revolution” and Roman intervention, were both results of what some political theorists call a “power-transition crisis,” the destabilization of the geopolitical order of the eastern Mediterranean caused by the foundering of the Ptolemaic Kingdom. This analysis is itself largely predicated on Eckstein’s 2006 study, in which he sets forth a case for the applicability of realist political theory to the ancient Mediterranean, describing it as a harsh anarchic system in which states competed with one another for security. Prior to the Second Macedonian War, the Hellenistic world was a relatively closed tri-polar system, meaning that the three successor kingdoms in Egypt, Macedon, and Syria were in competition with each other for dominance and smaller powers played them against one another in order to secure their own independence. This led to a violent, yet relatively stable, balance of power in which none of the three kingdoms could gain a significant advantage over the others. The breakdown of this system was precipitated by the weakening of the Ptolemaic regime by an uprising of the indigenous Egyptian population against the ruling

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5 Eckstein “Greek Mediation”; Greek East, 183: “Much evidence shows that news of the threatening Pact Between the Kings had a profound political impact throughout the eastern Mediterranean, and led directly to important actions taken by the medium-sized states. The clearest example is that of the Republic of Rhodes. It can be demonstrated that the Rhodians based radical changes in their foreign relations, both in 201 and later, on the assumption that the pact between Antiochus and Philip existed, and that it not only threatened the Ptolemies with destruction, but indirectly formed an enormous threat to Rhodian independence as well. It will be also argued below that knowledge of the pact—as far-reaching a treaty as Polybius claimed it to be—had a similar radical impact on the policies of Pergamum, of Athens, of Ptolemaic Egypt (naturally enough), and finally upon Rome itself.”

6 Eckstein, “Greek Mediation,” 1: “[Whether mediation of the First Macedonian War was in or against Rome’s interest] is important to know, because only a few years later (in 201 and 200 B.C.), three of the mediating states of 209-206—Ptolemaic Egypt, the Rhodian Republic, and Athens—played crucial roles in urging Rome into a new war against Philip V (the Second Macedonian War). If the policies of these states had previously run counter to Roman interests and purposes regarding Macedon, then we would be confronted with what appears a true diplomatic revolution in the eastern Mediterranean by 201-200—a revolution that would itself require an explanation.”

7 Eckstein, Anarchy, 104-9.

8 Eckstein, Anarchy, 36: “while all systems of independent states are competitive, sometimes brutally so, the state-systems that arose in the ancient Mediterranean after about 750 B.C. were exceptionally harsh and unforgiving anarchies—the type of systems where Realist paradigms work best. Further, the grimmest and most pessimistic of Realist paradigms of inter-state behavior appear to be confirmed both by the characteristics of the successive ancient Mediterranean state-systems and by the conduct of the units (states) within them.”

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Macedonian element in 207 BCE and the death of Ptolemy IV in 204, who was succeeded by a series of ineffective regents for his five-year-old son. Philip V and Antiochus III responded with a coordinated attack upon Ptolemaic possessions, less powerful Greek states learned of the pact and, fearing subjection to one or another of these monarchs, made a desperate appeal for aid to Rome. This constitutes Polybius’ central narrative, to which the συμπλοκή was but a prelude.

If true, this is a startling revelation for readers of Polybius. After all, the structural importance of the συμπλοκή and the directed narrative it drives has long been recognized. It would be difficult to believe that Polybius would have written so purposefully to reach an event in his fifth book, but would lack any equally significant structural hooks upon which to hang the remaining thirty-five. The fragments of Polybius’ work after Book 6 upon which such structure must be founded are relatively scanty, yet the historian’s initial brief overview of his work gives a glimpse at this structure:

In the course of which we will examine the upheavals in Egypt and how, when king Ptolemy [IV Philopater] died, Antiochus III and Philip V, having plotted to

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9 Eckstein, *Greek East*, 124-131. The initial statement on p.121: “We now come to the next hypothesis that is central to our study. It is that a really existing and severe crisis in the balance of power in the state-system of the Greek Mediterranean at the end of the third century—and not an internally generated and exceptionally predatory Roman imperialism—was the crucial cause behind the Roman decision in 200 to intervene for the first time with great force in the Greek East.” For detail on the situation in Egypt, Eckstein relies primarily on A.E. Veïsse, *Les révoltes égyptiennes: Recherches sur les troubles intérieurs en Égypte du règne de Ptolémée III à la conquête romaine* (Paris: Peeters, 2004).

10 Argued in detail from Polybius and epigraphic evidence in Eckstein, *Greek East*, Ch. 4.

11 Walbank, “Symplókē,” 205 brings up the observation of Klaus Meister, “Die Synchronistische Darstellung des Polybios im Gegensatz zur Disposition des Ephoros und Theopomp” in *Hermes* 99 (1971): 506-8, 508 n.1 that Polybius goes to great length to defend his chronological and geographic ordering of events without so much as mentioning the seemingly related συμπλοκή. Walbank hypothesizes that Polybius may have been responding to specific criticism which itself did not raise the issue. I suggest that this is because the συμπλοκή was not an explicit theme throughout Polybius’ work; after the interweaving of narrative threads occurred and Polybius settled into a comfortable pattern there would have been little reason to continue to emphasize it. The assumption that it continued to be the operative and explicit organizational principle is an artifact of the text’s disproportionate survival and the lack of a recognized replacement. For the narrative from book seven to the end of the end the war with Antiochus at least, the Syro-Macedonian pact and its repercussions as managed by Fortune can fill this role. Perhaps it carries through to Pydna, where Walbank, Symplókē, 211-12 places the theoretical obsolescence of συμπλοκή.

12 I would posit that a desire to see in Polybius a familiar conception of historiography as the dispassionate collection of facts has instilled some resistance to considering large-scale programmatic structures in Polybius, or at least has largely restricted it to that old warhorse, Τύχη.

13 Pol. 1.3-5, 3.1-5.
divide up the orphan Ptolemy V’s kingdom between them, launched on their wicked designs (κακοπραγμονεῖν), Philip laying hands on the Aegean, Caria, and Samos, Antiochus seizing Coele Syria.  

This is remarkably strong language for Polybius, κακοπραγμονεῖν being one of his most reproachful words and uniquely emphatic in its setting.  

Eckstein then cites the introduction to Book 14, as the second reference to the pact, stressing that the historian himself drew attention to the importance of this year for two reasons which, due to the emphasis given, must be of comparable importance: the end of the Second Punic War and the revelation of kings’ plans:

At this time it also happened that the kings’ wicked designs came fully to: all that previously was previously in circulation merely as rumor were proven to everyone, even those with no desire to gossip. Therefore, in order to provide a fitting record of these events I have not, as previously, narrated the events of two years in a single book.  

That Polybius felt that these two topics required double the attention paid to even momentous years of the Second Punic War, and then that most of this especially long book was dedicated to Egypt’s troubled history after Raphia, should leave no doubt concerning their significance.

Polybius’ third surviving and most dramatic mention of the pact falls in Book 15, at the end of his third pentad:

For while [Philip and Antiochus] were busy betraying each other and tearing the infant Ptolemy V’s kingdom asunder, [Fortune] alerted the Romans and justly and duly visited upon the kings exactly what they, against all decency, plotted against their neighbors. For straight away both were defeated in battle and not only kept from satisfying their lust for others’ lands, but were compelled to pay reparations and submitted to the Romans’ commands. Finally, in a very short time Fortune set right Ptolemy’s kingdom, but the

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14 Pol. 3.2.8: οἷς ἐπισυνάψομεν τὰς περὶ τὴν Ἀἰγύπτων ταραχὰς καὶ τίνα τρόπον Πτολεμαίου τοῦ βασιλέως μεταλάξαντος τὸν βίον συμφρονήσαντες Ἀντίοχος καὶ Φίλιππος ἐπὶ διαιρέσει τῆς τοῦ καταλελειμμένου παιδὸς ἀρχῆς ἠρέσατο κακοπραγμονεῖν καὶ τὰς χεῖρας ἐπιβάλλειν Φίλιππος μὲν τοῖς κατ’ Αἴγαιον καὶ Καρίαν καὶ Σάμον, Ἀντίοχος δὲ τοῖς κατὰ Κοίλην Συρίαν καὶ Φοινίκην.  


16 Pol. 14.1a.4-5: πρὸς δὲ τούτοις συμβαίνει καὶ τὰς προαιρέσεις τῶν βασιλέων ἐκφανεστάτας γεγονέναι κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους· ἀ γὰρ πρῶτον ἔλεγεν περὶ αὐτῶν, τότε σαφῶς ἐπεγνώσθη πάντα παρὰ πάσιν καὶ τοῖς μηδ’ ὅλως ἐθέλουσι πολυπραγμονεῖν, διό καὶ βουλόμενοι κατ’ ἀξίαν τῶν ἐργῶν ποιήσασθαι τὴν ἐξήγησιν, οὐ τὰς ἐκ τῶν δυσμέν ἐτῶν πράξεις κατατετάχαμεν εἰς μίαν βοίβλον, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρὸ τοῦ τούτου ἀποδεδοκιμαν.  

kingdom and successors of one she left ruined and undone, and cast the other’s into almost the same desperate straits.\(^\text{18}\) (Polybius 15.20.6-8)

Most striking is that here Polybius explicitly refers to the pact as a treaty, συνθῆκαι, a category of evidence where he accepts no inaccuracy in others. Having brought these three emphatic statements together, Eckstein notes that Polybius’ credibility as an historian depends on the historicity of the pact.\(^\text{19}\) He then shows, with a significant number of passages from Polybius’ narrative, that Philip’s Anatolian campaign of 201-200 BCE was squarely targeted at Ptolemaic possessions. Philip captured the critical naval base of Samos, along with Miletus, Bargylia, Heracleia-by-Latmus, and assaulted but failed to take Cos and Cnidus. More importantly, an inscription from Bargylia documents that Philip openly received aid from Antiochus’ viceroy Zeuxis, while that king moved against the Levant.\(^\text{20}\) In response to this dramatic turn of events not only Egypt sought Roman aid, but also Athens, Rhodes, and Pergamum, a combination notable for the bitter rivalry between last two states.\(^\text{21}\) Polybius recognized that the coordinated and highly irregular diplomatic appeals made to Rome were instrumental in persuading the Romans that Philip and Antiochus might soon pose a threat as great or greater than Carthage unless Rome swiftly intervened.\(^\text{22}\)

While Ptolemy was explicitly targeted in the pact, Rhodes and Pergamum based their opposition to Philip and Antiochus on the belief that the destruction of the Ptolemaic Kingdom would place them squarely under one of these monarch’s thumbs. Pergamum, however, faced a

\(^{18}\) Pol. 15.20.6-8: ἐτί γὰρ αὐτῶν παρασπονδούντων μὲν ἄλληλους, διασπομένων δὲ τὴν τοῦ παιδὸς ἁρχήν, ἐπιστήσασα Ρωμαίοις, ἀκέναιν κατὰ τὸν πέλας ἐβουλεύσατο παρανόμως, ταῦτα κατ’ ἐκείνων δικαίως ἐκώρισε καὶ καθηκόντως. παραυτίκα γὰρ ἑκάτεροι διὰ τῶν ὥπλων ἡττηθέντες οὐ μόνον ἐκωλύθησαν τῆς τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἐπιθυμίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ συγκλεισθέντες εἰς φόρους ὑπέμειναν Ρωμαίοις τὸ προστατήμενον (ποιεῖν). τὸ τελευταῖον ἐν πάνω βραχεῖ ἀρχὸν τὴν μὲν Πτολεμαίου βασιλείαν ἡ τύχη διώρθωσε, τὰς δὲ τούτων δυναστείας καὶ τοὺς διαδόχους τοὺς μὲν ἄρδην ἀναστάτους ἐποίησε καὶ πανωλέθρους, τοὺς δὲ μικροῦ δὲν τοὺς αὐτοῖς περέβαλε συμπτώμασι.

\(^{19}\) Eckstein, *Greek East*, 138.


\(^{22}\) The argument of Eckstein, *Greek East*, ch. 6. See esp. 233-41 and his conclusion, 265-70.
more immediate danger than Egypt, for kingdom had already come close to annihilation at
Philip’s hands in 202-1 BCE and Rhodes was badly beaten in the naval battle of Lade while
seemingly operating in conjunction with the Ptolemaic isle of Cos.23 While the immediate
pretext for hostilities between Athens and Macedon was a violation of the Eleusinian Mysteries
by two Acarnanians (allies of Philip), and the subsequent quarrel, Athens’ fundamental
motivation was the same.24 Macedon aided the Acarnanians in their reprisal for the execution of
the two offenders and Macedon was the focus of Athenian anger: they abolished both tribes
named in honor of Macedonian monarchs, honors that had endured previous conflicts with the
great northern power.25 A new tribe was subsequently created in honor of Attalus (fickle
adoration which Polybius found distasteful), then present in Athens stirring up opposition to
Philip; the tribe Ptolemais had already been given special honors, seemingly a show of support
for the beleaguered kingdom.26 We also know from Livy 31.9.1 that Athens was in direct
communication with Egypt at this time regarding opposition to Philip.27 The incident at Eleusis
is simply not sufficiently connected to Macedon to fully explain Athens’ hostility even in the
face of such great danger from Philip.28

23 Polybius 16.1.1. For Rhodes and Cos’ cooperation Pol. 16.15, Eckstein, Greek East, 156-9; A.N. Sherwin-White,
Ancient Cos: An historical study from the Dorian settlement to the Imperial Period (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck &
24 See Eckstein Greek East, 208 n. 99 for the apt comparison of the explicit disappointment with the Athenian
pretext in Livy 31.14.6, which certainly derives from Polybius (see Briscoe, Commentary vol. 1: 95), to Polybius’
criticism of Hannibal in 3.15 for not operating on feeble pretenses rather than legitimate Carthaginian complaints
against Rome. Note also that the passing mention of the pretext rather than the actual opposition implies that the
Athenians could have adduced a strong argument
25 Livy 31.14.6-10, based on Polybius. See Briscoe, Commentary vol. 1, 95; Eckstein, Greek East, 206-8.
26 For the tribal indications of Ptolemaic alignment see Eckstein, Greek East, 209; McDonald and Walbank, “Second
Macedonian War,” 190-2; William Ferguson, Athenian Tribal Cycles in the Hellenistic Age (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1932), 139-44, esp. 141 n.1 and 143.
27 Livy reports this as an appeal for aid sent to Egypt which prompts an Egyptian embassy to Rome reminding the
Romans of their own alleged duty to protect Athens. This need not indicate that the Athenians, in desperate straits,
thought that the Ptolemaic regime was in a position of strength. Engaging Philip in Greece may have been conceived
of as a way of diverting the king from mounting an overwhelming assault on Ptolemaic possessions. In light of
Livy’s emphasis on Athens, discussed below, it could also be that the historian interpreted an appeal for cooperation
as a unilateral appeal for aid.
28 As stated, and quite possibly exaggerated, by Athenian envoys in Livy 31.5.6.
Eckstein’s historical analysis fundamentally changes our understanding of this crucial period of ancient history, but for our purposes, the most important point is that Polybius, whom Livy regarded as an authority,29 structured his history around the Syro-Macedonian Pact, and that Polybius regarded the Roman decision to intervene and launch what would become the Second Macedonian War as a response to this pact. In terms of an historical assessment of Roman policy, the reality of the Syro-Macedonian pact and recognition of the importance of the many Greek diplomatic overtures to Rome lead us directly to a confirmation and marked intensification of Holleaux’s thesis. The indifferent antipathy towards Rome which he highlights in Greek mediation of the First Macedonian War is entirely transformed in the second, with intense diplomatic contact not just between Rome and Aetolia, but with Athens, Egypt, Pergamum, and Rhodes all attempting to use Rome to balance the threat of Macedon and the Seleucid Empire.30 The situation itself was extraordinary in geopolitical scope but, in terms of Rome’s foreign policy stance, was not qualitatively different from the crises faced over the course of Rome’s Italian and westward expansion. As before, Rome positioned itself as the least threatening power and, whether or not this was an artfully cynical grab for power, the mandate of principle, or merely effective policy, derived a great deal of benefit from it. It is nonetheless striking that, despite the undeniable fact that Roman power waxed tremendously and became a source of considerable pride, the Roman people remained unwilling to publicly acknowledge or privately consider territorial acquisition a legitimate objective. A detailed consideration of the course of events will show that, while the senate may have been motivated by more practical strategic concerns, these were not just insufficient abroad, but at home. The Roman people required that war be presented in terms of imminent danger and fides.

29 Livy 30.45.5.
30 See Eckstein “Greek Mediation,” and the fuller narrative political narrative he comes to in Anarchy, especially 104-117, fully developed in Eckstein, Greek East.
Livy’s Version of the Second Macedonian War

Where Polybius saw Egypt and the unfolding pan-Mediterranean crisis as the catalyst for Rome’s decisive intervention in Greece, Livy makes little mention of Egypt and the pact. Instead, he focuses on Athens, which he casts as a new Saguntum, and a Roman obligation to defend it against Philip. Livy frames Philip’s crimes in Greece as the prelude to an invasion of Italy, making this war a continuation of the king’s alleged aims in the First Macedonian War. Even the appeals for aid received at Rome, which Polybius treats as crucial for informing the Romans of the pact, do not figure as part of the same crisis, but only fit into Livy’s version in that they are against Philip. 31 This is perhaps the most significant difference between Livy and Polybius, crucial for the justification not just of this war, but Rome’s continuing involvement in the Greek world. I will show that, despite the differences in the historical settings these two historians evoke, the ethical justifications invoked by the Romans were similar. Because the opposition to Philip and Antiochus prevented them from realizing their plans for Egypt, Livy was able to exaggerate the role of Athens in the outbreak of the war and write Egypt almost completely out of his account without radical changes to his narrative. He did this because, writing under Augustus, stressing a Roman tradition of protecting the Ptolemies would have been decidedly impolitic.

Livy’s narrative has long been suspect, particularly because of the difficulty in matching the diplomatic missions he presents and their itineraries with those in Polybius. Explanations have varied: Luce saw the confusion as a result of chronological issues arising from Greek and Roman sources and their different calendars and Livy’s desire to integrate these sources into a

seamless narrative.\textsuperscript{32} In contrast, Briscoe saw a gross misrepresentation in Livy’s narrative, particularly because Livy omits mention of Roman envoys in Athens who may have pressed that city to take a tough stance against Philip.\textsuperscript{33} This change would then have been made to cover over the senate’s having acted without the people’s authorization.\textsuperscript{34} Nevertheless Briscoe shies away from accusing Livy of tampering, blaming a Sullan annalist and Livy’s attempt to integrate this into his reading of Polybius, but others see the historian as generally guilty of “patriotic distortion.”\textsuperscript{35} These interpretations, like other indictments of Livy, see the problems as highly localized issues stemming from errors in collating sources or patriotic bias. Following Livy through his account of the Second Macedonian War’s origins, we shall see that the Roman historian carefully excised Polybius’ programmatic use of the Syro-Macedonian Pact and its influence on the Roman decision to go to war.\textsuperscript{36} The thematic consistency of Livy’s account, which, for all its problems, is only undermined by an extremely detailed chronology of embassies, also militates against the idea that his version is merely the awkward hybrid of Polybius and an annalistic source only interested in stressing Rome’s defense of allies.\textsuperscript{37} In fact, it is difficult to see what could fit this pattern better than the defense of a friendly kingdom which had supported Rome during Hannibal’s invasion

Livy turns towards the Second Macedonian War with a brief prologue which sets the finishing touches on the tumultuous events of books 21 through 30. Here Livy primes his readers

\textsuperscript{32} Luce, \textit{Livy}, 47-74. He nevertheless prefaces his conclusion with this admirable sentiment: “The failure of so many good scholars to reach even the glimmering of a consensus suggests that the problem may be insoluble. Certainly anyone who proposes still other solutions should do so with diffidence; it is in this spirit that the present writer offers the following observations,” (70).

\textsuperscript{33} See Livy 31.14-15, a reworking of Pol. 16.25-6.

\textsuperscript{34} Briscoe, \textit{Commentary} vol. 1, 45-47. This hypothesis is contradicted by 31.3.4-5, in which Livy seems to have no anxiety about Laevinus being sent out to stir Greeks to war at an even earlier stage.

\textsuperscript{35} For example, Walsh, \textit{Livy}, 145.

\textsuperscript{36} Livy did not completely excise the Syro-Macedonian Pact, mentioning it in 31.14.4-5’s explanation of why Philip was not besieging Athens in person.

\textsuperscript{37} Such is Eckstein, \textit{Greek East}, 251-2’s conclusion which seems wholly unsatisfactory. Eckstein rightly highlights Polybius’ assumption that all states, and hence Rome, look to expand. Roman interaction with Egypt, however, could only be seen in this light after 30 BCE.
for the new challenges Rome will face in this new decade, transitioning into the narrative of Book 31 with an overview of the reasons for the next war:

But the war against Philip had ended almost thirteen years prior, since the Aetolians had been the cause of both the war and the peace. But then the pleas of the Athenians, whose fields Philip had devastated and whom he had driven into their city stirred the Romans, who were then free and at peace and who already were aggrieved at Philip on account of his faithless breach of the peace against the Aetolians and other allies in the region as well as the fact that he had recently sent troops and funds to Hannibal in Africa, to renew the war. (Livy 31.1.8-10)

Livy first reminds the reader of the prior war with Philip while blaming the Aetolians for both its inception and its abrupt end, inaccurately implying that Roman aims centered around defending the allies they had cynically abandoned. Because Romans rankled at the way the First Macedonian War ended, Livy’s next statement, that the Romans were now freed by the end of the Hannibalic War, implies revenge. Yet, as satisfying as it may have been, this was not a sufficient condition for a justifiable war. Instead, Livy frames Rome’s availability not as a motivation, but an opportunity for doing what ought to be done: dealing with the king’s failure to abide by the peace with the Aetolians and other allies. The only other allies in the text are the Illyrians. Since the Illyrian dynast Scerdilaidas was acting aggressively (the suggestion that he was suborned by the Romans into attacking Philip is difficult to credit), a claim that Illyria had been attacked could not have been foremost in Livy’s mind. This phrase is, therefore, most

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38 Livy 31.1.8-10: Ceterum coeptum bellum adversus Philippum decem ferme ante annis triennio prius depositum erat, cum Aetoli et belli et pacis fuissent causa. Vacuos deinde pace Punica iam Romanos et infensos Philippo cum ob infidam adversus Aetolos aliosque regionis eiusdem socios pacem, tum ob auxilia cum pecunia nuper in Africam missa Hannibali Poenisque preces Atheniensium, quos agro pervastato in urbem compulerat, exciaverunt ad renovandum bellum.
39 Briscoe, Commentary, vol. 1, 52-54, points out that the Aetolians were not included in the Peace of Phoenice, hence their separation in the phrase Aetolos aliosque regionis eiusdem socios pacem, explaining the seeming elevation of the Aetolians to allied status as a merely they result of a state of amicitia. The other allies, however, he limits to the Illyrians, seemingly on account of eiusdem regionis, and that Rhodian and Pergamene ambassadors arrive in the next sentence confirms this. The idea that both First and Second Macedonian Wars were essentially beneficia towards Aetolia makes their dissatisfaction with Flamininus’ arrangements and instigation of the war with Antiochus all the more galling. While untrue, it is natural that later hostility would have spawned a strain of public discourse at Rome playing up the benefits that Aetolia received at Roman hands.
40 Badian, Foreign Clientelae, 55 contests Holleaux’s claim, (Rome, 167ff.) that this included the Illyrians.
easily explained as a general statement, mostly relevant to Athens, for the objection that Athens at best enjoyed informal *amicitia* with Rome, can be neatly sidestepped by pointing out that Livy believed that the Athenians were *adscripti* to the Peace of Phoenice.\(^41\) Livy also cites the report that, beyond injuring Rome’s allies, Philip had sent aid to Hannibal at Zama.\(^42\) Both would have been serious breaches of faith and a failure to respond would have encouraged further transgressions, perhaps even undermining Roman credibility abroad, but these moments of crisis had passed and no longer provided a positive reason for war. Accordingly, Livy gives the most emphasis to the final cause, the entreaties of the Athenians, under siege, their lands laid waste. Philip’s other actions severed ties between Rome and Macedon, making war possible, but it is the situation in Athens, placed emphatically at the end of the sentence that creates the imperative for going to war. Moreover, only these *preces Atheniensium* are the subject of *excitaverunt*; the other grievances here are in prepositional phrases explaining why the Romans were *infensos Philippo*. There can be no doubt about what Livy labels as the cause.

In Livy 31.2, legates from Attalus and the Rhodians come to Rome to announce that Philip was attacking, a reference to his Carian campaign of 201 BCE in which he captured, amongst other places Samos, Ptolemy’s main naval base, and which ended with the king blockaded in Bargylia. The strict accuracy of Livy’s use of *socii* cannot be rescued by the pleas of Pergamum and Rhodes, to say nothing of Egypt, for the disjunctive *sub idem fere tempus* separates them from Livy’s stated causes of the war. This break implies a distinction between mainland and eastern Greek grievances against Philip, meaning that the senate was leaning

\(^{41}\) Holleaux, *Rome*, 259-60, dismissed Athens’ inclusion in Livy 29.12.14 among the signatories at Phoenice as an invention and this may very well be the case. But, if so, it is an invention that further highlights the important role Athens played in providing a pretext for war.

\(^{42}\) Although this is a weak pretense, it may have arisen out of one or more Macedonian individuals, rather than any sanctioned contingent, being preset at the battle and thus not have been a total fabrication. That it resurfaces again in Livy 30.33.5, 40.4, and 44, as well as in 34.22.8 and 45.22.6 indicates that it was not a claim Livy saw as suspect. Luce, *Livy*, 72-3 which comments that Livy would not have had our reasons for favoring Polybius over the Roman tradition, particularly in what might seem an omission, is also germane.
towards war before hearing of Philip’s Aegean exploits; these further complaints appear to confirm rather than drive their decision. Livy’s makes only a loose temporal association, as when in 31.2.5 he uses *eodem fere tempore* to move from events in Italy to unconnected events in Gaul. The phrase does not establish a sequence, only the impression of it, and the difficulty of identifying these *socii* highlights just how thin the Roman case for war is without Egypt and the upheaval caused by the Syro-Macedonian Pact.⁴³

Although Livy does not tell us, these legates surely spoke of the threat of the pact to destroy Egypt.⁴⁴ He did, however, leave clues: the senate immediately sent a mission to Ptolemy and its brief appears a slight *non sequitur*:

Meanwhile three legates were sent to Ptolemy [V], king of Egypt, C. Claudius Nero, M. Aemilius Lepidus, and P. Sempronius Tuditanus, to announce that Hannibal and the Carthaginians had been defeated and to thank the king because even in these difficult times, when even neighboring allies were deserting the Romans, he had kept faith. They were also to ask that, if Philip’s crimes compelled them to make war against the king, Ptolemy would maintain his traditional friendly attitude toward the Roman people.⁴⁵ (Livy 31.2.3-4)

*Amicitia* with Egypt had recently been renewed, yet Egypt had also attempted, contrary to Roman interests, to mediate the First Macedonian War.⁴⁶ It was hardly a close relationship and the announcement of the victory over Hannibal is an odd reason to send such a mission. The impending war with Philip also does not provide much justification, for Livy’s presentation makes Ptolemy seem merely an interested spectator. If we place this mission in the context of the

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⁴³ Whether or not these states were technically *socii* rather than *amici*, as Athens itself probably was, is a question, but there is no denying that Attalus was close to Rome, see Eckstein, *Greek East*, 248-251, and that the Roman tradition saw some prestige coming from the first contacts with Egypt.

⁴⁴ In addition to Eckstein, *Greek East*, 134 and 22-223, arguing that ἑπιστήσασα in Pol. 15.20.6 means “alerting” rather than “raising up” the Romans, see Appian *Mac*. 4. Here, even though Appian does not vouch for the historicity of the pact, he is explicit that it formed the core of the Rhodian and Pergamene ambassadors’ case.


⁴⁶ There is a great deal of discussion of Egypt’s relationship to Rome at this period, for which see Briscoe, *Commentary* vol. 1, 56-8. For the ultimate ambivalence of Egypt’s relationship with Rome and the history behind it, see Eckstein, *Greek East*, 201-4.
Syro-Macedonian Pact it is immediately clear why the senate opened communications with Ptolemy and Philip and why this directly followed the arrival of the Rhodians and Pergamenes.\textsuperscript{47} The senate had resolved on war unless Philip acceded to their demands, and Livy would have us believe that this resolution, if not action, preceded Rhodian and Pergamene complaints.\textsuperscript{48} This impression is the result not of falsification, but of careful imprecision on Livy’s part. The chronological relationships between events can be integrated with those given by Polybius without contradiction precisely because they are vague and non-sequential.

After the senate consulted the gods and decided to put a war vote before the people, Livy highlights events “opportune for stirring peoples’ minds for war,” \textit{opportune inritandis ad bellum animis}, which the consul Sulpicius uses to good effect in convincing the people that this war was an urgent priority.\textsuperscript{49} These were the reading of letters sent by the pro-praetor M. Laevinus, sent to investigate Philip’s military buildup and the visit of another delegation from Athens.\textsuperscript{50} We have mention of two Macedonian attacks upon Athenian territory, one in Livy 31.16 under Philocles, and the other, led by Nicanor in Polybius 16.27. Nicanor met with Lepidus’ second diplomatic mission, which was sent after the war vote, and Philocles’ attack came later, after Attalus, Rhodes, and Athens had joined forces. Because these delegates came

\textsuperscript{47} Identifying the various diplomatic missions sent, particularly between Polybius and Livy, has long been a source of confusion. That this particular embassy went directly to Ptolemy and was not identical with that which appears, also with Lepidus, in Athens has been established by A.R. Meadows, “Greek and Roman Diplomacy on the Eve of the Second Macedonian War” in \textit{Historia} 42 (1993): 40-60.

\textsuperscript{48} One might object that the senate, without the power to declare war, was not the critical decision-making body, yet for Livy, it was their opinion that mattered. The senate, not the \textit{populus Romanus}, was the source of policy Livy regarded as legitimate and when the people initially do not authorize the war, our historian believes demagoguery is responsible. Sulpicius leads the people to the right decision in 31.7 and the reader is left with no doubt on where Livy stood. Opposition which Livy does not regard as somehow seditious, namely the complaint in 31.13 that the loan wealthy citizens had given to the state in the Hannibalic War would not be paid back anytime soon, has no links in this version to the rejection of the war vote and is dealt with through proper means: an appeal to the senate.

\textsuperscript{49} Livy 31.5.5, 31.7-8.

\textsuperscript{50} Livy 31.3.3-6. For why this is likely not a doublet of his service during the previous Macedonian war, see Briscoe, \textit{Commentary} vol. 1, 60-61. Eckstein, \textit{Greek East}, 255-8 follows R. Stewart, \textit{Public Offices in Early Rome: Ritual Procedure and Political Practice} (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998) in crediting the sortition’s authenticity.
with the senate’s ultimatum, this could have happened in March at the earliest. Therefore, whatever spurred the second Athenian mission was distinct from these incursions and occurred at some point during December 201 BCE or the following January. It is tempting to associate this with Philip’s brief activity on the mainland between his breakout from Bargylia and his Thracian campaign. Livy shows us an Athens entirely dependent on Roman aid and makes no mention of their involvement with Attalus and the Rhodians prior to the war vote, just as in the opening of the book, Livy mentions nothing further east than Athens. Thus, when the senate brings the vote of war “on account of injuries and war brought against allies of the Roman people,” the reader is overwhelmingly primed to think of Athens. Legates from Egypt do show up during the preparation for war, making it certain that this was after the war vote, but their message is entirely aimed at prodding Rome into defending Athens, again with no mention of the pact and even an assertion of Ptolemaic strength. Livy’s attachment to Athens as the apparent source of his *casus belli* also goes a long way toward explaining his failure to mention the Romans, who appear working with Attalus in Polybius’ account. Livy’s ordering of events carefully avoids the implication that events further east had anything to do with the declaration of war.

Rome’s greatest concerns, in fact, lay even closer to home. Laevinus had been sent with a fleet to make sure Philip did not invade Italy. This fear may seem ridiculous in retrospect, but experience of the Epirote’s invasion coupled with Hannibal’s unexpected invasion of Italy had taught the Romans that such events were possible. In fact, Laevinus’ letter to the senate indicates that it was more than possible; he had been met on arrival by M. Aurelius, a legate already on the

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52 Briscoe, *Commentary* vol. 1, 100. The reference to this *Atheniensium nova legatio* in 31.5.6 makes clear that there was prior contact, most logically associated with the Acarnanian raid. Therefore the case cannot be made that this was actually an Athenian complaint about the Acarnanian raid and that Livy’s *preces Atheniensium* actually refers ahead to this mission.
53 Philip’s activities in Thrace, culminating in the destruction of Abydos, are mentioned in Livy 31.16.
54 Livy 31.6.1: *ob iniurias armaque inlata sociis populi Romani*. 196
scene, who described Philip’s actions in detail, interpreting his every act as preparation to invade Italy. The Athenians traveling to Rome may well have been the source of much of Laevinus’ information; they arrived in Rome complaining that Philip’s forces now posed not just a threat to Attica but the city itself. In Livy’s version it was this combination of fear and duty that ultimately drove the Roman people to vote for war.

The consuls for 200 entered office on the Ides of March, February 7th on the Julian calendar; as we have seen, the senate immediately met on the issue of war and was apprised of the rapid developments in Greece. That one of these consuls was P. Sulpicius Galba, the most notable commander in the First Macedonian War, is often thought to indicate the senate’s intent to wage war. Fergus Millar’s argument for the popular will’s importance in determining policy during the mid Republic raises two further possibilities: this may have been coincidence, or, perhaps, the people itself picked this candidate with a view to war. If the people were set on war they would have come to this decision because of the pact, for Athens’ situation would not yet have been critical. This would also mean that Livy’s emphasis on their war weariness is a smoke screen. For, in his account, the war-weary people at first rejected the war, framed in terms of avenging injuries to allies, on the grounds that the ruling class spins wars out of wars lest the people enjoy peace. The state’s debts to the equestrian class were also a concern. If, as Millar

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55 Livy 31.3.4-6.
56 Eckstein, *Greek East*, 254-6 highlights this fear and stresses the lack of accurate information available on Philip’s capabilities. Badian, *Foreign Clientelae*, 64 sees no preparations in Italy and judges fear of an invasion entirely false. Similarly, Gruen, *Hellenistic World*, 384 concludes “That the senate could have feared a naval invasion of Italy is manifestly absurd.” Whether or not Roman paranoia was a historical reality (the possibility of invasion certainly was not), the most important point for the present argument is that Livy’s narrative presents it as such.
59 This is certainly not a view Livy endorses in 31.6: the people did this of their own will because of impatience for danger and labor, exhausted as they were by the length and magnitude of the previous war, but Q. Baebius, tribune of the plebs, going down that well-trodden path of slandering the senators, had made the accusation that new wars were being manufactured out of old so that the plebs could not ever enjoy peace.
argues, the people truly did exercise their sovereignty, and the election of Sulpicius was significant, then the Roman tradition has exaggerated their reluctance to go to war. The simplest reason for this would be anxiety over the war’s justification, since they had just made peace with the king and Rome’s ties to these Greek “allies” attacked by Philip were weak. If the Romans were concerned about seeming to have responded opportunistically to these appeals for help, perhaps even breaking *fides* with Philip, they have recourse to almost the same narrative device, an initial decision and change of mind, used to justify aiding Capua and the Mamertines.⁶¹ If this was the rationale for the story of the second war vote, it works regardless of whether concerns were over Athens or Egypt, and thus represents a layer of apologetics prior to Livy.

In Livy’s version, the senate, judging that war could be delayed only with great cost and shame, urges Sulpicius to bring the matter to a second vote. Before calling the vote, the consul makes a speech persuading the centuries to vote overwhelmingly for war.⁶² The degree of historicity one is willing to accord to any speech given by an ancient historian is up for debate, but it is beyond dispute that Livy offers a compelling piece of rhetoric that defines the Roman understanding of the war. Declaring that war is inevitable, since Philip was already amassing troops for an invasion of Italy, Sulpicius draws upon the peoples’ traumatic experience of the Second Punic War, claiming that they could only choose whether or not they would fight this war in Italy. He frames Hannibal’s invasion as a simple consequence of a Roman failure to bring timely aid to Saguntum:

> Now who could doubt that, if we had promptly brought aid to the Saguntines when they were besieged and begging for the protection our *fides* promised, which our ancestors had brought to the Mamertines, we would have diverted the

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⁶⁰ Livy 31.13. Although the appeal to the senate comes later and Livy frames it as a separate issue, it stands to reason that economic concerns prompted some of the opposition to the war even at this earlier stage.  
⁶¹ This also supports Philip’s claims, as seen in Appian *Mac.* 4, that the Romans broke the treaty with him. Neither Appian nor the surviving Polybius mention this Roman war vote.  
⁶² Livy 31.7.
whole war, which we welcomed into Italy with delay and the greatest disaster, to Spain. Nor is there any doubt that by sending Laevinus with the fleet across to wage war upon him we held this same Philip in Macedon who, through legates and correspondence with Hannibal, had promised to invade Italy. Yet we hesitate now, with Hannibal driven from Italy and the Carthaginians conquered, to do that same thing which we did then when we were dealing with Hannibal as an enemy on Italian soil? Should we grant the king a taste of our sloth so he might sack Athens, just as we allowed Hannibal to sack Saguntum? It will not be five months later, as Hannibal arrived from Saguntum, but the king will land in Italy only five days after he will have launched his ships from Corinth.63

(Livy 31.7.3-7)

For the remainder of the speech Sulpicius expatiates on the dangers of an invasion of Italy, clearly his main point, but a reminder of Saguntum is not something that would pass unnoticed. While the consul dwells mostly on the people’s self-interest, the Saguntum comparison implies that it is Rome’s duty to defend its allies against Philip.

In fact, while Roman fears of an imminent Macedonian invasion are questionable, adding the collusion of Philip and Antiochus, already made known at Rome by the Rhodians, renders Roman security concerns somewhat more long-term, but far more reasonable. The Hellenistic kingdoms were already fielding armies far more massive than Hannibal’s, and the kings based much of their authority and prestige upon conquest. The possibility of one such monarch emerging triumphant and controlling the greater part of the Greek world’s resources was a strategic threat too great to ignore.64 The threat would have been almost as great if the two kings had proven themselves capable of significant collaboration. Such a threat might seem a long way off, yet the same had been said of Hannibal as he besieged Saguntum. The idea of a single world-

63 Livy 31.7.3-7: Quis enim dubitat quin, si Saguntinis obsessis fidelibus nostrum implorantibus impigre tulissemus opem, sicut patres nostri Mamertinis tulerant, totum in Hispaniam aversuri bellum fuerimus, quod cunctando cum summa clade nostra in Italiam accepimus? Ne illud quidem dubium est quin hunc ipsum Philippum, pactum iam per legatos litterasque cum Hannibale ut in Italiam traiceret, misso cum classe Laevinum qui ultimo ei bellum inferret, in Macedoniam continuierimus. Et quod tunc fecimus, cum hostem Hannibalem in Italia haberemus, id nunc pulso Italia Hannibale, deivitis Carthaginensiisibus cunctaumur facere? Patiamur expugnandis Athenis, sicut Sagunto expugnando Hannibalem passi sumus, segniam nostrum experiri regem: non quinto inde mense, quemadmodum ab Sagunto Hannibal, sed quinto [inde] die quam ab Corintheo solvere naves, in Italiam perveniet.

64 Eckstein, Greek East, 239-42, citing John Grainger, The Roman War of Antiochus the Great (Boston: Brill, 2002).
conquering army had, of course, been proven impractical by Xerxes, but using smaller expeditions to wage a war of attrition remained possible. Rome had just used Italian manpower to this very effect against Hannibal. The speech Livy gives Sulpicius is powerful. How much more powerful might it have been with not just Athens on the line, but Rhodes, Pergamum, even the once mighty Egypt?

During the mobilization for war in Livy 31.9, likely in mid-March (Republican April), legates from Ptolemy arrived replying to, and likely returning with, the Romans sent out in 31.2.65 Their apparent charge was to bring the Athenian’s plight to the attention of the senate, for they had also sought help from Ptolemy and, by offering to aid Athens if Rome will not, remind them of their obligations:

During the mobilization for war, legates from king Ptolemy arrived announcing that the Athenians had sought help from the king: but, even though they were common allies, he would neither send a fleet nor an army to Greece to defend Athens nor do battle with the king [Philip] for any reason unless under the authority of the Roman people. He would either remain quiet in his own kingdom, if it pleased the Roman people to defend their allies themselves, or, if they preferred, he would allow them to take no action and himself send such aid as would easily defend Athens from Philip.66 (Livy 31.9.1-3)

There is an implicit accusation here: Rome was failing to fulfill its obligations to its allies. In Livy’s version, this embassy serves to shame the Roman people into action and shore up support for the war. At the same time or slightly before, Aetolians may have also arrived at Rome seeking help against Philip. Their plea was rejected, either because of Roman anger over their separate peace with Philip in the First Macedonian War, or because the Romans were attempting

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65 Meadows, “Greek and Roman Diplomacy” 40-43 begins with this mission and highlights the difficulty explaining it as anything other than a response to previous Roman initiative.
66 Livy 31.9.1-3: In ipso apparatu belli legati a rege Ptolomaeo venerunt qui nuntiarent Athenienses adversus Philippum petisse ab rege auxilium: ceterum, etsi communes socii sint, tamen nisi ex auctoritate populi Romani neque classem neque exercitum defendendi aut oppugnandi causam regem in Graciam missurum esse; vel quieturum eum in regno, si populo Romano socios defendere libeat, vel Romanos quiescere, si malint, passurum atque ipsum auxilia, quae facile adversus Philippum tueri Athenas possent, missurum.
to build a more reputable coalition.\textsuperscript{67} It is after these events that Lepidus, freshly returned from Egypt, was sent on his second mission with a provisional declaration of war against Philip.\textsuperscript{68} It was long thought that this diplomatic mission, which Polybius 16.27 places in Athens and from which Lepidus detached to confront Philip at Abydos in Polybius 16.34 and Livy 31.18, was the same as that dispatched in Livy 31.2.\textsuperscript{69} This would have required many months’ dalliance in Greece before finally fulfilling its mission. So intricately linked with diplomatic overtures to Rome, the decision to go to war and its official declaration, as well as the chronology of Philip’s campaigns both in Asia Minor and mainland Greece, the thread of this mission has long threatened to unravel the entire narrative, while Livy’s apparent redaction of part of the mission led to sinister conclusions.\textsuperscript{70} All became simpler when Meadows demonstrated that what appears to be one diplomatic mission is actually the erroneous concatenation of two incomplete accounts of different missions involving the same Lepidus.\textsuperscript{71} The Roman’s itinerary is not at all improbable; the voyage to Alexandria would require between 10 and 13 days, the return voyage requiring somewhere between 50 and 70; having left around November or December this same Lepidus returned in time to be sent on the second mission in March.\textsuperscript{72} After setting straight the

\textsuperscript{67} Appian \textit{Mac.} 4, Livy 31.29. This is the contact which A.H. McDonald, and F.W. Walbank, “The Origins of the Second Macedonian War” in \textit{JRS} 27 (1937): 180-207.\textsuperscript{68} dates to the end of 202 BCE.

\textsuperscript{68} Meadows “Greek and Roman Diplomacy” rightly follows the conclusions of McDonald and Walbank 1937 and Walbank 1949 with regard to the declaration of war. They make an extremely convincing case that by this point cumbersome fetial procedures had been modified and that the senate and people would send representatives to deliver demands having already voted that should those demands be refused a state of war would then be in effect. Because it had long been recognized that Lepidus’ speech to Philip at Abydos sets a \textit{de facto} state of war and the first embassy to Ptolemy had departed before any vote on war was undertaken one had to suppose that a messenger was sent to track down the three diplomats as they wandered around Greece and inform them of the change in their mission. Meadows, 46-47 removes this awkward supposition with Lepidus returning to Rome and being sent on his second mission only after the war vote.

\textsuperscript{69} So Briscoe, \textit{Commentary}, vol. 1, 41, 56-8, 94.

\textsuperscript{70} Briscoe, \textit{Commentary} vol. 1, 41-42; Gruen, \textit{Hellenistic World}, 392-398; Walsh, Livy, 62-3 sees the confusion as the result of compositional difficulties reconciling annalistic and Polybian material and their dating systems.

\textsuperscript{71} Meadows, “Greek and Roman Diplomacy.” The scholarship on this subject is vast and a detailed enumeration of sources and arguments would require its own chapter. The problems, and the value of Meadows’ solution, can be briefly comprehended by Briscoe \textit{Commentary}, vol. 1, 36-47 and Gruen, \textit{Hellenistic World} 382-398.

\textsuperscript{72} Lionel Casson, “Speed Under Sail of Ancient Ships” in \textit{TAPA} 82 (1951): 136-148, particularly the chart on 145-6. Note also 143 for the trip from Alexandria to Massilia in thirty days attested by Sulpicius \textit{Dialogus} 1.1.
Lepidus’ two assignments and their chronology, Meadows described this mission as making the rounds of the Greek world before Lepidus assumed a symbolic position as the king’s tutor which, although not of much practical effect, was a signal of Roman support for Egypt in response to the rumored Syro-Macedonian pact. The reality of the pact allows us go much further explaining these two missions.

Lepidus’ first mission to Ptolemy, described in Livy 31.2, was sent soon after the arrival of Rhodian and Pergamene envoys; Livy tells us that their complaints were about Philip’s campaign in Asia, but Antiochus’ coordination with Philip confirmed the report of the pact. The possible ramifications were not lost on Rhodes and Pergamum and they will have stressed the danger to Ptolemy and the region. The three men sent in the following sentence were to do more than report on Hannibal’s defeat and test Egypt’s attitude towards a Roman war with Philip. The content of this embassy and the Egyptian reply cannot be known for certain, but their basic outline can be surmised. The Romans likely next step would have been gathering information on the pact and how immediate the danger to Ptolemy was, perhaps giving some statement of support. The Ptolemaic reply in Livy 31.9 then either endorsed or suggested a strategy of engaging Philip at Athens. The primacy of the Syro-Macedonian Pact in these diplomatic exchanges strengthens another point made by Meadows, that the request to have a Roman appointed tutor to the child Ptolemy attested in the epitome of Pompeius Trogus 30.2-3 fits with Livy’s narrative and was probably one request of the Egyptian embassy in Livy 31.9.1. Moreover, this seemingly unlikely request takes on much greater political significance, for Philip had negotiated his daughter’s marriage to Ptolemy, which would make him the king’s

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73 Meadows “Greek and Roman Diplomacy” pp. 54-60.  
75 Livy 31.2.3-4.  
76 Meadows, “Greek and Roman Diplomacy,” 49-50.
father-in-law and a natural protector, even while he plotted with Antiochus. That Lepidus, the very Roman who delivered the senate’s ultimatum to Philip assumed this role can only have been a rebuke of Philip’s behavior and a strong declaration of support for Egypt.

On their way to deliver the Roman ultimatum to Philip, this second embassy stopped at Athens and was present when Rhodian legates and Attalus appeared, lobbying to bring Athens into the coalition against Philip; Attalus’ claim that the Romans were already resolved on war with Philip and would support Athens could be verified on the spot. When, in Polybius 16.27, Philip’s subordinate Nicanor led a devastating raid up to the walls of Athens, the Romans requested that he inform his king that to avoid conflict with Rome he must cease to wage war with any Greeks and pay reparations to Attalus. Since the fetials, consulted, according to Livy, before the departure from Rome on whether the declaration of war had to be delivered in person to Philip, had decided that this was not required, this meeting seems to have been intended as a declaration of war, for Nicanor left immediately afterwards, as if to deliver the ultimatum to the king. Later, Lepidus’ encounter with Philip at Abydos was prompted by the seemingly unexpected news that he was nearby.

Livy, however, works Polybius’ account of Attalus’ reception at Athens into a digression, explaining how that city came to be at war with Philip. His version lacks all traces of the Roman envoys, except for the vague assertion in 31.14.4 that the Romans were also hostile to the king. For Polybius, the prospect of Roman support plays a greater contributory role in the decision to irrevocably break with Philip. The appearance of Attalus, Rhodians, and Romans in Athens

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77 Pol. 14.25.13; Eckstein, Greek East, 142-4; Holleaux, Rome, 78-80, particularly n.1 for the feasibility of arranging such a marriage with a five year old boy.
78 Pol. 16.25, 16.27.
79 As in both Livy 31.18.1 and Pol. 16.34.2.
80 In light of the violence already done to Athens, it is surprising that the Athenians had not yet made the final decision on war with Philip and required some persuasion to depart from their policy of relative neutrality; perhaps the First Macedonian War still left some doubt as to whether the Romans would honor their commitments.
either urging, or offering to support, open war with Philip resembles a coordinated diplomatic offensive, making it unlikely that Livy’s readers would conclude that the Romans just happened to be present at the right moment to offer critical moral support. Livy’s justification of the war as a response to Athenian appeals for help would have been greatly undermined by the impression that the Romans themselves were purposefully driving the conflict towards war.

There have been two schools of thought on Livy’s omission of these envoys and their part in the Athenian decision to go to war. The idea that Livy did so consciously finds its best expression in Briscoe’s commentary, in which he makes the case that the senate had acted beyond the bounds of its authority in preparing for, perhaps even setting in motion, a war without the people’s approval. The belief that Lepidus’ two diplomatic jaunts were one in the same rendered this particularly damning because his encounters with Nicanor in Polybius and Philip in both authors present the appearance of an *indictio belli*, yet he had left long before the actual vote for war. This would have then been covered up by some Sullan annalist, for whom the people’s authority in relation to the senate was a live issue, and taken over by Livy. Positing such manipulation while pinning it on some unknown annalist is convenient, maximizing the amount of trust we can place in Livy. The other explanation is to assume that Livy has made an error either due to Polybius and his Roman source each mentioning one embassy but not the other or his own carelessness.

The distinction between the two missions is decisive. The first possibility is unlikely since, even if Polybius had less interest in the first Roman mission and if, in addition, the war

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81 This was sometimes explained away by imagining a messenger sent to roam the Greek world in search of the ambassadors and update their orders after the vote. See Meadows, “Greek and Roman Diplomacy,” 46 for the idea and its reluctant exponents.

82 So Meadows, “Greek and Roman Diplomacy”; Luce, *Livy*, 67-76 makes quite a full argument for Livy’s having blundered, saying on p.72 “If ever a passage points to an author’s having taken a well-earned vacation between major parts of his work, this is it.”
vote was not as dramatic as in Livy, Polybius could not have passed over the dispatch of the ultimatum. At the very least it would have been quite clear to Livy when he came upon these Romans in Athens that they were to be associated with the mission just sent to deliver a message to Philip, a message curiously similar to what they ask Nicanor to convey to the king, rather than a mission to Egypt from the previous year. The second possibility, that Livy was simply mistaken, is too convenient. Making these two separate missions means that Livy no longer had to account for months of dawdling in Greece and there would have been very little for him to be confused about. The result of this omission is to emphasize Athens’ appeal to Rome as the central cause of the war, just as Livy carefully emphasized it in 31.1 and 31.5-7, and this forces us to conclude both that this was not an uncritically reproduced adjustment of some previous annalists, nor a mistake on Livy’s part.

Livy’s reason for eliding the mission was to make Rome’s intervention on Athens’ behalf fit the model for justified Roman warfare built up over his 30 previous books. Just as when the Romans wait for an invitation to cross the Adriatic and begin the First Macedonian War, this intervention can thus be cast as a disinterested and benevolent act and the suggestion of questionable motives is avoided. Livy underscores the gravity of the situation when Sulpicius reaches Greece, for another group of Athenians is there to meet him, complaining that Athens was under siege. In response Sulpicius sends C. Claudius Cento with twenty ships.83 Sulpicius’ meeting with the Athenians also holds an important time-marker, for Livy says that Philip was at that point engaged in the siege of Abydos. This siege is the last major event to consider in the outbreak of the war.

Polybius’ lengthy narrative of the siege and destruction of Abydos serves to cast Philip in a negative light and hold up the Abydenes’ behavior for rather gruesome praise. Livy, however,

83 Livy 31.14.3-4.
adapted the episode to his own ends, not just crafting a dramatic set-piece but deeply imprinting his own ethical stamp upon the incident, setting it within the same moral universe in which the Romans conceived of their own wars. Having already cast Athens as a new Saguntum, he uses a comparison of Abydos and Saguntum twice to frame Lepidus’ encounter with Philip, reinforcing the rhetoric used to justify the war. For, in 31.17 the Abydenes offered to surrender to Philip on what seem quite accommodating terms, simply asking that their Rhodian allies be allowed to depart with one article of clothing each, but the king refused and they resolve upon a desperate course of action:

> When Philip had replied that there would be no shred of peace unless they submitted to anything whatsoever, the legates reported this and so stirred up rage, both from indignation and desperation, that the Abydenes, reduced to that same madness experienced at Saguntum, were ordering that their wives be locked up in the temple of Diana, their sons and daughters along with their nurses in the gymnasiunm, while their gold and silver should be carried to the forum, their valuable clothing gathered in the Rhodian and Cyzicene ships in the harbor, and finally that priests and victims be led forward and altars set in the center of town. First men were chosen there who would, when they saw that their battle line had been cut down fighting before the ruined section of the wall, would at once slaughter their wives and children, throw the gold, silver, and vestments from the ships into the sea, and set ablaze buildings public and private in as many places as they were able. They were sworn to perform this crime with a solemn oath, the priests leading the cursed rite.84 (Livy 31.17.4-9)

The passage is already so arranged as to stir intense pathos and indignation, but the Abydenes’ faithful effort to secure the safety of their Rhodian allies and the explicit mention of Saguntum tie this episode both to Roman sensibilities and Sulpicius’ invocation of Saguntum in 31.6.7. While the issue is still in doubt, Livy adds Lepidus’ impromptu meeting with Philip, in which the

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84 Livy 31.17-4-9: *Quibus cum Philippus nihil pacati nisi omnia permittentibus respondisset, adeo renuntiata haec legatio ab indignatione simul ac desperatione iram accendit ut ad Saguntinam rabiem versi matronas omnes in templo Dianae, pueros ingenuos virginesque, infantes etiam cum suis nutricibus in gymnasio includi iuberent, aurum et argentum in forum deferri, vestem pretiosam in naves Rhodiam Cyzicenamque quae in portu erat coici, sacerdotes victimasque adduci et altaria in medio ponit. Ibi delecti primum qui, ubi caesam aciem suorum pro diruto muro pugnamentam vidissent, exemplum coniugis liberisque interficerent, aurum argentum vestemque quae in navibus esset in mare deicerent, tectis publicis privatisque quam plurimis locis possent ignes subicerent: id se facinus perpetratos praeuentibus exsecrabile carmen sacerdotibus iure iurando adacti.*

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Roman achieved nothing beyond provoking the king. Livy does reproduce Philip’s protest that, by going to war the Romans would be the ones in violation of the treaty, but since Livy has so hazily defined what the actual treaty violations are and set this complaint inside an episode showcasing the king’s cruelty, the reader is blind to its potential legal merit. The narrative then moves briskly through the Abydenes’ desperate act of self-destruction and Philip’s callous reaction, allowing them three days leave to kill themselves, and concludes with a second comparison to Saguntum: “When the disastrous end of the Abydenes at Philip’s hands had resolved the Romans on war, just as the destruction of Saguntum by Hannibal had before, messengers came reporting that the consul was already in Epirus and had set up his forces in winter quarters, the army at Apollonia and the fleet at Corcyra.” The statement of Roman resolve is rendered nonsensical by the second half of the sentence, which shows that Rome had already chosen war. The distortion’s effect is to further link Abydos to Saguntum, the destruction of which did precede the Roman decision, and make the Romans appear to merely be responding to Philip’s crimes.

Yet there is a further difference between Livy and Polybius’ versions of the meeting. When Lepidus meets Philip at Abydos and demands that he make war on none of the Greeks and pay reparations, this time to both Attalus and the Rhodians, Livy works carefully and directly from his source. Yet scholarly anxiety over the identity of the embassy and its mission has inadvertently concealed a remarkable difference between the two versions. The demands which

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86 Livy 31.18.9: *Cum velut Sagunti excidium Hannibali, sic Philippo Abydenorum clades ad Romanum bellum animos fecisset, muntii occurrerunt consulem iam in Epiro esse et Apolloniam terrestres copias, navales Corcyram in hiberna deduxisse.*
87 Briscoe, *Commentary* vol. 1, 105 focuses entirely upon this point: “The suppression of κατὰ τὰς ἐντολὰς and its apparent replacement by with *trium consensu* is the most striking of L.’s alterations to Polybius’ account. . . . Any alteration to *trium* (cf. McDonald’s apparatus) is quite otiose. Clearly the three *legati* decided which of them was to go to Abydus.”
Polybius’ Lepidus delivers to Philip are that he “make war on none of the Greeks, keep his hands off of Ptolemy’s lands, and submit to arbitration concerning the wrongs done to Attalus and Rhodes.” When the king complains that Attalus and the Rhodians made war upon him first, Lepidus retorts with a list of others Philip had attacked, including Athens. Livy compresses this conversation into one sentence:

[Lepidus] complained that war was waged against Attalus and the Rhodians, and most of all that Philip was besieging Abydos, but when the king started to say that he had been attacked first by Attalus and the Rhodians, retorted “And the Abydenes as well? Did they attack you?” (Livy 31.18.2)

Nowhere else in this passage, the most direct complaint made by Rome to the king and quite probably the *indictio belli*, does Livy make the slightest mention of Egypt.

Once, as Livy has it, the Romans had established their case relative to Athens and the destruction of Abydos had turned opinion against Philip, they could then attempt to bring the Aetolians aboard without suffering from the Aetolians’ bad reputation. In 31.29-32 Livy dramatizes the meeting of the Panaetolicum in Spring 199 BCE, at which Macedon and Rome competed for Aetolia’s allegiance. The Macedonian speaker begins, regaling his audience with the hostile interpretation of past Roman actions, decrying Roman administration of Sicily, calling Capua the “tomb and memorial of the Campanian people,” *sepulcrum ac monumentum Campani populi*, and ending with an argument for Greek unity against the barbarian. In the Roman historian, of course, we do not find these arguments at their most potent. In an adroit move that emphasizes their cooperative goals, the Romans yield to the Athenians in replying. In indirect

88 Pol. 16.34.3: μήτε τῶν Ἑλλήνων μηδενὶ πολεμεῖν μήτε τοῖς Πτολεμαίου πράγμασιν ἐπιβάλλειν τὰς χεῖρας, περὶ δὲ τῶν εἰς Ἄτταλον καὶ Ροδίους ἀδικημάτων δίκας ὑποσχέσθαι.
89 Livy 31.18.2: Qui questus Attalo Rhodisque arma inlata et quod tum maxime Abydum oppugnaret, cum rex ab Attalo et Rhodiis ultro se bello lacessitum diceret, ‘Num Abydeni quoque’ inquit ‘ultro tibi intulerunt arma?’
91 Livy 31.30.11: [The Athenians] thus said they were pleading and begging the Aetolians that they take pity on the Athenians and take up the war with the gods as their leaders, and the Romans, who were second to gods in power. [Athenienses dixerunt] itaque se orare atque obscenare Aetolos ut miseriti Atheniensium ducibus diis immortalibus, deinde Romanis, qui secundum deos plurimum possent, bellum susciperent.
speech, these shift the focus to Philip’s crimes and impieties, casting him as more barbarous in his actions than the Romans, and concluding with a remarkably Roman turn of phrase which claims that the gods, not the Romans, are leading the charge in this war.\(^92\) The Roman legate weighs in last, giving a long list of other Greek states that could echo Athenian complaints, and then providing the standard Roman justification for actions in Italy and Sicily, pointing out that of the latter, only the area that was under direct Carthaginian control was made into a province while Syracuse itself was not so much conquered as liberated. Avoiding offering an actual apology for abandoning the Aetolians in the previous war, he concludes by stressing Roman clemency and inviting the Aetolians to join them on favorable terms.\(^93\) The Romans, validated within the text by a Romanization of the Athenian position, do not see this war with Philip as fundamentally different from all that has come before. The same \textit{exempla} and the ethics underlying them serve to explain the wars with the Samnites and wars with Hellenistic monarchs. By linking the debate on a new and revolutionary step in foreign relations to a long history of actions his audience would have found unimpeachable, Livy makes Rome’s foray into the east appear equally justified, while transforming possible dissent on this issue into an uncomfortable repudiation of Roman values which his readers would be quite unlikely accept.

Livy’s case for the war is thus based almost entirely on Athens and Abydos, with the addition of an improbable Macedonian threat to Italy, but ignores the crisis, central to Polybius’ account, that precipitated Philip’s campaign and motivated the Greek embassies to Rome, the Syro-Macedonian Pact. Why Livy wrote Egypt out of the Second Macedonian War requires

\(^{92}\) Livy 31.30.11.

\(^{93}\) The Roman claim of clemency makes use of the same opposition between what is advantageous and what is right, with the Romans leaning markedly towards the latter, that we have already seen many times. Livy 31.31.15-16: “But why do I mention Capua, when we gave peace and liberty to the Carthaginians, conquered in war? The danger is more that by letting the conquered off far too lightly we might inspire many others to do the same and try their fortune against us.” \textit{Sed quid ego Capuam dico, cum Carthagini victae pacem ac libertatem dederimus? Magis illud est periculum ne nimis facile victis ignoscendo plures ob id ipsum ad experiundam adversus nos fortunam belli incitemus.}
explanation. We are fortunate in being able to make at least the beginnings of a comparison, through Justinus’ epitome of Pompeius Trogus, a contemporary of Livy. Since one of Trogus’ goals was to translate the Greek historiographical tradition into Latin, most likely for a Romanized western provincial elite,\(^94\) he sometimes reproduces strong anti-Roman sentiment and his narrative appears to have been situated within a very different worldview from Livy’s; in the moral universe of the Hellenistic kingdoms, conquest could be a noble goal and a result of kingly virtue. Accordingly, Trogus seems to have been predominantly interested in kings and their aspirations toward dominance. He felt little need to carefully explain each war, for war was familiar and endemic. If Justinus was at all accurate in his summary of Trogus, conquest and the vagaries of empire were programmatic from the beginning of the first book:

> Initially the control of affairs, peoples, and nations was in the hands of kings, whose moderation, tested amongst good men, elevated to the height of majesty, not their popular ambition. Peoples were ruled by no laws, but the pronouncements of leading men served as law. Their custom was to protect rather than expand their territory; their kingdoms were bound by the limits of what they had inherited. It was Ninus, king of the Assyrians, who first changed this old, almost ancestral, practice of nations with a new lust for domination. He first waged war upon his neighbors and subjugated peoples still unskilled at resisting all the way to the edge of Libya.\(^95\) (Justinus 1.1.1-5)

Trogus then went on to explain that previous wars conducted by Egyptians and Scythians did not count, for they were waged with far away peoples for honor rather than territorial gain. On a

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\(^94\) J.M. Alonso-Núñez, “An Augustan World History: The 'Historiae Philippicae' of Pompeius Trogus” in *Greece & Rome* 34 (1987): 56-72, 59. Discussion largely centers around the information provided by Justin in the preface to the epitome: “*Trogus Pompeius, Graecas et totius orbis historias Latino sermone consopuit, ut, cum nostra Graece, Graeca quoque nostra lingua legi possent,*” as well as the biographical scraps given in 43.5.11-12, which tell us that his ancestors came from the Vocontii and that his grandfather served under and obtained Roman citizenship from Pompey, his father under Caesar. Alonso-Núñez takes his position from A. Momigliano “A. Livio, Plutarco e Giustino su virtu e fortuna dei Romani. Contributo alla ricostruzione della fonte di Trogo Pompe o” in *Athenaeum* 12 (1934): 45-56, although a somewhat different perspective on Trogus. See also Ronald Syme, “The Date of Justin and the Discovery of Trogus,” in *Historia* 37 (1988): 358-71.

\(^95\) Justin 1.1.1-5: *Principio rerum gentium nationumque imperium penes reges erat, quos ad fastigium huius maiestatis non ambitio popularis, sed spectata inter bonos moderatio provehebat. Populi nullis legibus tenebantur arbitria principium pro legibus erant. Fines imperii tueri magis quam proferre mos erat; intra suam cuique patriam regna finiebantur. Primus omnium Ninus, rex Assyriorum, veterem et quasi atimum gentibus morem nova imperii cupiditate mutavit. Hic primus intulit bella finitimis et rudes adhuc ad resistendum populos terminos usque Libyae perdomuit.*

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large scale, his history follows the succession of empires throughout the world, and as Alonso-Núñez says, “The actor in history for Pompeius Trogus is mankind, not the city of Rome,” yet at a narrative level, his actors are tyrants, nobles, and most of all kings, for these are the men most influenced by the cupiditas imperii and whose actions make the greatest change.96 In Trogus’ history, Rome is treated as, at best, a unitary actor, much in the same way the Roman senate sometimes functions for Polybius as the royal court or an entity that foreign powers appeal to and interact with as if with a king.

Trogus set forth his own explanation for the chain of events leading to the Second Macedonian War, in which Rome is very much in the background.97 The crisis and collapse of Egyptian power that shook the Mediterranean and brought Rome into eastern affairs stemmed from the personal vices of Ptolemy IV Philopater, whose perceived weakness had previously fired Antiochus to launch the 5th Syrian War.98 This is then part of the destabilization of Egypt that led to the Syro-Macedonian Pact and the Second Macedonian War:

As if their infamy had been expiated by the king’s death and the courtesan’s punishment, the Alexandrians sent legates to the Romans, begging that they take up guardianship of the orphan and protect the kingdom of Egypt, because they said that Philip and Antiochus had already made a pact to divide it amongst themselves. The legation was welcome to the Romans, seeking pretexts for war against Philip, who had plotted against them during the Punic war . . . Thus legates were sent who would warn Philip and Antiochus to keep away from Egypt. And M. Lepidus was sent to Egypt to see to the kingdom as the orphan’s tutor. While these events were proceeding, legates of king Attalus and the Rhodians came to Rome complaining of Philip’s offenses, and this ended all senatorial hesitation about a Macedonian war. Immediately, therefore, war was

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97 Robert Develin, “Pompeius Trogus and Philippic History” in Storia della storiografia 8 (1985): 110-15, 14: “So Trogus based his work on Greek events (and the east initially) and Greek authors, including Rome in that framework as it impinged upon the Greek world; hence early Roman history and events with no Greek connection had to be consigned separately to books 43 and 44.”
98 Justinus 30.1.10: Haec primo laborantis regiae tacita pestis et occulta mala fuere. “This rot within the faltering regime was at first silent and its ills concealed.” For the 5th Syrian War itself see 30.1.3-4.
declared against Philip on the pretext of coming to the aid of allies.\footnote{Justinus 30.2.8-30.3.6}

(Justinus 30.2.8-30.3.6)

The order of diplomatic contacts contradicts what we reconstruct from Livy and Polybius, yet we should note that Livy only implies that the Roman mission to Egypt was sent after the Rhodians and Pergamenes arrived at Rome and that the Egyptian delegates arrived later. Trogus’ version would make Livy’s manipulation even more striking, since the Romans are here in much more direct contact with Egypt and the pact directly prompts Roman policy. Regardless of the historical details, this later author of the Augustan age seems to have made a direct and forceful link between the Syro-Macedonian Pact, Roman protection of Egypt, and the war with Philip.\footnote{While it might be argued that Trogus merely followed Polybius as his source here and thus adds minimal value to the historical tradition, there has been much discussion over whether he primarily used Polybius or Timagenes, there is not sufficient evidence to decide, Develin, “Pompeius Trogus,” 7. Furthermore, those passages which do seem Polybian offer other details and are likely to have come from a synthesis of sources.}

In light of Polybius and Trogus’ testimony to the importance of the pact, as well as its historical reality, we are compelled to ask why Livy suppressed the Ptolemaic connection. The defense of an ally and child dependent on the \textit{fides} of the Roman people appears to be almost a tailor-made \textit{casus belli}, making the war against Philip not only acceptable but necessary. I suggest two complementary reasons, the first very much contemporary with Livy, the second an aspect of how the war progressed. Writing in the 20s BCE or thereafter under Augustus, Livy would have had to make his readers sympathize with a people that had just been successfully cast as an irreconcilably foreign and hostile enemy.\footnote{The best known examples of this portrayal, of course, come from the Actium scene on Aeneas’ shield in Aeneid 671-730 and Horace’s Ode 1.37. For the date of Livy’s first pentad and decade, which would have considerably antedated these books, see T.J. Luce, “The Dating of Livy’s First Decade” in \textit{TAPA} 96 (1965): 209-40; Paul Burton, \textit{The War against Philip}} More to the point, Augustus had seized Egypt
for his own in 30 and removed Cleopatra VII, thus completely extirpating the Ptolemaic line, Livy would have found it decidedly awkward to assert a great Republican tradition (for it did not end with the defeat of Philip), of protecting the Ptolemies. Beyond highlighting all the discontinuities that the princeps would prefer to cover over, for he went to great pains to make his rule appear a return to traditional Roman practices and values, Augustus would actually appear to have succeeded in the very crime which Antiochus and Philip had only plotted.

Moreover, that Trogus did make Egypt his focal point does not indicate that Livy would have been free to do so as well. Trogus’ program may have been to present the Greek historiographical tradition in Latin. Altering his Greek sources for Roman sensibilities would vitiate his project.\textsuperscript{102} He also wrote later, after Augustus’ regime had become well entrenched.\textsuperscript{103} This Roman historian of Gallic ancestry and his presumably like-minded readership had no problem seeing Rome as yet another in a series of world empires; Augustus himself even appears quite similar to all those conquest-driven monarchs who appeared before in Justinus 44.5.8.

Luckily, Livy found that the events themselves furnished a means of avoiding offense: the failure of Egypt may have begun, but did not long remain central to, the crisis which led to Roman domination of the east. The Romans tied Philip up in Greece and Roman propaganda adapted accordingly, with the slogan of freedom for the Greeks coming to dominate the discourse to such a degree that by war’s end Flamininus’ Isthmian Proclamation became emblematic of Rome’s eastern policy. Much more interested in mainland Greece than Egypt, Polybius himself had no trouble interpreting later Roman actions as stemming from a desire to free the Greeks, a program


\textsuperscript{103} Syme, “Trogus,” 367 identifies the receipt of Parthian hostages in 10 BCE as the last datable event.
which conveniently enough included Egypt. In the long term, this policy of Flamininus came
to overshadow Egypt, even providing the immediate pretexts for the later war with Antiochus,
and Livy’s manipulation might even have been rationalized away as a matter of passing detail,
compared to Rome’s worthy policy. It is to this policy we now turn.

**Flamininus and Freedom for the Greeks**

What Livy changed in making Athens the reason for war was not, from a Roman
perspective, its nature, but its particulars. Defending Egypt and a broad and prestigious array of
Greek states, very much at their invitation, against the unethical and patently aggressive designs
of two monarchs was almost ideal. It is with Flamininus’ canny, and sometimes duplicitous,
politicking and the apparent escalation of Roman demands that the presentation of this war as
simply more of the same appears open to doubt. One popular solution has been to see any
derparture as a reflection of Flamininus himself, either in an unusually “philhellenic” policy of
promoting *libertas* for the Greeks at every turn or thoroughly unprincipled skullduggery.
However, in light of changing scholarly opinion, we should not assume that Flamininus was
recognized as a Greek expert from his brief stay at Tarentum, nor should we suppose that the
sortition of provinces was rigged. Opinion has also moved on the idiosyncrasy of Flamininus’
policy: it is now recognized as that of the senate. Moreover, in spite of the contrast between
Flamininus’ diplomatic and Galba’s relatively harsh styles, we are not justified in taking the

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104 Pol. 18.46.14.
105 For a thought-provoking survey of Flamininus’ reception see Ernst Badian, “Titus Quinctius Flamininus:
Badian, “Flamininus.”
107 Dmitriev, *Greek Slogan*, 154-99, esp. 175-7: “The adoption of this new Roman policy toward the Greeks was
thus prompted not by Flamininus, as some have believed, but by the senators, who were the first of the Romans to
come up with the idea. The latter made its way into the senatus consultum that gave the Greeks both “freedom” and
the right to use their own laws.”
young consul’s insistence at Locris, when he first met Philip, that the king withdraw from Greece entirely as either an idiosyncratic improvisation or evidence that the senate had entrusted him with a mandate significantly different than Galba’s. As convincingly argued by Ferrary, this was merely the first time such a demand could have been presented to Philip in person, and the call for an enemy to vacate the lands of a third party was not some innovative benefaction, but a common tool used in aggressively expanding Rome’s area of influence. It should not be equated with later guarantees of freedom.  

The political use Flamininus made of this demand amongst the Greeks was new and developed in novel ways, but Ferrary’s emphasis on its gradual development cannot be ignored. These demands were, initially, those of individual allies, filtered through Roman authority. They had not yet coalesced into the Roman slogan of Greek freedom.

Rome’s demands of Philip grew as the war continued, but not from simple opportunism. The object behind forcing Philip to withdraw from Greece was to create a compliant Macedon, either unable or unwilling to risk harming Roman friends and allies, and this remained constant. Who those friends and allies were, and how much coercion the Romans judged necessary to achieve this goal, changed with the fortunes of war. Such was the content of the demands made to Nicanor at Athens in 200 BCE and in person at Abydos: Philip was to make war on none of the Greeks, including Ptolemy. Polybius 16.34 also had the Romans, speaking to Nicanor, demand that Philip submit to arbitration concerning reparations for Attalus and the Rhodians. In 198 BCE, Flamininus met the king for the first time and demanded that the he remove his

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108 Ferrary, *Philhellénism et Impérialism*, 60. “Nous sommes donc tenté de croire que l’évacuation par le roi de toutes ses possessions de Grèce, de Thrace et d’Asie, et la réduction do son royaume à la Macédoine propre, avaient été dès le début de la guerre l’objectif que s’était fixé le Sénat, et que Flamininus se trouva seulement être le premier général romain à rencontrer Philippe depuis le début des opérations.” For the demand itself, see 61-3.


110 Dmitriev, *Greek Slogan*, 176 is emphatic that this emerges at or after Cynoscephalae.
garrisons “from the cities,” *ex civitatibus*, apparently referring to all Greek states, even those in Asia Minor. \(^{111}\) When Philip proposed submitting to arbitration concerning reparations and give up the territory he had conquered, Livy has Flamininus escalate his demands beyond what was natural after hostilities had commenced:

> The consul said that this situation had no need for a judge or arbiter, for truly to whom was it not apparent that the injury had been perpetrated by the one who had made war first and, moreover, that Philip had resorted to violence when not under attack from anyone? After that, since it was simply a question of what cities were to be set free, the consul first named the Thessalians. Philip was set aflame with such indignation that he cried out “What more would you command me to do if I had been conquered?” \(^{112}\) (Livy 32.10.6-7)

This was no platform for negotiation, for Thessaly had long been a Macedonian possession; Flamininus’ goal was to put an end to Macedon’s imperial aspirations, yet it is worth considering whether previous demands were any more likely to be accepted. The ultimatum of 200 BCE, while not calling for such territorial concessions, would have forcibly removed Macedon from the international stage and practically made it a satellite of Rome.

> The point of Lepidus’ mission to Philip, the same point we see made by Flamininus’ actions, was to assert that Rome had a right and an ethical obligation to intervene on behalf of friends and allies. At this point in the war, because their worst fears had not materialized, we see the Romans assert a positive agenda. Athens had lost no territory, the Achaean and Aetolian leagues were not yet on Rome’s side, and the massive assault on the Ptolemaic kingdom which the Greek world feared had not occurred. Rome’s allies further east, Pergamum and Rhodes, might have been quite happy with a cessation of hostilities after the mixed, yet still damaging,

\(^{111}\) Briscoe, *Commentary* vol. 1, 186 points out that Diodorus 28.11 uses the same phrase which Pol. 18.1.13 uses in the context of a later meeting at Nicaea, (Livy 33.3), when Flamininus calls on Philip to relinquish his possessions in Asia Minor, implying that the actual demand was the same at both meetings.

\(^{112}\) Livy 32.10.6-7: *Consul nihil ad id quidem arbitro aut iudice opus esse dicere: cui enim non apparere ab eo qui prior arma intulisset iniuriam ortam, nec Philippum ab ulla lacesitum priorem vim omnibus fecisse? Inde cum ageretur quae civitates liberandae essent, Thessalos primos omnium nominavit consul. Ad id vero adeo accensus indignatione est rex ut exlcamaret ‘Quid victo gravius imperares, T. Quincti?’*
results of Philip’s Carian campaign and marauding through the Chersonese. The specifics were all in favor of one or another of Rome’s allies, and whether Rome obtained them was a measure of Roman fides. Yet, because of the area’s volatile politics and the novelty or informality of Roman ties with Greek states, the legitimacy of Rome’s presence could be called into question. Livy has both Lepidus and Flamininus deal with this problem by deriving a broader ethical mandate from the alleged injustice of Philip’s actions towards the ‘Greeks,’ just as the unjust and predatory behavior of the Samnites was a convenient corollary to Rome’s rationale for accepting the Capuan deditio. The usefully vague obligation which this claim makes would continue to draw Rome further into the Greek world, yet just as in the Samnite Wars, it was not a comfortable rationale, hence the persistence of the idea that Philip, and even Antiochus, aimed at an eventual invasion of Italy.

Once war got underway, the feared invasion was rendered completely impossible; it was only useful in driving the declaration of war and, perhaps, enthusiasm for the initial mobilization. As the threats confronting Rome became increasingly remote, more emphasis came to be placed on the benefits of Roman intervention, particularly in contrast to the manifest unreliability of Philip. If the Macedonian claimed Thessaly as his by right, this was a claim which his actions just after the meeting on the Aous directly undercut, for in his retreat he laid waste his own lands and, admittedly with some reluctance, demolished the towns of Phacium, Iresiae, Euhydrium, Eretria, and Palaepharsalus lest they fall into Roman hands. Readers might recall how Rome pardoned cities which surrendered to Hannibal out of necessity, and Livy makes much out the Thessalian sentiment that they could suffer little worse from their enemies than their allies.\textsuperscript{113} It

\textsuperscript{113} Contrast Livy 32.13.7: “Nor was there anything worse left that they could suffer at the hands of an enemy than what they had already suffered at the hands of their allies.” nec, quod ab hoste crudelius pati possent, reliqui quicquam fuit, quam quae ab sociis patiebantur, with Roman concern for Petelia in Livy 23.20. Philip V’s victimization of his own allies is also a curious parallel to Philip II in Justin 8.1-6.
is, however, not enough to point to Philip’s criminal behavior. It becomes increasingly important to show that the recipients of Roman goodwill actually desire it.\textsuperscript{114}

When the Achaean League expelled one of Philip’s chief supporters, Flamininus went to great lengths to demonstrate that Rome would be both more trustworthy and helpful to the Achaean League, promising to restore Corinth to the league, much as the Aetolians had been enticed into the First Macedonian War with the promise of Atintania.\textsuperscript{115} Bringing up the Achaean claim to Corinth cuts to the core of the relationship with Macedon and highlights Philip’s suspect behavior and failure to deliver on his promises, especially in not protecting Achaea from the Spartan tyrant Nabis. Achaea’s position was, however, quite difficult, and Livy’s Achaean are extremely ambivalent. In weighing their debts to the Antigonid house against their abandonment by Philip, they manage to preserve the appearance of good faith in defecting to the Romans:

However, the Achaean attitude was not exactly simple: the Spartan Nabis, a dangerous and relentless enemy; they dreaded Roman arms; they were indebted to the Macedonians because of old and new favors; they held the king himself suspect because of his cruelty and treachery and, not making their judgment based on his actions at that time, they realized he would be a harsher master after the war.\textsuperscript{116} (Livy 32.19.6)

Thus, pulled in different ways, public opinion divided, no one dares to offer an opinion after hearing from legates of the Romans, Attalus, the Rhodians, Philip, and the Athenians. The content of these various speeches can be assumed to be roughly the same as what has come before. The only actual speech which the reader encounters is that of the Achaean \textit{strategos} Aristaenus as he attempts to draw debate from the silence on such a contentious topic.

\textsuperscript{114} The degree of difference a Latin and an Umbrian might have felt a few centuries previous may be similar to what was found between, for example, an Italian and Greek at this time period. However, looking back from after the unification of Italy, it is much easier to see this as a natural process and elide the differences.

\textsuperscript{115} Livy 32.19.

\textsuperscript{116} Livy 32.19.6: \textit{Erat autem non admodum simplex habitus inter Achaeos animorum: terrebat Nabis Lacedaemonius, gravis et adsiduus hostis; horrebant Romana arma; Macedonum beneficiis et veteribus et recentibus obligati erant; regem ipsum suscipit habeant pro eius crudelitate perfidiaque, neque ex iis quae tum ad tempus faceret aessimantae graviorem post bellum dominum futurum cernebant.}
Aristaenus’ sentiments, presumably an expansive Livian reworking of Polybian material, are largely in favor of the Roman alliance on pragmatic grounds. He argues explicitly that allying with Rome is a necessity, and implicitly that, due to Philip’s poor behavior and failure to honor agreements, there is little faith to break with this king. Aristaenus emphasizes Philip’s absence, he sends only a legate, while the Roman fleet is present in full force “carrying with it the spoils of the cities of Euboea.” Later in his speech he lists a number of Philip’s defeats: the loss of Eretria, Carystum, almost all of Thessaly, Locris, Phocis, and the fact that Philip, driven even from the extremely defensible passes north of the Aous, appears unable to lift the siege of Elatia. The most remarkable indication of Philip’s weakness comes in his not seeking aid from Achaea, simply a promise that they will not join the attack against him:

The Romans, Rhodians, and Attalus seek our friendship and alliance in the war they wage against Philip and think they deserve our aid. Philip reminds us of our sworn alliance; he only demands that we stand with him and says he is satisfied so long as we take no part in it ourselves. Has it occurred to no one why those who are not yet our allies ask more of us than our ally? This is not Philip’s modesty or Roman impudence, my fellow Achaeans: Fortune gives credibility from those who make demands and takes it away. We see nothing of Philip beyond his legate, but the Roman fleet lies off Cenchreae with the spoils of Euboean cities, and we see the consul and his legions, separated from us only by a narrow body of water, overrunning Phocis and Locris. Do we wonder why Philip’s legate Cleomedon just asked so hesitantly that we take up arms against the Romans for the king? If, as stipulated in the treaty, the one he keeps saying it would be an impiety for us to break, we should ask him that Philip protect us from Nabis, the Spartans, and the Romans, he would be able to find neither garrison to guard us with nor any kind of response, no more, by Hercules, than Philip did last year. For, when by promising that he would wage war against Nabis, he had tried to draw our young men off into Euboea, after he saw that we did not assign him forces or want to be bound up in the Roman war, forgetful of the alliance which he now bandies about, he left our lands for Nabis and his Spartans to plunder and burn.

117 Livy 31.21.7: *urbium Euboeae spolia prae se ferens.*
118 Livy 32.21.10-16.
119 Livy 32.21.4-11: *Romani Rhodiique et Attalus societatem amicitiamque nostrum petunt et in bello quod adversus Philippum gerunt se a nobis adiuvari aequum censent. Philippus societatis secum admonet et iuris iurandi et modo postulat ut secum stemus, modo ne intersimus armis contentum ait se esse. Nulline venit in mentem cur qui nondum socii sunt plus petant quam socius? Non fit hoc neque modestia Philippi neque impudentia Romanorum, Achaei: fortuna et dat fiduciam postulantibus et demit. Philippi praeter legatum videmus nihil: Romana classis ad Cenchreas stat urbium Euboeae spolia prae se ferens, consulem legionesque eius, exiguo maris spatio diiunctas,
Philip’s lack of *fiducia*, confidence and courage, is on display in this passage and the common root is enough to bring *fides*, which he also lacks, to mind; with the following mention of Philip’s failure to aid the Achaeans against Sparta, allied cities which had been taken, and the king’s other defeats, it appears that the king himself has doubts not only about the outcome of the war but also on the strength of the treaty, both in its practicality and whether the Achaeans would even consider it still in effect. With a *praeteritio* that makes Philip’s lack of faith clear, Aristaenus implies that even the Achaean’s silence in this assembly is due to their own fear of the king, casting doubt on whether Philip had any genuine adherents at all.120

While Antigonus Doson did truly deserve their loyalty, under that king no such situation would come to pass, for Doson would never have made such impossible demands of his allies.121 Making clear that resistance to Rome, as well as Nabis, is completely untenable and framing the choice as one between safety and utter ruin, Aristaenus ends with Roman goodwill, repeating Rome’s propagandistic claims about the origin of the war:

You have long desired to free yourselves from Philip far more than you dare. The Romans crossed the Adriatic with a great fleet and army to liberate you without even any labor or danger to you. If you scorn having them as allies, you are insane! But it is necessary that you make them either allies or enemies.122

(Livy 32.21.36-7)

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120 In fact Philip proves quite perfidious not much later when, in 32.38-40 he hands over Argos and Corinth to Nabis, who commits a number of atrocities. Livy draws a fine contrast to end the book, with Nabis, (referred two as *tyrannus* rather than by name 13 out of 16 times in these three sections), coming surrounded by guards to meet Flamininus and Attalus, who stand unarmed, save with their dignity.

121 Livy 32.21.25.

122 Livy 32.21.36-7: *Liberare vos a Philippo iam diu magis vultis quam audetis. Sine vestro labore et periculo qui vos in libertatem vindicarent* cum *magnis classibus exercitibusque mare traiecerunt. Hos si socios aspernamini, vix mentis sanae estis; sed aut socios aut hostes habeatis oportet.*
Tempers ran high but most of the Achaeans voted for the Roman alliance, although the people of Dyme, Megalopolis, and some of the Argives walked out in protest. Livy’s Romans accept this with equanimity, recognizing these communities’ strong private ties and deep obligations to Macedon. Lest we take too cheery a picture of Roman foreign policy, we must note that the application of force is nowhere absent; the possibility of destruction and the Roman fleet loom throughout the speech, and such considerations likely featured even more prominently in Polybius’ version of the deliberations. However, Livy’s account is almost surely based upon Polybius, making clear the emphasis that the Romans placed upon their claims to have undertaken this war on behalf of allies, and then the Greeks more generally, and that this approach did resonate in Greece. Gruen has shown, and Dmitriev greatly elaborates on the idea, that Roman rhetoric builds upon the common Hellenistic claim to ‘liberate’ communities from the oppression of another power; the Romans consciously availed themselves of this rhetoric and, in any case, many Greeks surely interpreted it in this way.123 This is in no way inconsistent with Romans’ own idea, seen throughout their consolidation of Italy and even the capture of Syracuse, that their dominance secured a favorable compromise between peace and liberty for their subjects.124

Skipping ahead to the conference with Philip at Nicaea, we find the Romans progressing not just in the war, but in their self-presentation before the Greeks. Although Livy admits suspicions that Flamininus put his own interests over those of the state, the Roman still makes a better showing than the manipulative Philip in asserting Rome’s obligation to its allies and

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123 Dmitriev, *Greek Slogan*, part 1, 1-141, chronicles the development of this slogan, along with the often illusory idea of a “common peace” in Greek politics up through the successors.

124 Rome’s alliance with the Boeotians is secured in a similar way. Flamininus and Attalus actually bring Aristaenus along and he gives much the same speech following a carefully staged Roman show of force. Flamininus speaks last, Livy 33.2.5: *Pauca ab ipso Quinctio adiecta, fidem magis Romanam quam arma aut opes extollente verbis.*
recognition of the need to acquire significant concessions on their behalf. At both the Aous and Nicaea, Flamininus further extended Rome’s interest in the Greeks’ libertas, but in neither case did the specific terms form the Romans’ chief concern. As we have seen, once Philip violated Roman fides all ties were severed and the Romans had a free hand; where Philip saw outcomes defined in terms of the status quo ante, the Romans regarded that condition as no longer relevant and were willing to go however far they must to make sure that the king would not be in a position to break faith again. The consul insisted in both cases that Roman demands were simple: the evacuation of Greece, reparations to Attalus, and a guarantee of safety for Ptolemy. When Greek ambassadors met with the senate, a new wrinkle was added, the so-called three fetters. These three cities, Demetrias, Chalcis, and Acrocorinth, which could be used to cut off traffic by sea. The way Livy has senatorial concern for these cities arise organically from discussion with the Greek ambassadors furthers the impression that the Romans’ true goal was that Greece be free.

Flamininus took the lead in negotiations and even had to, at Philip’s insistence, meet apart from the allies at Nicaea. Still, these allies were consulted in all proceedings, even before the senate, and their demands remained integral to any possible set of terms. Even at their

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125 This comes in his granting the talks and then convincing his allies to allow an proposal they do not support to be sent to the senate in order to gain time as we see in Livy 32.32.6-7: gravate regi concessum est, non quin cuperet Quinctius per se partim armis, partim condicionibus conquestum videri bellum: necdum enim sciebat utrum successor sibi alter ex novis consulibus mitteretur an, quod summa vi ut tenderent amicis et propinquis mandaverat imperium prorogaretur. This sort of behavior is, however, a standard behavior of Roman magistrates, exhibited even by Scipio. Livy does not take up the Polybian suggestion of 18.18.7 that Flamininus was not entirely forthright with the allies, or his poor behavior in 18.7.

126 Livy 32.37.1-4: “When they reached Rome the allies’ legates were heard first, then those of the king. The rest of their address was taken up in reproaches toward the king. They especially moved the senate by illustrating the lay of the land and sea so that it was apparent to all that if the king kept hold of Demetrias in Thessaly, Chalcis in Euboea, and Corinth in Achaea, Greece could not be free and Philip himself was no more inflammatory than correct in calling these the fetters of Greece.” Ut ventum Romam est, prius sociorum legati quam regis auditi sunt. Cetera eorum oratio conviciis regis consumpta est: moverant eo maxime senatum demonstrando maris terrarumque regionis eius situm ut omnibus appareret si Demetriadem in Thessalia, Chalcidem in Euboea, Corinthum in Achaia rex teneret, non posse liberram Graeciam esse et ipsum Philippum non contumeliosius qua verius compedes eas Graeciae appellare. Livy’s use of cetera here implies that he has skipped neatly over the content of their speeches as presented in his source.
angriest, the Aetolians admitted that the Flamininus allowed them a proper role in negotiations. The ostensible goal of any settlement was, as Livy has Amynander put it that “the peace had to be composed so that even with the Romans absent, Greece would be powerful enough to protect the peace and freedom at the same time.” There was nothing new in this presentation of the war or the stated desire for the minimum Roman presence necessary. Contention arose not over these goals but over how to achieve them, with the Aetolians advocating the assassination or expulsion of Philip as the only means of securing Greek liberty. Flamininus’ response that such a suggestion contravened the most fundamental of Roman values, meeting an enemy in open combat and showing clemency at the first opportunity, put an end to the argument. The true source of Aetolian anger becomes clear in the actual meeting with Philip, in which they laid claim to a number of towns directly from the king and Flamininus intervened on the grounds that these surrendered and were not, therefore, to be treated as booty:

Although Philip seemed to have stunned his bitterest enemies into silence, Phaeneas the Aetolian, while all others remained silent, asked “What? Philip, are you at last going to return Pharsalus, Larisa, Cremaste, Echinum, and Phthiotic Thebes to us?” When Philip said he was not stopping them from reclaiming them, a quarrel broke out between the Aetolians and the Roman commander over Thebes. Quinctius asseverated that it belonged to the Roman people by right of war because the Thebans, when the army had been brought against them territory and their lands were still intact, had been called upon to join amicitia with Rome but, even though they had the power to defect from the king, preferred to be his ally rather than the Romans. (Livy 33.13.5-8)

127 Livy 33.12.3.
128 Livy 33.12.2: *ita componendam pacem esse ut Graecia etiam absentibus Romanis satis potens tuendae simul pacis libertatisque esset*.
129 Polybius presents us with a far different Flamininus, one with no compunction about assassination in 18.43.7-12 when, after the war, pro-Roman Boeotians, fearing a resurgence in Philip’s strength while war looms with Antiochus, attempt to gain his support for the murder of Brachylles. The Roman merely attempts to retain plausible deniability and the incident provokes a serious backlash against the Romans. In Livy’s version 33.27-28 the threat posed by Philip to the pro-Roman elites is heightened and Philip’s men insult the Flamininus, but Livy suppresses the possibility that he knew anything at all about the plot. See Briscoe, *Commentary* vol. 1, 301. Polybius’ version does not imply a different Roman presentation of the war, just that Flamininus did not live up to his own values.
130 Livy 33.13.5-8: *Quamquam vel inimicissimis omnibus praeclusisse vocem videbat, Phaeneas tamen Aetolus cunctis tacentibus ‘Quid? Nobis’ inquit, ‘Philippe, reddisse tandem Pharsalum et Larisam Cremasten et Echinum et Thebas Phthias?’ Cum Philippus nihil morari diceret quo minus recipierent, disceptatio inter imperatorem Romanum et Aetolos orta est de Thebis; nam eas populi Romani iure belli factas esse Quinctius dicebat, quod
Polybius’ version differs slightly, with Flamininus giving the Aetolians Phthiotic Thebes because this city offered resistance when the Romans approached.\textsuperscript{131} The important point is that Polybius, and through him Livy, portray this as a principled stand against Aetolian predation welcomed by all the other Greeks. Handing over Phthiotic Thebes in Polybius’ version complicates and renders the point less edifying, but that author’s goal was to provide Greek statesmen with illustrative examples of how to deal with the Romans.\textsuperscript{132} Flamininus may have been over-eager to secure the glory of the war for himself by making peace, but the terms on which he was willing amply demonstrate that the goal the Romans eventually fixed upon, Greek freedom, was no specious pretext.

Flamininus’ commitment to this program is nowhere more evident than in his proclamation at the Isthmian games that the Romans would leave Greece free, without garrisons, and not under any obligation of tribute. Polybius gives Flamininus’ pronouncement:

“The Roman senate and the consul Titus Quinctius, having defeated king Philip and the Macedonians, set Corinth, Phocis, Locri, Euboea, the Phthiotic Achaeans, Magnesians, Thessalians, and Perhaebians without garrison or tribute, free under their own ancestral laws.”\textsuperscript{133} (Pol. 18.46.5)

Livy translates this with only slight alterations.\textsuperscript{134} In discussing the arrival of the decemvirs with the senatus consultum arranging affairs in Greece, Polybius makes clear that only the Aetolians were dissatisfied and that they were the source of the confusion and skepticism about whether

\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{integris rebus exercitu ab se adnomo vocati in amicitiam, cum potestas libera desciscendi ab rege esset, regiam societatem Romanae praeposissent.}
\item Polybius 18.38.5.
\item Pol. 18.46.5: \textit{Ἡ σύγκλητος ἡ Ῥωμαίων καὶ Τίτος Κοΐντιος στρατηγὸς ἀφιᾶσιν ἐλευθέρους, ἀφρουρήτους, ἀφορολογήτους, νόμοις χρωμένους τοῖς πατρίοις, Κορινθίους, Φοκέας, Λοκρούς, Εὐβοεῖς, Αχαιοὺς τοὺς Φθιώτας, Μάγνητας, Θετταλούς, Περραιβούς.}
\item Livy 33.32.5: “The Roman senate and the commander T. Quinctius, with Philip and the Macedonians defeated, order that the following be free, subject to no tribute, and at liberty to use their ancestral laws: Corinth, the Phocians and Locrians, the island of Euboea, the Magnesians, Thessalians, Perrhaebians, and Phthiotic Achaeans” \textit{Senatus Romanus et T. Quinctius imperator Philippo rege Macedonibusque deuitcis liberos, immunes, suis legibus esse iubet Corinthis, Phocenses, Locresesque omnes et insulam Euboeeam et Magnetas, Thessalos, Perrhaebos, Achaeos Phthiotas.} “ Percensuerat omnes gentes quae sub dicione Philippi regis fuerant.
\end{itemize}
the Romans would actually leave Greece free.\textsuperscript{135} We should also note that the \textit{senatus consultum} is quite specific, making it extremely difficult to interpret this policy as the result of the idiosyncratic philhellenism of one man. The \textit{decemvirs} do offer some resistance, prior to the Isthmian proclamation, on whether to evacuate Corinth, but this comes in the context of an expected Seleucid invasion.\textsuperscript{136} For this reason, and because it is perfectly in line with previous Roman actions, the freedom of Greece has to be seen simply as Roman policy.

The way Rome sold this war abroad, and even seem to have conceived of it themselves, was spectacularly successful. Most impressive is that Polybius himself, skeptical about Flamininus’ character and deeply critical of some Roman actions, believed it wholeheartedly:

\begin{quote}
Although the elation seems extreme, one might confidently declare that it was much less than the import of the event deserved. For it was incredible that the Romans and their commander Titus incurred every expense and danger for this cause, the freedom of the Greeks. It was important that that they raised a force suitable for their mission, and most impressive that no misfortune stood in the way of their endeavor, but everything led naturally to this one moment, with the result that with one pronouncement all Greeks, in both Asia and Europe, were set free without garrisons or tribute, and left to their own laws.\textsuperscript{137} (Pol. 18.46.13-15)
\end{quote}

This despite the fact, which he notes in 18.45.12, that Flamininus had been granted leave to do as he saw fit regarding the “three fetters” and maintained their garrisons because the threat of Antiochus crossing to Europe. To Polybius, and seemingly many other Greeks, the presence of these troops did not present any grave contradiction of Rome’s policy and, in fact, represents its

\begin{footnotes}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Polybius 18.45.
\item So similar are Roman actions at the end of the Second Macedonian and the Illyrian wars that it requires a touch of special pleading to even see this as a contentious issue doggedly pursued by a philhellenic faction in the senate. Even granting that some Scipionic faction lobbied for maintaining an armed presence in Greece, this would have been a temporary measure to do with an imminent threat from Antiochus, not the settlement to determine the political character of Greece.
\item Polybius 18.46.13-15: δοκούσης δὲ τῆς εὐχαριστίας ὑπερβολικῆς γενέσθαι, θαρρῶν ἄν τις εἶπε διότι πολὺ καταδεικτέραν εἶναι συνέβαινε τοῦ τῆς πράξεως μεγέθους, θαυμαστόν γὰρ ἦν καὶ τὸ Ῥωμαίους ἐπὶ ταύτης γενέσθαι τῆς προαιρέσεως καὶ τὸν ἡγούμενον αὐτῶν Τίτον, ὅστε πᾶσαν ὑπομεῖναι δαπάνην καὶ πάντα κίνδυνον χάριν τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερίας: μέγα δὲ καὶ τὸ δύναμιν ἀκόλουθον τῇ προαιρέσει προσενέγκασθαι· τούτου δὲ μέγιστον ἔτι τὸ μηδὲν ἐκ τῆς τύχης ἀντιτάσσαται πρὸς τῆς ἐπιβολῆς, ἀλλ’ ἰσχυρὸς ἀπαντα πρὸς ἕνα καρον ἐκδόρμησιν, ὅστε διὰ κηρύγματος ἐνός ἀπαντα καὶ τοὺς τὴν Ἀσίαν κατοικοῦντας Ἑλλήνας καὶ τοὺς τὴν Εὐρώπην ἐλευθέρους, ἀφοροιήτους, ἀφορολογήτους γενέσθαι, νόμοις χρωμένους τοῖς ἰδίοις.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotes}
continuation, for Rome’s commitments to Greece had grown rapidly since 201BCE. A war based around the “complaints of allies,” with a less openly acknowledge helping of revenge (also an honorable motive), broadened into assumed stewardship of the Greeks’ liberty. As this naturally, by Greek as much as Roman initiative, came to include Greek cities in Asia Minor and the Romans came to be in the same position relative to Antiochus that they had held with reference to Philip just a few years previously.

138 See Gruen, *Hellenistic World*, 529 ff.: “To treat the Hellenic states of the Aegean and Anatolia as an expanding collection of Roman friends and allies puts the matter back to front. Emphasis again belongs on the Greek perspective. Jealous rivalries and armed contests had carved up Asia Minor long before the arrival of Rome. . . . Tempestuous Asia and the islands off its shores slowly drew Rome into the vortex. Initiative and occasion repeatedly came from the East. The cities and states of the area prodded the Republic to advance their causes, sheltered themselves behind her might, or exploited her prestige to tip the balance in their quarrels. Hellenic circumstances generated the involvement of Rome-and Hellenic ingenuity endeavored to sustain it.”
Chapter 6

Rome and Antiochus III

The war between Rome and Antiochus III, declared in 192 BCE after Antiochus landed in mainland Greece, was the result of hegemonic rivalry between Rome and the Seleucid Empire. Rome had humbled Macedon, leaving the Seleucid Empire as the only other great power in the Mediterranean. Rome’s newfound stake in Greece put it at odds with Antiochus, making Greece and Asia Minor the theater in which these two states’ differences would be settled, and from which a new Mediterranean balance of power emerge. While both powers argued from principles such as Greek freedom and ancestral rights, these were political tools each state used to attempt to obtain security against the other. Such is Eckstein’s explanation of this war, which Badian had interpreted in light of the modern Cold War, and Grainger saw as the inevitable confrontation of two expansionist powers.1 We shall see that, although this conflict may have been inevitable, the Roman tradition stresses Rome’s forbearance and repeated attempts at a diplomatic resolution of the conflict. When war does break out, the Romans cast it as a result, not of desire for power or gain, but of their own resolute adherence to the principle of Greek freedom and fides towards

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1 Eckstein, Greek East, Ch. 8, esp. 315: “... the prime cause was the uncertain hierarchy of power and status in a system of states that had undergone increasingly severe disruption since 207. That system of states was now undergoing a transformation both in form and simultaneously in scale (a transformation into a new, Mediterranean-wide scale.) Interviews between Roman representatives and Antiochus or his envoys down to 193 failed to clarify the boundaries of power between the two states, or to resolve the issue of hierarchy, and so the crisis intensified. The problem was that Antiochus’ territorial claims were rapidly expanding, but the Romans wanted limits set upon his conduct with regard to their own expanded sphere of influence.” See Ernst Badian, “Rome and Antiochus the Great: A Study in Cold War” in CPh 54 (1959): 81-99; Grainger, Roman War.
their allies. As we should now expect, they portray their enemies, Antiochus and the Aetolians, as characteristically untrustworthy and opportunistic.

**Diplomacy with Antiochus during the Second Macedonian War**

Between 202 and 199 BCE Antiochus took control of Coele Syria, which he had lost to Ptolemy IV at the Battle of Raphia in 217 BCE. Antiochus may have even been contemplating invading Egypt itself. The Romans were concerned, for Polybius tells us that the same Roman diplomatic mission that delivered the conditional declaration of war to Philip in 200 BCE had also been charged with attempting to mediate between Ptolemy and Antiochus. This is conspicuous testimony that Rome was not just alarmed by Philip’s marauding, but the broader Mediterranean instability occasioned by Egypt’s faltering and the Syro-Macedonian Pact. That Antiochus did not march on Alexandria may indicate a Roman diplomatic success. Although Antiochus had been busy while Rome and its coalition of Greek states combatted Philip, Livy pays little attention to his activities until Attalus sends to Rome in 198 BCE seeking permission to withdraw from that war to defend Pergamum against the Seleucid monarch. This episode’s historicity, once subject to debate, is now generally accepted. Grainger, however, contends that...

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2 Pol. 16.18-19, 16.39 testify to a major battle and the siege and capture of Gaza by Antiochus, but are far from a complete account and do little to indicate their context within the campaign. See Walbank, *Commentary* vol. 2, 523-5, 546-7. See also Appian *Mac*. 4, *Syr*. 1, which mistakenly names the relevant Ptolemy Philopater instead of Epiphanies; Justin 30.3.3 and 31.1.2;
3 Livy 33.41.1-5; Grainger, *Roman War*, 30, believes such an invasion was too daunting, but Eckstein, *Greek East*, 308ff, makes a plausible case, especially in light of Antiochus’ abortive attempt in 196 BCE.
4 Pol. 16.27.5. Polybius does not mention this part of their mission in the context of the meeting at Abydos, and so Livy, omitting the Nicanor episode, makes no mention of it. He does, however, include Egypt on their itinerary in 31.2.3, but the only mention of Antiochus in Book 31 is in 31.14.5.
5 See Eckstein, *Greek East*, 309-11; Gruen, *Hellenistic World*, 612-17 for the Antiochus’ expansionist aims. On 616 Gruen thus describes Roman interest: “The Republic sought to reassure itself that a conflagration in the Near East would not spread to the Aegean world and thus complicate immeasurably the efforts to roll back the gains of Philip V.” Gruen stresses that “Antiochus’ imperialist appetite was insatiable,” (612) and sees Roman concerns as valid, although the threat was distant. Now that we know, and since the Romans knew, that Antiochus’ campaigns were not just a complicating factor, but intimately connected with Philip’s, their concerns appear much more acute.
6 Eckstein, *Greek East*, 311, suggests that it was for this Antiochus was declared a friend and ally of the Roman people, as he is referred to in Livy 32.8.13.
7 Livy 32.8.9-16. No Polybian mention survives.
Attalus was a subordinate ally of Antiochus and that he thus misrepresented Antiochus’ actions to avoid the costs of the war, or perhaps to leverage Rome against Antiochus in pursuit of his own independence.⁸ Yet the case for Attalus’ subordination is weak and, in light of the Syro-Macedonian Pact’s intent, it is possible that Attalus feared that Antiochus, unopposed by Egypt or Macedon, would turn towards Pergamum.⁹

The king’s request is, on the face of it, quite odd, for it first raises the possibility that the Romans would continue to use his troops against Philip but send their own against Antiochus:

The consuls then presented legates of king Attalus to the senate. These declared that the king was aiding Rome with his fleet and all his forces on land and sea and that up to that day he had promptly and obediently done whatever the Roman consuls commanded as soon as they gave the order. Yet they said the king feared lest he could no longer excel in their service because of Antiochus, for Antiochus had invaded his realm, empty as it was of land and naval forces. Thus Attalus begged the *patres* that, if they wished to use his aid for the Macedonian war, they would themselves send a force to secure his kingdom. If they did not wish to do this, that they allow him to return and defend his lands with his fleet and remaining forces.¹⁰ (Livy 32.8.9-11)

Livy makes Attalus a model of how the Romans thought their foreign allies should behave:

Attalus deferentially seeks Roman help, Antiochus, an *amicus* of Rome, yields before Roman *maiestas*, and Attalus then gives his thanks. The tenor of Attalus’ appeal, whether or not the content is accurate, shows that the king had quickly learned the Romans’ preferred script.

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⁹ John Ma, *Antiochus III and the Cities of Western Asia Minor* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999): 81 treats the episode as fact and Briscoe, *Commentary* vol. 1: 183 sides with Badian, “Cold War,” against Holleaux, *Études* vol. 3, 331-5; *Roman War*, 30-35; The argument for Attalus’ subordinate status comes on p. 18 n.39, which cites *OGIS* 236 and 240 (= *I Perg. 189, 182*), Pergamene statue bases dedicated to Zeuxis and Antiochus dated to 205, a slender thread on which to hang the sovereignty of the kingdom. Curiously, Eckstein, *Greek East*, makes no mention of this incident, but 310 n.10 cites Grainger for this period, although 195-8 and his political narrative more broadly would rule out any such relationship after 200 BCE even if it existed previously.
¹⁰ Livy 32.8.9-11: *Attali deinde regis legatos in senatum consules introduxerunt. Ii regem classe sua copiisque omnibus terra marique rem Romanam iuvare quaeque imperarent Romani consules impigre atque oboedienter ad eam diem fecisse cum exposuissent, vereri dixerunt ne id praestare ei per Antiochum regem ultra non liceret: vacuum namque praesidiis navalibus terrestribusque regnum Attali Antiochum invasisse. Itaque Attalum orare patres conscriptos, si sua classi suaque opera uti ad Macedonicum bellum vellent, mitterent ipsi prae sidium ad regnum eius tutandum; si id nollent, ipsum ad sua defendenda cum classe ac reliquis copiis redire paterentur.*
As Burton has shown with other examples, the Pergamene relationship with Rome was conceived of and expressed through a history of loyalty, cooperation towards shared ends, and mutual benefaction. The legates highlight the reciprocity of their relationship by deferentially listing Attalus’ services in a way that reinforces the Romans’ sense of hierarchy. By emphasizing Rome’s power to choose but presenting two choices, one of them quite unattractive, they obtain leave to withdraw from the war, diplomatic aid, and an idealized restatement of the basis of the relationship. Like the similar Ptolemaic “offer” to aid Athens at the beginning of the Second Macedonian War, this appeal succeeds by reminding the Romans of their obligations by providing them, and Livy, the opportunity to demonstrate their good faith.

The senate’s language toward Antiochus makes clear that it expected Antiochus to subordinate his own interests to his relationship with Rome:

The senate responded to the legates, saying that they were grateful that Attalus had aided the Roman generals with his fleet and other forces, but would not themselves send forces against Antiochus, a friend and ally of the Roman people, nor would they hold Attalus’ forces longer than was convenient for him. They affirmed that Roman people always made use of others according to those others’ consent and that the beginning and end of it was as at the discretion of those by whom the Romans were aided. They would send legates to Antiochus who would announce that the Roman people were making use of the effort of Attalus, his fleet, and his armies against their common enemy Philip and that Antiochus would do well by the senate if he were to stay away from Attalus’ kingdom and cease making war upon him. It was right that kings who were allies and friends of the Roman people maintain peace amongst themselves. (Livy 32.8.12-16)

11 Burton, *Friendship*, 84-87 focuses on cooperation in the First Macedonian War. His interpretation of this episode, 105-7, however, takes insufficient account of strategic factors: “The all-powerful ruler of the East, who now called himself “the Great,” would have had every reason to take advantage of Rome’s preoccupation, and give in to his “insatiable imperialist appetite” if all he was motivated by was self-interest, and his calculus was driven by the Realist imperatives of the international system. Rather than indulge in pure speculation because Antiochus’ behavior cannot be explained in Realist terms, we should accept the verdict of the ancient sources: Antiochus complied with Rome’s request because his obligations arising from *amicitia* compelled him to do so.” See also 339-40. This analysis treats power politics as the almost mechanical action of the basest unreflective animal instincts. Burton is quite right to highlight the moral force of relations such as *amicitia*, but this appears to reflect a Roman viewpoint to which astute foreigners like Attalus could adapt their behavior rather than the defining principle of this period’s international politics.

12 Livy 32.8.12-16: *Senatus legatis ita responderi iussit: quod rex Attalus classe copiisque aliis duces Romanos iuvisset, id gratum senatui esse: auxilia nec ipsos missuros Attalo adversus Antiochum, socium et amicum populi Romani, nec Attali auxilia retenturos ultra quam regi commodum esset; semper populum Romanum alienis rebus
Despite the blunt assertion of superiority, Rome’s position was even weaker than it appears, for Livy’s exaggerates in describing Antiochus as an ally rather than merely an informal amicus.13 We have no Seleucid reply, but in 32.27 we find Attalus dedicating a golden crown on the Capitoline because “Antiochus, persuaded by the authority of the Roman legates had withdrawn his army beyond Attalus’ borders.”14 Whether or not the threat had been as serious as Attalus indicated, he could reasonably entertain anxieties over Antiochus’ intentions and this narrative served the Romans too well to question.15 And, while Antiochus probably cared little for the Romans’ imperious tone, their mission signaled that attacking Pergamum would immediately make him the enemy of the entire coalition opposing Philip. Antiochus had no reason to pick this fight, for there were plenty of attractive targets.

After Cynoscephalae, Livy begins to shift his focus from Philip to Antiochus, linking the upcoming war to the Second Macedonian War and saddling Antiochus with responsibility in a way that makes these wars’ timing appear providential:16

The end of the Second Punic War did not come at a more opportune time, lest it had been necessary to wage war simultaneously with Philip, than Philip’s defeat, since Antiochus was already stirring up war from Syria. For, beyond that it was easier to combat them singly than if they had joined forces, Spain also rose up in war at around the same time with a great tumult.17 (Livy 33.19.6-7)
The supposition that the two kings were working in concert and would join forces against Rome further supports Livy’s belief in the Syro-Macedonian Pact, and Livy glosses over the intervening six years to interpret the war declared with Antiochus in 192 BCE as the result of a program of conquest begun by the king in 203/2 BCE. By treating the war as Antiochus’ ultimate aim, Livy can credit Roman diplomacy with its deferral; focusing on Antiochus’ initiative also makes it easier to pass over the Aetolians’ role in stirring up the war and their quarrels with Rome. Livy thus positions Antiochus as a willful and provocative enemy of Rome years prior to the outbreak of war. His readers, knowing that war will break, are primed to interpret it as the result of the king’s consciously chosen expansionist policy.

After this programmatic introduction we learn that Antiochus had spent the previous year taking Coele Syria from Ptolemy before retiring to Antiochia to prepare massive armies for further campaigning. In the spring of 197 BCE he sent his two sons to besiege Sardis while he proceeded along the southern coast of Turkey, subduing Cilicia, Lycia, and Caria, further Ptolemaic possessions. Most surprisingly, Livy explicitly credits the idea, somewhat fanciful after Philip withdrew from Asia Minor, that Antiochus was moving to aid Macedon. The reason Antiochus gave for his campaigns, reclaiming his ancestral lands (in formulam antiquam imperii redigere), does not appear until 33.38.1, making simple opportunism the apparent motivation. The Rhodians opposed Antiochus as he progressed along the southern coast of Turkey, and Livy effusively interprets this act as a paradigmatic example of good fides:

Because of their fides towards Rome and the entire Greek people, the Rhodians dared many admirable deeds on land and sea, but none was more marvelous than that, not cowed by the magnitude of the war then bearing down upon them, they sent legates to the Antiochus warning that he not pass the Cilician promontory of Chelidon, which is famous from the ancient treaty between the Athenians and

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18 For a detailed account of this campaign and reconciling Livy and Hieronymus In Dan. 11.15 (= Porphyrius FGrH 260, F 46), which gives a different order of conquest, see Grainger 2002 36-51; Ma 1999: 82-89.
19 Livy 33.19.11.
Persians. The Rhodians said that they would oppose Antiochus if he did not hold his fleet and army back before this boundary, not because of any antipathy, but in order to not allow him to join forces with Philip and thus stand in the way of the Roman liberation of Greece.\(^20\) (Livy 33.20.1-3)

Antiochus’ response was to reassure the Rhodians that they had nothing to fear from him and that he would not throw away his *amicitia* with the Romans, citing the return of his legates from Rome with an honorific decree of the senate. While these discussions were ongoing, news of Cynoscephalae arrived quite opportunely:

This news released the Rhodians from fear of Philip and they gave up their plan of opposing Antiochus, but they did not abandon their other concern, guarding the freedom of those cities allied to Ptolemy which Antiochus menaced with war. They aided some with garrisons, others by anticipating and warning them of the enemy’s attempts, and were responsible for the liberty of the Caunians, Myndians, Halicarnasians, and Samians.\(^21\) (Livy 33.20.10-12)

A fragment of Polybius, 18.41a, confirms that Livy followed Polybius here, and Polybius in turn seems to be following a pro-Rhodian account. That this presentation of Rhodian actions focuses on Rome dates it to the aftermath of the war, either when Rhodian ambassadors to the senate affirmed their loyalty and took Lycia as their reward, or when these claims were rehashed during Rhodes’ fall from grace a quarter-century later. In fact, it masks Rhodes own imperial agenda, for Grainger rightly calls the agreement reached with Antiochus “a division of the spoils.”\(^22\)

\(^20\) Livy 33.20.1-3: *Multa egregie Rhodii pro fide erga populum Romanum proque universo nomine Graecorum terra marique ausi sunt, nihil magnificentius quam quod ea tempestate non territi tanta mole imminentis belli legatos ad regem miserunt ne Chelidonias-promunturium Ciliciae est, includum foedere antiquo Atheniensium cum regibus Persarum-superaret: si eo fine non contineret classem copiasque suas, se obviam ituros, non ab odio ullo sed ne coniungi eum Philippo paterentur et impedimento esse Romanis liberantibus Graeciam.*

\(^21\) Livy 33.20.10-12: *Hoc nuntio accepto Rhodii dempto metu a Philippo omiserunt consilium obviam eundi classe Antiocho: illam alteram curam non omiserunt tuendae libertatis civitatum sociarum Ptolomaei quibus bellum ab Antiocho imminebat. Nam alias auxiliis iuverunt, alias providendo ac praemonendo conatus hostis, causaque libertatis fuerunt Cauniis Myndiis Halicarnassensibus Samiisque.*

\(^22\) Pol. 18.41a.1: *κωλύειν δὲ τὸν Ἀντίοχον παραπλεῖν, οὐκ ἀπεχθείας χάριν, ἀλλ’ ύφορώμενοι μὴ Φιλίπποι συνεπισχύσας ἐμπόδιον γένηται τῇ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερίᾳ. Walbank, Commentary vol. 2, 602-3, believes that Livy has here converted a Polybian inference into fact. For the Rhodian attribution see Briscoe, Commentary vol. 1, 286; Grainger, Roman War, 42; Eckstein, Greek East, 185; H.R. Rawlings, “Antiochus the Great and Rhodes 197-191 B.C.” in AJAH 1 (1976): 2-28.
The agreement between Rhodes and Antiochus is better interpreted as a *modus vivendi*, with the Rhodians compensated by Antiochus for acquiescence, but ultimately put in a constrained strategic position by the king’s territorial gains.\(^\text{23}\) Antiochus’ advance directly threatened to isolate Rhodes and, should he have joined with Philip, the worst-case scenario of the pact would not have been far off. The Rhodians thus had every reason to fear Antiochus and take desperate measures, and we should not suppose that they actually courted annihilation at the hands of Antiochus the Great because of abstract loyalty to a far-off power of brief acquaintance or because of the slogan of freedom. They used Rome as a deterrent to Antiochus, for they had little else in their inventory. Later they were able to reinterpret this act, undertaken for their own security and territorial gain, and flatter the Romans. Knowing that Rhodes did take Rome’s side, Livy thus displays this as an example of traditional Roman reciprocal *fides*: the Rhodians took a significant risk, seemingly on the Romans’ behalf, and the Romans exerted themselves in support of their loyal allies. When the Romans accepted this interpretation presented to them by the Rhodians, the bond of *fides* became real, and the Romans were more obliged to oppose Antiochus.

Livy cut short his account of Antiochus’ campaign after mentioning the communities “protected” by Rhodes, saying “There is no need to follow all that was done in this area, since I can scarcely cover what is germane to the Roman war.”\(^\text{24}\) Nevertheless, Antiochus’ campaign was of great significance, for he took Iasus, Euromus, and Pedasa, cities which the Romans declared an interest in freeing from Philip, and the king’s securing Ephesus as a base of

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24 Livy 33.20.13: *Non opera est persequi ut quaeque acta in his locis sint, cum ad ea quae propria Romani belli sunt viis sufficiam.* See Tränkle, *Livius*, 74-5, esp. n.10; Hermann Tränkle, “Beobachtungen und Erwägungen zum Wandel der livianische Sprache” in *Wiener Studien* 81 (1968): 103-52, 136-7 links this problem of scope to an increasing terseness in Livy; Briscoe, *Commentary* vol. 1, 288 sees this instead as Livy’s struggle with the scope of his work: “L. was writing the history of Rome, not the whole Hellenistic world (cf. also viii.24.18, xxxv.40.1). But these comments should be seen more as a sign of L.’s desperation of living to complete his work than of a lack of interest in non-Roman matters.”
operations was a significant strategic advance. We shall see that Livy focuses attention on specific friends and allies to the detriment of the broader strategic situation because the Romans could only claim to speak on behalf of these communities; this was particularly relevant because the diplomatic wrangling leading up to the war revolved around the legitimacy of Roman and Seleucid patronage of various Greek states. These relationships shaped Roman military actions and the post-war settlement of Greece and Asia Minor in a simple way that has not been fully recognized. The Romans did not cynically abandon the Isthmian Proclamation and the slogan of Greek freedom by rewarding allies with territory, but instead conceptualized Greek freedom and their objectives in terms of upholding the status and furthering the interest of those with whom they were already involved.

The Diplomatic Confrontation with Antiochus: Isthmia and Lysimachia

Concluding the war with Philip both freed and forced Rome to define relations with Antiochus and to take a stance on the contested areas of Asia Minor. Up until this point communications with Antiochus had remained friendly and non-confrontational, but the Isthmian Proclamation and the Romans’ grant of freedom to the Greeks made the two states’ conflict of interest explicit. It is no surprise then that Flamininus and the decemvirs’ first act was to meet Antiochus’ ambassadors, Hegesianax and Lysias:

After the Isthmian Games, Quinctius and the decemvirs heard the legates of various kings, peoples, and states. King Antiochus’ legates were summoned first. Although they spouted nearly the same insincere words they had spoken at Rome, they were given notice, not ambiguously as before, while the war with Philip, yet unharmed, was still uncertain, but directly, that Antiochus should withdraw from the cities of Asia which had belonged either to Philip or Ptolemy, that he keep out

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25 Walbank, *Commentary* vol. 2, 615, draws this conclusion from Polybius only mentioning Bargylia being freed by the Roman legate Lentulus in 18.48.1. The Senate’s indignation at this is expressed in Livy 33.39.5-6.

26 As in Dmitriev, *Greek Slogan*, 175-6. See also Livy 33.10.11, for Valerius Antias recording that Aegina was given to Attalus, Lemnos, Imbros, Delos, and Scyros were given to Athens, and that Philip’s holdings in Caria as well as Stratonicaea were given to Rhodes.
those cities that were free and not bear arms against any of them, for it was fitting that all Greek cities everywhere be free. Above all he was warned against crossing into Europe himself or sending troops. (Livy 33.34.1-4)

Livy here misunderstands Polybius in thinking that this statement encompassed all Greeks everywhere. But Livy also felt the need to account for the apparent inconsistency between the demands made here and the senate’s response to Antiochus’ ambassadors, implying that Livy abridged Polybius, but added the apologetic explanation of Rome’s changed position in 33.34.1-2. Nor does he inform us what these insincere words were, although we can guess that they were vague assurances of goodwill.

The detail of some of the senate’s orders, here and in the senatus consultum in Livy 33.30 upon which the proclamation was based, increases the suspicion that Livy pointedly passed over important events in pre-Isthmia diplomacy. The detailed pronouncements that Flamininus makes about mainland Greece are not included in Livy’s account of the s.c., yet Livy does have

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27 Livy 33.34.1-4: *Secundum Isthmia Quinctius et decem legati legationes regum gentium civitatumque audire. Primi omnium regis Antiochi vocati legati sunt. Iis eadem fere quae Romae egerant verba sine fide rerum iactantibus nihil iam perplexe ut ante, cum dubiae res incolumi Philippo erant, sed aperte denuntiatum ut excederet Asiae urbis quae Philippi aut Ptolomaei regum fuissent, abstineret liberis civitatibus, neu quam lacesseret armis: et in pace et in libertate esse debere omnes ubique Graecas urbes; ante omnia denuntiatum ne in Europam aut ipse transiret aut copias traiceret.*

28 Briscoe, *Commentary* vol. 1, 305.

29 Pol. 18.47.1-3. For Hegesianax and Lysias as the probable ambassadors, see Briscoe, *Commentary* vol. 1, 313, contra Badian, “Cold War,” 97 n. 23 (= Badian, *Studies*: 136 n. 23). Walbank, *Commentary* vol. 2, 614 also follows Nissen, *Kritische Untersuchungen*, 149-50 via Holleaux *Études* 5, 156-63 in suggesting that the autonomous cities mentioned here indicate compression and that there may have been two embassies to Rome, one in 198/7, and this one of 197/6 which would have been passed off by the senate to the commissioners in Greece. Tränkle, *Livius*, 43-4 makes the point emphatically, arguing also against Nissen’s view that Livy mechanically reproduced Polybius: “Vielmehr wurde wir lesen, ist eine livianische Einfügung, ein Rückverweis von der Art, wie der seines Werkes mit einander zu verklammern. Nissen hatte sich hier, wie bisweilen auch sonst, die Arbeitsweise des Livius zu mechanisch vorgestellt. Im Rahmen der durch Polybios vorgegebenen Fakten hat dieser sein Gestaltungskraft bisweilen sehr selbständig entfaltet.”

30 The sort postulated in Grainger, *Roman War*, 50-51: “... and the content of the messages is mainly unknown, so that much of the previous paragraph is conjecture. Yet the original senatorial message to Antiochos is supposed to have had hostile elements in it, but when the king’s envoys returned to him a few months later, the Roman message was friendly, even effusive. This change in attitude has to be explained somehow, and the obvious way to do so is to assume that the king’s envoy to the Senate had been convincing in his assurances as to the king’s immediate intentions. The further assumption that I have made, that Flamininus was privy to these exchanges, is nowhere evidenced, but may be assumed, given his geographical situation and in the light of the conduct of the two men later. That is to say, Antiochos and Flamininus had reached an agreement similar to that which Antiochus had made with Rhodes. It differed, of course, in not defining boundaries, since this was not necessary, but there were mutual assurances that neither would trespass on the other’s operational area.”

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Flamininus explicitly list the cities in Asia from which Philip was to withdraw his garrisons, 
seemingly to emphasize that Antiochus had already snatched up most of them.\textsuperscript{31} Also included 
are the \textit{liberae civitates}, Lampsacus and Smyrna, which were asserting their own independence 
in defiance of Antiochus and may have been the ultimate source of the Roman slogan of Greek 
freedom.\textsuperscript{32} Regardless of whether they suggested that Rome present itself as a champion of 
Greeek liberty, within Livy’s narrative these two cities are emblematic of the emptiness of 
Antiochus’ claims of benevolent stewardship of the Greek cities of Asia Minor. For, when 
Lampsacus claims its liberty, Antiochus insists that they should not seize it, but receive it as his 
gift. In addition to this vitiation of the concept of liberty, the organization of Livy’s history, 
relating events by region, and his incorrect reckoning of Polybius’ Olympiad year make 
Antiochus’ action against Lampsacus and Smyrna appear as a response to the Isthmian 
Proclamation.\textsuperscript{33} These two cities were never taken by Antiochus and appear to have never come 
under significant military pressure.\textsuperscript{34} But, within Livy’s narrative, the king appears to crudely 
and disingenuously ape the Romans’ own relatively munificent behavior while preparing to lay 
siege to them. This is not the last contrast Livy will draw between Roman and Seleucid claims to 
stewardship of Greek freedom.

\textsuperscript{31} Livy 33.30.1-3. These were Euromus, Pedasis, Bargylia, Iasus, Myrina, Abydos, Thasos, and Perinthos. Briscoe 
1973: 305 notes that Thasos, Perinthos, and Myrina are not in Asia. When the decemvirs actually set out to their 
charges in Livy 33.35.1, they can go only to Bargylia, Thasos, and Thrace.
\textsuperscript{32} For their propagandistic importance, see Dmitriev, \textit{Greek Slogan}, 189-99; Werner Dahlheim, \textit{Struktur und 
Entwicklung des römischen Völkerrechts im dritten und zweiten Jahrhundert v. Chr.} (Munich, Beck’sche 
Verlagbuchhandlung, 1968), 100-108. Additionally, their inclusion means that they had already been in contact 
with the senate, but Livy makes no mention. These details prompted Holleaux and Walbank to draw the conclusion 
that the senate was already wary of Antiochus’ advance and sought to send the king a message, perhaps following 
upon the successful deterrence already effected with regard to Egypt and Pergamum. See Briscoe, \textit{Commentary} vol. 
1, 314; Walbank \textit{Commentary} vol. 2, 611-5; Appian \textit{Syr.} 2; Holleaux, \textit{Études} vol. 4, 309, vol. 5, 141-55.
\textsuperscript{33} Briscoe, \textit{Commentary} vol.1, 320-1. Livy seems to date all of this section dealing with these cities to 196 BCE, but 
much of it occurred in the autumn and winter of 197/6. Syll\textsuperscript{3} 591 makes clear that Hegesias, the Lampsacene envoy 
had already met with L. Flamininus.
\textsuperscript{34} Grainger, \textit{Roman War}, 57-63, especially the contrast with the heavy resistance to Philip’s campaign in this area. 
Ma, \textit{Antiochus III}, 86-9 likewise sees this as a demonstration of force, not a “campaign of conquest.”
Livy gives even greater space to a diplomatic confrontation between Roman legates and Antiochus at Lysimachia in the Chersonese. As has long been recognized, much of the rhetoric surrounding this conflict boils down to fundamentally different conceptions of territorial rights. Claiming it as part of his ancestral kingdom, Antiochus crossed the Hellespont and rebuilt Lysimachia, which had been destroyed by Thracians, seemingly as part of a bid to present himself as a protector of Greek civilization against barbarians. In the years leading up to the war Antiochus would conduct a number of campaigns in Thrace. This was threatening to the Romans not just because it extended the king’s authority, but because he had crossed to Europe. In justifying his actions to the Romans, Antiochus invoked heredity to vindicate his right to possessions his ancestors had taken while the Romans argued from what Briscoe called the right of possession. All of Antiochus’ activities throughout this section of res Asiae were, Livy explains, part of the king’s project of returning Asia Minor “to its historical form,” in antiquam imperii formulam. At this conference at Lysimachia Antiochus claimed to have inherited a right to all those lands once possessed by Lysimachus, lands his ancestor acquired iure belli, as well as Lysimachia, which he himself rebuilt. Even this seemingly peaceable act took place in the context of a military campaign, demonstrating that the king’s territorial claims were predicated upon conquest. There is a tidy distinction between the Seleucid claim to the kingdom of Lysimachus and what Antiochus called the depredation of Philip and the Ptolemies: Lysimachus’ total defeat and death at Corupedium in 281 BCE was thought to transfer his

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36 Livy 33.38.1: *Eodem anno Antiochus rex, cum hibernasset Ephesi, omnes Asiae civitates in antiquam imperii formulam redigere est conatus.*
37 Livy 33.40; Pol 18.51.4.
38 Antiochus’ refoundation of Lysimachia was actually quite recent, Livy 33.38.10-14. His use of this action as a justification for his presence in Thrace occurs first at 33.40.5-6 and again at 34.58.5
kingdom wholesale to the victor, Seleucus I. Both types of claim are founded on violence and Antiochus is somewhat arbitrary in choosing the maximum theoretical extent of his ancestral kingdom to restore, but, as Ma recently pointed out, such claims could be persuasive in the Greek world. No decisive legal argument was possible with such contradictory principles at work, a situation that left the negotiations in the realm of bluster and the calculation of risk. The only judgment to be rendered, therefore, is ethical, and this hinges upon estimations of Antiochus’ intentions, and Livy makes the great king to appear to be acting in bad faith.

In Polybius’ version of the narrative, the Roman response to Antiochus’ speech is to immediately summon Smyrnaean and Lampsacene envoys to air their complaints, and Polybius’ inclusion of their names gives this a ring of truth. Evidently the Romans presented themselves as arbiters in a dispute between these cities and Antiochus, for Polybius says that the king was upset that he seemed to be on trial before the Romans and suggested that they submit the matter to Rhodian mediation, which the Romans did not accept. There are two possible interpretations this move, neither flattering to the Romans. If Antiochus was attempting to concede the issue while saving face by referring the dispute to Rhodes, a Roman ally. On this view, no formal agreement was reached, but both sides could be relatively comfortable that the other posed no immediate threat and continue with the diplomatic process. The other possibility is that

39 Grainger, Roman War, 84 n. 27 raises the possibility that Antiochus saw the defeat of Lysimachus as granting the Seleucids a legitimate claim to Macedon as well. Since Antiochus’ case is so strongly stated, in contrast to “the preceding Roman demands, so rudely and offensively stated,” Grainger thinks it possible that Polybius was using a piece of Seleucid propaganda as his source (95). I cannot agree, however, that the Roman position, while provocative, is so incoherent as to vitiate Polybius’ reliability.

40 Ma, Greek Cities, 30-33: “In the following century, Antiochus IV, during the Sixth Syrian War (168), justified himself before an audience of ambassadors from pro-Ptolemaic cities bent upon brokering a peace. He referred to τὰ ἐξ ἀρχῆς δίκαια, his original rights to ownership (κτῆσις) over Koile-Syria, originating in the history of the Diadochs (Pol. 28.29.1-9). As Polybius observes, Antiochus IV, with these arguments, ‘convinced not only himself, but also his audience that he was right’ (Pol. 28.20.10).”

41 Pol. 18.52.

42 Grainger, Roman War, 96-7, sees this as “a minor diplomatic success for the Romans, with Antiochos gracefully giving up his claims to the two cities.”
Antiochus’ suggestion of Rhodian mediation, as Dmitriev puts it, “once again revealed the precarious position of the Romans in Greece, who had no justification for meddling with what were exclusively Greek affairs.” Both interpretations work against Livy’s narrative. The first contradicts the slow and steady march towards another war driven by in inveterate enemy of Rome and, if the Romans were on the point of finding a *modus vivendi* with Antiochus, they would had to have been willing to accept his control over a number of Greek cities in Asia Minor. This vitiates the impression Livy gives of Rome making a principled stand for Greek freedom. The fact that Antiochus later sent legates seeking an alliance makes this the far more likely case. The other interpretation sees the Romans appear to refuse a legitimate attempt to come to a conclusion and proves their concern for friends such as Lampsacus and Smyrna was merely a pretext to stir up war with Antiochus. Thus Livy chose (for his speeches’ content shows that he read Polybius), not to include this offer in his narrative.

Livy ends the conference with what has been described a sort of “comic play” intended to mock Antiochus when the rumor comes of the young Ptolemy V’s death. After protesting his friendship towards the Ptolemy, to whom he was about to marry his daughter, Antiochus sets off to take Egypt by surprise. Even when Antiochus learned that the king was alive he still made an abortive attempt on Ptolemaic Cyprus only to lose a number of ships in a storm. Although it does not now survive, it seems likely that Polybius also included this episode, meaning that his version of the conference did not end with the rejection of Rhodian arbitration and that Livy did not need to formulate an alternate ending. This fits Livy’s purposes quite nicely, for rather than

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43 Dmitriev, *Greek Slogan*, 213; Badian, *Studies*, 121.
44 Livy 34.25.2.
46 Livy 33.41.
being forced to engage with arguments of territorial rights, he can undercut Antiochus’
credibility directly, showing that he was indeed no friend to Ptolemy and opportunistically
sought whatever conquests he could find. Cyprus is especially damning, for at this point
Antiochus knew that his soon-to-be son in law was still alive. This episode, farcical and
exaggerated as it may be, serves an important purpose for a Roman audience: it proves that
Antiochus was aggressively seeking to expand and that his word could not be trusted. In 33.44.7,
Livy has the decemvirs even credit Antiochus’ Egyptian diversion for the fact that war had not
already broken out in Europe. Most alarming was that Hannibal, driven from Carthage by the
pro-Roman party, had sought refuge with Antiochus, which the *patres* considered a sure sign that
the king was preparing to go to war with Rome, and Livy believed that Hannibal’s arrival helped
the king commit himself to this course.48

**Escalation and Preparation**

The threat of Antiochus posed problems for Flamininus and the implementation of the
senate’s orders for Greece. Even as he made the Isthmian Proclamation, Flamininus met
opposition from the decemvirs sent by the senate to help settle eastern affairs on the question of
whether the Romans could safely vacate Greece with Antiochus so close at hand.49 Later, when
Flamininus referred Antiochus’ envoys to the senate to seek a formal alliance with Rome, the
pro-consul publicly gave the imminent threat posed by the king as a reason for his quickly
coming to terms with the Spartan tyrant Nabis, a move that disappointed Rome’s Achaean

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48 Livy 33.45.5-49.7.
49 Liv 33.31.
Judging from the reported discussion of consular provinces for 194 BCE, Antiochus and the Aetolians appeared inevitable enemies, *haud dubie hostes*, to many senators as well. Nevertheless, Scipio Africanus lost the argument to make Macedon a consular province and the senate voted to continue with Flamininus’ proposed withdrawal of troops from Greece. This opposition to Flamininus’ “liberation” policy should not be read as an indication of a fundamentally different conception of foreign policy or the cynical application of *machtpolitik*. Scipio and Cato the Censor showed themselves quite attuned to *fides* in their own campaigns in Spain and elsewhere. Instead, if we interpret “freedom” in the limited sense used propagandistically throughout Greek history, we see that Flamininus’ was idealistic in the belief that relatively generous treatment would foster mutual loyalty with the Greeks and obviate the need for force. To this end, Livy depicts the pro-consul theatrically withdrawing troops from Acrocorinth at the end of his allied conference in 194 BCE and making the pointed remark that this would show whether the Romans or the Aetolians had been telling the truth about Greek liberty. The variance in Roman policy should thus be interpreted in terms of how much Rome could rely on the reciprocity of *fides*, a similar problem to that seen in dealings with Latin and Italian allies in the first two chapters.

The next development came when the senate received foreign embassies at the beginning of 193 BCE, for the envoys Antiochus had sent to strike an alliance with Rome in were referred to Flamininus, newly returned from Greece, and the decemvirs on the grounds that there was a

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51 Livy 34.43.4-9.

52 For Cato’s somewhat cynical attempt to keep faith on his Spanish campaign, see Livy 34.11-12.


54 Livy 34.49.5: *Demetriadis Chalcidisque praesidia intra decimum diem audituros deducta, Acrocorinthum ipsis extemplo videntibus vacuam Achaes traditum, ut omnes scirent utrum Romanis an Aetolis mentiri mos esset, qui male commissam libertatem populo Romano sermonibus distulerint et mutatos pro Macedonibus Romanos dominos.*
great deal of complicated business with the king. The whole proceeding presumed some
hostility, for Flamininus offered a brusque reply “in keeping with the dignity and interest of the
Roman people,” taking the king’s envoys, Hegesianax and Menippus, by surprise.55 Flamininus’
new and intractable attitude is reasonably explained by his having to assimilate to the harder line
taken by politicians at Rome.56 Attempting to assert Antiochus’ status in turn, Menippus
famously asserted that there were three ways to make treaties establishing friendly relations:
those in which victors dictate terms to the conquered, those in which two states make peace on
equal terms, and those in which the states had never gone to war. Since Antiochus and Rome fell
under the last category, the Romans had no right to make demands of the king as if they had
defeated him.57 No demands had yet been made in Livy’s narrative, but all involved knew the
points of contention.

In response to their brief, which charged them not with the negotiation of particulars, but
affirming goodwill and establishing an alliance with Rome, Flamininus declared two conditions
for friendship with Rome:

The first is that, if Antiochus should desire that we take no interest in what
pertains to the cities of Asia, he should himself stay clear from all of Europe. The
other is that, if he should not keep within the bounds of Asia but cross into
Europe, that the Romans should in turn have the right to maintain the friendships
they already have with cities in Asia and form new ones.58 (Livy 34.58.1-3)

55 Livy 34.57.5: T. Quinctio mandatum ut adhibitis iis legatorum regis verba audiret responderetque iis quae ex
dignitate atque utilitate populi Romani responderi possent.
56 Grainger, Roman War, 126-33 convincingly argues that the deterioration of relations with Antiochus was the
result of Flamininus, who had been empowered to serve as a mediator between various kings and Rome, having to
re-adapt to the tone of politics at Rome and take a harder line.
57 Livy 34.57. For these as circumstances rather than categories of treaty, see Täubler, Imperium Romanum, 3;
Briscoe, Commentary vol. 2, 138;
58 Livy 34.58.1-3: Ad ea Quinctius: ‘Quoniam vobis distincte agere libet et genera iungendarum amicitiarum
enumerare, ego quoque duas condiciones ponam, extra quas nullam esse regi nuntietis amicitiae cum populo
Romano iungenda: unam, si nos nihil quod ad urbes Asiae attinet curare velit, ut et ipse omni Europa abstineat;
alteram, si se ille Asiae finibus non contineat et in Europam transcendent, ut et Romanis ius sit Asiae civitatum
amicitas et tueri quas habeant et novas complecti.’
Hegesianax gave an indignant reply which further confirmed that the theoretical basis of Antiochus’ power lay in conquest as well as the rebuilding of Lysimachia.59 The Roman position has often been interpreted as a betrayal of the cities of Asia, specifically Lampsacus and Smyrna, and, should Antiochus have chosen to take up the offer of defined spheres of influence, Rome may have been forbidden contact with Pergamum and, perhaps, even Rhodes.60 The Romans would never have accepted this, and Seleucid indignation at the two alternatives indicates that Antiochus felt similarly about Thrace and the Chersonese. The point of this remark was to reply to Antiochus’ assertion at Lysimachia that the Romans had no business in Asia.61 Livy then has Flamininus bring up the slogan of Greek freedom and contrast that to the servitude which Antiochus would impose. Livy states that Hegesianax was unable to claim that servitude was better than liberty, which he interprets as tantamount to an admission that freedom granted by royal dispensation was a sham. Caught off guard, the royal envoys excuse themselves on the grounds that they have no authority to give away any of Antiochus’ possessions, and the Romans decide to send a legation to meet with the king. The outcome shows that the idea of separate spheres of influence was never a serious proposal, merely a part of an aggressive rhetorical strategy; the Romans, under no apprehension that anyone would construe it as such, related the course of discussion to the other foreign diplomats at Rome. Flamininus’ statement to them was that “they should report to their states that Rome would defend their freedom with the same good faith, fides, and virtue with which it had won it from Philip, should Antiochus not leave

59 Livy 34.58.4-5: Enimvero id auditu etiam dicere indignum esse Hegesianax Thraciae et Chersonesi urbis arceri Antiochum, <cum> quae Seleucus, proavus eius, Lysimacho rege bello victo et in acie caeso per summum decus parta reliquerit, pari cum laude eadem, ab Thracibus possessa, partim armis receperit Antiochus, partim deserta, sicut ipsam Lysimachiam ...
60 As Briscoe, Commentary vol. 2, 140,
61 Livy 33.40.1-2.
Europe." Livy also implies that Antiochus negotiated in bad faith by reporting the exaggerated rumors of Hannibal’s’ intrigues in Carthage and claiming that the general’s arrival confirmed Antiochus in his desire for war.

Before the next set of Roman legates met with the Antiochus and his official Minnio at Apamea, they stopped at Pergamum and prepared with Eumenes II, whom Livy credits with ambiguous motives for urging war:

Eumenes lusted for war against Antiochus, believing he would be a dangerous neighbor by virtue of being much more powerful were there peace, but, if there were war, that he would prove no more of an equal to the Romans than Philip. Antiochus would either be removed entirely or, if peace were made with him after he was defeated, many of the lands stripped from Antiochus would fall to Eumenes so that he would then be able to easily defend himself against Antiochus without Roman aid. Even in the case of disaster it would be better to undergo any ill fortune with the Romans as allies rather than, alone, to endure Antiochus’ rule or, unwilling, to be compelled to do so by force of arms. For these reasons he thus tried to stir the Romans to war with all his planning and authority.

This entire section of res Graeciae and Asiae is thought to derive from Polybius, who likely gave a similar description of Eumenes’ mindset, but even he may have been working from a Roman version of events, for the Romans quickly came to mistrust the Pergamene king. Eumenes’ desire for war, marked by the negative cupidus, shows poorly next to Roman attempts at diplomacy, yet Livy also acknowledges legitimate security concerns and sees the king not lusting...
after territorial gain so much as seeing it as a means to an end. What was most important for the Roman audience, however, was the king’s loyalty. Although Eumenes’ deliberation is highly pragmatic, Livy adapts the sentiment into a statement of unqualified loyalty at its end. This contrasts favorably with Antiochus’ own subjects, making it appear that they were held in check more by force. This might even bring to mind Abydos’ resistance to Philip, where the people preferred death to what they perceived as intolerable enslavement.

Livy then makes dramatic use of this conference at Apamea to justify involvement both in terms of Roman history and appeals for aid, just as he had done with the Panaetolicum of 199 BCE before the Second Macedonian War. The initial meeting with the king largely rehashed the points made at Rome, but Antiochus’ son suddenly died and the king passed the Roman legates off to his advisor Minnio. Livy then introduces a new point that, for the Roman reader, had the potential to dramatically alter the way this war was understood. Minnio directly accused the Roman legates Sulpicius and Villius of hypocrisy in claiming to foster the liberty of the Greeks while holding a number of Greek states in Italy in servitude:

There, with a prepared speech, Minnio said “I see that you Romans make use the specious pretext of liberating the Greeks, but your actions do not match your words, for you set one legal standard for Antiochus but use another for yourselves. Truly, how are the Lampsacenes and Smyrnaeans any more Greek than Neapolitans, Rhegians, and Tarentines, from whom you demand tribute and ships? Why do you send a praetor with imperium, rods, and axes every year to Syracuse and other Greek cities of Sicily? There is no other claim you could make than that you imposed these conditions on cities which you overcame in war. So accept the same justification from Antiochus concerning Smyrna, Lampsacus, and the other cities of Ionia and Aeolia: he merely is reasserting the old right towards those tax and tribute paying cities conquered in war. If would ask that you

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66 See the discussion of Livy 31.29-32 above.
67 While in 35.15.8 Livy labels Minnio ignarus omnium externorum viresque aestimans regis ex rebus in Syria aut Asia gestis, non causa modo superiorem esse Antiochum, quod nihil aequi postularent Romani, sed bello quoque superaturum credebat.
respond to these points, if this is a fair discussion and you are not merely seeking a pretext for war."68 (Livy 35.16.2-6)

Minnio effectively transformed the debate on the status of a few cities in Anatolia into a referendum on Roman history. Rather than acknowledge that the Roman and Seleucid empires were kindred entities founded on the sword, Sulpicius declared that Rhegium, Naples, and Tarentum were in no way similar to the Greeks of Asia. Livy’s Sulpicius avoids such harsh words as ‘conquer,’ but rather euphemistically says that these states came into Roman power and that the Romans receive ships and payments from them strictly according to the terms of their treaties. For Sulpicius, Roman rule was legitimate because it was relatively consensual, unlike that of a Philip or Antiochus:

“What is truly similar regarding the states you compared? We have claimed what we owed by treaty from the Rhegians, Tarentines, and Neapolitans from the moment they came into our power legally and continuously, our right always accepted and never interrupted. Can you say that these peoples have not altered their treaty either on their own or through others? That once the cities of Asia came under your power that they always remained part of your realm, and that some did come into Philip’s possession, others into Ptolemy’s, and that yet others did not gain their liberty with no one contesting it for many years?”69

(Livy 35.16.8-10)

The continuity of Roman rule is important, but where Briscoe’s phrase ‘right of possession’ implies something like a bloodier version of squatters’ rights, iure, not possessione, is the key word here. Rome’s subjects (there is no pretense that they are equals to Rome), had agreed to

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69 Livy 35.16.8-10: Quid enim similis habet civitatum earum quas comparasti causa? Ab Reginis et Neapolitani et Tarentinis, ex quo in nostram venerunt potestatem, uno et perpetuo tenore iuris, semper usurpato, munquam intermisso, quae ex foedere debent exigimus. Potesne tandem dicere ut iis populi non per se, non per alium quemquam foedus mutaverint, sic Asiae civitates, ut semel venerere in maiorum Antiochi potestatem, in perpetua possessione regni vestri manisses et non alias earum in Philippis, alias in Ptolomaei fuisse potestatem, alias per multos annos nullo ambigente libertatem usurpasse?
their individual treaties and continued to demonstrate their consent and contentment with their lot. Nor was their lot the same as that of cities under a king, for there was an implicit contrast between impartial law and an absolute ruler’s caprice. Again, just as in 199 BCE, legates from the concerned Greek states were on hand to plead their own case and provide proof of Rome’s honest advocacy.

One might object that revolts during the Hannibalic war undermine Sulpicius’ case, and of course Livy does not raise this issue, but that would be to miss the point of his argument. Rather than asserting merely that continuity of rule justifies domination, the Roman argued for an inconsistency in the Seleucid justification: the history of Asia Minor and the constant competition between the successor kingdoms for territory rendered simple claims of possession incoherent. Returning to the Roman claim to have liberated Greece and supporting it with the withdrawal of troops from the fetters, Sulpicius called in the representatives of various cities. Although they had been coached by Eumenes and Livy admits that their claims were not all just, *aequa iniquis miscent*, their participation, not a legalistic argument about the right of possession, was Sulpicius’ justification for Roman rule. Many Greek states may have seen this as a choice of masters, but the Romans understood their relationship with these states in terms of reciprocity. This was what legitimated their hegemony and differentiated it from the *servitus* Antiochus imposed upon his subjects.

**The War with Antiochus**

Although the diplomatic pressure Rome brought to bear on Antiochus drove the dispute’s escalation into open war, Livy consistently presents the Romans as unprepared for Antiochus’ aggressive actions, making the king responsible for the ultimate breach of *fides*. The sparks igniting the war, however, came from the Aetolians and their attempts to incite revolt. Beginning
with the Panaetolicum of spring 193 BCE, Livy uses Aetolian agitation to make Greek affairs appear a chaotic storm of bad faith and demagoguery. The Aetolians, whom Livy describes as more hostile than the Boii and Spaniards with whom Rome was actually at war, send ambassadors to Nabis, Philip, and Antiochus, urging an immediate war against Rome. They only succeeded in prompting the Spartan to action, and despite certainty that war would come, the sortition of provinces in 192 BCE saw the Romans acknowledge that they did not yet have a case for war against Antiochus, only against Nabis.

Meanwhile, the descriptions of intent Livy affixes to Roman actions demonstrate a growing realization that the gratitude gained by the liberation of Greece would not be sufficient to secure loyalty. Because the conference at Apamea resolved nothing, all at Rome thought of Antiochus as their enemy, yet Livy says “they were preparing nothing except their minds for this war.” Not so the king, for although Livy had hinted that Antiochus had already resolved upon war, the first concrete step occurs directly after the conference, a war council in which all compete in vociferously recommending war in the manner of Herodotean bad advisers. Their argument, amalgamated into indirect speech, is based on a striking reversal of perspective, for they assimilate Rome to the Persian Empire with Antiochus in the position of Sparta. Roman demands concerning Smyrna and Lampsacus are like that for earth and water, insignificant in relation to Antiochus’ power, yet “unjust power always has its beginning in small things.”

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70 Briscoe, Commentary vol. 2, 162.
71 Livy 35.12.1: Sed neque Boi neque Hispani, cum quibus eo anno bellatum erat, tam inimice infesti erant Romanis quam Aetolorum gens.
72 Livy 35.17.2: Itaque ne remissa ulla re nec impetrata, aequae ac venerant, omnium incerti legati Romam redierunt. Livy 35.20.1: Romae destinabant quidem sermonibus hostem Antiochum, sed nihilum ad id bellum praeter animos parabant.
74 Livy 35.17.7: sed initium semper a parvis iniusta imperandi fieri, nisi crederent Persas, cum aquam terramque ab Lacedaemoniis petierint, gleba terrae et haustu aquae eguisse. For the odd phrasing of the first clause see Briscoe,
view is then immediately contradicted by Seleucid fears that these cities would incite others to rebel, implicitly acknowledging that they would be claiming liberty and escaping from slavery under Antiochus. In this way Livy takes a powerful rhetorical stance, comparing Rome to Persia, a barbarian power invading the Greek world, and subverted it, creating a scene in which the Seleucids are unaware of the irony of using this *exemplum* to justify enslaving the Greeks. It is unfortunate that Polybius’ account has been lost; Livy’s hand is clearly discernible in the compression and adaptation of speeches which may have been similar to those given in the Greek’s account of the conference at Naupactus. Livy also gives significant attention to the Aetolian legate, Alexander the Acarnanian, who attempts to persuade Antiochus to hurry to Aetolia’s aid against Rome; by not giving Antiochus’ reaction, Livy implies that this argument had an effect.\(^75\) Focus then shifts to Hannibal, excluded from the conference because the Romans meeting with him had raised the king’s suspicion.\(^76\) Echoing yet invalidating his earlier claim that Hannibal’s arrival at court confirmed Antiochus in his decision to make war upon Rome, Livy moves directly from Hannibal’s speech to the statement that it was this meeting that set Antiochus firmly on the path to war.\(^77\) Thus, despite historical indications to the contrary, Livy’s version of this conference, framed by statements of Roman reluctance to go to war, makes the king seem an implacable enemy.\(^78\)

In an off-hand comment Livy reveals that the Romans’ attitude toward the Greeks had changed, for in 35.31.2 the legates’ judge that the Achaeans were “faithful enough” merely because of their hostility to Nabis. The Romans sent a fleet *ad tuendos socios* in response to

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Footnotes:

75 Livy 35.18.
76 While Pol. 3.11.2 has the Romans intentionally trying to discredit Hannibal, Livy 35.13.4 refuses to attribute such subterfuge to the Romans, and claims that casting suspicion on Hannibal only occurred *velut consilio.*
77 Livy 35.19.7. For Hannibal’s arrival, see 33.49.7.
Achaean complaints against Nabis, and Flamininus, along with Octavius, Servilius, and Villius as legates to “hold on to allied good will.” After visiting Athens, Chalcis, and a Thessalian assembly, these Roman goodwill ambassadors proceeded to the Magnesian city of Demetrias, where the improvement of Roman relations with Philip had stirred fears that the city would be given back to the king as a reward. While Livy categorically denies any such intention, and this was surely the case, he acknowledges that the Romans were now implicated in the sort of calculations that made such fears possible: “Against these rumors they had to speak in such a way as to remove their empty fears without quashing Philip’s hopes, for the king was strategically more important than the Magnesians.” At this point the Magnetarch Eurylochus claims that Demetrias was at the Romans mercy and only appeared free, provoking an enraged outburst from Flamininus, who calls the Magnesians ungrateful and perfidious, striking terror into the population. Eurylochus flees to Aetolia, where Menippus, an ambassador from Antiochus has just arrived. Although the relevant sections of Polybius are lost, Livy draws a picture of fevered demagoguery that, in its similarity to later descriptions of the support for Perseus and the destruction of Corinth and Carthage, bears the stamp of Polybian moralizing.

From this point on to the end of Book 35, Livy’s account fixates on showing that both Antiochus and the Aetolians were well matched in being unreliable and perfidious allies, placing this judgment in the mouth of Flamininus later in the book, when he says “Antiochus foolishly believed the Aetolians, and they his royal bluster, but you [Achaeans] should be less taken in by this, but instead trust the tried and true fides of the Romans.” Menippus’ address to the

79 Livy 35.22.1-2, 35.23.4-5: ad tenendos sociorum animos.
80 Livy 35.31.7: Adversus eos ita disserendum erat ne timorem vanum iis demendo spes incisa Philippum abalienaret, in quo plus ad omnia momenti quam in Magnetibus esset.
81 At an Achaean conference after Antiochus’ first abortive attempt on Chalcis, Livy 35.49.11-12: Male crediderunt et Antiochus Aetolis et Aetoli regiae vanitati; quo minus vos decipi debetis sed expertae potius spectataeque Romanorum fidei credere.
Aetolians exaggerates the resources Antiochus would be able to bring to a war with Rome and the speed with which he would be able to muster them, just as the Aetolians misled Nabis into thinking Antiochus’ crossing was imminent in 35.12.9, and in 35.12.15-18 exaggerated their own capacity and the willingness of Philip to rebel in urging Antiochus to make war upon Rome. Then, at the Panaetolicum for 192 BCE, Livy gives space to some brief further remarks of Menippus, who asserts that all Greece is “subject to Rome’s authority and whim,” *sub nutum dicionemque Romanam*, and that Antiochus would restore Greece’s dignity. Menippus urges them to rebel against Rome because their liberty would ultimately rest on their own strength, not someone else’s judgment, a statement that rings false in light of the sort of liberty Antiochus wished to bestow as a gift upon Lampsacus and Smyrna. When an Athenian delegation reminds the Aetolians of Rome’s aid, the assembly votes to ban Romans from addressing it. Only with the aid of some of the older and wiser Aetolian politicians does Flamininus gain an audience. Not sanguine about his chances, he attempts to make them hesitate or, more likely, make “all men witnesses that the fault for the war fell upon the Aetolians and that the Romans were about to take up arms justly, almost without a choice.”82 Livy merely records the themes; Flamininus says only a little about the territories the Aetolians claimed, but mostly speaks of how many times the Romans, moved by the *fides* arising from the treaty, came to their aid. Most Aetolians, and likely most modern historians, would say this number was quite small. Uttering a threat which Livy calls prophetic, that the Aetolians would suffer first for having stirred the war, Flamininus is answered in turn by the strategos Damocritus, who boasts that the Romans will receive their response from a camp pitched by the Tiber. The Aetolians thus vote to summon

82 Livy 35.33.3: *aut enim moturum aliquid aut omnes homines testes fore penes Aetolos culpam belli esse, Romanos iusta ac prope necessaria sumpturos arma.*
Antiochus to liberate Greece and resolve their dispute with the Romans, two incompatible goals.\textsuperscript{83}

Livy persistently characterizes this unsettled state of Greece and anti-Roman sentiment as the result of popular demagoguery and mob rule. The vote to not admit Romans to the Panaetolicum was the initiative of the “mob, eager for revolution” while the elder leading men worked to grant Flamininus his hearing.\textsuperscript{84} Similarly, by rushing through the proceedings with speakers only granted brief remarks and summary, Livy creates a sense of frenzied decision-making to contrast with Flamininus’ oracular pronouncement. Aetolian actions after the assembly make the contrast explicit, for the inner council, the \textit{apocletes}, explicitly recognize that their power comes from the masses, as opposed to the pro-Roman aristocracy:

They recognized that the leading and best men were in favor of the Roman alliance and were glad of the present arrangement, but the mob and all of those who found it not agreeable were desirous of revolution. The council then lit upon a plan and hope of something not just daring but unthinkable: seizing Demetrias, Chalcis, and Sparta.\textsuperscript{85} (Livy 35.34.4-5)

While the exiled Eurylochus brought in troops to take control of Demetrias after being recalled through some further theatrics, the attempt at Chalcis failed. Most notably, the Aetolian Alexamenus assassinated Nabis, hoping that the tyrant’s difficulties would bring the population around to his killers. Despite being the sort of leader Livy finds utterly repellant, Nabis cuts a rather tragic figure in his last moments. Forced to retreat to Sparta, he repeatedly begged the Aetolians for aid because he had rebelled on their instigation, giving the Aetolians a pretext for sending the troops that would murder the tyrant. Alexamenus buoyed Nabis’ hopes with the lie

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{83} Briscoe, \textit{Commentary} vol. 2, 33 rightly dismisses Badian’s claim (Studies, 131) that this decree was fundamentally an attempt to have Antiochus arbitrate without much in the way of hostile intent.

\textsuperscript{84} See Livy 35.33.1 for the \textit{multitudo avida novandi res}, and the \textit{seniores principum}.

\textsuperscript{85} Livy 35.34.4-5: \textit{Inter omnes constabat in civitatibus principes et optimum quemque Romanae societatis esse et praesenti statu gaudere, multitudinem et quorum res non ex sententia ipsorum essent omnia novare velle. Aetoli consilium cum rei \textit{tum} spei quoque non audacis modo sed etiam impudentis ceperunt Demetriadem Chalcidem Lacedaemonem occupandi.}
\end{footnotes}
that Antiochus had already crossed to Europe and that the Aetolians would soon come to his relief in force, and, ironically, by repeating the very exaggerations of Antiochus’ effective strength that Menippus had just foisted upon the Aetolians.\footnote{Livy 35.35.} After betraying and murdering the tyrant, Alexamenus seized control of Sparta, yet his poor planning, that Livy, surely taking the judgment over from Polybius, links to moral turpitude, brought the coup to ruin.\footnote{Livy 35.36.4ff. claims that if an assembly had been called and the citizens disarmed and treated respectfully the coup would have been successful, seemingly indicating that Nabis had incurred significant unpopularity.} Alexamenus shut himself up in the palace and “The Aetolians turned to plunder as if they had captured the city which they wanted to seem to have liberated.”\footnote{Livy 35.36.6: \textit{Aetoli velut capta urbe quam liberasse videri volebant in praedam versi.}} Once the Spartans had slain their oppressors, Philopoemen moved in upon the confused city and brought it into the Achaean League, his shrewd behavior contrasted with Alexamenus’ mismanagement.\footnote{Livy 35.37.1-3. Polybius’ biases, which in the short-term narration were surely amenable to Livy, prevent the gratification of this long-term territorial ambition from being cast in the same rapacious terms as the Aetolian attempt to take Sparta, but the issue of the Spartan exiles residing with the Achaeans and the forced integration of Sparta were be a key contributor to the dispute that would bring the league’s destruction. See Pol 20.12; Plutarch \textit{Philopoemen}. 15; Paus 8.51; Aymard, \textit{Premiers Rapports}, 318ff. ; R.M. Errington, \textit{Philopoemen} (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), 109; Walbank, \textit{Commentary} vol. 3, 2, 85.} Either Polybius or Livy smoothed over Philopoemen’s conduct at this point, making for a more schematic contrast between Aetolia and Achaea, leaving out a report that the Achaean general closed the gates of Sparta to keep out Flamininus and Achaean \textit{strategos} until he had arranged the troubled city to his own liking.\footnote{Plutarch \textit{Philopoemen} 15; Walbank \textit{Commentary} vol .3 p.2, 85-7; Aymard, \textit{Premiers Rapports}, 337.}

While the Aetolians were greedy, divisive, and manipulative, Livy uses the city of Chalcis’ resistance to Aetolian schemes to present the actions of Rome’s allies in terms of loyalty and goodwill.\footnote{Livy 35.42-43.1.} Threatened by an Aetolian-backed coup, the Chalcidean magistrates, Micythio and Xenoclides rally their allies because they “realized that not only their homeland but
the Roman alliance would be betrayed and deserted [should they flee].”92 The phrasing is striking; in Livy’s formulation the two are moved as much, or more, by regard for Rome as for their own homeland. When Chalcis and its allies take steps against the Aetolians, Livy remarks that “respect for the Romans most moved these states to action, for they had just experienced Roman valor in war and their justice and kindness in victory.”93 When they confront Aetolians on the march, the Chalcidians ask, in suitably Roman language, why they had come to attack socii et amici. After replying they had come to liberate Chalcis from Rome only to be rebuffed, the Aetolians, not equipped for intensive operations, which Livy refers to with the doubly valent iustum bellum, returned home.94

Livy makes Chalcis central to the end of Book 35, repudiating the Aetolian and Seleucid claim to be working for the liberation of Greece. By rapidly covering Antiochus’ crossing to Europe, Livy emphasizing the imminent danger the king had posed, and soon comes to the king’s march against Chalcis.95 Livy has the Aetolians and Antiochus take up contradictory rhetorical stances in quick succession in attempting to convince Chalcis to defect from Rome. First they claim that Antiochus has come not to wage war but liberate Greece and that becoming his ally would not break their amicitia with Rome. Next that the Romans only offered talk and the illusion of freedom. Then they level a threat.96 The Chalcidean reply is pitch-perfect Roman propaganda:

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92 Livy 35.38.1-2: Micythio et Xenoclides, penes quos tum summa rerum pulso Euthymida Chalcide erat, seu ipsi per se suspicati seu indicata re, primo pavidi nihil usquam spei nisi in fuga ponebant; deinde postquam resedit terror et prodi et deseri non patriam modo sed etiam Romanorum societatem cernebant, consilio tali animum adiecerunt.
93 Livy 35.38.5-6: Romanorum maxime respectus civitates movit et virtutem nuper in bello et in victoria iustitiam benignitatemque expertas.
94 Livy 35.38.8-14.
95 Livy 35.42-3 deals with the Antiochus’ activities in Asia, preparations, and crossing. By 35.44 Antiochus is taking counsel in Aetolia.
96 Livy 35.46.5-9.
To this, Micythio, one of the leading men, replied he was stunned that Antiochus would leave his own kingdom and cross into Europe to liberate them. Surely he had known that there was no Greek city that had a garrison, paid the Romans any tribute, or was bound by a harsh treaty which denied it its own laws. Thus the Chalcideans had no need for anyone to avenge their lost liberty, since they were free. Nor did they need a guard, since they had peace and their liberty thanks to the Romans.97 (Livy 35.46.9-11)

Antiochus retired and sent envoys to an Achaean assembly, at which Flamininus rebutted his grandiose posturing. Romans and Achaeans then sent a garrison to Chalcis, and Antiochus moved to cut them off, beginning the war with crime and impiety, killing Romans and Chalcidians “with war not yet declared” inside the precinct of Delian Apollo.98 With this act so marked in its contrast to the Roman reticence to initiate hostilities and to avoid an irreparable break, and most of all with the Romans’ care to follow forms and act honorably, the war against Antiochus is fully legitimated. That the Romans had already mobilized and crossed to Greece made clear that they understood such an act was likely.

Rather than embarking on a provisional war vote as with the ultimatum to Philip V, the Romans counted on putting themselves in Antiochus’ path to initiate a state of war in such a way that freed them from having to fully articulate specific demands or their legal position, which might have seemed weak. Through this shrewd maneuver the Romans were freed of the obligations of amicitia and could pursue hostilities against Antiochus however far they wished. The question the new consul, Glabrio, posed to the fetials about delivering a declaration of war confirms that Rome’s anxieties about the legitimacy and formal correctness of a war hinged on these questions of status and obligation:

97 Livy 35.46.9-11: Ad haec Micythio, unus ex principibus, mirari se dixit ad quos liberandos Antiochus relicto regno suo in Europam traiecisset; nullam enim civitatem se in Graecia nosse quae aut praesidium habeat aut stipendium in Romanis pendat aut foedere iniquo adligata quas nolit leges patiatur; itaque Chalcidenses neque vindice libertatis ullo egere, cum liberi sint, neque praesidio, cum pacem eiusdem populi Romani beneficio et libertatem habeant.
98 Livy 35.50: nondum ... indirecto bello
Manius Acilius, acting upon the *senatus consultum*, asked the fetials whether war had to be declared to the king in person or if it was sufficient to announce it to some military post, whether war should be declared separately against the Aetolians, and whether their friendship and alliance had to first be renounced before war could be declared.99 (Livy 36.3.7-8)

Their reply was that their response in the previous war set precedent for not having to declare the war to the king himself and that, since the Aetolians had already taken Demetrias by force, their *societas* and *amicitia* were already void.100 Livy thus brings the pentad to a close with an episode that serves to legitimate all that follows and opens the next with the Romans exactingly following ritual, declaring war, and obtaining a favorable omen.101

**The Peace of Apamea and Roman Continuity**

Unlike the peace treaty given to Philip V, the Peace of Apamea forced the loser to cede a number of territories that had not been in dispute at any point during the war, and which the Romans could make no pretext of having been called in to liberate. Forcing the king to give up all possessions west of the Taurus range was a logical move, given such a natural frontier, but Roman unwillingness to accept the anything resembling a *status quo ante* after crossing the Hellespont is yet another stark indication that while defense was an extremely powerful *casus belli*, it was not the primary ethic dictating Roman wars and foreign policy. Apamea also saw the Romans, less beholden to an espoused mission of liberation, dispose of captured territory much more freely, not directly seizing it for themselves but doling it out as rewards to their allies. The status difference accorded to cities that surrendered before and after the battle of Magnesia also

99 Livy 36.3.7-8: *M’ Acilius ex senatus consulto ad collegium fetialium rettulit, ipsine utique regi Antiocho indiceretur bellum an satis esset ad praesidium aliquod eius nuntiari, et num Aetolis quoque separatim indici iuberent bellum, et num prius societas et amicitia eis renuntianda esset quam bellum indicendum*.

100 What missions in particular constituted the *legatis totiens repetentibus res* (36.3.10), however, is unclear, perhaps indicating that the formal element of *res repetendae* had been dropped and some degree of strenuous diplomatic complaint was now sufficient.

101 Livy 36.1-3.
conforms much more directly to Roman practice in Italy and Sicily. Thus, despite the novelty of these Asian conquests, Roman behavior would prove entirely traditional.102

During the war, Livy has Scipio Africanus respond to a representative of Antiochus sent to meet with him privately in a manner that shows there were no strictures on Roman ambition and which can in no way be reconciled with ideas of defensive imperialism.

“You should have held Lysimachia so we could not enter the Chersonese or block that lest we cross into Asia if you were going to seek peace as if we were worried about the war’s outcome. Since Antiochus has allowed our crossing into Asia, almost as if he had willingly accepted not just the reins but the yoke, how can there be any discussion of peace on equal terms since our command must be accepted?”103 (Livy 37.36.4-5)

Yet, after the battle of Magnesia, Livy’s Africanus gives a fuller exposition of the same basic demands which makes clear that he conceives of this as traditional Roman practice. For, when an envoy of Antiochus seeks the leniency Rome had given to others on the grounds that the victory had made the Romans almost godlike masters of the world who should spare the human race, Scipio retorts that the Romans’ success is a gift of the gods and that they themselves keep their spirits in check just as they always have.104 Roman success and divine support is implicitly linked with the maintenance of the mos maiorum, and thus this success is itself continues to be further proof of Roman justice.

The settlement the Romans imposed after the battle of Magnesia was equally traditional. The senate appears to have always intended to reward its allies with territory, but this raised the difficult problem of squaring the interests of Rome’s allies and local rivals, Pergamum and Rhodes. With disingenuous but inspired reticence, Eumenes, who likely was responsible for

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102 Eckstein, Greek East, 348-9.
103 Livy 37.36.4-5: Lysimachia tenenda erat ne Chersonesum intraremus, aut ad Hellespontum obsistendum ne in Asiam traicercemus, si pacem tamquam ab sollicitis de belli eventu petituri eratis. Concesso vero in Asiam transitu, et non solum frenis sed etiam iugo accepto, quae disceptatio ex aequo, cum imperium patiendum sit, relicta est?
104 Livy 37.45.8.
turning Magnesia into a Roman victory, at first declines to name his desired reward.105 Called back before the senate, he gives an elaborate speech, claiming that the Rhodians would ask that many states be liberated, including some he considered ancestral possessions. Their interest, he claims, is not concern for Greek freedom, for Rhodes would acquire de facto control of these states, but weakening Pergamum. Expertly tactful in nevertheless acknowledging that Rhodes deserves a reward, Eumenes ends his speech not with any specific request, but by reasserting the principle that the senate surely had in mind:

“But it truly is a great thing to set enslaved states free. So I think, if they have done nothing hostile to you. If, however, they were on Antiochus’ side, how much more worthy of your prudence and equity is it to reward deserving allies than enemies?”106 (Livy 37.53.28)

The Rhodians, apologizing for having to speak ill of Eumenes, assert that it is right for him to have barbarians as subjects, and they helpfully suggest Lycaonia, Pisidia, both Phrygias, and the Chersonese, but the Greeks are a fundamentally different; giving Greek cities to Eumenes would mar the glory obtained in the Second Macedonian War.107 Both speeches, framed with deference, won approval from the patres, and the principle of the settlement, making significant territorial grants to both while granting freedom to cities which had gone over to Rome by the day of the decisive battle, was a sound compromise designed to please both parties. The Roman obligation to further their allies’ interest also shows up in their raising the question of Soli, which the Rhodians wished to have set free despite being one of Antiochus’ possessions on the far side of the Taurus range. Although few could have been sanguine about this hope, the Romans made a

105 Grainger, Roman War, 325-9; Eckstein, Greek East, 332-3.
106 Livy 37.53.28: At enim magnificum est liberare civitates servas. Ita opinor, si nihil hostile adversus vos fecerunt; sin autem Antiochi partis fuerant, quanto est vestra prudentia et aequitate dignius sociis bene meritis quam hostibus vos consulere!
107 Livy 37.54.24: Barbari, quibus pro legibus semper dominorum imperia fuerunt, quo gaudent, reges habeant; Graeci suam fortunam, vestros animos gerunt. The Pergamene kingdom was not itself a homogeneous unit: Eumenes I and Attalus had used force to compel the submission of Greek cities, see R.E. Allen, The Attalid Kingdom: A Constitutional History (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1983), 41-5.
show of advocating for their cause, prompting the Rhodians to offer effusive thanks and then politely withdraw the claim that could have scuttled the treaty with Antiochus.  

The fundamental principle outlined by the Romans has little to with abstractions and legal niceties. What matters is simply whether or not a city or nation had formed a relationship with the Roman people. The consul Gnaeus Manlius Vulso and the decemvirs sent from Rome carefully put a settlement based on this principle into effect, and Livy’s account includes a substantial portion of the treaty then finalized at Ephesus in 188 BCE and its implementation. Those which had been tributaries of Antiochus but threw in their lot with Rome were immune from taxation, the grant of *immunitas* effectively granting autonomy, while Eumenes was deprived of none of his former tributaries. By listing a variety of specific cases, Livy means to impress the reader with the commission’s careful work. Rather than giving the impression of Rome thoughtlessly divvying up Asia Minor between two rapacious masters, the episode may have redounded to Rome’s credit.

Rome’s unchallenged Mediterranean hegemony was inaugurated by the defeat of Antiochus and brought the power-transition crisis and political revolution initiated by the Ptolemaic regime’s foundering to an end. This transformation, the theme of Polybius’ work, was not lost on the Romans, despite the resistance seen in Livy to his Greek source’s programmatic interpretations. Yet in Livy, and seemingly in Polybius’ Roman sources, we find the Romans behaving just as they did at the dawn of the Republic, especially in advocating for and defending their allies. Since this earns their *fides*, Livy can contrast the relatively benevolent hegemony of Rome with the tyrannical power Antiochus exercised his subjects, providing striking examples

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108 Livy 37.56.7-10; Briscoe, *Commentary* vol. 2, 388-9; Walbank *Commentary* vol. 3, 118.
109 Livy 38.38 for the treaty, and 38.39 for the disposition of individual cities.
such as the Chalcidean repudiation of Antiochus’ offer to set them free. This limited degree of consent legitimates Roman power in the same way that the fides of the Latins and Hernici did in Livy’s first pentad. Additionally, Livy makes Rome’s wars appear inevitable by characterizes Rome’s opponents as unfaithful and hostile. Moreover, although they prosecuted the war aggressively, Livy and Polybius show the Romans refusing to take the initiative in severing their relationship with the king even while preparing for war, thus forcing Antiochus into the position of the unfaithful ally. And, while the slogan of Greek freedom fades into the background in the Peace of Apamea, yet as Livy presents it, the settlement the Romans impose was anything but unprincipled. The continual upheaval in Greek politics following the Isthmian Proclamation implicitly undercuts the notion that Rome could ensure stability in the region simply with auctoritas, and so the Romans fall back upon their traditional policy of bolstering friendly states. The continuity in Roman behavior and the terms in which wars are justified between Livy’s first and fortieth book remain striking.
Chapter 7

Perseus and Roman Disillusionment

The Battle of Magnesia established Rome in an unprecedented position of power over the Mediterranean, but winning set-piece battles proved much easier than establishing order. Struggles within and between Greek states continued unabated, although now they often played out before the senate, and the autonomy the Romans had granted was used to prosecute feuds and rivalries which destabilized the Roman settlement. Every decision the senate made could only fill the powder keg of dissatisfaction, which the revanchist policy of Perseus, son of Philip V of Macedon, ignited. For the Romans, and in the distinct but parallel view of Polybius, Perseus’ popularity was difficult to understand, prompting attempts to explain anti-Roman sentiment through class prejudice and in terms of national characters. Despairing of creating long-lasting bonds of fides and mistrusting allies such as Rhodes and Pergamum, the Romans began to act more unilaterally and resort more quickly to war. The Roman historical tradition therefore tends to regard signs of independence as irrational hostility to Rome and seeks to justify the Romans’ increasing reliance on force by focusing upon the perceived ethical failings and hostility of Rome’s opponents. Thus the Third Punic War, a cynical move to eliminate out a hated former rival, was justified in terms of Carthaginian treachery, and the destruction of Corinth in 146 BCE was a frustrated reaction to a rebellious strain of Greek politics which the Romans, expecting long-lasting gratitude for their stewardship, did not understand.
Philip and Perseus’ Opposition to Rome

Livy and Polybius maintain that the Third Macedonian War derive from Philip’s preparations for a decisive confrontation with Rome, despite narratives which suggest that the king and his successor were merely attempting to assert Macedon’s status as a regional power. Philip and Perseus’ path necessarily led to war, but although the Roman tradition sees their provocative acts as willful, they embarked upon it through miscalculation. In Philip and Perseus, Polybius saw a sort of madness leading to the tragic destruction of the Macedonian kingdom, the same madness that led to many in Greece, usually the contemptible masses, supporting the king, and to the continual squabbles that would ultimately lead to the destruction of Corinth in 146 BCE. As far as Philip and Perseus go, this was a theme Livy was happy to take up. While not a convincing historical explanation, this emphasis on Perseus choosing war with Rome should not be discarded as a thin pretext the annihilation of a clearly overmatched kingdom, for it appears to genuinely reflect the Roman perception of the conflict. For, while Roman justifications for war had not changed, Rome’s hegemonic position allowed it to demand stricter compliance and highlighted the asymmetry of the fides relationships it had always sought to impose. That Perseus had no sound plan ultimately reinforces the Romans’ sense of his inveterate and irrational hostility and thus, from the Roman perspective, legitimates the use of force.

From almost the moment the war against Antiochus ended, Greek complaints against Philip began pouring in. Philip had been blamed for stirring up the Thracian ambush of Gnaeus Manlius’ return from his Galatian campaign, Eumenes then complained that Philip had subjugated Thrace through espionage, and the Athamanians, Perrhaebians, and Thessalians were
agitating for the return of some of their old territories from Philip.¹ When Philip was forced to withdraw from Thessaly and, not much later, give up Aenus and Maeronea, he complained bitterly of Roman prejudice against him and massacred some of his opponents in the latter city.² These acts and aggressive policies caused Polybius to conclude that Philip had begun preparations for a large-scale war against Rome, and that Perseus only brought them to fruition.³

In his twenty-second book Polybius says: Already from these events came the beginning of the misfortunes that destroyed the Macedonian royal house. And yet I am not unaware that some of those writing about the Roman war against Perseus, wishing to show us the conflict’s causes, mark out the expulsion of Abrupolis from his kingdom [of Athamania], since he seized the mines of Mt. Pangaeus after Philip’s death. Perseus came to defend them and then routed and expelled Abrupolis from his kingdom. Following this they cite Perseus’ invasion of Dolopia and his visit to Delphi, and then the attack on king Eumenes at Delphi, the seizure of the Boeotian envoys, from which some say that the war with Perseus came about. Indeed I say it is most important for writers and those who wish to understand history know the causes of events, but most writers are quite mixed up in not understanding how the pretext differs from the cause, and then how the cause of a war differs from its beginning. Thus, with the events themselves dictating it, I have been forced to repeat myself.

Of all those events just mentioned, the first are the pretexts and the latter, that is the attack on Eumenes, the seizure of the ambassadors, and other similar events are clearly the beginning of the war between Rome and Perseus and the undoing of Macedonian power, but none of them are the cause. For, just as I said that Philip, son of Amyntas, planned and intended to wage the war against the Persians, but Alexander became the instrument of his designs, thus now I say Philip, son of Demetrius, decided to wage this last war against the Romans and had all the preparations made for the attempt, but when he died Perseus became the one to carry it out. If this is true [that Philip planned the war], then that is also clear [that these were the causes], for it is not possible that the causes of the war came after the death of the one who decided on and prepared for it. That is what is found in other writers, for all the things they mention came after Philip’s death.⁴

(Polybius 22.18)

¹ For the ambush, see Livy 38.40.8. For tampering with Thrace, Pol 22.6; See Walbank, Commentary vol. 3, 10-13, 184-6, for the placement of the fragment relative to Livy.
³ For a narrative of Philip’s actions and consolidation after the war, see F.W. Walbank, Philip V of Macedon (Hamdon, Conn.: Archon Books 1967), 223-57.
⁴ Pol. 22.18: Ὅτι φησὶν ὁ Πολύβιος ἐν τῷ εἰκοστῷ δεύτερῳ· περὶ δὲ τὴν τῶν ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ βασιλέων οἰκίαν ἤδη τις ἀπὸ τούτον τῶν καρδιῶν ἐφέστη κακῶν ἀνηκέστων ἀρχῆς, καθ’ ά’ οὐκ ἄγνοιο διότι τινὲς τῶν συγγραφόντων περὶ τούτῳ (συστάτους) Ῥωμαίοις πολέμου πρὸς Περσέα, βουλόμενοι τὰς αἰτίας ἡμῖν ἐπιδεικνύοντες τῆς διαφοράς, πρῶτον μὲν ἀποφαίνουσι τὴν Ἀβρουπόλιος ἐκπτωσιν ἐκ τῆς ἱδίας δυναστείας, ὡς καταδραμόντος αὐτοῦ τά περὶ τό
Some of these unknown authors must have been annalists, and Polybius’ phrasing implies that his interpretation was original and distinct from contemporary Roman propaganda. Livy readily accepts this judgment and makes it the basis for his own account of all Rome’s interactions with Macedon after Apamea. Unlike another large-scale Polybian interpretive framework which he rejected, the συμπλοκή, this concrete personal narrative seems to have appealed to Livy’s dramatic sensibilities. As with Polybius’ similar discussion of Hamilcar and Hannibal, Livy retains the personal but omits the abstract distinctions between causes and beginnings.

When Livy adapts this passage, he combines it with what was probably a Polybian discussion of Philip’s grievances, now lost:

The impending war with King Perseus and the Macedonians came not from the causes people generally think, nor from Perseus himself: the preparations were left unfinished by Philip and he, had he lived longer, would have waged the war himself. One thing in particular exasperated him when terms were imposed after his defeat, that the senate denied him the right to punish the Macedonians who had defected from him during the war although, since Quinctius had deferred its discussion in the negotiations, he had not then despaired of obtaining it. Then, with King Antiochus defeated at Thermopylae and duties in the war assigned, when the consul Acilius was besieging Heraclea and he himself had invested Lamia, he had taken it quite ill that, after Heraclea’s capture by the Romans, he had been ordered to withdraw from Lamia and that town too had been surrendered...
Livy makes clear that Philip’s gains, approved of or not contested by the Romans, did not reconcile him to Roman hegemony, but only temporarily assuaged his anger. Moreover, both Livy and Polybius place their discussions of Philip’s dissatisfaction at the point when these sops for the king’s wounded pride were being contested. Both authors’ interpretations of Philip and Perseus’ aims are extremely exaggerated and do not fit their accounts of Philip’s actions and strategic preparations. Livy places the king’s ultimate decision to rebel after he sated his anger against his opponents in Maeronea and not only failed to convince the Romans that the massacre was the result of the city’s own civil strife, but was compelled to hand over one of his officials for questioning. After this blow, the king sent his younger son Demetrius to Rome as a hostage and goodwill ambassador. Philip’s enemies took this as a sign of weakness and sent to Rome, where Polybius tells us it took three days to introduce all those who had come to complain of the king. The senate attempted some conciliation by crediting Demetrius for their leniency, or perhaps they truly did seek to meddle in the Macedonian succession, but their efforts only doomed their favorite.

Although there is a strong case to be made that Roman interference in the Macedonian succession was the decisive factor in the success of Perseus’ plot against his brother Demetrius, Livy, adapting Polybius, blames Philip’s own crimes. For, he tells how Philip began to eliminate

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5 Livy 39.23.1-9: *Cum Perseo rege et Macedonibus bellum quod imminebat, non unde plerique opinantur, nec ab ipso Perseo causas cepit: inchoata initia a Philippo sunt; et is ipse, si diutius vixisset, id bellum gessisset. Una eum res, cum victo leges imponerentur, maxime angebat, quod qui Macedonum ab se defecerant in bello, in eos ius saeviendi adventum ei ab senatu erat, cum quia rem integram Quinctius in conditionibus pacis distulerat, non desperasset impretari posse. Antiocho rege deidnde bello superato ad Thermopylas, divisis partibus, cum per eosdem dies consul Acilis Heracleam, Philippus Lamiam oppugnasset, capta Heraclea quia iussus abscedere a moenibus Lamiæ erat Romanisque oppidum deditum es, aegre eam rem tulerat.*

6 A passing phrase of Livy’s, 39.24.5, may indicate some cognizance of the difficulty, for at this point he describes Philip’s anger at the Romans rising anew: *rediere deinde causae, quae de integro iram moverent in Romanos.*

7 Livy 39.35.2: *Et legati a Philippi colloquio ita digressi sunt, ut prae se ferrent nihil eorum sibi placere, et Philippus minime, quin rebellandum esset, dubius.* Pol. 23.9 also mentions this mission.

8 Pol. 23.1; Justinus 32.2 compresses Demetrius’ downfall into one section dominated by this incident and has the same moralizing tone of Polybius and Livy with regard to Perseus. Appian *Mac.* 9.6 is briefer still.
the children of those he had executed and spins the pitiable tale of Theoxena, who killed her children and herself to avoid falling into the king’s hands. The people poured out curses upon the king in outrage, and “these curses were soon heard by all the gods, who brought it to pass that Philip turned on his own family.”⁹ Within Livy’s long and gripping tale of the plot against Demetrius, Perseus’ accusations that the Romans of trying to install his brother as a puppet ruler only surface as fabrications in service of the conspiracy.¹⁰ Flamininus’ influence on Demetrius was a key point of contention, for Polybius records that a letter from the Roman asking Philip to quickly send Demetrius back to Rome was instrumental in convincing Philip to assassinate his son, and that Flamininus encouraged the young prince to hope that the Romans would place him on the throne.¹¹ While Demetrius had reason to be associated with Flamininus, for it was with him he had been sent as a hostage after Cynoscephalae during his formative years, the Roman was particularly suspect at this time, having just been accused in the court of rumor in the death of Hannibal.¹² Livy 40.21.3-4 confirms that Philip sent agents to Rome investigating Demetrius’ association with Flamininus, but the historian attempts to diffuse the suggestion of impropriety by inserting Flamininus and his brother as examples of fraternal harmony into his adaptation of a speech Polybius has Philip address to his sons.¹³ What prompted Philip to order Demetrius’ assassination was a forged letter, allegedly from Flamininus, indicating that Demetrius was

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⁹ Livy 40.5.1: \textit{Huius atrocitas facinoris novam velut flammam regis invidiae adiecit, ut volgo ipsum liberosque exsecrarentur; quae dirae, brevi ab omnibus dis exaudita, ut saeviret ipse in suum sanguinem effecerunt}. This is Livy’s adaptation of Polybius 23.10, which waxes poetic on divine justice. He has done some small-scale reorganization, putting divine judgment before the story of Theoxena, but all the material surely comes from Polybius. The manner in which Pol. 23.10.15 breaks off implies that specific incidents follow, probably including Theoxena.

¹⁰ Livy 40.5-40.16.3.

¹¹ Pol. 23.1.4-9, 23.3.7-9.

¹² Demetrius’ first period as a hostage was from 198-191 BCE: Pol. 18.39.5; 21.3a. For Hannibal, see Livy 39.51.

¹³ The Polybian fragment is 23.11. It is possible but highly unlikely that what is lost contained the Roman \textit{exempla} of Livy 40.8.15.
plotting against his family. The political content of Polybius’ version is difficult to ascertain, but Livy appears to have adapted Polybius’ fatalistic interpretation of the fall of the Antigonid monarchy while suppressing Flamininus’ indiscretions in a way that trivializes Roman attempts to interfere with Macedonian succession.

Were it not for Polybius and Livy’s asseveration that Philip was preparing for war with Rome, it would seem that he was engaging in the same sorts of regional rivalries as the rest of Greece. Either because of his greater resources or recent enmity, the Romans would not tolerate his ambitions, and his enemies took advantage of the suspicion in which he was already held at Rome to help themselves to contested territories. For Livy, the idea that Philip was plotting a war against Rome at this early stage thus serves to buttress the accusations of Rome’s allies and clear Rome of breaking fides with the king in bilking him of the territories it had bestowed upon him. The narrative then offers further proof of Philip’s cruelty, beginning with the massacre at Maeronea and continuing on to the murder of his own son, which conveniently assimilates the next king Perseus to his father’s character. Livy’s readers are thus prepared to regard almost any action against Philip and Perseus as legitimate. While Polybius’ attribution of the war with Perseus to Philip was unique and thus could not have been part of actual casus belli, the vague rumors about Philip’s activities, that he had engineered the Thracian ambush of Gnaeus Manlius and that he was planning on having the Bastarnae invade Italy, were contemporary. This suggests that the annalists took a similar tone, treating Philip’s hostility to Rome as irreducible and

14 Livy 40.22.10.
15 Livy 40.25; 40.45-6. This, in effect, makes Perseus not just a criminal but an illegitimate king.
16 At one point Livy’s language hints that the senate was aware that the question of Philip’s successor was ambiguous, 39.48.1. When the senate sent him back to his father, they did so knowing “that they had his soul hostage, even if they returned his body to his father,” language that Perseus picks up in his later accusation in 40.5.12. Yet Livy implies that it was the senate’s innocent attempt at raising the young man’s distinction, amplitudo, that caused offense and suspicion.
emphasized the complaints against him, possibly in greater detail than Livy’s history could accommodate.

The Reign of Perseus

When Perseus ascended to the throne in 179 BCE he immediately sent to Rome to renew Macedon’s alliance, but Livy interprets this as temporizing. In Polybius, the renewal of the treaty introduces a fragment describing the initial character of his rule, in which the king offered relief to various debtors and exiles, established a dignified and kingly persona, and gave the Greeks good hopes for his reign.\(^\text{17}\) Attempting to explain why so many Greeks eventually sided with the king against Rome, Polybius places great significance on Perseus’ dignified public self-presentation differing greatly from the character he displayed in palace intrigues.\(^\text{18}\) In a later passage, located after Perseus’ initial victory over Roman forces, Polybius famously compares Greek enthusiasm for the king to a crowd’s natural reflex to support an underdog, using as an example a famous boxing match in which Greeks cheered for a boxer who represented Ptolemy rather than one of their own:\(^\text{19}\)

The multitude’s disposition to Perseus then was similar to this incident, for if someone had asked them frankly whether they wanted such great power to fall to one man and to experience monarchy, especially the rule of someone who could in no way be held accountable, I suspect that, having thought it over, they would have thoroughly recanted and inclined the other way. And, if someone had briefly pointed out all of the troubles that Macedonian dynasty had made for the Greeks and all the benefits of Roman rule, I think they would have changed their minds straight away. However, the delight of the crowd at the news [of the Roman defeat] was clear and in accord with their first impulse: they were pleased by the unexpectedness of there being anyone who could oppose the Romans. I was compelled to treat this matter at such length lest anyone, not understanding human nature, wrongly reproach the Greeks’ ingratitude at that time.\(^\text{20}\)

\(^{17}\) Livy 40.58.8; Pol 25.3.  
\(^{18}\) Champion, Cultural Politics, 220-39.  
\(^{19}\) Polybius introduces gives this anecdote at length along with the first report of Perseus’ victory in 27.9.  
\(^{20}\) Pol. 27.10: Τούτῳ δὲ παραπλήσιον ἦν καὶ τὸ κατὰ τὸν Περσέα συμβαίνον περὶ τοὺς ὄχλους· εἰ γάρ τις ἐπιστήσας αὐτοὺς ἠρετόν μετὰ παρρησίας εἰ βουλόμεν᾽ ἢν εἰς ἕνα πεσεῖν τὴν τηλικαύτην ὑπεροχὴν καὶ λαβεῖν μοναρχίκης
Polybius had a vested interest in spinning Greek behavior in the least negative way possible, especially considering his prominent role putting the pieces back together after the disaster of 146 BCE, but this is not just special pleading. His judgments about human nature were the fruit of perplexity and disappointment, but also tie in with his pervasive concern for informed moral judgments. Polybius’ paradoxical assertion that the Greeks were not, in fact, ungrateful, depends upon his political prejudices, for Perseus’ support came largely from the populace. Since Polybius sees such popular enthusiasms and the masses’ unmediated political self-assertion as illegitimate and self-destructive, he attempts to frame opposition to Rome not as a considered Greek policy, but as a natural human failing to be pardoned.

Perseus’ deceptively auspicious start has no place in Livy, who had already shown the king’s true colors and established a hostile perception of him at Rome. What mattered to the Romans was not whether Perseus cut a fine figure, but the obligations of *fides* to Rome that should have made the king’s self-presentation irrelevant. In consequence, the Roman interpretation of Perseus’ conciliatory moves towards Greece is entirely negative; Livy frames the king’s popularity as part of a competition with Eumenes, in which Perseus’ vain promises were believed despite rumors of his wickedness. Livy lists three possible reasons for Greek credulity: the antique repute of the Macedonian monarchy breeding contempt for Eumenes’ new

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21 See Pol. 9.22-26 on Hannibal’s character and his view that choices made under duress are those least illustrative of one’s true character.
23 Livy 42.5.6: *seu fama et maiestate Macedonum regum praecoccupat ad spernendam originem novi regni, seu mutationis rerum cupidis, seu qua non obiecti esse Romanis volebant.*
dynasty; popular eagerness for revolution; or, last and most significantly, a desire that not
everything be subject to the Romans. The passage has a clear Polybian ring to it, but it takes on a
very different meaning in the context of a Roman’s history.24 Although first two rationales
merely indicate popular vanity, the third is cast not as Polybius’ natural desire for autonomy, but
as hostility toward Rome. The word used for “subject,” obiecti, also hints at a degree resentment
and conflicts with how the Romans preferred to conceptualize their hegemony.25

Livy casts Perseus’ attempts to win over the Greeks as a subversion of Roman authority.
To make this connection he has to associate these moves, which Perseus tried to frame as settling
the quarrels the Greeks had with his father, with allied complaints that he was undermining the
stability of other states by fostering demagogic politics. The most damning piece of evidence
came from Masinissa, who convinced the Romans that Perseus had sent legates to Carthage and
that they had a secret night meeting with the Carthaginian senate.26 Most importantly, Livy
makes the case that Perseus was attempting to usurp Rome’s authority in Greece.

Around this time (174 BCE) Perseus set out against and subjugated the Dolopians
because some of them were not obedient and were calling for their disputes to be
brought before the Romans instead of the king... When he had suddenly appeared
in the middle of Greece he caused great terror not just to nearby cities but even
caused disturbing reports to make it so far as Eumenes. He stayed at Delphi not
more than three days and returned to his kingdom through Phthiotic Achaea and
Thessaly without causing any damage or injury to their lands. He was not satisfied
with conciliating merely those cities he passed through but, either by sending
legates or letters, sought that they should no longer pay any heed to the quarrels
they had with his father. These were not so bitter, he said, that they could not or
should not be brought to an end. Between those Greeks and Perseus, all was made
new and ready for faithfully establishing friendship.27 (Livy 41.22.1-7)

24 For the attribution, see Nissen, *Kritische Untersuchungen*, 243-4. Tränkle, *Livius*, has nothing on this passage.
25 As with Hiero’s policy before the First Punic War in Pol. 1.83.3.
26 Livy 41.22.
27 Livy 41.22.1-7: Perseus per id tempus, quia quidam Dolopum non parebant, et de quibus ambigebatur rebus
disceptationem ab rege ad Romanos revocabant, cum exercitus profectus sub ius iudiciumque suum totam coegit
gentem. ... Cum in media repente Graecia apparuisset, magnum non finitimus modo urbibus terrem praebuat, sed
in Asia quoque ad regem Eumenes tumultuos... misit.† Triduum non plus Delphis omoratus, per
Pthiotidem Achaian Thessalianque sine damno iniuria †...sum per quorum† iter fecit, in regnorum redit. Nec
habuit animos sibi conciliare; aut legatos aut litteras dimisit, petens ne diutius simulantum quae cum patre suo
Perseus’ suppression of the Dolopians was an expansionist move, for the Roman command that Philip remain within the ancient bounds of Macedon excluded Dolopia. Moreover, although Perseus presented his march through Greece as a religious visit to Delphi, the Greek reaction shows that it was a show of force aimed at the northern Greek communities intended to demonstrate that Macedon was once again an ascendant military power. These aggressive acts combined with the attempt to reset relationships with Greece altered the status quo and was seen by the Romans as unwelcome competition. The Romans also saw Macedonian involvement with the Dardanians and Bastarnae as an attempt to distract them with troubles on the border of Italy. Perseus’ Carthaginian intrigues, however, are what made all his actions appear truly sinister. That the meeting with the Carthaginian senate took place at night renders it sinister and, like the intrigues the Romans feared from Hannibal when he resided with Antiochus, contributes most to the idea that he was planning a major war against Rome. Thus, at the beginning of 175 BCE, Livy has Roman legates return from Macedonia claiming that Perseus would not long delay war.

In 172 BCE Eumenes himself came to Rome with a dire account of Perseus’ preparations for war, reinforcing the idea that the king inherited the war plan from his father in a vignette that bears a striking resemblance to the story of Hannibal’s oath. Most salient for this discussion, Livy has Eumenes connect support for Perseus with opposition to Rome:

For Eumenes said that Perseus’ dignity was revered by all the cities of Greece and Asia. This esteem was not accorded him for any merits or generosity, and

"fuisset meminissent; nec enim tam atroces fuisse eas ut non cum ipso potuerint ac debuerint finiri; secum quidem omnia illis integra esse sae instituendum fideliter amicitiam."

28 Although Philip had conquered the Dolopians during the Aetolian War, Thebes seized the Dolopian city of Menelaïs and the Romans seem to have upheld their claim. See Livy 36.33; 39.26.
29 Livy 41.19.4-11. Although Livy pays significant attention to this, the alleged Dardanian threat to Italy remains obscure and difficult to credit.
30 Livy 42.2.1-2.
31 Livy 42.11.
Eumenes was unable to discern or say for certain whether this happened by some chance or, what he himself was reticent to mention, because hostility towards the Romans obtained him favor.\(^{32}\) (Livy 42.12.1-2)

Were that not bad enough, Seleucus and Prusias were paying court to Perseus, Eumenes’ own reputation had suffered for his support of Rome, the Boeotians, once enemies of Macedon, were leaning towards Perseus, the Achaeans had barely been prevented from associating with the king, and the Aetolians, beset by their own civil strife, had also sought help from this traditional enemy. Eumenes then articulates hostile acts that could be the basis for war with Macedon: the expulsion of the *socius atque amicus*, Abrupolis, from his kingdom, the execution of a pro-Roman Illyrian, Arthetaurus, along with two Boeotians, aid to Byzantium contrary to the treaty, and the campaign against the Dolopians. He then described Perseus’ military march to Delphi as an attempt to further unsettle Boeotia and Perrhaebia, which were then embroiled in civil war.\(^{33}\) These comprise most of the *casus belli* which Polybius articulates.\(^{34}\)

Livy then makes a dramatic set piece of Perseus’ attempted assassination of Eumenes, which Perseus thought would be the war’s first blood, and the senate learns shortly thereafter that Perseus had attempted to suborn a citizen of Brundisium into poisoning Roman officials as they passed through.\(^{35}\) Nevertheless, the Romans observe formalities and do not yet declare war. Livy’s language shows that the relationship between the king and Rome was a tie that, until severed, prevented a declaration of war. For, upon learning of the attempted assassinations, the senate passed a motion declaring Perseus an enemy and even sent garrisons to Apollonia and other coastal Epirote cities, yet still had to notify him of this changed status. Livy specifies that

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\(^{32}\) Livy 42.12.1-2: *Nam apud Graeciae atque Asia civitates vereri maiestatem eius omnes. Nec pro quibus meritis pro qua munificentia tantum ei tribuatur, cernere nec dicere pro certo posse, utrum felicitate id quadam eius accidat an, quod ipse vereatur dicere, invidia adversus Romanos favorem illi conciliet.*

\(^{33}\) For the senate’s indifference to Abrupolis, who was merely an adscriptus to the earlier peace with Philip, see Gruen, *Hellenistic World*, 403.

\(^{34}\) Pol. 2.18.

\(^{35}\) Livy 42.15-16. The assassination attempt is motivated by Perseus’ envoy Harpalus indicating that the Romans were leaning towards war. The attempted poisoning is in Livy 42.17.
war was decided on, but not yet declared: *bello etsi non indicto, tamen iam decreto.* The crucial act was sending three legates demanding reparations and renouncing *amicitia.* Perseus’ response was to angrily complain that the Romans continued to watch his every move and mistakenly thought that all he did was subject to their approval. Then the next day he delivered a written statement:

> Thus a written reply was given to [the Roman legates]: He said that the treaty struck with his father had nothing to do with him and that he allowed it to be renewed not because he agreed, but because, as a new king, he had to endure all manner of abuse. If they wished to make a new treaty with him they should first discuss conditions; if they intended to make a treaty between equals, he would consider what he had to do as they would have to consider their own state interests. Then the king rushed out and ordered them all, just as they had begun to leave, to be removed from the palace. The legates said that they then had renounced their *amicitia* and alliance, and that, when they had said that, Perseus stopped and in a loud voice ordered them out of his kingdom within three days. *(Livy 42.25.10-12)*

Judging from Livy’s use of the phrase *res reddi,* the legates’ mission probably fulfilled fetial requirements, to whatever extent they were still in force, but the passage entirely elides the specifics. Moreover, while these legates had listed the charges and the conclusion the senate had come to, that Perseus had manifestly violated the treaty and was actively preparing war, these breaches alone did not suffice to terminate the relationship; the Romans strove to reconcile their obligations to their various allies and give Perseus some means of atonement by which he might keep his friendship with the Roman people. In a rage, Perseus himself was the one to sever all ties with Rome.

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36 Livy 42.19.3.
37 Livy 42.25.7: *Pro his iniuriis satisfieri senatum aequum censere, reddique sibi res sociisque suis quas contra ius foederis habeat.*
38 Livy 42.25.10-12: *Tum ita sibi scriptum traditum esse: foedus cum patre ictum ad se nihil pertinere; id se renovari, non quia probaret, sed quia in nova possessione regni patienda omnia essent, passum. Novum foedus si secum facere vellent, convenire prius de conditionibus debere; si in animum inducerent ut ex aequo foedus fieret, et se visurum quid sibi faciendum esset, et illos credere e re publica consulturos. Atque ita se proripuisse et summoveri e regia omnes coeptos. Tum se amicitiam et societatem renuntiasse. Qua voce eum accensum restitisse atque voce clara denuntiasse sibi ut triduo regni sui decederent finibus.*
Perseus’ rejection of the treaty and outburst would be an edifying story, were it true. Nissen, however, citing a fictitious clause in the treaty with Philip, judged that Livy 42.19-28 was adapted from an annalistic fabrication. That Livy used Polybius for the sections immediately prior explains the lack of any mention of the Roman envoys’ dispatch as well as the fact that one of their main complaints, a meeting with the kings of Asia, is mentioned nowhere else. A further point against it is that the actual declaration of war, located in 42.30, is dependent on Perseus not giving satisfaction, which would be nonsensical given the content of this mission. The invention of this inflammatory meeting, the report of which Livy credits for the senate’s hostility to Perseus, evidences a clear desire to make Perseus the war’s provocateur. This episode was a necessary annalistic fiction because, without it, Perseus’ actions, while inflammatory, can be interpreted as merely directed against his Greek rivals without hostility towards Rome. The aggrandizement of Macedon he aimed for would necessarily revolutionize, if not undo, the Roman settlement of Greece. Polybius, however, indicates that Perseus made a concerted effort to not break his friendship with Rome, advertising to every possible ally that he wished them to only support him so far as would not break their own agreements with the Romans. While this meant that he deeply misunderstood Roman goals in the region, it was not an entirely illogical. For, if he and his opponents were both Roman allies, he might hope that Rome would not become involved, or at least that they would be judged on an equal basis by the senate. The reason for this annalistic concoction was not to show that Perseus was the aggressor militarily. For, were that their concern, even if the attack on Eumenes were discounted, the complaints of

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41 See Pol. 27.6, discussed below.
any number of allies over the years could have been magnified into a desperate appeal and *casus belli*. Instead, their problem was to show that it was Perseus who broke faith with the Romans, whose duty it was to reconcile their friends and allies, rather than the Romans who ignored his conciliatory posture and pushed him to war.

Another, perhaps greater, problem for any historian eager to exclusively blame Perseus for the war was the embassy of Marcius Philippus to Perseus in 172 BCE, which laid the Romans open to the charge of flagrant deception. Part of a delegation sent to sound out Greek opinion as Rome began to mobilize, Perseus’ envoys approached him on account of the guest friendship established between Marcius’ father and Philip V, and the Roman and the king met at the Peneus river. Here, in 42.40, Livy gives Marcius the most forceful enumeration of the Roman complaints yet, and Perseus retorts with a speech in 42.41-2 that complains that the Romans were, at that moment, installing garrisons in Greek cities. This would be a strong counter to the Roman case had Livy’s narrative not unflinchingly affirmed Perseus’ culpability, especially in the attempted assassination of Eumenes. After this exchange, Marcius granted Perseus a truce for sending legates to Rome, not because there was any hope of peace, but to give the Romans more time to prepare and prevent the king from seizing strategic points along the coast.\(^42\) Livy subtly calls attention to Marcius’ misdeed with the phrase “with *fides* pledged to the truce” but deploys significant indirect commentary on the episode in the context of Marcius’ report to the senate, where the legate “gloried in nothing more than deceiving the king with a truce and the hope of peace.”\(^43\)

A large part of the senate approved, as if this had been done with the greatest foresight, but the older members and those mindful of the traditional standard of conduct said they recognized nothing of Roman practice in their actions...

\(^{42}\) Livy 42.43.2-3.
\(^{43}\) Livy 42.43.4: *fide indutiarium interposita*; 42.47.1: *Marcius et Atilius Romam cum venissent, legationem in Capitolio ita renuntiarunt ut nulla re magis gloriarentur quam decepto per indutias et spem pacis rege.*
Romans were accustomed to declare war before waging it, and to give notice where they would fight. It was with this same fides that they had handed over the doctor who plotted against his life to king Pyrrhus and the tutor and betrayer of children, bound, to the Faliscans. Those were the acts of Roman, not like Punic trickery or Greek sophistry, among whom it was more glorious to deceive an enemy than to defeat him.⁴⁴ (Livy 42.47.4-7)

This is a masterwork of indirect historiography, in which Livy has the authoritative senators expound his own views on Rome’s moral degeneration. The use of powerful exempla would need little comment except for the fact that here they establish the injustice of Roman conduct rather than vindicating it, something Livy avoids in the context of foreign policy, despite using it freely in domestic contexts. The downward trend in Roman morals which Livy saw and made central to his work’s preface had, of course, already surfaced in the shady dealings of Flamininus and squabbles about triumphs and the legitimacy of campaigns such as that of Gn. Manlius Vulso against the Galatians, but this turn in foreign policy was so dramatic that the historian did not reserve judgment. Nevertheless, this is no categorical condemnation of Rome; the justice of the war against Perseus is already over-determined by the king’s wickedness and Livy’s moral judgment is carefully circumscribed, with the authoritative and respectable members of the senate arguing for better practice. Livy himself is concerned about Roman honor, not whether Perseus was wronged.

Livy, however, does far more than take advantage of the opportunity for moralizing; he displaces these events out of their temporal sequence. The war vote occurs in Livy 42.30.8-11, and in 42.36.1 the king’s envoys were not admitted to the city because this vote had made them

⁴⁴ Livy 42.47.4-9: Haec ut summa ratione acta magna pars senatus adprobabat; veteres et moris antiqui memores negabant se in ea legatione Romanas agnoscere artes. Non per insidias et nocturna proelia, nec simulatam fugam improvisoqqsque ad incautum hostem reditus, nec ut astu magis quam vera virtute gloriarentur, bella maiores gessisse; indicere prius quam gerere solitos bella, denuntiare †etiam interdum† finire in quo dimicaturi essent. Eadem fide indicatum Pyrrho regi medicum vitae eius insidiantem; eadem Faliscis vincum traditum profiditorem liberorum. †tregis† haec Romana esse, non versusinterum Punicarum neque calliditatis Graecae, apud ‹quos› fallere hostem quam vi superverare gloriosius fuerit. Interdum in praezens tempus plus profici dolo quam virtute ‚sed eius demum animum in perpetuum vincii cui confessio expressa sit se neque arte neque casu, sed conlatis comminus viribus iusto ac pio esse bello superatum. Haec seniores, quibus nova ac nimiss...minus placebat sapientia.
formal enemies. Livy only takes up the narrative of Marcius and other Roman diplomats in 42.37, has the senate agree with his deception of Perseus in 42.47, and in 42.48 we find envoys from Perseus meeting with the senate and again being ordered out of Italy. The chronological problem has long been recognized and these envoys are a clear doublet of those sent away in 42.36. Since Nissen identified 42.30.8-36.7 as annalistic and 42.38.8 onward as Polybian sections of Livy, the tendency has been to view this issue as primarily the result of Livy incautiously combining his sources. Nissen saw the switch to Polybius in 42.37 as Livy’s demarcation of res Italiae and Graeciae. Rich conclusively proved that this meeting between Perseus and Marcius occurred in Autumn 172 BCE, before the setting of the Pleiades on Nov. 7th. Because of the linkage between 42.36.8-9, describing Sicinius’ crossing to Epirus and 37, which introduces Marcius’ mission with paucis post diebus, as well as the notice in 42.27.10-12 that Fulvius Flaccus committed suicide because his son had died in Illyria, Rich concludes that 42.18.1-5 is wrong in having Sicinius muster his troops as late as the Ides of February: they were already in position when Marcius met with Perseus. His interpretation is that the annalists were trying to make Rome seem less bellicose by delaying the deployment. Combined with the

45 Nissen, Kritische Untersuchungen, 243-56.
46 Nissen, Kritische Untersuchungen, 250: “Abgesehen von diesem chronologischen Widerspruch ist es für seine Methode bezeichnend dass er ganz dieselben Dinge zuerst nach den Annalen und darauf nach Polybios erzählt. Die vorliegende Partie c. 36-67 spielt im Wesentlichen in Griechenland und kann als allgemeine oder griechische Geschichte bezeichnet werden. Zwischen ihr und der vorhergehenden c.29. 30, in der wir eine Einleitung zur Geschichte von 583 [172] sahen, ist der italische Abschnitt ausgelassen.” Nissen goes too far in identifying Marcius’ reference in 42.40.1 to Perseus’ ambassadors with those sent after the war vote, which would then be an attempt to integrate this displaced section into its new position in the narrative. This is unlikely since the discovery of the citizen of Brundisium whom the king had attempted to persuade to poison Roman officials happened much earlier in 42.17, indicating that the embassy in question was that of Harpalus from 42.14.
47 This phrase is not “a loose copula,” as F.W. Walbank, “A Note on the Embassy of Q. Marcius Philippus, 172 B.C.” in JRS 31 (1941): 82-93, 85 would have it, but an original temporal link between Sicinius’ departure and that of the legates.
48 Rich, Declaring War, 88-99. Rich also disputes Walbank’s claim that Roman war votes had become conditional in order to adapt fetial procedure to wars further overseas. The main point of his discussion of the Third Macedonian War is to show that the condition included in the declaration was a direct response to Marcius’ embassy, which advised Perseus to send a further delegation to Rome, which had already been reported to the senate. Rich’s chronology is unimpeachable and indispensable for making sense of the order of events, yet I do not see what in his argument necessitates rejecting Walbank’s theory, which makes previous events much more comprehensible.
extra embassy in Livy discussed above, this shows an historiographical program that attempted to pin the blame on Perseus not so much for stirring up conflict, for this was beyond dispute, but for being the first to renounce the ties of amicitia and push for war, thus sparing Roman fides the charge of betraying an ally and propelling him to his own destruction. This program was already present in Livy’s annalistic source material and explains some of the content of his narrative of Marcius’ diplomatic mission, but does answer why Livy placed this episode after the war vote.

Livy’s repetition of the embassy from Perseus in both its annalistic and Polybian incarnations is not merely a mistake in stitching his source material together. Doublets of battles and campaigns in far-flung locales can be easily explained through varying descriptions of topography, casualty numbers, mistakes in recording a magistrate’s name, or the suspect claims families often made about their ancestors. Unlike these events, which are often passing details, the embassy and its ejection from Italy would necessarily include numerous time indicators and long rhetorical sections, making it unlikely that Livy merely reproduced both accounts unaware of the error. This must be taken more seriously since it is now no longer accepted that Livy mindlessly transcribed his sources, but often synthesized them into his own account. A number of structural points also force the conclusion that this doublet was deliberate. First, Polybius alternated between geographical areas, beginning with res Italiae and then moving through the Mediterranean, and Livy tended to defer to the Greek author outside of Italy and for foreign embassies at Rome. However, the Roman’s account of 172 BCE is entirely located in Italy, with foreign events narrated only as they were themselves described to the senate, excepting 42.15-16, which describes the attack on Eumenes. This is part of a Polybian section and 42.15.1 initially appears to be a Polybian geographical transition, but 42.16.9 follows the news of the attack back to Rome, whence the Italian material continues. Livy adds this to annalistic material also located
in Italy up through 42.28, after which point he moves into the year 171 BCE in a brief section, 29-30.7, also identified as Polybian.49 Livy thus omits the usual Greek section in his own account of 172 BCE, and it is probable that the Polybian account of Marcius’ mission in Greece was also part of the Italian section, since it traces the various envoys’ travels and returns to Rome for the senate’s discussion of Marcius’ deception. If this is the case, then Livy consciously moved this later section out of its Polybian context. If, on the other hand, it was part of a section on Greek affairs, then Livy has consciously omitted Polybius’ discussion of the war vote, which would have also been included in winter season. Therefore, either possible location within Polybius’ text requires that Livy was aware of the chronological problem and the ambassadorial doublet.

The reason for Livy’s heavy-handed manipulation of events becomes clear from Polybius’ testimony. For Perseus, in Polybius 27.4, after a meeting with Romans who can only have been Marcius and his companion Atilius, sends letters to a variety of Greek states making his case, yet provides that “if the Romans, contrary to the treaty, attack Perseus and the Macedonians, they should attempt to reconcile them.”50 Even when he attempts to interfere in Boeotia, contrary to Roman wishes, Perseus advises the Boeotians to not resist the Romans.51 Perseus’ preparations were not consistent with a plan to fight the Romans, and this response to Marcius’ mission makes clear that he meant to pursue his own interests but wished for peace with Rome. Livy himself admits that Perseus was taken in by Marcius’ ruse, which requires that Perseus desired peace, but by placing this episode after the war vote, Livy makes the king seem

49 Because Polybius organized his history by seasons, the consular year does not mark the dividing point in his narrative. Since this was part of the same winter as the end of 172, it was likely part of a single continuous section of Italian narrative, meaning that Livy did not skip over a section of foreign affairs to get to it.

50 Pol. 27.4.5: ἐὰν δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι παρὰ τὰς συνθήκας ἐγχειρῶσι τὰς χεῖρας ἐπιβάλλειν τῷ Περσεῖ καὶ Μακεδόσιν, πειρᾶσθαι διαλύειν.

51 Pol. 27.5.8.
like a genuine antagonist who had gotten in over his head and then seized upon a vain hope rather than an ally who was trying to appease Rome. Marcius’ treachery is in no way reduced by this transposition; it actually seems greater for the magnitude of the deception he foists upon Perseus. Yet, since the definitive break with Rome had already occurred, Livy’s version minimizes the importance of this episode for the outcome of the war and makes Perseus seem incompetent. Since it appears that the war had already been declared, the episode does not affect the justice of this decision itself. Livy can use it to full effect in highlighting Marcius’ perfidy and Rome’s moral decline without illegitimating Rome’s place on the world stage.

**Greek Instability and Roman Frustration**

Both Livy and Polybius, albeit in different ways, acknowledge the intensification of Roman control of Greek affairs around the end of the war with Antiochus. The Romans had learned that, even after the Isthmian Proclamation, not all Greeks would be reliable friends and that regional rivalries were often the fault lines triggering major wars. The Romans thus attempted to manage the affairs of states such as the Boeotian and Achaean Leagues, and, after the Third Macedonian War, divided Macedon into four separate republics. There is a strong undercurrent of frustration running through Roman sources which surfaces when their actions are severe, and the Roman tradition makes the case that they still exercised moderation and acted in service of stability rather than their own aggrandizement. Livy depicts many such acts as justifiably harsh measures taken in response to the recalcitrant and fractious behavior of the Greeks. Two of the harshest actions, the breakup of the Boeotian League and the division of Macedon into four republics after the Third Macedonian War, are even framed as paternalistic benefactions to those otherwise incapable of managing their polities. In contrast, Polybius sees a definite change for the worse in their administration of Greece; he believed that the Romans
quickly adopted a divide-and-conquer strategy for cynical power-seeking, using these disputes as opportunities to diminish or break apart Greek alliances and leagues as he would later accuse the Romans of doing with Egypt and as general policy.\textsuperscript{52} Polybius’ focus, however, is on the behavior of the Greek political class, and thus he picks out their toadyism as a major contributing factor. The divergent perspectives of these two authors are instructive, for Livy read Polybius and regarded him as an authority. Nevertheless, Livy remains blind to much of the self-serving flattery practiced by some of the Greeks and regards many of the assertive positions, which Polybius treats as principled stands, as merely more of the same self-indulgent bickering.

An early and noteworthy moment of Roman severity comes in the abortive pace negotiations of 191 BCE in the Aetolian War, which dragged on longer than that with Antiochus. Here, when the Aetolians wished to surrender and then balked at Roman commands, the Roman Glabrio had them placed in chains to make clear the meaning of \textit{deditio in fidem}.\textsuperscript{53} Either because of anti-Aetolian sentiment or a judgment that Aetolian intransigence required harsh measures, our sources do not find fault with the settlement. Polybius uses it not so much to complain of Glabrio as to illustrate Roman practice within a longer narrative of poor Aetolian decision making. If Livy is accurate, the eventual peace treaty had loaded language, clear provisions to entirely preempt the sort of territorial claims that had started the war, and the additional stricture of the much-discussed \textit{maiestas} clause.\textsuperscript{54} In addition to Aetolia’s conquests, the Romans seized the island of Cephalania, presumably because of its strategic position; the city

\textsuperscript{52} Pol. 31.10.7-9.
\textsuperscript{53} Livy 36.28; Pol. 20.9-10; Livy’s elaboration of Glabrio’s question, whether they truly meant to perform a \textit{deditio}, highlights what the historian took as the consul’s didactic motive. See Briscoe, \textit{Commentary} vol. 2, 263; Gruen, \textit{Hellenistic World}, 28, 260-2; Ferrary \textit{Philhellénism et Impérialism}, 72-5 attempts to define \textit{deditio in fidem} and points out that the lead Aetolian envoy, Phaeneas, had been instructed in the gentler meaning of \textit{fides}, the sort he hoped to attain, by Flamininus in Pol. 18.38; Eckstein, \textit{Moral Vision}, 216-7 sees Polybius using this episode to point out Aetolian mistakes; Champion, \textit{Cultural Politics}, 156-7 shows that Polybius used this episode to draw out differences between Greek and Roman practice.
\textsuperscript{54} Livy 38.11.1-3, 9 \textit{Imperium maiestatemque populi Romani gens Aetolorum conservato sine dolo malo}. See Gruen, \textit{Hellenistic World}, 26-33.
of Same then revolted, fearing the Romans would relocate the population because of its strategic position, causing them to be sold as slaves on their eventual capture.\footnote{The island’s position had been a concern in 190 BCE, Livy 37.13.12. For Same’s revolt and capture, see Livy 38.28-29.} This is a marked intensification, or at least an assimilation of Roman practice in Greece to levels of severity in evidence elsewhere, yet Aetolia’s role in inviting Antiochus to liberate Greece was exceptional. We must look at Rome’s dealings with other Greek federal states to find a change of attitude.

Tensions flared with the Boeotian League when Flamininus attempted to persuade them to restore a certain Zeuxippus. This man had been condemned for the assassination of Brachylles, which Flamininus may have masterminded. The Boeotians attempted to not obey the senate’s instructions and maintained that they could not repeal such criminal convictions. In this case, Polybius frames the struggles within the Boeotian League as the result of the simple class dynamic already seen, in which the masses favor revolution and the well-to-do rightly support Rome.\footnote{For a catalog of “anti-banausic” polemics in Polybius see Craighe Champion, “Polybian Demagogues in Political Context” in \textit{Harvard Studies in Classical Philology} 102 (2004): 199-212, 202.} The Romans took the curious step of asking the Aetolians and Achaeans to directly intervene and restore Zeuxippus.\footnote{Pol. 22.4.} With the Achaeans interpreting the Roman request as a bad precedent for outstanding litigation involving their own citizens and being ignored by the Boeotians, Philopoemen allowed Achaeans to seize Boeotian property with impunity, and Polybius states that, had the senate applied further pressure, war would have broken out.\footnote{Pol. 22.4.16-17: εἰ μὲν οὖν (ἡ) σύγκλητος προσέθηκε τάκτικληθον περὶ τῆς καθόδου τῶν περὶ τὸν Ζεύξιππον, ταχέως ἂν ἐξεκαύθη πόλεμος· νῦν δ’ ἐκείνη τε παρεσιώπησε, οἵ τε Μεγαρεῖς ἐπέσχον τὰ ρύσια, διαπρεσβευσαμένων ... τοῖς συναλλάγμασιν.}

Yet Polybius believed the Romans took up a policy of undermining the Greek federal states. When, in advance of their army, the Romans tried to secure the loyalty of Boeotia against Perseus, they had individual cities separately make their peace with Rome, which Livy interprets
as an *ad hoc* attempt to restore order. Polybius interpreted it as aimed at breaking up the Boeotian League: 59

With everything going as they wished—that is breaking up the Boeotian League and destroying many people’s goodwill towards the Macedonian royal house—they summoned Servius from Argos, leaving him in charge of Chalcis... The Boeotian people, having preserved their league for a long time while escaping many remarkable dangers, then, because they rashly and senselessly sided with Perseus, yielding to almost child-like enthusiasm, unexpectedly was broken up and divided up by city. 60 (Pol. 27.2.7-10)

Livy makes no mention of the Boeotian League, but interprets mandate that Boeotian cities individually sending envoys to make arrangements with Rome not as an attempt to dismantle the larger polity, but a simple response to the possibly disingenuous attempt to excuse Boeotia as a whole from siding with Perseus by claiming that “certain cities” had been tampered with. 61 Livy then links the events in Boeotia to the thanks the Romans gave to the Thessalian League for its loyalty, creating an impression of Roman responsiveness and equitable treatment of both communities. He ends the episode by commenting that the Thessalian assembly, stirred by “mutual commemoration of good deeds,” *mutua commemoratione meritorum*, was eager to work with Rome. Dividing up groups and giving a detailed hearing to individual communities was, of course, traditional Roman practice found throughout Livy’s first decade. Livy surely was aware of Polybius’ sinister interpretation and the significance attached to the league’s dissolution. One suspects that, confronted with such complaints, the Roman response was to reiterate the perceived guilt of the Boeotians in intriguing with Perseus and stress the moderation and

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59 For a summary of evidence indicating that the Boeotian League was permanently dissolved on this occasion see Walbank, *Commentary* vol. 3, 293.

60 Pol. 27.2.7-10: πάντων δὲ κατὰ τὴν πρόθεσιν αὐτοῖς χωροῦντων—ταῦτα δ’ ἦν τὸ διαλῦσαι τῶν Βοιωτῶν τὸ ἔθνος καὶ λυμήνασθαι τὴν τῶν πολλῶν εὔνοιαν πρὸς τὴν Μακεδόνων οἰκίαν—οὗ τοι μὲν μεταπεμψάμενοι Σέρουιον ἐξ Ἀργοὺς καὶ καταλιπόντες ἐπὶ τῆς Χαλκίδος... τὸ δὲ τῶν Βοιωτῶν ἔθνος ἐπὶ πολλὰ χρόνα συναίτητος τὴν κοινὴν συμπολιτείαν καὶ πολλόν καὶ ποικίλοις καιροῖς διαπερευγός παραδόξος τότε προπετῶς καὶ ἀλογίστως ἐλόμενον τὰ παρὰ Περσέως, εἰκὴ καὶ παιδαριώδος πτοηθὲν κατελύθη καὶ διεσκορπίσθη κατὰ πόλεις.

61 Livy 42.38.5-7.
exacting concern for justice of a policy which did not simply impose a collective penalty on all the Boeotians.

The Achaeans also continued to take an overly-assertive stance towards Rome, motivated primarily by their desire to maintain a stranglehold on Sparta. In 184 BCE the senate heard not only Spartan complaints, but that the Roman legate Caecilius Metellus had been denied access to the Achaean concilium on the grounds that they could only call a meeting if demanded by a senatus consultum. Caecilius, finding fault with the brutal treatment of the Spartans, had found support from Aristaenus, the architect of Achaea’s initial Roman alliance and a certain Diophanes, who added complaints about the treatment of Messene. This gave Caecilius the impression that the Achaeans were split on these issues, so that when he was thus denied a meeting with the Achaean assembly, it appeared an obstructionist move, part of bitter factional politics gone awry. This was characteristic of Philopoemen’s policy, continued by Polybius’ father Lycortas, of asserting as much independence as possible. From a debate over whether to accept a gift of Eumenes Polybius 22.7-9 and continued contacts with Ptolemy, we can see that this was not simply a concern relative to Rome.

Polybius takes care to explain was not intended to be a policy of opposition, but that it emerged from an internal debate over how much autonomy was left to Achaea as a subordinate ally of Rome and how what was left could best be maintained. Polybius articulates this in a synthetic debate between Philopoemen and Aristaenus, perhaps stitched together from actual

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62 In 189 BCE, after the Spartans took the coastal village of Las, the Achaean strategos Philopoemen took a harsh line. Livy 38.30.7 gives the Spartan motivation thus “in case they needed to send legates to Rome or anywhere else, and also that they have a market and storehouse for foreign goods and necessities.” Philopoemen’s severity caused the situation to escalate into full-scale war and, when he eventually took Sparta, he demolished its walls and repealed its constitution.

63 Livy 39.33.5-8. Pol. 22.10. Champion, Cultural Politics, 152-3, however, points out that in the latter this incident falls into a generally positive pattern of Achaean concern with obeying the law. Gruen, Hellenistic World, 331-3.

64 Pol. 22.10. See 18.13 for Aristaenus’ role in Achaean politics.

65 For Athens and foreign patrons, see Eckstein, Moral Vision, 207 n.51.
speeches, in which the issue at hand is never named. Philopoemen advocates resisting those Roman instructions that ran contrary to Achaean interests so far as possible without breaking the alliance, and Aristaenus argues that they have only a simple choice between acquiescence and enmity: “It must be shown that either we are strong enough to disobey or that, if we dare not make this claim, that we must readily obey all their commands.”\(^{66}\) Philopoemen responds with a slippery-slope argument:

> “Since every great power naturally dominates its subordinates, is it truly best to abet the whims of those in power and do nothing in opposition, so as to reach the depths of servitude as quickly as possible? Or should we do the opposite, so far as we are able ... especially since up to this point the Romans, as you admit, Aristaenus, value not breaking oaths and treaties and their duty towards their allies above all else?”\(^{67}\) (Pol. 24.13.2-3)

Such had been the Achaean policy towards the Macedonians after Aratus was forced to ally with Antigonus Doson against a resurgent Sparta. And, as galling as it had been to put Corinth in Macedonian hands, it had worked in the long term, allowing the Achaean League to remain largely intact and eventually reassert its power.\(^{68}\) In Polybian ethical terms that Macedonian alliance was not noble, but necessary.\(^{69}\) Champion’s discussion of this debate and its context in Polybius is illuminating:

The important point here is that, in Polybius’s representation, while Aristaenus and Philopoemen differed as to the proper Achaean diplomatic response to Rome, both were convinced that the Achaean political προαιρεσις, which Polybius glorifies in the Achaean προκατασκευη of book 2, would soon be a thing of the

\(^{66}\) Pol. 24.12.4: διόπερ ἢ τοῦτ’ εἶναι δεικτέον ὡς ἐσμὲν ἴκανοι πρὸς τὸ μὴ πειθαρχεῖν ἢ μηδὲ λέγειν τοῦτο τολμῶντας ύπακουστέον ἐποίμως εἶναι πάσι τοῖς παραγγελλομένοις.

\(^{67}\) Pol. 24.13.1-3: Ὅ δὲ Φιλοποίμην οὐκ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἔφη δεῖν ἀμαθίαν αὐτοῦ (κατα)γινώσκειν ὡστε μὴ δύνασθαι μετερήνῃ τὴν διαφορὰν τοῦ πολιτεύματος τῶν Ῥωμαίων καὶ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν μήτε τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δυνάμεως ἀλλὰ πάσης ὑπεροχῆς φύσιν ἐχούσης ἂν τρόπον χρησθῇ τοῖς ὑποταττομένοις, πότερον ἔφη “συμφέρει συνεργεῖν ταῖς ὁρμαῖς ταῖς τῶν κρατοῦντων καὶ μηθὲν ἐμποδούντων ποιεῖν, ἴνα τὰ τῶν βαροτάτων ἐπιταγμάτων ἢ τούναντιν, καθ’ ὅσον οἶδα τ’ ἐσμὲν, συμπαλαιοῦντας προσαντέχειν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον, ἕρ’ ὅσον μέλλομεν τελέως ....... καὶ τοῦτον ὑπομιμνήσκοντες αὐτούς ἐπιλαμβανόμεθα τῇ ὁρμῇ, παρακαθέξομεν ἐπὶ ποιον τῶν τῆς ἐξουσίας, ἄλλος τε ὅτι καὶ περὶ πλείονος ποιούμενον Ῥωμαίων ἐος γε τοῦ νῦν, ὡς αὐτὸς φής, Ἀρίσταινε, τὸ τηρεῖν τοὺς ὅρκους καὶ τὰς συνθήκας καὶ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς συμμάχους πίστιν.”


past. Indeed, Aristaenus admits that in obeying Roman wishes, the appearance of adhering to the law was the best that present circumstances permitted (24.11.5). In comparison with Polybius’s account of the Achaean Confederation and its uncompromising adherence to the political principles of freedom and autonomy as we find it in books 2, 4, and 5, the Aristaenus-Philopoemen debate marks a disintegration of the Confederation’s integrity in the international relations in the historian’s conception, even if it was imposed by external circumstances. (Champion, *Cultural Politics*, 155)

Although not nearly so well documented, debates of this sort surely underlie or were folded into many of the factional disputes throughout the Greek world, and they could have no positive outcome. Although the Romans believed that the refusal to convene the *concilium* for Caecilius had more to do with the issue at hand than procrustean legalism, the Romans issued a mild reproof, notifying the Achaeans that they should extend ambassadors the same courtesy their own received at Rome. On individual issues, therefore, Philopoemen may have been correct, but he missed their cumulative effect.

Polybius is thought to have used this debate between Philopoemen and Aristaenus, preserved as fragments in the Suidas, to explain the importance of a later event, the embassy of Callicrates to Rome in 181/0 BCE. With the Achaeans under increased Roman pressure concerning the situation at Sparta, Callicrates, an opponent of the Philopoemen and Lycortas’ policy, was sent as part of an embassy to Rome to plead his opponent’s case. This is he did not do, but instead blamed the Romans for not supporting their true friends among the Greeks and explained that the unsettled state of Greek politics was the result of the Romans being too lenient. Linking this to the class-based political schema used by both Livy and Polybius, he argued that opposition to Roman commands was a tool of populist demagoguery and that the better sort were becoming deeply unpopular through their support of Rome. Polybius dismisses

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70 Livy 39.33.6-8.
this, saying that by heeding this argument the Romans lost their true supporters and handed power over to sycophants. Honored before all the Greeks, not just the Achaeans,

Callicrates returned to Greece overjoyed, not knowing that he was the cause of terrible misfortunes for all the Greeks, and most of all, the Achaeans. For at this point it was still possible for the Achaeans to have some measure of frankness with the Romans because they had kept faith in critical moments, I mean the wars against Philip and Antiochus. The Achaean League had grown and become stronger than any point in history, but Callicrates’ brashness was the beginning of a backslide to a worse state...  

This was an issue in which Polybius had a distinct interest, for it involved his father and his hero Philopoemen’s policy. It also reflected on the eventual estrangement between the league and Rome that culminated in the destruction of Corinth, the aftermath of which Polybius was instrumental in settling. The issue of independence and integrity was also critical to his didactic program, which aimed to educate statesmen and teach them how to best interact with Rome.

For the Romans, gravely disappointed by the failure of Flamininus’ settlement and the popularity Antiochus had enjoyed in some corners, such resistance could easily be interpreted as, if not disloyalty, ingratitude and petty quarrelsomeness. While Livy read Polybius, his focus on events pertaining to Rome led him to largely ignore internal Achaean politics in his own history, and thus he produced an account that is fundamentally blind to the questions Polybius raises. Achaean legalism is seen as a pretext invoked to avoid particular actions and Callicrates appears merely as a loyal friend of Rome, one “of those who thought that their state’s safety lay in

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72 Pol. 24.10.8-11: ὁ δὲ προειρημένος ἔχων τὰς ἀποκρίσεις ταύτας παρῆν εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα περιχαρής, οὐκ εἰδὼς ὅτι μεγάλον κακὸν ἀρχηγόν γέγονεν πάσι μὲν τοῖς Ἐλλήσι, μάλιστα δὲ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς. ἔτι γὰρ τούτους ἐξῆν καὶ κατ’ ἐκείνους τοὺς χρόνους κατὰ ποσὸν ἰσολογίαν ἔχειν πρὸς Ῥωμαίους διὰ τὸ τετηρηκέναι τὴν πίστιν ἐν τοῖς ἐπιφανεστάτοις καιροῖς, εἰς ὃ δὲ τὰ Ῥωμαίον εἰλοντο, λέγω δὲ τοῖς κατὰ Φίλιππον καὶ Ἀντίοχον, οὕτω δὲ τοῦ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἔθνους ἡμέραν καὶ προκοπὴν εἰληφότος κατὰ τὸ βέλτιστον ἀφ’ ὧν ἦμεῖς ἱστοροῦμεν χρόνον, ἀρχὴ πάλιν ἀργή τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ χέριν ἐγένετο...μεταβολῆς, τὸ Καλλικράτους θράσος

73 Pol. 28.6-7 indicates that the historian’s own position was more moderate version of his father’s. See Champion, Cultural Politics, 222-5.

74 Champion, Cultural Politics, 15-18;
keeping the treaty with Rome intact.” 75 Indeed, Polybius thought the Romans decided to humble the league not long after the war with Antiochus, for the refusal of help recovering Messene and the declaration that Rome had no interest in the matter appeared to him an invitation for further defections from the league:

Concerning the Peloponnese, Marcius reported that, with the Achaeans unwilling to bring anything before the senate but deliberating and doing everything on their own, if the senate would pay them little heed for the present and made a brief display of displeasure, the Spartans and Messenians would soon come together (against Achaea). When this happened and the Achaeans had fled to Rome for help they would be only too grateful. Thus they replied to Serippus, the Spartan envoy, that they had already done what they could and that it was no longer their concern, wishing to keep the city guessing.... Disseminating this answer, which almost seemed an encouragement to those who wanted to defect from the Achaean League on account of the Romans, they kept the rest of the ambassadors close and waited on how events would turn out for the Achaeans concerning Messene. 76 (Pol. 23.9.8-15)

Comparing Polybius and Livy on the negotiations at Rome that led the senate to send Marcius reveals a significant difference in attitudes. Polybius 23.4 indicates that Achaean matters were too detailed to be discussed before the senate and that there were four different groups of Spartans all arguing different agendas. 77

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75 Livy 41.23.5: *Callicrates ex iis, qui in eo verti salutem gentis crederent, si cum Romanis inviolatum foedus servaretur.* He also appears in 45.31.10 as one of those informing on those who had supported Perseus. Karl-Ernst Petzold, “Die Freiheit der Griechen und die Politik der Nova Sapientia” in Historia 48 (1999): 61-93, sees Callicrates as operating under Roman influence from the beginning.

76 Pol. 23.9.8-15: *περὶ δὲ τῶν κατὰ Πελοπόννησον ὁ Μάρκιος τοιαύτην ἐπεποίητο τὴν ἀπαγγελίαν διότι, τῶν Ἀχαίων οὐ βουλομένων ἀναφέρειν οὐδὲν ἐπὶ τὴν σύγκλητον, ἀλλὰ φρονηματιζομένων καὶ πάντα δι᾽ ἑαυτῶν πράττειν εἰπαλλόμενοι, εἶναι παρακούσας μόνον αὐτῶν κατὰ τὸ παρὸν καὶ βραχεῖας ἐμφάνισιν δυσαρεστήσεως, ταχέως ἡ Λακεδαίμων τῇ Μεσσήνῃ συμφρονήσει. τούτου δὲ γενομένου μετὰ μεγάλης χάριτος ἥξει τοὺς Αχαιοὺς ἐρρ. καταπρεπειογότας εἰπὶ Ρωμαίους. διότι οἱ μὲν έκ τῆς Λακεδαίμονος ἀπεκρίθησαν τοῖς περὶ Σήριππον, βουλομένους μετέφορον εῆσατ τὴν πόλιν, διότι πάντα πεποιήκασιν αὐτοῖς τὰ δυνατά, κατὰ δὲ τὸ παρὸν οὐ νομίζουσιν εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ πράγμα πρὸς αὐτούς... ταύτην δὲ τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ἐκθέμενοι, κηρύγματος ἔχουσαν διάθεσιν τοῖς βουλομένοις ἔνεκεν Ρωμαίων ἀφίσασθαι τῆς τῶν Αχαίων πολιτείας, λοιπὸν τοὺς πρεσβευτάς παρακατέχων, καραδοκοῦντες τὰ κατὰ τὴν Μεσσήνην, ποὺς προχωρήσας τοῖς Αχαιοῖς.

77 Pol. 23.6 further shows a Messenian Deinocrates attempting to work around the senate by leveraging personal connections with Flamininus.
Livy indicates that the Roman attitude towards these issues was one of exasperation, commenting that “many and trivial arguments were bandied about.” He focuses attention on the agreement brokered by Rome in the attempt to settle the question of Spartan exiles in Pol. 23.4, mentioning the three main points of agreement reached and ignoring the fourth point, which Polybius indicates was deferred. Livy avoids discussing the causes of Messene’s secession directly as not part of the Roman history, merely describing these events as “upheavals left over from old quarrels,” ex veteribus discordiis residui motus, and notes that Quintus Marcius had been sent to investigate. He then describes the death of Philopoemen and the city’s capture, later remarking that the Achaeans gave an adequate explanation to the senate about the recovery of Messene but making no mention of Achaea in his report in 40.2-3. Livy, however, clearly follows Polybius at this point, moving from Marcius’ report into the long tragi-historic narrative of Philip and Perseus’ suspicion of Demetrius. Thus, while Livy consciously omitted Polybius’ recriminations on Rome’s treatment of Achaea, it is probable that he saw it not as the omission of a damning critique but merely another reflex of the unreasonable and vicious quarrels destabilizing Greece.

Thus, the Greek political scene into which Perseus forced his way was growing increasingly turbulent. Aetolia, an unpredictable and, in Roman eyes, faithless state, descended into the chaos of civil war. This unrest, somehow related to debt, was even spreading to Perrhaebia, Thessaly, and Crete, and Livy refers to it as furor and rabies, language similar to enough to that Polybius uses of the desire to join with Perseus and later opposition to Rome that

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78 Livy 39.48.2: Multae et parvae disceptationes iactabantur.
79 Livy 39.48.5.
80 Livy 40.20.2.
81 Livy 41.25.1-7; 42.2.2; 42.4.5; 42.5.7-42-6-3.
Livy may be translating a somewhat apologetic extended account of general unrest in Greece. Perseus’ courting of Greek popularity combined with the ongoing litany of complaints about Macedon to incline Rome towards even more suspicion of its heretofore faithful allies. While, for all their turbulence and the interference of allegedly corrupted partisans of Perseus, the Achaean cleaved closely to the Roman side, the Rhodians’ similar treatment of Lycia combined with their Macedonian associations undid their good standing at Rome.

Eumenes, Rhodes, and Proper Allied Behavior

The Romans expected that they would continue to enjoy the authority and popularity they had gained from the Isthmian Proclamation. Accordingly, as the Greeks continued to quarrel, Rome lost patience with the sort of reluctant compliance advocated by Philopoemen, increasingly interpreting it as opposition and hostility rather than assertiveness. The solicitous behavior of those Greek politicians such as Callicrates was a welcome contrast, and these same politicians found that it was in their interest to establish a firm binary opposition and frame the others as enemies of Rome. We have seen this manner of self-presentation practiced by the Achaean Callicrates and, more subtly, in Eumenes II’s appearance before the senate after the war against Antiochus, in which he successfully advanced his own interests in the regional rivalry between Pergamum and Rhodes. Yet even Eumenes later came under suspicion for allegedly setting a price for intervening with Rome on Perseus’ behalf. At the beginning of the Third Macedonian War he used this strategy with greater intensity to cast doubt on Rhodian loyalties.

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82 See Eckstein, Moral Vision, 132-40 for debt’s tendency to lead to mob rule and disaster.
83 Achaea’s loyalty was established by the vote not to normalize relations with Perseus (for the league had forbidden Macedonians from entering its territory), despite the Perseus’ attempted benefactions. The same Callicrates, so loathed by Polybius, appears as the champion of this policy in Livy.
84 This suspicion culminated in the senate’s declaration, upon learning of Eumenes II’s arrival in Italy, that it would give an audience to no kings so as not to either seem to absolve Eumenes of wrongdoing nor be forced to fully alienated him. See Pol. 30.1.6; Periochae 46.
When Rhodes attempted to broker a peace between Perseus and Rome, this suspicion turned to such great resentment that the Romans nearly declared war on this most reliable ally. Rhodes attempted to maintain its ties to Perseus while standing firm in its Roman alliance, but appeared to incur resentment. When the Lycians, awarded to Rhodes in the peace of Apamea, complained to Rome of their treatment, the Roman attempt to find a compromise was to send an ambiguous reply. Both Rhodians and Lycians interpreted the decision according to their own wishes, which led to greater conflict. Although Livy makes no mention of it, Polybius reports that, as early as 178/7 BCE, the Rhodians suspected that the Romans’ sought to set Rhodes and Lycia at odds because of the island’s friendship with Perseus. Livy’s first indication of Roman suspicion of Rhodes comes six years later in 172 BCE, arising from a virulent attack on Eumenes, whom the Rhodian legation to Rome suspected of defaming them. Although the introduction to the Rhodians’ audience is lacunose, they seem to have attempted to defend not just themselves, but Perseus, for Livy remarks that their speech was “of a populist bent and not displeasing to the peoples of Asia, for Perseus’ popularity had extended even there, but it was odious to the senate and useless to the ambassadors and their state.” Livy reports that later in 172 BCE Roman legates returned and from a diplomatic tour of the Aegean, reporting that the Rhodians were “wavering and implicated in Perseus’ schemes.” In response the islanders sent diplomats to clear their name at Rome, but they were not granted an immediate audience with the senate. The Rhodians’ next appearance in Livy makes clear both that they

85 Pol. 25.9 reports that the Rhodians conveyed Perseus’ bride Laodice to him and were lavishly rewarded.
86 Pol. 22.5.4-5.
87 Pol. 25.4, likely derived from one of his Rhodian historical sources. Walbank, Commentary vol. 3, 277. Livy omits a discussion of the ensuing war between Lycia and Rhodes in 41.25.8 as not pertaining to Roman history.
88 Livy 42.14.5ff.
89 Livy 42.14.8-10: Quod cum non contigesset, libertate intemperanti invectus in regem, quod Lyciorum gentem adversus Rhodios concitasset graviorque Asiae esset quam Antiochus fuisse, popularem quidem neque Asiae ingratam populis-nam eo quoque iam favor Persei venerat—orationem habuit, ceterum invisas senatui inutilemque sibi et civitati sua.
90 Livy 42.26.8: ceteras satis fidas, Rhodios fluctuantes et imbutos Persei consiliis invenisse.
continued to be faithful allies, and that they were alarmed by their sinking standing with Rome: Livy tells how a certain Hegesilochus brought it about that they anticipated the war and had a fleet on hand for Roman use when legates passed through Asia in 172 BCE. Directly following this we learn of the letter from Perseus through which he sought their aid in appeasing the Romans, and Livy shows that Rhodes was divided, although the “better” party prevailed and politely declined Perseus’ requests, stating that “if there were war, the king should not hope for or seek anything from the Rhodians that would break their friendship with Rome, for that had been well earned in war and peace.”

It is noteworthy that no action of the Rhodians could be interpreted as anti-Roman, yet the Roman narrative sees them as deeply divided and constantly on the verge of siding with Perseus. By framing the alleged supporters of Perseus as populares of a sort, their positions are discredited and the Romans reinforce a belief that their supporters in the Greek states were a small group of right-thinking elites who struggled to maintain legitimate government and control of the hostile multitude.

Nothing is heard of the Rhodians in Book 43, but Livy 44.14 records their attempted arbitration of 169 BCE. Framed in contrast to Prusias’ humble request that the Romans consider peace, the Rhodian speech harps upon the inconvenience of the war for Rhodes and seems to set Rhodes on a level with Rome in military achievements and moral authority, ending with the threat that the Rhodians would take action against whichever state appeared to be blocking peace. Before giving two version of the senate’s response, Livy comments that reading that speech could, even in his day, stir righteous indignation. He then notes that Claudius Quadrigarius reported that the senate did not answer the Rhodians directly but declared the Lycians and Carians free, while other authors include a minor diatribe on Rhodian insolence.

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91 Livy 42.46.6: *si bellum esset, ne quid ab Rhodiis speraret aut pateret rex quod veterem amicitiam, multis magnisque meritis pace belloque partam, diuineret sibi ac Romanis.* 42.56.6 indicates that the Rhodians did follow through and send supply ships even though there was no need, and the praetor immediately returned them.
Even in 168 BCE Perseus continued to hold out hope for Rhodian support, sending a request for them to join the war against Rome. The Rhodians had believed that, because the Illyrian king Genthius had joined Perseus after receiving a substantial bribe, the military situation had changed enough that they could persuade the Romans to make peace, forgetful of how each such obstacle tended to increase Roman determination. Unfortunately, Genthius had already surrendered and been sent to Rome, and the Rhodian diplomats reached the Roman camp just before the battle of Pydna. The leader of the delegation offered congratulations on the victory and explained their reconciliation attempts as to the Romans’ benefit because the war was dragging on, but they were rebuffed on the grounds that they had merely come “to snatch Perseus out of imminent danger.” Notably, Polybius, who relates this in 29.19, at least partially subscribes to the Roman interpretation, saying that it was “as if Fortune brought the Rhodian’s ignorance on stage, if we should speak of the Rhodians rather than those men then ascendant at Rhodes.” Livy notes that certain authors reported that the senate, which had detained a Rhodian delegation without a hearing, brought them in after receiving news of Pydna to jeer at them.

Livy takes a judicious tone in recounting the near declaration of war against Rhodes, granting that indignation was warranted while making clear that the Romans overreacted. Remarking on celebratory aspect with which Rhodian legates came to congratulate the senate on Pydna and how they were reproached for it as if false, he points out that they could not have done otherwise without seeming to mourn for Perseus’ downfall. The motion to declare war on Rhodes follows directly upon the Rhodians’ humiliation and abasement at being denied the

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92 Livy 42.23.
93 Livy 42.35.4-6.
94 Livy 45.3.5: ad Persea ex imminenti periculo eripiendum.
95 Pol. 29.19.2: τῆς τύχης δόσις ἡπτήδε ἀναβακούσθη ἐπὶ σκηνήν τὴν τῶν Ῥοδίων ἄγνοιαν, εἰ χρή Ῥοδίων λέγειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τῶν ἐπιπολασάντων ἀνθρώπων τότε κατὰ τὴν Ῥόδον.
96 Livy 45.20.4-8.
status of friends and allies, and the motion is made without consulting the senate, a novum malumque exemplum, which provoked further improprieties from the tribunes. After a lacuna, what survives of Livy resumes in the midst of a lengthy and persuasive Rhodian speech before the senate, yet there was still need of Cato’s famous lost speech to restrain the Romans. That they still kept the Rhodians in suspense after making their decision reflects poorly.\textsuperscript{97} Livy nevertheless leaves the Rhodians on a sour note, explaining their desperate attempt to secure a treaty with Rome as a volte-face from their previous policy of avoiding firm commitments in order to beguile the kings with false hopes of aid against Rome.\textsuperscript{98}

Eumenes also thought that the Romans desired peace, and his attempt to sell his influence with Rome to Perseus made him deeply suspect. In a long discussion of Perseus’ miserliness, adapted directly from Polybius, Livy admits as fact that Perseus had been consistently working for peace \textit{ab initio belli}, perhaps an infelicitous translation of the Polybian καθ’ ἕκαστον ἔτος, but this interpretation fits the events well and draws attention to the Roman program of exaggerating Perseus’ hostility and resources.\textsuperscript{99} The Greek historian’s interpretation, readily taken up by Livy, was that both kings were attempting to trick each other, yet for Eumenes it had the unexpected consequence of casting great suspicion on him at Rome. Eumenes, just like the Rhodians, thought that Rome would be eager for peace because of the duration and expense of the war. Even though even Livy accepts that Eumenes could have never wished Perseus to prevail, his motive was greed, not a desire to be of service to Rome. This parallels the Roman belief that the Rhodians, if they were not actually secret partisans of Perseus, were at least trying

\textsuperscript{97} Livy 45.22-24 contains the Rhodian speech, and the Roman decision comes in 25.
\textsuperscript{98} Livy 45.25.9-10. Diodorus 31.36 indicates that the Rhodians continued to profit from playing the various eastern kings off one another even after this brush with danger and illustrates the degree to which this kingdom depended on both trade and diplomacy rather than military force to maintain its position.
\textsuperscript{99} Livy 44.25.3, in Livy 44.24.7-26.2, adapted from Pol. 29.5-9. See also Nissen, \textit{Kritische Untersuchungen}, 264; Täubler, Livius, 95.
to gain clout at Rome’s expense. The Romans were compelled to hold even their most trusted allies’ *fides* suspect.

A Livian adaptation of another significant section of Polybius drives home the Romans’ feeling of betrayal. In what was likely part of the *res Graeciae* of 168/7 BCE, Polybius provides a taxonomy of Greek politicians accused of aiding Perseus, in which Rhodes figures significantly.\(^{100}\) He lists three types, those who were uncommitted, in which he likely classed himself, those who favored Perseus but did little, and those who actively supported the king.\(^{101}\) Giving an account of the shameful behavior of two Rhodians, Deinon and Polyaratus, and the strife afflicting cities torn between ties to Rome and the king, he claims that “this great ferment and upheaval did not just occur amongst the Rhodians, but in almost all cities.”\(^{102}\) Although Polybius thought that the Rhodians acted foolishly, his interest is here engaged with the personal bravery or cowardice of those who adopted these different policies. Livy, however, was inspired by this passage to create his own triple typology of Greek politicians, one directly concerned with their choice of alliance.

The Livian passage is not an adaptation of this Polybian excerpt, but includes what may be a significant Polybian sentiment, commenting on how the inquests into who had supported Perseus, here in the context of the Aetolians after the division of Macedon, led to the *intolerabilis superbia* of Rome’s allies and left all those who were in any way suspect at their mercy.\(^{103}\) Livy’s typology then reflects the criticisms Polybius heaps upon Callicrates, but differs dramatically in the assessment of who was to be trusted:

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101 Pol. 30.6-9.
102 Pol. 30.6.2: μεγάλης γὰρ οὔσης τῆς περιστάσεως καὶ τῆς μεταβολῆς οὐ μόνον παρὰ τοῖς Ῥοδίοις, ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν ἀπάσις ταῖς πολιτεῖαις.
103 Livy 45.31.3: *Hic eventus Aetolorum causae in omnibus Graeciae gentibus populisque eorum qui partis Romanorum fuerant inflavit ad intolerabilem superbiam animos, et obnoxios pedibus eorum subiecit quos aliquo parte suspicio favoris in regem contigerat.*
There were three types of politician in these states, two which, by fawning over Roman power or the friendship of the king gathered wealth for themselves by oppressing their fellow citizens; in between and opposed to each, a third group was attempting to safeguard their liberty and laws. So much as these men were dearer to their fellows, they earned less favor abroad.  

It was the sycophants, Livy says, who gained the ear of the Roman decemvirs and accused many of the middle group of secretly favoring the king per speciem tuendae libertatis. Two decemvirs, suspicious because no Achaean correspondence had been found in the king’s papers, felt the need to go to Achaea to protect Callicrates from reprisals from the pro-Macedonian set. This does not reflect favorably on the friends of Rome and must be derived from Polybius, but the fear for Callicrates’ safety stands out as more of an annalistic detail, and the entire passage seems to be a synthesis of multiple sources. Polybius’ account of these events would have been in close proximity to 30.6-7 and covered some of the same issues, making it extremely unlikely that Livy is reproducing a second Polybian set of three types. Instead, he was inspired to lay out his own typology, one that reproduces some of the Callicratean program in the Roman point of view. For, rather than seeing a subtle gradation of policies and a greater amount of internal turmoil than actual opposition to Rome, Livy maintains that Rome faced significant opposition in Greece. Yet he also recognizes that Rome’s supporters were capitalizing on the situation for their own gain rather than true loyalty and that their charges could not all be trusted. This must, in large part, stem from the embarrassment of Eumenes II and the continual and opportunistic

104 Livy 45.31.4-5: Tria genera principum in civitatibus erant, duo quae adulando aut Romanorum imperium aut amicitiam regum sibi privatim opes oppressis faciebant civitatibus; media una pars utrique generi adversa libertatem leges tuebatur his (ut maior) apud suos caritas, ita minor ad externos gratia erat.

105 While much of the content is Polybian, it may derive not from Pol. 30.6-9 but some other similar passage now lost. On the annalistic and Polybian sections in Book 45, Nissen, Kritische Untersuchungen, 272: “Die Verbindung und Vermischung dieser beiden so überaus verschiedenen Gattungen der Ueberlieferung ist hier bis zu einem Grade getrieben, daß die Kritik es aufgeben muß in der Fixirung der Quellen überall völlig feststehende Resultate zu gewinnen.” Contrary to 275-6, the senatorial command in 45.25 that Rhodes abandon Lycia and Caria need not conflict with 44.14, in which the senate declares those territories free, for the Rhodians may not have readily complied. Nissen 16, 277, however describes Livy 45.31 as a sort of epitome of Pol. 30.10, which is a gross simplification. Täubler, Livius, 134 uses this passage as an example of a Roman fault which Livy does not hide.
charges Masinissa brought against Carthage, discussed below. This scenario admits a subtle admission that the Romans did wrong in their foreign policy, for they were deceived, or perhaps complicit in their own flattery. One of the greatest problems thus came from outside: at the same time the Romans were despairing of obtaining fides from their friends and allies, they would have begun to learn that much of what loyalty they did gain, was insincere.

Nor would the Romans have much reason to be pleased with Macedon over the next two decades. After the war they divided this kingdom into easily manageable units which could not unite or gain enough power to disrupt the broader region. They also placed severe restrictions on the Macedonians, forbidding marriage and trade between citizens of these four new republics. In other respects it appears lenient in the lack of punishment for those outside of the court and the reduction of taxes. Livy describes Paulus’ law-giving as the sort “not given to defeated enemies, but to well-deserving allies,” non hostibus victis, sed sociis bene meritis. Livy makes the senate’s appear more concerned with the stability of Macedon and Illyria than profit.

First of all it was decided that the Macedonians and Illyrians be free so that it would be apparent to all nations that Roman arms did not bring slavery upon the free, but liberty for the enslaved, and that free peoples know their freedom was safe in perpetuity under the protection of the Roman people, and that those who lived under kings would believe that those kings were now more just and mild because of respect for Rome, and if ever were a war between Rome and their kings, that its end would bring the Romans victory, and them their freedom.

(Livy 45.18.1-2)

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106 Diodorus 30.8, however, marvels excessively at the generosity of the Roman senate towards the Greeks even while Perseus enjoyed much support.

107 Livy 45.32.7.

108 Livy 45.18.3-8 gives their reasoning for closing the highly lucrative Macedonian silver mines as avoiding the civil strife engendered by the possibility of such profits, and the halving of their taxes. The plundering and destruction of seventy Macedonian cities comes after the description of the settlement in Livy 45.34.1-6 and Pol. 30.15.

109 Livy 45.18.1-2: Omnia primum liberos esse placebat macedonas atque Illyrios, ut omnibus gentibus appareret arma populi Romani non liberis servitutem, sed contra servientibus libertatem adferre, ut et in libertate gentes quae essent, tutam eam sibi perpetuamque sub tutela populi Romani esse, et quae sub regibus viverent, et in praeceans tempus mitiores eos iustioresque respecto populi Romani habere se crederent, et si quando bellum cum populo Romano regibus fuisset suis, exitum eius victiam Romanis allaturum, sibi libertatem.
Despite these elaborate precautions, stability was not to be had. The Macedonians, unaccustomed to self rule, fell to quarreling\textsuperscript{110} and then rallied behind the Italian fuller Andricus, the so-called “false Philip,” who claimed to be the deceased son of Perseus and, invading from Thrace, rallied Macedon to his cause around 149 BCE.\textsuperscript{111}

The frustration and confusion engendered amongst the Romans by the disappointing results of their policy in the Greek world and, at least as it appeared to them, the maddening irrationality of their opponents, is encapsulated by the questions Aemilius Paulus asked Perseus after his capture.

The first question was what injury had compelled him to undertake a war against the Roman people with such hostility and why he brought himself and his kingdom into mortal danger. When, with all expecting a response, Perseus merely stared at the ground and wept, the consul asked “If you had acquired your kingdom as a young man, I would be less amazed at your not comprehending how great the Roman people is, either as a friend or as an enemy. But now, since you experienced the war your father waged against us and could recall the subsequent peace, which we kept with him with the utmost good faith, could you not recall ... what counsel [led you] to prefer war with those whose strength in war and good faith in peace you had experienced, to peace?”\textsuperscript{112} (Livy 45.8.1-4)

According to Livy, Perseus had nothing to say.

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{110} Pol. 31.2.12.
\footnotesize\textsuperscript{111} Pol. 36.10 sees the duping of the Macedonians as part of the degeneration and illogical behavior characteristic of this period. Appian only gives the briefest of mentions, with a chronological note in \textit{Punica} 135. Diodorus 31.40a gives an account of Andricus’ origin and arrest at Demetrius’ hands. See Diodorus 32.15, 9a, 9b for his escape and ascendance.
\footnotesize\textsuperscript{112} Livy 45.8.1-4: \textit{Prima percontatio fuit qua subactus iniuria contra populum Romanum bellum tam infesto animo suscepisset, quo se regnumque suum ad ultimum discrimen adduceret. Cum responsum expectantibus cunctis terram intuens diu tacitus fleret, rursus consul ‘si iuvenis regnum accepiisses, minus equidem mirarer ignorasse te quam gravis aut amicus aut inimicus esset populus Romanus; nunc vero, cum et bello patris tui quod nobiscum gessit interfuissest, et pacis postea, quam cum summa fide adversus eum coluimus, meminisses (...) consilium quorum et vim in bello et fide in pace expertus esses, cum iis tibi bellum esse quam pacem malle.}
Epilogue

Carthage and Corinth to 146 BCE

We have seen that the Romans’ historiographical tradition consistently presents their adherence to a higher ethical standard in foreign policy as integral to their national identity. Rather than an anachronistic dichotomy between offensive and defensive justifications for wars, the Roman standard was based primarily on the maintenance of reciprocal bonds of *fides*. This means that the Romans believed they treated their allies and conquered peoples relatively well and, in return for beneficence and protection, they expected loyalty and deferential obedience to Roman commands. This emphasis on *fides* also means that the Romans stressed their extreme reluctance to terminate a relationship with another state on their own initiative, often leading to their punctiliously following diplomatic forms until the other party was forced to break *fides*. Crucial to Livy and reflected through much of Polybius, this was the Romans’ self-presentation, not reality. Thus, these historians’ accounts display a clear pattern of distortion which works justify Roman acts in terms of Roman ideals. We see that the typical Roman *casus belli* focuses not on self-defense, but the defense of allies, supplemented whenever possible by a catalog of treaty violations, even when these considerations prove peripheral to the actual course, and thus objectives, of the war. When the Romans do appear to have clearly broken an agreement or *fides* out of self-interest, as in the decision to accept Capua’s *deditio* or aid the Mamertines, Roman accounts privilege their deliberations over the ethics of the eventual decision. This has the effect of making the Romans appear exceptionally concerned with propriety. Finally, the Roman
tradition persistently characterizes its enemies as naturally perfidious and irreducibly hostile to Rome, obviating the need for a clearly defined justification for going to war. When some Roman action cannot be creditably excused, Livy then works to pin the blame on a single individual or group and isolate the incident from his readers’ impression of Roman character. There is, therefore, a much greater internal consistency to Roman accounts of their own imperialism, than has previous been recognized.

It would, however, be impossible to end a study of Roman attitudes toward imperialism without some discussion of how the Roman tradition attempted to palliate two of Rome’s imperious acts, the destruction of Carthage and Corinth. Since our text of Livy breaks off after the increasingly lacunose Book 45, our sources are the Periochae, those less-than-ideal epitomies of Livy, Plutarch, Appian, Diodorus, and scraps of Polybius. The latter two authors lean heavily, but not exclusively, on Polybius, and often offer different commentary on events. Diodorus, as we saw in the passage with which I began this study, thought that the Romans conquered with kindness but, once their power was established, turned to intimidation to secure it. In a more detailed exposition of this view, he lists the removal of Perseus and the obliteraton of Carthage and Corinth as their decisive acts of terror.\(^1\) Polybius, present at the destruction of Carthage, lauds his patron Scipio, leaving a large encomiastic footprint in the record of this campaign throughout our sources. We must also recognize that Polybius was an extremely interested party in the Achaean War, the aftermath of which he helped manage. These difficult and far from unimpeachable sources still allow us to reconstruct some semblance of the Roman attitude towards these events.

Our fullest and only true continuous account of the Third Punic War comes from Appian, although its seed, the continued exploitation of Roman ill-will towards Carthage by Masinissa,

\(^1\) Diodorus 32.4.4-5.
lies in the background of the extant books of Livy. Throughout, we see that although the Romans allowed Masinissa to expand at the expense of Carthage, Livy strives to present the Romans as fair brokers, countering the sense that Carthage was being treated unfairly by offering unrebutted accounts of the various accusations made against them. In 182 BCE Masinissa argued before the senate for possession of lands from which he had expelled the Carthaginians, and Livy has the king broach the idea that the Romans might favor Carthage in order to not appear prejudicially favorable to their friends.² Nothing was decided, but not much later Livy reports that the Romans returned one hundred hostages to Carthage and prevented Carthage from taking any action against Masinissa, who continued to occupy the disputed territories.³ In 174 BCE, Masinissa had informed against Carthage, where there had allegedly been a secret nocturnal meeting of the senate with Perseus’ ambassadors.⁴ Then in 172 BCE, when the Carthaginians begged Rome for either the right to defend themselves against Masinissa, or at least a clarification of their status and what territories were rightfully theirs, the Romans strike a tone of impartiality in sending for representatives of the king to answer the complaints despite having the king’s son Gulussa on hand. Likewise, in 171 BCE, Gulussa came to Rome with the false warning that the Carthaginians were preparing a fleet against Rome, but both Numidia and Carthage provided grain for the war against Perseus.⁵ Then in 168 BCE, amidst effulgent well-wishing, the Numidian prince Masgaba seems to have made some request that the senate alter their hostage arrangements with Carthage, but a lacuna makes it difficult to say more.⁶

² Livy 40.17.1-6.
³ Livy 40.34.14.
⁴ Livy 41.22.1-3.
⁵ Livy 43.3.5-7; 43.6.11-14.
⁶ Livy 45.13.5. The editio Frobiana of 1531 and other editors have supplied various senatorial statements declaring it unseemly for the Romans to take orders from Numidia concerning Carthage, but with no good source for this Briscoe has rightly removed these supplements in his edition. See Briscoe, Commentary vol. 2, 378.
On the whole, Livy’s version of these events omits the results, or the lack thereof, and thus hides how prejudicial Roman non-action, in combination with the injunction against going to war without Roman permission, was to Carthage. Especially in Masinissa’s comment that the Romans might harm their allies by striving to be too fair, a highly effective flattery which Livy seem to not have recognized as such, we see that the Romans still clung to the same ideals. Masinissa’s skillful exploitation of Roman self-perception also implies that this was the image the Romans attempted to project in their dealings with other states. Even when their actions were driven by rancor and power politics, it seems that the Romans still clothed them in the language of impartiality and justice. The picture of Roman policy find in Appian is quite the opposite.

Appian alleges that Roman legates sent to settle disputes between Carthage and Masinissa were secretly instructed to rule in favor of the Numidian king. In the dispute of 174 BCE concerning the territory of the μεγάλα πεδία, which Masinissa had occupied, Appian explicitly states that the Romans “promised to send envoys to settle the matter, but waited until they thought that much of the Carthaginians’ interests had been undone.” 7 Appian quickly moves from this affair to Cato the Elder’s visit to Carthage, during which the city’s prosperity so impressed him that he began to asseverate at Rome that “the Romans’ freedom would never be secure until they destroyed Carthage. The senate believed this and decided on war but, as it lacked any pretext, kept its decision secret.” 8 This claim of the most cynical form of statecraft is borne out by the single-minded determination with which the Romans pursued Carthage’s destruction after embarking upon the war. When the Carthaginians engaged in a purely defensive campaign against Masinissa, who had invaded after the expulsion of some of his partisans at

7 Appian, Pun. 302-305 corresponds to Livy 33.47, where the main object appears to be Hannibal; Appian 306-10 reproduces the same instructions for the mission of 182 BCE in Livy 40.17;
8 Appian Pun. 314: καὶ ὁ Κάτων μάλιστα ἔλεγεν οὐδὲ ἡ Ῥωμαίως βέβαιον οὖν αὐτῷ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἔσεσθαι, πρὶν ἐξελεύσῃς Καρχηδόνα. ἧν ἡ βουλή συνθανομένη ἔκρινε μὲν πολέμειν, ἔτι δὲ ἐχρημάτες προφάσεων, καὶ τὴν κρίσιν ὑπόρρητον εἶχον.
Carthage, the Romans found their pretext. It is tempting to believe that Appian largely follows Polybius in this account.

The brief version given by the Periochae is, of course, quite different. In Book 47 Livy apparently reported that Roman legates found that the Carthaginians had a large supply of ship timber. This implied a breach of the treaty, which forbade the construction of a navy. Then in Book 48 Livy dealt with the run-up and outbreak of the war itself:

When a huge army of Numidians under Arcobarzanes, the grandson of Syphax, was reported in Carthaginian territory, M. Porcius Cato argued for war on the Carthaginians on the grounds that they had recruited an army in their lands, seemingly against Syphax, but actually against Rome. Since P. Cornelius [Scipio] Nasica opposed this, it was decided to send legates to Carthage who would gather information and conduct diplomacy. They upbraided the Carthaginian senate for having an army and naval material in violation of the treaty and wanted to make peace between Carthage and Masinissa, since he was withdrawing from the disputed territory. But Gisco, son of Hamilcar, a trouble-maker who then held office, said that their senate would not obey the legates and roused the people by urging war against the Romans that only flight saved the legates from being harmed.9 (Periochae 48)

In the same book Gulussa then appears, reporting that Carthage was building a fleet, yet Nasica again prevailed against war and decemvirs were sent to investigate the situation. These men then returned, confirming Carthaginian preparations for war, yet Nasica won the day again: the Romans would refrain from war should Carthage destroy its armament. If they did not, the question would be referred to the next consuls. Then the epitomator tells us that the Carthaginians, in violation of the treaty, attacked Masinissa and thus earned, meruerunt, the war with Rome. The war’s beginning then fell in Livy 49, which listed the construction of a fleet, war

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9 Livy Periochae 48: Cum in finibus Carthaginiensium ingens Numidarum exercitus duce Arcobarzane Syphacis nepote diceretur esse, M. Porcius Cato suasit, ut Carthaginiensibus, qui exercitum specie contra Masinissam, re contra Romanos accitum in finibus haberent, bellum indiceretur. Contra dicente P. Cornelio Nasica placuit legatos mitti Carthaginem, qui specularentur quid ageretur. Castigato senatu Carthaginiensium, quod contra foedus et exercitum et navales materias haberent, pacem inter eos et Masinissam facere voluerunt, Masinissa agro, de quo lis erat, cedente. Sed Gisco Hamilcaris filius, homo seditiosus, qui tum in magistratu erat, cum senatus pariturum se iudicio legatis dixisset, ita populum concitavit bellum adversus Romanos suadendo, ut legatos quo minus violarentur fuga expliceruit.
carried beyond their own territory, the attack on Masinissa, and the refusal to admit Masinissa’s son Gulussa to the city while he accompanied Roman legates. While Appian describes the Carthaginians’ fearful state and their vain attempt to appease the Romans, who would only cryptically answer that the Carthaginians knew what they needed to do, the epitomator records nothing of the sort, making the Carthaginians appear to be the party rushing headlong to war.

Just as with questionable Roman decisions from the repudiation of the Caudine Peace onward, the focus is on the process of deliberation at Rome. Nasica, the stalwart opponent of war, is just as much or more prominent than Cato and the Romans repeatedly attempt to avoid war in spite of numerous threatening reports. While the epitomator’s omissions are no basis for an argument about the details of Livy, it is reasonable to suppose that his summary at least captures the main thread and its tone, and such a supposition is supported by the repetition of the same pattern of Roman behavior seen throughout this study. Plutarch’s life of Cato also indicates that the debate at Rome centered not on the justice of action against Carthage, but the moral effect on Rome, although much of this tradition may be retrospective.10 The fact that Livy’s preface omits the Sallustian idea of *metus hostilis*, the argument made by Nasica that Roman morals were preserved in part by the threat Carthage posed, it is likely that Livy did not regard the Third Punic War as a great turning point in Roman policy. What interested Livy here was Rome’s domestic politics and the opposition of two great men with dramatically different philosophies. The impression the *Periochae* give is, therefore, that Livy treated the debate between Cato the Elder and Scipio Nasica much as that between Fabius Maximus and Scipio Africanus during the Second Punic War. Whether action against Carthage was ethical seems not to have come into question.

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The *Periochae* are less clear on Livy’s tone towards the Carthaginian attempt to preemptively surrender. Since this had been anticipated by Utica’s surrender to Rome, which itself followed the vote for war, the senate, particularly influenced by Cato, judged that the Romans should not be deterred from their course. The epitomator only briefly describes how the consuls crossed into Africa, accepted Carthaginian hostages and all their weaponry, and then demanded that the Carthaginians abandon their city. “The indignity of the demand compelled the Carthaginians to fight.”\textsuperscript{11} The Oxyrhyncus summary of Book 49, after mentioning Utica’s ready assistance to the Roman army, briefly states that the Carthaginians surrendered but did not obey Roman commands. In Appian, these proceedings, especially taking hostages, are described as the pinnacle of perfidy, and it is difficult to guess how Livy treated this. It is tempting to imagine that he showed the declaration of the war as a just response to Carthaginian breaches of the treaty, but took some issue with Catonian severity and the double-dealing of the consuls. This may have been the sort of distinction he made between legitimating the *casus belli* of the Third Macedonian War and his disapproval of Philippus’ conduct. Once the war begins, all of our sources concentrate as much on Scipio, his nobility and remarkable competence, as on the war itself. The summaries of Book 51, which included the sack of the city, are much briefer, merely mentioning the torture of Roman prisoners conducted by Hasdrubal as if it were the policy of the whole city and the noble resolution, in contrast to his own, of Hasdrubal’s wife.

Very little Polybius survives on this war, but one passage, 36.9, offers four different Greek views on the destruction of Carthage. The first is that the Romans acted prudently in disposing of a rival, while the second saw the Romans’ harsh treatment of Carthage as an

\textsuperscript{11} Livy *Periochae* 49: *Qui ubi in Africam transierunt, acceptis quos imperaverant trecentis obsidibus et armis omnibus instrumentisque belli, si qua Carthagine erant, cum ex auctoritate patrum iuberent, ut in alio loco dum a mari decem milia passuum ne minus remoto, oppidum facerent, indignitate rei ad bellandum Carthaginenses compulerunt.*
indication of deterioration and lust for power. The third acknowledges the general Roman concern for justice but accused them of deviating from it in this one case. The fourth took a legalistic view that vindicated the Romans because the Carthaginians had given themselves totally into their power and thus should have been prepared to obey their commands. This directly parallels a short speech of a certain Mago, whom Polybius praised for pointing out to the Carthaginians that they had to either resist to the last or undergo total surrender; their failure to understand their situation and react sensibly fits into the broader Polybian concern over irrational political behavior. Yet the other positions have parallels as well elsewhere in the text, and it is most sensible to see some part of Polybius’ judgment in each, and it is no serious objection that combining these judgments puts breaches of faith, παρασπονδήματα, on both sides. We should remember as well that the author depended on Roman patronage and thus could not express an openly anti-Roman view. Spreading these sentiments over a nameless multitude allowed him to safely offer a critique of Roman practice, yet it would have made little sense had he not mentioned Roman misdeeds. This critique starts from the assumption that the Romans do, or did, tend to operate justly, which further removes its sting, but one must suspect that this narrative, which was a significant source for Appian, would not match with the Livian version as described by the Periochae. More significant, therefore, than which of these views most closely reflects Polybius’ own, is that they demonstrate that Roman self-presentation abroad continued, even during the Third Punic War, to hinge upon the idea that the Romans were characteristically concerned with justice.

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12 This seems an analog of the Aetolian deditio in 191 BCE, Pol. 20.9-10.
13 See Walbank, Commentary vol. 3, 663-8 for a detailed discussion of the correspondences between these various opinions and ideas expressed elsewhere in Polybius. Champion, Cultural Politics, 163-6 highlights the implicit Polybian criticism of Rome and how the ἀσέβεια and παρασπονδήματα, characteristically barbarian traits, reinforce the narrative of moral degeneration. This is especially evident when combined with the commentary of 31.25 on the rarity of the sort of antique virtue demonstrated by Scipio in contemporary Rome.
At the same time as Carthage was being besieged and Andiscus, “the false Philip,” defeated, a great tumult rose in Achaea. Eckstein explains in detail how Polybius saw the Achaeans revolting as the result of demagoguery and almost a sort of madness overtaking Greece. Polybius directly attributed the disaster to the Greeks’ own ἀβουλία, ἀνανδρία, and ἀπιστία. 14 The latter, particularly because the Romans saw themselves as the saviors of Greece, was surely one of the Romans’ most significant complaints. Polybius walks a fine line between blame and pity, castigating the demagogues and blaming the people for mistakenly following them, thus establishing two tiers of moral fault in a way that justifies leniency towards the Achaeans as a whole while tying in to the anti-populist narrative which the Romans themselves used to interpret resistance to their rule and rebellion. He also explicitly addresses his own involvement and the difference between writing history, in which objectivity is most useful, and statesmanship, in which he was compelled to put the best face possible on Achaeans actions. 15 As with the Third Punic War, his discussion of Roman behavior was bound to have been much more constrained by political necessity, especially because Polybius did gain concessions from the Roman commander, Mummius. We can see something of how the Romans wished to present themselves in a fragment of Polybius describing Mummius’ victory tour in which he visited, amongst other places, Delphi and Olympia, and received thanks: “It was seemly that he was honored publicly and privately, for he behaved with spotless moderation and used clemency in everything, even though he had a great opportunity and power over the Greeks.” 16

14 Pol. 38.3.7-13. Eckstein, Moral Vision, 266-71. Burton, Friendship, 346-50, sees the break with Rome as the result of Achaea striving for greater parity within the framework of amicitia, but the hostility and resentment among some Greeks makes “friendship” seem not the best category except in so far as it was a quasi-formal political status. 15 Pol. 38.4; Walbank, Commentary vol. 3, 685-90. 16 Pol. 39.6.3: εἰκότως δὲ τιμᾶσθαι συνέβαινεν αὐτὸν καὶ κοινῇ καὶ κατ’ ἰδίαν· καὶ γὰρ ἐγκρατῶς καὶ καθαρῶς ἀνεστράφη καὶ πρᾴως ἐχρήσατο τοῖς ὅλοις πράγμασι, μέγαν καὶ μεγάλην ἔξουσίαν.”
In Latin, our sources are even less satisfactory than for the Third Punic War. The Oxyrhyncus summary says nothing here, but the Periocha for Book 51 has

There seeds of the Achaean War are recorded: that the Roman legates, who had been sent to detach those cities which had been in Philip’s power from the Achaean League, were attacked by the Achaeans and driven from Corinth.\(^{17}\)

After mentioning the battle at Thermopylae against the Achaean, Boeotians, and Chalcidians, the suicide of the Achaean leader Critolaus, and the accession of the demagogue Diaeus, the Periochae for 52 describes the result of the war thus:

> [Mummius] accepted all Achaea in deditio and demolished Corinth according to the decree of the senate, since it was there that the Roman legates had been outraged. Thebes and Chalcis, which had also helped, were destroyed. Lucius Mummius himself acted the part of a most temperate man and took nothing from the artworks and adornments of Corinth, which wealthy Corinth had in abundance, for his own home.\(^{18}\)

Rather than the brutish philistine, Livy seems to have portrayed Mummius, like Scipio, as another estimable moral exemplar who resisted Rome’s slide into luxurious decadence. While much artwork was taken, his own personal behavior dissociates him from blame in the matter.

These summaries highlight that the Romans justified this war in terms of wrongs done to envoys and violation of treaties. Despite the fact that the extreme asymmetry of power meant that little threat could accrue from Achaea, these categories of complaint continued to carry great moral force at Rome.

Particularly in the case of Carthage, as with Perseus, the Latin tradition seems to have gone to great lengths to paint the Romans as restrained and driven to war by the unremitting hostility of Carthage, even when events themselves testify to the Romans’ own bellicose

\(^{17}\) Livy Periochae 51: Belli Achaici semina referuntur haec, quod legati Romani ab Achaicis pulsati sint Corinthi, missi ut eas civitates quae sub dicione Philippi fuerant ab Achaico concilio secererent.

\(^{18}\) Livy Periochae 52: Qui omni Achaia in deditionem accepta Corinthon ex senatus consulto diruit, quia ibi legati Romani violati erant. Thebae quoque et Chalcis, quae auxilia fuerant, diruitae. Ipse L. Mummius abstinentissimum virum egit, nec quicquam ex his operibus ornamentisque, quae praedives Corinthos habuit, in domum eius pervenit.
intentions. The continuity is striking even where only traces of the Romans’ own historiography remain, but so is the different reaction it provokes. There is something unsettling in reading about the destruction of Carthage and Corinth even if one accepts the Roman complaints, and I would argue that this is a result of the Romans’ traditionalism butting up against issues of proportionality. Unlike previous antagonists, these cities could not pose a credible threat to Rome, and so war and the punishments appear ill-suited, even though to Romans like Livy the moral fault was paramount.

Thus in 146 BCE when, as Diodorus would have it, the Romans secured their empire with decisive acts of terror, we find that the Romans themselves seemed to believe that they were acting much as they had when Rome was one small polis beset on all sides by peoples lusting after its destruction. The Romans of the middle Republic prided themselves on making warfare openly and without deceit, demonstrating their *fides* in reliability to both allies and enemies alike. With this virtue they earned the loyalty of their subjects and allies, legitimating their rule with a modicum of consent and by offering better treatment to smaller states in need of a protector. Roman *fides* thus established reciprocal obligations which the Romans were punctilious in meeting. *Fides* was also the primary obstacle to going to war, and we find that the Romans were consistently reticent not to go offensive, as proponents of defensive imperialism would have it, but to sunder their relationship with another state. This often led to situations, as with the war against Antiochus, where the Romans would prepare for the inevitable conflict but wait until their chosen enemy furnished a suitable pretext. The proliferation of complaints of broken treaties and abused allies that surround nearly every Roman war demonstrate the significance of such pretexts even when the Romans did act in bad faith. This deep concern for the justice of their wars, especially when this justice was an illusion, made a deep impression on
Roman discourse and historiography. Thus, in Livy and through Polybius, we find a consistent and coherent set of ethics which, as Romans of the Republic believed, defined their foreign policy from their city’s foundation to its present.
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